

www.forgottenbooks.com

Copyright © 2016 FB &c Ltd.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

BY

DAVID G. RITCHIE, M.A., LL.D.

SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
AUTHOR OF "NATURAL RIGHTS," ETC.

EDITED, WITH A MEMOIR, BY

ROBERT LATTA, M.A., D.PHIL.

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

8v 3 00
13/9/1

London
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1905

All rights reserved

GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD.

PREFACE

In 1902 Professor Ritchie reprinted, under the title *Studies in Political and Social Ethics*, a number of essays in which he discussed "practical questions of political and social ethics on the basis of what may be called evolutionary utilitarianism, without raising, or at least without discussing, metaphysical questions." The present volume, on the other hand, consists of papers which are essentially philosophical, although they include incidentally many practical applications. Three of these papers are reprinted from the *Philosophical Review* and *Mind*, while the remaining three have been selected and arranged by me from Professor Ritchie's manuscripts. The *Cogitatio Metaphysica* is a general statement of his views on all the main questions of philosophy and religion. He had several times begun this and made some progress with it, only to leave it aside and begin again, and at his death it remained incomplete. Sections 1 to 21 inclusive, part of section 22, sections 23, 25 and 26, part of section 27, sections 28 and 29 and part of section 30 form the completed portion of the last draft. Following indications in Professor Ritchie's notes, I have completed section 22 from a review of Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and I have also expanded some of the other sections from various notes. The remainder (from section 31 onwards) I have compiled from notes in a manuscript

volume, which contained a complete outline, with headings, of the *Cogitatio*. The main parts of the *Confessio Fidei* and the "Moral Philosophy" were included, under these titles, in manuscript volumes; but I have freely rearranged these, divided them into sections, expanded them from other notes and occasionally added connecting or explanatory sentences, which are indicated by square brackets. I have also revised the references throughout and added others.

As Professor Ritchie's published works are concerned mainly with ethics and politics, it seemed to me that this posthumous volume should represent, as adequately as is now possible, the philosophical position that underlies his practical doctrine. I have therefore devoted the greater part of the Memoir to a connected exposition of his views in philosophy, and my aim has been, by full quotations from the notebooks, letters and other manuscripts which Mrs. Ritchie has kindly entrusted to me, to express his ideas as far as possible in his own words. As he wrote on these high subjects in a fresh and untechnical style, I hope that many readers, who know only his political and ethical writings, may find these studies illuminating and suggestive.

My thanks are due to the editors of the *Philosophical Review* for their kind permission to reprint the articles on "the relation of logic to psychology" and "the relation of metaphysics to epistemology," to the editor of *Mind* for kindly allowing the republication of the article on "the One and the Many," and to Mrs. Ritchie for much valuable help in the preparation of the Memoir and the Index.

R. L.

GLASGOW, *April*, 1905.

CONTENTS

PAGE

MEMOIR

I. Biographical, - - - - - - - 1
II. Philosophical, - - - - - - - 18

COGITATIO METAPHYSICA

What is Philosophy? §§ 1-5, - - - - - 66
Logic, §§ 6-13, - - - - - - - 70
Metaphysics, §§ 14-21, - - - - - - 84
Psycho-Physical Parallelism, §§ 22-23, - - - - 95
Morality, Society, etc., §§ 24-26, - - - - 110
Religion, Art, etc., §§ 27-44, - - - - - 117

THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY, 134

THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO EPISTEMOLOGY, - - - - - - - 172

THE ONE AND THE MANY, - - - - - 192
I. The Logical Problem, - - - - - 194
II. The Metaphysical Problem, - - - - 207
III. The Theological and Ethical Problem, 218

PAGE

CONFESSIO FIDEI

§ 1. The Nature of God and the Problem of Scepticism, 230
§ 2. Essential Conditions of Knowledge, - - 231
§ 3. Science and the Uniformity of Nature, 233
§ 4. Statement of these Ideas in Terms of Theology, 234
§ 5. Knowledge of Our Imperfection Implies an Ideal, 235
§ 6. The End of Conduct, - - - - - 237
§ 7. Free Will, - - - - - - - 238
§ 8. Immortality, - - - - - - - 238
§ 9. God, Freedom, Immortality—Objections, 239
§ 10. Free-Will and Predestination. - - - - 242
§ 11. Reason or Will, - - - - - - 244
§ 12. The Wants of Our Nature, - - - - 244
§ 13. Isolation of the Individual, - - - - 245
§ 14. Personality, - - - - - - - 247
§ 15. The Universal and the Individual Self, 250
§ 16. Religion, - - - - - - - - 251
§ 17. Evolutionary Fatalism, - - - - - 252
§ 18. Society and the State, - - - - - 255
§ 19. Dialectic of Conduct: Conflict of Duties, 257
§ 20. Position of the Social Reformer, - 260
§ 21. The Significance of Martyrdom, - - 261

MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ON THE METHOD AND SCOPE OF ETHICS—

§ 1. Moral Philosophy and Science, - - - - 264
§ 2. Moral Philosophy and Psychology, - 272
§ 3. The Unity of Self-Consciousness in Relation to Moral Philosophy, - - - - - - 274
§ 4. Personality and Society—The Historical Method, - 280
§ 5. Scheme of a System of Ethics, - - - - 282

PAGE

§ 6. (A) Ethics a Philosophical Science—Difference between Philosophy and Science, 283

§ 6. (B) The Ethical End, - - - - - 292

§ 6. (C) Free-Will, - - - - - - - 302

§ 7. Ethics and Religion, - - - - - - 310

§ 8. The Relation of Religion to Ethics and Morality, 312

§ 9. Christianity and Morality, - - - - - 313

§ 10. Society and its Institutions, - - - - 317

§ 11. The Common Good in Relation to Conduct, 321

§ 12. Custom and Moral Progress, - - - - 326

§ 13. Morality and Nature, - - - - - 332

§ 14. Equality, - - - - - - - - 335

§ 15. Means and End, - - - - - - 340

§ 16. Morals and Politics, - - - - - - 341

INDEX, - - - - - - - - - - 345



As an undergraduate at Oxford.

I.

[illegible] seldom rich in
[illegible]; and accor[illegible] in this Memoir
[illegible] so much to [illegible] describe a
[illegible]ly, indicating [illegible] of thought
and life.

David George Ritchie was [illegible] at [illegible]burgh in
1853. His father, the Rev[illegible] Ritchie, D.D.,
who was minister of the [illegible] of scholar-
ship and culture, in high [illegible] Church of
Scotland, of whose General [illegible] Moderator in 1870. Through the [illegible] Minto, the family was connected w[illegible] and in 1889 Ritchie edited a volume [illegible] of June *Welsh Carlyle*. He also pub[illegible] Scottish *Review* an interesting article on [illegible] in 1826," founded on the record of a tour [illegible] by [illegible] Aitken, who met Hegel at Berlin, as wel[illegible] chleiermacher, Neander, and other men of note. [illegible] grandfather, Dr. William Ritchie, was Professo[illegible] Divinity at Edinburgh University. Another relati[illegible] Professor David Ritchie, Hamilton's predecesso[illegible] Chair of Logic at Edinburgh University, whose [illegible]rts, however, lay rather in the direction of outd[illegible]e and of such sports as curling than in the [illegible] of According to Professor Campbell Fraser,

Biographia Philosophica, p. 46

A



MEMOIR

I. BIOGRAPHICAL

THE life of a scholar and thinker is seldom rich in incident; and accordingly my purpose in this Memoir is not so much to record events as to describe a personality, indicating opinions and ways of thought and life.

David George Ritchie was born at Jedburgh in 1853. His father, the Rev. George Ritchie, D.D., who was minister of the parish, was a man of scholarship and culture, in high repute in the Church of Scotland, of whose General Assembly he was Moderator in 1870. Through the Rev. Dr. Aitken, of Minto, the family was connected with the Carlyles, and in 1889 Ritchie edited a volume of *Early Letters of Jane Welsh Carlyle*. He also published in the *Scottish Review* an interesting article on "Germany in 1826," founded on the record of a tour made by Dr. Aitken, who met Hegel at Berlin, as well as Schleiermacher, Neander, and other men of note. His granduncle, Dr. William Ritchie, was Professor of Divinity at Edinburgh University. Another relative was Professor David Ritchie, Hamilton's predecessor in the Chair of Logic at Edinburgh University, whose interests, however, lay rather in the direction of outdoor life and of such sports as curling than in the study of philosophy. According to Professor Campbell Fraser,[1]

[1] *Biographia Philosophica*, p. 46

who was a pupil of his in the last of his twenty-eight years of professorship, he treated his class "more as an appendage to his ministerial charge than as the professor's supreme interest, after a fashion not uncommon in philosophical professorships in Scotland about that time." Ritchie used to tell how his father, on his appointment to Jedburgh, asked his uncle for advice in performing the duties of his new charge. "Advice!" said the Professor, "if you are a wise man, you don't need it, and if you are a fool you won't take it." And thereupon he began to discuss the best kind of flies for fishing the Border streams.

Ritchie received his early schooling at Jedburgh Academy. He had two sisters, but no brother, and he was not allowed to make friends of the town boys. Consequently he lived an unboyish life, which had profound effects in later years. He never throughout his life learned to play games of any sort, and in these early days his chief recreation was solitary fishing. Much mental work and insufficient exercise tended to increase a constitutional nervousness, and, as he had no healthy natural outlet for his young energy, his mind became too early concentrated on purely intellectual subjects. This early experience bred in him a longing for sympathetic companionship and a keen sense of loneliness, which he expresses vividly in his most intimate writings.[1]

When his school days were over he matriculated at Edinburgh University. His bent was towards classical study, and he worked hard at Latin and Greek under Professors Sellar and Blackie, for both of whom he had a lasting regard. Blackie, as is well known, was eccentric and unsystematic in his teaching; but Ritchie found him original and stimulating and learned a great deal from him. He used to tell of his surprise at finding, when he went to

[1] Cf. pp. 245 *sqq.*, 249, 276.

Oxford, that his Greek prose was approved while in his Latin prose he was deficient. But in addition to what he obtained from Blackie, he probably owed much to the tuition of William Veitch who, as a private tutor, taught most of the abler students at Edinburgh during many years and whose *Irregular Greek Verbs* was a famous text-book. At Edinburgh also Ritchie was introduced to philosophy by Professor Campbell Fraser, in whose class and in that of Professor Calderwood he gained the highest prizes, and his interest in the subject led him to join the students' Philosophical Society, where he discussed philosophical problems with the men of his own years. In one of his summers at Edinburgh he attended the class of botany, which was not required for the degree, and he thus formed an interest in natural science, which was useful, not merely as an outdoor hobby, but also as a preparation for further reading and thinking on biological problems, which bore fruit in his ethical and political theories.

In later years, when he had returned to Scotland as a professor and when the endless questions of University reform were under discussion, he spoke often of the merits and demerits of the Scottish University system as compared with that of Oxford and Cambridge. He believed strongly in the Scottish lectures to large classes, as giving stimulus both to teachers and to taught, and especially as evoking interest and responsiveness in the students. But he regretted the absence in Scotland of sufficient guidance for the students' reading and (in the large Universities) of personal intercourse between student and teacher. What he most strongly condemned was the system of class prizes and honours, awarded as the result of competition in essays and examinations. In this he saw a double evil, hindering the best educational results. On the one hand, it led to

bouts of over-study and cramming for this or the other class, alternating with periods of little else than note-taking, instead of moderate but regular study from day to day; and, on the other hand, it made it almost necessary for a professor to refrain from giving advice and help to individual students, lest they should get an unfair advantage in the class competitions. At St. Andrews he endeavoured to lessen these evils by excluding essays from the competition for prizes, and by forming small classes of students for discussion and tutorial work. But he always felt that this was merely a makeshift and that nothing less than the abolition of class prizes would have really satisfactory results.

After taking the Edinburgh degree of M.A. with First Class Honours in Classics, Ritchie went as an exhibitioner to Balliol College, Oxford, where he gained a First Class both in Moderations and in the Final "Greats" School. In 1878 he became a Fellow, and in 1881 a Tutor, of Jesus College. His work in connection with that College continued throughout his residence at Oxford, and from 1882 to 1886 he was also a Tutor at Balliol. In 1881 he married Miss Flora Lindsay Macdonell, who died in 1888, and he married again in 1889, his second wife being Miss Ellen S. Haycraft, who survives him along with a daughter of the first marriage and a son of the second.

The work of the "Greats" School at Oxford, in which Ritchie as undergraduate and as tutor was for so many years engaged, consisted then as now mainly in the application of classical scholarship to the study of ancient history and political theory and ancient philosophy, with continual reference to modern developments and the problems of our own day. The first condition of a right understanding of our institutions and ways of thinking and of a sane pro-

gress in politics and philosophy is the study of the growth of our civilisation, both on the side of practice and on that of thought, from its roots in ancient Greek life and speculation. Something like this was the dominant idea of Ritchie's work at Oxford; and history, politics and philosophy, conceived from this point of view, became the chief interests of his life. His keen and scrupulous scholarly instincts delivered him from the dangers of rapid and abstract theorising and they were saved from passing, on the other hand, into pedantry and scholasticism by his living interest in the social and speculative problems of our own time. In his early years at Oxford he came under two great and harmonious influences, those of T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee. Green's idealism had its roots in Hegel, to whom we owe the vitalising of the study of Greek philosophy and the broad conception of evolution which has led to the realising of the value of history in the study of modern thought and institutions. And Green's insistence on the duty of practical citizenship was in full harmony with the well-known work of Arnold Toynbee. Not that they and those who were influenced by them held the same views, either in politics or in philosophy; for they did not combine to institute a propaganda, but were united in virtue of common interests.

Of Green's influence upon Ritchie it would be impossible to speak adequately without a long philosophical exposition; but its nature may be inferred from their writings and from what will afterwards be said here regarding the governing ideas of Ritchie's thinking. His relations with Toynbee and with others of like mind are admirably described by Professor F. C. Montague, who has given me an interesting account of Ritchie and some of his friends in the early years of his life at Oxford. "Although," says Mr. Montague,

"I had been acquainted with Mr. Ritchie for some time before, I first became really intimate with him through the meetings of a little society of young men to which we both belonged and which had been formed by Arnold Toynbee in the summer of 1879. Toynbee was then full of enthusiasm for a renovation of modern politics inspired by belief in a religious and social ideal. He had chosen as members of the society several of his contemporaries who differed from him on many points or were even remote from him in habits of thought, but who would, he thought, understand his aims and enter into his aspirations. The original members besides Toynbee were A. Milner, P. L. Gell, J. D. Rogers, W. N. Bruce, Ritchie and myself, and we were joined some time later by E. T. Cook and B. R. Wise. Each of us took a department of public affairs for his province, and I remember that Milner took Foreign Relations and Ritchie Education. Our meetings were held sometimes in town, but oftenest in Oxford, and then in Ritchie's rooms at Jesus College. They were always very private and informal. Usually, but not always, somebody read a paper and then followed a conversation. The society lasted about three years, but expired as its members became more and more immersed in their own pursuits. I remember the strongly original cast of Ritchie's mind. He was instinctively a philosopher with a strong tendency to system. His habit of deducing political conclusions from first principles, his dislike of compromise, his remarkably pointed and clear expression struck me as rather French than English or even Scotch. Firmly as he held his own convictions, his gentle and sensitive nature ensured him from hurting those who might think otherwise. Indeed, others were prone to think that in the eagerness of discussion they might have grazed him, but he was far too earnest and unselfish ever to take offence.

Both in writing and in conversing he had a remarkable gift of fresh, lively and characteristic expression. We all felt that he had an original and stimulating mind, and we learnt much from him although we might not be able even to approach agreement. I need not dwell at length on the particular opinions which he expressed. They were substantially the same as those which he set forth in his later writings. He was a zealous democrat, although his mode of thought seemed to have little affinity with that of common men. He was a socialist, and had the strongest belief in State action wherever possible. He had, I think, an instinctive antipathy to the English way of regarding political questions. Nor had he, I think, much sympathy with Toynbee's peculiar temperament nor much tendency to approach modern politics from his spiritual standpoint. These discussions did not bring the members of the society nearer in belief, but they were full of interest and I look back upon them with a melancholy pleasure in which my recollection of Ritchie has a very large part." It need only be added that even at this more genial period of his life in Oxford Ritchie felt keenly the sense of intellectual loneliness and the longing for sympathy, to which reference has already been made, and that at a critical time his friendship with Arnold Toynbee saved him from a reckless indifference about himself and his future. In the interval between his graduation and the beginning of his teaching work he had difficulties about the choice of a profession. He had been brought up in the orthodox religion of his ancestral creed; but inevitably as his mind developed, orthodoxy became to him useless and untrue. Accordingly he felt it impossible to enter the clerical profession, for which he had originally been destined, and at the same time he shrank from causing a sharp disappointment to his family. Thus, although his father, with

whom he had the affectionate but reserved friendship which used to be common between fathers and sons, left him untrammelled in the choice of his life-work, he passed through a time of trying indecision. Attracted to the study of law by his interest in jurisprudence, constitutional history and political philosophy, he read for the English Bar; but he had no wish to practise as a barrister. The tutorship at Jesus College, however, solved his difficulties, and he adopted without hesitation the work of teaching.

As a teacher at Oxford his study and instruction lay mainly in the departments of logic, moral philosophy and political theory; but the comprehensive conception of evolutionary progress which was inherent in his idealist philosophical position led him to make a special study of the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories in biology, with the object of weighing and considering the use of biological notions in politics and philosophy. This was an interest which remained with him through life and which enabled him to make his most characteristic contributions to the thought of his time. It gave him a definite field of his own, in which the philosophical convictions he held in common with many of his teachers and contemporaries could find an original application and a distinctive expression. His characteristics as a teacher of political philosophy at Oxford are well described in a letter to Mrs. Ritchie from Professor W. J. Ashley of Birmingham, who recalls the impression which Ritchie's teaching and conversation made upon him, when he was a young graduate in Oxford. "The attraction which Ritchie's speculations in political philosophy exercised on those who were drawn to him was due to the same cause as the like influence of T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee—the complete fusion in him of the thinker and the citizen. Ritchie, absolutely free as he was from all sentimentality or gush, was yet

consumed by a passionate interest in the wellbeing of his fellowmen. He looked to political philosophy for practical guidance in his own conduct. The problem of 'the functions of the State' was no matter of academic casuistry to him; its solution determined his attitude to every contemporary political measure. The secret of his influence was that he cared intensely for the subject and never succumbed to that feeling of boredom which teachers in a University so often surrender to, or cultivate.

"But Ritchie—and this was another source of his power—was academic in an excellent sense. What ever might be his own leanings, he was always scrupulously careful to know exactly what the great masters of the world's thought, like Plato and Aristotle, Locke and Rousseau, had actually said, and to combine assent to or dissent from their meaning with an accurate knowledge of their text. I have often thought since, when confronted with the results of so-called 'sociological courses' in America and elsewhere, what an enormous service it was which Ritchie did to his pupils and friends when he insisted on a thorough first-hand acquaintance with the actual words of the great writers.

"The other point about Ritchie which occurs to me on looking back is that he was one of the very first among academic teachers to come to close quarters with modern biological or pseudo-biological theory in its relations to social ethics. Those who listened to him might conceivably continue to agree with Herbert Spencer's objections to State 'interference' on grounds of expediency; they could hardly continue to have any intellectual respect for the self-contradictory phraseology of 'organism' and the like in which he was fond of clothing them.

"The crude individualism which bases itself on 'the struggle for existence' could not be disposed of quite

so simply. It was indeed quite time that somebody who knew the best that the philosophers have said should deal very seriously with the current notions of the 'scientific' man in the street. Ritchie did so, I cannot but think, with a large measure of success—a success due to his own acquaintance with biological theory as set forth by its greatest exponent, Darwin, and his complete acceptance of it in its own field.

"These comments are sadly inadequate. Ritchie's teaching entered so deeply into the substance of my thought that I find it hard to disentangle his special influence. I am sure that I am not alone in that respect, and that his influence has been considerable and far-reaching. Not to speak of men in England and Scotland academically educated, the pirated edition of his *Darwinism and Politics* is every day giving men in remote parts of America a basis for their social faith."

In spite of the exacting duties of a tutorial post at Oxford, Ritchie found time to prepare the greater part of his published writings during his residence there. He contributed an essay on "The Rationality of History" to the volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, edited by Professor Andrew Seth and Mr. R. B. Haldane and published in 1883. Along with Professor R. Lodge and Mr. P. E. Matheson he translated Bluntschli's *Theory of the State*, and he also published *Darwinism and Politics* (1889), *Principles of State-Interference* (1891), and *Darwin and Hegel* (1893). He was a frequent contributor to various journals of philosophy, including *Mind*, *The Philosophical Review* and *The International Journal of Ethics*, and some of his articles were reprinted in the *Darwin and Hegel* volume. He also wrote papers for the Aristotelian Society, which were published in its *Proceedings*, and he contributed a number of articles to the *Dictionary*

of Political Economy and to Chambers's *Encyclopaedia*. His largest book, *Natural Rights*, was completed before he left Oxford, but was not published until 1895.

This is no small amount of literary production in ten or twelve years of a busy tutor's life at Oxford. But, though Ritchie was full of interest in his work, he felt that much more might be done in a Scottish chair of philosophy, with its wide spaces of summer leisure. The climate of Oxford also depressed him, and he held it responsible for a good deal of the *petite santé* which troubled him throughout his life. Accordingly he was more than once a candidate for chairs in Scotland, and in 1894 he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews University, in succession to Professor Henry Jones of Glasgow. His teaching had hitherto been concerned more with moral philosophy than with logic, and he had not been called upon to give much instruction in metaphysics to advanced students, nor had there been occasion for regular lectures in modern psychology. But his work now included a large number of lectures (150 or more in the five or six months of each winter session) in logic, psychology, metaphysics and the history of philosophy. Accordingly, during the early years of his residence at St. Andrews, the greater part of his time was occupied with the work of his classes. He was also unfortunate in the time of his coming to St. Andrews. The University was in the midst of a long and bitter conflict, involving litigation and much party feeling, regarding the position of University College, Dundee, the disposition of the Berry Bequest and the establishment of a medical school. The issues of the campaign affected not only the finance but the whole educational future of the University, and its incidents had more than once a disturbing effect on the actual teaching in nearly all the departments of study. It was impossible for the most pacific of

scholars, if he had any regard for his own and his students' work, to stand aloof from the battle. Ritchie's strong sense of public duty led him to take his full share in the controversy, of course on the side of progress and common-sense which ultimately prevailed. The extraordinary and incalculable incidents of the long struggle, when the University was "lost" and "saved" again every few months, and the proceedings of the reactionaries in power were as tragic to the teaching staff as they were comic to the detached spectator, brought much worry and distraction to Ritchie, who was able, however, to relieve himself occasionally by the writing of delightfully satiric verse as well as prose skits on the ways and sayings of the tormentors. But all this was good neither for health nor for literary production, and it was not until the dispute had been satisfactorily settled by the law courts, the Universities' Commission and the Privy Council, that he was able fully to resume his work as a writer and to publish his volume of *Studies in Political and Social Ethics* and his *Plato*, both of which appeared in 1902.

During his tenure of the chair at St. Andrews Ritchie naturally gave most of his interest to the logical and metaphysical aspects of philosophy. At one time he had it in mind, if opportunity occurred, to seek a chair of moral philosophy, as that subject was more in the line of his earlier work. But when, in the last year of his life, the professorship of moral philosophy at St. Andrews was vacant and it was suggested that he might desire to exchange, he preferred to retain the teaching of logic and used his influence to secure the election of Mr. Bosanquet as his colleague. His studies in ethics and politics, however, had an excellent effect on his lectures in the more speculative side of philosophy. Logic in his hands ceased to be a fruitless art of intellectual jugglery. He conceived it as a real

analysis of concrete reasoning, and he went behind the scholastic and post-scholastic forms of the text-books, with their abstract rigid applications, to the deeper and freer principles of Aristotle. In his discussions of J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, as well as in his lectures on psychology and metaphysics, he gave point to his arguments by felicitous illustrations and examples, drawn from his wide reading in history, politics, ethics and biology. For he was never afraid of metaphor, illustration and vividness in exposition, believing that metaphors are harmful in philosophy only when they are unconscious and that the deliberate avoidance of them is a counsel of despair. Though no one spoke more strongly of the perils of "picture-thinking," no one could more skilfully encourage a halting audience by concrete stepping-stones to higher thought. And not merely the form but the matter of his lectures owed much to his pre-occupation with social problems. As he put it in a paper read to the Scots Philosophical Club, "the study of the methods of social science is a necessary part of logic; the study of the social factor in mind and of the relation between the individual and society is an essential part of psychology and of ethics." He was convinced that the ultimate issues in ethics and in metaphysics were fundamentally the same, and he continually insisted on the importance of the social factor in perception, imagination, thinking and belief, as well as in the history of political institutions and moral systems. Probably the very fact that the social element is at first sight less prominent in the intellectual than in the practical human activities attracted him specially to the study and teaching of logic, psychology and metaphysics.

In spite of the academic troubles Ritchie found much to satisfy him in his life at St. Andrews. He worked hard for his subject, his students and the University as a whole, not caring much for the details of business,

but scrupulously attending and giving his help at the innumerable meetings which are needed to move the wheels of a place of learning in Scotland. His classes were not so large as to be unwieldy, and he had special pleasure in the work of his honours students, whom he could know individually and to whom he could give of his best in the frank and equal discussion which he loved. In general public affairs and in conventional society, where the interchange of ideas too often falls almost to a least common measure of intelligence, he took little part. He who was in the best sense social to his finger-tips used often ironically to describe himself as "unsocial." But nothing gave him greater pleasure than to beat out, in long talks with colleagues and friends, the larger questions of philosophy and politics, art, literature and religion. To these discussions, for which he found frequent opportunity at St. Andrews, he brought not merely hard thinking but imagination, humour and a rare susceptibility to aesthetic impressions. His talk was always charged with learning, thoroughly assimilated so as to be a part of himself rather than even lightly worn as a coat of mail or a weapon or a flower; and withal he was entirely unassuming and free from self-consciousness. He always unconsciously raised people to his own standard of thought, and he never, even in talk with a child, took up the position of knowing what was right but argued the matter out on equal terms. This inevitably brought him the strong affection of all who knew him well, and in the conditions of life at St. Andrews, favourable alike to intimacy and to antipathy, it mitigated his feeling of loneliness and increased the happiness which he regarded as a means rather than as the end of the best life.

The climate of St. Andrews suited Ritchie better than that of Oxford. His dislike of games prevented him from playing golf; but cycling and country walks.

which he greatly enjoyed, kept him in fair physical condition. One or two attacks of influenza depressed him and possibly left hidden traces of evil; but he had no illness so serious as to interrupt his teaching until the last fortnight of his life. His spare and somewhat delicate-looking but agile figure suggested the type of man who is "never well and never ill," for whom one is ready to prophesy a long life, remembering the proverb about creaking doors that hang long. But his life was destined to be all too short. In the end of 1902 and beginning of 1903 he was much troubled with neuralgic pains. Towards the end of January he took rest, on his doctor's advice, and spent a few days in bed. He grew gradually weaker, and on February 2nd symptoms of grave nervous trouble shewed themselves. The end came swiftly and mercifully the following evening.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to put on paper any adequate impression of Ritchie's many-sided personality. His spiritual lineaments were like those which in some people make every portrait a disappointment. Those who knew him well will always, in recalling him, think first of the simple, indefinable charm which eludes description, a charm not genial in the common sense (for he was reserved without being austere), nor flashing and wayward (for though he could coin an epigram on occasion, he shone rather than glittered), but a charm of exalted sanity, the charm of one who takes you, as it were, a few hundred feet higher in thought than you had ever been before, and gives you a new outlook on familiar things. Much of this charm was due to his complete freedom from pre-occupation with himself, his whole and simple devotion to inquiry and to truth, and his pure human sympathy. Men who can take you to intellectual heights too often drag you there and lecture you until your pleasure in the new view disappears in your resentment at being

regarded as pre-eminently foolish and ignorant. In intercourse with Ritchie there was no shadow of this kind. By his very sensitiveness to excellence in other people he brought then unconsciously to his own level and drew from them more than they seemed to possess. Above all things he detested inferior and pretentious work, which he regarded as seriously immoral; but the intensity of his dislike to moral and intellectual failure led him to avoid mentioning circumstances that told against others, and even to feel a sort of shrinking from such failures as if they wounded him personally. In this he was influenced no less by his social ideals than by his single mind in the seeking of truth. For it seemed to him that much error in judgment arises from making too hard a distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and defects, and he held that intellectual ignorance and incapacity is in great part a result of indifference to social progress, and is thus moral in its source. His own social optimism made him an ardent and incessant worker, restlessly intent on thoroughness of thinking, impatient of abstractions and hazy generalisations, and scrupulous in his endeavour to attain accuracy of statement and reference as regards even the minutest details. But there was no hardness in his sense of duty. It was rather a buoyant and optimistic belief, springing from his living interest in human wellbeing and progress. For him the whole duty of man lay not in doing good things, but in doing them well, and from this deep moral conviction there passed into his life a courtesy, gentleness and frankness that seemed instinctive in its readiness and ease.

Except in matters of conduct Ritchie was little of an artist, though he was unfailingly witty, and skilled in the craft of letters. But he had a great love of poetry and art, and in talk about literary and artistic questions, his judgments were often luminous and

suggestive. Though he had little ear for music, his mental alertness made him a good critic. It was, for instance, an idea of his own that Mendelssohn's concerted music had in it all the elements that were brought out consciously and developed by Wagner. In every kind of art his appreciation was for form rather than for colour, and as regards culture in general his sympathies were more with the classical than with the Teutonic elements. "I think," he said, in a letter to Professor Alexander (1888), "the *Weltgeist* has harnessed the Teutonic horse to the chariot of civilisation, but the driver is an Italian or a Romanised Celt, who has got his training from Athens and Jerusalem. Everything that lifts us above barbarians (*i.e.* mere Teutons) has come to us from or through Italy." Yet even in the most unclassical writers he found work which he could appreciate and enjoy. Thus he wrote (in 1886), "I am delighted at last to have found a poem of Walt Whitman's that seems to me the most genuine poetry. It is on Lincoln's death and is called 'When lilac blooms.' It is like a grand piece of music (although it contains the words 'debris,' 'depôt,' 'minutiae,') and as an elegy one can put it beside that on Saul and Jonathan." He was fond of a good novel, especially if its art lay in the depicting of character. "The best treatises on moral philosophy are good novels. But this is an esoteric doctrine, and not to be rashly communicated to the young, nor to those who arrange examinations in mental and moral science. Suppose Thackeray and Balzac were made subjects of examination in place of Plato and Aristotle, Locke and Kant, there might be some chance of these latter authors being fairly understood and appreciated."

In his thinking, as in his life, the ideal of social wellbeing and progress was Ritchie's ruling motive.

It was the complete dominance of this ideal in him, its full penetration of his spirit, that gave him his distinctive position, and was the mainspring of all his work. He drew from this his quick and wide interest in many great studies, in politics and history, in institutions and customs, civil and religious, in the geographical features of civilised countries, in biology and economics. Thus when his speech or writing rose into the thinnest air of pure speculation, it was always enriched and vitalised by his knowledge of the facts of human experience. Yet he never lost himself in the interest of detail, but maintained through the vivacity and picturesqueness of his instances a firm hold on principles, the grasp of a clear mind and a strong purpose. Pre-eminently a thinker, he abhorred thinking in *vacuo*, and his peculiar strength lay in his combination of philosophic insight with a living interest in human affairs, past, present, and future.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL

When one considers the lines of Ritchie's education and study, and the subjects which mainly interested him, one can see how inevitably his thinking came to be dominated by his view of history and science, on the one hand, and of logic, ethics, and politics on the other. From his training in Greek philosophy and in modern idealism, he received the fundamental attitude of thought which, in various forms, appears in the distinctions between the question of origin and that of validity, between historical and logical method, between fact and meaning, between picturing and conceiving. The essence of this distinction is as old as Plato; but it requires re-interpretation and fresh discussion in every philosophic generation. Ritchie's whole thought was ruled by it and by

the problems which it raises, and the special value of his work lies in this, that he did not merely reiterate and defend it as an abstract principle, but skilfully applied it to concrete questions in new and original ways. Although the distinction is familiar to all trained philosophical students, its special applications have been only imperfectly worked out, and writers as well as readers in many departments of knowledge find it difficult to assent to it and to appreciate its value. Ritchie felt this very strongly. In a letter (February 7th, 1886), in which he explains the application of the principle to religious questions, he writes: "I fear I weary you and vex you by saying the same sort of thing over and over again; but I am so much convinced of the truth of it, that it always seems to me that it must be owing to some defect in the way of putting it that it fails to produce conviction. And yet, as it is a way of looking at the whole question of religion which so few people in England at least will accept, perhaps I should not be so confident. And there always remains this great difficulty in practice. The majority of people always tend to clothe a spiritual truth in mythological form, *i.e.* to think of eternal relations as if these were particular events in time, and so to state "value" in terms of "origin," so that there is a constantly recurring conflict. And often one feels it wrong, for the sake of difference in the way of expressing a truth, to separate oneself from the ordinary Christian—by which separation there comes so much loss, moral and otherwise. And yet again, the utter heedlessness of truth in the ecclesiastical mind sends one back again into indignant protest and solitude."

The most elaborate statement and illustration of the principle, as Ritchie conceived it, is given in the essay on "Origin and Validity" in his volume *Darwin and Hegel*. But he was continually developing the idea,

and it appears in its latest forms in the present volume, more especially in the *Cogitatio Metaphysica* (pp. 76, 88, 97 *sqq.*, 127 *sqq.*). While he insisted on the recognition of the distinction as necessary for clear thinking in philosophy, ethics, politics and religion, it must not be supposed that he regarded it as absolute, or that he sympathised with the view that there are different "spheres" or "kinds" of truth, consisting of "judgments of fact" and "judgments of value," each independent of the other and each equally ultimate. The business of knowledge is to ascertain the true nature of things, and this can never be fully given by any answer to the question of their origin. The question of validity is the ultimate question. As he puts it, using the language of Aristotle, in the essay on "Origin and Validity," the final cause of a thing, the end which it comes to serve, must be known, if we are to know the true nature of the thing (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστί). Yet no one could be more opposed than was Ritchie to any teleological "short cuts" to truth. He had no sympathy with the facile and uncritical testing of the nature of a thing by reference to unanalysed conceptions of "individual or finite purpose" or "practical efficiency." The "use" of a thing is doubtless an expression of its nature; but its nature cannot be determined offhand by the uses to which we put it. The final cause which is the ultimate meaning and nature of a thing is an immanent final cause. It is the thing seen, not as an event in this or that temporal series or as an element in one or another limited "universe of discourse," but in its consistency with itself and other things in the one all-inclusive system of reality. Thus the scientific, historical knowledge of things as events or phenomena is at once indispensable and incomplete. Some answer to the question of origin is required in order that we may deal with the question

of validity; but an answer to the one question ought never to be substituted for an answer to the other. We cannot, for instance, rightly relate man to the whole universe immediately, without studying him as he is for physics and biology as well as for psychology, nor can we rightly regard the physical, the biological or the psychological account of him as expressing his whole meaning or nature. But, as we have seen, Ritchie was so much impressed with the harm that has been done to thinking by neglect of the distinction between origin and validity, that in most of his writing he tended to emphasise and illustrate it rather than to dwell upon its aspect of relativity.

In metaphysics Ritchie applied this distinction as an eirenicon in the modern conflict between materialism or realism and idealism. He states his attitude concisely in the preface to *Darwin and Hegel* (p. vi). "'Idealism' and 'Materialism' are commonly spoken of as antagonistic types of philosophy; and, in a sense, they are. I have tried to show that one form of idealism is quite compatible with that materialistic monism which is now-a-days the working hypothesis of every scientific explorer in every department, whatever other beliefs or denials he may, more or less explicitly and more or less consistently, superadd. Materialistic monism, it seems to me, only becomes false when put forward as a complete philosophy of the universe, because it leaves out of sight the conditions of human knowledge, which the special sciences may conveniently disregard, but which a candid philosophy cannot ignore. It is too probable that my *eirenicon*, like other efforts at peace-making, may only result in provoking a twofold hostility, and that 'Darwinians' and 'Hegelians' will both look on me as a heretic. But I cannot, as yet, see any other way out of a hopeless controversy than that towards which I have been led, especially by the teaching of

the late Thomas Hill Green on the one side, and by the influence of scientific friends on the other. And this Idealist Evolutionism (if a label is necessary) seems to me to give the best starting-point for an examination of the concrete problems of ethics and politics, which are, after all, the most urgent difficulties with which we have to deal." A fuller account of this "Idealist Evolutionism" was given in a paper read at the opening meeting of a "synthetic society" in the University of St. Andrews, the object of which was to bring together students of science and students of philosophy for the purpose of mutual discussion and the promotion of a better understanding between workers in different fields. After approving what Huxley described as the "legitimate materialism" of the sciences, which "simply means temporary and convenient abstraction from the cognitive conditions under which alone there are 'facts' or 'objects' for us at all," as distinct from the "dogmatic materialism," which is "metaphysics of the bad sort," Ritchie refers to some of the features in modern science which "show the effort to reach a unity behind the manifold of phenomena" and points out the significance of these in relation to an idealist philosophy. "If I may so express it, all our sciences seem to assume a monistic metaphysics. The doctrine of the conservation of energy is an assertion of that monism—unity amid difference of manifestation. The evolution theory is an assertion of the principle of Continuity (on which Leibniz laid stress long ago), which is unity asserted again amid the difference of time and change. As already said, the sciences which deal with phenomena in space and time necessarily use a materialistic working hypothesis, though the most careful scientific worker will probably be the most cautious in dogmatizing as to what matter itself is. Now in these tendencies of modern science—in

spite of its differentiation—we have, as it were, hands held out to philosophy. Philosophy, the endeavour after synthesis, must, it seems to me (though I know there are some who deny it in words) be 'monistic.' An ultimate 'pluralism'—an acquiescence in or theory of totally distinct and independent entities not included within one all-embracing system—such a notion seems to me unthinkable. Further, all philosophy, it seems to me, must be idealist. I cannot see how an ultimate explanation can be attempted except in terms of reason or intelligence. To give any other explanation is to refuse to explain. To refer one to feeling or emotion is not a philosophical explanation: a symphony of Beethoven may seem to many persons preferable to metaphysics or theology; but it is not a philosophical answer to our questions. But in saying that philosophy is idealistic, while the sciences are materialist, I do not mean to suggest that there is a necessary conflict between philosophy and the sciences, though there is necessarily a difference between the procedure of the understanding when it is dealing with some 'abstract' isolated aspect of things and the work of reason in its endeavour to see things as a whole. Nor, on the other hand, do I mean to suggest that in these tendencies towards a monistic view of the universe, to which I have referred, we have a final treaty of peace between the sciences on the one side and theology and philosophy on the other: the region of most controversy is just the relation between the unity which a rational theory of the universe, we might say, presupposes and the manifold of phenomena as we know them in experience—the old and central philosophical controversy about the relation between the one and the many."

"It is not, I hold, the business of philosophy to interfere in the controversies which arise within particular sciences. In any case the special student of

philosophy is not likely in these days to have sufficient detailed knowledge to interfere profitably. It is his business to wait and loyally to accept the best results of scientific knowledge in his time; they are part of the *data* which it is his business to try to connect and so to explain. It is a mistake which has constantly been made in the past by those who are anxious for the spiritual interests of man, to interfere with the changes that are going on in scientific conceptions. Such interference has always ended in the defeat of the supporters of quasi-scientific doctrines which the growing science of the time has discarded. Theology interfered with Galileo and gained nothing in the end by its interference. Astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, historical criticism have at different periods raised alarm in the minds of those who dread a materialistic view of man's nature; and with the very best intentions they have tried to fight the supposed enemy on his own ground, eagerly welcoming, for instance, every sign of disagreement between Darwinians and Lamarckians or every dispute between different schools of historical critics, as if the spiritual wellbeing of mankind were bound up with the scientific beliefs of the 17th or some earlier century, as if, *e.g.*, it made all the difference in man's spiritual nature whether he was made directly out of inorganic dust or slowly ascended from lower organic forms. These are questions that must be settled by the specialists. On the other hand, philosophic criticism is in place when the scientific specialist begins to dogmatise about the universe as a whole, when he speaks, for example, as if an accurate narrative of the various steps by which the lower forms of life have passed into the higher was a sufficient explanation to us of the mystery of existence. . . . When the dogmatic materialist tells us that thought is a secretion of the brain, or speaks of laws of nature as if they

were personal agents, or when he hypostatises Evolution, as if before the blast of that trumpet word all philosophies and theologies must fall down, then it is time for the philosophical critic to imitate Socrates and to ask troublesome questions about the meaning of common words like 'cause' and 'reality,' and to show that an infinite series of events in infinite time past does not give a final explanation of the universe, any more than does the Indian mythology which rests the world on an elephant and the elephant on a tortoise, and which could no doubt, if required, have continued the series down and down. In raising these ultimate questions, philosophy is only renewing that wonder which, in Aristotle's famous phrase, is the beginning of all science. And the advance of scientific knowledge has usually not diminished the magnitude of the problem to be explained, while it has made it continuously less easy for any one to believe in an ultimately chaotic or irrational universe. . . . The discoveries of a Newton or a Darwin give us no complete answer: for we feel that the universe which can produce a Newton and a Darwin must in its ultimate nature be not less intelligent than they. Considerations such as this, *when combined with the epistemological truth that matter and motion are only known to us as forms of consciousness*, may suggest how strong is the basis of philosophical idealism, difficult and doubtful as the superstructure may be."

The form of this view on which Ritchie most often dwelt in his later years is carefully set forth in his review of Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, a portion of which is reprinted in the *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, § 22. It led him to oppose strongly, on the one hand, the uncritical use of physical and biological categories as metaphysical principles, which he found in the writings of Spencer and other philosophical evolutionists, and on the other hand, the attempts to vindicate a spiritual

view of the universe on the ground of the impenetrable "personality" of God and of individual men, along with such theories as pluralism, "the will to believe" and all forms of apologetic which seek to establish the spiritual by finding discontinuity in the natural—by maintaining, for example, the existence of ultimate "gaps" in the process of evolution. "Naturalist" metaphysics seemed to him to rest on a confusion of the questions of fact and of meaning. The laws of physics and biology are generalised statements of fact, the truth or validity of which is dependent on certain abstract conditions or assumptions regarding space, time, matter, energy, organism, environment, etc. Such laws, when duly established, are true as facts under their appropriate conditions, within their special "universes of discourse"; but they cannot on that account be regarded as having necessarily an ultimate validity, a validity under all conditions, as being immediately true within the whole universe of reality. They are true so far as they go; but they do not go all the way. They tell us the nature of things up to a certain point, the nature of things as events of a certain kind; but the question remains: What are events? What are their various kinds, and how are they related to each other and to the whole in which they appear? This is a question of meaning rather than of fact, and we cannot penetrate to the true nature of anything except by attempting the solution of it. If we neglect this, we deceive ourselves by hasty and misleading generalisation. On the other hand, those critics of "naturalism" who oppose it by insisting on a certain amount of discontinuity in the universe and by trying to exclude a specific part of experience from the sway of mechanical law, seemed to Ritchie to err in a similar way, but in an opposite direction. They seek to fortify islands of meaning in an estranging sea of fact, and they thus are unable

to show that the meanings are the meanings *of* the facts. The "exclusive personalities" on which they insist are, just because they are exclusive, not the ultimate concrete reality of things, but abstractions of another sort, abstractions of "purpose," "will," "individuality," "feeling," "spirit," logically akin to the "naturalist" abstractions of "matter," "energy," "organism," "natural selection" and the rest. "Personality," he says in some rough notes on the subject, "is too apt to be treated as a solution or rather as a phrase with which to stop the mouths or arrest the progress of inquirers. A philosophical system is roughly brushed aside as untrue—certainly as dangerous—because it seems incompatible with the personality of man and the personality of God,—whatever these phrases may mean and whether they mean the same thing with one another or not." He points out that "only in society are there 'persons,'" and that when we come to consider the ultimate metaphysical problem of the relations of man, nature and God, we must use the conception of the one *in* the many, not the one alongside of the many. Or, as someone else has put it, we must not expect to find the unity "lying about among the differences." "The rival theory of 'monads,' pluralism, requires unity in order to be a philosophical explanation. It comes from hypostatising some of the abstractions of ordinary belief. It is valid as a protest on behalf of the manifold and the changing in nature, against a monism which excludes diversity, change. But *mere* multiplicity is contradictory and so is *mere* evolution, all change, *πάντα ῥεῖ*. The only tenable theory must reconcile both—the one *in* the many, the permanent *appearing in* change. Time and change are not, then, mere illusions. They are not absolute, certainly, but the manifestation of the absolute. This manifestation in time is evolution. Thus there is a connection between nature and man, and yet they are

distinct when consciousness appears. Spirit comes to itself in man." In brief, then, Ritchie's metaphysical position on its critical side is a protest against the hypostatising, on the one hand, of abstractions of "fact" in the form of scientific laws and principles, and, on the other hand, of abstractions of "meaning" cut off from "fact," in the form of ordinary beliefs accepted without analysis and without investigation of their history.

The distinction between fact and meaning also governs Ritchie's view of the history of philosophy, although he does not in this case expressly apply it. In a paper on "Philosophy and the study of philosophers" (*Mind*, Vol. VII. N.S.), he points out that there are "three main attitudes towards the doctrines of the old philosophers. First, there is the attitude of submission to authority." This attitude tends to become purely historical or philological rather than strictly philosophical, an inquiry into the facts regarding some thinker's opinions rather than into the meaning and value of his ideas. "A great deal of the prevalent historical interest in philosophers of the past is not properly interest in philosophy; the two interests may even sometimes, as Green said, be in the inverse ratio. Much of the study of Plato and Aristotle is scholarship. Much of the minute study of Kant has been correctly called 'Kantphilologie.'" The second attitude is that "represented by Bacon and Descartes—revolt against authority, assertion of individual independence in thinking. Earlier philosophies are regarded as false. They are systems to be thrown aside. If they are dealt with, it is only that they may be refuted." Manifestly such an attitude as this implies that the one question to be considered is that of the validity or meaning of philosophical conceptions and that the question of their history is entirely irrelevant to this. But, while history alone cannot answer our questions, the neglect of the

history of philosophy is a sure method for the production of fallacious answers. "No avoidance of metaphysics, but only serious metaphysical effort enables us to detect the assumptions" of common-sense knowledge and the special sciences. "'Enough metaphysics to get rid of metaphysical ideas' means in truth a very thorough metaphysical training, and, not merely a great deal of logical acuteness in unravelling complex concepts lurking under apparently simple words, but a knowledge of the history of thought in the past which has gone to form the intellectual ground on which we are standing, the intellectual atmosphere we breathe." "When the religious or the philosophical systems of the past are studied in what we have come to consider 'the historical spirit,' when criticism passes from merely refuting opinions to showing how and why these opinions came to be held, above all when the conception of development or evolution is extended from the natural world to the world of human thought, we have left behind the purely negative attitude to ideas that we no longer accept, and we come to see the long series of attempts to grapple with the central problems of knowledge and reality not as stray opinions with which we do not happen to agree, but as parts of one continuous movement in which our own thinking is itself included." This is the third attitude, the attitude of Hegel, which Ritchie adopted as alone satisfactory. It does not confuse origin with validity, nor does it neglect either, but it gives to each its appropriate sphere. While, however, in discussing science it was necessary to lay stress on the question of validity, it is equally necessary, in dealing with philosophy, to emphasise the value of history, which philosophers, interested in universal problems rather than in facts, are apt to overlook. Accordingly in this connection Ritchie dwelt mainly on the continuity of philosophical thought in its history, the evolution of ideas; but he

certainly did not mean to suggest that a knowledge of the history of philosophy could take the place of independent thinking. "Despairing of finding the truth, people sometimes begin assiduously to seek the exact forms in which successive errors have been held (substituting historical antiquarianism for philosophy). But to know the errors, must we not know the truth?" And again, "Every one must have his own philosophy. We can only face the problems rightly if we face them for ourselves. And for that reason one of the dangers we have to guard against is the scholastic habit of becoming the mere expositors of any one master, however great. For that reason we should welcome the rebels and the doubters, and should value every opportunity of serious discussion with those who have grown up under different influences from those that have moulded ourselves, or who by a long labour of systematic thinking have reached an independent position from which they criticise our most cherished judgments about the philosophers of the past."

In his discussions of the problems of logic and the theory of knowledge Ritchie continually urged the necessity of holding fast to the distinction between logical questions as questions of validity and psychological questions as questions of fact or origin. He carried this distinction out in detail in his class lectures on J. S. Mill's *Logic*, and it is illustrated so frequently in his essays in this volume and elsewhere that I need not dwell upon it. He held strongly that the ideal of truth is the complete self-consistency of a rational system, and accordingly he maintained that "the inconceivability of the opposite," if the phrase be rightly interpreted, is the sole ultimate criterion of truth. The formula, however, is often wrongly understood, both by sensationist and by intuitionist thinkers, who tend to give it a psychological rather than a logical sense. The question is not, What is it impossible for

this or that person, or for all persons at a particular time, to conceive? or what is it impossible for anyone at any time to picture? but, what is it impossible for anyone at any time thoroughly and consistently to think out? Whatever, by the very nature of its own content, apart from any question of the limits of our understanding as individuals or as men in general, cannot be consistently thought out is false and its opposite is true. There are degrees of truth, in the sense that this or that statement may be true under conditions, the validity of which has not been examined. But only that is absolutely true which, by its own nature, taking into account all the conditions and assumptions which it implies, can be consistently thought out. This, of course, means that truth does not depend in the last resort either upon abstract universal principles, intuitively known, or upon unanalysable abstract particulars, given in sensation. Both the logic of *a priori* intuitionism and that of *a posteriori* empiricism divorce fact from meaning, particular from universal. Intuitionism grounds itself on isolated meanings and endeavours deductively to approximate to the foreign facts, while empiricism begins with isolated facts and seeks inductively to establish laws, which are not the essential meaning of the facts, but are merely convenient colligations of them. In reality, neither fact nor meaning, neither particular nor universal, is a given starting-point of knowledge. Both are ideals, and knowledge is the process of their realisation. Truth is the definition both of the universal and of the particular by a process of knowledge which seeks to comprehend the manifestation of the universal in the particular, the essential nature of the fact in the light of its meaning. Thus Ritchie had little positive interest in the symbolic logic which consists in the mathematical manipulation of fixed concepts (abstract universals), torn out of their context in actual concrete

discourse, and he often dwelt upon the error of dealing with logical questions in a purely mathematical way. On the other hand, he was equally convinced of the futility of trying to solve problems in logic or the theory of knowledge by an appeal to such scientific theories as natural selection or heredity. Thus, for instance, he regarded Spencer's view, that what is *a posteriori* to the race becomes *a priori* to the individual, as being an irrelevant answer to the problem of the theory of knowledge, inasmuch as, even if it were true (which he doubted) it would be an answer merely to the question of fact and not to the question of meaning, which is the question in dispute. Whatever may be the facts about the development of the universals we employ, the problem of their validity remains. As he put it in a letter to Professor S. Alexander :—"Natural selection may produce greater ease in getting at truth; but I can't see what is meant by natural selection creating truth. The logical problem of 'necessity' seems to me to remain after every psychological and historical explanation of the growth of knowledge has been given. You see I am stuck fast in that old distinction." Again "natural selection (*plus* use-inheritance if you like) has as yet produced only a very imperfect adaptation of our likes and dislikes in taste, smell, etc., to what is life-furthering or life-hindering: how has it managed, working through a far shorter period, to produce an absolutely perfect adaptation of our beliefs (when we think clearly and distinctly) about mathematical axioms, etc., to reality? To have a liking for unwholesome things is surely more deleterious to the organism than to imagine the diagonal commensurable with the side of the square, to try to square the circle, etc. One would have expected natural selection to produce an expectation that things that are equal to the same thing will most likely equal one another, that

nature is sometimes uniform and sometimes not, etc. I think you are quite right in accentuating the significance of our organic experience in determining the *content* of our categories, *e.g.* 'cause' is (except by a special effort at elimination of 'animism') pictured as conscious voluntary agency, 'substance' and 'individuality' are 'metaphors' from ourselves, 'time' is pictured as a series of discrete moments because of the way our heart and lungs work, we are sensitive to lateral but not to vertical symmetry in space because of our bodily shape, etc.; but all that doesn't seem to me to touch the essence of Kant's reply to Hume."

Psychology, in Ritchie's opinion (v. *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, p. 106), "hovers bat-like between the sciences which deal conceptually with some more or less abstract aspect of the universe and some ideal philosophy of the mind which should deal with what is perfectly concrete and individual, and yet take up into itself all the scattered lights of the various abstract and partial sciences." But on the whole he was inclined to regard psychology as an abstract science akin to the natural sciences, and thus to dissent from Professor Ward's statement that "psychology never transcends the limits of the individual." "In considering the contents of consciousness purely as contents of consciousness, we are abstracting from the actual or real experience of any individual, and in treating of the average or normal individual mind, we have abstracted from the real individual." "We abstract from the individuality of the *ego* and look for the antecedent conditions of ideas, feelings and volitions as the 'causes' of them (*i.e.* material causes) in precisely the same sense in which we find causes in nature; and we seek to formulate psychological 'laws,' in precisely the same sense as in nature, *i.e.* they are statements of what *under certain conditions* must necessarily happen." But while psychology is

akin to the natural sciences as a science of fact and not of meaning, it is, in Ritchie's opinion, an error to regard the methods and conceptions of psychology as necessarily the same as those of the natural sciences. In the lecture to the St. Andrews Synthetic Society (quoted above p. 22), he says: "Psychology and sociology may be allowed the name and rank of sciences; but it is very often taken for granted that they are only scientific in so far as they are simply extensions of biology, and that the ideal method of treatment for them, as for all the sciences, is the reduction of their stubborn material to mathematical and mechanical formulæ. Now I think it necessary to protest against the assumption that the concepts and methods which are adequate in biology and the less complex sciences are therefore (without further proof) adequate to the treatment of the mental and social life of man. It is unreasonable to assume that the evolution of human society, and of all the manifestations of the human spirit, can be properly understood when approached solely from the biological side. Biology has undoubtedly thrown great light on many problems of psychology, ethics, politics, and economics; but the conditions of human society are so different from those of the individual organism, that I am not sure whether the metaphor of the social organism has not introduced so much confusion into sociological studies as to make the use of this striking phrase a rather doubtful benefit." "The biological conceptions are not false when applied to human societies, any more than mathematical, physical, chemical concepts are—they are simply inadequate. The statesman —and the statesman is, or he rather ought to be, a practical sociologist—cannot afford to ignore the truth that $2+2=4$; but the profoundest knowledge of abstract mathematics will not enable him to solve a single problem in public finance. The statesman

cannot afford to ignore the doctrine of the 'survival of the fittest'; but he will find that natural selection in its biological sense is *subtilitati rerum humanarum longe impar.*" Accordingly Ritchie continually insisted on the importance of the "social factor" in mental development, not merely with regard to the higher or more complex mental processes, but in connection with the most elementary forms of cognition. "The truth is that there is no such thing as wholly individual *experience*, beyond mere uninterpreted feeling and blind willing. It is human society, with its accumulated stock of concepts, that makes our experience a more or less organic system. The psychologists with their individualistic standpoint are, I think, responsible for much more confusion than even Mr. Ward admits. It takes more than one man to know anything, or to have an ideal end for volition."[1]

The problems of ethics and politics were those to which Ritchie gave the best of his thought. He regarded it, however as a fundamental error to attempt to separate the one discipline from the other, or either of them from metaphysics. "How can we," he asked, "consider the theory of conduct without examining the relation of the individual to society (a question of content) and the relation of the individual to God, the ideal (a question of form)?" And again, "has metaphysics more to do with ethics and politics than with the older sciences? Comte held that ethics and politics remain longer in the metaphysical stage. But is there not a real reason for this?" His reasons for holding, *e.g.* that while the geometrician rightly neglects both the psychological and the metaphysical questions about space, the moralist cannot do the same with regard to the self, are fully set forth in this volume, (v. *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, p. 110, and *Moral Philosophy*, §§ 1, 2, 3

[1] Review of Ward, P*hilosophical Review*, Vol. IX., p. 265.

and 6). A science of ethics independent of metaphysics "would be a historical science tracing the various ethical ideals which have been accepted by men (a history of their various distinctions between right and wrong), leaving out the question what right and wrong ultimately mean, or assuming some provisional explanation of them." "An attempt to describe the facts of morality, either in the individual or in society, as *now* existing, would be very delusive if the historical origin of these facts were overlooked, because obviously our society is in a transitional stage, and the various opinions of right and wrong must be taken in connection with their history in order to be rightly understood." "On the other hand, if we insist on going beyond these questions of *fact*, and wish to ask about what *ought* to be, we cannot shirk an investigation of what 'ought' means, *i.e.* we must bring in a metaphysic of ethics, by which I only mean a criticism of the basis of morality." As he puts it in a brief note: "That there is an ideal (ought, end) is *fact*. How there should be, is a question for metaphysics. This must be the foundation of ethics; but it only gives the form. The content comes from experience—(1) What has been the history of this ideal end? What different forms has it had at different times? (History); (2) How does it come to shape itself in the mind of each individual? (Psychology—the moral sentiments, the passions, character); (3) How can the ideal be (*a*) developed; (*b*) realised? (Practical Ethics)." The fundamental problems of ethics and politics are, accordingly, problems of form, meaning, validity, such as the nature of the ideal, and the relations of the individual to society and to God. But these problems cannot be adequately discussed apart from the questions of content, fact, origin. The chief errors in ethical and political speculation arise either from

regarding the two sets of problems as the same, or from attempting to deal with one in complete separation from the other. "The adequate study of either institutions or ideas requires both an historical examination of how they came to be what they are, and of what their value now is. If it was the tendency of the confident and hopeful rationalism of the eighteenth century to neglect origins, there is an opposing tendency now sometimes prevalent to neglect the inquiry as to rationality, and to despair of truth, or to acquiesce in evils, imagining that the study of politics and law and morals consists only in translating the present into terms of the past."[1]

Thus Ritchie's attitude towards current controversy about the main problems of ethics and politics was exactly similar to his views regarding metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. The intuitionist and, more generally, the moralist who takes his stand on a supposed sharp division between "nature," on the one hand, and human society, on the other, seemed to him to beg the question by accepting as fundamental the abstractions of ordinary belief regarding moral distinctions, without inquiry into their history. Such thinkers make abstraction of the formal element in the moral law, while a similar abstraction in regard to its content is made by the empirical hedonists and evolutionists, who, in their turn, beg the question by assuming that the discovery of what, as a matter of fact, is or has come to be enables us immediately to determine what ought to be. The history of moral ideas is a valuable material for ethics, and "the possibility of an interpretation" of that history "which shall fit in with and not distort the facts must serve as an important test of the value of any ethical theory"[2] But, on the other hand, "the presence of an ideal cannot be merely the result of an ethical development, because it is the

[1] *Moral Philosophy*, p. 282. [2] *Moral Philosophy*, p. 289.

condition of such a development." In all Ritchie's thinking on these matters the governing idea is the conception of society. Social wellbeing is at once the ethical and the political ideal. "If we say the ultimate end is the wellbeing of all mankind, and the end we should aim at is the wellbeing of all that portion of mankind, whom we can practically affect, we mean the same thing as the utilitarian when he speaks of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but it is put in a less misleading way."[1] The utilitarian identifies happiness with wellbeing, the evolutionist substitutes being for wellbeing, and the *a priori* moralist maintains that there are rights and duties independent of society and of any social ideal. Ritchie argued against all these views; but his criticisms were mainly devoted to the evolutionist and *a priori* positions.

He regarded those who say that the end is happiness as being "cruelly if unintentionally ironical."[2] "If we use happiness in the sense in which it is used in ordinary language the end is not happiness. Happiness is mainly dependent on the healthy state of the bodily secretions and is a very important means to the attainment of the good life." And again, "suffering does not always improve character; it often does the reverse. To most people happiness is beneficial. But to make mankind at any given stage happy would be the greatest curse, if it were possible. Is it not because, at any given stage mankind have yet reached, the happiness of some implies the misery of others? No civilization has yet been attained which is not merely a light sketch on a dark ground." "If happiness is the end we may well despair and make pessimism our creed. We may be sure we shall not attain it."[3] And the extreme opposite of the utilitarian view leads to the same practical result. Whether

[1] *Moral Philosophy*, p. 299. [2] *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 298, 299.
[3] *Confessio Fidei*, § 6.

we take happiness or self-mortification as the end, we move towards pessimism. "I think egoistic asceticism has done the world no good and some harm, because it has turned effort to despair."[1] But if happiness is unattainable and asceticism is futile or pernicious, may not pessimism be the true creed? "I think pessimism is a good protest against the blind optimism of the contented conservative, who thinks this 'the best of all possible worlds'; but I think it contains its own refutation, viz., the presence of an ideal by which the world and life are judged evil." "When we see the misery of life, we can't help also seeing how much of it is remediable, by removal of abuses in social arrangements, etc. It will be time enough when we (I mean the human race) have done all we can to make life less an evil for the majority of mankind, to consider whether life *per se* is an evil. Therefore it is desirable to adjourn the question of pessimism and consider the question of socialism first."

Intuitionism again has its value as a protest against a narrow hedonism, "against the notion that life could go on with cold-blooded, calculating, philosophical radicals deliberating about everything." But intuitionism in ethics and the "natural rights" theory, which is its analogue in politics, both err by attempting to set up *a priori* standards independent of society. Each has in its own way an individualist basis. They proceed on the assumption that individual men are persons, in the one case with duties, in the other with rights, which society does not determine. That, of course, means reducing to confusion the notion of moral or political personality. To call the rights "natural" is, as Ritchie very clearly showed, to evade the difficulty by the use of an ambiguous term. "'Nature,' as we know, is a word contrived to introduce as many equivocations as possible into all the

[1] Letter (1886).

theories, political, legal, artistic or literary, into which it enters."[1] And to maintain that the duties and the rights are "divine" is to pre-suppose a society (God and ourselves), separate from all other forms of society, without cohesion and incapable of being clearly thought out. Yet even in such "perverse" theories (as Ritchie regarded them) there is one aspect of the truth. "Man's nature is not exhausted, his aspirations are not satisfied in the *State*. There is an appeal even from the State, nay even from society, to . . .?" In the note from which I take this the blank is left unfilled. The question points, I think, to an ambiguity in the word "society," and Ritchie's answer to it may be gathered from what he says elsewhere. There is an appeal from any actual society, from society at any particular stage, to an ideal society. "The person who pursues ends which differ from those regarded as the only proper ones by those immediately round him (family, city, nation, church) must be acting as a member of some (ideal) community, which may be as yet only a heavenly city, 'a pattern laid up in heaven.' He may not indeed have thought of it in that way, but it must be implicit in his mind."[2] It does not follow, of course, that every appeal to an ideal society is justified. We can picture clearly or vaguely many kinds of ideal society, and we can, without understanding what we are doing, practically appeal to an ideal society which we should find to be self-contradictory if we seriously endeavoured to think it out. The truth of the *a priori* theories lies in their opposition to the view that all rights and duties are in the last resort determined by actual society, whether in a limited or in the widest sense. The validity of moral principles does not depend merely on society as fact, but ultimately proceeds from society as meaning. The ideal society, however, is not something cut

[1] Sir L. Stephen, *Hobbes*, p. 173. [2] *Moral Philosophy*, p. 298.

off from the actual. It is the meaning of the society which appears and changes in actual history. It is not a Utopia beyond the seas or a society which can be realised only by the destruction of that which exists. A society which ought to be, cut off from the society which is, would, as Sidgwick has pointed out, presuppose another society to determine *what* it ought to be and so on *ad infinitum*. And herein lies the defect of the *a priori* position. Consciously or unconsciously it separates fact from meaning, the actual from the ideal, and thus leaves the ideal, which it solely emphasises, with a content which has been selected in a practically arbitrary way. On the other hand, Ritchie maintained that the categorical imperatives of intuitionism and the so-called "natural rights" are not self-evident principles, data of ethics and politics, but moral and political ideals, the validity of which depends upon the proof that they are constitutive principles of ideal society, society as meaning.[1] The assertion of abstract individual liberty and innate equality tends only to give an appearance of reason to the views of those who seek to justify and to maintain privilege and caste. Men are not born free and equal: their freedom and equality are to be realised in the realising of the ideal society. The dogmatic individualism of the 'natural rights' theorist is met by the dogmatic individualism of the conservative who believes with Dr. Johnson that "inequality is the source of all delight," or, with Coventry Patmore, that "the doctrines of liberty, fraternity and equality are known instinctively only by very bad children." Ritchie's own belief was that "all inequality is a curse. It is a fact often, but an evil one, not a thing to be commended."[2] And he held that we can look for a rational issue of the conflict between the two individualist dogmatisms only if we abandon their individualism and emphasise the

[1] Cf. *Moral Philosophy*, § 14. [2] Letter (1887).

social ideal as the first principle of ethics and politics. This is what Ritchie meant when he preached "socialism" and described himself as a "socialist." He was not a doctrinaire socialist, nor did he accept as a whole any of the numerous socialist systems of recent times. But he believed profoundly in the socialist attitude as against any form of individualism, empirical or *a priori*.

This 'socialist' belief was also the foundation of his criticism of evolutionist theories in ethics and politics. They tend to ignore the special characteristics of human society, which differentiate it from animal communities and which are the logical ground of ethical and political principles, by transferring biological conceptions directly to ethics and politics. As a striking illustration of this Ritchie used often to take the evolutionist application of the conception of heredity to sociological (*i.e.* ethical and political) problems.[1] "The term 'inherit' in biology has a quite definite meaning; in sociology it is a very ambiguous word. It may mean either heredity in the biological sense or what for distinction I should prefer to call 'social inheritance'—the transmission of ideas, sentiments, practices through the medium of tradition and imitation, irrespective of transmission in the race, or as we say, 'in the blood.' It is true that among the higher social animals we find the germs of this social inheritance (education of the young by their parents, etc., 'nurture' added to 'nature'—Galton); but this kind of inheritance is of enormously greater relative importance among human beings, who possess language and definite social and religious institutions as a vehicle for the transmission of the results of past experience. The importance of this distinction will be seen when it is considered that among the lower animals the only possibility of improvement —apart from artificial selection by human beings,

[1] Synthetic Society Paper.

which is not always improvement from the point of view of the species of animal in question—is to be found in the unchecked operation of natural selection or (if the Lamarckian hypothesis be also accepted) of natural selection plus the racial inheritance of acquired characteristics; whereas among human beings reflection and discussion may lead to a deliberate change in customs and usages and beliefs that are supposed to be injurious to social wellbeing. We might call this 'artificial selection applied by a society to itself.' Such changes due to conscious choice may, in any given case, be wise or foolish, beneficial or disastrous. The working of natural selection is not eliminated. It is the final test. But the mere possibility of such deliberate changes makes it futile to study human societies as if their history were simply an illustration of biological laws." Again, in a note on the distinction between "evolution in the social environment" and "the inheritance of qualities in the individuals" (race inheritance), Ritchie points out that "there may be continuity of national existence and character though nearly all the original *races* which have set the type of civilization may have disappeared. Of course the civilization must receive some modification from its acting on new races; but the difference between two races under the same type of civilization is less than the difference between the same race under two different types of civilization. Thus the Roman civilization became the possession of Celts and Iberians; the New Englanders may die out, but they will have turned Irish, Germans, Norwegians and Italians into 'Yankees.'" Apart from the uncritical application of biological conceptions to sociology, the evolutionist view is inadequate in another way. Even when it clearly recognises the distinctive characteristics of human society, it seeks to determine moral principles by reference to actual society and its history

or to the direction in which, as a matter of fact, it seems to be tending. It ignores the ideal in any other sense than that which is likely to happen. It cannot pass from what has come to be or what is going to be, as a result of the struggle for existence, to what ought to be, except by a confusion of the question of meaning with that of fact. Considering society only as an event or a series of events, it has no logical ground for criticism of the actual, it can find no criterion of excellence except success. All this is so fully expounded in the *Moral Philosophy* that I need not dwell upon it here.

In this connection, however, something must be said about Ritchie's views regarding certain problems of practical ethics and politics. "The moralist does not profess to convert souls; but (1) he cannot shirk the responsibility of criticising as well as expounding the existing moral ideal (and as that varies so much he cannot even expound without criticising) and so suggesting its development. (2) All thinking honestly done in the long run betters practice. The 'immoral thoughtlessness' of mankind is the chief retarding force and is too little considered by moral teachers, who are too apt to assume that the ideal is generally agreed upon and that the only question is how to realise it." "The ordinary ideal needs enlargement to prevent it fossilising (evils of intuitionism) and also to show the need of a relative fixity, as against mere individualism, by constant reference to a social good. No mere appeal to 'instinct' or 'nature' will do." Thus one part of practical ethics is the development or enlargement of the social ideal. And along with this there must go development in the means of realising the ideal, *i.e.* development of customs and institutions. Now it seemed to Ritchie that in these aspects intuitionism shows great practical weakness. It prescribes absolute laws and thus overlooks (if it does

not deny) the progressiveness of the moral ideal, and it tends to minimise the ethical importance of customs and institutions. "Herein lies the practical evil of intuitionist systems of morals, that they tend to fossilise the principles of conduct at the particular stage of social development which commends itself to the particular intuitionist."[1] Thus he dwelt on the "mischief of 'absolute' moral precepts," precepts which leave out of account the relative aspect of duties, their relativity to varying conditions of society and to the various persons or institutions to whom they may be owing. Such "absolute" moral precepts "may cause intense misery to conscientious persons, who *feel* that they are not doing right to others in obeying them, and when obeyed they may cause mischief to society. For example, take the case of filial duty. *Pére Goriot* has no formulated moral; but there runs through it the sentiment of the absolute claims of paternity. The evil is especially clear in the case of sexual morality and the wrong principles on which it is enforced. For the proper working of family morality, as that is conceived by all our stricter moralists and religious teachers, are not so many and such virtues needed as would be sufficient for the maintenance of a freer set of institutions, which institutions should at the same time not hinder but promote and stimulate these virtues?" On the other hand, "before the institution of marriage is condemned, should we not ask whether it has ever yet had a fair chance? Only when women are better educated, when they are no longer driven to regard marriage as a 'profession,' and more healthy acquaintance between the sexes, independently of marriage, is possible than at present, only then will marriage get a fair chance. Question—would not a great many men and women choose to go through life as faithful companions

[1] *Moral Philosophy*, § 11, p. 322.

to each other without any external bond? But what of the weaker and less worthy of both sexes? In the meantime what have the State and the opinion of society got mainly to concern themselves with in this matter? An increased recognition of the responsibilities of parentage." Public opinion should endeavour to secure "a certain minimum standard of fitness for marriage—*e.g.* absence of some of the more terrible diseases. Life insurance among the more careful middle class is often used as a test of fitness in the case of men. This should be applied to women also. In course of time the law might require a certain minimum standard. Habitual drunkenness and lunacy might be bars to legal marriage and also grounds of divorce or at least judicial separation. So too with crimes. At present there is a tendency to treat many criminals as diseased: their punishment (whether death or life-long imprisonment) should be such as to prevent them transmitting their tendencies. It may be said that 'it is impossible to interfere in this way with human beings in such a purely personal matter as the relation of the sexes.' It is not impossible, for it is constantly done, but on grounds that cannot be defended as rational or socially expedient. For instance, there is interference with individual freedom on the ground of (1) race-prejudice (the white man who marries a black woman, etc.); (2) caste (*mésalliance*); (3) religion ('mixed marriages' discouraged); (4) prohibited degrees; (5) social and moral effect of laws about marriage and illegitimacy, *e.g.* Scotch law; (6) celibacy of clergy and of scholars (meaning often survival of the unfittest); (7) money considerations; (8) reasons of State. Some of these might be dropped and considerations of general fitness taken instead of them, in accordance with Plato's maxim, 'the most useful is the most holy.'"[1]

[1] From a paper on "the ethical aspects of the controversy about heredity."

"I do consider that it *is* the business of the State (supposing a well organised State) to regulate, if possible, the birth, and certainly the education of children so as to give them a fair chance of growing up into the best possible men and women, but that, apart from that end, the State should not interfere between fully-grown individuals; and that the usual opinion of society, which condemns *e.g.* George Eliot and has nothing but sympathy for people who cause the existence of children with inherited diseases and who have no prospect of giving them a fair education, provided only they have gone through a religious ceremony, is mischievous in the extreme."[1]

The great obstacle to these and other moral reforms is, in Ritchie's opinion, the individualism, on the one hand, of our sentimental belief in an abstract right of liberty and, on the other hand, of our competitive economic system. Thus in a letter (1890) he says:—

"I firmly believe that the existing average moral judgments about the relations of the sexes cannot possibly alter, till the whole economic structure of society is altered. Here and there an individual may anticipate the judgments of a future age or go back on those of a past. But average morality being ultimately conditioned by its economic structure more than by its political institutions or anything else, this must be so—however counter it seems to one's earlier notions of what morality is. Thus, *e.g.* (except in polygamous societies, where all women are married and kept under guard, or in such places as small villages where every one marries early and is strictly under the priest) there will always be an 'unfortunate' class while women's earnings are on the average less certain than those of men, and under a competitive system that will always be so. For men will as a rule only work (and stay in the country) for what will support them and a

[1] Letter (1887).

wife and allow them a glass of beer. Women will work for what will support themselves (without the beer) and so will always undersell men and one another. Thus some women will always find life easier by selling themselves and living in comparative idleness. I know it sounds horrible, but I fear it's true. 'Moral' and religious influences will only raise a few above the pressure of circumstances, *therefore* circumstances *must* be altered. . . . The economic change must come before the moral, before we can even know certainly what the moral change will be. This has always been so in history. However that's a long story; but the history of slavery is very instructive in this respect."

This may suffice to give an idea of Ritchie's views regarding moral reforms in which he was specially interested and of the way in which he applied his socialism to practical problems. His general attitude is clearly set forth in the *Moral Philosophy*, §§ 10 *sqq*. And when we turn to his opinions about political reform, in the widest sense, we find further illustration of the same bent of mind. He had, for instance, little if any sympathy either with narrow nationalism on the one hand or with vague cosmopolitanism on the other. But he believed firmly in the ideal of the federation of the world, agreeing with the doctrine of Kant that a permanent general peace can never be secured by treaties between independent nations, but only by the establishment of a federation of self-governing states, in which there is ultimately one sovereignty and attempts at war become equivalent to rebellion. And, again agreeing with Kant, he felt sure that this must eventually come to pass. Switzerland, which he regarded as "a very laboratory of political experiments," exhibits the ideal in miniature, and he spoke with great sympathy of the prompt way in which the Swiss Federated government suppressed at once by military force the revolt of Ticino, punished one member of the

confederation in order to secure the interests of the whole. War, like individual crime, can only be restrained by a common government able to keep the peace by the use of force, and he regarded as self-contradictory and delusive the views of those who preach peace between nations by means of disarmament and a refusal to employ force, while they have no objection to the use of police and prisons for the forcible maintenance of peace between individuals. Again it seemed to Ritchie that one great step towards the federation of the world would be the federation of the English-speaking communities. This also is in harmony with Kant's idea that, if one powerful federation of self-governing states could be established, other states would inevitably be attracted into it until in course of time it would become universal. In this sense Ritchie was an "imperialist" and, though no one could be more free from the spirit of jingoism or the desire for indefinite territorial expansion, he stoutly defended the Boer war against the views of the majority of his own party. He would not have held his action on this occasion to be inconsistent with an earlier declaration of his that "patriotism is a valuable moral discipline in a community that is struggling for freedom or for national existence. In a triumphant country it loses its virtuous character and is apt to be a name only for noisy disparagement of others and for self-aggrandisement at their expense." For he looked upon the South African war, not as a war of aggression, but as an endeavour on the part of the suzerain state to free the people of one of its dependencies from the tyranny of a narrow and stubborn oligarchy.

In dealing with the problem of the ideal relations of States to one another, Ritchie held that "we must distinguish between those ideals which assume impossible conditions and those which take account of

the conditions of nature and of human nature under which an ideal can possibly be realised."[1] The ideal of the older Utopias and the modern "anarchist" ideal both assume impossible conditions. "The imitators of Plato in modern times have been apt to place their Utopias in remote or inaccessible islands, so that the problem of good government could be restricted to internal wellbeing. To make this a condition nowadays is to assume an impossibility. Geographical discovery, the spreading of European races over the rest of the globe, the increased rapidity of communication due to steam and electricity have made it impossible to find the undisturbed solitude of the old Utopias. In other words, if we are to attempt nowadays to construct an ideal political society which we really believe to be an ideal that can actually influence the practical reformer and can legitimately be used for the criticism of defects in the political world we live in, we must not please ourselves with the fancy of a small community in some island bearing all manner of fruits under genial skies, unoccupied by awkward savages and unvisited by trading adventurer or foreign warship." On the other hand, "we need not linger over the ideal of the philosophical anarchist. If all human beings were or were likely to become actuated by fraternal sentiment and also gifted with such insight as to act not only with kindly intentions but with beneficial results, we might be content to regard the ideal of politics as the disappearance of all political institutions. This is what is sometimes meant by the dictum that the end of good government is to make government superfluous. The end of good laws is to make the infliction of the penalty for disobedience unnecessary; but that does not mean that the law makes itself unnecessary, except in the sense that the law passes into an unbroken habit. If freedom be put

[1] Paper on "The ideal of a World State."

forward as the end of the State and therefore of the whole political endeavour of mankind, this cannot mean the mere negative liberty of being left alone; and, unless we suppose changes in human nature for which past and present experience gives us no warrant, such absolute absence of control would mean a return to the lowest savagery and a long tedious process of building up again the overthrown fabric of order and civilization. If it be suggested that religion might bring about the happy change that would render prisons and policemen and lawyers and legislators unnecessary, it is forgotten that, so far as past experience helps us, religion, while capable of being the strongest of all social forces, is a social force only in virtue of its organisation of individuals in a society—a society which, with penalties of excommunication and threats of hell-fire, can dispense with the judge and the hangman. A religion which acted solely through the enthusiasm of disinterested love in the hearts of individuals would be acting upon saintly beings such as have never yet been numerous upon earth. We assume that human nature, apart from the discipline of institutions, retains some fierce animal passions of selfishness, such as may be found in most healthy children, and therefore that liberty in the sense of complete absence of restraint is not a desirable end. Freedom as the end of the State means the capacity for self-realisation. It is the positive ideal of doing something, of making things, possessing and using them, of acquiring knowledge, of living a full and manysided social life. As a means to this ideal sometimes *laissez-faire* and sometimes social help must be used; and opinions may reasonably differ as to the limits between them in each particular case." But liberty "in the sense of self-realisation is too vague to give us of itself much information, and further analysis is needed." And "the ideal of negative liberty applied

to independent nations means the continuance of the present constant fear of war and preparation for it."

As regards political reform in Great Britain Ritchie believed in imperial federation, the germ of which is to be found in the supreme court of appeal. Within this wider federation there should be a federation of the United Kingdom, with local legislatures (or committees) for Scotland, Ireland (or for each province) and Wales. The members of the House of Commons should be paid, and their number diminished. As to the House of Lords, the disabilities of peers should be removed; but the appeal in actions at law should be retained. The House might be reconstituted as a federal senate (at first with mainly consultative powers). In this case there might be a single chamber for Great Britain. But this would be advisable only if the referendum were adopted. Otherwise the second Chamber for Great Britain should consist of life peers and representatives of local bodies. Even in this case the referendum would be an advantage as a means of settling a possible conflict between the Chambers. Ritchie, however, regarded the referendum as likely to become a question of parliamentary politics only in the event of (1) "the splitting up of parties into groups, so that we no longer had the dual party system on which the smooth working of our Cabinet government depends"; or (2) "the abolition of the House of Lords, or the abolition of its power of veto." "The greatest advantages of all in the referendum" seemed to him to be "(1) that it would separate futile discussion as to whether a government has a mandate from the people to do this or that, from profitable discussion as to whether a measure is good or bad, and (2) that it would simplify the moral problem with which the conscientious citizen is constantly confronted. Suppose I

strongly approve of an important measure before the public, am rather indifferent about a second, and am strongly opposed to a third, and yet all three have been put in the party programme, what am I to do? I know, *e.g.* that a vote I am really giving for disestablishment will be counted as a vote for Home Rule or *vice versa*, and moreover, I am compelled to vote for Mr. A., when I really think Mr. B. would be a more useful person in Parliament. There are very great merits in our system of two parties, and two parties only; but there are very great drawbacks, and if the system should break down, I don't feel as if one would have to despair of one's country. There are other resources in the political institutions of mankind, and amongst them the referendum seems to me one of those most worth studying."

As regards the relations of Church and State Ritchie was also opposed to the policy of individualist Liberalism. "I think disestablishment a move in the wrong direction—it is a falling back on the old anarchical Liberalism of the Herbert Spencer type." "Is not the demand for the separation of the Church from the State a confession of failure on the part of the Church? It is only valuable as a recognition that religion is supra-national." On the other hand, is disestablishment clearly desirable from the State's point of view? "In Italy and in France, if the State severed all connection with the Roman Church, would not the clergy form still more an anti-constitutional party than they do at present? Is it safe to leave the clergy alone? If we had established the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland (government having a veto on the appointment of bishops), I think Ireland would have been more easily managed. But English Protestant prejudices have made that solution impossible, I fear." In some notes and suggestions, which Ritchie sent to

Mr. E. S. P. Haynes in connection with Mr. Haynes's book on *Religious Persecution*, he puts the matter thus: "'Separation' of Church and State is ambiguous. (1) It may exist in some very important cases with establishment of one or more churches (*e.g.* in France), and it may not exist, except merely in form, where there is no established church, but where certain religious bodies dominate political opinion. (2) Is it true that legal 'separation' of Church and State necessarily secures more toleration than every form of State recognition of religion *plus* legal toleration of certain things and social toleration, due partly to the greater toleration likely to exist within a State church than within any ordinary sect?[1] I think we must distinguish between (*a*) the toleration which favours intellectual progress, and (*b*) the toleration which favours the rise of all sorts of eccentric sects, some of which may, indeed, conceivably prove useful 'variations.' (*a*) is better secured probably in Germany or Switzerland, (*b*) in the United States of America. Where there is no State church the leader of an intellectual advance has generally to leave his sect and found a new little sect of his own. Note the difference between the Ethical Societies in America and in England. In England they may help to leaven opinion within the Churches; in America, in most places at least, public opinion does not tolerate the man who goes to no church, so the 'agnostic' or 'advanced thinker' has to make his own little church, and call it an Ethical Society. I doubt if this favours progress. Nobody perhaps would think of setting up an Established Church legally in the United States now, or in any American State; but the Supreme Court has decided that the United States is a 'Christian country,' which means establish-

[1] "Darwin was buried in Westminster Abbey. How would he have been treated in South Carolina?"

ing, without endowment, the greatest common measure of the Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Baptist, Methodist. and the more old-fashioned Unitarian religions.

"Where there exists an ancient established church, whose history is linked with that of the nation, would toleration (in sense (*a*)) gain by disestablishment, and would the nation gain by either handing over the cathedrals to a sect, or turning them into museums? Disestablishment in Scotland would give an enormous increase of members to the Scotch Episcopal Church. Many of the laity, and a good many of the clergy of the present established (Presbyterian) church would join it rather than be absorbed by the United Free Church. That *might* produce an intellectual widening in the Scotch Episcopal Church, but would increase the social gap between the more cultured and the less cultured form of religion. In England disestablishment would be a great gain to the Roman Catholic Church; it alone would have the historical prestige. It would not put the Methodist or Baptist socially in any better position. In Scotland the non-established Episcopal Church has, because of its use of a stately liturgy, etc., a social prestige, in some places, over the Established Church.

"Things of that sort seem to me worth considering before we accept the American solution as the best. It may, of course, come to be adopted because of the exigencies of party politics or because of growing anti-Erastianism and irrationalism in the Church. I doubt very much if the disestablishment movement is growing at present in spite of the noise of the Liberation Society. In Scotland, I think, it has decidedly gone back. Disestablishment agitation is one of the causes why parties in Scotland have altered in strength so much since 1880; and surely the Church of England is much stronger now than it was 20 or 30 years ago.

'Toleration' (the abolition of tests in Universities, etc.) has on the whole diminished its unpopularity. Again, has not the change from the old-fashioned *laissez-faire* Liberalism to the new semi-socialistic Liberalism helped to make the idea of a State Church less strange than it seemed to the individualists of the Bright and Cobden period? Lord Rosebery horrified old-fashioned doctrinaire Radicals by saying the State had as much right to establish a church as an army or navy.

"India is the greatest example of real religious equality in the world—not the mock religious equality, which is equivalent to the Nonconformist conscience, Sabbatarian legislation, the greatest common measure of Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, old-fashioned Unitarian (perhaps), very low Anglican, etc., leaving out Jews, Seventh Day Baptists, Roman Catholics (for many purposes), High Anglicans (for some purposes), Mohammedans, Mormons, aggressive Atheists, etc. In India, as in the Early Roman Empire, the magistrates administer Mohammedan, Jewish, Hindu, Parsee, Christian law, etc., according to the religion of the people 'indifferently,' except, as in the Roman Empire, that certain wild things (burning of widows, etc.) are put down on grounds of social order." "The case of the Doukhobors in Canada shows the difficulty of according complete toleration to a wild sect." While Ritchie could not accept the abstract dogma of religious equality in the form in which it is usually advocated, he was equally opposed to the contention that disestablishment is "sacrilege or robbery of God or anything of that sort." "If the State was justified in what it did at the Reformation in Scotland and even in what it did in England, the State would be justified in doing similar things now. The question is not one to be decided on abstract moral principles. It is solely a question of what is most for the welfare of the people as a whole."

To the problems of religion and theology Ritchie applied the distinction between origin and validity in a way which is illustrated in the concluding sections of the *Cogitatio Metaphysica*. It appears further in letters written between 1885 and 1887. "The ultimate value of the Christian religion must depend on the ideal it sets before mankind, *i.e.* on what it is in its highest form. How it originated and grew is a matter for the historian and scholar. The Jews used to ask, 'Is not this the carpenter's son?' assuming that origin determined value. The defence of Christianity is to be found not in the 1st chapter of Matthew but in the 5th. 'By their fruits ye shall know them' asserts this same principle of judging by effects (end) not origin. The fourth Gospel takes Christ away from Jewish genealogies altogether and identifies him with the Eternal Reason, which is identical with God, not a mere individual in a particular time and place. Of course it still remains possible that the Eternal Reason should be specially manifested (incarnate) in some individual; but the spiritual truth is not dependent on the historical event, for any alleged historical event (and the reported 'events' in the Gospels are not well authenticated, compared with many things in ancient history) always is open to dispute. But of a spiritual truth there can only be spiritual evidence, the witness of God in the soul, *i.e.* reason recognising itself . . . I know you feel this undermines reality, and most people feel that; but it leaves the only things that can't be shaken." Again, as to miracles he writes:—"All the old religions of the world had their miracles. The early Christian apologists never denied the miracles of the heathen: they only said they were wrought by the help of the devil, as the Jews said of Christ's. There is as good historical evidence for the Emperor Vespasian having cured a blind man miraculously as for any of the miracles in the New Testament. All ancient

history swarms with miracles. The difference between Jesus and Socrates is not that the former worked miracles and the latter did not; but that Socrates had an ideal of life for the privileged few. He even sends 'the women' away that they might not be with him at his death, and none of his teaching was for them or for the multitude whom he despised. Jesus addressed himself to all, especially to the despised and outcast. Camille Desmoulins was quite right when he called him 'le bon sans culotte de Nazareth.' The essence of Christianity is democracy, in the very widest sense. Walt Whitman is more a Christian than an archbishop, 'ranking next the Prince of Wales,' can ever be (though I don't think him much of a poet). This element of Christianity could not be a mere 'invention,' though all the aspirations of the oppressed meet in it. This is what I understand by the incarnation of God in man, that man as such, humanity, can put on the divine nature. Jesus may have worked miracles, may have thought he did or may have been only supposed to do so: that matters little. It is a question for historical research, not for faith. He began the revolution of society, which is yet very far from its end. You will say, 'that is turning religion into politics.' It is making politics religion. I think a man should give his vote in the spirit in which he might pray, 'Thy kingdom come, thy will be done *on earth* as it is in Heaven.' And if women had votes, they would be more religious, if less under 'the Church,' and would help to make politics more religious too. You will say, 'in all this there is no consolation or hope for the individual.' Perhaps not, but it is only as the individual can work for humanity, *i.e.* with God, that the individual has moral value or significance. All that we know as best and highest in the lives or ideas of others or in our own thoughts which tell us of our awful defects in feeling, thinking, acting—that is what

is morally truest, that is the ideal, the revelation of God, the only God we can practically know and in whom it is a duty to have faith, not in historical statements or dogmatic formulae. When we condemn life and say 'it is a poor thing at the best' (unless it is simply disappointed pleasure seeking) we do so only by measuring it by an ideal. This ideal in a progressive age or mind constantly grows. That is the perpetual revelation of God to man, the Holy Spirit 'leading us to all truth.' These are my sincerest convictions, though to most people I dare not express them. They would only be misunderstood and might needlessly offend.

"In Green's second sermon you will find the nature of 'faith' put more truly and more reverentially than I could put it. According to such a view, which I thoroughly accept, miracles even if they were verified are quite irrelevant to a religious truth, which must always be a truth of principle influencing conduct, not a statement of fact. I think only those can consistently believe in miracles having happened, who believe that they can happen now. The ordinary position of Protestants is quite illogical, I should say transitional." "When people really believed in miracles they burned ugly old women as witches and spread pestilences by crowding churches instead of cleaning cities. Now there is a sham belief in miracles that once happened and happen no longer, a belief arising from mental confusion or moral cowardice." "For beliefs about matters of fact we cannot be held morally responsible in the same way that we are for beliefs in principles of conduct. That is why it can be plausibly maintained both that 'men are not responsible for their opinions' and that they are." Again, "the Christian doctrine of incarnation, if it means only a miraculous birth, is nothing distinctive of Christianity. What is distinctive of Christianity is its overthrow of prejudice

of race, caste, sex, and its ideal of 'losing life to save it,' which is the spiritual truth in the ideas of incarnation and resurrection (God becomes man, *i.e.* humbles himself, suffers, dies to live, that men may do the same) and which is independent of any particular events happening or not."

Ritchie had no liking for creeds and he was strongly averse from the use of them in public worship. But he did not share the special dislike which is often felt towards the Athanasian creed. On the contrary he preferred it to the others, as being more metaphysical and less mythological. "I have no special objection to the Athanasian creed. It is a protest in favour of the Hegelian notion, the unity of contradictions, against the abstract metaphysics of the ordinary understanding. As such it is all right. All philosophers who don't accept that without doubt do 'perish everlastingly.' But as an arithmetical conundrum *plus* some strong swearing it is only a degradation to the souls of those who utter it and hear it. Why can't they let one worship without the insolence of repeating creeds? Even the Apostles' Creed (not the creed of the apostles, thank God) contains that monstrous parthenogenesis and the sitting 'at the right hand of God' (who is without body, parts or passions) and the resurrection of the body. Oh adulterous generation seeking after a sign, turning metaphors into absurd facts! What vast moral injury is done constantly by tacking spiritual truth to materialistic mythology!" Again, "if I were to occupy myself specially with Neo-Platonism and the metaphysical controversies of the Greek Church and to think myself into the mental atmosphere of the fourth century, I might feel quite able to accept the Athanasian creed, except a few statements at the end, which are common to it and the other creeds. It is the creed about which I felt the least difficulty for myself at the time I used to think theologically. It

contains hardly any questionable statements of fact. All these propositions about the Trinity and the relation between the divine and human nature are metaphysical theories, not statements of fact for which evidence can be given or required; and the objection to an ordinary English congregation using this creed is not that it is false, but that it is perfectly meaningless (though it may have a profound meaning to a person who has thought himself into the spirit of a Greek theologian). It has the same morally dangerous effect as the repetition of any other solemn and soothing formula, like 'Om, om, padne, om,' or 'abracadabra,' or 'the blessed word Mesopotamia.' (I think I must have told you of the Scotsman who, travelling in Russia, declared that he had found a countryman of his earning an honest (?) livelihood by becoming a priest, and, in administering the Sacrament, using the words, 'If it'll do ye nae guid, it'll do ye nae harm,' to the great edification of the Russian peasants. But possibly this was not Scotch, but old Slavonic.) Now though I might try to understand and appreciate and honestly accept some metaphysical formula about the universe, of Aristotle or Plotinus or Thomas Aquinas or Hegel or Schopenhauer, that is quite a different thing from asserting, as a historical fact, what one has no evidence for or may have evidence against. *E.g.* 'Plato was the son, not of the Athenian Ariston, but of the God Apollo,' or 'Julius Cæsar was not really killed but became one of the Olympian gods,' both which statements were believed, and in each of which I might recognise a moral truth (the grandeur of Plato and the permanent influence of Cæsar), but which I should not feel justified in asserting as literally true. Suppose that again, as in the Alexandrian age, the course of progress were arrested, and the wheels of intellect, instead of moving on the mind, were to turn round on themselves, scientific philosophy might turn

into dogmatism, and one could easily frame a creed which, though quite true for oneself, would be meaningless if repeated by rustics and children. 'Whosoever will be saved (from the ridicule of all enlightened persons) it is necessary above all things that he hold the Darwinio-Spencerian faith. . . . And the Darwinio-Spencerian faith is this: Evolution is a passing from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and from an unstable to a stable equilibrium in *saecula saeculorum*. . . . The struggle for existence an ultimate fact, natural selection an ultimate fact, survival of the fittest an ultimate fact: And yet they are not three ultimate facts, but one ultimate fact. . . . All knowledge is relative, and of phenomena only: all metaphysical systems that profess to reach noumena and enquire into the causes of ultimate facts shall without doubt perish everlastingly.'"

On the problem of immortality Ritchie occasionally expressed opinions, but without coming to any quite definite conclusion. He discusses it briefly in the *Confessio Fidei*, § 8, and in the *Moral Philosophy*, p. 56. He was more interested in the ethical consequences of the belief in immortality than in the question of fact. Belief in an abstract individual immortality, the immortality of "individual human souls 'naturally' indestructible and yet with a beginning in time," was, of course, inconsistent with the general principles of his thinking. Apart from this, he pointed out that "it is absurd to think it bound up with religion. Buddhism dreads it, Judaism is without it. It was not always a Christian doctrine, and it is really incompatible with theism. It requires a theory of pluralism." "Are we not immortal just so far as we cease to be individual merely?" His faith in society prevented him from any craving for personal immortality. His optimism, his belief in human progress, was so great

that he hardly realised the pertinacity with which people cling to the hope of personal survival. His belief in the rationality and the ultimate goodness of the universe kept him from feeling the need of any assurances about himself and what would happen to him : his whole interest lay in the question of finding and realising in this life the will of God, the ideal, so far as we are able to comprehend it. Thus, for instance, he asks :—"If there is no individual immortality, ought anyone to spend a life-time in spiritual cultivation, without producing anything that will help others? That seems to me the most difficult moral problem raised by the doubt about immortality." He did feel the difficulties which the belief endeavours to meet ; but he thought it a good thing for humanity that it should remain neither proved nor disproved, a hope rather than a certainty or an illusion. In a letter (1886) he wrote :—"For many years I had given up almost thinking about the question of a future life, and had settled down into a sort of acquiescence in the idea that all we could aim at was if possible to leave those who should come after us in the world better, or at least not worse off, than ourselves in the struggle with the evils of nature and humanity. But it was your several times coming back on the question, 'Don't you think there is any future life?' that set me pondering over it again and made me more clearly conscious of what in some way I could not help feeling all along—how terribly hopeless life often seems with everything in knowledge, in emotion, in conduct, even at the best so incomplete. Practically I don't get beyond this. (1) I think there can be no satisfactory argument against the probability of a future life for the individual. (2) I think a basis can be found for morality apart from any hope (or fear) of the kind ; but it is a rather stoical and despairing

morality. (3) If the world and human life has an ethical purpose in it, in some way or other our efforts must be not all in vain; and I begin to see that 'humanity' apart from its individual members is an unreal abstraction,—but so also is the individual apart from relation to others."

In these, as in other matters, Ritchie had travelled far in thought from his early beliefs. But he had little sympathy with the explosive or the gay manner of revolution in thinking. "I like *Literature and Dogma*," he writes in a letter (1887), "but doesn't Matthew Arnold spread his ideas rather thin? I think it a very useful book, more useful than more scientific and learned works. But I don't think one gains anything by trying to deny to oneself or others the saddening effect which comes from parting with old ideas, especially when that makes a break not only in the 'natural piety' that should link our days together, but in the possibility of mutual understanding between those who belong in fact or in spirit to different generations. Still we ought to face all troubles." Firmly believing in progress, both in thought and in practice, he was equally convinced that it cannot take place "by leaps and bounds." We may turn over a new leaf from time to time; but it is folly to try to skip the whole book except the last chapter. The good of the future is rooted in the good of the past and the present, and we shall only hinder reform if we ignore this. "I wish, for the sake of social reformers themselves, to be scrupulously just to anything of good in existing institutions, and above all to be quite just to human nature, because it is only through what is good now and through the capacities of human beings for greater goodness that we can ever get to a better society."[1] It was in this spirit that Ritchie did all

[1] Letter, 1887.

his work, in the belief, on the one hand, that we must have a comprehensive ideal, lest we lose our lives in meaningless little efforts without any great end, and on the other hand, that we must not merely rest in this ideal or proclaim it as an abstract dogma, but develop it and apply it in detail, finding it as we realise it. "If we are always gazing at the mountain-top, we shall never reach it—not being able to fly. We must be content to follow the humble path through forest and glen, where the view of the summit is hid from us, though the thought of it is still in our minds. We must not despise the details of duty in the citizen's life, the value of institutions though they are human and may often seem to conceal the divine end we wish to attain." [1]

[1] From a MS. note.

COGITATIO METAPHYSICA

(1902)

Perhaps not every one who reads this will grumble because it is short.

"Nothing has been more injurious to Philosophy than mathematics, that is, than the imitation of its method in a sphere where it is impossible of application." Kant, *Untersüchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze den natürlichen Theologie und der Moral.*

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

§ 1.

By ordinary knowledge we mean what the Greeks called "opinion," *i.e.* unsystematized, isolated beliefs about things, so far as they are considered true. Science is systematized knowledge, when some degree of unifica tion has been attained. The unification in science is only partial (as Herbert Spencer says); for science, or rather the sciences, can only proceed by breaking up the roughly constructed wholes of ordinary belief and considering certain aspects of them to the exclusion of others. Thus the procedure of the sciences necessarily involves abstraction. Thus science, *i.e.* the sum of the existing sciences, still fails to satisfy the demand for unification. Philosophy, which in its origin was not distinct from science and from which the sciences have

gradually differentiated themselves, is the effort after a complete unification and systematization of knowledge. In ordinary life and in the special sciences we assume that the world is some sort of cosmos or orderly system: philosophy is the attempt to know it as such—an attempt, an effort only—for complete knowledge is out of our reach. Philosophy is the love or striving after wisdom (Pythagoras).

§ 2.

Unification, system, is the ideal of philosophy; but the actual work it has to do consists mainly in criticism. For the purposes of ordinary life and of the special sciences we have to make abstractions, we have to make assumptions, we have to use conceptions ("categories") without testing them: thus dogmatism easily rises out of the rough thinking of ordinary life and out of the necessarily partial views of the special sciences. It is the business of philosophy, in its effort to uphold the ideal of complete unification, to test and criticise these partial and one-sided views; to endeavour to see them in their relation to one another. In this aspect of it philosophy has been well called "the criticism of categories." Plato's phrase (*Rep.* VII.) *συνοπτικὸς ὁ διαλεκτικός* brings out the double aspect of philosophy: it is "the looking at things as a whole," and it proceeds by dialectic, examining everything, taking nothing for granted.

When philosophy attempts constructive systematization without sufficient warning that its ultimate constructions can only be tentative and hypothetical, it is apt to seem and to be dogmatism, and to provoke scepticism in the work of philosophy generally.

§ 3.

Philosophy is a kind of knowledge, a kind of science —an attempt to realise the ideal of knowledge and

science. It is a *thinking* consideration of the world (Hegel). It has to take account of feelings and emotions, of the practical needs and the unsatisfied aspirations of mankind, as part of the material to be studied. But philosophy itself must be intellectual in character. Its business is to know, not to do; to test and criticise,[1] not to preach. Hence philosophy can never be popular. The sciences have all originated in man's practical needs (geometry was land measurement, etc.[2]); but there is no science in the strict sense, no philosophy, until man gets beyond the mere craving for the satisfaction of material wants, and in the leisure of a civilised society can feel purely intellectual wants and seek to satisfy them.[3] Those boastfully "practical persons" who do not indulge the desire to know, which Aristotle perhaps rashly ascribes to all mankind, though they may welcome the material conveniences of scientific progress, do not have genuinely scientific interests and do not philosophise. Philosophy cannot be made palatable to them except by becoming false to its special end.

§ 4.

Only confusion can arise from trying to get over philosophical difficulties by appealing to practical needs or to emotion, or from expecting philosophy to do the work of religion, poetry, music, cookery, or medicine. There has indeed come down to us from the Greek world, along with the name of philosophy, the conception of it as "a way of life." Pythagoras, "lover of wisdom," was thought of in later ages as a mixture of sage and saint. Stoicism, Epicureanism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, Neo-Platonism regarded philosophy primarily as a rule of life and as a substitute

[1] "Testing the instruments may be more useful than accumulating observations with bad instruments." [Note found elsewhere.]

[2] Cf. Herodotus, II., 109, v. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 19.

[3] Aristotle *Metaph.* I. *init.*

for religion: and so came the tendency to disparage mere knowledge, to subordinate theory to practice or even to emotional ecstasy. Philosophy to Plato and Aristotle was primarily a way of thinking, a desire to know the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; but knowledge was to influence practice, as theory, conscientiously and seriously held, must always do. The philosopher, like the man of science, must discipline himself to accept truth, however it may violate his private likings. He has, however, to consider problems raised by those aspects of the universe and of human life which the specialist in this or that natural science can altogether disregard.

It will not do to alter the multiplication table because we are getting into debt and are afraid of poverty: it will not do to twist our metaphysics in defiance of correct thinking because we are unhappy or shrink from death. Needs and desires set going all our thoughts, as well as all our other activities; but needs and desires of themselves give us no standard of value.[1] They must themselves be estimated. What is our test of truth? What is our test of the relative values for human beings of different beliefs and modes of conduct? These are the fundamental questions of logic (in the widest sense) and of ethics.

§ 5.

Philosophy cannot be profitably pursued apart from consideration of its history. To study our problems fairly we must at the least understand the way in which they have come to us. To think we can look our questions in the face unaffected by what has been believed by our predecessors is a delusion. The very language we use is permeated by the metaphysics of the past. Besides if all preceding systems were false or worthless, doesn't this make it highly probable that

[1] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, p. 244.

the new system will be false also? Whereas if all contain some element of truth and value, if the history of philosophy be itself "philosophy taking its time," gradually working out its solution in a long process of dialectic, *i.e.* of discussion, there is a reasonable hope that the new thought growing out of the old and worked out in relation to it, will not be worthless for the future (cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VII. i. § 5). We may well distrust any philosophical system which begins by proclaiming itself entirely new. Radicalism to be useful must be based on conservatism and on a reasonable respect for the wisdom of the past.

LOGIC.

§ 6.

Logic is the most suitable name for the whole philosophical science which discusses the question of validity in knowledge. Psychology professes to deal with knowing ("intellection") only as a mental process: it professes to be a science concerned with descriptions of what is. To limit logic to the estimation of consistency and leave over the question of truth for "epistemology" may be convenient for bibliographical or for elementary educational purposes; but it is only a makeshift division. We cannot separate the question of consistency from the question of truth.[1] Moreover there is a good historical reason for using logic to denote the subjects treated of in the *Posterior Analytics*, and not restricting it to some fragments of the *Prior Analytics* and the *De Interpretatione* twisted away from reality into a false resemblance to mathematics. The imitation of mathematics has been a curse to the philosophical sciences.

[1] See next §.

§ 7.

Truth is often said to be conformity of our thought with facts. But what are facts? The only pure fact (*i.e.* the only fact into which there enters no element of theory, of thinking, of mental construction) is the uninterpreted feeling or sensation, which so long as it is uninterpreted means nothing and cannot be expressed or spoken about: and pure facts, moreover, are facts only to the one consciousness that has the feeling and at the moment at which the feeling is felt. Interpretation, even recognition of a feeling as such and such (classification), involves theory. The fact that the sun rose at 6 a.m. to-day is a theory—and a false theory, though convenient. "I saw the prisoner on such a day in such a place" is an inference —possibly erroneous. What are commonly called facts are statements which are accepted as fitting in with the actual or possible experience of mankind in general, or of the experts in any special subject, though they may never directly have entered into my experience or yours: *e.g.* that there is a lonely rock on a little visited portion of the Antarctic Ocean which very few have seen, or that there is such and such an element in the atmosphere of the sun, or that Julius Caesar was killed on such a day. All these "facts" are ways of thinking which we accept as valid because they fit in with other ways of thinking and other parts of our and other people's experience which we accept as valid.

The sole ultimate test of truth is coherence in thinking and experience. Experience includes thinking and the pure facts of sensation and feeling. Descartes said the test of truth was "clear and distinct thinking"· he meant this principle of coherence or non-contradiction (cf. *Method*, Part IV.; *Meditation* III.); but his phrase was unfortunate, because it seemed to ignore all reference to the ultimate fact of mere

feeling (though *penser*, *cogitare*, to Descartes = consciousness in general) and because it seemed to suggest that by mere effort of individual ratiocination complete systems of truth could be built up.

As a matter of psychological fact we cannot, when thinking clearly and distinctly, admit a belief which is inconsistent with the existing mass of beliefs in our mind. Either we must reject the new opinion which claims our acceptance or we must readjust our existing system of beliefs in such a way as to admit the new opinion. Most persons very seldom think clearly and distinctly and it is impossible for us to think clearly and distinctly about our whole set of beliefs at once. Hence we very easily hold or think we hold in a dim, vague, partly realised fashion all sorts of beliefs which may turn out on examination to be inconsistent with one another; or again, we may carelessly reject what is not really inconsistent with what we really know and believe, though seemingly inconsistent with some mode in which we have been accustomed to express it. These are the reasons why the test of coherence, or non-contradiction, or inconceivability of the opposite has been rejected by some (*e.g.* Mill) as not an infallible test of truth.

No "proof" of this ultimate axiom can be given except by *reductio ad absurdum*—which is an appeal to the axiom itself. Anyone who denies it must maintain that contradictory statements can both be true (at the same time in the same reference, etc.). If so he must admit that the axiom itself can be true, as well as false, in the same sense. To deny the axiom is to make discussion impossible—as was seen by the Cynics, more keen-sighted than modern empiricists.

All thinking, all effort to know and understand the universe in however partial a way, makes the assumption that, so far at least as we can understand it, it is intelligible, *i.e.* it is a coherent, rational system.

Philosophy, which aspires to know the universe as a whole, makes the assumption that the universe as a whole is one coherent, intelligible system, though there may be much that to minds such as ours must always remain unintelligible. We know in part, but so far as we really claim to know, we assume coherence or system in what we study. We put down the unintelligible to defects in our present state of knowledge. To assert that anything that is ultimately real is absolutely unintelligible to any intelligence whatever would be to claim to possess a point of view from which we could survey the whole and see the chaos as chaos existing alongside of the orderly part. To establish the existence of a real element which could not be known in its relation to the whole would require us to know what by our profession we cannot know. There is however no necessary rejection of the ultimate principle of coherence involved in a system which is "dualistic" or "pluralistic," so far as to recognise the conditioning and limitation of the principle of order and unity by the imperfection with which it is manifested--(manifested to *us*, that is all we can judge of)—in the world of appearance or by the coexistence of beings of different grades of perfection. The principle of coherence by no means commits us to any abstract system of monism.[1]

§ 8.

Truth is one and indivisible, in the sense that the universe is one system; but in the one system there may be many subordinate systems, each of which is a cosmos or world, though not *the* universe (τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον); and in the one system, and in each of such subordinate systems, there are many aspects, and as we know partially and incompletely, we are led to speak of there being more than one kind of truth. For we

[1] Cf. "The One and the Many," pp. 207 *sqq.*

flatter ourselves, and say we know something to be true, when it is very far short of "the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." It is thus that we may hold that there can only be one true philosophy, and yet that all the great and serious philosophical systems are, so far, true and valid. They seem to conflict with one another because, and in so far as, one accentuates some element or aspect which is neglected in others.

§ 9.

[1] The principle of Identity, the principle of Contradiction (or rather non-contradiction), and the principle of Excluded Middle, are different aspects of this fundamental principle of coherence in its most abstract form. They are absolutely valid if applied strictly, but they can be applied strictly only to what is abstract. A must be A in the strict sense in which we speak of the same line or the same quantity in abstract mathematics; and that A must be either B or not-B is only necessarily true if not-B is taken in the strict sense of the *nomen* or *verbum infinitum*, applicable alike to that which exists or which does not exist, provided only it be not-B in the strict sense of B.[2] In ordinary language, and even in the language we use in the more concrete sciences, we do not speak in this strict sense of identity and contradiction. We do not think it worth while to assert that a person is identical with himself, unless he is in certain respects different (*e.g.* if, meeting a man after many years have changed him, we say "he is still the same"). We often say "contradictory" when we mean the logical contrary; and even when we expressly frame *nomina infinita* like "not-bad," "non-human," they do not apply to the whole of the universe actual and possible outside the "bad" and the

[1] Cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* III. 3, 1005 *b* 19:—τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό.

[2] Cf. "The relation of logic to psychology," p. 144.

"human," and they come in use to acquire a positive connotation. Hence it is that these fundamental logical principles cannot be applied directly, or without very great caution, to the solution of any concrete problem. Nevertheless they remain the ultimate test of truth even here. The apparent exceptions that have been alleged come from statements being made in confused form without all the conditions being clearly stated. The Antipodes can be called (*a*) "conceivable," or (*b*) "inconceivable," according as we think of gravitation (*a*) as a force acting in the direction of the greatest mass, or (*b*) as a force acting in the direction of an absolute "down." If we think seriously of gravitation as involving such an absolute "down," the Antipodes are inconceivable to us still.

The followers of Heraclitus (*οἱ φάσκοντες Ἡρακλειτίζειν*)[1] may have used his dicta to justify them in the absolute scepticism and impossibility of predication, which they rightly enough deduced from the denial of the principle of Contradiction.[2] Heraclitus himself was not thinking of the logical principle which had not yet been formulated. He was striving to express the idea that everything that is actual in the universe involves a unity of opposites: nothing can be understood properly in bare abstract self-identity. In modern phrase, we see the truth of what he means by considering the inapplicability of mere mathematical concepts to the world of concrete human interests. We may speak of Semi-Pelagians, but he was more mathematician than theologian, who described a Pelagian as equal to two Semi-Pelagians. We cannot remove a positive quantity from one side of an equation without adding it as a negative quantity to the other; but we must not argue like Mr. Spencer that every new law necessarily

[1] Aristotle *Metaph.* 1010 *a* 11.

[2] If nothing were absolutely certain, nothing could even be probable—nothing could be denied. (Cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* IV. 4.)

diminishes liberty, unless we expressly define liberty as mere absence of law, which is what no practical citizen means by it. John Locke spoke more wisely when he said : " Where there is no law, there is no liberty."

§ 10.

The principle of sufficient reason is the principle of coherence in its more concrete aspect. In seeking to interpret the world in which we find ourselves, we assume that it is a cosmos, that is to say that events and things cannot be regarded as isolated—they form parts of one system. Explanation in the scientific sense consists simply in taking things or events out of their isolation, and seeing them in relation to wider and wider aspects of the whole. Scientific description, classification, explanation (if we draw distinctions between them), are different grades of the same process of linking things together by the bond of a reason or cause (Plato, *Meno* 98 A).

Whether we call the principle of universal causation and the principle of the uniformity of nature ultimate axioms and presuppositions of all science, or regard them as scientific theories accepted gradually, and only as yet by scientifically-trained minds, depends entirely on what we mean by " causation " and by " nature." [1]

The fundamental principle of coherence is one without which we could have no " experience " (not merely no science)—we should have nothing but a succession of isolated sensations (or rather, to use a more careful psychology) a shifting, changing blur of confusion, which could only be called " experience " by courtesy. There would be no definite things with definite characteristics amid their changing aspects, such as to allow recognition (identification) and classification.

[1] Social factor in the axiom of the uniformity of nature (Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II., p. 195). See end of § 15.

Mere naming of things involves identity and non-contradiction; A must be A, and not other than A.

A principle (ἀρχή, major premise) may be the logical presupposition of an inference, although it is not yet formulated in words and though persons of no training in the use of abstract language might fail to recognise it or admit its truth, though they had been using it as a principle of argument all along.

Axioms are often called "immediate," "self-evident," "*a priori*." All such phrases are open to misunderstanding. The view here taken of axioms does not imply that axioms are got at without any trouble by simply looking at them ("intuitively"): they are ἄμεσα, "immediate," only in the sense of not being deductive conclusions from higher axioms; self-evident only in the sense of not having their validity proved (ἀποδείκνυναι) by experience—though experience of their successful working produces conviction (δηλοῦν) in the mind and makes us realise them vividly. They are *a priori*, not in the sense of being in the mind as fully formed principles prior in time to the use made of them, but only in the sense of logical priority. They are not dependent upon experience (*i.e.* on the use of them in experience) for their validity; because experience is dependent on their validity being presupposed.

If we are considering psychologically the growth and history of our processes of cogitation, it is important to notice that our own recognition of our self-identity amid changing experience (a recognition that is not a matter of immediate perception, but of sub-conscious inference) and of our power of so far controlling the movements of our bodies, the course of our thoughts and things in the world around us, gives us an original type of unity amid difference, of substance and attribute, and of cause and effect.[1]

It is important also if we are studying the history

[1] Cf. *infra*, p. 108, and Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 27.

of human civilization, to notice that practical needs in a narrowly material sense have given the starting point for what have afterwards developed into sciences (cf. *antea*, § 3); and practical considerations may continue to affect the interpretation put upon principles used in science. Thus the warning about "plurality of causes" (which is an application of the logical rule that we cannot argue safely from the affirmation of the consequent in hypothetical syllogisms) is only necessary if we take "cause" and "effect" in the sense in which they are used in rough practical language. The same effect only follows from different causes if we are in the habit of expressing our "causes" (the point where our control over things comes in) much more carefully than "effects," *e.g.* if we want to kill an animal for food, it may not matter whether an arrow or a bullet or a knife does the work: if we want to kill simply to get it out of the way, we may use poison, drowning, dynamite as well. From a strictly scientific point of view, death from any one of these causes is not "the same effect" as death from another of them.

But the logical question of validity is distinct from these psychological and historical questions of origin. The principle of coherence in its most abstract form and in its more concrete applications is valid because without it experience and the sciences would be impossible. If any ingenious sceptic or empiricist argues that this only shows that it is a convenient methodological postulate, a working hypothesis which may after all be false, we need not feel disturbed in our assurance of the certainty of the principle; for the presupposition of all knowledge and of all experience has got the best testimony to its validity for knowledge that any proposition can possibly have.

Without the assumption (however little recognised in consciousness) of the principle of causation in its

vaguest form, *i.e.* everything that happens has a cause, *i.e.* something with which it happens, without which (or without something analogous to which—this to allow for "plurality of causes") it would not happen—without the assumption of uniformity of nature in the vague sense in which that is involved in the principle of causation (for if what is the same cause did not produce the same effect when tried under favourable conditions, we should not regard it as the cause)—without the assumption of such general principles connecting our experience there could be no experience at all; but such principles in these vague forms are quite compatible with the rudest and wildest beliefs about what sort of agencies can be causes and about the contents of nature. The unscientific person who believes that running water will stop a witch, or that human sacrifice will avert the wrath of the gods, believes in the principle of causation and of the same cause producing the same effect under proper conditions, as much as the man of science who rejects these agencies as unverifiable hypotheses and accepts the agency of physical, chemical, and physiological forces of which the mass of mankind knows nothing. The progress of scientific knowledge changes the content of the conceptions of "cause" and "nature": it does not alter or increase the validity of the principle of coherence, except so far as it makes people realise more vividly the indispensableness and the universal applicability of the principle. What was at first a mere formal principle—"Everything, or at least every change" (for at first people don't trouble about explaining what has always been there: the thing that has been is taken for granted: only the new raises the question why?) "has a cause; but anything may be the cause of anything,"—gains in depth and meaning as the precise nature of the coherence of things comes to be understood.

§ 11.

At a very early stage in the history of Greek science it was seen that we must assume the conservation of matter (*omnia mutantur, nil interit*), if science is to be possible. This principle or its modern equivalent or supplement, the conservation of energy, does not involve the assumption that the universe is finite nor is it inconsistent with the admission that matter or energy may be infinite in quantity. What the principle, as the postulate of all accurate scientific work, means is that in any given section of the universe which we can isolate from the rest—(*e.g.* the substances contained in a particular test tube; a given quantity of coal, etc.)—the sum of matter and of energy remains the same, so that all *apparent* loss or increase is a problem that requires to be accounted for. Such postulates gain in acceptance when it is seen that their requirements can be fulfilled in scientific investigation, even in many cases where it seems most difficult to do so; but the logical validity of the postulate really rests on an application of the general principle of coherence. We satisfy only the pictorial imagination, which knows that light may appear out of darkness, sound out of silence, etc., and not the thinking reason, if we acquiesce in the lazy solution that things may spring into existence or go out of existence in a "mysterious fashion" or at the bidding of an almighty conjurer.

Other scientific maxims, such as "Occam's razor" (*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*) and the principle of Continuity (*natura non facit saltum*), are in the same way checks upon our indolence. They prohibit us from falling back upon a commonsense acquiescence in lazy picture-thinking. They keep before us the ideal of nature as a coherent intelligible system—however chaotic and irregular it may yet appear to us. At the same time such maxims may

be foolishly as well as wisely applied. Gaps prove science incomplete; but we must not stop them up by ambiguous phrases or by merely metaphorical or analogical explanation. New elements or forces must have their credentials very carefully examined; but we must often admit our classification to be incomplete rather than make rash identifications.

The ordinary scientific hypothesis is put forward to be proved *or disproved*: if these fundamental axioms or postulates of science could be disproved, science would come to an end. What would be the use of the chemist's laborious analysis if portions of matter could dodge in and out of the physical universe, and if an identical substance behaved in totally different ways in combination with another substance on different occasions? Why should we waste ourselves in searching for the causes of things, if things may occur without any causes whatever, or if there are no fixed laws to be discovered? The scientific worker shews a faith in the rationality of the universe (a faith held by him in spite of the seeming chaos of accidents he encounters): the sceptic as to the absolute validity of the fundamental principles of logic may or may not be acting in the supposed interests of theology, but it is only an irrationalist theology that he can hope to benefit. He may render probable the existence of the warring gods of Olympus, or even some less respectable powers; but he is not helping to prove the existence of the eternal and unchanging Intelligence who is said to have made man in his own image and therefore capable to some extent of understanding his working.

§ 12.

Inference, the special subject of logic in its narrower sense (and the central subject of logic in any sense) is best studied in its clearest and most distinct forms.

By applying analysis (*ἀναλυτική* is an older and perhaps a better name than *λογική*) to them we discover the essential elements of valid inference and are thus able afterwards to detect them in the more rudimentary forms. We understand the lower from the point of view of the higher that has developed out of it. Aristotle took as the special material for his analysis of scientific inference, the inferences of geometry—the most advanced science of the time.[1] The first figure of the syllogism is the form in which we apply general principles to less general, or individual cases: it is the form of demonstrative science.[2] In it alone can we establish with certainty A propositions. The third figure is of use in refuting universal propositions, affirmative or negative: and for refutation I or O is enough. The second figure is used in taking an individual or a group definitely out of a class or from under the application of a general rule. The hypothetical syllogism, where we deny the consequent (*Camestres* or *Cesare*), is one of its most important forms. The second figure also forms one of our most common but merely probable (and often treacherous) forms of inference. AAA (the enthymeme in Fig. 2 *ἀεὶ λυσιμός*) is the form of our unconscious or subconscious infer ences ("judgments" we call them) of perception, our inferences of practical identification, circumstantial evi dence, diagnosis, etc. The third figure with an A con clusion is the type of inductive generalisation of the ruder sort. More careful "inductions" (so called)

[1] The Aristotelian logic has been first narrowed, then caricatured, then attacked and ignorantly rejected.

[2] Fig. I. is the bringing of a particular (*i.e.* individual) case or cases, either wholly or partially, under a general rule, affirmative or negative. Fig. II. is the excluding of a particular case or cases, either wholly or partially from a general rule, affirmative or negative. Fig. III. is the proof of the (partial) coincidence or disagreement of certain characteristics, through an example or examples used definitely, or, in part, vaguely.

represent the bringing of cases under a rule or excluding them from a rule (*Barbara or Camestres*). Mill's inductive canons are major premises of the first or second figures.

§ 13.

Science is advanced not by mere accumulations of facts and generalisations from them. Mere facts teach nothing. Science is advanced by the framing of hypotheses (*i.e.* by guessing at causes) based upon our existing set of beliefs.[1] Scientific hypotheses must be such as to be capable of proof or disproof, or at least of being rendered more or less probable by tests applied *in pari materia*. The only useful observations or accumulations of facts are those made under the guidance of some hypothesis or set of alternative hypotheses. Experiments always presuppose an hypothesis of which they are the test.

The procedure of ordinary life is, logically, of the same kind as that of the sciences of observation and experiment—though it is carried on in less carefully guarded and in less conscious fashion. Every perceptive judgment is an hypothesis to account for a sensation. ("This looks solid; This is wood not stone; This hill must be 10 miles away.") Every perceptive judgment is thus an inference (an enthymeme in Fig. II.).

The method of philosophy is of the same character. We frame hypotheses to account for the facts. We throw out guesses and must then proceed to test them. We make these guesses on the basis of our accepted system of beliefs. Hence the importance of the history of philosophy, and of the criticism of concepts. Hence it is that philosophy seems so much occupied with discussing the meaning of words and the meaning of ancient theories. It must do so, if we are not to be the victims of *idola fori* and *theatri*. The ultimate

[1] Cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* I. 1 and 2.

hypotheses of speculative philosophy (ultimate metaphysical or ontological or cosmological theories) can never admit of verification of the kind which is possible where we can use scientific facts such as those of chemistry, or can look to see whether *e.g.* a supposed planet exists in such a region of the heavens. They are however quite analogous to wider scientific hypotheses, such *e.g.* as those dealing with the origin of species, the nebular hypothesis, hypotheses about the past geological history of the earth—which can only be made more or less probable according as they fit better with the known facts. If we start with an initial faith in the rationality of the universe, we must include among the facts which ultimate metaphysical theories must account for, and with which they must harmonise, the prevalence of religious beliefs and philosophical theories at certain times. We cannot expect to find all these beliefs and theories true (for many of them are contradictory of each other, and some are full of inner contradictions) but we must account for their prevalence, and should hope to show that having been widely held they have had some value for human beings.[1]

METAPHYSICS.

§ 14.

Within what is generally called "Metaphysics" (Aristotle's "First Philosophy") we may distinguish from speculative philosophy the indispensable work of "criticism of categories," which includes the epistemological problem: "How is knowledge possible, or what are the conditions of valid intellectual processes?" This problem is at once a necessary part of logic in the full sense of that term (cf. above § 6) and a necessary preliminary of speculative metaphysics.[2] It

[1] Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* VII. 1-5.

[2] Cf. "Metaphysics and Epistemology," p. 175.

is preliminary, however, only in the sense of logical priority: we cannot keep our minds free of all guesses about the ultimate nature of things till we have settled the conditions of human knowledge. For our minds are already influenced by theories of the past which we have inherited in the intellectual atmosphere we breathe, and we cannot examine the mere form of knowledge except in reference to some matter or content. The problems of the theory of knowledge or the criticism of pure reason are best treated, therefore, in connection with the various categories which we are in the habit of using in thinking about the world—Existence, Reality, Experience, Space and Time, Cause, Substance, Mind and Body, Nature and Spirit. Such are some of the fundamental concepts which must be dealt with by what we may call logic—if we take that as including the whole problem of knowledge—or if we restrict logic specially to the consideration of inference and the processes immediately connected with it, we may call it metaphysical criticism. But as we cannot discuss the meaning of these concepts without considering their relation to one another, we cannot separate off this metaphysical criticism from some hypothesis about the ultimate nature of things.

§ 15.

It does not matter whether we say to begin with that metaphysics deals with Reality as such (or the ultimate nature of Reality) or that it deals with experience as a whole; for Reality can only mean anything to us so far as it enters into an actual or possible experience. To begin by assuming that there is a Reality which falls entirely outside all possible experience of ours, is to assume that we know the existence of that of which we professedly cannot know anything—not even whether it exists or not. For to profess to know *that* something exists whilst we cannot know at

all *what* it is, is to make our "that" and "exists" so absolutely empty of meaning that we might quite well substitute "does not exist" for "exists." If I say I know there is an animal in that hole, but I don't know what sort of animal it is, I say something; but I at least profess to know that it is an animal (which means something to me) and by saying it is in that hole, I mean something about its size, habits, etc. If, however, I say that the ultimate Reality is altogether unknowable I say what means nothing; and those who say this sort of thing will be found to go on to speak of this Unknowable as a Force or Power, or to treat it as an object of reverence, which is to determine, in however vague a way, *what* it is.

Experience, however, if treated as the object of metaphysics, must be taken in the widest sense, the sense in which it includes thought, and must not be limited to sensation and feeling. In ordinary usage it is often specially applied to feeling in antithesis to thought.. I have an "idea," it may be said, of what you are speaking about, but I have never "experienced" *it*, and yet an idea is surely an experience, though it may make a very slight impression on the mind. On the other hand, the fact that I have an experience in the sense of having a feeling or a sensation does not of itself tell us anything about the value nor *even about the nature* of the feeling or sensation. The feeling or sensation may be wrongly interpreted by me (*i.e.* wrongly *thought* about) or it may be a very disagreeable feeling or one that I may come to hold that I ought not to have experienced or ought at least not to encourage. Experiences are of all sorts. Religious and artistic emotion extend a man's experience; but so also will opium eating and drunkenness and vice and crime and temporary insanity. The most experienced person in this sense might be the person who combined religious emotion with crime and sensual excesses of all

sorts. When we speak, however, with respect about an experienced person we mean a person who has exercised sober judgment about things, who has not merely felt but has done a great deal of thinking—practical thinking, indeed, but still thinking.

Whether an experience is valuable or not (valuable to the individual and to others) must depend on tests of reason and of social cohesion and social progress. (1) Does the experience make you a wiser man, more clear-headed, more capable of judging sanely? (2) Does it make you more useful to your fellow citizens, your fellow men? These are the tests by which we judge ethically the value both of "luxury" and of "asceticism." It will be seen that they are particular applications of our general test of coherence; and that test in its specially intellectual form must be applied when we are estimating the value for knowledge of any individual's "experience." Does it as interpreted by the individual (and it must be interpreted by concepts in order to be communicated to others) cohere with the rest of his experience (as interpreted) and with the experience of others (as interpreted and communicated by them). As a matter of history it is interesting to note that the needs of social cohesion are what lead to the adoption of fixed standards of judging between true and false; but the practical needs of social cohesion are not the logical proof of the validity of theoretical propositions. Very rough approximations and partly erroneous beliefs will often do well enough merely to enable people to understand one another's wants and get on together. That the earth is flat, that the earth does not move, that the sun goes round the earth, that there is an absolute up and down in the universe are principles that have done perfectly well as a basis for social cohesion (at an early stage of the world's history).

Knowledge is not the product of mere individual activity any more than conduct, our language, the

system of universities, measures, weights, stored up experience about the world, previous theories, religions, etc., are our social heritage. The "solitary thinker" is dependent on the society which has made it possible for him to think with a certain degree of clearness and with a certain amount of material to think about (content for his thoughts), and the society in its turn may gain from the work of the unpractical savant or philosopher a general progress, through gaining power over nature, over human nature, over inherited delusions and "idola."[1] Practical utility was the source of the multiplication table, of tables of logarithms, etc.; but their truth (validity) depends on considerations of "clear and distinct thinking," absolutely certain, and not on the fluctuating consideration of what is or may be useful.

§ 16.

It is customary to oppose "Thought" to "Reality" —a mere idea is contrasted with what is real, ideas are valued only if they correspond to reality. This common-sense distinction cannot, however, be rigidly maintained. Reality is a very ambiguous term; and in no intelligible sense can it be entirely opposed to thought.[2]

§ 17.

Existence as a predicate seems separate from meaning (or validity) only if both be taken in a very abstract way. The conception of a mathematical figure may be easily distinguished from an actual diagram occupying a certain portion of space and made at such and such a time. What exists is always individual; meaning is always a universal or some combination of universals. But if in meaning we include the possibility of realisation, as *e.g.* in a rectilineal triangle as

[1] Cf. Huxley, *Methods and Results*, p. 53.

[2] Cf. "What is Reality?" in *Darwin and Hegel*, pp. 81, 87, 91.

distinct from a rectilineal biangle, we see that the latter figure has no meaning, *i.e.* it involves contradiction and so cannot "exist."

A map of a large island in mid North Atlantic has a meaning for us—only if we leave out the question whether such an imaginary place fits in with the rest of what we know to exist.

Thought can be used to determine existence most easily in what is abstract and so more completely understood. That which we understand least (isolated events) is that of which we can predicate mere existence.[1]

§ 18.

There are many grades of reality and any idea that any one actually has, however foolish its content, is real as a mere psychical occurrence. An idea which fits in with other conceptions that we accept as valid is real in a much fuller sense.

To say that something is "appearance" (phenomenon) is not to say that it is an illusion. An illusion is real only in the sense that it is an idea that someone has. It is unreal in the sense that it is an interpretation of some sensation or feeling that does not fit in with the rest of a person's experience or with the experience of people in general. If a person thinks he sees someone whom he knows to be dead walking about; or if he thinks he is Emperor of China, when nobody else thinks that, we say he has an illusion—or if there seems no suggestion in anything objective for what he believes, we call it an hallucination. To hold, however, as Berkeley did, that the world known through sense perceptions is not real in the same degree as the conscious spirits who have such perceptions, is not to say that the world is an illusion. To

[1] Cf. in Logic

Intension	Extension
Analytic	Synthetic.

hold that time and space, which condition all our perceptions, are not conditions of all thinkable realities is not to hold that they are illusions.

We know things imperfectly, but imperfect knowledge is not illusion. Appearances differ in degree of reality. Appearance is not ultimate or absolute reality, but it may be appearance *of* reality.[1]

So far as we approximate to complete knowledge of anything, we know the universal in the particular, *e.g.* we do not know natural selection if we have merely in our minds some abstract phrases taken from a text-book, nor have we knowledge if we merely notice as a fact the peculiar shape of the columbine without seeing in it the working out of the results of successive self-fertilisation and cross-fertilisation.[2] We approximate to complete knowledge in proportion as we see the connection between universal principles and particular cases.

§ 19.

Time cannot be an ultimate reality: for it has only a meaning in connection with change. Yet we must not call it an illusion, for we work with it successfully, and the knowledge of the way in which things must appear to us and to other similar beings must be included in a perfect or complete knowledge of the universe, just as the way in which a picture will appear to the spectator is part of what the artist knows about it. There is no reason to suppose that Omniscience knows only abstract universals—mathematical formulae—without any knowledge of the way in which things will appear to beings conditioned by time and space and perception through a limited number of senses.

Kant saw that only the unchanging changes. To

[1] Cf. "The One and Many," p. 210.

[2] The colour of the tiger from the jungles differs from the colour of the lion from the desert.

be aware of change of succession we must in some sense stand outside the succession. We cannot *think* universal movement, unless we imagine something stationary relative to which or within which the movement takes place.

Our habit of using measurements of time gives a false suggestion of time as a succession or series of discrete moments. The rhythmic movement of various organic sensations helps to produce this notion. But when we *think* carefully, instead of merely picturing, we see that the moment of time is an arbitrary unit. Even if we discover the normal period of time (measured in reference to some fraction of some cosmic movement such as the revolution of the earth round the sun) which an individual, the average human being, can grasp as a unity, that normal period can be extended or diminished by (1) inattention or (2) attention.[1]

All this is psychologically important. The lowest stage of mental process is mere awareness of a flow of sensation or feeling. In the higher process of thinking we grasp a unity amid difference; and we may be able to see the succession, the time process, as the *appearance* of a reality which is not itself conditioned by time, *e.g.* when we apprehend a demonstration completely, seeing the conclusion *in* the premises, or when we grasp a work of art as an organic unity. Yet the mathematician who conveys his demonstration to other minds has to give it out bit by bit—by a succession in time. He may put the final conclusion first as the probandum[2]—then he gives the premises and conclusion in a temporal order which generally (but not always) represents or expresses the logical order. The dramatist *has* to put his work in a series

[1] Cf. Royce's "time-span," *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I. pp. 420, *sq.*

[2] In practice we generally think and state our conclusions before we think or state the premises.

of scenes, he can't let people have it all at once.[1] Yet if the work has an artistic unity it is more than a mere succession of scenes; it is grasped (approximately) as a unity where each part is conditioned by the whole: and the beginning needs the end to explain its *meaning* fully.

If we distinguish mere existence—mere fact, event—from meaning, we can say that what exists "is now" and ceases to exist when it is not now; but its meaning is not thus conditioned by time, though meaning can only be manifested in a time process.

§ 20.

To ordinary opinion what exists must not merely be "now" but "there" (*πού καὶ νῦν*, *daseyn*). The soul is thought of as *in* the body or *out* of the body: God is *in* heaven. Even a feeling is thought of as existing in the nerves or brain or a soul inside the body. In primitive thinking there is no "existence" except in space (note that even Parmenides envisages his *ὄν* and *ἕν* as a *plenum*, *ὄν γαρ ὄντι πελάζει*). It is almost impossible to keep the notion of space out of the connotation of existence (*ex-sistere*); and so it is easy to fall into the notion that nothing is "real" except what is in space: yet the word "real" can more easily be used for what is significant, what has meaning, what has validity. We might say of a falling Government: "It exists (*i.e.* you may find the officials in their offices) but it is no longer a reality," *i.e.* people do not obey it, do not believe in it. On the other hand a truth, a principle may be very real, true or valid; yet its only "existence" may be in some mind or perhaps written down on paper. But the written words or even the

[1] It was an intoxicated person who, hearing the bell of St. Paul's strike twelve, said "Can't you give us all that at once?" Being drunk he was demanding a mystic state of consciousness transcending the limitations of ordinary human knowledge.

spoken words, the mere "existence," is nothing unless the meaning is understood and accepted.[1]

Space is the condition of all that can be known through the senses. The distinguishing of three dimensions in space only means that to fix a position three things must be stated, and to state more is superfluous. Two dimensions, one dimension, are not what we *begin* with (the space we actually know extends "round" us everywhere and may be treated as of infinite dimensions, if we like); they are abstractions for the convenience of mathematics.

§ 21.

All our ordinary language being dependent on sense experience, the distinction of the "inner" as the mental from the "outer" or non-mental is a metaphor, which is very apt to mislead. The plain man means by the external world, the world outside his body. Hence the popular misunderstandings of Berkeley. What Berkeley insists on is a small matter perhaps; but it is the essential beginning of any careful thinking about the world. Nothing exists *for us* except what comes as an object "into" our consciousness. We can suppose the existence of what does not come into our consciousness, but remains at a lower level, in a sub-conscious or unconscious stage which nevertheless is continuous

[1] In the space world, the individual is simply what is separated in space from some other individual: in the world of meaning this is not necessarily so, *e.g.* the real self we know in consciousness contains the tribal self, etc. It is the difference between *extension* and *intension* in logic. In the spiritual world the principles of the quantitative are inapplicable, except as often misleading metaphors, and many of them have to be reversed. The part contains the whole; the Three are One; he that loses his life saves it. Pluralism takes the picture-thinking of the space world and applies it straight away to the spiritual—treating souls as atoms. Why may not the soul grow and become at once wider and more intense?

with the conscious,[1] or of what exists for consciousnesses other than ours; but of existence altogether apart from any mind, existence which cannot possibly come into any consciousness, we can have no knowledge.[2] It is a meaningless phrase.

Berkeley leaves many questions over, *e.g.* (1) What gives statements about the primary qualities of matter a greater certainty or validity (objectivity) than any possible statement about the secondary qualities which are purely subjective? (This was the question for Kant. "How are mathematics possible as *a priori*?") (2) How are our finite minds or egos related to other minds or egos and to the mind of God, from whom Berkeley holds the "ideas" come to us? (3) When we have admitted that all that is (with any meaning for us) is "mental," when we have said "all without is within," we have still to face the problem of the relation between that part of the content of our ideas (in the widest sense—of anything in the mind—*Vorstellung*) which we construe as in space, and that part which we distinguish as "inner" or not extended, purely mental or spiritual, the problem which appears most prominently as that of the relation between body and mind (in wider terms, of nature and spirit).

Materialism as an ultimate metaphysical hypothesis is refuted by Berkeley's "idealism" (epistemological idealism). "Materialism cannot explain itself"; but Berkeley's idealism leaves us still with the problem of the relation between "spirits" and their mental processes as such, on the one side, and that portion of our "ideas" which we call our bodies and the material world, on the other. Berkeley doesn't deny the "matter" of ordinary belief, but he doesn't discuss its relation to mind.

[1] This Berkeley did not recognise: hence his treatment of *minima visibilia*, etc., as absolutes, his disparagement of advanced mathematics, etc. Here Leibniz was far ahead of Berkeley.

[2] Cf. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, Vol. VI. pp. 95 *sqq.*, 279.

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM.

§ 22.

Mind and Body as "two aspects."

[1]Many philosophical men of science have substituted this conception for that crude materialism which in ancient times resolved the soul into certain very fine atoms, and which in modern times has called thought a secretion of the brain; and many psychologists have looked upon this conception as the most convenient working hypothesis by which to express the relation between psychology and physiology. Mr. Ward rightly regards the conception as the outcome of Cartesian dualism. But the dualism of Descartes was assuredly not the invention of that philosopher, but rather the survival in his system of the popularized Platonic dualism of soul and body, which had become stiffened into an accepted dogma in the Christian consciousness. All our ordinary language now assumes the antithesis between the inner life of the soul and the outer life of the body. The plain man means of course by the external world the world outside his bodily self: and here the distinction of outer and inner is literally correct, the outer skin of each individual dividing all space into two parts. But then the plain man has been further taught to regard the soul as a thing inside his body, and so, when he thinks he is thinking more deeply, he puts his conscious experience as such "inside" his soul, hardly aware that he is now using a metaphor, and then he opposes to that an external world, which he assumes to be the same for every mind, and from which the mind is supposed

[1][The following pages (95 to 100) are taken from a review of Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. IX. pp. 253 to 257.]

passively to receive impressions. It is thus that the dualism of popular philosophy is established; of this "common-sense" dualism Descartes accepted uncritically the initial antithesis between the mental and the external, giving it, however, a deeper and truer meaning by turning it into the distinction between thought and *extension*, and becoming aware of the problems to which it leads. The doctrine of psychophysical parallelism, as formulated by Spinoza, is a serious attempt to solve the problem which popular philosophy conceals under its easy metaphors of images and impressions, but which Descartes had
1 clearly realised. *Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.* Spinoza, it should be observed, does not use the metaphor of parallelism: he asserts an *identity* between the physical and the psychical order. And this identity in duality is maintained by the more careful philosophical psychologists (*e.g.* Höffding), who have employed Spinoza's conception as at least a working hypothesis. The psychical and the physical are two aspects or manifestations of one substance. Whether that substance is material or mental, or is unknown, is left over as a question for metaphysics. Mr. Ward seems to me hardly quite just to this suggestive idea of Spinoza's. He considers only somewhat crude expressions of it, *e.g.* Clifford's illustration by reference to the relation between the spoken and the written sentence, or Huxley's comparison of consciousness to the sound of the bell, or the shadow of the moving train. These illustrations are defective, because both sides are *in pari materia.* The sound, as waves in the atmosphere, is a form of energy, and the shadow of the moving train is in the physical world. On the other hand, the sound as heard, the shadow as seen, are in the psychical world; but so, also, are the bell as seen, the train as seen, the sentence as heard or

seen. When consciousness is called an "epiphenomon," this is really an inaccurate interpretation of metaphors like that of the shadow: it is a way, though a way philosophically indefensible, of escaping the absurdity of calling consciousness a physical product, a secretion or a vibration—an idea which would contradict the conservation of energy. The physical counterpart of a state of consciousness must be, on the principle of continuity, some "hypothetical brain mechanics," some jolt or jar among vibrating molecules. G. H. Lewes's adaptation from Aristotle of the illustration of the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of the circle is a better metaphor to express the relation of physical and mental. We might elaborate such an image a little and say that every one of us sees only the inner surface of a hollow sphere, but that surface we can construe into a moving picture made of spheres whose insides we can never see, but some or possibly all of which we conjecture to have minds inside them perceiving only inner surfaces such as we see; for we can only interpret things on the analogy of our own experience. The "myth" or picture does not work out very well; it brings us back to the old antithesis of "inner" and "outer," but in a way that perhaps helps to suggest, instead of to conceal, the difficulties involved in that antithesis. The best illustration of what Spinoza's doctrine, with some modification, may be made to signify is, however, an illustration used several times by Mr. Ward himself, but not in connection with psychophysical parallelism (see, *e.g.* Vol. II. pp. 264, 273). Not the relation between the spoken sentence and the written sentence, but the relation between the sentence spoken or written, on the one side, and the meaning of that sentence, on the other side, may serve as an analogy of the relation between body and soul, or more generally between the material and the spiritual.

Aristotle's definition of ψυχή as the realisation of the body belongs in the main to the same mode of thinking, as distinct from the notion of soul and body as separate substances. We might, as a matter of speculation, more on the lines of Leibniz than of Spinoza, apply the conception of psychophysical parallelism in some such way as this:

Let us for convenience use Roman capitals for the physical series, and the corresponding (*i.e.* fundamentally identical) Greek cursives for the psychical series. Then A may denote the (as yet almost entirely hypothetical) sphere of psychological physiology so far as it relates to the physical mechanism of the higher mental processes; these processes as known in consciousness will be α. Let B denote living organisms as the subject matter of the biological sciences, and C denote matter and motion (or shall we simply say "energy"?) as the subject matter of physics. It will be observed that in descending the scale we come always to what is more abstract; and below C we might place separately D, the abstract relations of space and quantity, though C is already so abstract in comparison with B that we may be content with three main divisions of the universe in its physical aspect, spatial extension being the characteristic that belongs to the whole of it. Now, can we give any meaning to β and γ and any subsequent Greek letters as representing stages in the psychical scale? Applying the same principle of continuity which led us to assert the reality (as an object of a conceivable science) of A, but applying this principle in the reverse order, we must recognize β as the region of "obscure perception" and of feelings of attraction and aversion not yet risen into the clear consciousness of α. As the psychical side of C (motion) we find mere psychical activity or blind will. This is really an

abstraction so far as our conscious experience goes, because we never experience pure volition without any thought (becoming conscious of it makes it "thought"), any more than we ever experience pure thought without activity; but we may follow Schopenhauer and call this mere activity, regarded as psychical, "will" *a potiori*, because it is the basis and lowest stage of what we know as conscious volition in α. "Will," in such a sense that we could apply it to the self-directed activities of animals and plants, is always found in some combination with feeling, or with what in the case of plants we may call such by courtesy. But this will seems only a higher development of what we may think of as the inner or psychical aspect of the inorganic mass or atom which has inertia or the *conatus* of self-maintenance: γ is the selfhood of mere abstract individuality. In our mental experience we have nothing more abstract than the vague tendency to activity: and so we cannot find intelligible psychical aspects of anything more abstract than motion. Mere space or extension is mere outwardness, and we can give it no "inner" meaning. It is the characteristic of the whole physical universe, but not of the psychical. It is, in quasi-Platonic language, the "other" of thought. But what is most abstract is just for that reason what can be most completely known on the physical side, being least known on the psychical side. We can think the geometrical and the mechanical aspect of things clearly and distinctly. Our science is less able to grapple with the organic, and least with the physiological aspect of the psychical, where, if we are careful, we have to admit the inadequacy of our mechanical conceptions. On the other side, we can have vivid consciousness of our own thoughts and feelings, and of the ends we are striving for, but we can only conjecture the experience of other beings: and when

we attempt to interpret the inner life, the actual "experience" of plants or of what we call inanimate things, we have to use anthropomorphic expressions which we admit to be inaccurate because too complex.

Observe (1) this way of looking at the relation of mind and body is an application of the distinction between (*a*) existence—in the sense of existence in time and space (here and now) and (*b*) validity or meaning. Take the analogy of writing. (*a*) Say a fragment of papyrus with brown marks on it of various shapes. This object existing in space can be described scientifically, it can be weighed, measured, tested physically and chemically. (*b*) The marks may be interpreted as having a meaning. Each sentence, each word has a meaning. Some we succeed in understanding: some we cannot make out; perhaps we cannot read the marks quite clearly (*i.e.* we are not quite sure about the "fact," the "event,") but even if we can we may be unable to see what it means, *i.e.* what its significance is in relation to the whole of which it apparently is intended to form a part. We may guess at the meaning of the doubtful words or clauses and at what is meant when there is a *lacuna* by considering the apparent intention or purpose of the whole passage. We do not, however, get *completely* at the meaning of a passage unless we have the *whole* context to which it belongs. I suppose the piece to be not a mere series of disconnected entries, but to have some unity, such as the unity of a poem or of a continuous philosophical discourse: the author, if a good poet or a careful and skilful philosophical thinker and writer, must have had a clear idea of the whole of his meaning, and each sentence—if possible each word—must have been chosen and placed where it is to bring out that total effect. Sentences which in isolation look clumsy or seem to convey some false or absurd statement may in their context be justifiable: one sentence has to be

supplemented by others in order to fulfil its full function as contributing to the whole. Now if we may apply this analogy to the relation not merely between the individual human mind and body but to the whole relation between the spiritual world and the material universe of things and events, may we not speak of God as the ultimate meaning of the whole, for whom are all things:[1] or if we keep up our imagery, as the author of the whole book of nature and of human history, who alone comprehends the relation of every part to the total meaning? We see only fragments of the book and therefore our knowledge of the meaning even of the parts is always imperfect. Individual finite human souls have a separate "existence," *i.e.* they have a manifestation in particular periods of time and portions of space, but their full meaning, their full spiritual (intellectual, ethical, religious) significance can only be known in relation to the whole: they are analogous to isolated sentences. In reading we have to start with the individual words and sentences as our data. The whole is only a vague ideal: so we start with individuals, they are our data. We try to find the universal aspect in them in order to understand them.[2] The words and letters of which these sentences are composed may symbolise the parts which go to make up the experience of this or that individual. Seen as mere events or occurrences in time,

[1] "God himself is the best poet, and the real is his song." We know only in fragments, in some of which we discern beauty and grandeur. Much we cannot understand.

[2] In self-consciousness do not fact and meaning coincide? Or rather is the self-consciousness of the individual (as *e.g.* empirical psychology deals with it and tries to describe it genetically) the fact of which the Eternal Self, manifested and differentiated in the system of the universe, is the ultimate meaning? The personality of the individual is a *problem*, which it needs a metaphysical theory to solve. Would it be better to be an absolutely independent being whom God could not annihilate than to be a significant sentence, a "living Epistle" in the Book of God?

words read off from the record (spoken words that have to be spoken in succession) make the best analogue of the mental processes dealt with by the psychologist. Their meaning (their worth as estimated by logic or ethics), is something over and above the mere "facts," something which has meaning and not merely existence. These things are an allegory.

(2) If the double-aspect theory be taken as here, we have not a mere parallelism between two orders of being on the same level, like a document existing in two different languages, each of which equally well expresses the same meaning (or the two clocks of Geulinx' or Leibniz's illustration): we have a relation between two perfectly different kinds of "being"—between existence on the one side (*i.e.* existence in time and space), which forms the subject matter of those sciences whose business is to apply the categories of quantity so far as possible and to describe everything as far as possible in terms of its "mechanical" basis, and, on the other side, a world not of existences (such a phrase is only misleading) but of meanings, values, ends, which do not admit of the categories of quantity, and which are the proper subject matter of logic, aesthetics, ethics.

(3) Aristotle in his *De An.* I. recognised that ψυχή must be studied differently by the φυσικός and by the διαλεκτικός and his definition of ψυχή as ἐντελέχεια σώματος represents a point of view which agrees with that here taken. The soul is what gives meaning to the body.[1] The aspect of "existence" is that in which

[1] Many people, whatever they allow one to say about God, would not like to be told that their souls are not existences but meanings. That need not be astonishing, for many people while occupying space and possessed of existence and mass do not appear to have very much meaning—though doubtless a sympathetic imagination or the faith of a charitable religion would discover meaning and worth even in them. "The soul too is immortal—where a soul can be discerned."

we apply the concept of "material cause"—and of "form" (*εἶδος*) in so far as we group "facts" according to "laws." The aspect of meaning is that in which we bring in the conception of end, purpose, and in which also we can properly use the conception of *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* which, when applied to events in space and time as such (as events), is apt to introduce animism (illegitimate anthropomorphism).

[1] All this may seem fanciful. It can only be put very briefly and formally here. But it is an attempt to give a possible meaning to the old antithesis of physical and psychical, and to carry out a little further than is usually done the best working hypothesis, both for the sciences of nature, on the one side, and for psychology on the other. If what proves a good working hypothesis for all the special sciences can be fitted in with a sound epistemological theory and with a consistent speculative metaphysics, then it has received as much verification as hypotheses on such ultimate matters admit of. The sciences of nature profess to work entirely with what takes place in space and time, to apply mathematical and mechanical conceptions as far as possible, and to allow no "causal explanation" except in terms of what is material, *i.e.* of the same kind with the spatial phenomena to be explained. To recur to my symbolic letters, A must be expressed in terms of B, B of C, and so on. Just as in ordinary language, in spite of Copernicus, we speak of sunrise and sunset, so we may continue to talk of B causing α, and of α causing B (a state of the body causing a modification of consciousness, and *vice versa*) while rejecting the old doctrine of interaction or *influxus physicus*; and such language is specially convenient, because of our almost complete ignorance of A and of β, compared with our comparatively full knowledge of α and of B. But the

[1] From P*sychological Review*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 257 to 259.

ideal of scientific explanation is complete description of A, B, C in their simplest and most abstract terms. Mr. Ward objects that "mechanical" explanations are mere hypothetical descriptions; but explanation in a science of nature only aims at such description, and purposely discards all teleology which falls outside the physical series. Teleology in a sense must come in when we are dealing with the organic—structures exist *for* functions. But this states a problem of natural science, and is not itself a solution. To take refuge in phrases like a "tendency to progression," or a *nisus formativus*, is simply to restate the problem as if it were the solution; "occult qualities" are not scientific explanations. The only "causes" with which the natural sciences can "explain" are what Aristotle called "material causes," τὰ ἐξ ὧν, *i.e.* the sum total of conditions that are equivalent to the phenomenon to be explained on its purely material (*i.e.* spatial) aspect. It would save much ambiguity, if we could revive the Aristotelian distinction, or introduce some adaptation of his "four causes." So far as I can make out, Mr. Ward allows no meaning to the word "cause," except that of "efficient cause." It is therefore inevitable that he should take all causation to imply activity of the kind that we only know directly in our own conscious striving after ends. This is precisely the view of Berkeley, to whom, curiously enough, Mr. Ward never refers in this connection. Berkeley, like Mr. Ward, resolves the substantiality of things into causality, and interprets all true causality as will, what are called causes and effects in scientific phrase being merely antecedent and consequent "ideas" (*i.e.* phenomena) which serve as signs of one another. Efficient causation, the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, is in place when we are explaining some particular occurrence, and wish to discover who or what is responsible for it. Who threw the stone that made the apple fall from the tree? Or was it what lawyers

call "an act of God"?[1] But science deals not with particular events (save as experiments or illustrations, or when we cannot get beyond the particular, as in the purely "historical" parts of geology), and consequently the difference between one antecedent condition and the others is only relative. The biologist as such is not concerned to explain why *this* flower has an abnormal number of petals, but to discover if possible the conditions of variation in general. On the other hand the ἀρχή κινήσεως is important in history (though the anecdotal historian is apt to overestimate its relative importance), and it is all important in judicial investigations, and the material causes are apt to be overlooked. The distinction between the individual and perceptual subject-matter of history on the one side and, on the other, the general and conceptual subject-matter of science is admirably put by Mr. Ward at the close of his second volume. But I think he errs in expecting from men of science a type of explanation which they do not (if they are wise) profess to give.

The Aristotelian formal cause is usually supposed, by scientific men who have read Mill's *Logic*, to be out of date. But the formal cause is exactly what we mean by a "law of nature." It is the universal or conceptual formula which is manifested in a number of particulars. And the very common habit of hypostatizing "Energy," "Gravitation," "Evolution," etc.,

[1] An analysis of causes involves some abstraction, some rather artificial isolation of antecedent and consequent. I can intelligibly, I think, distinguish (*a*) a movement of the nerves from (*b*) the movement of the arm which follows it; and (*a*) a set of feelings and ideas from (*b*) the external and yet "moral" action to which they give rise; (*a*) (*a*) I call efficient causes. I admit that *strictly* we never can speak of the real cause of an act, without taking the *whole* act in all its aspects into account; but then this conception of *efficient* cause is swallowed up in "material." (From Letter to Prof. Alexander.)

is only a recurrence to the mythological interpretation to which the Platonic doctrine of "ideas" or universal "forms" was exposed. The habit, again, of speaking of these abstractions with capital letters as efficient causes is the result of "animism"; it is so difficult to eliminate anthropomorphic interpretations even in scientific thinking.

(4) What is the place of psychology?

If we turn now to the psychical order, we find the proper sphere of final and of efficient causes. In our actual conscious experience we are aware of ourselves as striving for ends and as initiating events in such a sense that we are held responsible for them. Here we are in the region of what is strictly individual and concrete. If psychology be the science that deals directly with what I have called α and hypothetically with β and γ, then we may accept Mr. Ward's view that "psychology never transcends the limits of the individual." I find it, however, rather difficult to understand the account given of the province of psychology in Mr. Ward's treatise, which has done so much to reform the conceptions of English psychology, but which still remains buried in the inconvenient columns of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Psychology hovers bat-like between the sciences which deal conceptually with some more or less abstract aspect of the universe and some ideal philosophy of mind which should deal with what is perfectly concrete and individual and yet take up into itself all the scattered lights of the various abstract and partial sciences. What I call α, as it really exists *i.e.* as the actual conscious experience of some individual *ego*, contains in it all A, B, C, etc., so far as they are known to that *ego*; they are abstractions, except so far as they exist for some mind, and of course they are also abstractions as apart from the totality or organic unity of α. But a strict account of α so far

as possible would be a complete autobiography, not a "spiritual autobiography" or "confession" only (for such accounts of the "inner life," as a rule, imply abstraction from a great part of experience). A *science* dealing with α must generalize and empty it till it becomes the possible common or average experience of *any* human *ego*, and that too only in its aspect as existing *for* consciousness, or for sub-conscious feeling (if such an expression may be tolerated), in abstraction from its contents. And as such a science psychology is usually treated. The psychologist, in his endeavour to make his pursuit like the sciences of nature, is obliged, like those occupied with these other sciences, to deal with abstractions; and it seems to me only a matter of degree (though that does not make it un important) whether we start with the extreme abstrac tion of "sensations" or "simple ideas" (in Locke's sense), or with what Kant calls the "manifold of sense," or whether, like Mr. Ward, we start with the "presentation continuum," as it may be supposed to exist in the average normal mind and considered simply in its presentative aspect. In considering the contents of consciousness purely as contents of consciousness, we are abstracting from the actual or real experience of any individual; and in treating of the average or normal individual mind we have abstracted from the real individual.

But, if psychology be a science, we must, as in the other sciences, look for material and formal causes. Efficient and final causes belong more properly to practical life, and to philosophy. In psychology as a science, even in any psychological dissection of one's self, the self must be treated as an object, a quasi-thing, analyzable into various factors. The modifications of consciousness must be treated as events that happen and have to be explained by reference to antecedent events. We abstract from the individuality

of the *ego* and look for the antecedent conditions of ideas, feelings, and volitions as the "causes" of them (*i.e.* material causes) in precisely the same sense in which we find causes in nature: and we seek to formulate psychological "laws" in precisely the same sense as in nature, *i.e.* they are statements of what, *under certain conditions*, must necessarily happen. All laws of nature are true universal propositions, abstract, and best formulated as hypotheticals. At the psychological point of view there is no escape from necessity. The psychologist (1) leaves out space, (2) takes events as known only *in* consciousness, (3) but leaves out consideration of meaning. Hence psychology is the bat among the sciences—neither among the natural sciences nor completely among the philosophical.

It has been denied (by Mr. Shadworth Hodgson) that we can speak of the "agent" of self-consciousness. This is true if we mean by "agent" what the word has come to mean in careful modern scientific thinking when, *e.g.* we are speaking of physical causation. The "agent" is then simply a necessary condition of an *event* happening. The self is not one among the series of physical events. On the other hand, "agent" in its literal sense applies more properly to the self than to any physical phenomenon; for our only knowledge of agency in the sense not of mere movement in space and time, but in the sense of purposive action for which we acknowledge responsibility (αἴτιος), is in our own *conscious* experience. We transfer this to external agents (animism). The self is not an agent in the sense in which the combustion of wood causes heat, or in the sense in which gravitation causes a body to fall; but it is our only directly-known type of *efficient* causation. I am conscious of willing to move my arm, and of being responsible for the consequence of that volition.

(5) The distinction between existence or fact and meaning may be further illustrated by Leibniz's distinction between "nature" and "grace" and Kant's distinction of phenomenal and noumenal (without the arbitrariness of the noumenal). On this view, the universe must be regarded as "through and through mechanical; through and through teleological." [1]

"Either the universe," says Mr. Ward, "is mechanical or it is teleological; it is not likely to be a mixture of the two" (II. p. 63). May not the universe be both at once, through and through mechanical when regarded in its material or spatial aspect, teleological when regarded in its spiritual aspect, when that aspect is not being treated abstractly for the purposes of a quasi-natural science of psychology, but as the *meaning* of the whole process, a meaning such as we have in our consciousness of the ends and significance of some part of our own activities of thought and deed? If epistemology shows us that nothing can ever be known to us as having any actual existence save as an object for thought, it then becomes a reasonable philosophical faith, though it goes beyond the limits of possible knowledge, to suppose that the ultimate reality of all things animate and inanimate is their meaning for the one mind which *is* the universe in its inner aspect. This conclusion, though drawn from some of the premises that Mr. Ward questions, is not, I think, very different from his own: it may be called a spiritualistic monism, but it is not without a dualist and not without an agnostic element.

[1] A thorough-going idealism must go on to deny that anything is material outside of or alongside of the spiritual. The organic world cannot be completely understood by mechanical explanations; because the organism is something we can know partly from "within"—in the aspect of end, purpose, meaning.

§ 23.

It is quite unreasonable to suppose that the categories of physics, chemistry, physiology should be adequate to explain the psychical: quantity cannot be applied in psychology. The unit of Weber's law is a purely relative thing and is moreover subjective. Still less can the categories of quantity and mechanics apply to the psychical as interpreted in respect of its meaning. Physics and chemistry will not explain the perception of a picture, nor the meaning the picture has to the spectator, who recognises what it is about and judges it beautiful. Substance and cause (*i.e.* material or formal) belong to the world of existence in space and time. Subject is the world on its inner side.

MORALITY, SOCIETY, ETC.

§ 24.[1]

Can any science be properly treated independently of metaphysics? *i.e.* can any scientific investigator continuously shirk an examination of the conceptions he is using? We may answer no and yet recognise a sense in which the various special sciences are wisely enough treated and successfully treated and advanced without a metaphysics; their fundamental conceptions being *provisionally* assumed and accepted in some more or less vague way. Thus obviously enough the geometrician does not investigate the nature of space and the physicist may assume some rough provisional concept of matter or force. In this sense then can we have a science of ethics (*i.e.* of human conduct as right and wrong) independent of metaphysics? We can—but it will not be what is very commonly under-

[1] Notes from a MS. volume, *Ethica*.

stood by ethics. It would be a historical science tracing the various ethical ideals which have been accepted by men (a history of their various distinctions between right and wrong), leaving out the question what right and wrong ultimately mean or assuming some provisional explanation of them, *e.g.* that the right is "what furthers social well-being"; but all questions about the ultimate nature of the moral law and about free-will must be expressly excluded, and further, most of the psychological questions commonly introduced into ethics must also be left out because they involve metaphysical questions.

An attempt to describe the facts of morality, either in the individual or in society as *now* existing, would be very delusive, if the historical origin of these facts were overlooked, because obviously our society is in a transitional stage and the various opinions of right and wrong must be taken in connection with their history in order to be rightly understood. So that a descriptive science of ethics must be historical or delusive. On the other hand, if we insist on going beyond these questions of *fact*, and wish to ask about what *ought* to be, we cannot shirk an investigation of what "ought" means, *i.e.* we must bring in a metaphysics of ethics, by which I only mean a *criticism* of the basis of morality. Now to call this a science of ethics is, I think, claiming more certainty than we can rightly claim for a philosophical investigation. Philosophy must always be tentative: it must always be critical. Philosophies unfortunately are always tending to become dogmatic; but just in so far as they do so, they cease to be part of the living movement of philosophy, which must go on in every age and in every individual who finds himself tormented by the desire to fit his various ideas together and see how they stand in relation to one another. The worst kind of dogmatism may be that

of the scientific specialist who applies some one conception with which he has worked successfully in his own sphere, to unlock all mysteries. We are not going to free ourselves from theological dogmas to fall under the sway of a dogmatism of this kind.

Contradiction proves falsehood somewhere; absence of contradiction does not necessarily prove truth, but may only prove that we have taken very few elements into account. The greater the complexity, the more difficult it is to avoid contradiction. Thus the term moral philosophy is really more modest than science of ethics: it ought to imply a confession that we are dealing with problems that we cannot hope completely to solve, and with some problems that we *can't* solve at all, but can only hope to formulate clearly so as to warn ourselves and others. We need not therefore be unduly puzzled by the non-progressiveness of moral philosophy, because philosophy *must* be born again in the mind of every thinker. But for this very reason the great philosophies of the past do not, like the scientific discoveries of the past, become superseded by and absorbed in later expositions of the science. (1) They have the value which all genuine products of the human mind have, like great works of art or great religions. (2) It is necessary to know something of them, if merely to be on our guard against the metaphysical conceptions which are embedded in our ordinary language and the ordinary materials of our thinking. We must study old metaphysics if we really wish to escape from delusions which are the effects of them. (3) The history of philosophy may, with all truth, be called "philosophy itself taking its time"; it is the perpetual antithesis of criticism passing into dogma and requiring new criticism in turn, not a mere internecine quarrel of rival sects, but a continuous self-correction of thinking, a continuous

struggle towards a more adequate conception of the multitudinous phenomena of our experience, an attempt to get some unity which shall not ignore the multiplicity of facts which the special sciences deal with. Just because the various special sciences are always amassing new material and propounding new theories, the perpetual renewal of philosophy is a necessity. *Because* the sciences progress continuously, philosophy can't progress continuously, but has always to be beginning over again. Yet there are certain great landmarks in the history of philosophy which do seem to represent points behind which we need not go. Rather they are turning-points at which the way of putting the central question has been changed. Such are the "dialectic of Socrates" (as applied to the dogmatism of the earlier Greeks) and his turning philosophy mainly to *human* problems, (? Aristotle's doctrine of *δύναμις*), the "doubt" of Descartes shewing us that "thought" or consciousness must be our starting-point, and the critical method of Kant, who insists that before we try to settle *what* this or that *is*, we must ask ourselves what are the conditions and limits of our knowledge of it. Observe that each of these philosophical revolutions results in a *limitation* of the problem of philosophy, in a check upon dogmatism. Limit philosophy as we may, its problems remain large enough.

§ 25.

Ethics may mean three enquiries—and in the widest sense should include them all: (1) A scientific study as to the sentiments, judgments, and practice of mankind in different ages and in different places and sections of society now in respect of their conduct: in these, of course, would have to be included the opinions of more reflective persons on

conduct, and that includes the opinions of professed moralists and moral philosophers.[1] This is *per se* an historical and "inductive" inquiry, too much neglected because of the long prevalent assumption that human nature is much the same everywhere, and that "moral law" has been the same at all times and in all places. The discussion of moral sentiments will involve a certain amount of psychological analysis—in the bringing into consciousness of what is not generally clearly conceived.

(2) There are the more properly philosophical or metaphysical questions which arise out of a reflective consideration of human conduct, and the sentiments and judgments about it: How is it we have the idea of an "ought" confronting "facts"? What is meant by "moral ideals," "moral law," "duty," "virtue," "the good for man"? This (in its widest form) is the question of the relation between man as a social being and as a conscious reflective being on the one side, and nature—as the sum of phenomena—on the other. In this is included the question of free-will.

It is idle to discuss whether this "metaphysic of ethics" should precede or follow the purely historical and inductive enquiry. Without having attended to the facts to some extent, we should not raise the problems of philosophical ethics: on the other hand, these problems give a reason for enquiry about the facts, which we should otherwise lack. The nature of moral law and of our knowledge of it give a reason for enquiring into the actual judgments of mankind. The recognition of a common element in all that can be called morality (*e.g.* the hypothesis of "natural law" or the view that "conscience is the tribal self") gives a guiding principle in the collec-

[1] This last section would come under the head of what Aristotle calls *τὰ λεγόμενα* or *τὰ φαινόμενα* about conduct.

tion of facts. Whether in a complete system the philosophical or the historical part should be placed first is a matter of literary or didactic convenience.

(3) Reflection about conduct—however objectively scientific and impersonal in its aim[1]—cannot fail to react upon conduct, and on the sentiments and judgments about conduct. Moreover, the recognition that the "ought" confronts the "is," and that ideals have varied in the past and been "developed" makes necessary the discussion of what our ideals "ought" to be, and in what respects generally-accepted ideals and judgments and sentiments may require alteration. This is the practical aspect of ethics. In a sense it includes "casuistry," but the old casuistry had its character affected by the assumption of absolutely fixed moral laws.

Our views about many practical matters must differ according as we regard what is right and wrong as determined (1) by an absolute standard revealed to everyone's conscience or to an authoritative body of persons by a superhuman power, or (2) by some end, such as social well-being, which can be studied by historical and experiential methods. It makes a difference also if *ethical* duties are to be recognised which fall altogether outside any social obligations or tests. If so a man may be doing right when he is acting in such a way as to lead to the destruction of the society around him.[2]

It does not conflict with a "humanist" or social estimate of right and wrong if we regard evolutionary

[1] Cf. Spinoza, *Ethica*, Part II., Prop. 49, Dem. and Schol.: "All things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles."

[2] A Russian sect, the Doukhobors, asked the government of Assinoboia to assign them land where they might be subject to God only. No sane civilised government could grant such a request. It would be to recognise anarchy.

ethics as inadequate metaphysically to explain the problem of "*ought*" v. "*is*." The double aspect theory helps us here—though carried up into the less purely external (spacial) aspect itself. Self-realisation and the common good, as the end consciously sought after, may be seen as the "internal" or psychical aspects of what on its purely external side appears as the struggle for existence, where there seems only success by mechanical pressure out of the less fit. But in studying human evolution we can't take a merely external point of view: we learn most by looking from within. Self-realisation is not opposed to the common good because the self which realises itself is *social*.

Ethics is (1) based on custom—becoming authority (of rulers, priests, sacred books, etc.).

(2) There is reaction against external authority and ethics is based on "intuition" and modifications of it. This leads to the belief in a *lex naturae*. The defect of intuitionism is its arbitrary and individualist character.

(3) Utilitarianism appears, taking as the moral end "happiness" (*a*) as individual pleasure (*b*) as social well-being and progress.

(4) Utilitarianism is modified and supplemented by the theory of evolution.

(5) The evolutionist view, which gives an account of the facts but does not do justice to the meaning (the "ought"), receives a metaphysical interpretation in evolutionary idealism.

§ 26.

If the ethical end be defined as self-realisation, we have to ask what is meant by "self"? It is not the self as something merely individual and particular—exclusive (if that were possible) of the rest of the universe and of other selves.[1]

[1] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, § 14.

The investigation of the possibility of knowledge shews that the condition of knowledge (which is not mere individual feelings but has objective validity) is that sensations and feelings are held in a synthesis by a self, which cannot be itself a mere series of feelings (Mill admits this)—a self, moreover, which because aware of time and change must in some sense be "eternal." Yet such a self cannot be known as particular things or kinds of things are known. It is not "there" to be an object of knowledge. It is thus something never realised in experience: and yet it is the necessary condition of experience. Here we have the source of the contrast between "ought" and "is."[1] The external aspect has only "is." In the internal (psychical) we come upon that which is not there and yet must be. It makes nature possible as an object of knowledge and yet is more than mere nature as a series of events. In this seeming contradiction we have the explanation of that rising above mere nature, which is the characteristic of morality and also of art and of science.

Again, the self which is to be realised is a social self. The realisation of the eternal self in time produces society (ethical institutions). For practical ethics it is best to treat the self-realisation as the *good* of a community.[2] Here we have the link between politics and ethics.

RELIGION, ART, ETC.

§ 27.

But the significance of the "self" is not exhausted in the never completed struggle after an ethical ideal, a good that recedes with every attainment of a step higher.

[1] Cf *Moral Philosophy*, p. 270.

[2] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, p. 255, and *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 280, 295, 296, 299, *sqq.*, 318 *sqq.*

The effort to grasp the end—the whole truth—as something attained, to *feel* the eternal (since we cannot completely know it) in the temporal, is one aspect at least of religion.[1] To define religion we must not take eccentric specimens; nor should we begin with the very lowest types. We must take the highest type (*not* = most extravagant) known (judged highest by reference to intellectual and social characteristics).[2] Religion is "morality tinged with emotion"—an emotion that transcends mere struggle and contradiction.

Religion to begin with is the effort to conciliate powers of nature often conceived as malignant—to propitiate gods or daemons. The element of ritual is thus prominent in it. It is not a mere *individual* effort. That is magic. The conciliation of higher powers with respect to tribal interests is religion, which is not a mere individual matter (certainly not in the early stages of religion).

When combined with practical *reflection* on conduct and deliberate effort to attain social good, religion is ethical, not merely ritual. When combined with deeper reflection and effort to satisfy intellectual cravings also, we have doctrine (theology). And out of this mythology comes philosophy. The imagination is always seeking to translate conceptions into pictures of

[1] Religion is different from ethics. Ethics is practically affected by religious beliefs; but the social value of religious beliefs must be judged from the standpoint of an ethics based on sociology independent of religion. Cf. *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 310 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 22. "Insane conditions have this advantage that they isolate special factors of the mental life and enable us to inspect them unmasked by their more usual surroundings. They play the part in mental anatomy which the scalpel and the microscope play in the anatomy of the body." Also p. 39. "I said . . . that we learn most about a thing when we view it under a microscope, as it were, or in its most exaggerated form." This is quite a false analogy. The microscope gives you greater detail; but you should not choose abnormal specimens for investigation, if you want to study the type.

events in particular places at particular times; and it is often only in such pictures that concepts are first thought out (*e.g.* the ideas of incarnation, resurrection, etc.). Meanings must be expressed in concrete form. We may well distrust the great thoughts that can never get themselves uttered at all, or only in very ugly and confused forms. But there is a difference between the demand that certain alleged events be accepted as the *essence* of a spiritual meaning (which is inverting the relation of "history" to "doctrine") and the recognition that meanings require symbolic and figurative expression in order that they may be grasped by the ordinary mind. More can be said philosophically for an ornate ritual, symbolising ideas regarded as valid now, than for a creed containing assertions about matters of historical fact in the past. The smell of incense, if the incense is good, will do less harm to the mind than a genuine belief in stories like that of the Gadarene swine.

Art may seem immoral because it recognises and reverences the beauty of the healthy human form which the ascetic and the puritan have buried under ugly clothes and stunted by unwholesome surroundings: it may be immoral if it encourages a selfish individualism which neglects social duty or cultivates the abnormal, whether under the sanction of religion or of wild protest against Mrs. Grundy.

Religion puts the individual into relation to the cosmos, not merely to human society. Individualism in religion ignores all society. The hermit withdraws from it: the soul-saving "evangelical" neglects it, his characteristic being "other-worldliness."

Unequal stages of development are the cause of the conflicts between the religion of ritual and ethical religion (cf. the conflict between Hebrew priests and prophets); between religions of smaller groups and wider; between traditional observance and mythological belief on the one side and reflective scientific thinking

or philosophy on the other. Yet in its *ideal* philosophy is the clear thinking of what is felt in religion.

ART.

§ 28.

Art in its highest form[1] is the effort to express the self (ideal) in concrete form, to fashion better than nature. Fine art is emotion, or thought suffused with emotion, expressed so as to produce in the spectator[2] or hearer a disinterested pleasure (elation).

There may come conflict between art and religion, between art and morality, art and philosophy—again because of unequal development. In the ideal all might be different ways of "self-realisation."

HISTORY.

§ 29.

History is man's self-realisation in time. The imperfections and contradictions and conflicts require a faith in ultimate rationality to give them a meaning. Progress comes through conflict and struggle—as in the history of philosophy. In some periods of history carefully studied we *can* verify this hypothesis (*e.g.* the contribution of the struggles of the 17th century to our modern political existence).

History is not a mere chronicle of events; but involves an attempt to read *meanings*.[3] Hence it is not

[1] It may have begun in superfluous "play," in sexual selection, in ritual observances, or in a combination of these.

[2] Art must be judged from the point of view of the spectator.

[3] *E.g.* The controversy as to whether history should be interpreted on its materialistic side (economic basis) or "ideally"; both aspects are necessary. History is a series of events, to be "explained" scientifically like the phenomena of nature (cf. especially geology); but it has also its "meaning," to be read (imperfectly) in the light of a conception of ends or purposes (*e.g.* "education of the human race," "dialectic process," etc.).

a mere collection of materials for the sociologist to generalise about. The genuine historian will never consent to hand over material to be fitted into the ready-made pigeon holes of the scientific sociologist. The individual (person, event, nation, etc.) has a value and interest for the historian. There is a spiritual world manifested in the world of space and time. Seen on its "inner" side we see a meaning in the individual for complete consciousness, which is necessarily ignored if the mere time and space series is considered.

§ 30.

The questions of God, Free Will and Immortality may be considered in the light of the distinction between the psychical (inner) and material (outer) aspect.

God is not a "Being among other beings," to be discovered like a heavenly body in the sky, but the meaning of the whole. The question of the existence of God is an unimportant question: the important question is what we mean by God.[1]

Free Will is not caprice interrupting the causal sequence which science studies, but simply the fact that there is this inner aspect. Man is not merely a part of nature: a man's life is not merely a series of events, nor properly understood as such alone. He has also his ends, purposes for which he is held responsible. He is an efficient and final cause, not merely a material and formal.[2]

Man is free just because he is capable of being determined by ideas or thoughts, and by external stimuli as *known*. A man is held to be responsible for acts (liable to punishment or blame) just in those cases and in those cases only in which he was *capable* of knowing (thinking of) what he was doing or of

[1] *Confessio Fidei, init.*
[2] *Confessio Fidei*, p. 238. *Moral Philosophy*, p. 304.

putting himself into, or keeping himself in, such a position as to have or retain this capacity. Thus the element of thought (however that is to be explained) is the condition of that freedom which is presupposed in all moral (responsible) action.

In so far as his conduct is determined by the thinking of such ends as reason pronounces to be truly desirable, man is free in the higher sense—the sense in which freedom is not the presupposition but the end of moral action.

And the self has a meaning—included, however, in the meaning which is God: and so we come to a position like that of Lotze.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

§ 31.

Principal Fairbairn (*Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 198) says that "Without his mythology Homer would have made no appeal to the imagination of all," (Do we care for his mythology? Did Plato? Is it not the purely human interest that affects us? Hector and Andromache; Ulysses longing for Ithaca; Nausicæa; the recognition by the old nurse, etc.), "Æschylus would have given us no tragedy" (mythology *plus* reflection is needed for tragedy), "Plato no philosophy" (see *Euthyphro*, *Republic and Laws* for Plato's opinions about mythology. Mythology is the philosophy of childhood; and childish things must be put aside),[1] "Dante no *Divine Comedy*"

[1] The Jewish religion was a religion of the earthly continuance and prosperity of the race and nation; yet it led to the vision of a kingdom of God not of this world at all. The passion for the other world of mediaeval ascetics led to the growth of art, of learning. The puritan became the founder of progressive and commercial commonwealths. Calvin first among theologians recognised that usury was not wrong.

(true ; but Dante reads a good deal into his mythology), "Milton no *Paradise Lost* or *Regained*," (Satan being the most interesting character in the former, and the theology of the latter being heretical), "without the motive and the material which religion supplied." You must take account of the evil of religion as well as of the good to estimate fairly. It will not do to take some weak and aggressive form of philosophy, some dogmatic atheism or slipshod agnosticism, and then point to the most thoughtful of theologians. Philosophy is not religion, but, as the critic of theology, it may affect it for good.[1] It is of no use discussing social progress as if human beings would ever do without religion of some sort ; but it is of no use speaking as if any religion was in every respect good and beneficial. The careful philosopher cannot consider all religions equally false : and the prudent magistrate cannot consider them all equally useful.[2]

Philosophy and Religion.

1. Philosophy grows up out of mythology. (*φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πώς ἔστιν.*)

2. Then philosophy comes to be antagonistic to religion (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Plato, etc.). The first stage of reflective criticism always seems to suggest antagonism (*cf.* philosophy of art, of the state (Sophists), of morals). Yet religion cannot be ignored, hence,

[1] *v.* Gibbon, Ch. II. *init.* on worship, etc.

[2] Professor J. A. Stewart, in *Mind*, July, 1902, speaks of "the ordinary Christian concepts, etc." What is that ? The rabble that massacred Hypatia were Christians, the savage hermits of the Thebaid were Christians, Torquemada was a Christian. The Irish Presbyterian would undoubtedly consider himself a Christian of the purest orthodoxy when he preached the doctrine of grace and not of works, and ended up with "My friends, better murder your mother than be without Christ." But Origen and Synesius were Christians, and I presume that the 39 Articles and Westminster Confession contain Christian theology.

3. Philosophy tries to provide a religion (Stoicism and Neo-Platonism) and ceases to be pure philosophy.

4. Philosophy becomes *ancilla fidei*.

Defence of a creed against philosophy requires the use of weapons taken from the philosophers. The Christian theologians of the early centuries employed the philosophical conceptions and methods of Neo-Platonism in order to refute the Neo-Platonists. Thus we have a philosophy within the Christian religion. This is true also of Judaism, Mohammed-anism and other religions. [Philosophy is no longer regarded as antagonistic to religion or as simply identical with it; but is conceived as the ground of religion, its inner meaning.]

James says that philosophy is secondary to religion. Feelings are first, the intellectual interpretation can only come *later*. True; but is the first in *time* the criterion? [Is not that primary which is *logically* prior, the ground or meaning rather than the temporal antecedent?] Philosophy, he says, is an intellectual interpretation, and we need not expect that every one will accept it. But what criterion have we apart from reason?

§ 32.

There are those (Hatch, etc., Ritschl), who think that it would have been a gain to Christianity if it had not been affected and infected by Greek meta-physics, and that it would be a gain to Christianity now to clear out of it its philosophical doctrines and leave before the eyes of the faithful the simple and sublime figure of the real historical Jesus Christ.

But how are you to be sure you have got the real historical figure? This requires historical and critical investigation. You escape from metaphysics to find yourself in the atmosphere of the law court (where evidence has to be tested), and of the scientific

student of documents. If you neglect these scientific enquiries, you leave the interpretation to subjective caprice.[1] The Quaker, the Unitarian, the sentimental inheritor of elaborate ecclesiastical traditions, the devout Anglican or the Roman Catholic trained in the Jesuit cult of the Sacred Heart will each believe in a somewhat different Jesus Christ. The Quaker will be certain that Jesus condemned war, though he spoke no word of condemnation to the Roman centurion; Tolstoi will go further and see that precepts about turning the cheek to the smiter condemn law courts and police as much as armies and navies. The Unitarian will with justification lay stress on the first three gospels as earlier evidence than the fourth, but what is he to make of the still earlier evidence of the Pauline Epistles, where there is almost nothing about the historical Jesus and a good deal of metaphysics? Those whose religious emotions have been developed in the shadow of old and stately shrines, in the softened light of painted windows and amid the solemn melodies of sacred music, will find no satisfaction for their hearts in seeking to look at the isolated figure of the greatest of Hebrew prophets: they see their Lord and Master, as the art and the devotion of ages has seen him, surrounded by his Apostles, and founding the Church in which he still dwells. The living reality of the Church gives them

[1] Suppose you get rid of the accretions of Greek metaphysics round the primitive Christian belief, are you not all the more plainly brought face to face with the historical difficulty about alleged facts (the truth of the Resurrection, etc.)? Can we limit ourselves to what Paul held about these?

Suppose you say: After all the main thing is the teaching of Jesus, the *moralist*. Then the question arises, could this morality (*e.g.* as in Tolstoi) be compatible with the existence of human society? Does it correspond to our judgments of right and wrong? It is a noble protest indeed (*cf.* the Hebrew prophets); but is it more? Is it a rule to guide us, except as qualified by Greek ethics?

an assurance of the reality of the Christian tradition, which the searcher of historical documents may fail to find. Of the ordinary unthinking "evangelical" Protestants not much need be said. The Bible, in whatever version they have received it, is to them what the Church is to the Catholic; but it is the Bible not professedly guaranteed by the Church (though, whether they know it or not, that is the only medium through which they have received it). The spirit of God witnesses in their hearts to the truth of it; but if we ask how far this witness of the spirit agrees in different minds we shall find that it is unacknowledged ecclesiastical tradition that has given the doctrines, and proofs for them are afterwards sought in scripture, read uncritically, consulted as an oracle, and studied on bended knee. Evangelical religion is a fragment of the Catholic faith, taken out of its traditional setting; hence the startling crudeness of the ideas of justification and atonement, when separated from the philosophical doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. These crude doctrines are certainly efficacious in affecting the imagination. The death on the cross and the fountain filled with blood appeal to the fevered mind of the tormented soul with hardly less materialistic intensity than the ghastly bleeding heart in the sentimental idol which Jesuit piety has set up behind its altars.

If we are to explain the victory of the Christian Church over the ancient civilization except by supposing a widespread degeneration in the intellect of the Roman Empire, it must be by recognising that the Christian theologians had reached a better philosophy than their pagan antagonists. The Church prevailed not by isolating itself from the surrounding world of belief and practice; but because it absorbed in itself elements from the ritual of Greek and Oriental mys-

teries, the traditions of the Jewish synagogue which enable a dispersed people to feel themselves one family, the Roman methods of organisation for purposes of government, and also the metaphysics of Plato, the Stoics, and the Neo-Platonists—take away any one of these elements and the Christian Church which became the religion of the Roman world would not have been what it was. If Julian said *Vicisti Galilæe* (which is very doubtful) he had not said the whole truth; for what defeated him was not merely the simple faith of the fishermen of Galilee, but a philosophy better thought out than the theosophical rhapsodies in which he found a refuge for his soul; and what gave its greatest strength to the Christian Church in its contest with pagan religions and with Greek philosophy was that there was no such absolute gap between the Christianity professed by the uneducated convert from the worship of some local god and the educated convert from the schools of Alexandria (or Athens).

§ 33.

To the average Christian the doctrine of the Trinity may have often been simply a magic formula used in baptism; and the idea of the incarnation simply the belief that a virgin, contrary to ordinary human experience, bore a son. But no instructed Christian could be left without some opportunity of knowing the metaphysical phraseology connected with these beliefs. The philosophical conception of the Trinity and the Incarnation was not an esoteric doctrine to which only an inner circle was admitted. Within the Christian Church, in the fourth century as now, there were all types of mental and moral attitude ranging from the crudest materialism upwards; but there was no absolute gap such as existed, to the weakness of the Graeco-Roman world, between the many and the philosophers.

The difference between the "orthodox" Christian

philosophy and that of (most?) Neo-Platonism was in the view taken of *matter*. Matter to Christian ascetics was evil; but Gnosticism came to be set aside as heresy, and though monasticism was a concession to this, the official creed of the Church kept up a different idea.

In the Trinity, the son and Holy Spirit are co-equal, co-eternal. This is against the idea of emanation. The Son is *very* God of very God. In the incarnate Son, there is no loss of equality in his eternal aspect. He remains God while yet being man. *Quâ* man he is inferior, but the two natures are united in one. Here —though often in mythological setting—we have a real advance on Platonism, directly in the Platonic line. So the strength of the Christian religion is that, in spite of recurring extravagances, it has not proved incompatible with temporal well-being and progress. Perhaps this is partly due to its Jewish inheritance. The Jewish religion is the religion of a people who do not despise *this* world, who believe in rearing families and making their way in the world, and who regard such success as a proof and a result of obedience to the sane and sanitary law of Moses. The Christians unfortunately were too easily contemptuous of the washing of hands, they turned Roman baths into Churches and admired people who never took off their clothes; but still, though the counsels of perfection might require a break with the "world," those who lived and worked in the world as tent-makers, as soldiers, as men of letters, as lawyers and governors, were not cut off from the Church, and in the rank of her saints there are many more types than the fervid and fanatical recluse or the self-tormenting candidate for martyrdom. The gap between sacred and secular was constantly being set up, but as constantly it was broken down. In rude ages the bishop had to do the work of the earthly ruler, the monk

and friar the work of schoolmaster and scholar; and the temporal ambition of the Pope and the spiritual claims of Emperor and anointed king—along with all the strife they caused—meant a denial that God who became flesh and dwelt among us could have made any honest work the world needed common and unclean. Note how the ascetic orders take up learning and art.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

§ 34.

We have learnt (except a few fanatics) that precepts such as turning the cheek to the smiter, giving indiscriminate alms, etc., must be interpreted so as not to be incompatible with an orderly, coherent and progressive society.[1] We have learnt that knowledge, science, must be added to faith (is in fact involved in a thoroughgoing faith in the rationality, *i.e.* Divine government of the world): hence we must not take precepts necessarily as the Church has interpreted them. If Christians are not to be forbidden to take arms at the command of the magistrate, to take oaths in accepting civic office or giving witness in the law courts, to appeal to human law for the redress of their wrongs; may not Christians still claim to retain the name (if they choose) while prepared to revise some of the teachings of the Church about the law of marriage and divorce and the relation of the sexes generally—to base sexual morality on scientific consideration of individual health rather than on ascetic abhorrence of natural instincts and processes, and above all on scientific consideration of the well-being and progress of the race, rather than on abstract ideals of marriage as a sacrament? Human beings are animals in a state of domestication. Therefore it

[1] Cf. *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 313 *sqq.*

is only right to consider the lessons to be derived from the breeding of horses and dogs, as Plato did, instead of trusting to mere natural and "sexual selection" on the one hand or to religious taboos on the other.

If Christianity means that although we may *perhaps* be permitted to doubt that an ass spoke with human speech and that a big fish swallowed a minor prophet or even that devils went into a herd of pigs, we must nevertheless fervently believe that a unique case of parthenogenesis occurred among the mammalia; if it means that though a Christian may be a soldier, or a millionaire, or a commissioner of oaths, or even an actor or a ballet-dancer, yet a Christian may not marry a deceased wife's sister when the law of his country allows him, and that a Christian may rightly beget children certain to inherit disease or madness, and must be tied for life to a drunkard or an imbecile or a criminal, and may not further the wellbeing of his country by uniting himself to a more suitable mate if the law of the land allows, then there are many sober-minded and thoughtful persons who will feel compelled to disown the Christian name. But if the Christian name has survived the supposed impieties of Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin, and has ceased to feel alarm at the acceptance of scientific truth, may it not also survive what are called attacks on the sanctity of marriage and change its ideas of purity to something more in accordance with healthy human lives than these ascetic and irrational teachings, which permit and even encourage so much that is injurious to the survival of the fittest and forbid what might secure an increase in human happiness and welfare.

The true check on selfishness should be not simply that which runs contrary to instincts and impulses, but the consideration of the future of the race. *E.g.* should the family be monogamous? In what cases

should divorce be allowed? These should all be discussed from the point of view of the *children* and of the efficient work of the parents. This is to carry out the *spirit* of the Ten Commandments.[1] We must not assume that Christian ethics (the ethics of the progressive races) will crystallize exactly at the stage which would satisfy the conscience of the Irish Catholic or exactly at the stage which would satisfy the self-conscious American woman, who would prohibit whisky and tobacco and establish a matriarchate of neurotic iced-water idlers.

THE QUESTION OF EVIL.

§ 35.

God has been spoken of as a king, as a leader of armies—king of kings, the lord of hosts; he has been pictured as the judge of all the earth; he has been described as an artificer, shaping the heavens and the earth with his hands, and moulding man out of the dust of the earth; he has appeared to awe-struck mortals as riding on the whirlwind, wielding the lightning and speaking in the thunder; in the poetry of a pastoral race he has been figured more peacefully as a shepherd caring for his flock; he has been looked on with reverence and love as the father of gods and men. May we not, using still another image drawn from our human experience, realise and shadow forth the nature of the absolute and perfect by thinking of him as a schoolmaster, guiding the education of the human race? A father or a teacher who had warm kindly feelings, but did not think much about the best interests of his children, might try to make everything smooth for them—telling them at once the solutions of all his questions, dictating the very words of true

[1] 4th Commandment = 1st Factory Act.

knowledge and guiding the faltering pens of the little writers. A wiser teacher leaves his pupils to make a great many blunders, *which he knows quite well they will make*; because he knows that he will thus make them sounder scholars in the end. Can we say he wills the errors and the faults and the naughtiness of his pupils? Yes—as means to their education. He is responsible for the possibility of their errors—not the actuality. For he wishes to make men and women of character, not blameless automata.

THE JOY OF BELIEVING.[1]

§ 36.

Professor James accentuates the "happiness" of believers. If we read the lives of the saints, we find much self-tormenting among many of them. The happiest life is probably that of the man of good health with a congenial occupation, not too exhausting, and a congenial home-circle, especially with a good liver and digestive system. But his happiness won't prove the "truth" of his religion and irreligion. He can't be a very fanatic religionist of any kind nor a fanatical opponent of the religion of the people round. He probably accepts the religion he was brought up in and has never had any doubts; and a happy temperament will blind him to the less pleasing features of it, *e.g.* he may be an evangelical Protestant, but he won't think of his grandfather as roasting in hell for ever, though his grandfather never went to church or chapel: he may be a Roman Catholic but he will extend the doctrine of invincible ignorance to some dear Protestant friends who have had ample opportunities of learning the true faith. If people vividly realised the misery of this life and the misery they profess to believe in

[1] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, p. 246.

another life, they could never smile again. Of course it is joyful to believe that things are going well with us, and prayer and worship are a great outlet for emotion. But what does the joy *prove*? That certain beliefs and certain practices produce happiness in certain persons. The moral worth of these must be tested by their effect on social wellbeing. Here is where the superiority of some religions over others can be seen.

THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY[1]

I.

It is easy enough to mark in general terms the distinction between logic and psychology; but in the treatment of many logical questions, even by our most careful writers, there seems to me frequently some want of clearness in the detailed application of this distinction. And, in consequence of this want of clearness, many logical questions seem to be rendered more obscure and doubtful than need be. In any case, an attempt to see how the accepted distinction works out in several of the problems of logic may serve to test the accuracy of this distinction, and, unless I am too sanguine, may even throw some light on these problems themselves.

Every psychologist and every logician would agree that, whereas logic, even in its widest sense, has to do only with knowledge, and not with feeling and will, psychology has to do with all mental phenomena. So far as this goes, however, logic might be simply a branch of psychology, and many psychologists, though professedly recognising some further distinction between logic and psychology, are in the habit of including a great many logical questions in their treatment of the psychology of cognition. Almost all,

[1] Reprinted from the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. V. p. 585, and Vol. VI. p. 1.

however, recognise a distinction between the properly psychological and the properly logical aspects of the problem of knowledge. This distinction may be conveniently marked by saying that psychology has to do—among other things—with "knowing," while logic has to do with "knowledge." In other words, psychology has to do with mental processes as events; logic has to do with the validity of these mental processes. Psychology is therefore called a "descriptive" science;[1] it deals with facts, with what actually happens in the mind. Logic, on the other hand, is a "regulative" science; it deals with what ought to be, with rules for the right performance of the mental processes that lead to cognition. And, on this account, as is often pointed out, logic is related to the psychology of cognition in a way analogous to the relation of ethics to the psychology of feeling and volition, and to the relation of aesthetics to the psychology of a certain group of the emotions.

So far we seem to be on firm ground. No sooner, however, do we begin to apply these generally accepted distinctions than difficulties suggest themselves. They may show themselves even in connection with the definition given of logic in an elementary text-book. Thus Jevons mentions the common definition of logic as "the science of the laws of thought," and goes on to explain "law of thought" as meaning "a certain uniformity or agreement which exists and must exist in

[1] It may seem to make no important difference if it is said that psychology is "descriptive and explanatory." Every science is, or professes to be, explanatory; and explanation is simply a more advanced kind of description—a description that brings particular phenomena into relation with a wider range of phenomena. At the same time, in proportion as psychology professes to go beyond mere description of particular mental processes, and aims at a more and more complete grasp of all that bears on our mental life, it becomes more and more difficult to exclude logical questions from psychology. To this I shall have to refer later on.

the modes in which all persons think and reason, *so long as they do not make what we call mistakes or fall into self-contradiction and fallacy.*" Now this looks like an acceptance of the view that logic is a "regulative" science, whose "laws" are "rules" or "precepts." But Jevons continues, "the laws of thought are natural laws with which we have no power to interfere, and which are of course not to be in any way confused with the artificial laws of a country, which are invented by men and can be altered by them" (*Elementary Lessons in Logic*, p. 1). Now if by "laws of thought" we mean simply general statements of what actually happens in our thinking, or statements of what under certain conditions will happen as a matter of fact, "laws of thought" are merely the concern of the psychologist. But the psychologist is not restricted to those uniformities which exist in our thinking when we do not make mistakes. In seeking to ascertain the "laws of association of ideas," which are psychological "laws of thought," the psychologist may find the fallacies into which the average human mind is prone to fall an even more instructive study than the rigidly correct intellectual processes of the soundest scientific thinker. "Laws of thought," for the psychologist, are certainly "natural laws" in the sense of the other "laws of nature"; they are statements of what happens, or at least of what under certain conditions would happen. A statement of the fallacies into which the *intellectus sibi permissus* tends to fall, would be a statement of laws of thought in this psychological sense. But "laws of thought," in the logician's sense, tell us how we ought to reason, and thus may not seem properly comparable with the "laws of nature." We all seem to be able to violate the logical laws of thought; we do so every time we commit a logical fallacy. Now we cannot, in any strict use of language, be said to "violate a law of nature," though the phrase is used

often enough. What is meant is that we violate some practical precept of prudence based upon a knowledge of a law of nature. The man who throws himself from the top of a high cliff does not violate, he illustrates, the law of gravitation; he may be violating the laws of prudence or of morality. And so the man who commits a fallacy illustrates psychological, but violates logical, laws. Are we, then, to compare the "laws of thought" in their logical sense with maxims of prudence, or precepts of morality, or even with "the artificial laws of a country"? Are the laws of logic simply precepts of intellectual prudence which are, or should be, based on a study of psychological processes? Warnings against inaccuracy in observation, against hasty generalisation, against the tendency to overlook negative instances, if these warnings are called logical "laws," are such only in this sense. But this is a kind of logical doctrine which some of the stricter logicians have considered an excrescence rather than an essential part of the science. And, in any case, the term "laws of thought" has not been applied to describe such maxims for the avoidance of fallacies as we find in the first book of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, but has always denoted specially the axioms of formal logic—the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle; and to these the logicians who take a wider view of their science would generally add the principle of sufficient reason (under some name or other). Now can these fundamental axioms be considered practical precepts based on psychological laws? If so, what are these fundamental psychological laws? If they are not distinguishable from the logical axioms, and these last are therefore laws of nature, how are the fallacies which consist in their violation possible? The distinction between nature or "things" and our thinking about things, will hardly help us here, for these axioms of logic are at once statements about things and about the

necessities of our thought. Here, then, we are face to face with a difficulty which is just one aspect of the problem, "How is knowledge possible?" with its companion problem, "How is error possible?"

The "formal" logicians, who have chiefly favoured the definition of logic as "the science of the laws of thought," may seem, in limiting the problem of logic to consistency, to have separated logic from epistemology. But here we see that a consideration of the laws of thought themselves brings before us some at least of the fundamental questions about knowledge. In teaching logic to students who are only beginning the study of philosophy, or who are unable, or cannot be induced, to study ultimate philosophical questions, it may be advantageous to put aside the problems of epistemology. For bibliographical purposes, also, it is convenient to mark a distinction between works which deal mainly with the general question of the nature and limits of human knowledge, and those which are mainly or exclusively occupied with a detailed examination of the forms of judgment and inference with a view to testing their validity. But it does not seem to me possible to draw any really scientific line between logic and epistemology. The attempt to cut off logic from the problem of the validity of knowledge can only lead to that narrow and "formal" treatment which has brought logic into bad repute with men of science and philosophers alike, and which has made it an easy prey to the sport of the exuberant mathematician. If we seek to limit the province of logic by defining it as "the science of inference," we cannot avoid the question about the relation between our self-consistent reasonings on the one side and facts on the other. An attack on the syllogism, or a defence of it, must deal with the question whether it *astringit res*; and that is surely a question of epistemology. Again, even if we limit logic to inference, we must drag in by a side

door those processes "subservient to inference" which we have just kicked out at the front entrance. To what science does it belong to consider concepts, judgments, definitions, divisions,—not the mental processes as such of thinking, judging, defining, classifying, but the products of these processes in their possible relations to the real world to which they profess to refer? And how can we deal with the validity of general concepts, with the distinction between the essential and accidental, with the difference between "real kinds" and artificial classes, without being compelled to face the very problems with which a "theory of knowledge" professes to deal? Nay, how can we discuss the meaning of affirmation and negation without considering the relation of thought to reality? Traditionally, such topics as I have just named belong to the province of logic. As a matter of historical propriety, the science of logic might be expected to denote those subjects which are treated in Aristotle's *Organon* and specially in the *Analytics*. To separate logic from epistemology is to ignore the most im portant of Aristotle's logical writings, the *Posterior Analytics*; and the habit of ignoring this work is doubtless responsible for a good deal of that contempt for the Aristotelian logic which some logicians seem still to imagine to be the beginning of wisdom. Not merely, however, as a matter of historical sentiment and convenience, but on the ground of philosophical accuracy, we must include the question about the validity of knowledge in logic. Only for provisional pedagogic reasons can we afford to leave it out. I shall assume, then, that our "general logic," if taken seriously, must carry us up into "transcendental logic"; and I have just been showing how Jevons, in his first "elementary" lesson, raises (unwittingly perhaps) the fundamental question about knowledge and error.

In Mill's *Logic* we have perhaps the most striking

instances of a confusion between logic and psychology, or rather of a tendency to merge logic in psychology—a tendency which gradually becomes explicit and acknowledged. In his "Introduction" (§ 7) Mill speaks, indeed, as if his logic were independent of metaphysics; and by "metaphysics" it is clear from the context that he understands principally psychology, "the analysis of mental processes." But, by this independence of logic, he only means that logic, being chiefly practical in its aims, need not carry the analysis of mental processes very far. "The extension of logic as a science," he says, "is determined by its necessities as an art." That the "analysis of mental processes," which need not be carried very far in logic, is nevertheless psychological analysis, comes out clearly in the course of the treatise. Thus, in the chapter on "The Functions and Logical Value of the Syllogism," he speaks of those against whom he argues as representing the syllogism "as the correct analysis of what the mind actually performs in discovering and proving the larger half of the truths, whether of science or of daily life, which we believe" (Book II. ch. III. § 1, p. 209, 8th ed.). "Larger half," it may be remarked in passing, is a phrase which may seem ominously to foreshadow Mill's scepticism about the certainty of mathematical truths. Farther on in the same chapter (§ 8, p. 235) he speaks distinctly of "the psychological process," "false psychology,"—taking for granted that the psychological analysis of itself decides the logical question. It is in strict accordance with this that Mill, in treating the whole problem of necessary truths, deals with it solely as one of psychology. He rejects the inconceivability of the opposite as a test of truth, on the ground that as a matter of fact many persons have been incapable—*i.e. psychologically* incapable—of conceiving or believing what has afterwards turned out to be true. Now, if "inconceivability" be

taken in a purely psychological sense, it is impossible to defend the "ultimate postulate" as an infallible test of truth. The psychological question about belief has indeed a very important connexion with the logical test of truth; but, unless the logical question is distinguishable from the psychological, Mill's position is assailable only by showing that it is completely sceptical and destructive of other parts of his logical theory, such as his admission of the validity of the proof *per impossible*. As a logical principle, the inconceivability of the opposite is nothing but the principles of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle taken together; and it is best to take them together, for in their separation they are only partial and one-sided expressions of the basis on which all our knowledge rests. I am most certainly not prepared to defend the principle of the inconceivability of the opposite as the ultimate test of truth on any interpretation which would make of it a separate and distinct principle from that which is universally admitted as the basis of formal logic—the logic of mere consistency—and which is everywhere taken for granted in mathematical proofs. If A is B, it is impossible that in precisely the same sense of the terms, and the same relations of time, place, etc., A can also be Not-B; and, conversely, if A cannot be Not-B, it must be B. This is the principle of Contradiction combined with the principle of Excluded Middle; and this is also, expressed in its most abstract form, the principle of the inconceivability of the opposite, as a logical principle.

In the application of the principle, two considerations are of primary importance; and, if they are sufficiently kept in view, a great many of the objections commonly made to the principle fall to the ground. In the first place, it should be stated in a hypothetical form: "*If* A is B." That is to say, the principle cannot by itself furnish us with any positive knowledge whatever.

We must start with some assertion: and this assertion may be itself a mere assumption which may turn out to be quite untenable. But, in the testing of the truth of this assumption, the principle of contradiction renders indispensable service. When we test an hypothesis by comparing it with facts, we must assume the validity of the logical processes by which we deduce from our hypothesis the consequences which would follow if its truth were provisionally admitted. And the validity of logical processes involves the validity of the principle of contradiction. Even when a merely psychological interpretation is given to the principle of the inconceivability of the opposite, its validity as a logical principle is tacitly assumed. We know, for instance, that a sincere and undoubting Catholic, or Calvinist, or Mohammedan cannot, as a matter of fact, consciously and knowingly accept propositions as true which are inconsistent with the fundamental articles of the creed which has come to be a real part of his mind. He will, as a matter of psychological necessity, reject such propositions, although they may be accepted as certainly true by persons who have been differently brought up, or who do not hold their professed religious beliefs with the same thorough-going earnestness of conviction. And, it must be added, though this is not always so clearly recognized, he *ought*, as a matter of logical necessity, to reject such propositions. To profess to believe propositions which are strictly inconsistent with one another, is a proof that there is a want of thoroughness somewhere,—a want of clearness in thinking, or a want of sincerity, or both. Of course there are various well-known devices for getting over the difficulty—notably the distinction between two (or more) kinds of truth. There are undoubtedly real and important differences between what is "scientifically true," on the one hand (and that means, of course, true according to the phrase-

ology, and subject to the limitations and conventions of this or that particular science), and, on the other hand, what is "morally true" or "aesthetically true," in the sense of being more satisfactory to the moral or aesthetic emotions. But there is here an ambiguity in the word "true." The artist in colour or in words may produce a higher artistic effect by deviating from the exact proportions of nature, and we may call such deviation a preference of artistic over scientific "truth." An analogous distinction may reasonably be admitted in matters of religion: that is to say, religious emotion, like aesthetic, may struggle to find ἐκφression for itself in utterances which, taken as judgments and literally interpreted, are not accepted by the intellect. But it is only with the truth or falsehood of judgments, construed strictly, that logic can concern itself; and no distinctions between the "truth" of poetry and the "truth" of fact entitle us to say that in precisely the same sense of the terms the two propositions, "the world was made in six days," and "the world was not made in six days," can both be true. In ordinary phraseology, for our practical convenience, we still use pre-Copernican astronomy; but we do not seriously assert that the sun goes round the earth, and that the sun does not go round the earth, in precisely the same sense of the words. When, therefore, any one holding a system of beliefs finds that a strict application of the logical consequences of that system obliges him to contradict a proposition which, apart from that system, seems to him sufficiently proved, he ought logically either to deny that proposition or to be prepared to revise his system of beliefs. What any one, face to face with such a contradiction, will actually do depends on the kind of person he is. Most people's system of beliefs is not very much of a system: they can accommodate in their minds a number of inconsistent beliefs by holding many of them

very languidly, by not thinking much about them, and by keeping them for use on different occasions, just as Sunday clothes and ordinary apparel can be stowed away in separate drawers. There are a number of interesting psychological problems as to the nature and degrees of belief. But with these logic as such has nothing to do, for logic "should be made of sterner stuff." Beliefs which are still dimly outlined in a realm of dreams and hazy twilight are not yet subject-matter for logic. They must be brought up into the full light of "clear and distinct thinking" before they can be logically analyzed and compared and tested.

But this is as much as to say that the principle of Contradiction must be taken in a perfectly strict sense; and this is the second consideration to be attended to in applying it. The principle of Excluded Middle applies to logical contradictories only and not to contraries. It is only in the case of contradictory opposition that we can infer from the falsehood of a proposition to the truth of its opposite. A and Not-A divide the universe—or "the universe of discourse"—between them, but Not-A must not be turned without further proof into some positive B or C, nor must A alter its meaning in the very least. These limitations to the applicability of the principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle are generally admitted in words; but I do not think they are sufficiently recognized in the discussion about the inconceivability of the opposite as the test of truth. In other words, "inconceivability" is treated as a matter of psychology, and the purely logical character of the "ultimate postulate" and its identity with the axioms of formal logic are overlooked. Let me take the familiar example by which Mill seems so easily and plausibly to prove the untrustworthiness of the alleged test of truth. The antipodes were rejected as inconceivable by the ancients: we know that they exist. Now many persons may have rejected the

notion of antipodes simply because it was unfamiliar to them, or because it was rejected by others on whose authority they relied. But those who rejected the notion thoughtfully did so in the belief that gravitation was a force acting in the direction of an absolute 'down,' and they were quite right to reject the alleged existence of the antipodes, *if their system of belief about gravitation was correct.* They could not consistently think of human beings, constituted as we are, walking on the other side of the earth and not falling down. Can we consistently think such an idea? What we can picture or image is irrelevant to the question. Can we think it, *i.e.* think it out? No more than we can consistently think of human beings at the antipodes falling off, now that we know that "falling off" would mean to them "falling up," which is a self-contradictory notion.[1]

This example brings out very clearly the risks which may attend the application of an infallible principle to concrete problems. It can only be safely applied where we are certain that there is no ambiguity in the terms and when we are distinctly aware of the conditions under which we are making our assertions. We are very apt to take that which is true (or false) *secundum quid*, as if it were true (or false) *simpliciter*; in other words, we are apt to make statements roughly and vaguely without "clearly and distinctly" realizing all that we are really meaning by the terms we use. The infallible logical principle is always infallible; there is no doubt as to it when it speaks *ex cathedra*. But we are apt to apply it without due attention to the fluctuating meaning of ordinary words and the vague outline of most of our conceptions. It is not a test which is valid in formal logic and in mathematics,

[1] I may be allowed to refer to what I have already said on this matter in an article on "What is Reality?" in Vol. I. of the *Philosophical Review* (May, 1892), republished in *Darwin and Hegel.*

and not elsewhere, for every assertion about anything implies its validity. The difference is only that in abstract matters, where the conditions are fully stated and easily kept in mind, the principle can be applied with a certainty to which we can only approximate in the case of more complex and concrete subjects.

It may be here objected that the principle of inconceivability of the opposite, so interpreted, is a principle of consistency only and not of truth; truth, it may be said, is the agreement of thought with things, of theory with facts. But what do we mean by "facts"? Everything that in ordinary language, or in ordinary scientific language, is called a "fact" is, if we are to use words with philosophical precision, a "theory." Even the simplest perceptive judgment (*e.g.* it is hot, it hurts) involves some element of interpretation. In becoming aware of a sensation as "hot" or "painful," we have applied thought to what is given in sense. Nothing is mere *datum*—mere fact (if "fact" is to be opposed to "theory")—except (1) the uninterpreted sensation (and even in calling it a sensation we are making it something more definite and individual than a careful psychology warrants), and (2) the ultimate fact of consciousness itself. The uninterpreted sensation, moreover, is really an abstraction from what we actually know, and therefore is not in any full sense of the term an existing reality. Consciousness itself, on the other hand, cannot very well be opposed to "thought," unless we restrict the term "thought" to the operation of the discursive understanding. Beyond these ultimate facts—the *data* of outer and inner sense—all so-called facts are theories, thoughts about these *data*. Thus the question of truth cannot be separated from that of consistency The only distinction we can draw, if we are speaking accurately, is that "mere consistency" means consistency within any system

of thought or belief, however narrow, however incongruous with other "systems" or with the *data* of sense or consciousness; whereas "truth" means ultimately consistency within a complete and perfect system of knowledge which embraces the whole universe. Such truth is, of course, to us an ideal merely; and we are in the habit of dignifying with the name of truth anything that is consistent with whatever system of beliefs is the best and most coherent that we have yet been able to reach. Truth is consistency on a large scale, where the "universe of discourse" includes potentially, or analogically at least, a reference to the ultimate *data* of sense and consciousness. I insert the qualification "potentially or analogically," because otherwise we might seem obliged to deny the truth of abstract mathematical propositions. We can verify such propositions as $2+2=4$ by touching fingers or counting heart-beats, but we cannot draw a hard and fast line between such propositions and those in which an appeal to perception is impossible. $\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sqrt{2}}=1$ is quite as true, but is not equally well adapted for the methods of the Kindergarten.

A different kind of objection to the character here assigned to the principle of Contradiction, might seem to be suggested by the philosophical doctrine that truth is to be found in the unity of contradictions. Such an objection would, however, rest solely on an ambiguity in language. The unity of contradictions does not mean a unity of logical contradictories as explained above. As Mr. M'Taggart has very clearly put it in his *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*: "So far is the dialectic from denying the law of contradiction, that it is specially based on it. The contradictions are the cause of the dialectic process" (p. 10). The dialectic movement of thought is, in fact, just the process I have been describing, by which systems of belief are tested

and corrected. Contradictions in the strict logical sense can never be reconciled. One or other must be true. But the true proposition may be so very abstract that it gives us very little to satisfy our desire for positive knowledge. On the other hand, when we are dealing with *contraries*, which are what people generally mean when they speak of opposites or contradictories, the principle of contradiction forbids us accepting both as true; but both may be false, and if, nevertheless, both have some plausibility or reasonableness, we are driven logically to look for some deeper and fuller truth which lies beyond and of which they may be partial and inadequate expressions, false because one-sided and incomplete. The laws of 'formal logic,' if carefully interpreted, are by no means useless, even in metaphysics. To take an example: that 'Time is finite' and that 'It is infinite' are often spoken of as contradictory judgments. They are not; and they are not even contrary judgments, though they have contrary (or, if "infinite" means merely "not finite," contradictory) predicates. "Time is finite" and "Time is not finite" are contrary propositions (A and E), which may both be false. "Time is in every respect finite (or infinite)" and "Time is in some respects not finite (or infinite)" are contradictories (A and O), one or other of which must be true. The application of the principle of contradiction in all its sharpness sets us free from the incompleteness of the oppositions in which the inaccuracy of ordinary language leaves us entangled. How much popular argumentation turns on the assumption that between Freedom and Necessity, between Law and Liberty, between Authority and Reason, between the Ideal and the Real there is an absolute antithesis!

The "wonder" which makes science and philosophy begin and advance, is just the feeling of a contra-

diction; it is the logical law of thought making us uncomfortable by setting up a standard of rigid coherence over and against the scrappy, incongruous, ill-fitting bits of belief we have got hold of. The progress of the sciences is often spoken of as if it consisted in a continuous accumulation of facts; but, if facts are merely accumulated, that is not yet science, but only materials for science to work upon. When an alleged new fact is presented to us, we inevitably, *i.e.* by *psychological* necessity, test it by our existing system of beliefs; and, as already said, we are *logically* bound to do so. If the alleged fact turns out to be really a fact, and does not cohere with our existing system of beliefs, that system ought to be modified so as to become coherent with it. In this process of modification it may happen that many supposed facts will have to disappear. The progress of science is the continually more and more complete adjustment of our system, or rather systems, of belief; they are made more coherent in themselves and with one another, and so enable us to fit isolated facts into their places. Now such a progress may be more correctly represented as a dialectic movement of thought than as a continuous aggregation of facts. The ideal of a completely harmonious whole of knowledge is always before us, however unconsciously, leading us to destroy and reject incomplete and incoherent systems, or, in the more advanced stages of the process, to fit them into their places as partial and yet complementary fragments of the truth. Such scientific revolutions as the substitution of the Copernican for the Ptolemaic astronomy, of the Newtonian for the older account of gravitation, of the undulatory for the corpuscular theory of light, of the Lamarckian theory of species for the traditional theory, and of the Darwinian for the Lamarckian explanation of biological evolution, cannot be described correctly as

additions to our stock of facts; they are the displacement of less adequate by more adequate theories. This "dialectic" character of intellectual progress becomes still more conspicuous in the case of metaphysical systems. The substitution of new "categories" for old, in the sciences, in politics, in art, in religion, in any department of human life, leads to a readjustment of the metaphysical system in which the old categories had been held together in what seemed a coherent system. What a new "fact" or a new "law" is for each of the special sciences, that a new "category" is for metaphysics.

In the mathematical sciences we have, indeed, an example of what seems a steady and continuous advance; but it is an advance simply by the application of the Cartesian method of "clear and distinct thinking," *i.e.* by the continual application of the logical laws of thought to the *data* of space and number. And even in the progress of mathematics there have been periods of revolution, like that in which Descartes was a leader, when, if old categories have not been rejected, they have been absorbed in wider conceptions. There have, indeed, in recent times been suggestions which, if true, have been thought fatal to the supposed absolute truth of mathematics. I refer, of course, to the non-Euclidean systems of geometry (on which there has been an interesting discussion lately in the *Philosophical Review*[1]); and perhaps to some persons even heretical systems of arithmetic may seem conceivable, such as would have to prevail in John Stuart Mill's planet where $2 + 2 = 5$. Now, so far as I am able to understand a matter in which I have no special knowledge, such hypotheses as those of spherical space, of space of more than three dimensions, etc., are altogether

[1] Vol. V., No. 26, Mr. Schiller's articles on "Non-Euclidean Geometry," and No. 28, Professor Hyslop's article on "The Fourth Dimension of Space."

meaningless, except on the previous assumption of our tri-dimensional space, *i.e.* of our actual space, which for convenience of thinking we analyze into three dimensions, finding that we require at least three determinations to fix the position of any point, but that three are quite sufficient. If it is said that in spherical space parallel straight lines meet, that can only mean that on the surface of a globe lines, *which on a flat projection of this surface would be parallel*, must converge; or else it is nonsense. If it has any meaning, it assumes the truth of Euclidean geometry. Similarly, if any one likes to amuse himself by talking of 2 and 2 making 5, he can only mean either to use the symbol 5 where we now use 4, or else he means that when (*e.g.*) two pounds' weight of a certain kind of substance are placed alongside of other two pounds of the same substance, the resulting heap is found to weigh five pounds,—a statement which, if true, would reveal some hitherto unsuspected physical or chemical change, but which is meaningless except on the assumption of the absolute truth of *our* arithmetic; for the assertion of the mysterious appearance of the extra pound implies that $2+2=4$, and that $4+1=5$. We find $4+1$, where we expected 4.

Even supposing the contention of the neo-geometers to be admitted—I mean, of course, their metaphysical contention with which alone I am concerned—the truth of geometry would still be absolute within the conditions as to the nature of space taken for granted in any particular system of geometry. The dispute is as to whether Euclidean geometry is only a system parallel to other possible systems, or whether it occupies a position of primacy, being presupposed in all of them. Within the limits of any fantastic "meta-geometry" or "metarithmetic," the logical laws of thought would have to hold good or there would be no system.

The main purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to show the connection—or I should rather say, the identity—between the ultimate test of truth in every department of knowledge, viz. coherence within a system, and those "laws of thought" which are the basis of formal logic in its narrowest interpretation. Leaving these more general problems, which would usually be classed as epistemological, I proceed to deal with some of the special problems which are usually discussed under the head of logic.

II.

Recent logicians have protested against the old tradition of beginning with an account of terms or concepts, and have insisted that the judgment is the primary act of thought. But, in the reasons given for taking judgment first, I do not think a sufficient distinction is generally made between the logical and the psychological aspects of the question. That "the sentence precedes the word" in the historical evolution of language, seems proved from an examination of the beginnings of language among primitive races and among children.[1] This is a fact of undoubted psychological interest, but I do not think it has any direct bearing on the logical question of whether the judgment or the concept is prior; for, let it be said once for all, *priority in time is irrelevant in logic*. The only priority that concerns us is logical priority. That is logically prior which is logically presupposed in something else; in other words, the logically prior is that on whose truth or on whose existence something else is dependent, but not *vice versa*. Which of them comes first into any individual's mind, or into the average human mind, is a matter which is of itself of no logical moment. But without any irrelevant anthropology or psychology, it can be shown on purely

[1] Cf. Sully, *Studies of Childhood*, p. 171.

logical grounds that the judgment is, in a certain sense, prior to the concept; the logical character of concepts cannot be known unless they be considered as terms in an actual or possible judgment. The student of elementary logic is asked (*e.g.* by Jevons) to describe the logical character of such terms as "metropolis," "book," "library," "prime minister," etc. It is a puzzling question to set to beginners, who are always apt to think that every question must have one and only one correct answer. The same term, *i.e.* what looks the same when stated in isolation, may be singular or general, collective or distributive, according to the context in which it comes. "The Library is in this street," "This book is not in the Library," "It is not in any library." Here what we call the same term "library" is singular, collective, general, in succession; and in the last example is either general or collective according as we are thinking of the "any" or the "in."

Aristotle's definition of the term, nay the very word "term," suggests that the term is the element of a proposition: *ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις* (*An. Pr.*, I. 1). "The term (*terminus* = limit, end) is that into which the proposition is broken up when we analyze it." The two sides of a sheet of paper have no existence apart from the sheet of paper; but they may certainly be considered separately from it and from one another. Is not a similar abstract procedure permissible in logic? Aristotle has been unduly blamed for adopting in the *De interpretatione* the concept as his starting point, and building up the judgment out of concepts. But we may reasonably suppose that, taking for granted the definition of the *Analytics* (which was an earlier work), he considered himself at liberty, as in the sciences, to show how to construct a whole in thought out of elements that have only been arrived at by a process of abstraction. It should be observed

further that, in the passage in the *De Interpretatione*, his object is to show that the isolated concept is neither true nor false, that only the judgment is the real unit of thought. The very passage in which he is supposed to lapse into an erroneous view of the term is one in which he is practically asserting the logical priority of the judgment. But here, as elsewhere, the disciples have shown a peculiar facility for overlooking the more important aspect of the master's teaching, and his reputation has suffered in consequence.

In regard to the extension and intension of terms and their relation to one another, it is all important to distinguish the logical from the psychological aspects of the question. In considering the theory that the extension and intension of terms vary inversely, we must, first of all, absolutely reject the notion that there can be anything of the nature of a mathematical ratio between these logical aspects. This "inverse ratio" is only one among many examples of the fatal and delusive fascination which the exactitude of mathematics exercises over the students of other subjects. When we find a logician or a psychologist or an economist using mathematical formulae, we ought to be more than usually on our guard. Mathematical formulae in such matters are more insidious than metaphors. The extension of a term is, at least conceivably or potentially, capable of strict quantitative measurement. The number of individuals or the number of species to which a term is applicable is a quantity in the mathematical sense. But the intension of a term, the number of attributes it includes, is not in this exact sense a quantity at all. How many *words* we take to express what we mean by a term may in any particular case be estimated quantitatively; but how many they are will depend upon what particular words are used and upon what language a person happens to be using.

Where one person or one language uses one word to express an attribute, another person or another language may require two or three. Extension and intension are not, therefore, strictly commensurable quantities between which we can discover an exact mathematical ratio. Nevertheless it is possible to compare them together; and, so far as I can see, there is a very good sense in which it can be held that as a matter of logic they tend to vary inversely, *i.e.* the larger extension as a rule goes along with the smaller intension, and *vice versa*.

It seems to me perfectly irrelevant to object to this, that, while a person may with increasing knowledge of a subject come to know more individual specimens or more species of a genus, his conception of the genus may and should simultaneously increase in richness of content and depth of meaning. This is an important psychological fact, and as such should find recognition in any psychological account of the growth of knowledge. A complete "theory of knowledge" may very well be expected to overlap this portion of genetic psychology. But logic has nothing directly—at least, nothing primarily—to do with the varying degrees of knowledge of different individuals or with the different stages in the history of an individual mind. For logic "extension" ought to mean the total applicability of the concept, and "intension" the total content or meaning of the concept, if its content were completely known. That is to say, here, as in other cases, logic has to do not with what may happen to be in this or that person's mind, nor even with what, as a matter of fact, is in the mind of the average person, but with an ideal standard of knowledge to which any actual human thought can at best only approximate. It is meaningless to attempt to compare such varying and contingent matters as the number of individual roses,

or even the number of species and varieties of rose, that any particular person happens to know of at any moment, with the fulness of the description which he could give at the same moment of the genus *Rosa*. To use and extend the convenient terminology of Dr. Keynes,[1] "subjective intension" and "subjective extension" are quantities too fluctuating and indeterminate to admit of comparison; whereas "objective intension" and "objective extension" do conceivably at least admit of comparison. For the purpose of illustration and exposition we must be content to take "conventional intension" and compare it with the actually known applicability of the term. "Conventional intension" Dr. Keynes uses for "those attributes which constitute the meaning of a name"; he does not say "to whom." I suppose we must understand "to the average well-informed person of our acquaintance." This use of "conventional intension" as a substitute for "objective intension," which in most cases cannot be completely known, and of the extension known to the average person who is well informed on the subject for the complete "objective extension," is perfectly legitimate, and is only one example of that use of convention, which is necessary in every science. Because logic must accept conventions, it does not follow that it must confine itself to a manipulation of arbitrary symbols, and leave alone those fundamental problems of knowledge which we have already seen arise even out of such seemingly abstract formulae as the principle of contradiction. It is only the actually known that we are able to analyze, but we can take the best available knowledge

[1] *Formal Logic*, 3d ed., pp. 24, 25. The names "subjective and objective *extension*," which I here suggest, seems to me to express a distinction more useful and important than that which Dr. Keynes draws between *denotation* and *extension* on page 31.

as typical of what knowledge must be, and so seek to discover the general laws to which thinking must conform in order to be knowledge. In dealing, then, with this question of extension and intension, our best procedure is to take some well-mapped-out province of knowledge where there is a precise terminology and a clearly arranged system of classification. In such a subject as botany or zoölogy, it is obvious that the wider class needs a briefer scientific description than the narrower class, the intension of which includes all that can be said about the higher with the addition of its own *differentiae*. That this is so, seems to justify us in regarding the inverse variation as true generally of extension and intension. If we look on the whole universe as a classified system of beings, with the *summum genus* of "being" at the one end of the scale and the various individual existences at the other, then we find our law confirmed; for mere being is the emptiest of meaning, and the individual being is the fullest. The singular term has thus an infinite intension, and is therefore incapable of complete definition. The question which Mill raised about the connotation of proper names, seems to me to turn entirely on whether we mean by the proper name something different from the singular term. If we do, then it may be true to say that the proper name is denotative but not connotative. But such a distinction between proper names and singular terms seems to me entirely extra-logical. It is a matter of grammatical or rhetorical import whether I say "this person" or call him "John Smith." Logic is only concerned with proper names as appropriated to individual beings, and can recognize no distinction between them and singular terms. If the question of extension and intension be cleared of irrelevant psychology and irrelevant grammar, and of inapplicable mathematical precision, it does not seem to present much difficulty.

The problem of logic is analysis in order to discover the conditions of validity. As the logical theory of terms, therefore, should be based on a study of concepts whose applicability and meaning are well understood, so should the logical theory of judgments[1] be based on an analysis of highly developed types of judgment. In the light of such an analysis, it is then profitable to look back on the more rudimentary types, in order to understand their logical significance. In the analysis of a complex type it must not be assumed that one and only one form of analysis is legitimate. Logical analysis being analysis made with the view of testing validity, that form of analysis is to be preferred which is most convenient for that purpose. Now the form of analysis which is most convenient in order to make clear the mutual implication of propositions, and the validity or invalidity of the inferences of which judgments constitute the elements, is not necessarily that form which corresponds most closely to what is actually in the mind of any particular individual or of the average person when uttering the proposition. This last is a psychological problem, and should not be confused with the logical. A complete theory of knowledge may indeed be expected to contain a genetic account of the evolution of the different species of judgment, and to classify these species according to an evolutionary or genealogical principle, as is done so admirably by Mr. Bosanquet in his *Logic*; but for logic the primary business is, I think, to give an analysis applic-

[1] It would be convenient if we could restrict the term "proposition" to mean "a judgment so expressed as to bring out its logical character." We could then distinguish (*a*) the *sentence* (including the enunciative sentence) which is material for grammatical analysis; (*b*) the *judgment*, which may not be expressed in words at all or which underlies expressions that are not in form enunciative; and (*c*) the *proposition* = the judgment so formulated as to bring out its logical character.

able potentially to every form of judgment, and such analysis must be based on the characteristics of those judgments where the logical aspects are most prominent to consciousness and can therefore be most clearly apprehended. It is undoubtedly very important to recognize that in every judgment, as actually made by any one, there is a reference to reality in general, or to some portion of reality, as the ultimate "subject" of discourse. This account of judgment is confirmed in an interesting way by the fact that in the most rudimentary of all types of judgment—the impersonal perceptive judgment (*e.g.* "It is hot"; "It hurts," etc.)—there is no determinate subject, but only the indeterminate "it" = reality in general. But this recognition of the "reference to reality" as ultimate subject of discourse does not falsify nor exclude the traditional analysis of every judgment into subject and predicate,—an analysis which is of course based on a study of those kinds of judgments in which the "subject" is some clearly determined portion of the real world. Furthermore, the recognition that every term as actually used in a judgment must have both a meaning and some objective reference, however slight and indirect, allows us to analyze every judgment according to either extension or intension, or to treat the subject as primarily extensive (quantitative), and the predicate as primarily intensive (qualitative). The last of these modes of analysis may be preferred, because it corresponds best to the ordinary form of language, and to what is most usually in our minds when we say something (predicate a characteristic, *i.e.* a quality) of something (*i.e.* of all or some part of a thing or class of things). But the interpretation of both subject and predicate in terms of extension has the convenience that it exhibits most clearly the possibilities of transition from one proposition directly

to another, and the implications of combinations of propositions. The continuity which is the essence of all inference can be most easily exhibited by interpreting the "middle term" in mediate inference extensively. The extensive interpretation of propositions does, of course, make possible the treatment of judgments as equations, and so seems to threaten logic with absorption in algebra. But the logical objection to the quantification of the predicate, which is presupposed in the equational theory, is not that such equational judgments (all men = some animals, etc.) are not very often in our minds; this would be a purely psychological argument. The real logical objection is that a proposition with a definitely quantified predicate is always a complex verbal form which expresses two judgments and not one. Thus "All equilateral triangles are all equiangular triangles" wraps up into one formula two propositions which require separate geometrical proof (*Euclid*, I, 5, 6). Now the business of logic is to analyze complex mental processes into single judgments, and therefore these complex equational sentences do not represent the elements with which we have to deal.

The chief defects of the traditional formal logic seem to me to lie partly in its too exclusive predilection for the extensive interpretation of the judgment, but still more in the absence of distinction between the singular and the universal proposition, and, above all, in the absence of distinction between the mere collective judgment and the true universal. Very different types of judgment are all classed together as A and E propositions. "All the books on this shelf are bound in calf" is a judgment of a different type from "The angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles."[1] The ignoring of this distinction is the chief thing which has exposed

[1] Aristotle drew the distinction very clearly. *Anal. Post.*, I. 4.

the Aristotelian logic to attack in modern times. Mill's thesis that the Aristotelian syllogism is by its very profession a *petitio principii* rests upon a narrow "class" interpretation of the *dictum de omni et de nullo*, that is most certainly not justified by Aristotle's own language, which simply expresses the principle of continuity ("what may be predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject"),[1] and on the assumption that every universal proposition is simply a collective judgment. Now certainly if "All M is P" merely means "A is P," "B is P," "C is P," and "D is P," and if we then go on to say, "B is one of this group (M), therefore it is P," we have made no advance, but, as Mill points out, are simply reading off our memoranda. Where, however, the two premises are both singulars, or where (if anywhere) one is a true universal (*i.e.* necessary), Mill's argu ments are inapplicable. That excellent tale of Thackeray's about the too confidential abbé (it is quoted by Mr. Bosanquet in his *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 140, 141) seems to me alone sufficient to refute Mill's criticism of the syllogism. "An old abbé, talking among a party of intimate friends, happened to say 'A priest has strange experiences; why, ladies, my first penitent was a murderer.' Upon this, the principal nobleman of the neighbourhood enters the room. 'Ah, Abbé, here you are; do you know, ladies, I was the Abbé's first penitent, and I promise you my confession astonished him!'" The company, having the two premises given them from different quarters (and of course they might have been given at any interval of time and through many different channels), are at once able to form a conclusion which is certainly "new" to them. There is no suspicion of *petitio principii* here. The syllogism (συλ-λογισμός, *con*-clusio) arises only from the combination

[1] *Categ.*, 3.

of the premises; but the combination of the premises *is* the conclusion.

Mill expressly denies the existence of any true universal; all judgments professing to be necessary are, according to him, simply incomplete collective judgments, which we assert as if they were complete. The only necessity he allows is a psychological necessity—a tendency in our minds to expect a repetition of similar experiences. Mill's argument has undoubtedly been made easier for him by the absence of any distinction in the traditional logic between the true universal and the mere collective judgment; but the main determinant of his whole treatment of the subject of inference has been his assumption that he is dealing with a psychological problem, and that there is no logical problem distinct therefrom. The very question "whether the syllogistic process is or is not a process of inference" shows that he thinks of the syllogism as the consciously recognized and formulated inference. We need only translate Mill's question into Aristotelian Greek to see its irrelevance as applied to Aristotle's own analysis of inference. "Syllogism" to Aristotle simply means "inference," *i.e.* out of a combination of *data* arriving at something new—in the only sense, of course, in which we can ever know anything "new"; for we can never learn anything absolutely discontinuous with our existing knowledge. Still less could we be said to "infer" what has no connection with anything else. But how far we are conscious of the form of our inference is a matter for psychology: whether we formulate it in words is a matter of grammar or rhetoric. Logical analysis applies equally to fully conscious and half-conscious inferences, to fully formulated and half-formulated inferences; though of course, as already said, our knowledge of the logical forms of inferences is best arrived at by a study of the most fully conscious and clearly expressed specimens we can obtain.

Mill holds that all inference is ultimately from particular to particular. Now if it were true that, as a matter of psychology, we had first one particular case in our minds and then passed at once to the thought of another particular case, this would not prove that, as a matter of logic, inference was possible from particular to particular. Mill speaks of the village matron recommending her neighbour to try the medicine that cured her own child, without uttering any formal universal proposition, or without consciously formulating any universal judgment. But if she is asked why, she must enunciate the major premise of her argument. She must either commit herself to the statement that the drug is a panacea, or she must expressly recognize the similarity of the two cases. But to recognize similarity is, as a matter of logic, to arrive at a "middle term," distributed, undistributed, or approximately distributed: "All such (or some such or most such) cases are cured by this remedy. This is such a case." Mill himself uses the words "on the recollection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of her Lucy."[1]

Mr. Hobhouse,[2] in his chivalrous attempt to defend Mill against the fierce onslaught of Mr. Bradley, lays stress on this statement of Mill's; and he seems even inclined to follow Mill in making likeness an ultimate category, though he admits that where there is likeness there is *generally* identity in difference.[3] As an argument that there is not always such identity, Mr. Hobhouse asks: "What is the identity and what is the difference between blue and green?"[4] This question does not seem very difficult to answer: blue (in the widest application of the name) is the identity which

[1] *Logic*, Bk. II., ch. III., § 3 (I. p. 216, 8th ed.).
[2] *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 282.
[3] *Theory of Knowledge*, Bk. I., ch. III., § 11 (I. p. 75).
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 109, note 2.

links together the most purple of blues and the most yellowish of greens, when we see them in the spectrum. Mr. Hobhouse's chapter on "Resemblance and Identity" seems to me to offer one of the many cases in which a more precise distinction between psychology and logic is needed. "Likeness," he says, "does not in the least bit cease to be real because it is analyzed." That may be; but it is with the analysis that logic has to do. Mr. Hobhouse seems to think both likeness and identity "given" to immediate apprehension. Whether that is so or not is a question for psychology. Logically, identity is the prior, because there can be (in thought) identity without difference, though it is a mere abstraction, whereas we cannot think "likeness" without implying both identity and difference.

Mill's treatment of likeness as an ultimate category rests upon the psychological atomism which forms the basis of his whole theory of knowledge. Mr. Hobhouse is indignant at Mr. Bradley's supposing that when Mill talks of inference from particular to particular he means "particular images." It is quite true that Mill does not mention them in the passage which Mr. Hobhouse quotes from the *Logic*; but we know sufficiently well from other sources—notably from his *Examination of Hamilton*—that Mill accepts that theory of knowledge which was most clearly (and with fullest consciousness of its issues) expounded by Hume. Mill's whole argument in the *Logic* about the nature of mathematical judgments would be without meaning, unless we suppose that by "particulars" he means *ultimately* particular images of particular sense-impressions.

Once admit that, as a matter of logic, likeness may be analysed into identity in difference, then, if it is admitted that inference is only justified by similarity, it is admitted that inference implies identity and therefore that we cannot logically pass from particular to

particular except through a universal. We may not think of formulating the universal principle, the major premise, of our inference till we are met by the question why; and in proportion as we are untrained in abstract thinking or in the habit of scientific expression, we may find it difficult to do so; but the validity of our inference, nevertheless, depends on the truth of the universal principle, whether it be consciously apprehended or not.

Now if it be once admitted that logically no transition from particular to particular is possible except through a universal, this suggests that perhaps the psychological theory which holds that such transition takes place as a matter of fact, may also need revision. It would imply a break in the continuity of our mental life,—a break which we should not scientifically be prepared to accept without very distinct proof,—if no trace of the identity (the universal element) which comes out clearly in the higher and more fully conscious stage of logical inference could be found in the lower and less explicit stages of association and perception. And modern psychology, though it started from the empirical standpoint of Hume, seems to be coming to recognize that, in Mr. Bradley's phrase, "Association marries only universals." [1]

It may be considered misleading or inconvenient, as a matter of descriptive psychology, to speak of perception as being an unconscious or subconscious inference; but it is important as a matter of logic to recognize that the validity of perceptive judgments can be shown to depend on the same principles as those which determine the validity of conscious logical processes. If, for instance, looking at a distant mountain side, I say, "I see snow," this perceptive judgment (which I might quite as well have expressed in the

[1] This phrase is accepted by Mr. Stout in his *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II. p. 52. See the whole passage, pp. 45 *seq*.

inferential form "That *must* be snow") is an inference of a probable kind. It may be analyzed as an Aristotelian enthymeme: "Snow is white, glistening, etc. (a premise due to past experience lying latent in the mind). This presentation is white, glistening, etc. Therefore this is snow." This is an enthymeme in the second figure—an enthymeme of the weakest kind. But as the points of identity become more numerous, the middle term approximates to distribution, and so the major premise approaches the stage at which it admits of simple conversion. "All that has this particular combination of marks is snow." And then the inference passes into the first figure.[1]

Nothing, it may be remarked in passing, shows more forcibly the degradation to which Aristotle's logic has been subjected than the perversion of the meaning of "enthymeme" in the traditional formal logic. To define an enthymeme as a syllogism with a suppressed premise or conclusion, and solemnly to distinguish enthymemes of the first, second, or third order according as one or other of the three propositions is suppressed,—all this is, in logic, as absolutely irrelevant and unscientific as if, in zoölogy, we were to recognize a distinct species of quadruped when one or more of the legs is not seen, and then subdivide the species according as a fore leg or a hind leg, a left leg or a right leg, were at the moment out of sight. How I choose to express my argument, is a matter of rhetoric. If I wish to produce conviction, it may be expedient to conceal my weakest premise or to leave my hearers to make for themselves a conclusion which I only suggest. But such tricks of the platform furnish no special and peculiar types of inference for the science of logic. Aristotle's enthymeme "from signs (or

[1] The relation of perception to conscious inference is admirably treated by Höffding in his *Outlines of Psychology*. Cf. especially p. 132 (transl.).

symptoms)" is, on the other hand, a really important contribution to the logic of probable (as distinct from demonstrative) inference,—far more important than his "inductive syllogism from all the particulars." The diagnosis of the physician (Aristotle's own illustrations are medical), the circumstantial evidence of the law courts, and, as we have just seen, our ordinary recognitions in perception are affirmative syllogisms in the second figure, which gain in probability as they approach the stage at which the major premise can be converted, and the syllogism becomes of the first figure. Even in the first figure such enthymemes, in Aristotle's view, fall short of the scientific syllogism, because our middle term is a sign, or a combination of signs, and not a cause or ground. In the "scientific" syllogism the *ratio cognoscendi* is the *ratio essendi*.

Mill's inductive methods are a valuable contribution to the logical study of the manner in which, in ordinary life and in the sciences, we test the guesses that we make about the causes of events; but none of them are "inductive" in the sense of being arguments which do not proceed logically from universal to particular. The "method of residues" is professedly a deductive method, and involves the assumption of an axiom, the truth of which is most easily recognized in its purely mathematical form. The other methods are deductive applications of the principle of causation, as Mill himself acknowledges, though he attempts to derive the belief in universal causation and in the uniformity of nature from our experience of particular cases of causation and of particular uniformities of sequence,—an argument which turns on the same confusion of psychology with logic as that on which his attack on the syllogism depends. As a matter of mental development, we understand particular cases before we understand the principle involved in them; but the universal principle, though it may be apprehended and formulated

later, is logically prior. Our *conviction* of the universal may come later, but the *truth* of the particular instance is dependent on the truth of the universal principle. The question of the logical presuppositions of inferences about causation is, however, too large for treatment towards the end of a long discussion. I can only very briefly indicate what seem to me the main points for consideration. (1) In the sciences and in ordinary life we make abstractions according to our convenience. We isolate certain phenomena as "causes" for special consideration, taking for granted the other elements in the total reality. In his exposition of the inductive methods, Mill is obliged to desert his attempt at a philosophical conception of cause as the sum total of conditions, and to adopt the popular use of the term. (2) A logical analysis of what causation implies, compels us to go beyond the artificial distinction of antecedent and consequent, and to regard the assignment of causes as only one particular aspect of that fitting of particulars into their place in a system which constitutes "explanation." (3) This underlying assumption of system is identical with the principle of contradiction (or inconceivability of the opposite). In passing from "formal logic" to the logic of probable matter, in passing from mathematics to the sciences of observation and experiment, we do not come across a new set of *a priori* principles disconnected with our previous canons of inference. Our thinking is determined by the same principle of totality or coherent system (or however we describe it) throughout, though in passing from the more abstract to the more concrete sphere, we pass to a region in which our certain knowledge is more limited just because it is less abstract. The sphere of the contingent is simply the sphere where it is more difficult for us in intricate material to see the necessity: and the principle of sufficient reason is identical with the principle of contradiction.

A due consideration of the difference between the logical question of validity, and the psychological question of the temporal evolution of knowledge, seems to me to vindicate the syllogistic analysis of Aristotle from another charge of incompleteness which is made even by those who recognize the necessity of a universal element in our transition from particular to particular. Such inferences as "A > B; B > C; · A > C" are supposed to be incapable of reduction to syllogistic form. But the psychological fact that it is easier to see the principle, *e.g.* of *a fortiori*, in a concrete or in a brief symbolic form than when fully expressed in abstract language is no proof that the inference is logically possible except in virtue of the truth of the abstract general principle. The general principle here and in all similar cases (most A are B; most A are C; A is to the north of B, B is to the east of C, etc.) is a principle of quantity or a necessity of spatial relations; and it is to confuse logic with mathematics, if we set up axioms of quantity and axioms about space as if they were parallel to the *dictum de omni et de nullo*. Every science has its own axioms, which may be arbitrary conventions, or derived from other sciences, or capable of proof *per impossibile* (by inconceivability of the opposite); but the axioms of quantity or space are no more themselves principles of logic than are the Acts of Parliament which form the major premises of judicial and administrative inferences.

Finally, to guard against misunderstanding, it may be well to point out that the "Intuitionist" who appeals to the evidence of consciousness or the *consensus humani generis* in support of his immediate or necessary truths falls into precisely the same confusion of psychology (or anthropology) with logic as his "Sensationalist" opponent. *A priori* principles, if we call them so, are not known "prior to" experience;

they are not "immediate," in the sense of being got straight away, without any trouble, by anybody and everybody. They are *a priori* only in the sense of not being dependent upon experience for their validity; they are "immediate" only in the sense of not being deducible through a middle term from other logically prior principles. They cannot be "proved" except by a "transcendental proof," *i.e. per impossibile*, by showing that the denial of them makes knowledge impossible and involves us in contradiction. Nothing has more hindered the understanding and acceptance of the idealist theory of knowledge, than the persistent error of treating the logical argument for the validity and necessity of the laws of thought, as if it were an appeal to the average individual's incapacity to analyze some of the facts of his consciousness.

In the attempt to deal with my problem, I have been obliged to sketch in brief outline a good many parts of logic. If I have not altogether failed to make my points clear, I think I have done something incidentally towards vindicating the essential value of the Aristotelian logical analysis. I have also tried to show that "formal logic" is not so barren of philosophical interest as is often supposed, but, if studied seriously, leads us inevitably into problems of epistemology and metaphysics. But we are left with this seemingly paradoxical conclusion, that although psychology ought to be kept out of logic, it cannot be kept out of a complete epistemology to which logic leads up; and, on the other hand, logic ought not to be kept out of psychology. This conclusion is paradoxical only if we have been making the false assumption that logic and psychology are parallel sciences, or that logic is simply a branch or application of psychology. Psychology is, or professes to be, one of the special sciences, like physiology; and yet, as the science of the knowing mind, it occupies

a "unique" central position. So far as psychology is a special science, logic is related to it as it is to any other of the special sciences. But it is difficult for psychology to become one of the special sciences of nature or to remain merely one of them; logic and epistemology claim part of its province for their own, and seek to turn it into a "philosophy," as distinct from a special "science," of mind.

THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO EPISTEMOLOGY[1]

How does the problem of the ultimate nature of Reality stand related to the problem of the possibility of knowledge? In attempting to deal with this question, it seems most convenient to refer directly to the opinions on the subject which have been advocated by Professor Andrew Seth in the *Philosophical Review*, especially in his articles in No. 2 and No. 5. In the first of these articles, Mr. Seth has argued for the separation of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics from one another. With what he says about psychology I am inclined on the whole to agree, though with some qualifications. The question of the separation of psychology from epistemology (I should prefer to say, in more general terms, "from logic") and from metaphysics is to a great extent a question of convenience of terminology. But it is also a question which depends upon the possibility of the existence of psychology as a particular science of nature. This possibility might, indeed, seem to be proved by the existence of psychologists, who adopt that view of their science. The question, however, may still be raised, how far these psychologists are consistent with themselves. If, however, psychology *can* be treated as a special science like the other sciences of nature, it can be kept free of metaphysics in the same sense, and in the same sense only,

[1] Reprinted from the P*hilosophical Review*, Vol. III. p. 14.

in which they can be kept free of metaphysics. We know that even the mathematician, still more the physicist or the biologist, is apt to trespass beyond the limits of his special science and to put forward the abstractions or the conventional concepts, of which in his special science he has rightly made use, as if they were absolute realities, truths about the universe as a whole, truths about the ultimate nature of things. It is obviously still harder for the psychologist, dealing as he does with a more complex material and with a material in which the *idola fori* and *idola theatri* are more difficult to escape, to avoid such trespassing on metaphysics. And it may be argued that psychology, apart from metaphysics, or at least apart from epistemology, is too apt to mean an uncritical use of fundamental conceptions and a tacit and therefore mischievous assumption of some general philosophical theory; that psychology, apart from a critical theory of knowledge, is too often only a combination of haphazard observation and bad metaphysics, helped out by a little second-hand physiology. But a better ideal is possible, and is certainly present to the minds of many psychologists at the present day. A full recognition of the necessary abstractness of the psychologist's point of view and a careful elimination of metaphysical assertions, whether affirmative or negative, justify the claim to treat psychology as a natural science, or at least as what "wishes to be" a natural science.

If, however, psychology be treated in this way, as a special science like physiology or chemistry, it can no longer put forward the claim to be *the* foundation of philosophy or even of any of the special philosophical sciences, such as logic, ethics, æsthetics. All the special sciences form part of the material for philosophy. That is one reason why philosophy is never complete, but has to have its problems worked out afresh by every generation, and, in a sense, by every individual

who takes it seriously. All changes in scientific conceptions, just as all changes in religious ideas, in economical, social, and political conditions, bring new problems to light and compel us to face old problems in new ways. Psychology, from the nature of its subject-matter, has a closer connection with many philosophical problems than some of the other sciences. But philosophy cannot be based on psychology (as a science excluding epistemology and metaphysics) in any sense in which it is not also based on sociology and history, the sciences which deal with the human mind "writ large."

Admitting, then, a possible separation of psychology from epistemology and from metaphysics, we have to ask whether these can be separated from one another. Mr. Seth admits that metaphysics should be based on epistemology: at least he says that "Epistemology clears the way for metaphysical construction or hypothesis."[1] But he treats epistemology as if it were a science clearly separable from metaphysics, so much so that he thinks it possible for us to be "realists" in our epistemology, while we are "idealists" in our metaphysics.[2] There is an intelligible sense in which it can be said that mere subjective idealism—the assertion that we never can know anything beyond the "states of consciousness" which are the hypostatised abstractions with which the psychologist may profess to work—is inconsistent with idealism in the sense in which that means a belief in the ultimate rationality of the universe. But Mr. Seth sets up "reals" in epistemology—the supposed absolutely existing "things" of ordinary picture-thinking—in order to knock them down in metaphysics, by regarding them only as "moments in the being of an intelligently directed Life." It would seem easier, at least, and more obviously logical, to base such a metaphysical

[1] *Philosophical Review*, Vol. I. p. 138. [2] p. 142.

theory on an epistemology which denied the possibility of knowing anything that existed independently of all thought, and to base a denial of such a metaphysical theory on an epistemology which made the fact of knowledge require the existence of a plurality of absolutely existing "reals."

If metaphysics be strictly limited to speculative metaphysics, the attempt to frame an all-embracing hypothesis about the ultimate nature of the universe as a whole, we can, of course, distinguish that part of philosophy (whether possible or not) from an inquiry into the conditions of knowledge; but we cannot safely separate such speculations from the preliminary inquiry. If our epistemology gives us no ground for any belief in any unity of the cosmos whatever or in any rationality in the process of it, the attempt to explain it as a whole is condemned at the outset. The attempt to construct a speculative metaphysics, however tentative and hypothetical, is only defensible if we feel some justification for believing that there is a cosmos to be explained, and that it must be to some extent intelligible by us. That is to say, in our epistemology, we are already, if we are taking it seriously, on metaphysical ground. Knowledge professes to be knowledge of reality; and thus if we raise the question "How is knowledge possible?" or even the sceptical question "Is knowledge possible at all?" we are *ipso facto* dealing with the question "What is reality—the only reality we ever can know or intelligently talk about?" We may, indeed, reserve the question, "What is the *full* meaning of reality?" and we shall do well not to profess to give any but a provisional answer to it—such provisional answer constituting our speculative metaphysics, or "philosophy" in the narrower and special sense.

The plain man certainly believes that, when he claims to know anything, he knows what is real; but I do

not think he really believes this real world that he knows to be something outside his consciousness, however ready he may be to assent to the dualistic realism of so-called common-sense philosophy, which our realists in epistemology and our realists who try to do without epistemology alike tend to rehabilitate. Mr. Seth urges that knowledge, "if it is not an illusion altogether, is a knowledge of realities which are trans-subjective or extra-conscious; *i.e.* which exist beyond and independently of the consciousness of the individual knowing them."[1] That all knowledge is "trans-subjective," in the sense of having an objective reference, is undoubtedly true. Even my knowledge of my own mental states is trans-subjective, in the sense that there is a distinction between the knowing subject and the object known, as there must be in all knowledge. Such knowledge may also be called objective in the further sense that even my own mental states, though known directly to myself alone, are events in the real universe and are capable of becoming mediately an object of knowledge to other persons than myself, if I speak truthfully about them. But I am unable to see how a knowledge of my own mental states—and such knowledge both the plain man and the psychologist profess to have—can be described as "a knowledge of realities which exist beyond the consciousness of the individual knowing them." Nor can I see how even my knowledge of the external world or of the mental states of other persons can be a knowledge of that which is "beyond my consciousness" in any accurate sense of these words. The plain man certainly believes that he knows what is external to himself; but such a belief is entirely misrepresented by the epistemological realist, who declares that the plain man believes that he knows what is external to or beyond his consciousness. When the plain man talks of what is external to himself, he means

[1] *Philosophical Review*, Vol. I. p. 505.

what is external to his *body*; and that is exactly why he finds a theory of matter, such as that of Berkeley, so ridiculous. He "refutes" Berkeley by kicking a stone, like Dr. Johnson, or by suggesting that an idealist should sit down on a gorse bush. If the plain man be made to think a little about the question, he will admit that the outside of his body, at least, is part of the external world; but he probably continues to speak of his digestive apparatus as inside him. If the plain man thinks about his soul or his mind, he probably pictures it as a thing, occupying space, however tiny, inside his body—a box within a box: he may locate it in his bosom or in his head, according to the physiology of his period and to the degree in which physiological notions have penetrated into ordinary speech. It is only in virtue of this crude picture-thinking that the plain man is induced to say that he knows anything external to his mind or consciousness. No valid argument in behalf of the theory of epistemological realism can be drawn from what Mr. Seth calls the "primary, instinctive, and irresistible belief of all mankind, nay of the whole animal creation."[1] For the epistemological theories of other animals I cannot profess to speak confidently, but I feel certain that the "crude" or "naïve" or "uncritical realism" of the plain man is nothing more than his belief that the real world is the world of his sensations and of the mental constructs by which he has (without being aware of the process, save very dimly) got into the habit of interpreting them to himself: that is to say, the real world of the plain man's belief consists in sensations *plus* images and ideas suggested by them, and is a real world against which idealism finds nothing to say. "Crude realism" supplies no argument for the plausibility of epistemological realism unless advantage be taken of the ambiguity in the word "external."

[1] *loc. cit.* p. 506.

But how, one may well ask one's self, is it possible that a philosophical thinker like Professor Seth can have come to maintain such a proposition, as that knowledge is of that which is external to consciousness? Sympathy with Reid is an inadequate explanation. My suggestion is that Professor Seth has not really escaped from a confusion between psychology and epistemology; or, to put it rather more accurately, his theory of knowledge depends upon a juxtaposition in the same sentence of the abstractions of the psychologist and the abstractions of ordinary language and of the special sciences. I must explain this in greater detail. "The world of consciousness on the one hand," we are told, "and the (so far hypothetical) world of real things on the other, are two mutually exclusive spheres. No member of the real sphere can intrude itself into the conscious sphere, nor can consciousness go out into the real sphere and, as it were, lay hold with hands upon a real object."[1] This passage suggests some of the same difficulties to which I have already referred. If the world of my consciousness excludes the real world, are my internal, my mental, experiences not real? Is it a delusion on my part that at this moment I am thinking of an article of Professor Seth's? On the other hand, the moment I have put down these words on paper, are the visible written words excluded from the world of my consciousness? Again, in which sphere is my body? I do not see how I can describe various bodily sensations of which I am very distinctly conscious as outside the world of my consciousness. If anything I know or think of is excluded from my consciousness because I know it, the sphere of my consciousness must be completely empty. If the sphere of my consciousness is not empty, I cannot see on what principle anything that I know is excluded from it.

[1] *loc. cit.* p. 515.

There is one sense only in which I can see an intelligible meaning in speaking of the world of my consciousness as a sphere that excludes the real world: and that is, if by the world of my consciousness be meant—certainly not what actually exists in my consciousness—but the abstraction with which the psychologist professes to deal, the stream of mental events *regarded apart from their content*. But if this is the meaning of the world of my consciousness in Mr. Seth's sentence, that part of the proposition belongs to psychology and not to epistemology. In epistemology the world of my consciousness ought surely to mean the world of my consciousness as that actually exists, *i.e.* a series of images, ideas, etc., with their content, *i.e.* with their objective reference. Even if we took the world of my consciousness to mean the abstraction dealt with by the psychologist, the difficulty would not be entirely removed; for, as already said, the series of my mental states is supposed to be a series of events which form part of the real world, although only one aspect of the really existing fact is considered by the psychologist as such.

But the difficulty in Professor Seth's proposition does not end here. What does he mean by the "real world"—"so far hypothetical" even—which excludes the sphere of consciousness, and is excluded from it? There is certainly a real world which does not enter into *my* consciousness; but what is the real world which does not enter into any consciousness, if it be not that abstraction of real things, objects taken apart from their existence as objects for any subject, which ordinary language and the various special sciences find it convenient to assume? But epistemology as a philosophical science is surely bound to correct the convenient abstractions of the "abstract understanding" and to attempt to deal with the *whole* truth.

"At no point," says Professor Seth in another

passage,[1] "can the real world, as it were, force an entrance into the closed sphere of the ideal; nor does that sphere open at any point to receive into itself the smallest atom of the real world, *quâ real*, though it has room within itself *ideally* for the whole universe of God." The "as it were" and these metaphors of "spheres intruding themselves," etc., and such like, perhaps unavoidable, spatial figures leave one in some doubt how far the expressions are meant to be taken literally. I do not see how there can be any such thing as knowledge at all, unless the world of my consciousness is not a closed sphere, and unless the real world, *quâ real*, does intrude itself into that sphere. When I know anything, the sphere of my consciousness does lay hold with its hands (the metaphor is not mine) upon a real object: otherwise I do not know that thing, but am under an illusion that I do so. If the sphere of my consciousness insists on keeping its hands in its pockets and its mouth shut, it will inevitably find its inside empty. That we never *know* the real world, *quâ real*, is an odd formula for what calls itself *epistemological* realism. If "*quâ real*" means "*quâ thing-in-itself*," the statement is indeed an identical proposition: we cannot know what we cannot know. But if our knowledge is of *ideas* of things, and never of real things, the logical conclusion is the sceptical conclusion of Hume, and certainly not any doctrine that can claim kinship with the beliefs of the ordinary man. To sum up, the two closed spheres, in the only sense in which they have any meaning that I can understand, seem to me two opposite abstractions. On the one side there are the states of consciousness *minus* the content of these states, on the other, objects of possible knowledge (unless I am to say, of impossible knowledge—if "things-in-themselves" be meant) *minus* the subject which makes them objects of possible knowledge. That these two abstractions exclude one

[1] *loc. cit.* p. 516.

another may readily be admitted (apart from the difficulty that in psychology the states of consciousness *minus* their content are just the objects of possible knowledge which the psychologist, as such, treats in abstraction from the conditions under which they are objects). But the statement seems to me irrelevant in epistemology—a science which professes to deal with the conditions of knowledge.

Epistemology is nothing but a part of logic. It is only because of the wretchedly limited sense in which the term "logic" has come to be used, that there is any excuse for a separate term for the philosophical investigation of the conditions of knowledge. If logic be supposed to deal with consistency only, the question of truth (*i.e.* the question how knowledge is possible) —a question which Aristotle certainly dealt with in his *Analytics*—seems to require a separate science to deal with it. But this distinction between consistency and truth cannot be maintained as an absolute distinction. How, *e.g.* can we use the argument *per impossibile*, which we do use even in the most abstract mathematics and in the most purely formal logic, unless we hold that the inconceivability of the opposite is the test of *truth*? To speak of truth or knowledge as being the correspondence of thought to things is to fall back upon a metaphor and to adopt from popular language a theory of knowledge which only states the problem it professes to solve. The distinction between *my* thought and reality is a perfectly valid and a very important distinction; but it affords no grounds for the opinion that reality in its ultimate nature can be something quite other than thought. Reality is objectivity, *i.e.* coherence in thought for myself, and—whenever I can apply this test also—coherence of my thought with that of others.[1] So far as our *feelings* are concerned, we are

[1] See article *What is reality*? in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. I. No. 3, reprinted in *Darwin and Hegel*.

each of us shut up in "closed spheres"; but it is for that very reason that mere feelings do not constitute knowledge (though there may be knowledge *of* them). I have, therefore, taken it for granted that in a discussion about *epistemology* the world of consciousness referred to was the world of thought, or of feelings only as interpreted and transmuted by thinking. It is only the *ratio* of our feelings to one another that admits of comparison with what others experience. I can never know, for instance, that what I call a red colour gives you the same feeling that it gives me; but I am satisfied, if I find that I distinguish red from green and other colours in the same sort of way in which you and other persons do (not being the colour-blind minority—whose judgment I do not accept, simply because their judgments of identity and difference do not fit in with those of the majority of human beings *nor even with those of one another*). Identity of ratios—of relationships —is all I can know, when I say that sensations or feelings are the same to me and to you. But, as we know, $\frac{2}{3} - \frac{4}{6}$, and yet 2 and 4, 3 and 6 are different numbers. It is because of the objectivity of the primary, as contrasted with the subjectivity of the secondary qualities of matter that scientific men tend to regard the real world "behind" sensible phenomena as consisting of what possesses the primary qualities only, and to endeavour constantly to translate the chaos of subjective feelings into the terms of number and measure, *i.e.* to turn the ordinary man's real world, that he sees, touches, smells, into a world of thought-relations. After all, however, this real world of scientific thought is a world of imagined phenomena —figures, vibrations, etc., which we should see and feel *if* we had keener eyes and a keener sense of touch. In either aspect the real world of science is a world that implies the presence to it of a conscious subject to make it possible. Most scientists are fond of asserting the relativity of knowledge, without perhaps taking the

notion quite seriously: the more philosophical scientists admit that their atoms, molecular movements, etc., are only working hypotheses, *i.e.* mental constructs.

The objectivity of knowledge implies at least some degree of similarity between the mental structure of different human beings: still more obviously does the possibility of communicating knowledge imply such similarity. An epistemology, which does not wish to foredoom itself to complete scepticism, must take for granted that reality *is*—in some sense, that it can be known—to some extent, and that what is known can be communicated—to some extent. Otherwise we may as well accept the paradoxes of Gorgias as the sum total of human wisdom. But there cannot be similarity without identity. Mere similarity is a contradictory conception. Thus we are *logically* driven to the conclusion that, if knowledge is possible and if knowledge is communicable, there must be some identity underlying the differences of individual human minds. The question about the minds of lower animals or of any other possible intelligences need cause no trouble. If, and so far as, we can communicate our thoughts and feelings to dogs and cats, angels and devils, so far is there identity underlying the differences between us and them. To argue that such identity is merely "logical" and not "real" is only to evade the question and implicitly to deny the possibility of knowledge, by re-asserting an impassable gap between thought and reality.[1]

Whether we are to say that reality *is* thought or not, is a good deal a question of language. If the term "thought" be expressly limited to discursive thought, which is necessarily abstract, and which necessarily accentuates the distinction between subject and predicate, we cannot without qualification identify reality with thought in that sense. The predicate of the

[1] On "the identity between souls," cf. Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 347-353.

judgment is by its very nature a predicate *of* reality, and so distinguished from it. But this is only one aspect of the judgment. If the difference or distinction were the sole aspect of judgment, judgment would be impossible. Judgment is distinction; but it is distinction within a unity, difference in identity. If the predicate is not predicated of the subject as a part of it (or, in the negative judgment, denied of the subject to which it has been suggested it may possibly belong), there is no predication at all. A theory which asserts difference without identity and a theory which asserts identity without difference, both make predication impossible and land us in the old series of "Sophistic" difficulties, the outcome of Heracleiteanism and of Eleaticism alike, when these had given birth to popular philosophy. Now, if this identity of the real and that which we think of it is not to be called an identity in "thought" we must simply invent some other term. "Thought" seems to me a good term for the purpose: it is a possible equivalent of *νοῦς* or *νόησις*, as well as of *διάνοια*. Mr. Bradley prefers the term "Experience" as a name for "the Absolute," because of this "dualism inherent in thought" and as an assertion of the all-inclusiveness of the Absolute. "Feeling and will," he says, "must also be transmuted in this whole, into which thought has entered. Such a whole state would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in this whole all divisions would be healed up."[1] It is true the term "thought" is inadequate; but it seems to me the least objectionable of available terms, for these reasons: (1) "Experience" is apt to suggest multipli city and a time-process rather than the unity of imme diate apprehension. (2) "Feeling" does express "immediacy" and absence of difference, but on its lowest level, whereas we wish to express a unity in

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.

which differences are included and reconciled, rather than a unity which has not yet differentiated itself, because it is too low down in the scale.[1] (3) "Will" unless it be taken in a quite artificial sense, implies motives, which it is absurd to imagine as acting on "the Absolute," which, if absolute, can have no wants or cravings. (4) As I have tried to show, Thought, even in the sense of "rational and discursive thought," implies a unity amid difference, and therefore may be fitly used to express an immediacy of apprehension, of which we can only have faint and slight experience, the immediacy of feeling combined with the clearness and fulness of thought. Mr. Bradley himself says, "When thought begins to be more than rational, it ceases to be mere thinking"—a sentence which seems to admit a possible distinction between "thought" in the higher sense and "mere thinking" in which the dualism is not transcended.

It matters little what precise term we adopt, provided it be once clearly recognized that Reality, or the Absolute, or whatever we call it, cannot be something quite alien to, and inaccessible by, our conscious experience, and that, though including differences, it cannot itself be a plurality.[2] Truth—if there is any meaning in the term—must ultimately be one and indivisible, however much we may be in the habit of speaking of different kinds of "truths," because we have to content ourselves with very partial and one-sided statements, to which we give the name that

[1] I take it for granted that "the Absolute" must at least be expressed in terms of the *highest* elements of our experience, though these terms may need correction and qualification when transferred from their use in reference to human beings.

[2] Mr. Bradley's phrase about an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories" (at the end of his *Logic*) has been a favourite weapon in the hands of "Realist" assailants of Idealism. I trust that his exposure of a "plurality of reals" (in his *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 140-143) will be equally appreciated.

properly belongs only to the fulness of perfect knowledge in which every part or aspect of reality is seen at once in relation to the whole, in which there can be no appearance of a gap between thought cut off from reality and reality cut off from thought.[1] Such perfect knowledge is to us only an ideal; but it must be recognized as conditioning all sound logical theories, however much we provisionally adopt the metaphors (metaphors that soon get mixed) of ordinary speech about a parallelism between thought and things, about thought mirroring existence, etc.

To put these results together—a logic that takes itself seriously and deals, therefore, with the problem of epistemology, leaves us with, at least, the following principles as a starting-point for metaphysical speculation

I. There can be no knowledge except for a conscious subject, which can hold together the different sensations, images, ideas, etc., in a unity and so make a cosmos, an orderly and intelligible system, out of the primitive "blur" of feeling. (I have said hardly anything on this point in the present article, because it is generally conceded as a truth, at least for epistemology.)

II. Subject and object are distinguished in knowledge: in knowledge we have got beyond the primitive "blur" in which they are not yet differentiated. But the distinction cannot be an absolute one; else our

[1] Prof. J. Watson, in his article in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. II., No. 5, has dealt so fully and clearly with the theological difficulties to which Epistemological Realism leads that I feel it would be superfluous to say more on the subject. As an illustration of a very common way of speaking about "truths," I may refer to the Sunday-evening prayer of an old Scotchman, in which he said, "May the *truths* this day spoken, so far as agreeable to Thy Mind and Will, etc."—as if there were certain "truths" that the Almighty did not accept, and might not like to have mentioned in public.

very theory of knowledge makes knowledge impossible. The distinction is a distinction within the unity of knowledge (or of "thought" or of "experience" —whatever term we choose to adopt). This is a logical conclusion simply from taking the conception of difference or distinction and the conception of knowledge quite seriously. The reluctance which people generally feel towards accepting such a conclusion seems to arise from the tendency to translate "subject" and "object" straight away into the (supposed) definite individual soul and the (supposed) real world of ordinary thought, which is so largely impregnated with the traditional dualistic philosophy. If we start with the assertion of an absolute difference between the soul as thinking substance and matter as the opposite kind of substance, no wonder if we find a difficulty in explaining the possibility of knowledge. But do we *logically* need to start with any such assumption? A very slight amount of careful thinking shows us that the "soul" and the "thing" are alike mental constructs, inferences, not primitive data of consciousness.

III. Were we to stop here and attempt at once to pass to speculative metaphysics, we might fairly enough be charged with "solipsism"; but, as I have pointed out, knowledge, in the sense in which we human beings claim to possess knowledge, implies the presence of other selves than our own. Reality means objectivity, *i.e.* validity and coherence for other selves as well as for self. The existence of other selves than our own is an inference, though an inference speedily arrived at; but the identity of our own self through various experiences is likewise an inference. Since knowledge can be the same for different selves, and since we can communicate our knowledge to them and they to us, there must be an identity underlying all the differences of different selves.

IV. Consistency cannot be ultimately distinguished from truth. The ideal of knowledge is the impossibility of thinking a contradiction, or, to put it positively, the necessity of seeing every part in relation to the whole. This ideal of knowledge is presupposed in every actual step we take in acquiring knowledge; in learning, we gradually fill up this form of an orderly system, a unity of the manifold, which is implicit in our thought from the first.

These four positions seem to me some, at least, of the conclusions of an epistemology, which starts only with the assumption that knowledge *is* possible. They are the basis on which we must construct our speculative metaphysics. If, then, we hold that the truest thing we can say about the universe as a whole is that it is the manifestation of the One in the Many, we are not "hypostatizing logical abstractions," but simply putting these results together and summing them up in a general formula. On the other hand, to adopt a system of monadism or pluralism is to hypostatize the abstractions, not of logic, but of popular picture-thinking—to treat the "things" or "souls" which are the mental constructs of ordinary thought as if they were independent, real existences. If they are not "independent," but included in the unity of one system, then the system is not "pluralism," but a recognition, in a round-about way, of the "One in the Many" as the Absolute.

The results of epistemology only set the problem for speculative metaphysics in a definite form. The problems, even when thus determined, are so numerous and admit of so many various answers that the metaphysician has no reason to complain that the epistemologist is interfering unduly with his province. Granted that the ultimate nature of reality must be expressed by such a formula as the One in the Many, we have still to ask *How* the One manifests itself

in multiplicity and difference? To ask "Why?" is in vain, if by the question we are attempting to get behind the Absolute—to find out its "motives," so to speak, as if it were a finite person. Granted that our own consciousness of ourselves as subjects gives us our best clue to understanding the nature of the unity of the cosmos, we have still to endeavour to realize what is involved in a "self" which is not in time, but "eternal." Mr. Bradley, indeed, seems to reject the notion of a timeless self because it is "a psychological monster."[1] "A timeless self, acting in a particular way," he says, "from its general timeless nature, is to me a psychological monster." Now I quite agree that the notion of a timeless self is absurd in the special science of psychology, which deals only with events in time; but the "timeless self" is not a psychological, but a metaphysical concept. The notion of a "timeless self acting in a particular way" is also absurd, if it be taken to mean "acting at particular times and from particular motives," or without any motives at all, just as in theology confusion results if we put the metaphysical conception of God as eternal and unchangeable alongside of the picture-thinking of popular religious belief, so that the Unchangeable is spoken of as repenting, etc. I think it unfortunate that T. H. Green seemed to countenance this confusion of ideas by his phrase, "a timeless act."[2] It seems impossible to keep the notion of time out of the idea of an act: it is difficult enough to keep it out of the idea of a self, even though the logical argument for the existence of a timeless self is the possibility of being aware of succession in time. It must be clearly realized that in transferring any term such as "self," or "thought," to the ultimate unity of the cosmos, we must get

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 113, 114.
[2] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 102.

rid of the notions of particularity, of difference, of change, which belong to such terms in their psychological use. On the other hand, it must be equally borne in mind that this ultimate reality is a reality which appears, which manifests itself in many selves, in the multiplicity of particular things, in the change and process of the world of time: and perhaps the most urgent of problems in any philosophical system is to attempt to show how the One, the Eternal, the Real, manifests itself in the manifold appearances of time—the problem, that is to say, of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of History. The mysticism which simply turns away from the manifold empties the One of any meaning it can have for us. On the other hand, the attempt to construct an "evolutional" philosophy by assuming the absolute reality of time and change and multiplicity is equally suicidal. These concepts are meaningless except for, and relatively to, an eternal One. As in the logical question of the judgment, so here either Eleaticism or Heracleiteanism taken by itself leads only to nescience or scepticism. The mystical solution is not popular at present; but to many people the word "evolution" is the key to all mysteries, though evolution may mean to them nothing more than a vague belief that the universe is "toddling along somehow"; and, when they come to say more about it, they deny the existence of any *Uni*verse and let everything run along in an absolute flux. Evolution belongs only to the world of appearance; but that does not mean that it is an "illusion." Illusions are detected by a want of coherence in our practical experience: the world of appearance is the reality in which the plain man believes. And the idealist believes in it too, for to him, though it is not in itself the absolute reality, it is the only manifestation of that absolute reality which the human mind can

possibly know. And it is a strange objection to make,[1] that a philosophy is treating the world in space and time as an "illusion," because that philosophy regards this world—not, indeed, as the absolutely real, but as something more worth study than if it were—as the revelation of Supreme Reason, of what old theologies have described as that Co-eternal Reason of God, who creates nature and becomes incarnate in man.

[1] Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in the P*hilosophical Review*, Vol. II. p. 589, alleges that "upon Hegelian principles, if the Deity exists eternally, the time-process must be illusory altogether."

THE ONE AND THE MANY[1]

In this paper it is not my purpose to give a new interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, but to do what is perhaps more audacious—to deal with the question itself which that great dialogue has treated in its most abstract form. Whether our ultimate theory of the Universe must be "Monism" or "Pluralism" or whether any reconciliation is possible between these opposite systems—this is the question on which we are always ultimately driven back, whatever be the special philosophical problem that we may have set out to investigate. The logical controversy about the nature of universal concepts, the cosmological controversy between the thorough-going evolutionist and the "special creationist" (or his more modern counterpart, the partial evolutionist), the controversy about free-will, whether in its theological or in its psychological aspects, questions about the nature of God and the nature of the human soul, nay, even political controversies about the relation between individual liberty and state action—all bring us ultimately back to the problem, whether the multiciplicity of the world that confronts us is appearance or reality, and whether in any sense the One can be Many and the Many One. The discussions of Plato's *Parmenides* and *Sophistes* may seem at first sight barren of interest to the modern reader, who

[1] Read before the Aristotelian Society. Reprinted from *Mind*, N.S., Vol. VII. p. 449.

is keenly concerned about the freedom of the will or about the significance and rights of the individual person. But it was the peculiar advantage of Greek philosophy to be able to carry up controversies at once to the final court of appeal, *i.e.* to purely metaphysical discussion in an atmosphere largely free from the bias of theological, ethical and political partisanship—largely free but not entirely, for there can be little doubt that it was through the application of Ionic and Italic philosophies to the criticism of popular religion and traditional maxims about conduct that epistemological and logical questions came into prominence. "How can we know anything?" suggests itself more easily, when the discussion affects opinion about the gods or about right and wrong, than when it deals with the more purely theoretical questions about the constitution of the physical universe. Still the Greek philosophers had only customary belief and not formulated dogmatic systems of theology to contend against or explain. John Stuart Mill has told us in his *Autobiography*[1] how his desire to defend empiricism and to provide it with an adequate system of logic was bound up with his active combatancy on behalf of "philosophical radicalism." The zeal for individual liberty in thought and in action was the main motive which induced him to attack that theory of knowledge which he regarded as the support of conservative prejudice in religion, ethics and politics; and it is quite true, that the reaction after the French Revolution against eighteenth-century free-thought was one of the chief sources of the interest in idealist metaphysics in its earlier stages. But it is best, if the logical question can be discussed without any immediate consideration of its bearing on popular beliefs or prejudices.

[1] Pp. 224-226, 271-275.

I.—The Logical Problem.

John Stuart Mill's is the most thorough-going attempt to build up a theory of inference and of scientific knowledge upon the basis of an ultimate pluralism—the ultimate "many," whose existence is most certain and real, being for him "sensations." Mill's endeavour to get rid of identity comes out most clearly in his acceptance of "likeness" and "unlikeness" as ultimate categories incapable of further analysis (*Logic*, Book I., ch. III., § 11). According to Mill, there is no universal except the collective universal. The universal judgment is always, and can only be, a summation of particular instances, and its truth is dependent upon the truth of the particulars. On this turns Mill's whole theory of inference. In their ultimate reality all events are, as Hume said, "loose and separate." The unity we attribute to anything or to any person, the necessity we find in the causal nexus, the uniformity we presuppose in nature are mere subjective inferences of ours, due to association and liable to error, for in the last resort they are dependent merely upon an *inductio per simplicem enumerationem*. Hence there is, strictly speaking, no certainty at all in our knowledge. Even the truths of mathematics are generalisations from experience, and our experience might quite well be such that 2 and 2 made 5.

Now, is such a logical theory capable of being worked out consistently? That Mill himself worked it out consistently even his greatest admirers will hardly admit. A champion of extreme nominalism in his theory of definition, he found himself nevertheless obliged to argue for the existence of "real kinds"; and, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has acutely pointed out,[1] while impugning the principle of the inconceivability of the opposite as the test of truth, he admits the validity

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, II. 422.

of the *reductio ad absurdum*, which rests on that very principle. The psychical atomism of Mill is now discarded even by those who profess themselves empiricists. But I do not know whether those who insist that consciousness is a *continuum*, and not a collection or series of discrete feelings, always fully recognize the logical implications of their psychological theory. Prof. William James, whose *Psychology* has done so much to break down the traditional doctrine of the English empirical school, might have been prepared, one would suppose, to admit the doctrine of identity amid diversity as fundamental. But his recently published volume of Essays, *The Will to Believe*, *etc.*, contains a defence of "pluralism," which, though not expressly applied to logic, would certainly have been helpful to J. S. Mill in his endeavour to eliminate necessity from thought. Prof. James's "radical empiricism" has been hailed by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller (in *Mind*, N.S., Vol. VI., No. 24) as "a declaration of the independence of the concrete whole of man, with all his passions and emotions unexpurgated, directed against the cramping rules and regulations by which the Brahmins of the academic caste are tempted to impede the free expansion of human life. The great lesson it illustrates," according to Mr. Schiller, "is that there are not really any eternal and non-human truths to prohibit us from adopting the beliefs we need to live by, nor any infallible *a priori* test of truth to screen us from the consequences of our choice." A declaration of independence from the multiplication table ought to be popular among schoolboys, and there are many persons everywhere short of cash (and not merely the Silver Party in America) who have a strong "will to believe" that something less than 2 and 2 ought to make 4. Prof. James's own claims on behalf of his doctrine seem to me much more modest than those of his enthusiastic reviewer; but he does argue that the

Universe may not ultimately be one coherent system, but may contain real contingent elements,[1] and such a pluralist system (or want of system), Prof. James thinks, commends itself better than monism to the demands of our moral nature.

Now, as to the demands of our moral nature I shall have something to say presently. The first matter to be considered is, not whether a real ultimate incoherence, a real contingency, can be proved or disproved, but whether it has any intelligible meaning. That the world of our experience, the world as it appears to us, is full of the unexpected, the incongruous, the uncertain, needs no saying. If we were dependent upon experience alone, in the sense of the mere succession of sensations, should we ever have arrived at any belief in any uniformity of nature? Pluralism, says Prof. James, is the *prima facie* appearance of the world.[2] It is so—to *adult unreflective* "common-sense." Hume drew the perfectly sound conclusion from thoroughgoing empiricism—namely, that all certainty is an illusion. I cannot see that experience (*i.e.* sensation or feeling-experience) alone gives us even the identity of the self or the continuity of time and space (the three *continua* that Prof. James admits). Experience alone gives merely an undifferentiated mass of feeling (I use the word here in the sense of older English psychologists), out of which we speculatively and hypothetically construct for our practical convenience a multiplicity of definite "things" existing alongside of and after one another. The unity and individuality of each of these is a unity of theory, and not of "brute fact"; and their arrangement in any one system or set of systems is also a matter of theoretical construction. Of course the greater part of the theoretical systematization of our actual experience has been done for us by our predecessors, and is simply taken over by us in

[1] *The Will to Believe, etc.*, p. 294. [2] *Ibid.* p. viii.

the language we learn as part of our social inheritance. But this does not affect the truth of the statement, that all that is given us as mere fact in our own individual experience is uninterpreted sensation or feeling. And the uninterpreted sensation or feeling, as Plato saw long ago, is not, and cannot be, known or intelligibly spoken about. The only test, therefore, that we can have of reality, other than this appeal to uninterpreted feeling—an appeal which can obtain no intelligible decision—is the test of coherence in thought. So that any one who throws doubt—entire doubt, as Mill does, or partial doubt, as Prof. James does—upon the worth of this test of coherence, throws doubt upon our *knowing* any reality at all. For the real which is felt is, as merely felt, not known.

A multiplicity of sensations was accepted by Hume and Mill as the datum of experience. It has been rejected by later psychologists. The isolated pure sensation is an abstraction of reflective analysis, "a psychological myth" as Mr. Ward calls it. A multiplicity of "things interacting" is not a datum or primitive fact of experience, but an hypothesis, a rough and ready "methodological device" to systematize our thinking, which does well enough for the ordinary practical business of life, but which has to be discarded by advancing scientific thought in favour of some hypothesis of one underlying substance or force manifesting itself in many ways. If a presupposition of the unity and coherence of the cosmos is necessary for the working of the sciences, and if the sciences manage to work and enable us to anticipate experience and to control nature better than we can without their aid, this presupposition is not to be disposed of by being called merely "methodological." On the other hand, a supposition like that of objective chance or real contingency, which will not work and which would prevent us carrying on scientific

investigation, may be safely put aside. It will not do to suggest that "chance" in science generally is parallel to friction in mechanics. We do take account of friction in all practical applications of mechanical theory; and similarly we take account of our likelihood to err or to be ignorant; we admit "chance" as a name for our ignorance, but we do not suppose anything uncaused or happening absolutely at haphazard. The parallel of friction will not support the objectivity of chance.

Knowledge is only possible on the assumption of the absolute validity of the principle of contradiction, or to put it more widely, of the principle of coherence in thinking: the incoherent cannot be true, the true must be coherent, though the seemingly coherent is not necessarily true unless we suppose all experience exhausted. This principle in the form of the principle of contradiction or "the inconceivability of the opposite" is often treated as if it were inapplicable outside of formal logic, the logic of mere consistency. But this arises from a narrow interpretation of the principle which makes it a mere negative counterpart of the principle of abstract identity, and from the traditional separation of these "formal laws of thought" from the principles of material truth—the Principles of Sufficient Reason, of Universal Causation and Uniformity of Nature—or however we choose to describe them. Nothing can be deduced from the principle of contradiction absolutely *a priori*, *i.e.* without any reference whatever to experience. In arithmetic we must get our imagination of units from what we see or touch—as a matter of fact from our fingers—or from sensations of the heart beating, etc. In geometry we must have our intuition of visible or tangible figures from which by abstraction we get the surface, the line and the point. In the principle of sufficient reason the reference to the matter of experience is

obvious. But both principles, or sets of principles, are the same principle of coherence, and they differ simply in degree of abstractness. Truth, the only intelligible truth, must be one and indivisible: and the same principle which determines the validity of mathematical reasoning determines the validity of reasoning about the most complex of natural phenomena or about human affairs. We can obtain greater certainty in the more abstract than in the more concrete sphere, not because the properties of triangles are regulated by fixed order and the affairs of men given over to hazard, but simply because we can state clearly to ourselves and others all the conditions under which we make our assertions about the abstract relations of space, whereas we are constantly obliged to make rough general statements about the concrete and complex phenomena of human society without fully stating or realizing the conditions and limitations necessary to make our statements accurate. Every single event or thing in the universe, we are compelled logically to believe, is ultimately related to every other and determined by the whole to which it belongs and apart from which we cannot consistently think it: so that every statement whatever about any concrete event or thing must be inaccurate, because incomplete. The only perfectly true statements are statements about abstract matters, where the nature of the abstraction is clearly stated or understood. Our ordinary judgments of perception, if taken as expressing facts, are all more or less illusions—convenient illusions, as a rule, for the ordinary business of life. "I see green grass in the sunshine"—though an artist will tell me that I don't see green at all. "I hear the postman's knock"; "I hear the College bell ringing"; "I see a cubical box lying some distance off and see that it is of the same size as the one beside me." In all such cases it requires an effort

of psychological analysis to discover the halfpenny worth of fact amid the intolerable deal of inference with which we wash it down. So, too, we continue to talk of sunrise and sunset, of the body influencing the mind and the mind the body, of ideas coming suddenly into the mind, of acts done without a motive, of chance and accident, although our physical or psychological theories may contradict these convenient illusions of unreflective thought. A universe which is one system, but a system whose infinite complexity we never grasp and to which we strive to approximate through various kinds and degrees of abstraction—such a "one in the many" is the presupposition of all science, and a complete comprehension of it is the unattainable ideal of a synthetic philosophy.

The two extreme types of philosophy are those represented in the Greek world by the Eleatics and the Heracleiteans (I say expressly the Heracleiteans, not Heracleitus, for Heracleitus himself seems to have grasped, though not in any purely logical or ontological form, the idea of a unity amid the manifold, while his paradoxical followers whom Plato ridicules, being out and out pluralists, made all assertion impossible). In modern times we find the same antithesis between Spinoza (so long as he adheres strictly to his *Omnis determinatio est negatio*) and Hume with his world where all events are "loose and separate." In other systems the same two tendencies may be traced, *e.g.* if we contrast mediæval Realists and Nominalists or modern Idealists and Empiricists; but in none does it come out with such sharpness. The reconciliation is, however, generally some more or less unsatisfactory compromise which alternately allows the balance to incline to the side of unity or to that of diversity (*e.g.* in Empedocles and Anaxagoras among the ancients; in Kant and Lotze among

the moderns). Only Plato in his later dialogues,[1] and Aristotle, not quite consistently, among the ancients; in modern times only Leibniz occasionally and Hegel have really grappled with the problem of the complete and systematic reconciliation of the One and the Many. Plato's first attempt to escape from the sceptical consequences of the Heracleitean pluralism was, apparently, to take refuge, like many poetical and mystical philosophers in all ages, in a dualism which cut off Reality from Appearance—a dualism which makes the world of appearance an illusion. In the intelligible world there were "ideas" each one and separate: in the sensible world diversity. Under the influence, apparently, of a profounder study of Eleatic thought and possibly shaken from his confidence in his earlier solution by the criticisms of his brilliant young pupil, Aristotle,[2] Plato came

[1] I here assume the truth of the theory which puts the *Parmenides*, *Sophistes* and *Philebus* later than the P*haedo*, P*haedrus* and *Republic*. Lutoslawski (*The Origin and Growth of* P*lato's Logic*, 1897) seems to me to have thoroughly established the view which Prof. Lewis Campbell had maintained and elaborately supported in his edition of the *Sophistes and* P*oliticus*, 1867.

[2] It is Parmenides himself who is made to criticize the earlier theory of Plato; and the discussion is carried on with "the young Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the thirty." This suggests an allusion to Plato's young pupil. If we can suppose the criticisms of the P*armenides* to be partly Aristotle's own and the views Aristotle criticizes in the *Metaphysics* to be those of οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι (cf. *Soph.*, 248A)—*i.e.* other pupils of Plato who had adhered to the earlier doctrines of their master—the difficulty of explaining Aristotle's criticisms of the theory of ideas seems to me greatly diminished. But the question cannot be discussed here. Lutoslawski (*The Origin and Growth of* P*lato's Logic*, p. 401) argues that, even if we admit the possibility of an allusion to Aristotle in the "Aristoteles" of P*arm.*, Aristotle was too young to have made objections which modified the course of Plato's thought. Surely a Greek youth of eighteen or twenty might well have raised metaphysical difficulties, especially when that youth was Aristotle. Berkeley at twenty was criticizing Locke in his commonplace-book. [Cf. Ritchie's P*lato*, ch. 2 and 5.]

to see that dualism puts off difficulties and does not solve them, and that to explain the world of appearance it is necessary to recognize that in the intelligible world itself there must be diversity as well as unity. In the same way Christian theology, which is just Platonism applied to the interpretation of the beliefs of the first Christians, came to recognize that the relation of God to the world and to man cannot be thought out, unless in the Divine nature itself there is diversity and not merely abstract unity.

The doctrine of the Trinity is often represented by opponents and by anti-rationalist believers as if it were a mere magical violation of arithmetic, whereas it is a recognition in a theological form that the abstract category of quantity is inapplicable to what is most real—the spiritual principle which governs the universe. Aristotle, when he is expressly engaged in criticising Plato, seems to disparage unity; but it is only to "excessive unification" (*τὸ λίαν ἑνοῦν*) that he objects—to an abstract unity which excludes difference. His idealism is more fearless than Plato's earlier philosophy: for he does not seek to escape from the manifold details of the world of appearance but to find rationality (*θεῖόν τι*) in what Plato had thrust aside as irrational. Still it must be admitted that even Aristotle seems to fall back upon a notion which looks very like that of objective contingency or chance, though he describes *τύχη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον* not as positive agents, but merely as *στερήσεις*[1]—so that he must have held a theory of the imperfections in the universe more comparable to that of Spinoza than to that of Prof. James, who pleads for the recognition of "real evil" and "real contingency" apparently in the very same sense as that in which

[1] Cf. Mr. Stewart's remarks on *τύχη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον* in *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Vol. I. pp. 259, 260.

he wishes to maintain "a real God" and "a real moral life."[1]

In the special province of logic two extreme types of thought have been represented among us, though not with the same relentless audacity as among the Greeks. The Pure Formal Logic of Hamilton accentuates the principle of Identity in such a way as to reduce logic to a manipulation of abstract quantities. Mill, on the other hand, resolves inference into a mere unexplained transition from one particular to another. Hamilton and Mill did not go to the extremes of Megaric (or later Eleatic) and Heracleitean (or Cyrenaic) Sophists, who, from the opposite points of view of Identity and Difference respectively, agreed in making predication impossible. But Hamilton's quantification of the predicate tends to abolish the distinction between subject and predicate which seems essential in every real judgment: and Mill's refusal to see anything "new" in the conclusion of a syllogism, unless the conclusion be absolutely disconnected with the premises, makes inference impossible.

In logic, as commonly understood, we are only brought into the presence of the problem of the One and the Many; but the problem is certainly there,

[1] It may be urged that even Aristotle does not succeed in getting rid of a dualism such as he himself finds fault with in Plato's theory of ideas (as he understands that theory); but it may still be maintained that both Plato (in his later dialogues) and Aristotle have endeavoured to see the One in the Many and the Many in the One, instead of adopting either the one-sided theory of an Abstract Monism like the Eleatics (and the Stoics afterwards) or contenting themselves with the rough and ready "pluralism" of popular belief. When Plato is spoken of as a "dualist," it should be remembered that what he calls "matter" or "the unlimited" is described by him in more metaphysical language as "the other." It is the "not-being" which "is"—the negative element and not a second positive element alongside of the ideal element. The language in which the *Timaeus* describes the making of the physical universe is "mythical" and must not be taken literally.

confronting us in every one of the customary divisions of logic. (1) What is the general concept? If it is said to be an abstraction from particulars, what is meant by this? Is there nothing general except the name? If so, how can we distinguish "real kinds" (which even Mill recognizes) from τὰ ὁμώνυμα? If generality is only a generality in our thought, how can we distinguish truth from falsehood in the case of any general proposition? If we are thinking rightly when we think something common to different things, must there not *be* something common to them, identical amid the difference? Either we must give up the possibility of any scientific proposition, or we must admit some amount of truth in Platonic Idealism and Mediæval Realism. (It is curious how those who speak most about the laws of nature often throw most scorn upon "universals.") And so we arrive at the old problem: How can the many "partake" in the One? How can the One be manifested in the Many?

(2) The judgments, which we really think and utter —as distinct from artificial dried specimens in text-books—cannot be either purely analytic or purely synthetic. They cannot be either of the type "A is A" (A remaining absolutely self-identical in subject and predicate), nor of the type "A is B" (A and B being absolutely different).[1] Even in the negative judgment as really thought and uttered there must be some ground or basis of identity.[2] No one thinks it

[1] "A (*Alpha*) is ℵ (*Aleph*)" has been suggested to me as the most appropriate symbol for the judgment.

[2] Negation implies a possible affirmation, as Aristotle recognized. But Prof. James exaggerates this into falsity when he makes an absolute distinction between the affirmative judgment as objective and the negative as merely subjective (*The Will to Believe*, pp. 290, 291). A negative judgment is, as really thought or uttered, just as much a judgment about reality as an affirmative. And an affirmative judgment, as really thought or uttered, is just as much relative to some possible negation as a negative judgment is relative to a pos-

worth while to judge that "An elephant is not an illicit process of the major." All real judgments involve an identity in difference, a difference in identity. Judgments differ in degree of development —as Mr. Bosanquet has fully shown: and the most highly developed type of judgment—the disjunctive—in its logical ideal of an exhaustive enumeration of mutually exclusive alternatives makes the identity and the difference within that identity apparent in its very form.

(3) The whole controversy about inference turns on the same question: Can we pass from particular to particular except through a universal, identical amid the difference of these particulars? "We have not got inference," as Mr. Bosanquet says,[1] "unless the conclusion (i.) is necessary from the premises, and (ii.) goes beyond the premises." This is "the paradox of inference." There must be something new, and yet there must not be anything new. It is the old puzzle about the impossibility of learning, raised by the Greek Sophists: and it is only capable of solution, if we are allowed to make the distinction between what is implicit and what is explicit—a distinction which Mill puts aside as "a mere salvo"[2]—and to recognize that identity and difference are not mutually exclusive, a conclusion which cost Plato a great dialectical struggle, and which to modern common-sense still seems absurd.

sible affirmation. "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet." Here we have a negative judgment directed against the pagans who assert the existence of other gods and an affirmative directed against those who deny that Mohammed is a true prophet. Affirmative clauses are only put into creeds when somebody is denying them. All genuine affirmation is negation of negation. "Smoking carriage" means that the rule prohibiting smoking does not hold there; just as "*Nichtraucher*" negatives the prevailing habit. Prof. James must think that the English notice says something about objective existence while the German notice does not!

[1] *Essentials of Logic*, p. 137. [2] *Logic*, Book II., chap. III., § 2.

(4) The more concrete problems of logic, such as the investigation of the methods of proof in the sciences of observation and experiment, make it clear, as has been already said, that all science, all that can be called real knowledge, all that can be called "experience," in the sense in which experience supplies the materials for science, presupposes a coherent universe. The philosophical doubter, like Hume or Mr. Arthur Balfour, professes to be able to think a universe in which every event is "loose and separate," in which there is a "haphazard multiplicity of unordered succession."[1] Hume logically remains a complete sceptic, and holds that he has shown the impossibility of metaphysics; but Mr. Balfour thinks such a universe may satisfy the modest claims of philosophy, though he sees clearly enough that such a universe could never be interpreted by science. The possibility of even a few absolutely isolated, detached "phenomena" or "events" would upset the presuppositions with which science works. The accidental or contingent for science can only mean the as yet unexplained, never the uncaused or really spontaneous. Science demands a One in the Many in a much fuller sense than the co-existence of unrelated events in one Time and in one Space and (even) in one Consciousness. And surely philosophy, which attempts, however vainly, to obtain "complete unification," should not be satisfied with a lower standard of coherence, a less organized system, than satisfies the various particular sciences. It cannot settle down contented with an acceptance of mere plurality or multiplicity. The philosopher cannot, as such, make a system of Louis Stevenson's delightful child's-verses:

> The world is so full of a number of things,
> I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings.

[1] Cf. *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 154. [8th Ed., p. 164.]

II.—The Metaphysical Problem.

Thus metaphysics receives from logic the problem of the relation between the One and the Many. That in some sense the One must be in the Many is all that the science of logic requires. How? In what sense? That is the problem which metaphysics must attempt to solve and is always attempting to solve, whether a solution be possible or not. Popular thinking, or want of thinking, is content to leave such problems alone, or to accept any partial and haphazard solution of them: and a certain kind of popular philosophy has in all ages since the time of the Greek Sophists been ready, in its fear of "letting philosophy go too far," to lend support to the intellectual indolence of "the vulgar." Prof. James's "Essays in Popular Philosophy," as he purposely calls them, are the latest important example of brilliant cleverness holding a brief for laziness and stupidity. So far as I can make out, the main theses in Prof. James's qualified defence of the pluralism of ordinary belief are these: (1) that monism resolves real facts into illusions, (2) that philosophy is bound to satisfy other demands of our nature than those of reason, and (3) that, in order to explain that free-will which is presupposed in our moral judgments, we must posit a real objective contingency in the universe. If I have done any injustice to Prof. James in formulating these theses in a few words, I must apologise and excuse myself by explaining that I am not asking for any formal condemnation of his book on the ground of its containing philosophical heresy, but that I am simply using it as a suggestive expression of a discontent with idealist philosophies that is widely felt; and of this discontent these three theses seem to me a sufficiently precise statement.

As to the opinion that monism resolves real facts into illusions, the criticism is undoubtedly applicable

to strict monism like that of the Eleatics, to the predominant tendency of Spinoza's thought and to systems like those of Oriental pantheism or their modern imitations in Schopenhauer and others,—systems which treat the world of appearance in space and time as a world of illusion that we must leave behind us in order to discover truth. But the criticism seems to me inapplicable to the later form of Plato's idealism, and inapplicable to the idealism of Aristotle, which refuses to make any absolute gap (*χωρισμός*) between the One and the Many, and least of all applicable to the philosophy of Hegel, whose whole effort is to break down the barrier which Kant had set up between the unknowable world of unintelligible *intelligibilia* and the phenomenal world of our experience, and to regard this world of phenomena in space and time as the revelation and the only revelation we can have of the ultimate reality of things (the Idea). To call the phenomenal world a world of appearance is not merely to translate Greek into Latin, but it is to express more clearly than the word "phenomenal" can now do in English, that the world of our experience, whilst not simply as it presents itself to our senses completely true, because full of self-contradiction, is nevertheless real and true in proportion as we come to see it as the manifestation of an intelligible world. "Illusions" are sensations wrongly interpreted, facts which have been so placed by us in our system of belief that they do not fit in with the rest of what we accept. The world of appearance is not as such illusory; for we believe that it admits potentially of a coherent and intelligible interpretation. Prof. James, referring to the idea—an idea not of philosophers only but of many orthodox theologians also—that the creative mind must be timeless, goes on to treat this as equivalent to the assertion that "time is an illusory appearance."[1] Now

[1] *The Will to Believe*, etc., p. 181, note.

since our minds are not the creative mind but can only know things under the condition of time, where is the illusion, especially if we *know* that time is a necessary condition of the appearance of things to us? I know that I cannot see all the sides of a building at once; I am not subject to any illusion thereby, for I recognize the limitations of my knowledge. I should indeed be subject to an illusion if I judged from my own experience that the front and the back of the house could not possibly coexist in time, or that they could not be seen at once by some one who was able to look down through the roof. As already pointed out, an element of illusion enters into most of our ordinary judgments of perception; but it is an element of illusion which in practice we disregard because it is harmless and even convenient. We get rid of these illusions by psychological analysis, *i.e.* by substituting scientific reflexion for ordinary unreflective thought.

The contrast between "illusion" and "reality" is of a different kind from that between "appearance" and "reality." The person who has an illusion believes in it, so long as he has the illusion. He does not know it to be an illusion. When he does, he ceases to experience the illusion as an illusion. . But he who is aware of an appearance continues to experience the appearance, even when he knows it to be mere appearance and can get behind it to something more real. He who knows phenomena to be mere phenomena knows them to be a partial and imperfect interpretation of reality. If a child in a moving train thinks the scenery is actually rushing past him and that the carriage in which he sits is at rest, he has an illusion: he has misplaced a real bit of experience. When he comes to know that the moving trees and houses are merely "appearance," he has got hold of a bit of reality through the appearance. The feeling of conviction, however strong, is no proof of reality; but its

presence or absence is what differentiates "having an illusion" from "being aware of appearance." Prof. James in his *Principles of Psychology*[1] argues for the emotional character of the *belief* in reality—soundly enough so far as "belief" is concerned. "One of the charms of drunkenness," he says, "unquestionably lies in the deepening of the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein." And the "Will to Believe," it might be added, may resort to various forms of intoxication other than alcoholic. But let me appeal from Prof. James psychologically appreciating drunkenness to Prof. James thinking soberly. "The greatest proof," he says,[2] "that a man is *sui compos* is his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the highest result of education."

Appearance (the world of phenomena) is the real, as confusedly and partially understood. It is "empirical reality": it is "objective" in the sense of existing for the general mind. The real is the apparent completely understood and seen in the light of the whole. Appearance is the appearance *of* reality. If we know "only phenomena" we must thereby know something of that of which they are phenomena. Complete comprehension, indeed, remains an ideal for knowledge—the ideal of totality: and so we must distinguish between different grades of reality. This is constantly ignored by critics of Idealism. Thus Mr. Balfour[3] speaks of the Absolute, if it is not a mere "barren abstraction," holding in suspension "without preference and without repulsion every element alike of the knowable world." And similarly Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in an article entitled "Lotze's Monism,"[4] says that if God be identified with the

[1] Vol. II. p. 284. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 308.
[3] *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 146. [8th Ed. p. 155.]
[4] *Philosophical Review*, Vol. V. p. 242. The italics are mine.

Absolute, then "all the phases of existence are *alike* characteristic of the All. God is evil as well as good, or better still, non-moral and indifferent, manifesting himself in all things *alike*."

Now, while a thorough-going idealism must protest against the arbitrary preferences of hasty and immature thought, as Parmenides protests against the hesitation of Socrates to recognize ideas of mud and dirt, it follows that if the intelligible world be the truth of the phenomenal, we must distinguish within the world of appearance between those aspects of things which have more reality and those which have less reality in them. Where there is more contradiction and incoherence, there must be less reality than where we find rationality and organic system. Even Spinoza, who tends to deny any reality to the manifold and diverse, nevertheless recognizes degrees in the extent to which things have reality.[1] Hegel has distinguished very explicitly between the mere existence or mere appearance of things and that reality which he identifies with the rational. Metaphysics cannot rest content with discovering the contradictions in the world of appearance, as it presents itself to us in our ordinary experience, or even as it is partially rearranged and translated into intelligible terms by the sciences: there remains the positive and constructive task, at least as an ideal, of a systematic exposition of the world of appearance as the manifestation of the Absolute Reality. Now this was what Hegel attempted; and it is just one of his greatest claims to our admiration, that he did take the whole task of philosophy as seriously as Plato and Aristotle had taken it. His unfortunate error lay in putting down what could only be provisional and hypothetical interpretations as if they were to be taken as final. If we are to "think" the universe we must endeavour to comprehend the meaning of

[1] Cf. *Ethica*, I., prop. 9.

nature and still more the meaning of human history and the works of the human spirit in which the manifestation of the ultimately real becomes more intelligible to us. That human history is a small thing in the whole universe and that human history is very imperfectly known to us are undoubted difficulties which Hegel did not recognize explicitly enough; but they are no excuse for a philosopher declining the task of trying to understand the universe so far as he can by looking at those things which speak to us most clearly. Mr. Balfour has only renewed Lotze's general objection to Hegel's philosophy of history when he speaks (with special reference to Æsthetics) of "something rather forced and arbitrary in the attempts that have been made to exhibit the artistic fancies of an insignificant fraction of the human race during a very brief period of its history as essential and important elements in the development and manifestation of the 'Idea.'"[1] Yet when Mr. Balfour is himself dealing with the precisely similar and much more plausible objection to the Christian idea of the Incarnation, he rightly protests against the exaltation of quantitative magnitude into a criterion of spiritual significance.[2]

We must distinguish between different grades of reality, and we are justified in interpreting the universe in terms of the highest and clearest that we know. The inorganic seems to us easier to understand than the organic, the organic than the self-conscious, only because we care to know less and expect to know less about the inorganic than about the organic, about the merely organic than about the self-conscious. Our

[1] *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 155, note. [8th Ed. p. 165.] Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Book II., ch. VIII., § 217. "In spite of this [admission of the Copernican discoveries] they persuaded themselves that the spiritual development of their Absolute was confined to the shores of the Mediterranean."

[2] *The Foundations of Belief*, pp. 344-5. [8th Ed. pp. 334-5.]

demands for explanation become more exigent and more difficult to satisfy the more we approach the complex facts of our own personality. In geometry we only care to know about *the* triangle (*this* triangle is merely a symbol, and a very roughly drawn symbol will serve our purpose). In biology it is the species we describe and study; the individual is only a specimen, though a fairly good specimen is necessary. And similarly in sociology—so far as sociology exists as a science. But in studying human beings in history we have an interest in the individual, and we cannot rest satisfied with general causes and vague explanations. This is admirably brought out by Prof. James in his essays on "Great Men" and "The Importance of Individuals." In this also, I think, is to be found the element of truth underlying the very ambiguous statement that philosophy must satisfy other demands than those of reason. Philosophy must certainly satisfy other demands than those of the abstract understanding which works in the special sciences. No great man —no individual man whatever—can be completely explained by being analyzed into general tendencies. No scientific explanation of any kind known to us—no victorious and aggressive science of sociology—is likely to dispense us from the need of recognizing the factor which the temperament and character of individuals—nay, the particular acts of individuals or the particular "accidents" that happen to individuals—contribute to the shaping of human affairs. (I use the term "accident" for convenience, just as biologists speak of "accidental variations," meaning those of which we do not yet know the cause.) The reason is that we are interested in human beings and human events in a far higher degree than that in which we are interested in the secular movements of the stars or in the succession of organic types. Suppose that we wished to know, not merely why plants, like ferns or *coniferæ*,

are more ancient than flowering plants, or to know roughly how many centuries have elapsed since the last glacial period in Northern Europe; suppose that we wished to know why this particular fossil fish and no other came to be embedded in this particular place where we find it, or why this particular granite boulder is lying precisely in this spot—suppose our curiosity extended so far, are we likely to get any certain and precise answers from science? But our curiosity with respect to human beings and historical events is of this very minute kind: and therefore we must be prepared to find a large unexplained residuum after our best efforts have been made at comprehending anything in regard to human history. We are dissatisfied with the general explanations that do perfectly well when applied to the great phenomena of nature. We ask for something fuller and more concrete. And though, as a matter of fact, we do know much more about the conscious and deliberate acts of many human beings (*e.g.* Cicero and Samuel Pepys) who have left us some record of their fleeting feelings and opinions, than we know or want to know about the behaviour of any individual ichthyosaurus or mammoth, our interest makes us more exacting and less content with the abstract formulæ of scientific description. The unexplained element in human things concerns us more deeply, and though it is really smaller in proportion, on any fair comparison, than in natural phenomena, it yet bulks more largely in our discontent and makes us feel the inadequacy of all attempts to think the universe as a whole, especially in those aspects of it which affect us most and which seem to promise, if we could only get at the heart of them, most insight into the meaning of things. But it is one thing to admit all this: it is another thing to disparage rational explanation and to demand something else from philosophy; it is another thing to set up the as yet unexplained

as if it were an element absolutely outside the comprehension of even the most perfect intelligence conceivable. To do this is to turn our ignorance and impatience into a measure of the universe, of what is and what is not, in a far wilder fashion than can be charged against the boldest idealist construction.

The business of philosophy must be to think the world—to carry on that work of making things intelligible which is begun by the sciences. It is relevant to object to a philosophical system that it ignores some set of facts (if they are really facts) and does not explain them, *i.e.* does not fit them in with other facts and show their relation to the whole. It is possible and not difficult to show that every philosophical system is inadequate, because no philosopher has explained everything rightly and because all in varying degrees have erred and fallen into confusion of thought. But it is irrelevant to ask from philosophy the satisfaction of other than intellectual demands. Philosophy is not a good dinner, nor is it fine music, nor is it now-a-days the ecstasy of passionate love or of religious emotion. The consolations of philosophy must remain somewhat grey and grim. That human nature has other than intellectual needs—in fact that most human beings have very limited and easily satisfied intellectual needs—is one of those facts which philosophy must take account of, perhaps somewhat sadly. But philosophy would only be made absurd, if it were to profess to satisfy other than intellectual demands. The attempt to bring it down to the level of "the vulgar" by throwing in concessions to popular sentiment may make the name of philosophy popular but at the expense of its credit for honesty. A public which is satisfied with the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence will doubtless be pleased with the assertion of the liberty of the individual to believe what he wants to believe. It is what people

generally do, and there is no necessity to provide them with a philosophical formula to cover the nakedness of their haphazard thinking. A man may not like mathematics: he may prefer roulette. But do not let us suggest to him that he should pretend, while he travels to hell *viâ* Monte Carlo, that gambling is a superior kind of mathematics. Another person may dislike metaphysics, especially Hegelian metaphysics, and may prefer the most emotional and irrational religion he can find. But while he travels to heaven under whatever irrationalist authority he elects to follow, we need not tell him that he is a profound philosopher all the time. The truth of a scientific proposition or of a philosophical theory is not refuted by any one acting as if it were not true. The straight line is the shortest distance between two points; and yet a man may go a long way round on the chance of meeting his sweetheart or in order to call at his favourite publichouse.

And the old difficulty always recurs. Whose nature is to be satisfied? Live in the sensation of the moment, if you can, and do not think about the next. But if you once begin thinking and construct some rudiments of a system, you have appealed to reason and by reason you must be judged. So long as you blindly submit, as most human beings do, to the authority or tradition under whose influence you have grown up, you can escape the arbitration of thought; but if you once begin to weigh one authority against another, whatever may be the psychological explanation of the choice you finally make, your comparison of competing authorities must be made in terms of reason.

An appeal to any other ultimate authority than that of reason is an appeal which makes discussion impossible and absurd. Plato, taking Protagoras's *Homo mensura* to mean a declaration of the rights of every individual human being's feelings, asks why Protagoras

should expect us to give more weight to his own opinion than to the opinions of a pig or a baboon or a tadpole.[1] And if the appeal to reason is to be suspect, can Prof. James claim any more value for his opinions than for those of the American Eagle (if there be such a bird) or of the Pope or the Sultan? If the answer be that practice is the real test of the value of opinions, we may admit that, with regard to opinions in so far as they affect practice, on the very ground that the true is the coherent. But what is our test of the relative value of different kinds of life except an appeal to reason? If the question were put to the vote, a very small minority would vote for the pursuit of philosophical thinking, even of the lively type practised by Prof. James, in comparison with the pleasures of betting at horse races or looking on at football matches. In philosophy there can be no appeal except to reason. A philosophical theory is bound to take account of the whole nature of man along with other things in the universe which seem to pay very little regard to any man's private likings, but the ultimate appeal must be to clear and distinct thinking. That system which can give the most coherent account of the seemingly chaotic world of our experience must be preferred, however unpleasing the result may be to the feelings and wishes of this or that person. A system of philosophy must explain the fact of widespread beliefs as to religion and morality: it does not follow that it must confirm them all in their original form any more than that it must uphold the beliefs of unscientific "common-sense" about the physical world. It is too much to expect philosophy to confirm beliefs which are often mutually self-contradictory. "The heart," it has been said, "has reasons that the reason knows not of." "True," says M. Fouillée, "but whose

[1] *Theaet.* 161, C, D.

heart? Is it the heart of the cannibal savage or the heart of the civilized man? the heart of the Musulman or that of the Christian? Everything depends on the intelligence that is in the heart, whether it be in the reflective stage or in the stage of inherited traditional belief. The supposed conflict between intellect and feeling is in reality a conflict between one form of intellect and another, between reflective and unreflective thought."[1]

III.—The Theological and Ethical Problem.

In modern times dissatisfaction with Monism, or with any reconciliation of Monism and Pluralism which does not finally give the primacy to the Many, is connected, not with difficulties in the explanation of the physical universe—there Monism is easily triumphant—but with difficulties about personality. A "real personal God," a "real human soul" that cannot perish or become absorbed in anything other than its isolated self, "real absolute free will" in however restricted a domain—these moral ideas are supposed to be irreconcilable with any ultimately monistic system, and to compel us to adopt an ultimate Pluralism.

The picture-thinking of ordinary unphilosophical thought most certainly assumes a system which is pluralistic, and can only be described correctly as one of Polytheism—God being thought of as one great and powerful spirit among other independent spirits, who may indeed be his offspring, but who are governed by him only as human beings are governed by a monarch, and who can and do disobey, and who may even plan to dethrone him and set up a republican form of government.[2] Now, if a phil-

[1] *Le Mouvement Idéaliste*, p. lx.

[2] Prof. James has suggested an even more prosaic possibility. "That the universe may actually be a sort of joint-stock society, in which the sharers have both limited liabilities and limited powers, is

osophy is bound to justify in its literal form this *Vorstellung* of popular religion, then certainly pluralistic metaphysics must correspond to polytheistic theology. But the first requirement in a serious philosophy is that of self-consistency; and no picture or "myth" of this kind, whatever moral or spiritual truth it may contain, can be made self-consistent. If God is not the Absolute Being, if he is not the omnipotent, but can be really thwarted by rebellious spirits, *either* he and the other spirits are relatively independent beings within one system of things which is the true Absolute Being, *or* there is no system of things at all, and the universe is really that realm of chance in which "the materialist" is often said to believe. The Greeks advanced from the confused polytheism of primitive belief to the conception of "one God greatest among gods and men," and from that the transition was easy either to the Fate of the dramatic poets or to "the One" of Eleatic philosophy. An ultimate pluralism may be pictured, but cannot be seriously thought out. Either Fate or an Objective Chance (which is the same thing as blind Fate under another name) must control the relations between the many beings envisaged as "absolutes." That the many should be really and ultimately absolute is, so far as I can see, unthinkable, a contradiction. Each one is posited as absolute and independent. And yet each one is not absolute, because there are others, so that each is limited by the co-existence of others alongside of it; for, if not, there could be no interaction among the many. To say that the many

of course a simple and conceivable notion" (*The Will to Believe, etc.*, p. 154). The universe = "God and Company, Ltd." The suggestion is not intended to be profane, but to be an accommodation to popular religious belief. To me it seems a *reductio ad absurdum* of "pluralist" philosophy or theology. It is to pass into a different intellectual atmosphere to turn to the words of St. Augustine and St. Paul: "An potius non essem nisi essem in te, *ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia.*"

existences are real, and that the relation between them is only "a relation," and therefore ideal, would be to fall a victim to a verbal distinction. The many can be expressed by nouns, their unity or their interaction can be expressed by an adjective or a verb: "relation" is an abstract term and "thing" is a concrete. But if the various "things" belong to one system of things, that system of things is the ultimate reality. If they do not belong to one system, we are left with something unthinkable. The isolated, independent individual is unthinkable if there be any others isolated and independent outside of it. "Isolated" is meaningless unless there are others from which a thing is isolated. There can be no real and absolute (individual) except the whole universe. As we have already seen, however, this one universe must be thought of not as an abstract identity, but as containing a multiplicity within it, as manifesting itself as a many.

Prof. James does not speak of absolutely independent beings, but of "a plurality of semi-independent forces."[1] The world is only in part disorderly and given over to a real objective chance. The doctrine may seem less harsh; but is objective chance made any more thinkable by the plea that it is "only a little one"? The mystery is rather increased than diminished by the concession that a great part of the universe is one coherent system. That only a part and a small part of the universe is known by us from experience to be coherent, must of course be admitted; but the whole procedure of the sciences by which that part has come to be known assumes that all is coherent. How is the transition made from the necessary to the contingent? Is it gradual or is it abrupt? To contingency as a name for our ignorance, it is easy enough to give an intelligible meaning; and in that sense the accidental or the contingent may safely be talked about. It is that

[1] *The Will to Believe, etc.*, p. 175.

which we know incompletely; and there are no things, and very few aspects of things, that we know completely. But Prof. James insists on the reality of chance as something objective *in rerum natura*. "I fancy," he says, "that squeezing the thistle boldly will rob it of its sting."[1] He seems to me to have got hold of the wrong plant for his audacious experiment. "*Nemo me impune lacessit*" is the answer of the thistle, and of logic. For chance cannot be consistently thought out as any partial contradiction of necessity. With ordinary unloaded dice there is a chance of my throwing double sixes, but there is no chance of my throwing double sevens. This only means that I know the number seven cannot appear where it does not exist, while I do not know which of the various possible combinations will occur on any given occasion. Prof. James insists that possibility must be "real." This *either* means that the possible is the actual, in which case there is no longer any place for uncertainty, subjective or objective, *or* (and this of course is what Prof. James intends) it means that one alternative may happen as well as the other, which means that something may take place without a cause, a supposition that would make all science impossible, and which moreover is not seriously thinkable, for it would mean the thinking of a particular event in absolute isolation from all others.

"Semi-independent" is indeed a phrase that might properly be applied to the parts of an organism; but they are certainly not intelligible nor capable of existing except in relation to the whole. And in the organism the more differentiated and individualized parts are to be found in the higher organisms, where the dependence on the whole is greater than it is in the lower forms of life. Is not the "independence" or "semi-independence" of pluralist theory simply a

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

mistaken interpretation of the individual which co-exists with other individuals, whose very differentiation as an individual implies more complex dependences upon the whole to which it belongs? Independence of other parts or groups of parts is gained only by greater dependence upon the whole.

That there is some superficial plausibility in holding that certain regions or aspects of the universe are contingent, may however be admitted. Thus the numbers of the petals or stamina of flowers, which are definite in the case of small numbers (three in the monocotyledons, four or five in the dicotyledons) generally become indefinite and irregular when we get to numbers beyond five and six. It is as if plants were like savages who lost count beyond small figures. Nature's weakness (as Hegel would have put it) seems here to produce a real contingency. But I do not think the scientific biologist will so readily admit that the "accidental," though as yet unexplained, is absolutely inexplicable. Natural selection may account for the inaccuracy of nature when it deals with large numbers. With small numbers any deviation makes a greater relative difference in the symmetry and appearance of the flower, and so would affect the facility with which insects recognize it. But the difference, *e.g.* between ten and eleven petals is one that does not affect the general look of a flower, and so nothing is gained by rigid observance of number. Natural selection not operating, number is determined by other causes. That may or may not be the explanation. I only mean to show that, because something *looks* as if it were a case of absolute contingency, we are not entitled to say that there may be no explanation for any intelligence whatever.[1]

[1] Leibniz, who laid so much stress on the difference between necessary and contingent truths *for us*, did not assert any absolute contingency. "The difference between necessary and contingent

The question of the Will is perhaps to us the most prominent form of the question about the One and the Many. The metaphysical Greek intellect, when it came to be directed into theological channels, fought out the question of the One and the Many as a question about the Trinity and the Incarnation (How the One can be a plurality ; how the One, the absolutely real, can appear in space and time). The practical Western mind, trained in the conception of Roman law, fought out the same problem but only in its ethical aspect—as the problem of free will and responsibility: How can the One Divine Will be reconciled with a plurality of angelic and human wills which nevertheless must in some way be subordinate to it?[1] From Latin theology we have inherited the question of the will as our chief and typical philosophical difficulty. I cannot discuss the question here. I shall only point out (1) that "fate," in the Oriental sense, and "necessity" or "determinism" are not the same thing but contradictory. Prof. James speaks as if "*fatal* decrees" were a part of the doctrine of necessity.[2] Now the fatalist says: "Whatever you do, such and such things will happen." The determinist says: "*If* your character is of such and such a kind, and *if* circumstances of such and such a kind occur, you will act in such and such a way." The fatalist's proposition is always absolutely categorical: it denies any hypothesis. The determinist's proposition is always hypothetical: and the hypothesis is one which in the case of a human being can never be certainly known to be true. Those who think psychological deter-

truths is the same as that between commensurable and incommensurable numbers. . Contingent truths require an infinite analysis which only God can accomplish. Accordingly, it is by him alone that these truths are known *a priori* and with certainty." *De Scientia Universali seu Calculo Philosophico* (Erdmann, p. 83 *b*).

[1] Cf. Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 353 *seq.*

[2] *The Will to Believe, etc.*, p. 180.

minism inconsistent with that freedom which morality presupposes argue exactly as if we were to hold the first law of motion a dangerous doctrine, because if it were true we should be afraid to get up and walk, lest we should never stop. If the idea of the *vis inertiæ* is sound, we had best never begin to read Prof. James's book, because once beginning we shall never be able to stop reading it. The psychologist like any other scientific person is obliged to deal with abstractions. His propositions, if carefully stated, must always, like all carefully stated scientific propositions, take the hypothetical form. "Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, pure illusions," says Prof. James.[1] No; they are only abstractions. They are what would have happened, had certain conditions been different. The concrete reality is what does happen.

(2) With regard to the theological, as distinct from the psychological, aspect of the question of the will, a difficulty arises in every attempt to think of man as endowed in any respect with an (absolute) free-will independent of the "Eternal Decrees" of God. If we picture God making man with free-will and then looking on to see what happens, ignorant of the result, there is conceivably a more powerful, and more prescient being who knows what will happen as the result of the first God's action. This latter being is therefore God. If this latter does not in every respect know or determine what will happen, he is not yet God and so on till we admit an all-knowing and all-powerful God—*Ens realissimum*.

That there are difficulties in this way of thinking of an Absolute being and the relation of such a being to the particular things in the universe is true enough. But is any less philosophical system of theology free from difficulties? Only so long as we avoid thinking them out.

[1] *The Will to Believe, etc.*, p. 151.

Inferences *a posteriori*, as is recognized both by Kant and by J. S. Mill in his essay on "Theism," can only make probable the existence of an Intelligence of great but not of absolute power. But than such a being a greater can always be conceived; and "God" for philosophy cannot mean less than *id quo nihil majus cogitari potest*. Whether the Absolute can be called "good" in our sense of the word, which always implies comparison with a standard, has been doubted not only by philosophers but by some philosophical theologians also. But the Absolute must contain and surpass all that we know of as the highest goodness and the highest wisdom among mankind. (As Plato expresses it, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is higher than righteousness.) The problem of evil seems indeed to be simplified, if we suppose a devil or a power of darkness struggling with the Lord of light; but it is the method of popular mythology to stave off difficulties by increasing the number of things to be explained. So far as we are justified in calling anything morally evil, we must be prepared to show that it is some element of weakness and incoherence, which tends to pass out of existence because it is not rational. But we call many things evil simply because they are inconvenient to ourselves: and yet some things very inconvenient to ourselves we discover to be inevitable and unalterable for us even by omnipotence, *e.g.* the incommensurability of the diameter and the circumference of the circle or the impossibility of packing spheres as compactly as equal cubes. We all crave happiness and continuous happiness; but there may be abstract possibilities which, in Leibniz's phrase, are not "compossible." What right have we to set up our longings as a measure of the universe? Least of all are those entitled to do so who have begun by disparaging the certainty of clear and distinct thinking. No theory may be attainable by us which is satisfactory to all our

wishes; but we gain nothing by adopting theories that will not satisfy our intellect, for these will always provoke doubt. Irrationalism is at all times the parent of scepticism.

Whether the balance of pain or of pleasure preponderates in human life is an insoluble question, because pain and pleasure are not absolute quantities capable of statistical measurement, but relative to the judgment of particular individuals in particular moods. When people begin to reflect on this matter they generally adopt pessimistic conclusions, for reflexion about pleasure kills happiness. But that pessimism, genuine and earnest pessimism, can never be the living creed of any large portion of the human race is secured by natural selection. Sincere and convinced pessimists would kill themselves or cease to continue their accursed race. Nature has taken care that those shall prevail who are not indeed passively contented optimists, but who at the same time have sufficient interest in the struggle of life to keep toiling on, working out some purpose which, even in the clearest consciousness, is only faintly recognized.

It is perfectly true, as writers like Prof. James and Mr. Arthur Balfour are fond of reminding us, that mankind do not live by clear and distinct thinking but by faith. But it is the business of philosophy to discover what that faith is and not to accept the plain man's account of the matter without criticism; for the plain man's answer is not really the answer of the unsophisticated consciousness, which is blind and dumb, but the answer which has been put into his mouth by those who have brought him up. Now the faith by which we live and work and occasionally think—whatever other faith (*Aberglaube*) we may superadd—is faith in the rationality of the universe. And this faith means (1) that the world is an intelligible system, one and coherent, however little we may have discovered

about it, and (2) that there is some meaning or purpose in it all, that it is not a world wholly or partially left over to chance or caprice. The rationality of the universe includes the presupposition, not merely that events are linked together as material and efficient causes, but that they can be understood (ideally or potentially) in the light of the formal and final cause. The sciences of nature have to do mainly with the former mode of explanation, though their aim always is to reach formal causes (the laws of nature). But philosophy, which takes account of human life also, seeks for an explanation in terms of final cause, and even the sciences of organic nature, as Kant showed, have to use that conception at least as a methodological device.

In advocating the existence of an objective chance, Prof. James says that "our responsibility ends with the performance of [our] duty, and the burden of the rest we may lay on higher powers."[1] But can we do that unless we believe that the whole, including ourselves, is a rational system? If we believe in a real objective contingency, we are believing that there is a portion over which the higher powers have no control, and if we were really to believe that any demon or human scoundrel could actually and finally hinder the purpose of God, should we not have less heart for the fight, unless, indeed, we had such an inordinate "conceit of ourselves," as none of the world's best heroes have ever had, so as to fancy that we could do God's work independently of God's will? It may seem, perhaps, as if it made no practical difference to us whether what we find evil results from a rival power thwarting the benevolent ruler, or good principle in the universe, or from the necessary limitation of the temporal and spatial realization of the Eternal Idea; but it makes a great difference for

[1] *The Will to Believe, etc.*, pp. 174, 175.

clearness of thinking: and even for practice it is surely better to feel that all is comprehended in a (rational) system, than that the fears of our discontent and despair are warranted by careful theory also. For if we believe that the highest being is not the Absolute, how do we know that he may not be defeated after all?

It may perhaps be answered that our philosophical faith is not in an actually existing rational system of things—experience prevents us believing in that—but in an end, a "final goal of ill" towards which evolution moves; that the conception of evolution involves the conception of the Absolute as Becoming, not as Being. The universe, it may be said, consists of a multiplicity of independent beings who gradually come to settle down into stable equilibrium—atoms or monads making as it were a permanent social contract with one another. The world then would be the "best of all possible worlds" in the sense that it is the arrangement best fitted to survive. Such a view undoubtedly agrees with much that is commonly said about evolution. But it raises all the old puzzles that Zeno found in the "many" or "becoming" when treated as absolute categories. Thus it makes time an absolute and brings in the difficulties about a real beginning and end of time. Process and change cannot be thought out, unless in reference to a permanent and unchanging "substance." "It is only the permanent that can change," as Kant said. Heracleitus himself, the philosopher of the universal flux, had his "fire ever-living, thinking" as the one principle pervading all things: and it was only his sophistical successors who tried to work with the concept of absolute change and who found themselves logically compelled to give up saying anything at all. Our popular "Sophists" of the present day talk of "Evolution evolving" and of the "developmental

process" as if it were an absolute. But it is only the carelessness of popular language and the use of abstract nouns as subjects which allow such phrases to pass current. Evolution is the appearance or manifestation to us of a timeless reality which includes and transcends change.

Our Playwright may show
In some fifth act what this wild drama means.

Even the image or picture in these lines of Tennyson's helps to lead one into a more philosophical conception of the world, than the belief in Evolution as the absolute. The Playwright may show us his meaning only at the end of a long process, but if he is a perfect playwright, his thought, though only bit by bit revealed to us, pervades the whole of his work.

CONFESSIO FIDEI

(1885)

§ 1. The Nature of God and the Problem of Scepticism.

Of all disputed questions the most profitless is the question, "Whether there is a God?" The only question worth discussing is "What God is?" If by "God" be meant a gigantic human being, thought of as an absolute monarch, living somewhere up in the sky and governing the universe according to a capricious and changeable will, it is a pious duty to deny such a God, however much he may be concealed under venerable creeds and clothed in consecrated associations. If such be God, the pious man, if he have any intelligence and education, must needs be an atheist. Any conception of God which approximates to such an imagination must just in so far provoke and require indignant disbelief. Laplace swept the heavens with his telescope and said "There is no God," and he was quite right. If we find not God in our own human souls, we find him nowhere, and if we are honest we shall say so.

Is, then, the idea of God a "subjective delusion?" Knowledge, Nature, Morality—these are our facts. There is an ordered system of nature, which we can study and understand. There is a growing order of that human society, for whose welfare we can take thought, and in whose life we live.

Descartes tried to get a fresh start for human thought in the revolt from the oppression of authority by endeavouring to doubt everything. One thing remained which he could not doubt—the existence of the self which doubted. On this foundation he built a system in which he too readily readmitted much of the dogmatism he had begun by rejecting. The system we may leave; it has only an historical interest. The foundation remains.

Kant sought a refuge from scepticism by shifting the problem of philosophy. Instead of attempting to decide dogmatically whether God is, whether the will is free, whether the soul is immortal, he asked the preliminary questions: How is knowledge possible? How is morality possible? In some sense or other we do *know*, we do attain truth about some matters; we do act and judge our conduct (and most certainly that of others) according to a standard of right and wrong. We set up ideals (however we get them) which, we hold, *ought* to be attained or at least to be aimed at. He who denies this is so complete a sceptic that it becomes impossible to argue with him. If there is no truth, it is useless to ask whether any statement is true or not. Complete scepticism destroys itself. He who denies that there is any distinction between right and wrong cannot even join a gang of thieves. He will go solitary till he finds his way to the madhouse or the gallows.

§ 2. Essential Conditions of Knowledge.

Assuming, then, that knowledge exists as fact, let us ask what are the essential conditions without which it could not exist? All knowledge implies a conscious self-knowing. The simplest act of knowledge is judgment. Judgment implies comparison. Comparison implies that the different (sensations, things, etc.), can be held together in a unity. Without a unity

of thought, there could be no judgment of difference. Mere difference is a self-destructive conception. Thus if we grant that, as a matter of history, all knowledge grows up from sensation, which as a physical fact physiology can study, it is still necessary that a thinking (*i.e.* a judging, a comparing) self should be present to sensation.

When it is asked, "How can mind know matter?" "How can one mind communicate with another?" we should see whether these questions are not difficulties just because they involve assumptions we have no right to make. Why assume mind and matter
a as separate substances over against one another (Cartesianism)? Why assume "minds" as separate sub-
b. stances distinct from one another? That in some sense they are distinct is true enough, but their absolute (difference and separation is an unproved theory at the outset, even if it should in the end turn out to be the right one. Let us at least try the rival theory that mind and matter are not separate merely, but, in some sense, one; that minds are, in some sense, not separate but one. But is it a mere theory? So far as mind = self ("I"), so far we must assume mind in every act of knowledge. Knowledge is just this perpetual unity of the different: the unity is a fact—the absolute difference is the assumption. But again, knowledge, if it is really such, if it is scientific knowledge and not mere opinion (Plato's distinction) nor mere individual feeling, must be "objective," *i.e.* valid for all minds (*e.g.* my feeling warm or cold is only my feeling; that the thermometer is 50° is true for all). Objectivity or reality is not what is independent of mind; but what is valid for all minds. To assume separate minds and then a connexion between them, as if they were first separate and then united, is a theory at the outset unproved. Whereas a unity (of some sort) between all minds is a necessary

presupposition of there being any objective knowledge, any science.[1] If the antithesis between self (mind) and nature be made absolute there can be no knowledge at all; if the separateness of individual selves be made absolute, there can be no common or universally valid knowledge.

§ 3. Science and the Uniformity of Nature.

Science is the interpretation of nature (Bacon). Since nature is as a fact interpreted, it must be interpretable, *i.e.* intelligible. When we try to make out a hard sentence, say in a foreign language, we *assume* that it has a meaning (only the ordinary schoolboy doesn't, and so he doesn't succeed in making it out). If finally we find that no meaning can be made out, then we conclude that the text has suffered corruption at the hands of transcribers or printers, *i.e.* that we have not before us what the author wrote. Of course there may be deliberate mystification and some gross carelessness. In the latter case, the author did not write what he thought: in the former, he put together words arbitrarily. But these are the very last explanations of difficulties we should resort to. We do not *begin* by thinking even of the possibility of them. The conception of the book, the sentence, the word, as a whole is implied in our looking at the letters. The interpretability of nature is a presupposition of all science—nay, of all ordinary knowledge, of which what we specially call science is only a more systematic form. We should never get beyond isolated sensations without the link of *causation*. Every event must have a cause, and in the conception of cause it is implied that, given the same cause, the same effect will follow, else we have not got at a "cause." Thus Causation implies Unifor-

[1] This is a development of Kant.

mity of Nature. This principle cannot be got at from induction because it is involved in, pre-supposed in, every inference about nature, nay in the most primitive looking for a cause. But (1) the principle operates without being formulated or consciously apprehended. The formula here, as elsewhere, can only come after the use of it: (2) It is only the *form* of the "uniformity of nature" which is presupposed in any possible knowledge of nature. The particular *kind* of uniformity which is believed in, the particular kind of causes which are believed in, depend on the stage of actual knowledge of nature which men have reached.

The principle of uniformity of nature, in the sense of the presupposition that nature is an intelligible system, is just one aspect of the consciousness of self. Identity of self-consciousness and identity of the cosmos are only two aspects of the same self or soul.[1] There would be no cosmos or ordered system of nature except for a self-consciousness. The intelligible implies the intelligent. Nature (as a system) implies mind. Matter as the absolute antithesis of mind we never can know anything of. By its very nature it cannot be known. It is Aristotle's ὕλη πρώτη or Plato's Non-being.

§ 4. Statement of these Ideas in Terms of Theology.

Translate this into the customary language of theology. God, the Creator and ever present Ruler of the universe has made man in his own image, *i.e.* our souls. We only live and move and have our being in God. We gradually learn his thoughts. He gradually reveals himself to us. These are different ways of stating the same thing. But we must notice that this transcendental logic gives us no right to

[1] Cf. *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, p. 73, etc.

assume without further proof the ordinary *Vorstellung* of a personal God and separate human personalities. We are yet a long way from personality. The flippant defender of the faith goes too fast when he jumps from the Kantian argument to this popular view,—which is perhaps neither intelligible in itself nor in accordance with the deeper religious consciousness of mankind.

§ 5. Knowledge of Our Imperfection Implies an Ideal.

"But," it will be said, "there is surely a vast difference between our knowledge and what is to be known: between our finite minds and the infinite mind of God." Our minds just because we know them finite cannot be merely finite. That which is altogether limited cannot know itself as limited. We are finite and infinite in one. We are far from completely comprehending what yet we know lies before us to be comprehended. Our knowledge is imperfect and we know that it is imperfect, *i.e.* we have a standard or *ideal* of perfection by which we judge our progress in attaining truth. The self-consciousness, which we find to be presupposed in all knowledge, we yet cannot fully know. We cannot, so to speak, get behind it. It is there, we know it must be there, and yet it is not there. The cosmos we presuppose we yet only gradually come to know. (The Universal Self does not reach full consciousness in us.) It is and it as yet is not: it *ought* to be. Truth is the ideal of science. Again, to translate into theological language —man's *end*—what he *has to do*—is to know God. God only gradually reveals himself to man. God only gradually comes to himself in man. The process is continuous and incomplete.

Here we have the conception of an ideal, of an "ought," which is essential to the beginning and pro-

gress of knowledge: essential also to the beginning and progress of morality.[1] All theories of ethics which leave out the conception of "ought" leave out the essential element of morality. Of course here again it is only the form of duty ("ought") which is *a priori*, which is presupposed in morality: the particular content, the particular kinds of actions which are regarded as *duties* depend on the stage of actual moral development which men have reached. Duty is *a priori*: duties depend on experience. God reveals his moral law gradually to man.

The ambiguity in the word "law" has led to confusion here. Laws of nature are uniformities which are followed. Laws of morals are also uniformities which are *to be* followed. A law of nature cannot be broken: else it is not a law of nature. A so-called violation of a law of health is an illustration of it. Laws in the moral (or political) sense can be broken. They say what ought to be done or avoided: and this "ought" implies that they are not as a matter of fact invariably fulfilled. "Ought" implies freedom to do or not to do. A law of nature is formulated strictly in a hypothetical judgment. "If a stone be thrown up in the air, it falls down again." A law of morals is a "Categorical Imperative" as Kant called it. "Do this." (The Categorical Imperative can only become identified with a hypothetical judgment if we take account of the whole of humanity (? of the universe).) In an ideal state of society, laws of morals would be statements of fact; but then by saying "ideal" we have only shifted the conception of "ought" and not got rid of it.

[1] Knowledge is not a passive condition: it implies effort—the striving to attain an ideal, to realize in thought what we *believe* (presuppose to exist as fact). Conduct is the effort to realize as fact what exists in us as ideal.

§ 6. The End of Conduct.

Let us try to determine the end of conduct.

It is a terrible irony to say happiness is the end we ought to pursue.[1] It is a hopeless pursuit. If happiness is the end we may well despair and make pessimism our creed. We may be sure we shall not attain it. The ethical end must be something that we have always to hold before us. As J. S. Mill found, happiness can only be attained by not being directly pursued. This shows it is not the end. If not the end for oneself, *can* one make the happiness of others one's end, and why should one? "Yet happiness is what all do pursue." Is it therefore the end all *ought* to pursue? There is a physical striving for preservation and continuance of life in all animals. Any success in this striving is called happiness. But is this the ideal which determines conduct? Happiness is often best attained by those who forget that an ideal is to be attained.

The end is the Self which has to be realised (*i.e.* God). This self cannot be the self as finite and individual. Thus the end must be an end not for the individual only, but for the self in society—first the family, clan or tribe, then the city or nation, finally humanity. Religion has gone through these stages—first family religion, then national religions, finally world religions. This is the education of the human race.

God thus appears not only as the Creator of the universe, and the Maker of man, but as the Ideal

[1] Happiness or contentment is rather a means to the good life than the end of it. "Happiness is not an end but a means" (Clifford, *Lectures and Essays* (Eversley Edition), Vol. II. p. 158). I have long thought that (I didn't know Clifford had said it)—though perhaps much of the best work in the world comes from (or at least *with*) unhappiness; because much happiness comes from ignorance and indolence, though there is a degree of unhappiness that produces despairing apathy and hinders work altogether (Letter, 1886).

Good to be striven for, and as such reveals himself in humanity. This is especially the Christian doctrine.

§ 7. Free Will.

Is the will free? Not in the sense that each individual human being is an isolated creation. The freedom which is implied in morality is not the mere negative or logical freedom of *either—or*, but the capacity which the individual self has of realizing the universal self. This is the Augustinian or even the Calvinist doctrine of Grace. Our will to do what is right is God's will working in us. Of ourselves (*i.e.* as mere individuals) we can do nothing.

What is meant by "will"? Where *I* (Ego) *will* in the fullest sense, will is necessarily *free* will (self-determination, autonomy of reason); but many acts are done voluntarily (ἑκόντες) in the same sense as by animals, *i.e.* not under external compulsion—wittingly (Cf. Laurie's "attuent"),[1] which are not the outcome of the Ego (will) and therefore are not free.

§ 8. Immortality.

Is the individual soul immortal? Not in the sense that each individual is a necessarily existing atom. The life of the individual is only *in* the universal soul. And surely this is the most Christian doctrine—not an individual immortality irrespective of the will of God, but individual life dependent on his will (his will, of course, not being any arbitrary caprice, but realization of the Good). The individual life may continue, if that is best, or be merged in the universal, if that is best.[2]

Would those whom we consider most deserving of

[1] *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, by Scotus Novanticus, p. 18 *sq.* Cf. *Ethica*, pp. 18, 166 *sq.*

[2] "and *if God choose*
I shall but love thee better after death." E. B. Browning.

immortal life, themselves desire to continue always as individuals, since that would always imply imperfection?

We are apt to forget the *solidarity* of human beings. I as a person, here and now, have in me great part of the lives of many persons. We cannot abstractly separate the man and his acts, and his acts live on in others. He—apart from his particular acts—is the infinite power of realization in the Universal Self (*i.e.* the will of God).

§ 9. God, Freedom, Immortality—Objections.

All these three great questions—the nature of God, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul—depend ultimately, if we put it as a matter of logic, on the relation of the universal to the particular. Different thinkers seem to start from opposite sides. Some filled with a sense of the universal seem to ignore the reality of the particular altogether: others in the particular forget the universal. There seem to be these two opposite tendencies in human nature. Oriental mysticism and Western individualism, Spinoza and Leibniz, may be taken as types.

Any such position as that we have taken is certain to be met by two opposite forms of objection. The orthodox person, of whatever species of orthodoxy, will say: "These are mere logical formulae, instead of a reality. We must have a real God to believe in, and, further, he must be a personal God, whom we can love, and who can love and help us." You are giving us a vague "transcendental" pantheism, instead of the old creeds which have "helped our misery and saved us from sin."[1] On the other hand,

[1] What do people mean by a "personal God"? They mean a God who can be influenced by their entreaties, *i.e.* a God who is not the absolute principle of the universe.

the scientific person (*i.e.* he who has occupied himself mainly with the advancement of our knowledge of nature) will say: "These questions about God, and the soul, and free will, are matters we can know nothing about. Leave them alone, and let men occupy themselves with what they can know and can do." But the difficulty is that men cannot leave these things alone. If we say we have ignored metaphysics, it will always turn out that we have adopted some unconsciously assumed unproved metaphysics. Thus the ordinary Positivism assumes "the individual thing," as a given absolute. The ordinary understanding accepts an unproved Realism, which soon begins to contradict itself, and can be very easily turned over into an extreme subjective idealism or an absolute scepticism.

As to the other set of objections. In every system a formula may be accepted by the intellect, if it is not simply accepted by the memory, and yet may not be applied and lived in in such a way as to become a reality—as a part of the life and character. The profoundest philosophical system is equally exposed to the risk of unintelligent repetition with the shallowest catchwords of the itinerant revivalist: and only life itself, and its experience, and its efforts, can make the grandest doctrines real.

What is meant by Personality? Have those who are constantly using the term ever considered really what it involves? As animals, as material, we human beings are distinct from one another. That does not constitute our personality. In that sense we cannot say that God is a person distinct from us as persons: for then by putting him alongside of us, and ourselves alongside of him, we make him no longer God. As spiritual beings, are we in this way distinct from one another? What is the life of each of us apart from the influence of others and the relations

in which it stands to the lives of others? The person can only exist in a developed political society, which gives him rights and duties. Can we in this sense talk of the personality of God? He is the presupposition of any thought and morality, and cannot therefore be explained in terms derived from these, except metaphysically. Does not the doctrine of the Trinity, as against the abstract Theism of the Jews, reject the conception of personality as inadequate? The doctrine of the Trinity may be thought of as a mere magic puzzle to charm oneself out of hell with, but it may be and has been the greatest of all formulae ever used in the attempt to grasp the relation between the universal and the particular.

If God be thought of only as the Creator, only as the source of all things, there can be no religion except a religion of wonder. But God is also the Son—he reveals himself in man—and man requires our love and service. Lastly, through all the efforts of man moves the Spirit of God, bringing man back to him, or, what is the same thing, manifesting God in man. And this is an eternal process. God for ever is in himself the *same*: for ever he goes out of himself to become *other*: for ever he returns to himself. This is nonsense, it will be said. It represents the sincerest thought of the sincerest men that have ever lived—only torn apart from their lives, which made it real and true. We cannot get rid of mysticism, because the phrases that do well enough in space and time are inadequate with the things of eternity. There the contradictions must meet and be reconciled: the one is many; the universal, particular.

Plato said that "Time was the moving image of eternity." *That* the eternal is we must believe: when we begin to speak about it we slip into the imagery of time.

§ 10. Free-Will and Predestination.

It has often been pointed out that those who have denied most strenuously the freedom of the will have been persons of the very finest and strongest character. This is true not merely of individuals but of races, nations and philosophic and religious sects, *e.g.* the Stoics, Epicureans, Jansenists. "Men are often better than their creeds." There is more in it than that. This might apply—though not so much as people think—to individuals, but will not apply to whole bodies of men. So far the vigour of the Stoic and of the Calvinist is the vigour that comes from being in opposition. The Roman Emperor has no power over the wise man, whose life is guided by Divine Providence alone. The Roman Church cannot shut the gates of heaven in the face of him who is the elect of God, nor save her reprobate favourites from the just jaws of hell. (When predestination becomes a traditional dogma of those who are no longer in opposition, it paralyzes excellence or it is quietly allowed to drop out of sight. The decorous Evangelical preacher has no consistent basis for the doctrines he so ardently proclaims. If election (and its corollary reprobation) are put aside, why is the sinner *entirely* dependent on the grace of God for his salvation? Has not his salvation become his own affair? That he does half and then God does the other half may be a convenient practical escape out of the difficulty but won't satisfy any one who wants to think out the problem.) But the moral strength of the doctrine of predestination is not merely of this negative sort. It is the feeling that this is not my poor human will but the will of the Almighty in me that supplies the strength and firmness which enabled the Puritan to triumph over Church and King. It is an historical argument: it is the decision of "common sense" against the libertarian doctrine.

Real effective will is in its nature universal will. My knowledge is the universal mind knowing itself in me: my conduct is the universal will realizing itself in me. The strongest individual—if individuality be not mere weak rebelliousness—is the most swayed by the universal reason.[1]

Yet how is one to keep oneself from drifting, from the fatalist idea that we are parts of nature? The spirit has to fight with nature and overcome. This is the other element. We *are* not free against the universal will (the Stoic's *Nature*). We ought to seek freedom from the dominion of nature. Freedom is not a fact, nor does it precede morality: it is the ideal, the striving for which is, in one of its aspects, morality. So is it with political freedom—so far as political freedom is a positive good. It must not be the mere abstract uncontrolledness, but must have a content or filling of actual goodness. Can spirit only realize its freedom through struggle? *i.e.* is evil necessary? If spirit is to be *always* free, must there *always* be evil? Martyrdom cannot prove the historical character of alleged facts nor the intellectual value of definitions; although the martyr may have believed those facts or held those definitions. They have affected his character and his life only because of some spiritual truth *connected* with them in his mind. A man may believe that it is his belief that something happened or will happen that affects his whole life and conduct, and yet he may not understand the grounds of his own faith.[2]

[1] Cf. S. Laurie about Prometheus, *Metaphysica*, p. 179. The Christian's God is *with* Prometheus in his struggle and suffering—not against him.

[2] Cf. *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, § 35.

§ 11. Reason or Will.

Reason or will we may name the ultimate universal force, power, manifesting itself everywhere; but it makes a difference which element predominates in our conception.

Reason suggests *end* (good) consciously to be attained. It thus suggests a *final* optimism, a *final* reconciliation, though this *final* stage may always remain a mere *ideal*. Yet all the struggle and effort of life is looked at as in a rational process. From this point of view will is a "moment" of reason.

Will suggests rather merely effort, striving, and may leave out the suggestion of end. This life appears as a blind, unintelligible struggle, purposeless. The misery is certain enough and we are not at a point of view to give any even ideal solution of it. This is pessimism. From this point of view reason is only a "moment" of will. Such solution as there is is only transitory, only artistic. Any *theory* must however have recourse to reason. And thus pessimism can always be *theoretically* refuted. We only know that life is evil because we know a good, by the standard of which we judge it. That good can never be attained by the mere individual as such. Nothing can satisfy our cravings, because we being finite are infinite also. A merely finite nature could be satisfied. A purely infinite nature could not have want (?) This is the truth in Amiel's saying "Ce sont nos plus hautes aspirations que nous empèchent d'être heureux."

§ 12. The Wants of Our Nature.

A belief is not true because it is comfortable. To nourish oneself on dear illusions is hopeless: to attempt to nourish others on them is cruel. Disillusion is inevitable. But does not the fact of a belief being comfortable imply that it is adapted to the wants of our

nature? And if we presuppose a rationality in the system of things must what is adapted to our nature be rational? Yes, but are we so sure that we have discovered what is adapted to our nature? Have we discovered our nature fully? The Jew regarded the coming of a Messiah to liberate his land and restore the glories of the reign of Solomon as the fulfilling of his wants. The Christian (nay even perhaps the greatest Hebrew prophets) saw that that was an illusion and was *not* adapted to satisfy man's highest wants. "My kingdom is not of this world." Are we sure that a reign of Solomon in a future state is what is adapted to our truest nature? The child has its wants, its cravings, its aspirations. It wants unlimited cake and candy, it wants not to go to bed, it wants to be grown up. When he grows up he finds that these are not what satisfy his real nature. Wealth, power, honour, are these the best things for us because the young man desires them? Yes, but there are the goods of the soul—wisdom, goodness, love. Can we have too much of these? And must there not be the opportunity of satisfying our infinite craving for these—if life is not an inexplicable mystery, a cruel game in which we are the helpless pieces? But do we know these goods of the soul rightly?

§ 13. Isolation of the Individual.

"*Whoso increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.*"

Increasing knowledge brings with it increasing sensitiveness and in most cases acuter suffering. Why then should we wish to initiate the happy, or at least the dull, into the great mystery of sorrow which comes to those who think? Why should any one wish to teach the simple Tyrolese peasant or the South Sea savage the sad learning of the civilized man? First, because the child cannot always remain a child. Even those

who look back longingly on the days when there was nothing to do but play may remember how they used to long to be grown up. They are now less happy, but they cannot return and the wisest would not if they could (cf. Aristotle). To *know* is by itself a duty, a necessity, even with loss of animal contentment. Secondly, the chief source of misery to persons of education comes from the frightful loneliness in which they find themselves. The best consolation of life is the sympathy of those whose sympathy is worth having: and the more a person is educated, the fewer are those to whom he can turn with any hope of being understood. The illiterate boor can easily find his like to settle down among, and this keeps him contented.[1] The poet or philosopher is in the wilderness alone. If the general level of education and of intelligence among men and women were raised, it would be more easy to find companions who could understand, sympathize and help. What a bond it is between men to have had a university education—even such a wretched thing as that usually comes to. Suppose all men and women had had a real university education. A great source of unhappiness would have disappeared from the world. The leaders of mankind, the prophets of the race, will always be alone on the mountain tops; but there is a general level of culture to which it should be the endeavour of political and educational reformers that all should have the opportunity of attaining. This is the true Socialism.

The orthodox religionist often says: "Infidels are unhappy: look how much happier we believers are." In his argument from happiness to righteousness he seems to have forgotten the book of Job.[2] But what

[1] This is the reason why emigration is distasteful to the most miserable; they wish to remain among those they know and understand; and why when they do emigrate they can rise, to a certain extent, so much more easily out of the old low level.

[2] Cf. *Cogitatio Metaphysica*, § 36.

he says is true enough. It is the want of fellowship, the forced silence, the want of communion of spirit with spirit, the difficulty of doing good to those who differ about dogmas, that explains the unhappiness of the heretic and unbeliever and explains also the risk of moral decline to which they are exposed. This last risk is due specially to the fact that most women are rigidly orthodox, and their husbands and brothers, whose intellects have been better trained, lose all the moral good that might come from their sympathy. Every soul gained from the net of the priests is the possibility of a new friend. In the meantime we must work in bitterness and solitude "till the time of this tyranny be overpast." The devil was wise to take Christ into the wilderness to tempt him. Loneliness leaves the weakness of the heart exposed, and loneliness amid the multitude of those who do not understand is the worst loneliness of all. Their presence is a mockery because it suggests the semblance of companionship.

It is not that there are few who agree with one's opinions, *that* one can endure; but that there are few to whom one can dare or care to express them. This perpetual repression makes the soul eat itself: it is apt to sour the milk of human kindness.

It is a great gain that those of different religions and sects can associate without burning or damning one another; but they have to avoid doubtful subjects so much that conversation is confined to trivialities. This damages the moral fibre of the intellect.

§ 14. Personality.

"I" the concrete living person am a complex (how?) of the Ego, which is the presupposition of all knowing and being, and certain feelings, ideas, memories, aspirations, etc., which are the product of a long chain of antecedent feelings, etc., in many persons and which—some of which—will continue to operate on succeeding

persons. The Ego is eternal, timeless. These feelings and ideas have their indefinite past and their indefinite future in time. But all those concrete selves —changing constantly—yet so vividly conscious of suffering and sometimes of pleasure; are they only the transitory union of the one (Ego) and the many (feelings, etc.)? The "I" of to-day is different from the "I" of twenty years ago, in the greater part of its actual content, and yet it is the same because of memory. Yet a great part of what I remember in my life is no more *real* to me than things that have been told me and which might have happened in the lives of others as well. It is the past *as* remembered at the moment, and *as affecting* my present mind and character that alone concerns me. The Count Albert (in *Consuelo*) recollected the life of Ziska as if it had been his own and recognized the effects of Ziska's deeds on his own character and environment. Would there have been anything more if *he* had actually been Ziska?[1]

Is not the Ego apart from actual content an abstraction. But the content is impossible as character, etc., without the Ego, *i.e.* the one Ego must manifest (realize) itself in manifold different individuals. Whether or how far these individualities are permanent —to answer that we should need to be above the Ego. We are always driven back on that. It must be for the best, but what is the best? God only knows, as Socrates says in the *Apology*.

[1] What is the evidence of our self-identity? We have no direct knowledge of the Ego (one and permanent) as object. The self we know (the *me*) imperfectly, is a series of thoughts, feelings, volitions. Practically we are to be kept to a permanent self by the pressure of society round us. This helps us (unless we are insane) from getting out of ourself. Body, belongings, etc. (family) keep us together. But as matter of reflective thought, we have to postulate a *one* for the many. Ethically, "person" is an ideal—what we "mean" or "intend" to be. *Unity* (*i.e.* the organization of the many into one) is here an ideal. (From other notes.)

Plants show us in what different ways individuality may exist. Why may not plant life (the vine and its branches) symbolize some union of individuals in an individuality greater than their own? or as we go higher, does *freedom* necessarily imply more complete individuality?

Human beings as we know them are such fragmentary pieces of what we know men *ought* to be, that a mere mechanical putting together of these fragments would look like a solution of the problem to us.

This isolation of the individual is something terrible. "What heart knows another?" "Ah, who knows his own?" Is not this isolation (egoism in thought, feeling, etc.), just the root of all error (Maya) and sin? But we must get rid of it not by flinging ourselves suicidally into the abyss of the One, but by giving our mere self a content from others—appropriating their knowledge, their excellences—nay even their sufferings.

It is easy to prove that all human beings—even the best and greatest—are selfish; but then the selves differ so very much. We come to know that there are other selves ("ejects," Clifford), like ourselves yet different, and that we are in relation to these. Here is the place for morality. To idealize reality as it is to others (not merely to ourselves) is true knowledge: to bring into being a reality (to realize an idea) which is aimed at by others as well as ourselves (a common good) is morality. We come to know our own individuality by knowing that of others. Self and other selves mutually interpret each other. The one eternal self that logic compels us to believe to exist, we know only as existing in manifold different (opposing) selves. Here is the contradiction of individualism with which we are face to face. It is the problem for knowledge, it is also the problem for conduct. For individualism is the puzzle of thought (how can there be more than one self? and yet we only know one by others), and it

is the element of discord—evil, strife—this dreadful isolation of soul. All human civilization is the effort to escape from this.[1] The flight of the hermit from society is his effort to reunite himself to God. Love in all its forms is this effort, fruitless or not, to regain a unity. The evil of lust is that, being a parody of love, it is selfish and isolating. There is a true reason why the same word can be given to the higher form of the sexual instinct and to the feeling of man to God, or of God to himself.[2] Approaching from the side of nature we discover that we, isolated individual animal organisms, are yet members (spiritually) of social organisms. This suggests to us a unity of all mankind (by continuing the analogy). The individual finds his explanation and his true realization only in the whole. Put these two aspects together. *God* is known to us as *man*. That is the only way we can know Him, though that may not exhaust the meaning. Is this Arian heresy?

§ 15. The Universal and the Individual Self.

The metaphysician, starting from the universal reason (Ego), has to explain how this universal comes to be united with (realize itself in) particular human animals in particular times and places. The "naturalist," starting with the animal, is met with the fact that certain animals exhibit phenomena of consciousness which go beyond what can be studied by the methods applicable to the other phenomena of nature (?) The naturalist does not really begin with the individual. It is the species *Homo* that he studies. If he considers

[1] Cf. Buddhism,—escape from the three delusions: "sensuality, ritualism, individuality."

[2] Cf. Spinoza's account of the love of God. Note also the connection, which has often been pointed out, between the religious and the sexual instinct.

individuals, they are only specimens, typical specimens at the best. *Quâ* scientist he cannot really reach the individual. Does not this need metaphysics? Is it not the metaphysician's universal that alone explains the real individual, the self? At least it is only the metaphysician who fairly states the difficulties about the self.

Γνῶθι σεαυτόν; but he who knows himself must know God. To attempt to know self (individual) without God (universal) is to find—the devil. The individual assumed by the psychologist and by the ordinary political and ethical theories is a half-way abstraction of the ordinary understanding, a bastard product of bad metaphysics and bad science. He is neither a mere natural product nor an explained individual. This is the unconscious and often unwitting admission of the truth in the metaphysical view. The Sophistic (Aufklärung) individual has an element of truth about him which is wanting to "the social organism," "the evolution of society," etc. (if these phrases were taken strictly). Society is *made*, according to the social contract theories, by individual wills. Society grows—and is not made. This last claim is not true. Society grows, but not in the same way that the tree grows. H. Spencer, in his puzzle as to what kind of organism he must liken society to, is really face to face with this difficulty; but he does not see it.

§ 16. Religion.

What is religion? "The feeling of dependence." Hegel said that is the religion of a beast. Rather it is the feeling of union. In ordinary knowledge (and ordinary science) we are limited to particulars. When we know God we return to the unity of thought and being. In ordinary action we feel only too well how we are sundered from one another, shut up in our

wretched selves, isolated, lonely: and after all these selves are not really isolated. We know that we are linked in a thousand ways to others; yet we feel our loneliness perhaps all the more, because we are thus made conscious of an ideal of communion from which we have fallen away. Religion is the sense of communion with *all* men through God, *i.e.* through the highest or ideal Good. The "all" is the distinctive mark of Christianity, the democratic religion. Religion involves thought, feeling, conduct (will), all our nature, yet we define it as feeling, because mere thought, even about the matters of religion, is not yet religion. Conduct unless tinged with the emotion that is religious is not yet religion.

Worship (Cultus) is merely an external symbol in which this feeling of union may be more or less represented. It is with a true instinct that the Christian Church has made its chief act of worship *Communion*, communion with God and with men, with the living and with the dead; with angels and archangels, principalities and powers. The Mass is the grandest form of worship that has ever grown up, if only the idolatry and the wretched materialism could be knocked out of it.

§ 17. Evolutionary Fatalism.

The evolutionist tends to a sort of fatalism. We must find what is in nature and follow it. "Natura non nisi parendo vincitur" said Bacon, but the obedience is made more prominent by the modern evolutionist than the conquering. Find out what the law of progress is and submit. Don't meddle lest you hinder, says Spencer. How can *you* meddle, how can *you* hinder?

If we approach the study of man from the side of nature, we see in the individual only a "complex animal" whose actions are the result of inherited instincts and the influence of his environment (cf.

Maudsley),[1] and in the nation only a social organism whose life is in the same way conditioned by phenomena (natural events) in the past and by the physical environment of the present. But in the individual there is present a consciousness of self (this alone makes the study of man possible), an "I" which puts before itself ends to be attained and which does so more and more the higher the type of individual we are considering. In the nation, or, if any one objects to this as mere figurative personification, let us say, in its most prominent and typical men, there is present a political consciousness of ends to be attained: and this all the more the higher the nation is in the scale of progress. History is the struggle for freedom from fate. This consciousness which makes knowledge possible is not to be figured as a mere passive receiver of impressions. That is a *Vorstellung* into which we are apt to slip (*e.g.* in the words "impression," *tabula rasa*, etc.), but which implies a theory that we have not proved and that would make knowledge inexplicable. The consciousness which makes knowledge possible already implies activity. There is effort in the framing of conceptions. The higher the advance of knowledge, the more effort there is to create (or recreate) the world for ourselves: not merely to let a series of pictures pass before our idle eyes. Thus it is not first in the realm of conduct that we need to explain the activity of reason. The unconscious, the blind, is that against which we have to fight, or rather it is that which we have to overcome, to make our own.

The Radical, who looks for the voice of the people to guide his policy, is accused of a sort of fatalism also. But is the voice of the people the same as the process of nature? "No, something much more foolish," it may be said. In reality they are not comparable.

[1] Article in *Mind*, O.S. Vol. 12.

The process of nature = "what is"; a law of nature is what, under certain conditions, will be. The voice of the people = a want, an inspiration or demand for what is not, what ought to be. History may show that pursuit of foreign conquest and neglect of trade lead to national bankruptcy, that persistent refusal of political liberties produces discontent and ends in revolution, that a long enslaved people are less capable of using political liberty than those who are accustomed to it, etc. So far the statesman may study politics as a *science* which states what under certain conditions is or will be, and must adapt his practical measures accordingly; but all this does not yet determine what ought to be, *e.g.* whether it is not better to keep a people uneducated and unfree and happy rather than to educate them, liberate them and make them discontented. That implies reference to what ought to be. (Is the end happiness or self-realization?) Again science may say such and such a nation is happier, more stable, more highly developed; it does not say which is *best*.

The doctrinaire political savant, looking on from outside, must bring a ready formulated conception of the end by which to judge the condition and prospects and needs of a people. The people themselves, however, supply the content of their ideal, and the wise statesman is he who finds that for which they are groping. Thus it is hopeless to argue on utilitarian grounds against a sentimental demand for national independence, if the ideal of nationality has once really taken possession of a people. The volcano does not aspire to an eruption: it erupts. A people doesn't merely revolt: it aspires to revolution. The tree grows: the nation knows that it is growing; its leaders know clearly how.

How far can a people gets its thinking done for it by a few? The blinder, the less conscious a people

is, the more the policy appears to be entirely the work of the few. But even the benevolent despot is dependent on what the people wills. Frederick the Great did more than Joseph II.—not merely because he was the stronger man, but because his people were more with him. Henry VIII. was really more a tyrant than Charles I.; but he had the people with him.

§ 18. Society and the State.

How does Society become differentiated from the State? Society in the mediaeval states was a survival from the Roman Empire and from the primitive Teutonic political (social) institutions, and it was the product of the Church, with its idea of the community of Christendom.

Clergy—nobles—knights—serfs, these were society classes and were irrespective of the *states*. Society apart from the state tends to cleave into horizontal sections running through the different nations. It is only political reasons that link together noble, merchant, and peasant. The state must bring about the fusion of society. This non-political society ("family," "church," "le beau monde," "capitalism," "proletariate,") is anarchical and tyrannous. The state must override these organizations for the good of the individuals (for the good of *all* individuals ultimately), thus becoming the instrument of humanity.[1]

If by social links (apart from political) we mean those of the family, the clan, friendship, associations

[1] Say: Social divisions are horizontal; political divisions are vertical. Hence the rise of the modern nations meant a struggle with caste, which rendered monarchical despotism possible and necessary. The "absolute" monarch was at first the sovereign *independent* of others (Emperor, Pope). Afterwards (cf Clarendon—the English king "free and absolute") came the struggle with his own nation, *i.e.* to determine where (legal) sovereignty (on its internal side) lay. (The actual sovereign is always the "*moi commun*," but this was dormant and unexpressed at first.)

for purposes of business, science, religion,[1] pleasure, then these links have often been strongest (at least have been most conspicuous) where the state has been relatively weak, fallen into decay (as in the later times of Hellenic civilization) or not yet fully developed (as in the mediaeval period). When the unity and sovereignty of the state have come to be strongly asserted, many of these social links become more merged in the political. Thus we have national churches, national universities,—instead of a Church running through all Christian nations, instead of a number of universities (founded by Papal Bulls) where, especially by the help (as in the case of the Church) of the Latin tongue, the one republic of scholarship was more conspicuous than the diversity of nations.[2] *Society* is cosmopolitan (in the sense of supranational) only among the upper classes, the nobility, who in many countries are cut off from the real political life of the nation,[3] and among those of the working classes who are discontented with the institutions of their several countries. The great bulk of society is conditioned markedly by national differences. Trade, commerce is a great non-national link; but this is mere competition of individuals and the morality (ἦθος), such as it is, of commercial life is supplied by national influences (*e.g.* laws as to partnership, bankruptcy, etc.).

Question: Will world trade ever help to make a world state possible?—to create the demand for it?

Can we regard society as an organism independent

[1] Religious associations have, however, generally been part of the political, except where the religion is supra-national.

[2] The "*Nationes*" were divisions of the students of the Universities. Nowadays an English scholar is more separated from a German than in the Middle Ages. Cf. an *English* churchman, etc.

[3] The English nobility, being more political—a peerage—are less cosmopolitan.

of the state? Is it not in the main the survivals of ruined states[1] or the adumbration of possible future states?[2] Economic relations seem to be different. [They are characteristically supranational, governed by laws which are, in the main, independent of state boundaries.] Are they then the *δύναμις* of a world-state? The opposition to Free Trade will then be the struggle of the separate states against absorption [in a world-state as the result of economic forces].

The state *seems* to be separable from society because it is explicitly formulated, as a rule, whereas society needs to be discovered and is not always easy to discover. The state may be expressed more or less in a constitution written or expounded by publicists and thus *seems* something artificial. Society is there as a fact, not a formula, and thus seems natural. But this [distinction between society as natural and the state as artificial] is an unreal abstraction.

§ 19. Dialectic of Conduct: Conflict of Duties.

Conflict of duties—even conflict between a duty recognized by general custom or authoritatively commanded and some maxim of "self-realization" (*joie de vivre*)—shows want of organization in ethical system and points to a reform. *E.g.* the conflict between "family" and "state" (Antigone) shows a defective social structure; so with class-conflicts; so with "religion" *v.* "state"; "smaller state" (tribe, city, nation) *v.* "wider state" (empire, federal state); so even with brigandage (survival of an older tribal

[1] Hellenic world, Roman Empire: Papacy: U.S.A. as Colonies of England: Canada West as Colonies of France: South American Republics as Colonies of Spain, etc.

[2] An Anglo-Saxon community: German society before the German Empire: Italian society before united Italy: the Latin peoples of Europe: the Slavonic peoples, etc.

stage); wild outbursts of licentiousness, which are so far a protest against the puritan prohibition of cakes and ale; and the rowdiness of factory hands, which indicates a want of healthy outlet. If all the good were on one side, all the evil on the other (as the ascetic or fanatic thinks), life would be simpler. Even the kinds of acts incompatible with any social wellbeing or continuance or progress—the outcome of hereditary defects (as in the case of criminal lunatics) or of bad surroundings—point to social reorganization, including care for the race and (exclusion) of the unfit.

Prof. S. S. Laurie (*Ethica*, 117, 119) argues (1) There is no *obligation* to promote the happiness (= well-being?)[1] of society (yet he allows that philanthropy is the special vocation of certain individuals); (2) (pp. 118, 119), he argues that duties to the immediate circle are always to be preferred to those to the wider. Would not this condemn some of the greatest of mankind? Does not the difference in men's *vocation* extend to this also? Should Socrates have waited until he had made Xanthippe quite comfortable and happy before he went about convincing men of ignorance and drawing down on himself a prosecution for impiety? Should Jesus have returned at once with his mother instead of repelling her rather coldly as he did?[2]

Roman Catholic moralists shadow forth a truer system with their distinction between different degrees of obligation. Professor Laurie's argument assumes that the family and other social institutions that immediately surround a man are ultimate and absolutely final forms of the spirit. Does not the same apply to the man who feels that his vocation is to be a poet or an artist? Is he not sinning against the Holy

[1] And he has distinguished it from pleasure.

[2] "Who is my mother?" St. Luke ii. 48, 49; St. Matthew xii. 47-50. Cf. St. Matt. *x.* 34-37, "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me."

Ghost if he denies the "call" in order to provide for the comfort of a family circle? Of course it is a question of degree. A man may not be justified in neglecting a mother (still less a wife and children) for the sake of art; but he may rightly secure less of the external goods of life for them in order to secure more of the higher goods for himself and mankind. These conflicts of duties and the terrible sacrifices they involve (*e.g.* if a singer loses her voice because she nurses a sick mother) point to the instability of the economic structure of society. Yet in a socialistic state will there not be a difficulty in distinguishing real merit and promise from sham? Might there not be a fear of an artist with new and heretical ideas receiving no support from the official directors of art? But would he be worse off than at present? He might have to support himself by some trade, practising his art only in his leisure; but then his leisure will be longer and his trade exercised under no degrading conditions. The "amateur" might always hope through receiving some support from the voice of many judges—if he had real merit there would always be some to appreciate—to be recognized as an artist of the community and allowed to work for it. Besides are not art and imaginative literature, where originality comes in, just those pursuits which can be exercised along with other pursuits? The historian must give up his whole days for successful research: the poet may sing while walking home from his workshop. The artist may rise an hour earlier to draw. What is wanted here is that ordinary drudgery shall not occupy too long hours and degrade the mind. And this is exactly what the socialist hopes to attain.

There must be examinations to determine capacity for attainments of some particular kind, rather than to test past attainments. There will be less freedom perhaps in some ways in the choice of unsuitable

studies and professions; but more freedom in their exercise.

§ 20. Position of the Social Reformer.

It is absurd to say to the socialist, living, say on the profits of a capitalist business or on the interest of invested money: "You are not sincere in living in this way, holding such doctrines as you do. You should give it to the community." "Yes, but where is the community?" he could answer "I am convinced of the hopelessness and uselessness and mischief of your endless private charities. I shall only do harm if I give all my goods to feed the poor. When the state claims *all* capital, I shall surrender mine." Of course it would be insincerity if the said socialist were a Stock Exchange speculator and spent his life in idleness. If he is helping to propagate his ideas, he is living as a good citizen of the commonwealth of the future. The means of such propagandism may be chosen differently by different individuals. A certain amount of "jesuitism" may be quite allowable.

But it is hard, very hard, to live in one century with the ideas of another. And in the exact degree of compromise allowable there will be constant differences of opinion and much self-torment.

It is hard to interest one's self profoundly in the carrying out of reforms which one knows must be only provisional makeshifts. Would it not be better, if there is a future life, to return to this poor world and see how it is getting on, and reap some of the good (and evil) of what we have done in it—than to be transplanted somewhere else away from what we have interested ourselves in? Is it only our ideas that come back, live on—the foolish ones and the wicked ones, let us hope, dying out of themselves? Would not Moses dying on Pisgah have preferred to awake again beside the tabernacle of God in the promised

land, or to enter the courts of the temple with Solomon rather than to live in a far away heaven with Abraham? Whether would the earnest worker for his people (the prophet) prefer the company of his grandfathers or his grandchildren? Surely the latter, if he has really faith in what he works for; he would not wish to be gathered to his fathers, whatever the sluggard or the antiquarian may choose. It would be better to bring back all the grandfathers to help the grandchildren. Does this only mean that the reformer should have reverence for history?

Maudsley regards prophets and reformers as maniacs What a much more awful place the world would be it every one were sane!

The Universal Reason works unconsciously, and in some cases *immediately*. That is inspiration. The highly reflective and conscious mind is less capable of action. The man who can see the many sides of a question *does* less than he who is absorbed in gazing on one. The initiator must be narrow, and will appear exaggerated to those who enjoy quietly the results of what he did. The new reformers must have an opposite exaggeration. The admiration of a stereotyped reformation is of all things the most absurd. It is like a fossil change—a petrified river—and a river is only petrified by being frozen, and will easily melt.

There is no need of constructing an artificial conservatism. The tendency to observe the customary is strong enough already in human nature. But there is a gain in making a smooth channel for progress to run in.

§ 21. The Significance of Martyrdom.

In what sense of the preposition "of" are the martyrs of Christianity the more numerous? Contrast the "martyrdom" of a Christian under the Roman Empire and that of a philosopher or heretic at the hands of the

"Christians." The Christian, (say a slave of a long enslaved, a conquered race) brought face to face with the awful majesty—but a quite material, undisguised, quite intelligible majesty—of force and law, refuses to burn incense before the statue of the very human master of the legions. He believes that this terrestrial power will soon pass away; he has no sympathy with it. He looks forward to a speedy overthrow, a terrible retribution. (Cf. Tertullian.) So far he is like a Russian Nihilist. Moreover he has the personal hope of a heavenly crown. He is a slave, despised, down-trodden here: he will be before the throne of God with the elect in heaven. The balance of pleasure is clearly on the side of martyrdom. The heretic is resisting all the influences under which he has been brought up. These are solemn, appealing not to the eye but to the heart and the imagination. They are sanctified by long association to himself and those dear to him. He knows the strength of the ecclesiastical organization that is arrayed against him. He is under no illusions about its tremendous hold on the minds of men. He knows that, with his talents and knowledge, a safe and honourable career would be open to him among men. He might be a bishop, a cardinal, a pope, a doctor, a saint. In the opinion of those who have brought him up he is casting away his hopes in the next world. He has perhaps no sure belief in a future recompense for himself: the triumph of his cause is very distant and must come very gradually. Yet for what he believes to be truth—for that alone he dies. Which martyrdom testifies most to the truth of the opinions of the martyr? There may be a greater testimony to truth in the mere refusal of an honest and intelligent man to enter the church than in the excited devotee running towards the lions in the arena.

Contrast the eloquent preacher pleading the cause of a theological dogma in a grand cathedral, beautiful,

sublime, hallowed by long associations, after a service solemn and impressive with thrilling music, lights, gorgeous vestments, intoxicating incense—and on the other side the critic expounding his objections in the bare lecture room or addressing the listless reader through the dull printed page. In which case do we require to be most on our guard against deception? The testimony of martyrs is to "truth"; but *not* of matters of fact. The Girondists' noblest act of faith was their perishing in the name of liberty. Yet they bear no testimony to the truth of the stories about Lycurgus or Numa Pompilius which they believed. They do bear testimony to the moral value of the republican idea.

The impressions which are roughly put down as the impressions made by religion are really very mixed. Art, historical association, family and national sympathy, reminiscences of childhood, the presence of friends, the remembrance of the dead, the pleasantness of a comely habit, all contribute.

When people come back to the religion of their youth, this does not prove the truth of the dogmas of that religion, but only the power of early associations over sentiment. It is the fact that prayers were said at a mother's knee or at a father's grave rather than the substance of those prayers that draws back the repentant unbeliever.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

ON THE METHOD AND SCOPE OF ETHICS

§ 1. Moral Philosophy and Science.

It is constantly objected to moral philosophy at the present day that it is unprogressive, and that it presents an unfavourable contrast to the various sciences of nature. It is therefore a widely spread and generally accepted opinion that moral philosophy can only advance "by becoming scientific; by adopting the methods of science"—by "giving up its pretensions to a special method of its own."[1]

Thus the very name "moral philosophy" tends to fall into disfavour and discredit and to be superseded by "moral science."

Let us consider first the supposed contrast between philosophy and science.

Is it true that the sciences of nature progress by a steady accumulation of facts? There is no doubt a steady accumulation of facts. But what is a fact? A fact is a fossil theory (*e.g.* sunrise, considered as a

[1] "By an extension of all those parts which can be treated by the methods available in the sciences of nature and by a complete elimination of those parts which are infected with metaphysics and lay claim to a special method of their own."

[Cf. L. Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 4 *sq.*, 450, and A. E. Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, Ch. 1.]

"fact," implies the discarded theory that the sun goes round the earth, while in reality the earth goes round the sun); but the history of the sciences consists in the continual upsetting of less adequate or even erroneous theories by more adequate. Even an erroneous theory may have served a good purpose in helping us to connect together facts otherwise isolated and so to get a better view of them, and in a progressive age, if it does become crystallized in a dogma, it leads to its own overthrow by a better theory.

Take as an illustration the interpretation of a book. This interpretation certainly grows as time goes on, so that the latest commentary should contain more truth about the book than the earliest; but this growth is not properly represented as a continuous accumulation of "facts." Every fresh piece of interpretation is a theory; and more adequate theories should supplant less adequate. A great deal of the *waste* in scholarship comes from the unscientific way and inconvenient methods by which scholars proceed and from their expression in turn requiring interpretation. Then too, supposed "facts" are not always facts, *e.g.* the reading on which current interpretations are based may turn out to be a wrong one; some grammatical or historical parallel may have to be discarded as mistaken. So too it is with the difficult book of nature; with this important advantage that nature is still being written before our eyes and so we have a perpetual analogy by which to test and check our interpretation of the old.[1]

It may be admitted at once that every branch of human knowledge must be "scientific" and must endeavour to proceed always by scientific methods. This is in fact an almost identical proposition. It is an etymological quibble to say that knowledge is science. The double nature of our language has

[1] This is true even in sciences like geology and palaeontology.

allowed a convenient differentiation of terms by which it is as well to abide. Science is systematic knowledge. Philosophy must also be systematic; but it does not therefore follow, without further proof, that the kind of knowledge and the kind of system at which philosophy aims must be the same or must be pursued by the same methods as those which have proved successful in extending our knowledge of nature. The methods applicable in the science of geometry are not applicable in the science of chemistry, nor those of chemistry in that of biology; and it is an assumption which requires proof and is contrary to this analogy that the methods of geometry or chemistry or biology should be applicable in ethics and politics.

The temptation and attempt to transfer the methods which have proved successful in some other sciences to the study of man as a social being are not new. When the Pythagoreans defined justice as a square number, they were applying the conceptions of geometry to ethics and were doing so with the purpose of making ideas about humanity "scientific" and lifting them above the level of "proverbial philosophy."[1] Similarly Plato applied mathematical conceptions to metaphysics. In the 17th century the advances made in mathematics exercised a similar fascination over those who applied themselves to the study of mankind, such as Hobbes, to whom the knowledge of geometry came like a revelation.[2]

[1] They defined justice as *ἀριθμός ἰσακίς ἴσος* (*τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*) and evil as *τὸ ἄπειρον* (infinite in the mathematical sense).

[2] "He was forty years old before he looked on geometry—saw Euclid's elements in a library, lying open at I. 47." So he reads the proposition. "By God," says he, "this is impossible." Then he read the demonstration and was convinced of its truth. "This made him in love with geometry." It was after Hobbes had left Oxford that Savile founded his professorships of geometry and astronomy: when they were founded "not a few of the gentry kept their sons away from the University, not to have them smitted with the black

Spinoza forced his metaphysical and ethical thinking into a geometrical mould of definitions, axioms and demonstrations, which his warmest intelligent admirers consider his chief demerit.

These were delusions from which Aristotle was free (*Eth.* I. 8).

The analogy of chemistry influenced those moralists who applied the association of ideas to solve all difficulties in psychology and ethics.[1]

The great science of the present day is biology, and the biological watchwords of organism and evolution have been applied to solve all the difficulties in the study of human society. Society is not an artificial compound, it is an organic growth; conscience is not a sum of component parts, nor merely a chemical compound of different elements, but is evolved by the action of the environment on the individual. Moral laws can thus be assimilated to laws of nature; goodness can be regarded as moral health. Morality is adequately determined as the *health* of the social organism.

art" (à Wood). Croom Robertson's *Hobbes*, pp. 31, 32. Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Pt. I. ch. 5. p. 29), assumes that philosophy must begin like geometry with definitions. Cf. Pt. II. ch. 21. (p. 161). "The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as in Tennis Play) in practice only."

[1] Mackintosh (*Ethical Dissertation*, pp. 258, 259, 260) constructs a chemical theory of conscience. The phrase mental chemistry (cf. Hartley?) is used in Ward's article on P*sychology* in *Enc. Brit.*, also in Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*. Cf. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 219; and J. S. Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 160: "It thus appeared that both Macaulay and my father were wrong; the one in assimilating the method of philosophising in politics to the purely experimental method of chemistry; while the other, though right in adopting a deductive method, had made a wrong selection of one, having taken as the type of deduction, not the appropriate process, that of the deductive branches of natural philosophy, but the inappropriate one of pure geometry, which, not being a science of causation at all, does not require or admit of any summing up of effects."

In all this there is a great degree of truth. The study of human conduct and society has gained in many ways from the application to it of the same methods of systematic research which have been applied to the facts of nature. Even analogies and metaphors, which when pushed too far are misleading, have been useful in counteracting narrowness and exaggeration of a different sort.[1] As a protest against the merely literary or rhetorical treatment of philosophical questions, there may even be some excuse for the affectation of mathematical or quasi-mathematical formulae, which are in favour with some writers; yet these are apt to prove as deceptive as quotations from the "classical poets," without the merit of being sometimes ornamental.[2] But it must be noticed what assumptions are made in such a scientific treatment of ethics and politics (taking these for the present together). (1) It is overlooked that the fact of consciousness introduces an element which completely differentiates the social from the physical organism—as completely *at least* as the fact of life differentiates the organic from the inorganic. It is assumed that consciousness is *sufficiently* explained as itself the product of the unconscious stages of life: it is *ignored* that consciousness is already presupposed in all attempts to explain it into what is other than itself. (2) It is ignored that an historical account of the order in which facts have presented themselves still leaves unsolved and unsettled the question about the value or worth of these facts.

[3] "Origin does not determine validity (worth)." The popular superstition is that it does; and the same

[1] Take, as a test, what the methods of biology have done for philology. In language we have partly unconscious and partly conscious growth. So it is analogous to institutions and customs.

[2] The quasi-mathematical formulae of Lotze in his *Logic* are an instance of this.

[3] From a letter (1886).

assumption is often made by philosophers who limit themselves to the methods of the special sciences (*e.g.* Spencer). We see this in the question often asked about a person—not "What is *he*?" but "Who is his father?" So people think that, if it is shown that man (as an animal organism) has been developed out of lower animal forms, or all organic existence out of the inorganic, the dignity and value of human nature is thereby lowered. Hence the prejudice against Darwin's theory. In the same way a science of religions, which traces all religions back (in time) to the low forms of animism or fetishism prevailing among Australian and African savages, is thought to destroy all the validity of the highest religions; and even such a liberal and "unorthodox" thinker as Max Müller wished to make out that the original religion of mankind (at least of the Aryan race) was a comparatively high monotheism, such as he finds in the Indian Vedic hymns, lower forms being degradations of this. (This is just a survival of the myth of the Golden Age, the Garden of Eden, etc., even in a scientific and learned mind). So too Maclennan's theories, which trace back the institution of marriage to a very barbarous form of capturing females of another tribe, are put aside by Maine as true only of "occasional degradations," and are regarded by an old friend of mine as "too shocking" to be mentioned in his notes to the *Politics*. All this comes from confusing *origin* with *nature* (*character*). Now the same applies in theories of knowledge and morals. The scientific psychologist traces back all knowledge to *sensations* (rightly or wrongly): the physiologist traces back these sensations to their physical source, and so on. It is absurd and "bad metaphysics" when these scientific explanations of what happens as events in time are met by theories of "innate ideas," as if babies had a ready-made theory of logic in their heads. It was Kant's great service to take the philosophical

question about the nature of knowledge out of this psychological controversy. He urged that the possibility of knowledge *logically* requires the presence to sensations of a comparing and distinguishing self-consciousness. And this logical necessity remains unaffected by scientific explanations of the history of the gradual development of consciousness in the individual and of the gradual increase of intelligence in the race. So in morals, the fact that morality exists *logically* implies the presence to feelings and thoughts of an idea (or ideal) of duty ("ought"). Science and history may show how mankind have changed and developed their ideas of what their duties are; but the bare idea of "ought," of an ideal of some sort, is presupposed in any action directed to an end.[1]

(3) It is assumed that the laws with which ethics has to deal are of the same kind as the laws discovered by the student of nature. A law of nature is a statement of what as a fact *is*, or rather, since all science involves abstraction from the complicated detail of actual existence, of what *tends to be*, *i.e.* of what under certain conditions would be. The necessity of natural law is best expressed by the hypothetical judgment, "If A is, B is." A moral law is commonly understood to imply an expression of what *ought to be*, of an ideal, and to be properly formulated only as a "categorical imperative." A law of nature cannot be broken, it can only be illustrated: a precept based on a law of nature may be. A law of morals, like a law in the political sense, can

[1] What in ethics is parallel to our procedure in the sciences of nature, *e.g.* to explain what elements Christianity has brought into our ethical ideal, differentiating it from the Greek, etc.,—this is a question of causation. But how there can be an ethical ideal—that is a problem for metaphysics. The content of the moral judgment at any given time is a matter of fact to be discovered. But what is the nature of the moral judgment as such,—what are its subject and predicate,—and its relation to other judgments, is a question for metaphysics. Cf. p. 282.

be broken. The man who dies after eating poisonous food does not violate the laws of physiology: he exemplifies them. The man who murders another violates the moral law, and, in a civilized community, he violates the law of the land also. Were we to formulate a moral law, "If you do this, you will be hanged (or damned),"[1] in order to obliterate the difference, the difference is not really removed. For the law is violated even if for any reason punishment may not follow upon its violation. On the other hand, "punishment for violating the laws of nature" is a metaphorical and inaccurate expression for the unpleasant consequences, which in the ordinary course of nature necessarily (unless counteracting causes intervene) follow upon certain acts.

If it is said: "The moral law is what the good man *does*," then the good man is the man as he "ought to be." If you define the good man as the man who has completely adjusted his character to the health of the social organism, that may be denied, for the best man may be much better than the social organism in which he finds himself, and may be the man who adjusts himself to an *ideal* social organism. So that the "ideal" must come in somehow.[2]

It thus appears that ethics must be separated from the sciences of nature, if we are led (1) to recognize consciousness as more than a mere product of the unconscious, (2) to recognize the conception of "ought" as other than a particular form of "is." If these differences are valid, the methods of the natural sciences, even of the most complex, are not completely adequate for the study of ethics. We hope to show that these two points are really the same. The recognition of

[1] Cf. Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, p. 440: "Murderers are liable to hanging."

[2] See Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 137 ff., p. 438 ff., H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I. p. 271—"law of the perfect man."

them constitutes the metaphysic of ethics. And our contention is that no method of treating ethics is likely to advance the study which does not fully recognize this metaphysical basis.

§ 2. Moral Philosophy and Psychology.

A generation ago, before the influence of the epoch-making book of this age, Darwin's *Origin of Species*, had been so widely felt, the question "How can ethics become progressive?" would have been more generally answered in this country: "by being based on psychology." And there are very many writers and thinkers who would still give this answer, either alone or combined with the previous one. Among those who have not been influenced by evolution, the "sensationalist" or experientialist philosophy of English writers from Locke to J. S. Mill and the intuitionalist philosophy of the so-called Scottish school (Martineau) agree in insisting that ethics must be based on psychology. But such an answer settles very little. Psychology is a region of debateable ground as much as ethics. In fact the disputed questions of ethics have generally been read back into psychology, whilst professedly they were being solved by an application of psychological theories. What is the proper method for psychology? is the question that requires consideration, nay, whether there is a science of psychology at all, in the sense in which we talk of the science, say, of physiology. Is psychology, as it has been called, "a cross between bad metaphysics and imperfect physiology"? It seems very simple to say psychology is the science of the functions of the mind, just as physiology is the science of the functions of the body; but this assumes a parallelism between mind and body, which, though it may be convenient and though it may be valid, is a piece of metaphysics that requires vindication or at least requires express recognition. This assumption of

"mind" as parallel to body leads to all sorts of metaphors being tacitly adopted as facts. The mind is made a substance with qualities and attributes. It is represented as an organism with structure and functions. Such forms of expression are legitimate enough, if it be constantly borne in mind that they are only metaphors and conventional terms; and they are in fact unavoidable, but must be used with due caution and certainly not made the basis of *argument*. Thus that our minds are individually distinct from one another and yet resemble one another is true; but it is an assumption, which we have no right to make without proof, that this distinction and this resemblance are of the same kind as that between our bodies. The difference between one individual animal organism and another is obvious enough. They are spatially distinct objects; but the difference between one mind and another cannot be so expressed, and it is as much an assumption to say that our minds are all different from one another and that the metaphysician is bound to start with that, and then, if he can, to go on to prove their identity, as it is to say that as I am only conscious of self, identity of consciousness is what we ought to start with—difference being a matter to be proved afterwards, if at all. Again, the anatomist may take any body which is not incomplete, dissect it and assume safely that he knows about the human body in general; but the psychologist is not equally justified in assuming that his analysis of his own mental organization will be applicable to the human mind in general. The difference between the mental organization of the savage and the civilized man is greater than that between black and white skin, and cannot even be stated without a reference to the history of society.

To look into one's own mind and observe what goes on there seems a very simple operation until it is tried; but the mind is at once the subject and the object of the

experiment, and the full success of the experiment is defeated by the psychological fact that the more consciousness is concentrated on observing what is happening in the mind the less there will be to observe. Reflection and strong emotion, for instance, are inconsistent. The mind cannot vivisect itself. If it is replied that memory makes up for this defect, it must be pointed out that the representation of a feeling in memory is something very different from the feeling as felt—a difference which the "association" school have been apt to forget. Of course there is a sense in which the moral philosopher cannot dispense with psychology, but it must be a psychology (1) which is conscious of its metaphysical basis and (2) which is not limited to the observation of what goes on in the individual mind, but is extended to a study of ideas and feelings as expressed in language, customs, institutions, etc., ("the large letters").[1]

§ 3. The Unity of Self-Consciousness in Relation to Moral Philosophy.

In the doctrine or phrase, "the relativity of knowledge," is implicitly involved a recognition of the central point of modern metaphysics. Whatever we think away or leave out, we cannot as a fact leave out the self that thinks. This is the permanent value of Descartes's formula, "Cogito ergo sum," and it is at the same time the main and most important doctrine of Kant—that it is only the unity of self-consciousness which makes knowledge possible.[2] All attempts to derive this self or ego, or whatever we choose to call it, from series of sensations associated together imply a *hysteron proteron*. It is already presupposed in the possibility of sensations forming a series *for* a self. Of course all that is thus

[1] Cf p. 281.

[2] Is not this Kantian doctrine simply the "relativity of knowledge" taken seriously?

presupposed is only the bare, naked "I," not the concrete person who has a history in time and whose history can only be traced by a study of particular facts. The individual, so far from being the simplest, is the extreme of complexity. This "transcendental" Ego (*i.e.* this Ego whose existence we have to assume in order to make experience possible) is only the possibility of the various empirical Egos and shows itself as a particular person only in a definite environment, physical and social. The logical necessity under which we are of asserting *that* the Ego is, and of asserting also that since time exists for the Ego, the Ego cannot be merely in time,[1] does not allow us to go on, as the opponents of the "experience" school are too prone to do, to make any *a priori* assertions about the nature of the personality of man nor about the nature of God. Still less from the recognition of the unity of self-consciousness as the necessary presupposition of time, can we jump at once, as some defenders of the faith would wish to do, to a defence of the 39 Articles against all heretics. The critical examination of the conditions of knowledge shows that there must be present to every particular experience a unity of self-consciousness which is not itself in time. Yet the self we know about has most certainly had an existence in time past, has come to be what it now is and goes on changing: it *is* a series of particular experiences. And yet this series of experiences implies a unity. Now it is in this seeming contradiction that we find the second element in the metaphysical basis of ethics. This combination of an eternal (*i.e.* timeless) self and a self which has a history in time, of a permanent unity with a changing multiplicity, gives us the very conception we are seeking as an explanation of morality,

[1] Will this view about *time* hold? What can we know of anything apart from time? Therefore the process must show itself as in time. V. *infra*.

viz. the conception of an ideal, of an "ought." Logic tells us that this permanent and infinite "*is*" must (logically) be: our own experience tells us it *is not*. Thus it is what *ought to be*, what must (ethically) be, what is striving for realization—the end or good to which all effort, blindly or not, is directed.

This proof seems to me irrefutable. Yet doubtless the doctrine is formulated in a way that will be repellent to many. On the mere words I would wish to lay no special stress.

Let anyone start from the side of personal examination of his own experience, and he will find evidence enough of the double nature of our personality—the torment of our lives and the source of all that is best and noblest in what mankind is and does. "I condemn myself." "My better self reproaches me." We seem to mean something by these expressions. But what is this better self? Let us make the hypothesis that it is the principle of good that operates in all, and that *that* is *somehow* identical with the *ultimate* principle logic obliges us to recognize in the universe. "A mere hypothesis," you will say; but a hypothesis which, once admitted, seems to explain what otherwise is inexplicable. Now this hypothesis we have tried to show is no mere hypothesis but itself a logical necessity.

Everywhere a struggle, a striving, a groaning and a travailing. Where is the secret of it all? Can we find it in the lowest? Look at the highest, the striving of the most highly developed human beings. What are they seeking? Why are they discontented? They are discontented because of their terrible loneliness. Union is what they seek, a union of heart and soul. It is what the highest have often most difficulty in finding. Only in others can a man realize himself. This is the source of national aspirations. This is the source of passionate love, of ardent religion, nay, even of the mystic ecstacy that prompts to withdrawal

from the dreary wilderness of commonplace human society.

That we are one with "the reason of things" makes a knowledge of nature possible: that we are one with our fellow beings makes morality and society possible. To fill up this mere formal unity, to realize it in all its complex detail, that is the endeavour of all science, of all morality.

Is the fact of pain enough to explain the presence of an ideal? ("To get rid of pain." "How?") *Yes*, as a matter of history. But *logically* the good must explain the bad.

But just as the self which is logically presupposed in all knowledge is only the bare form of self and receives its actual content from events which happen in time and are known in experience, so this *end* or *good*, which is the realization of the self, is, as *a priori*, as the condition of morality, only the bare form of the good and receives its actual content from events which happen in time and are known in experience. Thus to base ethics on metaphysics does not exclude nor dispense us from the trouble of studying the facts of experience, but the very reverse. It shows us the necessity of filling up the empty form we start with by looking to all the available facts and using all available methods of study, without being the slave of any. It might be said, then, if the question be looked at merely as a debate between two opposing schools: Why make so much noise about so small a matter? If the *a priori* theory amounts to nothing more than a few initial phrases and the whole hard work remains to be done by the same study of facts in which the empiricist is already engaged, what advantage is offered by a metaphysical introduction to ethics? "Is it not better to put the controversy aside altogether and to join hands with the empiricist, whose starting point is much more generally acceptable, because more generally

understood?" To this we answer: The empiricist, in disclaiming metaphysics, is really working with a bad metaphysics, all the more mischievous because its existence is not fully known. Without acknowledging it he has made a great many assumptions about nature and about man, which vitiate the methods he employs; and the proof of this is the contradiction in which he is involved.

This doctrine of the transcendental and empirical Ego (or whatever we choose to call the distinction) contains nothing which conflicts with any result that can be arrived at through scientific investigation of nature. It *may* be perfectly true to say that consciousness is a result of a certain configuration of the brain or (regarding conciousness as an event) of certain conditions of non-adaptation between external stimulus and internal nerve action,[1] in the same sense as any other physical result is supposed to be explained by stating its conditions—and yet we may as philosophers (*i.e.* in our attempt to understand the world of experience, not partially but in its totality, by asking what are the necessary conditions of any experience) maintain that consciousness is the logical presupposition of its own material condition. But we must not go on to translate that logical priority into a priority in time and speak in that sense of consciousness existing *before* matter or of the one existing *before* the many; and yet we can quite well understand the inevitable tendency and inducement to speak in this way. We take up a position offering no challenge of hostility to the most materialistic scientist unless he becomes dogmatic on metaphysical questions, and yet enabling us to understand and appreciate what to him must appear the fantastic ravings of the most mystical theologian. This double advantage of what we may allow to be called the

[1] See Maudsley's article on "the Physical Conditions of Consciousness" in *Mind*, o.s., Vol. 12, p. 489.

Neo-Kantian position would, of course, of itself not *prove* the truth of it as a theory; though it would be an advantage in its favour as a hypothesis. But supposing the theory to be an inevitable logical outcome of our analysis of the conditions of experience, this double advantage is surely a striking confirmation of its truth.

It is needless to go over again the whole weary controversy with egoistic hedonist, universalistic hedonist, hedonist unaffected and hedonist affected by evolution. Let us only notice a few points which are specially relevant here. (1) What justifies the hedonist in passing from the proposition, (supposing we admit its truth), "Every sentient being does, as a fact, pursue its own pleasure" to "Every man *ought* to pursue his own pleasure" (an obligation which might seem superfluous) and from that to "Every man ought to pursue the pleasure of other men, or of all other sentient beings, even if inconsistent with his own" (an obligation which seems contradictory)? (2) How can the evolutionist get from a statement of what, as a matter of fact, has come to be, as a result of the struggle for existence, to a statement of what ought to be? Can he pass from existence (life) or continuance of life to good life? Can he find any other criterion of excellence except success? How can he talk about an ideal, or criticize what exists?

Again, it will be found that the conceptions of organism and evolution, if transferred from the realm of nature to that of human society, without a recognition of the fact of selfconsciousness, lead into hopeless contradictions and confusions. It is true that society is not made but grows; but it is not true that it merely grows. It makes itself, because it implies consciousness and conscious direction to an end.

Again, the whole long controversy about the freedom of the will seems insoluble so long as the

contention is between the facts of observed experience, on the one side, which always imply an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects, and, on the other side, the testimony of individual consciousness that we are not mere parts of nature and the apparent requirement of freedom for morality. If a recognition that consciousness involves a universal element, which is not a part of nature, does not solve the whole problem, it puts the difficulty in a less misleading way.

To put this matter in a different way:

All we are contending for is that moral philosophy must begin with an examination of the conceptions with which it has to deal. Now morality implies freedom, and freedom implies the *conscious* direction of action towards an *end*. So that the conceptions that we have to examine to start with are *consciousness* and *end*.

§ 4. Personality and Society—The Historical Method.

Intuitionist moralists have usually started with the conception of *Personality*. But this is to assume one of the most complex of all psychological and ethical conceptions without examination. The moral person is really a more complex conception than the legal person (which latter comes first as a matter of etymology). Both imply a highly developed society, and to be a person is rather the ethical end than the basis of morals. The mere fact of individuality affords no basis for morals. It is only in so far as we are not mere individuals that we are capable of moral action.[1] The

[1] *Right* is dependent on the welfare of society. Rather Right *is* the welfare of society. When the intuitionist (Prof. Upton) objects: ethics (idea of right and wrong) is primary; politics (institutions) is secondary, he feels properly enough that morality is of greater importance than institutions, that individual character is after all the essential thing, and that institutions are only good so far as they contribute to individual goodness; but he is misled by the time-connotation in the words he uses and supposes that the good individual,

implicit contradiction which there is in the simple fact of self-consciousness is the same difficulty as the difficulty of explaining the relation of the individual to society. Thus ethics cannot without loss be studied apart from politics or, if the wider modern term be preferred, sociology. Plato's Socrates goes to "the large letters" to read the nature of justice, and we would do well to follow his example. Aristotle, while differentiating ethics from politics, regards it as πολιτική τις. It is one of the advantages which we owe to the influence of the conception of evolution in ethics that man as a moral being is again studied in relation to his social environment. To begin with the meaning of personality in itself, apart from all relation to society, to discuss the duties of a man to himself and then to go on to discuss his duties in relation to others, is a method of procedure which is responsible for many fallacies. It is much safer to begin with the more obvious circle of social obligation and to work inwards to the rarer recognition of obligations—if there be such—which are purely personal. This has the advantage of being not only the easier but the historical method. "The historical method" has been of late so much spoken of that it is no wonder if somewhat of a reaction should set in against it. And there are some writers who need to be reminded that, besides tracing the origin and growth of institutions and ideas, it is important to ask ourselves what is the value of these institutions and these ideas as they now stand. Because the institution has had its pedigree traced back to a remote past, it does not follow that the institution has no value now, nor on the other hand that it can claim exemption from

as an individual merely, with his notions of goodness, preceded the social institutions. "First the individuals, then the society composed of them" is true in this sense that *these* or *those* individuals might exist otherwise than as members of this or that society, but not *as* such individuals as we know them.

criticism. Because we have found out how an idea came to be held, it does not follow either that that idea is right and useful or that it is wrong and harmful. The adequate study of either institutions or ideas requires both an historical examination of how they came to be what they are, and of what their value now is. If it was the tendency of the confident and hopeful rationalism of the 18th century to neglect origins, there is an opposing tendency now sometimes prevalent to neglect the enquiry as to rationality and to despair of truth or to acquiesce in evils, imagining that the study of politics and law and morals consists only in translating the present into terms of the past.

It was the fallacy of the older rationalists to suppose that whatever purpose (good or evil) an institution or custom served now, for that purpose it had been deliberately instituted. Thus superstitious usages were supposed to have been invented by priests with the malicious intention of debasing the intellect. When we find institutions and customs defended because they have a venerable and interesting past, we sometimes sigh for the sharp question of the old-fashioned utilitarian: What good purpose do they serve now?

Thus if the historical method be recommended in ethics and politics this must not be taken as excluding the estimation of worth for human life.

§ 5. Scheme of a System of Ethics.

Let us map out a scheme for a system of ethics:

Ethics is the science of man as capable of realizing an ideal in conduct. I. The specially philosophical or metaphysical part of ethics will therefore consist in an examination of the questions: (1) How does man come to have an ideal of conduct? What makes the conception of *good* or end possible? (2) How is he capable of realizing it? What makes freedom

possible? This is moral philosophy or the metaphysic of ethics.

II. The historical part will consist in tracing the changes and growth of the ideas of good which mankind in different ages have held, and, since the ideals of any age are relative to that age, must include also a consideration of the progress of mankind in the attainment of their ideals. Yet it is the first of these enquiries which specially belongs to ethics as an historical science. This is the science of ethics, an historical science only.[1]

Since the different portions of the human race have attained very different degrees of development, the study of the present condition and ideas of lower races will come to the same thing (only more so) with the study of the earlier conditions and ideas of higher races. Thus the comparative method comes in to supplement the historical.

III. The practical part must consider the various duties which lie before man in the attainment of his ideal, as it now exists, and the various virtues or good qualities which consist in the habitual tendencies to strive for the fulfilment of these various duties. These duties and virtues have commonly been classified and distinguished from the point of view of psychology; but it is better to take the various relations existing in society as a starting point and consider with regard to them what duties they severally give rise to. This procedure cannot be called either exclusively deductive or exclusively inductive. This is the art of ethics.

§ 6. (A) Ethics a Philosophical Science—Difference between Philosophy and Science.

The choice of the name "moral philosophy," rather than the apparently less ambitious "moral science,"

[1] Cf. Schurman, *Ethical Import of Darwinism*, p. 31.

implies the assertion of the claim of ethics to rank not only as a science but as a philosophical science.[1] Mr. H. Spencer has defined science as being "partially unified knowledge" as distinct from "knowledge of the lowest kind," which is "un-unified knowledge," and philosophy as "completely-unified knowledge" (*First Principles*, p. 134). So far this expresses the distinction very well. Philosophy is, or rather *it attempts to be* (for it is not σοφία but only φιλοσοφία), the unification of our knowledge. Mr. Spencer's distinction is, however, open to the objection that it appears to place ordinary knowledge, science, philosophy, in a continuously ascending scale in respect of unification. Now it is quite true that the scientific man knows things in a connected and co-ordinated way which the unscientific man knows only as scattered and unrelated facts. The scientific man holds his knowledge together by a σύνδεσμος τῶν αἰτιῶν (Plato, *Meno*); but this is only one aspect of the case. To the unscientific man the world of phenomena appears a unity of a sort, just because he has not yet reflected on it and has taken all the ideas, by the help of which he envisages it, "ready made." The scientific thinker has to begin by breaking up this merely accepted unity, by taking it to pieces and studying it in its separate parts, *i.e.* he has to use a method of criticism and abstraction. The sun and moon to the ordinary man are—well just the sun and moon:[2] their relations to one another and to the earth, etc., if known at all, are taken for granted. But the sun may be studied in very different ways. It may be considered physically, as a mass of matter coming under (*i.e.* illustrating) the law of gravitation,

[1] What is philosophy? Not a science alongside of the other sciences—else it would be a sham science, ontology, like alchemy and astrology.

[2] "A primrose by the river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him."

or it may be considered chemically and its elements studied by spectrum analysis. The various "things" of the ordinary world are broken up for purposes of study. New and previously unsuspected relations indeed disclose themselves. But on the whole the distinctive characteristic of the scientific as compared with the ordinary way of looking at nature is the tendency to analyze, to dissect, to specialize. Of course we are using "science" here in the sense in which it denotes the various special sciences. Ancient or mediaeval science attempted to range over the whole domain of things knowable (and sometimes over a good deal of the unknowable also). It is the wisdom of the modern sciences to rule by dividing. This is one of the reasons of the apparent conflict between the scientific temperament and the religious or artistic temperaments. Analysis seems to have sapped faith and to have killed beauty. Religion, which implies a theory of the universe as well as a rule of life, cannot give up her aspirations after unity, her longing for the simplicity and wholeness of a child's belief. And the poet and the painter seek to enter also into their heavenly kingdom by becoming as little children. Human beings appear as the actors in a drama. The mountains cease to illustrate geological formation and become transformed to amethyst in the light of sunset. What religion and art do for the emotions, and more or less unconsciously, philosophy tries to do consciously for the intellect. The greatest scientific minds have all indeed the philosophic impulse as well.[1] They are not content with mere specialization, but insist on seeing things in the totality of their relations. Every one, if only through the needs of practical life, retains much of the primitive and what we may call the prescientific spirit of unification. But what philosophy

[1] Cf. Karl Pearson (*Ethic of Free Thought*) in Essay on the *Prostitution of Science*: *init.* about Huxley.

attempts to do is to recover a unity consciously. Every one has a way of envisaging the universe of nature and man as a whole to himself; *i.e. every one has his own system of metaphysics*. Philosophy is the endeavour by criticizing and examining this unconscious metaphysics to avoid its defects and to eliminate its errors. Thus there need be no opposition between the most genuinely "positive" scientific spirit and a philosophical study of ultimate problems: there may be between a hastily formed and half-conscious metaphysics, and a fuller recognition of all that is implied in the conceptions which the ordinary man and the scientific specialists are alike compelled to use without complete examination. Philosophy has after all a not very ambitious, but a not quite useless task to perform, in criticizing the terms that are usually taken on trust, in asking for the meaning of all the little words that the best of dictionaries leaves unexplained. Hence it is apt to appear a dispute about words merely. All this admits of special application in the case of ethics. Just because ethics deals with conduct which is everyone's concern practically, no one can approach ethical questions without viewing them in relation to the general theory of the universe or at least of human nature. And it is best that this relation of ethical to general philosophical (metaphysical) questions should be explicitly seen and attended to. Metaphysics, if they are a very dangerous sea, in which many bright intellects have suffered shipwreck, are best encountered in the clearest light. Nothing is gained in the long run by shirking an enquiry into the meaning of the little words "ought" and "will."

It has been asked why cannot ethics be as independent of psychology (and of metaphysics) as geometry? The geometrician does not find it necessary to discuss the question of the nature of space nor the question of the nature and origin of our knowledge of space. Why

should the scientific moralist think it incumbent on him to discuss the nature of knowledge generally, the nature of feeling, emotion, desire, will? The answer to this seems simple. The assumption of space by the geometrician is an obvious one and causes no ambiguity. When he speaks of lines and triangles, there is no risk of our being caught unawares in the meshes of a theory about the *a priori* or *a posteriori* character of our knowledge of space. The fact that from certain axioms and definitions, by the help of constructions of imaginary perfection and with assumption of the law of contradiction, the geometrician can arrive at numberless results which he considers of absolute certainty and which moreover admit of important and satisfactory application in practical matters—this fact is something which the psychologist and metaphysician must take account of, and account for, if they can. But the geometrician *quâ* geometrician need not trouble himself at all about the philosophical controversies that have raged round the field of his science. If ethics were a deductive science, starting with a certain number of definite moral rules derived from some source of external or internal inspiration assumed to be infallible (if ethics were the "moral theology" of the schoolmen), then the moralist might occupy himself in drawing the inferences as to conduct which would result from the application of these rules, separately and in combination, to particular cases (or rather to particular *classes* of cases). But the modern scientific moralist does not occupy himself with casuistry, or does so only in order to discover what the ultimate principles are according to which conduct is (by ordinary fair-minded persons) considered right and wrong. When the moralist asserts that the moral quality of an act depends upon the intention but not upon the motive, or upon both, it becomes essential to explain what he means by intention and motive; for these terms are

certainly not used in ordinary language in the same unambiguous sense as line and triangle. If he says we must judge ultimately by reference to character, it is necessary to know what is meant by character. The very assertion that the controversy about free will is irrelevant in the science of ethics, implies a certain view about the proper limits of that controversy, because obviously morality is in some sense dependent on freedom and on volition, and these terms are not unambiguous but weighted with controversies.

How can we distinguish *man* from *nature* (and so say that ethics is not one of the sciences of nature) without bringing in metaphysics? or insist that man is a part of nature without bringing in a different metaphysics? It is impossible for the moralist to define the terms of his science without facing controversies which must carry him into psychology and into metaphysics. All the attempts to cut off ethics from philosophy result in an increase instead of a diminution of the confusion that surrounds it. The ease and simplicity which are thereby attained are only delusive. There is indeed a large province, which, as we contend, ought to form a part of ethics, in which a great amount of work can be and has been done without metaphysical difficulties needing to be encountered at every step, viz. the history of moral ideas. Even here it is necessary to know the metaphysical bias of the writer, so that we may be on our guard against the interpretations he is likely to put on the facts he records. There are, *e.g.* various aspects of the morality of savages which would admit of a different interpretation according as the reporter was an intuitionist or an empiricist. But this sort of ambiguity need not in practice trouble us much. The intuitionist and the individualist empiricist have been only too prone to neglect the historical study of morals, assuming the individual man, as they know him in themselves and

their friends, as the type of mankind generally and regarding people at a very different stage as exceptions and very likely expressly or implicitly holding all savages to be literally "degraded." The prominence of the evolution theory has led to more valuable results. Primitive races and civilized are no longer put alongside of one another for the purposes of comparison and edifying remarks as to the corrupt influences introduced by civilization or the moral darkness of those races which are not illuminated by the light of the Gospel. We are enabled to look at mankind as a whole going through different stages. Even here undoubtedly a definite formula about evolution is apt to lead to a certain amount of narrowness in statement. Mr. H. Spencer has been found fault with on this ground by other anthropologists and sociologists. And M. Letourneau, who is one of his accusers, undoubtedly himself suffers from a bias of his own, viz. an irrelevant importation of French anti-clericalism into the study of primitive ideas and institutions.

On the whole the collection of facts about the moral ideas and practices of mankind at different periods, so far as it is carefully and accurately done, is, not indeed a part of, but a valuable material for ethics. The interpretation of these facts must be undertaken by the moralist; and the possibility of an interpretation which shall fit in with and not distort the facts must serve as an important test of the value of any ethical theory. If, as said above (p. 277), the only element in the moral law which is *a priori* be the formal element (the presence of an ideal), then there need be no *further* quarrel with the evolutionist. In tracing the gradual filling up of the "content," idealist and evolutionist need not differ. The evolutionist insists on regarding the presence of any ideal at all as itself the result of a process of development. In a sense we need not deny this; but still we want to try to make the fact of an ideal more

intelligible to our reason than the evolutionist leaves it. The idealist holds that the presence of an ideal cannot be merely the result of an ethical development, because it is the condition of the possibility of such a develop ment. To explain the existence of an ideal of conduct at all must be the attempt of the ethical metaphysician; to trace the development of the content of that ideal is the work of the ethical historian; to trace its rise in the consciousness of each individual and its effect on his feelings, sentiments, etc., is the work of the ethical psychologist; to examine existing practices and institutions and prevalent opinions, in the light of the ideal as it has now come to be, is the work of the practical moralist. Ethics must remain an imperfect science so far as it wants any of these branches thus indicated; and if some of them or all of them must necessarily always be incomplete, it will follow that ethics must always remain an incomplete science, *i.e.* a philosophy rather than a science, an aspiration to knowledge, a love or desire of knowledge, rather than knowledge as something attained.[1]

From what has been said about this difference between philosophy and the sciences there follow two apparently contradictory results, (1) that philosophy must always be something individual and subjective and that every one has to construct his philosophy afresh, and (2) that the works of the great philosophers of the past never lose their value or become out of date. The sciences are objective and the personal element enters into them as little as possible. The student of any particular branch of science—simply as such—need not care whether a scientific theory was discovered three hundred years ago or yesterday. He only asks whether it is *true* or, if it is still only a hypothesis, whether it is the latest and best on the subject. He need not care whether its author was of one country or another.

[1] Cf. § 5, p. 284.

The contributions to mathematics of Euclid, Descartes, Leibniz, Newton may be understood irrespective of any knowledge about their dates or nationalities. Again, it is for the same reason that scientific text-books become antiquated. The newer absorb the results of the earlier. The advance of a science is a continual building up. It is constantly made a reproach to philosophy, and sometimes specially to moral philosophy, that in it there is no progress. In one sense this is true; but it is inevitable. Moral philosophy cannot be found ready to our hand in any text-book. Everyone has to think out his philosophy of conduct for himself, if he wishes to have a philosophy of conduct at all. But just because the problems have to be faced anew by everyone, the attempts made to solve them by the great thinkers of the past never lose their value. They were facing our problems, and yet not our problems: one of our reasons for studying them is just to see the difference, and to understand the form in which our questions have come to us. The philosophic solutions of one age become embedded in the ordinary language and current set of ideas which give rise to the problems of a later time. We cannot add an ethical result attained by Kant to an ethical result attained by Aristotle; but we must, to understand our ethical problems, consider the way in which they have been affected by the successive answers and modes of treatment in different ages. Thus the history of ethics is really an integral part of ethics itself. Properly to face the questions of obligation or of free will, we must know how these came to be ethical questions; and to do this we must go back, not only on the ethical philosophers of the past, but on the history, political and religious, of their times, which helped to raise into prominence for them certain questions rather than others. Here we have the connection between the metaphysical and historical elements of moral philosophy.

§ 6. (B) The Ethical End.

In the uses of the word "end" we must distinguish (1) the end as the last stage reached (πέρας). In this sense "death" is the end of life. (2) The end as the completion (τέλος) or perfecting of anything. In this sense the continuation of the species is the end of the reproductive system in organic beings. (3) In the case of human beings at least, "ends" in this latter sense may be consciously and deliberately *aimed at* or intended, *i.e.* set before our minds as objects *to be* obtained, not thought of merely as something which will or may follow, but as something which we choose and endeavour to make our own. Metaphorically we are constantly in the habit of transferring this third meaning into the second. The "positive" scientific spirit has often to make a special struggle to leave it out. But in ethics it is with the third meaning alone that we have to do. The ethical end is what men more or less consciously aim at in their conduct. Thus it will be seen that the free will which is an indispensable condition of morality means only the capacity of setting before us *consciously* the ends *to be* attained, *i.e.* free will depends on (1) the fact of consciousness and (2) the presence of an ideal or "ought to be."

The Will to Live.

The whole of organic nature, everything that has life, is perpetually struggling to preserve and to further its life. Observation, experience tells us this. But this "struggle for existence," even in its simplest stages, has a twofold aspect. There is the struggle for the preservation of individual existence. Pain and death are, as we say, instinctively avoided. And there is the struggle for the continuance of the life of the species. Now these two natural instincts or endeavours (*conatus*) may in many cases conflict. The lower we go in the

scale of organization, the more reckless seems the waste of individual life; in other words the less seems the worth or significance of the individual. Progress seems to carry along with it the diminution of waste.[1] Instead of the continuance of the species being secured by mere prodigality in the production of individuals, "Nature," making the individual more complex, makes it also thereby more fitted to maintain its own life and to ensure the preservation of that of its diminished offspring.

When we come on the fact of consciousness, then we have the preservation of individual life and the preservation of the life of the species made the objects of deliberate effort. The "will to live," which a conjectural metaphysics traces back not only into the unconscious but even into the insentient and inorganic, is an element in human nature of which human beings are conscious. But with consciousness there also comes the deliberate balancing of alternatives, the raising of the question whether, or at least under what conditions, life is worth living. The hen bird will face death in the effort to protect her helpless brood, but, so far as we can tell, she does not balance in her mind the respective advantages of continuing to live without her young ones and risking the loss of her own life on the chance of preserving theirs.[2] *We* may put it to ourselves in that way, but we seem safer in saying that the instincts of race-preservation are working unconsciously in her actions. But the human being is capable of deliberate selfishness or self-sacrifice. Much doubtless, especially in lower races or less cultivated natures, is as instinctive as in the life of the other animals; but it is possible to weigh the advantages of each course in the scales of the intellect and to pronounce the judgment, "this is better." And it is here we can discern the

[1] Yes, but how much "progress" is there in mere evolution?
[2] Cf. p. 303.

distinction between the mere desire for life and the desire for good life—for a life worth living: the conscious choosing between a better and a worse. An examination of the facts of human conduct, looked at in the same line with the facts of animal life generally, brings us to the same point to which a philosophical criticism of the condition of the possibility of knowledge leads us, viz., a recognition of the conception of "an ought to be" as conditioning conduct and effort. Some things are not merely desired, but they are judged to be *desirable*. It will be said "the desirable" is what experience has shown to be conducive to the maintenance of life (of the individual or of the species or of both); the good life is just that sort of life which is not inconsistent with the lives of others. Yes, but whence are we to explain or justify this consideration for the lives of others? and on the other hand where are we to find any limitation for it? Where do we get the standard by which a balance is struck between an egoism which would sacrifice everything to the clinging to individual life and an altruism which would sacrifice everything to the mere continuance of the race, irrespective of any regard for the individuals who compose it? The striking of such a balance implies a conception of "good," "better" and "worse," a discontent with what simply is, a dissatisfaction with mere existence. This is the truth of Pessimism. When the will to live becomes conscious of itself, it turns round (reflects) and sees that what is, is not "all very good," but very far from it, is not what it ought to be. But this judging and condemning of what is, implies the presence of an ideal by reference to which alone can the existent be judged and condemned. Now that there should be an ideal, a good of some sort, we have seen to be already implied in the conditions of knowledge; so that the introduction of this metaphysical conception or form clears up at once the facts as revealed by experience and explains

the relative truth and the shortcomings of a great philosophical and religious system. Admit the validity of this conception that there is an ideal, a good, and we can interpret, by reading backwards, the vague strivings of all lower life as the unconscious grasping after that which the more fully formed consciousness deliberately makes an end for effort. (We say advisedly "more fully formed" because in virtue of our double nature —a self which is and which as yet is not—we can know *that* we are yet only very partially emancipated from the blind and instinctive impulses of nature.) This conception of a good or an ideal we have seen to be logically required; but, suppose for the moment that it is a mere hypothesis, as a hypothesis it will have the merit of clearing up many difficulties and reconciling many otherwise irreconcilable and yet defensible ideas.

Self-Realization and Moral Progress.

As already said, all that is *a priori* (given) is the mere form of a good to be attained, a self to be realized. The filling or content of it comes from experience of and contact with actual life. (*That* God is, is certain, if we mean by God the indispensable condition of knowing and being, and the ideal for emotion and conduct; but to know this makes us none the better, makes us none the nearer to realizing God in our own souls and so really knowing him (not merely *that* he is), unless we seek among our fellow-men what is good and true and holy.[1] God reveals himself to us in man, becomes man to save us, *i.e.* to make us like himself, to restore us to himself. This is only an expression of the same thing in the customary language of the Christian religion.) Now this self is not the mere individual self. The attempt to realize a good in the gratification

[1] Is it expedient to use the name of "God" at all in working out a philosophical ethics? Yes, to vindicate our claim.

of the wishes and desires of our own self, in opposition to and distinction from others, turns the mere natural struggle for existence into a deliberate war of all against all. The life of deliberate self-seeking and self-gratification is only possible for some because others are not as bad as they. Complete and universal selfishness is unthinkable. We can only have temporary and partial glimpses of such a "state of nature" as anarchy, a vision of hell. This is a negative proof of the validity of righteousness (as it is argued by Socrates in Plato, *Rep.* I. *fin.* 351 D, no society can hold together unless based on justice of some sort). Thus the good to be aimed at must be, in some sense, a common good. The self to be realized must be a self in harmony with other selves. The growth of the community, which is considered as extending from the family to the tribe, to the nation, perhaps in the end to mankind, is the history of moral progress.

If we say the end is self-realization, this seems to make the end entirely relative to the individual (*ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*). The good becomes equivalent to the apparent good. Well, it is true that every one *does* pursue as good what seems to him good, does seek to realize the self which he is, to follow his nature. But this does not require us to say that there is no objective standard, no absolute end which all ought to follow. What each one is, is very much the result of his surroundings. The man is what his society makes him. The deliberately selfish, self-seeking man, *i.e.* the man whose self includes as far as possible no reference to social ends or aims, is the enemy of society; and society treats him as such, by putting him to death when necessary. Society, for its own sake, provides a conscience for its members, not merely for its preservation, its being, but in more advanced stages at least, for its well-being also. A society may be preserved, but in a better or in an inferior

condition. Thus we have to bring ethics into connection with politics.

Moral progress consists (1) in an enlargement in the list of virtues, but still more (2) in an extension of the range of persons to whom obligations are due. The social self becomes extended. Thus the growth of conscience is intensive and extensive. Moral progress is to be measured by advance rather in the ideal of conduct, than in the actual approximation to the ideal of the time. Some advances in the ideal may render the realization of *that* ideal more difficult than was the approximation to a previous and lower and less complex ideal.[1]

Moral progress is rendered possible by the fact of consciousness. Those individuals who come to understand and reflect on the society round them see the germs of an ideal beyond what others have grasped, and from their new point of view can criticize the defects of existing institutions and ideas. It is not of itself a proof that a society is diseased when it produces many who condemn it. The analogy of the body, where discomfort argues bad health, might mislead us unless we limit it to such discomfort as makes people anxious to find a remedy. The healthiest society—as things go in an imperfect world—will be that which is most capable of criticizing *and of mending itself*. The most hopeless stage is the torpor that precedes death, but which may be mistaken for healthy repose. Here is the place of the intellectual virtues and duties. There is excellence not only in doing

[1] Republican freedom was fought for by the citizens of Florence or Berne, who yet kept dependents in subjection.

Consider how the "rights of man" to liberty were proclaimed by many who yet kept slaves. Some, the more disinterested and *intellectually far-seeing*, saw that slavery was condemned also (*e.g.* Condorcet).

Some nations have adopted "universal suffrage," and yet women are left out by most.

what one ought to do, but in finding out what one ought to do.

Society at any stage by custom, or by custom and law (which is custom become conscious, reflecting on itself, and therefore often opposing itself), enforces certain duties and uniformities of action. But because the end is self-realization, we can see how it is that many individuals whom we do not condemn, but excuse or even praise, can act in defiance of custom and even of law in working out some aim of their own choosing, which is not that of those around them. How can we distinguish the eccentric genius or the heroic innovator from the selfish seeker of his own ends? The person who pursues ends which differ from those regarded as the only proper ones by those immediately round him (family, city, nation, church), must be acting as a member of some (ideal) community, which may be as yet only a heavenly city, "a pattern laid up in heaven." He may not indeed have thought of it in that way, but it must be implicit in his mind. A young man, instead of pursuing his father's business, takes to art or literature. He is acting for humanity. He is a citizen of the republic of letters or a servant in the temple of art; though he may only feel that he is following an impulse or an inspiration within him which bids him leave father and mother to follow a master who has called him. This is admitted in the case of religious "calls"; but there are these "calls" to other spheres of the service of God and man also. These are difficult to explain on the ordinary theories of morals.[1]

Happiness as End.

Those who say that the end is happiness are cruelly if unintentionally ironical. The wisest man of all who ever professed to make happiness the end not only

[1] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, § 19.

found but acknowledged that happiness is never attained except when it is not pursued.[1] If we use happiness as a term equivalent to self-realization, self-satisfaction, we may say that the end is happiness, just as we might say that the end is *x*, which would be more accurate. The end is really *x*, the unknown quantity. The whole progress of mankind consists in discovering what the value of *x* is. Every man and age starts life with this equation *x* = . . . The filling up is his own. Sometimes when the question is solved the result is that *x* = a fraction or O, or a minus quantity.

If we use happiness in the sense in which it is used in ordinary language, the end is not happiness. Happiness is mainly dependent on the healthy state of the bodily secretions, and is a very important means to the attainment of the good life.[2] We say children and brutes are happier than we are because they are less conscious, because they know less. Yet no person (as Aristotle would say) would really choose to remain always a child playing with dolls or to become a sheep for the sake of having more happiness. He who attains his end is happy and pleased in the attainment of it; but the end is not therefore happiness. If we say the ultimate end is the wellbeing of all mankind, and the end we should aim at is the wellbeing of all that portion of that mankind, whom we can practically affect, we mean the same thing as the utilitarian when he speaks of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but it is put in a less misleading way. We can claim all the advantages of utilitarianism.

Life of the Social Organism as End.

Need we assume anything more than the physical fact that *every living being naturally desires to preserve its life*? Thus all that tends to preservation of life will be good, all that hinders or injures life will be

[1] Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 142. [2] Cf. *Confessio Fidei*, p. 237.

bad.[1] According to this the man who lives longest will be best (*Krankheit ist Sünde*). Methuselah is the ideal man. But of such patriarchs may we not say, with a preacher who possesses some humour (W. Smith), "Their lives were as profitless as they were prolonged"?

We pass then from individual life to the life of the social organism, of which the individual is a member. It is admitted that no morality can be explained if we consider only the individual's life. As a moral being he is a member of a community. But having now got into a region of metaphor we must walk circumspectly. *What* community is to be considered?[2] *What* organism? The preservation of the family and its growth and power may be adverse to the preservation of the nation. The class, order, sect, corporation may flourish at the expense of the larger and wider and less closely knit community. Is the continued existence of the nation then to decide all that is right and wrong? There have been times of course when this is the prominent consideration, when patriotism appears the highest virtue and *salus populi suprema lex*,—the "populus" being one's own nation only. But what then of other nations? And is mere existence at any price, of injury to other nations, of sacrifice of intellectual and artistic energy and of what is ordinarily considered moral wellbeing, to be the determinant of right and wrong in the case of the nation any more than in the case of the individual? Is the man justified in giving up thinking to preserve his health? in leaving his dying relatives to die untended? in being a cannibal even with considerable provocation? And is a nation justified in doing the same? Is the social organism analogous to the successful beast of prey? Are we

[1] "The good life, or the really or objectively desirable life, it is maintained by the doctrine of evolution, is that life which is able to maintain itself" (S. Alexander).

[2] Cf. p. 322.

to rank China higher than Athens because it still *exists*? What pre-eminence hath a man over the beasts? Well then, let us take all *humanity* into account, not only the whole community of civilized nations, but the whole brotherhood of mankind. But is the mere continuance of human beings on the planet Earth an end to strive for? That is a question merely of the struggle with nature and with over-population, a struggle that primitive races on a lonely island had to face. If all mankind is one organism, its mere continuance will scarcely serve as an ethical end. The pessimist may be better justified in wishing it snuffed out. We must mean its *healthy* existence; but what do we mean by that, if it is translated out of metaphor? In the case of the individual organism, what aids life to continue is (on the whole) healthy and *vice versa*; but we cannot have such a test for the organism of the whole of mankind. We must distinguish between a better and a worse, irrespective of mere continuance. Experience does show us what are the things most worth cherishing, *i.e.* what gives most satisfaction to the self, which is a social self. But the metaphor of the life of the social organism does not help us much. The practical moralist or statesman is not merely concerned to keep the social organism from dying. He may extinguish the small life for the sake of the larger. He may find out that his patient has become only a parasite or a microbe, or perhaps that the whole body has turned itself into a leg of some other body. If we extended our hypothetical imperative so as to include the whole of mankind, it might *then* take the place of the categorical: "If the whole of mankind is to flourish (*i.e.* not merely to live on as a species of terrestrial animal, but to have *well*-being) act in such and such a way."

Would "the greatest continued existence of the whole combined with the greatest continued existence

of all the parts" help us? That would be equivalent to an indefinitely prolonged continuance on the planet Earth of a race of animals of the genus *homo*, whose lives average 100 years. I think we should like to know a little about how their hundred years were to be occupied before we chose that end, supposing it were offered to us or to be had for the asking. There would be some found to shorten their lives by thinking that life was misery. As things are now, with a prodigious preventable waste of life going on continually, there is no excuse for *ennui* of that particular sort. But there are things more precious to cultivated human beings than even life, and the intensest misery arises because of the loss of such goods. They might not seem goods to the primitive savage struggling for life against wild beasts, but they do to us now.

Thus we are thrown back again on the unavoidable recognition that our judgments of right and wrong are determined by reference to a standard, not merely of life, but of good life.

§ 6. (C) Free-Will.

The other condition of morality, besides the presence of an ideal to be attained, is the possibility of endeavouring to attain it, the condition of free will. The plant (to avoid the difficulty about consciousness in the lower animals, let us take an illustration from the vegetable world) grows, flourishes, decays according to its circumstances of soil, climate, etc. Those species flourish best which happen to be, through any peculiarity, particularly fitted to adapt themselves to their environment or to new and varied environments. We may find it convenient to speak of them as adapting themselves to their environment; but we are aware that, in doing so, we are more or less reading what happens to them in the light of our experience of some of the things that happen to us. We are interpreting

events as *actions*. We set before ourselves, previous to action, the end we wish to attain. It is thus not merely an end (result) attained, but an end (aim) *pro*posed. This fact of setting objects before ourselves constitutes the *fact* of free will. But how is this possible? How or how far is this consistent with the law of universal causation (uniformity of nature), etc.? Are human actions thereby rendered something quite incapable of being studied by the same methods as natural events? Human actions are natural events. There is no occasion for denying that, unless we wish expressly to limit the term "nature" so as to make it merely an antithesis to man, and then we should find ourselves involved in much awkwardness, for obviously a great many of the things which human beings *do* are natural events, exactly of the same kind with the things which plants and animals do. A man digesting his food is a natural event, of the same kind as a plant being nourished by air. And it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between such natural events and the sort of actions which we ascribe to men (or to some men) and which we cannot consider adequately described as mere natural events. Freedom, just like consciousness (and just because it is entirely the result of consciousness), does not come in abruptly but gradually as we ascend the scale. Much of what we call the unconscious we can only think of as being consciousness of some sort and then add the epithet "obscure" or the prefix "un." And thus much of what we consider unfree action we think of as if it were free. And much of what we consider free we can only understand aright, if we take into account the elements of unfreedom that enter into it.

The usual answer to the determinist has been psychological. The defenders of free will have appealed to our consciousness of being free to choose between alternative courses of action; but on the basis of

psychology the determinist has always had the answer ready, that we can only think so when we have insufficiently analyzed the phenomena. Our choice between alternatives can always, if we know sufficient of the facts, be traced back to antecedent conditions in our character and circumstances. It is only from limiting our observation to *some* of our experience that we can think that in our choice between alternatives we have come upon a first cause. There can be no genuine defence (or, rather, explanation) of free will so long as we do not distinguish between the meanings of cause, between the sense in which an event is the cause of another event (the only sense in which the "positive" scientist admits causality at all)[1] and the sense (an unusual one it would be) in which we might talk of "I" as being the cause of, *i.e.* responsible for (αἴτιος), my action. The self is cause, not as one event in the series of natural events, but as present to all those events which form the series of actions for which I can be considered responsible, and as constituting them not merely events but *acts*. The presence of consciousness, in other words the presenting to ourselves of possible results as ends *to be* attained, is the fact of free will, in the sense in which free will is the condition of morality. That man acts freely, the causes of whose acts are ideas and not mere animal impulses (cf. Spinoza).[2] We are free because and in so far as we *think* we are free, *i.e.* so far as we put before our thought ends to be attained and don't simply follow "blind" impulses. In the sense in which freedom is the end of conduct, it is equivalent to the acting constantly in accordance with rational aims, aims conducive to the general wellbeing.

[1] "A cause is that phenomenon without which the event to be explained would not happen, with which it must (*i.e.* does constantly) happen."

[2] *Ethica*, III. Prop. 9, Scholium.

The ordinary doctrine about free will is not only contradictory, but practically mischievous. It leads men to neglect the enormous significance of institutions and the effect of education and environment on character. Even the best, strongest and "freest" characters are dependent on circumstances for the opportunities and occasions of action; and the majority of mankind are obviously only what "circumstances" have made them. But these circumstances are themselves what human beings have made them; therefore responsibility is not excluded. Robert Owen's necessitarianism was only the theoretical aspect of his enthusiasm for social reform. The more consciousness is developed, *i.e.* the more men *think* about conduct, the less are they merely creatures of nature; not that there is thereby any breach in the continuity of natural causation, but that nature then passes into her own higher form and becomes conscious of herself. And, just because and in so far as nature passes into consciousness of herself, she seems to become other than and opposed to herself. The other of thought is nature, and the other of nature is spirit. This is only a generalized way of putting the fact that men may deliberately aim at securing some end which would not have been attained without their deliberate action. Of course, if we use nature or evolution in a wide sense, that deliberate action forms part of the process; but we cannot understand it without taking rationality (consciousness) into account.[1]

[1] Cf. Fouillée (*Science Sociale Contemporaine*, p. 384) "idées-forces." Ideas tend to realize themselves. Thus the unity and brotherhood of the human race, and moral liberty are ideas (or ideals) which, as we become more and more conscious of them, tend to produce their own realization.

As a matter of history we find (1) mechanical action; (2) living effort; (3) conscious effort. But question: Don't we need the last all through to explain? We may say that consciousness is the highest form of feeling, or will the highest form of

In what sense does the economic (material) factor in society explain movements in history? Are we entirely at the mercy of an economic process? The agitation for freedom of trade, etc., was the movement becoming conscious, the break up of the old limited production. So now the accumulation of enormous capital in fewer and fewer hands becomes conscious in the doctrine of socialists. It is by this gradual ascent into consciousness that ideas come to act and to effect revolution more wisely because less blindly. We are at the mercy of material conditions *until* we understand them.

When "theories" ("ideologists") seem to cause a revolution, that is only because the movement of facts has been *suddenly* translated into ideas. Ideas and leaders certainly make a movement different from what it would be without them. There is a difference between an animal eating something unwholesome and becoming sick and so getting rid of it or, as likely as not, dying, and a man having swallowed poison taking an emetic and making himself sick and so well. *That* is a revolution with ideas and leaders conscious of their aims.

There is, strictly, no merely individual responsibility. Whether we will it or no, whether we deny it or no, we are our brothers' keepers. All responsibility is at once individual and social. *I* am a social being, determined by an infinity of relations to others, and therefore at once I am responsible for society and society for me. Does not this diminish the sense of responsibility which "common-sense" holds a man ought to feel? Rather it increases it. I cannot escape the responsibility of being "my brother's keeper." I suffer indeed in great measure because of wrongs done by others, not by

force; but is it not at least equally true, if not truer, to say that feeling is obscure consciousness? The "unconscious" is the conscious in its lower stages; force is will. *v.* Hartmann and Schopenhauer.

myself. Therefore, from motives of pity or sympathy alone, I ought to endeavour that others should not suffer by me. No actions are merely self-regarding. Even our inmost thoughts are not solely our own, either in their origin or in their issue. Countless thoughts of other human beings have gone to determine the way in which our thoughts come to us. Language, which helps thinking to arise out of mere feeling, is the product of infinite thinking and feeling of those who have gone before us. And our thoughts go to form our characters and these our actions, and directly and indirectly continue their influence in a ceaseless chain. This is "Karma." The Buddhist philosophy has grasped a truth which the Westerns, with their assertive individualism, have been apt to overlook. But is it a doctrine which should lead us to fold our hands and submit to fate? The very reverse. If the evil that men do lives after them, the good is *not* interred with their bones. And, as we have seen, the clearest distinction between good and evil is to be found in the fact of experience that evil always in the end tends to dissolution and decay; it is self-destructive, it is a contradiction, a lie. Thus nothing good is lost. When good is said to have come out of evil, this is not literally true. Good comes out of previous good effort, perhaps long forgotten, and evil can only produce good by becoming recognized as evil and awakening stronger effort against it. Here is to be found the explanation of the hero and the solution of the antinomy:—history is the work of great men; great men are the products of their time. The great man is the man in whom a principle becomes conspicuously operative, through his clearness of intellect or strength of passion, usually through both. But *what* he sees, how he sees it and the direction in which he acts have been determined by uncounted efforts of others, good and evil.

Here again we are reminded of two points neglected

in modern ethics:—the intellectual virtues and the connection between ethics and politics (both together in Aristotle's *φρόνησις*). Moral progress is impossible unless we see our way and unless we are working for a community. Here is the practical aspect of ethics.

Evil Effects of False Conceptions of God, Free-Will and Immortality.

The great (religious) ideas of God, free will and immortality are constantly said to lie at the basis of morality. Without them it is supposed that the chief or the only reasons of well-doing have disappeared. But we must be very careful about what is understood by each of these terms, before we assent even to the modified proposition that a belief in them furthers the interests of morality. How often have not events been ascribed to "God" as his "judgments" which were really due to human error, negligence and crime. "*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*" When people really believed in miracles, instead of pretending to do so, plague-stricken crowds thronged the churches for prayer instead of cleaning the filth from their streets and houses. How many acts of tyranny and cruelty have been endured with patience and inflicted without remorse, because done in the name and for the supposed honour of God! How often has the recompense of a future life been an excuse for deferring justice in this! The kingdom of heaven and the reign of righteousness have been contentedly deferred to another world, a happy land far, very far, away, and the oppressed have been told to wait patiently, while their oppressors could make their peace with God by a death-bed repentance and a dying bequest for religious or charitable purposes.[1] The best spirits have often had their best energies with-

[1] A Highland soldier after Culloden broke in on an old woman who was weaving and seized a coat for himself She said, "You'll pay for it." "When?" "At the day of judgment." "That will be lang

drawn from aiding their fellow-men, in order to contemplate in ecstasy the bizarre splendours of the New Jerusalem. The preparation for death has consumed the zeal that might have been devoted to making life better. Nay, has not the future salvation and damnation of the soul been the pretext for the torture chamber and the stake? And when people talk with lingering regret of the old orthodox hopes of heaven they are surely forgetting the old orthodox terrors of hell. When Tennyson in his palinode writes, "Those that in barbarian burials killed the slave and slew the wife, felt within themselves the sacred passion of the second life," does the ennobled renegade really imagine he is commending the doctrine of immortality? "*Sacred* passion." *Yes*, if "*sacred*" means "sacrée." The world has not gained by this consecration of ignorance and wickedness.

The "free will" dogma has (constantly) led well-meaning persons to oppose measures of reform on the ground that they weakened individual responsibility. What is the good, it is often said, of changing institutions if you don't change men's characters? Perfectly true; but to change institutions is to go a long way towards changing the characters of those brought up under them. It was a correct instinct which made Robert Owen a necessitarian through zeal for social reform.

All these ideas may be held in a way in which they further, and are an expression of, the best endeavours for human well being; but it is better to put forward that first which is certain, and let the others come in afterwards. Consider the effect on conduct when men come to grasp fully, vividly and constantly the *solidarité* of the race, their responsibility for the present

credit; she'll tak' a waistcoat too." That is the worst of the "religious sanction" of future punishment. The gallows are needed to give a more immediately operating sanction in the case of such persons.

and future wellbeing, or the reverse, of others. This idea has been obscured by the accepted belief in a God to whom events are ascribed independently of our effort, by the free will dogma, and by the diversion of thought and energy to the consideration of another life.

§ 7. Ethics and Religion.

Moralists, especially in this country, have generally insisted on keeping questions of ethics quite distinct from questions of religion. This has arisen from fear of theological hostility, from a false reverence, or from a too thoughtless, though often explicable, dislike. Moral philosophy had to declare her independence by standing aloof from religion. But the time for this has passed. It is impossible to understand the history of moral ideas without taking account of the religious forms in which these have at different times found their sole, their most widely diffused, or their highest expression. In the Graeco-Roman world it did indeed seem possible, because of the purely external character of the national religions, to pass over religion with the silence of Aristotle, though even in his case we may doubt whether this procedure has not left his treatment inadequate, in comparison with that of the more religiously minded Plato or the Stoics.

But the whole morality and moral philosophy of the Christian world is unintelligible without the study of the fundamental conceptions of the Christian religion. Even the philosophers of the time from the Renaissance onwards, who are all more or less in revolt against ancient dogmas, and most of whom protest in the name of humanity against the identification of ethics and religion, if they take much of their terminology from the "pagan" Greek moralists, cannot avoid having their ideas derived from and their problems determined by specially Christian dogmas.

If the metaphysical basis of ethics be the existence of an eternal self-consciousness which presents itself as a permanent ideal, as a permanent goal to be attained, as an end which can only be known in respect of the quality of goodness in so far as it is realized, we cannot escape, if we would, from a recognition of this ultimate connection between ethics and religion.[1]

The good to which all human effort ought to be directed is one aspect of God. The old controversy, whether good was good because God willed it or whether God willed it because it was good, implies a false separation between God and goodness. Each opinion states one aspect of the case and states it in such a way as to make it a falsehood. The former opinion makes it impossible to say that God is good: the latter makes God no longer the highest principle in the universe, because he is controlled or regulated in his actions by something else.

As a matter of history, we fail to understand the greater part of the ethical development of mankind, if we carry a distinction which has served all the purpose it ever could serve, back into periods when it had no real existence for the popular mind.

The Christian church has, on her side, been sometimes anxious to ward off mere morality as far inferior to religion, and has sometimes in her practice illustrated in an unfortunate way her alienation from what she contemned.[2]

When those, whose ideals of conduct have come mainly from the sources of religious belief and discipline, find a conspicuous silence on religious matters in the writings of moralists, they are sometimes reasonably inclined to ask, "Why is there nothing about religion here?"

[1] Cf. Matthew Arnold's sonnet on S. Bernard, "The Divinity."

[2] Morality is independent of religion in so far as we can judge a religion to have good or bad moral effects.

§ 8. The Relation of Religion to Ethics and Morality.

Historical Outline.

1. There is the assertion of the independence of ethics upon religion. Socrates was accused of irreligion. Plato criticizes popular religion. Yet his ultimate ethical idea is religious. (The ἰδεα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ = God.) Aristotle's attitude to popular religion is neutral. The Epicureans are hostile to religion. The Stoics conform to religion, yet place the highest truth in morality.

With the Christian religion, which is an ethical religion, the problem is not so simple.

(*a*) We have the *moral* theology of the schoolmen. Ethics is a *deduction* from the commands of God, given in the doctrine of the church or of Scripture. This results in casuistry (the confessor as conscience).

(*b*) There is the Protestant revolt against this, maintaining the independence of morality upon authority. The voice of God is not only in the church and in Scripture, but in the *conscience* of the individual. This is the germ of intuitionalist ethics. In Kant's view, ethics is treated independently of religion, partly from reverence, partly from contempt.

(*c*) Religion accepts this position, asserts its superiority to "mere morality" and sometimes its independence in practice. Faith, not *works*, is the way of salvation.

(*d*) The religious sanction of future rewards and punishments, against which Plato protested, is expressly brought into ethics by Paley. This is the common way in which, in the popular mind, the difference between good and evil is envisaged. This raises the special question of a future life in relation to morality. (Cf. Plato, *Republic*, and Browning.)

2. (*a*) There is the view that God and free will are implied in our metaphysical basis.

(*b*) In the conception of the *self* as a universal self is implied the central doctrine of the Christian religion.

What is meant by Christian ethics? What is the differentia of Christianity?

A. The ecclesiastical view lays stress upon the idea of a future life: and the special virtue of chastity, poverty, obedience. All these imply a *bad* world; you give up the hope of regenerating *this* world.

B. The socialist view offers an ideal for *all*. We *must* attempt to realize the kingdom of God on earth. All men are to be regarded as ends, not as mere means.

§ 9. Christianity and Morality.

It is a common contention of theological apologists that the existing ideas of morality in the most advanced countries of the world are dependent on the continued belief in the doctrines of Christianity; and that, though a shadowy survival of respect for Christian morality may outlive the belief in Christian doctrines, the day must inevitably come when disbelief in doctrine will cause the overthrow of morality also, and we shall return to the condition of the good, or as they commonly tell us of the bad, heathen—worse than they, because we have passed from light to darkness. This opinion is the most effective argument that is now used and causes many persons to hesitate before rejecting a belief in the traditional creed, who are unmoved or repelled by appeals to authority or by arguments intended to prove the antiquity of documents and the reality of alleged extraordinary events. So far from miracles being now available as a proof of the demands of Christian ethics on our consciences, the appeal is rather made to the desirableness of Christian ethics in vindication of the reality of the miraculous element in Christianity. We are no longer asked, as used to be the case, (by Paley), to deny ourselves to

the lusts of the flesh because credible witnesses inform us that the dead have been raised to life again; but we are asked to believe that the dead have actually and physically been raised to life because those who have believed this have had the courage to lead a life of self-denial, a life which is commonly considered saintly and admirable. The imitation of Christ is not commended to us because of the raising of Lazarus, but we are asked to believe in the raising of Lazarus because we admire the imitation of Christ.

Now, while admitting the great force of this appeal, we must ask some questions which are apt to be overlooked by the apologists of traditional beliefs. (1) How much of the morality which is commonly called Christian, and which certainly is part of the moral code that, so far as we can judge, would have commended itself to Christ and to the best and greatest among his professed followers, was also enjoined and practised by other religions, notably by Buddhism, and by some of the Greek philosophers, notably the Stoics? Self-denial is no peculiarly Christian virtue; and the brotherhood of mankind is no peculiarly Christian idea. It may be said that Christianity has supplemented heathen virtues and ideas and so made them better and more useful; but it cannot therefore be fairly said that *these* virtues and ideas are exclusively dependent on Christian doctrines.

(2) When Christian morality is appealed to, those who make the appeal are obliged to confess that it has been an ideal only very partially realized in the Christian church;[1] and those who, in the name of

[1] Note that just those virtues (*e.g.* chastity), of which the Church has made most, have been those which have often been most flagrantly neglected where ecclesiastical rule has been unchecked. (*E.g.* the monasteries, in special countries such as Spain, see Cotter Morison.) It is a relevant argument against ecclesiasticism to point to the impurity of ecclesiastics: it is an irrelevant argument

their holy religion, have maintained the necessity and rightness of perpetual barriers of class, race and sex, have little right to point to the very incomplete triumphs of Christianity in liberating the slave, destroying the prejudices of birth and nation, putting an end to war, and elevating the position of women.

(3) It is too true that in many cases those who, from intellectual difficulties, have been obliged to renounce their allegiance to religious bodies have degenerated in moral character and have at least seemed to lead less useful lives than those who have stifled intellectual doubts and have engaged in the active work of definite religious organizations. It is also true that the most notable revolt against Christian beliefs which has taken place in the world, viz. that of a great part of the French people in the latter part of the 18th century, was accompanied with what the most ardent admirers of that great movement of liberation condemn as deplorable moral laxity. But in any case this moral laxity was less deplorable, because it was in many cases expressly intended as a protest against clericalism, than the orgies of the papal court and the organized hypocrisy which may be found at all times among orthodox believers. Again, it is assumed by the opponents of the revolutionary spirit that, if the ecclesiastical restraints be thrown off, the only alternative is a selfish hedonism, and that any unselfish system of morality is only a survival from the teaching of the church.

The bad effect on individuals of severance from religion is in great measure due to the enforced

against republican idealists to point to the impurity of the French Revolutionists, because the former allege that purity can only be maintained by the adherence to their creed, the latter expressly rejected the ecclesiastical standards of virtue and professed to revive those of the Greeks and Romans. The ecclesiastics have been much less true to their standard than the sons of the Revolution to theirs. This, of course, leaves still unsettled which standard is the higher.

solitude in which the heretic finds himself. It is notorious that the solitary Protestant among Catholics, and the solitary Catholic among Protestants, to say nothing of the more flagrant instance of the Christian in heathen lands, is apt to fall short in great measure of the standard up to which he would have lived among his fellow believers.[1] The tendency to form sects, at which the Catholic and the sceptic alike scoff, arises from a genuine instinct. It is impossible to continue to live up to a new ideal without attempting to form a society which shall embody it. The new sect soon enough becomes like old bodies and accepts a commonplace copy of the ideal as sufficient for ordinary purposes. Only here and there can an exceptional and strong spirit go through life in solitude with his ideal undimmed, living ever in the presence of the heavenly vision that appears to others only at rare intervals, if it appears at all. Therefore that any person, having left the shelter of an old religious belief and society, should fall away from the ideal of that society does not prove his ideal wrong, for he may have fallen away from it also. This is especially likely to occur where half the population are kept rigidly within the old limits, so that the heretics go out companionless, like man before God made an helpmeet for him.

(4) Those who appeal to Christian ethics are very apt to assume a monopoly of interpretation. They may admit the shortcomings of ecclesiastical practice, but they claim to have fairly and fully interpreted the precepts of their Master. But it is at least a possible contention that the existing ideas of morality, of which the church claims to be the sole sufficient defender,

[1] Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, ix. 9, 1170 a5, 1169 b16, "It is difficult to do well being alone." Cf. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 6th edition, pp. 480, 481, "The moral impulses of each individual commonly draw the chief part of their strength from the sympathy of other human beings."

are only an imperfect and impure representation of the real spirit of Christianity. The *differentia* of Christianity cannot be found in its claim to rest on a miraculous revelation, nor in the idea of an incarnation, nor even as is generally thought in its hope of a resurrection and an eternal life beyond the grave. Reports of miracles have abounded wherever miracles have been believed; the religions of Hindustan and of Hellas have in different ways presented the image of a union of God and man; the Persian religion contains elaborate visions of a resurrection of the dead; and the Egyptian religion filled the minds of its votaries with the vivid belief in another world more real than the present. The organization of the church, her ritual, her monasticism may find their counterpart in the great Buddhist system. But the proclamation of a gospel to all mankind irrespective of race, class or sex, and of a gospel which was one not of despair of life but of hope for the outcasts and oppressed of the earth—this is what is distinctive of the Christian faith. And how far has Christendom been true to this ideal? The ideal of those disturbers of the established order of things, whom the chief priests and Pharisees, the emperors and governors of the ancient world persecuted, seems to have passed from their nominal followers to the democrats and socialists on whom the official leaders of the church have too often pronounced their anathema.

§ 10. Society and its Institutions.

Ethics and Practice.

It has been said that the moralist must go to the "large letters," to society and its institutions. To know what the conscience is we must not be content with pondering over our mental experience in relation to conduct, but must look at the moral ideas of the age as they are embodied in laws and customs, of which the individual conscience is the

product and reflection. Butler's imagery about conscience is true enough, just because conscience is (as Professor Bain says) an imitation within us of the government without us. But conscience is not a mere handmaid of the lawyer, the policeman and Mrs. Grundy: at least conscience is capable of becoming more than that in some persons. How is it that the individual can turn round on the society that has reared him and condemn it? This is just because morality is dependent on an ideal, an ought to be, which is never completely realized in *what is*. And the ideals of law and custom are themselves relatively realized ideals; there is the ideal beyond them of what they might be, what they suggest. The earlier stages of advance may be sufficiently explained by the formulae "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest"; the tribe that submits to a stricter discipline under one strong man is successful in its contests with those which are more loosely organized. But even at this stage there comes in an element in virtue of which "man hath pre-eminence over the beasts." Not merely do the more strictly organized tribes succeed and survive, while the less strictly organized dwindle, decay and perish. So far we have what is exactly analogous to merely animal development; but it is possible for some of these tribes which are being hard pressed by their neighbours to observe and reflect and consciously *to imitate* their enemies (*μανθάνομαι δῆτα πολλά ἔκ τῶν ἐχθρῶν οἱ σοφόι.*) They may, like Israel, ask for a king to lead them into battle like other nations and so may themselves arrest the process of decay. In the evolution of human society *conscious imitation* has to be taken account of as a factor. The reflection that others are in a better condition in some respects suggests criticism of the existing state of affairs. Thus the success of Sparta suggested to the Athenians the demerits of Athenian institutions; even though we should probably regard

Athens as having on the whole reached a higher stage of development than Sparta, and most notably in this respect that Athenian institutions and customs rendered reflection on them possible. Just because the cultured Athenian was living a higher kind of life than the "Lacedaemonian savage," he was more conscious of the defects of the society in which he lived, he was more able to make comparisons and to imagine possibilities as yet unattained, to appreciate the real value of the stage that had been obtained and so to render to established law a willing homage, to recognize the reason which there is in society as one with the reason in himself. Even the enthusiastic Athenian patriot admired the ideals of life which Athenian democracy suggested and was not merely concerned in a blind defence of all institutions and customs that happened to exist. The few moments of exaltation that come in the lives of individuals or of communities often serve to call up a vision of a higher condition than that which is ordinarily reached. These moments may make the time that follows seem sadder than it would otherwise have been; but they put an end to that contented acquiescence which is the most fatal impediment to progress. The transitory and incomplete union of Hellas against the Persian invader called up a vision never realized but not without its effect on the world. And so too with the union of Christian Europe, shadowy as that was, against the infidel. Again formulae, which may have been used with slight appreciation of all they can come to mean, burn themselves into the memories of men and, in the few minds that think, produce results that may startle those who have been contented to repeat traditional phrases. The proceedings of mediaeval parliaments gave the precedent for a revolution which ended in the trial and beheading of a king. A phrase about the natural rights of man, which may be traced back to Roman jurists, was the formula of the American revolution

and, though it took a long time and a fierce civil war, could not but issue in the abolition of the venerable institution of slavery. Thus institutions rear those who shall understand and alter them. This is the work of consciousness, and therefore there is nothing really analogous to it (or only in germ) in the merely animal world.[1] The criminal may be regarded as a parasite; but not the patriotic rebel.

Those who rebel against the established order of things in any matters of moral or social usage are of two sorts: those who rebel because their own selfish impulses are thwarted and restrained; and those who rebel because their aspirations after a higher condition for themselves and others find no sufficient satisfaction in the society round them. Those who like to have an easy-going life and who have adapted themselves to their environment may detest the reformer as much as they do the criminal and may treat him in the same way. It happens now and then that society crucifies one prophet between two thieves; but time brings about its revenges, and the children build the tombs of the prophets whom their fathers have slain; the outcast and the rebel becomes the hero, the saint, or the god.

It requires much imagination to realize an orderly and reasonable life under different conditions from those to which we are accustomed. Foreigners are apt to be regarded with suspicion, as strange creatures of doubtful character. Many persons are quite unable to believe that human life could go on at all or at all well, if any serious alteration be made in institutions and customs that have become habitual. Yet institutions of government, laws and customs affecting property, personal

[1] Isn't the animal who adopts some new way of catching its prey, building its nest, etc., analogous? In all these cases is it not simply ("sport" or) external pressure *to begin with*? This has its analogue in the *early* stages of the development of human society, but not in the later.

rights, the relations of the sexes, have existed and do exist in ways that would be regarded by most people of our own age and country as quite incompatible with any degree of moral wellbeing. There *must* be definite institutions and customs on such matters, else there can be no morality respecting them. But these are capable of enormous variation. And we have no right to assume that we have reached the utmost degree of wisdom on all or any of these subjects. Yet those who suggest the need of any alteration in our ideas of right and wrong are very apt to find themselves denounced as immoral. Immoral they may be, because they may belong in spirit to a ruder stage of society and may be wishing for a retrograde movement;[1] but they may be the forerunners of a higher stage. The only test we can apply is, "Which manner of organization will afford the greatest measure of individual wellbeing (and that implies the wellbeing of the community) in the fullest sense?" And we must assume, nowadays, that we are bound to consider *all* individuals, not merely an elect few.

§ 11. The Common Good in Relation to Conduct.

At every step in practice it would be impossible to deduce the principles of our conduct from the general principle of acting for the common good; and the attempt to do so might produce a mischievous sort of scrupulosity which would certainly impede many good actions and might possibly provide an excuse for some bad ones. The average man will always, and all men must usually, guide themselves in accordance with accepted principles.[2] But it is of extreme importance that there should be the possibility of a revision of the

[1] *E.g.* the brigand is the survival of an antique type of society.

[2] Cf. Mill's *Autobiography*, pp. 211, 213; and *Utilitarianism*, p. 36 about the nautical almanac.

accepted code. Herein lies the practical evil of intuitionist systems of morals, that they tend to fossilize the principles of conduct at the particular stage of social development which commends itself to the particular intuitionist. Hence the sympathy which those interested in social reforms have so often felt with whatever theory of morals promised an escape from the tyranny of a fixed set of abstract formulae. The popularity and unpopularity of utilitarianism have both been due to the weapon of criticism which it provided for an attack upon existing prejudices and the means which it seemed to supply for an advance in our ideal of social wellbeing. The criterion of a "sum of pleasures" has been accepted and has seemed to work well in practice, because those who have applied it have failed to notice that, while apparently their ultimate standard was the feeling of pleasure, in reality their ideal of character and of social good has determined what kind of pleasure they should consider preferable for themselves and others. If we say explicitly that the ethical end is the common good, we certainly *seem* to be saying something much vaguer than in saying that it is the greatest sum of pleasures for the greatest number of individuals; but the latter phrase is deceptive in its apparent definiteness, and, when a distinction of qualities is introduced, the standard of "perfection of character" or of "the good of the community" has to be brought in to determine the qualities of pleasures. But is "the good of the community" anything more than the continued existence of a social organism? And if so, may not the "perfection of individual character" and the continued existence of the social organism be in some cases incompatible? It becomes all-important to ask, *what* organism is it whose continued existence is the determinant of right?[1] If we fix the limit at anything short of the whole community of mankind (not to go on to all sentient beings) we are

[1] Cf. p. 300.

always laying ourselves open to the objection that the success of the organism we are considering may be incompatible with the existence, or at least with the desirable existence, of some organisms outside it. So long as we determine wellbeing by reference to a struggle for existence, we imply vanquished as well as victors in the struggle. If we extend our view of the social organism so as to include the whole of mankind, do we then get any real help from the conceptions which are applicable to the evolution of animal organisms? Are we not thrown back on the conception of a perfection of mankind, which must be a perfection of individuals, of course of individuals existing in a community?[1]

But may not the perfection of the individual be incompatible with the perfection of mankind as a whole? To this we can only answer that our conception of the perfection of mankind is dependent on our conception of the perfection of individuals. We think of all as being in the condition of those whom we regarded as the best. And, on the other hand, we cannot consider any individual to be living the best life possible for him, unless his actions have some reference to the wellbeing of others, though those others need not necessarily be those immediately around him. The artist, the poet, the prophet, the saint may appear as the undutiful son, the negligent husband, the unpatriotic citizen. So far as we admire the man who *sacrifices* others to his own advancement, our admiration is not moral, and is either aesthetic or immoral. But the distinction between the two cases is not difficult to make. The artist or poet is undoubtedly expressing himself and cultivating his own capacities; but he is producing something which goes to contribute to the wellbeing of mankind. The merely ambitious man who loves to shine, or the

[1] See pp. 301, 302.

pleasure-seeker who has a theory of egoism, has himself only as an object and regards all others as merely means to his self-development. The artist and poet may be sometimes too apt to err in the reverse way by regarding his own character and life merely as a means to the production of what is artistically beautiful; for the moral man must not forget that he and others are alike ends. An ethical theory cannot be adequate which will not allow us to admire those whom we feel bound to consider the highest of mankind; and yet, if we were to assume a definite series of inflexible rules about "obedience to parents," "doing one's duty in the station in which we are placed," being content with "the daily round, the common task," "considering others always rather than oneself" etc, we should have to condemn some whom mankind have been ready to worship. We must admit the case of "calls" to particular vocations.[1] We can only judge in such cases by results. We cannot excuse the neglectful son who tells us he left home because he felt the vocation to be a poet, and who spends his time drinking in taverns. We cannot excuse the wife who deserts her husband and children, because she says she has a vocation for the religious life (though we may perhaps blame her less than the teachers who have given her a perverted ideal of the religious life). The conduct which leads to neglect of some of the ordinary maxims of social conduct must be capable of vindication by reference to some consideration of social wellbeing. It is not enough to appeal to nature; for nature may be brought in to consecrate any and every impulse. And nature is often what we have to resist, not what we have to follow.

[1] Cf. p. 298, and *Confessio Fidei*, § 19.

Development of Ideas of Common Good.

In the early forms of society the concept of human wellbeing is limited to the wellbeing of the family or tribe to which the individual belongs. Morality for him is determined by the needs of his family or tribe. That is right which tends to its preservation and success: that is wrong which tends to its decay or dissolution. The individual by himself has no morality; but in the struggle for the welfare of the family we have already, in an elementary form, many of the virtues, notably that of courage. As other communities grow up, wider than that of the family, the ideal of excellence is changed. When we come to the highly developed city-state of the Classical world, the civic virtues become the most prominent, sometimes threatening to crush out those of the family altogether. With the decay of the Roman Empire and the spread of Christianity there grew up the idea of a community of mankind, or at least of Christendom; and with the incursions of the northern barbarians the family and tribal virtues regain somewhat of their importance; but then the civic virtues fall into comparative neglect. The rise of the modern nations has restored them to their place in our complex and difficult ideal. But beyond the nation there is growing up more and more the concept of the oneness of humanity, not now as a vague phrase merely, as with the Stoics, nor limited to those of one creed, as in the Middle Ages. The interests of humanity seem often to conflict with the interests of the nation, as the interests of the nation with the interests of the family. The child must learn, in the little world of home and school, the lessons to be used in the larger world outside: and yet the virtues of manhood needed in the larger world are not exactly the same as those of childhood and youth. So it is in the education of the human race.

At each step in advance correction and modification are required. The very fact of progress makes abstract ethical precepts of little value: they have only a general validity and may not fit the case, when we wish to apply them. Our ethical judgments are judgments about particulars, and of our political judgments the same is true.

When any measure of state action is proposed, there is little advantage to be got by asking whether this is the sphere of the state? or whether it is meddling with the sphere of the individual? as if everyone could tell beforehand without any political experience what those spheres were. These "spheres" are what we think they ought to be

§ 12. Custom and Moral Progress.

Those who study human society in the historical spirit are constantly reminding us of the importance of custom in the formation of morality.[1] The great majority of mankind, all the world over, not only those who are in a primitive stage, but even among ourselves, regulate their conduct by the observance of what is customary. The question *why* one should do so and so is hardly asked at all. If it is asked by some rasher spirits, it seems sufficiently met by the answer "It is what every one does" ("every one" meaning only every one of the particular social group to which the speaker belongs). People living in an advanced stage of development, where the terms of reflective thought have become commonplaces, are very apt to say and imagine that they are regulating their conduct by the light of conscience or the fear of God, when they are only groping along in the wake of their neighbour's practice and swayed by the fear of Mrs. Grundy. A very great majority of the actions of even the most

[1] Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 25, 27, 29. Also Clifford, *Lectures and Essays* (Eversley Edition), Vol. II., p. 106.

reflectively conscientious person must necessarily be performed as customary practices. Moral progress consists mainly in the creation of good customs, in making people instinctively (as we say,) *i.e.* unreflectingly and unhesitatingly, do what is right ; and at the moment of action it is generally impossible or difficult to pause and reflect. We must *do* ; and perhaps we are happiest if we do not need to reflect too much afterwards.

But a community, certainly a highly complex community, cannot be in a healthy state if there are not some persons at least who insist on asking the rude but necessary "*Why*?" and who, moreover, will insist on getting a satisfactory answer to it. It is, as I have said, inconvenient or impossible to be asking this question of ourselves or others at the very moment when some particular action is required. All the more need for asking it with regard to various *kinds* of action, especially when these kinds of actions become the subjects of legislative enactments. It is true enough (as Bagehot says) that social cohesion is so important that, in judging of the morality of early ages, we must not feel disgust or impatience at the way in which what *we* should regard as the rights of free thought, free speech and free action are ruthlessly ignored. But, on the other hand, the value of the "cake of custom" in an early stage must not blind us to its possible mischief in a later. The hardened clay walls may remain long after the people living within have outgrown the need of them,[1] and the

[1] For examples of customs surviving see Tylor, *Anthropology*, pp. 410-411 : Putting the old to death was necessary in the wandering hordes, yet survived into the agricultural stage in some cases. But with settled life there gradually came kinder treatment. "The cat's place" was assigned to the old.

p. 412 : Valour was needed for existence, and so proof of valour, a scalp, etc, was needed before marriage could be formed. This was continued, where the trophy was got by treachery, *e.g.* perhaps some old woman and waylaid stranger.

Family vengeance survives into stages where the state takes

man who breaks them through and lets the free air circulate will certainly be *called* a revolutionary spirit, but he is doing a necessary work for the progress of his race. Of course it must be a test of any suggested change in the moral code, that it must be capable of becoming in its turn part of a fixed customary code. Else it is no real moral (*i.e.* social) code, but only the product of individual eccentricity or selfishness. It must be "cogitable as law universal"; at least we must be able to think of a large group of persons regulating their lives by it and yet still cohering in *a* social organism, not necessarily, however, the same organism or organisms to which they previously belonged.[1] Thus, when some bold spirits in ancient Hellas, probably some audacious Sophists, the humanists,[2] the rationalists, the freethinkers of their time, suggested the unnaturalness and consequently the wrong of slavery, the greatest philosopher of antiquity felt it necessary to refute them, because he could not understand society continuing to exist as a coherent unity without a substructure of non-free labour. And undoubtedly society, as he understood it, could not subsist without slavery; but not therefore *all* societies. And likely enough these Sophists had not given themselves the trouble to think out all the bearings of their new doctrine of individual rights. So nowadays the opponents of the equality of the sexes

punishment in hand. (Is the challenge in duelling partly this, partly an appeal to the judgment of God?)

Another survival appears in the taking of oaths by solemn form: holding up the hand, kissing the book, etc.

Formalities attending the sale of *real property* are a survival from the time when land was common and could therefore only be parted with on agreement of all the tribe, etc.

Observe the importance attaching to the act of *dining* together. The guest becomes in some sort *one* of the household—and so is no longer an alien.

[1] Reflective *Moralität* must justify itself by being able to pass over into a new *Sittlichkeit*.

[2] See Benn's *Greek Philosophers*, Vol. I., ch. 2.

feel or say that society is based on the family, and the family cannot cohere without the subordination of woman; and it is true, and ought to be faced by the advocates of woman's rights, that many institutions must undergo considerable changes because of the introduction of a new idea of human equality.[1] We must shew that these changes will be for the better. This constant asking of "Why?" ought not to be dreaded by those who recognise the full value of custom. If the custom still remains a useful one for the preservation of social well-being, then the custom will lose none of its sanctity if consciously and willingly accepted. Obedience to a law in which we acquiesce is not bondage but liberty.[2] But customs have a tendency to persist long after the reason for them has passed away: and then it becomes important to discover whether they are harmless or hurtful. If harmless they may be allowed to continue as interesting relics that link us in kindly sentiment with past generations; but if hurtful, they ought to be unhesitatingly swept away. History has taught us very little if it makes us think more of old clothes than of those who have to wear them.

All these things seem mostly commonplaces which everyone would accept when they are expressed in general terms; but the application of them in practice always meets with great resistance. The truth that morality rests on custom makes people think that every custom must be necessary to morality, and at the same time people ignore the ease with which new customs will grow up, as they have grown in the past.

The Aristotelian doctrine "that virtue is a habit" and the somewhat startling saying that "the man who

[1] "Much of the wrong-doing of the world comes from want of imagination." Tylor, *Anthropology*, p, 407.

[2] Cf. p. 319.

forms habits is lost" each contains an aspect of the truth. If a society or an individual is in a healthy condition morally, the majority of right acts must be done as a matter of course without any reflecting about them. But a society is not in a healthy condition if it does not lead to some at least of its members pondering how to make it better.

In any given community the mass of men are indifferent to new ideas, are unreflective, and therefore, by their *vis inertiae*, are ranged on the side of existing institutions. A small ardent minority may arise strongly possessed of some new idea. There may be a still smaller minority of persons conscientiously and after reflection opposed to this new idea and regarding it as necessarily subversive of the moral health of the society. Now if those possessed of the new idea separate themselves from the rest of the community and, disgusted by the antagonism and indifference of those round them, withdraw from any active part in the political life of their country and, either within its borders or in some new land, attempt of themselves to realise their ideal of a better life, the victory remains with the traditional idea and institution. But if, either with or without some practical experiment on a small scale in the direction of what they are aiming at, they set themselves to an active propagandism of their ideas, they gradually win over converts from the indifferent mass, until they make themselves into a majority capable, in any country with free institutions, of translating their ideas into a law. Very soon after this has been done, the whole indifferentism of the community comes to be ranged on the side of this new institution. The conscientious opponents may continue to grumble; but they have no longer the practical conservatism of popular feeling on their side. A step has been gained which is not likely again to be lost, and the way is prepared for some new project of

reform. Thus those who have at heart the most extensive projects of social reform will gain less for the world at large by withdrawing themselves into separate communities, where their whole ideal can be actually realized, than by pressing the separate articles of their programme, as occasion offers, upon the existing political forces in the community. Of course it is essential that some thinkers and teachers at least should keep alive the vision of the perfected ideal, and it is very useful that some should make practical experiments on however small a scale, if only to prove the capacities and adaptabilities of human nature. But we must give up the idea of earlier ages that these separate communities represent all that can be done in the way of reforming an evil world. We must utilize this terrible might of *custom* which is ranged against us and, wherever it is possible, win its support for our own ideas.

Heredity.

Supposing it proved that acquired characters are not transmitted, but only those which have arisen spontaneously, what is the effect on our practical attitude? At first sight it might seem that we were delivered over completely to a new kind of fatalism. The evil goes on perpetuating itself from generation to generation, along with such element of good as there may be, a blind natural process with which we cannot interfere. But is it so? It will certainly follow that less can be hoped merely from the education of individuals for the future well-being of the race. But does it not also follow that more must be done by institutions? Since the inherited tendencies of each individual cannot be altered in his descendants by our action, except by taking care that so far as they are evil they shall be counteracted, so far as they are good they shall be supplemented, by the mate with whom he is paired, it is all the more important that he should live his life in

such an environment as will further all that is good and hinder all that is bad. We must surround each individual with the best and healthiest influences. We know that the bad influences of his father's environment will not directly affect him : we have only his "original sin" to deal with and no acquired transgression of his ancestors. And we must keep these institutions going or improve them, because we cannot trust to the good effects produced in any individual being transmitted to his descendants, unless they also are trained amid similarly healthy surroundings. Thus we have to consider the possibility of the transmission of a type of culture irrespective of racial continuity. In human beings instinct counts for less, imitation and deliberate direction of the will count for much more, than even in the highest of the other animals. The animal can only transmit a good quality if it becomes an inherited instinct (through elimination of those that have it not) : man can transmit the stimulus to good in the form of law or custom.

§ 13. Morality and Nature.

"To live in accordance with nature" was the precept of the Stoics. The modern biologist repeats the precept in a new and different sense. The "nature" of the Stoic had the ambition and the vagueness of our phrase "perfection" or "self-realization." By nature the modern scientific reformer of ethics means the totality of the physical universe, as he understands it. Man's duty is thus comprised in the comprehension or interpretation of the nature of which he finds himself a part and the submitting himself to the conditions of life which he thus discovers. "*Homo naturae interpres et minister*," if we may reverse the order of Bacon's words. To endeavour to understand his position in the universe is most certainly the chief intellectual duty of man. But does it follow that he must submit, that he must

obey? Is this not one of the inferences from that unfortunate ambiguity in the word "law"?[1] If we do submit, on any occasion, is it not to conquer, where we can? "*Parendo vincitur.*" To the inevitable we must submit with such resignation as we can find; but is everything that we discover existing, the inevitable? Of course if we include in nature, as in one sense we certainly may, all that human effort has done and can do, if we include all systems of law and all institutions deliberately framed for certain definite purposes, then all human conduct is, in the last resort, according to nature. But the proposition has then become a truism: Whatever is, is. "To obey nature" is usually understood to be, not a truism, but a counsel, a precept which we shall follow if we are wise, and by disregarding which we shall suffer. In this sense it is certainly true that a man, if he wishes to live long and healthily, must obey the precepts as to health which may be framed after a study of the physical conditions of health; that a nation, if it wishes to continue to exist and to flourish, must not be a prey to perpetual internal dissensions and must not squander its natural resources in unprofitable ways. It is also true that when we wish to defeat any natural tendency which, if allowed to carry itself out, would lead to results that we wish to avoid, we shall succeed better in our contest if we thoroughly understand the movements of our enemy. For nature is in many cases the enemy of our best endeavours. It is curious how those who denounce the too ready belief in the power of the State to remedy evils (if only State be spelt with a capital S) are so ready to accept any tendency or fact as inevitable which can be dignified by the sanction of Nature with a capital N.

Physicians have not discarded their belief in the

[1] Cf. p. 270, and *Confessio Fidei*, §§ 10 and 17.

expediency of vaccination. On the contrary, they are prepared to hope for the applicability of similar expedients in the case of some other diseases. The proceeding is certainly based upon a knowledge of nature and follows the discovery that a mild form of the disease is a prophylactic against a severer; but the proceeding may surely be fairly described as an endeavour to defeat the results which would follow if natural causes were left to work out their full effects. The scientific physician will be careful in his administration of medicine, but will not throw all physic to the dogs: the scientific surgeon does not fling away his lancet and his knife because these are artificial contrivances. What justifies the admirer of natural science in preaching *laissez faire* to the politician or in telling the man who is trying to live the best life that he must submit to a guide which he knows to be blind, wasteful, pitiless? Nature is non-moral, and morality has to struggle up from her grasp. Nature tells only of *success*: morality tells of duty and right. If we listened only to the teachings of nature at any stage at which we *happen to be*, we could frame a code of conduct; and it would certainly be the code on which a great majority practically act. We should allow the strong to strengthen themselves and the weak to go to the wall. But to carry this out thoroughly we should have to undo the greatest part of what centuries of the civilizing influences of law and religion have accomplished. We should have to discard not only the ideals of the democrat and the socialist. We should have, with Strauss, to scoff at the possibility of abolishing war. We should have to eliminate the supposed virtue of compassion. We should have to surrender all our dreams of equality and fraternity. There are many who would be prepared to admit all this in theory, as well as to act on it practically; but those who will not admit it in theory,

must recognize that nature is not our guide, but only the raw material with which we have to work. The animal, we say, is at one with nature. He is non-moral, and, if it be happiness to escape the thought of sin and the consciousness of an ideal, he is happy. With reflection we see that the Hebrew God was mistaken and that all is not very good, and we try to make it better. Again and again we may only make it worse; but, unless we suppress our thought and sink back into the animal, we keep on our endeavours. Each step in advance gives a heightened consciousness of what has still to be done. This is not an increase of happiness, but it is the victory that comes through suffering, if the suffering stimulate to effort and be not allowed to deaden us to apathy.

If we start our study from the side of thought, we arrive at a system of idealism which seems to promise us an ultimate reconciliation with all that we can conceive of best and highest. If we start from the side of nature, there seems no escape from pessimism if we once allow ourselves to reflect. But nature is logically inexplicable and unintelligible without thought; and yet we do understand nature to some extent. Are we not therefore justified in the belief, however hard to reconcile with facts, that there is an ultimate reconciliation, an ultimate satisfaction?[1] But why *ultimate*? at the end of a process in time? Is there any reconciliation except in *idea*, except for philosophy and for art? Is the other world only the comprehension of this in its completeness? If there is a theoretic and an artistic satisfaction, would not symmetry require that there should be a practical also?

§ 14. Equality.

"All men are by nature equal"—not if *nature* be understood as by the scientific student. "The struggle

[1] See p. 294.

for existence," resulting in the "survival of the fittest," means a continual assertion of *inequality*. "Inalienable rights" means rights *to* equality (cf. Locke).[1] It is not a statement of fact. But nature here, though figured as a past ordinance that has been interfered with, is really our *ideal* for the future. This ideal has come into the minds of human beings, or into the minds of some of them, through the suffering caused by inequality. Once fixed in the minds of any considerable number, it becomes itself one of the factors in the struggle for existence, and more and more determines the course of the evolution of society. Men impressed with the belief in an ideal of equality will do acts, and will abstain from acts, which they otherwise would have neglected and done without hesitation.

It is *not* true that any and every human being *is* equal to any other. But the democratic ideal is that, as far as outward arrangements go, they *ought* to be equal.

[2] Equality is a very ambiguous term. (1) Civil equality, equality before the law, is generally accepted as part of what we now expect in civilized communities. (2) Equality in political rights (*jus suffragii* and *jus honorum*) is something different and may reasonably be refused in the interests of the wellbeing and progress of society as a whole, when civil equality is readily granted. (3) Social or economic equality is itself ambiguous. It may mean equality of opportunity—the career open to talent—which will soon lead to great inequality, among individuals at least, even if inequality among families were prevented. Or it may be taken to mean equality of position guaranteed, irrespective of the value of the work done.

Now in framing our ideal it is impossible to satisfy everybody's wishes. The wishes and demands of individuals have only to be taken account of, so far

[1] *Civil Government*, Bk. II., ch. 2.
[2] From a paper on "The Ideal of a World-state."

as they are sufficiently vehement and sufficiently widely shared to be a factor in determining what can practically be attained. What we have to consider is the well-being and progress of society as a whole. This means of course the social environment provided for individual self-realization. But it is the social environment which alone admits of such study and knowledge as can make it an object to be aimed at. We may wish that an individual, or any individual, may be good or happy or both; but we cannot directly will it. We can only seek to provide the surrounding conditions which we hope will produce such effects. Even with regard to ourselves, each of us cannot will to be good. Still less can he will to be happy. Such volitions are futile unless they mean that we seek those objects which we believe will produce these effects on us. We must choose to *do* this or that particular thing. And so if we say the ultimate end of political institutions is the greatest happiness of individuals or the perfection of character of individuals—the statesman or the political theorist can only hope to attain such ends by producing such a social environment as will enable the average individual he has to deal with to have a fair chance of developing a good character or attaining happiness. Laws commanding happiness are an absurdity: laws commanding moral excellence are moral precepts. Laws in the political sense must forbid or command certain kinds of acts; must provide certain institutions.

Thus the desirability of civil equality, of political equality, of social and economic equality (in any sense) must be judged by consideration of what will best promote general social wellbeing and progress, and not by the wishes of individuals—except so far as these form a limiting factor in estimating possibility (as has just been said). It is on grounds of social stability and progress that those who have urged the need of civil equality for

all, have often felt it necessary to deny political equality. Those who ought not to be treated as slaves may nevertheless be quite unfit to determine the policy of a nation even indirectly. It is from this point of view that questions of the suffrage ought to be considered. Practically they have to be considered also from the point of view of what can be safely refused, and the best constitution must be somewhat of a compromise. The same consideration applies to social equality. Equality of conditions, if made the object of legislative endeavour, must be sought not as directly meaning general happiness, but as seeming to offer the most favourable conditions for the attainment of individual wellbeing and happiness.

The true defence of democracy, *i.e.* of equality of political and then of social opportunity, is that human beings are *not* equal in capacities or in character, but that their respective merits can only be ascertained by actual trial. Judged from the standard of society as an organism, and not as an aggregate of individuals gifted with equal natural rights, democratic institutions are defensible in so far as they offer (or can be made to offer) the best means of obtaining a genuine aristocracy or government by the best.

It is more important that offices should be open to all, than that all should have votes. Giving all a vote may be merely an escape from the fear of revolution: universal suffrage has nothing glorious about it. Taken strictly it means the absurdity that all men's opinions are of equal value. It is only an escape from the difficulty of deciding whose opinions are of most value. But restrictions on eligibility to office are injurious to the chances of favourable variations.

Equality and Freedom.

"Between *un*equals sweet is equal love" (quoted by Coventry Patmore in defence of inequality). Yes, only

because, and if, they can consider each other equals. Mahaffy, in his *Art of Conversation*, shows that pleasant social intercourse is only possible on the assumption of equality, at least for the time being.

It is frequently remarked that the relations existing between an old Tory squire and his dependents are much more friendly and kindly than those between the Radical manufacturer and his workmen, or even his domestic servants, and the inference is usually drawn (*e.g.* by Courthope) that the Tory must represent a higher type than the Radical. The reason really is that the relation of master to servant forms an essential part of the Tory system of things and is accepted by both as fit and proper. It therefore entails certain mutual duties. Master and servant are both members of a system; they are both members of a common household, a *familia* in the original sense. Whereas the relation of master and servant is merely a survival in a society which *professes* to be based upon equality.[1] It is a temporary condition, resulting from a contract between those who are professedly equals; but since there is an actual inequality because of difference in education, in manners, in associates, in interests, co-existing along with a professed equality, the relation is uncomfortable, strained, unhealthy, false. It is not the mere presence of a cash-nexus that makes the difficulty. A gentleman may be on quite friendly terms and feel no constraint in the presence of his doctor or his lawyer, although accustomed to pay them fees; but then he is, by education and at all events by opinion, placed on an equality with them. If we could suppose all stigma attaching to manual labour of any kind removed, and education and such a general standard of comfort diffused throughout the whole community as would

[1] Observe that you cannot strictly examine what *is*, without considering what *was* and what *will be* (tendencies), *e.g.* what *is* our moral principle about the family, property, etc.

make social intercourse easy between all its members, the constraint and unpleasantness between those who are engaged, say, in directing some great industrial enterprise and those who cook food or clean rooms might completely disappear, and friendliness and friendship would become possible in a degree never found when the old servant is after all only on a level with the faithful dog. The contrast between a Tory (aristocratic) society and a Radical (democratic) is the contrast between a complete society, the very best of which has already been seen (let us hope that the worst of it has been seen also), and a society which is as yet only in the process of formation, which is incomplete, which has gone only half way, often only through its negative stage, and which therefore is full of contradictions.

The Tory is apt to scoff at the Radical for his inconsistency; it is perhaps well that he should, provided that we are taught thereby not to go back to the more easy-going morality of our critic, but to advance in the difficult path of realizing our own ideal. And it is well to repeat such a watchword as equality and fraternity, lest we should forget our ideal and, amid some degree of personal comfort, become ashamed of it. The Tory accepts a lower ideal (so we think); therefore he can more easily realize it. We have chosen a higher, therefore we are more apt to fall short.

The aristocratic ideal is proportionate inequality, equality only as *pis aller*. (Cf. the views of Plato and Aristotle.)

The democratic ideal is equality, inequalities only as *pis aller*.

§ 15. Means and End.

Does the end justify the means? Can we separate political from moral "rightness"? Rather people are too rash in assuming they have got good ends (*e.g.* such an end as that of uniformity in religion). Con-

sider also how much that we separate off abstractly as "means" really forms part of the end, *e.g.* uniformity in religion may be *willing* uniformity or *forced*. If our *end* is willing uniformity, can we get that by penal laws? If our *end* is external uniformity, we certainly can, if they are sufficiently strict and we can prevent rebellion.

So if our end is the permanence of family ties, do we mean *willing* or enforced? Again, if our end is moral purity, do we mean the innocence of ignorance or the innocence of a noble choice? The means, simply as means for an end, do get their moral value from the end. If the end is approved, the question about means is a question of efficiency; but we don't want to set up side results leading to what is detrimental. *e.g.* Punishment is good or bad solely according to the end in view. Certain punishments are bad because of other bad results (*e.g.* their brutalizing effect on the community) or because they are in excess of what is needed.

All *unnecessary* pain is an evil. If imprisonment is sufficient, don't have flogging. Don't have flogging in public, etc.

Force in the sense of restraint is not *per se* bad. Persecution is a very ambiguous term. [It may mean restraint in the interest of a particular sect or belief, which is bad; or restraint for the wellbeing, or even the safety, of the community, which may be good.]

§ 16. Morals and Politics.

1. Consider the assumption that they are different.

(*a*) "Morality concerns individuals: politics concerns a group of individuals as a whole."

That is true so far; but ethics has to do with the conduct of the individual in relation to, or in possible relation to, other individuals, and in any case with individuals as members of a society.

On the other hand, politics concerns the actions of individuals; and the good or the bad in politics must *ultimately* be judged by the effects on individuals (in society, of course).

(*b*) A maxim, *e.g.* the greatest happiness of the greatest number, may be valid in politics and yet not in morality. This is only true in the sense that politics, being more complicated than *some* parts of morality, may get on with less carefully formulated maxims, without their defects becoming so easily apparent.

(*c*) Morality has to do with the *ends* of life: politics with means to these ends. Aristotle's view is better: "The proper good of man is the same for the individual and the state, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure" (*Eth. Nic.* I. 2, § 8). But morality has also to do with means. The remoter or more complicated means are often more difficult to judge.

Take a question of the greater morality, *e.g.* ought I to give up time and energy to a certain course of study? I am bound to make a very difficult calculation as to what is needed, as to what I shall be able to do, as to the degree in which this may interfere with other duties &c. People generally are guided to a large extent by sentiment, the advice of others, the action of (inherited and acquired) impulse, taken as a guiding voice, etc. This is an exact parallel to what happens in politics. Ought I to vote for A or B? Ought a statesman to adopt a certain policy? Or *e.g.* a friend asks me to become surety, trustee, or to "lend" him money. An evidently distressed person asks help. What ought I to do? Calculation is needed as to the balance of possibilities, the balancing of different claims. People generally *don't* consider these matters with great care; they act on impulse, sentiment, custom. To this there is an exact parallel in politics. A finance minister may be quite as

scrupulous about spending as a person in his private expenses, in managing trust funds, etc.

Patronage comes in, in private matters as in public.

The chief difference between national and private interests is the need of military defences. This is parallel to private morality, when there is an absence of settled law, and private raids and feuds frequently occur. The code of military honour comes in here. Yet even now a war between nations is parallel to a lawsuit between individuals. In both there is the temptation to gain an advantage when we have a "good" case, though "moral" claims may be the other way. Each judges his own case, as with nations.

"Society" difficulties suggest a certain parallel to diplomatic relations. In both we find delicate manœuvres and the difficulty of keeping to strict truth. Therefore political casuistry is of the same *kind* as the casuistry of private morals.

2. What is true is that *law* and *morality* are distinct. The question as to what is *legal* is ultimately a question of *facts*. What *is* the law or custom of the country? Confusion arises where law is so largely a matter of judicial interpretation. The idea of *jus naturae* also makes confusion, owing to the ambiguity of the terms "right" and "justice." Bentham and Austin did good service in endeavouring to clear up this confusion. In any case, *law* is distinct from politics.

3. But what of the Machiavellian view that the ultimate political principle is the *raison d'état*, "public safety." The truth is this, that the statesman is not as a rule entitled to go behind the question of the preservation of the independence of his country. Compare with this, in private morals, self-preservation or the welfare of our family. *Generally* we do not go behind these. It is the same with one's maintenance of a cause or of any society, company, etc., one belongs to (a college, a school, a town, a church). We recognise

that as a rule we have to advocate the claims of what has obvious claims on us, unless *higher* claims very distinctly come in. Then we must defy the idea of *esprit de corps*, "loyalty" etc.

Is not the same the case with the statesman? The independence of one's state, the maintenance of the constitution, etc., are not *ultimate ends*. Cf. Sardinia, which was merged in "Italy"; the surrender of Savoy and even Nice; Hanover; Scotland at the Union. But there is a very difficult question of casuistry here.

INDEX

Absolute, the, and experience, 184; as becoming, not being, 228.
Actions, distinction between free and unfree, 303.
Alexander, Professor S., 17, 32, 105, 300.
Amiel, 244.
Anarchist, philosophical, 50.
Anaxagoras, 200.
Animism, 103, 108.
Apostles' Creed, 60.
Appearance and reality, 89 sqq.; and illusion, 209.
A priori principles, true meaning of, 169.
Aristocratic and democratic ideals, 340.
Aristotle, 25, 69, 82, 97, 98, 104 sq., 113, 153, 160, 161, 181, 201, 211, 267, 281, 308, 310, 316, 329, 340, 342; on final cause, 20; view of philosophy, 68 sq.; logic, 139; definition of a logical term, 153; analysis of inference, 162; enthymeme of, 166; on affirmation and negation, 204; on objective contingency, 202; attitude to religion, 312; on slavery, 328.
Aristotle and Plato, 202, 203, 208.
Arnold, Matthew, 64, 311.
Ashley, Professor W. J., 8.
Athanasian Creed, 60.
Atonement, evangelical doctrine of, 126.
Augustine, 219.
Austin, John, 343.
Authority and reason, 148.

Bacon, Francis, 28, 137, 332.
Bagehot, Walter, 326, 327.
Bain, Professor A., 318.
Balfour, Arthur J., 206, 226; on the Absolute, 210; criticism of Hegel, 212.
Bentham, Jeremy, 343.
Berkeley, Bishop, 89, 93, 94, 104, 177, 201.
Biological concepts applied to philosophy, 34, 267.
Blackie, Professor J. S., 2.
Body and mind, 95 sqq.; 177.
Boer war, 49.
Bosanquet, Professor B., 158, 161, 205.
Bradley, F. H., 163 sq., 183, 185; on experience and the Absolute, 184; on the timeless self, 189.
Browning, Elizabeth B., 238.
Buddhism, 62, 250, 307, 314, 317.
Butler, Bishop, 318.

Calderwood, Professor Henry, 3.
Calvin, 122.
Calvinists, 242.
Campbell, Professor Lewis, 201.
Carlyle, Jane Welsh, 1.
Casuistry, 115.
Categorical Imperative, 236.
Causation, Principle of, 76, 78, 168, 233.
Cause, 33, 85; different meanings of, 104, 105, 227, 304; efficient and final, 121.
Chance, nature of, 197 sq.
Change implies permanence, 228.
Charles I., 255.
Chemistry, mental, 267.
Christian Church, 124, 126, 128; view of matter, 127; morality, 129; religion, 57.
Christianity, distinctive ideal of, 317; the democratic religion, 58, 252; and morality, 313; and immortality, 62; and Platonic dualism, 95.
Church and State, 53 sqq.
Clarendon, 255.
Clifford, W. K., 249, 326; on psycho-physical parallelism, 96; on happiness as a means, 237.
Coherence, principle of, 71 sqq.
Common good in relation to conduct, 321 sq.; development of ideas of, 325.
Comte, 35.
Concept, general, nature of, 204; Aristotle's view of, 153.
Condorcet, 297.
Conduct, dialectic of, 257 sq.; end of, 237, 292.
Conscience, 317.
Consciousness, world of, and real world, 178 sq.; implies activity, 253; and the unconscious, 305.
Conservation of matter and energy, 80.
Conservatism and radicalism, 70, 339.
Consistency and truth, 146, 188.
Contingency, apparent distinguished from real, 222; objective, 227; Professor James on, 196 sq.
Continuity, principle of, 22.
Continuum theory of consciousness, 195.
Contradiction, principle of, 74 sq., 137, 141, 144, 147, 168, 198.
Contradictory and contrary opposition, 148.
Courthope, W. J., 339.
Custom, and moral progress, 298, 326 sq.; need of reflection on, 327; evils of, 327; support of, should be won for new ideas, 331.
Customs, tendency to undue persistence of, 329.
Cynics, 72.

Darwin, Charles, 54, 269, 272.
Democracy, true defence of, 338.
Democratic and aristocratic ideals, 340.
Descartes, 28, 113, 150, 231, 274; test of truth, 71 sq.; dualism, 95 sq.
Desire, satisfaction of, does not guarantee truth, 225, 244.
Determinism, distinguished from fatalism, 223; inadequacy of psychological answer to, 303 sq.
Dialectic, 67, 149.
Dictum of Aristotle, 161.
Disestablishment, effects of, 53 sq.
Doukhobors, 56, 115.
Dualism, 73.
Duties, conflict of, 257 sq., 259 298, 324.
Duty, form and content of, 236.

Economic relations supranational, 257; economic factor in history, 306.
Ego, transcendental and empirical, 275.
Eleatics, 200, 203, 208.
Emanation theory, 128.
Emigration, 246.
Empedocles, 200.
Empiricism, 31, 72, 278.
End, various meanings of, 292; end and means, 340, 341, 342; end of conduct, form and content of, 277.
Enthymeme, Aristotelian, 166.
Environment, social, 337.
Epicureans, attitude to religion, 312.
Epiphenomenon, consciousness as, 97.
Epistemology, and logic, 70, 84, 138, 181 sq.; and psychology, 178; and metaphysics, 172 sq.
Epistemological idealism, 94.
Equality, 41, 335 sq.; various meanings of, 336; an ideal, 336, 337; civil, political, and social, 336, 337, 338; equality and freedom, 338 sq.; equality and inequality, social, 339.
Ethical end, 292.
Ethics, in relation to metaphysics, 110 sq., 286 sq.; and politics, 117, 281, 308; and religion, 118, 310; metaphysic of, 282; science of, 36, 283; distinct from sciences of nature, 271; scheme of a system of ethics, 282; Christian ethics, 313; historical ethics, 288; history of ethics, 291; art of ethics, 283; ethics and morality in relation to religion, historical outline, 312.
Evangelical religion a fragment of Catholic faith, 126.
Evil, problem of, 131, 225.
Evolution, nature of, 228; and principle of continuity, 22; distinction between biological and social, 318.
Evolutionism, idealist, 22.
Evolutionist philosophy, 190; ethics, 116, 279, 289; ethics and politics, 42; sociology, 43; tends to fatalism, 252.
Excluded middle, principle of, 74, 137, 141, 144.
Existence, in space, 92; relation to consciousness, 93 sq.
Experience, 85; as object of metaphysics, 86 sq.; experience and the Absolute, 184.
External world, plain man's view of, 93, 176.

Fact and theory, 71 sqq., 92, 146, 264 sq.
Fairbairn, Principal A. M., 122.
Faith, rational, meaning of, 226.
Fatalism, 243; and determinism, 223; not involved in heredity, 331; evolutionist, 252; fatalism of the Radical, 253.
Federation, of the world, 49; Imperial, 52.
Feeling, nature of, 184; and thought, 181 sq.
Form and content of the moral end, 277.
Fouillée, 305; on intellect and feeling, 217.
Fraser, Professor A. Campbell, 1, 3.
Frederick the Great, 255.
Free actions distinguished from unfree, 303.
Freedom, and necessity, 148; and equality, 338 sq.; not a fact but an ideal, 243.

Free-will, 114, 223, 279, 302; nature of, 121, 238; theological aspect of, 224; and predestination, 242; defects of ordinary doctrine of, 305; evil effect of false conception of, 309.

Galton, Francis, 42.
Geometry, non-Euclidean, 150.
Germany in 1826, 1.
Geulinx, illustration of two clocks, 102.
Girondists, 263.
Gnosticism, 128.
God, nature of, 59, 121, 131, 225, 230, 234, 241; personality of, 239; evil effect of false conceptions of, 308.
Good, conception of, 294; the common good in relation to conduct, 321 sq.; development of ideas of, 325.
Gospel, fourth, identifies Christ with eternal reason, 57.
Great Britain, political reform in, 52.
Greek philosophy, 66, 68, 193.
Green, T. H., 22, 28; influence on Ritchie, 5; sermon on faith, 59; on "timeless act," 189.

Hamilton, Sir W., on formal logic, 203.
Happiness, as moral end, 38, 237, 279, 298; as means, 237; happiness of believers, 132, 246.
Hartmann, 306.
Hatch, Edwin, 124.
Haynes, E. S. P., 54.
Hedonism, 39, 279.
Hegel, 5, 61, 68, 201, 208, 222, 251; attitude towards older philosophy, 29; view of appearance and reality, 211; philosophy of history, 212.
Hegelianism and the Athanasian Creed, 60.
Henry VIII., 255.
Heracleiteans, 200, 203.
Heraclitus, 75, 123, 228.
Heredity, in relation to biology and sociology, 42; in relation to moral practice, 331 sq.; does not involve fatalism, 331.
Heretics, evil effect of solitude on, 315 sq.
Hero, explanation of the, 307.
Hindu law, 56.
History, has to do with meanings as well as events, 120; problems of, distinguished from those of science, 214.
Historical method, the, 281.
Hobbes, 266.
Hobhouse, L. T., on likeness and identity, 163, 4.
Hodgson, Shadworth, 108.
Höffding, H., 96, 166.
Home Rule, 53.
Houses of Parliament, reforms in, 52.
Humanity, life of, as ethical end, 301.
Hume, David, 33, 164, 165, 180, 194, 196, 197, 200, 206.
Huxley, T. H., 22, 88, 94, 96.
Hyslop, Professor J. H., 150.

Ideal, conception of, 235 sq.; and real, supposed antithesis of, 88, 148.
Idealism, Berkeley's, 94; and pessimism, 335.
Idealist and evolutionist ethics, 289; idealist evolutionism, 22.
Ideas, influence of, on practice, 306.

Identity, principle of, 74, 137, 141 ; and similarity, 183.
Illusions, nature of, 208.
Imitation, conscious, a factor in human evolution, 318 ; imitation and instinct in human beings, 332.
Immortality, 62, 238 ; evil effect of false conceptions of, 308.
Incarnation, doctrine of, 59, 126.
Inconceivability of the opposite, as a test of truth, 30, 140, 146, 198 ; views of Mill and Spencer on, 140, 194.
Individual, nature of, 251 ; isolation of, 245, 249, 252, 276 ; importance of, 213.
Individualism, problem of, 249 ; in religion, 119 ; objections to, 41, 42, 47.
Inductive methods of Mill really deductive, 167.
Inference, problem and paradox of, 205 ; Mill's view of, 163 ; inferences *a fortiori*, 169.
Institutions and customs, capable of enormous variation, 320 sq. ; corrective of evil heredity in individuals, 331 ; Athenian and Spartan institutions, 318 sq.
Introspection, 273.
Intuitionism, 280 ; defects of, 31, 37, 39, 41, 45, 116, 322 ; confuses psychology with logic, 169.
Intuitionist systems of morals, practical evils of, 322.
Ireland, 53.
Isolation *v.*. Individual.

James, Professor William, 118, 195, 213, 218, 223 ; on real contingency, 196 sq., 202, 227 ; on objective chance, 220 sq. ; on religion, 124, 132 ; defence of pluralism, 207 ; on affirmative and negative judgments, 204 ; on the emotional character of belief in reality, 210 ; on faith, 226.
Jesus, and Socrates, 58 ; moral teaching of, 125.
Jevons, W. S., view of logic, 135 sq., 139 ; on logical terms, 153.
Jews, religion of, 57, 62, 122.
Johnson, Samuel, refutation of Berkeley, 177.
Joseph II., 255.
Judgment, nature of, 183 sq. : Aristotle's view of, 154 ; types of, 158 ; the unit of thought, 153 sq. ; negative and affirmative, 204 ; analytic and synthetic, 204 ; singular, collective, and universal, 160 ; extensive and intensive interpretation of, 159 ; logical analysis of, 158 ; equational theory of, 160 ; nature of perceptive judgment, 165 sq. ; judgment involves reference to reality, 159 ; judgment, proposition, and sentence, 158 ; ethical and political judgments are about particulars, 326.
Justification, evangelical doctrine of, 126.

Kant, 28, 66, 107, 109, 113, 200, 208, 228, 236, 269, 274 ; Kant and scepticism, 231 ; reply to Hume, 33 ; on ethics and religion, 312 ; on perpetual peace, 48 ; on federation of the world, 49.
Keynes, J. N., on intension of terms, 156.

Knowledge, essential conditions of, 231; relativity of, 274; objectivity of, 182 sq., 232; trans-subjective, 176; not a product of mere individual activity, 87; knowledge and science, 265; imperfect knowledge implies an ideal, 235; knowledge brings suffering, 245.
Laissez-faire, 51, 56.
Lamarckian hypothesis, 43.
Laplace, 230.
Laurie, Professor S. S., 238, 243; on conflict of duties, 258.
Law and morality, distinction between, 343.
Law and liberty, supposed antithesis between, 148.
Law of nature, distinguished from moral law, 136, 236, 270 sq.; 333.
Laws of thought, in psychology and logic, 136; metaphysical application of, 148.
Leibniz, 102, 109, 201, 225, 239; principle of continuity, 22; mind and body, 98; view of contingency, 222; Leibniz and Berkeley, 94
Letourneau, 289.
Lewes, George Henry, 97.
Liberalism, 53, 56.
Liberty *v.* Freedom.
Life, waste and preservation of, 293.
Life of the social organism as ethical end, 299.
Likeness *v.* Similarity.
Locke, 76, 107, 201, 272, 336.
Logic, nature of, 70; a regulative science, 135; criticism of categories, 84; relation to epistemology, 138, 181 sq.; relation to psychology, 134 sq., 170; metaphysical application of logical laws, 148.
Logical priority and priority in time, 152, 278.
Loneliness, 246, 7.
Lotze, 122, 200, 268; on Hegel's philosophy of history, 212.
Love, 250.
Lutoslawski, W., 201.

Machiavelli, 343.
Mackintosh, Sir James, 267.
M'Lennan, J. F., 269.
M'Taggart, J. M. E., 147.
Mahaffy, J. P., 339.
Maine, Sir H. S., 223, 269
Martineau, James, 272.
Martyrdom, significance of, 261; not a proof of facts, 243.
Master and servant, relations of, 339.
Mathematical formulae delusive in logic, 154, 268.
Mathematics, progress of, 150; conceptions of, applied to study of man, 266; imitation of, a curse to philosophy, 70.
Material cause, 121.
Materialism, 21, 22, 94.
Matter and mind not separate substances, 232.
Maudsley, H., 253, 261, 278.
Means and end, 340, 341, 342.
Meta-geometry, 151.
Metaphysics, subject-matter of, 84 sqq.; speculative, problems of, 188 sq.; relation to epistemology, 172 sq.; relation to science, 278; relation to ethics, 110 sq., 286 sq.
Metarithmetic, 151.
Mill, J. S., 13, 105, 144, 267, 272, 321; confusion of logical and psychological questions, 30,

140; on inconceivability of the opposite, 72, 140 sqq., 194; on connotation of proper names, 157; on likeness as ultimate category, 194; on real kinds, 194; view of universals, 162, 194; on Aristotelian syllogism, 161 sq., 203; on inference from particular to particular, 163; conception of cause, 168; inductive methods, 83, 167; logic and philosophical radicalism, 193; psychological atomism, 164; pluralism, 194; on happiness, 237, 298; on theism, 225.
Mind and matter, not separate substances, 232.
Mind and body, 95 sqq., 177.
Minds, differences of, 273.
Miracles, 57, 59, 317; as evidence, 313.
Monadism, 188; imperfections of, 27.
Monism, 22, 73; materialistic, 21; and pluralism, 192; James's criticism of, 207 sq.
Montague, Professor F. C., 5.
Morality, and custom, 326 sq.; and Christianity, 313; Christian, nature of, 314; ecclesiastical, 314; and law, 343; and nature, 332, 335; and religion, 311, 312.
Moral philosophy, 35, 44, 48, 62; metaphysical and historical elements of, 291; distinguished from moral science, 283; and psychology, 272 sq.; and science, 264.
Morals and politics, relation of, 341 sq. *v.* Ethics.
Moral progress is progress in the ideal of conduct, 297; consists in creating good customs, 327.
Moral reforms must be capable of becoming customs, 328.
Moral theology of the schoolmen, 312.
Morison, James Cotter, 314.
Müller, Professor Max, 269.
Mysticism, 190.
Mythology, 122.

Nationality, 256.
Natural rights, 39, 41.
Natural selection, 32, 35.
Naturalist metaphysics, 26, 27.
Nature, 37, 39, 76 sq., 79, 114; relation to morality, 332, 334, 335; relation to thought, 335; meaning of obedience to, 333; evil of blind obedience to, 334.
Necessity distinguished from fate, 223.
Neo-Platonism, 68, 128.
Neo-Pythagoreanism, 68.
Nonconformist conscience, limitations of, 56.

Objectivity of knowledge, 182 sq.
Occam's razor, 80.
One in the many, 188, 192 sq.
Opinion, Greek sense of, 66.
Optimism and pessimism, 39, 244.
Origin and validity, 18 sqq., 57, 78, 268 sq.
Ought, conception of, 114 sqq., 235 sq., 276.
Owen, Robert, 305, 309.

Paley, 312, 313.
Parallelism, psychophysical, 95 sqq., 272.
Patmore, Coventry, 41, 338.
Pauline Epistles, 125.

Pearson, Professor Karl, 285.
Perception as subconscious inference, 165.
Perceptive judgments, 165 sq., 199.
Perfection of mankind as ethical end, 323.
Personality, 27, 240, 247 sq.; implies society, 27, 280; in connection with pluralism, 218; double nature of, 276.
Pessimism, 39, 226, 294; and optimism, 39, 244; and idealism, 335.
Philosophy, 23, 67 sq., 73, 112, 124; history of, 28, 69; relation to religion, 123; relation to science, 23, 24, 264 sq., 284 sq., 286, 290; professes to satisfy only intellectual demands, 215.
Plato, 46, 106, 197, 200, 201, 205, 211, 216, 225, 241, 266, 281, 284, 296, 310, 340; view of philosophy, 67, 69; attitude to religion, 312; dualism, 203; *Parmenides* of, 192, 201; *Sophistes* of, 192; Plato and Aristotle, 202, 203, 208.
Pluralism, 23, 26, 27, 62, 73, 93, 188; and personality, 218; and polytheism, 218; and monism, 73, 192; Professor James on, 196, 207; criticism of, 23, 26, 219.
Politics and ethics, 117, 281, 308; and morals, 341 sq.; and statesmanship, 341 sq.
Polytheism and pluralism in ordinary thought, 218.
Predestination and free-will, 242.
Predication, 184.
Priority, logical, and priority in time, 152, 278.
Proper names, connotation of, 157.
Protestant revolt against authority, 312.
Psychology, nature of, 106 sq., 272 sq.; as a science, 70, 106, 135, 172 sq.; relation to epistemology, 178; logic, 70, 134 sq., 170; metaphysics, 172, 173; moral philosophy, 272 sq.
Psychophysical parallelism, 95 sqq., 272.
Pythagoras, 67, 266.

Quantification of the predicate, 160.

Radical and Tory, 339.
Radicalism and Conservatism, 70.
Rationalism of the 18th century, 282.
Realism, epistemological, 174 sq.
Reality, nature of, 85 sqq., 88, 181; degrees of, 89, 210, 212 sq.; knowledge of, 175; test of, 197; implies objectivity, 187; relation to appearance and illusion, 89, 209; relation to thought, 183.
Real World, meaning of, 179 sq.
Reason the only ultimate authority, 216; reason and will, 244.
Referendum, 52 sq.
Reformers, position of social, 260, 330.
Reid, Thomas, 178.
Religion, nature of, 118, 251 sq.; relation to ethics, 118, 310, 312; relation to morality, 312; uniformity of, 340; and happiness, 132, 246.
Responsibility, not individual but social, 306 sq.

Revolt against established order, two kinds of, 320.
Ritchie, Professor David, of Edinburgh University, 1, 2.
Ritchie, David George, antecedents, 1; student at Edinburgh, 2 sqq.; opinion of Scottish University system, 3 sq.; at Oxford, 4 sqq.; marriage, 4; connection with T. H. Green and A. Toynbee, 5 sq.; characteristics as a teacher, 8 sqq.; published writings, 10 sq., 12; Professor at St. Andrews, 11 sqq.; personality, 14 sqq.; death, 15; philosophical position, 18 sqq.; idealist evolutionism, in metaphysics, 21 sq.; on naturalism and pluralism, 25 sq.; on the history of philosophy, 28 sq.; on logic and theory of knowledge, 30 sq.; on psychology, 33 sq.; on ethics and politics, 35 sq.; on intuitionism and hedonism, 37 sq.; on socialism and individualism, 39 sq.; on practical ethics and politics, 44 sq.; on marriage and the family, 45 sq.; on war and peace, 48 sq.; on relations of states, 49 sq.; on political reform in Great Britain, 52; on Church and State 53 sq.; on religion and theology, 57 sq.; on creeds, 60 sq.; on immortality, 62 sq.
Ritchie, Professor William, of Edinburgh University, 1.
Ritschl, 124.
Ritual element in primitive religion, 118.
Rosebery, Earl of, 56.

Scepticism, 231.
Schiller, F. C. S., 150, 191, 210; on radical empiricism, 195.
Scholastics, moral theology of, 312.
Schopenhauer, 99, 208, 306.
Schurman, J. E., 283.
Science, conceptual subject-matter of, 105, 106; legitimate materialism of, 22; presuppositions of, 206, 233; progress of, 149; science and philosophy, 24, 264, 278, 284, 286, 290; science and ethical ideals, 254.
Scientific thought, world of, 182.
Sellar, Professor W. Y., 2.
Self, universal and individual, 250; timeless, 189; timeless and empirical, 247, 275; as cause, 304; self and other selves, 187, 249.
Self-consciousness, 253; the unity of, 274 sq.; the condition of free-will, 304.
Self-identity, evidence of, 248.
Selfishness, complete and universal, is unthinkable, 296.
Self-realisation, not merely relative and individual, 296; as moral end, 237, 295.
Selves, individual, not separate, 232; existence of other selves, 187, 249.
Seth, Professor Andrew, 172, 174 sq.
Sexes, equality of, 328 sq.
Sidgwick, Professor Henry, 41, 316.
Similarity as an ultimate category, 163 sq., 194; similarity and identity, 183.
Socialism, 246; and individualism, 42; and the conflict of duties, 259.
Social environment, importance of, 337.

Social organism, 251, 268, 271; varieties of, 300; as ethical end, 299, 322.
Social reformer, difficulties of, 260, 330.
Society, 251; cosmopolitan, 256; application of biological conceptions to, 267; society and its institutions, 317; society and the state, 255.
Socrates, 58, 113, 312.
Solipsism, 187.
Solitude, evil effects of, 316.
Sophists, 328.
Space and time, not illusions, 90 sqq., 190, 208; spiritual world manifested in, 121; spherical space, of more than three dimensions, 150.
Spencer, Herbert, 9, 53, 75, 251, 252, 269, 271, 289; theory of knowledge, 32; on philosophy and science, 66, 284; criticism of Mill, 194.
Spinoza, 115, 200, 208, 239, 250, 267; on the physical and the psychical orders, 96 sqq.; degrees of reality, 211; freedom, 304.
State, differentiated from society, 255; self-preservation as ultimate principle of, 343; state interference, 7, 47; state and church, 53 sq.; spheres of state and individual, 326.
Statesmanship and political science, 254.
Stephen, Sir Leslie, 40, 264, 271.
Stewart, Professor J. A., 123, 202.
Stoics, 68, 242, 310, 312, 314, 325, 332.
Stout, Professor G. F., 165.
Strauss, 334.
Struggle for existence, 292, 318.
Subject and object, 186.
Sufficient reason, principle of, 168, 198.
Suffrage, universal, 338.
Sully, Professor James, 152.
Switzerland a laboratory of political experiment, 48.
Syllogism, Mill's criticism of, 161, 162; adequate for *a fortiori* arguments, 169.
Taylor, Professor A. E., 264.
Tennyson, 309.
Terms, logical, Aristotle's definition of, 153; relation to judgment, 152; intension and extension of, 154, 155; subjective, objective and conventional intension of, 156.
Thackeray, W. M., 17, 161.
Theology, Christian, and Platonism, 127, 128, 202.
Theory of knowledge, 30, 155.
Theory and fact, 71 sq., 92, 146, 264 sq.
Thought, nature of, 185; thought and reality, 183; thought and nature, 335.
Time and space not illusory, 90, 91, 190, 208, 209.
Timeless self, 189, 248, 275.
Toleration, religious, 54 sq.
Tory and Radical, 339.
Toynbee, Arnold, 5, 6, 7.
Trans-subjective knowledge, 176.
Trinity, doctrine of, 61, 127, 202, 241.
Truth and consistency, 146, 188.
Truth, unity of, 185, 199; different kinds of, 142, 143, 145.
Tylor, E. B., 327, 329.

Uniformity of nature, 76, 234.
Universal and particular, 239.

University education, advantage of, 246.
University system, Scottish, 3.
Upton, Professor C. B., 280.
Utilitarianism, 38, 116, 299, 322.

Validity and origin, distinction between, 18 sqq., 57, 77, 78 sq., 268 sq.
Veitch, William, 3.
Virtues, intellectual, 308.

War, South African, 49.
Ward, Professor James, 25, 33, 35, 95 sqq., 104, 106, 107, 109, 197, 267.
Watson, Professor John, 186.
Weber's law, 110.
Will, 185; freedom of, 114, 121, 223, 238, 279, 302 sqq., 309; will and reason, 244; will to live, 292; real will is universal, 243; will of the people, 254.
Worship, 252.

Zeno, 228.

GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD.