PART II

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ACHIEVEMENT

Chapter III

THE UNION OF EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA IN RELATION TO AMERICAN POLICY

Dynamism has become a necessity. Previously it was a matter of choice; those conditions no longer prevail. No one can believe that the present situation may be overcome by immobility. Science has altered every premise of existence; the structure of civilisation must, also, be changed to fit the facts of a new conclusion. The spirit of the Denier must yield to the Dynamism of the Doer. For this reason I have analysed at length in Part I of this book the forces which have created the great Negation, and the circumstances and psychology from which they were born. The analytical and destructive task is done: the dead wood of the mind must be cleared, before new life can come. Now we face the task of construction, and are no longer concerned with critical analysis of existing things except by way of contrast, or as illustration of a difference in principle or method.

The problem has often been stated with much authority and some clarity. It can be reduced in essence to a complete simplicity. The world has shrunk, and man has found the means of complete self-destruction. From these recognised facts it follows that power must extend, and must reside in hands that will prevent the final catastrophe. But it is not enough to enlarge the basis of national power; the extension of patriotism is, also, necessary to support that power. The mind and the spirit of man must grow with the problem. A new spirit must move the peoples, and a new type of man must emerge in Government. Above all, the union of the best must replace the division of all that is vital in Europe. They can only be united in a constructive task for the rescue of our Continent from chaos and misery: men only unite and act together for a real purpose.

Thus, survival now depends upon development, which, in turn, awaits a new dynamism in Statesmanship. Let us, forthwith, face the realities of this situation. The future of the world depends on rapid action by those who are capable of achievement. The nations possessing that capacity are those which have produced great science. Such countries hold the scales of Fate —complete destruction, or construction beyond limit of present concept. In the reality of the present day these nations are America—Britain—France—Germany, and the Latin countries of Europe and South America. In the new conditions of science, which are now the only reality, they contain the future of mankind; in present terms of fact and power the rest is meaningless.

Quality is now everything and quantity is nothing. This statement may offend many, but it remains true. It is necessary now that fact should be stated; unless facts are faced the task is impossible. It is, for instance, difficult enough to unite these nations in a constructive task; it is out of the question in the short time remaining to unite the whole world. Yet, time is now wasted in the attempt to unite the fundamentally divided, and to draw into a new harmony the finally inharmonious. The effort would obviously have to be made if it were necessary either to survival or development: but it is not. If the great countries of the West were united, survival would be assured, because none could challenge their strength. If the same great nations were resolved on a new development of their resources, that achievement could be secured without let or hindrance by any other power; which, indeed, it would not concern. Nothing inhibits them except their own division.

But, before we consider present divisions and inhibitions, let us turn for a moment to the beckoning and enchanting possibility of a constructive work beyond the previous dreams of man. May I postulate, at once, two necessities of the future? The first is that Europe should unite, and the second is that Europe should develop Africa to secure the foodstuffs and raw materials which the Home Continent lacks. Both these propositions are no doubt highly debatable: in present politics the obvious has usually to be debated until it becomes obsolete.

May we, therefore, consider first the wide issue whether the Union of Europe is a necessity, and, later, the further question whether the appended Continent of Africa should provide the natural solution of our present economic troubles, and the best hope for a future development of our new civilisation to a full and complete life. The first proposition that Europe should unite now commands a wide measure of acceptance; it is as old as the thought of Napoleon, or older; so, people have had time to think it over! Once again we observe that a constructive idea, which is intrinsically desirable, only enters the field of the practical when the alternative is complete disaster. The second idea that Africa should be regarded as an Estate of the European, and should be vigorously developed as the chief enterprise of our Continent is so novel, in any practical form, that it is contrary to the whole trend of present thought and inimical to that current conception of morality which, *inter alia*, this book is intended to challenge. The latter must clearly be discussed at some length; the former suggestion that Europe must now unite should scarcely be seriously disputed in the light of present circumstance. It is not a matter of volition, but of compulsion; if we accept the elementary premise that it is desirable that humanity should survive, and reject Mr. Bernard Shaw's very reasonable suggestion that the recent performances of mankind warrant a contrary opinion.

Within Western Europe, and the related Americas, resides the answer to the basic question whether the human species will continue. There dwells the answer to the riddle, because, in any estimate of probability based on historic experience, within that area alone will be found the political energy and scientific capacity either to build a new era or to destroy the world. Is it conceivable that ultimate survival is possible, if science is not only permitted, but encouraged, or compelled, to hurl the thunderbolts of new discovery from nation to nation which are organised in present alignments? Such a picture of future life is as tolerable as a previous vision of the City and the rest of London, or Neuilly and the rest of Paris, organised as independent powers with their private armaments, and able to open

a heavy artillery barrage on the adjoining suburb every time the local Mayors failed to agree on such daily problems as the disposal of the municipal refuse. Once the fact is grasped that the world has shrunk this analogy appears as apposite as it would previously have seemed fantastic.

The End of Isolation

It is no good saying, "Mind Britain's Business," as the writer said in 1939, or "Isolation," as able and patriotic Americans said, if, at any moment, a man somewhere the other side of the Channel, or somewhere the other side of the Atlantic, may press a button which releases a projectile that knocks London or New York flat. In the new circumstances what was plain commonsense becomes equally plain nonsense. Profoundly as I believe that we were right in our general view in the conditions of 1939, for reasons explained in my book, *My Answer*, I am, if possible, yet more convinced that in the new conditions the Extension of Patriotism from nation at least to Continent is an absolute necessity. We were right then to believe that an invading army could not cross the Channel if Britain had a strong Air Force and a modern Navy: we were not invaded although we possessed neither of these assets, and our argument appeared in practice even stronger than we claimed. We were right to say that we should Mind Britain's Business by concentrating on the building of a high standard of civilisation from the neglected wealth of British Empire, because the circumstances of that time gave Britain freedom to make this choice rather than to be drawn into the cauldron of European wars, where only financiers had interests. America, too, had an even greater case for saying the same thing in relation to the Western Hemisphere, because she had an even greater freedom of choice. Britain and America both had freedom of choice at that time if they had rested on their own strength and minded their own affairs; because they could not have been successfully attacked with the weapons of that period if they had been sufficiently armed against any such eventuality. In fact, they were not successfully assaulted even when they had no arms.

So, in my contention, we may claim to have been right at that time; but we should be obviously and absurdly wrong if we adopted that attitude to-day. Since that time every relevant fact has changed. Britain and America can be attacked with success from a remote distance by any power with the technical capacity to deliver the assault. Therefore, they have a vital interest in the area of the world which alone possesses such a standard of science and technique; it is not enough to say they have an interest, their whole life, their very existence is inevitably and irrevocably bound up with the destiny of Europe. Every premise of life and action has changed; not to recognise this is to step over a precipice in the belief that you are still stepping off the pavement. Only cowards surrender their beliefs when they are true; only fools cling to their beliefs when new facts render them no longer true. To live in the world a lifetime without learning anything is a waste of time, even when circumstances do not greatly alter. To live in the world without learning anything, during years in which all things change, is simply to be a fool. It is not now even a question of what is desirable; the situation has become a fact of necessity. Is it sense to sit comfortably in London, talking about British Empire, while the conduct of your politicians drives some despairing German to teach Russians, in a remote retreat behind the Urals, how to complete the Nibelung Saga of our times by blowing up the world? Is it realism, in such conditions, to sit in New York or Chicago with no eyes except for grain prices in the Middle West, or the movements of Wall Street? In 1939, to concentrate on the affairs of your own country was patriotism: in 1947, it is to serve the interests of the one country which desires to destroy your country and, indeed, the civilisation of the world. For, such an attitude can only have the result of giving Russia time, and a free hand, to prepare for the imposition of Communism by force upon all mankind. So, the attitude of a patriot in earlier circumstances becomes the conduct of a conscious, or unconscious, fifth columnist of to-day. It is one of the ironies, by which Fate has brought retribution to the last war's hypocrisy, that the old world has really got its Fifth Column at last; and Com-

munist Parties are so operating in many countries of the world.

The Extension of Patriotism: A Natural Process

We must realise that the Universe has shrunk and none are safe until Patriotism has extended, and the precaution of a wider rule can impose inspection wherever destruction may be prepared. The practical method to eliminate these risks will be considered shortly: at present, we are engaged only in regarding the necessity for a wider union of present nations. We should surely not be required further to argue this necessity when the range of weapons has suddenly jumped from a few to several thousand miles and, at the same time, the force of explosives has been vastly increased by a new and revolutionary principle of science. Nevertheless, such is the obscurantism of human nature, and the selfishness of political vested interests, that a protracted argument is almost certain before the elementary action, which the new circumstances demand, is implemented in some form of European Union. But that necessity is now clear —at least to the stronger intelligences of our time, and it should command rapidly increasing support. The writer is always more concerned to argue propositions whose present necessity is not yet so clear, and to suggest solutions, which are not yet sought, but the near, or remoter, future will certainly demand. So, we can leave shortly the question of European Union to the clatter of present politics, and move forward to regions which such thought has not yet reached.

But some further comment may be added with advantage to the controversy on European Union at this stage. We may enquire whether this Union, which is dictated by necessity, is so unnatural or undesirable at this stage in human affairs. It is simply an acceleration of evolution; it is the speeding up of a natural process which has been evident throughout history. It would be startling, if it were not so familiar, to reflect that the union of England and Wales only took place in 1543, and the union of England and Scotland only obtained in 1707 after centuries of bitter warfare: even so late as 1745 the last Scottish invasion of England succeeded in reaching Derby. Every child

knows these things, and familiarity has robbed subsequent development of its surprising character. The fact remains that the extension of patriotism to embrace the present area of nations is of recent origin even in Britain, and over large regions of the Continent it came later still.

Throughout history the process has been natural and inevitable. As the mind of man grew and his circumstance enlarged, his sense of patriotism extended always in the same natural manner of first embracing his nearest kin, unless the process was traversed by conquest. The village merged with the next village until small kingdoms emerged to cover roughly the area of present counties: only a long and fluctuating history of internecine struggle and savagery, as well as intrusion from the outside world, finally stretched the region of a kingdom so far as to include the territory of a Wessex or Mercia in Saxon days. Only in the eighth century did these Kingdoms begin to lose their "particularism" according to Oman, who observes: "Local patriotism died hard, but it was definitely on the decrease in this age, though the union of all the kingdoms would undoubtedly have taken a much longer time to achieve but for the Danish invasions which taught Angle and Saxon that servitude to the heathen Viking could only be avoided by combination." The moral for the present age need not be pressed further. It is interesting to note that the previous Celtic civilisation had failed to save itself in like manner by some measure of union, and was consequently defeated. According to the description of Lingard: "The population was divided among a multitude of chieftains whose crimes and dissentions had rendered them too attentive to objects of personal feeling or aggrandisement to act with any combined effort against the common enemy." To this may be added the comment of Gildas that such chieftains after defeat used to be "slaughtered . . . not after any examination of their true merits" but because others had triumphed. From the failure of Celtic civilisation it appears that the spirit which leads to Nuremberg leads also to defeat: but these primitive societies possessed, at least, the merit of stripping such occasions of their hypocrisy.

In the wars of the Greek City States, and the civil conflicts of the Roman Republic, it is also possible to trace some ratio between the increase of internecine savagery and the decline of the ability to resist the external pressure of the barbaric challenger. But in those days, at least, the stranger was not invited to the board while you decided the fate of your relations. Rhythmic are the repetitions of History but not always ascendent.

Setting aside these embellishments of human "progress," we can note from history that an extension of national feeling took place to embrace and to unite with the nearest kindred as necessity dictated such a development. That has been the way of nature and of history; attempts rapidly to combine larger or stranger areas by the artificial processes of politics have not evinced the same durability.

The Biological Approach: The Acceleration of Evolution

The difference between our biological approach and the political approach of internationalism is fundamental. For instance, the union of England and Scotland in 1707 was biological and natural, but the union of Britain and Timbuktu at that time would have been neither biological nor natural: in short it would have been that artificial and self-defeating process which has become known as internationalism. For such reasons, the idea of the Union of Europe may be placed in an altogether different category to attempts at internationalism like the League of Nations or the recent United Nations Oganisation. The first is biological, and in harmony with all nature and history: the second is purely political and, in large degree, a violation of both. All lessons of the past indicate that the Union of Europe is likely to succeed; while the political attempts to secure artificial combinations for power politics under a cloak of pseudo-idealism are likely to fail. The inhabitants of Europe and the Americas are related, and have all history and much nature in common. You may blend like with like, but you cannot mix oil and water; these simple facts have, hitherto, been overlooked by the politicians. Their myopia is not a peculiarity of

the present day, because these same realities were, also, not observed by the industrious planners of the Tower of Babel.

We shall return later to the biological problem in an effort to restore some perspective of realism to a question which has been the subject of much nonsense, both in affirmation and negation, but is pregnant with rare possibility for the future. For the moment, it is only necessary to observe that the Union of Europe is merely a continuation of a process which has been manifest throughout History in the tendency to unite with related peoples of adjoining territory, in larger areas of rule and power, as new circumstance and development suggested or compelled. It is clear that the great leap in scientific potential also entails a quicker movement than the normal in the evolutionary unfolding of human relationships. For, science everywhere postulates this increasing rapidity of evolution, if humanity is not to be outstripped by pure mind. We have reached the point where nature must be assisted; the Mother of all in her present conception needs midwifery of Destiny. Deliberately we must accelerate evolution. This may well become a root thought of this Age; it is plainly a necessity. How many have said that man is not equal to the present creations of his mind; has anyone yet dared to say, in what are called practical politics, that we must, therefore, make new men who are equal to such development? It is not only in the relationship of States and their rapid enlargement to a wider unity, that we need more speed. Also we must accelerate the evolution of man. We must lay before humanity, as a religion, the deliberate striving for a higher form upon this earth.

Only higher men can match, and dwell with, the forces which the mind of present man have created. The world will not last long if we flatter the latter into believing that some neo-mythical "age of the common man" has arrived, and that he is a perfect "image of God" under no constraint to surpass his present condition of complete self-complacency, which is as pathetic as it is absurd. The present creed of reducing all to the ordinary, or below it, is not merely a denial of normal nature which works slowly to higher forms of the future, through the outstanding of

the present. It is a complete negation of the first necessity of this age, which is to accelerate evolution by increasing the numbers, and intensifying the gifts and character, of those who are above the ordinary. To such consideration we will return in due course. At present, we need record only the fact that the clamant requirement of this age is to accelerate the evolution of man.

So, when we urge the Union of Europe we are only demanding at once something which all history shows would come in the end by ordinary process of nature. The Englishman, who regards us with fury because we ask him to unite with Frenchmen or German, must be gently told that his glare of patriotic passion merely reflects the equally inspired light in the eye of the Mercian when he was told to stop killing his hereditary enemies in Wessex and to unite for resistance to the Dane. It is true that in the ordinary course he would go on killing Germans or Frenchmen for a few more centuries before his mind enlarged. Unfortunately, however, we cannot spare the time as a new and strange species, called scientists, are making very odd things happen in the world which require a rather quicker tempo in the stately step of evolution, and, painful thought, in the intelligence of man. Therefore, as man has had a thousand years to think the matter over since Wessex and Mercia reluctantly abandoned their traditional pastimes, is it too much to ask him to make the effort to do now what his great-something-grandchildren would do in any case? If not—well—nature has tried and discarded in her striving prodigality many types and species: a lethal chamber, on the latest atomising model, seems to await those who are not quick-witted enough for modern life.

Doer Versus Denier: The "Copernican" Fallacy

We postulate, therefore, that the Union of Europe is a first condition of human survival, and is not so revolutionary a step as may at first appear in that it only anticipates by a short space a process which is bound later to occur. In fact, already a considerable measure of support has been obtained for this

proposal; as usual the main difficulty is not so much to propound paper plans as to get anything actually done in face of that great force of inertia which prevails within the "Democracies." In a more acute form than ever, and within a wider field, the old alignment between the Doers and the Deniers is beginning to take shape. The Doer type, as usual, tries to anticipate disaster by constructive action; the Denier exerts himself only to frustrate the Doer by impeding all action until it is too late in the interests of a *status quo* which he cannot realise is doomed.

This eternal clash of deeply divergent characters will, of course, continue whether or not the Union of Europe takes place.

A view of some *naivete* is advanced in America which suggests that the abolition of present national centres will almost automatically solve all human problems, and eliminate nearly every form of strife from mortal affairs. This standpoint is popularly known as the "Copernican": and rests upon the thesis that the present divisions of mankind originate through regarding world problems from the different angles of the various national capitals, with the result that reasonable men see things quite differently; whereas, if they were all in the same situation, they would see all problems in much the same way. So, the argument appears to run, all that is necessary is to remove the distinction of nationality and thus make the angle of vision the same in all cases: then, at once, and without more ado, something like the millenium will arrive with universal agreement and acclamation.

Unfortunately, real life is not quite so simple as that; in fact, we shall later study certain tendencies which indicate that the purpose, as well as the phenomena, of life is a good deal more complex. It is quite true, as we have long contended, that an enlargement of national boundaries at least to Continental dimensions is a prerequisite of survival. But a further, and eternal, dynamism is no less a condition of continuing survival: on this earth there is no repose, and each triumph of the mind presents fresh and greater challenge to the will. It is one of the fallacies of a certain type of neo-religious reformism that at some given point a stable and perpetual condition of blessed

repose is reached. The feeble wish is always father to the feebler thought, and the achievement of the magic state is usually to be reached through some incantatory word like "Socialism"; which the votaries often cannot even define. In this case the word of enchantment is "Internationalism," and the world of complete repose is usually to be obtained by such a wide embrace of such completely conflicting and diverse types, in such an entirely unnatural union, that the prospects of the desired quiet life are almost as probable as the "peace" which is to be obtained by locking up a tiger and a wild boar in the same cage. We have dealt elsewhere with the fallacies of the old Internationalism, and will not repeat the argument that attempts to introduce universal brotherhood by too close a blending of the completely incompatible can have no result but universal conflict. Setting aside the manifest illusions of the old "Internationalism," which have been amply demonstrated at innumerable "conferences," we have yet to admit that even the natural biological approach to a Continental Union among related peoples will not mark the end of human problems or the necessity for effort. In fact, as in the development of human character, each fresh achievement brings greater problems to evoke yet greater exertions of the mind and will.

More than ever, in the new age of science continued development is the condition of survival. Europe must unite to avert imminent disaster; but the great argument will still continue. More than ever will the division between the mind of the Doer and that of the Denier by accentuated. On the victory of the former in the hearts of the peoples will depend the future of the world. Survival and development will be increasingly interdependent; dynamism will become more than ever a necessity. But it may be generally anticipated that in a wider union the prospects for dynamic action will be improved: much that is static and inert will plainly have to disappear in the process, and the necessity for new and constructive thought will be obvious to many who are not normally moved by a yearning for change. A new period of flux and becoming is inevitable before a new civilisation crystallises within new boundaries: this will provide

not only an opportunity but a demand for the dynamic in thought and in character. The Denier will be at a certain disadvantage in a society within which something plainly has to be done, and for that reason would, of course, be inclined to resist any move towards it; if Fate had not been so harsh as to place an Atom Bomb under his present seat, with the result that this limited space will shortly feel untenable even to his yet more restricted intelligence. So, reluctantly, the Denier will transfer his resistance to life and achievement to a wider sphere, where, however, his prospects of successful lethargy are unlikely to be quite so roseate as they were in the island of Britain until the recent war.

Both history and more recent experience combine to teach us that any view is much too ingenuous which holds that a larger union will mean the end of argument; the most that we can ever hope is that it will mean the elimination of conflict between scientific nations whose new capacities provide them with the means of national and, indeed, of world destruction. The great argument between the Doer and the Denier will only be translated into a wider sphere in a yet more vivid form. It will almost certainly cut right across the previous division of nations, and men from all the previous national alignments will be found on either side of the discussion directly the existing boundaries of the main European nations have been removed. The Division of the Soul will replace the Division of the Soil: in the conditions of the present time it has become more natural. This is bound to happen directly the peoples decide to merge in a larger union and so to extend patriotism; and, when that is done, it is right that it should occur. From this great shake of the dice of destiny will be thrown a new dynamism in the service of high achievement.

"THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA"

The Absence of Alternative

In present circumstances it can hardly be contested that a new spirit of construction is needed. The great and decisive task, which awaits such an effort of new constructive energy

from a united Europe, is the development of Africa. Those, who are accustomed to think in terms of old world economics, and of a situation which no longer exists, will no doubt deride the suggestion of any such necessity. If they think such an idea is unorthodox to the point of the bizarre let them suggest any alternative which will work. They have had more than two years already since the end of the war in which to think out their answer, and it is not yet forthcoming. So far, their only action in the matter has been an alternation between international conferences, which have produced nothing, and requests to America for loans, which have so far been more productive than the Conferences, but cannot be expected for ever to obviate the necessity for fresh thought and self-help.

In basic terms, Europe must develop Africa for two reasons: the first is that Europe requires food and raw materials, and the second is that within the limits of the existing system we cannot find the means to pay for them. Each of the great nations and, in particular, France and Britain, have made great appeals for export drives to provide the foreign currency to pay for the needed exports. Britain set a target for an immense increase in pre-war exports in a world which presents less opportunity for her export industries than the conditions prevailing before 1939. During the six years of war previous customers developed their own local industries in an intensification of a process which was becoming marked in the decade of 1930. If a great export nation denies its customers all supplies in order to fight a war over that period of time, it cannot be surprised if they take steps either to supply themselves or to obtain the goods elsewhere. The first process means the development of local industries, and the second entails the formation of a habit of buying from other exporting nations: neither event was good for British exports. Both these factors clearly mean a great diminution of export opportunity for nations which were long engaged in the European war. Yet such countries as Britain and France set an export target far above their pre-war figures. It should not be surprising to any mind capable of analytical thought that the results proved disappointing. Moreover, the full shock

of the new situation clearly could not be felt until American home needs had been fully satisfied, and the immense surplus of a war-increased American productive power had washed into the remaining export markets of the world.

A temporary, but only partial, offset to these factors might provide a delusive reassurance in a mistaken policy by reason of the absence for the time being of ex-enemy countries from world markets, and the provision of a short-lived sellers' market in the post-war shortage of goods. The latter factor was bound soon to be eliminated by a war-stimulated productive power, and the former would not endure for ever. Sooner or later the war-exhausted nations have to face the fact that their war-neglected markets have shrunk as much as their own energies have been reduced. Within the limits of their system they have to solve the problem how to sell far more exports to obtain their new raw material requirements than they were able to sell before the war, and how to sell this larger volume of exports in a market of smaller capacity. To this problem so far their only answer is bigger and better international conferences to persuade former customers either to scrap their own industries, which they have recently developed, or to break their new habits of trade connections which they have formed over years while we were busy elsewhere. The former request will plainly be treated with derision, and the latter will only be considered if we can provide better goods at cheaper prices: men do not break habits except under strong inducement. Therefore, the only hope that can emerge from such a situation is success in a desperate price-cutting competition in the production of cheaper goods. As all the war nations would enter the game together, under the declared lead of Britain and France, it is not difficult to imagine the results. The end can only be a bigger scramble than before the war for a smaller prize. The nations all want to sell abroad more exports than before in order to obtain more imports; but this available market for these exports must be smaller rather than larger for reasons given above.

All this, of course, does not even take into account a factor which the writer analysed at length in previous books: namely

the development of cheap oriental labour by Finance Capitalism to undercut European labour in the markets of the world. For the moment, that factor is mitigated by the temporary absence of Japan and the destruction of much oriental productive power by war. But, just wait until "Free India" as well as "Free China" and other newly "emancipated" oriental countries, as an inevitable result of weak governments and corrupt social systems, pass more than ever under Western financial exploitation, or another and worse exploitation conducted by men of similar aspect, but longer whips, who are entitled Commissars. If present world tendencies continue, we shall witness from these sources a growing stream of competition in sweated production such as the West has never previously had to face. The experiences of Lancashire and Yorkshire from Japanese competition, in the decade of 1930, will be negligible in comparison with the part the Orient can play in undercutting Western industry in the decade of 1950 under the operation of the international system to which all the great "Democracies" adhere.

The Loss of Old Markets and Resources

But, setting aside for the moment all question of oriental competition, can any serious hope exist of our import requirements being satisfied by selling on world markets a far greater volume of goods than we were able to sell before the war, particularly when the much needed imports come from America, and we can only pay for them with goods that country does not want and will not accept? As noted above, our only hope of exporting so much is by succeeding in a price-cutting competition with all other great nations in a scramble for world markets. A price-cutting competition can only be won either by great efficiency or by cutting wages: the first cannot be achieved under the bureaucratic controls of a Labour Government, and the second would not be permitted by the Trade Unions which control the Labour Government (and in the second respect the writer experiences the rare felicity of being on their side). So, what hope have we in such a competition, and what prospect

have we of obtaining thereby the raw materials and foodstuffs which we cannot produce at home? Even if we win, some other nation must lose. It is doubtful, for instance, whether even Britain and France could both succeed in implementing their programmes, which are antithetical rather than complementary, in the restricted conditions of this competition. Room for all does not exist in the old world market which has been reduced by local production, and for which more countries are producing more exports.

This world situation is becoming more and more like a macabre game of musical chairs, played for the prize of food by starving men: on the one remaining chair of the shrunken world market will be found in the end the strongest player, who least needs the prize of food—America. Let no smaller player be reassured by the fact that the big man has not yet entered the game; he has been kept busy at home for the time being, but the rules which govern his present existence will impel him to enter the export game to some tune when the home work is exhausted. And what of the prize for which all contend?—the raw materials and foodstuffs of the world? They are not so plentiful as before the war, and the reason is not only the dislocation of production caused by war; which could be repaired. Can we be sure that these supplies from the old sources will be available as they were before the war? Before giving any confident answer our opponents should glance, for example, at rising figures of soil erosion. In this sphere the folly of man has again made a contribution to the destruction of recent years. Even America has been warned that this single factor of erosion may prove an Achilles heel to her great strength. All over the world many of the old resources have been just fooled away. And the reason?—precisely that frenzy of international competition which prevailed before the war, and is bound to be intensified in the new conditions if the same system and psychology is permitted to operate. The soil was neglected and exploited, because cheapness for competitive purposes governed all. It was cheaper to farm badly than to farm well, and cheapness in food production was important to the international

dumping game by which quick profits were knocked out of agriculture in some countries, and ruin was knocked into agriculture in other countries. Now the world pays for past follies as it contemplates a repetition of the same mistakes on a greater scale.

So, in summary, we ask two questions. Can we find means to pay for our imports by increasing exports for a diminishing world market: can we be sure that these raw materials and foodstuffs will always be there to import, even if we can manage to pay for them? It will take a good many international conferences to talk down these two questions! Even if such a Conference unanimously accepted a Heaven-drafted resolution, proposed by Great Britain, to the effect that every nation in the world would stop doing foolish things and start doing wise things, would cease to be selfish and would work only for the good of all, would stop chattering and start building—even if all lions agreed to lie down with all lambs, if all diplomats grew wings and all swords turned by magic to ploughshares—some little time would elapse before even a Committee, headed by the brightest lawyer in the Labour Party, could provide every nation with all the food and raw materials it required. May we, therefore, not be thought too cynical if we do not await this millenium, but turn our backs on the methods of Babel Internationalism which have wasted the time of mankind for the lifetime of more than a generation. In terms of realism we cannot sell in the old markets sufficient exports to buy the raw materials and foodstuffs we want: and, moreover, it is very doubtful whether the old supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials will long be available in sufficient quantity to satisfy even a fraction of requirement.

The Illusions of the Old Internationalism

We are, therefore, driven to seek a new area which can produce such raw materials and foodstuffs as we cannot produce, and is also able to accept in return our manufactured exports. A new region is indicated for such a purpose, in which extensive local industries have not already developed: a planned economy is

only possible with a fresh start. If such a thought is still rejected, let us consider a little more the difficulties and delays of the economic policy of the present British Government, which aims at securing a larger world market by what is termed " the division of labour and the development of specialisation " in existing industrialised countries by means of international conferences. If this phrase, which was used by the spokesmen of the Labour Government at Geneva in April, 1947, in opening a series of international conferences, has any any meaning, it implies that all great nations will agree to scrapping existing industries which do not comply with the formula. For example, if a conference decided that certain goods could be more appropriately developed by the " specialisation " of British labour than by " specialisation " in Canada or the Argentine, the latter countries must close down such industries in order to provide a balance between their primary products and Britain's manufactured exports. Since the Free Trade economics of last century's Manchester School have long ago ceased to operate, the body of world trade has to be carved up and sewn together again to conform to this model. If this is not the meaning of this policy, what does it mean? And what conceivable hope of success does it possess? Quite apart from the stimulus of the war to many many great countries to develop their own manufacturing industries, great and capable nations would never in the long run be content merely to be producers of foodstuffs and raw materials.

The diversification of industry became a very necessary precaution after their unfortunate experience of " putting all their eggs in one basket "; which was then used as a football in financial speculation. So, the process of local industrialisation was replacing import of manufactured goods in all great countries long before the war: it was merely accentuated and accelerated by war. Preposterous is now the suggestion to reverse the whole process by a series of resolutions at international conferences in the hope of persuading all industrial nations to scrap, or develop, existing industries according to some academic international plan, which is based on some theory of appropriate " specialisa-

tion and division of labour" by each nation. Just conceive the delays which would occur before even the first of the vested interests, in the first of the affected countries, had been overcome. Yet it is suggested that the policy can be implemented in all countries simultaneously and quickly: the awkward squad of the whole world is to fall in at Geneva and march off in quick step to the millenium under the gentle persuasion of a little economic theorising of a very obsolete kind. All this, also, has to be done in time to enable British exports to find a far greater market than pre-war, before America gets tired of lending money! On such fantastic illusions Britain, and Europe as a whole, are requested to rest not only the hopes of an industrial future but their hope of avoiding early starvation. We have spent the lifetime of a generation at international conferences asking other nations, in effect, to scrap their own industries and distort their economies in order to restore Britain's long-vanished export hegemony; because British statesmanship has been incapable of fresh thought to meet fresh facts. After the last war and the further development of local industries we have about as much chance of success as the classic petition of the candle-makers for the suppression of the Sun in the interests of their business.

The Obsolescence of Conservative Empire Policy

Conservative Empire policy is faced with almost exactly the same difficulties in "Imperial Preference"; any prospect of large-scale success, which that policy ever possessed, has been greatly reduced by the development of local industries in all the great Dominions during the war. This process had begun in the Dominions, as well as other countries, long before 1939: it was also accelerated by the cessation of British supplies during a period of over six years. In any case, it is as idle to hope that the great Dominions will remain for ever in the relatively primitive state of simple primary producers as it is to desire that other advanced countries will inhibit the development of their own secondary industries in order to provide a perpetual market for our exports in exchange for their foodstuffs and raw

materials. As already noted, in another aspect, all white countries tend more and more to a diversified and balanced economy. This trend is bound to increase rather than diminish as science provides means of producing almost anything, nearly anywhere, with but slight variation in any factor of cost which does not derive from wage and skill. For instance, the particularly humid climate of Lancashire originally provided an exceptional capacity to produce cotton goods which gave Britain a virtual hegemony of world markets. Science can now artificially produce such conditions even in a climate so dry as Australia. The old argument of the "Manchester School" that goods should only be produced in places particularly suitable for their production has long been largely vitiated by science, and will soon be entirely obsolete. The place and local conditions are already a very minor factor in relation to the question of skill and capacity for organisation; how many industrialists would now contend that climate was nearly as important as stability in labour conditions?

The industrial policy of the old Parties rests as surely on the industrial conditions of the last century as their system of training for the next war is always based on the conditions of the last war. All their efforts to persuade advanced countries, whether Dominions or Foreign, to check the development of manufacturing industries in order to provide a balance for our unbalanced economy can be reduced to a simple absurdity—we are asking them to ruin themselves for our benefit. Their resistance to that suggestion withstood the sonorous platitudes of the elder Labour Leaders, and the younger Conservative Leaders, at international conferences, for twenty-one years between the two world wars. After the inevitable development of their secondary industries, during the long and rude interruption of international conferences while the second war proceeded, they are still less likely to be responsive to the speeches of the new generation of Labour Leaders, who suffer both from a worse case and less eloquence. Whatever temporary alleviation of the position may be brought by such devices as Imperial Preference, it is plain that in present conditions we

cannot find a market for a great increase in our pre-war volume of exports either in the Dominions or in any other advanced countries which are interested in the development of their own industries, and do not wish to remain entirely rural populations or simple producers of primary products.

Britain should seek every opportunity of developing Dominion trade by direct bargaining; but in a manner which takes into account the natural and inevitable development of these advanced countries. It is in the sphere of mutual security, and cultural development, that blood relationship will draw Britain and the Dominions ever closer together in the future; that great communion is vital to the service which both Mother country and the Dominions can render in building the new civilisation of the future. But, rapid new trade developments can more easily take place in the Colonies, where existing industries would not be adversely affected.

It is necessary to sweep away illusions before any real prospect can be cleared to the vision: when this is done we are faced with the plain fact that we have to find a place which can supply us with raw materials and some foodstuffs in exchange for our manufactures. It must be an area which cannot supply these manufactured goods itself, and it is better if it is a region under our own control within which we can plan in advance a balanced economy, and thus prevent a repetition of the events which have reduced us to our present position.

Africa the Key

Africa is the key to all, for the following reasons: (1) It can produce any foodstuffs and raw materials we require; (2) In our African colonial possessions local industrialisation so far scarcely exists; (3) We control these regions and can thus plan a permanent economy by which their primary products are developed in exchange for our manufactures. We start with a clean slate, in our own possession, and can write on it the plan of the future. All development is within our own power and awaits only our own ability and energy. The relationship of

the British effort in Africa to that of the rest of Europe will be discussed shortly. Let us first consider the method of African development I propose for Great Britain, which is equally suitable for adoption in Africa by other European countries. The subject has, so far, scarcely been touched by any practical development or even by any theory of a plan. The effort of the Labour Party was wholly concentrated on international conferences to restore pre-war markets with hopes of success we have already analysed. The younger Conservative Leaders have received their only political training in the same school. At this time of writing the only suggestion of the Labour Party for African development is to use 150,000 acres in the whole of Africa during the first year of a plan to grow Ground Nuts! The ratio of their abilities to the potential of Africa is about the same as that acreage to the total dimensions of that Continent!*

Yet, a survey of modern tendencies in all the old world markets, whether foreign or Dominions, can only reach the conclusion that in Africa alone resides any substantial hope of obtaining the foodstuffs and raw materials we cannot produce at home in a natural balance of exchange with our manufactured goods. Moreover, in Africa we shall be able to obtain these primary products far more cheaply than in the Western Hemisphere, with the consequence that it will not be necessary to send in exchange nearly so large a proportion of our home production, and that our home standard of life can be proportionately higher. Both the practice and ethics of this conception will be considered shortly. Let us first press to a conclusion the enquiry what practical policy either of the Old Parties possess to meet the economic crisis?

Labour and Conservative Futility in Colonial Development

In the region of Colonial development, what improvement

*See footnote on Page 52 (Part I) concerning subsequent proposals of the Labour Party, after two years of office, to spend £100 millions on African development as compared with their previous proposals, at the end of one year, to spend over £2,400 millions on buying up obsolete industries in Great Britain.

is offered by Conservative policy on the complete inhibition upon all effective development in Africa presented by the official policy of the Labour Party, which declares that the "native inhabitants" must be able, "in the shortest possible time, to govern themselves"? Conservatism begins by affirming the same governing principle as the Labour Party, which was expressed by the leading organ of Conservative Imperialism in the words, "for the Colonies self-government is and always has been the aim." Beyond this inhibiting principle, the nearest approach to a constructive policy was advanced by a Conservative spokesman in the House of Commons on March 24, 1947: in the words "a much more fruitful course for us would be in the development of the Colonial Empire and its industrialisation. Markets for machinery could be available there in no very distant time. In Nigeria alone there was coal in formations which extended for 500 miles." This speech followed shortly after a recapitulation by the writer of that constructive policy in relation to Africa which we shall now consider at greater length. Let us note first the Conservative sense of urgency when confronted by crisis: "markets could be available there for machinery in no very distant time." May we ask, what market? Nigeria is inhabited largely by a species which became known to newspaper fame as the Ju-Ju men. Is it suggested that their executive capacity, and capital resources, are going to develop Nigeria? If not, who provides this vague market for British machinery in "no very distant time"? Is it suggested that British industrialists will buy the machinery and throw their energies and resources into the development of that territory, and of Africa as a whole? If so, are they likely to be attracted by the principle which governs Conservative policy as well as that of the Labour Party: "for the Colonies self-government is and always has been our aim"? It is an alluring prospect to devote a lifetime of energy, and every stake of fortune, to the development of Africa, in order at the end to be placed under the Government of the Ju-Ju- men?

British enterprise has already experienced the result of being placed under the government of a far higher type than the

Nigerians, who possess at least a very high degree of spiritual civilisation. After generations of developing India, British enterprise is now reaping the fruit of such principles. Will this experience encourage the energy of British industrialists to enter Africa in the certainty that at the end of all their exertions they will be placed under the "self government" of complete savages? If Conservative, as well as Labour, policy does not mean this, words have no meaning. In fact, it must mean this, if all the silly cant which the Old Parties have turned out for years, in a competition of humbug, is not to appear as a huge hypocrisy to a generation whom they have educated in principles of complete absurdity; which must lead to the final frustration of all executive action. So, Conservatism is left in the position that no individual in his senses would develop Africa under the limitation of the principles which they lay down; while this Party, in addition, rejects all State Action, on principle. Characteristically, they can only think of the State as a negative and never as a positive. Action by the State can only mean to them the grabbing of other people's money in the manner of the Labour Party. The concept of a creative State is beyond their furthest imagining. While, as for the Labour Party, the action of the State means to them merely the buying of obsolete industries which others have created, at the taxpayers' expense. That limited task alone they feel to be within the range of their capacity, as we have already noted in the first chapter. The concept of the Creative State as a great Pioneer of vast new enterprise demands an altogether new order of mind and will.

Yet, we must advance to this new conception of State Action, which is truly revolutionary in terms of present thought, but is plain sense in terms of reality. The State should be concerned with great things; not with small things! The task of the State is to create, not merely to appropriate what others have created. The mission of the State is to be a Leader in new enterprise, not just a parasite on old enterprise. The work of the State is to construct, not to restrict. The true function of the State is to create new things: not just to take over old things. To such end the State needs Doers and not Deniers; the State needs

Executives and not Bureaucrats. The latter may still be used to look after old drainage systems; but the former are now wanted to make a new Continent. In short, our Idea of State Action is the exact opposite of the present idea of State Action.

Principle and Method of Creative State Action

The action of the State in such an enterprise differs fundamentally from bureaucratic action in the conduct of a nationalised industry, or in the regimentation of private industry for official purposes within an already industrialised community. Also, it varies greatly and inevitably from the usual practices of private enterprise in a developed but free economy. In the pioneer work of opening up virgin territory the action of the State should resemble much more an operation of war; and must be governed by something of the same principles. It is an enterprise beyond the scope of any private enterprise, and is very different to any normal condition of trade. It possesses a definite and limited objective in the primary development of a new territory; just as an operation of war has the definite and limited objective of defeating the enemy. Neither are concerned with the niceties of marketing: a study of the customers' tastes is not relevant to their business. All that delicate finesse in adjustment to, and service of, varying demand, which is one of the main functions of private enterprise, does not enter the picture either in war or in the large-scale development of new territory. Demand is unlimited, until the task is done, for a type of material and construction which can be produced *ad hoc* and on a large scale. In practice, it has been found in war that it is not necessary to "nationalise" every industry which produces the material to be used: in fact, it has been found so undesirable that not even the most doctrinaire Socialists have been known to suggest it, when their lives, and that of the Community, were at stake. The luxuries of universal nationalisation and bureaucratic management are reserved for infliction upon the nation in times of Peace, with results which are now beginning to be observed. War is too serious a matter to be left to Bureaucrats, and an altogether different method has to be employed. The principle

is the co-ordination of private enterprise by the State. Our new concept of State Action in peace is neither "Nationalisation" nor undirected private enterprise.

Let all the doctrinaires reflect for a moment on practical things. It was not laid down that no component of a Mulberry harbour should be produced except in a State-owned factory. It was not ordained that the project should not proceed until some non-existent private enterprise on the coast of Normandy had provided a "market for our machinery" by placing a private order for a Mulberry with a private British firm at "no very distant date." It was an operation of war; the State gave the orders; the various tasks were allocated to a variety of responsible people, in a hierarchy of order and discipline; in fact, the State directed and co-ordinated, but did not conduct the whole work itself: yet the job was well done and quickly done. But no one could call it, in the doctrinaire sense of the old Parties, either Socialism or Private Enterprise. It was real State Action of a creative character, and on a great scale, which used every existing resource for a real end of achievement. Why are such things only possible in war? It must be admitted that such method could be used with far greater effect in the calmer and more deliberate atmosphere of peace, which makes possible organisation, in place of the improvisation which is necessary in war. And it is insufficient reply to say that the English people can only improvise and not organise; that is equivalent to saying that they are only active under compulsion, in other words that they are idle. A new generation may disprove this charge in a deliberate act of great creation.

In this connection, too, it may be commented that an ultra-sensible people does not exert itself until it must. The mass of the people are immersed in diurnal matters, until the necessity of crisis compels attention to more serious things and, in the circumstances of a war whose approach has been unnoticed, they turn to improvisation because they were not awake in time to organise. Such is the inevitable result of a prosperous absorption in small things, until a sudden danger arises. But the failure of a civilisation, which is a crisis of peace, and not of war, does not

come like a thief in the night. A long, slow, ever-developing pressure of suffering on the mass of the people heralds its approach. Such an event is different to any previous experience of a people who are as famous for their capacity to improvise as they are notorious for their incapacity to organise. In such circumstances, it may not be too much to ask them seriously to organise in advance to meet a menace to their life and to find a way out from disaster.

The Analogy of War

The plan which we suggest is the development of Africa, and we propose that the resources of the nation should be mobilised for this enterprise on the principles just outlined. It is equivalent to an operation of war, and the methods employed should resemble those which experience has proved to be essential to the conduct of successful war. But, in such a long-term project, the improvisation and muddle with which war usually begins could be eliminated. In Great Britain, in particular, it always takes a long time at the beginning of a war before bureaucratic methods are abandoned, or even reduced, and the executive type is called in for the employment of an efficient method. In fact, it takes so long that the war is nearly lost before the necessary change takes place. Even armies are strangled in red tape until gradually the stress of circumstances enables the executive individual to cut through. Generally, the red tape persists, in large degree, to the end, because the principles of realism are never frankly faced, and fearlessly and openly adopted. Within a "Democracy" the real things by which wars are won, or anything achieved, are always "under the counter." Even so, it works and the nation survives, when it has a great material preponderance and surplus of latent strength in relation to the task. It will not work when Britain is really up against it and the margin of success is small. The famous "blind eye" of British history is very romantic and it won despite all the deadheads: but two open eyes, in clear and unrestricted command of a given task, would be better still. So we ask for the conscious adoption of the Leadership

principle as the executive method in the opening up of Africa on the lines of a planned operation of war.

It is true that "Democracy" in Britain has managed to run even wars to some extent by committees and get away with it, but the fortune described in Chapter II, Part I will not always recur, and it certainly will not always have the same margin in hand for the practical tasks of the future. It is a fact that the "Democracies" won the war despite their only partial supersession of the Committee and Bureaucratic method in favour of the Leadership Principle, which that stress imposed in large degree. But, just consider the margin of strength in relation to their opponents when the combined resources in man power and material of America, Britain, France and Russia are assessed and measured against the resources of the Axis powers. A very short study of the mathematics of the matter would dispel any illusion that the "Democracies" owed victory to the greater efficiency of their system. Despite an overwhelming superiority in natural strength and resources, it was a very close thing. When a fourteen-stone man fights a ten-stone man, and ends a victor by a very narrow margin in a very exhausted condition, he cannot claim that his skill and method are the better. Conversely, when a light man fights a big man it is not enough for him to be better; it is essential for him to be overwhelmingly superior in skill if he is to win.

Leadership Principle

In facing the tasks of peace in the light of the lessons of war, we postulate Creative State Action in place of negative State repression, and the Leadership principle in place of Bureaucracy. A "Democracy" might, of course, choose to employ Bureaucracy in such a project as the development of Africa, instead of the Leadership Principle; such a policy would, at least, provide employment to many who do not normally find that condition easy to attain, even if the results were not so profitable for the Community. But, before the method of the Leadership principle is rejected in such an enterprise, let everyone, at least, be clear as to what it is, and what it is not. The

Leadership principle is not the dictatorship of one man: the suggestion is absurd. One man cannot do everything, and, in fact, no man can achieve anything without a host of willing colleagues. His achievement is then in proportion to his ability to evoke the ardour of able men for his ideas.

On the other hand, the Leadership principle does mean that one definite individual is responsible for each task whether it be great or small. Whether the work be the most important or the least important, a person and not a Committee is responsible for it. He is responsible to someone above him, and someone below him is responsible to him. The man at the head of the Government is responsible to the people as a whole. Whether a large or small undertaking be successful or a failure, everyone knows who is responsible for it, and that individual can shelter neither behind a Committee nor any other excuse. The principle is—give a man a job to do and sack him if he fails to do it. That principle goes, whether he is the head of a State, responsible to the whole people and liable to their dismissal, or the man who "sweeps up the dirt" and is responsible to the head cleaner of that particular building. Under the Leadership principle the man who does the job knows where he is, and everyone else knows where he is. There is no ambiguity, and responsibility is always clear: that is the first principle of executive action. In fact, it always has been the first principle of achievement since the world began: that is why institutions like armies, which have to do or die, are never run by committees. For such real purposes the "Leadership principle" has to be employed, and to the extent that this principle replaces the Bureaucratic method success has been secured in war. No one will suggest running an Army by a committee of Civil Servants; war is too serious. In war, too, the leadership principle of responsible individuals tends to replace the bureaucratic method in the direction of industry; it becomes a matter not of choice but of compulsion, when red tape has to be cut in a desperate situation. So, in war, "Democracy" tends to turn to methods of realism, not because it likes them, but because it must. Is it too much to ask that something of this spirit should

be shown in a situation of nominal peace, which threatens a condition as serious as war? For such a purpose we suggest that Executive Government should direct the general policy of industry, but not interfere in daily business. The chiefs of industry should be responsible to the Government for the carrying out of general policy. Those engaged in industry would, in turn, be responsible to their industrial chiefs for the detail of the plan. At each stage the chain of individual responsibility would be definite and clear.

This is the Leadership principle which is the opposite of that Bureaucracy which is the creation of Social Democracy. The latter plans just enough to paralyse everything, but never enough to do anything. It controls the producer and leaves free the parasite; so the best go down and the worst come up. Instead of telling an executive individual what is wanted, and holding him responsible for doing it, "Democracy" imposes Committee management and bureaucratic control. Instead of laying down a national plan and holding individual industrialists responsible for carrying out their allotted part of the work, a mass of civil servants are sent to bind them hand and foot in the daily conduct of their businesses. Clear direction is replaced by muddled control; freedom is lost without the gain of efficiency. Under the system we suggest, on the contrary, anyone would be free to manage his own affairs provided he conformed to the national plan. Under the present system, no one is free to manage his own affairs, but no national plan exists to which he can conform.

No more need be written of a controversial character at this stage. Europe can, of course, unite, and can essay to develop Africa with any patchwork muddle of bureaucratic committees, if it wishes: it is always open to great peoples to add another chapter to the tragic comedy of History! But a plea is entered here for a realistic and effective method, before we turn to other aspects of this question.

Relations of State and Private Enterprise

Whatever executive method is employed for the development of Africa, it is evident that only State Action, on a great scale,

will possess any chance of success. The task is much too big for Private Enterprise, even if it were not required to work under the shadow of current cant, such as the phrase: "for the Colonies, self-government is and always has been the aim," which simply means that the Black will ultimately be permitted to fuddle away what the White has created. We shall return later to the profound realities of the biological problem and the ethical considerations involved. At present it is only necessary to note that the pioneer task is too big for Private Enterprise, even if such enterprise could be attracted to the task by a reversal of the extraordinary values which would rob the European of the fruits of his labours in the attempt to establish a chimerical native self-government. The White Atlas will not attempt to lift the world on his shoulders, if, in the end, his world is to be handed over to someone who merely watched him do it, or was meantime playing with witch doctors in the jungle. In any case, Private Enterprise is not strong enough to play the Atlas role in this matter. A measure of real State Action is, therefore, required, which is as remote from the Labour conception of "Nationalising" obsolete industries at home as it is from Conservative *laissez faire*. But, private enterprise will still have a very vital role to play within the broad boundaries of the whole plan, which will be laid down by the Creative and Directive State.

In principle, it is not difficult to sort out the respective functions of the State and Private Enterprise. The role of the State should be confined to the equivalent of an operation of war, which is the opening up of the new territory. The role of private enterprise is not to participate directly in this process, but to follow it with that infinite diversification of lesser enterprise which builds a complex and desirable civilisation. The pioneer work is too big for private enterprises: but the creation of diverse industries and trading, and the marketing of their products, is much too complex for the State. Properly regarded, the parts of the State and Private Enterprise are complementary and not antithetical. The State can do what Private Enterprise cannot do, and Private Enterprise can do what the State cannot

do. The State alone can conduct a big *ad hoc* undertaking, such as the landing in Normandy or the pioneer development of a new Continent. What it cannot do is to manage what should be competitive businesses catering for the subtle variations in human tastes; but this latter is precisely what our doctrinaire Socialists try to make it do by the vicious principle of forcing the people to adapt their tastes to the fads and whims of Civil Servants. This imposes servitude instead of offering service; which should be the attitude of the State to the people. A State is a tyrant which says you must ride in a train instead of a bus, because all transport is in the hands of the State and the Civil Servants have decided that you must. A State is a good servant of the people if it opens up the resources of a new Continent for the nation by a great measure of creative organisation; instead of only using such methods for the conduct of foolish and unnecessary wars, which leave the country exhausted and impoverished. This is not to say, of course, that the State should refrain from laying down the broad boundaries within which Private Enterprise may be conducted; such indifference leads to the chaos of *laissez faire* in which Finance rules when Government abdicates. The Creative and Directive State must lay down certain limits which may not be transgressed, and, broadly speaking, they must represent the welfare of the country as a whole. Within these wide boundaries of the National well-being, Private Enterprise should be entirely free. While it serves it should be free both in enterprise and profit; when it exploits the strong hand of the Organic and Dynamic State should immediately descend.

The Conditions of Private Enterprise

In the case of African development it would, of course, be very necessary for the State to define in advance the kind of industry which Private Enterprise may develop. The whole purpose of the project would be frustrated if Finance-Capital could come along and develop manufacturing industries in competition with British industries. It would be a nice game for an uncontrolled finance to take advantage of the pioneer work of the State by developing manufacturing industries with cheap,

sweated black labour to undersell British goods on the home and world market. That is precisely what would happen, of course, when both Labour and Conservative policies handed back the fruits of white development to the nominal rule of helpless natives, and a swarm of financial racketeers moved in to " develop native industries." That is the kind of thing which always happens under the " humanitarian " principles of the Old Parties; and the process is greatly aided by all the humbug which is talked about native freedom: in practice, it generally amounts to freedom to be thrown into industrial slavery, because government has abdicated the duty of defending those who cannot protect themselves.

More than ever in this sphere will it be necessary for the strong State to save the people from exploitation and the general plan from sabotage. To that end the State must impose two conditions. The first condition will be that only industries may be developed which serve the general plan. The second condition will govern, under rigorous safeguards, the proper standards of native labour. In the first respect the development of no industry will be permitted which is competitive with, rather than complementary to, British industry: this means, in particular, that industrial development will be of a primary character, which is confined to foodstuffs and raw materials. In the second respect, a standard of life for native labour will be laid down on Factory Act lines (*mutatis mutandis*) and rigorously enforced. The standard enjoyed by the native can easily be higher than that he at present possesses under the industrial exploitation which has already begun. On the other hand, it is clear that even a much higher standard than prevails at present will still enable the production of raw materials and foodstuffs, which we cannot produce at home, at a much cheaper rate than any price at which we can now procure them elsewhere. Output and cheapness will be assisted by the operation of much modern machinery, which can be worked by a proportion of enterprising white labour of skilled capacities that will be attracted by the large rewards which the new wealth can afford to offer. White labour will do the skilled work at a higher

reward than it can now command: Black labour will do the unskilled work in much better conditions than it now suffers. With the aid of modern machinery, and vast natural resources, both output and cheapness can surpass anything yet known. Modern scientific method can have full scope where no previous restriction of the obsolete exists. The result will be that British exports of manufactured goods will obtain more raw materials and foodstuffs in exchange than they can obtain by the trade of a similar amount of goods in any other market (if they could obtain them at all).

In general, Private Enterprise will thus have unlimited opportunity in developing diverse, but defined, industries of a primary character. The Pioneer State will go in front like a Bulldozer over Forest land; Private Enterprise will follow behind like a plough and cultivator of Agriculture in the culture of varied products when the ground is cleared. In that conception lies the true relationship of State and Private Enterprise. The State will be a Leader who goes in front; not a flea who is carried on the neck; a creative pioneer, not a restrictive bureaucrat.

Machinery For African Development

It is clear that, apart from current machinery for normal productive purposes, a considerable amount of capital machinery will have to be despatched to Africa for pioneer development. The work of the State will consist largely of railway, road and building construction, and, of course, the provision of power, which can be secured in many areas by the harnessing of water energy, apart from the immense new possibilities in this sphere. This will require the export of capital machinery as distinct from the normal mechanisation of farming culture, which will merely require tractors, etc. The lazy mind will, of course, argue that it is much easier to continue the export of such capital goods to pay for the import of current consumption goods, like the films and tobacco which were purchased with such assets while even our home industries urgently required re-equipment. It is true, also, that the export of such capital goods to Africa will not be

so immediately productive in the return of consumption goods as they would if exported to some developed market, which could, at once, send such goods in exchange. By comparison, the development of Africa will yield a deferred, but much greater, result. It may involve, in the first instance, an even sharper effort; a deliberate sacrifice of more immediate comfort to an ultimate economic freedom and wider enjoyment.

Again, the analogy of war arises; a greater temporary privation for a greater end may have to be asked of the people. But this process can be greatly mitigated, if not eliminated, by a wise use of existing assets. Even after the war, Britain still retains abroad considerable capital assets which can be sold for the purchase of such capital goods: a better investment for the remaining external capital of the country could not be found. Various countries, also, owe Great Britain considerable sums which could be paid in acceptable goods: these foreign balances, too, could be used for such a purpose. Finally, Great Britain possesses the remains of the American Loan, and some politicians appear to be looking forward with eager expectation to further assistance from the same quarter. A superficial view might regard any policy of assistance in such a matter as contrary to the interests of America: that fallacy will be studied shortly. First, let us note that, apart from the rigorous policy of reducing current consumption in order to provide capital goods for the development of Africa, Britain possesses two certain sources from which she can derive assistance and another possible provider of powerful aid.

Partnership Arrangements: Dispossession of Inefficient

It may yet be argued that the development of the immense area of our African Colonies is beyond the unaided strength of Great Britain. Certainly, when we regard the size of the area and the potential of development, it is a formidable task. British possessions in Africa, including the Sudan, but excluding the Union of South Africa and the Mandated Territories, total over 2,600,000 square miles, and exceed by 33 per cent., the whole

area of Europe, excluding Russia. Yet, it is my firm opinion that an awakened British people, recapturing the mood and spirit of the greatest moments of their history, could be equal, unaided, to this highest call of Destiny. But, other methods are open to them without losing to any extent their freedom of action or control over their own affairs. A method is available, which is very common in business affairs and is, indeed, preferable to an alternative practice which is sometimes used in commerce, and, at present, is being used in our national affairs: the latter method is recourse to the moneylender. The better course is to bring in a partner, or partners. Britain might be regarded as a man with an expanding business, who seeks to introduce more resources and fresh abilities when he has an idea for some new and big development, which may be beyond his unaided powers. As owner of the business he draws up the conditions of partnership to his liking, and has a free hand to conduct the negotiations as he wishes and to settle on good terms, if his assets are good and his prospects are favourable. If he is a wise man, with some knowledge of human nature and capacity to succeed in large enterprises which require the co-operation of others, he will not seek to drive too hard a bargain with associates, but will admit them to equal partnership on terms which safeguard his own assets and business, but are fair to all. In that manner he obtains the maximum good will and energy in the mutual enterprise, with gain to, rather than a surrender of, his own interests.

In such a vast undertaking it might well pay Great Britain to enter into selected partnerships of that character either in general or *ad hoc* for particular enterprises. In so doing she would promote several good ends. New resources of capital goods production, beyond the now exiguous assets of Great Britain, would be attracted to the enterprise. The recovery of Europe would be assisted by an opportunity to other countries to share in a development which would certainly be greatly accelerated by the participation of others. The Peace of Europe, and the union and cohesion essential to that condition, would be promoted in high degree by a common task and mutual interest,

which offered all concerned a "way out" of intolerable troubles by a co-operative effort without parallel in history, either in the magnitude of the undertaking or the results to be obtained. It is for Britain to decide whether she will obtain considerable results in her own territory by her own unaided exertions which, in such case, must be very severe, if a full development is to be obtained within a reasonable time; or whether she will accelerate development and obtain more comprehensive, and greater, results within a shorter time by entering into partnership arrangements. In the interests of her own people and of Europe as a whole, in finding a way out of present troubles and dangers within a narrow margin of time, the latter method presents the greatest possibilities. It is, at any rate, preferable to the present situation of partnership with nothing except chaos, while money is borrowed not even for constructive purposes of capital equipment at home or in the colonies, but for easy spending in the manner of a drunken lout who neglects his land inheritance, which awaits development, and squanders his few remaining cash resources in a little sottish tippling. Let it not be thought for a moment that the suggestion of inviting partnerships on reasonable terms is advanced only in the interests of European Peace and Union, or in the interest of any nation which possesses no territorial opportunity.

Another proposal will now be examined which I suggest should be used for such purposes, without any impairment of one inch of British territory or any partnership arrangement by the British people, if an unaided development of their own African territory appeared possible or desirable in a close survey of the facts. If the principles here advocated were adopted by Great Britain, or anything approaching them, no one would level against this country the charge, or reproach, of failing to develop its territory and wasting its assets. But nations exist which are not free from such a charge, and, indeed are plainly incapable of developing with their own unaided strength the immense territories which bear their colour on the map, but have never yet felt the grip of their constructive hand. We shall begin to consider this matter from the basis of two undeniable

premises. The first is that enormous areas of Africa have never been developed by the nations which own them, and, in some cases, are incapable of development by the unassisted power of the countries in question. The second is that no nation has any better right to keep productive land idle, while a whole Continent, or indeed, the whole world, requires food and raw material, than an individual has the right to maintain good farm land in a derelict condition when his whole nation urgently requires food.

The parallel seems exact between a nation which owns African land and refuses to use it, and a man who owns a good farm and refuses to cultivate it. In Great Britain, and in nearly every advanced country, the latter is now very quickly dispossessed by the State. The process has been the subject of much complaint, but it is impossible to deny the justice of the principle if an impartial enquiry is held and judgment is given on a fair ascertainment of the facts, which is quite free from the suggestion either of bureaucratic spite or local jealousy. The principle is that no man has the right to play the dog in the manger while others go in want. He may not sit in idleness, or incompetence, upon the productive asset of good land while good farmers are denied access to land, and the people as a whole are short of the food which such capable husbandmen could produce. It has been found necessary to apply the principle rigorously in most European countries, including Great Britain, and few good farmers can be found to deny the necessity, if the method is fairly applied. Certainly the nation, as the representative of the hungry people, cannot afford to tolerate the neglect of the basic asset of productive land which is vital to the life and well-being of all. If such a principle be now fairly established in the life of individuals, why should it be so remote even from consideration in the life of nations? It is true that the gap between private morality and international morality is still very wide, but it must rapidly be reduced if mankind is to live in new conditions. A principle, which is plain commonsense in the relationship of individuals within a State, can no longer be dismissed as outside discussion in the

relationship between States. Once again, life has become too serious; we can no more afford the vanities of diplomats than the obstructions of bureaucrats.

"WHICH TRUSTEESHIP?"

We have heard much about the question of Trusteeship in the administration of African territories. This "principle of Trusteeship" has often been perverted into a principle of idleness, because, as already observed, it has been translated in practice into the principle of keeping jungles fit for negroes to live in. Administration has consisted of a few magistrates; a few hymn books and a good deal of liquor for natives; all applied in the name of "freedom" on the road to a mythical native self-government, which can never be attained except in chaos or a relapse to barbarism. Deliberately I postulate a new and very different principle of Trusteeship in Africa. The Trusteeship is on behalf of White civilisation. The duty is not to preserve jungles for natives, but to develop rich lands for Europeans. We will discuss later the ethics of the matter; whether this great Continent belongs to Europe or to the negroes, whether the Trusteeship is to the highest or the lowest purpose of man. At present it is only necessary to note two things. The first is that the development of African raw materials and foodstuffs has become a matter of vital necessity to Europe. The second is that Africa, in fact, will not be developed if some nations neglect, almost entirely, their large African possessions.

If the excuse be accepted that they are called upon for no action in the development of these resources, because their only duty is to act as custodians of large negro preserves of primitive life, we may say good-bye to all hope of a solution in Africa of the European problem. The latter excuse, in practice, is particularly disingenuous humbug as such nations almost invariably throw open this primeval paradise to the exploitation of Western Finance Capitalism with much profit to political racketeers but execrable effect on the conditions of native life. Here, again we demand a reversal of all existing values. The Trusteeship is on

behalf of White civilisation, not on behalf of a nominal stability of Barbarism, which is, in reality, a mask for the racket of financial exploitation. Having established that true principle of Trusteeship, we proceed to the new principle, just discussed, that nations within a new European morality should be subject to something of the same tests as individuals in the concept of morality which prevails within existing States. The efficient will never fear to submit himself to a fair test of efficiency. But nations, like individuals, must acquire some sense of responsibility to the Community as a whole. And, in the last resort, nations should be required to give up territory which they have neglected and were incapable of developing.

Two purposes would be served by this process. In the first instance, rich land would be brought into cultivation. In the second place, vigorous nations, which have had no such opportunity, would be given their chance to make good. Both the wealth and Peace of Europe would benefit from the event. The capable, but land-hungry, nation would replace the incapable and the life weary. Such a policy would not be carried through without friction: but, timely action to give the vigorous an opportunity of outlet and service is always less dangerous, as well as more productive, than to pander to inefficiency until a situation is created in which the able, and frustrated, are compelled to explode or perish. With some experience of human nature, and of the incapacity of some peoples for Colonial development, it is safe to believe that plenty of land would be available in Africa for development by the efficient, if these principles were fairly and fearlessly applied. And why should they not be tried? What is needed to this end? Nothing but the union, for such a purpose, of America, Britain and France. If these three powers decided that Africa should be developed on such principles, no one could gainsay their will in present circumstances. They are presented with a rare opportunity to solve the economic problem of the European Continent and, indeed, to relieve permanently the stress of the world. The interest of Britain and France in the matter is plain; they can solve their present economic troubles and eliminate in advance

many of the dangers of the future. But, it would be necessary for them, of course, to set their own house in order and to free themselves from any reproach of neglecting their own African possessions by a vigorous programme of Colonial development. The stimulus of necessity, in setting that example, could have nothing but a good effect on their present fortune and future character.

The Interest of America

The interest of America is not, at first sight, so obvious, but it is, none the less, evident. The first question is whether America desires to have Europe living for ever on her charity. If not, what alternative exists to the policy here suggested? Only two other possibilities can be envisaged. The first is that America should continue to supply Europe with food and raw materials for nothing, and should also send her capital goods to equip her competitors' industries; stripped of verbiage, that is what the loan policy means. The second is that Europe should either supply America in exchange with consumption goods, which she does not want, or should compete with her in all export markets with such goods in order to find means of payment for imports from America. Neither method is to the advantage of the American economy. The plain fact is that America neither wants consumption goods from Europe in her home market nor in her export markets. She believes, and rightly, that she can easily supply her home market from her own resources, and she needs any export market she can find for that surplus of production over home requirements, which her present economy makes ultimately inevitable. In fact, if foreign goods either invade her home or export markets successfully, a dimunition in outlet for American production must ensue; the nightmare of America will then materialise, which is over-production in relation to existing demand, and a consequent slump both in industry and on Wall Street. That menace threatens even when America is giving away a large part of her production, for which the euphemism is foreign lending. If the capital value of these loans were ever repaid, in the shape of consumption goods sent in exchange to the American home market, or by the process of acquiring means of repayment through successful competition with American goods in export markets, the shock to American economy would clearly amount to a disaster.

So, America has almost reached the strange paradox of only being able to avoid an over-production slump by giving away a large proportion of her current production: the fact that the gift is called a loan makes no difference, and the paradox is underlined by the fact that the loan can never be repaid without a catastrophe. Even so, it is apparent that in terms neither of politics nor economics can Europe live for ever on American charity. Sooner or later Europe must pay for what it receives from the Western Hemisphere, either by sending goods in exchange or by finding the means of payment through selling exports on world markets in competition with American goods. Quite apart from any question of repaying loans, America will then be faced with a contraction of the outlet for her production in one way or the other. When her post-war demand is thoroughly satisfied, and she turns as usual to dispose of her surplus of production over home demand in foreign markets, the position of America will be rendered very serious if a cheaper European labour system is competing in all those markets with the assistance of capital equipment goods which America has been good enough to supply by her loan policy. The wisdom of present world organisation will then be revealed in stark simplicity; and the blessing which it brings to the American people will also be exposed.

The sequence of events, and their disastrous absurdity, is both simple and obvious. First, America sends capital goods to equip European industries for nothing in exchange; this is called the loan policy. Next, American politicians naturally say that loans cannot continue for ever and Europe must begin to pay for what she is receiving. Next, European industries, which have been equipped with American machinery under the loan policy, proceed to export manufactured goods in vigorous competition with America in all world markets, in order to find means to pay her for raw materials and foodstuffs they cannot

produce for themselves. Next, America finds that the war-increased productive power of her industry has more than satisfied existing home demand and that she urgently requires to export her surplus production to foreign markets, where she is being undercut by the European industries she has recently equipped. Next, America is confronted by an over-production crisis of a magnitude which dwarfs any pre-war experience. Next, America is driven to avoid the crisis by dumping her own increasing surplus at any price on the markets of the world. Next, as already envisaged, the great power of America wins the game of desperation when she is driven to it, because her strength is so great that she can afford virtually to give away at any price a margin of surplus production, and the European Continent cannot. Next, the Europeans, as a result, again fail to sell sufficient exports to pay for their necessary foodstuffs and raw materials. Next, the European countries begin to go smash again and come back to America for further loans. So, once more, around the mulberry bush, dear boys, once more—and call it Statesmanship!

Will any American argue that this picture is entirely caricature? Can any American deny that at least sufficient fact is here stated to warrant the conclusion that it would be an advantage to America if Europe were withdrawn from competition with her both in her home market, and in her world export markets, and were concentrating on obtaining both a market and a source of supply in Africa? In fact, the only alternative to such a policy is that mythical expansion of the general "world market," which is discussed by the Socialist doctrinaires of Britain, and is to be obtained by each great nation undertaking only to produce what some international body decides it is best fitted to produce. As already noted, they would have to agree to give up all existing diversification of their industries, with consequent scrapping of many prosperous businesses, and to place their whole productive system at the behest of some international bureaucracy which will operate the theories of the old "Manchester School," that became obsolete in Great Britain toward the middle of the last century. This solitary

constructive proposal of the British Labour Government for "the division of labour and the development of specialisation" between nations has about as much chance of acceptance in America as a suggestion to surrender the Atom Bomb to a Committee appointed by the Third International.

It would , indeed, be an exhilarating thought to any American that the development of American industry should be in a state of suspended animation during a few years of international conferences, while Socialist lawyers from Whitehall discussed with American diplomats what American industries would be suitable for continuance, or closing down, under the new plan of specialised production. But, as things are, the choice of America and the world rests between the anarchic smash and grab on world markets described above, and some submission of all industry to the "planning" of some super-bureaucracy in interminable conferences, which is suggested by the British Labour Government. The other way is our suggestion to let Europe develop Africa as a source of supply and exchange for European manufactured goods, and to leave America the Western Hemisphere and the larger part of the other world markets.

The American Economic Problem

If it be not an impertinence it may, also, be suggested that America, too, would have an opportunity to develop a balanced and relatively stable economy. Such an achievement is, indeed, far easier for America with her vast resources, which are so largely developed already. It would be quite unnecessary for America to adopt that degree of "planning" and Governmental direction which might be necessary to recovery and development in the poorer and war-shattered Continent of Europe. All that is necessary for America is to prevent a recurrence of her great crises in over-production. And that is a problem which really should not be beyond the wit of statesmanship; although, on a lesser scale, it proved beyond the capacity of British Statesmanship for many years between the Wars. All that is necessary in such a case is to preserve some equilibrium between production and demand, and, in the case of an expanding economy of vast

natural resources, it could be achieved without any regimentation or bureaucratic control.

The essence of the matter is that market and demand consists in the final analysis of the power of the people to buy. Nowhere has this been more clearly grasped than in the theory of American economists and in the practice, over many years, of dynamic American industry in a high-wage policy. What has been lacking is a national policy and plan to implement the theory of economists and the attempted practices of individual industrialists. All may recognise as individuals that high wages and salaries mean high purchasing power, and that the latter factor alone can provide a large and stable home market with any hope of absorbing American production and freeing it from the vagaries of world demand. But a big gulf lies ahead between the widespread individual recogntion of the facts, and a national plan and policy to meet them. Industrialist A, in a particular trade, may recognise that the interests of his trade, and of American industry as a whole, require high purchasing power. But he cannot implement his belief by pushing up wages in his own business without the fear that Industrialist B, in the same trade, may take advantage of his patriotism and enlightened self-interest. The latter may keep wages as they are while the former raises them, or may even reduce wages within some spheres of American Industry. In that event the man who pays high wages in the interests of his own trade, and of American industry as a whole, is put out of business by the wage under-cutting of a less enlightened rival, and pays for his wisdom and patriotism with bankruptcy. The individual is powerless to implement the inspiration of American belief in a high standard of life in default of State action to protect him in such a policy.

What is required in America is a wages and production policy. Such a wage-production policy, in such conditions, need not imply any degree of control or regimentation. All that is required is some statutory, or agreed, prevention of wage-cutting within specific industries. It would be unnecessary for this purpose that America should go as far as the planned economy of industrial corporations which the writer on other occasions has

suggested. All that is required is that American industrialists, within a given trade, should agree not to cut wages below a given standard but to increase them, in accord with a national wage policy, as higher purchasing power was required by increasing productive power. The relative competitive position within an industry would remain the same; if all increase wages and salaries in proportion, the individual's ability to compete remains unaltered. A wage-cutting competition within the country would thus be eliminated, and a progressive increase in standard of living in proportion to an increasing productive power would eliminate a recurrence of over-production crises. The action of the State would be necessary in two respects. The first would be at least to give guidance in co-ordinating the wage policy of various industries in order to secure some national similarity in wage policy and the increase in the standard of life. To this end a national economic organisation in research and advice would possibly be enough in America to support the voluntary organisation of the various industries. The second action of the State would be by high tariff, or exclusion, to prevent under-cutting of that enlarged home market from cheap external competition produced by lower wage standards in other countries. For it must always be remembered that it is not enough to prevent undercutting from without by Tariffs; some organisation must prevent under-cutting from within, if a market adequate to American production is to be built.

A wage policy, which related American internal demand to production by some progressive harmony in the raising of wage standards to meet the ever-increasing productive potential, coupled with the exclusion of under-cutting goods from outside, would solve the American problem. Nearly all raw materials can be produced within America and American possessions. Anything which had to be purchased outside would very easily be acquired by the allocation of a very small proportion of American products in exchange. In fact, America could very easily become almost entirely independent of world markets. She could achieve this condition without any of that wide measure of Government planning and direction necessary to

poorer nations. In fact, she could enjoy a complete freedom of private enterprise and competition, provided she eliminated the possibility of over-production by establishing a sound basis of high purchasing power. If American industries conformed in one matter—the raising of wages in proportion to productive power—they could enjoy an absolute non-conformity in everything else. On the sound basis of an agreed high purchasing power, they could erect, if they wished, a superstructure of the happiest individual anarchy of competition, on the fullest traditional lines. In fact, in a new, naturally rich and expanding economy, even this author of many " plans " would agree it is probably the quickest way to get results; and what the world wants to-day are action and results.

But, whether or not America ever decided on such a policy, her interest in the European policy here suggested would remain the same. It is the interest of America to get Europe off her hands, and off her markets. America does not want to keep Europe on the Dole for ever and send abroad the product of American industry for nothing in exchange. America does not wish to equip Europe to compete with her in world markets. Even, therefore, if America retained her existing trade method without any development, or modification, it is her paramount interest to get Europe into Africa. America will need all the existing markets she can obtain, if she goes ahead in the old familiar fashion to the next over-production crisis. Europe is no true and final market for America, because Europe can send her no goods in exchange which she cannot make as well, or better, for herself. In short, Europe to America is economically nothing but a headache; either Europe lives on American charity, or sends goods in exchange which dislocate American economy. Economically, they are better apart as soon as possible, when America has given the primary assistance necessary to set Europe on her feet and on the road to self-help in the African solution. Such measure of assistance is commonsense, because America cannot afford to have a vacuum where Europe was. The subsequent division of the two economies will, ultimately, render easier the union of the two policies.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNION OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN RELATION TO THE WORLD MENACE OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM

IN contrast to economic affairs, considerations of present security and of final survival require a much closer political union. Apart from all tradition of spiritual and cultural communion, America and Europe have to work together for survival. The reason is that they are faced with the external menace of a fundamentally opposed and very powerful State, which intends the destruction of the civilisation and cultural heritage of the West in favour of that International Communism, which represents the sharp antithesis of Oriental values and methods under the challenging leadership of a highly-trained revolutionary Party. To suppose that the Leadership of Russia does not intend this is to presume that they have betrayed everything for which they and their Party have stood during forty years of struggle: a most insulting suggestion that should not be levelled by one war comrade against another. Britain and America should, at least, do the leadership of this war ally the honour of assuming that they are not traitors to their cause. World Revolution, through the force of her own armies and the agitation of various foreign Communist Parties, was and is the aim of Communist Russia. The method is to turn Russia into an army and every opposing country into a mob. To this end the maximum organisation, armament and discipline is required within Russia, and the maximum confusion is created within most other countries. Various Communist Parties in other lands are fostered to secure the latter purpose by ceaseless agitation and the engendering of industrial and social strife. Thus, Russia combines in the drive for world revolution the hitherto disassociated weapons of Imperialist aggression and mob anarchy. The two weapons become formidable, in conjunction, when they are available to the same hand for the first time in history.

It is a dangerous and novel technique which is worthy of some comment by those men whose business it has been to study this matter during years, as an essential part of their task in combating Communism in active struggle. To such experience, the ingenuousness of some of Russia's present opponents is always astonishing. Every seeming concession by the Soviet is so eagerly and innocently welcomed at its face value by the anxious liberal spirit in search of that goodwill which vanished some time ago from real affairs. Because they have made their usual mistake of never studying their opponent, they have not the faintest idea of what it is all about. In sport and athletics, the Englishman studies "form" meticulously from the very earliest days of a racehorse or a boxer: in politics, which affect his whole future existence, he seldom gives a moment of serious study to the corresponding "form" of an opponent who may be aiming at his life. If he did, we should not read the fulsome headlines of sentimental congratulations in some Conservative newspapers every time that the Soviet diplomats feel that they have pushed the Americans a little too near a premature war, with the result that they withdraw slightly behind some small concession, which is followed by a back-slapping competition at a vodka and caviare party.

On such an occasion the innocence of the guests must be a source of perennial amusement to the seasoned hosts, who have struggled along a hard and dusty road from Siberia to that festive board, and are not "letting up" now that the world may be within their grasp. Why should they; when a little more patience and cunning, until decisive force can be prepared, may crown the struggle of a lifetime? There is a fire in those bellies which does not permit the happy growth of that paunch of complacency which adorns some Democrats who have "made it." The latter politicians are dealing with a totally different animal to themselves; they have not yet understood that fact, let alone the animal. Difficult as the psychology of such an opponent must be to their comprehension, they yet would acquire some glimmer of understanding if they would even begin to study the principle on which the opposing system is based.

The subject is available to them in writing of considerable clarity and force. For instance, Lenin wrote in the *Infantile Diseases of Communism:* "the strictest devotion to Communist ideas must be coupled with the art of acquiescing in practical compromise, with veering tactics, conciliatory manoeuvres and the semblance of yielding, briefly with every device that could possibly hasten the attainment of political power." Even a knowledge of that single illuminating sentence might bring a short pause in the paean of thanksgiving when Stalin sometimes smiles, and even prompt the suspicious and uncomradely reflection that America has got the Atom Bomb, and he has not—yet! For, this single fact governs the whole situation. Russia has not got the Atom Bomb, or any equivalent weapon. When that fact changes, the situation will change overnight. Let us examine, for a moment, the position of the Russian leadership and assume that they have not betrayed, see no reason to betray, and are unwilling to betray their principles of world revolution and conquest through International Communism. They are obviously not going to force a showdown while they are at a hopeless disadvantage in the matter of weapons: not to mention the necessity to repair some of the damage of the last war before launching the next, and the ever-present possibility that the British or Americans might be coaxed into providing credits which would hurry matters up considerably.

Why, then, the innocent may argue, do they not keep quiet and appear much more complacent and easy-going at International Conferences, in order to lull suspicions while they work secretly to reach equality in armaments? Perhaps, even the measure of goodwill they occasionally show—even their outbursts of ingenuous irritability and unreasonableness—may prove that no such deep and far-reaching designs exist; do they not rather reflect the good and honest character of the simple Slav who finds himself outclassed in diplomatic discussions with the sophisticated British and Americans? So runs the reasoning of the wishful innocent, who is about as competent to take on the Oriental Communist, in the "hell's kitchen" of Modern Europe, as a new-born babe is fit to wrestle with a Boa-constrictor.

Such questioning ignores the whole basis of the technique described above—that duality which consists both of Imperialist aggression and Mob Anarchy. Russia seeks to integrate herself and to disintegrate others. Calm and secrecy might serve the first purpose, but not the second. Russia must not only strengthen herself, but, also, weaken her opponents. A withdrawal into seeming quiescence and secret armament can increase Russian strength, but leaves the strength of other countries unimpaired.

Yet, it is the essence of the dual technique not only to build up Russian power for Imperialist aggression but to weaken the resistance of other countries by promoting mob anarchy within their territories. The latter condition is created by securing their industrial paralysis and military disarmament. To both ends a ceaseless industrial and political agitation is necessary by the conscious, and unconscious, agents and assistants of Russia in other lands. Within their ranks, of course, are many quite innocent idealists who fall for the pseudo-humanitarianism which is one of the many stops in the organ of Communist Revolution. Such mob tactics cannot be inspired and continually fostered without an atmosphere of constant strife and the provision of fresh issues of clash and conflict. It is not enough for the conscious, or unconscious, servants of Russia to seek to paralyse the industries of other countries by inflaming every domestic dispute to the point of protracted and exhausting struggle. It is necessary, also, to mobilise all the completely unconscious dupes in other lands behind issues of pseudo-idealism, which are provided by Russian manoeuvres and mob slogans in international controversy. The other countries must be jockeyed into the position of appearing to oppose disarmament and peace; constant clash and controversy on these lines must be promoted to keep on their toes in domestic debate all the " flats " who have been caught for Communism in other countries.

In industrial disputes they are led to believe that they are fighting for the rights of the workers to higher standards which the " Capitalist " bosses are denying. In political disputes they

are led chattering up the garden of international peace, brotherhood, disarmament and universal amity; which, in practice, means that the other countries should surrender their present advantage in armaments to the realists of the Kremlin; who would know better how to use it. Nowhere in politics, has the present grotesque division between appearance and reality been carried so far as in the disparity between the sayings of the dupes, and the plans of the masters, of World Communism. A little reflection, therefore, answers the ingenuous question why Russia does not keep quiet and arm secretly, if she really prepares world war. The answer is that she uses mob tactics without, as well as military tactics within, for the long and careful work of war preparation. While Russia becomes ever more like an army her opponents must be reduced ever more completely to a helpless mob. For this purpose their industrial and social life must be disorganised and their military forces must be disarmed.

To both ends, ceaseless industrial and political agitation is necessary; and Father Russia must give the lead by continually providing fresh issues for controversy. Never previously in history has a political manoeuvre been so successful as to lead thousands of innocent idealists to demand the disarmament of their country in face of an armed enemy, and the surrender to his empty but eager hands of the decisive weapon of world mastery with which a great science has provided their own nation. A man with a riflle is faced by a gorilla; it is suggested by some of the friends and relations of the man with the rifle that he should not merely put it down, but should hand it over to the gorilla together with some instructions in the art of using it. Such is the policy proposed for their own country by many innocents; and by some who are not so innocent. (In passing may I note the contrast with that policy for which I was so much attacked: my policy prior to 1939 combined a demand for Peace with Germany, and the avoidance of European war, with a demand for the powerful re-armament of Britain, for which I struggled in a continual political agitation during seven years before the last war. *Vide* Book—*My Answer*.)

Russia Seeks Decisive Weapon for World Mastery

It is not strange that this proposal for the disarmament of their countries in face of Russia has not yet commended itself to majority statesmanship in Britain and America, but they are still held captive by the secondary manoeuvre of the Russians. They have not been persuaded by internal political agitation to lay down their arms, and the industries of no great countries have yet been quite paralysed by internal strife. But, they are still kept talking by Russian statesmen at International conferences while Russian militarism is seeking for an equality of weapons. The talks will be kept going, until they have found the weapons; so long, and no longer. Keep on talking—above all, keep on talking—Russia must have time—so, give them the anaesthetic —and it is talk—talk—talk—such is the order to the diplomacy which covers the military tactics of the Kremlin. So America is kept talking until Russia has found the weapon. That is what the Americans would usually describe as falling for a " sucker's punch." But, at the time of writing, some Americans, and more Britons, are opening their guard to it as wide as any Russian could wish.

If it is not the plan of the Russians to keep the Americans and British talking until they can develop decisive weapons, why has Russia refused inspection during months of manoeuvres and bogus concessions which are always retracted when the point of practical application is approached? What reason can be behind the attitude of Russia except the desire to conceal what she is doing? If she is doing nothing to develop such weapons, she has everything to gain and nothing to lose by accepting the American plan of inspection. In terms of power advantage, America would be the loser and Russia the gainer. In fact, the offer of America to expose her secrets, and submit to inspection if other nations will do the same, shows a magnanimity without parallel in the relationship of nations. What other country in history has pursued a policy which even approaches in generosity an offer to surrender the monopoly of a weapon, which might give her the mastery of the world? The Russians would be insane not to accept that proposal unless they hoped in time

to secure a weapon which would beat America. What conceivable reason can Russia possess for her attitude other than this ambition, which they are seeking to implement by feverish research and hard work in the field of armaments?

The contortions to which Russia has been driven to cover the obduracy of her policy have provided the most grotesque exhibition known to Diplomatic History. The founders of Internationalism have been reduced to talking about " Sovereign Rights "; while those whom they denounced as Jingoes, " nationalists " and " imperialists " have been offering to renounce them in the interests of Peace. All values are reversed, all policies thrown over, all slogans abandoned in the final harlequinade of self-contradiction with which Russian Communism seeks to conceal the basic fact that it rejects inspection of armaments; because it hopes to find a weapon with which to beat the world. So, the " Sovereign Rights " of Holy Russia are pulled out of old Czarist cupboards and " workers of the world unite " is marked for export only; while scientists work in Russian laboratories for weapons to obliterate working-class homes in every great city of the world. If this is not the reason behind their policy, what is it? Why should they miss such a chance to assuage their old fear of aggression by other countries, concerning which we have heard so much, when the only country strong enough for such an act makes a gesture of such extraordinary generosity that it actually offers to lay down the decisive weapon; if Russia will only refrain from picking it up. No apology and no excuse can cover this long-sustained manoeuvre by Russia.

It can mean only one thing; she seeks world mastery by force of arms and is determined to conceal at all costs her preparations for it. The cost to Russia in political prestige is, of course, considerable, and unaccountable except on the single hypothesis. Even the highly trained and flexible tacticians of Communism will find it requires a long time to extricate themselves from the confusion and ignominy cast upon them by this sudden switch of Communism from " Internationalism " to " Sovereign Rights," from demands for universal disarmament to obvious

preparations for war in secret, from the claim to be in the van of progress to becoming all too plainly the rump of reaction, from a world hope to a world fear, from the pose and humbug of being an idealist saviour to the stark reality that they plan to be the assassin of mankind. In fact, World Communism could never have recovered from the blow of that sharp reversal of Russian policy in favour of the new plan of conquest by military force, if their opponents in the politics and press of the Old Parties had not, characteristically, been too inept to follow up this moral rout and turn it into a final political disaster.

Russia's Dual Tactic of Police Terror at Home And Mob Terror Abroad

What now of the military situation? The usual innocents of the West dream world sometimes argue that if Russia does acquire the Atom Bomb, or any equivalent weapon, it will mean no more than a stalemate. Neither side would dare to use it for fear of devastating reprisals: consequently, fear will succeed, where goodwill failed, in inhibiting war. Again, they misunderstand the whole character of their opponent, the very texture of his thought and the whole structure of his system. The world must grasp the basic fact that equality in weapons will give the Soviet superiority in striking power. Equality in Armaments between the " Democracies " and the Soviet cannot mean equality of strength in a balance of power. On this fact rests every calculation of Soviet strategy. Let us see whether their analysis is fallacious. Take first the case of an Atomic war between Britain and the Soviet. The latter can disperse, but the former cannot; the wide open spaces of Russia give a great initial advantage in comparison with an overcrowded industrial island. Russia could, if necessary, evacuate her main cities and disperse their population; a similar measure in Britain would present far greater difficulty. The Soviet can shift her industrial target far farther back, and has probably done so already in the case of all war essential industries. Britain cannot move her industries any substantial distance; she can only put some of them underground.

So far we deal with matters which all soldiers can well understand; they could, of course, be much elaborated. But we soon enter a field which the military mind does not easily comprehend—the sphere of mob psychology. What would happen in Great Britain when one great city had been really shattered by Atom bombs and every other great city lay under a similar threat? What would happen in Russia in corresponding circumstances? Within the Soviet system the civil population would either he held at their work by force of a well trained and rehearsed terrorism or would be evacuated in orderly fashion under the cover of machine-guns; anyone who broke ranks in the process or showed any symptoms of beginning a panic would simply be shot out of hand. A highly trained and disciplined police would provide a political-military force, which would act with fanatical devotion to the national Communist cause, and with an utterly ruthless disregard of individual lives, or any human consideration. The civil population would be even more afraid of the machine-guns on the street corners, or lines of march, than they would of the Atom Bomb. They might, with luck, escape the latter, but they would have no chance of escaping the former. They would, therefore, choose possible death rather than certain death. The people of Russia would do precisely what they were told; whether it was to stay at their industrial posts until they died, or to evacuate great cities and move elsewhere in an orderly fashion which would not paralyse military operations or the life of the State.

What would happen in Great Britain when the Atom Bomb came down? It is of no use to cite the experience of the last war and the courage of the population under that degree of bombardment. In this situation, which we envisage, the degree of bombardment would be utterly different and beyond any previous experience or even imagining. All things break under sufficient stress; it is merely a question of degree. Even first-rate troops, in highly trained and disciplined regiments with a great military tradition, have been known to break at a certain point. It is just a question whether the opponent can sustain and intensify his bombardment sufficiently, and thus bring to bear

enough pressure upon the human frame to reach that point. Everything breaks in time; all soldiers, with any experience of real war, know that. Again it may be asked whether any civilian population in a "Democracy," even of proved heroism, can sustain atomic bombardment without breaking? If they break—if they leave their industrial posts—if they panic in evacuation—if they lose their order in any operation of daily life on any large scale, the grip of the state is paralysed and the war is lost.

It is the calculation of the Soviet—crystal clear to any mind capable of analytical thought—that the civilian population of the "Democracies" will always break under the shock of modern weapons. It is, also, the calculation of the Soviet that their own civil population will not be permitted to break—will be held by the secret police with utter brutality like stampeding cattle held by barbed wire—at least until after the "Democracies" have broken, and Communism has won the Third World War. Such is the calculation of events by the masters of World Communism; the implementing of the theory depends only upon obtaining a bare equality of weapons. For, equality of weapons means superiority of striking power; that is the basic lesson the Soviet derives from the contrast in terms of war provided by the two political systems.

Is it surprising that the Leaders of Russian Communism, who have travelled the dusty road from Siberia to the Kremlin, may think it worth a few silly banquets to diplomats, and a series of tedious manoeuvres at International Conferences, to gain time for such a consummation? They have learned patience and will never permit a petulant prematurity to forfeit the crown of nearly half a century of struggle. Is their reckoning so very far out? Will any realist affirm that? Is it fantastic to suggest that America and Britain are opening their guard for a "sucker's punch"? We have regarded for a brief moment the possible effect of atomic bombing on the crowded island of Britain. It is true that America has the advantage of space, which would render dispersion easier, though, probably, not so easy as in the case of Russia. But the political disadvantages of America in a war of the primeval savagery which modern science will, para-

doxically, provide, should be at least as great as those of Great Britain. Neither of the "Democracies" have either the means or the will to handle their civilian population as the Russians would certainly treat their industrial masses in the event of any tendency to panic. Further, there are not many democrats in Russia, but there are plenty of Communists within the "Democracies." Would even the most fatuous wish-dreamer be sure that all of them would be in favour of a relentless continuation of the struggle when the Atom bombs came down, or would even exert their influence very strongly in the maintaining of that public order and industrial discipline which alone would make possible further resistance to the Soviet Power? At any rate, that would not be the reckoning of the leaders of Russian Communism who have so long and arduously evolved the dual tactics of militarism for Russia and mob riot for their opponents.

Action Before it is Too Late

These matters are, at least, worthy of some reflection by those who demanded immediate action when they saw a Teuton with a cannon but feel quite complacent at the thought of a Slav with an atomic bomb. But, we may set aside all whose fears and passions appear to be dictated more by their political prejudices than by the welfare or survival of their country or Continent. When the weapons of the time were insufficient seriously to touch their own countries, if they minded their own affairs, they clamoured to embroil their nation in any political war that was going on in the remotest corners of the world. When weapons have developed sufficiently to devastate their countries from any distance, they urge on their nations a care-free indifference to the doom which is being prepared for them. Is it still indelicate to ask them on whose side they are? Can it still be dismissed as the question of a "boorish Fascist"? Let us face this problem in the way of serious men who are determined that Europe and the Western World shall live, and are not willing to throw three millenia of great history, together with the brightest prospects mankind has known, on the gaming board of the foolish

wish that the Communist has ceased to be a Communist, and the Oriental has been transformed into a Western patriot.

If we face the position in terms of reality, it is necessary to state the plain fact that America has a gun in the hand and that Russia is reaching for a similar gun, but has not yet touched it. In such a situation the only sane action is to command the other man to stand back from that gun; if his fingers have not reached it he has no choice except to obey. In a corresponding situation between individuals the man who held the gun and did not adopt that course would deserve to lose the subsequent shooting match, and, if that were his character, he certainly would lose it. Translated into the terms of International politics this simple realism means that America must enforce inspection now if the world is to be saved from the conquest of Communism. America has the Atom Bomb and Russia has not; that single fact dominates the whole position, but it will not last. If Russia is permitted to play for time, she will, sooner or later, obtain equality of weapons, and that will produce, not a balance of power, but the preponderance of Communist striking power in the showdown of the world. The Leaders of Russia are realists who would certainly give way without a war in face of overwhelming force in the hands of the Western Allies: if they did not give way they would lose, quickly and easily.

At worst, action now might mean a war which we must win. Delay invites a war which we might lose. The best possibility of peace is now to compel inspection of weapons; if necessary, by ultimatum. Not to force this showdown before Russia is ready is sheer insanity; not to remove the incentive to German scientists to work for Russia, and to prevent her attempts to bribe, cajole or force them into the service of Communism is more than imbecility; it is world suicide. This cannot be dismissed as overstatement unless four facts can be denied with certainty. They are: (1) That Russia seeks a decisive weapon; (2) That Russia means war when she has found it; otherwise she would welcome inspection to secure the abolition of such weapons; (3) That Russia lacks the technical ability to produce

such weapons without the aid of German scientists; (4) That immense inducements are being offered to German scientists to serve Russia, and, although the best of them still remain true to the West, a terrible strain is being put on their loyalty by the policy of the Western Allies, which, in the end, may drive them to any desperation. The first three facts are a virtual certainty, and the fourth is an observed event.*

GERMANY AND EUROPEAN UNION

The attitude of America, Britain and France to the dismemberment of Germany and the oppression of her ablest sons on the grounds of their political record, is preventing the union of Europe and risking the arming of Russia with weapons and a technical ability which she could acquire from no other source.

The fear of a German revival prevents European union; the lack of that union inhibits the action by which alone Europe can survive. This fear arises from the spirit of negation: both Union and achievement await a new affirmation. As usual in human affairs, fear is self-defeating: in this instance it is producing precisely the situation which it seeks to avoid. The triumphant Allies try to prevent a new challenge to their position by the repression of Germany. But, in so doing, they are providing a new challenger with the means to make his challenge effective. The new Communist Imperialism in Russia emerges in menace to every value of European and American civilisation.

*1. Herr Werner Heisenberg, a top German physicist and winner of the 1932 Nobel Prize, said that Russia had made a standing offer of $6,000 a year to any German atomic scientist who would work for the U.S.S.R.

" I was promised in addition," said Heisenberg, " 50 pounds of fresh meat a month, a ration of 3,500 calories of food a day for each of my six young children, and a comfortable, well-furnished house with many amenities." Heisenberg had declined, but he named others who had not. . . . There are still thousands of cold, hungry scientists in Germany to whom Russia's offer might well appeal. (*Time,* March 3, 1947)

2. " Professor Otto Hahn, the German scientist who in 1939 discovered uranium fission—the process that made the atomic bomb possible—said to-day that two of his assistants had ' disappeared to the East ' while they were on a visit to Berlin." (*Sunday Times,* December 8, 1946)

The new challenger plays for time because he lacks the weapons with which our scientific genius has equipped the West. The Allies use well for him the time which he seeks by driving into his arms the genius which he does not possess. One factor alone might give Russia the means of victory and that factor is German science. It is inconceivable that the Slav can ever challenge, let alone defeat, the West, in a new age which science commands. To have any hope of success he must use the talents which his opponents alone possess, and right well he is aided in that manoeuvre by a self-defeating fear.

A united and active West could afford to ignore in large degree the threat of Russian Communism, provided inspection eliminated the risk of attack by certain weapons. But it cannot be united while German territory and population are under the heel of a tyranny which is saluted by the remainder of the West as an Ally. It cannot be active until negation has changed to affirmation and the whole of Western Europe is engaged in a common task of continental construction. Union and reconstruction are alike inhibited by a mind which fears Germany to such an extent that even the menace of Russian Communism is treated as relatively insignificant. It is unnecessary to repeat any part of the analysis of that fear and dislike of Germany which was a subject of Part I of this book. But it is necessary, in considering the constructive task of Europe, to survey some possibilities which may inhibit any such development by the final destruction of the Continent. Chief among such dangers is the extraordinary paradox that many people in Britain, who most feared and resisted German power, appear to feel little or no apprehension concerning the threat of Russian Communism. Even Conservatives have so long been accustomed to using Russia against Germany that many of them are blind to the new threat: among them habit, of course, often works more potently than the processes of the intellect. In part, too, their attitude is explained by a subconscious feeling that Slavonic civilisation is so inferior that in a clash we can always master it: while they experienced, for good reasons, no such sensation

of confident superiority in relation to the Teuton. The network of complexes, which we have already dissected in Part I, render them placid toward a force which they feel they can command, but intensely irritable and suspicious in relation to any power which they feel might be capable of dominating them.

This instinct in relation to the force of Russia would, of course, be perfectly correct if the Soviet could only rely on its own talents for such a struggle. What chance would Russian Communism have in a fight against the whole of Western Europe in union with the strength of America? That question is answered by the recollection that 90 million Germans were able to throw 170 million Russians six hundred miles back, while Germany had one hand tied behind her back through the threat of Anglo-American intervention on the Continent. The present pretensions of the Soviet would appear almost farcical in face of the union of the Western World. It is only the division of the West which brings Russia into the picture of world events, and that schism is perpetuated by Anglo-American policy, with the result that the Soviet is a permanent and ever-increasing threat to world survival. It is the division of Europe which thrusts German talent into Russian service; and it is the genius of German science alone which might possibly give the Soviet world mastery. This is the factor the Old Parties in Britain have forgotten, and which France always forgets: it may be the factor of fatality. In the new age of Science the backward Slav is more than ever helpless against the united power of the West. The worst imbecility of history is to divide the West in order to provide the Barbarian with the decisive talents which he so conspicuously lacks.

What other effect can be produced by the present treatment of Germany? Their country is divided and occupied, and a large proportion of their territory and population is subjected to a power which they have learned by close contact in victory and defeat completely to despise. At the same time that Power offers to any German of talent every inducement, while the Western Powers offer every insult. Men of the highest ability in science and in administration are left to starve in frustration

and inhibition by the Anglo-American power on grounds of their political record, while Russia eagerly seeks to bribe and cajole any abilities which may serve her further end. In such circumstances a feeling must inevitably develop among some Germans that in the East, at any rate, they may use their capacities, and the future may bring them many and strange opportunities. The very fact that they do so despise the Russian may lead them to the view that they may serve him for a time in the confidence that finally they might make him serve them. The writer believes any such view to be profoundly mistaken: even a temporary strengthening of Soviet power is liable to result in the complete destruction of civilisation. To place the torch of science in the hands of the Barbarian would now be to ignite the world. And Germans, hoping to seek their lost home in the light of that conflagration, would find only ashes and deep death. But it is a course which, in desperation, high abilities may be gravely tempted to pursue.

What alternative hope is the West now offering to Germany? No hope is being given and, in present circumstances, but one hope can exist—it is the dream that this same science, in a fierce spasm of hard-driven genius, may give Germany alone some weapon of such new and fearful potency that it can be produced, even within the limit of present restriction, and used to give Germany victory over the world. Is that a hope which Democratic statesmanship in Britain and America desires to foster—is that a result it seeks to promote? They may laugh to-day in the arrogance of an easily acquired self-confidence: they laughed once before when glider clubs of young enthusiasts followed the destruction of previous German air power. The English say that necessity is the mother of invention, and the Germans observe, after Schiller, that the glance of necessity is sharp. It is indeed a gamble with dark Fate to impose upon the Teutonic genius but two possibilities of survival: the service of the Barbarian—or a deep plunge into the seething cauldron of secret science to solve the final riddle of world triumph. How hard foolish men sometimes work to produce results precisely the opposite of those they desire. The first lessons of this great age

is that all things have become possible: this is both the dread and the fascination of our time.

GERMANY MUST HAVE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

My constructive suggestion for the German problem is that for the first time Germany should be given equal opportunity both in membership of the European Union and in African development. Such a solution of the German problem is possible as an incident in this European Union, but it would probably appear an incredible risk to present statesmanship: in reality, it is nothing approaching the risk of an inevitably ineffective repression. Realism must recognise that all suppression may at any time be rendered futile by the fresh wind of scientific genius which, more than ever, "bloweth where it listeth." Experience shows that such a degree of talent is very unlikely to be found outside the great nations we have categorised. But the discovery of some new principle may in the present onrush of historic dynamism occur in any one of them; when this happens the face of the world may change almost overnight, and only ruins will mark the place of those who sought to contain the explosion. So, even from the standpoint of "Democracy," any degree of realism would suggest that equality of opportunity for a people of the German potential is a lesser risk than the inculcation of desperation. And, for a great and proud people, any form of dismemberment of territory, and subjection of population to a Barbarian tyranny, is a situation of desperation. Would England rest tranquil while a Mongol horde was bullying and ravishing in Kent and Norfolk; and an assorted mixture of pettifogging bureaucrats was bossing them about in the streets of London with the only result that an attendant menagerie of Oriental racketeers could profit from the chaos which paralysis had engendered. No risk is so great as the continuance in any form of the present treatment of Germany. And, is the risk of equality for Germans within European Union so great even from the point of view of present statesmanship? The Union of Europe must indicate, at any rate, some change in the present concept of national sovereignty. In fact, the more complete the Union,

the more effective the attainment of the end desired, which is to prevent the destruction of the Continent by national rivalries armed with new weapons of final ruin. Could anyone have so much reason to fear a German revival when the present alignment of nations had ceased to exist?

My proposals on the structure of Government, within a new Europe, belong to the next chapter; we are here considering, in this connection, the "Democratic" concept. A complete Union of Europe would presumably mean to them a European Parliament. In that event, an equality of opportunity for Germany would mean the right to return members to that Parliament, in some proportion to the numbers of their population. It could not entail the right to develop independent armaments within their national territory; when nationalities, as we know them to-day, had ceased to exist. For example, in 1939 the inhabitants of Middlesex or Würtemberg had no right to develop their own local forces or armaments. Even if Union were not complete, and some Federal solution were adopted, the national right to private armaments would presumably be the first to be surrendered in favour of some super-national authority with an armed force at its disposal. Such abrogation of national power would clearly be accompanied by some rigorous inspection of central authority to prevent the development of local armaments. So, the possibility of secret German re-armament would be no greater than it is to-day, and the incentive would be far less. Democratic statesmanship should, at least, reflect on these things before rejecting outright any suggestion of equality of opportunity for Germans in a new Europe.

The removal, or mitigation, of the fear of Germany is thus incidental to any logical conception of European Union. It is important from every standpoint because the elimination of that phobia in turn removes the chief risk of the destruction of the new Continent through the Western Powers unwittingly providing the barbarian with his means to that end. If the Union of Europe be necessary in any case, it is a rare fortune that a solution of the German problem can be regarded as a normal incident in the attainment of that policy, and as a logical part of a larger whole.

It has been charged against the writer, as a reproach, that he is pro-German. I reply that anyone who wants either to save Europe from destruction or to get things done in a new Europe must be pro-German; because, if Germany is not brought into European Union, the West will be divided and the East will triumph. But Germany can only be brought finally and securely into European Union as a united and satisfied people in full possession of their own land. Beyond the question of meeting the present menace and ensuring the future safety of our Continent, the further question of development within the new Union is no less important in the longer vistas of Statesmanship. The reasons for my attitude are simple and clear. All my life I have striven to do something in my time to improve the lot of man and raise his fortune: my life has, at least, proved a certain dynamism. In the Germans I see a people with an energy and capacity which can contribute greatly to large construction and high design. Whether the world likes it or not, they are a force for good or evil—for construction or destruction: like all great elemental forces they will either find an outlet or explode, they will either greatly serve mankind, or, in the end wreck the world in the bitterness of their frustration. The spirit of the Doer, in eternal opposition to that of the Denier, reaches out to Germany the hand of a comrade in high endeavour. What inhibits that understanding with the German people, which can bring union to Europe in the winning of present security—and in the building of a future civilisation beyond the weak imaginative grasp of that loose idealism which has denounced us builders for our "ruthless" realism?

THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE

Let us first consider the objections of a people for whom the writer has always felt a great affection—the people of France. That great nation was considered by many in the past to suffer from some kind of anxiety neurosis in relation to Germany. May we enquire whether her feeling was so unreasonable in the light of history, before we consider whether any justification for that sentiment still exists. France has good historic reason for

believing that after any successful clash with Germany her allies would extricate themselves as soon as possible, and leave her once more alone to face the far larger man-power of her traditional enemy. The dual fear that she would be deserted by her allies, and again outnumbered by Germany, dominated the whole policy of France. Her answer to this apprehension was invariably the attempt to hold Germany down by force and thus to prevent the latter developing the full resources of her latent strength. In practice, this policy failed, because it could only be achieved by wrecking the economy of Europe, and, in the end, the majority are always driven to oppose a destruction which affects their own lives. Further, a nation, as strong and vital as Germany, cannot finally be held down by any force, and, certainly, not by the power of a country which is numerically weaker. The will of Europe as a whole, inspired by a tardy sense of self-interest, has thus, always, combined in the last resort with the natural energy of Germany to frustrate the policy by which France strove to save herself from the repetition of a tragic experience.

In the final test of reality, France's policy was not strong enough to prevent the fatal recurrence, but only effective enough to provoke it in a yet fiercer form. No repercussion is so disastrous as that of an attempted repression, which fails. In examining any attempt to apply a traditional policy to a new situation, the first question to ask is whether the premises still exist on which it was based: the enquiry becomes yet more necessary when the policy has previously failed. The answer must be that neither of the premises of that policy any longer prevail. In the first instance, France's allies cannot leave Europe, because their own lives are inextricably interwoven with the fate of that Continent. As evidence of that compulsion accumulates, France will, therefore, be reassured that she will not again be deserted by her late allies in face of a stronger opponent. In the second instance, the numerical and, previously decisive, preponderance of Germany no longer exists in effective terms of power reality. This statement does not mean that attempts to dismember Germany, and to strip her of population and resources, will succeed; they are only likely to produce

exactly the opposite result of that intended. Something very different to such old world calculations is inherent in this new consideration.

What matters now in terms of power reality are not the numbers of a country's population but the decisive weapons which it possesses. In all spheres quality will be nearly everything and quantity almost nothing. If a country can produce, or become possessed of, the decisive weapons it will be all-powerful in face of a far more numerous enemy force, which does not possess these weapons. The old fear of France that she will be outnumbered has, therefore, no relevance at all to the new situation. In any clash between France and Germany the vital question will be not relative numbers but relative weapons. Therefore, both premises of past French policy appear to have no bearing upon any realist policy of the future. France's old allies cannot leave Europe and the superior numbers of Germany mean nothing at all. All that matters, in terms of power, is the ability of a nation to produce decisive weapons and the incentive to produce them. It is, of course, a matter of opinion, but experience suggests that the incentive to produce decisive weapons is likely to be a greater factor than the initial facility to do so. Whatever systems of inspection are devised, such decisive weapons will probably be produced by some new principle or method of science, if the incentive to produce them is sufficient. The greatest incentive, of course, would be the perpetuation of intolerable conditions of life for a great and proud people. If all their energies and abilities are frustrated and left with but one hope—the production of a decisive weapon—the lessons of nature and history indicate that such a weapon will finally be produced. Other countries besides France should bear in mind that probability in the treatment of Germany.

For France, in the particular light of her traditional policy, the question is whether the risk of driving Germany to such desperation is greater than the risk of bringing her into equal partnership, within a new Europe. The answer should be assisted by the fact that all countries within such a new union

of Europe will voluntarily subject themselves to armament inspection. Whatever safeguards can be provided will thus be secured. But, if incentive is sufficient, all safeguards in the end can be overcome by desperation. France, therefore, would lose no safeguard in bringing Germany into a new European partnership, and would gain the security that the main incentive to a German explosion would, thereby, be removed. If the safeguard of inspection is the same, whether the policy be partnership or an attempted repression, the removal of incentive to destruction is all gain and no loss. In view of a completely new situation which removes both premises of her previous policy, and of the equal physical safeguards provided by a new approach, is it too much to hope that the genius of France will contribute to a constructive solution in which the crystal clarity of the Latin mind is particularly required?

Old animosities will never be overcome by a mere negation: only the mutual effort to succeed in a constructive task can bring a new harmony. In fact, the dynamism of achievement is as essential to the winning of peace as to the finding of an economic solution for current chaos. The age-long conflict between Gaul and Teuton may at length be subdued by the necessity to find a new way of life, when the only alternative is Continental death. At least, all are confronted with the need to think again in the light of a new situation; that is the moment to ask whether the premises, on which old hostilities were based, have any longer any validity. The answer is plainly, no, when we survey the historic causes, and present facts, of the main rift of our Continent, which is the traditional antagonism between Germany and France.

The Jewish Problem

What are the other causes of European division which tend to prevent union and thus to inhibit peace, security and an economic solution? The other factors of bitterness, psychological rather than tangible, appear to be rooted in those dark, atavistic memories of the European mind, which, in recent times, have found a partial and unilateral formulation under

the general heading of "Atrocities." It is necessary to probe and to cauterise in analysis of fearless realism this sepsis of the European spirit. We will turn next to the general theme, but, in the first instance, it is necessary to deal with a subject, which, in the mind of many Anglo-Americans, forms a part of that general discussion. This view is incorrect because the Jewish problem, of course, has a deeper significance than any contemporary tumult concerning events in the recent war.

It is always difficult, and especially at the present time, to secure any rational discussion of that problem. But, the purpose of this book is invariably to attempt a constructive solution of all problems. The writer is all too well aware from personal experience, as well as from a study of history, that the constructive solutions of reason are seldom permitted to operate in real life. It is, so far, only rarely that the mind and will of mankind work in that way. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it is always our high duty and our wisest course to begin by offering the constructive solutions of reason. No one will accuse me of shrinking from the politics of passion when the unreason of men, or the overweening arrogance of an over-confident opponent, force them upon me: my record frees me from that suggestion. But, it has always been my way, in the first instance, to seek reason: if my opponents insist on passion, I am always ready. In this age-old problem I offer, once again, the solution of reason. For over two thousand years the Jews have asked for a national home, and sought again to become a nation. I adhere to the suggestion that they should be given a national home and the opportunity to become a nation. Will any of them be found to denounce as persecution the granting of something for which they have asked for over two thousand years?: if so, let us hear the reasons.

The Jews, of course, like the rest of us, cannot have it both ways. They cannot ask to be members of their own nation, but to retain membership of every other nation. The favour of dual nationality is rarely accorded to anyone, and the current tendency seems to curtail rather than to extend that principle. But we may surely assume from this long and very legitimate demand for a

national home, and the dignity of nationhood, that they will face the facts as well as claim the advantages of their choice. A constructive statesmanship, in the next phase, will seek the constitution of that national home with the minimum friction and the maximum prospect of final and stable solution.

To this end I propose the partition of Palestine and the placing of Jerusalem under a super-national authority which will afford Christian, Arab and Jew impartial access to their Holy Places. It is plain that even the whole of Palestine would not afford an adequate home to the Jewish population, even if it all were available without outrage of justice in the treatment of the Arabs. Such statesmanship would, therefore, in any case, be confronted with the problem of finding additional living room for the Jews. It is, naturally, desirable to provide such accommodation as near as possible to the Home Land of Palestine. But, this consideration is not now so pressing in view of the rapid facilities for travel provided by modern transport. After all, the limbs of British Empire are a long way from the heart, and that was so even in the days when some of the journeys involved might occupy very long periods. Distance did not even then sever the ties or affection of relationship; still less should this happen in an age when science annihilates distance. No insuperable difficulty should be encountered, therefore, even if the main bulk of the Jewish population had to live at some distance from the traditional national home. Palestine would remain a home to them in the same sense that the Dominions regard England as home. But it should be possible to find an outlet for Jews in the constructive work of nationhood much nearer to the National Home.

The reader will recall the suggestion that nations could not expect to remain in possession of African territory which they were unable fully to develop; and the further proposal that even strong and efficient nations might find it desirable to take other peoples into partnership for development purposes, if the full and rapid cultivation of their colonial resources was beyond the powers of their own population. The opinion has been very vigorously stated in recent times that Abyssinia was capable of

managing properly her own territory, and that Italian Fascism was quite wrong to suggest a contrary view. But, few people would argue that all the great potentialities of that country could be rapidly developed with the unaided resources of the local population. It would be very improper, in the light of principles outlined in this book, to suggest any dispossession of the Abyssinians in favour of some other people, without that full and impartial enquiry into the facts of each case which the suggested principles demand. Setting aside any such possibility, which would not even be discussed in the absence of proved facts, it may yet here be suggested that it might be an advantage to Abyssinia to adopt the second course, advocated in our plan, and to take another people into partnership, on proper terms.

It might be greatly to the advantage of both Abyssinians and Jews to enter into such a partnership for the development of Abyssinia, and it would certainly be to the advantage of the chief European powers to give all the encouragement they could to a solution which would promote both world harmony and economic development. The Jews might thus find an outlet for their national energies in a territory very near to their National Home. If this solution, in this particular territory, be unacceptable, it should not be beyond the limits of ingenuity and modern opportunity to find an alternative which could provide living room for Jewish Population in reasonable proximity to the National Home, under conditions of modern travel. The National Home is, and always has been, the final solution of the problem. We cannot blame nations for failing to solve the problem in that way, if they had no outside territory to their disposition: that charge, at least, cannot be laid at their door. But, in this great shake-up of the world, and the re-disposal of many lands which it must entail, it would be a tragedy for lack of energy and realist principles to miss so great an opportunity for the settlement of an age-old problem. It is a matter, too, which could be settled by consent if we accept as true and continuing the immemorial desire of the Jews to become again a nation. Failure to find a solution will mean the perpetuation of many troubles and evils. It has,

already, been observed in this book that the attempt to mix like with unlike, and to blend incompatibles in unnatural political or economic union, can bring nothing but the breakdown and disaster which History has recorded so perennially in such events. The main biological principles which influence these affairs will be regarded in general during the next chapter.

We have now reached a point in the study of these matters where some observed deductions may surely be suggested. It can be treated as a subject of science without relevance to prejudice or passion. But, in the political considerations now under discussion, we need only note the lesson of History that the attempt to bind together those who differ considerably does not succeed. In apparent, but comprehensible paradox, the contiguity of peoples, who differ not considerably but completely, is easier to sustain without friction; British success in Colonial administration has often proved this. It is the union of peoples who possess some things in common, but differ fundamentally in certain decisive respects, which always produces the maximum of friction. When all is said and done, this is not a matter of theorising but of proved practice in the Jewish case. The trouble has gone on for a very long time among many different nations and in many different climes. In that actual practice, with which practical politics are primarily concerned, the trouble, in one form or another, has nearly always recurred; and it is, therefore, necessary to seek a solution which humanity, as a whole, will approve. The differences which have caused the trouble, have been greatly stressed by Jewish thinkers. Few scientists would go so far as the Jewish leader of the Conservative Party, Mr. Disraeli, who observed, "race, all is race." What validity attaches to that conclusion will be discussed in the next chapter. For the moment we are facing a practical question, how to stop the disturbance of European harmony by the row about the Jews. A solution of reason is here suggested which gives the Jews the National Home they have always asked, and gives to Europe freedom from that problem, and the healing of an old and open wound.

"ATROCITIES"

THE UNION OF EUROPE AND THE MORAL QUESTION

It is necessary now to consider the general subject of "Atrocities," as they are compendiously described. It is essential to face this question, because a great and abiding bitterness can inhibit both European Union and something more important than any economic solution—the new way of life which may come from a new and wider opportunity. Let us begin by a most unpopular process; let us free our minds from cant. We will ignore for the moment, the darker phases of more ancient history and regard only the story of the great nations over the brief span of the last generation. In the course even of the last thirty years, the great countries, or various political elements within them, have accused each other of almost every crime in the calendar. Nearly all nations have been accused of these things by their opponents. But, we cannot accept the verdict of a contemporary enemy as history, even if he provides both accusation and judgment with the most differential pomp. Just look at the charges which have been flying about in periods of political passion in the last thirty years: we will return later to the specific matter of the last war.

Americans have been accused in reports published by leading British Daily Newspapers of the following actions: burning opponents alive at the stake; shooting men and women; flogging and other methods of torture; deportation of men from their homes; imprisonment under *ex-post facto* laws; deprivation of food and water; herding prisoners like sardines; and racial persecution.

Britons have been accused in reports published by leading British Daily Newspapers of the following actions: murder; rape; robbery; flogging and other torture; looting; arson; outrages on women; deliberate starvation of villagers; flogging of innocent schoolboys; kidnapping of children; brutal ill-treatment of prisoners; and racial persecution.

Frenchmen have been accused in reports published by leading British Daily Newspapers of the following actions: murder;

rape and other outrages against women and children; deportation of civilians from their homes; harsh and indecent conditions of imprisonment.

Among the smaller countries, citizens of one or more of the following nations: Hungary; Finland; Rumania; Turkey; have been accused in reports published by leading British Daily Newspapers of one or more of the following actions: deportation and massacre of men, women and children; brutal flogging of both sexes; imprisonment under insanitary conditions, producing typhus and wholesale deaths; plundering of hospitals of milk, etc., thus causing deaths of babies; murder; rape; and racial persecution.

Finally, Russians have been accused by reports published in leading British Daily Newspapers of wholesale murder; mutilation; torture of the most revolting description; rape and other outrages on women; herding in prisons under overcrowded and insanitary conditions; religious persecution.

Soviet Russia has also been indicted by their wartime comrade-in-arms, Mr. Winston Churchill, in the following terms: —

"Bolshevism, wherever it manifests itself openly and in concrete form, means war of the most ruthless character, the slaughter of men, women and children, the burning of homes, and the inviting in of tyranny, pestilence and famine.

"All the harm and misery in Russia have arisen out of the wickedness and folly of the Bolshevists, and there will be no recovery of any kind in Russia, or in Eastern Europe, while these wicked men, this vile group of cosmopolitan fanatics, hold the Russian nation by the hair of its head and tyrannise over its great population."

Germans have been accused by a Court and Judges constituted by the Allies at Nuremberg in terms too recent, familiar and voluminous to require, or permit, any repetition here. Germans will eventually have the opportunity to argue before History whether, or not, the "horror" conditions in their war concentration camps were largely produced by Allied bombing and consequent epidemics. History will consider such questions in relation to the morality and chivalry of hanging young girls

who happened to be placed in official positions in such camps at such a time. Here, we are necessarily concerned for the moment more with what is conveniently forgotten than with the subject of continual reminder from politics and press. From the foregoing catalogue only one fact emerges: if the verdict of opponents were accepted as final, nearly everyone would be guilty of the most revolting crimes in greater or lesser degree. Further, if all these charges were subject to impartial examination by a neutral court, it is possible, and probable, that no nation would be entirely free from any charge which would, in varying degree, be the subject of shame under any high code of morality. What now of this question of degree? Does it enter seriously the question of morality? Without casuistry, is it legitimate to enquire whether a man is any less a murderer if he has committed only half a dozen murders than if he has committed a thousand; once a crime has been committed the repetition appears more a matter of additional temptation, or opportunity, than a question of further immorality. But, it is unnecessary at this stage to be drawn into any speculative realm of ethics or philosophy.

The Moral Question in Nations Faced with Defeat

Let us all agree that such crimes cannot be excused, and that the most that can be urged in favour of the accused is a plea in mitigation. (We assume for the moment that the charges have been proved in a neutral court, which is not the fact in any case to date: neither the charges against Germany, nor any other nation, have yet been examined in a neutral court, and History will not accept them as true until they are). Now, if we agree that no defence for such crimes exists, but only a plea in mitigation, what factors should weigh in such a plea? Is it wrong to suggest that the only factor which can weigh is national necessity? It is not a defence but a plea in mitigation. Let us take an extreme hypothetical case, which illustrates the point. If the life of British Empire had depended in the recent war on the killing in cold blood of one prisoner, it would have been murder to kill him; but the plea in mitigation would have been

that the lives of millions had thereby been saved, a mighty structure of civilisation had been preserved, and one thousand years of great history could reach out again to future glories. To take another case, the killing of a man by Lions in the arena of Ancient Rome to make a crowd laugh would, in terms of fundamental morality, have been precisely the same crime; but the plea in mitigation would have been far less, in fact, non-existent. If we agree at all on these premises of the argument, which seem ineluctable, the preliminary conclusion appears to be inevitable. To murder one man is the same crime as to murder many; no defence exists for such a crime, but only a plea in mitigation; the only plea which appears at all tenable is the higher necessity of the survival of the nation or a great cause.

If, at this point of the argument, some slight psychological resistance is developing in some reader who happens to be a worthy Conservative Churchwarden, or a Socialist Nonconformist lay preacher, because he scents some danger in the path along which he is being led by easy stages, let me ask him one question. Supposing in 1940, it had been put to him, as a matter of fact, that the life of British Empire depended on the shooting of one man—the writer of these pages—would the fact that this writer could not even be charged with any offence against any law have deterred him from voting in favour of the shooting? Can he put his hand to his heart and swear that in such circumstances he would not have committed a crime which in any law, or under any system of accepted morality, would have been murder? Further, would the memory of his decisive vote in favour of shooting me even have ruffled his smooth complacency as he carried the offertory bag down the aisle of his church next Sunday? A little enquiry into the subject of motes and beams might well prelude this discussion. For, once our Churchman has accepted the (to me) lamentable fact that, in these circumstances of national necessity and desperation, he would have been guilty of a technical murder, he has lost the whole argument. The excuse that he could advance for his action is precisely the excuse by which his opponents could cover every action of which he accuses them.

No such situation of desperation arose in Britain to provoke any such action. Invasion was a possibility for a short period, but the life or death of the 1,500 British subjects, whom the Government held in their prisons without trial, was entirely irrelevant to the issue, even if those persons had been ill-disposed instead of proved patriots from the Air Force and trenches of the previous war. But the situation of Germany, reeling back in defeat in 1945, was very different. Men were short, food was short, disorder raged as all supply services broke down under incessant bombing. They held in prisons or camps a considerable disaffected population, some German, but most alien, who were requiring guards and good food supplies that were wanted elsewhere to the point of urgency and desperation. They were faced in a harsh and very practical form with the very hypothetical question stated above.

We must stress again that, in point of crime, it makes no difference whether the killing is of one man or of many: in practice the dilemma only arises when it affects many. In such a situation would any great nation have lost the last war, because of a moral scruple in its conduct? It is useless to say that the war was begun for moral reasons; they all say that, and anyhow, it has nothing to do with the point. The question is quite different—would any great nation lose a war, and suffer national destruction, rather than treat some minority in a brutal and immoral way? We all know the answer; if we have ever been in a minority in a moment of passion. Everyone knows the answer: no nation would be wiped out, rather than behave in this way. There is nothing which every great nation will not do, rather than accept defeat. Only those, who, faced by the test of fact, have accepted defeat rather than violate a moral principle, can throw a stone at others.

Modern war is the end of morality. Those, who are responsible for beginning war, are, also, responsible for ending morality. Can our Churchwarden then continue to rend the soul of Europe with eternal animosities against the German people because their leaders, now dead, followed a principle, which, in similar circumstances of a losing fight, he would have found it

very difficult himself to deny. The argument here stated is no sterile dialectic; it will, no doubt, be very unpopular—the destruction of humbug always is—but it goes to the root of the matter in terms of that morality which comes so lightly from so many thoughtless lips. There are times when self-deception and hypocrisy do not matter; these things are old and amiable idiosyncrasies of many of our people. But such humbug to-day is a world menace; because it strangles the soul of Europe.

Let us carry the argument forward to a point where the smug gentleman of our imagining must face further vistas of the horror that sometimes confronts men in real and terrible things. If he found a prisoner in a cell who held a secret on which the life of his country, or at least the lives of many of his comrades, depended, would he watch with gentle equanimity the derision of that prisoner at his ineffective efforts to obtain that information; if he had overwhelming force, and brutality, at his disposal? That is a situation which seldom confronts Churchwardens, but is often met, in varying degree, by military police in an occupied country, where resistance is being organised on a large scale. Did all the Black and Tans emerge quite so spotless from the same test in much the same situation in Ireland, as the Churchwarden would have liked to think in Church on Sunday, just after he had voted for the Coalition Government which used them in the attempt to break the spirit of the Irish by terror? Let us remember that Britain was not fighting for her life at the time the Government employed the Black and Tans in Ireland, but that every country, which occupied another country in the late war, was, at that stage, fighting for its existence. It is not pleasant to face facts, but even the most complacent must be made to face them at last, if fresh air and sunlight are to be let into the dark places of the European soul as harbingers of that new Springtime which shall follow a winter of oblivion.

Final Moral Question

Let us not shrink from carrying the argument to that final question which has embarrassed in fine dialectic and deep moral searching some of the noblest minds of Europe ever since the

zenith of Sparta first exposed to the enquiry of mankind an utterly ruthless method in the service of a higher purpose. The classic world discussed much the right to kill for the purpose of preserving, or fostering the emergence of, some species which was held by the prevailing sentiment to be worthy of much care. Does the best modern thought throw any light on that subject? The reader must settle for himself; at this point I do not seek to interpret such thought, but only direct attention to it for purposes of enquiry. Take a passage from the favourite Sage of our age in a writing which he, himself, selected as the finest, and furthest reaching, exposition of his thought. He is not only a superb intellect: he is also one of the kindest and most generous men that any of us, in any creed or party, have ever known. The passage runs as follows:—

ACIS (*to the She-Ancient*) Is she all right, do you think?

The She-Ancient looks at the Newly Born critically; feels her bumps, like a phrenologist; grips her muscles and shakes her limbs; examines her teeth; looks into her eyes for a moment; and finally relinquishes her with an air of having finished her job.

THE SHE-ANCIENT. She will do. She may live.

They all wave their wands and shout for joy.

THE NEWLY BORN (*indignant*). I may live! Suppose there had been anything wrong with me?

THE SHE-ANCIENT. Children with anything wrong do not live here, my child. Life is not cheap with us. But you would not have felt anything.

THE NEWLY BORN. You mean that you would have murdered me!

THE SHE-ANCIENT. That is one of the funny words the newly born bring with them out of the past. You will forget it tomorrow.*

Is it still necessary to say to our Churchwarden in the language of this same Sage, "Think child, think." Turn to the teaching of a moral philosopher who has long been accepted by many very serious and moral thinkers as pre-eminent in moral theory: "As for doing evil that good may come, it is really a meaningless

*Bernard Shaw: *Back to Methuselah.*

phrase: because if good comes of it, and it was done with that intention, it cannot be evil." Considerable qualification and development follows which the reader should study for himself, but the conclusion appears more or less to be: "From the point of view of practical decision, the end does always justify the means, in the sense that the course of action which will produce a balance of good results in the circumstances should be the one adopted."* These are principles which have been laid down by leading thinkers in very different spheres, who have long and rightly beer greatly honoured in Great Britain.

I will not attempt to apply these principles to the cases we have discussed, or to pronounce any verdict upon such actions in the light of those opinions. Each reader must work out such problems for himself with the assistance of the best minds which the contemporary world can offer. These principles are here quoted for one reason: it is necessary for many people to realise that these deep matters of theory, and hard facts of reality, are not quite so simple as they wish to believe. It is time, in fact, that they stopped chattering and started thinking.

The Crime of Substituting Terror for Policy

For my part, I return to the point where I began. My position is that such crimes, as we previously discussed, cannot be defended, and all that we can do in this respect is to listen to pleas of mitigation. The only possible criterion of such excuses appears to be national necessity which rests on the degree of danger to the life of a great nation, which would have arisen if the crime had not been committed. In such a light I should certainly judge events within my own experience. For instance, it would appear by this test that certain actions of British Government in India were less reprehensible than in Ireland. Personally, I opposed in Parliament and outside both the policy which employed the Black and Tans, and the policy which utilised similar measures in India. In both cases, incompetent and frightened Governments were, in my view, substituting brutality for efficiency. Their failure either to present a policy

*G. C. Field: *Moral Theory.*

or to grip the situation was covered by an ineffective terrorism. They were characteristic of the epigram of a wise old man upon a well-known Conservative family: "they can never come to a decision until they have lost their temper." Such Governments fumbled and hesitated in paralysed indecision until the situation frightened them, and, then, turned weakly to the brutality of passion.

Neither terrorism had even the excuse of necessity. But the plea in mitigation in the case of India would obviously be the greater. The reason is not that any more justification can exist for maltreating Indians than Irishmen. The reason is rather that in India a tiny White population was surrounded by a vast sea of hostility in which it would be rapidly submerged if the situation got out of hand, even for a very brief period. Terrorism, therefore, was employed both as a substitute for a policy and for a sufficiency of efficient force. In Ireland, no such plea in mitigation could be argued. The home island was adjacent and possessed overwhelming force; the use of Black and Tan terrorism had no vestige of reason except that it was a dirty little under-the-counter substitute for an open and effective repression by regular troops from which the Government shrank because of its effect on American and world opinion. In the first instance a Government had at least the excuse of being frightened into brutality: in the second case terrorism was part of a squalid intrigue which masked dishonesty and hypocrisy.

The extreme of extenuation can be urged in the case where the whole life, history and future of a great people is at stake: the minimum of mitigation may be pleaded in a case where bewildered old men seek to cover the bankruptcy of their policy and the squalor of their souls, in some dispute which has no vital significance, by a little sly terrorism and back parlour sadism. I regret that it is necessary to refer to these old policies of vile memory, which are very much within my personal experience, because, with a small band of companions, I began the Parliamentary fight against them, which ultimately succeeded in checking brutality if not in securing a constructive policy. Brutality and terrorism, born of fear, laziness and incompetence,

have always seemed to me as contemptible as they were unforgivable. If anything rough has to be done in a dark, fierce world which, on occasion, compels the facing of such reality, by men hardened to a higher purpose and called to the steel test of great events, it should be done openly in the full light of day, and explained in terms of such high necessity that men may understand and God forgive. Such things cannot be defended: but mercy can hear a plea in mitigation, and it has been said that to understand all is to forgive all.

These memories are here revived for one purpose only: it is necessary to redress the balance of Europe. Even so, let it not be thought that only the past can be cited to restore an equilibrium to the moral position, which will enable Europeans to live together. It is unnecessary to refer to the occupation of Germany after the previous war, concerning which we have already cited some facts alleged from responsible British sources at the time. We have, also, already, referred to some events of the present occupation of Germany, and observed that many Englishmen can extend to the Germans in this respect a sympathetic understanding because some of the "Britons" now occupying Germany have already occupied us. I will go further in the determination to restore some balance to an argument which has too long been one-sided: because, whatever offence is now given, the attainment of a new equilibrium is necessary to the future harmony of Europe. Therefore, I now reprint in this book a brief article which I wrote at the time of Nuremberg and the beginning of the post-war starvation of Germany:—

NUREMBERG AND AFTER

"With courts, judges and gaolers we are not concerned. They loyally and faithfully execute the laws which political forces lay down; they can do no other. These words are addressed to some of those political forces, and to some only among them.

"Are you yet satisfied? Or will you now permit the slow murder of a whole people by mass starvation? Even the finer spirits among the war leaders revolt against that; only the

small—the incredibly small—demand still further vengeance. The large of mind and spirit have more than had enough; is it not now enough even for the lesser?

"The principle of retroactive law has been firmly established in Europe. By that principle an opponent can, at any time, be eliminated by a new retrospective law made to fit his particular case. Do you not yet feel safe? You have not merely killed political opponents in cold blood: that was a commonplace at certain periods of history—we thought they were past. You have also killed brave soldiers who obeyed orders. You have made a zoo and a peep-show of your victims for the gloating joy of everything that is lowest in human or beast. You have mocked and derided the sufferings of the women who loved these men. You have done things not often known in the millenia of Western history—why?—Modern science has taught us the answer, even if the history of brave men had not already told us that such things are only found in those who fear.

"What else can it all mean?—the long, slow ordeal of 'trial' and killing to assure yourself that they are really dead, and that it is just; the frenzy of indignation because they were permitted last words, and you fear that even from the scaffold they will say something you cannot answer; the scattering of the ashes in an unknown place so that even their bodies may not rally the souls of men and prove them in the end stronger in death than you are in life. (Study the psychological works on Totem killings, and subsequent Totem fears, if you are interested to follow further the 'rational' processes of the 'Democractic' mind.) Then the desire to debase by every means, and, above all, to prevent any dignity in death: the manacling of the victims, the terror of suicide. Why not pemit it—if you were determined they must die—it was the habit of a finer civilisation in the Hellenic world than you have yet known.

"To try to prevent suicide, and to fail, was to enshrine Goering for ever, in the mind of every German, within the lustre of that immortal line from Goethe's *Achilleus,* when the hero is ready to 'take from the hand of despair the glorious crown of unfading victory.' You incurred that reverse because you could

not bear the thought of a suicide that might rob you of your ritual of debasement.

" What can all this signify in terms of the psychologist, except a deep sense of personal inferiority in your subconscious measurement of yourself against the victim? But we need no such learning to teach us that. For a man—a real man—in victory has but one thought—to prevent the necessity of further strife. The elimination of the opponent is enough—preferably not by death if he is a brave and manly figure. Can we conceive a real man—in victory dancing round a manacled enemy—shrieking insults in the face of death—laughing at the suffering of the women—frightened of his victim's last words—frightened even of his ashes—terrified of his ' legend '? What strange, dark spirit of some remote underworld has possessed our virile England?

" Even now is it not enough? Must you also destroy the million masses of ordinary people? Surely it is only the outstanding whom your natural character, for reasons obvious to any psychologist, leads you to hate. Cannot you spare the ordinary, the poor, the humble, the suffering? Is vengeance not yet slaked? Can you not even now leave the past to history? Or do you fear, too, the cold contempt in the eyes of posterity?

" It was well said within our time that the ' grass grows green over the battlefields, but over the scaffold, never.' This grass will not grow green. Revenge will follow vengeance until some generation is found great enough to disrupt the circle of fatality, and to break this ' Bondage of the Gods.' "

Look Forward

The last sentence of this article provides the reason for my present striving. Europe must forget and forgive, if the Continent is to live, in which resides our history, and on which rests the hope of Mankind. Can any great nation look back on the story of even the last generation without some sense of *mea culpa?* The answer is clearly, no; but few are sufficiently influenced by the creed which they profess, to be any less interested in the throwing of stones. Is it too much to hope that

a New Europe will grow away from the memory and influence of such events, as British Empire and French civilisation have developed far beyond many of the impulses and occurences which marked their origin? Who would condemn the present structure of British Empire by reason of the brutal and bloody incidents which occurred in the establishment of some Colonial outpost, or in the Indian Mutiny? Who would blame the fine flower of twentieth century French culture for the dark fertility of blood with which the Revolution soaked those deep roots? If National Socialist and Fascist civilisation had reached a maturity which was a glory of constructive achievement, would any philosopher of the future have troubled more about events discussed in Nuremberg than the birth pangs of any other civilisation? Can any serious thinker condemn a man of thirty, because there was a mess in the bedroom when he was born? To adopt this attitude is to show a lack both of the historic sense and of any realistic appreciation of the way of nature and of life.

The greater good cannot always be achieved without the lesser evil. Will that be denied by those who justified the dropping of an Atom Bomb on civilian populations with the plea that the war would be shortened and the lives of soldiers would be saved? That argument could only mean that it was more important to save the lives of British and American soldiers, which would have been lost in the invasion of Japan, than the lives of the relatively few Japanese children who perished in the agony of Hiroshima. The argument that the end justifies the means, that national necessity overrides the suffering of individuals, and that the few must be sacrificed to the many, could scarcely be pushed to a further extreme of moral dubiety. It is not for us here to judge these things, and no attempt is made to do so. The purpose of this writing is rather to eliminate an hypocrisy which poisons the soul of the world. In the light of recent history a little humility is not amiss in judging others: not even in those who profess the creed which makes humility the chief virtue, but refuse with insensate arrogance even to contemplate the possibility that they have constantly committed the crimes of which they accuse others. Such types in daily life are merely laughable: in the

seats of power they are a world fatality. The wounds of Europe must be healed before the work of construction can begin. They are wounds of the spirit, and they are kept open by these animosities and memories of atavistic savagery. These old things have no interest to the creative mind, but they impede our work. That is why we ask Europe not to look back, but to stride forward. In these pages I have attempted to describe some possibilities which beckon us onward in the march of the European spirit. They are worth that effort of the living mind and will, which forgets the past and, thus, achieves the future. Division is death, but Union is life.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT: ILLUSION AND REALITY

THE more complicated life becomes the more difficult will it be to sustain a system of the State which rests on the theory that everyone understands everything. This is the basic assumption of the idea which is now called " Democracy "; and, already, it has become a manifest absurdity. In theory, the opinion of everyone is given equal weight once in five years, or less, to settle every question of national affairs from the intricacies of currency management to the mathematics and strategy of the new scientific warfare. Between the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 p.m., on the appointed day, the whole adult population leaves factory, bench, office desk or public house to give their deeply considered verdict, which will govern all those questions for the next five years. In the interval of their daily work, they are supposed to have found time to follow all these matters with sufficient application and intelligence, not only to give a general verdict on the question whether the results of Government are good or bad—but, through their parliamentary representatives in detailed debate, to give precise instruction in their work to all experts in all these affairs. That is the basic assumption on which the whole system rests. Everyone is supposed to understand everything in a period when it is becoming truer to say that nobody understands anything. The more complicated everything becomes, the more completely ignorant people are brought in to settle the question. When the complexity of the problem is obviously beyond the grasp of the existing electorate, the only popular remedy is to extend the franchise. As things develop, and the electorate finds all questions difficult to the point of the impossible, the logical reduction to absurdity of the existing principle will be to give the vote from birth.

This is not to argue that the people should not have power over their own destiny and that of their country. On the con-