



Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)
African Peace and Security Programme (APSP)
African-led Solutions (AfSol) Research Project



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Operationalizing African-led Solutions in Peace and Security:

Case Studies from South Sudan and Somalia

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AACC:	All African Conference of Churches
AFIS:	<i>Amministrazione Fiduciaria della Somalia</i>
AfSol:	African-led Solutions
AMIS:	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSP:	African Peace and Security Programme
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
AUC:	African Union Commission
AUHIP:	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
CADSP:	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CEWS:	Continental Early Warning System
CEWARN:	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CMD:	Conflict Management Division
COMESA:	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPAX:	Peace and Security Council of the Central Africa
CPA:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMR:	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CAR:	Central Africa Republic
DCR:	Democratic Africa Republic
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC:	East African Community of West African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community

EU:	European Union
FLS:	Front Line States
GIZ:	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
ICU:	the Islamic Court Union
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM:	the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IPSS:	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
KDF:	Kenya Defence Force
LEWS:	Local Early Warning System
LAS:	League of Arab States
LRA:	Lord Resistance Army
NEWS:	National Early Warning System
NARC:	North African Regional Capability
NCP:	National Congress Party
NDP:	National Development Plan
NSSP:	National Security and Stabilization Plan
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
OIC:	Organization of Islamic Conference
PoW:	Panel of the Wise
PCRD:	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PCRP:	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding
PPCRD:	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
RECs:	Regional Economic Communities
RMs:	Regional Mechanism
SADC:	South African Development Community
SNF:	Somali National Forces
SPLM/A:	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

SSCC: South Sudan Council of Churches
SSPRC: South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UIC: Union of Islamic Courts
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNITAF: United Nations Task Force
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPOS: UN Political Office for Somalia
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
USC/SNA: United Somali Congress/ Somali National Alliance
WW1: First World War
WW2: Second World War

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Forward

INTRODUCTION

AFRICAN-LED SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS IN PEACE AND SECURITY

1. Background

1.1: IPSS Mandate to Undertake Research on African Peace and Security Challenges and Problems

At the outset, it is worth noting that the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) is mandated by African Union with a task of undertaking the intellectual challenge of researching peace and security problems that African continent is experiencing. The IPSS's mandated role was endorsed by the African Union Executive Council (see Appendix 1) to take up the intellectual challenge to define African-led Solutions (thereafter AfSol) for peace and security issues in the continent.

Towards that end, IPSS launched African-led Solutions research project as part of its African Peace and Security Program. So far, the Institute has deployed *an applied action research* in two case studies: South Sudan and Somalia. The two cases are utilized as research tools with an aim of analyzing AfSol practices and applications on the ground, and the implications of those practices on the management of peace and security issues in Africa. To be specific, knowing that African problems are numerous, complex and highly diversified, IPSS focus is precisely on *African solutions to African problems in peace and security* sector. This focal research niche, however, is not being conceptualized in an isolated context. Rather, it is perceived as part of the whole intrinsically interconnected components along *peace-security-development nexus*. Within this context, IPSS overall research quest is to stir up an intellectual debate on AfSol as a concept and practice in order to arrive at a more concrete and operational definition(s) of AfSol to peace and security problems based on applied research informed by specific case studies.

1.2: The History and Origin of the AfSol Concept

The precise meaning of the concept of “African led Solutions” to African problems in general is still debatable. More so, its practical application has been at best elusive. But it is largely agreed as a concept that offers Africa a leading role in defining its problems and providing solutions to the problems facing the continent. Through literature review one can learn that African solutions are usually based on either ownership i.e. of being African-led or of being ‘working’ solutions rooted in African identity manifested in its culture, values and realities of societies. The questions of ownership can again be discussed in the forms of African states, political leadership and institutions, and peoples at the grassroots level.

This concept is not a new phenomenon, but rather, dates back to the era of slavery, especially the Middle Passage, which massively depopulated the continent. However, it is the diaspora Africa such as the notables Marcus Garvey and W.E. B. Dubois that pushed the African solutions, as part of Pan African Movement, into the limelight. That initial effort pushed the Pan African movement espoused by the forefathers of the African independence including the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Since the beginning of the African consciousness at the end of WWI advocated by both Africans in the diaspora and in the continent; the concept still lacked clarity both as a coherent concept and practice.

However, the concept gained momentum and mustered energy in the early 21st century as a response to the continent’s growing and intractable conflicts, famine and poverty where it has maintained a constant presence at the bottom of all human development indices in Africa. Since the African independence decade of 1960s the leaders of the continent have been in one format or another packaging and repackaging Afsol through their summits, declarations, speeches and other platforms on the need to have an African led solution to African problems in peace and security. Despite the expressed desire towards this goal, however, and as many argue, the concept is yet to acquire some form of clarity in how the concept has developed and how best it can be translated into a viable practice that effectively tackles African problems.

Admittedly, many studies have been made on the topic but most produced more questions than answers. Since the end of the Cold War in early 1990s the most formidable challenge besetting the continent was the fragility or absence of peace and security. Since the 1960s, there have been more than 150 incidences of violent disputes among and between African states. More than 70 of them have been about claims to protect colonial boundaries, and of these, 50 have led to full internal wars. In 1998 alone, 18 African states were at war and 11 other countries faced internal civil unrest. The scourge of conflicts has been one of the most destabilizing factors that have severely undermined Africa's efforts to promote socioeconomic and political development and provide security. Regrettably for the advocates of AfSol, but to the relief of ordinary citizens, many of these complex intra and interstate conflicts ended with the help and direct intervention of non-African players.

Literature informs that while African solutions for peace and security have received widespread and strong attention ever, the underlying meaning of AfSol seems to have been taken for granted rather than critically studied. Several authors have drawn attention to the weaknesses of contemporary African-led peace operations while others have noted the discrepancy between the ownership rhetoric and the continuing dependence on external financial, research and policy support. The usage of the term sometimes treats Africa as one block and knits a framework which fails to apprehend that Africa is made up of 55 states, and an estimated 2,000 ethnic groups whose problems are often heterogeneous and one ethnic group's problems may be taken as others' solution (Nyuykonge, 2010).

1.3. Pan-Africanism, AfSol, and African Union/ Unity Link

As noted above, the concept of 'African Solutions' is closely linked in its origin and development to the pan-Africanism, as an ideology and a driving force behind Africa's struggle for political independence, its subsequent formation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) in 1963 and its transformation into the African Union (AU) in 2002. Despite its notable achievements in helping defeat colonialism and dismantling the apartheid regime of south Africa, the OAU was institutionally and politically unable and unprepared to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, stop the collapse of Somalia and the prevent the Eritrean/Ethiopian wars, and save eastern DRC from becoming the worst humanitarian crisis. These are just the major ones among a number of other armed conflicts and instability hotspots, which together reveal inherent weaknesses and

unattended structural limitations that render the continental organization extremely dependent on non-African players for mandate and guidance to solve conflicts in its own backyard.

Consequently, after almost forty years of existence, it became apparent that the OAU as an organization was no longer fit to face up to the changing nature and format of African problems, and reform appeared inevitable. One major stumbling block that narrowed the interventionist capacity of the OAU was the principle of *non-interference* enshrined in its Charter that aimed at respecting the sovereignty of states (Adogamhe, 2008). The OAU's incapability to handle Africa's changing and growing security and economic development challenges, led to the transformation of the OAU into the AU as a more assertive institution in 2002. As a new continental organization and through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU provides the architecture for promoting a new approach to African security, political and economic integration (see Constitutive Act, 2000, Articles 3 & 4).

The beginning of AfSol, as an African conflict prevention and management approach, is traceable back to the 1990s in the aftermath of the failure of the international community to decisively deal with conflicts in Africa. Hence, the coming of age of the AU from the OAU marked the first steps of the notion of AfSol which later served as one of the founding principles of the AU. AfSol has given prominence and encouragement to the search for indigenous solutions to African conflicts from its inception. *Article 4* (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act empowered the AU to intervene in Member States in the interest of peace and security; especially in cases involving crimes against humanity and genocide. It also places more emphasis on local conflict prevention and management, and the ownership of the processes as reflected in the Constitutive Act, and in its African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA (Sessay, 2010). Thereafter, AfSol the catch-all phrase of 'African led solutions to African problems' became a household name in many conferences and declarations and a popular slogan in the speeches of African leaders. The collective consensus remains that on several occasions a consistent message is being passed that 'African problems' need 'African solutions' on the ground, and that *home-grown* solutions are the best way to solve problems.

The establishment of the AU in 2002 brought a renewed sense of optimism in Africa after the dark years of the 1990's that witnessed more than a third of the continent engulfed in wars and indescribable tragedies. The preamble to the Constitutive Act of the AU paid tribute to the ideas of pan-Africanism, with a renewed desire to seek internal solutions to Africa's problems. Its formation

was critically focused on finding African solutions for Africa's problems. Its institutions, powers and objectives were meant to bring about a fundamental shift away from the constraints imposed by the principle of *non-interference* which was replaced with that of *non-indifference* (Apuuli, 2012).

To facilitate the implementation of the new security mandate, the AU established an operational structure: the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The establishment of the PSC constituted a fundamental change in the focus of the AU that brought to the forefront the quest for peace and stability in Africa. In 2004, the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) were established. The PSC and the CADSP are regarded as the legal frameworks underpinning the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union. The PSC is tasked with the following functions:

- a) Promoting peace, security and stability in Africa;
- b) Leading preventive diplomacy and the maintenance of peace;
- c) Managing catastrophes and humanitarian actions;
- d) Replacing the Central Organ of the Mechanism for the prevention, management and regulation of conflicts in Africa, created in 1993.

Acting as the main pillar of the APSA, the PSC is supported by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The relationship between the AU, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) is a key APSA component. Interaction between the PSC and other AU organs, such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as with civil society organizations, is equally vital for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The AU-PSC in collaboration with sub-continental Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, as well as some individual states, has attempted to implement AfSol and solve many on-going crises in the continent. So far, experiences show that the AfSol approach has had some glaringly painful failures as manifested in the continuing crises in Somalia, Zimbabwe,

Darfur, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Uganda. They demonstrate the weaknesses of the way AfSol have been perceived and implemented specifically stemming mainly from three key reasons: (i) adherence to protecting state *sovereignty*, (ii) *dependency* on forces outside the continent, (iii) and lack of *quality leadership* (Petlane, 2009).

It is vitally important to note that, the PSC Protocol provides for partnerships between the AU, on the one hand, the UN and other relevant international stakeholders, on the other hand. This implies that the notion of AfSol does not suggest exclusion of, or non-cooperation with international community with regards to providing solutions to African problems. It simply emphasizes that Africans, in terms of their institutions, leadership and peoples should lead the processes of initiating, designing, and implementing solutions to their problems coupled with international community playing a complementary and supporting roles.

2. Understanding AfSol: Main Debate

The definition and content of what is meant by African solutions to African problems, has constituted a major bottleneck since the 1990's, partially preventing the existence and viability of effective and replicable operational guidelines and institutionalization of intervention protocols. The common perception surrounding the inability of African solutions to confront and manage African problems begins from the assertion that it has been invoked by political leaders to reject calls for political and legal governance reforms and stall accountability. A number of political commentators, researchers and observers have analyzed the nuances in the meaning, illustration, ownership, implementation and impact of African solutions to African problems, as evidenced by the vast literature conducted and available on the issue. What constitutes a distinctly African problem? Are African problems owned by Africans? What follow is brief survey of the literature that reflects the mainstream debates on AfSol.

Some of the literature on the topic looks at the Afsol issue in a favorable lens. One side of the spectrum on the notion of African problems argues in favor of the initiative based on an advent of time 'ripe' for more emphasis of African ownership in peace and security'. It was in the wake of the liberation of South Africa and the emergence of a "new breed" of post-colonial rulers that the notion of "African solutions for African problems" gained currency in the mid-1990s although it

concept remains vague and can readily be appropriated for different purposes or condemned or ridiculed (De Waal, 2013).

The advocacy to implement African solutions is, consequently, widely regarded as a wise attempt to circumvent universally binding laws through continental and watered down benchmarks that permit or tolerate impunity. By the same token, critiques point out that the African solution approach is also emulated not from sincere intentions of seeking alternative conflict resolution tools to stabilize the continent, but rather out of taking over UN peace keeping functions with the objective of expanding regional political influence.

Others question the validity of what makes a solution *African*. De Waal (2013) asks why, for example, should a mechanism or institution that has an African cultural label, be more an “African solution” than a theory or practice drawn from political theory and international experience that has been developed and applied in Africa? Thus the praxis of the “democratic developmental state” as elaborated by Meles Zenawi makes reference to South Korea, Taiwan and 19th century Germany, but is as much an “African” solution as the cleansing rituals of the Acholi people of northern Uganda. Moreover, others examine the issue from political dimension where they argue African solutions can be those that reflect African political interests, including the fundamental continental interests of promoting democracy and development, and pursuing unity and autonomy vis-à-vis the implied and expressed desires of external powers.

Characteristically, African countries have been limited to participate in the implementation of political roadmaps and strategies defined by non-African players. The advocates of an African approach assert that practical African led solutions would begin with consulting of all the affected people including local and regional stakeholders in order to understand the real causes of the conflict in order to design appropriate and relevant policies action plans. The proposed recommendations and guidance are and should be open for debate and discussion as a natural process, with Africans setting the agenda of the discussions and framing the terms of negotiations. Such an approach would assure that local social, political and economic contexts and other relevant peculiarities are taken into serious consideration in the efforts to bring consensual solutions acceptable and enforceable by all stakeholders.

Another implication of an African political solution, says De Waal (2013), is that the response to an armed conflict in Africa would be led by the priority of finding a political solution. Thus, a negotiated resolution is preferable to the imposition of a solution by military means. “An African political solution will not take at face value the definitions, values and procedures preferred by outsiders and do not. Thus an African solution will not exclude certain groups on the basis that solely because Americans or Europeans consider them undesirable, or try to eliminate such groups as a precondition for a political settlement. Again, there will be debate and disagreement among Africans concerning the nature of this political settlement and how it is to be reached. But most important is that Africans should set the terms of this debate, and outsiders should participate in an African-led debate. Generally, the above mainstream debate on AfSol indicates that there are two competing lines of arguments that dominate the overall discussion, i.e. AfSol’s *proponent vs. opponents*.

2.1: *The proponents*

The AU, African Regional Economic Communities and African civil society are calling for “African-led” solutions to address African conflicts. These are expected to be more effective, efficient and sustainable than those initiatives that are driven – politically, conceptually, and institutionally – by non-African institutions (IPSS, 2009). Despite the fact that African and non-African proponents alike are clearly advocating for AfSol, they point to several hindrances that limit the efficiency of AfSol in practice. Hutchful (2000) asserts the need for an African driven solution to manage the African security dilemma is highly desired. Nevertheless, at the continental level the understanding is that each African peace agreement has its own distinct goal and purpose, the paper argues, and is the result of a particular situation as some peace accords tend to be more comprehensive and others remain partial agreements. Peace accords in Africa vary in their complexity, quality, their time table of implementation, and the time taken to conclude acceptable arrangements.

Although the need for African solutions, as advocated at the AU and RECs levels, remains firm and urgent, the implementation of peace agreements has been hindered by strict adherence to the principle of *non-interference* and inability or unwillingness to fund peace operations. Williams (2008) asserts that the time following the cold war disinterest to support peace keeping missions in Liberia and Burundi by the victorious west, accentuated the need to design and own home made mechanisms to deal with Africa’s security problems. Moreover, the ownership of AfSol at AU and

RECs has been further hindered by over-concentration at the political high level *viz* Heads of State rather than at the grass-root level. US president Barrack Obama delivered a speech in Cape Town, South Africa on June 30, 2013 where he admitted the need for African solutions to come from a consensus built around ordinary people in Africa. Such is an admission from the powerful non-African voices that ultimate responsibility must rest with African to deal with African problems.

Similarly, others argue that the African solution to its problems should be grounded and reflect its cultural heritage. Ayittey (2010) argues that many peace agreements in Africa failed because they did not reflect local realities and context and says “The real African solution is one rooted in African culture, tradition, and heritage, but not cut off from the rest of the world¹.” The assertion that most peace agreements and operations in African conflict resolution efforts neglect the involvement of grass-roots both at the inception and implementation levels is supported by various and solid empirical evidence (Cornwell, 1998). African culture is dynamic and diverse, say argues Tikly (2003), and is in the state of constant change. In this light, understanding of Afsol as one cultural essence may not be the best way to approach African conflicts from a point of view that takes Africa as a comfortably predictable and homogenous cultural strand.

2.2: The Opponents

The other side of the debate is cautiously optimistic about the prospect of exploiting the indigenous norms, practices and learning to address the root causes of the African problems and come up with timely and effective response to crisis situations. However, it is necessary not to push the issue of sovereignty over continental conflict situations and pay attention to the prevalent human suffering. This group argues that the continent has less sovereignty on the conflicts than it would have liked. Hence, the viability of African led solutions to devolve into operational measures capable to identify, contain and effectively resolve African conflicts is unrealistic. The critics assert that the notion is too manipulated by African leaders who are widely accused of overseeing and leading human rights

¹ Ayittey (2010) says “More than 30 such peace accords have been brokered in Africa since the 1970s, with abysmal results. Only Mozambique’s 1991 peace accord has endured, while shaky pacts hold in Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger. Elsewhere, peace accords were shredded like confetti even before the ink was dry, amid mutual recriminations of cease-fire violations.” In contrast, for Ayittey, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Gacaca. George Ayittey were successful based they based themselves in African tradition.

abuses and continued bad governance to justify their avoidance of accountability for the humanitarian and armed conflict crisis they take direct responsibility for.

In fact, some radical critics reject AfSol categorically. For example, Musewe (2013: 1-3) argues that “African Solutions to African Problems reflects the limited thinking of Africa’s leadership. It is a term that denies Africa the best solutions to its social problems and creates an excuse for substandard leadership and solutions. We must reject this thinking and continually seek world class solutions if we are to accelerate the economic emancipation of African masses. [...]” He concluded “The myth must now be destroyed.”

The overarching discussion reveals that, despite the limitations and debates in the field both pros and cons of the concept of AfSol, there are many attempts to conceive and implement an African led solution to its peace and security problems. This implies that AfSol is here to stay at work, for it is perceived widely by African political and socio-cultural institutions, political leadership and peoples at the grassroots as a home grown inspiring concept that empowers Africans to own and, therefore, administer their development path in this interdependent and ever-changing world.

3. AfSol and APSA as an Institutional Mechanism

The transformation of the continental organization from the OAU to the AU in 2002 had the vision and objective to provide “African solutions for African problems”, especially with regard to peace and security. From an institutional perspective, the AU has come a long way towards this goal where the African Peace and Security Architecture is becoming ever more operational while the RECs are by now the natural first ports of call whenever problems in this sector need to be addressed.

However, and in stark contrast to the relative success in the institutional dimension, the content and substantial meaning of “African solutions” is still largely shrouded in mystery.

Overall, we may say that African institutions – i.e. the AU or the RECs – usually make earnest attempts to adapt their interventions to the local environments. But, time and again, we also observe that there are immense pressures on these institutions to adjust themselves to ‘global standards and concepts’ that may have more relevance in, for example Europe, than in the conflict theatre proper. The immediate problem is that currently we can discuss these issues only based on impressions.

Therefore, a debate about the “African-ness” of the solutions provided today tends to quickly slide into an exchange on political positions.

Regarding the question whether – or to which extent – there are African characteristics that can inform specific African approaches, we remain insufficiently informed to support any consistent argument. There are those debates mentioned above, about punitive versus integrative justice, accountability mechanisms, etc. but evidence remains by far circumstantial, and the significance of the concepts to the practice of interventions appears largely open to subjective interpretations, rational priorities and evaluations.

3.1: African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Conflict Prevention

The APSA is “....built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent.” It encompasses the following issues:

- Early warning and conflict prevention;
- Peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development;
- Promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights; and
- Humanitarian action and disaster management.

In the first leg of the APSA is the issue of the unique benefits and challenges of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to anticipate and prevent future intrastate crises in the continent. Jentleson’s (1998) conceptualization of preventive diplomacy focuses on situations where the likelihood of mass violence is imminent—not yet existing; with a short to medium time frame; and a policy objective of intervention before the conflict begins or escalates. With its emphasis on prevention, preventive diplomacy differs from normal diplomacy or simple management of relations between states, and war diplomacy where conflict has already begun, with an immediate time frame, and an objective of

limiting or ending the conflict. Similar to other forms of diplomacy, prevention utilizes many of the coercive and non-coercive tools or strategies to achieve its objectives.

While preventive diplomacy may seem to be the superior form of interstate relations, it is fraught with three major methodological problems that call into doubt the effectiveness of this strategy. First, an assessment of the success or failure of preventive diplomacy relies on counterfactual reasoning. Second, the degree of relativity is lacking in the measurement of case outcomes (i.e. the gray area), and this harms (but does not eliminate) evaluative reliability. The third methodological problem is the idea that the designation of success is transitory, which means a policy could initially appear to be successful and later break down.

Generally the possibility of preventive diplomacy is based on the following three factors: purposive v. primordial sources of ethnic conflict, cases of missed opportunities for diplomacy, and cases that have been relatively successful with preventive diplomacy. Essentially, Jentleson (1998) dismisses primordial sources of ethnic conflict and asserts the instrumentalist and constructivist approaches to ethnic conflict. For example, Somalia and Rwanda as clear cases, in which the international community (particularly the AU, US and UN) failed to, act in the face of early warnings of conflict and genocide. Moreover, they failed to support some movements pertained to political reforms in the continent. To exemplify, following in the May 1990 Manifesto signing by 144 prominent political leaders in Somalia, dictator Said Barre arrested many of the signatories—with no substantive international outcry or action.

Attempting to shed a positive light on preventive diplomacy, the DRC is an example of a relative successful case of preventive action. However, even these cases do not escape the problem of transitory designation (especially in the DRC. Despite this concern, Jentleson (1998) feels that there are analytic and empirical bases for affirming the possibility of this type of diplomacy.

Nevertheless, oftentimes preventive diplomacy faces five obstacles: early warning, mustering political will, developing a fair and firm strategy, the sovereignty norm, and international institutional capacity. First, early warning relies on complete and credible information in addition to analysts that can accurately interpret that information. Unfortunately it is about the *signals* of imminent conflicts competing with the *noise* of louder international events (i.e. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait while Somalis were starving and being killed in 1990-1991). Also, there may be bureaucratic reasons why early

warnings are not disclosed, such as an analyst not wanting to be fired for giving bad news to policy makers that want to avoid making difficult choices.

Next, mustering political will is a significant barrier to preventive diplomacy because the nature of preventive action is not immediate, and most of the conflicts occur in areas that do not have vital interest for major powers or even international institutions. The development of a fair and firm strategy when dealing with the actors of a potential conflict is also an obstacle because it must be symmetric (note: this does not mean that it is impartial), ensuring that all parties feel assured that will not be disadvantaged if they abide by the peace. The strategy must also be firm, as to present a credible deterrent to non-cooperation to the proposed diplomatic outcome. This challenge is one of the most difficult to deal with because preventive diplomacy may create what was referred to as a “quagmire risk,” which is when the strategy that was intended to help backfires and makes the situation worse (i.e. escalation) and prevents future action on other cases.

Sovereignty is also a major consideration when analyzing preventive diplomacy because of the muddled stance taken by the UN in its Charter. For example, UN Charter, Chapter 1 (2) (7) states that *nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state* (UN, 1945). However, the Charter further declares that the UN promotes international respect for and observance of life, liberty, and security of persons. Finally, the capacity of international institutions is a difficulty faced in the execution of preventive diplomacy. On one hand, the UN and various regional organizations have the legitimacy as the authorizer of actions for the international community and it has a network of agencies that can support such actions. However, its capacity to deal with peacemaking has been somewhat limited relative to its peacekeeping potential.

In closing, preventive diplomacy is not only pragmatically sound (i.e. prevention is more cost-effective, in terms of risks, than violence), it is a moral imperative to prevent humanitarian crises like genocide, human displacement, and other tragedies of conflict.

3.2: Intervention and Peace Operations

According to Bellamy (2004), a great deal has been written on the strengths, weaknesses and experiences of peacekeeping, but little reflection on what this tells us about global politics or the role

of peace operations within it. Bellamy et al (2004) points to dividing opinions on the role of peacekeeping into Westphalian and post-Westphalian perspectives. In the former, stable peace is achieved by creating spaces and institutions for states to resolve their differences on the basis of consent; he argues, but what goes on within states is not a concern of peacekeepers unless their hosts invite them. Therefore, the primary function of peacekeeping is to assist peaceful settlement of disputes between states. The Westphalian model of peace-making is only concerned with the states without paying attention to the sub-national entities. It stresses that peace operation must respect the sovereignty of the state while at the same time it deals with security situations.

In the post-Westphalian conception, the Westphalian order is collapsing and as a result, peacekeepers are and should be in the business of re-building war-torn societies, if necessary without the consent of the state. Building on the democratic peace theory where democratic institutions and processes are conducive to peace between and within states is important. Hence, post-Westphalian conception sees the theory and practice of peacekeeping as driven by an effort to re-build states along liberal-democratic lines.

As evident in the above debate the issue of sovereignty is at the core of the peace-operations. Krasner (2004) advances four meanings of sovereignty that give a more nuanced account: *domestic sovereignty*: the effective organization of authority within the territory of a given state; *interdependence sovereignty*: the ability of a state to regulate movements across its own borders; *international legal sovereignty*: the fact of recognition of an entity as a state, established by states; *Westphalian sovereignty*: the exclusion of external authority structures from the decision-making processes of a state.

Nevertheless, as the Cold War came to end in early 1990s the concept has shifted heavily towards post-Westphalian model following the increase in the number of failed states especially in Africa. As a result many scholars and policy makers adjusted their view on the strict definition of sovereignty and hence on peace operations espoused by the Westphalian perspective. Robert Keohane (2003) and Stephen Krasner (2004) look at the peace operations (broadly defined) from the perspective of an *unbundled* concept of sovereignty. Both argue that the classical, unitary conception of sovereignty with state's exclusive right to determine policy within a defined territory became an obstacle to effective post-conflict reconstruction.

Keohane argues that conflict societies should not aspire to all four types of sovereignty in an absolute sense. But rather, we must understand that conflict countries suffer from "gradations of

sovereignty” and thus it may be necessary to by-pass Westphalian sovereignty and policies to intervene in crisis with a mandate drafted and enforced by international bodies such as UN, AU and other regional organizations. Unfortunately, existing policy tools for fixing collapsed states are inadequate because policy-makers in both powerful and weak states are reluctant to challenge conventional norms of sovereignty.² Nevertheless, there is an increasing consensus to establish intervention protocols that by pass the strict adherence to the Westphalian model in failed or collapsed states. To that end Krasner introduces: the concepts of *shared sovereignty*, an arrangement under which foreigners share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic governance (see also Krasner 2005), and b) *de facto trusteeship*, in which external actors control aspects of domestic sovereignty for an indefinite period, with no commitment to restore local authority quickly.

Consequently, four several fundamental questions out of many come to mind to at least tentatively answer four basic questions about the current peace operations system: Laitin and Fearon (2004) ask these four fundamental questions: *who should lead the operations and who should pay? How can the efforts of the multiplicity of actors engaged in these interventions be coordinated? If missions are led by interested states or regional actors, who will oversee their actions and hold them accountable for abuses? How quickly should the neo-trustees leave and transfer authority to local actors?*

At this junction it is critically to examine levels of intervention or peace-making operations. Belamy and Williams (2004) advance seven levels of peace-making intervention:

1. *Preventive deployment* is often done in consent with the host nation.
2. *Traditional peacekeeping* is designed to separate between two warring faction often two warring states e.g. Cyprus, Sudan and South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia.
3. *Wider Peacekeeping* is designed to enforce ceasefire and provide functions such as delivery of humanitarian assistance in an on-going conflict.
4. *Peace enforcement* is often authorized by the UN Security Council sometimes in collaboration with other regional entities like AU to intervene between warring factions. It is based on the UN Charter’s *collective security*.

² This practice can be seen from the AU’s political leaders who all the time respects “sovereignty” and neglect the genuine human suffering inside their nations.

5. *Assisting transition* is where the operation becomes multi-dimensional that encompasses military deployment, police and/or civilian personnel to assist the warring parties in implementing political settlement and transition from internationally supported institutions to indigenous ones. These operations take place after a ceasefire and political settlements have been reached. Examples include the end of transitional system in Somalia in 2012 enforced by AU's AMISOM troops in collaboration with the UN Political Operation for Somalia.
6. *Transitional administration* is another multi-dimensional operation deployed after peace agreement has been reached and sovereignty of the nation has been restored and accepted. This operation, in addition to supporting the country's economic and political stability, also enforces laws and border integrity, regulates media, runs schools, hospitals, electric grids and administers judicial systems.
7. *Peace support operations* take place after sovereignty of the state has been re-established and is designed to implement post-Westphalian peace and to found a democratic political system and society. It is a combination of robust military presence to tackle any threat to the ceasefire and stability and put in place a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies, police and courts.

Although the taxonomy is useful in analyzing peace operations, it is still neither agreed upon nor it is mutually exclusive and in reality most operations go back and forth between the classifications. The taxonomy, however, remains very important to understand the levels of intervention by the AU and other regional entities. From the point of view of “intentions for intervention”, it is imperative that we understand intervention as *interest* versus *hegemonic* driven. Adebajo (2000) compares what he calls “hegemonic peacekeeping” by the US in Somalia and by Nigeria in Liberia.

The thrust of his argument is that the two interventions are quite similar, yet have been portrayed very differently in the media. The lead interventionists in both cases were a regional and a global power who shared a historic missionary zeal. Both had to ratchet up their involvement to a more robust approach, but in both cases, policy eventually changed from attacking to appeasing the ‘spoilers’. The US, more sensitive to domestic public opinion and with less immediate national interests in Somalia than Nigeria had in Liberia, felt compelled to withdraw after a year during which things turned from bad to worse. Nigeria, on the other hand, stayed for eight years and eventually

succeeded in disarming the factions and organizing elections. Hegemonic peacekeeping is often implemented unilaterally and risks losing regional and international political backing as it drags longer and hence must be considered as a last resort. And when it takes place, it should involve all relevant stakeholders to broaden and deepen the decision making process.

4. Methodology, Conceptual Considerations, Objectives and the Study Layout

4.1: Some Conceptual Considerations

The main task for this study is to conceptualize and operationalize the concept of African Solutions for African Problems in peace and security. Since the African independence decade of 1960s, the leaders of the continent have in one format or another been packaging and repackaging through summits, declarations, speeches, and other platforms the need to have “an African led solution to African problems.” Despite the expressed desire towards fulfilling this goal, as many argue, the initiative lacks clarity in concept and practice. Many studies have been made on the topic and most produced more questions than answers. In this study we will attempt to shed some light into the challenges faced by AfSol as a theory and in practice taking two concrete case studies.

In this subsection, the terminologies imperative for this study are broadly defined. For the purpose of this study, *problem* is defined as *a source of perplexity, distress, or vexation* while the term *solution* is defined as *a bringing or coming to an end or into a state of discontinuity*. At the context level, one must also notice that the African continent is rife with social/ cultural, economic, political or combination thereof problems, where each needs its own solutions. We need to understand that on the one hand, these are human problems that the continent shares with all societies in other continents, hence requiring globally tested and consulted solutions which entail borrowing, adopting and imitating best practices used elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, there are distinct uniqueness(es) to African conflicts that have proved, through their dynamism, the need for domestically designed and enforced tools.

This study understands that the problem explored here is about the prevalent *peace* and *security* challenges facing the African continent that hovers at the bottom of all human development indices. This explanation suggests that we understand *security* in its narrow aspects of preventing and/or stopping of physical harm and more importantly resolving conflicts in pre, during and post conflict

stages. While the concept of *peace*³, despite its many meanings that range from the individual level of inner peace to community and eventually the human levels, for the purpose of this study, it is defined as *the absence of conflicts or preparation for conflicts*.

Since the purpose of this study is to attempt to operationalize Afsol, the analysis is, to large degree, driven and therefore, informed by field data from the two case studies. Conceptually, the study benefited from the method of *structured-focused* comparison.⁴ The study will test a limited number of cases in detail to understand the interaction between the independent and dependent variables, which determines the outcome variable.⁵ The limited scope has several disadvantages including the possibility that the outcome is due to the uniqueness both in the setting and condition of the cases, which might lead to incorrect conclusions based upon the small sample size of the research.

However, there are advantages, as Lijphart (1975) argues, “The problems of reliability and validity are smaller for the researcher who uses the comparative method. He can analyze his smaller number of cases more thoroughly, and he is less dependent on data that he cannot properly evaluate.”⁶ By studying each of the cases in detail, the consideration will be given to all the information that affects the outcome variable. This will lead to an explanation and conclusion for extracting the factors that are relevant for future generalizations regarding the peace and security challenges in general and in Sub Sahara Africa in particular.

As noted earlier, the methodological approach adopted in this study is the structured-focused comparative method using the “most different systems” design. Apart from their similarities and differences at the same time, a number of other criteria were taken into consideration in the selection of cases to be included in this study. We have chosen Somalia and South Sudan, which are as similar as they are different in many aspects. Both can be described as post conflict situations and are at the beginning of institution-building. However, while in South Sudan it is the beginning of

³ Peace is many things: the meaning of the word peace changes with context. It may refer specifically to an agreement concluded to end a war, or to a lack of external warfare, or to a period when a country's armies are not fighting enemies.

It can also refer more generally to quietude, such as that common at night or in remote areas, allowing for sleep or meditation. Peace can be an emotion or internal state. And finally, peace can be any combination of these definitions

⁴ George, Alexander L. (1979). *Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison*. In Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*. Pp. 43-68.

⁵We use the term “case studies” based on the relevant literature, e.g. Alexander George's article is appropriate to comparisons between several different cases. For early writers a case study only examined one case and any other types of inquiry were defined as comparative studies. For a description and typology to the comparative and case study methods see Eckstein, Harry (1975). *Case Study and Theory in Political Science*, In Fred I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (Editors) *Handbook of Political Science*. vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. pp. 79-138.

⁶ Lijphart, Arend (1975). *The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research: Comparative Political Studies* 8 (July): 171.

creating governance institutions, Somalia is at the final stage of the continuum of state institutional decay viz collapse.⁷ In another aspect the two countries are faced with two different sets of geo-political, socio-cultural, colonial history and economic realities. Selected Africa centered solutions include “processes that are clearly and deliberately rooted in local heritage such as Gacaca in Rwanda or the Guurti in Somaliland. But we should be careful about what we choose to label as an “African solution” and why (De Waal, 2013). In the next session, we will closely examine these two cases against a set of questions (see Appendix 11).

4.2: The Objectives and Focus of the Study

Despite the fact that African peace and security problems are either created by complex contexts, or have developed to radically change their character as time passes, this study concentrates on the continent’s peace and security challenges from the point of view of AfSol. In view of the above described conceptual reasoning, the entire task of the study is fourfold:

1. To offer a concrete and operational definition of AfSol based on peoples’ views and perceptions on the ground;
2. To provide some applied research-based principles that makes AfSol *politically sound* and *practically able* to offer tangible and sustainable solutions to today’s African problems in peace and security at different levels of governance;
3. To generate some general findings and conclusions from the two case studies with overarching implications that may serve as guidelines for a concrete and applicable definition of AfSol as an ‘all-Africa’ policy for managing peace and security challenges in the continent; and
4. To stimulate some fresh ideas that serve as generic indicators for further research agenda on AfSol as an intellectual challenge in peace and security in Africa.

⁷ According to Zartman (1995:1) state collapse "refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new. Also, Gros (1996:462) adds five attributes associated with failed states: "economic mal-performance, lack of social synergy, authoritarianism, militarism and environmental degradation caused by rampant population growth."

In a nutshell, the aggregate objective is to intellectually contribute to the effort aimed at *transfiguring* AfSol into a *tangible* and *workable substance* which is built on a defensible *operational definition* that has *practical utility* and *ability* to effectively solve Africa's contemporary problems in peace and security.

4.3: Research Key Questions, Fieldwork Method and the Limitations of the Study

Taking both the long term war-ridden Somalia state and the newly born nation of South Sudan as case studies, with their surmounting challenges of post-conflict (re)construction and the overall processes of nation-and-state-building, the following guiding key research questions were developed:

How effective or ineffective the AU's involvement in peace making/ building/ keeping in both cases? What elements of peace and security architecture are being deployed there? And which AfSol's core elements (institutional/ political *ownership*, local *participation* and *identity*) are being adopted? What lessons are learned from the AU's involvement in South Sudan and in Somalia? And most importantly, what are the perceptions/ assessments of the South Sudanese and Somali state and non-state actors on the AU involvements? And how the AU assesses its own performance and practices in South Sudan and Somalia? To what extent it succeeded in operationalizing its notion of AfSol in addressing challenges facing South Sudan as a state in the making, and Somalia as state with protracted civil war? Is the AU, together with the RECs as building blocks of the African peace and security architecture, are leading the exerted regional, continental and global efforts in peace and security as well as in state formation and nation-building processes underway in South Sudan?

No attempt is made here to answer all these questions. Rather, the attempt is to explore some of these questions and arguments in order to contribute to the emerging debate on the theoretical and practical application of African-centred solutions in peace and security within the case studies.

The quest is driven by narrative materials obtained through several field-centered interviews (see Appendix 111). In the case of South Sudan, the first set of the fieldwork was conducted in form of semi-structured interviews with a number of state and non-state actors, in Juba, the capital of South Sudan during the period December 9 – 14, 2013. Initially, the fieldwork plan was to do another round of fieldwork during January 5 – 10, 2014. However, due to the abrupt violent conflict that besieged in Juba on 15 December 2013 and continues unabated, the researchers were not able to do the second round because of the prevailing insecurity. This implies that the fieldwork data did not

capture the event of the December 15, 2013 and thereafter. Despite this limitation, the overall analysis captures some dynamics that followed the violent conflict from the secondary sources.

In the case of Somalia, the researchers were not able to undertake fieldwork inside Somalia due to continued insecurity. As an alternative, two rounds of fieldworks were carried out in Nairobi, Kenya, where sizable numbers of Somalis live with direct and strong influence on the Somali daily politics. The first round was carried out from December 1st – 9th 2013 while the second one was done in January 5th – 11th 2014. During the two rounds, a number of informants from multiple and relevant contexts were interviewed. They range from academics, civil activists, and businessmen to diplomats and politicians.

The second set of the interviews was conducted at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January, 2014. The focus was on some relevant and key informants in different departments/ sections of the AU, particularly at the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Continental Early Warning System, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) unit. The overall analysis is framed along and, therefore guided by, two operative sets of (i) the APSA's aspects of *prevention, intervention, (re)construction, and humanitarian/ disaster management*; and (ii) the AfSol's key elements mentioned above, i.e., (i) the *structural or institutional* dimension); (ii) the "*local participation*" dimension; and (iii) the "*identity*" dimension⁸.

The above described set of fieldworks clearly suggests that the study has faced several limitations. First, the three month period allocated to carry out the study was a very limited time, given the complex nature of the questions in focus. Second, the political turmoil both in South Sudan and Somalia hindered, to some degree, the researchers' fieldwork plans; and by implication it impacted negatively on the research outcome both qualitatively and quantitatively. Despite these limitations, the added value of the study outcomes and findings is believed to be significant. The study stands on its own as a complete brick contributing with its own utility within the larger on-going debate on the definition, utility and practicality of the 'African solutions to African problems in peace and security'.

⁸ See, De Wall, Alex, 2013, *African-centered Solutions paper 020813*, IPSS, p. 1.

4.3: The Organization of the Study

Apart from this introductory part, part two and three represent the core of the study. They provide narrative based analysis of the two case studies of Somalia and South Sudan respectively. The Somali case consists of five sub-sections: background to Somali geographical and social realities; historical overview of its political history and the emergence of the conflict; field-based analysis focusing on AMISOM operation; and finally the conclusions. The South Sudan case study is also presented in five sub-sections: background; South Sudan as a social field, the AU engagement in peace and security; analysis of views of the South Sudanese state and non-state actors on the operationalization of the AfSol on the ground; and wrapped up with some findings and conclusions. Finally, in part five, the conclusions of the two cases are revisited and synthesized into unified general conclusions and findings together with their implications for the operational definition and application of AfSol in managing peace and security problems in the continent.

SOMALIA CASE STUDY

1. Background

1.1: Introducing the Question

The Somali conflict represents the ultimate collapsed state. According to Osman (2012: 2500) state collapse "...represents a rare and an extreme level on a continuum of state decay, when a weak state becomes unable and/or unwilling to fulfill its task as the provider of public goods." Osman continues that the collapsed states have four traits joins them together in a category of state decay. "The first is the disappearance of state authority as a grantor of security and welfare of its citizens. The second is the appearance of subnational leaders, mainly in the form of strong warlords, who control several hundred armed militias that rob, rape, and pillage to finance their war efforts. Third, the national identity is replaced with subnational identities, including those of ethnic group, religion, and race. The territorial integrity of the collapsed state becomes compromised when all other state and non-state actors, especially neighboring states, intervene."

This description makes Somalia a unique case, which in turn makes it necessary that its revival warrants a unique approach in comparison to other decaying states in Africa. Nevertheless, the seeds for the failure to end the conflict including the earlier UN operation were planted at the beginning of the conflict in January 1991 when the UN, diplomatic missions, and international NGOs pulled out from the country. The international community did not help to resolve the conflict at its infant stage and nor did the regional organizations that Somalia was a member of, including the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), OAU, and the Arab League. None of these organizations, regrettably, had the capacity or the willingness to interfere, specially the oil rich Middle Eastern countries. For so long many described the Somalis as originating from the Arabian Peninsula and classified them as "*Arabs with a tan*" (Jimale, 1995:140). Perhaps Jimale has best explained this double identity and its consequences as "... tragic for the camel (the Somalis) as she is

killed by a hyena somewhere in between the two trees (between Africans and Arabs).⁹ The western countries which used Somalia's *strategic* location during the cold war were not helping at this earlier stage of the conflict either. It took several thousands of Somalis to die, millions of dollars' worth of property to be destroyed, and millions of refugees to show up in the neighboring countries and as far as Canada and USA for the West to come to the rescue. Blaine Harden (1992: 14-15) summed up how and when the western world reacts as "when the catastrophe meter soars way up-when body clicks into the tens of thousands."

The Somali warring factions were left alone to fight and destroy the infrastructure of the country, during when all manufacturing industries were dismantled and office equipment were sold to businessmen in other countries. Roads, schools, government buildings were destroyed, and most of all the city of Mogadishu was reduced to a ghost town. Surprisingly, 99% of this war was concentrated in the area south of Mogadishu. The first efforts of the UN to resolve the Somali misery started with visit of Mr. Jonah to Mogadishu in early January 1992. This led to the passing of resolution 733 (1992) on January, 1992, which urged the warring factions to cease the hostilities. After the UN authorized many more mandates that expanded the effort to safe guard the humanitarian delivery, a series of failures forced in 1995 the UN mandates to pull out without much of a success in reviving the Somali State.

The Somali conflict has been previously intervened and without many successes,¹⁰ as the Somali conflict steadily descended into a bottomless pit as a result of the number of clan-based warlords and later religion-based warlords increasing in number and strengthening their presence and territory. First, is inability or unwillingness to capture General Mohamed Farah Aideed¹¹ for the war

⁹ Ibid. P.141.

¹⁰ In 1992 the US led UNITAF forces intervened with humanitarian mission. This was followed by UN led missions of UNOSOM I & II that lasted until early 1995. These peacekeeping missions left Somalia without any meaningful impact. For over a decade the country was left unattended in collapse and the humanitarian crisis continued. Once again the in March 2007- African Union peacekeepers landed at Mogadishu amid pitched battles between insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops. UN Security Council authorized six-month peacekeeping mission in February. To date the mission, dubbed as AMISOM, has over 17000 soldiers and will be increased to over 24000 soldiers. Some successes that can be credited to the mission are, for example, the creation of the political space in Mogadishu that supported the establishment of a current post-transition government headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

¹¹ A major mistake of UNOSOM II was the creation of the rules but its failure to enforce it. A prime example is the death of 25 Pakistani soldiers, 10 prisoners, and 54 wounded in June 1993 by forces loyal to Aideed. The UNOSOM II concluded that Aideed's USC/SNA insurgents are responsible for the atrocity, issued a warrant for his arrest, and put much effort to see it happen. On October 3, 1993, Aideed's Mooryaans killed 18 US soldiers, wounded 75, and captured Robert Duran who was later released. Aideed, who was responsible not just for the death of many UN soldiers but also for the death and displacement of thousands of Somalis, was not held to account for his crimes. In fact, a US military

crimes he committed against the Somali people and the UN, which served as a prelude to impunity in the wake of genocidal crimes. Similarly, another missed opportunity was in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was destroyed and its leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed¹² was repackaged and helped into the Somali presidency instead of being brought to justice. Accordingly, unlike the other post-cold conflicts in Africa e.g. Sierra Leone and Liberia, none of the Somali criminal lords has been brought to justice. They are yet to be captured and face any judicial consequences, hence at the core behind the continuation of the conflict lies *impunity*.

This section of the research narrates the Somali case study and makes illustrations in terms of the four APSA provisions and examines the levels of the ownership at conception, implementation and finance levels. It is divided into three parts: The first one presents a brief historical overview of Somalia; the next one narrates the field report in a given matrix while the last part provides analysis and the way forward.

1.2: Somali People and Geography

Somalia is located in the horn of Africa and borders Kenya to the south; Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest; the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. The Somali population is estimated at 10 million and is divided into six major groups who speak two distinct languages. These are (a) Hawiye, Dir, Darood, and Isaaq who are overwhelmingly nomadic and speak the "Mahaa tiri" language, and (b) Digil and Mirifle who practice agro-pastoralism (a mixture of dry farming and herding) and speak the "Maay" language.

airplane transported him yet to another important meeting for the Somali people, the Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa 29 November to December 1, 1993. This sent a signal to everybody in Somalia, specially the warlords, that they could do whatever they wanted and they still be rewarded.

¹² In 2004, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed had become one of the leading figures in the Mogadishu Islamic Courts. His closest friends and allies included Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of the founders of the ICU, and Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow", a man whom Washington alleged had connections with the Al-Qaeda network and fought in Afghanistan in 2001. The leader of the ICU was allowed to attend an AU ceremony in Sirte, Libya, as an ICU delegate marking the seventh anniversary of a summit of African leaders. On 28 December 2006, after the defeat of the ICU's army, he committed himself to fight against the occupiers- the Ethiopian forces- fled towards the Kenyan border. He then met the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya for talks regarding cooperation with the TFG. After he visited many countries, he set his base in Eritrea and later became the president of Somalia on 31 January 2009. He remained in office until his defeat in September 2012.

The Somali map, like the majority of the post-colonial states, had separated ethnic groups into different states similar to countries such as Nigeria and Ghana. The 1960 independence saw the Italian Somali and the British Somaliland united to form the Somali Republic. The state functioned for 30 years, with the main goal of the union being the pursuit to bring all Somali speakers into one state (see map 2.1). Between 1960 and 1990, the Somali political map changed from eight regions (two from former British Somalia and six from Italian Somalia) that were later divided into 18 regions during the Barre regime (see map 2.2). Years of divisive clan politics coupled with policy of hyper-militarization squandered both human and material resources, rendering the Somali state weak and subdued by war lordism. As a result of this policy, the Somali state imploded and set off the ongoing conflict, which in turn caused the disintegration of the Somali Republic into smaller entities (see map 2.3).

Map 2.1: Greater Somalia Map 2.2: Somalia Political 1960-91 Map 2.3 Somalia Post 1991



Source: https://www.google.com.et/webhp?source=search_app&gws_rd=cr&ei=v9noUoH9O4ezyAOFloGoAQ#q=map+of+political+situation+Somalia, accessed January, 29th, 2014.

2. Historical Overview of Somalia

2.1: Political History

Somalis never knew a central state system at least in the modern sense of term. However, there was a fairly sophisticated customary legal system, locally known as Heer. The Heer mainly served as *diya* paying (blood compensation for wrongful death) and in some communities the Heer was the basis for a more sophisticated economic, political and social legal system. Between the 7th and 10th century, immigrant Arabs and Persians established trading posts along Somalia's Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coasts. For example, the current capital city of Mogadishu became an important trading post during that period.¹³ The European's scramble for Africa of the nineteenth century was essentially a permanent alteration of Somalia's lineage-segmented population and their future state. France first acquired a grip in the area in the 1860s and established the French colony of *Cote Francaise des Somalis*. Britain moved into the region in the 1870s when the Egyptian forces, which occupied much of the region, withdrew in 1884 in an effort to fight against the Mahdist movement in Sudan. Between 1884 and 1986 Britain entered into several agreements with local tribal leaders that led to the establishment of a British protectorate in 1887 in the Northwest of Somalia which is the present day territory of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland. In 1888, an Anglo-French agreement defined the boundary between the Somali possessions of the two countries.

Italy first established its authority in the area in 1889 when it created a small protectorate in the central zone. It then expanded to the south and northeast; a territory deserted by the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1925, a treaty was signed that detached the area east of the Juba River from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian colony. In 1936, Italian Somaliland was combined with Somali-speaking districts of Ethiopia to form a province of the newly formed Italian East Africa. During the World War II, Italian forces invaded British Somaliland. However, the British, operating from Kenya, retook the whole region in 1941, including Somalia Italiano, where it ruled until 1950.

13 For details on how Mogadishu city and coastal Banadir region see Kasim, Mohamed (1995) *Aspects of the Banadir Cultural History: The Case of Bravan Ulamaa*. In Ali Jimale (Editor) *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc. pp.29-42.

Italy renounced its claim to the rights and titles of the territory in 1947 under Article 23 of the 1947 peace treaty. However, on November 21, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years. Italy, using its tremendous local maneuvers, won this trusteeship and the General Assembly granted Italy the authority to administer the former Italian Somaliland territory¹⁴.

The Italians subsequently established the *Amministrazione Fiduciaria della Somalia* (AFIS), which led to the July 1, 1960 independence of Somalia. Soon after, the northern British territory of Somaliland, which gained its independence on June 26th, 1960, joined the South and formed the Somali Republic¹⁵. Other Somali speaking communities, however, remained a point of contention between Somalia and its neighbors over the years. Among these are the Ogaden in Ethiopia and Northern Frontier District in Kenya.

The Ogaden region, which was conquered by Ethiopia between 1887 and 1895, became an integral part of the Ethiopian Empire, and currently remains a part of its territory known as “Somalia Regional State.” This area has seen many violent clashes in 1964 and 1977. The Northern Frontier District - was also part of Britain’s northeastern corner of Kenya’s Crown Colony. In 1963, at the time of Kenya’s independence, the new government in Nairobi refused the local Somali’s demands for reuniting with the Somali Republic.¹⁶ Over the years, reuniting these territories under *Soomaali weyn* (greater Somalia) became an obsession for the successive Somali governments.¹⁷ This obsession led to, among other things, the rejection by the Somali Republic of the signing of the 1963 OAU charter, which legally accepted the borders inherited from colonization.¹⁸ This obsession laid the foundations of Somalia’s hyper-militarization since its independence.

Somalia’s hyper-militarization was greatly enhanced by its location, with its geo-political and strategic flashpoint attracting the interest of regional and global powers. The primary importance of its

¹⁴ For details on the Italian manipulation during this period see Mukhtar, 1989.

¹⁵ This union has been broken since 1991 when the former British colony of Somaliland declared its separation. However, this breakaway republic is yet to receive international recognition.

¹⁶ It is not easy to understand the complicated border quarrels resulting from this colonial division of the Somali people. For details on this topic see, Drysdale, John (1964) *The Somali Dispute*. London: Pall Mall Press. See also, Fitzgibbon, Louis (1982). *The Betrayal of the Somalis*, London: Rex Collings.

¹⁷ The flag chosen at independence, a white five-pointed star over a blue field, symbolized this feeling. The five points of the star represented the five 'parts' of the Somali people, three of whom were at the time controlled by foreign powers (France, Ethiopia and Kenya).

¹⁸ For a good evaluation of this problem at the time of independence, see Touval, Saadia (1963) *Somali Nationalism*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

geography in this case is its proximity to the all-important oil production centers of the Middle East. Secondly, it lies on the important trade routes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. During the early 1970s, the Soviets were allowed to establish a naval base in the strategic northern coastal city of Berbera, located at the entrance of the Red Sea. This was made mainly as a reaction to the large-scale American military support to Somalia's rival, Ethiopia. During the Ethio-Somali war in 1977-78, the superpowers switched their allegiances. The Soviets became allies of the Marxist regime of Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia (1974-1991) while the U.S. propped up the Somalia government with resources. Between 1979 and 1990 the U.S. sent hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms to Barre's regime in return for the use of the military facilities at Berbera (Ayittey, 1994, Lefebvre, 1991). In addition to the superpowers, the country received military support from Arab countries, China, former East Germany, Italy and Apartheid South Africa (Ottaway, 1999; Lefebvre, 1991).

In January 1991, Siad Barre's regime (1969-1991) came to an end and Somalia descended into a full scale internal war. A careful analysis of the root of the problem, however, reveals that the Somali internal war had been in the making for several years and resulted from a combination of several factors- local and international- who are involved in different levels and depth. The economic hardship of the 1980s facilitated the transference of weapons to the general public as a result of soldiers selling their weapons in order to feed their families. Thus, by the beginning of the war in 1991, law and order became immediately obsolete and Somalia was beset by total chaos. The crisis was further exacerbated by the failure of the international community to come together to resolve the conflict at its early stages.

The major factor that maintained the Somalia war continues to be the availability of caches of weapons and ammunition were accumulated by a previously militarized state. More importantly, despite the UN Security Council embargo on importation of weapons to Somalia and the non-existence of central government capable of buying weapons legally, Somalia continued to receive rounds of deliveries of weapons. This supply mostly, and initially, originated from two sources; the Arab states of Egypt and Libya and later Ethiopia in clear violation of the UN Security Council embargo.¹⁹

¹⁹ On January 23, 1992 the UN Security Council passed resolution 733, which called for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being sent to Somalia. However, since its passing this resolution had become one of the most violated resolutions. Time and again the Security Council revisited the observance of the resolution and came to the same conclusion. As early as, July 1992 the violation of the resolution and frustration of UN General Secretary Butrous Ghali was apparent. For example, a report he furnished on 22 July 1992, says: "...the situation regarding the flow of

Since 1992 the international community attempted to end the Somali conflict where it organized over 20 peace conferences. Each one of these conferences produced a compromise resulting in some kind of transitional governmental format for the failed state, but unfortunately, every one of these compromises ended in failure as the devastation continued. Having seen a series of transitional governments end without a chance of viability, on August 20th 2012 a parliament finally gave way to an election of 275 representatives sworn in inside Somalia that elected a president and his cabinet. This government has gained a strong acceptance in the halls of the international organizations as an equal member of the community of nations. Despite this acceptance and the achievement of the title of post-transition, Somalia is still a country yet to grow out of the conflict phase and shows numerous governance shortcomings.

2.2: Current Political Atmosphere

Recently the Somali people celebrated the first anniversary of the only government that has been entirely created inside Somalia. Truly, for the past one year the government has accomplished a number of milestones that improved the specter of hope for the public. The government of President Hassan Shekh Mohamud had for the first time received a vast international recognition and enjoys an important audience with global powers treated as an ally. Disappointingly, this international glory has not been accompanied by local policies favorable to the expansion of both economic and physical security beyond small enclaves in Mogadishu. The saga is a reminder of the phrase “All Politics is local”, coined by the former Speaker of the U.S. House Tip O’Neil. It advised, rightly, that a politician's success is directly tied to his/her ability to understand and influence the issues of his constituency. Politicians must appeal to the simple, mundane and everyday concerns of those who elect them into office. Such is the notion that is woefully missed amid the growing global recognition extended to the Somali government.

Since it has been enthusiastically swept into office a year ago the government of president Mohamud neglected much of the local needs and concentrated on sustaining the international limelight. As a

arms and ammunition from outside and the continuing use of military weapons on a large scale inside Somalia had not changed since the last report.” (S/24343). This violation has been repeated several times since Boutros Ghali’s report.

On a report furnished by the UN in November 1993 says “Major violations of the arms embargo against Somalia have taken place over a six-month period, but the weapons now arrive continuously in many small quantities, while large quantities arrive less often, a monitoring panel has told the United Nations Security Council.”

result, both economic and physical security severely declined in the past one year. The Shabab attacks increased and became bolder as evidenced by the shocking military style raids on the court building on April 15 and the UN compound on June 19 2013. Moreover, explosions and targeted killings are frequent in Mogadishu and public fear has been raised to a fever pitch. For the past three months the FGS has been at an impasse as the former PM was thrown out and the new PM is rumored to have quarreled with the president regarding the appointment of the cabinet. To the relief of ordinary Somalis and the international community that stakes a lot in maintaining the modicum of stability in Somalia, on January 16, 2014 the PM announced a cabinet consisting of 55 individuals although the candidates are yet to receive parliamentary approval. The confusion lingers.²⁰

2.3. Intervention in Somalia's Conflict

It is established beyond political and ideological debates that Somalia represents the highest level of the continuum of state collapse and decay. Subsequently, the agreement on the status quo of the collapse entails that the revival of the Somali state requires peace-making, building and maintaining operations intended to revive the statehood that it once was. This fairly translates into parallel peace operations, institution building and economic recovery. The Somalia state imploded in January 1991 when the regime of Siad Barre was toppled by self-aggrandizing tribal militias who senselessly murdered, raped, robbed and pillaged. It was also the inaction of the international community including of the then OAU during the critical early phases (1988–91) of the Somali crisis that further aggravated the humanitarian crisis and the deterioration of security in Somalia. In the same token, the subsequent 1992–95 humanitarian interventions in Somalia also fared so poorly mainly due to the “naïveté” of the international attempts that marginalized factional and militia leaders.

The visible shortcomings notwithstanding, the Somali conflict has been intervened several times, earlier as a humanitarian mission (e.g. UNITAF), and later as a peace operation e.g. UNOSOM I & II missions. Currently, the African AMISOM is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by

²⁰ These are 25 ministers, 25 deputy ministers and five state ministers. Prior to being introduced to parliament, two of the 25 deputy ministers resigned and Somali analysis suggest that more might follow suit. Some MPs are also saying they would reject the nominated cabinet.

the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate²¹.

AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union and UN Security Council in 2006. On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744 (2007)¹³. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.

Initially, the mission achieved successes, which along the Somali national forces has effectively evicted Al-Shabaab (the Islamist group which emerged in 2006) from most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu on December 2012. The uprooting of the Islamist group expanded to other regions including Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan. As a direct result of this military operation, Mogadishu is witnessing an improvement in the security realm.

The efforts of AMISOM along with UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Somali National Forces (SNF) created the necessary political space that ushered in the swearing of the Federal Parliament totally made inside Somalia on August 20th, 2012 and the subsequent election of President Hasan Shekh Mohamud in September 2012.

While these political events remain important milestones in the stabilization of the country, the mission is still plagued by serious and growing challenges. AMISOM and its regional and international supporters face the daunting task of creating governing institutions and defeat the well-entrenched institutional legacy of corruption. While in the meantime, they also need to create/strengthen and capacitate the weak and/or absent political institutions at least in the areas controlled by the government and cautiously deal with the complexity of clan-based politics that is preponderant in the informal, local and self-governed structures of power.

²¹ For further information on AMISOM's mandate and background see (<http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background>).

Thus far, the AMISOM Military is mandated to liberate the areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, secure liberated areas, and support and institutionalize Somalia's National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP).²² Since early 2012, AMISOM's expansion in the key areas of operation has been enormous but sustainable achievements are yet to be registered. Even after the development of AMISOM's Strategic Concept, the troops deployed are inadequate to guarantee the stabilization of its area of operations. Other challenges related to the sourcing and deployment of personnel and capabilities to the Mission are owing to severe constraints in logistical, institutional and financial aspects.²³ In addition to the mission problems, a major hurdle is peace-building that has failed to understand and internalize local dynamics and governing methods; provoking confusion and producing limited outcomes.

²² This includes integrating, harmonizing and sustaining security institutions, ensuring coordination among administrative entities, and implementing de-militarization programs as DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex combatants). The mandate is broad in relation to the human and financial resources that are needed or available.

²³ For instance, the expected troop deployment by Sierra Leone was delayed as a result of logistical supply problems involving the acquisition of ammunition. Disagreement between President Guellah of Djibouti and some of his senior military officers about the deployment of Djibouti's battalion is also symptomatic of the political and tactical problems confronting AMISOM and the TCCs. As a result of its failure to fill the power gap that arose from the incapacity or unwillingness of the post-transition Federal government, AMISOM is being perceived by the local population as "occupying".

3. Report from the Field

Given the fact that the AU's 'Peace and Security Architecture' and its notion of 'African Solutions to African Problems' are meant to deal with inter-state and intra-state conflicts through *prevention, intervention, humanitarian and reconstruction/development*, how effective or ineffective has the AU's involvement been in peace *making/building/keeping* in Somalia?

What elements of peace and security architecture are being deployed there? What lessons can be learnt from AU's almost eight years involvement in Somalia? Is the AU together with the Regional Economic Communities (in this case IGAD) as building blocks of the African peace and security architecture?

The attempt to analytically answer the above-listed questions is driven by narrative materials obtained through two sets of field interviews. The first set of the fieldwork was conducted in the form of semi-structured interviews with a number of state and non-state actors, in Nairobi, Kenya during a period of December 9 – 14, 2013 and January 5-12, 2014. The second set of the interviews was conducted at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia during January 1- 25, 2014. The focus here is on interviewing some relevant and key informants in different departments/sections of the AU, particularly at the APSA, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, post-conflict reconstruction and development support programs, the African Standby Force and the Peace support missions.

Despite the fact that this study could have benefitted tremendously from a trip to Mogadishu, the research team did managed to interview a number of Somali experts in Nairobi who provided vital insights into the AMISOM efforts and shared their objective and subjective perspectives. Three levels of general shortcomings were identified at the outset of the AMISOM intervention in Somalia, as discerned from the opinions of the interviewees.

Frist, the AMISOM mandate was authorized to deploy 34,000 soldiers, half of whom to be contributed by regional forces while the Somali State was slated to contribute the remainder. The plan could not, however, be put into action as expected financing for the operation was not forthcoming on AMISOM's part, and corruption and discipline problems nurtured by successive Somali governments rendered the Somali troops ineffective. As result of the operational plan being only partially put on the ground and in its own design problems, public frustration over AMISOM's deficiencies from the outset was significant.

Second, AMISOM's apparent inability to include the protection of civilians in its mandate (which fell on the shoulders of the Somali government as a duty but undelivered) disenfranchised a cross-section of the Somali society that felt unattended to.

Third, the mandate critically failed to take as one of its priorities the dismantling of Al Shabab and the rehabilitation of its fighters.

Overall, the disjoint between AMISOM's mandate and activities and the absence or ineffectiveness of the Somali government leaves the average Somali in a dilemma that worsens the disparity between *expectation* and *delivery*. The Somali government and AMISOM both take their share of responsibilities for the delay in bringing *stability* on which livelihood improvement efforts and public works programs could be established and scaled up. A fundamental error in this case was AMISOM's inability to clearly communicate its mandate, the likely and certain challenges and the critical need for the public to support the mission gave rise to an unmanageable degree of expectations by the public. Compounded with the political and bureaucratic failures of the Somali government to deliver relative and sustained stability and basic services, perceptions on AMISOM kicked off in a negative spotlight; which could have been avoided or reversed if timely actions were taken. With the understanding of the challenges that the Afsol initiative seeks to address and AMISOM's strategic objectives in support of Afsol, the researchers in this project have collected data in a manner that gathered the feelings and opinions of average person in Somalia on what is happening on the ground and how AMISOM can be improved.

Below is a summary of the field research conducted in Nairobi. The participants consist of: An academic, a regional governor, diplomats, former military officer, traders who work in Somalia, civil society activists, a UN staff working on Somali recovery program and a bureaucrat. Average age of the interviewees is 44. The summaries below are grouped together based on the questions.

3.1: Who and what is African? Does Africa own its problems and solutions?

The most important questions discussing who is an African or what we mean by Africa depends on where we are asking the question and the motive behind questions of such identity oriented issues. Where experts usually mention Africa, interviewees 5, 6, 9 said, it is with the understanding that the reference is sub Saharan Africa and not the continental Africa from the southern cape to the Mediterranean and from the eastern Islands to the western tip. Territorial and continental location is what is meant by African in current African discussions on African problems.

Is it a Somali problem? The conflict in Somalia, when defined, should also include the factors that are African, Arab, religious, and others that are strategic in nature, interviewees 7 and 9 explained. Since it is a Somali problem with strong strands of specific Middle Eastern and regional dimensions, solutions seriously need to bring into the equation all interest groups involved in the making or fueling of the conflict. The participants of the Focus Group stressed that in their assessment of what the root causes of the Somali problem constitute, it was revealed that many Somali grass root organizations firmly believe the crisis not to be a Somali problem but rightly a playing field controlled by foreign political powers under local alliances and international and regional business interests.

Accomplishments of AMISOM: Our field research revealed an agreement by all interviewees that the AMISOM's mandate has achieved commendable milestones in terms of security operations around selected towns and locations. Among those is the partial liberation of major cities like Mogadishu, Beletweyn, and Jowhar in southern Somalia from the clutches of the Al-Shabaab. The heroic fight by AMISOM troops along with the Somali National Forces has restored the confidence of the Somali people for which some of the interviewees extended their personal gratitude. Additional accomplishment was the maintenance of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in power and the liberation of Mogadishu from the hands of Al-Shabaab forces in 2012. This military victory was the most fundamental factor in the making of the political space needed to further the political road-map. The respite from the fighting helped the completion of the current post-transition government

in Mogadishu. Despite these accomplishments, interviewees 5, 9, and 10 pointed out, the mission is suffering from several shortcomings that range from public perception to operational and structural failures.

More critically, all interviewees pointed to the lack of clear vision, coherent objectives, resource, a unified control and command structure, and a careful exit strategy that does not compromise the governance and security gains, as the “major Achilles Hills” of the mission. These factors have negatively impacted the effectiveness of AMISOM's mandate.

3.2: Perceptions and Problems of AMISOM

Interviewees 6 and 8 revealed that the perception among the Somali activists and intellectual circles is such that the AU is experimenting with untested, ad hoc and insourced approaches to establish and maintain stability, peace, and a functioning government. The mission lacks a clear road map and a deliverables framework complemented by technical, institutional and financial obligations.

Additionally, as a major undertaker of this UN/ AU mission, interviewees 5 and 7 stress, Uganda must mull the idea of appointing women to reach out to women groups in Somalia (in terms of blending with cultural and religious norms) to effectively bring onboard women, seek their support, and factor in their concerns as a basis for an inclusive public policy needed for a functioning state.

Interviewees pointed out that AMISOM's current non-engagement has crystalized into a negative relationship between the common citizen and the intervention force (the assertion is shared by interviewees 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10). The fact that the public is uninformed about AMISOM directly equates to being misinformed in light of the nationalistic and religious propaganda packaged and delivered by Al Shabab. Such has already inflicted a serious reputational damage to AMISOM as the Islamist insurgents and other groups whose interest lies with the failure of AMISOM to relate to the concerns and daily needs of citizens in terms of security and social services, continue to gain a foothold in the community centers across Somalia not because they have convinced the public of their virtues, but because they simply filled in a civilian component and advocacy gap neglected by AMISOM.

There remains an absence of a well detailed and binding exit strategy drawn by the AU for AMISOM with a mandated body to oversee the progress, recommend and enforce changes, and

implements the strategy as planned. Interviewees 5, 8,9,10, and 11 highlighted the need for the mission to recruit, train, equip, and support a national army and the creation of a nationwide law enforcement and security apparatus.

Similarly, all participants illustrated that the Somali security forces attached to AMISOM exhibit a serious lack of discipline, increasingly becoming part of the security problem than the solution. In a society that has suffered internal displacement and absence of security for more than two decades, a local security force that can be trusted to enforce some semblance of normalcy is critical, they reiterated. In this sense, the trench warfare of no victory and no defeat or maintenance of the *status quo* for armed groups has made the possibility of stability far-fetched; and instead gave way to proliferation and sustenance of warlordism not just to hold out and expand clan political interests but also to spread foreign funded political/religious influence, secure financial routes, and serve as mercenaries for business and religious clients.

Al-Shabaab Problem: The Al Shabab problems began with a loose collation of religious groups that was created by the long vacuum in national political governance and the disintegration of local administrative structures. In fact, interviewee 8 suggested that if the AU was present seven years ago with clear coordination, mobility and offensive capabilities, the Al-Ethad group would have long been routed and its influence that led to the subsequent radicalization of the youth under ICU curtailed at its infancy. The radicalization, that began with Al Etihad, was further exacerbated by the 2006 Ethiopian intervention, interviewees 7 and 8 said, which brought the Al Shabab driven-and-controlled menace to the front of the Somali political dynamics. With improved security in Mogadishu to keep the government alive but bogged down by a lack of civilian and structural challenges, AMISOM now stands at a critical junction as a fourth intervention in the span of 21 years of the Somalia conflict.

Institutional negligence: neglect by AMISOM and the AU towards the importance of the Somali national army is revealed in the remuneration structure it administers. Somali troops organized and trained by AMISOM are financially disadvantaged; with their meager USD 100 salaries withheld for months. Financial pressures have in this case been blamed for numerous cases where soldiers resorted to robbery and other criminal practices to support their livelihoods, said interviewees 6, 7, and 8.

Coordination problems: The coordination problems attributed largely to a lack of unified command and a confused AMISOM control structure among troop contributing countries has proved to be a point

of discord between Somalis in central Somalia, the region of Bay in this particular reference and the AMISOM command stationed in Baidoa.

According to interviewee 8, a major incident that exposed the absence of a unified command and control body in AMISOM entailed a gun battle that followed a night time raid by Al Shabaab militants in September 2013. The militants were engaged by Somali troops commanded by the regional administration (partnered closely with AMISOM), repelled the attack, and sustained casualties. The Somali officials then requested a Medi-evacuation of the wounded soldiers from Baidoa airport which was unfortunately denied by the Burundian troops manning one of the two checkpoints of the airport. The refusal was repeated by the Ugandan check point that followed suit in denying the services of the airport to timely evacuate the wounded Somali soldiers. The row resulted in an avoidable loss of life for soldiers who were fighting Al Shabab in support of the mission.

The dissection of command between AMISOM contingents is considered a plain indifference and recklessness by the administration and people of Baidoa, who are AMISOM supporters and are expected to support security operations to flush out Al Shabab from the region, according to testimonies given by interviewee 8 and 10. The regional administration said the fact that Burundian troops take their orders from Bujumbura and the Ugandans from Kampala is clear evidence that raises serious questions on AMISOM's ability to control its contingents, its internal governance and accountability to the mission and the FGS.

The local officials of Bay region in southern Somalia thus maintain a general perception of AMISOM as an ambivalent entity uninterested to solicit the local support to do its job. Such negativities have played roles in dampening opportunities to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people. Moreover, an incident involving a war lord in Kismayo who initially defied the Mogadishu government is supported in stay in power with the backing of the KDF (Kenyan Defense Forces) while AMISOM was unable to intervene. It should, however, be noted that AMISOM is primarily in the country to support the FGS and not to be clogged by interests from neighboring countries, according to all interviewees. And with Kenya continuing to act outside of the AMISOM mission and cementing clan alliances intended to protect its national interests, the AMISOM, regional and continental security and stability initiatives all risk being hijacked despite a global backing and a significant resource already spent on the mission.

In support of the above points, interviewees 5,7,11 revealed that AMISOM as the continental force mandated by the AU and supported by the international community is only present at the physical level without much of coherent vision. During several meetings with soldiers and commanders of AMISOM, interviewees 6 and 8 reveal, it was apparent that the mission's command structure remains confused as to what the measurable objective of the different contingents is in Somalia (assertions shared by interviewees 5, 7, 10, 11). With the mission financially and logistically reliant on Europe and the USA, the soldiers on the ground are seen by the public and to some extent by the government, as more of a physical manifestation of political presence by global powers.

AMISOM went in with a mandate to keep the Somali federal government alive, among a few other objectives. But currently, the findings from the interviews indicate, that AMISOM is strangled trying to defend itself in trenches and protecting the airport and the palace, while Mogadishu is yet to be fully liberated from the clutches of Al-Shabaab.

The inefficiency that emanates from unclear rules of engagement and the narrow mandate of AMISOM, according to the interviewee 5, 7 and 8, could be blamed for the resurgence of militant groups who invoke a mix of nationalism and religious fervor to garner local support. Provision of social services is heavily used by the militant organizations to alienate the population from AMISOM, which they brand to the public as a western ploy in African helmets.

Handling defections and dismantling Al Shabab: "AMISOM's lack of direction and capabilities hinders its ability to encourage defection of Al Shabab and rehabilitate former fighters," explained interviewees 5 and 8, "In fact, there were a number of cases where allies of AMISOM received fighters who had defected from Al Shabab including senior commanders. But because of gaps in expertise and/or willingness to deal with defectors and provide resources such as accommodation and rehabilitation facilities, the defectors returned back to the ranks of the terror group."

Missed opportunities such as the above mentioned one are abound, according to the incidents recounted by interviewees (5, 8). The examples represent a serious gap in strategy by AMISOM to dismantle the insurgents by offering to enroll them in rehabilitation programs. The component is one critical area that could be considered by the AU planners to systematically disrupt the group's ability to plan and carry out attacks. Last but not least, the mission, instead of exercising nonpartisanship and working towards neutralization of armed militias, said interviewees 6, 7, 8, and 9, has aligned itself with this word lord in this area and that armed group in another area. Its tactical

alliances with armed groups has resulted in widespread resentment among the public and eroded the trust it badly needs from community groups on the ground.

3.3: AMISOM Failures and Possible Reasons

The interviewees revealed several failures of the mission are presented below. (statements are a compilation of suggestions made by all interviewees):

1. There is a clear lack of context in terms of the nature and rules of engagement and the consent of the host country (which include civil society, public outreach and other prerequisites that need to be in place to gain tolerance, if not the acceptance, of the public and grass root community, social and religious organizations and other structures).
2. The mission is faced with a possibility of failure to meet its objectives from a host of military, operational and structural challenges. But the most critical one, seen consistently from the design to implementation stages in the last seven years is the absence of a civilian component in its engagement.
3. As a major undertaker of this UN/ AU mission, Uganda's inability to appoint women in its military ranks for civil liaison has hampered AMISOM's capacity to relate to women groups.
4. In contrast with AMISOM soldiers who are paid a 1,000 USD/month, Somali national army troops who are trained by AMISOM and deployed on frontlines on response, reconnaissance and offensive operations are poorly paid (100 USD/3 month) and are out of sync with the operational and institutional frameworks of AMISOM. The feeling of exclusion from the resources and decision making process can be singlehandedly blamed for the low morale and minimal commitment of Somali troops towards creation of an independent, institutionally prudent, disciplined and technically equipped national army that can take on and overcome military and security challenges when the internationally backed AU intervention leaves.
5. Current state of affairs on the mobilization of AMISOM partnered Somali troops reveals that involvement by the security forces in extortion from businesses and the general public is rampant. Such accusations have weakened AMISOM's resources and focus, which could have been essentially put to root out Al Shabab.

3.4: Tactical and Strategic Failures

6. By building alliances with local armed groups to help it secure large swathes of territory, AMISOM is in essence appeasing, arming and boosting the capacity and legitimacy of war lords in mostly south central Somalia.
7. There is a gap of mandate and capabilities for the AU forces to identify security threats and plan and launch operations. How and when to engage Al Shabab under the military component needs to be clarified, reviewed, resourced and agreed upon by the AU and its international backers.
8. Significant and counterproductive gaps of coordination remain between AMISOM's contingents. The challenge is compounded by the lack of military transport and communication equipment and conflicting operational procedures between contingents. The combined effect of these shortcomings has resulted in limited mobility, exposure to attacks, inadequate preparedness to defend itself, and disrepute among the civilian population that regards them as nothing more than an invasive and ineffective force assembled by regional leaders and bankrolled by the USA.

4. Recommendations, Way forward and Conclusions

Finally, the interviewees were asked to provide recommendations to support a way forward plan for the mission to meet its objectives. Their recommendations are compiled and listed below.

4.1: Recommendations

i). A thorough civilian component as an integral part of the military and security objectives of AMISOM is urgent to reposition its focus on effective operational planning to identify, disrupt and neutralize the command and control structure of terror groups and to engage and destroy their units with minimum causality to civilians and AMISOM personnel. The civilian component, according to suggestions made by the interviewees, could include water wells, schools, outreach programs and health posts supported by an aggressive and intensive advocacy program. The advocacy program is best implemented by and with local civil society to promote the role and mission of AMISOM, highlight its successes and organize events to help AMISOM understand local norms and customs to adjust its engagements accordingly. The exercise would help AMISOM protect its gains and establish formal and informal links to capitalize on the values of local communities. Interviewees 7 and 8 summed up the need for children to go to school to keep them away from extremist groups and to give them a fighting chance at a better future. “water wells, health centers and schools are the simplest services development agencies could provide but the effect of these services for a stable and healthy life of communities goes a long a long way breaking the cycle of violence and poverty.”

ii) Such a detailed and tangible approach is important not only to solicit trust and create space for operational maneuverability, but more critically to turn a population wary of foreign interventions into a vital ally that will partner in intelligence gathering, marginalization and detachment of armed groups. The reach out initiatives will also prevent foreign extremist groups from getting a foothold in Somalia, which is now a critical concern given the incidents where foreign fighters have been killed and taken prisoner during engagements. It is also equally and strategically feasible in this initiative is the opportunity to build trust that is the basis for the recruitment of Somali youth into professional law enforcement agencies under formation. It must be noted that interventions encouraged by international forces and launched by Ethiopia and Kenya at different intervals have bolstered clan politics and dented the possibilities of political reconciliation at a national level.

iii) There needs to be a unified command and control structure that administers the entire force. Burundian troops taking order from Bujumbura and Ethiopian forces commanding their operations from their own bases with Kenyan defense forces striking deals with southern Somalia armed groups aggravate the security problem and further escalate clan and religious tensions. Different contingents from different groups need to come under a central commander and a coordinated command post for operations.

iv) AMISOM should consider working with UN and other international development agencies to design development programs and implement where possible. Practical observations indicate that global donor community priorities by region show engagement in Puntland classed 'recovery', while Somaliland qualifies for 'development' with Somalia eligible only for 'relief'. This priority is believed by local communities and administration to be misguided and has already proved counterproductive to efforts to hold and expand areas cleared of Al Shabab's presence.

4.2: Conclusions

AMISOM, for reasons and illustrations detailed above, is at best not meeting most of its objectives and at worst risks getting embroiled in fueling a current political, religious and clannish entanglements in Somalia. There are two equally important reasons why a radical and thorough assessment of performance and an honest effort to reform, review and reshuffle priorities, decisively solve competing interests from neighboring countries, and streamline decision making within the ranks of troop contributing nations and AMISOM officials, is urgently needed.

The first is to put the AU in a meaningfully strong pivot to develop the effective legal, operational and resource handles in its Somalia intervention through an assertive and well managed AMISOM.

The second reason, which is more critical in terms of the continental drive to see a unified African ownership of solutions to African problems, has to do with proving the Afsol concept as a homegrown and deployable tool. Efforts to review, reposition, and strengthen AMISOM by the AU will make a convincing basis to fully transform a concept that has been in the making for two decades, into a viable, detailed, and African-empowered approach to solving African conflicts.

SOUTH SUDAN CASE STUDY

AfSol Perception, Practice, and its Implications for Peace and Security

1. Introduction

This part of the study focuses on the South Sudan as a case study. AfSol concept is examined in this study through lens of its key elements of (a) African political/institutional *ownership*, i.e., the “structural or institutional” dimension; (b) “African” as adapted to a specific local environment, i.e., the “local *participation*” dimension; and (c) African as born out of and adapted to general social characteristics of Africa”, i.e., the “*identity*” dimension²⁴. The analysis is also framed by the AU institutional structures and functions pertained to peace and security.

It is worth mentioning that the African Union’s PSC and its notion of ‘African Solutions to African Problems in Peace and Security’ is meant to deal with inter-states and intra-state conflicts through *prevention, intervention, (re)construction, and humanitarian/ disaster management*. Precisely, the PSC “is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis situations in Africa. It is supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund, collectively referred to as the APSA. Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property.”²⁵

Apart from this introductory part, the study is organized into four sections. Part two gives a brief background of South Sudan as a social world. The focus here is on people and their political journey from a peaceful transition to a challenging independence, associated with mounting socio-political instability, and insecurity. Part three and four represent the core of the study, and both are based on a field-centred analysis. Precisely, part three focuses on the visibility of the AU engagement in peace

²⁴ For more details, see, De Wall, Alex, 2013, *African-centered Solutions paper 020813*, IPSS, p. 1.

²⁵ For more details, see, Fisher, Louis Matshenyego, *et al*, 2012, *Moving Africa Forward, APSA: 2012 Assessment Study*: Addis Ababa, African Union Peace and Security Department, p. 22

and security in South Sudan through the lens of its advanced mechanism of ASPA while part four examines the perception and practical operationalization of the notion of AfSol as viewed by some key informants representing voices from below within South Sudan. An empirically grounded summary of some key implications on the ASPA and AfSol based on the South Sudan experience concludes this part of the study.

Finally, it should be noted here that this case study should not be perceived in any way as an assessment of the AU performance. Rather, it meant to apprehend through a field-centred material the perceptions of the grassroots and their institutions on AfSol as concept; and to empirically trace its operationalization process in peace and security on the ground.

2. South Sudan as Social World

2.1: People, Land and Politics

The declaration of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011 was a major milestone of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the northern ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 2005. The agreement was under the auspices of the IGAD, the Kenyan government and the AU. The history of the OAU and thereafter, the AU involvement in the Sudan peace process can be traced back to the 1980s²⁶. The CPA could thus be branded as an African achievement though it involved strong pressure from major international and regional actors. South Sudan, with its land area of 619,745km, shares common borders with Ethiopia in the east; Kenya, Uganda, in the south-east; DRC, and CAR in the south and south-east; and the longest un-demarcated border to the north, with the Sudan. South Sudan is landlocked and the nearest seaports are Port Sudan in the Sudan and Mombasa in Kenya.²⁷ Outside a few oil enclaves, the landlocked South Sudan is a relatively undeveloped subsistence economy. It is estimated that 83 percent of the population is rural, and 78 percent of households rely on agriculture or animal husbandry as their primary source of livelihood.

This youngest nation of the world is a multi-ethnic entity, consisting of 10 administrative regional units known as states (see Map 1 below). According to the 2009 Sudan's population census, South Sudan is inhabited with a total population of about 8.5 million. This figure, however, was highly contested by the government of South Sudan, which believed that the actual population is somewhere between 11 and 13 million²⁸. Dinka is the largest single ethnic group in South Sudan. They exist in 7 out of 10 South Sudan states: Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warap, Lakes, Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile state, in addition to Abyei. They total around 3.2 million strong according to South Sudan Population Census 2008 (excluding Abyei). The majority of Dinka are found in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Warap, and Lakes states. The Nuer, on the other hand, is the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan. They are found in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states with a total population of about 1.6 million strong. In Unity state, they live in 7 counties out of 9

²⁶ Komey, Guma Kunda, *Land, Governance, Conflict and the Nuba of Sudan*, London: James Currey, 2010.

²⁷ Wassara, Samson S., "Nation and State building in South Sudan: Priorities for Research and Action". In *State Building in South Sudan: Priorities for Development Policy Research*, edited by: Dorothy Nyong'o (Nairobi: ARRF, 2013), p. 39.

²⁸ Deng, David, *Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa*, Country Report: South Sudan; Okland: the Okland Institute; p. 7.

where they are the overwhelming majority. The Dinka and Nuer combined make up 4.8 million or 57% of South Sudan population.²⁹ In addition to these two major ethnic groups, there are Shiluk and Anwak in the greater Upper Nile, the Bari group and Azande in the greater Equatoria. While this ethnic diversity speaks to the Country's rich cultural heritage, it has also always been a source of internal ethno-political discord.

Map 3.1: Administrative Map of the Republic of South Sudan



Source: <http://www.worldofmaps.net/uploads/pics/online-karte-suedsudan.png>, accessed January 7, 2014.

²⁹ John A. Akec, "Making Sense of the December 15 Crisis in South Sudan", Sudan Tribune <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49453> Accessed January 6, 2014

Like any state, however, the newly born state of South Sudan is expected to legitimately monopolize the use of force in providing security, establish and maintain public order and peace, and to efficiently deliver on promises of development and improving the welfare of its people. Thus, the expectations of the war stricken people nationwide remain very high in terms of peace, security, freedom, justice and development as generic dividends of sovereignty and independence. The heart of the matter here is that, as a new nation without a history of formal institutions, rules or administration are accepted as legitimate by its society. South Sudan continues to face multidimensional challenges in building viable state institutions from scratch.

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, some progress were made during the transitional period (2005 – 2011) in putting in place administrative structures and systems, including a new constitution, legislative assembly, and cabinet. In addition, it has formulated a number of policies and planning instruments, including core governance functions, aid coordination strategy, a governance profile, and a national development plan. After independence in 2011, South Sudan was classified by donors “as a post-conflict country” with “a very high degree of socio-economic fragility, especially in terms of weak institutional and human capacities, limited baseline information and statistics and one of the worst social development indicators” (African Development Bank Group, 2012: 01). Gradually, core administrative structures and mechanisms of political representation start to emerge while the newly formed Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) struggles to promote a sense of national unity, provide security, development and basic services to the population (World Bank, 2013).

2.2: From a Peaceful Transition to a Challenging Independence

The peaceful referendum, separation, and independence of South Sudan were remarkably commended world over. Despite this, several highly contested issues between the two Sudan(s) remained unresolved, namely un-demarcated border, oil resource, and the Abyei. They continue to create political tensions associated with sporadic military confrontations between the two states. The AU most noticeable engagement started and sustained during the transitional period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005 - 2011). In October 2009, the PSC established the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), chaired by former President Thabo Mbeki and including former Presidents Abdulsalami Abubakar and Pierre Buyoya. That engagement represented an

unprecedented degree of African support at the highest level signifying a serious attempt towards implementing African led Solutions to African Problems.

Despite this significant effort, the political and security situation in South Sudan remains fluid. The fluidity of the political landscape in South Sudan has been dominated by both internal and external threats to sustainable peace, security and stability. Internal threats are rife, and are often fuelled by ethnic rivalries, disputes over land and cattle, the spread of arms, the presence of militias, high levels of youth unemployment and the huge gap between the expectations of the population in the post-independence era and the challenging social reality on the ground. Ethnic rivalries and the proliferation of small arms result in conflicts, inter-communal violence and internal displacement of people. Programs to disarm and demobilize ethnic militias have not succeeded, thus compounding the security situation. Since 2008, the annual death toll in South Sudan has exceeded that of the years of the civil conflict.

The external threat to peace and security emanates essentially from pending key contentious post-secession issues with Sudan, notably on oil, border demarcation, the final status of Abyei and the issues surrounding the other two war torn border regions of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan. This situation has resulted in a volatile political environment, frequent hostilities and military confrontations both within and outside. In a nutshell, the heightened military tensions with Sudan, internal conflicts and population displacements make it challenging for the GRSS and Donors to make the full transition from addressing humanitarian needs to medium and long-term state-building and development needs (African Development Bank Group, 2012: 03).


Internally, at the time of declaration of the independence of South Sudan, rebel activities in several parts of the new country posed significant threats to sustained peace and security, coupled with simmering political tensions within the ruling party, the SPLM, and between the SPLM and other political parties. Moreover, the country continues to be ravaged with numerous inter-communal conflicts. The Institute for Peace and Security Studies' conflict mapping analysis, derived from its Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Strategy Development Project, identifies over 90 community related violent conflict cases in South Sudan during 2012 - 2013.

The study points that since it gained independence, the new state "has witnessed localized inter-ethnic conflicts, most notably arising from disputes rooted in grazing land and water points, cattle raiding and access to natural resources - predominately and recently in Jonglei State of Greater

Upper Nile Region. Despite concerted on-going national and local efforts to address the security challenges arising from these ethnic and tribal conflicts, instability persists and as a result is rendering the overall situation rather precarious. The study argues that, ethnic conflicts are serious constraints and a source of threat that stand to obfuscate South Sudan's successful transition into a sustainable and effective post conflict recovery and long-term peacebuilding" (IPSS and SSPRC, 2013).

The recent drastic violent development that took place in December, 2013 brought the processes of peace, security and political stability into jeopardy. It started in Juba on December 15, 2013 before it spread very quickly to other states' capital towns of Bor of the Jonglei state, Bantiu of the Oil-rich Unity state, and of Malakal of the Upper Nile state, among others (Map 2).

Map 3.2: South Sudan's Unfolding Violent Conflict



Source: <http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7626&magazine=474>, accessed January 1, 2014.

So far, the crisis which continues unabated has killed more than a thousand people within a period of two weeks, and displaced close to 200,000.³⁰ To concur with Lyman, the former Especial Peace Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, “the exuberance and optimism that accompanied independence is all but lost. In its place is fear of another failed state and civil war in the heart of Africa” (Lyman 2014:01). The heart of the matter here is that this unfolding crisis is another living test to the practicality and efficacy of AfSol as well as to the AU’s APSA to establish sustainable peace and security among its member states.

2.3: National Development, Peace and Security Challenges

Following its independence in 2011, the GRSS with assistance from donors, developed National Development Plan (NDP) 2011 – 2013³¹. The NDP “is the nation’s response to core development and state- building challenges during the first three years of independence.”³² The overarching objective of the plan is to ensure that by 2014 conditions are created for South Sudan to be a united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all. It has four main four pillars: (i) Governance, (ii) Social and Human Development; (iii) Economic Development; and, (iv) *Conflict Prevention and Security*. In addition, the plan includes seven cross-cutting issues, namely: environment, gender equality, youth employment, capacity building, human rights, HIV/AIDS, and corruption (see Table 1).

The focus of above mentioned NDP on issues related to peace and security, among others, is palpable. The core objective of peace and security component in the NDP is to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Sudan, prevent the resurgence of conflict and uphold the constitution by providing equitable access to justice and maintaining law and order through institutions which are transparent, accountable and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.[...]. Efforts to increase security and deepen peace-building will focus on solidifying a lasting peace with neighbors and overcoming persistent and deep-rooted internal sources of conflict through comprehensive national and local peace dialogue and reconciliation programmes. [...]. The

³⁰ For more details see, United Nations News Centre, “South Sudan: UN moves on political and peacekeeping fronts to staunch fighting”, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46852#.UsVH4_QW3D8, accessed January 2, 2014.

³¹ For more details, see African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan Interim Country Strategy Paper*, Regional Department, East Africa B, 2012; P. 9.

³² Government of the Republic of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan, 2011 – 2013: Realizing freedom, equality, justice peace and prosperity for all*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, GRSS, Juba, p. xiii.

Government will seek to ensure that all initiatives under SSDP are designed to be conflict-sensitive so that development activities do not do harm albeit unwittingly.”³³

Table (1): South Sudan National Development Plan (2011 – 2013)

Pillars	Areas of Focus	Objectives
Governance	i) Accountability ii) Public Administration	Build a democratic, transparent, and accountable government managed by a professional & committed public service, with an effective balance of power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of govt.
Economic Development	i) Economic Functions ii) Infrastructure iii) Natural Resources	Achieve a diversified private sector-led economic growth and sustainable development that improves livelihoods and reduces poverty
Social and Human Development	i) Education ii) Health iii) Social Protection iv) Youth v) Sports	Promote the well-being and dignity of all citizens & accelerate universal access to basic social services
Conflict Prevention and Security	i) Rule of Law ii) Security	Defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity, uphold the constitution, provide equitable access to justice and maintain law and order

³³ Government of the Republic of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan, 2011 – 2013: Realizing freedom, equality, justice peace and prosperity for all*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, GRSS, Juba, p. xix – xx.

Source: African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012- 2014*; Regional Department, East Africa B, 2012; Box (1), P. 9.

Towards that end, the government established several institutions concerned with peace building and national reconciliations, namely the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation with a mandate to promote peace, healing, reconciliation, unity and dialogue amongst institutions and the people of Southern Sudan; South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC), and South Sudan Committee for National Reconciliation.

3. AU Engagement in Peace and Security in South Sudan: a Narrative Analysis

3.1: Tracing the AU Involvement in Peace Process in Sudan(s)

No doubt, the AU and the international community played instrumental role in ending one of the longest civil wars in Africa (1983 – 2005) in the previously undivided Sudan. Its interventions can be traced through several stages: peace negotiations stage in the 1990s to the early 2000s, and the CPA transitional period (2005 – 2011). Later, the AU supported the South Sudan's journey to independence through the referendum in 2010, and eventually the declaration of independence in July 2011. After independence, the AU sustained its support as the young nation started to embark on building state institutions while attempting to construct national identity, promote national unity, and deliver development to the desperately needed population.

It is worth to note here that the OAU and its successor, the AU, did not play a role at *prevention* level to avert the then emerging conflict in the early 1980s. Instead, the OAU started with *intervention* in terms of negotiating peace in the early 1990s, followed by peacekeeping operation, and peace building in the undivided Sudan in the 2000s, and later on in the South Sudan. Under the auspices of the OAU, the Nigerian government initiated a peace process between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLM/A in 1992. In 1994, the OAU mandated the IGAD and Kenya to host peace negotiation which culminated in the signing of the final agreement in 2005.

Throughout its engagement, the AU, notably through the AUHIP, has maintained the AfSol view that solutions to the challenges at hand lie with the Sudanese people themselves. The AU also recognizes that the crisis affecting Sudan and South Sudan is an African crisis, and as such, Africa has a duty to assist the two States achieve a lasting solution. Most importantly, the AU affirmed its readiness “to work closely with the United Nations and friends of South Sudan for the construction

of the country; destroyed by over two decades of war”³⁴, therefore, facilitates the processes of state formation and nation building in the new born nations-state of the Republic of South Sudan.³⁵

Based on these principles, the African Union stepped in and spearheaded a negotiation under the auspices the AUHIP between the two Sudan(s) on transition issues covering, among others, citizenship, national assets and debts, land and boundaries. In this context, the AUHIP is a practical demonstration of the AU determination to operationalize its notion of AfSol. However, given the political nature of the AU interventions, the AU usually is not willing to see internal conflicts like the ones in South Sudan as their responsibility but the responsibilities of the respective states. The internal conflicts in the case of post-conflict South Sudan need not to be seen as locally brewed conflicts but as part and parcel of bigger national, regional and global political problems.

Arguably, peace and security cannot be consolidated at national level in post-conflict state like South Sudan without a holistic bottom-up peace and security approach. This is essentially due to the fact that “with several peace agreements, pacts and subsequently, independence, it was expected that conflict and violence would reduce. However, there are indications to suggest that violence only moved to the local level. Most of the discussions and responses to this violence have focused on the ethnic nature of violence without relating this violence to the conflict and post-conflict processes”.³⁶

The AU involvement in South Sudan in peace and security sector has been visible in two sets of separate, yet, interrelated issues related to peace and security at state level. The first set of intervention focuses on the post-referendum/independence issues between the Sudan and South Sudan. This set contains exclusively interstate issues, namely the disputed Abyei area, disputed border points, oil resource, and citizenship; while the second set contains *intrastate* issues within South Sudan pertained to peace/confidence building, and reconciliation. The visibility of the AU involvement in *(re)construction*, and in an overall process of state building *from below* is hardly evident. This is the case, despite that fact that according Dr. Takwa Z. Suifon, Expert at the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Unit (PCRD), African Union the AU established this PCRD unit

³⁴ AU Press Release, *Chairperson receives First Vice President of Sudan and President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir*, Addis Ababa, 01 February 2011. See, <http://www.au.int/en/content/chairperson-receives-first-vice-president-sudan-and-president-south-sudan-salva-kiir-mayardi>, Accessed December 27, 2013.

³⁵ AU Press Release, *the African Union Looks Forward to a Successful Summit Meeting Between the Presidents of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan*, Addis Ababa, 22 September 2012. See, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43978>, accessed December 26, 2013.

³⁶ Morris, Nsamba A. “When Fragility meets State-building: State-building in Post-Conflict South Sudan”. In *State Building in South Sudan: Priorities for Development Policy Research*, edited by: Dorothy Nyong’o (Nairobi: ARRF, 2013), p. 32.

“in 2006 to response to the needs of consolidating peace and stimulate socio-economic recovery and development by way of insisting rebuilding institutions and governance from local to national level” (Interview 12).

Moreover, this is the case despite the fact that the AU’s *Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development* (PPCRD) adopted in Banjul, Gambia in 2006 “is intended to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict [...]. The policy is, therefore, conceived as a tool to consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence.”³⁷ Most importantly, it emphasizes the AU commitment towards assisting the involved post-conflict states and their communities to successfully face complex recovery, reconstruction and challenges. AU long-term commitment and its mandate to mobilize resource for post-conflict reconstruction, recovery and development are well expressed in this key policy document:

The recovery, reconstruction and development challenges involved are complex and, as such, require *determination, long-term commitment, the mobilization of massive resources, as well as cooperation and close coordination at all levels*. Beyond meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of affected populations, recovery and reconstruction efforts in post conflict societies must address the demobilization, disarmament and re-integration of former combatants; the return and reintegration of displaced populations, grassroots level reconciliation; as well as lay the foundations for good governance in both the political and socio-economic spheres. These tasks should also be undertaken in tandem with Africa’s efforts toward regional integration and socio-economic regeneration (*italics added*).³⁸

The degree of the AU involvement in post-conflict South Sudan, as a state and a society, is far below its commitment enshrined in the above policy document. According an AU expert interviewed at his AU office, post-conflict states like South Sudan and their war-torn communities expect tangible support from AU and from its state members in areas of peace consolidation, reconstruction and state building. Their contributions are the practical expressions to the slogan of “African solidarity”. Thus, after signing the CPA, South Africa leadership pushed the AU to in order to be involved in

³⁷ African Union; *Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, Banjul, Gambia, 2006; <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwovowork-eng.pdf>, accessed January 11, 2014, pp. 1, 3

³⁸ African Union; *Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, Banjul, Gambia, 2006; <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwovowork-eng.pdf>, accessed January 11, 2014, p. v.

post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan, particularly its most war-affected southern region. At the time, the separation of south Sudan, which African leaders fear most, was not conceived by then. South Africa initiative materialized in establishment of Ministerial Committee for Post-Conflict Reconstruction for Sudan, at the AU. It includes members from Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The effectiveness of the committee seems to have been hampered by the expected referendum result which led to separation (Interview 12).

Practically, it seems some members of the committee became hesitant to send team into south Sudan during the transitional period to assess the need on the ground for that may antagonize the government of Sudan at the time there were arising voices in south Sudan towards separation. The committee is still there and it is not yet being dissolved though it achieved almost nothing. Same informant argued that one of the AU limitation in its interventions is its policy of confining itself to the task of resource mobilization without direct involvement in development process while other international actors like World Bank, UNMISS and EU are involved directly in development on the ground, and that make them more visible on the ground among the local communities while the AU is not (Interview 12).

The result is that peace was not consolidated, reconstruction was not established and preventing relapse of violence South Sudan was not achieved. Instead, South Sudan went back to political instability and eventual massive violence with itself. Following the abrupt political and military violence in South Sudan in December 2013, the AU in collaboration with IGAD as one of its APSA stepped in in an attempt to avert potential conflicts as the country seems to be heading to a full-scale civil war. The latter involvement can be seen in a context of its role in *humanitarian disaster management*. All these types of involvements (intervention, (re)construction, and humanitarian and disaster management) which aim at establishing peace and security within and between the two Sudan(s) are integral part of APSA. In view of this backdrop, what follow is a presentation and an analysis of narrative views and voices of a limited sample of the South Sudanese on the role of AU in realizing peace and security, and in supporting the process of state building of the newly established nation of South Sudan.

3.2: The AU Visibility/ Invisibility on the Ground in South Sudan

Generally, almost all informants acknowledged that the AU has been supportive to South Sudan since the signing of the CPA throughout the transitional period, the referendum, and eventually the independence. But it was and still is less supportive in some more difficult issues namely Abyei, and the disputed border points, thorny issues between the two Sudan(s). One key informant argues that Abyei question went through different stages with the government of Khartoum being ‘unruly’, while the AU was not serious enough. IGAD did more productive work than any other actors. The SPLM, a signatory and partner to the CPA, was determined to see the agreement implemented fully while the main ruling partner, the NCP was not. The Protocol of the two areas, Abyei referendum, were planned to take place before the referendum of South Sudan but they were not implemented to the present day. This is partly so, because many regional and global actors, including the AU, failed to honor their commitments in monitoring the political will of the two parties in the implementation process (Interview 2).

After independence, the government of South Sudan expressed its readiness and zeal in resolving the unfinished issues under the auspices of the AUHIP. The two states of Sudan negotiated and signed a package of agreements on the disputed issues, and agreed on how to implement them. So far, the level of the implementation of those agreements is “very slow”: The informant asked: “is this an African solution to African problems?” The 2046 UNSC resolution demanding the two states to move 10km away from the disputed border line. Instead of implementing the resolution, the Government of Sudan penetrated militarily frequently into the South Sudan territory while the AU sat idly by watched from the side steps. When the Government of Sudan complained about the intrusion of the Sudan into Mile 14, the AU supported the Khartoum regime. In this aspect, our informant stated bluntly that “I am not happy with the AU leadership position because they have not convinced me of their professionalism. The AU is pursuing interests which it is not capable to fulfill” (Interview 2).

Furthermore, the same informant argued that the AU does not read correctly the needs of different stakeholders. When states signed agreements under the auspices of the AU, and they did not implement them, why the AU is not establishing who is subordinating its authority? For example, the AU established a road map for Abyei with the consent of the governments of the two Sudan. According to that roadmap, the Abyei referendum was planned to take place in October 2013. The scheduled date passed without implementation. So far, the AU has not established who is responsible about the failure to implement the AU roadmap? The result is that the Abyei crisis is

getting more complex day by day with its people subjected to all types of insecurity coupled with an uncertain socio-political destiny. Yet, no international or continental body seems to be concerned, including the AU. “The AU is condoning so many serious violations by the Sudanese government”, concluded our informants. The burning question here is that knowing that the AU is a union of 54 member states, the dilemma here is that should this problem be attributed to the AU, or to the individual states which are handling the case of the two Sudan(s), though they carry the task in their capacity as member states of the AU?

Along similar line of argument, other informants argue that the AU is more visible at the state level, at least, in two key aspects. First, it supported the process of referendum, and second, it supported the government of South Sudan in dealing with LRA as a regional security concern when it sent troops to trace the LRA forces inside South Sudan. Same informants asserted the AU credibility and image seems to have been damaged to some degree among the South Sudanese people with regard to its different stands pertained to the Sudan-South tensions over border, Abyei, and oil disputes. They concur with the previous informant when claimed that the AU was not critical when the Sudanese air forces penetrated into South Sudanese territory several times, and bombarded several populated places in Unity states including Heglig; and it mildly responded when the Sudanese army forces bilaterally occupied Abyei (Interview 1). It seems AU is poor in accepting their mistakes, failures and blames; making it difficult to adjust to solving own mistakes. Meaning AU behaves as “Know it all” without providing room for lessons learnt. AU as an institution may not portray itself to be judged from the institutional position they take, rather principles and actions they take.

However, they argued, the same AU was very critical and harsh on the government of South Sudan when it's military forces occupied Heglig as a reaction to the repeated aggression by the Sudan. It was so quick in condemning the South Sudan reaction. It thus, together with UN and other global actors, exercised an excessive pressure until the government of South Sudan has to swiftly pull its forces out of Heglig. In short, the South Sudanese feel that the AU was and still is not prepared to put the necessary pressure over Sudan pertained to the interstate disputed issues mentioned above. Moreover, the AU is unable to find a solution to the Abyei problem. It failed to implement its own road map for Abyei. At the same time, it is not ready to allow the South Sudan to take the case to the UNSC.

Another informant states that the AU is felt only as a mediator on a number of important issues like Abyei and the border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan. But its performance is below the expectations of the common people on the ground. For example, sizable South Sudanese feel that Abyei people have been abandoned by all including the AU. Unlike the AU, UNMISS is more felt on the ground for it frequently involves in peace building, reconciliation, and consolidation of rule of law, good governance. Despite this, still there is a lot of killing going on here and there nation-wide in rural and urban areas alike. This is an area where community-based organizations, civil societies as *implementers and peace mobilizers*, state institutions and AU, among others, can work in partnership in mitigating different types of conflicts at their different levels, and in facilitating the processes of reconciliation, peace and confidence building nation-wide.

In responding to our question related to the AU support to South Sudan as it embarks on the processes of (re)construction, peace building, state formation and nation-building , informants claimed that the AU is not visible and hardly felt on the ground. “We are not seeing the AU on the ground” (Interview 4). It is not felt by the non-state actors and community-based organization at the bottom because its deals with government authorities at top level without reaching the grass root organizations including the churches and its national coordinating body, the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC).

As to how the AU should be involved in assisting the government of South in state building process, several informants (Interview 1) pointed out that the AU needs not to necessarily intervene directly in the internal affairs of South Sudan. But it should “exercise some sort of pressure over the government of South Sudan” when it failed to adhere to some key aspects of governance, accountability, rule of law, peace and security. “Sometimes, governments tend to blame the AU for nothing.” There is a need to clearly define the boundaries between the state’s domain and the AU’s sphere of intervention when dealing with issues pertained to peace and security within a state.

Key informants (Interview 4) stated that, the AU could have done better in assisting South Sudan as a nation in the making, particularly in the areas of institutional building, good governance, and rule of law, among others. Today, security, reconstruction and peace dividends are hardly felt at the grass root. What greatly felt instead is state driven corruption where “very little has been done to curb it”. Corruption and bad governance are linked directly to the quality of leadership, a conspicuous

problem in Africa. We seem to lack that type of “governments of, by and for the people”; “government that is a result-based entity; a government with “ability to deliver”.

Currently, South Sudan reconstruction, service provisions and development are mostly donors-and-NGOs driven instead of being state driven activities. Excessive dependency on non-state actors in providing basic services weakens the very state in the making, therefore, impedes the processes of peace, security, development, and state building. This pattern counteracts the spirit of the AU’s AfSol and reduces it to no more than an empty slogan. Against this backdrop, a key entry critical point for the AU, among others, to facilitate statehood in South Sudan, is to assist the ruling SPLM and its military wing, the SPLA, and the opposition parties to transform themselves from guerrilla movements to proper civic political parties. This is a crucial step towards building South Sudan as a viable political unit.

When the SPLM reached to power, common people thought that they have, at last, owned their state, therefore their better political destiny. Through time, they came to disappointingly realized that, it is the political leaders who have owned people and the state resources on a pretext that this is a reward for the cost they incurred during the liberation struggle in the bush. Thus, instead of being owned by, therefore, being servants of the citizens, the very leaders become servants of their own political and economic interests. The result is that the *participation, ownership* and priorities of the common people disappeared in the process of statehood and nation-building processes in South Sudan. Today, the national mapping of conflicts in South Sudan and recent political disintegration of the SPLM leadership coupled with military and communal bloody confrontations are inevitable consequences of the behaviors of the ruling elites that lack visionary and commitment to the collective interests and wants of the people they govern (Interview 3). All in all, the unfolding political and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is essentially an inevitable result of lack of that transformation. Indeed, the crisis is a big living test for AU’s APSA as well as AfSol. It informs that the AU and other regional and international actors involved in South Sudan succeeded, to some degree, in keeping away the two Sudan(s) from derailing to interstate war but failed to foresee the gradual move of South Sudan towards a full civil war with itself.

The South Sudan crisis which erupted in December 15, 2013, represents a fresh and tough test to the AU leadership, its interventional peace and security architecture, and indeed its intellectual expressions of the “African solutions to African problems”, “African-led Solutions”, or “Home

grown Solutions”. The challenges facing the AU and the international community stems from the fact that while focusing on inter-state issues between Sudan and South, the AU and the entire world community were shocked by the mentioned above sudden outbreak of a massive violent conflict among the political and military leaders of the ruling party, the SPLM, which took ethnic dimension.

The way the AU responded so far to the crisis evidently shows that it relies, to a large degree, on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building blocks of its peace and security architecture. It mobilizes the IGAD members to deal with South Sudan’s unfolding crisis. The AU coordinated with Hailemariam Desalegn, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, in his capacity as Chair of the IGAD and Chair of the AU to dispatch a ministerial delegation to Juba, comprising Ministers of foreign affairs from Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somali, Sudan and Uganda representing the IGAD, in addition to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security representing the AU. Moreover, the appeal of the AU Peace Security Council, on December 18, 2013, to regional and international community to help diffuse tension and to “support the South Sudanese parties to find a peaceful political settlement to the crisis”.³⁹

Following the briefing by the ministerial delegation to Juba, the AU Security Council reiterated its support to the efforts being exerted by the IGAD, appreciated the efforts of the IGAD ministerial delegation that included the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and commended the efforts of the UN Special Envoy. It encouraged the Chairperson of IGAD and the AUHIP to pursue efforts aimed at calming the situation and seeking a negotiated peaceful resolution to the conflict.⁴⁰

Currently, it is apparent that the new state of South Sudan is going through a period of great instability coupled with multiple challenges pertained to peace and security. The continuation of the military confrontations have resulted in another phase of human tragedy of mass killings and displacements of thousands peoples. The crisis reflects the enormousness of the challenges that face this young state of South Sudan; and that may endanger its very survival as viable political unit. No

³⁹ AU Press Release, “The African Union Welcomes the IGAD Ministerial Mission to South Sudan”, Addis Ababa, 19 December 2013. <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/auc-com-south-sudan-19-2013.pdf>, accessed 27 December 2013.

⁴⁰ AU Peace and Security Council, “Press Statement”, Addis Ababa, 24 December 2013. <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-com-410-south-sudan-24-12-2013.pdf>, accessed December 27, 2013.

doubt, for many observers, the crisis “tests the African Strategies and 'African solutions to African problems' mantra”.⁴¹

The following part analyzes the views of South Sudanese on the AU's engagement in South Sudan's processes of peace and security, (re)construction and overall state building, through its different mechanisms/ components enshrined in APSA, which itself is inspired by its intellectual principle of AfSol with its key three elements of political/institutional *ownership*, local *participation* and *identity* (Fisher *et al*, 2012; De Waal, 2013).

4. Operationalization of the APSA and AfSol: Views and Voices from Below

The notion of ‘African-led solutions to African problems’ connote sense of ‘identity’, ‘ownership’, and a desire from Africans to master their own destiny in peace, security, and development path in a highly interdependent global context. This necessitates, in the first place, asking questions like who is an ‘African’. And what is meant by ‘African’ problems/solutions? According to one key AU expert, African problems — the definition of what makes an African problem usually arises from the point of view of peace and security issues. The notion is discussed from the level of states, governments and people and came to the fore in the continent after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. African leaders rallied around the consensus that multi-lateral organizations and other global powers had not acted to prevent conflicts and intervene when they took place to protect people (Interview 13).

The above posed questions serve as essential and relevant starting point for any discussion on AfSol, and consequently, on the role of the AU in peace and security in Africa, an ethno-culturally, religiously, politically, and geographically diversified continent. These diversities pose different types of problems and challenges which equally require different solutions, hence, comes the importance of the question of AfSol's *identity* dimension.

⁴¹ *The African Executive*, Editorial 25/12/2013, “South Sudan a Big Test for African Strategies”, <http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7623&magazine=472#>, accessed on December 25, 2013.

4.1: Identity and Belonging Dimension: Who is an African?

In this respect, both state and non-state informants interviewed in South Sudan tend to share more or less same views with regard to ‘who is an African’. They asserted given the fact that Africa as continent accommodates diverse nations with different racial, religious, and cultural affiliations within and beyond the continent, *continental paradigm*, as opposed to *ethno-cultural global paradigm*, is the best way of defining who is an African. Thus, Africans are all peoples who are citizens of any state located in African continent, including people of a state which, for a reason or the other, may not be a member of African Union at a given time like Morocco today (Interview 1, 3). Although it is not a member of the AU and its APSA, Morocco participates in most of African inter-state economic and socio-cultural activities like the African Cup of Nations. This situation connotes that Africa has no unified identity but many and sometimes competing identities and belongings whose centers may be located elsewhere beyond the continent. Belonging of some member states of the African Union to the Arab League, Anglophone, Francophone, among others, attest to this assertion. The heart of the matter here is that, although the continental approach of defining who is an African is inclusive, it poses practical challenges in areas of collective security and peace.

For example, Morocco which is not a member of the AU remains outside the AU peace and security arrangements including its North African Regional Capability (NARC) which is integral part of the ASPA in North Africa. The unresolved dispute over the status of Western Sahara is a complicating factor between members of the NARC, with significant impact on its operationalization. The fact that, four of the six members of NARC do not recognize the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic complicates how these states relate to it in the context of NARC and beyond. This was identified as a crucial challenge that continues to impact on the operationalization of NARC (Fisher *et al*, 2012). In this aspect, one informant argues that “African identity is usually not amplified from within Africa but from outside the continent by others” (Interview 3). He eloquently made reference to the externally driven division of Africa into several sub-identities like Anglophone, Francophone, Sub-Saharan, black Africa, and North Africa. No, doubt, sustaining these externally driven sub-identities has weakened the quest for *African unity/union*, diluted sense of *collective identity*, therefore, posed a serious setback from the ultimate objective of Pan-African Movement. Most importantly, these divisions hamper African efforts which aim at designing African led Solutions to African Problems.

Moreover, some informants lamented that ‘Pan Africanism’, a driving force behind the essence of AfSol, seems to have lost its operational contents and effectiveness in postcolonial Africa. It used to have content and meaning, as a unifying ideology for liberation movement during the de-colonialization, and the struggle for political independence. Thereafter, Pan-African Movement becomes ineffective in post-colonial nation-and-state building processes. Therefore, Pan-Africanism needs new content and meaning derived from the post-colonial challenges facing the contemporary states in Africa (Interview 3). Looking critically in the AU 2063 agenda, it is evident that the AU concurs with the view that Pan-Africanism needs to be redefined, a part of the AU 2063 agenda for peace and security in the continent

The crux of the matter is that Pan-Africanism seems to mean different thing to different entities and/ identities. African political institutions and leadership seem to be divided along two competing paradigms: *continental* version of Pan-Africanism adopted by the AU and *ethno-cultural global* version of Pan-Africanism advocated by many African institutions and activists within the continent and beyond. Reference can be made here to 8th Pan African Congress, held recently in Johannesburg in South African, January 14 - 17, 2014, under theme: “mobilizing global Africans for African Renaissance and Unity”. In addressing the Congress in its closing session, Professor Kwesi K. Prah, a prominent Pan-Africanist, asserted that the *continental paradigm* is something of the past.

This congress has achieved an important victory by putting the *continentalist* conceptualization of unity behind us. [...] we are sure that as time goes on the correctness of an *Africanist definition*, the basis for unity will become even clearer. We have also reached the understanding that the first step which must go out of here in pursuit of *practical solutions to our problems* is the creation of a loud and robust *cultural movement*. Cultural movement which will give people a pride in being African; in celebrating African culture; in intellectualizing our languages as the only viable foundation for our development (*italics added*) (Prah, 2014).

The question of identity dimension of *who is an African* in this ethno-cultural of paradigm of Pan-Africanism is palpable. Another consideration related to identity is to whether the designed solutions for in peace and security issues by political institutions at state as well as at the AU and the RECs levels are rooted in, therefore, inspired by, local *customs, wisdoms* and *philosophies* of solving conflicts among African communities, or not. This begs the question of whether the adopted African

Solutions are organically “African” and “traditional” or political institutions and leaders have simply coopted particular traditions in pursuit of political goals.

In short, it is evident that the concept of Pan-Africanism faces at least two set of challenges. First, it is somewhat vague and can readily be appropriated for different purposes or condemned or ridiculed (De Waal, 2013: 01). Second, it appeared clearly that one of the most sensitive evolutions of Pan Africanism is the growing gap between a Pan African political elite and a popular experience of Pan Africanism. This gap points to a need for a critical assessment of the Pan African institution, of which the concerns seem more and more remote from the peoples on the ground (Bonacci, 2013:06).

4.2: Political/ Institutional Ownership Dimension

One key challenge facing the ASPA is its political, institutional, and leadership ability to find practical solutions the African problems. This is partly due to the sustained impact of colonial legacies. Almost, all interviewees’ narratives inform that due to the colonial legacy and its ‘neo-colonialism’ manifestations in post-independence Africa, some African problems are externally generated. Yet, others are internally generated mainly by the ruling elites. Thus, African leaders/elites are integral part of African problems, whether internally or externally generated. Internally, African problems can be seen in two separate, yet interconnected levels. First, *elites’ level* and their struggle for power that may contradict or complement with external interests; and second, *grass root level* in terms of inter-or-intra-communal conflicts which are usually fueled by the first level in terms of the elite power struggle by way instrumentalizing the grass roots. So, it can be said that most of African political institutions at state levels are contributing factors to recurring insecurity rather than the opposite. Another problem is that many African institutions and leaders hardly accept the fact that all African problems, whether generated externally or internally, are essentially integral part of their collective responsibility and therefore solutions are to be initiated and carried out from within Africa.

This implies that the quality of some African political leaders and elites is a central factor that continues to produce and reproduce “African problems”. To make it worse, the same leaders tend to deny their responsibilities to the problems of their making. This denial is not only stripping the

problems their “African roots” but the rejection of “African-ness” of the problems is inviting non-African interests to define and assert themselves as drivers of processes. The denial in essence is prolonging the life of conflicts beyond necessary as interested outsiders take it upon themselves to magnify and distort these problems, to consequently design solutions as they see fit to their respective interests; often incompatible with local and regional realities on the ground. Such outside-led solutions add more fuel to and thus complicate the problem other than providing sustainable solutions (Interview 1 & 3).

The point here is that owning problems is a prerequisite for owning sustainable solutions. This implies that ‘good governance’ and ‘visionary leadership’ are critical milestones towards a successful AfSol. That is exactly what AfSol wants to achieve. Paradoxically, what is going on in most of the African countries is ‘problems denial’ illustrated above, associated with disunity that together blend into structural and practical inability of African leaders and political institutions to deal with African problems of their own making. The result is systematic external interventions with solutions being designed outside; therefore, subordinate the participation of the African stakeholders in the process of decision-making on matters that directly affect their interests, priorities and choices (Interview 1 & 3).

Admittedly, some African leaders share this view. For example, speaking at the celebrations held at John Garang Memorial Grounds in Juba in July 2013, during the second independence anniversary of the Republic South Sudan, the Ugandan leader President Yoweri Museveni was quoted as saying that Africans have occasionally tempted the world into intervening in Africa and consequently subjugating it. “We lead outsiders into temptation by being weak. How do we weaken ourselves by religious conflicts, sectarianism and lack of organization? Those internal weaknesses invite foreigners to oppress Africa.”⁴² It is unequivocal to find African problems are redesigned and defined differently from the way Africans see it. Outsiders focus on outcome, not process and methods of finding out the root causes to address how the problems became to be, not they should seize to be. In this respect, the intended objectives of the externally funded AU’s missions may be diluted by injecting the interests of some powerful global funding actors like UN, NATO, USA, Germany and France, among many others. The negative repercussions of the interventions of external actors in

⁴² Editorial, “South Sudan a Big Test for African Strategies”, *The African Executive*, 5 - 01 January 2014; p. 1; see <http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7623&magazine=472#>, accessed December 25, 2013.

Libya, Mali, Ivory Coast, and recently in the CAR are practical examples that validate this claim. These interventions, among others, illustrate serious deficiency in ownership dimension of AfSol.

Ownership dimension though is essentially an issue of political will and commitment by African political institutions and leaders; it is partly an issue of an ability to mobilize African own economic and human resources. A general scrutiny of the overall financial expenditures on military and security sectors in the national budgets of the African countries reveals that the common claim of the AU inability to self-fund its peace missions is at best contrary to evidence and mystical at worst. To phrase it differently, the current and past financial constraints to launch and maintain peace keeping and intervention missions is not necessarily due to lack of economic and human resources, but rather principally is a result of lack of *political will* and *commitment* by the leaders of the AU member states to support the AU institutions, and to provide finance and human resources for its missions, notably in Somalia, Darfur in Sudan, and recently in the CAR and South Sudan (Interview 1).

This implies that as the AU celebrated the Golden Jubilee of the Organization of African Unity during the ending year of 2013 under the theme “*Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance*”, it is evident that some progress has been made in establishing institutional structures at the AU as peace and security sector. Reference can be made here to the establishment of the APSA, the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development support programmes, the African Standby Force and the Peace support missions. Despite this tremendous progress in institutional structures, it seems little has been made in terms of capacitating these institutions with the needed financial and human resources from the member states. The recent statement of H.E. Jean-Baptiste Natama, Chief Of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson of African Union Commission, on “State of Africa and the African Union Agenda 2063”, implies that Africans are still lacking behind in institutional and political *ownership* dimension. They have not yet maximally mobilized their immense resources towards strengthening ownership of their own created institutions at the AU:

“What is required now is to mobilize more resources for the functioning of the APSA so that Africa can take full "ownership" of it, and optimize the use of the various instruments that have been created. This will help to better manage the different stages of conflict situations from prevention to reconstruction, making full use of mediation and, if necessary, preventive deployments. We are

confident that promoting peace and security in Africa will enable the continent to take full advantage of its immense potentials.”⁴³

Along same line of argument, some South Sudanese respondents asserted that African leaders portray Africa as a poor continent as an excuse for seeking constant support from external donors. In reality, Africa is not poor but rich in economic and social senses. Instead, it is poor in political management. The problem lies in the quality of its political leadership that lacks a sustained unified vision for Africa in peace, security and development. African leaders should be duly appreciated for taking decisions at the AU institutions under the banner of African-led solutions to African problems. But the same leadership has revealed itself to be unable to translate its grand resolutions into viable programs; it remains poor in operational consensus and beset by inefficient bureaucracy in implementing its own decisions without significant external financial backing and political endorsement (Interview 3).

In fact, one expert at the AU observed that when we look critically to some AU support to South Sudan, it is an externally funded effort particularly in border demarcation process which is being funded by the GIZ through AU. The AU and its state members are not exerting the necessary efforts to mobilize human and material resources from within African states, and their business institutions. Perhaps, because of fear from political domination by some states than others if that happened (Interview 12). Another AU informant acknowledges that although African problems are largely African owned and driven, African solutions are partly African and partly non-African due to the foray of a multitude of global interest actors (Interview 13).

A key point to be noted here is that, the external dependency of the AU in funding most of its peace missions renders it ineffective and inefficient when it attempts to respond to urgent crisis situations. Inevitably, it frequently resorts to deploy, as one informant labeled it, a *fire brigade approach* in most of its interventions to tackle African problems. Thus, its prevention experiences so far have been disappointing with little success here and there.

In a nutshell, the AU, with its APSA and the theoretical justification underpinnings AfSol, remains ‘hostage’ to some external and internal dynamics. It is hostage to the influence of some major global

⁴³ H.E. Jean-Baptiste Natama, Chief Of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson of African Union Commission. “State of Africa and the African Union Agenda 2063”; <http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7616&magazine=472>, accessed December 25, 2013; p. 1.

actors, for the AU hardly intervenes independently without seeking some sort of support/permission from some external actors (Interview 3).

According to one key AU informant, the crux of the matter is that “resource domain” in conflict situations is “military by nature”. And within this resource sphere lies the ability of western powers to use satellite tracking and reconnaissance tools to gather actionable intelligence, advanced and effective air force to mount offensive operations and transport troops and logistics, and drones to constantly monitor and record unfolding events in real time, with the view of making interventions quick, less costly, and targeted with minimal loss of life. The point is that Africa does not have military satellites to study, evaluate, and plan interventions; Africa, except two or three countries, has not developed an air force capable of deploying soldiers and plan sustained and targeted offensives. In a nutshell, the African solutions notion has been severely crippled due to the resource factors that include finance, logistics, satellite, drone and air force capabilities (Interview 13).

Internally, African solutions are usually reduced and confined to agreements secured as a result of a personal relationship between heads of states. Such a pattern has been at play and proved important when it comes to taking some crucial decisions at the AU that directly affect the political future of some heads of states. In other words, the African leaders’ personal relations seem to be stronger than people to people and state to state relations (Interview 3).

The respondents in (Interview 1, 2, & 4) assert that ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the AU may have its roots in the *big man syndrome*, a perception of grandiose as well as conflict of interests among its member states. In both cases its decisions and the pursued objectives may be undermined by some powerful leaders of some dominant member states when their personal and/or national interests contradict with those of the AU. Moreover, as noted to before, the personal relations of some head of states tend to supersede the interests of their own country and of the AU as well. Thus, the AU functions and decisions seem to reflect and represent the personal interests of the heads of the states rather than being framed in the framework of national priorities and shared regional interests. Additionally, the AU, in reported and confirmed accounts of *bad governance*, was seen reluctant to objectively condemn the recurring irresponsible political actions of some its members, the heads of governments. The final results are catastrophic for Africa collective peace and security, with far-reaching national, continental and global repercussions as manifested in the cases of Somalia, Darfur, Abyei, Libya, DRC, CAR, and recently South Sudan.

One key informant from the AU substantiates this line of argument as he listed three major factors that determine the nature and effectiveness of African solutions:

1. Knowledge and understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts. African leaders and continental organizations must have a sufficient knowledge of causes of conflict and the variety and depth of components that need to appear in the analysis and frameworks of interventions.
2. External interventions by non-African players who take a major role in responding to crisis situations in Africa as evidenced by the Mali, Libyan and Ivory Coast conflicts which saw France, EU and NATO taking the lead to set the agenda and drive the interventions.
3. Resource deficit which continues to be a critical problem curtailing the efficiency and effectiveness of African solutions to African problems. Finance and facilities have been provided for and withheld by non-African powers that have resulted in serious operational compromises in AU's interventions (Interview 13).

Another problem is related to the AU's reluctance to fight against unruly regimes. This position continues to globally damage its credibility as an effective and efficient continental security apparatus with teeth to act. There is a critical need for a reform that introduces new and dynamic institutional structures, programs, and leadership capable of responding in time and with power to meet ever changing threats for peace and security in the continent. It can be strongly argued that the reform should start with evaluating the institutional and leadership qualities, and must continue to devolve and expand the review and reform into all structures of governance. Leaders must be encouraged and incentivized to promote democracy, transparency, accountability, leadership succession, and popular participation, and ownership of the state and the government by its people. Similarly, governments and their leaders must be dis-incentivized in ways that meaningfully hold them to account on regional and continental levels.

4.3: Local Participation Dimension

Several informants assert that part of the AU's ineffectiveness in delivery is partly ascribed to its top down approach in peace and conflict resolution processes. Most of the AU initiated, designed and implemented processes have failed to functionally link with the participation and with spirit of ownership by the stakeholders at the grass root. The crux of the matter here is that this linkage is one of the most crucial steps for any peace, stability, and reconciliation processes to succeed. The views, interests, and priorities of sub-national communities, the non-state actors, civil societies, faith-based organizations, youth, women, opposition parties, among others, must not only be listened to, but they must be an integral part and parcel of proposed solutions at all levels interventions (Interview 1).

In this respect, our informants, representing SSCC as peace a mobilizer and an implementing entity, see no presence of the AU mandate and resources on the ground (Interview 4). They stated that as peace partner, the SSCC focuses on people-to-people reconciliation and peace processes throughout the country. It functions through its peace mobilizers, committed individuals who work under "local peace committees" with their offices located in each capital of the ten states in the Republic of South Sudan. To advance its contribution in peace building at national and continental levels, the Sudan Council of Churches in collaboration with All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), appointed the Reverend Sam Kobia as their Especial Ecumenical Envoy to Sudan Peace, a position which he continues to hold to the present. The AACC continue to work closely with AU in peace issues with the appointed Envoy frequently representing faith-based organizations at the AU relevant functions.

Practically, once a conflict erupted somewhere in South Sudan, the SSCC's peace committee nearest to the event assesses the situation and delivers a report upon which the SSCC makes the necessary intervention in collaboration with state relevant authorities. This implies that the SSCC peace committee offices in the field act as Local Early Warning System (LEWS), a lower base for National Early Warning System (NEWS). With some degree of coordination, these peace committees located in remote rural areas can technically be capacitated by the state in collaboration with the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). This missing link points clearly to a gap between the AU CEWS and the participation of the stakeholders at the grass root level where most conflicts occur before they escalate to national level.

Along same line of reasoning, an AU expert stated that, it is vitally important to recognize that conflicts are a buildup of a bottom-up or top-down processes. In both cases, there are some indicators that show some trend to where events are moving. The CEWS provides those indicators may be timely to prevent the potential conflicts from happening. The CEWS is currently efficient and it does have sufficient data and information that point to trends and level of danger of some unfolding events. Despite this, the political leadership at the state and AU levels failed in many instances to timely intervene therefore, prevent the escalation of the conflicts. This failure is essentially a political and leadership problem and not technical problem of the CEWS (Interview 12).

The heart of the matter is that politicians tend to underplay indicators that point to a potential danger that is likely to happen. They move only when the crisis becomes a reality but not when it is imminent. The CEWS is an alert mechanism of a situation that is about to happened. And if there is a will from a decision maker, intervention can prevent a conflict or a crisis. The present crises in South Sudan and CAR do not reflect the CEWS failure or ineffectiveness. Rather, they manifest lack of political will by the African leadership to deal timely and responsibly with alert reports informed by the CEWS. In other words, there is lack of response from leaders and decision makers for political reasons including “problem denial”. In many cases, the CEWS staff are frustrated for their efforts go in vain, and crisis happen anyway though it would have been averted if the concerned political leaders were prepared to take the alert seriously (Interview 12).

Informant from the SSCC suggested rightly that their field-based peace committees can act as the lowest units for both national and continental early warning systems. In this way, the CEWS can be strengthened with better capacity and capability to respond to different types of conflicts at their different levels of scale by relevant stakeholders, being AU and or RECs, national government institutions, and or local authorities and community-based organizations. Moreover, as a faith-based coordinating entity, the SSCC and its member churches continued to play a crucial role in peace and reconciliation; during the war the church pushed peace process a step forward through its sustained advocacy and initiatives including “Let My People Choose”. The church role is to provide an environment that allows people to “live in peace and harmony”.

This implies that AfSol, essentially built on a consensus to design and effect solutions tailored to specific dynamics of problems, must be owned not only by states’ institutions, leaders and elites at

the top, but also by the masses and their civic and communal organizations. At present, AfSol remains state leaders' centered and not peoples' centered practice. To make AfSol effective and efficient as a home grown mechanism for realizing peace and security in the continent, the current state leaders centered and top-down approach must be systematically devolved into people-centered and bottom-up approach.

Based on the South Sudan experiences, the informants stated that for the notion of AfSol to be operational, the AU must recognize that some of the problems it tries to deal with at the state level are, in the first place, locally-based communal problems and, therefore, need to be diagnosed by actors from same level, for they know better the detailed dynamics behind those conflicts. AfSol is not yet owned by the African people at grass root level though most of African problems are community-based before they are politically instrumentalized to become national crises. Therefore, their solutions must be based on collective solidarity inspired by deeply rooted traditions, values, and wisdoms and customary of its communities.

Same informants suggest that to make AfSol more effective, coupled with strong sense of ownership by all Africans, the AU and other regional and state institutions need to recognize the roles and inputs of local non-state actors in the process decision-making and implementations. This view concurs with a similar view of an AU study carried out in 2012 which showed an absence of viable link between the APSA and the non-state actors on the ground. It therefore recommended that "The AU, RECs/RMs should increase their collaboration with civil society. This is crucial as it would ensure the operationalization of APSA is in tune with the developments on the ground."⁴⁴ It is the involvement of grass root institutions which give a real content to the AfSol's dimensions of *identity, participation and ownership*.

Along same argument, the AU Parliament needs to truly represent the interests and priorities of the African masses on the ground instead of being a representative of the governments of the member states. To make it so, members of the AU Parliament must be democratically elected by citizens of member countries instead of being appointed by the governments. AfSol will have better utility to solve African problems if and when mandated and overseen by wise and humane leaders that transit across humanity, with firm political and community will and commitment towards the challenges,

⁴⁴ See, Fisher, Louis Matshenyego, *et al*, 2012, *Moving Africa Forward, APSA: 2012 Assessment Study*: Addis Ababa, African Union Peace and Security Department, p. 11.

and people owned structures and mechanisms pertained to governance, development, peace and security at local, national and continental levels.

Our informant in (Interview 3) summarized his view by stating that Africa needs its own solutions to its problems. Solutions must originate from its accumulated indigenous culture, traditions, values, wisdoms, and religions pertained to leadership and problems-solving at different levels of governance, from grass root bottom to the top. More than often, the proposed solutions, considered by African leaders in their different institutional forums, are not originating within Africa; they are not generated from the collective minds of Africans but often dictated from outside. African leaders must be prepared to own problems and find solutions. An outside support and facilitation must be a complementary and not the main component for the solution. Owned solutions are costly and painful. But bearing the cost of our solutions and feeling their pains are prerequisites for claiming ownership and mastering Africa's destiny in this interdependent, yet competing world community.

5. Conclusions

The overall analysis of the South Sudan case has generated several insightful reflections and implications for policy makers, practitioners and researchers involved in conceptualizing, designing, implementing policies pertained to peace and security in Africa. Like any state, the newly born state of South Sudan was and still is expected to legitimately monopolize the use of force in establishing and maintaining security and peace, and to efficiently deliver development for its people. Given the fact that it is a new state which came into being without a history of formal institutions, rules or administration, it continues to face multifaceted challenges of building institutions from scratch while providing development, consolidating peace and security.

Its unfolding political and humanitarian crises is a real living test for the AfSol and its operationalization as well as for the effectiveness and efficiency of the AU's APSA in establishing peace and security in Africa. The test stems from the fact that recent political crisis, which continues unabated, has brought the processes of peace, security and political stability in this new state into jeopardy despite the sustained involvement of the AU and RECs, among others, under the banner of African-centered solutions to African Problems in peace and security.

Throughout its engagement, the AU has maintained the AfSol view that solutions to the challenges at hand lie with the Sudanese people themselves. In this context, the AUHIP can be seen as practical effort towards the operationalization of AfSol. However, given the political nature of the AU interventions, the internal conflicts are not perceived as part and parcel of its responsibility but they are state responsibility. This AU principle seems to underestimate the fact that local and national political conflicts in African states at different levels of scale are inseparable; they are intrinsically connected. Thus, AfSol must adhere to; therefore, provide a holistic approach in dealing with issues pertained to peace and security in the context of the AU principle of *non-indifference*.

The visibility of the AU involvement in *(re)construction* of the post-conflict South Sudan is hardly evident. This is the case, despite that fact that the AU PCRDC unit established in 2006 is meant to respond to the needs of consolidating peace and stimulates socio-economic recovery and development. One of the key AU limitations in its interventions is its policy of confining itself to the task of resource mobilization without direct involvement in development process on the ground. At the same time, there is direct involvement by multiple international actors in development and peacebuilding processes. The crux of the matter here is that the direct involvements of some international actors make them visible on the ground among the local communities while the AU is not.

The AU invisibility is also ascribed to its *top down approach* in peace and conflict resolution processes. Most of the AU initiated, designed and implemented processes have failed to involve stakeholders at the grass root. This is a crucial step towards any peace, stability, and reconciliation processes. The views, interests, and priorities of sub-national communities, the non-state actors, civil societies, faith-based organizations, youth, women, opposition parties, among others, must not only be listened to, but they must be an integral part and parcel of proposed solutions at all levels interventions.

South Sudan post-conflict construction, service provisions, development, security and peacebuilding are mostly external donors-and-NGOs driven and not state driven activities. This excessive dependency on non-state actors weakens state institutions, therefore, impedes the process state building. This dependency pattern counteracts the spirit of the AfSol and reduces it to no more than an empty slogan.

South Sudan case study informs that owning problems is a prerequisite for owning sustainable solutions. This is exactly what AfSol is all about. Thus, ‘good governance’ and ‘visionary leadership’ are critical milestones towards a successful AfSol. Paradoxically, there is a persistent politics of ‘problems denial’ associated with disunity that together blend into structural and practical inability of African leaders and political institutions to deal with African problems of their own making. The result is systematic external interventions with solutions being designed outside; and that tends to subordinate the participation of the African stakeholders in decision-making process on matters that directly affect their interests, priorities and choices. *Ownership dimension* though is partly an issue of an ability to mobilize African own economic and human resources, it is essentially an issue of *political will and commitment* by African political institutions and leaders of member states to provide the AU with the necessary financial, logistic and human resources for its missions.

Almost all the informants assert that AfSol must be owned not only by the AU, states, political leaders and elites at the top, but also by the masses and their civic and communal organizations. Hence, in order to make AfSol more effective and efficient as a home grown mechanism for realizing peace and security in the continent, the current top-down approach must also be systematically devolved into people-centered and bottom-up approach. For the notion of AfSol to be operational, the AU must recognize that some of the problems it tries to deal with at the state level are, in the first place, locally-based communal problems and, therefore, need to be diagnosed by actors from same level. The sought solutions must be inspired by deeply rooted traditions, values, and wisdoms and customary of its communities. Owned solutions are costly and painful. But bearing the cost of our solutions and feeling their pains are prerequisites for claiming ownership and mastering Africa’s destiny in this interdependent, yet competing world community.

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CONCLUSION

FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH SCHEMA

The overall analysis generated from the two case studies has provided several insightful findings that could have operational implications for policy makers, practitioners and researchers involved in conceptualizing, designing, and implementing policies pertained to peace and security in Africa.

5.1: Similar to any state, the two states, South Sudan and Somalia, were and still are expected to legitimately monopolize the use of force in establishing and maintaining security and peace, and to efficiently deliver on development pledges for their people. Somalia is a case of post-conflict reconstruction while South Sudan is a case for construction from a scratch. Given the fact that the new State, of South Sudan came into being without a history of formal institutions and rules and, administration, it continues to face multifaceted challenges of building an entire array of institutions from scratch while at the same time expected to provide basic services, plan and execute development programs, consolidate peace and sustain security. Each of these needs different post-conflict socio-economic, institutional and political interventions.

5.2: The prevailing conflict in Somalia and the recent unfolding violent crisis in South Sudan are both real tests for the initiative of AfSol and its operationalization as well as for the effectiveness and efficiency of the AU-APSA in establishing, managing and consolidating peace and security in Africa. This remains the bigger picture, representing both a challenge and prospect, for the AU and the RECs dealing with the situations in the two states under the banner of African-centered solutions to African Problems in the two states.

5.3: Throughout its engagement, the AU has maintained its drive for AfSol on the strong premise that solutions to the challenges at hand lie with the concerned people themselves. In this context, both AUHIP and AMISOM can be seen as practical efforts towards the operationalization of AfSol. However, given the political nature of the AU interventions, the internal conflicts are not perceived as part and parcel of its responsibility but as the responsibilities of the states. Local and national political conflicts in African states at different scopes, however, are intrinsically connected. This informs that AfSol must adhere to, and provide a holistic approach to deal with issues pertaining to peace and security in the context of the AU principle of *non-indifference*.

5.4: The visibility of the AU involvement in *(re)construction* of the post-conflict South Sudan and Somalia is hardly evident. This is the case, despite that fact that the AU PCRD unit established in 2006 is meant to respond to the needs of consolidating peace and stimulate socio-economic recovery and development. One of the key AU limitations in its interventions is its policy of

confining itself to the task of resource mobilization without direct involvement in development process on the ground. The deficiency in visibility is made starker as other involved international actors are recognized on the ground among the local communities where the AU is not. *This strongly implies that the AU needs to revisit its policy of non-involvement in security and peace building below state level.*

5.5: In both cases, post-conflict reconstruction, service provisions, development, security and peacebuilding are mostly external donors-and-NGOs driven and not state driven activities. This excessive dependency on non-state actors has weakened state institutions, therefore, hampered the process of state building. This dependency pattern counteracts the spirit of the AfSol and reduces it to no more than an empty slogan.

5.6: Africa as a continent accommodates diverse nations with different ethnic, religious, ideological cultural affiliations within and beyond the continent. This accommodation has led to an inevitable competition between two opposing paradigms of Pan-Africanism as an inclusive, inspiring, and unifying ideology for African cultural identity and political destiny. The two competing paradigms in this case are *continentalism* vs. *global ethno-culturalism*. The AU *continentalism* approach of defining who is an African is inclusive; yet faces practical challenges in areas of collective security and peace. Such is because it offers no unified identity but rather many competing identities and belongingness whose centers may be located elsewhere beyond the continent such as the Arab League, the Anglophone world, and the Francophone world, among others. The strength of the parallel affiliations at the core of the competing identities beyond Africa weakened the quest for *African unity/union*, diluted sense of *collective identity*, and therefore, hampered African efforts aimed at designing African-centered Solutions to African Problems.

5.7: There is a growing gap between Pan African political elites and a popular experience of Pan Africanism. This gap points to a need for a critical assessment of the version of Pan Africanism as adopted by the political institutions including the AU as the ideals and concerns of pan Africanism seem more and more distant from the realities and peoples on the ground. This explains why the solutions to the to peace and security challenges designed by political institutions at state as well as at the AU and the RECs levels are hardly rooted in, and therefore, inspired by, local *customs, wisdoms, institutions* and *philosophies* of conflict resolutions among African communities and their diverse social organizations.

5.8: One key challenge, then, facing the ASPA and AfSol is related to the ability of the political institutions and the leadership to find practical solutions to the problems because largely, of the problems are a result of the political and institutional deficiency. The leadership, nevertheless, hardly accepts the fact that all African problems are essentially an integral part of the African collective responsibility; therefore solutions are to be initiated and carried out from within Africa by and for Africans.

5.9: Owning problems is a prerequisite for designing and driving sustainable solutions. This is exactly what AfSol is all about. Thus, ‘good governance’ and ‘visionary leadership’ are critical ingredients towards a successful AfSol. Paradoxically, there is a persistent politics of ‘problems denial’ associated with disunity that together blends into a structural and practical inability of African leaders and political institutions to deal with African problems of their own making. The result is a direct and systematic external interventions with solutions designed outside. The process and the product in this scenario tend to subordinate the participation of the African stakeholders in decision-making process on matters that directly affect their interests, priorities and choices.

5.10: The negative repercussions of the interventions by external actors in Libya, Mali, Ivory Coast, and recently in the CAR illustrate the serious deficiency in the *ownership dimension of AfSol*. The intended objectives of the AU’s missions, because they are externally funded, are diluted by the injection of finance from competing global funding powers. . The *Ownership dimension*, though partly an issue of the ability to mobilize Africa’s economic and human resources, is essentially an issue of *political will and commitment* by African political institutions and leaders of member states to provide the AU with the necessary financial, logistical and human resource capital for its missions.

5.11: It is evident that some progress has been made in establishing institutional structures at the AU in the peace and security sector, particularly in the establishment of PSC and its APSA. Despite this institutional progresses, it appears little has been gained in terms of capacitating these institutions with the needed financial and human resource from the member states. The result means a sustained dependency of the AU institutions on external support to perform their continental functions. This implies that Africans are still lagging behind in taking economic and political *ownership* of their own institutions, namely the AU.

5.12: the AU’s ineffectiveness is partly ascribed to its *top down approach* in peace and conflict resolution processes. Most of the AU initiated, designed and implemented processes have failed to

involve stakeholders at the grass root levels. This is a crucial step towards any meaningful peace, stability, and reconciliation processes. The views, interests, and priorities of sub-national communities, the non-state actors, civil societies, faith-based organizations, youth, women, opposition parties, among others, must not only be listened to, but they should be an integral part and parcel of proposed solutions at all levels of interventions.

5.13: AfSol must be owned not only by the AU, states, political leaders and elites at the top, but also by the masses and their civic and communal organizations. Hence, in order to make AfSol more effective and efficient as a home grown mechanism for realizing the goals of peace and security in the continent, the current top-down approach must be systematically devolved into people-centered and bottom-up approach.

5.14: For the notion of AfSol to be operational, the AU must recognize that some of the problems it tries to deal with at the state level are, in the first place, locally-based communal problems and, therefore, need to be diagnosed by actors from the same level. The sought after solutions must be inspired by the traditional values, customs and wisdom of its communities. Owning solutions, understandably, does not come easy and cheap. But bearing the cost of our solutions and hence feeling the economic and political pains are the prerequisites for claiming full ownership and mastering Africa's destiny in this interdependent and competing global order.

5.15: AMISOM's experience informs that, at best, the AU is not meeting its key objectives and, at worst, risks getting embroiled in fueling political, religious and clannish entanglements in Somalia. There is an urgent need to have a radical and thorough assessment of performance of the mission in order to reform, review and reshuffle priorities, decisively solve competing interests from neighboring countries, and streamline decision making within the ranks of troop contributing nations and AMISOM officials, is urgently needed.

5.18: AU, RECs, and its member states need to exert more and concerted effort in Somalia and South Sudan in order to support the two states transform into sustainable successful experiences, and by extension, setting practical examples for the validity and political legitimacy of the "home grown" or "African-led solutions to African problems".

5.17: The adopted applied research in the two case studies of Somalia and South Sudan suggests the following operational definition of AfSol in peace and security problems:

“African-led solutions to African challenges in peace and security’ can be defined as a holistic political, socio-cultural, economic, and intellectual endeavor, aimed at managing peace and security challenges in Africa at different levels of African political institutions and social organizations. The endeavor is to functionally be owned and undertaken by, and for, the Africans peoples, their institutions, and leadership but in collaboration with the international community. Most importantly, it is a people- grounded process, enriched by the African traditions, values, beliefs, philosophies and wisdom related to conflict resolutions/ management.”

5.18: Based on the above listed findings and the proposed operational definition of AfSol, the following themes and questions are proposed as **future peace and security research agenda** to be undertaken as intellectual challenges by the concerned African universities and research institutions, particularly the IPSS:

- i) As a concept and practice, AfSol is not yet known by the African people. Thus, one key intellectual challenge is *how to popularize AfSol among all African political, socio-cultural, civic and academic institutions and leaders?*
- ii) Peace and security mean different things to different peoples in different contexts, time and place. As a consequence, and depending on the nature of the involved state and its governance system, peace and security desired by any state may involve insecurity for one or more communities within that state. In view of this, African led solutions in peace and security will never be owned collectively within a state unless the state itself is being owned by all. *Thus, good governance and inclusive political participation should be a top priority in peace and security research agenda in Africa.*
- iii) There is an urgent need for establishing a dynamic ‘national conflict mapping’ in every African state, particularly those ridden with multiple and recurring internal conflicts. *Such an endeavor should be based on comprehensive field-based studies guided by strict guidelines and indicators pertained to peace and security agreed upon by all African states.*
- iv) There is a need for a rigorous applied research on the AfSol’s fundamental principles of institutional/ political *ownership*, socio-cultural *identity*, and local *participation*. Despite their crucial role in operationalizing AfSol, these principles remain under researched; and are therefore subjected to conflicting interpretations by different stakeholders. Moreover, AfSol should not be tied to these three principles. The case studies inform that AfSol is governed by other significantly important

principles including *legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and responsibility*, among many others. The exhaustive list of these principles should be established through a careful applied research.

v) The *African Union needs to undertake a comprehensive self-assessment aimed at evaluating to what extends its peace and security initiatives, agreements, programs and deployed missions are inspired, therefore, guided by AfSol principles of ownership, identity, and participation.* The importance of such an assessment stems from an assertion that while the African Union and its member states are advocating for African led solutions to African problems in peace and security, most of their pursued solutions are hardly participatory, minimally informed by local values and wisdoms, and unable to be put on the ground without substantial external political guidance and financial and logistical support.

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APPENDIX 1

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

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Ref.: PSD/526/B/4/92.11
Addis Ababa, 17 August 2011

Dear General Chirwa,

I take reference to the Declaration adopted by the Special Session of the Assembly of the Union devoted to the consideration and resolution of conflicts in Africa, held in Tripoli, Libya, on the 31st of August 2009. In this Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government acknowledged that "making and sustaining peace and security on the continent is also an intellectual challenge". They, therefore, stressed "the need to build the capacity of African universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what succeeds and what fails in conflict resolution efforts, and to arrive at African-centred solutions".

I also refer to the MoU on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security, signed between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, which provides for "building and strengthening the capacity of the AU as well the RECs/RMs in the area of peace and security".

Finally, I refer to the Decision of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, held in January 2010, confirming the Commission's initiative to establish "in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of the Addis Ababa University, and other African academic institutions, a project aimed at bringing together a number of academic institutions on the continent to provide advanced training and undertake applied research in the area of peace and security, with the view to strengthening the capacity of the AU, the RECs/RMs and other relevant stakeholders in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" (EX.CL/567 [XVI]).


I am pleased to inform you that the AU PSD is in very good cooperation with the IPSS. Importantly, the first three Post-Graduate Executive Course on Managing Peace and Security in Africa have been a success in terms of training AU/RECs officers and a fourth batch is scheduled to start in September 2011. The batches of participants so far are made up of senior professionals and management up to the Director level from REC/RMs and the Commission itself. So far sixty experts

have been trained and twenty among them have graduated in May 2011. The response to the announcement of the course was, indeed, more than expected; and the IPSS always have a waiting list of several candidates from the RECs and some other applicant officials from the Foreign Ministries of Member States.

The course is making a substantial contribution to building the capacity of the Commission and RECs/RMs. Its curriculum has been vetted and recently reviewed (April 2011) by a panel of renowned international experts. Speakers and resource persons identified by IPSS include some of the most prominent names in African peace and security – many of whom have been involved in on-going AU initiatives across the continent. The course bolsters the public perception of the Commission as a competent institution, and it strengthens personal and institutional ties between the Commission and the RECs/RMs.

In this regard, IPSS is aiming at joining the APSTA as a provider of strategic specialized training to senior personnel from civilian, military and police component of the AU and the RECs. This is therefore, to present the IPSS as an additional training centre supported by the AU to join the circle of the centres of excellence. We grant our full support and strongly recommend the IPSS application to be a member of APSTA for the important capacity building training they are conducting.

Sincerely yours,



El Ghassim Wane
Director, Peace and Security

Brigadier General Marcel R.D. Chirwa (rtd)
Head of APSTA Secretariat
Nairobi, Kenya
apsta@apsta-africa.org

APPENDIX 11

Open Interview Guiding Questions

1. What makes Africa's problems 'African'?
2. Who is an African and what do we mean by 'African solutions'?
3. How are Africans expected to develop authentically African solutions without undermining the global best practices and universal values?
4. Is there is one-size-fits-all, or universal African solution to African problems, if not, then what fits whom and why?
5. What levels of problems we are targeting, (inter/intra-communal, and intra/inter-state)?
6. What are the pre-requisites for making AfSol politically sound and practically applicable to real problems on different settings in Africa?
7. Who employed AfSol and why?
8. How does it is implemented and it what context?
9. What purpose and motive behind employing AfSol?
10. What challenges face it and why? And why some cases (if any) are a success story and what lessons to be learned from them?
11. What factors that prohibit the functionality of "African solutions to African problems". Are foreign ideas, interventions, and solutions are inherently bad? Or they must be understood, interpreted and applied correctly in any given local context? And is that really happening in the contemporary Africa?

12. One is forced to wonder whether such solutions are truly African. To what degree, African philosophies, wisdoms, cultures, religions, traditional values and institutions are utilized in the quest to solve African problems?
13. Have the Africans, particularly the political leaders acknowledge, in the first place, that those problems are created by us, and that we owned them by admitting that they are our own making?
14. Have African leaders exerted sustained efforts, coupled with unrelenting political will and consensus, and availed the needed resources within African states capacities in their quest to address the problems? If not, why?
15. In what context, circumstances, and terms African leaders seek or reject international support and interventions?

APPENDIX 111

List of Interviewees

1. SOUTH SUDAN

Interview 1: 12/12/2013: A Semi-structured interview with some Academics at the University of Juba

1. Dr. Samson Wassara, professor of political science,
2. Dr. Sirisio L. Oromo, Director of Centre for Peace and Development Studies,
3. Dr Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, political scientist,
4. Dr. Asha A.Rahim, associate professor of economics,
5. Simon Manoja Lubang, Associate professor and former director of the Centre for Peace and Development Studies.

Interview 2: 12/12/2013 with Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, H.E. Bol Makueng Yuol.

Interview 3: 13/12/2013 with Edmund Yakani Edmund Yakani is a civil society activist and a chairperson of Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) in Juba, South Sudan. He participated in a number of forums that engaged with African-led solutions to African problems, AfSol at the AU, among others, as a civil society representative.

Interview 4: 13/12/2013 with South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC)

1. Rev. Micheal Taban, Chairperson of the SSCC,
2. Rev. Mark Akec, Acting Secretary-General, and the National Coordinator for Peace Desk of the SSCC, and
3. Mr. Peter Kong, the National Coordinator of Peace Desk of the SSCC.

2. SOMALIA

Interview 5: 02/12/2013, with anonymous Somali Nairobi-based Academics.

Interview 6: 05/12/2013, with an anonymous Nairobi-based Somali female civil society activist.

Interview 7: 07/12/2013 with five anonymous Somali citizens based in Nairobi, Kenya

Interview 8: 07/12/2013 with an anonymous high profile Somali politician based in Somalia but interview conducted in Nairobi, Kenya.

Interview 9: 09/01/2014 with an anonymous Somali diplomat

Interview 10: 10/1/2014 with an anonymous UN Somali affairs expert

Interview 11: 11/1/2014 with an anonymous Somali politician residing in Kenya

3. AFRICAN UNION

Interview 12: 10/01/2014: with Dr. Takwa Z. Suifon, Expert, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Unit (PCRD), African Union

Interview 13: 14/01/2014: with Dr. Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, AU PSC Secretariat.