Modernization of Indian Tradition

(A Systemic Study of Social Change)

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To Bappa
in loving memory

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PREFACE

THESE ESSAYS ARE an attempt to analyse the processes of modernization in India from a systemic sociological perspective. The two key concepts which have been used here to analyse the forces of modernization are 'social structure' and 'tradition'. Whereas the emphasis on social structure has led us to survey the uneven processes of social changes and modernization with the help of the contemporary sociological studies, the tradition's framework in our analysis has necessitated that we draw from the Indian history, or even employ a kind of sociological historiography. The historiographic constructions are necessitated to establish the cognitive-structural attributes of the Indian tradition, which we have characterized as consisting of elements of 'hierarchy', 'holism', 'continuity' and 'transcendence'. In the treatment of the structural features of the Indian social system and tradition Louis Dumont mainly highlights the element of hierarchy.* Hierarchy, in Dumont's treatment incorporates 'holism' and 'transcendence' (renunciation). There is, however, a need to study the structure of the Indian tradition in terms of the four attributes mentioned above individually as well as collectively to highlight the tendency in the traditions not only to persist but also to undergo adaptive changes.

The systems of 'social structure' and 'tradition' cover the entire gamut of the Indian social phenomena and its realities. Modernization in these systems begins either from the emergent and endogenous sources, or through contact with forces outside the systems. These two bases of the initiation of social change should be analysed both at the levels of social structures and traditions. The conceptual framework of most studies of social change in India is such that the focus is either on 'social structure' to the exclusion of 'tradition' or on the latter without proper treatment of the former. The conceptual scheme (paradigm) that we use for the analysis of modernization not only seeks to integrate most conceptual formulations about social change in India, but is also intended to render them systemic and broad-based. This excercise in the formulation of a conceptual paradigm is, however, adequate only for the analysis of trends of modernization rather than its theoretic formulation. The latter type of attempt would have to follow from a still higher order of integration of concepts and propositions about social change and modernization.

The first chapter, "Social Change in India: An Approach" is a review of the prevailing sets of conceptual formulations on social change

*Louis Dumont : *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1970.

and modernization in India. The concepts of change in the cultural traditions, such as 'Sanskritization' and 'Westernization', 'Little and Great Traditions', 'Universalization' and 'Parochialization', employed by social scientists studying social changes in India have been critically examined. Their shortcomings in the analysis of structural changes as also their logical inadequacies as concepts have been highlighted. It is contended that these concepts have utility only when used in association with other concepts that directly bear upon the structural processes of social change. The two sets of concepts, one each for structure and tradition respectively, should be applied schematically and integrated in the form of a paradigm. At the end of this chapter a paradigm offering an integrative scheme for these sets of concepts has been formulated.

This paradigm is formulated on two dimensions; the first refers to the sources from which social changes may begin. These sources, as we mentioned above, are either endogenous or exogenous to the social systems. The second dimension relates to the nature of the social phenomena which are undergoing such changes. These social phenomena could be categorised as 'tradition' and 'social structure' respectively. Following the common usage in the classification of these two forms of social realities, we have sub-divided 'tradition' into 'little' and 'great' traditions and 'social structure' into 'macro-structures' and 'micro-structures'. This classification generates a set of property-spaces or types of social fields bearing upon the process of social change and modernization. In the chapters that follow, analysis of the substantive realities of modernization in India has been undertaken through the conceptual categories formulated with the help of this paradigm. We find that through this method not only can we place the existing social change concepts into their logical context for the social analysis, but we can also generate new concepts to account for the rest of the social phenomena that could not be analysed through traditionally known conceptual categories.

We begin our analysis with a focus on the main attributes of the tradition of Hinduism and Islam and how these traditions are responding to the forces of modernization. We find that both the traditions in India were in the past patterned on the principles of hierarchy, holism, continuity and transcendence. Despite the fact that the Islamic doctrine had major elements of departure from these principles, in reality its traditions did imbibe in course of time many elements of the above four principles. Modernization for both the Hindu and the Islamic traditions, therefore, implies a psychic-normative challenge to break away from hierarchy to 'equality', from holism to 'individualism', from continuity to 'historicity' and from transcendence to 'this-worldly rationalism' and secularism. The process of transition is, however, seldom smooth and involves tensions or even social breakdowns. Both the Islamic and the Hindu traditions have undergone orthogenetic changes at many levels long before the modernizing changes began mainly under the Western impact. The concepts of 'Sanskritization' in the Hindu and 'Islamization' in the Muslim traditions respectively represent the processes of change

that took place in the two traditions from within. These processes not only represent a cultural movement but also social structural tensions in the systems. This aspect has been often neglected and should be analysed.

In Chapter II "Orthogenetic Changes in Cultural Traditions and Modernization" and Chapter III "The Impact of Islam and Modernization" we analyse various aspects of these changes in the tradition and their contemporary relevance to the processes of modernization and social change. The internal dynamics has been examined at the levels of the 'Little' and 'Great' traditions of Hinduism and Islam in the context of varying social structural forces. One hypothesis of the present study is that apparently cultural movements called Sanskritization or Islamization, that mainly represented a form of interaction between the' Little' and 'Great' tarditions, reflected the latent tensions of the Indian social system caused by the structural rigidity of the systems of stratification and power. The added impetus to cultural mobility that for a time convulsed the two traditions, resulted from the foreclosure of the chances for social mobility for the common people and the masses at large. The dynamics of the 'Little' and 'Great' traditions could be explained through these structural forces under which the varied groups, castes and communities in India resorted to either Islamization or Sanskritization, among other reasons, also as a protest against their existing position in the social structure. With the contemporary changes, however, the structural context of these processes has changed, but the principle remains the same.

These new factors have been explained in Chapter IV "The Western Impact and Cultural Modernization" which deals with exogenous processes of cultural change in India, mainly through the impact of the West. This contact led to the beginning of modernization as also to the historical phase for a large-scale confrontation between the heteronomic traditions of the East and the West in India. The earlier contact between Hinduism and Islam did lead to cultural challenges and responses but the confrontation was really between two *traditional* worldviews. This was not so during the phase of the Western contact through the colonial rule. In course of time the growth of universalistic legal norms, educational modernization, expansion of communication networks, technologies, urban centres and above all the emergence of the modern political institutions helped in the institutionalization of a parallel new 'Great' tradition. Indeed, most of these evolved organically in India through the historicity of its own circumstances. The typical structural forces were responsible for this pattern of adaptation.

In most studies of modernization and social change in India structural aspects have not been dealt with in a systematic form. We have examined the structural processes of modernization at the levels of the 'macro-structures' and the 'micro-structures' of the Indian social systems. These two sub-divisions of social structure could be treated as analytical counterparts of the 'Great' and 'Little' traditions. Chapters V and VI are devoted to the treatment of the processes of modernization taking place at the macro- and

the micro-structural levels of the Indian social systems.

Among the macro-structures (those relational linkages which have an all-India spread) we have analysed the changing nature of the political, industrial and urban structures and categories such as the industrial workers, middle classes and the elite. The role and organization of the bureaucratic, industrial, political and intellectual elite have been studied in relation to the modernization processes. We find that the cultural homogeneity of the elite groups which existed during the British days or even during the first decade of the free India has since been increasingly rendered heterogeneous. One might find significant differences in the subcultures, socialization patterns and the worldviews of the industrial, military, the bureaucratic and intellectual elite in comparison with the political elite. This reflects a degree of structural discontinuity in the social system resulting from the unbalanced growth of the processes of modernization. Our own conclusion, however, is that in the Indian case such discontinuities are reconcilable and the value-gap between them is more apparent than real. Structural tensions which are manifold in the Indian system may as well be symptomatic of 'modernization'.

This is clearly revealed when we analyse the role of micro-structures in the modernization of the Indian society and its traditions. These micro-structures have a narrow extension of relational linkages; these relations may be confined to a linguistic region or even a far narrower territorial limit based on kinship ties. Its examples are: the caste, family and village communities in India. The structural linkages based on caste have a regional character throughout India, and due to its pervasive nature the social relations of the family system also overlap with that of the caste. The village communities are, evidently, rooted in a set of structural relationships based on local territory, folklore, economy and identity. Traditional resilience of all these structures is well known, and social scientists have continually debated about the difficulties that these institutions would pose to modernization in India.

Our analysis reveals on the contrary that these micro-structures have responded with great adaptive capacity to the demands of modernization. Caste has today become a major structural network of modernization in the Indian social system. It has permeated some of the major structural forms, such as the local political bodies, voting behaviour, and power structure at the village, district and to some extent also the State levels. It is fast transforming itself into a corporate group without, however, giving up its social functions. This adaptive pattern is also visible at the level of the family structure and the village community. A unique feature of modernization in India, however, is that it is being mainly carried forward through adaptive changes in the traditional structures rather than structural dissociation or breakdown. A form of neo-traditionalization thus proceeds alongwith modernization. The ramifications of this process have been analysed in the concluding chapter: Modernization of Indian Tradition: Analysis.

This study of modernization has also some limitations. Focus is mainly

on selected sociological variables, such as little and great traditions, micro- and macro-structures and their specific forms. Some other important variables have either not been fully treated or not analysed at all. Mention may be made of the demographic and the economic variables. To our mind these could also be treated fully with the help of the paradigm we have formulated, but looking into the nature of these problems a separate and specialised treatment is necessary. Despite this we hope that our major conclusions would not be altered even though an account is taken of these two variables in the analysis of modernization.

Most parts of these essays were written during 1966–67 at the McGill University, Montreal, Canada, where I held a teaching assignment with the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology. I was offered the necessary facilities to write these essays by the Centre for the Developing Area Studies, McGill University. Some of the essays were subsequently revised. I am thankful to Professor Irving Brecher, Director, Centre for the Developing Area Studies, for the facilities he offered me to work on this volume. My thanks are also due to Professor W.A. Westley and Professor Richard Salisbury; both as Chairmen of the Department at various periods offered me excellent facilities. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Aileen D. Ross, Professor of Sociology at the McGill University. She, in fact, made it possible for me to visit McGill, have a most pleasant and comfortable stay there at the Faculty Club, and complete this work. She took every care to see that I was not inconvenienced and had the fullest opportunity to meet and discuss with Canadian and American scholars. Despite being very busy, she also read the first draft of the manuscript and offered me helpful suggestions.

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I have benefitted from the suggestions made by many colleagues in North America and India while writing this essay: the entire responsibility, however, of the form in which it has been presented and the ideas expressed are mine, and if there are shortcomings I alone am to be blamed.

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Chapter I

SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA : AN APPROACH

Our objective is to evaluate the existing concepts and propositions about social change in contemporary Indian society. We intend to show how either due to a partial focus on the social processes in India, or due to the limitations of the analytical categories used by individual sociologists, treatment of change in India remains narrow and inadequate. We suggest some major reformulations in these conceptual categories which are theoretically consistent and might also lead to a comprehensive understanding of the Indian processes of social change. These categories are represented in a paradigmatic form for clarity and precision in the final section of this chapter.

SOCIAL CHANGE AS IDEOLOGY

The study of social change, in view of the nebulous nature of its theory is a difficult task, and it is more difficult in the case of a society like India which has not only a fathomless historical depth and plurality of traditions but is also engulfed in a movement of nationalistic aspirations under which concepts of change and modernization are loaded with ideological meanings. In this form, change ceases to be viewed as a normal social process; it is transformed into an ideology, that change is in itself desirable and must be sought for.[1]

This introduces non-scientific elements in the evaluation of social change in India, elements of which are found in many studies. Authors of these studies evaluate change or non-change in India from their own moral or ideological view-points. With varying emphasis, these writers accept the desirability of change for the sake of change. Some of them assume prophetic aura,[2] others express dismay at the slow change,[3] and still others postulate quasi-deterministic interpretations about Indian phenomenon of change.[4]

The same tendency is manifest when change is treated by some social scientists as equivalent to 'development' and 'progress'. "This," Dumont says, "amounts to the justification of the social order being found not in what it is, but in what it is supposedly becoming.... in such circumstances a great and increasing social pressure is brought upon those who in the public estimation should know about social change."[5]

The ideological orientation, however, is not only confined to the formulation of the goals of social change, but also extends to the specific form the sociological categories should have to analyse change. To achieve this goal

a case for the development of a particularistic or typical Indian sociology is made. Its proponents admit, however, that sociological explanations involve some form of intellection which is universalistic, call it 'sociological apperception',[6] 'empathy',[7] or 'sociological imagination',[8] but simultaneously they also hold that explanation of specific forms of change in the cultural context of a nation requires delineation of conceptual categories applicable only to that particular culture. Hence, they claim there should be an *Indian* sociology distinct from sociology in the West or in other parts of the world. This particularism of some Indian sociologists introduces yet another ideological element in the analysis of change.

This tendency owes its origin particularly to the reaction of Indian sociologists to the ethnocentric formulation of the theories of social evolution propounded during the 19th century.[9] In part, it also reflects the intellectual orientation of some sociologists which is humanistic and non-empirical, and as a safeguard for this which favours sociological particularism on the one hand, and, on the other, attempts to accord sociology the status of a metaphysical and historical-speculative discipline in conformity with Indian tradition. The fact is, however, overlooked that even the Western sociology has a tradition of anti-positivism, and on this basis alone the case for Indian sociology cannot be defended. Obviously, a part of such reasoning is an outcome of the 'identity crisis' among the intellectuals and elite of the new nations.[10] To some extent it may also be a reflection of the way Indian politico-economic and cultural factors impinge upon the thinking of Indian sociologists....a problem which is relevant to sociology of knowledge.[11]

This orientation of Indian sociologists, however, is not entirely ideological. Quite a good deal of it also results from conceptual ambiguities common to sociology in general. For instance, some Indian sociologists object to a definition of social system which says: "(Social System) consists of a plurality of individual actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the optimization of gratification."[12] Their view is that Indian social system traditionally organized on caste lines idealized the value of 'self-denial', hierarchy and moral obligation (*dharma*) rather than 'optimization of gratification'. Such a notion of social system is derived from an individualistic frame of reference which did not apply to the Indian situation.

A closer scrutiny of the above will, however, reveal the way ideological elements are implicit in the arguments. Emphasis on the uniqueness of Indian society emerges from a confusion of levels between the raw data of sociology, such as the specific values, institutions, customs and cultural forms and its conceptual abstractions which constitute the basis of sociological categories. It is overlooked that 'society' or social structure as concepts are higher-level abstractions over culture.[13] A logical corollary of this view-point is the rejection of sociology for culturology,[14] or probably for a series of culturologies, each based on different sets of ideological commitments.[15] Moreover, the claim for an Indian sociology is not entirely based on a humanistic methodological tradition which, as we mentioned above,

also exists in the West;[16] its roots lie rather in the ideology of nationalism.

A comparative study of institutions is a prerequisite for analysis of social change which is not possible through a culturological approach to sociology as it overemphasizes the uniqueness of social phenomenon. For instance, how could the concept 'modernization' be explained from a purely Indological frame of reference? How could one explain the changes in the social structure of the Indian society, in the spheres of family, caste, civic and community administration and bureaucracy, without analysing the significance of new heterogenetic developments in law, constitutional rights, bureaucracy, science and technology?

Yet, none could deny that Indian cultural tradition is unique. But uniqueness is a common and simple fact of life; every concrete event in temporal sense is unique. Uniqueness is only one facet of reality; its other facet comprises function....the way social realities interact and are related to one another. A study of the latter aspect necessitates comparison which is impossible without conceptual abstraction. These abstractions form a hierarchical order, and through them the sociologist translates 'the language of the sources', to borrow a term from Hans L. Zetterberg, into the language of sociology. The sociologist not only takes note of the concrete individualities of social events and forms, but also translates them into higher-order abstractions for comparison.

It is probably in this sense that Louis Dumont, who otherwise takes a culturological or, in his own words, "ideo-structural approach to Indian sociology, is able to arrive at the functional equivalent of the (Western idea of the) individual" in the Indian institution of caste.[17] He writes:

> Terms like 'individualism', 'atomism', 'secularism' are often used to oppose modern society to societies of the traditional type. In particular, the contrast between caste society and its modern counterpart is a commonplace. Liberty and equality on the one hand, interdependence and hierarchy on the other, are in the foreground. Permanence versus mobility, ascription versus achievement allow for a neat contrariety between the two kinds of social system. We might well ask whether there was as much difference in social practice here and there, as between (explicit or implicit) social theories, and I shall point out that Western society is no stranger to the attitudes and even to the ideas which caste society upholds. ...To return to our comparison, we may say that the individual, in so far as he is the main bearer of the values in the modern society, is equivalent to order, or *dharma* in classical Hindu society...modern society has evolved from that of the Middle Ages, which certainly at first sight appears to be a society of the traditional type, more like the Indian than like the modern. ...The conception of the *Universitas,* i.e. of the social body as a whole of which living men are merely the parts, obviously belongs to the traditional conceptions of society and in particular is akin to the Hindu conception of *dharma* and the hierarchical interdependence of the several social statuses.[18]

This implies that many elements of the Indian culture, which for the lack of methodological clarity are treated as unique, can with facility be analysed in terms of higher levels of abstractions without, however, distorting their distinctiveness as cultural symbols. Could we not, for instance, offer a functional equivalent of *dharma* as normative order, of *karma* as personal moral commitment, of *jati* or caste as hierarchical principle of stratification? About caste, substantial comparative study has already been conducted to show how its structural counterparts are found even outside the Indian tradition.[19]

Disciplinary isolationism is, moreover, contrary to the tendency in social sciences to come together. This, however, proceeds side by side with the process of internal differentiation in the fields of individual disciplines. A number of noted sociologists including Raymond Aron[20] and Edward E. Shils[21] have acknowledged this process. In this light the claim for an Indian sociology appears somewhat anachronistic.

Another bias in the studies of social change in India results from too much concern with culture and values. Structural realities are often ignored and studies suffer from 'value bias', as it were. Most studies are focused on acculturation, diffusion of norms and values; change is identified with 'spread' of these values in regional or national spheres. The reason for this is mainly historical. Both the British and French social scientists who first conducted sociological studies in India were more interested in the ethnography of caste,[22] custom and culture and they studied these phenomena from a descriptive or functional model. Studies employing a dialectical or conflict model have been fewer indeed.[23]

The distinction between the functional and the dialectical models is too well-known to merit repetition. Functionalism assumes that "society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements" and consensus is an ubiquitous element of the social system. The dialectical model, on the contrary, treats 'change'[24] or 'tension'[25] to be ubiquitous in society. Since functionalism assumes social systems to be in a state of value consensus, it relegates the role of power in social relations to a secondary place; dialectical model, on the other hand, presupposes that value conflict is a universal reality of any stratified social structure. Functionalism treats change as a slow, cumulative process of adjustment to new situations. Dialectical model holds that most changes are revolutionary in significance and effect qualitative transformation in the social structure. According to functionalism, changes constantly take place in social systems through internal growth and adjustment with forces from without; in dialectical model, major sources of change are immanent in the system itself.

For ideological reasons, differences between these two models are exaggerated when in reality they have many common elements. The dichotomy between consensus and conflict which is often used to counterpose the two models is, however, not absolute. Not only consensus but also conflict has system-integrative functions as noted by many sociologists.[26] Moreover,

both models take an evolutionary view of change and, in some re both are based on an equilibrium model of society.

It is a curious fact, however, that Indian sociologists who voice the need for a typical Indian sociology also identify themselves methodologically either with dialectical or functional approaches. This shows not only the extent of ambiguity but also conflict in the thinking of these sociologists. Some illustrations of this we may find in their conceptual approaches to the study of social change in India.

CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA

Some major concepts and approaches about social change in India can be grouped as: (*i*) Sanskritization and Westernization; (*ii*) Little and Great traditions consisting of (*a*) processes of parochialization and universalization, and (*b*) cultural performances and organization of tradition; (*iii*) multiple traditions; (*iv*) structural approach, based on (*a*) functional model, and (*b*) dialectical model; and (*v*) cognitive historical or Indological approach. We shall briefly review each of them to find common grounds for a conceptual integration and also to show the biases and limitations from which they suffer.

Sanskritization and Westernization

The term Sanskritization was used first by M.N. Srinivas to describe the process of cultural mobility in the traditional social structure of India. In his study of the Coorgs in Mysore he found that lower castes, in order to raise their position in the caste hierarchy, adopted some customs of the Brahmins and gave up some of their own, considered to be impure by the higher castes. For instance, they gave up meat-eating, consumption of liquor and animal sacrifice to their deities; they imitated the Brahmins in matters of dress, food and rituals. By doing this, within a generation or so they could claim higher positions in the hierarchy of castes. To denote this process of mobility Srinivas first used the term 'Brahmanization'. Later on, he replaced it by Sanskritization.

Sanskritization is a much broader concept than Brahmanization. Srinivas realized that the process which motivated the lower castes to imitate the customs of the Brahmins in Mysore was a specific case of a general tendency among the lower castes to imitate the cultural ways of the higher castes; in many cases these higher castes were non-Brahmins; they were Kshatriyas, Jats, Vaisyas, etc. in various regions of the country. The crucial idea, however, is that of hierarchy in the caste system theoretically represented by *Varna*. There are four Varnas, the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaishya and the Shudra in the same hierarchical order, and all individual castes or subcastes, with the exception of the untouchables, can be classified on the basis of Varna into a hierarchical order. The untouchables have traditionally

been outside the Varna hierarchy and form the lowest rung of the caste stratification. The Brahmins, who constitute the top of the Varna hierarchy have since time immemorial enjoyed the most respectable position in the caste system. They form the priestly class, have the monopoly over the study and interpretation of the Hindu scriptures and sacred texts through institutionalized means.[27] As custodians of the Hindu tradition a stricter conformity with the ideal norms of Hinduism was expected from them; this expectation progressively became less and less strict for the castes lower down in the hierarchy until for the lower and untouchable castes the widest deviation from the ideal norms was tolerated.

Thus, in the social structure of the caste system the hierarchy of social positions coincided with the hierarchy of expectations about the conformity to ideal Hindu conduct-norms. Not only some form of deviance by the lower and untouchable castes from the sacred Hindu norms was tolerated but at one level their effort to follow the norms monopolized by the upper castes was stubbornly resisted. Status in caste being ascribed by birth, the chances of smooth mobility to high caste positions were more or less closed.

Despite this closure there have been changes in caste hierarchy and its norms from time to time. For instance, what was culturally accepted (Sanskritic) during the Vedic period of Hinduism was in some cases a taboo in the periods which followed. Vedic Hinduism was magico-animistic, Vedic Brahmins drank Soma (liquor), offered animal sacrifice and ate beef.[28] These were prohibited later and the only exception was made in cases of the lower and untouchable castes. The hierarchical principle, however, remained unchanged. It became rather stronger as with few exceptions the castes with ritual superiority had dominant economic and political positions.[29] This cemented the hierarchical foundation of the caste system.[30]

Sanskritization is the process of cultural and social mobility during these periods of relative closure of the Hindu social system. It is an endogenous source of social change. From a social psychological point, Sanskritization is a culturally specific case of the universal motivation toward 'anticipatory socialization' to the culture of a higher group in the hope of gaining its status in future. The specific sense of Sanskritization lies in the historicity of its meaning based on the Hindu tradition. In this respect, Sanskritization is a unique historical expression of the general process of acculturation as a means of vertical mobility of groups.

Here, we must explain the two levels of meanings which are implicit in Sanskritization and which interchangeably have been made use of by Srinivas. We may call them 'historical specific' and 'contextual specific' connotations of Sanskritization. In historical specific sense Sanskritization refers to those processes in Indian history which led to changes in the status of various castes, its leadership or its cultural patterns in different periods of history. It is indicative of an endogenous source of social change in the broad historical spectrum of India. In contextual specific sense, however, Sanskritization denotes contemporaneous processes of cultural imitation of

upper castes by lower castes or subcastes, in different parts of India. The nature of this type of Sanskritization is by no means uniform as the content of cultural norms or customs being imitated may vary from Sanskritic or Hindu traditional forms to the tribal and even the Islamic patterns.

This is illustrated by the diversity of patterns found in the contextual process of Sanskritization. Studies show that at many places lower castes imitate the customs of the Kshatriyas and not of the Brahmins;[31] at other places tribes are reported to imitate the customs of the caste Hindus;[32] in a few exceptional cases even the higher castes have been found imitating the tribal ways or undergoing the process called 'tribalization'.[33] In other contexts, Muslim cultural style is found to set the limit for imitation by upper as well as the lower castes.[34] Islamic tradition being exogenous to the Hindu tradition, such forms of acculturation fall outside the scope of Sanskritization. Beyond this a process of cultural interaction between the Sanskritic and other orthogenetic traditions such as those of the lower castes and the tribes has always existed in India; this renders it difficult to define the exact nature of Sanskritization.

Consequently, Srinivas has been changing his definition of Sanskritization from time to time. Initially he defines it as the tendency among the low castes to move higher in the caste hierarchy "in a generation or two" by "adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism, and by Sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon." He writes:

> The caste system is far from a rigid system in which the position of each component caste is fixed for all time. Movement has always been possible, and especially so in the middle regions of the hierarchy. A low caste was able in a generation or two to rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism, and by Sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon. In short, it took over, as far as possible, the customs, rites and beliefs of the Brahmins, and the adoption of the Brahmanic way of life by a low caste seems to have been frequent, though theoretically forbidden. This process has been called 'Sanskritization'...in preference to 'Brahmanization', as certain Vedic rites are confined to the Brahmins and the two other 'twice born' castes.[35]

Here Sanskritization is identified with imitation of the Brahmanical customs and manners by the lower castes. Srinivas later re-defines Sanskritization as "a process by which a 'low' Hindu caste, or tribal or *other group*, changes its customs, ritual, *ideology*, and way of life in the direction of a *high*, frequently, 'twice born' caste. Generally such changes are followed by a claim to a higher position in the caste hierarchy than that traditionally conceded to the claimant caste by the local community."[36] [italics added]. The new connotation of Sanskritization is evidently much broader; it is neither confined to Brahmins as a reference group nor to the imitation of

mere rituals and religious practices. It now also means imitation of ideologies, but it is not clear in what sense the term 'ideology' has been used. It could not be secular in meaning as in that case the distinction between Sanskritization and secularization (Westernization) would be blurred. Probably ideology refers to various thematic aspects of the Hindu tradition. Srinivas once wrote: "Sanskritization means not only the adoption of new customs and habits, but also exposure to new ideas and values, which have found frequent expression in the vast body of Sanskrit literature sacred as well as secular. *Karma*, *dharma*, *papa*, *maya*, *samsara* and *moksha* are examples of some of the most common Sanskritic theological ideas, and when people become Sanskritized, these words occur frequently in their talk." Thus a distinction between the two aspects can be drawn.

There is, however, one major theoretical implication in the meaning of Sanskritization as an ideological borrowing process. It broadens the connotation of the term 'Sanskritic' to include both sacred and secular elements of culture. In fact, through Sanskritization, often only secular status symbols of the higher castes are imitated by the lower castes. In north-eastern U.P., for example, the lower castes have imitated not the rituals or sacred customs of the upper castes but their conspicuous style of consumption and living, such as betel-chewing, wearing of gold ornaments, shoes and other forms of dresses which were proscribed until the abolition of Zamindari.[37]

Here the phenomena of economic and political domination assume great significance. This has been recognized by Srinivas, and he integrates the concept of Sanskritization with the phenomena of power and domination. He writes: "The mediation of the various models of Sanskritization through the local dominant caste stresses the importance of the latter in the process of cultural transmission. Thus, if the locally dominant caste is Brahmin or Lingayat, it will tend to transmit a Brahmanical model of Sanskritization, whereas if it is Rajput or Bania it will transmit Kshatriya or Vaishya model. Of course, each locally dominant caste has its own conception of Brahmin, Kshatriya or Vaishya models."[38] This evidently shows that meaning or context of Sanskritization would not only differ in each model but also within the same model from region to region. This introduces contradictions in various 'contextual specific' connotations of Sanskritization besides those which might exist between the historical and contextual specific levels of this process.

There is also a problem in integrating the concept of dominance or power with the process of Sanskritization. The phenomenon of dominance introduces the structural element in the Sanskritization model of social change which is never fully made explicit by Srinivas. In this connexion he correlates the processes of caste mobility with the 'fluidity of the political system'[39] in India at various levels of political organization (imperial, secondary local,[40] or imperial regional provincial, village level[41]) and with the 'pre-British productive system'.[42] Due to political fluidity, Srinivas

contends, many dominant castes in the past ascended to higher positions within the caste hierarchy either through royal decrees or through formation of autonomous political power. Historian K.M. Pannikar is even of the view that the Nandas were the last true Kshatriyas in India (fifth century B.C.), and since then all so-called Kshatriyas have come into being by usurpation of power by the lower castes and consequently the Kshatriya role and social position.[43]

The process of Sanskritization mentioned above is a good example of the 'historical specific' usage of this term. It refers to succession or circulation of dominant groups in Indian history through rise and fall of power, through conflicts and war and through political stratagems. All these are illustrative of structural changes which a concept like Sanskritization does not connote fully. Moreover, this meaning of Sanskritization bears no logical relationship to 'contextual specific' connotation of this concept since Sanskritization in this sense does not lead to a real ascendance to a higher-caste status or to real power.

Westernization

Compared with Sanskritization, Westernization is a simpler concept. It is defined by Srinivas as "the changes brought about in Indian society and culture as a result of over 150 years of British rule, the term subsuming changes occurring at different levels .... technology, institutions, ideology and values."[44] Emphasis on humanitarianism and rationalism is a part of Westernization which led to a series of institutional and social reforms in India. Establishment of scientific, technological and educational institutions, rise of nationalism, new political culture and leadership in the country are all by-products of Westernization. According to Srinivas, the increase in Westernization does not retard the process of Sanskritization; both go on simultaneously, and to some extent, increase in Westernization accelerates the process of Sanskritization. For instance, the postal facilities, railways, buses and newspaper media which are the fruits of Western impact on India render more organized religious pilgrimages, meetings, caste solidarities etc. possible now than in the past.

Srinivas prefers the term Westernization to 'modernization'. He contends that modernization presupposes rationality of goals which in the ultimate analysis could not be taken for granted, since human ends are based on value preferences and "rationality could only be predicted of the means not of the ends of social action."[45] By Westernization he also means primarily the British impact which he admits is "historically untenable (yet) heuristically unavoidable".[45]

Evidently, Sanskritization and Westernization as concepts are primarily focused to analyse cultural changes, and have no scope for systematic explanation of changes in the social structure. Srinivas concedes this point: "To describe the social changes occurring in modern India in terms of Sanskritization and Westernization is to describe it primarily in cultural

and not in structural terms. An analysis in terms of structure is much more difficult than an analysis in terms of culture."[45] He further adds that Sanskritization involves 'positional change' in the caste system without any structural change.[45]

The questions, however, are: how far do Sanskritization and Westernization as concepts describe the ramifications of cultural change in India? Are the phenomena Sanskritization and Westernization inclusive enough to account for all the major cultural changes in India? The answers to these require a discussion of the concepts in two parts: first, in logical terms and second, in terms of contextual sufficiency.

Sanskritization and Westernization, in logical sense, are 'truth asserting' concepts which oscillate between the logics of ideal-typical and nominal definitions of phenomena.[46] Hence their connotation is often vague, especially as we move from one level of cultural reality (historical specific) to another (contextual specific). Srinivas himself says about Sanskritization that it "is an extremely complex and heterogeneous concept. It is even possible that it would be more profitable to treat it as a bundle of concepts than as a single concept. The important thing to remember is that it is only a name for a widespread cultural process."[47]

The nominal nature of the concept is thus clearly evident. This is also why Sanskritization and Westernization fail to lead to a consistent theory of cultural change. Such consistency is far from realization since in Srinivas' own words, "the heterogeneity of the concept of Sanskritization.... subsumes mutually antagonistic values, perhaps even as Westernization does".[47] Even otherwise, nominal definitions are devoid of theory. They contain no hypotheses, and in Zetterberg's words "cannot be true or false. They can be clumsy or elegant, appropriate or inappropriate, effective or worthless but never true or false."[48] Obviously, Sanskritization and Westernization are theoretically loose terms; but as truth-asserting concepts they have great appropriateness and viability.

Theoretical looseness of these concepts is evident also from the way scholars have interpreted them. E.B. Harper, for instance, treats Sanskritization as a functional concept distinct from a historical concept of change. Sanskritization, according to him, is an interpretative category to understand the relationship among the changing elements within the tradition than its historical reconstruction.[49] Contrary to this, J.F. Staal writes: "It should be clear that the concept of Sanskritization describes a process and is a concept of change. It is not a concept at which synchronic analysis could ever arrive in order to explain material obtained by synchronic analysis. Sanskritization is a meta-concept in this sense, and all historical concepts"[50] are meta-concepts in that they are based upon concepts of synchronic analysis. He further adds: "Sanskritization as used by Srinivas and other anthropologists is a complex concept or a class of concepts. The term itself seems to be misleading, since its relationship to the term Sanskrit is extremely complicated."

The fluidity and contradiction in the meanings of Sanskritization are evident from the fact that it could be treated as a functional (a-historical) concept and a historical meta-concept at the same time. Staal's reference to Sanskritization as a meta-concept is also not clear as meta-concepts are generally at a higher level of abstraction over the primary or primitive concepts. Sanskritization on the contrary is a primary concept which describes a particular set of substantive processes of cultural changes in India. The emphasis in this concept is on the particular or specific and not on the general or universal. This is borne out from the following defence of this term by Srinivas: "There was (another) suggestion made that we should discard a local term like Sanskritization, and use a universal term like acculturation. I think this should be rejected for the reason that acculturation takes a particular form in Hindu society, and we want to characterize this particular form of acculturation."[51] This contradicts the thesis of Staal.

Contextually, Sanskritization and Westernization are founded upon empirical observations and offer objective insight into some aspects of cultural change. Difficulties, however, arise from the complexity of the contextual frame of reference. As we have said, these concepts do not have the same meaning or theoretical implications when used in 'historical specific' and 'contextual specific' terms. Probably, the controversy whether Sanskritization is a functional or historical concept is linked with these two levels of usages. In historical specific sense Sanskritization is a concept loaded with historical connotations closer to the view-point of Staal; but in contextual specific usage it tends to show many attributes of a functional concept implied by E.B. Harper.

However, Sanskritization fails to account for many aspects of cultural changes in past and contemporary India as it neglects the non-Sanskritic traditions. It may be noted that often a non-Sanskritic element of culture may be a localized form of the Sanskritic tradition. McKim Marriott finds such phenomenon in his study of a village community in India. He observes no clear process of 'Sanskritization' at the expense of 'the non-Sanskritic traditions'. Instead of borrowing, he finds "evidence of accretion and of transmutation in cultural form without apparent replacement and without rationalization of the accumulated and transformed elements.... Sanskritic rites are often added on to non-Sanskritic rites without replacing them."[52]

Moreover, Sanskritic influence has not been universal to all parts of the country. In most of northern India, especially in Punjab, it was the Islamic tradition which provided a basis for cultural imitation. Sikhism emerged here as a synthesis of the Hindu tradition with the Islamic movements of sufism and mysticism. In Punjab, writes Chanana, "culturally Sanskritic influence has been but one of the trends and at times it could not have become the main trend. For a few centuries until the third quarter of the 19th century Persian influence had been the dominating

one in this area."[53]

Chanana also does not find Westernization to be a simple process. He says, "as regards the present (situation in Punjab), it would be better to say that Indianization is at work; by this we mean Westernization to a large extent in externals and the reassertion of largely Indian values, mingled with the humanitarian values of the West in matters of spirit."[54] This cultural synthesis or Indianization has also been recognized by other historians.[55]

There are, however, aspects of Indianization which do not conform to Sanskritization-Westernization approach. The increasing tendency among the new elite and some castes and religious groups to emphasize their own ingroup identity through isolationism and nativistic revivalism[56] is a case in point. Some of these movements, such as for Dravidian identity in the south, for tribal identity in the eastern border of India and for Muslim national identity in Kashmir are not even related to the process of Indianization. The forces working in such movements, as often also in Sanskritization, are not merely cultural; they emerge from latent structural tensions in the social system rooted in the intergroup and interclass conflict and rivalry for economic resources and power.

As suggested by Harold A. Gould, often the motive-force behind Sanskritization is not of cultural imitation *per se* but an expression of challenge and revolt against the socio-economic deprivations.[57] Sanskritization is thus a cultural camouflage for latent interclass and intercaste competition for economic and social power, typical of a tradition-bound society where the traditionally privileged upper castes hold monopoly to power and social status. When the impact of the external forces like political democratization, land reforms and other social reforms break this monopoly of the upper castes, the cultural camouflage of Sanskritization is thrown away in favour of an open conflict with the privileged classes based on nativistic solidarity.

The term Westernization, too, is not without complications. Srinivas equates Westernization with the British impact on India, but this is too narrow since after independence the impact of the Russian and American versions of modernization in India has been considerable. This form of modernization has also not been entirely free from the influence of implicit ideologies; take for instance, the policy with regard to industrialization. In this field the persistent controversy over the public *versus* private management and ownership of factories offers an ideological case in modernization. These value conflicts which today form an integral aspect of change and modernization in India cannot be adequately accounted for by a term like Westernization. Moreover, for many new elite in India as also in the new states of Asia, the term Westernization has a pejorative connotation because of its association with former colonial domination of these countries by the West. It is, therefore, more value-loaded than the term modernization,[58] which to us appears as a better substitute.

Little and Great Traditions

The approach to analyse social change with the help of the concepts of Little and Great traditions was used by Robert Redfield in his studies of the Mexican communities. Influenced by this model, Milton Singer and McKim Marriott have conducted some studies on social changes in India utilizing this conceptual framework. The basic ideas in this approach are 'civilization' and 'social organization of tradition'.[59] It is based on the evolutionary view that civilization or the structure of tradition (which consists of both cultural and social structures) grows in two stages: first, through orthogenetic or indigenous evolution, and second, through heterogenetic encounters or contacts with other cultures or civilizations. The social structure of these civilizations operates at two levels, first that of the folks or unlettered peasants, and second, that of the elite or the 'reflective few'. The cultural processes in the former comprise the Little tradition and those in the latter constitute the Great tradition. There is, however, a constant interaction between the two levels of traditions.

Unity of a civilization is maintained by its cultural structure which perpetuates a unity of world-view through cultural performances and their products. These cultural performances are institutionalized around the social structure of both Little and Great traditions. "Those persisting and important arrangements of roles and statuses appearing in such corporate groups as castes, sects, or in teachers, reciters, ritual leaders of one kind or another, which are concerned with the cultivation and inculcation of the Great tradition"[60] form the social structure of this tradition. The social structure of the Little tradition consists of its own role-incumbents such as the folk artists, medicinemen, tellers of riddles, proverbs and stories, poets and dancers, etc. Changes in the cultural system follow through the interaction between the two traditions in the orthogenetic or heterogenetic process of individual growth. The pattern of change, however, is generally from orthogenetic to heterogenetic forms of differentiation or change in the cultural structure of traditions.

In this approach it is assumed that all civilizations start from a primary or orthogenetic level of cultural organization and, in course of time, are diversified not only through internal growth, but more important, through contact with other civilizations—a heterogenetic process. The direction of this change presumably is from folk or peasant to urban cultural structure and social organization. In the final stages, however, this results into a global, universalized pattern of culture, especially through increased cross-contacts among civilizations.[61]

With these assumptions, Milton Singer formulates a series of statements about cultural changes in India:

(1) That because India had a 'primary' or 'indigenous' civilization which had been fashioned out of pre-existing folk and regional cultures, its 'Great tradition' was continuous with the 'Little tradition' to be-

found in its diverse regions, villages, castes and tribes. (2) That this cultural continuity was a product and cause of a common cultural consciousness shared by most Indians and expressed in essential similarities of mental outlook and ethos. (3) That this common cultural consciousness has been formed in India with the help of certain processes and factors .... i.e. sacred books and sacred objects .... a special class of (Brahmins) and other agents of cultural transmission .... (4) That in a primary civilization like India's, cultural continuity with the past is so great that even the acceptance of 'modernizing' and 'progress' ideologies does not result in linear form of social and cultural change but may result in the 'traditionalizing' of apparently 'modern' innovations.[62]

Subsequent studies have revealed that Little and Great traditions not only interact but are also interdependent in India,[63] and modernizing forces are not only accepted but also absorbed by the traditional way of life. Milton Singer concludes:

The weight of present evidence seems to me to show that, while modernizing influences are undoubtedly changing many aspects of Indian society and culture, they have not destroyed its basic structure and pattern. They have given Indians new alternatives and some new choices of life style but the structure is so flexible and rich that many Indians have accepted many modern innovations without loss of their Indianness. They have, in other words, been able to combine choices which affirm some aspects of their cultural tradition with innovative choices.[64]

Another noteworthy study based on this approach has been conducted by McKim Marriott in a village named Kishan Garhi in northern India. Marriott believes that "concept of a primary civilization type of process is one of the most inviting of available models for conceptualizing Kishan Garhi's relations with its universe."[65] He too finds that in the structure of the village culture and its social organization, which consist both of the Little and Great traditional elements, there is a constant interaction of cultural forms. Elements of the Little tradition, indigenous customs, deities and rites circulate upward to the level of the Great tradition and are 'identified' with its legitimate forms. This process Marriott calls 'universalization'. Likewise, some elements of the Great tradition also circulate downward to become organic part of the Little tradition, and lose much of their original form in the process. He used the term 'parochialization' to denote this kind of transaction between the two traditions. Parochialization is defined as the "process of limitation upon the scope of intelligibility, of deprivation of literary form, of reduction to less systematic and less reflective dimensions"[66] of the elements of the Great tradition.

Sanskritization, Marriott finds, does not proceed in the village as an

independent process; it is superposed on non-Sanskritic cultural forms through accretion rather than simple replacement. Marriott writes:

> For understanding why Sanskritization has gone so short a way in so long a time in the festivals of Kishan Garhi, and for understanding why Sanskritic rites are often added on to non-Sanskritic rites without replacing them, the concept of primary or indigenous process of civilization again offers useful guidance. By definition, an indigenous civilization is one whose Great tradition originates by a 'universalization', or carrying forward of materials which are already present in the Little tradition which it encompasses (Redfield and Singer 1954: 68). Such an indigenous Great tradition has authority in so far as it constitutes a more articulate and refined restatement or systematization of what is already there.... Without subsequent secondary transformation of its contents and without heterogenetic criticism of the Little tradition the indigenous Great tradition lacks authority to supplant the hoary prototype that are the sources of its own sacredness.... If the indigenous origins and connections of the Great tradition limit its authority to uproot any Little tradition, the essentially unlearned and nonliterate nature of the Little tradition also obstructs the direct transmission or spread of elements downward from Great to Little. Downward spread, like universalization, is likely to be characterized by transformation.[67]

Comparatively speaking, the concepts of universalization and parochialization also describe the processes of cultural change implied by Sanskritization; especially universalization comes very close to this concept. Parochialization, however, refers to an inverted form of Sanskritization or de-Sanskritization, a connotation which escaped the formulation of Srinivas. Despite this, the contribution of Marriott is very limited in scope specially because he focuses merely upon the orthogenetic process of cultural change.

On evaluation we find the approach of the Little and Great traditions offers possibility of comparative studies in cultural change which is not possible through Sanskritization-Westernization model as the latter is culturally bound in scope. Moreover, this approach is broader in coverage in that its concepts of heterogenetic and orthogenetic sources of change take into account what Srinivas calls Westernization and Sanskritization, respectively, and yet has a tight logical structure of concepts. Despite this relative advantage, this approach too suffers from the culturological bias, and neglects the structural aspects of social change.

Multiple Traditions

The dominant feeling of some social scientists is that Indian society or culture could not be described fully either through the dichotomy of the Sanskritic and Western traditions or that of the Little and Great traditions. Indian tradition is far too complex, and consists of a hierarchy of traditions

each of which needs to be analysed in order to unravel all the ramifications of change. S.C. Dube advocates this view:

> In broad outlines the 'Sanskritic Model' appears to be attractive, but careful analysis shows that it is extremely deceptive. Sanskritic sources provide not one model but many models, some of them involving even fundamentally opposed ideals. What we call Hindu philosophy is not just one school of thought, it is a compendium of many systems of thought, recognizing and advocating many divergent images of society and many different schemes of values. . . . The Sanskritization hypothesis is unidirectional and has a single focus. It concentrates on the ritual theme. . . . The importance of the ritual theme in Hindu life is undeniable, but at the same time the impact of the secular trends is not too insignificant to be ignored. As far as Little and Great traditions are concerned, there is apparently no precise definition. . . . Where there are more than one Great or near-Great traditions, each with its canonical texts and ethical codes, the situation becomes all the more confusing. . . . It may also be added that the Great tradition-Little tradition frame of reference does not allow proper scope for the consideration of the role and significance of regional, Western and emergent national traditions, each of which is powerful in its own way.[68]

As an alternative, Dube offers a six-fold classification of traditions in India each of which is to be studied in rural as well as urban contexts to evaluate change. These are: the classical tradition, the emergent national tradition, the regional tradition, the local tradition, the Western tradition and the local subcultural traditions of social groups.[69] These various levels of traditions no doubt offer a wide scope for the study of change but the principle on which they have been classified is again *ad hoc* and nominalistic. In substantive realm the emphasis here too is more on culture than on social structure. Needless to point out that a few other attempts toward multiple classification of traditions or cultural patterns in India,[70] which have been made recently, also suffer from similar limitations.

Theories of Structural Changes

A structural analysis of change differs from the cultural one which is in terms of particularities of customs, values and ideational phenomena, their integration, interaction and change. Structural analysis is focused on the network of social relationships, which though culturally distinct share common and comparable attributes at a higher level of abstraction called social structure. Thus, caste, kinship, class, occupational groups, factory and administrative structures which comprise distinctive fields of social interaction constitute structural realities. They emerge from human needs and existential conditions of man, and are comparable intra-culturally as

well as cross-culturally. At the substratum of these structural realities are numberless particularities of values, customs and cultures.

The stability of social structure is contingent on culture. Yet, as abstraction, structure forms a higher level than culture. A structural analysis of change consists of demonstrating the qualitative nature of new adaptations in the patterned relationships, as when a joint family breaks and becomes nuclear, a caste group is transformed into a class group or when traditional charismatic leadership is replaced by leaders of popular choice, etc. From a functional view-point such "explanation consists essentially of pointing out how the different types of activity fit on top of one another, and are consistent with one another, and how conflicts are contained and prevented from changing the structure."

In India, for historical reasons, the cultural approaches to the analysis of change have been quite frequent but rarely structural. Still, structural studies have not been altogether neglected. Quite a few such studies exist on the sociology of village communities, family structure, urban areas, leadership and political structure, etc. No attempt has, however, been made to compare the findings in these various fields for inter-structural compatibility tests, and for some broad generalizations about social change. In its absence discussion regarding change remains confined to raw particularities of social data without abstract generalizations. As Bailey says, in structural analysis "we ought not to confine ourselves to the raw material provided by the principles that people themselves give", our only task is not to make sense of the "flagrant contradictions in popular thought" by abstracting out consistent elements which a culturological study attempts. Given certain problems, a valid sociological understanding can be achieved by making abstractions immediately from behaviour or from other non-verbal information, and by using our own concepts and evading the ideas of the people.[71]

Thus, a structural analysis presupposes formulation of abstract concepts over the ethnographic details through which the facts of social life are not only described but also explained.[72] This requires a hierarchy of propositions in structural terms. For instance, the distinction between the culturological and structural connotations of a term like modernization would depend upon the way its implications are formulated through abstract structural statements. As an example we have the following formulation of modernization, mainly from a structural frame of reference by Richard D. Lambert in his study of factories in Poona.

> Throughout this literature, however, a relatively simple polarity occurs—a set of ideal types whose component parts appear again and again in discussions about changes from peasant to industrialized societies. For our purpose, we will select five changes which are presumed to accompany that process of social change called modernization: status is superseded by contract as the predominant basis of interpersonal economic

> relations; primary group organized production processes are supplanted by a more complex division of labour, finer job specifications, and the interdependence of separate economic roles; ascribed status gives way to achieved status as the legitimizer of social gradation; status immobility surrenders to rapid vertical and horizontal mobility; and belief in the durability, inevitability, and propriety of one's status is replaced by aspirations for improving one's lot.... It is assumed that the introduction of the factory system has certain institutional imperatives that flow from this form of work organization, imperatives which are instrumental in moving a society from one end of the polarity to another, from a static, acquired-status-ridden, tradition-bound, primary-goup oriented, particularistic, fatalistic society into one that is rapidly changing, achieved-status-dominated, progressive secondary-group oriented, universalistic and aspiring.[73]

In most structural studies in India, the ideal-typical formulations and statements are not clearly indicated, although an implicit recognition of these is present. The differentiation of roles and shifting nuclei of authority in family,[74] the changing positions of caste and tribe in the power structure,[75] emergence of new factions[76] and dominant castes[77] in villages, the spread of bureaucratic administration, the emergence of youth organizations,[78] new labour movements,[79] urban growth and industrial-demographic changes and changes[80] in leadership,[81] etc., are some structural studies which offer valuable clues to social change in India. In these studies, however, methodological orientation does not remain uniform which merits brief discussion. We shall discuss below a few salient orientations in the structural approaches for the analysis of social change in India.

Dialectical Approach

From its early Marxist form, the dialectical approach in sociology has undergone further refinements in concepts and propositions; its speculative-philosophical elements have been replaced by genuine sociological formulations of categories.[82] In India, Marxist theory did influence some scholars but as a whole failed to develop a scientific tradition of thinking and research.[83] Among the early studies based on this model we may mention studies of caste based on economic interpretation,[84] interpretation of Indian history from a class view-point in the "chronological order of successive developments in the means and relations of production,"[85] and evolutionary formulation of the stages of social development in India, guided by economic institutions.[86]

Marxist sensibility, however, remains diffused in the thought patterns of modern Indian intellectuals. It dominates the minds of the leaders in the Communist Party, and a large membership of the Congress and other liberal parties is also influenced by its ideology. Generally, attachment to Marxism is less specific, and it often projects a spirit of militant anticoloni-

alism rather than function as an integrated world-view or system of thought. Intellectuals like M. N. Roy, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jayaprakash Narayan, who started as proponents of this philosophy, later controverted it. In sociology the influence of this approach was never strong in India probably because of the dominant influence that British sociology and social anthropology with its functional orientation exercised on its methodology and scope. Despite this a few sociologists were influenced by the methodology of the dialectical or Marxist sociology.

One of them is D. P. Mukerji. In his writings we find some systematic concern with the analysis of Indian social processes from a dialectical frame of reference. He mainly focuses upon the encounter of the Indian tradition with that of the West which, on the one hand, unleashed many forces of cultural contradiction and, on the other, gave rise to a new middle class. The rise of these forces, according to him, generates a dialectical process of conflict and synthesis which must be given a push by bringing into play the conserved energies of the class structure of Indian society. This, however, could be done through planning. He writes:

> The value of Indian tradition lies in the ability of their conserving forces to put a brake on hasty passage. Adjustment is the end-product of the dialectical connection between the two. Meanwhile is tension. And tension is not merely interesting as a subject of research, if it leads up to a higher stage, it is also desirable. That higher stage is where personality is integrated through a planned, a socially directed, collective endeavour for historically understood end, which means, as the author understands it, a socialist order. Tensions will not cease there. It is not the peace of the grave. Only alienation from nature, work, and man will stop in the arduous course of such high and strenuous endeavour.[86]

Evidently, Mukerji's views come closest to the dialectical approach to social change which he identifies as a process of synthesis emerging from the interplay and conflict of contradictory systems of values and class interests. This process according to him started with the impact of Islam on India and continues up to this date; the British rule created a new historical contingency in India by creating a middle class with its roots neither in tradition nor modernity. Thus, Indian society ceased to be closed without being open.[87]

The dialectical approach has been applied to the study of the emergence of nationalism in India by A.R. Desai. He contends that nationalism in India is a product of the material conditions created by the British colonialism, and it did not exist in pre-British India. The British rule simultaneously led to economic disintegration as well as economic reforms which released new social consciousness and class structure from which nationalism followed. Desai writes:

(During the British rule) different classes had their specific grievances against Britain. The industrialists desired freedom for unobstructed industrialization of India and protection for the native industries. The educated classes demanded the Indianization of Services, since the higher posts were mainly the preserve of the British. The agriculturists demanded the reduction of the land tax. The workers demanded better conditions of work and living wage. The nation as a whole demanded the freedom of association and press, assembly, elected legislature....and finally complete independence.[88]

The economic relationship is predominantly a stabilizing factor in the continuity of traditional institutions in India, which, according to Desai, would undergo changes as these relationships change. This is especially true about caste which will eventually disintegrate with the creation of new social material conditions, such as industries, economic freedom, education, etc. The role of education in the rise of Indian nationalism has been overdrawn according to Desai, who says: "Indian nationalism was in fact the outcome of the new social material conditions created in India and the new social forces which emerged within Indian society, as a result of the British conquest. It was the outcome of the objective conflict of interest.... While recognizing the progressive role played by the introduction of modern education in India, it would be incorrect to conclude that Indian nationalism was the child of this education."[89]

An important limitation of the dialectical approach for studies of social change in India is the lack of substantial empirical data in support of its major assertions which are often historiographic and can easily be challenged. In theoretical terms, however, this approach can be most viable for analysis of the various processes of change and conflict in India provided it is founded upon a sound tradition of scientific research. Despite this limitation, some studies conducted on this model offer useful hypotheses which can be further tested in course of the studies on social change.

Cognitive Historical Approach

Analysis of social change from a cognitive historical view-point has been postulated by Louis Dumont. He conceives of Indian society not in terms of systems of relationship but as systems of ideational or value patterns or cognitive structures. Sociology itself is considered a vocation, attempting to place each simple fact of social life in the complex texture of society's collective representations. Dumont says:

The difficulty is that the thing is true at the same time at a multitude of levels. Each field of thought, each point of view itself rests upon a simplification, but thought is discursive and it cannot only explore one field, but make one point of view succeed another and, by combining in this way different simplifications, reconstruct the complexity of the datum.... If common thought simplifies itself in this way at each instant,

> the vocation of the sociologist is, in this sense, inverse. His understanding consists in replacing the simple in the complex, the small in the great, in lighting up a restricted area by bringing back to it its environment, which common thought (and often, following it, thought in general) suppresses. The sociologist has to construct a view in which the representation is preserved as it presents itself and at the same time is seen in its relation to its non-conscious counterpart.[90]

The focus in social change study, according to Dumont, should be on "the reaction of Indian minds to the revelation of Western culture," and on how under the impact of the cognitive elements of Western culture such as individualism, freedom, democracy, etc., the cognitive system of Indian tradition is reacting with rejection or acceptance. The contrast in the Indian and Western cognitive systems lies in the holistic character of the former and the individualistic attribute of the latter; this contrast also poses the nature of tension between tradition *versus* modernity in India.

In the traditional social structure of India the principle of holism was maintained by the hierarchical organization of castes based on the conception of a moral order or *dharma* which reinforced the principle of hierarchy. From this followed the ideas of social inequality, pollution-purity and priest-king alliance to enforce social order through charismatic authority. Dumont thinks that the complementary relationship between the priest and the king as formulated in the old Brahmana texts was necessary for the development of 'a language of pure hierarchy' in Indian social system.[91]

Should this mean that Indian tradition is impervious to modernization? Dumont answers this in the negative, for two reasons: first, because the ideas of holism and hierarchy were predominant even in the pre-modern Western tradition,[92] and second, because the traditional Indian social system did recognize the legitimacy of social and cultural innovations through the institutionalized role of the Renouncer or Sanyasi,[93] who was liberated from the norm of social hierarchy or caste through spiritual transcendence and also authorised to re-interpret the meaning of tradition and thereby change it.

From the above it is evident that Dumont's primary focus is on changes in the basic themes of Indian cultural structure and not on the dynamics of social groups or structures as such. In his view sociological study should be concerned with deeper aspects of change in the 'ideo-structures' of a society rather than with expedient issues which are finally trivial. He writes that "study of change answers a strong public demand, and for a part corresponds more to the subjective needs of the student as a member of a modern society, than to properly sociological issues."[94] Moreover, the 'ideo-structural' approach has the added advantage of being fruitful for both synchronic and diachronic types of studies.[95]

The cognitive historical approach has also the advantage of formulating a series of abstractions on cultural themes for comparative study, generally

on the model of ideal-types. This flexibility of abstractions on concepts renders it possible through this approach to study the various historical stages through which cultural changes have followed in India. Liko Sanskritization and Westernization, for instance, this model does not foreclose the possibility of studying the impact of Islamic culture on Indian culture and society. Despite this, the approach is mainly culturological and, therefore, limited in scope. Moreover, Dumont's assumption of a kingly model based on the alliance between the Kshatriya and the Brahmin to explicate the nature of traditional social order in India may not be acceptable to all and may not be applicable to every part of the Indian society. [96]

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

As we evaluate the above approaches we find that each one of them has advantages of its own for the study of social change, but these advantages are limited as none of them provides a comprehensive enough perspective on social change in India. Sanskritization is an empirical reality, but it often takes a form which is more nativistic or de-Sanskritizing in orientation than being guided by the norms of the higher Sanskritic tradition. It may also manifest suppressed inter-class hostility. Harold Gould observes: "... one of the prime motives behind Sanskritization is this factor of repressed hostility which manifests itself not in the form of rejecting the caste system but in the form of its victims trying to seize control of it and thereby expiate their frustrations on the same battlefield where they acquired them. Only then can there be a sense of satisfaction in something achieved that is tangible, concrete, and relevant to past experience."[97] This subsumption of many meanings by Sanskritization and Westernization is admitted by Srinivas: "Sanskritization ... subsumes several mutually antagonistic values, perhaps even as Westernization does."[98]

Limitations in other approaches have also been pointed out. Little tradition-Great tradition approach is sounder in respect of the causal explanation of change but remains culturological in scope. It also does not take account of the more specific substructures of traditions. The multiple traditions theory goes deeper into the classification of traditions but lacks in theoretical or explanatory categories to account for change. The dialectical and other structural theories stand on established foundation of logical categories but suffer from the paucity of empirical studies or documentations on change. Each one of them has, however, something to offer toward an integrated approach to social change.

A series of concepts related to social change could be integrated into a logical system on the basis of similarities in theoretical formulations. It is our endeavour to find out the underlying theoretical similarities in the conceptual formulations of various approaches to social change and then string them together on a systematic logical principle to achieve a fair degree of conceptual integration.

The first such theoretical unity exists in regard to the direction of change as implied in various approaches. Most of them assume a linear evolutionary direction toward which cultural changes are observed to be moving. As Milton Singer says, "culture change like any other kind of change, has a temporal dimension which is useful to distinguish into linear and cyclical varieties. Linear type of culture changes imply a specification of a date or approximate date which allows us to fix a 'before' and 'after' division. Modernization of a cultural tradition is a linear type of change in this sense. It implies that tradition has been transformed which it did not have before a certain date .... Not all changes which the tradition undergoes in the modern period, however, result into modernization.... It is useful, in other words, to consider whether the result of any particular change in tradition is continuous with the structure prevailing before a certain date, or whether that structure has been replaced by a new one. In the former case we might speak of the change as a traditionalizing type, in the latter as a modernizing type.... If the change results in a structure which is neither quite like the traditional one nor a predominantly new one, we might speak of a compromise formation."

Most formulations of social and cultural changes in India, however, are evolutionary linear in direction. Srinivas formulates stages of change from Sanskritization to Westernization in which the initial stage of pre-Sanskritization is logically implied. Broadly speaking, these stages closely resemble the major historical-cultural periods and their transitions in India. In substantive contemporary sense a tribe imitating the caste ways would be an instance of change from a pre-Sanskritic stage to that of Sanskritization. The dialectical and structural models of change, however, clearly employ unilinear conception with regard to the direction of change. Hence one important integrative principle in the Indian theories of change seems to be that of unilinear evolutionism in the long run of this process. In short periods, however, regressive movements in change are accepted.

Once we recognize this broad theoretical unity in the concepts of change, questions may arise about other areas of integration at lower levels. One such level is of the *context* in which change-producing processes begin and materialize as new qualitative forms. At this level too we find a common factor in most conceptualizations of change. This lies in the definition of *context* through *macro* or great and *micro* or little structures of tradition. Redfield, Singer and Marriott clearly distinguish between Little and Great traditions. In Srinivas' term both Sanskritization and Westernization would constitute forms of macro traditions. The pre-Sanskritic is assumed as the micro tradition. Probably, what earlier has been called the 'historical specific' usage of Sanskritization refers to macroscopic level, and the 'contextual specific' usage then forms the microscopic level of tradition.

A clear distinction between macro and micro levels of structures is also found in the structural formulations of change by Bailey, Mayer, Epestein,

and others. In dialectical formulation, however, this distinction might not be simpler because of its assumed monistic reductionism. But even in this theory a distinction of contextual levels or of the substructures and superstructures is made. In D.P. Mukerji's writings we find a fuller treatment of the levels and types of traditions which produce changes through interaction and encounter. In most cases, however, focus is only upon the Great traditions, like those of Islam, Hinduism and of the modern West, and the treatment of the micro-structures of traditions is scanty. Despite this, a distinction between the macro and micro contexts of socio-cultural phenomena is quite pervasive in the literature of social change to warrant a conceptual unity in its approach not only on substantive but also logical grounds.

A further conceptual integration may be possible the way causal nature of change is explained in various approaches. The functional approach, for instance, explains changes through diffusion of new forms of behaviour and culture through exogenous sources; in contrast the dialectical theory puts greater emphasis upon intra-systematic or endogenous sources of social change and considers them to be immanent in the structure itself. An attempted integration of social change concepts necessitates that both of these causal sources of change be recognized for a unity and balance in the approach.

Most studies of change in India explain causation through external contacts which lead to the diffusion of new roles and values. The contribution of intra-systematic elements to change is recognized by a few sociologists. Mention may be made of the studies by Milton Singer and Marriott who following the model of Redfield explain changes both through the orthogenetic and heterogenetic sources. For Srinivas, Sanskritization would mean a process of endogenous change and Westernization an exogenous form of this process. Other sociologists too recognize this distinction either explicitly or by implication. An attempted conceptual integration of social change approach must, therefore, also take into account the two main causal factors which initiate change.

Finally, such a conceptual integration necessitates a clear formulation of the *substantive domain* of phenomena undergoing change. We find mainly two broad substantive areas of social realities to which most studies of change are oriented .... the culture and social structure. Culture forms the customary standards which govern social activities of men; social structure, however, results from the network of the activities themselves. The integrative element in culture is the meaning or symbolic system; the integrative element in social structure is culture itself which provides an institutionalized channel for the flow of motivations of men in various activities.

The concepts formulated to explain social changes in India are most often culturological. They focus upon the various forms in which the traditional Indian culture responds to the numerous modern cultural innovations introduced in India. Changes at other levels of social phenomena,

such as those in social structure and forms of group relationships are thus not adequately explainable through such conceptual categories. Moreover, cultural explanations always tend to be particularistic and, therefore, limited in matters of generalization about change. The reality of caste in India, for example, cannot be compared from one region to another because in cultural styles, rituals and with regard to interdictions on social intercourse caste in one region of India differs fundamentally from those in another. Comparisons can, however, be made in terms of structural criteria, such as power or domination, occupational status and economic status, etc. It is, therefore, necessary that explanation of change be attempted both from structural as well as cultural view-points.

The form in which conceptual integration in the approaches to analyse social change in India can be attempted may be presented in a schematic form as given below:

PARADIGM FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

MODERNIZATION

SOURCES OF CHANGES	*Cultural Structure*		*Social Structure*	
	Little-Tradition	*Great-Tradition*	*Micro-Structure*	*Macro-Structure*
HETEROGENETIC CHANGES	Islamization	Secondary-Islamic Impact	Role-Differentiation	Political-Innovations.
	Primary-Westernization	Secondary-Westernization or (modernization)	New-Legitimations	New Structures of Elite, Bureaucracy, Industry, etc.
ORTHOGENETIC CHANGES	Sanskritization or Traditionalization	Cultural Renaissance	Pattern-Recurrence, Compulsive Migration or Population Shift	Elite Circulation, Succession of Kings, Rise and Fall of Cities and Trade Centres

TRADITIONALIZATION

The above paradigm is a logical corollary of our analysis about the levels at which an integrated view on social change in India can be achieved. The causation of social change is to be sought both from within and without the social system or the tradition. For this we find the concepts employed by Redfield and Singer as being particularly useful and make a distinction between the heterogenetic or exogenous and orthogenetic or endogenous sources of change. A distinction between cultural structure and social structure is also made to focus upon the need to observe changes at the level

of these two relatively independent *substantive domains*. Again, following Redfield, cultural structure has further been sub-divided into the categories of the Little tradition and Great tradition. Similarly, the social structure is divided to form categories of micro-structure and macro-structure. These distinctions follow from the need to focus upon the *contexts*, as discussed above, through which processes of change could be evaluated in matters of spread and depth. Finally, the *direction* of change is represented in a linear evolutionary form from 'Traditionalization' toward 'Modernization'. Traditionalization comprises the total range of changes governed by orthogenetic patterns in the cultural and social structures. Modernization similarly represents the net balance of changes following from heterogenetic contacts.

The causal forces, substantive domain, contexts and direction of change provide us the logical boundaries within which the more specific processes of social change in India could be observed and described. These specific processes and the relevant concepts describing them have been noted in the paradigm in each appropriate cell. In the chapters that follow the significance of these specific concepts has been examined in course of the analysis of change pertaining to the relevant substantive domain. For instance, in the cultural structure of India, the Islamic impact constitutes an important heterogenetic source of cultural transformation and synthesis, and as we have analysed below, its significance can be seen at the levels both of the Little and Great traditions. This has been followed by Westernization as a major form of exogenous cultural impact on India, and its ramifications also have relevance for the Little and Great traditions. Srinivas himself calls the two levels of Westernization as "primary" and "secondary", and we have kept these terms to avoid unnecessary neologism.

Changes in the cultural structure of India from the orthogenetic sources also fall under many categories. Sanskritization is one such process of change. Theoretically, Sanskritization may represent changes in cultural structure, of the Little as well as the Great tradition, but most empirical observations about this process are confined to the Little tradition. For this reason a distinction has been made between Sanskritization and cultural renaissance, the latter being indicative of orthogenetic changes in the Great tradition of the cultural structure. As for Sanskritization, we treat it as a process of change in the Little tradition. As we shall discuss below, this concept has many unanticipated forms of implications for social change in India.

The changes in social structure could also be discussed more fruitfully when a distinction is made between the macro- and micro-structures. The instances of macro-structures are: bureaucracy, industry, market, leadership, political parties, etc. These consist of role relationships which have a pan-Indian extension of boundaries. In contrast, the micro-structures, such as kinship, family, caste and subcaste and tribe, etc. have limited boundaries for extension of role relationships and their obligations. Some of these

structures like kinship and marriage are governed by inherent "principle of limit" which renders the nature of relationships implied by these institutions, such as the number of kinship terms and the territorial limits in the selection of mates, narrowly circumscribed.

The basic changes in the micro- and macro-structures of Indian society have started taking place only after it came into contact with the West. The scientific and technological innovations which today constantly accelerate the momentum of changes in social structures towards an evolutionary direction have been inherited by India from the West. Consequently, most structural changes during the pre-contact phase of Indian history, whether in the micro- or macro-structures used to be of an oscillatory rather than evolutionary pattern. In the micro-structures like caste, family, etc. pattern recurrence was the usual form of transformation. Migration was an important source of change; but there being no scarcity of land,[99] such migration used to be from one rural habitat to another and did not lead to urbanization. Hence, migration too had the character of pattern-recurrence. The same was, broadly speaking, true of the macro-structures, also where the story of change mainly had its focus on the rise and fall of monarchies and expansion and constrictions of pre-industrial cities, which used to come into being as well as die out with the rising and falling fortunes of kingdoms.

Thus, the orthogenetic sources of change in the social structure of Indian society did not have the potential for real structural changes which have been set into action through the heterogenetic form of the contemporary processes. For a comprehensive treatment of structural change, however, the nature of changes activated by both of these factors have to be taken into consideration. The integrated approach as offered by us through a schematic arrangement of the concepts of change has the advantage of being comprehensive as well as theoretically consistent.

In the pages that follow an attempt has been made to analyse social change in India from the above schematic formulation of the approach to social change.

Chapter II

ORTHOGENETIC CHANGES IN CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNIZATION

Over the ages, unity of India has been symbolized by a cultural continuity, embodied into a unified principle of consciousness,[1] which has contributed to the identity of its 'inner-structure'.[2] This inner structure primarily lies in the religious principles and their interpretations.[3] The unity or identity has not been static. On the contrary, the structure of this tradition, which throughout succeeded in projecting an image of unity in value-structures, ritual styles and systems of beliefs, also contributed to the growth of a unified world-view of Indian civilization, in spite of the fact that it contained innumerable substrata of cultural beliefs and practices. Both its substantive structure and its underlying processes have been diversified and pluralized, each flowing like small rivulets and streams in its own local and regional matrix, and undergoing its own localized convulsions. But each finally, like all rivulets and streams, merged into the great ocean of the Indian cultural tradition. This interlinkage of the processes in the Little traditions of the Indian culture with its Great tradition, contributing to the processes of transformation and synthesis in the latter, is a historical reality.

Complex as this process has been, we could analyse its changing pattern and form in terms of our own theoretical approach. In the first instance, we have to view it in an evolutionary comparative-historical perspective in order to determine the quality-pattern of the direction of cultural change. In our scheme this refers to a change in the structure of tradition from its primordial-traditional moorings towards modernization. In the concept of modernization no evolutionary universalism is implied. Modernization, in its specific content and form, is treated as a historical rather than a universal evolutionary reality.[4] This implies that modernization in the cultural traditions of India might not be identical to or just a replica of modernization in other parts of the world. At the same time this historicity of development should not imply a refutation of the evolutionary viewpoint, which primarily lies in the existence of "recurrent causal relationships in independent cultural traditions."[5] The specific form that modernization might take in different cultural traditions may have distinctive features. Nevertheless, in its essential ethos, its basic system of values and cognitive structures, modernization everywhere in the world might share in some common and 'recurrent' substantive and causal characteristics. In order

to demonstrate this historical yet evolutionary nature of cultural transformation through modernization, as stated above, analysis may be undertaken of each ramification of the major cultural tradition in India. In this respect a distinction, as maintained earlier, between the Little and Great traditions of the Indian culture may provide the starting point. The processes of change in each cultural tradition may be analyzed in the context of the orthogenetic and heterogenetic causal sources. Cultural renaissance of the primordial Hindu system of cultural and religious beliefs may be treated as a major process of change in the Great tradition from the orthogenetic sources. Sanskritization, as an empirical process of cultural change, may symbolise an orthogenetic response to change in the Little tradition of the Hindu culture. From extra-systematic or heterogenetic point of origin, the changes taking place in the Little traditions may be called 'Islamization' and 'primary Westernization' and those in the Great traditions may be termed as 'modernization'.

Question may arise as to whether or not these various processes of cultural change contribute to some general pattern and direction of change in the Indian cultural tradition. Evidently, some of the processes have a mutually contradictory orientation and their simultaneous existence in the cultural system might lead to stresses and strains, which have been recognized by social scientists. On a deeper evaluation, however, it may appear that in spite of apparent dissonance between one process of change and the other, there exists an underlying principle of unity. The source of this unity perhaps lies in the underlying uniformity of the externally variant aspirations and adaptations for modernization. What at the national level might appear as nationalistic introversion or 'identity crisis' may at group level take the form of 'Sanskritization', or 'Westernization'. The basic structural principles underlying both the processes, however, continue to be identical, viz., motivation for normative adaptations to status ascendancy. The differences in the form of adaptations might result from differential contexts of structural constraints. It is one of our objectives in this study to bring out this aspect of the integrative principle in the various processes of cultural change in India. We shall not only attempt to map out the nature and extent of cultural changes by merely describing the various processes of cultural mobility and change. Our primary objective would rather be analytical: to underline the patterned aspect of cultural changes in terms of an emerging general 'macro-process' of change. In this context a basic question to be posed and analysed would be the nature and direction of cultural modernization in India.

In this chapter we shall focus only upon those changes in the cultural tradition which have emerged from time to time through the orthogenetic sources of change. Subsequent chapters shall be devoted to the discussion of cultural changes through acculturative adaptations to heterogenetic traditions.

ORTHOGENETIC PROCESSES OF CULTURAL CHANGE

It is not easy to distinguish between the primary (orthogenetic) and secondary (heterogenetic) stages of growth in the Indian civilization on the basis of historical data. From a strictly historical point of view, what one might call the orthogenetic or primary structure of the Indian tradition may itself be a product of synthesis of a number of indigenous or even alien cultural patterns.[6] Ethnographers and historians are undecided on the extent to which a relationship existed between the pre-historic Indus Valley culture and the traditional Vedic culture in India.[7] Similarly, controversy is rife about the nature of the relationship between the Aryan culture of the Vedic period and the culture and customs of the tribal people in India.[8] In view of these difficulties a historical formulation of the orthogenetic or primary nature of the Indian civilization might be difficult. Its sociological formulation, on the basis of typical normative principles, might be relatively less fraught with difficulties. In this sense, however, valid distinctions between orthogenetic and heterogenetic sources of change in the cultural tradition could be maintained. The cultural tradition of Hinduism, its religio-ethical values and aesthetic patterns, the life styles and conduct-norms which crystallized around about 1000 B.C. in Vedic literatures and were subsequently formalized in the Epics (being roughly dated from 1000 B.C. to 500 B.C.) could provide a working ground for an orthogenetic conceptualization of the tradition. The forms of Vedic Hinduism, especially its manifestation during the period of the Epics, laid the foundation of a system of beliefs, ritual patterns and cultural practices which may be treated not only as distinct from other world religions and cultural traditions but also as being autochthonous or primordial in nature.

This distinctiveness and primordiality of the cultural tradition may still be difficult to define in terms of the Vedic or the Epic culture of any specific period. Theoretically, the Vedas represent the Revelation of Hinduism and all its cultural patterns. But in practice, from time to time new innovations and additions were always made in the structure of this tradition. Whereas this process supports the hypothesis of continuous orthogenetic growth in the tradition, it also necessitates that the main characteristics of this tradition may be conceptualized ideal-typically rather than historically. It is on this basis that a distinction between the orthogenetic and heterogenetic processes of change in Indian culture could be attempted.

In concrete terms, Hinduism constitutes the basis of an orthogenetic cultural tradition in India. In contradistinction, all other religio-cultural patterns existing in India parallel to it provide instances of heterogenetic growth in its cultural traditions. Hinduism, as repeatedly emphasized by many scholars, may not be viewed as a religious system alone but more than that, it represents a way of life.[9] It constitutes a distinctive world-view and a cultural complex, in the background of which orthogenetic transformations in culture may be analysed. This analysis may be undertaken

on the levels of the Little as well as the Great traditions and should draw its material both from historical sources and empirical studies conducted by sociologists and social anthropologists.

GREAT TRADITIONS: CULTURAL RENAISSANCE AND CHANGE

Constant orthogenetic changes have been going on in the Great tradition of Hinduism from the Vedic time down to the twentieth-century period of cultural reformation. We define these processes of change as orthogenetic because the categories of cultural innovation that were sought to be introduced through such reformations were drawn from the structure of the primordial tradition itself. New categories or value-themes were under this process not drawn from cultural systems foreign to the original Great tradition. Even in extreme cases when some of the earlier normative principles were to be completely given up or refuted (such as in Buddhism and Jainism) the logical nature of departure in such cases was to be found rooted in the autochthonous tradition. Cultural tradition in such cases underwent changes through intrasystematic differentiation and diversification of forms. Such processes of cultural changes in the Great tradition of Hinduism have been defined as cultural renaissance.

In order to evaluate as to how these forms of cultural renaissance have been taking place under stages of progressive differentiation and departure from the 'primary' roots of the Hindu civilization, some of the basic attributes of the Hindu tradition may be delineated in an ideal-typical form. In other words we may formulate its basic 'cognitive structural' characteristics in a systematic approach.[10] Each subsequent differentiation in the cultural tradition compared from this ideal-typical form may then be treated as a case of intra-systematic growth and change.

The normative principles of Hinduism have been as meticulously systematic and closed as its empirical structure has been varied and amorphous. Often this latter attribute (eclecticism or amorphousness) of Hinduism is emphasized without any regard for the former, which gives an imperfect and incomplete picture of Hindu culture and religion.[11] Behind the extreme degree of permissiveness and liberalism in beliefs and variety in ritual practices as admitted by Hindu canonical system, there exists a strictly logical view of phenomena in terms of which the principles of *order* and *change*, *being* and *becoming*, *creation* and *destruction*, *hedonistic-utilitarianism* and *spiritual transcendence* can be meaningfully explained. Implicit in this system of logic and metaphysics is a theory of society and culture which admits little confusion and has been formulated with extraordinary clarity. The twin basic concepts of this system are *order* and *change*. Order, both normative and social, is conceptualized through the principle of hierarchy and change, which is assumed to be the immanent nature of all phenomena, and is thought of to be cyclical, occurring in temporal rhythms. The principle

of hierarchy combined with cyclical theory of growth and change introduces an element of dynamism in this theory of culture and society.

The principle of hierarchy, in traditional Hindu culture, is not viewed in a static form. Hierarchy is itself subsumed in the process of cyclical transitions which adds on to it a dynamic quality. For instance, by birth a person may be endowed with high or low moral potentialities which lead to the ascription of caste status, but these moral potentialities are not static but accumulative and additive, being influenced by man's personal deeds in this life or a series of lives to which he may be born. Similarly, even in this life, where a person is born with very high moral potentialities, for example if he is born in a Brahmin family, the status of Brahmin does not come to him automatically: he has to cultivate those potentialities and realize them through socialization and self-discipline[12] in other words, he has to undergo a rebirth and then achieve the status of a 'twice born'. Everyone, otherwise, is at birth a Shudra (lowest in social and normative rank) by Hindu tradition.[13]

Some of the ideal-typical characteristics of the orthogenetic Hindu Great tradition, in the light of which later differentiations and changes could be analysed, are capable of being formulated in spite of the complexities and contradictions as apparent in this tradition. Two major criteria for such an attempt could be the concepts of *order* and of *change*. Most of the cultural themes of the Great tradition may be integrated around these twin concepts. Order in the cultural tradition may be viewed in the manner of what Redfield and Singer call 'cultural structure' and 'cultural performances' in the social organization of tradition.[14] The chief abstractions on the cultural structure of this tradition from the view-point of order could be the principle of *hierarchy, holism* and *continuity* (between the sacred and the secular and between the material and the spiritual) in the tradition. In the frame of reference of change, the cultural structure tends to be oriented to a cyclical-devolutionary conception of cosmology and cultural time.

However, hierarchy, holism and continuity may be described as the characteristics of any traditional cultural system. We must demonstrate as to in what specific contexts these cultural norms subsisted in the orthogenetic Hindu tradition. Our second endeavour would be to bring out the various major stages through which historically these cultural themes have been orthogenetically subjected to revision, addition, depreciation and transformation.

The principle of hierarchy could easily be called the ethos of the Hindu traditional cultural pattern. It permeates through most of the cultural categories. In an analytical sense, principle of hierarchy may be seen as governing the cultural structure at many points. A few of such areas where this principle may be found in a manifest form are: role institutionalization and its legitimation in terms of *varna* and *jati*, the realms of goal-orientation or the theory of *purushartha*, the classification of the levels of charisma or *guna* as group and individual attributes, and finally, the changing cultural cycles. In some form, a principle of hierarchy may also be discerned in the

Hindu view of the evolution of mental phenomena as formulated first in the Upanishads and then elaborated in the philosophical system of the Sankhya.[15]

Hierarchy through role-institutionalization and its legitimation provides to us the cultural counterpart of the social structure of the caste system which still persists in India, and confirms our formulation about continuity as being a major attribute of the traditional culture. (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya, Shudra and the Untouchables as social groups based on differential commitment to normative standards have existed from the time of the Vedas.[16] Through orthogenetic modifications and formalizations during the time of the Epics and the Dharmashastras caste system underwent such changes which rendered its values internally more rigid and subject to greater non-equalitarian sanctions. It was perhaps during this period that caste emerged as a cultural system based on institutionalized inequalities. The principle of Vedic hierarchy based on functional specializations of groups was during this period petrified in the shape of rigid taboos on commensality, connubium, and other forms of social interactions. The earlier notion of distance between one caste and another, which was mostly based on functional criteria was accorded a ritual complexion; inter-caste distantiation thus became a ground for elaborate distinctions and rationalizations about pollution-purity relationships. (Thus, hierarchy which was a functional principle became a religious phenomenon.) Although some kind of latent religious sanction to inter-caste distance was accorded right from its mythical Vedic origin, there is reason to believe that a fuller sacerdotal transformation of this principle took place later during the time of the Epics and Dharmashastras. This leads us to another cultural dimension of hierarchy in the orthogenetic tradition.... the hierarchy of *guna* or charismatic qualities of individuals. The theory of *guna* in Hindu cultural tradition provides a systematic formulation of the principle of charismatic legitimation[17] not only of the caste hierarchy but also of the order of power or kingship in this tradition. The charismatic qualities (*guna*) are conceived on the principle of levels, the highest and the most virtuous being the quality of *sattva*, of brightness and virtue, associated with the sages and the Brahmins. Next in hierarchy comes *rajas*, the charismatic quality of passionate commitment to action; to power, the attribute of the *Kshatriyas* and the kings; the last and the lowest in hierarchy is *tamas*, a charismatic endowment to dullness, to profane inclinations and to servitude. *Sattva* also implies quietude and spiritual bliss; *rajas*, strong activity orientation and worldly commitment; and finally, *tamas* represents innate endowment of dependency and ignorance. Characteristically, *sattva* is the charismatic endowment of the Brahmins (priests), *rajas* of *Kshatriyas* (rulers) and *tamas* of the *Shudras* (the low castes). The *Vaisyas* have a position between the *Kshatriyas* and the *Shudras*. Thus, the hierarchy principle of role-institutionalization is reinforced by the theory of charismatic hierarchy.

The third major hierarchy in the Hindu cultural tradition is that of values regarding goal-orientation patterns. On this scale life-goals have been

arranged with increasing merit into the pursuit of *kama*, or sex and other material goals of sensory enjoyments, *artha*, or the economic-utilitarian goals, the *dharma*, or the goals of moral obligations (in social, religious and cultural realms) and finally *moksha*, or the pursuit of salvation from the chain of birth and rebirth. The first three orientations have a socio-cultural frame of reference but the orientation for *moksha*, which some scholars say was introduced later in the body of goal-orientations,[18] has a meta-social significance. Hinduism does not deny the pursuit of any of these goals because of being at a lower level of merit.[18a] *Kama* or sex goal is as laudable as that of *dharma* or moral obligations. But each level of goal-orientation is to be pursued at the appropriate stages of social life-cycle, in the context of which each becomes a *dharma*, or a moral duty. Value system of *dharma*, therefore, has a specific as well as a diffuse connotation in the Hindu social theory. At the specific level *dharma* is a progressive stage in goal-orientation pattern preceded by *artha* (economic values) and *kama* (biological gratification). At a diffuse level, however, in appropriate or culturally sanctioned social contexts each of the four goal-orientations described above constitutes *dharma*. Moral obligation or *dharma* is, therefore, a diffuse value-orientation pattern of the Hindu tradition, which renders its world-view sacred.

We have talked of culturally sanctioned contexts in which each level of goal-orientation becomes *dharma* or moral obligation from a generalized point of view. These contexts are defined through division of Hindu life into another hierarchy of four-fold stages, called *ashramas*. These are, *brahmacharya*, stage of learning and strict celibacy, *grahastha*, stage of householder's life, *vanaprastha*, stage of relative withdrawal to exclusive pursuit of moral and spiritual goals without leaving the family, and finally *sanyasa*, the stage of complete withdrawal from affective-particularistic social obligations, and devotion to pursuit of spiritual values and its propagation in society. If we compare the hierarchy of goal-orientations with the hierarchy of life-stages the specific and diffuse meanings of *dharma* (moral obligations) would be clear. For example, pursuit of *kama* (sex) is a legitimate goal for a householder but a deviation or sin for a person who has not crossed the stage of *brahmacharya* or education. Similarly, attempt for *moksha* or salvation is a laudable objective but only at the stage of *vanaprastha* or *sanyasa*, the stage of relative or absolute withdrawal from social life. It should, therefore, be clear that commitment to ascetic other-worldliness[19] in Hinduism is not as absolute and all-pervasive as generally conceived. Moreover, most of these values of life-stages and its goals being parts of the Great tradition, conformity to them was only expected from the upper (twice-born) castes. The rest of the population had greater permissiveness in this regard. Most of these values as 'ideological-motivational' phenomena did not find their articulation in the "institutional-organizational' framework of the society,[20] and many of them were 'ethico-religious' rather than structural in nature.[21] A great deal of flexibility was allowed in the expectation of conformity to the prescribed values of

goal-orientation, role-institutionalizations and appropriate obligations to duty in various life-stages or *ashramas*. These obligations were relative to space *(desha)*, time *(kala)*, ability to make *shrama* (effort) and innate *guna* (endowments of the individuals concerned).[22]

The above hierarchies of role-institutionalization *(varna)*, charismatic endowments *(guna)*, goal-orientations *(purushartha)*, life-stages and its value-obligations *(ashrama)* relate mainly to the Hindu concept of cultural order and its structure. Each hierarchy is in one way or another dependent or related to the formulation of the other hierarchy of cultural values. This inter-hierarchical connection and dependence of value-categories renders the system of the Hindu Great tradition logically coherent as well as closed. Apart from the hierarchical notion of the values, the formulation of the nature of the mental phenomena may also be treated to have been developed in Hinduism in a hierarchical manner. In Upanishadas and later in the Sankhya system of the Hindu philosophy mental patterns have also been conceptualized to be at various levels of evolutionary growth such as those of *budhi*, or intelligent mental awareness, *ahamkara*, ego involvement of consciousness, and finally *mana*, mental ratiocination which emerges after the growth of many intervening factors in the form of an integrative mental force for the various material and cultural phenomena[23] created by the *ahamkara* or the "ego principle".[24] The final stage of this evolution of the mental patterns culminates into the Being of the *purusha*, the greatest Creative Force.

As evident, all these hierarchical constructions of the cultural structures fit together into a logical pattern and develop into a holistic view of culture and society. The idea of holism is itself rooted in the notion of hierarchy. The hierarchies discussed above relate to the synchronic-structural attributes of the cultural Great tradition of Hinduism. A diachronic view of this system does nevertheless exist although it may not be historical in the Western sense.[25] Its first difference lies in the fact that like all other cultural constructions this too is postulated on the principle of hierarchy. It is hierarchical, cyclical and devolutionary; the last, if evaluated from a modern view-point. The basic unit of time, *kala*, a day of Brahma (4,320 million earthly years) is sub-divided into fourteen *manavantaras*, each lasting 306,720 thousand years and each proginated by a new *manu*. Each *manavantara* contains seventy-one *mahayugas* or aeons (of which a thousand form the *kalpa*) and each is sub-divided into four *yugas*, called *krata* (age of spiritual beings), *treta* (spiritualism still predominates), *dwapara* (age of mixed spiritualism) and *kali-yuga* (the age of debased spiritualism). The duration of each of these *yuga* progressively declines along with the declining spiritualism. At the end of the *kaliyuga* a divine incarnation, *kalika*, is prophesied to emerge and mark the beginning of another *mahayuga* after destroying the deviant tradition.

In this four-fold time span *(yuga)*, the human beings, as we know them in our own contemporary time, come to exist only during the last phase, the

period of spiritual degeneration during the *kaliyuga*.[27] During other higher-level cultural periods, population is supposed to have consisted of super-humans or of men qualitatively different from our own mankind. This reveals existence of hierarchies within hierarchy. On this scale, there is a hierarchy of humans, super-humans and gods. But as we have discussed above, in connection with the theory of role-institutionalization and the charismatic qualities within humans too, there is a hierarchical division based on these principles. Such a hierarchy would have been very tormenting for the existence of stable social and cultural systems but for another counterbalancing cultural category which has occupied an equally important place in the Hindu Great tradition. This is the notion of *continuity* and its chief institutional manifestation has been the theory of *karma* or predestination through one's actions. Its allied category is the theory of transmigration of souls.

The theory of *karma* is based on the assumption that the soul being immortal, its rebirth, its social placement after birth and its accompanying happiness and sufferings are due to the accumulations of deeds *(karma)* in the previous lives and the nature of commitment to the prescribed norms of action in the present life.[28] These also hold the key to one's future after death. Final liberation from this cycle of birth and action *(karma)* could only be attained through salvation, *moksha*, which liberates man from birth either by means of right conduct *(dharma)*, or through devotion *(bhakti)*, or accumulation of knowledge *(jnana)* or finally through the mastery of one's self *(yoga)*.[29] The concepts of action *(karma)* and rebirth *(transmigration)*, thus provide a rationale for the hierarchical view in Hinduism in regard to various cultural dimensions, such as goal-orientation and role-institutionalization. In time dimension, these provide orientation in human life not only to one's present but also to one's past and future. Thus, as a concept, action *(karma)* establishes *continuity* in the hierarchical world-view of the traditional Hindu culture. Action *(karma)* theory also reinforces the value system of hierarchy.

Holism, another characteristic of the Hindu cultural tradition, emanates from its principle of hierarchy. It amounts to a denial of the principle of the individual in this system in the Western sense of the term. The concept of the individual as a mediating independent variable in culture does not exist in the ideal-typical structure of the traditional Hindu culture. Dumont has rightly stated:

> The modern individual implies two things in one: a normative principle, and the agent, or as I should say, the subject of institutions such as private property and the State. What equivalent is found in India for these two functions of the individual? As normative principle, we may say at the outset that it is replaced by the holistic idea of order or *dharma*, a proposition that will have to be verified and made more precise. As to the second aspect, it is my contention that while a particular human being

is here as elsewhere the empirical elementary agent of institutions, the individual, is absent from all social institutions save one, that of *renunciation and becoming of a sanyasin*.... (italics mine). Hierarchy is thus a universal language through which everything is located in the whole and "receives its life from it", everything, including the very opposite of the governing principle. The caste system has its principle in the interdependence of higher and lower. The whole is hierarchized because it is oriented to its proper end, and its elements must be fixed and unaltered, in principle, for the whole to be. Hierarchy is fundamental, and separation an entailment of it, as we had occasion to notice regarding endogamy (C. VII–91). Caste endogamy as oriented to the whole, is the opposite of racist endogamy, for 'race' is in this respect the individual substance made permanent.[30]

The principle of holism, which is thus subsumed in the notion of hierarchy is maintained through a series of value-propositions which though apparently contradictory are yet reconciled together in the higher order of cultural symbolism. This higher symbolism is based on the belief in eternal continuity and unity of lower and Higher, *atman* (soul) and *paramatman* (Godhead), change and changelessness, creation and destruction and *karma* (predestination) and *moksha* (salvation). As Pocock suggests, it is "a sociology that operates in terms of contradictions[31] and disengages the structure which is founded on them."[32] This is logically accomplished as the whole system is based on the value system of hierarchy.

Now, in the light of these ideal-typical attributes of the traditional Hindu culture it may be possible for us to analyse and compare some of the changes which have been going on intra-systematically within its structure of basic categories. We might only focus upon some major renaissant alternatives introduced from time to time in the cultural structure of Hinduism. Orthogenetic changes constantly took place in this tradition right from the Vedic times through two types of processes. First, through accretion and reformulation within the Vedic tradition and, secondly, through differentiation and establishment of new traditions. The various reform movements within the Hindu cultural and philosophical systems may be quoted as examples of the first type and the emergence of Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism as examples of the second type, that of independent differentiation. The former process marks change through continuity, a value syndrome of the ideal-typical Hindu culture. The latter process symbolizes change through fission in the tradition. Nevertheless, it may be possible to find out some elements of continuity even in these breakaway traditions.

The cultural tradition during the Vedic time had not evolved a closed hierarchical system either of the goal-orientations, or of role-institutionalizations or of the charismatic attributes. With the probable exception of the *Shudra*, there used to be a good deal of overlap in social and cultural roles of the *Brahmin*, the *Kshatriya* and the *Vaisya*. These three categories were more in

the nature of functional specializations than as crystallized forms of social segmentations or hierarchies.[33] Referring to the caste in this context, Spear writes:

> The nature of the caste system is a social wonder and its origin a standing sociological mystery. It is thought that it attained the hard outlines it presented in the early nineteenth century at the time of the Muslim invasion from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. But of its origin we know little. We know that it did not exist in Rigvedic times. We know that by 500 B.C. it was in recognizable working order. We believe that it has been in existence for perhaps three thousand years.[34]

Following from the hierarchy of role-institutionalization, one might also detect that the formulation of goal orientations *(kama, artha* and *dharma)* was not as rigid during this time as it later became. In the first instance, the ossification of an ascetic ethic of life in Hinduism is of the post-Vedic origin, much later than the rise of Buddhism and Jainism. Emphasis on humanistic and life-affirming values was pre-eminent during the Vedic period;[34a] there were no restirctions on inter-dining[35] and on the consumption of meat, drinks and on enjoyment of life through singing and dancing.[36] Orientation to the principle of right conduct or *dharma* was adapted to the fulfilment of the goals located in the spheres of material desires or *kama* and the means of its achievement, that is *artha.* This order of values in goal orientations was almost reversed during later times. The humanistic primacy in the goal-orientation pattern of the Vedic culture was itself an extension of the liberalism which existed at this stage regarding the role-institutionalization patterns.

From the Vedic period onwards, the formalization in the ideal-typical attribute of the orthogenetic tradition continued. Roughly this period may be dated from 900 B.C., the time of the Mahabharata warfare,[37] till A.D. 800 following the end of the Gupta period. It was during this period that changes from within the Hindu cultural tradition took place both through processes of accretion and reformation (within the Hindu tradition) and through differentiation and fission in the forms of separate Great traditions like those of Buddhism and Jainism.

Within the Hindu tradition, this had been a period of the growth of the *Smritis* and *Dharmashastras,* which embodied the social legislation; it was also the period of the writing of the Epics (*Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*) of the *Puranas* (mythological traditions), of the *Arthashastra* (book of economic and political administration), of the *Kamasutra* (erotics) and finally of the efflorescence of classic poetry, drama, art, architecture, philosophy, science of medicine and astronomy.[38] The very fact that separate treatises were prepared for the elaboration of the norms connected with the erotic *(kama),* economic-administrative *(artha)* and social-ritual *(dharma)* aspects of life, amply testifies to the fact that the Great tradition of this time was

not, as popularly believed, entirely engrossed with the matters of the other-world. It sought to establish a harmonious relationship among various levels of goal-orientations, role-institutionalizations and social obligations. In spite of this fact, the notion of hierarchy was all pervasive, even stronger than ever. The material realm was in principle subordinated to the spiritual realm.

A major orthogenetic change which occurred during this period was a concretization of the normative structure of hierarchy. Manu's code book *(Dharmashastra)* clearly established the extent to which the rigid barriers now existed among the various *varnas* and castes. Unlike in the Vedic period the 'twice-born' castes now no longer had a socially homogeneous character and were socially not open in matters of commensality and connubium; they had ceased to be mere functional groups, and had turned into *jatis*, endogamous castes—the prototype of which we encounter today. No principle of equity or equality was accepted before law for all the castes and there were differential norms for reward and punishment for the same deeds on the basis of people belonging to higher or lower castes. The position of Brahmin commanded higher and most privileges and rewards.[38a] A new group or caste, that of untouchables, had come into existence, introducing rigid norms of pollution and purity. The social norms were deeply subsumed into the hierarchical notions of charismatic attributes *(gunas)*, theory of action *(karma)* and predestination. Only a few of these values were modified in other *Dharmashastras* or the codebooks.[39] Apart from these, the epics and the books of tradition *(Puranas)* now reinforced a more ascetic and self-negating world-view, probably owing to the impact of Buddhism and Jainism. More emphasis was now laid on teetotalism and vegetarianism. Vivid pictures of heaven and hell were drawn in various puranas to portray rewards and punishments for right and wrong conducts, respectively.[40] These developments had a negative consequence through value-polarization in favour of what Weber calls 'other-worldly asceticism' in the Hindu tradition.

The *Dharmashastras* not only contributed to a strengthening of the hierarchical values related to goal-orientations and roles of various *varnas* and *jatis* but also integrated these values in the hierarchical system of cultural cycle and on that basis postulated a relativism in the normative aspect of *dharma*.[41] Similarly, the hierarchies of charismatic endowments were also confirmed. To a no lesser degree do we find the support to these ideal-typical characteristics in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya. The relationship of *Arthashastra* to the *Dharmashastra* is not identical to that of the secular to the sacred. As we have mentioned, *artha* is itself a part of the hierarchical system of the four-fold goal orientations. In fact, *Arthashastra* reaffirms the principle of hierarchy through the introduction of its essential principles in the theory of kingship and power structure in society. It is an effort to directly formulate a system of polity based on holistic and hierarchical conception of political order. The seven limbs of a kingdom, viz., the master

(swami), the companion *(amatya)*, the country *(janapada)*, the stronghold or the fortified town *(durga)*, the treasury *(kosa)*, the army and the organs of power *(danda)* and the ally *(mitrani)*[42] are postulated in a hierarchy of relationships and on an organological model. The central figure in this hierarchy is the king. He is the wielder of the *legitimate* force *(danda)*; the legitimacy is, however, derived from *dharma*. The concept of power is formulated in a secular context, but not complete disjunction between the secular role of a king and its sacerdotal implications to the maintenance of religious order is implied. The relationship between the *priest* and the *king* in this tradition is supplemental, although fully differentiated in terms of role performance. Thus, the secular role of kingship does not violate the principle of hierarchy. Dumont writes:

> In ancient Egyptian or Sumerian kingship, or in the kingship of the Chinese empire for instance, the supreme religious functions were vested in the Sovereign; he was the Priest *par excellence* and those who were called the priests were only ritual specialists subordinate to him. Comparing this with the Indian situation, there seems to be a simple alternative: either the king exerts the religious functions which are generally his, and then he is the head of the hierarchy for this very reason, and exerts at the same time political power, or, this is the Indian case, the king depends on the priests for the religious functions, he cannot himself operate the sacrifice on behalf of the kingdom, he cannot be his own sacrificer, instead he 'puts in front' of him a priest, the *purohita*, and then he loses the hierarchical pre-eminence in favour of the priests, retaining for himself power only.
>
> Through this dissociation, the function of the king in India has been *secularized*. It is from this point that a differentiation has occurred, the separation within the religious universe of a sphere or realm which is opposed to the religious, and roughly corresponds to what we call political. As opposed to the realm of values and norms it is the realm of force. As opposed to the *dharma* or the universal order of the Brahman, it is the realm of interest or advantage, *artha*.[43]

Among the various forms of role-institutionalizations, the kingly role *(artha-dharma)* has been most eclectic and assimilative in structure. Some scholars even doubt the existence of *Kshatriya* as a distinctive *varna* or *jati* in historical times. Pannikar writes that, "it is a fact that in historical times there was no such caste as the *Kshatriya*."[44] Similarly also in the Brahmin tradition or the structure of its role-institutionalization constant internal changes were always taking place, each having a differential orientation within its legitimate spiritual vocation as well as in-between the spiritual and material pursuit in life.[45] This also was the time for the integration of other forms of values in the spheres of literature, education, art, craft and various other apparently secular vocations into the sacred-hierarchical

normative structure of the tradition. Consequently, hierarchical nature of the goals of education was formally spelled out and systematic expositions of the six philosophical traditions of Hinduism followed.

The goal of education both in its esoteric (*para*) and utilitarian (*a-para*) manifestations was communication of knowledge for proper conduct of *dharma* or moral and social obligations. Originally, education meant the knowledge of the Vedas but subsequently it also came to include the learning of various artistic, scientific and linguistic capabilities.[46] The principle of hierarchy was, however, still maintained and even the apparently secular crafts and techniques *(kala)* were not free from these norms.[47] As in the role of kingship, the role-institutionalization of the craftsmanship too came to be treated as a blend of the sacred and secular norms, with the primacy of the sacred, in a hierarchical sense. Stella Kramrisch writes:

> The upward trend within a craft, however, has also a deeper cause than social ambition. This was implicitly recognized in the law books. Manu says that the hand of a craftsman engaged in his work is always ritually pure. The Gautama *Dharmasastra* postulates that a Brahmin may not accept food from an artisan. The law books thus distinguish the craftsman in his social position on the one hand, and in his state of grace on the other—when he is engaged in his work, when he creates and, thereby gives effect to his being an embodiment of Vishvakarma (the God as sum total of creative consciousness.)[48]

These orthogenetic changes in the Great tradition continued to take place from the classical age of the Hindu period of history (A.D. 300–700) through post-classical (A.D. 700–1500), and medieval periods (A.D. 1500–1800) to the contemporary times. By the end of the Gupta period, most of the systematic works in the expounding of the Great tradition, be it in the field of religion, literature, sculpture, art, science, philosophy or ethics, etc., had reached the highest point of development. What followed later was a process of gradual 'particularization'[49] of these institutions and values in the structure of the Hindu cultural tradition. As these changes were taking place in the wake of the breakaway traditions of Buddhism and Jainism, etc., in subsequent periods signs of segmentation and disintegrative pluralism also began to appear. Shankracharya by his exegesis of the Great tradition (Vedanta school of philosophy) contributed a great deal to unifying the cultural tradition of Hinduism. In this regard his most important contribution was the establishment of four sacred centres of pilgrimage in the four corners of the nation (Badrinath in Himalayas, Puri in Orissa, Dwarka on Western coast, Shringeri in the South) which since then have served as the network of communication of the Great tradition.

In the post-Gupta period, the centre of cultural effervescence had shifted from north to south. Shankaracharya was from Kerala in the south. Another philosopher—Saint Ramanuja, in the eleventh century, also came

from the south. His emphasis, unlike that of Shankaracharya was not primarily on the metaphysical but on devotional and ritual aspect of Hinduism. In the thirteenth century, Madhava, another saint-philosopher from the south, further postulated the devotional cult of Hinduism. A very important function of these orthogenetic movements in the tradition was that through reformulation and re-interpretation the basic tenets of the cultural and ritual structure of Hinduism were brought nearer to the life of the people. These contributed not only to the Great tradition, but also established a bridge of communication between the Little and the Great traditions of Hinduism. Another significant development which had taken place during this period was the emergence of a liberal reform movement in the ritual status of the Shudra or the lower castes. Both Ramanuja and Madhava favoured the temple entry for the lower castes, and the removal of their many disabilities.

This was a period of cultural renaissance in the south. The Great tradition of Hinduism flourished in the south under the protection of the temples, which were not only works of art but also served as educational institutions and centres of intellectual discussions, cultural festivals and other artistic expressions.[50] Many classics, epics and literary works of the Great tradition were during this period rendered in Tamil, Kannada, Marathi and other regional languages.[51] It was during this period that a differentiated form of the Hindu tradition evolved the cults of Virashaivism (Lingayat movement). Virashaivism was partly a protest-cult and partly a reform movement within the tradition. The same was true of various other devotional cults which grew in south India during this time.

From this period up to the end of the medieval times, orthogenetic changes in the cultural Great tradition of Hinduism have mainly been marked by a growth of devotional-liberal traditions which had earlier started in the south. Guru Nanak in Punjab, Meerabai in Rajasthan, Raman,[52] Kabir and Tulsidas in Uttar Pradesh, Chaitanya in Bengal, Dadu in Gujarat, Tukaram and Ramdas in Maharashtra emerged as the leading saints of the new devotional tradition in Hinduism. The contribution of these movements was two-fold: first, they liberalized the orthodox conception of religious beliefs and carried it to the people in their own languages; they rendered the so far esoteric and ritual-ridden religious beliefs into simpler idioms of the masses; some of them, notably Kabir and Nanak, also introduced purely humanistic and mystical values in religious beliefs criticising both the Hindu and Muslim orthodoxy. Most of them were for the abolition of the social disabilities based on caste, sex and religious beliefs.[53] Their second contribution was to bridge the gap between the Little and the Great traditions of Hindu culture. In fact, the devotional cults and the social structure of its movement served as a major communication channel for the continuity of the Hindu Great tradition during a time when due to the Muslim rule state patronage to this tradition had not only broken down but it was exposed to constant external and internal challenges and threats.

The main channels of communication were the roving bands of disciples, the *mathas* (religious seminaries) and congregational meetings held for songs and prayers. Through these media the value system of this movement was carried in the country far and wide.

While a larger segment of the devotional school was an effort to popularize and reiterate the selected values of the Hindu Great tradition (which we find in the preachings of Chaitanya, Tulsidas and Tukaram, etc.) an important section of it led by saints like Ramananda, Kabir, Nanak, etc. were directly motivated by the need for the introduction of more equalitarian and non-hierarchical value system in the world-view of Hinduism. Similarly, in their exposition of the tradition, conscious effort was towards liberalization of the Hindu tradition and its synthesis with Islam. In this respect their movements were not entirely orthogenetic in nature.

As we pass from the medieval history of India to the contemporary history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it becomes difficult to isolate the processes of cultural change and many attempts towards cultural reformation and reformulation which could be called as entirely orthogenetic in origin.[54] Most of such movements tend to be socio-political in nature and directly or indirectly emerge as reactions to the forces outside the traditional culture. Consequently, the reform movements in Hinduism which emerged in the wake of the British rule in India could be grouped into two major types. First, reforms which called for changes in the cultural practices and values of Hinduism on the pattern of the primordial tradition of the Vedas, and second, which postulated synthesis of new norms and cultural themes with the traditional themes and value system of the Hindu culture. The pioneers of the second trend in cultural reformation have also been the apostles of modernization in India. It is difficult to catalogue the names of the social and cultural reformers of the two schools, as in some respects and with few exceptions, almost all the reformers of this period show moderation in their views on the need for synthesis. A distinction may, nevertheless, be made between those who postulate synthesis in terms of the normative structure of the Great Hindu tradition itself and those who adumbrate this point of view in terms of synthesis between the orthogenetic (Hindu) and the heterogenetic (Islamic and Western) sources of the normative structure.

Roughly speaking, among the reformers of the first category we might include the names of Dayananda Saraswati, Vivekananda and on final account that of Mahatma Gandhi. Other reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth century India right from Ram Mohun Roy to Nehru may be grouped in the second category and consequently their contributions to the process of cultural change form more a part of the process of cultural modernization in India rather than of orthogenetic changes in its structure.

It is curious to note that in their appeals for reform in the Hindu cultural tradition neither Dayananda nor Vivekananda nor Gandhi rejected the basic ideal-typical cultural themes of Hinduism. All of them accepted

the legitimacy of the principle of hierarchy. Dayananda did so by following the Vedic model of functional division of *varna* and its pattern of role-institutionalization. Vivekananda and Gandhi adhered to it, drawing their model from the Gita and giving it a new legitimation it terms of the philosophy of *karma-yoga*, or of detached social action. All of them considered the ritualistic disabilities of caste and social disabilities of women as being based on misunderstanding of the Hindu tradition and exhorted for their rejection. But they did not challenge the hierarchical world-view of Hinduism as found in its beliefs in charismatic attributes of men, hierarchy of goal-orientations or even the hierarchical cyclical conception of cultural change. Gandhi even borrowed the idea of Rama Rajya, a modified version of the Hindu conception of Golden age to project his ideals of a moral society. Although, unlike Dayananda, Vivekananda and Gandhi did not plead for deliberate hostility or rejection of the non-Hindu cultural values and religious beliefs, yet their interpretation of Hinduism and their formulation of the cultural policies for the Hindu society itself were such that it came as a sharp contradiction to the Western or modern way of life and its basic value premises.

In this connection, the contribution of Gandhi is far more systematic and complete from a sociological point of view than that of the other two, and needs careful analysis and thought. In fact, the model presented by Gandhi is not a product of aggressive reaction to alien religious or cultural patterns. It is also not an angry protest against the pathology of some Hindu cultural and ritual practices which is paramount in the writings of Dayananda. It does not emerge from a deep sense of resentment at the comparative lack of development or dynamics in the Hindu society vis-a-vis the West, which unconsciously or consciously motivated Vivekananda. Gandhiji's contribution is much more comprehensive, dispassionate and fundamental. It presents a total alternative world-view to the two of the most basic world-views of the contemporary times: first, that of *hedonistic-liberalism* of the so-called modern free world, and second, that of *hedonistic-collectivism* (Marxism) of the socialist societies.[55] The Gandhian contribution to the orthogenetic change in the Hindu cultural tradition has, therefore, been of the most fundamental kind.

Gandhiji had realized the significance of the encounter of the Hindu tradition with the West, whether it came in the form of the Marxist challenge or through the Western ideology of hedonistic-individualistic liberalism. He counterposed his philosophy which was drawn from the essentials of traditional Hinduism, as an alternative system.[56] He reiterated the Hindu concept of social and cultural order based on *dharma*, or moral obligations which implied a conscious rejection of the Western theory of social order based on 'power'. Gandhian principle of non-violence, which is derived from the hierarchy of five *yamas* (means of self-control) in the Hindu tradition, later extolled in the Jaina philosophy, is an effort towards restoration of a moral society as traditionally conceived. Similarly, his emphasis on agra-

rian and handicraft economy, his rejection of modern technology, his non-legitimation of private gain and profit, his theory of trusteeship in property (an alternative to communism), his emphasis on decentralized system of administration through a hierarchy of represesentative bodies in opposition to the atomistic form of modern democracy go together to reveal as to how deeply his whole system of ideas was rooted in the primordial tradition. His conciliatory view on other religions too might be simply an extension of the basic philosophy of tolerance, ever present in the Hindu theology. Gandhism, thus, should be treated as an expression of orthogenetic cultural renaissance *par excellence*. It is a fact that in independent India Gandhism has become a mere sect instead of being a cultural force with a dimension of mass mobilization, which it once had generated. The failure of Gandhism in India opens a vast window on the problem of cultural change and modernization in this country which should be analysed.

ORTHOGENETIC CHANGE THROUGH DIFFERENTIATION

If the internal reorganization of the Hindu cultural tradition from the post-Vedic times to the era of Gandhiji marks one kind of changes in the Great tradition, yet another kind of change in this tradition is revealed in the formation of new autonomous traditions through differentiation. Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are three major examples of such changes. Out of these, Buddhism and Jainism have been purely orthogenetic in nature. Sikhism, though fundamentally based on the general tenets of the Hinduistic tradition had also been influenced by the heterogenetic tradition of Islam, especially in its external form and style.

Both Buddhism and Jainism, though separate religio-cultural traditions, have deeper roots in the Hindu tradition.[57] In spite of these affiliations both of these movements, particularly Buddhism, introduced some new cultural values. We might evaluate their significance in the light of their deviation from the ideal-typical attributes of the Hindu Great tradition. From a historical point of view, the cultural movements of Buddhism and Jainism were marked by the growth of an urban-mercantile community in the social structure.[58] Most of the Jains, for example, came from the rich mercantile class. Both the Buddhists and the Jains had princely patronage.

In cultural terms, it would appear that both Buddhism and Jainism overemphasized the value of *continuity* (theory of predestination, transmigration and rebirth) and undermined the significance of *hierarchy* (belief in caste or *varna*). This cultural innovation, especially through Buddhism, had a great sociological significance. Jainism was mainly confined to the trading community; its emphasis on non-violence prevented agriculturists from entering into its fold. Cultivation of land involved killing of insects and was prohibited in Jainism. Consequently, although Jainism too did not support the theory of fixed hierarchy of *jatis*, its significance to this value

syndrome could never be tested in practice. Buddhism, however, did directly challenge the very rationale of the hierarchical role-institutionalizations which formed the basis of *jati* or caste sub-division. Its membership was open to all castes and both the sexes. For this reason it had a revolutionary appeal to the masses in general. The principle of hierarchy was nevertheless preserved though at a different level. In Buddhism it was transformed into a hierarchy of consciousness and moral progression to the ideal of salvation. In Jainism it took the form of progressive steps in soul-liberation through inculcation of a spirit of moral virtues through self-restraints, finally culminating in the very abolition of *karma* or action. Both Buddhism and Jainism, however, preserve in one form or another the hierarchical view of time and the conception of cyclical periodicity in culture; they also shared with Hinduism a devolutionary view on the direction of cultural movements which is supposed to be finally redeemed by an *Avatar* in Hinduism, by *Bodhisattva* in Mahayan Buddhism and by the *Great Men* in Jainism. Many other cultural values of Hinduism may also be found to have been preserved in these two breakaway traditions. For instance, the religious vows in Jainism are very similar to the five *yamas* of the Hindu Epics and *Yoga-sutra;* the conception of transmigration of soul in Mahayan Buddhism resembles its Hindu formulations. In spite of these similarities it may be noted that Buddhism and Jainism have an atheistic world-view whereas the classical Hinduism is always based on theistic beliefs. In this context it may, however, be remembered that many philosophical and metaphysical schools in Hinduism, too, were atheistic.

Sociologically speaking, the orthogenetic movements of Buddhism and Jainism have greater significance as a process of inner dialectics in the world-view of Hinduism rather than as cultural movements *per se*. This is not to overlook the revolutionary contribution of these cultural and religious movements, specially that of Buddhism which was the first beginning of the social and cultural protest from within the Hindu tradition. It was a protest against rigid formalism, tyrannical ritualism and ossification of the value system of hierarchy into exploitative institutions, especially those of caste and Brahmin religious orthodoxy.[58] However, in its later developments it could not completely extricate itself from the hierarchical value system of traditional Hinduism and was consequently integrated within its fold. The extent to which hierarchical world-view permeated the value system of Buddhism could be measured through its remnants in Ceylon. In connection with a structural study of Buddhism in Ceylon Michael M. Ames writes:

> Buddhism is a thoroughly particularistic structure with multiple standards of behaviour, a separate standard for each stratum in the system. Each Buddhist, whatever his level of spiritual development, 'specializes' in practising a certain number of precepts. After mastering one level, he moves on to the next higher one, either during the same life or by

means of rebirth. For example, once a house-holder becomes old, he may become a pious lay devotee; but most house-holders assume that they will be monks only in some other life. The implication of this particularistic *hierarchically organised structure* is that the ascetic ideal is the one all respect but not the one all attempt to emulate. Virtuoso ascetics specialize in emulating the ideal; others attain it only vicariously by venerating the ascetics.[59]

Later, Ames also demonstrates the existence of hierarchy not only in the role-institutionalization of the members in the Buddhistic society but also with regard to the goal-orientations as projected by the Buddhist religious world-view.[60] This to a great extent is in common with the cultural ideal types of the Hindu tradition. Nevertheless, in bringing out these similarities in the two religious systems one should not forget the protest-function of Buddhism in the orthogenetic tradition. As the mass conversion of lower and untouchable castes to Buddhism in the twentieth century India reveals, Buddhism continues to be a dynamic mechanism of cultural movement in India.[61]

CONTINUITIES IN THE ORTHOGENETIC PROCESS

Apart from the above major landmarks of changes in the Hindu Great tradition, the process of its orthogenetic continuity is still alive. This is increasingly brought out by many empirical studies that have been conducted by social scientists in India. This continuity is characterized both in the realm of beliefs and values as well as in the domain of its role-institutionalization. The pattern of communication in the structure of tradition has no doubt undergone major changes but its organization remains intact and even modern innovations in the media of communication tend to reinforce the traditional forms of communication.

An evaluation of the persistence of the Hindu Great tradition in the Indian society may be undertaken in the context of the rural and urban centres. In one study of the Little and Great traditions in a village it has been found that about fifty per cent of the festivals are directly related to the Hindu Great tradition and a contrast process of conversion of local deities into the deities of the Great tradition goes on through the process of new 'identifications'. It is concluded:

Seen through its festivals and deities, the religion of the village may be conceived as resulting from continuous processes of communication between a Little, local tradition and Greater traditions which have their place partly inside and partly outside the village. Only residual fragments of the religion of such a little community can be conceived as distinctive or separable.[62]

Persistence of the Great tradition in the rural society in India has similarly been reported by other social scientists. In a Pahari village of northern

India, Great tradition is reported as effectively being continued by the Brahmin priest;[63] a Himalayan Gaddi village is said to have priests who recite large portions from Ramayana by heart;[64] in another north Indian village the transmission of Great tradition is going on through revival of the *Siva Narayan* sect and its integration with Hindu mythological lore;[65] a village near Delhi celebrates nineteen festivals in a year out of which ten can clearly be associated with the Great tradition.[66] Similar persistence of the cultural structure of the Great tradition has been reported from villages in other parts of the country. In an Andhra village, Shivapur, cultural life is described by Ishwaran as follows:

> The Hindu view of life permeates the whole ethos of Shivapur not excluding its religion. This gives it a certain integrated personality, in spite of certain obvious differences between groups. . . . *All groups in the village* (italics added) hold the familiar Hindu beliefs in the value system of four fundamental goals: the *Dharma* (duty, morality, law, etc., all combined in one), *Artha* (material welfare), *Kama* (physical love), and *Moksha* (spiritual salvation); and in the division of human life into the four stages (*Ashrams*) of life: the bachelor, the householder, the mendicant and the ascetic. The rites of passages adopted by all . . . groups are dominated by Hindu themes and motives.[67]

The above may be an extreme case of the persistence of the Great tradition but in one form or another continuity of the Great tradition has been recognized in other studies too. For an Oriya hill village it is reported that "there are two temples in the village, in each of which daily *thakurpuja* (worship of Vishnu) is performed"[68]; for a West Bengal village Durga Puja is a big festival and "usually the goddess Lakshmi (the goddess of paddy and property) is worshipped in all homes."[69] The dominance of the themes of Mother Earth and Lakshmi have also been reported for a Mysore village;[70] the persistence of religious themes from the Great tradition in peasant culture as revealed in contemporary studies has been reviewed by Pauline M. Kolenda. On the basis of her own case-study of the religious beliefs of north Indian sweepers she concludes that the themes in the religion of the sweepers are 'austerity compulsion' and 'devotion-boon', both of which are related to the "ancient theme in Hinduism" to be found in *Bhagavat Gita*.[71] The persistence of the Great Hindu tradition in the peasant culture is thus sufficiently in evidence.

As we pass from the relatively simple structure of the village communities to that of cities and townships, the pattern of the persistence of the Great tradition changes but the process continues. The sacred city of Gaya in eastern India which during the closing years of the 18th century attracted only about twenty thousand pilgrims, when the means of transport were poor and travelling was unsafe, with the establishment of railways now attracts three hundred thousand pilgrims annually.[72] The same may be

true for all other sacred cities in India, though systematic studies of this phenomenon have not been conducted. A few studies which have been undertaken to study this process tend to substantiate this trend of intensive revitalization in the functioning of the "channels of the transmission of the Great tradition." About Tanjore town in the south E. Kathleen Gough writes:

> The Cholas, who ruled in Tanjore from the eighth to the early fourteenth century, patronized the Brahmans, settled them as exclusively landlords in many villages, and encouraged the teaching of Sanskrit philosophy and vedic rituals in schools. The latter, conquering Telugu and Maratha kings continued this patronage. Today, Brahman boys who wish to become household priests may still be taught to recite by heart one or more of the Vedas, in privately endowed vedic schools or by a Sanskrit *guru*. *Yagas*, or vedic sacrifices of goats, are still periodically carried out by Brahman sacrificial priests on the banks of the Cauvery as offerings to the vedic gods on behalf of mankind at large. Public recitations of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* in Sanskrit and their explication in Tamil draw vast crowds in the summer season. In Kumbakonam, the second town of the district, a richly endowed monastery is maintained for Brahman ascetics.[73]

It is thus evident that the processes of urbanization should not unilaterally be associated with forces of modernization or secularization, even though in some limited sense, as stated by Singer and Redfield, in the metropolitan urban centres as growth occurs from the stage of primary (orthogenetic) to secondary (heterogenetic) urbanization, traditional *literati* may be transformed into professional intelligentsia, whose function in the changed circumstances may be to mediate between tradition and modernity.[74] The above facts reinforce our arguments. Urbanization even in the 'secondary' phases may strengthen the sinews of the Great tradition because the communication channels which otherwise could be used for transmission of modern values, such as modern means of transport, press, radio, sound amplifiers, etc. are used to further the diffusion of the value system of the Great tradition. Every step in the intensification of communication thus means not only a benefit to modernity but equally, or probably more than equally, a benefit to the cause of the reinforcement of the Great tradition.

This phenomenon has been later realized by Singer. He writes:

> The details of the subsequent fate of a Great tradition as it undergoes secondary urbanization have, we must confess, remained shadowy because there are few intensive case studies to give a detailed picture. In the general literature on cultural and civilizational history, this kind of change is usually presented as a sharp one and a change for the worse, representing a decadence, fossilization, or secularization of the Great

cultural traditions. Because I suspected that this common view of the matter is, in part, influenced by a particular kind of cultural analysis—the textual study of the outstanding products of art and learning, abstracted from social and cultural contexts and the matrix of Little and popular cultural traditions—I undertook in a preliminary way a functional and contextual study of what happens to a Great tradition and its *literati* in a metropolitan urban centre in South India.[75]

His findings reveal that orthogenetic elements of the Great tradition continue through its localization in the cultural structure. The trend is towards devotional themes away from the path of *jina-marga* (path of knowledge); the frequency of religious meetings for *harikathas* and *bhajans* (forms of devotional cults) has increased; film media also tend to popularize the devotional tradition; elements of Great tradition find revocalization through performance of dramas and dance-forms (Bharat-Natyam). The overall trend in cultural pattern is to shun away from religious ritualism and give expression to the Great tradition through art-forms, devotional songs and other organised media.[76] Singer concludes:

The long run result of this process has been consolidative and selective. Some elements of language, learning, and the arts, as well as of the ritual customs, drop out (e.g. Vedic sacrifice); new ones are added (e.g. temples and monastic organizations). Aspects of heterodox sectarian movements and of tribal and regional customs are assimilated to orthodoxy. Fragments of Little traditions have been absorbed into the Great tradition and the culture of the villages and tribes has, in the long run, also been responsive to the authoritative teachings of literati. And just as a large and famous temple will contain numerous shrines to stones, snakes, trees, and the planets, as well as to the pantheon of major deities, so a learned and sophisticated Brahman will make offerings to these shrines and follow many local and family usages, as well as adhere to a very abstract *advaita* philosophy.[77]

The key to this resilience of the Great tradition and its continuity lies in the functioning of the modern channels of communication. In this respect the point to note is that whereas many traditional channels of communication of the Great tradition still continue to function, the new channels of communication too contribute towards its growth. V. Raghavan mentions recitation and exposition of *Ithihas* and *Puranas*, translation of sacred texts in the regional language, *mathas* and temples, dance and drama, and devotional music and *harikathas* as channels of communication of religious instruction in south India.[78] Most of these channels are still active as it is found through the study of Singer. Similarly, McCormack in his case study of the forms of communication in Virsaivism discovered that along with the traditional channels of communication like life-cycle rites,

folk song, *Purana* and devotional recitations and fairs, the modern forms of communications such as publications, drama-radio-cinema, clubs, hostels and developmental institutions also contribute to the dissemination of the values of the Great tradition. He writes:

> If the old and the new forms of communication are compared, the tendency for new modes to produce greater integration between different social classes and castes may be seen....It is apparent, however, that the tendency of the new media, particularly printed publications, is to simplify the communication structure within the sect and so to bridge the gap between competing social classes and castes.[79]

Thus, it is evident that not only in intensity of communication[80] but also in integrative function, the new channels of communication are equally or even additionally effective in serving traditional ends. The adaptive capacity of traditional media is so strong that even modern forms of communications are apotheosized. "The evidence suggests that the role of the religious preacher and of the secular social and economic reformer, which to some Westerners seem quite separate, are closely associated with the Indian social system. This would provide an explanation for the extraordinary popularity of individuals like Tilak, Gandhi and Vinoba Bhave (compared with secular leaders like Gokhale, Rajendra Prasad, or even Pandit Nehru) who associate their message of egalitarian social reform with traditional symbolism, and thus at least assure it a hearing."[81] Thus it may be concluded that whereas modern media of communication do serve to transmit traditional value-themes, the significance of the traditional media may not be minimized. "The change *in the form of communication* [italics mine] is thus neither so fast nor so abrupt as one might imagine."[82]

Continuity and adaptive changes in the Great tradition, thus constitute an important aspect of the process of cultural integration and social change. In any evaluation of the direction of social change and its qualitative pattern in India this fact should provide not only the substantive ground for analysis but also a reasonable insight into its dialectics. It must, however, be remembered that continuity of the Great tradition means also the continuity of its ideal-typical value syndromes, of hierarchy, holism continuity and fatalistic belief in cyclical devolutionary world-view. In abstract sense hardly any of these normative principles may seem conducive to cultural synthesis, much less to modernization. Paradoxically, however, the ethos of this tradition, as facts suggest, has been responsive to both. To understand this phenomenon one must go into the spirit of the critical balance that Hinduism professes between *commitment* and *renunciation*, which as analytical categories hold the key to the process of modernization in India.

ORTHOGENETIC CHANGES IN THE LITTLE TRADITION

Sanskritization

Cultural renaissance and reformations as processes of change have relevance for the Great tradition. Their significance has been both textual and contextual. Sanskritization as a process of cultural change has primarily a contextual significance; it is particularistic in origin and therefore belongs to the Little tradition. Sanskritization, above all, describes an empirical process in cultural change, and has been most widespread. It reflects an important process of cultural mobility and social change in India. As we mentioned above, Srinivas defines Sanskritization as "the process by which a 'low' Hindu caste or tribal or other group, changes its customs, rituals, ideology, and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently, 'twice-born' caste."[83] Looked at from an ideal-typical value frame, Sanskritization is a form of protest against the normative structure and principles as laid down by the Great radition. It amounts to a rejection of the Hindu theory of *karma* which integrates the various levels of role-institutionalization suppossed to be ascribed by birth; it is thus a process of usurpation of a position higher in *hierarchy* as defined by the Great tradition, by rejection of the fundamental principle of *hierarchy* (Great tradition) itself. This, however, is when we evaluate the significance of this concept in the context of the cardinal norms of the Great tradition, and from a purely logical point of view.

This would, however, reveal the extent to which Sanskritization is not a cultural response to the *hierarchical* world-view of the Hindu Great tradition, but to a set of empirical existential situations which provide motivation for status enhancement through emulation of the customs, rituals and ideologies of the upper castes. They emulate the customs of the groups or castes which are higher in status and prestige, because they positively value *higher status* and not because they value *hierarchy*, which constitutes its rationale. This is why, there is not one particular caste at a higher status scale which works as reference group for such Sanskritizing castes. Srinivas says, "Not any particular caste is imitated, or even the higher caste; Pocock is essentially right when he observes, a non-Brahmin caste of relatively low status does not (or did not before the advent of books) imitate the *idea* of Brahmanism nor did it have a *general* notion of secular prestige. For it the models of conduct are the castes higher than itself with which it is in close proximity. Properly speaking, we may not even speak of one caste imitating another but rather *one local section of a caste imitating another local section* [italics mine]."[84] Two points become clear from this observation: first, that Sanskritization is outside the pail of Great tradition and second, as cultural movement Sanskritization is a manifestation of a highly localized process of cultural change; secondly, the causal forces behind Sanskritization are existential rather than sacerdotal. This is clear from the extent to which dominant castes have invariably served as reference models for

Sanskritization. Ritually higher status is only one of the four criteria of dominance as defined by Srinivas; the other three are, education, economic strength and numerical majority.[84a] He says: "Even in the traditional system, a caste which acquired economic or political power did generally succeed in improving its ritual status"[85] inferring thereby that not the ritual but the existential factors determined the success or failure in Sanskritization. Also the motivation in Sanskritization is "to imitate the dominant caste's own prestigious style of life,"[86] the aspiration for which, more often than not, emerges when other structural pre-requisites for strengthening of such motivations come to exist; for instance when due to economic prosperity or educational achievements a lower caste wants to emulate customs of the higher caste or when legislative changes through providing franchise rights add to the numerical dominance of a caste the power of political dominance.[87]

Our purpose in analysing the nature of motivation in Sanskritization is to bring out the non-Sanskritic elements in Sanskritization, which have a crucial significance for an evaluation of the qualitative direction of social change in India. It would appear that in Sanskritization the objective of the goups involved is to give manifestation to their new identity in respect of social status and power. The customs, manners and styles, religious and social, of the upper castes are imitated as *means* for this end (identity formation) and not as an *end* in themselves, which a sacred world-view might imply.

As a process of cultural change, Sanskritization has been going on throughout the history of India. Historians point out that from time to time various invading groups and aboriginal populations were assimilated, according to their social position, in the appropriate hierarchy of castes; invading rulers would become Kshatriyas and powerful trading groups, Vaisyas and so on. This process of assimilation of alien ethnic and cultural groups within the Hindu system of role-institutionalization had only been a variant of Sanskritization.[88] Such processes also led to either formation of a new sub-caste, *jati*, or assimilation of the new group into some existing *jati* or sub-caste. More important than this historical aspect of change is the contemporary phenomenon of Sanskritization and its impact on cultural change.

Sanskritization, as analysed by Professor Srinivas and others, might take many forms. It may symbolize an effort on the part of the lower castes to adopt the name of a higher caste and claim higher socio-cultural status; it may also reflect itself in mere emulation of certain customs and styles of life, so far being the preserves of only the upper castes; in rare cases it might also represent a situation where the lower castes so re-adapt their customs and social practices as to claim even higher purity than that of the twice-born castes; in some cases, finally, Sanskritization might take the form of a process of regression from earlier Westernization by the upper castes, specially when rendered politically and culturally less feasible owing to changed circumstances. Such castes might "re-Sanskritize" themselves

in the quest of new identity. This process may also be called traditionalization.

Traditionalization

The first aspect of Sanskritization started with the census operations in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In some sections, census was considered to be an excellent opportunity for improvement of a caste's social standing and was similarly exploited by the leaders of various castes;[89] in some parts the purpose of census was misunderstood and about the Bengal census of 1911, the following observations of Srinivas on O'Malley's report may be noted:

> There was a general idea in Bengal that the object of the census is not to show the number of persons belonging to each caste, but to fix the relative position of different castes and to deal with questions of social superiority....Hundreds of petitions were received from different castes—their weight alone amounts to one and a half maunds (100 lbs. = one maund)—requesting that they might be known by a new name, be placed higher up in the order of precedence, be recognized as Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, etc.[90]

As the study of Srinivas reveals, between 1911 and 1931, thirteen castes continuously attempted to claim higher caste position; the nature of claim itself progressively rose in order of hierarchy. If in one census a caste claimed the status of a Vaisya, in subsequent censuses the claim would progressively rise for the status of Kshatriya and Brahmin, respectively.[91] In the census of 1931 alone 175 claims were made, of which the maximum—that is 101—were from the Shudra or lower castes, 46 were from untouchable castes and 8 were from the tribal groups.[92] The rest were from amongst the Muslim castes. It is also interesting to note that the caste status claimed was in maximum cases (80) that of Kshatriyas; next (33 claims) in favour of Brahmins and in the third place (15 cases) claim was made for Vaisya status. This might indirectly prove that the major motivation in the claim for high status and consequent Sanskritization of these castes was not governed by religious or ritual but social-cultural considerations. Kshatriyas, in all the states to which this census figure refers (U.P., Bihar and Orissa, Central Provinces and Berar, Bengal and Sikkim) constituted the ruling group with maximum economic prosperity and social prestige. This vindicates our inference. These census claims and counter-claims subsequently proved so irksome for the administration that at the 1941 census and thereafter the column of caste was eliminated from the census schedule.

Apart from the census, major case studies of Sanskritization have been reported by social anthropologists doing field work in various parts of the country. Srinivas reports as to how in southern Mysore, smiths claim the status of Vishvakarma Brahmins, Coorgs emulate customs of Brahmins and Lingayats too identify with Brahmin ritual status.[93] The emulation

of Rajput customs by the lower castes has been reported by Cohn, Pocock, Rowe and of both Rajput and Vaisya model by Shah and Shroff in their study of Gujarat. In the eastern region of Uttar Pradesh both Cohn and Rowe have found that low caste Chamars and Nonyas have started emulating the customs of Rajputs, some even claiming to be new Chauhan Rajputs.[94] Rajputs used to resist this change in customs before the abolition of their status as landlords, but now they look at this process with indifference. Pocock too mentions that in Gujarat where thirty years back, when a lower caste Baria tried to emulate the style of Patidar castes, he was victimized, but nowadays such emulation is looked at with indifference;[95] The study of A. M. Shah and R. G. Shroff reveals that formerly in Gujarat both Kolis and Patidars used to emulate the Rajput style but with changing social situation and value-scales now Patidars identify more with the Vaisya model. This is because, nowadays, in place of the former supremacy of the 'kingly model' of Rajputs, there is a dominance of "business model" in Gujarat, and accordingly this change in the Sanskritization model has followed.[96] Similar notes might be found in the study of this process by other social scientists. In such cases of borrowing and emulation of customs of the upper castes, change follows through re-adaptation of aspirations, values and cultural performances.

The third pattern in Sanskritization is even more important from a sociological point of view. Sanskritization in such cases takes place through increased puritanism and traditionalism in a caste along with rejection of the superiority of the 'twice-born' castes. The Koris of eastern Uttar Pradesh refused to accept water even from the Brahmins, considering them less pure than themselves.[97] In the case of many other lower castes too, the process of Sanskritization includes the rejection of some models of the Great tradition. Referring to the Chamars of northern India, Cohn writes:

> Literacy has enabled the Camars to relate to aspects of the Hindu Great tradition, through reading stories available in vernacular books. Urban employment has enabled Camars to participate in rituals, derived from the Hindu Great tradition, at low caste temples in the cities. Simultaneously, there continues an earlier movement, the Siva Narayan sect, whose goal was Sanskritization. Another strand is represented by the celebration of Rai Das birthday, which now is in the hands of Camar college students, who are, among other things, urging political action. Their stories about Rai Das have an anti-Brahmin tint to them and they stress right action and right principles rather than the more orthodox activities of worship and ritual.[98]

Such processes of deliberate reaction against Sanskritization, also called 'de-Sanskritization', have been recognized by many sociologists.[99] This process might take many forms of expression but the most crucial element is the emphasis on subcultural-identity and rejection of cultural form of the

upper castes derived from the higher traditions. In structural terms this contributes to new horizontal solidary groups and greater economic and political mobilization. Culturally, however, its traditionalizing element remains supreme, although it might indirectly advance the objectives of modernization.[100]

The last process in Sanskritization may be called re-Sanskritization, a case where a formerly westernized or modernized group discards many of the cultural symbols of modernization, such as dress, spoken language, food habits and style of living and political ideologies and reverts to traditional Sanskritic symbols and beliefs. As we have pointed out, this process is easily discernible in the Great tradition of elites in many Asian and African countries. But this process also persists in the Little tradition of specific groups. In the study of an eastern U.P. village it was found that Rajputs, who before independence were highly identified with the Western culture and its ideologies have after independence discarded this pattern of culture and deliberately identify with orthodox Hindu cultural symbolisms and the political ideology of Jana Sangh, a conservative political party with Hinduistic leanings.[101] This process is not only empirically existent but also logically possible; only in this case re-Sanskritization should not be equated with non-modernization in the same manner as de-Sanskritization may not be equated with lack of traditionalization. Singer has stated, "Sanskritization and de-Sanskritization are cyclical processes, in this sense. And while in general we should expect modernizing changes to be de-Sanskritizing and traditionalizing change so be Sanskritizing, this need not always by the case. *In final analysis these processes are relative to the position from which they are being compared* [italics mine]."[102]

This cyclical, or more correctly, the wave-like movements in the process of Sanskritization, have been a great source of cultural mobility and continuity in the substantive domain of the orthogenetic Hindu tradition. Unlike the movements in the Great tradition, Sanskritization did not have a pan-Indian pattern. Neither in respect of the sources for cultural emulation, nor in regard to the pattern and direction of emulation of cultural forms has there been a universal Indian character. Sanskritization and its various forms thus belong to a series of particularistic cultural responses by specific castes or even sub-castes to the Hindu Great tradition. But the process itself has a localized and specific rather than pan-Indic character. Nevertheless, it is a change at the grass-roots level and potentially more stable and meaningful even in comparison to the orthogenetic changes in the Great tradition. It may be correct to say that Sanskritization in its various forms is a response of India's Little traditions to modernity through the process of traditionalization.

The significance of such changes could be explained through the concepts of existential and cultural closures, which channelize aspirations for innovations and change into a limited series of manifestations.[103] The phenomenon of closure is itself existentially and culturally determined. Depend-

ing upon the intensity of aspirations and the existential and cultural resistance encountered for the realization of these aspirations, this process may result into certain forms of deviance, may be pathological, may be positive from a sociological point of view. It may happen, that a society might reinforce similar pattern of aspirations for all its members though they may be located in differential socio-economic (existential) situations as Merton[104] has mentioned about the universal prevalence of 'success theme' in American society or as Myron Weiner[105] writes about India being in the throes of the crisis of 'high aspirations'. In both cases the result for groups not situated in viable existential circumstances is to attempt a realization of the aspiration-directed goals through non-institutionalized, even negative, means: for instance, through crime in America and through casteism, liguism, regionalism and other factious mobilizations in India.

The attempt towards cultural mobility through Sanskritization may be also an expression of those aspirations for change which might be better understood through the theory of cultural closure. In this connection a point is worth taking note of, that if we analyse the cultural and structural situations of various caste groups which have been reported to attempt Sanskritization, a few very significant general principles come to our view. These general principles could also be called sociological pre-requisites of Sanskritization. These are: (1) that the groups or castes whose customs are being emulated are, more often than not, economically better off than the emulating caste or group itself; (2) that the group or caste which attempts Sanskritization, has high aspiration to improve its social status; (3) that such a group is in close proximity of the higher group or the reference group for Sanskritization and has many occasions to interact with it at social, cultural and economic levels; (4) that such a Sanskritizing group is generally less politicized, in other words, it still positively values the customs of the upper castes, thus indirectly accepting their cultural superiority and covets for vertical mobility rather than horizontal solidarity and identity-projection which generally follows the phenomenon of politicization. De-Sanskritization may be an expression of high politicization; this might reflect itself in anti-Brahmin movements in the southern part of India.[106] and in mass conversion of the low scheduled castes to Buddhism in Maharashtra.[107] In the light of these pre-requisites it may be clear that Sanskritization is a form of cultural response to aspirations for higher status mobility for a group under special sociological conditions as determined by these pre-requisites which close other avenues for status mobility for the groups concerned. In such conditions where the groups are not numerically very dominant (unlike in Tamil Nadu and Andhra), are economically also dependent on the upper castes and are culturally (educationally) and politically not advanced, they accept the traditional status symbolism of the upper castes as valuable and covet for that.

This implies that Sanskritization is in fact a disguised form of modernization; its foundation is rooted in the same structural soil which given propi-

conditions would lead to not merely emulation of the customs of the upper castes but also the adaptation of their other practices in the spheres of political initiative, economic enterprise and quest for modern education and developmental innovations. The reason why some castes are Sanskritizing rather than modernizing lies in the many structural bottlenecks and limitations from which these castes suffer and owing to which the other alternative is closed to them. Looked at from this view-point, Sanskritization should be deemed to have already set in a radical process of cultural and social change in India. Sanskritization like modernization poses a real challenge to the ideal-typical cultural attributes of traditional Hinduism. But ironically, it owes for its genesis to the orthogenetic tradition.

Renaissance and Sanskritization as two orthogenetic processes of change in the Hindu tradition are oriented to different directions. The renaissance or reformation movements, with few exceptions, have been focused to the need of maintaining the basic values of the traditional world-view by marginal adaptations. The core values are never compromised. Adjustments are proposed at the periphery. This has been true from Shankaracharya to Mahatama Gandhi. Orthogenetic renaissant changes are not neutral to modernization; it is always relegated to the bottom scale of the hierarchy of goal-orientations, that of *artha* and *kama*, which though necessary should never be made central to the goal-orientation in life. Apart from this, renaissance forms the part of the dynamics in the literate-elite tradition of Hinduism. It is more ideational than existential. Sanskritization is more existential than ideational. Unlike the renaissant changes in the tradition, Sanskritization is a process of change oriented to cultural synthesis rather than resistant encounter.

The relationship between Sanskritization and modernization is, thus, indirect yet in a way it is positive. A question may arise: how far does the structure of the Great Hindu tradition, through its various vicissitudes of orthogenetic changes, tally with modernization? Strictly, from a theoretical point of view, its value-themes of hierarchy, holism and predestination, do not appear to be consistent with many cultural pre-requisites of modernization, such as values of equalitarianism as opposed to hierarchy, atomism as opposed to holism, and a kind of progressive evolutionary world-view as opposed to Hindu theory of predestination. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that Hinduism has no strict dogmas, and orthogenetic changes in the Great tradition themselves suggest that its ethical norms have always been viable and elastic and assimilative. It only sets the outer limit of behavioural choices for individuals, without ever confounding the inner freedom of man. Though itself always setting neat logical categories of ethical norms and codes of behaviour, Hinduism has always tolerated dissent which ranged from atheism to agnosticism to devoted ritualism. Above all, its ethos is finally oriented to renunciation which discourages men from passionate hedonism and reinforces the attitudes of neutrality, tolerance for pluralism in values and objective curiosity in life. These attributes of the

Great Hindu tradition may finally triumph and work out a pattern of selective synthesis with modernization. As we shall elaborate later, this in fact is happening in contemporary India.

To sum up we have made an attempt to analyse the changes in the Great and Little traditions of Hinduism from orthogenetic sources. In order to evaluate these changes in a meaningful context some ideal-typical attributes of the Hindu Great tradition have been formulated. These ideal-typical attributes are hierarchy, holism; cyclical-devolutionary conception of change and emphasis on continuity. Since many of these attributes may be present in any traditional culture, the substantive-historical nature of these attributes in the context of the Hindu tradition has been illustrated and explained. Successive stages of major changes in the tradition have then been analysed in the light of the modifications which these sought to introduce in the meaning and value system of the ideal attributes. In this context, two major processes of change in the Great tradition, one by re-interpretation and re-adoption of the ideal-typical attribute and the other by formation of breakaway traditions like Buddhism and Jainism, have been analysed. In the sphere of the Little tradition, it has been found that Sanskritization as a concept adequately illustrated the nature of changes that have been going on. Whether treated in a linear or cyclical sense of the term, Sanskritization involves processes of diverse kind, which may stretch from de-Sanskritization to re-Sanskritization. The important element in this process is that all forms of its manifestations have a disguised reference to a protest against the basic ideal-typical value syndromes of the Great tradition. In a latent form, therefore, Sanskritization is an orthogenetic response of the Hindu culture to the forces of modernization.

Chapter III

THE IMPACT OF ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION

Cultural traditions, as we analysed, might undergo momentous and revolutionary changes even through endogenous processes. The logical and causal nature of such changes has been recognized by sociologists and anthropologists, many of whom have contributed a great deal to its theory.[1] However, in the developing contemporary societies, changes of much more revolutionary nature are at present in the offing, which emanate from exogenous sources. Such changes, as Arnold Toynbee postulates, result from cultural encounters through processes of 'challenge and response'.[2] Modernization is one such challenge. In the developing societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, modernization as a cultural goal implies an exposure to deeply ambivalent situations; the normative structure of modernization being mostly foreign to the indigenous cultural tradition of these societies, it poses a threat to their identity. In contradistinction to this, since modernization also constitutes a kind of universal strategy for economic development and social growth, its requirement is urgently felt and it is coveted for. This introduces some ambivalence in the cultural response of these traditions to modernization. Such ambivalence may be recognized as an inalienable part of all the processes of cultural changes which take place through encounters between an indigenous and a non-indigenous cultural tradition.

There is yet another aspect to such cultural encounters. More often than not, the bearers of heterogenetic cultural traditions came in contact with these primary civilizations as colonizers and conquerors. The processes of cultural syncretism which thus started, were from the very beginning faced with psychological constraint. It varied in proportion and magnitude corresponding to the nature of the indigenous civilization, and in accordance with the degree to which the indigenous tradition articulated an identity consciousness or projected a unified image of the civilization. In some essential psychological terms, however, the response to the alien culture pattern could not but be composite of feelings ranging from xenophobic hostility to retreatism or rejection and indifference.[3] The more established the nature of an indigenous cultural tradition, the more intense might be the feelings of cultural dissociation and ambivalence.

MODERNIZATION

Apart from such contacts and the consequent generic psychocultural reactions of the people towards an alien cultural pattern, there is another level of contacts which may be evaluated in a different frame of reference. This is evident when we evaluate the nature of response to 'modernization' by an indigenous culture which, in essential elements, is deeply rooted in traditional values. Modernization, as a form of cultural response, involves attributes which are basically universalistic and evolutionary; they are pan-humanistic, trans-ethnic and non-ideological. Modernization may in this respect be treated as a kind of 'cultural-universal', not at the level of the universal elementary needs or the bio-psychic unity of mankind as understood by social scientists,[4] but at a higher level of manifestation—a level at which the institutionalization of a higher order of culture is possible.

Modernization approximates to such a cultural order. It symbolizes a rational attitude towards issues, and their evaluation from a universalistic and not particularistic view-point; when it involves an emotional response to problems, orientation is empathic and not constrictive; modernization is rooted in the scientific world-view; it has deeper and positive association with levels of diffusion of scientific knowledge, technological skilll and technological resources in a particular society.[5] But what may be essential to modernization is the commitment to scientific world-view, the internalization of humanistic and philosophical view-point of science on contemporary problems and not merely the volume of technological advancement. It is possible that a society as also a person might command a maximum of scientific skills and resources but a minimum of its necessary psychic and emotional requisites. It is otherwise possible that a successful scientist may be a failure as a *modern* human, and a most affluent or technologically advanced society may also be the one which is most tyrannical. It is in this context that the meaning of modernization should be understood. And it is in this context of meaning that we could distinguish the changes implied by modernization from other forms of cultural changes that orthogenetic civilizations have undergone in contact with exogenous cultural systems.

The distinction between modern values and traditional values may be maintained on the ground that modern values, like science, being evolutionary universal, might not be typical to any one particular cultural tradition, whereas traditional cultural values may be particularistic and typical. It may be purely accidental that institutions contributing to modernity first developed in a culture other than one's own. Modernization in its essential attributes or in ideal-typical forms is a universal-cultural phenomenon. Like science, modernity is not an exclusive possession of any one ethnic or cultural group, but belongs to the humanity as a whole. This, however, should not mean that in all substantive details all modernized societies or cultures will be alike. On the contrary, the existential adaptations to modernization in every society, as evidence suggests, take

a historical and distinctive form.[6] But the substantive adaptation to modernization should be distinguished from modernization *per se* since in all likelihood, not for a long time to come (perhaps never), anywhere in the world shall we have a fully modern society.[7] This evolutionary nature of modernization has been anticipated by Daniel Lerner when he says:

> The sharp rise of xenophobia in public emotion has made it hard for intellectuals to establish the crucial but subtle point that the Western genesis of their modern perspectives is, so to speak, an historical accident; that thought ways, once acquired, develop an autonomous status; that the appropriate criteria for evaluating modernism are not its antecedents but its consequences, *which are evolutionary and universal in nature* [italics mine].[8]

The impact of heterogenetic cultural contacts upon a primary civilization should be viewed in this double context. First, in relation to those change-generating attributes of acculturation which mobilize the cultural structure towards modernization. Secondly, in the light of such cultural changes which emerge from syncretism of norms, values and other forms of institutional patterns. In an analysis of culture-change the evaluation of processes at both of these levels is essential. Nevertheless, the distinction between them may be more heuristic than real. Acculturative processses which contribute to modernization, in purely a historical sense, do not operate in isolation with other syncretic processes. For instance, the cultural impact of the British colonial rule in India did not merely result in an introjection of modern values or innovation of modern institutions, but also in the propagation of Christianity and introjection of many other cultural styles which for all obvious reasons have no connection with modernity. It is also for this historical reason, among others, that xenophobic reaction to Western-induced patterns of modernization persists in many Asian, African and Latin American nations.

The history of the contact of the primary Indian civilization with heterogenetic cultural traditions is very old; it dates back to the time of the Vedas.[9] However, most of such contacts either remained marginal or were assimilated in the cultural stream of the orthogenetic Hindu tradition. The real heterogenetic cultural encounters in India, one could say, began with the Islamic conquest and later through the imposition of the British rule in the country. We shall, therefore, confine our analysis of cultural changes in India primarily to the consequences of the Islamic and the Western modes of cultural impacts. In the light of these processes we shall also endeavour to find out the general pattern of cultural modernization and its problems in contemporary India. The three major cultural processes which shall be analysed in the context of heterogenetic growth in culture are: Islamization, Westernization, and Modernization. The major process, however, is that of modernization, which is to be analysed in contradistinction to the latent as

well as the emergent forces of traditionalism in the country. The processes of Islamization and Westernization might in this respect constitute subcultural patterns which might in their varied ramifications reveal the direction of cultural modernization in India, its problems and patterns.

In this chapter we shall deal with the socio-cultural consequences of the encounter between the Islamic and the Hindu traditions in India. We shall dwell upon the processes of cultural change that this contact activated and the problems that this cultural syncretism poses to modernization in India.

THE TRADITION OF ISLAM

In contradistinction to the structure of the Hindu Great tradition, the Great tradition of Islam is founded on a world-view which is apparently non-hierarchical, is purely monotheistic and messianic-historical in ethos. Emphasis on the historical nature of the tradition is paramount in all Abrahamanic religions,[10] but in Islam it is most prominent. Wilfred Cantwell Smith in connection with the role assigned to history in various faiths finds, "the Hindu, for whom ultimately history is not significant; the Christian, for whom it is significant but not decisive; the Muslim, for whom it is decisive but not final; the Marxist, for whom it is all in all."[11] This emphasis on the historicity of the revealed tradition has rendered the world-view of Islam not only more proselytizing or activistic in the sphere of religion but also makes it holistic and socio-centric in general cultural orientation. In principle, Islam does not admit of any institutionalized role for priests: "the *ulema* are in no sense priests; rather, they correspond to the 'scribes' in Judaism. Strictly speaking, Islam has no clergy, as any Muslim may lead a congregation in prayer."[12] Similarly, in ideal-typical form Islam has a more developed orientation towards the holistic principle in its conception of social order than even Hinduism. The holistic principle in Hinduism is derived from the primacy of the normative order *(dharma)* which is internally differentiated and hierarchized in socio-cultural manifestations. In Hinduism, the principle of holism is a coordinate of the principle of hierarchy. In the revealed tradition of Islam, the principle of holism is sociologically, though not in principle, differentiated from hierarchism, there being less substantive place for the latter in the tradition.

The typical nature of this holism and the emphasis on the historicity of the tradition have introduced elements of insularity and exclusiveness in Islam. Islamic holism is based on the unity of the Muslim *umma*, the collectivity of the faithful. This unity in principle transcends the boundaries of territory and nation and is derived from the conformity of members to the religio-ethical codes and principles embodied in the Quran and/or Sunna, the *hadith* (various traditions), and the *shariya* (legal code-book of Islam). The conception of nation in the territorial sense is non-existent in the Quran, "which does not speak of a series of Islamic states but of one

nation of believers—the *millat*".[13] This holistic principle, which is embodied in the notions of *umma* and the *millat*, has unlike in the Hindu tradition a radical egalitarian connotation. But it may be questionable as to how far this egalitarian holism was congruent with community-criteria at an empirical plane of existence. Nieuwenhuijze, while analysing the concept of *umma* in Islam concludes that in this religious tradition, like in all prophetic religions, emphasis is on the maximization of the *religious aspect* in the whole sphere of life. "The community concept thus engendered breaks away, of necessity, from the tradition of community criteria... By introducing the relatively novel concept of chosen people, church and *umma* respectively, the trend of thought engendered by the prophetic religions postulates one single, unequivocal criterion of membership of the new community, namely common faith in God who reveals Himself. Thus they implicitly criticize the vague and ever varying, ever expansive complex of criteria for unity (and implicitly membership) of the traditional socio-cultural units."[14] And one might add that implicitly the notion of *umma* comes closer to a hierarchical world-view, if one understands by hierarchy a scale for the evaluation of membership status on the basis of persons' conformity to or deviance from an immutable normative principle, in this case the scale being the revealed tradition of Islam. On this basis one might suggest that the elements of equality or egalitarianism as existent in Islamic tradition are logically foreclosed (and are not open-ended as in the modern world-view) within the framework of the tradition. Equality is thus meaningful within the immutable and sacerdotal contexts of the principles of holism and hierarchy. On this level there is a transcendent unity not only between Hinduism and Islam, but amongst all sacred traditions.[15] Only in this context could one appreciate how the challenge of modernization not only poses a dilemma for Hinduism and Islam, but also to all cultural systems rooted in the traditional world-view.

The typical form that the holistic principle took in the Great Islamic tradition also influenced its character as an exclusive and assertive religion. The exclusiveness in this tradition could be discerned from the fact that a sharp line is drawn between those who belong to the community of the faithful *(millat)* and those who do not; a society in which the latter have a preponderance could under some circumstances be declared *Darul harb*, or a war zone, antithetical to *Darul Islam*, or the land of Islam. *Jihad*, or holy war against such a society is religiously sanctioned. In this manner religion, politics and social structure are united into one single principle.[16] Nevertheless, like the Great tradition of Hinduism, Islam, too, has undergone many orthogenetic changes from the time of its revelation through Prophet Mohammed (A.D. 570 to A.D. 632) in Arabia. This was necessitated because with the expansion of Islamic domination over non-indigenous cultures in such countries as Persia, Egypt, Syria, etc., the social codes of Islam had to be adapted to the local customs and institutions. The main religious vows[17] in Islam, being simple and also crucial, did not undergo

major changes, but syncretism with other aspects of indigenous customs and traditions was unavoidable.

Originally, Islam developed in a nomadic socio-cultural milieu and its social structure had tribal egalitarian character. The structure of these tribal groups was not highly stratified, and a shift from kin-oriented egalitarianism to religion-oriented egalitarianism was relatively easier. But this form of structure did not last too long.[17a] When the Prophet came to Medina, the nomadic economic base of Islam was exposed to a mercantile and agrarian economy. Islam was now embedded into a social structure which was more complex in organization. Its militant dynamism was on the ascendence and within ten years of the death of the Prophet, Islamic domination expanded to Syria, Iraq, Persia and Egypt; these conquests were organized by caliphs, religious leaders, elected by senior members of the community. What is sociologically important is the structural changes which were activated in the tradition of Islam as a result of these expansions. The first important change was in the politico-economic nature of Islam; Its egalitarian and democratic structure of power was soon transformed into a feudal-authoritarian pattern. The establishment of the Ummayad dynasty is the beginning of this process. Secondly, the former unity between the political and religious leadership (between the governors of the new empire and the *ulema*) was weakened as often the political and cultural policies of the imperial administration could not conform to the limited religious perspectives held by the *ulemas*.[18] This contradiction between the perspectives of the political elite and the religious elite *(ulema)* became more important as time passed. It still constitutes an important factor in the process of modernization in the Islamic societies. The *ulema,* as representatives of the Islamic Great tradition tend to be conservative and reject innovations which they think are not within the framework of the Islamic tradition. Gibb writes that the attitude of a majority of the *ulemas* is characterized by:

> . . . a strict and unbending refusal to countenance any kind of truckling to the new philosophies and sciences. For them, these are all nothing but *ahwa*—velleities, caprices, unsubstantial imaginings of the rebellious human mind, or satanic devices to ensnare the heedless and foolish. A thousand years ago their ancestors met the assault of Greek philosophy in the same spirit and stood their ground. If Islam is a divine revelation, as they believe, history will repeat itself: the forces of materialism, which the Divine Providence has permitted for a time to tempt and mislead the sick-hearted and the hypocrites, will surely be overcome. . . . It is not to be wondered at that to the generality of '*ulema*' the West stands for pure materialism.[19]

Although this phenomenon continues in most of the new states where Islam is the dominant religion,[20] the fact remains that a minority of religious

elites have always shown a consciousness to adapt Islamic tradition to the requirements of modernity.[21] It is even contended that in the body of the Islamic law which is derived from the Quran and *hadith* and of which other elements are *ijtihad*, or reasoning, *ijma*, or consensus, *quiyas* or analogy and *taqlid*, or imitation, it was *ijtihad* or reasoning which was treated as being more important in the beginning and the orthodoxy of *taqlid* or blind imitation of traditional law-code only emerged later in the early medieval period which may not be essential to the system as such; and that jural postulates through *ijtihad* or rational interpretation allow the introjection of modernism in Islam.[21]

The third major consequence of the imperial extension of Islam was that many structural and cultural characteristics which pre-existed in the societies before conversion to Islam were added on to its structure, when a majority of its members joined this religion. Persian society before Islam was stratified on a hierarchical principle. This was superposed on the Islamic tradition in Persia.[21a] In Syria Islam came into contact with Greek culture[22] and the philosophy of Christian mysticism, which later flowered in Islamic Sufism.[23] The far-reaching cultural changes that Islam underwent in India shall be discussed below. All this goes to suggest that in spite of the greater relative impermeability of the Islamic tradition, many orthogenetic changes have been taking place in this tradition. This also points towards the positive aspect of Islam in the process of modernization.

ISLAMIC TRADITION IN INDIA AND CHANGE

The contact of India with Islam is almost a millenium old. It started with Arab conquest of the Sind in the beginning of the eighth century. Today, more than sixty million Muslims live in India. Thus, historically as well as in magnitude, Islam is an important and sociologically very meaningful cultural tradition in India. Since both Hinduism and Islam represent two varieties of traditional world-views, it may be rewarding to study the pattern and direction that modernization takes in each. Moreover, the pattern of cultural syncretism between Hinduism and Islam on the one hand and the process of the spread of Islam, which may be called Islamization, on the other, are significant social movements which have a bearing on the contemporary dynamics of culture in India and must be analysed. An evaluation of these processes may be undertaken first to bring out the contribution that the Great and the Little traditions of Islam have made towards cultural changes in India. These changes might either be in the form of new syncretic patterns emerging through interaction with the indigenous Indian traditions or they might be in the form of endogenous changes in the very tradition of Islam itself. Secondly, it may also be analysed how the processes of modernization in India are affecting or are being affected by the tradition of Islam.

Acculturative and endogenous changes in the Great tradition of Islam

in India have evolved through three major stages. These stages were set by the historical forces and greatly influenced the structure of this tradition. The first stage relates to the duration of Islamic rule in India, the second stage was initiated after the establishment of the British domination and finally the third stage was marked at the beginning of the Indian freedom movement leading to the country's partition and political independence. The vicissitudes in the structure of the Great tradition of Islam during three historical stages have been reflected through the changes that took place in the dominant psycho-cultural orientations of the religious and political elites of Islam in each successive stage.

The first stage had the longest duration (A.D. 1206 to A.D. 1818)[24] and in cultural historical terms was of a momentous significance. It was not only marked with periods of conflicts and tensions but also led to major adaptations and cultural syncretism between the Hindu and the Islamic traditions. Islamic conquest is apparently associated with the spirit of *jihad* or religious warfare. Such association about the cause of the expansion of Islam in India creates historical biases in an objective evaluation of the place of the Islamic cultural tradition in Indian civilization. Rajendra Prasad says about the nature of the Islamic conquests in India that "it is doubtful if any one of these invasions extending over about eight or nine hundred years was a purely religious invasion undertaken by religious fanatics or enthusiasts for spreading Islam. Like all conquests they were actuated by temporal and material motives rather than by religious zeal."[25] However, it is true that in such conquests the religious sanctions and the support of the *ulemas* played an important role; they were too ready to provide moral and religious justifications for otherwise purely political enterprises of the Muslim rulers.

Despite these sporadic wars of conquest and Islamic expansion, a more stable and sociologically more significant feature of the Islam in India was its cultural co-existence with Hindu and other traditions. We must take this fact into account in order on the one hand to understand the social structure of the Islamic tradition in India and on the other to evaluate its consequence to cultural change. From a social structural view-point, by the time the Islamic expansion in India started, its tribal egalitarian character had changed; coming into contact with Persian society, its social structure was hierarchized and Islamic elites, as bearers of its great tradition, were now stratified into separate classes. Ghaus Ansari writes:

> In a tribal organization, priests rarely exist as a distinct class. Individuals within a clan act as magico-religious conductors; they hardly develop any constant contact with their corresponding members of other clans or tribes. Thus priesthood as a distinct class is almost alien to them. Similarly, for political purposes the clan or tribe elects its own chief; the basic loyalty of a chief remains with his own clan or tribe. In tribal Islam, men as priests and intermediaries between man and God,

and men as hereditary rulers, were unknown. Both of these roles, that of priest and that of ruler, as two distinct classes, were introduced within the complex whole of Islam when the creed came in contact with the Persians and Byzantines, among whom the tradition and existence of both these classes had already been stabilized. Thus the Persians and Byzantines moulded the whole organizational structure of Islam to fit their own existing social classifications. Thereafter, the written history of Islam frequently refers to the 'courts' of the Caliphs and the role and teachings of the Muslim priests.

When Islam came to stay in India in the A.D. twelfth century its social organization had already changed. Although the conception of equality and brotherhood remained as an ideal—as an ideal it exists to this day—in practice there have been social grades within Muslim society. The twelfth century Muslim conquerors of India were distinctly divided into priests (including missionaries), nobility (ruling families and administrators), and all the others (including soldiers, merchants, artisans, etc.). Muslim priesthood in India in its early stages was not hereditary while the rule of succession among nobility was generally from father to son. Gradually the Muslim priesthood also acquired the rule of hereditary succession in India. Sons began to succeed fathers; thereafter, *Astane* and *Takiye* (seats of preaching and spiritual guidance) became a family monopoly.[26]

This is further so, since the elites who were the bearers of the Great tradition of Islam in India and constituted the uppermost segment of the Islamic society, did not come from amongst the indigenous converts to this religion.[27] Most of them were of foreign descent and belonged to the social hierarchy of the *Ashrafs*, or the four major immigrant groups of the Muslims called *Sayyad, Sheikh, Mughal* and *Pathan*. Out of these four groups, the Sayyads and Shaikhs belong to the nobility of Islam which has traditionally been occupying religious offices. They "are considered the descendants of early Islamic nobility and thus they are regarded as sacred *almost like the Brahmins* in the Hindu tradition."[28] The Mughals and Pathans, on the other hand, have by tradition been warriors, feudal aristocrats and rulers. Although this pattern of occupational differentiation had often significant exceptions, yet the fact remained that these four upper groups, which later evolved a caste-like structure, together were the bearers of the Great tradition of Islam in India. Many changes that were subsequently introduced in this tradition should, therefore, have close association with changes in the socio-economic conditions of this social substructure of Islam.

During the period when Islamic power in India was at its zenith, the political and cultural elites of Islam carried forward its cultural tradition in a protective and optimistic environment. The tradition flourished in Persian and Turkish literary works patronized by the Muslim rulers;[29] it went through many orthogenetic adaptations necessitated by the novel

socio-cultural situations encountered in a foreign land. For instance, the emergence of the various schools of the *Sufi* thought was as much a mark of creative resilience of Islam as its syncretic and eclectic tendencies. "Of the seventeen Sufi orders prevalent in India in the sixteenth century, mentioned by Abul Fazl, eight, the Habibi (followers of Hasan al-Basri), the Junyadi (pseudo-followers of Junyad al-Baghdadi), the Tusi (followers of Najm al-din Kubra), the Chishti, the Suhrawardi, the Qadiri, the Naqshbandi, and the Fidawasi, were orthodox and closely integrated with the *sharia*. The Karkhi and possibly the Saqati included Jews and Christians in their ranks, but probably not the Hindus. The Tayfuri followed Abu Yazid al-Bistoni, *who was influenced by Upanishadic and Vedantic metaphysics* [italics mine]. Adami followed Ibrahim ibn Adam. The founder of the Kaziruni sect, Abu Ishaq ibn Shahryar, was a convert from Zoroastrianism."[30]

The Sufi tradition of Islam was not only responsible for the perpetuation of the Islamic religious beliefs and metaphysics but played also a significant role in the spread of Islam in India. Its emphasis on ascetic personal ethic, ephemerality of material phenomena *(fana)*, and on mystical self-abnegation, though being of foreign origin, was also in many ways concomitant with the Hindu tradition and made a deep impact on a large section of the Hindus. Non-ritualism and abstract monotheism as preached by the Sufi saints and philosophers was not only appealing to the Hindu masses but also tended to be in harmony with the forces of introversion and retreatism which had overtaken the Hindu tradition after its loss of political power.

Many Muslim scholars and rulers made overt efforts to reconcile some aspects of the Hindu tradition with Islam. Akbar attempted it through introduction of a new synthetic cult called Divine Faith *(Din-e-ilahi)* which was a mixture of Islam, Jainism, Hinduism and Zoroastrianism. Dara Shikoh pleaded for a synthesis of Upanishadic monotheism with that of Islam and emphasized the similarities between the two traditions. Among the literary figures, Amir Khusro did a great deal to interpret the endogenous tradition of Hinduism to the Muslim world. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries A.D., many Muslim poets and writers ever chose to write in Hindi. Names of Jayasi, Nabi, Qazi Mohammed Bahri, Shaykh Danyal Chishti, Shaykh Abdul Quaddus Gangohi, Abdul Rahim Khan-e-Khana may be mentioned as representatives. Among Persian language poets, Faizi and Urfi were influenced by such syncretic cultural appeals.

However, it may be mentioned that syncretism was only a part of the movement in the Islamic Great tradition in India. A larger segment of this tradition was perpetuated on orthodox lines through the administrative organization, financial policies and the machineries of law and justice. In all these matters, during the periods of stable Muslim power, the religious, political and cultural elites of Islam enjoyed high social status and contributed actively to the perpetuation and expansion of Islam. Muslims used to be *qazis* (judges), *muftis* (preachers), *faujdars* (district administrators),

and courtiers, and they held most of the positions of economic benefit and power. Under this sheltered existence they contributed to the Islamic culture and way of life without hindrance.

The position, however, changed during the British regime. Gradually, the Muslim elite began to lose its pre-eminent status. "The Muhammadans lost not only politically, but in many other ways as well. For example, the reduction of the military establishments of the Nawab of Bengal threw out of employment a large number of Muhammadans who served in the Nawab's army. The Mughal faujdars were supplanted by European magistrates in 1781. The judges of criminal courts who before 1790 had been exclusively Muhammadans, were as a class removed by Cornwallis in the Diwani provinces. The operation of the same rule was extended in the North-Western Provinces in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Muhammadan qazis and muftis were of course continued, but the introduction of trial by jury in 1832 and the substitution of Persian by English rule in 1837 greatly reduced their importance. The posts of law officers were themselves abolished on the establishment of High Courts in 1862."[31]

Thus, far-reaching changes were introduced in the social and economic positions of Islamic elite. These changes had an adverse effect on the ability of the Great Islamic tradition to maintain itself with the same vigour and confidence as earlier, because: "*(a)* the recruitment of the Indian Muslim community from brother Muslims outside India ceased; *(b)* the higher classes of Muslims began to sink into poverty and to be submerged in the lower social strata; *(c)* Muslim education began to contract both in quantity and quality; *(d)* learned men began to connive at popular practices, and as the lamp of their learning began to burn less brightly, they werethemselves caught in the mesh of the influences that surrounded them; and *(e)* the loss of political power to the British made the former Indo-Muslim governing class bitter against the British and against the Western civilization which they represented."[32]

The politico-cultural movements in the Great tradition of Islam during the British regime and after (the second and third stages of this tradition in India) should be evaluated in the light of the above forces. Therefore, it is not surprising that Islam during this period lost more and more of its earlier syncretic and liberal tendencies and in its place orthodoxy and revivalism became its major preoccupations.

The emergence of orthodox cultural patterns in Islam dates back to the eighteenth century, soon after the decline in Muslim power started. Shah Wali-Ullah postulated a reform which would re-activate the solidarity of the *umma*, or the Muslim community, revitalize the members' commitment to the values embodied in *Hadith* and reduce the over-emphasis on the mere teachings of *fiqor*, the Islamic jurisprudence. He also called for re-interpretation or *ijtihad* of the tradition in accordance with modern needs. But what impressed his disciples more was his militant appeal for *jihad*, or holy war, to safeguard the identity of Islam. Subsequently, his son Abdul

Aziz continued the reform movement but without a militant orientation. Wali-Ullah's other disciples, Shah Ismail and Abdul Hayy, were more militant and purist in matters of religious practices. Similarly, Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi, a student of Abdul Aziz, also preached *jihad* for liberation of Muslims from the British domination, which, according to them, was like a *Darul Harb* or war zone.

In the nineteenth-century India, these various pulls in the reformation movement of the Great Islamic tradition began to polarize into two major schools, one which stood for liberalism and peaceful reform, and the other which was for more orthodoxy and militantism. The former trend was activated by Shah Abdul Aziz and his disciple Sheikh Karamat Ali, both of whom were for peaceful religious reforms. The more militant approach was offered by Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi and Shariat-Ullah who were for *jihad* and condemnation of the British regime as a religious war zone. The tussle between these two types of cultural forces reflects the inner anguish of the Muslim elites at their alienation from power. The psycho-cultural phenomenon generated by these movements which in one form or another continued to grow, finally culminated in the creation of Pakistan.

This phase of changes in the cultural tradition came to the fore in the early twentieth-century period of struggle for independence. By this time gradually a westernized elite had emerged in the tradition of Islam, and was working with the religious elite (the *ulema*) for the realization of the modern cultural goal of nationalism and freedom. This phase of the movement is rather complex since it involves two levels of relationships. First, a relationship within the Islamic tradition between the secular-minded and the orthodox elites. Secondly, the relationship between the Hindu elite, secular and non-secular, and the Muslim elites.

From a sociological view-point, the choices for the Islamic elites were not easy to formulate and at no stage very clear. Historical factors too were creating complications. The Muslim elite had vivid memories of their past domination and prestigious status, its complete withdrawal and loss subsequently. Therefore, for many of them freedom from the British rule had the connotation of being rehabilitated to the same old status of privilege and power, and they yearned for it and wanted to realize it within the framework of united Indian polity if it could be possible, otherwise through the creation of an Islamic nation of their own. The essential point was that Muslim elites could not think of a minority status for Islam in free India; they were for equal power and political parity. As early as 1888, Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan voiced this feeling: "Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations—the Mohammadans and Hindus—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable."[33]

True, a clear formulation by the Islamic elites (with the exception of non-communal ones) of the need for the creation of a separate Islamic

nation, Pakistan, came later,[34] but its social psychological roots were laid down in the subconscious of a great majority of Muslim elite and masses for historical and existential reasons. Firstly, there was the feeling of fear and suspicion in Muslim hearts of the Hindus, which had persisted since the very first establishment of Islam in India. This was further accentuated by Hindu communalist movements. Muslims felt suspicious aboutthe communal overtones in the ideological exhortations not only of Tilak and Lajpat Rai, but also of Gandhi, who used many cultural and social symbolisms in his ideological postulates smacking pretty well of neo-Hinduism.[35] "It is reasonable to suppose that Gandhi's objective was also double: to attain independence and to save Hinduism."[36]

Then, there were other reasons which contributed to the final communalistic victory for Pakistan. A historical contradiction between the aspirations of Islamic and Hinduistic elites existed on the basis of Islamic elite's unconscious or conscious goal to regain Islam's dominant past in India and Hindu elite's commitment to do away with all vestiges of foreign domination (both Islamic and British) in the context of which the meaning of nationalism was formulated by most of them. This becomes additionally clear when we realize that Islamic tradition admits of no pluralistic or secular state and even for the nationalist-minded Muslim elites who were against partition, it was often difficult to justify the co-existence of Islam within a Hindu-majority secular state. To this may be added the nature of sociological relationship between the Hindu and the Islamic traditions which was always based on the principle of equilibrium based on power. There was cultural syncretism between Islam and Hinduism but never a mutual cultural acceptance. This situation provides a social-psychological background for the politico-cultural insularity between the two Great traditions in India which still continues.

Existential circumstances also reinforced this separation. Muslims were behind Hindus in matters of English education and access to modern professional and industrial activities. This was partly because of their obsessive resentment to the British domination (culminating in the mutiny of 1857) and rejection of all British-introduced innovations,[37] and partly because of their dissociation from industrial and financial activities right from the Mughal period.[38] It may be remembered that loss of power through British conquest had a more traumatic effect on the Islamic than the Hindu elites in India. With the initiation of the British rule, the process of cultural introversion and retreatism[39] which Hindu tradition had encountered early in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries overtook the tradition of Islam. It became more reactive than adaptive in ethos and, consequently, lagged behind in cultural modernization. In this process Islamic tradition in India got highly politicized, was rendered acutely conscious of its self-identity, but by and large failed to accept the challenge of modernization.

A differentiation between the traditional *ulema* and the westernized elites took place in the twentieth century. Persons like Mohammad Ali Jinnah

and Iqbal, who laid the foundation of Pakistan, were westernized in orientation, but a majority of the *ulema* was rooted in the traditional values and could not easily be challenged because of their command on the popular opinion. Hence modernization in Islam either in the political or cultural sense has been confronted with special dilemmas of great sociological significance, which we might analyse below.

LITTLE TRADITION OF ISLAM : ISLAMIZATION

The distinction between the Little and Great traditions in Islam, as in Hinduism, is not only that the former is rural, mass-based, consisting of the unlettered and less formalized, whereas the latter is elite-based, urban, reflective and formalized. These distinctions do hold valid. But the Little tradition of Islam in India has one distinctive historical characteristic—it consists mainly of the converts from Hinduism. Often, it might also include those descendants of immigrant Muslim elites who due to loss of fortune gradually slid down to the lower status of the masses. It is reasonable to believe that such changes in the fortune of Muslim nobility was not uncommon during the early phase of the British rule in India,[40] still conversion provided the bulk of the Muslim population.

We use the term Islamization to cover three types of movements in cultural status; an upward cultural and social (which during the Muslim rule also implied economic) mobility in the status of groups through conversion to Islam; secondly, movements towards orthodoxy in cultural and religious matters among the converts to Islam; thirdly, adoption of some Islamic cultural values and styles of life by non-Muslims either for reasons of expediency and profit or due to the historical forces of culture contact. Islamization in all of these contexts may sociologically be equivalent to Sanskritization in the Little tradition of Hinduism. In the historic situation of Muslim domination in India, Islam as a form of cultural system should naturally have been the one commanding access to highest social status, power and profit. Conversion to Islam under these circumstances offered an easy and shorter route to status enhancement. The other relatively less certain method for the same was selective acculturation through learning and cultivation of skills needed by the new rulers. Islamization in the third context, however, is a recent (British and post-British) phenomenon and represents a form of revivalistic movement in the Little tradition of Islam resulting from greater politicization and identity-consciousness in the Islamic communities. It may be due to a feeling of greater alienation from the Hindu tradition generated by the changing political, cultural and economic conditions.

Islamization through conversion did not always lead to economic gain: many convert-Hindus retained their traditional skills and callings and did not change their status economically.[41] But in a country governed by Muslim rulers conversion offered security and since most of the converts were from

the lower castes, they might have been motivated by a psychological appeal for a sudden change in the cultural-social status. The use of force in conversion was more of an exception than rule and the most popular sources of conversion were the Sufi[42] saints who talked in an idiom very close to that of the popular Hindu saints and were less rigid and orthodox in their approach to religion. Aziz Ahmad writes:

> In the conversion of large masses of Indians to Islam the use of force was an exception rather than a rule. The conversion to Islam of over one-fourth of the sub-continent's population is due to a number of causes. To begin with Islam spread more rapidly in those areas where Buddhism had lingered on until the time of its arrival, as in some north-western and eastern parts of the peninsula. On the Indian coasts proselytizing by Muslim traders and settlers was not regarded as a serious challenge by the Hindu rajas, who imposed no restrictions on conversions to Islam which were, in those areas, in any case, on a minor scale. Brahmanical Hinduism offered a much more solid resistance to the spread of Islam, but its Achilles' heel was the caste system. For the lower Hindu castes acceptance of Islam meant an escape from the degraded status they had in the Hindu society to at least theoretical equality with the ruling community; it also meant in the pre-Mughal India better chances of state appointment.[43]

These large-scale conversions to Islam in reality did not actually bring about an acceptance of their higher status either by the caste Hindus, to whom every Muslim was an untouchable or by the Ashrafs, the uppermost section of the Muslims, who maintained a social distance from the lower-caste converts in matters of marriage and social intercourse. Even the pollution-purity norms were practised; Muslim Bhangis (untouchables) were not allowed to enter mosques for reasons of uncleanliness.[44] In marriages, *jati* (called *zat* in Urdu, endogamy and even hypergamy continued,[45] and the converts are reported to have maintained most of the cultural, social and ritual identities of early castehood. A hierarchical gradation in social and ritual status thus crept into the social structure of Islam very much on the pattern of the Hindu tradition. Yet sociologically it constituted a distinctive pattern.

The Ashrafs (four immigrant Muslim groups) have traditionally enjoyed the highest rank in the Indian Muslim community. The next in status are a few higher caste Hindu converts to Islam, particularly the Rajputs; below their rank come the masses of low-caste Hindu converts and the lowest status being that of the untouchable caste converts.[46] Islamization in case of these converts has had a number of cultural implications. An obvious result of this process was cultural syncretism and cultural diversification.[46a] The Rajput converts to Islam, it is reported, most tenaciously adhere to some of their early caste norms, especially those regarding marriage rules

and its rituals. The same was true of the other castes. An important result of this process was that the nature of hierarchical value-preferences did not change. The cultural symbolisms, style of life and customs of the upper-caste Muslims and of the upper-caste Hindu converts to Islam continued to have a significance as 'reference model' for the lower-caste Muslims. A process like Sanskritization in Hindu castes operated among the Muslims, in which lower-caste Muslims tried to improve their caste status by borrowing the customs and adopting the names (through creation of fictitious lineages, etc.) of the upper Muslim castes, especially in the Ashraf group. Ghaus Ansari has called them pseudo-Ashrafs.[47] We have called thisprocess Islamization. Interestingly, such Islamization, like Sanskritization, does not lead to the acceptance of their status as Ashrafs by the upper castes. The process only amounts to a unilateral differentiation within a caste. As in Sanskritization, in Islamization too, aspiration for status mobility is followed by a rise in the economic condition of the aspiring group. Of course, Islamization in this form has been relatively less frequent in comparison to the incidence of Sanskritization.[48]

However, Islamization as a process of status mobility within the Islamic social structural framework has many sociological equivalents with Sanskritization. In both the processes, mobility in status is sought through adoption of names and customs of culturally high-placed groups. In both situations, the economic status of the 'reference model' is and has been traditionally of a superior nature. Finally, both in Sanskritization and in Islamization aspiration for mobility is preceded by some degree of betterment in the economic status of the aspirant group. This goes to suggest that what we call Sanskritization in one case and Islamization in another is, in fact, the manifestation of an existential situation—the attempt to climb higher in status scale by lowly placed groups through manipulation of the most accessible resources involving least resistance. In a social system where avenues for status mobility are not open through other means (e.g. democratic political rights, occupational diversification through industrialization and urbanization, education, etc.), it is normal to expect that cultural framework of ritual symbols, life styles and customs and manners—in other words, caste—would play a significant role in this process. As a corollary of it, it would follow that with increasing expansion of other structural avenues for status mobility incidence of intended changes through processes like Sanskritization and Islamization would fall significantly. The vertical mobilityin caste would be replaced by increased trends towards horizontal consolidation of the power of castes.

That such a tendency is in fact operating is evident through many empirical studies;[49] some of them we have analysed above. In case of the Little tradition of Islam in India, similar processes have come into evidence, especially during the post-independence period. With the changing politico-cultural situation in the free and democratic India, the very context of Islamization as a process of cultural change has altered. There

is an increased tendency towards horizontal consolidation of ranks. This leads us to the evaluation of the second meaning of Islamization we mentioned earlier.

Islamization in this context connotes increased tendency among Indian Muslims towards new identity formation based on an increase in orthodox Islamic principles in cultural life and conscious rejection of many syncretic elements which had thus far persisted in their culture as remnants of their Hindu past. Many Muslim communities which were converted from lower Hindu castes had continued to maintain their cultural links with Hinduism, its festivals, deities and some rituals. In exceptional cases, rules not only of caste endogamy but also *gotra* exogamy in marriage were observed.[50] Some of these communities did not accept the custom of first cousin marriage, given a preferential status in Islam.[51] Many of them observed not only religious rituals as prescribed by Islam, but also a substantial number of them from the Hindu calendar and worshipped many Hindu gods.[52] In this manner the Little tradition of Islam was symbiotically integrated with the Little tradition of Hinduism for hundreds of years. The first strain to this relationship was caused by the political movement for Pakistan which had a double effect both of political and religious mobilization of Indian Muslims. It was during this period that a missionary movement for revivalism in Islam, called *tabligh*, was started by Maulvi Mohammad Ilyas. This movement became more popular especially after independence,[53] but had started earlier with the sole objective of ridding the Little tradition of Islam in India of its syncretic cultural remnants from Hinduism. It was in a way also a reaction to the Hindu revivalistic movement of the Arya Samaj which at about the same time was actively engaged in *shuddhi* movement which meant purification of convert Muslims for their reconversion to Hinduism.

Combined with the orthodox movement in the Great tradition of Islam, active during the first quarter of the twentieth century, the *tabligh* movement in its Little tradition generated a momentum for cultural retreatism and horizontal mobility. Partition of the country in 1947 only reinforced this tendency. It confirmed the minority consciousness amongst the remaining Muslim population in India; the post-partition communal riots created a traumatic psychological feeling of insecurity among the Muslims; alienation from the Hindu cultural life was additionally enhanced, since during post-partition days Arya Samaj carried systematic campaigns for conversion of some Muslim communities to Hinduism who were culturally nearer the Hindu tradition. This process involved coercive measures and was resented even by those Muslims who had agreed to such re-conversions.[54] Finally, with the introduction of a democratic type of political system which dispensed with the system of separate electorate and reserved seats for Muslims,[55] this community naturally felt insecure and had to mobilize itself as a solidaristic group for effective political participation.

Islamization, in the form of religious revivalism, distantiated Muslims from the cultural ties existing with Hinduism, and the increased identity con-

sciousness and political mobilization of the community was the normal sociological process for this minority group under the type of political and social situations to which it was exposed after the partition. Some of the studies which are available on this problem suggest that Islamization, in the form of a solidaristic movement reinforcing communal, cultural and political consciousness, is going on among the Muslims in India. In political behaviour there is a tendency among Muslims to vote as a unit. Kothari and Sheth have mentioned: "The traditional divisions in the Muslim community between Shiyas and Sunnis and within each, loyalties to various 'jamats', organizations—the Sulemanis, the Alvis, the Tais—and further, the distinction of all these from such communities as Voras, Momans, Khojas and Shaikhs, found no reflection in voting. During the election, even the sharpest divisions were minimized and a sense of solidarity overcame the incipient factionalism of Muslim community-living."[56]

The Muslims with minority community status in India who have historically been enjoying favourable cultural and political situations now of necessity are impelled to unite and form solidaristic groups for their welfare as well as for cultural survival. Islamization which serves to unite the multifarious shades of ethnic and cultural strands which have been ingested into the Islamic community through conversion provides the only viable ideological foundation for such a venture. It proves to be effective on multiple frontiers. In the political and economic arena it provides good bargains by creating expedient and pragmatic networks of loyalties and alignments. In cultural sphere, it automatically generates integrative symbolisms leading towards a monolith of the Islamic community. The highly pragmatic attitude of the Muslims in the voting pattern has been summarized by Paul R. Brass who writes that the set formula of the Muslim voting pattern is "that if the Congress alone puts up a Muslim candidate. Muslims will vote for the Congress; if a leftist party alone puts up a Muslim candidate, then Muslims will vote for the leftist; if both the Congress and a leftist party put up Muslim candidates, then the Muslim vote will be split; finally, if there is no Muslim candidate at all, Muslims will vote leftist."[57] In these choices all but the last one are directly pragmatic; the last choice may or may not be pragmatic but reflects the radicalism in the urban working-class Muslim community of which alone such an attitude may be typical. But it may be granted that radicalism in this class is a consequence of pragmatic realization of existential needs.

What we want to emphasize through reference to these political orientations of the Muslims is not the element of pragmatism in their political action. Our aim on the contrary is to show the relationship between this form of political behaviour and the process called Islamization, which in this context reflects the force of Islamic communalism. The same phenomenon is reflected in the size of the Muslim League in Kerala and in some parts of Madras;[58] to some extent (since 1960 and 1961) there are also some signs of revival of Muslim League in other parts of India;[59] also, since

1953, the Indian Muslim Convention has been putting up a solid front to give vent to this community's general grievances.[60] Islamization through such processes offers an ideological prop for the mobilization of the community to realize its political and cultural goals.

Political expression of Islamization is also reinforced through cultural movements. This is in harmony with the ethos of Islam, wherein religion and politics are subsumed into one uniform ethical system. Since the partition, in many parts of the country the revivalist movement called *tabligh*, of which mention has been made earlier, has effectively been campaigning for weaning out cultural elements of Hindu folk tradition from the rituals and customs of the Muslim peasant communities. Such cultural symbiosis between the Hindus and the Muslims has been recorded by many ethnographic and sociological studies;[61] a study which was recently conducted on the religious and secular values in connection with non-violence found many elements of similarity in the value systems of the Hindus and Muslims.[62] Another study of values has revealed that in the matter of empirical fatalism, Hindus and Muslims are nearer to each other than Muslims and Christians.[63] In spite of this symbiosis of values between the two communities and the identity of many forms of culture and customs, the Hindus and Muslims have always been divided and suspicious of one another. Even stronger syncretic movements could not bridge the gap. Sikhism, which started under the influence of syncretic preachings of Nanak, had a deeper impact on Islamic culture and the philosophy of monotheism; in the beginning it attracted many Muslims[64] but later turned into a front hostile to Islam. Deeper though had been the symbiotic impacts of the teachings of Muslim and Hindu saints of the Satpanthi, Kabirpanthi, Imam Shahi[65] and other saintly traditions, the resultant cultural borrowings could not establish a cultural bridge between Hinduism and Islam.[66]

Hinduism and Islam stand for two distinctive traditional view-points, and tend to be internally disjunctive. Historical factors have rendered this phenomenon further acute. As Dumont puts it, the co-existence of the two traditions in India always had its basis in an "equilibrium between religion and power".[67] As a corollary of this statement it may be said that Islamization during the post-independence phase of Indian history might be an effort on the part of the Muslim community to recompensate through religious and cultural mobilization what it apprehends to have lost in the realm of power.

Islamization, like Sanskritization, is a disguised politico-cultural movement but its relationship with modernization is by no means clear or easy to comprehend. There is one element common between the two processes—both are consciously or unconsciously revolts against the principle of hierarchy—a major value component of the traditional world-view. But revolt against hierarchy through Sanskritization implies a withdrawal from tradition—an indirect release from its psychological contours and might eventually accelerate the pace of modernization. Comparatively, Islamization

as a movement of revivalism of basic virtues in the Islamic tradition—of unity of *umma,* increased egalitarianism, conformity to *sharia* and other legal codes of Islam, relatively more organized as the Church is in Islam—might contribute to greater conservatism by increasing the hold of the religious elites on the population. The resistance that Islam has shown in India to legislations intended for social reform (some of which have been promulgated even in an Islamic state like Pakistan)[68] tends to support this assumption. Historically, in most of the Islamic societies where modernization has been introduced, initiative was taken by the political elites often despite the resistance of the *ulema.* In Pakistan, President Mohammad Ayub Khan promulgated Muslim Family Law Ordinance in 1961 overruling the *ulema.* In India, *ulema,* in spite of their show of apparent concern for the need to modernize and reform the Islamic social structure and its outmoded norms, continue to vacillate on this issue. Commenting on the issue of reforms in Islam taken up by *ulema* in 1963 under the auspices of Majlis-i-Tahqiqat-i-Shariyah (committee for evaluation of Shariyah Muslim codes), Ziyaul Hasan Faruqi writes:

> My impression is that, in spite of the anxiety shown at the time. . . , the ulema took up the problem half-heartedly, and as far as I know, nothing substantial has thus far been done by the Majlis. This reluctant attitude is not confined to this particular question—*that is legal reforms* (italics mine). The ulema generally are incapable of taking any positive steps to reconstruct Muslim society. And yet, it is the ulema who are the leaders and wield authority with the masses.[69]

Consequently, the parallel between Sanskritization and Islamization ends at this point. Hinduism does not have an organized religious elite like *ulema* to enforce conformity to traditional norms; the movement of Sanskritization, is in no way approved by Brahmin priests and yet it goes on. Islamization on the contrary, is not only engineered by the religious elites but results into an enhancement of their hold on the Muslim masses. It is thus a traditionalizing movement *par excellence.* It symbolizes the increasing hold of the Great tradition of Islam on its Little tradition. Politicization is its obvious by-product but it is doubtful if it amounts to a break from the conservative tradition of Islam.

The third form of Islamization, which is of minor historical importance now, generally took place during the Muslim rule in India. Many Hindu communities and castes during the Mughal period borrowed many Muslim cultural patterns, ranging from food habits, style of dress, learning of Persian language, to even celebration of some Muslim religio-cultural customs. Kayasthas of north India were reputed to be proficient scribes and scholars in Persian. They took to the learning of this language during the reign of Sikandar Lodi and Suri.[70] In the regime of Muhammad Shah they monopolized all the clerical posts.[71] Khatris in Punjab and Kshatriyas in U.P.

came under the cultural influence of Islam since many of them were *mansabdars* (military commanders) for the Mughal kings. Amils in Sind came under Islamic cultural contact and were consequently Islamized soon after the Arab conquest. Kashmiri Pandits were another sociological case of Islamization in India. As Brahmins, they offer a unique example in India for closer affinity with Islamic customs and manners. They took to learning of Persian, meat-eating, which is generally taboo among Brahmins, Muslim style of dress, and observed quite a few of the Muslim festivals. Ahmad writes:

> Some Hindu communities like the Kayasthas, the Khatris, the Pandits of Kashmir, and Amils of Sind adopted Muslim culture, cultivated Muslim languages and literature, participated in Muslim administration effectively, and even moulded their domestic life to the Muslim way of living, a social development not unlike the 'westernization' of the elites of other civilizations today. Apart from their religion the members of these communities were hardly distinguishable from the Muslims, whereas, in some Muslim cultural strongholds, they went to the extent of adopting some secondary Muslim religio-social practices, such as writing elegies (*marsiyas*) on the martyrdom of Husain. Some of them adopted part-Muslim names.... In their self-identification with Muslims some, though not all of them, went to the extreme of partly seceding from their own culture.[72]

Islamization in this form, like early Westernization in India, proceeded as a form of anticipatory socialization in the culture of the dominant ruling community, which had at that time not only a higher position but also served as an instrument of access to higher offices and material benefits. How far it was motivated by sheer cultural appeals of the new tradition is a matter of speculation.

ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION IN INDIA

Islamic cultural tradition in India, in size and significance second only to that of Hinduism, poses unique problems to the process of cultural modernization. For historical reasons, the Indian Muslims are a very self-conscious community. The impact of the British rule and subsequent partition have further enhanced this awareness. Modernization implies a policy of cultural liberalism and pragmatism. These values are generated within a particular type of cultural and social framework, a framework in which "people come to see the social future as manipulable rather than ordained and their personal prospects in terms of achievement rather than heritage".[73] How far does the cultural tradition of Islam show concomitance with such pre-requisites of modernization? Our analysis shows that elements of traditionalism in the form of caste-like principles of hierarchy, religious revival-

ism, resistance to cultural and social reforms are forces in contemporary Islam in India which go against the value system of modernization. Some of these cultural resistances to modernization are alike in Hinduism and Islam—such as hierarchical division of society into various castes which constricts the scale of social participation, social mobility and consequently the empathic ability. However, the dominant elites in Islam—the *ulema*—constitute a conservative force which does not have an equivalent in the Hindu tradition. It may be remembered that the Brahmins have been the forerunners of Westernization in India.[74]

The development of powerful political elites and middle classes in countries like Pakistan, Indonesia and some Arab nations which could override the influence of the religious elites has contributed to the process of cultural modernization. The case of Turkey is one where the religious elite was almost overthrown by the political. This, however, is an extreme case. What is necessary for modernization of the Islamic tradition is a dialogue between the religious and political elites. Even the religious elite can serve as 'cultural brokers' and in that way contribute to modernization through the spread of education and new political values to the people. As *Kijajis* are reported to be doing in Indonesia, they can contribute to cultural modernization. The feeling of ambivalence to modernization will remain as the common heritage of the people belonging to both the Hindu and the Islamic traditions. It is characteristic of all transitional phases of cultural adaptations. Even it exists in the modernizing nations of the Middle East, where it is said "intellectuals now feel obliged to drift with the swelling tide of Islamic self-glorification. Some feel ashamed of their modernism and try to hide it."[75]

Modernization in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, as reported by Lerner, is coming through the rise of urbanization, leading to literacy, to greater access to media of information (newspapers, books, and other mass media), and this in turn mobilizes the people to greater political and economic participation. As more and more people are exposed to these modernizing situations, the cumulative momentum towards modernization is accelerated. This creates new elites of the transitional and modern disposition in contradistinction to the traditional ones. Whatever may be the nature of the Islamic tradition, Muslims in India are exposed to these processes leading to modernization as any other community. The fact that the Muslim community is now showing trends of high political mobilization and identity formation, may ultimately be a forerunner to the development of socio-cultural forces and leadership sympathetic to modernization.

A source of greater resistance to modernization lies in the immutability of Islamic social codes. However, even these social codes, as analysed by many scholars, have not been rigid for all times. There were many adaptations to accommodate social codes of other cultures when they embraced Islam. Hence, the possibility exists of these codes, too, being adjusted to the needs of modernization; traditionally such adjustments were introduced through *ijtihad*. Reviewing the progress of Islamic law,

Noel J. Coulson writes:

> But however considerable the problems that still face Islamic jurisprudence may be, legal modernism has at least infused new life and movement into *Sharia* law and freed its congealed arteries from a state fast approaching *rigor mortis*. The era of *taqlid*, of blind adherence to the doctrines of the medieval scholars, now appears as a protracted moratorium in Islamic legal history. Stagnation has given way to new vitality and potential for growth.[76]

This new phase of the internal response of the Islamic law to modernization will sooner or later also enter the Indian scene. Until then modernization in Indian Islam will take place on other cultural frontiers. Education is one such important cultural frontier. Modernization in Indonesia has significantly been aided by educational expansion. Clifford Geertz writes:

> The fact that the renovation of 'Islam' as a religious system tends to find its centre of gravity in educational reform, rather than reorganization of ecclesiastical hierarchy or alteration in liturgical practice or even, at least initially, in re-orientation of theological speculation has some important implications for the whole process of 'modernization in Islamic society', not only in Indonesia but fairly generally.[77]

However, the question arises: can education by itself be a sufficient catalyst for modernization in Islam? No one would deny that the categorial structure of modern education, especially as it is being imparted at higher levels, is, in spirit, essentially modernizing. Its value structure is causal, utilitarian and probabilistic. The world-view on which its foundation has been laid is liberal. But this might be true only in the case of college and university education, modelled on the pattern introduced by the British. And, in this case too, only in a theoretical sense. In effect, how much of the modern values are really being internalized by the college graduates in India is a matter of speculation. A few studies, which have been undertaken to find out this phenomenon, reveal that education in India creates many 'transitional types' of youth, in-between traditional and modern world-view, rather than a modernized youth-social-substructure.

Traditionally, education was imparted to Muslims through *madarsas* which varied in respect of size and grades up to which education was imparted on the traditional lines. These *madarsas* had neither modern methods of teaching nor of learning and did not emphasize the teaching of modern secular subjects like science and humanities. The situation, however, changed with the arrival of the British. In 1875, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, which later became Aligarh Muslim University, was established; in 1919, Osmania University was established at Hyderabad, where the medium of instruction was Urdu. The traditional institutions continued

along with these modernistic centres of education but gradually even they came under the influence of the former. At present although many traditional Muslim institutions of education continue to impart instruction on traditional lines, the trend is towards the modern education. A. Yusuf Ali writes:

> In education western influences are more positive. Modern education has been standardized in government schools and universities; and private and communal schools and colleges, whatever special distinguishing features of their own they may have, are yet made to conform to general standards by systems of grants-in-aid and general provisions. Even the old institutions have tended slightly in the direction of modernization. Modern influence affects even the Dar-ul-Islam at Deoband, a theological college in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), which is one of the homes of extreme orthodoxy. . . . The Calcutta Madarsa, which is controlled by the Government, has a modern site, and the Delhi Arabic College has to submit to the standards of the Delhi University. The *Nadwat ul Ulama* in Lucknow owes a great deal of its modernization to the efforts of Maulvi Shibli Numani. The Jamia Millia of Delhi was started under the impulse of Muslim nationalism by the late Mr. Muhammad Ali as a rival to the Aligarh University, but is, under its present competent management, of a severely modern and practical type.... It may be said generally for the whole of India that 95 per cent of the students of this generation receive an education, even if it is not in English, of a kind wholly different from traditional education of a century ago.[78]

Since independence the aspiration for modern education has increased in all communities. Many states have also taken policy measures to curtail the element of communalism in education for reinforcing the policy of secularism. This has not always succeeded or been accepted without resentment.[79] However, the emphasis on modern education will in the long run produce results in conformity with the culture of modernization.

The reaction of Muslim religious elite to modern education always ranged from ambivalence to hostility. Resistance had been especially stronger from the lower level of these elites (*bazar Maulivis*).[80] But a recent study reveals that religious conservatism persists even among a sizeable section of the Muslim political elites, especially in regard to personal laws, system of purdah, and family planning.[81] An interesting feature of modernization of Islam in India is that the pull towards this cultural system is never without an agonizing consciousness of deviation from the traditional path. New sources of legitimation of modernizing adaptations by Muslims have not yet been fully institutionalized. It has not been institutionalized even in Hinduism, but its general characteristic of permissiveness in cultural innovations and lack of an organized church does not lead to the same degree of crisis of values as in Islam.

The legitimation for modernization in Islam should emerge from the social

structure of this community in India. Partly it should also come from the modernizing Islamic societies abroad. Pakistan may provide an immediate reference model for modernization. But so far it has not. The personal laws have considerably been modernized there, but Indian Muslims still resist them. The answer lies probably in the fact that no effective leadership of modern orientation has so far emerged to mobilize the community. Whatever leadership of such orientation exists, is confounded in its efforts towards modernization by fear and suspicion of a Hindu majority society, which has still not disappeared. This lack of confidence is the major bottleneck in the growth of new principles of legitimation which are necessary for modernization. Logically, the Hindu community can help remove this suspicion and strengthen the forces of modernization in Islam. Until then, modernization will continue to be a half-hearted response and will remain eclectic in nature. The reasons are more expedient than real. But then, is this not a universal psychology in modernization of all developing societies? Islam alone is, therefore, not an exception.

Chapter IV

THE WESTERN IMPACT AND CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

The encounter between the cultural traditions of Hinduism and Islam was essentially of two *traditional* world-views. As we have analysed above, the value systems of hierarchy and holism were predominant in both traditions. The normative elements which came into contact through these cultural traditions were pre-modern and served only to perpetuate the traditional outlook and social system. But the contact of the Indian (Hindu) tradition with the West was of a different and radical sociological significance. Historically, it was a contact between a pre-modern and a modernizing cultural system. By the time the Western tradition could bear meaningfully upon the cultural, political and social systems of India, its own structure had undergone radical internal metamorphoses; its traditional hierarchical and holistic character had broken down;[1] its value-structure was rendered more open, liberal, equalitarian and humanistic;[2] and this tradition was imbued with a new-found sense of confidence in the scientific and technological world-view based on rationalism, equality and freedom.[3] These values had both positive as well as negative reactions among the many Western intellectuals;[4] yet, the great historical importance that this contact had for initiation of a new era of change in the Indian cultural tradition can hardly be overemphasized.

The mode of the Western cultural impact on the Indian tradition had distinctive features, in historical as well as substantive terms. Historically, the distinctive element was in its gradual expansion through succession and replacement of various forms of Western traditions differing in political and cultural orientation and influence. The earliest (fifteenth and sixteenth century) contact, of which sociological consequences were marginal, was with the Portuguese. In orientation, their impact was proselytizing and predatory[5] and brought with them pre-modern values and religious prejudices. They were followed by the Dutch and the French in the 17th and 18th century. Neither the Dutch nor the French had Christianization as their main objective. The Dutch were mainly interested in commerce. The French had political goals, but their influence was marginal. Only the British[6] finally emerged as a dominant power in India. The Western impact on the Indian culture has, therefore, been primarily of the British.[7]

The consolidation of the British power in India, which started in early seventeenth century, was complete only towards the end of the nineteenth

century. Behind this political power was the cultural tradition of the West. There were basic differences between this politico-cultural tradition and the Indian. Some of these have been sketched by Max Weber with great lucidity and historical objectivity.[8] According to him, emphasis on formal rationality, experimentation, codification, verification, and rational-utilitarian orientation in behaviour and thought, are some of the unique substantive qualities of the Western cultural tradition. He admits that in isolated forms many of these cultural traits also existed in the Oriental civilizations of India and China, but in the absence of other requisite structural features of the Western society, these cultural elements failed to develop systematically in these societies.

The cultural tradition of the 19th century West which overwhelmed the Indian scene was in its ethos and structure fundamentally different from the traditional cultural patterns of Hinduism and Islam. Its basic tenets were in contradiction with most of the essential attributes of the contemporary Indian tradition. The form of legal rationalism on which the Western tradition was based (by the time it came into contact with the Indian tradition), recognized a contractual-individualistic relationship between man and society. In matters of legal justice and civil rights, it encouraged the values of equality, equity and universalism and not those of status and hierarchy. In contrast with communal and familistic status allocation system of India, the Western tradition through various bureaucratic structures, administrative, legal and military, and through educational and cultural innovations, introduced new criteria for social stratification which were based on achievement and not ascription and allocated status only on individual performance and not on charismatic qualities. Together, these new orientations posed a serious challenge to the two cardinal attributes of the Indian tradition—those of *hierarchy* and *holism*.

Gradually, the Western impact has led to acculturative and innovatory changes in the cultural pattern of India. Its processes, therefore, bring to light not only how far modernizing acculturation has taken place in the Indian tradition, but also the extent to which such acculturation reinforces the endogenous tendencies for change and modernization, and how far these changes do or do not pose a threat to the cultural identity of the Indian tradition. The two aspects of the problem are in a way inter-related: the first relates to the process of cultural synthesis and the second to the phenomenon of cultural identity. The two processes are disparate. The question, however, is: can there be a point of convergence for these processes? In the following pages we shall examine this question.

Following the analytic scheme we developed for the study of cultural changes in India through exogenous sources (Cf. Chapter I), we shall describe the ramifications of Western impact—both on the Little and Great cultural traditions in India. We shall use the term 'primary westernization'[9] for changes induced by the Western impact on the Indian Little traditions. Such changes generally are of two types: first, the emergence of a westernized

sub-cultural pattern through a minority section of Indians who first came into contact with Western culture. This also includes the sub-culture represented by those Indian intellectuals and scholars who not only adopted many Western cognitive patterns and styles of life, but also supported its rapid expansion. As the influence of this westernized sub-culture was localized, it may also be treated as a part of the primary stage of Westernization. This process forms part of the Little and not the Great tradition, because its mode of expansion and adaptation did not develop a systematic world-view. It was primarily sub-cultural. Sub-cultural Westernization has always been characterized by an eclectic and fragmentary process of acculturation; it lacks an organized structure and exists only in the marginal sphere of the accepted cultural pattern.

The second type of primary Westernization in the Little tradition refers to the process of general diffusion of Western cultural traits, such as the use of new technology, dress, food, and changes in the habits and styles of life of people in general, resulting from the cultural contact with the British. This form of Westernization differs from the sub-cultural form in two respects: first, it does not have its basis in the assimilation of values or cognitive categories but merely in imitation of external forms of culture. Secondly, it is, unlike the first process of primary Westernization, diffused both among the laymen as well as the scholars, among the villagers as well as the urban dwellers.

Besides 'primary Westernization', there has also been going on in India another form of Westernization, which is not confined to the Little tradition alone. This form of Westernization has a pan-Indian character and has contributed to the growth of various forms of cultural structures which out-cross the local or regional boundaries and extend to the country as a whole. These cultural structures are representative of a coherent normative system and have their basis in an organizational structure which is far different from the normative system of the Little tradition. Some examples of such cultural structures are: education, law, science and technology, new forms of politicization, urbanization, industrialization and finally new media of cultural transmission through press, printing and facilities of transport and communication. The emergence of these institutional foci may be called the process of cultural modernization.

These forms of cultural innovations in India make a substantial contribution to the emergence of a new Great tradition of modernization, parallel to the classical Great tradition. This leads us again to the problem of coexistence between the traditional and modern value systems in the changing cultural tradition of India, and the question of, how far it could be realized. In the following pages we shall evaluate these problems. First we shall discuss the cultural changes introduced by early sub-cultural forms of Westernization. This will be followed by an analysis of the emergence and continuity of the Great tradition of cultural modernization in India. Then we shall analyse the trend of modernization in the Little traditions

of India. The evaluation of the problem of synthesis and identity formation in Indian culture shall be analysed in the last section.

SUB-CULTURAL FORMS OF WESTERNIZATION

The historical point at which the Hindu tradition came into contact with the Western tradition, the former was engrossed in and burdened by centuries of stagnancy and foreign domination, whereas the latter had just emerged invigorated and triumphant with its achievements through Renaissance to Industrial Revolution. At this point in history, the Hindu tradition was at its lowest ebb of internal resilience and external strength. In contrast, the Western tradition was steeped in philosophies of optimism, of universal progress, rationalism and hedonism. The spirits of Condorcet and Jeremy Bentham were reigning supreme. Despite these relative disadvantages the Hindu tradition was still resistant and the early Western impact remained peripheral and localized.

These peripheral or localized forms of Western impacts were the Little traditions of Westernization. Its first manifestation was in the growth of a Westernized sub-culture of middle-class elites specially in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, where the contact with the Western tradition first started. Gradually, however, this sub-cultural tradition grew into a Great tradition of modernization, but in its initial form it was represented by a small community of scholars, writers, commercial-middlemen, entrepreneurs and administrator-politicians who imitated the Western culture, for material benefit and only partly on account of commitment.

The sub-cultural form of Westernization also grew in stages. Its first manifestation could be found in the emergence of a commercial middle-class in the 18th century. Its social composition was different from region to region. In the Calcutta region, which during this period was the most important centre of British influence in politics and commerce being the seat of the Company's Government, the new middle-class came mostly from the *Banyan* (merchant) or Sarkar caste. In Madras region most of them were Brahmins and in Bombay the majority of them consisted of the Parsis.[10] The members of this class served as middlemen for the European traders and had generally a lower class origin. Some of them were petty clerks (*gomashtah or munim*), others were interpreters (*dobhash*), cashiers (*shroffs*) and petty contractors (*paikars*), who went from one part of the country to another to make purchases for the European trading companies.[11]

Culturally, these middlemen were not Westernized to any significant extent. Like the Kayasthas and the Khatris during the Muslim period, these commercial groups were only partly Westernized. They spoke the language of their European masters and did not hesitate in emulating some of their customs and ways of living too. In June 1673, one European who observed these middlemen flocking aboard the ship at Masulipatam (Madras Presidency) remarked that: "Unlike the boatmen who carried the English

treasure to the shore, they were clad in a more stylish garb, with a head-dress of calico-coiled turban, light vest, and loose trousers. They all spoke English, offered their services for small wages, and waited on the passengers to execute their business."[12] About the last quarter of the 18th century the number of such interpreters-cum-middlemen in Bengal was estimated to be one thousand.[13]

What was important in the growth of this class of quasi-Westernized middlemen and traders was not their numerical strength but the cultural breakthrough which was initiated by them. Their jobs required specialized training and education. It also required learning of new professional skill in trade and commerce, and the ability of rational-managerial[14] administration far different from traditional mode of transacting business. Soon these middlemen were transformed into a new commercial middle-class. As in size and magnitude this class was a mere ripple in the ocean of Indian humanity, its greater significance lay in being the forerunners of Westernization. To this process this class contributed in diverse ways, though not always in an organized form; through them a sub-culture of Westernization was gradually established in India.[15]

Commercial middlemen were probably the earliest groups to come in contact with the Western cultural pattern. This sub-culture of Westernization continued to expand in India throughout the eighteenth century and only in the early part of the nineteenth century new sub-cultures of Westernization began to emerge. These were represented by the new generation of middle-class professional groups and groups of social reformers. Western educational institutions which contributed to the growth of this class were still localized in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay regions. These institutions were reinforced by the effort both of the Government and of the missionaries. In 1859, there were 13 government colleges containing 1909 students, and 4 aided colleges with 878 students; 74 superior government schools containing 10,989 students, and 209 aided schools of the same or somewhat lower grade with 16,956 scholars; 25 normal schools containing 2,241 students; and 16 colleges for special subjects containing 1,154 students.[16] A year later, however, the number of Anglo-Vernacular schools went up to 193 with 23,963 students.[17]

The result of educational changes was two-fold: first, the interjection of the Western values and ideologies among the members of the new educated class, and secondly, the rise of social and cultural reformation movements.[18] Coupled with the expansion of Christianity, these changes gave a further push to the process of Westernization. Most of the early educational expansion was confined to the upper and middle class urban people. Their interaction with the Western cultural tradition led, in the initial periods, to an exaggerated effervescence for all that was Western. This was specially true of the early Westernized middle-class in Bengal. Of this trend in Calcutta Spear writes:

The...reaction was the move of a radical group in Calcutta to accept

the West *in toto*. They accepted the Western claim to have found the secret of progress based on the principle of reason; they accepted Western humanist values. The only way to mend the abuses of Hinduism, they believed, was to end them. They were much influenced by the French and English rationalists, whose representative in Calcutta was David Hare, the watchmaker. A section of them, influenced by Alexander Duff, the Scots missionary, went further and accepted the religion as well as the philosophy and philanthropy of the West. Pains were taken to symbolize the break with tradition by ritual meals of beef, and one poet could boast of dreaming in English.[18]

The Western influence was not only confined to ethics and philosophy; it had also in some quarters extended to habits and customs, specially amongst the members of the upper middle class. It was about them that Hot Mackenzie (1831) said, "Judging from Calcutta, there has been, I think, a very marked tendency among the natives to indulge in English luxuries; they have well-furnished houses, many wear watches, they are fond of carriages, and are understood to drink wines."[19] The sub-culture of Westernization was also reinforced by literary tradition in Bengal. Among the early 19th century Bengal poets there was a rush for emulating the contemporary model of poetry and rhyme from the English literature; the characters of the novelists conversed in the idiom of Western philosophy;[20] many novels were modelled after the Western classics and the new Bengali school of drama had a deep impress of the Western theatrical style and form.[21]

The emergence of this literary sub-culture of Westernization was not typical of only Bengal. Tamil in Madras, Telugu in Andhra and Marathi in the central peninsular India were equally influenced by the English literary tradition.[22] These literary works created an indigenous medium for the transmission of many Western values to the Indian people. Marathi writers not only translated the works of Shakespeare, Johnson and Bunyan, but some of them consciously imitated the style of Gibbon, Johnson and Macaulay and many of them had deeply imbibed the rational-positivistic values of Bentham, Mill and Herbert Spencer. The same was true of the Tamil and Telugu literatures, and also of many other regional literary traditions.

The process was confined not only to the world of literature but also took an organized form in various reform movements. One such movement was led by Raja Rammohan Roy in Bengal. He was a profound scholar and a linguist. He was a pioneer in introducing humanistic social reforms. In his judgment the cause for the moral and material decadence of India was formalism of Hindu religion. He was, therefore, for innovations in Hindu culture and pleaded for radical Westernization. Underlying his faith in the Western values was his passionate desire to revitalize India and credit it with the social, cultural and economic dynamism which he observed the Western societies possessed. His position as a reformer and thinker has best been summarized by Miss Collet:

"The Raja was not meeely occidental, no Hindu polished into the doubtful semblance of European, just as little was he, if we may use the term without offence, a spiritual Eurasian. If we follow the right line of his development, we shall find that he leads the way from the orientalist, into, but through Western culture towards the civilization which is neither Western nor Eastern but something vastly larger and nobler than both.[23]

Rammohan Roy was a passionate advocate of Western values, ethical systems and spirit of positivism for Indian culture. He campaigned for the introduction of Western form of institutions of learning in India and sent a petition to the Governor-General against the establishment of the Sanskrit college in Calcutta since he thought "the pupils will there acquire what was known 2,000 years ago, with the addition of vain and empty subtleties since produced by speculative men..."[24] Traditional education was, according to him, out-dated for the present needs of the Indian society.

As a student of comparative religion Rammohan Roy founded the Brahmo Sabha (later *Samaj*) based on his conception of theism and ethical precepts. This Society met every Saturday for two hours in the evening when passages from the scriptures (*Shastras*) were read out followed by a sermon in Bengali and then by the singing of the hymns. The kind of theism propagated by the Brahmo Samaj was a syncretic form of rational-humanism plus monotheism as found in Hindu Vedanta philosophy and Christianity. The overall orientation was apolitical, since Rammohan Roy believed that "the present system of religion adhered to by the Hindoos is not well calculated to promote their political interests"[25] and hence religion must be reformed first. After the death of Rammohan Roy, Brahmo Samaj was led by Keshub Chandra Sen. His commitment to Western values and his admiration for the Christian ethics was even stronger than that of Rammohan Roy. He considered the contact of the Indian society with the West as a source of cultural and moral redemption for India and pleaded for whole-heartedly emulating the Western cultural values of humanism, rationalism and science.[26]

These movements of primary Westernization were led by men who, though being uncompromising in their advocacy of the need for rapid assimilation of aspects of Western tradition and culture were yet men who were self-made, had strength of character and sound grounding in the Hindu tradition itself. But, the generation of their followers which later emerged from among the college youth, was far different in orientation. It was 'denationalized and hyper-Westernized',[27] being completely uprooted from its own indigenous tradition. Though short-lived, this wave of the so-called Western way of life and thought pattern led to many excesses. "Most extreme were the students of the Hindu College at Calcutta who adopted an aggressive attitude to everything Hindu and openly defied the canons of their inherited religion, while some of them offended public opinion by their youthful exuberance, such as drinking to excess, flinging beef-bones into the houses

of the orthodox, and parading the streets shouting 'we have eaten Mussalman bread'."[28]

The impact of these protestant sub-cultures of Westernization was limited indeed. Often the groups which represented these cultural ideologies were self-alienated and failed to make substantial impact on the contemporary society. "Intellectually they were children of the English, socially they were a class apart, divorced on their own initiative from orthodox Hindu society. There was little sympathy either between them and their countrymen, or between them and the English; they had been raised out of one society without having a recognized place in another."[29] This extremist movement apart, even the Brahmo Samaj could not succeed in striking roots in the cultural soil of India. It is said, "The tenets of the Samaj were too refined and eclectic to be popular, it was widely separated from Hinduism by its denial of the doctrines of metempsychosis and incarnations, and never became a Hindu sect."[30] Hence, the value of these movements was not in the extent of its spread, but in the new cultural awareness which it generated in the society.

Similar movements for Westernization were also going on in Bombay and Madras regions. The prototype of the Brahmo Samaj in Madras was the Veda Samaj and in Bombay the Prarthana Samaj. Both Societies were devoted to reformatory theistic movements in Hinduism and propagated the discontinuance of harmful social usages and customs prevalent in the contemporary Indian society. They opposed the custom of child-marriage and exploitation of women. As in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras too had the hyper-westernized youth movements, but their scale was not the same as existed in Bengal. In Bombay this form of Westernization was confined only to the Parsis.[31] Otherwise, in emphasis and orientation primary Westernization process in Madras and Bombay was deeply embedded in the emergent nationalistic aspiration.

Localized and elitist as these movements were, they made more than expected impact on the policies pursued by the British government during the early nineties and succeeded in carrying through many radical-humanistic social reforms. These reforms related to the social practices generated by the Little tradition of the Hindu culture. For instance, we may mention the practice of widow-burning (*Suttee*) which in Bengal alone consumed the lives of about 600 widows annually.[32] On the steadfast initiative of Rammohan Roy this custom was abolished in Bengal in 1829; Bombay followed suit in 1830 and some Rajasthan states abolished it in 1846.[33] Laws were also passed banning infanticide, stealing of children for slavery (1774) and claims of legal rights on slaves (1843). Widow Remarriage Act was passed in 1856 for the first time, according legal sanction to such marriages. These changes in the social customs and institutions of the Hindu society were forerunners of basic cultural readaptations to follow later in this societ . The underlying values from which the rationale of these reformations emanated were those of humanism, universal equality, dignity and

freedom of man. Logically, the ethos of this value system was not embedded in the notion of hierarchy but in equality; theory of pre-destination had no relevance in the ethical context from which these reforms were conceived and implemented. Thus, a beginning in howsoever elementary form had been made towards the process of cultural modernization in the Hindu tradition.

Moreover, a number of changes in other realms of the Indian society were introduced as British control extended on the Indian soil. Lawlessness, banditry, private armies and *thugee* (an institutionalized form of deception[34] and killing) which were common in the 18th and 19th century India were abolished and controlled.[35] Foundation was also laid for the expansion of education, means of transport and communication, and for a society based on rational legal justice following "the principle of equality and the creation of a consciousness of positive rights."[36] Most of these reforms started in the early part of the 19th century, later became the foundations of modernization in India.

Despite the high qualitative significance that these sub-cultural movements for Westernization had for the process of culture-change, the movements did not have the institutional bases to spread far and wide as the macro-processes of the Indian cultural structure. Its normative categories were recondite and its organizational base was weak and limited to the urban-dwelling middle-class, and student population. Its importance in mobilizing the forces of cultural changes, therefore, was more qualitative than quantitative.

THE GREAT TRADITION OF CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

The change from sub-cultural or primary mode of Westernization to secondary Westernization or modernization with interlinkages in the Great tradition of India was caused by factors partly historical and partly cumulative. Historically, an important dividing line was the revolt of 1857. It brought about a radical change in the response-pattern of educated Indians to the phenomenon of Westernization; in orientation and ideology now Westernization increasingly meant a sense of nationalism and secularism. The short spell of xenophilic identification with all that was Western now gradually started to wane and give way to a cultural reaction, the motto of which was, "to draw level with the West in achievement and Western estimation and at the same time to be loyal to... Hindu past."[37] The writings of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Condorcet, David Hume, Pain and Bentham, which inspired Indians to look at the West with a sense of adoration also enthused them with a feeling of nationhood and quest for liberty and freedom.

The other aspect in the new phase of Westernization lay in the cumulative social effects of some of the policies that the Company and British government pursued in the fields of education, legislation, commerce and industry,

etc. One impact of these policies was the growth of a new consciousness and structure of values. It is true that the revolt of 1857 dampened the zeal and self-confidence of the British administration for reforms in the Hindu customs and institutions, yet the real foundation of modern India was laid in the post-Mutiny (revolt) period. O'Malley says, "Modern India may indeed be said to be practically a post-Mutiny creation owing to the alterations in the conditions of life which have followed the establishment of the *Pax Britanica,* an immense increase in population, the extension of State activities, the development of trade and industry, and the introduction of the adjuncts of modern Western civilization ... called the three great engines of social improvements, which science had already given to the West, the railways, the postal system, and the telegraph."[38]

The developments in these fields had the consequence of extending the communication network and structural foundations of the institutions of modernization. In addition to this, the process of modernization in other aspects of culture continued unabated, and with an increased momentum. Some of the institutional developments which have directly been instrumental in the creation of a Great tradition of modernization in India are: (1) the growth of a universalistic legal superstructure; (2) expansion of education; (3) urbanization and industrialization; (4) increased network of communication; and (5) growth of nationalism and politicization of the society. Each of these factors had a pan-Indian significance and was not a sub-cultural or localized process as primary Westernization was.

The Growth of a Universalistic Legal System

If we follow Emile Durkheim, law is a "visible symbol"[39] of the invisible fact of social solidarity in a society; society being a moral phenomenon eludes measurement or observation through other (than law) objective indices. He also maintains that, "custom is not opposed to law, but is, on the contrary, its basis,"[40] and these two together provide an indirect measure of the nature of social solidarity or the extent of internal differentiation within a particular society. In exceptional circumstances, however, a conflict between customs and law might arise, but this, according to Durkheim, is mainly due to 'force of habit' which drives a wedge between custom and law. However, Durkheim did not anticipate the conflict between custom and law, as in India, based on the historical processes of cultural encounters and diffusion of heterogeneous traditions of legal norms. However, his emphasis on law as being the objective effect of the causes of social solidarity and (we might add) social processes, adds a new significance to the study of change through the study of transformations in the customs[41] and laws of the Indian society.

In fact, diffusion of new legal norms and gradual emergence of a universalistic form of positive law in India does itself mark the beginning of a new tradition ... a change from status to contract,[42] from hierarchy to universal-equity and equality. In the Great tradition of both Hinduism and Islam,

the norms which constituted the foundations of the legal system were an extension of the principle of hierarchy. The *dharmashastras* clearly lay down differential standards of legal rights and administration of justice based on the recognition of qualitative-ascriptive status of various castes and classes to which the standards of legal sanctions were graduated. "Thus, a Brahmin slandering a Kshatriya should, according to Manu, pay a fine of fifty panas, but for slandering a Vaisya or a Shudra the fines are only twenty-five and twelve panas, respectively. For members of the lower orders who slander their betters the penalties are much more severe. Similar gradations of penalty according to the class of the offender are laid down for many crimes, and the equality of all before the law was never admitted in ancient India, and was quite contrary to most Indian thought."[43] However, to this we must add that, whereas by their social status the higher classes enjoyed superior legal rights, in relation to conformity with higher ethical standards, traditional Hindu law set more rigorous standards for them from which the lower sections of the community were either exempted or for the violation of which they were punishable with comparative leniency. Bhasham writes:

> In fairness to the Hindu legal system, we must note that it did not always work in favour of the Brahmin. Manu lays down that as the penalty for theft the Shudra should pay a fine equal to eight times the value of the stolen goods, while the Vaisya, Kshatriya and Brahmin should pay sixteen, thirty-two, and sixty-four times the value, respectively. The upper classes were expected to follow higher standards of conduct than the lower, and their theft were correspondingly more heinous.[44]

In both instances, however, we come across the principle of hierarchy. In Hinduism, the innate moral and qualitative attributes of men have been conceived of hierarchically, and these differ in men according to their birth in high or low castes. The men in the higher castes are, therefore, expected to be also having a higher level of charismatic moral endowments in comparison to those at the lower level. Hierarchy of charismatic qualities (*guna*) in human nature, to which reference has been made before (Chapter 2) logically fits in with this form of particularistic and non-equalitarian system of law, which imparts justice not on the basis of equity and individual responsibility but on the ground of holistic group or caste affiliation or status of a person. Theoretically, such a system of law could be treated to be logically consistent with the Hindu phenomenology of human nature and the conception of social structure. But in practice there have always been variations in the functioning of this system.

As in the case of the other aspects of Hindu tradition, in respect of legal system too, there has been a lag between the textual records and contextual functioning. The legal system and its practices were constantly being adapted to regional and sub-cultural requirements as were dictated by the

needs of ethnic assimilation[45] and historical circumstances. Apart from the *dharmasastras* (law books), local customs and royal decrees modified the contextual significance of the socially operative legal norms and its social structure. Despite these regional and contextual variations the particularistic and hierarchical nature of the Hindu legal system persisted. It continued to be group-oriented and non-equalitarian or ascriptive instead of being individual-oriented and universalistic. The impact of the Muslim culture and administration did not bring about any basic change in the qualitative nature of this legal system. Muslim law was itself in many ways particularistic. "Evidence of non-Muslims was inadmissible against Muslims, a rule which made it impossible to hold the scale of justice evenly in cases between Hindus and Muslims....The sons or next of kin....were free to pardon the murderers of parents or kinsmen."[46]

At the time of the contact of the British with the Indian society, the legal system which existed in various parts of the country was still particularistic and non-equalitarian. Towards the end of the 18th century most of the central India and the Deccan was under the domination of the Marathas and in these areas Hindu form of legal administration operated. Whatever accounts are available reveal that justice was inequitable, often arbitrary and without conforming to any systematic logic of law.[47] Certain groups such as the Bhats in Gujarat and Brahmins in the north used to maintain their privileges under the threat of committing suicide (*traga* in west India and *dharna* in the north), of which people were highly apprehensive since they believed the sins of such a death would fall upon them.[48] Operation of law and administration of justice was highly mixed up with local customs, people's superstitions and the non-equalitarian values of the traditional Hindu and Islamic legal codes. The operation of the law was also partial owing to the lack of law and order[49] and an organized form of political structure in the country.

With the establishment of the British power in India there came a new turning point in the legal system of the country. Various forms of legal innovations were introduced by the British which were in contradistinction with the traditional Hindu law, and were based on the principles of universalism, rationalism and individualism. Legislation thus became an instrument of modernization. Its growth was, however, slower and in one respect it might be true to say that gradually a synthesis was taking place between the traditional and modern legal forms and practices reflecting the over-all process of synthesis between tradition and modernity in India.

The foundations of the new jural system were laid down by Warren Hastings. He was for a decentralized system of law courts to conduct civil and criminal justice in the districts. These were all Company's courts; Supreme Courts, first in Calcutta and then in Madras and Bombay were also established under a royal charter based on the provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773 enacted by the British Parliament to control the activities of the East India Company. The Supreme Courts or King's

Courts, were separate from the Company's courts and exercised no jurisdiction over the latter. So, for a time there existed a dual form of administration of justice which was confusing and often led to hardship for the people. This was removed by 1861 when the enactment of the Indian Penal Code and the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure rendered it possible to have a systematic control on lower courts in each province by a provincial High Court vested with powers to hear appeals from these lower courts. Above these lower courts and the High Courts was the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council as the court of ultimate appeal, vested with highest powers.

In the growth of this jural administration and its legal normative structure a novel feature was the separation between the judicial and executive functions and powers of courts. The credit for this goes to Cornwallis who first introduced it in Bengal and later the same model was followed by other provinces. The sociological significance of this system was that even the governmental executive decisions were now contestable in civil courts, thus providing a foundation for the rule of law and right of liberty and justice.[50] But still the legal norms, specially in respect of domestic and personal realms, were heterogeneous consisting of such diverse legal traditions as the English, Hindu, Islamic, Parsi, Customary and Tribal. Even within some of these traditions there were regional variations.

Nevertheless, establishment of a uniform system of legal rights and its administration which was achieved with the stabilization of the British rule in the third quarter of the nineteenth century brought about many forms of cultural changes. Firstly, its emphasis was on humanistic values. Many social customs which violated the norms of human dignity and personal security and freedom were legally abolished. *Suttee* (widow burning) was declared illegal in 1829. Claims to slaves was abolished by law in 1843. Earlier, in 1832 the trade in slaves from one district to another was made a penal offence. In 1850, Caste Disabilities Removal Act was passed which guaranteed freedom of conscience and right to keep one's property and inheritance rights even after conversion to a different faith. An Act legalizing the remarriage of the Hindu widows was passed in 1856. These changes were introduced during the pre-Mutiny period, which was marked by an extraordinary enthusiasm of the British administrators to introduce radical changes in the indigenous Hindu social customs and cultural practices which were inhuman and unhealthy; it was also followed by their zeal to introduce new liberal institutions based on Western cultural patterns.

The Mutiny of 1857 dampened this enthusiasm of the British administration for social reforms. But directly or indirectly the process continued and most of the basic changes in the legal system of India, which had a modernizing effect on its culture were introduced during the post-Mutiny period. Lindsay writes:

> The first Law Commission, under the presidency of Lord Macaulay,

was set up in 1834; its most notable achievement was the production of the draft of the Indian Penal Code, which, however, did not become law until 1860. Macaulay's Commission also drew up a number of reports which embodied proposals for legislation and which fell under the consideration of a succession of Law Commissions which sat in England at various times between 1853 and 1870 and whose efforts led to the enactment of the Codes of Procedure, civil and criminal, in 1859 and 1861, respectively. This latter year also marked the unification of the judicial system in India by the amalgamation of the Supreme and Sadar Courts into the High Courts. The later fruits of the labour of these Commissions were the Succession Act (1865), the Limitation Act (1871), the Evidence Act and the Contract Act (1872), and still later, under the direction of the Government of India, there came the Specific Relief Act (1877), the Negotiable Instruments Act (1881), the Trust Act (1882), the Transfer of Property Act (1882), and the Easement Act (1882). By this time, it may be said, the process of codification came to an end, though further legislation of a comprehensive character was undertaken to define the law of land tenure for the various provinces.[51]

This shows the radical character and sweep of the new legal norms which were introduced for the administration of justice in India. Much of its basic formulation was completed by the end of the nineteenth century, but since then new additions have been going on. Legislations introducing social reforms in many sensitive areas of Hindu customs continued. In order to accommodate the marriage customs of the Brahmos, who claimed no formal membership with any religion, a Native Marriage Act III was legislated in 1872, which in an indirect form was like a civil marriage law, since it permitted marriage between two persons who were or claimed to be outside the membership of various religious groups in India. This was the first secular legislation of its kind. In 1891, another controversial legislation in the field of marriage, the Age of Consent Act, was passed. This was further modified in 1929 when the age of consent for marriage of girls was raised to thirteen years from ten.

In fact, the legislation raising the age of consent for marriage of girls was a very human need. But the conservative sections in India, including even eminent leaders like Tilak were opposed to it and treated it as an intrusion on the Hindu culture. A month after the Age of Consent Bill became an Act, Tilak wrote (April 12, 1891) in the *Mahratta,* "We are very sensitive and we feel nothing so much as an attack on our national character. That the Age of Consent Act will write in the statute book the character of the Indian nation in the blackest letters is our grievance. . . . so long as this certificate of bad character remains on the statute book we can enjoy no rest."[51] Tilak's exhortations deeply stirred nationalistic feeling and motivation for self-reform and reinforced the conservative nationalist faction in India. Despite this, how badly such social reforms were required is clear from the

fact that in the Census of 1881 in Bengal 14 per cent of all Hindu girls in the age of ten were either married or widowed. Same figure for Bombay was 10 per cent and for Madras 4.5 per cent.[52] The problem of widowhood was equally worse. In 1931, 21 per cent of women in Bengal between the ages of 15 and 40 were widows.[53] Evidently, legislation to enforce humanistic reforms in marriage customs was highly justified.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century legislation became more diversified and attuned to the expanding economic, industrial and political requirements of the time. India had now entered into the age of mass communication through post office, printing and press. In 1878, a Press Act came into being to be followed by the News Papers Act in 1908. Many legislations were enacted for the welfare of factory workers as the number of factories increased. The Factory Act was first passed in 1881 and then successively revised in 1891, 1925, and 1931 and later. Bengal Tenancy Act was legislated in 1885, setting a pattern for reform of land tenures. In 1904, a Co-operatives Act was passed. Without going into the details of other enactments, in the fields of industry, communication, penal codes, and civil rights and customs, it may be noted that by the first quarter of the twentieth century a uniform all-India pattern was established in the form of judicial administration based on a homogeneous normative structure of law. Sociologically, the content of new legislation was as important as its pan-Indian character which created an institutional base for a new national identity and processes of cultural modernization.

However, more radical social legislations in the field of Hindu personal law and custom had to wait till the dawn of freedom, which introduced a new era of radical social legislations. The beginning was made with the enactment of the Constitution itself which guaranteed to all citizens without discrimination of religion, caste, sex, place of birth, equality and freedom before law. It also abolished the practice of untouchability in any form, striking at the very root of the Hindu system of caste. This was followed by legislations like the Special Marriage Act (1954). Hindu Marriage Act (1955), Dowry Prohibition Act (1961), Children's Act and many other welfare legislations for the underprivileged classes and tribes in India[54] which if set into actual operation would change the very fabric of Hindu society.

These legal innovations provide us examples of gradual spread of modernizing cultural norms in Indian society. It is true that until Independence, many aspects of the Hindu customary and personal law were left intact by the British. Despite this, they had introduced numerous enough legislations to change the very form of jural administration and relationships pertaining to the economic, commercial and social institutions. Firstly, the jural postulates emphasized "equality in the eyes of the law, judicial ignorance of the complainants, the ideal that economic relations are based on contract not status, the goal of settling the case at hand and only in that case, and the necessity of a clear-cut decision rather than compromise,"[55]

which in ethos and procedure were fundamentally different from the traditional pattern.

From a cultural point of view the impact caused a major breakdown in the principles of hierarchy and holism, the two pivotal value systems of the traditional culture. Hierarchy was abolished in the new legal system which was anchored in the norms of equality and equity in matters of its administration. Justice founded upon new legal norms did not have inequitable standards based on distinction between one caste and another.[57] Not only in theory, but also in actual practice the introduction of new legal norms led to breakdown in many hierarchical values and relations in the social system. O' Malley writes:

> Two results of the judicial system may be briefly noticed, viz., the establishment of the principle of equality and the creation of a consciousness of positive rights. The last was a plant of slow growth owing to the abject submissiveness of the lower classes, which prevented them from taking advantage of the system of equal laws and vindicating their rights by legal action. A change was gradually effected. In 1841, for example, it was noticed that the Chamars, despised untouchables of northern India, were not afraid to bring suits against their landlords, and it was added, "nothing vexes or annoys the zamindars in our whole system so much as this."[57]

In assessing the extent to which legal innovations have succeeded in realizing egalitarianism in social justice, a distinction may be maintained between the potential and actual change. Law in India has introduced many factors leading to the possibility of changes in the customs and structure of the Indian society. But have these potentialities for change kept pace with actual rate of change? Its evaluation in the absence of empirical data may not be perfect, but the indications are that actual changes are much more slow considering the form of legal radicalism in India. In a comparative study of this phenomenon at village level Bernard S. Cohn points out that although the lower classes in villages have become increasingly conscious of their legal rights and often even try to enforce it through law courts, they are rarely successful. The superior knowledge and economic resources of the upper caste villagers always tends to foil the effort of the lower classes for legal equality and redressing of their grievances.[58] Yet, most villages now have a class of people who are supposed to be experts in the matters concerning law and law-courts and serve as village-level legal advisers and as go-betweens for urban lawyers and villagers.[59]

Nevertheless, compared to the personal laws (those related to family, marriage, divorce, adoption, joint family guardianship, minority, legitimacy, inheritance, succession and religious endowments) the impact made by the legislations about land rights, commerce, trade, industries and labour, etc., which involve the material interests of the people directly has been

relatively greater. In case of personal law, recourse to it appears to be greater in cities than in villages and more among the educated than the illiterate. The actual changes, which legal innovations have brought about in hierarchical social relationships, might be less than expected, but from a cultural point of view great significance is also laid on efforts to change such relations which fail or which are mere potentialities. As the number of educated and urban citizens increases, the potential rights guaranteed by law would be increasingly converted into realities. The trend in this direction is already there.

Holism is another characteristic of Hindu tradition which is materially affected by legal reforms. Traditional culture did not treat individual to be the unit of social and cultural participation: for all modes of interaction the household, clan, sub-caste and caste were recognized social units. Now, the legal and administrative innovations recognize only the individual as the unit in all matters of negotiation.[60] This marks a major break from the tradition. The impact of change is magnified since individualism in legal normative structure is also coupled with values of rationalism and universalism rendering it specially modernizing in significance. O' Malley says that: "The spirit of individualism, to which other factors have also contributed, has already done much to modify the organization of a society of which the group rather than the individual is the unit and in which a man's status is determined by the rights which belong to him as a member of a group."[61]

Cultural modernization through legal innovations, therefore, proceeds in India in many forms. It operates by posing a challenge to the time honoured traditional value systems of hierarchy and holism. It produces changes also of a systematic and pan-Indian character by being a part of a uniform judicial administration, which constitutes a new cultural Great tradition in India. It serves the objectives of modernization by also educating people in the culture of individualism and rationalism and consciousness of their rights and obligations. Finally, it contributes to the growth and multiplication of modern legal professions and new professional norms, leads to the establishment of rule of law which, as Weber had postulated, reinforces the growth of a viable and rational economic system, so essential for modernization.[62]

Education and Modernization

Contemporary education, which is an agent of modernization in various forms is also of the Western origin. Traditionally, content of education was esoteric and metaphysical; its communication was limited to the upper classes, or the 'twice-born' castes and the structure of its professional organization was hereditary and closed. The roles both of the teachers and the taughts were qualitative-ascriptive. Modern education has a fundamentally different orientation and organization. Its content is liberal and exoteric, and it is steeped in modern scientific world-view. Freedom, equality,

humanism and denial of faith in dogmas are the themes which a modern education should contain. It has a professional structure which is not ascribed to any specific group or class but can be achieved by merit by any one in society. Some branches of modern education such as science, engineering and medicine directly focus on a world-view which embodies the core values of modernization, and imparts skill to realize the goal of a modern society. Traditional Indian education departed fundamentally from these normative and organizational prerequisites.

The foundation of modern education in India was established by the British. Its historical landmarks are: Macaulay's policy of 1835 to promote European learning through English, Sir Charles Wood's dispatch of 1854 which for the first time recognized the need for mass education with the private and missionary help and gave up the policy of selective education known as the 'filtration theory',[63] and finally the first Indian Education Commission of 1882 which recommended the initiative of private Indian agencies in the expansion of education.

Gradually, a broad structure of educational organization emerged in India which may be roughly classified into three groups: first, primary-vernacular education (with the exception of the English missionary schools); secondly, high school and secondary school education and, thirdly, college and university education. From the very beginning a contradiction between the primary and the college-university level of education emerged in India on account of the medium and content of education. At the primary level the medium of instruction (with the exception of missionary and public schools) was the regional language and at the college level it was English. Teaching of science and European literature was done at the colleges and universities to which select few had access; but the mass education at the primary level remained isolated from this main current. This lag in the structure of education which started from the time of Macaulay has still not been fully bridged. Modernization through education thus right from the beginning in India has been confined to a sub-culture of college and university educated youth and elite and never did become a mass phenomenon.

In the expansion of education, too, in early days there was more emphasis on the higher education than primary education. In the nineteenth century the rush was for higher education, specially among the urban middle classes and the growth in higher education was also considerable.[64] Primary education was neglected till education became a provincial subject. For instance "the number of scholars in all kinds of colleges in 1921 was 59,595. It rose to 144,904 in 1939, nearly 2.4 times as much. The number of pupils in schools of all kinds during the same period increased from 8.32 to 14.55 million, only 1.7 times as much. The difference in the pace of college and school education was accentuated in the decade following 1939. In 1949-50, for example, the number of all kinds of college students rose to 380,837, is, 2.7 times as much in ten years. The corresponding figure for pupils

in all kinds of schools rose from 14.55 to 23.66 million, an increase of only 1.6 times as much. Higher education was thus becoming increasingly top heavy, especially after British influence."[65] The school population now stands at about 50,000,000 and the literacy rate is nearing 25 per cent.[65] This aspect of the expansion in education has contributed to many important sociological problems in cultural change in India.

The significance of education in modernization could be analysed in three areas: first, the cultural content of this education, secondly, its organizational structure and thirdly, the rate of its growth. The content of new education was doubtlessly modernizing and liberal in nature. This is true whether reference is made to the humanities or social science or natural and applied sciences. The literary content of the courses in the humanities and social sciences was drawn from the literature of the European Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. Its themes were humanistic, secular and liberal. For example, "John Stuart Mill's essay '*On Liberty*' soon after its publication became a text in Indian colleges. Indians came to know about Magna Carta, and the struggle for liberty and equality in Europe and America. The implications of modern science became manifest in their studies."[66] An important element in this education was emphasis on contemporaneity and humanistic evaluation of social, political and historical issues. Its sociological result was a disenchantment from traditional education, whose categories being embedded in the scriptural and mythological lores had an obsessive degree of orientation towards the past. The categorial structure of the new education was oriented to the present and the future. Disciplines like history, geography, political science and economics, etc., in the curricula had a subtle orientation to focus the attention of students on social and physical realities and on the world-view of contemporaneity and anthropocentrism. This itself marked a major break from the traditional outlook and system of values.

In cultural modernization through education often more positive value is associated with learning of physical and biological sciences, medicine and engineering rather than the humanities and social sciences. The reason for this association is not only that science education has more modernizing effect than arts, but because this education creates manpower which is indispensable for economic and industrial growth. Nevertheless, if the creation of a substantial profession in science and engineering contributes to modernization of society, education in the humanities and social sciences contributes to the modernization of man. One must not be considered less significant than the other. This is evident from the analysis of the pedagogic content of both groups of disciplines. How and to what extent the humanistic content of the Western literary forms supplemented the liberal values of the intellectuals and the educated in India has been sketched by Edward Shils as follows:

It was almost as if this older generation had taken, as their guiding star

Macaulay's lightly uttered assertion of superiority of a shelf of books of Western literature and science to whole libraries of Oriental works. The situation has been little different in the generation now between the middle thirties and middle fifties. The names have changed to some extent, but the distribution of attention remains the same. Tennyson and Browning fall away, Blake and Donne take their places. Keats, Shelley, Byron are recalled with distant honor. T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound replace them. Dickens and Thackerey are supplemented by Aldous Huxley, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Sartre, Camus, Mann, and Moravia. Thomas Huxley, John Morley and Burke yield place to Bertrand Russell and Harold Laski; Mazzini and Ruskin are supplemented by Marx and Lenin, Bergson by Freud. Among the less intellectual intellectuals, Somerset Maugham and Stefan Zweing are much appreciated. *Encounter* and *The New Statesman* bring a continuous flow of names, which many know about and some read. The idols of the Victorian generation, which in India lived longer than they did in the West, continue to hold high places mainly because they continue to be 'set books' in secondary schools, and colleges.[67]

Apart from the emphasis on the works of Western thinkers and litterateurs a current of cultural introspection and new look on traditional literature was simultaneously going on in India. Its symbols were drawn from the pragmatism of the Vedas, the logical metaphysics of the Upanishads and the *karma yoga* or the philosophy of positive action as contained in the Gita. Leaders like Vivekananda, Tilak, Gokhale, Gandhi, and Aurobindo established the foundation of this tradition. A militant nationalist culture flourished in Bengal, Punjab, Maharashtra and some other parts of India. This cultural process served to counterbalance the effect of Western education and its literary and cognitive content.

The new education was also different in its organizational structure. It was imparted by teachers who were appointed on the basis of educational achievement irrespective of their caste or birth, a principle which was in basic contrast with the concept of *Guru* (teacher) in the Hindu tradition who had to be a Brahmin by caste. Not only the content of education but also the structure of the teaching profession was thus secularized. Training schemes for teachers in the primary, middle and high and higher-secondary schools were launched. In Bengal, first Normal School for teachers was established in 1844 and the district primary and middle school education was placed under the charge of Inspector of Schools. The Education Code of 1904 for the first time made the appointment of a certain minimum number of trained teachers a necessary condition for the recognition of schools.[68] During 1919–20 the total number of vernacular teachers in India was only 201,000, of which 70,000 were trained. The teachers in Anglo-vernacular schools during the same period were 100,000 of whom 35,000 were trained and 11,000 possessed a degree.[69]

Since then there has been a tremendous expansion in primary, middle and high school education. The total number of teachers in lower primary schools during 1950–51 was 537,918 of whom 82,281 were women. During the same year the number of teachers in higher primary schools was 85,494, about 12,887 of these being women. The estimated number of lower primary school teachers by 1965–66 is about 1,050,000; out of this 200,000 would be women. For the same year the number of higher primary school teachers is estimated to be 520,000, about 140,000 being women. Although the rate of growth in the number of teachers has been low, through this profession an organized pattern for cultural diffusion in the country has emerged which contributes to the Great tradition of modernization in India.[70]

The expansion of primary and secondary levels of education has been followed by growth in higher education. To the three universities, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras which were established in 1857, fifteen more were added till the end of the British rule in India. After Independence, however, the number of universities has more than doubled. Between 1947–66, forty-six new universities have been established and nine Institutes have been deemed to be universities.[71] About 2,565 colleges are being controlled by the sixtyfour universities which are functioning in India, with a total enrolment of 15,28,227 students. Comparing it with the figures in 1911, when there were only 186 colleges and about 13,551 students (in graduate and post-graduate courses), the progress is phenomenal. Percentage increase in the output of post-graduate students in basic sciences has been of 120.6 per cent during 1950–51, of 83.6 per cent during 1955–60, and of 48.2 per cent during 1961–63.[72] The number of engineering students, which during 1889–94 totalled only 1,104 (an average of about 221 students per annum) was recorded in 1964–65 alone to be 78,114. However, it may be added that as compared to the total number of students pursuing higher education, this number constitutes only 5.4 per cent, which is fairly small. However, the balance of enrolment between science and humanities (arts) has been considerably made even if we compare the 42.0 per cent of total enrolment of students for arts courses with 31.3 per cent enrolled for science degrees and additional 12.4 per cent enrolled for degrees in engineering, medicine, agriculture and veterinary science.[73]

Progress has also been made in other spheres of educational planning and modernization of its organization. Percentage of girls going to schools and colleges has increased. In many States schooling of children has been made free and compulsory. New vocational and polytechnical institutions have been started for better utilization of educated manpower for the economic and social growth of the country. The working conditions and salaries of teachers at all levels have been improved to a considerable extent, although some imbalances still remain. But all this growth appears phenomenal only in temporal sense. In magnitude the growth rate of education does not seem to be very impressive or phenomenal.

Also the expansion of education has not led to a sociologically meaningful

degree of social mobility and change in stratification system. Higher education is still primarily confined to the upper classes, is a scarce good and reflects the advantages of wealth and social origin.[74] More than seventy-five per cent of people are still illiterate.[75] "The proportion of national income devoted to education in India is small in comparison with educationally advanced countries of the world. The absolute amount per capita spent on education in India is about one-hundredth of that spent by a highly industrialized country like USA."[76] India spends about 2.4 per cent of national income on education compared to 6.5 per cent by Japan, 6.2 per cent by USA and 4.5 per cent by Ceylon.[77]

In spite of these limitations, education has been one of the most influential instruments of modernization in India. It has led to the mobilization of people's aspirations for nationalism, liberalism and freedom. It alone has been responsible for the growth of an enlightened intelligentsia which carried forward not only a movement for Independence but also a relentless struggle for social and cultural reforms. It has created a sub-culture of students in India which though not fully modern, contains elements of transition from tradition to modernity.[78] The persistent strains that we find in the internal system of this sub-culture partly reflects the stresses of transition from one constellation of values to another and partly results from the structural maladjustment of this culture with that of the larger society. Yet, its modernizing significance is self-evident. Finally, the educational system has contributed to modernization by growth of new forms of rationally organized structures in the shape of schools, colleges and universities, which serve as cultural networks for the diffusion of knowledge and cultural categories which are modern in ethos. However, some elements of conflict between tradition and modernity can persistently be discerned in the functioning and administration of the educational system in India at all levels. Whereas modernization has in some forms been welcomed there has also been a conscious effort to preserve the traditional values.

This has a very logical explanation. Modernization in all traditional cultures goes along with the process of a new identity consciousness. Since the former is outer-directed process, the latter must necessarily be inner-directed. Hence identity consciousness finds its basic symbolic structure in the past tradition. Nationalism, as a modernizing process in such societies emerges as a queer blend of modern psychology of outer-directedness and the commitment to tradition as revealed by inner-directed search for national symbols. In the field of education a good example is the following statement in the Report of the Education Commission, 1964–66, appointed by the Government of India:

> The most powerful tool in the process of modernization is education based on science and technology. The one great lesson of the present age of science is that with determination and willingness to put in hard work prosperity is within the reach of any nation which has a stable and

progressive government. There is no doubt that in the years to come India's trade and commerce will grow; there will be more food for all; more education, better health and a reasonable standard of living will be available. But India's contribution can, and should be far more than these material gains. She should learn to harness science but she must also learn not to be dominated by science.[79]

Urbanization and Industrialization

In sociological literature, a relationship between cultural modernization and urbanization and industrialization is assumed as a matter of logical necessity. All classical works in sociology are replete with construction of neat dichotomies such as rural-urban,[79a] community-society,[80] mechanical solidarity-organic solidarity,[81] sacred-secualr,[82] etc., which not only suggest that a transition from one stage to the other would mark the growth of new forms of social structure but also of new levels of moral and cultural patterns. Willy-nilly, in each formulation the first part is associated with traditional, social and cultural patterns and the latter part with modernization, which, of course, is evaluated differently by different sociologists.[83]

However, as we move away from the above world of logico-deductive formulations to that of reality, we are confronted with more complex phenomena which elude neat compartmentalizations. This is specially true about the extent to which urbanization or industrialization led to the modernization of culture. Modernization is a relative phenomenon and an open-ended process. The role of urbanization and industrialization is necessarily modernizing although variations in its extent and pattern may be there. In such pattern-variations historical factors play a crucial role. This is specially true for India.

Urban culture in India is centuries old. Handicraft and commerce-based industries are also as old as the cities. Hindu tradition provides elaborate guides for the planning and construction of various types of cities;[84] from this literature it is evident that traditional cities in India were planned in accordance with the principle of hierarchy; the caste and social rank determined the extent to which more or less favourable sites or neighbourhood could be allotted to a family. The king's or chief's fort must be located on the most favourable site, followed by those of priests (Brahmins) and merchants. The lower and the untouchable castes must live at the outer fringes of the city away from the higher castes. Each city must be built keeping into consideration its sacred-hierarchical geography and need for security from invasions. Hence, traditionally "at the ideal level the city is the centre of caste as at the political level it is the centre of the king whose prime duty, one need scarcely stress, was the maintenance of the caste order."[85]

Traditional form of urbanization, thus, only reinforced the established cultural pattern which was hierarchical, caste-oriented and pre-industrial.[86] Historically, in India, therefore, no straight equation between urbanization and modernization might be possible to establish. Often modernization

may lie in the breakdown of the hierarchical or traditional form of urbanization, which is as old as the Indian tradition. Is such a process taking place? Is industrialization in India contributing to the growth of modernizing processes in urbanization? Answers to these questions are important.

The focus in various urban studies and surveys conducted in India is not always uniform or directed to the issues we have raised. Nevertheless, in these studies there is much relevant information on this theme. Many urban studies show that cities in India continue to be dominated by cultural and structural attributes which are far different from those which are considered to be typical for a city, e.g. formalization, atomization, lack of familism and kin-bound groupings and predominance of secular ideologies, etc. Studies reveal, on the other hand, that in the Indian context a rural-urban dichotomy is untidy if not irrelevant;[87] comparatively larger number of persons are found engaged in primary industries even in metropolitan cities, not to say of others;[88] contrary to the sociological stereotype, familistic norms and joint family structures have been found to be predominant in many urban centres;[89] the neighbourhood pattern of some cities studied is organized on caste and kinship lines similar to the villages[90]. The migratory pattern in the city is also closely related with ties of kinship and acquaintance;[91] it has been categorized as "family-centred associational migration" by Lambert.[91] Migration to cities is often caused by social and economic stresses in the rural habitat rather than by the pull of the city-life,[92] which operates only in exceptional situations.[93]

Cities in India do not constitute a cultural isolate; the centre and network of culture and communication in many cities expands to not only the hinterland but a whole region and in some cases to the country as a whole.[94] There is a continuity of interaction between the city and the villages and in many realms of cultural activities the distinction between the two as separate complexes is blurred by the unity of the regional cultural pattern. In some areas the cultural contacts between the villages and the cities are parts of a very old tradition and the culture of cities in such cases is reported to be bereft of novelty for the urban dwelling villagers, who either look at it with indifference[95] or with a kind of "intra-rural"[96] outlook. Bert Hoselitz concludes "that Indian cities .... even some of the largest ones ....show sizable quarters which have preserved their rural character and in which life is carried on under general conditions only little different from those of the villages."[97] Urbanization in India according to him follows a pattern which exists in Latin America; even urban growth rate of India is similar to that of Latin America.[98] Uniformity in the cultural patterns of urbanization in some Indian cities is comparable to that in the Mexico city, studied by Oscar Lewis. Caste and community neighbourhoods of the Indian cities find its parallel in the *compadrazgo* and vacindades of the Mexico city, which also represent neighbourhood unit based on face-to-face relations and kinship ties. It is a process of 'urbanization without breakdown in the traditional patterns.[99]

Persistence of the traditional cultural patterns in the cities or often an invigoration of the traditional ways have been reported in many urban studies. Prof. G.R. Gadgil's study of the Poona city revealed an increased strengthening of caste and communal associations for management of educational and other cultural resources and opportunities offerd by the contemporary changes in outlook and communal identities.[100] Milton Singer has found a process of resilience in the cultural structures of the Little and Great traditions of the cities that he investigated. In these cities, modern media of communication are being used for the spread of the traditional culture.[101] Urbanization is, therefore, not only having a modernizing impact on culture in India, but also tends to reinforce tradition.

The rate of urbanization in India is rather slow. "The rapidly urbanizing nation is involved in a huge and troublesome geographic shift of its population. To put it succinctly, about 60 per cent of its population must move from the countryside to the cities."[102] Compared to this, only about 20 per cent of the population of India was living in cities in 1951.[103] There was no substantial change in this figure during the Census of 1961. The estimate of Kingsley Davis was that as against 1951 when 7.8 per cent of the people were living in places of 100,000 population and 11.9 per cent were living in towns with 20,000 population, in 1961, there would be 8.9 per cent in the former category and 13.3 per cent in the latter category of urban centres. His projection of urban proportion based on logistic extrapolation shows that only by 1975 will India have an urban population as high as 50 percent of the total. This calculation is somewhat biased due to the steep rise in towns and cities in India during 1931–51 and shows much higher rate of urban growth than may be realistic.[104] Considering this, Davis has also projected the urban population of India for the year 1975 taking the United States as a model where the rate of urban growth has been slower than in Japan and faster than in Britain and France, which renders it a 'middle-of-the-road' model.[105] On this basis he finds that by 1975 only 32.4 per cent of the total population in India will be living in cities; to reach a proportion of above 50 per cent urban population India will have to wait till A.D. 2000.[106]

In spite of the comparative slow rate of urbanization, there has been a steady growth in this respect since 1881, when only 9.3 per cent of India's total population was living in cities. Davis writes: "During the entire period from 1881 to 1941 the percentage of the Indian population in urban places increased only 41 per cent, whereas in the United States it increased 111 per cent. Urbanization in India between these dates resembles urbanization in the United States during an earlier period between 1790 and 1850. Only in the last decade, 1931–41, did the pace of urbanization in India exceed that in the United States during a contemporary period. The gain was 18.3 per cent in India, as against a gain of only 0.7 per cent in the United States. It appears that India is just beginning a period of rapid urbanization, comparable perhaps to the 1820–30 period in the United States."[107]

The slow rate of urbanization in India which no doubt has retarded the

pace of social structural changes in the society has not to the same extent slackened the process of cultural modernization or diffusion of modern values. Urbanization has led to the growth of commercialism, monetization of economic relationships, factory and workshop employment for many, popularization of mass media of leisure and entertainment and slow but steady growth in the new sub-cultures of modernized elites. Communication studies have revealed that within a structural framework of ranking and distance from the cities, cultural values and informations flow steadily from the cities to the villages.[108] Urban returnees bring with them many elements of modern ways of life and habits from the cities to the villages.[109] The village studies conducted by social anthropologists have consistently supported this fact.[110]

Urbanization as a macro-process derives reinforcement from industrialization. But the relationship between industrialization and urbanization from the viewpoint of reciprocal growth is subject to controversy. If by urbanization we mean loss in the traditional social and cultural forms then industrialization does not always contribute to urbanization.[111] Moreover, industrialization is linked in an indispensable manner with the rate of economic growth with which the processes of urbanization may or may not be consistent.[112] These incidental disbalances between urbanization and industrialization apart, the latter invariably contributes to cultural modernization, not by totally replacing the traditional ways and forms of cultures but by leading to new cultural syncretisms and sub-cultures.

Compared to other nations industrial growth has been slow in India. About 70% of our population is engaged in agriculture compared to 4.5% in the UK, 12 per cent in the USSR and 61 per cent in China.[113] In absolute terms, however, there has been a significant growth. The number of joint-stock companies which in 1881 was only 231 had risen to 22,675 in 1947–48. In 1851 there was only one cotton mill; the number in 1938 had increased to 403; since then many more factories have sprung up. "Since the early 1950's .... India's steel production has been increased seven-fold. India's electric power capacity is now five times what it was in 1953 and it will double again in the next five years."[114] Between 1950–61, there has been a change of 45.7% in the working force of the operatives and artisans.[115] In other industrial spheres, too, India has made significant progress. But in comparative terms and due to population increase this growth has not been in accordance with the expectations.

Kingsley Davis summarises the causes for this slow growth as follows:

> The gist of Indian industrialization can be summed up in four general propositions: (1) There is no doubt that industrialization has been moving ahead in this region, growing faster than population; (2) But there is also no doubt that it has moved ahead more slowly than it might have done; (3) Among the reasons for retardation are apparently the Indian social organization, the long sway of Britain, and the gradually evolving

demographic situation; (4) By now, with independence attained, the major obstacle to rapid industrial growth is the excessive population, although other obstacles are also present.[116]

The role of cultural and institutional factors in the slow growth of industrialization has been a subject of much speculation among social scientists. There is a long-standing tradition of a section of social scientists who pin down slow rate of economic growth in India to its philosophy of renunciation or 'other-worldly-asceticism' of the Hindu religion.[117] The main weakness of such interpretations of the Hindu culture is its exclusive dependence on motivational-individualistic frame of analysis and explanation without taking the institutional and politico-historical[118] factors into consideration. Another pitfall in such analytical approaches is to compare India with the West at those historical points where they are uncomparable; for instance, asceticism of the classical Indian culture is compared with rational-hedonism of the European Enlightenment and not with the medieval European ethic of Christianity which was also ascetic-other-worldly in nature.[119] The fact of the matter is that neither in real life nor in the traditional postulates has Hinduism denied materialism or pursuit of pleasure in life. Emphasis has always been on a healthy combination of the material pursuit, *artha-kama*, with the moral-transcendental goals or *dharma-moksha*. The latter was given a theoretically higher place than the former but in practice the major pre-occupation of all sections of the Hindus was pursuit of material goals and a robust practical attitude towards life. Observational studies of social anthropologists have clearly confirmed this point.[120] Comparative regional studies in India on villagers' acceptance of modern agricultural and mechanical innovations have shown that the same innovations are readily accepted by one region and neglected with indifference by another, not because of the value system of Hinduism which is universally the same but because of the regional and local variations in structural and institutional phenomena.[121] On the whole in India there is less of an indifference towards material progress[122] but more of a revolution of rising aspirations.[123]

Despite the persistence of traditional cultural values and institutions in the cities, urbanization and industrialization foster many cultural norms and material conditions which are macroscopic and modernizing. We have mentioned the role of mass media of education, recreation and leisure. Even the physical conditions of the city life call for many compromises in the traditional mode of living and traditional culture. New colonies as they expand have a more heterogeneous-ethnic nature and differ fundamentally from caste-neighbourhoods of the past. Increased use of modern transport, banking and other rational-monetary transactions, modern medicine and political culture create a broad cultural foundation of modernization in the cities and the industrial centres, which merge into the formation of the great cultural tradition of modernization in India.

Communication and Modernization

The media of communication which have accelerated the rate of growth and cultural diffusion of modernization have also been introduced in India through the Western contact. Printing was introduced by the Portuguese in the second half of the sixteenth century and incentive for this was provided by the Christian missionaries.[124] In British territory, the first press appeared in Bombay in 1674 on the initiative of an Indian named Bhimji Parekh but it is doubtful if it ever functioned effectively. In early 18th century a printing press was established in South India (Tranquebar) by the Danish Lutheran Mission. Written newspapers called *akhbar* are known to have been in circulation during the time of the Mughal empire,[125] but the printed newspapers came into existence only after the contact with the West. A beginning in this direction was made about the last quarter of the 18th century.[126] Similarly, the British also introduced telegraph, railways and modern postal system in India.

The changes which have followed since the expansion in these communication media in India constitute an indirect but concrete index of modernization. A *Friend of India* survey of newspapers in Calcutta during the middle of the 19th century revealed "that eight Bengali newspapers of Calcutta between them had not 1,300 subscribers; that the interior of the country took less than 200 copies; that in January 1837 only 151 copies were sent by post out of Calcutta, and 195 in a month in 1843; that all the English papers of Calcutta, with an aggregate circulation of nearly 4,000, had between them only 125 Indian subscribers."[127] This report might be an under-estimate of newspaper circulation in Calcutta since it does not take into account the papers and periodicals in the local languages,[128] yet the rudimentary character of press as media of communication during this period is clear from this report.

Since then, the number of newspapers and periodicals has been constantly rising. During 1940–41, India had between 3,000 to 4,000 printed newspapers and periodicals published from a variety of centres in seventeen different languages, a few bilingual.[129] The Annual Report for 1966 of the Registrar of Newspapers for India records that the number of newspapers and periodicals at the end of 1966 was 10,977. It also mentions that during the past ten years the number of daily newspapers in India has increased by 42.7 per cent.[130]

Phenomenal increase has also been made in the means of communication such as postal services, movies, radio and information media through posters, hand-bills and mobile film-show units, etc. The increase in postal facilities alone may be evident from the fact that in 1836 there were only 276 post offices[131] in India; the recorded number in 1962 was 74,596.[132] Similar increase has also been made in the other media of communication and transport. The expansion in transport by the railways, roadways, airways, and waterways has contributed to the intensification in the volume of interaction and contact between one region and another; travelling

by railways and buses was an immediate blow to the principle of caste hierarchy based on the theory of pollution and purity, since in the same railway coach or bus people of all castes, high or low, had to travel. In the beginning there was some resistance from the conservative section of the upper castes, but such movements soon petered out; travelling by railways and buses was not only accepted but these were increasingly used for pilgrimages and for other socio-religious purposes. These technological innovations have, therefore, to some extent brought changes in the traditional outlook but also at the same time have reinforced tradition.

The expansion in the technological means of travel and transport and increase in the number and circulation of the newspapers as forms of media-exposure are, according to Daniel Lerner, directly associated with cultural modernization. In the Indian case, this media-exposure results both in modernization and traditionalization. Postal and telegraph services not only bring with them more information about distant places and the relatives located distantly, thus increasing people's 'psychic mobility', but also the facility to organize caste associations and other traditional group activities more efficiently.[133] Hence, the modernization of the channels of communication and modes of transport results into a kind of cultural syncretism between the value systems of tradition and modernity. As a part of this process, ability to empathize and facility in psychic mobility, which are the psychological counterparts of modernization and ultimately form part of the consciousness of a "world culture",[134] proceed side by side with emerging new sense of identity with traditional institutions.

Nationalism, Politicization and Modernization

Nationalism and political culture of democracy are another forms of normative innovations which are essentially modern in ethos and have a pan-Indian character. Both of these phenomena are of exogenous nature and pose serious challenges to the primordial normative structure of the Indian tradition. Nationalism implies the consciousness of one nationhood and its related sense of political identity, which results from political consensus.[135] Its sociological manifestation is the idea of a nation-state. Democracy is a special form of political organization and system of values on which a nation-state can be founded. Both nationalism and democracy in the contemporary form are Western innovations. In the West, historical origins of democracy and nationalism can be associated with the breakdown of the feudal hierarchical system of estates and rise of the philosophies of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This led to a breakdown in the medieval system of patrimonial authority relationships which were replaced by individual authority relationships. These were achieved by a revolution which was industrial and at the same time political.[136]

Before this revolution the norms of hierarchy and holism, which are characteristic of any traditional society were also present in the Western culture. Rights and liberties were only extended to groups and not to individuals,

the system was dissensual rather than consensual. Of this system Bendix writes:

> (The) medieval political life depends on the link between hereditary or spiritual rank in society, control over land as the principle economic resource, and the exercise of public authority. All those whose rank or status excluded them from access to control over land are thereby excluded from any direct participation in public affairs. Rights and liberties are extended to groups, corporations, estates rather than to individual subjects; representation in judicial and legislative bodies is channelled through traditionally privileged estates.[137]

The group and estate-based rights as mentioned above were similar to caste-based rights as acknowledged in the Hindu tradition. Through the social forces unleashed by leaders of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, communal values based on estates gradually disappeared and were replaced by values of freedom, equality and humanism. These were guaranteed to individuals through recognition of their civil rights within the political framework of democratic nation-states. The materialization of these cultural goals was gradual and was closely linked with the past cultural traditions.

Both nationalism and democracy in India have come into being in a different historical context. The cultural consequences of these systems may be as radical for India as it was for the West, but its historical manifestation cannot be identical.[138] This is for various reasons. First, these values have been derived from an alien tradition and have grown on the soil of India under a colonial patronage, which is a psychologically irksome factor. Secondly, the economic and social structural factors of the contemporary India are not comparable to those of the 17th and 18th century West. Thirdly, for historical reasons these institutional innovations have been introjected in the Indian body-politic in a compressed form which in the West had evolved gradually, and this phenomenon creates new and far greater cultural stresses than it did in the West.

This would be evident if we review the process of growth in nationalism and democracy in India. Historically, Indian nationalism has been a forerunner of democratic polity. Substantively, it was never modelled completely after the Western pattern. From Rammohan Roy to Gandhi, the nationalistic consciousness was oriented towards the Indian tradition; in this matter there were differences of degrees but not of kind. The national leaders were for modernity but not at the cost of traditional cultural identity. Tilak and Gandhi represent extreme forms of this movement, being the advocates of a kind of nationalism which was deeply embedded in the past Hindu tradition. In the rise of Indian nationalism, the role of Gandhi has specially been of great historical significance, which renders Indian political process of modernization unique.

Gandhi had an uncanny skill to project to Indian masses the many humanistic values of the modern West through traditional cultural symbolism; the kind of nationalism of which he was an advocate was rooted in the Hindu tradition but at the same time was non-communal and to that extent secular; secularism for Gandhi did not mean a-religiosity but the spirit of religious tolerance which he postulated on the basis of universalistic ethic of Hinduism itself. His conception of Indian polity was entirely non-communal and yet not secular in the strictly Western sense of the term.

The concepts of communalism and secularism provide useful conceptual tools for the analysis of the role of Indian nationalism in the cultural modernization of the nation. Secularism is a sub-process in modernization. Its spread implies that various issues and events in personal and social life are evaluated not from a religious point of view but utilitarian.[139] With an increase in the process of 'secularization' the various spheres of social life which formerly were guided by religiously ordained norms are exempted from its hold and are increasingly governed by norms which tend to be rational or hedonistic or both.

Increasing nationalism contributed also to rapid politicization in India. This movement was primarily led by the Indian National Congress which right from its beginning took a non-communal standpoint. One year after its founding in 1885, its report stated that "the Congress is a community of temporal interests and not of spiritual convictions that qualify men to represent each other in the discussion of political questions."[140] Commitment to this ideal was kept intact by the Congress despite many difficulties, such as heterogeneous nature of its leadership which from time to time consisted of even zealous communal nationalists and the system of communal representation introduced by the Government of India Act 1919 and the historical suspicion or ambivalence in Muslim-Hindu relationship in India. These factors taken together led ultimately to a partial if not the total triumph of communalism —the partition of the country.

In free India, however, secularism has survived despite its many difficulties. The Indian National Congress which came into power as a political party under the leadership of Nehru consistently advocated the need for India becoming a secular state. Free India adopted a Constitution which guarantees individual and collective freedom of religion and lays down that there should be no state discrimination on the ground of religion in public employment and education; it further provides that state as such must be neutral to religious goals and should not levy taxes for religious purposes or encourage religious teachings in educational institutions wholly financed by the state. It, however, does provide for special seats in the Legislative Assemblies and the House of the People for the members of the scheduled castes and tribes, on purely humanitarian considerations. Thus, Constitution of India offers us a normative structure of secularism and democracy which form essential parts of the Great tradition of modernization in India.

However, the enactment of the secular ideals in the Constitution does not

imply an actual conformity to its norms in public life and relationships between major Indian communities. Its proper evaluation is necessary. It may be pointed out that the Hindu community right from the beginning of the British rule took a more liberal attitude towards various social legislations which abolished many of its pseudo-religious customs by law. It even tolerated legislation affecting the caste system quite early in the 19th century, as we mentioned above. After independence, many legislations regarding reforms in customs of marriage, untouchability, inheritance, etc., have been accepted without much opposition. This may partly be explained by the universalistic nature of Hindu religion itself,[141] but it is mainly due to the emergence of an enlightened elite in the Hindu society with rational commitment to nationalism. The case of other major Indian community, the Muslims, as we analysed above, has been fundamentally different. This creates disbalances in the processes of secularization in India.

There are also other inconsistencies in the growth of secularism in India. Despite claims made for religious neutrality, the state in India has often intervened in the religious matters; this particularly holds in case of management of temples and religious institutions, such as monasteries and monastic heads. Enactment in this sphere, of course, existed from the British times; for instance, in Bengal in 1810 and in Madras in 1817 regulations were passed for regular administration of temple endowments by the government.[142] These were subsequently revised, until in 1960 the Government of India appointed a Hindu Religious Endowments Commission to examine the administration of Hindu religious endowments and suggest steps to improve their management. Following the Commission's report in 1962, legislations have been enacted in many States of India, which previously did not have such legislation (Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab) for the management of temple endowments and steps have also been taken to rationalize the methods of learning and training of the Hindu priests through theological colleges and encouragement of Sanskrit teachings.

In the political sphere too, many political parties and groups have continued to voice communal point of view on contemporary issues. Political parties like the Hindu Sabha, Rama Rajya Parishad, Jana Sangh and Muslim League which directly or indirectly have communal orientations are active in the political arena; some of them like the Jana Sangh and the Muslim League have even increased their political influence in many parts of the country, sadhus and religious leaders conducted a violent movement against the killing of cows and in many States parochial movements based on caste, regionalism, and linguistic affinities voice degrees of particularistic identities in political processes. Since secularism implies a universalistic world-view, these contemporary movements in India do not harmonize with its value system.

Despite these difficulties secularism has been accepted widely as the national policy in India. Majority of the political parties and even the Jana Sangh which is often accused of being communal in orientation profess

to be secular in outlook. As Donald E. Smith says, "It is meaningful to speak of India as a secular state, despite the existence of the problems.... India is a secular state in the same sense in which one can say that India is a democracy. Despite various undemocratic features of Indian politics and government, parliamentary democracy is functioning, and with considerable vigour. Similarly, the secular state; the ideal is clearly embodied in the Constitution, and it is being implemented in substantial measure."[143]

The ambivalence which we find in the Indian political system on the issue of secularism is also evident in the functioning of democratic polity. The contemporary democratic tradition in India is a natural outgrowth of political reforms introduced by the British from time to time. Its major landmarks as Norman D. Palmer has mentioned are: the Indian Council Act of 1861, Lord Ripon's Resolution on Local Self-Government of 1882, the Indian Councils Act 1893, the Morley Minto Reforms of 1909. the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1918, the Government of India Act of 1919 and the Government of India Act of 1935. The last Act was never enforced but has substantially influenced the federal nature of the parliamentary system as adopted through the Constitution. Despite this linkage with the British heritage, democracy in India cannot be said to be patterned entirely on any foreign model. This obtains both in case of the formal pattern and the processes of democratic functioning.

The Indian Constitution recognizes the diversities in the Indian tradition through its emphasis on federalism and decentralization; it has an imprint of the Gandhian philosophy in its recognition of the need for village panchayats, cottage industries and to a great extent its emphasis on a welfare state embodies the central values of humanism and tolerance preached by Gandhi. During the previous decade and a half the functioning of democracy in India has further vindicated the extent to which it is rooted into the basic textures of traditional particularistic values represented by caste, kinship and other parochial identities.[144] Pressure groups based on universalistic identities of political and economic interests as operate in the Western democracy are replaced in India by groups which have quasi-universalistic if not fully particularistic identities. From a sociological point of view these manifestations are not necessarily symptomatic of malfunctioning of democracy in India. In fact, these are natural manifestations of the stuff of which Indian democracy is made. Its gradual replacement by more advanced and universalistic group-identities would take place only through an advancement and change in the Indian society. This gradual change will further contribute to the Indianization[145] of politics and democracy in India.

LITTLE TRADITION OF CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

The five major dimensions of cultural modernization we discussed above are related with the formal aspect of the contemporary cultural traditions in India. For this reason we call them elements of the Great tradition of

modernization. As processes, these cultural elements are pan-Indian in character, have their centres in the urban and cosmopolitan areas, are highly structured and sophisticated in form and integrated with the world-view of science and liberalism. Hence, these comprise the upper stream of cultural modernization. Besides, another process of modernization is also going on in India, at the grass-root level as it were. This relates to daily lives, customs and habits of people in general in India. It has been noted by many social anthropologists studying processes of social change in India. This dimension of cultural modernization conforms to the characteristics of a Little tradition.

It consists of changes in dress, food habits, rituals, vocabulary, material culture, mode of travel and types of conveyance and customs. Traditionally, home-made clothes were worn by villagers all over the country, a custom which now survives only among a few castes in some regions in India. The factory produced clothes now have replaced the home-spun clothes and occasionally one might come across modern synthetic fabrics like nylon, terylene, etc., even in remoter parts of the country. In the Eastern U.P. villages many shopkeepers which fifty years ago kept the handloom-produced cloth in stock with a very small stock of factory-made cloth now deal mostly in factory-made textiles and the sale of ready-made garments is becoming quite popular. Even in poorer homes now ladies do not tailor clothes for their family members; professional tailors do this job; many prosperous families have their own sewing machines which are used by women for occasional sewing. Even the mode of dress has changed considerably in these villages. The use of turbans by peasants has become rare; so is also the old style of loose shirts *(kurta)* which has increasingly been replaced by modern style shirts. Traditional combs made from wood or horns have now almost disappeared from the villages and have been replaced by combs made of synthetic materials; buttons, trinkets and toys made of synthetic materials have become commonplace things in the villages.

About the changes in dress and other habits in Mysore Prof. Srinivas writes: "The Westernization of the Brahmins of Mysore brought about a number of changes in their life. There was a change in their appearance and dress. The tuft gave way to cropped hair and the traditional dress gave place, at least partially, to western-type dress and shoes. The change in dress marked a gradual weakening of ideas regarding ritual purity. For instance, formerly eating was a ritual act, and a Brahmin had to wear ritually pure robes while eating or serving meals. This meant wearing either a freshly washed cotton dhoti, or a silk dhoti, and a pure upper cloth. Wearing a shirt was taboo. But as Western clothes became more popular Brahmins sat at dinner with their shirts on. And today, dining at a table is becoming common among the rich."[146] Changes in dress also of other 'twice-born' castes have taken place on the same pattern in varying degrees.

Modernization has also reached the level of food habits and mode of eating. As we know, commensal restrictions form an essential part of the

normative structure of the caste system and are related to the ideas of pollution and purity. First compromises in eating habits and norms were made after the introduction of railways and other public transport systems such as buses and ferries. In railway coaches and buses there was no segregation on caste lines and often its seats were fitted with leather, etc., which also were supposed to be polluting. Water taps on the railway stations had valves made of leather. These changes threatened the established norms of purity in eating habits. Yet, what the caste-people compromised were the rigidities about commensal rules and not the travelling by these modern means of transport.

A change in food habits has also taken place which brings people nearer to modern food technologies. The use of ghee (purified butter) has increasingly been replaced by vegetable oil, not only in the urban areas but also in the villages; tea shops are now common in most of the roadside villages where buses ply and persons of all castes take tea in china cups, glasses or earthen cups, although tea might have been brewn by a person of lower caste. Prof. Srinivas writes about the Mysore region "that popularity of travel and tea shops is not confind to city folk but extends to villages as well."[147] Other new items of food which are gaining popularity even at the village level are sweets, soft drinks and other edibles processed and packed in factories. Meat-eating and use of eggs among the higher caste members is on the increase, and in north Indian villages where a decade back poultry farming was looked down upon as a polluting occupation the number of such farms has now multiplied. Formerly upper caste men used to avoid eating at restaurants and public places, but now fewer people observe these restrictions.[148]

Many terms from the English language have now become an organic part of colloquial expression of rural folk, also bringing with them nuances of cultural modernization. Expansion of civil administration popularized the terms like 'court', 'collector', 'judge', 'barrister', etc. Expansion of transport facilities has rendered the terms like 'rail', 'station', 'signal', etc., matters of daily usage. Politicization of villages since Independence has now introduced villagers to terms like 'party', 'socialism', 'communism', 'coalition government', 'ministry', etc.; similarly, spread of medical facilities now makes expressions like 'injection', 'mixture', 'penicillin', etc., also household words. People now also talk about plans and family planning. In this manner many linguistic motifs of modernization have now become parts of the Little tradition. There may be contextual variation in meanings of these terms but that is less important considering the elements of 'psychic mobility' which these phrases imply for the common people.

Modern technology and cultural equipment too now form part of the Little tradition in India. In the urban areas 'the pressures of urban life' itself, as Prof. Srinivas says, make people adopt new schedules of work and personal habits and motivate them to use modern media of transport, communication and leisure. But due to changes in the frontiers of trade,[149]

transport, and expansion of administrative, developmental and political activities at the village level in India, these modern technological and cultural equipments have made an impact on cultural life too. Modern agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers, tube-wells, electricity, tractors and bicycles now form part of rural material culture in India. In many households one will find china cups and pots, radios and cosmetic goods bought from the cities or presented by family members working in urban centres and cities. Bicycle has become a popular conveyance and with its increasing number many workshops have sprung up in villages. This brings Indian villagers closer not only to commercial but also to technological know-how on the one hand and establishes their stable contact with the urban centres on the other.

Increasingly, themes from urban life, contemporary politics and social economic issues are being borrowed by the cultural media of the folk tradition. Folk songs now often use metaphors, idioms and tunes of popular cinema songs; many of them refer caustically to contemporary feuds and tensions among various castes and groups; election propaganda is often made through the media of folk dramas, songs and devotional meetings. About changes in Namhalli in Mysore resulting from outside contact, Alan R. Beals writes that "a form of 'modern' prose drama became common during this period (following World War I) and influenced the dress and manners of villagers."[150] Presumably since then many more changes must have taken place in the folk cultural tradition with its increasing contact with modern cultural themes and ideologies.

How this Little tradition of modernization spreads through interaction of its networks of communications with the Great traditions of modernization, we have mentioned before. The indigenous centres and networks of the Little and Great Indian tradition functions sometimes independently and sometimes also as bearers of the Little and Great traditions of modernization. In the contemporary processes of culture-change in India both syncretic and separate existence of tradition and modernity, which often seems enigmatic to many, can be explained by these processes. Culturally, therefore, we may find in India three important ramifications: the traditional, the modern and the traditional-modern. This last ramification is one which is paramount in the processes of cultural change. This constitutes a transitional phase which Fred W. Riggs calls 'prismatic'[151] stage of change. The existence of a 'modern' and a 'transitional' sector in cultural traditions by itself, however, does not connote the nature or pattern of modernization as such; it also does not imply that modernization in each country will have an identical form.

It is reasonable to assume that since modernization in traditional societies proceeds through a transitional or prismatic stage, in which traditional cultural forms have necessarily to undergo syncretic changes, the net result of modernization which would finally emerge at the conclusion of this transitional phase will have the imprints of tradition. The question arises

how far contemporary modernization in Indian culture does have such traditional imprints? What is its nature and direction?

CULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN INDIA

Tradition and modernity as heuristic concepts are easy to formulate, but to separate them at substantive level is rather difficult. As Joseph R. Gusfield has said, "We cannot easily separate modernity and tradition from some *specific* modernity, some version which functions ideologically as a directive. The modern comes to the traditional society as a particular culture with its own traditions."[152] But it seldom comes in the same form or brings about identical cultural consequences in every society that it comes in contact with. Modernization as a process, in fact, has more elasticity of form than tradition. It implies an open world-view which like science undergoes perpetual self-falsification and self-transcendence in its value-structure and postulates.

Comparative studies on modernization in the new states have shown that contrary to stereotyped beliefs, old traditions are not completely displaced by modernization. what follows is an accretion and transmutation of forms. Similarly, tradition does not necessarily retard the process of modernization. As we have mentioned above, religious leaders in Indonesia studied by Geertz serve as carriers of modernization.[153] In India, caste associations, which are otherwise typical symbols of tradition, have increasingly been found to serve the ends of political modernization. Lloyd I. Rudolph calls this phenomenon 'modernity of tradition'[154] and concludes with Edward Shils that "modernity has entered into Indian character and society but it has done so through assimilation and not replacement."[155] Other studies in Indian social processes also provide evidence that traditional institutions like joint family, kin-based entrepreneurial functions continue to co-exist with and support modern values and forms of social action.[156] From the advancement in modern means of transport and communication not only the cultural diffusion of modernization but also that of traditionalism is accelerated.

These processes in the institutional realm of modernization are also in harmony with historical growth of this phenomenon in India. Historically, as we discussed above, the rise of nationalistic movement which later changed into a movement for political, cultural and economic modernization was itself never bereft of the consciousness of the past tradition of India. The new leadership that is now emerging is more conscious of national identity and prides in the traditional culture of India. Consequently, it is fair to assume that as forces of cultural modernization grow there will also simultaneously grow the feeling of national identity and the identification with the nation's past tradition. Cultural modernization will under this process assume a syncretic form and persist along with traditional values. Modernity will never completely supplant tradition in India.

Chapter V

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION

(The Macro-Structural Changes)

Modernization implies some typical forms of changes in the social structure of societies. These changes in the systems of social relationships contribute to the growth and institutionalization of new roles and group-structures based on concomitant norms of modernization. This process cumulatively leads to structural modernization of society. There are, however, many forms of changes in the social structure which fall outside this process. Examples may be: changes in family structure through death, birth and marriage, large-scale migration due to war or epidemic, rise and fall of pre-industrial cities and commercial centres owing to the changes in the political power and the trade routes, etc. Such structural changes in societies have been going on since time immemorial; most of these changes were cyclical or rhythmical in pattern, that is, social structures used to appear or disappear, used to wax or wane in form, but they functionally remained static or 'fused'.[1] Whatever specialization there was, referred to 'some concrete activity' and not a whole aspect of social life, which structural modernization implies. Marion J. Levy, Jr. writes:

> Throughout history craftsmen and even whole village population have been specialized with regard to the output of certain particular types of products, for example, dolls or some special form of cloth, etc. However, the organization in terms of which those activities are carried out... usually a family unit in the case of craftsmen and, by definition, a village unit in the case of the village example... are not usually specialized with regard to a specific aspect of the behaviour of its members such as the economic aspect or the political aspect. The units are viewed by the members who belong to them as general living units. Neither the family nor the village is more predominantly economically oriented than other families or villages.[2]

Specialization of work in traditional societies was, in fact, structurally undifferentiated from traditional forms of authority and particularistic patterns of social relationship. Even the craft guilds were not based on rational-universalistic forms of authority with regard to the allocation of resources and facilities in the group structure. "The merchant and craft guilds of the Occident", Max Weber writes,"cultivated religious interests

as did the castes. In connection with these interests, questions of social rank also played a considerable role among guilds. Which rank order the guilds should follow during processions, for instance, was a question occasionally fought over more stubbornly than questions of economic interests.[3] The guild may be an extreme case of work specialization. In other realms of social activities too, traditional societies paramountly comprised groups without significant functional differentiation or specialization.

A classic example of undifferentiated role-structure, as characteristic of traditional society, may be found in the systems of feudalism and patrimonialism of the medieval Europe.[4] The king had the patrimonial authority over his subjects and the management of his household. This authority was not merely secular but also religious, not merely formal but also patriarchal, and not merely political but also universal. The same was true about feudalism. Occasionally feudalism, like the Church, posed some threat to the patrimonial authority of the king, but normally both of them were more supplemental than contradictory. The relationships between the king and the feudal lord, between the feudal lord and his tenants and serfs were in substance equally based on a series of hierarchical authority relationships which were more particularistic than universal, more functionally diffuse than specific and more emotionally loaded than neutral. Social classes, representing differential economic interests, did not exist. What existed were the estates wherein not the individual but the group as a whole was charged with rights and obligations according to the social rank of its estate. The individual as such had no rights aside from the estate to which he belonged. "A man (could) modify the personal or corporate rule to which he (was) subject only by an appeal to the established rights of his rank or to the personal and, therefore, arbitrary benevolence of his master."[5] Thus, the social system was closed and had an authoritarian[6] structure.

The social structure of a "relatively modernized" society could grow in Europe only after the breakdown in the feudal-patrimonial system of social organization. Its process was gradual. It started with stray protest movements in the medieval society.[7] But the great transformation came later. It was spurred by the forces released through the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The Industrial Revolution led to a gradual change in the social structure of the feudal society by transforming it first into a mercantile society and later into an industrial-liberal society.[8] In this process the estates, mainly consisting of the serfs and the feudal lords underwent cataclysmic changes. Peasants and serfs were transformed into industrial workers; feudal lords, especially in Britain, took more and more to commercial and industrial entrepreneurship, traditional guilds in the cities became obsolescent and guild masters were replaced by "projectors" or entrepreneurs. The transition from one stage to the other was not smooth. Its human cost was great. The intervening periods were marked by pauperization of the uprooted peasantry, growth of slum-like work houses in

cities, sudden breakdown in the family structure and exploitation of the workers by an emergent entrepreneurial class which was more predatory than rational in orientation.

The centre of the Industrial Revolution was Britain. To the question, why the Industrial Revolution first started in Britain and nowhere else, Will and Ariel Durant answer:

> Because England had won great wars on the Continent while keeping its own soil free from war's devastation; because it had secured command of the seas and had thereby acquired colonies that provided raw materials and needed manufactured goods; because its armies, fleets, and growing population offered an expanding market for industrial products; because the guilds could not meet these widening demands; because the profits of far-flung commerce accumulated capital seeking new avenues of investment; because England allowed its nobles....and their fortunes.... to engage in commerce and industry; because the progressive displacement of tillage by pasturage drove peasants from the fields to the towns, where they added to the labour force available for factories; because science in England was directed by men of a practical bent, while on the Continent it was predominantly devoted to abstract research; and because England had a constitutional government sensitive to business interests, and vaguely aware that priority in the Industrial Revolution would make England for over a century the political leader of the Western world.[9]

The pivotal element in each causal factor mentioned above is change in the structure of relationships between and within groups, economic systems and systems of power. These changes implied the creation of fundamentally new role-structures such as those of industrial labour, factory systems, financial and technological bureaucracies and modern market-mechanism. These changes were not rhythmical but transformative; there was a built-in mechanism of acceleration and progression in the process of change taking place now, because the systems of science and technology as forces of innovation had a cumulative character hitherto unknown in the history of mankind. Moreover, scientific and technological inventions revolutionized the processes of production of goods and services and rendered possible a progressive rate of economic growth. In the past, economic growth did take place, but its rate was so slow as to be imperceptible. "If we had information for points in time perhaps 10,000 years apart, we would probably find that the standard of living of the world's human inhabitants had increased between each two points. But the rising trend was so slow until recent times that examination, even at thousand-year intervals, might not show progress during every interval."[10] The Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of "a series of advances in technology and a rise in per capita output rapid enough so that marked changes occurred within each generation, and indeed during each decade."[11] Thus, economic growth became an

organic part of the process of social change.

Similar structural changes were also precipitated by the Revolution of 1789 in France. The emergence of a politically active urban middle-class, break down in the feudal structure and the liberation of a vast section of peasantry from the feudal-military domination, and catastrophic decline in the credibility of Church were some of the major forms of changes which followed the revolution. Slowly new bases of authority-legitimation also emerged which transformed the feudal-patrimonial system of power into a liberal-democratic form. It struck at the very roots of the particularistic elements in the social structure. "The French Revolution brought about a fundamental change in the conception of representation: the basic unit was no longer the household, or property, or the corporation, but *the individual citizen;* and representation was no longer channelled through separate functional bodies but through a *unified national assembly* of legislators. The law of August 11, 1792 went so far as to give the franchise to all French males over 21 who were not servants, paupers or vagabonds, and the Constitution of 1793 did not even exclude paupers if they had resided more than six months in the *canton.* The Restoration did not bring back representation by estate: instead the *regime censitaire* introduced an abstract monetary criterion which cut decisively across the earlier criteria of ascribed status."[12]

These processes offer us an example of what is meant by structural changes in society. It implies changes in a whole system of social relationships. For instance, the transformation of the feudal social organization, based on particularistic ties between estates, into industrial social organization based on class and factory systems, professionalization of work and occupation and democratization of the authority and leadership structure is symptomatic of structural changes in society. Such changes were ushered in by the Industrial Revolution in the European society. The process through which structural changes appear in the social system is that of differentiation of roles. Differentiation of roles leads to structural differentiation. "The model of structural differentiation is (also) an abstract theory of change. When one social role or organization becomes archaic under changing historical circumstances, it differentiates by a definite and specific sequence of events into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the new historical circumstances,"[13] and finally bring about a structural change in the social system. The new social units which emerge through differentiation are structurally distinct but functionally equivalent to the structure they have replaced. Of course, structural differentiation follows the process of functional specialization. For instance, traditional joint family not only functioned as an agency of procreation and socialization of new members for the society, but also performed duties in other spheres such as occupation, education, leisure and recreation, etc., which have now been taken over by specialized agencies. The nuclear family in industrial societies which had differentiated from joint family,

is functionally specific and not diffuse like its traditional counterpart. Another example of structural differentiation which followed functional specialization may be that of production which by stages passed from households to guilds and finally to modern factories. Household production in terms of roles was merged with a number of other roles. Work in guilds was more specialized but still not fully differentiated from kinship and religious roles. Division of labour in a modern factory is, however, an example of a higher degree of functional specificity and specialization. According to Durkheim it marks a change from the 'mechanical' to 'organic' type of solidarity or social structure of society.

Structural changes involve similar role differentiations in almost all aspects of social life. Growth in science and technology adds impetus to this process and finally accelerates the momentum of change. Change ceases to be an exceptional phenomenon as in the traditional societies; it becomes a day-to-day fact of life to live with; it is not merely tolerated, it is glorified. With increasing pace of differentiation new structural forms come into being and older ones disappear. For instance, in medieval England arranged marriages were a common phenomenon; marriage was a relationship between two families or clans; now it has disappeared from the social scene. In marriage, kinship has been replaced by courtship. Formerly marriage also involved diffused sets of relationship, now it is highly specific—a relationship between two individuals who choose to enter into this form of relationship. Modern factories, bureaucratically organized administration, army and modern networks of communication media involve role-structures which were unknown in the past.

The contemporary processes of structural differentiation, coincidentally, also contain elements of structural modernization. This is because contemporary forms of structural differentiation are also organically reinforced by innovations in science and technology. These innovations not only render many modern forms of structures, such as factories, formal organizations of administration and communication etc., possible but also imbue the social relationships within these structures with the value system and cognitive categories of modernization. Marion J. Levy writes: "Characteristically, the structures of all relatively modernized societies reflect an increasing emphasis on rationality, universalism, functional specificity, and emotional neutrality or avoidance (objectivity). It is also characteristic of them that these emphases are much higher and more general throughout social structure than is the case for any relatively non-modernized society."[14] An important process which contributes to the growth of such structures is that of economic growth, of which industrialization and urbanization are to a certain extent natural concomitants. Political institutions based on legal-constitutional legitimation of authority embodied in representative bodies support the social structure of modernization.

In relatively modernized societies of the West, there was a gradual but spontaneous upsurge of values and motives which laid the foundation of

modernization. Cultural forces of modernization were more attuned to the pace of structural differentiation and adaptation. In England the process of breakdown in the traditional joint family system almost coincided with the emergence of modern factories. The changes were continuous and uniform in the realms of culture and social structure as well as in the central and the peripheral areas of society in general.[15] Modernization was not beset to the same degree with problems of breakdown as in the new nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these societies, modernization both in cultural and structural forms is exogenous to the system and constitutes a phenomenon of historical growth, mostly through colonial confrontations.

Under these circumstances there is often a lag between the cultural and social structural forms of modernizing influences in these societies. The equations of modernization which proved to be reliable with respect to Western society fail to represent the socio-cultural processes of the new nations. Apparently, modern social structures in these societies, in terms of functions, might only partially serve the goals of modernization, as in parts they might be reinforcing traditional role-structures and forms of social obligations. It is, therefore, necessary that in our study of the structural changes in India, we pay particular attention to the ramifications and inter-linkages of the social structure with regard to both of these directions of adaptation.

We may analyse the forms of these structural inter-linkages under two broad categories: the macro-structures and the micro-structures. Family, community, clan, tribe, caste and sub-caste are examples of the micro-structures of the Indian society. Micro-structures are relatively autonomous institutions and provide a social space for primary relationships. Their organization is less formal, the relationships are more affective and particularistic and, as such, their functions are focused mainly to the needs which are narrower yet primary in nature. The network of relationships in these groups is also limited and the quality of relational bonds is diffused rather than specific. Relationships are governed by kinship, birth, territorial bonds which delimit the horizon of social interaction and reinforce values which may be in apparent contrast with those of a modernized role-structure. But this is not necessary. Even in a modernized or relatively modernized society there is legitimate scope as well as need for such group structures. Some of the social roles performed by these micro-structures, for instance those performed by family, cannot be substituted and constitute structural universals. Child-rearing, socialization and provisions for institutionalized role of reproduction are basic needs of any society, traditional or modern.

Yet, within the structural framework of these micro-structures there is relative scope for organization of role in such a manner which reinforces the process of the structural or cultural modernization without basically altering the essential nature of the functions they perform. This is one of the key qualities of structural differentiation, of which mention has been mad

above. What happens under this process of structural differentiation is that the former, generalized nature of role-structures is rendered more and more specialized and specific, and many of the former roles which were not essential to a particular micro- or macro-structure are relegated to other specialized structures. This happens without significantly altering the qualitative nature of the relationship concerned. For instance, if the micro-structure is family, then its essential affective quality in social relationships involving the basic sets of family roles[16] does not change, but many of the functions which were traditionally performed by the family are radically reduced in a relatively modernized society.

However, the exact way in which the micro-structure in a traditional society adapts to the pressures of modernization might vary. From a structural point of view change may not always be followed by *differentiation* of role-structures but also *role-accretion* under certain situations. This is particularly true of caste in India, which under stresses of change is now taking over many functions which were traditionally outside its domain. In certain situations it works as a political interest group and an economic association, which is essentially foreign to its communal-particularistic structure.[17] We shall discuss this problem below in some detail. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that role-accretion in such unusual circumstances does not rule out the normal process of role differentiation which social change involves. We shall analyse how similar or other changes are taking place in selected micro-structures of Indian society and to what extent these changes contribute to the process of structural modernization.

Macro-structures refer to those organized roles and relationships which are more extensive, more formal, are organized or acclaimed to be organized on universalistic principles (rational legal norms) and which have to do with the integration or regulation of the larger system of society and involve secondary and higher orders of relationships. Familiar examples of macro-structures are: political and other types of elite, administration and bureaucracy (executive, legal, industrial and military), industrial workers and entrepreneurs and other urban and industrial groups and social classes. Political elites form part of Indian democratic party structure and its processes; similarly, cultural elites provide a network for the communication of values and ideologies. Systems of administration, factory, industry, labour and entrepreneurship provide large-scale structures for social interaction which are necessary for the growth of a modern nation state as a viable economic and administrative configuration. Macro-structures taken together generate social consensus necessary for structural modernization.

We shall analyse the processes of change in the social structure of the Indian society on the basis of ongoing structural changes in selected major macro- and micro-social structures. Among the macro-structures we shall particularly analyse the changes that have taken place through the growth of a new elite or leadership, bureaucratic forms of administration, industrial working class, and urbanward migration, industrial entrepreneurs, industries

and factories, and new political structures. Among the micro-structures we shall analyse the changes taking place in the family, caste and village community. While analysing the changes through these macro- and micro-social structures, attention should also be paid to the causal aspects of change. As with the cultural traditions, so also in the case of the social structure of Indian society, changes have been taking place both from the endogenous (orthogenetic) and exogenous (heterogenetic) channels. Consequently, at each level (micro and macro) of structural analysis, it shall be our endeavour to draw a line of distinction between the two types of causal factors. Presumably in India structural changes occurring as a result of exogenous sources may far outweigh the changes that have taken place endogenously, yet, to get a historically coherent picture of change such an attempt may be necessary. Moreover, it may also be necessary from the view-point of systematic theoretical analysis of social change, which we have postulated above.

MACRO-SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGES

The social and political history of India reveals the existence of a variety of macro-structures through which, from time to time, loose forms of centralized political and economic controls were exercised on a larger part of the country. The rise of the Mauryan empire in the fourth century B.C., the partial centralized control of the kings belonging to the Gupta dynasty during the A.D. fourth to sixth century, the Mughal empire from the early sixteenth century to the first quarter of the A.D. eighteenth century and, finally, the British empire from the 18th to the middle of the A.D. 20th century are examples of the growth of some kind of political and economic macro-structures in the past. From the Mauryan times to that of the Mughal empire, the organization of the political structure was monarchical-feudal. "There were surely some Republics but to find them one has to go back before Christ".[18] The economic macro-structure was organized on the mercantile pattern and into guilds, which used to be located in the urban centres. Two important categories of guilds were those of the merchants[19] and the craftsmen.[20] The membership to them was largely closed on ascriptive principles. These and many other forms of macro-structures existed in traditional India. With passage of time, new macro-structures have also come into being. We shall analyse below, as far as possible within a historical context, the stages in which modernizing changes have taken place in the selected macro-social structures in India.

The Elite and Social Change

Elite-structure of a society represents not only its basic values but also the extent to which these values find a concrete expression in the power-structure and the decision-making process of the society. It has rightly been suggested that "the 'leadership' of a society is a criterion of the values by

which that society lives. The manner in which the 'leadership' is chosen; the breadth of the social base from which it is recruited; the way in which it exercises the decision-making power; the extent and nature of its accountability. . . . these and other attributes are indicators of the degree of shared power, shared respect, shared well-being and shared safety in a given society at a given time. By learning the nature of the elite, we learn much about the nature of the society".[21] The changes in elite structure, therefore, might also reveal the essential nature of social changes taking place in that society.

Elites represent the standards of value-excellence in different domains of life through their roles which are either ascribed to them, as in the traditional society, or have been achieved by them by meritorious performance, which is the norm of a relatively modernized society. There may be as many types of elites as there are the forms of 'valued outcomes'[22] and institutions as mentioned by Harold D. Lasswell. In 1952 he wrote: "The concept of the elite is classificatory and descriptive, designating the holders of high positions in a given society. There are as many elites as there are values. Besides the elite of power (the political elite) there are elites of wealth, respect and knowledge (to name but a few)."[23] Recently, these value-spheres were further postulated by Lasswell into eight categories, e.g. 'power', 'enlightenment', 'wealth', 'well-being' (outcomes involving health, safety and comfort of man), 'skill', 'affection', respect', and 'rectitude'.[24] He writes:

> Employing the definition of 'elite' as the influential, we distinguish eight elite levels in a social process. Where influence is unequal, the elite class, with respect to each value outcome, may be occupied by few or many. Obviously, the distribution pattern of influence for each value may approximate many different geometrical figures, notably the pyramid or the 'onion tower'. It is clear on reflection that the specific persons who occupy a top position with respect to one value are likely to hold correspondingly favourable positions with respect to other values. In fact, this possibility is the 'agglutination hypothesis'. The social contest as a whole can be characterized according to each value or all values aggregatively.[25]

In fact, the structure of elites in a society also undergoes the process of differentiation with changes in the social system as a whole. This is especially true when a traditional society passes into the stages of modernization. Innovations in science and technology create value domains and spheres of skill which did not exist before and offer new opportunities of role excellence or elite role in the society.[26] This leads to the growth in the number of elite groups, which to some extent breaks the 'exclusiveness' of the traditional elites.[26] To use the metaphor of Lasswell, new pyramids of elites come into being. Yet, the agglutination process does not cease to operate; as the

elite-pyramids multiply a competition goes on between elites representative of one value domain with those who have control over another. This process is regulated and determined by the power structure of the society. It is in this context that political elites generally constitute the most important segment of the elite structure of any society, since they have direct access to the political power which is over-riding among all other forms of power.

A distinction has also been suggested on the above ground between the 'general' and 'special' elites[27] or between the 'elect elite' and the 'eminent elite'.[28] The general or elect elites are those who possess many qualities or have command over a combination of values; the special or the eminent elite has excellence in only one field of values. In the former case many influences tend to agglutinate in a single elite status and in the latter cases elites have command over only one sphere of influence. Since the crucial factor in differentiation of elites is the growth in values and ramifications of power (we define power as the ability to have command over values in society), change in elite structure has a significant association with the transformation of the traditional society.

A traditional society has more homogeneous structure of values. It offers fewer specializations and its "valued outcomes" are not only limited, but traditionally closed. Elites in such society are not highly differentiated into varieties or levels. Agglutination of levels into one general level of elite status is also simpler to achieve and more characteristic of this type of society. This we could find being the case in most of the traditional societies. The social structure of traditional societies is authoritarian. Elites in such societies constitute a closed group: elite status (command over values) is in most cases ascribed; it is ascribed on the basis of birth, kinship and age; its bases may be patrimonial, or gerontocratic or charismatic;[29] mostly they comprise landed aristocracy;[30] only a section of them spilling over to other occupations such as trade and commerce or priestly callings. The world-view of traditional elites is rooted in the search for the esoteric and abstract ideals and has scorn for manual-technical type of work, which is considered plebeian; this leads to a lack of creativity and innovation in their thinking especially with regard to material and technological aspects of society.[31] Elites in such societies are also psychologically constricted, aggressive and suffer from deep-rooted sense of status anxiety[32]. Their capacity for empathy and psychic mobility is limited.[33]

The social structure of elites in traditional India was based on the principles of hierarchy, holism and continuity.... the cardinal values of the Hindu tradition. The king and the priest were the two important elite roles in this tradition. Both roles were derived from the caste system which offered a cultural and moral frame of reference to the elite structure. It was the duty of the king to be an effective military leader, to protect the caste order by enforcing its obligations on people, to strictly adhere to caste-norms himself, to protect the priestly class and offer it congenial environment for

meditation and performance of religious duties. The offices of the king and the priest were complementary; the priest was the source of moral norms (*dharma*) which the king was obliged to enforce. Theoretically, therefore, the office of the priest was superior to that of the king. In practice, however, conformity to this ideal was never fully achieved but its ruthless violation was also rare. Kings always respected the moral and religious prerogatives of the priests. The principle of hierarchy was evident in the traditional structure of the elite, since the priest role was legitimately assigned only to the Brahmins and the kingly role only to the Kshatriyas, both comprising the upper two segments of the varna hierarchy. However, this was not always the case. Often, non-Kshatriyas held the kingly offices; "in practice the aphorism 'whoever bears rule is Kshatriya' was applied."[34] In some religious texts a cyclical theory of kingship has also been postulated, that with the decay of social and moral standards in each *yuga* or period of time finally in the *Kali* Age the lower castes (*Shudra*) will come into power and challenge the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas. Thus, a circulation in the structure of elites has also been postulated, which is in accordance with the principle of continuity in the Hindu tradition. Also, we find that in the traditional Hindu theory of elite and social polity no antinomy between the individual and the state is ever conceived of, which in contrast is 'the favourite theme of Western political thought.'[35] This is in harmony with the principle of holism in Hindu social tradition.

As we pass from the level of theoretical postulates about elites to historical transitions, we find that for a long time the elite structure of Indian society remained authoritarian, monarchical-feudal and charismatic. In the Hindu period a quasi-feudal system prevailed. Kings and "emperors" had a number of lesser chiefs or vassals under their sphere of influence. In Mauryan time, the emperor had his own centrally administered territory surrounded by vassal kingdoms subordinate to him in varying degrees; "vassals themselves had vassals of their own in petty local cheiftains calling themselves rajas."[36] The relationship of king with his vassals was not contractual as in the West; it was governed by arbitrary relationships of power and conquest. Priests and councillors as supplementary elites were associated with each level of this monarchical-feudal structure. Since often the political control of the king over his vassals used to fluctuate and in many cases was almost nominal, the macro-structure of elites existed only during the time when imperial rule was relatively stable, such as during the Mauryan and the Gupta empires in the north and the rise of the Cholas in the south.

With the emergence of the Muslim rule in India, feudal pattern of elite structure was further stabilized. In the first instance, many Muslim warriors established themselves as rulers and vassals of the Muslim kings who came to power by conquest. This was especially true during the Turko-Afghan rule before the rise of Mughal empire. The Turk and Afghan Sultans had a number of courtiers, *Khans, Maliks* and *Amirs;* justice was the charge of

Qazis and *Muftis* and in the provinces kings, viceroys, Naib Sultans ruled with the help of *Amils* who were rulers over smaller estates. Ulema now occupied the same position in the hierarchy of elites which was assigned to the Hindu priests in the past. A more compact feudal structure of elites emerged with the establishment and consolidation of the Mughal empire. Mughal emperors introduced the systems of *jagirdari* and *mansabdari* which involved land grant to a vassal with contractual obligations to supply a predetermined number of troops and personal military services to the king at the time of need. The *jagirdars* and *mansabdars* thus emerged as new feudal nobility. The nature of these elites was partly patrimonial and partly feudal. Besides, there were various categories of administrative elites who looked after the functions of the royal court and its departments.[37] But their selection or appointment was not based on rational criteria; its system of 'imperative co-ordination' as Weber would call it, was governed by tradition and more than that by chief's own free will.[38]

The character of elites, whether political or intellectual, was predominantly feudal and charismatic. Both, Hindu priest and king, derived their authority from qualities inherited by birth which had behind it traditional as well as charismatic sanction. Elite status was partially rooted in the caste system which is itself an example of hereditary charisma.[39] The position of political elite was hierarchically arranged with king at the top followed by his vassals, councillors, courtiers, priests, artists and poets. From the top to the bottom the structure was governed by particularistic loyalties and patronages. The Muslim rule only replaced the persons or offices involved in elite status and not the system as such. It was succession of one class of elites by another in the same system rather than a change in the structure or functions of elite; elite structure continued to be feudal, patrimonial and charismatic. As Muslim kings stepped into the imperial role of power many Hindu kings became their vassals; others who did not accept vassalage remained in perpetual conflict. But within his limited domain each vassal king maintained the traditional paraphernalia of officers and elites under his patronage.

Not all sections of these elites had a macro-structure or a pan-Indian influence. Such influence was characteristic only of the few top political elites who were the representatives of the imperial power or of the cultural and religious elites who controlled monastic organizations with networks in various parts of the country. Even then the macro-structural linkages were not always effective. Local vassals or vice-regal representatives had the tendency of revolting very frequently and no religious or cultural movement was without rival schools. The elite structure of this time was mainly segmental with a very thin crest of a macro-structure.

The slow downfall of the Mughal empire coincided with the decadence of the traditional elites. The entrenchment of the British power further accelerated this process and created the material condition for the emergence of an entirely new structure of elites. The monarchical-feudal type of elites were to be replaced by the national-liberal type. The British colonial rule in India

helped in this process in many ways. It neutralized the military potential of feudal chiefs in India; it established a rule of law in the country; it introduced a modern system of education, rational form of administration, a modern army, communication channels and technological and scientific know-how. True, many of these things the British did in their own enlightened self-interest, but its latent function was the emergence of a new macro-structure of elites in India.

Manifestly, the British continued to patronize the traditional feudal elites; they even created (by permanent settlement) a new class of big landlords in Bengal and Bihar. In Bengal it led to great hardship for the old landed gentry who could not pay the high taxes imposed on their lands and it passed on to the *noveaux riches* sections of the rich business classes. The British had a vested interest in keeping the traditional elites—the land owners and the princes—in power since their motto was: 'counterpoise of natives against natives'.[40] This created a historical schism between the traditional feudal and the emergent nationaslist elite in India.

The social structure of the nationalist elite which grew in spite of the British policy (which should be distinguished from the orientation of individual scholar, missionary or journalist English man) in India was fundamentally different. The new elite, a product of cities rather than villages, belonged to the professions (journalists, lawyers, social workers, etc.) more than landed aristocracy, which was in most cases hostile to national movement; the elite constituted a new middle class which grew in India as a result of English education and the expansion of administration, judiciary and teaching professions. Raja Rammohan Roy was a journalist and scholar, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and Keshab Chandra Sen were educationists and teachers, Dayananda Saraswati and Vivekananda were social and religious reformers, Ranade and B.K. Gokhale were social workers and teachers, Madan Mohan Malviya was an advocate, educationist and scholar, B.G. Tilak was a journalist and teacher, Moti Lal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Lajpat Rai, Ambedkar and Sardar Patel were trained in the legal profession, Gandhi was himself a barrister-at-law. Similar professional backgrounds could be found in the cases of other illustrious national leaders such as Aurobindo Ghosh, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, J.P. Narayan, Abdul-kalam Azad, Subhas Chandra Bose and others.

The rise of the political elite coincided in India with the growth of a Westernized middle-class. It emerged as a result of the expansion of higher education among the upper castes. The upper castes which dominated the elite position were the Brahmins (Nagar and Anavil Brahmins in Gujarat, Chiptavan Brahmins in Maharashtra,[41] Kashmiri Brahmins in the north, Bengali Brahmins in eastern India and various sub-castes of Brahmins in South India), Kayasthas, Parsis, Banias and other Muslim upper castes. In professional terms lawyers were predominant in the early social structure of the political elite. "The total of 13,839 delegates who attended the various annual sessions (of the Congress) between 1892 and 1909, as many as 5,442,

or nearly 40 per cent, were the members of the legal profession. The other important groups were those of the landed gentry with 2,629 delegates, and of the commercial classes with 2,091. The rest of the total was made up of the journalists, doctors and teachers...."[42] As the political movement grew in strength the landed gentry was increasingly isolated and the political elite role passed to the educated middle classes and professional groups.

In the early twentieth century Indian elite constituted a composite group. But for the bureaucratic and the technical professional elites, other levels of elite were not fully differentiated. No sizable section of business elite had emerged as the process of industrialization was just beginning. The levels of the intellectual and political elite were merged into one sub-structure. Most of the top political elites had attained high intellectual standards, had their education in well-known Western universities and were actively engaged in creative political and social discourse through the media of newspapers and journals, group meetings and mass public appearances. Intellectually, they were more active than many college and university professors, their thinking was directed towards the contemporary political and moral issues confronting their society and the world at large and it was pragmatic and free from the type of abstract theoretical ratiocination common among the contemporary academics. They combined the roles of demagogues and scholars. In times to come this pattern was going to be radically altered.

The growth of this type of elite was a structural break from the feudal-monarchical character of the traditional elites. The new elites were there on the basis of their professional achievements and modern education. The role was not ascribed to them nor was it delegated to them by feudal-patrimonial patronages; in fact, a sizable section of the new elite was opposed to feudalism and wanted social and economic reform. Its internal composition was now different and its former exclusiveness was also gone. But, since still the majority of elite belonged to the upper castes, particularly the Brahmin caste, the elite structure could not be said to have been 'democratized' in the real sense. Also, the emergence of the new elites in India did not follow the same types of structural changes in the Indian society as were characteristic of the European social transformation after the Industrial Revolution. The breadth of the social base from which elites were recruited remained narrower and their selection was confined to the upper castes. The predominance of the Brahmins in elite role also had major sociological consequences; it introduced an element of moderation in the social and cultural adaptation to the Western values; it kept the traditional allurement for charismatic elites alive; the latter was also conditioned by the structural processes. In this connection it is said:

> The process of breaking from traditional past creates attitudes that are strongly inclined toward accepting charismatic leaders. Native ruling houses and aristocracies are rapidly losing, or have lost already, an authority sanctioned by supernatural beliefs. Withering of deep emotional roots

of respect for traditional authority is taking place which leaves the habits of obedience free-floating, in search of new attachments. In the meantime, the slow spreading of education of a rational character and the scarcity of the media of mass communication retard the development of a new consensus based primarily on intellectual persuasion. In such periods of transition, charismatic leaders are likely to fill the vacuum.[43]

The conditions described above are extraordinarily suggestive of the Indian situation, and probably also explain the reasons why Gandhi and Nehru had charismatic control over the Indian people. But even otherwise, the new elite had a continuity with the traditional elites. According to Prof. Srinivas, this continuity existed in two forms: "First, some members or sections of the traditional elite transformed themselves into the new elite, and second, there is a continuity between the old and new occupations. A simple instance of continuity is provided when the sons of a Brahmin *pundit* enter the professions, or when a chieftain's son achieves a high position in the Indian army, or a Bania's son becomes a leading exporter and importer of goods."[44]

This structural continuity explains the ideological peculiarities of the new elite, most of whom were westernized yet committed to the Indian tradition. There were a few cases where the elite were wholly enchanted by the West; in most cases their greater exposure to the Western culture and its system of values used to reinforce their feelings of nationalism and nationalist cultural identity. The elites of all the three major political ideologies, e.g. communal-conservative, moderate-liberal and radical-populistic, had one factor in common, that is, emphasis on maintaining the traditional cultural identity of India. The differences of opinion on this point were only of degrees. The most influential political elites belonging to the Congress, which eventually won freedom for the country, were openly wedded to this policy. Gandhi, as we have discussed above, provides an extreme case of this ideological tradition. Nehru, in spite of his passion for internationalism and cultural pluralism was also a proud nationalist.

The new elite stood for the modernization of economy, social reforms, policy of egalitarianism, social justice, universal civil rights, removal of caste handicaps and for welfare and equal rights of women and backward classes. These policy exhortations together constituted a value system which was logically far distant from the traditional Indian values of hierarchy, holism and continuity. It came closer to the modernized Western world-view. Yet, these elites were fascinated by the Indian tradition, and wanted to preserve it in its essential forms. This created a psychological schism in their outlook which has been variously described,[45] but its common feature is a feeling of ambivalence between tradition and modernity emerging from the differential demands involved in the quest for cultural synthesis on the one hand and cultural identity on the other.

Structurally, the new elite were from the middle classes, belonged to

various professional groups, and had primarily an urban base. Their social influence used to flow downward from the top of the social structure to which they belonged. Their political orientation was idealistic and free from regional group interests. For this reason, they constituted an integrative macro-structure of the Indian society. Since they were also highly westernized, they were somewhat culturally distantiated from the people.[46]

The form of elite structure changed further after Independence. The political and cultural goals, which before Independence were diffuse and idealistic had now to be translated into specific goals; the function of elites was also now altered; former exhortations had to be converted into action, and the national movement now had to be transformed into an effective system of party movements under a parliamentary democratic framework. This altered the elite-people relationships, which were now materially dominated by interest-groups within and outside the political parties. Since a strong opposition party could not grow in India, the operation of these group interests largely remained confined within the Congress party.

The important trends of change in the elite structure which have appeared during the post-Independence period are: (i) increasing influence of rural-based political elites and slight decrease in the influence of the elites drawn from various professions; (ii) greater differentiation in the elite structure with significant increase in the number of persons belonging to the middle classes; (iii) greater articulation of regional and interest-group oriented goals in political cultural ideologies; (iv) slight breakdown in the exclusiveness of upper castes to the elite position and its consequent democratization.

One indication of the trend of increase in the rural-based political elites may be had from the study of the occupational background of the members of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha). In the provisional Parliament of 1947 there were only 6% members with agricultural occupational background; they comprised 19% of the total strength of Parliament of 1952, 22% in that of 1957 and finally their number rose to 26% in the Parliament of 1962. In contrast to this, the percentage population of members belonging to professions successively declined. In the provisional Parliament of 1947 their strength was 83% of the total; this in 1952 declined to 74%, in 1957 to 73% and remained the same in 1962. The two professional groups which constitute a substantial proportion of the strength of the Parliament are the lawyers and the social workers. Both of these groups together constituted 46% of the strength of Parliament in 1947; in 1962 their strength was 48% of the total membership.[47] The business groups have also increased their strength by 2% in course of successive elections. But the maximum increase (20%) has only been in the number of the rural-agricultural elites. Similar ruralization of the political offices has been taking place also in the state legislatures.[48]

Second important process following Independence was that of increase in the number of persons in the middle-class group, which strengthened the

elite structure at various levels and eventually led to rapid differentiation in its internal structure. Consequently, the ranks of the intellectual and political elites separated into two functional elite groups. Among the intellectual elites were large numbers of persons now engaged in various technical, legal and educational professions, in journalism and art. The number of urban middle-class professional employees (teachers, journalists, lawyers and doctors and others engaged in health services) increased by 74% during 1950 and 1961.[49] The total number in 1950 was estimated to be 770,000 which rose to 1,220,000 by 1961. All of them obviously do not have elite position, yet a substantial increase in the middle-class group may be noted. About the number of intellectual elite in India, Edward Shils writes:

> It is extremely difficult in the present state of Indian statistics and the shadowiness of the boundaries of the term 'intellectual' to assay an estimate of the number of Indian intellectuals now in existence. Within an upper and lower margin, ten thousand in each direction, one might say that there are about 60,000 professional intellectuals in India today... including in that figure college and university teachers, research workers in government and on the staff of scholarly and scientific research institutes, applied scientists in industry, writers and journalists, literary men, critics, scenario writers, painters and sculptors. Productive intellectuals on the bench and at the bar, in medical practice, civil service, in business and in active professional politics, might add a thousand more. The consuming intellectuals whose vocations are not in themselves intellectual, but whose training and disposition, whether connected with their occupations or not, lead them to interest themselves in intellectual matters, must run into the neighbourhood of 100,000. In sum, we estimate that there are at least 160,000 persons in India today who might be termed 'intellectuals' according to strict standard.[50]

The figures quoted by Shils (published in 1961) are based on a definition of intellectuals which does not include all the categories of the urban middle class professional employees mentioned above, whose number in 1961 alone amounted to more than 1,000,000. In the absence of definite records there is no reliable way to check the facts, but the figures of Shils might be an under-estimate of the actual position. The trend is, nonetheless, self-evident. The number of productive and consuming elites has increased significantly, and Shils concluded that "India alone, of all the new states, appears to possess an intellectual class which is 'modern' in the sense of embodying the wide range of technical and analytical skills and the dispositions and tastes characteristic of the intellectuals of the Western countries. It is "an estate of the realm", its existence, for better or for worse, is acknowledged within its society, and it performs the great variety of roles, such as are appropriate to the intellectuals in Western countries."[51] This clearly substantiates our point that a differentiation within the elite structure has

taken place during the post-Independence time.

Another important change has taken place in the orientation of elite's interests and loyalties, specially that of the political elites. The political elites now increasingly succumb to as well as articulate the values and aspirations of the regional interest-groups; the diffuse ideological orientation of the pre-Independence days is found to be increasingly absent in the consciousness of the emerging new political elites. This, however, reflects the normal realities of political life in India which Myron Weiner terms as the 'politics of scarcity'. As the democratic process takes roots in the Indian soil, mobilization of regional interest-groups is a normal process to take place, and the political elite has to take account of these forces. But since this process takes place with the simultaneous differentiation and increase in the numerical strength of other types of elites, one should not read too much of political regionalism in it or conclude that this would finally break up the Indian federation. On the contrary, it is through articulation of the regional group-interests with its counter-checks in the growth of politically independent, articulate and enlightened professional, bureaucratic and intellectual elites that lies the possibility of a higher level of political and social integration of India.

Finally, since Independence, the social and economic bases for the recruitment of elites in India have also been widened. The former monopoly of the upper castes and the middle classes to this role-structure has to some extent been broken. In most of the southern States, such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Mysore and to some extent in Kerala, the upper caste monopoly on political elite status has been foiled. In these States, however, there is a tendency among Brahmins who were former political elites to now move away to other elite roles which are politically neutral and depend upon higher standards of professional and intellectual achievements in science, engineering, medicine, etc.[52] Thus, there is a vertical mobility in elite status, the character of which is being governed by changes in the political power of the Brahmin and non-Brahmin groups and by the time-lag from which the non-Brahmins suffer in these States in the matter of education and general westernization.[53]

To summarize the changes taking place in the elite-structure of the Indian society we postulate three stages of transition: (1) the monarchical-feudal elites of the traditional types, whose social structure as well as the world-view was hierarchical, to whom elite role was ascribed on religious, patrimonial and other particularistic grounds or on the basis of wealth; who were less creative and more wedded to the ideology of the status quo, and finally, the source of the legitimation of their authority was in the traditional status, honour and charisma; (2) the new nationalist-liberal elite, who emerged as a result of the British rule in India, led to the growth of Western education, contact with Western ideology of liberal-humanism, democracy, egalitarianism, nationalism and industrialism. It created a kind of elite structure which though in some respects being rooted in the

past social structure based on high caste status, middle and upper middle class status and traditional positions of honour, were in some respects differentiated from the social structure of the traditional elites; most of the new elite did not belong to feudal-monarchical class or landed aristocracy but to an emerging professional group; most of them were highly westernized and faced hostile response from the elites of the older disposition. The social drama of such conflicts is clearly portrayed in *The New Brahmins* by D.D. Karve.[54] The elites of this type had a diffuse rather than specific ideology; they projected cultural values of nationalism, liberalism, science and economic advancement as general goals, but without specific policy orientations. Their reaction to such values, being of Western origin was ambivalent and ranged from xenophobia to xenophilia.[55] But pure cases of the either extreme are very hard to come by. Most of the elites of this group were, as Prof. Srinivas says, "two-faced, one face turned toward their own society, while the other was turned toward the West. They were spokesmen for the West as far as their people were concerned, and spokesmen for their people, as far as the rulers were concerned."[56]

With the growth of India as an independent democratic nation another elite structure emerged: (3) the new elite of political-populistic orientation. These elites differ from the new elites of the pre-Independence time in the fact that they have more pragmatic and specific policy orientation in political goals; their political ideology is not diffuse but specific; they do not appeal to masses on the ground of generalized nationalistic themes but on specific issues which form part of the social structure of the contemporary interest groups in their community or region; they are also now increasingly recruited from rural, agricultural and lower middle caste or class backgrounds; they are less westernized than the national-liberal elites of the British times; the rise of this level of political elite also coincides with increasing differentiation within the elite structure. The intellectual elites have now a separate and relatively autonomous existence; the new political-populistic elites are seldom intellectuals and they rarely claim such pretensions.

These stages of change in the elite structure of the Indian society conform to a general process of change taking place in South Asia, Africa and Latin America where political elites are increasingly becoming more conscious of national identity and resist direct cultural and institutional identification with the West.[57] The new populistic elites in India are also more pragmatic and identity conscious than idealistic and international in orientation. The rise of Jana Sangh in the north and D.M.K. in the south is clearly indicative of growth in the populistic types of elites. Communists and other political elites of the leftist or Marxist leanings too have their identification more with the specific and immediate issues concerning specific group interests rather than commitment to a diffuse political ideology (which they have in theory but ironically always tend to flout), which was characteristic of the national liberal elites.

Bureaucratic Elite and Bureaucracy

In ideal typical form, bureaucratic organization is an extension of a modernized social structure. It is based on legal authority, which according to Weber, is located in rationally defined legal norms; these norms are not embodied in persons but in 'offices' which are abstract rational categories; obedience in bureaucracy is, therefore, not to persons but to 'the laws' which are defined by 'rules' and 'specified sphere of competence'; offices are hierarchically arranged in terms of competence and responsibility; administrative procedures are formulated and recorded in 'writing', so that the whole organization is 'rationalized and de-mystified'[58] specially in the realm of power relationships. In a pure type of bureaucratic structure, as Weber writes, individual officials are appointed and function according to the following criteria:

> (1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their personal official obligations. (2) They are organized in clearly defined hierarchy or offices. (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense. (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection. (5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not *elected*. (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account. (7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent. (8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgement of superiors. (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position. (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.[59]

In real life, however, there are variations from the characteristics of bureaucracy mentioned above. Weber says that traditional India did not have a developed socio-cultural foundation for the growth of rational legal authority and bureaucratic social structures.[60] Broadly speaking, he is right. We get details of a complex system of administration of the State, city, and military organization, etc., in Kautilya's *Arthasastra;* king's counsellors are reported to be organized into hierarchies of competence and power, there were a number of counsellors (*mantrin*) below a chief counsellor (*maha-*

mantrin), for administration of various sate activities; there was the treasurer (*Arthasastra sannidhar*), the tax collector (*samahartra*), the chief judge and legal adviser (*pradvivaka*), the army general (*senapati*), and the chief record keeper (*mahaksapatalika*). All were members of the king's council. Cities were administered by an officer called *nagaraka* or *purapala*, who was responsible for tax collection and maintenance of law and order; he controlled the police, secret agents and the troops which were sometimes under the command of a captain (*dandanayaka*), or under his own command. For each forty households in the city there was a *gopa* or a petty officer, who kept record of their income and expenditure, and took note of deaths and births in the families under his charge. There also were administrators for the control of crime, disposal of criminals, and for the administration of finances.

Apparently, this administrative structure makes us believe that some form of legal authority with a bureaucratic type of structure existed in ancient India. But this legal system was not contractual or egalitarian; social and criminal codes had a bias in favour of certain castes and individuals in certain offices; charismatic and traditional status were given priority in the administration of justice; equality of all persons before law was not an accepted rule. There was no established constitution or legal procedure; king used to rule through royal decrees (*sasana*), which were arbitrary and were changed from time to time. Some officials were paid salary, but most of them depended on commissions; none of them had a fixed tenure or a rationally defined sphere of competence; the abstract notion of 'office' did not exist, all officials were servants of the king and owed loyalty to him in person. This type of administrative structure comes closer to the 'patrimonial bureaucratic model'.[61]

With some variation, the system continued during the Turko-Afghan and the Mughal rule in India. Now, both the Hindu and the Muslim law formed the basis of administration of justice; some changes were effected in the personnel and the pattern of administration, but, non-equalitarianism in law and patrimonialism in official appointments and allocation of duties, etc., continued to persist.

The modern bureaucratic structure in India is a contribution of the British rule. Its rational character has evolved slowly, and in its present form, this organization has imbibed many typical elements, which distinguish it from bureaucracy in any other nation; as we shall discuss below these typicalities have resulted from its organic development in the unique historical setting of India. This was also to be expected. The political and administrative growth in the new nations might have systematic similarities with those in some nations of the West, but as Ralph Braibanti has pointed out, "the qualitative fibre of the context both affects and creates conditions of dissimilarity vitiating relevance of other experience,"[62] consequently the same systems assume different functional orientations in different societal contexts.

This is also true for the bureaucratic system and its elite structure (Indian

Civil Service) in India. In some respects the British gave it a shape; they were responsible for introducing into this system its basic rational framework which consists of : "open entry based on academic competition; permanency of tenure irrespective of party political changes; a division into grades or classes according to whether the function is responsible or merely routine; a regular, graded scale of pay; and a system of promotion based on a combination of seniority and selection by merit."[63] But these characteristics have evolved under a historical contingency of forces, which the Company and the British government encountered in India. They could not have been imported from Britain in toto. Hugh Tinker writes: "None of these features could be detected, even in embryo, in the 'Civil Service' in the United Kingdom of the eighteenth century. Whitehall functionaries moved from party political appointments into 'administrative' office and back into politics. Appointment was by patronage. Salary was attached to a specific appointment.... Frequently, an ill-paid deputy discharged the duties of the post. No clear distinction was drawn between purely clerical posts, which might be ill-paid or richly paid, and higher positions of responsibility. Not until after 1870 did the 'home' Civil Service begin to assume its present pattern. This pattern was largely derived from the evolution of a superior civil service in India."[64]

A more rational organization of Civil Service evolved in India because of the concern of the politicians in Britain to control the possibilities of accumulation of wealth by the Company's servants so that "the cornucopia of Indian patronage should not become the means of dominating the politics of England."[65] Consequently, Pitt's India Act of 1784 was introduced which provided for definite scale of pay and emoluments and formulated the principles of promotion by seniority; it also fixed the age for entry into the service of 'writers' and cadets at fifteen to eighteen years. In 1793, under Company's renewed charter the position of higher civil office was reserved for the 'covenanted' civil service, which was later renamed as Indian Civil Service and regularized by the Indian Civil Service Act of 1861. During the Company's time the bureaucratic elite were the members of the 'covenanted' civil service; Indian Civil Service came to occupy this position with the beginning of the Crown's rule, now renamed in the Independent India as the Indian Administrative Service. Thus, one might find a great deal of continuity in the structure and function of the bureaucratic elite-cadre in India.

The social structure of the Indian bureaucracy may be analysed in terms of three major evolutionary stages: first, at the inception and during the early phases of the Company's rule (1600–1740),[66] when the 'ethos of trade'[67] was dominant in the civil service. Second, the period of Company-Crown rule (1740–1947) when the Civil Service was guided by 'ethos of professional career' and the psychology of 'masters and guardians.'[68] The third stage is the one following the Independence (1947...) when the ethos of Indian bureaucracy imbibed elements both of professionalism and nationalistic

consciousness.[69] In course of these three stages, not only the ethos but also the social composition and role of Indian bureaucracy and its elite structure has undergone significant changes.

During the first stage, the bureaucratic system tended to be particularistic in matters of recruitment of officials. Company's directors used to nominate the factors (mercantile agents), writers, cadets and other categories of officers on considerations of kinship and friendship. The appointments to the Company's civil services made on the grounds of friendship and kinship during 1809–1810, 1819–1820, 1829–30, 1839–40, and 1849–50 were 75 per cent, 74 per cent, 75 per cent, 85 per cent, 79 per cent of the total appointments made for the respective years.[70] Substantial proportion of these appointees were sons of persons in the Company's service, of gentlemen and of merchants and manufacturers.[71] Most of them were trained in the Company's training college at Haileybury, where the staff had a markedly religious orientation[72] and made every attempt to inculcate a religious moral sense among the trainees. The trainees did not come from the aristocratic or upper middle class families; they were mainly "drawn from banking and commercial families and landed groups in Scotland and the south-east of England. Cultural and economic ties of these groups were very much buttressed by ties of descent and affinity."[73]

The salaries of these officials were very low. A senior factor of the East India Company in 1674 used to draw annual salary of forty English pounds, a writer of ten pounds and an apprentice of only five pounds, for the first five years. For this reason, most of them also engaged in private trade[74] and plantations.[75] "The Company assumed that its servants could engage in private trade to make their living."[76] Under these circumstances professionalism in service could not grow.

By the middle of the 18th century, however, professionalism in civil service began to grow; appointment by 'patronage' wasincreasingly being replaced by appointment on the basis of 'merit' through examination. The elite position in the civil services was now reserved for the "covenanted" officers who were appointed by the Court of Directors in London. Hugh Tinker writes: "By restricting all senior positions to the covenanted service, the British effectively eliminated the adventurers who had battened on Indian administration; this restriction also sowed the seeds of a professional *esprit de corps*, while the changing spirit of the age.... fed by the humanitarian zeal of evangelical Christianity and the reforming, scientific sense of Benthamite Utilitarianism.... was elevating the tone of government service."[77]

The entry into the 'covenanted' services was exclusively reserved for the English till the Act of 1833, which proclaimed that, "No native of the said territories (of British India).... shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment of the Company."[78] As a result of it, Indians were appointed to middle rank of the administrative services, but they were still not taken into covenanted services. A few Indians were appointed deputy

collector or civil judge by promotion. The entry of Indians to covenanted services could be possible only when the principle of open competition by examination was accepted for recruitment after 1855, when the first examination for Civil Services was held. The first successful candidate to the Indian Civil Service was Satyendranath Tagore who gained his place in 1864. "In 1869, four Brahmo candidates, Surendranath Banerjea, Romesh Chandra Dutt, Bihari Lal Gupta and S.B. Thakur, competed and all were successful."[79]

Thus, a new phase of slow Indianization of the civil services started. This process was, however, not without resistance. In 1876, the upper age limit for competition was lowered (from 21 to 19) which placed Indian candidates in a disadvantageous position; this was because examinations were held in England and a prospective candidate had to be sent there at least four years in advance to get a qualifying degree from Oxford or Cambridge before he could appear for competition and now, due to reduction of age, time was too short for Indian candidates to get the requisite proficiency. There was also discrimination against the Indian civil servants. Consequently, a Civil Service movement was launched by Surendranath Banerjea in 1877, but the process of Indianization remained very slow. Only in 1922 an examination for Indian Civil Service was simultaneously held in India (Allahabad) and England. Subsequently, the Lee Commission proposed that by 1939 a numerical parity between the British and the Indian appointees to the Civil Service be established, and thereafter, gradually the British component may be reduced so that the civil service is completely Indianized. Some progress in recruitment of Indians to the Civil Service was made following the Lee Commission Report. In 1929 there were 894 British and 367 Indian civil servants; by 1939 there were 759 British and 625 Indian I.C.S. officers.[80] If we compare this position with that in 1909 when there were only 60 Indians to 1082 British personnel in the Indian Civil Service, the process of Indianization had made some progress, although the final goal of the Lee Commission was not achieved during the British rule in India.

Like the early nationalist political elite, the Indian bureaucratic elite also came from the upper middle classes and the upper castes. In Bengal most of the early recruits to the I.C.S. were from the reformist Hindu group of the Brahmos;[81] in other parts too the Brahmins and other upper castes dominated. B.B. Misra writes that, "most of the Hindus in the service of the Government were upper-caste men, especially Brahmins and Kayasthas, who dominated the field. The Indian Public Service Commission reported in 1887 that of 1,866 Hindu members of the judicial and executive services as many as 904, or nearly half, were Brahmins, and 454, or nearly a quarter, were Kayasthas, who were called *Prabhus* in Bombay. The number of Kshatriyas or Rajputs was 147; of Vaisyas 113; of Shudras 146; and of others 102. The Brahmins were especially dominant in Madras, with 202 of total of 297, and in Bombay, with 211 out of 328."[82] To a great extent this

was so because the Brahmins and the Kayasthas and some other upper caste groups, we have mentioned above, were in the professional services right from the Mughal times and they had a better access to openings in the professional domains because of a traditional elasticity in their attitude to adapt to the new standards of professional requirements.

The third stage in the structural transformation of the bureaucratic elite in India came after Independence. This altered the composition of these elite. Prior to Independence there were 608 British and 549 Indians in the Civil Service; just after Independence there were only 33 Britishers in the Service compared to 418 Indians; by 1964 the strength of indigenous civil servants (now called Indian Administrative Service) had gone up to 1971 and only 3 British civil servants remained in the Government service.[83] Moreover, the proportion of civil servants belonging to the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service, trained and educated entirely in India considerably increased in comparison to number in the former Indian Civil Service many of whom were trained and educated in Britain and had closer ties with the Western culture. The estimated strength of the former I.C.S. in the Indian Administrative Service was only 9·1% of the total strength of 2,252 in 1965; this percentage is likely to go down to 0·1% by the year 1982. Thus, after Independence a double process of Indianization of the bureaucratic elite took place: first, replacement of the British by the Indian officers; and secondly, within the Indian bureaucratic elite the numerical increase in the strength of indigenously educated and trained elite.

The social effect of this double Indianization is a radical transformation in the cultural and political orientation of these elite. Simultaneously, the former pattern of relationship between the bureaucratic and the political elite has also undergone a sudden metamorphosis. Before Independence, bureaucratic elite of Indian origin were torn between two sets of loyalties: one to the ideological appeal of nationalism and the other to their professional norms. Fortunately, Indian bureaucracy succeeded in keeping to its professional norms and functioned only within a specified sphere of competence determined by legal-constitutional authority. This rendered their adaptation to the altered situations after Independence much easier and more effective.

The social background of the new bureaucratic elite has also changed to some extent but still most of the direct recruits to the I.A.S. come from the higher income families.[84] An analysis of 615 direct recruits of 1960 indicated that 58% recruits came from families with salaries between Rs. 300–900 per month; 33% from families with monthly salaries of more than 900 per month and 9% only from families with income below Rs. 300 per month.[85] There is some change, however, towards levelling down of this class bias in the successful competition. "The 72 recruits undergoing training at the National Academy of Administration in 1960 divided fairly evenly on this scale between high, middle and low family income groups....

37%, 39%, and 24% respectively. Of further interest is the recent dramatic increase in the representation of scheduled castes and tribes, formerly called untouchables: 26.2% of the total batch of direct recruits in 1962 came from this background."[86] A study of direct recruits between 1948–60 by Trivedi and Rao has shown that 44.5% of recruits are sons of government officials, and fathers of 14.3% are teachers, 10.6% are lawyers, 9.9% are businessmen, 8.0% are agriculturists, and 4.9% are physicians. Obviously, the candidates whose parents belong to the professional groups dominate the recruitment to the I.A.S. The share of agriculturists' children who constitute more than 75% of the population is only to the extent of 8 per cent.

It is not surprising that agricultural groups do not have a share in recruitment proportionate to their population; this can be explained by obvious reasons, e.g., their educational backwardness, poverty and lack of opportunities. But it is very significant that within the professional groups from where most of the bureaucratic elite are being recruited, the share of the families with lower incomes is increasing and monopoly of this status by the higher income groups and higher castes is slowly breaking down.

The changes that have taken place in the structure of the bureaucratic elite, its cultural background and orientation during the three phases of transition are now evident and comparable. During the Company's time, these elite were recruited exclusively from those who did not have a professional orientation; a slow Indianization of bureaucratic elite structure started with the consolidation of the British rule after the Mutiny; a professional ethos emerged in the orientation of these elite, but its scope was narrow, confined only to the maintenance of law and order. In social composition these elite (of Indian origin) were drawn from the upper middle-class professional groups. After Independence, both the structure and the orientation of these elite have changed; more and more of them come from relatively lower income professional groups; all of them are educated and trained in India, and their orientation is not only maintenance of law and order (which is still primary)[87] but also social development and national growth.

The commitment of the bureaucratic elite to the national growth-ideology is still, however, secondary to their function in maintaining a stable and constitutional macro-structure of Indian society. This elite social structure, though disparate, provides a principle of functional unity. It offers a social base for national consensus. Potter writes: "The I.A.S. officer, all-India in his functional orientation, carries national ideology with him into every district, where he articulates it constantly in his exposed position before the district population. His behaviour reinforces the national consensus spreading through India's developing political system."[88] Through its successive stages of change this elite structure also tends to conform to the same processes of democratization, liberalization and non-exclusiveness of its social base to which the political elite structure is exposed. Increasingly,

a large section from among both the sub-structures has only vicarious acquaintance or identification with the Western values and ideologies. But the bureaucrats' position in this regard is more sheltered than that of the politicians' who have to respond to the cultural and political aspirations of the masses. However, this process of change foretells of a better possibility of functional adjustment between the bureaucratic and the political elite in India.

Bureaucracy in India offers a most stable structural foundation for modernization of the society and growth of a consensual normative order. It, no doubt, suffers from internal cultural tensions; these tensions arise from role conflict in inter-structural participation of the bureaucrats; his familistic, caste and kin-oriented particularism might come into clash with the ideology of universalism in his bureaucratic roles; his personal loyalties might cut across the legal anonymity and abstractness of his 'office'. But these dangers have been over-rated and over-emphasized, on the false belief that these exclusively arise out of the less 'developed' and traditional nature of the Indian society; when we look deeper into it, many dysfunctions seem to be related with the phenomena of power and the relative deprivations of groups and classes. In this form such dysfunctions of bureaucracy may be comparable to those existing in the Western societies.[89] It also emerges from the false assumption that functionally equivalent processes or results must everywhere follow structurally similar growth. This happens to be a popular fallacy in most of the thinking that goes on about modernization of the traditional societies.[90]

The political, intellectual and bureaucratic elite are all forms of macro-structures which contribute to structural modernization of Indian society. The role-structures of all the three levels of elite imply conformity to cultural goals consistent with democracy, legal-rational institutions, universalistic norms in public life, emphasis on achievement and competence, etc., which are basically modern in ethos. But these values in macro role-structures have to grow within the structural constraints of each level of participation as well as under that of the conditions of the Indian society in general. These structural constraints are rooted in the power relations of various classes and social strata. At present, the political power in India is shifting from the urban to rural areas, from the upper to middle and lower classes, and from ideological-nationalistic to regional-populistic type of political elite; increasingly these elite are representatives of indigenous cultures, many of them even do not have university education, which most of the bureaucratic and intellectual elite in India have, and their commitment to modern values is more instrumental or pragmatic than ideological. They want modern institutions but are not westernized. To most of them modernity is a surrogate of national identity and revival of lost national glory. They dominate the more westernized bureaucratic and intellectual elite. The *New Statesman* recently formulated the situation as follows:

> In any case since Independence, political and administrative power has shifted from the hands of the English educated. Parliament and state legislatures are now dominated by those who either do not speak English or are violently opposed to it. It is not uncommon to see Oxford educated Indian bureaucrats trembling in the presence of junior ministers with rural school background.[91]

This creates an imbalance between power relationships and cultural communication. The intellectual and bureaucratic elite who are culturally nearer the value system of modernization are structurally, or in terms of power relations, less effective than the political elite; moreover, often the structural goals of modernization, such as liberalism, equality of opportunity, wider political participation, etc., themselves generate social forces which change the balance of power relationship in favour of populistic political elite rather than westernized liberal intellectual elite. Imbalances of power relationship not only constrict but also distort the cultural goals of modernization, and lead to various forms of protest movements.[92] From an international point of view it leads to a psychology of suspicion and resentment against the developed Western nations and their cultural patterns. So far as imbalance in power structures of classes within nations and between nations is a result of historical processes and it tends to persist, it is difficult to visualize the growth of modernization in developing countries as an extension of Western culture as implied by many Western scholars.[93] In developing countries like India, with greater political mobilization, there is bound to be growth in the awareness among classes about the imbalances in power relations within the society and with other nations in the outside world, which might increasingly result into protest movements in intergroup relationship in the country and militant nationalism in the international realm.

INDUSTRIAL AND URBAN MACRO-STRUCTURES

An emerging entrepreneurial class or business elite, rising volume of industrial workers in factories and trade unions, urbanward migration of population and expansion of cities are other forms of macro-structural phenomena which may contribute to social change and modernization of Indian society. These structures are together focal to the processes of industrialization and economic growth. The extent to which there is an increase in these macro-structures within a traditional society may indicate the rate and quality of its social change.

Among these macro-structures, the rise of a dynamic class of business elite has the key to the whole process, as other macro-structures (the growth in factories, in migration and in the rate of urbanization) are to a considerable degree dependent upon the amount of entrepreneurial initiative and skill that exists in society. Business elite are the first order innovators in

these realms of macro-structures. They are entrepreneurs par excellence; their risk-taking ability sets a whole series of contingent entrepreneurial responses into motion; of these, urban-ward migration is one and the labourers' 'commitment' to the new industrial work in factory setting is another. Both these phenomena imply also a series of other forms of readaptation in behaviour and thought which are crucial to industrialization, economic growth and social change.

Business Elite

The emergence of the new business elite and entrepreneurial class in India coincides with the consolidation of the British rule, which established an organic connection between the Indian economy and that of Great Britain; the latter, also being under the convulsions of the Industrial Revolution, exposed the Indian business elite for the first time to the vicissitudes of evolving technological and scientific innovations in economic enterprises. In the rise of the contemporary business elite, if the British empire in India introduced a historical break, the contact with technology and science introduced a cultural break from the past tradition.

Contrary to the common notion that Indian tradition does not favour growth of enterprising business elite, traditional India at many stages of its history had a flourishing and adventurous class of such elite, who had expanded their operations beyond the shores of India to Africa and the Middle East, to Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China and elsewhere;[94] Helen B. Lamb writes: "One is puzzled by the apparent contradiction between the hierarchical view of society as contained in Indian caste and the obvious vigour of Indian trading communities."[95] That the Indian tradition had a developed form of business-ethics would be evident from the qualities that Manu lays down for a trader:

> He must have knowledge of the prices and qualities of precious stones, metals, and woven goods; the rules of weighing articles; information about the wages of artisans, about soils, and sowing of seeds; and about measurement of land; about the profits and losses from the sale of different articles; he must have ability to forecast price fluctuations; he must be skilled in methods of buying and selling, he must be conversant with the good and evil of nations; he must speak the languages of different peoples, know how to multiply his riches by honest means.[96]

It is clear that an ethic in consonance with the contemporary economic realities existed in traditional India. With the rise of Buddhism and Jainism about the middle of the 600 B.C., new business classes came into being. Banking and book-keeping developed, and in cities merchant-guilds became the centres of economic activities. While Buddhism succumbed to Hindu revivalism, Jains have continued to dominate the business and industry in India. Their domination has particularly been in the Gujarat area and

Rajputana.[97] In 1829 an English writer noted that "more than half of the mercantile wealth of India passes through the hands of the Jaina laity.... The officers of the State and revenue are chiefly of the Jaina laity, as are the majority of the bankers from Lahore to the ocean."[98] In other parts of the country the Vaisnava Baniyas played a similar role. The British rule added to the disintegration of the traditional mercantile network of India which was already decaying due to political turmoils during the declining Mughal rule. The British ruralized India as their economic policy converted masses of artisans into peasants and agricultural labourers. Now only two avenues of mercantile enterprise remained open to Indian businessmen: moneylending and agricultural financing, and the work as middlemen and brokers to British firms.

The rise of the new business elite in India is linked with the emergence of these new brokers and middlemen. This happened in the regions of Calcutta and Bombay. Baniyas, Jains (Shroffs) and some Kayasthas dominated as brokers in the Calcutta region; Parsis, Baniyas and Jains mainly controlled such business in Bombay, and Chettiars did so in Madras. Like elite at other levels, these business elite too came primarily from the upper segment of the caste structure.

These business groups acted mainly as commercial agents and not as industrial entrepreneurs. Their role was not concerning industrial management or its organization but in supply and marketing of goods. For industrial entrepreneurship, technical know-how, machines and statistical data were required, which were not developed in India. However, about the second quarter of the 19th century, a few Parsi and Bengali entrepreneurs emerged on the scene. Cavasjee Banajee started a spinning and weaving mill in 1845; other Parsis took to ship-building industry; in Bengal, Dwarkanath Tagore purchased an English colliery in 1836.[99] However, these enterprises were insubstantial. The British were the only major industrial entrepreneurs till 1911, except in the Bombay region where the Parsis, Jews and Gujratis were also active.[100]

From 1911 onwards Indian industrial entrepreneurs began to catch up with the British; Gujratis had control over only 3 companies in 1911; the number rose to 11 in 1931, and 17 in 1951; similarly, in 1911, Parsis controlled only 15 companies and in 1931 the number went up to 25, though in 1951 it declined to 19; most phenomenal increase during this period was in the industrial entrepreneurship of the Marwaris. They did not control a single company till 1911, and had control over only 6 companies in 1931, but by 1951 they had control over 96 companies.[101] "The Parsis, Gujratis, and Bengalis were ahead of Marwaris in 1911 and as late as 1931. The Parsis dominated the cotton textile industry, and one of their number, the Tatas, started the Iron & Steel Works at Jamshedpur in 1907 and the hydro-electric works in Bombay in 1910. The Gujratis and Marwaris, however, overtook the Parsis in the cotton industry in the 1930s. The most important of these were the Birlas, Juggilal Kamlapat, Ruia, Ambalal Sarabhai

Kasturbhai Lalbhai, and some others."[102] The business elite of India, in fact, come mainly from these industrial households.

There are two outstanding sociological characteristics of business elite in India: first, in social structural terms their rise provides a continuity with the past tradition; most of them belong to the trading and mercantile castes of India and as such their emergence does not mark a radical break in the traditional social structure of the business elite. Secondly, business elite have been actively associated with nationalist movement in India; their entrepreneurial aspirations were in some respects also guided by their patriotic zeal.[103] For this reason, Indian business class has even after Independence been more adaptive than retroactive to the governmental policies in respect of industrial growth.[104] This has specially been true during the first decade of Independence, after which new breaches in the pattern of harmony have been particularly in evidence.

These two characteristics influence the role that business elite play in the modernization of Indian society. Their continuity with traditional role-status might appear to smoothen or even synthesize the elements of modernity with tradition; or it may only graduate the process of transition. The recent evidence suggests that gradually most of these business elite are being alienated from the traditional patterns of work-organization and life-styles. More and more of them now resemble the Western industrial elite and manage their affairs through similar industrial bureaucratic organizations as in the West, rather than adhering to the traditional styles. A section of industrial elite are today even more modernized in India, than even the intellectual and the bureaucratic elite. They command enormous resources and prestige and also influence the Indian political processes through distribution of patronages and control over pressure groups.

Indian business elite now organize their industrial activities and investment on similar scientific and rational lines as their Western counterparts. Emphasis on rational recruitment of personnel for technical and managerial functions has increased in manifold terms in recent years; many big business concerns have established research institutes to conduct independent studies in the field of marketing, industrial relations and other allied matters of vital concern to industries. Some of them have instituted their own cadres of administrative and technical services for which recruitment is made on the basis of all-India competitions. Thus, a new class of industrial bureaucrats are now emerging in India, who not only provide a rational foundation for the management of industries but also constitute a new form of reference group for the rest of the bureaucracy in India.

Apart from the big business elite, there has also been an increase in the strength of middle-class elite of the merchant and employer categories.[105] Compared to the early 1950s, the number of employers in 1961 had increased by 75% and those of merchants (retailers and wholesalers) by 30.4%. This indicates that entrepreneurship is increasing not only at the topmost

level, but also at the middle-class level in the urban areas.

In fact, for a general acceleration of economic growth in the country a mobilization of the entrepreneurial motivation on the generalized level of society is a prerequisite. On this point, many scientists have felt that in a society like that of India which is still embedded in an authoritarian social structure mobilization of entrepreneurial skill would be slow and difficult, and even if it has a significant entrepreneurial class at the higher level, at the grass-root level its emergence would be tenuous; it would not be broad-based or representative of all the diverse social groups and castes, it would tend to be an extension of the traditional calling of a group or caste which, like the Jains, Banias and Parsis, were from the very beginning a trading and commercial group.

Despite the truth in these observations, some studies of entrepreneurial growth in India have shown that the process is not hindered by traditional social structure. James Berna's[106] study in the Madras region shows that the emergent level of entrepreneurs has risen not from among the hereditarily rich but from among those who first started with a very small capital and worked their way upward in stages; it also shows that quite a significant number of them had modern education and utilized their rational and technological skills in the field of investment; contrary to general belief they did not preponderantly belong to the traditional group of traders with a traditional world-view of economic activities and investment. In the process of saving and investment, traditional institutions like the extended family and kinsmen have proved helpful rather than being a source of hindrance.[107] The study of Leighton W. Hazlehurst in Ram Nagar also indicates that in the rise of entrepreneurs not only is there a structural continuity in the form of the old trading groups (local merchants) but also a break by way of the recruitment to this class of the refugees, who according to him "have played a significant role in a process of economic experimentation in Ram Nagar ranging from experimentation in new lines of industry to experimentation with new consumer goods..."[108]

In the absence of sufficient representative studies of entrepreneurship in India, nothing very conclusive could as yet be stated, but whatever studies are available tend to refute the prevailing stereotype about traditional social structure of India being uncongenial for the growth of rational entrepreneurship. On the contrary, these studies suggest that some traditional institutional foci instead of hindering, help in the process of entrepreneurial growth.[109] What hinders the process more strongly is the limitation imposed by the economic backstart of groups and classes aspiring for growth, and not the values and traditional cultural categories, which are considerably adaptive.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS' MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

The growth of factories, and of industrial workers as a new class, has not only a causal relationship with social change and modernization but also

gives rise to a new level of macro social structure in the society. Factories offer a uniform rational setting for work-style, division of labour, new social, physical and cultural[110] environment and extensive associative organizations which have an integrative role in the macro-structure of society. Trade unions are an example of associative institutions which function not only in the specific setting of an individual factory but also have macro-linkages with the industrial system as a whole and some of them have even a national organizational base. The rise in the industrial work-force may also indirectly represent the process of slow erosion of some form of traditional ties in a folk society[111] and their replacement by new structures of social relationships. In ideal typical sense, it might imply a change in social relationships which supersede role allocations on the basis of status and honour by those defined in terms of contractual obligations; status may not be ascribed to a person but be left open for him to achieve it by his performance; family and kin-groups might cease to be the units of production and may be superseded by production through complex division of labour in factories which rationalize as well as depersonalize the processes of production. The cumulative result of all these changes is to slowly transform the society from "a static, acquired-status-ridden, tradition-bound, primary-group-oriented, particularistic, fatalistic society into one that is rapidly changing, achieved-status-dominated, progressive, secondary-group-oriented, universalistic and aspiring."[112]

These changes are postulated only at the theoretical level. In actual life, there are variations from this pattern because of the typicality of cultural and social institutions. Industrialization does not proceed in the same fashion in every society. Its basic functions in all societies may remain the same but its forms undergo variations owing to the historicity of circumstances and the pre-existing structural characteristics from which industrialization has to proceed. The pre-supposition of a universal pattern in industrialization takes only the quantitative factors of growth into account without anticipating the qualitative variations in the response pattern.[113a] For this reason, many assumptions regarding the social selectivity, recruitment and commitment and structural characteristics of Indian industrial workers, which are found valid for other nations or other regions within India do not pass the test of validity for Indian industrial workers as a whole.

We shall try to demonstrate some cases of variation with a view to analysing the role of industrial work-force as an institutional mechanism of social change. From the viewpoint of change the qualitative character of industrial working class may be more important but its quantitative growth is equally important since it shows the actual volume of social mobility.

Quantitatively, industrial workers are only a small fragment of the total work-force in India. The number of urban working class in early 1950s was 11,450 thousand, of which only 1,800 thousand were workers in registered factories[113b]; this number had slightly risen by about 1961 when the total urban working class in various categories of occupations was 14,800 thousand

and the number of workers in the registered factories was 2,700 thousand.[114] Between 1951–61, the total number of the working population (rural and urban) in India had a static growth-rate in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In the secondary sector (which includes the industrial workers) there were 14.1 million workers in 1951 compared to the 101.4 million in the primary sector and 24.0 million in the tertiary sector during the same year. In 1961, the work-force in the secondary sector rose to 22.1 million, in the primary sector to 136.2 million and in the tertiary sector to 30.2 million; thus, although in absolute terms there was an increase in each sector, in comparative terms (between sectors) the percentage of growth remained more or less stationary.[115] In 1951, according to one estimate, there were only 7 million industrial workers in India,[116] which was roughly 5% of the total labour force at that time and 2% of the total population in India.[117] Since then the number has increased but in comparative terms remains meagre. From one estimate, in 1961 0.5% of the Indian population was engaged in mining and quarrying and 10% in manufacturing and construction work, which together comes to 10.5%; comparatively the percentage of work-force in the same categories is computed to be 32% in China, 36% in USSR, and 49.5% in UK.[118]

In quantitative terms, therefore, the growth in the macro-structure of industrial workers has not been on the same scale as in some other countries, both in the developed and developing categories. A lag in comparison to China is obvious. The question arises: why has this rate of growth been lesser in magnitude and slower in acceleration? Part of the answer to this question lies in the domain of economics, e.g., the structure of capital mobilization and investment rate and pattern which is outside the scope of present analysis, but another part of the explanation is associated with the cultural and sociological features of the Indian society. This point may be analysed since it may provide some answer to the question raised above and also bring out the main structural features of Indian industrial workers.

Many studies of industrial workers in India have emphasized the fact that the workers are not committed to industrial work and way of life;[119] they are pushed into this career rather than following it willingly or that the proportionate rise in the number of industrial work-force is a function of the inability of the traditional society to meet the goals of its members."[120] It is assumed that factory workers must comprise a selective class of deprived persons in the traditional institutional moorings from which they are perforce pushed out and to which they aspire to return. This phenomenon is what explains, according to these thinkers, absenteeism, erratic labour turnover and leave applications, etc., in factories. This also explains the lack of growth in trade unionism and rational procedure of recruitment of workers.

It must be acknowledged that in a broad sense these assumptions are valid within specific regional contexts. But there are also exceptions. Lambert's study of five factories in Poona shows that selectivity in labour-force is not confined to the lower castes or deprived sections as Slotkin hypothesized.

On the contrary, it represents the categories by caste and ethnic groups, literacy, education, and marital status of the work-force in the same ratio as in the city population of Poona. This goes contrary to Slotkin hypothesis of the selectivity of the deprived sections. Similarly, his study also casts doubt on the labour commitment hypothesis about Indian workers. Lambert finds that "by the time the workers reach their present factory employment, between one-fourth and one-third of the new employees had worked at similar jobs before, a little less than one-half had worked in factories before, and about one-third had been employed before.[121] This shows that a substantial proportion of workers did have a stable relationship with factory work, although it does not fully explain their nature of commitment. With regard to the organization of the internal structure of the factories in terms of mobility of personnel, allocation of work and rational distribution of reward and facilities, Lambert's study corroborates the traditional stereotype that factory social structure maintains many elements of traditional society. Particularistic considerations in recruitment, salaries and wages and even in union movements continue to persist.

This indicates that in sociological terms modernizing role of industrial work-force is limited, although not insignificant. It is limited not because of the determinant role of the traditional cultural system *per se*, which is no doubt giving way to modern forces, but owing to a persistent traditionalization of these forces of modernity.[122]

URBANIZATION AND URBANWARD MIGRATION

Growth of cities or urbanization is another source of structural differentiation in a society. In this respect, pre-industrial cities could be evaluated on a different level than modern cities. Pre-industrial cities have a history in India which goes back to the days of the Indus Valley civilization. Such cities existed as centres of pilgrimage, as royal capitals, as nuclei of trade and commerce, as military encampments on some strategic sites and as educational centres, etc. Cities of one or another of the type described above abounded in pre-British India. Sociologically, such cities had a static and archaic character. Their functions were not integrated with cumulative industrial or economic advancement; cities were centres of conspicuous consumption and production of some luxury goods or armaments for the elite; lack of technological advancement in the fields of water supply, sanitation and defence placed a limit on the expansion of such cities. Most of them used to be walled and migration of persons to them was controlled; even otherwise a walled city had limited scope for physical expansion.

These pre-industrial cities in India used to appear and disappear, used to be raised or down-razed with fluctuation of political power, due to changes in the trade routes or by simple whim of a monarch. Often cities would also wither away by withdrawal of support or patronage by nobility. Population of the cities fluctuated on account of epidemics; plague epidemic was

recurrent feature of most of the cities in every summer season, although its severity varied from year to year. For these reasons rate of urbanization in India has been lower compared to most of the countries in the world.[123]

Not only the demographic character of the pre-industrial cities in India was static but also their social structure was hierarchical and closed; cities at the ideal level were manifestations of caste, and at the political level they were seats of kingdom; both ways, they symbolized the basic features of the traditional social order.[124] Their cultural activities were organized around the temples, their economic activities were managed by guilds and the political activities originated from the kings' courts, all being based on the traditional Hindu principle of caste hierarchy. During the Muslim rule the pattern did not change; only one principle of hierarchy was replaced by another, the *Koran* and the *Shariya* now subsisted along with the *dharma-sastras*.

Growth of cities with industrial character or modern demographic features began to take place in India only after its contact with the West, which brought in its train the fruits of Industrial Revolution, modern facilities of health and sanitation, a rational structure of public utility services, stable security and modern firms and industries. Still the rate of urbanization from 1881 to 1941 in India was very slow. The total urban population (defined as places where 5,000 or more persons lived) in 1881 was 9.3 million, in 1891 was 9.4 million, in 1901 was 10.0 million, in 1911 was 9.4 million (due to plague epidemic there was sudden fall in urban population), and in 1921, 1931 and 1941 urban population was 10.2, 11.1 and 12.8 million, respectively.[125] Thus, during these six decades urban population remained more or less stationary. The decade 1941–51 saw a marked increase in urbanization and urbanward migration. In 1951, there were 3,018 towns in India with a combined population of 61.9 million; the urban population had increased by 41%.[126] Since then there has been a constant stimulus towards urbanization.

The slow rate of urbanization in traditional India was not due to the cultural inhibitions of people with regard to physical mobility as is the stereotyped view. On the contrary, access to the city was considered a mark of social prestige and upward social mobility; rural scholars, artists, artisans and warriors and even unskilled workers always aspired to move to the cities for royal patronage and wider acclaim and renown and for better life. It was the closed social structure of the traditional cities which put many restraints on in-migration because of structural limitations of various kinds. Donald J. Bogue and K.C. Zachariah rightly mention:

> India's history has been one of great invasions and migrations, with much circulation of population so that it is doubtful whether the conditions of near perfect immobility ever really existed. Indian peasants have anxiously rushed into new plantations as they were opened up (for example in Assam), and into foreign lands whenever they would be admitted

(Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Africa). It is quite possible that the great dominance of the village over the residential desire of the average Indian citizen (especially those feeling the pinch of population pressure the most) has been greatly exaggerated, and that deficient statistics have perpetuated this bit of misinformation.[127]

A study of urbanization and migration trends in India by these authors shows that rural to urban migration in India is not negligible and is a wider phenomenon; migration is taking place not only to big cities but also to hundreds of medium-size and small cities; the earlier predominantly masculine character of migrants changed during the decade 1941–51 when as many women as men migrated to the cities; also there is little evidence of inhibition among villagers for migration, and migration has progressed to a point where resident of almost every village has some relative or fellow villager who lives in the city. Most of the migrants are absorbed in non-agricultural activities, specially in the manufacturing and service occupations; they do not succeed as easily in business as in other forms of employments.

Consequently, it is fair to assume that with advance in time, urbanization will grow in India with a cumulative pace. The process has already set in. The question is: what sociological changes will follow from this process of accelerated urbanization? Will it radically transform the basis of traditional social structures of caste, joint family, kinship and marriage, etc.? The various urban studies that have been completed in India suggest that urbanization does not necessarily change traditional structural forms, although it does serve the goals of modernization through new structural innovations in the spheres of industry, transport and communication, leisure and recreation and the mode and pattern of social interaction. We have mentioned above how modern means of communication and modern media are increasingly employed in cities for the perpetuation of traditional institutions. Yet at the same time urbanization also introduces breakdown in the functioning of traditional institutional patterns. The forms often continue to persist, but the functions undergo major re-adaptations. Many new roles, often rational and modern in orientation, are added on to the traditional institutional forms. This applies in the case of many institutions like the caste, family, community and neighbourhood, etc., about which we shall discuss below in some detail.

POLITICAL MACRO-STRUCTURES AND CHANGE

Since Independence, active participation of people in the national democratic process has articulated itself through mobilization of a plurality of political structures or political parties which emerge as a new form of macro-structure of social change and modernization in India. Their significance is directly social-structural since their commitment is primarily to a legiti-

mate access to the sources of power. A unique feature of the political macro-structure in India has been continuity of a single party (the Congress) dominance in the sphere of political power which was only partly broken in the general elections of 1967. This provides a historical setting for any analysis of political structure of India in relation to the processes of modernization.

The political framework of modernization is essentially rooted in the changing sources of legitimation of authority and process of its diffusion and centricity in the social structure. In a society having a traditional polity, source of power is in the traditionally established and institutionalized offices of king, chief, or priest-rulers who have access to this office by virtue of qualities ascribed to them. The norms which form basis of allocation of these political offices are inequitably distributed on hierarchical principle of castes (estates in Europe) or similar status groups. The incumbents to political offices have an authoritarian character and their conformity to political norms is arbitrary in the sense that the sphere of actions which may truly be called 'political' or which have to do with policy formulation for the nation or the community as a whole is limited to a selected few and access to political rank is also traditionally closed. In such a system authority has a hierarchical character and not consensual. It is undifferentiated from other roles of incumbents vis-a-vis their role in power structure.

Democratic political framework radically alters such role-structures with regard to power. Power ceases to have a closed hierarchical character; the sphere of political action is broadened to the level of mass participation and begins to respond to the wishes of people which are articulated through various interest-groups. A new concept of responsibility in the functioning of political power structure comes into existence. Consequently, there is ever increasing emphasis on role differentiation, reconciliatiom, ideological mobilization and interest group formation in the political processes of society. All these forces contribute to modernization of political structure.

If we evaluate the democratic processes in Indian society from this frame of reference, we are impressed by two phenomena which to some extent are mutually contradictory: first, increased mass participation in the political process and articulation of group-interests through pre-existing institutional media, like caste association, tribal groups, linguistic and ethnic communities, etc., second, the continued elitist character of most of the political innovations. In fact, the choice of democratic framework of a particular kind in India is itself the result of elitist choice rather than people's will. Had the Indian elite substituted some other model of democracy in India for the one at present, it would as well have been that. This shows that although the choice of democratic polity is a singularly modernizing feature in India, its ethos reflects the traditional principle of hierarchy and charismatic-elitism, akin to the traditional patterns. This incidentally reflects the central feature of modernization in India which in large measure proceeds through innovation in functions of traditional structural forms.

On the political scene, however, the second phase of political moderni-

zation is now largely a matter of the past. Most of the contemporary processes of political changes are focused to the first dimension, that of political mobilization, through reconciliation pattern. It is at this level that most of the questions are being asked: how will political macro-structure survive the contradictions of regional interest-groups? How the development in one level of macro-structure, for example economic, will affect the structure and function at the other level, say, political? How far the traditional institutions like caste, tribe, ethnic groups, will be able to adapt to the functional requirements of a modern democratic political structure?

Briefly, the political trends in India since Independence have largely been a series of reconciliations with demands articulated by regional interest groups; linguistic formation of States in the political realm, emphasis on mixed economy in the sphere of economic policy, ideology of secularism in religion and culture and neutrality in international relationship are all reflections of the predominantly reconciliatory pattern of political modernization in India. The same pattern is also true in case of traditional institutions' role in politics; caste associations, kinship groups and ethnic solidarities, as the evidence suggests, have adapted themselves to the needs of a modern democratic political culture in large measure quite successfully and with fewer distortions.[128] Some maladjustments are, however, natural in the process, specially those which take the form of new protest movements. But so far, the reconciliatory orientation of Indian politics has succeeded in absorbing their shocks without any peril to the system. One cannot, however, speculate about the future. If the natural elasticity of Indian institutions and built-in tendency of tolerance in the cultural tradition of India is assumed as constant, we may speculate that in future among the political protest movements threatening the political structure, reconciliatory orientation will triumph again and again. This might render the pace of political modernization of India slow but it will certainly minimize the social cost of transformation.

Chapter VI

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION

(The Micro-Structural Changes)

In the process of structural change, transformations in macro-structures, analysed earlier, have a tendency to spill over the micro-social structures. Changes in the micro-structures can, therefore, be analysed from two frames of references: first, as a result of the spread-effect of transformations in the macro-structures of society, such as industrialization, politicization, bureaucratization and urbanization, etc., and secondly, as a consequence of endogenous forces of change. The micro-structures which we have selected for analysis are caste, family, and village community.

In any analysis of caste it is necessary that a distinction is made between its theoretical formulation and its existential processes. Theoretically, caste system is rooted in the *varna* division of society into four caste categories, viz. Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Shudra, and a fifth category of the untouchables, who, though excluded from the caste frame of reference, yet constitute its lowest stratum in social and ritual hierarchy. The *varna* model of caste system is macro-structural in nature. But the reality of caste lies at the existential level and not at the ideal-typical level which the *varna* theory postulates. At the existential level there does not exist a single *varna* (caste) with an all-India structural network of kinship, occupational specialization and continuity of social interaction. Srinivas writes:

> It is not merely that some castes. . .for example, the *bharbhujha* or grain parcher, *kahar* or water carrier, and the *bartos* or genealogists. . . are to be found only in some parts of the country, or that the position of a few occupational castes varies from one part of the country to another, but that caste mainly exists and functions as a regional system. In fact, all the Brahmins speaking the same regional language, let alone all the Brahmins in India, do not form a single endogamous group. There may be a dozen or more endogamous groups among them. Again, even within a small region a caste normally interacts with only several other castes and not with all. However, a few castes are found spread over a wide area, and this usually means that there are cultural differences between its various sections. To the average peasant, moreover, the names of castes in other linguistic areas are pure abracadabra. They make sense only when they are fitted into the Procrustean frame of *varna*.[1a]

At the existential level, therefore, castes or *jatis* are divided into hundreds

of regional endogamous groups. The linguistic barriers between regions have served to isolate them further on the one hand and the regional cultural variations, the built-in system of institutionalized inequality and mutual repulsion among *jatis*, on the other, have further reinforced the regional or local character of castes. From a comparative view-point, caste structure differs in regard to internal rank differentiation from one region to another.[1b] Empirically, therefore, castes or *jatis* exist as micro-structures of Indian society. The *varna* model which has the appearance of a macro-structural phenomenon is in reality a cultural framework of caste as a pure category. It lays down normative principles without having much to do with actual processes of structural and functional variations in the reality of caste system.

A structural analysis of caste in India should, therefore, concentrate on how castes and sub-castes in different regional settings maintain or deviate from, first, their traditionally established pattern of activities, and, secondly, in respect of interaction with other castes. The first case would be of a caste which has given up its traditional occupation, and dissociated itself from traditional occupational obligations....for example, of the *jajmani* relationships. The second category of changes would include the processes which threaten to break down the established pattern of inter-caste relationships as such, and thereby threaten the continuity of the system. Such changes are, however, rare, but the emerging, though still a weaker trend toward inter-caste marriages, may in future bring about such a possibility when the rules of caste-endogamy are broken. Till now, its incidence is too insignificant to matter. At another level, structural changes would also include the varied functional differentiations within caste, a process through which the sphere of caste activities instead of constricting is gradually expanding. Examples of such changes are when caste groups function as political associations, economic interest-groups or as classes. It is these forms of changes which have been too frequent since Independence and offer a new locus for structural analysis of caste. These processes have also sparked off new theoretical discussions about the reality of caste in India.[2]

In order to meaningfully focus upon the above areas of structural changes in caste it is also essential to recapitulate some of its essential structural characteristics, which may be derived from, though may not be reducible to, its cultural features of hierarchy, pollution and purity, and doctrines of *karma* and *dharma*. Briefly, such structural features are two: first, institutionalized circumscription of the spheres of social interaction, and second, unequal distribution of power. The restrictions on marriage, on interdining and on other forms of social relationships, which belong to the first type of structural characteristics, were reinforced and carried out because of the second form of structural characteristic of caste....inequality of access to power. A structural treatment of changes in the caste system, therefore, must focus on its role in the changing power structure.

History of changes in the caste system supports this point. It has been noted that whenever a particular *jati* or caste could, by stroke of fortune,

or by changes in political power structure, or by its own industriousness and enterprise, improve its chances economically (often also politically), it claimed for itself a higher position in the caste hierarchy, in which it often succeeded. Such changes have been taking place right from the Vedic times. Panikkar writes that "from even the Vedic days there have been innumerable instances of men born in the lowest rank of caste-society taking to professions which in theory were the monopoly of the other castes. This was to some extent inevitable when, following Mahapadma Nanda and the Mauryas many of the royal families came from among the *Shudras*. Even today a large number of the ruling families of India belong to the aboriginal castes, though many have assumed Kshatriyahood or at least advanced claims to higher social status. In the South where, of course, there were no Kshatriyas, the Brahmins went to the extent of allowing *Shudra* rulers to assume a second-class Kshatriyahood after a symbolic rebirth through a golden cow."[3] These instances refer to ascendance to higher caste hierarchy following access to political or economic power.

In some recent anthropological studies of caste the use of the kingly model to analyse its structure and change is also indirectly focused on the phenomenon of power. King stands for a role-relationship in which there is concentration of power to have a relative command over actions and decisions of other members of society. Traditionally, at the level of political macro-structure, Kshatriya kings had this role in alliance with the priests. At the micro-structural level of villages and other territorial groups there were functional equivalents of the kingly role represented by what Srinivas has called 'dominant castes'.[4] As soon as a caste could achieve a position of dominance, relative or absolute within the caste hierarchy, it would attempt to claim a higher position in the caste rank, if its existing position was lower. Such changes in the position of caste, apart from being cultural in significance or Sanskritizing, bear a relationship with the structural phenomenon of power.

Dwelling upon the same problem D.F. Pocock observes:

> Just as the Kshatriya or king stands with the Brahmin as superior to the Vaisya and Shudra *varna*, so we may also speak of the kingly model in the Hindu society which is complementary to, though dependent in certain respects upon the Brahminic. At any given time or place the kingly model is represented by the dominant political power in any area, and is mediated by the local dominant non-Brahmin caste or castes of that area.[5]

From one point of view the two models—the Brahminic and the kingly—could be treated as being equally an expression of two forms of power—normative and secular. The priest has the normative power over the king, he represents the ideal tradition; but the king's power being secular is rooted in the existential situations, and in secular matters prevails over

those of the Brahmins. Caste studies in village settings have demonstrated the validity of this postulate. In Chanukhera, the village we studied, the Kshatriyas would greet the Brahmin first using very respectable expressions; on ritual occasions they would even touch the feet of the Brahmin priests; but in secular matters such as social gatherings, decision-making processes, etc., they would expect subordination from the Brahmins, which they usually received. Even in seating arrangements on social occasions (not ritual) Brahmins had a lower seat than that of the Kshatriyas.[6] Similar observations have also been made by many other anthropologists. Beidelman observes that "in Senapur and Rampur the Brahmins were not the powerful or economically superior caste, but were subordinate to the Jats and Thakurs."[7] The Kshatriyas or Rajputs were also found to be dominant in other north Indian villages, for example, in Mohana[8] village in central U.P., Khalapur[9] village in western U.P., and in Kasandra[10] village in Gujrat and Ramkheri[11] village in Malwa. Berreman observed that both the Rajputs and Brahmins as a pair constituted a dominant caste in the village Sirkanda, in the Himalayas.[12] The warrior caste (which is equal in rank to that of the Rajputs) has been reported to be dominant in the Bisipara village studied by Bailey.[13]

In the south Indian villages Brahmins and Okkaliga as dominant castes have been noted by social anthropologists. The Havik Brahmins in village Tottagadde[14] in Maland area of Mysore and Smarth Brahmins in the Kumbapettai[15] village in Tanjore (Tamil Nadu) have been observed to be dominant castes. Okkaligas are dominant in the villages of Rampura,[16] Wangala[17] and Delana[18], studied in Mysore. An interesting common factor which plays a very significant role in the dominance of these castes in the villages mentioned above is their superior economic status, especially in land.[19] Brahmins in Totagadde have ownership on all cash crop land; Kumbapettai Brahmins traditionally controlled all land; Okkaligas in Wangala and Delana control more than 80% of land; Rajputs in Senapur, eastern U.P., control 82% of land in the village and the Vaghela Rajputs in Kasandra village in Gujrat have control over all the land in the village. In all these villages the degree of dominance of these castes is high. In the village Mohana, where Thakurs (Rajputs) control only 41% of the land, and in Bisipara, where the Warriors have ownership over only 28% of the land, the dominance of the two castes is of a medium degree.[20]

The phenomenon of dominance or power of one caste over another is a key factor in the maintenance of the social structure of caste. In a theoretical kingly model the elements of economic and political dominance also coincide with the ritual, since both the Kshatriyas and the Brahmins belong to the category of higher or 'twice-born' castes. The facts regarding dominance as analysed with respect to the villages mentioned above tend to support this theoretical formulation, since the reported dominant castes are Brahmins, Rajputs and Okkaliga; the first being in the upper and the other two in the upper middle and middle category of castes. This would indicate a continued structural stability in the caste system, especially with

regard to the villages where these studies have been conducted. But it may be added that this stability is not without continued tensions which keep the balance of power among castes at a precarious level. Traditionally, when modern jural and constitutional rights were not available to all castes, victims of dominant castes could always take shelter behind other dominant caste families inimical to those exercising such dominance; or the subject could leave the village, which was not difficult, considering the kinship ties that subject caste had across villages and scarcity of labour power existing in former days. Occasionally, however, even open revolts against the dominant castes took place which sometimes altered the mode of inter-caste relationship.

Instances of lower-subject-caste revolts against the upper-dominant-castes even during the pre-Independence days have been many. In the village Chanukhera in eastern U.P., the low castes (Chamars and Kahars) agitated against the Kshatriyas for better wages and freedom to participate in the Congress movement for Independence, and to this, with initial resistance the Kshatriyas finally had to acquiesce.[21] Bernard S. Cohn reports a similar case of challenge by the Camars (Chamars) to the authority of Thakurs (Rajputs) in Madhopur village. He writes:

> Thirty years ago, in opposision to their own Thakurs, some Camars of Madhopur declared also that they would no longer carry manure to the Thakurs' fields. They were compelled to leave the village to escape the Thakurs' wrath. When ultimately these Camars were permitted to return to the village and were excused from the manure work which they had perceived as degrading, Camar women in general took a further step: they refused any longer to make dung cakes for the Thakurs' households. Ultimately they too secured a grudging acquiescence from the Thakurs.[22]

Many similar instances could be produced from the studies of sociologists conducted on inter-caste relationship; these studies substantiate the view that phenomenon of dominance was never absolute[23] and on utilitarian grounds or in the context of changing configuration of power between the dominant castes and their subjects adaptive changes were always possible and did take place. Their frequency and magnitude were, of course, limited since the system as such was relatively closed.

Today, as the formal closure of the systems of rural and urban communities is being rendered open through democratization and politicization of the social structure at large and through land reforms and developmental measures in villages and industrialization in cities, the former configuration of power of castes is also changing. This constitutes a potential area of structural change in the system of caste in India. Introduction of universal suffrage through democratization of political structure from the village

level (panchayats) to the state and the nation have added a new dimension to the functional differentiation of caste. Land reforms in villages have further enhanced the pitch of the new changes.

At the village level, the dominant castes have to face new challenges from their former subject castes on account of changes in their power due to land reforms and the need to woo the numerically large subject castes to gain access to power in the village panchayats, the offices of which are now elective. In many villages this has created a form of contradiction between the ritual and economic forms of power, which are still monopolized by upper castes (who are in numerical minority), and the numerical power, which is with the lower castes. In situations where the lower castes are successful in exploiting their numerical power they have altered the traditional configuration of power. Land reforms too have produced changes in dominance relationship among castes.

About the village Senapur, mentioned above, William L. Rowe observes that "in the past a small group of economically and politically all powerful Kshatriya landlords quietly (for the most part) directed the society. Now with the social tie of landlord and tenant severed, a numerous and economically able caste community such as the Noniya (a lower caste) feels somewhat free to pursue its own ends independently."[24] For another village, Kishan Garhi in U.P., McKim Marriott also notes a similar process of internal tension in the former pattern of inter-caste relationship, saying that "at present there is intense competition for rank among castes and for prestige among individuals. Competition is currently intensified by the elimination of landlords as tax collectors and by the election of villagers to serve on the village committee (*gaon panchayat*) and on the rural court (*panchayati adalat*)."[25]

Changes in the structure of power relationships of various castes at the village level also articulate at the regional levels, although there is no evidence (with the possible exception of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes) that any single caste or *jati* articulates its domination at the macro-structural level of the Indian society. Social scientists have also noted the increasingly pervasive and important role that caste associations now play in the political processes in India, especially in elections to the legislative assemblies, to district bodies and in matters of distribution of offices in the institutions run by the Government.[26] Srinivas, in a review of emerging caste consciousness and its new organizations and functions in Gujrat, Orissa, Madras, Andhra, Mysore, Bihar and U.P., has concluded that the forces of caste instead of weakening with modernization are being further strengthened. He writes:

> The building of roads all over India, and the introduction of railways, postage, telegraph, cheap paper, and printing . . . especially in the regional languages . . . enabled castes to organize as they had never done before. A post-card carried news of a caste meeting, and the railways enabled

members scattered in far flung villages to come together when necessary, while the availability of the cheap newsprint facilitated the founding of caste journals, whose aim was to promote the interests of their respective castes. It is usual to point out that railways and factories relaxed rules of pollution regarding eating and drinking and other forms of contact. But this is only one side of the story. The availability of cheap paper enabled caste disputes to be recorded, and this gave permanent form to rules and precedents which were till then dependent upon the fallible, and, therefore, challengeable memory of elders. I learn that several castes in Gujarat have their constitutions printed.[27]

Among other forces which show caste resilience Srinivas mentions growing anti-Brahmanism in Madras which provides a rationale for polarization of lower castes in the D.M.K. movement; the rise of Mahars and Marathas as political groups in Maharashtra (which too had an undertone of anti-Brahmanism),[28] the rivalries between the Kammas and the Reddis in Andhra, both of whom first united to drive out Brahmins from power and following that sub-divided among themselves to reap greater benefits of power;[29] he also mentions the Lingayat-Okkaliga rivalry in Mysore, where too anti-Brahmanism has been a catalyst for politicization of castes; and caste has been recognized as a factor for appointment to government posts and for offering seats in medical and engineering colleges; this, however, could not have been achieved without a complicity of the Government of India, which amended the Constitution in 1951 to give preference in services and educational institutions to the backward classes and members of the scheduled castes and tribes. The Rajput-Bhumihar rivalry for power in Bihar and scheduled caste movements of Shoshit Sangha in U.P. has also been noted by Srinivas to be connected with increased mobilization of castes for gaining secular objectives. His conclusion is, "the power and activity of caste has increased in proportion as political power passed increasingly to the people (through Constitutional reform and democratization) from the rulers."[30]

Identical processes as mentioned by Srinivas have also been pointed out by Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. They have laid emphasis on the changing role of caste in the Indian political process which according to them corresponds to that of an association; functioning of caste associations, they hold, comes very near to resembling voluntary associations and interest-groups familiar in European and American politics.[31] "The caste association, in this context, is no longer a natural association in the sense in which caste was and is. It is beginning to take on features of the voluntary association. Membership in caste associations is *not* purely ascriptive; birth in the caste is necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership. One must also 'join' the (Rajput) *Kshatriya Mahasabha* or the (*Jat*) *Kissan Sabha* through some conscious act involving various degrees of identification.... ranging from attendance at caste association

meetings or voting for candidates supported by caste association leaders, to paying membership dues. The caste association has generally both a potential and an actual membership. When it speaks, it often claims to speak for the potential represented in the full caste membership."[32]

Elsewhere, Lloyd Rudolph characterizes caste association as having the mixed attributes both of the ascriptive and voluntary groups (in Weber's term 'communal' and 'associative' relationships) leading to what he calls "shadow-society" which has a modernizing impact without overtly replacing the traditional institution of caste. He writes:

> The ascriptive element strongly suggests that there is a natural limit to the caste association's capacity to approximate a wholly voluntary association. However far it may lead those who identify with it from the narrow confines of the traditional face-to-face community, it cannot, so it is argued, lead them beyond ascriptive boundaries. The individual can never be fully free to define himself, to make his own destiny, and as a consequence, he is unable to act politically in ways that are untainted by group parochialism and selfishness.
>
> Several recent developments have challenged this view. First, in so far as it is possible in India to "leave" traditional and 'join' modern society by, for example, being educated in the English medium and 'Western' ideas, being trained in a modern profession and practising it, marrying out of caste, and associating with people who, at least ostensibly, do not take caste into account in their friendship — and this is possible up to a point in India today — the modernization of Indian society and politics through the transformation of caste becomes one of the two ways to achieve modernity. But the kind of westernization that Marx was talking about and the kind that Srinivas hypothesized, that is, an alternative process of change that results in the formation of society in Western terms, is more an analytic construction than a description of reality. Westernization has created a 'shadow' society, like the Opposition's cabinet in British politics, ready to take power but for the moment serving as a critic of those in power and an innovator or catalyst of change. Like a shadow cabinet, it can change the existing regime's direction without ever replacing it. *Modernity has entered into Indian character and society but it has done so through assimilation, not replacement.* The changes that now appear on the horizon with respect to the further evolution of the caste association and its transcendance of ascription have to do with internal differentiation (fission) and the operation of integrative institutions upon it and federation or consolidation of caste associations into large groupings (fusion).[33]

This rather lengthy quotation from Rudolph has been reproduced in order to present his views more succinctly and in all its dimensions. One point that clearly emerges is that Rudolph, in spite of his emphasis on the

associativeness of caste association realizes that its political functions as such are a mere superposition on the essential elements of caste, which continue to be communal in nature instead of being associative. His anticipation about a future change in caste-based associations leading to a transformation in their communal character by growing full-fledged secular integrative associations through fusion (as macro-structures according to us) is more conjectural than factual. In the first instance, the incidences of leaving tradition to 'join' modernity through inter-caste marriages are very insubstantial; moreover, the modernity of the Western educated and professional classes has repeatedly shown elements of contradiction and ambivalence, which Rudolph himself points out. The fact is that caste associations are political manifestations of the micro-structure and there is a possibility that either they will remain so or further undergo fissions and sub-divisions, but hardly will they assume the form of macro-structure. We can discern instances of fissions in caste solidarity in the events described by Rudolph. The Vanniyar caste which was united into one group called Tamil Nad Toiler in 1952, suffered internal sub-divisions in 1954 and formed a splinter group. In the 1955 election in Andhra, Congress could defeat communists by matching caste with caste in the selection of candidates; Kamma communist candidates were opposed by Kamma opponents from the Congress.[34] Matching caste by caste has been a common policy of political parties in general elections in India, which shows that castes not only unite on political fronts but also have a tendency to sub-divide and form a faction, as widely observed by social anthropologists.[35]

The potentiality of caste associations developing into macro-political structures is limited by linguistic, kinship and regional cultural factors. The Rudolphs accept this fact when they say that "the caste associations' main impact on politics within the Indian federal system is at the State level.... Caste associations do not generally extend across State boundaries. Castes do not, as a rule, include persons of different linguistic-cultural backgrounds, and most Indian States are today organized on a linguistic-cultural basis".[36] When to this we add the tendency of fissions and inter-caste rivalries for power, the potentiality of caste associations emerging as all-India institutions of political participation becomes very remote indeed.

If we look at the caste associations from another point of view we shall find that through them emerging structural inconsistencies caused due to recent constitutional, legal and economic reforms in India find a substantive materialization. Since temporally the processes of constitutional and social reform in India have been compressed, they give rise to aspirations for the fulfilment of which institutional mechanisms as yet do not exist. The rapidity in the emergence of new social aspirations of people is such that it could not wait for development of appropriate institutional mechanisms as it did in the West. In India, traditional institutions like caste, ethnic and linguistic groups, therefore, offer natural arenas for articulation of new values and aspirations and spheres of activities.

In this process the structural composition of castes in various regions and the traditions of inter-caste relationships which subsisted in these regions have emerged as a determining factor in the politicization of caste. This is evident if we compare the distribution of various caste ranks in selected regions of India, especially between north and south. In 1952–54, in the rural areas of the northern regions there were 1.8 million upper, 3.7 million middle, 1.8 million lower and 2.4 million scheduled castes; compared to this in the southern region of India, there were 0.3 million upper, 0.5 million middle, 7.5 million lower, and 2.4 million scheduled castes.[37] Thus, the number of the lower castes in the south far outweighs those of the upper and middle castes; in the southern region the number of the lower caste Hindu households is 70.9% as compared to the 18.5% in the northern region.[38] When we evaluate this phenomenon in the background of other facts, such as the upper castes' near-monopoly on economic resources, their traditional discrimination against the lower castes and suppression of their freedom of movement, of work and cultural participation which prevailed till the introduction of reform legislations and constitutional changes, the political manifestation of current lower caste solidarity, and its anti-Brahminism and anti-Aryanism in the South appears as a disguised form of political conflict.

The legal and democratic rights introduced after Independence bestow a new form of political power upon the groups or collectivities which have numerical strength provided that strength could be politically mobilized, which is possible if the existential situation of the group as such is homogeneous and uniform. These conditions obtain in the case of the lower castes in South India and the scheduled castes and tribes in the central and eastern regions of India (there were 3.7 million scheduled castes in the eastern and 1.6 million in the central region in 1952–54).[39] Evidently it is in these regions that political movements of these castes articulate themselves most strongly.

The review of some caste movements in South India from a historical perspective reveals that till the end of the second quarter of the twentieth century lower caste movement was not anti-Brahmanical or anti-Aryan in posture; like the caste movements in the north; here too lower castes were Sanskritizing themselves; their constant attempt was to emulate Brahmin or Kshatriya caste status, secure the privileges of entering the temples and the rights to dress and live like members of the upper castes. The Shanan or Nadar castes of the South claimed in 1891 census the status of Dravidian Kshatriyas which was not accepted by the Census Commissioner who felt this claim was "absurd, as there is no such thing as Dravidian Kshatriya."[40] In 1901, a group of Shanans submitted a petition to the Census Commissioner which said: "We humbly beg that we are the descendants of the Pandya or Dravid Xatra race who.... first disafforested and colonized this land of South India."[41] In 1874, Shanans tried to establish their rights to enter the temples of Madurai and failed; in 1889, they took recourse to legal case through courts to establish this right and

again failed as the court ruled, "Only Aryans not Dravidians could be Kshatriyas; the pollution of the father followed the sons into commerce, the professions and agriculture."[42] This sparked off a riot. In 1921, however, the Shanans' claim to higher status was conceded by the Government and the name Shanan was replaced by Nadar, an honorific title which distinguished them from Shanan toddy-tappers. It was now claimed that Nadars were the lords of the soil and only a few degenerate ones among them worked as toddy-drawers.[43]

Similar is also the story of the Vanniyars (formerly Pallis), largest single caste in Madras State, who claimed themselves to be *Vanniya Kula Kshatriya* and established an association to realize this social status. In 1951, they formed a party called Tamil Nad Toilers to fight elections and became a formidable political force.[44] Formerly, the association had identified with the Congress but gradually it drifted towards the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a party which stands for Tamil para-nationalism and is opposed to the supremacy of the Brahmins, and the north-Indians. The Nadars and other major caste groups have also now joined their forces with the ideology of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. This is also revealed by the fact that in the general elections of 1967, D.M.K. has been able to oust Congress from office in the Madras State. The lower castes have now given up their former orientation to identify with or claim the status of the Kshatriyas or Brahmins, instead they now tend to reject the whole ideology of upper castes which, according to the D.M.K. theory, is a Brahmanical or Aryan imposition. The earlier aspiration for vertical mobility or Sanskritization among the lower castes has now been replaced by a new feeling of self-identity within one's own caste or increased horizontal caste solidarity. Caste associations are an indirect reflection of this new trend.

Why is it that during the early part of the 19th century lower castes everywhere in the country were vying with one another for Sanskritization and a few years after Independence this tendency has increasingly been replaced by emphasis on horizontal solidarity or identity consciousness? The answer lies in the changing sources of honour and power. Formerly, access to power and higher social status was only through traditional caste hierarchy, in other words, the kingly model was in operation. The upper castes, Brahmins and Kshatriyas, constituted stable reference groups, and their command over social and cultural resources was unchallenged. After Independence the position of these upper castes as reference groups has been challenged through a process which Karl Mannheim calls 'fundamental democratization'. There is a tendency among castes to differentiate the ritual from the politico-economic aspects of this system. The ritual level of caste still tends to be evaluated on hierarchical principle; Brahmins are still needed to conduct rituals; but in the politico-economic sphere the principle of hierarchy has been rejected and egalitarian and competitive ideologies prevail. In extreme cases, as in the D.M.K. movement, the process of differentiation is absolutized by a conscious rejection of the whole world-view

of caste. Obviously such changes have been rendered possible only due to the contemporary political, economic and social reforms, but the extent to which these reforms are able to articulate themselves sociologically is determined by demographic and social compositions of castes and the nature of the historical tradition of inter-caste relationships. In the southern region, as we mentioned above, both the demographic characteristics and the past history of upper castes' relationship with the lower castes (which had been extremely discriminatory) explains the current sentiments and social movements associated with caste. Political mobilization of lower caste creates a formidable social force in the South primarily because the lower and scheduled castes constituted 92.9% of the total Hindu households.[45] The demographic feature of caste in the South was a latent social structure which now manifests itself because of changes in its external environment through democratization, education and politicization, etc.

Since these changes in caste imply role differentiation or functional diversification, these may portend structural changes in the system. There is, however, disagreement among social scientists about this interpretation.[46] The political functions of caste, it is claimed, may not be essential to caste social structure *per se*, but is an additional superposition of another structure on this system; however, the distinction is more semantic than real. Practically, caste relations are affected (through formation of splinter groups and parties, etc.) when political mobilization of castes takes place in a region. Occasionally, various castes unite together for the realization of a common political or economic goal, thus assuming a class character,[47] but such changes are ephemeral. After the realization of such secular goals, castes again revert to their traditional basic functions, connubial, commensal and ritual. The bed-rock on which the stability of caste is founded are these social functions and in this realm caste is not changing to any appreciable extent. The studies of inter-caste marriages which are fewer also do not suggest changes in these basic functions of caste.[48]

The castes as 'communal' groups structurally persist. Changes are, however, taking place at other levels of their functional differentiation, such as their articulation as interest-groups, as political micro-structures and as communication networks for modernization. These functions caste largely performs either owing to the structural constraints, as we discussed above, or because caste alone in India provides an immediate and pre-existing structural framework for diffusion and mobilization of new role structures. These functions may not be basic to the caste structure, but these in the absence of other fully differentiated voluntary associations not only carry the imprint of caste but also articulate new activities through its social structure. In this form social structure of caste undergoes changes which are meaningful to the process of modernization in India.

Caste is also undergoing other forms of change which alter its traditional mode of inter-relationships by bringing about changes in power structure which maintained its hierarchical character. In Bisipara (a village in

Orissa studied by Bailey) the untouchable Boad distillers by trading in hides and liquor could earn enough money to purchase land equal to that of the Warrior castes; similarly, Ganjam distillers through trade in liquor purchased more land than any other caste in the village. Following these economic changes, there have been changes in the political structure of the village altering the balance of inter-caste relationships.[49] This type of change is common in villages of other regions in India too, and has especially been observed in the changing form of traditional *jajmani* relationships.[50]

Structural changes in caste originate from changes in the inter-caste power structure just as cultural changes in it are manifested through alterations in rituals, life styles and customs previously assigned to specific castes and sub-castes. In the peninsular India power has rapidly passed to the lower castes and traditionally dominant castes have been either expropriated from it, or, hold on to it under precarious circumstances.[51] In northern India, upper castes still have a dominant role in the power structure both at the village level and other levels such as the block, the district, and the State. Other regions of India are in transitory stages between these two extremes. Statistically also, there are significant differences in the existential situations of the lower and the higher castes both in the rural and urban regions. In 1952–54, the number of agricultural labourers and share-croppers comprised 23% of the total lower caste households, 45% of the total scheduled caste households and only 5% of the upper caste households, which shows the relative economic weakness of the lower and scheduled castes in villages.[52] In urban areas too the better position of the upper castes can be measured by the fact that during the same period the upper caste households having administrative and professional occupations comprised 58% of their total number, when only 28.8% of the lower castes and 27.0% of the scheduled caste households had this occupation.[53] The lower percentage of lower caste households having administrative and professional services as main occupation, in spite of the reservation of seats for them in government and other services, shows the extent of their backwardness in status and power.

But whereas in relative terms these figures might indicate slow rate of occupational and structural changes in the caste system, from a total point of view even these changes mark a significant break in the traditional hierarchical structure of castes. In a society where only a few decades back the lower castes were more or less completely excluded from professional-administrative positions, the fact that about one-third of them have now access to such positions marks a departure from the past which is sociologically radical and significant. However, the structural changes in caste must be looked at in the light of the continued resilience and plasticity of this institution which has for centuries defied the forces that challenged its existence by evolving adaptive mechanisms for assimilation of and co-existence with many structural changes. For this reason and many others it may be concluded that for a long time to come caste will continue to provide an

institutional foundation for the operation of modernizing social structures in the realms of politics, economics and culture.

THE CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

Family is the basic and universal social structure of human society. It fulfils needs and performs functions which are indispensable for the continuity, integration and change in the social system. The forms and functions of family have undergone adaptive changes with changes in the technological and economic superstructure of society.[54] One way to characterize this change is to associate conjugal or nuclear forms of families with relatively modernized or industrial society and extended or joint types of families with traditional-agrarian and pre-industrial societies. The transition from extended-family-based society to nuclear-family-based society is thus, in essence, an example of structural change, since this involves systematic changes in role-structures through processes of differentiation. Compared to an extended family the combinations of role-structures in a nuclear family are fewer, the authority system and networks of kinship relations are also different. A nuclear family is itself an example of structural differentiation from the more composite social structure of an extended family.

Traditional peasant societies everywhere in the world had a predominance of extended families. Usually such families were patrilocal and patriarchal; in such families women had a relatively subordinate position; all members were guided in their activities by an elder family head and inter-personal relations of all members were authoritarian. Marriage in such families was governed by rules of kinship rather than courtship and was considered a matter of inter-familial and not inter-personal concern. Family in such society was also the unit of economic, cultural, religious and political activities. Feelings of individualism and personal freedom were foreign to this type of family organization. Since the economic structure of such societies was closed and technological innovations were rare, the total volume of knowledge, which existed in the form of folklore, mythologies, riddles and folksongs, etc., could be handed down to the younger generation by the elders through the medium of oral tradition. For this reason, age was generally an important element governing social status and privilege in extended families as well as in peasant societies in general.

Thus, there had developed a symbiotic relationship between agrarian-peasant societies and extended family type. In England such family types were predominant till the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Enclosure laws which uprooted the peasantry from the villages and pushed it to the cities, coupled with industrial technological innovations, brought about a fundamental change in the family structure. As the Industrial Revolution progressed, the transition from the extended to conjugal forms of families became much more accelerated and the latter form became a predominant feature of society.

As the extended family changes into nuclear family, the socialization of children in the family takes on a new direction; the child has now to grow in a comparatively much smaller social universe; there are not too many kinsmen to always fondle him and look after him;[55] the playmates and members of the child's peer group have also to be selected from outside the family and if the mother is also working, it means an emotional strain on the child in an early age to establish contact with strangers and to distribute his emotional universe between levels of particularistic attachment. The child in such a family environment is not hampered by excessiveness of sheltered universe of attachment as in an extended family which breeds dependence characteristics in personality. Authoritarianism is only an obverse of dependence which socialization in an extended family system commonly fosters in personality. In a nuclear family the emotional universe of a child oscillates between degrees of attachment and alienation and the resultant tension breeds a type of personality which has greater empathic capacity, is more independent and capable to cope with crisis situations and is generally more imaginative and innovational in orientation. This type of personality initiates as well as carries forward changes conducive to modernization.

There is, however, one qualifying condition about the role of nuclear families in socialization pattern being conducive to the growth of creative personalities. This is that nuclear families are existentially situated in the milieu of an 'adaptive society' and not that of an 'established society',[56] which is the overwhelming mode of a folk or peasant society. We make this point because in a partial sense nuclear families also existed in traditional peasant societies. In India, for example, lower caste families where the chief occupation was agricultural labour were mostly nuclear, but this nuclearity was often due to negative rather than positive causes. These negative factors were absence of landed property, lack of sufficient and stable means of livelihood and shifting mode of occupation. Such nuclear families had many characteristics of traditional joint families, such as excessive dependence on kinsmen and elders, child marriages, dependent position of women and authoritarian inter-personal relationship in the family. In some sense relatively greater personal freedom did exist in such families, for example, divorce and remarriage of widows was permitted, women did not observe *purdah* and moved freely and worked side by side with men. But these values were not accepted as ideal. This is also implied by I.P. Desai when he says that "a residential nuclear group is embedded in the social, cultural and other non-social environments which are not the same as in other societies, say, of the West where also the residentially nuclear group is the dominant pattern of residence or, say, in India in the past when the nuclear group did exist but nuclearity was not the prevalent pattern of family."[57] Even for lower castes who lived in such nuclear families the ideal was the Hindu joint family to which most of the landed gentry and priests belonged. In other words, the idea of nuclear family was not institutionalized, nor was its socio-

logical significance fully manifested in the absence of requisite structural changes in economic and technological base of the society.

Extended families which are the dominant pattern in India have existed side by side with the nuclear families of the traditional type described above Changes are now taking place in both of these traditional family forms; this bears significant relationship with the direction of social change and modernization in India. Traditionally, these extended families fostered sociological processes which were conducive to the integration of traditional-agrarian structure of Indian society and its personality system. Now, changes are taking place due to contemporary forces. We might review a few major trends of structural changes in family in India.

The first question which arises in a trend analysis of changes in family structure is: how common are the nuclear and joint types of families in India? and, with which structural variables are the nuclear and extended types of families generally associated? The explanation of the first question might also throw light on the second. The studies concerning the distribution of family types (structurally) in India shows results which considerably fluctuate on the basis of criteria employed for the classification of jointness. Defining jointness "with reference to residence, property and mutual obligations among the kin", I.P. Desai offers four categories of family types: "I-a, husband and wife only; I-b, uni-member households; II-a, husband, wife and married sons without children and other unmarried children; II-b, the above group with other relatives who do not add to generation depth; III, three generation groups of lineal descendants and; IV, four or more than four generations of lineal descendants."[58] Under the category of nuclear family he includes the family types I-a to II-b, and his study shows that such families in Mahuva (a town in Gujarat) constitute 61% (260 out of 423) of the total; types III and IV which he defines as joint families make the rest of the 39%.[59]

Desai makes a distinction between the nuclearity or jointness of family types as a structural phenomenon (lineal-collateral depth) and the degrees of sentiment of jointness in each family-type derived from "the relationships as obtaining among those living in one household and between the relatives who are living in another household either in Mahuva (in the same town or village) or outside it."[60]—in other words, the quality of interaction pattern. Evaluating the structurally nuclear and joint families on the sentimental criteria of jointness he finds that 70 families in Mahuva which are classified as nuclear on structural criteria comprise the 'high' category on the scale of the sentiment of jointness; 51 such nuclear families are in the 'higher' category and 6 families in the 'highest' category on the scale of sentiment of jointness. (The scale of sentiment of jointness runs from zero, low, high, higher to highest categories).[61] The nuclear families on the zero scale of sentiment of jointness are only 21 and those on the low scale are 112 in number. Excluding the 5% families where sentiment of jointness is zero, 95% of the total sample families have sentiment of jointness ranging

from 'low' to 'highest' degree.[62]

This phenomenon casts serious doubts on the measurement of structural changes in the family system simply on the basis of incidence of structural differentiation from joint to nuclear families in India. What matters more is not the composition of the residential family group but the nature and quality of social interaction emanating from the supposedly nuclear family which interlinks it in sentimental bonds, ritual and economic obligations to other family units in the same place or in other places which too may be nuclear as residential group but functionally may be joined in obligational ties with this nuclear family. I.P. Desai observes:

> The expression 'joint family' is not the translation of any Indian word like that. It is interesting to note that the words used for joint family in most of the Indian languages are the equivalents or translations of the English word 'joint family'. The family as the group wider than the nuclear group is not unknown to the European society. Yet, strangely enough, the joint family came to be understood as the conglomeration of nuclear families for all purposes instead of a qualitatively different family. That has befogged our understanding and the study of the family in India. Any two or more nuclear families who are legal partners in business could not make a joint family. To the Indian the family is that which is the 'joint family' in English. The concept of family as nuclear family is still not the Indian concept. Consequently, the nuclear family to the Indian is not the same as it is to the Englishman or the American today.[63]

Family jointness still continues to be a major sociological phenomenon in the Indian social structure, being unaffected by the differences of religion, caste, urbanization and occupation. In Mahuva, not only Hindus but the Jains and the Muslims have joint families; greater degree of jointness was observed co-existing with agriculture as well as business and other occupations and it was found that a "longer urban stay did not dissolve jointness."[64] The findings of K.M. Kapadia support the conclusions of I.P. Desai. In a comparative study of family patterns in the Navasari town and fifteen villages from the same region with varying degrees of urban impact, Kapadia found that joint family pattern was not only generally predominant but contrary to the popular image was stronger in the towns in comparison to the villages He concludes that "not only the total complement of the joint family is higher in the town but even its size is larger there than in the rural areas. The latter fact reinforces the vitality of the former, and so the predominance of joint families in the town cannot be regarded as accident."[65] Psychological attachment of joint family is also equally present among the villagers and the urbanites. An opinion poll conducted among the West Bengalis by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in 1955 showed that 60.5% of the urban and 54.5% of the rural West Bengalis preferred to live with a

joint family.[66] In Gore's study among the Agarwals of Delhi, three-fourths preferred the joint family, but only 54% believed that brothers should continue to live together after the death of the parents.[67]

Although the structure of joint family is widespread in India and the sentiment of jointness continues to be stronger, there are many regional differences in this pattern. In Badlapur and Taluka city studied by Morrison 85% of the families were nuclear, in Poona city two-thirds of the families were found to be nuclear; nuclear families have also been found predominant in other regions of India.[68] Preponderance of nuclear or smaller families in some regions of India might not be an index of change in the social structure of families since this pattern is an old one. The census reports have noted the smallness of family size in India; in 1951 census only 17% of the families consisted of 7 to 9 members; even in 1911 census, family size in India was found to be smaller in spite of the prevalence of joint families, and Gait wrote in the Census Report, "except among the higher castes, who form but a small fraction of the total population, the joint family is not nearly so common as so frequently supposed."[69] The crucial question, therefore, is of the nature of nuclear and joint families themselves.

In this connection observations of I.P. Desai and K.M. Kapadia about nuclear family being involved in the sentiments and relationships of jointness are largely valid on social structural grounds. The nuclear family of the West is a product of Industrial Revolution which altered the whole pattern of economic and kinship relationships. In the absence of such existential conditions nuclear families could not have been self-supporting or self-perpetuating in an agrarian caste-ridden society like that of India. Goode's objection to the interpretation given to nuclear family by Desai and Kapadia —that on the basis of their conception of nuclear family "all family systems in the major cultural areas of the world, including the West, become 'joint family'[70]—is not tenable either on historical or sociological grounds. It has been observed by I.P. Desai[71] and other sociologists that nuclear family in India is merely a stage in the joint family cycle.[72] There is no linear evolutionary differentiation from joint to nuclear family organization. Dube makes the following observations on this point:

> The traditional typology of simple, compound and extended family does not accurately fit the forms of family organization met with in India. At one point of time, the size and actual composition of a family often denotes only a particular stage in its developmental cycle. Simple families grow into extended families and then break up into simple families again. A simple family emerging out of this process may retain some adhesions from the former extended family. Aged parents may later attach themselves to one of their sons, who had broken away from them earlier to set up an independent household. The changes from simple to extended and from extended to simple families are fairly frequent. Perfect three-generation extended families are rare, and not many simple

families can remain technically simple for a long period.[73]

The process of cyclical changes in the structure of families simultaneously brings out two points: first, that all changes in the contemporary family structure, as in other forms of Indian social structure, are not caused by exogenous factors of Western borrowing alone, and secondly, to assume a universal function for the nuclear families everywhere in the world on the presuppositions of universal evolutionism, as implied in the criticism of William J. Goode, is contrary to the historical processes in many traditional societies. With this reservation, one might agree with the conclusions of Goode that "at any given point of time, most Indian households are not joint composition; this fact, however, does not prove much change has occurred, since most were not joint in the past, either; nevertheless, Indian values and attitudes are still generally in favour of the joint family and (that) a number of important structural changes in the joint family are occurring, however."[74]

A wider picture of changes in the family structure in India can be gained only by comparative regional studies. One such attempt has been made recently by Pauline M. Kolenda who has classified family types into twelve categories for a comparative evaluation: "*first*, single person household; *second*, sub-nuclear family [a fragment of a former nuclear family as a widowed or divorced parent with unmarried children, or unmarried, widowed or divorced siblings living together]; *third*, supplemented sub-nuclear family [a sub-nuclear family plus some other unmarried, widowed or divorced relative(s) who were not part of the original nuclear family. For example, a widow with her unmarried children plus her dead husband's brother's widow]; *fourth*, nuclear family [couple and their unmarried children]; *fifth*, supplemented nuclear family [a nuclear family plus some other widowed, divorced or unmarried relative(s), such as the husband's widowed mother or his unmarried brother or sister]; *sixth*, lineal joint family [parents with unmarried children plus one married son and his wife and unmarried children]; *seventh*, supplemented lineal joint family [a lineal joint family plus some other unmarried, divorced or widowed relative(s), such as the widowed sister of the older man or his unmarried brother]; *eighth*, collateral joint family [two or more married brothers with their wives and unmarried children]; *ninth*, supplemented collateral joint family [a collateral joint family plus some other unmarried, widowed or divorced relative(s), such as the widowed mother or widower father or unmarried brother or sister of the married brothers]; *tenth*, lineal collateral joint family [parents, their unmarried children plus two or more married sons with their wives and married and unmarried children]; *eleventh*, supplemented lineal collateral joint family [a lineal collateral joint family plus some other relative(s) who is (are) not (a) member(s) of any of the nuclear families involved. For example, a wife's widowed brother or the eldest male's unmarried brother]; *twelfth*, other [those families categorized as 'other' by

the researchers and not further defined or described, as well as some families that did not fit in the types above, such as a grandmother living with a grandchild, and a widower living with his widowed daughter-in-law.]"[75]

She compares the distribution of family types on the basis of thirty-two publications which refer to family structures in thirteen regions of India, viz., West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan, Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Madras, Mysore and Kerala. For an analysis of the distribution of family types she has merged the twelve family types into only two categories: (1) single person, sub-nuclear and nuclear families; (2) joint and supplemented nuclear families; distribution of these two forms of families shows both inter-regional and intra-regional variations. In West Bengal, for example, Kanchanpur[76] (Burdwan district) has joint families 39%, nuclear families 61%; Shyambazar[77] area, Calcutta, has joint families 58%, nuclear families 42%. In Uttar Pradesh, among the Thakurs of Senapur[78] (Jaunpur district) joint families are 74.5% and nuclear families only 25.5%; Khalapur Rajputs[79] (Saharanpur district) have 51% joint families and 49% nuclear families; Sherapur[80] (U.P., Fyzabad district) has 56% joint and 44% nuclear families. The pattern, however, changes in other parts of U.P.; for instance, in Sirkanda[81], a sub-Himalayan village in Dehradun district, the joint families comprise only 39% and there are 61% nuclear families; Senapur[82] untouchables have 34% joint families and 66% nuclear families. Untouchable *Chuhras* of Khalapur[83] (Saharanpur district) also have only 44% joint families and 56% nuclear families.

In the Delhi region, Rampur village[84] has 54% joint and 46% nuclear families and Khatris of Delhi city[85] have more than 28% joint and less than 72% nuclear families. In Rajasthan, Korna[86] (Jodhpur district) has 57% joint, 43% nuclear families; four Panchayat Samiti[87] areas (Barmer district) have 48% joint and 52% nuclear families; in Jalore district[88] frequency of joint and nuclear families is 47 and 53%. Pandit Brahmins of Utrassu-Umanagri (Anantnag district) in Kashmir[89] have 60% joint and 40% nuclear families. In Madhya Pradesh, Ramkheri[90] (Malwa) consisted of 41% joint and 59% nuclear families. In Gujarat,[91] high school students from Brahmin, Bania and Patidar castes had joint family homes in 42, 37 and 62% cases, respectively, and nuclear family homes in 58, 63 and 38% cases of each.

Badlapur[92] in Maharashtra has 14% joint and 86% nuclear families, and in Nagpur district[93] the two categories of families comprise 38 and 62%, respectively. In Shamirpet[94] village (Andhra Pradesh, Telangana) the frequency of joint families is 18.5% and of nuclear families 81.5%. Orissa Brahmins of Bira Narsinghapur,[95] have joint families in 53% cases and nuclear families in 47% cases.

In the southern zone of Madras, among the Brahmins of Kumbapettai[96] (Tanjore district) the distribution of joint and nuclear families is 42 and 58% in each case. The Pramala Kallar[97] in Madura district (Madras) have only

8% joint families and 92% of their families are nuclear. In four zones of Gokak Taluka[98] (in Belgaum district, Mysore) the distribution of joint and nuclear families in each zone is 59 and 41%, 55 and 45%, 66 and 34%, and 62 and 38%, respectively. The untouchable Paraiah of Bangalore[99] are reported to have joint families in 24% and nuclear type families in 76% cases. In Kerala, the two census tracts of Angadi[100] village in Ernad taluk (largely Nayar caste) have nuclear and joint families in 55 and 45 and 61 and 39% cases, respectively.

From this sample about the distribution of family types in various regions in India a few generalizations have been made by Kolenda. Between regions the rural areas of the Gangetic plains have higher proportion of joint families than those in the Central India, Maharashtra, Andhra and Madras. In the Gangetic plains itself, joint families are more common among the Rajputs and nuclear families predominate among the lower castes. In the sub-Himalayan village of Sirkanda, where most of the population is that of Rajputs, contrary to the plains-Rajputs nuclear family type is predominant. Among the Brahmins of Kashmir 60% families are joint and the same is true for the upper caste Pattidars in Gujarat, Brahmins of Orissa and Nayars of Kerala.

Kolenda analyses the factors which could possibly be associated with predominance of joint family in one region or in one group and that of nuclear family in another. She concludes that neither economic explanation (that joint family provides convenient labour pool), nor classical Hindu law, nor caste identity, nor ownership of land, nor the dominant or subservient status of castes has a universal association with preponderance of joint family types. Rajputs of Khalapur and Senapur have maximum number of joint families, yet all of them take pride in "*never* indulging in agricultural fieldwork."[101] The Pramalai Kallars of Tengalapatti, in Madras, own land and are the dominant caste of the village, yet they have only 8% joint families; also the Rajputs of Sirkanda who too belong to upper caste and own land have joint families in only 39% cases. The Rajputs of Senapur have maximum number of joint families. The number of joint families among Rankheri Warriors is less frequent, yet in both places the same Hindu school of Mitakshara law is followed.

Kolenda's hypothesis is that differential incidence of joint or nuclear family types in various regions and among groups could be explained through the process of family break-up. She writes:

> What I suggest here is that where the nuclear family in India is most prevalent, it is not only the result of the natural death of the older generation, but is the result of break-up *before* the parents' death. Furthermore, where the joint families are *most* prevalent, the death of the progenitor does not result in either the immediate nor somewhat delayed break-up of the joint family. Three different patterned timings for break-up emerge from the studies of Indian rural areas. First is the patterned break-up within a few months or years of marriage of the sons (reported by Dube

> for Shamirpet, Telangana, by Beals for Namhalli, Mysore, by Dumont for the Pramalai Kallar, by Bailey for Bisipara). The second pattern is the break-up of married brothers upon, or shortly after the father's death... A third pattern is the break-up of the joint family when it is headed by married brothers who have lived together with their families for some years, or even when the family is headed by male first cousins. This pattern appears among the Thakurs of Senapur, Uttar Pradesh.[102]

But these break-up sequences still do not explain the initial causes for differences in the timing of break-up of joint family in various regions. Kolenda postulates three causes for this phenomenon: the high rate of divorce and remarriage, payment of bride wealth and dowry and uxorilaterality versus virilaterality. Association of divorce and remarriage with frequency of jointness in families she finds by comparing the two factors in villages of Senapur, Khalapur, Ramkheri, Sirkanda and the Pramalai Kallar. On the frequency scale of joint families Senapur and Khalapur have the highest position, Ramkheri occupies the middle position and Sirkanda and the Pramalai Kallar have the lowest position. Regarding the frequency of divorce and permissiveness for remarriage of women their position is reversed. In Senapur and Khalapur legal divorce is prohibited by custom and widows do not remarry; in Sirkanda Berreman estimated that about 20% marriages end in divorce;[103] for the Pramalai Kallar, according to Dumont, several successive marriages is the rule.[104] The incidences of divorce and remarriage in Ramkheri are fewer; Mayer estimates that only 3.6% marriages were remarriages in this village.[105]

The villages where joint family is more common it is the dowry system which is predominant and where joint family is less frequent in those villages the custom of bride wealth prevails. Similarly, in those villages where joint families are frequent, the influence of wife's paternal family or uxorilaterality is weakest and virilaterality prevails. In Senapur, highest on the joint family scale, distance between the natal and conjugal village for married women ranges from 40 to 200 miles, in Ramkheri which is on the medium joint family scale, the distance is of 13.7 average miles. On the other hand, in Sirkanda, lowest on the joint family scale, this distance is minimum, that of 4 miles only. Similarly, for Pramalai Kallar, the spread of their whole Nad is in an area of 18×10 miles. Kolenda concludes:

> ...of crucial importance for the high and low proportions of joint families seems to be the scope for the husband's development of close bonds with his wife's people and their capacity to offer him economic aid. Such conditions correlate with high and low rates of divorce, and with the dowry versus the bride-wealth systems of negotiating marriages, as well as with counter-balancing strong versus weak patri-family and patri-lineage.[106]

In essence, the factors which according to her closely associate with incidence of joint family, such as strong patrilineage bonds, weaker ties with affinal relatives, etc., are indirectly an expression of structural limitations and historical growth. Historically, the differences between the northern and southern systems of kinship and marriages, such as the preference for cross-cousin and uncle-niece marriages among many castes in South India and gotra exogamy (by which an individual should not marry anyone having a common ancestor five generations back on the father's side and three generations back on the mother's side) in the North, may lie, as Kolenda recognizes, in the growth of villages in the two regions, which Baden Powell emphasized on the basis of the distinction between the joint-villages of the North, which have common land ownership and strong patrilineal solidarity, and the *raiyatwari* or severality type of villages of the South, which have individual peasant proprietorship, less conducive to the growth of joint family, bonds. The basis for structural limitations, as clearly recognized by Murdock and other anthropologists who have made comparative studies of social structure, lies in the existential situations or the material and economic resources which could be commanded by social units within and outside the family structure.[107] The changes in Indian families may be governed by both sets of factors individually or in combination.

Changes have also been observed in the internal structure of families in India, which Aileen Ross describes as the sub-structures of rights and duties, of power and authority and of sentiment and work.[108] In her study of the upper and middle-class urban families in Bangalore, Ross finds that with the increasing strain of new types of activities in urban contexts many traditional forms of family role expectations are changing; children now often tend to be more independent on certain issues; traditional division of labour between man and wife breaks down in an urban nuclear family as the husband has to share some work which was traditionally the duty of the wife. In such families the wife becomes the most important agent around whom the whole family activity revolves; she is consulted and shares in all important family decisions. From the point of view of authority, the family still continues to be the most important institution for enforcement of discipline and its authority remains strong. Still, "boys and young men are more likely to come into contact with new situations.... They are able to get away from supervision of parents; so they can often practise new types of behaviour in secret,"[109] from which girls are still excluded, however.

Some strains in the authority pattern of the family do arise on account of the younger generation's urge for freedom, but "on the whole there is not yet the evidence, among urban middle-class families, that even when they (younger generation) live as separate units, the control of the elders completely disappears; however, there is evidence that the elder generation no longer dominates the younger to the same degree or in the same way."[110] Transition from joint to nuclear families also alters the nature of affection and sentiments in inter-personal relationship of family members. Love

for one's own children, affective bonds between husband and wife become more particularized and become intense, and bonds uniting collateral relatives tend to be weakened, thus altering the very structure of traditional joint family sentiments. But changes in this sphere are rather slow. An important example of sociological result of changes in the structure of sentiments is the breakdown in the matrilineal *tarvada* families of Kerala, where with accumulation of private property, growth of business connections or higher education, a person of the younger generation wants to establish a separate home for himself, his wife and children, away from the traditional *tarvada* form of joint family.[111]

Changes in the structure and functions of joint families in India are thus following a reconciliatory pattern, a pattern common in the structural changes in the Indian society. In mate selection, the principle of personal choice, especially in urban families, is today increasingly reconciled with parents' approval; the wife's freedom in middle-class homes to work outside in offices and schools operates within the traditional framework of the husband's approval and sometimes the approval of the husband's or even wife's parents. Such reconciliations are, however, not without tension which is an inalienable aspect of social change. In spite of these changes, the traditional world-view of the joint family still prevails.

VILLAGE COMMUNITY

The third important micro-structure in Indian society is the village community. The early literature on Indian village communities, such as those of Maine, Baden Powell, Karl Marx, Altekar, Radhakamal Mukerjee,[112] etc., assumes a semi-autonomous or independent structural significance for villages in India. C.T. Metcalfe's observation that "village communities are little republics, having nearly everything that they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations,"[113] has become a classic formulation. Later on, the national leaders, especially Mahatma Gandhi, reinforced the ideology of a self-sufficient, morally and economically integrated village community as the elemental organic unit of the superstructure of Indian society. The village as a micro-structure has thus not only been recognized, but has gradually become a vital aspect of national developmental planning and politico-cultural consciousness.

Study of village communities has also become an established tradition in Indian sociology and social anthropology, although occasionally controversies on the sociological reality or structural autonomy of these communities flare up. A few years back a strong protest about treating villages in India as sociological micro-cosms came from Louis Dumont. He wrote:

> To what extent, we are asked, is an Indian village a micro-cosm reflecting the macro-cosm of Indian civilization? But India, sociologically speaking,

is not made up of villages. It is true that the *idea* of the village is present in Indian literature and thought and can affect the unwary sociologist as much as the villager or the modern Indian politician. To pose the opposition of village to civilization is at once to have given the village a sociological reality which similar groups may have elsewhere and to have been deceived by the appearances... The *idea* of the village in Indian civilization, its reinforcement by Mahatma Gandhi, the pragmatic interests of early government officers and the influence of anthropological methods elsewhere in the world have created this fundamental supposition that the clue to an understanding of Indian society lies in the village.[114]

Dumont's objections emerge from his methodological pre-suppositions, which as we have discussed above (Chapter I) lie in his postulate that a sociological analysis has to be cognitive-structural or culturological; it should focus upon the representations or ideas of reality rather than reality *per se*. According to Dumont, sociologists' "understanding consists in replacing the simple in the complex, the small in the great, in lighting up a restricted area by bringing it back to its environment which common thought, and often, thought in general, suppresses,"[115] and if one could add, it also lies in understanding the objective realities of social phenomena in terms of systems of ideas, ideo-structures or representations.

This approach has many advantages: it provides a construct for the analysis of social change in the context of traditional ideo-structures of Indian society. Its limitations appear when one tries to explain the structure at the level of concrete social relationships and with regard to empirical aspects of continuity and change, especially when changes originate from sources outside the traditional ideo-structures of Indian society.

This also applies about the reality of Indian village as a micro-cosm. In fact, villages in India demonstrate many elements of structural unity, such as sentiment of territorial 'political' kinship and economic solidarity. Henry Orenstein has observed that as a territorial cohesive unit the village community still continues to exist. The sense of village-identity on many occasions cuts across caste loyalties which usually divide a village. In Gaon, the village he studied, there are important village-level rituals in which people as a whole cooperate and participate; when the Gaon wrestlers compete with wrestlers from other villages (in Gaon these wrestlers are untouchables), Rajputs of the village cheer the wrestlers of their own village even when opponents were Rajputs.[116] He also mentions that a number of factors in Gaon, such as neighbourhood, friendship, contiguity of land brought members of different castes together and united them into a cohesive group.[117] This is not to say that divisive factors connected with caste do not operate, but these co-exist with village-level sense of solidarity. Orenstein concludes:

Cohesion is an elusive phenomenon, but some evidence can be given for

its existence. Village identification was not entirely unconscious; at times, concern for the village and for harmonious relations within it was verbalized. One instance of this was given in connection with the Maratha-Rajput conflict on Hanuman Jayanti, when a Maratha maligned his own caste in order to prevent an open fight, and Rajput spoke of the need not to 'hurt the village'. People who professed 'radical' sentiments sometimes said that they could not act on all of their beliefs, because, they explained, they must live with and get along with their neighbours as smoothly as possible. This kind of statement was not frequent, but it was heard more often in connection with the village than with caste. This does not mean that village was more solidary than caste. On the contrary, the fact that the need for cooperation was verbalized might indicate a more fragile solidarity. In any event it probably is indicative of a different kind of solidarity, 'organic' rather than 'mechanical', to use Durkheim's term.[118]

The kind of solidarity that is found in Gaon is characteristic of most of the villages in India. Inter-caste relations in villages are not only governed by relationship of dominance but also reciprocity. The institution which illustrates this phenomenon in the villages is the *jajmani*[119] system, also known as Baluta, Aya, Miland, etc., in different regions of India. This institution has been the centre of economic and ritual mutuality and inter-dependence of castes binding them into relations ranging from dominance to reciprocity. Studies of Wiser, Dube, Opler and Singh, and K. Ishwaran on the functioning of the *jajmani* system have indicated that *jajmani* roles bind castes into solidary relationships. The same is true about Gaon, where the Baluta system (*jajmani*) binds villagers into reciprocal relationship. However, a special example of village cohesion and reciprocity of inter-group relationships resulting from the *jajmani* system may be seen in Shivapur studied by Ishwaran, where the institution of Aya (*jajmani*) binds villagers together into a cohesive moral order. K. Ishwaran writes:

> The (Aya) system is not based on any egalitarian ideology of the modern type. Rather it is based on the idea that each has a role to play in the drama of the community life as a whole. Each role is not a simple one, but a complex one, consisting of economic, moral and social functions. In the last analysis, the balance of the system is maintained by the fact that when power of one kind, like economic, tends to dominate, other kinds of power, religious or social, are automatically generated to counteract it.[120]

However, not in all villages, the *jajmani* system tends to be as reciprocal as described by Ishwaran. Dominant castes swing the balance of power in their favour in such relationships in many villages in India.[121] The institutional changes introduced through land reforms, community develop-

ment programmes, panchayat elections and national elections have considerably changed the structure of community-cohesion and its pattern of inter-group relationship and power structure. But none of these factors has completely eroded the sense of village identity nor do they portend to do so in future. Since Independence, many government-sponsored schemes of development and reform have been introduced having the village as a unit of administration and communication of change-producing values and techniques. The significance of village as a social micro-cosm has thereby been further reinforced.

In all regions of India, villages are changing in respect of economic institutions, power structure, and inter-caste relationships. A major source of economic change is land reform which has created great sociological impact on village social structure, even though its economic impact may be subject to controversies.[122] Land reform in villages has been introduced through: (*i*) abolition of intermediaries; (*ii*) tenancy reforms; (*iii*) ceiling on land holdings and redistribution of land; (*iv*) consolidation of holdings and prevention of holdings from deteriorating to uneconomic size; (*v*) emphasis on and development of cooperative farming; and (*vi*) religio-economic movement for gift of surplus land by the rich to the poor as bhoodan. These measures have been implemented differently in different states but they have created some uniform sociological consequences.

An important consequence is in the realm of power structure of the village. The abolition of privileges and economic rights of the intermediaries like the zamindars and feudals, has though not succeeded in introducing an egalitarian class structure in villages, yet it has made a great social psychological impact on ex-tenant groups and motivates them now for competition with traditional powerful groups for access to positions of power and social status. This process coinciding with reforms of panchayats has transformed the structure of village leadership. Village leadership has now increasingly become more conciliatory and pragmatic in orientation. With the traditional bases of power for the older village elite having been removed, the leadership which is now emerging has to reconcile with factions and opposite interest-groups to stay in power. In order to be effective, leaders now have to be pragmatic;[123] exercise control through informal relations and integrate bureaucratic innovations to their role within the framework of informal leadership. Orenstein reports that informal leaders are more effective in the village he studied than formal leaders.[124] Alan Beals found the village leadership in Namhalli (Mysore) faction-ridden and villagers prone to rely on a leader who had the capacity of successful action.[125] The emphasis on pragmatism in leadership choice is once again in evidence. Factional basis in the structure of leadership also seems to be the case in the village of Morsalli in Bangalore district studied by William McCormack.[125a] In this village growth of factions is related with introduction of government sponsored reforms and with interference in village affairs by the government; new factional leaders have gained additional economic autonomy by moving

away from subsistence farming to cash-crop farming which releases them from dependence upon traditional free cooperative labour as the new farming is done through hired labourers and with the help of outside employees. These processes have given the factional leaders an edge over the traditional leaders, whose only sanction was to manipulate the free cooperative supply of labour in case of refusal to comply with their decisions.

Thus, changes in the economic and administrative structures introduced a new dynamic element in the leadership of Morsalli village. In the Andhra village Padu, studied by R. Bachenheimer, leadership is in the hand of economically dominant families within each caste and wealth plus high caste status determine leadership.[125b] Families which are more outward looking and are rich, hold leadership which still follows the traditional pattern. Continuity of traditional form of leadership is also observed by Edward and Louise G. Harper in village Totagadde in Karnatak.[126] Traditionally dominant Jats hold leadership in Rampur village in north India. Oscar Lewis[127] observes four characteristics of Jat leadership in Rampur village: first, the tendency to minimize the status difference between the leader and the led within caste; second, resistance to delegate authority to leaders permanently without consultation with the appropriate faction; third, complete absence of youth leadership; and, fourth, lack of direct role of women in leadership. This pattern may not be typical of all north Indian villages. A survey of panchayat leaders in Rajasthan[128] showed that 57.4% of the *sarpanches* (panchayat presidents) are below 40 years of age. An all-India study of panchayat leadership sponsored by the Planning Commission in 15 evaluation blocks (14 States) covering 175 villages and on a sample of 547 members of panchayats and 47 presidents of panchayats revealed following characteristics: of the panchayat members, 1.1% are below the age of 25 years; 38.9% are between 25–40 years of age and 59.6% are above the age of 40 years. There is not a single panchayat president below the age of 25; 46.8% are between 25–40 and 53.2% are above 40; 42.2% of members and 17.0% of presidents are illiterate; 88.1% members and 95.7% presidents are land holders; 32.5% members and 89.4% presidents belong to the rich class and 69.8% members and 97.9% presidents come from high castes.[129]

Now, we have a fairly wider perspective on leadership and power structure of villages in India. Its structure seems still to be dominated by rich and upper caste groups but there is a tendency towards recruitment of younger members to the leadership role in villages and a majority of leaders are literate. An important source to gain leadership in the village and have dominance over its affairs is the landed property;[130] the landed rich are also better educated and have better contacts with the outside world.

Leadership is an indirect manifestation of the system of social stratification. The processes of change in the leadership structure reveal that there is a tendency toward re-definition[131] and re-adaptation of roles among the traditionally powerful groups in order to maintain their position in the

power structure. The traditional structure itself has not changed. The new democratic rights and legal safeguards provided to the less powerful classes motivate them to aspire for power but their economic handicaps thwart their desires. The emergent tensions for power of this type ultimately end up in reconciliation by which traditionally dominant castes and classes remain in power by series of accommodations and manipulations.

Where there is a possibility for lower castes to move upward economically, as in the case of Boad and Ganjam distillers in Bisipara village studied by Bailey,[132] the economic change becomes a forerunner of changes in the balance of power. As we have mentioned above, these two untouchable castes by trade in liquor could earn enough money to purchase land in the village which formerly was the sole monopoly of the Warrior caste, the dominant group in Bisipara. Consequently, a change in the traditional system of social stratification has taken place. However, the pattern differs in different regions. In Sripuram village (Tanjore district studied by Andre Beteille) there has been a change in the power structure of village without the traditional land-owning groups having lost their land to any substantial extent. Beteille observes:

> Although relations between classes have been undergoing change, this change has not kept pace with changes in the distribution of power. Ownership of land has shifted only in a small way from the old renter class to the emerging class of farmers and owner-cultivators. Power, on the other hand, has shifted much more decisively from the traditional elite of the village into the hands of the new popular leaders.
>
> Not only was there greater congruence between caste and class in the traditional system, but both were congruent with the power structure than today. The powerful families in the past were the big land-owning families. These included the principal Brahmin families and, among non-Brahmin families, the Maratha families. Today political power, whether in the village or outside it, is not as closely tied to ownership of land as it was in the past. New bases of power have emerged which are, to some extent, independent of both caste and class. Perhaps most important among these is the strength of numerical support.[133]

The finding of Beteille shows an instance of regional variation; otherwise closeness of fit between land-ownership and degree of dominance of groups comparatively evaluated by B.S. Cohn in twelve villages of India from different regions is very conclusive indeed. In six villages land control also compensates for lack of numerical dominance (these villages are Rampura, Totagadde, Kumbapettai, Senapur, Khalapur and Kasandra mentioned above).[134]

Despite the fact that major changes in the system of social stratification have not been widespread, marginal changes in this system have been frequent. This specially refers to occupational diversification, migration

to urban areas and towns and rationalization of agriculture. Epestein's study of the two villages in South India offers an example of economic diversification as a consequence of external environmental stresses.[135] In Chanukhera we found many cases where traditional servant castes have opened tea-stalls, goldsmiths run grocery shops and untouchable labourers work in construction work, brick-kilns and factories.[136] Generally speaking there has been a break in the centripetal world-view of castes and classes in most villages in India; there is a rising motivation for education, status mobility and share in local, regional and national power structures. A great deal of this change has come as a result of politicization of villages through the contemporary political reforms. It has also been motivated by community development schemes which now cover almost all the villages in India.

Benefits of development and progress, it is true, have generally gone to the upper castes and classes in the village,[137] but there have been visible changes in the standard of living, conditions of housing, health and sanitation of most villagers in the country. In 1957, 71% of settlements had schools in them and 61% of the population between the ages of 6 and 11 was enrolled in the year 1960–61. All this is indicative of aspiration for progress and change. Existential structure has not kept pace with the aspiration, however; as the social stratification and power structure of the villages shows only marginal changes of adaptive nature rather than changes which may really be called structural, the rate of economic and social progress has also not been of a revolutionary character. The process of change and its tensions continue and the hopeful aspect of the process is that the village micro-structure now has ceased to be 'inward-looking[138] and is poised for more—dynamic internal adjustments as external pressure for change gains strength. Uncertainty and tension are a natural by-product of this process in the interim period.

Changes in the rural micro-structure are more adjustive than structural in significance. Traditionally influential groups still continue to wield influence and power. Caste privileges still continue to coincide with privileged class status. Despite these attributes, change is taking place. Upper castes now hold on to power not by traditional legitimation of their authority but through degrees of consensus, which though manipulated, is essentially democratic in ethos. This has changed the very psychological base of inter-group relations in villages. *Power is held by a traditional privileged class but it is no longer institutionalized by tradition.* This explains the fundamental change which has taken place in the relational matrix of the Indian rural society. As time passes, many latent features of the new power structure will emerge which may be helpful in bringing about structural changes in this society.

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION OF INDIAN TRADITION : ANALYSIS

TRADITION, BY WHICH we mean value—themes encompassing the entire social system of Indian society prior to the beginning of modernization was organized on the principles of hierarchy, holism, continuity and transcendence. These four value-themes were deeply interlocked with other elements of Indian social structure. Hierarchy was engrained not only in the system of caste and sub-caste stratification but also in the Hindu concepts of human nature, occupational life cycles (*ashramas*), and moral duties (*dharma*). Holism implied a relationship between individual and group in which the former was encompassed by the latter in respect of duties and rights; what had precedence here was community or *sangha* and not the individual. This subsumption of individual by collectivity persisted all along the line of traditional social structure, e.g., family, village community, caste and political territory or nation. Communalism in traditional social system was reinforced through the value system of continuity which in Hinduism was symbolized by principles of *karma*, transmigration of soul and a cyclical view of change. The principle of transcendence also posited that legitimation of traditional values could never be challenged on grounds of rationality derived from the non-sacred or profane[1] scales of evaluation. It formed a super-concept contributing to integration as well as rationalization of the other value-themes of the tradition.

The organization of tradition based on these value-components could not be called typical only of the Indian society, since at one level similar phenomena also existed in the traditional West.[2] The divergence between the two traditions, however, arose from their unique social heritage, existential situations and historicity of circumstances. From this a question follows: will the historicity of modernization in heterogeneous societies and traditions result into their transformation towards a universal and homogeneous form of modernization? This question assumes significance especially for India which has a hoary past and has been the centre of civilizations with great temporal depth.

This temporal depth of civilization in traditional Indian society has relevance not only for analysing the direction the process of modernization might eventually take through major transformations in the social structure and culture, but it is also important for understanding causality and sequence of events through which modernization has made its impact on the traditional Indian society. It might reveal also the manner in which initial structural and cultural conditions of modernization in India might

contribute to such institutional adaptations which may be universalistic in orientation yet particularistic in form. The form of traditional institutions may remain intact but their substance might undergo major transformations incorporating modernization.

Historically, social structure and tradition in India remained impervious to major elements of modernity until the contact with the West began through colonization. The earlier encounters with Islam only reinforced the tradition since Islam despite being exogenous to the Hindu tradition was basically organized on value-themes which were traditional; ideally, Islam had no place for hierarchical differentiation of individuals within its community of believers; its world-view was messianic-historical in contrast with the Hindu view of continuity; the principle of transcendence in Islam was strictly monotheistic and here too it differed from Hinduism. The principle of holism which no doubt was present both in Islam and Hinduism also varied in sociological meaning in the two civilizations. In Hinduism, holism implied individual's social and moral subordination to the group without theocratic implications, so basic in Islam.

Despite these dissimilarities in ideal value-themes of the Hindu and Islamic traditions, there took place a synthesis between them which reinforced the traditional character of Indian society without significant breakdown in its organization. Islam, in its Persian transformation had already imbibed some elements of hierarchical stratification when it came to India from there, and in the midst of the caste-stratified Hindu society, more so, owing to large-scale conversion to Islam by caste Hindus, Islamic social structure in this country soon developed its own pattern of caste hierarchy.[3] In political structure too feudal monarchical system followed by the Muslim rulers was not fundamentally different from those of the traditional Hindu rulers, and even where there were variations attempt was made to accommodate Hindu norms of political order through institutional adjustments. Hindu princes and administrative functionaries held important offices at the courts of Muslim rulers in the North. Consequently, there took place a high degree of cultural as well as institutional syncretism between the two systems without major breakdowns. From the view-point of modernization, therefore, the Islamic contact was more tradition-reinforcing than otherwise.

SOCIAL CHANGES IN TRADITIONAL INDIA

It is necessary to draw a distinction between social change and modernization, especially to evaluate changes in the traditional society. In traditional India there were continual instances of social change without implying modernization. These changes were from one traditional structure to another, without, however, transcending them for a qualitatively distinctive evolutionary differentiation. The changes were initiated both through orthogenetic and heterogenetic causal sources, and related to social struc-

ture as well as culture, but these were essentially pre-modern in nature and quality.

The traditional cultural structure comprising the Little and Great traditions in India experienced many changes before the beginning of the Western contact. Buddhism and Jainism emerged as protest movements against the Hindu caste system; their growth led to formation of new caste-like segmentary groups which later degenerated into castes contributing further to pluralistic tradition. These movements had their impact also on political and economic structure of the Indian society. Jainism particularly was an urban movement, and both Jainism and Buddhism led to the emergence of new mercantile castes in urban centres. Orthogenetic movements also formed the bases of Sikhism in north India, of Bhakti movements in north and south India, of Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj during the British regime, and finally of the Gandhian movement in the contemporary times that culminated in India's political independence. With the partial exception of the Bhakti movements in north India which projected egalitarian values and sought for a synthesis between the Hindu and Muslim traditions, all other movements were either break-away processes to establish parallel Great traditions or reiterated the established Great tradition of Hinduism.

The changes which thus occurred were confined to differentiation within the framework of traditional social structure and values; structural changes were very few, and those which took place were limited in respect of the types of roles. Mention may be made of the priestly roles and monastic organizations which emerged with the rise of Buddhism. Similar developments in religious role-structures and organizations partially followed the emergence of other traditions. But these changes by no means could be called structural, since differentiation of roles was segmental and did not alter the system as a whole. The role differentiations also had an elitist character since all of them were led by members of the upper class and caste. Only a few Bhakti movements were an exception, but these were invariably reiterative rather than innovative in significance. None of them had a meaningful impact on political system, the stratification system or the caste order against which they propagated.

The Islamic tradition in India came from a heterogenetic source; its establishment by conquest introduced a complex emotional variable right from the beginning which has continued through time. Value-themes of Islam were holistic but the principle of hierarchy or caste was not accepted in theory; the idea of continuity was also less pronounced as Islam, like all religions of Semitic origin, was based on the conception of historical time; its value-theme on transcendence too was rooted in the principle of absolute monotheism. These contrasts of history and value-themes could not, however, render Islam as a systematic exogenous source for radical transformation in the Indian tradition. Despite the apparent dissimilarities, the contact between the Great traditions of Hinduism and Islam was only a contact between two traditional systems. Large-scale conversions to

Islam during the Muslim rule in India might be said to have offered a structural outlet for the deprived Hindu castes for social, economic and cultural mobility. But the extent to which the converts succeeded in it was always limited. Ashrafs (the four immigrant Muslim groups) generally maintained their social distance from these converts in matters of marriage and kinship ties; they never recognized them as their equals. The caste hierarchy continued within the convert Muslims and in most cases traditional occupations and caste rituals were also maintained. Yet, it is reasonable to believe that there must have been some advantages; being a Muslim in a political set-up where Muslim kings and chiefs were the rulers did offer security and other peripheral benefits to these groups.

These facts, however, do not support the view that conversion to Islam was motivated by cultural rigidity of the caste system and its dysfunctions. Both caste and cultural deprivations did largely survive among the converts within the Islamic social structure. A stronger motivation behind conversion, therefore, might have been that of the felt structural deprivations (in terms of new economic opportunities, security and power) rather than cultural deprivation of the caste system. The spirit behind conversion may not have been merely that of escape but also of innovation. However, the groups which took readily to the Islamic faith were from the lower castes for whom psychological appeal of belonging to the ruling community must have been stronger apart from the material benefits they must have anticipated. The main structural deprivations here were those of power and social status, which Dumont rightly characterizes as an equation between 'power and religion'. In all traditional societies where the system of social stratification is closed and there are no legitimate structural means to climb up in social hierarchy, the change of faith, or of customs and rituals might offer a relatively secure means of gambling for higher status.

This is clearly revealed when we shift our analysis from the Great to the Little traditions. These Little traditions as Redfield and Singer have maintained comprise the cultural beliefs and practices held by the folk, through oral tradition and localized adaptations of cultural roles and values of the Great tradition. Both Hinduism and Islam in India have maintained these Little traditions. Plurality of the Little traditions was preserved through caste structure and its local cultural expressions especially among the castes of lower and intermediate ranks. These castes, both Hindu and Muslim, formed their own plural traditions and micro-structures. As we have already mentioned kinship and social ties of castes hardly ever extend beyond the radius of two hundred miles in any part of India; the diversity of languages and communication barriers traditionally delimited the scope of caste interaction. Thus, plural traditions of these castes formed the Little traditions in India.

Two important processes of change which have traditionally been active in the Little traditions are those of Sanskritization and Islamization. Sanskritization refers to the processes of change from within the Hindu tradition whereas Islamization has been in response to the contact with an external

tradition. Both these processes reflect a tendency among the strongly deprived groups to adapt or change their local traditions in conformity with the normative elements of a Great tradition, whether orthogenetic or heterogenetic in origin. There is considerable literature on Sanskritization which has grown since the pioneering studies conducted by M.N. Srinivas. Similar empirical studies on the process of Islamization are, however, lamentably scarce (*see* Chapter III), although both Sanskritization and Islamization are at one point homologous processes. This homology arises from the similarity of structural contexts in which the motivation for these changes comes into being.[4] An important causal factor here is that of 'relative deprivation' of groups and castes in comparison to other groups and castes enjoying better social status; within or outside the tradition, this forms a part of the theory of reference group analysis.[5]

STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND SANSKRITIZATION

Endogenous changes in the cultural tradition of Hinduism were mainly confined to Sanskritization before the beginning of Western contact. Sanskritization took place in two different forms throughout this period; first, as a historical process by collective recognition of lower castes to the ranks of upper castes as a result of their acts of chivalry, rise in economic and power status and political alliances.[6] In most such cases mobility was legitimized by consensus of the dominant castes and came into being as a historical necessity. Such legitimation to status upgrading was provided by the established higher castes, even by kings through royal decrees, and by other formal means of admittance to a higher rank recognized by the priestly castes. Here, Sanskritization had a wider historical implication. Although its impact was confined to a region or a sub-region the implicit political and economic relationship in its background gave it a new dimension of importance. In the second form, Sanskritization has a contextual or local meaning and generally amounts to unilateral attempt of a caste or sub-caste to move upward in hierarchy. Some lower caste groups begin to emulate customs and styles of upper castes in their region, give up some of their own low-rank customs and seek to get recognition for higher caste status within the system. A major difference in this process from the historical context of Sanskritization is the absence of consensus. Often the opposite of it, that is, resistance by the dominant castes, prevails.[7] Sanskritization in this form is seldom legitimized within the caste system. The maximum empirical cases of Sanskritization refer to this type of change.

Sanskritization in the second, or the contextual form, is a slow and non-spectacular process of cultural mobility of castes. It is devoid of wider political implications which this process follows in the historical sense. In both forms, however, Sanskritization results from certain developments which may be called the structural pre-requisites of this process. These are (1) a change in the self-image of castes or groups followed by higher status

aspiration; (2) some improvement in social and economic status of these castes (groups) which could render changes in aspiration and self-image viable for making active effort for status mobility; (3) the closure of stratification system in respect of other avenues (social roles, occupations, economic competition and competition for power status, etc.) except through emulation of customs and cultural styles; (4) the absence of social and psychological pressures among the aspiring castes to identify upper caste status as negative reference group[8] either due to deeper commitment to ideology of traditional society or force of habit; and (5) the absence of organized opposition from the upper castes to such behaviour of the lower castes due to reasons either psychological or structural.

In the light of these pre-requisites which in various combinations are present in all reported cases of Sanskritization, whether historical or contextual, many structural implications of this process can be seen. Sanskritization, might not be a result of lower castes' greater acceptance of the values of the Great tradition held by the upper castes, but it might be used as the only pragmatic means available to them for status mobility in a closed system of social stratification. Hence, Sanskritization may often disguise the seedbeds of effective modernization. Sanskritization is psychologically or even structurally, akin to modernization in so far as the motive forces to challenge the deprivations imposed by Great tradition are stronger. After Independence, with the lower and backward classes having gained political and legal rights to fight out their deprivations not Sanskritization but formation of politically oriented caste associations is the practice.[9]

Sanskritization denotes changes in the cultural and not the structural aspect of tradition and society. It does not, for example, show how role differentiations following urbanization and new occupational innovations, or changes in family structure and power structure (leadership and elite) follow from the inter-linkage of social variables, and how these variables could be explained. The major analytic orientation in this concept is culturological rather than sociological. However, some social scientists believe that once Sanskritization is evaluated in the framework of reference group theory it could be defined not only culturally but also structurally. Owen M. Lynch writes:

> Under the frame of analysis provided by reference group and status role theories, Sanskritization can be defined not only culturally but also structurally. That is to say, it can be seen as more than a borrowing of status attributes or as more than a change of behaviour of a particular caste, whereby it substitutes the ritual, pantheon, and practices of an upper caste for that which it previously held. Sanskritization can now be seen as structured relation between groups or castes. Thus a Sanskritizing caste *defines the social situation in which its mobility is to occur (reference groups) and thereafter interacts with members of other castes.* In such interaction particular statuses are activated (dominant and salient statuses). *Such*

social action has the intended consequence of a rise in status within the caste hierarchy and an opening of the power and opportunity structure to the members of the Sanskritizing caste. More often than not, such social action has the unintended consequence of 'conflict' or 'contradiction'.[10] (italics added.)

The important distinction involved here is between Sanskritization as a concept referring to cultural changes in the internal organization of a particular caste and as a concept relevant to the understanding of structural changes within the caste system. There is no doubt that reference group theory offers a structural explanation of the cultural process called Sanskritization; it is because being more general, reference group theory has greater explanatory power. But in the analysis of Sanskritization by Lynch there seems to be an unfortunate implication that simply by introducing the reference group theory to this nominalistic concept, Sanskritization could be made to explain structural changes in the caste system.

The reason for this simplistic assumption in Lynch's analysis lies in his lack of focus on some other important distinctions that Merton has introduced while formulating his reference group conceptual frame. These are: (1) the distinction between membership and non-membership groups based on the feeling of relative deprivation of members within a group;(2) the process of anticipatory socialization of members willing to renounce their existing membership to a group in favour of some non-membership group; and (3) the important role of closure or openness of membership of the aspired for non-membership group which would finally define the limit of success or failure of reference group behaviour of the aspirants.

Sanskritization process found in some castes is more like anticipatory socialization in the hope of status enhancement; but it must be stated that this hope is rarely if ever realized. Lynch's statement that a Sanskritizing caste defines the social situation in which its mobility is to occur[10a], is very relevant but his conclusion, "and thereafter *interacts* with members of other castes"[11], is highly vague. Probably the idea is of the interaction with the higher reference group caste, but again the meaning of interaction is left undefined. This is particularly misleading as some negative (conflict, litigation) or positive (cooperation, *jajmani*) forms of interaction are always present among castes forming its social system. The specific context in which 'interaction' assumes additional meaning through reference group analysis can only be made by membership non-membership distinction which is not fully explained by Lynch. The *Jatavas* of Agra whose cases he cites could never be accepted within the membership fold of the upper castes; their interaction with upper (Kshatriya or Brahmin) castes could never be either commensal or connubial, the two most significant and key forms of interactions which define the structure of the caste system. Consequently, these upper castes have according to Lynch's own statement become a negative reference group for the *Jatavas*. It is here that the status of caste as closed

group assumes new explanatory significance which Lynch's analysis fails to pin-point.

In a more comprehensive treatment of the reference group theory as applied to the study of mobility in the caste system Y.B. Damle writes:

> The caste system is characterized as a closed system and inclusion into a caste (*jati*) other than one's own (by birth) is not normally possible. *But the reference group theory sets forth the pre-requisites for positive orientation in an open system, where ultimate inclusion in the non-membership group is possible and often anticipated.* If ultimate inclusion in another caste (*jati*) is not normally possible by the very nature of the caste system, would positive orientation to a caste other than ego's be dysfunctional for the person concerned? The paradox of caste lies in the fact that, although lower caste persons cannot expect to be included in a higher caste (*jati*), and also because higher caste persons need not fear their inclusion, positive orientation for reference and imitation is permitted and even encouraged. Anticipatory socialization can thus occur and it has the effect of reducing distance and repulsion between castes even if it does not ensure ultimate absorption or inclusion.[12]

This renders it clear that Sanskritization as a process only refers to changes in cultural attributes of a caste and not to a structural change in its system; the structural factors, however, are highly meaningful; mention may be made of the five structural pre-requisites of Sanskritization we mentioned above. The most important among these is redefinition of a caste's self-image following either a change in its economic or political situation. What matters more in such changes is not the actual amount of improvement in status but the perception that a positive change is possible. Once this feeling is there, closure of membership to the aspired for group does not matter as it is adequately compensated by recognition by default of reaction from the upper castes. However, if the reaction of the upper castes is hostile or is perceived to be so by the lower castes, it is likely that latter (lower castes) would define the former (upper caste status) as a negative reference group, and from this a break-away movement in the caste system would follow. Particular mention may be made of conversion to Islam in the medieval period, to Christianity during the British period, and the current neo-Buddhist movement among the scheduled castes and tribes in India.

Despite these limitations, Sanskritization is an extremely viable concept to understand the changes in the traditional system of Indian society, where the social stratification system was closed and the normative principles were correspondingly hierarchical and holistic; the latter strengthened the former and thus a relatively stable social equilibrium was achieved. The changes which took place within tradition were seldom contradictory to this system of stratification and the value-themes. On the contrary, legitimation was sought for changes and innovations from within these twin

structural-normative attributes of the traditional society. Sanskritization connotes the special form that change takes place in the framework of Indian tradition.

Now the question is: What were the forms of structural changes in the traditional Indian society? To analyse such changes we have made a distinction between micro-structures and macro-structures of society. Heuristically, this categorization is attempted on the basis of extension of networks of relationships. The range of extension of relationships of micro-structure is limited both in terms of territory and choices of activities involved. Its instances are: family, caste and sub-caste, and village community. The caste structure played crucial role in defining the networks of relationship both of the family and community in the traditional society. Empirical studies suggest that its own boundaries of interaction very rarely outcrossed the limits set by the regional-linguistic and cultural inclusiveness, which in territorial terms extended not beyond two to three hundred miles. The macro-structures, on the other hand, have an inter-regional and pan-Indian spread of relational networks. Instances of such macro-structures in traditional India were the imperial and feudal political networks, the institutions of banking and commerce and monastic and other religious structures, etc.

An important aspect of structural change in the traditional society was determined by the nature of the relationship which existed between the micro-structures and the macro-structures. These relationships were characterized by a high degree of autonomy;[13] its consequence was that changes and upheavals at macro-structural levels could seldom generate corresponding repercussions at the micro-level of society. Hence, the spectacular continuity of cultural practices and norms in India despite the steady stream of encroachments to its cultural identity from alien sources. The inter-structural autonomy helped in selective syncretism of new cultural modes, forms of behaviour and structure. Innovation at one level could be effected without causing breakdown in the social structure as a whole. This structural characteristic of traditional Indian society proved to be extremely helpful in its adaptive transformations towards modernization, beginning with the British regime.[14]

This attribute of traditional society also set a limit to the nature and direction of structural changes. These changes were characterized by circular processes: a joint family would become nuclear and then again grow joint in structure; townships and trading centres would appear and disappear and re-appear; there would be circulation of elite and rulers from among the same class and caste, etc. without major structural transformations. The changes were, therefore, adaptive rather than structural in the real sense. Fluctuating nature of these changes would be evident from the estimates of India's population between 300 B.C. and 1845; population during this period fluctuated between 100 and 140 millions. Only after 1855 a rising trend in population seems to have stabilized in India.[14a] The

social structure had, thus, a 'fused'[15] character without much functional differentiation of roles. This was because most innovations were re-interpretative adjustments in structural forms and activities (role-structures) within the traditional principles of legitimation and not alternative evolutionary solutions. This pattern continued even after the first major exogenous impact, that of Islam, on the traditional Hindu social structure.

ISLAMIZATION: AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN TWO TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS

For social change the Islamic influence on India was limited and not conducive to modernization. However, its diffusion gave birth to the emergence of new Great and Little traditions, although it is not clear to what extent Islam led to innovations in the micro and macro-social structures of Indian society. Its impact on family, caste and village community was insignificant, and in the macro-structures too it did not set out any basically new forms. Islamic polity and judicial administration were essentially feudal and patrimonial; the legal principles and norms were also hierarchical and did not fully recognize the principles of equality and equity in political and civil rights. This explains why Islamic impact unlike that of the West failed to contribute to modernization.

The cultural changes which the impact of Islam initiated emerged from the growth of Islamic Great tradition on Indian soil. Since Islam established itself in India by conquest some element of force in the spread of this tradition cannot be ruled out, but a more important reason for its growth can be attributed to structural factors which in early Hindu tradition motivated castes towards Sanskritization. It is revealing that both Sanskritization and conversion to Islam or Islamization had been most popular among the lower castes of India. The structural pre-requisites for Islamization too were the re-definition of self-image, frustration from the closure of existing system of stratification and anticipation that conversion would improve social chances; the same factors were active also in Sanskritization. Important difference, however, was in the reaction of the Hindus to such changes which presumably was of definite hostility and isolation. Islamization at every stage might have meant an active and hostile reaction from the original membership group towards the converts and their complete exclusion from its membership. This was not the case in Sanskritization.

Hence, Islamization also led to some structural changes through continual differentiation and segmentation of new castes who got converted to Islam. As the sub-culture of these Muslim castes even to this day suggests, they did not renounce many of their former rituals and practices. This led to formation of Little traditions of Islam. These traditions were remarkably syncretic and worked out a synthesis between the Hindu and Muslim cultural patterns and beliefs. With formation of Little traditions of Islam, Islamization further developed structural similarities with Sanskritization. The

lower caste converts began to strive for the status of Ashrafs (the Muslim upper castes or groups) and a caste of pseudo-Ashrafs emerged.[16] As in Sanskritization, here too the claim for higher status is not recognized by the upper Muslim castes. Such cases of Islamization are widespread and have been reported from different parts of the country.[17]

With the establishment of the British power gradually the relations between Hindu and Muslim groups and traditions began to be politicized. This was sparked off by many factors, such as the emergence of Hindu revivalist movements (e.g. the Arya Samaj professed to reconvert Muslims to Hindu faith), frustration of Muslims with the British, and the beginning of new political movement for national independence which stimulated Muslims to chalk out their own course of action. The result of this politicization was finally the division of India, adding a new dimension to the minority status of the Indian Muslims.

There has now emerged a new awakening among the Muslims to level off the differences of their Little traditions and of caste sub-cultures of the past by encouraging purist conformity with the Great tradition of Islam. Tabligh movement, for instance, is directly oriented to this goal. Muslim communalism has also become active and forceful in some parts of northern India and Kerala. The process of vertical mobility to new caste status by Islamization is now being replaced by emphasis upon horizontal solidarity of the entire Muslim community.

Thus, we see how Islamization as a cultural process has completed a full cycle in India. It began as a process of external impact and conversion of low caste Hindus to Muslim Great tradition, then it emerged as a process of status mobility within the Islamic social structure very much like Sanskritization, and finally it regained its earlier orthodoxy; sub-cultural frills which are outside the tradition of Islam are purposely renounced with the view that Muslims must consolidate themselves into an organic whole irrespective of divergent Little traditions (of language, caste and sub-caste and region, etc.,). This turn in the process of Islamization corresponds with the new movement among the lower Hindu castes to form caste associations and establish horizontal solidarity instead of seeking status mobility within the caste system through Sanskritization. The causal background for both seems to be structurally identical. It emanates from the realization that in a democratic society power and status mobility would more easily be gained by consolidation of one's rank and formation of effective power and protest groups rather than by imitating a traditionally defined higher status which is difficult to get and is also becoming rapidly obsolescent in the new social dynamics.

It may well be that latent reasons for such changes both in the Hindu and Islamic cultural tradition are disguised protest movements against the established system of stratification and power. Attempt is not only towards forming horizontal communal solidarities but also to give them organizational

shape of modern corporate groups, based on rational norms, allocation of duties and obligations and rational means of communication and propaganda.[18] This aspect of the movements which may apparently seem to be traditionalizing is highly relevant to our analysis of modernization.

PROCESSES OF MODERNIZATION

Modernization in India started mainly with the Western contact, especially through establishment of the British rule. This contact had a special historicity which brought about many far reaching changes in culture and social structure of the Indian society. Not all of them, however, could be called modernizing.[19] The basic direction of this contact was towards modernization, but in the process a variety of traditional institutions also got reinforcement. This demonstrates the weakness of assuming a neat contrariety between tradition and modernity. This polarity may be more heuristic than real. However, only after the establishment of British rule in India, modern cultural institutions and forms of social structure were introduced. In this respect the impact of Western tradition fundamentally differed from that of Islam, although both were heterogenetic and both began with political domination and rulership. The Western tradition at the time of contact had itself undergone fundamental transformations through Industrial Revolution and social reformation. Its traditional principle of hierarchy in stratification represented both by Church and feudalism were shaken; its medieval holism of value system was seriously jeopardized by emergence of Protestantism, and was on the way out. Its place was now being taken by rational-individualism in economy and society. The basic dynamism to all these processes was imparted by cumulative chain of innovations in science and technology. It was a period of extreme optimism and ever more accelerated rate of social change in the West, particularly Britain.

This social background to a large extent determined the attitude of the British rulers and administrators about modernization in India; another determining factor was their colonial status. With the exception of a handful of Orientalists who were overwhelmed by the textual grandeur of Indian tradition, the majority of British missionaries and administrators were only impressed by contrasts which Indian society presented to their own Western society.[20] Indian society appeared to them as consisting of discrete plural traditions of castes, sub-castes and tribes devoid of a systematic binding force of a universal nature.[21] The significance of British contribution to modernization mainly lies in the creation of such networks of social structure and culture which were modern and pan-Indian.

Initially, the contact led to growth of a modernizing sub-culture or Little tradition of Westernization, especially during the seventeenth century in Bengal, Madras and Bombay, where a small nucleus of interpreters, trader-cum-middlemen emerged who were slowly being socialized to Western ways;

subsequently, there also emerged sects which emphasized assimilation of Western cultural norms, and Western modes of learning (e.g. Brahmo Samaj, Prarthana Samaj, etc.); these also ran a crusade against obscurantism in Hindu traditions. These movements on one hand and the consolidation of the British power towards the middle of the nineteenth century on the other, finally led to the institution of a modernizing Great tradition. Its components were: a universalistic legal system, expansion of Western form of education, urbanization and industrialization, spread of new means of communication and transport and social reforms. Along with these modernization norms structural modernization also took place. For instance, rational bureaucratic systems of administration and judiciary, army, and industrial bureaucracy, new classes of business elite and entrepreneurs came into being. These were accompanied by emergence of political elite and a nationalist leadership by the middle of the nineteenth century. Growth of industrial entrepreneurship also contributed to the emergence of industrial working class and trade unions organized on corporate lines as in the West. These modernizing structures had a uniform character throughout the country. Their development led, therefore, to articulation of nationalist aspirations in the country which itself was a major step in the growth of modernization.

There was, however, one important feature of Indian modernization during the British period. The growth of this process was selective and segmental. It was not integrated with the micro-structures of Indian society, such as family, caste and village community. At these levels, the British by and large followed a policy of least interference, especially after the rebellion of 1857. Moreover, some British administrators were wrongly impressed by the staticness and autonomy of these micro-structures compared with the rest of the Indian society. This was especially so about the notion of village community,[22] and importance attributed to caste. For a long time caste and ethnic factors were given recognition in recruitment of officers to army and middle and lower ranks of bureaucracy. Later, in the twentieth century, as the nationalist movement gathered momentum, a communal electorate system was introduced. These historical factors have deeply influenced the process of modernization which followed during the post-colonial period. It increased the contingency of traditional institutions and symbolisms to the Indian process of modernization.

This development is fully articulated in the freedom movement and the pace of modernization of Indian society thereafter. Freedom movement ushered in a new political culture of modernization. At its centre was the personality of Mahatma Gandhi whose one foot was always deeply embedded in tradition. His emergence during the peak of Westernization process in India signifies an orthogenetic response of Indian tradition to the new challenges of social change. Gandhi successfully mobilized Indian people for the attainment of freedom, but he could not, however, avert one serious breakdown in the process... the partition of India into two independent

nations. As we mentioned above, it followed from the uneven growth of sub-cultural traditions of modernization in Hinduism and Islam, each conditioned by unique historicity of their own. The quest for a separate nationhood by the Muslim community in India reflected a crisis of aspiration along with that of confidence.

Following Independence, modernization process in India has undergone a basic change from its colonial pattern. As an integral part of developmental strategy now modernization has been envisaged for all levels of cultural and structural systems. Discontinuity in modernization between macro-structures and micro-structures and between the Little and Great traditions, as during the British regime, has now been consciously abolished. Introduction of adult suffrage and a federal parliamentary form of political structure have carried politicization to every sector of social organization. Conscious legal reforms in Hindu marriage and inheritance laws have deeply affected the foundations of traditional Hindu family structure. Community Development Projects have carried the cultural norms and role-structures of modernity to each and every village in India, and this, coupled with introduction of land reforms and elective village panchayats, has initiated villagers to a bureaucratic form of participation in local level management and administration of justice. Caste has in the process undergone radical transformation of roles, developed new functional adaptations and activated aspirations unleashed by democratization of polity and power structure. We have analysed in detail how caste is increasingly developing an associational character. Now it functions as an important structural network in the process of modernization.

As the process of modernization becomes all encompassing, it also generates inter-structural tensions and conflicts between traditions (past and contemporary). Future course of modernization in India would depend much on the manner in which these tensions are resolved as modernization gathers momentum. In many developing countries in Asia modernization contributed to a structural and cultural breakdown in society. The cases of China, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan could be cited. The only successful case of modernization in Asia is that of Japan, but there too its institutionalization has not been without a breakdown following the Second World War.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND BREAKDOWN IN MODERNIZATION

The questions are: Under what structural or cultural conditions does modernization lead to integrative transformation of society? What are the structural pre-requisites for institutionalization of modernizing changes without breakdown? How far does the Indian case warrant the possibility of institutionalization of modernity or alternatively of structural breakdown in the process ?

Answers to these questions are related to the way modernization is

conceptualized. Significantly, there is still no unanimity on concepts and evaluative standards of modernization among social scientists, and each approach can be charged with having latent ideological bias.[22a] Sociologists having a Marxist approach to modernization might decry the very concept of 'breakdown' as employed by sociologists from the 'free world' bloc; for Marxists 'breakdown' may be a vulgarized conceptual substitute for 'revolution' which is a pre-requisite for modernization in all developing as well as developed capitalist societies. It is, therefore, necessary that we try to evaluate some important theoretical presuppositions of modernization which may have a bearing upon modernization in India.

Most approaches to modernization could be grouped under two broad categories: structural and evolutionary. The structural approach is rather preponderant in social sciences. It seeks to analyse modernization with the help of selected social or normative variables. Such variables as 'social mobilization'[23] growth of 'communication', 'media exposure'[24]; democratic political institutions and values[25], morals and norms conducive to modernization[26], technological and economic resources of society[27], and 'initial conditions'[28] of society with respect to the presence of cultural and structural autonomy[29] of parts within the social system, have been taken into consideration. Modernization is supposed to follow as a result of the presence of these variables in the social system; their intensity and proportion would determine the nature and extent of modernization in specific situations.

Evolutionary approach to modernization, on the other hand, is based on more systematic theoretical assumptions. It treats modernization as an evolutionary stage in the life of human society. There are, however, differences in formation of the process of evolution and its direction. Its methodological formulation may either be structural-functional[30] or dialectical[31]; similarly direction of evolution may also be either unilinear[32] or multilinear[33]. A major difference between dialectical (Marxist) and structural-functional evolutionary approaches to modernization is that the former treats 'breakdown' in the established political, economic and structural framework of a society as a necessary and inevitable condition for development towards modernization. Class-struggle and its international form of struggle between the rich and poorer nations are here assumed as necessary processes for such evolutionary achievements. Even modernization as a concept is understood differently, its focus is upon changes in stratification system, system of property ownership and ownership of productive resources in a nation[34], and not on psychological-normative variables like 'achievement orientation', 'psychic mobility' and 'rational hedonism', etc., common among the treatments of many social scientists. Individual characteristics are here treated as bye-products of major aggregates of changes in institutional structure of society and its structure of power and property relationships.[35]

The structural-functional evolutionary treatment of modernization is drawn primarily from an organismic analogy where evolution is treated

as a continuity from the sub-human to human phase and beyond. In an essay on modernization as an 'evolutionary universal' of human society, Talcott Parsons writes that such evolutionary changes would engulf all human groups despite their typicalities in other facets of social and cultural organization. His view assumes that the watershed between sub-human and human does not mark a cessation of the developmental change, but rather a stage in a long process that begins with many pre-human phases and continues through that watershed into our own time, and beyond.[36] Modernization follows a succession of 'evolutionary universals', which are defined as "any organizational development sufficiently important to further evolution that, rather than emerging only once, is likely to be 'hit upon' by various systems operating under different conditions".[37] An important 'evolutionary universal' in the sub-human organic world as a whole is that of vision, and in case of man it is development of hand and brain.[38] In the social realm the sequence of its evolution is set by four pre-requisite universals; these are: communication with language, religion, social organization with kinship, and technology. These integrated together constitute a set for elemental social organization. On this foundation universals like 'stratification', 'cultural legitimation', bureaucratic organization, 'money and the market complex', 'generalized universalistic norms', and finally, the democratic associations develop in a sequential order. Of these, the last four (bureaucratic organization, money and market complex, the generalized universalistic norms and democratic associations) constitute the structural-normative conditions of a modern society.[39]

Structural breakdown in modernization, according to Parsons' theory, emerges when, due to historical or other cultural factors, the sequence of evolution is reversed or made uneven or when some of the universals become far too rigid and offer more than normal resistance to further evolution. Such conditions according to a later study by Buck and Jacobson prevail in the Asian nations. These nations, being ex-colonies, have many evolutionary structures like bureaucracy, democratic associations, and generalized universalistic norms introduced into their social structure without adequate development of other basic founding universals like communication, technology, stratification and principles of legitimation.[40] This is true for countries like Indonesia, India, Pakistan and many others in Africa, Latin-America and the Middle East. Particularly about India, Buck and Jacobson's study reveals higher development in respect of bureaucracy and generalized universalistic norms but very poor growth in spheres of communication, kinship, technology, social stratification and money and market complex.[41] Thus, value support to many modern institutions is lacking, and the wholesale transfer of many institutions from the West renders the lag more acute.

There are many assumptions in Parsons' evolutionary theory of modernization which may not be accepted by other sociologists. For instance, his assertion that 'democratic association' is the highest evolutionary stage in the

process of modernization could be variously interpreted or even refuted both by Marxist and non-Marxist sociologists.' Gunnar Myrdal in a recent study on Asian prospect of development and modernization writes:

> Yet it may be doubted whether this ideal of political democracy with political power based on free elections and with freedom of assembly, press, and other civil liberties—should be given weight in formulating the modernization ideals. This is not because the ideal is at present not very fully met, and may not be met in the future: value premises represent merely an angle from which actual conditions are viewed and need not be 'realistic' in that sense... This *democratic* ideal is not essential to a system comprising all the other modernization ideals.[42] (italics added)

Despite these limitations which emanate from value premises of modernization, Parsons' formulation is theoretically powerful and could be used to explain many structural and cultural contradictions of modernization in under-developed countries. Stratification is one important factor which causes bottlenecks in rapid modernization of India by its rigidity and non-egalitarian character. His model also delineates a course of modernization hypothetically, which would involve least conflict through stages of transition.[43]

Formulations closely resembling those of Parsons but without similar theoretical presumption have also been made by Marion J. Levy, E.S.N. Eisenstadt and Gunnar Myrdal. Much responsibility for either 'breakdown' or smooth transition to modernization is attributed by these sociologists to structural and normative 'initial conditions' in the developing societies. Comparing the cases of China and Japan, Marion J. Levy attributes successful modernization in Japan in contrast with structural breakdown (revolution) during this process in China to dissimilar initial structural conditions in the two countries despite many other structural similarities which they shared. For instance, both had merchant class placed at the bottom of stratification system, both had strong familistic ethic and similar religio-cultural values. Yet, owing to structural differences in initial stages of modernization, results of this process varied fundamentally in the two nations. In China, the family authority was supreme and encompassed the principles of the authority of Emperor and feudal lords, which were modelled after it; the class system was open in comparison to Japan where it was not so, and finally, the feudal system was not fully crystallized in China while it had a developed form in Japan.[44] Under the impact of the initial modernization in China during the nineteenth century when the industrial-urban centres offered employment opportunities independently, the family authority collapsed; this collapse also meant decline of authority in other spheres of state administration, as the source of legitimation for these was also in the authority system of the Chinese family. Corruption in the bureaucratic echelons and general decline in the moral norms followed from it.

Moreover, since China had an open, class system, monetary gains which accrued to merchants (till then at the bottom of stratification pyramid) were invested in land to attain the status of nobility; the reverse of it happened in Japan where, such opportunities being denied, investment was made in the industries.[45] Eisenstadt attributes this breakdown to the lack of institutional autonomy in China between polity and value system, between political system and stratification and between major social groups and strata.[46]

Eisenstadt's conclusions are similar to those of M.J. Levy. In the Chinese case he reiterates that no autonomy existed between the Confucian value system and legitimation principle of the Empire; "no church or religious organization existed independently of the state".[47] Stratification was also primarily centred on political system; "the literati as an elite group was contingent on the persistence of the ideal of a unified Empire".[48] This was reinforced by strong familistic bonds which did not allow for creative innovations and when the imperial structure collapsed, the elite and other groups could not contain the new forces of change through alternative sources of legitimation. The whole system had to be fabricated afresh. Contrary to this, Japan had a specialized form of feudalism under the Tokugawa, and the dual authority structure, one of symbolic Emperor and the other of feudal Shogunate existing before the Meiji restoration helped in selective adaptation to modernizing structural and cultural demands. The stratification system was not as homogeneous as in China. This consisted of landed nobility, merchants and intellectuals each with some autonomy of functions and norms. The value system of familism, which was also predominant here, went along with equal commitment to collective loyalties;[49] this was particularly reinforced by Meiji emphasis on renovation of traditional symbols and small particularistic groups for economic modernization.[50] Even the traditional austerity norms of Buddhism and Shintoism were utilized in the initial stages of industrialization when stress was laid on controlled wages to produce cheaper goods for market competition abroad. Also, Meiji governments showed little interest in promoting welfare measures in early phases of industrialization.[51]

THE INDIAN SCENE

Modernization, in its initial stages in India, according to Eisenstadt, did not lead to any serious breakdown because of the peculiar structural characteristics of the Indian society. Here, cultural system was fairly independent of political system.[52] Louis Dumont writes: "This domain (polity or *artha*) is, in the dominant tradition, relatively autonomous with regard to absolute values";[53] there was also independence between the political system and the system of caste stratification. Castes had their own panchayats and plural traditions, and similarly there also existed an autonomy for groups and regional communities. This inter-structural autonomy facilitated

assimilation of modernizing innovations, without introducing major breakdown. Modernity, however, mainly developed as a sub-structure and sub-culture without pervasive expansion in all sectors of life.

The colonial phase of modernization did not seriously articulate many structural challenges which now the totalization of this process in free India implies. As segmental nature of modernization becomes encompassing, relevance of structural autonomy ceases to operate as a shock-absorber. Changes in political system begin increasingly to impinge upon the system of stratification (caste, class, ethnic communities), and these together create serious stresses for the cultural system as a whole. The cultural pre-requisites of a comprehensive modernization necessitate adaptive changes in the system of values which come in direct confrontation with traditional cultural values and norms. For instance, secularism, untouchability, non-parochialism are some cultural demands of modernization in contemporary India which its traditional value system continues to resist. The question thus arises: will Indian society be able to avoid structural breakdown also in the second phase of modernization? Will not the advantage which it formerly enjoyed through structural autonomy, become, under the changed circumstances, a bottleneck for smooth institutionalization of modernity?

The answer to these questions can be formulated only through objective analysis of important trends of social and cultural changes in India which are relevant to the process of modernization. In cultural sphere, major changes have been introduced by legislations. These seek to abolish social inequalities and exploitations handed down by tradition and accord democratic rights and constitutional privileges to all members of society. This has led to a trend away from Sanskritization (emulation of the Great tradition) and towards formation of new identities and associations of castes, regional groups and tribes. These processes are accelerated by 'Great traditions' of modernization such as, urbanization, industrialization, spread of education, and politicization. The traditional structures and loyalties are being mobilized for objectives which are essentially modern and an increased emphasis is on protest movements. However, the tradition also gets reinforcement in the process; modern media of communication and transport are increasingly used for spreading ritual order and for rational organization of religious groups and their mode of activities and social participation. There is a tendency among religious sects to organize themselves on rational bureaucratic model, and the previous fission of each new sect from the parent body has now changed into strong orientation towards fusion.[54]

Inconsistencies are similarly there in structural changes that India has undergone during the post-colonial phase of modernization. Micro-structures like caste, family and village community have retained their traditional character; caste has shown unexpected elasticity and latent potential for adaptation with modern institutions, such as democratic participation, political party organization and trade unionism, and it persists unabatedly.

Joint family loyalties and particularistic norms continue to prevail. These contradictions are, however, further magnified at the level of macro-structures, such as the political system, bureaucracy, elite structure, industry and economy. The colonial period of modernization had a homogeneity in elite structure. These elite from industrial, civil and military bureaucracies, as well as political spheres came from similar class-caste stratum; they had equitable exposure to Western education, and socialization. They also had uniformity of ideologies and aspirations.[55] This was because the social base for recruitment of these elite was limited. This has fairly widened during the post-Independence period; it may not be equitable in terms of stratification system, but in cultural background there is enough representativeness which leads to many contradictions. A gap is specially coming into being between political elite and non-political elite; the former are less Westernized, and externally at least identify with traditional cultural symbolisms more strongly than the latter. Contradictions are also growing in the federal structure of the Union as one party government is being replaced by multi-party governments in States, having divergent ideological policies (Communist-led united fronts in Kerala and West Bengal, D.M.K. in Tamil Nadu). There is also evidence that, in the course of three five-year plans additional income generated by economic investments has gone in favour of only the well-to-do classes to the deteriment of poorer sections.[56] Planning has thus accentuated and sharpened the gaps in social stratification. This along with the slow rate of economic growth and rapid increase in population creates additional intensities for structural tensions. Despite the years of effort at industrialization, India continues to be a rural-peasant dominated society with general poverty of living standards.

Thus, major potential sources of breakdown in the Indian process of modernization may, in one form or another, be attributed to structural inconsistencies, such as: democratization without spread of civic culture (education), bureaucratization without commitment to universalistic norms, rise in media participation (communication) and aspiration without proportionate increase in resources[57] and distributive justice,[58] verbalization of a welfare ideology without its diffusion[59] in social structure and its implementation as a social policy,[60] over-urbanization without industrialization[61] and finally modernization without meaningful changes in the stratification system.[62]

Gunnar Myrdal refers to similar impediments to modernization in India and other Asian countries in his work *Asian Drama*. Nationalism and democratic institutions themselves, according to him, have grown in a structurally uneven form in these countries. "In Europe, strong independent State with a fairly effective government and a common pattern of law enforcement," he says, "preceded nationalism, and both preceded democracy;"[63] in South Asian countries democratic ideology if not reality, has, due to special historicity, preceded strong and independent State and effective government, and this is further complicated by onslaught of nationalism.[64] This uneven

historicity goes along with economic dependence of these countries on developed nations and slow rate of economic growth and still slower pace of institutional changes. Particularly in India, which, according to Myrdal, has a more viable size of intellectuals and middle classes necessary for democracy, planned economic growth has not made as deep an impact towards liberalizing the structural bottlenecks for modernization as should have been expected. According to Myrdal, India's 'soft-state' policy after Independence inhibited its leadership from going to the root of the problem, that is, introduction of basic changes in the institutional structure of society. Consequently, the inegalitarian structure of society continued to grow and consolidate itself;[65] there developed a long gap between verbalization (even enactment) and implementation of policies of reform;[66] the decentralization of power in rural sectors led to concentration of power in the hands of a petty plutocracy.[67] Also the leadership of the country as a whole remained with those who are opponents of real economic and social change.[68]

Myrdal's well known position on theory of social change and development is that of circular causation and cumulative change. He suspects the validity of constructing universal evolutionary stages of 'growth'. These according to him tend to be teleological and often have conservative ideologies latent in them.[69] The crucial factor in development is an 'upward' movement of the social system as a whole with all its component 'conditions'.[70] These conditions for the South Asian countries as described by Myrdal are: (1) output and income; (2) conditions of production; (3) levels of living; (4) attitudes towards life and work; (5) institutions; and (6) policies. He assumes a uni-directional causal relationship between these conditions; an 'upward' or 'downward' movement in one would cause cumulative movement of similar nature in other conditions too. Value premises, related to these conditions might differ from country to country specially in regard to conditions which are treated for their 'independent' (as a goal in themselves) values as different from those having 'instrumental' values.[71] These valuations define ideological contexts of development in each national society, but their selectivity is organically linked with attributes of social system as a whole. The modernization process in India and other South Asian countries, according to Myrdal, is heading fast towards a climax, and the time for reasonable choice for them is limited.[72] The opportunity for a 'gradualist' approach is also over. Myrdal thinks "it is not more difficult, but easier, to cause a big change rapidly than a small change gradually."[73] The prime areas for such big, rapid changes are social and institutional conditions in Indian society. These conditions (4 and 5 of the above) hold keys for mobilization of all other conditions of development.

Myrdal's theory of modernization could best be evaluated through the distinction he introduces between 'independent' and 'instrumental' values that institutions and social realities of a society ('conditions') have for their people. The 'independent values' of a traditional society differ from those of a modern society, and more often they are mutually contradictory. But

the 'independent values' cannot be demonstrated to be false or irrelevant without transforming them into 'instrumental values'. Since, the institutions and attitudes towards life and work in a traditional society come to be valued for their 'independent values', it is necessary to demonstrate their poverty over 'independent values' of a modern society in order to motivate people to renounce them for the latter. This, however, cannot be realized without introducing the medium of 'instrumental values'. If we want to convince people that "(A) closed system of stratification is bad" and "(B) open system of stratification is good", then we have to demonstrate also that "(C) the goal of social justice cannot be realized in a closed stratification system, but it can be easily accomplished in an open system." People would change their independent value (A) for (B), more easily when the instrumental value (C) they cherish, is shown to have closer association with the latter (B) than former (A).

As we have explained above the crucial variable to bring this about lies in mobilization of people's motivations for change on utilitarian grounds or what Myrdal calls the grounds of rationality. If we accept this, then it would appear that Myrdal's overemphasis on priority of radical changes first in the value systems of the developing society over the more instrumental or structural 'conditions' such as income, production, etc., tend to be highly unrealistic. To our mind it is difficult to begin with radical value changes in traditional society in order to facilitate the growth of modern instrumental structures. In fact, Myrdal votes for a 'mobilization system'[74] of social transformation which is valid but does not logically conform with his emphasis on first changing the values or institutions rather than the structures of society.

The institutional changes are, however, necessary for coordinating modernizing changes in other structural conditions of a society, but no general hypothesis, that 'big-push' policy of change in institutions is preferable to 'gradualist' approach to change, can be tenable. This in fact, contradicts Myrdal's own theory of balance among various 'conditions' for development and modernization.[75] More important factor will be rational coordination rather than 'big-push' policy which in an uncoordinated manner might inevitably contribute to a breakdown in the social structure, especially in India where democratic polity and way of life have been accepted as independent values.

In fact, the emergent tensions caused by processes of modernization in India do direct our attention to much needed further coordination in the strategy of change with radical changes in policy. Contradictions are emerging in the system at various points as a result of uncoordinated institutional reforms and economic measures introduced for modernization during the post-Independence period. These contradictions, however, also inhere and symbolize the frictions caused by upward movement of hitherto suppressed aspirations and interests of groups. Protest movements whether disguised (like Sanskritization, Islamization, formation of parochial

associations based on caste, language and regional culture) or overt (Centre-State tensions) are inevitable in democratic transition to modernization. These, of course, indicate the specific areas where institutional and other reforms could further be accelerated to remove friction in the process of change. Modernization should thus proceed by a series of conciliatory steps through a forceful strategy of mobilization in the course of the developmental process. The need is also simultaneously to reinforce the democratic values and institutions. Given a democratic political framework, there exists a built-in mechanism in this system to build pressures for removal of inconsistencies emerging from uncoordinated changes in the 'conditions' of modernization; but the same cannot be said to be true for other forms of totalitarian political systems.

On the Indian scene it appears that, despite continual tensions and contradictions, chances of the institutional breakdown are minimal; democratic values have fairly institutionalized in the political system; cultural gap which has recently widened between various levels of the elite does not go far enough to introduce major conflict about the ideology of modernization. Caste, which represents institutionalized form of inequality sanctioned by tradition now fights battles against inequality and inegalitarianism by its own rational self-transformation into associations; many independent or categorical values of tradition have shown a surprising degree of elasticity to adapt themselves to the cultural system of modernization. Some of these traditions even thrive as modernization processes accelerate without creating major contradictions. In the realm of material resources too, the recent 'agricultural revolution' in the countryside has created a new atmosphere of optimism for future progress. This, along with people's increasing awareness to curb the birth-rate may point towards new hopeful signs of modernization without a breakdown.

This assumption would, however, rest on one major conditional assumption, that at no stage in the Indian process of development would conciliation as a goal of resolving contradictions be renounced or replaced by a policy of controlled suppression. A constant coordination of mobilization with conciliation is a pre-requisite for democratic form of modernization in India.

HISTORICITY OF MODERNIZATION

The problems connected with historicity of modernization emerge from the 'initial conditions' of different societies from where modernization as a process starts. The differences in these conditions may be both cultural and social structural in origin and lead to variations in adaptive patterns in modernization, which have been recognized by many social scientists.[76] In contrast with evolutionary universalistic theory of modernization these social scientists hold that modernization would develop typical forms in different societies. This is also our contention in this essay.

There are both logical and substantive grounds why growth of modernization might vary in pattern from society to society. Often, modernization is defined through attributes which are too abstract and partial in nature and do not take account of the dynamics of social and cultural forces in each society. Modernization is understood as growth of a uniform set of cultural and role-structural attributes, but attention is not paid as to how these attributes develop typical adaptations within the traditional conditions of each society. This limitation, in our view, can be avoided if we conceptualize both tradition and modernization as sets of values and role-structures which interact as they come into contact, and between them a selective process of assimilation and syncretism starts. The crucial role in selective acceptance is played by the system of values. These values in each society are differentiated into (1) categorical or independent;[77] and (2) instrumental types. All role-structures whether traditional or modern inhere both categorical and instrumental standards, and this leads to a combination of both; a person who is well-trained in the modern role-structure with high instrumental value, for instance a surgeon or an engineer or a scientist, may be deeply committed to traditional categorical values. This is logically quite possible, because the categorical values enjoy autonomy over the instrumental values. Such instances are quite common in the Indian society, but it is presumed that no society would be an exception to this rule.

As for modernization in India, we find a growing trend that traditional role-structures are giving way to modern ones. But persons following these roles often retain categorical values of tradition instead of those of modernity. We have mentioned how caste itself is adopting many functions which properly belong to rational corporate groups. Generally, ritual order and religion which are essentially based on categorical values of a traditional nature do not show evidence of decline, nor is there an easy possibility of their disappearance in the near future.[78] Since many of these categorical values differ from one society to another, there may always be a possibility of unique combination of traditional values with modern ones; the categorical values can hardly be falsified by scientific proof and hence the spread of science may not *logically* lead to obsolescence of traditional categorical values.

This would explain the diversity in the pattern of modernization in different societies. But it would be wrong to deduce from this argument that modernization will not bring about structural and cultural similarity among the peoples of the world. As modernization proceeds, it would create uniform sets of role-structures with accompanying modern value commitments, instrumental or categorical. Inconsistent combinations of roles and values may still persist but a large sector of societal and cultural life of societies would share uniformity of standards with other modern societies. Diversity may persist within this strong sense of unity in the traditions of mankind. The major factor would here be the nature of value premises that societies adopt for modernization. So far, however, no uniformity of such value

premises is in sight. The divergence of political ideologies, contradictions in cultural and racial identities coupled with inequality of resources among nations create basic schism in the value-structure of modernization. Hence, particularistic growth pattern of modernization seems to be more credible than universalistic form of its development.

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA : AN APPROACH

(1) LOUIS DUMONT, "Change, Interaction and Comparison", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VII, March 1964, pp. 7–17 (This article clearly analyses the contemporary social scientists' over-concern with the study of change as a reflection of modern world view of mankind, a phase in cultural transition rather than emanation from purely objective scientific concerns).

(2) *See* RONALD SEGAL, *The Crisis in India*, Penguin Books, England, 1965; SELIG HARRISON, *India the Most Dangerous Decades*, Princeton, 1960.

(3) A typical reaction of this sort may be discerned in a highly literary writing on contemporary India *by* V.S. NAIPAUL, *An Area of Darkness*, London. Deusch, 1964.

(4) *See* NIRAD C. CHAUDHARI, *The Continent of Circe*, London, 1966.

(5) LOUIS DUMONT, op. cit., p. 10.

(6) LOUIS DUMONT, "The Modern Conception of the Individual", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, October 1965, p. 16.

(7) EDWARD SHILS, "The Calling of Sociology", in Theories of Society (ed.) *by* TALCOTT PARSONS, EDWARD SHILS, KASPER D. NAEGELE & JESSE R. PITTS, Vol. 2, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. The relationship between empathic capacity and growth of social sciences in India (which could be disputed by many scholars) has been a subject of discussion in *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, by* EDWARD SHILS, Mouton & Co., the Hague, 1961.

(8) C. WRIGHT MILLS, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, Grove Press, 1959, pp. 5–13.

(9) B.N. SEAL, quoted in H. BARNES & BECKER, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, Vol. 3, p. 1147.

(10) LUCIAN W. PYE, *Aspects of Political Development*, Toronto, Little, Brown & Co., 1966, Ch. III, pp. 49–67.

(11) *See* MARSHALL B. Chinard & Joseph W. ELDER, "Sociology in India: A study in the Sociology of Knowledge", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 4, August 1965, pp. 581–587.

(12) TALCOTT PARSONS, *The Social System*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1951, pp. 5–6.

(13) For this distinction between culture and social structure *see* LINTON, *Culture and Mental Disorder;* and NADEL, *The Foundations of Social Anthropology*, London, Cohen & West, 1953, p. 81.

(14) F.G. Bailey, "For a Sociology of India", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. 111, July 1959, the Hague, pp. 88–101.

(15) This would be evident from the fact that various Indian sociologists who are advocates of a typically Indian sociology do not argue for it from a similar value frame of reference. For instance, D.P. Mukerji claims himself to be a Marxologist, R.N. Saksena pleads for a sociology based on traditional categories of Hindu social system such as *Karma, Dharma, Moksha*, etc.; for others Indian sociology would consist in basic and distinctive ideo-structural realities of the Hindu civilization. *see*, D.P. MUKERJI, *Diversities*, New Delhi, Peoples Publishing House, 1958; R.N. SAKSENA, in *Sociology, Social Research and Social Policy in India* (ed.), op. cit., and also his article in *Sociology for India*, (ed.) by UNNITHAN, SINGH, SINGHI & DEVA, New Delhi, Prentice Hall of India, 1967.

(16) Hans Zetterberg for example admits the nature of social realities to be symbolic but this according to him should not rule out the possibility of a universalistic form of sociology. He says: "The difficulty of sociologists' struggle with theory lies in part in the dilemma of sociology being both a humanistic and scientific discipline. We never escape the humanistic content of sociology but we try to treat it scientifically." *See* HANS ZETTERBERG, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology*, New York, Bedminster Press. 1965, p. 20.

(17) L. DUMONT, *Contributions*, No. VIII, pp. 85–99.

(18) Ibid., pp. 13–19.

(19) *See* E.R. LEACH, (ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and N-W Pakistan*, Cambridge, 1960; JOHN DOLLARD, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, New York, 1940. W. LLOYD WARNER, "American Caste and Class", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, 1936, also *see*, W. LLOYD WARNER & ALLISON DAVIS, "A Comparative Study of American Caste" in: Edgar T. Thomson, (ed.) *Race Relations and Race Problem*, Durham, North Carolina, 1939.

(20) RAYMOND ARON, "Science et Conscience de la Societe" *Archives Europeannes de Sociologie*, 1, 1960, p. 29.

(21) EDWARD SHILS, op. cit.

(22) *See*, A.M. HOCART, *"Caste: A Comparative Study"*, London, Methuen, 1950; also the writings of ZIMMERMAN, BOUGLE & others. Further references and review of this orientation is available in L. DUMONT, *Contributions* No. II, 1958.

(23) The study of Indian social processes from dialectical or Marxist point of view has been conducted by some scholars in India; but this tradition in social science in India is not very rich. *See*, M.N. DUTTA, *Indian Social Polity;* S.A. DANGE, *India from Primitive Communism to Slavery*, Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1949; D.D. KOSAMBI, *Indian History*, Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1956; A.R. DESAI, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1959.

A deeper sociological analysis of the Marxist or dialectical view in the context of social changes in India may be found in the works of D.P. Mukerji, whose thinking in fact oscillates between orthodox Marxism (to which his intellectual temperament never surrenders fully) and a traditionalistic point of view. *See* his, *Modern Indian Culture* (1942), *Views and Counterviews* (1946) and *Diversities* (People's Publishing House, 1958).

(24) RALPH DAHARENDORF, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", in (ed.) Amitai Etzioni *et al.*, *Social Change: Source Patterns and Consequences*, 1964.

(25) WILBERT E. MOORE, in Amitai Etzioni *et al.*, Supra., p. 10.

(26) *See* MAX GLUCKMAN, *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1955; *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1954; LEWIS A. COSER, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1956.

(27) V. RAGHAVAN, "Methods of Popular Religious Instructions in South India" in *Traditional India: Structure and Change*, (ed.) Milton Singer, Philadelphia, 1959.

(28) M.N. SRINIVAS, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization" in *Caste in Modern India and other Essays*, London, Asia Publishing House, 1962, p. 42.

(29) Ibid., p. 45.

(30) Ibid., p. 44.

(31) The imitation of the Kshatriya model of customs and rituals by the lower castes has been reported by a number of social anthropologists. *See* A.M. SHAH & R.G. SHROFF "The Vahivanca Barots of Gujarat: A Caste of Genealogists and Mythographers" in Milton Singer (ed.) op. cit. pp. 40–68; BERNARD S. COHN, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste", in (ed.) McKim Marriot, *Village India*, University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp. 53–77; D. POCOCK, "Inclusion and Exclusion: A Process in the Caste System of Gujarat", *South-Western Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 13, 1957; WILLIAM L. ROWE, "Changing Rural Class Structure and the *Jajmani* System", *Human Organization*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1[illegible] pp. 41–44.

(32) SRINIVAS, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization" op. cit., p. 44.

(33) S.L. KALIA, "Sanskritization and Tribalization", *Bulletin of the Tribunal Research Institute*, Chindwara, April 1959.

(34) Dev Raj Chanana, "Sanskritization and Westernization and India's North-West", *Economic Weekly*, Vol. 8, No. 9, March 4, 1961, pp. 409–414.

(35) Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization...", op. cit., p. 42.

(36) Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Los Angeles: California, 1966., p. 6.

(37) Yogendra Singh, "Chanukhera: Cultural Changes in Eastern Uttar Pradesh" in (ed.) K. Ishwaran, *Change and Continuity in India's Villages*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

(38) Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 14.

(39) Ibid., p. 32.

(40) B.S. Cohn, quoted in Srinivas, ibid., p. 33.

(41) A.M. Shah and R.G. Shroff, ibid., p. 36.

(42) Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 42

(43) K.M. Panikkar, *Hindu Society at the Cross Road*, Bombay, 1955.

(44) Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization...", op. cit., p. 55.

(45) Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 7.

(46) Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 40.

(47) Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization...", op. cit., p. 61.

(48) Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 40.

(49) E.B. Harper, "A Hindu Village Pantheon", *South-Western Journal of Anthropology*, XV, 1959, 227–234.

(50) J.F. Staal, "Sanskrit and Sanskritization" *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, May 1963, p. 226.

(51) M.N. Srinivas, "Discussion", in (ed.) A. Aiyappan and L.K. Balratnum, *Society in India*, S.S.A. Publication, Madras, 1956, p. 113.

(52) McKim Marriot, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization", in (ed.) *Village India: Studies in the Little Communities*, op. cit., pp. 196–197.

(53) Dev Raj Chanana, op. cit., p. 413.

(54) Ibid., p. 414.

(55) K.A. Nilkantha Sastri, "Ancient Indian Contacts with the Western Land", *Diogenes*, 28, Winter, 1959, pp. 40–62. Also *see* his "Modern India and the West", *Diogenes*, Spring, 1964, p. 135.

(56) McKim Marriott, "Changing Channels of Cultural Transmission in India" in (ed.) L.P. Vidyarthy, *Aspects of Religion in Indian Society*, Meerut 1961. The studies of elite in some Asian and African nations have revealed that a new trend in their values is emerging which leads to a conscious rejection of Western culture and its many symbolic forms; this tendency neither fits in with the model of Sanskritization nor with that of Westernization. It is not Sanskritization in the sense Srinivas uses the concept because the elite's return to tradition is not identical to the imitation of the higher Sanskritic tradition by the lower groups and classes but on the contrary it amounts to a rejection of Westernization by a class which traditionally was the custodian of Sanskritic form. The case is clearly analysed by Marshall Singer in case of the Ceylonese elite, who were highly Westernized before independence, many of them even being converted to Christianity, but the same elite, after independence are reconverting to Buddhism and are giving up all associations with Westernized mode of culture; they are rejecting English for Sinhalese. See Marshall Singer, *The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon*, M.I.T. Press, 1964. Also see Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, New York, Praeger, 1963 and Lucian Pye, op. cit.

(57) Harold A. Gould, "Sanskritization and Westernization: A Dynamic View", *Economic Weekly*, Vol. 13, June 24, 1961, pp. 945–950.

(58) *See* Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., pp. 1–52. In place of Westernization, the term 'modernization' has been preferred by Daniel Lerner, Gould and Milton Singer; *see* Daniel Lerner, *The Passing Away of Traditional Society*, Free Press, 1958, pp. 45–49; H. Gould, op. cit., p. 947; Milton Singer, "The Social Organization of Indian Tradition", *Diogenes*, Spring 1964, p. 106.

(59) Robert Redfield, "The Social Organization of Tradition," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol.

15, 1955–56, pp. 13–21. Also *see* MILTON SINGER, "The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civilization: A Preliminary Report of a Methodological Field Study", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, 1955–56, pp. 23–36; and his "Preface" in (ed.) *Traditional India: Structure and Change*, op. cit., p. 10–12; the issue has again been taken up by Singer in *Diogenes*, op. cit., pp. 84–112.

(60) MILTON SINGER, *Traditional India: Structure and Change* op. cit., p. 12.

(61) SINGER "The Social Organization of Tradition", op. cit., p. 94.

(62) SINGER "The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civilization" op. cit., pp. 23–24.

(63) MCKIM MARRIOTT, op. cit., pp. 171–222.

(64) SINGER "Social Organization of Indian Tradition", op. cit., p. 111.

(65) MARRIOTT, op. cit., p. 181.

(66) Ibid., p. 200.

(67) Ibid., p. 197.

(68) S.C. DUBE, "The Study of Complex Cultures", in (ed.) T.K.N. Unnithan, Indra Deva and Yogendra Singh, *Towards a Sociology of Culture in India*, Delhi, Prentice Hall of India, 1965, pp. 421–423.

(69) Ibid., p. 424.

(70) UNNITHAN, DEVA & SINGH, op. cit., pp. 1–35.

(71) F.G. Bailey, "For a Sociology of India", op. cit., pp. 89–90.

(72) GEORGE C. HOMANS, "Bringing Men Back In", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 6, December 1964, pp. 809–818.

(73) RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India*, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 16–17.

(74) A structural study of family has been conducted by quite a few social scientists in India recently; *see* AILEEN D. ROSS, *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting*, University of Toronto Press, 1961; I.P. DESAI, *Aspect of Family in Mahuva*, Asia, Bombay, 1965, K.M. KAPADIA, *Marriage and Family in India*, Oxford University Press, 1958; KANANA, *Inter-caste Marriages in India*, Popular Book Depot, 1961, etc.

(75) *See* F.G. BAILEY, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, Manchester, 1957; *Tribe, Caste and Nation*, Manchester, 1960; *Politics and Social Change: Orissa*, 1959, Oxford, 1963. Also *see* A.C. MAYER, *Caste and Kinship in Central India*, London, 1960; WALTER C. NEAL, *Economic Changes in Rural India—Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh* 1800–1955, Yale University Press, 1962. T. SCARLETT EPSTEIN, *Economic Development and Social Change in South India*, Manchester, 1962. S.C. DUBE, *India's Changing Villages*, London, 1958. DANIEL THORNER, *Agrarian Prospect in India*, Asia, 1955. DANIEL & ALICE THORNER, *Land and Labour in India*, Asia, 1962.

(76) OSCAR LEWIS, *Life in a North Indian Village*, University of Illinois Press, Alabama, 1958. M.N. SRINIVAS, *A Study of Disputes*, Asia, 1964. *See* also his *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit.

(77) Ibid.

(78) *See* M. CORMACK, *She Who Rides a Peacock*, Bombay, Asia, 1960; MYRON WEINER, *The Politics of Scarcity*, Chicago University Press, 1962; Y.B. DAMLE, *Emerging Elite*, (in press). Also *see* articles concerned with India in "Student Politics", (ed.) S.M. Lipset, *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 1966.

(79) *See* V.B. SINGH, *Industrial Labour in India*, (ed.) London, Asia Publishing House, 1963; DANIEL THORNER, *op. cit.*

(80) More than a dozen urban surveys have been completed and many of them are now published with the help of the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, Government of India.

(81) *See* PARK & TINKER (ed.) *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Princeton University Press, 1959. Study of leadership in the context of villages has been a part of most of the monographic studies on villages.

(82) *See*, RALPH DAHARENDORF, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958.

(83) EDWARD SHILS, op. cit., p. 83.

(84) B.N. DUTTA, op. cit.

(85) D.D. KOSAMBI, op. cit., Ch. I, p. 6.

(86) D.P. Mukerji, *Diversities, op. cit.*, p. 76.
(87) D.P. Mukerji, *Modern Indian Culture*, op. cit.
(88) A.R. Desai, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
(89) *Ibid.*, p. 145.
(90) Louis Dumont, *Contributions*, No. I, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
(91) Louis Dumont, *Contributions* No. VIII, p. 90.
(92) *Ibid.*, p. 60.
(93) *Ibid.*, p. 99.
(94) Dumont, *Contributions*, No. VII, op. cit., p. 12.
(95) *Ibid.*, p. 8.
(96) K. Ishwaran, *Tradition and Economy in Village India*, Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 152.
(97) Gould, *op. cit.*, p. 946.
(98) Srinivas, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
(99) Burton Stein, in Srinivas, ibid., pp. 42–43. *See* also Baden Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, Swan Sonnenschien, London, 1899.

Chapter II

ORTHOGENETIC CHANGES IN CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND MODERNIZATION

(1) W. Norman Brown, "The Content of Cultural Continuity in India", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume XX, No. 4, August 1961, p. 434.

(2) Robert N. Bellah, "Epilogue" in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, (ed.) R.N. Bellah, Free Press of Glencoe, 1965, pp. 170–171. Also *see* Louis Dumont, *Contribution to Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, October 1965, for a cognitive historical comparison of Hindu cultural values with the modern West. (Published by Mouton & Co., The Hague).

(3) M.N. Srinivas, "The Nature of the Problem of Indian Unity" in his *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 105.

(4) Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1964, pp. 9–13.

(5) Julian H. Steward, *Theory of Culture Change*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1955; in connection with the concept of evolution Steward writes: "It is our basic premise that the crucial methodological feature of evolution is the determination of recurrent causal relationships in independent cultural traditions. . .for regardless of which features are considered causes and which are considered effects, it is assumed that some must always be accompanied by others under stipulated conditions. Whether it requires ten, twenty, or several hundred years for the relationship to become established, development through time must always take place. Therefore, parallel developments which require only a few years and involve only a limited number of features are no less evolutionary from a scientific point of view than sequences involving whole cultures and covering millennia (page 27).

(6) For controversies on this issue *see*, Surjit Sinha, "The Tribal Cultures of Peninsular India" in *Traditional India* (ed.) Milton Singer, op. cit., pp. 299–300; G.S. Ghurye, *The Aborigines—"so-called"—and their future*, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona 1943; Milton Singer, "The Social Organization of Indian Civilization", *Diogene*, op. cit.,

p. 93; A.L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, Grove Press Inc., New York 1954, Ch. II, pp. 10–43.

(7) On the issue of relationship between tribes in India and the Hindu caste system the opinion differs among the social anthropologists and ethnographers. For instance, with the exception of Hutton, who maintains that caste system and many cultural traditions of Hinduism have organic links with the tribal cultures, and of Ghurye, who holds similar views, all other census commissioners and anthropologists, such as Risely, O'Malley, Elwin etc., hold the tribal and the Hindu traditions to be separate. *See*, Hutton, *Caste in India*, London, 1955; Ghurye, *The Aborigines*, op. cit.; Verrier Elwin, *The Aboriginals*, Oxford University Press, Bombay 1943; for a recent evaluation *see*, F.G. Bailly "Tribe and Caste in India" in *Contribution to Indian Sociology*, No. V., 1961; D.D. Kosambi also maintains that many cultural items of the existing peasant Hindu culture in India have their origin in the aboriginal cults and cultural patterns; *see* his, *An Introduction to the History of India*, Popular Book Depot, Bombay 1956.

The continuity between the Vedic Hindu culture and the Indus Valley culture has been most forcefully postulated by John Marshall. *See* his *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization*, London, 1931. Spear on the other hand considers Indus Valley culture to have been overthrown by the invading Aryans although he concedes that the evidence is not conclusive. *See* Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961, pp. 31–32.

(8) *See* the works of Kosambi, Bailey, Elwin, Ghurye as cited above.

(9) S. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1927; also *see* P. Spear, op. cit., II, pp. 39–40.

(10) Louis Dumont, in *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, Nos. VII, VIII for this viewpoint (Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1964 and 1965).

(11) About Hinduism, P. Spear writes, "The more Hinduism is considered, the more difficult it becomes to define it in a single phrase. It is a gargantuan, many bodied and subtle at the same time, reaching to the skies and falling to the depths. In fact it is much easier to say what it is not than what it is." op. cit. p. 40.

(12) *Mahabharata*, the Hindu epic tells the story of a butcher, who by virtue of the righteous devotion to his calling had accumulated so much merit that he taught *varna-dharma* (moral duties of caste) to a Brahmin named Kaushik. Epic goes on to say: "There can be said many things as regards the goodness or badness of our actions. But he who sticks to the *dharma* of his own *varna* acquires great glory. For the Brahman who is vain and haughty, who is sinful and evil-minded, and who indulges in degraded practices is no better than a Sudra." (*Mahabharata*, Vanaparva, quoted in P.N. Prabhu, *Hindu Social Organization*, Popular Book Depot, 1954, pp. 311).

(13) P.N. Prabhu, op. cit. p. 339.

(14) Milton Singer, *Traditional India*, op. cit. pp. ix–xii.

(15) Madelein Biardeau, "Ahamkara: The Ego Principle in the Upanishada", *Contributions To Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, op. cit. pp. 62–84.

(16) P.N. Prabhu, op. cit. p. 291.

(17) Edward Shils, "Charisma, Order and Status", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2, April 1965; pp. 119–213. Shils in this essay extends the meaning of charisma to a more generalized level of manifestation in social action in comparison to the restrictive sense in which it was used by Weber.

(18) Daya Krishna, "Three Myths about Indian Philosophy", *Quest*, 53, Spring 1967, pp. 9–16.

(18a) The same point has been made by Louis Dumont when he says:

"There are three 'human ends' in Hinduism (italics mine), *dharma*, *artha* and *kama*, duty, profit, and pleasure. All three are (necessary) and lawful, but they are so graded in a hierarchy that an inferior ideal may be pursued only so long as a superior one does not intervene: *dharma*, conformity to the world order, is more important than *artha*, power and wealth, which in turn, is above *kama*, immediate enjoyment. These three ideas are conceived as distinct

substances, but let us consider, apart from the hierarchical aspect, what other relations exist between them. The analogy with the hierarchy of *varna* is apparent: *dharma* corresponds to the Brahman or priest, *artha* to the king or kshatriya, the temporal power, and *kama* to the others. This is not all, and one can go further with the help of Talcott Parsons' method of structural analysis. First, *kama* is opposed to the two others as an action flowing immediately from affective impulses is opposed to an action submitted to intellectual or moral considerations. Then while *dharma* is moral universalism, *artha* is calculating egoism, something after the manner of "rational action" in our economic theory—but extended to politics, since wealth here is little more than attribute of power. While *artha* is opposed to *kama* as deferred satisfaction to immediate satisfaction, *dharma* is opposed to both as ultimate ends to particular ends, as the sacred to the profane. In the language of Parsons, *kama* is expressive action, *artha* instrumental action, *dharma* moral action and is based upon a system of oppositions." (See Louis Dumont, "World Renunciation in Indian Religion", *Contributions To Indian Sociology*, No. IV, April 1960, p. 41).

(19) MAX WEBER, *The Sociology of Religion*, (translator, Ephraim Fischoff) Beacon Press, Boston, 1963.

(20) S.C. DUBE, "Cultural Problems in the Economic Development of India", in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, (ed.) op. cit. 43–55.

(21) Ibid, p. 46.

(22) P.N. PRABHU, op. cit. p. 73.

(23) A.L. BASHAM, op. cit. p. 324.

(24) MADELEIN BIARDEAU, op. cit.

(25) D. POCOCK, *Contributions*, No. VIII p. 26.

(26) A.L. BASHAM, op. cit. 321.

(27) P.V. KANE, *History of Dharmashastra*, Vol. III, Poona: Chapter XXXIV.

(28) P.N. PRABHU, op. cit., pp. 15–72.

(29) Ibid.

(30) LOUIS DUMONT, "The Functional Equivalent of Individual in Caste Society", *Contributions*, No. VII op. cit. pp. 83–91.

(31) It may be interesting to compare this logic of contradictions with the concept of "heterogony of purpose", as analysed by Werner Stark in the context of the social theory in Christian and Western tradition. *See* WERNER STARK, *Social Theory and Christian Thought*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, I, pp. 1–62.

(32) D. POCOCK, "The Anthropology of Time-Reckoning", *Contributions*, No. VII, op. cit. p. 28.

(33) On this point *see*, BASHAM, op. cit. pp. 148–149; P.N. Prabhu, op. cit. p. 291; G.S. GHURYE, op. cit.; PANIKKAR quotes following passage from R.P. Masani with approval:

"The seers of the early Vedic period know nothing of caste. Delve as much as one might into the literature of this period, one discovers only classes not caste. The elements which go to form castes were however there so that gradually a gulf was created between one order and another. For a long time however the conception of social segregation and untouchability was repugnant to the genius of the people who sought unity in variety and dissolved variety in unity. Each class was regarded as an integral part of the fabric of society." (R.P. Masani, quoted in PANIKKAR, *Hindu Society at Cross Roads*, Bombay: Asia, 1955, p. 15.) R.C. Majumdar also contends that caste as a restrictive group emerged later and was not present among the Aryans. *See* his, *An Advanced History of India*, London: MacMillan & Co. 1956, pp. 32–33.

(34) ALBERT SCHWEITZER, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, Bombay: Also *see* BASHAM, op. cit. p. 37; R.C. MAJUMDAR, op. cit. p. 33.

(35) P.N. PRABHU, op. cit. p. 293.

(36) *See* BASHAM & R.C. MAJUMDAR, op. cit. pp. 33 and 37 respectively.

(37) A.L. BASHAM, op. cit. p. 39.

(38) Ibid.

(38a) Professor Ghurye writes: "This period (circa 600 B. C.–A.D. 300) sees a great consolidation of the Brahmin class, while the degradation of the *Sudras* comes out in marked contrast

to the growing superiority of the Brahmins." G.S. GHURYE, op. cit. quoted in M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 5.

(39) R. Lingat, "Time and the Dharma", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VI, p. 39.

(40) The *Bhagavat Puran* and *Garun Puran* make special mention of these.

(41) *Manusmriti*, Book I.

(42) *See*, KAUTYLYA'S *Arthsashtra*, Book VI.

(43) L. DUMONT, *Contributions*, No. VI, pp. 54–55.

(44) K.M. PANIKKAR, op. cit. p. 8.

(45) DANIEL INAGLI, "The Brahman Tradition", in *Traditional India* (ed.) by Singer, op. cit. p. 7.

(46) P.N. PRABHU, op. cit. pp. 120–122.

(47) STELLA KRAMRISCH, "Traditions of Indian Craftsman", in *Traditional India*, (ed.), op. cit. pp. 18–19.

(48) Ibid, p. 18.

(49) MORRIS OPLER, "Particularization and Generalization as Processes in Ritual and Culture" in (ed.) Edward B. Harper, *Religion in South Asia*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, pp. 83–87.

(50) ROMILA THAPAR, *A History of India*, England: Penguin Books, 1966. pp. 214–15.

(51) Ibid, pp. 213–14.

(52) From a sociological point of view for an excellent analysis of the Bhakti movement in a region of Gujarat, *see*, "The Religious Creeds among the Patidars of South Gujrat—A Panoramic View" in (ed) T.K.N. Unnithan, Indra Deva & Yogendra Singh, *Towards a Sociology of Culture in India*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1965, pp. 242–261, Also *see*, D.P. Mukerji, *Modern Indian Culture*, op. cit. pp. 17–18.

(53) CHARLES H. HEIMSATH, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reforms*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 54.

(54) T.K.N. UNNITHAN & YOGENDRA SINGH, *Tradition of Nonviolence in East and West*. (It is a comparative analysis of value systems of nonviolence in major traditions and gives a detailed analysis of Gandhian system of nonviolence from this point of view. In press: to be published by India International Centre, New Delhi.)

(55) TOYNBEE writes: "In wrestling with the problem of the penetration of India by the Western system of Industrialism and by the Western spirit with which this system goes hand in hand, the Mahatma (Gandhi) has come to the conclusion that India must repudiate not only the present-day apparatus of Western technique, but the whole system and spirit for which this apparatus stands, if she is to find her own salvation. This is the doctrine for which he has found a concrete symbol...in the *khaddar*, or hand-woven cloth of hand-spun home-grown cotton thread, which he urges all Indian men and women to make for their own wear... The Mahatma's advocacy of hand-spinning is really an advocacy, in symbolic terms, of a transfer—or reversion—of Indian interest and Indian energy from a material to a spiritual plane of action," Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London: Oxford University Press, 1948; Volume III, p. 190.

(56) BASHAM, op. cit. p. 256.

(57) ROMILA THAPAR, op. cit. pp. 109–135.

(58) M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 23.

(59) MICHAEL M. AMES, "Magical-animism and Budhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System" in (ed.) *Religion in South Asia*, op. cit. p. 29.

(60) Ibid, p. 30–32.

(61) Buddhism in the past had started as a protest movement against Hinduism. In modern India, too, led by Dr. Ambedkar, 300,000 members of the scheduled caste embraced Buddhism in 1956. This movement still goes on. See, Donald Eugene Smith, *India as a Secular State*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963; chapters 6 and 11.

(62) MCKIM MARRIOTT, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization", op. cit. p. 218.

(63) GERALD D. BERREMAN, "Brahmanism and Shamans in Pahari Religion" in (ed.) *Religion in South Asia*, op. cit. p. 55.

(64) W.H. Newell, "Goshen: A Gaddi Village in the Himalayas", in (ed.) M.N. Srinivas, *India's Villages*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955; p. 56.

(65) Bernard S. Cohn, "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste", in *Traditional India*, op. cit. p. 212. Also *see* his, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste" in (ed.) McKim Marriott, *Village India*, op. cit. p. 59.

(66) Oscar Lewis, *Village Life in Northern India*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958, p. 198.

(67) K. Ishwaran, *Tradition and Economy in Village India*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966; p. 12.

(68) F.G. Bailey, "An Oriya Hill Village-I", in (ed.) *India's Villages*, op. cit. p. 128.

(69) Jyotirmoyee Sarma, "A Village in West Bengal", ibid. p. 199.

(70) M.N. Srinivas, "The Social Structure of a Mysore Village", ibid. p. 30.

(71) Pauline Mahar Kolenda, "Religious Anxiety and Hindu Fate", in *Religion in South Asia*, op. cit. pp. 78–79.

(72) L.P. Vidhyarthi, *The Sacred Complex in Hindu Gaya*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay: 1961.

(73) E. Kathleen Gough, "The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village", in *Village India* (ed.) op. cit. p. 38.

(74) Robert Redfield & Milton Singer, "The Cultural Role of Cities", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*; Vol. III, No. I, 1954, pp. 53–73.

(75) Milton Singer, "The Great Tradition in a Metropolitan Centre: Madras", *Traditional India*, op. cit. p. 141.

(76) Ibid, pp. 172–73.

(77) Ibid. p. 180.

(78) V. Raghavan, "Methods of Popular Religious Instruction in South India", *Traditional India*, op. cit. pp. 130–138.

(79) William McCormack, "The Forms of Communication in Virasaiva Religion", in *Traditional India*, (ed.) op. cit. p. 129.

(80) McKim Marriott, "Changing Channels of Cultural Transmission in Indian Civilization", *Journal of Social Research*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1–2. 1961 (Prof. Majumdar Memorial Volume: *Aspect of Religion in Indian Society*) p. 22. McKim Marriott mentions about the changed intensity of new channels of cultural transmission. He writes:

"The emergence of such a new pattern of communication brings with it newly formed Indian civilization. Two phases may be distinguished. In the first, communication is intensified, one way, from higher to lower levels of culture; Sanskritic models are taken for direct emulation, while intermediate levels and specialists are bypassed; the contents of lesser traditions are replaced by borrowings from above. In the second and succeeding phase, popular needs begin to work changes in the contents and form of the higher cultural levels themselves, selecting and condensing material suitable for mass dissemination as part of a new democratic national culture." (op. cit. p. 22.)

(81) John J. Gumperz, "Religion and Social Communication in Village North India", in *Religion in South Asia*, op. cit., p. 96.

(82) Ibid, p. 96.

(83) M.N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 6.

(84) M.N. Srinivas, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61, No. 1.

(84a) Ibid, February 1959.

(85) M.N. Srinivas, "The Indian Road to Equality", in *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 90.

(86) M.N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 17.

(87) M.N. Srinivas, "The Indian Road to Equality", op. cit. p. 90.

(88) K.M. Panikkar, op. cit. pp. 6–26.

(89) G.S. Ghurye, op. cit.

(90) Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, pp. 169–170.

(91) Ibid, p. 97.

(92) Ibid, p. 99.

(93) M. N. Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization", op. cit. pp. 48-62.

(94) B.S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste", in *Village India*, pp. 53–76.

(95) D. Pocock, "Inclusion and Exclusion: A Process in Caste System of Gujrat", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring, 1957.

(96) A.M. Shah & R.G. Shroff, "The Vahivanca Barots of Gujrat: A Case of Genealogists and Mythographers", in *Traditional India*, op. cit. p. 63.

(97) Yogendra Singh, *The Changing Pattern of Socio-economic Relations in the Countryside*, Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1958 (unpublished).

(98) B.S. Cohn, "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste", in *Traditional India*, op. cit. p. 215.

(98b) Martini Orans mentions a similar process in the case of Santals. In the pre-independence days Santals identified with Hindu traditional symbols, although this never happened without ambivalence. Now, after freedom, these Santals, especially their educated leaders, project their own group-identity and take stands against overt identification with the Hindu tradition. *See* his, *The Santal: A Tribe in Search of a Great Tradition*, Detroit: Warre State University Press, 1965; Chapters 2, 3 and 6.

(99) S.K. Srivastava, *The Process of Identification and De-Sanskritization*, Fourth All-India Conference in Sociology, Calcutta, 1959. Also *see*, D.N. Majumdar, *Caste and Communication in an Indian Village*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958.

(100) Milton Singer, "The Great Tradition in a Metropolitan Center: Madras", op. cit. p. 179.

(101) Yogendra Singh, "Chanukhera: Cultural Change in Eastern Uttar Pradesh" op. cit.

(102) Milton Singer, "The Great Tradition in a Metropolitan Center: Madras", op. cit. p. 179.

(103) Edwin M. Lemert, *Social Pathology*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

(104) Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957.

(105) Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

(106) *See*, M.N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit. pp. 13–41; see also, Selig Harrison, *India—The Most Dangerous Decades*, op. cit.; M.L.P. Patterson, "Caste and Politics in Maharashtra", *Economic Weekly*, Vol. VI, No. 39, September 15, 1954.

(107) M.L.P. Patterson, op. cit. pp. 1065–7.

Chapter III

THE IMPACT OF ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION

(1) Endogenous causation to change, from a dialectical point of view, may be found in all Marxist sociology. In Max Weber's work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, we find a similar emphasis on endogenous nature of cultural change working through innovation of new values—the protestant ethic for institutional transformation of society. Sorokin's and Kroeber's theories of culture-change clearly emphasize the endogenous sources of change. Even Durkheim in his theory of division of labour in society comes closer to a postulation of an endogenous causation of this phenomenon when he explains division of labour through changes in the dynamic density of population, through natural growth. All innovation theories of social change directly or indirectly postulate endogenous factors for the causation of change.

Even imitative innovation which is more frequent than creative, leads to endogenous changes in the cultural pattern of a people. *See*, e.g., Everett Hagen, (op. cit. pp. 86–98) and H.G. Bernett, *Innovation the Basis of Cultural Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 181–224. For Sorokin's ideas see his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: 1937), Vol. I; Kroeber propounds his theory of growth in culture in his *Configurations of Culture Growth* (Berkeley: 1944) and for Durkheim see his *Division of Labour in Society* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1947).

(2) Arnold J. Toynbee summarizes his approach in the following words:

"We have now completed our investigation of the processes by which civilizations grow, and, in the several instances which we have examined, the process appears to be one and the same. Growth is achieved when an individual or a minority or a whole society replies to a challenge by a response which not only answers the particular challenge that has evoked it but also exposes the respondent to fresh response on his part. And the process of growth continues, in any given case, so long as this recurrent movement of disturbance of equilibrium is maintained. This is the process of growth as we have observed it in a comparative study of a number of cases; but, although the process may be uniform, the experiences of the various parties that undergo the process are not the same." *See* Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), Vol. III, p. 377.

In the process of growth of civilizations, which is engineered, according to Toynbee, by creative elite and creative minority of the society concerned, there are stages of 'withdrawal' and 'return' which apply in case of individual elite (like Buddha, Muhammad, Saint Paul, etc., as described by him, op. cit. pp. 263–332) as well as the societies. The concept of 'withdrawal' in Toynbee could be compared with that of 'retreatism' as employed by Hagen for being the pre-requisite process for the development of innovative personalities. Cf. Everett E. Hagen, Supra, pp. 123–160.

(3) Xenophobic reaction to Western contact in the developing societies of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America has been widely noted. In the Middle Eastern nations studied by Daniel Lerner, elites' reaction to Westernization is Xenophobic and ambivalent. (Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 408–409); Cf. Edward Shils, "The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Supplement I (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1961). Toynbee quotes and mentions an interesting case of indifferent reaction of the Chinese to the Western achievements in technology (Supra, p. 189) to show the identity consciousness of the non-Western societies. He also mentions the role of Gandhi in India as being directed towards the same ends (Supra, p. 190).

(4) Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture", *Anthropology Today* (ed.) A.L. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 507–523. Abraham, Kardiner, *Individual and His Society* (University of Columbia Press, 1955), Ch. I.

(5) Marrion J. Levy Jr. defines modernization in terms of technological growth. He writes:

"My definition of modernization hinges on the uses of inanimate sources of power and the use of tools to multiply the effect of effort. I conceive each of these two elements as the basis of a continuum. A society will be considered more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts. Neither of these elements is either totally absent from or exclusively present in any society".

See his, *Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 11.

(6) Reinhard Bendix writes: "To be sure, the early nineteenth century contrasts between tradition and modernity barely disguised a largely ideological reaction to a rising commercial civilization, while later versions are more detached and circumspect. But even where the earlier invidious contrasts between the "golden age" of the past and the modern decay of civilization receives less credence than formerly, it is still difficult to avoid the generalizations implicit in this intellectual legacy. We are so attuned to the idea of a close association among the

different elements of "tradition" of "modernity" that wherever we find some evidence of industrialization we look for, and expect to find, those social and political changes which were associated with industrialization in many countries of Western civilization."

"Implicit in this approach is the belief that societies will resemble each other increasingly, as they become "fully industrialized". Similarly, economically backward societies will become like the economically advanced countries—if they industrialize successfully. Yet these views, conditional as they are on "full industrialization", have little warrant. The industrial societies of today retain aspects of their social structure that have been combined with economic development in various ways. They are like each other with reference to aspects covered by the adjective "industrial", such as the occupational structure, the urban concentration of the population, and others. Even that assertion is more complex than it appears to be, but it is merely tautological, if all "non-industrial" aspects of such societies are tacitly eliminated from comparison." *see,* REINHARD BENDIX, *Nation-Building And Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 8.

(7) Here we use the concept of modernization in an ideal-typical or Utopian sense as an aggregate of all the attributes with which it is identified. Even if we give up this cultural construct of modernization and replace it with more concrete criteria such as the use of technology and inanimate power (as suggested by Marrion J. Levy Jr., Supra, pp. 9–15), the fact that modernization even on this criterion tends to be a relative phenomenon is not ruled out. Modernization like science is an open-ended process, it is evolutionary in nature, that is self-modifying and self-transcending. Hence, no society can claim for itself the status of *full modernity;* there only exist degrees of modernization, and that too defined on the basis of criteria which are always partial in nature.

(8) DANIEL LERNER, op. cit. p. 408.

(9) K.A. NILAKANTA SASTRI, "Ancient Indian Contacts with Western Lands", *Diogenes,* (Vol. 28, 1959), pp. 40–62.

(10) MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, "A Comparison of Islam and Christianity as Frame-Work of Religious Life", *Diogenes* (Vol. 32, 1960), pp. 49–74.

(11) WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 21.

(12) DONALD E. SMITH, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 38.

(13) KEITH CALLARD, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 214.

Islamic Millat "is the grouping together, as an independent, self-governing organism, of all those individual human beings who owe allegiance to Allah and His Divine Law, wheresoever they may be. . .

"No matter what Muslim country the Muslim comes from, his nationality is Muslim: he is equally the citizen of every Muslim country". See, S. Ghaleb Khan Abbasi and A. de Zayas Abbasi, *The Structure of Islam Polity, Part I, The One Party System In Islam* (Lahore: 1952), pp. 5–6; (cited by) KEITH CALLARD, p. 215.

(14) C.A.O. VAN NIEUWENHUIZE, "The Ummah", *Studia Islamica* (Vol. X, 1959), p. 9.

(15) Cf. Frithj of SCHUON, *Transcendent Unity of Religions,* (London: Faber, 1953.)

(16) Cf. A. YUSUF ALI, "Muslim Culture and Religious Thought", *Modern India and the West* (ed.) L.S.S. O'Malley (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 394–395. Also *see* KEITH CALLARD, Supra, pp. 194–195. Donald E. Smith writes: "When Mohammed and his followers moved to Medina in A.D. 622, he established an autonomous society, and it soon became clear that Islam was far more than a body of private religious beliefs. The Islamic community had most of the characteristics of a state, with its own system of government, law, and institutions. This autonomous community was central in the very concept of Islam—its institutions were not mere appendages. Furthermore, it was a unitary society in which ecclesiastical and political functions merged together—in which, indeed, there was no significant distinction between religious and secular." Donald E. Smith, op. cit. pp. 37–38.

(17) On the religious vows in Islam, S.M. IKRAM writes:

"These beliefs and practices finally found vivid form in the 'Five Pillars of Islam', an easily remembered summary of ritual and doctrine. These are: 1) profession of faith in the unity of God and the prophetic mission of Muhammad; 2) the observance of five daily prayers; 3) the giving of alms; 4) fasting during the month of Ramadan; and 5) the making of a pilgrimage to Mecca." Cf. S.M. IKRAM, *Muslim Civilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 3.

(17a) GHAUS ANSARI, *Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh: A Study in Culture Contact* (Lucknow: Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society, U.P., 1960), p. 28.

(18) ANWAR Moazzam, "Islamic Tradition and Modernity", *Quest* (53, June 1967), pp. 27–34.

(19) Cf. H.A.R. GIBB, *Modern Trend in Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1945), pp. 47–48. (cited in) L. Fallers, "Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States." *Old Societies and New States* (ed.) Clifford Geertz (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 200.

(20) Cf. NOEL J. COULSON, "The Concept of Progress and Islamic Law", *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (ed.) R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 74–92. L. Fallers, op. cit. p. 200; Also see, AZIZ AHMAD, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Chapter IV.

(21) NOEL J. COULSON, Supra, pp. 77–92.

(21a) GHAUS ANSARI writes:

"As we have already noted... the division of Persian society into four major groups has been continuous since the Avestan period. These four classes, of priest, warrior, commoner, and serf, correspond almost identically to Indian *varnas*. In Sasanian Persia (3rd to 7th century A.D.), society remained divided into the same four classes except that the third group was composed of the bureaucracy instead of the commoners, and the fourth group was that of peasants and shepherds. The Sasanian dynasty came to an end with the advent of Islam in A.D. 650. Islam, though proclaiming the message of equality and universal brotherhood, had to surrender in the face of the established and deep-rooted institution of social segregation in Persia. Even the reputed Muslim scholars of Persia, like Nasir-ud-Din at Tusi preached the division of society; his classification of society remained the same as it was during the Sasanian period." ANSARI, op. cit, p. 29.

(22) S.M. IKRAM, op. cit. p. 5; GHAUS ANSARI, op. cit. p. 26.

(23) AZIZ AHMAD, op. cit. pp. 121–123.

(24) Cf. PERCIVAL SPEAR, *A History of India* (Vol. 2, Penguin Books, 1965), p. 129.

(25) RAJENDRA PRASAD, *India Divided* (Bombay: 1946), p. 69.

(26) GHAUS ANSARI, op. cit. pp. 29–30.

(27) B.B. MISRA, *The Indian Middle Class* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 389.

(28) GHAUS ANSARI, op. cit. p. 38.

(29) Cf. AZIZ AHMAD, op. cit. pp. 229–234.

(30) Ibid, pp. 136–137.

(31) MISRA, op. cit. p. 387.

(32) A. YUSUF ALI, op. cit. p. 391.

(33) Cf. KEITH CALLARD, op. cit. p. 11.

(34) In his presidential address to the 1930 session of the Muslim League, Iqbal for the first time proposed the creation of Pakistan. Since then, negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League were going on for a *modus vivendi* and political adjustment. This suffered a major blow with the refusal of Congress to form a coalition with the Muslim League in state assemblies after the 1937 elections. In 1940 a formal resolution demanding a separate state for the Muslims was adopted at the Lahore session of the Muslim League. In 1942, the British conceded this point on the demand of the League, but efforts went on for some kind of reconciliation. British cabinet mission in 1946 suggested the creation of a federation in which there were to be three zones, one of the Hindu majority (zone B) and two of the Muslim majority (zones A and C). Each zone was to be autonomous in all matters except foreign affairs, defence, and communications, which were proposed as federal subjects.

Muslims and Hindus were given equal parity in the federal government irrespective of their numbers. Obviously this scheme was unacceptable to nationalist leaders of the Congress. The partition of the country followed.

(35) Louis Dumont writes:

"We are led to understand how fundamentally the political action of Tilak and Gandhi was based on the intellectual synthesis that was prepared in the 19th century and which is often called neo-Hinduism. Unfortunately, it is impossible here to retrace the development from Ram Mohan Roy to Vivekananda, in which all the subsequent political movement on the Hindu side is rooted. Let us only characterize it schematically by saying that it is a synthesis in response to a Western challenge which is still more political and social than religious: an integration of the new social and political values within a reformed traditional, and at least outwardly, religious view; a reaffirmation of the supposed Hindu values on a new level. The major fact for us here is that the integration and internalization of modern Western views, which was conscious of being a victorious reaffirmation of traditional Hindu values, was a preliminary condition of an active political struggle against foreign domination on the part of Hindus. One is led to speak of "Hindu Nationalism", an expression which, were it not self-contradictory, would well describe the common ground between tendencies as different as those of Tilak and Gandhi. This was obviously not destined to make the union between Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, the Muslims also tried, later than the Hindus, to reinterpret their Scripture and tradition in order to find room for innovation". Louis Dumont, "Nationalism and Communalism", *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (No. VII, March 1964), pp. 59–60.

(36) Ibid, p. 63.

(37) Cantwell Smith, op. cit. pp. 185–199.

(38) Misra, op. cit. p. 387.

(39) Spear, op. cit. p. 224.

(40) *See*, A. Yusuf Ali, op. cit. p. 392; Dumont, op. cit. p. 57.

(41) Aziz Ahmad, op. cit. p. 84. About the role of the Sufi order in conversion he writes:

"Most of the Sufi orders as well as individual Sufis, at one time or other, regarded the conversion of non-Muslims as one of their primary spiritual objectives in India. Moplahs of the South coast were converted to Islam by the disciples of Malik ibn Dinar (d. 744), the Dudwalas and Pinjaras of Gujarat by al-Hallaj (d. 921), Labbes of Trichnopally by Nithar Shah (d. 1039), Memons of Cutch by Yusuf al-din Sindi, the Daudpotas of Sind and Baluchistan by Qaramite missionaries of Sind, the Bohras of Gujrat by Abdullah Kharrazi...and the Khojas of Gujrat by Ismaili missionaries like Nur Satgar...The foundation of the Chishti hospice at Ajmer and the Suhrawardi hospice at Multan in the thirteenth century was as much a missionary as a religious mystical activity." Aziz Ahmad, op. cit. p. 84.

(42) Ibid. pp. 82–84.

(43) Ibid, p. 82.

(44) Ghaus Ansari, op. cit. p. 50.

(45) Ibid, Chapter 6. *See*, also David G. Mandelbaum, "The System of Caste in India" (mimeographed draft of a forthcoming publication, Centre for South Asia Study and Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, 1958). The Part II of this study contains detailed references of works which refer to the existence of the caste system in the Muslim communities of India.

(46) Cf. Ghaus Ansari, op. cit. p. 35.

(46a) Aziz Ahmad writes:

"In the case of Muslim syncretic sects, Hindu elements are usually survivals of Hindu rituals after their conversion to Islam. Thus, Malkanas who are converts from various Hindu sub-castes like Rajputs, the banyas, and Jats have conserved many Hindu practices. They have retained Hindu names; they visit Hindu temples for personal ceremonies and greet each other in the Hindu manner. But they pray in Muslim mosques, practice circumcision and bury their dead. Among the half converted Muslims are Churihars in the Ganges valley who worship the Hindu deity Kalka Mai; Meos of the Punjab who worship Hindu godlings Siansi, Magti and Lalchi; and the Mirasis, musicians of north India who worship Durga Bhawani.

As late as the nineteenth century before the Wahhabi reformism of the Faraizi movement made its effect felt, some Muslims of Bengal worshipped Krishna and Durga. A syncretic sect among the Marathas was led by a Muslim, Shaykh Muhammad, whose followers could go on pilgrimage either to Mecca or to Pandharpur in Maharashtra. The Khanzada Muslim converts of Rajputana did not participate in any Hindu festivals or rites, but Brahmins continued to perform their marriage ceremonies. The Meos of Punjab still continue some features of their older Hindu social structure such as denying their daughters the right of inheritance, and conforming to near-Hindu laws of genealogy and consanguinity. Some Vaishnavite converts to Islam retained Hindu social exclusiveness and did not dine with other Muslims." AZIZ AHMAD, op. cit. pp. 159–160.

Many of these syncretic customs still exist in various forms. Prof. K.M. Kapadia in his study of Navasari town in Gujrat finds the syncretism of many Islamic customs in the ritual system of the Udas and Satpanthi Patidars. For instance, they have dispensed with idol worship, their temple does not have an idol; they observe fast for one month like the Muslim fast of Ramadan; they are enjoined upon to set aside one-tenth of their income for religious purposes which resembles *zakat* in Islam. But along with these, they also observe Hindu customs. It is a blend of Vaishnavism and Islamic ritualism. cf. K.M. KAPADIA, "The Religious Creeds among the Patidars of South Gujrat—A Panoramic View", *Towards A Sociology of Culture In India* (ed.) op. cit. pp. 242–261.

(47) Ghaus Ansari, op. cit. pp. 38, 62.

(48) Ibid, p. 38; SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 99.

(49) *See*, SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., Ch. 3; D.N. MAJUMDAR, op. cit.; SELIG HARRISON, op. cit; MYRON WEINER, op. cit.

(50) Cf. GHAUS ANSARI, op. cit., pp. 40–41. Also *see*, PRATAP CHAND AGGARWAL, "Cultural Change and Widening Integration Among the Meos of North India" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1966), pp. 252–283.

(51) P.C. AGGARWAL, Supra.

(52) Cf. AGGARWAL, Supra, pp. 197–214; AZIZ AHMAD, op. cit. pp. 157–160.

(53) AGGARWAL, op. cit.

(54) Those Meos who got converted to Hinduism had a feeling of suppressed hostility and anger against the majority community of the Hindus; they did not like being forced to eat pork as a mark of conversion; most of them were converted to Hinduism under duress. *see*, P.C. AGGARWAL, op. cit. pp. 58–74.

(55) Cf. DONALD SMITH, op. cit. p. 409.

(56) RAJNI KOTHARI & TARUN SHETH, "The Extent and Limit of Community Voting: The Case of Baroda East", *Indian Voting Behaviour* (ed.) Myron Weiner, Rajni Kothari (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1965), pp. 21–22.

(57) Paul R. Brass, "Class And Community Voting in Kanpur City", *Indian Voting Behaviour*, loc. cit. p. 58.

(58) NORMAN D. PALMER, *The Indian Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 212.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Cf. DONALD SMITH, op. cit. pp. 416–419.

(61) Ethnographic studies *by* K. ISHWARAN and S.C. Dube at the village level show many elements of cultural syncretism and interaction. *See*, K. ISHWARAN, *Tradition And Economy In Village India* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 12. S.C. DUBE, *Indian Village* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 92–93. Louis Dumont, op. cit. p. 55.

(62) *See*, T.K.N. UNNITHAN & YOGENDRA SINGH, *Sociology of Non-Violence and Peace* (Research Council for Cultural Studies, India International Centre, Delhi, 1969), pp. 39, 61.

(63) JOSEPH E. ELDER, "Religious Beliefs and Political Attitudes", *South Asian Politics and Religion*, (ed.) Donald E. Smith (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 257.

(64) K.A. NILAKANTA SASTRI, "Indian Contacts with Western Lands—Medieval", *Diogenes* (32, Winter 1960), p. 44.

(65) K.M. KAPADIA, op. cit. pp. 242–261.
(66) DUMONT SUPRA, p. 54. SASTRI, *Diogenes*, (32, Winter 1960), p. 48.
(67) DUMONT, Ibid, pp. 55–56.
(68) DONALD E. SMITH, op. cit. p. 422.
(69) ZIYA-UL HASAN FARUQI, "Indian Muslims and the Ideology of the Secular State", *South Asian Politics and Religion*, op. cit. p. 148.
(70) AZIZ AHMAD, op. cit. p. 106.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Ibid, p. 105.
(73) DANIEL LERNER, op. cit. p. 48.
(74) *See* EDWARD SHILS, op. cit.; B.B. MISRA, op. cit. p. 54; HARRISON, op. cit. p. 55.
(75) DANIEL LERNER, op. cit. p. 408.
(76) NOEL J. COULSON, op. cit., p. 92.
(77) CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case" *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, op. cit. p. 104.
(78) A. YUSUF ALI, op. cit. p. 410.
(79) DONALD SMITH, Supra, Ch. 12., pp. 335–371.
(80) A. YUSUF ALI, op. cit. p. 401.
(81) THEODORE P. WRIGHT Jr., "Muslim Representation in India", *South Asian Politics and Religion*, op. cit. pp. 105–106.

CHAPTER IV

THE WESTERN IMPACT AND CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

(1) Cf. LOUIS DUMONT, "The Modern Conception of the Individual", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, (October, 1965), pp. 13–61.
(2) *See*, MAX WEBER, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1954); KARL MANNHEIM, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940); Reference may specially be made to Mannheim's concept of "fundamental democratization" as opposed to the notion of hierarchy in the traditional societies.
(3) On this point PERCIVAL SPEAR writes:
"There was a new climate of opinion born of the great movement of European thought from the seventeenth century onwards. The old deference to the classical world gave way under the impact of the Renaissance, the discovery of the New World, and the scientific revolution of the late seventeenth century, to a new confidence. . . . The Industrial Revolution, the child of applied science and the parent of unheard-of riches, gave an impetus to this process like the second stage of a space rocket. The former respect for the past gave way to a great pride in the present and an abounding confidence in the future. A symbol of this new spirit was Condorcet's *Essay on the Progress of the Human Spirit*, written under the shadow of the guillotine in 1794. It was minds breathing this intellectual air which now turned their attention to India." See, Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 255.
(4) *See*, ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press), Vol

I, for a discussion of various ideological justifications for cultural ethnocentrism in the theory of civilization which grew up following the over-optimistic world view generated by the Industrial Revolution.

(5) L.S.S. O'Malley, "The Impact of European Civilization", *Modern India and the West: A Study of the Interaction of their Civilizations*, ed. L.S.S. O'Malley (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 45.

(6) For details *see*, Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History*, op. cit., pp. 215–224.

(7) M.N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 53.

(8) *See*, Max Weber, Supra, pp. 13–31.

(9) M.N. Srinivas mentions the possibility of various stages in Westernization. He says, "I think it will be increasingly necessary to qualify "Westernization" by the prefix "primary," "secondary", or "tertiary"; in primary Westernization, unlike secondary and tertiary, the linkage is simple and direct." *See* his *Social Change in Modern India*, Supra, p. 56.

(10) B.B. Misra, Supra, p. 104.

(11) Ibid, pp. 76–77.

(12) Ibid, p. 76.

(13) Ibid, p. 76.

(14) Ibid, p. 106.

(15) Spear, *India*, p. 299.

(16) H. Woodrow, *Macaulay's Minutes on Education in India* (1862), p. 2; quoted in Misra, op. cit., p. 160.

(17) Joseph Mullens, *Ten Years of Missionary Labour in India*, p. 138, quoted in Misra, op. cit., p. 160.

(18) Spear, *India*, op. cit., p. 292.

(19) Misra, op. cit., p. 154.

(20) *See*, Nirad C. Chaudhari, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1951).

(21) J.C. Ghosh, "Bengali", ed. O'Malley, op. cit., pp. 487–490.

(22) O'Malley, op. cit., Ch. XIV, pp. 484–534.

(23) Miss Collet, *Life and Letters of Ram Mohan Roy*, 1911, quoted in K.C. Vyas, *The Social Renaissance in India* (Bombay: Vora & Co., Publishers Private Ltd., 1957), p. 29.

(24) Rammohun Roy, quoted in O'Malley, op. cit., p. 485.

(25) Rammohun Roy, quoted, K.C. Vyas, op. cit., p. 19.

(26) Charles H. Heimsath writes:

"Like Rammohun Roy Keshub Chandra Sen regarded India's contact with Christian civilization as the surest means of its moral regeneration. British rule, the agency of that contact, Sen felt, should thus be considered a chapter "of ecclesiastical history". The book which treats of the moral, social and religious advancement of our great country with the help of Western science, under the paternal rule of the British nation, is indeed a sacred book...Who can deny that Victoria is an instrument in the hands of Providence to elevate this degraded country in the scale of nations...(spoke Sen in one of his lectures)". See, Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 21.

(27) J.C. Ghosh, ed. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 491.

(28) Heimsath op. cit., pp. 12–13.

(29) O'Malley, op. cit. p. 66.

(30) Ibid, p. 67.

(31) The over-enthusiasm of Parsis for the Western culture is reflected in the writing of a Bombay Parsi, Farmji Bomaji in 1863: "We want the English language, English manners, and English behaviour, for our wives and daughters; and until these are supplied, it is but just that the present gulf between the English-man and the Indian should remain as wide as ever". Quoted in Heimsath, op. cit., p. 14.

(32) Shanti S. Tangri, "Intellectuals and Society in Nineteenth-Century India", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 3, 1960–61, p. 375.

(33) O'Malley, op. cit., p. 69.

(34) An interesting account of this institution may be found in a historical novel, *The Deceivers* by John Masters.

(35) O'Malley, op. cit., pp. 54–56.

(36) Ibid, p. 59.

(37) Spear, *India*, p. 292.

(38) O'Malley, op. cit., pp. 79–80.

(39) Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (Illinois: Free Press, 1947), p. 64.

(40) Ibid, p. 65.

(41) Bernard S. Cohn makes a distinction between what he calls "local law-ways" which are based on customs and "lawyer's law" which is derived from formal legal codes. We might say that the local law-ways or customs and the lawyer's laws constitute the little and great traditions of legal norms. For Cohn's distinction *see* his "Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law in India", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 67, No. 6 (December 1965) pp. 82–122.

(42) B.S. Cohn, "From Indian status to British contract", *Journal of Economic History* 21: 613–618.

(43) Basham, op. cit., 1. 120.

(44) Ibid, p. 121.

(45) J. Duncan M. Derrett writes:

"During the period when Smritis were being compiled it seems that some slight attempts were made at accommodation between Aryan tradition, which formed the core of the Shastras as set out in Vedic and the earliest Smriti texts, and the surviving non-Aryan usages of peoples who had joined the "orthodox" fold and were accepted as caste Hindus. To this extent elements were introduced into the basic shastric authorities which were inconsistent with the traditional Aryan way of life, and it appears that they were eventually excluded or became obsolete as the predominant tone of the Shastras prevailed, and the distinction between shastric and non-shastric customs emerged. There were certain classes for whom the Shastras provided a juridical umbrella; others were outside the contemplation of the Shastras, except for procedural or similar purposes. Later (though still prehistorically) non-Aryan races seem to have become ritually and otherwise partially Aryanized: the umbrella had therefore to be widened. The only method available was interpretation of the Smiritis by successive generations of commentators, compilers of digests, and the authors of comprehensive treatises." See, Derrett "The History of the Juridical Framework of the Joint Hindu Family", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VI, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

(46) Sir Benjamin Lindsay, "Law", ed. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 619.

(47) O'Malley, op. cit., p. 30.

(48) Ibid, p. 32.

(49) Ibid, pp. 31–43.

(50) Percival Spear, *A History of India* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1965), Vol. 2., p. 98.

(51) Tilak, quoted in Heimsath, op. cit., p. 174.

(52) Ibid, p. 153.

(53) Ibid, p. 153 (footnote).

(54) *See, Social Legislation*, Government of India Publication, 1955.

(55) B.S. Cohn, "Anthropological Notes...", op. cit., p. 105.

(56) The upper classes did not like the legal reforms introduced by the British which treated all men irrespective of their birth, caste or wealth alike before law. This resentment and also the fact that new legislation was being taken advantage of by the lower classes is revealed in the following statement of a man from the upper class (in 1866–67) as quoted by Bishop Thobourn:

"In the days of our Rajas," he said, "if any man without a well-established reputation ventured to go into court and lodge a complaint against a respectable person like myself, if he did not make good his accusation, he knew very well that he would probably have both his ears cut off and be turned out of court; but now see how it is. Any low-caste man can not only go

to the English court and lodge a complaint against me, but he can compel me to meet him in open court face to face and answer his questions as if I were a common man of no standing whatever. It is this that we complain of. There is no honour, no sense of right, no justice left. That which you call justice and impartiality is really wrong and oppression." Bishop J.M. Thoburn, *India and Malaysia* (Cincinnati, 1893), p. 69., quoted in O'Malley, op. cit. p. 632.

(57) O'Malley, op. cit., p. 59.

(58) B.S. Cohn "Anthropological Notes...", op. cit., p. 108.

(59) Ibid, p. 106.

(60) O'Malley writes:

"The foundations of collectivism on which the village community was based were further weakened by the system of land revenue administration which, to an increasing extent, substituted individual for communal responsibility: in other words, individual holdings were assessed separately, whereas formerly the village was assessed as a whole,the quota to be paid by each family being determined by the villagers themselves. A subsidiary factor has been the recognition of rights of private ownership in land." See, O'Malley, op. cit., p. 85.

(61) Ibid, p. 630.

(62) Weber, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

(63) The "filtration theory" in educational policy was based on the assumption that educational institutions may be established only in the urban areas from where education would spontaneously spread towards the villages in the course of time. This idea led to the establishment of one high school in each district headquarter as the centre of educational radiation.

(64) Misra, op. cit. pp. 302–305.

(65) Ibid, p. 305.

(65a) Harold R. Isaacs, *India's Ex-Untouchables*, (New York: The John Day Company, 1964), p. 79.

(66) Tangri, op. cit., pp. 372–73.

(67) Edward Shils, op. cit., p. 60.

(68) Misra, op. cit., p. 294.

(69) Ibid, p. 295.

(70) Daniel Lerner postulates a close association between literacy, media participation and cultural modernization. *See* his *The Passing of Traditional Society*, op. cit.

(71) *Report of the Educational Commission* 1964–66: *Education and National Development* (Delhi: The Manager of Publications, Government of India Press, 1966), p. 298.

(72) Ibid, p. 399.

(73) Ibid, p. 401.

(74) Among the studies which point out to this fact may be quoted: V.K.R.V. Rao, *University Education and Employment (A Case Study of Delhi Graduates)*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961); Baljit Singh, *Urban Middle Class Climbers*, (Lucknow: J.K. Institute of Sociology and Human Relations, 1958); P.C. Joshi & M.R. Rao, "Social and Economic Factors in Literacy and Education in Rural Areas", *Economic Weekly*, (Bombay: January 4, 1964), pp. 21–27; Leslie Palmer, "Educational Systems of Southern Asia and Social Stratification" paper presented at the Seminar on Sociology of Education in India, Tata Institute of Social Science, Bombay, 1966.

(75) *Statistical Year Book* 1963 (Paris: Unesco, 1964), pp. 39–58.

(76) *Report of the Education Commission*, op. cit., p. 466.

(77) Unesco *Statistical Year Book*, op. cit., pp. 282–295.

(78) *See*, Margaret Cormack, *She Who Rides a Peacock*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 225–236; B.V. Shah, *Social Change and College Students of Gujrat* (Baroda: The Maharaja Sayajirao University, 1964), Ch. IX; Y.B. Damle, *"College Youth in Poona"* (Poona: 1966), pp. 193–214; Yogendra Singh, "Cultural Integration and Changing Values (A Study of Value System of Educated Youth)", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XIII, September 1964.

(79) Report of the Education Commission, op. cit.

(79a) *See*, P.A. Sorokin, & C.C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York:

Henry Holt, 1929); ROBERT REDFIELD, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

(80) FERDINAND TONNIES, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (list ed., 1887) tr. and ed. by C.P. Loomis as *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* (New York: American Book Company, 1940).

(81) DURKHEIM, op. cit.

(82) HOWARD P. BECKER, *Through Values to Social Interpretation*, Greenwood, 1968.

(83) In the works of classical sociologists like Tonnies, Weber, Durkheim, etc., one might find elements of conservatism existing alongside values of liberalism or even radicalism. For instance, Weber in the concluding part of his essay on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* looks at capitalism, the institution which according to him epitomizes the values of rationality and modernity, with a sense of skepticism. His words are:

"No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualist without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved." See, Weber, op. cit., p. 182. For a general discussion of such ideas in the thinking of sociologists *See*, Robert A. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), Part One, pp. 3–44.

(84) *See*, P.V. KANE, *History of Dharmasastra*, Vol. III, pp. 178–183.

(85) DAVID F. POCOCK, "Sociologies: Urban and Rural", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. IV, April 1960, p. 66.

(86) *See*, GIDEON SJOBERG, *Preindustrial Cities* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

(87) RICHARD D. LAMBERT, "Some Impact of Urban Society upon Village Life", *India's Urban Future*, ed. Roy Turner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 117.

(88) Ibid, p. 118.

(89) Cf. K.M. KAPADIA, "Rural Family Patterns", *Sociological Bulletin*, (Bombay), V, September 1956, pp. 111–126.

(90) Cf. A. BOPEGAMAGE, "Neighbourhood Relations in Indian Cities... Delhi", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. VI, No. I, (March, 1957), pp. 34–42. Also *see*, R.L. SINGH, *Banaras...A Study in Urban Geography* (Banaras: Nand Kishore & Brothers, 1955).

(91) B.R. MISHRA, *Report on Socio-Economic Survey of Jamshedpur City* (Patna: Patna University Press, 1959), pp. 10–26.

(91a) LAMBERT, op. cit., p. 136.

(92) P.N. PRABHU, "Social Effects of Urbanization on Industrial Workers in Bombay", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. V, No. 1 (March, 1956), p. 29.

(93) LAMBERT, op. cit.

(94) R.L. SINGH, op. cit.

(95) GERTRUDE WOODRUFF writes that for the Pariahs in South India:

"Going to the city is not so much a move of desperation as it is an alternative way of life. There is no stigma attached to migration, and it is by no means the unsuccessful family only that makes the move. In Pariah conversation, the phrase "to see the world" is a common one. This is considered the natural prerogative of every man, and to a lesser extent of women. Bangalore, particularly, is constantly discussed and knowledge of it is fairly detailed...the gardens and parks and bright nightlights have a romantic tinge, but reality corrects romance. One young man, back from a visit, said to his sister, "I have seen your Bangalore...it is nothing but a river of sewage."

"There is hardly a boy in the Cheri who does not know the bus and train timetables, expenses, and the address and place of work of several relatives. Intervisiting and postcards are frequent. Some villagers regularly go to Bangalore during the hot season to enjoy the city's superior climate." See, Gertrude Woodruff, "An Adidravida Settlement in Bangalore... India" (Doctoral dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959), p. 78; quoted in Lambert, op. cit., p. 132.

(96) LAMBERT, op. cit., p. 132; also see, P.N. PRABHU, "Bombay: A Study on the Social

"Effects of Urbanization on Industrial Workers Migrating from Rural Areas to the City of Bombay", *The Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization: Five Studies in Asia* (Calcutta: Unesco Centre on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1956).

(97) BERT F. HOSELITZ, "The Role of Urbanization in Economic Development: Some International Comparisons", ed. Roy Turner, op. cit., p. 178.

(98) BERT F. HOSELITZ writes, "The trends of urban growth (in Latin America) have been similar to those of India. In fact, cities and towns there have grown even more rapidly. In Venezuela, for example, the proportion of the population in places with more than 20,000 inhabitants was 5.3% of the country's total in 1891. By 1951 this proportion had risen to 31.3%. Similar trends were observable in Mexico, Chile, Puerto Rico and Panama. In Latin America also it is the large cities which have grown more rapidly."; See, Hoselitz, op. cit., p. 177.

(99) Cf. OSCAR LEWIS, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study", *Scientific Monthly*, LXXV, No. I (July, 1952), pp. 31–41.

(100) Cf. D.R. GADGIL, *Poona: A Socio-Economic Survey* (Poona, 1909), Part II.

(101) MILTON SINGER, "Great Tradition in a Metropolitan Center: Madras", op. cit., pp. 141–182.

(102) KINGSLEY DAVIS, "Urbanization in India: Past and Future", ed. Roy Turner, op. cit. p. 7.

(103) GEORGE ROSEN, op. cit., p. 15.

(104) DAVIS, op. cit., p. 12.

(105) Contrary to the views of Kingsley Davis, Bert F. Hoselitz feels that the model of urbanization which might correspond to the Indian pattern is not the American one but the European. See, Hoselitz, op. cit., pp. 159–160.

(106) KINGSLEY DAVIS, op. cit., pp. 10–11.

(107) KINGSLEY DAVIS, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 127–128.

(108) Y.B. DAMLE, *Communication of Modern Ideas and Knowledge in Indian Villages* (Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955).

(109) LAMBERT, op. cit., p. 137.

(110) *See*, M. N. SRINIVAS, "Industrialization and Urbanization of Rural Areas", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. V (September, 1956); D.N. MAJUMDAR, *Caste and Communication in an Indian Village*, op. cit.; BAILEY, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, op. cit.

(111) Cf. BERT F. HOSELITZ, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1960).

(112) Cf. S. TANGRI, "Urbanization, Political Stability and Economic Growth", ed. Roy Turner, op. cit., pp. 192–212. In contrast to the general assumption that urbanization leads to economic growth, Tangri holds the view "that urbanization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic growth. Under certain conditions, however, and up to a point, it can be desirable condition for growth, while under other conditions, or beyond a certain point, it can be a factor in slowing down growth. In contemporary India the process of urbanization, *in* both magnitude and nature, seems to be a factor retarding than accelerating growth". (Tangri, op. cit., p. 192).

(113) Cf. RONALD SEGAL, op. cit., p. 174.

(114) CHESTER BOWLES, *New York Times*, September 16, 1967.

(115) GEORGE ROSEN, op. cit., p. 191.

(116) KINGSLEY DAVIS, *Population of India and Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 213.

(117) Cf. MAX WEBER, *Sociology of Religion* (Beacon Press, 1963); Also, MAX WEBER, *The Religion of India*, tr. H.H. Gerth and Don Martindale (The Free Press, Glencoe, 1958).

(118) KINGSLEY DAVIS summarizes the various factors in the colonial administration of India by the British which were not conducive to industrialization. Amongst the reasons he mentions for it are: (1) that "the men who ruled India were not of the type, even had they been so motivated, to develop Indian industry; (2) the tariff policy in England and India has been admittedly influenced by strong demands from British economic interests; (3) organization and rate structure of the (transport) system favoured unduly the port towns and the foreign

trade as against the interests of the inland towns and a uniform general industrial development of the country; (4) the (Indian) government did not guide and control the exploitation of natural resources for the purpose of maximizing the long-run national interest; (5) neither did the (Indian) government lend much support to the native producers of raw materials as against the foreign manufacturers in India who used the raw materials; (6) contracts were let to British firms (for purchase of stores ... equipment for army, materials for city utilities, supplies for hospitals, tracks and rolling stock for railroads, etc.,) when Indian firms could have supplied the goods, and (7) the British government in India, collaborating with British economic interests, ruined the handicraft industries of India, and thus impoverished and forced into an already crowded agricultural situation countless thousands of artisans." KINGSLEY DAVIS, *Population of India and Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 217.

(119) Cf. M.N. SRINIVAS, "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development: A Discussion", *Introduction to the Civilization of India (Developing India)*, ed. Myron Weiner (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), Vol. II, p. 123. Also *see*, D.G. KARVE, *Introduction to the Civilization of India*, op. cit., pp. 123–126; LOUIS DUMONT, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, op. cit., p. 25.

(120) *See*, MILTON SINGER, "Cultural Values in India's Economic Development", *Introduction to the Civilization of India*, op. cit., pp. 107–117. M.N. SRINIVAS, ibid, pp. 120–123. S.C. DUBE, "Cultural Problems in the Economic Development of India", *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, ed. R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 43–55.

(121) cf. KUSUM NAIR, *Blossoms in the Dust: The Human Element in Indian Development* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1961).

(122) MILTON SINGER, ed. Myron Weiner, op. cit., pp. 107–108.

(123) MYRON WEINER, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

(124) O'MALLEY, op. cit., p. 223.

(125) W.C. WORDSWORTH, "The Press", ed. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 188.

(126) Ibid, p. 188.

(127) Ibid, p. 191.

(128) Ibid, p. 191.

(129) J.R. CUNNINGHAM, "Education", ed. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 180.

(130) *The Indiagram* (Indian High Commission, Ottawa), August 10, 1967.

(131) O'NALLEY, op. cit., p. 236.

(132) REINHARD BENDIX, op. cit., p. 260.

(133) cf. M.N. SRINIVAS, "Caste in India of Tomorrow", *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 74; GUSFIELD JOSEPH R., "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 72, No. 4, (January, 1967), pp. 351–362; CLAUDE E. WELCH, Jr., "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization", *Political Modernization*, ed. Clause E. Welch (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. 1967) pp. 9–10.

(134) LUCIAN W. PYE, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965, p. 8.

(135) W.H. MORRIS-JONES, *Parliament in India* (Philadelphia, 1957), p. 37.

(136) BENDIX, op. cit., Ch. 3., p. 55.

(137) Ibid, p. 55.

(138) DAVID E. APTER, "Political Religion in the New Nations", *Old Societies and New States*, ed. Clifford Geertz (London: The Free Press, 1963), p. 59.

(139) *See*, SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 119.

(140) *Reports and Proceedings of the Second Indian National Congress*, quoted in Donald E. Smith, op. cit., p. 88.

(141) Ibid, p. 41.

(142) Ibid, p. 73.

(143) Ibid, pp. 499–500.

(144) *See* M.N. SRINIVAS, "Caste in India of Tomorrow", op. cit.; LLOYD I. RUDOLPH AND SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, "The Political Role of India's Caste Association", ed. Welch,

op. cit., pp. 126–145; SELIG HARRISON, op. cit.; MYRON WEINER, *The Politics of Scarcity*, op. cit., etc.

(145) *See*, NORMAN D. PALMER, *The Indian Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961); MORRIS-JONES, op. cit.; DAVID APTER, op. cit.; BENDIX, op. cit.

(146) SRINIVAS, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization", op. cit., p. 53.

(147) SRINIVAS, *Social Change*, op. cit., p. 112.

(148) Ibid, p. 123.

(149) F.G. BAILEY, *Caste and the Economic Frontier* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957), p. 231.

(150) ALAN R. BEALS, "Interplay Among Factors of Change in a Mysore Village", ed. McKim Marriott, op. cit., p. 90.

(151) FRED W. RIGGS, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 28–30.

(152) GUSFIELD, op. cit., p. 361.

(153) Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns: A Case in Point", *On the Theory of Social Change*, ed. Everett E. Hagen (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962), pp. 385–407.

(154) LLOYD I. RUDOLPH, "The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 4, (December, 1965), pp. 975–989.

(155) Ibid, p. 983.

(156) *See*, RICHARD D. LAMBERT, ed. Roy Turner, op. cit.; RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Workers, Factories, and Social Change in India*, op. cit., pp. 214–224; JAMES BERNA, "Patterns of Entrepreneurship in South India", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. VII (April, 1959), pp. 343–362; WILLIAM GOODE, "Industrialization and Family Change", *Industrialization and Society*, ed. Hoselitz and Moore (New York: UNESCO, (1963), Ch. XII.

CHAPTER V

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION

(The Macro-Structural Changes)

(1) FRED W. RIGGS, op. cit., pp. 22–23.

(2) MARION J. LEVY, JR., *Modernization and the Structure of Society* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 38–39.

(3) MAX WEBER, *Essays in Sociology*, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 400.

(4) REINHARD BENDIX, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

(5) Ibid, pp. 38–39.

(6) *See*, B.B. MISHRA, op. cit., pp. 49–65; EVERETT E. HAGEN, *On The Theory of Social Change* (Illinois: Dorsey Press Inc., 1962), pp. 55–85.

(7) REINHARD BENDIX mentions that in the medieval European society too, protest movements such as *millenarian movement, social banditry* and movements of *populist legitimism* used to spring up against the traditional authority. *See*, BENDIX, op. cit., pp. 43–46.

(8) KARL POLANYI, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) pp. 68–76.

(9) WILL & ARIEL DURANT, *Rousseau and Revolution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 669.

(10) EVERETT E. HAGEN, op. cit., p. 10.

(11) Ibid, p. 10.

(12) BENDIX, op. cit., p. 94.

(13) NEIL J. SMELSER, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 1–2.

(14) MARION J. LEVY, JR., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 62.

(15) S.N. EISENSTADT, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 1966), pp. 55–67.

(16) *See*, GEORGE P. MURDOCK, *Social Structure* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), Ch. 9–11.

(17) On this point, *see*, MYRON WEINER, M.N. SRINIVAS, RUDOLPHS & SELIG HARRISON cited above.

(18) DAYA KRISHNA, "Democracy and Traditional Indian Values", ed. Baidya Nath Varma, *Contemporary India* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 126.

(19) HELEN B. B. LAMB, "The Indian Merchant", ed. Milton Singer, op. cit., pp. 25–34.

(20) STELLA KRAMRISCH, "Traditions of the Indian Craftsman", ed. Milton Singer, op. cit., pp. 18–24.

(21) HAROLD D. LASWELL, DANIEL LERNER & C. EASTON ROTHWELL, *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 1.

(22) HAROLD D. LASSWELL, "The Study of Political Elite", ed. Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, *World Revolutionary Elite*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 8.

(23) LASWELL, LERNER & ROTHWELL, op. cit., p. 6.

(24) LASWELL, in ed. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, op. cit., p. 8.

(25) Ibid, pp. 8–9.

(26) KARL MANNHEIM, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), p. 86.

(27) A. DE GRAZIA, P. DEUTSCHMANN & F. HUNTER have made this distinction in their definition of elite as follows:

"The elite, or leadership group, consists of those persons in any community who possess in extraordinary degree one (quality) or a combination of generally desired qualities. The elite possess power, respect, wealth, and skill in combination or singly. A person who has a high rating on only one index is a member of a special elite, as for example, the religious elite or the elite of wealth. If, however, that one factor is the dominating one in the society, he is also a member of the *general* elite. On the other hand, if he has a high rating on several qualities which together dominate the leadership of a society, he is part of the general elite as well as of several special elites". *see* A. DE GRAZIA *et al.*, *Elite Analysis: A Manual of Methods for Discovering the Leaders of a Society and their Vulnerability to Propaganda* (Stanford, California: Institute of Journalistic Studies, 1955), p. 1 mimeographed, quoted in Marshall R. Singer, *The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 5.

(28) FRED W. RIGGS, op. cit., pp. 126–127.

(29) MAX WEBER, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 341–363.

(30) EVERETT E. HAGEN, op. cit., pp. 74–81.

(31) Ibid, pp. 80–81.

(32) Ibid.

(33) DANIEL LERNER, op. cit.

(34) A.L. BASHAM, op. cit., p. 91.

(35) D. MACKENZIE BROWN, "Traditional Concepts of Indian Leadership", ed. Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.6.

(36) BASHAM, op. cit., p. 94.

(37) R.C. MAJUMDAR, H.C. RAYCHAUDHURI & KALKINKAR DATTA, *An Advanced History of India* (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1956), p. 557.

(38) MAX, WEBER *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, op. cit., p. 341.

(39) Ibid, p. 372.

(40) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, *The Discovery of India*, (London: Meridian Books Ltd., 1951), p. 283.

(41) D.G. KARVE (trans. and selected with the assistance of Ellen E. McDonald) *The New Brahmans: Five Maharashtrian Families*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), *see* General Introduction, pp. 1–5.

(42) B.B. MISRA, op. cit., p. 353.

(43) GEORGE McT. KAHIN, GUY J. PAUKER, & LUCIAN PYE, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries", *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, December 1955; quoted in Myron Weiner, "Some Hypothesis on the Politics of Modernization in India" in Park and Tinker, op. cit., p. 27.

(44) M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 69; Studies of elite by historians corroborate the continuity in the structure of elite groups. Papers of J.H. BROOMFIELD, "An Elite and its Rivals: The Bengal Bhadralok at the Opening of the Twentieth Century"; of P.R. BRASS, "Regionalism, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Uttar Pradesh" and of E. IRSCHICK, "The Brahmin and Non-Brahmin Struggle for Power in Madras", referred to by Srinivas may be noted in this connection. *see*, SRINIVAS, ibid, p. 176, footnote 55.

(45) *See*, EDWARD SHILS, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity*, op. cit., and Daniel Lerner, op. cit.

(46) M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit., p. 72.

(47) GEORGE ROSEN, op. cit., p. 73.

(48) MYRON WEINER, "Changing Leadership in West Bengal", ed. A.R. Desai, *Rural Sociology in India* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961)

(49) GEORGE ROSEN, op. cit., Table 21, p. 175.

(50) EDWARD SHILS, Supra, pp. 17–18.

(51) Ibid, p. 18.

(52) Information given by Prof. B. Kuppuswamy, India International Centre, New Delhi.

(53) SRINIVAS, Supra, pp. 71–73.

(54) D.D. KARVE, *The New Brahmans*, op. cit., *see*, "My Life Story", by D.D. KARVE in this volume for a glimpse on social resistance by traditionalists to bring reform in the status of women (widow remarriage and education), pp. 17–57.

(55) *See*, I. P. DESAI, "The New Elite", ed. Unnithan et al, op. cit., pp. 150–155; also T.B. BOTTOMORE, "Modern Elite in India", ed. Unnithan et al, Supra, pp. 180–188.

(56) SRINIVAS, Supra, p. 80.

(57) A trend in the psychology of Asian-African elite towards greater identification with the culture of their own country away from Western values and cultural symbols has been observed in many recent studies. *See*, MARSHALL SINGER op. cit., S.N. EISENSTADT, op. cit.; P.E. SIGMUND, JR. *The Ideology of Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1963); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, ed. *Old Societies and New States*, op. cit.; JAMES COLEMAN, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1959); LUCIAN PYE, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); THOM KERSTIENS, *The New Elite in Asia and Africa: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966).

Kerstiens observes a process in both Indonesia and Ghana whereby the western-educated elite who in these countries led the struggle for Independence, are now increasingly being challenged by the rise of new mass leaders who are non-westernized and view western cultural incursions on their culture as a disguised form of neo-colonialism. Kerstiens writes:

"The new western-educated elite is, however, menaced itself by a newer group, the mass leaders... The mass leader in general is not so well educated, nor so western in outlook, but is in closer contact with the population. He has come forward from the mass organization,

either trade unions, youth groups or the army. This elite, being more revolutionary in outlook, out-bids the western group in its stand against the European elite. If the latter has been concerned with braking the European elite's political strength, it was still willing to let it hold on to a great deal of its economic power, and imitate its style of life. The former is however, against European economic power in which it sees a form of neo-colonialism". *See*, KERSTIENS, Supra, p. 221.

(58) For comment on Weber's ideal-type regarding bureaucracy, *see*, CARL J. FRIEDRICH, "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy", ed. Robert K. Merton et al., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 27–33.

(59) MAX WEBER, *The Theory of Social Economic Organization*, op. cit., pp. 333–334.

(60) MAX WEBER, *Essays in Sociology* op. cit., pp. 416–417.

(61) MAX WEBER, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, op. cit., p. 335.

(62) RALPH BRAIBANTI, "Introduction" ed. Ralph Braibanti, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 9.

(63) HUGH TINKER, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", ed. Ralph Braibanti, op. cit., p. 24.

(64) Ibid, p. 24–25.

(65) Ibid, p. 25.

(66) BERNARD S. COHN, "Recruitment and Trading of British Civil Servants in India, 1600–1800", ed. Ralph Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 88–93.

(67) HUGH TINKER, Supra, p. 24.

(68) *See*, PHILIP WOODROUGH, *The Men who Ruled India: The Guardians* (London, 1954)

(69) DAVID C. POTTER, "Bureaucratic Change in India", ed. Ralph Braibanti, op. cit., p. 166.

(70) B.S. COHN, ed. Braibanti, Supra, p. 105 (see Table).

(71) Ibid, p. 107.

(72) Ibid, p. 119.

(73) Ibid, pp. 110–111.

(74) Ibid, p. 91.

(75) TINKER, Supra, p. 26.

(76) B.S. COHN, Supra, ed. Braibanti, p. 92.

(77) HUGH TINKER, ed. Braibanti, op. cit., p. 26.

(78) Quoted in Tinker, op. cit., p. 29.

(79) Ibid, p. 54.

(80) Ibid, p. 63.

(81) TINKER, op. cit., p. 54.

(82) B.B. MISRA, op. cit., p. 322.

(83) RALPH BRAIBANTI, "Concluding Observations", ed. Ralph Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 645–647.

(84) POTTER, op. cit., p. 152.

(85) D.N. RAO, "Disparities of Representation Among the Direct Recruits to the I.A.S.", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, IX, (January-March 1963), 91; quoted in Potter, op. cit., p. 153.

(86) POTTER, ibid, p. 153.

(87) Ibid, p. 160.

(88) Ibid, p. 162.

(89) MICHEL CROZIER, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

(90) On this point, *See* EDWARD SHILS' article on Afro-Asian intellectuals in *Daedalus*, Spring 1967, published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton St. Brookline Station, Boston, Mass., U.S.A., in which Shils postulates a universal intellectual tradition (its centre) in which he finds Afro-Asian elite located on its periphery. The problem of Afro-Asian intellectuals, according to him, is of their inclusion to this central universal intellectual stream of which the modern West is the representative core. Obviously Shils

takes a universal evolutionary view of modernization which is a widespread fallacy among western intellectuals today.

(91) K.R. Sundar Rajan, *New Statesman* (Friday, October 13, 1967), p. 456.

(92) The emergence of protest movements in India has been noted in the forms of caste associations, communal and ethnic groups and backward class movements. In this connection, *see* M.N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India...*, op. cit.; Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity*, op. cit.; Selig Harrison, op. cit; Rudolph, op. cit., etc.

(93) *See*, Shils in *Daedalus*, op. cit.

(94) Helen Lamb, op. cit., p. 25.

(95) Ibid, p. 25.

(96) S. Bhargava, *Indigenous Banking in Ancient and Medieval India* (Bombay, 1935), p. 9., quoted in Helen Lamb, op. cit., p. 27.

(97) Helen Lamb, Ibid, p. 29.

(98) J. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol I, pp. 518–519, quoted in Helen Lamb, op. cit., p. 30.

(99) B.B. Misra, op. cit., p. 117.

(100) Ibid, p. 249.

(101) Ibid, p. 250.

(102) Ibid, p. 250.

(103) Helen Lamb, op. cit., p. 33.

(104) Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity*, op. cit.

(105) George Rosen, op. cit., Table 21, p. 175.

(106) James Berna, *Industrial Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Madras State* (Bombay: Allied Press, 1961).

(107) James Berna, "Patterns of Entrepreneurship in South India", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. VII, (April, 1959), pp. 343–62.

(108) Leighton W. Hazlehurst, *Entrepreneurship and the Merchant Castes in a Punjabi City* (Duke University, Programme in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia, 1966), p. 144.

(109) Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 72, No. 4, (January 1967), p. 357.

(110) For a study of factory culture and folkways on the model of Malinowski, *see*, John S. Ellsworth, Jr., *Factory Folkways: A Study of Institutional Structure and Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), Chapter IV, pp. 89–191.

(111) *See*, J.S. Slotkin, *From Field to Factory* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960); Wilbert E. Moore & Arnold S. Feldman, *Labour Commitment and Social Change in Developing Societies*, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960).

(112) Richard D. Lambert, *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 17.

(113a) L.W. Hazlehurst, op. cit., p. 140.

(113b) George Rosen, op. cit., p. 191.

(114) Ibid.

(115) Ibid, p. 138.

(116) Charles A. Myer, *Labour Problems in the Industrialization of India* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 8.

(117) Ranbir Varma, "Industrial Labour as a Factor of Economic Growth in India", ed. B.N. Varma, op. cit., 148.

(118) Ronald Segal, *The Crisis of India* (Penguin Special, 1965), p. 174.

(119) *See*, Charles A. Myer, Ranbir Varma & Wilbert E. Moore & Feldman, op. cit.

(120) Slotkin, op. cit., Ch. III and VI.

(121) Richard D. Lambert, op. cit., 104.

(122) Ibid, p. 223.

(123) Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 129.

(124) David F. Pocock, "Sociologies: Urban and Rural", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. IV (April 1960), p. 66.

(125) KINGSLEY DAVIS, Supra, p. 127.

(126) DONALD J. BOGUE & K.C. ZACHARIAH, "Urbanization and Migration in India", ed. Roy Turner, op. cit., pp. 30–31.

(127) Ibid.

(128) *See*, LLOYD I. RUDOLPH, "The Modernity of Tradition: The Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 4 (December 1965); also *see* GUSFIELD, op. cit.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION

(The Micro-Structural Changes)

(1a) M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. p. 3.

(1b) MCKIM MARRIOTT, *Caste Ranking and Community Structure in Five Regions of India and Pakistan* (Poona: Deccan College, 1960), pp. 53–55.

(2) For a discussion on this point *see*, EDMUND E. LEACH, ed. *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and N.W. Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge Papers in Social Anthoropology, 1960); LOUIS DUMONT, "Caste, Racism and "Stratification", Reflections of a Social Anthropologist", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. V (October 1961) pp. 20–43; RUDOLPH, op. cit.

(3) K.M. PANIKKAR, *Hindu Society at Cross Roads* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955), p. 12.

(4) SRINIVAS, *Caste in Modern India*, op. cit.

(5) DAVID F. POCOCK, "The Movement of Caste", *Man* (May 1955), pp. 71–72, quoted in Srinivas, *Social Change...*, op. cit. pp. 7–8.

(6) YOGENDRA SINGH, in ed. K. Ishwaran, op. cit.

(7) T.O. BEIDELMAN, *A Comparative Analysis of the Jajmani System* (New York: Monograph of the Association for Asian Study, 1959), p. 18–19.

(8) D.N. MAJUMDAR, *Caste and Communication in an Indian Village* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1958).

(9) JOHN HITCHCOCK, *The Rajputs of Khalapur* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963).

(10) GITEL P. STEED, "Notes on an Approach to a Study of Personality Formation in a Hindu Village in Gujarat", ed. McKim Marriott, *Village India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

(11) ADRIAN C. MAYER, *Caste and Kinship in Central India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960).

(12) GERALD D. BERREMAN, *Hindus of the Himalayas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); also *see*, BERREMAN, "Caste and Economy in the Himalayas", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. X (July 1962), pp. 386–394.

(13) F.G. BAILEY, *Caste and the Economic Frontier* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957).

(14) EDWARD B. HARPER, "The Systems of Economic Exchange in Village India", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. LXI (1959), pp. 760–778.

(15) KATHLEEN GOUGH, "The Social Structure of a Mysore Village", ed. McKim Marriott, op. cit.

(16) SRINIVAS, "The Social System in a Mysore Village", ed. McKim Marriott, op. cit.

(17) SCARLET T. EPESTEIN, *Economic Development and Social Change in South India*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962).

(18) Ibid.

(19) B.S. COHN, "Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law in India", op. cit., p. 84.

(20) Ibid, p. 87.

(21) YOGENDRA SINGH, op. cit.

(22) B.S. COHN, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste", ed. McKim Marriott, op. cit., p. 73.

(23) B.S. COHN, "Anthoropological Notes...", op. cit., p. 92.

(24) WILLIAM L. ROWE, Supra, p. 41.

(25) MCKIM MARRIOTT, "Social Structure and Change in a U.P. Village", ed. M.N. Srinivas, *India's Villages* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955) p. 114.

(26) *See*, LLOYD I. RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, "The Political Role of India's Caste Association", ed. Claude E. Welch, op. cit.; L. RUDOLPH, "The Modernity of Tradition..., op. cit.; SELIG HARRISON, op. cit.; MAUREEN L.P. PATTERSON, "Caste and Politics in Maharashtra", *Economic Weekly*, Vol. VI, No. 39 (Sept. 25, 1954), pp. 1066–1067, and M.N. SRINIVAS, Supra.

(27) SRINIVAS, "Caste in Modern India", ed., MYRON WEINER, *The Civilization of India*, Vol. II (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 194.

(28) M.PATTERSON, op. cit.

(29) M.N. SRINIVAS, "Caste in Modern India", op. cit., pp. 201–204; also *see*, SELIG S. HARRISON, "Caste and the Andhra Communists", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. L (June 1956), 378–404.

(30) SRINIVAS, ibid, p. 199.

(31) RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, op. cit., p. 127.

(32) Ibid, p. 129.

(33) RUDOLPH, op. cit., p. 982–983.

(34) M.N. SRINIVAS, ibid.

(35) On factions in villages in India *see* OSCAR LEWIS, op. cit.; R.W. NICHOLAS, "Village Factions and Political Parties in Rural West Bengal", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. II, No. I, (November 1963); P.N. RASTOGI, "Anatomy of Factional Conflict", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. I (March 1967), pp. 17–32; RALPH W. NICHOLS, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis; in *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power*, A.S.A. Monograph 2 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965) pp. 21–61; RAYMOND FIRTH, "Introduction to Factions in Indian and Overseas Indian Societies", *British Journal of Sociology* 8:291–295, (1957); In this connection the writings of Srinivas and Dube on dominant caste have central relevance.

(36) RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, op. cit., p. 132–133.

(37) GEORGE ROSEN, op. cit., p. 28.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Ibid.

(40) EDGAR THURSTON, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* (7 Volumes, Madras, Government Press, 1909), Vol. VI, p. 365.

(41) Ibid.

(42) RUDOLPH, op. cit., p. 980.

(43) Ibid, p. 981.

(44) RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, op. cit., p. 138.

(45) GEORGE, ROSEN, op. cit., p. 28.

(46) *See*, LEACH, Supra.

(47) YOGENDRA SINGH, Supra.

(48) KANAN, *Inter-Caste Marriages in India* (Bombay: Popular Book, 1964).

(49) BAILEY, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, op. cit., pp. 208–209.

(50) For a comparative analysis of *Jajmani*, *see*, P.M. KOLENDA, "Toward a Model of the Hindu *Jajmani* System", *Human Organization*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1963) pp. 11–32.

(51) Andre Beteille, *Caste, Class and Power* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 202–207.

(52) George Rosen, op. cit., p. 29.

(53) Ibid, p. 36.

(54) George P. Murdock, op. cit.

(55) Irawati Karve writes:

"A joint family . . . is always an exciting group to live in. All the time something of interest is happening there. Now it is the marriage of a girl or a boy, now it is an initiation ceremony, the birth of a new baby, the puberty rites of a new bride, some particular family ritual, a fast, a feast, sometimes a death. The great extent of the family always ensures the coming and going of guests. The brothers of the brides come to invite them to their mothers' houses, the daughters of the house are being brought for a family feast or wedding. There is always bustle and expectation, laughter and quarrels, discussions and plans". *See*, I. Karve, *Kinship Organization in India* (Poona: Deccan College Monograph, 1953), p. 14.

To a child being brought up in such a family environment bonds of attachments are manifold and the emotional universe in which he can move is vast indeed. In contrast, a nuclear family does not offer equivalent emotional space which is much more constricted and alienative. This has an impact on the development of personality.

(56) Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945), pp. 11–19.

(57) I.P. Desai, *Some Aspects of Family in Mahuva* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 40.

(58) Ibid, p. 34.

(59) Ibid, p. 41, Table I.

(60) Ibid, p. 34.

(61) Ibid, p. 35.

(62) Ibid, p. 71, Table II.

(63) Ibid, p. 31–32.

(64) Ibid, p. 146.

(65) K.M. Kapadia, "Rural Family Pattern: A Study in Urban-Rural Relationship", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1956), p. 119.

(66) *Monthly Public Opinion Survey*, Indian Institute of Public Opinion, I (October 1955). 8. 23.

(67) M.S. Gore, "The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on the Agarwal Family in the Delhi Area" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1961), p. 207. Quoted in William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), p. 247.

(68) Goode, op. cit., p. 242.

(69) *Census of India*, Vol. I, Part I Report (1911), p. 46.

(70) Goode, op. cit., p. 243.

(71) I.P. Desai, Supra, pp. 44–47.

(72) *See*, Harold A. Gould, "Time Dimension and Structural Change in an Indian Kinship System: A Problem of Conceptual Refinement" (Unpublished paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies, New York, April 5, 1966); T.N. Madan, *Family and Kinship: A Study of the Pandits of Rural Kashmir* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965); B.S. Cohn, "Chamar Family in a North Indian Village: A Structural Contingent", *Economic Weekly*, 13: (1961) 1051–1055; Ralph W. Nicholas, "Economics of Family Types in Two Wes Bengal Villages", *Economic Weekly*, 13: (1961), 1057–1060; A.B. Bose & P.C. Saxena, "Composition and Size of Rural Joint Households", *Indian Journal of Social Research*, 30–40 (1965) Savitri Sahani, "The Joint Family: A Case Study", *Economic Weekly*, 13: (1961), 1823–1828

(73) S.C. Dube, "Men's and Women's Role in India: A Sociological Review", ed. Barbara E. Ward, *Women in New Asia* (Unesco: 1963), p. 177.

(74) Goode, op. cit., pp. 238–239.

(75) Pauline M. Kolenda, "Regional Differences in Indian Family Structure", ed. Robert I. Crane, *Regions and Regionalism in South Asian Studies: An Exploratory Study* (Duke University, Program in Comparative Study in Southern Asia, Symposium Papers, 1967), pp. 149–150.

(76) Tara Krishna Basu, *The Bengal Peasant from Time to Time* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962).

(77) Jyotirmoyee Sarma, "The Nuclearization of Joint Family Households in West Bengal", *Man in India*, 44: (1964), pp. 193–194.

(78) Rudra Datta Singh, "Family Organization in a North Indian Village: A Study in Culture Change" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1962), quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 151.

(79) Hitchcock, op. cit., quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 151.

(80) H.A. Gould, "Family and Kinship in a North Indian Village" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, 1959), cited in Kolenda, ibid.

(81) Geral D. Berreman, op. cit, quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 151.

(82) B.S. Cohn, "Chamar Family in a North Indian Village: A Structural Contingent", *Economic Weekly*, 13: (1961), 1051–1055, in Kolenda, ibid, p. 151.

(83) P.M. Kolenda, Unpublished field census of Chuhras of Village Khalapur, U.P. quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra p. 151.

(84) Oscar Lewis, op. cit., quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra 151.

(85) Kolenda, op. cit., ed. Crane, Supra p. 151.

(86) A.B. Bose, S.P. Malhotra & Lala Paul Bharara, "Socio-Economic Differences in Dispersed Dwelling and Compact Settlement Types in Arid Regions", *Man in India*, 43: (1963), 119–130; quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, op. cit., Supra p. 151.

(87) S.P. Malhotra & Mohan Lal A. Sen, "A Comparative Study of the Socio-Economic Characteristics of Nuclear and Joint Households II", Journal of Family Welfare, Vol. II, No. 2 (1964), pp. 21–32.

(88) Bose & Saksena, op. cit.

(89) T.N. Madan, op. cit., (Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra p. 152).

(90) A.C. Mayer, op. cit., (Kolenda, ibid).

(91) Savitri Sahani, op. cit., in Kolenda, ibid.

(92) William A. Morrison, "Family Types in Badlapur: An Analysis of a Changing Institution in a Maharashtrian Village", *Sociological Bulletin*, 8 (1959), 45–67.

(93) Edwin D. Driver, "Family Structure and Socio-Economic Status in Central India", *Sociological Bulletin*, 11: (1962), 112–120, quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra (figures adjusted).

(94) S.C. Dube, *Indian Village* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955), in Kolenda, ibid.

(95) Ajit Ray, "A Brahmin Village of the Sansna Type in the district of Puri, Orissa", *Man in India*, 36:(1956), 7–16.

(96) Kathleen E. Gough, "Caste in a Tanjore Village", ed. Leach, op. cit., quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra p. 152.

(97) Dumont, quoted in Kolenda, ed. Crane, Supra p. 152.

(98) M.G. Kulkarni, "Family Patterns in Gokak Taluka", *Sociological Bulletin*, 9: (1960) pp. 60–81 in Kolenda, ibid, p. 153.

(99) Gertrude Marvin Woodruff, "An Adidravida Settlement in Bangalore, India", (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959), quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 153.

(100) Joan P. Mencher, "Changing Familial Roles Among South Malabar Nayars", *South Western Journal of Anthropology*, 18: (1962) 230–245, quoted in Kolenda, ibid.

(101) Kolenda, ibid, p. 157.

(102) Ibid, pp. 166–67.

(103) Berreman, op. cit., quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 174.

(104) Dumont, op. cit., in Kolenda, ibid, p. 174.

(105) MAYERS, op. cit., quoted in Kolenda, ibid, p. 175.

(106) KOLENDA, ibid, p. 203.

(107) MURDOCK, op. cit. (*see*, specially the suggested sequence for structural changes in kinship).

(108) AILEEN D. ROSS, *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).

(109) Ibid, p. 134.

(110) Ibid, p. 135.

(111) KATHLEEN GOUGH, "Mappilla: North Kerala", ed. David M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough, *Matrilineal Kinship* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961) pp. 437–439.

(112) The studies of all these authors tend to emphasize the self-sufficiency of village communities in India. For a review of their works *see* YOGENDRA SINGH, "The Changing Pattern of Socio-Economic Relations in the Countryside", (Lucknow University, 1958).

(113) C.T. METCALFE, quoted in B.B. Mishra, op. cit., p. 56.

(114) LOUIS DUMONT, "Village Studies", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. 1, (April 1957) pp. 25–26.

(115) LOUIS DUMONT & D. POCOCK, "For a Sociology of India", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. 1, op. cit., p. 12.

(116) HENRY ORENSTEIN, *Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian Village* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 232.

(117) Ibid, Ch. 9, pp. 161–164.

(118) Ibid, pp. 229–230.

(119) The term "*Jajmani*" is common in the north. In Orenstein's village, *Gaon*, it is known as "baluta"; in Shivpur studied by K. Ishwaran in Mysore it is known as Aya system. But all these names connote similar types of relationships with regional variations. A special case of variation from the above is the "Maland System" reported by Harper. *See*, DAVID F. POCOCK "Notes on *Jajmani* Relationships", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. VI (December 1962), pp. 78–95, for a discussion on Harper's hypothesis.

(120) K. ISHWARAN, *Tradition and Economy in Village India* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966), p. 41.

(121) *See*, KOLENDA, "Toward a Model of the Hindu *Jajmani* System", *Human Organization*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 11–32.

(122) *See*, RAJ KRISHNA, "Agrarian Reform in India: "The Debate on Ceilings", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. VII, No. 3, Part I (April 1959), pp. 302–17.

(123) EVELYN WOOD, "Patterns of Influence Within Rural India", ed. Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 390.

(124) HENRY ORENSTEIN, "Leadership and Caste in a Bombay Village", ed. Park and Tinker, ibid, p. 426.

(125) ALAN BEALS, "Leadership in a Mysore Village", ed. Park and Tinker, op. cit., p. 435–437.

(125a) WILLIAM MCCORMACK, "Factionalism in a Mysore Village", ed. Park and Tinker, op. cit., p. 444.

(125b) R. BACHENHEIMER, "Elements of Leadership in an Andhra Village", ed. Park and Tinker, op. cit., pp. 451–452.

(126) EDWARD B. & LOUIS G. HARPER, "Political Organization and Leadership in a Karnataka Village", ed. Park and Tinker, op. cit., pp. 468–469.

(127) OSCAR LEWIS, op. cit., p. 150.

(128) *The Working of Panchayat Raj in Rajasthan* (Jaipur: Evaluation Organization, Government of Rajasthan, 1962), Appendix II.

(129) *A Study of Panchayats* (Programme Evaluation Commission, Planning Commission, Ch. IV of the fifth Evaluation Report, May 1958).

(130) B.S. COHN, "Anthropological Notes . . .", op. cit., p. 87.

(131) YOGENDRA SINGH, Chanukhera: Cultural Change in Eastern Uttar Pradesh op. cit.
(132) BAILEY, op. cit., pp. 267–271.
(133) BETEILLE, op. cit., p. 199.
(134) B.S. COHN, ibid, p. 87.
(135) SCARLET EPESTEIN, op. cit.
(136) YOGENDRA SINGH, Supra.
(137) S.C. DUBE, *India's Changing Villages*, op. cit.
(138) OSCAR LEWIS, op. cit.

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION OF INDIAN TRADITION: ANALYSIS

(1) Cf. EMILE DURKHEIM, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* tr. Josph Ward Swain, (New York: Collier Books, 1961), Ch. I, pp. 37–63 (for a distinction between the sacred and profane).

(2) Cf. LOUIS DUMONT, "The Modern Conception of the Individual", *Contributions To Indian Sociology*, No. VIII, op. cit., pp. 13–61; also *see*, R. Bendix, op. cit. for parallels between the social systems of Eastern and Western societies.

(3) *See*, Chapter III of this volume, also GAUS ANSARI, *Muslim Castes in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit.; BARTH F., "The System of Social Stratification in Swat, North Pakistan", *Some Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan*, op. cit.

(4) L. DUMONT, "Nationalism And Communalism", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, op. cit., pp. 59–60. *See* also Ch. III of this volume.

(5) Cf. Y.B. DAMLE, "Reference Group Theory With Regard to Mobility in Caste", *Social Mobility In the Caste System in India*, Comparative Studies in Society and History Supplement III, ed. James Silverberg (The Hague: Mouton. Publishers, 1968), pp. 95–102; OWEN M. LYNCH, "The politics of Untouchability: A Case from Agra, India", *Structure and Change in Indian Society*, ed. Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 209–213.

(6) Cf. M.N. SRINIVAS, *Social Change in Modern India*, op. cit. also *see* his "Mobility in the Caste System", in *Structure and Change in Indian Society*, ed. Singer and Cohn, op. cit. pp. 189–207; BURTON STEIN, "Social Mobility And Medieval South Indian Hindu Sects", *Social Mobility in The Caste in India*, ed. Silverberg, op. cit., pp. 78–94.

(7) BURTON STEIN, Supra; WILLIAM L. ROWE, The New Cauhans; A Caste Mobility Movement in Northern India', *Social Mobility in the Caste System in India*, op. cit., pp. 66–77.

(8) For the concept of negative reference group *see*, R.K. MERTON, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 300–1.

(9) *See*, RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, op. cit.; YOGENDRA SINGH, "Caste and Class: Some Aspects of Continuity and Change", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. XVII, No. 2. Sept. 1968, pp. 165–186.

(10) OWEN M. LYNCH, Supra, p. 236.

(10a) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Y.B. DAMLE, op. cit. p. 98.

(13) *See*, S.N. EISENSTADT, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 5, Oct. 1965. Also *see*, YOGENDRA

SINGH, "Historicity of Modernization", paper presented at the Seminar on Modernization in India organised by the Department of Sociology, Benaras Hindu University and the United States Educational Foundation in India, at the Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi, Feb. 3–6, 1969.

(14) Cf. S.N. EISENSTADT, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization", *op. cit.* also "The Development of Socio-Political Centers at the Second Stage of Modernization—A Comparative Analysis of Two Types", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. III, Nos. 1–2, March 1966. *see* M.J. LEVY & YOGENDRA SINGH, Supra.

(14a) *see*, KINGSLEY DAVIS, "The Population of India and Pakistan", op. cit., p. 25.

(15) FRED W. RIGGS, *Administration in Developing Countries*, op. cit., pp. 19–30.

(16) GHAUS ANSARI, op. cit., p. 38.

(17) Cf. Ch. III of this volume.

(18) Cf. F.G. BAILEY, *Politics and Social Change—Orissa in* 1959 (Oxford University Press, 1963), op. cit., YOGENDRA SINGH, "Caste and Class...", op. cit.

(19) In fact, the dichotomy of 'tradition' and 'modernity' which has been used by many social scientists should in case of India be understood in the special context of British colonialism. The viewpoint of colonial administrators about the state of society in India helped in popularity of the notion of an overly static tradition and society in India. The Orientalists who were more sympathetic to the India's past, also helped this viewpoint in gaining strength; this they did by paying too much attention to Indian classical literature, and its textual image rather than the historical social reality which had always had its own internal dynamics. In this connection *see*, BERNARD S. COHN, "Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture", *Structure and Change in Indian Sociology*, ed. Singer and Cohn, op. cit., pp. 3–28; also Cohn's intervention in the "Colloquium", *Social Mobility in the Caste System in India*, op. cit., p. 116; BERNARD BARBER, "Social Mobility In Hindu India", *Social Mobility in the Caste System in India*, Supra, pp. 18–35.

(20) Bernard Cohn, "Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture", op. cit. p. 3–28.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid. Also, Bernard Barber, Supra. p. 27.

(22a) Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 12–16. Professor Myrdal refers to the way in which studies of Western scholars on developing countries are influenced by reasons of diplomacy, national and block power interests, and other cultural, social and economic biases of various kinds.

(23) Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No. 3, September 1961.

(24) Cf. Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, ed. *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries* (Honolulu East West Center Press, 1967). In this volume see specially the papers by Wilbur Schramm, Lucian W. Pye, Daniel Lerner and S.C. Dube. Also see, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, op. cit.; Lucian W. Pye, ed. *Communication and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

(25) In this connection see, David E. Apter, *Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Clifford Gertz, ed. *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Almond G.A. and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1965), etc.

(26) Cf. Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe Illinois: The Free Press, 1958); David C. McCleland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961); Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962); R.N. Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*. op. cit., etc.

(27) Cf. M.J. Levy J., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1966) Vols. I and II; also see the approaches of the economists who identify modernization with capacity for capital mobilization and investment in industries; for example, W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge (Eng.): Cambridge University Press, 1960); Other theories of similar hue are reviewed by E. Hagen, op. cit.

(28) The importance of 'initial conditions' of social structure, culture and resources has been emphasized by several social scientists; this determines the prospect and pattern of modernization. *see*, M.J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan", *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, eds. Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore and Joseph J. Spengler (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1955), pp. 496–97; S.N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political and Cultural Orders in Modernization", op. cit.; G. Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, op. cit., Ch. 14.

(29) Eisenstadt, Supra.

(30) Structural-functional approach is one of the commonest ones in the studies on modernization. Works of Parsons, Eisenstadt, Apter, Shils, Marion J. Levy, Jr. etc. as cited above are its good illustrations.

(31) Cf. W.F. Wertheim, *East-West Parallels* (The Hague: W. Van Hague Ltd., 1968); also Irving L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

(32) Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 1964, pp. 339–357.

(33) Cf. Bendix, Gusfield, Yogendra Singh, op. cit.

(34) Cf. I.L. Horowitz & Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit.

(35) *See*, A.A. Zovorikine, "Some Problems of the Theory of Culture", *Socialist Digest*, No. 2, June, 1968, pp. 68, 96.

(36) Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society", op. cit., p. 339.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Ibid, pp. 339–40.

(39) Ibid, pp. 341–356.

(40) Gary L. Buck & Alvin L. Jacobson, "Social Evolution and Structural-functional Analysis: An Empirical Test", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3, June, 1968, pp. 343–355.

(41) Buck & Jacobson have used the following indices for measurement of communication, kinship, technology, and social stratification: *Communication: (a)* linguistic homogeneity; *(b)* daily newspapers per 100 persons; *(c)* radio receivers per 100 persons; *(d)* T.V. receivers per 100 persons; (e) number of passengers and commercial vehicles per 100 persons. *Kinship: (a)* interest articulation by non-associational groups; *(b)* proportion of unpaid family workers to the total working force. *Technology:* (*a*) per capita production of electricity in kw hours *(b)* percentage of gross domestic product originating in agriculture; *(c)* percentage of labour force in industry; (*d*) percentage of labour force in agriculture. *Stratification:* (*a*) percent literate of the population aged 15 and over; (*b*) students enrolled in higher education per 1000 population; (*c*) percent of the population living in cities of 100,000 or greater; (*d*) adjusted school ratios for enrolment in first and second level schools; and (*e*) labour force diversification. *See* Buck and Jacobson, op. cit.

(42) Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, op. cit., p. 65.

(43) Cf. Buck & Jacobson, op.cit.

(44) Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan" op. cit., pp. 496–536.

(45) Ibid, pp. 499–524.

(46) Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization", op. cit., p. 660.

(47) Ibid, p. 661.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Herbert Normon, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

(50) EISENSTADT, Supra, p. 666.

(51) WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, "The State and Economic Enterprise in Modern Japan", *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, op. cit., p. 545.

(52) EISENSTADT, Supra, p. 667.

(53) LOUIS DUMONT, "The Conception of Kingship in Ancient India", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, eds. Dumont and David Pocock (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1962), No. VI., p. 75.

(54) JAMES SILVERBERG, op. cit., p. 116.

(55) Cf. articles *by* ANDRE BETEILLE & T.B. BOTTOMORE in *India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity*, ed. Philip Mason (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

(56) GUNNAR MYRDAL, *Asian Drama*, op. cit., Vol.I, pp. 563–575.

(57) MYRON WEINER, *The Politics of Scarcity*, op. cit.

(58) GUNNAR MYRDAL, Supra, p. 278.

(59) S.N. EISENSTADT, "The Development of Socio-Political Centers at the Second Stage of Modernization—A Comparative Analysis of Two Types", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. VII, No. 1–2, March 1966, pp. 125.

(60) GUNNAR MYRDAL writes: "Thus the combination of radicalism in principle and conservatism in practice, the signs of which were already apparent in the Congress before independence, was quickly woven into the fabric of Indian politics. Social legislation pointed the direction in which society should travel, but left the pace indeterminate. Many of these laws were intentionally permissive. In banning dowries, child marriages, and untouchability, the government did not vigorously seek to enforce its legislation. Laws that were compulsory were either not enforced at all or were not enforced according to their spirit and intention" *Asian Drama*, op. cit., p. 276.

(61) Cf. N.V. SOVANI, *Urbanization and Urban India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966. Ch., I, pp. 1–13.

(62) Cf. MYRDAL & HOROWITZ, op. cit.

(63) MYRDAL, Supra, p. 119.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid, p. 258.

(66) Ibid, p. 278.

(67) Ibid, p. 293.

(68) Ibid, p. 295.

(69) MYRDAL, *Asian Drama*, Vol. III, op. cit., pp. 1847–1855.

(70) Ibid, pp. 1855–60.

(71) Ibid, pp. 1866–67 and pp. 1879–81.

(72) MYRDAL, Supra, pp. 34, 35.

(73) Ibid, 115.

(74) Cf. D. APTER, op. cit.

(75) G. MYRDAL, Supra, pp. 1901–2.

(76) *See*, the works of Bendix, Gusfield, Myrdal, etc. cited above.

(77) Cf. MYRDAL, op. cit.

(78) Cf. R.N. BELLAH, "Religious Evolution", *American Sociological* Review, Vol. 29, No.3, June 1964, pp. 358–374.

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