MIYUME TANJI *AND* DANIEL BROUDY



OKINAWA UNDER OCCUPATION

MCDONALDIZATION AND RESISTANCE TO NEOLIBERAL PROPAGANDA

Okinawa Under Occupation

Miyume Tanji • Daniel Broudy

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McDonaldization and Resistance to Neoliberal Propaganda

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To people everywhere struggling for truth and dignity

Preface

For a book about cultural conditioning and militarism in Okinawa produced by two people with significantly different life experiences, we reckoned that questions about our own positions, relative to our subjects of study, would likely arise. To address this self-perception, we begin with a reference to David Takacs' query as a departure point for talk of how two people on divergent paths arrived at the same point on a journey toward richer self-awareness and appreciation of how larger social and political forces have come to shape Okinawa and ourselves. In his article, "How Does Positionality Bias Your Epistemology," Takacs asks, "How does who you are shape what you know?"[1]

The seeds of this book were first positioned in 2014, in the fertile ground of free dialogues between a foreign teacher and a local graduate student on topics for a study in Japanese English education as a vehicle for globalization and related neocolonial activities. The major impetus for this book is that student, who wishes to remain unnamed. In those dialogues, there surfaced her recollections of a remarkable encounter she'd had during her undergraduate studies and travel in 2011 to Nanaimo, British Columbia. There in Canada, thousands of miles from home, she awoke from a haze surrounding the pervasiveness and influence of the US military presence in Okinawa during her chance encounter with an elderly woman in the local town. The grandmotherly figure appeared to be well informed about the post-World War II world in which we live. She asked the university student where she was from, and she replied, "Japan." Curious to know which part, the older woman wanted to know where precisely. "Okinawa," was the response. The woman's reply unfolded a

fortunate moment of insight and revelation for the student: "Oh, so you're from America." Although she had mistakenly believed that all Okinawans also spoke English, the student recalled, the older woman was right about the extent of our own relative blindness as Okinawans to the structural discrimination we were (and still are) born into, much like our blindness to the historical deletions of Ryukyu.

Those productive dialogues revealed something profound about the position that local people in Okinawa have vis-à-vis the US military bases which visitors are almost completely blind to. As the winds, rain, and tides that buffet the island with predictable and steady routine, the bases, she observed, also pretend to be a part of this natural flow of life and scenery which become normalized as local people are born into, grow up in, and choose to live among these foreign structures of martial dominance. It is not until they begin to reflect on this odd manufactured normality that they experience an awakening, and ultimately, if they dare to question it publicly, a vigorous resistance from others who are content to accept this kind of norm. This is how what the student had discovered in Nanaimo also came to shape who she is now, a person who wants to continue quietly pressing forward with questions about these present conditions in Okinawa and what might be done to alter the path that the people are moving along toward what seems, to her, to be inexorable future conflicts.

Born and reared in Sapporo, Japan, I (author 1) set out at 18, never to return but for a brief visit 27 years later. The tenuous ties I sense to my birthplace are linked to the history and practice of modern nation-state building of Japan and to the erasure of indigenous ownership to the livelihood and history of the Ainu. From multiple places within Japan, my (great-) grandparents had 'migrated' to Hokkaido before and after World War II for various reasons and in different periods not clearly remembered. The absence of a strong ancestral lineage to the land where I was born, combined, in my case, with the casual uprooting and moving to distant places many times, is typical of settlement mentality. After finding a place in Australia, though still in search of a firm foothold, I have come to appreciate the difficulty and irony of my own orientation toward Okinawa and of writing anything about the community and history; to try to write something that does not further contribute to the violence and colonization that Okinawa has long seen, but helps us become more aware of these realities.

Born and raised in the United States, one of us also came to comprehend the imposition of America's empire of bases on local communities after living and working within this system for 20 years, and afterward,

moved by scholarly curiosity, making of the system a study in public relations activities and their associated rhetorical contortions. Stirred by an interest in understanding local anger over Washington and Tokyo's plans to expand the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Camp Schwab into Oura Bay with a new base, I (author 2) was forced to revisit memories of my own questions and anxieties, buried years ago, over seeing the senseless destruction of human life and community during the invasion of Panama. In the early 1990s, palm trees had become a dreadful sight to me as a soldier because, without being entirely aware of it then, I had merged memories of these forms of flora with the smell and sight of nearby corpses going into graves dug during the 1989 invasion.[2]

Studies of contemporary propaganda and its social effects in Okinawa return me to the past where palm trees and surveillance cameras abound and military helicopters fly overhead to survey vocal crowds of resistant protestors. Images of the past comingle with the present chaotic mix of sights, sounds, and smells of resistance, anger, and anguish. Our eyes dazzled, perhaps, by sophisticated propaganda supporting the status quo, what we don't seem to discern so clearly as citizens is an honest representation of what war and war preparations do to the public mind and to the minds of those who witness its hideous terrors. Some readers may, therefore, wonder how an outsider holding a position of some influence in a Japanese institution of higher learning can justifiably be engaged in research that critiques local systems of dominance and persuasion.

The institutions where we read and write contend that truth is freedom, a universal human aspiration to and condition for genuine peace, which goads us to reflect on our experiences both within and in close proximity to the military, our studies of language and history, and observations of how sign, symbol, and image are used by higher centers of power to fortify systems of social and economic inequity. This book marks an effort to raise wider awareness of these conditions and disclose their scarcely perceptible truths lying about and yet just out of sight.

Canberra, Australia — Miyume Tanji
Nishihara, Okinawa, Japan — Daniel Broudy

Notes

1. David Takacs, "How Does Your Positionality Bias Your Epistemology?" *Thought & Action* 27 (2003).
2. "Panamanians Dispute Casualty Figures from Invasion One Year Later, Survivors are Bitter," *The Baltimore Sun* (December 23, 1990).

Notes on Names

Publications in Japanese (and other East Asian languages) feature names cast in the traditional order of family name and given name. For example, the name Yamashiro Hiroji appearing in Okinawan newspapers would appear throughout this book as Hiroji Yamashiro. Japanese writers who publish largely in English reverse the East Asian tradition of word order. Western writers publishing in Japanese either maintain or dispense with Western word order.

We maintain throughout this book a strict Western convention for the ordering of names: given name followed by family name for all sources cited. All names appearing in the endnotes follow the Western convention, despite whether or not the reference in the note itself is published originally in Japanese. Conversely, all names appearing in the Index are ordered by family name followed by the source's given name.

Acknowledgments

A complicated cross-cultural cross-disciplinary study, this book is the culmination of countless conversations and interactions over four years with students, professors, researchers, referees, theorists, journalists, cartoonists, activists, and enthusiastic supports of the status quo. For their offering insights, critical readings, comments, and suggestions on earlier drafts of chapters and sections in this book, we express our sincere thanks to Maki Sunagawa, C. Douglas Lummis, Anthony Jenkins, Makoto Arakaki, Hideki Yoshikawa, Mark Seldon, Kosuzu Abe, Masami Mel Kawamura, Peter Simpson, Satoshi Tōyama, David Flynn, Nariko Ōshiro, John Pilger, Gavan McCormack, Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Makishi Yoshikazu, David Ulvog, Casimir Krul, Christopher Valvona, Ruth Wodak, Joseph Coleman, Teun van Djik, John Whalen-Bridge, Tomoko Arakaki, Katarzyna Molek-Kozakowska, Gabriele Vogt, Christophe Thouny, Michael Bradley, Greg Groesch, and Charlotte V.T. Murakami.

We acknowledge the vital importance of keeping up a continued tension with received wisdom, especially when it breaks free from its moorings on solid shores of reason and drifts into the darkness of alternative facts.

Contents

1 Introduction 1
Relevance of the Okinawan Struggle to the Neoliberal World 5
Scope and Structure 6

Part I Method, Theory, and Context 11

2 Critical Discourse Analysis of Public Relations 13
CDA Difficulties in Okinawa 17

3 Why McDonaldization in Okinawa? Social Relations of Production in the Neoliberal Playground 31
Neoliberalism: Utopic Concepts 33
Coercion and Hegemony in Neoliberal Capitalism 37
Actually Existing Neoliberalism 40
Why McDonaldization in Okinawa? 42
The Friendly Face of McDonaldization in Okinawa 46

4 Processes of Conditioning: Propaganda in Education and Media Systems 53
Background: Precisely What Is Propaganda? 53
How Does It Work? 54
Why Is It Produced? 56

Regimenting Thought in Educational Practice in Okinawa Main Island 58
Regimenting Thought in Mediated Communications 69

5 Rationalizing Processes of Unnatural Selection 75
A Summary of Environmental Regulation 78
Where We Are Now 79
How We Got Here 80
Detour Strategies 83
(Mis)Interpretation 87
Techniques in Editing History 89
Techniques in Fabricating 'Official' Explanations 90

Part II Propaganda, Processes, and Analysis 97

6 McDonaldizing as a Force for Militarizing Okinawan Society 99
Making Efficiency Normal 102
Reinventions of Traditional Okinawan Culture 103
The Efficiencies of Burden Relief from Futenma 111
The Efficiencies of Controlling Meanings of 'Development' 114

7 Predictability as a Means of Manufacturing Consent 117
Manufactured Forms of Authority in New Media 120
Fear as a Manufactured and Renewable Product 123
Unpredictability in Protestors and Imprecision in Descriptions 127

8 Communication and Control Over 'Unstable' Actors 131
Fortifying State Narratives Across Cultures 134
The 'Haters': Kamaduu gwa tachi no tsudoi 140
The Organization of Free Association 145
Weaponized Packing Tape 147
Impossible Questions 151

9 Calculability as a Quantifier of Future Profits Added to the Present 157
Free Trade and the Cost of Future Healthcare 160
Heavy Industry and Construction Narratives 162
Politicizing Catchphrases and Colors 165
Politicizing Cooperation and Its Profit Potential 167
An Efficient Future of Incalculable Profits 169

Part III Historical and Contemporary Forms of Resistance 175

10 Political Economy and Identity of "All Okinawa" Resistance 177
Kenmin *(People of the Prefecture): Bifurcated Nationalism* 178
Jichi *(Self-Governance)* 182
The 'System' 186
Ōru Okinawa *(All Okinawa) and* Shimagurumi *(All/Entire Island): 'Okinawan Identity'* 192

11 Time as a Defense of the Environment: A Fight Against McDonaldized Forms of Progress 209
Time as Technological Development 210
The Language of Waiting in Time 212
Time as a Cause in Managing the Masses 215
Resisting Militarized Assaults on the Environment 216
Indigenous Concepts of Time 219

12 Conclusion 223

Appendix A 231

Appendix B 233

Index 235

List of Abbreviations

AFN	Armed Forces Network
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BS	Bullshit
CALA	Combat Aircraft Loading Area
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CPC	Compliance Promotion Committee
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCCJ	Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan
FRF	Futenma Replacement Facility
GRI	Government of the Ryukyu Islands
HCP	Heart Clean Project
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science, and Technology
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHK	Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NIH	National Institutes of Health
ODB	Okinawa Defense Bureau
OIST	Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology

PWRA	Public Waters Reclamation Act
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SBF	Sea-based Facility
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Committee
USCAR	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
USFJ	US Forces, Japan
USMC	United States Marine Corps
VAWW-NET	Violence Against Women in War Network

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1	Gramscian triangle showing "The Relations of Force," by Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*	39
Fig. 6.1	"My Number" propaganda	100
Fig. 6.2	1997 Sea-based facility (SBF) design	104
Fig. 6.3	1966 Master plan of navy facilities Okinawa	105
Fig. 6.4	Para-militarized van in Okinawa	109
Fig. 6.5	Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (top quarter)	110
Fig. 6.6	Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (second quarter)	112
Fig. 6.7	Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (third quarter)	113
Fig. 6.8	Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (bottom quarter)	114
Fig. 7.1	Kent Channel commentator	120
Fig. 7.2	Representations of purported influence on Okinawa in corporate media. | Greg Groesch | 2015 | *The Washington Times*	124
Fig. 8.1	Nationalist propaganda from privately owned vehicle	135
Fig. 8.2	Nationalist poster	136
Fig. 8.3	Relocation goals of *Kamaduu* on cardboard sign	145
Fig. 8.4	*Kamaduu* message to pedestrians	147
Fig. 8.5	Weaponized packing tape	148
Fig. 10.1	A triangle showing "The Relations of Force" by Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press) 97	178

List of Illustration

Illustration 9.1	Okinawa Medical Island Strategic Plan. Original Japanese translated by Maki Sunagawa. Graphic illustration interpreted and produced by Yena Broudy	163

List of Tables

Table 4.1	MEXT revision to education law	64
Table 5.1	Timeline of Henoko approval process	82
Table 5.2	Excerpt of SACO Final Report	84
Table 8.1	Neutrality survey	132

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book is for the masses that have grown weary of living in a capitalist world deprived of humanity, who feel futility and fear for the future and see their lives going nowhere, but who may be unable to act politically, as of yet, to change their conditions. We set out with an observation of contemporary society that has come to assume the appearance of a sad truth: we live in times so strange as to be inexplicable. The "vulgar,"[1] "racist,"[2] "sexist,"[3] "xenophobic"[4] billionaire celebrity of a mediocre reality show has ascended to the office of the American presidency while having promised in his campaign to protect the hardworking middle class from the crass billionaire elites of which he is an integral part. In attempts to explain to ourselves this bewildering age, we feel drawn to comedy for relief from the social madness and alternative realties manufactured by mass media, the education system, and the established powers. Yet, comedy as a play has now come to provide us with a more serious and solid footing in social reality where "alternative facts"[5] compete against empirical truths for space in the public mind. The following soliloquy from comedian George Carlin speaks of a salient truth about the present age, that propaganda is a necessary component in training and controlling the public to obey the dictates of its rulers:

> There's a reason education sucks, it's the same reason it will never, ever be fixed. …because the owners of this country don't want that. … [T]he real owners, the big wealthy business interests that control things and make all

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> the important decisions … own all the big media companies, so that they control just about all of the news and information you hear. …They don't want well-informed, well-educated people capable of critical thinking.[6]

Though he referenced mechanisms of control at work in contemporary American society, the point of Carlin's rant is ever more true in Okinawa Main Island, the site of our study in the southernmost region of Japan, which has been occupied as a US military outpost in the Pacific since 1945, a location where propaganda reveals much about the systems of global capitalism and militarism that produce it, and those who both support and challenge its messages. While we focus much analysis tightly on the local, many readers will likely see its universal implications.

To begin a book about contemporary Okinawa with reference to such a quote may seem unusual, but we are swimming with intention against stronger scholarly currents characteristic of Okinawa studies, which have focused on the exceptional history of war and its attendant miseries, on (post-)colonization, feminist critique, victimization, American base presence, and longevity and health, among many others. This book is a critique of the propaganda and systems of delivery needed to sustain the social and economic inequities created by late capitalism.

Injustices and resistance seen in contemporary Okinawa are not well understood and attract little attention from the outside, including especially the United States and Japan. Gavan McCormack wonders if this disinterest is because of the complexity of the long history of this situation, citing Richard Falk's summary of the Okinawans as a forgotten people, a colony in a post-colonial world.[7] Falk observes that

> the tragic fate that has befallen Okinawa and its people results from being … a forgotten remnant of the colonial past…. In this respect, it bears a kinship with such other forgotten peoples as those living in Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Tibet, Puerto Rico, Palau, and the Mariana Islands, among others.[8]

This is an accurate yet incomplete summary and one that doesn't provide the necessary impetus for wider public empathy and the possibility of enacting future change, something George Carlin cynically thought impossible.

Many people in Okinawa endure the same alienating and banal existence created by an emerging digital techno-culture as anyone else in advanced capitalist societies: the disorienting loss of awareness of who they

are to consumer algorithms and mediated communications and the ever-growing influence of vacuous shopping-mall culture replete with its fast fashion and fast food. It is a feeling of loss of self-control and a sense of control over the future to larger dehumanizing McDonaldizing forces.

At the front gate of Camp Schwab, an ongoing site of resistance, protesters challenging the status quo engage in various activities: performing sit-ins at the gate, hurling insults at the base or at soldiers and base workers, showing signs of disagreement, singing protest songs that symbolize indigenous Okinawan resistance, and dancing *kachaashii* (a traditional Okinawan dance of optimism and celebration). The struggle itself has produced illuminating reactions that cannot be reduced to and understood as a war between two distinct political oppositions. Significant numbers of people in Okinawa (and many in mainland Japan) have developed negative impressions of the protest movement, as well as the protesters themselves, as framed by mass media. People who have witnessed these demonstrations—either at the actual protest sites, through news stories in corporate media, or even in various forms of new media—tend to find the gathered crowds fearsome and uncharacteristically un-Japanese. Onlookers passing by the sites of protest or consuming secondhand images and textual representations in media develop a sense of discomfort and insecurity at the sight of so many angry citizens exercising their civil freedoms through direct democratic action.

People who look on and report their dissatisfaction with the protestors and their methods tend to hastily conclude that the central messages of the protest are simply wrong. That is, the methods the protestors employ seem confused for the messages they want so much to communicate to the larger public disengaged or uninterested in what is actually happening to the Island. Thus, many critics of the popular protest deduce that the Washington and Tokyo policy aimed at destroying parts of the marine environment in Oura Bay to make way for a new military base is actually the right policy. This seems to hold true not only about the unfolding construction, but also for already existing social and economic conditions caused by the bases.

This book asks how the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) arrangement has served to construct legitimacy and popular consent. Inasmuch as the persistent anti-base resistance in Okinawa has made significant impact and worldwide appeal, how has further military base construction that involves destruction of a heritage marine environment, coral ecosystem, and feeding area for Okinawa dugong managed to pass as reasonable and to become accepted? We wonder how the present order has

become normalized under the compelling global hegemonic ideology of neoliberal development. Identifying the ideological tools by which perpetual destruction and injustice are justified, normalized, and rationalized is essential for people who seek peace and to make a future for themselves.

In the case of current-day Okinawa, signifiers of rationalizing processes can be seen in the public discourse as members of the leading party and their supporters defend policies of development that breach environmental law and seek to curb free speech rights.[9] Significantly, to proceed with the plan to build the new Marine Corps base in Henoko, the state has resorted to violating its own environmental assessment processes required for such a public project. As regards the accident-prone MV-22 Osprey aircraft to be deployed at the new base, the Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB), the undertaker of the assessment for Tokyo, avoided mentioning their estimated environmental impacts (e.g. noise) up to the final stage, to which citizens could not express their views.[10] The ODB also conducted the environmental survey in intrusive ways that damaged the coral reef and chased away the Okinawa dugong, which led to the statement's conclusion that the construction will not adversely affect the health of the species that was non-existent in the construction site. The survey was conducted in a 'surprise attack' before citizens could express opinions regarding the methods of the assessment in its scoping stage as the process required.[11]

The policymakers were cognizant of the violation, which, presumably, has caused them to harbor a moral dilemma as referenced by the ODB chief's describing the delivery of the government's final environmental assessment statement to the Okinawa Prefecture as an act of "rape."[12] How have bureaucrats in the position of promoting the goal of the replacement facility's construction coped with the potential cognitive dissonance caused by their awareness of the environmental destruction that would ensue? This is where relentless rationalization becomes necessary.

This book explores the idea that cultural signs, symbols, and discourse practices in contemporary Okinawa reflect powerful political incentives to rationalize processes of organization influencing reproduction of the social order where conformity and obedience to authority and decisions about the defense structure go unquestioned. Taking a more global view than the narrower, regional studies' focus, we endeavor to connect the residents' protest in Okinawa to the human predicament of late capitalism we live in.

Relevance of the Okinawan Struggle to the Neoliberal World

In *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, one of us wrote about the so-called three waves of resistance since World War II (WWII), which have marked Okinawan history and have been known variously as the "Okinawa Struggle," the "All-Island Movement," or more recently, the "All Okinawa Coalition."[13] Popular protests against American military land seizures of the early to mid-1950s comprise the first wave. Desperate to remove themselves from the humiliating deprivation of basic civil rights and safety, as well as control over their own livelihood and well-being by the authoritarian occupation, Okinawans throughout the 1960s and early 1970s demanded reversion to Japanese administrative rule. The second wave culminated in a series of mass protests led by teachers, unionized base workers, and left-wing political parties, but most notably in the unorganized and spontaneous street riot in Koza in 1970. The third wave developed from the outrage felt across the island from the rape of a schoolgirl at the hands of three US service members. Since reversion in 1972, it has been argued that Japanese neglect of Okinawan entitlements to an equal share of national peace, safety, and dignity have been largely compromised by the claimed necessity of maintaining the Security Alliance with the United States. Such neglect has been visible in the state-imposed policies that maintain a high concentration of US military garrisons in Okinawa away from *Yamato*, an ancient name of what is known as the "Japanese people."[14] This prolonged condition of tenuous acquiescence has been maintained through a system of control that comes with special subsidies and conciliatory budgets; the resistance to the system is currently ongoing in a bipartisan "All Okinawa" front that we argue is the fourth-wave all-island "Okinawa Struggle."

Through direct protest and democratic political opposition, the people of Okinawa have stalled the construction of a new US Marine forces base in Northeastern Okinawa. Though construction has started in recent days, Okinawan people have, more than anything, dramatically overcome their internal predicament, which had been residing in them since at least the late nineteenth century. They are referring to the new Henoko base construction, imposed upon them, as "discrimination against Okinawans," a self-description of their situation never uttered until quite recently, for fear of alienating themselves from the colonizing forces to which they had been assimilating. This newfound strength is described by Albert Memmi

as the awakening of the colonized to a colonizing system. Okinawan people used to deny their indigenous identity and unique cultural heritage[15]—not any more.

In a brief glimpse of rare honesty, we can also see into the power holders' perspectives. From the position of a social scientist committed to securing the smooth management of "base politics," Kent Calder explains that US overseas bases "play a systemic role in the global political economy that is vital, although often overlooked"; throughout the WWII years, they have functioned as "implicit enforcers of transnationalism, and thus catalysts for rising transcontinental trade and investment in ways that abstract rules alone never could have been."[16] Specifically, as regards the development of neoliberal globalization, Calder's statement bears witness to the coercive part that the bases have played to materialize and, directly and implicitly, enforce the smooth operation of global capitalism in the way that neoliberal abstract principles alone could never have guaranteed. And in Okinawa, David Vine observes: "Although the United States has long had some bases in foreign lands, this massive global deployment of military force was unknown in U.S. history before WWII."[17]

Thus, we wonder, how much do the Okinawans' current struggle against the new US base share with the much larger global movement against what now is often called the neoliberal project? If US overseas bases protect the smooth global capitalism in its neoliberal stage, the protestors in Okinawa contend with the forces we *all* confront throughout the world. Their fight is not just theirs; we on both sides of the fences that divide us are tragic victims of a neoliberal citadel. Even the uniformed men and women behind the fences training for combat and constant conflict with their thoughts colonized also by the pernicious conviction that this is the only way to live. Maybe we are all tragic, not just the colonized in the post-colonial world. To what extent, therefore, is the people's resistance in Okinawa also a resistance to the global military-industrial complex, the presence of which is more immediate and in your face in Main Island than most other places in the world?

Scope and Structure

In critical discussions throughout this study, we focus on contemporary Okinawa as an emerging development of the 1996 SACO agreement to "consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas."[18] This agreement was, in part, a response to the fury expressed across the island after the

infamous 1995 rape which then represented, and has since been part of, a long list of other similar outrages resulting directly from the long military presence in the island, which has gone mostly unchanged since the end of WWII. The SACO group cleared the groundwork for the future force structure of the US military in Okinawa so as to reduce its "footprint."[19] These designs included the development of Henoko in the sparsely populated North as an agreeably suitable replacement location for Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in Ginowan City in the densely populated South.

The chapters that comprise Part I unfold our analytical strategy and rationale. We offer in Chapter 2 a discussion of our methods with examples gathered from close observations of social conditions illustrating why we choose particular approaches, which draw upon work in classical rhetoric, social semiotics, and cognitive linguistics. In Chapter 3, we offer a theoretical framework that draws upon critiques of the classical liberal school of economics, its recent embodiment expressed in neoliberal policies and practices, and an updated model of George Ritzer's McDonaldization thesis, which provides a methodological framework for understanding how propaganda and the manufacturing of consent are woven into Okinawa's unique social relations of production. Chapter 4 offers a critical discussion of public relations and their expressions in education and media that enable and reinforce these social conditions. The chapter is an explanation of what we mean by propaganda and how its practices in Okinawa serve those in power and maintain the current situation. In Chapter 5, we offer a brief history of the central problem under study in this book: the processes of site selection and how central power rationalizes uses of authority that circumvent laws and regulations.

Part II unfolds analysis of the signs, symbols, images, and discourse practices that signify aspects of McDonaldization specific to Okinawa. In Chapter 6, we offer a critique of efficiency (the first feature of Ritzer's model) as a social practice and examine the propaganda of integration that aims toward achieving compliance with central government planning. Chapter 7 offers an account of how predictability (the second feature) is understood locally as an effect of social discipline and order and how resistance movements threaten this order. The chapter is an explanation of efforts made through propaganda to eliminate the unpredictability of social movements. In Chapter 8, we discuss control (the third feature) as an aim for those with access to the tools of mass communication and as an outcome of this access. Whereas Ritzer spoke of mechanization as a source

of control, we extend the idea to mass communications as a source of social control. Chapter 9 offers a critique of calculability (the fourth feature) found in central government plans laid for the development of geographic spaces that will open upon return of land to local control. It assesses the corporate propaganda that represent the socially hazardous future developments as desirable.

Part III presents a history of the origins of the so-called Okinawa struggle and a philosophical reflection on its deeper meanings. In Chapter 10, we trace the roots of the ongoing bipartisan "All Okinawa" movement against the construction of a new US base in Okinawa, the meaning of the newfound assertion of Okinawan identity, the relevance to the recent change in political economy, and a growing wish and confidence for self-governance. Chapter 11 presents a critical reading of the ongoing protest as a movement that draws upon and deploys its only peaceful tool of resistance—time. It is a contemplation of how and why the strategic use of time in the popular protest represents an effort to assert cultural autonomy and identity.

Notes

1. Viv Groskop, "Vulgar Misogyny didn't harm Donald Trump—It helped him," *The Guardian* (April 5, 2017).
2. Anushka Asthana, "MPs pour scorn on 'racist and sexist' Donald Trump in state visit debate," *The Guardian* (February 21, 2017).
3. Emily Shugerman, "Donald Trump's sexist attack on MSNBC host criticized by leading Republicans and Democrats," *Independent* (June 29, 2017).
4. Greg Sargent, "Trump returns to his old standbys: Xenophobia, hate, lies, and, yes, mass deportation," *The Washington Post* (September 1, 2016).
5. A transcript of Kellyanne Conway's exchanges with Chuck Todd can be found at, http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-01-22-17-n710491.
6. George Carlin. "Life is worth losing," Beacon Theater, New York City (November 5, 2005).
7. Gavan McCormack, "Japan's Problematic Prefecture—Okinawa and the U.S. Japan Relationship," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Vol. 14, Issue 17, No. 2 (September 2016).
8. Ibid., 2.
9. Kunitoshi Sakurai, "Japan's Illegal Environmental Impact Assessment of the Henoko Base" *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 10, Issue 9, No. 5 (February 27, 2012).

10. Article 28 of the Japanese Environmental Impact Assessment Law nullifies the assessment statement altered mid-way, resulting in increased adverse impacts to the environment not reflected in the assessment's earlier stages. Ibid., op. cit., 4.
11. Ibid., 1.
12. "Okinawa defense official's injudicious remark regarding the submission of the Henoko environmental impact report," *Ryukyu Shimpo* (November 29, 2011).
13. Tanji, op. cit.
14. See Masataka Okamoto, *Minzoku no Soushutsu (Creating Ethnicities)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014).
15. For example, the government's deletion, in the 2007 history textbook censorship, of the element of coercion by the Japanese military needs to be understood in the context of the imperative for the Okinawans to assimilate to Japan, to overcome pre-war discrimination at the time. The pressure to assimilate made Okinawans' (especially the teachers') wartime embrace of emperor-centered patriotic education all the more intense, resulting in suicides in the event of capture by enemy forces. The assimilationist tendency also drove the teachers' corporeal punishment on students against speaking *Ryukyuan* at school. The survivors' testimonies of the collective suicides had been silenced by their guilt and shame for having cooperated in the killing, until 1982 when the Ministry of Education similarly instructed to delete the description of Okinawan residents killed by Japanese soldiers from history textbook. The survivors had to come out and tell their stories against the Japanese attempt to eliminate the compulsory element of the suicide, suggesting voluntary patriotism. See Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 2006), 38–39; and Steve Rabson, "The Politics of Trauma: Compulsory Suicides During the Battle of Okinawa and Postwar Retrospectives" *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific* Issue 24, June 2010, available at http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue24/rabson.htm (accessed May 28, 2017).
16. Kent Calder. *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 65.
17. David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Abroad Harm America and the World*. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015), 3.
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PART I

Method, Theory, and Context

CHAPTER 2

Critical Discourse Analysis of Public Relations

The chapters comprising Part I of this book explain the theoretical approaches we take throughout in describing and analyzing the kind of social control we see unfolding in contemporary Okinawa. Before clearing this theoretical groundwork, this chapter offers an explanation of our methods with discussion of examples and analysis illustrating the reasons behind our approaches.

In Japan, as elsewhere, many people appear to underestimate (or lack ample awareness of) the unassuming power of language (as a semiotic tool) to mold the public mind to a particular social perspective or political ideology. Teun van Dijk observes that scholars working within the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) movement are "interested in and motivated by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis. Theories, descriptions, methods and empirical work are … elaborated as a function of their relevance for the realization of such a sociopolitical goal. Since serious social problems are naturally complex, this usually also means a multidisciplinary approach, in which distinctions between theory, description, and application become less relevant."[1]

As a movement within the humanities and social sciences, CDA practitioners aim "to correct a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power."[2] Our work throughout this book draws upon classical rhetoric, semiotics, and cognitive linguistics to bring clarity to our critical analysis of the discourse. Examples throughout this chapter serve to illustrate how

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the power of language is directed toward the goal of gaining ideological control over the public mind.

Notwithstanding present tensions (April 28, 2017) stoked by inflammatory rhetoric emanating from the Trump White House regarding North Korea (officially, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK), "… we could end up having a major, major conflict"; it appears that any advance, in military defense or other area, in the DPRK is cause for such deep concern that news consumers in the advanced nations must always be wary of Kim Jong Un's motives. During North Korea's efforts to put a communications satellite into orbit on February 7, 2016, leaders in Tokyo framed Pyongyang's rocket launch as a "long-range ballistic missile disguised as a satellite launching vehicle."[3] Even after it was confirmed that a satellite was in orbit, officials continued deploying these emotive signs to engender, it seems, a certain level of fear in the public, while Japan's national media uncritically reported, and thereby assisted in reproducing, the image of possible impending nuclear annihilation.[4]

At the time, the unspoken, underlying aim appears to have been part of an effort to condition the public's consciousness to accept the deployment of missile defense systems in the neighboring islands of Ishigaki and Miyako, as well as to subdue the possibilities of public debate over their exorbitant costs.[5] Critics have suggested that this strategy is part of the propaganda of diversion, an effort to agitate apprehension so as to preemptively silence potential citizen criticism of the new missile emplacement. The tactic turned out to be a success, as the level of panic was consciously raised for individual citizens who, through their handheld devices, received alert messages, typical only during times of earthquake or tsunami. Increasing the public's critical consciousness of how language contributes to this sort of domination of some people by others, as Norman Fairclough notes, is the central purpose of CDA, since consciousness is really the first step toward emancipation.[6]

As noted earlier, many citizens do not appear to be especially conscious of the ways in which central power and authority make deliberate use of language to channel thought—and, therefore, speech—within a more controlled ideological frame of public discourse. Language used by the powerful has long helped divert public attention away from the realities of ongoing social and environmental problems (i.e. shrinking birthrate, growing childhood poverty, nuclear radiation contamination) and to channel attention and awareness toward various manufactured fears of the Other.

In perceiving this manufactured need to attend to these problems, the public is being asked to accept uncritically the remedies offered by the central planners in the form and practice of a particular ideology. To better understand the methods used by central government leaders working to put this ideology into practice in Okinawa, it is useful to examine carefully the signs and symbols that prevail in the public discourse. Roland Barthes suggested:

> [S]emiology aims to take in any system of signs, whatever their substance and limits; images, gestures, musical sounds, objects, and the complex associations of all of these, which form the content of ritual, convention or public entertainment: these constitute, if not *languages*, at least systems of signification.[7]

Of course, a careful examination also implies we are conscious that these "systems of signification" can, and often do, affect us in particular ways. Writing about contemporary Polish youth (25 years after the country's transformation from a communist regime to a democracy) Katarzyna Molek-Kozakowska points out that "many students are not prepared to include a critique of their objects of study, be they popular media representations, conventions in public discourse, or routine communicative practices."[8] One reason she points to is that "interrogation of everyday cultural practices and media uses must be exceedingly difficult for young people raised in the digital age without awareness of the cultural constructedness of consumerism and ideological preponderance of globalization."[9] Such is the concern for those engaging with young people in classrooms in Okinawa.

Molek-Kozakowska observes from her interactions with students that they are born into an information rich society where anyone can be a medium and can send a message to the world, but also lack a critical sense of the destructive powers of rampant consumerism and globalization. This ability to both communicate to the masses and to receive mass communication paradoxically complicates the efforts that people make in discerning and understanding the very sources of that information, whether they are biased or unbiased, authoritative or uninformed.

The physical forms taken by leading stories in digital image and text that appear on the screens of popular communication devices predispose young people to accept hastily representations produced especially by centers of political, economic, or social power. The media in which these

representations appear now allow for the instant dissemination of diversions, as the common social practice of sharing can help lend an air of legitimacy to deceptions. Interestingly, the effects of these phenomena of mass distribution were identified by George Orwell in 1946:

> Political language—and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists—is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.[10]

Another clarification Molek-Kozakowska offers is that "the dominant schooling of Poland requires students to absorb views handed down to them by the curriculum rather than learn how to deconstruct meaning and power relations in canonical texts and institutional discourses."[11] She sheds light on typical educational practices of universities in Poland where messages focused on creating dutiful consumers are normalized and rarely critiqued, preventing students from being fully conscious of and understanding their more important roles as citizens. Similar ideas are also reflected in Japan where schooling, examined in Chapter 4, is said to serve the core purpose of conditioning the habits of society's next generation of consumers who will uncritically "buy" the status quo.

The free and democratic Japan that young people perceive in daily life represents a fantasy that they are, in fact, free to choose their own way forward. This impression develops and is reconstructed, in part, through the top-down selection process of educational materials that maintain boundaries around the language of Japanese history and narratives of the economic rise of the nation from the ashes of World War II. Reinforcing this notion is the systemic compulsion in schooling culture that obliges teachers, who acquire their hard-earned titles and authority through tightly controlled government licensing programs, to disregard their own expertise and select exclusively government-approved texts. Positioning political interpretations of history in the classroom, rather than historical facts, helps construct the perception of a system impervious to critique.

Reflexive acceptance of the infallibility of central authority, elaborated in Chapter 4, can be seen when casual discussions over government-prescribed textbooks commence and such materials are given hasty priority by acquiescent teachers, especially in elementary and junior high school. As Fairclough notes, "the domination of some people by others," can be seen reinforced in the domination of some texts by others.[12] So, the

difficulty we face as citizens in emancipating our minds is the raising of our conscious awareness that ideological domination both exists and reproduces the impression that democratic choices actually exist.

This sensation is maintained by those who are able to select, define, and disseminate the prevailing ideology not only through schooling systems, but also through access to society's mass media systems. Evidence of this kind of control can be found in the public discourse, in the signs, symbols, images, and words that appear in media. This is why, as Molek-Kozakowska argues, there is a "need for students [and citizens more generally] to look at how precisely ideologies tend to be articulated in discourse."[13] Fairclough expands on this kind of control of the public discourse: "Ideology is seen as located in both structures (discourse conventions) and events."[14]

Concerned citizens can observe the ideology at work in the signs and symbols of consent in public events where leaders appear with smiling faces for photo opportunities, in signifiers of international agreement—in back-slapping, hand-shaking, document signing, and ribbon-cutting ceremonies—all of which serve to create the impression that political decisions are the outcome of democratic decision-making processes.[15] "We absorb these images and messages of the prevailing social order," notes Herbert Schiller, "and these make up [our] frame of reference and perception. With few exceptions, it is this framework which insulates most from ever imagining an alternative social reality."[16]

CDA Difficulties in Okinawa

In spite of its explanatory power as an analytical tool, CDA also has limitations. Michael Billig describes the paradoxical situation that CDA researchers face when they employ these methods to critique uses of language exhibited in others: "They [analysts] tend to use, and thereby instantiate, the very forms of language whose ideological potentiality they are warning against—such as deleting agency, using passives, and turning processes into entities"[17] [all of which are expounded and linked to propagandizing in later sections].[18]

Billig refers to scholarly activities, but this irony can also be found in the field of journalism, in the reporting practices of investigative journalists who, employed by corporate news organizations with interests that align with their industry sponsors, fall in line[19] with the plans and policies of the leading parties and business giants of the time. Billig points to an apparent

problem when we (researchers) analyze language critically and want to expose the inner workings of power and ideology, but wonder how we can do this

> …, if we have to use language in order to make our critical analyses? How can we be sure that our own use of language is not marked, even corrupted, by those ideological factors that we seek to identify in the language of others?[20]

While we (authors) acknowledge this paradox in the critical approach we are taking, we are also grounding analysis of the discourse in our respect for "life in dignity of human beings and of animals and plants."[21] We assume the same position Peter Saladin holds when he argues that "man is not allowed to destroy, damage, or make suffer parts of nature except where it is unavoidable for his own survival."[22] Saladin seems to reflect the sentiments of Ryukyu's last king, Shō Tai, who is heard reminding the people, as he is led away in 1879, "*nuchi du takara*," (life itself is a treasure). Our study derives from the perspective of concerned citizens conscious of the harm that people, obsessed with power and moved by the ideology of consumption, can inflict upon people and nature—not for survival, but for economic profit at all cost. David Suzuki comments on this process when he observes that economics today tends to reflect a kind of brain damage[23] where capital growth ignores the effects of development on the environment.

The poisoning of rivers from mountain top removal, the radioactive contamination of aquifers, the depletion of ozone from fossil fuels, the decimation of honeybees from pesticides—indeed, the entire biosphere that sustains all life—all are reduced to externalities, which have real costs on the world in which we live but, as we are conditioned to believe, can safely ignore. These costs are often unseen or too complex to appreciate as central to our own existence as a species, but ignoring or trivializing them makes complex issues such as environmental destruction much easier to accept.

Adopting Saladin's stance, furthermore, sets our analysis apart from competing theories about Okinawa's position in the Washington-Tokyo hierarchy for global/national defense where its intellectuals and assorted advocates (discussed in Part II) claim to hold a monopoly on truths and facts, both contemporary and historical.

Compounding the problem of environmental degredation is the apparent tendency of pro-base advocates to effectively frame issues of national defense in largely black-and-white terms. China is planning to attack, but the military will protect us: this argument typifies current forms of fear-mongering in

Okinawa which seem to echo George W. Bush's infamous reduction of world events into Manichean terms. "Either you are with us," he declared in dividing the world, "or you are with the terrorists."[24] In the wake of 9/11, this kind of Manichean argument has served, in part, to erase the potential for plausible reasons why citizens might seek to open a critical public discussion about why the Bush administration sought to assault Iraq. Today, in Okinawa, a similar manner of public discourse serves, in part, to inhibit thorough public discussion of why Henoko and Takae should necessarily come under such assault from the developers.

This difference, we suggest, can be partly understood in terms of two competing views of how economic development and national security are achieved and maintained in society. On one side stands the bureaucracy and its passionate supporters who appear to embrace a "form of reason that configures all aspects of existence in economic terms [and] is quietly undoing basic elements of democracy."[25] As Wendy Brown notes, signs of this ruination can be seen in "vocabularies, principles of justice, political cultures, habits of citizenship, practices of rule, and … democratic imaginaries."[26] On the other side stand people of the resistance who, through a strong sense of civic responsibility, struggle to assert self-determination and exercise their citizen rights. This struggle appears in resistance against central control over ongoing efforts to exploit local natural resources and political culture, historical narratives, public speech, and perception.

We suggest that these two opposing positions may also be identified by the quality of the evidence they present to support their plans and claims. If neoliberalism (critiqued in Chapter 3) embodies unquestioning faith in the operation of the free market as an ethic in itself, which can guide human action while supplanting our sense of morality, and if economization is a way to pursue that devotion, then the ruling party's growing embrace of this ideology, we suggest, produces forms of truthiness that appear in the public discourse posing as facts. We use "truthiness" in the sense defined by the American Dialect Society in 2006, which "refers to the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true."[27] Whereas factoids have "no existence on earth other than what's appeared in the newspaper and then repeated forever after,"[28] truthiness, we suggest, emerges from a similar modus operandi, from an ideological struggle taken up in the interest of gaining control over ontological realities and, thereby, the power to reshape public perception.

The representations of truthiness we examine appear in various media where evidence can be found in efforts taken by Tokyo bureaucratic leaders working to delete the agency of local people by wiping out the larger categories

of indigenous language, culture, and history. Attempts to erase these categories of indigeneity serve to remove the agency of those who might assert their rights to resist policies that expand the base presence in Okinawa. Such removal, it has been observed, can help bureaucrats feel justified in "ignor[ing] the structural discrimination that [has] long caused Okinawa to suffer"[29] as well as, presumably, to undermine the motivation behind local resistance against policies supporting base expansion. It must be said, however, that ongoing discrimination is itself a clear semiotic sign of the very category of difference elites aim to erase. Acts of discrimination create the conceptual and material differences that officials continue to ignore.

To illustrate, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) convened in 2008 and observed in their report that, "the State party [Japan] ha[d] not officially recognized the Ainu and the Ryukyu/Okinawa as indigenous peoples entitled to special rights and protection."[30] In their report, committee members unanimously adopted the following resolution:

> The State party should expressly recognize the Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawa as indigenous peoples in domestic legislation, adopt special measures to protect, preserve and promote their cultural heritage and traditional way of life, and recognize their land rights. It should also provide adequate opportunities for Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawa children to receive instruction in or of their language and about their culture, and include education on Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawa culture and history in the regular curriculum.[31]

Recognizing, evidently, that little had changed in the intervening years to "protect, preserve and promote" this heritage, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted a subsequent resolution on August 20, 2014:

> The State party should take further steps to revise its legislation and fully guarantee the rights of Ainu, Ryukyu and Okinawa communities to their traditional land and natural resources, ensuring respect for their right to engage in free, prior and informed participation in policies that affect them and facilitating, to the extent possible, education for their children in their own language.[32]

Underscoring the importance of protecting citizen rights to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur, responded to Suyoshi Arakaki's question about recent attempts made by the LDP to

suppress journalism in Okinawa and the speech of protestors at Henoko and Takae. At an April 19, 2016 press conference hosted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan (FCCJ), Arakaki asked Kaye his opinion about the activities of the LDP to oppress local citizens by seeking to curb their freedoms of speech during popular protests. Kaye responded by expressing serious concern over the excessive force used by police and the coast guard against the non-violent protestors.[33] Beyond the physical lies the force of language that is typical of racism and discrimination. In October 2016, a police officer was derided for having shouted at the protestors, "*Dojin!*" (native). The intent, few Okinawans doubt, was an expression of anger aimed at the "uncivilized primitives"[34] resisting construction of the helipads in Takae.

In response to Kaye's concern, Japan's State Minister of Foreign Affairs Seiji Kihara has since urged the UN to modify and essentially withdraw its resolutions regarding the recognition and protection of indigenous cultures in Japan. While Kihara's request may be seen as an effort to delete agency, it both denies the historical colonization of Okinawa and serves as the rationalization for categorizing Okinawan people as non-indigenous, or as citizens with full and equal access to social, economic, and political power. Kihara took the following position: since the opinions the UN holds regarding Okinawa contrast with the opinions of the Japanese government, as well as with opinions concerning communications that don't reflect the actual conditions of our country, we request that the UN withdraw what it has said [regarding Okinawa] and revise its understanding.[35] Such is the rhetorical equivalent of the Republican Party in the United States suggesting that indigenous Hawaiian culture does not exist, along with its history and language. Masahisa Miyazaki attempted to support this view by asserting that most Okinawan people do not see themselves as indigenous, and that the communication from the UN can be interpreted as a strategy of "divide and conquer."[36]

As we expound throughout this study, bureaucrats appear to prefer operating with facts they wish to be true, as political expediencies, while ignoring facts known to be true as objective realities. Such claims assume an air of truthiness that, on one hand, connotes positive images of national harmony and unity while, on the other, ignores historical and contemporary realities of annexation and colonialism,[37] forced militarization and its attendant destruction of the environment, the systematic suppression of indigenous languages, culture, religion, economic marginalization, and

construction of a societal dependency on foreign powers. Silence over these realities may be seen as a form of propaganda that serves to integrate competing public views of reality with established political views. If Tokyo's position regarding Okinawa pivots upon its understanding of the meaning of "indigenous," this position contrasts with the current understanding expressed by the UN. In its fact sheet titled "Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices," the following characteristics can be found in these cultures:

- Self-identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member.
- Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies
- Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources
- Distinct social, economic or political systems
- Distinct language, culture and beliefs
- Form non-dominant groups of society
- Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.[38]

Okinawan people largely resist the label "indigenous" with its mostly negative connotations reflected in the Japanese language; at the same time, they also explicitly embrace surviving remnants of the culture, history, and language that have been eroded since the 1879 Meiji annexation and subsequent US occupation and militarization of the island. Okinawans pride themselves on being *Uchinaanchu* (people of Okinawa), the collocations of which embody the characteristics of "indigenous" described above.

Still another way to comprehend the ruling government's enduring approach to Okinawa is to examine the meaning of the tone struck in a once-Top Secret 1947 memorandum addressed to General Douglas MacArthur from his political adviser William J. Sebald. The memo itself appears to set the future tone for the ways in which Okinawa can be understood by both mainland Japanese and by US occupying forces. Evidence of such an effort to frame Okinawa in this way can be found in the language used in various official communications, both previously classified and open to the public, between the governments of Japan and the United States. In the memorandum, Sebald, who had been in close contact with Hidenari Terasaki—Emperor Hirohito's adviser—lays out the Emperor's sentiments toward the miliary occupation of Okinawa, other islands in the Ryukyu chain, and their future.

In the memorandum, MacArthur learns of the Emperor's "**hope** that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa…"[39] and that this occupation will serve to "… **benefit** the United States and also provide **protection** for Japan."[40] This condition is something the Emperor feels will "meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who **fear** not only the menace of Russia but … the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an incident with Russia as a basis for interfering internally in Japan."[41]

We also learn, significantly, from the memo that the Emperor further suggests that the occupation, "should be based upon the **fiction** of a long-term lease—25 to 50 years or more—with sovereignty retained in Japan." In justification of the method, he explains, "it [the long-term agreement] would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs on the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly the Soviet Russia and China, would thereby be stopped from demanding similar rights."[42]

At last, Mr. Terasaki comments that "As to procedure … the acquisition of 'military base rights' … should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan." In the explanation of the purpose, he claimed, "the latter method would … savor too much of a dictated peace and might in the future endanger the sympathetic understanding of the Japanese people."[43]

Analysis of the connotations of keywords in the memorandum reveals interesting insights. The word **hope**, for example, may suggest the Emperor's willingness to forfeit Okinawa as if the region, in lacking agency, were subjected to a sort of adoption process. Parents who have the power and desire to adopt may sometimes feel regret for having finalized an adoption. Some parents may attempt to return their adopted child to foster care because of changes in their marital status. Others may come to scorn their child because he or she may not meet their initial expectations, or they may exhibit behavioral problems, such as disobedience or aggresiveness.

After its annexation, Okinawa became an unruly and unwilling adopted child that exhibited acute behavioral problems, that resisted the imposition of forced assimilation by striving to preserve its indigenous culture, language, and history. Use of the word "hope" might signify that the Showa Emperor did not view Okinawa as a part of Japanese body politic worth defending. Rather, Okinawa was, perhaps, the pitiable child returned to the orphanage when the adoptive parents tired of caring for her.

This sense seemed to colonize the minds of the occupying forces. The perception is reflected in the title of Helen Mears' article of that period: "Okinawa: Orphan of Conquest."

Mears observes that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles managed, through bilateral talks, to produce a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that would be presented to the Japanese government on a take-it-or-leave-it basis: "The solution for Okinawa was to leave their sovereignty in doubt, but to arrange for absolute United States possession for an indefinite period."[44] The Emperors message and the document from the Secretary appear to clarify how both the Japanese and American governments see Okinawa as an object to be possessed.

The word **benefit** comes from the late fourteenth century and originally meant "good or noble deed" as well as "advantage or profit." Clearly, it is not possible to argue against the great military advantage the United States would gain over China in East Asia with an American military presence in Okinawa. Perhaps, the Emperor came to believe that a US occupation would represent a "good or noble deed," as US troops would take up the responsibility of defending Japan from other regional powers that might be intent to "demand similar [basing] rights." With relations between Japan and America normalized, the US advantage, as the Emperor believed, would "also provide protection for Japan."

Protection derives from Latin, which means to "cover in front" or "shelter, defend, or keep in guardianship." If Okinawa served as a sacrifice to protect the mainland from US forces during World War II, Okinawa's place within the post-war Japanese concept of nation hardly seems to have changed during the Emperor's negotiations with MacArthur. In battle, the frontline provides cover for the rear where command and control of the war resides. Certainly, given Tokyo's "fear" of Russia and China during that time, Okinawa could serve as cover to defend the seat of power.

The appearance of **fiction** in the memo suggests that the relationship between Japan and Okinawa, as well as between America and Okinawa, are grand illusions. If the Emperor had actually perceived Okinawa to be a part of his sovereign domain, why would he not have sought to keep it? Why would it be necessary, as Sebald remarked, to create the "United States military occupation … upon the fiction of a long-term lease"? If the lease is a fiction, as the Emperor suggested, can the Emperor's "hope that the United States … continue the military occupation of Okinawa" also be read as a kind of retribution against the people of Okinawa?

In interpreting the subtext, one could infer that the fiction of a lease is really just an outward gift. After all, Okinawa, since its annexation, had not been an entirely observant subject of the Emperor's concept of an Imperial Empire.

It is worth noting as well that this diplomatic cable was discovered 32 years after communications between Hirohito and MacArthur. As the communiqué received widespread attention and precipitated deep debate over its significance, it has also been seen as an example of abuse of the Emperor's power over politics under the philosophy that the Emperor is the figurehead of the state.[45] To the people of Okinawa, it was especially painful discovering that the various incidents of crime they had suffered due to the resulting military occupation had been, in part, *hoped for* by the central figure of mainland Japan, which Okinawans had sought so badly to rejoin. Okinawan people were desperate for reversion because they believed they might gain the same human rights as Japanese people, and also see the military bases entirely removed from the island. What happened after reversion, though, was not what Okinawan people had hoped for when they held demonstrations and waved Japanese flags in 1972. An underlying sense of betrayal came to shape, in part, the political course that Okinawa would later chart.

One way to grasp the significance of this path and the political realities of contemporary Okinawa is to enlist the help of a useful metaphor. The Gaderene Swine fallacy supposes that because a group is in the right formation, it is necessarily on the right course. Conversely, it also supposes that because an individual has strayed from the group and isn't in formation, that s/he is off course. Yet, to an objective observer, the individual may seem lost to the group but actually not off course. R.D. Laing uses the following illustration in the *Politics of Experience*:

> From an ideal vantage point on the ground, a formation of planes may be observed in the air. One plane may be out of formation. But the whole formation may be off course. The plane that is 'out of formation' may be [viewed by the group as] abnormal, bad or 'mad'….[46]

Who is the formation, and who is the plane thought to be flying off course? Since the end of World War II, Washington and Tokyo have been flying largely in formation regarding the view that Okinawa belongs squarely in the flight pattern they designed to defend both America's global ambitions and Japan's national security. Through no voice of its own, Okinawa

figures prominently in the strategic military alliance between America and Japan outlined in the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty. According to Yukinori Tokuyama,

> Beyond … economics, the larger external … politics in Washington and Tokyo that influence internal Okinawan decision-making suggest a new form of [colonialism] at work in the post-war era. These systems of governance operate under the guise of democracy and allow two superpowers to maintain the status quo.[47]

In terms of Japan's national security, the plane leading the formation may be seen as America, with the remaining aircraft trailing close behind seen as Japan. The plane just off course is a region incensed and long dominated by outside decisions made by superpowers who question the plane's self-determination to correct the course where democracy and social equity may be reached.

The metaphor illustrates the efforts of those who tend to rationalize the tight formation they assume in moving forward, in developing and progressing. They are of single-minded determination and can imagine no alternative reality besides the flight path they have charted. They have no doubts about the potency of their plans and where they want to take the entire formation; therefore, any deviation of one of its own threatens the integrity of the formation as well as the plan to maintain the standard order. In light of these present conditions and the pretense that we live in a free and democratic society with a truly egalitarian constitution respected by all citizens, we must also ask how this formation began developing.

In the following chapter, we suggest that this kind of collective maneuver can be understood through the lens of rationalization as both a psychological state and as a principle of social and economic organization. Since we believe that a peaceful and prosperous life in a world of reason and logic is best and best informs our habits of production, consumption, and ways of understanding the environment around us, we examine the rationalizing that now informs the socioeconomic practices aiming to keep this huge formation intact.

Notes

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2. Norman Fairclough. *Language and Power* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 1989), 1.

3. Taoka Shunji (Trans. Kenji Hasegawa), "Japanese Government Misinformation on North Korea's Rocket Launch," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 14(8) 2016, accessed April 24, 2016, http://apjjf.org/2016/08/Taoka.html.
4. It is important to note that the 2016 satellite launch stands in contrast to the actual ballistic missile tests of March 2017, which are consistently framed in Japanese corporate media as a North Korean "provocation." This framing of current events erases key parts of the larger picture where US and South Korean military forces conduct annual military exercises across the Peninsula, which involve 320,000 troops. Decades of such war-gaming exercises have long been seen by North Korea (DRPK) as a provocative disguise for impending military invasion, and this has had unsurprising effects in North Korea. Concluding that persistent military manuevers threaten the very existence of the DPRK, North Korean leaders react with predictable measure: they have managed to develop their own nuclear deterrence. Commentary in corporate media in the West (and in Japan) tend to ignore the larger context regarding the likely reasons why the DPRK is determined to develop and test its own atomic arsenal and why this capability serves, however wrong, its power to bargain. In 2015 and 2017, North Korea's proposal to suspend development and testing of its emerging nuclear program, including ballistic missiles, came with a counterproposal for the US to cease its joint military maneuvers in the ROK. Both Presidents Obama and Trump rejected these offers. Complicating efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution in March 2017 was an "internal White House review of strategy on North Korea [which] includes the possibility of military force or regime change to blunt the country's nuclear-weapons threat, people familiar with the process said, a prospect that has some US allies in the region on edge" (Wall Street Journal). The review hints a similar strategy to that applied in the preemptive attack on Iraq 2003 may be chosen. As noted by Steve Rabson (September 2017) in private communications, the effects of recent sanctions on the DPRK from the UN can also be understood by a larger historical context: the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 emerged as a reaction to the US and UK embargo on Japan.
5. A parallel can be seen in South Korea, with the impending deployment of missile defense systems that have already ignited protests. The US military's terminal high attitude area defense (THAAD) system, as of this writing, is scheduled for deployment in Korea in the face of sharp criticism from China and North Korea.
6. Op cit., Fairclough, 1.
7. Roland Barthes. *Elements of Semiology* (trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith) (London: Jonathan Cape, [1964] 1967), 9.
8. Katarzyna Molek-Kozakawska, "Inspirations for Critical Literacy Across Cultural and Media Studies," *News from Somewhere: A Reader in Communication and Challenges to Globalization*, eds. Daniel Broudy, Jeffery Klaehn, & James Winter (Wayzgoose Press, 2015), 17.

9. Ibid., 21.
10. George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" (1946).
11. Ibid., 21.
12. Op cit., Fairclough, 64.
13. Ibid., 28.
14. Norman Fairclough. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (London: Longman), 25.
15. Edward Bernays suggests in *Propaganda* (2005) that these public acts are part of the system of propaganda and that some of the "phenomena of the process are criticized—the manipulation of news, the inflation of personality, and the general ballyhoo by which politicians and commercial products and social ideas are brought to the consciousness of the masses" (39).
16. Herbert Schiller. *Living in the Number One Country: Reflection from a Critic of American Empire* (New York: Seven Stories Press), 152.
17. Nominalization refers to speech acts that illustrate efforts to turn processes into entities.
18. Michael Billig, *The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominalization,* in Discourse & Society (Los Angeles: SAGE Publication, 2008), 783.
19. In contemporary Japan, those journalists or entire media organizations that do not toe the line risk being sacked or closed down altogether. Discussions of examples appear throughout the book.
20. Ibid., 783.
21. Peter Saladin, "Responsibility Towards Creation." In *The Responsible Scholar: Ethical Considerations in the Humanities and Social Sciences*, edited by Gerald Berthoud and Beat Sitter-Liver (Canton, MA: Watson Publishing International, 1996), 3–7.
22. Ibid., 6.
23. David Suzuki interview *Surviving Progress* 3:16.
24. A transcript of George W. Bush's full speech can be found at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
25. Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books), 17.
26. Ibid., 17.
27. "American Dialect Society," 2006, http://www.americandialect.org/truthiness_voted_2005_word_of_the_year.
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29. Author unknown, "Critics of 'indigenous people' designation must recognize history of annexation and oppression," *Ryukyu Shimpo* April 29, 2016.
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34. "Cabinet: No Need for Tsuruho to Apologize over 'Dojin' Issue," *The Asahi Shimbun* (November 22, 2016).
35. "Critics of 'Indigenous People' Designation Must Be Recognize History of Annexation and Oppression," *Ryukyu Shimpo*. http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2016/05/04/24981/.
36. Ibid.
37. Tomoko Arakaki, *Evidentials in Ryukyuan: The Shuri Variety of Luchan, a Typographical and Theoretical Study of Grammatical Evidentiality* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 3.
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39. Okinawa Prefectural Archives. "Emperor's Message," accessed February 18, 2016 at http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/collection/2008/03/post-21.html. (Emphasis added.)
40. For further details, please visit: http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/collection/2008/03/post-21.html. (Emphasis added.)
41. The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website at http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/emp1.html. (Emphasis added.)
42. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
43. Ibid.
44. Helen Mears, "Okinawa: Orphan of Conquest," *The Nation* (November 3, 1956), 367–369.
45. Op Cit., Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
46. R.D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 105.
47. Yukinori Tokuyama, "Collective Traumatic Memory in a Jointly-Colonized Okinawa," In *Under Occupation: Resistance and Struggle in a Militarised Asia-Pacific*, edited by Daniel Broudy, Peter Simpson, and Makoto Arakaki (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 193.

CHAPTER 3

Why McDonaldization in Okinawa? Social Relations of Production in the Neoliberal Playground

One of the many surprises in store for foreign visitors, including visiting US forces, to Okinawa Main Island today is the explosive effects of McDonaldization: processes by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate wider sectors of society. The presence of the unique traditional cultural flavor of local businesses has significantly declined, subsumed by transnational corporate retailers and fast-food giants. Shopping malls have multiplied like mold spores, and have risen like elaborate cathedrals to consumerism. Traditional Ryukyuan homes are giving way to high-rise cookie-cutter flats; the attractive myth of Okinawan longevity has morphed into a mundane reality for many with metabolic syndrome, diabetes, and other lifestyle maladies; stable employment has bowed out to abusive, temporary work conditions, just to name a few.

These are surprising alterations, likely because of the great gap between pre-modern images of traditional Ryukyuan culture and ways of life, and the present sense that society is disintegrating into an atomized chaos. In unconscious attempts to camouflage this unhinged existence, tradition and history are increasingly presented to tourists in standardized theme-park packaged visits to Shuri Castle, Ryukyu Mura (Village), and Okinawa World combined with shopping excursions to *Kokusai Dori* (International Street), Rycom Mall, and American Village. Why are we seeing these banal McDonaldizing processes, which aren't really new or interesting anymore,[1] nowadays? There is something uniquely Okinawan, we suspect, about them: that is, the history of colonialism and militarism, the latter

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largely unchanged since World War II, are all intertwined with global market economy and the policy reform agenda for neoliberalization.

Though we are now living in a post-industrial age, we can still point to the past to understand something quite profound about the present. The designs of communication under analysis in this study, we suggest, are direct heirs of the Industrial Revolution when technology gave rise to a small but powerful capitalist class that began amassing the affluence and power to control the majority of society's natural, material, and intellectual wealth. We can trace in the Industrial Revolution the dawn of modern capitalism, and the origins of techniques in social management: "the power of individuals to control their surroundings, satisfy needs and desires, and influence social life through mechanization and technology."[2] The extent and nature of social control has become ever more profound and deceptive in today's age of digital communication, where information, meaning, awareness, and perception can be ordered and deftly managed by those possessing greater wealth and the most capable technology imaginable.[3]

Our analysis is grounded in a political economy perspective of media and public culture; in our present imperfect "democratic" society, important political decisions, such as the relocation of Futenma Air Station to pristine Northeast Okinawa, reflect the interests of those with the material and economic means to manufacture the consent of the masses by controlling their perceptions through media, education, and other cultural signifiers. As we cannot identify a collection of powerful individuals congregating in a boardroom to plot the designs of control over the thought processes of people in Okinawa, we dare to draw upon the most general reference to the dominant capitalist class, namely, an aggregate and disparate population whose members may not be in direct contact with one another but who, nonetheless, enjoy access to great material and technological wealth as well as the power and privilege to influence public culture through media, education, and other means.

Such control over the public mind is necessary for the implementation of neoliberal reform policies, which have become the dominant agenda across advanced capitalist economies, including in Japan and Okinawa. In this chapter, we map out key concepts of neoliberalism, especially the disjuncture between the universal neoliberal principle, on one hand, that purports to achieve a kind of utopian self-regulating global market and, on the other, the actually existing neoliberalism we are subjected to—the socially embedded version. In practice, neoliberalism requires concrete forms of

state intervention in accordance with varying historic and geographic conditions relevant and specific to each site chosen for development.

We then explain how the concept of rationalization and George Ritzer's "McDonaldization of society" thesis might potentially shed light on the processes of manufacturing popular consent for the implementation of neoliberal reforms. In Okinawa, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) construction plan is integrated in the Okinawan version of neoliberalization, which can be understood more clearly through the lens of McDonaldization. Equally, however, we attempt to test the McDonaldization thesis itself, to see if it is still useful in helping us understand social relations of production in the context of colonialism embedded in the exigencies of the Japanese-U S military-industrial complex. This chapter conceptually grounds processes of manufacturing consent in the realm of ideas in terms of political economy of capitalism in the neoliberal stage practiced in Okinawa. We are talking about capitalism and rationalization in a colonized/militarized society.

Neoliberalism: Utopic Concepts

Capitalist society, Karl Marx saw, features a major division between "two mutually antagonistic classes," the bourgeoisie (capitalists) and the proletariat (workers).[4] The capitalist class owns and controls not only the means of production but also the products and profits generated from it, all of which is only enabled by the existence of the labor class, whose members do not own the means of production, so are thus "compelled … to sell their capacity to work, or labor power" and "purchase what they collectively produce."[5] In a capitalist society, according to Marx, class relations constitute social relations of production and, despite any semblance of balance, constantly contain potentials for crisis. Of course, "class" in contemporary society requires a more complex understanding than two socioeconomic categories: capitalists and workers. Although much of the working class today does not own the means of production, some of its members are in a position to manage and redistribute surplus values of profit for the capitalist class. The political agency of this management class is not consistent with that of the traditionally defined working class and would not support the proletariat revolution. This is just one example of the obstacles to describing a coherent political agency of the working class. Furthermore, this is partly why we saw a disgruntled working class in the United States, for example, vote for a quintessential capitalist who doesn't

represent their interests. Also, "class in advanced capitalist society is crosscut by division such as race, ethnicity and gender."[6] However, we must emphasize that basic antagonistic class relations still matter in capitalism in the neoliberal stage.[7]

Neoliberalism generally refers to the economic principle of unrestricted realization of individual entrepreneurial potentials according to the universal laws of the market, with "an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade."[8] As regards its history, the neoliberal economic principle was resurrected to prominence in response to the recession combined with inflation throughout the advanced capitalist economy in the 1970s,[9] when capital accumulation could no longer be achieved through economic growth under the welfare state and through Keynesian policies of state-led expenditure. Backed by the neoliberal economic theory of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and charismatic heads of state, notably Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, state officials in the United Kingdom and the United States launched neoliberal economic reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s: targeting inflation, cutting public expenditure in welfare and education, privatizing formerly public services, relaxing labor and financial regulations, and so on. Resulting effects saw massive closures of factories and other production sectors that were deemed unprofitable, generating widespread social anxiety. International trade and financial regimes such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) also saw significant reforms that abandoned the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency exchange rates based on the gold standard, so as to accommodate maximum mobility of finance and unrestricted transnational business activities that could take full advantage of cheap foreign labor and natural resources, leading way to neoliberal globalization, where "technologies have compressed the rising density of market transactions both in space and time."[10]

As many critics recognize today, the cardinal liberal principle of unrestricted profit-making activities that were freed from state regulation now paradoxically need, in practice, to be instigated by the state: deregulation processes have more aptly taken the form of state re-regulation. As Polanyi explains, the abstraction of a self-regulating market treats humans and natural resources—bizarre as that may be—as if they were fundamentally created by someone for the market at some price, including "fictitious commodities"—in particular, labor, land, and money.[11] Treating humans and the environment as if they were commodities set in the free market, absent state mediation and attention to the needs of society itself, lays the

groundwork for the dog-eat-dog world of a zombie apocalypse where all citizens would arm themselves.[12] Without some social authority assuring the integrity of currency and property rights and fair labor conditions, the market economy in which fictitious commodities are bought and sold—as if they were actual commodities—is not only impossible but also, if attempted in practice, destructive to the population.

If the fundamentalist version of neoliberalism, typified by its magical self-regulating market,[13] were actualized, "such an institution could not exist for any length of time," Polanyi observed in 1944, "without annihilating the human and natural substance of society."[14] His argument still stands that the self-regulating market is a "utopia": perfect theorizing in theory that is never attainable in reality.[15] So a significant disjuncture appears between principles of liberty, small government, and non-intervention, namely, neoliberalism as an ideal, on one hand, and the actual implementation of it on the other, which requires active measures taken by the state to enforce and maintain the process. However, this obvious fissure between theory and practice tends to be hidden, if not unrecognizable. Such has been typified in Margaret Thatcher's infamous observation of the "pestilence-stricken multitudes": "They're casting their problem on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women, and there are families."[16]

Neoliberalism, as evidenced by Thatcher's conclusion, has managed to so ensnare its sponsors that reason has been replaced by the rationality of irrational policies and practices. Enterprising researchers have tended to trace this cooptation of reason to the Chicago School of Economics, embodied especially in the words of its most articulate advocate, Milton Freidman who observed thus:

> It would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves. The state would police the system, establish conditions favorable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress. The citizens would be protected against the state by the existence of a free private market; and against one another by the preservation of competition.[17]

Here—in 1951—Friedman casts capitalist competition, with its Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest presuppositions, as a necessarily positive social

development. Yet, a couple of problems seem almost immediately evident if we look more carefully at the structure of this configuration. Nowhere does cooperation among human beings figure into the calculus of neoliberal thinking. As Charlotte Murakami observes, Margret Thatcher, known then as the "milk snatcher," believed that society was non-existent and shouldn't be held responsible for providing nourishment for needy children. The lessons of cooperation and sharing learned in kindergarten and primary school for preparation in human community must, therefore, be erased from memory if neoliberalism is to successfully survive.

The neoliberal turn of the late 1970s has essentially "reconfigured" the newly expanded capitalist class, incorporating much wider economic sectors including financial, real estate, and information technology (IT) industries. Thus, the capitalists have pretty much won the class struggle, appearing to the elite to put class antagonism to rest forever.[18] On the contrary, the class divisions continue to grow. In the past three to four decades of neoliberal globalization, workers' income growth in industrial countries has gradually stagnated, paired with greater access to consumer credit and lower-priced goods due to the expansion of worldwide production, maintaining the desired levels of demand that would expand the coffers of moneyed interests.[19] Today, while a few billionaires accumulate unprecedented amounts of material wealth, the rest of the population, a growing majority, are exposed to greater poverty, social insecurities, and unpredictable effects of volatile market fluctuations such as the global financial crisis in 2008–2009. The durability of the neoliberal idea, in its utopic vision,[20] as Karl Polanyi predicted, has contributed to the making of today's dystopia: achieving "fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure, and security need no enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the owners of property."[21]

Still, in order to continue producing surplus value, capital relies upon the input of labor and preferably the exploitation of it. Moreover "capitalists need to sell commodities to the workers who produce them, while simultaneously having an incentive to depress their real remuneration."[22] The potential danger of popular revolt is real. However, the economic survival of labor relies on wages in exchange for labor, provided by those who own the means of production, obstructing their organized resistance to capitalist endeavor by way of withholding their workforce. In the neoliberal stage of capitalism, organized trade union movements, most crucially, have been gradually rendered powerless to represent the interests

of most members of the labor class due, in part, to the corporate media: "perhaps the greatest service neoliberalism has achieved for capital."[23] Furthermore, "while neoliberalism has been deeply unpopular because of its exploitative character and disruptive effects upon people's everyday lives," as Cahill argues, "it is important to recognize the extent to which consent to neoliberal governance has been generated."[24] The durability of neoliberalism as expressed in Okinawa must be understood in terms of creating consent by both the harder dimensions of state coercion, as well as the more indirect forms of domination in the cultural and ideological realms, including those expressed in various forms of propaganda appearing in media, education, and in the use of language and symbols in mass media, as elaborated in the rest of this book.

Coercion and Hegemony in Neoliberal Capitalism

Despite the disjuncture between theory and practice, how does the legitimacy of neoliberalization continue to survive and thrive? The state, again, plays a central role. According to fiscal policy expert James O'Connor, the state has a double responsibility of assisting in the continuation of capital accumulation while maintaining legitimacy as a political entity. As much as the state needs accumulation of capital to enhance its own economic power and ensure tax revenue, it also needs to keep "social harmony"—by maintaining the illusion that it doesn't favor the capital accumulation of one class while sacrificing the other. Intriguingly, in order to maintain social harmony and, thus, public support and political legitimacy, the state assists the capitalists in their efforts to increase their wealth by either mystifying "its policies [and] calling them something that they are not, or [attempting] to conceal them."[25] Any type of market economy requires state power to implement market functions. Under neoliberalism, however, corporate power enjoys more direct access to policymaking "to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate"[26] to the practice of unrestricted private economic activities free from state regulations.

Harvey explains that the United States exemplifies the *neoliberal state* as "a state apparatus whose fundamental mission [is] to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital."[27] Crucially, such an apparatus includes the military forces and international warfare capabilities to enforce smooth operations of international market economy if necessary.[28] It is, thus, no accident that state leaders cite their desires to "support freedom and liberty" as the

reason for conducting international warfare and occasional preemptive strikes to "save the children." Freedom, in this neoliberal context, is code for market freedom and further entrenchment of neoliberalization, the process of subjecting ever-greater locus of human life to market forces through privatization and commodification, or the "financialization of everything,"[29] as is also unfolding in Japan and Okinawa.

However, importantly, the state's coercion, backed by its military might, is but a partial force that works to inculcate the general public's compliance with the dictates of neoliberal capitalism. In late 1930s Italy, Antonio Gramsci, like Polanyi, argued against liberal economic intellectuals who stressed the gradual separation of the self-regulating market from the intervention of the state, which was seen by the liberals to be responsible only for safeguarding public order.[30] Gramsci, however, emphasized the reality that the state's role to engender a capitalist economy far exceeds that of the night watchman: that is, coercion by force and the rule of law, as well as "hegemony" or domination exercised through civil society.[31] In Japan, since the 1990s, neoliberalization policies and further entrenchment of the Japan-US Security Alliance have been infused and promoted together. This current entrenchment policy of the LDP has entailed a political campaign to scrap Japan's peace clause (Article 9) as well as promote the realignment of US forces in Okinawa. In Japan in particular, we highlight the hegemony of neoliberalization welded to the processes of Japanese remilitarization and the new base construction in Okinawa. To ensure these processes move forward, state coercion, as well as softer forms of hegemony that promote certain ideas and ideologies, is necessary. Gramsci identified this hegemonic process as expressed

> through capillary power—akin to 'an incorporeal government'—when it is transmitted organically through various 'social infusoria', such as schools, street layout and names, architecture, the family, workplace, or church.[32]

Intellectuals, thus, fulfill important roles in shaping the public mind, which Gramsci called "intersubjective forms of consciousness."[33] Specifically, Gramsci referred to organic intellectuals who "have the function of organizing the social hegemony of a group and that group's domination of the state."[34]

We refer to that group as capitalists in the service of (and part of) the military-industrial complex, a group identified and critiqued by a highly trained "company man" with certified experience and authority in the system.

Smedley D. Butler (retired United States Marine Corps (USMC) general, twice awarded the Medal of Honor) provides a succinct account of the workings of the complex and makes the historical abstractions patently clear, especially in its present profit-making form. He asks in 1935: "What does [war] profit anyone except the very few to whom war means huge profits?"[35] His experience and observations in five military actions caused him ultimately to rail against the bankers, munitions manufacturers, shipbuilders, speculators, and even the meat packers who held vested interests, of which the public at large should be highly conscious. But, in Okinawa today, concerned residents and observers can see firsthand that war and war-making, as outlined by Butler, are indeed part of an elaborate business enterprise that necessitates sophisticated forms of cover and concealment, the spectacles of commercialization, consumerism, and the manipulation of cultural values. Gramsci illustrates how hegemony works through political forces, military forces, and social forces of production (Fig. 3.1).

Hegemony in the social relations of production in neoliberal capitalism, working in threesome with the military and the state, is described well in the rare candor of Thomas Friedman's observation of the strong connection between McDonald's, perhaps the most proliferated corporation on earth, and the US global network of military forces:[37]

> The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist—McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.[38]




Fig. 3.1 Gramscian triangle showing "The Relations of Force," by Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*[36]

Though Friedman's allusion to Adam Smith's aphorism appears on the surface to be a clever play on the hidden hand of the market, the hidden fist in Okinawa—at least to residents and visitors—is hardly invisible.[39]

Actually Existing Neoliberalism

At this point, it is useful to return to Polanyi's argument that the economy is subject to society, and not the other way around, as assumed by missionaries of the church of neoliberal fundamentalism. The concept of market economy's "embeddedness" in social relations means, according to Polanyi who first used this word, "the economy is not autonomous, as it must be in economic theory, but subordinated to politics, religion, and social relations."[40] The idea of economic relations disembedded from social relations has strongly appealed to classical economists and thinkers, and impacted nineteenth-century English and US economic policies. In practice, argued Polanyi, the market economy is *always* "embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic,"[41] which contradicts the universal laws of how the free market is purported to operate, no matter where and when. Actual "economics" as material human life is "organized according to different logics—reciprocity, redistribution and exchange—in different places and at different times in history."[42] In contemporary Okinawa, such social relations include colonialism as described by Albert Memmi: "[T]he colonizers suggest that employing the colonized is not very profitable, thereby authorizing [their] unreasonable wages."[43] This situation is illustrated by the general condition of wages in Okinawa where pay has consistently and historically been lower than in the rest of Japan.

Neoliberal principles (such as financial deregulation), when actually operationalized, necessarily develop in historically specific local contexts. Although initially may be inspired by the "neoliberal ideology [i.e. neoliberalism], in which market forces are assumed to operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are 'unleashed',"[44] the processes that follow involve necessary adjustments, mostly in the form of public policy promulgated by the state. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore distinguish the idealized neoliberal principle from the development of market-oriented reforms actually put into practice, specifically as "actually existing neoliberalism":

> We emphasize the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects insofar as they have been produced within *national, regional, and*

> *local contexts* defined by the *legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles* (emphasis added).[45]

Social reconfiguration processes toward market dependence, specific to the history, geography, and politics of a place should be termed *neoliberalization* instead of neoliberalism. We stress that the economic and social restructuring that are ongoing contemporaneously with the military realignment outlined in the SACO Final Report in Okinawa (to be explicated in Chapter 5), as elsewhere, is *not* a mirror of neoliberalism as a "coherently bounded 'ism' or 'end-state'" of "a policy regime, ideological form, or regulatory framework."[46]

In Okinawa, the state introduces market dependence within the scope of the "Okinawa development regeneration" policy, which has traditionally been Tokyo's core administrative principle for the prefecture. Indeed, market economy is "embedded" in the predominant social relations specific to the place. Thus, not only being part of the global network of overseas bases to fulfill the function of the US neoliberal state, the FRF construction appears to be embedded in the processes of the actually existing neoliberalization of Okinawan economy and society. Such locally specific neoliberalization processes embedded in the recent military realignment in Okinawa also flow with the currents of regional and global capitalism.

Japan, with its strong interventionist state in its industrial policy specifically for economic development, was once regarded as a "developmental state."[47] It provided a distinct alternative economic model to both liberalism and communism during the Cold War era, especially for newly developing economies in East Asia. Following the burst of the bubble economy in Japan and the financial crisis across East and Southeast Asia in 1997–1998, the developmental state has lost its credibility as the alternative model for economic growth.[48] However, despite the neoliberalization accelerated by the Koizumi administration, Japan has kept the paramount characteristics of the developmental state. Despite persistently expressed recognition that structural reform was necessary, neoliberalism is still being promoted and guided by state interventions and "plan-rational" bureaucracy.[49] Okinawa is part of Japan and has also been increasingly incorporated into this growing neoliberal orthodoxy played out across the world.

Neoliberalization in Okinawa requires distinctive understanding from that of mainland Japan in general.[50] In particular, the local economy is managed by the "Okinawan Development Regeneration System."[51]

This is a unique system devised by Tokyo that unofficially (but not implicitly) compensates Okinawa for the long imposition of the heavily concentrated US military presence. As discussed in Chapter 10, the system placates the people with special budgets while depriving them of agency for autonomous economic development. The Okinawan Developmental Regeneration System with the SACO plan and subsequent new base construction in Henoko/Takae have served as vehicles to carry neoliberalization into Okinawa.

Neoliberalization processes have been embedded in the significant material and ideological enticements for Okinawans to weigh and accept the otherwise unacceptable construction plan of a USMC installation that comes with the destruction of the only pristine coastline left, after every other has been buried under concrete and red clay bleeding from exposed mountains excavated for reclamation projects. Having said that, it is important to note here that neoliberalization, or greater market dependence, is an increasingly defining feature of Okinawan economic and industrial development projects *anyway*, not only those accompanying the new US base construction. This is precisely why propaganda has been necessary for a particular kind of neoliberalization that embraces construction of the FRF (as outlined in the SACO Final Report), driven by the interests and influence of elite corporate capital.

Why McDonaldization in Okinawa?

Corporate McDonald's exemplifies the hegemonic social force of production illustrated in the Gramscian triangle above in George Ritzer's highly popularized "McDonaldization of society" thesis. Growing its business from small town America in the 1950s to a transnational fast-food giant that has intruded into people's lives everywhere by the late twentieth century, corporate McDonald's adopted and refined the production models of scientific Taylorism and Fordism for fast-food business practices. McDonaldized social relations of production, Ritzer explains, are a series of "rationalization processes that had been occurring throughout the twentieth century"[52] in terms of four features: efficiency, calculability, control, and predictability. According to Ritzer, "the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world."[53] Over more than two decades since the theory's appearance in 1993, the McDonaldization thesis has been applied to many aspects of contemporary society ranging from

social work to tourism and higher education to prostitution. It has nearly provided a platform for mass-produced academic studies akin to the franchise model it critiques.

As the world has vastly changed since publication of its first edition, Ritzer's social analysis may have lost its one-size-fits-all appeal of a grand theory explaining global social change as American social change writ large. Yet, we witness all four aspects of McDonaldization alive in brutal forms aggressively promoted in the island society of Okinawa. Instead of dismissing it as outdated, our resident observations of a strong pull toward the four aspects of social relations spelled out by the McDonaldization thesis demands a targeted analysis specific to this place and time. Subsequent editions to Ritzer's model had yet to incorporate the predominance of neoliberalism in the 21st century. Furthermore, the key historical and social aspects required for understanding Okinawan capitalism, especially its colonial history and the US military presence, fall outside Ritzer's original scope. We suggest, nonetheless, that the framework of McDonaldization, perhaps because of its simplicity, allows for clarification of extremely complicated social relations and the neoliberalizing political economy specific to Okinawa and helps provide some explanation for rationalization and propaganda.

In instigating social practices that contribute to the growth of capitalist economy, Max Weber saw bureaucracy as the most significant form of power.[54] As if to respond to Polanyi and Gramsci's argument for the symbiotic relationship between larger society and the economic system that develops within it, Weber focused on the relationship between citizens and society's institutions of power whose services and activities touch the lives of everyone and everything. A significant influence on the public and its environment, bureaucratic authority acted as power situated in periods when society's elites could make calculated use of their privilege, wealth, and knowledge to justify and reinforce their own positions and agendas. Weber describes specific actions and routine activities of bureaucracy as acted out in "official *jurisdictional areas*, which are given coherence through rules, laws, or administrative regulations."[55] The strength of bureaucracy is explained to be characteristic of a "plan-rational capitalist developmental state … a shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist northeast Asia."[56]

Among other East Asian nations, Japan's economic planning bureaucracy constructs a "Weberian ideal type of an interventionist state,"[57] also characterized by its symbiotic relations with private corporations and the

systematic suppression of organized labor resistance through corporatized labor unions. Each of these characteristics align largely with people's obedience to strong authority figures, whether those figures are individuals or collectives serving in bureaucratic institutions, exemplified by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),[58] which serve to protect the official racket. From his observations of the practice of Protestant work ethic, Weber offered the concept of rationalization as an explanation of the prevalence of jurisdictional authority over every facet of social life. Rationalization, in sociology, replaces human values, emotions, and traditions with calculated or rational goals which, in capitalist systems, are economic ends. Weber observed that the good protestant worshipper values honesty and consistent hard work, not for living necessarily, but for the sake of God, who enabled people to feel justified in their submission to the hard work set before them and for the many hours they labored each week to complete their work for their daily bread. His concept of rationalization[59] is a necessary logic that would become "rational" for the great growth of capital production.

Weber's idea of rationalization constitutes a basis of Ritzer's "McDonaldization of society" thesis. The four features of McDonaldization are post-Fordist fast-food production methods that came to rationalize social relations in wider sectors of capitalist society in the 21st century. Ritzer's interpretation of the McDonald's business model further illustrates humanity's own self-constructed iron cage that Weber had explicated. Ritzer critiques the business model in terms of its "irrationality of rationalization," namely, its homogenizing and dehumanizing forces that deprive humans of their capacity to explore freely their own creative potentials. He observed that he wanted to "see a society in which people are freed to be creative rather than having their creativity constrained or eliminated."[60] McDonald's, he has since argued, increases homogeneity in our forms of consumption. Not only is McDonaldization irrational, it is also destructive to health and the environment. Ritzer has also argued in later editions that its cultural homogenization erases cultural diversities into globalized "nothingness."[61]

Globalization here is explained as the spread of American culture and corporate practice the world over, which has both advantages and disadvantages, such as the availability of cheap and fast services, on one hand, and dehumanization and paradoxically vulnerable social systems, on the other. To be clear, globalization is distinguished from McDonaldization in that the latter is a particular model of the former imbued, as it were, with

America's own corporate cultural identity. To further illustrate Ritzer's point, Robert McChesney observed:

> Globalization is the result of powerful governments, especially that of the United States, pushing trade deals and other accords down the throats of the world's people to make it easier for corporations and the wealthy to dominate the economies of nations around the world without having obligations to the peoples of those nations.[62]

McChesney suggests that the small group of elites, the national policymakers and owners of capital, make effective use of their power to extract the greatest benefits of cheap labor from the masses, both domestic and international. Of course, forcing something "down the throats" of others requires an effective kind of propaganda that either distorts or camouflages this domination.

What is lacking in Ritzer's McDonaldization thesis is substantive exploration of the correlation between "the spread of formal rationality" and "the relentless pursuit of capital accumulation" of the global corporate class under neoliberal globalization.[63] We should emphasize here that the social processes of McDonaldization developed simultaneously in the context of capitalism's global expansion—in particular, the predominance of neoliberal economic ideas and policies since the 1970s. Following the various campaigns (in particular, the McLibel trial) against its product and corporate practices, we have come to associate McDonald's with the negative legacies of a contemporary world dominated by multinational corporations. That is, McDonaldization is an effect of neoliberal globalization, driven by "accelerating technological innovation designed to reduce socially necessary labour time and strategies to increase existing markets and cultivate new global markets for goods and services."[64]

We contest the view that the post-war proliferation of McDonald's and other rivals (A&W, Subway, KFC, MOS Burger, etc.) in the Okinawan landscape is just a natural byproduct of modernization. Our analysis of the ongoing public relations campaign to modernize reveals camouflaged political expediencies working to condition the Okinawan public to support the business of military protection of Japanese economic growth as well as larger US interests protecting neoliberal globalization, as Calder noted.

Weber and his theory of rationalization serve to ground our larger argument in a historical context in Okinawa where bureaucracy holds sway in the accepted practices of economic development and base politics.

Okinawa Main Island is an island over-represented by rebar, concrete, and walls and fences rimmed with barbed wire, where the greatest amount of development-related budgets of all prefectures in Japan are designed by Tokyo under the guise of "development" and "regional regeneration." The important political foreground of the state-sponsored economic development in Okinawa is the concentration of US Forces in Japan (USFJ) in the Okinawa Main Island and, more recently, the islanders' resistance to the SACO realignment, especially the Futenma replacement facility (FRF) construction. In other words, the expensive "development" of this small island (one-ninth the size of Tasmania) is an intensely political project, and the propaganda for "development" needs to be understood accordingly.

The Friendly Face of McDonaldization in Okinawa

The success of McDonald's today, within the cornucopia of other corporate entities, captures a once seemingly prophetic vision of future American business ventures which, the then President of Columbia University, Woodrow Wilson, described. In an often-cited 1907 observation about American corporate and military operations, Wilson emphatically speaks for the need to force market liberalization overseas in the interest of the United States:

> Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of this nation must follow him, and the doors of unwilling nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked or left unused.[65]

We can see more explicitly than anywhere else "on" this so-called rock (Okinawa Main Island), how Wilson's vision presently appears in the interlocking interests between the business of war expressed in the private contracting economy[66] supporting the infrastructure as well as the men, women, and weaponry. The collective overseas US bases protecting America's national interest is code for protecting the interests of multinational corporate businesses, as both Butler and Calder testified.

This is why we use McDonaldization as the central framework of our study of social relations in which actually existing neoliberalism manifests in Okinawa. On its origins, we can begin to discern an image of this ethos under the critical lens of authors such as Bertram Gross who had warned in 1980 that a new, friendly kind of fascism was emerging in the United States. This new ideology has also since been projected overseas in US military outposts, such as in Okinawa, where local populations can encounter its expression in the unassuming activities of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) guests. How can this sort of friendly fascism be understood in the island culture? Taking care to stipulate that this ideology is not simply synonymous with neofascist policies, Gross observed that apologists of this strain of fascism see themselves as defending the country's authentic conventions in classical liberalism, which in 1980 was in its neoliberal chrysalis stage. Gross argues that this new form of fascism where

> more concentrated, unscrupulous, repressive, and militaristic control by a Big Business-Big Government partnership [aims] to preserve the privileges of the ultra-rich, the corporate overseers, and the brass in the military and civilian order.[67]

He points out that this emerging redesign of the social is presented as exceedingly "reasonable" because it is overtly friendly—to business—and, thus, part and parcel of the logic of neoliberal globalization. The 1943 image of a fascist jackboot in the face of the conquered has been replaced by a contemporary smile inviting both enthusiastic and reluctant local people to the fenced-in playgrounds and shopping malls in Okinawa. Resistance to the new base construction in Okinawa entails resistance to these welcoming overtures and the values and social relations promoted by propaganda for McDonaldization found ubiquitously in the Okinawan media and the educational milieu.

Instead of producing another descriptive study of how Okinawan society has been McDonaldized, we reveal who benefits from the expansion of the rationalization processes beyond the fast-food industry to wider Okinawan society. As an essential component of the hegemony at work in the social forces of production in Okinawa we have discussed in this chapter, an effective system of propaganda is necessary. The following chapter discusses the role that propaganda plays in winning the hearts and minds of people to serve unquestionably the needs of the Japan-US Security Alliance.

Notes

1. These processes stand in contrast to the retreating shopping-mall culture in big cities within the United States today. See, for example, "Is American Retail at a Historical Tipping Point?" *New York Times* (April 15, 2017).
2. Carolyn Handa. *Visual Rhetoric in a Digital World*. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004), 246.
3. There is a growing perception that new (digital) media are supplanting traditional forms of mass media and putting greater power in the hands of private citizens, but Sheldon Rampton points out that "One reason things have not changed as much as the techno-utopians imagine is that the traditional broadcast media remain the dominant media today. Television is still the main medium through which Americans get their information about the world. Much of the ferment that I have been describing on the blogosphere actually consists of people discussing what they have seen on TV, read in newspapers or heard on the radio. New media such as the Internet will undoubtedly continue to grow in importance as time progresses, but their actual impact to date is still limited" (2007).
4. Peter McLaverty, "Class" in Georgina Blakeley and Valerie Bryson (eds.) *Marx and Other Four-Letter Words* (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 46.
5. Daniel Cahill, *The end of Laissez-Faire? On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 65–66.
6. McLaverty, ibid.
7. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho, "Thirteen Things You Need to Know about Neoliberalism", *Critical Sociology* (August 16, 2016). https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920516655387.
8. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
9. Neoliberalism inherits the intellectual tradition of neoclassical economics, "above all the marginalist reaction against both the classical political economy of [Adam] Smith and the Marxist critique which sought to build on what he had accomplished …. dating back at least to the 1830s …. most important thinkers have been those of the Australian School," such as Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich von Hayak. [David Nicholson, "What was Neoliberalism?" in *Neoliberal Scotland: class and society in a stateless nation,* edited by Neil Davidson, Patricia McCafferty, and David Miller (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2010, pp. 1–89)], 5. Building on this neoclassical tradition, intellectuals of the Mont Pelerin Society, established in 1947, and the Institute of Economic Affairs developed the idea of neoliberalism and further publicized it; Hayak and Milton Friedman were especially influential.

10. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
11. Fred Block. 2003. "Karl Polanyi and the writing of The Great Transformation." *Theory and Society* 32:275.
12. The observation is hardly fanciful as debate has been unfolding for years over whether teachers ought to be armed with weapons in the classroom. More recently, in a May 2016 interview, Donald Trump observed that, "I'm not advocating guns in classrooms, … but remember in some cases … trained teachers should be able to have guns in classrooms."
13. Perhaps the most articulate claim about the benevolence of corporate power appeared in the public discourse in 1980 in a PBS series, *Free to Choose*. In it, Milton Friedmen directly addresses the camera, holds a pencil in his hand, and uses it to illustrate the wonder and magic of the free market: "There's not a single person in the world who can make this pencil. Remarkable statement? Not at all. The wood from which it's made, for all I know, came from a tree … cut down in the state of Washington … to cut down that tree, it took a saw, to make the steel, it took iron ore. This black center … graphite … comes from some mines in South America. … thousands of people cooperated to make this pencil—people who don't speak the same language, … who might hate one another if they ever met…. What brought them together and induced them to cooperate and make this pencil? … It was the magic of the price system, the impersonal operation of prices that brought them together and got them to cooperate …. This is why the operation of the free market is so essential—not only to promote productive efficiency, but even more to foster harmony and peace of among the peoples of the world."
14. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press [1944][1957]2001), 3.
15. Ibid.
16. Margaret Thatcher. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.
17. Milton Friedman. "Neo-liberalism and its Prospects," *Farmand*, February 17, 1951, pp. 89–93.
18. Op. cit., Harvey, 31.
19. Cahill, *The end of Laissez-Faire?* 66.
20. On the comprehensive examination of the durability of the idea-centric understanding of neoliberalism after the global financial crisis in 2007–2008, see Cahill, ibid.
21. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 265.
22. Ibid., 66.
23. Neil Davidson, "What was Neoliberalism?" in *Neoliberal Scotland: Class and Society in a Stateless Nation*, edited by Neil Davidson, Patricia McCafferty and David Miller (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2010), 31.
24. Cahill, *The end of Laissez-Faire?* 67.

25. James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 2002[1973]), 6.
26. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7.
27. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7.
28. Ibid., 2.
29. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 33.
30. Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, [1971] 1992), 262–3.
31. Gramsci defined civil society as, "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'." Ibid., 12.
32. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings, 1910–1920, ed. Q. Hoare, trans. J. Matthews, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), 143–4, cited in Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press), cited in Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press), 162.
33. Gramsci 1971, 235.
34. Gramsci 1996: 200–1.
35. Smedley D. Butler. *War is a Racket*, (New York: Revisionist Press, 1974 [reprint 1935]), 9.
36. Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci*, 94.
37. For a synopsis of McDonald's unparalleled effects on global food production systems and the environment, see: https://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/our-food-system.
38. Thomas Friedman. "A Manifesto for the Fast World," *New York Times Magazine* (1999).
39. In this context, 'hidden' can be understood in two ways: To the younger generations who grew up in the post-reversion era, the militarized local economy is not entirely visible to conscious awareness; conversely, to the older generations who lived through the US military occupation, the militarized local economy is visible. It is visible and present in the conscious awareness of those who both benefit materially and those who choose not to benefit. The former gives willing consent to the conditions and the latter reluctantly.
40. Fred Block, "Introduction" in Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, xxiii.
41. Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process", in Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg and Harry Pearson (eds), *Trade and Market in Early Empires: Economics in History and Theory*, Free Press, Glencoe, pp. 250, cited in Cahill, 63.
42. Cahill, *The End of Laissez-Faire?* 63.

43. Albert Memmi. *The Colonizers and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), 79.
44. Ibid.
45. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, "Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism'" *Antipode*, Vol. 34, Issue 3 (2002): pp. 349–79.
46. Ibid., 353.
47. On the 'developmental state', see, in particular, Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), and "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept" in Meredith Woo-Cummings ed. *The Developmental State* (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 32–60.
48. Meredith Jung-En Woo, "After the Miracle: Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia" in Meredith Jung-En Woo ed. *Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 1–31), 2.
49. Meredith Woo-Cummings, "Developmental State" in *Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1.
50. The Anti-FRF struggle in Okinawa since the mid-1990s coincides with the onset of political reforms toward neoliberalization in Japan. Since reversion in 1972, Okinawa became locked solidly in Japan's developmental state. The developmental state is a concept made salient by Chalmers Johnson and others' work as an alternative model of economic growth to both laissez faire liberalism and communism. However, as explicated in the World Bank report, the developmental state was considered a variant of neoliberal economy: with hyper-exaggerated state orchestration of market-oriented growth, managed by the 'plan-rational' state bureaucracy exemplified by MITI. The equivalent bureaucracy that orchestrated economic development in Okinawa was the Okinawa Development Agency and other delegated authorities reporting to the Prime Minister's Cabinet.
51. In Japanese, regeneration is *shinko*, which connotes conjuring up fire. In this context, it is industry, but the fruit of the efforts is often reaped by mainland economic actors as profit.
52. George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society.* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1993), 31.
53. Ibid., 1.
54. Weber, ibid., 956.
55. Ibid., 956.
56. Woo-Cummings, "Developmental State", 1.
57. Ibid.
58. Chalmers Johnson (see note 45) based his analysis of the developmental state on his observations of the MITI (now Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry).

59. In the estimation of Saint Jerome (*circa* 350), if you are idle, you are not being productive, or living out your birthright as a human being. Saint Jerome's original observation expressed as *"Fac et aliquid operis, ut semper te diabolus inveniat occupatum"* is the contemporary aphorism: "Idle hands are the devil's workshop." The concept colonizes the minds of many.
60. George Ritzer, interview by One-Off Productions, 1997.
61. Ibid.
62. Robert W. McChesney, "Noam Chomsky and the Struggle Against Neoliberalism," Monthly Review (50)11 (1999): 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/MR-050-11-1999-04_4.
63. Barry Smart, "Resisting McDonaldization: Theory, Process and Critique," in *Resisting McDonaldization*. London: Sage (1999), 4 (1–21).
64. Ibid., 4.
65. Michael Parenti, *Against Empire*. (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 1995). Reprint.
66. 'Private contracting economy' refers to both local people and American expats who serve the military complex in all areas of life and community, such as in housing, transportation, medical care, catering, family holidays, leisure activities, touring, foreign cultural experiences, sports activities, dating, and socializing. It also refers to the private technical assistance of multinational contractors specializing in war-fighting and logistical support.
67. Bertram Gross, *Friendly Fascism: The New Face of American Power in America*, (New York: M. Evans and Co., 1980), 161.

CHAPTER 4

Processes of Conditioning: Propaganda in Education and Media Systems

So far, we have discussed key concepts and effects of late capitalism as relevant to Okinawa's situation. We have also clarified the ever-present incentives for capitalists to manipulate the public mind through the use of cultural signs and symbols supporting neoliberalization and the militarism needed to protect the ideology. Whereas others use the term interchangeably with "public relations," we refer to this manipulation simply as propaganda.

In an effort to give some coherence to the chaotic mix of sights and sounds we observe in Okinawa, we turn to earlier systematic studies of propaganda, its social and psychological effects, and how these relate to media and education. This chapter explains what propaganda is, how it works, and how it serves to create consent to the realignment of forces in Okinawa.

Background: Precisely What Is Propaganda?

Edward Bernays sets out, in the early part of the twentieth century, to describe efforts made in society by intelligent people who must realize that propaganda is the contemporary tool by which chaos is turned into social organization for productive ends.[1] He suggests that propaganda is a special necessity to the successful maintenance of representative democracies, that the "conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses" is essential. The producers, "largely men we have never heard of," who "manipulate this unseen mechanism of society, constitute an invisible government, which is the true ruling power."[2] Whatever

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actions of social consequence are undertaken by systems of power, "whether in politics, finance, manufacture, … [or] education, it must be done with the help of propaganda."[3] Indeed, Aldous Huxley suggests that "if you want to preserve your power indefinitely, you have to get the consent of the ruled, and this they will do … partly by [the] techniques of propaganda."[4] "It is," as Bernays points out, "the executive arm of the invisible government."[5] From these descriptions we may see more clearly that well-organized societies, such as that of contemporary Japan, achieve coherence and stability partly through propaganda campaigns, the omnipresent ruler of the unconscious mind the public is hardly aware of.

Jacques Ellul explicates two important distinctions for two major forms of propaganda. These distinctions are useful if one seeks to understand their effectiveness and power over the people they aspire to appeal to in Okinawa. In aiming to move people from mere resentment toward revolt, agitation propaganda (as spectacle) is deployed by both organized opposition to established power as well as by governments against their own citizens. As it naturally attracts the most attention, agitation, according to Ellul, is the more visible and widespread.[6] For those empowered to assign to it official definitions, agitation is often seen as subversive since its common associations are destruction of an established order, rebellion, or war. Its presence has been felt throughout history as leaders (or subversives) use it to rally support for their particular cause.

Conversely, integration propaganda (adjusting to desired patterns of thought and behavior), as Ellul points out, is focused on achieving "conformity." Since it is no longer "sufficient to obtain a transitory political act (such as a vote), one needs total adherence to society's established truths and behavioral patterns … the more perfectly uniform, the stronger its power and effectiveness."[7] We will show that both forms are needed and widely used by established power and corporate media to achieve acquiescence through efforts to create common standards of thought. As integration serves as the carrot, agitation becomes the stick.

How Does It Work?

As contemporary theories and practices of persuasion are grounded in classical rhetoric, professionals employed in public relations today use a range of appeals to achieve their intended influence. Aristotle described the three major and most effective: *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*. Logos is an appeal to reason where objects of a message become persuaded by apprehending the

logical connections between a claim, proposal, or prediction and the data presented to support it (e.g. the new base in northern Okinawa will expand the local economy). The aim in such rhetoric of reason is to unite common concepts of militarism and concepts of the material economy, a concern that crosses social strata.

Ethos is an appeal whose persuasive power hinges upon a personality perceived to be authoritative and positioned to induce the object to accept a claim, proposal, or prediction (e.g. Barack Obama, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, advocates for global peace and security by advocating for expanded military operations and mass surveillance). The aim in this claim is to draw upon the power of archetypes by fusing positive associations of a person with authority (Nobel laureates) with concepts (e.g. militarism).

Pathos is an appeal to an object's sense of self-interest, identity, or emotion and works by connecting a claim, proposal, or prediction to the object's perception of the self (e.g. the new base in Okinawa will save you from the Chinese). The aim, here, is to stir emotions of fear and hope for protection grounded in the object's sense of vulnerability and need for self-preservation set against manufactured concepts of a dreaded enemy. Pathos has long been seen as the strongest appeal and been used with great effect in advertising and other areas of public relations. The selective absence (or strategic exclusion) and use of certain signs, symbols, images, colors, slogans, or other data meant to manipulate emotions are all part of the effort to fuse the intended effect with the latent feelings and perceptions of self residing in the object.

The desired effect can be seen in the emergence of expressed pseudo-needs. Persistent exposure to public discourse pervaded by claims of a communist Chinese desire to swallow up Okinawa forms part of the conditioning process that aims to create an emotional need on the part of the local people to be rescued or protected by authority figures. This feeling cannot develop in the object without an effective "education." Ellul refers to this process as pre-propaganda—the conditioning of minds with vast amounts of incoherent information, already dispensed for ulterior purposes and posing as "facts" and as "education."[8]

We aim to show that the propaganda campaign in Okinawa is sophisticated, pervasive, and enduring. It has been waged on all fronts described here. The prevailing signs and symbols in messages tightly focused on the purported benefits of destroying an ecosystem in Oura Bay, for example, appeal to the logic of economic development, to local conceptions of indigenous identity, and to various professional intellectuals who assert unquestionable expertise in national security.

Why Is It Produced?

One way to understand the profusion of propaganda in current-day Okinawa as part of the larger project of neoliberalization is to turn briefly to the lessons of the post-war period in the US as Stuart Ewen observes, when "the 1920s emerge as a watershed, [which are] the beginnings of a new social order codified by corporate developments."[9] Developments in industrial production, distribution, and corporate law were unparalleled in history, and the sheer bounty of material wealth and products that these changes brought to the free market for mass consumption were, at the time, enormous and overwhelming. Crucially, Ewen notes that if the post-war population were to be effectively

> habituated to respond to the demands of the productive machinery, the manufacturer had to create an ideological bridge across the traditional gaps—region, taste, need and class—which would narrow consumer prejudices in his favor. In response to the exigencies of this productive industrial system…, excessiveness replaced thrift as a social value. It became imperative to invest the laborer with a financial power and psychic desire to consume.[10]

This psychological desire Ewen refers to is stirred by an effective propaganda of conformity and integration toward consumption. When successfully manufactured, uncritical acceptance of Western democratic society's presuppositions and consumer behavioral patterns will produce stable conduct, adaptation, shared stereotypes, and beliefs that integrate individuals as active participants into the economic, aesthetic, and political order.[11] Since the end of World War II, work in the capitalist project aiming toward a standard and stable global order of economics has only intensified, and this intensification has become all too apparent in the purposes informing the propaganda of conformity presented for consumption in Okinawa.

In describing modern public relations, William Albig refers to the secret character of the sources and goals of propaganda,[12] the intention to modify opinions,[13] the dissemination of conclusions of suspicious validity through emotional appeals,[14] and the practice of inculcating ideas and positions rather than explaining them.[15] These aspects of propaganda are central to our analysis of Okinawa today. In light of Japan's traditional cultural tendency toward group cohesion—especially in Okinawa as a

marginalized voice within the Security Alliance hierarchy—understanding the ongoing propaganda campaign and resistance to it is crucial. Alluding to the purported necessity of questionable policies, Jacques Ellul notes:

> [N]ecessity never establishes legitimacy; the world of necessity is a world of weakness, a world that denies man. To say that a phenomenon is necessary means … that it denies man; its necessity is proof of its power, not proof of its excellence.[16]

Coercion, though, is ineffective in the long run. In spite of the stories of the omnipresent menace of the Nazi regime during World War II, for instance, US laws and policies alone, crafted to defeat Nazi aggression, were insufficient. This is why, as Massimo Leone notes, "Laws [and policies] are accompanied by continuous efforts of moral suasion and propaganda, whose joint efforts aim at inculcating in citizens a certain ideology of speaking, at setting a specific balance between disclosure and taciturnity."[17]

The right balance between what is disclosed in the propaganda and what remains hidden is struck in systems of education and mass media. Governments, their mechanisms of bureaucracy, and their corporate sponsors "cannot limit themselves to enforce an ideal standard of sustainable public conversation. They must also endorse it through an on-going propaganda effort, so as to convince citizens that,"[18] say, North Korea and/or China will most certainly attack us no matter what we do. Public relations (propaganda) firms

> ... provide an on-going rationalization for war by servicing government propaganda activities, military contractors, pro-war Hollywood films, and the marketing of war toys, cartoons and related products.[19]

In light of the long propaganda campaign undertaken by the military-industrial complex during the Cold War, many private citizens in Okinawa still exhibit residual symptoms of having internalized the central messages of that era. The presupposed menace of communism that agitated fear and loathing during the Cold War period can still be seen today in media references to Communist China or North Korea. This perceived ever-present threat imposed upon citizens through the propaganda serves to block any public critique of the standards, laws, constraints, and limitations.[20]

Regimenting Thought in Educational Practice in Okinawa Main Island

Though it comes from a distant place and time, the following anecdote can inform our understanding of the present. As collections of received knowledge, textbooks also signify efforts made by powerful interests to standardize public thought about society itself and its place in the larger world.[21]

As a reply to Thomas Edison's condescending remarks about the presupposed value of education, Einstein countered by suggesting that "[t]he value of an education … is not the learning of many facts, but the training of the mind to think something that cannot be learned from textbooks."[22] Einstein sees value in education if it is taken beyond prescribed academic texts toward larger truths accessible through observation and reflection on lived experiences outside institutional walls.

Our analysis throughout this book is an attempt to critique practices and forms of "education" that young people in Japan receive according to guidelines set by current holders of political power, especially the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEXT) under the LDP. We aim to look closely at messages in media and at the textbook as a sign of elite domination, at the symbolic and textual reproductions of knowledge that "inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society."[23] What we are referring to here can be understood as part of a larger system of public relations.

Control of and access to social power begin with standard education. The word itself and its signified variants (i.e. educated, educator, educating) may engender positive images of clean classrooms, the teacher and her students smiling, the orderly rows of desks with pupils sitting attentively in their chairs preparing for standardized tests. Everyone may be happy, at least those who want to be present and learning something new. A chalkboard filled with hand-scrawled formulas or maxims may enter the mind's eye. In light of these various positive connotations associated with education generally, Noam Chomsky offers an alternative perspective, applicable here and now, which describes how the educational "system is supposed to train people to be obedient, conformist, and not to think too much, do what you're told, stay passive…, [and] don't raise any questions."[24]

Since the end of World War II, Japan, with its pacifist Constitution, has been universally perceived as a nation of people who seek harmony and peaceful coexistence with its neighbors. This sense of pacifism has been reinforced, it may be argued, by a long-cherished cultural tradition employed to achieve these aims. *Honne to tatemae* refers to a larger cultural resistance to physical confrontation, specifying how harmony and peace can be maintained through adherence to the social prohibition of explicitly expressing personal feelings toward others—especially in public. Given the necessity of social order and peace, these traditional modes of communication, meant to conceal real feelings and intentions and to camouflage with a straight or smiling face, are essential in the world of adulthood.

In other words, the conspicuous absence of expressed emotion is considered to be of high virtue in Japan. This means that showing one's true feelings strongly in front of others is often construed as childish, disgraceful, embarrassing, or even incomprehensible for those who view themselves as reasonable adults. So often, in Okinawa, outside observers of the ongoing anti-base protests conclude that claims put forward by such impassioned people at the gates are simply unworthy of the general public's attention. Thus, it is extremely unusual to see citizens filled with and publicly expressing such outward signs of anger. While harmony and peace are central to the prevailing sense of social order, *honne to tatemae* can also make of emotion and experience a mask that obscures the expression of legitimate anger and dissent. The cultural tradition also, sadly, serves to camouflage important realities that may need vigorous public discussion in a democratic society.

Compounding these negative implications of *honne to tatemae* is a larger societal apathy intensifying the hesitancy of many people to engage or empathize with the protesters. Unswerving trust in authority added to passive indifference blinds many citizens who might otherwise come to see the problems also as their own and, thus, assume some responsibility to voice their own concerns about what is unfolding before their very eyes. Powerful public and private institutions are widely held to be respected and largely obeyed by citizens cultivated through schooling and media to accept uncritically what they are told. Forming an opinion counter to the established order, let alone expressing it, tends to be seen as extreme or offensive.

Another part of the problem in popular resistance to current base expansion plans is how the centers of power use various media to shape public perception. Details of the firsthand experiences of current protestors, for example, who had participated in resistance movements during the military occupation and after reversion are almost entirely lost to official history. The details of their witness of historical tragedies during World War II, for example, are largely excluded from the received varieties of history codified[25] in national school textbooks. Thus, their stories and perspectives grounded in a history of military brutality submerge in the private realm as unofficial histories. Since their viewpoints are not a part of the official textbook, many of the younger Okinawan generation who drive by the ongoing protests by Camp Schwab seem to avoid becoming involved or even showing sympathy. One way to appreciate this peculiar inability to apprehend the reasons behind such anger is to draw attention to the propaganda of taciturnity and conformity.

In public schools in Japan (including Okinawa), teachers lack power to select textbooks, nor do schools or prefectures themselves. Meanings of "academic freedom" are negotiated centrally and prescribed from above. Selection of a particular strain of knowledge comes from the top of the order, from bureaucrats and educational elites in the halls of political power in Tokyo. MEXT maintains its prerogative in prescribing which narratives of history are reproduced for schools.

This privilege is exercised through MEXT's textbook selection process. Citizens see the illusion of choice as a variety of textbook companies compete in the process, while the Ministry carefully screens the content so as to maintain the unassailable impression of a neat and orderly historical narrative. Any facts of history that might threaten to contaminate the purity of the present order are safely isolated, ignored, or erased by Ministry judges or editors. Students who receive their education in public schools, it has been observed, receive a sanitized variety of history. Details of this process of selection are discussed in the following chapter.

Even as world history and Japanese history are required subjects, Ryukyuan culture, history, and language are almost entirely absent from the academic coursework from elementary through high school in much the same way that Ainu narratives go missing.[26] Though it has long been claimed (and still consistently so) by the centers of power in Washington and Tokyo that Okinawa is the Keystone of the Pacific with its now great array of foreign military firepower, students learn nothing about pre- and

post-war Okinawa—the very periods that witnessed the emergence of this purportedly strategic region. The irony of systematically ignoring these eras of regional and global history in the education system seems not to have escaped the notice of many educators in Okinawa. The systematic ignoring of this history prevents students from grasping vitally important facts about their own identity and homeland, which has followed a distinctly different path in times past from other prefectures throughout Japan. Though some teachers are aware of these gaps in knowledge and attempt to address the history of Ryukyu and Okinawa, beyond the received varieties, in reality, even completing the curriculum within the time limits prescribed by MEXT in an academic year is a huge challenge. As a result, children in Okinawa now know about the generals or emperors of Imperial Japan, but have no understanding of past monarchs of the Ryukyu Kingdom.

Similar problems appear in Japanese classes. *Kokugo*, which is roughly translated as "the country's language," is necessarily Japanese. As an additional requirement, students also learn ancient Japanese and classical Chinese. That is, Chinese characters are learned and read with Japanese pronunciations. Despite this variety and depth of linguistic inquiry, no classes are given in Okinawan language studies, even as electives. As with the gates of the military bases that dot the local landscape, scholastic access to knowledge about Okinawan language and history is effectively closed off to public entry. This sort of systematic suppression of indigenous culture has been read as a form of oppression. If Okinawa continues to serve as a classic case study of ongoing oppression, it is instructive to turn to Paulo Freire's interpretation of education as a means of liberation. We seek, here, to elucidate some of the significant contrasting features between Freire's revolutionary ideas concerning education and those concepts that appear to prevail in Japan today.

There is still a significant gap, we suggest, between the official history supplied in schools and the MEXT curriculum, and an autonomous political agency. Whereas the late nineteenth-century Meiji seizure of Okinawa meant suppression in schools of local language and customs, the 27-year post-war US military occupation (1945–1972) meant suppression of political rights and will. Dispossessed of political power, cultural heritage, and language by colonial Japan and the US occupation, Okinawans have long attempted to reclaim their lost history of collective suffering in war that was denied to them.

One way of understanding current conditions is to see education as a process of banking, as Freire observed, in which students, rendered as accounts, are "filled" with something of relative value by teachers. Expected, therefore, only to "receive" the world as passive "receptacles," the banking model illustrates how thinking and action are controlled and how students are turned into spectators rather than re-creators.[27]

These concepts can also be seen in common understandings of what education is often thought to be. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) defines education as "(1) the process of nourishing or rearing a child or young person; (2) the process of 'bringing up', the manner in which a person has been brought up with reference to social station; (3) the systematic instruction, schooling, or training of the young in preparation for the work of life; (4) the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received (i.e. classical, legal, medical, technical, commercial, art education, etc.)."[28]

Prevailing ideas about education in Japan are typified by observance of top-down social processes which, at first glance, appear entirely reasonable. Professors (and Tokyo bureaucrats) and others in higher social positions are supposed to possess the greatest experience and wisdom. In spite of this, the problem is that politics appears to interfere with practice. Thus, local citizens in Okinawa, as elsewhere in Japan, must continually question whether those in positions of central power who decide the content of education actually have the best intentions for the greater good of the whole society. What are the moral, ethical, and economic sensibilities that inform their desire to "educate"? Tied also to concepts of education are words such as "nourishing," which connotes a thing needing to be fed. The object possessing need must rely for its well-being on the subject above who has the means and moral responsibility to provide nourishment.

The same might be said of "bringing up," as the phrasal verb suggests that one person occupies lower social strata and relies on the one in power to raise another person from a certain poverty of ignorance. This concept, a remnant of the Meiji era, finds elaboration in current educational law and classroom practice. Contemporary democratic Japan sees the elect arrogating to themselves all decision-making regarding the content of education, effectively circumventing the possibility of entertaining views of popular opposition. Such an assumption of power to "nourish" the electorate can be found in recent fundamental changes to MEXT guidelines (March 2015).[29]

Under the control of MEXT, strict guidelines come into place for primary and secondary schools throughout the nation. As universities represent the last bastion of support for young learners refining their methods of independent thinking and critical reflection, they are now under threat from central planners seeking to apply further controls over the standardization of thought. In recent years, central planners have been largely successful in marginalizing faculties in national universities from key decision-making processes.

In the following illustration (Table 4.1), the latest revision of Article 93 can be seen in the new education law, which dramatically shrinks the power of the teaching faculty by confining it strictly to discussions of enrollment, graduation, certifications, anything important regarding education and research, and any perspective the president might deem important enough for faculty to entertain.

Issues regarding budgets, management, human resources, and the entire curriculum are left to the control of university presidents. This revision marks a monumental shift from previous law (expressed in the upper half), which simply stipulates that faculty meetings must be convened for any important matters that arise. This recent change has been viewed as an efficiency that is both authoritarian and patronizingly paternalistic. Faculties have interpreted the subtext of this abrupt alteration in the following kinds of sentiment:

> The administrators, those at the top of the institution, have confined us to peripheral roles for our own good and the good of the students in our charge. We can now focus more fully on attracting new students and preparing them for work in the global economic engine in accordance with the directions and agendas of the administrative leaders.

This widely seen anti-democratic move toward a sudden consolidation of power invested in the university president and other top leaders has been seen in a corresponding move reflecting similar developments in larger society where the consolidation of power finds expression in the present government and its approach to controlling uncooperative citizens.

While discussed in fuller detail in succeeding sections, attitudes such as these are also reflected in the kinds of commands given to people who challenge the destruction of the forest in Takae and Oura Bay in Henoko.

Table 4.1 MEXT revision to education law

Basic law on school education: before and after revision
Before revision Article 93 A faculty meeting shall be established at universities, to discuss important matters. 1. Associate professors and other staff can be added to the faculty meetings organization. *After revision* Article 93 2. The faculty meeting shall state opinions on the following matters, on which the president makes a decision: (a) Student enrollment, graduation, and completion of the program (b) Degrees awarded (c) In addition to what is listed in the preceding two items, any important matter concerning education or research the president prescribes as necessary to consider the opinions of the faculty meetings. 3. In addition to what is prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the faculty meeting can express opinions concerning the education and research conducted by the president, dean, and other head of organization where the faculty meeting is located (hereinafter referred to as "president" etc.) or on request of the president. 4. Associate professors and other staff can be added to the organization of faculty meetings.

Note: Interpreted by author from the original Japanese text. Original illustration can be found in Appendix A

As protestors act to delay construction vehicles from moving forward through the gates protecting the military compounds where work commences, hired guards (as agents of central power) echo what many see as an authoritarian ethos adopted by the LDP: With mocking paternalism, they command the participants in the protest to, "Move back and watch out; it's dangerous (*abunai!*)." As though they were naïve school children, the protestors are reminded by guards, "You need to be careful because you don't want to get hurt," and "You must follow our instructions, and don't resist."[30] When asked to explain how they can possibly be involved in their protection racket focused on the illegal destruction of the environment, the guards merely repeat their commands. Observers of these interactions puzzle over the irony that those who want to protect the environment are being told that its destruction is for their own good and protection. This is characteristic of the kind of "education", it has been observed, that recalcitrant children receive.

While this paternal instinct to reinforce political power and order can be located in the LDP's new educational model, the idea has seen elaboration in George Lakoff's *The Political Mind*. The "strict father" model of society serves, in part, to explain how paternal care is shown to the offspring:

> The strict father is the moral leader of the family, and needs to be obeyed. … because there is evil in the world from which he has to protect them … [and since] there is competition in the world, …he has to win those competitions to support the family … You need a strict a father because kids are born bad, in the sense that they just do what they want to…, and don't know right from wrong, [and so] need to be punished strictly and painfully when they do wrong, so they will have incentive to do right in order to avoid punishment, [and rather] build … discipline…. With that discipline, they can enter the market and become self-reliant and prosperous. …Mapped onto politics, the strict father model explains why conservatism is concerned with authority, … obedience, …discipline, and … punishment. It makes sense in a patriarchal family where male strength dominates unquestionably.[31]

From this perspective, people are born unregulated (they want their freedoms), while the established order assumes the position of the central regulating force that sets limits on the aspirations of the public. The government makes use of law to discipline those who act outside the acceptable limits. Agents of the established order, whether in classrooms or at sites of popular protest, are empowered to dictate the terms of right and wrong.

Other denotations of "education" appearing in the *OED* engender negative impersonal images of rigid, methodical, and unchanging processes. For example, "systematic" suggests order, which presupposes the condition that people already in positions of power are enabled by the influence of tradition to fix arrangements and impose them on others. Raymond Williams notes that to be educated

> [w]hen a majority of children had no such organized instruction the distinction between educated and uneducated was reasonably clear, but, curiously, this distinction has been more common since the development of generally organized education and even of universal education. There is a strong class sense in this use, and the level indicated by educated has been continually

> adjusted to leave the majority of people who have received an education below it. The structure has probably been assisted by the surviving general sense of bringing-up, as in properly brought-up, which can be made to mean anything a particular group wants it to mean.[32]

An examination of education policy in contemporary Japan illustrates order and systemization as well as training and nourishing of students' minds to conform to the guidance given from the top by the "moral leader of the family,"[33] the central authorities. The central level of control over educational processes is most clearly exemplified in MEXT's present guidelines regarding moral education in particular: "The purpose of moral education is to nurture a consciousness of being Japanese people who respect, inherit, and pass along Japanese traditions and culture and love their country and homeland and work hard for the development of the nation."[34] In overseeing all facets of education across all academic areas, the Ministry, as a political tool, wields immense control over young people who pass through the disciplines of morality and culture.

Worth noting is the absence of "citizen" in the Ministry's conception of the purpose of a moral education that produces ideal people who are also aware of and engaged in their responsibilities as members of a social democracy. Editors at *The Japan Times* have also wondered what the central point of such an education should be if it is not to "cultivate in children an ability to consider what behavior they should display in a given situation, how they should act, what kind of life they should live, and what values they should embrace."[35] Cultivated through 12 years of formal education to obey the Ministry's concepts of morality, how should and how can the products of such a system think critically about larger society?

The editors warn readers that education once served the purpose of instilling in people the "ideology of militarism based on emperor worship [*sic*]" that sought "to infuse citizens with a uniform ideology."[36] An alternative may be, for example, a system that respects democracy and law and the importance of the informed citizen, who consciously participates in the democratic system that makes society strong and vibrant. But such an ideal has been a struggle for people throughout history. In turning briefly to some major philosophical figures, we can see a similar sort of struggle played out in competing ideas about education and its central purpose.

Civil societies have long wrestled over the meanings and aims of education. Some of the earliest debates appear in Plato's *Republic* where the philosopher saw education as a civilizing force for emotional development in the individual. According to Edward Power, "Plato [was] interested in building souls, a practical consideration that whet his interest in education."[37] Plato was also a conservative in some respects and believed strongly in the preservation of Greek culture, feeling that education was the highest virtue because it helped sustain society.[38] It is quite certain that he sought a lesser emphasis on sport, a greater emphasis on mathematics, and a careful expurgation of literature.[39] While he believed the greatest purpose of education is developing ethical values, and his writings are philosophical discourses appropriate only for the higher rungs of the educational ladder, he also knew that philosophy without a foundation of knowledge is a cold, barren, almost useless thing.[40]

Regarding his view on society, Plato also reserved some contempt for both traditional forms of education in Athenian life as well as in the orthodox view of women and their role and importance in society. His views were, in fact, rather progressive as he saw women being entirely capable of "making creative contributions to the community."[41] During the time of Plato's Academy, he saw that the "social limitations in Athens made it impossible for women to develop their natural gifts."[42]

It is instructive here to recall how indigenous Okinawan culture, before the Meiji annexation, placed females on common ground with their male counterparts. Whereas men were involved in public ceremonies of politics, only women were permitted to communicate with the gods of ancient Okinawan ancestors. This dual importance put on the public and the religious life in traditional Okinawa gave both men and women leading roles, but with the annexation in the modern era and subsequent introduction of mainland Japanese Shinto and Buddhist symbols displacing symbols of indigenous worship, the social power that women had once enjoyed disintegrated. A corresponding dissolution in local educational systems followed in Okinawa with the marginalization of the indigenous language, customs, and belief system, which were replaced with emperor worship.

The modern era is also marked by Enlightenment thought where reason and logic arise from trust in absolute objective truths. Out of this thinking came pragmatism, a philosophy that saw knowledge, meaning, belief, and science as free from the influence of ideology and best applied in the most practical way for the benefit of humankind. As societies are a

kind of human-made marvel, nonetheless in need of continuous attention and care by concerned citizens, John Dewey saw education as preparation of the individual as a social creature conscious of the needs and welfare of the whole society. Pragmatism came to shape much of Dewey's thinking about what education is and what place educational institutions should take within larger society. He felt that

> the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself. Through these demands he is stimulated to act as a member of a unity, to emerge from his original narrowness of action and feeling and to conceive of himself from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs.[43]

Bound to Dewey's idea of education is the concept of social democracy in which members of this unity can conceive of themselves as concerned for the "welfare of the group"[44] and not obsessed with the survival of a system that profits principally the very few.

Dewey also rejected the traditional view of education where knowledge is construed as an objective body of data divorced from human subjectivity and experience, but fed intact to young fertile minds not yet prepared for systematic forms of critical thinking. He observed that the

> [t]raditional model is teacher-driven rather than learner-centered. Knowledge and skills are commodities to be delivered by the teacher to the student. Students are docile, passive receivers, while teachers are agents of this transmission of knowledge and skills.[45]

The progressive perspective Dewey advocated sees knowledge as emerging from a process of interpretation and clarification of meanings, which contrasts with ideas in contemporary Japan where bureaucrats promote the teacher-driven model and students are conceptualized as passive repositories. In this educational milieu, top-down instruction supersedes horizontal dialogues that might open student awareness to multiple interpretations of reality. In such academic environments where dialogues proceed, the ideology of the day is put at risk of being deconstructed by fertile minds that dare to reassess the socioeconomic order.

Citizens expressing concern today about preserving Japan's peaceful post-war traditions are also having, increasingly, to reconcile their cherished

concepts of democratic education with the nation's current move toward nationalistic policies in schools just beginning to re-introduce the daily recitation of instructions of patriotic behavior outlined in the 1890 Imperial Rescript of Education.[46] While the movement to the right has been read as a reasonable response to the neoliberal global project, nationalism has been interpreted as a chance to reconstitute the unique characteristics of a culture being eroded and reshaped by McDonaldizing processes. When education teaches children to "extend benevolence to all" and to serve as "good and faithful subjects" of the emperor who will "offer [themselves] courageously to the state,"[47] we might wonder what kind of integration propaganda is needed to achieve these competing aims. David McNeil and Adam Lebowitz observe that new "education law views students as future subjects rather than as citizens."[48]

Tetsuya Takahashi sites a possible reason for this move by reflecting on Japan's gradual post-war return to nationalism as a "failure to rupture the continuity between the pre- and post-war periods" as "the emperor system survived"[49] and the result has been a "nebulous"[50] or "comfort-seeking totalitarianism."[51] Only recently, Takahashi notes, have Japanese begun to understand how "neo-liberalism and neo-statism reinforce each other while advancing separately at the same time."[52]

Regimenting Thought in Mediated Communications

In referring previously to privilege and to elite managers of bureaucracy and business, we wish to introduce additional connotations that tend not to appear in talk of powerful influences over perception and the public mind as these relate to contemporary Okinawa. Probing the etymological roots of "privilege" shows the term comprised partly of "privy," meaning "private," and "lege" growing from the root "legislate." Associated meanings are grounded in commonplace understandings of secrecy and privacy. A further point can be made about "elite," as the root derives from Old French, which was used to describe someone elected, but was in time, extended from those formally chosen in the social process to those specifically selected by God for some particular purpose.

As mass media have long assumed relative positions of authority and privilege, they have also taken on the role of primary knowledge source for larger society beyond the academy, where those at the top of the

social order can maintain some control over meaning and awareness. As part of the fourth estate of the realm, media also reflect society's powerful political and corporate interests. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky observe in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*:

> The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society.[53]

If we consider this observation within the context of contemporary Okinawa, we might also ask ourselves (as citizens) how the central government sees us as fulfilling our civil roles in society. According to Prime Minister Abe, we must, "Ask not what [our] country can do for [us]; [but] ask what [we] can do for [our] country."[54] This exhortation can also be read as a way of drawing a distinction between nation and citizen (or ruler and subject). Abe's use of antithesis (the "conjoining [of] contrasting ideas")[55] delineates clear power differences between elites and those whom they perceive to be subjects. The aim in such a balanced rhetorical equation is to reinforce public memory of these distinct categories. Media assist in fortifying the impression that guardians of the state call upon citizens to support them and their plans.

It is also clear that Abe is citing, if cynically, a memorable observation made in history when the American President John F. Kennedy (JFK) sought to inspire the nation to rally around his vision of the West. JFK promised to "assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty" and that, "this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house."[56] Max Atkinson observes that in terms of Kennedy's approach to public address, "contrasts were [his] preferred weapon."[57] Abe's apparent embrace of authoritarian governance[58] stands in contrast to Kennedy's egalitarianism.[59]

The apparent difference between Kennedy's and Abe's concepts of education might be summarized best in the conflicting interests that arise periodically between citizens and the state. Josiah Ober recounts the classical concept of an important contractual argument made against Socrates:

> [B]ecause 'we' [the state] are responsible for your birth, upbringing, and education 'you' [the citizen] owe us obedience in repayment for goods received, and because of this implied contract you must do that which may not initially seem to you most desirable.[60]

Central government attitudes toward Okinawa in contemporary life can be partly understood in light of the historical processes that brought Ryukyu into Meiji's domain of authority, where state leaders appear today to conceive of local people as ungrateful for the civilizing influences that helped rescue them from an "uncultured" and "primitive" past. The following chapter presents analysis of authority and its influences and techniques in rationalizing new developments for Okinawa.

Notes

1. Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*. (New York: Ig Publishing, 2005 [1928]), 168.
2. Ibid., 37.
3. Ibid., 47.
4. Aldous Huxley, *The Mike Wallace Interview*, May 18, 1958, retrieved at http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/huxley_aldous_t.html.
5. Op. cit., Bernays, 48.
6. Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 71.
7. Ibid., 74–5.
8. Ibid., vi.
9. Stuart Ewen. *Captains of Consciousness Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 192.
10. Ibid., 192.
11. Op. cit., Ellul, 75.
12. J. William Albig, *Modern Public Opinion*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), 296.
13. Ibid., 487.
14. Ibid., 293.
15. Ibid., 88.
16. Op. cit., Ellul.
17. Leone, Massimo. 2017. "Silence Propaganda. A Semiotic Inquiry into the Ideologies of Taciturnity," forthcoming. *Signs and Society*, 6, 1 (The University of Chicago Press).

18. Ibid.
19. Peter Phillips, "The Diabolical Business of Global Public Relations Firms," *Project Censored: The News that Didn't Make the News* (March 15, 2017).
20. Ibid.
21. At the University of California Berkeley Language Center, Aldous Huxley discusses *Brave New World* in a lecture titled "The Ultimate Revolution" and the influences that manipulate the public mind, and provides some perspective on efforts made by states to, "make use of all the devices available … to standardize the population, to iron out inconvenient human differences, to create, …, mass produced models of human beings arranged in some sort of scientific caste system" (March 20, 1962).
22. Alice Calaprice and Trevor Lipscombe, *Albert Einstein: A Biography* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 11.
23. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1988), 1.
24. Chomsky, op. cit., 1989.
25. Codification here means that the received variety of knowledge must be encoded in official texts so that interested persons can learn and use the "correct" forms that they believe will confer the likelihood for social or economic advancement. Codification in this context refers to one effort made by the MEXT to standardize thought and awareness about history.
26. Kohei Hanazaki recounts a life-changing conversation he heard between an Aboriginal Australian who had visited Hokkaido in 1983 to elicit support from the people in a campaign against uranium mining on Aboriginal land. The man told of the sorrows of the Aboriginal people who had their history and culture erased in 1788 by a colonizing force from England. This story prompted an indigenous Ainu woman to share the history of the Kunashir-Menesh Revolt of 1789 in Ezo (Hokkaido) that saw the indigenous Ainu take a final stand against Japanese aggression. This story of resistance, notes Hanazaki, "is little known in Japanese history; indeed, most Japanese know almost nothing about it" (117).
27. Ibid., 62.
28. *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Education."
29. The MEXT guidelines (2014) under Prime Minister Abe's direction now feature explicit directions for teachers to develop in students a sense of pride toward the nation-state and respect for Japanese tradition and culture. From primary school through high school, students also receive training in ethics. The guideline remind teachers that their "[s]tudents must be aware that wherever they go in the world that they are Japanese first." The subtext of this change is that one standard of being Japanese exists and, thus, the various cultures within the nation do not exist, or have no value to be considered as part of the educational directions.

30. Unnamed protestors, *Strangled Sea*. DVD. Directed by Yukihisa Fujimoto and Asako Kageyama, Naha, Okinawa: Morinoeigasha Co. Ltd., 2015.
31. George Lakoff, *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist's Guide to Your Brain and its Politics* (London: Penguin, 2009), 77–78.
32. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press), 111–12.
33. Op. cit., Lakoff, 77.
34. 『中学校学習指導要領』, 文部科学省 November 2010, 113.
35. Editorial, "Moral Education's Slippery Slope," *The Japan Times*, October 26, 2014, accessed February 16, 2016.
36. Ibid.
37. Edward J. Power, *Evolution of Educational Doctrine: Major Educational Theorists of the Western World*. (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts), 79.
38. Power, Ibid., 79–80.
39. Power, Ibid., 79.
40. Power, Ibid., 80.
41. Power, Ibid., 81.
42. Power, Ibid., 81.
43. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," (*School Journal* vol. 54, 1897), 77.
44. Ibid., 77.
45. John Dewey, *Experience and Education*. (New York: Kappa Delta Pi, 1938), 17.
46. Jonathan Soble, "Bigotry and Fraud Scandal at Kindergarten Linked to Japan's First Lady," *The New York Times* (February 24, 2017).
47. Ibid., Soble.
48. David McNeil and Adam Lebowitz. "Hammering down the educational nail: Abe revises the fundamental law of education," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, July 3, 2007, Vol. 5, Issue 11.
49. Tetsuya Takahashi and Hyo-duk Lee. "Philosophy as activism in neo-liberal, neo-nationalist Japan," (Trans. Norma Field) *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, November 3, 2007, Vol. 5, Issue 11.
50. Ibid.
51. Shozo Fujita. "Anraku e no zentaishugi" (originally published in Shiso no kagaku in 1985) in Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (Experiencing the age of totalitarianism, Misuzu Shobo, 1997). Tr.
52. Op. cit.
53. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1988), 1.
54. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goJaXzRgeSo.
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CHAPTER 5

Rationalizing Processes of Unnatural Selection

As sites selected for development (or destruction) are often informed by politics and have political outcomes, selection processes also force citizens to consider how their free speech can alter social and political dynamics. This chapter grounds site selection and self-censorship practices on historical concepts of rationalization. The protestant-inspired idea of rationalization, Max Weber noted, prevailed in the capitalist system of the industrialized world, in favor of certain groups of people inclined to protect their privileged positions in society. In *Economy and Society*,[1] we see Weber's historical investigation of societies that reveals how social order tended to align with major shifts in political power, a process that certainly survives in Okinawa in various forms today. Weber discussed three major distinctions: (a) *Legal Authority*,[2] grounded in legal processes and elections; (b) *Traditional Authority*,[3] exemplified by kings and queens who ruled through aristocratic power; and (c) *Charismatic Authority*,[4] exercised by a particular person who possesses all power to rule by autocratic might.

He saw "legal authority" as power emerging from the public's belief in and acceptance of the legality of enacted rules and the rights of those citizens elevated to positions of authority under such rules wherein they could legally issue commands and decrees. An example of legal authority is state politicians serving and reporting to the people who elect them to public office.

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"Traditional authority" rested on well-established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority within them. Monarchies today maintain various levels of influence over political processes as regards traditions that citizens seek to maintain. In Japanese culture, an example of the appeal to traditional authority is the observance of the Akishino-miya family as royalty.

Likewise "charismatic authority" rested upon societal devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him or her. Twentieth-century history provides the example of Hitler, whose adoring subjects praised him in routine public displays of affection. Today, Kim Jong Un holds authority over the people of North Korea through his dictatorship developed previously by his grandfather and father over the past six decades. Through the lens of mass media, we can see similar levels of filial piety expressed toward Chairman Kim as was expressed toward Herr Hitler during his reign.

As our discussions of rationalization have drawn upon sociology, rationalizing must also be seen as a psychological construct. In contemporary psychology, rationalizing refers generally to the process of justifying thoughts or behaviors that conflict with rules of logic and ethics. When people adopt this "coping style, [they] deal with emotional conflict or internal or external stressors by compartmentalizing opposite affect states and failing to integrate the positive and negative qualities of the self or others into cohesive images."[5]

Such behavior may involve attending to the internal stress by concealing the actual motivations for a thought, action, or feeling, which necessitates complex, reassuring, or self-serving reasons. For clarification, we turn to an infamous illustration. The Bush administration's preemptive assault of 2003, for instance, saw officials rationalizing the invasion of Iraq while declining to address squarely its ethical, legal, and logical motives by pointing repeatedly to the necessity of finding questionable stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). By dealing hastily with the purported threat of WMDs in the hands of a dictator, officials effectively obscured the underlying motivations for the invasion and, thereby, undermined the need to deal with any potentially troubling matters of logic, ethics, or law.

As we noted in Chapter 4, in systems of education and public awareness, bureaucratic power and privilege are exercised through selection processes. While we can see the exercise thereof in the selection of textbooks and

content, we can also locate the exercise of power and privilege in other areas of social life and corporate culture. Here, we offer a brief historical account of the process by which power and privilege in Okinawa both select and ignore inconvenient facts about the sites they identify for development. As we sketch out the background of Henoko's site selection, we suggest that the process of development creates various quantities of both real and rhetorical waste.

Our discussion here of propaganda leads us to wonder about other instances of disclosure and taciturnity. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt refers to these instances and forms as bullshit (BS hereafter), which is "one of the most salient features of [contemporary] culture, … [that] everyone knows this … [and] everyone contributes his share."[6] Frankfurt expounded his theory of BS within the context of the worst carnage in Iraq after the Second Battle of Fallujah.

Frankfurt's conceptualization of the public discourse of that period in the United States can help explain how in contemporary Japan assorted bureaucrats exercising legal authority set the parameters of the public debate over the unfolding offensive against the marine environment in Oura Bay. Central to the campaign to bury part of this pristine ecosystem are the government, military, and business strategies that seek to wield control over public perception of the issue outlining the claimed necessity of the new base. That success in structuring public opinion, Tim Hayward argues, comes from the

> capacity to generate compliant beliefs on a grand scale [through] an elaborate apparatus. Ordinary individual people do not command such a thing, but states and other powerful forms of organisation do. Such entities may develop strategies of deception for a variety of reasons. They can then produce *serious* [author's emphasis] BS.[7]

Frankfurt's concept illuminates empirical facts concerned citizens encounter in the public discussion. He argues that those who trade in BS

> ignore [the] demands of [truth] altogether. [They do] not reject the authority of the truth, as [liars do], and oppose [themselves] to it. [They] pay no attention to [the truth] at all. By virtue of this [behavior], [BS] is the greater enemy of the truth than lies are.[8]

For the purpose of the discussion of rationalization involved in the selection of Henoko, we refer to existing laws to contrast and emphasize the characteristics of BS presently on display. These serve as a solid foundation of legal precedent regarding long-cherished environmental protections.

As we discussed in Chapter 3, the forms of rationalization in contemporary Okinawa can be extrapolated from the signs and symbols in the public discourse signifying how state leaders and their supporters work to enact policies that breach environmental law and seek to curb free speech rights.[9] Significantly, to proceed with the plan to build a new US base in Henoko, the state bureaucracy has resorted to ignoring its own legal environmental assessment processes required for a public project. Regarding the MV-22 Osprey aircraft to be deployed at the new base, the ODB, the undertaker of the assessment for Tokyo, avoided mentioning their estimated environmental impacts (e.g. noise) up to the final stage, to which citizens could not express their views.[10]

Also, the ODB conducted its environmental survey in intrusive ways, which damaged the coral reef and chased away the Okinawa dugong, leading to the statement's presupposed conclusion that the construction would not adversely affect the health of the species that was now nonexistent at the construction site. The survey was conducted in a "surprise attack" on citizens, before any of them could communicate their opinions regarding the methods of the assessment in its scoping stage, as the process required.[11] Policymakers were cognizant of the violation, which, presumably, has caused them to harbor a moral dilemma as revealed by the ODB chief's describing the delivery of the government's final environmental assessment statement to the Okinawa Prefecture as an act of "rape."[12] How have bureaucrats in the position of promoting the goal of the replacement facility's construction coped with possible cognitive dissonance caused by their awareness of the environmental destruction that will ensue? This is where constant rationalization becomes necessary.

A Summary of Environmental Regulation

During the era of Japan's imperial expansion, the Public Waters Reclamation Act[13] (PWRA) came into existence in 1922 in an effort to promote coastal landfill as a peaceful civil means of broadening the national territory and as greater motivation to enlarge economic output during the years of rapid industrialization. The ensuing decades saw virtually uninhibited geographical expansion with many shocking alterations

to coastal and marine areas throughout various regions of the country.[14] Beyond rearranging coastlines, large-scale reclamation projects also wreaked havoc on mountains excavated for landfill purposes. Poisoned rivers, landslides, damaged fisheries, and devastation to previously undefiled ecosystems were among the effects.

As a reasoned response to the injudicious rush to develop and expand the nation's geographic boundaries, lawmakers amended the Act in 1973 in order to restrain uninhibited landfill rather than promote it. Today, key amendments in that law reveal troubling facts for the case that central government bureaucrats have built against Oura Bay. As regards publicly owned water, a landfill must be (1) reasonably necessary and appropriate; (2) conducted under sufficient consideration for environmental conservation and disaster prevention; and (3) conducted under processes of careful and strict consideration of laws.

It is also worth noting that despite the haste to fill in this portion of Oura Bay, the Prime Minister shares equal power with municipal and prefectural government leaders. Like the 1973 amendment to the PWRA that constrains the excesses of unchecked central powers to defile the natural environment, the Decentralization Reformation Act, amended in 2000, places significant limitations on Tokyo's legal ability to develop coastlines and marine waters without the consent of local citizens, but this balance of power has not prevented central planners from using other enticements[15] at their disposal to get their way.

Where We Are Now

The argumentative flow of the present plan runs as follows: In December 2013, a political arm of the Abe administration, ODB, asked Governor Nakaima to request that a study of the issue be undertaken by the Coastal Administration and Disaster Management Division—a subordinate office to the Bureau of Civil Engineering and Construction. In receiving their orders from Nakaima to undertake a study of the potential impact of the landfill, three office workers,[16] untrained in environmental conservation, signed official government documents declaring, bizarrely, that destruction of the environment from the new base construction will not disrupt conservation efforts. Added to their signatures were those of various other officials who consented to the results. This bureaucratic oddity, as summarized by Hideki Yoshikawa,[17] is made more acute by the fact that these office workers failed

even to consult experts before they signed the papers. Ironies from the resulting bureaucratic intrigue appear inescapably obvious:

> [T]he Disaster Management Division has managed to endorse the making of a disaster of a coastal area and coral reef whilst legal advice regarding the deliberate assault is dispensed by unqualified personnel and subsequently accepted by then Governor Nakaima.

The ongoing popular protests against the plan for the militarization of this peaceful bay appear to be the direct effect of central government bureaucrats abiding by a fundamentally flawed process of site selection. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has noted, "Japan is a country that respects the rule of law; therefore, the government is proceeding with landfill construction based on the fact that approval has already been obtained and with a view toward administrative continuity."[18]

One way to understand this thought process is to turn to the fallacy of incomplete evidence. While anecdotal observations of the issue might suggest that Suga is correct, history reveals disregard for the fact that local people had actually put Nakaima into power on the electoral platform of opposition to Tokyo and Washington's plans of FRF in Henoko. Furthermore the claim, as earlier discussed, conceals the fact that LDP officials had pressured Nakaima to reverse his opposition (see Chapter 10).

Furthermore, Suga rhetorically maneuvers from the active voice to the passive, first highlights (in the active) how national leaders abide by the law and, then, how approval was obtained (in the passive) so as to gloss over the realities of who precisely had given that approval. This maneuver, observes Michael Billig, is "often ideologically charged"[19]—a sign seen with little effort in Suga's description that the leading bureaucrats are content to "ignore the demands of truth" about their plans "altogether."[20] Standing in stark relief to the injudicious legal and procedural justification produced at the behest of Nakaima—and upon which Tokyo rests its rationalization—are three other environmental impact studies carried out by competent experts.

How We Got Here

Analysis of this present problem necessitates a return to Spring 2013 when ODB precipitates a landslide of critical opinions from local citizens as its official request for the Governor's approval of landfill operations arrives at

the prefectural office. The ODB request opened up a three-week window for citizens to study and respond to the 8,000-page application document. By the July 18 deadline, the prefectural office in Naha received more than 2000 critical responses, an unprecedented number,[21] from concerned citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the prefecture and the nation.

From early to late Autumn, another 3,576[22] responses appeared at the Mayor's office in Nago City. The deluge of angry reactions and conclusions to various studies prompted Mayor Inamine to solicit further advice from individual experts. Dr. Mariko Abe, Director of The Nature Conservation Society of Japan, Dr. Ken Tokashiki, Professor of Environmental Engineering at the University of Ryukyus, and Dr. Kunitoshi Sakurai, Professor of Environmental Engineering, all conclude from their research that the landfill operation requested from ODB will inflict harm on environmental conservation.[23] As a result of their expert testimony, Mayor Inamine delivered to Governor Nakaima the 23-page Nago critique of ODB's request, which included the expressed dissent of 14 city council members supporting Inamine.

Besides the Nago study, the prefectural Department of Environment and Social Affairs acquired the services of specialists in environmental conservation. Their inquiry, undertaken in November 2013 by 13 various experts in aquatic conservation, physiography and topography, marine botany and biology, zoology, botany, and geological conservation, also expressed doubt that the construction plan would not harm the environment. Beyond their study of environmental impact, the 13 experts also uncovered 48 flaws[24] in the original request submitted by ODB to Governor Nakaima for his approval of land reclamation.

The study participants enumerated and subsequently submitted the long list in a report to the Coastal Administration and Disaster Management Division, which apprises the Governor of potential violations of the law. In accordance with Frankfurt's prediction of BS practices, Governor Nakaima ignored for one month the 48 facts in the flawed application before he signed his approval for base construction.[25]

The studies themselves indicate that the government's plan violates not only its own laws, but features no expert opinions regarding the destruction done to "environmental conservation." The following timeline contextualizes differences between studies subjected to disinterested scientific rigor and those manufactured from apparent political expediency (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Timeline of Henoko approval process

Title/name/commissioning organization	*Dates*	*Experts consulted*
Reviewers Mayor Inamine Nago City[26]	Publication 11/27, 2013	1. Mariko Abe 2. Kunitoshi Sakurai 3. Ken Tokashiki
Environmental Impact Evaluation Committee[27] (EIEC) The Department of Environment and Social Affairs[28] Okinawa Prefecture Nakaima Administration	Official Intra-Prefectural Announcement 11/29, 2013	1. Junichiro Tsutsumi 2. Yasutoshi Yoshinaga 3. Shigeru Oide 4. Eizo Nakaza 5. Akira Maekado 6. Kunihiro Miyagi 7. Mizuki Tsuji 8. Kazunori Tatsuhara 9. Kazuharu Shinjo 10. Masashi Yokota 11. Shoichiro Suda 12. Michio Hidaka 13. Hiroko Ono
Clerical Procedure[29] The Department of Civil Engineering and Environment[30] Okinawa Prefecture Nakaima Administration	Signatures 12/25, 2013	
Environmental Impact Assessment[31] (EIA) Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB)[32]	*Ongoing*	1. Seiji Azuma 2. Nobuaki Arai 3. Shunsuke Ikeda 4. Hajime Kayane 5. Koichi Goka 6. Masazumi Shioda 7. Eiji Nakada 8. Yoshiyuki Nakamura 9. Takeshi Hara 10. Hiroyuki Matsuda 11. Tetsuya Yabuki 12. Hideo Yamazaki
Third Party Experts Commission[33] Okinawa Prefecture Onaga Administration[34] Administration	7/16, 2015	1. Hiroshi Oshiro 2. Kunitoshi Sakurai 3. Keisuke Taira 4. Hiroki Tajima 5. Makoto Tsuchiya 6. Yoshiaki Toma

Since 2013, while government bureaucrats appear to have, at least publicly, "paid no attention to the truth"[35] regarding the legal and environmental ramifications of their own project, the prefectural government, as outlined above, has commissioned an inquiry that would explore the various violations of law the project would trigger and which would, thus, justify a lawful cancellation of the former Governor's approval.

According to the "Verification Results" of Governor Onaga's so-called Third Party Experts Commission,[36] published in July 2015, the authors express reasonable doubt that the Tokyo plan contains "any rationale," "logical necessity," or "sufficient grounds," as the "process of consideration for environmental conservation" also lacks "rigorous and open research."[37]

Detour Strategies

As sleight of hand remains a gestural mainstay in a magician's stagecraft, corresponding forms of rhetorical misdirection can sometimes achieve similar aims in efforts to perplex the public over what precisely state policies are and who enacts them. Apart from determining to build a so-called sea-based airport facility in Oura Bay in the Henoko district in return for the closure of Futenma, SACO members had also agreed to enact a plan of relocating helicopter-landing zones in the pristine forest of Takae, Higashi Village, in northern Okinawa. The plan would require the return of 9900 acres (40 square kilometers) of Camp Gonsalves, also known as the Northern Training Area (NTA), which is about half of the entire base (75 square kilometers). It is important to note that the vast, subtropical forest in the northern region of Okinawa Main Island is called Yanbaru, which is home to over 4000 species of wildlife, including 11 and 12 forms of flora and fauna, respectively, found nowhere else.

As we suggested in Chapter 3, the sort of development outlined in the commonly known SACO agreement also necessitates certain kinds of disregard. In this case, it appears to be disregard both for transparency as well as for the necessity of precise language as ambiguity seem to serve the purpose of mystifying the public over government policies. Former Governor Masahide Ota referred to this absence of transparency in 2010[38] when he pointed to a secret meeting held in 2005 between former Defense Agency Chief Fukushiro Nukugawa and former Nago City Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro to solve problems over aircraft noise levels that would be generated in Oura Bay by the construction of an airfield. This kind of disregard for transparency allowed the sea-based facility in the

Table 5.2 Excerpt of SACO Final Report[39]

Return land:
- Futenma air station—see attached
- Northern Training Area

(1) Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3987 ha/9852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159 ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

(a) Provide land area (approx. 38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

(b) Relocate helicopter-landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

SACO agreement to mutate into the V-shaped runway design elaborated in the 2006 so-called Roadmap agreement.

Discussions of Henoko today often engender discussions of Takae. To understand why, it is useful to return briefly to the 1996 SACO Final Report (sections reproduced in Table 5.2). Key details appearing in the agreement illustrate our point about mystification of government policies.

Linguistic forms of ambiguity can camouflage acts of disregard for the forestland itself. Retrospect helps us discern the obscurity. For 11 years, from publication of the Final Report to July 2007, the details of how (a) would be applied in practice remained difficult for the public to discern. While the dazzling figures appearing in (1) were conditioned upon (a) and (b) being completed, hardly anyone in Okinawa could have predicted what was in store for Takae. Rhetorical misdirection, however, helped achieve a sufficient level of distraction and ambiguity: the conditions outlined in (a) and (b) might appear to the casual observer to be imperatives (commands) since they begin with action verbs, but we suggest that they belong to a different category of locution. Given the appearance of strong active verbs, we may infer that the agent (or agents) is doing the public a favor with the "Return" of something by providing and relocating.

Whereas nominalization is the rhetorical process of turning verbs into nouns, we suggest that actionalization[40] is the rhetorical process of turning nouns into verbs. The process enables the speaker—within a given context—to direct attention away from the agent (responsible party) while maintaining the pretense of using the active voice. Note that the agent (subject) assumed in (1) (the US military) cannot be the same agent assumed in (a) nor (given the shift in agency) is it clear in (b) who precisely the agent is. As part of the public record, such an ambiguity is difficult to interrogate and

over time develops a certain kind of official inertia, which also becomes difficult to resist given the weight of its long appearance in the public domain. Thus, the mystery itself dampens potential resistance to the plans made public in 1996, since no one in particular at that point could be identified or blamed for planning the environmental destruction of certain areas in Takae.

The ambiguity in public policy language disappears only when agreements are put into practice and the bulldozers and dump trucks roll up on the scene to commence work. The effect is a startled public outraged by what it perceives to be a sudden attack by the state on the peace and tranquility of the natural environment. When they were finally applied in actual practice, the agreed-upon principles in (a) and (b) meant construction crews had to begin sacrificing thousands of trees to "ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean." The decimation of so many trees has shown, again, how central power selects which rules to observe and which to ignore. Since plans for the wilderness in Takae have actualized in 2007, more recent strategies of obfuscation have also commenced in plans for Futenma.

In February 2014 in Tokyo, central government bureaucrats announced a new initiative skillfully named "Futenma Airfield Burden Relief Promotion Council."[41] Touted with flourishes of official fanfare, this purportedly all-new government project promised highly focused attention on solving Ginowan City's lingering problems with the Marine base at the very center. To reinforce public perception that the central government is working hard for Okinawa Prefecture, the Prime Minister asked President Obama, also, to work really hard to have MCAS Futenma operations closed down within five years, as well as to see to the removal of all Ospreys outside the prefecture.

On the surface, the name itself for this initiative suggests positive advances in central government attention to long-standing conditions, yet a closer look at the words chosen to represent this official act of relief reveals an Orwellian interpretation of reality. Citizens of Okinawa who have long endured the occupation of their land have consistently seen the foreign military garrison in Ginowan as a base (基地) rather than as an airfield (飛行場). The varied connotations are important, as they call up distinctly different images in the mind—one neutral, the other negative. Framed officially as an "airfield" in government literature, Futenma can be reimagined as a simple minor runway with assorted planes parked about haphazardly, whereas 'base' connotes an organized complex, vast and permanently

anchored in a geographical space. The careful naming represents a strain of BS that minimizes the expanse of land occupied by the base while, at the same time, ignoring the vast amount of land needed to fill in part of Oura Bay as a so-called replacement facility.

In agreeing with Donald Rumsfeld[42] that Futenma is the "most dangerous base in the world," Suga reminds the public of the government's solemn responsibility to protect the citizens of Ginowan City from the ever-present dangers of the "airfield" and to carry out that effort in the most expeditious manner.[43] This tight rhetorical focus helps Suga ignore the fact that Rumsfeld had declared, quite plainly, in 2003 that the Henoko relocation plan was dead.[44] According to Suga, it has already been 19 years since the SACO agreement, so it is vital, since we finally have Nakaima's endorsement, that the government move dramatically to alleviate the burden.[45] By framing the construction of a new base in Henoko as an act of great relief, the central planners free themselves from the burden of addressing the legal ramifications of the Henoko plan, as it focuses exclusive attention on its burden relief efforts for the people of the City.

Another strategy employed by bureaucrats is to overlook local political processes so as to enforce central government aims. According to reports from the *Sankei Shinbun*, three hamlets in the vicinity of Henoko, incorporated within the boundaries of Nago, were scheduled in October 2015 to receive a burden compensation of approximately $100,000 each for their acquiescence to Tokyo's plans,[46] as well as for their suffering through the daily inconveniences created by the ongoing protest movement.[47] Since it was deemed necessary, evidently, to bypass the political process, a new name was needed to describe this extraordinary circumvention of politics. The translated name given to this so-called exceptional measure was Local Promotion Support Plan (地元復興支援策).

The October plan was meant to support first and foremost social contact between local citizens and Camp Schwab Marines in cultural exchange events funded strictly by the first installment of compensation. Subsequent compensation, as of this writing, purportedly may come to Henoko for future large-scale infrastructure development projects. One way to interpret this process is to consider the carrot and stick analogy. As local people focus attention on the carrot of future development, which represents the potential promise of attention and support, the government's veiled threat of neglect serves as an effective stick of symbolic violence. Having previously voted against destruction of Henoko reef, Nago City has felt the presence of this stick from Tokyo.

To further bolster Tokyo's October plan of the previous year, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani himself appeared in Nago City in late March 2016 to discuss a recent development in the size of the monetary carrot that would be offered to leaders of the three hamlets. The Minister of Defense emphasized that he would like to listen to the demands of the leaders to understand how he could best support development of local communities.

Funded by citizen income taxes, this political strategy to mollify Okinawan public opposition to Tokyo plans his also a variety of BS that effectively ignores both larger issues of central government assault on the local environment and on democratic processes (see Chapter 10 for more detailed discussion).

(Mis)Interpretation

The transfer of ideas from one form of communication to another presents excellent opportunities for the production and dissemination of BS. The following examples illustrate how interpretations of language and history are swayed by various ideological forces that inform central government policies. Political pressure tactics can precipitate forms of self-censorship, the signs of which appear in the practices of professional interpreters and news organizations. In the Spring of 2015, during a press conference with Mr. Abe in the White House Rose Garden, Mr. Obama made the following observation of the ongoing issues in Okinawa:

> Our new guidelines complement our effort to realign U.S. forces across the region, including on Okinawa, in order **to lessen the impact of our bases on local communities**. And I reaffirmed our commitment to move forward with the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to **Guam**.[48]

Simultaneous interpretation, in Japanese, of President Obama's remarks, however, yielded the following oral invention from a translator at *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation):

> 沖縄の普天間基地の移転について、より柔軟に対応したいと思います.
> (With regards to Futenma Air Base in Okinawa, I want to deal with its relocation more flexibly.)

Here, we see the interpreter both ignore keywords in the President's speech, such as "Guam," and the US Government's "commitment to move forward with relocation" as well as interpose a reference to Futenma.

This rhetorical evasion creates the impression for the larger viewing public in Japan that Washington sees Okinawa as the only and best solution for the repositioning of Futenma operations. At the time, some members of the audience may have inferred from this exchange that any reference to other possible locations besides Okinawa might serve to weaken Tokyo's case to carry out its plans for Oura Bay.

The following day, other media outlets picked up the NHK story to report on the Rose Garden speech at the White House and called attention to the interpretation. Although it is unclear whether the inaccurate interpretation had been planned or not, NHK did respond to perceived public concern by tersely correcting its error the next day in an early morning broadcast when much of the nation, unlikely to take significant notice, was waking up. Perhaps as an effort to avoid acknowledging the questionable communication, NHK offers no archived evidence of the apology from the brief morning broadcast nor, as of this writing, can there be found any original transcript of the Rose Garden speech which might be further studied.

Frustrated by an inability to access the details, we called NHK's service center in February 2016 to request the archived transcript. Conflicting responses to our requests included the following: (a) "I have the transcript of the interpretation in front of me, but I asked my boss, and he said that we cannot share it"; (b) "We don't have a transcript of that speech"; (c) "I will look for the speech right now, please hold; … Please use the official website and send a written inquiry so that we can try to find this speech transcript and send it to you. By the way, we may not have the entire speech, actually, but only portions of it."

A subsequent written request for the transcript lodged at the official website on the same day produced the following reply from NHK.

> *Dear X,*
>
> *Thank you for your inquiry. We are sorry, but we do not write the transcript for simultaneous interpretation before nor after the speech. Also, the footage with interpretation is not available on our website at this moment. Generally speaking NHK do not hand our news script itself to outside* (sic)*. We are sorry we could not be of any help to you. Please kindly understand our situation. For your reference, there is footage with Japanese dub on the website by the official residence of the Prime Minister.*
>
> *Kind regards,*
>
> *NHK Audience Assistance Center*

The polite tone in the response can be read as *tatemae* which masks *honne*: an effort to conceal ontological facts. While this communication

style is shaped by cultural pressures, we can also observe how political pressures can be applied to news organizations in the interest of obscuring uncomfortable facts. Of course, the practice of applied power crosses national boundaries. During the preemptive rhetorical assaults launched on Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 US invasion, the Bush administration became infamous for using mass media to fabricate Iraq's hand in 9/11 so as to turn public opinion toward its political will. The Abe administration, it also appears, is willing to adopt similar strategies. The form of this rhetorical fabrication follows the function, or purpose, of creating an illusion that the United States—principally—is leading the present assault against Oura Bay, with Japan following this prime mover.

Techniques in Editing History

Having commissioned and finished work on the rough cut for a new documentary film that intended to cast new light on the 'comfort women' issue, three NHK executives were summoned to appear before then Minister of Economics, Trade, and Industry Shoichi Nakagawa and then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe after a screening of the production in 2001.[49] Evidently incensed by some of the content, Abe remonstrated, "You will not get away with it. Think for yourself!" while Mr. Nakagawa observed, "Make the program neutral; if you can't do that, then quit."[50] While the first locution implies a veiled threat, and the second a tempered excuse for the threat, the third and fourth seem to express some odd ambiguities.

Since a direct order to modify the content was not explicitly issued, the NHK officials were left merely to interpret the implied meaning of their visit to LDP headquarters. Subsequent editing of the content, though, saw deletions in taped testimonies given by surviving war veterans who had admitted to the rape of Chinese women.[51] NHK officials, it may also be inferred, felt coerced in reinterpreting the central aim of the documentary as the title, moreover, received a complete makeover from "Japanese Military's Wartime Sexual Violence" to "Questioning Wartime Sexual Violence."[52]

In late 2004, in his testimony before NHK's own Compliance Promotion Committee (CPC), a third-party panel of lawyers who seek to protect workers from retribution when they report ethics violations, Satoshi Nagai effectively blew the whistle on Nakagawa and Abe by admitting to

unwavering compliance with the forces of central government political power. After Nagai's testimony, NHK was bound by law to carry out its own internal investigation, yet the political pressure to move forward with an inquiry appears to have been too great for even this storied institution, as the *Asahi Shimbun* reports.[53]

According to Nagai, no investigator has, since his appearance before the CPC, approached him to learn more about his involvement in the scandal. The result of this appearance, though, has produced a landslide of internal and external complaints, as well as a lawsuit against NHK brought by the NGO contracted, originally, to direct the documentary.[54] Much of the content that had appeared in the rough cut of the film had been provided by the Violence Against Women in War Network Japan[55] (VAWW-NET Japan), a Japanese NGO of 700 people that works closely with Amnesty International to create a 21st century, free from war and violence against women.[56]

In 2015, at a public rally against the current CEO of NHK, Kouzo Nagata, then a producer at the network, appeared at the protest adjacent to NHK headquarters where he also reflected on the 2001 documentary scandal. "We made a huge mistake," Nagata admitted, "when we bent the truth under pressure from Abe. We should never have done that. That painful mistake is something I have to bear for the rest of my life."[57]

A new conceptual model clearly explains how public perception can be manipulated and the interpretation of facts so widely ignored in the production and dissemination of BS, amidst the complexities illustrated in the national political discourse.

Techniques in Fabricating 'Official' Explanations

Just before he exited public office as Defense Minister, Satoshi Morimoto observed in 2012:

> Militarily, the relocation of Futenma [operations] doesn't need to be in Okinawa, but politically, Okinawa is the most appropriate place. … There is only Okinawa that can allow it.[58]

Morimoto's explanation represents an incredible admission: bureaucratic elites can ignore with impunity the results of local democratic decision-making, in Okinawa. This apparent culture of political disregard

we are describing seems to be verified as well by acknowledgments offered by former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in early February 2016. At the Japanese National Press Club in Tokyo, Hatoyama made public some rather surprising details concerning this sort of political intrigue when he produced a purportedly official three-page government document entitled, "Explanation from the United States Regarding the Futenma Relocation Issue."

The document, dated April 19, 2010, had been marked "confidential" but, as the narrative unfolds, was declassified in April 2015. When it finally came into the public purview at the press conference, Hatoyama pointed out that three officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had visited him at the Prime Minister's office on April 19, 2010, with this allegedly official document outlining the results of a high-level discussion they had recently had with US officials at the Embassy in Tokyo. The document referred to the content of a hitherto unnamed US military training manual which, reportedly, includes the following key passage: "In terms of the unity of the training of the air force and the training of the ground forces, the relocation limits must be within 65 miles of Futenma"[59]—an obvious sign that no one wanted any other site besides Okinawa Main Island, which conveniently happens to be 66 miles from head to toe.

As regards the declassified 'confidential' document and understanding the mountain of BS that Hatoyama himself had to contend with as Prime Minister, it is important to recall the political promises he had made during his 2009 campaign for the nation's highest seat. He had been elected during the popular movement for Okinawa in a time when the citizens of other prefectures, evidently, felt more amenable to the possibility of seeing Futenma operations leave Japan altogether, or at least be moved elsewhere within the country. The US base burden that Okinawa had long borne, finally, appeared to be a matter of merely working out minor details in achieving some genuine long-awaited social equity.

After he came into office, Mr. Hatoyama presented to the Japanese public the possibility that Tokunoshima, an island within Kagoshima Prefecture, could be a potentially suitable site for the relocation of Futenma. The location, though, is over 200 miles north of Ginowan City.

As he noted in the Tokyo press conference, after the document was apparently declassified, Hatoyama asked the *Ryukyu Shimpo* to conduct an investigation on the authenticity of the US military manual cited in the document as grounds for keeping the base in Okinawa. A subsequent inquiry undertaken by researchers with the *Shimpo*, however, has yielded

no evidence of the existence of such a manual, nor of such a statement regarding the claimed necessity of maintaining Futenma air operations within 65 miles of ground operations.

Hatoyama also indicated that his office contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs just after the document was declassified and asked that officials explain how the document had even come into their hands. The initial response during the conversation, he reported, was surprising: "It is not an official document," but later in the conservation they hedged, saying, "We are not sure if it was drafted by the Ministry."[60]

As of this writing, an investigation is ongoing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to determine where responsibility lies for this ostensible fabrication. As a final thought before moving on, we are reminded of Philosopher Harry Frankfurt's illustration: BS pays no attention to [the truth] at all, and as Minister Morimoto admitted, the truth is that Okinawa is not necessary for the relocation of Futenma. The document that Hatoyama made known to the public served, in part, to point to the likely fabrication of a supposed military necessity as well as the desperation of bureaucrats to rationalize an unreasonable policy.

Notes

1. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
2. Weber, ibid., 941.
3. Weber, Ibid., 9xx.
4. Weber, ibid., 954.
5. Sophia Dziegielewski, *DSM-V-TR*. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 2010), 75–76.
6. Harry Frankfurt. *On Bullshit*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 61.
7. Tim Hayward, April 9, 2017 (5:00 p.m.), "A Theory of Bullshit II: Serious Stuff," Tim Hayward Blog, April 7, 2017, https://timhayward.wordpress.com/2017/04/07/a-theory-of-bullshit-ii-serious-stuff/.
8. Op. cit., Frankfurt, 61.
9. Sakurai Kunitoshi, "Japan's Illegal Environmental Impact Assessment of the Henoko Base" *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 10, Issue 9, No. 5, February 27, 2012.
10. Article 28 of the Japanese Environmental Impact Assessment Law nullifies the assessment statement altered mid-way, resulting in increased adverse impacts to the environment not reflected in the assessment's earlier stages.

11. Sakurai, "Japan's Illegal Environmental Impact Assessment of the Henoko Base."
12. 'Okinawa defense official's injudicious remark regarding the submission of the Henoko environmental impact report', *Ryukyu Shimpo*, November 29, 2011.
13. For details, visit http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/T10/T10HO057.html.
14. Background information regarding the PWRA can be found at http://www.foejapan.org/aid/henoko/pdf/150826_sakurai_text.pdf.
15. Related forms of so-called enticement can be found at http://apjjf.org/2013/11/27/Daniel-Broudy/3963/article.html.
16. For details, see: http://okinawabd.ti-da.net/e6378232.html.
17. For details, see: http://apjjf.org/-Hideki-YOSHIKAWA/4799/article.html.
18. Original quote in Japanese reads as follows:日本は法治国家なので、行政判断の継続性の視点から埋め立て工事を進めていきた
19. Michael Billig, "The language of critical discourse analysis: The case of nominalization," *Discourse & Society*. (Thousand Oaks; Sage Publications, 2008), 783–800.
20. Op. cit. Frankfurt.
21. Hideki Yoshikawa, e-mail message to author, February 1, 2016.
22. Detailed statistics can be found at http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-210375.html.
23. Public Relations and Liaison Division Planning Department, Nago City Office, telephonic communication, January 30, 2016.
24. For details, visit: http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-210375.html.
25. Concerned citizens infer that Mr. Nakaima ignored the results from independent studies submitted for review.
26. Having witnessed during the July window of opportunity the unparalleled outpouring of the public's critical response to the Henoko plan, Mayor Inamine subsequently solicits further responses, over a three-month period, from citizens as well as reviews from three experts, so as to bolster the City's scientific and democratic case. Delivery of the comprehensive report to Governor Nakaima comes just a few days after five national politicians from the Okinawa LDP reverse their positions on relocation within the prefecture. Inamine suspects that Nakaima will also cave in and reverse his position, which he later does.
27. For details, visit http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/kankyo/seisaku/hyoka/shinsakai/meibo.html.
28. The evaluation was commissioned before Nakaima reversed his position on Henoko and published with conclusions that throw into doubt that reclamation will do no harm to the environment. Having consulted individually with 13 members of the EIEC, the Department of Environment and Social

Affairs submitted their opinion paper to Coastal Administration Disaster and Prevention Division under the Department of Civil Engineering and Environment, and to The Fisheries Infrastructure Division under Agriculture, under the Department of Forestry and Fisheries (県農林水産部漁港漁場課).

29. 吉川秀樹「普天間飛行場代替施設建設に関わる公有水面埋立承認の判断基準に関する公開質問(要請)」 (June 6, 2014) Accessed at http://www.nacsj.or.jp/katsudo/henoko/pdf/2040606henokoumetatekoukaisitumonjyo.pdf.
30. Used by the central government to warrant base construction.
31. For details, visit http://www.mod.go.jp/rdb/okinawa/07oshirase/chotatsu/kankyoukansiinkai/h26iinmeibo.pdf.
32. Since April 2014, participants of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) have convened five meetings and have, thus far, produced no conclusions. While ODB has funded the study, it has also been reported that four members of the EIA received 1.3 million JPY from companies that promote the construction plan, including a major construction company and a construction environment consultant company in Tokyo. Professor Seiji Azuma resigned in March 2015 over his belief that the group's work did not reflect the will of the people of Okinawa.
33. 第三者委員会、2015年7月16日http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/documents/houkokusho.pdf.
34. Lawyers and environmental experts studied the plan and published conclusions that Nakaima's use of a clerical stamp of approval had violated four of six legal stipulations in the PWRA and, thus, the subsequent Governor Onaga's cancellation is legal. An in-depth investigation was undertaken of the procedure the Coastal Administration Disaster and Prevention Division had followed when providing its conclusions. Publication precipitates lawsuits and counter-suits from both Tokyo and Naha.
35. Op. cit. Frankfurt.
36. Gavan McCormack, "Introduction: The Experts Report and the Future of Okinawa," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 13(2) 2015, accessed February 14, 2016, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/29/Gavan-McCormack/4344.html.
37. Comprehensive details of the Advisory Panel process and results can be found in Japanese at http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/houkokusho.html.
38. Masahide Ota, "The World is beginning to know Okinawa: Ota Masahide Reflects on his Life from the Battle of Okinawa to the Struggle for Okinawa," (Interview with Satoko Oka Norimatsu) *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 8(38) 2010, accessed June 17, 2017, http://apjjf.org/-Ota-Masahide/3415/article.html.

39. Details of the Final Report can be found at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html.
40. Brian Michael Goss and Christopher Chávez observe in "Total Aliens or Humans Just Like Us?" in *Identity: Beyond Tradition and McWorld Neoliberalism* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 52–53.
41. Details of the meeting can be found in English at the official government homepage of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/actions/201402/18futenma.html.
42. A reference in Japanese to Rumsfeld's observation about Futenma can be found here http://www.okinawainfo.net/futenma2.htm.
43. Yosihide Suga, "Visiting Okinawa: I Will Do My Best to Alleviate Base Burden" *Personal Blog*. Accessed August 16, 2016, at http://blogos.com/article/128515/.
44. Unsigned Article.『普天間飛行場:米「代替なしで返還も」』*Mainichi Shimbun*, February 13, 2004, 1.
45. Op. cit. Suga.
46. Details of the central government direct monetary support to districts surrounding and including Henoko that circumvent Nago City authority can be found reported in Japanese at *Sankei Shimbun*: http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/151023/plt1510230006-n1.html.
47. Details of the inconveniences are outlined in Japanese at http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/151110/plt1511100045-n1.html.
48. A full transcript of the address can be found at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere.
49. Further details of LDP's political pressure on NHK regarding comfort women issues can be found at http://www.jcp.or.jp/tokusyu-04/nhk/.
50. Details of that meeting have been reported by Kozou Nagai and can be found at http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik13/2013-12-16/2013121601_01_1.html.
51. Henry Laurence, "Censorship at NHK and PBS," *Japan Policy Research Institute*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005
52. Ibid.
53. Unsigned Article. NHK 番組改変問題「会長了承していた」と告発者会見, *Asahi Shimbun*, January 13, 2005.
54. Akira Uozumi.「政治介入」の決定的証拠, *Nikkan Gendai*, September 2005, 28.
55. The NGO changed its name to Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC) in 2011.
56. Details on the work of VAWW RAC can be found at http://vawwrac.org/nhk01.

57. Details of Nagata's public address in front of NHK headquarters can be found at http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/259892.
58. Details of Minister Morimoto's press conference can be found at http://ryukyushimpo.jp/editorial/prentry-201059.html.
59. Details of Prime Minister Hatoyama's press conference at the Japan Conference of Journalists (JCJ) can be found at http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/285911#idx-3.
60. Ibid.

PART II

Propaganda, Processes, and Analysis

CHAPTER 6

McDonaldizing as a Force for Militarizing Okinawan Society

Humans are incoherent and inconsistent creatures. We inherently hope for peace and tranquility, yet repeatedly rationalize and devise new and more efficient ways of killing ourselves and our natural environment. We are capable of the most compassionate and courageous acts as well as the most hideous cruelties. With our intuitive sense of time escaping our grasp each new day, we insist on telling ourselves to take pause and savor life while inventing new ways of increasing speed and efficiency at the cost of personal freedom. Our schools, universities, and media purport to liberate us with new knowledge while confining us to patterns of thought that abide by the centers of power. Indifference and a lack of critical thinking are effects of this cultural conditioning pushing efficiencies, invited and uninvited, into our lives.

In contemporary Japan, one can clearly see the sorts of efficiencies in the features of McDonaldization insinuating themselves into the public consciousness. Their presence can now be felt in the signs of integration propaganda employed by central government bureaucrats. One such instance appears in the propaganda campaign for the new "My Number"[1] system (Fig. 6.1), featuring the highly effective signs of a pretty face and a cute bunny meant to combine a disarming smile with (and subdue) our sense of suspicion at being numbered and tracked by Big Brother.

The central government's effort, launched in October 2015, aims to introduce the latest advances in IT, touted to "usher in a more efficient, egalitarian society" that claims to "cut away red tape by improving the

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DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5598-0_6



Fig. 6.1 "My Number" propaganda

efficiency of administrative tasks" that will "enable the public sector to keep abreast of individual and social welfare information linked to ID numbers."[2]

Each person in Japan, whether citizen or resident, is meant to receive a card embedded with a computer chip holding the name, birth date, address, photo, unique 12-digit identifier, as well as the bank account number of the bearer. Sheldon Wolin predicted the implementation of this kind of purported economic efficiency when he observed that "the economy is viewed as a tool which the powers that be manipulate and utilize in accordance with what they conceive to be the political requirements of ruling, and they will take whatever steps are needed in the economy in order to ensure the long-run sustainability of the political order."[3] As to the language used for nominalizing[4] and, thus, normalizing the process of numbering prisoners in death camps where "Work sets you free" (*Arbeit macht frei*),[5] the process of digital numbering, or micro-chipping, citizens requires a new language to actionalize[6] and normalize this emerging cultural tradition. Critics of the new social process suspect an old kind of economic slavery reemerging and made more enticing through sophisticated marketing techniques and the general public fascination with new technologies. These new tools of efficiency promise speed and accuracy and tacitly declare to citizens the great value of abiding in the long human traditions of societal evolution.

Classical rhetoric offers something insightful about the emerging social practices of the present. The *argumentum ad antiquitatem* (appeal to tradition) signifies that the propagandist is likely embracing a fallacy. Holding such a position in an argument means maintaining an inconsistent logic in the claim that tradition, in and of itself, holds justified power and prestige over reason in a battle over who holds the logical and valid position. Appeals to tradition appear in interpersonal relationships, organizations, institutions, and cultures. We wonder, though, whether we can say that all social situations, as well as developments in new and more efficient tools, are simply traditional and natural aspects of the human condition.

Such has long been the case in the argument that many people construct concerning the socioeconomic status quo in Okinawa. The well-established tradition of maintaining US garrisons throughout the island is often presented as important self-evident proof that peace and security can be maintained if only the hitherto 72-year-old tradition were preserved. The post-World War II era for Okinawa continues to live the tradition of militarization, the extent of which scarcely anyone outside the local culture can fathom. The day-to-day problems associated with these conditions remain visible to concerned citizens locally, but hidden from those outside the island who can exercise power and authority to rationalize efficiencies for the future of the island.

This rationalization is, in essence, a method in the McDonaldizing process where logically consistent rules are replaced by illogical (or traditional) ones. Rationalization necessitates the propaganda of integration. One of the fundamental aspects of McDonaldization is that almost any task in the scheme can (or should) be rationalized. For the past seven decades, the power holders in Washington and Tokyo have rationalized the tradition of maintaining an immense US military presence on the small island of Okinawa. In the context of neoliberalization of the Okinawan economy, this tradition inextricably works with the state's social conditioning toward McDonaldization. In this chapter, we explore the top-down process in efforts to propagandize and condition the hearts and minds of it targets to internalize its messages and promises, concerning, in particular, the promotion of efficiency.

Making Efficiency Normal

The first feature of McDonaldization we discuss is efficiency—a quality of the routine business transaction we tend to crave as well as one forced upon us as consumers and citizens. Anyone who enters a typical McDonald's will likely note almost immediately that staff tend to be highly efficient in carrying orders and delivering menu items into the hands of customers. Top managers have designed optimal processes and workspaces for staff to move efficiently from the counter where orders are received, to deep fryers or grills, to soda dispensers or lamp-lit bins with sandwiches ready for serving.

Numerous steps in the process are also automated and spelled out in instructions displayed on widescreen monitors where servers can simply read and follow the most efficient path to the goal, which is consumption. In some McDonald's, human servers have been altogether replaced by computerized touchscreen menu stations that receive and communicate orders to human workers. This has further increased efficiency as well as control (to be elaborated in Chapter 7). Efficiency as an applied science is elevated to a fine art at McDonald's. According to Ritzer, "McDonaldization implies a search for maximum efficiency in increasingly numerous and diverse social settings. Efficiency means choosing the optimum means to a given end."[7] Elsewhere in his definition, Ritzer further notes that, "Although the fast food restaurant did not create the yearning for efficiency, it has helped turn it into a nearly universal desire."[8] McDonald's itself has helped immensely to manufacture the perception and belief that all forms of efficiency are a necessity in all things consumable. Various organizations and institutions have had to adjust their practices so as to achieve the levels of efficiency demanded by consumers accustomed to unparalleled convenience and the routines of daily life in the fast lane.[9]

One prominent feature of the geographic and economic landscape of Okinawa's reconstruction in the post-war period, during the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR),[10] is the introduction and development of the American fast-food industry and the concepts that were, and still are, needed to efficiently sustain and, with some luck, nurture that industry in the midst of a traditional, agrarian culture. An image of this efficient fast-food culture in Okinawa emerges in George Barrett's 1952 *New York Times* piece of that era.

> The Cup and Saucer, a soda-fountain hangout for the 'teenage set' (complete with bobby socks and blue jeans) and for the hit-and-run coffee crowd, does a rush-order business in 'tin roof sundaes', and any car customer who wants to spend an extra five cents for the take-out service can get it from jaunty-capped soda clerks—Okinawan—who looks as though they have just stepped out of a Howard Johnson's.[11]

Along with apparent efficiencies needed for the effective militarization of geographic spaces came the emerging culture of fast food that would help support the military system and remake oriental Okinawa into a model of occidental development. The picture provided by Barrett is characteristic of the members of an emerging military community on the move and taking full advantage of the modern conveniences presented by the growing infrastructure.

As Ritzer notes, while "the military was at the center of Weber's analysis of the rationalization process (the forerunner of McDonaldization), [the military] continues to be at the center of the process."[12] In construing efficiency as a means to a given end, "the global U.S. military role in response to the spread of communism" just after the war, for example, "did expand at about the same time that McDonald's was created; they [the military and the company] are based upon the same principles."[13]

Reinventions of Traditional Okinawan Culture

In Okinawa, the central government's interpretation of efficiency through its economic-development propaganda became more clearly defined during Okinawa's gubernatorial election of November 2014. This key election dislodged the pro-Henoko candidate from power. This chapter examines the sorts of efficiencies packaged in the propaganda that claims to benefit larger society. Understanding these contemporary messages requires a brief return to history for context.

In recent years (2007–2017), citizens in Okinawa have been at odds over the issue of Henoko, framed by the centers of power as the only site in Japan suitable and justifiable for a certain kind of development. Stark differences of opinion have appeared in the public discourse and at protests whenever plans for Henoko's development reemerge for debate. This is likely because the threat of destruction planned for Oura Bay has long been in the making. What the SACO decision did in 1996 for the planned SBF (see Fig. 6.2) was merely to confirm those plans, at long last, laid decades previously for what




Fig. 6.2 1997 Sea-based facility (SBF) design

is now known as the FRF (see Fig. 6.3). Archived blueprints, uncovered by Makishi Yoshikazu,[14] show various designs drawn up during the mid-1960s for a comprehensive facility to be built for the US Marine Corps at Camp Schwab. The earliest known proposals for military development of this region of the island had, as opportunities arose, returned periodically for discussion and debate. The decisions made by the SACO board, when examined in hindsight, appear to have marked the perfect opportunity in history to finally put plans laid during the formal US military occupation into action in the post-occupation era. That is, the contemporary argument for development (or destruction) of Oura Bay is based upon decisions made in the post-war era of US military occupation, a period when Okinawans were subjects of the US military government and required passports to visit Japan. These facts of history have not gone unnoticed by many local people, some of whom have lived through the brutality of war, its attendant miseries in occupation, and present-day conditions.




Fig. 6.3 1966 Master plan of navy facilities Okinawa

Two distinct designs in blueprints from the Vietnam War era illustrate both the historical and practical nature of the architectural drafts. While the dates of the drafts show a significant history, they also reveal something profound about the thinking in that era regarding attitudes toward the environment. As the plans of that period were meant to deal with the problem of Futenma and its inconvenient location, efficiency appears to have been the central goal in the planning of its relocation to Oura Bay during a time when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not yet come into existence. In terms of deployment, mobility, and logistics, the most efficient site for a MCAS in Okinawa is Henoko, but gains in efficiency, as it is argued, are lost in the destruction of biodiversity (Fig. 6.3).

Certainly, this kind of development of the island is not only against the law, according to anthropologist Hideki Yoshikawa,[15] it is also unethical. Construction would mean the destruction of the ecosystem and a natural habitat for marine animals in the waters just off the coast in this region of the main island.[16] Beyond these problems in the logic that informs decisions about Henoko's fate, Yoshikawa observes that "officials [from the Department of Civil Engineering and Construction] have admitted that they have no expert knowledge or experience regarding the conservation of dugong, coral, [or] alien species."[17] This particular absence of knowledge and its use as justification represents a key point of public contention, as we discussed in the previous chapter.

Influenced simply by ignorance (or indifference), the planned development in Henoko appears typical of those who hastily advocate for efficiency in place of the necessary research and procedures to protect the environment. We referenced in our discussion of CDA the rationalizations for efficiency seen in the mining practices of mountaintop removal where monstrous externalities of toxic sludge impoundments, poisoned drinking water, flooding, and the destruction of communities have hardly curtailed this mining practice.[18] Certainly, the efficient destruction of mountains has meant higher monetary profits for energy companies. Ritzer encapsulates the gradual decline of our sense of connection to the natural world from our blind pursuit of efficiency:

> In the 1950s, the dawn of the era of the fast food restaurant, the major alternative to fast food was the home-cooked meal made mostly from ingredients previously purchased at various markets. This was clearly more efficient than earlier methods, such as hunting game and gathering fruits and vegetables before cooking. By the 1950s, few Americans still relied on hunting or gardening for the ingredients for the meals; local stores and the burgeoning supermarkets were more efficient sites for obtaining food.[19]

Thus, those who pursue greater efficiency, or seek to maintain systems of efficiency at all cost, have internalized their disconnection from less efficient practices in daily living, which are more natural and bring people into closer proximity to and understanding of nature, but require greater patience. Howard Zinn put this sort of hurried uncritical embrace of efficiency into a larger context in a lecture about wars in American history deemed unquestionably "holy" and impervious to serious reexamination. In discussing codified

American history with its presupposed necessity of the Revolutionary War, Zinn poses a rhetorical question about whether fighting against England was even required for eventual freedom from the British Crown, especially given the huge costs in lives lost. He points out that

> sometimes it takes longer [to realize your goals] if you don't want to kill. Violence is fast. War is fast. And that's attractive—right?—when you do something fast. And if you don't want killing, you may have to take more time in order to achieve your objective. And actually, when you achieve your objective, it might be achieved in a better way and with better results.[20]

Professionals employed in the business of planning, practicing, and prosecuting war (or supporting the complex) tend to focus intently on meeting the immediate goal given the most efficient means available. Beyond achieving maximum efficiency in military operations, the impulsive rush to higher levels of efficiency appears also in negotiating contracts for construction projects that necessitate environmental destruction. When indigenous citizen knowledge of the environment is subsumed by the so-called professionals, or officials, as Yoshikawa points out, the officials tend to exercise their power to preserve the pretense that they understand the effects their decisions have on the environment better than the people affected by those decisions. For decades, government officials and local citizens have weighed the issue of whether yet another US military base will benefit the island against the cost of destroying more of the natural environment.

These issues were widely explored in local gubernatorial election politics in 2014, which can be read as a referendum over accepting or rejecting the planned destruction of Oura Bay. As advocates for the plan consistently framed the military project for Henoko as a development in national security, our use of the term "destruction" is also politically charged. In 2013, for example, the campaign of Nago City Mayor Susumu Inamine, whose district includes Henoko, centered on the promise to thwart Tokyo and Washington's plan to develop Henoko for military use. Mayor Inamine not only overcame not only the campaign mobilizing large funds against him by his local political opponent, but also contended well against the larger political forces associated with Governor Nakaima and the centers of economic and political power in Tokyo and Washington. Nakaima had run his own earlier gubernatorial campaign on the pledge that he would never accept the planned base at Henoko, an apparent sign that he had rejected the plan of destruction for the sake of efficiency as construed by the planners in Tokyo and in the American military.

But with Tokyo and Washington moving ahead with plans for the base, Mayor Inamine decided to take the anti-base case to Washington and New York. Inamine's visit from May 18–24, 2014, was both pragmatic and symbolic. He was able to communicate to the political leaders and people in the US in person the grievances of the local people who have long endured the impositions created by the bases. His presence provided an opportunity to directly challenge Okinawa Governor Nakaima who had given Tokyo and Washington a coveted gift on December 25, 2013—official prefectural permission to begin construction of the new US military facility.[21] As the effect of that kind of gift-giving had immediate political ramifications, the following discussion serves to critique the signs and symbols used by the political forces in Naha, Tokyo, and Washington now supporting (and resisting) base expansion so as to control the connotations of key terms in the debate[22] (i.e. development). It is an examination of the continuing struggle to shape the outcome in the most efficient way possible.

If efficiency refers to the optimum means to a given end, the effective use of symbols of power and authority represent an efficient means of manufacturing consent. Local citizens and members of the US military forces cannot likely miss the omnipresent symbol of the prefecture, prominently positioned in public spaces, mass media, and official written documents. The design is simple and elegant. The white circle represents the Roman character "o" (standing for Okinawa) while the outer red circle represents the surrounding ocean, and the inner solid circle represents peace, harmony, and development within the larger global context. One can hardly mistake, too, the importance of the meanings expressed in the prefecture's symbol and its colors. When the symbol appears in official communications, citizens know that these messages carry the power and authority of the local government.

Visually casting Okinawa as an integral component of the nation state, even while the voices of local people are largely marginalized, represents an effort in achieving a certain form of efficiency. The shape and color of the prefectural symbol collocated with the state symbol (*Hinomaru*) and the symbol of Imperial Japan (*Kyokujitsu-ki*) mounted on a para-militarized van of a right-wing group represent a simplistic reduction of Okinawa's local authority (Fig. 6.4).

Colors and symbols are instant and visceral messengers. Of all the nonverbal forms of communication, it is worth noting that color is the most immediate means of communicating messages and meanings.[23] The



Fig. 6.4 Para-militarized van in Okinawa

repeated visual juxtaposition of local and state symbols and their colors make the meaning of their relationship normal and routine in the minds of those who encounter them in public. "Colour," notes J.H. Kleynhans, "stimulates and works synergistically with all of the senses, symbolizes abstract concepts and thoughts, expresses fantasy or wish fulfillment, recalls another time or place and produces an aesthetic or emotional response."[24] Their collocation and contextualization with the traditions of Imperial militarism are an effort to hasten the conclusions we might draw, as consumers of visual information, about Okinawa's harmonious integration into the national plan. This effort can also be found in political communications that blur the line between the official and the corporate.

The following communication was published October 5, 2014, in the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, *The Okinawan Times*, *Miyako Mainichi*, and *Yaeyama Mainichi* by the Okinawan Government Planning Office (企画推進課), American Military Affairs Office, and Community Security Policy Office (地域安全政策課). The top portion features the ubiquitous symbol for

the prefecture connoting its official status with accompanying (*kanji*) characters for Okinawa and public relations (広報). In bold black, next to the name of the official office is the title of the communication, a definition of what is being proposed, which is a "Prefectural Government Plaza" (県政プラザ). "Plaza," cast in Japanese *katakana*, connotes the positive images of the European concept of a public space where citizens are free to meet. The subtitle in bold red, just below the black bold title, combining *kanji* and *kana*, proclaims a "new stage" in the military base "solution." The *katakana* evoke positive developments that represent a literal "step up" from previous socioeconomic lows. The feeling is that when people can finally accept the Henoko plan, we can all move forward together. The "21st Century Vision" the preceding Nakaima government had put forward was to represent a great "relief," as the name connotes, and ability of the government to strategically and efficiently give shape to the economic future (Fig. 6.5).

The central message in the text below the gold line calls attention to the local government's hard work in solving the Futenma base issue through productive dialogues with Tokyo and with US military authorities. They promise to "keep working hard" to secure "liability relief" from the central government, and in order to maintain positive forward momentum. The strategy is to keep the audience focused on the visible problem of Futenma MCAS, that dangerous and overbearing foreign military presence in the center of densely populated Ginowan City, which is slated to be closed once the Henoko Base is constructed.



Fig. 6.5 Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (top quarter)

The Efficiencies of Burden Relief from Futenma

In the following section of the advertisement, readers are greeted with an array of images and textual information. The headline in white, with pink background, invites readers to contemplate a future when they can realize fast (早い) and efficient relief from the ever-present dangers (危険性) of Futenma. The *kanji* for "fast" reinforces the necessity that taxpayers ought to act quickly, much like their response to an infomercial peddling Ginsu Knives.

The aerial image of Futenma MCAS features a red border (connoting danger) outlining the base and a legend corresponding to the various schools in close proximity to this danger zone. No one who has lived in Okinawa for any length of time, especially in Ginowan City, can fail to recognize the great dangers that exist for people who live and work in communities crowded around this base. The image and its mockup of school danger zones reinforces a long-understood reality but presents it as some fresh government insight that we should, as citizens, be grateful and happy to be apprised of.

To the right of the image, an explanation box outlines five main points: (a) we live with daily aircraft noise and under threat of a potential plane crash in our communities; (b) the base occupies one quarter of the city while the surrounding areas just outside the base hold many schools and residences; (c) the base creates negative effects on civic functions and transportation in such a densely populated area; (d) eighteen years have already passed since Washington agreed to return the land; and (e) both the Japanese and American governments insist that relocation of Futenma base to Henoko is the only available solution and that the process of constructing Henoko and removing Futenma will require more than nine years. Having reflected on the first four points, presented as new information, readers see the fifth presented in the strict terms of black and white as the government's one and only plan for solving the problems.

Zero alternatives are entertained, and this conclusion for the urgent problem is further reinforced in the box featuring a message in red pointing to the only way forward. On the right, the image of President Obama and Prime Minister Abe calls attention to their hard work to come to a reasonable agreement featuring details of three high-level meetings in February, April, and September of 2014. The first meeting resulted in significant progress in the development of Futenma Airbase Burden Relief Promotion Committee, a taskforce needed to show citizens that both governments are fully committed to relieving Okinawans of the

burden. At the second meeting in April, Prime Minister Abe asked President Obama to work to have Futenma closed within five years. The final meeting in September showed even greater progress when a new government minister was appointed to head the Burden Relief Committee (Fig. 6.6).

The final image is a view of Futenma MCAS featuring a KC130 taxiing to the runway. Readers wondering what kind of work has already been done to move the Futenma base learn that an unknown number of KC130s have already been relocated to Iwakuni Air Station on mainland Japan in August 2014. It remains unclear, though, whether the aircraft have been permanently moved.

In the following section of the advertisement, the color green predominates. The positive images of a green environment flood the imagination as we read about the "burden removal that is moving forward" (基地負担の軽減は、着実に進んでいます).[25] A green map of central Okinawa depicts the troubling US bases scattered across the land from Naha City to Chatan Town. The bases, depicted in red splotches, are singled out as areas that will be returned once the new Henoko base is completed, turning the populous central and southern areas green. To reinforce the value of building the Henoko base, which will destroy the natural bounty of Oura Bay, citizens learn that they can look forward to yet another massive shopping mall, with accompanying industrial facilities, on land once long occupied by a military golf course. Worth noting is that this region, known for its extremely rich soil, before the US military took it from local farmers, had produced some of the island's richest crop harvests. The artist's rendering of a new business development surrounded by greenery evokes many positive images of a time when this area was rich with nature itself (Fig. 6.7).




Fig. 6.6 Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (second quarter)




Fig. 6.7 Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (third quarter)

The textual information reinforcing the map points to a hopeful future when the southern region of the island and the northern region can be more closely linked as the bases that effectively divide the island and severely hamper travel disappear. As with the preceding section, the box of text points an arrow downward to the only logical conclusion that readers are compelled to draw: if we can strengthen the geographical links between northern, central, and southern Okinawa, we can enjoy a new and more tightly knit prefecture born of our collective efforts.

In the final part of this ad, readers are shown a future free from bases in areas from Chatan Town to Naha City. They can also see another artist's concept of land once occupied by Futenma as tree-lined streets bound by a light rail system that cuts a path directly through the old airstrip. The old asphalt tarmac, concrete flight line, and steel hangars give way to new apartment buildings, houses, and shopping areas. Local school children, from elementary and junior high, were also enlisted in the effort to put an innocent spin on the hopes of the future with submissions of art work that imagined a future without the presence of the Futenma base (Fig. 6.8).

The three central points conveyed in the header communicate the idea that the investment for developing the land is imperative to bringing Okinawa into a brighter future and that the bureaucratic plan lays the groundwork for this future. These points also emphasize that government leaders will also pay close attention to citizens' opinions about the direction of development for Okinawa as a whole. Perhaps the cruelest irony is that the bureaucrats have largely ignored the opinions of local citizens about the "development" of Henoko.



Fig. 6.8 Prefectural propaganda for Futenma relocation (bottom quarter)

The Efficiencies of Controlling Meanings of 'Development'

Herbert Schiller notes, in "US as Global Overlord," that one of the most tested and effective ways of maintaining order in society is to control the meanings of important words, which can be accomplished through power and access to powerful forms of media. Schiller called this society's "informational infrastructure," (expounded in Chapter 9), which the elite use to produce and circulate "the governor's view of reality local or global."[26] In the case of Okinawa Prefecture governed then by Nakaima, citizens were confronted with a governor who could easily draw upon the forces of the informational infrastructure at his disposal and advance his particular view of development for the people and the land.

The signs, symbols, and textual information analyzed in this local government propaganda point to spaces, land areas, and imagined communities in the future that develop, strangely, from the destruction of these present places. Citizen voices that demand respect for local democratic decision-making are largely overcome by calls for efficient "development" at all costs—notably at the expense of the environment threatened by the huge reclamation project. At the time, the impending decision in the political race for the Governor's seat in Okinawa's November 16, 2014, election possessed significant consequences for the environment, which were obscured by stories of future economic development. If Schiller was right about the power that Governors hold generally over the meanings of key words and concepts, the question is, how can citizens develop critical awareness of the issues beyond the narrow views presented to them?

Notes

1. We suggest that the possessive pronoun 'My'—ubiquitous in this present age of mediated digital communications over 'My network' on 'My computer' with 'My documents' saved at 'My settings'—represents a pervasive and insidious expansion of the institutionalization and commodification of egotism. The so-called My Number system is part of an effort to normalize anti-social attitudes and to integrate the individual citizen more deeply into the growing automation of digital commerce, consumption, and civil responsibility. The 'My Number' public relations campaign presupposes that citizens had chosen to exercise their authority as free agents and select a method of fair and efficient social organization. Embodied in these expressions of possessive pronouns are forms of false autonomy, freedom, and personal choice in an age of eroding social relations and mutual trust. 'My Number' pretends to confer control and autonomy but, we contend, promises a future of passwords, alienation, and increased control over domestic life with coerced interaction with the machines and databanks that are coming to dominate us in this digital age.
2. Unsigned (October 5, 2015). "Red flags abound as government kicks off My Number system with notices," *The Japan Times.*
3. Part 1 of interview on "Inverted Totalitarianism as a Threat to Democracy" can be found here: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/10/chris-hedges-and-sheldon-wolin-on-inverted-totalitarianism-as-a-threat-to-democracy.html.
4. CDA researchers are concerned, among other things, with ways in which agency (i.e. responsibility) is obscured through the use of passive verb constructions (e.g. Microchips were inserted in all new ID cards). In such grammatical forms, agency can be concealed entirely through 'nominalization' as verbs morph into nouns (e.g. The micro-chipping of citizens was becoming a new norm). Nominalization makes the hegemonic order that enforces the practice entirely mysterious.
5. This is a reference to the ominous irony in the message at the front gate of Auschwitz where prisoners were lead to believe that their hard work and obedience would lead to a richer life.
6. Whereas nominalizing is the practice of turning verbs into nouns, actionalizing is the practice of turning nouns into verbs. We suggest that this marks further development in abstracting, that is, taking something that is already an abstract and making it seem routine, compulsory, inevitable, or normal (e.g. the practice of chipping citizens has become customary).
7. George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society.* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1993), 35.
8. Ibid., 36.

9. Ibid., 36.
10. USCAR (1950–1972) is a moniker widely seen as euphemism for 'military dictatorship.'
11. George Barrett. "Report on Okinawa: A Rampart We Built." *New York Times*, September 21, 1952.
12. George Ritzer, e-mail communication with author, March 6, 2016.
13. Ibid.
14. For further details, please visit: http://www.ryukyu.ne.jp/~maxi/.
15. Hideki Yoshikawa, "An Appeal from Okinawa to the U.S. Congress: Futenma Marine Base Relocation and its Environmental Impact: U.S. Responsibility," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 12, Issue 39, No. 4, September 29, 2014.
16. According to a complaint lodged in United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, "This plan would destroy the most important remaining habitat of the Okinawa dugong, a genetically isolated and unique population of dugong (a marine mammal) and a protected cultural property under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)" (2014, p. 2).
17. Yoshikawa, op. cit.
18. For further details, please visit: http://content.sierraclub.org/coal/mining-destroying-mountains.
19. Op. cit., Ritzer, 8.
20. Howard Zinn. "Holy Wars" (lecture, Boston University, Boston, MA, January 8, 2010).
21. For further details, please visit: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/actions/201312/25mendan.html.
22. Herbert Schiller. "US as global overlord: Dumbing down, American-style" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1999.
23. Leatrice Eiseman. *Pantone's Guide to Communicating with Color*. (Sarasota: Grafix Press Ltd., 2000), 6.
24. Kleynhans, J. H. (2007). "The use of colour as a tool for propaganda." *Interim: Interdisciplinary Journal*, 6(1) 46–53.
25. For more information on the NHK's interpretation on President Obama's speech, please visit http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/150429/plt1504290006-n1.html.
26. Schiller, ibid.

CHAPTER 7

Predictability as a Means of Manufacturing Consent

As creatures of comfort, human beings generally seek to live in a world that is, to an extent, ordered with certain routines of consistency, granting us degrees of predictability. Such an existence heightens our sense of calm assurance, whereas the unpredictable produces various levels of anxiety and distress over mysteries waiting on the horizon. Anyone in business knows well that the more precise a prediction, the greater potential for increased future profits.

This chapter analyzes aspects of perceived reality as understood by the pro-FRF intellectuals who interpret, evaluate, and recommend treatments for increasing predictability in Okinawa's population in terms of political beahviour especially in relation to the US military base issue. Discussion begins with a wider talk of control over public perception and narrows to Okinawa where efforts to maintain predictability, while eradicating the unpredictability that challenges the established military-industrial order, are applied in mass media.

In a McDonaldized society, Ritzer sees predictability as emphasizing such things as "discipline, order, systemization, formalization, routine, consistency, and methodical operation. In such a society, people prefer to know what to expect in most settings and at most times."[1] From the perspective of media creators, the media consumers are sometimes imagined as "bewildered herds"[2] at the bottom of a simplified form of the social pyramid where power resides at the top in "the specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality."[3] As media consumers, bewildered by the mystifying policies of the state,[4] for example, we tend to seek honest

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stories about society and economy that help us predict and plan a future. Walter Lippmann suggests:

> [P]ractically everywhere it is assumed that the press should do spontaneously for us what primitive democracy imagined each of us could do spontaneously for himself, that every day … it will present us with a true picture of all the outer world in which we are interested.[5]

The producers, or "press" as Lippmann observed (i.e. the influential centers of political and corporate power), also seek predictability in broader society. Both sectors seek predictability, but for different reasons. The more order and consistency that the powerful can create and impose on society, the more precise predictions can be made about social behavior and, thus, about the future. It is important to note that predictability is both an outcome of social discipline and order, as well as a motivation to control, importantly, that can be imposed through the media and public relations. As extrapolated in Chapter 3, mass media represent one important medium through which hegemony operates to manufacture consent.

This is why peaceful resistance of an anti-establishment nature is sometimes perceived to be potentially dangerous in a capitalist society in the neoliberal stage. Who knows whether demonstrations of peaceful struggle might erupt into revolution that upsets the existing power and possession of material wealth? The very unpredictable nature of the struggle is the key reason why it is perceived to be so threatening—it is disorderly, unpredictable, and holds the capacity to overturn the current socioeconomic order. Such social unpredictability suggests an inherent possibility of threatening people and institutions—especially the power holders, who seek to maintain the existing unequal structures explained in Chapter 3, characterized as "accumulation by dispossession."[6] Examples can be found in recent Japan.

In one such example, huge demonstrations in Tokyo sought to maintain the integrity of Article 9 of the Constitution,[7] just as the government sought to undermine the traditional pacifist reading of the peace clause. The people's movement to protect the pacifist Constitution challenges the political leaders who attempt to maintain the global neoliberal economic structure by removing a legal obstruction from going to war with the United States. In another example, Tokyo sought to destroy demonstrations in Okinawa and to maintain the integrity of its plans to build a new US base[8] while ignoring the inevitable destruction of the marine environment in Oura Bay. The demonstrators in both Tokyo and Okinawa cannot predict that their cause will be successful,

just as the power holders cannot predict that their position and power will be sustained. This is why media are vital elements in maintaining social control and the status quo. By effectively manufacturing the narrative that predicting and planning are more desirable than protesting, corporate media wield such power that the stories they create can influence protestors, and sympathizers, to view resistance as futile. Mass media can frame those who empathize with the anti-base demonstrators as traitors or, as we shall see, "communists," the *verboten* label.

Sheldon Wolin illuminates the point about media's inherent power. He observed in 2014 that one of the "striking characteristics of our age is the extent to which so-called private institutions, like the media, are able to work toward the same end of control, pacification, that the government is interested in, that the idea of genuine opposition is usually viewed as subversion."[9] We suggest that analysis of the narratives developed for consumption by society's influential storytellers in mass media can yield insights about the current social world, about dominant political structures, their methods in achieving control and pacification, and ongoing popular struggles for truth and respect for democratic processes. Wolin goes on to point out that democracy is "subordinated now to the so-called demands of economic growth, [where] … scientific and technological advances … are being applied by industry, [and where] dominant groups have such instrumentalities at their control … radio, television, newsprint, what have you."[10] The advances Wolin refers to here extend to the military-industrial complex in contemporary Okinawa, a region whose citizens are not fully aligned with larger political forces holding sway over the public discourse. CDA can help clarify the difficulties elites face in creating widespread compliance with unpopular national policies forced upon people: in Okinawa, where people remain intent to exercise democracy "in terms of the kind of present and future that they want."[11] The narratives of the central rulers do not have a firm grip on the mass media in Okinawa, as demonstrated by the daily editorials of the two major local newspapers, *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Taimusu*, that have consistently been referred to as "communist" or "ultra-left."[12]

The following discussion focuses on the media, both traditional and new, that serve the hegemonic control by locating news and the "right" ideas on how best to comply with the centers of political and cultural power. Communications appearing in the *Washington Times* and on YouTube illustrate how new media can help reinforce or promote the dominant narratives developed for consumption in traditional corporate

media through the process of framing. "To frame," Robert Entman notes, "is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described."[13] A pervasive communication practice, framing finds many uses in mass media focused on Okinawa.

Manufactured Forms of Authority in New Media

Such is the case with YouTube as a new mass medium, accessible and empowering to both private citizens and institutions, where prominent public personalities can effectively spread their ideas and ideologies to the general populace. Kent Gilbert, a noted public figure (of American descent) in Japan, known decades for his fascination with Japanese culture, is also a noted entertainer, actor, writer, lawyer, and entrepreneur who deftly uses his notoriety to advance the aims of established power on his *Kent Channel* (Fig. 7.1).[14]

As a commentator on Japanese politics, Gilbert and his words (in either English or Japanese) carry significant cultural capital, given his fame. Gilbert's Japanese is impeccable, the result of having developed his skills for work as a missionary in Japan in the early 1970s.



Fig. 7.1 Kent Channel commentator

His public profile indicates that he spent six months in Okinawa on Kadena Air Base in 1976 and that various family members have served in the military, all of which, he assumes the position, well qualifies him to speak authoritatively about local politics in Okinawa.

In a YouTube video dated June 2, 2015, and titled "(Official) The Truth About the Anti-base Activists in Okinawa How Many Are Really Okinawan?"[15] Gilbert suggests that he has the truth, and the sort he possesses is official. With his analysis of the situation in Okinawa, offered evidently from his Tokyo headquarters, it is unclear how he is using the word "Official," as the connotations engender images of established political power. In immaculate corporate style (smart business suit, collared shirt, and handsome tie), he calmly deconstructs the meaning of the local protests against the proposed destruction of the coral reef in Henoko, as well as the protestors themselves resisting the construction of the new US military base. Viewers of this nine-minute production might puzzle over the precise role that Gilbert plays in local democratic actions and politics in Okinawa as an outsider living in an area geographically and politically remote.

He frames his discussion by referring early on in the video to enduring issues over MCAS Futenma, "smack dab in the middle of Ginowan City," which "houses the Ospreys" and other aircraft that

> come in low over these housing areas, and people are worried that if there's a crash, people will die, and in fact, they've had [muffled laughter] a couple of [muffled laughter] crashes, but nobody died, fortunately, but anyway there's a big controversy.

Gilbert's tone and description of the situation in Ginowan barely hints at and, as a result, conceals the fact that these aircraft have actually been involved in fatal accidents. While he is correct that the aircraft, especially the large military cargo planes, do come in low, the description does not accurately capture the reality of what occurs daily. The aircraft, in fact, come in so low over Maehara and Kamiojana (villages adjacent to the southern approach) that observers, if they were standing on someone's rooftop enjoying the view, will develop the sense that they can touch the bellies of the aircraft. The commentary on military aircraft dangers to the public excludes other important facts: On June 30, 1959, a US Air Force F-100D Super Sabre crash-landed into Miyamori Elementary School, killing 11 students, 6 residents outside school grounds, injuring 210 villagers, and destroying 35 houses, including the community center.

Interested citizens can still visit the memorial. If crashes are rare, they continue to occur, as in the 2004 crash of a Marine Corps CH-53 Sea Stallion, which slammed into the main administrative building on the campus of Okinawa International University.

Assumptions in the title of Gilbert's YouTube piece also seem to reflect and reinforce those in the title of Robert Eldridge's *Washington Times* opinion piece published earlier on May 31, 2015.[16] In "The Other Side to the Okinawa Story: The 'All Okinawa' Opposition U.S. Military Presence is a Leftist Ruse,"[17] Eldridge suggests that the opposite side of the debate is actually the legitimate side, with 'All Okinawa' (elaborated in Chapter 10) appearing in scare quotes, as if to suggest that the movement is not representative of Okinawan sentiment.

It turns out, however, that the "All Okinawa" movement, a term adopted by bipartisan political forces—which includes business leaders and conservative political leaders—in Okinawa who oppose the construction of a new US military base continues to represent a significant democratic majority. This fact, reinforced also by the results of local and national elections in 2014, seems to elude the notice of many such intellectuals.

In returning to Gilbert's YouTube production, viewers can clearly perceive his attempt to evoke an air of ethos. His fame and Japanophile persona itself may create a strong sense of persuasiveness and authority for audience members unaware of the actual history of the movement in Okinawa. In invoking an air of expertise on local issues, for example, Gilbert suggests that, "…75 percent of … Okinawa is devoted to U.S. armed forces bases, [but that is a] deceptive number." While it is true that statistical data can be highly persuasive when accurately applied to real situations, the commentator appears to have confused the 75 percent figure. According to the Prefectural Government, the bases occupy approximately 18.4 percent of Okinawa's land area, hosting 74.8 percent (at the time) of US-exclusive military facilities in Japan.[18] Maybe, the most patent omission of data in Gilbert's calculation is that Okinawa represents 0.6 percent of Japan's entire landmass.

One problem with official calculations, which represent real disparities, is that they do not generate a realistic impression in the imagination. It is not easy to conceptualize 0.6 percent of Japan's landmass made to bear the burden of 74 percent of the US Forces in Japan. To grasp the reality, it is important to remember that 1.3 million local people are forced to make space for these huge installations while being barred from entry to them. The following analogy serves to illustrate the disparity.[19]

Imagine you are one of 100 guests invited by the king in Tokyo to a sumptuous feast prepared in the castle. To offset some of the costs to him, the king asks each guest to contribute a $10 offering. Once everyone arrives on the castle grounds, the king decides that one guest, you (the smallest and poorest who has traveled the greatest distance), will pay 74 percent of the costs while the remaining 99 guests will pay 26 percent of the costs. At the conclusion of the feast, the bill arrives at the table where 99 other guests open their wallets to find the $2.63 they owe. As the final guest, you are saddled with the greatest portion of the bill, scratch your head, and wonder how and why you were made to pay the remaining $740.00.

While this analogy illuminates the often unnoticed costs that Okinawan people are forced to pay, it fails to shed light on the reasoning behind formulaic thinking that is necessary to keep Okinawa positioned in its precarious place. Certain media, as we have noted, play the role of blinding viewers from facing the costs imposed on Okinawa: the potential of becoming the target of attack in the event of war or being attacked or murdered by traumatized former members of the US military, or losing the only remaining pristine marine environment inherited from their ancestors, or being exposed to the constant threat of aircraft accidents, or possible vehicle fatalities (the costs go on). Gilbert attempts to blind his viewers to the costs by using contempt: construction will all be accomplished by "filling in the ocean, which will destroy coral reefs [rolls his eyes and shakes his hands with mock outrage] and all that garbage." The message is that this sort of environmental offense means nothing to those who don't have to live with it. Also obscured from public view are residents' safety and equal treatment under the law compromised by extraterritorial privileges granted by the SOFA.

From the perspective of the masters of public relations, it is necessary to remain taciturn over such injustices so as to reinforce the necessary levels of broad societal ignorance needed to maintain a disciplined, ordered, and predictable society. Greater predictability in Okinawa is maintained by the propagada of taciturnity.

Fear as a Manufactured and Renewable Product

As a reflection of local citizen demands, Onaga's insistence that the so-called replacement facility be located elsewhere has been interpreted by Eldridge and Gilbert as "extreme left," "leftist," or "communist,"—a practice of naming when "genuine opposition," according to Wolin, "is viewed as subversion."[20] Yet, nowhere in his official plea does Onaga insist that the US remove all of its bases. The emotive force behind words such as these, meant to agitate fear, is further felt by a corresponding graphic (Fig. 7.2).



Fig. 7.2 Representations of purported influence on Okinawa in corporate media. | Greg Groesch | 2015 | *The Washington Times*

Readers of *The Washington Times* article may note, almost immediately, that particular nation-state and prefectural symbols frame the entire article. The silhouettes of three Ospreys flying in formation across the Okinawa prefectural flag in the foreground are framed by a larger Chinese national flag in the background, suggesting that China is the central actor behind the scenes influencing local political decision-making. It is an excellent graphic illustration of the article. However, if one were to carry the fear and suspicion suggested by the image to its logical conclusion, one would have to see that China is acting against its own self-interests, since Governor Onaga insists that any replacement for MCAS Futenma be outside of the prefecture. A passing glance at a map of East Asia will apprise the viewer that no Japanese islands south of Okinawa could adequately accommodate the imposition of such a massive facility. Nevertheless, were a major USMC facility to relocate to Kyushu or Shikoku, as some commentators have pointed out, that geographic repositioning puts the lethal armaments of the Marine Corps in closer proximity to China's capital, which means an obvious rise in the stakes of deterrence.

The use of emotive words and images, which frame Onaga (a lifelong LDP politician until his run for the governorship on an anti-base platform) and his supporters as communists, creates contradictions. Gilbert, in his *Kent Channel* commentary, unwittingly reinforces the contradictions when he notes, with supposed authority, that he "wouldn't put [the replacement facility] in Henoko … but [he doesn't] think there is any other place in Japan that it can be put right now except on Okinawa island." This thinking is consistent with that of the officials who had hammered out the agreement on the future of MCAS Futenma in 1996.[21]

If it is true, as asserted by the supporters of US military presence, that communist China is the key cause for concern, then the Henoko plan appears to reveal a striking inability (or unwillingness) to imagine

alternatives outside the boundaries fixed around Okinawa. Propaganda that communicates unswerving persistence that Henoko is the only region suitable for the replacement of Futenma may signify other interests at work in the vast complex of military contractors, construction companies, politicians, business leaders, lobbyists, and landowners who hold a considerable stake in the project. Yet no amount of wordplay can conceal the creative use of communications consistently framing the planned destruction of the bay.

George Orwell's analysis of the public discourse appearing in "Politics and the English Language," provides a useful historical grounding of the sort of framing we're referring to, as he notes that

> political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. […] People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them.[22]

The invention of acronyms and abbreviations as convenient shorthand for complex ideas, actions, or unpleasant realities is one such illustration of euphemism at work in the Okinawan public discourse. In April 1996, the SACO Interim Report[23] called for the construction of a "heliport" within an existing base in Okinawa. The word "heliport" calls up the mental picture of a home base for a certain number of helicopters, or other rotary-wing aircraft. Key to the mental image of a heliport is the erasure of runway needed for fixed-wing aircraft, such as the one that occupies vast swathes of land in the center of Ginowan City. The acronym for heliport or helipad is simply "H," whereas in the SACO Final Report[24] of December, the heliport concept had morphed into an "SBF" (Sea-based Facility). When one contemplates the mental images called up by the word "sea" aligned with a "facility," one can begin to imagine an invasion of the sea by some kind of destructive encroachment.

Between April and December of 1996, the initially proposed heliport had magically transformed into an SBF that might be constructed as "(a) Pontoon Supported-Pier Type; … (b) Pontoon Type; … or (c) Semi-Submersible Type."[25] Common images associated with pontoons include buoyant nautical structures, floating or partially submerged. Significantly,

the acronym SBF for the planned floating facility in the bay at has morphed again, as we have already referenced, into an "FRF," the Futenma Replacement Facility, a moniker that makes a fine illustration of Orwell's sense of "sheer cloudy vagueness." This seemingly innocuous label produces nearly zero mental pictures, and it seems so for good , since the FRF plan is merely an elaboration of blueprints drawn up earlier in the mid-1960s,[26] as discussed in Chapter 6. The designs for the SBF have now assumed the uncanny appearance of an airport, replete with impressive V-shaped runways jutting into the bay atop a coral reef system and sea grass beds long targeted for burial under 3.4 million dump-truck loads of landfill.[27]

Among the many "guiding principles" outlined in the SACO final agreement, "environmental compatibility" (see 3.c.)[28] figures into the equation for construction of the SBF, yet our ongoing research has yet to yield evidence of any surveys or interviews conducted with any forms of ocean life that the planners have marked for destruction. To be fair to the central planners of this project, the FRF is not a new base in the strictest sense of the word "new." This is, perhaps, one reason why Gilbert might appear to feel some justification in rolling his eyes with contempt so as to downplay any concerns people might have of the level of damage in store for this area of the island. Mockery of the distress and anger of the local people appears rooted in the criticism that Eldridge levels against the movement in his *Washington Times* article. As Eldridge points out: "Beginning last year, [the protestors] have labeled the planned construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, where protests have picked up in recent months, as a 'new base', when, in fact, it is not."[29] This is an important point. It must also be said, nonetheless, in light of the monumental amount of landfill calculated for reclaiming this part of the bay along the coast of Camp Schwab, the FRF may just as well be known as a new base.

"These protestors," Gilbert says, "are not necessary [sic] locals. They seem to be financed by China. […] It is interesting because they protest down at Futenma in the morning, then they get on the bus and go up and protest in Henoko in the afternoon, then at five o'clock they're all done, they get a free lunch out of it and they, the professionals at least, get 20,000 Yen for the day." In our own reporting of Gilbert's observations of the resistance movement to members of the protest itself—

that they are not local people but paid experts from the mainland—they smile and remind us of that predictable and absurd enduring myth that generates genuine laughter among them. They are mostly retired, in fact, and report that they draw strength from their own vivid memories of the past decades when they had witnessed local landscapes morph into military garrisons. Rightwing groups, nonetheless, hardly ever fail to drive by the ceaseless protest (now in its 19th year) to intimidate, shout invective, and paint them as communists. This practice, we suspect, draws upon a tradition that dates to the Occupation era, during the USCAR era.

One of the most brutal military seizures of land over decades past provoked a very intense protest against the US Army when the Isahama farmers (in current Ginowan City) tried to challenge the theft of rice fields but were met with "bulldozers … and trucks with armed soldiers."[30] As a witness to the campaign to capture Okinawan land during the 1950s, Otis Bell wrote that "the soldiers came with machine guns, burp guns, and fixed bayonets. The Okinawans were armed with nothing but the right to stand on their own land."[31] Writing in 1954, Bell begins his article, by noting that US "troops [in Okinawa] … were called upon to suppress what the army termed a communist uprising, [but] the 'trouble-makers' were an unarmed group of Okinawans … protesting the use of their land by the occupation forces without agreement and without payment."[32] At last, for all of his relative expertise on Okinawa, Gilbert fails to mention the daily buses that carry local people for a modest fare from various cities on the island to Henoko each day. Rather than receiving payment and a lunch, they are paying and carrying their daily bread (or bento) to sites of protest.

Unpredictability in Protestors and Imprecision in Descriptions

The anti-base movement in Okinawa is not as easy to contain in a single leftist (or communist) category as Gilbert and Eldridge strive to do with the broad brush strokes they apply.[33] Indeed, while this conceptual frame is convenient, it is also imprecise. The frame does not sufficiently fit conditions on the ground. If we can abandon it for a moment, one thing that becomes clear is that the concept of "agreement," as expressed in 1996 by the SACO participants, is little more than a political construction.

The effects of the SACO arrangement are the reactions of people today expressing disagreement in Henoko and other sites of protest in Okinawa. The popular movement is hardly new and can hardly be framed with accuracy as a "leftist ruse."

Indeed, the continuing protest movement is not monolithic. The movement against plans to destroy this portion of the bay cuts across political ideologies, socioeconomic classes, professional groups, generations, genders, national origins, religions, and, yes, prefectures. Agitators, union representatives, students, teachers, principals, office workers, writers, poets, painters, salaried professionals, transplanted citizens who have fled the nuclear fallout in Fukushima, and retirees are all in league with the protest. The protest cannot reasonably be distilled in black-and-white terms and accurately represented in the discourse as a simplified movement of two opposing halves. It is complex and also rooted in a palpable history of wartime horrors that local people do not want to witness again. It is about burning an outdated image of Okinawa as a helpless orphan caught in the imaginations of two powerful nations that find it convenient, or economically expedient, to ignore the aspirations of the people.

Perhaps, in the end, Wolin is right in stating that the "demands of the world are … now … so dangerous, with the kind of weaponry and resources available to every crank and nut in the world, [it is] extremely difficult for governments to relax a moment and think about social order and the welfare of the citizens [and environment] in some kind of way that's divorced from the security potential of the society." If Wolin's point has merit, then perhaps we should stop pretending as though democracy continues to hold real meaning.

Notes

1. George Ritzer. *The McDonaldization of Society.* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1996), 79.
2. Walter Lippmann. *The Phantom Public.* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1925).
3. Walter Lippmann. *Public Opinion.* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, 1921), 237.
4. James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 2002[1973]) 6.
5. Ibid., 244.
6. David Harvey, "New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession" in *Socialist Register*, Vol 40, 2004, 63–87.

7. Details about the security bill can be found here: http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-japan-protests-20150915-story.html.
8. Details about the Okinawan resistance movement can be found here: http://fpif.org/resisting-u-s-bases-okinawa/.
9. Part 4 of interview on "Inverted Totalitarianism as a Threat to Democracy" can be found here: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/10/chris-hedges-and-sheldon-wolin-on-inverted-totalitarianism-as-a-threat-to-democracy.html.
10. Ibid., Part 4.
11. Ibid., Part 4.
12. "Okinawa newspapers fire back after anti-media comments at LDP event" The *Japan Times*, July 2, 2015. Accessed April 30, 2017, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/02/national/politics-diplomacy/okinawa-newspapers-fire-back-anti-media-comments-ldp-event/.
13. Robert Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), Autumn (1993), 51–58.
14. Kent Gilbert is well known publicly in mainland Japan as an entertainer who uses his fame to advance the cause of the LDP with media appearance and publications, all of which criticize Okinawa and any local leadership that defies Tokyo.
15. Kent Gilbert. "(Official) The Truth About the Anti-base Activists in Okinawa How Many Are Really Okinawan?" YouTube. Accessed June 13, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_a2xH5ZtwqI.
16. Access to the full article can be found here: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/31/robert-eldridge-the-other-side-to-the-okinawa-stor/.
17. Robert Eldridge. "The Other Side to the Okinawa Story: The 'All Okinawa' Opposition to U.S. Military Presence is a Leftist Ruse," *Washington Times*, Accessed June 14, 2015, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/31/robert-eldridge-the-other-side-to-the-okinawa-stor/.
18. In January 2017, as a result of the partial return of the Northern Training Area (NTA), the figure is now 70.6 percent. Further details may be found here: http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/us%20military%20base%20issues%20in%20okinawa.pdf.
19. Further details may be found here: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2015/index.htm.
20. Op. cit. Part 4.
21. Evidence of the early commitment to Okinawa as the only region fit for the new base can be found in the SACO agreements. The SACO Interim Report of April 1996 specifies thus: "The airfield's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained through relocations of facilities.

This will require construction of a heliport on other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa." Also, the SACO Final Report of December 1996 specifies thus: "The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa."

22. George Orwell. "Politics and the English Language," Accessed June 13, 2015, at http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit/.
23. Further details may be found here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html.
24. Further details may be found here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.
25. Ibid., MOFA.
26. Further details on the earlier plans for Henoko may be found here: http://apjjf.org/-Makishi-Yoshikazu/1819/article.html.
27. Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu. *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States.* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2013), 164.
28. Further details may be found here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.
29. Op. cit., Eldridge.
30. Miyume Tanji. *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa.* (London: Routledge, 2006), 70–71.
31. Otis Bell. "Play Fair with the Okinawans," *Christian Century.* (January 20, 1954), 77.
32. Ibid., Bell.
33. Anti-base movements in Okinawa have traditionally resisted the permanent singular organizational structure of a 'movement'. Even the ongoing 'All Okinawa' coalition is a temporary alliance of multiple actors focused on stopping the new base construction and the MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa (which may be the only thing they agree on). Union members, political party members, women's groups, feminists, environmental activists, local historians, and campsite protesters in Henoko and Takae, who may all be identified as 'anti-base,' have all different priorities, strategies, and motivations. I have argued: "Splintered organizational structure of the community of protest more genuinely represents the multiple concerns. Individual organizations are less likely to lose sight of their own objectives under the pressure of one, hegemonic organization and reform agenda." Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest, and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 2006), 180.

CHAPTER 8

Communication and Control Over 'Unstable' Actors

Control refers to power and influence residing in the methods used to manage the thoughts, actions, and perceptions of others. In Ritzer's McDonaldization paradigm, control represents a certain sort of domination over key actors and processes in the fast-food transaction—the customers, employees, and methods by which the buying experience is made complete (or satisfying). More broadly, the human participants remain a significant source of uncertainty, unpredictability, and inefficiency in any rationalizing system.[1] Ritzer suggests that control over such sources can be increased through mechanization; employers maintain more effective levels of control over the entire rationalization process. Control, as it were, can be realized in one part of the buying equation through the substitution of a human resource for a non-human technological resource.

Achieving influence over public opinion, we argue, can also be realized through control of other sources of uncertainty and ambiguity—the signs, symbols, salaries, benefits, positions, and relative power granted to (or taken from) people near the top of the social order. As we noted in Chapter 4, the right kind of balance between what is revealed in the propaganda and what must be kept concealed is achieved through systems and structures of education and media. In what appears to be a response to a perceived loss of influence and control over public perception and opinion (Table 8.1), the ruling party has recently developed an efficient digital communication system that allows concerned citizens to report teachers who appear to deviate from prescribed texts, as well as the bureaucratic

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Table 8.1 Neutrality survey

Survey on Political Neutrality in School Education	
Currently, the Liberal Democratic Party Subcommittee on Education and Science is drafting recommendations to secure complete political neutrality in school education and is seeking unbiased education. Nevertheless, in schools, there are some teachers who claim that "politically neutral education is impossible," or "do not send children to the battlefield," making claims that deviate from neutrality.	
While it is important to educate sovereign citizens, there is a possibility that the students will be deprived of multi-faceted viewpoints by the biased teaching of the educators. The Party is gravely concerned with the educational results colored by specific ideologies, due to politically imbalanced education, for example, a voting simulation at a high school etc. Therefore, we have decided to conduct a survey on political neutrality in school education. We ask for your cooperation.	
* Family Name:	Full Font Input, (example) Yamada
* First Name:	Full Font Input, (example) Taro
* Furigana:	Full Font Katakana Input (no space in between)
* Gender:	Male/Female
* Age:	Please select:
* Occupation:	
* Work contact/Name of School (only if educator)	
* Contact Phone:	
* Contact fax:	
* Contact address:	
* Email:	
Below, please record in detail an inappropriate case that goes beyond political neutrality concretely (when, where, who, what, how).	
* Inappropriate case that violates political neutrality	
The information input in this form is encrypted and sent. It cannot be sent from a browser that does not support the encrypting system. Please agree to it beforehand.	
Post	/Cancel all input

Note: Interpreted by author from the original Japanese text. Original illustration can be found in Appendix B

authority that approves such texts. The following table is an interpretation of the original Japanese that appeared on the LDP homepage.

Reactions from academics in Japan to this reporting in digital mass media are slightly mixed but consistently critical. They range from utter disbelief to unsurprised resignation. Responses include allusions to George Orwell's *1984* and efforts by the Inner Party to hide hideous truths with innocuous language: It seems like a fabulous satire that "the Party Subcommittee on Education and Science"—the instrument of a

powerful political ideology—would be so keen to strike a note of neutrality in education and science. Responses also include rhetorical questions and comments: Why don't they begin by reporting on themselves first and their myopic acceptance of atomic radiation in Fukushima or unruffled support for burying Oura Bay? Aren't many bureaucrats themselves already well-practiced in ignoring the science of environmental impact studies? Neutrality suggests fairness to both ends of the political spectrum. If party leaders are so genuinely interested in targeting and eliminating ideas they perceive to be extreme, shouldn't LDP leaders begin by targeting their own ideas? Failing to consider how the East German Stasi saw its demise, has the leadership forgotten history? Clearly, this system is meant to intimidate educators and researchers into self-censoring.

The question for us in this chapter is: how do influential actors with access to mass media shape the attitudes and perceptions of the public, both within and beyond the fences that surround the US garrisons? Two forces, we suggest, are at play.

The first is the agent. Antonio Gramsci observed that the dominant (or hegemonic) order of a society (or system) includes both the effective function of intellectuals within the order as well as the role played by ideology as a tool of intellectual and moral authority in relation to material conditions.[2] All citizens were recognized by Gramsci as intellectuals, but only certain people in certain positions served a more pressing social function as professional (or organic)[3] intellectuals whose work would involve engaged participation in everyday life as agents within the economic, political, and cultural areas acting as organizers, constructors, and persuaders in forming (or challenging) the hegemony. In Okinawa, a number of such intellectuals appear to fulfill important roles in helping to organize the rationale that supports the present hegemony.

The second force is the tool (or technology). As earlier noted, the 'informational infrastructure'[4] serves key actors in the centers of social and political power in Washington and Tokyo who enjoy greater access to the broader public in efforts to get positions known, understood, and widely accepted. This communications model is a necessary, and more easily managed, component of the propagandizing effort in which control over society's key definitions and concepts can help keep order in the social rank and file. Since the infrastructure itself heightens this kind of control, it creates meaning and (un)awareness and a greater sense of certainty and predictability that the leader's global or local view of reality can be explained and circulated.[5] Crucially, Schiller observes, when this infrastructure

> is in place and performing routinely, the exercise of definitional control is generally invisible, … needs no prompting or instruction from the top of the social pyramid, … and comes into play effortlessly…. Throughout life, … [news consumers] absorb the images and messages of the prevailing social order. These make up their frame of reference and perception. With few exceptions, it is this framework which insulates most from ever imagining an alternative social reality.[6]

The ability to control meaning and awareness minimizes potential threats to the prevailing order. In the face of popular opposition to the Henoko plan, for example, both US military public relations officials as well as local unofficial news sources have served as necessary mechanisms of control used in the manufacturing process of hoped-for public consent to the FRF relocation policy. Discourse practices in which the appearance of consent is designed by the powerful feature some images that appear to betray reality. As we pointed out in Chapter 4, centers of power cannot simply restrict their activities to enforcing a standard of sustainable public discourse; they must actively endorse the standard in propaganda campaigns. The following discussion explores how those campaigns are both undertaken and resisted in Okinawa today.

Fortifying State Narratives Across Cultures

Various groups, from extreme left and extreme right to mainstream special interests, have long cultivated unique techniques in organizing political activities and positioning their messages in the public discourse with the greatest emotional effect possible. Okinawa has seen a variety of approaches taken in public protests, in leaflet campaigns, and in paramilitary men operating vehicles decked with loudspeakers blaring Imperial-era hymns. Some approaches appear on passenger cars (Fig. 8.1) that navigate narrow Naha City streets on circuits which include consistent passes by the Prefectural Office.

This example of the propaganda of integration appearing in the streets (日本=沖縄) and seeking to equate Okinawa with Japan, ironically, causes ordinary people to pause and reflect consciously on that which is often unacknowledged in the routine worries of everyday life—the over-arching structural inequities beyond their reach to change. Other approaches to reinforcing the message of "Japan = Okinawa" appear in posters pasted on concrete utility poles (Fig. 8.2).



Fig. 8.1 Nationalist propaganda from privately owned vehicle

The structural discrimination that some local people scarcely notice or, if they do, lack power to contend with directly is made conscious in such daily campaigns waged in the streets, seeking to reinforce the idea that all local people are—beyond anything else—fully Japanese integrated into an enduring love affair with the local status quo. Routine displays of patriotic expression in the political right appear to some commentators to reflect Japan's increasing move toward nationalism. The effectiveness of such efforts meant to reshape local self-perception cannot, however, be understood simply through these activities; they must be seen as part of a more sophisticated and ongoing process.

Such is the case with so-called new media, which have come to play a substantial role in reflecting the interests of the dominant class and assisting in the manufacture and management of public opinion.[7] For instance, *Channel Sakura*[8] (*Nihon Bunka Channeru Sakura*) television, (a reportedly far-right media outlet)[9] has functioned, among other things, as reinforcement of state efforts to control the descriptions and definitions of the local protest movements as well as its central actors. For example, Jon



Fig. 8.2 Nationalist poster

Mitchell notes that *Channel Sakura* is "known for its glorification of Japan's role in World War II"[10] and for generally entertaining the perspectives of the political right. Significantly, a well-recognized expert in US-Japanese bilateral relations, Robert Eldridge appeared on the show during his tenure with the USMC in Okinawa as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of Government and External Affairs. In a January 2015 interview, Eldridge suggested that the protest movement in and around MCAS

Futenma is motivated by local hatred and bigotry.[11] Though his appearance has been read as an effort to fuse state plans with local public discourse, his depiction of the popular movement did not remain without comment from local academics, among them Professor Manabu Sato, who observed that Eldridge's appearance on the network harmed what little goodwill Okinawan people had held toward the US Marine Corps.[12]

As we noted earlier, efforts in control are also made through the relative authority given to high officials serving the social order who hold the power to frame anti-base protestors, in this case, as bigots and haters. From our own close observations of the movement, an alternative perspective would also hold that the perceived hatred expressed by the protest is, more precisely, anger directed at mainland Japanese discrimination against Okinawans and motivated by the Henoko plan. It might be added, too, that accusations of bigotry expressed on the part of the protestors have also been reversed and aimed back at the centers of power, as local people have complained for years about the structural discrimination.

Besides having access to channels of official public communication, various intellectuals generally have, over the past few years, used unofficial channels with some success in their efforts to disparage and vilify citizens exercising their rights to resist state plans for Henoko and Takae. Despite their power to communicate to the mass public, new unofficial media, such as *Channel Sakura*, also contain intrinsic flaws in their control mechanisms. The paucity of nuanced (and neutral) editorial control over messaging can create unpredictable effects in these forms of new media and on the public mind.

For instance, in spite of Eldridge's superb and important work in organizing a highly complex US military relief operation for the victims of the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,[13] as well as advocating initially for the relocation of Futenma outside of Okinawa,[14] a reported unofficial disclosure of US military surveillance footage resulted in a discharge from his official duties.[15] As with the perceived necessity to rationalize the acquisition of full control over the fast-food business transaction, key actors in a McDonaldized state security apparatus appear also to rationalize autonomous campaigns to acquire control over communications with the public. As Ritzer notes, human participants are a source of uncertainty in any system that seeks to rationalize complete control, and even its most enlightened supporters can sometimes rescript policies and procedures outside official channels of oversight.

A skilled community organizer, Tedokon Bogii appears also to assume a complementary role as a local intellectual. According to the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times*, what appears to be US military surveillance footage featuring the February 22 arrest of Hiroji Yamashiro for stepping over a yellow line[16] in front of the main gate of Camp Schwab had been provided by a man living in Okinawa.[17] Though the identity of the man is unstated in the article, readers can learn that the man subsequently uploaded the video to YouTube on March 9.[18]

According to the *Shimpo*, though the unnamed man who remains a mystery "said that he could not say how he got the video,"[19] the footage did appear in March 2015 on Tedokon's YouTube channel as an unofficial medium.[20] In this instance, the mere appearance of official military surveillance footage of the arrest may have complicated state efforts to control wider public perception of Yamashiro as a "lawbreaker." The official footage presented to the public on YouTube and framed as conclusive evidence of Yamashiro's alleged law-breaking appears, alternatively, to show that Yamashiro was "ordering demonstrators to be especially careful not to cross the boundary line when he was suddenly attacked by Marine Corps security personnel, flung to the ground, handcuffed, and dragged feet-first into the base."[21] To an untrained eye, the surveillance footage, absent audio and context, tells an ambiguous story. Subsequent to this incident, because Yamashiro had wanted to witness for himself how the forest in Yanbaru was being destroyed, he was arrested in October 2016 and again the following month, with three other activists, for "forcible obstruction of public business," "wire cutting and obstruction of public duties."[22] The treatment of Yamashiro sparked a response from Amnesty International for human rights abuse because he had been detained before trial for five months without bail.[23]

Apart from organizing counter-resistance against the ongoing Osprey protests at the gates of Futenma MCAS, Tedokon has also been an occasional panelist on *Channel Sakura*.[24] His great success in local organizing efforts had also earned him an invitation to express support for the status quo through official channels within the US military community in Okinawa. Whereas Eldridge has appeared on *Channel Sakura*, Tedokon had appeared reciprocally in an American Forces Network (AFN) Okinawa morning radio show.[25] As regards the wider protest movement, Tedokon suggested in a December 22, 2014, interview, through his interpreter (Eldridge), that "most of the protestors come from the mainland," and suggested to the young generation in Okinawa that they should join the

community where military members and local people have built good relationships so that they can enjoy and respect both cultures and both Americans and Okinawans can express their gratitude for each other's presence.

Readers might puzzle over the purpose of AFN. The network forms part of Okinawa's official US military informational infrastructure. Its aim, or "vision," is to "provide 'a touch of home' through encrypted satellite multi-channel broadcast quality radio and television services and expanded internal information products to all DoD members and their families … around the world."[26] In theory, AFN works to offer military members stationed overseas with entertainment comparable to what they'd likely receive back in the US. Reinforced by daily announcements are reminders that musical content is provided to the station royalty free, so there remains ostensibly no motive, monetary or political, in AFN's radio broadcasting. This position holds for television as well. According to Casimir Krul, former AFN journalist, "Despite this overt absence of such motive, AFN does serve as a covert tool for positioning the American military perspective in Okinawa, for example, more than providing entertainment to service members."[27] The integration of public opinion with state plans must be achieved, as we earlier noted, through a stable infrastructure. In the case of AFN, Krul observes, "It is, effectively, a propaganda tool … camouflaged as a source of 'entertainment', which is why the Tedokon interview became such a big deal amongst senior AFN officials."[28] It appeared publicly to confirm suspicions that this particular "mass medium had gone crudely beyond simple entertainment, but was now actively endorsing one side locally in an ongoing hot political issue."[29]

The subtext reference to mainland involvement in the local protest has been interpreted as twofold: It serves to (re)construct the narrative that mainland leftist politics directs or dominates Okinawan resistance; the reference also helps construct local public perception that Yamato continues to meddle in Okinawan affairs, and so young people locally should learn to organize on the political right in order to take control of their own economic future. While the former assertion is a representation of politics grounded in certain experience that has been witnessed in the forefront of the Okinawan protest, the latter represents a certain "balance between disclosure and taciturnity."[30] It speaks to the reality of Yamato involvement (vis-à-vis Tokyo LDP) in local politics, but maintains silence on the post-reversion Japan's developmental policy in Okinawa which controlled all socioeconomic aspects of Okinawa maintaining the Main Island as a

garrison island of the Japan-US security arrangement. The narrative of a mainland leftist conspiracy today seems designed to draw attention away from an underlying issue: Okinawan voters had set their will against the new base,[31] as Douglas Lummis notes, yet the propaganda campaign to obscure those results continues.

Apart from making effective use of the informational infrastructure, Tedokon also organizes the Heart Clean Project (HCP), the stated aim of which is to "heal the hearts of the military members and their families who [in passing through the gates] have been hurt by the hate speech and hate crime"[32] enacted by protestors. Appealing to our general sense of pathos are highly effective YouTube videos that depict angry protestors shouting at passing cars carrying GIs and contrasting images of the good-natured members of the HCP who hold signs of thanks, salute the national flags, and embrace American pedestrians passing through the crowd. Work undertaken by the HCP appears to harmonize other work Tedokon undertakes in the Osprey Fan Club,[33] a reaction to the organized public anger and dissent that developed across the island in 2012 when the first Ospreys were assigned to Futenma MCAS, and where they remain based. While the propaganda of integration analyzed, thus far, aims toward constructing a conception of reality that largely dismisses local democratic decision-making in elections, an equally persuasive propaganda of agitation appears to construct the impression that the protest movement is a mainland Japanese leftist conspiracy seeking to foment hatred and civil unrest.

The 'Haters': *Kamaduu gwa tachi no tsudoi*

Efforts in control over the wider public's perception of direct democratic actions carried out in the protest movement are also undertaken through the very language that organic intellectuals employ. In this sense, the informational infrastructure proves invaluable to the formation of public awareness and understanding. Who are the purported hate-filled communist bigots gathering at the gates and along the fence line of Futenma MCAS each morning? Our initial contact with an anti-base protest was a group of concerned daughters, mothers, and grandmothers. Because of previous harassment from far-right groups, they prefer to maintain anonymity, but also remain keen to call attention to the injustices they have both researched and witnessed during their work with *Kamaduu gwa tachi no tsudoi* (The Gathering of *Kamaduu*): a group of female residents in and around Ginowan City. We are focusing on the philosophy and

tactics of this group, as an example of the FRF opponents labeled as "communists," "terrorists," and "haters." As we show, they may not be any of these; however, they certainly challenge the ongoing efforts in the alternative media to control and engender tacit popular acceptance of the FRF construction in Henoko.

One member of *Kamaduu* we interviewed[34] observed that the group's moniker draws upon traditions of Okinawan indigenous culture. *Kamaduu* is a female name that means "kitchen" in *Uchinaguchi* (Okinawan language), a wordplay representing strong women who also take up hard work beyond the traditional boundaries of domestic life. With this rather conservative gender construction that could be exploited by the effort to support a nation at war, *Kamaduu* nevertheless cite democracy itself and the process by which the people communicate their decisions about society as inspiration for collective anti-base public action. Another member said that she became involved in 1997 just after Prime Minister Hashimoto and Ambassador Mondale announced the joint plan to relocate Futenma MCAS to Henoko. That government declaration precipitated a swift collective action demanding a referendum in Nago City (the municipality responsible for Henoko). After the results of the referendum on the replacement facility construction showed obvious public rejection of the plan, she joined the gathering protests. Their memory of the democratic process that unfolded in Nago City during that period, they admit, is something they cherish highly and continue defending today.[35] The feelings they had about the process soon began appearing in concrete signs of a desire to defend Henoko from the joint US-Japan decision. Countless red ribbons tied to the chain-link fence surrounding Futenma came to signify an expression of warning from the people that the plan to destroy the bay in the North must stop.

While their symbolic protest represents an attack against the Henoko plan, it also attracts counter-attacks from supporters of the status quo. The simple name that *Kamaduu* use for the action of warning with red ribbons along the fence near the Nodake Gate, an access to MCAS Futenma, is the "Fence Movement for the Lives of Okinawans." One interviewee stressed the fact that *Kamaduu* do not want to be perceived as angry radicals without constructive ideas but, rather, as citizens deeply concerned about the lives of their children, primarily in their neighborhood.

Kamaduu members are the earliest proponents in the Okinawan community of protest who demanded clearly that mainland Japanese should "undertake" the FRF. Until then, it was a moot point or even a taboo for

Okinawan opponents to the new base to demand the relocation of the FRF to mainland Japan. For example, members of another women-only anti-base group, Okinawan Women Act Against Military and Violence, made it a point not to argue relocation to mainland Japan, and simply demand the closure of Futenma Airfield: demanding relocation to *Yamato* would have made it impossible to build solidarity with mainland Japanese women who oppose war and militarism.[36] Outside the anti-base community, moreover, a focus on relocation of the FRF to mainland Japan could be misunderstood as support of the construction of a new base as a solution to the dangerous US base in Futenma, just not in Okinawa. In other words, other protesters in Okinawa have expressed concern that focusing on "outside the Prefecture" would shift the political debate among concerned citizens to the unfairness toward and discrimination of Okinawa, away from the debate of whether the FRF construction is necessary, or, for that matter, whether the US alliance is necessary, which would favor the status quo, namely, Tokyo and Washington.[37]

In 2015, approximately 86 percent of the overall population of Japan supported the alliance between the United States and Japan.[38] However, the human rights and safety violations resulting from the US extraterritorial privileges are concentrated in Okinawa as a condition of the alliance agreed upon at the time of Okinawa's reversion between Nixon and Sato in 1971. *Kamaduu* members have pointed out that mainland Japanese people do not actually notice the price attached to the FRF: bodily pain and psychological fear of unexpected murders, helicopter accidents, sexual assaults (as in the recent rape and murder case of a 20-year-old female in May 2016) because they consider them something happening to others.[39] If the mainland Japanese public were capable of feeling such a price for the alliance as a visceral danger to members of their own community, the astounding figure of support for the alliance may be different, they observe. Indeed, as Chinin Usii notes, mainland Japanese people are hardly bystanders of the FRF relocation issue, because it is caused by the Japan-US alliance, a policy of the government supported by Japanese voters, of which Okinawans count for just one percent.[40] Most mainland Japanese are not even interested in the issue, as if the FRF were a trivial matter that concerns someone else, which is a form of violence resulting from 'unconscious colonialism."[41]

Our interviewee pointed out:

> "When you look carefully at history, you cannot justify ignoring indisputable facts: the people of Okinawa have *never* [her emphasis] agreed to being 'hosts'—their word not mine—to the U.S. military, but it is patently

> obvious, if someone simply looks around and acknowledges this reality in the great concentration of U.S. garrisons, that Okinawa remains to be a colony, not truly a 'prefecture' in the common sense of the word."

These facts, she points out, are self-evident to the larger protester population, beyond *Kamaduu*, and that the present Washington-Tokyo security arrangement stands as a symbol of the decades-long rationalization of discrimination and colonialism. From the central government's perspective, therefore, there was no alternative of the FRF construction site other than Okinawa, for a "political reason," as uncannily blurted out by then Defense Minister Morimoto Satoshi[42]: building anywhere outside the Prefecture would potentially destabilize the Japan-US alliance. Considering all that, *Kamaduu* members have started a potentially subversive debate, especially since in several locations such as Osaka, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Tokyo, "Undertake the Base" groups have begun advocating for constructing the FRF in their backyard.[43]

As discussed in Chapter 10, in the recent decade, breaking the long-held taboo among the anti-base Okinawans, demanding relocation of the FRF "outside Okinawa" has become the unambiguous slogan of the "All Okinawa" coalition. *Kamaduu* members, together with another women's group in rural Nago (*Jannukai*), have argued for the necessity of opening this potentially dangerous debate, since December 1998 when they paraded the streets of Ginza in traditional Ryukyuan costumes, mocking a hawker of "Replacement Facility with Development Promotion Funds."[44]

Beyond all the potential animosity and controversy, it is most important to keep one's eye on the central aim, that is, to widen awareness toward the real price of Japan's alliance, and with the power of public awareness, possibly to cancel the relocation of the FRF, and ultimately, the alliance itself. In this sense, highlighting the controversial and angst-raising characteristics of *Kamaduu* actions would make complete tactical sense from the perspective of controlling the public debate beyond tacit consent to the FRF. As currently seems to be the case, the conservative media focus has not been on "the real price of U.S. alliance" but, rather, on the "communist protesters in Okinawa," all of which evokes unjustified fear of radical women in the public consciousness.

The right-wing media depiction of Okinawa reveals, in fact, a surprising level of rationalization featuring a rhetoric that aims to delegitimize the protest movement as well as local newspapers. In a March 2017 briefing given by US State Department and US military officials to a group of American journalism students, one commander characterized the resistance

movement as a complex of three forces: (a) committed peaceniks, those who earnestly yet naïvely believe that no military equals perpetual peace; (b) the communists[45]; and (c) those who are "not quite right in the head" and incapable of grasping the reality of the dangerous world around them.[46] Such stereotypes of the wider protest movement may be read in two ways: profound ignorance or disingenuous representation. Sound knowledge of the local interpretation of history would clearly demonstrate that the popular opposition to US military bases (especially the construction of a new base) and Tokyo's textbook censorship are not based on blind pacifism, communist conspiracy, or mental illness; they are inspired by human rights abuses and collective suffering felt during World War II as well as the US military occupation.

This sort of contempt for democratic actions collides with the intended meanings in the long-stated position that the US military is merely a friendly neighbor and considerate guest to the local people. As regards the contempt communicated toward the women by members of the HCP, our interviewee with *Kamaduu* continued emphasizing their frustrations with the so-called Fence Clean Project that undertakes beautifying activities:

> We affix colored tape in order to communicate our steadfast support for the lives and the dignity of Okinawan people. So, we don't want these people [the fence cleaners], whose minds also seem to be occupied by this long colonial history, to remove our expressions. They continue to claim that the tape we affix disturbs the scenery of Okinawa, but it is clear that the bases are disturbing the natural scenery. Just have a look at these fences topped with barbed wire! It is these fences and what they are protecting that obscures, indeed destroys, the natural environment. It is the base that is creating all these various levels of noise pollution, high- and low-frequency waves that distress our mental and physical health. It is the base that is launching and dropping the helicopters and dangerous fragments which can kill people. It is the base that is polluting our land with chemicals and still denying their culpability. Armed with our rolls of packing tape, it is now we who are dangerous. We are just trying to create an Okinawa that allows future generations to decide their own direction. We will be happy to remove the tape ourselves that we have applied but after the base is gone, so we ask them [the fence cleaners] to cease their activities.

The Organization of Free Association

Our initial contact with these local citizens who embrace the *Kamaduu* philosophy indicates that they also each share the very same goals and appear at the same time at the same site to speak publicly about the unfairness of the status quo. Their affections for free speech appear obvious in their hand-scrawled cardboard signs with messages of opposition made indelible in red and black text, which seems hardly a form of hate speech. In one sign that a woman holds, the people who pass by can see her eagerness to communicate an alternative proposal, though long ignored. The third row of this placard is particularly controversial: in the conservative media, this message is construed as perniciously radical; in some quarters of the population, the message is interpreted as hatred toward Yamato people, and the expression of Okinawan independence, or Okinawan nationalism. If anything, parochialism drags attention away from the intended *Kamaduu* warning on the price of humiliation, danger, and most importantly, colonialism of the US security alliance. And, as such, meaningful debate on the alliance, the real human price paid excessively by the Okinawans, and the unconscious colonialism of the mainland Japanese, has not developed in the mainstream mainland Japanese media.[47] The following table contains a translation of the placard (Fig. 8.3).



Fig. 8.3 Relocation goals of *Kamaduu* on cardboard sign

Keeping MCAS Futenma in the same place	No
Building a new base inside Okinawa	No
Building a new base outside Okinawa but somewhere else in Japan	Yes

The women vigorously rejected labels such as "activist," "group," or "collective." Each person who identifies with the ideals of *Kamaduu*, according to our interviewee, is a leader. Like the "Occupy Movement," no particular leading figure in Okinawa can be held up as the head and then torn down by the media as a central authority within the movement. Lacking power and direct access to mass media, their apparent mistrust of the status quo had given shape to this decentralized interaction of citizens with overlapping interests and aims.

Our interviewee reminded us that *Kamaduu* emerged as a natural expression of great concern among local women over the outrage touched off in Okinawan society by the 1995 rape of an elementary school girl at the hands of three US military men in Kunigami Village, just north of Henoko. This appalling crime was akin to throwing petrol on simmering coals, which ignited local anger from decades of marginalization. People across the island, she noted, awoke to the actual conditions and spoke out against them. They describe the enduring struggle as one against well-entrenched social injustices sanctioned by occupied minds that dismiss outrages as part of the cost of state security. The rape in 1995 typified a long and unjust, albeit complex, social situation that had formed in local society and one that the women want people to remember always.

Another member recalled the words of her earliest inspiration, Martin Luther King, who spoke powerfully about injustices in the 1960s when she was younger. She made a point of reminding us of how King electrified audiences across generations and ethnic divisions when he spoke of discrimination, and the patient and peaceful resolve needed to defeat this injustice. She tells Marines, especially African-Americans, who pass by where she protests, "We have a dream of no bases in Okinawa" (Fig. 8.4).

She trusted in the universal sense of empathy that humans feel toward others and hoped that her words would resonate most distinctly with African-American service members who have known firsthand the pain and injustice of discrimination. She also hoped that in reciting King's ideas and using his formulations, her words weren't construed as disingenuous or belittling to Americans who would hear her convey these sentiments in




Fig. 8.4 *Kamaduu* message to pedestrians

English. She communicated through these unsophisticated signs, symbols, and words, which she felt, nonetheless, were common to all within earshot. In this sense, far from being anti-American "haters," *Kamaduu* have attempted, she points out, to share universal human sentiments with their neighboring military forces.

When we asked about their impressions of the depiction of protest presented in the media, she expressed bewilderment at the characterizations that painted her fellow mothers and grandmothers as rabble-rousers who somehow possessed the power to crush the forces of militarism with mere anger. If she hated anything, it was the process that had played out in history and that created the present conditions of unfairness and inequity.

Weaponized Packing Tape

The *Kamaduu*'s passionate feelings to protect their children's future were given expression in the tools of resistance acquired in the home improvement section of local hardware stores. Through the years, countless rolls of red and yellow packing tape have served as the core medium they would use to fix various geometric shapes to the chain-link fences surrounding the gated US military communities (Fig. 8.5).



Fig. 8.5 Weaponized packing tape

These signs were meant to signify to observers on both sides that the destruction of Oura Bay, with the impending closure of Futenma is, without question, unacceptable. The traditional color chosen in 2010 by the protest against the bases was yellow, a hue selected for its cross-cultural associations with caution. Its semiotic connotations evoke strong meanings within the English culture, ranging from optimism to cowardice. Yellow connotes danger, power, status, fear, loathing, disease, toxicity, abhorrence, and sickness. It is an immediate sign of the serious and urgent warning directed at the US military that its aircraft must take careful precautions when flying over Okinawa's densely populated areas. The color was also thought to signify caution to the Japan-US alliance as it considered its joint plans for the Prefecture and its moves to impose its will on Okinawa. Because of its universal recognition as a sign of prudence, attention, and vigilance, yellow was deemed to be the ideal color for the movement during this period.

Just before the first MV-22 Osprey arrived in 2012 in the face of widespread local opposition, the protest added another symbolic representation to its efforts, the adoption of red. With the global recognition of red dominating the common stop sign with its connotations of warning, this color was meant to express to the Marine Corps to halt plans drawn up to base its accident-prone aircraft at Futenma. To the protestors, the absurdity of basing such a dangerous aircraft[48] at the world's most dangerous airfield, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had observed,[49] stirred

an increased number of local people to action. Red served as an excellent signifier of the movement's desire that the military planners must stop and think.

The women who embrace the *Kamaduu* concept hold onto the Clintonian assurance of 2000, that America "will consolidate" while "reducing [its] footprint" on the island—sentiments "specific enough to sound genuine while vague enough to promise nothing."[50] For those advanced in age enough to recall decades past, the very presence of the US base in Ginowan City stands as a permanent footprint on the collective consciousness when "the 1955 rape case, and the forceful eviction of the Isahama farmers by US bulldozers and bayonets, … finally woke Okinawans to the need to act to protect their own dignity and rights."[51] The women we interviewed wanted very much to see Clinton's heartfelt promise realized through closure of MCAS Futenma.

Apart from the video that the media hosted on the informational infrastructure, various right-wing blogs (some reportedly ideologically associated with far-right factions of the LDP)[52] have featured hasty criticisms of the women associated with the *Kamaduu* concept. Contributors to these alternative media form part of the public discourse in Japan that constructs alternative facts about packing tape as an illegal weapon in the hands of women who, hardly cowed by fear or upsetting cultural mores, insist on asserting their constitutional rights by speaking out.

Among them are *Nihonjin Nara Shitte Okitai Koto* (Things You May Want to Know if You are Japanese).[53] The tacit message in the title, of course, is that the women of *Kamaduu* do not qualify as Japanese citizens. In an unsigned article titled "Okinawan Local Group Called '*Kamaduu*' Repeats Illegal Acts," the anonymous author observes that, "A local peace group continues to make trouble for the American military."[54] Another piece in the same blog features an unsigned article that complains about the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times* and their alleged refusals to frame *Kamaduu* as a collection of outlaws.[55]

Another blog on the political right that takes the name, "Is There Democracy in Okinawa?" portrays *Kamaduu* in a recent feature article as a group of terrorists. The author (alias Hijai) characterizes one previous *Kamaduu* protest with balloons as a "terrorist act." To challenge possession of the airspace that aircraft from Futenma use, which is directly over houses, schools, churches, and hospitals just outside the borders of the base, *Kamaduu* have floated balloons (one meter in diameter) to protest the near-constant disturbance of these aircraft on the civil peace. References

to "terrorism" and "illegal" activities (despite their legality) may remind readers of Joseph Goebbels' observations concerning the great utility of agitation propaganda: "We do not talk to say something, but to obtain a certain effect."[56] The intended effect, it appears, is control over the public's perception of anyone or any group that resists.

It should be noted that the most recent demonstration followed all laws regarding democratic processes, that formal paperwork had been filed with the local government, that newspapers had been notified, and a press conference held to invite all members of local society and the military community to take part. Letters in English describing the event were also sent to members of the military. During the demonstration, our interviewee points out, one military cargo plane diverged from its normal flight path and feigned flying directly into one of the balloons. Photographs taken during this military aerial maneuver have since been used by right-wing bloggers who claim that *Kamaduu* had used its balloons as weapons, a suggestion so absurd as to defy all logic.

The blogger ignores these facts as well as any reference to the US military's own instructions, which it also ignores with impunity, as regards safe entry and exit corridors for aircraft. A 2008 letter to former Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha from General Goodman, addressing city complaints at the time, clarifies the Marine Corps' position on flight safety:

> We are extremely sensitive to the concerns of our neighbors in our local community. Our entry and exit routes from the helicopter pattern at Futenma are specifically designed to avoid over-flying the local schools and some cultural areas when possible. Our pilots operating at Futenma are instructed on these routes and the reasons behind them, and do a good job of avoiding over-flight of schools, hospitals, and cultural areas whenever possible.[57]

At the protest site near Nodake Gate in Ginowan City, the successful defense of MCAS Futenma, from "outraged" mothers and grandmothers we interviewed, assumes many forms. The establishment has concluded that a multinational security contingent is needed to confront the threat posed by the forces of *Kamaduu*. Thus, on the scene each day are (a) Japanese security guards (clad in sunglasses and armed with digital cameras) contracted by the US military; (b) American military personnel in civil attire conducting in crowd analysis and the identification of potential terrorists; (c) local police; (d) prefecture police; and (e) members of the HCP.

Their apparent successes in defending the integrity of the gates and fences of Futenma appear to derive from the organized network of local communications, which assures that the security guards, US personnel, or fence cleaners can expeditiously notify the Ginowan City police of all potential infractions. As with any occupying force in a combat zone, defenders of a key perimeter who catch first sight of an advancing enemy are tasked to sound the alarm and to rally reinforcements from neighboring areas of operation. For their part in the defense, local police show remarkable speed in appearing on the scene with cameras ready to document evidence of any woman threatening the integrity of the fences with packing tape. Other defenders of the status quo seem to embrace the same rationalizations, and work together to frustrate the efforts of the women by continually criticizing them and characterizing their efforts as full of hate and terror.

Along with verbal condemnation and harassment come periodic threats of bodily harm. One member recalled a morning when she was intimidated by hooded sunglass-wearing bullies who used threatening speech to dissuade and deter her persistence. Though she felt physically threatened by these actions, she also felt emboldened by the memory of Martin Luther King and the civil rights demonstrators standing up in the face of segregationist contempt and violence. On another occasion during a prayer gathering in the evening, which included singing Gospel hymns, another member of *Kamaduu* recalled being confronted by an imposing American male who described them as "bitches" and harangued them to "express their grievances to Tokyo, not America." Another interviewee offered her recollection of being physically and verbally harassed by Ginowan City police when she tried to use the tape to signify protest on the fence. One officer, who had been standing behind her, grabbed her hand forcefully as she affixed some tape to the fence, whereby the metal of the fence cut her fingers. She wondered how uniformed civil servants sworn to protect peace and the common good could justify their own behavior.

Impossible Questions

For their part, the members of *Kamaduu* acknowledge that they can understand, to some extent, the reasons behind the fallacies their critics create to portray them and their activities. Because of what they see as deeply irrational forms of logic played out in the actions of their antagonists, the women can also admit that they feel a sense of pity for their

opponents and can, thus, remain calm when confronted with their intimidation tactics. When opportunities present themselves, they say they find some relief in maintaining their composure and calmly posing reasoned questions that their tormentors evidently have little capacity to answer. If these bases, they consistently ask, are so vital to the defense of this nation, why are they not more strategically distributed throughout the entire country of Japan? Why must the vast majority continue—for decades—to occupy our small parcels of land and space? To questions like these, the bullies who appear on the scene, they point out, to harass them never fail to walk away confounded by their inability to formulate reasonable answers.

When former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye called attention in August 2014 to the vulnerability of the bases in Okinawa in light of recent Chinese advances in ballistic missile technology,[58] perhaps it is worth wondering, too, why Tokyo and Washington continue to insist on the Henoko plan. The members of *Kamaduu* we interviewed wondered whether such a strong concentration of military force on such a small island makes any strategic sense today.

In the opening of this chapter, we referred to the need of any rationalizing system to gain control over the unpredictable elements of any transaction. This is why, regarding communications, official (or state-sanctioned) propaganda campaigns that vigorously reassert official lines of thinking are elemental components in the process of conditioning the public mind to accept official positions, no matter how unpleasant. Our studies of the public discourse, the signs, and symbols of popular protest, have revealed dangers inherent in highly unpredictable transactions in communication. The practice of ignoring reasonable and pragmatic questions posed by an opposition is symptomatic of rationalization in the attempt to control inconvenient questions: among others, what will the Japanese, not only the government, but ordinary people, do about the continuing violations of Okinawans' human rights, to maintain the status quo that develops from the joint alliance? Questions such as these, prevalent in Okinawan society, are excluded from the mainstream Japanese media, with the effect of removing the inconvenient question of the Japan-US security treaty from the nation's informational feedback loop.

We noted earlier that McDonald's is increasing control over transactions by increasing its uses of self-service kiosks. While public communications with kiosks, and other automated answering systems, are cost-effective and are gaining favor in the world of McDonaldized forms of customer service, these communications remain linear,[59] and by their very nature

undemocratic. Their pervasiveness and ever-growing presence signifies a larger unfolding shift in society where citizens are excluded, more and more, from the feedback loop in their interactions with the centers of power. Ongoing anger over the Henoko plan appears to persist, in part, from the communications systems now in place.

Concerned members of the public perceive that the campaign to maintain tight control over messaging is no more than a form of McDonaldized communication where discourse has been reduced to linear forms of protest. Complaints, in effect, are registered with automated answering systems incapable of engaging in the process of transactional human communication.[60] The technology increases the distance and, thus, the sense of alienation and powerlessness that people feel toward the system they are part of. Packing tape, balloons, personal insults, threats, offensive speech, and labels declaring terrorism and lawlessness on the part of angry women are part and parcel of the problem of McDonaldized forms of control. Threats are rationalized as reasonable options for responding to vocal citizens who insist on having answers to their reasonable questions.

Notes

1. George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society*. (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1993), 101.
2. Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 91.
3. Ibid., 92.
4. Herbert Schiller "US as global overlord: Dumbing down, American-style" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1999.
5. Herbert Schiller (April 1998). Living in the number one society. *Gazette: The International Journal of Communication Studies*, 60:2, 181–197.
6. Ibid.
7. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, (New York: Free Press 1997[1922]), 158.
8. Visit http://ch.nicovideo.jp/ch132.
9. Jon Mitchell "In appearance on far-right TV, US official calls Okinawa base protests 'hate speech'," *The Japan Times*, February 16, 2015.
10. Ibid.
11. The full interview can be accessed here: http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/1420780781.
12. Op. cit.

13. Ayako Mie. "Scholar tries to ease Okinawa's US pains," *The Japan Times*, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/24/national/scholar-tries-to-ease-okinawas-u-s-pains/#.WRmM0VJ7FE4.
14. David Allen (November 6, 2005) reports for the *Stars and Stripes* that Robert Eldridge characterized the Japan-US plan for Henoko as a fiasco, which has the real potential to undermine the alliance politically, militarily, and strategically. During his address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, Eldridge supported a 1994 plan proposed by an Okinawan businessman (and backed by business interests) to build the base on a dead coral reef off of Okinawa's Yokatsu peninsula.
15. The article is available in Japanese at http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-240600-storytopic-271.html.
16. The so-called yellow line at Camp Schwab is like the proverbial line in the sand signifying a graphic ultimatum that demonstrators are not to cross.
17. "US Marines official dismissed for leaking video of arrest of Henoko protesters," *Ryukyu Shimpo* at http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2015/03/27/17631/.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Further details can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjJaw1SACnw.
21. Gavan McCormack and Sandi Aritza. "The Japanese State versus the People of Okinawa: Rolling Arrests and Prolonged and Punitive Detention," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*. Vol. 15, issue 2, no. 4 January 2017.
22. Ibid.
23. Further details can be found at https://www.amnestyusa.org/get-involved/take-action-now/urgent-action-victory-okinawa-activist-released-on-bail-after-five-months-japan-ua-2317.
24. According to AFN, "Tedokon is a radio host with FM21, a TV host with the *Channel Sakura* internet TV, and the leaders of the [Fence Clean Project and the Heart Clean Project]" (December 22, 2014). Further details can be found at https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1707190/local-radio-music-personalities-visit-afn.
25. Efforts to acquire a full transcript of the interview on AFN are ongoing. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1707190/local-radio-music-personalities-visit-afn.
26. Details found at http://myafn.dodmedia.osd.mil/Services.aspx?b=1.
27. Personal interview with former journalist Casimir Krul, May 30, 2017.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Massimo Leone. 2017. "Silence Propaganda. A Semiotic Inquiry into the Ideologies of Taciturnity," forthcoming. *Signs and Society*, 6, 1 (The University of Chicago Press).

31. Douglas Lummis. "Okinawa State of Emergency," *Counter Punch*, accessed February 19, 2015 at http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/02/13/okinawa-state-of-emergency/.
32. Further details may be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTNFWD2s_tQ.
33. Further details may be found at http://nippon-end.jugem.jp/?eid=4016&guid=ON&view=mobile.
34. References to interviews on March 24, 2015 in Ginowan City include five members of *Kamaduu*.
35. On Kamaduu members' cooperation with women group members in Nago before the referendum in 1997, see Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge 2006), 169–173.
36. Personal communication, September 14–19, 2009.
37. Usii Chinin, "'Kengai Isetsu' no Shisou to wa: Nakazato Isao shi no Hihan e no Outou: Ge (On the philosophy of 'FRF Relocation Outside the Prefecture' in response to Nakazato Isao's Critique: 3)" *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 20, 2016, at https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-364546.html.
38. According to the Kyodo News poll conducted in May and June 2015 (*Ryukyu Shimpo*, July 31, 2016, at https://ryukyushimpo.jp/editorial/entry-326630.html).
39. Chinin, op. cit. Also see *Shiranhuuna no Bouryoku* (Subconscious Violence of Ignorance) (Tokyo: Miraisha: 2013) by the same author.
40. Usii Chinin, "'Kengai Isetsu' no Shisou to wa: Nakazato Isao shi no Hihan e no Outou: Chuu (On the philosophy of 'FRF Relocation Outside the Prefecture' in response to Nakazato Isao's Critique: 2)" *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 19, 2016, at https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-364543.html.
41. Koya Nomura, *Muishiki no Shokuminchi Shugi: Nihonjin no Beigun Kichi to Okinawa jin*, (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 2005).
42. Reported in *Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 26, 2012 at https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-200735.html.
43. For example, see "Hikitori e renrakukai: Tokyo nado 5 fuken no Dantai" (Committee for Undertaking: 5 groups in Tokyo etc.) *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 14, 2017, at https://mainichi.jp/articles/20170515/k00/00m/040/130000c.
44. Usii Chinin, "'Kengai Isetsu' no Shisou to wa: Nakazato Isao shi no Hihan e no Outou: Jo (On the philosophy of 'FRF Relocation Outside the Prefecture' in response to Nakazato Isao's Critique: 1)" *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 18, 2016, at https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-364493.html. Also, see Miyume Tanji, "The *Unai* Method: The Expansion of Women-only Groups in the Community of Protest Against Violence and Militarism in Okinawa" in *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context*, Issue 13, August 2006, paragraph 51, available at http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html.

45. This reference has served throughout the decades, since the end of WWII, as the reflexive go-to rationalization of the status quo.
46. Personal interview with Professor Joseph Coleman, March 18, 2017.
47. The exceptions include the books and articles of Takahashi Tetsuya arguing for mainland Japan's 'undertaking' of the FRF. See Takahashi Tetsuya, *Okinawa no Beigun Kichi: Kengai Isetsu o Kangaeru,* (Tokyo: Shueisha Bunko: 2015).
48. A routinely updated site featuring statistics on the operational issues associated with the MV-22 Osprey can be found at http://www.g2mil.com/scandal.htm.
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51. Miyume Tanji. *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge 2006), 76.
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53. Author Unknown, "Okinawa: Citizens Group Repeats Illegal Acts," Things You May Want to Know If You Are Japanese (April 22, 2013) Accessed at http://nihon.phpapps.jp/archives/775.
54. For further details, please visit: http://nihon.phpapps.jp/archives/775.
55. For further details, please visit: http://hijai.ti-da.net/e4010962.html.
56. Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 71.
57. Further background details of the Ginowan City's complaint and the Marine Corps' response can be found at http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/DAT/LIB/WEB/1/tenp18.pdf.
58. For further details, visit: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s--nye-explains-why-the-abe-government-s-new-military-doctrine-is-a-positive-development.
59. The linear model of communication emphasizes a one-way process in which the sender is the only one encoding a message and the receiver decodes but doesn't respond, isn't expected to respond, or is incapable of responding directly to the sender.
60. The transactional model of communication emphasizes the process in the exchange of messages where sender and receiver either take turns encoding and decoding messages or coding and decoding simultaneously.

CHAPTER 9

Calculability as a Quantifier of Future Profits Added to the Present

Wrapped in the desire to control is the perceived need to quantify not merely the material, but also the ineffable. In our yearning to calculate feelings of sublime adoration, this desire appears in music, poetry, and economy. The love of money, for example, expressed in the construction of a world now governed by free-market capitalism has transformed the fruit of human activity, feeling, and aspiration into products packaged for mass consumption. Referring to this process as "marketization," Michael Burawoy speaks even of current markets where "parts of the human body … have become commodities that are bought and sold."[1]

We have critiqued how late capitalism needs and uses propaganda to support its project of perpetual buying and selling. Despite the precariousness it creates for human economy, we wonder, too, how it survives in its present guise. Again, the history of Okinawa provides an excellent case study for understanding how late capitalism's inherent power to dispossess and alienate people contributes to the local project for neoliberalization. As regards the necessity of preserving this system, Silvia Federici notes that capitalism, through privatization, must capture latent control of the means of production, which is fundamental to the reproduction of our lives—the land, the forest, the waters:

> If you look at the history of capitalism, you see [this] pursued incessantly…. The process of dispossession has continued today to accelerate and … proceeds at a pace that is devastating, and it is … one of the main struggles on the planet, particularly in the so-called free world…. When you dispossess

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> people of their means of reproduction, you are also dispossessing them from the knowledge they accumulate in their cultivation of the land. This also dispossesses people of their political … capacity of self-government, … community solidarity and decision-making.[2]

With the effects of dispossession found in powerlessness and alienation, free-market capitalism as social practice is insidious in its manner of dividing people and corrupting their values and reasoning processes. Any wonder why marketing campaigns are continually rationalized, devised, and undertaken? The incessant search for higher profits made normal in the common pursuit of capital accumulation creates class differences that distort values and set people against one another. This is likely why already thriving communities separated from the marginalized by false differences tend to tolerate (or remain willfully blind to) these categories and their own separation from the commons, though this has hardly been the case at sites of protest in Henoko and Takae where many people fight for the land, forest, and water. As late capitalism divides, it creates hierarchies and different experiences that appear not communicable, Federici notes, so the capitalist class has been able to systematically separate the colonized from the non-colonized.

The practice of dispossession and alienation has a long history, and some of its roots can be found in post-World War II Okinawa when base expansion was at its height. George Barrett notes in his "Report on Okinawa: A Rampart We Built":

> [L]iving down its reputation as an 'outpost for the outcast,' [Okinawa] is now a collection—almost a magical transplanting—of whole American communities, with several more still building. Some of these are already complete, even to schools, department stores, theatres and suburban housing developments boasting winding roads, flagstone walks and 'picket' fences made of bamboo.[3]

Barrett's piece exemplifies the glee of a Western reporter on assignment in East Asia touring and taking careful note of the "magical" emergence of the vast expansion of Occidental culture in possession of aspects of the Orient. His journalistic survey of Okinawa, which "quietly mushroomed into a first-class island bastion, barbed with batteries of long-muzzled 120's," divided and dispossessed of its land, remains an important study in the concrete calculability of American capital transplanted to the island fortification the colonizers constructed. "The construction project," Barrett notes, "which in effect is converting the lower third of Okinawa

from tropical barrenness into a series of self-contained communities, is roughly the equivalent in manpower effort, …, to building a city the size of Indianapolis from scratch."[4] In erasing the agency of the surviving local population, Barrett could characterize the island as inert badlands devoid of life, which helped justify the radical transformations of that time and the expenditures understood best in monetary calculations:

> This barrier-reefed outpost was little more than a wasteland when the last war ended here seven years ago. But what was still only recently a lonely, memorial to the 12,520 Americans and 110,000 Japanese who died in the savage transfer of title has become a rivet-hammering, rock-blasting, $500,000,000 construction project.[5]

As we can see with the missing agent, what was once a "memorial" to the war dead now becomes a "construction project," which remains a key pursuit in contemporary life as the calculated costs, measured in lives, time, or natural resources, are presented as self-evident proof of capitalism's unassailable reputation in being the only justifiable measure of progress. The military planners and engineers in the post-war era offer a graphic illustration of the astonishing developments to the island made possible by their calculations.

> Nobody wants to talk here in terms of precise construction statistics that might give away some of the military developments, but they will break down the overall picture enough to disclose that the several communities with their schools and stores and club houses and block after block of residential homes account for only about 25 percent of the Okinawan project—all the rest is military. …If all the asphaltic concrete used on Okinawa could be put into a single-land road 11 feet wide, the highway would go from New York to Chicago; if the poured concrete could be formed into a sidewalk 4 feet wide, it would start in New York and end in San Francisco; and if the cement blocks could be laid end to end in the United States, they would make a wall 4 feet high complete across the country, with an extension of another 1000 miles into the sea.[6]

In Henoko and Takae, that kind of progress is renewed in "rivet-hammering" and "rock-blasting" construction projects that unfold the calculated wonders of new military expansion. According to Ritzer, "calculability is an emphasis on the quantitative aspects of products sold (portion size, cost) and service offered (the time it takes to get the product). *More is better* [authors' emphasis]. If there is a lot of a product, then it must be good."[7]

One can grasp the extent of the importance of calculability in Okinawa (as conceived by the central planners) when one examines the plans devised for future economic development of the spaces cleared by the eventual return of land presently occupied by MCAS Futenma. Another aim of the bureaucratic planners appears to emerge in the realization of an alternative form of colonization disguised as healthcare development.

To achieve a wider perspective, we turn first to a well-known American pundit and ardent advocate of unfettered free speech in the unregulated free market. Political commentator and ideologue Rush Limbaugh has argued: "Nobody has the right to good health."[8] Couched in his consistent criticism of national universal healthcare, Limbaugh's claim has been read as code for "nobody has the right to good healthcare." After all, healthcare has costs that anyone can easily calculate. According to media scholar Robert McChesney, "In the view of 'free market' conservatives, the market (i.e. business) should rule and the political system should logically deal with how best to protect private property and not much else."[9]

Limbaugh's assertion seems easy to make in US public discourse now loosely controlled by a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) taken over by corporate interests over the past few decades. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has "dramatically reduced important FCC regulations on cross ownership," observes Bill Moyers "and [has] allowed giant corporations to buy up thousands of media outlets across the country, increasing their monopoly on the flow of information in the United States and around the world."[10]

Limbaugh's ideas also appear to reflect the sort of economic beliefs that neoliberals abide in, where the "operation of a market, or market-like structure, is seen as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action and substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs."[11] This ethic extends to Limbaugh's conception of the way in which societies ought to manage healthcare for their people. Against this ideological backdrop stand free trade agreements.

Free Trade and the Cost of Future Healthcare

Should the local social architects have their way for new geographic and economic spaces cleared by Futenma's eventual return to local control, Limbaugh's ideas may well find their way into local practice. Although the details were then negotiated in secret, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) purported to promise enormous economic benefits for the Japanese

national economy, but the greatest beneficiaries would likely have been a handful of transnational corporations—notably the pharmaceutical giants[12] whose lobbyists command much respect in the halls of power in Washington, DC.[13] Although President Obama's agenda for the TPP has been scrapped, for now,[14] by the current Trump administration, Trump himself remains intent to enact his own trade agenda in "bilateral relations" which will aim to "provide the U.S. with maximum leverage."[15] Among the strands of negotiation will be the American expansion of healthcare and pharmaceutical markets.

What are the ramifications of such progress? Current American concepts of managed healthcare law, largely written by huge corporate interests, stand in stark contrast to those of Japan's (and Okinawa's) healthcare model. In the United States, Bill Moyers observes that the "movers and shakers rotate between the government and the lucrative private sector at a speed so dizzying they forget who they are working for," and they work to "give the industry exactly what they want: higher profits and no competition from alternative non-profit coverage that could lower cost and premium."[16] In the American market, "money not only talks," Moyers notes, but "it writes the prescriptions."[17] Under direct threat during TPP was Japan's national health system which, in emerging bilateral talks, may mean its neoliberalization. Signs of movement toward a new concept of Japanese healthcare emerged over the past campaign for the Okinawan governorship.

A brief history frames our discussion of the present. During the reconstruction years after World War II, Japan embarked on an impressively egalitarian path toward social healthcare coverage. The history of the present system has its roots in the 1948 Health Insurance Reformation, among the finest achievements, ironically, of the US military occupation.[18] The Japanese government worked hard in the decade that followed in order to introduce a universal healthcare system that went into effect in 1961 and which still provides equal healthcare and financial risk protection to all members of society. Many other countries such as the former Soviet Union, New Zealand, and Scandinavian countries, as well, developed healthcare systems that respect Article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by all nations in 1948. Article 25 declares:

> Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.[19]

Despite the obvious altruism in this declaration, the sentiment has hardly seen widespread practice in the majority of nations around the world—a reason all the more to protect Japan's present system. Illustrating this very point is an April 2017 memorandum from the UN High Commissioner that expresses deep concern over President Trump's scrapping of ObamaCare and asks "whether scrapping ObamaCare without a suitable replacement would violate global law."[20]

While ways of providing universal health care differ across national boundaries, Japan manages to do so by employing the Compulsory National Health Care System, which is administrated by municipal governments and which enables all citizens to receive fundamental healthcare with an extremely low financial burden on the individual. Up to 90 percent of medical payments are covered by the national budget (i.e. taxes) in order to reduce the economic risks for families and individuals and to achieve overall positive outcomes for the health and well-being of every citizen (and even legal resident). According to Hitoshi Kono, a physician with a 20-year practice in Tokyo, the system serves, "Anyone, anywhere, anytime."[21] A direct result, then, of the philosophy that explicitly informs Japanese healthcare practices, the people continue to enjoy some of the world's highest longevity rates. What follows is a critique of political and business propaganda that conjures up the illusion that new plans for medical research and pharmaceutical development in Okinawa arise from the egalitarian philosophy that has guided national healthcare in Japan for decades.

Heavy Industry and Construction Narratives

Election seasons can offer spectators some clear views of planned future social and economic developments. The flier, pictured here,[22] appeared routinely for weeks in the daily newspapers *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times* during the 2015 Okinawa gubernatorial race. It was published by a local citizens' group headed by a prominent citizen in Okinawa, who also heads the largest construction company, Kokuba Group (國場組). It is worth noting that the particular name of this citizens' group—Prefectural Citizens' Group for the Rapid Realization of Okinawa's 21st Century Vision (沖縄21世紀ビジョンの早期実現を求める県民の会)—is actually a clever euphemism for a private association of influential individuals whose primary concern lies in building more US military bases in the Island's North (Illustration 9.1).




Illustration 9.1 Okinawa Medical Island Strategic Plan. Original Japanese translated by Maki Sunagawa. Graphic illustration interpreted and produced by Yena Broudy

The name of the group also contains the name of the new national developmental plan under former Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, "21st Century Vision" (a.k.a. "Nakaima vision"), which he had used to point the electorate toward a future of militarism in the Northern part of the Main Island and, as will be discussed, corporatism in the Southern part. The Vision is the most recent national budget scheme allocated specially for the Prefecture's development, since Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972. Nakaima succeeded in increasing the budget, which had been declining to almost a half since 1998. The budget boost for the 21st Century Vision Plan was Prime Minister Abe's reward for Nakaima's 2013 approval of reclamation of Oura Bay for the FRF construction (see Chapter 10). "Nakaima vision" was part of the larger neoliberal project, which is a near mirror reflection of plans expressed in the 1996 SACO[23] Final Report. This so-called vision refers to the return of Futenma and bases south of Kadena—if the Okinawan people could surrender to the Marine Corps plan for Henoko, known then as "the heliport" and "sea-based facility."[24] The propaganda in the flier integrates artist renderings of an imagined future with the present where we can calculate the promise of future material profits.

Interestingly, while the 1996 SACO agreement included not a single Okinawan voice concerning the future of Henoko,[25] the results of the gubernatorial election of 2015, despite widespread propaganda supporting Nakaima, exemplify a small victory for democratic action. Onaga's win also seems to shed light on an electorate that was largely well engaged in understanding both the history of the 1996 SACO decision and how this vote would shape the future. During the deeply contentious gubernatorial campaign leading to election night, the slogan, incessantly repeated in the streets through loudspeakers and in fliers distributed by the group, seemed to resonate with some voters, despite the Governor's inability to draw on ideas outside of the 1996 agreement. In US parlance, this "citizens'" group would equate to a Political Action Committee (PAC), which takes on the work of gathering funds and supporting their particular candidate for public office.

After implementation of the 1994 Political Funds Control Law (政治資金規正法), corporations were restricted from directly supporting candidates for public office. To circumvent those restrictions, corporations employed an unsophisticated, but nonetheless practical, approach to political funding by teaming up with other like-minded corporate entities, raising funds, organizing support, and having their CEOs present gifts of money to the chosen candidates. Though this practice wasn't necessarily illegal, it was ethically questionable, as corporations, in effect, sent their emissaries disguised as private citizens, but with much louder voices than

individuals, to curry future political favor. Nevertheless, thanks to fairly recent changes in the Law, announced on June 13, 2014,[26] corporations now have sweeping discretion in the funds they allot to candidates.

The 2015 election for Okinawa's governorship saw the effects of this new law unfold during the campaign when 11 citizen associations and private businesses,[27] the largest of which were Ryuseki (りゅうせき商事), Kokuba Group (國場組), and Okinawa Electric (沖縄電力株式会社), supported Governor Nakaima's reelection bid. These three most powerful corporate entities in Okinawa (with economic interests in the US military presence) are in the petroleum trade, in construction, and in electricity, respectively, and were all in league with the Nakaima regime and Tokyo's plans for Henoko. While these companies and associations used the full weight of their economic power to support the LDP and benefited in varying degrees from the military-industrial status quo, it is also telling that Nakaima still failed to secure a reelection victory. Though Onaga's election appears, as of this writing, to be a solid victory for the power of the popular vote, it remains to be seen how powerful democracy will be when Tokyo, goaded by Washington, will feel pressure to move forward on the Henoko "development" project.

As regards the election itself, a compelling parallel appears to exist between the recent change in Japanese campaign law and a 2010 US Supreme Court decision in the case of *Citizens United* (a conservative lobby) *vs. the Federal Election Commission* (FEC). In that closely contested decision (five to four), the Court "ruled that the government may not ban corporations from political spending on elections." The decision, observed Chomsky, "heralds even further corporate takeover of the U.S. political system."[28] The results of the local election in Okinawa raise similar questions. Is free speech, enacted by powerful corporate persons, as powerful as Chomsky suggests it is in Okinawa as well? In light of the sustained advance of neoliberal economic policies on governments across the globe, as seen in Nakaima's substantial financial support from huge corporations, a more in-depth analysis of the changes in election law in Japan might illuminate the actual power of neoliberalism to undermine democratic elections.

Politicizing Catchphrases and Colors

Turning again to the propaganda in the flier included above, the headline calls immediate attention to Nakaima's so-called 21st Century Vision. The message in the Nakaima name itself presents a simple black-and-white decision for citizens to make. Vote for him, and the Futenma base will disappear, replaced by Tokyo's special vision of a new corporate healthcare

colossus whose details are elaborated throughout the flier. Vote for Onaga (or any other candidate), and receive no future economic benefits. This is the underlying message of neoliberal rationalization—an effort to destroy logic and replace it with rules written by long traditions.

Over the past 70 years, Okinawa has traditionally been the place to base the major bulk of US garrisons, a place to rationalize the destruction of towns, of geographic spaces and ecosystems and to ignore the logic of preserving basic human rights to live in peace. Futenma MCAS is one of many local symbols of that rationalization, a location despised for its ongoing dangers to the public and the military tradition of displacing people and their livelihoods that stand in the way. Okinawa is the place where the powerful elites in Washington and Tokyo can work in concert to rationalize the limitations of the important public debate where the USMC should next take up residence.

The rationalization is also communicated in a carefully chosen color. Directly below the headline is the flier's subtitle in bold green, declaring "Okinawa medical island design," symbols that call up positive images of well-laid plans. The gradations of green color in the kanji characters blend nicely with the cultivated self-image that local people have of themselves and their gorgeous subtropical island where warmth and life remain highly valued.

Reinforcing these positive notions are well-placed catchphrases just below the subtitle: (a) "Life is a treasure" (命どぅ宝)—a commonly understood metaphor rooted in the deep past when Shuri ruled the Ryukyus; and (b) "A bridge to many nations" (万国津梁)—another metaphor that recalls Okinawa's past kingdom as a hub for trade among many other neighboring nations. It is worth noting, too, that these phrases are cast in a variety of *Uchinaguchi*—a collection of indigenous languages long suppressed by the forces of colonialism, but a feature of the culture nonetheless that calls forth positive images of Okinawan self-determination and identity. To those who see below the surface of the propaganda, this use of the Okinawan language is especially offensive since the language itself is used in a way that masks a deeply vexing reality in which outside interests manipulate local aspirations for control over the land, air, and sea.

The descriptions that follow "Life is a treasure" play on the enduring myth that Okinawa still enjoys the world's highest longevity rates, despite marked declines since the end of World War II, when the insatiable appetite for fast food cultivated under American and then Japanese rule began influencing local cuisine and local eating habits. Once the holder of the highest longevity rates on earth, Okinawa has slipped considerably (accord-

ing to the most recent government statistics) to 30th for men and 3rd for women out of Japan's 47 prefectures.[29] This translates to 79.4 years for men and 87.2 for women. Despite the considerable decline for Okinawa, the nation of Japan still ranks third highest in the world in terms of longevity.[30]

The descriptions that follow "A bridge to many nations" recall ancient times when Okinawa saw visitors joining in the great culture of trade among nations. For Nakaima, though, trade is now a part of the global empire of Western medicine funded by corporations profiting from highly complex and expensive treatments for the chronically ill. The description in the flier lays out the goal to see Western physicians and researchers teaming up with local researchers seeking new and improved treatments for disease within the Western paradigm. Ironically, the traditional East Asian practice of living life in Okinawa to its fullest included a diet rich in organic foods produced locally that sustained life and maintained health—a culture that has largely been crippled by the weight of the Western diet and subsumed by the great network of fast food globalization. Another related statistic that the propaganda in this flier glosses over is Okinawa's other dubious distinction in overall health, the highest rate of citizens suffering from obesity of any other Japanese prefecture—a likely effect of the combination of the local car culture and fast-food industry working in congress on waistlines. Besides the unmistakable presence of the US bases, remnants of the occupation period remain and are maintained by an ongoing tourist fascination with A&W and Blue Seal Ice Cream (among others)—now reappropriated as local symbols of 1950s Americana.

Politicizing Cooperation and Its Profit Potential

The Nakaima proposal also featured details about the cooperation envisioned for the 21st century where multinational pharmaceutical companies, the University of the Ryukyus' Department of Medicine and the Hospital, the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST), and the United States Naval Hospital collaborate in the interest of developing new therapies and medicines for the international marketplace. It is worth reminding readers at this point that OIST comes out of Tokyo's official efforts in 2009 to internationalize Okinawa, to build a bigger bridge of trust, so to speak, between Tokyo and Naha. Officially, OIST was conceived in order to (a) "establish an international hub for scientific research and education;" (b) to develop "jobs in scientific and technological industries;" (c) to "nurture human interest in science and technology;"

and (d) to "nurture an environment of international curiosity around the campus and transform Okinawa's industrial base."[31]

However, many local people see OIST as an expensive experiment where Tokyo continues spending millions of yen—precisely because the US military continues existing in Okinawa: a very well-endowed quid pro quo for Okinawa's long-held burden of bearing the imposition of foreign military bases. When strictly viewed as a symbol of strong central planning in Tokyo, the OIST project presents opportunities for potentially useful studies of the power of the political "sweetener," where most local citizens find themselves largely on the fringe of important scientific work, assuming positions as clerical support while mainland Japanese and international scientists dominate both the teaching posts and administration.[32] Though OIST has also become a source of pride for many local people, anecdotal observations suggest that scarcely anyone in the broader populace understands or experiences its tangible benefits, let alone knows of its existence.

The final significant image in this flier features the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland. Nakaima's vision includes the construction of Japan's first national research institute modeled directly on the NIH, which is intended to be housed on land occupied by previous Marine Corps residences. It promises to be a base of medical research controlled by the nation's top social and scientific planners in Tokyo. Although the plan, purported to be another benefit to Okinawa, is not necessarily militarism in the direct sense, the returned site will be re-occupied by a shared developmental undertaking between largely Yamato technocrats and new US Naval Hospital, presently finalizing construction on Camp Foster in close proximity to MCAS Futenma. According to an unnamed official with the Okinawa Medical Association (沖縄県医師会), a co-sponsor of the Citizens' Group propaganda, the plan had been conceived by Shigeru Ishiba, Head of the Tokyo LDP, and presented in 2012 to the local LDP committee in Okinawa as a codified direction (like the plan for Henoko) which is to be followed without question.[33]

Premised upon the plan is the common understanding that Okinawan people are attached to the position of number one, when it comes to longevity. To effectively persuade local people that the national plan is beneficial, the details are wrapped in language that appeals to the deep emotional connections that people have toward living a long and fruitful life. The propaganda supporting the international medical hub purports to profit the local people by returning them to first place in longevity. Most interesting about the process of propagandizing, though, is the

template used by the bureaucrats, which seems to mirror the one they had designed for Henoko.

The Tokyo LDP instructs the Okinawa LDP to gather the necessary experts in a particular area of business (in this case medicine) so as to generate propaganda for presentation to the larger populace featuring the right symbols and language that will stimulate wider integration with Tokyo's plans. On the surface, the Party's designs appear to be excellent in every sense, especially in the area of medicine (its practice and accompanying promise of medical research), but the plan, it has also been observed, also illustrates Tokyo's power, pressure, and control over local issues, which, as earlier discussed, reflects efforts in achieving McDonaldized efficiency. Initially challenged in the courts by Naha City, the development of Henoko, for example, is presently cast in media as a Naha LDP project.

An Efficient Future of Incalculable Profits

The power of the central government bureaucrats supercedes local voices seeking to chart alternative paths of development beyond the rationalizing proposals for sustained military occupation offered consistently over the decades. Research undertaken for the proposed medical hub itself and the resulting integration propaganda is methodical, as the connection between the USMC and the NIH extends back to 1798 when President John Adams, "signed an act for the relief of sick and disabled seamen."[34] Positive images of the current "medical bridge" (医療津梁) flood the minds of citizens who see the kanji symbols in the propaganda but who might not be able to discern the military bridge upon which the plan is built.

We suggested in the opening section of this chapter that Rush Limbaugh is a staunch and influential advocate for free speech, especially when it benefits the bottom line of his legion of corporate sponsors. Governor Nakaima's sponsors, who remain committed despite his recent reelection loss, are just as keen to continue supporting plans that further the massive business interests working to generate the pro-Henoko propaganda and to clear the way for the eventual corporate takeover of Futenma. These interests, as of this writing, appear to include uncritical acceptance of the terms of the TPP that allows big multinational business firms to sue the governments of foreign nations that resist plans for the ongoing development of business ventures.[35]

In secret negotiations among TPP signatories over "Patents and Patentable Subject Matter" (November 13, 2013), leaked documents

reveal that long-held protections regarding equal "access to affordable medicines worldwide"[36] have been consistently opposed by the United States Trade Representative (USTR). As of this writing, it is unclear from these leaks whether Japan, a co-proposer, has since moved beyond merely "considering this provision"[37] in 2013 to formally endorsing it. What appears clear enough is the United States' eagerness to help nurture a pharmaceutical hegemony that would

> expand pharmaceutical patenting and create new drug monopolies, by lowering patentability standards[38]; eliminate safeguards against patent abuse, including among others the right of third parties to challenge patent applications (pre-grant opposition)[39]; risk facilitating patent abuse by requiring countries to condition marketing approval on patent status (patent linkage)[40]; and expand exclusive control over clinical trial data including through an extra three years of data exclusivity for new uses of known products.[41]

In contemporary Japan, with its current Constitutional provisions allowing for an expansive military combined with the nation's interest in the TPP, the Nakaima plan for Okinawa represented a real threat to national sovereignty and egalitarian principles expressed in the Constitution. The propaganda hints at a future where the US military maintains its long presence and where transnational pharmaceutical giants are free to work within the terms of the agreement to remodel Japan's world-class public healthcare system into a private corporate venture operating by the profit motive. Illustrating the current resistance, nine nations have opposed the US and Japanese proposal to "impose patents for new uses … of old medicines, [which] can facilitate "evergreening"—a form of abuse leading to long drug monopolies."[42]

The proposal stands in contrast to India's belief, "which has helped protect access to affordable medicine worldwide,"[43] much to the dismay of the big transnational pharmaceuticals. The American and Japanese position, it is also worth mentioning, is not unlike Chomsky's earlier characterization of the sort of damage that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has done under the tutelage of the WTO: "The outrageous patent principles, for example, designed to grant monopoly-pricing privileges to immense private tyrannies, far in the future, and to stifle innovation and development, in their interests."[44] These sorts of corporate efforts in ultimately monopolizing market share, masked as they are with the clever euphemisms of "free trade" and "smaller government," are typical of what John Feffer sees in neoliberalism:

> [A]ll barriers to the flow of capital and goods must fall, governments must withdraw from the economy, and labor must become more 'flexible.' In other words, East Asian economies should remake themselves in the image of the U.S. or British economies.[45]

Apart from the tyranny of military power the United States has maintained over the decades in Okinawa, the issue of pharmaceutical tyranny now appears on the horizon for Japan and its citizens. As in the US, a corporate medical hegemony will invariably drive up healthcare costs. Today, the out-of-pocket price of a simple aspirin, presently at four cents[46] per tablet in Japanese hospitals across the nation, could rise to 21 dollars[47] and beyond, which is the average cost to patients in American hospitals. This disparity in costs for such a simple medication seems, at first glance, to be absurd and implausible, but the present world shows no shortage of cases where so-called free trade agreements have "elevate[d] companies to the same level as sovereign governments, [and] effectively enable[d] them to circumvent domestic laws and courts"[48] to get their way.

Just after the 2015 gubernatorial election produced a clear political winner for the Governor's seat in Naha, Tokyo and Washington's plan for Henoko once again began moving forward a mere one day after the celebrations concluded. Suga Yoshihide, Chief Cabinet Secretary in charge of overseeing US base issues, observed somberly that despite Nakaima's loss, the government will, nevertheless, move forward, albeit surreptitiously, with plans for the FRF construction in accordance with the signed contract.[49]

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22. Access to the digital copy can be located here: http://www.okinawavision.net/vision1.pdf.
23. SACO was formed partly as a response to the 1995 rape of an elementary school girl by three American servicemen. The committee, which included not a single Okinawan voice, laid out designs for the future force structure of the American military on Okinawa and to reduce the "footprint." These designs included the development of Henoko in the North as a suitable replacement for MCAS Futenma in Ginowan City.
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27. Ryukyu Shimpo (print version) 琉球新報9月2日りゅうせき11社仲井真氏を推薦.
りゅうせきグループ11社で構成する、りゅうせきネットワーク会議の金城克也議長は1日、11月16日の知事選に出馬を表明している仲井真弘多知事に推薦状を手渡した。仲井真氏には既に国和会(国場組グループ)、百添会(沖縄電力グループ)、沖縄偕生会ネットワーク、日本保育推進連盟県支部、県情報通信関連産業団体連合会、太名嘉組などの企業グループが推薦を決めている。金城氏は「地方人口が減る中、沖縄が増えているのは策を講じてきたからだ」と仲井真氏の実績を評価した。※県情報通信関連産業団体連合会=219社で構成.
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34. For further details, visit http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/historical/chronology_of_events.htm#eighteenhundred.
35. Further details regarding the power of corporations to attack nations can be found at http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=5411.
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39. Kılıç et al., Ibid., 16.
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(同県宜野湾市)の名護市辺野古への移設に反対する翁長雄志前那覇市長が当選したことについて「米軍の抑止力維持と普天間の危険除去を合わせた中で、辺野古移設が唯一の解決策だということで政府は一貫している。辺野古移設を粛々と進めたい」と述べ、移設方針に変更がないことを改めて強調した。【木下訓明】.

PART III

Historical and Contemporary Forms of Resistance

CHAPTER 10

Political Economy and Identity of "All Okinawa" Resistance

So far we have examined propaganda and various uses of language, words, and signs to manufacture local people's consent to Tokyo's political priority to execute the FRF construction within Okinawa Prefecture. Part III explores the resistance of the Okinawan people. Unprecedented since the 1996 SACO Final Report in 2013–2014, local Okinawans transgressed the conservative and progressive political differences to form an anti-FRF coalition.

In Chapter 3 we discussed the concept of hegemony, and how its domination works not only through coercive means using the military, government, and laws, but also through control of social relations, civil society, and the cultural realm. Gramsci's triangle, the diagram below, illustrates this dynamics. In particular, propaganda, education, and the media are important tools operated by delegate intellectuals to enforce the ruled to voluntarily give consent to the order created by the hegemony, and its political agenda. Counter-hegemonic forces, those who oppose hegemony's rule, also utilize ideas in particular ways and philosophize their political struggles and education in their attempts to construct an alternative social order. Accordingly, we analyze the key ideas, uses of language, and the legacies created by the opponents to FRF in Okinawa.

Since the 1996 SACO report, it took nearly 20 years for a bipartisan "All Okinawa" coalition to form against the core agenda of SACO, the relocation of FRF within the Prefecture, encompassing a disparate range of political views within. Even though they ultimately want the same

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


Fig. 10.1 A triangle showing "The Relations of Force" by Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London*:* Pluto Press) 97

thing, peaceful and prosperous Okinawa, conservative and progressive Okinawans have usually disagreed on how to achieve it, and a united coalition across this line is rare. The expression *Ōru Okinawa* ("All Okinawa"), suggesting prefecture-wide inclusion, albeit in reality including mainly those in Okinawa Main Island, deserves a closer look: what it is that conservatives and radicals now share, how it came to the fore to glue people together, and why in that particular timing. We examine words that appear frequently in the political context in the community of protest in Okinawa, in particular, *kenmin* (prefecture people), *jichi* (self-governance), and *shimagurumi* (all-island). This chapter examines the recent change in political economy of base politics that made the all-island resistance possible. We also ask: what is the bottom line of the "All Okinawa" coalition, what does it challenge, and what are the dynamics between social relations in production, military relations, and political relations in Gramsci's triangle (Fig. 10.1)?

Kenmin (People of the Prefecture): Bifurcated Nationalism

Okinawa kenmin (people of the Okinawa Prefecture) is a political collective used by the people of Okinawa to refer to themselves in relation to Japan. Literally meaning people (*min*) of the prefecture (*ken*, a Japanese for regional municipality), *kenmin* simply would describe the members of an administrative group in Japan in the case of the other 46 prefectures. However, having lost the option to call themselves "nationals" of the

Ryukyu Kingdom since its annexation by Japan in 1879, for Okinawan people *kenmin* has functioned as a term of self-demarcation that comes closest to a nation, albeit disguised, by the Japan-specific term "prefecture." Unlike *Uchinanchu*, which refers limitedly to the people of the Main Island (*Uchinaa*), *kenmin* encompasses multiple identities within Okinawa. When used in statements, requests, and protests made vis-à-vis Japan, *Okinawa kenmin* represents a strong political agency mainly against the rest of Japan.

Significantly, the expression *Okinawa kenmin* simultaneously signals a sense of belonging to Japan and separation from it, without cancelling each other out. It embodies a bifurcated nationalism, an imagined subjectivity of "us" against "them": identifying with Japan and also against it, "in syncretism, rather than competition."[1] Yet at any one time, one manifests in front of the other.

In the early 1950s, under the harsh and arbitrary US military administration that rendered military needs primary before residents' rights and well-being, the residents' biggest concern was the land lost to the US enclosure without the residents' consent for base construction.[2] The armed US soldiers bulldozed over farmlands, houses, and crops; the first *shimagurumi* resistance that transgressed conservative and progressive was the resistance against the land seizure and demand of livable compensation: 160,000–400,000 residents protested in island-wide rallies.[3] With the military's seizure of arable land, scarce in the Main Island in the first place,[4] the islanders lost their family land, owned for generations, and the most important means to make a living, which was farming. After being used as a battlefield to delay US invasion in the mainland, the islands of Okinawa and Amami were placed directly under the US military government, separated formerly from Japan by the 1952 San Francisco Treaty, and subjected to the military's civil administration; Okinawans became citizens of no country. With their rights protected by no government, the residents increasingly coveted re-inclusion to Japan, hoping for protection under the new post-war Japanese Constitution. The residents' struggle against US land seizures generated a strong longing for, and identification with, the Japanese nation, described as "reversion nationalism."[5]

Informed by anthropologists, the US military government personnel considered the Ryukyuan and Japanese ethnicity at odds with each other.[6] While harshly suppressing any local political expressions against the US rule, the USCAR implemented a policy of encouraging traditional "Ryukyuan" culture and identity, separate from Japanese, in order to facilitate the administration by suppressing the Okinawans' animosity toward

the United States and the demands to reunite with Japan.[7] In this situation, according to Masakazu Sakashita, *Okinawa kenmin* started to appear frequently in the underground newsletters of the Okinawa People's Party and the Okinawa Socialist Mass Party, in political statements describing their land struggle as a struggle to defend the territorial integrity of the Japanese nation.[8] As the raising of the *hinomaru* flag (the Japanese national flag) protest rallies expressed reversion nationalism in the 1960s, the term *Okinawa kenmin* thus challenged the US military rule, which entailed risks of persecution and punishment.

Since the late 1960s, and disappointment with the US-Japan reversion agreement on the continued presence and operations of US bases in Okinawa, the political implication of the term *Okinawa kenmin* increasingly started to lean toward separation from *Yamato*, shorthand for mainland Japan. *Yamato* is the name of the ancient tribe that moved in and presided over indigenous people to construct what is known today as Japan between the third and 7th century CE. In mainland Japan, where the myth of a singular ethnic nation prevailed since modern state-building, *Yamato* is rarely used in the everyday language to refer to the dominant ethnicity, or to one of multiple ethnicities including Izumo, Emishi, Hayato, Ryukyu, and Ainu,[9] unlike in Okinawa, and also unlike in Hokkaido where non-Ainu Japanese are referred to as *Wajin*. In this regard, Okinawans' referring to Japanese people as *Yamato* represents a sense of ethnic separation. When used in the political context vis-à-vis *Yamato*, the expression *Okinawa kenmin* conveys a sense of imagined community against Japan—that is, *Okinawan* nationalism—behind the safeguarded 'prefecture' boundary.

The source of tension between Okinawa Main Island and mainland Japan after reversion has been the increasing concentration of US-owned military presence on the Island. In 1952, Japan (minus Okinawa) hosted 130,000 hectares (ha) of US military bases. In 1958, much of the USMC stationed in mainland Japan moved to Okinawa. In 1960, US military bases occupied 30,000 ha of Japan as opposed to 26,950 ha in Okinawa. In 1969, the presence in Japan reduced to 21,000 ha in 1969, and to 9,702 ha in 1974. In the mid-1990s, Japan hosted only 8,000 ha of exclusively US military facilities, whereas Okinawa continued to host approximately 26,300 ha. Considering the land surface difference between the two, the US military presence in Okinawa was more than 100 times of that in Japan in density.[10] In a tight and confined Okinawan Main Island, residents have been exposed to a foreign standing army with extraterritorial

privileges, trained to kill. Intense interactions with the US military presence at the community level, often accompanying violent influence and tension, while still existing locally, have become much less of a pressing concern for the general public in mainland Japan.

However, even on the issue of excessive US military presence, the bipartisan protest of Okinawa *kenmin* against the rest of Japan has been rare in post-war Okinawa because of the conservative-progressive division that has constantly divided local politics. When it happens, the powerful moments of solidarity among Okinawa Main Islanders against a greater power are captured in the expression "all-island" (*shimagurumi*) struggle, initially against the US military's land seizure policy in 1956. This first wave of the all-island Okinawan struggle for land rights and compensation that stormed through the Island yet soon fell apart in disagreement on the point of compromise with the US authority.[11] In the mid-1960s, conservatives and progressives both demanded reversion to Japan, described as the second wave of the Okinawan struggle; they soon disagreed on the timing and conditions to do with US military presence, and could not form a bipartisan political organization.[12]

Traditionally represented by business and corporate interests, before the reversion, the conservative political forces in Okinawa have focused on maintaining amicable relationship with the US civil administration, and consequently, the LDP and the Japanese government. The progressives are traditionally critical of the dominant LDP policy on both Japan's Security Treaty with the United States (*Nichibei Anpo Joyaku, Anpo* hereafter), and the US military presence, staunchly supporting the non-belligerent clause of Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution. Their anti-base and anti-war position is predicated on the uniquely Okinawan perspective of "absolute pacifism" firmly predicated on the memory of residents' collective suffering during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa.[13] Generally the conservatives have been more ready to make concessions to Tokyo, depending on the terms. True to the meaning of conservative, they value pragmatism over idealism, and trust gradual, rather than a major, social change, focusing on putting food on the table for the Okinawan people tomorrow, rather than abstract principles such as peace or protecting the planet.

However, as we examine in the next section, both conservative and progressive Okinawan political forces have shared a common concern: the US forces' arbitrary and exclusive territorial occupation, of nearly 20 percent of the land, and also using the air and sea of the Main Island, restricted *Okinawa kenmin*'s ability to self-govern its own economic development.

Jichi (Self-Governance)

A year before Okinawa's reversion to Japan, Yara Chōbyō, leader of the reversion movement and the first publicly elected Chair of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), submitted to then Japanese Prime Minister *Fukki Sochi ni Kansuru Kengisho* (*Proposal on Post-reversion Treatment of Okinawa, kengisho* hereafter) in 1971, in which *Okinawa kenmin* appears repeatedly as the subject of the Proposal. *Kengisho* firstly demanded respect for Okinawa's unique history, especially the disproportionate damage and devastation caused by Japan's war in World War II. Then it demanded Okinawa's self-governance (*jichi*): the right to make its own political decisions. Most importantly, it argued that the elimination of US military bases was essential for Okinawa's self-determination[14]:

> During the 26 years of its direct administration of Okinawa, the U.S. built a massive amount of military facilities exclusively and arbitrarily. Okinawa practically has existed inside the surrounding military bases: one million *kenmin* in a small island have lived amongst the fences, nuclear weapons and poisonous gas. The U.S. military-first policy restricted our political and civil rights, repeatedly abusing our basic human rights…. *It has also delayed our civilian economic development*: Okinawan per capita income is only about 60% of mainland Japan's, not to mention all kinds of irreparable damages caused by the U.S. military on the local environment and public health. *On reverting to Japan, kenmin strongly demand our Island back peaceful, without the military bases.*[15]

In the four decades since reversion, Tokyo systematically silenced *kengisho's* demand for autonomy and removal of US military bases. *Okinawa kenmin* lost the self-governing power to make everyday decisions and plans to run local economy and society given to GRI under the US military occupation, although ultimately restricted by the US High Commissioner's veto. For example, post-reversion Okinawa Prefecture lost the authority of GRI to grant permission to foreign companies that wished to operate in Okinawa. In the late 1960s, with an aim to overcome dependence on direct US military expenditure, GRI launched an industrial policy to develop a local manufacturing industry; it invited multinational corporations (such as Gulf, Esso, and Alcoa) to construct petroleum and aluminum refineries in central Okinawa Main Island to locally generate revenue and employment. However, immediately before reversion, Tokyo put bureaucratic pressure to overwrite this local initiative. MITI instructed GRI to accept exclusively Japanese petroleum

companies (Mitsubishi etc.) instead of foreign capitals, to construct petroleum storage facilities instead of operating refineries.[16] Despite resistance from GRI, post-reversion Okinawa Prefecture had to relinquish the plan they initiated to construct refineries, in favor of the environmentally destructive CTS (oil storage facilities) by Mitsubishi, with little future benefit for the local manufacturing sector development.[17]

Importantly, under both conservative and progressive governors, the prefectural administrations have worked toward the spirit of *kengisho*: greater autonomy and reduction of US military presence, with varying degrees of readiness to compromise with the central government. Conservative Governor Junji Nishime (1978–1991) successfully negotiated with the US military and Japan's Defense Agency to charge the US forces local fees for their water usage.[18] Governor Nishime made two official visits to Washington in 1986 and 1988, to directly request the US State Secretary to reduce US forces' presence in Okinawa. Following Nishime, every Okinawan Governor—conservative and progressive—has made similar visits to directly lobby the US State Department and politicians, for the closure of the Futenma Airfield in particular, and to stop dangerous live-fire range training in the Marine Corps facilities because of the danger to the local population living a stone's throw away, which continues to threaten the safety of local people.

Simultaneously, nevertheless, the Governor's duty to improve the economic and social infrastructure and amenities for *kenmin* has necessitated maintaining good patron-client relationship with Tokyo. Especially under conservative governors, this duty tended to eclipse the demand for self-governance and demilitarization. All the more remarkably, the demands of converting 27 US military-occupied properties into civilian uses made by the Nishime administration and a Committee of mayors of the municipalities hosting US military bases resulted in the 1990 decision of the Japan-US Joint Committee to return 17 US properties.[19]

For post-reversion Okinawa's economic development, the government of Japan devised a quintessential "developmental state" (see Chapter 3) industrial policy, characterized by the state's intervention into private economic activities in the form of special laws, budgets, and policies according to plan-rational goal-setting, designed to grow targeted industries.[20] This particular developmental framework, however, was devised specifically for Okinawa, not so much for economic growth but more for control. Three sets of a 10-year scheme called the Okinawa Developmental Promotion Plan (*Okinawa Kaihatsu Shinkō Keikaku*) were introduced under a special legislation that allocated budgets for Okinawan development.[21]

This budget operates under the Okinawa Development Agency in Tokyo, a ministerial organization similar to the Hokkaido Development Agency, its chief appointed from the LDP politicians. In Naha, the Okinawa Development Agency Office was positioned as a one-stop office that liaises with various bureaucratic organizations (e.g. Ministry of Construction, Finance) to obtain permits to make necessary arrangements for local projects (such as road construction, infrastructure building, reconstruction of Shuri Castle).

Altogether, the system perfected itself into what Okinawan politics scholar Jun Shimabukuro calls the "Okinawan Developmental Promotion System,"[22] organized to micro-manage the Okinawan economy through channeling funds as Tokyo sees fit. The rationale of this system was to "correct" various social economic differences such as the per capita income and unemployment rate that existed between those in Okinawa, the poorest of all prefectures, to average levels in Japan. Under this System's didactic and centralized governance, the Prefecture first drafts social and economic development projects necessary in Okinawa, then submits them to the Prime Minister, who makes the final decisions after consulting with the relevant ministerial organizations, and notifies the Governor.[23] With Okinawa's ever-increasing dependency on public finance transfer from Tokyo, furthermore, economic autonomy moved further away from Okinawa's hands. Since 1972, this highly rationalized bureaucratic system, ostensibly set up for Okinawa's development, has effectively suffocated Okinawa's *jichi* and demilitarization, while Okinawa figuratively remained Japan's poorest prefecture to the present.[24]

As *kengisho* identified, the US military's unrestricted usage of the land, air, and the ocean that dotted all over the Island was a major obstacle to Okinawan economic development. Deprived of the authority on diplomacy or defense matters, however, the Okinawan Development Agency refused to deal with the suggestions or requests relating to bases or operations that inhibited urban development. With the Okinawan economy increasingly dependent, particularly on financial transfers from the state,[25] the prefectural government had no choice but to focus on available projects within the range not affected by the US military presence, rather than spoiling relations with Tokyo and risking blocking the funding pipeline. With regards to US military facilities and operations in Main Island, the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System constrained the local administration's ability to challenge the central government. Ingenuously, the System effectively prevented the US military presence in Okinawa ever becoming a political issue in Tokyo and Japan: at least until mid-1990s.[26]

The progressive administration under Governor Masahide Ota (1990–1998) attempted to challenge, perhaps most boldly than any, the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System, to regain *jichi* of Okinawa, and remove US bases in Main Island.[27] Since 1992, his team began drafting an International City Formation Proposal, aimed at revolutionizing Okinawa into a regional trading hub, utilizing its geographical location next to East and Southeast Asian economies. The proposal involved turning all Okinawan islands into a "free trade zone" by removing the state's restriction to the flow of money and goods. The proposal was designed to transfer authority on taxation, tariffs, and budgets to Okinawa Prefecture, away from the Development Agency and Minister of Finance in Tokyo, under the "one state, two systems" model, taking advantage of the neoliberal globalization that was changing the regional economy in the 1990s. In particular, the 1995 Osaka meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) highlighted the future direction toward liberalization in trade and foreign investment in the regional economy.[28] The proposal was an attempt to utilize "actually existing liberalism" (see Chapter **3**) that involves the "substitutions of competitive for redistributive regulatory logics while downloading risks and responsibilities to localities,"[29] as a means to further reclaim Okinawa's *jichi*.

Inheriting 1971 *kengisho*'s demand of the eventual removal of all US military bases, the International City Formation Proposal included the Base Return Action Program, a plan for eventual complete elimination of US military bases from Okinawa in three steps: in the first stage (–2001) 10 facilities, including the Futenma Airfield and Naha Military Port, will be returned; in the second stage (2002–2010) 14 facilities; and in the third (2011–2015), the 17 remaining facilities, including Kadena Air Base and the White Beach area, will be returned.[30] The removal of US military bases from Okinawa was defined as a pre-requisite for opening up necessary space for urban development, particularly in the central and southern regions of Main Island. This optimistic—in retrospect—proposal in the early 1990s was based on the hope on the part of Ota's administration that most of the US bases in the Asia-Pacific, as in Europe, would become redundant, with the Cold War ending. It was also a forward-thinking, pro-active initiative, to prepare for necessary socioeconomic adjustments to a unilateral decision of the US forces to leave, as well as imminent economic liberalization and globalization.[31]

The Proposal reflects an interesting moment of Okinawan history when progressive leaders, most importantly a former public servants' union leader, Masanori Yoshimoto,[32] endeavored to take advantage of economic

globalization and the end of the Cold War, to achieve *jichi*. The proposal aimed to transfer the authority to make final decisions on how the budget would be used from the central government to the Prefecture. This transfer of power was, and still is, a crucial agenda for self-governing social and economic development that is necessary for the unique history and environment of the Prefecture.

As we stressed in Chapter 3, an "ideational" perception of neoliberalism that emphasizes absence of the state in economic affairs is misleading, as the actual processes of economic deregulation requires favorable industrial state policies that facilitate such processes. Maintaining the US alliance regime, with a major bloc of USMC training facilities concentrated in Okinawa, was, and still is, the primary concern of the government of Japan. As seen in Gramsci's triangle above, the International City Formation Proposal intended to challenge the hegemonic system of dominance of Okinawa, through the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System (political relations) and *Anpo* (military relations).

The 'System'

Optimism toward the US military's withdrawal from Okinawa was shattered by the 1995 US Department of Defense report that outlined a security policy to maintain overseas forces and 100,000 personnel in East Asia, even after the Cold War.[33] Adding to the Islanders' disappointment and anger, in September, a violent child kidnapping and rape by three US soldiers ignited a mass protest rally (*Okinawa Kenmin Sōkekki Taikai)* attracting some 85,000 *kenmin*. It was a historic 'all-island' (*shimagurumi*) protest: both conservative and progressive political and business leaders attended and gave speeches, challenging both Japan and the United States, communicating to the world their opposition to the long-time suffering caused by the US military presence, particularly demanding that the particularly dangerous and hazardous Futenma Airfield be closed and returned. Referred to as the third-wave Okinawan struggle,[34] it became a catalyst for change with regards to the US bases and *jichi*: among others, the SACO decisions to do with Futenma Airfield and the FRF (see Chapter 5), and Governor Ota's refusal to approve the lease renewal of the few US military properties on behalf of the landowners who would not sign the contract (the so-called anti-war landowners),[35] and the lawsuit made by the government of Japan against his refusal.[36]

The 1995 display of *kenmin* dissent and Ota's refusal to approve the lease of the occupied territory temporarily gave the Ota administration a window of opportunity to bargain with the Prime Minister into supporting Okinawa's International City Formation Proposal financially and politically. In the wake of WTO and the "Washington consensus" in the mid-1990s, Japan was under pressure to transform its economy toward UK- and US-style neoliberal models.[37] As a result of Okinawan leaders' patient lobbying of the LDP government, also under pressure to perform liberalization of trade and labor markets and political decentralization, then Prime Minister Hashimoto in September 1996 announced his support of the International City Formation Proposal, which came with a special budget of five billion yen, and establishment of *Okinawa Seisaku Kyōgikai* (Okinawa Policy Conference), a high-level decision-making institution on Okinawa-related policies consisting of the Prime Minister, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, core Ministers, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary.[38]

Once initiated, nevertheless, the International City Formation Proposal became a source of anxiety among local economic actors: the drastic deregulation meant increased competition and risks. Most significantly, many *kenmin*, not limited to the conservatives, were apprehensive about losing the Okinawa Development Agency, and suddenly detaching from the Okinawan Development Promotion System, especially with so much of the Prefecture's revenues dependent on public finance transfer from Tokyo.[39] Losing the political support, especially among the progressive political forces, Yoshimoto was denied another term as a deputy governor, which meant Prefecture government now lost a leader to put the Proposal into practice. Interestingly, some of the Okinawan progressive forces opposed the Proposal from an anti-globalization perspective, concerned with the potential destructive social and environmental effects of ongoing economic globalization, as expressed in the public statement of the participants in a citizens' forum at the 2000 G8 summit held in Okinawa.[40]

The third-wave bipartisan *kenmin* coalition, furthermore, was brief: by September 1996 before a prefectural referendum, demanding reduction of US military presence. Conservative organizations including the LDP Okinawa Branch and the Military Landowners' Union (representing those who receive rent from the Japanese government for their properties occupied by the US military) both retired from the referendum organizing committee, led by *Rengō* Okinawa Branch (a major labor union coalition).[41] Following the SACO Final Report, the Cabinet Secretary in Tokyo started channeling special subsidies to the municipalities hosting US bases,

in an attempt to generate local consent especially targeting the northern districts, the site of FRF. The "Northern District Development Funds," for example, exceeded 100 billion yen in total (1997–2006), separately from the third Okinawan Developmental Regeneration Plan (1991–2001), paid to the municipalities of FRF and other SACO-related relocations. The funding was strategically placed in the northern region, which has been struggling under economic depression.

Nago City, where Henoko is located, traditionally is the conservative LDP constituency, especially through ties to local construction companies. Nevertheless, the opposition collected enough signatures to hold a referendum in 1997, to question whether the local residents accept the FRF or not. The LDP amply funded the Nago City's referendum campaign. With the introduction of Northern District Development Funds, the conservatives attempted to influence the voters into accepting the FRF (referred to as "heliport" at the time) by incorporating a phrase "accept, because it will be beneficial for development and the environment" in the referendum options.[42] Surmounting the uphill battle, the referendum of Nago City resulted in a majority opposition to the construction plan in Henoko in 1997. This referendum, a result of the grassroots citizens' effort by democratic means,[43] however, was immediately quashed by then Nago mayor's acceptance of the FRF in Henoko, and simultaneous resignation in December 1997 to be interpreted as Nago's collective will to accept FRF by Tokyo. This insult against the democratic will, an event that deserves to be told and retold from one generation to another, disqualifies Japan from calling itself a "democracy." The Nago referendum result also demonstrated the intensity of the division among local residents: the opposition counted 52.85 percent of the votes. For the next decade, Nago City elected conservative mayors.

Governor Ota in 1998, at this time, officially opposed to the "heliport" plan. The refusal fiercely antagonized Tokyo: not another Okinawa Policy Conference was held, stopping funding coming to the Prefecture. This eventually led to Ota's defeat in the November 1998 gubernatorial election to a conservative and LDP-supported Keiichi Inamine,[44] who accepted the FRF on condition that the heliport would permit civilian use, and eventually be closed in 15 years. At this point, Okinawa's International City Formation Proposal finally died.

In turn, the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System tightened its grip. Under new Governor, Inamine, the Okinawa Policy Conference restarted, unblocking the funding pipeline from Tokyo, with government

subsidies now even more obviously rewarding the municipalities' acceptance of the US base relocation facilities in the northern region.

Yet importantly, Jun Shimabukuro points out, acceptance of US bases by Okinawa was never officially a condition of the Okinawa Development Promotion Plan. Kent Calder's analysis that Okinawa exemplifies Japanese "compensation politics,"—a smooth state management policy of potential dissenters to the presence of US bases by compensating them with financial subsidies and budgets—would only apply as of the developmental funding starting from the Northern Districts Development Funds. For the first time, such funding was controlled by the Ministry of Defense, which targeted the FRF and other base relocation areas: public funds obviously purchasing local consent to hosting foreign military bases.[45]

For example, Henoko, a small hamlet of approximately 2,100 people, receives annual base-related income of 200 million yen, and "at least half of its residents are recipients of rental income" for their properties occupied by Camp Schwab.[46] In its 2010 annual dragon boat festival,

> ... the hamlet displayed four splendid boats, each costing roughly $10,000 (900,000 yen). Sixty teams, including some from the adjacent Camp Schwab base, competed. Henoko's Exchange Plaza, completed in 2007 at a cost of just under one billion yen and featuring a six-hundred-person hall, library, computer facilities, lavishly equipped sports facilities, and massage equipment, was another symbol of the fruits of compliance. Supposedly designed for the invigoration of the village, like so many other local developments this too was part of the price paid by Tokyo to ensure dependence and complicity.[47]

Another example is the special budget called *Beigun Saihen Kōfukin* (Special US Military Realignment Grant) to be paid to 33 municipalities hosting US bases nationwide, announced in October 2007. However, in Okinawa, the money only went to Urasoe City, as it alone agreed to the relocation of the military port from Naha; Nago City, Kin Town, Onna, and Ginoza Village were excluded, as they requested revisions to the contents of realignment. For example, Nago City requested that the FRF site be moved off the coast to prevent noise pollution and accidents to the nearby residents. Eventually, the grant was paid to those excluded municipalities, as they all quickly shifted to acceptance.[48]

Over time, by the mid-2000s, cynicism prevailed both in Tokyo and Okinawa (and other parts of Japan), with the entire Okinawan Developmental Promotion System being regarded as an economic transaction: Japan and its people shipping off dangerous and undesirable FRF to Okinawa, for some cash rewards.

On the frontline of the planned FRF construction site in Oura Bay, where anti-FRF protesters, many of them elders, have kept around-the-clock vigilance over the government's activities for the FRF construction on the beach, and obstructed work, if necessary in non-violent disobedience on small boats and canoes, since 2004. The protesters geared in wetsuits at times risked their lives while blocking the government-contracted surveyors, which resulted in the removal of the equipment in September 2005, temporarily stalling the project.[49]

While the protesters blocked the government from starting work in Henoko, the Japan-US Joint Committee significantly altered the FRF site and plan, resulting in a final plan in 2006 that could not be called a "heliport" any longer: a new facility requires a military port and two 1,600 meters (one mile) runways in a V-shape on a major land reclamation off the coast of Camp Schwab, where protesters could no longer approach (see Chapter 5): the plan was particularly unacceptable for nearby residents, for the predicted noise and risks of aircraft accidents.[50] Simultaneously, the Joint Committee decided on the construction of helicopter landing zones in Takae.[51] Governor Inamine was now officially opposed to the FRF construction in Okinawa,[52] retired from politics, and was succeeded by conservative Hirokazu Nakaima (in office from 2006 to 2014), president of a local petroleum company, and a career MITI bureaucrat, supported by LDP.

Even conservative Okinawan leaders, Shimabukuro notes, recognize that "development funds," no matter how much, would not ultimately resolve social and economic restrictions of the US military presence.[53]

> 'Development' … tended to be concentrated on infrastructural public works projects that often were economically retrogressive, ecologically damaging, and debt and dependence building (the same strategy that was followed by the state in order to impose nuclear power on reluctant local communities elsewhere in Japan) … even as public works—led … development came to be discredited elsewhere in Japan.[54]

A 2.1-billion-yen public work project, the Nago Multimedia Building, a 29,409 square meter complex in a small hamlet of 150 households, is a good example. Although such construction public works as building sports facilities and concert halls may initially drop money into the local economy, maintaining them often becomes a burden on the public finance, especially for small hamlets in the northern region. Unlike in the 1970s

and the 1980s when Okinawan infrastructure needed significant improvement, by the late 2000s, highly subsidized construction-related public works made less economic sense to more local residents.

Further indicating a significant political change in Japan's capitalism, in 2006, over 170 local construction companies were punished for bid-rigging (*dangō*) to maintain high bidding prices, charged over three billion yen, over civil and public works procured by Okinawa Prefecture in June 2005.[55] The 2005 amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Act, which empowered the anti-trust authority to punish bid-rigging, rationalized by the structural reform of Koizumi's government to increase competition and remove structural impediments for foreign corporations to access Japanese markets,[56] resulted in this scandal in Okinawa. The social impact of this incident was significant: *dangō* was a significant part of what made public works lucrative for the construction companies. *Shinkō* (promotion/invigoration) policies—traditionally public works-induced—came to be regarded as no longer effective in creating sustainable economic benefits for Okinawan economy, especially for the local construction industry.[57]

Also significant was the impact of a 2006 study of the economic and urban development of districts formerly occupied by the US military after being returned during the 1970–1980s: the Oroku-Kinjo district, the Naha New City Center district, and the Chatan and Kitamae districts, now home to the—ironically—"American Village" shopping center. The study, commissioned by Okinawa Prefecture to Nomura Research Institute, supported the long-held local impression originally pointed out in 1971 *kengisho* by Governor Yara: the heavy military presence was an obstacle to Okinawan economic development and *jichi*. The study demonstrated that former US base sites that have been returned generated far more employment, tax, and revenues from business and economic activities than did the financial transfer from the central government for hosting bases combined with incomes generated by direct contribution of the military personnel.[58] This study transformed Okinawan people's thinking: the presence of bases is clearly inhibiting, rather than contributing to, their economic development.[59]

Even in Nago City, a conservative stronghold of the "base mafia" construction industry, as it is commonly understood, base-linked funding was making less economic sense, as they are increasingly recognized as just one-off cash paid for the military bases that ultimately, we now know, do not contribute to sustainable economic growth, but only inhibit autonomous and indigenous long-term urban development. In particular, the "special financial zone" project, implemented in 2002 under the

Okinawa Promotion Plan, disappointed the locals. Tax and other generous incentives were offered for businesses to set up offices in the Nago Multimedia Building built in Toyohara. The building and the special zoning were "supposed to support the operations of financial institutions and venture firms" flocking in from mainland Japan and overseas, and create local jobs and other economic effects to create a thriving town. Yet the project failed to deliver any more than a drop in the ocean: "So far, the 18 tenants … and the 16 companies … have yet to generate significant demand for workers in the area."[60] In 2005, when this author visited the city, the eastern side of Nago was eerily quiet, surrounded by brand new tall buildings but very few people around, with the Multimedia Building occupied by a handful of companies, and young call center workers idly chatting away in one big room.[61]

In Nago City, Susumu Inamine was elected mayor in early 2010: he was elected on the pledge to stop the construction of the FRF in Henoko, sending quite a shockwave to Tokyo and Washington. The election of an anti-FRF mayor was nothing but a signal of a new perspective on the economy and the new base; increasingly, the residents were ready to live without the Okinawa Developmental Promotion System, a tax-payers-supported devise to control Okinawa to shoulder Japan's US bases.

Ōru Okinawa (All Okinawa) and *Shimagurumi* (All/Entire Island): 'Okinawan Identity'

As the central government has become less capable of controlling Okinawa through the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System, the "All Okinawa" coalition of the conservative and progressive political forces materialized in opposition to the construction of the FRF in Okinawa Prefecture between 2013 and 2014. What was the bottom line, or a uniting point, of "All Okinawa"? Here, we must return to "bifurcated nationalism" implied in the expression *Okinawa kenmin* discussed earlier. The events in the early 2000s shifted the Main Islanders' bifurcated national affiliation further away from Japan, toward Okinawan nationalism.

It was not the base issue, but the history textbook censorship controversy, however, that first demonstrated the formation of a *shimagurumi* political cooperation that transgressed conservative and progressive line toward "All Okinawa" coalition. The biggest ever number (estimated more than 116,000, including those in Miyako and Yaeyama rallies) attended the *kenmin* rally in March 2007, and protested against the government's

instruction to delete high school history textbooks' description of the 1945 Battle of Okinawa: the passage explained the Japanese military's responsibility in the Okinawan residents' collective suicides during the final stage of the battle places such as Tokashiki and Zamami islands, with 600–700 residents dead.[62]

The memory of wartime collective suffering is at the heart of the Okinawan identity definitively as opposed to *Yamato*.[63] The state's censorship, as in similar deletion of the Japanese army's killing of Okinawan residents from history textbook in 1982, indicated the Japanese people's insensitivity toward Okinawans' ethnic trauma of murder and self-denial by assimilation, directly or indirectly inflicted by Japan. The textbook issue awakened the Okinawans to the Japanese inability to share trauma and pain associated with wartime collective suffering, which translates into a sense of different nationhood.

Facing *Yamato*, both conservative and progressive, they were now "All Okinawa," foregrounding the anti-base political coalition building against the FRF relocation in Okinawa: the 2007 *kenmin* rally's organizing committee leader, Toshinobu Nakazato, emphatically argues this point.[64] For the first time in history, the *kenmin* rally protested against a non-US-base-related issue. There was no division between conservative and progressive political forces, most remarkably.

Another event that antagonized Okinawa versus Japan followed the victory of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) over LDP in the 2009 election. The DPJ campaigned for the August 2009 Lower House election, promising the relocation of Futenma Airfield outside Okinawa Prefecture. Okinawans had supported DPJ (all LDP candidates had lost seats in 2009 national election) and Hatoyama's commitment to move FRF with a yet another 2010 *kenmin* rally (with 90,000 attendants). However, after defeating LDP and becoming Prime Minister, DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama relented: in May 2010 he apologized and asked Okinawans to accept the replacement facility in Henoko, and resigned from post.[65] Shock and outrage of those who held their hopes up toughened further into another "All Okinawa" FRF front.

In November 2010, Governor Nakaima won another election for another term, promising his opposition to constructing the FRF in Okinawa, altering his position of conditioned acceptance. His victory was largely due to this election promise, which was also a position of the progressive candidate, former mayor of Ginowan City, Yoichi Iha. Correctly judging the sentiment of the *kenmin* on the FRF, it was then mayor of

Naha City and conservative LDP member Onaga Takeshi on the Nakaima supporting board, who advised him to run on this election promise.[66] Now a bipartisan consensus appears to have established "identity politics" against Yamato, "transcending the categories of conservative and progressive, 'left' and 'right', and proclaiming the priority of 'identity over ideology'."[67] As McCormack notes, the "All Okinawa" focus on these events in the 2000s appears to be the result of the excess abuses that firmed up Okinawa *kenmin* toward Okinawan nationalism into challenging Japan and the United States.

Political consensus building against the FRF, importantly, seemed to have depended on a group of financially and politically influential conservative leaders, who changed their position from accepting, to refusing the FRF. In contrast, the Okinawan progressive politicians and activists' antiwar and anti-base political position, at least since following the reversion, has constantly connected to Okinawan identity, yoked to 'absolute pacifism' inspired by the collective memory of the Battle of Okinawa.[68] In 2000, in what is known as the *Okinawa Inishiachibu* (Okinawan Initiative) statement, conservative scholars and political advisors to former Governor Inamine, Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro, and Morisada Maeshiro, argued that the Okinawans ought to discard the victim mentality and resentment carried from the war, and positively view the heaviest US military presence in the Island as Okinawa's "greatest contribution" to Japan's security, greater than any other prefecture's, and recommending that Okinawans "articulate an Okinawan historical and political position more in concert with the aims of the US-Japan security partnership and Japanese government policy."[69] We see that many conservative Okinawans, out of pragmatism, had long made an "adult" decision to put a lid on their emotional attachment to the Okinawan version of history that is different from *Yamato*, until finally unleashing it in the advent of the 2007 history textbook censorship. Considering the conservatives' primary interest, which is always economic, it would be necessary to explore the changes in political economy of US military bases in Okinawa that prompted the conservatives' significant political switch.

Following the International City Formation Plan failing to actualize, the new *Okinawa Shinkō Keikaku* (Okinawa Promotion Plan, 2002–2011) succeeded the Okinawa Developmental Promotion Plan that spanned over three terms in three decades (1972–2001). The Promotion Plan dropped the word "Development," and the Okinawa Office under Cabinet Chief Secretary replaced the Okinawa Development Agency as of 2001.

Then, unlike all previous Plans that were made in Tokyo, it was Okinawa Prefecture that wrote the 10-year plan, coined the "Okinawa 21st Century Vision," implemented in 2012 (–2021). It must be noted however that even though Okinawa make plans for development, this did not rule out bureaucratic intervention from Tokyo, as observed in Chapter 9 by our interviewee, a member of the Okinawa Medical Association: the idea of a Medical Island Hub plan, part of the 21st Century Vision Plan, was said to have been conceived and directed by the head of Tokyo LDP. The Plan's emphasis on the local self-determination, when it comes to the FRF-related issues, is more propaganada than a strict principle.

Both budget frameworks incorporated the International City Formation Plan's focus on "autonomy" in deciding how the budget is used. The 2002 Okinawa Promotion Plan stressed the "provision of conditions for autonomous development" rather than correcting the Okinawan economy's negative difference from mainland Japan.[70] However, the final decision-making authority still resided with the Cabinet Office. Rather, this principle on local autonomy reflected the central government's intended structural reform since the mid-1990s toward financial and trade deregulation, and greater local autonomy with reduced responsibilities of the state.[71]

Also inherited from the International City Formation Proposal in both frameworks was the state-implemented deregulation policy of making Okinawa a "free trade zone," known to have been successful in Ireland and Southern China, inviting overseas corporations to generate an export-oriented, local manufacturing sector. In 1988, a "free trade zone" was set up in Naha, and in 1998, in Nakagusuku Bay area: "The 122-hectare … on reclaimed land, offers corporate tax deductions of 35 percent for 10 years or as much as a 15 percent tax deduction on initial capital expenditures for companies with 20 or more full-time employees."[72] Similarly, "special financial zones" were designated in Nago City, and targeted telecommunication and IT companies in mainland Japan and overseas countries to open businesses and call centers in Okinawa, by providing benefits such as rent, internet bills, and younger local employees' salaries. Also strategically targeting tourism, the entire Okinawa Prefecture was designated a "tourist special zone" in 2014.

As we witnessed in the Multimedia Buildings in eastern Nago, the special economic zones (SEZs) have mostly failed to deliver expected results. In 2013, 60 percent of Nakagusuku Free Trade Zone was vacant,[73] and only one company purchased land in the Naha Free Trade Zone in 14 years.[74] In 2002, Yuji Kinjo, a seasoned anti-FRF activist who lived in Henoko said, "the only people who will benefit from a tax haven are the

big corporations." Mahito Uchida, head of the Bank of Japan's Naha branch, commented that "public funds are no longer very effective at stimulating the private sector…. A grab-bag approach will only dilute the effects of economic stimulation plans, and we'll still be calling for further industrial development in Okinawa."[75]

The locals' suspicion that Japan's Okinawan Developmental Promotion System was no longer to be counted on increasingly came to be shared among the local Okinawan people. Under the depressed financial climate of Japan, most significantly, total amounts of the budget allocated for Okinawan development decreased from the peak of 450 billion yen in 1996–1998 to 220 billion in 2009, less than half.[76] Showing his strength as a former MITI bureaucrat, Nakaima demanded that the central government in 2011 expand the total budget to more than 300 billion yen, not only for a year, but to maintain this annual amount for the next 10 years. Nakaima also demanded that the budget come in a lump sum, which allows transferring the final decision-making authority from Tokyo to the Prefecture: crucial for Okinawa's self-governance. Nakaima's negotiation for the budget being paid in a "lump-sum grant" form was an effort of claiming Okinawa's *jichi*—another core agenda of the International City Formation Plan—rather than as a bigger financial reward for accepting the base.[77]

We suggest that these changes in political economy, to an extent, contributed to the making of the bipartisan "All Okinawa" coalition against the FRF construction in Okinawa. As the model of public works-induced development became less lucrative, and with the government budget decreasing, the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System has been losing its grip. Greater confidence in, and desire for, economic and political self-governance (*jichi*) encouraged the traditionally conservative business leaders to unleash their Okinawan identity publicly, and refuse accepting FRF. By the end of 2009, LDP Okinawa Branch and prominent local businesses declared their anti-FRF position.[78]

The decisive event that hardened the solidarity of "All Okinawa" against Japan on the US base issue was the MV-22 VOTL Osprey deployment in Okinawa in 2012. Since the late 1990s, anti-FRF activists were concerned about the new model helicopter MV-22 Osprey that would be deployed in the FRF. Also known as "widow makers," the aircraft was already renowned for an exceptionally high rate of accidents. Images of MV-22 flying with disjointed movements played repeatedly on YouTube and were visually aligned with the new US sea airbase in Henoko, in the local public's imagination.

To understand the reason why the Osprey deployment is unacceptable to the Okinawan opponents, the 2004 crash of CH-53 aircraft in Futenma atop a building of the Okinawa International University campus must be recalled, which awakened the residents to their continuing colonial status under the US military's extraterritorial privileges.[79] Equally infuriating was the indifference of the *Yamato* people to the accident, well observed in scholarly writing and local comedy theater.[80]

But in 2011 the government announced that MV-22 Osprey aircrafts would be deployed in 2012, inter alia, in Futenma Airfield. Despite another *kenmin* rally to protest the Osprey deployment (95,000 attendants), organized by the "All Okinawa" coalition in September, the awkward-looking aircraft soon started flying above the Islanders' heads. Outraged, residents blockaded two gates to Futenma Base in protest, immobilizing US military personnel and their families for more than a day. The deployment was also possible in Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture; however, the central government cancelled it immediately after the Iwakuni City Assembly passed a resolution against the deployment. Living next to massive US military airfields in Okinawa, aircraft crash is constantly in the mind of residents as a potential life-threatening danger, unlike many parts of Japan: an example that demonstrates separate standard of acceptable human rights abuse is applied to Okinawa from Japan.[81] Around this time, the media and people in Okinawa started referring to Tokyo's Futenma replacement policy in the language of "Okinawa *sabetsu*" (discrimination against Okinawa), with a political intensity with which Okinawan identity is spoken.

Naha's Mayor Onaga, with a delegate of 150 politicians and mayors, went to Tokyo in January 2013, where they held a rally, and most significantly, handed over to Prime Minister Abe a petition to withdraw the Osprey deployment, close Futenma Airfield, and stop the new base construction in Henoko.

Consequently, in November 2013, the LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba, presumably threatened five Okinawan LDP MPs—all elected on the anti-FRF platform in 2012—into giving up their opposition.[82] In December 2013, Governor Nakaima approved the central government's environmental assessment of Oura Bay for FRF construction, which was scientifically flawed and illegal.[83] This was a massive shock to *kenmin* and understandably perceived as betrayal of an election promise. The Abe government had promised Nakaima the 300-billion-yen budget he demanded for 2012, and every year for the following decade in a "lump-sum grant," reported in the media as a quid pro quo to accepting the FRF. However, the budget was

still controlled under the Cabinet Office as the highest decision-making authority, which did not transfer to the Prefecture as blueprinted in the International City Formation Plan as a necessary step toward achieving *jichi*.[84] Prime Minister Abe maximized the media opportunity to describe Nakaima's approval to start the work for reclaiming Oura Bay as if it had been auctioned for the increased special budget for Okinawa.[85]

At this point, the president of the *Kariyushi* hotel chain, Satoshi Tōyama, and other local business representatives requested Onaga to run for governor, who they trusted would "protect what's good for Okinawa," by not accepting further military bases.[86] Onaga eventually ran for Governor, supported by the *shimagurumi* coalition established in July 2013. This coalition was made to support Onaga's election, initiated by a group of Naha LDP Assembly members, and progressive political parties (including the Communist Party Okinawa Branch), trade unions, and citizen groups. Although many progressives were hesitant at first to trust a former LDP member, they were able to come together under the common goal of refusing FRF in Okinawa. This "All Okinawa" coalition has supported the election of current Governor Takeshi Onaga, a former LDP member, in a landslide victory against LDP-supported incumbent candidate Nakaima, in November 2014.

Major local businesses other than *Kariyushi*, such as *Okinawa Hamu* (meat processing) and *Kanehide* (supermarket chain), also joined the anti-FRF coalition, and have supported the protest in Henoko by sending employees to attend demonstrations and providing financial support. Together with artists and journalists (including animation film director Hayao Miyazaki), these local businesses established the Henoko Fund, with a 350 million yen budget in 2015. Apart from contributing to public relations, importantly, the Henoko Fund has provided free transport (buses) from Naha to Camp Schwab, enabling boosting the number of protesters.

According to Tōyama, for the Okinawan hotel business, "we have to think about the risk of accidents and crimes that come with the bases against the safety of the visitors. A helicopter crash is a catastrophe for the industry, so we are better off without the Futenma base, and a new base that replaces it"; and "the FRF used to be a topic to avoid talking about, but we can clearly express our opposition now, because of the confidence that we are capable of designing the economy after the removal of military bases, *on our own*."[87]

Tourism, the core post-reversion local industry of Okinawa, has been growing exceptionally: visitors increased from 4.13 million in 1998 to 7.06 million in 2014. New airport facilities upgraded with a new international terminal and Low Cost Carrier terminal have contributed to this

increase.[88] Also, with Naha Airport's introduction of All Nippon Airlines' Cargo hub in 2009 that linked most big cities in Asia within four hours from Naha, the cargo network "increased the airport's freight volume to 174,000 tons in 2015—up 190 times from 935 tons in 2008, and the fourth-largest in Japan after Narita, Kansai International and Haneda."[89] With Naha becoming a logistics hub, addressing the "supply chain globalization" accompanying the Transnational Pacific Partnership, and with a 2700-meter-long second runway, the growth of local export-oriented manufacturing is expected to grow.[90] A mainland Japanese business magazine, *Nikkei Bijinesu* headlined a special article on the Okinawan economy:

> Airlines, renewable energy, and manufacturing: new businesses on the edge have been mobilized, undetected. Their unlimited potential will draw in droves of people and money. Okinawa is no longer Japan's periphery. It's approaching the center of Asia's gravity.[91]

The article stresses that Okinawa's average growth margin is the biggest in Japan, surpassing that of Tokyo and Kanagawa, especially highlighting the foreign investment hotel and resort businesses (Hilton, Ritz, Four Seasons etc.) targeted for the post-return development of soon to be returned US base properties. The article reads as propaganda, selling the idea of Okinawa as a trading hub in a neoliberal globalized economy, based on a revived image of the 16th century Ryukyu Kingdom's experience benefiting from trading with China and Southeast Asian countries.[92]

On the other hand, three months earlier, a *Japan Times* article depicts "Okinawa's economic doldrums continue" with still the lowest per capita income in Japan, with manufacturing industry a fraction of Japan's average.[93] Writer Tami Sakiyama, who has lived in a town adjacent to US bases, comments on today's Okinawa: whereas foreign capital accumulates wealth investing in new luxury hotels and resorts, poverty and social despair is expanding to a level never experienced before. Poverty in children in Okinawa is most pronounced.[94] In Okinawa, as elsewhere in late capitalism, the contractual ethic of market relations is replacing pre-existing beliefs about social and human relations; in particular, the spirit of generosity, or communal support network that has traditionally provided for the poor in Okinawa.[95]

Recent Okinawan economy's trajectory toward greater exposition to neoliberal globalization is what the International City Formation Proposal had intended, which was rejected 20 years ago by Okinawans themselves.

Tourist, retail, and logistic sectors represent the limited portion of society in Okinawa that have, at this point, benefited and thrived in the neoliberalizing environment. Those conservatives, who have recently converted to the anti-FRF position, have perhaps politically parted ways from other conservatives, the likes of Governor Nakaima, who do not share the confidence and optimism for *jichi*. The process of neoliberalization in Okinawa, in the language of David Harvey, has required a "creative destruction"[96] of the Okinawan Developmental Promotion System, a bureaucratic and institutional product of the post-war Japanese economic growth model of "developmental state" and its updated version.

Returning to Gramsci's triangle above, in which hegemony dominates through the social relations of production, political, and also military relations, the old hegemonic rule is losing its triangular shape: Okinawa's dependence on public finance transfer and construction work-oriented public funding from Tokyo, which had sustained the *Anpo* regime, with Okinawa as a place to shift its necessary social costs (land deprivation, danger, humiliation, risks, etc.). The shape of the new triangle, however, is becoming similar with the bigger triangle we discussed in Chapter 3: the global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, with overseas bases as its bouncer. We are uncertain how much longer "All Okinawa" resistance to the FRF will continue; however, the coalition contains serious splits in perspectives. As Governor Onaga stresses, for example, he basically supports *Anpo*, and does not oppose all bases in Okinawa. Conversely, some progressive Okinawan anti-base activists, driven by a more purist anti-war motive, have long hesitated to even demand moving FRF to mainland Japan. The recent converts to the anti-FRF struggle based on the newfound expression of Okinawan identity, who represent capital, most likely would not join other Okinawan anti-base activists who also challenge the bigger triangle: global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism that requires protection by the global network of US troops. At this point, we wonder if the sort of *jichi*, self-governance, that Okinawans have been on the long quest for is closer or further away under market governance.

Notes

1. Sakashita, *Okinawa Kenmin no Kigen* (The formation of syncretic national identity in Okinawa: 1945–1956) (Tokyo: Yushindo, 2017), 2017, 2.
2. Arnold Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands: 1945–1950* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1988).
3. Moriteru Arasaki, *Nihon ni totte Okinawa towa Nandattanoka (What did Okinawa mean to Japan?)*, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016), 28.

4. Fisch, op. cit. 160, 168.
5. Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 2006), 87–88.
6. A study on Okinawa, conducted by three anthropologists of Yale University led by George Murdock, was summarized in a 'handbook' and distributed to the US military personnel in 1944. Etsujiro Miyagi, *Senryōsha no Me (In the Eyes of the Occupier)* (Tokyo: Hirugisha, 1983), 26.
7. Ibid., 240. On USCAR's cultural policy, see, for example, Yasuhiro Tanaka, "Ryukyu Daigaku to Amerikanizumu"(University of the Ryukyus and Americanism) in Atsushi Toriyama ed., *Imo to hadashi: senryo to genzai, (Sweet potatoes and no shoes: Okinawa's occupation then and now)* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 2009, 37–70).
8. Sakashita, op. cit., 372–373.
9. Masataka Okamoto, *Minzoku no Soushutsu (Creating Ethnicities)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014).
10. Moriteru Arasaki *Okinawa Gendaishi* (A contemporary history of Okinawa) 1996, 26; Makoto Sakurazawa, *Okinawa Gendaishi* (A contemporary history of Okinawa) 2015, (Chuo Kouron Shinsha) 168.
11. Sakurazawa op. cit., 62–63.
12. Atsushi Toriyama, "Senryoka Okinawa ni okeru Seicho to Kaimetsu no Fuchi" (Between growth and collapse) in Masakazu Nagae et al. *Seichou to Reisen e no Toi* (Interrogating growth and Cold War), (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 2011) 141–142.
13. Tanji 2006, op. cit., 41, 51–52.
14. Jun Shimabukuro, "Okinawa Kaihatsu Shinko Taisei e no Chosen" (Challenging the Okinawan Development Regeneration System), *Sekai*, July 2012, No. 48 (2012: 45–53), 47.
15. Ryukyu Seifu (GRI), *Fukki Sochi ni Kansuru Kengisho*, November 1971, available at http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/proposal_document (accessed May 18, 2017) 3–4, my translation and emphasis.
16. This MITI intervention exemplifies the industrial policy that Chalmers Johnson explains distinguishes Japan's model of economic growth from other capitalist models, especially the classical liberal model dominant in the United States and Europe, and also, from the communist model of central planning. See *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press: 1982).
17. Sakurazawa op. cit. 152–155.
18. Sakurazawa op. cit. 203–205.
19. Akihiro Sadou, *Okinawa Gendai Seiji Shi*, (Okinawa Contemporary Political History) (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2014), 58–60. Actual development of returned properties, however, usually takes many years, requiring conditions such as identification of owners' registration, relocation of military facilities, and planning and agreement on

the future land use. One of them, Awase Golf Course, has recently been turned into an Aeonmall Okinawa Rycom.

20. See for example, Meredith Woo-Cummings, "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development" and Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of the Concept," in Meredith Woo-Cummings ed., The Developmental State, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press: 1999: 1–31; 32–60), and Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton University Press: 1990).
21. *Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho* (Special Okinawa Developmental Measures Law).
22. Shimabukuro, op. cit., 2012.
23. Article 4 of the Special Okinawa Developmental Measures Law (Sadou 2015: p. 31–32).
24. For example, Jun Shimabukuro, *Okinawa shinkou taisei o tou* (Interrogating the Okinawa Regeneration System) (Kyoto: Houritsu Bunkasha, 2014), Akihiro Sadou, *Okinawa Gendai Seiji Shi*, (Okinawa Contemporary Political History) (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2014).
25. Okinawan economist Yasuo Kurima calls Okinawa's economy a "public finance dependent economy": after the reversion, in the nine years between 1969 and 1978, the financial transfer from the state to the Prefecture grew 15.4 times, and continued thereon ("Kichi Mondai Ronso de mirareru Okinawa wa 'Kichi Izon Keizai' no Ayamari" [The misleading assumption of Okinawa as a base economy in the debate on the base issue]), *Ekonomisuto*, August 3, 2011, 68–70.
26. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2012, 48.
27. Supported by progressive political parties, trade unions, and anti-base and peace citizens' groups, including the Anti-Landowners' Movement, Ota is a distinguished peace studies scholar specialized in the study of the Battle of Okinawa, a key figure in a citizens' historical research group, the Okinawa Historical Film Society (Tanji 2006, op. cit., 45–46, 111–115), and also for the establishment of *Heiwa no Ishiji* (Cornerstone of Peace): a collection of marble walls with names of over 240,000 casualties of all nationalities inscribed on. See Gerald Figal, "Waging peace in Okinawa," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden eds. *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
28. Shimabukuro, op. cit., 2014, 6–7, 118–119, 123–124.
29. Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner, "Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations," *SAIS Review*, Vol. 29 no. 1 Winter-Spring 2009, 49–66.
30. "*Kichi Henkan Akushon Puroguramu: soan"* (Draft of the Base Return Action Program), in Okinawa ken chiji koushitsu taisakuka (Okinawa Prefecture Base Affairs Section), *Okinawa no Beigun Kichi, Heisei 20 nen*

3 gatsu (Okinawan U.S. military bases, Heisei Year 20 March) (Naha: Okinawa Prefecture) March 2008, 457, available at http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/shiryo13.pdf.

31. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 116, 123.
32. Yoshimoto was a founder of the *Okinawa Tokubetsu Jichiken Kousou* (Special Self-governing Prefecture Proposal) originally publicized in 1981 by Jichirou Okinawa ken Honbu (Okinawa Prefecture Chapter), Sadou, 39–46. Also, see, *Yoshimoto Masanori Oral History: moto Okinawa ken fuku chiji* (Oral history of Yoshimoto Masanori, former deputy governor of Okinawa Prefecture), *C.O.E. Oraru Seisaku Kenkyu Purojekuto,* National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2005, available at https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/index.php?active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&page_id=13&block_id=24&item_id=1500&item_no=1 (viewed 21 May 2017).
33. US Department of Defense, "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," Washington D.C., February 1995.
34. Arasaki, op. cit., 1996, 2.
35. The 'contract' landowners receive rent subsidized by the government of Japan, whereas 'anti-war' landowners receive a reduced amount of indemnity instead of rent (See Tanji, op. cit., 106–126). Until Ota's refusal in 1995, the governors of Okinawa (including Ota regarding other properties) have given the central government consent to the US military compulsory lease of anti-war landowners' properties, overwriting the refusal of their owners and of the municipal leaders. Without the governor's 'delegate signature,' legally the US occupation breaches the right of private property, thus undermining the legitimacy of *Anpo.* The new 2002 Local Autonomy Law, ironically, overwrote this limited authority of the governor which is now solely practiced by the Minister of Defense.
36. For accounts and significance of the lawsuit against Governor Ota, see Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 139.
37. David Harvey. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University Press: 2005), 92–93.
38. Sadou, op. cit., 80–83.
39. In 2002, prefectural and municipal governments were responsible for 40 percent of Okinawa Prefecture's GDP, 72.6 percent of which was financed by the central government (as opposed to about 25 percent and 41.9 percent in Japan) (Munehiko Yaka, *Okinawa Jiritsu no Keizaigaku* (Economics of Okinawa's Independence) Tokyo: Nanatsumori Shokan, 2016), 17.
40. Shimabukuro, op. cit., 2014, 124–129.
41. The first ever in Japan at the prefectural level, the *kenmin* referendum was held in December 1996, resulting in 89.09 percent supporting the

reduction of US bases in Okinawa and reform of the SOFA (Sakurazawa, op. cit., 251).

42. McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit., 140.
43. Tanji op. cit., 163–169.
44. On the process of the 1998 election that ousted Ota, in which LDP's secret public funds were used in the election campaign to elect Inamine, see McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit., 140–141.
45. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 272. Calder explains compensation politics as a "'carrot-and-stick' approach toward prospective dissenters" that involves "substantial material payment … from the host-nation government to various interests in the host nation that are adversely affected by foreign base activity. Through such payments, states aim to neutralize antibase sentiment and to stabilize foreign base presence." Japan, Calder evaluates, clearly illustrates the "compensation-politics paradigm" [Kent Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton University Press: 2007) 130].
46. McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit., 147.
47. Ibid., 148.
48. Sakurazawa op. cit., 299.
49. See Yumiko Kikuno and Satoko Norimatsu, "Henoko, Okinawa: Inside the Sit-In," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus,* 8-1-10, February 22, 2010. The official reason for the removal was to avoid typhoon damage. *Ryukyu Shimpo,* September 2, 2005, available at http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-6158.html (accessed May 24, 2017).
50. Also see McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit., 152–153.
51. SACO members also agreed to enact the plan of building six helipads in the pristine forest of Takae, Higashi Village, in northern Okinawa. This plan would require the return of 9900 acres (40 square kilometers) of Camp Gonsalves, also known as the Northern Training Area (NTA), which is about half of the entire base (75 square kilometers). The vast, subtropical forest in the northern region of the island is called Yanbaru, which is home to over 4000 species of wildlife, including 11 and 12 forms of flora and fauna, respectively, found nowhere else. August 24, 2007, saw the inauguration of 'Residence's Group of No Helipad,' which served as a valiant but ultimately ineffective effort to halt further construction of helipads in the forest of Takae. Despite a consistent and concerted effort to oppose the construction within Takae itself, two helipads have already been built and are now in use by the US military.
52. The United States and Japan's 2006 FRF plan simply ignored his conditions of acceptance to limit the military use of the airport to 15 years, and to permit civilian use. In 2005, Governor Inamine was sighted at the protest rally following the US Marines' live-wire training being executed at the new urban combat training facility dangerously

adjacent to residential Kin Town, ignoring residents' protest against the facility being built in the first place (Sakurazawa, op. cit., 289).

53. Ibid., 2014, 273.
54. McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit., 9.
55. Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), Cabinet Office, Okinawa General Bureau, "The JFTC issued cease-and-desist order and surcharge payment order against bid participants for construction works procured by Okinawa prefecture," March 2006, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly_2006/mar/2006_mar_30.html (accessed May 25, 2017).
56. Traditionally construction companies' bid-rigging for public works had been considered acceptable business practice in Japan, which has been targeted in the structural impediment reform, pressured by the United States, since the late 1980s. See Kazukiyo Onishi, "Can the new Anti-Monopoly Act change the Japanese Business Community?" *Asia Pacific Economic Papers,* Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, no. 373, 2008, 28, available at https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-373.pdf (accessed May 25, 2017).
57. Shimabukuro, op. cit., 2014, 275.
58. Nomura Research Institute and Toshi Kagaku Seisaku Kenkyujo, "Churyu Gunyochi Atochi Riyou ni tomonau Keizai Hakyu Kouka nado Kentou Chosa Hokokusho," March 2007, 59, available at http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/kichiatochi/keizaikouka-ga.pdf (accessed May 25, 2017).
59. Sakurazawa 2015, p. 329.
60. Mayumi Negishi, "Okinawa's free-trade zones failing to attract companies," *Japan Times,* September 13, 2002.
61. Sadayuki Horie at the Nomura Research Institute argues that further drastic financial deregulation, such as the introduction of captive insurers, is necessary to deliver results; tax breaks and wages (paid for employers under age 30) and costs (rent, internet use) support are not enough. "Okinawa Kinyu Tokku no Genjou to Kongo no Kadai" (Okinawa's special financial zone: its reality and prospects) in Financial Information Technology Focus, Nomura Research Institute, April 2005, available at https://www.nri.com/jp/opinion/kinyu_itf/2005/pdf/itf20050402.pdf (accessed May 29, 2017).
62. The censorship paralleled the court case made by plaintiffs "claiming the Oe Kenzaburo's 1970 book Okinawa Noto, falsely stated military orders urging civilians to commit mass murder-suicide so as not to hamper Japanese troops fighting US forces and also to ensure troops had enough food" demanding the publisher discontinue the book publication. Osaka District Court and the Supreme Court both dismissed this suit ("'Okinawa Suit' Favours Oe" *Japan Times*, April 23, 2011), available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/04/23/national/okinawa-notes-suit-favors-oe/#.WSpWRvl96Uk (accessed May 28, 2017).

63. See Miyume Tanji, "Close Yet Distant Relations: The Politics of History Textbooks, U.S. Military Bases and Trauma in Okinawa" *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific* Issue 24, June 2010, available at http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue24/tanji.htm.
64. Arasaki, op. cit., 2016, 139.
65. For the background and the aftermath of this turn, see Satoko Norimatsu, "Hatoyama's Confession: The Myth of Deterrence and the Failure to Move a Marine Base Outside Okinawa" *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus,* 8-1-10, February 22, 2010.
66. Arasaki, op. cit., 2016, 140.
67. Gavan McCormack, *"'All Japan'* versus *'All Okinawa'—Abe Shinzo's Military—Firstism," The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 13, Issue 10, No. 4, March 16, 2015.
68. Tanji 2006, op. cit., 41, 51–52.
69. Julia Yonetani, 'Future "assets" but at what price? The Okinawa initiative debate,' in *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*, ed., Laura Hein and Mark Selden, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 254–255.
70. Sakurazawa op. cit., 320.
71. Yaka, op. cit. 61, Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 138.
72. Negishi, op. cit.
73. Ibid., and Yohei Matsuo and Jun Yamazaki, "Japan's Special Zone Scheme: Third Time Lucky?" *Nikkei Asian Review*, 20 May, 2014, available at http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-s-special-zone-scheme-Third-time-lucky (accessed May 30).
74. Negishi, op. cit.
75. Ibid.
76. Sakurazawa op. cit. 274.
77. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 277–278.
78. Ibid., 282.
79. According to Douglas Lummis, after the accident, the US military occupied the crash site: "They set up a cordon of yellow tape around the accident site, and kicked out not only reporters and cameramen, but also the Okinawan firemen who had come to put out the blaze, the local police who had come to investigate the cause of the accident, and even the mayor of the town.… Standing behind the tape was a line of Marine MPs, pistols on their belts. Behind them, Marines were dismantling the wrecked helicopter and loading it into trucks (from a police standpoint, destroying the evidence)." However, there is no legal clause that justifies such military police power over the citizens of Okinawa in SOFA ["Mission Creep Dispatch: C. Douglas Lummis" *Mother Jones*, September 28, 2008, available at http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/09/mission-creep-dispatch-c-douglas-lummis (accessed May 28, 2017)].

80. Mainland Japanese NHK news reported the accident only fifth, after the change of Yomiuri Giants owners, the 2004 Olympic report, and other news items, indicating a dazzling emotional distance (Shimabukuro, op. cit., 2014, 65).
81. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 284.
82. Arasaki, op. cit. 2016, 150.
83. Kunitoshi Sakurai, op. cit.
84. Shimabukuro, op. cit. 2014, 278–280.
85. Editorial. *Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 26, 2013, cited in Arasaki, op. cit. 2016, 152.
86. Interview, Naha, July 1, 2016.
87. Interview, Naha, July 1, 2016.
88. Sakurazawa op. cit. 326.
89. Hayato Ishii, "Naha Airport hoping to become Asia cargo hub, helped by TPP" *Japan Times*, July 24, 2016 available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/24/national/naha-airport-hoping-become-asia-cargo-hub-helped-tpp/#.WS5eycklGT9 (accessed May 31, 2017).
90. Ibid.
91. "Okinawa Keizai Ken" (Okinawan economic bloc), *Nikkei Bijinesu*, August 6–13, 2012, 24–41, 25 (my translation).
92. Ibid., 27.
93. Jun Hongo, "40 years after return, Okinawa still struggling to grow up", *Japan Times*, May 15, 2012, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/15/national/40-years-after-return-okinawa-still-struggling-to-grow-up/#.WS7Q5cklHtU (accessed May 31, 2017).
94. "Kichi no Machi ni sumu Sakka ga tou: Okinawa wa yutakani nattanoka" *Asahi Shinbun Dejitaru,* May 15, 2017, available at http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK4W5V8HK4WUTIL05M.html (accessed May 31, 2017). Relative poverty rate of children in Okinawa is 29.9 percent, as opposed to the national average of 16.3 percent [Okinawa Prefecture, *Okinawa Kodomo Chōsa Chōsa Kekka Gaiyōban,* March 25, 2016, 67. available at http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/kodomo/kodomomirai/documents/okinawakodomotyousagaiyouban.pdf (accessed June 1, 2017)].
95. "*Shin jiyū shugi ni kōsuru shiten*" (Special Issue: against Neoliberalism) in *Kēshi Kaze*, no. 73, December 31, 2011, 6–33, 20.
96. Neoliberalization process has necessitated "not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart" [David Harvey, *Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge University Press: 2015), 3].

CHAPTER 11

Time as a Defense of the Environment: A Fight Against McDonaldized Forms of Progress

Maybe wherever social movements of resistance are mounted against processes of control, predictability, calculability, and efficiency foisted upon us as citizens, we might begin to grasp the depth of their root causes if we look first at ourselves and our instinctual demands as both citizens and consumers in society. The impulsive human embrace of speed and convenience, which appears to typify so many of today's consumer expectations, seems to occupy our thinking about any transaction as self-evident support for every mode of efficiency presented to us. This property of our consumerist preferences may serve in a way to define us, however much we resist. Also, political and corporate powers become indignant and punish when we—perceived necessarily as consumers—reject the speed and convenience with which they seek to enact their policies. The tension here brings us to the problem of time. If time is money, it is clear that any waiting we must periodically endure as buyers or sellers, as consumers or producers, as citizens or public servants can be quite painful.

Waiting can present a burden too tough to bear in a society that demands instant, or near real-time, results or access to alternate social worlds. The annoying pause when the WiFi fails to connect for five full seconds we may perceive to crawl by like a minute. The minute needed to reboot a frozen laptop may feel like an hour. In these present times of false

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desperation, when first-world problems press the limitations of our patience, we must, if we are to reclaim some perspective and wisdom, reexamine the value of the purposeful wait. The movements of popular resistance we have discussed throughout this book might be better understood and appreciated as purposed forms of waiting which remake (in)action into defensive weapons which are, in turn, deployed in protest movements against the neoliberal interpretations of efficiency and development imposed upon society and the environment. Since waiting must occur within a given timeframe, we discuss here the complications we meet when we reduce or, if we have the social or political power, compel others to reduce the act of waiting to an immense waste of time.

We begin with a reference to an essay that addresses a salient but often unnoticed and unnatural consequence of development in the so-called developed world. The discussion considers how technological advances, far from reducing social alienation and unnecessary toil, can paradoxically increase these aspects of development and enhance the power of those in positions to do so to abuse their power and the people affected by it.

Time as Technological Development

Twentieth-century essayist George Woodcock observed in the "Tyranny of the Clock": "It is a frequent circumstance of history that a culture or civilization develops the device that will later be used for its destruction."[1] Woodcock cites compelling examples to support the claim that some technological innovations set their inventors (or pathological users) on a path toward decline, depravity, or complete devastation. He contends that "the clock represents an element of mechanical tyranny in the lives of modern men more potent than any individual exploiter or than any other machine."[2] This claim might cause us to imagine other outstanding additions.

A recent example of the invention of a device leading to the destruction of social awareness and aptitude among people is the smartphone. As of this writing, the smartphone serves as a key advancement in entertaining and informing us, paying our debts, receiving our demands and inquires, waking us from slumber, turning us in the right direction when we are disoriented, searching the web, and even telling us the time. Countless associated apps promise to integrate us more fully into the social edifice of cyberspace where we can kill time or virtual enemies in a contrived world of online gamers.

Yet, for the convenience it offers, the smartphone appears to have largely subsumed the laborious task of critical thinking even as it communicates suggestions on where we might dine. In short, it appears to be an electronic person in the palm of our hands whom we can manipulate on impulse. While we are walking hand-in-hand with this surrogate person, attending to its pristine face, it can so captivate our interest that, at times, we may forget where we are as we enter a busy street only to be slain by a passing vehicle. This sort of growing obsessive fixation on the technological attests to a profound and troubling neglect and ignorance of the natural.

Such is the case with other inventions that come to capture our attention and, thus, influence our behavior. Our devices, in effect, become vices that lead us astray. Money, the love of which is said to be the root of evil, is a device that embodies an abstraction of a certain value, used to exchange a certain value for a certain good or service. The blind, impassioned pursuit of this abstraction, as it has been often observed, can so ensnare our attention that we can lose sight of the very things that imbue it with value—human beings, culture, society, and the natural environment. When we busy ourselves in single-minded pursuits of monetary profit, we soon see that the expedition necessitates expenditures in time, which, as Woodcock observes, is reduced to a product in the capitalist calculations of the current business world:

> Western [and Eastern] man … lives in a world which runs according to the mechanical and mathematical symbols of clock time. The clock dictates his movements and inhibits his actions. The clock turns time from a process of nature into a commodity that can be measured and bought and sold like soap or sultanas.[3]

The apex of Woodcock's characterization of industrial capitalism can also be located in the contemporary world where neoliberal interpretations and practices of the ideology predominate and the operation of an "open" market is seen as an ethic in itself, well qualified, observes Paul Treanor, to serve as mentor and guide for all human action and as a substitute for all previously existing ethical beliefs.[4]

When it was rationalized, for example, by the owners of the means of production to extract more work from the labor force through manipulation of the clock,[5] the question of justifying the practice became reduced to one of profits and losses rather than of ethics and morality. Thus, today, the intentional poisoning of a river (or a city's water supply) by a major

corporation becomes a calculated risk to the bottom line from potential fines rather than a severe and humiliating breach of ethics or a devastating blow to the public image of the corporate entity.

The Language of Waiting in Time

One useful way of putting this sort of reasoning and human behavior into perspective is to reexamine the language used to condition us through systems of education and media. How does language reflect our engagement with the world and reveal what we believe and understand about it and those with whom we share this space in this epoch of time? Lakoff and Johnson point to figurative language, suggesting that metaphor is

> pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The concepts that govern our thoughts are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details.[6]

This is why metaphors for waiting so often represent the sheer height of tedium in contemporary post-industrial life. Lakoff and Johnson point out that our conceptual systems play a central role in defining our everyday realities and structure what we perceive and value.

Our discussion here represents part of an extended argument for seeing action, in this case the act of waiting, as having a certain value. Correspondingly, since the protest movement we have analyzed is also an argument against the destruction of the environment in the name of development, we wish to consider first the concept of "argument" and the words we use to embody how people manage to express disagreement over certain issues of social import.

In the Western world, the metaphorical language imported into a heated discussion tends to represent concepts of war and battle. This is why people engaged in protests against government or corporate plans to destroy the environment describe direct action as an ongoing battle or fight. Practices of direct action also appear in war stories among veterans and casual talk

over who legitimately saw engagement with the enemy in battle during military campaigns. The Alberta Tar Sands calamity, West Virginia's practice of mountaintop removal, Fukushima's nuclear meltdown, obliteration of Gangjeong's coastline in Jeju, Bhopal's unending chemical nightmare, the atrocities of rainbow herbicides in Vietnam, and a long list of other similar environmental outrages, all in the name of profit and control of resources, all engender the language of war among protestors.

The various protest movements in Okinawa serve as yet another example of a defensive battle carried out against the planned offensive demolition of a delicate ecosystem. The destruction of this ecosystem means a significant rise in profits for the construction companies that won the bidding war to "develop" this region of the Okinawa Main Island.

The war metaphor can also be applied to the personal level, when we successfully argue for a raise in salary and speak of demolishing the boss's defenses, or of being on target by taking the moral high ground. When we feel abused or overworked by the system, or its gatekeepers, we may feel compelled to fire our boss for stealing some of our time without compensating us. The language seems to represent the palpable sense in the enduring struggle over securing or defending resources, whether natural or human-made, whether real or conceptual.

Edward Hall points out: "Time with us is handled much like a material; we earn it, spend it, save it, waste it."[7] It's clear, at present, in the struggle for securing the natural resources that those engaged in the business of transforming the coastline and burying the reef system sense the pressure of time and the prospect of potential profits slipping away. Certainly, Hall's analysis of time as a material force (and resource) appeared to play out in practice during the years when vigorous US military base expansion unfolded in the 1950s.

> Working against typhoons, against the long supply haul across the vast Pacific, against the operating demands of daily bomb strikes on enemy installations, and against time itself—while the world wonders where the next communist attack will hit—construction gangs of Americans, Okinawans, Filipinos, and Japanese have converted this central island of the Ryukyuan chain into the key American base in the Far East.[8]

In *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, Lakoff and Johnson provide further perspective on this sense of pressure we perceive regarding the movement of time: The time-is-money

metaphor arises by taking money as a special case of a resource, that is, by substituting money for resource throughout the resource schema. Words like *budget*, *spend*, *invest*, *profit*, and *loss* are defined relative to the resulting resource schema for money.[9] If we then take the time-is-a-resource mapping and substitute money-for-resource, we get the time-is-money mapping, which allows us to comprehend sentences like the following:

> I have to budget my time, I spent too much time on that. I've invested a lot of time on this project, You don't use your time profitably. That mistake resulted in a considerable loss of time.[10]

One problem with the reasoning revealed in the language of this sort of decision-making process is that some natural resources cannot be re-created once they are destroyed by certain uses of time in certain projects of development. When, for example, society's power holders express regret for not using their *time more profitably* by *spending too much of it* on "needless" public debates over the long-term environmental impact of major reclamation projects, they are also conveying a certain kind of blindness. Development that destroys in the name of national security or the war on terror or on whatever other fashionable abstraction cannot, so easily, be reversed. Once those in power have rationalized the burial of a coral reef system, the removal of entire mountaintops, the radioactive poisoning of a water table, they are effectively admitting to the demolition of the faculty of reason by the all-consuming ethic of consumption at any cost.

If the neoliberal interpretation of capitalism is valid and if we see clear signs of neoliberal ideology infecting the minds of government leaders around the globe, that the business transaction alone represents, at present, an ethic in itself, then we can understand why it is such a powerful brand of consumption. Within the ideology of development, Douglas Lummis observes:

> [T]he power of the metaphor is that it gives the impression that projects being carried out under that ideology are natural, inevitable, and bring about the proper and predestined future of the entity being developed.[11]

In the case of Okinawa, further material developments underway in the security apparatus (which means more destruction of the environment) appear to supersede decisions made in democratic elections which, oddly, seem to fortify the power of those already in control. Despite results in the local electoral process expressing citizen rejection of a planned American

military base, the power holders in the central government have chosen development of the base as a natural and inevitable outcome of the Japan-US Security Alliance. The project for Henoko imposed upon a largely reluctant public represents a disturbing level of disdain for the political process.

If Tokyo still serves as a client of Washington,[12] this kind of abuse of power, it can be argued, "illustrates … contempt for democracy among western elite opinion," and according to Chomsky, it "doesn't matter what the population thinks …, what matters is what the dictators think."[13] Chomsky was referring in his lecture to the dictators of the Arab world who supported the Western plan to rid Iran of its nuclear program, but the view holds as well in Okinawa, among other East Asian regions, where leaders have long ignored the wishes of the populace to rid the island of American bases. One may wonder, at this point, how this kind of myopic view of the perceived necessity of development can gain such currency in the public mind.

Time as a Cause in Managing the Masses

Sheldon Wolin suggests the current brand of American politics has helped give shape to a "managed democracy,"[14] sanitized of genuine citizen participation and "where governments are legitimated by elections … they have learned to control."[15] Dissenting views in such a controlled system are generally tolerated (though contemptuously), since corporate media serve as effective filters, allowing citizens with limited time on hand to keep themselves marginally acquainted with current issues, and to hear only points of view that these media conclude are "fit to print."

Propaganda helps maintain and manage the prevailing myth that the press is free by obscuring the interlocking interests among the powers of government, industry, banking, military, entertainment, and news media itself.[16] Successful systems of propaganda are, thus, the sustained effect of coordinated efforts in mass communication that make use of the informational infrastructure to maintain social order through definitional control—the ability to explain and circulate a particular view of reality propounded by the centers of power. As Schiller has observed: "Its practice is dependent on a reliable national instructional system. Schools, entertainment, the media and the political process are enlisted."[17] The role of propaganda proclaiming the preordained merits of this current political and economic order in America is twofold.

First, those practices directed at the domestic media consumer achieve measures of subjugation, obedience, and compliance, which could not be realized without well-coordinated systems of communication management propagating consistent and coherent messages. Maintaining America's competitive edge, for example, through "increasing efficiency and productivity," "downsizing the workforce," "outsourcing labor overseas," and "cutting taxes on the wealthy" are all central to staying "on point" and maintaining coherence in the message of the neoliberal program rationalizing the extraction of increased man-hours from the workforce at decreased cost to the owners. These processes of increased time extraction on workers create a state of social insecurity and desperation where job uncertainty deepens citizens' sense of alienation and powerlessness to attend adequately to the demands of democracy in the public square.

Second, state propaganda meant for an international audience finds expression in the discourse of State Security and the Global War on Terror promulgated by the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war and, subsequently, reinforced by the Obama and Trump administrations. The policy of war waged on amorphous enemies constrains the United States to view as illegitimate the efforts of states or actors challenging the legitimacy of rash national belligerence.[18] Bound to the propaganda supporting this new doctrine is the sense of urgency needed to legitimate various levels of assault on democratic processes, on basic freedoms, on people, and on the environment. Popular protest and resistance to this doctrine is seen as futile and grounds for a variety of disciplinary actions, such as in the case of contemporary Okinawa where the people remain engaged in a struggle against Washington and Tokyo's plans to destroy an area of the island in the name of National Security and Development.

Resisting Militarized Assaults on the Environment

With the 1879 Meiji seizure of the Ryukyu islands complete, the resulting American militarization of the island in the wake of World War II, and current forms of neoliberal globalization now informing local public policy, Okinawa today has mounted a sustained struggle against the forces of development presently (re)shaping much of the world. What indigenous aspects of Okinawan culture, language, and identity colonialism and globalization have hitherto failed to erase or reshape, Okinawan

people continue to challenge the ongoing US occupation with resistance to Western concepts of time imposed upon them through forced militarization.

We suggest that the roots of Okinawa's present dilemma as a colonized island can be found in the advent of atomic warfare. Herbert Anderson's recollection in 1942 of the first controlled nuclear chain reaction, which would later lay the groundwork for testing of the first atomic detonation, illustrates the enthusiasm and utility of man's meticulous mastery of measured time and its implications in wielding what was then perceived to be immense control over the physical world. In recorded observations of his colleagues, Anderson notes:

> A precise schedule was followed for each measurement. With the rhodium in place in the graphite, the source was inserted in its position inside the pile removed after a one-minute exposure. To get the rhodium foil under the Geiger counter in the allotted 20 seconds [because its induced half-life is only 44 seconds] took coordination and some fast legwork. The division of labor was typical. I removed the source on signal; Fermi, stopwatch in hand, grabbed the rhodium and raced down the hall at top speed. He had just enough time to place the foil carefully into position, close the lead shield and, at the prescribed moment, start the count. Then with obvious satisfaction at seeing everything go right, he would watch the flashing lights on the scaler, tapping his fingers on the bench in time with the clicking of the register. Such a display of the phenomenon of radioactivity never failed to delight him.[19]

Anderson's description of the fastidious focus on highly precise calculations in time prefigures the emergence of America's empire of bases today, roughly 800 at last reckoning, as noted by David Vine. Precision in timekeeping is paramount to maintaining military might and material spread across the face of the earth. This precision is also pivotal in the successful organization of highly complex events in communication, in command and control for military operations. As Woodcock observed, if "mechanized time is [a] valuable means of coordinating activities in a highly developed society,"[20] one could argue that strict compliance with the monotonous march of time is also an essential practice in preserving the machinery and employing the strategies in America's standing army garrisoned on foreign soil. As we have suggested in earlier chapters, Okinawa provides an excellent case study of time as conceptualized in the Western mind, occupied with its manifold false urgencies, and superimposed upon the East Asian.

Edward Hall observed in *The Silent Language* that "Americans tend to think of time as something fixed in nature, something around us and from which we cannot escape, an ever-present part of the environment, just like the air we breathe."[21] If it is so, we propose that "Okinawa time" represents an ongoing refutation of this prevailing view that time is inescapable. If time in the Anglo-American mind is like a toll road bounded by walls on both sides and the distant future lies just beyond the horizon, time in Okinawa is an open ocean where movements in the tides and currents of society sometimes carry people a bit off course and delayed for meetings, quite like the concept of time to the traditional Navajo where time is space and only the here and now is real. Lakoff and Johnson observe that the view in which time is not considered a resource, in which there is no rush to get things done with maximum efficiency, is sometimes viewed mockingly by those who are not part of the Native American culture as "Indian time." Western businessmen seeking to set up factories in Third World countries often see indigenous peoples who do not conceptualize time as a resource as being lazy.[22]

As a vestige of traditional agrarian culture, one variety of indigenous Okinawa time is deployed, if subconsciously, as a soft defense against the neoliberal forces of "gunboat globalization"[23]—a distinctly foreign invention of time and action exported to contemporary Okinawa as a "device" for safeguarding America's military primacy in East Asia. The wait in Henoko is a particular action carried out in the social space of "Okinawa time," and it underscores the great value and urgency of careful deliberation, of laying siege to the tools of war (and war-making) most obviously expressed in the physical boundaries erected between the local community and the US military population.

As once deployed by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, public acts of passive resistance demonstrate opposition to a government's activities through citizen non-cooperation. We contend, though, that the protest movement in Henoko signifies not merely opposition to government plans and policies, but a fundamental rejection of both the concept of time as marked on a clock face and the social practice of attending to the dictates of time ushered in by the capitalist dispensation and normalized through a common and uncritical embrace of the clock as lord over our daily habits and routines. Wrapped up in this purposeful wait, moreover, is the solemn hope that pure reason will prevail over the neoliberal rationalizations now threatening democratic institutions and the natural environment that sustains all life. This hope emanates from the belief that the promise of material profits in the cool business transaction cannot

subdue the logic of loving the environment in which we all live, loving its inhabitants, and seeing in all these things a sublime essence whose value surpasses the rational.[24]

With vivid images of the American takeover of Okinawan land still fixed in the memories of many older protestors, the rationalization presented to the public to destroy Oura Bay represents an intolerable sort of symbolic violence identical to the forceful land seizure they witnessed in the 1950s. One member of the resistance recently observed (April 3, 2017), "If the Japanese government continues to insist on destroying this bay, we will refuse to cease our protests until they relent."

Indigenous Concepts of Time

If our programmed submission to the demands of measured time purports to signify a sort of noble practice in the shared maintenance of civilized society, one can learn much from indigenous peoples about civilization itself and resistance to this surrender. Chief Standing Bear contemplated the meaning of such a society when he observed: "Regarding the 'civilization' that has been thrust upon me since the days of reservation; it has not added one whit to my sense of justice; to my reverence for the rights of life; to my love for truth, honesty, and generosity."[25]

The sort of "civilization" thrust upon the people of Okinawa in the wake of the world war is also worthy of our wonder and attention. Ignoring it means ignoring the sense of justice that all people embrace, no matter who is holding the power. If we persist in our self-respect as sophisticated, enlightened, and sensitive to the universal truths of reason, we ought also to take care and weigh the meanings of society and civilization packaged by the neoliberal propaganda and sold to us in the ideology of development.

Notes

1. George Woodcock. "The Tyranny of the Clock," In *Broadview Reader* 3rd Edition, edited by Jane Flick and Herbert Rosengarten (Calgary: Broadview Press, 1998), 301.
2. Ibid., 301.
3. Ibid., 302.
4. Paul Treanor, "Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition," accessed January 9, 2017, http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html.

5. For further evidence of manipulating time in the interest of profit, visit: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/us/altering-of-worker-time-cards-spurs-growing-number-of-suits.html.
6. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 3.
7. Edward T. Hall. *The Silent Language* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), 7.
8. George Barrett. "Report on Okinawa: A Rampart We Built." *New York Times* (September 21, 1952).
9. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 163.
10. Ibid., 164.
11. Douglas Lummis. *Radical Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 63.
12. Gavan McCormack. "Japan's Client State Problem," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 11(25) 2013, accessed April 30, 2016, http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3961/article.html.
13. Noam Chomsky. "The Emerging World Order: Its Roots, Our Legacy," accessed January 9, 2017, https://lissnup.wordpress.com/2012/09/30/the-two-worst-rogue-states-in-the-united-nations/.
14. Tocqueville calls this Democratic Despotism, and states that "it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd."
15. Sheldon Wolin. *Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 47.
16. Sheldon Wolin observes that inverted totalitarianism follows a different route. Instead of pursuing unanimity, it encourages divisiveness; instead of rule by a single master race, it promotes predomination—that is, rule by diverse powers which have found it in their interests to combine while retaining their separate identities. The key components are corporate capital, the very rich, small business associations, large media organizations, evangelical Protestant leaders, and the Catholic hierarchy. Models of organization tend to be corporate as well as military (2008: 185).

    John Feffer notes that, "Transnational corporations shift operations to other countries, withhold taxes, and show national allegiance only to benefit the bottom line. International financial institutions, too, are not the instruments of particular countries, but rather a group of countries of which the U.S. is first among equals." (1999: 55)

17. Herbert Schiller. *Living in the Number One Country: Reflections from a Critic on American Empire* (Cambridge: Seven Stories Press, 2000), 152.
18. "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2002).
19. Craig Nelson. *The Age of Radiance: The Epic Rise and Dramatic Fall of the Atomic Era* (New York: Scribner, 2014), 124.
20. Op. cit., Woodcock, 301.
21. Op. cit., Hall, 7.
22. Op. cit., Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 153.
23. John Feffer. "Gunboat Globalization: The Intersection of Economics and Security in East Asia," *Social Justice*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (82), Neoliberalism, Militarism, And Armed Conflict (Winter 2000), pp. 45–62.
24. This refers to the defense mechanism in which controversial behaviors or feelings are justified and explained in a seemingly rational or logical manner to avoid the true explanation, and are made consciously tolerable—or even admirable and superior—by plausible means.
25. Luther Standing Bear. "What the Indian Means to America," In *The Great American Mosaic: An Exploration of Diversity in Primary Documents*, edited by Gary Y. Okihiro, Lionel C. Bascom, James E. Seelye Jr., Emily Moberg Robinson, Guadalupe Compeán (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2014), 211.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

In 1966, while B-52s based in Okinawa were bombing North Vietnam and disrupting North Vietnamese Army movements along the Mugia Pass, American military veterans from World Wars I and II were staging rallies and opposing combat operations in Vietnam. All of this, as plans for a dramatically expanded base at Camp Schwab in Okinawa were being rolled out. As part of the General Development Plan Marine Corps Air Facility, Henoko, the designs called for the construction of two runways. It is possible that because of the ongoing conflict in Vietnam and the resources needed to support it, US military forces were not able at the time to allocate sufficient funding for this massive reclamation and construction project.

The January 17, 1966, original plan for Henoko had called for two 3000-meter-long runways for the new facility, but it wasn't until 1996 that plans for the development of this part of the island were brought out again. The SACO Final Report of 1996 specified that a SBF would be built as part of the Futenma MCAS realignment. Central to our analysis of the propaganda since that time has been the word "Final" for the fascinating absence of finality to these plans. The 1996 "Final Report," oddly, morphed into a 1997 "Executive Report," which called for the additional construction of a Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA). This change necessitated a dramatic expansion of the 1966 SBF design. At a subsequent 2005 meeting, the 1997 "Executive Report" changed, yet again, into a so-called two-plus-two meeting between Washington and Tokyo planners. The upshot of that meeting was the construction of "a pier for refueling and relevant facilities."

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Worth noting are the names given to each meeting and the resulting shift in policy, which connote increasing vagueness and ambiguity. Makishi Yoshikazu, award-winning Okinawan architect and peace activist, comments on this highly complex process by suggesting that therein lies "deceit in this government's expression."[1] A careful study of the entire process, Yoshikazu calmly dissects the various blueprints for Henoko since its 1966 inception and realizes that the runway design published in the 1997 blueprint was a "mannequin (dummy) of what the US military had actually intended all along, which was to resurrect the 1966 designs."[2] In Chapter 3, we referenced James O'Conner's discussion of how "[t]he state must involve itself in the [process of capital] accumulation, [by] either mystify[ing] its policies [and] calling them something that they are not, or … try[ing] to conceal them."[3] Beyond the realm of capital accumulation, we wonder what parallel case can be made for seeing the same processes of rhetorical mystification at work in the accumulation of new state projects of development.

Given recent efforts by the bureaucracy to destroy (degrade or threaten) the humanities and social sciences, what does this proposal offered by the centers of power signify in terms of the social and economic processes we have described? What would become of Japan—its remarkable culture and history and the human beings that imbue it all with value and meaning—were studies in the humanities and social sciences to fade away? If, as Wendy Brown observes, "neoliberalism is a peculiar form of reason that configures all aspects of existence in economic terms," can neoliberal elites quantify and make public the details of how their programs for economic development will leave cultures, social institutions, the commons, and the natural environment untouched?[4]

As with so many businesses beyond the fast-food enterprise that seek maximum profits at all costs, these are powerful externalizing forces in society that possess highly destructive potential for the environment. Gabriela Kütting expands on this idea:

> The neoliberal economic order … treats the natural environment as if there were an unlimited supply of natural resources. The 'goods and services' provided by the planet are not costed, unlike capital goods and resources owned by a supplier; therefore they are externalized by economists and taken for granted in economic valuations.[5]

Kütting alludes to an important point that must be clarified about contemporary democracies. To sustain the system, the party men and women in power must practice a certain level of disregard for the negative externalities

produced by the present system of development, with its unchecked assaults on the environment and on democratic institutions while—at the same time—paying a certain level of respect for those sacrifices. This level of disregard can be extrapolated from propaganda, as we have discussed, which works to channel citizen attention away from real externalities, while it expresses public respect and praise for that which is forfeited. Simply put, the system requires a perpetual sacrifice. In the case of Japan, Tetsuya Takahashi argues in his book *Sayonara Amerika, Sayonara Nippon* (2012) that this rationalization of continued capitulation has shaped the landscape of both Fukushima and Okinawa.

In Okinawa with its high concentration of military bases crammed into this small provincial region, this sort of sacrifice, Takahashi argues, represents a certain kind of colonization. The same, he observes, holds true for other rural areas in Japan, such as Fukushima, where some of the nation's key nuclear power plants sat concentrated and exposed to the potential fury of an unforgiving ocean. In a sacrificial system, Takahashi observes:

> The profits of one person (or group) are acquired and sustained through a sacrifice in the living conditions (lifestyle, health, property, dignity, identity, self-determination, etc.) of another person (or group). Such profits cannot be acquired or sustained without the sacrifice of the sacrificed. This sacrifice is usually obscured from view or mythologized and legitimized as a 'noble sacrifice' undertaken for the benefactor (state, society, community, or company, etc.). (authors' interpretation of the Japanese text)[6]

This is why neoliberalism, as Henry Giroux observes, has been labeled as a "disposability machine …, relentlessly engaged in the production of an unchecked notion of individualism that both dissolves social bonds and removes any viable notion of agency from the landscape of social responsibility."[7]

Signs of this new culture of disposability appeared in the public discourse in 2015 when, as Jeff Kingston notes, an "anti-intellectual salvo from Prime Minister Abe's government" was launched at the "humanities and social sciences departments at Japanese national universities."[8] Groundwork for the offensive had been cleared a year before at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development where Abe remarked that, "Rather than deepening academic research that is highly theoretical, we will conduct more practical vocational education that better anticipates the needs of society."[9] The Prime Minister's statement had been construed as code for government policymakers "trying to

silence academic opposition to its policies by threatening and undermining the subject areas that produce and hire those critical voices."[10] Kingston further observes that this effort "fits into a larger pattern of dumbing-down education, promoting patriotism and stifling dissent."[11]

Disconnected from awareness of the rights of a citizen and responsibilities of citizenship, healthy actors able to pursue this sort of individualism Giroux refers to take part in their own disenfranchisement and disempowerment as neoliberal practices sacrifice their health, property, dignity, identity, and self-determination. Besides sacrificing the environment, neoliberalism demands a sacrifice of the human being. "The financial world in Japan," observes Takahashi, "now makes a strict distinction between the elite and the 'disposable' others—in other words workers who can be thrown out in an instant in favor of fresh 'raw material.'"[12] This is the same precariat Alan Greenspan alluded to in his testimony before Congress that predicted a booming economy for the greatest centers of wealth at the planned expense of "greater worker insecurity."[13] The sacrifices that Takahashi refers to simply become the externalities the neoliberal elites ignore in their calculations for this emerging economic order. As he deconstructs the puzzling syllogisms that support this sacrificial system, he focuses on a key implication: it produces the need for an ethical response on the part of all. The nation cannot simply memorialize and mourn the victims and their sacrifices, Takahashi argues. The history of Okinawa and the unfolding horrors of Fukushima teach us that the system of continued sacrifice must come to an end.

The norms of disposability and externalized sacrifices are expanding in the neoliberal economy in Okinawa, as we examined in Chapter 10. Paradoxically however, economic deregulation in the neoliberal global regional markets has, to a significant extent, advanced and energized the hope of Okinawa's self-government (*jichi*) and the removal of military garrisons from Okinawa Main Island. The neoliberalization of the Okinawan economy contributed to the emergence of the "All Okinawa" coalition against the FRF construction, led by an anti-base, conservative Governor. The "anti-base turn" of the conservative Okinawan economic actors in the recent decade is currently and increasingly supported by the growth sectors such as tourism, trade, and logistics in the "actually neoliberalizing" Okinawan economy. This fact demonstrates that the opposition to the FRF in Okinawa, as staged by the "All Okinawa" coalition, cannot be projected as a critique of global neoliberalism, at the moment.

We currently do not know whether the battle against colonialism and FRF construction in Okinawa will ever manifest clearly as a battle against our desensitization to externalized human sacrifices growing in the neoliberal stage of capitalism.

At the outset of our study, we referred to our wonder of how the SACO arrangement, its subsequent obscure modifications and calls for the illegal destruction of a pristine marine environment—despite popular resistance—managed to unfold as it has, as reasonable and legitimate in the minds of so many. How had these processes come to be seen as acceptable to individual citizens? Certainly, the local resistance movement, with its newly emerging sense of Okinawan identity, could not be denied by supporters of the status quo. Still, with the observable onslaught of neoliberalism reshaping societies and environments and erasing democratic rights around the globe, we postulated that effective forms of propaganda were needed to enforce these measures. People would not simply stand by and watch without comment or concern about the destructive dismantling of all they believe in and work toward. We offered a model of social relations, expanded from George Ritzer's contributions to sociology, as a way of grasping how consent to the neoliberal project in Okinawa has been effectively manufactured.

Our attempts throughout this book to describe and analyze the disparate causes and effects of neoliberalization in Okinawa and the propaganda essential for its completion compel us, also, to think about what can be learned from these developments. As we have discussed theories and practices of rationalization as social and psychological states, we wonder also whether late capitalism hasn't already consumed in its neoliberal practitioners the very faculty of reason needed for discernment of how this global project sacrifices the very things it claims to secure. As witnesses to or victims of growing social inequality, declining standards of living, increasing hours of labor for dwindling wages, many citizens today see their lives measured in strictly economic calculations that dominate the designs of the public servant crafting policies and implementing practices.

We began this book by asking how public knowledge and thought are regimented and states of ignorance maintained in the interest of this global project we have described, especially as it is manifested in this region of Japan. Why is the ocean environment in Henoko—protected as it were by the ancestors of the people in Nago—okay to destroy? Why must the Yanbaru rainforest—nominated for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage status—be subjected to

incursions of such development? Is it for the party men to maintain their power? Thought control, as we have discussed, is needed for these sorts of sacrifices to be made "normal" and, thus, "reasonable." Given their power both to enact and to ignore laws, how do "party men and women" in Japan and Okinawa today manage to sustain the impression that the practices we have analyzed have no indirect costs to people, the environment, and democracy itself? We conclude that consent requires thoughtful reflection on the Okinawan struggle itself in its most basic element—the individual citizen.

We think it is useful to first acquire some wider view of what we mean by "the individual" by turning briefly to classical interpretations of citizenship. In *Crito*, we see Socrates awaiting his execution but engaged in a dialogue with his old friend about civil obedience, faithfulness, and the obligation of every citizen to observe the laws of society. Socrates proposes to Crito a new conception of what it means to be a responsible citizen. He opposes the traditional model of the citizen connoting notions of naïve loyalty and patriotism shaped by a romantic view of the state stretching back to the poetry of Homer. He seeks the establishment of a more reasoned or philosophical sense of what it means to be a citizen, a view that puts individuals in touch with their inherent intellectual powers of logical independent thinking and discernment.

Citizenship obliges the member of society to be actively engaged in the public sphere. Questioning poets and politicians in public spaces, Socrates stresses that citizenship ought to arise from, and be applied through, the individual's own personal powers of reason rather than reliance on custom and tradition. This awareness of the power of human reason inherited from Socrates, we suggest, can assist the citizen to see more clearly how many powerful institutions and people who thrive in the neoliberal stage of capitalism, consciously and unconsciously, shape the public mind, mold opinion and perception, to deepen general indifference toward the future of the commons. In Chapter 11, we examined the hopeful prototype actions of individual citizens capable of challenging the tyranny of time imposed on us all by the social control in industrial capitalism.

The propaganda and resistance we have analyzed in Okinawa Main Island throughout this book has roots in very old traditions. The processes we have described to induce the empowered to feel no compunction in ignoring inconvenient truths also are a practice with a rather rich history. In his dialogues with Plato, for instance, the Athenian describes a situation in the public discourse of ancient Athens that plagues many societies today. The speaker refers to the men of the prevailing political

party who talk of citizens' duty of obeying the law, but only if obedience benefits the party while citizens are asked to turn a blind eye to the larger needs of society as a whole and of the very environment that sustains it all. The following passage surmises a discussion that might be drawn from this study:

> When offices are filled competitively, the winners take over the affairs of state so completely that they totally deny the losers and the losers' descendants any share of power. Each side passes its time in a narrow scrutiny of the other, apprehensive lest someone with memories of past injustices should gain some office and lead a revolution. Of course, our position is that this kind of arrangement is very far from being a genuine political system; we maintain that **laws which are not established for the good** of the whole state are bogus laws, and when they favor particular sections of the community, their authors are not citizens but **party men [sic]**; and people who say those laws have a claim to be obeyed are wasting their breath.[14]

Like the uniformed women and men who risk their lives outside the wire where bullets and laser-guided munitions blaze by, citizens caught on the brutal battlefields of neoliberalized societies bear similar concerns for their very own survival. Realignments in (work)force structures, be they military or civilian, caused by incessant outsourcing of work to cheaper global labor markets intensify our daily activities in hunting for and gathering newer sources of revenue. So often these processes mean the sacrifice of something sacred and irreplaceable. It is the powerful illusions of neoliberal propaganda, we think, that sell us the myth of a blessed hope that new technologies will someday secure our lives, erase inequities, vanquish poverty, and save us from unnecessary toil and the sudden unexplainable loss of our livelihoods. If we dare to take some time and look carefully, we should see more clearly in Okinawa the canary in a dark neoliberal coalmine. Survival may depend on whether we can dispose of the oppressive daily regiments of late capitalist time and simply pay attention to one another.

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Appendix A

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○学校教育法（昭和二十二年法律第二十六号）（第一条関係）　新旧対照表

（傍線部分は改正部分）

改正後	改正前
第九十二条　大学には学長、教授、准教授、助教、助手及び事務職員を置かなければならない。ただし、教育研究上の組織編制として適切と認められる場合には、准教授、助教又は助手を置かないことができる。 ②　大学には、前項のほか、副学長、学部長、講師、技術職員その他必要な職員を置くことができる。 ③　学長は、校務をつかさどり、所属職員を統督する。 ④　副学長は、学長を助け、命を受けて校務をつかさどる。 ⑤～⑩　（略）	第九十二条　大学には学長、教授、准教授、助教、助手及び事務職員を置かなければならない。ただし、教育研究上の組織編制として適切と認められる場合には、准教授、助教又は助手を置かないことができる。 ②　大学には、前項のほか、副学長、学部長、講師、技術職員その他必要な職員を置くことができる。 ③　学長は、校務をつかさどり、所属職員を統督する。 ④　副学長は、学長の職務を助ける。 ⑤～⑩　（略）
第九十三条　大学に、教授会を置く。 ②　教授会は、学長が次に掲げる事項について決定を行うに当たり意見を述べるものとする。 一　学生の入学、卒業及び課程の修了 二　学位の授与 三　前二号に掲げるもののほか、教育研究に関する重要な事項で、教授会の意見を聴くことが必要なものとして学長が定めるもの ③　教授会は、前項に規定するもののほか、学長及び学部長その他の教授会が置かれる組織の長（以下この項において「学長等」という。）がつかさどる教育研究に関する事項について審議し、及び学長等の求めに応じ、意見を述べることができる。 ④　教授会の組織には、准教授その他の職員を加えることができる。	第九十三条　大学には、重要な事項を審議するため、教授会を置かなければならない。 （新設） ②　教授会の組織には、准教授その他の職員を加えることができる。

Appendix B

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学校教育における
政治的中立性についての
実態調査

党文部科学部会では学校教育における政治的中立性の徹底的な確保等を求める提言を取りまとめ、不偏不党の教育を求めているところですが、教育現場の中には「教育の政治的中立はありえない」と主張し中立性を逸脱した教育を行う先生方がいることも事実です。
学校現場における主権者教育が重要な意味を持つ中、偏向した教育が行われることで、生徒の多面的多角的な視点を失わせてしまう恐れがあり、高校等で行われる模擬投票等で意図的に政治色の強い偏向教育を行うことで、特定のイデオロギーに染まった結論が導き出されることをわが党は危惧しております。

そこで、この度、学校教育における政治的中立性についての実態調査を実施することといたしました。皆さまのご協力をお願いいたします。

姓※
全角入力　例) 山田

名※
全角入力　例) 太郎

フリガナ※
全角カタカナ入力(空白で区切らずに)

性別※
○男性　○女性

年齢※
選択してください

職業※

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投稿する　全入力取消

Index[1]

A

Abe, Shinzo, 70, 72n29, 73n48, 79, 89, 90, 111, 112, 197, 198, 225
Actionalization, 84
Ainu, viii, 20, 60, 72n26, 180
Albig, William, 56, 71n12
Alienation, 115n1, 153, 158, 210, 216
All Nippon Airlines (ANA) Cargo Hub, 199
All Okinawa' movement (*Ōru Okinawa*), 8, 122, 178, 192–200
American Village, 31, 191
Annexation, 21–23, 25, 28n29, 67, 179, 219
Anpo, 181, 186, 200, 203n35
Armed Forces Network (AFN), 138, 139, 154n24, 154n25
Article 9, 38, 118, 181
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), 185

B

Balloons, 149, 150, 153
Bayonets, 127, 149
Bernays, Edward, 28n15, 53, 54, 71n1, 71n5
Bhopal, 213
Bifurcated nationalism, 178, 179, 192
Bigots, 137, 140
Bilateral trade, 161
Brenner, Neil, 40, 51n45, 202n29
Bretton Woods system, 34
Brown, Wendy, 19, 28n25, 224, 230n4
Bulldozers, 85, 127, 149
Burawoy, Michael, 157, 171n1
Bureaucracy, 41, 43, 45, 51n50, 57, 69
Bureaucrats, 4, 60, 62, 68, 77, 78, 133, 190, 196
Bush, George W., 19, 28n24, 76, 89, 221n18
Bush Doctrine, 216
Butler, Smedley D., 39, 46, 50n35

[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refers to notes.

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M. Tanji, D. Broudy, *Okinawa Under Occupation*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5598-0

C
Calculability, 8, 42, 157–171, 209
Calder, Kent, 6, 9n16, 45, 46, 189, 204n45
Camp Schwab, ix, 3, 60, 86, 104, 126, 138, 154n16, 189, 190, 198, 223
Chinin, Usii, 142, 155n37, 155n39, 155n44
Chomsky, Noam, 58, 70, 72n23, 72n24, 73n53, 165, 170, 173n28, 174n44, 215, 220n13
Citizen(ship), xxi, 3, 4, 8, 14, 16–21, 26, 35, 43, 48n3, 54, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 68–71, 75–81, 85–87, 91, 93n25, 93n26, 100–103, 107, 108, 110–114, 115n1, 115n4, 115n6, 119, 120, 122, 123, 128, 131–133, 137, 141, 142, 145, 146, 149, 153, 162, 164, 165, 167–169, 171, 173n36, 174n42, 179, 187, 188, 198, 202n27, 206n79, 209, 214–216, 218, 225–229
Clinton, Bill, 9n19, 149
Colors, 55, 108, 109, 112, 132, 144, 148, 165–167
Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA), 223
Communism, 41, 51n50, 57, 103, 128
Conservatives, 67, 122, 141, 143, 145, 160, 165, 177–179, 181, 183, 186–188, 190–194, 196, 200, 226
Controls, 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 24, 32, 33, 42, 47, 58, 62, 63, 66, 70, 77, 102, 108, 114, 115n1, 117–119, 131–153, 157, 160, 161, 166, 168–170, 177, 183, 189, 192, 198, 209, 213–215, 217, 228
Costs, 14, 18, 99, 106, 107, 114, 123, 146, 159–162, 171, 174n46, 174n47, 189, 200, 205n61, 214, 216, 224, 228

D
Dangō, 191
Democracies, 15, 19, 26, 53, 66, 68, 118, 119, 128, 141, 165, 172n10, 188, 215, 216, 228
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 193
Development, 4, 6–8, 18, 19, 33, 36, 40–42, 45, 46, 51n50, 55, 56, 65–67, 71, 75, 77, 83, 86, 87, 101–104, 106–108, 110–114, 115n6, 158–160, 162, 165, 169–171, 172n23, 181, 183–186, 188–191, 195, 196, 199, 201n19, 210–212, 214–216, 219, 223–225, 227, 228
Developmental state, 41, 43, 51n47, 51n50, 51n58, 183, 200
Dewey, John, 68, 73n43, 73n45
Discrimination
  ethnic, 146
  structural, viii, 20, 135, 137
Dispossess(ion), 118, 157, 158

E
Economization, 19
Education, vii, 1, 7, 9n15, 20, 32, 34, 37, 43, 53, 76, 132, 133, 167, 177, 212, 225, 226

Efficiencies, 7, 42, 49n13, 63, 99–103, 105–108, 111–114, 169, 209, 210, 216, 218
Eldridge, Robert, 122, 123, 126, 127, 129n17, 130n29, 136–138, 154n14
Elites, 1, 36, 42, 43, 45, 58, 60, 69, 70, 90, 114, 119, 166, 215, 224, 226
Ellul, Jacques, 54, 55, 57, 71n6, 71n11, 71n16, 156n56
Emotive language, 123, 124
Environmental assessment, 4, 78, 197
Ethos, 47, 54, 55, 64, 122
Evergreening, 170
Ewen, Stuart, 56, 71n9
Externalities, 18, 106, 224, 226
Externalize, 224, 226, 227

F
Federici, Silvia, 157, 158, 171n2
Fictitious commodities, 34, 35
Financialization, 38
Free trade zone, 185, 195
Friedman, Milton, 34, 35, 48n9, 49n17
Friedman, Thomas, 39, 40, 50n38
Friendly fascism, 47
Fukushima, 128, 133, 213, 225, 226, 230n6
Fundamental education law, 63, 64, 69
Futenma MCAS, 7, 85, 110–112, 121, 124, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 149, 150, 160, 166, 168, 172n23, 223
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), 33, 41, 42, 46, 57, 126, 134, 141–143, 155n37, 155n40, 155n44, 156n47, 177, 186, 188–190, 192–198, 200, 204n52, 226, 227

G
Gandhi, Mahatma, 218
Gangjeong, 213
Gilbert, Kent, 120–124, 126, 127, 129n14, 129n15
Ginowan City, 7, 85, 86, 91, 110, 111, 121, 125, 127, 140, 149–151, 155n34, 156n57, 193
Giroux, Henry, 225, 226, 230n7
Globalization, vii, 6, 15, 34, 36, 44, 45, 47, 167, 174n44, 185–187, 199, 216, 218
Global War on Terror, 216
Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI), 182, 183, 201n15
Gramsci, Antonio, 38, 39, 43, 50n30, 133, 153n2, 177, 178, 186, 200
Greenspan, Alan, 226, 230n13
Gross, Bertram, 47, 52n67
Guests, 47, 123, 144

H
Hall, Edward, 213, 218, 219, 221n21
Harvey, David, 37, 48n8, 49n10, 49n18, 50n26, 50n27, 50n29, 128n6, 200, 203n37, 207n96
Hashimoto, Ryūtaro, 141, 187
Haters, 137, 140–144, 147
Hate speech, 140, 145, 153n9
Hatoyama, Yukio, 91, 92, 96n59, 193
Hayek, Friedrich, 34
Healthcare, 160, 161, 165, 170, 171
Hegemony, 37–40, 47, 118, 133, 170, 177, 200
Henoko, 4, 5, 7, 8n9, 9n12, 19, 77, 78, 82–84, 86, 92n9, 93n11, 93n12, 93n26, 93n28, 95n46, 103, 105–107, 110–113, 124–127, 130n26, 130n33, 137, 141, 146, 159, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171, 172n23, 188–190, 192, 193, 195–197, 204n49, 215, 218, 223, 224, 227, 229n1

Henoko Fund, 198
Hinomaru, 108, 180
Hirohito, 22, 25
Hosts, 8n3, 21, 142, 180, 204n45

I
Identities, 6, 8, 45, 55, 61, 138, 166, 177–200, 216, 220n16, 225–227
Iha, Yoichi, 150, 193
Inamine, Keiichi, 188, 190, 194, 204n52
Inamine, Susumu, 81, 82, 93n26, 107, 108, 192
Indigenous, viii, 3, 6, 20–23, 28n29, 55, 61, 67, 72n26, 141, 166, 180, 191, 216, 218, 219
Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices, 22
Inequities, ix, 2, 123, 134, 147, 229
Integration, *see* Propaganda
International City Formation Proposal, 185–188, 194–196, 198, 199
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 34
Inverted totalitarianism, 220n16
Isahama, 127, 149

J
Japan–US Security Alliance, 38, 47, 215
Jeju, 213
Jichi, 178, 182–186, 191, 196, 198, 200, 226
Johnson, Chalmers, 51n47, 51n50, 51n58, 201n16, 202n20, 212, 213, 218, 221n22

K
Kengisho, 182–185, 191, 201n15
Kenmin, 178–183, 186, 187, 192–194, 197, 200n1, 203n41
Keystone, 60
King, Martin Luther, 146, 151, 218
Kinjo, Yūji, 195
Koizumi, Junichiro, 41, 191

L
Lakoff, George, 65, 73n31, 73n33, 212, 213, 218, 220n6, 220n9, 221n22
Land grab, 217
Late capitalism, 2, 4, 53, 157, 199, 227
Leftist, 23, 123, 127, 139, 140
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 14
Limbaugh, Rush, 160, 169
Lippmann, Walter, 118, 128n2, 128n3, 153n7
Logos, 54
Lummis, Douglas C., 140, 155n31, 206n79, 214, 220n11

M
Marketization, 157
Marx, Karl, 33, 48n4
McArthur, Douglas, 22–25
McChesney, Robert, 45, 52n62, 160, 172n9
McCormack, Gavan, 2, 8n7, 94n36, 130n27, 154n21, 156n50, 194, 203n36, 204n42, 204n44, 204n46, 204n50, 205n54, 206n67, 220n12
McDonaldization, 4, 7, 31–47, 99, 101–103, 115n7, 131, 153n1
Medical island, 163, 166
Meiji, 22, 61, 62, 67, 71, 216
Memmi, Albert, 5, 40, 51n43
Metaphor(ical), 25, 26, 166, 212–214
Military-industrial complex, 6, 33, 38, 57, 119

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 44, 51n47, 51n50, 51n58, 182, 190, 196, 201n16
Miyazaki, Hayao, 198
Multimedia center, 190, 192, 195
My Number, 99, 100, 115n1, 115n2

N
Nago, 81–83, 86, 87, 93n23, 95n46, 107, 141, 143, 155n35, 188–192, 195, 227
Naha, 73n30, 81, 94n34, 108, 112, 113, 134, 167, 169, 171, 184, 185, 189, 191, 194–199, 203n30
Nakagusuku Bay, 195
Nakaima, Hirokazu, 79–82, 86, 93n25, 93n26, 93n28, 94n34, 107, 108, 110, 114, 164, 165, 167–171, 190, 193, 194, 196–198, 200
National Institutes of Health (NIH), 168, 169
Nationalism, 69, 135, 145, 178, 180, 192, 194
Neighbors, 59, 144, 150
Neoliberalism, 19, 32–37, 40–43, 47, 48n9, 49n20, 165, 170, 186, 224–227, 230n7
Neoliberalization, 32, 33, 37, 38, 41, 42, 51n50, 53, 56, 101, 157, 161, 200, 207n96, 226, 227
Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) (NHK), 87–90, 95n49, 95n51, 95n53, 96n57, 207n80
Nishime, Junji, 183
Nominalization, 84, 93n19, 115n4
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 170
North Korea, 14, 27n3, 57, 76
Nye, Joseph, 152

O
Obama, Barack, 55, 85, 87, 111, 112, 116n25, 161, 216
O'Connor, James, 37, 50n25, 128n4, 230n3
Oka Norimatsu, Satoko, 94n38, 130n27
Okinawa Developmental Promotion Plan, 183, 194
Okinawa dugong, 3, 4, 78, 116n16
Okinawa Inishiachibu, 194
Onaga, Takeshi, 83, 94n34, 123, 124, 164–166, 194, 197, 198, 200
Orwell, George, 16, 28n10, 125, 126, 130n22, 132
Osprey, 4, 78, 85, 121, 124, 130n33, 138, 140, 148, 156n48, 196, 197
Ota, Masahide, 83, 94n38, 185–188, 202n27, 203n35, 203n36, 204n44
Other, 14, 122
Oura Bay, ix, 3, 55, 63, 77, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 103–105, 107, 112, 118, 133, 148, 190, 197, 198, 219

P
Pacifist, 59, 118
Paid protest(ors), 127
Pathos, 54, 55, 140
Peace constitution, 59
Peaceful protest, 8
Plato, 67, 228, 230n14
Polanyi, Karl, 34–36, 38, 40, 43, 49n11, 49n14, 49n21, 50n40, 50n41
Policy, 3–5, 7, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 57, 66, 69, 78, 83, 87, 92, 109, 117, 119, 134, 137, 139, 142, 165, 179, 181–183, 186–189, 191, 194, 195, 197, 201n7, 201n16, 203n32, 206n73, 209, 216, 218, 224, 226, 227

Predictability, 7, 42, 117–128, 133, 209
Privilege(d), 32, 43, 47, 60, 69, 75–77, 123, 142, 170, 181, 197
Propaganda, ix, 1, 2, 7, 8, 14, 22, 28n15, 37, 42, 43, 45–47, 53–71, 99, 100, 103, 110, 112–114, 116n24, 125, 131, 134, 135, 139, 140, 150, 152, 157, 162, 164–170, 177, 199, 215, 216, 219, 223, 225, 227–229
Propaganda of integration, 7, 101, 134, 140
Propaganda of taciturnity, 60, 123
Protest
  Futenma, 126, 137, 138
  Henoko, 21, 29n33, 63, 121, 126, 128, 141, 158, 198
  Kamaduu, 149
  Takae, 21, 158
Protestant(ism), 44, 75, 220n16
Pyongyang, 14

Q
Quid pro quo, 168, 197

R
Racism, 21
Rationalization, 4, 21, 26, 33, 42–45, 47, 57, 75, 76, 78, 80, 101, 103, 106, 131, 143, 151, 152, 156n45, 166, 218, 219, 225, 227
Reagan, Ronald, 34
Reason, viii, 1, 13, 15, 19, 26, 35, 38, 48n3, 54, 57, 60, 67, 69, 76, 77, 101, 118, 126, 150, 151, 162, 197, 204n49, 214, 218, 219, 224, 227, 228
Resistance, viii, ix, 2, 3, 5–8, 19, 20, 36, 44, 46, 47, 57, 59, 60, 72n26, 85, 118, 119, 126, 129n8, 138, 139, 143, 147, 170, 177, 209, 210, 216–219, 227, 228, 229n1
Reversion, 5, 25, 50n39, 51n50, 60, 139, 142, 180–182, 194, 202n25
Reversion nationalism, 179, 180
Ritzer, George, 7, 33, 42–45, 51n52, 52n60, 102, 103, 106, 115n7, 116n12, 116n19, 117, 128n1, 131, 137, 153n1, 159, 171n7, 227
Rycom Mall, 31, 202n19
Ryukyu, viii, 18, 20, 22, 23, 28n29, 29n33, 29n35, 29n41, 31, 61, 71, 81, 102, 109, 166, 167, 179, 180, 182, 199, 200n2, 201n15, 204n49, 216

S
Sadou, Akihiro, 201n19, 202n23, 202n24, 203n32, 203n38
Sakashita, Masakazu, 180, 200n1, 201n8
Sakiyama, Tami, 199
Sakurai, Kunitoshi, 8n9, 81, 82, 92n9, 93n11
Schiller, Herbert, 17, 28n16, 114, 116n22, 116n26, 133, 153n4, 153n5, 215, 221n17
Sea-based facility (SBF), 83, 104, 125, 126, 130n21, 164, 223
Security Alliance, 5, 57, 145, 215
Shimabukuro, Jun, 184, 189, 190, 201n14, 202n22, 202n24, 202n26, 202n28, 203n31, 203n40, 204n45, 205n57, 206n71, 206n77, 207n80, 207n81, 207n84
Shimagurumi, 178, 179, 181, 186, 192, 198

Shinkō, 51n51, 183, 191, 194, 201n14, 202n21
Signs, xxi, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 53, 55, 58, 59, 78, 80, 87, 91, 99, 107, 108, 114, 131, 140, 141, 145, 147, 148, 152, 161, 177, 186, 214, 225
Silence(d), 9n15, 14, 22, 139, 182, 226
Smith, Adam, 40, 48n9
Socrates, 70, 74n60, 228
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), 3, 6, 7, 9n18, 41, 42, 46, 83, 84, 86, 103, 104, 125–128, 129–130n21, 164, 172n23, 177, 186–188, 204n51, 223, 227
Special economic zones (SEZs), 195
Standardization, 63
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 47, 204n41, 206n79
Strategically, 152, 154n14
Suga, Yoshihide, 80, 86, 95n43, 95n45, 171
Surveillance, ix, 137, 138

T
Taciturnity, *see* Propaganda
Takae, 19, 21, 63, 83–85, 130n33, 137, 158, 159, 190, 204n51
Takahashi, Tetsuya, 69, 73n49, 156n47, 225, 226, 230n6, 230n12
Tanji, Miyume, 9n15, 130n30, 130n33, 155n35, 155n44, 156n51, 201n5, 201n13, 202n27, 203n35, 204n43, 206n63, 206n68
Tape, 99, 144, 147–151, 153, 206n79
Textbooks, 9n15, 16, 58, 60, 76, 144, 192–194, 206n63
Thatcher, Margaret, 34–36, 49n16
Theodore, Nik, 40, 51n45, 202n29
Tokashiki, 193
Tokyo, ix, 3, 4, 9n14, 14, 18, 19, 22, 24–26, 41, 42, 46, 60, 62, 78–80, 83, 85–88, 91, 94n32, 94n34, 101, 107, 108, 110, 118, 121, 123, 129n14, 133, 139, 142–144, 151, 152, 155n39, 155n41, 155n43, 156n47, 162, 165–169, 171, 177, 181–185, 187–189, 192, 195–197, 199, 200, 200n1, 200n3, 201n7, 201n9, 201n19, 202n24, 215, 216, 223, 230n6
Tōyama, Satoshi, 198
Toyohara, 192
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 160, 161, 169, 170, 172n12, 173n37, 173n38, 174n42
Trump, Donald, 8n1, 14, 49n12, 161, 162, 172n20, 216
Two-plus-two, 223

U
Uchinaa, 179
Uchinaguchi, 141, 166
Uchinanchu, 179

V
Vine, David, 6, 9n17, 217

W
Wajin, 180
Washington (DC), 161

Weber, Max, 43–45, 75, 92–94n1, 103
Wilson, Woodrow, 46
Wolin, Sheldon, 100, 119, 123, 128, 215, 220n15
Woodcock, George, 210, 211, 217, 219n1, 221n20
World Trade Organization (WTO), 34, 170, 187
World War II, viii, 5–7, 16, 24, 25, 32, 56, 57, 59, 60, 136, 144, 158, 161, 166, 182, 216, 223

X
Xenophobia, 8n4

Y
Yamashiro, Hiroji, xi, 138
Yamato, 5, 139, 142, 180, 193, 194, 197
Yara, Chōbyō, 182, 191
Yoshikawa, Hideki, 79, 93n21, 106, 107, 116n15, 116n17
Yoshikazu, Makishi, 83, 104, 224, 229n1, 229n2
Yoshimoto, Masanori, 185, 187, 203n32

Z
Zamami islands, 193