



Cass Military Studies

MILITARY STRATEGY OF SMALL STATES

**RESPONDING TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre
and Jacob Westberg



Military Strategy of Small States

The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks.

Using primary sources from four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the twenty-first century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor.

This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defence studies, security studies and international relations.

Håkan Edström is Associate Professor in Political Science and Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University.

Dennis Gyllensporre is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Swedish Defence University.

Jacob Westberg is Senior Lecturer in Security Policy and Strategy at the Swedish Defence University.

Cass Military Studies

Space Warfare in the 21st Century

Arming the Heavens

Joan Johnson-Freese

Strategy Before Clausewitz

Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400–1830

Beatrice Heuser

Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century

Perspectives from the Social Sciences

Edited by Jessica Glicken Turnley, Kobi Michael and Eyal Ben-Ari

Civilians and Warfare in World History

Edited by Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams

The Military and Liberal Society

Societal–Military Relations in Western Europe

Tomas Kucera

Israel, Strategic Culture and the Conflict with Hamas

Adaptation and Military Effectiveness

Niccolò Petrelli

War and Strategy in the Modern World

From Blitzkrieg to Unconventional Terrorism

Azar Gat

Military Strategy of Small States

Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century

Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Cass-Military-Studies/book-series/CMS

Military Strategy of Small States

Responding to External Shocks of the
21st Century

**Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre
and Jacob Westberg**

First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2019 Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg

The right of Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-138-48364-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-351-05434-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	ix
1 Continuity and change in small states' strategy	1
2 Studying small states' strategic adjustments	8
3 Before the shocks	55
4 The first shock – the 9/11 terrorist attacks	81
5 The second shock – the Georgian war	115
6 The third and fourth shocks – Ukraine and the Caliphate	147
7 External shocks and the responses of small states	180
<i>Index</i>	198

Illustrations

Figure

1.1	The analytical framework for explaining change and continuity in small states' defence strategies	6
-----	---	---

Map

2.1	The Nordic countries and their neighbourhood	25
-----	--	----

Tables

2.1	Summary of the control variables	23
2.2	Summary of the intervening variables	33
2.3	Small states' alignment strategies	38
3.1	The core of Denmark's military capability in 1999	58
3.2	The core of Finland's military capability in 1999	62
3.3	The core of Norway's military capability in 1999	67
3.4	The core of Sweden's military capability in 1999	72
3.5	The strategy of the four Nordic countries before the first shock	75
4.1	The core of Denmark's military capability in 2001	84
4.2	The core of Finland's military capability in 2001	89
4.3	The core of Norway's military capability in 2001	95
4.4	The core of Sweden's military capability in 2001	102
4.5	The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the first shock	106
5.1	The core of Denmark's military capability in 2008	119
5.2	The core of Finland's military capability in 2008	125
5.3	The core of Norway's military capability in 2008	131
5.4	The core of Sweden's military capability in 2008	138
5.5	The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the second shock	142
6.1	The core of Denmark's military capability in 2013	151
6.2	The core of Finland's military capability in 2013	157
6.3	The core of Norway's military capability in 2013	162

6.4	The core of Sweden's military capability in 2013	169
6.5	The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the third and fourth shocks	173
7.1	The Nordic countries that experienced strategic shocks and their strategies to address respective shock	183
7.2	The impact of strategies at the military-strategic level	185
7.3	Changes in military strategies	190
7.4	Differences between the Nordic countries	193

Acknowledgements

During the process of writing this book we have had the privilege of being supported by five talented assistants; Amanda Bäcklund, Josefine Gyllensporre, Johanna Muhrbeck, Emil Petersson and Louisa Tarras-Wahlberg. Without their effort, our project would have taken much longer to finalise and surely not been as enjoyable.

We are indebted to several colleagues who, throughout our work with this book, unselfishly have provided their support, encouragement and insights. We would especially like to express our gratitude to three of them: Professor Magnus Petersson for enabling us to present a draft version of our discussions on strategy at a seminar hosted by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies; Professor Kjell Engelbrekt for arranging a workshop on the study of small states at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU); and last, but not least, to Professor Jan Ångström for, on several occasions, allowing us to present papers at the SEDU seminar series on War Studies.

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nation
AU	African Union
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
BALTNET	Baltic Air Surveillance Network
BALTRON	Baltic Naval Squadron
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	[EU] Common Foreign and Security Policy
ChoD	Chief of Defence
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COB	Collocated Operating Base
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCI	[NATO] Defence Capabilities Initiative
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAPC	[NATO] Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EEAW	European Expeditionary Air Wing
EEC	European Economic Community
EPAF	European Participating Air Forces
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
FNC	Framework Nations Concept
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IFOR	[NATO] Implementation Force
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IR	International Relations
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Islamic State in Iraq
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

JEF	[NATO] Joint Expeditionary Force
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
KFOR	[NATO] Kosovo Force
MIDLIFE	Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law enforcement, Information, Finance, Economic
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OPV	Ocean Patrol Vessels
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARP	[NATO] Planning and Review Process
PfP	[NATO] Partnership for Peace
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SEDU	Swedish Defence University
SEK	Swedish Kronor (the currency of Sweden)
SFC	Structured Focused Comparison
SFOR	[NATO] Stabilisation Force
SHIRBRIG	Standby High-Readiness Brigade
STANAVFORLANT	[NATO] Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic
STANNAVFORMED	[NATO] Standing Naval Forces in the Mediterranean
TEU	Treaty on the EU
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided [anti-tank missile]
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIKOM	UN Kuwait Observer Mission
UNMEE	UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina
UNMIK	UN Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMISET	UN Mission of Support to in East Timor
UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (in Croatia)
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force

UNSC	UN Security Council
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization (in the Middle East)
US	United States (of America)
US CENTCOM	US Central Command
USA	United States of America
USSR	Soviet Union
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP	Warsaw Pact
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	The First World War
WWII	The Second World War

1 Continuity and change in small states' strategy

The present global order is in a state of flux. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the seemingly stable liberal order of the 1990s has been challenged on several unexpected events that have created great uncertainties and pressures on states to adjust their defence strategies to a changing security environment. In this book we will analyse how four potential strategic shocks – the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Russian war against Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate in 2014 – have affected the defence strategies of four small states – the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. How and to what extent have these four small states adjusted their strategies in response to these events in their external security environment? Which factors explain differences and similarities in their responses and how can we explain elements of change and continuity?

In this study, we define a strategic shock as an event that is perceived as unexpected, deeply consequential and demanding counter measures by the political authorities of a specific state.¹ These shocks represent two very different types of strategic challenges for the small states included in our study. The first and fourth shocks triggered requests from a friendly superpower for contributions to military crisis management and for a global war against terror. These requests raised questions related to cooperative security, western solidarity and small states' ability to contribute to multinational military operations against primarily non-state actors. The Russian-Georgian war and Russia's annexation of Crimea and further military engagements in other parts of Ukraine are examples of traditional security threats that concern both the protection of individual European states' territorial integrity as well the future of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Russia's use of military force against neighbouring countries also created a renewed concern regarding issues related to the management of power asymmetries between small and great powers and the strengthening of capacities needed for national and collective self-defence.

The four Nordic countries aforementioned share a number of structural similarities related to strategic exposure, interdependence and military capacity. Moreover, they all share similar national interests. These similarities would make an observer expect that the four Nordic states should respond in a *similar*

2 *Small states' strategy*

manner to changes in their common external environment – they are likely to develop military strategies corresponding to similarities in terms of strategic exposure, limited military capabilities, security interests and general foreign policy outlook. Before and during the Second World War (WWII), armed aggression against one of the Nordic states could occur without the other states being directly involved in the war. Today, and ever since the beginning of the Cold War, this has been close to inconceivable. It also seems reasonable to argue that all four states are roughly equally exposed to threats related to radical Islamic terrorist movements. Regarding capacities and interests, all four states can be categorised as third ranked powers primarily focused on defensive security goals related to the survival of the own state. Additionally, they all have long traditions of support for international security cooperation.

However, each country also has different historical experiences in conflicts and wars as well as unique geographical characteristics regarding extension and relative closeness to friendly or threatening great powers. The four countries' varying experience in military conflicts during WWII resulted in different strategies regarding participation in both military and political alliances. The German invasion in 1940 and the failure of neutrality made Denmark and Norway join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949; Finland and Sweden continued their policies of peacetime neutrality during the Cold War and for both countries, their policy of neutrality was seen as incompatible with membership of the European Community (EC). However, in 1995, both countries became members of the European Union (EU) and now they both actively participate in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 1973, Denmark became a member of the EU. Denmark has, however, remained outside the EU's cooperation on defence and foreign policy. Norway is not a member of the EU but participates in different efforts related to the capacity building of the EU's international military crisis management.

The differences between the countries' unique geographical characteristics, historical experiences of armed conflicts and differing political and military alliance memberships will be used to analyse the strategic shocks' potential and indirect effects. Varying unit-level characteristics are expected to produce *different* responses from the four countries by acting as intervening variables. In tandem with the structural similarities, unit-level differences between the four Nordic countries make them well suited for a comparative study of small states' military-strategic adjustments to sudden and unexpected changes in their external security environment.

The 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon led to the first invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.² President George W. Bush, who declared a Global War on Terror, immediately defined the attacks as 'acts of war'. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the acts and recognised the right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 in the charter of the United Nations (UN). In late September, Resolution 1373 on counter-terrorism was adopted by the UNSC. The efforts of NATO and the UN to fight terrorism included a great number of distinctive measures. The initial

attacks by the United States (US) against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan paved the way for the UNSC Resolution 1386 of December 2001, which authorised an International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF. How then, did the four Nordic states respond to the US' calls for support in the global war on terror and to the request from the UN?

In August 2008, the territorial dispute between the Georgian government and a separatist movement in South Ossetia escalated into an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia. Striving for closer ties with Russia, the separatists received support from a large-scale military intervention launched by the same country. The fighting lasted only a few days and came to a halt with a ceasefire agreement, which largely reflected the Russian interest. Prior to the Russian invasion, the Georgian government had clearly expressed its ambition to join NATO. The Russo-Georgian conflict was by some observers quickly interpreted as a first step to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in areas formerly part of the Soviet Union, i.e. the USSR (see, for example, Friedman 2008). This raises yet another question: to what extent did Nordic countries adjust their defence strategies³ in order to respond to this potential change in the balance of power in Europe?

Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the continued military support to the pro-Russian separatists in other parts of Ukraine followed the pattern in Georgia. This time, Russia's armed aggression was preceded by initiatives to establish closer ties with the EU. However, Russia's use of military force to promote its political interest was even taken a step further and included the partial annexation and occupation of a recognised sovereign state. This time, the Russian aggression also resulted in counter measures from the EU, NATO and the US. These measures required deliberations on strategic options from the four Nordic countries. Should they increase their efforts to support common positions and policies decided by the EU and/or NATO, try to free ride on the security provided by major powers or try to isolate themselves from the increased tension between Russia and the western powers?

When western political leaders were still considering measures to counter the new challenge from Russia they were presented with yet another challenge. In June 2014, Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Syria launched a surprise attack and assumed control over several Iraqi cities, including Mosul. In late June, the foundation of a Caliphate was officially proclaimed (Rosiny 2015). The announcement was followed by a wave of terrorist aggressions that swept the globe. The attacks in Paris in November 2015 made France activate Article 42:7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which made this challenge a matter of EU solidarity as well. Moreover, the internal wars in the Levant and different parts of Africa triggered refugee crises in Europe. Once again, the Nordic countries faced a situation in which the US called for a coalition of willing states. A new phase in the global war on terror had begun. Now, how would the Nordic states respond this time?

The Nordic countries' responses to these shocks are of both practical importance and theoretical interest. An increased number of international operations

4 *Small states' strategy*

and a greater need to find new ways to share costs and risks among participating states has characterised the post-Cold War security environment (Haaland Matlary 2013). All four Nordic countries made important contributions to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War (Jakobsen 2009). In the post-Cold War era, they not only participated in several UN missions but also contributed to international military operations led by NATO and the EU (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014). In matters related to collective self-defence, the Nordic countries constitute a common strategic area of vital importance to NATO's ability to enhance the credibility of Article 5 commitments. Finland and Sweden's enhanced partnership with NATO and their respective signing of the Host Nation Support Agreement with NATO in 2014 can be interpreted as an official recognition of this strategic interdependence.

Concerning theoretical contributions, this study develops a framework for analysing strategic adjustments and factors promoting change and continuity in defence strategies on both an (international) system and a (state) unit level of analysis. This analytical framework can be used to study both great powers and small states. However, our own theoretical contributions primarily aim to provide explanations for small states' strategic responses to changes in their external environment. For a long time, researchers have argued that small states, due to their lack of capabilities and power asymmetries in relation to greater powers, are forced to develop strategies different from the strategies of great powers. However, there is still a very limited body of research on small states' foreign and security policy and even less focusing on the military strategies of small states (Rothstein 1968; Reitner 1994; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; Wivel *et al.* 2014; Jesse and Dreyer 2016). Since the vast majority of today's states do not qualify as neither first nor second ranked powers, a deeper understanding of small states' strategic behaviour is needed in order to include strategic choices and action possibilities of both great powers' and small states in the field of Strategic Studies. Yet another reason to study small state strategies is the cuts in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. These reductions have diminished the former European great powers' military resources to an extent that they have come to embody many of the characteristics traditionally associated with small states.

In this study, we will focus primarily on strategic choices articulated as defence strategies on the highest political level in each country. For the purposes of the study 'defence strategy' will be defined as interconnected ideas on how politically defined military-strategic *ends* should be achieved through a combination of *alignment strategies* and suitable strategic *ways* of employing *military means* (use of force). Furthermore, the concept of 'defence strategy' includes ideas on how current and future military capacities should be created (force generation). A defence strategy may include arrangements for pooling and sharing of military resources. Alignment strategies refer to different ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organisations in matters related to national security and defence. Examples of alignment strategies are *balance of power*, *bandwagoning*, *isolation* and *hedging*. These alignment strategies may be pursued both within and outside an alliance and different members of an alliance

may pursue different alignment strategies. The different strategic responses among the member states of the EU and NATO to the four strategic shocks provide many examples of different alignment strategies within an alliance. The defence strategies analysed in this book are therefore less inclusive than most definitions of grand strategy (or most actual security strategies of states and organisations) but more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy. The discussion on the concept of strategy is further developed in Chapter 2.

In the next chapter, Chapter 2, we first introduce the general research design of this study together with our definition of small states. The details of our analytical framework are presented in Section 2.3 to 2.6. These sections begin with a further analysis of our independent variable, the concept of strategic shocks and continue with a presentation of the control variables. The latter accounts for the basic structural similarities between the four countries: (i) strategic exposure, (ii) capacity and (iii) interests. In the next section, we will introduce three intervening variables: (i) geographical characteristics (extension/strategic depth and proximity to a potentially hostile or friendly great power), (ii) historical experiences of armed conflicts, (iii) membership in NATO and/or the EU. These variables are used to explain differences in strategic responses and failure to respond to the external pressures exercised by the four shocks. Finally, we define the dependent variable; defence strategies.

Our analysis of the external systematic pressures for change is based on neo-realist research on alliance formation and research focusing on small states. Since both neorealist theory and research on small state strategy assume, or at least recommend, that states quickly adjust their strategies to changes in their external environment, these theories have little to offer when it comes to explaining continuity, failure to adjust as well as differences between structurally similar states. To find potentially relevant causes for continuity and differences in the four countries' strategic responses we have turned to the analytical tool box of classical and neoclassical realism and research on strategy. These general theoretical perspectives are cross-fertilised with research focusing on specific small state alignment strategies. Lastly, in addition to this theoretical discussion, Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the empirical material used in Chapters 3 to 6. Figure 1.1 summarises the basic components of the analytical framework. The numbers in the boxes indicate which section in Chapter 2 each variable is discussed.

Chapter 3, the first empirical chapter, presents a brief account of the defence strategy that each country pursued immediately before the first shock, i.e. the terrorist attacks 9/11 2001. Chapters 4 and 5 include two separate cross-country analyses of the four countries' different responses to the first two strategic shocks. Since the third and fourth shock both appeared in 2014 they will both be analysed together in Chapter 6. Each empirical chapter follows a similar structure. In the initial section, the potential shock is briefly presented. Thereafter, in Sections 2–5, the subsequent responses from each of the Nordic countries are analysed. Each of these country specific sections are divided into five subsections: (i) the analysis of the international environment (including the shocks), (ii)–(iv) the strategic responses of each country divided into the




Figure 1.1 The analytical framework for explaining change and continuity in small states' defence strategies.

subsections' ends, means and ways and (v) a summary. Finally, each empirical chapter concludes with a section comparing the responses of the four different countries to the shock. Finally, in Chapter 7, conclusions drawn in the previous chapters are aggregated in a comparison between the four countries' different responses to all four shocks.

Notes

- 1 For a similar definition, see Gray (2014:197). The concept of strategic shocks is further discussed in Chapter 2.
- 2 Notably, the process to invoke Article 5 was initiated by France.
- 3 Our definition of defence strategy is further elaborated at the end of this chapter and in Section 2.6.

Bibliography

- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds) (2014). *Alike or Different? – Strategic thinking in Scandinavia*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Friedman, George (2008). 'Georgia and the Balance of Power' in *The New York Review of Books*. Volume 55, Issue 14.
- Gray, Colin (2014). *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haaland Matlary, Janne (2013). *European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2009). 'Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Volume 47, Issue 1.

- Jesse, Neal and John Dreyer (2016). *Small States in the International System. At Peace and At War*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Neumann, Iver and Sieglinde Gstöhl (2006). 'Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?' in Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Jessica Beyer (eds). *Small States in International Relations*. Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press.
- Reiter, Dan (1994). 'Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past' in *World Politics*. Volume 46, Issue 4.
- Rosiny, Stephan (2015) 'The Rise and Dimise of the IS Caliphate' *Middle East Policy*. Volume 22, Issue 2.
- Rothstein, Robert (1968). *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wivel, Anders, Alyson Bailes and Clive Archer (2014) 'Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security' in Clive Archer, Alyson Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. Abingdon: Routledge.

2 Studying small states' strategic adjustments

This chapter introduces the general research design of our study. In Section 2.3–2.6 the analytical framework is presented in separate sections focusing on the independent, control, intervening and dependent variables of the study. The last section of the chapter introduces the empirical material and the structure of the empirical chapters. However, before we can present the details of the analytical framework for our study, we must first present a clearer definition for the category of small states to which the four Nordic countries belong.

2.1 Defining small states

Not surprisingly, the concept of *small states* is closely related to the concept of *small powers*. The distinction between small and great powers emerged in the beginning of the nineteenth century in the final phases of the Napoleonic Wars. In the eyes of great powers, small powers were states too weak in terms of their military capacity to be able to act as guardians of peace agreements and of the international order that the treaties tried to establish. This view gradually evolved during the nineteenth and twentieth century. One important step in the development was the birth of the League of Nations, which offered an institutional platform with opportunities for small states to be heard and occasionally exercise a significant influence (Rothstein 1968; Wight 1986; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006).

The body of research on small states' foreign and security policies has thematically always been adjusted to both the general theoretical developments within mainstream research in International Relations (IR) theory as well as to structural changes and events in the real world of international politics. During the interwar era of the 1930s and in the early post-WWII era, research on small states focused on their position within the international organisations system for each era, especially the League of Nations and the UN system (Rappard 1934; Jones 1969). However, according to a survey of the small state literature by Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, scholarly interest in the subject of small states faded in the 1950s when researchers became preoccupied with the bipolar tension between the USSR and the US (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006). In the 1960s, beginning with Annette Baker Fox's (1959) study *The Power of Small States* there was a renewed interest in questions relating to small states' security.

This wave of small state studies was centred on questions related to their survival strategies and alignment policies during great power conflicts, with the spotlight on their fates during WWII. Another important work from this generation of small state research is Robert Rothstein's (1968) *Alliances and Small Powers*. This work includes a definition of small powers that we will return to later.

In the 1970s the discourse surrounding small state research saw the introduction of themes related to dependency and economic cooperation. This reflected a general shift in the research on IR with an increased interest in International Political Economy and questions relating to the concept of interdependence as well as the workings of international organisations. According to Neumann and Gstöhl, the research approaches within small states studies did not develop significantly until the 1980s and the early 1990s. However, the post-Cold War Era proved to be a more fertile ground for small state studies growing a diverse third wave of small state research that reflected both structural changes and events in the real world of international politics and developments within IR theory. The continued process of globalisation and regional integration raised questions concerning previous assertions about small states' economies and foreign policies. Institutional changes and the enlargements of the EU and NATO resulted in a renewed attention to small states' strategies within these new institutional settings. Furthermore, the birth of new states in central and eastern Europe and the ethno-political conflicts that followed the disintegration of former multi-ethnic countries sparked even more research on small states. In the theoretical debates within IR theory, the end of the Cold War was used as an opportunity to challenge mainstream neorealist theory. From the early 1990s and onward, social constructivism with a focus on international norms, ideas, roles and identities established new research patterns that further benefitted the academic subfield of small state research (Goetschel 1998; Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Thorhallsson 2000; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010; Archer *et al.* 2014).

In this study, we will return to some of the themes and theoretical points of departure for the first wave of research on small states. The deteriorating security environment in Europe, the Middle East, and northern and central Africa and other parts of the world motivates a renewed interest in questions related to military conflicts, military alliances and power asymmetries between great powers and small states. However, these threats to national security present themselves in the context of a globalised world where small state governments also need to consider threats related to advancements in information technology, transnational non-states actors and non-antagonistic threats related to interdependencies within a globalised economy as well as common concerns regarding the global environment. In this study, we focus foremost on military strategies and the perceived security challenges following the previously mentioned four strategic shocks. However, since two of these shocks concern threats from transnational non-state actors and the solutions to these challenges include security cooperation and international military crisis management within

different international institutionalised settings, we will include themes from the second and third wave of small state studies as well. The analytical framework of this study conflates elements of neorealism (its conceptualisation of the international system) with later neoclassical realist research on alliance policies, different states' unit level characteristics and research within Strategic Studies related to the concept of strategy.

Despite the rather lengthy history of small state studies, there are still divergent views on the proper definition for the concept of small states. In the scholarly debate on this matter, it is possible to identify a least four basic directions. A first group of scholars used definitions based on specific levels and/or combinations of *quantifiable characteristics* such as economic development and the size of national economy, population, territory and military capabilities (Vital 1967; East 1973). A problem with quantitative definitions is that the 'cut-off line', the precise chosen number for the size of the economy, population or other power resources that may be used to distinguish different classes of states are always arbitrary (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; Wivel *et al.* 2014). A second group of researchers defined small states by distinguishing them from a number of greater powers. Small states belong, according to these definitions, to a *residual category*¹ of states that remains after one or more groups of greater powers have been separated from other states and have been attributed specific characteristics (Wiberg 1987; Krause and Singer 2001).² A third group of scholars has focused on *qualitative characteristics* of small states, which makes it reasonable to assume that they are more inclined to develop different strategies to protect their interests compared to more resourceful states. This line of research points to essential differences between small and great powers, where objective measures of size are contributory but not crucial for the definition of 'smallness'. Small states are, according to Robert Rothstein, not simply weaker great powers and should therefore be defined in terms of something other than relative power status. He argues that a new definition should also consider 'psychological' differences between small and greater powers. Rothstein's suggested definition is that 'a small power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so' (Rothstein 1968:29).³

If this definition is accepted, a small state's choice to remain outside military alliances may seem difficult to understand, especially in situations where access to or control of the small state's territory can be assumed to be strategically important to competing great powers. One example for this is Sweden's peace-time policy of neutrality during the Cold War. In the minds of Swedish Cold War strategists, the country did not have to prepare its Armed Forces and society to match the full power of the USSR and its allies alone. According to the Swedish 'marginal doctrine', most of the military resources of the Warsaw Pact (WP) were assumed to be locked to balance NATO's military resources. As a result, Sweden only needed a defence that was so strong that an attack against Sweden would shift the balance of power between the WP and NATO elsewhere (Andrén 2002:111–2). In this way, Swedish decision-makers can be said to have

recognised that Sweden could not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities but they hoped that the balance of power would create a situation where an attack against it would still be seen as too costly.

Rothstein's emphasis on the psychological dimension, that political leaders of small states must be *aware* of their own state's limited capabilities, is an important point since leaders of states act on the basis of more or less correct assessments of both the capabilities of the own state and the intentions and capabilities of other states. A small state that pursues a unilateral strategy against a great power and disregards the asymmetry in power resources is, according to this definition, not exercising a small state strategy. Rothstein's definition instead makes it reasonable to expect that small states should seek different external ways to ensure their safety while great powers can rely foremost on their own power resources to promote their interests. Rothstein's ideas were scrutinised by Robert Keohane in an article from 1969. According to Keohane, only three states – the US, the USSR and China – could reasonably obtain security primarily by use of their own capabilities. To be able to make a more precise distinction between states with different capabilities, Keohane suggested a fourfold typology that focused on the 'systemic role' that states' leaders see their countries play (Keohane 1969:293–6).

Keohane's first category, 'great powers', consisted of 'system-determining' states. These states are the 'imperial power' in a unipolar system, one of the two 'great powers' in a bipolar system or one of several 'major powers' in a multipolar system. Great powers are, according to this definition, further characterised by the fact that their political leadership believes that their state can, alone, 'exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system' (Keohane 1969:296). In the 1990s, the US was a unipolar power. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, this position was gradually undermined because of the efforts related to the global war on terror as well as China and Russia's increasing assertiveness since these countries are trying to climb from a second to a first ranked status.

Keohane's next category, 'secondary powers', consisted of 'system-influencing' states. Leaders of these states consider that they can, alone, 'exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive', on the system. Presently, France and the United Kingdom (UK) are probably the only EU member states that would qualify for this category.⁴ Keohane's third category, 'the middle powers' consists of states whose leaders consider that their state 'cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution'. All Nordic countries except Iceland belong to this category.⁵ The fourth category, the 'small powers', consists of 'system-ineffectual' states. The leaders of these states 'consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system'. Iceland belongs to this category because a total lack of national military capabilities (Keohane 1969:295–6).

A fourth group of scholars have instead suggested a *relational definition* of small states and great powers focusing on the asymmetric power relation

between specific states. Accordingly, a small state is defined as 'the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship' and a part that 'is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own'. Consequently, small states are 'stuck with the power configurations and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific relation to it is'. As an example of this kind of 'power disparity', Anders Wivel and his colleagues compare the consequences if the US or Denmark left NATO. If the US removed its troops from Europe and exits NATO the power configurations in Europe and NATO as an institution would change dramatically. If a small state like Denmark would choose to leave NATO the consequences would mainly be felt by that country itself. As a result, small states cannot present credible threats to leave a particular cooperation as part of a negotiation strategy (Wivel *et al.* 2014:9). A further advantage with relational definitions is that they allow for the possibility that a specific state may be a small state in some relational power configurations and a great power in others. When France restricted its participation in NATO's military command structures in the 1960s NATO did not change, but when President de Gaulle decided on a French boycott of the decision-making institutions of the European Economic Community (EEC) he managed to prevent an increase of the powers of the Commission and a planned change in the decision-making rules of the EEC.⁶

We use a definition of greater and lesser powers that combines Rothstein's definition with Keohane's fourfold distinction and some of the relational aspects put forward by Wivel and others. In our definition, we will follow the traits of Keohane's fourfold definition but this definition is modified to fit the specific purposes of our study. Instead of scrutinising differences in perceived abilities to influence the system, our definition focuses on differences in perceived military capabilities related to the four strategic shocks included in this study (national defence capabilities against attacks from another state and capabilities related to contributions to international military crisis management).

- 1 The political leadership of a first ranked state believes that it can obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it can defend itself against states of each category. A first ranked power further believes that it can lead and organise multilateral military operations. The number of first ranked powers determines the character of the system (uni-, bi- or multipolar).
- 2 The political leadership of a second ranked state recognises that it cannot obtain security against a first ranked state primarily by use of its own capabilities but they believe that it can, alone, defend itself against a second, third or fourth ranked state and that it has the ability, together with other states or through an international institution, to lead and organise multilateral military operations.
- 3 The political leadership of a third ranked state recognises that it cannot obtain security against an attack from first or second ranked state primarily by use of its own capabilities or lead and organise multilateral military operations. The political leadership of a third ranked state does, however, believe

- that it can defend itself against a third or fourth ranked state and that it has the ability make significant contributions to multilateral military operations.
- 4 The political leadership of a fourth ranked state recognises that it cannot obtain security against an attack from any other state or make significant contributions to multilateral military operations.

From a global standpoint, third and fourth ranked states represent the vast majority of states in our present state system. However, when the definition is applied to actual states it is important to consider the psychological factor. It is perfectly possible that the political leadership of a particular third ranked state believes that it alone can defend itself against a higher ranked state or lead and organise multilateral military operations. If such an effort even were successful, that particular third ranked state would demonstrate some of the characteristics of a higher ranked state on this particular parameter. It is also important to note that our definition only concerns military responses to external shocks, which involve the use of military force. The similarities between our cases, the fact that they are all stable democracies with highly developed economies and situated in the same corner of Europe, also create uncertainties regarding the possibility of generalising to politically and economically instable states situated elsewhere in the world. We will return to the question of generalisation of our results in the concluding Chapter 7.

2.2 Research design

The aim of our study is to analyse how, if at all, the four potential external shocks have influenced the defence strategies of four Nordic countries. Our focus is to explore if the dependent variable, i.e. the defence strategy of each state, is characterised by change or by continuity. A further ambition is to explain differences and similarities between the four countries in matters of strategic adjustment.

The Nordic countries share a number of relevant unit level characteristics that may explain similarities in their security policy orientation and military strategy. They are neighbouring countries situated in the same northern part of Europe and are similar both in terms of relative power (they are all third ranked military powers) and in terms of general security interest (internally stable welfare states with no offensive military ambitions). However, they also differ in some potentially relevant aspects such as geographical extension and proximity to Russia, historical experiences of armed conflicts and present membership in military and political alliances. To handle this mix of similarities and differences analytically, the differences between the countries are seen as *intervening variables* relating to unit level characteristics. The structural similarities will be used as *control variables* that represent the basic similarities between our cases. This study therefore employs a modified most similar system design.⁷

Our design is divided into two different explanatory stages. The first stage concerns discussions regarding *similarities* in responses between our cases

related to a *direct influence* from the four shocks and from other factors related to changes in a common external environment (anarchy, the distributions of capabilities and the level of tension). Regarding this direct influence, the basic argument is that since all four countries share a number of theoretically relevant unit level characteristics (strategic exposure, capacity and interest) we should expect that changes in the external environment produce similar strategic responses (adjustments in the military strategies). This part of the study uses the method of structured focused comparison (SFC) based on the analytical framework presented in later sections of this chapter.⁸

In our second explanatory stage, we will focus on *differences* in responses and explanations of *continuity* or failures to adapt to external changes. In this phase, we use the four countries' different unit level characteristics (national geographical characteristics, historical experiences of armed conflicts and differences regarding membership in alliances) as an intervening variable that filters the influence from the external environment and the four shocks. The causal link between the internal environmental variables and the strategies of the four states is analysed both with a between-case comparison analysing how differences related to the internal environment corresponds to differences in strategic adjustment (co-variation) and a within-case analysis of each case.

The major challenge of using a most similar cases design is case selection, as it is nearly impossible to find perfectly matching cases (Blatter and Haverland 2012:38–45). To tackle this challenge our analysis of the similarities between our cases are focused on three carefully defined control variables. These control variables relate to unit level characteristics, which have been used in previous research to explain a state's strategic choices. The control variables are also closely related to our definition of small states. The differences are analysed as intervening variables in the second explanatory stage of our analytical framework.

Our use of intervening variables deviates from traditional similar cases designs because the relevant variation in the explanatory variables cannot be found in the independent variables but in the *intervening* variables. The effects of our independent variables, the four shocks and other factors relating to the external environment (distributions of power and level of tension), are in this second stage of our explanatory framework supposed to be filtered by intervening variables related to unit level characteristics.⁹ The *cross-case* aspect of the study thus takes the form of a structured, focused comparison, by way of most-similar systems design, in which the relevant variation *between* cases is expected to be found in the intervening variables, while a set of relevant control variables are held constant *across* cases. The purpose is to determine whether or not variation in the intervening variables coincide with variation in the dependent variable – the defence strategies. To strengthen the causal link between the intervening variables and our dependent variable, we also use the co-variation approach. This complements the study with an intra case analysis concerning the effects of the intervening variable on a specific state's defence strategy.¹⁰ The intervening variables are primarily expected to exercise a restraining effect on

the dependent variable, explaining continuity in the defence strategy of each country. However, the effect and relevance of each specific intervening variable may change depending on the character of the shocks.

2.3 Strategic shocks: the independent variable

Strategic shocks vary in size and origin. Some represent an unanticipated continuation of a trend that would dislocate the strategic setting; others are inconceivable or at least unpredictable events or outliers that Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) denoted 'Black Swan events'. However, in retrospect there are always signs even if they are subtle, 'below noise level', neglected or unnoticed (Schwartz and Randall 2007). Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall provide a comprehensive definition as they distinguish strategic shocks or surprises from other contingencies by outlining the following criteria: (1) 'It has an important impact on an organization or country'; (2) '[...] it challenges conventional wisdom [...] it is difficult to convince others that the surprise is even possible'; and, finally, (3) 'It is hard to imagine what can be done in response' (Schwartz and Randall 2007:94). Regarding the impact of strategic shocks, Nathan Freier argues 'Strategic shocks jolt convention to such an extent that they force affected institutions to fundamentally reorient strategy, strategic investments, and missions' (Freier 2008:2). Mindful that many of these criteria would be difficult to measure and verify and that they go beyond the scope of this book, we settle for a more straightforward definition.

According to Colin Gray a strategic shock is 'an event that is not expected, not anticipated as at all probable by political authorities, and whose consequences are deeply consequential' (Gray 2014:197). As this definition makes clear, the occurrence of a strategic shock is partly dependent on the involved actors' perceptions, evaluations and reactions. The political elite in another state may not perceive an incident that is seen as highly unlikely among the political authorities in one state as even improbable. Strategic shocks will also affect individual states differently. The 9/11 attacks, the Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine respectively and the Caliphate proclaimed by IS are therefore seen as *potential* strategic shocks. The aim of the empirical investigation is to establish to which extent these incidents were perceived as unexpected, deeply consequential and demanding counter measures by the political authorities in the four Nordic states included in our study.

The environmental sections in the empirical chapters provide a first glimpse of the political-strategic level. These sections will establish to which extent a specific shock was perceived as unexpected and consequential. The empirical material used in these sections are mainly defence bills, official reports and other official material related to the parliamentary decision-making process in each country. Notably, a shock at the political-strategic level does not necessarily imply a major shift in the military strategy. Shocks can be absorbed at the political level or they can be funnelled to other policy areas and thus be subject to responses other than military. The impact of the shocks on each country's

defence strategy will therefore be analysed on two levels. On the political-strategic level, the effects of strategic shocks would imply a change in the alignment strategy of a specific country. On the military-strategic level, the effects of a shock would concern changes directly involving the use of force or force generation. The responses to the shocks will be mapped in the sections presenting the general security interests and military aims of each country's defence policy and in the sections presenting political-strategic and military means and methods.

2.4 Structural similarities between the Nordic countries: the control variables

In this section, the three control variables of our study are further explained. These control variables concern structural similarities and common characteristics shared by all four Nordic countries. The control variables – strategic exposure, capacities and interests – have been selected due to their potential relevance for explanations of the content and general direction of a specific country's defence strategy. The similarities between the Nordic countries on these variables are the basis for expecting similar strategic responses to changes in their common external security environment. In the next section, we introduce the intervening variables that may explain differences in strategic responses.

2.4.1 Strategic exposure

The first variable, *strategic exposure*, concerns the actual level of exposure and strategic interdependence. The concept of strategic exposure relates to a basic precondition for a successful policy of non-alignment: that the territory of the small state must be *strategically irrelevant* for all parties in a potential or ongoing conflict (Rothstein 1968:32). Strategic exposure is at the other end of the spectrum, it is a situation where a small state, without the necessary national means to protect itself, faces a situation where one or more of the conflicting powers have a strategic interest in controlling parts of its territory. Strategic interdependence refers to a situation where two or more states are so dependent on each other's security that an attack against State A makes a further attack on State B from one of the major parties in a conflict inevitable, or at least very likely. Strategic exposure and interdependence are expected to create pressures for increased defence measures and cooperation between friendly and interdependent countries. For a country with limited capability to defend itself with its own military resources, the pressure for pursuing alignment strategies like courting or hedging would increase. Isolationist strategies like hiding are less likely to be successive; unless the exposed country has the necessary military means to make an attack against it appear as too costly. Strategic exposure may also result in an appeasement policy. All four Nordic states are, we argue, strategically exposed in case of an attack against any one of them. However, this has not always been the case.

During the Crimean War in 1853–5 the battles spread to the Baltic Sea where the British and French navies attacked Russian ships and military bases. Since Finland was part of the Russian Empire between 1809 and 1917, Finnish ships and cities were also attacked. The United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway was close to join forces against Russia but the war ended before the Swedish-Norwegian king managed to reach an agreement on this matter with the western powers. During the First World War (WWI), Denmark, Norway and Sweden remained neutral. Finland used, on the other hand, the opportunities created by the war in tandem with the Russian Revolution to gain independence from the Russian empire. Why did Germany and the Allied Powers allow the Scandinavian countries to remain neutral during WWI? One plausible explanation is the strategic irrelevance of the Scandinavian Peninsula. The land battles that arose in Europe were concentrated to the east, west and south. During WWII, Finland was attacked by the USSR already in November 1939 and in April 1940, Denmark and Norway were invaded by Germany. Shortly after, the UK sent troops to Iceland. Sweden, however, remained non-engaged in this world war. Sweden's continued neutrality was dependent on an appeasement policy towards Germany as well as external factors beyond the Swedish government's control. One of those factors was Finland's successful defence against Russia that created a buffer without which it probably would have been much more difficult for Sweden to avert the war once Hitler decided to attack the USSR. One primary motive behind Germany's attack against Denmark and Norway was to secure a continued access of Swedish iron ore shipped through Norwegian ports. When Germany invaded, an allied expedition force was already on its way to Norway to cease the Swedish export. Had France and the UK reached Norway first it would have been very challenging for Sweden to invoke its non-engagement strategy. Since the Swedish government, in spite of its policy of neutrality, continued to export iron ore to Germany Hitler had no reason to invade Sweden. Moreover, in 1940 and 1941 Sweden permitted Germany to transport troops using its railway systems thereby further diminishing the risk of an invasion (Carlgrén 1977; Westberg 2015).

However, we see a shift in these attitudes following the Cold War. In 1949 Denmark and Norway joined NATO and in 1955 West Germany was integrated into NATO. In the same year the USSR created the WP. Simultaneously, Sweden had engaged in a secret defence cooperation with Denmark, Norway and the US. Sweden also received guarantees of US aid in the event of an attack from the USSR. These guarantees were confirmed by successive US administrations during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In internal US documents, this was motivated by reference to US commitments to NATO allies in northern Europe. As per these documents, the US government viewed the Swedish territory as strategically vital for Scandinavia's defence mechanism as an entirety and it was deemed necessary to prevent the USSR from controlling Swedish territory (Holmström 2011). According to Robert Dalsjö, the Swedish government also calculated that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for Sweden to remain outside a prolonged conflict between the USSR and the western powers. One

reason for this conclusion may have been that the Swedish government expected to face a situation where it had to choose between either letting allied bombers pass through Sweden's air space, or shoot them down (Dalsjö 2014).

East Germany, Poland and the Baltic States' memberships in both the EU and NATO have fuelled the strategic interdependence of the four Nordic states even further. Denmark and Norway are, through their memberships of NATO, committed to assist any other member state suffering an armed aggression. Finland and Sweden's governments have instructed their Armed Forces to develop the ability to provide and receive military assistance. Both countries have confirmed that they accept the obligation to assist other EU members in the case of armed aggression in accordance with Article 42:7 of the Treaty of Lisbon. They have, however, not yet explicitly defined the nature of the support. When France invoked Article 42:7 following the terrorist attacks in November 2015, per the request from Paris, both Finland and Sweden responded by assisting in overseas operations.

Access to Swedish territory is arguably even more important for NATO's war efforts in the Baltic Sea region today than it was during the Cold War. As a result, the possibility of Sweden remaining uninvolved in conflicts between Russia and the western powers has shrunk compared to the situation during the Cold War. For Finland, the Baltic States' entries into the EU and NATO have increased the strategic importance of the de-militarised islands of Åland and the southern parts of Finland. Arguably, Finland's strategic exposure and interdependence with the other Nordic states have increased as well.

2.4.2 *Capacity*

Definitions of capacity, or capabilities,¹¹ are central to all realist theories since they determine relative power and the states' position within the international system. However, which are the relevant factors in determining a state's relative power? In his seminal work *Power among Nations*, the classical realist Hans Morgenthau presented a long list of different 'elements of national power'. This list included geography, natural resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership as well as the quantity and quality of the Armed Forces), population (size and trends), national character and morale and, lastly, the quality of government and diplomacy (Morgenthau 2006:122–62). In neorealist theory, the system's structure is determined by the distribution of capabilities across the major units. In other words, the number of great power poles. Capability is often defined in aggregated terms as a combination of different variables. Waltz, for instance, defined capabilities as the combination of 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence' (Waltz 1979:131). Stephen Walt has provided a similar definition, ascribing relevance to a state's total resources, such as population, industrial and military capacity as well as technological prowess (Walt 1987:22).

John Mearsheimer modified this aggregated capabilities approach by introducing a distinction between latent power ('raw potential', primarily population

and wealth) and military power. He argues that though both dimensions are relevant, military power is what states actually compare (Mearsheimer 2001:55–67). Glenn Snyder presented a further modification of the capabilities analysis as a process variable. He argues that capability should be considered in terms of a relationship, that is, what a given state could *accomplish* in interaction with other states. By doing this, it is possible to distinguish how static resources are translated into power – the ability to affect the behaviour of others (Snyder 1996:180).

Previously we argued that Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden all belonged to a category of third ranked states. The elements of power described by Morgenthau and later realists forms a base for our distinctions between more and less powerful states. However, in agreement with Snyder, we complement these latent assets with an analysis of what kind of task differently ranked states can hope to achieve using its own military resources. According to our definition, the political leadership of a third ranked state recognises that it *cannot* obtain security against an attack from first or second ranked state or lead and organise multilateral military operations primarily by use of its own military resources. In spite of this, the political leadership of a third ranked state believes that it can defend itself against a third or fourth ranked state and make significant contributions to multilateral military operations.

The four Nordic states do not exercise *equal* capability in these dimensions. The differences, however, do not amount to a difference *in kind*. It could be argued that Finland's comparably strong Army acts as a deterrent against ground attacks even from current second ranked powers. However, this objection does not have much practical relevance since the only potential attack from other states that Finland reasonably faces comes from Russia, the present leading military power in Europe. When it comes to deterring Russian military aggression with national military means alone, Finland has the same basic power asymmetry as the other Nordic states in relation to its great power neighbour. None of them can obtain sufficient security from military threats by use of their own capabilities alone. Consequently, they must rely on the aid of other states and/or organisations in this regard. Whether or not the governments officially recognise this dependence on others is an empirical question that will be explored in our case studies. When it comes to leading and organising multilateral military operations, all four Nordic states would face similar difficulties if they were to strive for a first or second ranked status. None of them has thus far demonstrated capability in leading and organising multilateral military operations. Even the second ranked powers in Europe, France and the UK, seem to have difficulties in fulfilling this criterion. They have, however, demonstrated a capability in leading and organising (small-scale) multilateral military operations (see, for example, Edström and Gyllensporre 2013).

All Nordic states have clearly demonstrated that they fulfil the positive criterion for a third ranked power: the political leadership's belief that it can make significant contributions to multilateral military operations. It has been estimated that the Nordic countries together contributed with 125,000 soldiers to

peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, which was about 25 per cent of the total number of UN forces at that time. The intimate cooperation and coordination between the Nordic countries on these operations has made some researchers speak of a specific 'Nordic Approach to Peace Operations' (Jakobsen 2006; 2007). The capabilities regarding contributions to international military crisis management make all four Nordic states able to contribute to multilateral military operations substantially.

The similarities between the Nordic countries regarding their limited military capabilities in relation to national self-defence against a first ranked power are expected to increase the pressures for collective defence cooperation with other states or organisations if a risk of armed aggression against the own state or organisation increases. If this variable were combined with the variable concerning strategic exposure and interdependence, the pressure for defence cooperation would grow.

2.4.3 *Interests*

The concept of *national interest* remains an omnipresent and vital element across various IR theories. Consequently, there is very little support for this concept and it has continued to be contested similarly to other central political concepts like *power*, *justice* and *democracy*. Our understanding of this concept is founded on primarily realist research but as we move from general definitions of national interests to specific interests of small internally stable states, our definitions will include variables relating to other theoretical traditions as well.

According to an influential definition by Hans Morgenthau, '[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is fundamentally a struggle for power'. Governments and peoples may have many different aims relating to fundamental values like freedom, security and prosperity. They may define their goals in terms of specific ideological or religious ideas and may choose various means and ways to realise such aims. However, 'whenever they strive to realise their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power'. Power, defined as 'man's control over the minds and actions of other men [...] a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised', is therefore, according to Morgenthau, always the *immediate* aim and increasing the power of the own state or government in relation to other actors was accordingly the key to achieve all other political aims (Morgenthau 2006:29–30). In his influential work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, John Mearsheimer (2001) elaborates the idea of states being power maximisers.

Kenneth Waltz took a different stance on this issue. For him security, survival and independence were the primary aims for states operating in an anarchical self-help environment:

We do not expect the strong to combine with the strong in order to increase the extent of their power over others [...]. In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as

tranquillity, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions.

(Waltz 1979:126)

In our opinion, it is not necessary to make a definite choice between Waltz's defensive realism and the offensive realism that Morgenthau and Mearsheimer present. Some states and governments have given priority to ambitions related to survival and independence while others have been ready to risk the very survival of the own state and government on expansive missions to gain control over other actors and their power resources. The balance between offensive and defensive priorities of a specific state may also fluctuate. However, among the four Nordic countries defensive interests have been prioritised over offensive ambitions for a very long time. All four states are on this general level expected primarily to guard the protection of their own political independence and survival. This, on the other hand, does not exclude the idea that all four states may have ambitions related to increasing their relative power by other means than territorial expansion.

Randall Schweller has presented a further distinction between different types of revisionist and status quo states. His work is useful when analysing how different states adjust to increasing tension between great powers. First ranked status quo states are in this terminology labelled *lions*. This category of states consists of satisfied great powers that are the principle beneficiaries of the present international order. They are, in consistency with Waltz's assumptions, defensive security maximisers. The lions are therefore likely to pursue balance of power strategies championing weaker states against hostile expansive states. However, if the lions foresee that other states will adopt this same strategy, they will be tempted to pass the buck and free ride (Schweller 1994:101). The US was the obvious 'alpha lion' during the establishment of the post-Cold War order in the 1990s, with France and the UK acting as supporting second ranked status quo powers.

The first ranked revisionist states, the *wolves*, differ from the lions on every aspect except the fact that they are strong military powers. They 'value what they covet far more than what they possess' and they are willing to take great risks, even extinction, 'to improve their condition, which they consider to be intolerable'. These states give priority to expansion and power maximising but they neither balance nor bandwagon – they make up the very impetus that propels the bandwagon, which the lions try to stop and prevent other states from embarking (Schweller 1994:103). Napoleon's France and Hitler's Nazi-Germany are two examples of wolf states. During the 2000s, Putin's Russia has shown several signs of developing into a first ranked revisionist state.

Wolves may also have their lieutenants, i.e. supporting second ranked states coined *jackals*. Like wolves, jackals are dissatisfied states but 'they value their possessions and so as expanders they tend to be risk-averse and opportunistic'. They are therefore likely to engage in offensive bandwagoning, or 'predatory buck-passing', supporting whichever power that is the most likely winning the

completion among the great powers. A fourth category of states, the *lambs*, are the prey in Schweller's fable. They are torn countries with weak or broken links between government and society and are often early victims of a revisionist state's aggression (Schweller 1994:102–5). Historical examples of lambs include Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia during the 1930s.

Schweller's categories are useful for the analysis of different alliance and alignment strategies and the dynamics of hegemonic wars but his typology lacks one particular category: the satisfied, politically stable and economically advanced small state. This group of status quo states may be labelled domesticated dogs, or *pet-dogs*. States within this category are anxious to protect what they possess but they have very limited national resources to defend themselves against an attack from a bigger state. Their governments and societies are loyal to liberal values like democracy, national self-determination, human rights, the rule of law and free trade. Their small defensive and offensive military capabilities make them less assertive when navigating the jungle of international politics and they are therefore often supportive of multilateral diplomacy, collective security and various initiatives that strengthen international law and regulate the use of force. When one or more wolves threaten a particular security order and its distribution of power, pet-dogs are quick to adjust their strategies for survival. Depending on the context, pet-dogs may pursue different alignment strategies. They may chain gang and approach the lions to support their efforts in balancing or containing the expansive powers or they may pursue a policy of defensive bandwagoning towards neighbouring predatory states. Non-aligned pet-dogs may, like some lambs, try to isolate themselves from competing powers and pursue a policy of neutrality, hoping that other states will satisfy the wolves' appetite for expansion or that the lions and their allies will succeed in their struggle to defeat the wolf pack, a strategy of hiding and defensive buck-passing. All four Nordic countries belong to this fifth category of states and therefore share a general foreign policy outlook that may influence their general security strategies and perceptions of vital interests (Westberg 2016:420–1).

Sam Tangredi (2002) argues for a further hierarchical distinction that prioritises between three different kinds of interests: survival interests, vital interests and value interests. Survival interests concern a nation's territorial integrity and economic security. Vital interests are interests critical to the long-term vitality of the state but a failure to achieve these interests does not necessarily pose an immediate threat to the survival interest of said state. Value interests relate to the desired general state of affairs, hence contributing to the international security. Because they are small and economically advanced, all Nordic states are highly dependent on external factors and international cooperation when it comes to the enhancement and protection of their vital and value interests. Their economies are greatly dependent on international trade and the different institutions that ensure a stable international economy based on common rules and regulations. On issues related to security cooperation, the Nordic states, being third ranked powers, depend on cooperative relationships with other states to promote their

Table 2.1 Summary of the control variables

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Strategic exposure	Strategically exposed and interdependent in the event of an attack against one of the other Nordic countries.	Strategically exposed and interdependent in the event of an attack against one of the other Nordic countries.	Strategically exposed and interdependent in the event of an attack against one of the other Nordic countries.	Strategically exposed and interdependent in the event of an attack against one of the other Nordic countries.
Capacity	Third ranked.	Third ranked.	Third ranked.	Third ranked.
Interest	Survival, status quo and support to western institutions and values.	Survival, status quo and support to western institutions and values.	Survival, status quo and support to western institutions and values.	Survival, status quo and support to western institutions and values.

own interests on an international scale. All four Nordic states have long traditions of supporting international organisations that are providing institutional platforms for international cooperation and they have a long tradition of cooperating among themselves in various institutional settings dating back to the peace conferences in Haag 1899 and 1907 and the League of Nations (Jones 1969; Götz 2009; Westberg 2012b).

On the issue of interest, we assume that the four Nordic countries included in this study prioritise those interests related to the protection of its citizens, political independence, territorial integrity and economic interests essential for the continued existence of the nation. In post-Cold War Europe, they were status quo states that pushed survival and political independence efforts before any offensive ambitions. The Nordic states are dependent on other states and institutions and have low thresholds for changes in both tension levels as well as for the distribution of power in their regional context. All four Nordic states have internalised western values common to both the EU and NATO. We further assume that, at their helm, the four Nordic countries share a number of vital interests and value interests that seek to perpetuate long-term prosperity as well as international peace and security. Not surprisingly, these can only be promoted through international cooperation. With these common interests, we can presume that all four Nordic countries will pursue alignment strategies that strengthen international cooperation.

2.5 Unit level characteristics: the intervening variables

In this section, we will introduce three general unit level characteristics that explain why the four Nordic states – in spite of their similarities regarding strategic exposure, capacity and interest – still may respond *differently* to

changes in their external environment. These unit level characteristics comprise our intervening variables: geographical characteristics, historical experiences of armed conflicts and membership in military and political alliances.

2.5.1 *Geographical characteristics*

Realist researchers and strategists have ceaselessly investigated the importance of geographical characteristics in their analyses of security situations and military strategies. According to Morgenthau, geography is 'the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends'. The separation of the UK from continental Europe, even by a small body of water is, accordingly, 'a factor that Julius Caesar could no more afford to overlook than could William the Conqueror, Philip II, Napoleon, or Hitler'. Technological developments in communication, transportation and warfare still could not eliminate the oceans' isolating force. High mountain massifs may, Morgenthau argues, fulfil a similar function. The Alps, for instance, meander gradually southward towards the plains of northern Italy and precipitate in the north, which 'has made it extremely difficult to invade Central Europe from Italy, while it has made it much less difficult to invade Italy from the north'. The extension and size of a country was another topographical quality Morgenthau recognised, which is also mirrored in the defensive advantages of Russia's great strategic depth. On its western borders, Russia had, on the contrary, no natural obstacles for invasions. Russia's lack of national frontiers on its western borders has ever since the fourteenth century been a permanent source of conflict between Russia and western powers. Similarly, the wars between France and Germany were partly spurred by French ambitions to transform the river Rhine into a natural frontier between the two countries (Morgenthau 2006:122–4).

In a similar manner, Gray claims that 'as a limitation upon the power of states, nothing has proven to be more pervasive and enduring than geography' and it is 'close to self-evident' that 'geographical factors (location, size and character of national territory, character of neighbours and so forth) must permeate defensive thinking'. According to Gray, 'physical and political geography provide opportunities, challenges, and dangers that help conditions the frame of reference for the official and public debate over national choices in policy and grand strategy'. The geographical circumstances of states and their enemies, Gray continues, do not determine the details of grand strategy but they shape 'the policy and strategic problems in need of solution'. One example of this is Britain's insular geographical setting, which mandated that 'maritime security had to have first call upon those resources of society that could be mobilized for defensive purposes'. According to Gray, geographical characteristics also contribute to a nation's strategic culture. In tandem with culture, geography 'predisposes states and their military establishments towards particular ways in warfare'. At the same time, 'the objective aspects of geography [...] can have a logic of their own' (Gray 2006:137–9 and 146).

The influence of strategic culture on a state's military strategies has been the object of a growing literature on theoretical controversies.¹² In this debate, we

agree with Gray's conceptualisation of culture and strategic culture as a set of socially transmitted attitudes, beliefs and preferred procedures. We also agree with those who argue that strategic culture is an intervening variable, a set of shared intersubjective understandings within a particular community, which channels influence from historical experiences, geography and other factors to the helm of policy-making and practice. However, in this study we are not primarily interested in deepening our understanding of the attitudes of policy-makers or the procedures that they learn and practice. We will therefore not use the concept of strategic culture as an intervening variable. Instead, we will focus on two variables that are the two arguably most important factors in the shaping of a country's strategic culture: the geographical characteristics and historical experiences of previous armed conflicts.¹³

In terms of geographical characteristics, we will focus on three dimensions related to Morgenthau and Gray's arguments: (i) whether the state has a land or



Map 2.1 The Nordic countries and their neighbourhood.

sea power nexus, (ii) strategic depth and natural defences and (iii) proximity to friendly and threatening great powers. Arguably, none of the four Nordic states qualifies as being either a land or a sea power. The Nordic states have not been able to match the leading land and sea powers since the Great Nordic War in the beginning of the eighteenth century. They are all situated on the Eurasian continent potentially exposed to the risk of land invasions. However, our use of the three geographical dimensions concerns differences between our four cases compared to *each other*. As a small land power with a clear priority on land forces, Finland is an outlier of the land-sea dimension. A glance at the map of its more than 1,300 kilometre-long land border with Russia as well as its larger cities mushroomed along a coastline stretching along the Baltic Sea provides sufficient support for this. Note also that the de-militarised island of Åland is an autonomous part of Finnish territory.

With the luxury of not being land locked, Denmark, too, possesses the preconditions for potential amphibious focused Armed Forces. The Danish capital, Copenhagen, along with other nuclear parts in the country are located on or are islands (Funen (Danish: *Fyn*), Lolland and Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, and the autonomous countries within the Danish Realm, the Faroe Islands and Greenland in the Atlantic Ocean). Similar to Finland, Norway's mainland consists primarily of a long coastline where almost all major cities are located. The Svalbard and Jan Mayen islands in the North Arctic Ocean, although defined as unintegrated areas, also belong to the country. Norway also has dependencies in the South Atlantic Ocean (Bouvet Island) and areas included in the Antarctic Treaty System (Peter I Island and Queen Maud Land). For geographical reasons, we expect that Denmark and Norway place a greater emphasis to sea power resources than Finland and both states need a blue water Navy in order to protect their territorial interests.

Sweden's geography follows a similar pattern to that of Finland and Norway. Its territory is dominated by the mainland. The capital, Stockholm and most major cities are located by the sea. Sweden has two bigger islands in the Baltic Sea (Gotland and Öland) and the southern part of the country is located at the mouth of the Baltic Sea. The western coastline borders the North Sea. In this region the second largest city, Gothenburg, and its ports are strategically exposed and serve a crucial role as Sweden's main trade port.

Finland, Norway and Sweden have strategic depth on a north-south axis but a limited depth on an east-west axis. This makes all three states vulnerable to air and sea attacks, while it is difficult for an invader to establish control over the whole territory with land forces. During WWII, there was prolonged fighting in both Finland and Norway. Denmark lacks strategic depth on both axes and natural defences on land; consequently, it was occupied by Germany within hours on 9 April 1940. Finland, on the other hand, lacks natural defences along its long land border with Russia and has on several occasions been attacked by Russia from land. Favourably, any state that seeks to attack Sweden from land must first pass through Finnish and/or Norwegian territory. Sweden has occasionally been attacked by foreign powers (mainly Denmark and Russia) but has never, throughout history, been occupied.

The Nordic states' proximity to both friendly and threatening great powers also varies dramatically. Denmark shares its sole land border with Germany but its position at the entrance of the Baltic Sea makes Denmark strategically placed in the event of an at-sea conflict. Denmark may receive fast military support through both Germany and the North Sea as long as the entrance to the Baltic Sea is controlled by friendly powers. Finland's case is almost the contrary as it shares its long land border with Russia, a historical aggressor. Military assistance to Finland from friendly great powers must therefore pass through and/or over Norwegian and/or Swedish territory as long as these powers have not managed to establish air and sea command in the Baltic Sea. During WWII Finland was offered military assistance from France and the UK, but neither Norway nor Sweden allowed this expeditionary force to transit through their territory (Westberg 2015).

Norway shares a short land border with Russia in the north. In addition, Norway and Russia have territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean and the northern waters under Norway's control have been the Russian gateway to the North Atlantic for centuries. If the western powers had established air and sea control in the North Atlantic, this would have facilitated support for Norway's military. If not, military assistance would most likely have to pass through Swedish territory. On that note, Norway does have a long tradition of seeking military support from western great powers to balance the threat from its eastern neighbour. In 1855, during the final phases of Crimean War the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway entered a defensive alliance with France and the UK, the so-called November Treaty. In this treaty, the western powers guaranteed military support to Sweden–Norway in case of an armed aggression from Russia. In return, the Swedish-Norwegian king agreed not to cede any territory to Russia. From the British government's perspective, this treaty supported its containment policy towards Russia and its ambition to prevent Russia from acquiring ports in northern Norway. When the union between Norway and Sweden dissolved in 1905, the Norwegian government immediately entered negotiations with the western great powers to find a new agreement on security guarantees that would replace the November Treaty (Walhbäck 1986; Westberg 2015).

As for Sweden's geographical characteristic, the absence of a land border with any great power leads friendly powers free to enter the country from both ports at the western coastline and from Norway. The southern part of Sweden, the entrance to the Baltic Sea and the island of Gotland are strategically important for any power that wishes to establish air and sea control in the southern and central parts of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic States and Poland's membership in NATO make especially these parts of Sweden strategically exposed in case of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO.

2.5.2 Historical experiences

In his seminal work, *Perception and misperception in international politics* Robert Jervis (1976) concluded that learning among decision-makers tends to be

overgeneralised with a predisposition to distort cause-effect analysis. Policy that leads to success is, according to Jervis, likely to be repeated while a situation similar to a previous failure is likely to generate a new policy response to avoid a repeated failure. The last war experiences are, in most cases, important formative experiences so powerful that lessons can be passed down to those who did not experience it.

According to Jack Levy, 'people learn more from failure than from success [...] a corollary, framed in terms of policy impact, is that past success contributes to policy continuity whereas failure leads to policy change' (Levy 1994:304). In a study of small power alliance behaviour, Dan Reiter showed that learning from formative experiences also has significant effects on the choice between alliance and neutrality strategies. For example, successful neutrality is likely to promote continuity of such a strategy, while failure leads to a revised strategy, that is, the seeking of an alliance (Reiter 1994). However, some research indicates that references to historical experience are used to rationalise a particular choice of policy (Snyder 1991; Levy 1994). Regardless of whether historical experiences are a part of a learning process or are used as a rhetorical tool, they affect the freedom of action for policy-makers. As Stanley Hoffmann once wrote: in advocating a specific foreign policy move the policy-maker 'can do so only by taking the nation along, with its baggage of memories and problems' (Hoffmann 1995:75–6). This makes some policy options (those associated with previous failures or those not in line with national traditions) more difficult to promote, while other policy options may instead find support in the collective intersubjective interpretations of the previous experiences of a particular national community.

As mentioned in the previous section, historical experiences may also be seen as one of several roots for national strategic cultures. According to Darryl Howlett and Jeffrey Lantis, national conceptions of roles and identities can be characterised as 'axiomatic beliefs' regarding the own state's relation to its external environment and its understanding of appropriate ways of acting. Past learning is in this view coalesced in a collective consciousness of a particular community. This makes these intersubjective understandings relatively resilient to change as they serve as a filter for future learning. However, changes in both identity and culture do occur. External shocks that challenge existing beliefs and undermine past narratives is one potential source of change. Defeat in war is an example of an external shock with a great potential to produce sudden and dramatic changes in previously axiomatic belief systems.¹⁴ A second potential source of change presented by Howlett and Lantis is 'strategical dilemmas'. These are situations where established identities, values and practices come into an internal conflict with one another. An example of this would occur if a state with a strong support for democracy and an aversion to the use of military force is confronted with a challenge to democracy that calls for a military response (Lantis and Howlett 2016:89–94).

The historical experiences of armed conflicts and state building during the last 200 years are unique for each Nordic country. In January 1814, following a

Swedish invasion, the Danish king was forced to cede control over Norway to Sweden. This led to a terminus of the unification of Denmark and Norway that had lasted for more than four centuries. As compensation for this loss, the Danish king was given some German-speaking territories. With these changes, the German-speaking citizens amounted to about 40 per cent of Denmark's total population. The high proportion of the population that identified itself as German created a fertile ground for further wars on Danish soil. In the 1840s liberal Danish nationalists questioned the absolute powers of the king and managed to force the king to present constitutional changes. In 1848 and 1863, the southern German-speaking parts of Denmark revolted against the Danish king. The separatists were supported by some German states. At this time, Denmark fell into the frame of Schweller's definition of a lamb state. In 1848, Denmark managed to avoid complete defeat due to political interventions by both Russia and the UK. Sweden–Norway even sent troops to Denmark in 1848 and 1849. Between 1863 and 1864, Denmark was left alone against a coalition of German states that included both Prussia and Austria. The Swedish king had promised his Danish colleague military support if Denmark was attacked by German states but the Swedish government prevented him to fulfil his promise. This time, Denmark suffered a complete defeat and was forced to cede all German-speaking territories to Prussia (Jansson 1961; Wahlbäck 1986; Feldbæk 1994; Hansen 2002; Bjørn 2003; Westberg 2015).

The unification of Germany and its victory over France in 1871 added more pressure on Denmark. As a result, Denmark began to pursue a policy of appeasement towards Germany. The Danish government was, in addition, active in supporting various arrangements for strengthening international law and the creation of institutions for peaceful conflict resolution through arbitration and mediation. There were also a number of initiatives in support of permanent neutrality. The former lamb had now transformed into a pet-dog (Jones 1969; Salmon 1997; Lidegaard 2003; Westberg 2012a).

In Norway, the 1814 peace agreement between Denmark and Sweden was not accepted. Instead, it summoned a constitutional assembly to appoint a Norwegian king and issue a declaration of independence together with a constitutional treaty, the Eidsvoll Declaration of 17 May. The Swedish government responded by invading Norway and the Norwegians were forced to accept the Swedish king as their monarch. Yet they were still allowed to keep their independence regarding domestic politics, and 17 May is still celebrated as Norway's day of independence. The Swedish–Norwegian union was peacefully dissolved in 1905 when the Swedish government reluctantly accepted the Norwegian demands for national self-determination. Similar to the Danish government, the Norwegian government championed initiatives that purported international security cooperation in the contexts of both the peace conference in Haag in 1907 and the League of Nations in the interwar era. There was also a strong support for neutrality in Norway before the German invasion in April 1940. Clearly, Norway qualified as a pet-dog already in the beginning of the twentieth century (Höjer 1954; Jones 1969; Westberg 2012a; 2012b).

Before Finland was invaded by Russia in 1808, it had since medieval times been an integrated part of the Swedish kingdom. The war, fought mainly on Finnish soil, bled into the beginning of 1809 when Russian troops reached the northern parts of present-day Sweden. In March 1809, the Swedish king was forced to resign and, a few months later, the Swedish government pleaded for peace. In the peace agreement that followed, Sweden was forced to cede all of Finland, including the Swedish-speaking county Åland, to Russia. For Finland, the separation from Sweden in 1809 developed into a first step to national self-determination. Finland was granted the status of a grand duchy within the Russian empire and the Finnish Parliament was initially given generous rights of freedom in domestic politics. However, during the latter parts of the nineteenth century, the Russian oppression grew worse and during WWI the Finnish government used the opportunities created that sprouted after the Russian Revolution to legitimise Finland's sovereignty. During the negotiations with Russia's newly established government, Finland received support from Germany. The declaration of independence in December 1917 was followed by a civil war between revolting communists, advocating close ties with the Bolshevik Russia and the right-wing governmental troops. In 1918, the Finnish government regained control of Finland's entirety. Soon after, it started to support the western powers' military interventions into the Russian civil war by deploying Finnish troops in Estonia and in the Russian part of Karelia. There were even plans to attack Petrograd. In the Finnish-Russian peace agreement of 1920 Finland was not only allowed to keep all territory as a Russian grand duchy but also received control over strategically important islands in the Finnish Gulf and some territory with a coast to the Barents Sea. During the first part of the 1920s Finland made unsuccessful attempts to establish defence cooperation with the Baltic States and with Poland. In the end of the 1920s and in the 1930s, Finland instead approached the other Nordic countries. Ambitious plans for defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden were made and in early 1939, the two states presented a plan for a joint remilitarisation of the Åland islands to the League of Nations. However, in May 1939 this plan was, stopped by the USSR (Nevakivi 2001; Meinander 2006; Westberg 2012b).

The Soviet government had previously demanded Finland to return some of the islands that were ceded to Finland in the peace agreement of 1920. When Finland disagreed, the USSR launched an invasion of Finland in November 1939. Subsequently, Finland requested support from Sweden but the Swedish government was unwilling to send regular troops. Military material and some 8,000 voluntary troops including an air squadron were sent as unofficial support. Finland managed heroically to hold back the invading forces until March 1940. In the following peace agreement, Finland had to accept the USSR's territorial demands. In 1941, Finland was approached by Germany and agreed to support the German invasion; Operation Barbarossa. In 1944, Finland was instead forced by the USSR to declare war on Germany and to repel the German forces that remained on Finnish soil (Westberg 2012b).

2.5.3 Membership in military and political alliances

Following Waltz's argument that states prioritise national security, survival and independence, it is reasonable to expect that the first choice of a state, if possible, would be to secure a unilateral national access to the means necessary that ensures their own security and survival. However, power asymmetries between higher and lower ranked states make this unilateral option difficult for small states as they, both in- and outside of military alliances, would be dependent on other states' actions in sustaining the balance of power. When weighing the options of joining an alliance and staying outside small states are more dependent than great powers on external factors like the balance of power, the level of tension between states as well as multilateral institutions for security cooperation. Small states are in these contexts often described as quick adapters. In choosing between joining a military alliance or remaining outside, small states face a difficult choice. Membership may limit their autonomy and risk entrapment within an alliance. On the other hand, small states that stay outside alliances risk abandonment (Mouritzen 1991; Elgström 2000; Krause and Singer 2001; Westberg 2016).

According to Rothstein, the decision to remain outside of alliances is sensible for small states only when four basic conditions prevail. First, the small state must not be so potentially powerful that its entry into an alliance would threaten to shift the balance of power between the competing parties in a conflict. Second, the small state must be 'politically non-provocative' and be willing to withdraw from world politics. Third, there must be a balance of power between competing great powers. Fourth, and arguably most importantly, small state's territory must be strategically irrelevant for all parties in the conflict. From a historical standpoint, a geographically favourable location has proven a more critical factor than the choice of a particular policy in explaining why some states manage to stay outside major wars (Rothstein 1968:32–5).

In deciding upon joining an alliance, small states, according to Rothstein, primarily base their decisions on the balance of power in their own regional system. There are divided opinions on the question of which alliance or alignment strategy small states prefer or should prefer.¹⁵ Successes and failures of small state strategies have also proven to be highly dependent on contextual factors that small states have very limited abilities to influence (e.g. their own geographic location, the war plans of great powers and the balance of power in the system). The choice of alliance strategy must therefore be based on an analysis of contextual factors related to the specific individual small state's power resources and regional security environment (Rothstein 1968; Labs 1992; Elgström 2000).

For those small states that decide to create or join a military alliance there is an additional item on the menu: the choice between a small state alliance and an alliance with one or more great powers. The main benefit of a small power alliance is that the contracting parties have greater opportunities to define their mutual obligations themselves. Small states that join a great power alliance will

have less opportunity to exercise a significant influence on the treaties. As minor parties in a great power alliance, small states may also be dominated by the greater powers. Small states alliances have, however, not proved to be effective in dealing with threats from great powers but they may be sufficient to manage threats from other small states. Small state alliances may also be beneficial for efforts to promote common political objectives, cooperation in international organisations and internal cohesion between small states in a region (Rothstein 1968:171–3).

The experiences of armed conflict during WWII left their marks in the Nordic countries' policies of alliances during the Cold War. In the peace negotiations in Paris 1947, Finland had to accept limitations on its sovereignty in matters related to its future security policy. In 1948, Finland, in addition, entered the agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the USSR. The agreement stipulated that Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks by 'Germany or its allies' and to seek help from the USSR if it was unable to defend itself. The agreement also recognised Finland's desire to remain outside great power conflicts and thereby formed a basis for Finland's peacetime policy of neutrality during the Cold War. For Denmark and Norway, the experiences of German occupation meant the end to their policy of military non-alignment. In a similar vein, in 1948, the Swedish government proposed that Denmark, Norway and Sweden should enter a defensive military alliance without official ties to any western power. Both the Danish and the Norwegian governments insisted on formal support from western powers and April 1949 both Denmark and Norway decided to sign the Washington Treaty and hence become two of NATO's founding members. For Sweden, the experiences of WWII came to be the backbone for continued non-alignment. Regarding political alliances, all Nordic countries stayed outside of the early steps of the European integration process. Denmark was economically dependent on the British market and coordinated its membership applications with the UK in the 1960s and 1970s. It later joined the EC after a referendum in 1972. In the 1990s and 2000s Denmark chose, however, to remain outside the EU's defence and security cooperation. Consequently, Denmark has not participated in any of EU's Nordic Battle Groups (Hansen 2002). For Finland, the expected negative responses from the USSR made membership in the EC a non-issue until the end of the Cold War. Norway, still weary of political unions, has held two referendums on membership in the EC, in 1972, and the EU, in 1994 (Neumann 2002). The lack of EU membership has not prevented Norway from participating in all Nordic Battle Groups.

The British and Danish applications to the EC in the 1960s and 1970s turned EC membership into a political issue in Sweden as well. From the Social Democratic government's point of view, membership of the EC was ruled out with reference to its expected negative effect on the credibility of Sweden's policy of neutrality, but in 1995 both Finland and Sweden joined the EU. Unlike Denmark, both Finland and Sweden have been active in their support of the EU's ambition to develop military capacities related to international crises management (Westberg 2003; Jakobsen 2009; Edström and Gyllensporre 2014a; 2014b).

The variance in the Nordic countries' membership in the EU and NATO will in this study be treated as a constant in the same manner as the variances relating to the other two intervening variables, geographical characteristics and historical experiences, are treated. The differences regarding membership in alliances are also scrutinised *in silo* from the four countries' choices between different alignment strategies and their crafting of military strategies. Our aim is to analyse to which extent the membership and non-membership in the respective organisations influence the four countries' alignment and military strategies. This choice is motivated by the fact that members of the same military or political alliance have been shown to pursue different alignment and military strategies. In the present context, Turkey's membership in NATO does not seem to prevent its government to pursue a strategy of courting towards Russia on matters related to the war in Syria, while other members instead have joined a US-led coalition willing to pursue a bandwagoning strategy. Similarly, EU member states have pursued varying strategies regarding the economic sanctions against Russia relating to the war in Ukraine. A further reason for making the relationship between membership in alliances and the choice of defence strategies an open empirical question is the fact that a specific country's alignment and military strategies may change even though their membership status remain unchanged.

Table 2.2 Summary of the intervening variables

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Geographical characteristics	Territory dominated by sea; no strategic depth or natural defence; closer to friendly than threatening powers.	Territory dominated by land; strategic depth north-south but not east-west and long coastline; limited natural defences; long land border to threatening power.	Territory dominated by long coastline; mountain range provides some natural defence and strategic depth north-south; short land border to threatening power and potentially contested territorial claims in the North Atlantic.	Territory dominated by land; strategic depth north-south but not east-west and long coastline; limited natural defences; no land border to threatening power.
Historical experiences	Repeated military defeats and occupation; failure of neutrality and national defence.	Victories and defeats; national defence meaningful; mixed record of neutrality.	Resistance, military defeats and occupation; national defence meaningful; failure of neutrality.	No war experiences since 1814; non-alignment beneficial for security.
Membership in alliances	NATO; EU (but not in defence and security policies).	Non-military aligned; EU.	NATO; EU-cooperation.	Non-military aligned; EU.

2.6 Defence strategies: the dependent variable

In the introduction of this book, defence strategy was defined as the conflated ideas on how politically defined military-strategic *ends* should be achieved through a combination of *alignment strategies* and suitable strategic *ways* of employing *military means* (use of force). Furthermore, defence strategies were defined to include ideas of how current and future military capacities should be created (force generation). In the next two sections, this definition will be applied to previous research on alignment strategies and military strategy. In doing this we will provide more precise definitions of the constitutive elements included in our definition: alignment strategies and military-strategic ends, means and ways. Finally, we will present six questions that will constitute a framework for measuring change in military strategies.

2.6.1 *Alignment strategies*

In the last part of the previous section on our intervening variables, we presented our reasons for analysing states' alignment strategies separately from differences relating to membership in political and military alliances. Membership in alliances will instead be treated as a constant intervening variable whose influence on the alignment strategies of a particular state is an open empirical question. Alignment strategies are in this study defined as different ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organisations in matters related to national security and defence. In line with this definition, the alignment strategies that are included in our definition of defence strategy do not include strategies for promoting the influence or interest of states relating to other policy areas.¹⁶

The choice between alliance and non-alignment is not as clear-cut as it may seem. In an analysis of the Swedish alliance strategies in the nineteenth century, Elgström has shown that it is possible for non-aligned states to pursue strategies that have apparent similarities with alignment strategies like *bandwagoning* and *balance of power*. A non-aligned state may without a formal agreement through concessions to a threatening state practice a policy that is similar to a defensive bandwagoning strategy (*appeasement*). A non-aligned small state may also, without a formal treaty, approach a state or an alliance to the conflict that is perceived as less threatening through informal cooperation and preparations for future alliances (*courting*) and thereby practice a policy similar to the *balance of threat strategy* as identified by Stephen Walt (Elgström 2000:31–3). According to Elgström, non-alignment strategies may also differ in their degree of activity intensity. An active effort to highlight an independence from the great powers is termed *distancing*. The opposite of this strategy consists of a passive approach where states try to avoid involvement in conflicts by *isolating* themselves and remaining outside of the superpowers' conflicts (*hiding*). According to Mouritzen, non-aligned small states are expected to activate their foreign policy in times of tension between major powers in order to avoid losing their position. An aligned small state will on the other hand deactivate its foreign policy and be

more prone to make concessions to its aligned major power (Mouritzen 1991).¹⁷ Even within an alliance, member states may pursue different alignment strategies in response to increased tension or challenges to the balance of power. Some states may *chain gang* and choose to commit themselves even stronger to the Alliance and agreements on collective defence, while other member states may decide to *pass the buck* to others, hoping that they will free ride on the security provided by other members of the Alliance (Christensen and Snyder 1990).

The alignment strategies discussed in this section can all be seen as responses to possible or actual changes in the balance of power related to the threat perceptions of the political leadership in a specific state. The concept of balance of power has been a central point of departure for analysing both alignment strategies and European great power politics since the eighteenth century (Hinsley 1963; Sheehan 1996). In this section, we will focus on three different uses of the concept.

If the concept of balance of power is applied to a regional or global system of states, the 'balance' may refer to an *equilibrium* of the power resources available to the main competing powers in the system. This equilibrium is assumed to decrease the probability of the outbreak of war since expansive revisionist states must consider the risk that other great powers may come to the aid of the threatened weaker state. If there is an equilibrium the outcome of such great power conflict will appear as more uncertain and therefore costlier. Arguably, a balance of power thereby supports all states' independence. This claim was, however, disputed by Rothstein. He pointed to the fact that great powers on many occasions have proved themselves ready to sacrifice the territorial integrity of small states in agreements to avoid conflicts among themselves and to preserve the balance of power (Rothstein 1968:34–5; Morgenthau 2006:179–81).

A second meaning of the concept of balance of power concerns the differences in the distribution of capabilities across units, and more precisely, the number of system-defining great powers that coexist in a specific international system. It is the distribution of capabilities that determine if the system is uni-, bi- or multipolar. Great powers are, according to Waltz, 'induced by the system' to protect their own long-term interest of independence and their own position in the system by balancing against rising powers by supporting the weaker state or coalition in a conflict. Similarly, 'secondary states' were expected to 'flock to the weaker side' thereby avoiding their main threat: the states on the stronger side (Waltz 1979:126–7).

Waltz's argument on alliance formation and balancing behaviour presents a third meaning to the concept of balance of power: balance of power as a specific choice of alignment strategy. As an alignment strategy, *balance of power* strategies aim to create counter weights to expansive powers in order to increase costs for their further expansion. The effort to create counter weight may include alliance commitments to threatened states and other forms of *chain gaining* measures that signal political will and military capability to support the weaker state and deter the potential aggressor. States outside an alliance may in

the same situation pursue a strategy of *courting*, which includes preparation for a common use of force and other measures related to a possible future entry into the Alliance. Balance of power is, according to Waltz's definitions, the opposite to the strategy of bandwagon. A state that *bandwagon* aligns itself with the rising expansive power. Waltz's argument concerning balancing behaviour has been modified by Walt who argues that the choice to either oppose (balance) or ally (bandwagon) with rising powers are not primarily based on statesmen's assessments of changes in relative power distribution but on their threat perceptions, that they will 'ally with or against the most *threatening* power' (Walt 1985:8–9).

Bandwagoning may, according to Walt, be pursued with two distinctly different motives. First, defensive bandwagoning may be pursued as a form of *appeasement policy* towards a threatening state or coalition. In these cases, 'aligning' with the threatening power may avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere. This strategy is typically chosen by small states bordering a threatening great power that has demonstrated its ability to compel obedience. Finland's policy towards the USSR during the Cold War was Walt's prime example for this strategy. Second, bandwagoning may be pursued for offensive purposes where a state may 'align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory' (Walt 1985:8 and 11). The strategy of *bandwagoning for profit* has been further explored by Randall Schweller. He argues that balance of power and bandwagoning are driven by two different aims. Balancing states aim for self-preservation and the avoidance of losses. Bandwagoning, on the other hand, is driven by 'the opportunity for gain', a motive characteristic for revisionist states (Schweller 1994:74).

In our view, bandwagoning strategies may be pursued by status quo states as well if they see that joining arms with the stronger side in a conflict may benefit their interests. Contributing internationally to rectify a strategic shock may add political clout and credibility vis-à-vis other partners. A proactive role may also allow small states to 'punch above their own weight' and get a seat at the table along with stronger powers with more influence on the political process (Jakobsen 2007). However, note that though bandwagoning is the result of a cost-benefit analysis, it can also imply significant sacrifice to join the effort of a greater power. In this study, we will further explore offensive and defensive bandwagoning strategies as possible alignment strategies both within and outside a military alliance. Sweden has contributed with troops to NATO missions since the mid-1990s and the appeasement policy pursued by Sweden towards Germany during WWII did not entail any formal treaties.

For the purposes of this study, *offensive bandwagoning* is defined as strategy primarily motivated by perceived opportunities for gains and includes support to a non-threatening state or alliance. Furthermore, this strategy includes cooperation with the stronger side in a conflict and substantial contributions to common efforts. *Defensive bandwagoning*, on the other hand, is defined as a strategy including unilateral concessions to a threatening state or alliance in order to promote the security of the own state.

As a small state alignment strategy, balance of power may be pursued both unilaterally outside of an alliance and collectively as a member of an alliance or as a partner to an alliance. *Unilateral balancing* by small states includes efforts to increase the cost of an attack against the own nation through the strengthening of independent national defence capacities. However, power asymmetries between states will make strategical exposed states that pursue this strategy dependent on the action of other actors, the level of tension between competing great powers and the balance of power within the regional or global state system. Small states can pursue collective balancing in two different ways depending on whether they are members of an alliance or not. Within an alliance, small states can *chain gang*. This strategy includes stronger commitments to agreements on collective defence and offers of military contributions to allied contingency planning or war efforts. As opposed to offensive bandwagoning, this policy is primarily motivated by the defensive aim to collectively balance against an expansive threatening state or alliance. Outside an alliance, small states with similar defensive balancing ambitions can pursue a strategy of *courting*. This strategy includes measures to increase the possibility of receiving support *from a particular* state or alliance and measures to enhance the ability to give and receive military assistance.

However, balancing or bandwagoning strategies are not the only options available for states in crafting their alignment strategies. A third main strategy that has been practiced by both small states and great powers is *isolationism*. Isolationism is an option that is based on the principle that a nation's security is maximised by avoiding or limiting interaction with competing powers. With the notable exceptions of the later parts of WWI and WWII, this was the main strategy of the US in its relationship with the competing European great powers during the greater parts of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. *Isolationism* was also the dominant strategy among the Nordic countries before WWII in the later part of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century. For Sweden–Norway it was also the dominant strategy during the reign of Charles XIV John (Swedish: *Karl XIV Johan*) 1818–44. Isolationism may be pursued as a passive strategy, *hiding*, that is based on the idea of minimising the risk of being drawn into a conflict by keeping a low profile to avoid the attention of competing powers. *Distancing* is the active version of this alignment strategy. A prime example of this second strategy is the active foreign policy pursued by Sweden during the last decades of the Cold War. Sweden was then loudly criticising both the USSR and the US in order to demonstrate its independence towards both sides in the east–west conflict. A further consequence of this strategy of distancing was that the Swedish government abstained from seeking membership in the EC with explicit reference to the need to protect the credibility of its peacetime policy of neutrality. In relation to other states' efforts to balance against an expansive power, isolationism is a form of free riding and 'non-balancing behaviour' characterising *buck-passing*. Note that buck-passing may also occur within an alliance by members who free ride on other states' balancing efforts or withdraws its support for allied efforts (Christensen and Snyder 1990).

Table 2.3 Small states' alignment strategies

<i>Balance of power</i>	<i>Bandwagoning</i>	<i>Isolation</i>	<i>Hedging</i>
Unilateral Chain-ganging Courting	Offensive (for profit) Defensive (appeasement)	Active (distancing) Passive (hiding) Buck-passing	Combination of alignment strategies involving cooperation with several different states and/or alliances.

A fourth main alignment strategy is *hedging*. It involves mitigating risks by pursuing different options simultaneously. For instance, the EU policy in relation to Russia has sought to balance a possible aggressive resurgence and integrate the country in Europe, both in terms of norms and values as well as institutionally (Art 2004). In this study, strategic hedging is translated to the even distributing of commitments. This strategy typically includes multiple courting as the state approaches other states or alliances with the aim of increasing the possibilities of receiving or giving military assistance.

State actions are not always consistent with our definitions of alignment strategies. In our conclusion, we will therefore focus on the main tendency for each Nordic country's response to the shocks. In Table 2.3, the small state alignment strategies defined in this chapter are summarised.

2.6.2 *The constitutive elements of strategy*

Military strategy is a nebulous expression. It involves the delicate division of labour and complex interaction between the political level and the senior military level. Moreover, strategy is, as a concept itself, subject to a myriad of interpretations. The term was introduced in Greece already around 500 BC when elected military leaders collectively formed a council; *strategos* (Cummings 1993). The research in this book falls within the realm of Strategic Studies. According to Richard Betts, this field of research addresses the interaction between political ends and military means under contextual constraints (Betts 1997). In Strategic Studies, as well as in practice, at least three conceptual or analytical levels coexist; political-strategic, military-strategic and operational level (and sometimes the tactical level). These levels have a hierarchical relationship and they harbour their own distinct logic. The logic at each level governs the immediate inferior level while at the same time severing its superior level (Betts 2000). According to Betts, Strategic Studies focuses on the classical Clausewitzian problem: 'how to make force a rational instrument of policy rather than mindless murder – how to integrate politics and war' (Betts 1997:8).

Strategy is commonly understood in a rationalistic manner. As argued by Jan Willem Honig and Jan Ångström it would be a conceptual contradiction to talk about strategy without a distinction between ends and means. Honig and

Ångström also argued that a second component of strategy is the need for careful management of scarce resources since access to unlimited resources would make every discussion on which military resources to use pointless (Honig and Ångström 2012:669). According to Betts, strategy can be defined as 'the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other' (Betts 2000:5). Colin Gray offers a similar definition, claiming that strategy concerns 'the direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends' (Gray 2010:18). In addition to this, Gray makes a distinction between *grand strategy* and *military strategy*. The first concerns 'the direction and use made of any or all of the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics'. Military strategy concerns 'the direction and use made of force and the threat of force, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics' (Gray 2015:47). In his influential work, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Barry Posen presents a similar distinction between grand strategy and military doctrine:

Grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself. [...] A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. [...] [M]ilitary doctrine [is] the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means.

(Posen 1984:13)

Since our definition of defence strategy includes alignment strategies and strategies for both the use of force and force generation, it is more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy. At the same time, our analysis is less inclusive than Gray and Posen's respective definitions of grand strategy. Our focus on the public statements on strategy at the political level also means that we will not be able to explore the relationship between political-strategic, military-strategic and operational level. Instead, our focus is directed towards political alignment strategies concerning different ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organisations and the military strategies that are articulated and decided on the political level. Our definition of defence strategy shares the rationalistic points of departure with the definitions of strategy presented above. However, with the help of our intervening variables, geographical characteristics and historical experiences we will also explore the limitations of perspectives assuming full rationality. These limitations will be shown in explanations relating to differences between the four Nordic countries' defence strategies and their failure to adapt to external pressures.

Arguably, the rationalistic paradigm is not exhaustive in explaining and understanding military strategy. Other schools would contend that hierarchies and objective reasoning fall short of providing a sufficient account of strategy. For instance, organisational affiliation and bureaucratic agendas may provide additional explanatory power. Graham Allison's influential work on explaining

strategy during the Cuban missile crisis pursues three competing perspectives; rational actor, organisational process and governmental politics (Allison and Zelikow 1999). Constructivists posit that military strategies are socially constructed, that is, they are shaped by social contexts, interaction processes and beliefs relating to norms and identities that influence the way different actors perceive their aims and interests (Finnemore 1996; 2003; Katzenstein 1996; Honig and Ångström 2012).

Despite these alternative perspectives, an instrumental, rationalistic view is used for the purpose of this book, more specifically, through the lens of Maxwell Taylor's definition of military strategy. It frames strategy as a matching set of ends, ways and means (Lykke 1989). This view was initially advanced by Clausewitz, who coined the ends-means paradigm (Herberg-Rothe 2014). Taylor amended it by including ways. From this vantage point, military strategy is made up of military objectives, military-strategic concepts and military resources. This trinity encompasses considerations to frame and justify the military mission and ensures that it is addressing the political intent by formulating military objectives (ends), allocating resources including capabilities and forces (means) as well as considerations on their application including courses of action, doctrine and concepts (ways). Basil Liddell Hart stressed the importance of having clear and distinct objectives for the political and military levels, respectively (Liddell Hart 1975). However, they need to be carefully nested so that the military efforts support the political intent. Plausible military objectives include, but are not limited to, deterring a military aggression, protecting lines of communication, defending the homeland, territorial expansion or regaining lost territories and defeating an opponent (Lykke 1989). The ways to employ military force include various concepts based on combinations of offensive and defensive measures forged into a feasible course of action. Offensive concepts typically involve air superiority, deterrence and separation of parties by force, while defensive options comprise elements of forward defence, defence in depth and retrograde operations. Other important factors include possible level of cooperation with other military forces and the relative weight of the principles of war (see, for instance, McIvor 2012).

Notably, the use of the military instrument of power is not limited to forceful situations (Nye 2004; 2011; Art 2009). The attainment of military objectives and the application of military concepts are conditioned by the military means at disposal. Means include, for instance, forces on standby and mobilised forces as well as conventional forces, Special Forces and nuclear forces. It also comprises various niche capability areas including, for instance, computer network attacks, clandestine operations and deep strike capabilities. Means also include critical infrastructure, security of supply and prepositioning of stock.

From this angle, strategy is further defined as a harmonious balance between these elements (ends, ways, means). Lykke argues that there are two temporal perspectives on military strategy. The short-term perspective considers the current threats and the extant forces. In addition, the long-term perspective takes potential future threats as a point of departure and focuses on how to adapt the forces

including concepts and resources. To this end, capability development is the most inert process that needs specific attention, including the development and procurement of equipment as well as the recruitment and training of officers.

Based on Lykke's temporal disintegration, military strategy accommodates an inherent dichotomy of particular relevance for the research scope of this book. On the one hand, dealing with ends, ways and means to swiftly invalidate imminent threats including, for instance, putting troops on alert, recalling reservists, mobilising, deploying troops to key terrain, dispatching naval forces and increasing airspace surveillance. On the other hand, it should hold a long-term perspective to prepare for new and currently unanticipated threats that may materialise in the future, including recruiting and training personnel, procuring weapons system, pooling and sharing resources with partners, transforming forces to change the capability set to deal with anticipated future threats (Birnbaum 1966; Edström 2003).

Arguably, this temporal disintegration calls for two disjoint ways to optimise military power: focusing on contemporary challenges or on the potential future threats. Clearly, these perspectives compete in terms of resources but also in non-tangible ways. Force development is a long-term and deliberate process since it requires authorities to question current perceptions on the nature of the threat and the configuration of the extant force. Generals are sometimes accused of fighting the last war, suggesting that the minds of senior military officers are trapped in the past, by media pundits and political officials, while failing to grasp characteristics of modern warfare. These two logics must coexist. According to Edström and Gyllensporre (2014a), separate strategies are often prepared in practice. In fact, two distinct planning disciplines have emerged to use force and develop forces, respectively. At some point, however, military-strategic authorities need to attune these strategies.

2.6.3 Measuring change in military strategies

The elements of strategy (ends, ways, means) require one further operationalisation to make it possible to measure and compare strategic adjustments and change in military strategies. The basic elements of ends, means and ways will therefore be complemented with an analytical framework focusing on six pertinent questions based on a number of previous studies (De Wit and Meyer 1994; Collins 2002; Edström 2003; Lindley-French 2007; Gyllensporre 2010):

- 1 Why? The answers to this question concern justifications to engage the military organisation and defined military objectives and tasks.
- 2 What? The answers to this question concern threats and other factors that may challenge the basic security interest of a political community.
- 3 How? The answers to this question concern the selection of military instruments and their use.
- 4 Where? The answers to this question concern geographical aspects relating to the use of force.

- 5 When? The answers to this question concern the temporal aspects relating to the use of force.
- 6 Who? The answers to this question concern cooperation with other actors to promote common security interests.

The first question, *why*, revolves around the justification to engage the military organisation. Armed Forces are traditionally intertwined with their nations' ultimate *raison d'état*, the survival interest of each nation. General political aspirations are converted to policy objectives, in some nations embedded in a national security strategy. Subsequently these objectives need further refinement to make them amendable to the Armed Forces (Stone 2011). Military objectives that include national defence and maintaining territorial integrity as well as supporting civilian society and contributing to international peace support operations are general and should need no further explanation for the purpose of this study. However, the jurisdiction of Armed Forces for internal security may vary. In some countries, the responsibility for countering terrorism is shared between the military and police. In a similar vein the responsibility for coast guard and patrolling of national borders are uniquely designed in each nation. These matters are sometimes sensitive as authorising use of military force on civilians in peacetime is a delicate and often sensitive topic in democracies. In addition, military instruments of power may serve many other purposes in peacetime than to deter potential aggressors from offensive military behaviour.¹⁸

The second question, *what*, pertains the nature of threats to the security interest of a state or political community. There is no universally agreed set of military threats, neither is there a clear-cut division between threats and risks. Threats can be viewed as the product of capabilities and intentions of the perceived adversary (see, for example, Garthoff 2001; Thrall and Cramer 2009). Notably, the political and military levels may attribute different weight to the same threat (Ersel 2004). According to Anne Hammerstad and Ingrid Boas (2015) threat-based concepts have a higher degree of correlation with survival and vital interests while risks are calculated threats that demand responses. According to a comprehensive empirical analysis on military threats, comprising 77 encounters to crystallise determinants for success of the aggressor it is concluded the majority of the cases were successful (Karsten *et al.* 1984). Notwithstanding, one interesting conclusion pertains the will of the actors. The determination of the defending state was found to be more important in shaping the result than the steadfastness of the aggressor. Huntington took a system view of threats and identified an emerging world order comprising eight competing civilisations (Huntington 1997). In examining individual conflicts, Mary Kaldor (2006) concludes that contemporary threats are constituted by a mixture of war, organised crime and human rights violations. Branislav Slantchev (2011) opens up lucid lines between military threats and force generation labelled as military moves. These moves, it is argued, need not be accompanied by explicit articulation of the intent.

The analysis of risks and threats is closely related to the analysis of the concept of security. It is possible to identify at least two broad approaches to the concept of security in small state literature. A traditional line of research that focuses on small states' responses to security threats related to the use of military force between states and second, a comprehensive approach that has adopted the idea of a 'broader' set of security concerns that small states faces.¹⁹ This second approach was pioneered by Barry Buzan, claiming that security is a comprehensive concept, composed of several levels (global, regional, national and individual) and sectors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), which are closely interlinked (Buzan 2016:283).

Alyson Bailes and her colleagues have presented a comprehensive security agenda for small states composed of four different categories. Category A, Military, 'hard' security, covers interstate and internal armed conflicts as well as subversion, political and economic blackmailing, forced clientele, outside coup and severe civil disorder. Category B, 'Non-state violence', includes terrorism, violent/organised crime, smuggling of strategic goods, asymmetric attacks (such as cyber-attack) and illegal immigration/trafficking. Categories C, 'Economic security' and D, 'Accidents and natural hazards' that concerns threats to related to economic security and development and different other kinds of non-antagonistic threats like pandemics, natural disasters, environmental degradation and climate change (Bailes *et al.* 2014:29–32). The four strategic shocks whose impact we will analyse in our case studies belong to Categories A and B, which will be the prime focus of this book.

The third question, *how*, concerns the selection of military instruments and their use and, to a certain extent, questions regarding how military resources should be developed and used. The answers to this question have two tiers. At the superior level, the grand strategy needs to contemplate the wider set of instrument and consider the roles of Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law enforcement, Information, Finance and Economic elements (MIDLIFE). This acronym has been preceded by similar acronyms: DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic) and PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure). They all stem from a desire to adopt a holistic view. To this end a comprehensive approach, or sometimes referred to as 'whole of government approach', provide analytical concepts to coral and synthesis of the instruments that are at the disposal of the superior political-strategic level (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1997).

The second tier of responses to the question of *how* involves the use and generation of military means. Clausewitz understood strategy as the shortest path between the aim and the means of warfare (Herberg-Rothe 2014). It involves military capabilities, either embodied in military units or supporting their conduct. Many concepts of military capabilities seek to capture the essence of its complex nature. At the core for assessing, the short-term strength lies the quality, quantity and level of preparedness. Collins defined nine principles for the assessment of a joint force including organised, equipped and trained to fulfil particular responsibilities (Purview) and regional conditions (Regional

Peculiarity), Quantitative Sufficiency as well as Qualitative Superiority. Armed Forces perform best when the mix maximises the strengths and minimises the weaknesses of Active and Reserve components (Complementarity), when diversified installations facilitate essential training and furnish essential support (Infrastructure), when they prepare to participate in multiservice operations with allies whenever appropriate (Compatibility), when present and future preparedness proceed concurrently in proper balance (foresight) and when there exist Financial Sufficiency (Collins 2011). The complementarity assessment considers, among other items, the degree and nature of cooperation with other Armed Forces, in particular when there exist legally binding defence treaties. When the longer-term view is assessed (force generation) the calculus to assess the strength shifts towards the nations' strategic resources including the projected size of the defence budget, the defence industrial base, manpower, Research & Development, military infrastructure, innovation and the logistics base (Tellis *et al.* 2001).

When considering the geographical aspects of power politics, the fourth question of *where*, the historical pedigree rests with Halford Mackinder's Heartland Theory (Mackinder 1904). It is underpinned by the idea that the earth will be divided into two competing spheres, land and sea, and the source of global power is in the heart of Euro-Atlantic landmass (Clover 1999; Megoran *et al.* 2005). Any actor controlling this region could gain sufficient strength for world domination. In his view, control of eastern Europe had pivotal importance. The salient point for this research project is the importance geography plays in the wider considerations on strategy. It should be noted that geopolitical theory has an uneasy academic relationship within social science and is under-researched (Taylor 2002). The practical application demonstrates a large variety of interpretations based on national concepts and priorities (see, for instance, Atkinson and Dodds 2002).

However, territory forms a key component from which power can be drawn. Control of vast landmasses enables security. Access to sea lines of communication provides opportunities to project power, and at the same time, it constitutes a vulnerability to hostile sea powers (Rosenau and Durfee 2000). A globalised world does not change these fundamentals. Perhaps the most important contemporary contribution in the practical aspects of geopolitics has been advanced by scholars from the Copenhagen School by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) in their seminar work on regional patterns of security. For our analysis on the impact of the four strategic shocks the question of *where* is primarily of interest as it relates to priorities regarding international crisis management as well as the collective or national defence of the own nation and other states in the home region.

The fifth question, *when*, relates to the temporal aspects of taking action. For the use of force strategy it indicates when to employ military force in the conflict, proactively and in the conflict's infancy or in response to a military aggression. In international law, however, it is anticipatory that preventive and pre-emptive employment represents early action. These have been subject to

intense debate in conjunction with the US invasion in Iraq 2003. This question is also concerned with the balance between ready and available forces to counter the existing and near-time threats as well as prepare for future potential future threats:

Readiness and capabilities management systems are distinct as they involve different actors handling different information, but their ultimate convergence in the national-level discourse is important. The single overarching question drives the energy in both systems, yet readiness and modernization often compete against each other for defence dollars.

(Galvin 2015:2)

The sixth and final question, *who*, will in this study revolve around questions relating to cooperation with other actors (states and institutions) in order to promote common security interests. In analysing the four countries' military-strategic responses to the four shocks, we will focus on change in terms of which states and organisational settings each country chose to rely on. The latter is explored in the context of choosing partners for activities that concern force generation and the use of force at home or in international crisis management or expeditionary warfare.

2.7 Retrieving empirical material

Each country specific section in Chapters 4–6 presents a detailed presentation of the sources used in our analysis. We have retrieved the empirical material for the analysis solely from primary official sources. The defence decision-making process in each of the Nordic countries has hence served as a guiding tool. Consequently, we have used bills, committee recommendations, commission reports etc. in our text analysis. Since the processes are not identical among the countries, there is a discrepancy. We argue that these differences do not affect the result of the comparison. Although their roles in the process may differ between the countries, the Cabinet, the Parliament and the Chief of Defence (ChoD) play, in one way or another, a key role. Occasionally, groups of experts and special commissions can be appointed in order to provide additional analysis. Neither the Cabinet nor the Parliament constitutes, however, a homogeneous entity. In the former case, the Prime Minister's or the Cabinet's office plays a central and coordinating function. The involvements of the Office may differ not only among the countries but also between the occasions a defence decision is to be made. We have experienced that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become more fundamental in the process over the years and that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) hence often has been given a supporting role. This goes not only for the relation between the ministers themselves but also for the division of labour between the committees of the Parliament. Consequently, the Foreign Affairs Committee has gradually become more involved at the expense of the Defence Committee (see, for example, Edström 2003; Edström and Gyllensporre 2014a).

We have also retrieved secondary sources. These sources have, however, not been used in our own analysis. Rather, the purpose has been to analyse the relationship between our conclusions and the results of previous research. Consequently, the findings of other researchers are discussed only in the summarising sections. Naturally, we have also used secondary sources in the initial section of each of the empirical chapters when introducing the historical background and the settings.

We aimed to use mainly primary sources as the backbone to this study, while using secondary sources as a complement when deemed necessary. Our primary sources stem from various branches within the Nordic governments; the departments of defence, Parliaments and defence commissions as well as departments of foreign policy, and they consist of official reports, bills as well as policy and strategy documents etc., which have been collected via governmental websites.

Notes

- 1 The expression 'residual category' is used by Neumann and Gstöhl (2006:4) and by Wivel *et al.* (2014:6) to characterise this particular way of defining small states.
- 2 In a later work, Vital also shifted towards this somewhat negative, residual, definition. He describes the international community as essentially 'a class-society', in which first class powers, unlike the other classes, are practically immune to the use of force by others (Vital 1971:3–6).
- 3 For other definitions that also emphasise perceptive factors and small states' dependency on other states and institutions see Elgström (2000:24), Hey (2003:2) and Toje (2011:45–8).
- 4 The end of the Cold War accelerated a process of regionalisation creating a more autonomous and prominent role for the regions (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Consequently, Keohane's definition of system-influencing states would probably have to be modified making it possible to differentiate between global and regional system influence. On a regional system level, the political leadership of a secondary power can perceive itself with the ability to exercise the same amount of influence, as a first ranked power is able to do on the global level. In a similar vein, it can also be assumed that a third ranked state, 'a middle power', would rise to a second ranked status at a regional level.
- 5 For a similar classification of the Nordic countries, see Doeser (2008:14).
- 6 For an account of de Gaulle's struggle against increased powers for the Commission during the 'empty chair crisis' see, for example, Haas (1966) and Dinan (2005). For an application of Wivel's definition of small states in the context of the EU see, for example, Grøn and Wivel (2011).
- 7 Comparative methods derive their basic logic from John Stuart Mill's method of agreement and method of difference. Depending on the author, different names are used to refer to these logics. For example, the method of agreement is sometimes referred to as the most-different systems design or the positive comparative method. The method of difference is also called the most-similar systems design, or the negative comparative method (George and Bennet 2005:153).
- 8 According to George and Bennett, the research method SFC relies on two major components. First, its 'structure' is borrowed from statistical or survey methods and implies a reliance on 'asking a set of standardized, general questions to each case'. These questions should reflect the research objective and theoretical focus and is intended to produce comparable data that allows 'cumulative development of

knowledge' about a given phenomenon. Second, 'focus' entails that the study follows the research objective, and the theoretical focus relevant for that objective; one study should not address all aspects of an event (George and Bennett, 2005:69–70). The purpose of SFC is to obtain systematic, consistent data on study-crucial variables that is possible to compare across cases. King and his colleagues emphasise that SFC is mainly characterised by its highly systematic data collection; the same information should be collected about the same variables in all cases with the guidance of relevant theory. The goal is systematic description in order to make the drawing of causal inference possible (King *et al.* 1994:45–6).

- 9 For other examples of research on strategy using unit level characteristic as intervening variables, see Rose (1998), Schweller (2004) and Rathbun (2008).
- 10 According to George and Bennet intervening variables are used to explain cases with multiple interaction effects. The intervening variables are found between the cause and effect variables and constitute parts of a causal mechanism. By testing this type of variable, it is possible to eliminate other, rivalling causal explanations (George and Bennett 2005:206–7). The term 'intervening' variable is also the one used by Gideon Rose to describe factors at the unit level that translate systemic pressures into foreign policy (Rose 1998:146).
- 11 'Capabilities' is the term most frequently used in literature to denote national military resources and abilities. Our intervening variable 'capacity' denotes the sum of a specific country's military capabilities.
- 12 Johnston (1995) and Kier (1997) are two of the more recent major works on strategic culture. For an overview of the theoretical controversies, see Johnston (1995), Gray (1999) and Glenn *et al.* (2004).
- 13 Regarding the central importance of historical experiences and geographical characteristics in the shaping of a country's strategic culture, see Doeser (2016) and the different contributions in Biehl *et al.* (2013).
- 14 The effects of an external shock are, on this issue, related to the concept of 'critical junctures'. For more reading on this later concept, see March and Olsen (1996; 1998).
- 15 Stephen Walt argues that the weaker the state, the more likely it will choose bandwagoning with the threatening power, rather than balance against it. Bandwagoning is particularly common in the case of geographic proximity to the aggressive power (Walt, 1987:21–31). In contrast to this, Erik Labs claims that small states do not tend to bandwagon with threatening powers. Based on studies of wars during the German unification process in the nineteenth century, Labs instead claims that small states prefer to balance with a protecting great power rather than free ride if the most preferred strategy non-alignment should fail. According to Labs' study, bandwagoning is one of the least favoured strategies of small states (Labs 1992:393–4 and 406).
- 16 For an analysis of the role of international institutions in small state strategies, particularly when it comes to 'softer' security issues, see Bailes and Thorhallsson (2013). For an analysis of the Nordic countries special interest in cooperation regarding soft security, see Archer (2014).
- 17 For a further analysis of different passive and active strategies of small states, see Vital (1967:121–2).
- 18 There are also indirect applications of military power, for instance, in support of negotiations (Slantchev 2011). According to Frederick the Great, King of Prussia 1740–86, 'Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments'. Military contributions to international military management may also be a way to gain influence and recognition. Joseph Nye went even further by elaborating on a continuum of tasks beyond the physical realm ranging from command power to co-optive power (Nye 1990). This liberal conception overlaps with the realist contention held by Robert Art regarding the 'fungibility of force' (Art 1996). Art maintains that the utility of military power transcends the realm of military threat as it is integral to statecraft and force is integral to statecraft and useful in many policy domains.

- 19 Examples of the traditional approach are found in Vital (1967 and 1971), Rothstein (1968), Mouritzen (1991) and Elgström (2000). For examples of the comprehensive approach, see Buzan (1983), Bauwens *et al.* (1996), Zajedova (1999/2000), Bailes and Thorhallsson (2013); Archer *et al.* (2014) and Crandall (2014).

Bibliography

- Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow (1999). *Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Longman.
- Andrén, Nils (2002). *Säkerhetspolitik: analyser och tillämpningar*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
- Archer, Clive (2014). 'The Nordic States and Security' in Clive Archer, Alyson Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds). *Small States and International Security: Europe and beyond*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Archer, Clive, Alyson Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds) (2014). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Art, Robert (1996). 'American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force' in *Security Studies*. Volume 5, Issue 4.
- Art, Robert (2004). 'Europe Hedges its Security Bets' in Thazha Paul and James Wirtz (eds). *Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Art, Robert (2009). 'The Fungibility of Force' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds). *The Use of Force*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Atkinson, David and Klaus Dodds (eds) (2002). *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*. London: Routledge.
- Bailes, Alyson and Baldur Thorhallsson. (2013). 'Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State Strategies' in *Journal of European Integration*. Volume 35, Issue 2.
- Bailes, Alyson, Jean Marc Rickli and Baldur Thorhallsson (2014). 'Small States, Survival and Strategy' in Clive Archer, Alyson Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Baker Fox, Annette (1959). *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bauwens, Werner, Armand Clesse and Olav Knudsen (eds) (1996). *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Betts, Richard (1997). 'Should Strategic Studies Survive?' in *World Politics*. Volume 50, Issue 1.
- Betts, Richard (2000). 'Is Strategy an Illusion?' in *International Security*. Volume 25, Issue 2.
- Biehl, Heiko, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (eds) (2013). *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defense Politics across the Continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Birnbaum, Karl (1966). 'Strategiska doktriner' in Leif Backlund, Alf Edeen, Karl Birnbaum and Kjell Goldmann (eds). *Strategi i väst och öst. Studie utförd på uppdrag av 1965-års försvarsutredning*. Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar.
- Bjørn, Claus (2003). 'Arveføljeproblem og Treårskrig' in Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen (eds). *Dansk udenrigspolitik historie – Fra helstat til nationalstat: 1814–1914*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon.
- Blatter, Joachim and Markus Haverland (2012). *Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Buzan, Barry (1983). *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in international relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, Barry (2016). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 25th Anniversary*. Colchester: EPCR Press.
- Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Carlgren, Wilhelm (1977). *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*. London: Ernest Benn.
- Christensen, Thomas and Jack Snyder (1990). 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity' in *International Organization*. Volume 44, Issue 2.
- Clover, Charles (1999). 'Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics' in *Foreign Affairs*. Volume 78, Issue 2.
- Collins, John (2002). *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Collins, John (2011). *Military Preparedness: Principles Compared with U.S. Practices, Report #94–48*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Crandall, Matthew (2014). 'Soft Security Threats and Small States: the case of Estonia' in *Defense Studies*. Volume 14, Issue 1.
- Cummings, Stephen (1993). 'Brief Case: The First Strategists' in *Long Range Planning*, Volume 26, Issue 3.
- Dalsjö, Robert (2014). 'The Hidden Rationality of Sweden's Policy of Neutrality during the Cold War' in *Cold War History*. Volume 14, Issue 2.
- De Wit, Bob and Ron Meyer (1994). *Strategy: Process, Content, Context – An International Perspective*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.
- Dinan, Desmond (2005). *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Doerer, Fredrik (2008). *In Search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988–1993*. Stockholm: Stockholm University.
- Doerer, Fredrik (2016). 'Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic Culture' in *Comparative Strategy*. Volume 35, Issue 4.
- East, Maurice (1973). 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models' in *World Politics*. Volume 25, Issue 4.
- Edström, Håkan (2003). *Hur styrs Försvarsmakten? – Politisk och militär syn på försvarsdoktrin under 1990-talet*. Umeå: Umeå University.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2013). *Political Aspirations and Perils of Security – Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds) (2014a). *Alike or Different? – Strategic Thinking in Scandinavia*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2014b). *Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter det kalla krigets slut*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Elgström, Ole (2000). *Images and Strategies for Autonomy – Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19th Century*. London: Kluwer Academic.
- Ersel, Hasan (2004). 'Optimal Growth under Military Threat' in *Defence and Peace Economics*. Volume 15, Issue 2.
- Feldbæk, Ole (1994). 'Denmark and the Baltic, 1720–1864' in Göran Rystad, Klaus-Richard Böhme and Wilhelm Carlgren (eds). *In Quest of Trade and Security: The Baltic in Power Politics 1500–1990*. Stockholm: Probuss.

- Finnemore, Martha (1996). *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, Martha (2003). *Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Freier, Nathan (2008). *Known Unknowns: Unconventional Strategic Shocks in Defense Strategy Development*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
- Galvin, Thomas (2015). *Military Preparedness*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press.
- Garthoff, Raymond (2001). 'Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities' in Gerald Haines and Robert Leggett (eds). *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union*. Washington, DC: CIA.
- George, Alexander and Andrew Bennet (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Glenn, John, Darryl Howett and Stuart Poore (eds) (2004). *Neorealism vs. Strategic Culture*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Goetschel, Laurent (ed.) (1998). *Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies*. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.
- Gray, Colin (1999). 'Strategic Culture and Context: The First Generation Strikes Back' in *Review of International Studies*. Volume 25, Issue 1.
- Gray, Colin (2006). *Strategy and History. Essays on Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Gray, Colin (2010). *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, Colin (2014). *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, Colin (2015). *The Future of Strategy*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Grøn, Caroline and Anders Wivel (2011). 'Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy' in *Journal of European Integration*. Volume 33, Issue 5.
- Gyllensporre, Dennis (2010). *Competing and Complementary Perspectives on the EU as a Crisis Management Actor*. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (Maastricht University).
- Götz, Norbert (2009). 'Blue-eyed Angels' at the League of Nations: The Genevese Construction of Norden' in Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). *Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Haas, Ernst (1966). 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Volume 5, Issue 4.
- Hammerstad, Anne and Ingrid Boas (2015). 'National Security Risks? Uncertainty, Austerity and Other Logics of Risk in the UK Government's National Security Strategy' in *Cooperation and Conflict*. Volume 50, Issue 4.
- Hanf, Kenneth and Ben Soetendorp (eds) (1998). *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hansen, Lene (2002). 'Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe' in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds). *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*. London: Routledge.
- Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2014). 'Clausewitz's Concept of Strategy—Balancing Purpose, Aims and Means' in *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Volume 37, Issue 6–7.
- Hey, Jeanne (2003). *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

- Hinsley, Harry (1963). *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1995). *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964–1994*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Holmström, Mikael (2011). *Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- Honig, Jan Willem and Jan Ångström (2012). 'Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan' in *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Volume 35, Issue 5.
- Huntington, Samuel (1997). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.
- Höjer, Torvald (1954). *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia 1810–1844*. Stockholm: Norstedts.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2006). *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2007). 'Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War' in *International Peacekeeping*. Volume 14, Issue 4.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2009). 'Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Volume 47, Issue 1.
- Jansson, Allan (1961). *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia 1844–1872*. Stockholm: Norstedts.
- Jervis, Robert (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995). 'Thinking about Strategic Culture' in *International Security*. Volume 19, Issue 4.
- Jones, Shepard (1969). *The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kaldor, Mary (2006). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. London: Polity Press.
- Karsten, Peter, Peter Howell and Artis Frances Allen (1984). *Military Threats: A Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter (ed.) (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keohane, Robert (1969). 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics' in *International Organization*. Volume 23, Issue 2.
- Kier, Elizabeth (1997). *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Krause, Volker and David Singer (2001). 'Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns' in Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (eds). *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.
- Labs, Eric (1992). 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?' in *Security Studies*. Volume 1, Issue 3.
- Lantis, John and Darryl Howlett (2016). 'Strategic Culture' in John Baylis, James Wirtz and Colin Gray (eds). *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Levy, Jack (1994). 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield' in *International Organization*. Volume 48, Issue 2.
- Liddell Hart, Basil (1975). *Strategy*. New York: Praeger.
- Lidegaard, Bo (2003). *Dansk udenrigspolitik historie – Overleveren 1914–1945*. Copenhagen: Danmarks nationalleksikon.
- Lindley-French, Julian (2007). *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – The Enduring Alliance*. New York: Routledge.
- Lykke, Arthur (1989). 'Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy' in Arthur Lykke (ed.). *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
- Mackinder, Halford (1904). 'The Geographical Pivot of History' in *Geographical Journal*. Volume 23, Issue 4.
- March, James and Johan Olsen (1996). 'Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions' in *International Journal of Policy and Administration*. Volume 9, Issue 3.
- March, James and Johan Olsen (1998). 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' in *International Organization*. Volume 52, Issue 4.
- McIvor, Anthony (2012). *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Mearsheimer, John (2001). *The Tragedy of International of Great Power Politics*. London: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Megoran, Nick, Sevara Sharapova and Alisher Faizullaev (2005). 'Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland' – A Help or Hindrance?' in *Geographical Journal*. Volume 171, Issue 2.
- Meinander, Henrik (2006). *Finlands historia: linjer, strukturer, vändpunkter*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- Morgenthau, Hans (2006). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Mouritzen, Hans (1991). 'Tension between the Strong, and the Strategies of the Weak' in *Journal of Peace Research*. Volume 28, Issue 2.
- Neumann, Iver (2002). 'This Little Piggy Stayed at Home: Why Norway is Not a Member of the EU' in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds). *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*. London: Routledge.
- Neumann, Iver and Sieglinde Gstöhl (2006). 'Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?' in Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Jessica Beyer (eds). *Small States in International Relations*. Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press.
- Nevakivi, Jukka (2001). 'Finnish and Swedish Security Policy before 1945' in Bo Hultdt (ed.). *Finnish and Swedish Security: Comparing National Policies*. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College.
- Nye, Joseph (1990). 'The Changing Nature of World Power' in *Political Science Quarterly*. Volume 105, Issue 2.
- Nye, Joseph (2004). *Soft Power*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books Group.
- Nye, Joseph (2011). *The Future of Power*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books Group.
- Posen, Barry (1984). *The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rappard, William (1934). 'Small States in the League of Nations' in *Political Science Quarterly*. Volume 49, Issue 4.
- Rathbun, Brian (2008). 'A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism' in *Security Studies*. Volume 17, Issue 2.
- Reiter, Dan (1994). 'Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past' in *World Politics*. Volume 46, Issue 4.

- Rose, Gideon (1998). 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy' in *World Politics*. Volume 51, Issue 1.
- Rosenau, James and Mary Durfee (2000). *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rosenthal, Uriel and Alexander Kouzmin (1997). 'Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making' in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. Volume 7, Issue 2.
- Rothstein, Robert (1968). *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Salmon, Patrick (1997). *Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2007). 'Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise' in Francis Fukuyama (ed.). *Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Schweller, Randall (1994). 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In' in *International Security*. Volume 19, Issue 1.
- Schweller, Randall (2004). 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing' in *International Security*. Volume 29, Issue 2.
- Sheehan, Michel (1996). *Balance of Power: History and Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Slantchev, Branislav (2011). *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Snyder, Glenn (1996). 'Process Variables in Neorealist Theory' in *Security Studies*. Volume 5, Issue 3.
- Snyder, Jack (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (R-2154-AF)*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Snyder, Jack (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Steinmetz, Robert and Anders Wivel (eds) (2010). *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Stone, John (2011). *Military Strategy – The Politics and Technique of War*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2007). *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. New York: Random House.
- Tangredi, Sam (2002) 'Assessing New Missions' in Hans Binnendijk (ed.). *Transforming America's Military*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press.
- Taylor, Peter (2002). 'Geopolitics, Political Geography and Political Science' in David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds, (eds). *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*. London: Routledge.
- Tellis, Ashley, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson (2001). *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*. Santa Barbara, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Thorhallsson, Baldur (2000). *The Role of Small States in the European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Thrall, Trevor and Jane Cramer (2009). *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11*. London: Routledge.
- Toje, Asle (2011). 'The European Union as a Small Power' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Volume 49, Issue 1.
- Vital, David (1967). *The Inequality of States – A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. Oxford: Calderon Press.

- Vital, David (1971). *The Survival of Small States – Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University press.
- Wahlbäck, Krister (1986). *The Roots of Swedish Neutrality*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- Walt, Stephen (1985). 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power' in *International Security*. Volume 9, Issue 4.
- Walt, Stephen (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove: Waveland Press.
- Westberg, Jacob (2003). *Den nationella drömträdgården: den stora berättelsen om den egna nationen i svensk och brittisk Europadebatt*. Stockholm: Stockholm University.
- Westberg, Jacob (2012a) 'Den nordiska småstatsidealismens rötter' in Fredrik Doeser, Magnus Petersson and Jacob Westberg (eds). *Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund – Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete i det gamla och nya Europa*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Westberg, Jacob (2012b) 'Finskt och svenskt försvarssamarbete under mellankrigstiden: Det hotade landet och det skyddade' in Fredrik Doeser, Magnus Petersson and Jacob Westberg (eds). *Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund – Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete i det gamla och nya Europa*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Westberg, Jacob (2015). *Svenska säkerhetsstrategier*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Westberg, Jacob (2016). 'Säkerhet utan alliansfrihet: svenska alliansstrategiers teori och praktik' in *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*. Volume 118, Issue 4.
- Wiberg, Håkan (1987). 'The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences' in *Journal of Peace Research*. Volume 24, Issue 4.
- Wight, Martin (1986). *Power Politics*. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books/RUSI.
- Wivel, Anders, Alyson Bailes and Clive Archer (2014) 'Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security' in Clive Archer, Alyson Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. Abingdon: Routledge
- Zajedova, Ivi (1999/2000). 'The Baltic States' Security and NATO Enlargement' in *Perspectives*. Number 13.

3 Before the shocks

3.1 The Nordic countries preparing for a new millennium¹

During 1989–91 the Berlin Wall was demolished, the WP dissolved and the USSR disintegrated. Hence, the Cold War came to an end, which dramatically changed the strategic settings not only for the Nordic countries but also for Europe as a whole. Soon the international organisations with security on their agenda adjusted to the new settings. Already in 1991, members of NATO approved a strategic concept reflecting the new landscape of security policy. Later that year the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between NATO and its former adversaries in the WP. In 1992 the UN adopted *An Agenda for Peace* with the ambition to further strengthen the UN framework for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI of the UN Charter soon came to be applied with much more vigour.

The same year, in 1992, members of the EC signed the Maastricht Treaty thus transforming the community into a union, the EU, and launching a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Furthermore, in 1992, the Western European Union (WEU) adopted the Petersberg tasks focusing on humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and crises management including peacemaking. Two years later, NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme offering non-members of the Alliance an option to develop bilateral cooperation with NATO. Both Sweden and Finland jumped on this opportunity and became NATO partners the very same year. In 1995, Finland and Sweden joined the EU.

The USSR was not the only state disintegrating in 1991. In June that year, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence and seceded from Yugoslavia. Soon war and insurgency erupted throughout the former federation. The UN launched several military missions but proved unable to manage the situation. In December 1995, the UNSC unanimously decided to transfer the authority of the military operations from the UN-led United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). This was the starting point of NATO going out-of-area assuming command of military operations mandated by the UNSC. All four Nordic countries became troop contributors to the efforts of the Alliance.

In 1996 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was created as a European pillar within NATO, allowing European countries, through the WEU, to use NATO assets if considered desirable and necessary. In late 1997, the EU members signed the Amsterdam treaty incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the portfolio of the Union when the treaty entered into force in May 1999. In April 1999, NATO adopted yet another strategic concept focusing even more on the out-of-area dimension. In the shadow of the concept signing, and without approval from the UNSC, NATO launched *Operation Allied Force* against Serbia-Montenegro. As members of the Alliance Denmark and Norway joined the airstrikes while Finland and Sweden, being NATO partners, did not. When preparing for the new millennium the developments during the 1990s had shaped a completely different strategic landscape compared to the situation less than a decade before.

3.2 Denmark

Already in the mid-1990s, the Danish Cabinet decided to appoint a special commission to investigate the needs of further transformation of the Danish Armed Forces regarding the strategic developments. The Defence Commission presented its report on 18 November 1998. Six months later, on 25 May 1999, the analysis of the Commission was followed by a broad defence agreement reached between the major political parties represented in the Danish Parliament, *Folketinget*.² In addition to these two major documents, the two following annual reports presented by the Danish MoD, in 2000 (for the year 1999) and 2001 (for the year 2000) have been analysed.

3.2.1 *International environment*

In the late 1990s, the Defence Commission did not deem it likely that any direct military threats against mainland Denmark, Greenland or the Faroe Islands would emerge during the upcoming decade. However, this did not mean that the Commission neglected potential risks and challenges against Danish territory and Denmark's immediate neighbourhood. Political and social instability in the Baltic Sea region and on the Balkans, environmental catastrophes as well as transnational criminality, organised crime and international terrorism were perceived with increased concern. Aside from the direct risks against Denmark and its NATO allies, other challenges outside Europe were observed. Asymmetric warfare, information warfare, missiles as well as the spread of missile technology, failing states and interstate wars such as between Ethiopia and Eritrea were perceived as indirect threats (Danish Defence Commission 1998).

In the political agreement between several political parties regarding the defence policy 2000–4 it was concluded that the challenges in NATO's neighbourhood demanded that priority was given to the international dimension of Denmark's security and defence policy (Danish MoD 1999). The Danish MoD was more focused on the country's annual reports. The former enmity between

east and west was explicitly declared being of less, if any, relevance for the current strategic situation. Instead, the unsolved situation on the Balkans was a source of great concern. Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia were all mentioned as being of importance regarding Denmark's security. The interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was also mentioned but not at the same level as the cases on the Balkans (Danish MoD 2000; 2001).

3.2.2 Ends

The Defence Commission identified keeping the security order that emerged in Europe after the end of the Cold War as a key objective. Hence, the ends were more related to an indirect than a direct approach. Preventing re-nationalisation of not only security in a broad sense but of defence issues was high on the agenda. As was also strengthening the cooperation within NATO with a focus on collective defence. However, not all discussions focused on the continental level. Both a narrower national and a broader international perspective were applied. In the former case, protecting the political integrity and defending the territorial sovereignty were mentioned as fundamental objectives. In the latter case, promoting international norms such as human rights and preventing political instability were considered important. In order to ensure relevant contributions to NATO's efforts, the Danish Armed Forces needed to participate in international military missions ranging from peace support and crisis avoidance operations to peace enforcement operations (Danish Defence Commission 1998).

In the defence agreement, the signing political parties stressed the importance of neutralising threats against the NATO alliance as well as defending Danish territory. Crisis management capabilities were therefore at the top of the priority list (Danish MoD 1999). The MoD presented similar conclusions as the Commission but included the role of the UN in the discussions. However, this recommendation did not prevent the MoD from stressing the protecting of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and the promoting of peace in Europe. The latter case presented two especially vital aspects: preventing hostilities from erupting in the Balkans and rebuilding Kosovo. The MoD also gave priority to maintaining the image of Denmark being one of the most reliable members of NATO as well as generally promoting Danish interests when considered possible and appropriate (Danish MoD 2000; 2001).

3.2.3 Means

At the start of the new millennium the Danish Armed Forces consisted of three well-balanced services covering a broad spectrum of capabilities. However, this image did not last.

At the political-strategic level, the Danish Defence Commission identified international organisations such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO as important forums for Denmark's

Table 3.1 The core of Denmark's military capability in 1999

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 3 Brigades	3 Submarines	3 Squadrons with 69 F-16 A/B
1 Rapid Reaction Brigade	3 Corvettes	8 Air Defence Batteries
248 Main Battle Tanks	4 Ocean Patrol Vessels	
	23 Missile/Patrol Craft	

Source: IISS 1999.

possibilities for influencing global politics. NATO was considered especially crucial when completing Denmark's ambitions in the Baltic Sea region and eastern Europe as a whole. International institutions and regimes were also perceived as fundamental when it came to issues such as arms control and disarmament. The Danish Armed Forces were given an instrumental role when implementing its security policy. The Navy's role in preventive diplomacy is an example of the latter but the role of all services was highlighted when stressing the importance of building the image of Denmark being a trustworthy NATO member. At the military-strategic level, the discussions were more detailed with a clear focus on transforming the Armed Forces to an expeditionary force. As for the Army, the international brigade was given priority. In order to increase the deployability the airlift capability was given more weight together with all-weather capacity and the armament of the international task force unit of the Air Force. The blue sea capacity of the Navy was another area of importance. More ocean-going vessels and submarines were on the top of the priority list (Danish Defence Commission 1998).

Obviously, the Danish Cabinet was successful in reaching a broad political agreement on the new Danish security and defence policy in these regards. All aspects of the transformation of the Armed Forces mentioned were included in the agreement that underscored the importance of military means in the service of politics. In addition, the statement mentioned the entire conflict spectrum. Consequently, Danish military was to contribute to the efforts of primarily NATO in international operations ranging from humanitarian crises via conflict management to more demanding high-intensity operations (Danish MoD 1999).

The MoD took the discussions even further. It stressed the NATO membership rather than the decision in not participating in the EU's military dimension. To enable the establishment of international units in all three services the role of conscription and territorial defence units were given lower priority and the total number of troops was shaved down. The National Guard was, however, trusted with more demanding tasks and at the same time reorganised and re-equipped in order to increase its mobility. The expeditionary units of the Army were equipped with new helicopters, tactical command and control systems and armoured personal carriers while the main battle tanks underwent modernisation. The Air Force procured the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Navy new submarines. In the latter case, cooperation with Norway and Sweden on the Viking class project was the main option (Danish MoD 2000; 2001).

3.2.4 Ways

The Defence Commission stressed the need for closer cooperation within NATO and with individual NATO members regarding both aspects of strategy, i.e. the use of military force and the generation of military force, respectively. In the latter case, the options regarding potential partners were viewed more inclusively. Consequently, non-NATO countries like Finland and Sweden were not excluded. The Commission's discussions were conducted primarily at the political-strategic level and the only proof of more operational or tactical awareness was related to the use of air power. The conclusion was that both offensive and defensive air operations were fundamental elements of the Danish military strategy (Danish Defence Commission 1998). However, the political agreement among the core of the parties represented in the Danish Parliament did not go into detail on this. Instead, the arguments that the Commission and the MoD presented were approved without further discussions (Danish MoD 1999).

Contrary to the Commission, the Danish MoD presented discussions on several levels. At the political-strategic level, the MoD, in addition to the conclusions of the Commission, pointed at the importance of continued integration of NATO's partners within the frames of the PfP programme. Regarding the military-strategic level, both national defence and the international aspects were analysed. In the former case, the cooperation with Germany and Poland within the frames of Multinational Corps Northeast was emphasised and in the latter case, the participation in multilateral NATO-led operation such as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was identified as key for success. At the operational and tactical levels, the importance of high readiness was stressed. The MoD included the UN in these calculations and especially mentioned the key role of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), the Danish-led initiative intended to establish an international standby unit ready for peace support operations. It is worth noting that cooperation within the frames of the EU was explicitly dismissed in this context. When it comes to the force generating aspect cooperations with the other Nordic countries as well as the US were preferred (Danish MoD 2000; 2001).

3.2.5 Summary – the Danish strategy before the first shock

The Danish government presented a focused assessment regarding the international environment. Direct military threats against Denmark were dismissed. Instead, the discussions were concentrated on the developments in NATO's neighbourhood and especially those on the Balkans. The government also took a closer look at challenges from non-state actors such as transnational and organised crime and international terrorism. However, the risks of interstate conflicts and wars were not neglected. At one end of the threat spectrum, these risks were associated with advanced technology related to information warfare and weapons and their delivery systems. At the other end of the spectrum, the concerns were emerging from weak and failing states. Keeping the present security order in

Europe, preventing re-nationalisation of defence policy and strengthening the cooperation within NATO in addition to protecting the political integrity and defending the territorial sovereignty of Denmark were the objectives the Danish government was giving priority to on the political-strategic level. At the military-strategic level promoting Denmark's image, being a trustworthy member of NATO, was the key end. Consequently, Danish Armed Forces placed its ability to participate in a wide range of military operation including peace enforcement operations and high-intensity warfare at the top of the priority lists (see, for example, Jensen, 2008).

In order to meet these ends the Danish government concluded that a continued transformation of the Danish Armed Forces was not an option but a necessity. In order to develop the expeditionary capabilities all services were to both re-equip and reorganise. Therefore, a new effort was undertaken to develop the international brigade of the Army, the airlift capability and the international task force unit of the Air Force, and to the blue sea units of the Navy, i.e. the ocean-going vessels and the submarines. The lower priority given to the territorial defence did not mean that the National Guard was neglected, quite the opposite. More demanding tasks and increased mobility were on the agenda. High readiness was considered an overarching mean at the military-strategic level. Despite being a member of the EU, Denmark regarded its NATO membership to be the fundamental mean at the political-strategic level. Consequently, closer cooperation within NATO and with individual NATO members, regarding the use of military force as well as the generation of military force, was identified as the primary way ahead. Force integration with other NATO allies was an important method when implementing this part of the strategy (see, for example, Doeser, 2011).

As a result, the cooperation with Germany and Poland within the frames of Multinational Corps Northeast took centre stage. Multilateralism as the key way was also used in terms of conducting international operations. Even if it was decided to stay outside the cooperation within the EU in this regard, Denmark took initiative to establish high-readiness military units within the UN system. The ability to conduct both offensive and defensive air operations was fundamental for the Danish use-of-force strategy. Regarding force generation, the Danish ways were more inclusive as it cooperated with all Nordic countries as well as the US. It is noteworthy that the Danish defence policy seems to have been rather unproblematic to implement despite relatively weak cabinets. Changes in power between different constellations among the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament do not seem to have had influence in this regard. We therefore argue that the Danish strategy was a result of a broad political consensus (see, for example, Olesen and Nordby 2014).

3.3 Finland

On 13 June 2001, the Finnish Cabinet submitted the report *Finnish Security and Defence Policy* to the Finnish Parliament, *Riksdagen*. Six months later, on 14 December, the statement by the Defence Committee was presented. We will

discuss the analysis of this statement and the statements of other committees of the Finnish Parliament presented after 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in Chapter 4. The defence decision that preceded the report from 2001 was already assumed in 1997 in the beginning of the Finnish defence transformation process. We therefore focus on the Cabinet's report from June 2001 in our analysis of the Finnish defence strategy before the first shock.

3.3.1 International environment

The Cabinet concluded that, following the end of the Cold War, the risk of a large-scale conflict in Europe was minimal and that no separate military threat was directed against Finland in the near future. Despite these favourable conditions, the Cabinet declared that Finland's decision on defence matters still had to be based on Finland's geopolitical position and historical experience, and that a credible defence capability would be needed even in the longer run. States were, according to the report, increasingly driven by a common value base and common economic and social institutions. Another positive external development was a trend towards deepening international cooperation and integration with a number of central European states and soaring membership applications for both the EU and NATO. According to the report, the Union was increasing its influence in the sphere of foreign and security policy, improving its capabilities to prevent security problems and providing comprehensive security. The US was assumed to continue to be the leading actor in the international security system. The US was actively involved in security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. NATO was described as an important forum for maintaining US presence in Europe, a promotor of a wide cooperation in crisis management and the institution responsible for the collective defence of its member states. Russia was, according to the report, striving to achieve economic reform and better social conditions. Though Russia was assumed to be becoming gradually more stable and to have found its role on the international stage, there were still many uncertainties about its future acts (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

Despite the overall positive developments, the Cabinet also took note of a number of potential security threats. Regional or local conflicts could break out even within Europe or in its near environment. Recent war experiences in the Balkans, East Timor and some African countries, including violence against civilians and ethnic cleansing, had, the Cabinet argued, shown the necessity of a broad concept for crisis management. Other security threats mentioned in the report was proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), military force used against infrastructure critical to the functioning of society, information threats, human rights violations, terrorism, international crime and non-antagonistic threats relating to environmental change and disasters, epidemics and sudden and large migration of people and vulnerabilities relating to economic interdependences. To prevent these transnational, non-state and non-antagonistic threats, further international and European cooperation was deemed necessary (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

Regarding threats related to a military attack from another country, the 2001 report was presented during a transitional phase that had begun with the defence decision in 1997. This decision included a shift in focus from the traditional large-scale attack on Finnish territory to a potential strategic strike. Such a strike was expected to quickly paralyse and seize control of vital objects and subjugate the Finnish Cabinet. The strategic strike was assumed including the joint use of the Air Force, artillery, missiles, electronic warfare and Special Forces. As compared to the threat scenarios in the 1997 report, the 2001 report added regional crises that may have both direct and indirect effects on Finland (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

3.3.2 *Ends*

In the Cabinet's report from 2001, the overall aim of Finland's security policy was defined to be promoting the security and well-being of the nation and its citizens, and protecting the basic values of society in a world of increasingly close cooperation. The objectives for the Armed Forces were to guarantee the independence of the country, to safeguard the living conditions, to prevent Finnish territory from being seized and to protect the state leadership. The Armed Forces' main tasks were specified as surveillance and safeguarding the territorial integrity, defending the nation, providing military training and participating in international peace support operations (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

3.3.3 *Means*

During the 1990s, the Finnish Armed Forces had gradually been reduced and further reductions were planned. General conscription was deemed necessary to ensure the capacity to defend the entire country and the most economical way to ensure access to a quantitatively sufficient number of wartime troops. To defend the country against a strategic strike it was imperative that the Finnish Armed Forces not only increased its readiness and mobility but also improved its capacities regarding surveillance, command and control systems, electronic warfare and developed capabilities related to offensive and defensive use of long-range fire (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

Table 3.2 The core of Finland's military capability in 1999

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
2 Armoured Brigades 14 Infantry Brigades 10 Jaeger Brigades 230 Main Battle Tanks	1 Corvette 9 Missile Craft	3 Squadrons with 64 F/A-18C/D

Source: IISS 1999.

According to the Cabinet, the number of wartime Army brigades would be reduced to 22 by the end of 2001. The wartime strength of the Armed Forces was expected to decrease to some 350,000 troops by the end of 2008. These reductions were driven by increased costs for defence material procurement. Major cuts were to be made on refresher training, territorial surveillance and procurement of wartime defence material. Both technological changes and a changing security environment motivated the structural changes, including the threats of strategic strikes and regional crises, as well as new demands related to international crisis management. Focal areas in developing the defence system were improvement of surveillance and command and control systems, and increased interoperability, firepower and mobility of the new readiness brigades. With new governmental support, the Army was expected to reach the required level for preventing and repelling a strategic strike by the end of the upcoming decade. The main development target was the upgrading of three Jaeger brigades to readiness brigades. Regarding territorial surveillance and defence, the Armed Forces were to continue the close cooperation with the Frontier Guard. As for military crisis management, Finland maintained a rapid deployment force including two infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, one transport company and a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) company specialising in civil military cooperation. In addition, the Navy kept two minelayers operational over time. Finally, a study on potential participation of the Air Force in the designated crisis response force was initiated (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

3.3.4 Ways

The Cabinet presented clearly defined concepts for both national defence and Finnish contributions to international crisis management including military participation. The defence of Finland was based on two principles; *territorial defence* and *national defence* (total defence). The main idea of the former principle, territorial defence, was to hold possession of strategically important areas while taking the advantage of the country's geographical depth, which would supposedly gradually lead an invader to be wore down and delayed. In decisive points, where the Finnish Armed Forces could create local superiority, the enemy would be repelled and defeated. The logic behind the latter principle, the national defence, envelops precautionary measures and preparations to combat threats to society based on cooperation between the Armed Forces and various governmental agencies as well as private actors. The comprehensive system therefore included military, economic and civil defence, social and health care, the functioning of technical systems, law and order and defence information (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

Regarding international crisis management, the report emphasised the importance of CIMIC. Another method for international crisis management mentioned in the report was the effort to build and share capacities together with other states. In this context, the report outlined both the EU and NATO's efforts to create common capacities for international crisis management and interoperability between forces from different countries. In this context, the report highlighted

the importance of NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the EU and NATO cooperation on the latter organisation's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The development of Finland's own readiness was taking account of the EU aim of achieving military crisis management capability in 2003. Finland also participated in the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), a cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden aiming at establishing troop contributions that complemented each other. Deficiencies in the command and control and support functions for the planned Nordic force pool brigade was, for example, planned to be eliminated in 2003 (Finnish Cabinet 2001).

3.3.5 Summary – the Finnish strategy before the first shock

The descriptions of the security environment in the 2001 report of the Cabinet has been interpreted as a shift in Finland's defence and security policy towards a more international direction with a stronger emphasis on transnational non-state security threats and Finnish contributions to international crisis management and multilateral security cooperation. When the report was presented to the Parliament, it was criticised for placing too much emphasis on international crisis management and expressing 'an excessively rosy picture of developments in international relations' (Limnéll 2012:36–8).³

According to a study of the changing Finnish conceptions of war in the post-Cold War era by Jyri Raitasalo, these changes were evident already in the reports on defence policy from 1995 and 1997. In the report from 1997, the Finnish defence transformation was also linked to the development of the technological development related to the information society and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In the report of 1997, the conclusion was that it was necessary to reduce the quantity of troops to find resources that could be used to increase preparedness, raise the quality of training of the Armed Forces, invest in new military technology and develop capabilities to participate in out-of-area military crisis management. The report from 1997 also contained an analysis of the Russian defence reform that envisaged Russia's investment in increasing the level of professionalism in its Armed Forces as well as its investment in new defence equipment with the aim to create 'fully equipped combat troops compromising all branches of forces [...] for deployment on all the main fronts' (Raitasalo 2010:48–57).⁴

Limnéll and Raitasalo's studies and the analysis of the Cabinet's 2001 report demonstrates that Finland had begun developing capacities need for participation in military crisis management well before 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks. Finland was also transforming its defence capacities to be able to manage strategic strikes, creating capacities that, together with increased interoperability with NATO countries and Sweden, would make Finland able to both give and receive military assistance. In this way, Finland prepared its Armed Forces for handling shocks similar to the 2008 and 2014 war in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. However, the transformation of the Finnish Armed Forces was not expected to

have been concluded until 2003 (the Nordic brigade and the EU resources for military crisis management) and 2010 (the national readiness brigades needed to repel a strategic strike). A further limitation regarding Finnish capacities to contribute to military crisis management and military support to states that had suffered armed aggression was the restrictions regarding coercive uses of military force (see, for example, Edström, 2003).

At the start of the new millennium, Finland clearly fulfilled the criteria for being a third ranked power in terms of both national defence capabilities and a proven ability to contribute to military crisis management. However, its non-military alignment and self-imposed restrictions regarding participations in sanctions related to Article 42 and 51 of the UN Charter still made it an open question to which extent Finland would be prepared to support the US in the upcoming operations related to the Global War on Terror. Finland's active supportive policy towards both NATO/PfP and the EU in matters related to international crisis management and multilateral security cooperation is also a good example of an active small state strategy aiming at improving the own country's security situation by supporting common efforts for cooperative security (see, for example, Jakobsen 2009 and Palosaari 2011).

3.4 Norway

In the summer of 2000 both the Norwegian ChoD and the Norwegian Defence Council presented their final reports with recommendations on how to develop the Norwegian Armed Forces for the upcoming years. The former work had been initiated already in November 1998 and the latter in July 1999. Based on these suggestions the Norwegian MoD 2001 presented the Cabinet's defence bill in February 2001. In early June the same year, the Defence Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, *Stortinget*, delivered its response to the bill. These four documents are used in the analysis presented in this section.

3.4.1 International environment

The ChoD did not expect an interstate war, at least not within the upcoming decade, and especially not in Europe. Not all forms of armed violence and conflict were, however, regarded as historical. Terrorism, rogue and/or failing states and the risks involved with WMD were perceived as emerging threats. Consequently, both the national and the international arena were considered as potential areas of operations (Norwegian ChoD 2000).

These views were also present in the discussions of the Defence Council. The Council stressed, in addition, the challenges related to the rapid technological developments in areas such as information and cyber warfare and missile technology. In contrast to the ChoD, the Council seems to have been more reluctant to dismiss Russia's military capability. Since it also provided a much broader security analysis ranging from humanitarian and environmental catastrophes to intermediate range nuclear forces and regional armed conflicts one might expect

different conclusions and recommendations. This was not, however, the case. Even if the articulation of the Council slightly differed from the military vocabulary, the quintessence was similar; Norway had to be prepared to support NATO allies on their territories, and NATO had to be ready to go out-of-area in order to remain relevant (Norwegian Defence Council 2000).

The MoD seems to reluctantly have accepted not to focus on Norway's geopolitical position. Norway's natural resources were still at the core of the discussions. Although observing the challenges reported by the ChoD and the Council respectively, Russia was considered a source of concern, especially militarily. Russian capability of military force projection in Norway's immediate neighbourhood was seen as troubling. The shift in focus to the lower levels of the conflict spectrum and from interstate to intrastate conflicts was not championed by the entire European theatre but also by northern Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Threats directed to oil and gas installations and infrastructure seem, however, to have been a common theme in the considerations (Norwegian MoD 2001).

The position of the Parliament was similar to the Cabinet's. Russia was, in other words, to remain as a key aspect when formulating the defence policy. The Defence Committee, however, not only provided a broader approach to security than the other strategic actors regarding the thematic dimension; the spatial dimension was also more generously treated. Furthermore, the Committee stressed the high degree of uncertainty surrounding security and defence policy. According to the Committee, this did not only go for the domestic situation within certain actors, and especially Russia, but also the unorthodox ways crises could erupt and develop in the future. International terrorism was mentioned as such an example (Norwegian Defence Committee 2001).

3.4.2 Ends

The ChoD stressed the need to protect and secure Norway's national interests, including the vital functions of the society and the territorial integrity. The latter included the economic zones at sea. He expressed the military capability and readiness providing support for all kind of crises management and for international military operation abroad as an end itself (Norwegian ChoD 2000).

The Council also underscored the national interests but referred to peace, stability and sovereign rights rather than to territorial integrity. It also gave priority to political freedom of action and expressed the NATO membership as an end itself. Even if the Council discussed all levels of escalation from peace to war, its focus was on the lower levels of the spectrum. Consequently, the ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to support civilian authorities in peacetime crisis avoidance and conflict management was expressed as a military objective. However, the Council did not shy away from expressing objectives on the higher end of spectrum as well. The ability to deter an adversary from attacking Norway militarily and supporting the Alliance in Article 5 operations were also mentioned as key military objectives (Norwegian Defence Council 2000).

Norway's credibility as a NATO ally was considered to be of crucial importance by the MoD. Consequently, the ability to fulfil the obligations that come with the membership was treated not only as a core military objective but as a political end as well. Protecting and promoting Norway's national interests was fundamental in the discussions that often were held on a quite abstract level. Hence political freedom of action, sovereign rights, human rights, the rule of law and the principles of democracy were occasionally mentioned yet seldom specified. When a more detailed analysis was presented it included a discussion on the political stability in not only Russia but in all of northern Europe, the developing democracy in the Baltic Sea area as well as the protection of the Norwegian society and infrastructure. In the latter case oil and gas installations at land as well as off shore were of great concern (Norwegian MoD 2001).

The Committee presented similar analyses and conclusions as the Cabinet. The two major parties outside the Cabinet, the Conservative Party (Norwegian: *Høyre*) and the Progress Party (Norwegian: *Fremskrittspartiet*) stressed, however, the importance of territorial integrity, more intensively than the other parties (Norwegian Defence Committee 2001).

3.4.3 Means

By the end of the 1990s, each of the three services of the Norwegian Armed Forces built its personnel strength on conscription, with about 15,000 conscripts annually, and on cadre units.

The ChoD not only stressed the importance of NATO as a mean for Norway to achieve its ends but also argued for national Norwegian resources in order to fulfil Norway's obligations towards the Alliance. The national assets were exemplified with total defence and conscription. He recommended reductions in numbers in order to increase not only readiness and deployability, but also the quality. In balancing between the use of force and force generation, the ChoD favoured the former. Consequently, he argued for longer procurement cycles. Regarding key investments for the future, he pointed out both the air-to-air and the air-to ground capacity of the Air Force, replacing the current F-16 of the Air Force with about 50 new fighters, new frigates for the Navy and two high-readiness battalions for the Army. Although he considered cruise missiles and attack helicopters as desirable investments, the ChoD concluded that neither system would be affordable within the budget (Norwegian ChoD 2000).

Table 3.3 The core of Norway's military capability in 1999

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 3 Brigades	10 Submarines	4 Squadrons with 58 F-16A/B
1 Armoured Brigade	4 Frigates	1 Squadron with 15 F-5A/B
2 Mechanised Brigades	15 Missile Craft	
170 Main Battle Tanks		

Source: IISS 1999.

The Council agreed with most of the ChoD's conclusions but emphasised civil-military relations rather than total defence. The EU was, in addition to NATO, regarded as a potential mean when fulfilling the Norwegian security objectives. On the political-strategic level, the Council pointed at the value of binding international agreements such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in order to establish arms regimes and hence reduce the role of military instruments in international relations. The Council also focused on military issues but rather on how to generate military forces than on how to use them. It recommended increasing the number of NATO-led exercises on Norwegian soil. The Council also recommended reducing the Army's reserve organisation to two or three brigades in favour of more interoperability and integration with other NATO allies in multilateral units (Norwegian Defence Council 2000).

The MoD seems to have considered all recommendations and concluded that a deeper integration with the EU and NATO was the natural next step. Moreover, all grand strategic instruments were to be better integrated within the national context. At the military-strategic level air bases, the torpedo boat system and the Army's 14 territorial regiments were among the units suggested to be disbanded in order to transform the military into a high readiness, interoperable and deployable force. The core of the Army would consist of two brigades and a National Guard of 60,000 troops (Norwegian MoD 2001). The Defence Committee did not approve the reduction of the Army but instead recommended three brigades and a National Guard of 83,000 troops. In addition, the Committee argued for keeping the Navy's torpedo boat system. All other aspects seem, however, to have been welcomed by the Parliament (Norwegian Defence Committee 2001).

3.4.4 Ways

None of the strategic actors presented any more substantial discussions on the ways. This applies to both the political-strategic level and the military-strategic level. Regarding the former, the ChoD mentioned the importance of cooperating through NATO but also the UN among other international organisations. The analysis on the military-strategic level was slightly more substantial and mentioned the importance of receiving and hosting allied reinforcements for Norway's defence. As for the collective defence, the importance of common measures against WMD was notified and so was the option of pooling aircrafts among NATO allies (Norwegian ChoD 2000).

While stressing the importance of NATO membership the Council also argued for boosted efforts in Norway's activities and cooperations through the EU, the UN and the OSCE. The cooperation with the other Nordic countries through NORDCAPS complemented the existing transatlantic structure. The Council also argued that the NATO membership remained the only trustworthy option deterring a potential aggressor from attacking. Preparations for receiving allied reinforcements were hence perceived as a crucial measure (Norwegian Defence Council 2000).

At the political-strategic level, the MoD saw the bilateral cooperation as a complement to the efforts channelled through different international organisations. The US was a key partner in this regard. The Cabinet specified the responsibility for each of the Armed Forces' military operations, those that the Norwegian Armed Forces were to conduct solely and those that were to be managed through the Alliance collectively. Naturally, the operations related to the lower end of the conflict spectrum such as territorial integrity would be manageable by the Armed Forces itself (Norwegian MoD 2001). The Parliament took a similar position as the Cabinet. Primarily the cooperation through NATO and with other members of the Alliance, especially the US, was the preferred method at the political-strategic level. The EU and partners to the Alliance were also mentioned but mostly related to generating military force (Norwegian Defence Committee 2001).

3.4.5 Summary – the Norwegian strategy before the first shock

The Norwegian government presented a broad picture, both thematically and spatially, of the strategic environment before the first shock. On the one hand were the non-armed challenges, that indirectly, and if not managed properly, could escalate into violence. The challenges included social, economic and environmental aspects of international relations. On the other hand were the political and military aspects including the threat of use of armed violence, for example, arms races and the uncontrolled spread of WMD. The violence could include states as well as non-governmental actors such as terrorists and the conflicts characterised as both interstate and intrastate in their nature. Even if the government did not neglect the potential of untraditional forms of conflicts and risks, at the core of its elaboration was the military capability of Russia in the geographical proximity of Norway. The ends and objectives mentioned by the government were often related to Norway's national interests that envelop spatial and societal aspects such as control over certain territory and the protection of critical infrastructure. The interests also had a political dimension related to both the freedom of action at the national level and the functionality of NATO at the international level. More importantly, Norway's credibility as a reliable ally had an impact on both levels (see, for example, Edström 2003).

NATO was viewed both as an objective and as a mean. The government realised that Norway was unable to deter Russia on its own and in case such measures were needed Norway would be reliant on the Alliance. Without any immediate threat from Russia, the government had a clear path in proving itself as a trustworthy member. Norwegian military capability was a crucial mean in this regard. Consequently, quality, readiness and deployability were emphasised over quantity and capacities previously provided by allies to defend Norway, such as air-to-ground ability by the Air Forces, were now introduced as high-priority procurement for the Norwegian Air Force. When weighting high-readiness battalions for international operations against brigades for national tasks, the former were prioritised. To organise two such deployable battalions

the numbers of brigades needed to decrease to two. It is not clear to what extent the frigates were necessary for national purposes related to the surveillance of the economic zones and the protections of oil and gas installations at sea. When it comes to ways, no clear preference regarding the use of force other than NATO integration was explicitly expressed, at least not at the military-strategic level. On the political-strategic level, cooperation with other organisation as well as bilaterally with key partners were mentioned but mostly regarding other security instruments than the military. In terms of force generation, other ways were occasionally preferred, especially with other Nordic countries and the EU (see, for example, Edström and Ydstebø 2011).

3.5 Sweden

Due to the rapidly changing security environment, February 1998 to March 2000 turned out to be an exceptionally intense period in political considerations on security. The parliamentary composed Defence Commission had devised to inform the Cabinet in preparation for the defence bills and subsequently provided two reports, issued in February 1998 (Ds1998:9) and January 1999 (Ds 1999:2). Shortly thereafter, the Swedish Cabinet issued the two bills, presented 4 March (1998/99:74) and 18 November (1999/2000:30) respectively, and the Defence Committee of the Swedish Parliament, *Riksdagen*, responsible for preparing defence resolutions in the Parliament's response to the bills, provided two consecutive advices, released in May 1999 (1998/99:FöU5) and March 2000 (1999/2000:FöU2). Moreover, the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs became formally involved by, for the first time, producing a joint statement with the Defence Committee; the Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (1998/99:UFöU1). In addition, the deliberations and parliamentary decision concluded that assessments that are more frequent and political guidance were needed to adjust to external changes and therefore the defence resolution periods were shortened from 5 years to 3 years.

3.5.1 *International environment*

The Commission assessed that a positive security development had continued throughout the 1990s while uncertainties regarding domestic policies in Russia remained prevalent. The favourable trend was underpinned by palpable progress in international cooperation, primarily concerning the institutions for advancing European security. The expansion of NATO to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, its broader commitment to crisis management beyond its own territory as well as the cooperation with Russia and the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) were significant steps. Moreover, the EU's revised treaty included a more ambitious foreign policy agenda that reinforced the notion of a positive evolution. No invasion threat towards Sweden could be perceived in the coming decade, however military aggressions of limited nature, for instance including long-range weapons system, air strikes,

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, were possible, albeit unlikely (Swedish Defence Commission 1998; 1999).

The bills took stock of the Commission's findings as they acknowledged that a threat of invasion was not relevant in the near future. Instead, emphasis was placed on a broadened view on security to encompass distress on the civil society and crises during peacetime including coping with belligerent non-state actors. These actors comprised criminal and terror organisations, i.e. non-military entities that could potentially constitute a threat against a society through sabotage on vital functions of the society. In this context, the risks of illegal proliferation and use of WMD was highlighted. Moreover, challenges to security were increasingly addressed through international cooperation. Notably, the potential threats posed by military as well as non-military actors were described in general terms without disclosing any identities. Priorities on the Swedish neighbourhood and Europe were to be amalgamated with contributions to global security (Swedish Cabinet 1999a; 1999b). The Defence Committee subscribed to the Cabinet's recommendations (Swedish Defence Committee 1999; 2000). Because of the subsequent decisions by the Parliament, the traditional invasion threats were no longer to dimension the military forces.

3.5.2 *Ends*

Given the situation, the Commission argued that the overarching objective at the political-strategic level was economic and political cooperation that would result in increased economic growth and interdependence within the Baltic Sea region. This included fostering the democratic development in all countries in the region, Russian integration in the European cooperation and supporting the Baltic States' as well as Poland's aspirations to join the EU (Swedish Defence Commission 1998; 1999).

Despite the significant changes in the fluid security environment and the redefined policy priorities, the main objectives for the Armed Forces prevailed; to repel military attacks, ensure territorial integrity, contribute to international crisis management operations and support civil society in times of distress. However, the priority and emphasis changed. International crisis management was given increased attention while the relevance of repelling attacks faded. More importantly, the overhaul of the Armed Forces included ambitions to ensure that the organisation was preparing to address new and potential future threats (Swedish Cabinet 1999b). Arguably, this was the superior military objective. The titles of the two bills support this claim: *Changed security environment – transformed defence* (Swedish Cabinet 1999a) and *The new defence* (Swedish Cabinet 1999b).

3.5.3 *Means*

Based on the priorities, defence resources were increasingly dedicated to operationalise the evolved web of security cooperation in proximity to Sweden. These included the NORDCAPS, the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic

Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Sea Council and the Barents Council. Another priority was to support the Danish initiative to assist the UN with rapid response capabilities through the SHIRBRIG. In addition, bilateral support continued in the security sector to the Baltic States and relations with Russia were to be fostered. Within the national sphere, the military focus shifted from a defence designed to repel invasion to forces that were optimised to deal with more limited forms of aggression. At the heart of the transformation was the ability to adjust to new threats as they arose. Implicitly these new threats may be in other regions of the world underscoring the need to contribute to international operations (Swedish Defence Commission 1998; 1999).

While the Cabinet adopted the proposals on international cooperation, it went further in the national resource allocation. In essence, the security situation required less defence capabilities and, with a concept of adjustability, it would be possible to decrease readiness on many units given the current security projections. The Cabinet proposed a significantly reduced organisation while, according to its assessments, maintaining the qualitative level. The articulated strategic vision of the change was a shift from an invasion-based defence to a defence focused on operations. As a principle, all forces (except home guard units) needed to develop interoperability and capabilities to be able to conduct international operations. Consequently, it recommended deactivation of a significant number of peacetime establishments (units as well as staff organisations). Given the swift transition, it is reasonable to assume that the prospect of reduced expenditure was a key driver in the transformation. With reference to potential threats of sabotage, the Cabinet was more explicit in that it could also originate from Special Forces; hence, this was not only to be regarded as a non-military threat (Swedish Cabinet 1999a; 1999b).

Although the Defence Committee endorsed the shift from an invasion-based defence to a defence focused on operations and the associated deactivation of unit and staffs, three influential parties filed motion to reject this principal development and motioned against approval of the entire bill (Swedish Defence Committee 1999; 2000).⁵ At the beginning of the new millennia, prior to implementing the decided deactivation of combat units, the force comprised the key elements presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 The core of Sweden's military capability in 1999

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
3 Divisions with 13 Brigades	9 Submarines	5 Squadrons with 90 JAS-39
537 Main Battle Tanks	20 Missile Craft	1 Squadron with 30 AJS-37
	2 Coastal Artillery Brigades	2 Squadrons with 130 JA-37

Source: IISS 1999.

3.5.4 Ways

To influence and reinforce the positive security development, Sweden aspired to play a more influential role in the reshaping of the European security architecture. A broad range of areas was identified. A significant share of the efforts could be labelled as strengthening of institutions. The EU needed both a larger set of member states and a more ambitious agenda. The WEU's ability to conduct peace support operations was to be bolstered. The charter of the OSCE needed revision to reflect and support the changes in European security, including the area of arms control. Within the framework of NATO cooperation, it was important to develop the possibilities for non-allies to contribute to NATO-led operations. As Sweden was a non-permanent member of the UNSC 1997–8, it regarded itself to have an important responsibility for the global agenda and the continued effort to reform the UN (Swedish Defence Commission 1998; 1999).

The general approach that emerged was to achieve the security objectives through institutions by setting the agenda and influencing the progress towards an inclusive and cooperative security environment. International responses were deemed important as conflicts near Sweden were unlikely and because it would be a way to prevent the conflict to spread to Sweden. Mindful of the commitments in the Western Balkans and the recent failings of the UN elsewhere to respond to emerging crises, e.g. Rwanda, early and rapid responses to prevent and contain conflicts were important. High readiness on selective units in combination with interoperability to operate with partner forces in international operations was a priority. To that end, the cooperation with NATO on common standard and operability became a vehicle for change. The international cooperation also included development and procurement of equipment. Although Sweden had a significant commitment in the NATO operations in the Western Balkans, the support to international efforts were primarily towards UN and OSCE. The concept of adjustment of the Swedish forces to the new realities and priorities was important. It would allow a rapid shift from invasion focus and allow another logic to guide the force composition (Swedish Cabinet 1999a; 1999b).

The Defence Committee endorsed the recommendations put forward by the Cabinet. Notably, the Defence Committee was complemented by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Their important joint statement concluded that the Swedish security policy doctrine based on non-binding military security commitments with other countries or organisation would not pose any obstacle for pursuing a proactive role in international military cooperation, including participation in NATO-led peace support operations (Swedish Defence Committee 1999; 2000; Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 1999).

3.5.5 Summary – the Swedish strategy before the first shock

Indeed, the post-Soviet turmoil had significant impact on the forging of Swedish security policy. For once, its perennial neutrality doctrine settled in 1992 as the

Prime Minister declared that neutrality was but one possible option and not an end in itself. More importantly was that the dawn of a new era allowed, or necessitated, Sweden to redefine itself from an autonomous and self-reliant country towards becoming interwoven in the fabric of European security. The descending threat from the east allowed policy-makers to widen the security aperture. Concurrently it aligned to the European trend of cashing in on the peace dividend by cutting spending on defence (see, for example, Edström and Gyllensporre 2014c).

It was not, however, until 1999 that the collapse of the USSR and the WP transformed into substantial changes in priorities for the Swedish Armed Forces. In retrospect, this lag may have seemed unwarranted; however, given the historical focus on Russia as a threat and the significant degree of uncertainty surrounding the newly established Russian state it was prudent to allow significant analysis prior to altering the fundamental principles guiding the Armed Forces. In further refining the security policy it was felt that it should focus on threats that could emerge rapidly or have a significant impact on society as a whole. Arguably, this new mind-set allowed strategists and politicians to divorce them from the previous focus on Russia. Against this backdrop, the Armed Forces needed to be redesigned from its current invasion focus to become of instrumental use in peacetime to advance the foreign security policy agenda. Although non-state actors and acts of terrorism were contemplated, in particular regarding illegal proliferation of WMD, it was not at the core of the analysis. One of the more prominent researchers on Swedish security and defence policy, Wilhelm Agrell, concluded that the Swedish government in 1999 decided on extensive cuts in the defence budget without having any clear vision on what replacing the out-dated invasion defence with (Agrell 2000). As argued above, we do not fully agree.

3.6 Conclusion: the Nordic countries before the first shock

How well prepared were the four Nordic countries facing the challenges of the new millennium and what similarities and differences can be observed in their military strategies?

From the standpoint of the *international environment* all four countries observed global challenges from international terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of WMD as well as the risks of humanitarian and environmental catastrophes. However, the traditional threats from Russia were still present in especially Finland, Norway and Sweden's analysis respectively; all four Nordic countries were influenced by the ideas of a new comprehensive security agenda.

Consequently, the *ends/objectives* mirrored each other in the international perspective but not in the national one. Denmark and Norway both gave NATO high priority and their memberships were sometimes presented as an end in itself as both countries had core interests in being viewed as a trustworthy and reliable member among their fellow allies. Both Finland and Sweden placed similar weight to their EU membership but the membership was not articulated as an

Table 3.5 The strategy of the four Nordic countries before the first shock

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Environment	Political and social instability. Risks for environmental catastrophes. Transnational and organised criminality. International terrorism	Geopolitical position and historical experiences still important. Many ‘uncertainties’ regarding Russia. Risk of regional and local conflicts even in Europe. Proliferation of WMD. Strategic strikes	Threats emanating from terrorism, rogue/failing states, the proliferation of WMD and cyber and missile technology. Threats directed against oil/gas-installations. Risks of humanitarian and environmental catastrophes. Regional armed conflicts. Russia still a source for concern	Military aggression against Sweden possible but unlikely. Threats instead from terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of WMD
Ends	Protecting and defending the political integrity and the territorial sovereignty of Denmark. Strengthening the intra-NATO cooperation and promoting the image of Denmark as a trustworthy NATO member	Defending Finland’s independence. Promoting the security of Finland and the well-being of its citizens. Protecting the state’s leadership, the territorial sovereignty and basic values	Protecting and securing Norway’s national interests, especially the functionality of society, the political freedom of action, the territorial integrity, the sovereign rights and Norway’s credibility as a NATO ally	Repelling military attacks, ensuring territorial integrity, contributing to international crisis management operations (increased priority) and supporting civil society in times of distress. Adapting the forces to new and future missions
Means	Expeditionary capacity of the Armed Forces with focus on one Army brigade and airlift capacity, as well as new fighters and submarines	Credible national defence force including 22 Army brigades	Increased readiness and deployability for all services with focus on new fighters and frigates as well as two high-readiness Army battalions	Significantly reduced number of forces. Focus on quality instead of quantity. Versatility. High readiness. Interoperability
Ways	Closer cooperation with other NATO members. Offensive and defensive air operations. High readiness	National defence at the grand strategic level including close interagency cooperation. Territorial defence at the military-strategic level	Deterrence through NATO membership. Enabling allied reinforcements to Norway	Non-binding military commitments regarding the national defence. Proactivity and participation in international military cooperation, including in NATO-led peace operations

end itself. Furthermore, neither focused solely on military aspects, rather on a wide range of security related issues. When both Finland and Sweden, in addition, stressed their NATO partnership, Denmark decided to remain outside the union's military cooperation. Both Denmark and Sweden explicitly presented the transformation of their Armed Forces into expeditionary capable forces as an objective. In Finland's case, however, the transformation focused on the ability to repel a strategic attack against Finnish territory. Norway and Sweden too shaped objectives that would repel armed aggression but these efforts were not as strong as Finland. Although all four countries articulated the ends related to political and territorial integrity, Denmark placed the least emphasis on the national dimension.

Despite the similar approach to both the environment and the ends, the *means* considered necessary to meet the future and to fulfil the objectives created a chasm between the states. Clearly each of the four Nordic countries reached different conclusions on balancing quality, quantity and readiness when transforming their Armed Forces. Regarding the armies, all four states gave readiness and deployability highest priority. The quantity of the units given this capacity varied, however, from Finland's three national readiness brigades to Norway's two readiness battalions. In addition, the number of units to be mobilised after the upcoming transformations varied from Finland's 22 national brigades to Denmark's focus on contributing to a multinational Army corps. While Denmark was the country that focused the least on quantity, the new Danish Army would ensure quality. A similar trend persisted in the navies. While Denmark and Norway focused on few but ocean-going vessels, Finland and Sweden turned their attention to smaller torpedo and/or missile crafts more or less suitable solely for Baltic Sea operations. The latter type of vessels came to be a disputed area in Norway and arguably, the decision to keep the torpedo boat system affected the capacity of the ocean-going vessels. An important difference between Finland and Sweden is the latter country's submarine.⁶ Additionally, Sweden's Air Force stands out when it comes to quantity. When Norway was at the brink of initiating the replacement of its old F-16 system with the next generation fighters, Sweden was to complete its fighter aircraft upgrade. Both Denmark and Finland had not even begun their upgrading programmes replacing the F-16 and the F-18 systems respectively. The quantitative strength of the Swedish Air Force was, in addition, almost equivalent with the strength of the three other countries together.

Another different approach was related to the *ways*. Arguably, only Denmark and Finland explicitly presented a preferred method at the military-strategic level. In the former case, it was all about interoperability and multinationality within the NATO context in both national and international operations. In the latter case, the strategy was built on the principles of territorial defence. Naturally, the Finnish approach only had a national dimension. It seems, however, reasonable to argue that Norway's strategy was implicit. In the national context, it was all about receiving and hosting allied reinforcements for the defence of the country. By being a trustworthy ally and contributing to NATO's efforts in

times of low threat level against Norway, the idea was to increase the willingness of other NATO allies to contribute to Norway's defence, if needed. As a militarily non-aligned country, Sweden could not apply neither Denmark's nor Norway's method. Finland's approach may have been an option for the Swedish decision-makers yet it remains unclear if any decision regarding the Swedish ways was taken. At the political-strategic level, Sweden took a similar approach as Denmark but without focusing solely on NATO-led operations.

What can then be said about the three control variables introduced in the previous chapters? Regarding the *strategic exposure*, all four Nordic countries interpreted similar challenges on the global arena. However, as for the national arena, Finland, and to some degree also Norway, seem to have been reluctant to let the traditional strategic settings disappear. Russia was still perceived as a potential aggressor.

When it comes to *capacity*, all four countries fulfil the criteria of being a third ranked state. The political leadership in each of the states recognised that their country could not obtain security primarily with national capabilities. The degree of necessary reinforcements from other states seems, however, to have differed. As a non-aligned country, Finland relied far more on national resources than the other non-aligned country, Sweden. Similarly, differences between the two NATO allies can be observed in these regards. All four leaderships seem, in addition, to believe that they, together with other states and through international organisations, could exercise some impact on the system. However, what stipulates a significant military contribution to the efforts of these institutions may differ. Obviously, Denmark was the most willing to provide troops and other military capabilities.

Furthermore, all four states fulfil the *interest* criteria as pet-dogs. They were all supportive towards the new post-Cold War European security order established during the 1990s, shared a strong preference for multilateral cooperations and lacked offensive territorial ambitions.

In terms of the intervening variable, we argue that *Denmark's* geographical characteristics (closeness to NATO ally Germany and distance to the potentially threatening Russia), historical experience (the failure of waging war alone), and the membership in alliances (NATO but not the military cooperation within the EU), all play a role when explaining the developments of the Danish strategy. Arguably, Denmark seems to have adopted a *bandwagoning* strategy vis-à-vis NATO and ultimately the USA.

Moreover, *Finland's* geographical characteristics also explain the Finnish strategy. The lack of strategic depth (east-west), the long common border with Russia, together with the successful historical experience in defending Finnish territory from occupation and the military non-alignment all arguably explain the, in this context, limited ambitions of transforming the Armed Forces in a non-traditional direction. Consequently, the Army remained the bulk of the Armed Forces. If this is a part of a conscious, decided *balance of power* strategy remains to be seen. Obviously, Finland strove to balance the power of Russia with both its EU membership and its own strong military force.

The *Norwegian* case also provides evidence for explanatory power in the intervening variables. The long coast line together with the important economic zones in the Atlantic Ocean, the common but short border with Russia, the experience of receiving allied reinforcements, together with the NATO membership explain why Norway prioritised improving the naval capabilities, with a balance between quality and quantity, while maintaining extant air bases. Since both these two aspects focus on Norway's defence, we argue that it demonstrates why Norway hesitated in making similar steps as Denmark. Clearly, Norway was not navigating an isolationistic direction and not being an EU member seems to have prevented a hedging strategy. At this stage of the analysis we cannot find any clear indication on whether Norway was preparing for a *bandwagoning* or a *balance of power* strategy. Consequently, Norway's strategic preferences seem unclear.

Finally, for *Sweden*, the absence of a land border with Russia, the successful historical experiences of neutrality together with the EU membership and the NATO partnership explain why Sweden cut its Army units in favour of higher readiness and deployability. By letting the Navy and the Air Force primarily focus on the Baltic Sea area, the expeditionary capability of the Army provided a balance between national needs and international opportunities. Since a relatively equal spatial focus was put on the EU, NATO and the UN, it is tempting to conclude that Sweden was seeking a *hedging* strategy. It is, however, far too early to suggest such a strategy since the EU had not yet launched its first led military operation. On the other hand, the use of force is only one of the dimensions of strategy. In the context of force generation, Sweden was balancing the contribution to NATO- and UN-led operations by taking steps for increased cooperation within the EU.

Notes

- 1 For further details regarding the historical background see, for example, Gyllensporre (2010); Edström and Gyllensporre (2012; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015).
- 2 The Social Democratic Party (Danish: *Socialdemokratiet*), the Social Liberal Party (Danish: *Det Radikale Venstre*), the Liberal Party (Danish: *Venstre*), the Conservative Party (Danish: *Det Konservative Folkeparti*), the Centre-Democrats (Danish: *Centrum-Demokraterne*) and the Christian Democrats (Danish: *Kristelig Folkeparti*).
- 3 Limnell translates the citation from the parliamentary debate from Finnish.
- 4 Raitasalo translates the citation from the 1997 report from Finnish.
- 5 The Conservative Party (Swedish: *Moderaterna*) the Liberal Party (Swedish: *Folkpartiet*) and the Christian Democratic Party (Swedish: *Kristdemokraterna*).
- 6 In the next chapters, we will discuss Sweden's use of its submarines when developing its military relations with the USA.

Bibliography

- Agrell, Wilhelm (2000). *Fred och Frukten – Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000*. Lund: Historiska Media.
- Danish Defence Commission (1998). *Fremtidens forsvar – Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 1997*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.

- Danish MoD (1999). *Forsvarsforlig – Aftale om forswarets ordning 2000–2004*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2000). *Årlig redegørelse 1999*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2001). *Årlig redegørelse 2000*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Doeser, Fredrik (2011). 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish "Footnote Policy"' in *Cooperation and Conflict*. Volume 46, Issue 2.
- Edström, Håkan (2003). *Hur styrs Försvarsmakten? – Politisk och militär syn på försvarsdoktrin under 1990-talet*. Umeå: Umeå University.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds) (2012). *Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2013). *Political Aspirations and Perils of Security – Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds) (2014a). *Alike or Different? – Strategic Thinking in Scandinavia*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2014b). 'Observing War – Keeping Peace? – Unpacking the Military Strategy of UN Non-Force Missions' in *Journal of International Peacekeeping*. Volume 18, Issue 3–4.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2014c). *Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter det kalla krigets slut*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2015). 'Minding the Gap between Words and Deeds: Towards a New EU Strategy?' in *European Foreign Affairs Review*. Volume 20, Issue 1.
- Edström, Håkan and Pallo Ydstebø (2011). *Militærstrategi på norsk*. Oslo: Abstrakt forlag.
- Finnish Cabinet (2001). *Finlands säkerhets- och försvarspolitik 2001 – Statsrådets redogörelse till Riksdagen 13.6.2001*, VNS/2001.
- Gyllensporre, Dennis (2010). *Competing and Complementary Perspectives on the EU as a Crisis Management Actor*. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (Maastricht University).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1999). *The Military Balance 1999–2000*. London: Routledge.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2009). 'Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Volume 47, Issue 1.
- Jensen, Michael Jedig (2008). *Fremtidens internationale militære operationer – Hvad skal afgøre dansk deltagelse?* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (Report 2008:1).
- Linnéll, Jarno (2012). *Finnish Threat Perception Policy in the Early Years of the 21st Century*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Norwegian ChoD (2000). *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000: Sluttrapport*. Oslo: Forsvarets overkommando.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2001). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. Innst. S. nr. 342 2000/2001.
- Norwegian Defence Council (2000). *Et nytt forsvar (NOU 2000:20)*. Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste.
- Norwegian MoD (2001). *Omlegging av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. St. prp. nr. 45 2000–2001.

- Olesen, Mikkel Runge and Johannes Nordby (2014). 'The Middle Eastern Decade: Denmark and Military Interventions' in Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds). *Alike or Different? – Strategic Thinking in Scandinavia*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Palosaari, Teemu (2011). *The Art of Adapation. A Study on the Europeanization of Finland's Foreign and Security Policy*. Tampere: Tampere University Press.
- Raitasalo, Jyri (2010). *Reconstructing Finnish Defence in the Post-Cold War Era*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Swedish Cabinet (1999a). *Förändrad omvärld – omdanat försvar*. Regeringens proposition 1998/99:74.
- Swedish Cabinet (1999b). *Det nya försvaret*. Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30.
- Swedish Defence Commission (1998). *Svensk säkerhetspolitik i ny omvärldsbelysning*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 1998:9.
- Swedish Defence Commission (1999). *Förändrad omvärld – omdanat försvar*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 1999:2.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (1999). *Försvarspolitiken*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 1998/99:FöU5.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2000). *Det nya försvaret*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 1999/2000:FöU2.
- Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (1999). *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik*, Sammansatta utrikes- och försvarsutskottets betänkande 1998/99:UFöU1.

4 The first shock – the 9/11 terrorist attacks

4.1 The United Nations and NATO put to a test

On 11 September 2001, four American commercial passenger aircraft were hijacked by members of a global terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden – Al-Qaida. Two of the hijacked airplanes were flown into the World Trade Centre's Twin Towers in New York and another into the Pentagon in Washington DC. The fourth and last airplane was presumably targeted towards either the White House or the Capitol Building. However, because of resistance from the passengers on board, it crashed on a field before reaching its target (Kean and Hamilton 2004. See also Utley 2012).

This was the first act of war on continental United States of America (USA) in 136 years and the US President George W. Bush expressed his shock by stating that 'night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack' (Bush, 2001). The damage of the attacks was immediate and widespread; both towers collapsed and the surrounding areas of Lower Manhattan were affected, one section of the Pentagon collapsed, almost 3,000 lives were lost and the long-term consequences were far-reaching. The attacks have been described as a 'failure of imagination', referring to how completely unexpected and unimaginable they were (Parker and Stern 2002. See also Utley 2012).

Though the terrorist attacks were perpetrated by non-state actors against the US, President Bush immediately condemned the attacks as 'acts of war' rather than violations of criminal law (Flaherty 2011; Leudar and Nekvapil 2011). In his address to the Nation, he declared a 'global war on terror' as an act of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. On 18 September, the US Congress granted the President the Authorization of the Use of Armed Force which gave him emergency power to use 'all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, or harboured such organizations or persons' (Flaherty 2011:36. See also Boyle 2014).

The UNSC condemned the acts and recognised the US' right to self-defence. On 28 September the Council adopted Resolution 1373 authorising actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Concurrently NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty hence declaring the terror

attacks as an aggression not only on the US but also on all of the members of the Alliance. Consequently, the core of the organisation, the collective defence, was activated (Rosand 2003).

4.2 Denmark¹

The 9/11 terrorist attacks were explicitly mentioned as a catalyst for the broad political agreement on further defence transformations reached in June 2002.² In March 2003, the Danish Cabinet decided to appoint a special council tasked to investigate the international conditions that should be taken into account when developing Denmark's security and defence policy during the upcoming years. Already in August the very same year, the Danish Defence Council presented its report. Furthermore, in June 2004 six of the eight political parties represented in *Folketinget* reached a consensus on the 2005–9 defence policy.³ In addition to these key documents, the Minister of Defence's annual reports (Danish: *Årlig redegørelse*) have been analysed.

4.2.1 International environment

When the Minister of Defence, Sven Aage Jensby of the Liberal Party, in early 2002 summarised the developments of the international environments during the previous year, the focus was, out of natural courses, on international terrorism. Jensby concluded that the international society would have to put a substantial effort into fighting not only terrorism but also mass terrorism in the years to come. He also stressed the threats from WMD, especially in areas already suffering from armed conflicts. As Minister of Defence, Jensby shed extra light on the areas where Danish troops were deployed. He was worried that Al-Qaida, the Taliban or other terrorists could target Danish soldiers abroad. In addition to these threats, the Danish Armed Forces had to struggle with challenges from ethnic-related violence, organised crime and corruption (Danish MoD 2002a).

Concurrently as the Minister presented his analysis, a broad political agreement was announced. In the agreement, signed by all eight political parties represented in *Folketinget*, the signatories concluded that the nature of the threats directed against Denmark had changed dramatically. The conclusion was that the Danish society was far more vulnerable in areas such as information technology and other critical infrastructure as well as in the supply of fresh water and energy (Danish MoD 2002b).

The picture painted in the Danish Defence Council was complex. The most challenging threat was terrorism in combination with WMD but the proliferation of WMD to an increased number of states was also on the top of the list. The international environment was, in addition, perceived as more unpredictable than before with both direct and indirect threats, governmental as well as non-governmental actors, and both symmetric and asymmetric relations between these actors. Several challenges, such as organised crime, pollution and uncontrolled migration, were considered to be transnational in their character. The

society's increased vulnerability made the threat and risk assessments even harder. The Council elaborated on the risks of external shocks without defining or exemplifying what a shock could consist of. The relations between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan and between North and South Korea were, together with the Middle East, considered likely to be the main areas of interstate conflicts. However, the Council also stressed the challenges related to failing states and intrastate conflicts. In addition to challenges of economic, social and political character, the Council mentioned the risks that emerged from increased cyber warfare capabilities and missile technology under development in several states. Finally, the Council illuminated that Denmark's contribution to the international efforts fighting terrorism could lead to increased threats directed against Denmark and Danish national interests (Danish Defence Council 2003). The fundamental themes from the report of the Council were in focus, i.e. the changing nature of modern security risks and threats, also in the defence agreement of 2004. Consequently, not only terrorism and the proliferation of WMD but also the transnational unpredictable characters of the challenges were central in the discussions (Danish MoD 2004a).

4.2.2 Ends

Contributing to international peace and stability, protecting and promoting Denmark's national interests and values including freedom, democracy and market economy were, in addition to defending Denmark the core objectives in focus for the Minister of Defence, Sven Aage Jensby's annual reports for 2001, 2002 and 2003. In June 2004 Jensby resigned and was replaced by another representative of the Liberal Party, Søren Gade. If the change of minister influenced the discussions or not is difficult to say. It is, however, clear that the reports for 2004, the first presented by Gade, had a slightly different perspective. Peace, freedom and security, nationally as well as internationally, were still fundamental objectives but other more 'soft' ends such as prosperity and the respect for human rights, were given more of an emphasis (Danish MoD 2002a; 2003; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2007).

In the Council's report presented in August 2003 the following were presented as fundamental objectives: protect Danish sovereignty, defend Danish territory and citizens, and promote Denmark's freedom, security, interests, prosperity and values, as well as international peace and security. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law were explicitly mentioned as core values. The Council also presented a plan on how to promote peace and security abroad where the focus lay in preventing crises and wars from erupting (Danish Defence Council 2003).

These objectives were repeated in the Danish defence policy between 2005–9. One additional objective was, however, also mentioned – to counter both direct and indirect threats against not only Denmark but also against its allies. This objective was described as consisting of two parts or two separate ends. First, it was considered as an end itself having military capabilities ready to be deployed

abroad. Second, Danish Armed Forces were not only able to counter-terrorism but also to manage the effects of terrorist activities (Danish MoD 2004a). In December 2004, a memorandum on the consolidated implementation of the June agreement was published. As it underpinned these two ends, it was considered an objective being able to contribute militarily to the NATO Response Force (NRF) (Danish MoD 2004c).

4.2.3 *Means*

In his annual report for 2001, the Minister of Defence announced that the Danish Cabinet approved continued participation in the Nordic Viking submarine cooperation and the American JSF project. This was echoed in the report for 2002. One year later, the report had a slightly different tone. On the one hand, one of the armoured battalions was to be dismantled and all training with mortars within the Army was to end. On the other hand, light armoured personnel carriers were to be introduced. While the number of operative F-16 fighters was to be decreased by six, the remaining aircraft would have increased night vision ability (Danish MoD 2002a; 2003).

The political defence agreement, reached in June 2004, underscored the need to reallocate resources from the national to the international context. A rapid reaction force of 2,000 troops and sailors would be organised while several units would be dismantled, among them two brigades, three Army battle groups and 180 main battle tanks, the Navy's submarines and the Air Force's ground-to-air air defence systems. The Army's new nucleus was reduced to two brigades of which one was to have higher readiness. The three corvettes were gradually to be replaced by three new Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPV), which in addition to the ten patrol crafts to be kept, would be the bulk of the new Navy. All together 16 F-16s were to be deployed for international missions, half of them with a higher readiness (Danish MoD 2004a). In 2007, the Minister of Defence not only stressed the transformation discussed above but he also emphasised the importance and strength of Danish Special Forces. Not only had the number of troops grown, but so had also the support units like helicopters and armoured personnel carriers. The increased airlift capability of the Danish Armed Forces can also be mentioned in this context (Danish MoD 2007).

Table 4.1 The core of Denmark's military capability in 2001

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 3 Brigades	3 Corvettes	3 Squadrons with 68 F-16 A/B
1 UN High Readiness Brigade	4 Submarines	6 Air Defence Batteries
238 Main Battle Tanks	12 Missile/Patrol Craft	

Source: IISS 2001.

4.2.4 Ways

In the Minister of Defence's annual reports for the years throughout the period, cooperation with key partners on force generation was identified as a path to success. As mentioned above, the other Nordic countries were considered as playing a vital role when developing the Danish Navy's submarine capacity. Regarding developing Denmark's future airpower, the USA and its JSF project played a similar role. The reports also stressed the need for cooperation regarding the use of military force. Initially, the UN and NATO were treated similarly and in a balanced way. SHIRBRIG and the UN-led operation UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethiopia were, together with the other UN operations with Danish participation,⁴ developed much like the NATO-led operation *Amber Fox*, *Allied Harmony*, *Active Endeavour*, Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and KFOR respectively in the former Yugoslavia. Notably, the participation in EU-led missions was limited to the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). Consequently, when the EU-led operation *Concordia* assumed command after the NATO operations in Macedonia, Denmark decided to withdraw the Danish contingent completely. Soon, however, focus shifted towards NATO and the USA. Subsequently, Denmark put its participation in not only NATO's standing naval forces in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), the Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) but also the US-led operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan and *Iraqi Freedom* in Iraq at the top of the priority list. The reports also elaborated on how Denmark intended to contribute to the NATO- and US-led operations. Proactiveness and rapid deployment were therefore key catalysts. Naturally, this was foremost linked to international operations. Denmark also took the initiative to start a review of NATO's defence planning including the national dimension and collective defence. Cooperation with others was thus the preferred method even in this context (Danish MoD 2002a; 2003; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2007).⁵

The directions and political guidance decided by the centre-right Cabinet on the ways and the methods seem to have had broad political support within the Danish Parliament. In the Council's report from August 2003, the military dimension of the EU was given far more consideration in the reports presented by the Cabinet. Notwithstanding, the Danish stance not to cooperate militarily within the frames of the Union was never challenged. Consequently, when discussing offensive counter-terrorism operations, cooperation with NATO and/or the USA, including coalitions of willing, were the only identified options. In the political defence agreement reached in June 2004, neither the preferred ways nor the, from a political point of view, desirable methods were further developed. 'Danish armed forces are to be able to contribute with battle-ready, well-equipped and efficient units to international operation' was the only guidance (Danish MoD 2004a).

4.2.5 Summary – the Danish strategy after the first shock

The Danish authorities were determined in their path paved already before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Still, we argue that the terrorist attacks were perceived as a shock regarding the formulation of strategy. The events were definitely perceived as unexpected, and deeply consequential. As discussed above, the Danish government clearly decided to implement military counter measures but direct military threats against Denmark were dismissed. The analysis of the international environment shifted its spatial focus from NATO's immediate neighbourhood to the Middle East and especially to Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, the Danish politicians explicitly declared that even if there was no direct military threat directed against Denmark, the Danish society was far more vulnerable for risks and for threats emitted from other actors and states. Denmark's gradually increased involvement in crisis management abroad snowballed into another source of concern. Already at this stage, worries about Denmark punching far too much above its weight started to emerge (see for example Holm 2002).

Despite that latter conclusion, contributing to international peace and stability, especially militarily, was perceived as an end in itself. It was considered as going hand in hand with the overarching objective, i.e. to protect and to promote Denmark's national interests and values including freedom, democracy, market economy and the rule of law. Despite the absence of direct military challenges, defending Danish territory and citizens was another core objective. Prosperity and the respect for human rights were gradually given more of the spotlight. Preventing crises and wars was prioritised over managing their actual consequences. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Danish authorities shifted focus on the military-strategic means during the period. Initially, a rather broad spectrum of military resources was considered necessary in order to implement the defence policy. Submarines were, for example, not only deployed abroad but also a fundamental part of the force generation processes. The Army was also transformed from a rather mechanised profile including heavy main battle tanks towards a light deployable service with expeditionary warfare in focus. The Air Force took similar steps. Clearly, readiness and quality were given priority over quantity. The Special Forces was more or less the only service that strengthened in numbers. Certain branches of each of the services were also strengthened while other capacities were reduced or even cut off. Strategic and operational transport capacity were, for instance, given priority while the ground-based air defence systems were phased out. Without a doubt, the Danish authorities put action behind their words regarding the means needed in order to implement policy (see, for example, Ringmose and Rynning 2008).

Even if the Danish politicians were explicit in their evaluations of the international environment, the decided ends and the prioritised means and ways were seldom elaborated. At least this remark applies to the use of force perspective at the military-strategic level. At the political-strategic level, cooperation with identified key partners on both the use of force and the force

generation perspectives was given the green light. Clearly, NATO and especially the USA were key players here. Proactiveness was declared as the preferred approach but exactly what that meant when using Danish military power within the frames of US- and/or NATO-led operations was not specified. However, by using the performance of the Danish Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as a point of reference, it seems that applying the very same methods as the American and British brothers in arms at the operational and tactical levels was a de facto method. Our conclusion is therefore that Denmark had a consciously formulated strategy, a position that is not uncontested (see, for example, Breitenbach 2008).

4.3 Finland⁶

The Finnish Cabinet's report on security and defence policy was presented to the Finnish Parliament in June 2001 (for an analysis of the report see Chapter 3). The statements on this report by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee of the Finnish Parliament, *Riksdagen*, were published on 27 November and 14 December 2001 respectively. Consequently, the two committees' statements include the first parliamentary responses to the 9/11 attacks directly related to the shaping of the Finnish military strategy. The Finnish decision to contribute to ISAF was initiated on 21 December 2001 following the UNSC's Resolution 1386 and a request from the British government. Since the mandate of the Resolution was based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peace enforcement, the Cabinet was required to, according to the Finnish Peace-Keeping Act (514/1984), consult with the Parliament and did so by presenting a report (VNS 5/2001) to the Parliament in January 2002. The Parliament approved (UaVM 19/2001) it on 9 January 2002. The analysis in this section includes these documents and the defence bill presented by the Finnish Cabinet in September 2004 as well as the comments made by the Finnish Defence Committee (FsUB 1/2004 rd).

4.3.1 International environment

Aside some general consideration regarding the international milieu, the Foreign Affairs Committee allocated a whole section of its reports exclusively focusing on the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism was considered a threat against democracy, rule of law and human rights. According to the Committee, the attacks confirmed the need for a broad comprehensive approach to security. However, the risk of a direct terror attack against Finland remained low and the Committee noted that it was too early to draw any far-reaching conclusions regarding changes in the Finnish security policy (Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2001).

The statement of the Defence Committee was more critical about the analysis of the international development and Finland's security situation compared to the Cabinet's bill. The Cabinet was accused of neglecting important geopolitical aspects, especially in terms of Finland's geographical proximity to the Barents

Sea and the Baltic Sea regions. The Committee concluded that the proximity could be a significant threat since Finnish territory could be used for foreign military operations in a conflict between great powers. The Cabinet was also accused of being too Eurocentric. The 9/11 attack and its consequences gave, according to the Committee, further reasons to use a global lens when looking at security. Since the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks had triggered the first ever activation of Article V in the Washington Treaty, the Committee predicted that the war on terrorism might be the beginning of a new era of international security cooperation, focusing on counter measures to asymmetric threats (Finnish Defence Committee 2004). Both the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs Committee stressed the similarities between the ISAF mission and previous Finnish contributions to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (Finnish Cabinet 2002; Finnish Parliament 2002).

In 2004, the Cabinet concluded that the enlargements of the EU and NATO had boosted security throughout the region and reduced the threat of a conventional war in Europe. The 9/11 attacks had, according to the Cabinet, resulted in an increased counter-terrorist activity, especially by the US. A new kind of 'network terrorism' was gaining strength from extremist groups of radical Islamists. The bomb attacks in Madrid in March 2004 exemplified the seriousness of this threat. Referring to the EU's solidarity clause, the Cabinet concluded that a terrorist strike anywhere in the EU would have an immediate effect also on Finland. The likelihood of a direct terrorist attack against Finland was, however, considered low. The US was seen as the only global power but other major powers were assumed to increase in importance, especially in different regional contexts. The assessment on Russia was somewhat dualistic. On the one hand, Russia had become more stable politically and socially during President Putin's term in office. On the other hand, the Cabinet drew attention to Russia's criticism of all three Baltic States on issues related to Russian minority and the status of Kaliningrad. The Cabinet assessed that Russia's primary interest was to expand its influence in the former Soviet republics, focusing especially on its southern borders. The Cabinet presented threat scenarios to be used in the upcoming defence planning: (i) a regional crisis effecting Finland, (ii) political, economic and military pressure, including threats of use of military force, (iii) use of military force in the form of a strategic strike. The latter was assumed to include a wide range of methods such as information warfare, Special Forces, sabotage, long-range precision weapons, limited ground attacks and diplomatic efforts to isolate Finland internationally. The Cabinet also discussed asymmetric warfare including acts of terrorism, sabotage, proliferation and use of WMD as well as information warfare (Finnish Cabinet 2004. See also Finnish Defence Committee, 2004).

4.3.2 Ends

In 2004, the Cabinet clarified that the primary objective of Finland's security and defence policy still was the promotion of security and stability in northern

Europe. The objectives and aims of the national defence were also almost identical with the objectives presented in 2001. Consequently, the overarching ends was to safeguard Finland's independence and the Finnish fundamental democratic values and to promote the security and welfare of its citizens. The general aims of the Finnish Armed Forces were expressed similarly; to guarantee Finland's independence and to safeguard both the living conditions of the population and the national leadership's freedom of action. The statutory tasks of the Armed Forces were specified as i) safeguarding territorial integrity; ii) defending the country, its legal system and the living conditions of its people; iii) maintaining a defensive readiness; iv) assisting other governmental authorities; including participating in emergency operations; and v) participating in international crisis management including military peace operations (Finnish Cabinet 2004. See also Finnish Defence Committee, 2004).

4.3.3 Means

There were no dramatic shifts regarding the Finnish military capabilities following the 9/11 attacks. The defence transformation that had begun before the terrorist attacks continued. The parliamentary reports noted, for instance, that the conscription system made the Finnish forces particularly suitable for CIMIC operations focusing on building trustful relations with the local population. Fortunately, the British government had specifically asked for Finnish CIMIC contributions and the Parliament endorsed the Cabinet's proposal to send a CIMIC unit consisting of a maximum of 50 officers to Afghanistan (Finnish Cabinet 2002; Finnish Parliament 2002).

In 2004 the Cabinet declared that the Finnish Armed Forces consisted of 350,000 war time troops divided between 250,000 *regional troops*, focusing on the defence of territory and important societal infrastructure in cooperation with border protection units, and the *operational forces* consisting of 100,000 troops with long-range fire power at their disposal and capable of joint mobile operations. The latter were given more attention. To improve the overall capability a focus on the air defence and the integrated command and control system was imperative. Consequently, further reductions of some 60,000 personnel, including one of the two wartime armoured brigades, were considered a necessity. The Navy was to decommission most of its mobile and fixed coastal artillery as well

Table 4.2 The core of Finland's military capability in 2001

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
2 Armoured Brigades	1 Corvette	3 Squadrons with 57 F/A-18C/D
11 Infantry Brigades	9 Missile Craft	
9 Jaeger Brigades		
230 Main Battle Tanks		

Source: IISS 2001.

as some of its missile craft and mine counter measures vessels. In the Finnish Air Force, improving the air defence command and control system but also combating aircraft's interception capacity and international interoperability were high on the priority list. In addition, a long-range precision guided weapon system permitting air-to-ground operations would be procured. The capability of the Frontier Guard would also be adjusted as the number of troops were drastically reduced. Additionally, 14,000 troops were decommissioned, leaving the total strength at 8,500 troops by the end of 2008. The remaining troops, however, would develop an increased capacity for reconnaissance and counter-special forces operations. Furthermore, specially designated troops from all services were trained for use in international crisis management operations including operations that are more demanding. The Finnish Cabinet confirmed Finland's support to international efforts regarding cooperative security and confirmed its support for Nordic defence cooperation. Regarding the EU's common military capabilities, the Cabinet clearly stated its support regarding Finnish contributions to the EU battle group concept as well as to the Berlin Plus arrangement between the EU and NATO (Finnish Cabinet 2004. See also Finnish Defence Committee, 2004).

4.3.4 *Ways*

Regarding ways and methods, the Cabinet's stance in 2004 continued along the same two paths as the position taken in 2001. Finland's defence was still organised along the twin concepts of *territorial defence*, i.e. the joint use of territorial troops, border troops and the operational forces of the three services, and *national or total defence*. The latter concept was more consistently developed in 2004. The Cabinet provided instructions on two key areas. On the one hand, the instructions outlined a focus on specific practical measures related to both the development of internal security, i.e. protection against organised crime, terrorism, cyber-crimes, illegal immigration and environmental risks, and to the protection of the Finnish society's basic functions such as secured access to energy, food, health services, secure electronic communications and transportation. On the other hand, the Cabinet underscored the cooperation with the EU in combating international organised crime and terrorism. The EU's counter-terrorism activities were directly linked to the 9/11 attacks. Regarding the latter area, the Cabinet applied a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and management in which conflict prevention and strategies for civilian and military crisis management was combined with post-conflict reconstruction strategies using a range of different instruments related to the different stages of a conflict (Finnish Cabinet 2004. See also Finnish Defence Committee, 2004).

The CIMIC concept was not explicitly used in the presentation of this comprehensive approach, but the suggested strategies would presumably include extensive civil-military cooperation. The EU was, in the perspective of the Cabinet, the principal actor in the development of civilian crisis management activities but it also intended to increase Finland's participation in NATO

training exercises and dispatch civilian and military personnel to NATO headquarters. The Cabinet stated that Finland was developing its cooperative relations with NATO through the EAPC and the PfP programme and intended to seek extensive transatlantic collaboration. Finnish participation in international crisis management was implicitly seen as a method for developing and improving the Finnish Armed Forces' interoperability with Armed Forces of other countries. International defence materiel cooperation was seen as another way of maintaining interoperability by promoting not only materiel compatibility and shared principles of use and training but also for establishing the preconditions considered necessary for the mutual security of supplies (Finnish Cabinet 2004. See also Finnish Defence Committee, 2004).

Regarding Finland's national defence, the operational forces were planned to be used in such a manner that they would be able to create a centre of gravity of defence. Hence, they would consist of the most effective units of all three services. It is interesting to note that the Finnish Cabinet explicitly declared that Finland 'has no cause to consider joining the CFE Treaty at this stage'. In 2001, the Cabinet explicitly rejected a Finnish acceding to the Ottawa Convention on landmines. In 2004 it declared, however, that Finland intended to do so but not until 2012. A Finnish ratification of the Ottawa Convention at that late stage would permit Finland to keep the for the military strategy crucial landmines until 2016 (see Finnish Cabinet 2001:37–8, 2004:86–7).

4.3.5 Summary – the Finnish strategy after the first shock

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 did not directly affect the Finnish defence policies and military strategies. The Finnish defence transformation, which had begun already before September 2001, continued as planned, focusing on a triad of priorities. These included modernising the defence capabilities related to defending the country against a strategic strike, increasing interoperability with Armed Forces from other countries and developing capabilities to participate in out-of-area military crisis management. The analysis of new transnational non-state security, such as international terrorism and other threats to human rights and global security, was further developed and enhanced in the documents presented after 9/11 but the attacks themselves did not change the general direction of Finnish defence policies and the military strategies pursued before September 2001. General male conscription was essential for the national defence even after the focus shifted from a grand-scale invasion to a strategic strike as the prioritised threat scenario (see, for example, Liméll 2012).⁷

Arguably, the 9/11 attacks had an *indirect* effect on the Finnish defence policy. According to Jarno Limnéll, the Finnish politicians and civil servants involved in preparing the 2004 bill were aware of the need to emphasise 'the broad concept of security' used by other western countries and the EU, NATO and the UN. There was also, according to Limnéll, a need to express Finland's commitment to the western block and western values. These ambitions were particularly strong among the representatives of the Foreign Office. However, there

was no desire to allow the dominant role of the broad security concept to challenge the principles of non-military alignment and the need for credible national defence capabilities (Limnell 2012:102–3). The EU played a particularly important role in transmitting the effects of the 9/11 attack to Finnish defence policy. In its 2004 bill, the Cabinet made extensive references to the EU's responses to the attacks and Finland committed strongly to all forms of security cooperation related to the EU's security strategy as well as to the new articles in the Constitutional Treaty.

According to Jyri Raitasalo, Finland's concepts for national defence, including the distinction between territorial troops and operational forces, were also developed in a manner that conformed very closely to 'the general Western image of war' and concepts like 'network-centric warfare' that emphasised a need for smaller but more mobile units with advanced systems for common real-time situational assessment.⁸ In 2006, Finland also drafted and passed a new law on military crisis management. The new law was seen as necessary due to the more extensive and demanding nature of military crisis management operations. The most controversial aspect of the new law was that it enabled Finnish troops to partake in operations that did not have an UNSC mandate (Raitasalo 2010:70–2. See also Martelius *et al.* 2007).

4.4 Norway⁹

Already in April 2002 the centre-right Cabinet presented a new defence bill. Although the main conclusions from the previous bill, decided by the Norwegian Parliament, *Stortinget*, in June 2001 (see Norwegian Defence Committee 2001), was still valid, the Cabinet stressed the importance in boosting the budget and transforming the Armed Forces. The Cabinet explicitly mentioned the 9/11 attacks as a trigger for future reforms. An additional bill was presented in March 2004. The conclusions drawn in the bill were further developed in a strategic concept presented in October the same year. In 2006, the newly elected Social Democratic-led Cabinet appointed a special council for defence policy. The Council later presented its report in October 2007 and the Norwegian ChoD soon afterward presented a similar report. Both were taken into consideration when the Cabinet presented a new defence bill in March 2008. Along with an analysis of these documents, we have also discussed the Parliament's Defence Committee's response to the bills as well as the Cabinet's following directives to the Armed Forces in the following section.

4.4.1 *The international environment*

International terrorism and the risks for proliferation of WMD were both spotlight issues in the 2002 bill. In particular, Afghanistan was given a lot of wiggle room for discussions. The combination of terrorism and WMD was treated with deepest concerns (Norwegian MoD 2002a). The Norwegian Parliament tended to have been more open minded in these regards compared to the Cabinet.

Already in its response to the 2002 bill, the Defence Committee included aspects such as international crime, human and drug trafficking in its discussions. On the other hand, the Committee also put more emphasis on indirect and direct challenges against Norway and Norwegian interests (Norwegian Defence Committee 2002).

In the defence bill presented in March 2004 the national and international perspectives were more balanced. The discussions on Norway's neighbourhood specifically mentioned uncertainties regarding the developments in Russia, and, on the other hand, on challenges connected to Norway's economic assets at sea. The international environment was described as both unpredictable and uncertain. International terrorism was still in focus but was put into a broader context involving a scale of armed violence ranging from peacetime disturbances to full-scale war. The challenge was not only analysed from a state-centric perspective but also from a broader societal and human perspective. Consequently, inter- as well as intrastate armed conflicts, organised crime, refugees and uncontrolled migration, humanitarian catastrophes and ecological disasters were also observed. The use of political, military and/or economic means to put pressure on Norway's political leadership was accounted for in the analysis. The use or threat of use of armed violence against Norway or Norwegian interests was therefore not neglected. 'The possibility that Norway or our allies can be attacked with WMD is a reality' the Cabinet declared (Norwegian MoD 2004a:21).

When the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, presented her strategic concept, *Relevant Force*, in October 2004 she shed light on all items aforementioned. The minister stressed that terrorism had once again struck Europe, explicitly mentioning the attacks in Madrid earlier the very same year. However, she also underscored specific military threats such as information warfare and long-range delivery systems, as well as risks related to societal security such as pandemics and climate changes. Not only Norway and its interests but also universal values such as human rights were, according to Krohn Devold, under pressure and challenged from non-governmental organisations (NGO) as well as states and governmental actors (Norwegian MoD 2004c).

The Defence Council dove even deeper in its elaboration and analysis. Consequently, the Council not only mentioned terrorism but different forms of terrorism. Failing states and risks of regional conflicts was another more in-depth item. Moreover, the Council also warned against threats concerning global energy production, which, according to the Council, in the end could lead to detrimental consequences also for Norway as an energy exporter. It also stressed more direct threats related to increased military activities in the Arctic region (Norwegian Defence Council 2007). The Norwegian ChoD reached similar conclusions in his 2007 report.

Both the Cabinet, in its defence bill (Norwegian MoD 2008), and the Parliament, in its response to the bill (Norwegian Defence Committee 2002), seem to have been influenced by the reports developed by the Council and the ChoD. As a result, the transnational and often asymmetric character of modern security

challenges constituted the tipping point for the discussions. Poverty in addition to increased competition for strategic resources were both important aspects aside the more traditional military threats.

4.4.2 Ends

Preventing and fighting international terrorism and decreasing the effects of terrorist activities were both central objectives when the Cabinet put more focus on the international arena. The ends were articulated both in short and long-term perspectives. To increase Norway's ability to contribute to the international efforts, defeating terrorism was mentioned as an end in itself along with a plan to provide troops to Afghanistan (Norwegian MoD 2002a).

Compared to the Cabinet, the Norwegian Parliament leaned more towards the importance of the national issues. Even if fighting and preventing terror were mentioned as ends, it was presented as a part of a broader objective that focused on contributing to stability and peaceful developments in the global perspective. Additionally, when the international ends were presented in one paragraph, the national ends were articulated in three different ones. The first addressed the importance in promoting Norwegian rights and interests as well as protecting Norway's freedom of action. While the second mentioned defending Norwegian sovereignty in a broader sense, the third focused specifically on the military aspects. Consequently, defending Norwegian land and sea territory as well as air space not only against intrusions but also against invasion was the end the Committee of the Parliament stressed the most (Norwegian Defence Committee 2002).

In March 2004, the picture was more developed. Some ends expressed in the defence bill were specifically related to promoting Norwegian national interests while others had a more general approach and were promoting universal values. In the former case the social and economic well-being of Norway's citizens, environmental security and the protection of the resources in the economic zones at sea were stressed while human rights cases, democracy and the rule of law were used to exemplify the latter. The temporal aspects now focused on fighting terrorism in its nascent stages along with objectives that stabilised and deterred in both the national and the international context (Norwegian MoD 2004a).

In September 2004, when presenting her directives implementing the defence decision of 2004, the Minister of Defence discussed the Cabinet and the Parliament's arguments. She concluded that the functionality of NATO's collective defence and the trustworthiness of Norway's ability to contribute to the efforts of the Alliance was a core Norwegian objective (Norwegian MoD 2004b). Her statements echoed in the strategic concept that she presented a couple of months later (Norwegian MoD 2004c). The message clearly reached the ChoD as the collectiveness was paraphrased in a later 2007 study (Norwegian ChoD 2007). Preventing war and other challenges against Norway and the collective security; contributing to peace, stability and the UN system;

promoting Norway's sovereignty, rights, interests and values; defending Norway's freedom of action; collectively defending Norway and NATO; and securing the functionality of the society were the overarching ends presented by the Cabinet in March 2008, thereby summarising the discussions during this period (Norwegian MoD 2008).

4.4.3 Means

Shortly after the terrorist attacks in September 2001 the Norwegian Cabinet spearheaded a transformation campaign of Norway's Armed Forces. The focus was on finding a structure enabling Norway to contribute to NATO's anti-terrorism operations. Consequently, the new structure forced the organisation at hand to cut some 5,000 personnel in order to fund its increased quality, readiness and deployability. Some 20 independent companies of the mobilisation army as well as the missile crafts and three amphibious vessels of the Navy were to be phased out. One Army garrison, Haslemoen, was shut down and reorganisation of the base structure in both the Navy and the Air Force initiated (Norwegian MoD 2002a). The Parliament approved the suggestions (Norwegian Defence Committee 2002). In her directives for the implementation of the decision, the Minister of Defence declared that one of the remaining three brigades, 12th Brigade, would be transformed into an independent brigade. The Norwegian Army's rapid deployment units would be concentrated and integrated within this brigade. The need to ensure airlift capability for the brigade's manoeuvre units was stressed (Norwegian MoD 2002b).

In September 2004, the Minister of Defence presented the Armed Forces' new structure that would be implemented four years later. The Army division remained but only with two brigades, Brigade Nord and 6th Brigade. The former included the rapid deployment unit, Telemark battalion, while the latter would be a mobilisation unit without any further training and exercise. The Navy would include five new *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates, six new *Skjold* class missile crafts and six old *Ula* class submarines. The latter was presumably a consequence of Denmark's withdrawal from the Viking project in 2004. Three of the *Ula*-submarines would be modified to enable them to take part in international operations. Hence, the joint Scandinavian submarine project was cancelled and no new submarines would be purchased. Interestingly, there were no

Table 4.3 The core of Norway's military capability in 2001

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 3 Brigades	6 Submarines	4 Squadrons with 57 F-16A/B
1 Armoured Brigade	3 Frigates	
2 Mechanised Brigades	14 Missile Craft	
170 Main Battle Tanks		

Source: IISS 2001.

dramatic shifts in the Air Force' structure. Consequently, the four squadrons with their F-16 were kept as the bulk of Norway's air defence while five air bases were shut down (Norwegian MoD 2004b).

The ChoD was keen to accelerate the transformation even more. In the report he presented in 2007, focus lay on phasing out the F-16 system of the Air Force and replacing it with 48 new combat planes. In order to fund this ambitious investment the ChoD suggested cuts in both the Army and the Navy. The Army would be reduced to one brigade (Brigade Nord) and the Navy would phase out the missile craft system (Norwegian ChoD 2007). The special council for defence policy presented similar conclusions and recommended, among others, that the Army should consist of one battalion with conscripts and two with professional soldiers (Norwegian Defence Council 2007).

When the Cabinet presented its defence bill in March 2008, only some of these suggestions were included. Consequently, the Army would be decreased to one single brigade, but the missile craft system of the Navy would be kept.¹⁰ The Air Force was, however, not excluded from the reductions. The air bases would be crystallised and organised in one single unit. The air defence of the bases was also to be reduced from two to one units. In both cases the remaining resources were to be concentrated to Ørland. Furthermore, the numbers of operational F-16 aircraft was due to be reduced from 57 to 48 with the nine shut down and salvaged as advanced spare parts (Norwegian MoD 2008). The Parliament also approved these suggestions (Norwegian Defence Committee 2008).

4.4.4 Ways

Although the newly elected Cabinet swiftly indicated a shift towards a more internationally focused concept, its methods were not solidified (Norwegian MoD 2002a) and the Parliament abstained from providing any support in this regard (Norwegian Defence Committee 2002). The implementation directives presented by the Minister of Defence indicated, however, that the long-rooted traditional defence strategies would remain but with far less units. She also stressed the need to contribute to NATO's international missions but did not provide any detailed information on how that would be orchestrated. Subsequently, she ordered the ChoD to 'continue the work attaching Telemark Battalion, and other potential [Norwegian] resources to Allied units for international operations' (Norwegian MoD 2002b:16).

The defence bill delivered in March 2004 failed to provide any clarity but did make suggestions on force generation efforts. Cooperation with other Nordic countries and the Baltic States regarding, for instance, maintenance and procurement, was explicitly announced as desirable. The discussions did not, however, only include military-strategic considerations but also political-strategic. Since the other Nordic and Baltic states, contrary to Norway, were members of the EU, the cooperation in generating military force was perceived as a 'point of entrance' for Norway's dialogue with the EU in other political venues (Norwegian MoD 2004a:30–1). The bill underscored the Norwegian North Sea Strategy.

Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were explicitly described as Norway's most important allies in addition to the USA. The Cabinet's ambition was to encourage these countries to train and conduct military exercises in Norway on a more frequent and substantial level. The strategy included both receiving and providing military support. The Telemark Battalion would be integrated in not only the Dutch-German army corps but also in the element of the corps being a part of NRF. The Norwegian Air Force was to cooperate with the Danish and the Dutch counterparts within the frames of European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) and European Expeditionary Air Wing (EEAW). Finally, the royal British and Norwegian navies were to cooperate more closely regarding training, exercises and doctrine developments. Exactly what roles the Norwegian Armed Forces were to fulfil in this cooperation was not explicitly mentioned (Norwegian MoD 2004a) and the Parliament did not contribute with any clarification (Norwegian Defence Committee 2004).

In her strategic concept of October 2004, the Minister of Defence did try to clarify some issues. In the national dimension, the Norwegian Armed Forces were to be continuously present in the northernmost areas. Their role was not to be a deterrent, rather to be a stabilising force with a focus on information gathering and surveillance as well as controlling the respect of Norwegian territorial integrity. Providing support to civilian authorities and hence contributing to the overarching societal security was also mentioned without specifying the military role any further. In case of a more demanding international situation, including an armed conflict with Russia, the Norwegian forces would, the Minister elaborated, potentially be tasked to protect certain geographical areas in addition to taking part in the allied operations. She also mentioned Norwegian niche capabilities and specific roles within the frames of these operations without specifying her ideas any further (Norwegian MoD 2004c).

In the Special Council for Defence Policy's report, the considerations took an additional step. Operational forces and military bases located in northern Norway on a high readiness were declared as a necessity. Bilateral agreements on storage of allied military equipment, similar to the American, were labelled crucial and so was the allied training in the north. The Council did not explicitly discuss the Norwegian Armed Forces' role within the frames of allied-led operations on Norwegian soil or elsewhere (Norwegian Defence Council 2007) and the ChoD, the Cabinet and the Parliament failed to provide any further information (Norwegian ChoD 2007).

4.4.5 Summary – the Norwegian strategy after the first shock

Clearly the Norwegian government perceived the terrorist attacks as unexpected and met them with what they considered imperative counter measures. We argue, however, that despite these insights the strategic shock did not lead to as deeply consequential decisions as in the Danish case. Rather, the Norwegian strategy was developed with a cross-eyed perspective and shaped by a myriad of challenges. These included stress on the national dimension including not only

potential military and political threats and pressure from Russia but also challenges related to Norway's sovereignty, and its economic zones at sea. When it comes to the Russian issues, the NATO membership was perceived as a precondition but also the UN and EU systems were considered vital. Interestingly, at the same time the Norwegian government saw increased threats from international terrorism. The primacy of the latter perspective lasted for no more than 1 year. Soon the traditional national outlook was again given the leading role. Norway's dependency on international organisations, and primarily NATO and the EU, reflected in the objectives. Being a trustworthy ally and contributor to not only the transatlantic but also to the (western) European security structures as well was regularly expressed as an end in itself. We argue that the shifts in Norwegian strategic thinking, i.e. towards a hedging strategy, implicitly also indicated a paradigm shift (see, for example Ulriksen 2007).

The first weak link that started to unravel the logical chain was the means. In the transformation process of the Armed Forces, which was initiated soon after 9/11, the Navy was given more focus. New frigates, primarily designed for the national dimension, were prioritised over reorganising the Army for an expeditionary role. Despite the fact that the ground forces were reduced from about one division with three brigades to one brigade with three battalions, the outcome remained almost the same – one battalion ready to contribute internationally to the Alliance's efforts. At the same time, the core of the concept from the Cold War era – several air bases protected with air defence enabling rapid allied reinforcements to Norway – was gradually phased out without any explicit concerns. Jean-Marc Rickli claims (2008) that Norway adopted a niche strategy after the end of the Cold War, specialising on Special Forces. We simply do not agree with his conclusions.

Consequently, the second weak link was the ways. Despite the emphasis put on integrating the Norwegian Armed Forces with the forces of prioritised allies, there was no convincing story explaining the role the former was going to play within these frames. On the other hand, the use of force perspective was not elaborated on. Instead, multilateral cooperation regarding force generation was at the top of the agenda. The military-strategic level was hence used as a tool gaining Norwegian influence at the political-strategic level. This approach also included the EU in addition to the traditional NATO focus (see, for example Saxi 2010).

4.5 Sweden¹¹

In 2001 Sweden was preparing the defence resolution for the period 2002–4. Following Swedish governmental traditions, a defence commission had been appointed to present analysis on global events relevant when formulating Swedish security and defence policy. An initial report (Ds 2001:14) was published by the Commission some six months prior to the terrorist attack. Another report (Ds 2001:44) was published on 30 August 2001. When the Cabinet presented, as initially planned, its defence bill (Prop. 2001/02:10) on 26 September

2001, only two weeks after the attack, it took the two reports as a point of departure for its discussions. Already in November 2001 both the Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee and the Defence Committee of the Swedish Parliament, *Riksdagen*, presented their recommendations following the bill. In preparation for the defence resolution covering the period 2005–7 the Defence Commission issued three reports (Ds. 2003:8, 2003:34, 2004:30), preceding the Cabinet's bill (2004/05:5) and the recommendations of the Defence Committee (2004/05:FöU4; 2004/05:FöU5). The Defence Commission also issued three reports (Ds. 2006:1, 2007:46, 2008:48) in preparation for the defence resolution covering the period from 2008 and onwards. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Russian invasion of Georgia delayed the bill of the Cabinet and with it the recommendations of the parliamentary committees. The documents analysed in this section hence start with the 2001 reports from the Defence Commission and ends with the 2008 report.

4.5.1 International environment

The initial report by the Defence Commission was, as mentioned, published some 6 months prior to the terrorist attack. The Commission suggests that it had honed in on international terrorism. However, its analytical focus was elsewhere. Globalisation was the megatrend that fuelled international collaboration. Yet interdependence also made the society more vulnerable as it allowed local conflicts to have global impact. Indeed, different types of terrorism were identified in this context. However, the report was more concerned with environmental threats compared to those emanating from international terrorism (Swedish Defence Commission 2001a). The second report presented by the Defence Commission did not provide any further discussions in this regard (Swedish Defence Commission 2001b).

The subsequent defence bill followed suit in that it was underpinned by globalisation as the mega trend. However, influenced by the horrific terrorist attacks the understanding of globalisation was broadened by further emphasising transnational threats that included antagonistic violence. Notwithstanding, the Cabinet assessed that a military invasion of Sweden was highly unlikely in the coming 10 years; provided that fundamental Swedish defence capabilities remained. Instead, focus shifted to the international arena as globalisation made nations increasingly dependent on cooperation to counter opaque transnational threats such as international terrorism, cyber-attacks and proliferation of WMD. Moreover, the bill conveyed solidarity and support to the USA (Swedish Cabinet 2001).

By the time the Defence Committee issued its recommendations on the bill, the understanding of the terrorist attack had matured even further. The Committee was clear on the implications from a national point of view; it had shifted the threat perception from Russia to transnational threats. Notwithstanding, the Moderate Party argued that it was premature to discount the Russian threat. At the same time, the Committee went even further than the Cabinet on the

important assessment regarding threats of invasion against Sweden; 'it seemed not to be possible' it was argued. The significance of the terrorist attacks was underscored in the opening paragraph where the Committee stated that a further review of the international order was needed to shed light on the changed threat scenarios. Indeed, the Committee included numerous references to the terrorist attacks. Hence, efforts and resources should be redirected to support civil society and contribute to international crisis management. The Committee posited that the relations with Russia needed to be enhanced. International institutions, in particular the UN, the EU and the OSCE, played an instrumental role for security but also for Sweden to leverage its priorities. To this end the so-called broadened scope of security, encompassing and emphasising other than military aspects, was a concept to convey to partners and ultimately convince them of its utility. Although the transatlantic link was indispensable for European security, it was argued that it should not alter the Swedish non-military alignment policy as it would curtail the national political freedom of action and reduce the influence in international disarmament processes (Swedish Defence Committee 2001). The report presented by the Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee was limited to the security policy aspects of the bill. The Committee reaffirmed national peace and security as the foundation for security policy, but emphasised that in the spirit of solidarity there is an obligation to contribute to peace and security globally (Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2001).

In preparation for the defence resolution covering the period 2005–8, the EU security strategy and the formalised cooperation between NATO and the EU (so-called Berlin Plus arrangements) suggested even more potential in international cooperation. A further geographical expansion of the EU and an increase in its crisis management capabilities were welcomed. The role of the UN was emphasised against the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq, falling short of a UNSC authorisation. Russia's weakness was confirmed based on conclusions from the Chechen War (Swedish Defence Commission 2003a; 2003b; 2004).

Based on the Commission's analysis, the Cabinet concluded that Sweden's immediate environment continued to develop in a positive direction including increased integration. A military attack against Sweden was considered unrealistic during at least the upcoming decade. Minor military incidents were, however, not totally eliminated in the considerations. The Cabinet argued that Sweden could play an even more active role in the international efforts for security and crisis management outside Europe. The Swedish Armed Forces were hence considered as having a unique opportunity to support Sweden's foreign affairs policy (Swedish Cabinet 2004a; 2004b). The Parliament championed the ideas presented by the Cabinet (Swedish Defence Committee 2004a; 2004b).

Three years later the Defence Commission expressed that the challenges for and threats against Sweden's security were not only transnational and complex in their character but in continuous flux. The roots were to be found in adversary and non-antagonistic aspects, which could be hard to predict in advance (Swedish Defence Commission 2007).

4.5.2 Ends

Mindful that it was only 1 year since the Parliament passed a defence resolution and set a new trajectory for the military arm (see Chapter 3), it was logical that this important principle remained and got confirmed, which it did. In essence, the objectives remained unchanged: to repel military attacks, ensure territorial integrity, contribute to international crisis management operations and support civil society in times of distress. Based on recommendations from the Commission, the Cabinet as well as the Defence Committee concluded that it was justified to shift priorities from an invasion-based defence concept to a concept of available and deployable forces, albeit in lower numbers as discussed in Chapter 3.

The Cabinet stated that there was only marginal change in the scope and that was because the traditional military threats seemed to be slightly more remote than before. Indeed, the Cabinet had a strong focus on the broader perspective on security as well as globalisation. While these principles were established in the previous defence bill, it is clear that the interpretation of these principles changed. Arguably they became more ambitious as they underwent revision in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. In an illuminating passage (see page 36), the Cabinet argued that the interdependence makes national interests broader and more difficult to define. Swedish interests, it was claimed, are increasingly overlapping with those of other actors. Clearly, Sweden saw little utility of specific national priorities. Instead, it succumbed to the common agenda of partners, still aspiring to play an independent role (Swedish Cabinet 2001). The Defence Committee confirmed the extant security policy objectives as still being relevant. Indeed, there is a high degree of concurrence with the deliberations presented in the bill while the report appears to be more focused on the ways and means (Swedish Defence Committee 2001).

In the preparation for the defence resolution covering the period 2005–8 the most salient shift in all the deliberations of the Defence Commission was a further emphasis on engagement in international crisis management (Swedish Defence Commission 2003b). When the Commission 3 years later outlined a proposal for a security strategy, protecting values, people, independence and the legitimacy of democracy were in focus. Promoting the well-being of citizens, protecting the functionality of society, promoting the fundamental values including human rights were the suggested main objectives (Swedish Defence Commission 2006). Two years later, in 2008, when the Commission focused on Sweden's defence policy, the suggested tasks for the Armed Forces were (i) preventing and managing conflicts and ultimately war; (ii) securing Sweden's independence; and (iii) protecting the society including its functionality (Swedish Defence Commission 2008).

4.5.3 Means

The changed threat perception put emphasis on societal resilience in peacetime as opposed to mustering civilian and military resources in a total defence to withstand an armed aggression. Consequently, the Cabinet recommended that the total defence be demounted and peacetime requirements were largely to govern the capacity, civilian as well as military. To square the circle, the capacity for adjustment due to changes in the security environment would ensure that timely preparations would be made to deal with more serious threats, if such an unlikely situation would arise. The Cabinet proposed to deactivate the central agency for civil preparedness and other civilian structures designed for wartime needs. Instead, a central planning agency was proposed to provide coordination and guidance for other agencies in their preparation for peacetime crisis but also if needed for wartime scenarios. Particular emphasis was put on the need to protect critical infrastructure, including telecommunications and energy supply (Swedish Cabinet 2001).

Because of the terrorist attack, the Cabinet proposed to repeal an earlier decision by Parliament to locate the operational headquarters in a site without special protective measures in a densely populated area. Indeed, an important way to achieve efficiency was to enhance command and control. An earlier decision in 2000 had been made to streamline the command structure by reducing the number of headquarters from 27 to 6. Now the Cabinet wanted it to become relevant for future requirements by aligning to the nascent development of network-based defence spearheaded by the USA. The network-based defence would provide unparalleled situation awareness that would allow for efficient employment of combat forces. It also served the purpose of ensuring interoperability and avoiding unique Swedish solutions. The Air Force was, for example, suggested to consist of, among others, eight squadrons with 160 JAS combat aircraft, allowing 40 aircraft of the initially ordered about 200 be used for export purposes (Swedish Cabinet 2001).

The Defence Committee endorsed the recommendations put forward by the Cabinet. However, it raised concerns over the air defence capability and requested the Cabinet to revert to the issue in due course. Moreover, while it supported the need to reconsider the location of the joint operational headquarters it disagreed with the Cabinet on the need collocate all staff elements on one site. Consequently, the reduction of the Army to four operative brigades with 16 mechanised battalions, and the transformation of the coastal artillery to

Table 4.4 The core of Sweden's military capability in 2001

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Divisions with 6 Brigades	7 Submarines	5 Squadrons with 95 JAS-39
368 Main Battle Tanks	20 Missile Craft	1 Squadron with 20 AJS-37
	1 Amphibious Brigade	2 Squadrons with 91 JA-37

Source: IISS 2001.

an amphibious force consisting of three battalions continued (Swedish Defence Committee 2001).

Three years later, in 2004, the Cabinet argued for further reductions. The bulk of the Swedish Armed Forces were suggested to consist of one ranger battalion, eight mechanised battalions, one airborne battalion, three artillery battalions, two air defence battalions, four submarines, seven missile crafts, one amphibious battalion and four squadrons JAS combat aircraft (Swedish Cabinet 2004a; 2004b). Once again, the Parliament supported the bill (Swedish Defence Committee 2004a; 2004b).

In the preparations for the upcoming long-term defence decision, to be taken in 2008, the Defence Commission recommended that the Swedish Armed Forces should have the capacity of having 2,000 troops of the ground forces ready to be deployed nationally as well as internationally. 'Relevant' parts of the Navy and the Air Force respectively would be given similar tasks. In order to finance the increased readiness the major part of the ground-based air defence, main battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers would be phased out while the number of operational combat aircrafts would be cut (Swedish Defence Commission 2008).

4.5.4 Ways

The Cabinet gave new impetus to strengthen international cooperation in general. Mindful of the terrorist attacks the Cabinet outlined a desire to strengthen international cooperation on counter-terrorism. Pledges to force registers within the EU and the UN provided, according to the Cabinet, an important vehicle for force transformation, in addition to participation in international crisis management operations. Another important area of cooperation that emerged was the increased need to work with and support civilian agencies to address non-military contingencies in peacetime. This need was further perpetuated by the changes made both in the military command organisation and in the structural changes made among the civilian organisations. Based on two inquiries the Cabinet argued for a need to formulate a strategy for procurement as well as research and development. On the one hand, it wanted to harness the efficiency potentials in international cooperation, and on the other hand it was needed to promote the Swedish defence industry in the export markets. Against the recent progress in Nordic procurement of NH-90 helicopters, the bill included a framework agreement for Nordic defence equipment cooperation (Swedish Cabinet 2001). The Defence Committee supported the recommendations made in the bill. While the Liberal Party argued that Sweden should join NATO and that Sweden, as an EU member, could not claim neutrality if any EU member state or a Baltic country was subjected to a military aggression, the Committee on the other hand concluded that the current security policy still was relevant (Swedish Defence Committee 2001).

In 2006, the Defence Commission formulated a standpoint to be known as the unilateral Swedish declaration of solidarity. The Commission suggested that the Swedish Cabinet should officially declare that, if a catastrophe or an armed

attack hit another member of the EU or another Nordic country, Sweden would not remain passive. The Cabinet was, in addition, to express its expectation that the EU and the other Nordic countries would support Sweden in a similar manner in case of a catastrophe or of an attack hitting Sweden (Swedish Defence Commission 2006).

4.5.5 Summary – the Swedish strategy after the first shock

Clearly the terrorist attacks were unexpected by the Swedish government. The events had, in addition, a deeply consequential impact on the Swedish defence policy and the political authorities undertook counter measures. While its security policy has been firmly anchored in the Baltic Sea region for centuries, the alleviation of a Russian military threat allowed Sweden to align this policy area with its global aspirations, manifested in export-focus and devotion to humanitarian aid and fostering democratic values. The terrorist attacks gave new impetus to the already started shift towards contextualising Sweden in a global community and abandoning the Russia centric view on security. Wilhelm Agrell (2010) argued that the Swedish government did not replace Russia as a driving force when reformulating the strategy. We do not agree with his conclusion. Rather we argue that threat perceptions, including Russia, were gradually replaced with an interest-based approach.

The invasion threat was for all practical purposes disregarded. Instead, threats posed to Sweden had nature other than traditional military such as terrorism, cyber-attacks and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN), often posed by non-state actors. Still, there was a risk in having traditional regional conflicts spill over to Sweden. In essence, Sweden regarded itself as a post-modern society among its European peers. War and conventional military threats were relics of the past. Indeed, this intellectual seed also grew from Brussels and manifested in the European Strategy issued in 2003. A fundamentally important assumption for this shift was that practically all nations were winners in globalisation. Hence, nations like Russia would eventually converge to the principles of globalisation including liberal western values and free trade because that would benefit the Russian people. The Swedish government concluded, among other things, that the attacks and the decisions made in the UN had changed the role of the military – there was a right to exercise military self-defence against international terrorism. Moreover, internal developments within Sweden led to a new law, finally passed in the Parliament in 2006, that allowed military support to the police in the fight against terrorism. Against the backdrop of the historical experience of using military force in support of police operations, this was no insignificant achievement. Ever since the Ådalen-incident in 1931, when soldiers were employed, under police authority, to curb strikers and tragically killed five workers in a rally, the employment of military force for internal security has been stigmatised. Clearly, the shock of the 9/11 attacks influenced Swedish defence policy in both the international and national dimension (see, for example Edström and Gyllensporre 2014c).

4.6 Conclusions: the consequences of the first shock

How did the four Nordic countries respond when facing the first potential shock? What similarities and differences can be observed when exploring their military strategies? Were the terrorist attacks perceived as a shock at all?

Regarding the perceptions of the *international environment*, all four countries observed a decreased level of immediate military threats directed against the Nordic region. Especially Denmark and Norway saw, however, an increased international interest for the Arctic region. This interest had, for the time being, no clear military ties but could, in the long run, lead to increased competition and growing tensions among the great powers. Risks involved with terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as well as the increased vulnerability of the Nordic society were other similarities. The interpretation of Russia and different aspects of Russian developments differed among the Nordic countries.

Despite these differences, the *ends/objectives* expressed by each of the four Nordic states were rather similar. Contributing to international peace and stability, protecting and promoting the national interests and values, as well as defending the territory and the citizens of the state, were hence common themes.

Despite the similar approach to the ends, the *means* considered necessary to meet the future and to fulfil the objectives differed considerably. Clearly each of the four Nordic countries reached different conclusions regarding balancing quality, quantity and readiness when transforming their Armed Forces. Denmark and Sweden seem to be the most willing to transform their Armed Forces towards a more expeditionary profile. While Denmark could rely on its NATO membership to phase out certain niche capabilities, Sweden had, however, to keep a rather broad spectrum of resources and to balance between the services. Both Finland and Norway seem also to have been striving for a balance between the capabilities of services. Arguably, they reached this conclusion from rather different angles. While Finland's main focus remained countering a potential Russian use of military force, each of the Norwegian services seem to have had rather different *raison d'être*: the Air Force countering Russia, the Navy protecting the economic zones and the Army contributing to NATO's international efforts. Consequently, only Finland seems to have kept a national capability leading military operations at the operational level.

Despite the rather different approach to the means, another similar approach related to the *ways*. Arguably, this conclusion applies at least for the force generation dimension. However, although all four states explicitly acknowledge the necessity to cooperate internationally in this regard, the preference for whom to cooperate with differed. While the military non-aligned countries Finland and Sweden preferred the other Nordic countries and other EU members, the NATO members Denmark and Norway preferred other NATO allies. Norway especially seemed interested in cooperating with its Nordic neighbours as well. When it comes to the use of force dimension, Finland kept its policies of total and territorial defence while Sweden phased out the concept of total defence without replacing it. Increased integration with especially the UK and the US was the

Table 4.5 The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the first shock

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Environment	Direct military threats against Denmark dismissed. The vulnerability of the Danish society. The threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD. The situation in Asia in general and in the Middle East in particular	Regional crisis. Political, economic and military pressure, including threats of use of military force. Strategic military strike. Asymmetric warfare including acts of terrorism. Proliferation and the use of WMD. Information warfare	Pressure from Russia, challenges related to Norway's sovereignty including the economic zones at sea and in the Arctic region, international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, armed conflicts, military threats such as information warfare and long-range delivery systems, risks related to societal security such as organised crime	Transnational threats including antagonistic violence, international terrorism, cyber-attacks and proliferation of WMD. Military invasion of Sweden highly unlikely. International institutions, in particular the UN, the EU and the OSCE, playing an instrumental role for security
Ends	Contributing to international peace and stability. Protecting and promoting Denmark's national interests and values. Defending Denmark's territory and citizens	Promoting security and stability in Northern Europe. Safeguarding Finland's independence and territorial integrity as well as the values of the Finnish society. Promoting the security and welfare of all Finland's citizens. Protecting the political freedom of action of the national leadership	Preventing and fighting international terrorism, decreasing the effects of terrorist activities, promoting Norwegian rights and interests, protecting the political freedom of action, defending Norwegian land and sea territory as well as air space against intrusions and invasion	Repelling military attacks. Ensuring territorial integrity. Contributing to international crisis management operations. Supporting civil society including protecting critical infrastructure

Means	Readiness and quality were given priority over quantity. Specialisation and focus on niche capacities in each of the services. Expeditionary warfare capability	Initially only minor reductions in the number of infantry brigades and combat aircrafts. Naval resources remained at previous levels. Further quantitative reductions announced including one armoured brigade and several coastal artillery units. Conscription still seen as fundamental	Increased quality, readiness and deployability, air lift capability, new combat aircraft	Transformation of the Armed Forces toward a more modern and network-based defence force
Ways	Interoperability with the UK and the US at the operational and tactical levels in the use of force context. Cooperation with the US and within NATO in focus regarding force generation. Proactiveness	Continued focus on the twin concepts of territorial defence and national or total defence	Cooperation with other Nordic countries and the Baltic States regarding Force Generation, and with Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK regarding Use of Force. Force integration within NATO	International cooperation. Pledging units to especially the force registers of the EU and the UN when it comes to international use of force. Nordic cooperation regarding force generation

preferred way for both Denmark and Norway when it comes to the use of force at the operational and tactical levels. Explicit discussions on ways of using force at the military-strategic level was absent in the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish analysis.

Regarding the first control variable, *strategic exposure*, all four Nordic countries seem to have interpreted similar challenges in the global arena. However, regarding the national arena, Denmark and Sweden reached different conclusions compared to especially Finland but also to Norway. When the two former countries viewed the current Russian weakness as a window of opportunity, the two latter were not yet completely convinced. The perceived exposure from potential Russian military aggression was, in other words, different among the four Nordic states.

Consequently, when it comes to *capacity*, the four countries applied slightly different approaches. While Denmark and Sweden took further steps towards an expeditionary profile of their Armed Forces, Finland kept its guard to the east. Norway seems to have been ambivalent in this regard. On the one hand, it was clear that Norway had to contribute to the international efforts of NATO in order to remain a trustworthy ally. On the other hand, Norway had a need to protect its interests in northern Europe. Clearly, this need was not always directed against Russia. Despite these differences, we claim that all four states fulfil the *interest* criteria of being a pet-dog. All of them showed, for instance, a clear awareness of their dependency on international organisations. The organisation given highest priority seems, however, to have varied from case to case.

When it comes to the intervening variables referring to the internal aspects, we still argue that *Denmark's* geographical proximity to NATO and EU allies and ditto remoteness to Russia, in combination with the historical experience, especially the catastrophes following waging war alone, contribute to explain the developments of the Danish strategy. It seems reasonable to conclude that Denmark was implementing a *bandwagoning* strategy vis-à-vis the USA and NATO. The unconditional burden sharing with the US and the UK in both Iraq and Afghanistan can arguably be interpreted as signs of this strategy at work.

We also continue to argue that the Finnish strategy can be explained by a combination of *Finland's* geographical characteristics and historical experience. Despite the terrorist attacks most of the discussions regarding the international environment was, one way or another, referring to Russia or circumstances that can be associated with Russia. The successful experience of waging war with a neighbouring great power presumably had a restraining effect when developing the defence concepts and transforming the Armed Forces. If we hesitated to describe Finland's strategy as an act of *balance of power* in the previous chapter, we are now willing to claim that this was the case. Despite all options wholeheartedly supporting the USA and NATO after the terrorist attacks, Finland continued to balance the power of Russia by its own strong military force and by the Finnish EU membership.

The intervening variables also continued to provide explanatory power to the *Norwegian* case. At least this goes for the geographical characteristics. The

economic zones in the Atlantic Ocean and the proximity to not only Russia but also to areas of key strategic importance of Russia remained fundamental in the Norwegian assessments. It seems, however, that the historical experiences began to fade away. One of the fundamental, perhaps the most crucial, aspect, being able to receive allied reinforcements, the air bases, were gradually given less priority. We argue that the national strategy, at least at the military-strategic level, hence lost in consistency. Consequently, the overarching strategic performance of Norway seems not to have been cohesive. At the political-strategic level, the preferences clearly indicate an awareness of NATO dependency and especially the US when it comes to managing political-military challenges. Since NATO can hardly be interpreted as a tool managing political-economic challenges, Norway had to create a balance between contributing to NATO operations abroad, on the one hand, and to allocating military resources to managing the challenges in the national arena, on the other. Naturally, this dual-faced strategy had a cost and the bill seems to have been paid with a less visible part, infrastructure. We argue that less relevance of NATO in the political-economic sphere also forced Norway into a *hedging* strategy at the political-strategic level. By putting attention not only on the UN and the UN system but also on the EU, the 'shortcomings' of NATO were compensated. This awareness of the Norwegian government included the use of military power within the frames of the Union, despite Norway not being a EU member.

Finally, when it comes to *Sweden*, it seems reasonable to conclude that neither the geographical characteristics nor historical experiences played any significant role. Most likely, this can be explained by the overarching conclusion made by the Swedish authorities. Simply put, the perceived weakness of Russia created a window of opportunity enabling Sweden to take additional steps away from its traditional policy of neutrality towards a more pro-west position. We therefore claim the Swedish strategy at the political-strategic level can be labelled as *bandwagoning*. Consequently, a continued use of geography and history as a point of departure for the strategic discussions did not serve the interest of the Swedish stakeholders. At the same time this approach created a strategic vacuum since the use of force aspect was more or less neglected in the national dimension. Clearly, the Nordic dimension was still present in the calculations but solely regarding the force generation aspects. By demounting the concept of total defence the authorities gave the impression that globalisation had made Sweden a safe haven.

To summarise, we argue that the terrorist attacks were perceived as a strategic shock in Denmark, Norway and Sweden but not in Finland.

Notes

- 1 When the terrorist attacks occurred in September 2001, Denmark was governed by a centre-left minority Cabinet consisting of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party (Danish: *Radikale Venstre*) and led by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen of the former party. After the elections in late November 2001, a centre-right coalition was formed consisting of the Liberal Party (Danish: *Venstre*) and the Conservative People's Party

- (Danish: *Det Konservative Folkeparti*). Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of the former party led the new Cabinet. The centre-right coalition remained in power throughout the period analysed in this section.
- 2 The Social Democrats, the Danish People's Party, (Danish: *Dansk Folkeparti*), the Socialist People's Party (Danish: *Socialistisk Folkeparti*), the Social Liberal Party, the Red-Green Alliance (Danish: *Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne*), the Christian People's Party (Danish: *Kristeligt Folkeparti*, currently the Christian Democrats, *Kristendemokraterne*), the Conservative People's Party and the Liberal Party.
 - 3 The Liberal Party, the Conservative People's Party, the Social Democrats, the Social Liberal Party, the Danish People's Party and the Christian People's Party were all signatory parties while the two socialist parties at the far left, Socialist People's Party and the Red-Green Alliance were not.
 - 4 UNMIBH in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNMOP in Croatia, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), UNMISET in East Timor, UNOMIG in Georgia, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNIKOM in Kuwait, UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and UNTSO in the Middle East.
 - 5 It is noteworthy that Denmark already on 1 November 2001, slightly more than a month after the terrorist attacks, deployed liaison officers to US CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida (Danish MoD 2002a).
 - 6 Tarja Halonen of the Social Democratic Party (Finnish: *Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue*) was Finland's President throughout the period explored in this section. After the parliamentary elections in 1999, Paavo Lipponen remained in office as Prime Minister and led a Social Democratic majority Cabinet for another 4 years. The parliamentary elections of 2003 partly led to a shift in power. A coalition Cabinet consisting of the Centre Party (Finnish: *Keskusta*), the Social Democrats and the Swedish People's Party (Swedish: *Svenska Folkpartiet*), formed a majority Cabinet led by Anneli Jäätteenmäki of the former party. She resigned as Prime Minister after only two months in office and was replaced by another member of the Centre Party, Matti Vanhanen. After the parliamentary elections in 2007, the Social Democrats left the Cabinet coalition. Vanhanen instead formed a new majority coalition consisting of the Centre Party, the Swedish People's Party, the National Coalition Party (Finnish: *Kansallinen Kokoomus*) and the Green League (Finnish: *Vihreä Liitto*).
 - 7 According to Limnell, the military threat models in the Cabinet's bill of 2004 was developed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, who actively blocked suggestions of presenting a large-scale invasion as a separate model. Both Admiral Kaskeala and the Minister of Defence, Seppo Kääriäinen, publicly stated that there was 'no real military threat aimed at Finland' (Limnell 2012:128 and 133).
 - 8 That the Finnish Armed Forces' material acquisitions and organisation should be developed with a view to 'the change in the nature of warfare, advances in technology and increases in international cooperation' was explicitly acknowledged in a government report on a strategy for societal security from 2006 (translated from Finnish by Raitasalo 2010:74).
 - 9 Soon after the terrorist attacks the Norwegian minority Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of the Social Democrats (Norwegian: *Arbeiderparti*), had to resign due to the outcome of the elections in October 2001. The newly elected Cabinet was a coalition and consisted of the Conservative Party (Norwegian: *Høyre*), the Liberal Party (Norwegian: *Venstre*) and the Christian Democrats (Norwegian: *Kristelig Folkeparti*). Kjell Magne Bondevik of the latter party headed the new minority Cabinet. After the elections in 2005, Jens Stoltenberg returned as Prime Minister. This time he formed a majority Cabinet consisting not only of his own Social Democrats but also of the Socialist Left Party (Norwegian: *Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) and the Centre Party (Norwegian: *Senterpartiet*).

- 10 The Cabinet had suggested the phasing out of the 6th Brigade already in a previous bill (Norwegian MoD 2006). The Parliament approved the suggestion (see Norwegian Defence Committee 2006).
- 11 In 2001, a Social Democratic minority Cabinet led by Göran Persson since March 1996 when he took over as Prime Minister after his fellow Social Democrat Ingvar Carlsson had governed Sweden. After a decade in office Persson was replaced by Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderate Party (Swedish: *Moderata Samlingspartiet*) as a result of the elections of 2006. Reinfeldt formed a centre-right majority coalition consisting of the Moderate Party, the Centre Party (Swedish: *Centerpartiet*), the Liberal Party (Swedish: *Folkpartiet*) and the Christian Democrats (Swedish: *Kristdemokraterna*). The coalition Cabinet remained in power throughout the remaining years of the period explored in this section.

Bibliography

- Agrell, Wilhelm (2010). *Fredens illusioner – Det svenska nationella försvarets nedgång och fall 1988–2009*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- Boyle, Joe (2014). 'Making Sense of Self-Defence in the War on Terror' in *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law*. Volume 1, Issue 1.
- Breitenbauch, Henrik (2008). *Kompas og kontrakt – Om Danmarks behov av en national sikkerhedsstrategi*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Military Studies.
- Bush, George W. 'Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks' September 11, 2001. Online: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1099.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2018.
- Danish Defence Council. 'De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik, August 2003'. Online: www.fmn.dk/gamlesites/Forsvars-%20og%20sikkerhedspolitik/Forsvarspolitik/Documents/sikkerhedspolitiskrede%C3%B8relse.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2018.
- Danish MoD (2002a). *Årlig redegørelse 2001*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2002b). *Politisk aftale om redningsberedskabet efter 2002*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2003). *Årlig redegørelse 2002*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2004a). *Forsvarsforlig – Aftale om forswarets ordning 2005–2009*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2004b). *Årlig redegørelse 2003*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2004c). *Consolidated implementation basis for 'Danish Defence Agreement 2005–2009'*. Copenhagen, 7 December 2004.
- Danish MoD (2005). *Årlig redegørelse 2004*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2006). *Årlig redegørelse 2005*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2007). *Årlig redegørelse 2006*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2014c). *Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter det kalla krigets slut*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Finnish Cabinet (2001). *Finlands säkerhets- och försvarspolitik 2001 – Statsrådets redogörelse till Riksdagen 13.6.2001*, VNS/2001.
- Finnish Cabinet (2002). *Suomen Osallistumisesta Sotilaalliseen Kriisinhallintaoperaatioon*, VNS 5/2001.
- Finnish Cabinet (2004). *Finlands säkerhets- och försvarspolitik 2004 – Statsrådets redogörelse till Riksdagen 24.9.2004*, VNS6/2004.
- Finnish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2004). *Försvarsutskottets betänkande FsUB 1/2004 rd*.

- Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee (of the Parliament) (2001). Utrikesutskottets utlåtande UtUU 6/2001 rd.
- Finnish Parliament (2002). *Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen Osallistumisesta Sotilaalliseen Kriisinhallintaoperaatioon*, UaVM 19/2001.
- Flaherty, Martin (2011). 'Human Rights Law, American Justice, and the "War on Terror"' in *Magazine of History*. Volume 25, Issue 3.
- Holm, Hans-Henrik (2002). 'Danish Foreign Policy Activism: The Rise and Decline' in Bertel Heuerlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds). *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2002*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2001). *The Military Balance 2001–2002*. London: Routledge.
- Kean, Thomas and Lee Hamilton (eds) (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: Macmillan.
- Leudar, Ivan and Jiri Nekvapil (2011). 'Practical Historians and Adversaries: 9/11 Revisited' in *Discourse & Society*. Volume 22, Issue 1.
- Limn  ll, Jarno (2012). *Finnish Threat Perception Policy in the Early Years of the 21st Century*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Martelius, Juha, Krista Salo and Anu Sallinen (2007). 'Finsk forsvar efter 11. september 2001' in Bertel Heurlin (ed.). *Nationen eller Verden? – De nordiske lands forsvar idag*. Copenhagen: Jurist- og  konomforbundets Forlaget.
- Norwegian ChoD (2007). *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport*. Oslo: Forsvarets overkommando.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2001). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. Innst. S. nr. 342 2000/2001.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2002). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om Gjennomf ringsproposisjonen – utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. Innst. S. Nr. 232, 2001–2.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2004). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008*. Innst. S. nr. 234, 2003–4.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2006). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om bevilgninger p  statsbudsjettet for 2007, kapitler under Forsvarsdepartementet mv*. B. innst. S. nr. 7, 2006–7.
- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2008). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om et forsvar til vern for Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier*. Innst. S. nr. 318, 2007–8.
- Norwegian Defence Council (2007). *Et styrket forsvar (NOU 2007:15)*. Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste.
- Norwegian MoD (2002a). *Gjennomf ringsproposisjonen – utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. St.prp. nr. 55, 2001–2.
- Norwegian MoD (2002b). *Gjennomf ringsproposisjonen – utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005. Iverksettelsesbrev for forsvarssektoren*. 21 June 2002.
- Norwegian MoD (2004a). *Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008*. St.prp. nr. 42, 2003–4.
- Norwegian MoD (2004b). *Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008. Iverksettelsesbrev for forsvarssektoren*. 14 September 2004.

- Norwegian MoD (2004c). *Styrke og relevans: strategisk konsept for Forsvaret*. 11 October 2004.
- Norwegian MoD (2006). *For budsjettåret 2007*. St. prp. Nr. 1, 2006–7.
- Norwegian MoD (2008). *Et forsvar til vern for Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier*. St.prp. nr. 48, 2007–8.
- Parker, Charles and Eric Stern (2002). 'Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise' in *Political Psychology*. Volume 23, Issue 3.
- Raitasalo, Jyri (2010). *Reconstructing Finnish Defence in the Post-Cold War Era*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Rickli, Jean-Marc (2008). 'European Small States' Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies' in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. Volume 21, Issue 3.
- Ringmose, Jens and Sten Rynning (2008). 'The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier Membership' in Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds). *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Rosand, Eric (2003). 'Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism' in *American Journal of International Law*. Volume 97, Issue 2.
- Saxi, Hakon Lunde (2010). 'Defending Small States: Norwegian and Danish Defence Policies in the post-Cold War Era' in *Defence and Security Analysis*. Volume 26, Issue 4.
- Swedish Cabinet (2001). *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret*. Regeringens proposition 2001/02:10.
- Swedish Cabinet (2004a). *Vårt framtida försvar*. Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5.
- Swedish Cabinet (2004b). *Återkallelse av en del av propositionen 2004/05:5*. Regeringens skrivelse 2004/05:42.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2001a). *Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet – gemensam säkerhet*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2001:14.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2001b). *Ny struktur för ökad säkerhet – nätverksförsvar och krishantering*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2001:44.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2003a). *Säkrare grannskap – osäker värld*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2003:8.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2003b). *Vårt militära försvar – vilja och vägval*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2003:34.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2004). *Försvar för en ny tid*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2004:30.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2006). *En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2006:1.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2007). *Säkerhet i samverkan*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2007:46.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2008). *Försvar i användning*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2008:48.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2001). *Försvarsbeslutet för 2002–2004*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2001/02:FöU2.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2004a). *Sveriges försvarspolitik 2005–2007*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2004/05:FöU4.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2004b). *Sveriges försvarspolitik 2005–2007*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2004/05:FöU5.

- Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2001). *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik*. Sammansatta utrikes- och försvarsutskottets betänkande 2001/02: UFöU1.
- Ulriksen, Ståle (2007). 'Brydningstid – Paradigmeskiftet i det norske forsvar 2001–2005' in Heurlin, Bertel (ed.). *Nationen eller Verden? – De nordiske lands forsvar idag*. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlaget.
- Utley, Rachel (ed.) (2012). *9/11 Ten Years After: Perspectives and Problems*. Farnham: Ashgate.

5 The second shock – the Georgian war

5.1 The European Union put to a test

In August 2008, an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, to be known as the five-day war, emerged out of a territorial dispute that had been lingering since the dissolving of the USSR. Following Georgia's independence in 1991, South Ossetia broke away from Georgia and declared Tskhinvali as its capital, calling for a unification of the Ossetians. Yet the Ossetians strove to become an integrated unity within the Russian Federation rather than establish an independent state (German 2009; Mouritzen and Wivel 2012).

Since his rise to power in 2004, the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili clarified that regaining power over the lost territories, of which South Ossetia constituted one part, and bringing them back under effective Georgian sovereignty was an essential political aim (German 2009; Wheatley 2009). A crucial aspect of President Saakashvili's ambitions was to facilitate the return of thousands of ethnic Georgians to their homes (Cheterian 2009). Shortly before the war Georgia had been attempting to join NATO, which would not only put Russia's influence and control in the Caucasus area to a risk but also impact the US-Russian relations (German 2009).

Prior to the five-day war there had been heightened tension between South Ossetia and Georgia that escalated when five Georgian police officers were killed in South Ossetia on 1 August. Six South Ossetian police officers were killed in retaliation. The aftermath included artillery shelling and accusations of aggressive behaviour from both the pro-Georgian and South Ossetian (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012). On the night of 7 August, Georgia escalated the conflict into a state of peril with bombs dropping over the city of Tskhinvali (Ellison 2011).

Immediately after the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, the Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev ordered Russian military forces to launch an operation that would 'force Georgia to peace'. The 'unprepared' Russian response started on 8 August with air raids against targets in both Georgia and South Ossetia and with ground troops intruding Georgian territory by marching into South Ossetian (Fawn and Nalbandov 2012:75. See also Mouritzen and Wivel 2012). Before the offensive, Russian passports had been distributed to South Ossetians. After

transforming the Ossetians to Russian citizens, Russia justified its invasion with the need for protecting innocent Russians from Georgian violence (German 2009; Fawn and Nalbandov 2012).

The outcome of the war was determined within two days. On 12 August, President Medvedev and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy (on behalf of the EU, of which he was the President) agreed on a ceasefire document that largely reflected Russian interests and was later signed by President Saakashvili 15 August (Cheterian 2009).

5.2 Denmark¹

Soon after assuming power after the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Danish Cabinet appointed a commission, the Danish Defence Commission, in order to present suggestions on how to develop the Danish Armed Forces. The Commission was initially expected to deliver its recommendations in February 2009 but in December 2008 they were postponed until March 2009. The recommendations were taken into account by seven of the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament, *Folketinget*, and it subsequently reached an agreement on the defence policy for 2010–14 in June 2009.² On 30 November 2012, the seven parties reached yet another defence agreement, this time for the years 2013–17. These three documents aforementioned are the backbone to our analysis in this section.

5.2.1 International environment

According to the Commission, Denmark was not expected to face a conventional military threat in the foreseeable future. The Commission declared that a favourable and historically unprecedented position of geostrategic security was at hand. The absence of these conventional threats was not only related to Denmark but to NATO territory in general. The unlikelihood of a general war erupting in Europe was explicitly articulated. At the same time, the Commission admitted that globalisation had resulted in a complex and unpredictable environment in which Denmark's security was challenged by a number of global threats, risks and trends. They expected that China and India's growing economic strength would spark ambitions in these states to play a more significant role in the international system. Even if the US was still considered the dominating world power during the upcoming decade, the emerging powers' influence was expected to gradually grow thereby shaping how the global order tackled security challenges. According to the Commission, not only great powers but also regional organisations, NGOs and multinational companies would grow into more important roles at the global stage. The challenges identified ranged from terrorist networks and organised crime syndicates through demographic, economic, climatic and resource-related factors, to fragile and failed states. Additionally, security risks and problems at the local or regional level could potentially snowball into global threats more easily and more rapidly than before. The Commission concluded

that the growing dependence on information and communication systems would continue to increase the importance of the cyberspace. This was related to both the society in general but also specifically to the military domain and the Armed Forces (Danish Defence Commission 2009a).

In an appendix to the main report, the Commission focused especially on military-related challenges. Once again, it was declared that even in the long-term perspective a conventional interstate war in Europe was unlikely. Instead, the main fissure of conflicts was between the values and political ideals of the west and the Islamic world. Different groups of Islamic extremists were accused of striving for developing WMD and planning for terrorist attacks in Europe. Some rogue regimes were, in addition, considered to be in the process of developing and/or procuring not only WMD but also ballistic missiles. The antagonism and enmity were, however, not limited to these organisations, networks and states. Uncontrolled migration of Muslims to Europe cross-fertilised with increased numbers of Islamic population in Europe were expected to spark cultural-related conflicts within the European societies. The cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammed are iconic to this development. Other military challenges analysed in the appendix to the report included interstate as well as intra-state wars and conflicts in Africa, piracy, asymmetric counter-insurgency conflicts and increased military activities in the Arctic region (Danish Defence Commission 2009b).

In the defence agreement of 2009, though the political parties supported the conclusions presented by the Commission they put more of a spatial focus on the Arctic:

[T]he Arctic regions are expected to gain increasing international importance. The melting of the polar ice cap as a result of global warming will open new opportunities for the extraction of raw materials and the opening of new shipping routes. The rising activity will change the region's geo-strategic dynamic and significance and will therefore in the long term present the Danish Armed Forces with several challenges.

(Danish MoD 2009:2)

The focus on the Arctic region was still lingering in the political agreement of 2012 but threats directed against Danish national interests could, according to the parties, occur anywhere in the world and cyberspace was once again mentioned as a critical domain (Danish MoD 2012).

5.2.2 *Ends*

In his foreword to the report of the Danish Defence Commission, the President, Hans Hækkerup, concluded that ever since 9/11, combating terrorism, extremism and proliferation of WMD had become one of Denmark's key objectives. To this end, it was an explicit Danish interest to support the regional capacity building taking place within the frames of the African Union (AU). The core

objectives were, however, considered to be the upholding of Denmark's sovereignty, protecting Denmark's integrity, enforcing Danish jurisdiction as well as contributing with military capabilities to Denmark's national emergency and disaster response management systems, and concurrently being able to contribute to international conflict and disaster management efforts. Defending Denmark was hence still the key task of the Danish Armed Force, but the responsibilities were to be executed further away from Danish territory than before (Danish Defence Commission 2009a).

In the very first sentence of the 2009 agreement, the political parties declared that defending Denmark's sovereignty and securing the country's existence and integrity were the fundamental objectives of Danish security politics. To ensure these objectives, the Armed Forces were to fulfil national tasks that included surveillance of Danish territory, defending the national sovereignty, and supporting other Danish authorities in order to protect the society. Moreover, it would also take on responsibility in the international arena, by contributing to international operations throughout the conflict spectrum – from conflict prevention through conflict management to post-conflict peacebuilding (Danish MoD 2009).

Three years later the message was almost identical:

The primary purpose of the Danish defence is to enforce the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and to ensure the continued existence, integrity and safety of the nation. [...] Our contributions to international operations in recent years have given Denmark significant international recognition. Along these lines the Danish defence will continue to contribute to safeguarding Danish foreign and security policy interests, while also our national security is safeguarded by international deployment of military capabilities.

(Danish MoD 2012:1)

In the agreement, the political parties stressed the importance of democracy, freedom and human rights. A strong international rule of law, adherence to international humanitarian law and effective multinational cooperation were explicitly mentioned not only as prioritised, but also as ends in themselves (Danish MoD 2012).

5.2.3 Means

The Commission warned that Denmark's international engagement had placed more stress on the Danish Armed Forces, both in terms of equipment but also in terms of the personnel. The Armed Forces were considered having to draw on their reserves. Consequently, a need to raise the level of investment in equipment was identified. In addition the services were also estimated to constitute more than 2,300 vacancies altogether. To halt this development an expansion of the officer training programmes was suggested. Despite the need to redress the shortages of equipment and personnel, and the limited space for new activities this was estimated to lead to, new capabilities for computer network operations

was highly recommended by the Commission. In order to concentrate the resources, focus was split between a triad of international tasks: armed conflict; stabilisation tasks; and international policing. '[T]here is at present an imbalance between the Danish Armed Forces' tasks and the resources allocated' the Commission concluded (Danish Defence Commission 2009a:52).

Consequently, it was crucial to adjust the level of ambition for the services. The Army would focus on its capability to simultaneously deploy up to two units organised as battle groups as well as of a number of smaller contingents. Each of the battle groups would include between 300 and 800 soldiers. At the same time, they would maintain the ability to deploy a brigade-sized formation, albeit only 'after appropriate warning'. The main battle tank capability was also to be kept while certain niche capabilities such as the Stinger air defence system and the TOW anti-tank missile system would be discounted.³ The Navy would comprise of three frigates, two support ships and four OPVs with the likelihood of phasing out some of the patrol crafts. The Navy was to be capable of concurrently deploying two units composed of frigates, support ships and/or OPVs. Moreover, the plans were to expand the Navy's ability to provide sea-to-land support as well as make prudent considerations on the Navy's ice-breaking capability. Regarding the Air Force, the ambition was slightly higher with up to three contingents simultaneously deployed. Each of the contingents was to consist of transport aircrafts, helicopters and combat aircraft as well as surveillance and early-warning units. The Commission stressed the need to uphold a decreased number of operational F-16 combat aircrafts, six EH 101 helicopters for troop transport purposes and four C-103 transport aircraft. At the same time the question of acquiring and gradually introducing a new type of combat aircraft was put on the table (Danish Defence Commission 2009a; 2009b).

In the June 2009 agreement, the suggestions of the Commission were implemented by the signatory political parties. In some cases, they were even further specified. Regarding the smaller contingents to be deployed by the Army, the number of troops was, for instance, clarified to be about 150 soldiers. The number of operational F-16 combat aircraft and the Leopard 2 main battle tanks were to be reduced from 48 to 30 and from 57 to 34 respectively.⁴ The Army's air defence capability was to be decommissioned and so was the M109-system, i.e. the self-propelled howitzers. The political parties also recognised the need for procuring new combat aircrafts replacing the F-16 system in the near future (Danish MoD 2009).

Table 5.1 The core of Denmark's military capability in 2008

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 2 Brigades	3 Corvettes	2 Squadrons with 48 F-16 A/B
1 UN High Readiness Brigade	15 Missile/Patrol Craft	6 Air Defence Batteries
231 Main Battle Tanks		

Source: IISS 2008.

The cuts continued for three years. In the agreement of November 2012, it was decided to reconstruct the Army's six combat battalions into three larger standing combat commands. The three frigates of the Navy would be manned with two full crews and a maintenance crew (Danish MoD 2012).

5.2.4 *Ways*

At the political-strategic level, multilateral cooperation was explicitly mentioned as the preferred way ahead. The conglomerate of international institutions with greatest significance for global security, the EU, NATO, OSCE and the UN, were the focus of Danish discussions. Even if multilateral responses to transnational threats and risks were preferred, the USA seemed to have had a specific role in the analysis. Regarding the discussions on the military-strategic level, the expected demand for an ability to contribute to international military operations that are both long term in duration and periodically highly-intensive were under careful scrutiny. This insight seems to have had more impact on the force generation perspective than on the use of force ditto. The shortage of Danish personnel may also have influenced the preferred approach to support regional and local stakeholders to assume greater responsibility in the conflict management themselves and both the AU and Afghanistan were specifically mentioned in this context. Supporting the capacity building of these regional and local actors by dispatching military instructors and advisers was projected to be a successful measure. Regarding the use of force in the Arctic region, closer cooperation with the USA, Canada and other Nordic countries was deemed a potential route. Even if such cooperation was established, the need for deploying Danish military resources for surveillance and monitoring the waters and air space in and around the Faroe Islands and Greenland remained undisputed. NATO was considered the capstone when using Danish military force and participation in NRF was perceived as fundamental (Danish Defence Commission 2009a).

The political parties decided to continue a proactive Danish foreign and security policy with NATO membership as the cornerstone of Denmark's security and defence policy. Article 5 and the collective defence were the guiding principle when defending not only Danish but also NATO territory as a whole. The ability to fight conventional wars was not an option but a necessity. In addition, NATO was the key provider of the strategic and operational framework when contributing to international military operations. Counter-insurgency and peace-making operations were under especial scrutiny. The UN was also attributed a seminal role providing global legitimacy and conducting peacekeeping operations. The latter, in particular, spilled over into the cooperation with other Nordic states when training and instructing African peacekeeping forces. Danish participation in EU-led military operations was mentioned but only in the event of a discontinuation of Denmark's EU defence opt-out. Despite this remark, the political parties saw it necessary for Danish Armed Forces to be able to contribute to EU operations outside Union territory regarding peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance (Danish MoD 2009).

NATO's fundamental role for Danish security and defence policy was confirmed in the agreement of 2012. It underscored the importance of participating in NATO's expeditionary forces and enhancing the operational capacity of NATO's Multinational Corps Northeast. Compared to previous agreements the role of the UN, in particular the Security Council, was highlighted more than before. Moreover, Denmark explicitly announced its ambition to join the contributing forces in the international operations matrix, based on the principle of responsibility to protect whenever a coalition of nations deemed a military intervention necessary (Danish MoD 2012).

5.2.5 Summary – the Danish strategy after the second shock

From what we have seen, Danish strategists switched their attention from the Caucasus to the Arctic, a region previously overlooked. Climate changes and the melting ice cap were expected to create new economic opportunities such as sea lines of communications and exploration of natural resources. Combined with China and India's growing strength, the Arctic risked being a crucial part of a potential great power competition. The Georgian war passed more or less completely under the radar of the Danish politicians. Despite the fact that an interstate war had erupted on European soil, such a war was inconceivable. With the exception of the Arctic, the analyses of the international environment maintained status quo. In this way, the Georgian war did not cause ripples in the Danish infrastructure and was therefore not a strategic shock to the Danish government.

Consequently, the considerations of the objectives and ends largely followed the previous pattern. NATO was still perceived as fundamental but the membership was not described as an end in itself; instead, the UN system drew more attention from the increased focus on the Arctic. The UN rather than NATO could be seen as the key driver in guaranteeing continued Danish sovereignty over Greenland and the Faroe Islands including the surrounding waters. When ensuring Denmark's sovereign rights to explore natural resources, the UN held a fundamental role. Despite the Danish decision to stay outside the military cooperation within the EU, the Union was still given more attention. Potentially this can also be related to the end of protecting Denmark's integrity. The high ambition with which Denmark had contributed to international conflict management efforts ever since the end of the Cold War seems to eventually have taken its toll on Denmark's military resources for both the material and the immaterial aspects. The Defence Commission also noted the imbalance between ends and means. The Danish response to this insight was to focus even more on the core capabilities necessary to achieve the objectives. Consequently, all services had to undergo decommissioning and concurrently put more energy into recruiting new personnel (see, for example, Branner 2013).

The insight of the weathering that the Danish Armed Forces had undergone affected, together with the new attention to the Arctic, Denmark's preferred ways at both the political-strategic and the military-strategic levels. One factor was the increased focus on the UN system; another was the ambitious plan to

contribute to the capacity building processes of regional and local partners. A third was the renewed interest in contributing to NATO's collective defence dimension and the Multinational Corps Northeast. By increasing the multilateral cooperation, Denmark strove for a continued proactive approach. The intended role of the Danish Armed Forces in this myriad of factors was not always explicitly elaborated. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces embraced the developments and actively pushed for increased internationalisation (see, for example, Saxi 2010).

5.3 Finland⁵

Between the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and of Ukraine in 2014, the Finnish Cabinet presented three major reports on defence and security policy: a report on the Finnish security and defence policy in February 2009; a strategy for the societal security in December 2010; and another policy report in March 2013. The two reports of 2009 and 2013 respectively form the basis for the analysis of the Finnish defence policy after the Georgian war, as do the responses to the reports presented by the Parliament. Notably, the Foreign Affairs Committee was given the overarching responsibility to formulate these responses, having other committees, including the Defence Committee, provide statements to it before presenting the standpoints to the Parliament. Compared to previous chapters, this was a complete shift in the policy process.

5.3.1 *International environment*

The Finnish Cabinet concluded that Russian Armed Forces had its finger on the trigger and was both ready and capable of quickly launching a military operation in Russia's neighbourhood. According to the Cabinet, the military actions proved that Russia had units well trained for local conditions with good situational awareness and capable of information and network-centric warfare. The Cabinet also warned that Russia had demonstrated its willingness to use military force when defending its national interests. The aftermath of the crisis was presumed to cause long-term tensions in Europe, including fissures in a worsened EU-Russia relationship. In addition to military threats, the Cabinet also emphasised other threats related to Russia's efforts including cyber-attacks and deliberate disruptions of raw material or energy deliveries as instruments of political pressure. Non-antagonistic, non-state and cross-border threats and challenges related to, among others, the environment, infectious diseases, terrorism, nuclear safety and organised crime were also analysed. So was the turbulence in the US' financial market in 2007, which triggered a global financial crisis in 2008. The Cabinet mentioned several security impacts of the crisis including increased protectionism. As the developments could generate international tensions in the end, it could also weaken the position of small states in relation to major powers. Terrorism continued to be a long-term security issue in the US foreign and security policy and it would likely continue to play an active role in the Middle East and

elsewhere. The Iraqi War had put a tremendous strain on the US' Armed Forces. The US was nevertheless assumed to continue playing its predominant security role in Europe including the Baltic Sea region. Regarding the EU, the Cabinet was concerned that the 'financial crisis and slower economic growth may negatively impact solidarity among the Member States and emerge as heightened national interests and increasing protectionism' (Finnish Cabinet 2009:26). The committees of the Parliament presented similar conclusions (Finnish Defence Committee 2009; Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2009).

While 'Georgia' was mentioned in 27 sentences in the 2009 report, it did not appear in the 2010 strategy (Finnish Cabinet 2009; 2010). In the 2013 report, 'Georgia' appeared three times. First, it was noted that Georgia's process of a potential accession with NATO was unlikely to proceed quickly. Second, in the context of the EU's Eastern Partnership programme, Georgia, together with Moldova and Ukraine, had made the most progress in coming closer to the EU. Finally, in the section on Russia's security and defence policy, it was argued that Russia viewed the enlargement of NATO as a political and military threat as it weakens its foreign policy goal of achieving a multipolar world order. Georgia and Ukraine were in this context presented as countries whose membership aspirations raised particular concern in Russia. However, the Cabinet also underscored a number of issues where Russia and the US were working more intimately under President Obama's reset policy. The branches of this policy materialised in various efforts. One such effort concerned the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which took force in 2011. Another effort was related to the use of Russian territory for NATO supply routes to Afghanistan. A third aspect was Russia's participation in the 5+1-cooperation regarding diplomatic efforts to stop Iran's nuclear programme. Yet another effort focused on Russia's membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which had emerged in 2012 with the support of both the EU and the US (Finnish Cabinet 2013).

There was no fast escape from the 'severe economic crisis' that the EU had fallen into, the Cabinet argued. A further decline of the Union could 'extensively erode the multinational system and international cooperation'. Other factors of uncertainty were 'recent internal developments' in certain members and 'the difficulties the EU's enlargement policy faces'. The EU was, according to the Finnish Cabinet, challenged by 'economic, political and value related changes in the world' and the member states had lacked the political will to act more coherently and support common institutions. Instead, the major members had acted outside the EU framework, which in turn birthed a multitude of uncertainties. The democratic movements in northern Africa could result, the Cabinet warned, in a 'long period of uncertainty and instability'. It also argued that the weakened influence of the US in the area had already resulted in increasing rivalry between states in the region and an increased role of political Islam (Finnish Cabinet 2013:27–8 and 58).

The Foreign Affairs Committee interpreted Russia's membership of WTO and its ambition to join the OECD as important steps towards a more rule-based

and open system. The Committee claimed that Russia's transformation into a market economy had created a middle class that would be a crucial pillar in the stability and the development of a civil society. This democratic development was not completed but the Committee considered things were 'moving in the right direction'. The Committee noted that Russia's political system was characterised by the concentration of power in the hands of the President. Upcoming governmental reports on Russia should, the Committee argued, focus more on the developments of the rule of law, the freedom of information and anti-corruption work. The Committee also noted that the Russian government's official statement on foreign policy from 2013 included open criticism of western democracy, alignment policy and human rights policy (Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2013:16–17).

5.3.2 *Ends*

According to the Cabinet the most important objectives of Finland's security and defence policy were safeguarding Finland's independence, defending Finland's territorial integrity and the common values of the Finnish society, maintaining and advancing the security and well-being of Finland's citizens and sustaining the functioning of the Finnish society. The Cabinet explicitly referred to the concept of comprehensive security and stressed that these national interests were best promoted through international cooperation. The tasks assigned to the Finnish Armed Forces were specified as to 'repel' any use of military force against Finland and 'counter the threat thereof'. The primary objective was to maintain 'such defence capabilities and readiness which make it unbeneficial for an aggressor to use military force against Finland'. The Cabinet declared that Finland's defence capability was 'scaled to guarantee the country's independence, the citizens' living conditions and to secure freedom of action for the state leadership'. Moreover, it argued that the Finnish Armed Forces were to be prepared to 'support other public authorities in order to secure society's vital functions, both at home and abroad'. Lastly, it also stressed the assumption that international defence cooperation bolstered the capacity and credibility of Finland's defence and that the capacity to receive and provide international assistance hence was an end in itself (Finnish Cabinet 2009:81–2). Note that the committees of the Parliament did not counter any of these statements (Finnish Defence Committee 2009; Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2009).

The objectives were repeated in the 2013 report accompanied by most of the tasks given to the Armed Forces. International cooperation was, however, further pronounced and the full development of the defence system was given a new deadline.

In the desired end state, in the 2020's Finland will have the capability, respected by the state leadership and others, to defend the country and its independence, sustain the livelihood of its citizens and, in concert with international actors, manage security threats.

The Cabinet stated that Finland, as a non-aligned country, ‘prepares to repel military threats without outside assistance’ and therefore it had to maintain ‘all capability areas of the defence system’ (Finnish Cabinet 2013:76 and 99). The Parliament stressed the importance of giving more attention to human rights in Finland’s policy. Democracy and the rule of law were, in addition to respect for the human rights, considered important values to protect, not least in the EU neighbourhood (Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2013. See also Finnish Defence Committee 2013).

5.3.3 Means

In the statistics retrieved from the IISS, no dramatic quantitative changes in the Finnish Armed Forces occurred between 2001 and 2008 apart from the drop in the number of main battle tanks from 230 to 163. In qualitative terms, however, changes related to the Finnish defence transformation process had continued to produce the new capabilities demanded in the defence decision.

In the 2009 report, the Finnish Cabinet listed a number of capabilities and requirements that it considered necessary for both deterring and repelling an armed attack. A comprehensive situation awareness and early-warning capability, high readiness in the chain of command, capable units and systems in each of the services, capability of cooperating with other authorities and private actors, self-sufficiency in logistics, capability to reallocate resources across the nation as well as operational mobility and international interoperability were among the capacities mentioned. In order to afford the procurement necessary to fulfil these ambitions, the Cabinet concluded that the wartime troops had to be reduced in numbers. The Air Force was, however, to keep its three squadrons and six main operating bases. Instead, the burdens were to be shared between the Army and the Navy. In the former case three readiness brigades, two mechanised battle groups and five regional battle groups were to make up the bulk. Notably all jaeger brigades would be decommissioned. In the latter case, the reductions were foremost to be undertaken regarding the mine warfare capacity (Finnish Cabinet 2009).

The Defence Committee stressed the necessity to improve Finland’s ability to prevent a sudden attack and approved the aforementioned suggestions. The Committee explicitly mentioned that the idea of quality and readiness should be given more ardent support before quantity (Finnish Defence Committee 2009).

Table 5.2 The core of Finland’s military capability in 2008

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
2 Armoured Brigades 11 Infantry Brigades 10 Jaeger Brigades 163 Main Battle Tanks	10 Missile Craft	3 Squadrons with 61 F/A-18C/D

Source: IISS 2008.

The Foreign Affairs Committee presented similar conclusions. The Committee underscored that if the defence budget was not increased by 2 per cent, the number of regional battle groups to replace the infantry and jaeger brigades was to be limited to two or three (Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2013).

The continuity and long-term perspective for capacity building was explicitly stressed in the 2013 report. The Cabinet stated that the continued developments were to be 'built on the long-term policies adopted over the past two decades and investments in weapon systems, know-how and infrastructure, among other things' (Finnish Cabinet 2013:102). Obviously, Finland had suffered from the economic crisis and the reforms of the Armed Forces had to be made within the context of a decreasing defence budget. According to the Cabinet, Finland had spent €2.45 billion on defence in 2011. The budget was now to be reduced to €2.22 billion in 2015 with a reduced wartime strength from 350,000 to 230,000 troops. The number of peacetime training units was to be reduced from 25 to 16. As a result, the warnings raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee turned out to be true. The number of regional battle groups was now suggested to be three. The Navy had to transform its five fast-attack craft and mine counter measure squadrons into two fleet battle groups. The number of coastal jaeger battalions was cut from two to one. This time the reductions also hit the Air Force. While the number of fighter squadrons was to remain three, the main operating bases were cut from six to four (Finnish Cabinet 2013).

The Foreign Affairs Committee expressed concerns regarding the decrease of refreshment training for reserves, fewer field exercises for conscripts and minimised exercise hours in both the Navy and the Air Force. The Committee recommended that the latter should be restored in the next defence-planning period. The Committee also paid attention to the negative effects of lower defence spending on the long-term procurement of defence equipment and the upcoming need to replace major defence systems in all three services (Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee 2013).

5.3.4 Ways

The Cabinet introduced the active defence policy concept in its 2009 report. The explicit idea was to provide Finland's national leaders with a wider range of instruments. The national or total defence as well as the territorial defence principles, the general conscription and the strong willingness to defend the nation, were now complemented with international military cooperation in the military toolbox. The new steps were referred to as a comprehensive defence approach. The territorial defence concept included a combination of territorial troops, now labelled as regional troops, mobile operational units and the Border Guard. Within the frames of the concept, the Army was to maintain control over militarily important areas and, supported by the other services, protect the functions and targets vital to society while the operational units were to act as 'a force multiplier' to establish 'sufficient local superiority' in 'selected decisive areas to repel and defeat an aggressor' (Finnish Cabinet 2009:107–10).

Notably the Cabinet deemed it necessary to analyse if it was 'possible to carry out the required tasks with national capabilities alone'. If the national capabilities were considered to be inadequate 'during normal conditions', the Cabinet was entitled to find new ways to 'guarantee the reception of military and other assistance needed in crisis'. This could, the Cabinet admitted, be achieved through both 'close international cooperation' and 'through being allied with others'. The defence of Finland's territorial integrity therefore required both capabilities related to the conduct of 'joint operations in key areas' and 'abilities to receive assistance from abroad'. The EU and NATO were described as 'key organisations in terms of military capabilities and international military management' (Finnish Cabinet 2009:108–9).

The Cabinet did not expect to face 'military pressure or armed aggression outside the context of a wider international conflict'. Accordingly, Finland was not expecting to have to face an armed attack from Russia alone. The Cabinet explicitly suggested that Finland should participate in 'supplementary activities of the NATO Response Force' and in NATO's Civil Emergency Planning. The Cabinet concluded however that a decision on a Finnish NATO membership must be taken in a broad political consensus. Nevertheless, the Cabinet recommended seeking membership as an option to be maintained (Finnish Cabinet 2009:79–81). The Cabinet also confirmed Finland's commitment to the EU's solidarity clause articulated in the Treaty of Lisbon:

Pursuant to the obligation of assistance, Finland will provide assistance to the other Member States and expects the others to act likewise. Finland believes that a mutual assistance obligation covering military means is but a natural commitment in a close-knit entity such as the Union. It goes without saying that the strong solidarity within the Union also reflects on military activities and the readiness to defend the other Member States by all available means.

(Finnish Cabinet 2009:72)

In 2013 the Cabinet was, however, less enthusiastic about the Lisbon Treaty and instead prioritised the Nordic defence cooperation. According to the Cabinet, the Nordic countries' geographical proximity, shared security environment, similarities of strategic goals, tasks and operating cultures facilitate and foster deeper defence cooperation and common solutions with the added benefit of defence from an operational as well as economic and technical perspective. The Cabinet stressed the significance of multinational response forces and concluded that this would become 'increasingly important in the coming years as vehicles for the development of interoperability and armed forces transformation'. Not only Finland and the other Nordic countries but also all European states were considered dependent on multinational defence cooperation in terms of both using and generating military capabilities (Finnish Cabinet 2013:44–5 and 70).

5.3.5 *Summary – the Finnish strategy after the second shock*

We argue that the Russian intervention in Georgia was perceived as a strategic shock by the Finnish government. The Russian use of military power in its relation with a neighbouring country was unexpected. The events also had deep consequences in terms of Finland's defence policy that led to the Finnish authorities undertaking demanding counter measures. Initially these measures had impact on the means, i.e. transforming primarily the infantry and jaeger brigades of the Army into regional combat groups, and consequentially also on the ways, i.e. on the territorial defence concept. The strategic shock was, however, followed by an economic ditto. The new shock had further impacts on the means and this time neither the Navy nor the Air Force were spared. These new reductions also led to consequences regarding the ways. Finland had to admit that operating in a silo was no longer a trustworthy strategy. International cooperation was not an option but a necessity. Furthermore, a comparison between analysis of the international security environment in 2009 and 2013 clearly indicates that the Finnish government perceived a shift away from the stable unipolar order of the early 2000s towards a multipolar order with greater uncertainty regarding the continued US support for global and European security. In addition, the analysis of the EU in the reports from 2009 and 2013 mirrors the gradually more pessimistic assessments of the US policy during this time-period. In the 2013 report, these uncertainties and fears had begun to materialise. Consequently, we agree with Teija Tiilikainen (2010) that the EU forms the core of Finnish security policy.

It is, however, difficult to estimate the *direct* effects of the Georgian war on the Finnish defence strategies. On one hand, it can be argued that Finland seems to have increased its commitments to collective EU defence while concurrently intensifying its policy of courting in relation to NATO. The analysis of the consequences of membership of NATO may also be interpreted as a response to the analysis of a more assertive and military capable Russia. On the other hand, the Finnish government's references to the Georgian war were almost absent in later documents and in several ways the Finnish defence reform continued along the lines decided already in 2001 and 2004. The Finnish government continued, in addition, to advocate further cooperation with Russia, both bilaterally and within the EU context. Jean-Marc Rickli (2008) claims that Finland abandoned its defensive posture and streamlined its Armed Forces foremost to meet the requirements of the EU. He also concludes that the Finnish Armed Forces were reformed towards expeditionary operations. We disagree with his conclusions.

The most important external factor for Finnish defence policy between 2008 and 2014 may very well instead have been the economic crisis and financial austerity that followed in the wake of the 2008 global economic turmoil. The crisis had weakened both the EU and the US and resulted in drastic cuts in defence spending of many European states. One result of this development was increased efforts to reach increased cost effectiveness in the production of military capabilities through different forms of cooperative agreement between smaller clusters of states (Valasek 2011). For Finland, Nordic defence cooperation became

the major alternative when the EU had not developed as it was hoped for in the 2009 and earlier reports. However, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was a cooperation between three NATO members, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, and two military non-aligned states, Finland and Sweden, which made it necessary to exclude commitments related to collective defence (see, for example, Saxi 2011; Westberg 2015).

5.4 Norway⁶

In September 2009, the MoD presented a report on the Cabinet's evaluation of the 2005–8 defence bill implementation. The very same month, slightly ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, presented a new strategic concept (Capable Force, Norwegian: *Evne til innsats*).⁷ It took 2.5 years until the Cabinet, in March 2012, developed a new defence bill (Prop. 73S, 2011–12). One year later, in March 2013, the Cabinet oriented (Meld. St. 14, 2012–13) the Parliament on how to implement the defence decision. The Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee of the Norwegian Parliament (organised after the parliamentary elections in 2009 by merging the Foreign Affairs and the Defence committees) presented recommendations referring to both the bill and the Cabinet's report. The ChoD did not present any individual reports comparable to his FS2007 study during the period analysed in this section. Along with the governmental documents mentioned above and to some documents related to the procurement of new combat aircraft, his annual reports have also been included in our analysis.

5.4.1 International environment

In September 2009, the Cabinet concluded that the international environment consisted of challenges and risks related to both the national and the international arena. Several new threats, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, were described as transnational in their character and therefore trickled into both arenas (Norwegian MoD 2009a).

The Minister of Defence exemplified both the national and the international challenges. In the former case, she mentioned not only political and military-related aspects such as increased dependency on technology, long-range weapons system, cyber warfare, rivalry among great powers and political as well as military coercion in addition to climate changes. Also in the latter case, she pointed at both more traditional threats and at challenges related to a broader concept of security. Contrary to the national domain, the international elaboration was more balanced. Consequently, this created a *mélange* of concerns including intra- and interstate wars, the proliferation of missile technology and WMD to NGOs, and ideological and cultural-based tensions mixed with ditto referring to the global environmental situation as well as pandemics and other humanitarian crises including population growth and increased crime against human rights (Norwegian MoD 2009b).

Even if both the national and the international dimensions were further developed, the focus of the Cabinet in March 2012 was on Norway and its immediate neighbourhood. Threats against critical infrastructure, short-range nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, espionage, strategic shocks as well as climate change were on the agenda. In the international dimension, the concerns included increased global competition on strategic resources such as fresh water and energy, political instability, terrorism and asymmetric threats. Notably, several of these international challenges included risk of spillovers and more direct connections to Norway. Naturally, the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 were a source of concern (Norwegian MoD 2012) and were furthered echoed in the Parliament's conclusions (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2012).

The Cabinet presented the technological aspects of the challenges in its March 2013 considerations. The assessments included the rapid proliferation of technology in relation to ballistic missiles and direct technological threats (Norwegian MoD 2013). The annual reports of the ChoD included similar considerations and conclusions as presented by the actors at the political level. Arguably, the ChoD identified the technological aspects of the international environment slightly earlier compared to the politicians (see, for example, Norwegian ChoD 2012; 2013; 2014).

5.4.2 Ends

In evaluating its previous defence policy, the Cabinet could proudly conclude that most objectives had been fulfilled. The prevention of crises in Norway's proximity had been successful while the Norwegian contributions to the international efforts preventing and managing conflicts in the global arena were still in their infancy. The end of contributing to NATO's collective defence was also only partly fulfilled and subsequently the Cabinet's ambitions were, in other words, higher than the performances during the previous couple of years. Being able to, on the one hand, cooperate with NATO allies managing different challenges within the frames of collective defence, including the use of WMD, was a key objective. On the other hand, the ability to contribute to all forms of non-Article V operations, ranging from preventive deployment to peace enforcement, was an additional objective. Increasing the capability using military resources in support for Norwegian diplomatic efforts was also mentioned as an objective (Norwegian MoD 2009a).

The very name of the strategic concept – *Capable Force* –, concurrently presented by the Minister of Defence, underscored the Cabinet's ambition. The ends for this ambition were contextually different. To prevent a crisis from erupting, stabilising and reducing its consequences were the main ends in the national context while, internationally, contributing to NATO's efforts was given more weight. Nevertheless, the overarching key objectives remained intact: to protect Norway's sovereignty, sovereign rights and territorial integrity, promote national interests and values, ensure political freedom of action and to be perceived as a trustworthy ally by other NATO members (Norwegian MoD 2009b).

The ChoD discussed other objectives as well: to contribute to international peace and security and to the societal security of Norway. In addition, he concluded that the Norwegian Armed Forces must be able to solve their tasks without initial support of allied military forces (Norwegian ChoD 2012). In March 2012, the Cabinet declared that contributing to international peace and stability, defending human rights and strengthening multinational cooperation were part of the country's national interests. In the new defence bill, the Cabinet also presented additional prioritised objectives such as increasing the Norwegian Armed Forces war preventing capacity, both nationally and internationally as well as contributing to NATO- and UN-led military operations and increasing the Armed Forces' capability to support civilian authorities in crisis. Contrary to the ChoD, the Cabinet expressed the objective to defend Norway solely within the frames of NATO (Norwegian MoD 2012).

Not unexpectedly, the Parliament recognised the Cabinet's objectives. Consequently, issues such as promoting the UN system, contributing to NATO's relevance and trustworthiness, and strengthening multilateralism, including the Nordic defence cooperation, were underscored. The Parliament also presented a multifunctional and interagency approach stressing the objective of enhancing the interoperability between Norwegian authorities including the Armed Forces (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2012).

5.4.3 Means

In September 2009, the Cabinet seemed satisfied when evaluating the defence transformation that had rolled out during previous years. The reforms of the National Guard (Norwegian: *Heimevernet, HV*) were implemented with 50,000 soldiers with an additional 33,000 in reserve organised in 13 HV districts. Furthermore, the rapid deployment unit, Telemark battalion, was organised within the frames of Brigade Nord. However, several intended reforms still waited to be implemented. The delivery of both the new *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates and the new *Skjold* class missile crafts were delayed and so was the Air Force's air refuelling. The Cabinet decided, however, to focus on strengthening the Army during the upcoming couple of years. In the longer perspective, the Cabinet especially stressed the importance of the decision in December 2008 to proceed the procurement of new fighters,⁸ replacing the F-16 system, solely with Lockheed Martin's JSF or F-35 (Norwegian MoD 2009a).

Table 5.3 The core of Norway's military capability in 2008

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
2 Mechanised Brigades 165 Main Battle Tanks	6 Submarines 5 Frigates 7 Missile Craft	3 Squadrons with 57 F-16A/B

Source: IISS 2008.

In June 2011, the Parliament approved the procurement of four F-35 for training purpose (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2011). This was a response to the request by the Cabinet presented a month earlier (Norwegian MoD 2011).

In March 2012, the Cabinet stressed the priority of integrating all new procurements, i.e. the frigates, the coastal corvettes (previously referred to as missile craft), the F-35 system and the NH90-helicopter system etc., within the frames of a network-centric concept. The focus was hence on both increasing the ability of the national operational level and making Norwegian forces interoperable with core NATO allies. Quality rather than quantity was considered as the main catalyst for the continued reforms. The Cabinet stressed, however, that there was a certain bottom level regarding the numbers. In order to enhance the quality even further, additional cuts in the volume were therefore not considered an option and, instead, a review of the range of capacities was initiated. However, the Cabinet recognised that a focus on Norwegian niche capacities would increase the dependency on support from NATO allies (Norwegian MoD 2012).

In the defence bill, the Cabinet also presented the novel role of Norway's air power. The four pre-approved F-35s would be complemented with an additional 48 fighters between 2016–20, leaving the total number at 52. Note that the initial procurement plan included 56 fighters (see Norwegian MoD 2008), and the Cabinet indicated that the total number could very well stay at 46, i.e. four F-35 for training and 42 operational fighters. Moreover, the Cabinet announced that the procurement could be prolonged until 2014. The Cabinet explicitly admitted that the reason for the adjustments and the uncertainties was increased costs. Regardless of the final numbers, the new fighters were to be organised in two squadrons stationed at Ørland air base. Only one additional air base, Evenes, would be operational. Other bases, including Bodø and Rygge, would be shut down or transformed to host solely helicopters. In addition, all air defence capabilities were to be concentrated on Ørland (Norwegian MoD 2012).

While the Air Force discussions were given its own chapter in the bill, the considerations regarding all other services and joint resources were merged into a shared chapter. When it comes to the Army, the armoured battalion of Brigade Nord would be transformed into a rapid reaction unit with professional soldiers, similar to the concept for Telemark battalion. The third manoeuvre unit of the brigade, Skjold battalion, would be transformed into a light infantry battalion with conscripts, similar to the concept for the King's Guard (Norwegian: *Kongens Garde*) in Oslo and the Border Guard (Norwegian: *Grensevakten*) along the Norwegian–Russian border. As for the Navy, the six *Skjold* class missile crafts were upgraded, at least by name, to corvettes. The suggestions were all approved by the Parliament (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2012).

5.4.4 Ways

Multinational cooperation was the preferred route of the Cabinet regarding both the use of force and in the force generation perspective. In the former case NATO members in the North Sea region, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, were identified as key allies and, in the latter case, Nordic neighbours were prioritised partners (Norwegian MoD 2009a). In the strategic concept presented in September 2009, the Minister of Defence acknowledged what had previously been articulated by the ChoD, namely that Norway had to be prepared to initially conduct the more demanding military operations in the national context sans support from NATO allies. The collective defence approach was, however, still a capstone, yet the ways the Norwegian Armed Forces intended it to be used when operating solely on its own and within the frames of NATO operations remained lucid. Clearly Norwegian forces were to conduct surveillance and information gathering operations in both contexts, but the methods to be applied on the battalions of the Army, the frigates, corvettes and submarines of the Navy and the F-16s (and later on the F-35s) were not elaborated (Norwegian MoD 2009b).

The ChoD mentioned the importance of an omnipresence at sea, in the air and on land in order to prevent conflict and deter aggression. In case of an escalated conflict involving military aggression directed against Norway, he underscored the need to be able to receive allied reinforcements. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of Norway 'contributing as much as possible' to NATO's rapid reaction forces (Norwegian ChoD 2012:10). The role of and the way by which the Norwegian forces were to be orchestrated was not discussed in detail (see also Norwegian ChoD 2013).

The Cabinet declared that the procurement of the F-35 system for the Air Force reflected the ambitions regarding Norway's defence policy. Two specific roles were mentioned. On the one hand, the Air Force was to independently conduct air operations. On the other hand, the Air Force was to support ground and naval forces in their operations. The Cabinet admitted that the quality and quantity of both the Army and the Navy were dimensioned related to the capacity of the Air Force. In a similar vein, the quality and quantity of the Air Force was resourced in order to enable both overarching tasks to be fulfilled concurrently. The Air Force would also perform its air defence role over three prioritised areas (Norwegian MoD 2012. See also Norwegian MoD 2013).

In November 2013, a change of guard took place. Army General Harald Sunde left as ChoD and Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen assumed command of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Admiral concluded that Brigade Nord was unable to defend Norway alone against major military aggression. He did not, however, explain how to use the brigade in order to enable the necessary allied reinforcements. The role of the brigade in the NATO context was to provide units to the collective defence of the Alliance. The role of the National Guard was to guard and secure important geographical areas and to protect critical infrastructure (Norwegian ChoD 2014).

5.4.5 *Summary – the Norwegian strategy after the second shock*

Russia's invasion of Georgia only caused minor ripples, if any, on the developments of Norway's strategy (despite the fact that the term *strategic shocks* was communicated). During the process, both the national and the international dimensions of the international environment were analysed. The discussions in the national arena came gradually to focus more and more on technological aspects such as critical infrastructure, short-range nuclear weapons and cyber warfare. In the international arena, the concerns on the one hand included non-state actors such as terrorism and growing global competition on strategic resources, and great power politics on the other. Yet the spotlight was on Norway and its immediate neighbourhood. Consequently, we argue that the Norwegian government did not perceive the Georgian war as a strategic shock.

Despite the references to collective defence within the frames of NATO, most of the objectives expressed by the political leadership belonged at the lower parts of the conflict spectrum – to protect and promote Norway's interests and values served as an overarching dogma. However, when put under more specific scrutiny, most of the interests can be categorised as national in their character. The ability to concurrently fulfil the objectives of protecting Norway's sovereignty, sovereign rights and territorial integrity, and to be perceived as a trustworthy ally by other NATO members, was contingent on a focus on low-intensity conflicts and crises in Norway's immediate neighbourhood (see, for example, Hilde 2013).

Simply put, the reason for the statement above is Norway's lack of means in the quantitative perspective. The aggregate of frigates, corvettes and submarines had in their sheer numbers only just passed the threshold for surveillance and protection capability over Norway's claimed territory at sea. Naturally, sending naval resources for international missions was not at the top of the priority list but when procuring new material they were. Although the Norwegian Air Force indisputably made an impressive contribution to the NATO operations in Libya in 2011, it is questionable if the future Air Force consisting of two rather than four squadrons will ever be allowed to emigrate their Norwegian bases (or rather, 'base' since the costs for the F-35 system do not allow maintaining more than one single base). The decrease in the number of bases also challenged the previous strategy in receiving allied reinforcements. The Norwegian Air Force was said to have more bases than squadrons just because of the dependency of support from the allies. The ratio between squadrons and bases is, as elaborated above, now to be 2:1. Consequently, the Army would most likely have to bear the burden of contributing to international efforts. The Army's transformation also indicates that a high-readiness and deployable battalion would, in time, support NATO missions abroad. However, the decrease in numbers has left the Army unable to conduct more demanding operations without allied support. At the same time, it was said that Norway had to prepare to fight the initial phases of a high-intensity conflict on its own soil by itself. Despite the fact that some of these shortcomings were explicitly mentioned, no convincing concept on how to

use Norway's military might was presented. No ways or methods were, in other words, articulated either for the pure national operations, nor for Norway's role within a NATO-led affair. The political leadership claimed that the number of F-35 to be procured were the result of novel operational calculations. In fact, these were so demanding, only Lockheed Martin passed the test. When the costs exponentially rose, the number had to be decreased yet the operational discussions remained in status quo. To summarise, the Georgian case was, from the Norwegian perspective, a war in the European periphery (see, for example, Bogen and Håkenstad 2015).

5.5 Sweden⁹

At the time of the Georgian war, Sweden was preparing the defence resolution for the period 2009–14. In accordance with the procedures the Defence Commission issued an initial report on security policy (Ds 2007:46) in 2007 and subsequently a report on defence policy (Ds 2008:48) in 2008. The latter report came only some six weeks before the war erupted. Although both these reports were analysed in the previous chapter they are discussed in this chapter as well. The annual Statement of Government Policy was presented on 16 September 2008, only a month after the so-called six-point plan for ceasefire in the Georgian war was signed. Originally scheduled to be put forward to the Parliament during autumn 2008, the new timeline allowed some additional six months for reflection. In December 2008, a special report was prepared by the MoD and briefed to the Defence Committee of the Parliament. In March 2009 the Cabinet eventually presented its bill (prop. 2008/09:140). After requesting a statement of the Foreign Affairs Committee (2008/09:UU4y), the Defence Committee recommended (2008/09:FöU10) an approval of the bill and in June 2009 the Parliament decided (rskr. 2008/09:131) to approve the defence policy suggested by the Cabinet. In 2012, the Defence Commission had reconvened to prepare recommendations for a defence resolution in 2015. It issued its initial report 'Choices in a globalised world' in 2013 (Ds. 2013:33).¹⁰ In this section, the analysis is mostly based on the bill and the reports of the committees and the Commission.

5.5.1 *International environment*

Although the Commission detected some indicators, they did not anticipate the upcoming Georgian war. Russia's increased interdependence with Europe purported stability in the Baltic Sea region. It was a priority for Sweden to facilitate greater integration of Russia in Europe. However, due to their aspiration for greater independence and increased US engagement, growing tensions between Georgia and Russia emerged. Moreover, the role of the EU in Swedish security policy was highlighted, as was the limited number of interstate conflicts globally. In the latter 2008 report, the Commission identified traces of concern about the developments in Russia. The trend towards a democratic deficit and nationalism was a source of worry. Russia was at a crossroads with its foreign

policy. How it chose to interact with former Soviet republics would, the Commission argued, constitute a litmus test for Russian behaviour as an international actor (Swedish Defence Commission 2007; 2008).

Clearly, the Cabinet outlined a new assessment of Russia. Consistent with the litmus test the Russian policy shifted from integrating it into Europe to exclusion. The Cabinet's ambitions to strengthen cooperation with countries in the Baltic Sea region subsequently did not include Russia. The authoritarian development was a major concern. The Cabinet also expressed concerns that Russia's new policy would have a negative impact on the security architecture in Europe. A fundamental conclusion with regards to the security in the neighbourhood states that the risks of military conflicts had grown: 'The Georgia conflict has shown that the Russian threshold for using military violence in the immediate area has been reduced, but it varies with the political and strategic situation in each case' (Swedish Cabinet 2009:24). Notably, this threat was not primarily directed to Sweden but towards former Soviet republics in its vicinity. The assessment made by the Commission on the likelihood of a military aggression concluded that previous assessment remained valid; hence, it was deemed unlikely for the foreseeable future. Everything in the analysis of the Cabinet was, however, not about Russia. The threats and challenges Sweden was facing were considered transnational in their character and under continuous change. The unsolved conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, the ongoing armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the risks of nuclear proliferation involving not only Pakistan but also Iran, increased competition over natural resources, international terrorism climate changes, pandemics and natural catastrophes were among the topics the Cabinet discussed (Swedish Cabinet 2009). Moreover, both the committees of the Parliament confirmed the assessment made by the Cabinet (Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee 2009; Swedish Defence Committee 2009).

In its 2013 report the Defence Commission elaborated on issues such as globalisation, climate change, natural resources including fresh water, energy and minerals, terrorism, international conflict management, the cyber domain and proliferation of WMD. The developments regarding military capacities were given special attention. The Commission also analysed the developments within key international organisations such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE. Regionalisation including the developments of other international organisations including the Arab League, the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN), the AU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were also topics for consideration. In addition, key actors including the global powers China, Russia and the US, as well as regional European powers such as France, Germany and the UK were studied. The Commission was, in other words, presenting a broad analysis on actor, regional and thematic aspects. The developments were, however, not always connected to Sweden and the impact on Swedish security was often left unanswered (Swedish Defence Commission 2013).

5.5.2 Ends

At the most aggregate level the objectives for Sweden's security policy remained rather unchanged until 2009. They were codified in the Commission report on strategy in 2006 and included: to protect the life and health of the population; to protect society's functionality; to safeguard our ability to maintain our basic values as democracy, legal certainty and human rights and freedoms. Notably these objectives have to date remained the military objectives outlined by the Commission focused on the ability to actively protect fundamental values and interests of the nation, together with others, both in and outside the country, by: preventing and managing conflicts and war; ensuring the sovereignty of the country; and protecting society and its functionality (Swedish Defence Commission 2006).

However, these ends were altered in the bill presented by the Cabinet in March 2009. The Cabinet suggested that the ends from 2010 and onward should be to defend Sweden and promote Sweden's national security, individually and together with others, within and outside the country. This should be done by asserting Sweden's sovereignty; safeguarding sovereign rights and national interests; preventing and managing conflicts and war; as well as protecting the society and its functionality by supporting civilian agencies. Consequently, the objectives of the Armed Forces were also articulated in a new manner. Having deployable units to be immediately ready to conduct operations in Sweden as well as abroad without any further preparations was hence the core task. The Armed Forces were also tasked to be ready at short notice to contribute to international military operations outside Sweden and to host military support from other states in case the operations were to be conducted on Swedish soil (Swedish Cabinet 2009). Both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee concurred with the Cabinet on their priorities (Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee 2009; Swedish Defence Committee 2009). Despite its broad analysis the Commission did not present any conclusions or suggestions regarding the ends of Sweden's defence policy in its second report (Swedish Defence Commission 2013).

5.5.3 Means

While earlier defence resolutions put a premium on the transformation process to allow a relevant force for future threats and demands, the Cabinet now claimed that the best way to prepare for an uncertain future was to have immediate availability of the forces. In addition, the operational experience from international crisis management would, the Cabinet argued, provide valuable experience to build on. High readiness and deployability underscored that the needs were fundamentally different compared to the mobilised force that was the hallmark of the Swedish defence during the Cold War. To ensure availability the Cabinet proposed that draft through conscription, instigated in 1901, was to be replaced by professional soldiers and sailors who would serve either full time

Table 5.4 The core of Sweden's military capability in 2008

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 3 Brigades 280 Main Battle Tanks	5 Submarines 6 Missile Craft 1 Amphibious Brigade	4 Squadrons with 130 JAS-39

Source: IISS 2008.

or part time. Part time units were justified by the costs incurred by having standing units. However, contracted personnel would be called up if needed, in particular for overseas operations. The Cabinet set out an ambitious agenda for changing the force structure in which lighter battalion-sized battlegroups were to constitute the backbone of the Army. Ground-based air defence systems, fighter aircraft and battle tanks were, according to the Cabinet, equipment that could be reduced in numbers to free up funding for the new initiative. The Cabinet also suggested that the need to free up resources would be met by reforming and rationalising personnel, equipment and logistics supply systems and other support activities (Swedish Cabinet 2009).

The Committee adopted the proposals advanced by the Cabinet. However, it was a slim majority. All parliamentarians in the left block voted against the bill and the votes fell 153–150 in favour. The most controversial issue was the proposal on the law on draft through conscription. Consequently, the language in the Committee report is vague on this subject. It is also rather difficult to interpret the substance behind figures such as 'a Special Forces Unit'. Nevertheless, the reductions in quantity is obvious. The core of the Army was, for example, to be two brigade staffs, seven mechanised battalions, one ranger battalion, two artillery battalions and three independent tank companies. The bulk of the Air Force was to be four squadrons with some 100 JAS combat aircraft and two air base battalions (Swedish Defence Committee 2009).

Four years later, in 2013, the Defence Commission concluded that the decisions made in 2009 still were valid. Without going into details, the Commission argued that high readiness and immediate availability of the Armed Forces was the mean needed (Swedish Defence Commission 2013).

5.5.4 *Ways*

Yet the Cabinet put another fundamental change forward. National defence was neither a task predestined to be carried out independent of others nor was Sweden able to retain its freedom of action to act in a crisis when European partners were involved. Most likely influenced by the work on the Treaty of Lisbon, including Article 47.2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), and the solidarity clause – Article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) a statement of solidarity was proclaimed. Sweden will not be inactive, the Cabinet promised, if a disaster or attack would affect another EU

member state or a neighbouring Nordic country. The Cabinet also explicitly declared its expectation that these countries would act in the same manner if Sweden were affected. This shift perpetuated the need for deeper military cooperation with partners. This would, the Cabinet argued, strengthen the ability to promote common interests and contribute to security and stability. This was not only referred to in the global or the European contexts but also related to the vicinity of Sweden and within Sweden's own territorial boundaries. The policy reorientation aimed at enhancing defence capabilities by increasing the usability and accessibility of the Armed Forces, were however, only in part due to the Georgian war. The Cabinet outlined three salient characteristics – usability, availability and flexibility – as overarching priorities for the Armed Forces. In essence, the Armed Forces were expected to be increasingly deployable and contribute to a greater extent than hitherto to Sweden's security and stability in the world. Enhanced operational accessibility and flexibility would enable the Armed Forces to respond to crises and conflicts more rapidly and effectively, even when these arose at short notice. The justification came at least in part from the surprise attack mounted by Russia during the Georgian war. The inherent flexibility advocated by the Cabinet would better equip the Armed Forces to address broad and dynamic threats, it was argued. Consequently, deploying main battle tanks to Gotland, the Swedish island in the centre of the Baltic Sea, was a natural step in implementing the new strategy (Swedish Cabinet 2009).

There was, however, some political opposition in the Parliament. The three parties of the centre-left block¹¹ accused the Cabinet of moving outside the broader cross-block agreement that was reached by the Defence Commission. The increased focus of the Cabinet on the situation in the Baltic Sea Region was hence one aspect of the criticism. Another was the ambition of closer cooperation with NATO including potential participation in the NRF. The political opposition did not approve the intention to pledge as framework nation for a EU's battle group rotation. The Defence Committee nevertheless subscribed to the silent principles proposed by the Cabinet (Swedish Defence Committee 2009).

The Defence Commission was explicit in its conclusion that international cooperation was the preferred way. The argumentation was threefold. First, by contributing to international conflict management abroad, Sweden indirectly served its own national security – preventing direct threats against Swedish territory and Swedish interests. Second, bi- and multilateral cooperation regarding force generation, procurement, training etc. were cost efficient. Third, Sweden should prepare for both hosting and providing military resources to be used in the context of national defence. The Commission was, however, not clear of which roles and responsibilities the Swedish Armed Forces were to assume within the frames of a more demanding multilateral military operation. That cooperation with the other Nordic countries in these regards was prioritised was clear (Swedish Defence Commission 2013).

5.5.5 Summary – the Swedish strategy after the second shock

We argue that the Georgian war was perceived as a strategic shock by the Swedish government. Indeed, the Russian aggression made an immediate impact on Swedish policy; the declaration proclaimed that the war underscored the need for a carefully crafted security policy. The reaction can be broken down into four parts. It was not only an incursion on the Georgian people and its sovereignty. The Russian aggression was also an attack on international law. Ultimately, this was about Swedish security. Georgia, like Sweden, was a small military non-aligned state that relied on the European security order and solidarity. A proactive and unified European response would not only benefit the Georgian people but also ensure the relevance of Swedish security policy. The Georgian war also became a watershed in Swedish foreign policy. It set in motion a reversion of the global focus; national security related to a military antagonist was reintroduced. This development coalesced with the development of the solidarity doctrine that gave further impetus to regional cooperation and the need for more output from the organisation, in particular as it related to international crisis management operations. The habitual major cuts in the Armed Forces' organisation that had been a key factor in earlier resolutions came to a halt. The ambition to generate more output from the Armed Forces was tempered by fiscal restraints. As no additional funding was added, the transformation needed to be financed within the existing budget. Even though most of the changes were expected to be implemented by 2015, the pace was dictated by the available funding (see, for example, Dalsjö 2010; Westberg 2015).

Arguably, the priority set on national defence was ambiguous as the detailed proposals were to a large extent tailored towards international crisis management. While the changes may appear subtle, they revealed a rift in military strategy. In essence, the Swedish government regarded commitments to overseas operations as the first line of defence. Already in 2008, the Commission advocated the increased instrumental use of the Armed Forces.¹² However, the report fell short on being so explicit on the requirements. We therefore argue that the Cabinet took the necessary steps only after the Georgian war (see, for example, Edström and Gyllensporre 2014).

5.6 Conclusions: the consequences of the second shock

How did the four Nordic countries respond when facing the second potential shock? Was the Russian war against Georgia perceived as shock at all? Moreover, what similarities and differences can be observed when exploring their military strategies?

The four countries presented slightly different perceptions regarding the international *environment*. While both Denmark and Sweden dismissed direct military threats, Finland expressed concerns regarding the Russian use of military power in its foreign relations. The Finns also warned for a decreased American interest for European security. Both Denmark and Norway articulated

worries for increased tension between the west and the Islamic world as well as between the great powers while Sweden's concerns mainly had social and environmental roots. Clearly, both Finland and Sweden perceived the Georgian war with more worry than their Nordic neighbours did.

Despite these differences, the *ends/objectives* expressed by each of the four Nordic states were rather similar. Protecting the sovereignty and integrity of the country, promoting the national interests and values, and ensuring the functionality of the society were at the core of the discussions of all four states. So was managing conflicts and terrorism but referring to the latter the ambition seems to be different. When, for example, Denmark expressed the ends in terms of 'combating', Norway and Sweden instead used 'preventing' while Finland did not express any clear intentions in this regard.

Arguably, these differences had an impact on the *means* considered necessary to meet the future and to achieve the strategic objectives. When Denmark, Norway and Sweden clearly focused on high readiness, deployability and rapid response capabilities, i.e. expeditionary warfare, Finland instead gave priority to deterrence. Consequently, the three former countries saw professional soldiers and sailors as necessities. All three decreased the traditional system for conscription but to different degrees. In the case of Finland, quantity still mattered. In order to be able to mobilise a rather large Army and hence deter a potential aggressor, i.e. Russia, conscription was not an option but a need. There were, however, also differences between the three former states. While, for example, Norway strove to acquire new ships and aircrafts, Denmark had to focus on maintaining the resources currently at its disposal. When Denmark undertook this challenge, the focus was arguably on ensuring a continued capability contributing to NATO's international efforts. We are not completely sure this was also the preference in the Norwegian case.

Despite the rather different approach to the means, a similar approach was applied regarding the *ways*. Presumably, all four countries acknowledged the need for multilateral cooperation in the force generation dimension. Finland, Norway and Sweden especially seem to have striven for increased collaboration with their Nordic neighbours. In Denmark's case NATO was the preferred framework for the cooperation both in the force generation and in the use of force dimensions. When Finland built its national defence concept using force solely on its own resources, Norway explicitly admitted its dependency on allied reinforcements. Since both Denmark and Sweden considered military threats against themselves unlikely, it can be explained why none of them elaborated on ways of using force in the national context. In the case of miscalculation in this regard, contrary to Sweden, Denmark could always rely on its NATO membership. It seems, however, that Sweden also strove for some sort of ensured 'allied' support in case of an unlikely threat. The unilateral declaration of solidarity can be interpreted as such an effort.

Regarding the first control variable, *strategic exposure*, Denmark and Sweden seem to consider themselves rather unexposed to increased Russian military aggressiveness. This was definitely not the case with Finland and to some degree

Table 5.5 The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the second shock

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Environment	No conventional military threats against Denmark. Risks for great power competition in the Arctic. Conflicts mainly between the west and the Islamic world	Frozen conflicts. Russia projecting military power outside its borders. Reduced US military presence in Europe. Disturbances in the functioning of the international financing system	Ideological and cultural-based tensions. Increased global competition regarding strategic resources. Risks of intra- and interstate wars as well as proliferation of missile technology and WMD	Conventional threats such as climate change, natural disasters and poverty. Direct military threats toward Sweden considered unlikely in the foreseeable future
Ends	Combating terrorism, extremism and proliferation of WMD. Protecting Denmark's integrity and sovereignty. Enforcing Danish jurisdiction	Safeguarding Finland's independence, territorial integrity and values. Maintaining and advancing the security and well-being of Finland's citizens. Ensuring and sustaining the functioning of society. Securing the freedom of action for the political leadership of Finland	Preventing crises from erupting. Reducing the consequences in case of a crisis in Norway's neighbourhood. Protecting Norway's sovereignty, sovereign rights and territorial integrity. Promoting Norway's national interests. Ensuring political freedom of action	Protecting the life and health of the population; as well as the society's functionality. Safeguarding Sweden's interests and values including democracy, legal certainty and human rights and freedoms. Preventing and managing conflicts and war. Ensuring Sweden's sovereignty
Means	Managing the shortages of equipment and personnel. New capabilities for computer network operations. Two Army battle groups, two naval and three Air Force task groups	Capabilities and resources necessary for upholding a credible deterrence force. Improved capacity to participate in military crisis management	Quality rather than quantity. New frigates and corvettes for the Navy. New combat aircraft for the Air Force. Increased rapid reaction ability of the Army	Immediate available forces. High readiness and deployability of all services. Professional soldiers, sailors and airmen
Ways	Multilateral cooperation with NATO as the capstone. Supporting regional and local stakeholders. Proactive approach	A territorial defence system covering the entire area of the country. General conscription. Cooperation with the other Nordic countries regarding force generation	Multinational cooperation. Priority to Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK regarding the use of force and to the Nordic countries regarding force generation. Ability receiving allied reinforcements	Solidarity – Sweden will not be inactive if a disaster or attack would affect another EU member or Nordic country. No explicit description how this was going to be implemented

neither with Norway. We consider, however, that the Finnish and Norwegian awareness of the potential challenge from Russia had a slightly different focus. While Finland did not exclude a strategic attack and highly-intensive combat, Norway seems to have been more interested in the lower parts of the escalation ladder.

Consequently, when it comes to *capacity*, the four countries took slightly different steps. While Denmark and Sweden were wholeheartedly preparing their contribution to international efforts in the global arena, Finland could not avoid paying full attention to its own backyard. Norway was ambivalent in this regard. On the one hand, the Norwegian strategists were fully aware of the necessity in providing capable military units to NATO's out-of-area operations. Not least for increasing the willingness of NATO allies to reinforce Norway if needed. On the other hand, the Norwegian leadership was reluctant to put all its attention on this aspect. Consequently, a military capacity for the national dimension was considered necessary. As a result, the services seem to have been given separate focus as well as priority.

When taking into account the abovementioned aspects, we still claim that all four states fulfil the *interest* criteria of being a pet-dog. In addition, we also continue to argue that the geographical characteristics help explain Denmark, Finland and Norway's strategies. The closer to Russia a country is, the harder it is to avoid giving priority to the national dimension. The only discrepancy in this pattern is Sweden. The geographical aspects cannot explain why it took a quite similar approach to Denmark.

Arguably, the historical experiences can provide clues to the similarities between Denmark, Finland and Norway. The similarities between Denmark and Sweden are, however, more difficult to explain. Neither the geographical characteristics nor the historical experiences played any significant role when Sweden declared its policy of solidarity.

To summarise, we argue that the Georgian war were perceived as a strategic shock in Finland and Sweden but not in Denmark and Norway. While the Finnish government seems to have preferred a *balance of power* strategy, the Swedish ditto tend to favour a *hedging* strategy.

Notes

- 1 When the armies of the Russian Federation invaded Georgia in August 2008, Denmark was led by a centre-right coalition consisting of the Liberal Party (Danish: *Venstre*) and the Conservative People's Party (Danish: *Det Konservative Folkeparti*), led by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of the former party. When Fogh Rasmussen became Secretary General of NATO in April, his party fellow Lars Løkke Rasmussen assumed the responsibilities of the Prime Minister. After the elections in October 2011 a centre-left coalition was formed consisting of the Social Democrats, the Social Liberal Party (Danish: *Radikale Venstre*) and the Socialist People's Party (Danish: *Socialistisk Folkeparti*). Helle Thorning-Schmidt of the Social Democrats led the new Cabinet. The centre-left coalition remained in power throughout the period analysed in this section.

- 2 The Liberal Party, the Social Democrats, the Danish People's Party (Danish: *Dansk Folkeparti*), the Socialist People's Party, the Conservative Party (also known as the Conservative People's Party), the Radical Liberal Party (Danish: *Radikale Venstre*) and the Liberal Alliance Party (Danish: *Liberal Alliance*) were all signatory parties while the Red-Green Alliance (Danish: *Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne*) was not.
- 3 TOW stands for Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided.
- 4 It was noted that the Danish F-16s had been used on a far higher degree and more demanding role than originally anticipated. The aircraft had, for example, often been used with a heavy load due to the need of carrying extra fuel and weapons as well as reconnaissance and surveillance equipment. Consequently, this had placed a heavy strain and caused a greater wear and tear on the aircraft than foreseen. Hence, the Danish F-16 were expected to have a shorter service life than initially estimated (Danish Defence Commission 2009a).
- 5 Tarja Halonen of the Social Democratic Party (Finnish: *Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue*) was Finland's President from March 2000 to March 2012. After the presidential elections in 2012, Sauli Niinistö of the National Coalition Party replaced her (Finnish: *Kansallinen Kokoomus*). Matti Vanhanen of the Centre Party (Finnish: *Keskusta*) was Prime Minister since 2007, leading a coalition Cabinet also consisting of the National Coalition Party, the Swedish People's Party (Swedish: *Svenska Folkpartiet*) and the Green League (Finnish: *Vihreä Liitto*). In June 2010, Vanhanen resigned and was replaced by Mari Kiviniemi of the Centre Party. After the parliamentary elections in 2011 Jyrki Katainen of the National Coalition Party replaced her. He formed a coalition Cabinet including, in addition to his own party, the Social Democratic Party, the Swedish People's Party, the Green League, the Left Alliance (Finnish: *Vasemmistoliitto*) and the Christian Democrats (Finnish: *Kristillisdemokraatit*). The coalition remained in power throughout the remaining years analysed in this section.
- 6 When the Georgian War erupted Norway was governed by majority coalition consisting of the Social Democrats (Norwegian: *Arbeiderparti*), the Socialist Left Party (Norwegian: *Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) and the Centre Party (Norwegian: *Senterpartiet*) led by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of the former party. The Cabinet remained in power after the elections in 2009.
- 7 When the English version was presented two months later, in November 2009, Grete Faremo had replaced Strøm-Erichsen as Minister of Defence.
- 8 See Norwegian MoD (2008) and Norwegian Defence Committee (2009).
- 9 In the parliamentary elections in 2006, the incumbent Social Democratic Cabinet lost power to a right-wing majority coalition with Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Moderate Party's leader, at the helm. In addition to the Moderate Party, the Centre Party (Swedish: *Centerpartiet*), the Liberal Party (Swedish: *Folkpartiet*) and the Christian Democrats (Swedish: *Kristdemokraterna*) took part in the coalition Cabinet, which remained in power throughout the period explored in this section.
- 10 The second report presented by the Commission, 'The Defence of Sweden – a stronger defence for an uncertain time', was delivered in May 2014 and will be analysed in the following chapter.
- 11 The Social Democrats. The Green Party (Swedish: *Miljöpartiet*) and the Left Party (Swedish: *Vänsterpartiet*).
- 12 The report had the fitting title *Defence in Use* (see Swedish Defence Commission 2008).

Bibliography

Bogen, Olav and Magnus Håkenstad (2015). *Balansegang – Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen*. Oslo: Dryers Forlag.

- Branner, Hans (2013). 'Denmark between Venus and Mars: How Great a Change in Danish Foreign Policy?' in Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds). *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2013*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Cheterian, Vicken (2009). 'The August 2008 war in Georgia: from ethnic conflict to border wars' in *Central Asian Survey*. Volume 28, Issue 2.
- Dalsjö, Robert (2010). 'Från neutralitet till solidaritet: Omgestaltningen av Sveriges säkerhetspolitik efter det kalla kriget' in Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Ångström (eds). *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juidik.
- Danish Defence Commission (2009a). *Dansk Forsvar, Globalt engagement – Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 2008* (Hovedbind). Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish Defence Commission (2009b). *Dansk Forsvar, Globalt engagement – Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 2008* (Bilagsbind). Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2009). *Forsvarsforlig – Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2010–2014*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2012). *Forsvarsforlig – Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2013–2017*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Edström, Håkan and Dennis Gyllensporre (2014). *Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter det kalla krigets slut*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press.
- Ellison, Brian (2011). 'Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War' in *Demokratisatsiya*. Volume 19, Issue 4.
- Fawn, Rick and Robert Nalbandov (2012). 'The Difficulties of Knowing the Start of War in the Information Age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008' in *European Security*. Volume 21, Issue 1.
- Finnish Cabinet (2009). *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 – Government Report*. Prime Minister's Office Publications 13/2009.
- Finnish Cabinet (2010). *Security Strategy for Society*. Government Resolution 16 December.
- Finnish Cabinet (2013). *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012 – Government Report*. Prime Minister's Office Publications 1/2013.
- Finnish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2009). Försvarsutskottets utlåtande FsUU 4/2009 rd.
- Finnish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2013). Försvarsutskottets utlåtande FsUU 4/2013 rd.
- Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee (of the Parliament) (2009). Utrikesutskottets betänkande UtUB 5/2009 rd.
- Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee (of the Parliament) (2013). Utrikesutskottets betänkande UtUB 1/2013 rd.
- German, Tracey (2009). 'David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia's Coercive Diplomacy' in *Defence Studies*. Volume 9, Issue 2.
- Hilde, Paal Sigurd (2013). 'Nordic-Baltic Security and Defence Cooperation: The Norwegian Perspective' in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää (eds). *Northern Security and Global Politics*. London: Routledge.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2008). *The Military Balance 2008*. London: Routledge.
- Mouritzen, Hans and Anders Wivel (2012). *Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Norwegian ChoD (2012). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2011*. Oslo: Forsvaret.
- Norwegian ChoD (2013). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2012*. Oslo: Forsvaret.
- Norwegian ChoD (2014). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2013*. Oslo: Forsvaret.

- Norwegian Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2009). *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om nye kampfly til Forsvaret*. Innst. S. nr. 299, 2008–9.
- Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2011). *Innstilling fra utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen om investeringar i Forsvaret*. Innst. 441S, 2010–11.
- Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2012). *Innstilling fra utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen om Et forsvar for vår tid*. Innst. 388S, 2011–12.
- Norwegian MoD (2008). *Nye kampfly til Forsvaret*. St.prp. nr. 36, 2008–9.
- Norwegian MoD (2009a). *Gjennomføringen av St. prp. nr. 42 (2003–2004) Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008 – En samlet vurdering*. 24 September.
- Norwegian MoD (2009b). *Evne til innsats – Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret*.
- Norwegian MoD (2011). *Investeringar i Forsvaret*. St.prp. nr. 100S, 2010–2011.
- Norwegian MoD (2012). *Et forsvar for vår tid*. St. prp. nr. 73S 2011–12.
- Norwegian MoD (2013). *Kompetanse for en ny tid*. Meld. St. 14 2012–13.
- Rickli, Jean-Marc (2008). ‘European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies’ in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. Volume 21, Issue 3.
- Saxi, Hakon Lunde (2010). ‘Defending Small States: Norwegian & Danish Defence Policies in the post-Cold War Era’ in *Defence and Security Analysis*. Volume 26, Issue 4.
- Saxi, Hakon Lunde (2011). *Nordic defence cooperation after the cold war*. Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier.
- Swedish Cabinet (2009). *Ett användbart försvar*. Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2006). *En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2006:1.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2007). *Säkerhet i samverkan*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2007:46.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2008). *Försvar i användning*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2008:48.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2013). *Vägval i en globaliserad värld*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2013:33.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2009). *Försvarets inriktning*. Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2008/09:FöU10.
- Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee (of the Parliament) (2009). *Ett användbart försvar*. Utrikesutskottets yttrande 2008/09:UU4y.
- Tiilikainen, Teija (2010). ‘The Finnish Neutrality – Its New Forms and Future’ in Laurent Goetschel (ed.). *Small States inside and outside the European Union – Interests and Policies*. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic. (2nd ed. Paperback).
- Valasek, Tomas (2011). *Surviving Austerity. The Case for a New approach to EU Military Cooperation*. London: Center for European Reform.
- Westberg, Jacob (2015). ‘Det nordiska försvarssamarbetets drivkrafter och utvecklingsmöjligheter’ in Kjell Engelbrekt, Arita Holmberg and Jan Ångström (eds). *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
- Wheatley, Jonathan (2009). ‘Managing ethnic diversity in Georgia: one step forward, two steps back’ in *Central Asian Survey*. Volume 28, Issue 2.

6 The third and fourth shocks – Ukraine and the Caliphate

6.1 The world put to a test?

In the fall of 2013, the Ukrainian government under President Yanukovich refused to sign a trade and association agreement negotiated with the EU. The widespread protests that followed came to be known as the Euro Maidan Uprising. When the protests were met with violence, Ukrainians became more anti-Yanukovich, and the situation eventually led to the President fleeing the country on 21 February 2014 (Gruzd and Tsyganova 2015; Wood *et al.* 2016).

According to a Russian-Ukrainian agreement, Russian forces had been deployed to Sevastopol and other bases in Crimea since the collapse of the USSR. Soon after Yanukovich left Ukraine, some of these Russian units removed their insignias claiming to be local militia. It did not take long before governmental buildings on the Crimean peninsula were occupied or controlled by the militia, i.e. Russian forces. The main legislative body of Crimea therefore decided a referendum. It was held on 16 March. The voters were presented with two alternatives: to become a part of the Russian Federation or to remain a part of Ukraine. An overwhelming majority was claimed to have voted in favour of the former alternative. On the following day, the Russian President Putin recognised the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign and independent state, with the city of Sevastopol having a special status. On 18 March, President Putin formally declared Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation. Special Forces supported by regular units already deployed in the area made up the bulk of the Russian conquering forces (Cimbala 2014; Grant 2015).

This was not only the first time since WWII that a European state invaded and forcibly annexed a part of a neighbouring state's territory but also the first time a permanent member of the UNSC using force sought to extend its own borders. The Russian actions therefore caught everyone off guard (Grant 2015; Menon and Rumer 2015). Shortly after the annexation, tensions arose in the Ukrainian region of Donbas. Russia was immediately accused of trying to repeat its operations in Crimea. However, the Ukrainian government launched anti-terrorist operations and the fighting was intensified throughout April. By August, it became obvious that the pro-Russian side of the conflict received direct military support from Russia. Consequently, the proposed peace plans failed

(Davies 2015). Nevertheless, on 5 September, the Trilateral Contact Group, with representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, brokered a ceasefire agreement. The Minsk Protocol was signed by the Group as well as by representatives of the separatists and the Ukrainian government respectively (Daugirdas and Mortenson 2015).

In June the same year, 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State (IS), captured some key Iraqi cities including Mosul and Tikrit. IS was first called Al-Qaida in Iraq, but rebranded themselves as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 2007. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the group expanded to Syria as well and became ISIS. The capture of Mosul was an especially important strategic turn for the terror group and on 29 June a spokesperson for IS declared the re-establishment of the Caliphate in the city. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the terrorists, was declared as the Caliph (Isakhan 2015; Rosiny 2015; Hashim 2016; Kilcullen 2016). As a response to the declaration of the Caliphate, an alliance between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Shia militants was formed in order to prevent further IS advances. In August 2014, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2170 condemning the violations of fundamental human rights conducted by IS and placed sanctions on terror-related individuals. The US and its allies assembled a coalition of approximately 60 states aiming to provide the anti-IS alliance with training and intelligence. Since September 2014, the US-led coalition has taken direct action against IS, initially primarily by air strikes. However, the Caliphate gained international reinforcements. Already in November 2014, around 60 Jihadist groups from about 30 countries had pledged their support to IS (Fromson and Simon 2015; Bar 2016).

The activities of IS were not isolated to the Levant. On 13 November 2014, a multisite terror attack, which IS claimed responsibility for, occurred in Paris resulting in France declaring a state of urgency. This was the first well-coordinated attack conducted by IS in Europe and contrasted to previous drive-by shooting and attacks perpetrated by single terrorists. The attacks ignited discussions on home-grown terrorism and how the new internal terrorist threats contrasted from the external which was the case of the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks. Shortly after the attacks, the French President Hollande explained how France had to cope with the upcoming war against terrorism. President Hollande also invoked Article 42 of the Treaty of Lisbon, hence not only expecting but also demanding aid and assistance from other EU member states. This was not only the first time the Article was put to a test; furthermore, Hollande referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter and called upon Russia, the US and others to form an international coalition against IS (Isakhan 2015; Kilcullen 2016; Lequesne 2016).

Consequently, the four Nordic countries had two potential strategic shocks to respond to in 2014; Russia's aggressive behaviour against its neighbours including illegal annexation and occupation of parts of a European sovereign state, and the unprecedented level of violence and cruelty that had also swept Europe by the terrorists of the Caliphate.

6.2 Denmark¹

In early April 2014, the centre-left Cabinet reached an agreement with several parties of the opposition on how to continue to develop the Danish defence policy until 2017.² Less than half a year later the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Martin Lidegaard of the Social Liberal Party, had, however, to present requests to the Danish Parliament, *Folketinget*, regarding IS. The new Minister, Mr Kristian Jensen of the Liberal Party, presented similar requests in both October 2015 and in March 2016. Not everything put on the political agenda on defence policy did, however, concern how to deter the fighting Caliphate. In April 2014, a revision of the broader defence agreement for the period 2013–17 was undertaken and in June 2016, the Liberal Cabinet reached an agreement with four other political parties regarding the procurement of the replacement for F-16 combat aircraft.³ In October 2017, the Cabinet explicitly announced its position before the upcoming negotiations regarding a new defence agreement for the period 2018–21. In late January 2018, the new defence agreement was reached among a broad majority of the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament, *Folketinget*.⁴ Together these documents constitute the frame for the analysis in this section.

6.2.1 International environment

In his 2014 request, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs described how the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had, from June until August, assumed control over western and northwestern Iraq. The Iraqi security forces' lack of capacity had left the civil population in the ISIL-controlled areas without protection but with a severe humanitarian crisis as a consequence. Over a million refugees had to flee while those unable to suffered enormously from the violence. ISIL was referred to as an extreme example of international terrorism. The request was wholeheartedly supported by the four centre-right parties who added that more than a hundred Danish citizens were expected to have joined ISIL since 2012.⁵ The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament raised a warning that the Danish ISIL terrorists might be a potential threat once they returned to Denmark (Danish Parliament 2014a).

One month later, on 30 September 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs described ISIL not only as a local problem but also as a threat to the populations of Iraq and Syria and potentially to the whole of the Middle East. The risk for Danish and international security threats was escalating. From the areas controlled by the ISIL, the organisation was expected to plan terrorist attacks against the west. The crimes against humanity were, in addition, worsening with the use of mass executions. The four centre-right parties not only once again supported the Cabinet in the issue itself but also by standing by the use of an urgent decision-making process, which was approved in the Danish constitution for extraordinary circumstances (Danish Parliament 2014b).

In a similar request, presented a year later by the new minister, Mr Kristian Jensen of the Liberal Party, the situation described was even worse (Danish

Parliament, 2015). In March 2016, Mr Jensen presented another request to the Parliament. ISIL was now described as a global threat. The activities of the organisation were not only related to the Levant, but were rather considered to have spread all over the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time the threat against Danish personnel contributing to fighting ISIL had escalated to high, and occasionally very high, levels and included the use of chemical weapons (Danish Parliament 2016).

In October 2017, Russia's more aggressive foreign policy in tandem with the instability in the Middle East and North Africa were the focus of the Cabinet's discussions. The former case was a source of growing concern. The Cabinet stressed the increased Russian military spend as well as the activities in the Baltic Sea region. Russia was not only accused of violating international norms in its international relations but also for conducting covert operations. The latter case was considered to be a source of concern in terms of militant Islamists, terrorism and uncontrolled migration. Additionally, threats from the cyber domain as well as the increased military activities in the Arctic were analysed (Danish MoD 2017). Clearly, the Cabinet was successful in its negotiations with the other parties as its views were also articulated in the agreement (Danish MoD 2018).

6.2.2 Ends

Protecting and promoting western values such as human rights was in focus when explaining the objectives that the Danish participation in the fight against ISIL were to fulfil. Preserving the stability in the Middle East and strengthening Iraq's ability to fight ISIL were additional benefits not always expressed as ends in themselves. Preventing terrorist attacks against the west including Denmark was, however, mentioned as an objective (Danish Parliament 2014a; 2014b, 2015; 2016). The *raison d'être* for the new combat aircraft was said to promote Danish national interests. Among the specified interests were protecting Denmark's sovereignty and contributing to defending NATO territory (Danish Parliament 2016).

Shortly ahead of the negotiations formulating the Danish defence policy 2018–21, the Cabinet declared its ambition to maintain Denmark as one of the core members of NATO. Strengthening NATO's ability for collective defence was presented as an end in itself. To deter a potential intruder from attacking NATO allies and ultimately Denmark itself was hence a key objective of the Danish Armed Forces. Protecting Denmark as well as the freedom and safety of the Danish people was also mentioned as a fundamental task (Danish MoD 2017). All these items were also stressed in the parliamentary agreement. Consequently, protecting Denmark's sovereignty and securing Denmark's continued existence, integrity and safety were expressed as overarching objectives (Danish MoD 2018).

6.2.3 Means

The ChoD was, together with a part of his staff, to be collocated with the MoD while the other part of his staff was, together with the three operational commands, to merge into a new single joint military command to be located to Karup. The Arctic Command in Nuuk and the Special Forces Command in Aalborg were to be subordinated to this new operational command. In total, the political parties expected to increase the efficiency and reduce some resources considered redundant. The number of generals and admirals was, for example, to decrease from 14 to 9 (Danish MoD 2014).

When the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the Cabinet's initial request to the Parliament regarding Danish contributions to the US-led operations against ISIL, the means to be allocated were a single C-130J transport aircraft and a handful of logisticians. In total, some 55 military personnel were to be involved. The four centre-right parties signalled right from the beginning that they had other resources in mind including F-16 combat aircraft. The Socialist People's Party could, however, only accept Denmark to participate with transport aircraft while the Red-Green Alliance (Danish: *Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne*) could not accept any Danish military involvement (Danish Parliament 2014a). A month later the Cabinet's proposal was to organise the Danish contribution in three parts. The first part was to consist of up to seven F-16 combat aircrafts including roughly 140 military personnel. About 20 officers were to form the second part serving as staff and liaison officers while the third part was to consist of units designated for military capacity building including around 140 military personnel. The latter part was to focus on advisory roles, training and logistical tasks (Danish Parliament 2014b). In October, the suggested additional military resources to be deployed to Iraq consisted of an air surveillance unit and a national support element of about 30 and 10 personnel respectively. The F-16 and C-130J units were to be redeployed to Denmark later the same month (Danish Parliament 2015). Already in March 2016, the Cabinet requested, however, to deploy both F16 and C-130J units of similar strength to the Middle East. In addition, a Special Forces unit of some 60 troops was to be deployed to the area of operations (Danish Parliament 2016).

As mentioned before, the Danish Air Forces' F-16 combat aircraft had gradually been worn down by intensive use in international missions. As a result, the need to replace the old F-16s with modern aircraft could no longer be neglected.

Table 6.1 The core of Denmark's military capability in 2013

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 2 Brigades 60 Main Battle Tanks	1 Frigate 5 Ocean Patrol Vessels 7 Missile/Patrol Craft	2 Squadrons with 45 F-16 A/B

Source: IISS, 2013.

The MoD launched a programme in which three candidates were evaluated: Eurofighter Typhoon, F-35A (JSF) and F/A-18F Super Hornet. In June 2016 the winner was announced: F-35. As previously mentioned, the Liberal minority Cabinet reached a broad agreement to procure 27 new F-35 combat aircraft to be gradually introduced in the Air Force 2021–26 (Danish MoD 2016).

In late 2017, the Danish Cabinet presented its intention to allocate an additional almost 13 billion Danish kroner for defence over the years 2018–23. In relative terms, this meant increasing the defence budget by more than 20 per cent by the year 2023 as compared to 2017. The investments were to be used for boosting the capability of all services. The plans were to have an army brigade of more than 4,000 soldiers including modern combat vehicles, air defence and artillery by 2024. The brigade was to have high readiness and deployability for participating in international operations both within the collective defence context and in out-of-area missions. The Army was also to organise a high-readiness light infantry battalion of about 500 soldiers for national tasks. A second brigade was to be organised as a reserve. The capacity of the Navy's three frigates of *Iver Huitfeldt* class regarding both air defence and anti-submarine warfare was to be strengthened. This increased capacity was not mentioned regarding the four OPVs of *Thetis-class*, nor for the patrol crafts, i.e. the three of *Knud Rasmussen* class and the six of *Diana-class*. The Air Forces' capability for both national and international missions was also mentioned in relation to the decision to procure F-35 combat aircraft. The Cabinet did not, however, present any further details. The Special Forces were also to organise more units but the specific numbers were not presented. Finally, the Armed Forces' ability to conduct cyber warfare operations was said to be increased (Danish MoD 2017).

In the broad political agreement, the increased capacity of the Armed Forces was a result of the threats from both Russia and the Caliphate. In the former case, the strengthened military capabilities were related to NATO's collective deterrence and defence capacity, and to defending Denmark against cyber warfare. In the latter case, they concerned contributions to international operations abroad as well as defending Denmark against direct terrorist attacks. Consequently, both focus areas had an offensive as well as a defensive dimension (Danish MoD 2018).

6.2.4 *Ways*

When it comes to the use of force and contributing to international military operations, Denmark clearly had a preferred strategy. As soon as the American administration asked for Denmark to participate, the Danish politicians were very swift to live up to the requests and to put Danish Armed Forces under US operational control. By operating with Special Forces in Iraq and Syria, F-16 from air bases in Turkey, C-130J from air bases in Kuwait, mobile air surveillance units from air bases in Iraq and with air controllers from the headquarters in the United Arab Emirates, Denmark clearly had no nationally framed role at

the operational level. That was also not the whole idea. Instead, Denmark focused on the strategic levels (Danish Parliament 2014a; 2014b; 2015; 2016).

The Danish Cabinet declared that the lessons learned throughout history indicated that democracies have to prepare for the future from a strong position. From a Danish perspective, this was said to be implemented through a robust and trustworthy integration in NATO's chain of command. On the one hand, the Cabinet acknowledged that Denmark was no front state facing the same immediate threats and challenges as its eastern and southern NATO allies. On the other hand, it expressed its willingness to play an active role in the defence of these other member states. Especially the three Baltic States were mentioned in this regard and so was the army brigade. The Cabinet also recognised the importance of Danish infrastructure such as ports and airports in case Denmark was to serve as a transit spot for NATO reinforcements heading east. Not only host nation agreements but also a Danish ability to defend this critical infrastructure was mentioned in this context. A close cooperation with the Danish police was identified as the key for success. When it comes to the use of military force internationally within frames other than Chapter V operations, fighting terrorists directly as well as indirectly was the Cabinet's suggested route. Regarding the indirect approach, supporting states such as Iraq in increasing its own capacity by launching training missions was stressed (Danish MoD 2017). The collaborating political parties obviously reached the same conclusions since the broad agreement was very similar to the Cabinet's initial standpoint (Danish MoD 2018).

6.2.5 Summary – the Danish strategy after the third and fourth shocks

Both Russia's military assault on Ukraine and the establishment of the Caliphate and its terror regime were clearly perceived as strategic shocks by the Danish government. Russian military interventions and international terrorism were already known phenomena but the magnitude of each of the events was unexpected. Each of them also led to deeply consequential and demanding counter measures as decided by the Danish political authorities. It seems reasonable to claim that the Danish analysis on the international environment focused on four separate areas. At the core was mainland Denmark and the risks of direct terrorist attacks on Danish territory. The Middle East and North Africa were strongly connected to these discussions. On the one hand, the instable political and social conditions were in themselves a fertile ground for terrorist organisations to recruit new members. On the other hand, civil war and armed violence forced millions to flee their homes seeking a safe haven in Europe and potentially Denmark. Russia's increased involvement in the region and especially in Syria was a source for concern but so was the more direct Russian threat against NATO's eastern members. The increased Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region perpetuated this perception. Even if Russia was not always explicitly mentioned when the focus was on the Arctic, it was nevertheless clear that the

Danish concerns regarding Greenland and the Faroe Islands included some obscurity regarding Russia's intentions. The same could arguably be said about the perceived challenges from the cyber domain. Our conclusion is that eastern Europe had a revival in Danish security policy after the Russian attack on Ukraine (see, for example, Jakobsen 2014).

The Danish discussions on objectives often took the overarching term 'national interest' as a point of departure. When specifying these interests protecting Denmark's sovereignty as well as the safety of the Danes, preventing terrorist attacks and defending NATO territory were often mentioned. Other objectives included promoting western values, preserving the stability in the greater Middle East region and deterring potential intruders from attacking Denmark and NATO allies. Obviously, there was a clear connection between the perceptions of the international environment and the national interests. There seems also to have been a connection to the means although the resources had become quite lean. An army brigade, a light battalion, some frigates and potentially up to 27 new combat aircrafts were arguably a quite modest military force. We interpret that the ambition was to upgrade the two battle groups to two brigades although with separate level of readiness. Since the out-phasing of the F-16 system and the introduction of the F-35 system meant that the ability to participate with air power internationally would, in practice, vanish for a couple of years, it seems that the Danish politicians would have to rely on the reputation earned during the previous decades. The Special Forces were, on the other hand, to increase in numbers and so was the ability to conduct cyber warfare operations. It is noteworthy that the use of force perspective dominated the considerations heavily. The preferred ways and methods were still proactive in nature even if the decrease in number as well as the transformation of the Air Force obviously affected the Danish strategists' awareness of what they actually could do. Moreover, the indirect approach in international operation, supporting host nations' capacity building rather than fighting the terrorists directly, seems to be a result of this calculation. The shift of focus towards eastern Europe obviously had an impact on the Danish strategy. The central objective in the war against IS was, from a Danish standpoint, hence not to win but to contribute in order to remain a trustworthy ally (see, for example, Jakobsen 2016). That the Caliphate despite this reorientation was perceived as a shock might very well be a result of the timing, i.e. that the third and the fourth shock occurred concurrently. In the European case *balance of power* seems to have been the preferred approach, while *bandwagoning* was preferred in the Middle East.

6.3 Finland⁶

The first official governmental strategy document that was published after the Russian annexation of Crimea was published in the summer of 2014 presenting an analysis on Finland's future against the background of international developments and trends. Later the very same year, in September, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs presented an additional report; 'Future Outlook'. The report

included not only the discussions of Finland's initial responses to the war in Ukraine but also the Finnish ditto to the IS proclamation of a Caliphate. In June 2016, the Cabinet issued yet another report, this time on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy. This report was in March 2017 complemented with a special report on Finnish defence policy. The four texts constitute the frame for the analysis in this section.

6.3.1 International environment

The Cabinet noted that the events in Ukraine had proved that Russia was prepared to break the fundamental principles of international relations and resort to extreme measures to achieve its political aims. The Cabinet concluded that the situation in Ukraine might force the US to re-evaluate its previous policy of reallocating military resources from Europe to Asia. The crisis in Ukraine had, according to the Cabinet, also showed that unpredictable developments and uncertainties in the international environment could produce sudden changes in the security environment. The geopolitical and revisionist angles of Russian policy were strongly emphasised. The Cabinet claimed that Russia was constructing its own power base and sphere of interest rooted in Russian traditions, interests and relative strengths. This presented, according to the Cabinet, a challenge to the whole web of values and rules that had been built up in Europe during several decades. Finland was however, the Cabinet argued, not exposed to a direct military threat from Russia but military measures could no longer be excluded from the arsenal of methods used by the Putin regime (Finnish Cabinet 2014).

The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not explicitly mention either Ukraine or IS in its report from September 2014. In a brief analysis of international developments, the Ministry stated that the European security environment was in a state of flux with frozen and open conflicts increasing as a result of Russia's interventions against military non-aligned neighbours. The repercussions were seen as unpredictable and the Ministry concluded it would take a long time to fix the tense relations between Russia and the west. The aspirations associated with the Arab Spring have, the Ministry observed, had to give way to the turmoil in both North Africa and the Middle East, creating an influx of refugees across the Mediterranean (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2014).

In June 2016, the Cabinet noted that Russia's annexation and occupation had not only created a crisis in eastern Ukraine, but had also led to increased tension and military activity in the Baltic Sea Region. The Cabinet claimed the history and practice of IS was an example of terrorist organisations that 'breed in conditions plagued by social exclusion, unemployment and negligible prospects for the future, a fragile or failed government' and an absence of a security structure that ensures the respect for basic freedom and human rights. The Cabinet concluded 'terrorist organisations and networks and their violent acts cannot be excluded from Finland either'. The Cabinet also concluded that the UNSC remained powerless in conflicts where one of its permanent members was directly involved or had vested interests (Finnish Cabinet 2014:14 and 26).

In March 2017, the Cabinet claimed that Russia, alongside the ‘protracted conflict in Ukraine’, had demonstrated its ‘sophisticated and wide-ranging air power in the Syrian War’ and that Russia was developing military capabilities to manage a major military crisis. It was noted that Russia had bolstered its western defence capabilities in several aspects including long-range weapon systems and anti-access/area-denial as well exclusion zones in both airspace and sea areas. NATO had, according the Cabinet reinstated the defence for its members’ territories as its core task, increased its military readiness and Article 5 related exercises and increased the military presence in the Baltic Sea Region. (Finnish Cabinet 2017:8–9).

6.3.2 Ends

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presented interesting general formulations regarding Finland’s national interests that clearly expressed a small state perspective on these issues. In the introduction to the report, the Ministry claims that Finland needs to ‘adjust to a host of factors that are beyond its power or influence’. Among these factors were, the ‘expanding global interdependence’, intensifying ‘influence of geopolitics’ and ‘values being ever more contested are constantly modifying Finland’s foreign policy playing field’. The Ministry acknowledged that the lack of national resources created a need to focus the security and defence policy on key objectives (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014:6).

In 2016, the Cabinet explicitly declared that the ends of the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy were to strengthen Finland’s international position, to secure its independence and territorial integrity, to improve the security and wellbeing of Finns and to ensure that the society functions efficiently. These national-oriented objectives were complemented with international ends such as the promotion of international stability, peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Cabinet declared, however, that the primary end of Finland’s foreign and security policy was to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict (Finnish Cabinet 2016).

The Defence Committee of the Parliament did not fully approve the Cabinet’s idea of avoidance. Instead, the Committee clarified that Finland does not have the option or desire to isolate itself from its strategic environment. Furthermore, it was stated that Finland, as a member state of the EU, could not remain passive if threats to the security would emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe. At the same time the Committee declared that Finland would not allow the use of its territory for hostile purposes against other states, but that this position did not limit Finland’s prospects providing and receiving international assistance as well as intensifying defence cooperation with other states (Finnish Defence Committee 2016).

The tasks given to the Finnish Armed Force by the Cabinet in 2017 were, with one important exception, similar to the tasks previously given. Tasks related to Finnish contributions to international military crisis management were almost totally absent in the 2017 report. Nevertheless, when these aspects were

mentioned, it was stressed that the aim of the Finnish participation was improving ‘national defence capability’ and that Finland would ‘evaluate its participation in military crisis management from the standpoint of effectiveness and national goals’ (Finnish Cabinet 2017:17).

6.3.3 Means

In 2017, the Cabinet explained that the Finnish defence reform that was carried out in 2012–14 had adopted the size and the basic structure of the Armed Forces to meet stringent financial demands and the then lower threat level of the security environment. The defence budget had been cut by approximately 10 per cent. Consequently, the number of peacetime personnel had been reduced to approximately 12,000 employees while the wartime strength of the Finnish Armed Forces had decreased to 230,000 troops (Finnish Cabinet 2017).

The Cabinet acknowledged further problems. Financing shortfalls had made it necessary to postpone defence procurements and shift resources from defence materiel acquisitions to cover operational expenses. According to the Cabinet, the volume of exercises had been reinstalled to an acceptable level in 2015 and materiel investments had gradually increased. However, a number of challenges were still awaiting the Armed Forces. The Cabinet gave priority to the capability for repelling an attack and it was noted that the Armed Forces required higher readiness in land, maritime, air and cyberspace operations as well as better long-range strike capability. In addition, shortcomings in the regional forces as well as the branches of intelligence and surveillance, command and control, and logistics had, according to the Cabinet, to be addressed. The Army was obviously still given priority:

Among other things, the Army’s mobility, firepower and striking power will be improved by modernising the BMP-2M armoured combat vehicles, carrying out the mid-life update of the CV9030 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and by procuring Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks.

(Finnish Cabinet 2017:22)

The Cabinet admitted that there was an imbalance between the requirements and the present level of resources. Without corrective action Finland’s defence

Table 6.2 The core of Finland’s military capability in 2013

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
2 Armoured Brigades 2 Mechanised Brigades 6 Infantry Brigades 3 Jaeger Brigades 100 Main Battle Tanks	8 Missile Craft	3 Squadrons with 62 F/A-18C/D

Source: IISS, 2013.

would, the Cabinet argued, presumably be degraded. In the 2020s, the main weapon systems of both the Navy and the Air Force would have to be phased out. The *Rauma-class* fast-attack craft and *Hämeenmaa-class* minelayers of the Navy would be replaced with four vessels of *Squadron 2020 class* concurrently as the four *Hamina-class* fast-attack craft would be scheduled for overhaul. The backbone of the coastal troops would consist of a mobile coastal battlegroup. It was also announced that the procurement decision replacing the Air Force' Hornets would be made in the early 2020s. Perhaps not surprisingly the Cabinet stated its support for further developing defence cooperation with other states as well with the EU and NATO (Finnish Cabinet 2017).

6.3.4 *Ways*

In September 2014, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced the new concept of 'active foreign policy'. The EU was described as the 'most important framework defining our international position' and a unified Union with strong institutions that could 'amplify' the Finnish voice in international affairs. Close contact with other Nordic countries was of 'primary importance for Finland's international position' being a key source of Finland's 'soft power'. Nordic cooperation also considered contributing to uphold Finland's international profile and it was a precondition for the development of Finland's Arctic Policy. A third component of the active Finnish foreign policy was direct bilateral relations with the major powers, the US, Russia and China respectively. Regarding military alignment policies, the Ministry declared that Finland could not base its security on solely one solution, be it NATO membership or military non-alignment. Consequently, Finland's security would in the future also consist of its own defence capability in combination with international cooperation (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2014).

This approach was also an important element in the Cabinet's report of 2017. Bilateral defence cooperation with Sweden enjoyed, according to the Cabinet, 'a special status', while the US was described as an 'important partner'. Additionally, Finland was, the Cabinet declared, to 'purposefully promote' the development of defence cooperation within the EU. The Finnish option to seek NATO membership was explicitly declared to be maintained. Furthermore, the Cabinet noted that cooperation within the NORDEFCO setting was to be intensified and cooperation within the Northern Group supported. The Cabinet announced revisions regarding the national defence strategies. The previous territorial units were to be divided into regional and local units. All forces were to maintain troops in different stages of readiness (Finnish Cabinet 2017:6, 16–21 and 28).

Accordingly, the land forces were instructed to create a nationwide, regional and local coverage that would not only prevent the occupation of Finnish territory but also support other authorities in securing the vital functions of society. With the support of air and maritime forces, the Finnish Army was then to defeat the aggressor on the ground. The maritime defence was to protect the integrity of Finland's territorial waters and the vital sea lines of communication. Attacks

from the sea would also be repelled. The Air Force was, among other tasks, instructed to limit the aggressor's possibilities for using its air power without warning and from afar (Finnish Cabinet 2017).

6.3.5 Summary – the Finnish strategy after the third and fourth shocks

A strategic shock is defined as an event that is perceived as unexpected, deeply consequential and demanding counter measures by the political authorities in a particular state. While the proclamation of a Caliphate and the continued war in Syria and Iraq do not meet these criteria, the war in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 do. The Finnish government had analysed the revisionist ambitions of Russia's foreign policy before 2014 but the authorities seem to have been unable to foresee that Russia was preparing to use Armed Force to seize a part of the territory of another European state. The illegal actions undertaken by Russia were, according to the Finnish government, explicitly consequential. A need to develop counter measures to the increased levels of tension and military activity in the Baltic Sea region that Russia's actions had caused was perceived. These measures included a new overall objective of Finnish foreign and security policy – to 'avoid becoming a party to a military conflict' and new methods, the active foreign policy and even closer relations to NATO and a number of bilateral defence agreements. The agreement with Sweden is the most far-reaching of these and includes the use of force perspective. In addition, the Finnish government clearly articulated a need for increasing the defence spending as well as the readiness of the Armed Forces (see, for example, Pykönen and Forss 2017).

Another change in the Finnish security and defence policy was an increased awareness of Finland's dependence on other actors to manage both old and new security challenges. In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that Finland had to adjust to a number of factors that are beyond its power or influence and that it was difficult to imagine situations where it would be advisable to pursue Finland's interest alone. It seems, in other words, that the Finnish government, as a further response to the Russian aggressive policy, was more ready to accept the limitation associated with a third ranked power. Even if the words sound familiar, the deeds to be undertaken in order to implement the new approach were different (see, for example, Doeser 2017; Pesu 2017).

6.4 Norway⁷

In December 2014, the Minister of Defence, Mrs Ine Eriksen Søreide, appointed a group of experts in order to analyse the Norwegian Armed Forces' capability to manage the challenges for both a short and a long-term perspective. In April 2015 the group issued its report and in mid-June 2016 the Cabinet presented a long-term plan for developing the Norwegian Armed Forces. The responses of the Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee of the Parliament, *Stortinget*, on the

Cabinet's proposals, and the annual reports presented by the Norwegian ChoD are, in addition, also central in the analysis presented in this section.

6.4.1 International environment

In his annual report for 2014, the Norwegian ChoD, Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hansen, focused on both Norway's immediate neighbourhood and to the global arena. In the former case, he mentioned increased challenges without always specifying what he was referring to. Russia's increased willingness to use military power in its international relations was, however, mentioned in this context. Despite the technological developments of the Russian Armed Forces and their extensive activities around Norway, the Admiral concluded that Russia was not a military threat for Norway. The transnational characteristics of global risks such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and cyber threats were the focus of the analysis in the latter case. The ChoD concluded that both states and NGOs had to be included in the risk assessments and especially mentioned the developments in Syria (Norwegian ChoD 2015).

In the report of the expert group on Norway's military defence, also presented in 2015, terrorism, cyber warfare and long-range missiles led to the conclusion that geographical distance had decreased in importance. The experts stressed that Norway did not only face traditional security challenges but also more unconventional threats of various kinds. The international environment was expected to become even more complex and diffuse in the future including unpredictable geopolitical settings. As well as Russia and the US, China was also discussed in this context. Disinformation, the use of Special Forces and digital assaults contributed to the new challenges. The experts elaborated extensively on Russia. According to the experts, increased Russian military capability in the Arctic region as well as the ability to use rapid reinforcements contributed to an asymmetric military relation between Norway and Russia. Russia's intervention in Ukraine and the uncertainty surrounding President Putin's intentions were sources of concern. Nevertheless, the experts concluded that the risk of military conflicts in northern Europe was unlikely. Al-Qaida and ISIL were analysed proportionally. Both terrorist organisations were accused of causing humanitarian suffering as well as destabilising the Middle East and North Africa (Norwegian MoD 2015).

In his report for 2015, the ChoD presented similar discussions and conclusions as the previous year. Russia's increased military activity in Norway's neighbourhood forced the ChoD to pay more attention to northern Norway. He concluded that the continued change in the global climate could impact on ongoing as well as latent conflicts, which in turn could lead, among other issues, to mass migration and shortage of food. The melting ice cap in the Arctic was expected to lead to increased use of the Northeast Passage with more extensive sea traffic along the Norwegian coastline as a consequence. Although Admiral Bruun-Hansen touched upon international terrorism, he did not explicitly mention any specific terrorist organisation (Norwegian ChoD 2016).

The Cabinet expressed its concerns regarding Russia's increased military capacity and also the Russian willingness to use military might for the end of politics. Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war was used as an example of its great power ambitions. Despite these developments, the Cabinet concluded that Russia did not constitute an immediate military threat to Norway. The Cabinet was also worried about the developments in NATO's southern neighbourhood. Increased tensions and conflicts including weak governments, militant extremism and mass migrations were all part of the discussions. Piracy, organised crime and terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and ISIL were all sources of concern in this regard (Norwegian MoD 2016).

The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee agreed on the analysis presented by the Cabinet. However, the representative of the Socialist Left Party (Norwegian: *Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) added concerns about the consequences of the new American administration under President Trump. USA's willingness to fulfil its obligations regarding the collective defence of NATO as well as the risks of worsening international relations caused by the new American foreign policy were therefore mentioned (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2016).

6.4.2 Ends

Protecting and promoting Norway's security, national interests and values were the overarching objectives elaborated in the annual reports of the Norwegian ChoD. Defending Norway against foreign military aggression that ultimately might threaten the security of the state was a core task given to the Norwegian Armed Forces. This fundamental end was to be achieved through the cooperation within NATO and the ChoD explicitly declared that Norway also had a similar obligation to support the defence of NATO allies. To deter a potential aggressor from attacking, to ensure political freedom of action, to promote Norway's sovereignty and sovereign rights, to contribute to multinational crisis management efforts and operations and to support civil authorities protecting the functioning of the Norwegian society were all identified as primary objectives (Norwegian ChoD 2015; 2016).

Defending the Norwegian state, promoting Norway's sovereignty and sovereign rights, protecting Norwegian territory and population, and securing Norway's national interests were all elaborated by the expert group. The analysis of the experts resulted in some recommendations regarding the objectives of both the security and defence policies. Regarding the latter, the experts' recommendations were almost identical to the ditto presented by the ChoD. In the former case, four overarching objectives were presented. Strengthening the UN system and the international institutions that constitute the global order was the first objective. This security objective was connected to Norway's ability to promote its sovereignty and sovereign rights. Preventing armed conflicts and the eruption of conventional as well as unconventional threats was the second

recommended objective. NATO and Norway's ability to deter armed attacks, and if that failed defend NATO allies from violent aggression, were linked to this security objective. The third and fourth objectives were about resistance – the political ability to resist foreign political and military coercion, and the society's ability to resist attacks and catastrophes during peacetime (Norwegian MoD 2015).

In addition to agreeing with the recommendations provided by both the ChoD and the experts, the Cabinet stressed the importance of protecting the population and the critical infrastructure. Societal security and territorial integrity were discussed at more length than the recommendations of the ChoD. The Cabinet also put emphasis on the protection of military infrastructure and other critical resources (Norwegian MoD 2016). The Parliament presented similar analyses and conclusions as the Cabinet (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2016).

6.4.3 Means

In his annual reports, the ChoD described the current situation in the Norwegian Armed Forces and his prioritised developments during the upcoming years. The Army was concentrated into three units: the Brigade Nord, the Border Guard and HM the King's Guard, with the former unit serving as the nucleus of the service. The brigade consisted of three manoeuvre battalions. The armoured battalion was to take part in the EU's Nordic Battle Group and the Telemark battalion in NATO's NRF. The remaining battalion, named Second Battalion, had successfully been transformed into a light infantry battalion. The ChoD placed priority on enhanced force protection as well as increased firepower and high readiness. Despite this, the ongoing cooperation with Sweden regarding the Archer artillery system was terminated. Consequently, the rather old M109 system had to be retained. The Navy continued to phase in the new frigates of *Fridtjof Nansen class* and the new corvettes of *Skjold class*.⁸ All five frigates and six corvettes were now commissioned and had joined forces with, among others, the rather old six submarines, three minehunters and three minesweepers. In addition, a new replenishment oiler, *KNM Maud*, was to be commissioned within the next couple of years. The Air Force had received 5 of the planned 14 NH90 helicopters and was waiting to phase in the F35 combat aircraft as a replacement for the F16 system (Norwegian ChoD 2015; 2016).

Table 6.3 The core of Norway's military capability in 2013

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Mechanised Brigade 52 Main Battle Tanks	6 Submarines 5 Frigates 6 Missile Craft	3 Squadrons with 57 F-16A/B

Source: IISS, 2013.

The expert group did not elaborate much on the means and considerations were mostly focused on the force generation angle. The experts concluded that it was likely that multinational cooperation would become even more important in the near future. The expensive F35 system was included in the analysis as well as the development of new submarines. The experts urged for a re-establishment of protected air bases but did not specify what kind of means were essential to do this. They also recommended that high-readiness host nation support units were assigned to two collocated operating bases (COB) with combat aircraft, i.e. to Sola air base in Stavanger and to Bodø air base, and to the stored equipment of the US Marine Corps outside Trondheim, in order to reinforce US provision (Norwegian MoD 2015).

Meanwhile, the Cabinet focused on maintaining and developing the already existing means rather than introducing new units to be organised. Regarding the Army, the Cabinet agreed with the reports presented by the ChoD. Priority was hence given to the brigade. The Border Guard was, however, to be reinforced with an additional rangers' company. The state of the Navy worried the Cabinet. A lack of both crew to man ships along with the spare parts to maintain them was a source of concern. Subsequently, the Navy prudently allocated resources to solve these shortcomings.⁹ Replacing the six ageing submarines was also high on the priority list but only four new ones were to be procured and then not before 2028. Two of the current submarines were to be phased out by 2022, hence providing spare parts to the other four. The Marine Ranger Command was, in addition, to be decommissioned and so were the *Skjold class* corvettes. The latter were to be kept until the Joint Strike Missile system was operational for the F35 combat aircraft. This was estimated to happen around 2025 and until then additional crew was to be recruited, making all five corvettes operational. The minehunters and minesweepers were to be reduced from six in total to four between 2017 and 2020.¹⁰ The ambition to procure 52 F-35 combat aircrafts was still at hand but the Cabinet explained that the decision regarding the last six aircraft was not definite. The Cabinet also declared its intention to procure new air defence systems for the protection of Ørland and Evenes air bases. Consequently, the COB bases at Sola and Bodø were to be relocated (Norwegian MoD 2016). The proposal presented by the Cabinet was approved by the Parliament (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2016).

6.4.4 Ways

The ChoD expressed worries concerning the attuning between the use and the generation of military force. He concluded that the Norwegian Armed Forces had almost reached a point of either or. The suggested focus was to deter Russia from escalating the conflict level by having military units continuously actively operating in northern parts of Norway. Exercises with allied participation, such as Cold Response, was part of this approach and so were intelligence and surveillance operations. Concurrently, the defence planning was to continue and be

developed at both the national and the allied level. At the same time the Norwegian Armed Forces had to be prepared to contribute to international operations abroad. Participation in NATO's standing naval forces seem to have been the preferred way but contributions to NRF and EU Battle Group can be also be seen as examples of integrating Norwegian forces with allied ditto in the international context. Notably, the discussions on force generation were rather absent (Norwegian ChoD 2015; 2016; 2017).

The expert group recommended a defence concept built on four pillars: a national defence with a core of high-readiness military forces and with robust and resilient mobilisation forces; NATO reinforcements including Norwegian contribution to international operations; conscription; and a national total defence. The experts also made recommendations regarding the operational concept. The capstones of this concept were: an immediate Norwegian ability to counter an armed aggression; an ability to manage an armed aggression despite asymmetric relation with the aggressor and huge geographical distance; a national capacity to engage the enemy; and enlisting allied reinforcements in the initial phase of the conflict. Similar to the ChoD, the experts suggested a focus on deterrence rather than on fighting wars. They recommended a permanent military presence in northern Norway through national operations and exercises with allied participation. Notably, neither the force generation perspective nor the use of force in an international context were given much consideration (Norwegian MoD 2015).

The Cabinet followed the suggestions and gave priority to deterrence by force projection in the northern parts of Norway. This was to be achieved by national military units but ultimately by the participation of allied forces in exercises. Intelligence gathering and surveillance operation were hence perceived as the key for success. Operations and exercises showing the Norwegian ability to protect key infrastructure and to host allied reinforcements were also considered crucial. The Cabinet preferred a multinational approach in regards to both the use of force and force generation perspectives. The Northern Group, Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), Framework Nations Concept (FNC) and NORDEFCON were all considered important in either or both of these perspectives. The Cabinet was aware of the need for Norway not only consuming but also contributing to allied collective defence capacity. Despite this awareness, the Cabinet explicitly declared that Norwegian involvement in operations abroad was not going to risk the availability of both personnel and materiel needed for national operations (Norwegian MoD 2016). On the one hand, the Parliament agreed with the Cabinet's force projection approach in northern Norway but, on the other hand, stressed the need to preserve the Arctic region's reputation as an area of low conflict level and détente (Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2016).

6.4.5 Summary – the Norwegian strategy after the third and fourth shocks

Clearly, the Russian foreign policy worried the Norwegians. The annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the occupation of the eastern parts of Ukraine and Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war were all taken as proof of Russia's increased use of military force in service of its political ambitions. The aggressive behaviour of Russian Armed Forces in Norway's immediate neighbourhood added to the fear. International terrorism and proliferation of WMD were also interpreted as challenging but not as much as the cyber warfare capability, the long-range missiles and other technological developments of the Russian Armed Forces. Despite all these explicitly declared concerns, the Norwegian authorities proclaimed that Russia was not a military threat for Norway. Even if both the annexation of Crimea and the rise of the Caliphate were perceived as unexpected, they were not considered consequential and demanding counter measures were not undertaken. Consequently, we argue that neither event can be labelled as a strategic shock in the Norwegian case.

However, uncertainty regarding the USA's willingness to fulfil its role in NATO's collective defence concept made the situation quite demanding for Norway. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa was, in addition, perceived as problematic for NATO members at the southern flank of the Alliance. Norway was, in other words, not the only member in potential need of allied reinforcements and guarantees. Despite these emerging threats, the overarching objectives remained protecting and promoting Norway's security, national interests and values. Defending Norway against foreign military aggression was the ultimate end for the Norwegian Armed Forces. The focus was, however, not on the war fighting but rather on the war prevention. Consequently, the practical objective was deterring a potential aggressor, Russia, from attacking. Ensuring political freedom of action, promoting Norway's sovereignty and sovereign rights, preserving the territorial integrity, contributing to multinational military operations and protecting the functioning of Norwegian society together with other Norwegian authorities were also presented as main objectives (see, for example, Hilde 2015).

The means allocated for achieving these objectives were quite limited. A brigade consisting of three manoeuvre battalions, a Border Guard along the 200 kilometre-long Norwegian-Russian border and a battalion-sized unit for the protection of the royal family was the bulk of the Army. Several of the Navy's 17 major ships lacked a crew and two of the submarines had to be cannibalised in order to get spare parts to make the other four operational. Moreover, replacing the Air Force's F-16 with new F-35 combat aircraft would clearly be costly and would also lead to decreased operational effect during the transformation period. The decommissioning of a number of air bases in order to fund the procurement would, arguably, affect the ability to receive allied reinforcements. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Norwegian strategists were aware of the imbalance between ends and means. The authorities tried to compensate for the

shortcomings by focusing on use of force rather than on force generation, and also by elaborating on how to use the military resources for force projection at the national level rather than on how to conduct operations. At least this seems to have been the case until a more proper balance could be established. The problem is that such a situation would not occur until the mid-2020s, almost a decade later. In the meantime, the preferred method was inviting allied forces to exercise on Norwegian soil, thereby projecting an image of collective determination. Other researchers have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Forss and Holopainen 2015).

6.5 Sweden¹¹

In 2012, the Swedish Defence Commission reconvened to prepare recommendations for a defence resolution in 2015. It issued, as mentioned in the previous chapter, its initial report (Ds. 2013:33) in 2013 and, while conducting a closed session to finalise the second report, the Russian aggression occurred. Consequently, the instructions to the Commission were amended with a delayed reporting time and specific instructions to analyse the unfolding events in Ukraine. The second report (Ds 2014:20) was delivered on 15 May 2014. Later the very same month the Swedish ChoD presented his recommendations on how to organise the Armed Forces after 2018. The red-green Cabinet presented its defence bill in March 2015, which was followed by the recommendations of the Defence Committee and the Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee respectively before the Parliament in June 2015 made its decision on the Swedish defence policy. The Cabinet also issued a separate bill on the deployment of Swedish troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq. Following the Swedish constitution, a committee of the Parliament, in this case the Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee, provided comments on this bill as well. In January 2017, the Cabinet issued its national security strategy. The very same month the Defence Commission was given new tasks, this time focusing on the Total Defence. In December 2017, the Commission presented its first report according to the new regulations. All these documents are analysed in this section.

6.5.1 International environment

The Commission report issued before the attack on Crimea does not highlight any immediate concerns over the security situation in Ukraine. It is acknowledged that the country was torn between the interests of aligning further to Russia or to the west (Swedish Defence Commission 2013). The illegal annexation of Crimea generated dismay and outcry in Sweden. The somewhat ambiguous initial statement by Prime Minister Reinfeldt on 2 March indicated that the administration was taken by surprise; 'It is understandable to some extent that Russia acts on a Russian minority's concern in the Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine but not in the way it acts' (Aftonbladet 2014). The statement generated criticism as it could be construed as acknowledgement of the Russian actions.

The proactive Minister of Foreign Affairs was quick to clarify that there was no justification for Russia's unlawful act.

In the subsequent report, the language of the Commission was extensive and blunt on the situation in Ukraine. It was argued that the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea was the most significant challenge to the European security system since its establishment a quarter of a century ago. Russia's actions were a violation of international law and bilateral commitments. Fundamental principles such as states' right to territorial integrity and political independence, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition of violence, had been discontinued. Russian political leadership had proven to be unreliable. It cannot be accepted, it was argued, that an act of aggression is changing Europe's borders. Mindful that in 2008, following the Georgian war, the government concluded that the Russian threshold for using military violence had been lowered in Russia's immediate vicinity, the Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that the threshold was even lower, at least against former Soviet republics in their own neighbourhood, if not members of NATO or the EU. Aggression against Ukraine demonstrated the ability of Russia to combine the use of military force with a broad palette of other powers, such as economic pressures including the energy sector and trade, propaganda, history falsification and qualified information operations. Economic pressures have been followed by military operations backed up by foreclosures of international law and accompanied by a propaganda apparatus that built domestic policy support and deepened polarisation in Ukrainian society. Later the terms 'hybrid warfare' and operations in the 'grey zone' between peace and war, mixing civilian and military instruments of power, were applied to denote the Russian *modus operandi*. More generally, the Commission once again took globalisation as a point of departure, albeit with more focus on the negative effects. The strategic implications of the security situation demanded that the priorities adopted by the Parliament in the previous defence resolution should be continued. The threats to Swedish security now included the danger of military crises and incidents in its region. Notably the IS carnage was still at a nascent stage and the Commission did not make specific references to IS (Swedish Defence Commission 2014). In April 2015, the Cabinet issued a separate bill on the deployment of Swedish troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq. Notably the Cabinet did not indicate any implications to Sweden's national security (Swedish Cabinet 2015a).

Two years later, in January 2017, the Cabinet concluded that the situation in Europe and also in Sweden's neighbourhood had developed in a negative direction. Russia's intervention in Ukraine was specifically mentioned. Even if the Cabinet concluded that an isolated military attack on Sweden was unrealistic, it did not dismiss the risk of incidents and power projection including military force (Swedish Cabinet 2017a). Concurrently, the Commission not only stressed the positive effects of globalisation but also issued a warning that disturbances in international trade and financial flows could have a negative impact on Sweden's security regardless where the events occurred. The Commission also warned that forces negative to the globalisation could undertake deliberate actions in order to

cause these disturbances. It was, however, concerns related to Russia's use of military power in its foreign relations that were the focus of the report. Therefore, both the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and also the ditto in Syria elaborated. Also mentioned were information and cyber security, digital risks and challenges, terrorism and violent extremism, organised crime, threats against energy supplies as well as against transports and critical infrastructure and climate changes (Swedish Defence Commission 2017).

6.5.2 Ends

The overarching objectives for security remained unchanged across all stakeholders in the process. Concerning the military objectives, the Commission introduced an important amendment in that the Armed Forces should protect Sweden's freedom of action for political, military or other pressure, and if necessary defend Sweden against incidents and armed aggression. The first part, 'to counter external pressure', may reflect the need to counter the *modus operandi* of Russia in Ukraine. The second part of the military objectives, 'defence against an armed aggression against its nation', is a given for any Armed Forces. It is, however, a far cry from the mind-set and language not used since the 1990s (Swedish Defence Commission 2014). These changes were accepted by the Cabinet and subsequently by the Parliament (Swedish Cabinet 2015b; Swedish Defence Committee 2015; Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2015a; 2015b).

In its national security strategy, the Cabinet declared its determination to not only promote but also defend Sweden's core national interests whenever they were threatened. The objectives were explicitly defined as:

- i to provide the safety, security and well-being of the Swedish citizens;
- ii to secure sustainability and to protect the functioning of the society;
- iii to uphold the fundamental values, i.e. democracy, the rule of law as well as human rights;
- iv to, under all conditions, defend Sweden's freedom, security and independence;
- v to promote stability and security in Sweden's neighbourhood;
- vi to maintain and strengthen the cooperation, solidarity and integration of the EU;
- vii to promote a rule-based multilateral world order (Swedish Cabinet 2017a).

The Commission clarified that the fundamental objective of the Armed Forces was to defend Sweden's national interests both within Sweden and abroad. Preventing conflicts and war and, if necessary, managing conflicts and war were hence the core tasks (Swedish Defence Commission 2017).

6.5.3 Means

The report prepared by the Commission put new demands on the Armed Forces in terms of output. No longer was efficiency the overarching principle. Instead, the report emphasised effect in terms of more capable forces. The Commission also reversed a long trend of prolonging or cutting defence spend by agreeing on a 5.5 billion Swedish kronor (SEK) annual budgetary increase by the end of the period. However, the rate of ramp-up became a contagious issue, with the senior opposition party at the time, the Social Democrats, advocating some 800 million SEK extra in total. The Commission also provided recommendations on how to use the increased budget. The quality of the combat aircraft was not only to be improved to E-version; the quantity was also to be increased from 60 to 70 JAS. The Commission also discussed the potential procuring long-range attack missiles for the Air Force. On a similar note, the number of submarines grew from four to five. A new ground-based air defence system and increased activities on Gotland are other examples of strategic considerations (Swedish Defence Commission 2014).

Because of the Commission's report, the centre-right Cabinet increased the budget by 7 billion SEK for the period 2016–20. However, before the Cabinet, now with the Social Democrats at the helm, finalised the bill it reached out to selected parties in the Parliament. Consequently, a broad consensus was achieved to increase the budget even further.¹² An agreement was settled with another 10.2 billion SEK, thus having expanded the budget with some 17 billion extra for the period 2016–20.¹³ Throughout this process, the deteriorating security situation and the need to increase war-fighting capabilities were narratives that explained these decisions. For the first time in more than two decades, the Swedish Parliament decided on a substantial increase of the defence budget (Swedish Cabinet 2015b).

The increased level of ambition the Commission outlined – the procurement of ten new fighter aircraft and one new submarine – never came to fruition, as the Cabinet did not adopt them in the bill. Instead, priority was given to addressing the basic requirements of the units in areas such as personal equipment, communications equipment, ammunition, trucks and new anti-tank weapons. In addition, training and exercises was a priority. Some reinforcements were made, for instance in anti-submarine warfare and the ability to conduct brigade operations. The organisation of the Army also saw a slight increase. For example, two

Table 6.4 The core of Sweden's military capability in 2013

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
1 Division with 2 Brigades 132 Main Battle Tanks	5 Submarines 4 Corvettes 4 Missile Craft 1 Amphibious Battalion	4 Squadrons with 110 JAS-39

Source: IISS, 2013.

brigade-sized battle groups were to be organised with a total number of four armoured and two mechanised battalions. In addition, a battalion-sized battle group was to be organised on Gotland. Against the backdrop of hybrid warfare and propaganda and other activities that could be used in peace and in war, cyber security surfaced as an area of priority outlining the need for active cyber defence capability. Moreover, the fluid and deteriorating security environment called for bolstering the capability within the Defence Intelligence Authorities. Following the defence resolution, the Cabinet made an important decision to ensure sufficient manpower in that they reactivated the dormant law conscript service as a complement to the volunteer force decided in 2009. Notably, the implementation was gender neutral (Swedish Cabinet 2015b).

The Swedish contribution to the international efforts in fighting IS was limited to 35 officers tasked to train the Iraqi Armed Forces with an additional 85 troops as backup. The Cabinet stressed that under normal conditions the Swedish contingent would not undertake direct combat missions (Swedish Cabinet 2015a).

6.5.4 Ways

In addition to increasing the war-fighting capabilities, reinvigoration of the total defence concept was a top priority. For all practical purposes, the legislation from the Cold War was still in effect but it had been discontinued for more than a decade. This meant that the civilian defence needed a major overhaul and that cooperation and coordination, including planning, related to wartime situations between the military and civilians was required. In its deliberations, the Commission singled out support to the Armed Forces as the key priority for the civilian defence in wartime (Swedish Defence Commission 2014).

While the Swedish government generally put emphasis on institutional cooperation with the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE and other multilateral forums like the Nordic cooperation, the defence bill presented by the Cabinet in 2015 introduced a bilateral dimension, in particular regarding Finland and the US, as it was in Sweden's interest to maintain and further deepen the bilateral relationship with the latter country. In addition, deepening of bilateral cooperation with Finland was considered critical. The cooperation with Finland would, the Cabinet claimed, cover operational planning and preparations in order to be able to defend the territorial integrity of the respective countries, including the right to self-defence as proclaimed under the Article 51 of the UN Charter, an unprecedented move in Swedish security policy. Gotland, an island in the Baltic Sea, played a significant role in the resolution. Through its geographical position, Gotland has a strategic value in the region. According to the Cabinet, Sweden had a strategic interest in having a permanent military presence on the island. While the Commission had argued for the need to augment the military detachment on the island, the Cabinet went much further by proposing reinforcements with a new battlegroup comprising a standing mechanised infantry company and a mobilised armoured company. However, the Cabinet did not

make specific priorities within the objectives of the civilian defence (Swedish Cabinet 2015b). In all these important aspects, the Parliament concurred. Following the Cabinet's example, the civilian defence was not given specific attention (Swedish Defence Committee 2015; Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee 2015a; 2015b).

The total defence was, however, in focus in both the national security strategy and the report the Cabinet and the Commission respectively issued in 2017. The former explicitly clarified that the Armed Forces, in case of a military attack on Sweden, would defend Sweden in order to gain time while ensuring the political freedom of action. What the time gained would be used for was not explained. High readiness and, at the same time, high sustainability were considered crucial (Swedish Cabinet 2017a).

6.5.5 Summary – the Swedish strategy after the third and fourth shocks

It can be concluded that by the time of the defence resolution's completion, in the spring of 2014, Caliphate activities were regarded as unexpected in Stockholm. Yet it did not lead to any counter measures. The Cabinet only included a few brief descriptive paragraphs on the existence of IS and the US-led response in its bills. Clearly, the Russian military attack on Ukraine was, however, perceived as a strategic shock by the Swedish politicians. If the defence resolution after the Georgian war was a wakeup call for Swedish security policy in that it could not assume that peace and stability would prevail in northern Europe, the decision following the illegal annexation of Crimea was a call for action. A substantial supplemental funding was apportioned to ensure increased war-fighting capabilities. Although a renewed focus was put on national defence, including both military and civilian aspects, and reintroduction of conscript's service, the decision was not a return to the Cold War concepts, primarily because of the solidarity doctrine and the backbone of all-volunteer force. Moreover, the limited number of forces made a stark contrast to those in the inventory during the former period. Nevertheless, the Russian military aggression was not only perceived as unexpected, it led to consequential and demanding counter measures by the Swedish political authorities. Sweden became one of the loudest European voices on EU sanctions on Russia. The rationale for the strong Swedish reaction emanated from the same concerns that underpinned the response on the Georgian war. Ultimately, Swedish security was at stake if the European security order was allowed to change at the detriment of small nations without security guarantees. Obviously, other researchers, such as Robert Dalsjö, have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Dalsjö 2015).

The previous adopted doctrine on solidarity was reaffirmed in all steps leading to the defence resolution. While the Commission encouraged deepening the bilateral cooperation, the Cabinet went further by outlining joint planning with Finland under the auspices of Article 51 of the UN Charter on the inherent right for self-defence, including collective self-defence, against an armed attack.

These preparations were of complementary nature without any political commitments. Mindful that this decision was not in the purview of the Parliament, it did not generate any negative reactions in either the Defence Committee or the Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee. In a separate process, the solidarity doctrine was codified further by signing an agreement with NATO on host nation support. The agreement would facilitate practical preparations to enable foreign units to operate within Swedish borders. The agreement was signed in September 2014 by the centre-right Cabinet. It was ratified by the Parliament in May 2016. Arguably, Sweden was once again preferring a *hedging* strategy, seeking cooperation through international organisations as well as bilaterally (see, for example, Gyllensporre 2016).

6.6 Conclusions: the consequences of the third and fourth shocks

Regarding the perceptions of the *international environment*, all four Nordic countries undoubtedly interpreted the aggressive and revisionist Russian foreign policy as threatening. The perception was strengthened by the concurrently perceived weakening of the EU and the US. Clearly, the increased military activity of Russia drew more attention compared to the developments in the Middle East.

Consequently, the *ends/objectives* were not only quite similar but also focused more on the national dimension than previously. However, both Denmark and Norway also included aspects outside the pure domestic domain. Being members of NATO, defending NATO allies as well as contributing to the efforts of the Alliance were still important objectives. Arguably, military non-aligned Finland and Sweden could have included EU aspects in their calculations but explicitly expressed and defined ends related to the EU were absent.

The similar approach to both the environment and the ends was, at least to some degree, repeated regarding the *means*. The similarity was that none of the countries could afford to invest in an overwhelming transformation. Consequently, all four focused on maintaining and increasing the efficiency of already existing resources. Denmark's intention to procure new F-35 aircrafts deviates from this general trend. The number of new planes was, however, quite modest. The big difference among the Nordic countries was still the profile of the means. Both Denmark and Sweden maintained a rather expeditionary warfare-oriented force structure, while Finland kept its deterrent by denial focus and Norway by an ambivalent mixture. Arguably, in all cases but Sweden the profile of the means fit pretty well with the discussions on environment and ends. Regarding Sweden, the cost of focusing on quality and availability during the previous decade now had to be paid. Even if the imbalance between ends and means was obvious in all four cases, the gap was almost an abyss in the Swedish case. Facing a hostile neighbouring great power with expeditionary warfare without military allies can hardly be perceived as a preferable strategy.

The *ways* saw a similar approach. Clearly all four states had come to realise the need for international cooperation. Arguably, their memberships in the EU

Table 6.5 The strategy of the four Nordic countries after the third and fourth shocks

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Environment	Severe humanitarian crisis in the Middle East. Terrorist attacks against the west. Russian military spending. Increased military activities in the Arctic. Threats from the cyber domain	Revisionist Russian policy. Both the US and the EU weakened. Turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East. Expanding global interdependence	Russia's increased willingness to use military power. The transnational characteristics of global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and cyber threats. Worries about the developments in NATO's southern neighbourhood	Russian aggression. Military crises and incidents in the Nordic-Baltic region
Ends	Protecting and promoting western values. Promoting Danish national interests. Protecting Denmark's sovereignty. Contributing to defending NATO territory	Strengthening Finland's international position. Securing Finland's independence and territorial integrity. Improving the security and the well-being of Finns. Ensuring functionality of the society. Avoiding being forced into a military conflict	Protecting and promoting Norway's security, national interests and values. Defending Norway against foreign military aggression. Contributing to the defence of NATO allies	Protecting Sweden's freedom of action from political, military or other pressure. Defending Sweden against incidents and armed aggression

continued

Table 6.5 Continued

	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Means	Increasing the capability of all services. High readiness and deployability for one Army brigade. Increased anti-submarine warfare capability. 27 new F-35 combat aircrafts. More Special Forces units	Immediately available troops. Higher readiness in land, maritime, air and cyberspace operations. Better long-range strike capability	Focus on maintaining and developing the already existing means rather than introducing new units and capabilities. Border Guard reinforced	More capable forces. Basic requirements of the units in areas such as personnel equipment. Training and exercises given priority. Increased ability for anti-submarine warfare and to conduct brigade operations
Ways	A robust and trustworthy integration in NATO's chain of command. Host nation agreements in case Denmark was to serve as a transit spot for NATO reinforcements	Active Foreign Policy concept. Cooperation with other Nordic countries. Defence cooperation within the EU. Bilateral defence agreements with the UK, the US and others	Continuously having military units operating in northern Norway. Exercises with allied participation on Norwegian soil. Participation in NATO's standing naval forces. Contributions to NRF and EU Battle Group	Doctrine on solidarity. Deepening bilateral cooperations. Joint planning with Finland. Agreement with NATO on host nation support. Reinvigoration of the total defence concept

Source: IISS, 2013.

and/or NATO provided the most important frames but also traditional military non-aligned Finland and Sweden had to be open to cooperating with not only NATO but also with key NATO members on a bilateral level. Consequently, hosting NATO units came to be a common theme for all Nordic countries. In the case of Denmark, this was mainly referred to as a transit for continued eastward deployments. Potentially this was also the case for Sweden even if hosting NATO units can be interpreted as a part of the country's defence. In both Finland and Norway's case this was the intention right from the beginning. Yet another similarity was that the role the host nation was to play within the frames of the NATO-led operations was not expressed, at least not explicitly. Arguably, the quantity of units had decreased all but Finland's ability to independently lead military missions at the operational level. In Denmark's and, potentially also, Norway's case, this seems to have been intention for several years. For a military non-aligned country such as Sweden, this inability is clearly a paradox.

Regarding the *strategic exposure*, we argue that Russia was a direct driving force in all cases but Denmark. In the Danish case, the Russian aggressiveness had an indirect effect. Since Denmark had adopted a policy of close integration with identified key NATO allies, and since some of these allies perceived an increased need to meet the Russian threat, Denmark had to follow. Arguably, both Denmark and Norway continued to be exposed by their NATO membership. Consequently, they still had to meet the demands of being able to contribute to NATO operations including those out-of-area. When it comes to *capacity* and the *interest* criteria, all four countries fulfil the criteria of being a third ranked state and a pet-dog respectively.

Regarding the intervening variables, we argue that both the geographical characteristics and the historical experience provide explanatory power. The three cases having experienced Russian intervention historically, Finland, Norway and Sweden, all responded to the increased Russian hostility. The magnitude of the response seems to have correlated to the degree of geographical proximity.

Notes

- 1 As mentioned in the previous chapter, a centre-left coalition consisting of the Social Democrats, the Social Liberal Party (Danish: *Radikale Venstre*) and the Socialist People's Party (Danish: *Socialistisk Folkeparti*) moved into the Cabinet office after the elections in October 2011. In late January 2014, the latter party left the coalition. In early February, Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt formed a new Cabinet with members solely from the two former parties. After the elections in June 2015 Thorning-Schmidt was replaced by Lars Løkke Rasmussen who formed an all-liberal Cabinet with members exclusively from his own the Liberal Party (Danish: *Venstre*). However, in November 2016 Løkke Rasmussen invited members from the Conservative People's Party (Danish: *Det Konservative Folkeparti*) and the Liberal Alliance Party (Danish: *Liberal Alliance*) to form a new centre-right Cabinet.
- 2 The Conservative People's Party, the Danish People's Party (Danish: *Dansk Folkeparti*), the Liberal Alliance Party, the Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party.

- 3 The Danish People's Party, the Liberal Alliance Party, the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party.
- 4 The Liberal Party, the Liberal Alliance Party, the Conservative People's Party, the Social Democrats, the Danish People's Party and the Social Liberal Party.
- 5 The Conservative People's Party, the Danish People's Party, the Liberal Alliance Party and the Liberal Party.
- 6 Sauli Niinistö of the National Coalition Party (Finnish: *Kansallinen Kokoomus*) was Finland's President throughout the period explored in this section. After the parliamentary elections in 2011, Jyrki Katainen, also of the National Coalition Party, formed a coalition Cabinet including, in addition to his own party, the Social Democratic Party (Finnish: *Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue*), the Swedish People's Party (Swedish: *Svenska Folkpartiet*), the Green League (Finnish: *Vihreä Liitto*), the Left Alliance (Finnish: *Vasemmistoliitto*) and the Christian Democrats (Finnish: *Kristillisdemokraatit*). In June 2014, Katainen resigned and was replaced as Prime Minister by Alexander Stubb of the National Coalition Party. At the same time, the Left Alliance left the coalition, which nevertheless represented a majority in the Parliament. After the parliamentary elections in 2015 Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party (Finnish: *Keskusta*) assumed the Prime Minister's office and formed a coalition Cabinet including, in addition to his own party, the National Coalition Party and the Finns Party (Finnish: *Perussuomalaiset*). The coalition remained in power throughout the remaining years analysed in this section.
- 7 After the elections in October 2013 Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and his centre-left Cabinet had to leave office. Instead Erna Solberg formed a right-wing Cabinet including members not only of her own Conservative Party (Norwegian: *Høyre*) but also of the Progress Party (Norwegian: *Fremskrittspartiet*). The Cabinet remained in power after the elections in 2017. In January 2018 the Liberal Party (Norwegian: *Venstre*) joined the coalition.
- 8 The latter were previously classed as missile crafts.
- 9 Only three of the five frigates could, for example, be manned with a full crew.
- 10 Crews for staffing five ships were, however, to be kept.
- 11 Fredrik Reinfeldt centre-right coalition Cabinet consisting of the Moderate Party (Swedish: *Moderaterna*), the Centre Party (Swedish: *Centerpartiet*), the Liberal Party (Swedish: *Folkpartiet*) and the Christian Democrats (Swedish: *Kristdemokraterna*) held the Prime Minister's office from 2006 to 2014. After the parliamentary elections in September 2014, a red-green Cabinet replaced it. The new minority Cabinet was led by Mr Stefan Löfven of the Social Democratic Party (Swedish: *Socialdemokraterna*), and consisted of, in addition to the Social Democrats, members of the Green Party (Swedish: *Miljöpartiet*). The red-green coalition held power throughout the remaining years analysed in this section.
- 12 In addition to the Social Democrats and the Green Party of the new Cabinet, the Moderate Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats of the former Cabinet reached the consensus. The Liberal Party, the fourth party of the former Cabinet, did not support the agreement as it argued for even more money to the Armed Forces.
- 13 During 2017 another 6.8 billion SEK was added to the budget. However, in this process the Christian Democrats dropped out because it argued for a significantly higher number.

Bibliography

- Aftonbladet. 'Hård kritik mot Reinfeldts uttalande', published 2 March 2014. Online: www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article18466680.ab. Retrieved 4 February 2018.
- Bar, Shmuel (2016). 'The Implications of the Caliphate' in *Comparative Strategy*. Volume 35, Issue 1.

- Cimbala, Stephen (2014). 'Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February–18 March 2014' in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*. Volume 27, Issue 3.
- Dalsjö, Robert (2015). 'Från neutralitet till solidaritet: Omgestaltningen av Sveriges säkerhetspolitik efter det kalla kriget' in Kjell Engelbrekt, Arita Holmberg and Jan Ångström (eds). *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2015.
- Danish MoD (2014). *Organiseringen af ledelsen af forsvaret og tillæg til aftale på forsvarsområdet 2013–2017*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2016) Aftale om anskaffelse af nye kampfly, 9 June 2016.
- Danish MoD (2017). *Et stærkt værn om Danmark – Utspil til nyt forsvarsforlig 2018–2023*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish MoD (2018). *Forsvarsforlig – Aftale på forsvarsområdet 2018–2023*. Copenhagen: Danish MoD.
- Danish Parliament (2014a). *Forslag till folketingsbeslutning om dansk militært bidrag til støtte for indsatsen i Irak*. Folketinget B122/2014.
- Danish Parliament (2014b). *Forslag till folketingsbeslutning om yderligere dansk militært bidrag til støtte for indsatsen mod ISIL*. Folketinget B123/2014.
- Danish Parliament (2015). *Forslag till folketingsbeslutning om udsendelse af et supplerende dansk militært bidrag til støtte for indsatsen mod ISIL*. Folketinget B8/2015.
- Danish Parliament (2016). *Forslag till folketingsbeslutning om udsendelse af yderligere danske militære bidrag til støtte for indsatsen mod ISIL i Irak og Syrien*. Folketinget B108/2016.
- Daugirdas, Kristina and Julian Mortenson (2015). 'United States Objects to Russia's Continued Violations of Ukraine's Territorial Sovereignty' in *American Journal of International Law*. Volume 109, Issue 1.
- Davies, Lance (2015). 'Russia's "Governance" Approach: Intervention and the Conflict in the Donbas' in *Europe-Asia Studies*. Volume 68, Issue 4.
- Doeser, Fredrik (2016) 'Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic Culture' in *Comparative Strategy*. Volume 35, Issue 4.
- Doeser, Fredrik (2017). 'Strategic Culture, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy: Finland's Decision to Refrain from Operation Unified Protector' in *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Volume 17, Issue 3.
- Finnish Cabinet (2014). *Framtidens Finland i förändring – Ministeriernas gemensamma omvärldsbeskrivning*. Stadsrådets kansli.
- Finnish Cabinet (2016). *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*. Prime Minister's Office Publications 9/2016.
- Finnish Cabinet (2017). *Government's Defence Report*. Prime Minister's Office Publications 7/2017.
- Finnish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2016). *Försvarsutskottets utlåtande FsUU 7/2016 rd*.
- Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2014). *Finland's Position, Security, and Welfare in an Increasingly Complex World – Future Outlook of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs*, 10/2014.
- Forss, Stefan and Pekka Holopainen (2015). *Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press.
- Fromson, James and Steven Simon (2015). 'ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse No' in *Survival*. Volume 57, Issue 2.

- Grant, Thomas (2015). *Aggression Against Ukraine – Territory, Responsibility and International Law*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gruzd, Anatoliy and Ksenia Tsyganova (2015). 'Information Wars and Online Activism During the 2013/2014 Crisis in Ukraine: Examining the Social Structures of Pro- and Anti-Maidan Groups' in *Policy & Internet*. Volume 7, Issue 2.
- Gyllensporre, Dennis (2016). 'Den vetenskapliga analysen av svensk säkerhetspolitik – Dags för vitalisering och realism?' in *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*. Volume 118, Issue 3.
- Hashim, Ahmed (2016). 'The Caliphate at War: Ideology, War Fighting and State-Formation' in *Middle East Policy*. Volume 13, Issue 1.
- Hilde, Paal Sigurd (2015). 'Norway, the Ukraine Crisis and Baltic Sea Security' in Ann-Sofie Dahl (ed.). *Baltic Sea Security*. Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies (University of Copenhagen).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2013). *The Military Balance 2013*. London: Routledge.
- Isakhan, Benjamin (2015). *The Legacy of Iraq – From the 2003 War to the 'Islamic State'*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2014). 'Danmarks udenrigspolitiske hovedudfordring ligger atter i Østeuropa' in *Reason*. Volume 24, Issue 4.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2016). 'Danmarks går ikke i krig mod ISIL for at vinde men for at være med' in *Reason*. Volume 26, Issue 2.
- Kilcullen, David (2016). *Blood Year*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Lequesne, Christian (2016). 'French Foreign and Security Challenges after the Paris Terrorist Attacks' in *Contemporary Security Policy*. Volume 37, Issue 2.
- Menon, Rajan and Eugene Rumer (2015). *Conflict in Ukraine – The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Norwegian ChoD (2015). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2014*. Oslo: Forsvaret.
- Norwegian ChoD (2016). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2015*. Oslo: Forsvaret.
- Norwegian ChoD (2017). *Forsvarets Årsrapport 2016*. Oslo: Forsvaret.
- Norwegian Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2016). *Innstilling fra utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen om Kampkraft og bærekraft. Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren*. Innst. 62S, 2016–17.
- Norwegian MoD (2015). *Et felles løft – Rapport fra Ekspertgruppen om forsvaret av Norge*.
- Norwegian MoD (2016). *Kampkraft og bærekraft. Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren*. Prop. 151S 2015–16
- Pesu, Matti (2017). *What Non-alignment? – Finland's Security and Defence Policy Stems from Partnerships*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- Pyykönen, Juha and Stefan Forss (2017). *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*. Cambridge, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre.
- Rosiny, Stephan (2015). 'The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate' in *Middle East Policy Council*. Volume 22, Issue 2.
- Swedish Cabinet (2015a). *Svenskt deltagande i den militära utbildningsinsatsen i norra Irak*. Regeringens proposition 2014/15:104.
- Swedish Cabinet (2015b). *Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020*. Regeringens proposition 2014/15:109.
- Swedish Cabinet (2017a). *Nationell säkerhetsstrategi*. Regeringskansliet.
- Swedish Cabinet (2017b). *Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i den militära utbildningsinsatsen i Irak*. Regeringens proposition 2017/18:31.

- Swedish Defence Commission (2013). *Vägval i en globaliserad värld*. Förvarsberedningens rapport Ds. 2013:33.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2014). *Försvaret av Sverige – Starkare försvar för en osäker tid*. Förvarsberedningens rapport Ds 2014:20.
- Swedish Defence Commission (2017). *Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025*. Förvarsberedningens rapport Ds 2017:66.
- Swedish Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2015). *Förvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020*. Förvarsutskottets betänkande 2014/15:FöU11.
- Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2015a). *Svenskt deltagande i den militära utbildningsinsatsen i norra Irak*. Sammansatta utrikes- och förvarsutskottets betänkande 2014/15:UFöU4.
- Swedish Joint Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee (of the Parliament) (2015b). *Säkerhetspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar för perioden 2016–2020*. Sammansatta utrikes- och förvarsutskottets betänkande 2014/15:UFöU5.
- Wood, Elizabeth, William Pomeranz, Wayne Merry and Maxim Trudolyubov (2016). *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*, New York: Columbia University Press.

7 External shocks and the responses of small states

The previous empirical chapters examined the defence strategy of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively, in response to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Russo-Georgian war, the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the rise of the Caliphate, i.e. IS. It is time to revisit Chapter 1 and the questions that cued the empirical analysis in this book. How and to what extent have these four small states adjusted their strategies in response to these events in their external security environment? To what extent were their military strategies affected? Which factors explain differences and similarities in their responses and how can elements of change and continuity be explained? In our attempt to address these questions it is prudent to initially review to what extent the events were perceived as shocks and if so what defence strategy option did they pursue in its response.

7.1 Did the nations experience strategic shocks and how did they respond?

By most accounts, the 9/11 terrorist attacks are perceived as a strategic shock (see, for example, Hirst 2007; Schwartz and Randall 2007). A surprise attack by an international terrorist organisation weaponising commercial air-flights to strike at the heart of a world hegemon's financial and military power centres was unimaginable for the Nordics as well as other countries. In combination with the American response to expand the conflict geographically, the conflict generated shock waves that propagated to northern Europe. President Bush's ultimate statement 'you're either with us, or against us' (CNN 2001) made isolation a difficult option to pursue at this Rubicon. While international terrorism was not new in Europe, the experiences of the Nordic countries were of limited nature. In the aftermath of the attacks, all of them contemplated their own exposure and vulnerability. In all Nordic states but Finland did this infamous event qualify as a strategic shock. In Denmark, international terrorism surfaced as a key threat, in particular in combination of WMD. The newly formed government in Norway argued that the attack was a trigger for the defence reform. Also in Sweden, the event shaped the subsequent defence bill, not so much related to the defence reform but as a justification to reassess globalisation, the international security

order and ultimately the threat scenarios. In addition, the government launched a special inquiry to review the national preparedness for a similar event. Notwithstanding the ultimate demand of support by the American President, Norway opted for a *hedging* option. At this point in time focus was on bolstering relations with the EU and the military instrument became an instrument to that end, in particular to support Norway's resource strategy. The response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a means to hedge its interests. We label the responses by Denmark and Sweden, respectively, as *bandwagoning* as they contributed to advance the fight against international terrorism in the UN, the EU and NATO in accordance with the priorities set out by the USA. For them there was no rationale related to offsetting other priorities. Finland, on the other hand, reacted to the event but curtailed their response by other priorities, hence the impact was of lower magnitude. The attacks, it was contemplated, confirmed the need for a broad perspective on security. Still it did not increase risks for attacks on Finnish soil.

When reviewing the Georgian war, it is clear that it did not have the same magnitude of global impact. However, as noted in Chapter 5, it was ultimately about the future of European security order and, as such, a major concern. Arguably, the mounting global financial crisis diverted some of the international attention. Among the Nordic countries, it was only Finland and Sweden that fully grappled with the event as a strategic shock. During that period Denmark and Norway appear to have been more concerned with risks in the Arctic region, regarding environmental hazards and competition over strategic resources. Indeed, the Georgian war made no lasting impact in their policy documents. In Sweden, the war intersected the ongoing defence deliberations and it was indeed a significant event. In essence, the policy on Russian relations switched from inclusion to exclusion. It was a wakeup call. The security equation had to factor in Russia. It emphasised that Sweden needed to pay more attention to its neighbourhood and formulate a new security doctrine based on a unilateral declaration of support to its partners. Sweden adopted a *hedging* strategy. Finland, at the helm of the OSCE, was in the midst of the situation from the onset and intimately involved in the efforts leading to the six-point peace plan. Finland made far-reaching conclusions on the increased Russian military capabilities and their willingness to employ military force. A special report on the event provided an extensive analysis on Russia and its implications on national security. Subsequent policy documents made few explicit references to Russia, potentially to maintain the unique and important dialogue it had with its eastern neighbour. Finland appears to have complemented its traditional policy of unilateral defensive *balance of power* towards Russia with a courting strategy. Additionally, it did so within the frames of an EU context by firmly committing Finland to the evolving assistance clause of the new treaty.

In addition, when considering the rise of the Caliphate and its terrorist actions the perceptions among the Nordic countries differ. Only in Denmark did it qualify as a strategic shock. In Norway, there was indeed dismay due to the mayhem caused by international terrorism. However, IS was but one of the

networks associated with these horrific actions. Perhaps due to its recent and fatal experience of home-grown terrorism in 2011, the event was not elevated to the level of national security concerns. In a similar vein, the Finnish deliberations regarded IS as one of several toxic networks that provided a fertile ground for an increase in international terrorism. Nevertheless, IS in itself did not constitute a specific challenge. Rather, it was the challenge of international terrorism in general. Finland's contributions to the coalition effort to defeat IS were an act of solidarity as opposed to a measure for national security. Mindful of the high priority of human rights and dignity for all people in the world, the Swedish security policy seemed to pay little attention to the maiming and barbaric actions pursued by the Caliphate. However, it was, together with Germany, one of the countries that absorbed most refugees in the EU from the Middle East during that time. The Swedish focus and commitment lay outside the national security policy realm, though it deployed forces to Iraq later. Sweden was an ardent supporter of Syria and Iraq in terms of humanitarian aid and continued to champion human rights and democracy in the region through international institutions. Also, Sweden was one of the initiators to the civilian CSDP mission in Iraq, decided in late 2017 (Swedish Cabinet 2017b). Although victim of an Islamic terrorist attack in Stockholm in 2010, Sweden did not nest IS in its national security context. In Denmark, however, a broad political consensus made a timely response through extraordinary decision-making procedures on the aspirations of a new Caliphate. Not only was IS singled out as a key entity, it was considered a threat to security in the Middle East as well as an increasing risk for the west, including Denmark, in terms of terrorist attacks. In addition, Danish IS terrorists returning from the Middle East constituted a security concern. Consequently, Denmark acted promptly by contributing early on in the coalition with a robust military force package to defeat IS in both Iraq and Syria. Indeed, Denmark was at the forefront of the American coalition that was established, and it can be concluded that Denmark opted for a *bandwagoning* strategy.

The Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the following war in Ukraine turned out to be a strategic shock for Denmark, Finland and Sweden, albeit for different reasons and with different magnitude. In Sweden, the Cabinet issued a new defence bill in 2015 that was exceptionally critical of Russia. More importantly, the Armed Forces were reoriented towards national defence including reintroduction of conscript service as well as stronger international cooperation, with the USA and Finland. Additionally, a total defence concept was reinstituted. By all accounts, it was a historic makeshift change in security and defence policy. The build-up of national capabilities in tandem with enhanced defence cooperation, with NATO and non-NATO countries, suggests a *hedging* option. For Denmark, the shock did not primarily shake its own territory but spurred it to prepare, enable and assist defence of the Alliance against a Russian aggression, which makes it reasonable to classify Denmark's as chain-ganging and *balance of power*. To some extent, Finland regarded the event as a confirmation of earlier assessments of Russia, following the Georgian war. In fact, an official report warned that Ukraine might fall victim to Russia's behaviour. It was still a

Table 7.1 The Nordic countries that experienced strategic shocks and their strategies to address respective shock

	<i>9/11 attacks</i>	<i>Georgian war</i>	<i>Caliphate</i>	<i>War in Ukraine</i>
Denmark	Bandwagoning	–	Bandwagoning	Balance of power
Finland	–	Balance of power	–	Hedging
Norway	Hedging	–	–	–
Sweden	Bandwagoning	Hedging	–	Hedging

shock as priorities were changed and the event may have contributed to a new policy on bilateral defence arrangements with Sweden, including contingency planning, as well as the US. Consequently, we conclude that Finland adopted a *hedging* strategy. Though Norway concluded that Russia did not constitute an immediate threat, the concerns grew. This was further perpetuated by Russia's aggressive behaviour in Norway's vicinity. Still, the deliberations did not constitute a change in Norwegian priorities.

Table 7.1 summarises to what extent the Nordic countries perceived the seminal events as shocks and if so what strategy they opted for. Notably, all events were regarded as shocks in at least one country but no event generated a strategic shock in all countries. Defence strategy in Denmark and Sweden appears to be more susceptible to external events. The results are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

7.2 Change or continuity with regard to military strategy?

This study also analyses the impact of external shocks on military strategies, one component of the dependent variable – the military strategy of each state – has been explored to determine whether it is characterised by change or continuity. Against this backdrop, the previous section on defence strategy framed a broader political context of the dependent variable in the four Nordic states. Notably, a shock at the political-strategic level does not precipitate to the military-strategic level by default. Shocks can be absorbed at the political level or they can be funnelled to other policy areas and thus be subject to other responses than military. Below is a short review of the development related to each of the Armed Forces.

Denmark experienced a strategic shock following the 9/11 attacks. It did not fundamentally alter the course set for the Armed Forces but some significant priorities were changed. The Danish Armed Forces were already committed to overseas operations. At this juncture, the geographical scope widened beyond the neighbourhood of NATO to include Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, more emphasis was put on deployable capabilities. These capabilities were often integrated in American and British units and their employment driven by the doctrine of those nations. Regarding the Georgian war, it did not constitute a shock and the Armed Forces were not affected by its consequences. The concern was instead the overstretched forces, following some six years of operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan and the imbalance between ends and means was acknowledged. Instead of adjusting the ends or allocating additional funding, safeguarding core capabilities and recruitment became a priority. Both the Caliphate and the annexation of Crimea and the following war in Ukraine constituted shocks. It is clear that both events had impact on the military strategy. Following these events, lucid lines were established between national interests and military-strategic objectives. There were no caveats in employing military forces abroad in the fight against terrorists. These included, *inter alia* sovereignty, preventing terrorist attacks and defending NATO territory. By now, the organisation had become lean to such an extent that it became a limiting factor for overseas commitments.

Finland's strategic shock after the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not change the trajectory of the Armed Forces. The ongoing defence reform continued as planned to modernise the Armed Forces. National defence against a strategic strike was singled out as the top priority. Like many other nations, Finland's forces were redesigned to prepare for modern conventional warfare by developing network-centric capabilities with real time situation awareness and international interoperability. Downsizing was but one way to finance the new initiatives. The strategic shock induced by the Russo-Georgian war caused ripples in the military sphere. Although it put more emphasis on territorial defence principles and general conscript, the real change was in military cooperation. As the subsequent event, the rise of the Caliphate, did not qualify as a shock in Finland, there was no impact on the military level. The Russian illegal annexation of the Crimea peninsula and the war in Ukraine had impact on the Armed Forces as high-readiness forces became a priority, as did bilateral military cooperation with selected partners.

The 9/11 shock in Norway transcended to the military strategy. Defeating international terrorism became an objective. Although not anticipated initially, Norwegian forces would find themselves entangled in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long period and to such extent that it had impact on the military strategy. The Armed Forces played a key role in ensuring Norwegian credibility in the international community. New frigates for national defence was still a top priority. The much-needed modernisation of the Army and the maintaining infrastructure, primarily airbases, for NATO reinforcements appears to have had less importance. The Georgian war was not a shock in the Norwegian mind-set according to the criteria in this study; still that term was used in official texts. Indeed, it did not alter the priorities in the Armed Forces. Instead, the strategic outlook included deliberations on technological aspects of future capabilities of relevance in the vicinity of its own territory. There was only so much that could be achieved with the number of forces available. The Armed Forces were to transform within the allocated budget given to the military. Arguably, it became difficult to formulate a coherent military strategy. Neither the rise of the Caliphate nor the illegal annexation of Crimea and the following war in Ukraine qualified as strategic shocks. Still Russia, with its enhanced military capabilities, was a growing concern, although not regarded as a threat. The priorities remained and so did the strategic imbalance.

Table 7.2 The impact of strategies at the military-strategic level

	<i>9/11 attacks</i>	<i>Georgian war</i>	<i>Caliphate</i>	<i>War in Ukraine</i>
Denmark	Change	–	Change	Change
Finland	–	Change	–	Change
Norway	Change	–	–	–
Sweden	–	Change	–	Change

The strategic shock in Sweden after the 9/11 attacks did not constitute a change of military priorities, yet it offered more rationale and credibility to the ongoing transformation of the Armed Forces by leaving the threat based and Russia-focused invasion defence towards a modern and agile military capable of expeditionary warfare abroad. Following the Georgian war, Sweden experienced a shock and this time it had some tangible impact on the military strategy. A long trend of reduced defence spending and force deactivation came to a halt while the regional security regained some of its earlier prominence. Still the force structure was largely influenced on international crisis management, for instance lighter battalion-sized battlegroups were to constitute the backbone of the Army. While the rise of the Caliphate did not generate much attention in the security policy realm, Ukraine was a milestone in Swedish security policy and national defence was once again elevated as the top priority and a series of successive budget increases were initiated. Mindful of the *modus operandi* in the war in Ukraine, hybrid warfare and propaganda generated a new set of priorities, including cyber security and permanent forces on the island of Gotland.

In Table 7.2, the impact on military strategy is summarised. Indeed, shocks manifest themselves as changes in military strategy. There is only one aberration, the Swedish responses on 9/11 attacks. The experienced strategic shocks on defence strategy did not reverberate on the military strategy. On average, the external events generated penetrated the defence strategy and subsequently had impact on military strategy.

7.3 Examining the change in military strategy

As depicted in Table 7.2, changes in military strategy occurred at eight instances. In this section these changes are further examined based on the six ‘pertinent questions’ (*why, what, how, where, when, who*) outlined in Chapter 2.

7.3.1 Case 1: Denmark’s response to 9/11

The shock had significant impact at the military-strategic level. It was internalised in that the approach reflected a notion of national concern as well as solidarity. Denmark’s approach was dominated by the proactive use of force concept, stressing the importance of having forces available for immediate action. The shock-response encompassed five aspects highlighted by the cueing questions. The authorities expressed concerns regarding an increased vulnerability in

society (*why*). It was recognised that the nature of modern risks and threats in the defence realm had changed; the Defence Council outlined terrorism in combination with WMD as the most challenging threat (*what*). Therefore, it was envisaged that the Armed Forces were to become engaged in counter-terrorism operations as well as consequence management following terrorist attacks. It was consistent with the ongoing force transformation to deal with modern threats, emphasising forces to become rapidly deployable and more versatile. The Army was re-equipped to lighter formations, the Special Forces were bolstered and the Air Force put priority on night vision and airlift capabilities (*how*). The operational focus shifted to the greater Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan (*where*). Proactivity and rapid deployment underpinned the notion on the use of military forces. To this end, Denmark spearheaded a review of NATO's defence planning process (*when*). In terms of cooperation in operations, more focus was put on NATO and the USA at the expense of UN cooperation (*who*).

7.3.2 Case 2: Norway's response to 9/11

Norway's response to 9/11 was in many ways different to that of Denmark. For one, it had significantly less impact. Prior to the shock, the Norwegian government was entangled with force generation and while 9/11 changed some priorities, it did not cause any dramatic deviation from that trajectory. For instance, the shock did not alter the general justification for employment of military force (*why*). However, the defeat of terrorism was introduced as an end in the military strategy (*what*). Consequently, it was necessary to introduce a drawdown of some 5,000 troops to fund participation in NATO's anti-terrorism operations (*how*). While some forces were deployed the spatial focus was still on Norway and its neighbourhood (*where*). The Norwegian forces' transformation to inter alia improve rapid deployability was already ongoing, for instance with regards to the Telemark battalion. The shock put further emphasis on this development but it did not significantly change the priorities (*when*). The broad cooperation with organisations, primarily NATO but also the UN and the EU, and nations, in particular the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, continued (*who*).

7.3.3 Case 3: Finland's response to the Georgian war

Finland's shock in response to the Georgian war also manifested itself in the military strategy, albeit on a limited scale. While there was an immediate and intense reaction among policy-makers, the reference to the war soon faded in policy documents. The shock coalesced with a financial crisis and it was plausible that it had an impact on the military strategy. At the time of the shock, the Armed Forces were focused on force generation and in particular to continuing its transformation forces. While the attack demonstrated increased Russian military capabilities, as well as a possible diffusion of Russian military activities in the Finnish neighbourhood, it did not change the vulnerability of the nation nor did it change the justification to resort to military means (*why*). Accordingly,

the shock did not generate any changes in the military objectives (*what*). The identified capabilities to repel an attack against Finland included inter alia mobility, early warning and readiness. In essence, the requirements were consistent with those articulated prior to the Georgian war. Potentially, the shrinking defence budget could have tempered the identification of new requirements (*how*). The Finnish territory remained the geographical focus although auxiliary forces were deployed (*where*). The primary focus continued to be preventing war by having a sizable and robust force for territorial defence (*when*). However, tangible change was made with regard to international cooperation. The new concept, 'active defence policy', rested on four pillars: territorial defence, general conscription, the public support to defend the country and international cooperation. The novelty rested in the last element. It was underpinned by a realisation that Finland did not expect to face Russia on its own. This was a significant shift in policy. A unilateral solidarity declaration was issued to the EU member states thereby expecting reciprocal support in times of crisis. Arguably, the concurrent process in adopting Article 42.7, the mutual defence clause of the TEU, also influenced the change in strategy. Subsequently, military cooperation within the NORDEFCO and the bilateral cooperation with Sweden and other arrangements became prevalent (*who*).

7.3.4 Case 4: Sweden's response to the Georgian war

Sweden's response to the Georgian war became a crossroads in military strategy. Prior to the Georgian war, military strategy focused on international operations on the one hand, and on longer-term force generation on the other hand. Notwithstanding the impact of the shock, it did not change the scope of the military instrument although national defence remerged (*why*). Indeed, the Russian aggression was a wakeup call. It was assessed that the threshold for using military force in Sweden's vicinity had been lowered. However, Russia's military assertiveness was primarily seen as a peril to the Baltic republics, formerly included in the USSR, but not to Sweden (*what*). A major shift in personnel management was made as recruitment of soldiers, sailors and airmen were to be conducted on a voluntary basis thereby abandoning the conscript system. Although this constituted a significant change in strategy, it was not related to the Georgian war as the preparations for the decision started years earlier (*how*). An important change in spatial focus was made due to the Russian aggression. While before the shock the focus was on overseas operations, now emphasis was also put on the presence in the Baltic Sea region, in particular regarding naval and Air Force units (*where*). Moreover, the availability of forces in Sweden became increasingly important. While the shift to professional soldiers was primarily to ensure rapid international operations, it was instrumental in achieving higher readiness. They became a vehicle to boost availability of forces domestically. Unit readiness levels were increased in general and force generation was narrowed down to the coming 3–5 years, thereby reducing long-term ambitions (*when*). Like Finland, a national solidarity declaration propelled

international cooperation. However, unlike in Finland it was clearly detached from the Georgian war and was a far less ambitious change as Sweden already had a wide array of cooperation arrangements (*who*).

7.3.5 Case 5: Denmark's response to the rise of the Caliphate

Denmark's response to the rise of IS shook the military strategy. As combating international terrorism had been embedded in the military strategy ever since the 9/11 attacks, the aggressive and violent behaviour of IS did not change the justification for the military instrument (*why*). However, their rise posed a threat not only to Iraq and Syria but also to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. More importantly, there was also an escalating threat to Denmark and Europe. In particular, it was noted the threat level posed to Danish military personnel engaged in the fight against IS had increased (*what*). Due to a high-operational tempo following the 9/11 attacks, many units were worn down and personnel as well as equipment were in dire need of recuperation. Still it managed to prioritise an ambitious contribution to the coalition in Iraq and Syria (*how*). The new commitments intensified the engagement in the Middle East, however it did not change the overall geographical priorities (*where*). The shock put additional emphasis on early responses. The objectives included prevention of international terrorist attacks and when the US requested military support Denmark responded swiftly with a sizable force package including fighter aircraft, airlift, Special Forces and air surveillance assets (*when*). The Danish forces were put under US operational control, thus making their cooperation strong. However, the bilateral military relations were already well established based on provisos operations with embedded Danish forces in US units (*who*).

7.3.6 Case 6: Denmark's response to the war in Ukraine

In tandem with its response on the rise of IS, the war in Ukraine also had ramifications for military strategy. However, it did not provide any new rationale for the Armed Forces' mission (*why*). The importance of NATO's collective defence was elevated and deterrence measures in support of Allies re-entered the military strategy calculus (*what*). A substantial budget increase was projected during 2018–23, not only to reconstitute units that had been employed overseas but also to better prepare for a modern conventional aggressor. Such measures included enhanced capabilities in air defence, artillery, cyber warfare and anti-submarine warfare (*how*). The reorientation in the military strategy to contribute more to protection of allied countries' territories implied a change in geographical focus from overseas operations towards creating stability in Europe. The infrastructure of domestic ports came into new light as they could play a role if Denmark would serve as a transit area for major operations (*where*). High-readiness and deployability remained important (*when*). Mindful of the established cooperation in the NRF, the cooperation within the NATO framework did not change significantly, although more emphasis was put on the Baltic States (*who*).

7.3.7 Case 7: Finland's response to the war in Ukraine

Finland's response to the war in Ukraine generated some changes in the military strategy. Still, neither the role and rationale for the Armed Forces (*why*), nor the priorities on homeland defence (*what*) changed. There was not any direct military threat towards Finland but employment of Russian military forces in Europe could not be excluded. The key priorities in the defence concept as well as the defence reform remained. Following a period of reduced budgets there was a general need to bolster the capability to repel attacks (*how*). Although overseas operations saw less attention, they did not implicate any significant change as national defence had consistently been the top priority (*where*). The Ukrainian war triggered new priorities to be set on higher readiness of forces including land, maritime, air and cyber operations (*when*). Arguably, the most significant shift was a more concentrated focus on bilateral cooperation for the USA and Sweden, respectively (*who*).

7.3.8 Case 8: Sweden's response to the war in Ukraine

Sweden's response to the war in Ukraine had several consequences for the military strategy. Following the Georgian war, it paid more attention to national defence; however, the big shift came in the political decisions after the initiation of the war in Ukraine and a clear priority on national defence. The total defence concept was reintroduced and provided a wider context for the Armed Forces as it assumed that civilian support would be provided to the military in times of war. Notwithstanding the impact of the shock, it did not change the scope of the military instrument although national defence remerged (*why*). Once again, the Russian aggression generated a redefinition of the security environment. It was assessed that the threshold for using military force in Sweden's vicinity had been lowered further. In combination with increased Russian military capabilities, it provided a toxic mix that required strategic adjustments. Notwithstanding these perils, there was no imminent military threat against Sweden (*what*). While earlier emphasis was on efficiency of the forces, the focus became an increased effect. This aspiration was propelled by a series of significant budget increases (*how*). The unambiguous focus on national translated into firm priorities of the Baltic Sea region and the High North for all forces (*where*). Although conscription was reintroduced, high-readiness forces for conflict prevention remained the guiding principle for most of the forces except parts of the Army (*when*). Like Finland, Sweden took a significant step in bolstering bilateral relations for operational purposes, in particularly with Finland and the USA (*who*).

Table 7.3 summaries the changes in military strategy based on the six supporting variables (*why*, *what*, *how*, *where*, *when* and *who*). Notably there are no two identical responses as all supporting variables have been subject to change at some point and the utility of the variables is confirmed. *What* and *why* appears to be the most significant variables. *What* has changed most frequently, six

Table 7.3 Changes in military strategies

	<i>Why</i>	<i>What</i>	<i>How</i>	<i>Where</i>	<i>When</i>	<i>Who</i>
Case 1: Denmark > 9/11	X	X	X	X	X	X
Case 2: Norway > 9/11	–	X	X	–	–	–
Case 3: Finland > Georgian war	–	–	–	–	–	X
Case 4: Sweden > Georgian war	–	X	–	X	X	–
Case 5: Denmark > Caliphate	–	X	X	–	X	–
Case 6: Denmark > war in Ukraine	–	X	X	X	–	–
Case 7: Finland > war in Ukraine	–	–	–	–	X	X
Case 8: Sweden > war in Ukraine	X	X	X	X	–	X
Sum	2	6	5	4	4	4

times, only cases with Finland exclude *what*. Only the two cases with most changes (case 1 and 8) include changes in *why*.

When assessing the magnitude of the strategic shocks in the Nordic setting, 9/11 and the war in Ukraine had the most significant impact on defence policies as it affected three out of four countries in each of the cases (see Table 7.1). According to Table 7.3, the most significant impact on military strategy was generated by the war in Ukraine. Military strategies in Denmark and Sweden are more susceptible to external shocks than strategies in Finland and Norway. The former category is hereafter labelled *cosmopolitans* and the latter category is denoted *provincial*.

As a longitudinal observation across all countries and all shocks, the military strategy of Nordic countries generally maintained their goals and objectives only with a few additions throughout the shocks. During the period, the relative purchasing power of the defence budgets declined, except for some sporadic increases at the end of the period of study (*ends*). Modernisation, as well as more ambitious commitments to international crisis management, have in part been funded by deactivation of units. Forces have undergone major reductions during the period of study (*means*). While their respective defence strategies are well developed and articulated the military strategy appears to be less developed, or largely under-communicated.

7.4 Additional observations

In this section, we present some observations indirectly related to our research questions presented in Chapter 1. We argue that the findings provide interesting insights to take into account when framing future research.

7.4.1 Prepare for the Black Swans

Recalling the categorisation of shocks in unanticipated continuation of a trend or unimaginable, so-called Black Swan events, it is time to reflect on its application concerning the analysis.

Arguably, the rise of IS and the Russo-Georgian war are best understood as the former category. The Caliphate is in essence a mutation of Al-Qaida that, like its origin, destabilises societies with terror and mayhem, albeit with unprecedented brutality. While its epicentre was in Syria and Iraq, those countries were already in turmoil and IS jettisoned these countries into chaos and despair with global ramifications as the organisation expanded and its impact triggered humanitarian, financial, political and military responses by the international community. The Russian/Soviet military presence in Georgia's contested areas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has been a source of contention ever since 1991 when Georgia declared its independence and the USSR was falling apart. The Russian surprise attack in 2008 punctuated the frozen conflict. On the other hand, both the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Russian annexation of Crimea were Black Swan-like events. Still, there were indicators for both shocks but the international community did not respond. The scale and modus operandi of Al-Qaida when mounting its attacks against the only superpower in the world was inconceivable, despite some warnings. Arguably, Russia's war on Georgia would have made the attack on Crimea plausible, in particular since Ukraine and the EU were grooming their relations at the expense of Russia if one applies zero sum logic, as Russia habitually does. Still, the attack on Ukraine was a surprise. Notably, it represented a new modus operandi and only late in the campaign was the military force put into action. Russia employed hybrid warfare, a mix of conventional and unconventional measures that allowed the war to be conducted by proxy and with a degree of deniability.

Interestingly, the degree of perceived shock among the Nordic countries seems to correlate more with this categorisation than one based on geographical proximity, as depicted in Table 7.1. Indeed, the analysis in the empirical chapters suggests that when exposed to a shock, nations try to rationalise events within the existing priorities. For instance, in Sweden the 9/11 attacks were instantly seen as a confirmation of the need to transform the Armed Forces from an invasion focus to an expeditionary force, although there was no deliberation over the role of the military to combat international terrorism. Obviously, events including extraordinary measures are more difficult to rationalise and thus become more likely to generate shock responses and the subsequent tailoring of priorities for the military. Accordingly, it would be prudent to focus on Black Swan scenarios as opposed to continued negative trends when preparing for an uncertain future at the military-strategic level.

7.4.2 It is the history, stupid!

Mindful that the analysis in this study produces a limited data set, there are some observations to make. It is clear that small states, although sandwiched between two major powers, have different options and that those are oftentimes used. In the study, *balance of power*, *bandwagoning* and *hedging* have been employed to address strategic shocks. Interestingly, Russia's aggressive behaviour did not generate shocks exclusively among its neighbouring countries, Finland and

Norway, nor among the non-Allied countries. In a similar vein, the shocks on the global scene underpinned by international terrorism and with vested US interests did not muster homogenous reactions among allies. Clearly, out of the three intervening variables applied in the analytical model, neither geographical characteristics nor alliance relations provide sufficient explanatory power for the findings. Instead, we turn to the third intervening variable, historical experience.

Table 7.1 reflects a chasm between Denmark and Sweden, on the one hand, and Finland and Norway on the other hand. The dividing line seems to be in how they identify themselves within the international system. Arguably, the national character stems from their respective historical experiences. Denmark and Sweden are more cosmopolitan in that they define themselves first and foremost as actors in the international system, while Finland and Norway, although outward looking, are firmly anchored in their national interests. The *Cosmopolitans* are more likely to internalise external events by adjusting national priorities to influence and adapt. Since vital interests are perennial, *Provincials* are less prone to alter priorities because of external events. At the end of the day, an event that does not pose an immediate threat to the long-term vitality of the state becomes second in their concerns.

While this categorisation has merit it falls short of accounting for another dichotomy that has surfaced during the analysis: the idealistic-pragmatic rift. In the quest of meeting the strategic objectives, the idealistic approach is understood as being guided by norms and values whereas the pragmatic approach finds guidance in what is practical and straightforward. While all Nordics subscribe to the western liberal values, it is argued that Norway and Sweden are more concerned with those aspects, for instance with regard to the use of force. Denmark and Finland, on the other hand, devise strategies that are more direct.

Denmark is a *pragmatic cosmopolitan* power that employs military means in sync with other instruments of power; it does not overrule military options for the sake of morality. Its history is rooted in continental Europe, where its security intertwined with that of other nations. Denmark's WWII legacy suggests that it will become involved in major conflicts and that its security depends on being a valuable partner that is firmly supported in crisis.

While all Nordic countries are committed to advancing universal human rights, Sweden is championing this field by being an *idealistic cosmopolitan* power with a loud voice in distant conflicts. Compared to the other Nordic countries, this policy field is less integrated within national security. For over 200 years, Sweden has not had to fight an existential war and is hence arguably less obliged to link these domains. Moreover, military means are employed with discretion abroad. Instead, it put more reliance on diplomatic efforts. After all, it can be claimed that it was diplomacy and bandwagoning that allowed Sweden to stay out of WWII. This balancing act involved delicate considerations regarding Germany and western powers and, at the end of the day, it was a successful strategy.

Finland is a *pragmatic provincial* power. It fought for survival against both Germany and the USSR during WWII. Finland was never militarily defeated and, because of that, it managed to maintain its sovereignty. It did so by its own

Table 7.4 Differences between the Nordic countries

	<i>Pragmatic</i>	<i>Idealistic</i>
<i>Cosmopolitan</i>	Denmark	Sweden
<i>Provincial</i>	Finland	Norway

means with a significant sacrifice to its society. Finland is confident in its ability to muster sufficient national support to its cause in times of crisis. When devising strategies it is cognisant of the importance of safeguarding the national interests and finding pragmatic solutions to advance its goals.

Norway is an *idealistic provincial* power that, on the one hand, is firmly committed to protecting its national interests, and, on the other hand, subjects the role of the military to scrutiny. It shares many of the idealistic notions that Sweden embodies, including that military means should only be used as a last resort. Indeed, the WWII legacy suggests that political oversight over the military is important. Norway is well aware that its somewhat peripheral geographical location in the western world requires it to work consistently to justify its relevance as a priority in the Alliance. While commitments to NATO operations and high-readiness forces are important, these are the first and foremost means to gain credibility as an Allied nation.

Based on this elaboration, differences among the Nordic countries can be understood in two dimensions: *strategic outlook* ranging from provincial to cosmopolitan and *strategic value system* divided into pragmatic and idealistic, see Table 7.4.

Notably, this categorisation seems to hold true regardless of the political composition of the government holding office. It suggests that the categorisation is rooted in strategic culture, a term originally defined as ‘sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’ (Snyder 1977:9).

7.4.3 *Crafting strategy*

On a sliding scale, Denmark and Finland, the pragmatic nations, represent the endpoints in the cosmopolitan-provincial continuum. Arguably, these states are more stable and predictable in terms of integrating military strategy in the national security strategy. In the case of Finland, the priorities and strategy are firmly anchored in the defence of the nation. Denmark initially applied a fix-point that was not static, although predictable, as it consistently pursued a *bandwagoning* strategy. However, the Russian aggression against Ukraine seems to have altered the Danish position towards a *balance of power* strategy. Clearly, these circumstances are more conducive to a deliberate and long-term military strategy. The strength of Norway and Sweden, holding the middle ground, rests with their moderate approach that navigates in safe waters far from ignorance

and turmoil. It could be argued that they put the military strategy in a broader ideological context that makes the military strategy to a greater extent reflect a broader set of policy factors, beyond the realm of security policy. Hence, an understanding of the military strategies requires analysis beyond a strict definition of defence policy. Strategists in these nations are more likely to find themselves adjudicating competing policy goals.

7.5 Conclusions: the security of small states in the twenty-first century

Mindful of the limited empirical data we have analysed, there are still some inductive propositions that could serve as inspiration for further research on small states.

Black Swan events are more consequential than other shocks

A shock is either an unanticipated continuation of a trend or an unimaginable so-called Black Swan event. In this study, the latter category had more impact on the small states studied. However, our number of cases and shocks are admittedly very limited. Therefore, to confirm this proposition we need further empirical research including other states and shocks.

Small states have options

The strategy of small states is inherently reactive as they adopt and adjust to an external environment that cannot be shaped, let alone controlled, if left to its own devices. Still there is room to manoeuvre. The empirical analysis in this book demonstrates that a variety of strategies apply. Small states' alignment strategies include *balance of power*, *bandwagoning*, *hedging* and *isolationism*. We have not found any clear examples of the latter strategy in this study, which is explained with reference to a perceived strategic exposure and interdependence. Notably, three countries have changed their respective strategy more than once. Each of these three states has hence chosen more than one of the strategies at hand. Clearly, small states not only have options but also use them.

Alliance affiliation lacks explanatory power of small states' behaviour

All too often, elaborate security policy analyses cluster small states into allies and non-allies, respectively. This study suggests that alliance affiliation in isolation is not sufficient for explaining small states' behaviour and adjustments of defence strategies. Indeed, the strategy choices examined suggest a low correlation between alliance affiliation and strategic priorities. Denmark and Norway provide examples of NATO members choosing bandwagoning, balance of power and hedging strategies, while Finland and Sweden provide examples of military non-aligned states choosing exactly the same strategies.

Small states also have strategy layers

We conclude that strategic shocks can be absorbed in the defence strategy realm or funnelled into other instruments of power without any implications on the military strategy. Clearly, this suggests that there are two distinct strategic layers that operate partly autonomously and under different sets of rules. While alignment strategies guide the defence strategies at a political-strategic level, the ends-ways-means triad provides a powerful tool for analysing and comparing military strategies.

History is a gateway to understanding strategy of small states

According to research on strategic culture, historical experiences and geographical characteristics are the two most important elements in a particular country's strategic culture. In this study, we have analysed the influence of these two variables separately. Differences in historical experiences, and especially the different fates of the Nordic countries' in the last hegemonic war (WWII), explain important variations between the four countries the defence strategies. Historical experiences of conflicts – including perceived failures or successes of previous alignment strategies, military defeats or victories and experiences of aggression or military assistance from other states – provides significant explanatory power to understand the defence strategies of small states.

Geography, too, plays a part

Geographic proximity to nearby great powers, relative landmass and location of major cities plays a fluctuating role in determining defence of small states in that it provides an understanding for the strategic positioning, or makes up the strategic base, for each state. In the Swedish case, the geographic proximity to Russia, Sweden's comparably large landmass, exposed cities and other critical infrastructure seemed to be more or less ignored in the formulation of Sweden's defence strategy before the war in Ukraine. In the defence decision from 2015, the strategically exposed island of Gotland received more attention, but the overall organisation of the Swedish defence does not reflect the geographical characteristics of the country. One possible reason for this is that history trumps geography, that experiences of war have long-term effects on how the leadership and the population of a specific country perceives its geographical exposure. The fact that Sweden has not been attacked by another state since the Napoleonic wars seems to have made the political leadership in Sweden unable to calculate with the risk of armed aggression against the own state in spite of its potentially strategically exposed geographical position. Perhaps Sweden's previous fortunes also made it easier for the political leadership in Sweden to believe that the end of the Cold War was also the end of the era of great power competition in Europe.

Small states can be categorised as cosmopolitan-provincial and pragmatic-idealistic

The Nordic countries share many characteristics and they are occasionally conflated as a homogeneous set of actors. While this has some merit, our study has focused on their differences. To this end, a model along two orthogonal axes – cosmopolitan-provincial and pragmatic-idealistic, respectively – has been instrumental in highlighting their unique traits. This two-by-two matrix can assist in understanding differences in strategic choices among small states. The model also predicts strengths and weaknesses in their ability to craft strategies.

Size matters – if properly understood

Awareness of limitations in relative military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful states and/or institutions and expressed an awareness of the necessity to cooperate with others to protect and promote their security interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect third ranked states to pursue against a potential first ranked state.

Final remark

In this study, we have focused on one particular category of states defined as third ranked states. Our categories and definitions focused on differences between states regarding capabilities of national defence and contributions to multilateral military operations and military crisis management. Our definition of small states included aspects of power asymmetries between states regarding the use of military capacities and a psychological dimension emphasising the importance of the perceptions of the political leadership. Regarding the latter, an awareness of the limitations of the own state's relative military capacity and a dependence on the actions of other states and more or less well-functioning institutions for security cooperation, was the basis for expecting that small states should develop defence strategies that were qualitatively different from strategies practiced by more resourceful states. Our study has confirmed this expectation. Despite differences in both alignment strategies and military strategies, all four countries pursued strategies that included cooperation with other more resourceful states or institutions and they expressed an awareness of the necessity to cooperate with others to protect and promote their security interests.

The observations above have made us curious regarding differences between second and third ranked powers. On the one hand, reductions in defence spending have diminished some second ranked states' military resources to an extent that they embody some of the characteristics associated with third ranked states. On the other hand, second ranked states may still have greater ambitions than third ranked states when it comes to influencing processes, actors and institutions

beyond their own regional system. Within a regional state system, second ranked powers may develop a relative power position corresponding to that of first ranked global powers. Such a position can allow secondary states to mobilise resources within their own regional system to promote their own global interests and thereby compensating for power asymmetries in relation to global first ranked powers.

Bibliography

- CNN “‘You are either with us or against us’”, published 6 November 2001. Online: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/>. Retrieved 11 February 2018.
- Hirst, Christian (2007). ‘The Paradigm Shift: 11 September and Australia’s Strategic Reformation’ in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. Volume 61, Issue 2.
- Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2007). ‘Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise’ in Francis Fukuyama (ed.). *Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Snyder, Jack (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options* (R-2154-AF). Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Swedish Cabinet (2017b). *Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i den militära utbildningsinsatsen i Irak*. Regeringens proposition 2017/18:31.

Index

Page numbers in **bold** denote tables, those in *italics* denote figures.

- 9/11 terrorist attacks 2001 (first shock) 1, 2–3, 15, 81–114, 180–1, 185–6, 191; background to 81–2; consequences of 105–9, **106–7**; Denmark, effects on 82–7, 183, 185–6; Denmark’s strategy after the attacks 86–7, **106–7**; ends/objectives of Nordic countries 83–4, 88–9, 94–5, 101, 105; Finland, effects on 87–92, 184; Finland’s strategy after the attacks 91–2, **106–7**; international environment and Nordic countries 82–3, 87–8, 92–4, 99–100, 105; means, of Nordic countries 84, 89–90, **89**, 95–6, **95**, 98, 102–3, **102**, 105; Norway, effects on 92–8, 186; Norway’s strategy after the attacks 97–8, **106–7**; Sweden, effects on 98–104, 185; Sweden’s strategy after the attacks 104, **106–7**; ways, of Nordic countries 85, 90–1, 96–7, 103–4, 105, 108
- Agrell, Wilhelm 74, 104
- alignment strategies 4–5, 16, 34–8, **38**; alliance affiliation 194–5
- Allison, Graham 39–40
- Amsterdam treaty 1997 56
- Ångström, Jan 38–9
- appeasement 29, 34, 36
- Arctic region 93, 105, 117, 120, 121, 150, 151, 160, 164, 181
- armed forces *see* military capability
- Authorization of the Use of Armed Force 81
- axiomatic beliefs 28
- Bailes, Alyson 43
- balance of power 4–5, 21, 22, 31, 34, 35–6, 78, 108, 181, 182, **183**, 191, 193, 194; unilateral balancing 37
- balance of threat 34
- bandwagoning 4–5, 21–2, 34, 36, 47n15, 77, 78, 108, 109, 154, 181, 182, **183**, 191, 193, 194
- Betts, Richard 38, 39
- black swan events 190–1, 194
- Boas, Ingrid 42
- Bruun-Hansen, Haakon 160
- Bush, George W. 81, 180
- Buzan, Barry 43, 44
- Caliphate *see* Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate
- capacity/capabilities 10, 11, 18–20, **23**, 35, 77, 108, 143; *see also* military capability
- chain ganging 35, 37, 182
- Clausewitz, Carl von 38, 40, 43
- Collins, John 43–4
- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 55
- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 2
- cooperative security 1, 2–3, 4, 18, 19–20, 45, 131, 141, 172, 175, 181, 182, 196; Denmark 59, 85, 86–7, 120–2, 150, 152–3, 188; Finland 63–4, 65, 88, 90–1, 92, 124, 127, 128–9, 156–7, 158–9, 187; Norway 68, 94–5, 96–7, 130, 131, 133, 163–4, 185; Sweden 70, 72, 73, 103–4, 138–9, 170, 171–2
- courting 16, 33, 34, 35–6, 37, 128, 143
- Crimean War 17, 27
- Cuban missile crisis 40
- cultural conflicts 117

- Dalsjö, Robert 17–18, 171
- defence and military strategies 2, 34–45, **38**; action, temporal aspects of 44–5; alignment strategies 4–5, 16, 34–8, **38**; change and continuity 183–5, **185**; constitutive elements of strategy 38–41; cooperation with other actors 45; crafting strategy 193–4; Denmark, after the first shock 86–7; Denmark, after the second shock 121–2, **142**; Denmark, after third and fourth shocks 153–4, **173–4**; Denmark, before the first shock 59–60, **75**; ends, ways, and means, explanation of 40–1; examining change in military strategy 185–90, **190**; Finland, after the first shock 91–2; Finland, after the second shock 128–9, **142**; Finland, after third and fourth shocks 159, **173–4**; Finland, before the first shock 64–5, **75**; before the first shock, Sweden 73–4, **75**, 78; justification for change 42; measuring change in military strategies 41–5; military instruments, selection and use 43–4; Norway, after the first shock 97–8; Norway, after the second shock 134–5, **142**; Norway, after third and fourth shocks 165–6, **173–4**; Norway, before the first shock 69–70, **75**; strategy, definitions of 39, 40–1; Sweden, after the first shock 104; Sweden, after the second shock 140, **142**; Sweden, after third and fourth shocks 171–2, **173–4**; threats to security interest, nature of 42–3; twenty-first century security of small states 194–7
- Denmark 2, 12, 17, 18, 9/11 terrorist attacks 2001; effects of 82–7, 180, 183, 185–6; ends/objectives 57, 83–4, 117–18, 150; geographical characteristics 77, 108; Georgian-Russian War 2008; effects of 116–22, 181, 183–4; historical experiences 28–9, 192; international environment 56–7, 82–3, 116–17, 149–50; Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate, effects of 149–54, 182, 184, 188; means 57–8, 84, 118–20, **119**, 151–2, **151**; military and political alliances 32; military capability 57–8, **58**, 60, 84, **84**, 86–7, 105, 118, 118–20, **119**, 151–2, **151**, 154, 186, 188; and NATO 57–9, 60, 74, 85, 105, 108, 120, 121, 150, 153; proximity to friendly/threatening great powers 27; sovereignty 118, 121, 154; strategy after the first shock 86–7, **106–7**; strategy after the second shock 121–2; strategy after third and fourth shocks 153–4, **173–4**; strategy before the first shock 59–60, **75**, 77; Ukraine and Russian aggression, effects of 149–54, 182, 184, 188; vulnerability 26, 82–3; ways 59, 85, 120–1, 152–3
- dependency 9, 22–3
- Devold, Kristin Krohn 94, 95, 96, 97; *Relevant Force* 93
- distancing 34, 37
- Edström, Håkan 41
- Elgström, Ole 34
- ends/objectives 74–6, 83, 105, 141, 172; Denmark 57, 83–4, 117–18, 150; explanation of 40–1; Finland 62, 88–9, 124–5, 156–7; Norway 66–7, 94–5, 130–1, 161–2; Sweden 71, 101, 137, 168
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 70, 91
- European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 56
- European Union (EU) 9, 55–6, 68, 100, 172; economic crisis 123, 128; foreign and security policy 61; membership of 2, 18, 32–3, 74–6, 103
- Finland 2, 4, 17, 18, 9/11 terrorist attacks 2001; effects of 87–92, 181, 184; active foreign policy concept 158, 159, 187; alignment strategies 36; capacity/capabilities 19; ends/objectives 62, 88–9, 124–5, 156–7; EU membership 55, 74–6, 158; *Finnish Security and Defence Policy* 60–1, 63–4; foreign and security policy 155, 156, 159; ‘Future Outlook’ 154–5; geographical characteristics 77, 87–8, 108; Georgian-Russian War 2008; effects of 122–9, 181, 184, 185–6; historical experiences 30, 108, 192–3; international environment 61–2, 87–8, 122–4, 155–6; Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate, effects of 154–9, 182, 184; means 62–3, **62**, 89–90, **89**, 125–6, **125**, 157–8, **157**; military and political alliances 32; military capability 62–3, **62**, 64–5, 89–90, **89**, 105, 124, 125–6, **125**, 128, 157–8, **157**, 158–9; and NATO 55, 63–4, 90–1, 127, 128, 158; proximity to

Finland *continued*

friendly/threatening great powers 27;
sovereignty 193; strategy after the first
shock 91–2, **106–7**; strategy after the
second shock 128–9; strategy after third
and fourth shocks 159, **173–4**; strategy
before the first shock 64–5, **75**, 77;
Ukraine and Russian aggression, effects
of 154–9, 182–3, 184, 189; vulnerability
26; ways 63–4, 90–1, 126–7, 158–9

First World War (WWI) 17

Fox, Annette Baker, *The Power of Small
States* 8

France 18; and NATO 12; Paris terror
attacks 2015 3, 148; as a secondary
power 11

Freier, Nathan 15

geographical characteristics 24–7, 25, **33**,
77–8, 108–9, 143, 195–6

Georgian-Russian War 2008 (second
shock) 1, 3, 15, 115–46, 181, 191;
background to 115–16; consequences of
140–3, **142**; Denmark, effects on
116–22, 183–4; Denmark, strategy after
the war 121–2, **142**; ends/objectives of
Nordic countries 117–18, 124–5, 130–1,
137, 141; Finland, effects on 122–9,
184, 185–6; Finland, strategy after the
war 128–9, **142**; international
environment and Nordic countries
116–17, 122–4, 129–30, 135–6, 140–1;
means, of Nordic countries 118–20, **119**,
125–6, **125**, 131–2, **131**, 137–8, **138**,
141; Norway, effects on 129–35;
Norway, strategy after the war 134–5,
142; Sweden, effects on 135–40, 185,
187–8; Sweden, strategy after the war
140, **142**; ways, of Nordic countries
120–1, 126–7, 133, 138–9, 141

Germany 17, 29, 30, 60; East Germany 18

Global War on Terror 1, 2–3, 65, 81

globalisation 9, 99, 101, 104, 116, 167–8

Gray, Colin 15, 24–5, 39

great powers 11

Gstöhl, Sieglinde 8, 9

Gyllensporre, Dennis 41

Hammerstad, Anne 42

Hart, Basil Liddell 40

heartland theory 44

hedging 4–5, 16, 38, 78, 109, 143, 172,
180, 181, 182, 183, **183**, 191, 194

hiding 37

historical experiences 27–30, **33**, 108,
191–3, **193**, 195

Hoffmann, Stanley 28

Honig, Jan Willem 38–9

Host Nation Support Agreement 4

Howlett, Darryl 28

Huntington, Samuel 42

international crisis management *see*
cooperative security

international relations (IR) theory 8, 9

International Security and Assistance
Force (ISAF) 3, 87, 88

Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate (fourth
shock) 1, 3, 15, 147–79, 181–2, 191;
background to 148; consequences of
172, 175; Denmark, effects on 149–54,
184, 188; Denmark, strategy after the
shock 153–4; ends/objectives of Nordic
countries 150, 156–7, 161–2, 168, 172;
Finland, effects on 154–9, 184; Finland,
strategy after the shock 159;
international environment 166–8, 172;
international environment and Nordic
countries 149–50, 155–6, 160–1; means,
of Nordic countries 151–2, **151**, 157–8,
157, **162**, 169–70, **169**, 172; Norway,
effects on 159–66, 184; Norway,
strategy after the shock 165–6; Sweden,
effects on 166–72; Sweden, strategy
after the shock 171–2; ways, of Nordic
countries 152–3, 158–9, 163–4, 170–1,
172–3

isolation 4–5, 16, 22, 24, 34, 37, 194

Jensby, Sven Aage 82, 83

Jervis, Robert, *Perception and
Misperception in International Politics*
27–8

Kaldor, Mary 42

Keohane, Robert 11, 12

Lantis, Jeffrey 28

League of Nations 8, 23, 29

Levy, Jack 28

Limn  ll, Jarno 64, 91

Lisbon, Treaty of 3, 18, 127, 138, 148

Lykke, Arthur 40–1

Maastricht Treaty 1992 55

Mackinder, Halford 44

means 76, 105, 141, 172; Denmark 57–8,
84, **84**, 118–20, **119**, 151–2, **151**;

- explanation of 40–1; Finland 62–3, **62**, 89–90, **89**, 125–6, **125**, 157–8, **157**;
 Norway 67–8, **67**, 95–6, **95**, 98, 131–2, **131**, 162–3, **162**; Sweden 71–2, 102–3, **102**, 137–8, **138**, 169–70, **169**
 Mearsheimer, John 18–19, 21; *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* 20
 middle powers 11
 military and political alliances 31–3, **33**
 military capability 76, 141, 172; Denmark 57–8, **58**, 84, **84**, 86–7, 105, 118, 118–20, **119**, 151–2, **151**, 154, 186, 188; Finland 62–3, **62**, 64–5, 89–90, **89**, 105, 124, 125–6, **125**, 128, 157–8, **157**, 158–9; Norway 65, 66, 67–70, **67**, 95–6, **95**, 97, 98, 105, 131–2, **131**, 133, 134–5, 159–60, 162–3, **162**, 164, 165–6, 184, 185; Sweden 71, 72, **72**, 74, 102–3, **102**, 105, 137–8, **138**, 139, 168, 169–70, **169**, 185, 187, 189
 military crisis management 1, 2, 9–10, 20, 63, 64–5, 90, 91, 92
 military strategies *see* defence and military strategies
 Morgenthau, Hans 20, 21, 24; *Power Among Nations* 18, 19
 Mouritzen, Hans 34
 Multinational Corps Northeast 60, 121, 122

 national interest 20–3, **23**, 77, 108, 154, 156
 neorealist theory 5, 9, 10, 18
 network-centric warfare 92, 122, 132, 184
 Neumann, Iver 8, 9
 neutrality 2, 28; Sweden 10–11, 17, 73–4, 103; in WWI 17
 Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) 64, 68
 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) 129, 158, 164, 187
 Nordic states *see* Denmark; Finland; Norway; small states; Sweden
 North Atlantic Corporation Council (NACC) 55
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2–3, 4, 9, 12, 27, 55–6, 61, 100, 123, 155, 172, 175; Defence Capabilities Initiative 64; and Denmark 57–9, 60, 74, 85, 105, 108, 120, 121, 150, 153; and Finland 63–4, 90–1, 127, 128, 158; membership of 17–18, 33; and Norway 66, 67, 68, 69–70, 74, 76–7, 94–5, 98, 109, 130, 131, 134–5, 161, 165; Partnership for Peace (PfP) 55, 59, 65, 91; Planning and Review Process (PARP) 64; and Sweden 73, 78, 103, 139, 172
 Norway 2, 17, 18, 9/11 terrorist attacks 2001; effects of 92–8, 180, 181, 186; *Capable Force* 130; ends/objectives 66–7, 94–5, 130–1, 161–2; geographical characteristics 77, 108–9; Georgian-Russian War 2008; effects of 129–35, 181; historical experiences 29, 192, 193; international environment 65–6, 92–4, 129–30, 160–1; Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate, effects of 159–66, 181–2, 184; means 67–8, **67**, 95–6, **95**, 98, 131–2, **131**; military and political alliances 32; military capability 65, 66, 67–70, **67**, 95–6, **95**, 97, 98, 105, 131–2, **131**, 133, 134–5, 159–60, 162–3, **162**, 164, 165–6, 184, 185; and NATO 66, 67, 68, 69–70, 74, 76–7, 94–5, 98, 109, 130, 131, 134–5, 161, 165; proximity to friendly/threatening great powers 27; sovereignty 130, 134, 161; strategy after the first shock 97–8, **106–7**; strategy after the second shock 134–5, **142**; strategy after third and fourth shocks 165–6, **173–4**; strategy before the first shock 69–70, **75**; Ukraine and Russian aggression, effects of 159–66, 183; vulnerability 26; ways 68–9, 96–7, 133, 163–4
Operation Allied Force 56
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 57–8, 68, 73
 Ottawa Convention 91

 Paris terror attacks 2015 3, 148
 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 55, 59
 passing the buck 35
 Petersburg tasks 55, 56
 Poland 18, 27, 60, 71
 Posen, Barry, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* 39
 power 18–19, 20–1, 40, 47n18

 Raitasalo, Jyri 64, 92
 Randall, Doug 15
 Reiter, Dan 28
 Rickli, Jean-Marc 98, 128
 Rothstein, Robert 10, 11, 31, 35; *Alliances and Small Powers* 9

- Russia 24, 61; aggression from 27; and Finland 30, 88, 108; and Norway 65, 66, 69, 109; and Sweden 71, 74, 104; *see also* Georgian-Russian War 2008 (second shock); Ukraine and Russian aggression (third shock)
- Saakashvili, Mikheil 115
- Schwartz, Peter 15
- Schweller, Randall 21–2, 36
- Second World War (WWII) 2, 9, 17, 32
- secondary powers 11, 196–7
- security: concept of 43; threats to 9–10, 42–3, 61, 65–6, 70, 72
- Slantchev, Branislav 42
- small states (Nordic states) 13–15, 9/11 terrorist attacks, consequences of 105–9, **106–7**; alignment strategies 34–8, **38**; alliance behaviour 28; analytical framework for explaining change and continuity in defence strategies 6; assistance to other countries 18, 19–20; awareness of limited capabilities 10, 11, 19; black swan events 190–1, 194; capacity/capabilities 18–20, **23**, 35, 77, 108, 143; cosmopolitan-provincial and pragmatic-idealistic categorisation 192–3, **193**, 196; crafting strategy 193–4; defence strategies: the dependent variable 34–45; definition of 8–13, 196; differing military strategies 2; empirical material 45–6; examining change in military strategy 185–90, **190**; before the first shock 74–8; geographical characteristics 24–7, 25, **33**, 195–6; Georgian-Russian War 2008; consequences of 140–3, **142**; historical experiences 27–30, **33**, 191–3, **193**, 195; Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate, consequences of 172, **173–4**, 175; military and political alliances, membership of 31–3, **33**; military strategy, change and continuity of 183–5, **185**; national interest 20–3, **23**, 77, 108; perception of, and reactions to strategic shocks 3–4, 5–6, 180–3, **183**; proximity to friendly/threatening great powers 27; qualitative characteristics 10; quantifiable characteristics 10; relational definition 11–12; research design 13–15; research on 8–11; residual category of states 10; similarities and differences 1–2, 14–15; small powers concept 8; state rankings 12–13, 21–3; strategic exposure 16–18, **23**, 77, 108, 141, 143, 175; structural similarities: control variables 16–23, **23**; twenty-first century security of 194–7; Ukraine and Russian aggression, consequences of 172, **173–4**, 175; unit level characteristics: intervening variables 23–33, **33**, 47n10; vulnerability 26
- Snyder, Glenn 19
- sovereignty 118, 121, 130, 134, 154, 161, 193
- Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) 59, 72, 85
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 123
- strategic culture 24–5, 28
- strategic exposure 16–18, **23**, 77, 108, 141, 143, 175
- strategic focused comparison (SFC) 14, 46–7n8
- strategic shocks 180–97; black swan events 190–1, 194; crafting strategy 193–4; definition 1; examining change in military strategy 185–90, **190**; as an independent variable 15–16; military strategy, change and continuity of 183–5, **185**; perception of, and reactions to 180–3, **183**; small states' responses to 3–4, 5–6; twenty-first century security of small states 194–7
- Sweden 2, 4, 17, 109, 9/11 terrorist attacks 2001; effects of 98–104, 180–1, 185; alignment strategies 34, 36, 37; declaration of solidarity 103–4; ends/objectives 71, 101, 137, 168; EU membership 55, 74–6, 103; geographical characteristics 195–6; Georgian-Russian War 2008; effects of 135–40, 181, 185, 187–8; historical experiences 192; international environment 70–1, 99–100, 135–6, 166–8; Islamic State (IS) and the Caliphate, effects of 182; means 71–2, **72**, 102–3, **102**, 137–8, **138**, 169–70, **169**; military and political alliances 32; military capability 71, 72, **72**, 74, 102–3, **102**, 105, 137–8, **138**, 139, 168, 169–70, **169**, 185, 187, 189; and NATO 55, 73, 78, 103, 139, 172; neutrality 10–11, 17–18, 73–4, 103; proximity to friendly/threatening great powers 27; strategy after the first shock 104, **106–7**; strategy after the second shock 140, **142**; strategy after third and fourth shocks 171–2, **173–4**; strategy before the first shock

- 73–4, **75**, 78; Ukraine and Russian aggression, effects of 166–72, 185, 189–90; vulnerability 26; ways 73, 103–4, 138–9, 170–1
- Taleb, Nassim Nicholas 15
- Taliban 2–3
- Tangredi, Sam 22
- Taylor, Maxwell 40
- Tiilikainen, Teija 128
- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 68–9
- Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 138, 187
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 138
- Ukraine and Russian aggression (third shock) 1, 3, 15, 33, 147–79, 182–3, 191; background to 147–8; consequences of 172, 175; Denmark, effects on 149–54, 184, 188; Denmark, strategy after the shock 153–4, **173–4**; ends/objectives of Nordic countries 150, 156–7, 161–2, 168, 172; Finland, effects on 154–9, 184, 189; Finland, strategy after the shock 159, **173–4**; international environment and Nordic countries 149–50, 155–6, 160–1, 166–8, 172; means, of Nordic countries 151–2, **151**, 157–8, **157**, 162–3, **162**, 169–70, **169**, 172; Norway, effects on 159–66; Norway, strategy after the shock 165–6, **173–4**; Sweden, effects on 166–72, 185, 189–90; Sweden, strategy after the shock 171–2, **173–4**; ways of Nordic countries 152–3, 158–9, 163–4, 170–1, 172–3
- UN Charter 55; Article 42, 65; Article 51, 65, 81, 148, 170, 171–2; Chapter VII 55, 81, 87
- United Kingdom (UK): isolation 24; as a secondary power 11
- United Nations 120, 121; *An Agenda for Peace* 55
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 55, 155; Resolution 1373 2, 81; Resolution 1386 3, 87; Resolution 2170 148
- United States 61, 123, 161, 170; Global War on Terror 2–3; as a great power 11; guarantees of aid to Sweden 17; and NATO 12, 165
- Wæver, Ole 44
- Walt, Stephen 18, 34, 36
- Waltz, Kenneth 18, 20–1, 31, 35, 36
- Warsaw Pact (WP) 10, 17, 55
- Washington Treaty 32, 81–2, 88
- ways 76–7, 105, 108, 141, 172–3; Denmark 59, 85, 120–1, 152–3; explanation of 40–1; Finland 63–4, 90–1, 126–7, 158–9; Norway 68–9, 96–7, 133, 163–4; Sweden 73, 103–4, 138–9, 170–1
- weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 61, 65, 68, 69, 71, 74, 82, 92–3, 105, 117, 129, 130, 160, 165, 180, 186
- Wivel, Anders 12
- World Trade Organization (WTO) 123