Methods in Historical Pragmatics

t.me/BooksandYou

Edited by
Susan Fitzmaurice
Irma Taavitsainen

Mouton de Gruyter

Methods in Historical Pragmatics

t.me/BooksandYou



Topics in English Linguistics 52

t.me/BooksandYou.

Editors

Elizabeth Closs Traugott
Bernd Kortmann

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Methods in Historical Pragmatics

t.me/BooksandYou

edited by

Susan Fitzmaurice
Irma Taavitsainen

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague)
is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.

t.me/BooksandYou

♾ Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Methods in historical pragmatics / edited by Susan M. Fitzmaurice, Irma Taavitsainen.
p. cm. − (Topics in English linguistics ; 52)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-3-11-019041-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Pragmatics. 2. English language − History. 3. Discourse analysis. 4. Speech acts (Linguistics) 5. Historical linguistics. I. Fitzmaurice, Susan M. II. Taavitsainen, Irma.
P99.4.P72M465 2007
306.44−dc22
2006034484

ISBN 978-3-11-019041-0
ISSN 1434-3452

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

© Copyright 2007 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin.
Printed in Germany.

Contents

Introduction 1
Susan Fitzmaurice and Irma Taavitsainen

Historical pragmatics: What it is and how to do it 11
Irma Taavitsainen and Susan Fitzmaurice

The development of *I mean*: Implications for the study of historical pragmatics 37
Laurel J. Brinton

Soþlice, forsoothe, truly – communicative principles and invited inferences in the history of truth-intensifying adverbs in English 81
Ursula Lenker

Speech act verbs and speech acts in the history of English 107
Irma Taavitsainen and Andreas H. Jucker

Text types and the methodology of diachronic speech act analysis 139
Thomas Kohnen

A pragmatics for interpreting Shakespeare's Sonnets 1 to 20: Dialogue scripts and Erasmian intertexts 167
Lynne Magnusson

Developing a more detailed picture of the English courtroom (1640–1760): Data and methodological issues facing historical pragmatics 185
Dawn Archer

What do you lacke? what is it you buy? Early Modern English service encounters 219
Birte Bös

Letters as narrative: Narrative patterns and episode structure in early letters, 1400 to 1650 241
Monika Fludernik

Historical linguistics, literary interpretation,
and the romances of Margaret Cavendish 267
James Fitzmaurice

Discoursal aspects of the *Legends of Holy Women*
by Osbern Bokenham 285
Gabriella Del Lungo Camiciotti

Index 307

t.me/BooksandYou

Introduction

Susan Fitzmaurice and Irma Taavitsainen

t.me/BooksandYou

1. Objectives of the book

The diversity of approaches that inform the essays in this volume indicates that what we call historical pragmatics is less well-defined and constrained than the seminal work by Jacobs and Jucker (1995), and Jucker (2000) might be taken to allow. The sheer range of work that falls within the parameters of pragmatics has begun to exert considerable pressure on the designator 'pragmatic'. In other words, the general term 'pragmatic' is increasingly required to describe a variety of functional analyses of historical discourse that might be better and more usefully accounted for by fresher, more finely discriminating terminology (Fitzmaurice 2000). The apparent pressure imposed by questions of classification and nomenclature on the way in which we conduct historical pragmatics research in English represents an opportunity to spur a collective review and assessment of what it is we do when we do historical pragmatics or historical discourse analysis. The present volume is an outcome of a set of many conversations prompted by this observation. As editors we set ourselves the task of assessing the body of research conducted on the history of the English language within what we might loosely identify as the framework of historical pragmatics, and critiquing the assumptions and practices defining that research. We set our contributors the task of engaging, through their own interests and concerns, with matters of approach and method as they prepared their studies. The contributions in this volume thus participate in the exercise to the extent that they offer insights into earlier communicative practices, registers, and linguistic functions as gleaned from historical discourse.

Our volume has several groups of essays distinguished loosely by their orientations within the scope of the study of language and meaning in historical texts, both literary and non-literary. The structure of the volume thus represents a critical convergence of traditions of reading texts or analyzing discourse which in turn exposes some key questions about the methods and the outcomes of such readings or analysis. In gathering the essays for this volume, we were interested in the ways in which these traditions approach

the analysis of historical discourses, discourses that have their own cultural settings, historical codes, circumstances of production and transmission, and attendant language practices. The essays in the volume address, in different ways, and with varying degrees of explicitness, to be sure, a range of issues that consider the role of context and contextual factors in conditioning the different ways in which we might read/interpret expressions. They explore the ways in which the conventions that mark particular genres are instrumental in characterizing and perhaps fixing (or not) the communicative functions associated with expressions or forms on the one hand, and the linguistic realizations of certain communicative functions on the other. The essays in this volume are thus intended to contribute to the growing maturity of historical pragmatic research approaches as they exemplify and extend the range of approaches and methods that dominate the research enterprise.

2. The contributions

The contributions in the volume share a range of concerns. The larger issues regarding methodology, data, interpretation, and explanation will always attend our research, but in this volume our contributors attend to how we approach the study of the construction and reception of speaker meanings in context with the assumption of linguistic, cultural and textual change. The essays may be read as complementary contributions on particular matters, as we will indicate.

Chapter 1, by the editors, represents a survey of the approaches and methods that are shaping the still developing field of historical pragmatics. The authors first present and then rehearse the characteristics of two distinct approaches and the methods they deploy. The first approach is marked by its reliance on large, specially designed electronic corpora of texts produced in earlier periods of the language, together with the quantitative analytical and data preparation methods developed for corpus linguistic analysis. Irma Taavitsainen examines in detail the challenges posed for historical pragmatic study using corpora by the situation-specific idiosyncracies and special characteristics of early texts owing to the special circumstances of their production and transmission. Susan Fitzmaurice discusses the second approach, one that is informed by literary historical and literary critical methods of qualitative analysis. The chapter then turns to a discussion of particular challenges and requirements for advancing the field of historical pragmatics, including the necessity of laying out and making transparent our methods of analysis,

the need to be responsible for the integrity and quality of our data, whatever their sources, and the importance of being aware of the limitations of our data and databases, either because of their design or because of their extent.

In light of these different perspectives, the contributions represented by the remaining ten chapters create a multi-faceted set of approaches to the study of language use in multiple contexts over time in earlier periods of the English language. The papers represent onomasiological approaches (the mapping of function to form) and semasiological approaches (the mapping of form to function). Some contributors seek out the meaning and functions of linguistic expressions at the clause or discourse level. A number of our contributors utilize corpora for their studies, whether purpose built or generic, and many use genre as a key concept in classifying language use. This introduction has an appendix detailing the corpora used in the studies for this volume. Finally, authors combine quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to shed light on the complexities of language change and use.

In chapter 2, Laurel Brinton adopts a semasiological method in order to examine the historical development of the expression *I mean* as a discourse marker. Her goal in offering a micro-analysis of this particular case is to contribute to the question of what mechanisms of language change are at work in the evolution of discourse markers. Accordingly, this study is part of a larger ongoing investigation of the extent to which the processes of lexicalization, idiomaticisation and pragmaticalisation may be regarded as distinct from grammaticalisation. To do this, she starts with the present and tracks back in time, to reconstruct the evolution of *I mean* as a pragmatic marker, focusing on the contexts of its occurrence and its communicative functions over time. Acknowledging the difficulty of determining pragmatic meanings in texts from earlier periods of the language, she identifies a number of semantic-pragmatic functions using Modern English corpora as a starting point, and then she goes back in time to try to determine when and in what syntactic contexts these functions first arise and how they relate to one another. This method illustrates the sort of solution researchers deploy to address the impossibility of adopting the stance and perspective of an historical speaker in a distant speech community.

In chapter 3, Ursula Lenker adopts an onomasiological method to study the changes in meaning and function of "truth" adverbials in English over time. She pays attention to the question of the survival of expressions such as *trewely/truly* in the domain at the expense of others. She is interested in the range of functions that truth adverbials perform, from phrasal and sentential level emphatics, to discourse organizers used intersubjectively. She

concludes that the truth adverbials under scrutiny undergo regular semantic-pragmatic change in the process of acquiring phrasal, sentential, and finally discourse communicative functions as particles. As in chapter 2, the relationship of meaning change to processes of grammaticalization underpins the discussion in chapter 3. Interestingly, Lenker demonstrates that taking a pragmatic perspective using Grice's maxim of quality necessitates the assumption of onomasiological change with respect to the truth adverbials she examines.

From the level of lexeme, we shift to the question of speech acts and their linguistic realization over time. Chapters 4 and 5 form an interesting pair of papers on the problem of identifying speech acts in earlier periods of the English language. Adopting an approach informed by corpus linguistics and genre analysis, Irma Taavitsainen and Andreas Jucker explore the challenge of identifying and searching for speech acts in large scale electronic corpora. As they observe, speech acts are fuzzy concepts; as well as being culture-specific and time-specific, together with their specific linguistic realizations, speech acts are socio-culturally negotiated. Accordingly, each speech community creates its own inventory of speech acts and the speech act verbs with which they can talk about the speech acts themselves. Taavitsainen and Jucker examine a set of verbs in the semantic space of verbal aggression in order to ascertain the extent to which they are used to operate within the pragmatic space of verbal aggression. The challenge in this paper is the fact that speech acts can be realized using linguistic expressions other than the speech act verbs that we ordinarily take to be their ordinary linguistic realizations. It is clear that the corpus-based approach provides a controlled setting for the exploration of the relationship between speech act verbs and speech acts, and this allows the development of a means to identify how a speech community perceives specific speech acts.

Thomas Kohnen's contribution in chapter 5 provides a micro-level analysis of the problem of identifying speech acts in earlier periods of the language. Instead of beginning the task with a word-list gleaned from a semantic space, as Taavitsainen and Jucker do, Kohnen uses a set of sub-corpora designed specifically for the purpose – a genre-based corpus of sermons extracted from corpora collecting texts from Old English to Early Modern English – to explore possible changes in speech acts in a specific genre over time. Kohnen thus scours his corpora for the extent and range of predictable forms of directive speech acts, classifying sub-types functionally, as performatives, imperatives, modal expressions and indirect manifestations. Instead of identifying a set of linguistic forms and on the basis of their frequency

and distribution in a given set of texts, working out their pragmatic functions, he sets out to find the forms that may be pressed into service by speakers in order to convey a range of functions, namely directives. This method allows him to uncover the multiple instantiations of directives in religious instructional prose exemplified by the sermon and homily in earlier practices of English religious instruction. He notes that the qualitative nature of this task precludes an automatic method. The use of a genre-specific database both makes the task manageable and provides a basis for the assessment of the method's effectiveness. Thomas Kohnen's essay thus represents a major methodological innovation in corpus-based historical pragmatics.

Chapters 4 and 5 together provide a tantalizing pair of perspectives on the study of a standard pragmatic phenomenon, and one that is probably the most frequently studied in pragmatics that is not focused on earlier periods of the language. It is evident that the use of large databases of texts provides an immensely valuable source of language in use in earlier periods at the same time as presenting a challenge for analytical tasks that cannot be automated. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the extent to which the identification of speech acts can be greatly simplified (not to say routinized) by the adoption of genre-specific corpora.

Chapters 6 and 7 take our attention to the historical nature of interrogational activities in courtroom discourse and that of the transactional activities in service encounters respectively. Accordingly, Dawn Archer addresses the methodological challenges of making systematic assumptions about spoken interaction from written records whose production and use were constrained by historical notions of genre and function. In chapter 7, Birte Bös tackles the challenge presented by the elusive nature of historical service encounters, investigating the extent to which the pragmalinguistic realizations of the interactions represented are marked, stereotypical or parodic. Both authors adopt a corpus-based approach though each exploits her corpus in very specific ways. Archer develops a check-list of linguistic features in order to explore what might be typical or not within a specific environment, namely, the courtroom trial exemplified by the Salem witchcraft trials in the late seventeenth century. She draws extensively from the historical accounts of the trials as well as from her own pragmatic readings of the courtroom records to provide a rich description of the discursive practices that characterized the culture of these trials. This study exemplifies the ways in which historical pragmatic studies can be critically informed by the materials and methods of other disciplines, in this case, social history. Bös also explores texts from the Early Modern period in order to examine the ways in which service en-

counters of the period contrast with those of the present. Bös adopts a conversational discourse analytical approach based on the classic conversational and situational analytical methods developed by Schriffin on the one hand, and by Gumperz and Hymes on the other. Her study illustrates the effective adaptation of methods designed for the study of present day spoken conversational data and their application to speech-based or related data.

The remaining chapters, chapters 8 through 11, enact the literary-philological impulse in historical pragmatics and reveal opportunities for productive conversations among linguists and literary scholars over the structure and functions of narrative discourse. In chapter 8, Monika Fludernik traces the emergence of narrative episodes in letters produced between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries by tracking the roles of discourse markers in narrative structures in this genre. Fludernik demonstrates the value of a usage based approach to the analysis of narrative in a specific genre over time. Some of her findings are indeed tantalizing for developing our understanding of the competing influences of genre and chronology in shaping rhetorical structure and narrative style. Indeed, her conclusions regarding the ways in which discourse markers accent points in the episode structure of narratives that characterize particular genres within the letter, such as romance indicate that there is a great deal of material here for further study.

In chapter 9, Lynne Magnusson explicitly calls for the interaction of literary and linguistic analysis in her study of the language of Shakespeare's sonnets. She pays attention to the influence of prior texts such as Erasmus' educational writings, including *De conscribendis epistolis* ("On the Writing of Letters") on the style and meaning of the language in the object of analysis. In particular, she attends to the deployment and functions of the pronouns *you/thou*, arguing that Shakespeare imitated and transformed certain Erasmian rules into recipes (or dialogue scripts) for use in the sonnets. The dialogue script is a textual manifestation of the culturally given interaction genres upon which interactants draw to conduct various communicative routines, including an argument between a married couple. Critically, she attends to the nature of audience, and is interested in Shakespeare's choice of language designed for reception by a particularly imagined audience. This attention to reception is important to the analysis of the ways in which speech communities regard particular pragmatic phenomena, including speech acts. Magnusson's contribution is also important in encouraging the beginnings of a productive dialogue between historical pragmatics and literary discourse analysis in order to develop methods that may be mutually valuable.

In chapter 10, James Fitzmaurice continues the theme of interaction among literary and linguistic methods for the study of language in use in earlier periods of the language. He compares romance and non-romance narratives as a context for examining how speakers and writers demonstrate their changing understanding of the functions of reporting clauses through the processes of editing and rewriting. Comparing large-scale corpora of literary texts (Literature Online – LION – and Renaissance Women Online – RWO) with a specialized corpus of the romances written by a seventeenth century writer, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, he examines the extent to which the use and distributing of reporting clauses might be associated specifically with the genre of romance. Here, the focus is on the relation of language in selected texts to tendencies or patterns in the genre to which those texts might be argued to belong. Like Magnusson's study, Fitzmaurice's takes a historical discourse analysis perspective to linguistic choice. Unusually for a principally literary approach, Fitzmaurice uses a basic quantitative method to uncover the question of typicality of use.

Last but not least, in chapter 11 Gabriella Del Lungo Camiciotti aims to show how reports of direct speech are an integral part of the genre of saints' lives, as exemplified by Bokenham's *Legends of Holy Women*. She focuses on rhetorical and narrative functions served by directly reported speech in the *Legends*, noting both how they recall dramatic structure as well as serving the narrative. Such narratives were designed to promote social cohesion in connection with ritual and cultic practices in the period, and to interpret for the community the very ideal of sanctity itself. Adopting a method of analysis based on the models developed by Labov on the one hand and Fleischman on the other, Camiciotti conducts a pragmaphilological study of the *Legends*. Camiciotti shows the extent to which dialogue serves textual and pragmatic functions, on the one hand, and stylistic and interpersonal on the other.

These four chapters illustrate some of the ways in which researchers may draw upon multiple approaches and methods in concert to offer compelling accounts of historical pragmatic phenomena that are critically grounded in the historical, social, and textual histories of the language.

3. The history of the volume

This volume of essays is the outcome of several events and initiatives. In August 2002, we convened a workshop on Historical Pragmatics as part of the Twelfth International Conference on English Historical Linguistics in

Glasgow. The workshop was designed as a forum for participants to examine matters of data collection and selection, data analysis, and interpretation in the body of work on the history of the English language that identifies itself as historical pragmatic in approach.

The discussion at the workshop was so wide-ranging and varied that we decided both to memorialize the workshop discussion and continue the conversation begun, in the form of a volume of essays. As we began work on assembling and reading the essays, we decided that we needed to range farther a-field in order to expand the scope of the discussion started in Glasgow. Irma attended the biannual conference of the European Society for the Study of English, ESSE-6, in Strasbourg later in 2002, where she convened a seminar together with Andreas H. Jucker, and where she heard some provocative papers offered in a historical discourse panel. We invited those participants to contribute their essays, and were very pleased with the response.

However, we wanted to build a volume of essays that would constitute a wide-ranging discussion from multiple perspectives rather than a collection of separate and independent essays that did not appear to speak to the same questions. It so happened that Elizabeth Traugott and Susan convened a panel at the annual Modern Languages Association Convention in San Diego in December 2003 which was aimed at examining the limits and limitations of 'text' as evidence in the theorization of interpretation. The panelists conducted a conversation regarding the use of texts as evidence for theorizing interpretative processes as analytical procedures that remain robust when applied as routines, rather than as subjective, highly contextual, nonce interpretations. One outcome of that panel discussion was an invitation to participants of that session to submit papers to our volume. Some additional contributions were invited to complement the collection.

We hope that the conversational points that we have raised in this opening chapter will colour and shape the reader's travels through the studies in the volume. More importantly, we hope that the reader will be challenged to pose more questions as well as glimpse some answers to the issues already raised. We are fortunate now to be able to present a collection of essays that represent the nature and texture of the ongoing discussions among scholars interested in exploring the most effective and illuminating ways to study the changing meanings and functions of language over time. The perspectives included are varied indeed; linguists and literary scholars demonstrate their different takes on the data and materials at hand, on formal and functional analytical modes, and on different ways to accounts for their findings to offer interesting interventions on the ways in which we conduct historical prag-

matics. We thank our contributors, and we thank the editors of the series. We particularly thank our editorial assistant Jukka Tuominen for his efficiency and for a job well done.

Appendix – List of electronic corpora for English historical pragmatics

The studies reported in the contributions to this volume draw upon a diverse body of texts for their data, including many texts accessible only in manuscript or printed form. In addition, a formidable range of electronic text corpora covering the language in a range of periods in the history of the English language provides a major source of data for historical pragmatics analysis. Although details of all of the data sources are given in the contributions themselves, we list the electronic corpora and databases here for the reader's convenience.

ARCHER Corpus (= *A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers)*. Corpus Linguistics Research Program, Northern Arizona University. 10 prose registers of American English (1750–199) and British English (1650–1990). ⟨http://www.nau.edu/english/CLRP/⟩

British National Corpus, World Edition (BNC). 100 million word collection of written (90%) and spoken language (10%) designed to represent a wide cross-section of British English from the later part of the twentieth century. Monolingual, synchronic language samples. ⟨http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk⟩

Chadwyck-Healey On-line Literature Collection. Accessible through university library affiliation. The literature collections include the following: Prose subcollections in Early American Fiction (1789–1875), Early English Prose Fiction, Eighteenth-century Prose Fiction, Nineteenth-century Prose Fiction, Drama collections: American Drama (1714–1915), English Drama, Twentieth-century Drama. For additional details of new collections, consult ⟨http://www.proquest.co.uk/brands/CHbrand.html⟩

Corpus of English Dialogues (1560–1760). Compiled by Merja Kytö (Uppsala) and Jonathan Culpeper (Lancaster). Includes a sub-corpus, the Sociopragmatic Corpus (henceforth SPC), a specially annotated sub-section.

Dictionary of Old English, Old English Corpus. ⟨http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/o/oec/⟩

ICAME Collection of English Language Corpora. 1999. 2nd ed. CD-ROM. The HIT Centre, University of Bergen, Norway. Corpora included in the ICAME collection and used in the volume:
Australian Corpus of English (ACE) [synchronic]
Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler (CEEC) [diachronic]
Freiburg-LOB Corpus British English (FLOB) [synchronic]
Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English (FROWN) [synchronic]

Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, diachronic part (see Kytö 1996). (HC)
Lampeter = Lampeter Corpus of Early Modern English Tracts (see ⟨http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/LAMPETER/LAMPHOME.HTM⟩)
London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (LLC) [synchronic]
Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English (WC) [synchronic]

Literature Online (LION). Accessible through university library affiliation. A collection of full-text versions of 350,000 works of English and American poetry, drama and prose. Includes work from 1500 to the present.

Middle English Collection, University of Virginia, Electronic Text Center. ⟨http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/mideng.browse.html⟩

Middle English Dictionary, Middle English Consortium. ⟨http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/med/⟩

Modern English Collection, University of Virginia, Electronic Text Center. ⟨http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/modeng/modeng0.browse.html⟩

Oxford English Dictionary. 2003. 3rd ed. online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⟨http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl⟩

Renaissance Women Online. Brown University Women Writers Project (WWO). ⟨http://www.wwp.brown.edu/⟩

References

Fitzmaurice, Susan
2000 Remarks on the rhetoric of historical pragmatics. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 2 (1): 1–6.

Jacobs, Andreas, and Andreas Jucker
1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In *Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in the History of English*, Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Jucker, Andreas
2000 English historical pragmatics: problems of data and methodology. In *English Diachronic Pragmatics*, Gabriella di Martino, and Maria Lima (eds.), 17–55. Napoli: Cuen.

Historical pragmatics: What it is and how to do it[1]

Irma Taavitsainen and Susan Fitzmaurice

1. Introduction

How do we, as historical pragmaticians, historical linguists, historical discourse analysts, or philologists, guarantee that the interpretations and inferences we offer of language forms and features in texts produced in periods distant from our own are valid? This is an ambitious question, and it is uncertain whether we can ever provide a definitive answer. In this chapter, we take this provocative question as a starting point for discussion in the light of recent developments. The convergence of different traditions of reading texts and analysing discourse prompts fresh discussion of the methods that make historical pragmatics. The interaction of formal and functional approaches on the one hand, and of linguistics and discourse studies on the other have helped shape new dynamic fields of study prompting visits into various disciplines to better inform our work. What we call historical pragmatics is one such interesting instance; its increasingly interdisciplinary character with its elastic boundaries encourages exciting innovations.

The linguistic study of historical texts is complicated. It is natural to encounter obscurity, vagueness, and ambiguity of language use in the material products of distant cultures with no direct access to the speakers and original contexts of production. Furthermore, data problems grow more conspicuous the further back in time we go. The question is, what is the quality of this vagueness? How much of an obstacle is obscurity? Is ambiguity a data problem or is it a problem that arises because of the nature of the historical period? Answers to these questions are elusive and difficult to pinpoint. The special characteristics of historical texts and their production and transmission pose particular challenges to researchers to understand what these features are and why the material is such as it is.

In this chapter, we review the scope of the field that we call historical pragmatics, and its definitions. Then we approach the field from two perspectives, and consider the challenges of method and data within those terms. The first perspective is the increasingly popular and dominant domain of quantitative corpus linguistics, and its special application to historical linguistics.

The second perspective is literary and qualitative in impulse. We shall also review the foundational questions and problems for historical pragmatics, and offer some recommendations for future study.

2. The scope of historical pragmatics

2.1. History and definition

Historical pragmatics has been defined as historical linguistics combined with pragmatics (*Journal of Historical Pragmatics*, cover). According to modern textbook definitions, historical linguistics investigates the ways in which language changes over time and how different languages are interrelated.[2] The ultimate aim of historical linguistics is to explain the causes of linguistic change (Milroy 1992: 20). Recent developments in historical linguistics reflect the abandonment of earlier views of language as a homogeneous entity. The variationist view regards language as "an object possessing orderly heterogeneity" (Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968: 100), and relies on language change as its point of departure:

> One of the most important facts about human language is that it is continuously changing … At this very moment changes are being implemented and diffused: old varieties are dying out and new varieties are springing up; … sometimes change is rapid, and sometimes it is slow, and at any given time some linguistic structures are changing while others remain stable. (Milroy 1992: 1)

Empirical studies that rely on computerised corpora as databases constitute the main trend in English historical linguistics at present. With internal variability of past language forms at centre stage, it was only a matter of time for the traditional areas of historical linguistics, i.e. phonetics, morphology and syntax, to cross over to semantics and pragmatics. Modern historical linguistics has developed into several, somewhat overlapping subfields. We have had historical stylistics since the 1960s (Sebeok 1960), historical sociolinguistics since the 1980s (Romaine 1982)[3], and historical pragmatics since the mid-1990s (see below).[4]

Pragmatics, the other component piece of 'historical pragmatics', has been defined in various ways, e.g. as "the study of speaker meaning as distinct from word or sentence meaning" (Yule 1996: 133), or as negotiation of meaning in interaction, taking "account of the different contributions of

both speaker and hearer as well as that of utterance and context to the making of meaning" (Thomas 1995: 23). The most theoretical approaches have dealt with utterances separated from their discourse context, following the traditions of Chomskyan formal syntax, accommodating introspection in interpretation. Indeed, much early work in pragmatics overlaps with language philosophy (see Levinson 1983). At first empirical pragmatics attended solely to the study of authentic spoken language, but its scope has since expanded to include texts as communicative events. Pragmatics focuses on contextualised uses of language, viewing language as a communicative instrument that responds to and is shaped by the pressures of actual situations of verbal interaction with specific communicative purposes and specific speech contexts. It is the pragmatician's task to describe how larger utterances and verbal exchanges cohere, what kinds of communicative functions utterances perform, and what the unspoken "rules" of communication are. The broadening scope in pragmatics with the acceptance of written material as legitimate data was crucial for historical pragmatics. As historical linguistics has become more empirically grounded, with the study of variability in the forefront, and pragmatics including a broader range of material, even historical written texts removed from spoken modes of communication by several moves (see below), so it was possible for the development of the field that we now know as historical pragmatics (Jucker 2000, 2006).

A provisional and fairly neutral definition of historical pragmatics could be that historical pragmatics focuses on language use in past contexts and examines how meaning is made. It is an empirical branch of linguistic study, with focus on authentic language use in the past. This definition is sufficient to cover this new and dynamic field, with its various branches and different foci.

2.2. Branches of historical pragmatics

As a field of study historical pragmatics is about ten years old.[5] It is a well-established branch of historical linguistics with its own journal and a broad range of research topics and methodologies. According to the opening view in the volume *Historical Pragmatics* (1995), historical pragmatics has two main branches, pragmaphilology and diachronic pragmatics. This view is still valid and frequently repeated, but the present state of the field is more elaborate. Pragmaphilology has been described as consisting of largely synchronic descriptions and studies on pragmatic aspects of historical texts in

their sociocultural context. Examples of such studies include new readings of medieval texts, analyses of Chaucerian dialogues or Shakespearean scenes, or new communicative interpretations of documentary evidence. Even if the approach is not explicitly informed by a present-day perspective, the insights offered about, say, acts of courtship in domestic situations in Shakespeare's time are inevitably shaped by a present-day reading of the past. According to the pragmatic approach, texts – both literary and non-literary – are regarded as communicative events in their own right. Diachronic pragmatics, in contrast, compares two or more stages of the same language, and the focus is on language change. This branch is further divided into form-to-function and function-to-form mapping. The former studies for example how the communicative functions of linguistic features like pragmatic particles, interjections or intensifiers have changed over time. The opposite, function-to-form mappings trace the changing linguistic realisations of pragmatic phenomena over time, for example, the various ways in which speech acts are realised across time (Jacobs and Jucker 1995).

The term *discourse* is often connected with *pragmatics*. Indeed, the terms have been explained with different foci but are often used interchangeably, contributing to a terminological maze. Text-based historical pragmatics and historical discourse analysis overlap, and further terms like historical dialogue analysis have also been used. Brinton (2001) divides the field of historical discourse analysis into three branches. Of these the first, historical discourse analysis proper, focuses on particular stages of language and the study is largely synchronic; the description corresponds to Jacobs and Jucker's pragmaphilology. The second branch is diachronically-oriented discourse analysis, and focuses on the evolution of forms and systems that have discourse functions (cf. diachronic pragmatics). The third is discourse-oriented historical pragmatics, which seeks to find the origins or motivations for change in discourse.[6]

Language change is of overarching importance in historical linguistics, and as historical linguistics is the launching pad of historical pragmatics, it is natural that language change should be prominent in historical pragmatics as well. An alternative definition of historical pragmatics presents it as a use-based approach to linguistic change:

> … the study of meaning change based on theoretical pragmatics has come to play an important part in our understanding not only of semantic change and lexicalization, but also of the relationship between structure and use in general, most especially the nature of contextual meaning (Traugott 2004a: 538).

Traugott (2004a) relates the branches of historical pragmatics to language change, calling pragmaphilology the "macro-approach" with its focus on changing social conditions, whereas diachronic pragmatics is a "micro-approach" with a focus on the interface between linguistic structure and use. Form-to-function mapping can be associated with semasiological changes, the pertinent question being "What are the constraints on ways in which meaning can change while form remains constant?" Function-to-form mapping is onomasiological, the question being "What constraints are there on recruitment of extant terms to express a semantic category?" The interface of semantics and pragmatics has received a great deal of attention lately. Much of the work at this interface deals with grammaticalisation, and recent studies adopt a "neo-Gricean" approach.[7] For a historical linguist the issue is finding what the "path" of the change is, what motivates it, and what the mechanism of the change is (Traugott 2004a: 548). The first is the transition question, while mechanisms and motivations are part of the actuation question (Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968). A great part of the work in this branch of historical pragmatics overlaps with historical linguistics.[8] The general direction indicated by numerous studies is that interpersonal and subjective meanings develop out of more concrete meanings; context is seen as a major explanatory factor.

It is evident from recent studies that the lines notionally dividing these branches have become indistinct, and some of the labels, e.g. *historical pragmatics* and *historical discourse analysis*, are applied almost indiscriminately as an increasing number of historical pragmatic studies are based on large units of textual data, i.e. discourse. As a consequence, it is increasingly difficult to delimit the domain of historical pragmatics and the scope has been presented in somewhat different ways in the literature. Fields overlap and influence one another. A clear indication of a work belonging to historical pragmatics is its focus on core pragmatic features like inference, implicature, presupposition, maxims of conversation, the Co-operative Principle, politeness, or speech acts. As such studies increase and new perspectives open up, a vision of a pragmatic history of English is taking shape.

3. Corpus linguistics, historical linguistics, and historical pragmatics

Research methods of historical pragmatics rely upon the adaptation and application of current theories of language to earlier periods in language history. In her inaugural volume on historical sociolinguistics, Romaine argued that

"the working principle of sociolinguistic reconstruction must be the 'uniformitarian principle'. In other words, we accept that the linguistic forces which operate today and are observable around us are not unlike those which have operated in the past" (1982: 122).[9] The uniformitarian principle has been accepted in historical linguistics without much challenge. Yet the issue becomes more complicated in historical pragmatics where we are required to differentiate between structure and use. If we assume that language (structure) works identically regardless of period or culture, then we are obliged to ask the same question of use. In other words, is it true that the manifestation of language in use also works identically regardless of period or culture? This question has tantalized pragmaticians who have taken up the matter in consequence. Grice's distinction between conventional and conversational implicature serves to distinguish among pragmatic inferences that may be reliably made in multiple contexts and those that occur in conversational contexts and may not necessarily be replicated in just any other context. Examples of culture-dependent interpretations are insults or jokes; hearers may recognize that an insult has taken place but unless the hearer is familiar with the culture and context in which insults mean insults and jokes mean jokes, the hearer might not be able to parse the insult or get the joke. We cannot assume a direct correspondence between form and function. This and similar examples make us more sceptical than most historical linguists. Yet we can accept a weaker statement that there is "no reason for claiming that language did not vary in the same patterned ways in the past as it has been observed to do today (Romaine 1982: 123); the patterns themselves, however, may differ from present-day language practices.

In recent decades, linguistics has seen a shift from Chomskyan armchair linguistics to empirical studies using authentic data. The introduction of statistical methods into linguistics took place decades ago with their application in authorship studies and descriptions of grammatical structures in large computer-readable corpora (Burrows 1960). The technical development of the linguistic analysis of computer-based corpora has been rapid, from the first narrow-scale pilot studies to more ambitious research projects. The introduction of corpus-based methodology into linguistic inquiry has changed the conduct of empirical research in fields such as lexical studies, cognitive semantics, and second-language acquisition. The most obvious realisation of present-day corpus-based approach in linguistics is the development of richly data-driven accounts of language use, e.g. the *Longman Grammar* (1999) based on a 40-million-word corpus, or dictionaries based on frequency counts of corpora of hundreds of millions of words.[10] It is only natural that

the methodology and techniques adopted in corpus linguistics have started to shape historical pragmatics as an empirical branch of linguistics. Indeed, its interaction and overlap with historical linguistics is worth closer scrutiny. The use of computerised corpora in English historical linguistics originated with the *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts*, a 1.5-million-word multi-genre general-purpose structured corpus launched in 1991. Corpus linguistics methodology has shaped the conduct of the empirically-based studies of language change at the heart of historical linguistics. The point of departure in corpus-based studies is a theoretical assumption of the mechanism of change and its direction.

There are several databases currently available for historical studies, and increasingly, new unconventional corpora are being compiled for specific research projects.[11] In addition, large corpora of literary and biblical texts such as the Chadwyck-Healey collections make entire texts from all possible historical periods available to scholars, but the software and methods of analysis used in such studies are in need of development. Empirical investigations of various types of corpora provide new lenses through which to approach old research questions, and it has also become possible to pose questions in new ways. Typical research questions for historical corpus linguistics include the extent to which the frequency and distribution of particular linguistic features across text-types or registers, sorted by historical periods, provide evidence for claims about linguistic change. The corpus linguistic method relies on processing large quantities of authentic data with statistical methods. The increasing sophistication of statistical assessments in historical linguistics has made frequency counts common working tools for instance in historical stylistics.

Historical pragmaticians have begun to use the resources of corpus linguistics, conducting corpus-based studies and stretching the robustness of the method to approach pragmatic research questions. The research question is key here, as it is not clear that corpus methodology is applicable to purely pragmatic research questions. For example, in form-to-function analysis, a challenge for corpus-based approaches is the identification of the functions before their associated forms, which is a laborious and time-consuming task not readily amenable to corpus methodology. Progress has been made: there are new applications of corpus linguistic methods that illuminate subtle features of discourse and argumentation patterns. For instance, it is possible to distinguish implicit meanings and association patterns, such as “spirals of moral panic” in eighteenth-century prose with key word analysis (McEnery 2006).[12]

The difficulties in applying corpus methods are most manifest with macrolevel questions like the diachronic development of speech acts. Indeed, corpus-based methods can be barriers to the investigation of pragmatic phenomena like conversational implicatures, which are neither routinely nor conventionally realized in lexical grammatical expressions. In these cases, corpus methodology encourages the identification of the function with a linguistic expression; such reliance can severely limit findings and thus jeopardize the validity of the study.

4. Data problems for corpus-based historical pragmatics

4.1. Orality and literacy

A prerequisite for the conduct of historical pragmatics is the acceptance of written texts as legitimate data. The interest in spoken language of the past has two different aspirations. One relates to historical linguistics and the theory of language change "from below"; the idea is that genres nearest to spoken language would be pioneers of change and the closer to spoken language a text is, the deeper we can probe the initial stages of language change in past periods. The other trend relates to pragmatic interest in spontaneous speech and studying speech-like features in written texts of the past to enable comparison with modern conversation studies or dialogue analysis. The distance of various genres from spoken language was actively researched in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the attempt to find most speech-like written language of the past, researchers collected drama comedies as the closest to speech, and selected passages from trial records and fiction to affect speech-like data.

Yet even with such ostensibly speech-based or related genres, the conventions governing their production have to be taken into account. For instance, encoding practices were conventionalised in courtrooms, letters follow set formulae, and typified utterances are common in fiction.[13] The most influential corpus-based synchronic linguistic study of the relation of spoken and written language to date is Biber's *Variation across Speech and Writing* (1988). Its key findings that linguistic features may serve different functions, from marking a speaker's involvement or a speaker's concern to convey information, have inspired others to adapt and modify his approach for application to historical data. Biber's approach consists of the examination and interpretation of the co-occurrence patterns of linguistic features retrieved by

statistical methods, and tends to reduce attention to contextual factors, which are essential components of pragmatic analyses. More recently the model of the language of immediacy versus the language of distance has provided another angle to the discussion; the advantage is that both the spoken and written ends of the scale have both formal and informal realisations (Jucker 2000: 19–27; Koch 1999; Koch and Österreicher 1985; cf. Chafe 1985). In addition, the model takes into account both genre context and context of situation, which makes it more readily applicable to pragmatics. These two models have gained acceptance in historical linguistics and historical pragmatics, but there is a third kind of influence of spoken language to be taken into account as well, and it brings us to more philological considerations.

It is a commonly accepted fact that the European Middle Ages were "oral", as writing was dictated and literature was transmitted by reading aloud. Oral practices continue in the Early Modern period and beyond. For example, pamphlets were read aloud in street corners centuries after the introduction of printing, and we still have poetry readings and religious events build on reading aloud, to mention just a few traces of orality in the modern world. The primarily oral mode of medieval culture reflects on the structure of language, and the indeterminate nature of vernacular texts has been noted by scholars familiar with readings in original manuscripts (Fleischman 1990; Blockley 2001). Adopting literacy practices has taken centuries; the reading experience of a play is very different from viewing it staged, as our imagination is not trained to combining orality practices with the written mode. Past periods were different.

It has been noted in literacy studies for a long time that oral habits leave a mark on the composition of texts. For example, traces of orality in Chaucer's texts include long mnemonic lists of things and *loci amoeni* for the audience to pause and contemplate upon.[14] Medieval vernacular documents contain features that do not belong to modern written prose: texts are full of idiosyncrasies and incoherences, with gaps, anomalies of grammar, and incoherent discourse patterns. Additive sentence structures with *and*, *then*, *thus*, etc. have been pointed out as traces of orality (Ong 1982). Such sentence structures are extremely common in late medieval non-literary prose, as the following extract from a vernacular medical treatise dealing with theory and praxis demonstrates. The passage also shows how difficult it is to read a text without punctuation, and how impossible research would be if corpora were based on diplomatic transcriptions like this. Points of comparison can be found in spoken language and its characteristics:

(1) Also in another maner a mannys accidental complexion is vnkyndelich changed and than it maketh a man falle in to syknesse and such changyng cometh in many maner wyse as in chaungyng of metis other of drynkes also in takyng to moche outher to lytel of mete and drynk in slepyng to moche other wakyng to moche outher travaylyng to moche bathyng to moche or restyng to moche thynkyng to moche gret joye gret sorowe gret angir gret hete other of cold outher of drynesse outher of moystenes of the place …

(Thesaurus pauperum, 15th cent. MS: BL Sloane 3489, ff. 29r–33v)

Orality played a role in shaping the grammar of medieval vernaculars and, consequently, the linguistic structures at the level of syntax and discourse. It is not always easy to make meaning in texts as the "pragmatic" functions of discursive strategies of past periods in real contexts may be obscure. Language features reflect oral practices, not the written idiom. Old French texts have been characterised as follows:

> … word boundaries and orthography are inconsistent; case marking is idiosyncratic and obviously no longer functional; tense usage seems to defy grammatical logic, with jarring alternations between the past and the present; clauses are often simply strung together, with little or no formal "connective tissue" (subordinators, coordinators) to articulate the junctures; narrative chronology can be illogical, showing major temporal gaps and prolepses as well as conspicuous repetitions of the same events. (Fleischman 1990: 21)

We may add other features to the list, for instance, multiple voices in discourse. A typical case with fluctuation of personal pronouns is provided by a specialised medical text of the fifteenth century:

(2) Of the which boke yn the fyrst chapitre he declarith what an eye ys and the makyng þerof after the opinion of the auntient phisitions and also after his own seying: a eye is a rounde holow thing … Consequently he shewyth how an ey is made … But hyer fynyally I wyl 3e knowe, 3e þat wyll be practyfe yn the acurye crafte, þat noon of þies iiij curable cateractes yt nedyth to doon from clene metys abstynence, as I haue prouyd by experyence, … neuerthelesse yt behouyth alwey to haue …

(*Benvenutus Grassus*, pp. 49–51)

The point of view vacillates and the combination of the third person and the first person metatext is strange, but can be explained. The text is a translation

of a learned Latin text, and the shifts of personal pronouns in English reflect an intermediate mode between a paraphrase and a commentary (Taavitsainen 2004). Genre conventions were not fixed and the strange fluctuation reflects the difficulties in writing science in the vernacular. Similar passages are common in literary texts.

The fuzziness of genres was brought to focus in literary studies in the early 1980s (Fowler 1982), and recent trends in linguistics have extended the discussion to grammatical categories (Lakoff 1987; Aarts et al. 2004). An alternative has been offered in viewing grammar as "emergent", that is, not as a synchronically stable bedrock of form-and-meaning or form-and-function correlations, but as a set of linguistic transactions that are continually being negotiated in individual contexts of communication (Hopper 1988). This view accords well with historical pragmatics, where the fuzziness, ambiguity and vagueness of categories can be informed by considerations of the nature of data sources, such as the contrast of oral versus literate practices mentioned above.

4.2. Manuscripts and editorial interpretations

Some scholars have gone as far as advocating a return to original manuscript sources in linguistic research.[15] This stance is not new; literary bibliography focuses on the nature of the questions that can be asked depending upon the status of a text, relative to its predecessors and copies. Accordingly, the quality and provenance of medieval literary texts, renaissance texts and even eighteenth-century English texts have been key concerns in this field for decades. Returning to manuscripts cannot be the solution here, as it is impossible to do this on a larger scale, though digitising techniques open up new possibilities for taking manuscript reality into account.[16] For practical reasons it is impossible not to rely on edited texts in large-scale corpora, but what can and should be done is to take the local, idiosyncratic nature of source texts better into account. It is the editor's task to make past texts available to scholars, and thus editors are important mediators of past texts and language structures. The process of editing involves decisions between alternatives from blurred and indistinct letter forms that might invite different interpretations to expanding abbreviations, marking corrupt forms and possible emendations; in good editions these steps are clearly marked, but it often takes an expert reader to use the apparatus. When translated into electronic form, distinctions such as the use of italic and roman typeface to mark

editorial intervention may be lost. Computerised historical corpora rely on editions, with a few exceptions.[17] Texts with complicated transmissions are different from more ephemeral texts. Punctuating a medieval text is always a problem as medieval practices were very different from ours, and imposing modern ideas and practices on medieval texts is a form of interpretation. For instance, the notion of *verbatim* quotations is a modern concept, and sentence boundaries can be ambiguous.[18] Editors' judgements gain more weight and have cumulative effects as linguistic assessments of, for example, syntactic structures are based on editions. In general, edited texts are too easily taken for granted by scholars not familiar with editing practices.

5. Historical discourse analysis, philology and "new philology"

Let us consider approaches to discourse analysis and interpretation as literary critical and cultural practice. These approaches involve assessing and describing the cultural and literary context in which a text is produced or reproduced. In this practice, it is not only the illocutions of the author that count but the reader is required to offer an interpretation of the way(s) in which the writer's subject position or perspective shapes and constrains the ways in which his or her words can be read. In this sense, the practice is fundamentally concerned with making manifest the ways in which language can be understood in its contexts. *Context* here is a very rich concept, collecting historical, ideological, material, as well as textual contexts.

Although the provenance of this brand of discourse analytical approach might be generalized as broadly literary in impulse and in disciplinary influence, it has been appropriated and developed within a range of related theoretical paradigms that one might collectively term "the new philology". Now, in order to construe the "new" in the term "new philology", it is important to review the tenets of traditional philology. In brief broad brush strokes, the philological approach to literary study was the foundation of literary studies in English, French, German, Russian, and Italian in European universities in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. Central to the philological approach is the assumption of linguistic skill, expertise and knowledge of the sociohistorical background in construing the structural and stylistic aspects of the language of the text. Texts regarded as critical objects of study were typically literary texts produced in periods distant from that of the scholar's own, and thus intimate knowledge of the historical variety or dialect of the text's language was critical. Context was considered equally

important, requiring the ability to conduct an analysis of the intellectual, historical, and cultural period in which the text was produced and transmitted. The philological tradition was instrumental in fashioning the establishment of the Old English, Medieval, and Early Modern canons of English literature. In the course of the twentieth century, the advent of practical criticism (as expounded by I. A. Richards in England) and New Criticism (as practised by John Crowe Ransom in the US), on the one hand, and the advancement of the Jakobsonian structuralist and Derridian and Foucauldian post-structuralist poetics, on the other, swiftly displaced the primary place that philology had occupied in the academy.[19] However, vigorous reaction against the perception of exclusive focus on aesthetic form by the structuralists and against the mystification of practical criticism motivated a general revisioning of the philological method. This took place through the complex lenses of critical theories borrowed from history, psychoanalysis, anthropology, modern linguistics, and political philosophy.[20] Accordingly, depending upon the period and/or place in which the text(s) examined find their source and production, the paradigm might be post-colonial, new historicist, rhetorical, cultural, etc. For example, the most persistent and constantly contested paradigm for the study of Early Modern English texts (including Shakespeare, renaissance English drama, historical memoir, philosophy, etc.) is new historicism, an approach that privileges the place of history, including that of the text, its material culture, and that of the author, in shaping interpretation.[21] Competing, though related, approaches to historical discourse analysis privilege sexuality and gender identity (variously labelled gender studies, feminisms, queer theory), politics and ideology (Marxisms), or indeed psychology and subjectivity (psychoanalytical theories).

The approaches mentioned here are linked by method rather than framework, though the field of literary studies is replete with critique and counter-critique. To risk oversimplification, in each case, the scholar must demonstrate how the theory shapes and constrains the text's range of meanings, whether the meanings sought privilege cultural, political, subjective and/or literary interpretation. Thus the reader reads the language of the text, whether literary or non-literary, through a lens provided by homosexual identity, or Marxism, or psychoanalysis. Importantly, the object of inquiry – the text – is not constrained in type or genre. The texts that scholars argue are critical communicative acts range from the poetic to the quotidian. The textual data for analysis include drama as the imitation, symbolisation or representation of speech, history as the construction of past narratives, fiction as the mapping of psychological perspectives, as well as memoirs and letters as

abstractions of subjective, individualized experience. This complex process of analysis amounts to the scholar's matching text and context through a critical theoretical reading, which in turn highlights the scholar's perspective and subjectivity in shaping the meaning(s) of the text. These practices thus acknowledge the inevitable ways in which a skilful reader's experience and apprehension of his or her own condition must shape the resulting reading of the text. In the critical pursuit of meaning in discourse, the role of theory is to properly situate or frame the reading or the analysis of the interpretation. In other words, each approach shapes the terms of reference that anchor the construction of meaning in the text.

The question for literary critics is how to evaluate these approaches; what criteria apply in preferring one account over another? As the scientific method relies upon rules of engagement, so does the literary practice of discourse analysis rely upon a praxis. However, whereas corpus-based linguistic discourse analysis is supported by the strength of quantitative analysis, literary discourse analysis is powered by the persuasive force of rhetoric. The internal debates within literary studies regarding the values and validity of different approaches are not dissimilar to the debates that have marked the last half century with the split in linguistics between the formal abstraction of Chomskyan syntactic and phonological theory and the functional, empirical domains of sociolinguistics and applied linguistics. Thus literary critics' debates about the uses of theory and the uses of materialism in literary analysis rage around the methodological prescriptivisms predicated by theoretical positions, such as the attribution of radical prescriptivism to the self-reflexive, relativistic methodologies of deconstruction and psychoanalysis. The so-called turn to history within literary historical criticism has been regarded as a productive mediation between theoretical principles and empirical data in order to present interpretations that are intersubjective and accountable:

> if theory has convincingly demonstrated that meaning is not immanent but rather situational, or, put differently, that both reading and writing are not unmediated activities but take place only and always in context and action, the specific situations, contexts and actions – that is, the actual historical circumstances of literary production and reception – cannot be merely gestured at but must be recovered and analyzed. (Kastan 1999: 211–212)

This statement might usefully be invoked in the project of bringing the empirical tradition of corpus linguistics informed historical discourse analysis

into conversation with the practice of literary discourse analysis, which is itself informed by the principle that texts are products of historical contexts that must be recovered in order for the interpreter to negotiate meaning that will be intersubjective. In other words, the question before us is how we can engender a productive historical pragmatics from the convergence of a literary historical approach and a functional corpus-linguistic approach to the negotiation of meaning in texts.

6. Foundational questions and problems

In the remainder of this chapter, we pose and examine a set of questions predicated upon the desire to approach the negotiation and construction of textual meaning within a cultural, intellectual, and historical context. We consider how we might guarantee a firm foundation for such an approach by ensuring that we can resist the charge of radical self-reflexivity or circularity. At the same time, we must guarantee that we can avoid the accusation that we can do no more than construct a pragmatic taxonomy to match an inventory of linguistic forms we have identified in historical contexts. The practice of offering the fullest possible reading of forms in texts in their historical contexts presents the opportunity for richly interpretative accounts of how authors mean in their representation of form. Let us consider some foundational questions and problems that we believe are central to our field of inquiry in light of the discussion above.

6.1. Pragmatic competence, forms and functions

Historical pragmatics is engaged with the study of forms on the one hand, and with the study of functions on the other. The focus may be on form, i.e. how speakers mean by selecting particular forms among other possible variants in any given context, or it may be on function, i.e. how hearers or readers construct the speaker's meaning through their reading of the text – how the speaker's meaning is encoded in language. Thus time, situation, and aspects of speaker identity (age, gender, social rank), which are salient for corpus linguists and historical sociolinguists, are also matters of negotiated meaning. The engagement with corpora of historical linguists supplies us with ample sources of form; what corpora subsume but rarely make manifest is the context in which texts and their forms occur, and so it remains up

to the historical pragmatician to go beyond and negotiate the meaning of form by examining it in its context assuming a richly informed construction of context. The other party of the communication needs to be considered as well. Meanings are not fixed but different audiences make different meanings: how the original readership understood a text may be very different from the meanings made by contemporary other audiences, later periods or present readers. There is ample evidence of this in literary history, for example, of Chaucer's or Shakespeare's texts.

A key question that must be posed in order to provide informed and responsible analyses is, how do we draw upon our own pragmatic competence in attributing functions to historical expressions? We should go beyond and ask: How do we interpret the communicative functions of historically distant expressions in a world in which one can only imagine functioning? Alternatively, how do we understand that our own pragmatic competence equips us to conduct analyses of the pragmatic functions of expressions we ourselves do not and cannot use? We must develop ways of making this reflective practice transparent in order to be able to assess the reliability with which it can be used to produce consistent results.

We might learn from practices in the new historicism that incorporate and regard as valid the reader's own subject position with respect to the text being studied. In other words, we might routinely incorporate the fact that the scholar is an actor in the process of recovering and ascertaining how meaning is/was negotiated because he or she mediates in the space between the historical life of the text and its present construal. To give a concrete example, how do we know whether an address form was a conventional expression that might have commanded humorous functions rather than no functions at all, unless we have a systematic means of mapping functions onto expressions in given contexts but not in others? Similarly, how do we know that an insult was an insult in Old English unless we have a very good basis on which to propose the conditions that must be satisfied for somebody to recognize an expression as an insult?[22] If we can produce those conditions and demonstrate that they apply in a consistent and predictable manner, then we may have gone some way in making the pragmatic processes of implication and inference historically transparent. We have to imagine ourselves into the historical worlds that produced and used the texts that are the objects of our research. In order to examine the kinds of linguistic, non-linguistic, and situational factors that might be criterial in assigning communicative functions to "time-sensitive" expressions in a systematic and principled fashion, we have to think historically, and be prepared to test the ways that we map func-

tions to forms over time. Such studies often account for the development of pragmatic *units* in discourse conventions, speech acts, politeness, pragmatic markers, and even genres and text- or discourse-types. This approach has the formal virtue of delimiting, and hence controlling, the relation of function to form by training attention on form.

6.2. Historical discourse analysis and corpora

A particular strength of the functionally-based practice of historical discourse analysis is that it is data-driven, or, nowadays, corpus-based. In other words, we feel able to make claims about earlier generations' or communities' discourse practices because we base those claims upon real language use and the quantitative analysis of large databases representing authentic language use make these claims valid. Here, however, also lies the dilemma that the historical discourse analyst (not corpus linguist) must face: the quantitative analysis of language use actually amounts to the study of the occurrence of linguistic forms within a context that is defined in terms of a set of parameters that may have more to do with the design of a database than the production of language by speakers in the world. Furthermore, the context is reduced by the medium of study: the computer restricts the view both literally and figuratively, and gaining sufficient background knowledge of the text requires active reliance on library resources and familiarity with editorial practices. Accordingly, we must examine the question of how well corpus-based discourse analysis provides the basis for inference about language use and function as opposed to a diagnosis of the frequency and distribution of linguistic forms in a given selection of texts. As the quantitative instruments with which we approach the analysis of historical texts become easier to use, we should consider some of the implications of relying upon frequency counts for the accounts that we produce. For example, if we wish to rely upon the quantitative presentation of data as a material basis upon which to build an account of a functional shift or meaning change in an expression or class of expressions, we must consider the empirical status of analyses of frequency as the basis for generating inferences about usage and function. Perhaps more pressing is the need to be explicit about how we adapt corpus-linguistic methodology, which focuses on form, for use in historical pragmatics, which focuses on function, and how the context in its various forms should and can be taken into account.

6.3. Data sources

The quality of sources has consequences for historical pragmatic studies as well as historical linguistics. It is good to be aware of the pitfalls and dangers, and good editions provide the information needed for sound judgements. Both form-to-function mapping and function-to-form assessments could profit from insights of multiple readings and a more open attitude to texts, taking into account the possibility of fuzzy sentence boundaries and different scopes of modification, the indeterminacy of direct and indirect quotations, and multiple voices in texts in a different way. The variety of historical discourse analysis represented in literary studies has as much to offer historical pragmaticians whose research tool is corpus linguistics as the corpus linguist has to offer the literary historian who is interested in discourse analysis. Despite the increasing sophistication with which historical pragmaticians are able to conduct quantitative analyses, we are generally less capable of grounding a qualitative analysis in sound historical understanding. It is important that we study properly the traditions and cultural histories of our data sources. Unlike cultural historians or literary critics, we are not always interested in the stuff of our texts and in the conventions or situations in which they are produced, transmitted, and changed. Of course, the lack of this kind of knowledge can threaten the integrity of our analyses. To remedy or compensate for this lack, we must develop ways to demonstrate and explain what counts as "good" data for historical pragmatic investigation. For example, if we are interested in the development of transactional language and the ways in which such language becomes conventional or formulaic in what we would call the register of service encounters, we have to find texts and data sources that we are confident report, replicate, or represent the transaction we are interested in examining. Similarly, if we are interested in the conventions that govern courtroom practices and seek to distinguish between common practice and innovation or aberrant behaviour regarding witness questioning, for example, we must be confident that we can identify the status of the language observed or reconstructed in court transcripts as indexical, interpretative, suggestive or representative of actual practice.

6.4. Integrity

In order to ensure the integrity of the exercise, we must also be responsible to lay open the procedures we follow and the principles which we rely on for

selecting material for the best possible data set for our research questions. This responsibility entails that we are careful to disclose how we perform the work of selecting and collecting relevant data. Second, it is important to consider the role of context and contextual factors in conditioning the different ways in which we might read expressions on different occasions and in different texts. More particularly, we should examine the ways in which the conventions that mark particular registers might be instrumental in fixing (or not) the communicative functions associated with expressions or linguistic forms. For example, it is worth considering the extent to which the convention of greeting or saluting one's addressee at the beginning of a letter contributes to the impression of the personal letter as a register that is marked by interactive and, indeed, involved, language rather than by fixed formulae. Statistics can be of assistance in our endeavour to distinguish between conventional and innovative (perhaps *ad hoc*) uses of language, and thus quantitative analysis can be a valuable tool for studying change in pragmatic aspects of language use from this angle.

7. Looking at the future of historical pragmatics

Even more tantalizingly, we could examine the extent to which the changes in the technology involved in the production of a genre or text-type might condition linguistic change, specifically changes in meaning. Media play an important role here: the age before the printing press is different from the times following it, though changes were slow and literacy practices remained orally based for centuries (see above). More recently, mass media and now electronic communication are changing our literacy practices. We live in a multimodal world with different ways of communication that influence the forms and functions of language. History is not only something of the past but is present, and it extends beyond us into the future.

We believe that a step forward can be taken by raising the level of awareness of methodological problems. This can be done by explicit discussions on what and how methods are applied, what their limitations are, and what can be done in the future.

We can learn more about our data, be more systematic in contextual analysis, ask questions about the reliability of our sources and consider their special restrictions. Our analytical methods can be developed to be more effective in informing pragmatic studies of past language forms. Recent insights and developments can lead to a more analytical approach and inspire further

discussions. Even if we cannot achieve certainty of "right" interpretations, we can take the inherent ambiguity into account and avoid pitfalls. This is a lofty goal. If we can go some way to reaching it, we shall be able to make our enterprise less one of number-crunching and it will also reduce the highly subjective, individual close readings; we must seek to create a set of practices that can be assessed and critiqued on their own terms. Working with these questions requires us to consider how the ascription of function relates to the contextual conditions or situation of a text. At all times we have to ask: what changes? (And what remains constant, cf. above.) Because we are interested in historical discourse analysis we must be alive to the historical conditions in which a text is constructed, transmitted and received, and the ways in which pragmatic shifts and changes might be affected by changes in those material historical conditions. Reliable methods are worth striving for.

Notes

1. Part of this chapter (including Section 4) was given as the Jacob Grimm Lecture by Irma Taavitsainen at Humboldt University in Berlin in autumn 2005, and she wishes to thank the audience for their comments and discussion. We would also like to thank Elizabeth Traugott for her suggestions and advice.
2. The latter part includes e.g. comparative studies and hypothetical constructions, but is not relevant for an empirical branch of study like historical pragmatics.
3. Historical sociolinguistics is concerned with the study of variation and change in historical texts and how the observed changes might be conditioned by sociohistorical background factors like age, sex, and social rank, or geographical region.
4. Literary pragmatics is a related field at the interface of pragmatics and literary studies. It was launched at the beginning of the 1990s (Sell 1991).
5. The term was used in the 1980s (e.g. Stein 1985), but it is generally agreed that the publication of the collected volume *Historical Pragmatics* (ed. Jucker, 1995), with articles by 26 researchers and an influential introduction, marks the inauguration of the field.
6. An example of studies in line with this branch is the Scientific Thought-styles project at the University of Helsinki. It aims at charting the evolution of medical writing from scholasticism to empiricism, rationalism and modern statistically-based science, the focus being on language change.
7. Based on assumptions such as "it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicature to become conventionalized" (Grice 1989: 39) and "it is possible to argue that there is a sequence from particularized

through generalized conversational implicatures to conventional implicatures" (Levinson 1979: 216). For a discussion on the approach, based on Levinson (2000), see Traugott (2004b).

8. E.g. grammaticalisation studies in line with Traugott and Brinton. Not all grammaticalisation studies are, however, pragmatic as the focus may just as well be on syntactic features.
9. A stronger form of the uniformitarian principle states that the forces operating in linguistic change today are of the same kind and magnitude as those which operated in the past (for a discussion, see Lass 1997: 24–32).
10. Corpus linguistics as a methodology started in the 1950s and 1960s, with the *Survey of English Usage* (Randolph Quirk) and the *Brown Corpus* (Nelson Francis, Harry Kucera). For a brief history, see McEnery and Wilson (1996: 1–27).
11. In addition to the corpora described e.g. in Taavitsainen and Jucker in this volume, there are "second-generation" one-register, one-genre corpora, and "third-generation" corpora designed for specific research tasks.
12. This can be done by assessing significantly more and less frequent items in a corpus when compared to another corpus used as a control.
13. Examples can be found in saints' legends where the insults highlight the confrontation of the saint and the tyrant and provide the turning points of the plot (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000).
14. E.g. the long list of birds in Chaucer's *The Parliament of Fowls* is such a passage.
15. In a polemical article on historical dialectology, Roger Lass (2005) questions the authenticity of edited texts and advocates in their place central reliance on original manuscript sources. Lass's concerns stem from the fact that with the explosion of corpus linguistics methods, including their use in the diachronic fields of linguistic study, historical linguistic studies tend not to consider variation in the rush to report trends (inferred from frequency counts). Dialectology deals with difference, and the suppression of formal variation in the editing of a text militates against the study of variation. Lass's critique must be read in the context for which it was written – the conduct of historical dialectology.
16. In modern discourse studies multimodal approaches are advocated; in historical pragmatics, manuscripts can provide such clues, see e.g. Taavitsainen (2001).
17. When compiling e.g. the corpus of *Middle English Medical Texts* (2005) this problem was discussed, but editors' interpretations are informed "guesses" and relying on editions seemed the only feasible way to compile larger historical corpora of this kind. In the course of compilation, the need for some new transcripts became obvious and the best policy seemed to be that of minimal intervention; yet leaving the text completely without punctuation as a diplomatic transcript would also be misleading. The electronic medium does not offer possibilities for reliable judgements of e.g. sentence boundaries or scope of modification as the computer screen cannot offer sufficient context (see example [1] above).

18. Blockley (2001) advocates more open-ended readings of medieval texts and goes even further with her questioning: the development of sentence types "has often been presented as the development of a more precise system of subordination, a move from parataxis to hypotaxis. Such an explanation, with its flattering implications of progress, nonetheless raises the question of how the later stage of the language was able to add distinctions that the earlier stage failed to make … Rather than emerging ex nihilo, certain syntactic forms come to have different uses as the significance of other forms becomes obscure" (2001: 173).
19. In this process, pejorative meanings were assigned to the term, but the more neutral and matter-of-fact meaning also remains valid, as attested by e.g. names of disciplines at European universities and definitions of Chairs such as Professor of English Philology (in Glasgow and Helsinki, for example).
20. For differing accounts of the recent history of theory in literary and cultural studies, see Knapp and Pence (2003), Boutcher (2003).
21. Exponents of this approach include Catherine Belsey, Stephen Greenblatt, and Louis Montrose, all scholars of Shakespeare and the English renaissance.
22. One solution is to study expressions of perlocutionary effects in texts (see Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000).

Text quotations

Benvenutus Grassus

Benvenutus Grassus, The Wonderful Art of the Eye: *A Critical Edition of the Middle English Translation of his* De Probatissima Arte Oculorum. Ed. L. M. Eldredge. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996.

Thesaurus pauperum

MS: BL Sloane 3489, ff. 29r–33v. Transcription by Irma Taavitsainen.

References

Aarts, Bas, David Denison, Evelien Keizer, and Gergana Popova (eds.)
2004 *Fuzzy Grammar: A Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Biber, Douglas
1988 *Variation across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2004 Historical patterns for the grammatical marking of stance: A cross-register comparison. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 5 (1): 107–136.

Biber, Douglas, and Edward Finegan
1989 Drift and the evolution of English style: A history of three genres. *Language* 65: 487–517.

Blockley, Mary
2001 *Aspects of Old English Poetic Syntax: Where Clauses Begin*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Boutcher, Warren
2003 The analysis of culture revisited: Pure texts, applied texts, literary historicisms, cultural histories. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64 (3): 489–510.
Brinton, Laurel J.
2001 Historical discourse analysis. In *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (eds.), 138–160. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chafe, Wallace L.
1985 Linguistic differences produced by differences between speaking and writing. In *Literacy, Language, and Learning: The Nature and Consequences of Reading and Writing*, David R. Olson, Nancy Torrance, and Angela Hildyard (eds.), 105–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crombie, Alistair C.
1995 Commitments and styles of European scientific thinking. *History of Science* 33: 225–238.
Diller, Hans-Jürgen, and Manfred Görlach (eds.)
2001 *Towards a History of English as a History of Genres*. (Anglistische Forschungen 298.) Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter.
Fleischman, Suzanne
1990 Philology, linguistics, and the discourse of the medieval text. *Speculum* 65 (1): 19–37.
Fowler, Alastair
1982 *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Grice, H. Paul
1975 Logic in conversation. In *Syntax and Semantics, vol. III: Speech Acts*, Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
Hopper, Paul J.
1987 Emergent grammar. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 13: 139–157.
Jacobs, Andreas, and Andreas H. Jucker
1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In *Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in the History of English*, Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 35.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Journal of Historical Pragmatics
Andreas H. Jucker and Irma Taavitsainen (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Published since 2000.

Jucker, Andreas H.
2000 English historical pragmatics: Problems of data and methodology. In *English Diachronic Pragmatics*, Gabriella di Martino and Maria Lima (eds.), 17–55. Napoli: Cuen.
2004 Contrastive analysis across time: Issues in historical dialogue analysis. In *Contrastive Analysis in Language: Identifying Linguistic Units of Comparison*, Dominique Willems, Bart Defrancq, Timothy Colleman, and Dirk Noël (eds.), 197–212. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
2006 Historical pragmatics. In *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, 2nd ed. Keith Brown (ed.). Oxford: Elsevier.

Jucker, Andreas H. (ed.)
1995 *Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in the History of English*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 35.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Jucker, Andreas H., and Irma Taavitsainen
2000 Diachronic speech act analysis: Insults from flyting to flaming. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (1): 67–95.

Kastan, David Scott
1999 Shakespeare after theory. In *Opening the Borders: Inclusivity in Early Modern Studies. Essays in Honor of James V. Mirollo*, Peter C. Herman (ed.), 206–224. Newark, DE/London: University of Delaware Press/Associated University Presses.

Knapp, James A., and Jeffrey Pence
2003 Between thing and theory. *Poetics Today* 24 (4): 641–668.

Koch, Peter
1999 Court records and cartoons: Reflections of spontaneous dialogue in Early Romance texts. In *Historical Dialogue Analysis*, Andreas H. Jucker, Gerd Fritz, and Franz Lebsanft (eds.), 399–429. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 66.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Koch, Peter, and Wulf Österreicher
1985 Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz: Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte. *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 36: 15–43.

Lakoff, George
1987 *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Lass, Roger
1997 *Historical Linguistics and Language Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2005 Ut custodiant litteras: Editions, corpora, and witnesshood. In *Methods and Data in English Historical Dialectology*, Marina Dossena and Roger Lass (eds.), 21–48. (Linguistic Insights 16.) Bern: Peter Lang.

Levinson, Stephen C.

1979 Pragmatics and social deixis: Reclaiming the notion of conventional implicature. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 5: 206–223.

1983 *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2000 *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. (Language, Speech, and Communication.) Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Longman Grammar = Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, and Edward Finegan

1999 *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English*. London: Longman.

McEnery, Tony

2006 The moral panic about bad language in England 1691–1745. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 7 (1): 89–113.

McEnery, Tony, and Andrew Wilson

1996 *Corpus Linguistics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Middle English Medical Texts

2005 Compiled by Irma Taavitsainen, Päivi Pahta, and Martti Mäkinen. CD-ROM. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Milroy, James

1992 *Linguistic Variation and Change: On the Historical Sociolinguistics of English*. (Language in Society 19.) Oxford: Blackwell.

Ong, Walter J.

1982 *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. (New Accents.) London: Methuen & Co.

Romaine, Suzanne

1982 *Socio-historical Linguistics: Its Status and Methodology*. (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 34.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sebeok, Thomas (ed.)

1960 *Style in Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Sell, Roger D. (ed.)

1991 *Literary Pragmatics*. London: Routledge.

Stein, Dieter

1985 Perspectives on historical pragmatics. *Folia Linguistica Historica* 6 (2): 347–355.

Taavitsainen, Irma

1993 Genre/subgenre styles in Late Middle English? In *Early English in the Computer Age: Explorations through the Helsinki Corpus*, Matti Ris-

sanen, Merja Kytö, and Minna Palander-Collin (eds.), 171–200. (Topics in English Linguistics 11.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

1997 Genre conventions: Personal affect in fiction and non-fiction in Early Modern English. In *English in Transition: Corpus-based Studies in Linguistic Variation and Genre Styles*, Matti Rissanen, Merja Kytö, and Kirsi Heikkonen (eds.), 185–266. (Topics in English Linguistics 23.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

2001 Middle English recipes: Genre characteristics, text type features and underlying traditions of writing. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 2 (1): 85–113.

2004 Transferring classical discourse conventions into the vernacular. In *Medical and Scientific Writing in Late Medieval English*, Irma Taavitsainen and Päivi Pahta (eds.), 37–72. (Studies in English Language.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, Jenny

1995 *Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics*. (Learning about Language.) London/New York: Longman.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs

2004a Historical pragmatics. In *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward (eds.), 538–561. Oxford: Blackwell.

2004b A critique of Levinson's view of Q- and M-inferences in historical pragmatics. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 5 (1): 1–26.

Weinreich, Uriel, William Labov, and Marvin Herzog

1968 Empirical foundations for a theory of language change. In *Directions for Historical Linguistics*, Winfred P. Lehmann and Yakov Malkiel (eds.), 95–188. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Yule, George

1996 *Pragmatics*. (Oxford Introductions to Language Study.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The development of *I mean*: Implications for the study of historical pragmatics[1]

Laurel J. Brinton

1. Introduction

I mean is a parenthetical of relatively high frequency in Modern English.[2] It patterns with other parentheticals including *I say, I think, I guess, you know, you see,* etc. which serve pragmatic functions and belong to the larger class of "discourse" or "pragmatic markers". In this paper, this set of forms will be designated as "pragmatic parentheticals". The discourse-pragmatic functions of *I mean* in Present-day English (PDE) have been extensively studied (see, for example, Crystal and Davy 1975: 97–98; Goldberg 1980; James 1983; Schourup 1985; Erman 1986, 1987; Schiffrin 1987; Stenström 1995). These synchronic studies will serve as a starting point for this paper, which focuses on the historical development of *I mean*. In general, the history of pragmatic parentheticals has been rather neglected. Furthermore, the paper will explore the semasiological and syntactic development of *I mean* in the larger context of theories of language change. Almost all diachronic studies of pragmatic markers in English (dating back 20 years) have been carried out in the framework of one subfield of diachronic linguistics, namely, grammaticalization theory (e.g., Traugott 1982, 1995a; Brinton 1996). It is perhaps timely to reassess whether grammaticalization is indeed the process that underlies the development of pragmatic markers, especially in light of the fact that, on an empirical level, pragmatic markers are often deemed "agrammatical", and on a theoretical level, grammaticalization as a distinct process is currently being questioned (see, e.g., Campbell [ed.] 2001). Some alternative processes suggested as underlying the development of pragmatic markers include "pragmaticalization" (e.g., Erman and Kotsinas 1993) and "lexicalization" (e.g., Wischer 2000), as well as idiomaticization.

1.1. Pragmatic parentheticals

Parenthetical uses of verbs such as *know, believe, deduce, rejoice, regret, conclude, suppose, guess, expect, admit,* and *predict* were first studied by Urmson (1952) under the label of "parenthetical verbs". Seeing them as comparable to a certain class of adverbs, such as *luckily, happily, unfortunately, consequently, presumably, admittedly, certainly, undoubtedly, probably,* and *possibly,* he notes that

> when these verbs are used in the first person of the present tense, as is very clear when they occur grammatically in parenthesis, the assertion proper is contained in the indicative clause with which they are associated … They themselves have not, in such a use, any descriptive sense but rather function as signals guiding the hearer to a proper appreciation of the statement in its context, social, logical, or evidential. (Urmson 1952: 495)

Furthermore, parenthetical verbs "prime the hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of our statements" (Urmson 1952: 484). "They help the understanding and assessment of what is said rather than being a part of what is said" (Urmson 1952: 496). More recently, Quirk et al. (1985: 1112–1118) have termed these structures "comment clauses", seeing them as parenthetical disjuncts, either "content disjuncts that express the speaker's comments on the content of the matrix clause, or style disjuncts that convey the speaker's view on the way they are speaking" (Quirk et al. 1985: 1113). Specifically, *I mean* compares with Quirk et al.'s type (i) comment clause, namely, transitive verb or adjective which elsewhere requires a nominal *that*-clause as object (e.g., *I believe, I hear, I see, you know, I'm sorry to say*). Comment clauses are defective syntactically since they have a subject and verb but lack the normally obligatory complementation (Quirk et al. 1985: 1114). Comment clauses function as hedges, as expressions of the speaker's certainty, as expressions of the speaker's emotional attitude, and as claims to the hearer's attention (Quirk et al. 1985: 1114–1115).

Though not included by Urmson, *I mean* clearly belongs to the set of parenthetical verbs. It consists of a first-person pronoun plus a present tense verb, with the verb lacking its normal complementation. In Modern English, clause-initial *I mean* followed by a declarative clause without *that* is ambiguously a matrix clause or a parenthetical (Biber et al. 1999: 1076), as in:

(1) *As it was he sold the goddamned things at my racket club.* ***I mean*** *he was only a member because of my husband* (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 105; FLOB).

According to Stenström, however, *I mean* is rarely a main clause and serves "almost exclusively" (85 per cent of the time) as a parenthetical (1995: 296, 297, 299). The description of parenthetical *I mean* in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) as "a filler, with no explanatory force" (s.v. *mean*, v. 1, def. II 6e)[3] betrays its status as a pragmatic marker, as do descriptions of it as a "fumble" (Edmondson 1981), a "pragmatic expression" (Erman 1986, 1987), a "discourse marker" (Schiffrin 1987), a "discourse particle" (Goldberg 1980), or a "comment clause" (Stenström 1995: 291). One may thus conclude that *I mean* most often has procedural meaning and is best analyzed as a species of pragmatic marker that could be termed a "pragmatic parenthetical".

1.2. Negotiated meaning

If pragmatics is defined as negotiation of meaning in interaction, taking account of the contributions of both speaker and hearer as well as those of utterance and context (Taavitsainen and Fitzmaurice, Chapter 1, this volume), *I mean* is prototypically "pragmatic". It is concerned with "how speakers mean" by selecting a particular form in context and "how hearers or readers construct the speaker's meaning" by reading a text in which meaning has been encoded. As we will see below, the various functions of *I mean*, such as repair, reformulation, explication, or expression of speaker attitude, can be classified as metalinguistic (the speaker's modification of his or her expressions) and metacommunicative (the speaker's modification of his or her intentions); *I mean* thus serves the speaker's goal of establishing and negotiating meaning with the hearer.

More specifically, we see meaning in texts as arising through a process of "construction":

> In this model both readers and writers construct meaning within the broader context of a social and cultural context, of language, of discourse conventions … These form an outer circle of influence in conjunction with (and often mediated through) a more immediate circle of general purposes, specific goals, and activated knowledge linked to the task at hand. In the model, both readers and writers build socially shaped, individually formed meanings. (Flower 1994: 52–53)

Moreover, negotiation can be seen within the context of the cooperative principle: "Faced with options, invitations, constraints, and pressures on how they select, organize and connect ideas, writers give in, resist, integrate, synthesize, and innovate" (Flower 1994: 76).

1.3. Approach

This following study is corpus-based, with data selected from a variety of on-line and electronic corpora. Old English (OE) data was collected from the Old English Corpus. Sources of data for Middle English (ME) included the *Helsinki Corpus* (HC), the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the Middle English Collection of the University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center (U of V), and the *Middle English Dictionary* (*MED*), while sources of data for Early Modern English (E-ModE) included the *OED* (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), the *Lampeter Corpus*, HC, and the Modern English Collection (U of V). Several corpora of Modern English, all found in the ICAME collection, were used; see list of sources for details. I have chosen to use corpora of written rather than spoken Modern English in order to provide a better comparison with the (necessarily) written corpora of Middle and Early Modern English.

Rather uncontroversially, I assume that the frequency and distribution of *I mean* across these corpora will provide evidence for its semantic and syntactic development. A more difficult matter is how pragmatic functions and meanings can be recovered in texts from an earlier period, where many aspects of context are missing, and then how these meanings can be related to one another by pragmatic principles, most especially inferencing, which is seen as lying behind much semantic change (Traugott and Dasher 2002). The approach adopted here has two parts. First, I identified a number of semantic-pragmatic functions using Modern English corpora as a starting point (see section 2.1) where the pragmatic context is more readily available to me as a speaker of PDE.

Second, I went back in time to try to determine when and in what syntactic contexts these functions first arose and how they are related to one another. The underlying assumption was that pragmatic meaning works uniformly over periods and societies. In the many cases in which *I mean* had a metalinguistic function and focused on the linguistic code, features of the immediate context corresponding to the repaired, reformulated, or exemplified item could be identified. In the less frequent cases in which *I mean* had

an interpersonal or hearer-directed function, second-person pronouns, vocatives, or imperatives in the context were significant. But often the semantic-pragmatic interpretation of *I mean* in any given context rested on translation equivalents, such as 'namely' or 'in other words'. This offered the most reliable and transparent method for teasing out pragmatic meaning in these contexts and provided the greatest possibility for replicability.

2. The pragmatic parenthetical *I mean*

2.1. The function of *I mean* in a synchronic perspective

A rather wide range of pragmatic functions have been identified in synchronic studies of parenthetical *I mean*. First, it has been seen as a filler, hesitation marker, or staller indicating ongoing planning.[4] However, Erman (1986: 146) argues that *I mean* is not a hesitation marker since it occurs in fluent speech. Second, *I mean* is a "mistake editor", or marker of self-initiated (self-)repair of a preceding utterance, used to prevent misunderstanding.[5] Third, *I mean* may provide elaboration, clarification, expansion, explanation, or reformulation of the preceding utterance (= 'In other words what I'm saying amounts to the following').[6] In this function, *I mean* indicates "change in emphasis, direction, or meaning in order to align the conveyed information with the speaker's intended contribution" (Goldberg 1980: 215), signals a "something like" relationship between qualified construction and item in absentia and functions as a voluntary marker of "imprecision", an expression of '*like*-ness' (James 1983: 194, 198), or denotes 'non equivalence' where what the speaker says and what the speaker has in mind are not well matched (Schourup 1985: 147–148). Finally, *I mean* may serve to express a 'further instance', in which the general is made more specific,[7] or to sum up, meaning 'the point is' (Gerhardt and Stinson 1994: 164).

I mean also expresses of range of speaker attitudes. For example, it may function as a "softener" (Crystal and Davy 1975), as a "compromiser" (James 1983) softening the assertive force, or as a mitigator of "the strength of an evaluative statement" by making the speaker less committed (Erman 1986: 143; 1987: 119). It has been argued that as a "cajoler" *I mean* increases, establishes, or restores harmony between interlocutors; it is interactive, cooperative, and hearer-oriented, thus contributing to intimacy.[8] In contrast, however, it has been argued that *I mean* is not interactive or hearer-oriented and usually doesn't evoke a response (Edmondson 1981; Erman 1986: 145,

146); it is, in fact, speaker-oriented,[9] serving as the "*speaker's* modification of his/her *own* talk" (Schiffrin 1987: 299, 317, emphasis original). Moreover, *I mean* may serve as a politeness marker since it is deferential and hedges assertions to protect face.[10] Finally, *I mean* has also been seen as "evaluative" (Gerhardt and Stinson 1994: 168, 182) or "epistemic" (Coates 1998: 143; Scheibman 2001: 74–75).

In general terms, one can say that *I mean* may be either metalinguistic, "message-oriented", with focus on properties of code (that is, it modifies the speaker's expressions),[11] or "metacommunicative", with focus on the speaker's communicative act (that is, it modifies the speaker's intentions) (Schiffrin 1987: 304).

In the Modern English corpora, one finds parenthetical *I mean* and a number of fixed expressions containing *I mean*. The number of tokens of these expressions is recorded in Table 1. Most common is parenthetical *I mean*, but *I mean* plus a phrasal complement (NP, AP, etc.) is also quite common. An interactive form (*if you {see, understand, know} what I mean*), an expression of sincerity (*I mean {it, this, what I say}*), and a metalinguistic form (*by X I mean, I mean by X*) also occur in significant numbers.

Table 1. Instances of parenthetical *I mean* and other fixed collocations in four corpora of Modern English (FLOB, FROWN, ACE, and WC)

Expression	FLOB	FROWN	ACE	WC	**Total**
I mean (parenthetical)	24	25	22	23	**94**
([if] you) {see, know, understand} what I mean	3	2	5	4	**14**
I mean (that) S	1	3	–	1	**5**
I mean NP/AP/VP/AdvP/PP	15	13	6	10	**44**
I mean {it, this, what I say}	1	6	1	3	**11**
what I mean is;	1	–	2	1	**4**
what I mean by X *is*					
by X *I mean*;	1	2	1	5	**9**
I mean by X *(that)*					
that's (not) what I mean	–	4	–	–	**4**

While studies generally agree that *I mean* occurs initially and medially, but rarely in final position,[12] my corpora show that parenthetical *I mean* occurs predominantly in initial position, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Position of *I mean* in four corpora of Modern English

Corpus	Initial	Medial	Final
FLOB	20	4	–
FROWN	21	3	1
ACE	20	2	–
WC	18	–	5
Total	**79**	**9**	**6**

Note that when *I mean* occurs in initial position it is not always possible to determine its grammatical status as main clause or parenthetical, although one can be guided by punctuation and meaning.

2.2. Semantic-pragmatic functions of *I mean* from a diachronic perspective

In her study of *I mean* in Modern English, Schiffrin (1987) points out that the development of the pragmatic functions of *I mean* seems fairly transparent, as they can be traced back to the two primary senses of *mean* in the semantic domain, namely, 'to intend to convey or indicate' and 'to have as an intention': "the literal meaning of the expression 'I mean'", she says, "suggests that *I mean* marks a speaker's upcoming modification of the ideas or intentions of a prior utterance" (Schiffrin 1987: 302, 317–318; see also Gerhardt and Stinson 1994). The following section tests this hypothesized development of pragmatic *I mean* from the literal meaning of the verb *mean.*

As only three examples of *ic mæne* (none of *ic gemæne*) occur in the Old English Corpus, and none is parenthetical, it was possible to begin the following survey with the Middle English period.[13]

2.2.1. "Full" meanings

The "full" or dynamic meaning of *mean* 'to intend (to do something)' typically occurs with a *to* complement:

(2) ***I** didn't **mean** to be rude last Wednesday* (1941 J. Rhys, *Letters* 1 Mar. [1984] 35; *OED*).

This structure is common in the earlier periods. However, as there are very few examples of *I mean* with this sense in my Modern English corpora

(*mean* in this sense perhaps being replaced by *intend* or other verbs), I do not consider this meaning significant in the semasiological development of *mean*.

In contrast, the cognitive meaning 'to signify, to intend to convey a certain sense' is found in a variety of syntactic structures in Modern English, such as *I mean* with clausal or phrasal complement, *what I mean is*, and *by* X *I mean*:

(3) a. *You misunderstand, sir.* ***I mean*** *the debates remain secret, not a word of them leaked to the press or the public* (1992 Ludlum, *The Road to Omaha* 68; FROWN).
b. ***I mean*** *'mythology' technically – as the ideal recollection of an event which shapes our current values* (1986 Hannaford, *On Being – The Servant's Servant April* 1; ACE).
c. *What* ***I mean*** *is that King's memories and perceptions of the past are, one would expect, coloured by the context in which he is writing now* (1986 McBride, "Pakeha ethnicity and New Zealand society", *Hurupaa* 12; WC).
d. *By reading* ***I mean*** *that I treat the charts as texts and attempt to tease out the assumptions that go into constructing it* (1991 Parker, "Reading the charts – making sense of the hit parade", *Popular Music* 2; FLOB).

However, the sense 'to signify' is rarely expressed parenthetically in Modern English.

In Middle English, the variety of syntactic forms is more limited than in Modern English; compare (3) and (4).[14] In Early Modern English, the formula *by* X *I mean* arises (5); it has a metalinguistic function and may serve to gloss foreign or unknown terms. This structure is still common in Modern English; see (3d) above.

(4) a. *Forto bisette my wordis … so that thei be not colourabili impugned, and also be chalengid to meene other wise than* ***y meene*** (c1456 Pecock, *Book of Faith* [Trin-C B.14.45] 122*; MED*).
'In order to fashion my words … so that they are not plausibly impugned and also challenged to mean other than I mean'
b. *And how* ***I mene****, I shal it yow deuyse* (1385 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* 4.1379; U of V).
'And how I mean I shall it to you describe'

(5) a. *By Mundus continens* ***I mean*** *the Compages and frame of the Physical heaven and earth* (1638 Mede, *Works* iii. 615; *OED*).
b. *By a *leather mouthed fish,* ***I mean*** *such as have their teeth in their throat, as the Chub or Cheven, and so the Barbel* [etc.] (1653 Walton, *The Compleat Angler* ii.55; *OED*).
c. *By 'lust'* ***I mean*** *those general desirings of our mind after any unlawful object which are forbidden in the tenth commandment* (1677 Gilpin, *Dæmonologia Sacra, or a Treatise of Satan's Temptations* [1867] 63; *OED*).

2.2.2. Appositional meanings

Closest to the "full" meaning of *mean* is what Quirk et al. call the "appositive" or "appositional" function, where *I mean* serves to "express the content of the preceding item or items in other terms" or "add another formulation" (1985: 637–638). Typically, the appositional meaning is expressed in the structure *I mean* + phrasal complement. This function has a number of different subvarieties, and in the sense that all focus on code, on the particular expression used – in repairing, reformulating, making more explicit, or exemplifying the code – they are all metalinguistic. While these meaning are often quite close, they can be distinguished by use of paraphrases such as "what I mean to say" and "namely" or by features of the context.

2.2.2.1. Repair

Instances of "mistake editing" or "self-repair" with *I mean* are in fact quite infrequent, but their rarity in written corpora is perhaps understandable. In Modern English, *I mean* may precede or follow a phrasal category, as in (6a–b), or occur parenthetically, as in (6c–d):

(6) a. *"I'll see you in the morning." She laughed. "****I mean****, afternoon"* (1991 Thomson, *The Five Gates of Hell* 46; FLOB).
b. *"Lucy!" A flustered look crossed Rob's face. "Miss Chalmers,* ***I mean****"* (1992 Savery, *A Handful of Promises* 26; FROWN).
c. *"How many …* ***I mean****, how long is it since you got the first of these?"* (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 33; FLOB).
d. *I don't mind it.* ***I mean*** *I mind, of course I mind, but I'm not squeamish* (1992 Block, *A Walk among the Tombstones* 19; FROWN).

Unequivocal examples of parenthetical "repair" uses of *I mean* do not seem to occur until the Early Modern English period:

(7) a. *"Take Saffron … then tease it,* ***I mean****, pull the parts thereof asunder"* (1617 Woodall, *The Surgions Mate* [1653] 344; *OED*).
b. *Set 'em off Lady* ***I mean*** *sell 'em* (1625 Fletcher, *The Humorous Lieutenant* iii.i; *OED*).
c. *The chiefe use,* ***I meane*** *abuse, of Oaths, is as afore I have said in our Courts of Justice* (1653 Robinson, *Certain Proposals in Order to a New Modelling of the Laws* 1; Lampeter).

We see that the writer in (7a) replaces the obscure word "tease" with the more common expression "pull asunder" in an attempt to make his meaning clearer to the reader, while the writers in (7b) and (7c) correct obvious mistakes, the incorrect "set" being replaced by "sell" and "use" by its antonym "abuse".

2.2.2.2. Reformulation

The second appositional function is the use of *I mean* to reformulate the preceding utterance. Parenthetical uses of *I mean* in this sense occur for the first time in Modern English:

(8) a. *"I could verify that?" Anna asked. "***I mean****, are there three independent witnesses to this visit?"* (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 48; FLOB).
b. *… but I can't remember when anyone spoke so many words to me in such a short time.* ***I mean*** *gave me so much attention* (1992 Stanley, "The stranger's surprise", *Saturday Evening Post* 56; FROWN).
c. *"I just want to look at the stuff,* ***I mean****, examine it physically, not experience it emotionally"* (1986 Corish, *Greenwich Apartments* 1; ACE).

To the extent that *I mean* expresses contrast, it expresses the speaker's belief and is hence subjective and metacommunicative.[15]

In Middle English (9) and Early Modern (10) reformulating *I mean* precedes a phrasal complement:

(9) a. *Ther saugh I Dane, yturned til a tree, – / **I mene** nat the goddesse Diane, / But penneus doghter, which that highte Dane* (1387–1394 Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* A.Kn. 2062–2064; U of V).
'There I saw Daphne turned into a tree – / I do not mean the goddess Diana / but Penneus' daughter, who is named Daphne'

b. *… don þeire preiers. **I mene** of þeire specyal preiers, not of þoo preiers þat ben ordeynid of Holy Chirche* (1425 [?1400] *The Cloud of Unknowing* 74.1–2; HC).
'… do their prayers. I mean of their special prayers, not of those prayers that are ordained by the Holy Church'

c. *The claper of his distouned bell … **I mene** his fals tunge* (1450 [?1422] Lydgate, *Life of our Lady* [Dur-U Cosin V.2.16] 2.922; *MED*).
'the clapper of his distoned bell … I mean his false tongue'

(10) a. *"And with the same [stabbers] thei slashe me out good God what preatie shiues. Not shiues of bread **I meane** … But gobbes of fleshe"* (1581 Derricke, *The Image of Ireland, a Poem* ii. F ij; *OED*).

b. *Pandarus: At whose pleasure, friend?*
Servant: At mine, sir, and theirs that love music.
*Pandarus: Command, **I mean**, friend* (1601–1602 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida* III, i, 24–26; U of V).

In texts from an earlier period, this function of *I mean* can be identified by using the translation equivalent "in other words"; thus in (9c) the writer replaces a metaphorical expression with a literal one in order to clarify his meaning: "the clapper of his distoned bell, in other words, his false tongue".

2.2.2.3. Explicitness

The next appositional function – to make the preceding utterance more precise or explicit – may be glossed by 'namely, that is', as in these Modern English examples:

(11) a. *"It could be embarrassing, you see. Politically, **I mean**"* (1991 Pearce, *The Mamm Zapt and the Girl in the Nile* 62; FLOB).

b. … *the challenge I am referring to is crucial to our future.* ***I mean*** *reform of the American Government* (1992 *Weekly Compilation of the Papers of the President of the US* 10; FROWN).
c. *I've never heard about one here, a poisonous one that bites,* ***I mean****, the island shouldn't have spiders but look … look at this red line* (Papaellinas, "Peter Mavromatis rides the tail of the donkey", *Ikons* 1; ACE).
d. *"It must be so marvellous to use words at all," Firth said. "With that freedom,* ***I mean****"* (1986 O'Sullivan, "Putting Bob down", *Landfall* 16; WC).

This is the majority usage in the Middle (12) and Early Modern English (13) periods (see Table 3, below) and examples are numerous:

(12) a. *For somme of hem seyn moore, and somme seyn lesse, / Whan they his pitous passioun expresse – /* ***I meene*** *of Mark, Mathew, Luc, and John* (1387–1394 Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* B. Mel 949–951; U of V).
'For some of them say more, and some say less when they express his piteous passion – I mean Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John'
b. *The ladre of heuene,* ***I meene*** *charitee, Comandith vs, if our brothir be falle In to errour, to haue of him pitee* (1415 Hoccleve, *Address to Sir John Oldcastle* [Hnt HM 111] 1; *MED*).
'The ladder of heaven, I mean charity, commands us, if our brother is fallen into error to have pity on him'
c. *Shuldrys sharpe,* ***I mene*** *not reysed with slevys, Off evyl feith is lyklynesse* (1450 Lydgate, *Secreta Secretorum* [Sln 2464] 2670; *MED*).
'Sharp shoulders, I mean, not raised with sleeves, is evidence of evil faith'
d. *Salomon conceyved not þe cause of synfull lyvynge of a gonge man,* ***I mene****, why a gonge man is prompt un-to vicious lyvynge* (1450 [c1415] *Roy.Serm.*[Roy 18.B.23] 267/5; *MED*).
'Salomon did not conceive the cause of sinful living of a young man, I mean, why a young man is prompt to vicious living'

These examples show writers using *I mean* in negotiating meaning by presenting more explicit phrasing of the preceding NP, phrasing they believe will make their meaning clearer to readers. The translation equivalent "namely"

can replace *I mean* in these instances, as in (12b) "the ladder of heaven, namely charity" or (12c) "sharp shoulders, namely not raised in sleeves".

(13) a. *The Puritans are angrie with me, **I meane** the puritane preachers* (1589 Marprelate, *Tr*., *Epit.* A ij; *OED*).
b. *Shylock: there be land-rats and water-rats, water-thieves and land-thieves, **I mean** pirates* (1596–1597 Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice* I, iii, 22–23; U of V).[16]
c. *First the childe is to be taught, how to call every letter, pronouncing each of them plainely, fully and distinctly; **I meane**, in a distinct and differing sound, each from others* (1627 John Brinsley, *Ludus Literarius or The Grammar Schoole* 15; HC).
d. *Let us now take a Prospect of their Governours, **I mean**, consider the Manners and Maxims of their Nobility* (1677 de la Houssaye, *Government of Venice* 266; *OED*).
e. *Many of our fierce and staring Seperatists, like their Ancestors of another denomination (the Papists **I mean**) embrace Principles and Ways of Worship, though they understand them not* (1682 Pittis, *An Old Way of Ending New Controversies* 1; Lampeter)
f. *… and all other Offenders, accustomably presentable in a Court-Leet, **I mean**, in a City Court-Leet* (1724 Trueman [pseudonym], *An Examination and Resolution of the Two Questions* 1; Lampeter).

Here *I mean* seems to restrict the referent of the preceding NP, picking one member of a set of possible referents. Thus, in (13a), not all Puritans are intended, only Puritan preachers; in (13f), not all Court-Leets are intended, only City Court-Leets.

In respect to its syntax, *I mean* may occur with a NP (11b, 12b, 13a, 13b, 13e), a PP (11d, 12a, 13f), an AP (12c), a VP (13d), an AdvP (11a, 13c), or a dependent clause (12d). It may be postposed (11a, 11d, 13e) as well as preposed. Parentheticals are common only in the modern period; see, e.g., (11c).

2.2.2.4. Exemplification

The last appositional function – to exemplify – may be glossed 'for instance':

(14) a. *Miranda was a star; I was space dust.* ***I mean****, when she made cheerleader our sophomore year, I got elected treasurer of the Latin Club* (1992 Lanning, "I was a prom date renegade", *Teen* 16; FROWN).
b. *… blokes who had lived in the bush all our lives, really understood the hidden feelings of our land or his, really, I suppose.* ***I mean****, like, he'd spend hours staring at a plant or pretty flower* (1986 Weller, "Herbie", *Going Home* 1; ACE).

There do not appear to be pre-modern examples of this function. Again (14a–b) are parenthetical.

2.2.3. Cause

Perhaps the most interesting meaning of *I mean* is that exemplified in (15), roughly translatable as 'because' or 'I'm saying this because'.[17] This appears in Modern English and is quite common in parenthetical instances of *I mean*:

(15) a. *"Don't you think it's time you put that thing away.* ***I mean****, look at it, it's antique; you could hurt yourself with it"* (1991 Royce, *The Proving Ground* 31; FLOB).
b. *"… for the most part it makes little difference.* ***I mean*** *the people are dead"* (1992 Cook, *Blindsight* 43; FROWN).
c. *Do we need the one-cent coin?* ***I mean****, how long has it been since one could buy something for a cent …?* (1986 *The Herald* 1; ACE).
d. *Shouldn't there be lots of places going.* ***I mean****, with the tax changes?* (1986 Corish, *Greenwich Apartments* 1; ACE).

As the speaker is being attentive to the hearer's need for explanation, this usage is "intersubjective".[18] It is also subjective since the utterance preceding *I mean* usually expresses a personal opinion or view of the speaker.

2.2.4. Speaker attitude

In the modern period (with occasional earlier examples), parenthetical *I mean* or *I mean* preceding or following a phrasal category may express a variety

of speaker attitudes. First, it may express emphasis or assert the veracity or an utterance:[19]

(16) a. *I'm not talking about little people although they were.* ***I mean*** *real dwarves, with beards, crossbows, and armor* (1992 Spector, "His cool, blue skin" 82; FROWN).
b. *But Cousin Alexander is rich! Really rich,* ***I mean*** (1991 Nash, *Mr. Ravensworth's Ward* 71; FLOB).
c. *… when he might have been the best at this one thing. The very best* ***I mean*** (1987 Kidman, *The Whiteness* 27; WC).

In (16a) and (16b) "real" and "really" contribute to the sense of veracity being expressed, but as (16c) shows, such a modal marker is not obligatory. Second, *I mean* may express evaluation or judgment, especially in the context of an evaluative adjective:

(17) a. *… he'd made a gigantic hole in the sand.* ***I mean****, it was huge* (1991 Steed, *Boxed In* 90; FLOB).
b. ***I mean****, it's humiliating to be beaten by someone who doesn't even walk properly* (1987 Sharp, "Round the rugged rocks", *New Outlook* 21; WC).
c. *… then I'm appalled the SK should try to destroy it.* ***I mean****, that's nothing short of treachery* (1991 Robinson, *Artillery of Lies* 26; FLOB).
d. *What could be more bizarre than a mob of 70,000 heading towards <ab> St Heliers Beach for no apparent reason (****I mean****, it wasn't a sunny day …)* (1987 Sharp, "Round the rugged rocks", *New Outlook* 11; WC).

Finally, *I mean* may express sincerity[20] in the sense 'I'm serious when I say':

(18) a. *I do no fors,* ***I speke right as I mene*** (?c1450 [?c1390] Chaucer, *Merciles Beute* 31; *MED*).
'I pay no attention, I speak just as I mean'
b. *Now god turne all to good,* ***I say as I mene*** (1500 [1460] *Towneley Plays* [Hnt HM 1] 120/131; *MED*).
'Now god turns all to good, I say as I mean'

c. *Mistress Page:* ***I mean it not****; I seek you a better husband* (1597–1601 Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* III, iv, 83; U of V).
d. *… he will lose unless he concentrates on every point, and* ***I mean*** *every point* (1991 *Evening Standard* 62; FLOB).
e. *I'm in this for the distance.* ***I mean it*** (1992 Dove, *Through the Ivory Gate*. *A Novel* 32; FROWN).
f. *I would never pick up the phone and call him;* ***I mean****, I wouldn't do that* (1992 Gates, *Chief: My Life with the LAPD* 5; FROWN).
g. *… so you felt like snuggling up to her. Well* ***I mean****, I wouldn't, but I could recognise the look* (1987 Edmond, "Sadie" 12; WC).

2.2.5. Interpersonal meaning

The only interpersonal or interactive use of *I mean* is in a variety of phrases containing a second-person pronoun or in an interrogative:

(19) a. *It is because she isn't that she is successful …* ***if you understand what I mean*** (1991 Holt, *Daughter of Deceit* 50; FLOB).
b. *"If it was, then conceivably Congressman Metcalf resented that and – Well.* ***You see what I mean****"* (1992 Roosevelt, *Murder in the Red Room* 17; FROWN).
c. *Or the paper does rather.* ***Know what I mean****?* (1986 O'Sullivan, "Putting Bob down", *Landfall* 22; WC).
d. *… if Smith's orchard would have any ripe apples we could swipe on the way …* ***see what I mean****?* (1987 *In our own Write* 52; WC).

In Middle English, when these occur in verse, they often seem to be used as empty metrical tags, though this does not appear to be their use in Early Modern English:

(20) a. *… gif þu wolt sen in þi siht God of heuene …* ***Vnderstond nu what I mene*** (c1330 [c1300] *Speculum of Guy of Warwick* [Auch] 405; *MED*).
'if you will see in your sight God of heaven … understand now what I mean'
b. *And for a time yit thei like; /* ***If that ye wisten what I mene*** (1390–1393 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 6.738–739; U of V).
'and for a time yet they like; if you know what I mean'

c. *Vnnethe myghte they the statut holde / In which that they were bounden vnto me; /* ***Ye woot wel what I meene of this, pardee!*** (1395 Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* D.WB 198–200; *MED*).
'Hardly might they hold the law by which they were bound to me; you know well what I mean by this, indeed!'
d. *She dryueth man to purge hem,* ***ye wote what I meane*** (1475 [c1450] Idley, *Instructions to his Son* 1.710; *MED*).
'she drives men to purge themselves, you know that I mean'
e. *Faith:* ***You know what I mean****; all carnal and fleshly content* (1666 Bunyan, *The Pilgrim's Progress*; U of V).[21]

Although this structure is hearer-directed, it is not always interactive as it does not elicit or expect a response from the interlocutor. According to the *OED*, this expression denotes "a hope that one has been understood (esp. when one has spoken imprecisely circumspectly, or euphemistically)" and is used "as an intensifier, or appended to a statement by way of innuendo or insinuation, or as a filler" (s.v. *mean*, v. 1, def. II 6d). The sense of *I mean* is thus 'I'm implying more than I'm saying'. This is an intersubjective meaning as it contains overt social deixis and explicit markers of the speaker's attention to the addressee. It operates by Levinson's (2000) R-Heuristic ("what is said implies more is meant") (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 23).

2.3. Syntactic development

Two possible syntactic paths of development present themselves based on studies of other first-person parentheticals: (a) from a matrix clause *I mean (that)* + S, and (b) from a relative structure *{as, so, which} I mean*.

The first scenario is proposed by Thompson and Mulac (1991) for the synchronic development of the pragmatic parentheticals *I think* and *I guess*. They argue for a direct correlation between frequency, first-person subjects, *that*-less complements, and the grammaticalization of these forms as what they call "epistemic parentheticals". In short, they argue for a reversal of the matrix and subordinate clause, as follows:

I think that he will win > I think he will win > He will win, I think.

Analogous developments have been argued for the history of *I think* and *methinks* (Palander-Collin 1999; Wischer 2000); of *(I) pray/prithee* (Akimoto

2000; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 252–255); of *I promise you* (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 206–209); of *I say* (Brinton 2005), and of *I'm afraid* (Akimoto 2002).

The second scenario is proposed by Brinton (1996) for the diachronic development of parenthetical *I think, I guess,* etc. from Old to Middle English. While this does not involve a reversal in the status of the matrix and subordinate clause, it does involve deletion of the relative pronoun and change in status of the *I mean* clause from adjunct to disjunct.[22]

Note that these two sources correspond to what Quirk et al. (1985: 1112) call type (i) and type (ii) comment clauses: type (i) is like the matrix clause of a main clause, and type (ii) is like an adverbial finite clause (e.g., *as you know* in which *as* has a relative function, or *as I see it* in which *as* has a subordinator function).

A problem for proposal (a) is that throughout the periods of English, *mean* followed by a *that* complement is rare. Table 3, which presents counts from representative corpora of ME and EModE, illustrates the distribution of different syntactic constructions with *I mean* in earlier periods (cf. also Table 1 for PDE).

Table 3. Structures with *I mean* in two historical corpora of English

Structure	ME section of the *Helsinki Corpus*	*Lampeter Corpus*	**Total**
I mean (parenthetical)	4	3	**7**
I mean (that) S	–	3	**3**
I mean NP/AP/VP/AdvP/PP	11	53	**64**
by X *I mean (that)*; *when I say* X *I mean*	1	5	**6**
(which/who/that) I mean	1	3	**4**
what I mean	2	2	**4**
I mean to	–	2	**2**
I mean not thus	1	–	**1**
of that I mean	1	–	**1**
I mean what you do	–	1	**1**
Total	**21**	**72**	**93**

That may occur in the pseudo-cleft construction, *What I mean is (that)* (see 3c) or the *by* X *I mean (that)* construction (see 3d) in PDE. Note that in the *Lampeter Corpus*, only one of the 3 examples of *I mean* followed by a claus-

al complement contains an explicit *that* and only one of the 5 examples of the *by* X *I mean* constructions is followed by *that*. Examples of *I mean* plus *that* complements in the different periods of English are illustrated in (21):

(21) a. ***I mene*** *not* ***þat*** *þou shuldist not lawhe, but I wold þat þi lawhyng be not to moche* (1460 *The Tree & Twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost* [McC 132] 107/17; *MED*).
'I do not mean that you should not laugh but I would that your laughing be not too much'

b. *And* ***I*** *do not* ***meene,*** *by all this my taulke,* ***that*** *yong Iengtlemen, should alwaies be poring on a booke* (1563–1568 Ascham, *The Scholemaster* 216; HC).

c. *… and as a recognition of what women have already contributed to the life o their Churches.* ***I mean****, quite seriously,* ***that*** *no great emotional investment was involved* (1991 Kent, "Women, ministry, and apostolicity" 3; FLOB).

Note that in all cases in (21) the "full" meaning of signification (or occasionally intention) is expressed. The usual clausal complement of *mean* in all stages is the infinitive (Visser 1969: 1330; Rudanko 1989: 22, 43, 80).[23] If *mean* occurs at all with finite clause complements, these are usually indirect questions.

As deletion of *that* becomes common in late Middle English (see Rissanen 1999: 284–285), ambiguous structures with sentence-initial *I mean* followed by *that*-less complements (analyzable as main clause or parenthetical) occur more frequently:

(22) a. *"I wol ben here, withouten any wene. /* ***I mene****, as helpe me Iuno, heuenes quene, / The tenthe day, but if that deth m'assaile, / I wol yow sen withouten any faille"* (1380–1387 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* 4.1593–1596; U of V).
'I will be here without any doubt. I mean, as help me Juno, heaven's queen, the tenth day, unless death assails me, I intend to see you without fail'

b. ***I mene*** */ Maister Geffrey Chaucer hath translated this sayd werke oute of latyn in to oure vsual and moder tonge* (1477–1484 Caxton, *The Prologues and Epilogues* 37; HC).
'I mean Master Geoffrey Chaucer has translated this said work from Latin into our usual mother tongue'

c. ***I mean**, my lords, those powers that the queen / Hath raised in Gallia have arrived our coast, / And, as we hear, march on to fight with us* (1588–1592 Shakespeare, *The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth* V, iii, 7–9; U of V).
d. *The dean and he are not great; that is, **I mean** the dean is not his creature* (1690 Lady Russell, *Letters* 5 Feb.; *OED*).

These sentences continue to express the "full" meaning of *mean*.

In respect to proposal (b), it may be observed that relative structures with *I mean* are somewhat more common than matrix + *that* clause structures in Middle English and Early Modern English (see Table 3). Representative examples from the two periods are given in (23) and (24), respectively:

(23) a. … *þis fool wommon, **of whom I mene*** (1390 *Northern Homily Cycle: Narrationes*. [Vrn] 300/54; *MED*).
'this foolish woman of whom I mean'[24]
b. *Boecius, **þis same of whom I mene** … was a noble senatour* (1450 [1410] Walton, *Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae* [Lin-c 103] p. 6; *MED*).
'Boethius, this same of whom I mean, … was a noble senator'
c. *And that was thilke time sene / For whan this Pope **of whom I meene** / Was chose* (1390–1393 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 2.2829–2831; U of V).
'And that was seen at the same time for when this Pope of whom I mean was chosen'
d. *That is Novembre **which I meene**, / Whan that the lef hath lost his greene* (1390–1393 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 7.1167–1168; U of V).
'That is November which I mean, when the leaf has lost its green'

(24) a. *Malcolm: It is myself **I mean**: in whom I know / All the particulars of vice so grafted* (1605–1606 Shakespeare, *Macbeth* IV, iii, 50–51; U of V).
b. *The Person **I mean** is, the worthy Bishop Blackall of Blessed Memory* (1718 Roberts, *The Flying Post Posted* 1; Lampeter).

Like *if you know what I mean* in Middle English, the relatives often seem to be empty fillers.

A few unambiguous parenthetical *I mean*s can be found in Middle English (25) and Early Modern English (26). Note that the parenthetical nature of *I mean* can be determined by one of two formal means: either *I mean* is in non-initial position, as in (25a) and (25c), or *I mean* precedes a non-declarative clause, as in (26a):

(25) a. *… for to holde in love a man in honde, / And hym hire lief and deere herte calle, / And make hym an howve above a calle, / **I meene**, as love another in this while / She doth hireself a shame and hym a gyle* (1425 [c1385] Chaucer *Troilus and Criseyde* 3.773; *MED*).
'for to hold a man in hand in love and to call him dear heart and precious to her and make him a hood over a cap [i.e., deceive him] – I mean, as love another in this while – she does herself a shame and him a deception'

b. *& Gif he, þat haþ a pleyn & an open boystous voice by kynde, speke hem poerly & pypyngly – **I mene** bot Gif he be seek in his body, or elles þat it be bitwix him & his God or his confessour – þan it is a verrey token of ypocrisie* (1425 [?1400] *Cloud of Unknowing* [Hrl 674] 101.21–22/102.1–2; *MED*).
'and if he that has a plain and an open untaught voice by nature, speak poorly and pipingly – I mean but if he be sick in his body or else that it be between him and his God or his confessor – then it is a very token of hypocrisy'

c. *Medleth namoore with that art, **I mene**, / For if ye doon, youre thrift is goon ful clene* (c. 1395 Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* G.CY 1424–1425; U of V).
'Meddle no more with that art, I mean, for if you do, your thrift will be gone completely'

(26) a. *Anne: **I mean**, Master Slender, what would you with me?* (1597–1601 Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* III, iv, 60; U of V).

b. *Pandarus: You depend upon him, **I mean**?* (1601–1602 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida* III, i, 4; U of V).

The meaning of most of these forms is 'namely, that is'.

Despite the existence of some *that* complements with *I mean* and some relatives containing *I mean*, it seems clear that the origin of parenthetical *I mean* cannot be found in either of the structures proposed to date (matrix

clause + nominal *that* clause or sentential relative). The predominant structure, *I mean* followed by a phrasal category, is the most likely source of this parenthetical structure. A possible scenario for the syntactic development of parenthetical *I mean* is the following. Initially *I mean* governs a phrasal element {NP, VP, AP, PP, AdvP} and has scope within the sentence. The bonds between *I mean* and the phrasal element are weakened or loosened, and *I mean* can begin to be postposed to the phrasal element. The phrasal element is then reanalyzed as an independent element, and *I mean* as a syntactically free parenthetical with scope over the sentence. At this point, *I mean* is extended to the context of clauses and can be pre- or postposed to clausal elements as well, thus acquiring scope over discourse (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 40).

2.4. Semantic development

While the meaning of the pragmatic marker *I mean* does indeed derive from the original meaning of 'signification', it does not do so in the simple linear course proposed by Schiffrin (1987). The semantic development can be schematized as in Table 4. The categories in the table are not intended to be mutually exclusive, as the metalinguistic meanings 'I'm making this previous discourse more precise' and 'I'm exemplifying the previous discourse' also have an intersubjective quality, with the speaker attending to the hearer's need for more explicitness or for exemplification.

Table 4. The semantic development of *I mean*

Function	Old English	Middle English	Early Modern English	Modern English
metalinguistic	'I intend the previous discourse to signify/ have the meaning' (exx. 3, 4, 5)	'I'm making the previous discourse more precise/ explicit' (exx. 11, 12, 13)	'I'm repairing/ correcting the previous discourse' (exx. 6, 7)	'I'm exemplifying the previous discourse' (ex. 14)

Function	Old English	Middle English	Early Modern English	Modern English
meta-communicative/ subjective		'I'm reformulating the previous discourse (perhaps contrastively)' (exx. 8, 9, 10)		'I'm empha–sizing the importance/ veracity of the previous or following discourse' (ex. 16)
				'I'm evaluating the previous discourse' (ex. 17)
				'I'm serious when I say' (ex. 18)
intersubjective		'I'm implying more than I'm saying' (exx. 19, 20)		'I'm saying this because' (ex. 15)

Most of the extended meanings of *I mean* can be understood as invited inferences arising in appositional structures, where a previous element in the discourse is restated or reformulated.[25] By the Gricean Maxim of Manner "be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)" (Grice 1975: 46) or Levinson's "M-Heuristic" "what's said in an abnormal way isn't normal" (2000), hearers will make the inference that the same information is not simply being restated but that some *additional information* is being presented. Some of the possible inferences are the following:

– the information in the previous utterance is being corrected

I'll see you tomorrow morning, I mean afternoon.
+> 'afternoon is the correct time'

– the information in the previous utterance is being more precisely or more explicitly expressed

  The situation could be embarrassing, I mean politically.
  +> 'the situation is not generally embarrassing, but the precise way in which it could be embarrassing is in a political way'

– a contrastive reformulation of the information in the previous utterance is being presented

  I just want to look at, I mean, examine the evidence.
  +> 'I do not want to have a (quick) look but rather a thorough examination of the evidence'

– a particular example or instance of the information in the previous utterance is being supplied

  He really knows cars. I mean, he can name all the different types of sports cars.
  +> 'An example of his knowledge is his ability to name all the types of sports cars (his knowledge could manifest itself in other ways)'

– the information in the previous utterance is emphasized or its accuracy is asserted by the speaker

  He's rich, I mean (really) rich.
  +> 'I'm emphasizing the extent of his richness/I'm being emphatic about his richness'

– the information in the previous utterance is evaluated by the speaker

  It was humiliating to be beaten, I mean (truly) humiliating.
  +> 'My subjective view is that it is humiliating'

– the information in the previous utterance is sincerely expressed by the speaker

  I felt like walking out. I mean, I wouldn't, but …
  +> 'I am being sincere when I say that I wouldn't walk out'

  (Note that this last meaning often requires more involved expression, e.g., *I mean it*.)

The exact nature of the inference is contextually determined. The 'causal' meaning expresses the reason for the speaker having made the previous statement, as in *It makes no difference what you say. I mean, the damage is already done*. It should probably be seen as an extension of the 'preciseness,

explicitness' meaning since it makes explicit the speaker's reasons for having reached some conclusion, or the reasons which underlie the speaker's utterance.[26]

3. Accounting for the development of *I mean*

Within a larger theory of language change, the goal of the micro-analysis provided in this paper is to determine whether pragmatic markers develop via a process unique to historical pragmatics (such as pragmaticalization) or via more general processes of diachronic change (such as grammaticalization, lexicalization, or idiomaticization). The development of pragmatic parentheticals such as *I mean* has been treated alternately as a case of either lexicalization or grammaticalization, processes which in other contexts are seen as being "mirror images" (e.g., Ramat 1992). On one hand, Schiffrin (1987: 319) designates *I mean* as a "lexicalized clause". On the other hand, Thompson and Mulac (1991: 315) call the analogous forms *I think* and *I guess* "unitary" particles, similar to epistemic particles in other languages. They reject lexicalization (understood here as univerbation) as the process responsible for the formation of *I think* (Thompson and Mulac 1991: 324), arguing instead for grammaticalization.[27] Many of the diachronic studies of first-person pragmatic parentheticals cited above (Brinton 1996, 2005; Akimoto 2000, 2002; Palander-Collin 1999; Traugott 1995a; Traugott and Dasher 2002; cf. Diessel and Tomasello 2001: 106–107)[28] likewise suggest a grammaticalization analysis. However, Wischer (2000) argues that the similar form, *methinks*, undergoes both grammaticalization and lexicalization.

3.1. Grammaticalization

For the purposes of this paper, grammaticalization will be defined as "the change whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain contexts to serve grammatical functions and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions" (Hopper and Traugott 2003: xv).[29]

My research (Brinton 1996), as well that of others (see e.g., Traugott 1995a), has argued that pragmatic markers, though not usually showing morphological bonding ("coalescence", see Lehmann [1995: 148]) or phonological reduction ("attrition"; see Lehmann [1995: 126]),[30] undergo many of the

morphosyntactic and semantic changes thought criterial to grammaticalization, including:

a) "decategorialization", or loss of the morphological and syntactic characteristics of the full categories and assumption of the characteristics of the secondary categories (Hopper 1991: 22, 30–31);
b) change from major (open) to minor (closed) word class;
c) freezing or ossification of form;
d) desemanticization, or semantic "attrition" (Lehmann 1995: 127);
e) shift from referential (propositional) to non-referential (pragmatic or procedural) meaning (Traugott 1995a; 1995b: 47);
f) the coding or conventionalization of invited inferences;
g) "subjectification", or "the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or speaker attitude to what is said" (Traugott 1995b: 32);
h) "divergence", or retention of the original lexical form as an autonomous element when the form is grammaticalized (Hopper 1991: 22, 24–25);
i) "layering", or the continual emergence of new layers within a functional domain (Hopper 1991: 22–24); and
j) "persistence", or adherence of some traces of the original meaning of a form in the grammaticalized item (Hopper 1991: 28–30).

However, evidence of syntactic "fixation" (fixing of the item in a fixed slot, see Lehmann [1995: 188]) is ambiguous for pragmatic markers; in fact, Traugott (1995a) argues that loss of syntactic freedom is not a necessary aspect of this type of grammaticalization. It might be argued, furthermore, that pragmatic markers do not undergo loss of syntactic scope ("condensation", see Lehmann [1995: 143]), since in their pragmatic functions they relate not to individual words or even clauses but to larger stretches of discourse (Traugott 1995a).[31]

I mean would also seem to have undergone many of the changes identified with grammaticalization. In this construction, the verb *mean* is decategorialized, losing verbal characteristics such as the ability to be modified by adverbials or to take phrasal or clausal complements, and it is desemanticized, losing its "full" meaning and assuming less "concrete" meanings. As *I mean* evolves from a full complement-taking verb to a pragmatic parenthetical, it becomes "adverbialized" in a number of discourse functions and as a consequence shifts from major (open) to minor (closed) word class.[32] The con-

struction is frozen in the first person, singular, present tense, and shows some degree of coalescence since, although *I mean* is still orthographically two words, adverbial elements (e.g., *really, truly, only*) cannot intercede between *I* and *mean*.[33] *I mean* also undergoes some degree of phonological attrition, tending to be reduced to [əmi:n] or [mi:n] (Crystal and Davy 1975: 97). By a process of invited inferencing, *I mean* acquires non-referential (pragmatic or procedural) meanings such as mistake editing, clarification, precision, and exemplification. As discussed above, *I mean* becomes (more) subjective[34] and intersubjective in meaning. However, as is the case with pragmatic markers generally, *I mean* does not lose syntactic scope (undergo "condensation"); rather, it increases its scope from relating to phrasal or clausal complements to functioning on a global level. Nor does *I mean* become syntactically fixed; as a parenthetical it becomes freer its position, though initial position is still favored.

I mean also exhibits Hopper's (1991) grammaticalization principles of "divergence", in which *I mean* continues to be used as a free syntactic combination with main clause status carrying its "literal" meaning; "persistence", in which vestiges of the verb's original meaning of 'intention' are clearly present in the newer, pragmatic meanings of explicitness, reformulation, etc.; and "layering" where *I mean* comes to replace or complement a number of older forms with similar appositional meaning, including *that is* from Old English (see Mitchell 1985: 130–131, 533, 605); *namely* from Early Middle English; *that is {to say, to wit}* from Middle English, and *to wit* from Early Modern English (on *to wit,* see Koivisto-Alanko and Rissanen [2002]).

3.2. Pragmaticalization

The apparent inconsistency in describing the development of pragmatic markers, which are typically syntactically extragrammatical and functionally agrammatical, as a case of grammaticalization has led certain Swedish scholars (see, e.g., Erman and Kotsinas 1993; Aijmer 1997) to suggest a contrasting process known as "pragmaticalization", as schematized below:



(Aijmer 1997: 2)

In the case of pragmaticalization, a lexical element develops "directly into a discourse marker without an intermediate stage of grammaticalization". It produces markers "mainly serving as textstructuring devices at [non-sentential] levels of discourse" (Erman and Kotsinas 1993: 79). According to Aijmer (1997: 3), the "overriding" distinction between pragmaticalization and grammaticalization rests with the non-truth-conditionality and optionality of items undergoing pragmaticalization. Otherwise, there are many similarities in the processes; both may result in function words, dummy markers, or clitics (Erman and Kotsinas 1993: 79), both may involve the development of pragmatic meaning, or the increase in informativeness, and both may adhere to Hopper's (1991) principles of specialization, layering, divergence, and renewal (Aijmer 1996: 2–3, 6). Erman and Kotsinas (1993) describe the development of *you know* as cases of pragmaticalization, which they see as delexicalized, with no trace of grammaticalization, while Aijmer describes the development of *I think* (1997).

Pragmaticalization, it seems to me, is just a subspecies of grammaticalization, not a distinct process. In rejecting the distinction between the two, Traugott (1995a) observes, on one hand, that while clearly grammaticalized tense, aspect, and mood markers are not "as obviously pragmatic" as pragmatic markers, they "surely" have pragmatic functions in most languages. On the other hand, she points out (1995a; 2003: 643) that pragmatic markers, though they carry scope over more than the sentence, are indubitably "part of the grammar". That is, although pragmatic parentheticals such as *I mean* are extrasyntactic, falling outside the core syntactic structure of the sentence, they are not agrammatical, and their adverbial-like function would place them squarely within the grammar.

3.3. Lexicalization

The concept of lexicalization captures the univerbation that many pragmatic markers undergo as well as their acquisition of syntactic independence (Traugott 1995a). However, as has been frequently observed, there is no general consensus as to what phenomena lexicalization refers to (see Brinton 2002). Perhaps the most widely used sense of the term *lexicalization* – though *degrammaticalization* is also used in this context – is the change of a grammatical word into a lexical word (see Hopper and Traugott 2003: 58, 134; Ramat 1992: 550–551; 2001: 394). Examples include the development of the verb *down* from the homophonous particle *down* or of the German

verb *duzen* from the pronoun *du*, comparatives that have lost their grammatical status (*elder, mayor*) or participles that are no longer part of the verbal paradigm (*shorn, cloven*). Another common understanding of lexicalization is the univerbation of a syntactic phrase or construction into a single word (see Traugott 1994: 1485; 2005; Moreno Cabrera 1998: 214; Wischer 2000: 359). The classic example of this type of change is *today* < *to* + *dæge*. However, the reverse of this process, namely the change from a bound morpheme to a lexeme, or the change of a (derivational) suffix to an independent word (e.g., *ism, ology, onomy, ocrasy, ade, itis, teen, gate*), is also included under the rubric of "lexicalization" (see Ramat 1992: 549–550; 2001: 393). Combining the last two definitions, it would seem that lexicalization can involve either of two directions of movement, arriving at the endpoint of the lexeme, as shown below:

morpheme
↓
lexeme
↑
syntactic construction

The development of idiosyncratic, monomorphemic lexical pairs due to phonological change and morphological loss, such as *lie/lay* or *foot/feet*, is also cited as a case of lexicalization (see Hopper and Traugott 2003: 135; Traugott 1994: 1485; 2005).[35] Finally, a lexeme or lexemes becoming more lexical (e.g., *hlafweard* > *lord, song* + *writer* > *songwriter*) is also seen as lexicalization (Wischer 2000: 359; van der Auwera 2002: 26n).

Nonetheless, a more coherent view of lexicalization is currently evolving (Brinton and Traugott 2005). Lipka defines lexicalization as "the phenomenon that a complex lexeme once coined tends to become a single complete lexical unit, a simple lexeme. Through this process it loses the character of a syntagma to a greater or lesser degree" (2002: 111). Similarly, Aijmer says of lexicalization that it is "a linguistic process which makes it possible to create new wholes or 'gestalts' from the combination of single words" (1996: 10). In a recent discussion, Lehmann (2002: 13, 15) defines lexicalization as a process which "involves a holistic access to a unit, a renunciation of its internal analysis"; it "reduces the inner structure of a unit, shifting it into the inventory", as in English *him* + *self* > *himself* or *be going to* > *gonna* or Spanish *baxo de* > *bajo, a cabo de* > *cabe*. Lexicalization can thus be defined as the change by which structurally compositional forms are, over time, "decompositionalized". Lexicalization typically involves the development of

new monomorphemic, non-compositional elements belonging to major lexical classes, as one sees, for example, in cases of compounding (e.g., *holiday* < *halig* 'holy' + *dæg* 'day', *garlic* < *gar* 'spear' + *leac* 'leek') or blending (e.g., *guestimate* < *guess* + *estimate*, *docudrama* < *documentary* + *drama*) (Brinton and Traugott 2005).[36]

Although there is little discussion of lexicalization in the context of pragmatic markers, one exception is Wischer (2000), who argues that *methinks* undergoes lexicalization as well as grammaticalization because a once productive construction has been fossilized, partly demotivated, and changed into a symbol; as a result, it is stored as a whole entity in the lexicon and classified as an adverb (Wischer 2000: 363). Once lexicalized, it immediately assumes grammatical functions and is hence grammaticalized (Wischer 2000: 364). The lexicalization of *methinks* becomes clear when it is compared with *I think*, which is not lexicalized, according to Wischer (see also Thompson and Mulac 1991).[37] Another exception is Krug (1998), who – using the definition of lexicalization as a complex phrase becoming a monomorphemic word – argues that the change from *is it not?* to *innit?* (through an intermediate stage *in't it*) involves the form becoming invariant (always *is* and *it*, regardless of the subject, operator/verb, and tense in the main clause), inseparable, and morphologically opaque. There is also desemanticization of *it*, loss of phonological substance, fixing into a semi-institutionalized spelling, and acquisition of pragmatic functions, primarily a turn-taking function.[38] Finally, Aijmer (1996: 12–13) sees "conversational routines" such as *thank you* as resulting from lexicalization. However, as Aijmer believes that there exist degrees of lexicalization – degrees to which a phrase is fixed in form, institutionalized, or culturally recognizable, more or less literal in meaning, or more or less easy to analyze into parts – she sees conversational routines as only partially lexicalized: they are not fully adverbialized and are only partially fixed.

Nonetheless, Traugott (1995a) concludes that pragmatic markers do not undergo lexicalization since they do not behave like lexical items: they frequently do not belong to any major lexical category and they are syntactically and prosodically constrained. Moreover, Brinton and Traugott (2005) argue that although lexicalization, like grammaticalization, concerns the fossilization of complex structures, those structures that are used to express the major categories, N, V, and A, undergo lexicalization, while those that used to express functional categories are grammaticalized.

Following Lehmann's (2002: 3) definition of lexicalization as a process of "accessing a collocation … holistically [and] treating it as an entry of the inventory, as a lexical item", it might also be possible to consider *I mean* as

a case of incipient lexicalization. The original collocation (subject + verb) has fossilized, (partially) lost its internally complex structure (evidenced by phonological reduction and the lack of interspersed elements), and gained syntactic independence. *I mean* would seem to be analyzed as a whole, as a unified lexical entry, part of the lexical inventory.

3.4. Idiomaticization

A fourth process, idiomaticization, is the loss of semantic compositionality, a process of semantic change from literal to figurative or metaphorical meaning (Bussmann 1996: 217, 278, 316). According to Nuccorini, idiomaticization is a diachronic process of "metaphorization", "specialization", and "shrinkage of meaning": "the degree of opaqueness of fixed expressions can be measured diachronically against the process of metaphorization they have undergone" (1990: 418, 420). In addition to the loss of semantic transparency, idiomaticization may also involve the lexical fixing and syntactic ossification which characterizes idioms synchronically.[39]

Idiomaticization is often equated with lexicalization (Lehmann 2002: 14; Lipka 2002; Traugott 2005). Bauer sees idiomaticization as the subtype of lexicalization he calls "semantic lexicalization" (1983: 55–59); as examples, he cites compounds such as *blackmail* and *butterfly* or derivatives such as *unquiet* and *inspector*. Bussmann considers idiomaticization to be the diachronic element of lexicalization, which occurs when "the original meaning can no longer be deduced from its individual elements" (1996: s.v. *lexicalization*, also see *idiomaticization*). However, Aijmer (1996: 10–11) points out that not all items which are lexicalized are idiomaticized; also unlike lexicalization, idiomaticization can be strong or weak.

I mean is largely idiomaticized. Like idioms, *I mean* shows a high degree of lexical invariability or fixing; that is, it is not possible to substitute synonymous verbs such as *signify, denote, purport,* or *drive at.* Also, like idioms, the phrase is syntactically fixed, allowing no alteration in tense, mood, or aspect, such as *I meant,*[40] *I should mean,* or *I am meaning,* and no adverbial modification. *Mean* has become semantically opaque to some degree, having undergone semantic "bleaching", though not figurative change. Furthermore, the syntagm *I mean* has become less compositional as it ceases to express a cognitive state of the speaker. Although all of these changes are typical of idiomaticization, I would suggest that this process is part of the larger processes of grammaticalization and lexicalization at work here.

4. Some conclusions

On the micro-level, this study of *I mean* has shown that we need to expand the possible syntactic sources for parentheticals to include not only matrix clauses followed by clausal complements or relative clauses but also subject + verb sequences followed by phrasal complements. It has also shown that the semantic changes characterizing the evolution of even a fairly transparent pragmatic marker such as *I mean* are not at all simple. While pragmatic meanings tend to arise through invited inferences, it is not possible to establish a single unilinear course of semantic development. There do seem to be some unidirectional patterns: for example, metalinguistic meanings tend to precede both metacommunicative / subjective and intersubjective meanings. However, in the case of *I mean* one cannot show that subjective meanings clearly precede intersubjective meanings (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002). Considerably more work needs to be done on the semantic development of pragmatic markers before the entire picture becomes clear.

On a macro-level, the results of this study suggest that the evolution of *I mean* is best understood as a process of grammaticalization. What distinguishes the development of *I mean* as grammaticalization and not lexicalization is the decategorialization of *I mean* and concomitant change to functional, or operator, status. The fossilization of a complex structure and (partial) erasure of morpheme boundaries, which is characteristic of both processes, in the case of *I mean* leads to the creation of a pragmatic parenthetical (which belongs to a functional category) rather than to the creation of a noun, verb, or adjective (which belongs to a major lexical category); hence, the change is best understood in this instance as grammaticalization rather than lexicalization (Brinton and Traugott 2005). Moreover, the apparent regularity of the change in *I mean* – comparable to the development of a number of other subject + verb sequences as pragmatic parentheticals (such as *I think, I guess, you know*) – is also characteristic of grammaticalization patterns, which tend to affect whole semantic classes and high-frequency items that originally have quite general meanings. By contrast, lexicalizations are more likely to be language-specific and affect individual items of low frequency, often with highly specialized meaning. Finally, the acquisition of subjective meanings, which we see in the case of *I mean*, is characteristic of grammaticalization but not of lexicalization. Idiomaticization, understood as a semantic process involving the loss of semantic transparency, underlies both lexicalization and grammaticalization, but is not in itself able to account for the development of pragmatic markers (and may occur independently of either process, e.g., *spill the beans*).

The larger significance of these findings is that they suggest – contra a view which has, until recently, been received opinion – that grammaticalization and lexicalization are not contradictory processes, and that lexicalization does not represent a counterexample to grammaticalization (see Brinton 2002). Instead, they appear to be complementary: both are unidirectional processes involving freezing, the (optional) erasure of morphological or phrasal boundaries (i.e., the loss of structural compositionality), and the "holistic" rather than analytic accessing of complex forms (see Lehmann 2002; Brinton and Traugott 2005).

Notes

1. I would like to thank members of the Semantics–Pragmatics workshop at Stanford University (June 2002) and members of the Pragmatics Workshop at ICE-HL (August 2002) for thought-provoking responses when I presented versions of this paper.
2. Stenström found *I mean* to be the third most frequent marker (after *you know* and *you see*) in the *London-Lund Corpus* (1995: 293). Biber et al. note 2,000 occurrences per million of *I mean* in American English and 1,500 per million in British English (1999: 1098). Jucker and Smith record a frequency of one *I mean* every two minutes in the speech of college students, but among the ten pragmatic markers that they count, *I mean* is the sixth most common (after *yeah*, *like*, *oh*, *you know*, and *well*) and constitutes only 4.1 per cent of the total tokens used (1998: 176). Scheibman observes that *mean* is the most common verb of "verbal process", constituting 81 per cent of all present tokens of such verbs in her corpus; furthermore, all instances of *mean* are present, and all but 4 occur with a first-person subject (2001: 74).
3. Interestingly, the 2nd edition of the *OED* (1989) fails to identify a parenthetical use of *I mean*.
4. See Lalljee and Cook (1975: 305), Edmondson (1981: 153), Östman (1981: 9), James (1983: 201), Swan (1994), and Stenström (1995: 294).
5. See Goldberg (1980: 120), Levinson (1983: 340, 365), Quirk et al. (1985: 1313), Schourup (1985: 147–148), Schiffrin (1987: 300), Redeker (1990: 374), and Stenström (1995).
6. See Crystal and Davy (1975: 97, 98), Goldberg (1980: 125, 214), Edmondson (1981: 154–155), who says that *I mean* belongs to "the let-me-explain" type fumble, Erman (1986: 137, 140, 142; 1987: 118), Schiffrin (1987: 296, 299, 302, 304), Chafe (1988: 14–15), Crystal (1988: 49), Gerhardt and Stinson (1994: 164), Swan (1994), Stenström (1995: 295), Jucker and Smith (1998: 174), and Biber et al. (1999: 1077).

7. See Gerhardt and Stinson (1994: 164) and Swan (1994); cf. Erman (1986: 137).
8. See House and Kasper (1981: 168), Faerch and Kasper (1982: 75), James (1983: 198, 202), and Schiffrin (1987: 305).
9. See Edmondson (1981: 155), Östman (1981: 34–35), and Stenström (1995: 294).
10. See Brown and Levinson (1987: 167), Lalljee and Cook (1975: 305), Coates (1998: 143), and James (1983: 198). Lalljee and Cook (1975: 305) speculate that since *I mean* has "overtones of apology", it "may be interpreted as the speaker not being sure of himself".
11. See James (1983: 198), Schiffrin (1987: 303), and Gerhardt and Stinson (1994: 163).
12. See Lalljee and Cook (1975: 303), James (1983: 196), and Stenström (1995: 298).
13. Etymologically, *mean* finds its source in OE *(ge)mænan* 'mean, signify, intend, allude, complain of', which has numerous cognates in the other Germanic languages (see Kroesch 1911: 503), likely from Germanic **mainjan*. While traditionally the verb is related to the PIE root **men* 'mind', this connection is difficult to explain phonologically. A connection to the PIE root **mei-no* 'opinion, intention' (giving *mean* and *moan*) has been made (see Watkins 2000). Wood (1899: 130) relates it to the root **me-i-o-* 'measure'.
14. The only pragmatically-colored usage with the meaning of signification cited in the *MED* is *I mene thus* (s.v. *mēnen*, v. (1), def. 1a) 'this is what I am getting at'. Variants found in my corpora include: *I mean thus, thus I mean, I mean as thus*. These often stand as independent utterances.
15. Quirk et al. (1985: 638–639) actually treat this usage as "contrastive", not "appositive" since one formulation is *replaced* with another rather than *added* to another; but they are clearly closely related, and both may be glossed with 'in other words'.
16. As a reviewer has noted, *I mean* has a kind of summing up function here.
17. The suggestion, made by a member of the audience at Stanford, that *I mean* in this sense is equivalent to 'after all' is intriguing, but not ultimately correct, I think. Note that *after all* works for some, but not all of the example sentences.
18. Intersubjectivity is "the explicit, coded expression of [the speaker's] attention to the image or 'self' of [the hearer] in a social or an epistemic sense" (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 22).
19. A possible early example is the following:
    That ech of yow, to shorte with oure weye, / In this viage shal telle tales tweye / To Caunterbury-ward, ***I mene it so*** (1388–1392 Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* A.Prol. 791–793; U of V).
    'That each of you, in order to shorten our way in this voyage shall tell two tales to Canterbury, I mean it'
20. The *OED* (s.v. *mean*, v. 1, def. II 6c) dates this usage from 1750; all early examples consist of an entire phrase, such as *I mean it*, not *I mean* alone.

21. The *OED* (s.v. *mean*, v. 1, def. II 6d) gives a 1575 occurrence of "you wot wel what I meane", but cites the first instance of *if you understand what I mean* from 1846.
22. For more on the syntactic development of pragmatic markers, see Brinton (2006).
23. While *-ing* complements with *mean* were possible in earlier English, they are marginal in Modern English (Rudanko 1989: 43; Visser 1973: 1879).
24. The "of" in (23a–c) is odd. Perhaps there is a blending of "of whom I speak" and "whom I mean" to give "of whom I mean".
25. This is foreshadowed by James's remark that *I mean* serves as an appeal to hearer deduction/inference = 'I invite you to interpret the head as a synonym of expressions of *like* significance' (1983: 199).
26. Cf. *OED* (s.v. *mean*, v. 1, def. II 6b): *mean* can be used "to signify by an action; (hence, by implication) to have as a motive or justification of an action", especially *what do you mean by …?*

    What do you mean by saying such a thing = 'Why are saying such a thing'
    I mean by saying such a thing that … = 'I am saying such a thing because'
27. Thompson and Mulac (1991) reason that the continued possibility of using *I think* and *I guess* as matrix clauses with literal meaning militates against a lexicalization analysis. I would argue that this simply shows Hopper's (1991) principle of divergence.
28. Diessel and Tomasello (2001) show that nearly 50 per cent of the earliest finite complement clauses acquired by children in fact occur with what they call "formulaic" or propositionally empty uses of *think*, *guess*, *bet*, *mean*, and *know* functioning as epistemic markers; the clauses are hence not complement clauses at all. Formulaic uses of *mean* include *I mean*, *you mean*, and *what do you mean* (Diessel and Tomasello 2001: 115).
29. Hopper and Traugott's definition is a refinement of Kuryłowicz's (1965: 69) well-known formulation: "Grammaticalization consists in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status, e.g., from a derivative formant to an inflectional one."
30. Some pragmatic markers undergo phonological reduction, such as *God woot > Goddot(h)* (Brinton 1996), or *indeed, in fact* /ndid, nfækt, fæk/ (Traugott 1995a), but many do not.
31. In fact, Tabor and Traugott (1998) challenge the notion of scope reduction (from "loose" to "tight" syntax) in the process of grammaticalization generally.
32. A clearer instance of this change is the development of the participle *meaning (that)* as a conjunction in Early Modern English, e.g.:

    Saiyng, when he was diyng: I haue saued the birde in my bosome: ***meaning that*** *he had kept both his promise and other* (1550 Hall, *Chronicle* 2; *OED*).
33. Only a few cases of *I only mean* are found in my corpora, and they are not parenthetical.

34. Because of the presence of the first-person subject, *I mean* is necessarily speaker-oriented.
35. Similarly, Bauer (1983: 53–54) cites non-productive affixes such as *-th* and word sets such as *eat/edible* or *right/rectitude*, where one member is productive and one non-productive (and hence lexicalized), as instances of what he calls "morphological lexicalization".
36. Lexicalization is not the same as, and should not be confused with, ordinary processes of word formation such as derivation, conversion, initialisms, acronyms, and clippings. While such changes result in new lexemes, they occur instantaneously, are created following structural templates in the language, and do not involve boundary reduction or indeterminacy. Word formation is a synchronic process (Brinton and Traugott 2005).
37. Wischer (2000) argues that that lexicalization (a syntagm becoming a new lexical item or a lexeme becoming more lexical) and grammaticalization (a syntagm becoming a new grammatical item, a lexeme becoming a grammatical item, or a grammatical item becoming more grammatical) are not contradictory processes; they simply occur on different levels. Both involve syntactic reanalysis, demotivation, fossilization, and conventionalization. However, the semantic changes differ: lexicalization involves the addition of semantic components, while grammaticalization involves the loss of semantic components.
38. Although Krug's is a synchronic study (1998), he argues that an apparent-time study shows that *innit* is spreading and is a true change in progress.
39. For example, in the case of the idiom *shoot the breeze*, lexical substitution is not possible (**shoot the wind*) nor are various syntactic operations (**the breeze was shot*).
40. Logically, one might expect *I meant* rather than *I mean* since the expression is typically referring to the preceding discourse. A reviewer has very helpfully pointed out that the present tense may serve as a marker of the speaker's online discourse.

Sources

Dictionary of Old English
Dictionary of Old English. Old English Corpus.
⟨http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/o/oec/⟩
ICAME
1999 *ICAME Collection of English Language Corpora*. 2nd ed. CD-ROM.
The HIT Centre, University of Bergen, Norway.
ACE = *Australian Corpus of English*
FLOB = *Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English*

FROWN = *Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English*
HC = *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, diachronic part* (see Kytö 1996)
Lampeter = *Lampeter Corpus of Early Modern English Tracts* (see ⟨http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/LAMPETER/LAMPHOME.HTM⟩)
WC = *Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English*

MED = Middle English Dictionary
Middle English Dictionary. Middle English Consortium. ⟨http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/med/⟩

OED = Oxford English Dictionary
2006 (in progress) *Oxford English Dictionary*. 3rd ed. Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⟨http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl⟩

U of V = University of Virginia Library, Electronic Text Center.
Middle English Collection. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/mideng.browse.html
Modern English Collection. ⟨http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/modeng/modeng0.browse.html⟩

References

Aijmer, Karin
1996 *Conversational Routines in English: Convention and Creativity*. London/New York: Longman.
1997 *I think* – an English modal particle. In *Modality in Germanic Languages: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, Toril Swan and Olaf Jansen Westvik (eds.), 1–47. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Akimoto, Minoji
2000 The grammaticalization of the verb 'pray'. In Fischer, Rosenbach, and Stein (eds.), 67–84.
2002 On the grammaticalization of the parenthetical '*I'm afraid*'. In *Studies in English Historical Linguistics and Philology: A Festschrift for Akio Oizumi*, Jacek Fisiak (ed.), 1–9. Bern: Peter Lang.

Bauer, Laurie
1983 *English Word Formation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, and Edward Finegan
1999 *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English*. London: Longman.

Brinton, Laurel J.
1996 *Pragmatic Markers in English: Grammaticalization and Discourse Functions*. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
2002 Grammaticalization versus lexicalization reconsidered: On the *late* use of temporal adverbs. In *English Historical Syntax and Morpholo-*

gy, Teresa Fanego, María José López-Couso, and Javier Pérez-Guerra (eds.), 67–97. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

2005 The development of *(I) say*: Grammaticalization, pragmaticalization, or lexicalization. In *Opening Windows on Texts and Discourses of the Past*, Janne Skaffari, Matti Peikola, Ruth Carroll, Risto Hiltunen, and Brita Wårvik (eds.), 279–299. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

2006 Pathways in the development of pragmatic markers. In *The Handbook of the History of English*, Ans van Kemenade and Bettelou Los (eds.), 307–334. Oxford: Blackwell.

Brinton, Laurel J., and Elizabeth Closs Traugott.

2005 *Lexicalization in Language Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson

1987 *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original edition: 1978.)

Bussmann, Hadumod

1996 *Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*. Gregory Trauth and Kerstin Kazzazi (trans. and eds.). London/New York: Routledge.

Campbell, Lyle (ed.)

2001 *Grammaticalization: A Critical Assessment*. Special issue of *Language Sciences* 23 (2/3).

Chafe, Wallace

1988 Linking intonation units in spoken English. In *Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse*, John Haiman and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.), 1–27. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Coates, Jennifer

1998 Gossip revisited: Language in all-female groups. In *The Sociolinguistics Reader*, Vol. 2: *Gender and Discourse*, Jenny Cheshire and Peter Trudgill (eds.), 127–152. London: Arnold. (Reprinted from *Women in their Speech Communities: New Perspectives on Language and Sex*, Jennifer Coates and Deborah Cameron [eds.]. New York/London: Longman, 1988.)

Crystal, David

1988 Another look at well, you know … *English Today* 13: 47–49.

Crystal, David, and Derek Davy

1975 *Advanced Conversational English*. London: Longman.

Diessel, Holger, and Michael Tomasello

2001 The acquisition of finite complement clauses in English: A corpus-based analysis. *Cognitive Linguistics* 12: 97–141.

Edmondson, Willis

1981 *Spoken Discourse: A Model for Analysis*. London/New York: Longman.

Erman, Britt
1986 Some pragmatic expressions in English conversation. In *English in Speech and Writing: A Symposium*, Gunnel Tottie and Ingegerd Bäcklund (eds.), 131–147. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
1987 *Pragmatic Expressions in English: A Study of* you know, you see, *and* I mean *in Face-to-Face Conversation*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Erman, Britt, and Ulla-Britt Kotsinas
1993 Pragmaticalization: The case of *ba'* and *you know*. *Studier i modern språkvetenskap* 10: 76–93. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Faerch, Claus, and Gabriele Kasper
1982 Phatic, metalingual and metacommunicative functions in discourse: Gambits and repairs. In *Impromptu Speech: A Symposium*, Nils Enkvist (ed.), 71–103. Åbo: Åbo Akademi.
Fischer, Olga, Anette Rosenbach, and Dieter Stein (eds.)
2000 *Pathways of Change: Grammaticalization in English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Flower, Linda
1994 *The Construction of Negotiated Meaning: A Social Cognitive Theory of Writing*. Carbondale/Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
Gerhardt, Julie, and Charles Stinson
1994 The nature of therapeutic discourse: Accounts of self. *Journal of Narrative and Life History* 4: 151–191.
Giacolone Ramat, Anna, and Paul J. Hopper (eds.)
1998 *The Limits of Grammaticalization*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Goldberg, Julia Anna
1980 Discourse particles: An analysis of the role of *y'know*, *I mean*, *well*, and *actually* in conversation. Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge.
Grice, H. Paul
1975 Implicature. In *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 3: *Speech Acts*, Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
Hopper, Paul J.
1991 On some principles of grammaticization. In Traugott and Heine (eds.), Vol. 1, 17–35.
Hopper, Paul J., and Elizabeth Closs Traugott
2003 *Grammaticalization*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

House, Juliane, and Gabriele Kasper
1981 Politeness markers in English and German. In *Conversational Routine: Explorations in Standardized Communication Situations and Prepatterned Speech*, Florian Coulmas (ed.), 157–185. The Hague/Paris/New York: Mouton.

James, Allan R.
1983 Compromisers in English: A cross-disciplinary approach to their interpersonal significance. *Journal of Pragmatics* 7: 191–206.

Jucker, Andreas H., and Sara W. Smith
1998 *And people just you know like 'wow'*: Discourse markers as negotiating strategies. In *Discourse Markers: Descriptions and Theory*, Andreas H. Jucker and Yael Ziv (eds.), 171–201. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Koivisto-Alanko, Päivi, and Matti Rissanen
2002 *We give you to wit*: Semantics and grammaticalisation of the verb *wit* in the history of English. In *Variation Past and Present: VARIENG Studies on English for Terttu Nevalainen*, Helena Raumolin-Brunberg, Minna Nevala, Arja Nurmi, and Matti Rissanen (eds.), 13–32. Helsinki: Société Néophilologique.

Kroesch, Samuel
1911 The semasiological development of words for 'perceive', etc. in the older Germanic dialects. *Modern Philology* 8: 461–510.

Krug, Manfred
1998 British English is developing a new discourse marker, *innit*? A study in lexicalisation based on social, regional and stylistic variation. *Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik* 23: 145–197.

Kuryłowicz, Jerzy
1965 The evolution of grammatical categories. *Diogenes* 51: 55–71.

Kytö, Merja
1996 *Manual to the Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts: Coding Conventions and Lists of Source Texts*. 3rd ed. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki.

Lalljee, Mansur, and Mark Cook
1975 Anxiety and ritualized speech. *British Journal of Psychology* 66: 299–306.

Lehmann, Christian
1995 *Thoughts on Grammaticalization*. München/Newcastle: LINCOM EUROPA.
2002 New reflections on grammaticalization and lexicalization. In Wischer and Diewald (eds.), 1–18.

Levinson, Stephen C.
1983 *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2000 *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press.
Lipka, Leonhard
2002 *English Lexicology: Lexical Structure, Word Semantics & Word-Formation*. 3rd revised ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Mitchell, Bruce
1985 *Old English Syntax*, Vol. 1: *Concord, the Parts of Speech, and the Sentence*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moreno Cabrera, Juan C.
1998 On the relationship between grammaticalization and lexicalization. In Giacolone Ramat and Hopper (eds.), 211–227.
Nuccorini, Stafania
1990 From transparency to opaqueness: The case of fixed expressions. In *La rappresentazione verbale e iconica: Valori estetici e funzionali*, Clotilde De Stasio, Maurizio Gotti, and Rosanna Bonadei (eds.), 417–428. Milano: Angelo Guerini.
Östman, Jan-Ola
1981 You know: *A Discourse Functional View*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Oxford English Dictionary
1989 *Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. Prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon.
Palander-Collin, Minna
1999 *Grammaticalization and Social Embedding: I THINK and METHINKS in Middle and Early Modern English*. Helsinki: Société Néophilologique.
Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik
1985 *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London/New York: Longman.
Ramat, Paolo
1992 Thoughts on degrammaticalization. *Linguistics* 30: 549–560.
2001 Degrammaticalization or transcategorization? In *Naturally! Linguistic Studies in Honour of Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler Presented on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday*, Chris Schaner-Wolles, John Rennison, and Friedrich Neubarth (eds.), 393–401. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier.
Redeker, Gisela
1990 Ideational and pragmatic markers of discourse structure. *Journal of Pragmatics* 14: 367–381.

Rissanen, Matti
1999 Syntax. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. III: *1476–1776*, Roger Lass (ed.), 187–331. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rudanko, Juhani
1989 *Complementation and Case Grammar: A Syntactic and Semantic Study of Selected Patterns of Complementation in Present-Day English*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Scheibman, Joanne
2001 Local patterns of subjectivity in person and verb type in American English conversation. In *Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure*, Joan Bybee and Paul Hopper (eds.), 61–89. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Schiffrin, Deborah
1987 *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schourup, Lawrence C.
1985 *Common Discourse Particles in English Conversation*. New York/London: Garland Press.
Stenström, Anna-Brita
1995 Some remarks on comment clauses. In *The Verb in Contemporary English*, Bas Aarts and Charles F. Meyer (eds.), 290–302. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Swan, Michael
1994 Language conundrums. *ELT Journal: An International Journal for Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages* 48: 356–360.
Tabor, Whitney, and Elizabeth Closs Traugott
1998 Structural scope expansion and grammaticalization. In Giacolone Ramat and Hopper (eds.), 229–272.
Thompson, Sandra, and Anthony Mulac
1991 A quantitative perspective on the grammaticalization of epistemic parentheticals in English. In Traugott and Heine (eds.), Vol. 2, 313–329.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs
1982 From propositional to textual and expressive meanings: Some semantic-pragmatic aspects of grammaticalization. In *Perspectives on Historical Linguistics*, Winfred P. Lehmann and Yakov Malkiel (eds.), 245–271. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
1994 Grammaticalization and lexicalization. In *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Ronald E. Asher and J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), 1481–1486. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
1995a The role of the development of discourse markers in a theory of grammaticalization. Paper presented at the 12th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, Manchester, August 1995.

Available at ⟨http://www.stanford.edu/~traugott/ect-papersonline.html⟩.

1995b Subjectification in grammaticalization. In *Subjectivity and Subjectivisation: Linguistic Perspectives*, Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), 31–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2003 Constructions in grammaticalization. In *The Handbook of Historical Linguistics*, Brian D. Joseph and Richard D. Janda (eds.), 624–647. Malden, MA/Oxford: Blackwell.

2005 Lexicalization and grammaticalization. In *Lexikologie – Lexicology*, Vol. 2, D. Alan Cruse, Franz Hundsnurscher, Michael Job, and Peter Rolf Lutzeier (eds.), 1702–1712. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, and Richard B. Dasher

2002 *Regularity in Semantic Change.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, and Bernd Heine (eds.)

1991 *Approaches to Grammaticalization*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Urmson, James Opie

1952 Parenthetical verbs. *Mind* 61: 480–496.

van der Auwera, Johan

2002 More thoughts on degrammaticalization. In Wischer and Diewald (eds.), 19–29.

Visser, F. Th.

1969 *An Historical Syntax of the English Language*, Part Three, First Half: *Syntactical Units with Two Verbs*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

1973 *An Historical Syntax of the English Language*, Part Three, Second Half: *Syntactical Units with Two and with More Verbs*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Watkins, Calvert

2000 Indo-European roots. In *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th ed., 2020–2055. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Wischer, Olga

2000 Grammaticalization versus lexicalization: '*Methinks*' there is some confusion. In Fischer, Rosenbach, and Stein (eds.), 355–370.

Wischer, Ilse, and Gabriele Diewald (eds.)

2002 *New Reflections on Grammaticalization*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Wood, Francis A.

1899 Understand, guess, think, mean, semasiologically explained. *Modern Language Notes* 14: 129–131.

Soþlice, forsoothe, truly – communicative principles and invited inferences in the history of truth-intensifying adverbs in English[1]

Ursula Lenker

1. Introduction

The adverbs *soþlice* ('truly'; from *soþ* 'truth, true', *soþlic* 'true') and *witodlice* 'truly, certainly'[2] are employed in various functions in Old English (OE): on the phrase level, they may be used as manner adverbs, mainly in direct speech with a first-person subject (e.g. in phrases such as *ic secge soþlice* 'I tell you truly'), or they are employed as emphasizers. Yet, as I could show in an earlier study, they also have another function – which is not commonly noted in dictionaries – in OE narrative prose: as sentence adverbials and eventually discourse markers, they lose much of their original meaning, extend their scope from the phrase level to at least the sentence level and at the same time develop a metatextual function – they are used as discourse markers demarcating episode boundaries on the global level of discourse and as highlighting devices on the local level of discourse (cf. Lenker 2000).

In the discussion following the presentation of this earlier study at the ICHL at Düsseldorf, the question was raised[3] whether this development from manner adjunct to discourse marker was specific to *soþlice* and *witodlice* or whether other semantically similar adverbs, i.e. those with a basic meaning 'truly', showed the same functional diversity and development. To test this assertion is one of the aims of the present chapter.

The approach chosen in this chapter is therefore, in contrast to many studies on related subjects, a decidedly onomasiological one, though I will obviously have to limit the detailed analysis to a few exemplary cases: on the basis of a brief summary of my findings for OE *soþlice*, which are supplemented by the data for Middle English (ME) *sothly*, the functions of ME *forsoothe* and ME *trewely* are examined. Their history will then be compared to adverbs whose propositional meaning does not express 'veracity' but 'factuality' (Present-day English [PDE] *indeed*, *in fact*, *actually*), thus linking the findings to recent research on PDE *indeed* and *in fact* (Traugott 1999;

Traugott and Dasher 2002: 159–169) and thus to the Adverbial Cline suggested by Elizabeth Traugott (1995 [1997], 1999; Traugott and Dasher 2002) as a regularity in language change:[4]

clause-internal adverbial > sentence adverbial > discourse particle

In a last step, I will show that an onomasiological approach suggests that this Adverbial Cline from referential to metatextual function is inherent in the semantics of the lexemes investigated, if we take a pragmatic perspective and consider communicative principles, in particular Grice's Maxims of Quality ("Do not say what you believe to be false"; "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence"; Grice [1989: 25–27]).

2. Epistemic modal adverbials expressing the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition: The inventory

These adverbs with the basic meaning 'truly' are, to be linguistically more precise, epistemic modal adverbials expressing the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition.[5] The following summary lists the lexemes which have been used as such epistemic modal adverbials in the history of English. It was compiled by a search of the *OED* online for adverbs which had terms such as 'truly, truthfully, verily' or 'truth, veracity' in their "definitions" section; the items found this way were then – in repeated test runs – entered in the definitions search until no new items turned up.

The inventory of these adverbs in the different periods of English shows them to be a relatively closed set (high-frequency elements are marked in bold):[6]

OE	*cuþlice, eornostlice, gewislice,* ***soþlice****, sweotole, sweotolice,* ***witodlice***
ME[7]	***certes****,* ***certeyn(ly)****, dowteles,* ***forsoothe****, indeed,* ***iwis****, perfay, sikerly,* ***soothly****,* ***trewely****, (verily), witerliche*
EModE	*actually, assuredly* (rare), ***certainly****,* ***doubtless****,* ***forsooth****,* ***indeed****,* ***surely****,* ***truly****, undoubtedly,* ***verily****, veriment*
PDE[8]	***actually****,* ***certainly****, definitely, doubtless,* ***indeed****,* ***really****,* ***sure*** (informal AmE)*,* ***surely****,* ***truly****, truthfully, undeniably,* ***undoubtedly****, unquestionably*

The comparison of the inventories first of all illustrates that the number of adverbs, as we might have expected, has increased steadily over the centuries, mainly due to the influx of Latin and French loanwords typical for the vocabulary of PDE. In the ME period, for example, a number of French loans such as *certes, certain, certainly, dowteles* and *verily* enter the language and complement or gradually replace the OE items. A second source of new adverbs is to be found in prepositional phrases which were univerbated and lexicalized, such as *indeed* (cf. OE *in* + *dæd* 'deed').

Secondly, it is evident that we are dealing with a rather unstable group. Not a single one of the OE items has survived into Modern or even Early Modern English. This instability gives us quite a number of lexemes on which to test the assertion that the adverbs in question generally follow the suggested cline from manner adverb to discourse marker, and it further may also allow a suggestion what happens to the lexemes after they have finished the cline, a question obviously vital for the hypothesized unidirectionality of these assumed regularities in language change (see Traugott and Dasher [2002: 284], and below, section 7.1).

In the following analysis, I will only investigate adverbs which explicitly exhibit the semantic feature of 'truth', i.e. lexemes for which the speaker/writer and listener/hearer does not need any etymological knowledge to link them to another lexical item (noun, adjective, adverb) meaning 'truth'. All of them – OE *soþlice* and ME *soothly, forsoothe* and *trewely* – are high-frequency items in their respective periods.

3. OE *soþlice* – ME *soothly*

Let me now in a first step sum up my findings for OE *soþlice* (cf. Lenker 2000) and supplement them with its functions in ME. I will hereby basically apply the classification of adverbs by Quirk et al. (1985: 478–653) in which "disjuncts" are distinguished from "adjuncts" (manner or time adverbs such as *[to walk] slowly, [to come] regularly*) and "conjuncts" (connecting adverbs such as *therefore, however*).[9] Disjuncts (Quirk et al. 1985: 612–631) – the category most important for the adverbs analysed here – express an evaluation of the speaker, either with respect to the meaning of a sentence (content disjuncts) or with respect to the form of the communication (style disjuncts).[10]

3.1. Functions on the phrase level: Manner adjunct – emphasizer

Soþlice and *soothly*[11] may be employed in several coexisting functions in OE and ME. They can – in very restricted contexts – be used as manner adjuncts, most typically with a first-person subject and a verb of communication (OE *secgan*, ME *seien*, *tellen*)[12] in the present indicative form, such as

(1) *Nacode he scrydde, and* ***swa ic soðlice secge****, ealle nyd-behæfnysse he wæs dælende þam þe þæs behofodon* (*Eustace* 9)[13]
'The naked he clothed; and, as I truly tell, he distributed to every necessity of them that had need thereof' (transl. Skeat 1900: 191)

(2) *And thus* ***I*** *mai* ***you sothli telle****, …, I am in Tristesce al amidde …* (Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 4.3496–3499)
'And so I can truly tell you, …, I am completely in the middle of Despair …'

Soþlice or *soothly* with a verb of communication can either be used in a parenthesis, as in (1), or as a matrix clause, as in (2). These uses provide the ground for all the later uses of *soþlice* as a style disjunct and pragmatic marker: the speaker wants to stress the assertion of another clause by explicitly pointing to its truth value.

First, this underlying phrase gives rise to the adverbs' use as "emphasizers" which may be defined as enhancing "the truth value or force of a sentence" (Quirk et al. 1985: 485).

(3) *Apolloni, ic* ***oncnawe soðlice*** *þæt þu eart on eallum þingum wel gelæred* (*Apollonius* 16,24)
'Apollonius, I know truly [indeed] that you are well taught in all things' (transl. Swanton 1975: 166)

(4) *… and if that he / ne hadde* ***soothly knowen*** *therbifoore / that parfitly hir children loved she …* (Chaucer, *ClT* (4) 688–690)
'… and if he / had not truly [indeed] known before / that she loved her children perfectly …'

While examples (3) and (4) might be considered ambiguous cases ('I know in a true (certain) way …' or 'I [intensifier] know ….'), an emphasizer use is clearly suggested by the stative verbs in (5) and (6) and further by the semantic contrast *soothly* vs. *as I gesse* in (6):

(5) *Ic **eom soðlice romanisc**. and ic on hæftnyd hider gelæd wæs* (*Eustace* 344)
'I am truly a Roman, and I was brought hither in captivity' (transl. Skeat 1900: 211)

(6) *But Venus is it **soothly**, as I gesse* (Chaucer, *KnT* (1) 1102)
'But it is indeed Venus, as I guess'

3.2. Functions on the sentence level: Sentential adverbials

In narrative contexts (i.e. not in direct speech) and thus in the majority of their occurrences,[14] however, the scope of these adverbs is *not* restricted to the phrase level, but extends to the whole sentence.

(7) *Wæs he **soðlice** on rihtwisnysse weorcum … swiðe gefrætwod* (*Eustace* 4)
'[Marker], he was greatly adorned … with works of righteousness'

(8) ***Soothly,** the goode werkes that he dide biforn that he fil in synne been al mortefied and astoned and dulled by the ofte synnyng* (Chaucer, *ParsT* (10) 232)
'[Marker], the good works he did before falling into sin are all nullified, rendered null and made void by his frequent sinning'

The adverbs are here employed as disjuncts and replace an independent sentence, a matrix clause, with a different proposition and a specifically first-person subject – "soþlice ic eow secge þæt …" (style disjunct) or "soþ is þæt ic secge þæt …" (content disjunct). This change involves increased scope and syntactic freedom:[15] the adverb is no longer part of the core syntactic structure, becomes syntactically optional and is often found sentence-initially.

As a manner adjunct or emphasizer, *soþlice/soothly* is primarily found in direct speech with a first-person (singular) subject because its propositional meaning 'truly, truthfully' demands a human agent with high trustworthiness, most likely the speakers themselves. In its sentential use, on the other hand, there is no constraint on either the subject of the sentence, which can be third person or even inanimate, or the verb, which can be in all tenses and moods. The adverbs do, however, retain their epistemic meaning 'truly' in that

they introduce the voice of the narrator without directly mentioning her or him and allow the speaker to mark his opinion, her attitude or even his faith or trust in the veracity or importance of the proposition. Thus the adverbs show increased subjectification, if this term is understood with Traugott as a process which focuses on the subject of a discourse and emphasizes subjective valuations.[16]

3.3. Discourse functions

3.3.1. The global level of discourse: Episode boundary marker

The fundamental difference between the various uses of *soþlice*/*soothly* and its use as a discourse marker lies in the fact that the adverb loses almost all of its propositional meaning 'truth' as a discourse marker. *Soþlice* and *soothly* can no longer be considered style or content disjuncts because a paraphrase "ic secge soþlice" or "soþ is þæt ic secge" is impossible in these contexts.

In (9), you find the instances which originally made me think about this function of *soþlice* when working on the rubrics of the OE *West Saxon Gospels* (Lenker 1997). There, the beginnings of the gospel lections read during the service, i.e. the beginnings of the episodes, are marked by sentence-initial *soþlice.*

(9) (Luke I.26) ***Soþlice*** *on þam syxtan monðe wæs asend gabriel se engel fram drihtne on galilea ceastre …*
RUBRIC
(Luke I.39) ***Soþlice*** *on þam dagum aras maria and ferde on muntland mid ofste. on iudeisce ceastre …*
RUBRIC
(Luke I.56) ***Soþlice*** *maria wunude mid hyre swylce þry monþas. and gewende þa to hyre huse. …*
RUBRIC
(Luke II.1) ***Soþlice*** *on þam dagum wæs geworden gebod fram þam casere augusto. þæt eall ymbehwyrft wære tomearcod …*

Luke I.26 '[*Truly,] in the sixth month was sent Gabriel the angel by the Lord to a Galilean town …'
Luke I.39 '[*Truly,] in these days Mary got ready and went to the hill-country with haste to a Iudeaen town …'

Luke I.56 '[*Truly,] Mary lived with her such three months and went then (back) to her house. …'
Luke II.1 '[*Truly,] in these days an order was given by the Emperor Augustus that all the world should be described …'

Soþlice does not show any of its propositional or emphasizer meanings in these examples – the notions of 'in a true way' (manner adjunct) or enhancing the truth value or force of a sentence as an emphasizer (implied 'I tell you truly') are no longer important. Instead, the focus is on the organization of discourse in which *soþlice* functions as a marker of the global text structure: it signals the beginning of a new episode. It is not employed referentially, but metatextually.

In the same intersubjective function of organizing the discourse, *soþlice* is found at the chapter beginnings of the OE translation of *Apollonius*, where it signals the beginnings of chapters 3 and 4:[17]

(10) (3,1) *On þisum þingum* ***soðlice*** *þurhwunode se arleasesta cyngc Antiochus … he asette ða rædels þus cweðende: … And þa heafda ealle wurdon gesette on ufeweardan þam geate.*
'[Marker] the infamous king Antiochus persisted in this state of affairs … he set them a riddle, saying: … And their heads were all set up over the gate'

(11) (4,1) *Mid þi* ***soðlice*** *Antiochus se wælreowa cyningc on þysse wælreownesse þurhwunode, ða wæs Apollonius gehaten sum iung man se wæs swiðe welig …*
'While [Marker] the cruel king Antiochus persisted in this cruelty, there was a certain young man called Apollonius who was very wealthy …'

3.3.2. The local level of discourse: Highlighting device

This demarcating function is, however, not only found on the global level of discourse but also on the more local levels, a discourse-marker function especially attested for ME *soothly*. In prose texts, *soothly* or *for soothly* often follow quotations, as may be seen from the two examples taken from Chaucer's *Parson's Tale*, an argumentative piece of prose on the seven deadly sins.

(12) *Homycide is eek by bakbitynge, of whiche bakbiteres seith Salomon that 'they han two swerdes with whiche they sleen hire neighebores'. **For soothly**, as wikke is to bynyme his good name as his lyf. Homycide is eek in yevynge of wikked conseil by fraude … For whiche the wise man seith 'Fedeth hym that almost dyeth for honger'; **for soothly**, but if thow feede hym, thou sleest hym* (Chaucer, *ParsT* (10) 565–570)
'Homicide is also by backbiting, of which backbiters Salomon says that "they have two swords with which they slay their neighbours". For [Marker], it is as wicked to take away a man's good name as his life. Homicide is also in giving wicked counsel by fraud, … This is why the wise man says "Feed him who is almost dead from hunger"; for [Marker], if you do not feed him, you kill him'

(For) soothly here marks the end of the quotation and is more or less equivalent with today's "end of quote". It signals the continuation of the original argument and marks or even highlights the author's personal opinion in respect to the quotation.

Other frequent collocations with conjunctions, such as *but soothly*, *and soothly* or *now soothly*, also testify to its similarity to conjunctions and its discourse function as a demarcating marker on the local level of discourse.[18]

Yet, *soþlice/soothly* also reveal this demarcating function when on their own. *Soothly* may, for instance, be used to introduce or to summarize an argument:

(13) *… as God seith be the prophete Ezechiel, 'Ye shal remembre yow of youre weyes, and they shuln displese yow'. **Soothly** synnes ben the weyes that leden folk to helle* (Chaucer, *ParsT* (10) 141)
'… as God says about the prophet Ezechiel, "You shall remember your ways, and you will not like them". [Marker], sins are the ways that lead people to hell'

In sum, OE *soþlice* and ME *soothly* thus follow exactly the path Traugott has suggested as an Adverbial Cline: original manner adverbs come to be used as sentence adverbs and finally as text-structuring and, in particular, highlighting discourse markers. Highlighting an episode or a part of the argument is a decidedly subjective activity of the speaker/writer who achieves this emphasis by *soþlice*, an adverb which originally expressed the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition. While OE *soþlice* works as an episode

boundary marker on the global level of the text and a highlighting device on the more local level, ME *soothly* retains only this function of a highlighting device on the local level, and serves as a element marking additional authorial information or personal opinion.

4. ME *forsooth(e)*

A similar pragmatic and semantic history can be seen in ME *forsooth(e)*, which enters the semantic field at the beginning of the ME period even though at that time *soothly* is extensively employed, fulfilling all the functions of its OE precursor *soþlice*.[19] The new item is – like *soþlice/soothly* – overtly related to the concept of truth (OE noun/adjective *soþ*), though it is not clear whether it should be analysed as a univerbation of the prepositional phrase *for soþe* (see *OED*, s.v. *forsooth*) 'in truth, for a truth' or as a prefixed form of the adjective *soþ* modified by the intensifying prefix *for-* 'very true' (see Lenker [2003: 276–278]; cf. OE *formicel, forwel*).

The form is only attested seven times in OE, but becomes very frequent from the thirteenth century (cf. *MED*, s.v. *forsooth*, and Lenker [2003: 274–278]) mainly as an emphasizer or intensifier. In contrast to the adverbs mentioned above, however, it is also abundantly used in an emphasizer function in both positive and negative answers to questions (see also *MED*, s.v. *forsoth*, sense 2b), e.g.:

(14) *'Ye/Yis,* ***forsothe****', quod I* (Chaucer, *Boece* 3, prosa 11.203; prosa 12.57)

(15) *'Nay/No* ***forsothe****', quod I* (Chaucer, *Boece* 3, prosa 12.150; 4, prosa 2.100)

In this function, it is also quite frequent in original ME prose, for example as a particle of affirmation in Malory's *Morte D'Arthur*, e.g.:

(16) *'Ye* ***forsothe****', said the queen …* (Book 13, capitulum vii)

Today's negative connotations of *forsooth*, which is now only employed "parenthetically with an ironical or derisive statement" (*OED*, s.v. *forsooth*), are certainly a consequence of the overuse of these formulae. In Early Modern English, *forsooth* even came to be considered a superfluous interjection marking the speech of the "lower classes" in London (Lenker 2003: 283–286).

In ME, however, the scope of *forsoothe* could also be wider and extend over the whole sentence. Accordingly, it is – like *soþlice/soothly* – found in collocations with conjunctions, such as *and* and *but* and is also employed in the metatextual function sketched for *soþlice/soothly.* In (17), for instance, *and forsothe* indicates end of the episode:

(17) … *And* ***forsothe*** *this foreseide woman bar smale bokis in hir right hand, and in hir left hand sche bar a ceptre. [end of episode]*
[New paragraph] And whan she saughe thise poetical muses …
(Chaucer, *Boece* 1, prosa 1.41)
'… And [Marker] this abovementioned woman bore small books in her right hand, and in her left hand she bore a sceptre.
[New paragraph] And when she saw the Muses of poetry …'

The polysemous character and the various functions of ME *forsoothe* on different levels may also be inferred from a contemporary metalinguistic scource, the *Catholicon Anglicum*, dated 1483. This English-Latin dictionary provides the following list of Latin translations for ME *forsothe*:

> *amen, autem, certe, enim, enion, eciam, equidem, nempe, nimirum, profecte, quippe, reuera, siquidem, utique, vero, vere, quidem, quoque, porro, veraciter, quin, quineciam, quinimmo, quinin, veruntamen.*

Only a small number of the Latin equivalents (*certe*, *vero*, *vere*, *veraciter*, *veruntamen*) exhibit – like *forsoothe* – a connection to the concept of truth. Only some of them may be used as emphasizers, while most of them (*autem*, *enim*, *quidem* …) belong to the group of Latin adverbs for whom Kroon (1995) has established a discourse function.[20] This allows us to infer that a contemporary lexicographer indeed regarded *forsoothe* as an adverb with a text-organising function, thus testifying to the suggested Adverbial Cline (see section 1).

5. OE *treowlice* – PDE *truly*

PDE *truly* (OE *treowlice*) also follows the Adverbial Cline sketched for *soþlice/soothly* and *forsoothe* from a certain stage, but had to develop an epistemic meaning in a first step and is thus more similar to the items whose development will be summarized below in section 6, namely *indeed*, *actually* and *in fact*.

5.1. Manner adjunct

In OE, the adverb *treowlice* (cf. *treowe* adj. 'faithful') could only be used as a manner adjunct, meaning 'faithfully, loyally, with steadfast allegiance' (see *OED*, s.v. *truly*, senses 1–2; *MED*, s.v. *treuli*, senses 1–5).[21] In ME, we still find a number of examples for this referential use, as in

(18) *He was also a lerned man, a clerk, / That Cristes gospel* ***trewely*** *wolde preche* (Chaucer, *GP* (1) 480–481)
'He was also a learned man, a clerk / who would loyally preach Christ's gospel …'

(19) *This preyere moste be* ***trewely*** *seyd, and in verray feith, and that men preye to God ordinatly and discreetly and devoutly* (Chaucer, *ParsT* (10) 1044)
'This prayer must be spoken reliably, and in true faith, so that men pray to God properly and discreetly and devoutly'

In the *General Prologue*, Chaucer describes the manner in which the clerk would preach the gospel as 'loyally, with steadfast allegiance', and in (19) the manner in which the prayer is to be said is prescribed by the adverb *trewely*, but also by the propositional phrase *in verray faith* (cf. also the following manner adjuncts *ordinatly*, *discreetly* and *devoutly*).

In a more abstract sense, *trewely* can also mean 'accurately' (cf. *MED*, s.v. *treuli*, sense 9), as is evident from the rubric of Chaucer's *Astrolabe* which requires the instruments to be set correctly:

(20) *To knowe the degrees of longitudes of fixe sterres after that they be determynat in thin Astrelabye, yf so be that thei be* ***trewly*** *sette.* (Chaucer, *Astrolabe* 2.18. Rub.)
'To know the degrees of longitudes of fixed stars after they have been placed in your Astrolabe, if it is the case that they are accurately set'

5.2. Epistemic uses

Only by the thirteenth century does *trewely* become semantically epistemic (cf. *OED*, s.v. *truly*, senses 3 and 5; *MED*, s.v. *treuli*, sense 11). Its epistemic force is evident in (21), since *trewely* does not primarily designate that the

revellers are going to pay 'faithfully', but indicates the subjective perspective (they will not pay!) and marks the speech act to be an (unfulfilled) promise.

(21) *But specially I pray thee, hooste deere, / get us som mete and drynke, and make us cheere, / and we will payen* ***trewely*** *atte fulle.* (Chaucer, *RvT* (1) 4131–4133)
'But we ask you in particular, dear host / bring us some food and drink, and make us merry / and we'll fully pay for it, that's for sure'

The new truth value force of *trewely* is even more evident in its use as an emphasizer in (22), which does not allow an interpretation of 'faithfully' but indicates the narrator's subjective evaluation of the land where "milk and honey flow":

(22) *… and seiden, We camen to the lond, to which thou sentest vs, which lond* ***treuli*** *flowith with mylk and hony …* (*Wycliff Bible*, Numbers XIII.27)
'… and said, We came to the land to which you sent us, a land which indeed flows with milk and honey …'

The newly acquired epistemic meaning and its functional truth value is most obvious in the translation of the Latin *Amen, (amen) dico vobis* in the New Testament. These formulaic expressions are used when Jesus reinterprets the Old Testament by virtue of his authority as the Son of God and they thereby require an epistemic value. While the OE texts translate these by ***soþ*** *ic (eow) secge* or ***soþlice****/witodlice ic (eow) secge* (*West-Saxon Gospels*), the Earlier and Later Wycliffite versions use ***treuli*** *I seie* (see Matthew XXVI.13.21.34; Mark XIV.9.18.25; Luke XXII.59; John XIII.16.20.21).

At this stage, the functional variability and polysemy of *trewely* is most clearly seen in phrases such as *loven trewely*, in which the adverb may function as a manner adjunct, emphasizer or sentence adverb. In the examples taken from Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, only the word order and collocation with the conjunction *for* distinguish the uses which in modern editions are then highlighted by punctuation, i.e. the comma in (24).

(23) *Sithe I have* ***trewly*** *loved on* (Gower, *Confessio Amantis*, 3.66)
'Since I have indeed loved one'

(24) *For* ***trewli****, fader, I love oon* (Gower, *Confessio Amantis*, 5.2536)
'For indeed, father, I love one'

5.3. Discourse level use

Finally, *trewely* can also be used as a discourse marker on the local level of discourse. It is found in the same collocations as *soothly* – namely with the conjunctions *and*, *for* and *but trewely* – and is also similar in its metatextual functions as a highlighting device, as in (25), or a marker of personal opinion, as in (26).

(25) *And ye shul understonde that looke, by any wey, whan any man shal chastise another, that he be war from chidynge or reprevynge.* ***For trewely****, but he be war, he may ful lightly quyken the fir of angre and of wratthe, which that he sholde quenche …* (Chaucer, *ParsT* (10) 628)
'Understand, in any case, that when a man has to chastise another, he should beware lest he chide or reproach him. For [Marker], unless he be wary, he may very easily kindle the fire of anger and wrath, which he should quench'

In (26), which gives the last lines of the *Clerk's Prologue*, this use as a marker of personal opinion is reinforced by the phrases *as to my juggement* and *me thynketh*.

(26) *… the which a long thyng were to devyse. /* ***And trewely****, as to my juggement / me thynketh it a thyng impertinent / save that he wole conveyen his mateere; / But this his tale, which that ye may heere* (Chaucer, *ClPro* (4) 53–56)
'… it would take a long time to describe this thing to you. / And [Marker; *truly], in my mind / it seems to be an irrelevant thing / save that he wanted to introduce his material; / But here is his tale which you may hear (now)'

The adverb became very popular in the course of the ME period (Swan 1988: 255), as can be seen in the many examples from London English in which we find *truly* used as a highlighting device. In (27), the author highlights the reason why there was no need for a new election by the collocate *and truly* and also by the inverted conditional construction *had not* without a conjunction:

(27) *… & I wene ther wer a-boute a xxx craftes, & in Chepe they sholden haue sembled to go to a newe eleccion,* ***&, truly****, had noght the aldermen kome to trete, & maked that John Norhampton bad the poeple gon hoom, they wolde haue go to a Newe eleccion …* (*The Appeal of Thomas Usk*, p. 28)

‘ … and I guess that there were about 30 guilds, and in Cheapside they should have assembled to go to a new election, and, [Marker], had not the aldermen come to make terms and caused that John Norhampton bade the people to go home, they would have gone to a new election’

In (28) the author emphasizes his summary of events, i.e. the “full intent”:

(28) … *& that al strange vitaillers sholden with thair vitailles … frelich kome to the Cite, to selle thair vitailles as wel be retaile as in other wyse, hauyng no reward to the Franchise.* ***And, truly****, the ful entent was that al the ordinances that wer ordeyned in hys tyme …* (*The Appeal of Thomas Usk,* p. 24)
‘… and that all foreign traders in food-stuffs should come with their victuals freely to the City [London], to sell their victuals by retail-trading as well as in other ways, having no regard of the freedom from tax in London. And, [Marker], the full intention was that all the commissions that were commissioned in his time …’

OE *treowlice* thus shows an identical line of change as the adverbs discussed above. It develops from manner adjunct to sentence adverbial and discourse marker with highlighting function. As a discourse marker it virtually has the same text-structuring functions as *soþlice/soothly* and *forsoothe*. The major difference, however, is that *treowlice* first had to change its propositional meaning. In sum, the changes in the lexical and syntactic properties involved in this shift from manner adverb to discourse marker may be summarized as follows:

Table 1. The shift from manner adverb to discourse marker

manner adjunct >	**sentence adverb (disjunct)** >	**discourse marker**
medial position	(commonly) initial position	(commonly) initial position
syntactically obligatory	syntactically detachable	syntactically detachable
(lexical synonym)	‘I tell you truly’ ‘truly speaking’ ‘It is true that …’	no/vague meaning pragmatic functions: highlighting function; episode boundary marker; marker of personal opinion

It is important to note, however, that these meanings do not replace each other immediately – language change necessarily involves polysemy and loss of original meaning is relatively rare (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 280–281). Thus the old and new meanings may coexist in the same text, a property commonly referred to as "layering".

6. PDE *indeed, in fact* and *actually*

6.1. PDE *indeed*

As has been mentioned above, the adverbs analysed here are semantically and functionally similar to the development of other PDE discourse markers, in particular *indeed*, *in fact* and *actually*. These lexemes share the expression of factuality in their original prepositional meaning and only acquire epistemic meaning (veracity) in the course of their history. The development of *indeed* from a bare prepositional phrase with propositional meaning ('in the deed/act') to its discourse-marker use 'what's more' has been repeatedly discussed by Traugott and may be summarized as in the following table (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165). In stage II, *indeed* develops an epistemic meaning and becomes semantically similar to *soothly*, *forsoothe* and *truly*:

Table 2. The development of *indeed*

Stage I:	PP 'in action / in practice'	1300–1850	'in the act' > **'in truth'**
Stage II:	semantically epistemic	1450–	**'in truth'** > 'in addition'
Stage III:	discourse-marker use	1600–	'what's more'

6.2. PDE *in fact*

The Adverbial Cline is also identifiable in the history of *in fact*, originally a prepositional phrase with the head *fact* (borrowed from Latin in the sixteenth century), which develops into an epistemic adversative, functionally similar to the conjunction *but*, and eventually into a discourse marker (cf. Traugott 1999; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165–169).

Table 3. The development of *in fact*

Stage I:	adverbial of "respect in which"	(1670)
Stage II:	**epistemic** adversative	(1680)
Stage III:	discourse-marker use	(1815)

6.3. PDE *actually*

A similar cline was followed by *actually* which shares the original propositional meaning 'in actual fact' or 'in reality' with the prepositional phrases *indeed* and *in fact*. The adjective *actual* was borrowed in the fourteenth century from Romance (cf. French *actuel*, late Latin *actual-is* in philosophical and theological writers) with the meaning 'of or pertaining to action; exhibited in deeds; active' (cf. Latin *actu-s*; cf. *OED*, s.v. *actual*, sense 1). From the sixteenth century onwards it is used to express factuality "in act or fact; as opposed to *possibly*, *potentially*, *theoretically* …", thus meaning 'really, in reality' (*OED*, s.v. *actually*, sense 3).[22]

(29) a. *This minde … hath being and continuance **actually** and of it selfe, and euen when it is seperated from the body.* (1587 Golding, *De Mornay* xv. 232)
b. *Every substance that actually is, by **actually** being that thing, actually is not any other. A piece of brass, for example, **actually** is not an oak.* (1775 J. Harris, *Philos. Arrangem.*, [1841] 365)

Only in the eighteenth century *actually* develops a genuine epistemic meaning "as a matter of fact, in truth, truly; indeed; even. Not said of the objective reality of the thing asserted, but as to the truthfulness of the assertion and its correspondence with the thing" (*OED*, s.v. *actually*, sense 5), as in

(30) a. *I had some dispositions to be a scholar and had **actually** learned my letters.* (1762 Goldsmith, *Cit. W.* cxix. [1837] 463)
b. *And this principle will be **actually** found, I believe, to guide the old workmen.* (1849 Ruskin, *Sev. Lamps* iv. §33, 124)

Actually is hence added to vouch for statements which seem surprising, incredible, or exaggerated. In (31), this interpretation is supported by sentence-final *after all*:

(31) *He has **actually** sent the letter after all.*

In PDE, *actually* has reached the right end of the Adverbial Cline and is, at least in spoken communication, commonly used as a discourse particle. In an in-depth study analysing the discourse functions of *actually* in about 700 tokens in spoken British and American conversation, Lenk (1998) shows that *actually* – like *soothly* and *truly* in ME – either marks the statement of a personal opinion, expresses self-correction or contradiction (cf. *in fact*), or indicates the introduction of a new or shifted topic. In dialogue, it functions as a turn initiator (Lenk 1998: 155–188).

Actually is thus a typical example for the Adverbial Cline from manner adverb to discourse particle:

Table 4. The development of *actually*

Stage I:	clause-internal adverbial	'of or pertaining to action'	(1315–)
Stage II:	expression of factuality	'really, in reality'	(1590–)
Stage III:	epistemic use	'truthfulness of the assertion'	(1760–)
Stage IV:	discourse marker, turn initiator		(20th cent.)

6.4. Regularities

Apart from the shifts from one semantic domain to another summarized above, all the lexemes analysed here share the pragmatic-semantic tendencies which Traugott established for the adverbs with a discourse-marker function (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 281):

non-subjective	>	subjective	>	intersubjective
content	>	content-procedural	>	procedural
scope within proposition	>	scope over proposition	>	scope over discourse
truth-conditional	>		>	non-truth-conditional[23]

7. Truth, facts and communicative principles

7.1. Regularities in language change

The aim of the present investigation was to find out whether adverbs with a basic meaning 'truly' undergo a recurrent and regular semantic cline from clause-internal adverbial to sentence adverbial and discourse particle (see

above, section 1). After the analysis of several of these items, we may safely assert that this cline seems to be a general and unidirectional one. It is important to note that

> no lexeme is required to undergo the type of change schematized [here] … The hypothesis is that if a lexeme with the appropriate semantics undergoes change, it is probable that the language change will be of the type specified. More importantly, a reverse order of development is hypothesized to be ruled out except under special circumstances such as language engineering.
>
> (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 281)

The data collected here confirm this hypothesis for the adverbs in question: all of them follow the suggested cline once they had started it, and none of the items shows a reverse movement. Most interesting in this respect is the highly frequent *soþlice*, which died out after *trewely* had acquired its epistemic and pragmatic functions. Another interesting case is *forsoothe*, which, after having been forced out by *trewely*, has only survived in a highly intersubjective and negatively connotated function, i.e. "parenthetically with an ironical or derisive statement" (*OED*, s.v. *forsooth*; see above, section 4, and Lenker [2003: 283–286]). This also supports Traugott and Dasher's view that items – after they have reached the right end of the cline – are replaced onomasiologically (2002: 284):

> A third issue is what happens to those polysemies that have developed non-truth-conditional, procedural, scope-over-discourse, and intersubjective meanings. Our hypothesis is that Ls [= lexemes] with such meanings are replaced by newly recruited polysemies from other Ls, i.e. do not continue further semasiologically, but are replaced onomasiologically.

7.2. Grice's Maxims of Quality

As was shown above (sections 5, 6.1–6.3), the replacing items (cf. *indeed*, *in fact* and *actually*) are not linked by their basic meaning 'truly' but by their original meaning 'in fact, deed, action'. It is thus adverbs referring either to veracity or to factuality which seem to provide the "appropriate semantics" (Traugott and Dasher [2002: 281]; see above) of a lexeme to undergo the recurrent changes of the Adverbial Cline.

I would, however, like to go one step further and suggest that the semantics of these adverbs are not only "appropriate" but that the original propositional meaning of these lexemes almost inevitably leads to pragmatic strengthening, to their emphasizer and, eventually, discourse-marker use.

I rest this view on one of the seminal concepts in pragmatics, Grice's Co-operative Principle and in particular his Maxims of Quality (Grice 1989: 26–27):[24]

1 Do not say what you believe to be false.

2 Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Obviously, these maxims are directly connected to the adverbs analysed in this chapter: while Quality (1) is related to the adverbs meaning 'truly', Quality (2) clearly encompasses those with an original meaning of 'in fact, in deed, in action'.

If we accept the most basic of Gricean assumptions, namely that all partners in a communicative act want to be cooperative, then the Maxim of Quality implies that we should only talk about the veracity or factuality of a proposition if speakers/writers or listeners/readers doubt it, i.e. in highly emotional or negative contexts. Speakers/writers may thus want to mark their speech acts as performative ones (see the "promise" in (21)) or explicitly express their commitment to the truth of the proposition because they fear the non-acceptance of the interlocutors (see the many instances of *soþlice*, *soothly* and *verily* with verbs of communication). Further, the speakers' reference to truth could be co-operative in negative contexts or when they want to mark a hedge, such as in *I'm not sure whether it is true but …* or *as far as I know …*.

7.3. Invited inferences

In many of the instances quoted above – apart from some manner adjunct and emphasizer uses – none of these contexts are given. Stating the veracity or factuality of a proposition by means of the adverbs in question would thus seem superfluous and therefore un-cooperative. The recurrent use of these adverbs would hence also impair the Maxim of Quantity ("Do not make your contribution more informative than is required") and the Maxim of Relation ("Make your contribution relevant").[25] Yet, according to Grice's hypothesis, when a talk does not proceed according to the maxims, hearers/readers assume that, contrary to appearances, the principles are nevertheless being adhered to at some deeper level (cf. Levinson 1983: 102).

In cases of this sort, inferences arise to preserve the assumption of co-operation. Relying on the Maxim of Quality, listeners/readers will principally

assume that speakers are telling the truth. If speakers/writers choose to assert the veracity or factuality explicitly by using a sentential adverbial such as *soþlice, forsoothe, trewely* or *in fact*, the invited inference of the hearer/listener is that the meaning of these items stating the truth or factuality has to be found on another than the propositional or lexical level.

The first level to be expected for these truth-intensifying adverbs is their epistemic use implying increased subjectification, when speakers and hearers agree in their conceptualization of the adverbs as emphasizers: the speaker wants to stress the assertion of another phrase or clause by explicitly pointing to its truth value. In case this level does not provide the expected meaning in accordance with the Co-operative Principle, because the proposition and the grammatical context (inanimate subject, subjunctive mood) will not allow a meaning of 'truth' or 'factuality', a hearer will fully understand that the speaker's commitment to truth does not relate to the proposition but again to a different, deeper level, i.e. to the organization of discourse itself. The adverbs are employed and will be understood as discourse markers, because otherwise the interlocutors would flout the Maxim of Quality.[26] Once they are predominantly interpreted on this level of textual organization, however, they have lost much of their force as truth-intensifiers on the manner-adverb level and have to be replaced by new lexemes, which may – in due time – follow the same cline.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the organizers and participants of the workshop "Historical Pragmatics" at the 12 ICEHL in Glasgow, the editors of the volume, and in particular Andreas Mahler and Elizabeth Traugott for their most helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
2. *Witod* is the past participle of the verb *witian* 'to order, to decide', which is cognate to the verb *witan* 'to know'.
3. I would like to thank Christian Mair (Freiburg) for raising this stimulating question.
4. This cline has been the subject of various papers by Traugott and is now summarized in Traugott and Dasher (2002: 152–189). In the last decade, this cline was seen as a subtype of grammaticalization in an approach which might be labelled "a semantic-pragmatic approach to grammaticalization" and it was argued that this Adverbial Cline should be added to the inventories of clines in grammaticalization; see, for example, the title of Traugott (1995 [1997]). Grammaticalization processes proper and the above sketched cline indeed

agree in several important characteristics, in particular semantic bleaching, increased subjectification and pragmatic strengthening. These structural similarities are also stressed in a more recent publication (Traugott and Dasher 2002), but the cline is now no longer regarded as a subtype of grammaticalization, but as a "regularity in semantic change". In this chapter, I will only refer to the properties inherent in these changes – subjectification, semantic bleaching etc. – but will neither use the term "grammaticalization" nor "regularity in semantic change", because in my opinion neither of them is fully appropriate (see Lenker 2004).

5. Cf. Swan (1988) who refers to them as "truth-intensifying adverbs"; I will not use this term, however, because it might obstruct an objective approach to the various semantic and especially pragmatic functions of the lexemes in question.
6. I only list adverbs proper or phrases which have been univerbated to adverbs from former prepositional phrases, such as *forsooth* and *indeed*; this excludes, for example, phrases such as OE *in soþe* 'in truth'. I also exclude items whose propositional meaning is not (yet) exclusively connected to veracity or factuality, such as *candidly*, *clearly*, *honestly*, *seriously* etc.
7. I exclude terms like *amen* and *aplight* which are only occasionally – and in very specific contexts – used in the meaning in question.
8. A group of adverbs listed by Quirk et al. (1985: 620–621) are excluded because they are rare and predominantly used in formal registers: *assuredly* (rare, formal), *avowedly* (formal), *decidedly* (rare, formal), *factually* (rare, formal), *incontestably* (rare, formal), *incontrovertibly* (formal), *indisputably* (formal), *indubitably* (formal), *unarguably* (formal). This does not mean, however, that they might not eventually undergo a semantic path similar to *soþlice* etc.
9. In the *Longman Grammar*, Biber et al. (1999: 762–892) call the different types "circumstance" (adjuncts), "stance" (disjuncts) and "linking" (conjuncts) adverbials.
10. For speakers' comments on or evaluations of the sentence (content disjuncts), cf. "She *wisely* didn't attempt to apologise" ('It was wise of her that she didn't attempt to apologise'). Speakers' comments on the form of the communication can take the form of style disjuncts, such as "*Frankly*, I'm tired" ('Frankly speaking, I'm tired'; 'Put frankly, …'; 'I'm frank when I say ….'; 'In all frankness …').
11. For more detailed information, see Lenker (2000); for a survey of the history of the adverbs see *OED*, s.v. *soothly*, *MED*, s.v. *sothli*, and Swan (1988: 91–104, 263–265).
12. Of the altogether 20 manner adjunct/emphasizer uses of *sothli* in Chaucer, 14 modify *sei(en)* or *tell(en)*. In Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, four of the five direct-speech instances are with the communicative verbs *say* and *tell*, one with *lieve* 'to believe'.

13. For the dates of the texts quoted, see the list of sources at the end of the chapter.
14. In Chaucer, 86 of the 114 instances of *soothly* are found in pieces of narrative prose.
15. This is one of the main reasons why it is difficult to regard this development as a case of grammaticalization; see note 3 above.
16. For the terms "subjectification" and "intersubjectification", see now Traugott and Dasher (2002: 19–24, 89–99). For a completely different conception of subjectification, see Langacker (1999).
17. For the relation of these items to the Latin text, see Lenker (2000: 231) on the *West Saxon Gospels* and (2000: 238–239) on *Apollonius*. *Soþlice* and ME *soothly* translate a number of different Latin adverbs (*autem*, *ergo*, *igitur*, *nam*, *vero*) which have been shown to be discourse markers organizing the text in Latin by Kroon (1995). It has to be stressed, however, that they are also frequently employed without a Latin discourse marker in the exemplar.
18. Among the prose instances of *soothly*, the numbers are as follows: *for soothly* (31), *but soothly* (16), *and soothly* (7) and *now soothly* (2); *soothly* alone is used 31 times. For the relation between "conjuncts" and "conjunctions" in linguistic theory, see Lenker (2003: 268–272). For the explanatory force of collocates, see Traugott and Dasher (2002: 168).
19. For a survey on the history *forsooth*, see *OED*, s.v. *forsooth*, *MED*, s.v. *forsoth*, and Swan (1988: 259–262). For a fuller account of the etymology, development and semantic and pragmatic characteristics of *forsooth(e)*, see Lenker (2003).
20. While *vero* 'truly', for instance, is also a discourse marker in Latin and functions on the interactional level of communicative acts and moves, *autem* is a connective on the level of textual organization (Kroon 1995: 371–375).
21. For a survey on the history of *truly*, see *OED*, s.v. *truly*, *MED*, s.v. *treuli*, and Swan (1988: 254–258).
22. The examples for *actually* are taken from the *OED*, s.v. *actually*.
23. This is most clearly seen with the adverbs analysed here, which start with a proposition referring to the notion of truth which is then completely lost in their discourse-marker uses.
24. For a survey of the principle, the maxims, revisions, applications and problems see Levinson (1983: 100–166; 2000: 12–21) and Mey (2001: 68–88).
25. This Maxim of Relevance ("Be relevant") has in recent years been considered as the only important one in the cognitively oriented approach by Sperber and Wilson (1996). For a survey and criticism of the concept, see Levinson (2000: 54–64).
26. Levinson (1983: 100–101) deduces the notion of cooperation from "general considerations of rationality" which might consequentially mean that we are dealing with a universal here; cf., for example, Latin *verumtamen* 'nevertheless' and especially the use of Latin *vero* as a discourse marker on the intersubjective level (see above, notes 17 and 20).

Sources

Apollonius [Old English; mid-eleventh century] = Goolden, Peter (ed.)
1958 *The Old English* Apollonius of Tyre. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Appeal of Thomas Usk [Middle English; 1384]
1967 The Appeal of Thomas Usk against John Northampton. In *A Book of London English 1384–1425*, R. W. Chambers and Marjorie Daunt (eds.), 22–31. Oxford: Clarendon.

Catholicon Anglicum [1483] = Herrtage, Sidney (ed.)
1881 *Catholicon Anglicum, an English-Latin Wordbook, Dated 1483*. (Early English Text Society o.s. 75.) London: Oxford University Press.

Chaucer [Middle English; fourteenth century] = Benson, Larry D. (ed.)
1987 *The Riverside Chaucer*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ClPro = The Clerk's Prologue
ClT = The Clerk's Tale
GP = General Prologue
KnT = The Knight's Tale
ParsT = The Parson's Tale
RvT = The Reeve's Tale

Eustace [*Life of St Eustace*; now considered to be anonymous; first half 11th century] = Skeat, Walter H. (ed.)
1900 *Ælfric's Lives of Saints*, Vol. 2. (Early English Text Society 114.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 190–219.

Gower, *Confessio Amantis* [Middle English; fourteenth century] = Macaulay, G. C. (ed.)
1900–1901 *The English Works of John Gower*. 2 vols. (Early English Text Society, Extra Series 81–82.) London: Oxford University Press.

Malory, *Morte D'Arthur* [ca. 1469]
1990 *The Works of Sir Thomas Malory*. Eugène Vinaver and P. J. C. Field (eds.). 3rd ed., 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.

OED = Oxford English Dictionary Online (see References below).

West-Saxon Gospels [Old English; around 1000] = Liuzza, Roy M. (ed.)
1994 *The Old English Version of the Gospels*, Vol. 1: *Text and Introduction*. (Early English Text Society 304.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wycliff Bible [Middle English; fourteenth century] = Forshall, Josiah, and Frederic Madden (eds.)
1982 Reprint. *The Holy Bible. Translated from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliff and his Followers*. New York: AMS Press. Original edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850.

References

Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, and Edward Finegan
1999 *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English*. London: Longman.

Blank, Andreas, and Peter Koch (eds.)
1999 *Historical Semantics and Cognition*. (Cognitive Linguistics Research.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Grice, Paul
1989 *Studies in the Ways of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kroon, Caroline
1995 *Discourse Particles in Latin: A Study of* nam, enim, autem, vero *and* at. (Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology 4.) Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben.

Langacker, Ronald
1999 Losing control: Grammaticalization, subjectification and transparency. In Blank and Koch (eds.), 147–175.

Lenk, Uta
1998 *Marking Discourse Coherence: Functions of Discourse Markers in Spoken English*. (Language in Performance 15.) Tübingen: Narr.

Lenker, Ursula
1997 *Die westsächsische Evangelienversion und die Perikopenordnungen im angelsächsischen England*. (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Englischen Philologie 20.) München: Fink.
2000 *Soþlice* and *witodlice*: Discourse markers in Old English. In *Pathways of Change: Grammaticalization in English*, Anette Rosenbach, Olga Fischer, and Dieter Stein (eds.), 229–249. (Studies in Language Companion Series.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.
2003 *Forsooth*, a source: Metalinguistic thought in Early English. In *Bookmarks from the Past. Studies in Early English Language and Literature in Honour of Helmut Gneuss*, Lucia Kornexl and Ursula Lenker (eds.), 261–288. (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Englischen Philologie 30.) Frankfurt: Lang.
2004 Review of Traugott and Dasher (2002). *Word* 55: 262–265.

Levinson, Stephen
1983 *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2000 *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. (Language, Speech, and Communication.) Cambridge: MIT Press.

MED = Kurath, Hans, Sherman M. Kuhn, John Reidy, and Robert E. Lewis (eds.)
1954–2001 *Middle English Dictionary*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Mey, Jacob
2001 *Pragmatics. An Introduction*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

OED = Oxford English Dictionary Online
Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⟨http://oed.com/⟩

Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik (eds.)
1985 *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.

Sperber, Dan, and Deidre Wilson
1996 *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

Swan, Toril
1988 *Sentence Adverbials in English: A Synchronic and Diachronic Investigation*. (Tromsø-Studier i Språkvitenskap 10.) Oslo: Novus.

Swanton, Michael (ed.)
1975 *Anglo-Saxon Prose*. London: Dent.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs
1995 [1997] The role of the development of discourse markers in a theory of grammaticalization. [Paper presented at ICHL XII, Manchester, 1995; version of 11/1997.] Online. ⟨http://www.stanford.edu/~traugott/ect-papersonline.html⟩
1999 The rhetoric of counter-expectation in semantic change: A study in subjectification. In Blank and Koch (eds.), 61–89.

Traugott, Elizabeth, and Richard Dasher
2002 *Regularity in Semantic Change*. (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Speech act verbs and speech acts in the history of English[1]

Irma Taavitsainen and Andreas H. Jucker

1. Introduction

The seminal early work on speech acts by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1979) was based entirely on abstract and invented utterances. It took some time for analyses of speech acts also to be carried out empirically. In particular the cross-cultural speech act realisation project by Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989) was based on native-speaker reactions that were collected with written questionnaires (discourse completion tasks). Other empirical methods include role-play situations in which informants are asked to act out small scenes where particular speech acts are likely to occur (e.g. Trosborg 1994). Corpus studies on authentic texts, however, are still rare. It is difficult to search for specific speech acts in large corpora, unless they are very formulaic in nature. Greetings, for instance, are usually realised in a limited number of different formulations and can be searched for relatively easily. Less formulaic speech acts, such as requests, compliments or insults, however, can occur in an infinite number of different realisations and are much more difficult to search for, if they do not defy automatic search techniques altogether.

There are fairly few studies on the history of speech acts but the number is increasing (see Davidson 1998; Arnovick 1999; Jucker 2000; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000; Kohnen 2000a, 2000b, 2002, and in this volume). Historical investigations cannot use any of the standard techniques of speech act analysis, such as the researcher's own intuition or the various methods of tapping native-speaker intuitions mentioned above. They rely entirely on printed data and require painstaking philological analysis, possibly supported by corpus linguistic techniques. The problem of identifying speech acts is central in historical assessments, and researchers have solved it in different ways. In corpus-based studies two main methods are possible: we have relied on searches with speech act verb (SAV) lists that we compiled with the help of dictionaries and other available research

tools in our study, while Kohnen focuses on detailed analysis of corpus data for inventories of speech act realisations and "hidden manifestations" of speech acts (see below).

In this chapter we propose to study the history of speech acts indirectly via an analysis of speech act verbs. Speech act verbs, as we will argue in more detail below, do not give us any direct access to the speech acts that they name, but they provide an interesting ethnographic view of how a speech community perceives specific speech acts and which ones are important enough to be labelled with a speech act verb which the speakers use to talk about the speech act and – in some cases – even perform the speech act in question. Thus we focus on the labels and classifications that are provided by the members of the speech community themselves. In this sense, an ethnographic view provides us with an insight into cultural practices and norms of polite behaviour that prevailed among the social classes, age groups, or gender groups whose interactions are depicted in written texts.

We take speech acts to be fuzzy concepts with both synchronic and diachronic variation. Speech acts and their specific linguistic realisations are socio-culturally negotiated; they are culture-specific and time-specific so that every speech community creates its own inventory of speech acts and its own set of speech act verbs with which they can talk about the speech acts themselves. In the course of time, both the realisation of a particular speech act as well as the underlying speech function may change. Speech act theory and analysis have to be developed accordingly. The starting point of this study is the observation that the diachronic analysis of speech acts can best be carried out in relation to their neighbouring speech acts and that the context has to be taken into account at several levels. Thus we want to locate speech act verbs within a particular semantic field and speech acts within a particular pragmatic space (see Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000).

We shall illustrate our approach by looking at a range of verbs within the semantic field of verbal aggression and we shall relate their use to the sociocultural context of changing times. As a result we hope to shed some light on the changing perception within the speech community of the speech acts in the pragmatic space of verbal aggression. Thus our paper has both a descriptive aim and a theoretical aim. On the one hand, we want to describe the distribution and use of a small range of speech act verbs in the history of the English language, and on the other hand, we want to develop the descriptive tools that are necessary for such an endeavour.

2. Theoretical background

Three issues in speech act theory are of particular relevance for the purposes of our current investigation: the identification of specific speech acts, the classification of speech acts, and, in particular, the relation between speech act verbs and the speech acts they name (see also Bertuccelli Papi [2000] for a discussion of some problems in diachronic speech act theory).

Early work on speech acts dealt extensively with the problem of how speech acts could be identified and how their illocutionary force could be established. The theoretical concept used for the purpose was the illocutionary force indicating device, or IFID for short. IFIDs can be defined as formal elements which conventionally signal a particular force. An interrogative form, for instance, is taken to typically signal the illocutionary force of a question. Another type of IFID is the performative uses of so-called performative verbs, that is to say if they are used in the first person indicative present tense to signal the illocutionary force of an act, e.g. "I command". There are cases in which the speech act verb in itself can be used to perform the appropriate speech act, for instance "I apologise" said in the right context and with the right intention is in itself an instantiation of the speech act of apology (see also Searle 2002).

However, more recent work has shown that most of these devices are very problematic and can at best be suggestive but not indicative of a specific speech act (e.g. Sbisà 1995: 50–51; Verschueren 1999: 25). Speech act realisations may be very different in various contexts; even in public and formal language use and on legal occasions there is variation. Moreover, indubitable cases of performative speech acts with the verb in the second or third person (singular or plural) or in the passive voice can be found in sentences like "You are hereby authorised to pay…", "Passengers are warned …" or "Notice is (hereby) given". The test of inserting "hereby" shows that we are dealing with the act of authorising, warning, or informing, and "hereby" is a useful criterion of performative utterances (see Traugott and Dasher 2002: chapter 5). Further links to variability and alternative ways of saying the same can be found in cases with imperative forms. They give the advice directly in a truncated form, without the mitigating effects of indirectness. "Go!" may be explicated as 'I (hereby) command/advise/suggest that you go'.

The second problem mentioned above concerns the classification of speech acts. There seems to be no generally accepted speech act classification, but Searle's well-known distinction between speech acts provides a starting point. He distinguishes five different groups: representatives, direc-

tives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. This classification presents problems. Various types of speech acts seem to behave in different ways. The main focus in the earlier studies was on performative and directive verbs; expressives have received less attention perhaps because they form a heterogeneous and more elusive category (Searle 1979). The speech act verbs in the field of verbal aggression that we shall analyse in the second part of this paper fall within this category. The relevance of the class of expressives has been discussed, and a redefinition has been suggested as the class of speech acts whose function is to express an emotion that the utterer expects an interpreter to attach particular importance to (Verschueren 1999: 132–133). If we take emotional utterances and affective language as a starting point, verbal aggression becomes one of the central semantic fields of expressive speech acts.

The third problem, finally, concerns the relationship between a specific speech act verb and the speech act that it describes. Many speech acts, perhaps most, are not realised with an explicit speech act verb; Searle accounted for this fact by postulating the notion of indirect speech acts. Even if there is an explicit speech act verb, there is no guarantee that it describes the speech act that is performed. Yet some others rely on perlocutionary effects only, a case in point being insults (Jucker 2000; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000). The verb *insult* cannot be used performatively in the prototypical formula "I insult you", and unintentional insults are frequent in real life.

An example of an indirect way to express verbal aggression is found in sentences like "you were cowardly". Such utterances may contain various illocutions as they may be said to verify a situation, to reprimand or to insult the addressee. The illocution may be made explicit in the first case by saying "I reprimand you", but "I insult you" is not possible (Austin 1962, 30–31). However, the situation is different if we talk about descriptions of speech acts rather than performative uses of speech acts. Here we can expect a closer fit between the speech act label and the speech act that is performed, because the speaker who uses it conceptualises the speech act in precisely these terms (see below). Thus we can assume that the results of a survey like ours cast light on the cultural repertoire of speech acts. According to our model, speech acts are analysed in a multidimensional pragmatic space, including several dimensions. Such a grid, whose details have to be identified for every instance of an individual speech act in the material, allows the diachronic study of speech acts both in the changing cultural grounding in which they occur and the changing ways in which they are realised. Thus speech acts are analysed in actual use, in their linguistic and sociocultural context.

Verschueren (1989: 7) has described the analysis of speech act verbs (or linguistic action verbials, in his terminology) as

> an attempt to come to grips with the varying ways in which linguistic behavior is conceptualized by those engaged in it, by way of scrutinizing empirically observable linguistic reflections of those conceptualizations (such as linguistic action verbials – LAVs for short – i.e. the verbs and verb-like expressions used, in natural language, to talk about the conceptualized behavior).

Verschueren's aims are contrastive and not quantitative, and therefore he restricts his attention to basic linguistic action verbials, i.e. elements which are monolexemic, monomorphemic, formally, semantically and pragmatically unmarked and psychologically salient; they are not based on frequency counts. He presents data on 81 languages. English has ten basic linguistic action verbials ('say', 'speak', 'talk', 'tell', 'ask', 'name', 'count', 'greet', 'thank' and 'answer'), while German, for instance, has twelve (*sagen* 'say', *sprechen* 'speak', *reden* 'talk', *erzählen* 'tell', *fragen* 'ask [question]', *bitten* 'ask [request]', *nennen* 'name', *zählen* 'count', *grüßen* 'greet', *danken* 'thank', *antworten* 'answer' and *schweigen* 'be silent') (Verschueren 1989: 68, 72; see also Verschueren 1985, 1994).

Traugott (1991) provides a historical perspective on speech act verbs. She investigates the semantics of 275 speech act verbs that can be used performatively, and she notes that with very few exceptions all of them have their etymological origins in one of four semantic areas. These are

1. verbs of uttering (like 'shout' or 'call'),
2. mental and psychological states (like 'know', 'wish', 'praise'),
3. terms of vision (like 'shine', 'look at') and
4. spatial expressions (like 'put under').

On the basis of Searle's classification of speech acts, she distinguishes between representative speech acts and non-representative speech acts, where the latter category comprises Searle's directives and commissives. She equates representative speech act verbs with epistemic modality and non-representative speech act verbs with deontic modality and hypothesises that any possible shift from one speech act category (that is to say a speech act verb that changes its meaning) would be from non-representative (deontic) to representative (epistemic).

In a diachronic perspective, direct speech acts with speech act verbs have been claimed, on the basis of extensive reading but not of systematic sta-

tistics, to be rather the rule than the exception in medieval texts (Bergner 1992: 169). Kohnen (2000a: 307–308, 315, 317–318) provides the supporting evidence for this claim. In a corpus linguistic study, he found directive performatives with explicit speech act verbs to be more common in Old English texts than in Modern English; high frequencies were found in particular in prefaces, documents and laws in the *Helsinki Corpus*, whereas lower occurrences were noticed in other genres. In these genres the speech acts are directly aimed at the addressee (vs. secondary uses that are fictional or reported). The underlying text function of instruction and strict social hierarchy with asymmetric communication situations may show in these figures.

In his (2002) paper, Kohnen extends his investigation to indirect directives, where he distinguishes between speaker-based directives such as *I desire that you would be pleased to …* and hearer-based directives such as *Will you follow, Gentlemen* (Kohnen 2002: 167). According to his evidence indirect speaker-based directives develop earlier than the hearer-based directives and they are more frequent presumably because the statement of speaker volition has a long tradition in orders and commands while interrogative speaker-based forms seem to be a new development in Early Modern English. In this volume, Kohnen corroborates these findings with data from one particular genre in the history of English, i.e. homilies and sermons. He advocates that genres are the proper place for investigating the diachronic developments of speech acts because differences across genres may blur the overall quantitative development of specific speech acts. In addition he points out the difficulty of isolating speech acts that may be realized in a multitude of different forms. He calls this the problem of the "hidden manifestations" of speech acts.

3. Uses of speech act verbs: Analytical classification

For the purpose of our paper it is necessary to distinguish two different uses of speech act verbs: performative uses and descriptive uses.

1) PERFORMATIVE USE is found in sentences like *I (hereby) declare …*, *I (hereby) bet …*, *I promise …*. In these instances they provide direct evidence of the speech acts in their prototypical form in institutional language use. Examples occur more rarely in everyday communication. In historical data the range of speech act verbs in the performative function may be highly restricted, but a performative occurs, for instance, in the following sentence. The verb *challenge* is in the first person singular as a legal verb in an institu-

tional setting in a performative function and the focus is on the intentions of the speaker, i.e. on the illocutions.

(1) I, Henry of Lancastr', **chalenge** yis rewme of Yngland and the Corone ... (RParl 3.423a)

2) DESCRIPTIVE USE is far more common than the performative use and applies to all cases that are not performative. A speech act verb is used in order to talk about the performance of a speech act on another occasion and not in order to perform the speech act on the occasion of the present utterance. In some cases, these descriptions are accompanied by the actual wording of the reported speech act, while in other cases the actual wording may be omitted.

Descriptively used speech act verbs that are accompanied by the actual wording give us first-hand evidence of the performance, though the verb itself is not used in the performative function. There may be narratives reporting on how somebody performed a particular speech act. These accounts may be more or less accurate recordings or constitute fictional scenes and various constraints may influence the formulation (see below). The range of speech act verbs may be broader in this category. The focus may be either on illocutions or on perlocutions. In the following example, the verb *challenge* is used descriptively followed by a statement about what constitutes the speech act in a direct quotation:

(2) If eny man wolde **challenge** a frere of Seint Frauncessis ordre and seue ... Frere, thou louest money as myche as othere men ... (c. 1449 Pecock Repr.)

Descriptive uses of speech act verbs without any indication of the actual wording of the performance are often given in lists of adjoining, overlapping, or contrastive acts so that they are defined in relation to one another. In these instances the semantic implication was clear to the contemporary audience but it may be lost to the modern audience. The frequency of occurrence may show the importance of the speech act in question. Collocations indicate relevant groupings and help us to construe inventories of speech act verbs in various semantic fields, e.g. in the field of verbal aggression, in a particular period in the history of English.

(3) Þe zenne ... of bedeles, of sergons þet accuseþ and **calengeþ** þet poure uolc. (1340 *Don Michel's Ayenbite of Inwyt* [Arun 57])

(4) To loue them ... that reprouyth, **chalengeth** and rebuketh vs. (c1525 *Rule & T.St.Francis [2]*)

4. Constraints on realisation: Genre conventions

In any corpus-based study, genre is an important parameter to be taken into account, especially in the interpretation of the results. The field of verbal aggression is particularly likely to be central in fiction, drama, and trial records. In these genres, plots are prototypically based on conflict and ensuing action, either with reconciliation of the conflict, or an unhappy ending. Trial proceedings are a non-literary genre with a function of recording the events and actions that led to court and there is always a conflict at the heart of a trial. Most often these events involve verbal exchanges and speech act verbs of verbal aggression can be assumed to occur frequently.

Our earlier study (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000) showed that genre conventions have a direct bearing on the realisation of specific speech acts. For example, insults in the accounts of saints' lives provide functional turning-points in the plot and the wordings have acquired a highly typicalised and conventionalised form. Fiction imitates real life, but may condense, exaggerate and select. Some genres may have recurring patterns with conventionalised speech act formulations. They vary so that some genres have more constraints than others (see Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000). Other genres, e.g. letters, may record instances of verbal aggression, but narratives of such events are not particularly central. The basic function of letters is to allow communication between participants who are removed from one another in physical space. The default is that more intimate correspondence would relate insults and instances of verbal aggression more than letters between distant participants.

When the communicative function of genres is taken into account, the matter becomes even more complicated as individual units in texts may have multiple functions. In letters, for example, several levels of communication can be discerned. Greetings work at the primary level: the writer salutes the addressee, wishes him or her good health, and the realisation of the speech act consists of the conventional address form, determined by the politeness code and social hierarchy of society. Other speech acts on the primary level are, for instance, well-wishing and reporting. At the same time a speech act of reporting at the primary level may represent some other speech act type on the embedded level. Thus on the primary level a writer performs a repre-

sentative speech act, and by doing so he/she may describe a speech act that is either representative or not (see Jucker 2000).



Figure 1. Embedding of speech acts in letters

Two socio-cultural contexts therefore have to be taken into account in the analysis of embedded speech acts: the context of the primary communicative situation, i.e. the letter in which it occurs, and the communicative situation in which the speech act originally occurred in its performative form. The embedded levels are, of course, not restricted to written communication, but may be accounts of spoken interaction in the extant records. There may even be cases of original communicative situations in which speech is only incidental. Thus the double social embedding of a reported speech act in its original activity type and the genre in which it gets reported have to be taken into account.

In an earlier study (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000), we analysed the incident reported in the letter from Margaret Paston to John Paston I, written in 1448, from the point of view of how the situation of verbal aggression developed. It started with non-verbal disrespectful behaviour, a violation of the polite code. This served as a provocation to verbal assaults, name-calling with derogative terms and accusations, accompanied by the violent action of throwing stones. The aggression was extended to other people associated with the target, the narrator and her mother. All this was reported in a letter which gives us first-hand evidence of the activity type of provocation leading to insults. The letter itself is the primary level of communication and it can be analysed as a representative speech act, with embedded expressive speech

acts in the account of the event. The passage contains several speech act verbs of reporting: *say*, *answer*, *call*. They are used to introduce both direct and indirect speech quotations in narrative speech acts. At this level we have the actual wordings, e.g. *Gloys seid he lyed* which could be paraphrased as "accused him of lying". This speech act verb is, however, semantically different as it encodes speaker attitude (and perhaps the way of saying, too). The author chose to use the more neutral representative verb. The expressive speech act contains name-calling and direct commands without politeness. Thus in the above example there are no expressive speech act verbs as such, but the speech act can still be readily identified. Unfortunately the writer censored the word-for-word account of the outburst of verbal aggression, the "large langage", because she considered it taboo in written language.

5. Speech act verbs of verbal aggression in the history of English

Our starting point for identifying the speech act verbs belonging to the semantic field of verbal aggression throughout the history of the English language was the *Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM* (OED) and the *Middle English Dictionary Online* (MED). As a first approximation, all entries were searched for that were categorised as verbs and included the expression "insult" in their definition field.[2] Some of the results were then excluded by hand because they describe a possible reaction to insults rather than forms of aggressive behaviour themselves, for instance "retaliate". This provided us with a list of 42 verbs.

Table 1. List of verbs including "insult" in the definition field of the OED and the MED with the years of supporting OED quotations given in brackets

Verb	Date
affront	(1315, 1393, 1577, 1665, 1757/1783, 1824)
a'scorn	(1553–1587)
backbite	(1175, 1300, 1393, 1496, 1520, 1609, 1791, 1811, 1851)
'bismer	(c1000, c1160, 1340)
cag	(1504, 1801, 1886)
contumely	(1483)[3]
defame	(1303, 1489, 1526, 1615, 1684, 1725, 1850)
despise	(1377, 1385, 1483, 1557)
disclander	(1290, 1380, 14.., 1530)

Verb	Date
di'sperson	(1400–50, 1489, 1579–1580)
fig	(1597)
flout	(1551, 1605, 1607, 1612–1615, 1727, 1805, 1840, 1873)
frump	(1577–1587, 1606, 1625, 1655, 1753, 1841)
gothele	(1340)
hean, hene	(950, 1175, 1205, 1230, 1410)
hinder	(1375, 1430, 1555, 1573)
honish	(1362, 1400–1450)
injure	(1583, 1603, 1653)
in'saut	(1425, 1425)
jape	(1440, 1450, 1730, 1822)
lip	(1898, 1902, 1941, 1972)
malign	(1647, 1718, 1758, 1831, 1882)
mis-say	(1225, 13.., 1470, 1541, 1568, 1631, 1872, 1888)
mock	(1450, 1484, 1530, 1610, 1642, 1781, 1812, 1869)
outrage	(1590, 1622, 1663, 1726, 1849, 1884)
ou'tray	(1400, 1475, 1530)
reprove	(1340, 1400, 1450, 1568, 1667, 1727, 1855, 1871)
revile	(1330, 1390, 1432, 1530, 1591, 1648, 1687, 1729, 1780, 1833, 1875)
scandalize	(1566, 1606, 1631, 1705, 1790, 1819, 1840, 1865)
scold	(1715, 1763, 1771, 1781, 1832, 1848, 1865, 1889)
scream	(1970, 1974)
shout	
skander	(1300, 1424)
slag	(1971, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1981)
slander	(1340, 1397, 1450, 1468, 1569, 1599, 1621, 1653, 1735, 1864, 1888)
thou	(1440, 14.., 1450, 1530, 1564–1578, 1603, 1664, 1682, 1805, 1888)
top	(1700, 1785)
triumph	(1535, 1565, 1572, 1591, 1594, 1617, 1746, 1825)
tweak	(1601, 1602, 1663, 1748, 1795, 1816, 1826, 1858, 1913)
upbraid	(1678)
'villain	(1412–1420, 1475, 1532)
wray	(1320, 1399, 14..)

This list includes verbs that are only attested in Middle English (e.g. *'bismer* defined by the OED as 'to treat with scorn, mock, deride, insult' and attested c1000, c1160 and 1340), verbs that are attested throughout the centuries (e.g. *backbite* defined as 'to detract from the character of, to slander, traduce, speak

ill of' with quotations from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries), and verbs that only occur in Modern English (e.g. *slag* defined as 'to abuse or denigrate (a person); to criticize, insult' with six supporting quotations between 1971 and 1981). Only fourteen words in this list are still used in Modern English and current enough to be included in a medium-sized dictionary. These are: *affront*, *backbite*, *contumely*, *defame*, *injure*, *malign*, *mock*, *outrage*, *reprove*, *revile*, *scandalize*, *scold*, *slander* and *upbraid*.

As a next step, this list was checked against the very substantial section of "Contempt and Disrepute" in *The Historical Thesaurus of English*, under construction at the University of Glasgow.[4] This thesaurus will include almost the entire recorded vocabulary of English from Old English to the modern period. Words are arranged in chronological order, in a hierarchical scale according to semantic fields. Thus it gives us access to a complete range of words ever used for a particular object or idea, and it shows us the range of words at the disposal for a language user at any given period. The *Thesaurus* is based on material taken from the OED and its supplements, and Anglo-Saxon dictionaries, especially for the earlier stages of the language.

The section "Contempt and Disrepute" lists approximately 3,000 words whose meaning falls into this semantic field. The whole field is subdivided into 79 different groups according to parts of speech and shades of meaning. Many of these groups are further subdivided into even finer sense distinctions. Fifteen of these contain transitive verbs. They are labelled: "deride/ridicule/mock", "banter", "ridicule caustically/ironically", "leer/ scoff/taunt", "insult", "disapprove of", "criticize", "dispraise/discommend", "blame", "reproach", "rebuke/reprove", "denounce", "abuse", "slander/ calumniate", and "disparage/depreciate". The subgroup "insult" contains 24 words. They are given in Table 2.

The examples of speech act verbs were retrieved from electronic corpora with lexical searches taking the various spelling forms into account. We relied on computer-readable corpora of written material, including both literary and non-literary texts and covering Old English, Middle English, Early Modern, and Modern English up to the nineteenth/twentieth century. The advantage of the corpora is that they provide the broad cultural context of genres as well as the close linguistic context. The assumption is that verbs of verbal aggression would be more likely to occur in more speech-like genres that depict interaction and communication, and on genres based on conflict (see above).

Table 2. Transitive verbs denoting "insult" in the section "Contempt and Disrepute" of *The Historical Thesaurus of English*

vt	gehornian OE
vt	hospan OE
vt	gehyspan OE
vt	hean/hene<(ge)hienan OE - c 1410
vt	say/speak shame by/of/on a 1225 - 1470 85
vt s	ay/speak (one) shame a 1250 - c 1385
vt	affront c 1315 —
vt	disperson a 1400 50 - 1579 80 sc&no
vt	insaut c 1425 + c 1425
vt	set language against 1467 sc
vt	say language against 1470 85
vt	contumely 1483
vt	cag 1504 + 1801 + 1886 dl di
vt	put (a person) to villainy 1513 - 1565
vt	ascorn 1553 87
vt	do (one) scorn 1568
vt	affrent 1578
vt	injure 1583 - 1653
vt	insult 1620 —
vt	put a scorn (up)on 1633 - 1653
vt	fuffle 1635
vt	upbraid 1678
vt	top a 1700 - 1785 di ca&vu
vt	rank 1971 us bl —

We used four different corpora: the *Helsinki Corpus*, the ARCHER Corpus, the *Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler*, and the Chadwyck-Healey drama and fiction corpora. The *Helsinki Corpus* is a multigenre corpus that provides a good starting point for an overall view of occurrences across different types of writing as it aims at covering all extant non-literary genres as well as samples of fiction and poetry from Old English to 1710. The size of the corpus is 1.5 million words, and the size of the text samples c. 2,000 words.

The ARCHER Corpus (= A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers) can be used to complement the *Helsinki Corpus* as its chronological coverage of British texts begins in 1650 and ends in 1990. The corpus contains different types of texts and both written and spoken language.

The written registers include journals and diaries, letters, fiction, news, legal opinion, and medicine. Each of the ten periods contains 20,000 words per register, and each individual text has at least 2,000 words.

The *Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler* (CEECS) contains the non-copyright materials of the Corpus of Early English Correspondence and covers the period 1418–1680, with 23 letter collections and 194 informants. The size of the corpus is 450,000 words. Most of the letters in the *Sampler* deal with business transactions, but it also contains some more personal and intimate letters.

Chadwyck-Healey drama and early fiction corpora were used on-line to complement the material. These corpora were of special interest as the materials are comprehensive and texts recorded in full, which guarantees appropriate contexts for our purposes. The English fiction part begins with texts from the sixteenth century and comes up to the twentieth century. The following individual collections were included: *Early English Prose Fiction 1500–1700*, with over 200 complete works in fictional prose; *Eighteenth-century Fiction 1700–1780* with 96 complete works from the period and *Nineteenth-century Fiction* with 250 novels from the period 1782–1903. In addition to fiction, we consulted the drama corpus, *English Drama 1280–1915*, which is a full database of 4,000 plays by 1,200 authors. The coverage of these collections is impressive, and provides an excellent resource to test our hypothesis of conflict being one of the central areas which fiction and drama build upon. Thus we could expect frequent examples of SAVs of verbal aggression. The results proved our assumption right, but lead us even further as the examples displayed an interesting ethnographic view of social and cultural norms.

5.1. Helsinki Corpus

All verbs relevant to the period in Tables 1 and 2 were searched for. Some of the verbs did not occur in the present material, e.g. OE *gehornian* mentioned in our *Historical Thesaurus* list is so rare that it does not occur in the *Helsinki Corpus*, and only one instance is recorded in the *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*. The verb *hospan* did not occur as such, but phrasal constructions with *hosp* and a more neutral speech act verb were found in phrases like *hosp gecwyð* (three times in O3 IR HOM AELFR15 532), *hosp sprecað* (OX/3 XX XX CHRI7) and *hospwordum spraec* (OX/3 XX JULOE118). Phrasal expressions were also found in Middle and Early Modern English: *shame seyde*

(M2 NI ROM HAVEL 53) and *had large langage* (M4 XX CORP JPASTON 440), and *have cagments* (E1 XX CORP APLUMPT 186–187). Some verbs seem to express mental attitude only, e.g. *despise* occurs, but the context does not make the verbal aggression explicit in any example. A similar difficulty was encountered with *scorn*, and e.g. phrases like *answerd … in scorne* (M4 NI FICT REYNARD 9) describe the way of answering.

Table 3. Speech act verbs of verbal aggression in the *Helsinki Corpus*, occurrences according to the genre

Period	Verb	Genre
OE	bismerian (16)	Bible (11), biography (1), history (2), religious treatise (2)
	gehyspan (1)	Bible (1)
	hean/hene (7)	Bible (1), homily (1), philosophy (1), rule (4),
ME	backbite (10)	Bible (6), homily (1), religious treatise (2), verse (1)
	bismerian (4)	biography (1), religious treatise (3)
	chide (1)	religious treatise (1)
	defame (5)	drama (2), religious treatise (2), sermon (1)
	disclander (2)	document (2)
	heane (6)	biography (6), religious treatise (1)
	missay (7)	biography (1), religious treatise (6)
	mock (8)	drama (2), fiction (2), private letter (3), verse (1)
	reprove (12)	Bible (2), document (1), fiction (1), philosophy (3), sermon (5)
	sclaunder (14)	Bible (2), document (1), drama (1), fiction (1), homily (1), sermon (7), religious treatise (1)
	scorn (4)	drama (1), fiction (1), history (1), religious treatise (1)
	strife (1)	religious treatise (1)
	wray (1)	romance (1)
EModE	affront (1)	comedy (1)
	defame (1)	biography (1)
	injure (1)	sermon (1)
	mock (1)	fiction (1)
	reprove (8)	biography (1), educational treatise (2), handbook (1), sermon (3), trial proceeding (1)
	revile (2)	biography (1), sermon (1)
	scandal (1)	trial proceeding (1)
	scold (3)	biography (1), comedy (1), fiction (1)
	scorn (2)	educational treatise (1), travelogue (1)
	slander (1)	diary (1)
	thou (1)	trial proceeding (1)
	upbraid (3)	comedy (1), history (2)

We could not identify any performative uses of speech act verbs of verbal aggression in the Old English or Middle English parts of the *Helsinki Corpus*. The verbs were used descriptively, in most cases without any specification of how the speech act was performed. The generic distribution is fairly broad in Old English, but most of the examples were found in the Bible and texts connected with religion. A representative example is found in Wulfstan's homilies:

(5) we gyldað mid weorðscipe þam þe us **scendað**:
we him gyldað singallice, & hy us **hynað** dæghwamlice. Hy hergiað & hy bærnað, rypaþ & reafiað & to scipe lædað; & la, hwæt is ænig oðer on eallum þam gelimpum butan Godes yrre ofer þas þeode, swutol & gesæne? (O3 IR HOM WULF20 272:Heading)
'we repay with honour to those who bring shame on us. We pay them continually, and they humiliate us daily. They ravage and they burn, plunder and rob, and carry away on board; and indeed, what else is there in all these events but the wrath of God clear and visible towards this nation?' (trans. by Swanton 1975: 120)

In this passage, several verbs are given to describe various aspects of God's anger. They include both verbal aggression and physical action. This is a typical description of this particular speech act, with other verbs of the same semantic field.

The speech act verbs of verbal aggression in our list were more frequent in the Middle English materials, but the same trend was evident: descriptions without the actual wordings of the speech acts were by far the most common. The large majority of occurrences are found in religious genres: the Bible, homilies and sermons, religious treatises, religious verse and drama. The following example comes from *The Prick of Conscience*, an instructive religious treatise in rhyming verse. This poem is the most popular piece of Middle English literature with 117 extant copies from all over the country (Lewis and McIntosh 1982). In this passage, speech act verbs of verbal aggression occur in a passage with sensory verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs with negative meanings in a vivid description of the conditions of Hell. The passage below appeals to visual, auditory, and sensory perception with a rich array of verbs and other dynamic expressions marked with italics. According to the medieval conventions, the heart is mentioned as the centre of emotions. The style of the passage can be described as highly affective, emphasising the negative end of the scale of emotions.

(6) Þai sal *here* in helle, on ilka syde,
Ful hydus noyse and duleful dyn
Of devels and of synful men þar-yn:
Þai sal *here* devels þar, *rare ful hydusly*,
And þe synful men *goule and cry*;
Þai sal þar, in *smellyng, fele mare stynk*,
Þan hert may here ymagyn or thynk,
Of brynnand brunstan and of pyk,
And of alkyn othir thyng þat es wyk.
Þat *stynk*, als yhe sal understand wele,
Sal be strang *payne til þam to fele*;
Al-swa þai sal ilkan other wery,
And **myssay** and **sclaundre** God allemyghty,
Þai sal ay **stryfe** and *be at debate*,
And ilkan other sal *despice and hate*.
Omang þam sal never be pees,
Bot *hatreden and stryfe* þat never sal cees.
(M3 IR RELT PRICK 253:Heading)
'They shall hear in hell everywhere
Full hideous noise and distressed clamour
Of devils and of sinful men therein.
They shall hear devils roar there very hideously
And sinful men moan and cry.
They shall there smell more stinking
Than the heart can here on earth imagine or think
Of burning brimstone and pitch,
And of all other things that are causing pain.
That stinking, as you shall well understand,
Shall be strong pain for them to feel.
Also they shall exhaust each other
And insult and slander God Almighty,
They shall always quarrel and be at debate
And each other despise and hate.
Among them shall never be peace,
But hatred and quarrel that will never cease.'

This passage provides a contrast to a commonplace in medieval literature where the narrator halts to give a detailed description of pleasant things that appeal to the audience's imagination (*locus amoenus*); here the appeal is

direct*: mare … Þan hert may … ymagyn or think*. Chaucer uses the device in the *Parliament of Birds* and in the *Book of the Duchess*, for instance. The above description is in total contrast to these scenes of calmness and bliss, the approximation of paradise in the worldly life.

Late medieval drama was also connected with religion and moral education. The following scene is an outburst of anger caused by idleness, ensuing negotiation and derogatory remarks in low style, understood by Mankynde as mockery. Several emotional features like exclamations and oaths are found in this passage. The verb *mock* occurs twice in the example below, first collocated with *scorne* and then in a direct question, without an answer, so that it could be understood as a rhetorical question.[5] Mankynde's speech contains rude, bald-on-record commands and threats, a religious oath and a religious curse, which all contribute to the violent aggression in words. Appropriate gestures were certainly used to enforce the effect on stage. The last line gives a reaction with an interjection encoding emotional attitude of alarm and misery. The passage provides a scene modelled on stereotypes of everyday life, perhaps in parody of a quarrelling wife, conflicts and temptations to idleness.

(7) *Mankynde*. Why stonde ye ydyll? Yt ys pety þat ȝe were born!
Nowadays. We xall bargen wyth yow and noþer **moke** nor **scorne**.
…
Mankynde. Go and do yowr labur! Gode lett yow neuer the!
Or wyth my spade I xall yow dynge, by þe Holy Trinyte!
Haue ȝe non other man to **moke**, but euer me?
ȝe wolde haue me of yowr sett?
Hye yow forth lyuely, for hens I wyll yow dryffe.
New Gyse. Alas, my jewellys! I xall be **schent** of my wyff!
(M4 XX MYST MANK 166:Heading)
Mankynde. Why do you stand idle? It is a pity that you were born!
Nowadays. We shall bargain with you and not mock or scorn.
…
Mankynde. Go and do your work! God let you never prosper!
Or with my spade I shall scourge you, by the Holy Trinity.
Haven't you got anybody else to mock but ever me?
Would you have me as one of your followers?
Hasten forth briskly, as I will drive you away from here.
New Gyse. Alas my jewels, I shall be scolded by my wife.'

As stated above, performative examples of SAVs are not frequent in our material, and in Early Modern English we found only one explicit instance of performative use in a trial record. The verb *thou* is used performatively in a violent verbal attack with emphatic repetition of the pronoun in various forms with contemptuous overtones and name-calling. This is metalinguistic use, the speaker is commenting on his own language use, making speaker meaning explicit:

(8) *Raleigh*. I do not hear yet, that you have spoken one word against me; here is no Treason of mine done: If my Lord *Cabham* be a Traitor, what is that to me?
Attorney. All that he did was by thy Instigation, thou Viper; for **I *thou*** thee, thou Traitor.
Raleigh. It becometh not a Man of Quality and Virtue, to call me so: But I take comfort in it, it is all you can do.
Attorney. Have I anger'd you?
Raleigh. I am in no case to be angry.
C. J. Popham. Sir *Walter Raleigh*, Mr. Attorney speaketh out of the Zeal of his Duty, for the Service of the King, and you for your Life; be valiant on both sides.
(E2 XX TRI RALEIGH I,208.C2:Heading–I,209.C1:Heading)

The range of genres in the Early Modern period is broader, including new secular genres like biography, diary, travelogue, and educational treatises. The scope of drama broadened to secular comedy, and some examples of speech act verbs of verbal aggression can be found in it. The examples have more varied forms, e.g. the cause of the speech act is given, but the actual wording is omitted, as in the following extract:

(9) take the most notable Wines of Fraunce for olde Wines, before they bee fullye one yeare olde. And this doth he holde \enarrationum medicinalium, lib. sexto, enarratione septima\. In the same place he **reproueth** *Aloisius Mundella* **for saying that** wine sixe yeares olde was newe wine after *Galen*, who although fayled in exceeding one yeare beyond *Galens* numbring of the yeares of new wine, yet he went a great deale ...
(E1 IS HANDO TURNER B2V:Heading)

The following metalinguistic passage (cf. above) consists of an imaginary dialogue with the reader in which the actual wordings are cast in indirect speech quotations. *Scorne* is used here to express response, as the author expects the reader to react in this way to his text. He sets out to defend himself and reverse the situation for his own benefit; the tone of the passage is somewhat condescending towards the reader. The interpersonal function of this passage is explicit, and the communication takes place on the primary level, between the author and the reader:

(10) in that crafte, wherin he deliteth, moste excellent, in vacant tymes from other more serious lernynge, he shulde be, in the moste pure wise, enstructed in painting or keruinge. And nowe, perchance, **some enuious reder wyll** hereof apprehende occasion to **scorne me, sayenge that** I haue well hyed me, to make of a noble man a mason or peynter. And yet, if either ambition or voluptuouse idelnes wolde haue suffered that reder to haue sene histories, he shuld haue founden excellent princis, as well in payntyng as in keruynge, equall to noble artificers: ...
(E1 IS/EX EDUC ELYOT 28:Heading)

The speech act verbs of verbal aggression are mostly given in descriptive examples with adjacent verbs, e.g. in the collocations *heaneð us & hearmið*, *momeleþe & moccheþ ant marreþ*, *sclaundire or backbyte or falsely defames*. Alliteration is frequently present in the early examples, but the pattern varies and, for example, in the following passage in Shakespeare's *The Merry Wives of Windsor* verbal aggression is contrasted to physical violence.

(11) *Host*. Heere boyes, heere, heere: shall we wag?
Page. Haue with you: I had rather heare them **scold**, then **fight**.
Ford. Though *Page* be a secure foole, and stands so firmely on his wiues frailty; yet, I cannot put-off my opinion so easily: ...
(E2 XX COME SHAKESP 45.C1:Heading)

5.2. Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler

The occurrences of the speech act verbs of verbal aggression given in Tables 1 and 2 were not frequent in the one-genre corpus of letters. The same instance as in the *Helsinki Corpus* with *have cagments* occurs in this corpus. In addition, the noun *langage* with the verbs *report*, *say*, and *have* has qualifications like *sarten*, *thys*, and *such*, which seem to imply foul language or verbal

aggression. There were several examples of verbs in which the activity was mental only, e.g. *despise* occurred four times to express mental attitude.

Table 4. Speech act verbs of verbal aggression in the *Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler*

CEECS1 (15th and 16th centuries, with one collection going on to the 17th century)
deface (2)
malign (1)
slander (3)
CEECS2 (17th century, with 3 letters from the 16th century)
affront (1)
deface (1)
reprove (2)
revile (1)
scold (1)

Writing conventions of the genre come out clearly in the examples that employ speech act verbs of verbal aggression on the primary level, in communication between the author and the addressee of the letter. In the following, silence reproves. The language is eloquent and formulaic, in accordance with the code of politeness. Thomas Meautys (d. 1649) was a member of the gentry and a clerk at the Court. He was a Londoner by birth and knighted in 1649. This letter is to his first cousin Jane Lady Cornwallis.

(12) [\CXI. THE SAME TO THE SAME.\] }] [*THOMAS MEAUTYS TO JANE CORNWALLIS*]
My ever best Lady and Cosin,
Your not vouchafing, eyther by letter or message, to take knowledge of the contents of my last to you touching my cosin Fred., **reprooves** mee sufficiently of being in my last an officious foole; and although, Madam, I shall take it for a warning, yett when I reflect as well upon the affection and singleness of heart whearwith I did it, as also upon the motives which confined mee in point of time from acquainting you first thearwithall, I plead not guilty of having deserved at your La=pp's= hands to have my well meaning hearein to be soe passed by as not worthy of a lyne or a message.
(COR 1627 T2MEAUTYS 173:Heading)

There are some accounts of verbal aggression on an embedded level. The following passage is from a letter by Robert Blakiston. He lived in the North of England and was presumably a member of the gentry. He wrote this letter to his niece. The letter is written in 1629 and the author refers to the future reexamination of an event from the previous year. The offensive communication with name-calling and the author's thoughts take place on a secondary level. At the end of the passage the author switches back to the primary level of communication:

(13) For the other hard
esteeme of me in difference between Mr. Braidley his Curate and me, I must neads saie I could and yet can prove sufficiently, if it were to re-examined by your selfe with free libertye and without offence taken against the witnesses, who will saie that on the 9=th= of May 1628, he did **revile** me approbriously, calling me base scurvye rascall, and strooke at me very eagerly, when I did much forbeare him, partly for that I thought he was not himselfe through his distemperature, not fitting a man of his function, but especially for my brother his sake, thinking he would have given him an open rebuke for his open miscarriage against a naturall brother, for he denied before
him with execrable imprecations that he did not misdemeane himselfe either by word or deed as I have related, which I conceived was then too much beleeved, and which, if I cannot sufficiently disprove as aforesaid, I will submitt my selfe to your hardest censure.
(COS 1629 RBLAKISTON I,160:Heading–I,161:Heading)

5.3. ARCHER

Table 5. Speech act verbs of verbal aggression in *ARCHER*

Period	Verb	Genre
1650–1800	affront (3)	drama (1), fiction (1), journal (1)
	backbite (1)	drama (1)
	defame (2)	drama (1), fiction (1)
	injure (7)	drama (3), fiction (3), sermon (1)
	mock (3)	drama (1), sermon (2)

Period	Verb	Genre
	reprove (3)	fiction (1), journal (2)
	revile (1)	letter (1)
	scold (3)	drama (2), letter (1)
	slander (1)	drama (1)
	upbraid (6)	drama (1), fiction (1), journal (1), letter (1), sermon (2)
1800–1990	injure (2)	news (2)
	mock (4)	drama (3), sermon (1)
	outrage (2)	drama (2)
	revile (2)	journal (1), sermon (1)
	scandalize (1)	fiction (1)
	scold (8)	fiction (7), letter (1)
	slander (2)	fiction (1), sermon (1)
	triumph (1)	fiction (1)
	upbraid (1)	sermon (1)

There is a very clear bias towards drama and fiction in this material, and mostly the uses were descriptive in the same way as in the previous examples. Speech act verbs of verbal aggression are found in passages with other verbs. In the following, the contrastive phrases of the first sentence are accompanied by a cumulative list of verbs:

(14) Some people have flourished by imputed wit; I have suffered by imputed dullness. I have been **abused, reviled**, and **calumniated** for satires I never saw; I have been censured for absurdities of which I could not possibly be guilty ... (h:\un**letter**\1759smlt.x3)

Sometimes the actual wordings may be given and accompanying physical action is mentioned, as in the second example from drama below:

(15) {=f PEGGY.} Here's Mrs. Arabella does nothing but **jeer** and **abuse** me; she says eating between meals will spoil my Shape, and I snatch'd a Book out of her hand, and she said a Primmer was fitter for me.
{=f LADY. Beauc.} I'll never endure this, how dare she **affront** my Daughter?
{=m CHEATALL} So, I'm like to have a fine life, nothing but scolding and noise ...
(h:\un**drama**\1697pix.d)

There were no performative uses in the first person singular, but the verb *mock* is found in questions in the second person, asking the previous speaker to specify what she intended, i.e. to explicate her illocutions.

(16) {=f WIDDOW.} Gentlemen you're welcome, I have been troubled with an over-talking Sister, that quite wound me into melancholly.
{=m BONAVENT.} I wish you mirth, Madam, with all my heart, but I don't come as one of Fools to make you any, tho'.
{=f WIDDOW.} Be not so brief, let me speak with you, tho'.
{=m BONAVENT.} Do you **mock** me?
{=f WIDDOW.} Mistake me not, sweet Sir.
{=m WELL-BORNE.} Fie Mr. Bonavent, you are too blunt a Suitor for our City Ladies, they have been us'd to a soft way of Wooing, and cannot brook this harshness.
(h:\un**drama**\1693powe.d1)

5.4. Chadwyck-Healey drama and fiction corpora

Our next step was to investigate the SAVs of verbal aggression in the Chadwyck-Healey corpora. This resource opened up a wealth of examples as the instances of speech act verbs of verbal aggression were numerous here. For example, the verb *mock* occurs frequently both in drama and in fiction; the number of hits in drama 1700–1992 was 707, and in prose 1700–1903 the total was 288. The respective hits for the verb *scorn* were 390 (drama) and 271 (prose). The verb *insult* occurs even more frequently; *insult* (verb and noun) 1700–1900 was found 1,932 times in drama and 2,790 in prose fiction. It is interesting that the development of the verb came out very clearly from the examples. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the first occurrence of the verb *insult* (v.) in the modern meaning describing a speech act is from 1592: "To manifest arrogant or scornful delight by speech or behaviour; to exult proudly or contemptuously; to boast, brag, vaunt, glory, triumph, esp. in an insolent or scornful way" (OED, s.v. *insult* v. 1). The first transitive use of "insult" dates from 1620: "To assail with offensively dishonouring or contemptuous speech or action; to treat with scornful abuse or offensive disrespect; to offer indignity to; to affront, outrage" (OED, s.v. *insult* v. 2). Our study revealed that the Chadwyck-Healey corpora serve to outline aspects of semantic development in an excellent way, but our main question was whether pragmatic aspects could also be studied with their help. The answer is affirmative, and the results of our study opened up a whole new

dimension. The examples show that we are dealing with different value sets and customs of a historical period different from our own; in this respect historical pragmatics can be compared with cross-cultural pragmatics. The context in which the SAVs occur and the acts they label reflect the varying value judgements and politeness norms.

6. Negotiating illocutions and perlocutions

The above example (16) from the ARCHER corpus reveals an important function of speech act verbs of verbal aggression in drama and fiction: negotiating illocutions and perlocutions. The pragmatic side of the use of SAVs of verbal aggression rests on these negotiations. E.g. the verb *mock* was commonly used in the Chadwyck-Healey corpora in the question form, in exclamations, or commands, e.g. *Do you mock me? You mock me! Do not mock me ... you mean to mock me* … . Such stock phrases highlight tensions between characters and help to build up the plot. Passages with negotiations about emotions are, of course, central in the genres that build on conflict in human interaction.

Another verb that illuminates the use of speech act verbs of verbal aggression is *insult*. The examples in the Chadwyck-Healey corpora reveal a pattern, and an ethnographic view of what was considered insulting emerges. The following repertoire of topics could cause the perlocutionary effect of insults and the instances illustrate the use of this speech act verb in various shades, including speaker intentions:

Name-calling, impolite action:

(17) "Now see ... I am wearied to death with solitude and sickness. Come, amuse yourself, if you will, with **insulting** me ... calling me what you like; I do not mind, so long as you remain."
"I have no desire whatever, Captain Coppinger, **insult** you and call you names."
"You **insult** me by standing there holding the latch ... standing on one foot, as if afraid to sully the soles by treading my tainted floor. Is it not an **insult** that you refuse to come in? Is it not so much as saying to me, 'You are false, cruel, not to be trusted; you are not worthy that I should be under the same roof with you, and breathe the same air'?"
"Oh, Captain Coppinger, I do not mean that!"
(Baring-Gould, Sabine, *In The Roar Of The Sea* [1892], vol. I, pp. 129–130)

In this example *insult* is repeated several times, and various ways of performing insults both verbally and by actions is negotiated. Both illocutions, the wish to insult, and perlocutions, *you insult me* i.e. 'I perceive it as an insult', are discussed. The same pattern is found below:

Remarks on family relations:

(18) "You ask a strange question, sir."
"Which I will answer for you in the negative," said Luther. "You know neither yourself nor your parents."
"Do you wish to **insult** me?" cried the other, reddening and somewhat confused.
"I wish to **insult** no man. But enough! you shall know more in time."
(Bennett, Emerson, *Kate Clarendon; or, Necromancy in the Wilderness. A Tale of the Little Miami* [1848], p. 46)

Social standing, money:

(19) "Your father, I say, became possessed, by will, of his brother-in-law's property; and a vast possession it was, which he still holds; but his sister, after spending the little bequeathed to herself, removed with her children to this city, and here died of starvation and a broken heart."
"Sir!" cried Arabella, turning pale; "Mr. Malcolm! do you say this to **insult** me?"
"No, Miss Goldfinch; I pride myself on being a gentleman, and no gentleman will **insult** a lady; nevertheless I must tell you the truth."
(Bennett, Emerson, Oliver Goldfinch; or, The Hypocrite [1850], p. 72)

(20) What should I have given them? Money! what right had I to **insult** them by offering them money? Advice! words, words, words; friends, there is a time for everything; ...
(Borrow, George Henry, *Lavengro* [1851], vol. III, p. 6)

Example (19) is an explication of speaker meaning with an application of a common formula; *pride* is a performative verb here, *insult* is used as a description of the perlocutionary effect. The monologue passage (20) has a very emotive tone with two direct questions and short emphatic answers as exclamations of one word, the first focusing on the cause of the insult directly, the second on the alternative in exactly identical form. There is repetition

contributing to the affective tone, and direct address. The rhetorical structure of the passage is elaborate.

Personal skills:

(21) "Then, indeed, very excellent and worthy father Cristobal," resumed the stranger, courteously, "though I do not pretend to understand you ..."
The padre raised his head; his meekness vanished; he eyed the traveller with a sharp and indignant frown:
"*Gachupin!*" he cried; "you are a man with two souls: you are wise and you are foolish, and you speak bad Spanish! ... Why do you **insult** me?"
The stranger stared at his new acquaintance with fresh amazement.
"**Insult** you, father!" he exclaimed. "I declare to you, I have, this moment, woke out of a revery; and I scarcely know what you have said or what I have answered, or what you are saying and what I am answering. If I have offended you, I ask your pardon."
(Bird, Robert Montgomery, *Calavar; or, The Knight of the Conquest. A Romance of Mexico* [1834], vol. I, p. x)

The negotiation of perlocutions takes the form of a violent reaction in the last turn of speech. It starts with an exclamation and a direct address, the verb *declare* is used in a performative function and the sentence goes on with the pronouns *I* and *you* intertwined in a negotiation of mutual agreement. The final sentence contains a performative use of *ask pardon*, i.e. "apologise". This verb belongs to the category of expressives, but its uses are very different from speech act verbs of verbal aggression.

Breaking commitments:

(22) The next morning I waited on him again; he was not quite as polite as he had been, and when I reminded him that he had not kept his promise the day before, he looked very surly, and asked if I meant to **insult** him in his own office.
"No, Sir," I replied, "I certainly do not mean to **insult** you, and I hope you did not mean to **insult** me when you appointed an hour to meet me here, without any intention of keeping the appointment."
(Briggs, Charles F. *The Adventures of Harry Franco* [1839], vol. 2, p. 36)

This example contains a negotiation of both illocutions and perlocutions, and the verb *insult* is repeated several times.

National insults:

(23) But this was not all, for as we saw the Execution, so we were curious to Examine into the Crime too; and we ask'd a young Fellow who stood near us, what the two Men had done, for which they suffer'd that Punishment. The Fellow, an unhappy ill natur'd *Scotch man*, perceiv'd by our Speech, that we were *English-men;* and by our Question, that we were Strangers, told us with a malicious Wit, that they were two *English-men;* and that they were Whip'd so for Picking-pockets; and other petty Thieveries, and that they were afterwards to be sent away, over the Border into *England.*

Now this was every Word of it False, and was only form'd by his nimble Invention, to **insult** us as *English-men;* for when we enquir'd farther, they were both *Scotch-men*, and were thus Scourg'd for the usual Offences, for which we give the like Punishment in *England;*

(Defoe, Daniel, *Colonel Jack* [1723], pp. 127–128)

The above passage relies on national stereotypes and typified reactions, found e.g. in jokes and comical descriptions.

Genre conventions came out very clearly in the corpora compiled for historical linguistics, and constraints of genres prevail in earlier periods. It proved important to pay attention e.g. to the embedded levels of discourse. The examples show the use of the SAVs as labels of actions often without specification of the actual wordings, especially in the earlier periods. These historical corpora served to yield clues how to continue, which genres to focus on and investigate in more detail. Fiction and drama proved to be by far the best genres for examples in multigenre, multipurpose corpora, though the text samples are small and occurrences of SAVs were limited. Genre conventions of fiction and drama apply here, too, and the uses may be condensed, stylised, or stereotypical, yet they are in imitation of normal, everyday communication and thus closer to spontaneous speech than other genres. The literary collections of Chadwyck-Healey are comprehensive and provide abundant examples. A whole new dimension of the use of SAVs of verbal aggression opened up with this material. The examples illuminate how the verbs were used in actual communication to negotiate interpersonal relations.

7. Conclusions

In this paper we have tried to demonstrate how a diachronic corpus analysis of speech act verbs may shed some light on the development of the associated speech acts. Speech act verbs provide labels for speakers to talk about the speech acts themselves. Thus speech act verbs may allow an ethnographic view on how speakers describe, classify and evaluate speech acts. As an example we have analysed a small range of speech act verbs that describe speech acts of verbal aggression. The examples show clearly how these speech acts are culturally and historically conditioned.

Speech acts in the field of verbal aggression belong to Searle's class of expressives. In contrast to the directive speech acts, which Kohnen (2000a, 2000b) found to occur frequently in explicit performative formats in the Old English period, these expressives almost exclusively appeared in descriptive formats. In the Old and Middle English periods such descriptions were particularly frequent in religious contexts, where the verbs described various aspects of God's anger. But gradually the emphasis shifted to descriptions of interactions between conversationalists. The range of insulting topics became broader. The Chadwyck-Healey corpora of fiction and drama turned out to be a particularly rich source of examples of speech act verbs of verbal aggression. In this corpus there were many examples of speech act verbs of verbal aggression that were used to negotiate the illocutions and perlocutions of these speech acts, for instance in the form of such formulaic challenges as *Do you mock me?* or *Do not mock me!* With such forms speakers negotiate the intentions of their interlocutors, and the accounts of such interactions that we found in our data offer a fascinating ethnographic view of what was considered polite and suitable or insulting in a particular context and at a particular time in the history of the English language.

The genre differences, not surprisingly, were important for the different instantiations of these speech act verbs, and it might be expected that a more detailed analysis within a more restricted set of genres would reveal additional interesting patterns. On the basis of the Chadwyck-Healey data, for instance, it appears that accounts of verbal aggression are particularly frequent in romantic prose. It is possible that a more detailed division within the broad categories of the genres would reveal constraints and tendencies of development in more detail (see Jucker and Taavitsainen forthcoming).

Notes

1. Some of the ideas we develop in this paper go back to a presentation that we gave at a seminar on historical pragmatics convened by Leslie Arnovick at the International Conference on Historical Linguistics in Vancouver (1999) and to a presentation at the Conference on Lexical Change and the Genesis of the English Vocabulary (LECH) organised by Dieter Kastovsky in Tulln, Austria (2001). We thank the audiences at both conferences for valuable feedback and suggestions. This paper is also a continuation of work that was published as Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000).
2. In the *OED on CD-ROM* the search was carried out with the following statement in the query language: ent df=(insult) & ps=(v) into (result.ent), which searches for all those entries (ent) that contain the string "insult" in their definition field (df) and whose part of speech (ps) is marked as a verb (v). The results are saved into a file called result.ent. The online version of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, unfortunately, did not allow this type of combination of search criteria at the time we carried out this research. The electronic *Middle English Dictionary*, on the other hand, provides a very user-friendly interface and allows complex combinations of search criteria. For more information, see also the *Middle English Compendium* (http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/med/index.html).
3. OED, s.v. *contumely*, v.: "*trans*. To treat with contumely; to reproach insolently, insult." 1483 CAXTON *Gold. Leg.* 424/1 She ... said many Iniuryes & vylonyes to fyacre contumeleyng & blasphemyng hym.
4. Our thanks go to the compilers of the *Thesaurus* for making this section available to us.
5. The methodological issue of meaning change should be raised here; did *mock* and *scorne* mean the same as they do now? The context seems to indicate that they did. It is advisable to consult the relevant dictionaries MED and OED for examples and possible meaning developments.

References

Anglo-Saxon Dictionary = Bosworth, Joseph, and T. Northcote Toller (eds.) 1882–1898 *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Arnovick, Leslie K. 1999 *Diachronic Pragmatics: Seven Case Studies in English Illocutionary Development*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 68.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Austin, J. L. 1962 *How to Do Things With Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bergner, Heinz
1992 The pragmatics of medieval texts. In *Cooperating with Written Texts: The Pragmatics and Comprehension of Written Texts*, Dieter Stein (ed.), 163–177. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Bertuccelli Papi, Marcella
2000 Is a diachronic speech act theory possible? *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (1): 57–66.
Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, Juliane House, and Gabriele Kasper (eds.)
1989 *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Davidson, Olga M.
1998 Epic as a frame for speech-acts: Ritual boasting in the Shâhnâma of Ferdowsi. In *New Methods in the Research of Epic. Neue Methoden der Epenforschung*, Hildegard L. C. Tristram (ed.), 271–285. (ScriptOralia 107.) Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
Jucker, Andreas H.
2000 Slanders, slurs and insults on the road to Canterbury: Forms of verbal aggression in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. In *Placing Middle English in Context*, Irma Taavitsainen, Terttu Nevalainen, Päivi Pahta, and Matti Rissanen (eds.), 369–389. (Topics in English Linguistics 35.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Jucker, Andreas H., and Irma Taavitsainen
2000 Diachronic speech act analysis: Insults from flyting to flaming. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (1): 67–95.
forthc. Apologies in the history of English: IFIDs as routinized and lexicalized expressions of responsibility and regret. In *Proceedings of the Conference on Lexical Change and the Genesis of the English Vocabulary (LECH)*, Dieter Kastovsky and Arthur Mettinger (eds.). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Kohnen, Thomas
2000a Explicit performatives in Old English: A corpus-based study of directives. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (2): 301–321.
2000b Corpora and speech acts: The study of performatives. In *Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory: Papers from the Twentieth International Conference on English Language Research on Computerized Corpora (ICAME 20), Freiburg im Breisgau 1999*, Christian Mair and Marianne Hundt (eds.), 177–186. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
2002 Towards a history of English directives. In *Text Types and Corpora: Studies in Honour of Udo Fries*, Andreas Fischer, Gunnel Tottie, and Hans Martin Lehmann (eds.), 165–175. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
Lewis, Robert, and Angus McInstosh
1982 *A Descriptive Guide to the Manuscripts of the* Pricke of Conscience. (Medium Aevum Monographs, NS 12.) Oxford: The Society for the Study of Medieval Languages and Literature.

MED = *Middle English Dictionary*
Middle English Dictionary. Middle English Consortium. ⟨http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/med/⟩

OED = *Oxford English Dictionary*
1992 *Oxford English Dictionary*. CD-ROM. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sbisà, Marina
1995 Speech act theory. In *Handbook of Pragmatics*, Jan-Ola Östman and Jef Verschueren (eds.). Online. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. ⟨http://www.benjamins.com/online/hop/⟩

Searle, John R.
1969 *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1979 *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2002 How performatives work. In *Essays in Speech Act Theory*, Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo (eds.), 85–107. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 77.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Swanton, Michael (ed. and trans.)
1975 *Anglo-Saxon Prose*. London: J. M. Dent.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs
1991 English speech act verbs: A historical perspective. In *New Vistas in Grammar: Invariance and Variation*, Linda R. Waugh and Stephen Rudy (eds.), 387–406. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, and Richard Dasher
2002 *Regularity in Semantic Change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Trosborg, Anna
1994 *Interlanguage Pragmatics: Requests, Complaints and Apologies*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Verschueren, Jef
1985 *What People Say They Do with Words: Prolegomena to an Empirical-Conceptual Approach to Linguistic Action*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
1989 Language on language: Toward metapragmatic universals. *Papers in Pragmatics* 3 (2): 3–144.
1994 Speech act verbs. In *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, vol. 8, R. E. Asher and J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), 4138–4140. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
1999 *Understanding Pragmatics*. (Understanding Language Series.) London: Arnold.

Text types and the methodology of diachronic speech act analysis

Thomas Kohnen

1. Introduction: Approaching a methodological predicament

While many problems with the data and methodology of historical pragmatics have been addressed at a relatively early stage of this still rather young discipline (see, for example, Jacobs and Jucker 1995; Bertuccelli Papi 2000; Culpeper and Kytö 2000; Jucker 2000; Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000), the specific difficulties of a corpus-based study of the diachronic development of speech acts seem to have attracted less attention. Some problems recorded for historical pragmatics present themselves as even more challenging when seen in a corpus-based framework. There are two issues which seem to be particularly important, the problem of the complete inventory of the forms of a speech act and what I would like to call the problem of the "hidden manifestations" of a speech act.

The first difficulty refers to the well-known fact that it is virtually impossible to create a complete catalogue of all the different manifestations of a speech act in the history of the English language. For example, if we want to trace the history of promises or requests in English, how are we to know all their different manifestations in all the periods of English? Researchers have to put up with a more or less eclectic analysis of supposedly "typical" forms which they assume to be frequent in a historical corpus. But even a limited number of patterns typically associated with promises or requests will have unforeseeable orthographic realisations, given the lack of standardisation in the earlier periods of English. Since analyses of electronic corpora mostly rely on form and since there are, as far as I know, no corpora with tags for speech acts available, speech acts are virtually irretrievable in a systematic, let alone automatic way. One fairly reliable way of coping with this problem seems to be a time-consuming microanalysis "by hand", that is, the researcher has to read all the texts of a corpus, considering carefully which forms might be counted as promises or requests.

An alternative way of approaching this problem is presented by Taavitsainen and Jucker (this volume). They look at speech acts from the perspective of speech act verbs. The set of speech act verbs can be determined for the major periods in the history of English and thus the speech act verbs can be systematically retrieved in a historical corpus. By analysing the use of the speech act verbs relating to verbal aggression and the portions of discourse they are used to refer to in a large mixed corpus, Taavitsainen and Jucker trace the changing perceptions of the respective speech acts in the history of English and the typical functions they serve (e.g. negotiating illocutions and perlocutions). This approach can cover all the items in a historical corpus where speech act verbs of a certain kind are mentioned and can thus reach a highly instructive ethnographic picture of the respective speech acts. But it does not attempt to cover all the manifestations of a specific speech act in a historical corpus.

The second problem, which I have called the problem of the "hidden manifestations" of a speech act, does not seem to be less serious. It relates to the fact that we simply cannot make any hard and fast statements about the development of a speech act because we usually cannot cover all its different manifestations across time.

For example, some recent corpus studies have suggested that there is a sharp contrast between Old English and Modern English in terms of directive performatives, with directive performatives being much more frequent in Old English, and that manifestations of directives show a trend towards indirectness in the course of history, with the typical indirect requests developing during the Early Modern period (Kohnen 2000, 2002). Although the quantitative evidence of the studies, which is based on the *Helsinki Corpus* and the *LOB Corpus*, is quite plausible, these findings leave some questions open. Does the decreasing frequency of performative directives in the history of English suggest an increase in alternative manifestations of directives (e.g. imperatives, periphrastic constructions with *let*, indirect manifestations etc.) or does it reflect a general tendency to avoid directives (and use other speech acts instead)? In a similar way, the tendency towards indirectness noted in Early Modern English directives could suggest either that the more face-threatening manifestations are replaced by more polite ones or that the indirect realisations are used "in addition to" the less polite directives.

In each case the "underlying" quantitative and qualitative proportions in the development of directives are not revealed because we do not know about the "hidden manifestations" of the directives in the corpus, that is, we do not

know how many directives and what kinds of directives there are altogether. The "hidden manifestations" could, of course, only be revealed if we had a list of all the directives in the corpus on which the analysis is based. But how are we to know if a complete inventory of the forms is missing?[1]

This paper seeks to obtain a more detailed idea of the seriousness of this methodological predicament and its relevance to practical corpus analysis. I start from two basic assumptions. First, I think that the problem of the "hidden manifestations" can only be tackled if the analysis is based on comparable text types or genres and their more or less stable functional profiles.[2] It appears to be problematic to talk about the frequency of directives used in Old English as opposed to Modern English in general terms, without specifying the "occasions" on which directives are used. These "occasions" are, of course, functional units, for example text types. We can assume, for instance, that the genres associated with religious instruction require directive speech acts in every period of the history of English. Against this background, realistic comparisons seem to be possible. By contrast, a mixed corpus entails the risk of mixing up directives of different genres. For example, decreasing frequencies in religious treatises and increasing frequencies in statutes during the same period could add to simulate a stable situation.

Secondly, we do not know exactly to what extent the different manifestations of speech acts are conventionalised in older texts and what proportion the "unpredictable" realisations cover. An exploratory survey may be a first attempt to determine the practical significance of the more or less theoretical considerations. A study aiming at the "unpredictable" manifestations in a corpus must necessarily be based on microanalysis.

In this paper I will focus on five relatively small sub-corpora of sermons covering the history of English from Old English to Modern English. By means of microanalysis the number and approximate range of the directive speech acts contained in these sub-corpora are determined. The aim of the investigation is to get a more precise idea of the heterogeneity of a particular class of speech acts in a genre-based corpus, the extent to which statements about quantitative changes need to be qualified and the role of the concept of text type as a tool in the diachronic analysis of speech acts.

In the following sections I will first give a short overview of the data and an outline of the different manifestations of directives found in the data. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the different frequencies of the manifestations. In the conclusion I will discuss some of the implications of the findings for text types and corpus analysis.

2. The data

Sermons seem to be among the more stable genres in the history of the English language. Their functional profile is determined by the aim of religious instruction, which is prevalent throughout all the periods under consideration, with a priest (or a person in a similar clerical function) addressing a religious congregation.

The Old English data, in contrast to all the other sub-corpora, contain texts called homilies, not sermons. Quite often in the Middle Ages the terms "sermon" and "homily" are used synonymously, but some differences have been pointed out: "Both words identify preaching as their central activity, but they differ with respect to the circumstances and the sources of that preaching" (Heffernan 1984: 179). Whereas *homilia* was "an exegetical commentary on scripture composed for a specific liturgical celebration", *sermo* was "an edifying discourse meant to bring the faithful closer to Christian truth with no *prescriptive* theme – scriptural or otherwise – and no obligatory connection to a liturgical event" (Heffernan 1984: 179). Despite these differences both homilies and sermons have been subsumed here under the same text type. They are both characterised by the central activity of preaching. In addition, a survey of the Old English homilies contained in the sub-corpus showed that they do not necessarily comprise more or larger exegetical sections than the later sermons. Their "sermon character" is further confirmed by the fact that most of them start with an explicit address (e.g. *leofan men, men ða leofstan* etc.), suggesting a congregation of people who are listening. No claims are made in this study with regard to the questions whether the sermons were actually delivered or whether they represent "edited" versions of sermons preached previously.

The five sub-corpora of the present analysis cover most periods in the history of the English language and comprise slightly more than 129,000 words: Old English (tenth/eleventh century, 25,390 words), Late Middle English (fifteenth century, 26,716 words), Early Modern English (sixteenth century, 25,145 words; seventeenth century, 26,002 words) and contemporary English (late twentieth century, 26,016 words). The data contain the Old English homilies compiled in the *Helsinki Corpus* (tenth/eleventh century; see Kahlas-Tarkka, Kilpiö, and Österman 1993),[3] sermons of a revised and extended version of the Middle English and Early Modern English parts of the *Helsinki Corpus* (fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; see Kohnen 2001 and 2004) and sermons compiled in the *London Lund Corpus* and the *British National Corpus* (late twentieth century). A detailed list of the excerpts of the sub-corpora is given in Appendix A.

3. Manifestations of directives

The aim of this paper is to investigate the number and range of the different manifestations of directives in the sermons of the different sub-corpora. This means that the basic quantitative unit which will be counted is the directive speech act. According to Searle a directive speech act is an attempt by a speaker or writer to get the addressee to carry out an act (Searle 1969: 66, 1976: 11). Thus, if we can assume that the addressor in (1) attempts, by the utterance of (1), to get his audience to turn to God and show true repentance, this portion of text will be analysed as a directive.

(1) *Forþan **we sceolan** mid eallum mode and mægne to god gecyrran and soðe bote don for urum synnum, ...* (A Homily for the Sixth Sunday, 165)
'Therefore we must turn to God with all (our) mind and all (our) strength and show true repentance for our sins.'

Within the context of a sermon the addressee of a directive must be seen as the audience of the sermon, that is the listeners, or part of them. Requests in the sermons which are not directed to its audience were not included in this investigation. Directives which are introduced as citations (especially from the Bible) were not included either.

In Searle's framework of speech act analysis a speech act is usually associated with (the utterance of) a sentence or clause. It follows for the present analysis that a speech act is generally expressed by a (spoken or written) language unit which corresponds to a sentence or clause, not by larger stretches of discourse or whole texts.

The manifestations of directives found in the corpus fall into four classes: performatives, imperatives, modal expressions and indirect manifestations.[4]

Performatives typically contain a directive speech act verb in the first person singular or plural indicative active, an object referring to the addressee and the requested act.

(2) *forþon **ic myngige** & **manige** manna gehwylcne þæt he his agene dæda georne smeage, þæt he her on worlde for Gode rihtlice lifge, & on gesyhþe þæs hehstan Cyninges.* (Blickling Homilies, 109)[5]
'Therefore I admonish and exhort every man to consider carefully his own deeds, so that he may live here in the world rightly before God and in the sight of the highest king.'

(3) ***I charge*** *you in the feare of God that you do not mistake that which is said* ... (Smith, E7V)

Some performative comments stating the purpose of an utterance in terms of a speech act verb were also included in the analysis.

(4) *This **I say** on purpose **to recommend** to men a nobler exercise for their wits, and if it be possible, to put them out of conceit with that scoffing humour* ... (Tillotson, 430)

Performatives are usually counted among the most straightforward and potentially face-threatening manifestations of directives. However, it should be noted that the speech act verbs contained in a performative expression may vary with regard to the obligation associated with the directive speech act. They may range from direct commands to polite requests and suggestions:

(5) *And now **I beg** your patience to apply what I have said to these three purposes.* (Tillotson, 427)

However, the number of performatives found in the Early Modern and Modern sections of the data is so small (3 in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) that no attempt was made to trace a development towards more "polite" speech act verbs in the data.

The term "imperative" is used in this study in a rather broad sense, covering not only imperative sentences but also so-called periphrastic imperatives and constructions involving inversion and the subjunctive mood.[6] In this broad sense imperatives may be subdivided into imperatives involving the first, the second and the third person.First-person imperatives are the so-called periphrastic forms comprising *let us* / *let's* or Old English *uton we* (and related forms).[7] The Old English form *uton (we)* is usually translated as *let us* in contemporary English (see Traugott 1992: 185).

(6) *... if it please God to give us Leah, in stead of Rachel, to give us that which pleaseth us not so well, **let us** be content with it and serve him on still,* ... (Sermons, 383)

(7) ***Uton we** þonne þæs geþencean, þa hwile þe we magon and moton, þæt we us georne to gode þydon. **Uton** urum Drihtne hyran georne, & him þancas secggan ealra his geofena, & ealra his miltsa,* ... (Blickling Homilies, 115)

‘Let us then be mindful of this, while we can and may, that we may diligently strive for good things. Let us diligently obey our Lord and give thanks to him for all his gifts and all his mercies.’

Another imperative form with the first person is the construction involving the subjunctive (“hortative subjunctive”, Traugott [1992: 185]), mostly with inverted word order (VS).

(8) *Men þa leofestan,* ***geearnie we****, þæt ure se ytemesta dæg wurðe gode gecoren, and* ***gecyrran we*** *to drihtenes willan and* ***geþencan****, þæt he deað þrowude for us and he us of ðam nearwan þystrum alysde.* (A Homily for the Sixth Sunday, 166)
‘Dearest men, let us deserve that our last day may be well chosen and let us turn to the Lord’s will and remember that he suffered death for us and delivered us from the oppressive darkness.’

(9) *...* ***be we war*** *and* ***trowe we*** *not þat God hymself made synne.* (Wycliffite Sermons, 477)

According to the accounts given in current handbooks, the construction with *let* developed during the second half of the fourteenth century, slowly replacing the inverted pattern with the subjunctive (see Franz 1939: 535–536; Jespersen 1940: 469; Visser 1966: 802; Faiß 1989: 231; Fischer 1992: 248; Rissanen 1999: 279–280). The construction with *let* is a common construction in Middle English, Early Modern English and later on.

Imperative constructions with the second person (both singular and plural) are those sentences which are usually called imperative sentences in the strict sense of the term. They may or may not contain the second-person pronoun. In Old English these imperatives are usually morphologically marked by *-∅* or *-aþ*.

(10) ***Scyldað*** *eow wið gitsunga & wið gifornessa, & ðæt ge ahwar ne beon manswican ne mansworan, wedlogan ne wordlogan, ne on leasre gewitnesse ahwar standan. And* ***scyldað*** *eow wið galscypas & swyðe georne wið æwbrecas, & wið oferfylle* ***beorgað*** *eow georne.* (Wulfstan, 183)
‘Protect yourselves against covetousness and against greed, (and) that you never be traitors and perjurers, violators of agreements and liars, and (that you) never rely on false testimony. And protect yourselves against luxury and very eagerly against lawbreakers, and beware of excess carefully.’

(11) *Therefore if Christ be come to your hearts, as he came to Zacheus house,* ***restore*** *now as Zacheus did, and* ***escape*** *this iudgment.* (Smith, E2R)

Third-person imperatives are constructions with the third person subjunctive (both singular and plural) and third-person constructions with *let*.

(12) *Ne* ***beo næanig man*** *her on worldrice on his geþohte to modig, ne on his lichoman to strang, ...* (Blickling Homilies, 110)
'Let no man here in worldly power be in his thoughts too proud nor in his body too strong.'

(13) ***Let no man think*** *the worse of Religion, because some are so bold as to despise and deride it.* (Tillotson, 428)

Such constructions can be classified as directives in the context of sermons if the referent of the third-person subject includes the addressee. This is the case, for example, with general expressions referring to every human being; see (12) and (13).

The third group of directives found in the corpus is formed by modal expressions. These are modal verbs and other lexical items denoting obligation, permission or possibility. Modal verbs include – from the perspective of contemporary English – the central modals (*shall, should, must* etc.), the marginal modals (*need, ought to* etc.), the modal idioms (*be to, have got to* etc.) and the semi-auxiliaries (*have to, be bound to, be obliged to* etc.) (see Quirk et al. 1985: 137).[8] The predecessors of these verbs in the earlier periods of English do not necessarily have auxiliary status and may show many different forms. Occasionally we find completely different verbs, for example *þearf* in Old English, see (14).

(14) *Ne* ***þearf nan man*** *þæs wænan, þæt hyne ænig man mæge alysan fram helle wite, gif he sylf nele his synna betan ær his ende.* (A Homily for the Sixth Sunday, 166)
'No man may imagine this, that anybody can deliver him from the punishment of hell if he himself is not willing to amend his sins before his end.'

(15) *Nu* ***mote we*** *habban maran rihtwisnysse, nu us synd behatene þa heofonlican speda, ...* (Ælfric, 536)

'Now we must have more righteousness, now (that) we are promised the heavenly riches.'

(16) *And also **3e most** fast from all maner flesch mete and whyt-mete;* (Mirk, 84)

(17) *And although our enemy deserve not to be forgeven for his awne sake, yet **we ought to** forgeve hym for Gods love, ...* (Certain Sermons and Homilies, 123)

(18) *... for **wee are** moste **bounden** to serve God in doyng good deedes, commaunded by hym in his Holy Scripture, all the daies of oure life ...* (Certain Sermons and Homilies, 81)

(19) *... we've received the Holy Spirit – and now **we've got to** walk in him – we've died with Christ – and now **we've got to** mortify the deeds of the body ...* (LLC, S12.1d)

(20) *... and so **we are to** follow them before we pass our judgement on the world of today ...* (LLC, S12.1b)

There are some cases where no directive reading is possible with modal verbs, for example, when *shall* is used as a marker of future time (21) or in some subordinate clauses (22).

(21) *Now **wee shall** heare what maner of writing is contayned in thys booke.* (Fisher, 396)

(22) *And alle þese seuene miracles techen how **we schulden** loue Crist.* (Wycliffite Sermons, 336)

In (22) the object clause containing the modal does not fully specify a required act but rather contributes to a description of the *seuene miracles*.

Modal verbs expressing permission or possibility are usually negated and express a prohibition when they appear in directives; see (14) above and (23) below. However, there are some cases where the positive forms of verbs like *may* and *can* form a directive. Here permission and possibility are used to express a non-binding directive, for example, a suggestion, which leaves open different ways of reaction, as in (25) and (26); (24) is probably a suggestion as well.

(23) *And so **no man may** excusen hym fro werkys of mercy, as **no man may** wante werkys of a good wille for þat werk ys þe furste and hey3est in man.* (Wycliffite Sermons, 237)

(24) *Thus **ye may** vndirstonde how God yeveth pees, rest and vnytee to men and women of gode will and callis all such men and women his childre.* (Advent, 83)

(25) *... and with this **we can** begin to see the spirit of God at work in the world.* (BNC, G5H)

(26) *... but since charity begins at home **we may** give our ... our reforming zeal full vein ...* (LLC, S12.1a)

Since the frequency of these modals never goes beyond 0.3 per 1,000 words, with an incidence between 1 and 8 tokens in the sub-corpora, they are not listed separately. The present data suggest that in contemporary English sermons such constructions are used more often for "proper" instructions, as in (25) and (26), whereas the earlier possibility modals combine mostly with verbs of cognition or perception in metacommunicative utterances relating to the reception of the sermon, as in (24). But in order to corroborate this hypothesis, we need more data.

Apart from the modal verbs there are other modal expressions in the data, mostly impersonal or passive constructions, which denote obligation and which in the context of sermons are used to express directives.

(27) *Ac us **is mycel neodþearf**, þæt we geþencan, hu drihten us mid his þrowunge alysde fram deofles anwealde, ...* (A Homily for the Sixth Sunday, 164)
'But we have great need ("there is great need for us") to consider how the Lord delivered us by his suffering from the devil's power.'

(28) *... & **is** eallum mannum **nedþearf** & **nytlic** þæt hie heora fulwiht hadas wel gehealdan.* (Blickling Homilies, 109)
'... and to all men it is needful and profitable to observe well their baptismal vows.'

(29) *And so eche man by þis lawe **is holdon** ay to loue eche broþur.* (Wycliffite Sermons, 521)

(30) ***Oure office is*** *not to passe the tyme of this present lyfe unfruictfully and idlely after that we are baptised or justified, not caryng howe fewe good workes we do to the glory of God and proffite of our neighbors; much lesse* ***it is oure office*** *after that we be once made Christes membres, to lyve contrary to thesame, makyng our selfes membres of the devil,* ... (Certain Sermons and Homilies, 86)

(31) ... ***it is our partes*** *and* ***duetie*** *ever to remembre the greate mercie of God* ... (Certain Sermons and Homilies, 79)

(32) *Therefore ere wee put forth our hands to take this blessed Sacrament,* ***we are charged*** *to examine, and to trie our hearts whether God bee in vs of a truth or no.* (Hooker, 39)

In this group the lexical variation of the different expressions is quite considerable. It seems that such forms are hardly predictable.

Modal expressions forming directives can be classified in the same way as imperatives. There are first-person modals (for example 1, 15, 18 and 32), second-person modals (for example 16 and 24) and third-person modals (for example 14, 23 and 27–31). Third-person modals were only counted as directives if the agent of the required act includes the addressee.

No effort was made to distinguish, on a lexical basis, the individual modal verbs and other modal items with regard to the relative "degree of obligation" or "politeness" they express. Even if we could find out hard and fast differences between the individual modals, we would need more data to be able to show any significant distribution and development.

The last and most variable group of directives found in the data are the so-called indirect directives. Since it seems extremely tempting, in the context of religious instruction, to count any utterance implying a possible link to an honest and virtuous act of the addressee as a directive, an effort was made to restrict the possible candidates of directives to a manageable and definite number.

The indirect directives mainly consist of two groups: hearer-based interrogative sentences and speaker-based declarative sentences. Hearer-based interrogatives are sentences which question the ability or willingness of the hearer to perform the required act or the fact that the act is a future act of the hearer.

(33) ... ***will you*** *look at verse twenty-two in the revised standard version ...* (LLC, S12.1d)

(34) ***Will ye*** *hear Alms Deed speaking: "Come ye blessed children of My Father, ..."* (Erasmus, 357)

Only four examples of hearer-based interrogatives were found in the data. The scarcity of the interrogatives may be due to the fact that these manifestations usually require an immediate reaction by the hearer (Kohnen 2002: 174), an interactive setting which sermons, with their unidirectional communication, usually do not allow.

Speaker-based declaratives are sentences with a first-person pronoun plus a verb expressing the volition (35, 36) or attitude (37, 38) of the speaker *vis-à-vis* the required act.

(35) ***I wish*** *that you could resolue your selues, that I mighte not speake of it* ... (Smith, E2V)

(36) ***I'd like*** *us to think for a little while this morning just what it means to be a Christian* ... (BNC, KN6)

(37) *And þanne* ***me þinkuþ*** *þat we schulden preye þat Godis wille be don, as hit is in heuene so here in erþe;* (Wycliffite Sermons, 376)

(38) ***I suppose*** *we must go back and we must say, well* ... (BNC, G5H)

Only those items were counted as directives which explicitly mention the addressee and the required act. These two classes of directives can be seen as more or less established ways of expressing a request indirectly or tentatively in contemporary English (see Kohnen 2002).

There are, of course, many other ways of expressing directives "indirectly", by stating more or less implicitly that some course of action is necessary, desirable etc. Here, again, only these items were classified as directives which explicitly mention the addressee and the required act.

(39) ... ***it's time*** *we sat down for a while and laid aside our burden of care* ... (LLC, S12.1b)

Those items which only state that some act is necessary or appropriate are seen first of all as statements, not as requests.

(40) *Well perhaps this* ***is a good time*** *just to take stock and to say* ... (BNC, G5H)

(41) *For **the right and true Christian faith is** not onely to beleve that Holy Scripture and all the forsaied articles of our fayth are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence in Gods mercifull promises to be saved from everlastynge dampnacion by Christe, wherof doeth folowe a lovyng harte to obey his commaundementes.* (Certain Sermons and Homilies, 86)

It may be instructive to compare (40) and (41) with (39) and (30) above. On the one hand there are statements that a certain act with no specified agent is due (40) or part of the "right faith" (41),[9] on the other hand the act which is due and the obligation which is expressed are explicitly linked with the addressee (39 and 30). All four constructions could be seen as "indirect" directives. But if we were to include cases like (40) and (41), almost any expository statement in the context of religious instruction referring to some course of action could be counted as directive because, in the end, it may lead to an act required of the addressee. Apart from the fact that the number of directives would hardly be manageable, this position ignores the important distinction between the expository and the directive side of religious instruction.

Some very general assumptions were made about the "degree of obligation" imposed by the different manifestations of directives, that is, their relative "strictness" or "politeness". It has already been mentioned that performatives can be seen among the more face-threatening manifestations of directives (unless the speech act verb is one of begging, suggesting etc.). On the other hand, the indirect manifestations described above are face-saving strategies, which can be described as strategies of negative politeness (see Kohnen 2002). With regard to imperatives and modal expressions the distinction between first-person, second-person and third-person constructions seems to be relevant. A priest who uses the first-person plural pronoun includes himself in the directive addressed to the audience. He thus asserts that the instruction applies to himself as well. This may be called a strategy of common ground.[10] By contrast, the use of the second-person pronoun explicitly excludes the addressor. The addressor, who, in the context of a sermon (especially before the twentieth century), can be assumed to be in a socially superior and more powerful position, presents himself as an unimpeachable authority, giving moral directions to his subordinates. This may be called a strategy of superior rank. third-person constructions are by their nature impersonal. They often state moral obligations as established and given; see, for example, (23), (29) and (30). This may be called the strategy of objective

duty. In this study common-ground strategies are seen as face-saving and "more polite", whereas superior-rank and objective-duty strategies are considered face-threatening and "less polite".

4. Analysis of the data

The microanalysis of the texts yielded 668 directives in the corpus. Individual sermons in the sermon collections of the sub-corpora vary considerably with regard to the number of directives. This seems to depend mainly on whether the sermon has its focus on narration, exegesis, exposition or explicit regulation.[11] The individual text files with sermon collections fluctuate in their mean frequencies as well, but here the deviation stays within certain limits. The Old English sermon collections range between 6 and 14.9 directives per 1,000 words,[12] the fifteenth-century corpus between 2.1 and 9.1, the sixteenth century between 2.5 and 7.6, the seventeenth century between 2 and 4.5 and the late twentieth century between 3 and 7.5 (see Appendix B). The variation may also stem from individual stylistic differences as far as authors can be identified. For example, Wulfstan and Hooker seem to employ more directives, whereas Smith and Tillotson use fewer. An analysis accounting for the relative heterogeneity of the distribution in the individual texts and text collections would have to include all the major text functions (for example, narration, exegesis, exposition etc.) in all the texts and possible stylistic idiosyncrasies of their authors. For the present exploratory investigation it seems most useful to conduct the analysis in terms of the mean frequencies of the sub-corpora, although it is advisable to keep the individual variation in mind.

Table 1 contains the frequencies of the directives per 1,000 words in the five sub-corpora. The figures in the periods differ to a large extent and we may recognise a certain development. The Old English data show the highest frequency of directives (8.5), the late Middle English frequency is much lower (5.1), and the following centuries bring a further decrease up to 2.8. The late twentieth century, by contrast, has an increase up to 4.8. The general impression conveyed by the data is that the overall quantity of directives in sermons changes considerably during the centuries. From Old English till Early Modern English, English sermons seem to become less "directive" and regulative, that is, they contain fewer requests and guidelines directed at the audience. On the other hand, sermons seem to turn more "directive" again towards the end of the twentieth century.

Table 1. Directives in the sub-corpora (frequency per 1,000 words)[13]

10th/11th c.	15th c.	16th c.	17th c.	late 20th c.
25,390 W	26,716 W	25,145 W	26,002 W	26,016 W
[215] 8.5[14]	[135] 5.1	[120] 4.8	[73] 2.8	[125] 4.8

These findings nicely illustrate that the developments of individual manifestations of directives must be seen against the background of the overall evolution of directives. For example, if we assume that the changes of certain directives sketched out in the introduction apply to the present text type, the following picture would emerge. The decrease in (mostly face-threatening) manifestations of directives would reflect the general trend to employ fewer directives as revealed in Table 1 until the seventeenth century. On the other hand, the increase in more polite manifestations registered for contemporary English will probably reflect a change or a shift in the manifestations of directives, not a general decrease of directives, because the overall frequency rises in the late twentieth century.

However, this is slightly speculative because the present data are only based on one text type. More reliable insights may be gained if we take a closer look at the development and changes within the different manifestations of directives in the present data. The following analysis will focus on three aspects: the distribution of the different classes of directives in the Old English corpus and the major changes compared with the fifteenth-century corpus; an analysis of the decrease in directives from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century; and the exact nature of the increase in directives which can be seen at the end of the twentieth century.

Table 2 shows the frequency and distribution of the different classes of manifestations of directives (as described in section 3). The most frequent constructions in the Old English sub-corpus are the modal expressions (3.4 in 1,000 words, with a proportion of 40 per cent). Among the modals there are first-person constructions (with a frequency of 2.3) and third-person constructions (with a frequency of 1.1), but no second-person constructions. The next frequent construction in the Old English data is the first-person imperative, that is, constructions with *uton* or inverted constructions with a subjunctive verb form plus a first-person pronoun (2.7, with a proportion of 32 per cent). Second-person imperatives and (inverted) third-person imperatives only play a minor role (with a frequency of 1.2 and 0.9 and a proportion of 14 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively); performatives are even less important (0.3, 4 per cent).[15]

Table 2. Distribution of directives in the sub-corpora (frequency per 1,000 words)[16]

	10th/11th c.	15th c.	16th c.	17th c.	late 20th c.
	25,390 W	26,716 W	25,145 W	26,002 W	26,016 W
	[215] 8.5[17]	[135] 5.1	[120] 4.8	[73] 2.8	[125] 4.8
performatives	[8] 0.3	[7] 0.3	[1] 0.04	[2] 0.1	–
	4%	5%	1%	3%	–
1st-p. imperatives	[68] 2.7	[21] 0.8	[13] 0.5	[11] 0.4	[23] 0.9
	32%	16%	11%	15%	18%
2nd-p. imperatives	[30] 1.2	[34] 1.3	[51] 2	[24] 0.9	[37] 1.4
	14%	25%	43%	33%	30%
3rd-p. imperatives	[23] 0.9[18]	–	[9] 0.4	[10] 0.4	–
	11%	–	8%	14%	–
∑ modals	[86] 3.4	[72] 2.7	[40] 1.6	[26] 1	[49] 1.9
	40%	53%	33%	36%	39%
– 1st-p. modals	[58] 2.3	[21] 0.8	[18] 0.7	[14] 0.5	[49] 1.9
– 2nd-p. modals	–	[17] 0.6	[11] 0.4	[3] 0.1	–
– 3rd-p. modals	[28] 1.1	[34] 1.3	[11] 0.4	[9] 0.3	–
indirect directives	–	[1] 0.04	[6] 0.2	–	[16] 0.6
	–	1%	5%	–	13%

Basically, the distribution of the directives in the Old English sermons leaves a mixed impression. Given the fact that the overall frequency of directives is so high, we find not as many "strict" directives as we would expect. On the one hand second-person imperatives do not play such an important role. Modal constructions and periphrastic constructions emphasising a common ground seem to prevail (first-person modals and first-person imperatives add up to a frequency of 5 per 1,000 words). On the other hand, there are – in addition to the inherently face-threatening second-person imperatives and performatives – quite a few third-person constructions, constructions which suggest a rather distanced strategy of "objective duty". In the present context we cannot solve this question and must state that the exact nature of directives in Old English sermons requires more research. One of the important questions which would need to be considered here is whether the terms "face" and "politeness" can be applied in the same way in Anglo-Saxon England as in the other periods.

Which changes can be noted in the fifteenth-century corpus? The decrease in directives in the late Middle English data can clearly be attributed to the decline of the first-person imperative constructions. They go down from 2.7 to 0.8. The Old English constructions with *uton* are quite frequent in the tenth/eleventh-century corpus; after their disappearance in Middle English the inverted first-person imperatives and the few constructions with *let* in the fifteenth-century data only make up for part of their frequency. Third-person imperatives (mostly inverted subjunctive constructions) vanish as well. On the other hand, performative constructions as well as second-person imperatives stay more or less the same. The frequency of modal expressions changes from 3.4 to 2.7, with some interesting shifts in this category. Whereas the frequency of first-person modals is significantly reduced (2.3 to 0.8), second-person modals show an increase of 0.6 and third-person modals of 0.2. Thus one can say that the decrease in directives in the Middle English data results in a decrease in common-ground strategies, accompanied by a shift in the modals towards superior-level and objective-duty strategies. If this result is correct, its implication is quite remarkable: a decrease in directives does not necessarily imply that the directives become less "forceful" or more "polite".

Which noticeable changes can be registered during the further decrease in directives in the Early Modern period? Basically, the frequencies of all constructions seem to go down (apart from third-person imperatives with *let*, which only appear in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Performative constructions are reduced to 0.04 and 0.1 (till they vanish completely in the Modern English data). Second-person imperatives rise in the sixteenth century, but then follow the general decline. First-person imperatives only go down a little (0.4), while modal expressions are reduced significantly (2.7 to 1). In the modals both first-, second- and third-person constructions are affected by the decline but it seems that in the seventeenth century first-person modals turn out to be the most frequent modal constructions, whereas second-person constructions become very rare. There are also some indirect directives, but their number is fairly small and their frequency only reaches 0.2 once (in the sixteenth-century sub-corpus).

The general decline of all directive constructions, with the first-person constructions being affected least, and the first appearance of indirect constructions suggest that Early Modern sermons employ fewer directives but also tend to make directives more face-saving. This is a result which would have been expected against the background of earlier research. But the important new finding is that the most noticeable change in Early Mod-

ern English sermons is a general decrease, less a change or shift of directives (after all, the "common-ground" first-person modals go down from 0.8 to 0.5 and there are no indirect directives in the seventeenth-century corpus).

Seen from the perspective of the Early Modern English findings, the rise of directives in the late twentieth-century corpus may seem unexpected. But what exactly are the changes that occur? On the surface, all directive constructions are affected (apart from performatives and third-person imperatives, which are no longer found here). The largest increase is registered in modal expressions (1 to 1.9). This rise actually involves a spread of first-person constructions and the disappearance of all the other modal constructions.[19] In a parallel development, first-person imperatives (constructions with *let us* and *let's*) rise from 0.4 to 0.9. A third factor which contributes to the increase in directives is the rise of indirect constructions. Their frequency is still relatively low (0.6) but with a proportion of 13 per cent they are much more noticeable than in the Early Modern sub-corpora. The largest part of the indirect constructions (11 out of 16) are speaker-based constructions.

These three developments together point to a strengthening of common-ground and face-saving strategies and seem to continue a development which could already be seen in the Early Modern data. But there is also an increase in second-person imperatives (0.9 to 1.4). This spread of second-person imperatives is quite puzzling and seems to contradict the other findings. Here a closer look at the predicates used in the imperatives may be useful. Among the 37 second-person imperatives found in the late twentieth-century corpus 18 imperatives contain verbs which denote (mostly cognitive) acts associated with the reception of the sermon, for example *remember, listen, think, look* etc.; see (42) and (43).

(42) *... and* ***remember*** *his words before the crucifixion ...* ***remember*** *him saying to God ...* (LLC, S12.1c)

(43) ***Listen*** *to Saint Matthew's gospel again.* (BNC, G5H)

The other 19 imperatives go beyond the sermon and are instructions in the strict sense of the word, because they tell people what they should do (or not do) in their lives:

(44) ***Show*** *Jesus by your personal example.* (BNC, G5H)

However, 13 out of the 19 genuinely "instructive" imperatives stem from one text (BNC, G5H). In this text the religious minister seems to enjoy lining up second-person imperatives:

(45) ***Rejoice*** *in the Lord always, yes for he heals the broken heart, he binds up the wounds, again I say* ***rejoice****. There are those of us here today who are happy. There are even a few who I'm sure don't have a care in the world, although I'm almost prepared to stick my neck out and say that they're in the minority. But if you are in that fortunate position then* ***rejoice*** *and* ***give*** *thanks.* ***Give*** *thanks and* ***do*** *your best to spread your good fortune around, as the old song goes,* ***spread*** *a little happiness. But if, and most of ... are ... I'm sure that we've come today with some thorn in our flesh somewhere, some worry, some difficulty or a disappointment perhaps of some kind, then just* ***remember*** *that in all things God works together for good with those who love him, and for that* ***rejoice*** *and* ***give*** *thanks, and again I say,* ***rejoice****.* (BNC, G5H)

Paraphrased in a rather loose way, these imperatives are requests to be happy, to spread happiness and to give thanks for this happiness – a far cry from the restrictive injunctions found in the Old English homilies. So the relatively high frequency of "instructive" imperatives in the late twentieth century may be attributed to the personal style of the addressor in text G5H, his predilection for "positive" requests and to the majority of "text-related" imperatives mentioned above; see (42) and (43). But if we were to follow this line of argument we would have to analyse all the predicates in all imperatives in all sub-corpora, and we would probably need more data. Meanwhile we need to reckon with the possibility that second-person imperatives may be relatively frequent in Modern English sermons.

5. Conclusions

This investigation was based on a relatively small corpus. So it seems easy to cast doubt on some or most of its findings. But it is important to see that the focus was here on the development of one text type[20] and that the main purpose of this paper was exploratory. As a first approach to one of the major methodological predicaments of historical corpus linguistics it was to show whether the serious questions raised on a theoretical level would turn out to be as important in practical corpus analysis and which aspects have to

be taken into account. Against this background I would like to present four conclusions. Whereas the first conclusion refers to the general role of text types as tools for the diachronic analysis of speech acts, the second and third points involve the problem of the "hidden manifestations" and the fourth the problem of the complete list of the forms of a speech act.

First, text types have proved to be a manageable instrument for gaining a first idea of the overall development of speech acts in a limited domain. In fact, text types or genres seem to be the proper place for investigating the diachronic developments of speech acts. Since historical pragmatics usually deals with texts and since the quantity and range of speech acts in texts is linked to their function in texts, it is only within the more or less restrictive functional profile of genres that quantitative and qualitative changes of speech acts can be traced consistently.

Secondly, the exploratory study of directives in English sermons has shown that the total number and mean frequency of directives in sermons change considerably across time. The present study suggests a graduated decrease from Old English till the seventeenth century and again an increase in the late twentieth century. This initial profile of sermons shows that changes of individual manifestations of directives always have to be seen against the background of the general development of directives. We may assume that this applies to most text types and most speech acts contained in them.

Thirdly, the necessity of checking the development of individual constructions against the general background was further corroborated by a more detailed analysis of the data. Whereas a decline of the total number of directives would usually be associated with a qualitative evolution of more polite and less rigorous requests and a quantitative increase with a more authoritative change, it was just the reverse development that could be revealed in the data. Only during the Early Modern period a decline of the frequency could be linked to a tendency towards more polite manifestations. So it seems that in practical corpus analysis all possibilities have to be reckoned with. Quantitative and qualitative speech act developments have to be systematically distinguished. This study has also shown that one of the important elements of a qualitative analysis is an in-depth investigation of the predicates denoting the requested act of the directive.

Fourthly, the exploratory survey of the sermons suggests that the issue of the linguistic variability of the manifestations can actually be limited to a certain extent. It turns out that in all periods the proportion of imperatives and modals ranges between 87 per cent and 97 per cent (see Table 2). Once the different orthographic realisations of the imperative forms and the modal verbs are determined, we are only left with the (highly variable) class of "other modal expressions" and – of course – the indirect manifestations. These would actu-

ally require more microanalysis. Further research will have to reveal whether the "variable" proportion of directives is similarly low in other text types.

The two variable classes of manifestations in this survey point to another problem, the delimitation of the manifestations. In this paper I have followed a rather restrictive procedure, excluding some realisations which might be called indirect directives, but which can also be analysed as statements or claims within the expository sections of religious instruction. It seems that the notorious delimitation problem can be approached more successfully if the speech act description of an utterance or sentence is embedded in its larger functional context. For example, religious instruction may comprise not only "directive" instruction but also exposition, exegesis and narration. Once a representative act, for example in (41), is located in the expository section of a sermon, there is no need to qualify it as an "indirect" directive because it is quite clear that religious instruction can be "directive" as well as "expository" and any exposition in the context of religious instruction will necessarily have consequences for the addressee's actions. Locating individual speech acts within the context of larger text units is, of course, a problem which goes beyond the scope of the present paper and which may create new difficulties for corpus analysis. But it again underlines the central role text types play in the methodology of diachronic speech act analysis.

Appendix A: Primary sources

The following references specify full details only for those excerpts which are not part of the *Helsinki Corpus*; for the texts of the *Helsinki Corpus* see Kytö (1996). They indicate page and line numbers of the excerpts (7.2–34.6 = excerpt from page 7, line 2 to page 34, line 6).

Tenth/eleventh century

Wulfstan	*Wulfstan's Homilies*	8,260 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Ælfric	*Ælfric's Catholic Homilies* *Ælfric's Homilies*	4,850 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Blickling Homilies	*The Blickling Homilies*	10,670 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
A Homily for the Sixth Sunday	*A Homily for the Sixth (or Fourth) Sunday after Epiphany*	1,610 words	*Helsinki Corpus*

Fifteenth century

Wycliffite Sermons	*Wycliffite Sermons*	13,460 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Mirk	*Mirk's Festial*	3,190 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Royal	*Middle English Sermons* (MS Royal)	5,820 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Advent	*Advent and Nativity Sermons*	4,246 words	

Susan Powell (ed.) 1981. *The Advent and Nativity Sermons from a Fifteenth-Century Revision of John Mirk's Festial*. (Middle English Texts 13.) Heidelberg: Winter. 71.1–91.260.

Sixteenth century

Fisher	*The English Works of John Fisher*	4,460 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Erasmus	Desiderius Erasmus, *A Sermon of the Exceeding Great Mercy of God*	3,307 words	

Elizabeth M. Nugent (ed.) 1956. *The Thought & Culture of the English Renaissance: An Anthology of Tudor Prose 1481–1555*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 350.36–357.29.

Certain Sermons and Homilies	*An Homelie of Christian Love and Charitie* (2,764 words) *An Homelie of the Salvacion of Mankynd, by Onely Christ Our Savior, from Synne and Death Everlastyng* (4,414 words)	7,178 words	

Ronald B. Bond (ed.) 1987. *Certain Sermons or Homilies (1547) and A Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion (1570)*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 79.1–87.40, 120.1–125.27.

Latimer	Hugh Latimer, *Sermon on the Ploughers* *Seven Sermons Before Edward VI*	5,010 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Smith	Henry Smith, *A Preparative to Mariage* *Of the Lords Supper* *Of Usurie*	5,190 words	*Helsinki Corpus*

Seventeenth century

Hooker	Richard Hooker, *Two Sermons upon Part of S. Judes Epistle*	5,110 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Sermons	Thomas Grantham, *A Wife Mistaken, or a Wife and No Wife* Thomas Fuller, *Blessed are the Peacemakers* Ralph Cudworth, *Quintessence of the Gospel*	8,422 words	
	John Chandos (ed.) 1971. *In God's Name: Examples of Preaching in England from the Act of Supremacy to the Act of Uniformity 1534–1662*. London: Hutchinson. 377.1–383.12, 400.1–406.35, 437.1–440.32.		
Tillotson	John Tillotson, *The Folly of Scoffing at Religion* *Of the Tryall of the Spirits*	6,600 words	*Helsinki Corpus*
Taylor	Jeremy Taylor, *The Marriage Ring*	5,870 words	*Helsinki Corpus*

Late twentieth century

British National Corpus, World Edition (BNC)	Text G5H	7,564 words
	Text KN6	6,359 words
	Text KN7	6,868 words
London Lund Corpus (LLC)	Text S12.1a	1,050 words
	Text S12.1b	2,100 words
	Text S12.1c	1,212 words
	Text S12.1d	863 words

Appendix B: Incidence and frequencies (per 1,000 words) of directives in the text files

10th / 11th century	Wulfstan	Ælfric	Blickling H.	A Homily ...
	8,260 W	4,850 W	10,670 W	1,610 W
	[88]	[29]	[74]	[24]
	10.7[21]	6	6.9	14.9

15th century	Wycl.Serm.	Mirk	Royal	Advent	
	13,460 W	3,190 W	5,820 W	4,246 W	
	[67]	[29]	[30]	[9]	
	5	9.1	5.2	2.1	
16th century	Fisher	Erasmus	Cert.S.a.H.	Latimer	Smith
	4,460 W	3,307 W	7,178 W	5,010 W	5,190 W
	[32]	[11]	[26]	[38]	[13]
	7.2	3.3	3.6	7.6	2.5
17th century	Hooker	Sermons	Tillotson	Taylor	
	5,110 W	8,422 W	6,600 W	5,870 W	
	[23]	[21]	[13]	[16]	
	4.5	2.5	2	2.7	
late 20th century	BNC G5H	BNC KN6	BNC KN7	LLC	
	7,564 W	6,359 W	6,868 W	5,225 W	
	[41]	[19]	[26]	[39]	
	5.4	3	3.8	7.5	

Notes

1. It is quite interesting to note that many speech act studies, both diachronic and synchronic, seem to be based on the tacit assumption that the manifestations of the speech act(s) under consideration are easily identifiable and form a closed set.
2. In this paper no terminological distinction will be made between the concepts "text type" and "genre".
3. Here one of Wulfstan's homilies was excluded ("Her ongynð be Cristendome", Bethurum 1957: 200–210). This homily contains an exceedingly large number of directives (113 directives in 1,980 words, which means one directive in 17 words). In particular, there is an extremely large number of third-person imperatives (81), which seems rather unusual for a homily and is found in no other excerpt in any of the sub-corpora. The rather lengthy enumeration of impersonal imperatives does not give the impression of a sermon which may actually have been preached but rather of a collection of regulations, with many links to the laws to which Wulfstan has probably contributed (see Bethurum 1957: 326,

329–331). If this homily were to be included in the analysis, it would further increase the difference between the Old English and the late Middle English data and significantly enlarge the proportion of the Old English third-person imperatives. On the frequencies including this homily see notes 12, 14, 17 and 18 below.

4. These four classes are the result of the microanalysis. The incidence and frequencies of the four classes are listed in Table 2 in section 4.
5. The object *manna gehwylcne*, of course, includes the addressees as referents.
6. See also the list of imperatives given in Quirk et al. (1985: 830), which contains imperative sentences and constructions with *let*, among others.
7. First-person imperatives here do not include constructions with the first person singular (e.g. with *let me*) since this investigation is not concerned with requests a priest might address to himself during his sermon (which does not happen very often anyway).
8. There is a vast literature on the development of the English modals – see, for example, Fischer (1992: 262–265, 393–394), Denison (1993: 292–339), Rissanen (1999: 231–238) and the references listed there. Given the limited space of this paper, the developments of the individual modals cannot be dealt with here.
9. Believing and having trust are seen here as conscious cognitive acts.
10. Brown and Levinson (1987: 127) subsume the inclusive *we* as a positive-politeness strategy ("Include both S and H in the activity").
11. For example, in Ælfric the homily "Dominica secunda in Quadragesima" does not contain one single directive; it is mainly concerned with narration and exegesis. On the other hand, the two homilies "VIII. X. Kalendas Septembris. Assumptio Sancte Marie Uirginis" and "Dominica VII post Pentecosten" comprise the majority of the directives found in the excerpts from Ælfric used in this investigation.
12. If Wulfstan's homily "Her ongynð be Cristendome" (see note 3 above) were included in the analysis, the Old English collections would range between 6 and 19.6.
13. Numbers in square brackets indicate the incidence of directives. Figures indicating the frequencies are rounded off.
14. If Wulfstan's homily "Her ongynð be Cristendome" (see note 3 above) were included in the analysis, the respective figures would be [328] 12.9.
15. This frequency corresponds more or less exactly to the value given for Old English directive performatives in the text prototype "religious instruction" of the *Helsinki Corpus* in Kohnen (2000: 309): 3.2 per 10,000 words for primary examples (items which are not fictional or reported). In the present context it is interesting to see that these performatives are actually a tiny minority of the total number of directives in sermons.
16. In Table 2 figures (both frequency and percentage) are rounded off.

17. If Wulfstan's homily "Her ongynð be Cristendome" (see note 3 above) were included in the analysis, the respective figures would be [328] 12.9.
18. If Wulfstan's homily "Her ongynð be Cristendome" (see note 3 above) were included in the analysis, the respective figures would be [104] 4.1.
19. Sermons KN6 and KN7 (*BNC*) sometimes use a combination of *you* and *I*, for example, "how grateful you and I should be" (KN7). This was counted as a second-person construction.
20. Many early studies using selected text types of the *Helsinki Corpus* have a similarly "small" data base.
21. If Wulfstan's homily "Her ongynð be Cristendome" (see note 3 below) were included in the analysis, the respective figures would be [201] 19.6.

References

Bertucelli Papi, Marcella
2000 Is a diachronic speech act theory possible? *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1: 56–66.

Bethurum, Dorothy (ed.)
1957 *The Homilies of Wulfstan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson
1987 *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Culpeper, Jonathan, and Merja Kytö
2000 Data in historical pragmatics: Spoken interaction (re)cast as writing. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1: 175–199.

Denison, David
1993 *English Historical Syntax*. London: Longman.

Faiß, Klaus
1989 *Englische Sprachgeschichte*. Tübingen: Francke.

Fischer, Olga
1992 Syntax. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. II: *1066–1476*, Norman Blake (ed.), 207–408. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Franz, Wilhelm
1939 *Die Sprache Shakespeares in Vers und Prosa*. Halle/Saale: Niemeyer.

Heffernan, Thomas J.
1984 Sermon literature. In *Middle English Prose: A Critical Guide to Major Authors and Genres*, A. S. G. Edwards (ed.), 177–207. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Jacobs, Andreas, and Andreas H. Jucker
1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In *Historical Pragmatics:*

Pragmatic Developments in the History of English, Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Jespersen, Otto

1940 *A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles*, Part V: *Syntax*, vol. 4. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard.

Jucker, Andreas H.

2000 English historical pragmatics: Problems of data and methodology. In *English Diachronic Pragmatics*, Gabriella Di Martino and Maria Lima (eds.), 17–55. Napoli: Cuen.

Jucker, Andreas H., and Irma Taavitsainen

2000 Diachronic speech act analysis: Insults from flyting to flaming. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1: 67–95.

Kahlas-Tarkka, Leena, Matti Kilpiö, and Aune Österman

1993 Old English. In *Early English in the Computer Age: Explorations through the Helsinki Corpus*, Matti Rissanen, Merja Kytö, and Minna Palander-Collin (eds.), 21–32. (Topics in English Linguistics 11.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Kohnen, Thomas

2000 Explicit performatives in Old English: A corpus-based study of directives. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1: 301–321.

2001 Text types as catalysts for language change: The example of the adverbial first participle construction. In *Towards a History of English as a History of Genres*, Hans-Jürgen Diller and Manfred Görlach (eds.), 111–124. Heidelberg: Peter Lang.

2002 Towards a history of English directives. In *Text Types and Corpora: Studies in Honour of Udo Fries*, Andreas Fischer, Gunnel Tottie, and Hans Martin Lehmann (eds.), 165–175. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.

2004 *Text – Textsorte – Sprachgeschichte: Englische Partizipial- und Gerundialkonstruktionen 1100 bis 1700*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Kytö, Merja

1996 *Manual to the Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, Coding Conventions and Lists of Source Texts*. 3rd ed. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki.

Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik

1985 A *Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.

Rissanen, Matti

1999 Syntax. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. III: *1476–1776*, Roger Lass (ed.), 187–331. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John R.
1969 *Speech acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1976 A classification of illocutionary acts. *Language in Society* 5: 1–24.
Traugott, Elisabeth Closs
1992 Syntax. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. I: *The Beginnings to 1066*, Richard M. Hogg (ed.), 168–289. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Visser, F. Th.
1966 *An Historical Syntax of the English Language*. Vol. II. Leiden: Brill.

A pragmatics for interpreting Shakespeare's Sonnets 1 to 20: Dialogue scripts and Erasmian intertexts

Lynne Magnusson

The field of historical pragmatics has been emerging as an exciting place of intersection between literary studies and linguistics, and particularly between literary interpretation of Shakespeare and linguistic work on Early Modern English. For many years, Shakespeare critics, on the whole, having rejected the methods of formalist stylistics prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, ignored language and language-based close interpretation of the texts. At the same time, they attended to the social and political contexts of Shakespeare's drama and poetry, developing increasingly sophisticated ways to engage with the historically specific contexts and power relationships evoked by dramatic situations. The emergence of historical pragmatics, as an area of linguistics emphasizing language use in context and maintaining an interdisciplinary outreach, offers exciting opportunities for literary critics interested in re-engaging Shakespeare's language in ways attentive both to text and context. Jonathan Hope and Sylvia Adamson have recently made some fascinating suggestions about how linguistic knowledge about the history of Early Modern English, and specifically an understanding of linguistic variation and change, can illuminate Shakespeare's texts. Hope (1999: 253, 255) has argued that, writing on the "cusp of standardization", Shakespeare "was more able to exploit variation than most of his contemporaries" and that in the "resulting interplay between the old and the new, the strange and the familiar, is one of the least-known glories of Shakespeare's texts, and one of the few under-researched areas of Shakespeare studies". Adamson (1998: 165) has argued that new historicist critics interested in reconstructing "the context of material and cultural circumstance" might productively also attend to the context of the linguistic code itself. I am arguing for a reciprocal learning process: that is, whereas literary studies has much to learn from the history of the language and historical pragmatics, linguistics (and especially historical pragmatics) has much to learn from the specialized skills that have developed in literary and cultural studies for the interpretation of context.

Valuable gains can be made in both disciplines by work able to integrate the history of Early Modern English with the history of its contexts.

In this paper, I will make a case for what I call "dialogue scripts", or culturally specific interaction genres, for interpreting the historical context of relationship within which competing linguistic forms such as second person singular *thou* and *you* become legible and interesting to the literary critic. At the same time, I am suggesting that a tool like dialogue scripts for interpreting literary and related cultural contexts with greater delicacy has something of value to offer to linguistic pragmatics as it tries to assess features within Shakespearean texts as evidence for its theories. For my primary example, my focus will be on *thou*/*you* shifts that have puzzled interpreters in Shakespeare's Sonnets 1 to 20. I will argue that the surprising choice of pronouns of address is related to Shakespeare's imitation and transformation of a dialogue script for familiar relations found in some of Erasmus's educational writings, including *De conscribendis epistolis* ('On the Writing of Letters'). But before turning to the sonnets, we need to consider what makes a pronoun choice a matter of interest.

1. Pronouns of address: Literary and linguistic interpretation

Literature and linguistics sometimes have trouble talking to each other because they differ so entirely in what they want to do with texts. Roughly speaking, where a linguist might treat a particular textual instance as evidence in framing a higher-level rule or theory of how language works, asking what is normative even about an apparently anomalous example, a literary critic – whether considering poetry or cultural documents – asks of the particular instance what makes it surprising, remarkable, strange or complex. In practice, this rarely means that what is held out as remarkable in literary usage is remarkable or anomalous as a linguistic instance. Consider two examples, the first foregrounding the steward Malvolio's unaccustomed use of *thee* to address his mistress in *Twelfth Night* and the second featuring pronoun selection by Jack Cade and his companions at the height of the rebellion in *2 Henry VI* (all quotations from Shakespeare are from the Norton edition [Shakespeare 1997]):

(1) OLIVIA Why, how dost thou, man? What is the matter with thee?
MALVOLIO Not black in my mind, though yellow in my legs. It did come to his hands, and commands shall be executed. I think we do

know the sweet roman hand.
OLIVIA Wilt thou go to bed, Malvolio?
MALVOLIO [*kissing his hand*] To bed? 'Ay, sweetheart, and I'll come to **thee**.'

(*Twelfth Night* 3.4.23–29, emphasis added)

(2) CADE So, sirs, now go some and pull down the Savoy; others to th' Inns of Court – down with them all.
BUTCHER I have a suit unto **your** lordship.
CADE Be it a lordship, **thou** shalt have it for that word.
BUTCHER Only that the laws of England may come out of **your** mouth.
…
MESSENGER My lord, a prize, a prize! Here's the Lord Saye which sold the towns in France …
Enter a rebel with the Lord SAYE
CADE Well, he shall be beheaded for it ten times. [*To* SAYE] Ah, **thou** say, **thou** serge – nay, **thou** buckram lord! Now art **thou** within point-blank of our jurisdiction regal. What canst **thou** answer …?

(*2 Henry VI* 4.7.1–6, 17–18, 20–23, emphasis added)

In the first instance a literary interpreter might remark upon the socio-pragmatic sophistication of the pronoun switching to mark Malvolio's miscalculated sweet talk to his mistress: misled by tricks played on him by other household members, he mistakes the conversation, hears Olivia's power-differentiating *thee* as intimate *thee*, and responds in kind. The modern editor's determination (indicated by the insertion of quotation marks) that Malvolio is, in fact, citing a popular love song further registers the steward's mistaken perception of the change in interaction script corresponding to a changed relationship as he and Olivia reveal their mutual passion. In the second instance what is strange is how the language of revolution inverts and yet reproduces social hierarchy, even while Jack Cade and his rebels congratulate themselves on pulling down traditional political and social structures. Both examples reflect Shakespeare's ingenuity in fashioning the contexts and linguistic encoding for complex and shifting relationships. Yet they make no demand upon the linguist to re-examine or adjust the generally accepted theories about *thou*/*you* variation. The power–solidarity model relating variation to social structure, articulated by Roger Brown and Albert Gilman (1960) and modified over the years to account for evanescent shifting in

terms of politeness, emotion, affect and other factors, is adequate to the task of making these literary surprises legible.[1] Yet this situation should not be taken to mean that literary interpretation benefits from linguistic knowledge without having anything to offer in return.

The example of Shakespeare's Sonnets 1 to 20 is more interesting, for it has seemed anomalous both to literary and linguistic scholars. Here, addressing advice to marry and have children to a youthful aristocratic patron in the first twelve sonnets, the poet-commoner, surprisingly, uses *thou*. Then, in a transitional group of sonnets (13, 15, 16, 17), just as a shift in intimacy seems to be occurring, with the poet's impersonal and generalized counsel giving way to expressions of love ("dear my love", 13.13) and personal engagement ("I engraft you new", 15.14), the speaker, surprisingly, shifts to *you* address, with Sonnets 18 to 51 returning to *thou*. These *thou*/*you* choices apparently invert expectations: the modified power–solidarity model would predict initial *you* address to register the status of the patron, with a subsequent shift to *thou* possible to register intense affect and increased intimacy. Shakespeare's usage here challenges both literary and linguistic scholars to find another explanatory principle. This problem has been treated directly both by the literary critic, Andrew Gurr (1982), whose thoughtful article predates new historicist interpretations of the Sonnets, and by the linguist, Ulrich Busse (2002), who has recently published a detailed and valuable monograph on second-person pronoun variation in the Shakespeare corpus as part of the *Pragmatics & Beyond New Series*.[2] Employing very different methodologies, they nonetheless arrive at a similar conclusion, accounting for the anomalous uses by positing a greater preference for *thou* in "poetic" as opposed to socially inflected contexts.[3] Basically, what is being suggested is that, in the first movement of the Sonnets, a high poetic register overrides the social specification that Shakespeare registers so dynamically in his plays, not merely with a finely tuned interplay of pronouns but also with a wide range of other politeness and pragmatic markers.[4]

As Busse works towards his generalization differentiating pronoun selection in a "higher poetic style", producing tables showing the high incidence of *thou* usage in Elizabethan sonnet sequences (Busse 2002: 94),[5] he says surprisingly little about such significant contextual factors as the one-to-one address normal to sonnets that cuts down on plural uses of *you*, the power dynamic created by the usual male-poet to female-beloved direction of address, or even the significant difference that same-sex address to the beloved makes in Shakespeare's sonnets. Busse's tendency here to cut competing interpretations of context out of the picture is related to his choice of quanti-

tative methods, and it may also point to a larger tension within the endeavour of historical pragmatics. As Irma Taavitsainen and Susan Fitzmaurice have explained in Chapter 1, historical pragmaticians have joined the trend within the linguistic field towards large-scale corpus-based studies. Such empirical studies tend to test claims or hypotheses about language variation or change by comparing frequencies of particular linguistic features between one genre, text-type or register and another. Once one has settled on comparing poetry and drama, or sonnets and letters, other potentially relevant micro-contexts tend to drop out of sight. While language use in context is the *sine qua non* of pragmatics, nonetheless pragmatics as practiced on this increasingly dominant empirical model for linguistic inquiry seems under pressure to reduce any lifelike plurality of contexts to a strictly limited set of variables. Indeed, the rubric for the MLA conference session on "Linguistic Theory and Text: Evidence and Interpretation" for which this paper was originally prepared – "to conduct a conversation regarding the use of texts as evidence for theorizing interpretative processes as analytical procedures that remain robust when applied as routines, rather than as subjective, highly contextual, nonce interpretations"[6] – was itself premised on the imperative to resist the messiness of contexts. Quantitative studies may appear to the literary scholar to pull against nuanced readings of literary texts like Shakespeare's Sonnets, although James Fitzmaurice's chapter in this volume, arguing for a "new philology" rather than a "new pragmatics" within literary studies, makes a welcome effort to show their applicability to a literary analysis of Margaret Cavendish's prose fiction.

2. Complicating context: The role of dialogue scripts

The messiness or plurality of contexts was one of the most powerful messages of Mikhail Bakhtin's well-known intervention into the formalist study of language, an intervention many have regarded as compatible with or predictive of pragmatics. Bakhtin discouraged the construction of language use as an encounter between the Saussurean poles of *langue* and *parole*, with the individual utterance drawing upon (or taking shape against) the background of a general language system. Instead of encountering anything like the abstraction of a general language system, the "speaking subject" encounters words and linguistic forms in the interplay of other people's utterances, always saturated in historically and socially specific contexts, always in process of becoming accented and re-accented by differently situated conversa-

tions or speech situations (see Bakhtin 1981: 264, 276, 293–294). To follow an utterance is to catch the tune of the conversations it quotes or alludes to, or, as Bakhtin and his circle put it in more strongly systematizing moments, to recognize its affiliation with a speech genre or a speech interaction genre (Bakhtin 1986; Vološinov 1986: 95–98). Since context in play-texts and sonnets does not exist except as scripted in text, speech interaction genres in literary works and in other types of historical document can be recognized primarily as dialogue scripts.

By dialogue scripts, I mean the textual manifestation of the culturally given interaction genres upon which a playwright – for example – might be drawing to build up a dramatic dialogue, a husband and wife to conduct an argument, a humanist scholar to devise a colloquy, a merchant to direct his factor by letter, or a sonneteer to write what sounds like half of a silent conversation. I chose a term that can cross over between speech and writing, between life and literature.

Against Gurr's and Busse's claims that the language of Sonnets 1 to 12 evokes a high poetic register and against formalist critic Helen Vendler's similar view (1997: 2) that social context and historical specification are stripped away in lyric poetry to make the speaking "I" "voiceable by anyone", I would argue that Shakespeare, the consummate dramatist, writes sonnets in which he means it to matter who is speaking, to whom, and in what situation. Reading the sonnets with attention to the Early Modern dialogue scripts they evoke and re-accent helps to illuminate the historic specificity of the roles and relationships being negotiated, together with the interest of their related structures of affect. These sonnets make a demand on the interpreter to situate the dialogic interaction: Shakespeare, the dramatist turned poet, innovates by creating the private thought of his speaker out of the materials of socially situated dialogue.[7] For literary studies, finding the dialogue scripts should help to illuminate the important interplay between Shakespeare's verbal artistry and sociohistorical contexts. For linguistics it should hold out a caution against oversimplifying the history of contexts in using historical texts, whether literary or cultural documents, as evidence.

3. "Aggressive familiarity" in Erasmus and Shakespeare

It has long been acknowledged that Shakespeare drew for themes, metaphors and motifs in the opening group of "procreation" sonnets upon Erasmus's *Encomium Matrimonii*, a letter exhorting a young man to marry that circu-

lated widely in England and on the continent as part of Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis* and was also disseminated in English translation in the many editions of Thomas Wilson's *The Art of Rhetoric*.[8] What has not been recognized is that Shakespeare was, at the same time, imitating Erasmus – or the radical forms of persuasion widely disseminated throughout northern Europe by his works – in the dialogue script creating the initial state of the same-sex relationship his sonnets would explore. In Erasmus's letters and in his educational writings, including the rhetorical textbooks *De conscribendis epistolis* and *De copia*, Erasmus had developed (or, at least self-consciously theorized and disseminated) what Lisa Jardine (1996: 84, 96) has called a radical "technology" for fashioning intense affect and evoking immediate presence in written interactions, a technology which humanists put to instrumental use to further scholarly, pedagogic and patronage aims. Erasmus's teachings took deliberate aim at social transformation: in espousing an aggressive familiar style that could be used for instruction, directed to patrons, or exchanged among scholars, a style overturning social norms and hierarchies, Erasmus held out to schoolboys through their rhetorical practice the power to use words to create intimacies and tried to implant the fervour to use these verbally constructed or transformed social relationships to greater ends.

In order to pursue this point further, let us consider five features contributing to a script of aggressive familiarity displayed both in Shakespeare's opening sonnets and in Erasmus's epistle on matrimony and other letters and textbook examples, where they are evident even in translation: question series, insistent second-person address, address that simultaneously insults and compliments, critical or accusatory imperatives, and questions with projected answers. Sonnet 4 amply illustrates the first three:

(3) Unthrifty loveliness, why dost thou spend
Upon thyself thy beauty's legacy?
…
Then, beauteous niggard, why dost thou abuse
The bounteous largess given thee to give?
Profitless usurer, why dost thou use
So great a sum of sums yet canst not live?
…
Then how when nature calls thee to be gone:
What acceptable audit canst thou leave?

(Sonnet 4.1–2, 5–8, 11–12)

For the question series, compare Erasmus, in Thomas Wilson's translation of the letter concerning matrimony:

> *What is more inconsiderate* than under the desire of holiness to eschew that as unholy which God himself … would have to be counted as most holy? *What is more unmanly* than that man should go against the laws of mankind? *What is more unthankful* than to deny that unto younglings, the which (if thou hadst not received of thine elders) thou couldst not have been the man living to have denied it to them?
>
> (Wilson [1560] 1994: 81; emphasis added)

Sonnet 4's insistent use of direct second-person address intensifies the immediacy of the question series, with an in-your-face directness and familiarity that is surprising in address to a nobleman. Erasmus also uses the strategy to intensify the forcefulness of parallel series: "*Do you seek* to be compted more holy than Abraham himself? … *Do you look* to be reckoned more devout than Jacob? … *Will you be taken* for wiser than Solomon? … *Will you be compted* more chaste than Socrates …?" (Wilson [1560] 1994: 88). A third key feature of the question series in Shakespeare's Sonnet 4 is the epithet that half compliments and half insults ("Unthrifty loveliness", "beauteous niggard", "Profitless usurer"). These catch up with greater concision than Erasmus usually manages what is nonetheless probably the most characteristic quality of his familiar style: his version of active or tough love – that is, speaking your affection by daring to speak your criticism. In this spirit, Erasmus's letter manual ([1522] 1985: 169, 85) includes such surprising categories as "friendly consolation with reprimand" or "salutary reproof": "My reproofs were brimming with affection" (Erasmus [1522] 1985: 216) is characteristic of the materials offered to schoolboys for imitation in their letters. And for Erasmus's related practice of insulting namecalling, enlivened with affectionate wit, consider the strategy of his letter to Christian Northoff (1974: 145):

> I shall call you rascal, butcher, gallows-bird, glutton, wretch, scandal, abomination, monster, nightmare, dung, dungheap, plague, ruin, disgrace, slanderer, wastrel, jailer (or rather jail itself), whipping block, kiss-the-rod, and any still more insulting terms I can invent; these, I repeat, are the names I shall use to humiliate you. So you will be forced to write a reply, even while you fume.

Erasmus's familiar style creates its most startling effects by the unmitigated boldness of the writer's direct address. Brash and presumptuous no matter who is being addressed, Erasmus shares with Shakespeare's speaker a fourth

strategy, a habit of levelling critical or accusatory imperatives at his friend. Compare, for example, Shakespeare's "Be not self-willed" (Sonnet 6.13), "Be as thy presence is, gracious and kind" (Sonnet 10.11) to Erasmus's epistolary address: "If … Servatius, dearest of my comrades, you have any regard, I do not say for me, but for yourself … then *listen to my exhortations, shake off sluggishness, strip away all faintheartedness*; *play the man* and, at long last, … *set your hand to the task*" (1974: 21; emphasis added). Here, Erasmus writes in his own person to a young monk of no greater status than himself, but noblemen like his former pupil Lord Mountjoy are not exempt from what we might regard as an "impoliteness script", given the age's habit of registering and reproducing power structures through linguistic deference.

To these effects of brash and direct address by speaker to addressee, Shakespeare adds a fifth strategy related to the addressee to suggest, within this single-voiced conversation, the effect of spoken interaction. Sonnet 2, for example, scripts a question-and-answer session with the addressee:

(4) Then **being asked** where all thy beauty lies,
Where all the treasure of thy lusty days,
To say within thine own deep-sunken eyes
Were an all-eating shame and thriftless praise.
(Sonnet 2.5–8; emphasis added)

The vivid evocation of an interlocutor's responses is a regular feature of Erasmus's epistolary scripts, creating through single-authored written words the impression of spoken conversation or debate. Often these imagined responses take the form of opposing arguments: "'But liberty,' *you will say*, 'is much more pleasant, for whosoever is married weareth fetters upon his legs, or rather carrieth a clog, …' *To this I answer*: I cannot see what pleasure a man shall have to live alone" (Wilson [1560] 1994: 96). Shakespeare's sonnet, of course, complicates and re-accents this basic dialogue pattern, not simply projecting the "*you will say*" of the addressee's anticipated counter-argument but also the "*If thou couldst answer*" of the addressee's hypothetically achieved consent to the speaker's persuasions: "'This fair child of mine / Shall sum my count, and make my old excuse', / Proving his beauty by succession thine" (2.10–12). But Erasmus also offers some vivid evocations of words to be heard in future, post-persuasion scenes: "where you shall have a pretty little boy running up and down your house, such a one as shall express your look and your wife's look, *such a one as shall call you 'Dad' with his sweet lisping words*" ([1522] 1985: 94; emphasis added). Similarly,

Shakespeare's Sonnet 8 invents the future concordant utterance of addressee, imagined wife and child:

(5) Resembling sire and child and happy mother,
Who all in one one pleasing note do sing;
Whose speechless song, being many, seeming one,
Sings this to thee: 'Thou single wilt prove none.'

(Sonnet 8.11–14)

4. Rereading Shakespeare's pronouns

The dialogue script of the early sonnets models the initial relationship not primarily as Petrarchan lover to beloved but instead as humanist poet-tutor offering precepts in a persuasive style of aggressive familiarity to a beautiful aristocratic young patron. Nonetheless, the quotations from Erasmus I have offered thus far do not make an immediately compelling case for the argument that the Erasmian script might explain the sonnets' unexpected *thou* address to one characterized in terms of the trappings of nobility. But the English translations do not faithfully capture the spirit of a style that English schoolboys would have first encountered not in Wilson's translation but in their grammar-school classes in Latin composition. Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis*– widely used in the sixteenth century as a textbook in English grammar schools[9] – makes an explicit and powerful argument against status-based T/V use. Despite the unavoidable Present-day English use of *you* for singular second-person address, Charles Fantazzi's superlative modern translation of Erasmus's diatribe against *vos* address to a single person vividly captures his unforgettable message:

> As for that absurd practice, curiously in vogue now for several centuries, of addressing a single person in the plural, young men should not so much be untaught this vice as encouraged to scorn it altogether … even today a good many users of the *vos* form of address, … not only hang on tenaciously to what they wrongly learnt as boys but also require it of others … They consider it an unforgiveable insult if someone greets them in the singular … 'Why are you thouing me? Thou your servants. I am better than thee and all thy lineage.' Look here, you abomination, do you disdain to be addressed as parasites once addressed their patrons, as freedmen or ordinary labourers once spoke to the greatest monarchs of the earth? And then, how do you yourself call upon almighty God? Why should I not address you as one person when I see only one, even if you were bigger than Polyphemus?
>
> (Erasmus [1522] 1985: 45)

In his argument for resisting the plural form in address to the powerful, with its corresponding reproduction of hierarchy, Erasmus ([1522] 1985: 45) makes it clear that even powerful Caesar was addressed in his own time with the singular pronoun:

> We say to Caesar, ruler of the whole world, 'May the gods prosper thy deeds, O Caesar.' But this curious individual is insulted unless you say 'Success to the deeds of your lordships,' as if we were addressing not a single person but a triform Hecate, or Hermes Trismegistus, or three-bodied Geryon.

It is easy enough to imagine that nothing Erasmus says here about Latin usage in his time translates into any application to pronoun use in Early Modern English, yet it is fascinating to see how in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* subordinates repeatedly say *thou* to Caesar. Artemidorus, reading out loud his own letter to Caesar, warns "Decius Brutus loves *thee* not. *Thou* hast wronged Caius Ligarius" (2.3.3–4; emphasis added), and Metellus, even while abasing himself and expressing deference to Caesar with the superlatives "Most high, most mighty, and most puissant Caesar", follows Erasmus's rule: "Metellus Cimber throws before *thy* seat / An humble heart" (3.1.33–35; emphasis added). Patricia Parker (2003: 39) has explored some of the multilingual aspects of Shakespeare's language use in constructing puns, and this may be another example of how the bilingualism encountered through the educational system could impact in particular instances upon English usage. At the same time, for schoolboys and humanist scholars living within hierarchical societies, there may have had to be a disjunction between speech they could acceptably write and speech they could decorously and acceptably speak, speak without risk. It was primarily in the silent speech of humanist letters where social relationships not fully speakable in the outside world could be fashioned, perhaps even broached to others without the high-risk "fear of trust" (Sonnet 23.5) that would attend love declarations – especially among unequals – in face-to-face conversation. I am arguing that Shakespeare's dialogue script in the first movement of his sonnets, with *thou* address as one of its defining features, imitates and adapts Erasmus's script for an aggressive familiar style, a script Erasmus made imaginable primarily as written currency addressable even to patrons who were social superiors. Although this script is just one tune of his time that Shakespeare catches and varies in the sonnets, it helps to illuminate a level of verbal risk-taking that comes into play at the outset as Shakespeare sets up the same-sex, cross-class intimacy of the primary sonnet relationship.

If the Erasmian script yields the logic of the initiating *thou* address, one has a base from which to interpret the temporary switch to *you* – at the juncture where the private *I* of love disclosures displaces the tutorial *we* of authoritative generalizations.[10] As the speaker becomes more personal, self-asserting, and self-conscious, the conversation, or dialogue of one, changes its tune. To become self-conscious is for the speaker to newly recognize what he is, not in himself, but in relation to the elite and powerful other. The self-asserting *I* weighs himself in Sonnet 17 in relation to "*your* most high deserts" (17.2; emphasis added), and his now status-conscious pronoun choice is an early register of the sonnet sequence's developing thematic concern with the poet-lover's own self-worth and deserving. Finally, in a third phase of this silent conversation of one, we can infer from statements like "I … love and am beloved" (Sonnet 25.13) that the speaker's confessions of love have yielded some signs of reciprocated affection from the other, thus yielding the logic whereby the *thou* of intimacy replaces the *you* of deference.

This reading is an interpretation of context based on a strong consensus about intertextual links between Erasmus's advice on marriage and Shakespeare's Sonnets 1 to 20, but, as a literary critic attuned to the messiness of contexts, I would nonetheless suggest that other interpreters might legitimately construct other relevant contexts. Nonetheless, to assume (without the work of interpretation) a poetic zone of *thou* use independent of the quotidian pragmatics of interaction shaped by historic contexts and influences is to miss out on the vibrant and risk-taking social dialogue of Shakespeare's artistry. It is also, almost inevitably, to misinterpret the linguistic evidence Shakespeare's sonnets may provide about Early Modern English. I am not denying that distinctive scripts associated with a high poetic register may enter into the interplay of relevant historical contexts. I am arguing instead for a mutual dialogue between linguistics and literature that engages both the history of the English language and the history and plurality of its contexts of use.

Notes

1. For important developments and recent overviews, see Brown and Gilman (1989: 176–179), Wales (1983), Hope (1993; 2003: 72–83), Lass (1999: 148–155), and Taavitsainen and Jucker (eds., 2003). Although Brown and Gilman's (1960) theory of pronoun variation in terms of power and solidarity relations between speaker and addressee is a usual reference point for new studies, there

is by no means universal agreement that these factors are basic to the address system in Early Modern English. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2003: 13–15) classify the Early Modern English pronoun system as non-symmetrical (interlocutors need not address each other with the same form) and "retractable" (it is possible to switch between *you* and *thou* use with the same interlocutor), with pronoun shifts, on the one hand, occurring to express transient attitudes and emotions and demanding "micro-pragmatic" analysis and attention to "close context" and, on the other hand, often exhibiting at least some degree of what appears to be "random variation" or "inexplicable fluctuation". Many recent linguistic studies are corpus-based, which allows for relatively comprehensive studies and statistical comparisons across genres, but also poses challenges for attention to "close context". The three recent studies of pronominal address forms in Shakespeare by Busse (2003), Mazzon (2003), and Stein (2003) all offer statistical studies applying some type of norm and deviation approach to the problem of *thou/you* fluctuation. Stein, for example, establishes norms, or unmarked uses, for relational dyads in *King Lear* and *As You Like It* and analyzes deviations, or marked uses, to establish that Shakespeare uses the marked form systematically to express "some sort of emotional value" (2003: 296); as motivation for pronoun switching, Mazzon (2003: 240), like Calvo (1992), emphasizes not only mood but also politeness negotiations.

2. Though I am objecting to one isolated conclusion, Busse's study is one of a number of important recent books by linguists on Early Modern English that crosses over in fruitful ways between linguistic and literary study or makes new research on Early Modern English accessible to literary and cultural critics interested in the possibilities for reconstructing and historicizing the context of the linguistic code. A few other studies of this kind include Fitzmaurice (2002), which introduces linguistic methods for the close analysis, for example, of intersubjectivity in Early Modern letters that might be potentially fruitful for literary analysis; reference works such as Hope (2003) and Lass (ed., 1999), which make up-to-date knowledge about the linguistic code widely available; corpus-based studies of generic conventions such as Taavitsainen (1997), which compares verbal representations of personal affect in literary and non-literary genres; and corpus-based studies in historical sociolinguistics such as Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg (1996, 2003), which examine sociohistorical contexts for linguistic variation and change. To some extent, the closer rapprochement between linguistics and literary studies results from an increasing attention to historical context in each field. At the same time, the considerable disciplinary differences between linguistics and literary studies in the conventions for structuring studies, citing previous research, treating data, and judging what constitutes valuable results still militate against linguists writing for literary scholars and vice versa.
3. On the poetic or literary register of *thou* selection, see Gurr (1982: 13–25) and Busse (2002: 98).

4. On the many different levels of message construction in which the complexities of social relationships are inscribed in Shakespeare's works, see Magnusson (1999: 2).
5. The table is reproduced in a slightly adapted form from Jones (1981: 83). Jones includes the third-person pronoun *she* (or *he*) in his tabulation, which brings out a striking difference between most other Elizabethan sequences and Shakespeare's Sonnets: their frequent use of indirect reference to the beloved using the third person as opposed to Shakespeare's strong preference for second-person direct address.
6. Quote from the call for papers for the 2003 MLA conference session organized by Elizabeth Traugott and Susan Fitzmaurice for the Linguistic Theory Division.
7. For more on these dialogic aspects of Shakespeare's Sonnets, including dialogic scripts related to service, see Magnusson (1999: 35–57; 2004) and Schalkwyk (2002). Magnusson (1999: 61–74) also discusses interaction scripts for social transformation in Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis*, but without exploring specific links to Shakespeare.
8. Baldwin (1950: 183–185) identified the epistle of Erasmus as setting the convention Shakespeare follows; Wilson (1974: 146–167) analyzed specific themes and passages that Shakespeare imitated or, in her reading, parodied; and later editors of the sonnets from Booth (1977: 135) onward have tended to repeat or elaborate these intertextual connections.
9. Baldwin (1944: especially vol. 1, 210, 299, 305–306, 312, 348–349 and vol. 2, 239–252 and 269–287).
10. This argument presupposes a planned order for Sonnets 1 to 20, whereas it is not certain that Shakespeare either authorized the publication or organized the sequence of the 1609 edition of the Sonnets. As Gurr (1982: 13) suggests, however, the organization of the first movement of the sonnets is seldom contested, since the repeated and rhetorically varied advice to the young man to marry obviously unifies the group.

References

Adamson, Sylvia
1998 The code as context: Language-change and (mis)interpretation. In *Context in Language Learning and Language Understanding*, Kirsten Malmkjær and John Williams (eds.), 137–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail M.
1981 Discourse in the novel. In *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*, Michael Holquist (ed.), Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (trans.), 259–422. Austin: University of Texas Press.

1986 The problem of speech genres. In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, Vern W. McGee (trans.), Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (eds.), 60–102. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Baldwin, Thomas Whitfield

1944 *William Shakspere's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*. 2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

1950 *On the Literary Genetics of Shakspere's Poems & Sonnets*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Booth, Stephen

1977 *Shakespeare's Sonnets*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Brown, Roger, and Albert Gilman

1960 The pronouns of power and solidarity. In *Style in Language*, Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.), 253–276. New York: MIT Press.

1989 Politeness theory and Shakespeare's four major tragedies. *Language in Society* 18: 159–212.

Busse, Ulrich

2002 *Linguistic Variation in the Shakespeare Corpus: Morpho-syntactic Variability of Second Person Pronouns*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 106.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

2003 The co-occurrence of nominal and pronominal address forms in the Shakespeare Corpus: Who says *thou* or *you* to whom? In Taavitsainen and Jucker (eds.), 193–221.

Calvo, Clara

1992 Pronouns of address in *As You Like It*. *Language and Literature* 1: 5–27.

Erasmus, Desiderius

1522 *On the Writing of Letters* (*De conscribendis epistolis*). Reprinted in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, Vol. 25, Jesse K. Sowards (ed.), Charles Fantazzi (trans.), 10–254. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

1974 *Collected Works of Erasmus*, Vol. 1: *The Correspondence of Erasmus*. Roger A. B. Mynors and Douglas F. S. Thomson (trans.), Wallace K. Ferguson (annotator). Toronto/Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

Fitzmaurice, Susan M.

2002 *The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English: A Pragmatic Approach*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 95.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Gurr, Andrew

1982 You and thou in Shakespeare's Sonnets. *Essays in Criticism* 32: 9–25.

Hope, Jonathan

1993 Second person singular pronouns in records of Early Modern 'spoken' English. *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 94: 83–101.

1999 Shakespeare's 'Natiue English'. In *A Companion to Shakespeare*, David Scott Kastan (ed.), 239–255. Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell.
2003 *Shakespeare's Grammar*. London: Arden Shakespeare.

Jardine, Lisa
1996 Reading and the technology of textual affect: Erasmus's familiar letters and Shakespeare's *King Lear*. In *Reading Shakespeare Historically*, 78–97. London/New York: Routledge.

Jones, G. P.
1981 You, thou, he or she? The master-mistress in Shakespearian and Elizabethan sonnet sequences. *Cahiers Élisabéthains* 19: 73–84.

Jucker, Andreas H., and Irma Taavitsainen
2003 Diachronic perspectives on address term systems: Introduction. In Taavitsainen and Jucker (eds.), 1–26.

Lass, Roger
1999 Phonology and morphology. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. III: *1476–1776*, Roger Lass (ed.), 56–186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lass, Roger (ed.)
1999 *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. III: *1476–1776*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Magnusson, Lynne
1999 *Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2004 Shakespeare's Sonnets: A modern perspective. In William Shakespeare, *The Sonnets*, Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (eds.), 355–369. (The New Folger Library.) New York/London: Washington Square Press.

Mazzon, Gabriella
2003 Pronouns and nominal address in Shakespearean English: A socio-affective marking system in transition. In Taavitsainen and Jucker (eds.), 223–249.

Nevalainen, Terttu, and Helena Raumolin-Brunberg
1996 *Sociolinguistics and Language History: Studies Based on the Corpus of Early English Correspondence*. Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi.
2003 *Historical Sociolinguistics: Language Change in Tudor and Stuart England*. (Longman Linguistics Library.) London: Longman, Pearson Education.

Parker, Patricia
2003 (Peter) Quince: Love potions, carpenter's coigns and Athenian weddings. *Shakespeare Survey* 56: 39–54.

Schalkwyk, David
2002 *Speech and Performance in Shakespeare's Sonnets and Plays*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shakespeare, William
1997 *The Norton Shakespeare Based on the Oxford Edition*. Stephen Greenblatt (general ed.). New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Stein, Dieter
2003 Pronominal usage in Shakespeare: Between sociolinguistics and conversation analysis. In Taavitsainen and Jucker (eds.), 251–307.
Taavitsainen, Irma
1997 Genre conventions: Personal affect in fiction and non-fiction in Early Modern English. In *English in Transition: Corpus-based Studies in Linguistic Variation and Genre Styles*, Matti Rissanen, Merja Kytö, and Kirsi Heikkonen (eds.), 185–266. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Taavitsainen, Irma, and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.)
2003 *Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 107.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Vendler, Helen
1997 *The Art of Shakespeare's Sonnets*. Cambridge, Mass./London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Vološinov, Valentin N.
1986 Verbal interaction. In *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik (trans.), 83–98. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Wales, Kathleen M.
1983 *Thou* and *you* in Early Modern English: Brown and Gilman re-appraised. *Studia Linguistica* 37: 107–125.
Wilson, Katharine M.
1974 *Shakespeare's Sugared Sonnets*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Wilson, Thomas
1560 *The Art of Rhetoric*. Peter E. Medine (ed.). University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994.

Developing a more detailed picture of the English courtroom (1640–1760): Data and methodological issues facing historical pragmatics

Dawn Archer

1. Introduction

Existing linguistic research relating to the historical courtroom tends to concentrate on a few well-known trials (the most popular being the Salem Witchcraft Trials of 1692) and/or one aspect of the interaction (e.g. the judges' use of questions). Consequently, anyone interested in the discursive practices of the historical courtroom in a more general sense has been reliant on the work of historians (e.g. Beattie 1986, 1991; Langbein 1978, 1999; Landsman 1990). This is not meant to imply that historical studies have nothing to offer linguists interested in the historical courtroom, for the reverse is true. By way of illustration, historical studies relating to the English courtroom (1660–1800) have revealed that judges were the primary examiners and that defendants were responsible for their own defence – and, as such, were allowed to ask questions of witnesses (cf. Beattie 1986: 345). The above studies also describe how defendants were severely hampered in their cause by the Court's assumption that any defendant who was innocent ought to be able to demonstrate it to the jury (cf. Beattie 1986: 341; Langbein 1999: 315). In simple terms, there was no presumption of innocence in the English historical courtroom (Beattie 1991: 222), as there is in today's courtroom (but see the work of Harris [1984]). In addition, several of the studies highlight what has been described as the "flowering of the art of interrogation" after the introduction of the lawyers in the 1730–1740s (cf. Langbein 1978: 312). What these and similar historical studies do not explain, however, is what the newly emerging interrogation strategies (or counter-strategies) actually entailed in linguistic terms.

Although a lack of linguistic information in history-oriented accounts of the English courtroom may be understandable, it is worth remembering that the law courts were as reliant upon language then as they are today (cf. Tiersma 2000; Mellinkoff 1963: vi). Given this reliance on language, it is my

contention that linguistic-oriented research still has an important role to play if we are to fully appreciate the dynamics of the historical courtroom. Indeed, one of the aims of this chapter is to show how we can identify the discursive practices of specific participant groups (judges, defendants, witnesses, lawyers) via a systematic assessment of the speech acts typically utilised by them when involved in certain dyadic interactions in the courtroom (cf. judge-witness, judge-defendant and judge-lawyer). Moreover, if we develop a more detailed picture of the English courtroom in all its guises (state, ordinary, military, etc.), we can also identify any changes to those practices over time. Consequently, a second aim is to demonstrate how we might develop a more detailed picture of the English courtroom (1640–1760), by adopting a multidisciplinary approach: that is to say, continue to draw from the work of historians, whilst also engaging in linguistic research that pays attention to the discursive strategies of different participant groups in different types of trial across different time periods. A third aim is to demonstrate how the "quantitative" type of approach I am advocating can also be used to establish a "norm" against which we can measure the "(a)typicality" of (historical) trials.

At various points in this chapter, I will also address some of the issues that complicate the study of texts produced in periods distant from our own (see also Taavitsainen and Fitzmaurice, Chapter 1). By way of illustration, whilst historical courtroom transcripts are closer to spoken language than other written texts (Biber and Finegan 1992: 689), they do not mimic their spoken originals in all respects – even when they claim to be "verbatim" accounts. Indeed, Kytö and Walker (2003: 228–230) suggest that transcribed texts should be regarded as being particularly subject to (conscious or inadvertent) interference throughout their production process. This, in turn, highlights the importance of choosing "quality" sources and avoiding "bad" data when investigating the historical courtroom (Kytö and Walker 2003: 231). Consequently, I begin this chapter with an assessment of the different courtroom records that are available for the Early Modern English period in the following section, and then go on to catalogue a number of studies that have drawn from these sources, with varying success, in section 3.

2. An assessment of historical courtroom data

The biggest source of English historical courtroom data are the many extant court records in library archives throughout the country and, in particular, in the Public Record Office. That said, there are some practical concerns that

tend to complicate their utilisation, including accessibility issues and their hard-copy (as opposed to electronic) form, to name but two. Length constraints prevent an in-depth analysis of all these sources here. The following should therefore be regarded as a summary of the most accessible.

The State Trials (1163–1858)

The best example of trial texts in quantitative terms is the *State Trials*. First published in 1719, Salmon's edition was later revised and expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by various editors, including Hargrave (1776–1781) and Howell (1809–1826).[1] The various *State Trials* contain accounts of criminal proceedings from Norman down through Stuart and, in later editions, Georgian times. However, in important respects they are unreliable:

(i) They have been retrospectively compiled – the compilers patching together their accounts of trials in former centuries from a variety of sources, many now suspect (primarily because they are the work of non-professional scribes), including manuscripts of doubtful provenance, lay chronicles, pamphlets and tracts (Langbein 1978: 265).

(ii) During the Tudor-Stuart period especially, there is evidence to suggest that compilers gave preference to sources with a Puritan and Whig bias (see Clark 1967: 92–114). According to Langbein (1978: 265), however, the reliability of the trial reports reprinted in the *State Trials* improves towards the end of the seventeenth century, as a result of the increasing use of shorthand and/or professional scribes, and the speed at which the scribes' work was written up and published in pamphlet editions.[2]

(iii) The *State Trials* is not representative of the ordinary criminal trial, as in most cases the documented court cases involved high politics, although they do contain the odd case of witchcraft, bigamy, homicide, etc., from the mid-seventeenth century onwards. These cases were probably chronicled because of the sensational nature of the crime or the notable status of the defendant. However, there are no cases of "ordinary" crimes such as sheep stealing. Although this last point might not seem overly problematic, it is indicative of the political bent of the editors (Whigs) and their "gentile, predominantly non-lawyer readership", according to Langbein (1978: 266).

The Salem Witchcraft Trials (1692)

Boyer and Nissenbaum's (1977) three-volume *Salem Witchcraft Papers* contains many of the primary documents relating to what is the most documented speech event of the Early Modern English period. Moreover, much of the primary data contained within the collection (i) adopts a direct question-and-answer format resembling modern stenographic trial transcripts, and (ii) is supplemented by a wealth of historical commentary detailing how a seemingly insignificant village "witchcraft" outbreak led to the largest witch trial in America. Like the *State Trials*, however, it cannot be taken to be representative of the courtroom of the Early Modern English period as a whole, as it relates to a specific crime – witchcraft – at a specific time. Its setting – America – also has to be taken into consideration.[3] An additional "problem" for some historians and historical linguists is the accuracy and arrangement of the *Salem Witchcraft Papers*. A new project headed by Professor Rosenthal is therefore underway to produce a chronologically (as opposed to alphabetically) organised edition that includes Salem-related material that has come to light over the past twenty years.

The Pendle Witch Trials (1613)

Thomas Potts's *The Wonderfvll Discoverie of Witches in the Covntie of Lancaster* (1613) offers a similar, although less documented example of a single speech event. However, like the *Salem Witchcraft Papers*, this account is also problematic, not least because, although the title page claims that the accounts of trials and depositions within are "truly reported", it was commissioned by the judges of the trials and, ultimately, by James I himself, who was a strong believer in witchcraft. Moreover, the *Wonderfvll Discoverie* contains evidence to suggest that Potts may have constructed the work – and, indeed, the judges may have conducted their trials – to reinforce the king's own writings on the subject (e.g. his *Daemonologie*, published in 1597).[4]

The Old Bailey Sessions Papers (1674–1834)

The earliest *Old Bailey Sessions Papers* resemble an earlier genre of literature, the "crime" chapbook. They are, therefore, little more than "sensation-mongering pamphlets written by non-lawyers, usually anonymously, for sale to the general public", according to Langbein (1978: 267). And, even when their format and function changes over the next 250-year period (initially to newspaper and then to true law report), they remain problematic, as they

tend to tell us very little about individual trials (Langbein 1978: 267, 269). In other words, they are summaries rather than detailed trial transcripts with a question-and-answer format (although some dating from the 1730s do adopt the latter form). Even so, the *Old Bailey Sessions Papers* are regarded by some as "probably the best accounts we shall ever have of what transpired in ordinary English criminal courts before the later eighteenth century" (Langbein 1978: 271), which may help to explain why a project has been undertaken to make digital images of the Old Bailey trials available online (see http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ for details).

The Corpus of English Dialogues (1560–1760)

Compiled by Merja Kytö and Jonathan Culpeper of the universities of Uppsala (Sweden) and Lancaster (England) respectively, the *Corpus of English Dialogues* covers a two-hundred-year time span divided into forty-year intervals, and consists of more than one million words of "authentic" and constructed imaginary speech drawn from five text types (prose fiction, comedy drama, courtroom proceedings, witness depositions and handbooks in dialogue form). The trial section of the *Corpus of English Dialogues* consists of 302,027 words and, like the *State Trials*, brings together some of the many extant texts lying in libraries and record offices. However, although there is some overlap with the *State Trials* in regard to the trials represented, the *Corpus of English Dialogues* is very different in other respects. First, it adopts an electronic format, and thus, in conjunction with the computer, potentially provides a much more systematic approach to the analysis of language (Leech 1997). Second, only trial texts with publication dates within 40 years (typically, within a few years) of the speech event they represent are used to ensure that they reflect contemporary usage (cf. the *State Trials*, which draws on later imprints that are potentially susceptible to the influence of usage current at the time of their [re]production). Third, the trial texts resemble modern stenographic trial transcripts (in other words, obvious scribal interference – including tense shifts to the third person – have been kept to a minimum). Fourth, many of the texts have been rigorously checked against related data (i.e. manuscripts, alternative contemporary accounts, etc.).[5] Fifth, a sub-section of the *Corpus of English Dialogues* (trial and drama texts dating from 1640 to 1760) has been annotated to enable the systematic retrieval of appropriate contextual information regarding the speaker *and* addressee(s)' *role, status, age* and *gender* at the *level of the utterance*. I provide a summary of that annotated sub-section in section 5.1.

3. A brief review of existing research

Existing studies relating to the historical courtroom of the Early Modern English period tend to draw on one or more of the above sources, the most popular source being that of the Salem Witchcraft Trials (see, for example, Hiltunen 1996; Archer 2002; Doty and Hiltunen 2002). These Salem studies provide some illuminating insights, most notable of which is the Salem examiners' obsessive belief in the guilt of the accused. As previously noted, an initial presumption of guilt was a common feature of the English historical courtroom (see section 1). But the Salem examiners did not merely present defendants with evidence that they would have to counter in order to prove their innocence – they sought to cause the accused to abandon their own "innocent and therefore *unable* to confess" perspectives in favour of the examiners' "guilty but *unwilling* to confess" perspective (see section 5.3 and also Archer 2002). Other reasons for considering the Salem data to be atypical of the English historical courtroom as a whole include the fact that it represents (i) a single speech event, and (ii) a very specific type of trial (that of witchcraft), which occurred in Massachusetts, America (albeit when she was a colony).

Studies relating to (non-witchcraft) English trials have been undertaken. Two of the most notable are Kryk-Kastovsky's (2000) examination of two trials from the *State Trials*, both of which occurred in 1685 (*Titus Oates*; *Lady Alice Lisle*), and Culpeper and Kytö's (2000) examination of four trial texts from the pilot version of the *Corpus of English Dialogues*, whose trial dates fall between a twenty-year period at the close of the seventeenth century (*Robert Green, Henry Berry & Lawrence Hill* 1679; *Lady Alice Lisle* 1685; *Charles Lord Mohun* 1692; *Haagen Swendson* 1702). As with the Salem studies, the English studies provide some useful insights. By way of illustration, the above studies suggest that questioning was as central to courtroom discourse in the late seventeenth century as it is today – "not only in terms of frequency, but also as a way of controlling the discourse" (Culpeper and Kytö 2000: 62). Moreover, Culpeper and Kytö (2000) suggest that judges treated male and female witnesses differently, allotting them different conversational roles. The female witnesses, for example, were often constructed as "crime narrative givers", and "prompted" to provide quite extensive answers to the judges' questions. In contrast, the male witnesses were "encouraged" to provide minimum responses – and those responses were more frequently challenged than was the case with female witnesses. As the coverage of the English studies is quite limited (i.e. 1679–1702), however, we should seek to corroborate such findings, rather than assume that they are representative of the historical courtroom as a whole.

4. Developing a more detailed picture of the courtroom: The historians' contribution

One way of corroborating the findings of existing linguistic research is to draw from the findings of historians. Let us consider the Trial of Titus Oates (1685), for example. Kryk-Kastovsky (2000) suggests that Oates's trial was unusual because Oates represented himself. Yet, historians would probably argue that it was the *extent* of Oates's participation rather than his lack of counsel that sets Oates's trial apart from other trials of the Early Modern English period. Indeed, defendants facing charges of perjury were not regularly represented by counsel until the mid-eighteenth century.[6] Consequently, they were largely responsible for demonstrating their innocence to the jury and/or judge, usually by the quality and character of their replies to the prosecutors' evidence (Beattie 1986: 341). That said, evidence from the Surrey Assizes during 1660 to 1800 suggests that most defendants said very little by and large, and when they did speak, they tended to rely on simple denials of having anything to do with whatever was alleged against them, or ineffective comments that seemed to hamper rather than benefit their cause (Beattie 1986: 350). Yet, Oates was responsible for 15.8 per cent of the total turns during his trial.[7] Moreover, the fact that many of these turns initiated a new exchange or continued an existing exchange by means of a question suggests that he made the most of his right to query/challenge evidence previously given by prosecution witnesses.

5. (In)validating existing research via further research

Although historians such as Beattie and Langbein provide us with important insights in respect to the English courtroom (1660–1800), they tend to "overrely" on the Old Bailey and the Surrey Assizes, according to Cairns (1998). They also tend to point out general trends without explaining what those trends actually entailed in linguistic terms. I have therefore undertaken my own study of the English courtroom (1640–1760), drawing on the trial texts of the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* (the name given to the annotated sub-section of the *Corpus of English Dialogues*: see section 5.1, following, for description). As these texts are drawn from a number of sources (e.g. Treason trials, Sessions of Oyer and Terminer, and Old Bailey sessions), they provide us with a useful tool with which to (in)validate previous research (linguistic and historical). For example, in Archer (2005), I have shown that defence lawyers

were active prior to the 1730s and 1740s (cf. Beattie's [1986] study of the Surrey Assizes and Langbein's [1978] study of the *Old Bailey Sessions*),[8] and that their appearance coincided with changes in courtroom procedure: defendants began to leave their defence to counsel; judges questioned witnesses and defendants less in the eighteenth century than they had in the seventeenth, and adopted more of a presiding role; lawyers became more involved in the examination procedure; witnesses faced increasingly "adversarial" questioning strategies (i.e. they had their evidence contradicted, and their credibility questioned), and began to adopt defensive counter-strategies.

As I have highlighted the emergence of increasingly "adversarial" questioning strategies, I should point out a further criticism made by Cairns (1998: 36), namely, that historians have simplified the emergence of the modern trial, by giving the impression that it was "an inevitable development rushing to completion". Indeed, Cairns (1998: 4) maintains that the criminal trial only achieved its modern adversarial form after the Prisoner's Counsel Act of 1836 removed what he calls "the felony counsel restriction", and after the "capital felony process" was slackened. The former prevented defence counsels from making an opening address to the jury, and the latter advocated capital punishment for serious and minor crimes alike. Cairns also believes that historians have introduced "present concerns" into their historical analyses, by assuming that eighteenth-century procedure was inferior, because of "falling short of the standards of the late twentieth century", for example. Cairns' point about modern concerns biasing historical accounts also applies to using modern techniques to study historical data. However, as section 5.1 (following) will reveal, the "answer" to such "problems" is not to abandon the use of modern techniques, but to be sensitive to the socio-historical context (Jacobs and Jucker 1995: 19), so that we investigate language use in a way that takes account of the cognitive, social and cultural contexts affecting the interaction: Birnbaum (1985: 171–172) likens this to "transport[ing] oneself, as it were, into the very milieu in which [the texts] were produced, reproduced and read" (cited in Collins 2000: 18).[9]

5.1. A description of the trial section of the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* (1640–1760)

The *Sociopragmatic Corpus* contains sixteen trial texts, which cover three of the five periods of the *Corpus of English Dialogues* (i.e. 1640–1679, 1680–1719 and 1720–1760). As such, the texts account for a decent portion of the

Early Modern English period. Importantly, they also represent a number of crimes, including robbery, forgery, treason and attempted murder (see Table 1 below).

Table 1. The trial section of the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*

Period	Trial of …	Crime of which accused	Place	Date of trial
3 = 1640–1679	Connor Lord Macguire	Rioting/enticing rebellion in Ireland (treason)	Old Bailey	10.02.1644
	King Charles I	High treason	Westminster Hall	20.01.1649–27.01.1649
	H. Slingsby, Dr. J. Hewet, J. Mordant	High treason (against L. Protector and Commonwealth)	Westminster Hall	25.05.1658, 01.06.1658
	Sir Waller, Harrison, Heveningham, Martin, Millington, Tichborn, Roe, Lilburn, Peters	Treason	Hick's Hall, Middlesex	Oct 1660
	Mary Moders	Bigamy	Old Bailey	04.06.1663
	Edward Coleman	Conspiring the death of the King, And the subversion of the Govt Of England and the Protestant Religion (treason)	King's Bench	27.11.1678
4 = 1680–1719	Elizabeth Cellier	Treason	King's Bench	11.06.1680
	John Giles	Attempted murder of John Arnold	Old Bailey	14.07.1680
	Nathaniel Thompson, John Farewell, William Pain	Writing and publishing scandalous letters to Mr. M. Prance	Guild Hall	20.06.1682
	Ambrose Rookwood	Conspiracy to assassin. King William	Westminster Hall	21.04.1696
	Francis Francia	High treason	Old Bailey	22.01.1716

Period	Trial of ...	Crime of which accused	Place	Date of trial
5 = 1720–1760	Christopher Layer	High treason	High Bench, Westminster	1722
	William Sloper	Two Causes, between Teophilus Cibber, Gent. Plaintiff, and William Sloper, Esq. Defendant, the first for criminal conversation, the second for detaining the plaintiff's wife	King's Bench	05.12.1738
	Bartholomew Greenwood	Robbing Mr. Roger Wheatly near Camberwell	Surrey Assizes	02.08.1740
	Captain Ambrose	Enquiry into conduct whilst engaged in combat at sea	On board ship[s]	Oct/Nov 1745
	William Baker	Forgery	Old Bailey	Dec 1750

This means that the trial texts within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* are potentially more representative of the English historical courtroom than (i) texts taken purely from the *State Trials* or the Surrey Assizes, (ii) texts whose coverage of the Early Modern English period is limited to a few years, and (iii) texts that relate to a specific crime (cf. *The Salem Witchcraft Papers*).

An additional strength in linguistic terms is the annotation that has been added to the texts (see Archer and Culpeper 2003; Archer 2005). Length constraints prevent my describing the schemes in detail. Suffice it to say, Archer and Culpeper's (2003) tagging scheme identifies the *gender*, *role*, *status* and *age* of both speaker and hearer(s), at the level of the utterance.[10] In the following utterance, for example, a male prosecution lawyer, identified as "s4tfranc001", is interacting with a male witness, identified as "s4tfranc003". The speaker's status is that of "gentleman" and the addressee's status is that of "commoner". The speaker is also older than the addressee, i.e. over the age of 45 as opposed to between the ages of 15–44 (see Archer and Culpeper [2003] for a complete breakdown of the various categories):

<u speaker= “s” spid= “s4tfranc001” spsex= “m” sprole1= “v” spstatus= “1” spage= “9” addressee= “s” adid= “s4tfranc003” adrole1= “w” adstatus= “4” adage= “8”>Look upon this Book; Is this the Book?<u>

As modern sociological categories are not applicable, and the possibility of asking participants is not available, we engaged in a considerable amount of socio-historical research to ensure that the *gender*, *status* and *age* fields (and the values they subsume) reflect the society of Early Modern England. The *status* field, for example, is based on rank, estate or sort, in order to reflect the way in which Early Modern English contemporaries (e.g. Wilson 1600; King 1695) spoke about status. Similarly, the *age* category gives a general indication of a participant’s age rather than a specific age, as conceptions of age were not based on an exact numerical figure at this time, but on factors such as physical appearance and seniority in a profession (e.g. a judge was highly likely to be 45+). Sociological variables such as *gender*, *status* and *age* are relatively static, of course, and thus could have been accounted for in the header of a particular computerised text. However, the *role* variable necessitates capturing speaker and addressee characteristics at the utterance level, as participants can switch from one role to another, depending on the context and/or their interlocutor(s): in one of the trial texts in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*, Mary Moders switched from “defendant” to “wife” when talking to her “husband” during a brief pause in her bigamy trial.[11]

The scheme I develop in Archer (2005) captures the *form* (i.e. the lexical, grammatical and prosodic aspect), *force* (i.e. the speech act aspect) and *interactional intent* (i.e. the discoursal aspect) of the speaker(s)’ utterances, that is, what the speaker said, what the speaker intended by what s/he said and how the utterance related to the rest of the discourse. The *form* field is relatively self-explanatory, constituting the range of question-types (e.g. yes-no, disjunctive, wh-, negative polar, etc.) used in the English historical courtroom. The *interactional intent* field relates to the position an utterance occupies in the discourse, and its (interactional/organisational/ structural) purpose. As such, it reveals the influence of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) and Stenström (1984). Possible values include:

initiation	= initiating a new exchange by means of an eliciting device. Prototypical examples: question, request, requirement.
response	= providing information that has been directly elicited by another participant, usually by responding verbally. Prototypical examples: answer, acceptance, refusal, denial.

response-initiation	= responding to a direct elicitation of another participant by using/and following it with an eliciting device. Prototypical examples: an answer immediately followed by a request.
report	= stating information which has not been directly elicited by another participant. Prototypical examples: statement, explanation.
follow up	= providing follow-up/feedback to a preceding utterance in some way. Prototypical examples: comment, evaluation.
follow up-initiation	= providing follow-up/feedback to a preceding utterance by using/and following it with an eliciting device. Prototypical examples: a comment immediately followed by a question.

The extract below, taken from the Trial of Giles (1680), provides an illustration of all but the "response-initiation" value. The recorder (a type of judge) was questioning a witness (Elizabeth Crook). When she contradicted evidence given by an earlier witness (William Richmond), that witness intervened. Shortly after, other participants also became involved. They included the King's Counsel:

Record.	You made the Bed, did not you?	[initiation]
Crook	I did.	[response]
Recorder	Upon your Oath, what time of Night was it?	[follow up-initiation]
Crook	I think it was nearer Eleven than Ten.	[response]
[text omitted]		
Kings Coun.	What time of Night was it that he was making love to you?	[initiation]
Crook	I think about Ten a Clock.	[response]
Kings Coun.	Time passed merrily away with you then.	[follow up]
Rich.	It was Twelve a Clock.	[report]

The *interactional intent* field ensures that (i) I do not confuse turns (i.e. what a speaker says as long as s/he holds the floor) with what the speaker *actually does in a turn*, so that (ii) I can account for those instances *when the speaker does more than one thing in the same turn*, such as responding to given information and immediately eliciting new information (see Stenström 1984: 83). The scheme is such that I can also determine the level of interaction of each participant group in the English historical courtroom (see sections 5.2–5.4).

As far as the *force* field is concerned, I take inspiration from Searle (1969, 1975) and Wierzbicka (1987).[12] However, my approach is not a strict lexical classification of so-called illocutionary verbs or Searlean speech acts. Rather, I assign utterances to one (or more) of seven macro categories (see below), which I view as "reasonably accurate approximations of the prototypical instances of verbal behaviour describable by means of the English verbs used as labels" (Verschueren 1999: 131–132):

counsel	S wants to convey something to A which will help prevent/result in Y [= an event not in A's best interest], e.g. "My advise to you is, that you would put your self upon your Tryal [sic]."
question	S wants A to supply a missing variable by saying/confirming/ clarifying something about X [= an action/event/behaviour/ person], e.g. "Shall I withdraw?"
request	S wants Z [= an action/event] to happen and hopes to do it/get A to do (or get others to do) it, e.g. "I do humbly move, that I may have time allowed me by this court to send for my Witnesses."
require	S wants (and expects) A to do something, even though A may be reluctant, or to do something him/herself, in spite of A's (probable) reluctance, e.g. "My Lord, I demand this, to hear the Commission read."
sentence	S wants to signal a legal decision to A/others (that A is (i) being formally indicted, (ii) to be legitimately punished for, or (iii) being released from the threat of legal punishment), e.g. "… *this Court doth adjudg, That the said* Charls Stuart, *as a Tyrant, Traytor, Murtherer, and a publique Enemy, shall be put to Death, by the severing his Head from his Body* [sic]."
express	S wants A (and others) to know his feelings (about X) and/or cause the action or behaviour to stop, e.g. "The L. *Fingshall* is a Papist, and *Clamorris* a pestiferous Papist!"
inform	S wants to communicate something (about X) to A, e.g. "We will now call Mr. *Buckley*."

Put simply, the above macro-categories are designed to capture "neighbouring speech acts", that is to say, speech acts that interface with one another (cf. Jucker and Taavitsainen's [2000: 70] notion of "pragmatic space"). Thus, the "counsel" macro-category subsumes "caution", "warn", "threaten", "compel", "advise", and so forth, and the "question" macro-category subsumes "ask (about)",

"inquire (into)", "interrogate", "query", and so forth. Moreover, rather than assuming that the illocutionary force of a particular "verbal action category" (e.g. "question", "request") existed as a language function during the period under investigation (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000: 70), I have sought to ensure contextual/historical relevance by (i) drawing and/or constructing these categories from my historical courtroom data, and (ii) corroborating them utilising the *Oxford English Dictionary* and other historical corpora/dictionaries (for example, the *Early Modern English Dictionaries Database*). This is not meant to imply that I am wholly reliant on explicit performatives. On the contrary, as I am interested in "speech acts" as functional units – and "speech acts as functional units do not correspond directly to speech act verbs" (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000: 70) – I utilise evidence of all "speech act" phenomena (direct and indirect). As the force of some utterances can/may remain indeterminate (because of contextual factors such as status, power and discourse sequencing, for example), my design also allows for the inclusion of multiple and, indeed, indeterminate forces (by using the "m" and "p" values respectively).[13]

Information regarding the force of an utterance and the roles of the interlocutors is especially useful when investigating the historical courtroom, as we have a means of systematically assessing the relationship between speaker(s)' use of questions and answers (and other speech acts) and the role(s) assigned to them – and to their addressee(s) – by the activity-type. Put simply, we can identify the discursive practices of various courtroom participants, and, because of the coverage of the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data, any changes to those practices as the Early Modern English period progressed (see section 5). As length constraints prevent a detailed analysis of all of the relevant practices here, I will focus primarily on the discursive practices of the judges for the remainder of this chapter. In particular, I will show how the judges' interaction with defendants differed from their interaction with witnesses, and how the judges' interaction with witnesses differed, in turn, from lawyers' interaction with witnesses. I will also argue that the arrival/greater involvement of the lawyers during the Early Modern English period seemed to lead to new practices for both themselves and the judges.

5.2. The discourse practices of the judges

Judges today play an extremely significant role in judicial proceedings – they are responsible for managing the day-to-day running of the trial. Indeed, they have "the freedom to address all members of the courtroom cast" (e.g. law-

yers, witnesses, jury, public gallery, etc.), and "restrict the turns of these participants" (Cotterill 2003: 93). The *Sociopragmatic Corpus* trial texts reveal that judges also played a prominent role in trials of the Early Modern English period. However, unlike judges involved in the Anglo-American adversarial system today, they were heavily involved in the examination (and cross-examination) of witnesses and defendants. This helps to explain why the judges were the most active questioners in the period 1640–1679, and the third most active questioners in the trial section of the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* overall (1640–1760). Indeed, they addressed 314 questions to their interlocutors during the period 1640–1760 (see unshaded section of Table 2), 127 of which were utilised during the period 1640–1679 (see shaded section of Table 2).

Given the judges' involvement in the questioning of witnesses and defendants, it is not surprising that "questions" should be their most frequent eliciting move. Indeed, they account for 71.5 per cent of the judges' (re)initiations, by which I mean those turns that initiated a new exchange or continued an existing exchange. However, like today's judges, judges of the Early Modern English period also utilised a number of other eliciting devices, most notably, the "require" (see Table 2).

Table 2. Eliciting devices utilised in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*, and their frequency (according to role type) (Quest. = Question, Rqst. = Request, Rqre. = Require, Couns. = Counsel)

	Period 3 (1640–1679) Total no. of (re)initiations = 514				Periods 3–5 (1640–1760) Total no. of (re)initiations = 2,120			
ROLE	Quest.	Rqst.	Rqre.	Couns.	Quest.	Rqst.	Rqre.	Couns.
Prosecution	28	20	10	7	351	43	59	9
Judge	**127**	**1**	**62**	**17**	**314**	**3**	**103**	**19**
Court examiner	44	0	1	0	388	0	3	0
Defendant	19	103	10	2	185	116	19	2
Defence counsel	–	–	–	–	251	24	29	3
Recorder	3	1	1	0	91	1	6	0
Court official	32	0	16	0	32	0	16	0
Witness	0	0	0	0	7	3	0	0
Jury	3	1	0	0	4	2	0	0
Others	2	2	1	1	10	2	24	1
TOTAL	258	128	101	27	1,633	194	259	34
(%)	(50.2)	(25.0)	(19.6)	(5.2)	(77.0)	(9.2)	(12.2)	(1.6)

Some of these "requires" sought to silence defendants, e.g. "You may answer in your time, hear the *Court* first …" (Trial of Charles, 1649). Others "required" that defendants answer the charge put to them, e.g. "you must plead guilty or not guilty" (Trial of Robert Tichborn, 1658).

Cotterill (2003: 101) suggests that the "right to use such forms is symbolic of the judge's power and influence in [the modern] court, and specifically of his ability to direct the talk". However, as Table 2 reveals, additional members of the "courtroom cast" utilised "requires" in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* texts. Some of these participants – lawyers, for example – enjoyed a powerful role in the courtroom, like the judges, but others – defendants, for example – did not. It is tempting to conclude that the defendants' use of "requires" and other eliciting devices ("questions", "requests", etc.) was due to the absence of defence counsel prior to 1680 (cf. Table 2), which meant, in turn, that they were responsible for questioning witnesses themselves. However, only 3 per cent (or 7 out of 235) of the defendants' utterances were addressed to witnesses during the period 1640–1679. Indeed, the pre-1680 defendants addressed most of their utterances to the judges (i.e. 177 out of 235), the majority of which had an eliciting function. It would seem, then, that defendants did not adopt a respondent role when interacting with the primary examiners as often as one might expect (see Archer 2005, 2006).

As the greatest difference between judges today and judges in the Early Modern English period is the latter's involvement in what we now refer to as the *evidential* phase of the trial process, sections 5.2.1–5.2.2 concentrate on their examination of witnesses and defendants in more detail.

5.2.1. 1640–1679: Judges as primary examiner

Judges were responsible for directing much of the trial during the period 1640–1679 according to the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data, and the prosecution counsel (when they did appear) played a supporting role: they tended to urge the judge to force defendants to "plead" to their charge or to force witnesses to provide specific information, etc., rather than engaging in "contentious" encounters with witnesses/defendants themselves (see Archer [2005] for a detailed explanation of the prosecution counsels' discursive practices). The judges' most popular addressees at this time were the defendants, followed by the witnesses (this ordering was reversed in the Period 4 and Period 5 *Sociopragmatic Corpus* trial texts). Given that judges were responsible for investigating the allegations put to them, it is perhaps not surprising that they

should favour the question when interacting with witnesses: 103 out of the 110 utterances that judges addressed to the witnesses had the force of a question. Significantly, most of these questions were information- and, to a lesser extent, confirmation-seeking. Witnesses were often asked to supply a location ("At what house was it?"), time ("What time did you …"), or an amount ("What did you spend there?"), for example, or to recall "what" they knew and/or "what" they had said or heard another say (e.g. "Mr. *Gadbury*, What do you know concerning this Plot?", "What said Mr. *Langhorn* to you about the Commissions in his chamber?", "What was the Information you gave at that time to the Council against Mr. *Coleman*?", etc.). In contrast, the questions that judges addressed to defendants tended to have a querying and/or clarification-seeking function in the period 1640–1679. By way of illustration, when one defendant requested that he be allowed witnesses, he was asked:

> What can your Witnesses say for you? Can they say thus much, That you did not conspire, as this Indictment charges you? that there was no taking of these Castles? Can they sweare in the Negative? the proofe lies in the Affirmative on the Kings Part?
>
> (Trial of Connor Lord Macguire, 1644)

The implication of the rhetorical *wh*-question was that the witnesses could not say anything for him, of course (cf. Greenbaum and Quirk 1990: 240). Moreover, the judge was careful to reinforce the implicature by appending a series of leading questions.[14]

It is worth noting that judges addressed three times as many "informs" than "questions" to defendants (i.e. 60 compared to 21), and more than half as many "requires" than "questions" (i.e. 45 as opposed to 21) in the period 1640–1679. They also utilised a significant number of "counsels" and "expresses" (i.e. 17 and 9 respectively, see section 5.1, above, for definitions). The overwhelming impression of many of these "informs", "expresses", "requires" and "counsels" is that judges were commenting upon – and thereby shaping – testimony as it was being given. By way of illustration, Edward Coleman expressed a concern that "*the violent prejudices that seem to be against every man in England that is confess'd to be a Roman Catholick*" would mean that he would not be given a fair trial. Coleman's concern stemmed from the fact that he had been named as a "catholic conspirator" by Titus Oates (Oates infamously invented a fictitious plot involving the Duke of York, which came to be known as the Popish Plot). The judge's initial response to Coleman's fear was to reassure him that he would receive a fair trial. However, the judge had more to say:

> … Therefore you shall find, we [= protestants] will not do to you [= catholics], as you do to us, blow up at adventure, kill people because they are not of your perswasion; our Religion teacheth us another Doctrine, and you shall find it clearly to your advantage. We seek no mans blood, but our own safety. But you are brought here from the necessity of things, which your selves have made; and from your own actions you shall be condemned, or acquitted.
>
> (Trial of Edward Coleman, 1678)

Notice that the opposition between "we" and "you" effectively positioned Coleman with those Catholics that "blow up at adventure, kill people…", etc., and the judge with those whose "Religion teacheth … another Doctrine". As such, it strongly suggests that Coleman's fears were founded, that is, the assumption that "Roman Catholic equalled traitor" was in operation. We have no way of measuring the impression that such comments may have made upon the jury. What we do know is that Coleman was found guilty, and executed at Tyburn on 3 December 1678, and that Oates, his main accuser, was later found guilty of perjury, and imprisoned.[15]

5.2.2. 1680+: A changing role for judges

After 1680, the judges' discursive practices (and indeed, the discursive practices of the prosecution lawyers) begin to undergo change, according to the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data (as previously intimated, the catalyst for this appears to be the arrival of defence counsel: see also section 5.3). Put simply, the prosecution counsel became more involved in the questioning of witnesses, and the judicial examiners played a more reactive (as opposed to pro-active) part in proceedings (cf. Landsman 1990: 520). This change is not merely reflected in the number of questions that post-1680 judges addressed to witnesses, but in their function, for most questions were clarification-seeking. By way of illustration, the judge in the Layer trial (1722) intervened to help clarify an interchange between a witness and the defendant (for clarity, I have indicated to whom each of the utterances were addressed):

> [Context: a witness, Mrs. Mason, has previously stated that the prisoner had instructed her to take in any letters "directed to Mr. *Fountaine*" for him, and that she had done so]

Prisoner. [to witness]	How can you tell how that Letter was directed, which you took in since you say you cannot Read?
Mrs. *Mason*. [to prisoner]	It was directed to Mr. *Fountaine*.
Prisoner. [to witness]	Did you read the Superscription?
Mrs. *Mason*. [to prisoner]	No. Mrs. *Cook* did.
Ld. Ch. Just. [to witness]	You say you was desired by Mr. *Layer*, when any Letter came directed to Mr. *Fountaine*, to take it in; and that a Letter came directed to Mr. *Fountaine* , and you took it in. The Question is asked you, **since you cannot read, how could you tell it was directed to Mr. *Fountaine*?**
Mrs. *Mason*. [to judge]	My Landlady told me it was for Mr. *Fountaine*, and she knew he went by the Name of *Fountaine* sometimes.
Prisoner. [to judge]	She said she read it.
Mrs. *Mason*. [to prisoner]	No. I said I gave it to you, and you open'd it, and you read it.
Ld. Ch. Just. [to prisoner]	**The Occasion of this Question is, that this Misnomer was approved of by you. She says that you order'd her, that if any Letter came directed to Mr. *Fountaine*, she should take it in; a Letter did come directed so, she took it in, and then deliver'd it to you; and you receiv'd it from her, and open'd and read it;**
Ld. Ch. Just. [to witness]	**but how, say they, cou'd you know this Letter was directed to Mr. *Fountaine*, when you can neither write nor read?**
Ld. Ch. Just. [to prisoner]	She having receiv'd such an Order, when there was a Letter come, it was natural enough, that she that cou'd not read, should ask her Landlady the Directions of the Letter, and it was directed for *Fountaine*; it was natural enough for her to take it in, and give it to you.

The initial evidence that the Lord Chief Justice chose to clarify related to how the witness could tell that the letter she had taken in was directed to Mr. Fountaine if she could not read (see first emboldened utterance above). Although one could argue that Mrs. Mason had already provided the evidence,

albeit implicitly, when she informed the defendant that Mrs. Cook had read it, the judge apparently desired an explicit response from her (as Tiersma [2000: 168] highlights, the same expectation – that information which is pragmatically obvious be made more explicit – can be evidenced in the modern courtroom). That explicit response provoked a second interchange between the witness and the defendant, and caused the Lord Chief Justice, in turn, to "weigh" the evidence given by each participant, before coming to a conclusion in favour of the witness (see second emboldened utterance). Notice that the judge was careful to frame his utterances so that they "objectively" summarised what had been said by the participants themselves ("She says that you … but … say they …"). This type of strategy appeared to be designed so as to avoid misrepresenting the participants and, in turn, draw the jury's attention to (without negatively influencing their assessment of) particular salient points.

The impression given by this and similar extracts from the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data is that judges were beginning to adopt a "presiding" role similar to that embraced by judges today. However, they were not as "neutral" as we assume modern judges to be (cf. Drew's [1985: 136] assessment of contemporary judges, in particular, their concern for neutrality). Indeed, the judge in the Rookwood trial (1696) chose to "cross-examine" a defence lawyer, Sir Bartholomew Shower, in front of the whole court (cf. today's courts, where lawyers "approach the bench for a side-bar conference" [Tiersma 2000: 169]).[16] The exchange occurred when Captain Porter was recalled to answer questions regarding the first meeting – or meetings – between him and the defendant. Captain Porter stated that he could not "remember" whether Rookwood "spoke one word" about "dislik[ing] the Affair" (= a treasonable plot) during their "meeting", or, indeed, whether he "refuse[d] to be any way at all concern'd in it". Picking up on Rookwood's apparent silence, Lord Chief Justice Holt asked the defence team:

> Why then, suppose at the *Globe-Tavern*, such an Expression had not dropt from the Prisoner, but a Man is present at two Consults that are held about the Death of the King, but says nothing either at the first or second, What wou'd you make of that Case?
>
> (Trial of Rookwood, 1696)

Although Shower responded by stating that Rookwood's presence did "not amount to a proof of Treason", the judge pursued the matter, pointing out that there were two meetings not one. Shower was careful to insist that he "did not know whether there were two Meetings or one", but that it did not really

matter, because Rookwood could have attended them both "by accident". Holt did not appear to agree, initially querying "how" one could attend two meetings "by accident" and then going on to point out that:

> … there is another thing, Why did he give a List to Mr. *Harris*? the List that was given had Mr. *Rookwood's* Name at top, as he was to command the Party, and there was *Harris's* Name and *Hare's* Name as of his Party; that is, their feign'd Names; Mr. *Rookwood's* feign'd Name was *Roberts* that was at top, and they were to go to *Turnham-Green*, and *Rookwood* told *Harris*, he shou'd be his *Ayd du Camp*.
>
> (Trial of Rookwood, 1696)

Notice that the *why*-interrogative presupposed that Rookwood had given him the list and, by implication, was responsible for its contents. In other words, the judge seemed to be assuming that Rookwood was guilty. Yet, it is worth reiterating that an assumption of guilt at the outset of a trial was not unusual at this time (section 1). Moreover, evidence from the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data suggests that judges were prepared to revise their "guilty" assumptions when faced with contradictory evidence. By way of illustration, Elizabeth Cellier was accused of treason by Thomas Dangerfied, but managed to convince the recorder (a type of judge) that Dangerfield was an "unfit" witness, and the case against her was dropped. This is in stark contrast to the Salem magistrates, for, as previously established, they tended to assume that any defendants who did not give them the answers they wanted and/or resisted any accommodation to their version of the truth were lying and/or being "uncooperative" (see section 3).

5.3. The impact of the lawyers: A new "contentious" questioning procedure

The arrival of the defence lawyers, and the increased activity of the prosecution lawyers not only affected the role of the judges, but also led to a new "contentious" questioning procedure in the courtroom (Landsman 1990: 522). This was especially true of the eighteenth-century trial texts within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*. I believe that the change to/development in counsels' questioning strategies can be linked to a growing recognition that (i) defence counsels should provide persuasive evidence regarding the innocence of the defendants, and (ii) questions could be used as a means of controlling and, on occasions, undermining their respondents' contributions so that they could steer "the testimony of witnesses" in a way that created a "story" – or

"secondary reality" – that was of maximal benefit to their clients' case (cf. Walker 1987: 59–60; Tiersma 2000: 160–161; Hale and Gibbons 1999). Significantly, those "stories" were increasingly being established over a (number of) questioning sequence(s) within the eighteenth-century trial texts, and often involved more than one respondent. This suggests that defence lawyers were beginning to design their utterances so that they did not just relate to those that they followed (the immediate questioning sequence of which they were a part), but also to what had gone before and, ultimately, to the context of what was at issue in the trial as a whole: the guilt or innocence of the defendant (cf. Drew 1985: 137). The prosecution lawyers, in turn, began to use similar techniques to construct a version of events that proved the defendant(s)' guilt. Both parties also attempted to persuade the judges/jury to believe that witnesses who did not "cooperate" were *able* to provide the requested information, but were *unwilling* to do so because it would damage the opposition's case (cf. Harris 1984).

Elsewhere, I have developed the notion of "conflicting reality paradigms" to capture the way in which the particularised "perspectives" of reality that interlocutors operate out of and filter information about their world(s) through often clashed in the (historical) courtroom (see Archer 2002: 20–22). As one might expect, examiners who adopted an *able but unwilling* perspective tended to ask questions that were accusatory in tone. Such perspectives also seemed to affect their inferencing processes. By way of illustration, in the Trial of Francis Francia (1716), a witness for the prosecution (Buckley) was asked (by the prosecution counsel) to give an account of Francia's examination before Lord Townshend and Mr. Secretary Stanhope, which he had been responsible for taking down. Buckley informed the court that Francia had refused to swear on the New Testament. Instead, "he took another Book out of his Pocket" to swear on, and then "sign'd" the written record of his examination. Two of Francia's defence team (Mr. Denton and Mr. Ward) then took over the questioning of Buckley:

Mr. Denton.	Was he examin'd at any time after?
Mr. Buckley.	Yes.
Mr. Denton.	Was you present then?
Mr. Buckley.	No.
Mr. Ward.	How long were they [a book and some letters belonging to Francia] in your Custody?
Mr. Buckley.	From the time that Mr. *Walpole* went abroad, till he came back again, and then I deliver'd them back to him.

Mr. Ward.	Were they in your Custody when Mr. *Jones* was under Examination?
Mr. Buckley.	I can't tell; but I never did show them to him
Mr. Ward.	Were they not deliver'd out on that Occasion?
Mr. Buckley.	No, they were not deliver'd out by me.
Mr. Ward.	**You say you read the Examination to him. Did not he desire to read it himself?**
Mr. Buckley.	I don't remember it.
Mr. Ward.	**Was he not refused to read it?**
Mr. Buckley.	No, upon my Soul.

(Trial of Francis Francia, 1716)

Notice that the defence team's initial questions were designed to establish whether Francia was permitted to read his own examination/confession. However, by the sixth and seventh question, Ward was suggesting that Francia did desire to do so, but was refused the privilege (see emboldened negative polar interrogatives, above). Buckley's answer – "I don't remember it" – to one of those questions is particularly interesting, as it can be interpreted in several ways (see note 13). It may intimate an inability on Buckley's part – apparently occasioned by his poor recall – to provide Ward with the confirmation he sought. Alternatively, we may infer that Buckley did not remember Francia making any such request because it did not happen. Ward's follow-up question suggests a third interpretation, however; that Buckley could remember, but was using an "evading" tactic (claiming that he did not remember) so that he did not have to provide the confirmation that had been requested. As Thomas (1995) highlights, pragmatically misleading or potentially pragmatically misleading utterances of this sort are regularly encountered in today's trials, so much so, in fact, that "they could be seen as the norm for this type of interaction, and be interpreted in that light by participants" (Thomas 1995: 74).

5.3.1. The fluidity of the courtroom of the Early Modern English period

The above findings are not meant to suggest that the post-1680 trial was the same as a modern trial. Indeed, I found that the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century trial was very different from a modern criminal trial, not least because the judicial examiners often (i) determined the extent to which defence counsels were actively involved when they were present, and (ii)

continued to ask questions during the examination sequences, mainly of witnesses, but also of counsel. It is also worth reiterating that defence counsels could not address the jury, which meant that there were no opening addresses or closing arguments. One consequence of this was that defence counsels were reliant on the jury's ability to "deduce" the significance of their questions from cross-examination sequences alone. This may explain why counsels intervened in others' examination sequences. Interestingly, defendants and, very rarely, witnesses also intervened in examination sequences, giving historical trials a distinctive fluidity. Another significant difference between the historical courtroom and the modern courtroom relates to the types of speech acts utilised, for examinations within the historical courtroom were not (solely) made up of questions and answers, in practice. Indeed, the only trial within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* to adopt a strict question-and-answer format throughout was the *Court-martial of Captain Ambrose* (1745) (see section 5.4, following). We should, therefore, heed Cairns' (1998: 36) advice of not simplifying the emergence of the modern trial in a way that "gives the impression of an inevitable development rushing to completion" (see section 5).

5.4. Atypical features of the Ambrose and King Charles texts

Macro-level analysis (in my case, analysing texts collectively over three 40-year periods and one 120-year period) is a useful means of establishing not only discursive norms but also potential changes to those discursive norms. However, it is only when we combine macro-level analysis with micro-level analysis that we fully appreciate how a particular text differs from or is similar to texts representing the same (or a similar) trial-type/trial date. By way of illustration, as its title implies, the Ambrose text (1745) records a court-martial hearing (see Table 1). Such hearings were usually held aboard one of His Majesty's ships of war, before a group of naval officers (their rank depending on the rank of the defendant), with the highest-ranking officer acting as president. Collectively known as the "Court", these officers followed a strict format in the Ambrose text that was atypical when compared to other trial texts within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* (further work is required to ascertain whether this format was/is [a]typical of court-martial texts in general): A deposition was initially read to all present, and then the Court asked witnesses a series of questions (e.g. "Is this Deposition true?", "Was she [= the Rupert] [ever] within point-blank?", "Did you see the Fireship go[ing] down?", etc.).

The question-and-answer format explains why the majority of the Court's utterances functioned as questions in this specific text. It also helps to account for the Court's position as the most active questioner in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* as a whole.

Another atypical feature of the Ambrose text relates to Ambrose himself. Ambrose utilised a large proportion (i.e. 85) of the 185 questions assigned to the defendant in Table 2, all of which he addressed to witnesses. Moreover, most of those questions were part of long questioning sequences. Christopher Layer was the only other defendant within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* to address a substantial number of questions to witnesses (i.e. 44). Like Ambrose, many of these questions were part of long questioning sequences. However, Layer – unlike Ambrose – was represented by counsel (most other defendants with counsel present asked witnesses very few questions).

King Charles provides a further example of an atypical defendant – and not just because of his royal blood. Indeed, he was responsible for a substantial proportion of the "requests" and "requires" utilised by defendants (i.e. eighteen and seven respectively), all of which he addressed to his "judge", Lord President Bradshaw. The theme of six of Charles's requests – that he be given an opportunity to speak – suggests that he was not given every opportunity to prove his innocence like Ambrose, but, rather, was actively silenced (see Archer 2006). Charles was not the only defendant to be discouraged from speaking, of course (cf. Beattie 1986). However, several of his "requires" reveal that he was prepared to be more confrontational than most when pursuing his right to speak. In one instance, for example, Charles "demand[ed] to be heard" and, in another, "require[d] that [he] may give in [his] Reasons why [he would] not answer" his charge. As Leech explains (1980: 70–71), acts that make explicit reference to their intended pragmatic force acquire a "sledgehammer" effect, when used by subordinate speakers. This may help to explain why Bradshaw curtly informed the king: "It is not for prisoners to require".[17]

Significantly, the other defendants to utilise "requests" and "requires" in the period 1640–1679 (Connor Lord Macguire, Sir Henry Slingsby, Mr. John Mordant, Thomas Harrison and Dr. John Hewet), faced treason trials like Charles, and, moreover, had a status that was that of "professional" or higher. Further study is therefore required to determine whether defendants' use of "requests" and "requires" is a feature of pre-1680 trials only, a feature of treason trials only and/or a feature of defendants with a particular status (see Archer 2006).

6. Moving towards identifying the discursive "norms" of the historical courtroom

The primary argument of this chapter is that our understanding of the courtroom of the Early Modern English period should be based upon greater coverage, in terms of duration, venue and type of trial. Having catalogued some of the data that is available to the historical linguist, I have proposed two (complementary) means by which this might be achieved; (i) drawing from the work of historians, and (ii) drawing from corpora such as the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*, which covers a 120-year period (1640–1760). I have also suggested that, when combined with annotation schemes, the latter method can help us to develop a checklist of typical linguistic features and, by so doing, a means of measuring the (a)typicality of trial texts.

Taavitsainen and Fitzmaurice revealed the close relationship between historical pragmatics and corpus linguistics in Chapter 1. By adding "*interpretative*, *linguistic* information to an electronic corpus" (Leech 1997: 2, original emphasis), I am attempting to strengthen that relationship even further. Annotation is only designed to capture the "what" and the "how" as opposed to the "why", however, which means that we still have to engage in qualitative analysis as a means of exploring the importance of our findings. So *why* engage in corpus annotation techniques at all? I would argue that my particular investigation – studying the relationship between the role of the participants and the various verbal action categories utilised by them – was made easier *because* of the systematic identification of *functional/contextual aspects at the level of the utterance* (the speaker[s]' and addressee[s]' role, status, age, gender, interactional intent, force of utterance, etc.).

The *Sociopragmatic Corpus* is not completely comprehensive in terms of the types of trials that are represented, of course. Consequently, the discursive patterns or generalisations that I have identified here (and in Archer 2005) must remain open to (in)validation by ongoing research, not least because:

(i) *"Discursive norms" may change according to the type of trial as well as over time.* We need to ascertain the extent to which court-martials occurring in the Early Modern English period share the format utilised in the Ambrose text, for example. We also need to explore the emergence of the defence lawyers in more detail, to determine whether their earlier appearance in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* data is a misrepresentation of the English historical courtroom as a whole, and, if

it is not, whether their strategic use of questioning strategies belies a "learning curve" that began in State trials, and was extended to the ordinary courtrooms, as their appearance there became more regular.

(ii) *"Discursive norms" may be resisted or manipulated* (as in the case of Charles I and Oates). As this chapter has shown, these types of behaviour, in particular, may necessitate our looking beyond questions and answers (as has traditionally been the case), and/or exploring the effect of participants' conflicting reality paradigms.
Of course, it is only by engaging in macro-level analysis as well as micro-level analysis that the similarities or differences between trials will become more readily apparent.

Notes

1. See Muddiman (1930) for a discussion of the various editions of the *State Trials*.
2. It's worth noting that the later pamphlets often claimed accuracy and completeness. Although technically untrue (see Kytö and Walker's [2003: 230] work on the "interference" caused by the production process itself), such a claim is important, not least because the published editions could be (and probably were) scrutinised by contemporary audiences that included many of the official participants (Langbein 1978: 265).
3. Kytö and Rissanen (1983) provide a useful account of American English in the Early Modern period.
4. Culpeper and Kytö (1999) present an interesting account of the multiple discourse levels present within the *Wonderfvll Discoverie*, and their effect upon its representation.
5. By way of illustration, the different imprints of the trial of Charles I (i.e. *A Perfect Narrative* and the first and second editions of *King Charls His Tryal*) were compared (see Kytö and Walker [2003: 231–235] for a detailed description of the process adopted).
6. Langbein (1999) and Beattie (1986) suggest that the eventual introduction of defence lawyers was due as much to the highly political use of charges of treason, some serious miscarriages of justice, and the subsequent decline in the reputation of the judges and the courts during the late seventeenth century as it was to the introduction and/or increased participation of prosecution lawyers at this time.
7. The Lord Chief Justice was responsible for 21.9 per cent of the turns, the Attorney General was responsible for 14.1 per cent of the turns and the Solicitor General was responsible for 8.2 per cent of the turns.

8. The difference in the level of activity of the defence lawyers probably relates to the presence of Treason trials as well as ordinary trials within the *Sociopragmatic Corpus*.
9. Grimshaw (1990: 281) suggests that "the disambiguation process" used by analysts of modern "talk" is similar to "that which we ourselves employ in interaction – where, it must be conceded, we sometimes err". I believe that, although the distance in (historical) time may exacerbate this potential to "err", it is nevertheless possible to reconstruct "plausible" intentions, *given adequate evidence* (see sections 2 and 5.1).
10. The development and implementation of Archer and Culpeper's (2003) Sociopragmatic Annotation Scheme was made possible by a grant awarded to Dr. Culpeper by the British Academy (SG-350252).
11. The role category contains four fields: "activity (type) role" (prototypical examples of which are *witness* and *defendant*), "kinship role" (which indicates a blood [or legal] relationship between the interlocutors, e.g. *father*, *wife*), "social role" (which indicates an occupational or familiar role, e.g. *surgeon*, *friend*) and "dramatic role" (which captures dramatic stereotypes such as *fool* and *villain*).
12. Wierzbicka (1987: 17) seeks to "model in explicit and verifiable formulae the meanings which people convey in speech (… by conventional linguistic means)".
13. Some existing speech act taxonomies (e.g. Stiles 1992) lack "unclassifiable" categories. However, the ability to classify/capture ambiguity/indeterminacy is crucial when studying texts that were produced in periods distant from our own (see also Archer, Culpeper, and Davies forthcoming).
14. Macguire appeared to recognise that he could not hope to answer any of the "questions" without buying into their damaging presuppositions, for he did not attempt to answer any of them. Instead, he informed the judge that he felt the Court had been misinformed about him! The judge – and the Court – did not share his view. He was found guilty of "rioting and enticing rebellion in Ireland", and executed.
15. Interestingly, Oates was one of the most verbose witnesses in the *Sociopragmatic Corpus* trials. Indeed, he was responsible for the longest turn. He was also the only witness to use more than one "disclaim" during the period 1640–1679 ("disclaims" establish S's inability to provide the requested information). Although the use of disclaims is not surprising, given that he was later found guilty of perjury, it is significant that the judge did not perceive him to be an "uncooperative" witness.
16. A "side-bar conference" is a brief session between the lawyers and judge out of hearing of the jury.
17. I suggest in Archer (2006) that Charles's behaviour was the result of a conflict between his role as "defendant" and his role as monarch, which he was unable to reconcile.

References

Archer, Dawn

2002 "Can innocent people be guilty?" A sociopragmatic analysis of examination transcripts from the Salem Witchcraft Trials. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 3 (1): 1–30.

2005 *Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640–1760): A Sociopragmatic Analysis*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 135.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

2006 (Re)initiating strategies: Judges and defendants in Early Modern English courtrooms. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 7 (2).

Archer, Dawn, and Jonathan Culpeper

2003 Sociopragmatic annotation: New directions and possibilities in historical corpus linguistics. In *Corpus Linguistics by the Lune: Studies in Honour of Geoffrey Leech*, Andrew Wilson, Paul Rayson, and Tony McEnery (eds.), 37–58. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Archer, Dawn, Jonathan Culpeper, and Matthew Davies

forthc. Pragmatic preprocessing. In *Corpus Linguistics: An International Handbook*, Anke Lüdeling, Merja Kytö, and Tony McEnery (eds.). Mouton de Gruyter.

Beattie, John M.

1986 *Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1991 Scales of justice: Defence counsel and the English criminal trial in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. *Law and History Review* 9 (2): 221–267.

Biber, Douglas, and Edward Finegan

1992 The linguistic evolution of five written and speech-based English genres from the 17th to the 20th centuries. In *History of Englishes: New Methods and Interpretations in Historical Linguistics*, Matti Rissanen, Ossi Ihalainen, Terttu Nevalainen, and Irma Taavitsainen (eds.), 688–704. (Topics in English Linguistics 10.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Birnbaum, Henrik

1985 Orality, literacy, and literature in Old Rus. *Die Welt der Slaven* 30: 161–196.

Boyer, Paul, and Stephen Nissenbaum (eds.)

1977 *The Salem Witchcraft Papers: Verbatim Transcripts of the Legal Documents of the Salem Witchcraft Outbreak of 1692*. Vols. I–III. New York: Da Capo Press.

Cairns, David J. A.

1998 *Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Clark, G. Kitson
1967 *The Critical Historian*. London: Heinemann.
Collins, Daniel
2000 *Reanimated Voices: Speech Reporting in a Historical-Pragmatic Perspective*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 85.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Cotterill, Janet
2003 *Language and Power in Court: A Linguistic Analysis of the O. J. Simpson Trial*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Culpeper, Jonathan, and Merja Kytö
1999 Investigating nonstandard language in a corpus of Early Modern English dialogues: Methodological considerations and problems. In *Writing in Nonstandard English*, Irma Taavitsainen, Gunnel Melchers, and Päivi Pahta (eds.), 171–187. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 67.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
2000 Gender voices in the spoken interaction of the past: A pilot study based on Early Modern English trial proceedings. In *The History of English in a Social Context*, Dieter Kastovsky and Arthur Mettinger (eds.), 53–89. (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 129.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Doty, Kathleen, and Risto Hiltunen
2002 "I will tell, I will tell": Confessional patterns in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 1692. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 3 (2): 299–335.
Drew, Paul
1985 Analysing the use of language in courtroom interaction. In *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Vol. 3: *Discourse and Dialogue*, Teun A. van Dijk (ed.), 133–148. London: Academic Press.
Early Modern English Dictionaries Database
1999 *Early Modern English Dictionaries Database*. Ian Lancashire (ed.). Online. ⟨http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/english/emed/emedd.html⟩
Greenbaum, Sidney, and Randolph Quirk
1990 *A Student's Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
Grimshaw, Allen D. (ed.)
1990 *Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations of Arguments in Conversations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hale, S., and John Gibbons
1999 Varying realities: Patterned changes in the interpreter's representation of courtroom and external realities. *Applied Linguistics* 20 (2): 203–220.
Hargrave, Francis (ed.)
1776–1781 *A Complete Collection of State-Trials, and Proceedings for High-Treason, and other crimes and misdemeanours; the fourth edition;*

commencing with the eleventh year of the reign of King Richard II. and ending with the sixteenth year of the reign of King George III. 11 vols. London: T. Wright.

Harris, Sandra
1984 Questions as a mode of control in magistrates' courts. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 49: 5–27.

Hiltunen, Risto
1996 "Tell me, be you a witch?" Questions in the Salem Witchcraft Trials of 1692. *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 2: 17–37.

Howell, Thomas Jones (ed.)
1809–1826 *Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the earliest period to the present time*. (Vols. 11–21: *A Complete Collection of State Trials ... with notes and other illustrations compiled by T. B. Howell*; vols. 22–33: *A Complete Collection of State Trials ... from the earliest period to the year 1783 with notes and other illustrations: compiled by T. B. Howell ... and continued from the year 1783 to the present time*.) 33 vols. London: R. Bagshaw: Longman and Co.

Jacobs, Andreas, and Andreas H. Jucker
1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In *Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in the History of English*, Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 35.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

James I, King of England
1597 *Minor prose works of King James VI and I. Daemonologie, The true lawe of free monarchies, A counterblaste to tobacco, A declaration of sports. Edited by James Craigie. and prepared for the press by Alexander Law*. Facsimile edition, Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982.

Jucker, Andreas H., and Irma Taavitsainen
2000 Diachronic speech act analysis: Insults from flyting to flaming. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 2 (1): 67–95.

King, Gregory
1695 Ranks, degrees, titles and qualifications. Reprinted in *Seventeenth-Century Economic Documents*, Joan Thirsk and J. Phillips Cooper (eds.), 751–757. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

Kryk-Kastovsky, Barbara
2000 Representations of orality in Early Modern English trial records. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (2): 201–230.

Kytö, Merja, and Matti Rissanen
1983 The syntactic study of Early American English: The variationist at the mercy of his corpus? *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 84 (4): 470–489.

Kytö, Merja, and Terry Walker
2003 The linguistic study of Early Modern English speech-related texts: How "bad" can "bad" data be? *Journal of English Linguistics* 31 (3): 221–248.
Landsman, Stephen
1990 The rise of the contentious spirit: Adversary procedure in eighteenth-century England. *Cornell Law Review* 50: 498–609.
Langbein, John H.
1978 The criminal trial before the lawyers. *University of Chicago Law Review* 45: 263–316.
1999 The prosecutorial origins of defence counsel in the eighteenth century: The appearance of solicitors. *Cambridge Law Journal* 58 (2): 314–365.
Leech, Geoffrey
1980 *Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics*. (Pragmatics & Beyond I:5.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
1997 Introducing corpus annotation. In *Corpus Annotation*, Roger Garside, Geoffrey Leech, and Tony McEnery (eds.), 1–18. Harlow: Longman.
Mellinkoff, David
1963 *The Language of the Law*. Boston: Little, Brown.
Muddiman, Joseph G.
1930 *State Trials: The Need for a New and Revised Edition of "State Trials" [i.e. "A Complete Collection of State Trials"]*. Edinburgh/London: W. Hodge and Co.
Oxford English Dictionary
2003 *Oxford English Dictionary*. 3rd ed. Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⟨http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl⟩
Potts, Thomas (ed.)
1613 *The Wonderfvll Discoverie of Witches in the Covntie of Lancaster*. Reprinted in *Trial of the Lancaster witches A.D. MDCXII*, G. B. Harrison (ed.). London: Peter Davies, 1929.
Salmon, Thomas (ed.)
1719 *A Compleat Collection of State-Tryals, and proceedings upon impeachments for high treason, and other crimes and misdemeanours; from the reign of King Henry the Fourth to the end of the reign of Queen Anne*, etc. London: Timothy Goodwin, etc.
Searle, John R.
1969 *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1975 Indirect speech acts. In *Speech Acts*, Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), 59–82. (Syntax and Semantics 3.) New York: Academic Press.
Sinclair, John M., and Richard M. Coulthard
1975 *Towards an Analysis of Discourse: The English used by Teachers and Pupils*. London: Oxford University Press.

Stenström, Anna-Brita
1984 *Questions and Responses in English Conversation*. (Lund Studies in English 68.) Malmö: Liber Förlag.
Stiles, William B.
1992 *Describing Talk: A Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Thomas, Jenny
1995 *Meaning in Interaction*. (Learning about Language.) London: Longman.
Tiersma, Peter M.
2000 *Legal Language*. London: The University of Chicago Press.
Verschueren, Jeff
1999 *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Arnold.
Walker, Anne G.
1987 Linguistic manipulation, power, and the legal setting. In *Power Through Discourse*, Leah Kedar (ed.), 57–82. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.
Wierzbicka, Anna
1987 *English Speech Act Verbs: A Semantic Dictionary*. Sydney: Academic Press.
Wilson, Thomas
1600 *The State of England Anno Dom. 1600*. Frederick Jack Fisher (ed.). In *Camden Miscellany* 16. (Camden Third Series 52.) London: Royal Historical Society, 1936.

What do you lacke? what is it you buy? Early Modern English service encounters

Birte Bös

1. Introduction

For thousands of years, service encounters, i.e. interactions for the provision of goods and/or services, have constituted an important part of our daily communication. Although today we can make use of modern media like the Internet to satisfy our needs, most service encounters are still carried out face-to-face as they have always been. Difficult as it is to capture these interactions in present-day English (PDE), historical service encounters are even more elusive. Indeed, if we want to analyse them, we are confronted with what is generally considered the "most prominent problem for historical pragmatics ... the availability of historical natural language data" (Jacobs and Jucker 1995: 6). The only sources at our disposal are written documents.

For the Early Modern English (EME) period, we find evidence of service encounters in a range of texts. For example, non-fictional sources like accounts give detailed lists of how money was spent; journals and letters contain reports of various service encounters the writers participated in; and also fictional texts, e.g. plays, include instances of service interactions.[1] Based on sources like these, section 2 proposes a rough classification of EME service encounters.

As will be shown in section 3, some of the documents go beyond a mere reference to service interactions; they represent (at least parts of) the linguistic realisation of the actual service encounters. After discussing the reliability of such data, I will compare some aspects of the global and local structure of EME samples with their modern counterparts.

2. Types of EME service encounters

A sound qualitative analysis of EME service encounters is not possible without some knowledge about the social and economic conditions of the time. Cultural histories deliver useful information about participants, locations

and objects of EME service encounters – criteria which determine the types of service encounters and their realisation. Table 1 illustrates the variety of EME service interactions ranging from the buying and selling of a diversity of goods to the provision of services in different locations.

Table 1. Predominant types of EME service encounters: locations and providers of goods and services

Locations of service encounters	Types of service encounters	
	Goods / providers, e.g.	Services / providers, e.g.
Home	Pedlar Milkman	Household servants Secretary Physician
Special in-door locations – Shops	Smith, shoemaker, apothecary Milliner, haberdasher	Barber-surgeon Miller Moneychanger
– Taverns, inns, alehouses		Host, innkeeper
Markets	Groceries (costermonger, fishmonger, poulterer) Prepared foods (baker) Livestock (horse-courser) Handmade goods (button-maker, soap-boiler)	Porter, carman Knife-sharpener Corn-cutter

As indicated in Table 1, many service encounters were actually carried out at home. It has been estimated that in the English Renaissance 29 per cent of all households employed servants (Thornton Burnett 1997: 1). Consequently, a considerable amount of service interactions took place between masters and their attendants. This resulted in a diversity of guides for servants and their employers, which described the servants' varied duties and gave both parties instructions for appropriate behaviour, e.g. *The Boke of Kervynge* (1508) and *The Gentlewoman's Companion* (Woolley 1675). Servants came from a range of social levels. Even young aristocratic people worked temporarily in higher service positions to make contacts and acquire courtly manners (cf. Singman 1995: 16). Educated men serving as secretaries found advice in books like *The English Secretorie* (Day 1586). Numerous literary works of the period contain further evidence of master-servant relationships.[2]

There were many people who provided their services and goods at the homes of the respective clients. For example, pedlars and milkmen went from door to door to sell their goods, physicians treated patients at their homes, and even chaplains delivered their religious service in the households of people of rank and quality. Providing a definition of the particular term and also a list of contemporary quotations, the *Oxford English Dictionary* proves helpful in tracing these possible suppliers of goods and services.

Special in-door locations like shops, taverns, inns, and alehouses were well established as scenes of service encounters as well. Obviously, it is not possible to give a complete list of providers here. Table 1 contains only a few examples of the tradesmen and craftsmen who did not only offer their goods in the shops, but frequently also produced them there. Especially towns like London impressed with their enormous wealth of trades and crafts. This is described, for instance, in Isabella Whitney's *Wyll and Testament* (1573), a farewell in verse to London and its pleasures, or in the account by Thomas Platter, a Swiss physician (1599): "In one very long street called Cheapside dwell almost exclusively goldsmiths and moneychangers on either hand so that inexpressibly great treasures and vast amounts of money may be seen here." Other contemporaries like Thomas Smith (1581) observed the desire for the fashionable, imported goods sold by milliners, haberdashers, etc.:

> There is no man can be contented now with any other gloves than is made in France or Spain; ... nor owche, brooch, or aglet, but of Venice making or Milan; ... no not as much as a spur, but that is fetched at the milliners. I have heard within these forty years when there were not of these haberdashers that sell French or Milan caps, glasses, knives, daggers, swords, girdles, and such things, not a dozen in all London. And now, from the town to Westminster along, every street is full of them; their shops glitters and shines of glasses, as well drinking as looking, ...

The greatest variety of shops was probably to be found at the Royal Exchange (opened in 1571), "where all kinds of fine goods [were] on show" (Platter 1599: 157). The Exchange introduced a new concept of shopping, it

> meant a complete departure from the market-principles that had hitherto influenced London business. Instead of streets and districts devoted to special trades, he [Gresham, the financier] was trying to establish a general shopping-centre, or supermarket as we should now call it, where merchandise of many kinds could be seen and purchased without an elaborate journey round the different quarters of London associated with this commodity or that. (Holmes 1969: 43)

However, travellers like Thomas Platter were not only impressed by London's shops, but also by the "great many inns, taverns, and beer gardens scattered about the city, where much amusement may be had with eating, drinking, fiddling, and the rest" (Platter 1599: 170). In fact, alehouses were important social institutions where also the poor could go for a pint of beer, a meal, and some entertainment[3], and they were also used as alternative places to markets for retailing (especially of second-hand goods) and financial dealings. Even service workers like barbers satisfied their customers' needs there (Clark 1983: 137 ff.).

As a third major location of service encounters, markets were of great significance in the EME period. Historical documents like *Holinshed's Chronicles* (Harrison 1577) inform us that "[t]here are ... few great towns in England that have not their weekly markets, one or more granted from the prince in which all manner of provision for household is to be bought and sold, for ease and benefit of the country round about". In addition to these weekly markets, some of the largest markets in Europe were held once or twice a year. Ben Jonson's play *Bartholomew Fair* (1614), for example, presents a vivid description of one of the biggest annual fairs of the time. Jonson's list of characters provides further evidence for the classification proposed in Table 1. It includes, for instance, a costermonger, a gingerbread-woman[4], and a pig-woman offering prepared foods, a horse-courser selling livestock, and other people from various trades and crafts. Contemporary illustrations[5] round off the image by depicting market scenes.

Naturally, it was usually the servants who participated for their masters in the service interactions at the market. This is indicated in some of the guide books mentioned before. For example, Woolley (1675) gives "Instructions for all Chamber-maids to Gentle-women in City and Country. Keep your Mistresses Chamber clean, and lay up every thing in its due place; you ought to be skillful in buying any thing in the Market."

3. Linguistic realisation of EME service encounters

The documents discussed so far are helpful for the description of the historical situation and the classification of service encounters, but for the most part they do not include any information on the communicative means applied. Fictional sources like plays are an exception. Due to their dialogic form, plays reflect natural conversations to a certain degree, although they are, of course, usually adapted for dramatic purposes. Since plays have been consid-

ered to imitate spoken interaction, they have been used, for example, as data for studies on certain politeness phenomena (e.g. Brown and Gilman 1989; Kopytko 1995). Taking medieval literary texts as an (idealised) representation of everyday talk, Lebsanft (1999) provides an analysis of a late medieval French bargain dialogue.

Looking for EME samples, the above-mentioned *Bartholomew Fair* appears promising. Most scenes of the play are set in the marketplace where the gentry, merchants, traders, and working people mingle and engage in activities such as buying and selling, eating and drinking; and they enjoy entertainments like ballad singing and wrestling. Their service encounters are captured in the play. It is the rich language, varying according to the social and regional background of the characters, that gives these incidents their liveliness. For example, the traders bark out their offers, struggling for the attention of their customers:

(1) LEATHERHEAD. What do you lack, gentlemen? Maid, see a fine hobby-horse for your young master; cost you but a token a week his provender.
CORNCUTTER. Ha' you any corns i' your feet and toes?
TINDERBOX-MAN. Buy a mousetrap, a mousetrap, or a tormentor for a flea.
TRASH. Buy some gingerbread.
NIGHTINGALE. Ballads, ballads! fine new ballads!
(Jonson 1614: Act II, Scene iv)

As the extract shows, not only goods, but also various services are advertised at the market. Lines like these allow for conclusions on important elements of service encounters like the service bid, but unfortunately, the service interactions in the play usually remain fragmentary.[6] On the rare occasions where a service interaction is more fully represented (cf. e.g. Act III, Scene iv), it is interrupted and distorted by simultaneous conversations.

However, the utterances given in (1) very much resemble the service bids that can be found in another most promising source of EME service encounters, namely sixteenth-century English-language coursebooks written for foreign learners. Coursebooks like *A very profitable boke to lerne the maner of redyng, writyng, & speakyng english and Spanish* (1554)[7], and James Bellot's *Familiar Dialogues* (1586), a handbook for French learners of English, give several model dialogues which are concerned with the service situation.

Just like literary texts, this non-fictional source has its pros and cons which have been under discussion. Of course, the sample dialogues were designed for didactic purposes and might, as Lebsanft (1999: 272) puts it, display a relatively "high degree of stereotype in the arrangement and organisation of discourse". Of course, they are not exact transcriptions of reality, lacking e.g. an annotation of pauses, repairs, back channel items, etc. (cf. Radtke 1994: 28). On the other hand, Radtke points out that the aim of coursebooks is to teach spoken discourse, that texts of this genre are bound to natural speech situations, and consequently the pragmatic relevance in the dialogues is probably higher than in other texts. Becker (2003: 277) adds that due to the similarity of situations and participants' roles as well as the highly standardised activities, reproduced service interactions offer a greater amount of context information than other model dialogues.

Since we have two coursebooks at our disposal here which contain more than one sample interaction, the dialogues can be compared, and thus the reliability of the data is greater. The degree of naturalness in the two handbooks is differentiated by Watts (1999: 226) in his analysis of EME language coursebooks. He regards *Familiar Dialogues* as more realistic and less stilted than *A very profitable boke*, claiming for the service section in the former that "[t]he whole interaction certainly contains the necessary lexical items and structures to be learnt, but it is also a realistic impression of what bargaining interactions may have sounded like in the late Elizabethan age" (Watts 1999: 229).

Summing up, one has to admit that the diversity of the sources cannot hide the fact that there is no authentic material of EME service encounters. All the sources may be stereotypical to a certain degree, but the model dialogues given in the coursebooks probably represent the most accurate picture we can get. They will therefore be used to contrast EME service encounters with their modern equivalents.

The following analysis roughly follows a path paved by a variety of approaches which are often subsumed under the fuzzy umbrella term *pragmatics*: Discourse Analysis, Conversation Analysis, Speech Act Theory, etc. The common distinction between global and local discourse levels provides the frame for the discussion.

3.1. Global structure

Since service interactions constitute an institutionalised form of discourse, their global structure displays certain regularities. For modern service interactions, these are, for example, represented in the phase models popular in sales guides, but also applied in linguistic studies like the *Dialoggrammatik* ap-

proach by Franke (1985) or Henne and Rehbock's (1995) and Brons-Albert's (1995) Discourse Analysis. What appears problematic here is that phases are mostly considered obligatory and fixed in a linear way. Linguists like Halliday and Hasan (1980) and Ventola (1987) oppose this view and postulate that variations in sequence and obligatoriness of elements are possible. This is supported by the analysis of 100 service interactions recorded in London bookstores (Bös 2004), which yielded the following global structural elements: ESTABLISHING CONTACT, GREETING, SERVICE BID, NEED PRESENTATION, SERVICE, PURCHASE DECISION, PURCHASE REALISATION, FAREWELL, and BREAKING UP CONTACT.

These elements serve as the starting point in the analysis of the global structure of EME service interactions. Obviously, the system is open for changes. If necessary, elements can be modified and new constituents can be introduced.

Example (2), which was chosen for illustration, shows an extract from the section "To the market" in Bellot (1586). The example is one of the six dialogues given in that book to acquaint learners with the language of service encounters, and it involves the customer Ralf, who wants to buy goods from the poulterer. The utterances of the sample text are presented in italics and appear parallel to several global structural elements (represented in small capitals) assigned to them.

(2) ESTABLISHING CONTACT

The Poulter

What doe you buye? SERVICE BID
What doe you lacke?

Ralf.

Showe me a coupell of good, and fatte Rabettes. NEED PRESENTATION
A fat Capon. A good henne. A fatte goose. A good goseling. A dozen of larkes. A stoke doue. A Hayre. A mallart. A ducke. A drake.
A crane. A sparow. A woodcoke. A swanne. A blackbirde. A Patter.

The Poult.

Here be them, that be very good and fat. SERVICE (PRE-BARGAINING)

Ralf.

They be very stale.

The Poult.

Truely, they be very new.

Ralf.

How sell you them? BARGAINING
How much?

The Poult.
Ten pence the couple.

Ralf.
It is to much, you are to, deare, They be not worth so much. They be worth but a grote.

The Poul.
They be not mine for that price. They coast me more.

Ralf.
Tell me your lowest word.

The Poul.
Are you willing to buye?
[Ralf:] *Yes, if you will, be reasonable.*

The Poul.
At one word: you shall pay two grotes for them.

Ralf.
I will pay but six pence for.

The Poul.
I may not sell them so.

Ralf.
Fare you well then.

The Poul.
Here ye Syr: Cast th'other penye.

Ralf.
I will pay no more for.

The Poul.
You are a very hard man: Well, you shall haue them: I sell this day. Robin hoodes peners: Shall I fleae them?

Ralf. PURCHASE DECISION
Yea, here is your money. PURCHASE REALISATION
God be wy ser. FAREWELL

The Poul.
Well come Ser, at your commaundement.

BREAKING UP CONTACT

(Bellot 1586)

The service encounter is opened by the poulterer who, just like the traders in *Bartholomew Fair*, offers his service and his goods in the SERVICE BID (ll. 1–3).[8] The customer Ralf accepts this offer by presenting his needs (l. 5). This NEED PRESENTATION is a central element not only in EME, but in all service encounters. As every service interaction is carried out, because the customers want certain needs to be satisfied, these needs have to be expressed (verbally or non-verbally) at some point in the interaction.

In connection with the goods Ralf desires, several alternatives (ll. 6–8) are given in the NEED PRESENTATION of (2), which provide the learner with a choice of other poulterer's items. Word lists like these occur repeatedly in Bellot's work. Interrupting the flow of the conversation for a moment, they have to be ignored in the search for the actual structures underlying these modified dialogues.

Once the need has been presented, the requested goods are supplied and their quality is discussed in the SERVICE section (ll. 9–14). Activities like these can also be observed in PDE service interactions. However, in the EME samples, this constituent also serves another important function, which Becker (2003) terms PRE-BARGAINING. Both customer and seller try to create for themselves a good position for the price discussion that is to follow. In many of the model dialogues, their utterances form an almost ritualised sequence of doubting and praising the quality of the respective goods (Becker 2003: 290).

This discussion introduces the next and most extended component in this EME service interaction, the BARGAINING (ll. 15–44). It starts with Ralf raising the price question and continues with a lively discussion, in which both interactants haggle about the price. Again, this section contains a variety of expressions the learner can apply to either force down or push up the price (cf. e.g. ll. 21–22).

After the price is settled and Ralf has made his PURCHASE DECISION (which is not verbalised here), the PURCHASE REALISATION, i.e. the actual exchange of money and goods, is carried out. The PURCHASE REALISATION usually consists of a sequence of physical actions and is accompanied here by a verbal utterance (cf. ll. 45–46). A comment like this is included in all but one sample dialogue when the money is handed over. The fact that this is not common in authentic modern English data might suggest that the linguistic realisation of this element has changed. However, it appears more likely that the EME utterances were just used to visualise the physical activity, which would otherwise have remained unnoticed, since the coursebooks do not contain any other information on non-verbal or physical aspects of service encounters.

In contrast to the PURCHASE REALISATION which is dominated by physical activities, the next element in the interaction, the FAREWELL, is an essentially communicative element, in which the exchange is closed with terminating greetings (ll. 47–49).

The structural elements described above are not only characteristic of (2), they are confirmed by an analysis of the other model dialogues. Table 2 summarises these components of the EME service encounter and contrasts them with the prototypical structural elements found in PDE service interactions.

Table 2. Comparison of the global structural elements of EME and PDE service encounters

EME service encounters (example [2])	PDE service encounters
ESTABLISHING CONTACT	ESTABLISHING CONTACT
[GREETING]	GREETING
SERVICE BID (ll. 1–3)	SERVICE BID
NEED PRESENTATION (ll. 4–8)	NEED PRESENTATION
SERVICE/PRE-BARGAINING (ll. 9–14)	SERVICE
BARGAINING (ll. 15–44)	**Ø**
PURCHASE DECISION	PURCHASE DECISION
PURCHASE REALISATION (ll. 45–46)	PURCHASE REALISATION
FAREWELL (ll. 47–49)	FAREWELL
BREAKING UP CONTACT	BREAKING UP CONTACT

In Table 2, a major structural difference can be observed. As illustrated, the BARGAINING element constitutes the largest part of the EME sample, and this is also typical of four of the remaining dialogues in Bellot's coursebook and the example given in *A very profitable boke*. There, 212 out of 292 lines of dialogue are devoted to BARGAINING.[9] This indicates that bargaining must have played a significant role in EME service encounters, so that learners of English had to be provided with various phrases for discussions about the price. Besides, most of the model dialogues also demonstrate how the bargaining can be prepared by a discussion of the quality of goods (PRE-BARGAINING).

Research on PDE service interactions shows that the BARGAINING element appears to have lost its importance. Looking at our service encounters in bookstores, it is not surprising that – due to the fixed prices of books – there is no BARGAINING (and consequently also no PRE-BARGAINING) (Bös 2004). However, even in natural discourse carried out at the same location as the

EME dialogues, the marketplace, prices are nowadays usually accepted by the customer (cf. Lindenfeld 1994).

Generally, prices were apparently less fixed in the EME period, and this allowed for their discussion.[10] Still, some products obviously had fixed prices at that time. This is shown by Bellot's sample dialogue at an inn where the bill is immediately accepted by the guests. On the other hand, although bargaining is usually not part of service encounters in our modern western society, there are, of course, still a few occasions when prices are negotiated (e.g. bargaining for discounts for second-quality goods or expensive products such as cars).[11]

3.2. Local structure

The comparison of EME and PDE service encounters can also be extended to the local structure. I would like to demonstrate this by having a closer look at the NEED PRESENTATIONS of the service interactions. Forming an obligatory part of each service interaction, their function has remained stable over the centuries and can be analysed with respect to its changing realisations.[12]

Generally, all NEED PRESENTATIONS are based on the same illocution. They always contain some kind of customer demands for certain goods or services. Consequently, the request, or directive, is the central illocution in this element. Of course, this illocution can be expressed by a diversity of linguistic realisations ranging from straightforward imperatives to vague hints. In their modern English form, directives have been described e.g. in the studies by Ervin-Tripp (1976), Blum-Kulka (1987), and Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989). Ervin-Tripp's classification, which includes 6 types of directives, influenced the slightly more detailed system by Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper, where 9 request strategies are distinguished. Some of the categories proposed overlap, other forms are either characterised differently or (possibly due to the different data sets) not included in both systems.

Table 3 classifies the directives of EME NEED PRESENTATIONS and those found in the corpus of 100 PDE service encounters in bookstores (Bös 2004). It applies Ervin-Tripp's request types, which are assigned to Brown and Levinson's categories "on record" and "off record" (1987: 68–69). As the samples in Table 3 illustrate, both data include on-record requests, in which the communicative intention of the speaker is usually clear. These on-record directives can be further differentiated into direct and conventionally indirect types. Off-record, or non-conventionally indirect directives could only

be documented in the modern English material. They are marked by a high degree of ambiguity.

Table 3. Requests in EME and PDE NEED PRESENTATIONS

Types of directives	EME service encounters	PDE service encounters
ON RECORD		
Direct:		
– Imperatives	*Showe me* *Giue vs* *Bring vs*	*Ø*
– (Elliptic Forms)	*A fatte thippes. flesh*	*A ten pound book voucher, please*
Conventionally indirect:		
– Question directives	*Haue you any good broade cloth.* *How holde you a pounde of this chese?*	*Have you got erm [TITLE]* *Do you sell graphic novels*
– Permission directives	*Shal I haue shirtie for a peny?*	*Can I just pay for these*
– Imbedded imperatives	*Ø*	*Could you look up a couple of things for me*
OFF RECORD		
Non-conventionally indirect:		
– Need statements	*Ø*	*I'm looking for a book on salsa*
– Hints	*Ø*	*I can't find these books*

One of the most prominent differences can be observed in the use of direct speech acts, which are apparently more frequent in the EME than in the PDE samples. Ralf, the customer in (2), uses a plain imperative (*showe me*, l. 5) for his NEED PRESENTATION, and this means is also applied in three of the other EME model dialogues. A comparison with the results of the PDE study shows that the use of these bald on-record speech acts has markedly declined. In fact, the corpus does not contain any imperatives at all. The only direct NEED PRESENTATION we find, beside some real information questions (e.g. *where are your investment books?*), is one elliptic form (*a ten pound*

book voucher, please), a structure which is also suggested in one of the EME sample texts (again with several alternatives: *A fatte thippes. flesh. / A side of porke. / This breast of beefe*, etc.).

Conventionally indirect forms like question directives can equally be discovered in both sources. What appears like an information question at first can serve as a pre-request (as we will see later on, cf. Table 4), but it is more frequently taken as an indirect expression of the request itself. In this case, it is often followed by the immediate supply of the goods or services asked for. What is specific to the EME material (due to the fact that prices were less fixed) is the many price enquiries covered in the question directives. Utterances like *Good wife, what is the price of an elle of this clothe*, *How holde you a tankard of this wine*, *How many for a peny?*, etc. are listed in both EME coursebooks. Apart from the variety of forms they show the learner that the price question can (and probably should be) brought up right away, so that frequently the NEED PRESENTATION immediately leads to the BARGAINING.

Permission directives are characterised by the fact that "[b]ringing about the condition stated requires an action by the hearer other than merely granting permission" (Ervin-Tripp 1976: 29). They can be described by the formula *modal + speaker reference + verb + ?*. The only two EME samples illustrate that permission directives can refer to one or several beneficiaries (*Shal I haue shirtie for a peny?* vs. *shall we haue a pynte of wine well drawen?*). In the modern English corpus, where we find no more than four instances, permission directives are also rather rare.

The third group of conventionally indirect requests, the imbedded imperatives (like *could you look up a couple of things for me*), are among the most frequent types found in the modern English data. According to Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987: 109), they are explicit (and consequently on record) in two ways: They contain a propositional component, which clearly states the action requested of the addressee (i.e. *look up a couple of things for me*); and they are explicit with regard to the speech act's felicity conditions, in this case the ability of the addressee (*could you*). Imbedded imperatives are, of course, conventionalised to a degree which does not allow for a direct interpretation as information questions in this context, but they are generally treated as polite requests or at least as pre-requests (see below). Interestingly, this frequent modern English form is not applied in the EME service encounters at all. A study by Kohnen (2002: 172) shows, however, that these constructions started to emerge in the spoken language of that period.

As has been mentioned above, another group which is lacking in the EME data is that of non-conventionally indirect, i.e. off-record, requests. Only the

modern English material includes instances of need statements and hints, which take a declarative form (in contrast to the interrogative form of conventionally indirect types of requests). Especially hints can be very vague expressions of the actual illocution. However, all the hints in the modern English corpus contain a reference to the actual request and are thus what Blum-Kulka (1989) refers to as "strong hints" (in contrast to the much more ambiguous "mild hints").

Table 4 illustrates that in the sequential organisation of the NEED PRESENTATIONS similarities can be discovered. Beside simple-structured NEED PRESENTATIONS, consisting of only one turn, more complex structures are displayed as well. For instance, in both the EME and the PDE data, NEED PRESENTATIONS containing a pre-request can be found. Since customers (or people in general) want to avoid a refusal of their requests (i.e. a dispreferred turn according to Levinson [1983: 336]), pre-requests can be used to prepare the actual request. As shown in the examples in Table 4, customers can check, for instance, the availability of certain goods (cf. the EME sample) or the ability of the addressee (cf. the PDE sample). In both cases, the customers try to confirm certain preconditions with their pre-requests. Both servers then ask for a specification of the needs, which is given by the customers in the third turn.

Table 4. Sequential organisation of NEED PRESENTATIONS in EME and PDE service encounters

Sequential organisation		EME service encounters	PDE service encounters
Simple NEED PRESENTATION		*Showe me a coupell of good, and fatte Rabettes.*	*I'd like two ten pound vouchers please*
Complex NEED PRESENTATION			
Pre-request	Customer:	*Haue you any good broade cloth. ...*	*Can you check a book for me*
	Server:	*What collour will ye haue. I haue fayre whitte. Blacke. ... I have of all collours, and of all prices.*	*Yeah what are you looking for*
+ Request	Customer:	*Showe me some fayre darke greené if you haue any.*	*Er it's called the Dalai Lama's book of Transformation*

To sum up, we can say that regarding the sequential organisation of the NEED PRESENTATION, EME service encounters and their modern equivalents show more parallels than in their application of certain forms of requests. In the EME examples, direct and conventionally indirect speech acts (or, more specifically, question directives) dominate, whereas off-record strategies are not used. In contrast to that, the NEED PRESENTATIONS in the corpus of PDE service interactions are mainly realised by conventionally indirect and non-conventionally indirect forms while only a small percentage are direct speech acts (which are, apart from one exception, real information questions).[13]

Requests are generally considered to be face-threatening (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987: 65 ff.). Particularly their direct expression is today regarded as problematic, because it severely restricts the addressee's options. Indirect speech acts allow for more choice and are consequently less face-threatening, although the most indirect forms are not necessarily the most polite ones. As Blum-Kulka points out, conventionally indirect requests are seen as most polite, since the relation between pragmatic clarity on the one hand and the necessity to avoid coercion on the other is well-balanced (1987: 131). With almost 40 per cent, this form is the preferred one in the modern English corpus. Looking at the EME forms of request with our contemporary expectations, we might perceive the repeated use of bare imperatives as rude.[14]

The fact that direct strategies were obviously a frequent means in EME service encounters is confirmed in the other parts of the interaction, particularly when the participants haggle about the price.[15] In the BARGAINING section of (2) we encounter many more imperatives, e.g. *Tell me your lowest word* (l. 26), *Here ye Syr: Cast th'other penye* (l. 39), and this list could be continued with instances from all the other model dialogues. Interestingly, these imperatives are not only used to make directives, but also to give warnings (*be reasonable*, l. 29). Both speakers object to the other's notion about the price. Complaints like these are, of course, conflictive by their very nature (cf. Olshtain and Weinbach 1993) and therefore often softened by their indirect expression. However, Ralf's protest in (2) consists of open face-threatening acts: *It is to much, you are to, deare, They be not worth so much* (ll. 21–22).

Another striking feature is Ralf's abrupt *Fare you well then* in l. 37, when the price discussion seems stuck. By using the FAREWELL as a negotiating strategy, Ralf threatens the poulterer, indicating that he will leave if the server is not willing to give in. Since this would mean the loss of the sale, the poulterer finally makes a concession and Ralf's strategy is crowned with success. That this is not an exception can be seen in the dialogue in *A very profitable boke*, where the FAREWELL strategy is also applied (even repeatedly). In this

case, not only the customer Daniel threatens with BREAKING UP CONTACT. Even Katherine, the seller, pretends to break off the negotiation (*Fare well then. go se i another place whether you cã buie for lesse money*), but she then hastens to continue (*You shall buye no Where better chepe.*).

Despite this hard and stubborn BARGAINING, the final exchange of greetings in the real FAREWELL is usually – and in our eyes maybe surprisingly – pleasant. Once the sale is settled, the interactants are relaxed and friendly, as the following extract from the dialogue just mentioned demonstrates:

(3) K *Now I am paied Will you haue it brought to you? I will see it brought home. Nowe boye, take this, and folowe hym.*
D *It is no nede, I will easely beare it my self. Farewel good wife.*
K *Frend I thãke you If you nede of / any thyng at other tymes come to me, and you shall haue it very good chepe.*
D *Well Dame, I will gladly. Fare well.*

(*A very profitable boke*, 1554)

This suggests that the use of direct – and from our perspective impolite – strategies did not have any negative effects on the relationship between customer and server in the EME service interactions (as they certainly would if we applied the same strategies today). The use of polite address forms (*good wife*, *Frend*, *Dame*), which often increases towards the end of the interaction (cf. Becker 2003: 35), as well as greeting formulae and blessings apparently stabilise the customer-server relationship in preparation for future interactions.

4. Conclusion

Although there are numerous references to service encounters in EME texts which convey a good impression of their range and variety (cf. section 2), relatively few text samples are documented in the available sources. One of the richest sources are English-language coursebooks of the period.

The service interactions displayed in the seven model dialogues in two EME coursebooks look familiar to the modern reader at first glance. The general aim of the interaction, i.e. the satisfaction of a certain need, has remained the same as ever; we recognise typical structural elements and comprehend the functions of the participants' utterances. A closer comparison, however, reveals some variance between EME service interactions and their

modern counterparts. Of course, the data base of EME service encounters analysed here is much too small to allow for generalisations, but – with the necessary caution – some tendencies can be indicated.

The most obvious difference in the global structure is the existence of a (quite extended) BARGAINING section in EME service encounters, which is often prepared with a PRE-BARGAINING element. These constituents are, for the most part, absent in PDE ones. This structural distinction reflects a change in the market conditions. While more prices were negotiable in the EME period, prices are nowadays fixed in the western world for most of the goods and services on offer.

An analysis of the local structures suggests that in the EME service encounters other linguistic strategies than in the PDE ones were preferred. Examining the forms of directives in the obligatory NEED PRESENTATIONS, the EME samples display a general lack of non-conventionally indirect requests and a considerable number of on-record strategies like imperatives and question directives asking for the availability of certain goods or their price. Other on-record strategies like imbedded imperatives, which are frequent in modern English, are missing. These results might support Busse's (2002) hypothesis that there has been a shift from requests asserting speaker sincerity (e.g. imperatives) to requests referring to the ability or willingness of the addressee (e.g. imbedded imperatives).

The impression that there was a preference for more direct strategies is supported by a look at the linguistic realisation of the BARGAINING elements, where we find more imperatives and direct complaints. Since language coursebooks can be taken as (idealised) representations of what was considered to be adequate behaviour in certain speech situation, these direct strategies, which might nowadays be perceived as impolite, were obviously acceptable forms. The reasons for the apparent shift in politeness strategies will have to be left to further discussion.

Notes

1. A variety of these documents is reproduced in Cusack (1998).
2. Many plays by Shakespeare and his contemporaries include master-servant dialogues. For a discussion of master-servant relationships cf. e.g. Thornton Burnett (1997).
3. A contemporary poem (cited in Ashley 1988: 67–68) makes humorous reference to people from various trades and crafts (e.g. plumbers, butchers, carmen,

fishmongers, tailors, etc.) who used to attend different pubs with suitable names (e.g. the Fountain, the Bull, the Bridewell Dock, the Dolphin, the Shears, etc.).

4. The fact that there were strict regulations for the making and selling of bread is demonstrated in *The Assise of Bread ... Together with Sundrie Good and Needfull Ordinances for Bakers, Brewers, Inholders, Victualiers, Vintners, and Butchers* (1600). In: Cowen Orlin (1995: 100–101).
5. E.g. "Leaden Hall Market" from Hugh Alley (1598), *A Caveatt for the Citty of London* (reproduced in Cowen Orlin 1995: 85).
6. Similar service bids and street cries can be found, for example, in Dekker's *The Shoemakers Holiday* (e.g. in Act IV, Scene i), and in *Turners Dish of Lenten Stuff* (1612) (cf. Pritchard 1999: 164–166).
7. This book goes back to a version of Noël van Barlement's *Vocabulaire* (1551).
8. ESTABLISHING CONTACT and BREAKING UP CONTACT are considered obligatory elements to create the face-to-face situation necessary for a service interaction. They are basically physical actions and do usually not involve any verbal utterances.
9. Cf. Radtke's (1994) discussion of the French version of *A very profitable boke*.
10. Cf. Lebsanft's results for medieval French service encounters (1999).
11. In non-western societies bargaining is, of course, still a very important element in service interactions (cf. e.g. Traverso's study on Syrian service encounters [2001]).
12. Becker (2003), in her analysis of address terms and discourse markers, proceeds in the opposite way, assigning function to form.
13. The rest of the requests in the modern English NEED PRESENTATIONS is realised by various combinations of forms. What is remarkable is that, in these cases, an off-record strategy (i.e. the vaguer one) is used first, before an on-record form is added.
14. It could be discussed to what extent the preference for bald on-record speech acts in the EME model dialogues is related to the fact that off-record strategies are obviously more difficult to teach.
15. For a more detailed discussion of the bargaining section in EME model dialogues cf. Becker (2003).

References

A very profitable boke

1554 *A very profitable boke to lerne the maner of redyng, writyng, & speakyng english and Spanish*. Menston: The Scolar Press Limited, 1971.

Ashley, Leonard R. N.

1988 *Elizabethan Popular Culture*. Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.

Becker, Monika
2003 *Familiar Dialogues in Englyssh and Frenche. Sprachliche Interaktion und ihre Vermittlung in der frühen Neuzeit*. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
Bellot, James
1586 *Familiar Dialogues*. Menston: The Scolar Press Limited, 1969.
Blum-Kulka, Shoshana
1987 Indirectness and politeness in requests: Same or different? *Journal of Pragmatics* 11: 131–146.
1989 Playing it safe: The role of conventionality in indirectness. In Shoshana Blum-Kulka, Juliane House, and Gabriele Kasper (eds.), 37–69.
Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, Juliane House, and Gabriele Kasper (eds.)
1989 *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
The Boke of Kervynge
1508 *The Boke of Kervynge*. London: printed by Wynkyn de Worde. ⟨www.milkmama.tripod.com/kervynge2.html⟩
Bös, Birte
2004 *Integrative Darstellung englischer Serviceinteraktionen: Verbale, nonverbale, physische und kognitive Aspekte*. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.
Brons-Albert, Ruth
1995 *Auswirkungen von Kommunikationstraining auf das Gesprächsverhalten*. Tübingen: Narr.
Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson
1987 *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, Roger, and Albert Gilman
1989 Politeness theory and Shakespeare's four major tragedies. *Language in Society* 18: 159–212.
Busse, Ulrich
2002 *Linguistic Variation in the Shakespeare Corpus: Morpho-syntactic Variability of Second Person Pronouns*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 106.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Clark, Peter
1983 *The English Alehouse: A Social History 1200–1830*. London/New York: Longman.
Cowen Orlin, Lena
1995 *Elizabethan Households: An Anthology*. Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library.
Cusack, Bridget
1998 *Everyday English 1500–1700: A Reader*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Day, Angell
1586 *The English Secretorie: Wherein is Contayned, A Perfect Method for the Inditing of all Manner of Epistles*. In Lena Cowen Orlin 1995: 49.
Dekker, Thomas
1599 *The Shoemaker's Holiday*. In *Four Great Elizabethan Plays*. New York: Bantam Books, 1960.
Ervin-Tripp, Susan
1976 Is Sybil there? The structure of some American English directives. *Language in Society* 5: 25–66.
Ervin-Tripp, Susan, Amy Strage, Martin Lampert, and Nancy Bell
1987 Understanding requests. *Linguistics* 25: 107–143.
Franke, Wilhelm
1985 Das Verkaufs-/Einkaufsgespräch: Entwicklung eines dialoggrammatischen Beschreibungskonzepts. *Wirkendes Wort* 1: 53–72.
Halliday, M. A. K., and Ruqaiya Hasan
1980 Text and context: Aspects of language in a social-semiotic perspective. *Sophia Linguistica. Working Papers in Linguistics* 6: 4–91.
Harrison, William
1577 *Holinshed's Chronicle*, Chapter IV. ⟨www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1577/harrison-england.html⟩
Henne, Helmut, and Helmut Rehbock
1995 *Einführung in die Gesprächsanalyse*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Holmes, Martin
1969 *Elizabethan London*. London: Cassell.
Jacobs, Andreas, and Andreas H. Jucker
1995 The historical perspective in pragmatics. In Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 3–33.
Jonson, Ben
1614 *Bartholomew Fair*. London: Nick Hern Books, 1997.
Jucker, Andreas H. (ed.)
1995 *Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in the History of English*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 35.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Jucker, Andreas H., Gerd Fritz, and Franz Lebsanft (eds.)
1999 *Historical Dialogue Analysis*. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 66.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Kohnen, Thomas
2002 Towards a history of English directives. In *Text Types and Corpora: Studies in Honour of Udo Fries*, Andreas Fischer, Gunnel Tottie, and Hans Martin Lehmann (eds.), 165–175. Tübingen: Narr.

Kopytko, Roman
1995 Linguistic politeness strategies in Shakespeare's plays. In Andreas H. Jucker (ed.), 515–540.
Lebsanft, Franz
1999 A Late Medieval French bargain dialogue (Pathelin II). Or: Further remarks on the history of dialogue forms. In Andreas Jucker, Gerd Fritz, and Franz Lebsanft (eds.), 268–292.
Levinson, Stephen
1983 *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindenfeld, Jacqueline
1994 Cognitive processes and social norms in natural discourse at the marketplace. *Journal of Pragmatics* 22: 465–476.
Olshtain, Elite, and Liora Weinbach
1993 Interlanguage features of the speech act of complaining. In *Interlanguage Pragmatics*, Gabriele Kasper and Shoshana Blum-Kulka (eds.), 108–122. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oxford English Dictionary
1992 *Oxford English Dictionary*. CD-ROM. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Platter, Thomas
1599 *Thomas Platter's Travels in England 1599*. Clare Williams (trans. and ed.). London: Cape, 1937.
Pritchard, Ron E.
1999 *Shakespeare's England: Life in Elizabethan & Jacobean Times*. Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing Limited.
Radtke, Edgar
1994 *Gesprochenes Französisch und Sprachgeschichte: Zur Rekonstruktion der Gesprächskonstitution in Dialogen französischer Sprachlehrbücher*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Singman, Jeffrey L.
1995 *Daily Life in Elizabethan England*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Smith, Thomas
1581 *A Compendious or Briefe Examination of Certayne Ordinary Complaints of Divers of our Country Men in These our Dayes, ...* In Lena Cowen Orlin 1995: 91–92.
Thornton Burnett, Mark
1997 *Masters and Servants in English Renaissance Drama and Culture*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press.
Traverso, Véronique
2001 Syrian service encounters: A case of shifting strategies within verbal exchange. *Pragmatics* 11 (4): 421–444.

Ventola, Eija
1987 *The Structure of Social Interaction: A Systematic Approach to the Semiotics of Service Encounters*. London: Frances Pinter.
Watts, Richard
1999 Refugiate in a strange countrey: Learning English through dialogues in the 16th century. In Andreas Jucker, Gerd Fritz, and Franz Lebsanft (eds.), 215–241.
Whitney, Isabella
1573 *Wyll and Testament*. In R. E. Pritchard 1999: 158–163.
Woolley, Hannah
1675 *The Gentlewoman's Companion: or, A Guide to the Female Sex*. ⟨www.onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/subjecstart?BH-BJ⟩

Letters as narrative: Narrative patterns and episode structure in early letters, 1400 to 1650

Monika Fludernik

1. Introduction

In this chapter I offer results drawn from the analysis of early letters as part of a larger project on the development of narrative structure in texts from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Work in progress on the development of narrative structure in a selected number of genres between 1250 and 1750 includes an analysis of the earliest letters extant from the fifteenth century to the end of the Renaissance period. As put forward in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology* (Fludernik 1996), the basic presupposition of this research is that early vernacular genres of narrative tend to be inspired by a cognitively based episodic structure of narrative that even today can be seen to operate in conversational storytelling (Labov and Waletzky 1967; Fludernik 1991, 1992a, 1992b). This substrate of episodic narrative, it is further argued, persists in narrative genres throughout the Middle English period and slowly gives way to more teleological forms of narration (Ermarth 1981). The process of the dissolution of the narrative episode is therefore linked with the constitution of those narrative structures that are responsible for shaping the texture of the novel. This research is discussed in this collection as an example of historical pragmatics from a literary perspective or of how the concerns of diachronic narratology intersect with historical pragmatics as a linguistic discipline. My work concentrates on genres, on linguistic items such as syntactic features and discourse markers that are also studied by "pure" linguists, but it places these analyses within a wider framework of literary history and negotiates the interaction between a literary, narratological focus and linguistic methodology. One of the questions that I hope this research will help to stimulate is the relationship between literary and linguistic definitions of genre.

Letters are a particularly interesting genre as regards their narrativity. Whereas other genres, such as verse and prose romances, verse and prose saints' lives, or historical texts, are clearly *narrative* under most definitions of the term, letters initially belong to communication-based genres; they are

a written version of interaction between displaced interlocutors. This spontaneous expectation needs to be somewhat modified. Although letters are based on a communicative structure (A addresses B in the letter), they may be (partly) narrative as well as merely communicative (asking for advice; persuading the addressee to give the writer more money; inviting the addressee to a wedding; etc.).[1] For literary scholars, especially, the existence of epistolary fiction immediately raises the expectation that letters must have narrative quality, and this expectation is further enhanced by the practice of present-day private letters, which tend to be predominantly narrative.[2]

In fact, epistolary fiction took its inspiration not from actual letters but from translations and imitations of the *Lettres Portugaises* (Würzbach 1969) and from a tradition of letter-writing manuals that – imitating Ovid's *Heroides* – had started to tell stories of unhappy love affairs in letter format (Kany 1937). My choice of the letter as one of the major genres to be analysed was additionally motivated by the presumed "orality" or, better, informality of the genre, which seemed to promise an easy transition from natural storytelling to letter writing. Letters therefore initially seemed to be a likely hunting ground for reflexes of the narrative episode. However, present-day expectations of letter writing as informal language close to the pole of orality as in Biber's model (Biber 1991) are not at all relevant to the beginnings of the epistolary genre. Early letters, especially those of the fifteenth century, are extremely formulaic in structure and form, and peculiarly resistant to expressive and narrative elaboration (Nevalainen 2001). The expression of subjectivity became a key feature of letter writing only during the Restoration period as Fitzmaurice's (2002) examples demonstrate. In my corpus personal feelings and emotions register very rarely indeed. As it turned out, early letters were in fact resistant to the influence of orality and tended to imitate scriptorial language of Latin origin or at least eschewed emotionality and spontaneity (Guillén 1986). As Kany (1937) and Visconti (1994) demonstrate, the epistolary novel's narrative quality stems from the fictionalizing tendencies in the letter collections which were used as models for writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and which the *Lettres Portugaises* develop into a new genre, epistolary fiction (cf. Würzbach 1964).

2. Research questions, hypotheses and corpus

The larger project of which this research is part concerns the development of narrative structure between 1250 and 1750. The general framework is that of the rise of the novel from a discourse-related perspective, with the attempt

to explain how narrative surface structure develops so that the episodic narrative of the Middle Ages transforms itself into the non-episodic narrative discourse of the novel. This transformation of the narrative texts is a long and gradual process. At one end there are series of narrative episodes; at the other end blocks of report, comment, dialogue and description (Bonheim 1982).

In determining how this process of change works, the project looks at a number of narrative genres (irrespective of whether they are fictional or non-fictional) and analyses the prevalence of narrative episodes, how these get dissolved and how a new non-episodic discourse emerges. I am interested in analysing a large textual corpus for each genre and in attempting to corroborate or modify hypotheses developed from the initial survey I conducted in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology* (1996).

The following hypotheses were part of the earlier project:

Hypothesis 1. Vernacular English narrative, where it is not constrained by Latin pretext, has a dominantly episodic structure which remains in force well into the seventeenth century, with some fossils still appearing in the eighteenth-century novel. This is to be checked against a larger corpus.

Although episodic narrative structure will be explained in more detail below, briefly, what I am referring to here is a narrative structure which consists in a series of episodes (defined by an episode onset, episode centre and episode conclusion) strung together (Ermarth 1981). Episodic narrative typically occurs in conversational narrative. Its presence in the written medieval vernaculars can be explained as a substrate from oral storytelling patterns.

Hypothesis 2. The structure of narrative that underlies the novel emerges from developments in episodic narrative that expand and eventually dissolve the patterns of episodic narrative. The process is also influenced by the model of Latin prose and by the example of genres that are primarily descriptive, reportative and argumentative (travelogues, scientific texts, religious treatises, sermons). In particular, the spread of Latinate syntax, notably the use of relative clauses instead of separate sentences with demonstrative anaphorics, can be argued to enhance the process of discourse levelling.

Hypothesis 3. The change from episodic to non-episodic narrative is strongly triggered by the expansion of dialogue, of descriptive passages and of thought representation within the episodes.

Signs of the extension and modification of the episodic narrative pattern can be observed from the very beginning. Even in Middle English texts, for instance, dialogue scenes are quite common. In these the dynamic exchange of views and the verbal interaction of interlocutors start to grow into independent constituents of the narrative (Herlyn, in progress), even when they

often can be read as part of an extended episode. In Fludernik (1996) I also noted that seventeenth-century texts start to expand the narrative episode by means of consciousness scenes in which the thoughts, feelings and emotions of protagonists are presented in detail. Another expanding feature is description. Although this occurs less frequently within narrative episodes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,[3] descriptive passages soar in importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in the diaries and travelogues come to displace in importance reportative sequences.

The levelling of episodic narrative is moreover crucially enhanced by the merging of episode endings with episode beginnings while episode-central incidences disappear or are actions by the protagonist rather than events impinging on him/her.

Hypothesis 4. As I also noted in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*, the dissolution of the narrative episode comes about not merely through the expansion of its size (by means of dialogue, thought representation or description) but also by the change of emphasis from encountered incidences (the core of the experiential episode) to deliberate action and involvement with the world on the part of the protagonist(s). In Fludernik (1996) I discussed this development in reference to the early picaresque novel, showing how the villain or *picáro* moves from one canny stratagem to the other, with the successful cheating of his victims serving as conclusion to the narrative episode. Moreover, I pointed out that the loss of the central incidence in narrative episodes also frequently causes a running of episodes into one another in a way that makes the distinction between episode beginnings (incipits) and result/conclusion points difficult to determine in practice: the closure of one episode consists in the action that initiates the following episode. It can now be seen that these developments (the emphasis on action, the seamless enchaining of episodes to result in extended action sequences) do not arise as late as the Renaissance but can already be found in earlier narrative genres at the end of the Middle Ages, though perhaps not in such profusion as after the 1550s.

These hypotheses also give rise to a number of new questions.

Question 1. Are developments chronological or genre-specific, i.e. do they occur in all genres at the same time or earlier/later in some genres?

Question 2. Do developments occur synchronously in verse and prose genres?

Question 3. What is the relationship of Latinate syntax, especially of non-hypotactic relative clauses (*relativischer Anschluß*), to the episodic narrative structure, and how does it influence the transition from episodic to non-episodic narrative?

The analyses pay particular attention to those features marking the slots of the narrative episodes: discourse markers, the use of the historical present tense, subject–verb inversion, preposing of constituents. They also focus on narratological features such as plot management by the narrator figure.

Corpus. In this chapter the preliminary results of my analysis of the letter corpus will be presented. This non-computer-readable corpus consists of twenty-three early letter collections selected because of their prominence in the *Helsinki Corpus* (see Appendix, Table 1 for the full list). In contrast to the *Helsinki Corpus*, which has only selected letters from these collections, here *all* letters in each collection have been analysed. This has allowed me to compare the incidence of narrative letters and episodes statistically, without, it is hoped, foregoing the representativeness of the corpus.

Before turning to my results, more information on the narrative episodes and on the definition of narrativity will be necessary.

3. The narrative episode

Narrative episodes in this research are characterized by a frame of abstract and coda on the Labovian model (Labov and Waletzky 1967); they have an initial orientation section, and may include internal sections of delayed orientation and narrative comment. The key points of the recursive narrative episode are the onset of the narrative episode, called incipit (*so off he went to the pub*); its central setting plus incidence (*as I was hugging my pint, in comes Joe and says*); sometimes a reaction to this incidence (*I answered*); and a result/resolution point (*so I struck him and he went down*). There can be several incidences in one episode, and several reaction and result points, so this structure is fairly flexible in the handling of narrative. Usually, a narrative will consist of several narrative episodes in concatenation framed by the initial abstract and orientation and the concluding coda.

Abstract – Orientation – {[episode 1][episode 2][...][episode n]} – Evaluation – Coda
↑ ↑
initial incipit final resolution

Episode pattern:
incipit – (narrative clauses) – setting – incidence(s) – situative – result(s)

Figure 1. Episodic narrative structure (Fludernik 1996: 65)

To illustrate the shape of a narrative episode, let me quote a long letter of Dr. Nicholas West, the later Archbishop of Ely, to Henry VIII. The letter contains some fifteen narrative episodes and is therefore one of the most consistently narrative letters in the corpus. The passage quoted here employs a number of discourse markers:

(1) a. … for wher they that spake fayr to your Grace and gaf you not the best counsell wold peradventur deceve you, he would rather dee with you then see your Grace take any dishonor: **and therwith** the busshop of Galaway, Dean of the Chapell, ascertaigned hym that it was past none, **and then** he toke me by the arm and went in to a chamber, **and** I said to hym Sir, sithe your Grace wol aunswer nor doo non otherwise then ye have said, and I that have no farther charge I beseche you gif me licence to depart, **and** he said with good wyll, **and soo** I toke my leyf for the consideracions above writen, **And then** he said I must goo see the Quene and the Prince at Lythgo. for she had ordened [*sic*] tokens for your Grace and for the Quene: **and** I answered that I was right well contented soo to doo if it wer his pleasor.

(13 April 1513; *Original Letters*, Ellis 1824: 73)

b.

… for wher they that spake fayr to your Grace and gaf you not the best counsell wold peradventur deceve you, he would rather dee with you then see your Grace take any dishonor:	(free indirect speech)
and therwith the busshop of Galaway, Dean of the Chapell, ascertaigned hym that it was past none,	result
and then he toke me by the arm and went in to a chamber,	incipit
and I said to hym Sir, sithe your Grace wol aunswer nor doo non otherwise then ye have said, and I that have no farther charge I beseche you gif me licence to depart,	incidence
and he said with good wyll,	reaction
and soo I toke my leyf for the consideracions above writen,	result
And then he said I must goo see the Quene and the Prince at Lythgo.	incipit
for she had ordened [*sic*] tokens for your Grace and for the Quene:	incidence
and I answered that I was right well contented soo to doo if it wer his pleasor.	result/ reaction

Dr. West was England's ambassador to the Scottish court of James IV. The passage demonstrates the sequence of two brief narrative episodes. The pre-

ponderance of parataxis, and the use of discourse markers (printed in bold) are typical of the narrative episode pattern.

Letters and narrativity

Literary accounts of the epistolary novel frequently bear the assumption that this genre emerged by imitating real-life correspondence in a fictional framework. This observation correlates with a general tendency to see the novel as a coalescence of earlier narrative genres; see Day (1966), Davis (1983), Hunter (1990). However, closer analysis of extant collections of family letters and political correspondence demonstrates that the telling of stories was only rarely indulged in in these texts. Most early letters are brief, business-like and unemotional; they emphasize report, persuasion and polite indirection and do not give much room to the expression of the letter writer's emotions, or to extensive accounts of personal experience (see also Nevalainen 2001). Where narrative does take over, it occurs mostly in intelligence reports, battle accounts or in other political contexts as in Sir Thomas More's explanations about his involvement with the Maid of Kent.

This unexpected scarcity of narrative can be linked to the purposes of Early Modern letter writing which consisted mostly in business dealings and, due to the very real possibility of letters going astray, avoided any too open comments on current political events. With letters dictated to amanuenses, sent by messengers and perhaps read out to recipients by private secretaries, personal experiences and domestic events dropped from view. It is even likely that a narrative of such household events was provided in personal communication by the messenger rather than committed to paper.

When I say that there is very little narrative in the early letters, I define narrative as a quality that exceeds mere reporting and devotes some space to the presentation of events in the form of narrative episodes. Consider the difference. In (2) several occurrences are mentioned in report-like fashion, but no extended account of them is provided. In (3), on the other hand, a real narrative is told in the form of the narrative episode pattern:

(2) This morning came Hugh May to mee and told mee that there is one Baker, since my wife's death, has sued the Duke of Buckingham for an annuity wch her husband, Mr. Lyster, purchassed of Hugh May, wch was to be paid him by the Duke during his life; and that his pretence is, that he bought Martin Lyster's title to the sayd annuity of him. I have not yet had time to examine those papers wch I have concerning that businesse; but I beleeve I shall find that Baker has

forged this pretence, and that the 500[li] which he has recovered of the Duke did belong to my wife, Martin having never parted with his interest therein to him.

(16 August 1664; *Hatton Letters*, Thompson 1965, 1: 35)

(3)

Not long since the Prince, understanding that the *Infanta* was used to go some mornings to the *Casa de Campo*, a Summer-house the King hath on t'other side the River, to gather *May-dew*,	delayed orientation
he rose betimes and went thither, taking your Brother with him; they were let into the House, and into the Garden, but the *Infanta* was in the Orchard:	incipit
and there being a high partition-wall between, and the door doubly bolted,	delayed orientation
the Prince got on the top of the wall, and sprung down a great height, and so made towards her;	incidences
but she spying him first of all the rest, gave a shriek, and ran back:	reaction 1
the old Marquis that was then her Guardian came towards the Prince, and fell on his knees, conjuring His Highness to retire, in regard he hazarded his Head if he admitted any to her company;	reaction 2
so the door was open'd, and he came out under that wall over which he had got in.	result

(James Howell to Captain Thomas Porter, 10 July 1623;
Kermode and Kermode 2003: 17)

In (2), Sir Charles Lyttleton communicates to Christopher Hatton that he had a visit from Hugh May who told him of a suit against the Duke of Buckingham. Although both Lyttleton's account of the visit and the report given by May are concerned with events, neither constitutes a proper narrative since they mention, or report and comment on, these events rather than making a story of them. Not only does the passage lack the *formal* features of a narrative episode (incipit – incidence – result); it also lacks an experiential core, an emotional or evaluative reaction to the events on the part of the protagonist, a consistent uniformity of agent and patient, or a proper explanatory framework.[4]

Contrast (2) with (3), James Howell's account of Prince Charles's behaviour at the Spanish court, where the later Charles I behaves as a womanizer. Here

the frustrated attempt to woo the Infanta is presented in the shape of a narrative episode. The whereabouts of the princess are detailed in a clause of delayed orientation ("understanding that …"), the Prince's initiation of the hoped-for encounter provides the incipit point ("he rose … they were let into the House"), Charles jumping over the wall constitutes the incidence, and the Infanta's flight the reaction (*but*-clause) with the interception of the Prince and his eviction from the orchard providing the conclusion to the episode ("so the door was open'd"). To contrast this with a report of the episode, one might have had "The Prince this morning jumped over the wall into the orchard to rendezvous the Infanta, but was stalled by her guard." The liveliness of the narrative in contradistinction to the plainness of the report consists in a delineation of many individual actions by the protagonists – getting up early, climbing the wall, jumping down from it, the Infanta shrieking, etc. – which allow the reader to picture the scene in some detail; it also depends on the presentation of Charles's purposiveness, the frustration of his plans, and the rather humiliating exit from the orchard which suggest the emotional analogues of these experiences to the reader.

Examples (2) and (3) also illustrate that report and narrative episode are not opposites of a binary opposition but parts of a scale from zero-degree narrativity to more pronounced forms of narrativity. Our episode could of course have been much expanded towards increased narrativity by introducing Charles's plans in more detail in dialogue with his companion, by allowing a glimpse into the mind of the Infanta, particularly her fears, or by a rendering of Charles's thoughts as he was forced to quit the field. Such tendencies towards the introduction of dialogue and thought representation would necessarily fictionalize the tale. Howell's account, as a report by a retainer about events in which he was not personally involved, necessarily is unable to supply such information (we cannot see into other people's minds). Since there are few narratives of personal experience in my corpus of Early Modern letters, a full flourishing of narrativity on these lines is not yet encountered in the early letters.

Let us now turn to some more specific results of work in progress, the shape of narrative episodes in the letters, and the inventory of discourse markers in the letter corpus in comparison with other genres.

4. Results: The narrative episode

As Table 1 in the Appendix indicates, narrative letters are comparatively rare in the various collections, and frequently there are only a few letters

that have a greater number of narrative episodes. There is no steady chronological increase in narrativity, but those collections which have narratives tend to have more of them in the late sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries.

One of the most extended and sensational narrative letters is the account by Anthony Thacher of his shipwreck in New England in 1635 which he sent to his brother. Here is an extract from this letter as printed in Kermode and Kermode (2003):

(4)

While I was thus above the waters I saw a piece of the mast as I supposed about three foot long	incipit
which I labored to catch into my arms,	setting
but suddenly I was overwhelmed with water and driven to and fro again	incidence
and at last I felt the ground with my right foot.	result
Immediately I was violently thrown groveling on my face.	incipit
When presently I recovered my feet	setting
[I] was in the water up to my breast and through God's great mercy had my face to the shore and not to the sea.	incidence
I made haste to get out	reaction
but was thrown down on my hands with the waves	result 1
and so with safety crept forth to the dry shore,	result 2
where, blessing God, I turned about to look for my children and friends	incipit
but saw neither them nor any part of the pinnace where I left them as I supposed,	setting 1
but I saw my wife about a butt-length from me, getting herself forth from amongst the timber of the broken bark,	incidence 1
but before I could get unto her	setting 2
she was gotten to the shore.	incidence 2
When we were come each to other we went up into the land and sat us down under a cedar tree, which the winds had thrown down,	result
where we sat about an hour, even dead with cold, for I was glad to put off my breeches, they being rent all to pieces in the rocks.	macro-result

(Anthony Thacher to Peter Thacher, September 1635;
Kermode and Kermode 2003: 31–32)

Thacher has been drowning, but comes to stand on a sandbank, therefore is safely "above the waters" at the onset of this section of the narrative. He is thrown down by grappling with the ship's mast (incidence), but recovers and ends up saving himself ("so with safety crept"). He then sees his wife, tries to help her, but she makes it ashore by herself. The episode ends with a coda that describes the couple's rest after their ordeal. This is an episode of a narrative of personal experience, and it portrays a clearly sensational stage in the narrative, the saving of Thacher and his wife from drowning. The experientiality of this narrative is well in evidence: Thacher's motives are freely discussed ("labored to catch"), as are his attempts at making sense of the situation, speculations and impressions (note the frequent use of the verb *supposed*). Thacher is being acted on by external forces, here rendered in a passive construction ("suddenly I was overwhelmed"; "I was violently thrown"; "was thrown down on my hands with the waves"). The entire narrative backgrounds the agency of Thacher and foregrounds that of the elements and of God, who saves him. Even towards the end of the account where Thacher tells his brother how they survived the three days until a ship came to rescue them, the emphasis is on his "finding" a knapsack with useful contents, a drowned goat and his son's coat; only towards the end of the passage does he become active, drying his wife's neckcloth, making a fire and skinning the goat, but even these actions are presented as less important than the desolation of their predicament ("Our drink was brackish water. Bread we had none" – Kermode and Kermode [2003: 33]). Indeed, Thacher's narrative prefigures the American jeremiad so popular with the early American colonists.

It will have been observed that, with the exception of some present participles, the extract I have quoted is mostly paratactic in structure and that the clauses start with conjunctions that have discourse marker function:

but suddenly I was overwhelmed	[incidence]
and at last I felt the ground	[result]
but was thrown down	[result]
and so with safety crept forth	[result]
but saw neither	[result or setting (in the analysis above)][5]
but I saw my wife	[incidence]
but before I could ... she was gotten	[result or setting (see note 5)]

All of these discourse markers mark slots in the narrative episode. At the same time, the passage has traces of the very popular Renaissance use of the continuative relative (Jespersen 1965: § 4.34), the use of a relative construction to initiate a new sentence:

which I labored to catch into my arms	[setting]
where, blessing God, I turned about	[incipit]
where we sat about an hour	[macro-result]

In earlier texts these clauses, too, would have been formulated in paratactic shape (*so I labored to catch it*; *I blessed God and turned about*; *so we sat there for about an hour*).

Thacher's style is not very hypotactic at all, but the interbraiding of parataxis and relative constructions is a reflex of earlier prevalent practice where the typical Elizabethan continuative clause or *relativischer Anschluß* (Reuter 1936) came to displace discourse markers in the narrative episode. Let us look at an example. The events refer to the wars of Henri IV in 1592.

(5) a. The 6th we remoued hither to Estampes whether as we were passing, the k: [King] receaued aduertisement from Monsr. de Marolles, a gent. of the relligion gouernor of Joinville that three regymentes of foote of the Companies of Orleans having ben abroade pylling the Countrie about Chasteaudun ***and afterwardes coming*** to lodge in a bourge called Patte he held them Invested therein wth some nomb^{r} of horse and foote ***desiring*** therefore the kinges speedie assistance in that behalf: ***whereuppon the king*** without making anie staie here trauelled all night thither onlie wth some Companies of horse and arryued there verie seasonablie finding they had well obeyed their gard, ***and*** to thend [the end] to force them to render at his pleasure and not wth the libertie of a Composition, he sent back imediatelie for twoe Cannons, ***wch marched wth all dilligence to him, w^{ch}*** they not thincking good to attend, yealded themselfes to his mercye, ***whereof*** 230, wth a Capten, tooke oathe presentlie to serue the k. The rest of the souldiours were sent awaie disarmed but the Captens kept prisoners. The strangenes hereof is that not 200 men of horse and foote held them in that sorte invested being aboue 400. This being perfourmed the k: retourned the 9th backe hither againe.

(30 October 1592; *Edmondes Papers* XIV,
Butler 1913: 36–37; my emphasis)

What can clearly be observed in this passage is the use of subsidiary relative clauses in what is ultimately a paratactic function in the deep structure. The only phrase in the extract of Sir Thomas Edmonde's intelligence report from the French court[6] that seems to contain a paratactic discourse marker, *and afterwardes*, in fact constitutes part of an indirect speech clause ('the King received advertisement that three regiments … had been pillaging and afterwards came to lodge in Patte and that M. de Marolles had kept them in this castle'). The *and afterwardes* phrase, therefore, is part of a coordinated participle construction in the function of a relative clause (*having … and afterwardes coming* instead of *who had … and afterwards came*). The crucial call for assistance to the king is also rendered in a present participle construction (*desiring* instead of *and he asked the king*). In other words, the formal surface structure of the passage disguises its underlying cognitive episode structure to such an extent that one can barely refer to it as an example of oral substrate.

Nevertheless, one could argue that the passage has two narrative episodes in its deep structure. The first starts with an incipit (*The 6th we remoued hither to Estampes*), setting ('as we were passing'), incidence ('the king received information') and a request for speedy help ('desiring'). As a result (reaction plus incipit run together), the king starts off again ('whereupon the king … travelled … and arrived'), then orders two cannons (incidence as action); then the cannons arrive, and as a result the company give up and swear an oath to the king (double result construction: second *which*-clause followed by a continuative *whereof*-clause). The remaining sentences consist in the ultimate developments (macro-result) and in a coda evaluating the events ('the strangeness hereof'). The passage ends with a return to the plot level, concluding with a reference to the king's current exploits: 'This adventure over, the king returned.' We can therefore note a preponderance of participle constructions and relative clauses with some relative constituents transformed from subjuncts into conjuncts (the typical continuative relative clauses of Renaissance English). To demonstrate this visually, here is a reinterpretation of the passage in the framework of narrative episode structure:

(5) b.

The 6th we remoued hither to Estampes	incipit
whether as we were passing,	setting
the k: [King] receaued aduertisement from Monsr. de Marolles, a gent. of the relligion gouernor of Joinville	incidence 1

that three regymentes of foote of the Companies of Orleans having ben abroade pylling the Countrie about Chasteaudun ***and afterwardes coming*** to lodge in a bourge called Patte he held them Invested therein wth some nomb^{r} of horse and foote	tale within tale
desiring therefore the kinges speedie assistance in that behalf:	incidence 2
whereuppon the king without making anie staie here trauelled all night thither onlie wth some Companies of horse and arryued there verie seasonablie finding they had well obeyed their gard,	result + incipit
and to thend [the end] to force them to render at his pleasure and not wth the libertie of a Composition, he sent back imediatelie for twoe Cannons,	incidence 1
wch marched wth all dilligence to him,	incidence 2
wch they not thincking good to attend, yealded themselfes to his mercye, ***whereof*** 230, wth a Capten, tooke oathe presentlie to serue the k.	result 1
The rest of the souldiours were sent awaie disarmed but the Captens kept prisoners.	macro-result
The strangenes hereof is that not 200 men of horse and foote held them in that sorte invested being aboue 400.	comment
This being perfourmed the k: retourned the 9th backe hither againe.	result 2

What this comparison between paratactic and "officially" hypotactic episodes shows is the cognitive prevalence of the episode structure even where Latinate constructions (hypotaxis, mostly relative clauses, present participle clauses; sometimes absolute constructions) hold sway. This is not to say, however, that Latin syntax does not eventually manage to disrupt the episode structure. As we could already observe in the above example, the continuative use of relative clauses tends to blur the line between episodes and points within the episode and eventually results in a levelling of the dynamics of the narrative episode. Just as the emphasis on actions by the protagonist in the picaresque genre tends to flatten the reliefing of incidence, result and incipit points since all of these are taken up by actions of the protagonist, the concatenation of continuative clauses likewise unifies the individual clauses, counteracting the dynamics of reliefing in the paratactic episode structure.

Both contexts therefore ultimately tend to produce a series of seemingly equivalent clauses that prepare for report sequences or blocks of report in the texture of the early novel. Helmut Bonheim's influential distinction between four narrative modes – report, description, speech, and comment (Bonheim 1982) – aptly characterizes the set-up of narrative surface structure that applies to the later novelistic discourse which is no longer structured episodically.

The development of report sequences can be illustrated, moreover, by reference to episodes which run into one another. In the following extract from the Ferrar Letters, Nicholas describes the very difficult situation that his mother's stubbornness involves him in:

(6)

… ***soe*** uppon this information I was forced to alter my former intentions of going soe soone for London; and vse my vtmost indeauyours to take care for a speedy passage for her;	result
and therefore that I might performe my duty, and satisfy her desires in the speedy accomodating her for her Iourny, I went to Oundle upon Saterday to hire a place for her in that Coach,	incipit
but when I came thither the Coach went not vp that weeke,	setting + incidence
soe I came home againe and told her as much;	result
but finding her fully resolued to goe upon Munday I went afterwards to Huntingdon, being informed that y^{r} went a Coach from thence:	incipit
but when I came	setting
there went no Coach but a Wagon;	incidence
soe finding my expectations frustrated, and that I might altogether free myselfe from y^{t} svspition wch my mother had of mee, that I would haue hindered her in her Iourney,	result
I went from thence to Peterborough;	incipit
but coming thith^{r} I found that Coach full, and places hired before hand,	setting + incidence
and soe lost my labour, and came home againe betweene ten and Eleuen clock at night …	result

(3 November 1657; *Ferrar Papers*, Blackstone 1938: 309)

Ferrar's prose begins to level the dynamics of the narrative episode by running results and incipits one into the other. For instance, in line 16 ("*soe* finding my expectations frustrated"), which serves as a result to the unhappy search for a coach at Huntingdon, the discourse marker *soe* marks this result point, but it could also be argued to mark the incipit ("*soe* … I went from thence to Peterborough") of the next search effort. Note also the predominant use of present participles which provide the motivation for Ferrar's actions and detail his feelings and intentions. Since present participles accompany the paratactic incipit, incidence and result clauses, they tend to blur the dynamic of the incipit – incidence – result schema, especially because the present participle is no longer regularly used in its original function of specifying the setting on which the incidence obtrudes (instead, Ferrar uses *when*-clauses for the setting: "when I came thither the Coach went not vp"; "but when I came there went no Coach").

5. Results: Discourse markers

Discourse markers do not demonstrate any large developments between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the letter corpus. A consideration of developments needs to be set against results obtained from the analysis of fifteenth-century genres, where more variety and greater fluctuation existed.

The excerpt quoted in (6) has already tuned us in on the subject of discourse markers. The most common discourse marker is *and*, particularly in episode-internal positions. There is also a frequent use of *but* and *then* in all positions, and a near-exclusive use of *so* as a result marker (no longer as an incipit marker as in Middle English). Moreover, the key positions of the narrative episode are increasingly underlined by the insertion of temporal adverbials or adverbs of manner: *and yet*, *after this*, *to this*, *the last Sunday* and by a variety of relative constructions (see above). *Thus* continues to be used as a macro-result marker, though much less frequently than in Malory.[7] I also noted that *anon*, a common discourse marker in late Middle English, has dropped from the texts and been replaced by *(and) presently*. At the same time, argumentative discourse markers begin to be used as narrative discourse markers. This appears to be a regular tendency even in the Middle Ages. Thus, in the *South English Legendary*, *ac* ('but') occurs quite frequently as a discourse marker; and *but* can be found in Malory as a narrative discourse marker in result sections and, as noted, becomes more prominent in the letter corpus. Besides *but* I have also come across *howbeit* in the function of a

discourse marker (rather than as a conjunction). Another notable feature in the letter corpus is the use of *now* as an incipit marker, sometimes in combination with the historical present tense (*now* only rarely appeared in Middle English texts as a discourse marker).

The results can be presented in summary as follows (cf. also Table 2 in the Appendix):

incipit: *(and) when*-clause; *(and) then*; *but*; *(and) so*; *now*; *(and) thereupon*; *howbeit*; *where* + S'; *which* + S'; *upon which* + NP; *at which time* + S'; *upon returne hereof* + S'; etc.

result/resolution: *(and) so*; *(and) then*; *and*; *but*; *and finally*; *which* + S'; *who* + S'; and other continuative clause constructions.

settings: progressive clause; present participle; *while*- or *as*-clauses.

incidences: *and suddenly*; *and presently*; *lo*; but also: *and*; *(and) then*; *and forthwith*.

These results suggest that the distribution of discourse markers (and perhaps of other features, too) depends on *genre* rather than chronology. One can of course argue that some developments set in first in one genre and then emerge in another genre belatedly. Other features appear to be more erratic since they occur in some texts in one genre but not in others. (This is particularly true of the historical present in the romances and the letters.) However, some other features do allow a chronological treatment in cross-genre fashion. Thus, even though *tho* drops from view in the verse romance earlier than it does in the verse legend, this is a discourse marker that dies out in the fifteenth century in all genres. Likewise, the *whan … than* construction at incipit points is an infrequent device before the fifteenth century, when it rises to prominence in the prose legends and prose romances, but equally quickly disappears from popularity already in Malory. Like *tho*, *ac* seems to be a discourse marker with a fairly short life span. In the genre under discussion no major discontinuities are to be observed, and the predominance of *(and) then* and *(and) so* is in fact typical of other prose genres in the Early Modern period.

By contrast, the alignment of certain discourse markers with key points in the episode pattern seems to link to genre rather than period or is simply erratic. For instance, *anon(e)* occurs at all key points in the romance corpus but in Malory seems to be mainly linked to the incidence point. Likewise, *thus* in Malory is an almost exclusive macro-result marker, but in the romance,

the saints' legends, and the letters it can also be found in incipit positions and tends to co-occur with metanarrative comments as an argumentative discourse marker. Moreover, although the *whan … than* construction only rises to prominence in the mid-fifteenth century, one can perhaps argue that it does no more than replace earlier *as*-clauses or *þo*-clauses with the same function, namely that of elaborating the onset of an episode by means of indicating simultaneous events. Again, the letters do not seem to provide any definitive answers to such larger constellations.

However, the use of Latinate syntax seems to peak in the sixteenth century for letters and saints' lives, whereas it already dominates some prose romances and verse legends of the fifteenth century (Bokenham). This suggests that the influence of Latin hypotaxis and present participles became significant at different chronological points for different genres. For the Early Modern period, this still needs to be determined in detail and will be addressed specifically in the analysis of the Elizabethan prose romance (Sidney, Greene) and the picaresque novel and low-style genres (Dekker, Nashe, etc.).

6. Concluding remarks

It is too early for any general conclusions at this point in the research project, and so in summarizing the information in this chapter I will be cautious and merely point out the two preliminary results given below.[8] However, as far as the genre of the Early Modern letters is concerned, results are much clearer to formulate, so I will start with this issue.

Letters between the fifteenth and mid-seventeenth century are *not* predominantly narrative. As Table 1 shows, only very few letters in each collection contain narratives, and many have merely one or two narrative episodes. Only the *Oxford Book of Letters* sports an unrepresentatively large number of narrative letters, chosen no doubt for their presumable interest to the reader. Even when letters contain narrative episodes, they often do not consistently employ discourse markers, a fact that explains the surprisingly low numbers of discourse markers in Table 2. (This becomes quite clear in comparison with the Middle English genres, where narrative episodes and discourse markers abound.)

Besides the dearth of narrativity to be encountered in Early Modern letters, a number of interesting features can, however, be noted. For one, letters, when they *do* narrate, take recourse to the episodic narrative structure, and they do so even where on the discourse level that narrative structure is

no longer immediately apparent. In so far, then, as narration occurs to any extent, i.e. where letters expand from report to narration, they resort to a cognitive schema of episodic narration and either use paratactic narrative episodes with discourse markers or Latinate syntax that still abides by the cognitive pattern.

Secondly, the later and more lively narrative letters, like the other Renaissance prose genres, display a preference for running result and incipit sections together and generally tend to level the dynamics of the narrative episode. The letters therefore partake of the same process of converting narrative episodes into blocks of report, description, speech and commentary that Bonheim (1982) has observed to be the constitutive structure of novelistic discourse.

Finally, one result of the analysis of letter narratives has been that in the letter corpus the liveliest letters tend to be those of vicarious experience (the Ferrar letter quoted in this chapter is an exception to this rule). Perhaps the most satisfying narratives in the corpus are found in intelligence reports. It is only in the seventeenth century that first-person accounts of adventures and experiences move to the forefront in narrative letters (Ferrar and Thacher). The discussion in this chapter naturally tends to warp the proportions found in the letter collections themselves since the most useful texts to discuss are precisely those letters of which there exist only a handful in the corpus.

The analysis of the letters has corroborated the overall thesis that letters would confirm the presence of the narrative episode structure as a cognitive resource for writers of narrative in new genres. The letter corpus has turned out to be more resistant to the inclusion of narrative concerns than was originally expected, but conforms to the general outline sketched for the development of narrative structure in the Early Modern period.

In relation to research results of the project *Narrative Structure, 1250–1750* the letter corpus is not such a very exciting or significant chapter. It is, however, important to note that even in a genre as resistant to orality as the Early Modern epistolary genre, the structure of episodic narrative is used widely whenever letters shift from report to narrative proper. Moreover, a preliminary comparison between genres suggests that many key features of episodic narrative in the Middle English period rely on genre rather than placing within a period. Comparable developments, that is, occur at different times in different genres. Whether this is also true of other Early Modern genres will be the topic of further research. At the same time, some chronological developments are also observable, which may however be inflected

generically, as the introduction of *(and) so* as a major discourse marker in the late fifteenth century.

It seems to me that these results may interest both linguists and literary scholars. On the one hand, it is chastening to realize that a cross-generic analysis of discourse markers as lexemes would tend to distort their distribution and individual use since discourse markers vary between genres. On the positive side, this clearly underlines the importance of (historical) pragmatics as against *langue*-oriented linguistic approaches (morphology, lexicology, semantics, syntax). Secondly, from the perspective of literary study, the importance of genre helps to underscore literary practice which has always been genre-specific. In fact, the research presented here helps to bridge the traditional gap between literary scholars caught in the fold of literary genre and the philologists balancing synchronic and diachronic levels of language use. As the research presented here suggests, the pragmatic approach of looking at language in terms of synchronic and diachronic genre and register, and therefore within a framework of *parole* and *performance*, has much to recommend itself and additionally allows a clear *rapprochement* between the literary and the linguistic camps in medieval and Early Modern studies. Taking my metaphor from the genre analysed in this chapter, I am emboldened to suggest that conversation between linguists and literary people has again arrived at a degree of correspondence long absent from their scholarly discourse.

Appendix

Table 1. Letters

Title (in chronological order)	Episodes (narrative)	Narrative letters	Total number of letters
Stonor Letters, Vol. I (1290–1483)	0	0	158
Cely Letters (1472–1488)	16?	5?	247
Paston Letters (1425–1510)	6?	2	930
Plumpton Correspondence (1461–1550)	0	0	241
Original Letters I (1418–1529)	26	5	101
Original Letters II (1529?–1586)	8	4	117
Clifford Letters (1525–1547)	4	2	44
Sir Thomas More (1499–1535)	17	6	68 (English)
Lisle Letters (1533–1542) Vol. I	6	3	109

Title (in chronological order)	Episodes (narrative)	Narrative letters	Total number of letters
Lisle Letters Vol. IV	4	3	260
Lisle Letters Vol. VI	29?	4	43
Beaumont Papers (late 15th C.–1688)	3	1	96?
Edward VI (1545–1552)	2	2	15 (English)
Edmondes Papers (1592–1599)	13?	8	162
Thynne (1575–1611)	3	2	68
Gawdy (1579–1616)	11?	3	119
Arbella Stuart (1588–1611)	0	0	101
Hatton Letters I (1601–1704)	12+ ? 10	16	175
Ferrar Papers (1613–1658)	7	2	49
Harley Letters (1625–1643)	0	0	205
Barrington Family Letters (1628–1632)	0	0	252
Alice Thornton (1651–1692)	0	0	21
Letters OUP (1535–1741)	84+ ? 4	17	63

Table 2. Discourse markers in the letters (excluding *Oxford Book of Letters*)

	ICP	*ICD ICD/RCT*	*RES*	*macro-RES*	*Total*
and	5	12 34 (ICD/RCT)	6 5 (RCT)	4	**27** **+ 39**
but	13		8		**23**
but presently		2			
(and) so	**8**		**36+6**	**1**	**45+6**
(and) so	8		23 6 (RES→ICP)	1	
(and) so + INV			6		
other *so* CSTRs			7		
so that			4		4
(and) then	16	29 (ICD/RCT)	9		**60**
other *then* CSTRs			6		
(and) yet	1	1	1?		3
with that			1		1
upon this			1	2	3
(and) finally			6		6

	ICP	*ICD ICD/RCT*	*RES*	*macro-RES*	*Total*
(and) presently			4		4
[but presently]		[2]			[2]
(and) suddenly		4			4
(and) forthwith		2			2
(and) therewith		4			4
(and) thereupon		1	2		3
therefore		2			2
and when	18	1			19
(and) as (soon as)	2				2
how that		1			1
howbeit	7		1	3	11
after + NP/S'	3		2		16
after this	11				
PP of time/space	9	3			12
absolute CSTR	2	1			**3**
present participle	3				**3**
relativischer	13	9	27		**49**
Anschluß		+5 (ICD/RCT)	+9 (RCT)		**+14**
HPR	4	8	1	3	**16**
do periphrasis		6	1		**7**

CSTR = construction(s)
HPR = historical present tense
ICP = incipit
ICD = incidence
ICD/RCT = reaction in lieu of incidence
INV = inversion
NP = noun phrase
RCT = reaction (several narrative clauses before result)
RES = result
macro-RES = conclusion to larger narrative unit
Total = total number of discourse markers

Note: undecidable categorizations (ICD/RCT and RES→ICP) are given as "+" numbers so that the total numbers are not misinterpreted/skewed by including them.

Notes

1. Fitzmaurice (2002) provides good examples of communication-oriented epistolary writing in the aspects she highlights in her work.
2. Since most day-to-day communication is nowadays conducted by phone or email, longer private letters tend to narrate holiday experiences or, in Christmas letters, give a summary of the year's events.
3. There are some examples of this in the *South English Legendary* and a larger number of instances in Chaucer and in fifteenth-century genres.
4. For a fuller discussion of grades of narrativity see Fludernik (2004).
5. The second half of this extract of Thacher's narrative can be analysed in different ways. As an alternative to (4) one can read "but saw neither" as the result of Thacher's looking about ("blessing God" is then the incipit and "I turned about to look" the incidence). Likewise, everything after "but before I could get unto her" could be read as part of the result section. Since Early Modern texts, unlike their medieval and oral counterparts, use more hypotactic structures, it is sometimes difficult to parse narratives unequivocally. In the present case, the analysis given in (4) was chosen as more likely since there is no new episode beginning after the "but saw neither" clause combination. I have therefore opted for one bigger episode with two sets of incidences. Both *but*-clauses serve the function of explanatory comment that provides important background information that highlights the events (Thacher sees that his wife has survived; her arrival on shore). They therefore depict the background on which the incidences impinge and hence can be interpreted as settings.
6. Sir Thomas Edmonde (1563?–1639) was appointed English agent to Henri IV at Paris in 1592.
7. Malory's work is quite notable for the explosion of the number and variety of its discourse markers; cf. Fludernik (2000).
8. So far, analyses have been completed on the Middle English verse romance (Herlyn), the letters and diaries (Fludernik), and the historical texts (Hanke/Herlyn); chapters on the verse hagiography (Fludernik) and prose legends (Lederer) are fairly advanced, and work on the fifteenth-century prose romance is in progress (Fludernik). All the chapters will be published in Fludernik (in progress).

References

Biber, Douglas
1991 Reprint. *Variation Across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Original edition, 1988.

Blackstone, Bernard (ed.)
1938 *The Ferrar Papers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bonheim, Helmut
1982 *The Narrative Modes: Techniques of the Short Story*. Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer.
Butler, Geoffrey G. (ed.)
1913 *The Edmondes Papers. A Selection from the Correspondence of Sir Thomas Edmondes, Envoy from Queen Elizabeth at the French Court*. (Roxburghe Club 148.) London: Nichols.
Davis, Lennard J.
1983 *Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Day, Robert Adams
1966 *Told in Letters: Epistolary Fiction Before Richardson*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Ellis, Sir Henry (ed.)
1824 *Original Letters, Illustrative of English History.* Vol. I. London: Harding, Triphook, and Lepard.
Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds
1981 Realism, perspective, and the novel. *Critical Inquiry* 7: 499–520.
Fitzmaurice, Susan M.
2002 *The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Fludernik, Monika
1991 The historical present tense yet again: Tense switching and narrative dynamics in oral and quasi-oral storytelling. *Text* 11 (3): 365–398.
1992a The historical present tense in English literature: An oral pattern and its literary adaptation. *Language and Literature* [Austin, Texas] 17: 77–107.
1992b Narrative schemata and temporal anchoring. *The Journal of Literary Semantics* 21: 118–153.
1996 *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*. London/New York: Routledge.
2000 Discourse markers in Malory's *Morte D'Arthur*. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (2): 231–262.
2004 Letters and chronicles: How narrative are they? In *Essays on Fiction and Perspective*, Göran Rossholm (ed.), 129–153. Frankfurt/New York: Lang.
Fludernik, Monika (ed.)
in progr. *Narrative Structure, 1250–1750: A Genre-by-Genre Analysis*.
Guillén, Claudio
1986 Notes toward the study of the Renaissance letter. In *Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History and Interpretation*, Barbara Kiefer Lewalski (ed.), 70–101. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Herlyn, Anne
in progr. Dialogue and narrative structures in Middle English verse romances. Ph.D. diss., University of Freiburg.
Hunter, J. Paul
1990 *Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction*. New York: Norton.
Jespersen, Otto
1965 Reprint. *A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles*. Part III: *Syntax*, vol. 2. London: George Allen & Unwin. Original edition, 1927.
Kany, Charles E.
1937 *The Beginnings of the Epistolary Novel in France, Italy and Spain*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Kermode, Frank, and Anita Kermode (eds.)
2003 Reprint. *The Oxford Book of Letters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Original edition, 1995.
Labov, William, and Joshua Waletzky
1967 Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience. In *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts*, J. Helm (ed.), 12–44. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Nevalainen, Terttu
2001 Continental conventions in Early English correspondence. In *Towards a History of English as History of Genres*, Hans-Jürgen Diller and Manfred Görlach (eds.), 203–224. Heidelberg: Winter.
Reuter, Ole
1936 On continuative relative clauses in English: A feature of English syntax and style ascribed to Latin influence. *Societas scientiarum Fennica. Commentationes Humanarum Literarum* 9 (3): 1–61.
The South English Legendary
1956 *The South English Legendary*. Vol. I. Charlotte D'Evelyn and Anna J. Mill (eds.). (Early English Text Society O. S. 235.) London: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, Edward Maunde (ed.)
1965 *Correspondence of the Family of Hatton, Being Chiefly Letters Addressed to Christopher First Viscount Hatton, A. D. 1601–1704*. 2 vols. New York: Johnson Reprint Society.
Visconti, Laura
1994 The beginnings of the epistolary novel in England. In *Contexts of Pre-Novel Narrative: The European Tradition*, Roy Eriksen (ed.), 293–318. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Würzbach, Natascha
1964 Die Struktur des Briefromans und seine Entstehung in England. Ph.D. diss., University of Munich.

Würzbach, Natascha (ed.)
1969 *The Novel in Letters: Epistolary Fiction in the Early English Novel 1678–1740*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Historical linguistics, literary interpretation, and the romances of Margaret Cavendish

James Fitzmaurice

1. Introduction

For many years, the disciplines of literary studies and linguistics were bridged by the field of philology. Philologists had broad knowledge of the grammar and vocabulary of classical languages as well as thorough understanding of the literatures of Western Europe. A philologist who wrote about *Paradise Lost*, for instance, was able to describe in detail Milton's multilingual word play. Thus, the "horrid hair" of the character Death was understood as a learned joke involving the Latin *horridus*, or 'bristly', and the English *horrid*, or 'frightening'. Understanding of double entendre of this sort, however, is now mostly lost, for philology, as well as the study of Latin, became increasingly unfashionable in the second half of the twentieth century, and there are few philologists active today, at least in the United States. During the same period, many linguists chose to avoid literary texts, because what is found in such writing represents artificial rather than natural language. Literary scholars, also in this period, were drawn to totalizing theoretical approaches such as psychoanalysis or Marxism, approaches that minimized the importance of language study. The current dominant theory, for those interested in the literature of seventeenth-century England, is, of course, new historicism, if this set of ideologies and ideas is really to be labeled a theory. While new historicism purports to return to an understanding of the literature of the past within the context of the past, it finds much of its foundation in recent developments in anthropology. New historicism, as with many other current theoretical approaches to literary study, does not concern itself much with the history of the English language. Rather than a bridge, there now exists a substantial gap between the disciplines of literature and linguistics.

This is not to say that currently there is no connection between the two fields. Adrian Pilkington, a theorist of language, is quite interested in ideas that derive from the history of literary criticism as well as from current literary theory. Pilkington likes to cite I. A. Richards and does not ignore Terry

Eagleton or Stanley Fish.[1] A literary scholar who works with language, Roger Sell (2000: 40) "cannot but admire the real achievements" of the New Criticism as an advance over older views and as a development parallel to what happened in the thinking of the "Saussurian and Bloomfieldian structuralists." Most importantly, a great many articles have appeared in the journal *Language and Literature* which examine literary works from the perspective of the practicing linguist. There is as well a special issue of *European Journal of English Studies* (Fludernik [ed.] 1998) on the subject of connections between language and literature. Finally, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse, in particular, are subjects that have led linguists to literary texts, as with Monika Fludernik's *The Fictions of Language and the Language of Fiction* (1993). Literary scholars have been more slow to develop interest in possibilities offered by linguistic approaches to literature, except as classics from the history of linguistics like Saussure and Jacobsen help to elucidate this or that theory of literature. A few have applied work done on free indirect discourse to British fiction, especially that written by Jane Austen, but scholars of British literature, in general, ignore the gap between their discipline and linguistics.[2] Sylvia Adamson's work on literary language, and in particular her views on empathetic narrative, as found in *The Cambridge History of the English Language* (Adamson 1998; see also Adamson 1995a, 1995b), are sadly underused by scholars who are not linguists.

That gap is nowhere more evident than in the two fields' differing regard for quantitative data. For linguists, numbers often are more compelling than individual cases in support of scholarly assertion, although insights derived from anecdotes frequently work to strengthen hypotheses. For literary scholars, numbers are more frequently a sort of background noise, while an apt anecdote sums up and drives home an assertion. In one such anecdote, Queen Elizabeth I commented on the rebellion of the earl of Essex, asking those within hearing if she were not herself Richard II. This brief question, an apparent allusion to a performance of Shakespeare's *Richard II*, is often taken to be compelling evidence that shows that English drama was vitally important in shaping of public opinion about the monarchy. Elizabeth, it seems, was referring to a special performance of the play that may have been mounted in order to stir up animosity towards her, though Worden (2003) disagrees. There are, of course, numbers that might be adduced in connection with the claim for the political importance of drama, numbers involving theater attendance for instance. Nevertheless, literary scholars tend to cite numbers infrequently and to view quantitative data with suspicion.

I do not expect to bridge the gap between linguistics and literary study in this chapter, but I will use numbers to support my assertions, assertions that are literary rather than linguistic in nature. The numbers that I will employ are derived from two large, recently constructed data bases, Renaissance Women Online (RWO) and Literature Online (LION). Literary scholars currently use RWO and LION to obtain copies of texts for reading, texts that are difficult to find otherwise except in rare book libraries or on microfilm. Some of these scholars also search the two data bases for keywords and a few have been known to use RWO to obtain answers for such questions as, "Did any early women writers have anything to say about Aristotle?" These few literary scholars simply search for words like "Aristotle" and then look for substantive rather than incidental discussion among the "hits." The number of hits that this kind of search receives for most literary scholars would not be significant in itself. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is only a matter of time before literary scholars realize that they can make various sorts of claims based on numbers. Margaret Cavendish, for instance, never mentions Aristotle in her early books on natural history but uses his name fifteen times in a latter study, *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy* (1666). Critics prior to the publication of *Observations* had faulted her for failing to give credit to authors like Aristotle, and one might surmise that she changed her policies of citation in response.

The likelihood that literary scholars might once again take an interest in linguistics, and specifically in the history of the English language, is increased by an ongoing and recently heightened disenchantment with totalizing theoretical approaches. Robert Scholes (1998: x) writes in *The Rise and Fall of English* that he is "critical of much that has been going on … in the name of [literary] 'theory'". Scholes is not alone, and W. J. T. Mitchell (1985: 2) explains that there are those who, disappointed by theory, espouse "antifoundationalism," or complete rejection of theory. Less radical scholars simply want to restore something like an equal balance between the theoretical and the practical, rescuing "us from the illegitimate sovereignty of theory" (Mitchell 1985: 8). It is unlikely that anyone will suggest that we all go back to producing mechanical source studies, common in the 1930s and 40s, or that anyone will advocate a reprise of the contentious explications engendered by new criticism during the 1950s and 60s. Literary scholars, while maintaining an interest in literature as literature, nevertheless may find practical uses in quantitative studies of literary language as it once was written. Much has been said theoretically about Shakespeare and authorship, especially from a Foucauldian perspective. Jonathan Hope (1994), however,

has given us good practical information about coauthored plays like *Two Noble Kinsmen* by establishing the differing habitual modes of negation in Shakespeare's and John Fletcher's writing. We now have a more firm idea of who wrote which scenes. Further, there is evidence that literary scholars are beginning to pay attention to those who look at the history of the English language, as witnessed by a large session on that subject sponsored by the Shakespeare Association of America for its meeting in 2001. Mitchell (1985) writes about "the new pragmatists." There even may be room in the world of literary scholarship for "new philologists," albeit of a somewhat different sort from those who once existed.

2. A quantitative approach to the case of Cavendish's romances

I choose Margaret Cavendish's romances, found in *Nature's Pictures*, for a case study because the changes between the first (1656) and the revised (1671) editions of that volume lend themselves to quantification. The revisions are not apparently substantive from the point of view of plot, characterization, or any other of the usual literary perspectives and are almost exclusively a matter of the recasting of sentences. Paragraphing is also changed but that matter will not be discussed here. Instead, I will restrict myself to dealing with reporting clauses like "said the Duke" that are replaced in the revised edition with their uninverted forms or are moved from the initial position to the end of sentences, as in the following examples (all emphases in bold mine):

(1) a. **Said the Duke** you cannot be comprehended. (1656)
b. **The Duke said**, you cannot be comprehended. (1671)

(2) a. **Said she**, heavens have blessed me from him. (1656)
b. Heavens have blessed me from him, **said she**. (1671)

I will go on to use the numbers generated in this study to speculate about the intentions of the author regarding the literary kind of the book itself. Did she, for instance, have a sense that *Nature's Pictures* owed too much to the style of romance in its language and hence try to shift her style away from the linguistic conventions of that *genre*?

Cavendish was a member of the upper gentry and was educated as a girl by a woman tutor. Cavendish (1664: letter 131) tells us that she wrote a great

deal as a child, and we know that as an adult, she composed and published some thirteen books in twenty-two editions, including poetry, fiction, personal essay, scientific essay, drama, autobiography and biography. Indeed, her sense of identity was closely bound up with writing, as may be seen in various portions of her autobiography. She worried about printers' errors and fussed about her own unusual spelling (Fitzmaurice 1991). In short, the changes found at the sentence level in *Nature's Pictures* were not happenstance and were not product of anything like house style in a printer's shop. She may have had advice from her husband, who sometimes contributed short sections to her books, but her writing, as found on the printed page, was as nearly her own as she could make it.

Nature's Pictures is a collection of pieces of narrative fiction, of which some are romances, others moral tales, and still others cynical or ironic jests. The book is equally divided between prose and verse, though I will confine myself to verse for purpose of this chapter. A romance, also for the purposes of this chapter, will be defined as a narrative that involves the adventures of well-born characters, some of whom love purely and faithfully under the most difficult of circumstances. Elaborate pageantry, improbabilities of plot, and exotic settings abound. Cavendish begins *Nature's Pictures* by stating that it is a gathering of tales told by members of her family, who are sitting around a cheery fire on a cold winter's evening. This larger narrative frame, reminiscent of *The Canterbury Tales*, *The Decameron*, and *The Heptameron*, is abandoned before long, though the book continues to speak, as it were, with differing narratorial voices in individual stories. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will confine myself to two prose romances of moderate length: *The Contract* and *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity*. Both romances, as found in the first edition of *Nature's Pictures*, are now widely available in Kate Lilley's Penguin edition (Cavendish 1992), *The Contract* running to more than 30,000 words and *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity* to nearly 20,000. The first edition of the two romances is also accessible in electronic form in LION. The second edition of the entire book is available from University Microfilms, and is searchable electronically in RWO, a part of Brown University's Women Writers Online data base (WWO).

One might imagine that Cavendish's initial practice with reporting clauses in her two romances would have been influenced most by two earlier romances, Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia* (1590) and Lady Mary Wroth's *Urania* (1621). Writers of romance often relied upon earlier models, and Sidney's book was the quintessential model. Wroth was less famous than Sidney, but Cavendish shared a special kinship with her as a writer, since both were

women and both were disparaged for publishing at a time when many people felt that writing literature, itself, was an immodest activity for a woman. Little work has been done on the influence of any earlier prose romance on Cavendish's romances, however. Instead connections have been made between plots in Shakespeare's plays and some of her story lines. The story line of *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity*, for instance, may find a progenitor in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, in that both involve a cross-dressing young woman who is befriended by a sea captain (Hackett 2000: 185). Reports of speech in plays, of course, are usually incidental and, except for closet drama, were not in the first place intended for the printed page. Prose romances like those by Sidney and Wroth would not have been the only influences on Cavendish's use of reporting clauses, but they were likely to have been important and provide a good place to begin. At the same time one should remember that, while Cavendish was amenable to influence and used models, she did not always follow her models closely (Fitzmaurice 2003).

Sidney's *Arcadia* was probably the single most important prose romance for English readers of romance in the first half of the seventeenth century. *The Arcadia* was printed in its tenth edition in 1655, a year before *Nature's Pictures* appeared for the first time, so the popularity of *The Arcadia* continued long after its first publication. When she was in her late teens, Cavendish, who writes about attending the theater with her family, may have seen a stage adaptation of *The Arcadia* put together by James Shirley. Certainly she would have heard about the production. Shirley's adaptation was sufficiently popular to allow for separate publication in 1640, and it was not the only stage rendering, merely the most recent. How, then, did the source of this theater success handle reporting clauses? In two ways. First, inverted forms are always used in the way that we today would use quotation marks: they designate directly quoted material. Quotation marks, of course, began to be commonly used in print in England only during the second half of the seventeenth century and so are not to be found in Sidney, Cavendish, or most other writers mentioned in this chapter. I list below examples of inverted reporting clauses from *The Arcadia*, which may be categorized as reporting verb + pronoun, reporting verb + proper name, reporting verb + title, and reporting verb + epithet, respectively.

(3) a. My Lord (**said she**) God knowes I loue you. (Sidney 1590: 25)[3]
b. But those thoughts (**replied *Basilius***) cannot in this your lonelines neither warrant you from suspition in others, nor defende you from melancholy. (Sidney 1590: 57)

c. What, **saide the captaine**, hath *Palladius* forgotten the voice of *Daiphantus*? (Sidney 1590: 29)
d. Because I affirme (**answered the forsaken Knight**) that thou dost most rebellious iniurie to those Ladies. (Sidney 1590: 310)

The reporting clause is never found in initial or final position in the sentence, and it almost always appears after a brief opening phrase. In (3a), (rendered more fully as [4]), the reporting clause might have been omitted, except that it is conventional as a marker of direct quotation.

(4) Shee (wringing him by the hand) made no other answere but this: my Lord (**said she**) God knowes I loue you.

The earlier portion of the sentence is intended to give context ("wringing him by the hand") but also might have served to report speech. Sidney adds "said she" as we would add quotation marks.

The second way that Sidney's *Arcadia* deals with reporting combines uninverted reports with indirect quotation. Here, too, pronouns, proper names, titles, and epithets are found. In their simplest form, these reports do no more than indicate an indirect quotation.

(5) **They said**, they could bring any new or doubtfull thing vnto him. (Sidney 1590: 136)

Often, however, these clauses allow for more complex ways to situate the indirectly quoted material.

(6) ***Musidorus*** (according to the agrement betwene *Pyrocles* & him to alter their names) **answered**, that he called himselfe *Palladius*, and his friend *Daiphantus*. (Sidney 1590: 130)

In this case, the proper name and the reporting verb are separated by a long parenthetical phrase, which helps to set straight any confusion that might arise from the indirect quotation. Reports of speech, when subjunctive, also can be uninverted.

(7) And you (if my speech had preuailed) should haue been at this time, as no way more in danger, so much more in quietnes; **I would then haue saide**, that wisdome and vertue be the only destinies appointed to man to follow. (Sidney 1590: 18)

Inverted forms on rare occasion carry more than the bare minimum of reporting verb + subject, but not much more as with the following:

(8) Whether it be (**said he smiling**) that nature loues to exercise that part most, which is least decayed … (Sidney 1590: 19)

Subject and verb are never separated in inverted forms, perhaps because it would have been unidiomatic to do so, as with "said smiling he." More importantly for this study, Sidney seems to have tried to keep his inverted reports of direct speech uncluttered. He contextualized in separate sentences. Indirect quotation in uninverted reports was another matter.

The second likely influence on Cavendish's two romances, Lady Mary Wroth's *Urania*, was not reprinted in the seventeenth century, but Cavendish definitely knew about it, identifying with the plight of its author who had been chastised by Lord Denny with the words, "Work lady work, let writing books alone" (quoted in Wroth 1983: 22, 34). Cavendish, in a preface to *Sociable Letters* (1664), answers Denny without naming him by echoing his words and asserting that the writing of books is a proper sort of work for women who are so inclined. Because *The Urania* was recalled at the behest of its author, some have thought that it would have been scarce, but Helen Hackett (2000: 183) has argued convincingly for its availability. Cavendish's husband, in particular, would have been likely to have owned a copy.

Wroth's use of reporting clauses in *The Urania* is very much like what is found in Sidney's *Arcadia*. Wroth, of course, was consciously imitating her famous uncle, Sir Philip Sidney, in composing her romance, but there are some interesting differences. While the two texts have about the same length (*Arcadia* 300,000 words, *Urania* 350,000 words), Wroth's has a much greater proportion of reporting clauses, both uninverted and inverted. What happens with the inverted clause is probably most interesting, and I will look closely at inverted reporting clauses that involve the third person pronoun. In *The Urania* there are 828 cases in the category *said* + third person pronoun, while in *The Arcadia* there are only 245.[4] Stated another way, Wroth uses this sort of inverted report at 2.3 per thousand words, while Sidney uses it at a rate of less than one in one thousand. If these figures apply more broadly to inverted reporting clauses and it seems that they do, then we are probably safe to infer that Wroth includes a great deal more directly quoted dialogue than does Sidney. Cavendish has a somewhat larger ratio than Wroth in *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity* (3.2) and a much greater ratio in *The Contract* (7.0). Where inverted reporting phrases are concerned and according to the

sampling employed in this study, Cavendish is more congruent with Wroth rather than Sidney.

3. Cavendish's romances and popular narrative fiction

It is useful to compare these ratios with ratios found in other narrative fiction that is not romance, for instance John Lyly's enormously popular *Euphues* (1578) and Thomas Nash's influential *The Unfortunate Traveller* (1594). *Euphues* is the moral tale of a naive young man, who learns that, while friendship between men is desirable, love between a man and a woman is not, for women should not be trusted. The text, running to about 58,000 words, has a ratio involving *said* + third person pronoun of .166 per thousand words, or about a quarter of Sidney's (.81). The speeches in Lily's *exemplum* tend to be long and there is not much give and take in dialogue. Where the proportion of dialogue to other text is concerned, *Euphues* bears little resemblance to Cavendish's romances. Reporting phrases in *The Unfortunate Traveller* (more than 43,000 words) are more frequent than in *Euphues*. *The Unfortunate Traveller* recounts the mostly comic misadventures of a young, lower-class scoundrel but makes little use of the word *said*, relying instead on *quoth* to report direct speech. I will, therefore, treat *quoth* as a rough equivalent of *said*. Nashe's rate, .60 per thousand for *quoth* + third person pronoun, is only a little under Sidney's, but it is well below Wroth's for *The Urania*. Narrative fiction that is not romance is not much like Cavendish's romances in its handling of dialogue. If we go one step further and also consider story lines, then *The Urania* has the greatest general similarity to Cavendish's romances of narratives mentioned so far. In both Wroth and Cavendish, aristocratic heroines find themselves having to endure the abuse of libertines, whom they love. The major difference between the two authors regarding plot is that Cavendish's heroines turn these libertines into faithful husbands and Wroth's main heroine, Pamphilia, fails in this regard.

In the first edition of her two romances, Cavendish is like both Sidney and Wroth in tying *said* + third person pronoun closely to direct reports of speech and in favoring direct speech over indirect. She is, however, unlike her two predecessors in where she places these reports in her sentences. While Sidney and Wroth always position reporting clauses within the reported speech itself, she often places them before or after the speech they report. If she is not following *The Arcadia* or *The Urania*, what sort of writing might have

offered a precedent to her positioning of reporting clauses? One might ask at the same time, what of her replacing inverted with uninverted forms of reporting in the second edition of her two romances?

4. Cavendish's romances and a captivity narrative

Answers to these questions seem to be found outside of the world of fiction, though within the realm of printed narrative. Perhaps the most intriguing instance of nonfiction narrative relevant to the present discussion is *This Short Revelation* (1662), which was published between the printings the two editions of Cavendish's romances.[5] *This Short Revelation* describes the captivity of Katherine Evans and Sarah Cheevers by Jesuits on the island of Malta. Evans and Cheevers were not alone as Quaker women writing travel narratives, for Barbara Blaugdon, Joan Vokins, and Elizabeth Hooton also recorded the events of travelling on religious missions (Wiseman 1997). The Evans and Cheevers narrative, however, sparked much public interest, because the two were still in captivity when the book was published, the manuscript having been smuggled out of Malta. Upon their release and return to England in 1663, their narrative was republished presumably as a result of broad public interest (Villani 2004). At the same time, Evans and Cheevers were like many Quaker women who, during the 1650s, had been at odds with Oliver Cromwell and who had been, as Susan Wiseman says, "locked into internecine struggles with sects at home" (Wiseman 1997: 154). In *This Short Revelation*, we learn that Jesuits questioned Evans and Cheevers aggressively in hopes of converting them to Catholicism, and, if the book is to be believed, the women more than held their own. Because of its notoriety, Margaret Cavendish would have had known about the volume, and she loved exotic tales of the sort contained in it. While it is true that she had little respect for what she took to be the rantings of religious extremists, she would have been horrified by the interrogation and intimidation that is contained in the tale of the Maltese captivity and would have been delighted that Evans and Cheevers were the kind of women to have been at odds with Cromwell (see Mack [1992: 132] and Ezell [1993: 148–149]). In short, Cavendish probably read *This Short Revelation*, and it is entirely possible that the use of reporting phrases found in it influenced the revised versions of her romances.

Evans and Cheevers rely heavily on reporting clauses but strongly favour uninverted forms, which they use indiscriminately with reports of direct and indirect speech. Indeed, they only include four inverted forms in the whole

of the text, a number small enough to be attributable to compositors' errors. *This Short Revelation* runs to a little more than 13,000 words, and its ratio of third person pronoun + *said* is 8.2 per thousand, that is even greater than Cavendish's rate of 7.0 for the inverted variety in *The Contract*. In addition to direct and indirect speech is speech that could be of either sort, as found in (9c) below. The "he" in these three examples is the Jesuit inquisitor. The "you" and "we" are the two women.

(9) a. I said, *Wilt thou strike me*? (Evans and Cheevers 1662: C1v)
b. He said, *We were Hereticks and Heathens*. (Evans and Cheevers 1662: B4r)
c. He said *it was true*. (Evans and Cheevers 1662: B4v)

It seems reasonable to conclude that Cavendish put together the first edition of *The Contract* and *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity* carefully following a model that included Wroth and Sidney as regards the use but not the placement of inverted reporting clauses. I am unable to speculate substantively at this time about why she chose to compose a sentence for the first edition which sometimes places the reporting clause before the quoted materials (e.g., "Said she, heavens have blessed me from him"), but it seems to me that she might have been influenced by *This Short Revelation* or other nonfiction narrative in her revision of the two romances. In *This Short Revelation*, the reporting clause is very nearly always uninverted and placed before the direct or indirect speech. The first example of revision found in this study is typical of what is found in Evans and Cheevers' narrative.

(10) a. **Said the Duke** you cannot be comprehended. (Cavendish 1656)
b. **The Duke said**, you cannot be comprehended. (Cavendish 1671)

If Cavendish did have *This Short Revelation* in mind, one might ask "why?" Why would an aristocratic, Royalist writer want to associate herself with fractious Quaker women from the middling classes, Jesuit inquisitors notwithstanding?

The answer to this question in part lies with Cavendish's ambivalence regarding romance as a *genre*. It was an irony not lost on her that her own romance heroine in *Assaulted and Pursued Chastity* refuses to read a romance when offered several by an old bawd: "Will you have some romances, said the old lady? She answered no." (Cavendish 1671: sigA1v). Cavendish elsewhere goes so far as to specifically deny that she has ever read a romance

to its conclusion. Even Dorothy Osborne, a contemporary who loved *The Grand Cyrus* as well as *Cleopatra*, felt that people who acted like characters from romance were nonsensical and neglected the practical matters of this world. On June 26, 1653, Osborne wrote the following derisive remarks about a suitor:

> If he may be believed, he is resolved to be a most romance squire, and go in quest of some enchanted damsel, whom if he likes, as to her person (for fortune is a thing below him) – and we do not read in history that any knight or squire was ever so discourteous as to inquire what portions their ladies had, – then he comes with the power of the county to demand her (which for the present he may dispose of, being Sheriff). (Osborne 1903: 107)

Could it be that Cavendish hoped to leaven her highly fictional, romance narratives of love with reporting clauses more appropriate to descriptions of actual captivity, that is, nonfiction narrative? Even if we decide that Evans and Cheevers' quoted material would have been approximation or exaggeration (fiction of a sort) rather than exact quotation, their *genre*, nevertheless, would have been taken to be nonfiction by most English readers of the time. One might say that it would have partaken of "reality" in the way that "reality TV" purports to be real today. Because she did not want to abandon romance altogether, Cavendish did not eliminate all inverted forms. She just moved some of them away from the beginnings of sentences and in doing so may have tried to write a "true romance."

5. Cavendish's romances and jest books

Those inverted reporting phrases left intact but moved to the ends of quoted material often occur in connection with quick exchanges of dialogue. Cavendish included in *Nature's Pictures* short narratives of a page or two that are essentially jests in the manner of the sixteenth-century jest books, which still were in print during the seventeenth century. We may be confident that she was familiar with the *genre* simply because there were so many jest books and she read widely. Their authors, unlike writers of romance, often placed inverted reporting phrases at the end of directly quoted material and did so when writing quick exchange of dialogue, as with the following between two men on Nottingham Bridge. The passage is taken from *Merie Tales of the Mad Men of Gotham*, which was reprinted in 1613 and 1630 (Hazlitt 1864).

One man plans in due course to cross the bridge with his sheep and the other forbids him to do so.

(11) Thou shalt not, **said the one**. I will, **said the other**. Let [stop] here, **said the one**. Shue [shoo] there, **said the other**. (Hazlitt 1864, 3: 4)

Another example derives from *Pasquil's Jests and Mother Bunche's Merriments* (1608, 1627, 1629, 1635, ca 1650). A madman, who is confined as a cure for his madness in a watery ditch, asks a gentleman on horseback where he is going.

(12) On hunting, **quoth the Gentleman**. What do you with all those Kytes and Dogges? They be Haukes and Houndes, **quoth the Gentleman**. Wherefore keep you them? **quoth the other**. (Hazlitt 1864, 3: 62)

We eventually learn that the gentleman pays forty pounds per year for the upkeep of his hawks and hounds, grossing only ten pounds worth of game. The madman suggests that the gentleman keep these money matters a secret in order to avoid being put in the ditch himself. Interestingly, one reporting phrase is missing, that following "Kytes and Dogges." Thus *Pasquil's Jests* anticipates modern practice, where reporting phrases in quick exchanges of dialogue can be understood rather than explicit. If Cavendish does have jest books in mind, then many of the quick exchanges of dialogue found in her romances are intended by her to partake of ordinary and practical, if comic, situations.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to offer explanations based on quantitative evidence for revisions made by an aristocratic woman writer of seventeenth-century England. That woman was admittedly an oddity, if for no other reason than because she published what she wrote. Many women wrote, of course, but few, excepting Quakers, published before 1670. Dorothy Osborne suggested that Cavendish, was "a little distracted," and until about fifteen years ago Cavendish was often referred to in literary circles as Mad Madge (Osborne 1903: 83; Fitzmaurice 1999: 55 note 2). How might the quantitative study of the writing of such an apparent anomaly be of any benefit to those who are broadly interested in the history of the English language? As odd as she

may have seemed in comparison with other women of the time, Cavendish is now generally taken to be a writer of considerable merit, someone whose work influenced succeeding generations of writers in various ways. More to the point, one might ask whether there is benefit to be gained from studying any one particular seventeenth-century writer's revisions from the point of view of language. The answer to this last question lies in the ability of revision to point the student of the history of the English language in two directions. First, an examination of revision not only tells us what was revised but what was not. Cavendish left diction and grammar largely unchanged in the second edition of *Nature's Pictures*. These aspects of language were for her and perhaps for others not major issues. Second, analysis of revision helps us to determine the literary contexts that influenced the linguistic decisions of those who wrote for print. When reading later romances as with Congreve's *Incognita* (1692), an understanding of revision in an earlier author helps us to speculate about a reporting clause like "Said the Lady" (Congreve 1692: 29). This clause, given what we know about Cavendish's understanding of her reporting clauses, may have been intended by Congreve to tell the reader that what the lady said in some way partakes of the *genre* of romance rather than captivity narrative. Cavendish's use of reporting clauses does not explain everything about Congreve's, though Congreve, like Cavendish in the second edition of *Nature's Pictures*, liked to mix inverted and uninverted forms. Rather, Cavendish's revisions suggest to us that it might be interesting to look at reporting clauses in appropriate cases when we examine the language of narrative over the hundred years or so after the publication of *Nature's Pictures*.

Notes

1. Pilkington (2000: xi) begins his introduction thus: "The main aim of this book is to examine a problem that is relevant to literary criticism and literary theory … This question is … partly a version of on that I. A. Richards asks at the beginning of *Principles of Literary Criticism*."
2. See for example Ferguson (2000), Uddén (2000), Mezei (1996), Strauch (1993), Shaw (1990), Finch and Bowen (1990). Scholars of French literature have taken a greater interest in the subject; see e.g. Ramazani (1987).
3. LION's transcription is based on the 1593 edition.
4. I have restricted myself to two spellings of *said*: "said" and "sayd." Others may exist, but the variant "sayd" only accounts for less than 10 per cent of the total of the two in either *The Arcadia* and *The Urania*. I also have restricted pronouns

to the third person: "he(e)," "she(e)," and "they." A fuller study might consider "I," "we(e)," "you," "ye," and perhaps other forms. It could also include "thou" together with "saist."

5. I rely on the WWO version and on Margaret Ezell's introduction found in RWO.

References

Adamson, Sylvia

1995a Empathetic narrative: A literary and linguistic problem. In *Syntax and the Literary System: New Approaches to the Interface between Literature and Linguistics*, Wendy Ayres-Bennett and Patrick O'Donovan (eds.), 17–42. Cambridge: Cambridge French Colloquia.

1995b From empathetic deixis to empathetic narrative: Stylisation and (de)subjectivisation as processes of language change. In *Subjectivity and Subjectivisation: Linguistic Perspectives*, Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), 195–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1998 Literary language. In *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, Vol. IV: *1776–1997*, Suzanne Romaine (ed.), 589–692. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cavendish, Margaret

1656 *Nature's Pictures*. London. 1st ed. Copy used in LION [Literature Online].

1664 *Sociable Letters*. London.

1671 *Nature's Pictures*. Revised ed. London. Copy used found in RWO [Renaissance Women Online].

1992 The Blazing World *and Other Writings*. Kate Lilley (ed.). London: Penguin.

Congreve, William

1692 *Incognita*. London. Copy used found in LION [Literature Online].

Evans, Katherine, and Sarah Cheevers

1662 *This Short Revelation*. Copy used found in WWO [Women Writers Online].

Ezell, Margaret

1993 *Writing Women's Literary History*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ferguson, Frances

2000 Jane Austen, *Emma*, and the impact of form. *Modern Language Quarterly: A Journal of Literary History* 61 (1): 157–180.

Finch, Casey, and Peter Bowen
1990 "The tittle-tattle of Highbury": Gossip and the free indirect style in *Emma*. *Representations* 31: 1–18.
Fitzmaurice, James
1991 Margaret Cavendish on her own writing: Evidence from revision and handmade correction. *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 85: 297–307.
1999 The life and literary reputation of Margaret Cavendish. *Quidditas* 20: 54–74.
2003 Margaret Cavendish's *Life of William*, Plutarch, and mixed genre. In *Authorial Conquests*, Nancy Weitz and Line Cottegnies (eds.), 80–102. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses.
Fludernik, Monika
1993 *The Fictions of Language and the Language of Fiction*. London: Routledge.
Fludernik, Monika (ed.)
1998 *Literature and Linguistics*. Special issue of *European Journal of English Studies*, 2 (2).
Hackett, Helen
2000 *Women and Romance Fiction in the English Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hazlitt, W. Carew (ed.)
1864 *Shakespeare Jest-books*. London.
Hope, Jonathan
1994 *The Authorship of Shakespeare's Plays: A Socio-linguistic Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
LION = Literature Online
⟨http://lion.chadwyck.com/⟩
Lyly, John
1578 *Euphues*. London. Copy used found in LION [Literature Online].
Mack, Phyllis
1992 *Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophesy in Seventeenth-Century England* [Net Library Edition]. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mezei, Kathy
1996 Free indirect discourse, gender, and authority in *Emma*, *Howards End*, and *Mrs. Dalloway*. In *Ambiguous Discourse: Feminist Narratology and British Women Writers*, Kathy Mezei (ed.), 66–92. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Mitchell, W. J. Thomas
1985 Introduction: Pragmatic theory. In *Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism*, W. J. Thomas Mitchell (ed.), 1–10. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Nash, Thomas
1594 *The Unfortunate Traveller*. London. Copy used found in LION [Literature Online].
Osborne, Dorothy
1903 *Letters from Dorothy Osborne to Sir William Temple*. Edward Abbott Parry (ed.). London: Sherratt and Hughes.
Pilkington, Adrian
2000 *Poetic Effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Ramazani, Vaheed K.
1987 Emma Bovary and the free indirect si(g)ns of romance. *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 15 (3): 274–284.
RWO = Renaissance Women Online
Women Writers Project, Brown University. ⟨http://www.wwp.brown.edu/texts/rwoentry.html⟩
Scholes, Robert
1998 *The Rise and Fall of English*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sell, Roger
2000 *Literature as Communication*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Shaw, Narelle
1990 Free indirect speech and Jane Austen's 1816 revision of *Northanger Abbey*. *SEL: Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 30 (4): 591–601.
Sidney, Sir Philip
1590 *Arcadia*. London. Copy used found in LION [Literature Online].
Strauch, Gérard
1993 Richardson et le style indirect libre. *Recherches Anglaises et Nord-Americaines* 26: 87–101.
Uddén, Anna
2000 *Veils of Irony: The Development of Narrative Technique in Women's Novels of the 1790s*. (Studia Anglistica Upsaliensia 112.) Uppsala: Uppsala University Press.
Villani, Stefano
2004 Cheevers [née Shenel], Sarah (c. 1608–1664?), Quaker missionary. In *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⟨http://www.oxforddnb.com/⟩
Wiseman, Susan
1997 Read within: Gender, cultural difference, and Quaker women's travel narratives. In *Voicing Women: Gender and Sexuality in Early Modern Writing*, Kate Chedgzoy, Melanie Hansen, and Suzanne Trill (eds.), 153–171. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Worden, Blair
2003 Which play was performed at the Globe Theatre on 7 February 1601? *The London Review of Books* 25 (13): PAGES.
Wroth, Mary
1621 *Urania*.
1983 *The Poems of Lady Mary Wroth*. Josephine Roberts (ed.). Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
WWO = Women Writers Online
Women Writers Project, Brown University. ⟨http://www.wwp.brown.edu/texts/wwoentry.html⟩

Discoursal aspects of the *Legends of Holy Women* by Osbern Bokenham

Gabriella Del Lungo Camiciotti

A pragmaphilological approach informs this paper. My study focuses on verbal interaction in the work of one medieval author, Osbern Bokenham, with the aim of describing the rhetorical and narrative functions served by directly reported speech in Bokenham's *Legends* rather than dialogue structure and dialogue sequences. Specifically, I regard this literary work as a communicative act where the author chooses dialogue as a mode of expressing a set of intentions arising from changes in the socio-cultural environment. I have particularly attended to contextual factors in order to situate the *Legends* in the medieval tradition of saints' lives writing and to elucidate the goals of the text *vis-à-vis* Bokenham's contemporary audience.

1. The saint's life and Bokenham's *Legends of Holy Women*

Saints' legends represented a well established genre by the middle of the fifteenth century, when Osbern Bokenham wrote the first all-female hagiography: *Legendys of Hooly Wummen* (unique manuscript copied and therefore presumably completed in 1447). In the early Christian period, the legend was originally a tributary biography compiled from local memory and testimony as to the holiness of a deceased member of the community, typically read aloud in church as part of a liturgy commemorating the anniversary of the individual death. It was a form of historical narrative which, over the centuries, developed into pious fiction serving a variety of functions (on this development, see Wolpers [1964]; Heffernan [1988]) related to changing socio-cultural values and practices. Although the basic function remained to teach the truth of the faith through the principle of individual example, saints' stories were, in fact, told and retold throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. In this sense, such narratives were designed to promote social cohesion in connection with ritual and cultic practices and to interpret for the community the ideal of sanctity itself. Particularly in the late Middle Ages,

because of the spreading of popular piety, saints' legends proliferated both in miracle collections recorded at the shrines of saints and in the hagiographic exempla collected for preachers (Ward 1987; Finucane 1977). In short, the saint's life became a very popular narrative genre with a long tradition of production and use.

The past several years have witnessed a marked revival of interest in medieval saints' lives. Recent studies tend to focus on the legend as a literary genre from the public discourse angle (Delany 1998; Boffey 1999; Ashton 2000; Wogan-Browne 2001) or on its linguistical and philological features (Nevanlinna and Taavitsainen 1993; Görlach 1998). The legend as a narrative genre has been studied by Fludernik (1996) who takes into consideration this text type with the primary view of tracing the origin of the novel; however, her work also highlights the discoursal aspects of the saint's legend.

Both the paradigmatic aspect of saints' lives and the well established tradition of producing such texts explain the highly conventional presentation of the story throughout the Middle Ages. However, in its long history this narrative genre underwent significant refashioning, evolving from religious didactic tale to literary artefact whose aim did not exclude entertainment. Legends of the saints grew in popularity in the late Middle Ages and occupied a special place in late medieval devotion; in particular, beginning in the late 1300s, numerous hagiographers and artists, among them Chaucer, Bokenham, Capgrave, and Lydgate, reframed old texts so as to invite new interpretations of the model of sainthood (on the change of this model see Vauchez [1981] and [1999]) and to attract new audiences. In fact, in this period the saint's life, in addition to being used by preachers as *exemplum*, was recontextualized as a narrative genre *per se*.

Bokenham states that his work is based on the *Legenda Aurea* by Jacobus of Varagine, which was an extremely popular thirteenth-century collection of lives intended for preachers (Reames 1985); however, his legends have little in common with their acknowledged source. Writing for an interconnected circle of East Anglian readers in the mid-fifteenth century (Edwards 1994), Bokenham routinely embellishes Jacobus's action-packed narratives with extended discussions of the saints' imitable virtues, with descriptions of their suffering and devotion, with elaborate passages of prayer and exposition garnered from the Latin *passiones*, and with expanded dialogue (Winstead 1997: 122). For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on directly reported speech, whose relevance in Bokenham's lives was first noted by the editor: "Where it can be checked, his translation keeps close to the original, and his additions have reference to himself rather than to the story, except that he

not infrequently elaborates the dialogue" (Serjeantson 1971: xxiv). In fact, most of his exemplary lives are made up of dialogue embedded in narration, and the predominance of directly reported speech over event and action can hardly be overestimated.[1]

To conclude this brief introduction, it is my opinion that dialogue is a crucial factor in late medieval religious narrative where, to some extent, it echoes the contemporary dramatic model[2], but suits the purpose of narrative as well. It is indeed the site of creativity for Bokenham, the locus where the medieval author intervenes in the complex interplay between generic traditional conventions and personal elaboration. In fact, Bokenham transforms Latin source materials in order to reposition the discourse of a clerical audience for lay female patrons, offering them new authoritative models of speech in line with late medieval religious and cultural developments. The use of directly reported speech is crucial for this purpose as Bokenham's legends rely heavily on external dialogue (i.e., conversation) rather than narration and indirect speech reporting. Authorial intervention is restricted to the metanarrative frame and comments in the story[3], since characters' functional and straightforward exchanges make everything explicit for the audience.

2. Textual and pragmatic analysis

To organize his saints' lives, Bokenham makes use of the typical external structuring principle found in many other verse narratives (Gittes 1991): metanarrative discourse, which serves to introduce the tale, to connect passages, to interpret the events and to supply a final conclusion or moral. Rather than acting as a metafictional technique, the active narrator persona is here a structural device: his comments provide a scaffolding to the boxed stories which are thus transformed from a loose collection into a meaningful unit. The enclosed tales are made up of a series of episodes connected by the continuous presence of the heroine and by narratorial intervention: the narrator is present in the general prologue, in the prologue and epilogue of each life and in metacomments within lives. Clearly such an external organization of the story is the primary means of effecting the articulation and alignment of episodes in medieval narrative (Evans 1986). However, another meaningful structural principle is at work in Bokenham's legends: dialogue providing a link between structure and theme, thus serving a metanarrative function.

To fully assess this function, it is necessary to examine the global discourse organization of the stories. I have analyzed the narrative structure

of Bokenham's lives following the model elaborated by Labov (1972) for natural narratives and later refined by Fleischman (1990). Focusing on the complicating action, that is the body of the narrative, I have noted that most of it is realized through dialogic exchanges. The typical plot of Bokenham's lives is usually a straightforward one: the chronological sequence of narrated events is linear – no flashbacks or forwards – and tends to focus on two climactic points: the confrontation with pagan adversaries and the apparition of supernatural agents. These climactic peaks are linguistically presented as verbal encounters and normally directly reported.

I will now turn to the *Legends* to illustrate my point that Bokenham elaborates the episodic narrative pattern by increasing the prominence and quality of dialogue. After a very brief description of the formal devices used to signal the boundary between narration and dialogue, I will deal with the functions served by directly reported speech highlighting conventional and innovative uses of dialogue.

2.1. Form and function of frames

The framing of directly reported speech in medieval works is usually linked to oral storytelling or performing of verse (on frames in romances, see Herlyn [1999]). However, Bokenham's exploitation of this device is quite complex and not just an aural device. His framing technique is certainly rooted in the episodic narrative of his time, saints' lives and romances, but he also demarcates directly reported speech in a way that is analogous to contemporary religious genres such as devotional treatises and drama.

Bokenham's framing of directly reported speech is consistent at the level of both episode and turntaking within the dialogic exchange.[4] Each conversational passage is framed; that is, it is regularly introduced and concluded by a reporting clause/sentence, thus marking explicitly some boundary between narration and citation:

(1) **He [Olibrius] hyr [Margaret] thus areynyd wyth a pale faas:**
'Sey me, damysel, of what kyn thou art,
And whethyr thou be bonde or ellys fre.'
'Seruage in me had neuere no part,
For cristene I am sekyr, sere,' quod she.
'I aske of what kynrede thou art,' quod he;
'I serue,' she seyth, 'that souereyn godheed

That hedyr-to hath kept myn maydynheed.'
'Than folwyth it thus ful consequently
That thou clepyst crist thy god,' quod he,
'Whom that my fadrys dede crucyfye.'
May no thyng be seyd sothere,' quod she;
'Thy fadrys naylyd crist vp-on a tre,
Whom I do wurshepe wyth hool herte,
And they in helle suffryn peynys smerte.'
Whan Olibrius herd this conclusyoun
Of mayde Margarete, he wex ner wood, …
(*Vita S. Margaretae*, 511–527)

As to the form of frames, I have identified two main types: tags (e.g. *quod she, she seyth*) serving the sole purpose of patterning turns in dialogic exchanges, and introducers and closings – i.e. clauses/sentences demarcating dialogic chunks of discourse so as to mark transitions from narration to dialogue and vice versa. Introducers are always present, while closings may be omitted. This happens rarely and, if so, other linguistic devices can be used to signal the shift back to narration. For instance, *gan* or *anon* can textually suggest a structurally significant transition (Brinton 1996: 74–79, 85–101). Opening and closing sentences usually highlight the action of speaking (examples [2] and [3] below), but introducers often have a character evaluation function as well. In (4), (5) and (6) the saint is devout, the pagan is malevolent, and the supernatural being is benevolent.

(2) To hym hir sentence þus dede expresse (*Lyf of S. Anneys*, 4305)

(3) Whan þus endyd had hys preyere (*Lyf of S. Faith*, 3797)

(4) She [St. Christine] þankyd god, seying þus **deuoutly**
(*Vita S. Christianae*, 2826)

(5) **In hys fers rage** to hem [the philosophers] he [the emperor] vttryd þis language (*Lyf of S. Kateryne*, 6801–6802)

(6) Quod þis elder [St. Peter], **softly smiling** (*Lyf of S. Agas*, 8696)

Although the frame is a typical medieval discourse-structuring device, it does not only have a textual function. Together with the narrator persona it

is part of the ongoing conversation between author and audience. The personalized narrator is a strategy to facilitate empathetic identification on the part of the audience and to increase the explanatory power of the story by presenting comments that help interpret the characters' motives and values. It usually refers to the scaffolding of such embedded tales as the *Canterbury Tales* (Gittes 1991) or to the intervention of the many garrulous narrators of medieval works. However, I also include introducers and closings in this category as they do not just explicitly mark the beginning and conclusion of a dialogically represented chunk of discourse in order to facilitate listening, but also contribute to the characterisation of protagonists and often serve as narratorial comment or internal evaluation. See, for instance, the use of adverbial expressions contained in frames in (7) and (8). In this sense, complex frames can be considered a metanarrative strategy, while tags just serve the textual purpose of demarcating turntaking within the dialogic passage.

(7) And to hyr husbonde, … þus she seyde, **for drede quakyng**: …
(*Lyf of Marye Maudelyn*, 5867)

(8) Quod Agal [*sic*] ageyn **wyth ful sad chere** (*Lyf of S. Agas*, 8666)

It has been argued that repetitiveness (Tannen 1987, 1989) and formulaicity (Norrick 2000) are features of oral storytelling where such devices help the narrator to organize his narrative into orderly chunks, and hence can guide listeners through them. At the same time formulaic frames would provide clues to listeners in a public reading of the text: clearly the audience wait for signs of the closure of an episode or of a chunk of discourse, and stock formulae offer them important cues. In order to enlist listeners and clearly mark the beginning of a dialogic section, the narrator traditionally draws on formulae because listeners naturally attune their ears to formulaic markers (Norrick 2000: 48–49). In short, because of their formulaicity and repetitiveness, frames have the function of organizing narrative performance and are metamessages of rapport between speaker and audience.

The findings for contemporary conversational narrative seem to indicate that repetition is at the heart of language organization[5] since it facilitates comprehension by providing semantically less dense discourse when a written document is read aloud. It also evidences a speaker's attitude thus creating meaning, it bonds participants to the discourse and to each other, and it serves the overarching purpose of creating interpersonal involvement (Tannen 1989: 49–52). Repetition strategies such as those observed in conversa-

tion are also found in nonconversational discourse types, and in fact formal or ritualized discourse is often particularly rich in repetition, as is observed by Johnstone (1987). In short, repetition is a fundamental linguistic strategy. As to the extent of its formulaicity, though all repetitive expressions are relatively fixed in form, there is a continuum of relative fixity: some discoursal situations require more fixity and others at least slight variation. In particular, it has been observed that variation seems to be felt as necessary when discourse is written (Tannen 1989: 86). There is an interplay between fixity and variation which basically depends on the oral/written dimension: in the second mode, parallelism is usually preferred to the exact repetition of words and formulae, which are more easily encountered in the first.

Bokenham's employment of frames seems to exceed the demarcating function of performed text and also indicate more literate strategies. Indeed, it shows considerable pattern variety, since framing devices, apart from tags, are not completely repetitive and there is a fundamental difference between introducers and closings. The first is frequently a sentence rather than a phrase or clause and can be fairly complex, while the second is usually less varied than the opener, since it only signals closing and does not need to catch the attention of listeners. Compare, for instance, the opening and closing of Constance's vision of Saint Agnes:

(9) **And to hyr blyssyd Anneys dede apere,**
Seying: 'O Constaunce, do constaunthly,
And cryst, goddys sone, feythfully
Beleue to be þi uery saluatour,
And he shalle cure & hele al þi langour.'
At þis voys dame Constaunce awook …
(*Lyf of S. Anneys*, 4661–4666)

The use of complex frames in Bokenham's legends seems to point to a literate use of such devices. In addition, other literate discourse signals are used to complement the text-organizing function of frames, such as the use of adverbs and verb forms indicating narrativity in written text. See, for instance, the use of *anoon* and *dede* in (10):

(10) 'Be yt so þan,' he **anoon dede** seye.
And aftyr to here hous þei hem **dede** lede
And mynystryd hem alle þat þei had nede.
(*Lyf of Marye Maudelyn*, 5882–5884)

Bokenham's frames also display other typical literary/written uses: they are interpersonal devices to help readers focus on coming important words or evaluate characters and their actions. Of course there is some overlapping and the function of discoursal devices is not always clearcut. For instance, the frequent use of cataphoric and anaphoric deictics seems to point to the oral organization of discourse – e.g. the frequent use of *thus* and *this*, as in (11). However, the same devices can serve an evaluative and interpersonal function in written text to signal attitudes and move listeners to adopt parallel perspectives, as in (12).

(11) Whan she thus endyd had hyr preyere,
Sodeynly from heuene this voys cam down,
So lowde that alle men myht it here: …
(*Vita S. Margaretae*, 848–850)

(12) And at þese wordys of exortacioun,
The peple besyde wept pytously …
(*Lyf os S. Feyth*, 3937–3938)

In addition to frames, directly reported speech is clearly signalled to the reader/listener by the use of interjections and nouns of address in turntaking initial position for purposes of reading aloud:

(13) 'What chere wyth yow, **syre**? Dede ye owt se
Thys syht þat I had in my visyoun?'
'**Ya, ya, wyf!** & þat causyth me
To be now in greth trybulacyoun.
I ne woot what best we do moun:
Whyddyr to be reulyd aftyr hyr byddyng,
Or ellys stylle to kepe oure owlde lyuyng.'
'**I-wys, syre**,' quod she, myn opynyoun
Is þis, þat bettyr it is to obeye
Than to fallyn in-to þe indignacyoun
Of hyr god, & myscheuously deye.'
(*Lyf of Marye Maudelyn*, 5871–5881)

This use is similar to the technique employed in early drama and reminds us that the most common way of transmitting literature in the late Middle Ages was still oral delivery (Coleman 1996). The use of interjections and nouns of address in quotations has a practical purpose in making the turntaking

explicit and thus facilitating and guiding the audience's reaction; in addition, it is a literary device used to heighten attention and emotional involvement (Taavitsainen 1997). This is specifically the case when interjections and vocatives are used in narrative passages and in direct addresses to the audience on the part of the narrator. In this respect, it is perhaps useful to recall that similar interjections and addresses to the audience are frequently found in religious and devotional works as a device to trigger empathy and involve readers and listeners in public reading.

To conclude this section, we can say that dialogic episodes in the stories are bounded at the outset and at the end to facilitate comprehension and suggest interpretation to the audience. Having thus established how dialogue is clearly demarcated from narration and signalled by specific linguistic structures which go beyond text organization to serve other functions, less rooted in oral performance, we can now turn to the significance of directly reported discourse.

2.2. Form and function of directly reported discourse

As previously pointed out, numerous stretches of directly reported discourse contribute to the macrostructural pattern of the story as characters' dialogue and speech are enlarged at the expense of narration. It should further be noted that these conversational inserts are by no means uniform; on the contrary, they are quite varied and have different functions loosely correlating with the following five dialogue types:

(a) Drama, or short passages without formulae of quotation. The scarce use of frames may be offset by the use of address nouns, pronouns, and interjections to facilitate the patterning of dialogue.

(b) Dialogic exchanges consisting of short conversational turns, sometimes just repartee. In this case there are *inquit* tags marking turntaking.

(c) Dialogic exchanges consisting of longish conversational turns.

(d) Monologues, mostly professions of faith and prayers in praise of God, to ask for intercession or to thank God, or addresses to bystanders, usually aiming at the conversion of someone else.

(e) Quotes, i.e. written text or important words reported verbatim.

As to frequency, we mostly encounter types (b) and (c), which are used when narrative discourse switches to dialogue at crucial points in the story; in this case there are always opening and closing frames providing a closure to the dialogic episode. Type (a) is less frequent and tends to merge with (b). A very important speech is usually directly reported (d–e). This occurs especially when the speaker is a supernatural being or the saint herself, and the power of their words is to be emphasized.

As to the functions served by dialogue, these can be textual and pragmatic, on the one hand, and stylistic and interpersonal on the other. There is, however, considerable overlapping and it is not always easy clearly to distinguish one function from another. The principal textual function is that of marking climaxes in the plot. In each life the sequence of reported events climaxes with dialogic episodes, which highlight the most relevant points of the story: confrontation with pagan adversaries and special relationship with supernatural beings, which, in effect, constitute the basic message of the saint's life as a genre. In this sense, we can say that Bokenham dramatizes his stories to throw a significant light on the hagiographic meaning of the event.

A second textual function served by dialogue is clearly to demarcate speech from narration. For instance, in the life of St. Agatha, the episode of the encounter between St. Agatha and St. Peter (14) starts with a short passage of narration introducing the vision of St. Peter, who appears to the saint in prison to heal her wounds. The beginning of the episode is signalled by an adverbial clause introduced by *Wherfore,* which establishes the initial setting of the scene and in its initial position assumes a text-organizing function (on episode boundary marking see Brinton [1996: chapter 6]). After a few lines, the focus shifts to directly reported speech and the end of the episode is marked by two lines making explicit the supernatural nature of the encounter. In this example, in addition to the function of signalling the climax of the encounter between the saint and an angelic being, dialogue has a foregrounding function as it helps the audience to distinguish between the narrative background, i.e. the story, which is traditional and thus already well known to the audience, and the more salient foregrounded world of the marvellous, which in the late Middle Ages is a major plot element.

(14) **Wherfore** to hyre in prysoun he sent
A ould man a-boute mydnyht,
Beforn whom went a chyld wyth lyht.
Thys old man sempt a leche to be,
And dyuers medycyns wyth hym broht he

Wych were both good & sure
And suffycyent hyr woundys to cure.
And whan he cam euene þere she was,
To hyre he seyd þus: ‘o mayde Agas,
Al-be-yt so þat þis mad man,
Thys consularye, þis Quyncyan,
Wyt torment hath þe doon greth dere,
Yet hast þou hym wyth þine answere
Tormentyd more þan he hath þe;
For in hys conscyence ful confuse ys he,
And, as yt semyth, at hys wyttys ende.
But for I present was whan he dede rende
From þi brest þi pappys cruelly
Wyth-oute eythyr pyte or mercy,
I consyderyd haue by my kunnyng
That wyth good dylygence & entendyng
They mounn wele be recuryd ageyn
And maad al hool, yf þou wylt, certeyn.
And comyn I am to þe same entent,
And wyth me brouht many an oynement
Wych be both good & profytable,
And to cure ych soor good & able;
And ellys I nolde haue come now here.’
Quod Agal [*sic*] **ageyn wyth ful sad chere:**
‘**Syre**, treuly I wyl ye knowe þat y
Dede neuere yet medycyn to my body
Syth I was born, wherfore now shame
To begynne yt were & wurthy blame.’
‘**Doughtyr**, I am a crystyn man,’ quod he,
‘And þerfore þou nedyst not to be shamyd of me.’
‘**Nay, nay, syre**,’ quod Agas, ‘certeynly
No thhyng a-shamyd of you am y,
Ner aferd, for syth fer stopyn in age
Ye been, as semyth by your vysage,
And, on þat oþir syde, wyth greth torment
So woundyd I am & so al to-rent,
That on no wyse, as yt semyth be me,
No man of lust myht temptyd be;
Wherefore, fadyr, ryht humbylly

I you thank & sey gramercy
That ye of your cherytabylnesse
Vouchesaf to do swych besynne
Me to curyn wyth greth dylygence;
But yt shal not be, wherfore goth hence.'
'And what ys cause, I you beseche,' quod he,
'That you to coryn ye nyl [s]uffryn me?'
'**I-wys, syre**,' quod she, 'for ful of uertu
A lord I haue, clepyd cryst Ihesu,
Wych of swych myht ys & of puyssaunce
That wyth o wurde al my greuaunce
He curyn may and euere sore,
And perfyth helth to me restore.
Therfore, yf he wyl, yt shal be do.'
'And þis same lord sent me þe to.'
Quod þis elder, softly smylyng,
'And hys apostyl I am wythowte doutyng,
In whos name, I dar wele expresse,
Dylyueryd þou art from al dystresse,
And eek alle þi woundys ful curyd be.'
And þis seyd, sodeynly vanysshyd he
And no more was seyn in þat plas.

(*Lyf of S. Agas*, 8638–8703)

A third textual function is the foregrounding of voices and quotations. In St. Cecilia's life (15), Valerian is invited to read silently a text written with letters of gold in a book held by an angel: this text is reported verbatim. In short, important voices – prayers, exhortations, speeches by supernatural beings heard in visions – are usually highlighted for attention.

(15) Wyth þis wurd Valyryan roos up redyly
And on þe scryptur lokyd ful dylygently,
And in hys hert priuyly he dede rede,
Wher-oute þe sentence wyth-oute drede
Was þis: 'o lord & oon feyth þer-to,
O baptem þer is, and o god also,
Wych fadyr is of alle thyngys,
And ouyr alle, by alle, & in alle us is.'

(*Lyf of S. Cycyle*, 7621–7628)

It should be noted that these textual functions point to performed text because they pragmatically aid in oral delivery the audience in identifying peaks in narration and in paying attention to foregrounded voices. However, they can also refer to more literate strategies of discourse organization. For instance, there are evaluative closing frames which constitute a sort of didactic guidance to both listeners and readers, helping them to interpret discourse. See (12) above, which explicitly indicates that the speech just reported is one of exhortation.

To sum up, although extended dialogue and monologue are considered a sign of the structural crisis of late medieval narrative which lead from the episodic to the scenic pattern, eventually replacing action with consciousness (Fludernik 2000: 240), it seems to me that it is also an interpersonal strategy through which Bokenham plays with the generic expectations of his readers in retelling well-known stories. In addition to dramatically highlighting confrontation with pagan adversaries, Bokenham emphasizes the non-dramatic conversations between the saint and supernatural beings, thus inviting the audience vicariously to experience not only the protagonist's rhetorical victory, but also the presence of God in this world.

As to the interpersonal functions of dialogue pointing to literary uses of text, they can be summed up as follows: first, to manipulate the reader/listener's emotions; and second, to create involvement in narrated events by dramatizing. It is well known that dialogue typically fulfils an important expressive function in oral storytelling and performance-based narrative. In fact, prominence of speech appears to be a typological feature of all performance storytelling and one that contributes to involvement and dramatization (Toolan 1988; Tannen 1989). This may seem at odds with the frequency of this device in late medieval written works. However it should be noted that the text types where it is more often encountered are very interpersonal works, such as devotional treatises, where it serves the same audience-involving function as in performed texts.

Dialogue can serve the additional function of stylistic marking. The analysis of Bokenham's work seems to suggest that directly reported discourse is a rhetorical device which also has a world-creating function, since the protagonist and other main figures are characterized through interaction. In this context, the use of directly reported speech enables the author to introduce diverse stylistic levels according to the type of speakers involved in conversation and to the tenor of speech. In fact, the stylistic quality of Bokenham's dialogues ranges from solemn invocation in prayer and didactic/pastoral addresses to bystanders or to the audience, to polite conversation with pagan

adversaries and angelic agents. In addition, the analysis shows that there are stylistic differences between two basic types of dialogue, proving how available reporting strategies do not constitute a mere inventory of formal choices, but relate to Bokenham's intentions *vis-à-vis* his audience: the exchanges with pagan adversaries tend to show participants as emotional and hostile, while dialogues with supernatural beings, angels and demons alike, show participants engaged in polite and decorous conversation. The moral significance of the saint's story has shifted from conflict to otherwordly contact and the hagiographer's concern is with pleasing as well as edifying his audience.

2.3. Discussion of results

The analysis of Bokenham's *Legends* suggests that dialogue is a crucial narrative strategy in that it is the primary way of reshaping prior text to new contexts. Bokenham adapts the traditional saint's life to a new audience and to the changed function of the hagiographic text by employing rhetorical and narrative strategies that rely on the employment of dialogue.

In the late Middle Ages, the saint's life evolved from historical/utilitarian writing – open-ended collection of lives to be used by preachers – to narrative framed texts in accordance with a shift in the audience's tastes and ways of conceiving sainthood. The saint's life, in addition to being used by preachers in sermons, became a literary artefact for a sophisticated audience that included lay people with a lively interest in moral and theological issues, and who were avid consumers of secular poetry, particularly chivalric romance and lais (Winstead 1997). The literary production and use of the saint's life is illustrated by works by Chaucer, Gower, Capgrave and Lydgate, a community of authors among whom Bokenham places his work by citing them in prefatory materials.[6] The function of the hagiographic text accordingly evolved from the factual report of the saint's miraculous deeds towards proof of the special relationship between divinity and the saint. While paradigmatic action dominates the traditional narrative structure of the hagiographic text, the predominant element in Bokenham's lives is dialogue used to foreground innovative elements such as the saints' emotions, expressed in prayers, expository passages and longish conversations with angelic beings.

Dialogue is thus a most important rhetorical device, but the use of frames may be equally important to reveal the generic evolution of Bokenham's

saints' lives and their adaptation to an increasingly literate consumption of such narratives. Medieval framing devices are fixed or nearly fixed expressions particularly useful in oral performance to make text organization more predictable for listeners; for this reason exact repetition is more commonly found in oral discourse or written text meant as a prompt to oral delivery. Bokenham's introducers and closings seem to indicate the adaptation to a more literate use of the saint's life as they are more varied and complex than those used in previous hagiographic collections for preachers where, in addition to the text-patterning function, they provide internal evaluation, thus rendering the text more interpersonal and reader-oriented. This would be in line with the expression of late medieval piety, in whose context Bokenham's work can be culturally situated. In short, in addition to traditional reading aloud in a group, Bokenham's lives could also be meant for private perusal on the part of dedicatees who could thus meditate on the virtues displayed by their namesakes.

By way of conclusion, I would like to underline once again the combination of oral and written discourse aspects in Bokenham's use of dialogue, which attests to the complexity of interrelated modes of text production and consumption in the late Middle Ages. Though in this era people were increasingly literate, in the fifteenth century saints' legends still existed primarily as an oral/visual medium in that they were commonly experienced by their audience in performance (exempla in sermon preaching, panel paintings and statuary), as performed narratives remained the predominant means of instruction and edification, as well as of entertainment. Moreover, the transition from speech-based to literate narrative does not necessarily signal a new diachronic stage since orality and literacy are not mutually exclusive culture-types, but mind-sets which can coexist beside each other in spite of technological changes. It has, in fact, been suggested (Vitz 1987) that hagiography is a fusion of oral and written mentalities.

3. Concluding observations

This paper is an attempt to describe some discourse features that characterize late medieval hagiographic narrative by presenting a case study and to interpret the emerging data from a historical pragmatic perspective. Though the paper is more technical than theoretical, many of the points it raises can have significant impact upon the assumptions which underlie the pragmatic investigation of historical fictional texts.

Firstly, I would argue that literary works are a good source of data for investigating discourse features as a full text provides a key to understanding not only dialogue between fictional characters, but also the author's interaction with his intended audience. In addition, in the general evolution of genres, it is easier to notice continuity in ways of communicating values and attitudes rather than those elements that in the long run give way to variation in the pattern. It is, in fact, the microhistorical investigation of expressions and their functions in texts that best reveals gradual change.

Secondly, a historical pragmatic approach requires us to focus on whether and how effects achieved by culture-bound structural and rhetorical devices trigger emotional response in diverse audiences. Of course, the function of a medieval text for us can never be simply the same as for the intended audience. How do we, reading in a milieu so very different from Bokenham's own, make sense of his *Legends*? Since interpersonal devices are an all-time human phenomenon in communication (Sell 2000) and genres are pragmatic resources, both for writers in composition and for readers in interpretation (Fowler 1982), an audience-oriented account of generic conventions and discourse strategies can help us not only to reconstruct the intentions of authors and experiences of readers, but also to respond to the distant text in some meaningful way. As a matter of fact, it is through our perception of Bokenham's co-adaptation with generic norms that we can situate his work. To present discourse directly cannot be counted only as a surface feature of the text, but depends on and involves pragmatic processing as well: it is an interactive strategy with an affective impact on both listeners and readers. We assume that the effect intended by Bokenham was in line with the affective piety of his times: a device empathetically to involve the audience and to trigger on their part the experiencing of the narrated events. Can we interpret his legends along the same lines? This is unlikely, though we can still appreciate his use of dialogue as it retains the function of triggering involvement and emotional response.[7]

To conclude, if change in narrative patterns is viewed as a change of discoursal techniques and rhetorical strategies, then the diachronic study of the functions served by dialogue can be integrated into a pragmatic history of English. In this context, the examination of the use of dialogue as a structural and rhetorical device in Bokenham's *Legends* can provide a useful case study to shed light on questions of difference in textual conventions over time and to elucidate how strategies to win and retain attention are a universal phenomenon of any strictly non-informative communication.

A final point may be made with reference to the methodological issues raised in the introduction to the volume. In this article I suggest, by example, that the close reading techniques of philologically based discourse and narrative analysis are an appropriate tool for investigating historical texts. As observed by Johnstone (1996: 11), "[i]n order to understand how language works on the most concrete level, that is to understand the mechanisms that influence what real people say in actual situations, we need to study small bits of talk in great detail". The statistical regularities and large generalizations of language use patterns across time uncovered by historical corpus linguists need to be checked against actual usage in specific texts, because speakers and writers alike express their individuality by exploiting in a novel way what is conventional or even formulaic. Speakers/writers and listeners/readers decide what is meant by what is said/written on the basis of conventional discourse strategies, which are never exactly the same because different speakers/writers employ different combinations of such strategies. One of the key issues that define historical pragmatics, to understand why particular linguistic forms take the shape they do in different historical periods, can be fully addressed only with reference to the particular, by listening to individual variation and voice.

As to the fraught questions of textual meaning interpretation, the discourse analyst's aim is to understand the data, rather than to prove preformulated hypotheses: text rather than theory tends to be the source of the discipline. Her or his role in understanding how historical texts mean is like that of the translator, who, through linguistic and discourse analysis, mediates between source text and target audience. Of course, interpretation of texts, like translation, must remain approximate and time-relative if considered from a "scientific" perspective.

Notes

1. The increase in the direct representation of conversational exchange in much late medieval narrative has been recognized by Fludernik (1996) as a strategy to present characters' intentions and motives since the observer-narrator can only describe events from an outside perspective. A similar strategy has been observed in romances (Schroeder 1983).
2. The overlap of hagiography with the genre of romance has been noted by many scholars. For instance, according to Delany (1998: 86, 170) the *South English Legendary* is explicitly meant as an alternative to romance and Capgrave's version of the *Life of St. Katherine* has evident claims to the status of romance.

However, similarities with such a popular contemporary genre as religious drama have usually been overlooked. Grantley (1994: 266) notes that, given the position of saints' legends within the institutional process of religious practice, there is an all the more important connection between the saint's play and the saint's legend; however, her comment refers to the ideological functions that such genres are intended to fulfil and not to formal and rhetorical aspects.

3. On paratext in Bokenham's *Legends* see Johnson (1994).
4. This becomes apparent when comparing this text to contemporary hagiographic narrative. For instance, in the *Life of St. Katherine* by Capgrave, very long dialogic turns or monologues are introduced by short simple clauses (see Horstmann 1973).
5. On a different type of repetitive pattern in Middle English narrative, pious formulae, and their function see Dalrymple (2000).
6. On Bokenham's literary background see Winstead (1997), Boffey (1999); on his connections with Chaucer see Delany (1992) and (1998).
7. It has been argued (Sell 2000: 230) that the negotiation of different affective patterns is one of the most crucial aspects of the entire reading process. It is also a crucial aspect of performed text and oral storytelling (Tannen 1994; Norrick 2000) in spite of socio-cultural changes over time since, for any speaker or writer, there is an inevitable trade-off between the need to help the audience to understand the meaning of the text and the intention to make an impact.

Sources

Horstmann, Carl (ed.)
1973 Reprint. *The Life of St. Katherine of Alexandria by John Capgrave.* (EETS, OS 100.) Millwood, New York: Kraus Reprint. Original edition, 1893.

Serjeantson, Mary S. (ed.)
1971 Reprint. *Legendys of Hooly Wummen by Osbern Bokenham*. (EETS, OS 206.) London: Oxford University Press. Original edition, 1938.

References

Ashton, Gail
2000 *The Generation of Identity in Late Medieval Hagiography*. London/New York: Routledge.

Boffey, Julia
1999 Middle English lives. In *Medieval English Literature*, David Wallace (ed.), 610–634. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinton, Laurel
1996 *Pragmatic Markers in English: Grammaticalization and Discourse Functions*. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Coleman, Joyce
1996 *Public Reading and the Reading Public in Late Medieval England and France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dalrymple, Roger
2000 *Language and Piety in Middle English Romance*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer.
Delany, Sheila
1992 *A Legend of Holy Women*. Notre Dame, Indiana/London: University of Notre Dame Press.
1998 *Impolitic Bodies: Poetry, Saints, and Society in Fifteenth-century England*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edwards, A. S. G.
1994 The transmission and the audience of Osbern Bokenham's *Legendys of Hooly Wummen*. In *Late-medieval Religious Texts and their Transmission*, A. J. Minnis (ed.), 157–167. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer.
Evans, Jonathan D.
1986 Episodes in analysis of medieval narrative. *Style* 20 (2): 126–141.
Finucane, Ronald C.
1977 *Miracles and Pilgrims: Popular Beliefs in Medieval England*. London: Macmillan.
Fleischman, Suzanne
1990 *Tense and Narrativity: From Medieval Performance to Modern Fiction*. London: Routledge.
Fludernik, Monica
1996 *Towards a Natural Narratology*. London/New York: Routledge.
2000 Narrative discourse markers in Malory's *Morte D'Arthur*. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (2): 231–262.
Fowler, Alastair
1982 *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gittes, Katharine S.
1991 *Framing the* Canterbury Tales*: Chaucer and the Narrative Frame Tradition*. New York: Greenwood Press.
Görlach, Manfred
1998 *Studies in Middle English Saints' Legends*. Heidelberg: C. Winter Universitätsverlag.
Grantley, Darryl
1994 Saints' plays. In *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Theatre*, Richard Beadle (ed.), 265–289. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heffernan, Thomas J.
1988 *Sacred Biography: Saints and Their Biographers in the Middle Ages*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Herlyn, Anne
1999 *So he says to her, he says, "Well," he says …*: Multiple dialogue introducers from a historical perspective. In *Historical Dialogue Analysis*, Andreas H. Jucker, Gerd Fritz, and Franz Lebsanft (eds.), 313–330. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 66.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Johnson, Ian
1994 Tales of a true translator: Medieval literary theory, anecdote and autobiography in Osbern Bokenham's *Legendys of Hooly Wummen*. In *The Medieval Translator* 4, Roger Ellis and Ruth Evans (eds.), 104–124. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.

Johnstone, Barbara
1987 An introduction. In *Perspectives on Repetition.* Special issue of *Text* 7: 205–214.
1996 *The Linguistic Individual: Self-Expression in Language and Linguistics*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Labov, William
1972 The transformation of experience in narrative syntax. In *Language in the Inner City*, William Labov (ed.), 354–396. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Nevanlinna, Saara, and Irma Taavitsainen
1993 *St Katherine of Alexandria. The Late Middle English Prose Legend in Southwell Minster MS 7*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer and Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.

Norrick, Neal R.
2000 *Conversational Narrative: Storytelling in Everyday Talk.* Amsterdam/Phildalphia: John Benjamins.

Reames, Sherry L.
1985 *The* Legenda Aurea*: A Reexamination of its Paradoxical History*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Schroeder, Peter R.
1983 Hidden depths: Dialogue and characterization in Chaucer and Malory. *PMLA* 98: 374–387.

Sell, Roger D.
2000 *Literature as Communication*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Taavitsainen, Irma
1997 Exclamations in late Middle English. In *Studies in Middle English Linguistics*, Jacek Fisiak (ed.), 573–607. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Tannen, Deborah
1987 Repetition in conversation as spontaneous formulaicity. *Text* 7: 215–244.
1989 *Talking Voice: Repetition, Dialogues, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1994 *Gender and Discourse*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Toolan, Michael
1988 *Narrative: A Critical Linguistic Introduction*. London/New York: Routledge.
Vauchez, André
1981 *La sainteté en Occident aux derniers siècles du Moyen Age*. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome.
1999 *Saints, prophètes et visionnaires: Le pouvoir surnaturel au Moyen Age*. Paris: Editions Albin Michel.
Vitz, Evelyn Birge
1987 Vie, légende, littérature: Traditions orales et écrites dans les histoires des saints. *Poétique* 72: 387–402.
Ward, Benedicta
1987 *Miracles and the Medieval Mind*. Aldershot: Wildwood House Limited.
Winstead, Karen A.
1997 *Virgin Martyrs: Legends of Sainthood in Late Medieval England*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Wogan-Browne, Jocelyn
2001 *Saints' Lives and Women's Literary Culture, c. 1150–1300*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolpers, Theodor
1964 *Die englische Heiligenlegende des Mittelalters*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

Index

Adamson, Sylvia, 167, 268
Adverbial Cline, 82, 88, 90, 95, 97, 98, 100
ARCHER (A Representative Corpus of Historical English Texts), 9, 119, 128, 131
Archer, Dawn, 5, 185–217
Austin, J. L., 107

Bakhtin, Mikhail, 171, 172
bargaining, 225, 227, 228
Beattie, John, 185, 191, 192, 209, 211
Biber, Douglas, 18, 69
Bokenham, Osbern, 158, 286–288, 291, 292, 294, 297–300
–, *Legends of Holy Women*, 7, 285–305
Bös, Birte, 5, 219–240
Brinton, Laurel, 3, 14, 31, 54, 37–79, 289, 294
British National Corpus (BNC), 9, 142
Brown, Roger, 169, 178
Busse, Ulrich, 172, 179

Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle, 7, 171, 269, 270, 272, 274, 276–279
–, *Nature's Pictures*, 270, 271, 275, 278, 279
Chadwyck-Healey On-line Literature Collection, 9, 17, 119, 120, 130, 131, 134, 135
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 14, 19, 26, 31, 57, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 101, 102, 124, 263, 286, 298, 302
–, *Canterbury Tales*, 290
communicative functions/practices, 1, 2, 13, 26
context, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24–27, 29, 37, 39–41, 64, 99, 108, 118, 143, 146, 151, 159, 172, 178, 280
convention, 2
conversation
–, analysis, 6, 18, 224
–, maxims of, 15
corpus, 2–5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 42, 45, 54, 107, 118, 120, 130, 134, 139, 141, 152–155, 243, 245
–, analysis, 158, 159
–, linguistics, 2, 4, 28, 107, 112, 157, 210, 301
corpus-based, 4, 5, 16–18, 24, 27, 107, 114, 139, 171
court, 189
courtroom, 207
–, discourse, 5, 18, 190
–, English, 185–217
–, historical, 185, 186, 190, 194–196, 198, 206, 208, 210
–, practices, 28
–, records, 5, 186, 189
Culpeper, Jonathan, 190, 194
cultural
–, history, 28, 219
–, studies, 167

Del Lungo Camiciotti, Gabriella, 7, 285–305

diachronic
–, narratology, 241
–, pragmatics, 13–15
dialogic
–, exchange, 289
–, form, 222
dialogue, 18, 223, 224, 227, 228, 230, 233, 234, 243, 244, 249, 275, 278, 279, 285–287, 293, 294, 297–300
–, functions, 7
–, scripts, 6, 168, 172, 173, 176, 177
Dictionary of Old English, 9
directives, *see* speech act
discourse, 62, 87, 195
–, analysis, 6, 224, 225, 301
–, function, 86, 90, 97
–, marker/particle, 3, 6, 37, 39, 81, 83, 86–88, 93–98, 100, 102, 245–247, 249, 251–253, 256–259, 260, 262, 300
–, organization of, 100, 224, 287
–, strategies, 300, 301
discourse-type, 27
discursive practices, 5, 202
disjunct, 38, 54, 83–86, 94
drama, *also see* plays, 114, 130, 134, 189, 292

Early English Correspondence, Corpus of, 119, 120, 126
Early Middle English, 63
Early Modern English, 4, 5, 19, 23, 52, 56, 57–59, 63, 83, 89, 112, 118, 120, 125, 140, 142, 144, 155, 158, 167, 168, 177–179, 186, 188, 190, 191, 193–195, 198–200, 207, 210, 219, 224, 228–233, 235, 247, 258, 259
editing, 7, 21
editorial practices, 27
emphasizer, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 98–100
English Dialogues, Corpus of, 9, 189–192
episode/episodic structure/narrative episode, 6, 87, 241, 243–247, 249, 252–254, 256, 258, 287, 288, 294
epistemic (meaning/use), 42, 82, 85, 90–92, 95–98, 100, 111
epistolary fiction, 242, 259
Erasmus, Desiderius, 168, 172–178, 168, 174–178
–, *De conscribendis epistolis*, 6, 168, 173–177, 168, 173, 176
–, *De copia*, 173
–, *Encomium Matrimonii*, 172
ethnographic view, 108, 135, 140
examination sequences, 208
experience/experientiality, 24, 247–249, 251, 259

Fantazzi, Charles, 176
fiction, 18, 23, 114, 120, 121, 128–130, 134, 222, 276, 285
Fitzmaurice, James, 7, 171, 267–284
Fitzmaurice, Susan, 2, 8, 11–36, 39, 171, 179, 180, 186, 210, 242, 263
Fleischman, Suzanne, 7, 19
Fludernik, Monika, 6, 241–266, 268, 286, 297, 301
form to function mapping, *also see* semasiological, 3, 14, 15, 17, 28
frames/framing devices, 288–292, 297–299
free indirect
–, discourse, 268
–, speech, 246

function to form mapping, *also see* onomasiological, 3, 14, 15, 28

genre, 2, 3, 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 29, 112, 114, 115, 118, 121, 125, 127, 135, 141, 142, 158, 168, 241–243, 257, 260, 277, 278, 280, 285, 286, 294, 300, 301
–, analysis, 4
–, communicative functions of, 114
–, constraints of, 134
–, conventions, 21, 114, 134, 287, 300
–, non-literary, 114
–, religious, 121, 122, 141, 293
genre-based, 4
genre-specific, 5
Gilman, Albert, 169, 178
global
–, level, 224
–, structure, 87, 219, 224, 225, 228, 235, 287
grammaticalization, 3, 4, 15, 31, 37, 53, 61–64, 66–69, 100–102
Grice, Paul, 4, 16, 30, 59, 82, 98, 99
–, Communicative Principles, 97
–, Co-operative Principle, 15, 40, 99, 100
Gumperz, John, 6
Gurr, Andrew, 170, 172, 179, 180

hagiographic/hagiography, 285, 294, 298, 299, 301
hedges, 38, 42
Helsinki Corpus, 17, 40, 54, 112, 119, 120, 122, 126, 140, 142, 159, 245
historical discourse analysis, 1, 7, 11, 14, 15, 22–24, 27, 28, 30
historical pragmatics, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 11–36, 61, 131, 139, 158, 167, 210, 219, 241, 260, 299–301
–, corpus-based, 5
–, definitions, 11
Historical Thesaurus, 118–120
homilies, *see* sermons
Hope, Jonathan, 167, 178, 179, 269
Hymes, Dell, 6

I mean, 3, 37–79
ICAME Collection of English Language Corpora, 9, 40
idiomaticization/idiomatization, 3, 37, 61, 67
illocutionary force indicating device (IFID), 109
implicature, 15, 16, 18, 26
incidence, 244–251, 253–257, 262
incipit, 244–246, 248–250, 252–259, 262
inference, 15, 16, 26, 27
–, invited, 99, 100
insult, 16, 26, 107, 110, 116, 132
interaction/interactive, 29, 41, 52, 53, 118, 195
interpersonal function/meaning, 7, 15, 41, 52, 126, 134, 290, 292, 294, 297, 299, 300
interrogation/interrogational activities, 5, 109
intersubjective/intersubjectivity, 3, 24, 25, 50, 53, 59, 63, 68, 87, 97, 98, 102, 179

Jardine, Lisa, 173
joke, 16
Jonson, Ben, *Bartholomew Fair*, 222, 223, 227

Jucker, Andreas H., 4, 8, 13, 14, 30, 31, 69, 107–140, 178, 179, 197, 198

Kohnen, Thomas, 4, 107, 112, 135, 139–166
Kytö, Merja, 190

Labov, William, 7
Lampeter Corpus, 40, 54
Langbein, John, 185, 187–189, 191, 192, 211
Lass, Roger, 31, 178, 179
Lenker, Ursula, 3, 81–105
letter/letters/letter writing, 6, 18, 23, 29, 114, 115, 120, 121, 126, 128, 179, 219, 241–266
Levinson, Stephen C., 13, 53, 59, 99, 102, 163, 232, 233
lexicalization, 3, 37, 61, 64–69
literacy, 18, 19, 299
–, practices, 29
literary, 7, 22, 23, 260, 280
–, criticism/critical, 2, 22, 24, 167, 168, 267
–, discourse analysis, 6, 24, 25
–, history/historical, 2, 25, 241
–, perspective, 241
–, studies, 28, 167, 171
–, text, 118, 224
literary-philological, 6
Literature Online (LION), 7, 10, 269, 271, 280
local level, 87, 224
local structure, 219, 229, 235

Magnusson, Lynne, 6, 167–183
marketplace, 223
medieval
–, drama, 124
–, literature/texts, 14, 19, 22, 288, 290, 297, 300
–, narrative, 287
metacommunicative (subjective), 39, 42, 46, 59, 68, 148
metalinguistic, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 58, 68, 125, 126
metanarrative, 258, 287
–, devices, 290
metatext/metatextual, 20, 87, 90, 93
Middle Ages, 244
Middle English (ME), 52, 54–59, 81, 83, 88–90, 117, 118, 120, 122, 135, 142, 152, 155, 163, 243
Middle English Collection, 10, 40
Middle English Dictionary (MED), 10, 40, 116, 136

narrative, 6, 7, 23, 114, 242, 258, 259, 278, 285–287, 288, 290
–, analysis, 301
–, context, 85
–, discourse, 6, 294
–, episode, *see* episode
–, fiction, 271, 275
–, prose, 81
–, strategy, 298
–, structure, 6, 241, 243
–, style, 6
narration, 152, 159, 293
narrativity, 247, 249, 250, 258, 291
negotiated meaning, 12, 25, 26, 39, 48
negotiation, 131–133, 135, 140
New Criticism, 23, 268, 269
new historicism, 23, 26, 167, 267
new philology, 22, 171
non-literary text, 118

Oates, Titus, 190, 191, 201, 202, 212

Old Bailey Sessions Papers, 188, 189, 191, 192
Old English (OE), 4, 23, 26, 40, 54, 58, 59, 63, 83, 88, 89, 91, 112, 118, 119, 122, 135, 140–142, 144, 152–155, 157, 158, 163
Old English Corpus, 40, 43
onomasiological, *also see* function to form mapping, 3, 4, 15, 81, 82, 98
oral/orality, 18–20, 242, 243, 259, 290, 292, 293, 297, 299
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), 10, 39, 40, 116, 117, 130, 136, 198, 221

parenthetical (epistemic, pragmatic), 37–39, 41–43, 46, 49, 50, 53, 57, 58, 61–64, 68
performatives, *see* speech act
philology/philological, 11, 19, 22, 23, 107, 260, 267, 270, 286, 301
plays, *also see* drama, 222, 272
polite/politeness, 15, 27, 108, 114–116, 127, 131, 135, 140, 144, 149, 151–154, 158, 170, 223, 235
practical criticism, 23
pragmalinguistic, 5
pragmaphilology, 7, 13–15, 285
pragmatic
  –, function, 40, 41, 62, 64, 66, 294
  –, marker, 3, 27, 37, 39, 58, 61–64, 66, 68, 84
  –, particle, 14
  –, principle, 40
  –, space, 4, 108, 110, 197
pragmaticalization, 3, 61, 63, 64
presupposition, 15
printing press, 29
promise, 139
pronoun switching, *also see thou/you* variation, 169, 170
prose, 19, 87, 130, 259, 271
  –, fiction, 189
  –, non-literary, 19
  –, romance, 258, 272
  –, instructional, 5
Public Record Office (PRO), 186

qualitative analysis, 3
quantitative analysis, 3, 7, 11, 24, 27–29, 171, 268, 269, 279
questioning
  –, sequences, 205, 206, 209
  –, strategies, 192, 211

Ransom, John Crowe, 23
reception, 6
register, 17, 28, 29, 120, 171, 260
religious
  –, context, 135
  –, drama, 288, 302
  –, instruction, 142, 149, 151, 159
  –, narrative, 287
  –, treatises, 141, 243, 288
Renaissance Women Online (RWO), 7, 269, 271
repair, 41, 45, 46, 224
reporting clause, 7, 270, 272–274, 276–278, 280
request, 107, 139, 143, 150, 157, 197, 198, 229, 231–233, 235, 253
result, 244–246, 248, 250, 251–257, 259, 262
rewriting, 7
rhetoric/rhetorical, 23, 24
  –, device, 297, 300
  –, strategies, 298
  –, structure, 6

Richards, I. A., 23, 267, 280
romance, 7, 241, 258, 271, 274, 275, 277, 278, 280, 301

saints' legends, 31, 258, 286
saints' lives, 7, 241, 285, 286, 294, 298, 299
Salem Witchcraft Trials, 5, 185, 188, 190, 194
Schiffrin, Deborah, 6, 37, 43
Searle, John R., 107, 109, 110, 135, 143, 197
Sell, Roger, 30
semasiological, *also see* form to function mapping, 3, 15, 37, 44, 98
sermons/homilies, 4, 5, 112, 121, 122, 128, 141–143, 146, 148, 151, 152, 154–158, 243
service encounters, 5, 28, 219–240
setting, 245, 250–253, 255, 257
Shakespeare, William, 6, 14, 23, 26, 167–183, 235, 268–270, 272
–, *2 Henry V*, 168, 169
–, *Julius Caesar*, 177
–, Sonnet 4, 173, 174
–, Sonnet 6, 175
–, Sonnet 8, 176
–, Sonnet 17, 178
–, sonnets, 6, 168, 170–178, 167–183
–, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, 126
–, *Twelfth Night*, 168, 169, 272
Sidney, Sir Philip, *Arcadia*, 271, 272–275, 277, 280
social history, 5
speaker
–, attitude, 41, 51, 86, 116, 290
–, meaning, 2, 125, 132
speech act, 4–6, 14, 15, 18, 27, 107–139, 143, 158, 186, 195, 197, 198, 230, 233
–, directives, 110–112, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150–156, 158, 229, 231, 233, 235
–, imperatives, 4, 140, 143–146, 149, 151, 153–158, 163, 229, 231, 233, 235
–, interrogatives, 149, 150
–, narratives, 116
–, performatives, 4, 109, 110–113, 115, 122, 125, 130, 132, 133, 135, 140, 143, 144, 151, 153–155, 198
speech act classification/speech act theory, 109, 224
speech act verbs (SAVs), 4, 107–138, 140, 151, 198
State Trials, 187–190, 194
stylistic function, 7, 294
structural device, 300
subjectification, 86, 100, 102
subjective function/meaning, 15, 23, 46, 50, 59, 63, 68, 86, 92, 97
subjectivity, 24, 88, 92, 242

Taavitsainen, Irma, 4, 8, 11–36, 39, 107–140, 171–179, 186, 197, 198, 210
text, 26
–, function, 152, 294
–, organization, 291, 293, 299
–, type, 17, 27, 29, 141, 157, 158, 171, 286, 297
textual
–, convention, 300
–, function, 7, 289, 296
thou/*you* variation, 6, 168, 170, 176, 178, 179

transaction/transactional activities, 5, 28
Traugott, Elizabeth, 8, 15, 30, 31, 40, 53, 54, 58, 61, 62, 64–68, 81–83, 86, 88, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 109, 111, 145, 180
trewely/truly, 3, 63, 81, 85, 90–93, 95, 97, 98, 100
trial, 189, 190
–, records, 18, 114, 125
–, texts, 187, 189
truth adverbials, 3, 4
unidirectionality, 83, 98, 150

Vendler, Helen, 172
verbal aggression, 4, 108, 110, 113–116, 120–122, 125–131, 133–135, 140

Wilson, Thomas, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 173–176
witchcraft, 188, 190
Wroth, Lady Mary, *Urania*, 271, 274, 275, 277, 280

Topics in English Linguistics

Edited by Bernd Kortmann and
Elizabeth Closs Traugott

Mouton de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

31 *Generative Theory and Corpus Studies. A Dialogue from 10 ICEHL.* Edited by Ricardo Bermúdez-Otero, David Denison, Richard M. Hogg and C. B. McCully. 2000.

32 Manfred G. Krug, *Emerging English Modals. A Corpus-Based Study of Grammaticalization*. 2000.

33 *Cause – Condition – Concession – Contrast. Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives.* Edited by Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Bernd Kortmann. 2000.

34 Hans-Jörg Schmid, *English Abstract Nouns as Conceptual Shells. From Corpus to Cognition*. 2000.

35 *Placing Middle English in Context.* Edited by Irma Taavitsainen, Terttu Nevalainen, Päivi Pahta and Matti Rissanen. 2000.

36 Michael G. Getty, *The Metre of* Beowulf. *A Constraint-based Approach* 2002.

37 Renaat Declerck and Susan Reed, *Conditionals. A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis.* 2001.

38 Alexander Kautzsch, *The Historical Evolution of Earlier African American English. An Empirical Comparison of Early Sources.* 2002.

39 *Studies in the History of the English Language. A Millennial Perspective.* Edited by Donka Minkova and Robert Stockwell. 2002.

40 Thomas Herbst, David Heath, Ian Roe and Dieter Götz, *A Valency Dictionary of English*. 2004.

42 Anette Rosenbach, *Genitive Variation in English. Conceptual Factors in Synchronic and Diachronic Studies*. 2002.

43 *Determinants of Grammatical Variation in English*. Edited by Günter Rohdenburg and Britta Mondorf. 2003.

44 *Modality in Contemporary English.* Edited by Roberta Facchinetti, Manfred Krug and Frank Palmer. 2003.

45 *Studies in the History of the English Language II: Unfolding Conversations.* Edited by Anne Curzan and Kimberly Emmons. 2004.

47 Ute Dons, *Descriptive Adequacy of Early Modern English Grammars*. 2004.

48 Raymond Hickey, *A Sound Atlas of Irish English*. 2004.

49 Verena Haser, *Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy. Challenging Cognitive Semantics*. 2005.

50 Bernd Kortmann, Tanja Hermann, Lukas Pietsch and Susanne Wagner, *A Comparative Grammar of English Dialects: Agreement, Gender, Relative Clauses*. 2005.

51 Alexander Bergs, *Social Networks and Historical Sociolinguistics: Studies in Morphosyntactic Variation in the Paston Letters (1421–1503).* 2005.