tive mode that is generated and controlled by the left hemisphere of the brain. Hunter Adams prefers to talk about "cultural styles of knowing" rather than splitting the brain in this way.[104]

Perhaps the most recent vintage of this Eurocentric view, "scientifically" stated, is to be found in the work of Julian Jaynes. His theory is that human consciousness as "we" know it did not begin to develop until the Second century before the Christian Era! This means that the Great Pyramid of Gizeh and the calculations involved in its creation, the medicine, mathematics, chemistry, and state organization of ancient (Kemet) Egypt, not to mention Sumeria, were all accomplished without "consciousness." "A civilization without consciousness is possible." [105] Jaynes' theory is interesting and ultimately of the classical Eurocentric genre, while on the surface giving the impression of being unique and innovative. It is a new variation on an old theme. For Jaynes, consciousness has the following features: (1) "spatialization." (2) "Excerption" - we only "see" a part of any particular thing. It is ironic that he should say this since it is the left-brained European modality that keeps people from comprehending globally. (3) "The Analog 'I'" which allows us to imagine ourselves doing things, i.e., "The Metaphor 'Me.'" Of this feature of consciousness, Jaynes says, "We can both look out from the imagined self... or we can step back a bit and see ourselves." (4) "Narratization," from which "we are constantly seeing ourselves as the main figures in the stories of our lives." (5) "Conciliation," "bring[ing] things together as conscious objects."[106] According to Jaynes, human beings in ancient times could speak, write, listen, read, learn, make decisions, think, and reason, but were not "conscious":

> . . . consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository, or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog "I" that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts.
> *Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things.*[italics added.][107]

He takes Havelock's view one step further, "There is in general no consciousness in the *Iliad* . . . . The beginnings of action are not in conscious plans, reasons, and motives; they are in the actions and speeches of gods. . . .The Iliadic heros had no egos."[108] Why were these ancient people not yet "conscious?" According to Jaynes, it was because of the structure of their brains, which had two distinct "chambers." They used only one part for speaking, thinking, learning, etc. The other was used for the "voice" of the "gods." In other words, ancient human beings were told what to do by "voices" in their heads. "Voices" told them to build pyramids and civilizations. They took these voices to be the authoritative speech of divine beings, and so they obeyed. One question that comes to mind is: What *couldn't* they do? Well, says Jaynes, they were not capable of "introspection." (One has only to read the ancient Kemetic texts to know that he is mistaken.) And they could not be "self" directed. The voices of the bicameral mind were a form of social control; the last stage in the development of language, a development that made civilization possible. In the bicameral stage of "civilization," "the language of men involved only one hemisphere in order to leave the other free for the language of gods."[109] It seems that one of the things that led Jaynes to the development of his theory was his observance of schizophrenics. He tells us that schizophrenic hallucinations are like the guidances of the gods in antiquity. Stress is the instigation in both instances. During the eras of the "bicameral mind" the stress threshold of human beings was lower, like that of schizophrenics today.[110] Stress, he says, comes from decision making, and that is what caused hallucinations of the gods. Jaynes writes:

> . . . the presence of voices which had to be obeyed were the absolute prerequisite to the conscious stage of mind in which it is the self that is responsible and can debate within itself, can order and direct, and that the creation of such a self is the product of culture. In a sense, we have become our own gods.[111]

Jaynes' theory is quite physiological. The difference between "conscious" and "unconsciousness" human beings, or rather "preconscious" human beings, lies in the structure of their brains. The two temporal lobes of the bicameral brain connected by the tiny "anterior commissure" across "which came the directions which built our civilizations and founded the world's religions, where gods spoke to men and were obeyed because they were human volition,"[112] became the "modern" brain with the right and left hemispheres as we know it. The left hemisphere, according to Jaynes, contains the "speech areas" ; the supplementary motor cortex, Broca's area and Wernicke's area. The latter is the "most indispensable to normal speech." This coupled with his feeling that the right brain is "largely unnecessary,"[113] led him to conclude that the right brain is a "vesti-

gial" remain of the "chamber" of the voices of the gods in ancient times. These "voices" that caused past civilizations to be built were afterall only "excitations" in what corresponds to Wernicke's area on the right hemisphere of the contemporary human brain.

But cultural/environmental changes were to cause physiological changes in the brain. Writing and trade interfered with the "voices." Writing no longer stressed the auditory, and trade meant interaction with other groups of people who were hearing "other" voices, which at the very least was confusing. The gods also failed in the "chaos of historical upheaval."[114] The result was "consciousness." The result is also a continued valorization of the left-brain cognitive modality by the European. Beneath the complexity and ingenuity, even intellectual creativity of Jayne's theory of consciousness, are quite visible the earmarks of the European *utamawazo* as well as its ideological tendencies: Universal, unilinear evolution, "progress," and the intellectual superiority of European culture is assumed. The differences between earlier civilizations and those that came later are understood invidiously: "contemporary differences between the hemispheres in cognitive functions at least echo such differences of function between man and god as seen in the literature of bicameral man."[115]

For Jaynes the process has not ended; it couldn't. "Evolution" does not stop; after all "progress" is not reached. That is the beauty of these ideas for the European mind. And so he imagines us to be still in the throes of "transition" from the grip of the bicameral mind, still fighting the authority of the gods, or their "voices"—even though now we can only "read" their voices (except for those of us who are "schizophrenic.") Jaynes never says what "we" are moving towards. Is it toward a one-hemisphered brain? The illusion will then become the reality, and that is truly psychotic. I agree with Jaynes on one point. We see the same thing, but we see it from different perspectives. "Science" has become secularized; its view of the human, profane. And as this happens people (Europeans) search for the loss "authorization" of the gods past.[116]

But typically Jaynes has falsely "universalized" a cultural phenomenon. He is describing European science and the European malaise. In his view "we" are going through a necessary stage in the march towards "enlightenment," which, if I interpret him correctly, results when human beings "realize" that there is nothing more than themselves, that they can look to no greater authorization for their decisions. This leads to the ultimate and total desacralization of the universe. (Thank goodness Europe represents only a small minority of the world, given the nature of the European conception of the human!)

But there are other views of the modalities of human consciousness. Erich Neumann offers a Jungian-influenced conceptualization, to some degree reminscent of the right-brain/left-brain distinction. His distinction is between "matriarchal consciousness" and "patriarchal consciousness." Matriarchal consciousness is prior, is linked to the "moon spirit" and "moon time," as it is grounded in natural and cyclical rhythms; it is intuitive and becomes "impregnated" with ideas, rather than "willing" them. Understanding in this modality is not divorced from feeling. It involves natural processes of transformation, so that knowing and comprehending affect the knowing being. Matriarchal consciousness is also associated with the still darkness of night that is pregnant with growth.

Patriarchal consciousness relates to "daylight and sun." It is associated with independently willed thought. Neumann says however, that it is self-deceptive, "interpreting itself as an absolutely free system." It is "highly practical," efficient, and quick to react. It followed matriarchal consciousness in development, detaching itself from the unconscious.

> We see processes of abstraction, which assist in the free disposal and application of ideas and . . . lead to the manipulation of abstractions like numbers in mathematics and concepts in logic. In the psychological sense such abstractions are in the highest degree without emotional content.[117]

In "patriarchal consciousness" the knower is not affected by what is known; rather the knower controls the idea. While matriarchal consciousness involves "affect-participation," "the abstract thought of patriarchal consciousness is cold in comparison, for the objectivity demanded of it presupposes an aloofness possible only to cold blood and a cool head."[118]

For Neumann, as opposed to Jaynes, both modalities represent forms of consciousness, even though one is linked closely to the unconscious. But in an African-centered view this is not negative, since it allows us to be in tune with a universe in which we participate as one form of being. Clearly *both* forms of consciousness are necessary. They complement one another. The whole brain has two halves. Perhaps European culture has been molded by a Platonic, "patriarchal" consciousness, and seeks to destroy "matriarchal consciousness" because of the destructive, confrontational nature of the European *utamaroho*. "Matriarchal consciousness" represents a loss of control in the European view. And as it struggles to resurface even

European feminists fight against it.

When Plato deified the "patriarchal consciousness," he reified "form" that inhibited the further "transformation" ("matriarchal consciousness") of the human spirit. As a result European culture does not allow its members to become complete ("full-term") human beings (the symbolism of *Yurugu*). Jaynes may be correct but only with regard to the European. Maybe they will succeed in the elimination of one of the hemispheres of their brains, therefore being forever off balance, in a state of perpetual disequilibrium. (Or is that, in fact, how they came into being?) This is certainly a description of the culture.

According to Levy-Bruhl, who offered an earlier version of Eurocentric theory, "logic" began with "civilized" thought, based on the principle of contradiction. "Primitives" made use of "prelogical," "collective representations." The mode of participation contradicts the European emphasis on recognition of discrete entities. In anthropological theory this cognitive style of thinking has been called "primitive," "native," and sometimes "folk." But aren't we really dealing with two different world-views, which in turn, generated different epistemological and ontological conceptions? Indeed, the objective of this discussion has been to scrutinize the "taken-for-granted" aspects of European culture or "mind," which is afterall a minority phenomenon,[119] so that they can no longer be assumed to be "universal": two (or more) world-views rather than two developmental stages of human thought as Levy-Bruhl, Julian Jaynes, and countless other European theorists would have them.

The African metaphysic, the Native American and Oceanic "majority cultures" (it is safe to generalize here), all presuppose a fundamental unity of reality based on the organic interrelatedness of being; all refuse to objectify nature, and insist on the essential spirituality of a true cosmos. What became known as the "scientific" view was really the European view that assumed a reality precluding psychical or spiritual influences on physical, material being. This view also resulted in the elimination of a true "metaphysical" concept and of an authentic cosmology. David Bidney says that,

> Levy-Bruhl . . . exhibited an ethnocentric prejudice in assuming that only the positivistic, antimetaphysical position current in his time was logical as well as scientific and that metaphysical postulates were a priori prelogical as well as prescientific.[120]

Desacralization of Nature: Despiritualization of the Human

From the outset, let me say that, in discussing these European conceptions we will have a problem with gender terminology. First of all, it is awkward, but nonetheless important to refrain from the use of "man" to refer to "human" as the European has done in discourse. Second, the confusion is further complicated by the fact that when discussing the European, I will be talking about European men for the most part, because Plato,and those who followed in his wake, ignored women and did not include them in their self-concepts of "philosopher," "king," or "the European," and that is why they could refer to themselves collectively as "European Man." In one sense we *are* talking about ideas that effected and were adopted by European women, children, and men. The issue, then, becomes complicated, and the reader must indulge me as I attempt to deal with these problems generated by the European world-view.

The way the European is taught to view nature and his/her proper relationship to it is particularly important, because it is, in part, the consequences of this conception that are most distinctive of European culture. European ontology generates a conception of nature and the human, and of reality.

What is the implicit idea of nature and its significance that emerges from Plato's dialogues? Alvin Gouldner says:

> In Plato's view . . . ends are not resident in nature but in the universal Ideas or eternal Forms which transcend nature, in which nature only imperfectly "participates" and apart from which it is inherently disorderly. From his standpoint, therefore, nature cannot be controlled by the external influence of some regulating end or design.[121]

Elsewhere Gouldner talks about the ideas of those who were to restructure the society:

> On conceiving of all nature as intrinsically hostile or indifferent to mind—having, that is, an abiding disposition toward disorder—the planners'proposed changes are felt to be made and maintained only against nature, not with its cooperation. From Plato's standpoint, mind and reason, and therefore orderliness are not in but above nature and need to master it.[122]

Nature emerges as the world of becoming, the sensate world of a lower order than "being" and, therefore, to be always controlled,

conditioned and moulded in accordance with the absolute and perfect ideas that issue from the "World of Being." And the human being, insofar as he is part of this imperfect nature, which only "imitates" but cannot "be," must be controlled and moulded as well.[123] What begins to emerge is a view of nature and of the human that places them in opposition to one another, by virtue of the fact that only that part of the human being which is other than nature (the rational) is superior to it. This idea of the basically hostile relationship between "human" and nature, in which the human seeks continually to control nature is characteristically European. It runs through European culture lineally (in a chronological historical sense) and collaterally or synchronically in that it has both effected the course of European development and informed the collective behavior and social constructs of the culture.

The Christian view of nature again exhibits the influence of Plato's idea of the disorderly and chaotic, even hostile "nature" that must be controlled. The "pattern" or "design" (standard) to which Gouldner refers, is what the Christian uses to measure the morality of other peoples and to mould them. Katherine George comments on the Christian view of nature as evidenced in reports of newly "discovered" lands in the sixteenth century:

> The dominant attitude in these accounts conceived of civilization-Graeco-Roman civilization in particular- as an essential discipline imposed upon the irregularities of nature; as nature -blind nature-without restraint and guidance, runs to monstrousities, so culture without civilization runs to disorder and excess.[124]

> Raw nature, "fallen" nature, which for the Greek was disorder, is for the Christian even worse: it is sin.[124]

Rheinhold Niebuhr attempts to present a more "modern" explanation of Christian concepts, a more philosophically and politically attractive interpretation in terms of contemporary European lifestyles than that offered by the Church's scholastic heritage. The results of an astute mind wrestling to make Christian ideas into both something distinct from and simultaneously appropriate to the European *utamawazo*, and to rescue the Church from the more barbarous tendencies in European history are most interesting. Niebuhr is fighting a losing battle, for to separate Christian ideology from European cultural imperialism would be to forge an entirely new religious statement. This, of course, he cannot do since he is intent on demonstrating the way in which his philosophical interpretations are

rooted in the origins of the Christian idea. (Unconsciously, perhaps, it is precisely the European heritage that he wants to claim.)

Though Niebuhr's style and subtlety make his ideas appear to be unfamiliar at first, it is possible to recognize, if we know how to look, a characteristically European interpretation of the relationship between "human" and nature:

> Human existence is obviously distinguished from animal life by its qualified participation in creation. Within limits it breaks the forms of nature and creates new configuration of vitality. Its transcendence over natural process offers it the opportunity of interfering with the established forms and unities of vitality as nature knows them. This is the basis of human history, with its progressive alteration of forms, in distinction from nature which knows no history but only endless repetition within the limits of each given form.... Since man is deeply involved in the forms of nature on one hand, and is free of them on the other; since he must regard determinations of sex, race and (to a lesser degree) geography as forces of ineluctable fate, but can nevertheless arrange and rearrange the vitalities and unities of nature within certain limits, the problem of human creativity is obviously filled with complexities.[125]

and finally Niebuhr says,

> Nature and spirit both possess resources of vitality and form. The resources of nature may be more negative. The vitalities of nature and its forms may be the indispensable presuppositions of human creativity rather than its active agents; but they cannot be disregarded. . . the vitalities and unities of nature may play a more negative part in human destructiveness than those of spirit. The natural impulse of sex is, for instance, an indispensible condition of all higher forms of family organization as it is the negative force of destructive sex aberrations. In the same way the natural cohesion of tribe and race is the foundation of higher political creations as also the negative determinant of interracial and international anarchy.[126]

In spite of Niebuhr's continual qualifications, the view of the relationship between "human" and nature that he offers is ideologically consistent with and characteristic of European thought. The relationship to nature is one of arrogance and exploitation as opposed to awe, respect, and harmony. Put simply, nature is not to be trusted. The human only trusts her/his rational faculties that are not natural, but "cultural." One ends up in conflict with one's nature, which represents the devalued circle of repetition as opposed to the

valued line of historical progress. To which category does "god" belong?

The concepts of nature, of reality, of "the human," and of truth are intricately bound one to the other and inextricably entwined in the "specialness" or seen another way, the "otherness" of the European world-view. It is a particular view of nature that allows for European science, a "science" which is predicated on an epistemology that involves the separation of the human from itself in order to isolate and valorize the seemingly peculiar human ability to rationalize.Thus as the concept of the human becomes limited, so does the concept of reality. Theodore Roszak places emphasis on Francis Bacon and René Descartes for this European tendency, while I have begun with an emphasis on Plato.

> . . . domination remains the object; Bacon never deviates from his conviction that "the command over things natural—over bodies, medicine, mechanical powers and infinite others of this kind—is the one proper and ultimate end of true natural philosophy."[127]

Roszak's work critiques "objectification," "reductionism," "alienation," and power in European thought in unparalleled fashion:

> . . . what Baconian-Cartesian epistemology did was to bestow high philosophical status upon that act of alienation by insisting that it provided our only reliable access to reality. Far more directly than it encourage callous behavior, this ennobling of the alienated psyche has progressively degraded every other form of awareness human beings possess.
>
> once we elevate such a psychic mode to the highest cultural dignity, identifying it as the only intellectually productive way of addressing the universe. . . There will be knowledge, power, dominion without limit. We are licensed to unravel all mysteries and to remake the world- including human nature itself.[128]

Roszak's view of the "psychic mode" that makes European science possible is radically different from Eric Havelock's, who praises Plato for ushering in a new modality. Indeed, it was Plato, and others who followed, who laid the groundwork on which Bacon and Descartes could erect their theories. Roszak speaks of Bacon and his disciples:

> They had found the great truth: break faith with the environment, establish between yourself and it the alienative dichotomy called objectivity, and you will surely gain power. Then nothing—no sense of fellowship or personal intimacy or strong belonging—will bar your access to the delicate mysteries of man and nature. Nothing will inhibit your ability to manipulate and exploit. This is the same power we gain over people when we refuse to honor their claim to respect, to compassion, to love. They become for us mere things on which we exercise power. Between ourselves and them there is no commerce of the feelings, no exchange of sentiment or empathy.[129]

Roszak has stated almost poetically what became the cutting edge of the thesis of this study: that European epistemology is symbiotically related to European imperialism. The objectification of the human and the natural allow one to treat both as "things." Peoples and cultures that refuse to regard themselves and nature as spiritless are considered "stupid."

Roszak's concept of "reductionism" explains why life must be taken out of nature in order to facilitate the method:

> Reductionism flows from many diverse sources: from an overwhelming desire to dominate, from the hasty effort to find simple, comprehensive explanations, from a commendable desire to deflate the pretentious obscurantism of religious authority; but above all from a sense of human estrangement from nature which could only increase inordinately as Western society's commitment to single vision grew ever more exclusive. In effect, reductionism is what we experience whenever sacremental consciousness is crowded out by idolatry, by the effort to turn what is alive to a mere thing.[130]

In discussing European cosmology, Arthur Lovejoy isolates certain ideas or principles that in his view have been seminal to European philosophy. These ideas find their origins in Plato and can be traced through their various expressions in the subsequent history of European thought. He concludes that there have been basically three ideas so closely associated in European intellectual history that they together have produced "one of the major conceptions in Occidental thought"; expressed in a single term they are represented by (1) the "Great Chain of Being."[131] Two of the generative aspects of this idea taken in isolation have been the "Principle of Plenitude":

> . . . not only for the existence of this world, but for every one of its characteristics, for every kind of being which it contains—in strictness, indeed, for each particular being—there must be an ultimate reason, self-explanatory and "sufficient."

. . . and (2) the "Principle of Continuity":

> . . . there are no sudden "leaps" in nature; infinitely various as things are, they form an absolutely smooth sequence,,in which no break appears, to baffle the craving of our reason for continuity everywhere.[132]

These culminated in "two great rationalistic ontologies of the seventeenth century" and in the argument for optimism. According to Lovejoy, the idea of an "ontological scale" in combination with Aristotle's zoological and psychological hierarchies produced a third principle of "unilinear gradation" that was grafted to the two principles of "plenitude" and "continuity."[133]

Lovejoy is concerned with tracing the "historic sources" of these cosmological and ontological ideas. He says that the principles underlying the Chain of Being conception and its related groups of ideas—"plenitude," "continuity," and "gradation"—owed its genesis to Plato and Aristotle and its systematization to the Neoplatonists."[134]

> The scale of being, as implied by the principle of expansiveness and self-transcendence of "The Good" becomes the essential conception of the Neoplatonic cosmology.[134]

Difference of kind automatically implied difference of value, which generated "diversity of rank in a hierarchy."[134]

As we move toward a theoretical model for the explanation of European cultural imperialism, Lovejoy has given us food for thought. Clearly one of the outstanding characteristics of the European world-view is its treatment of "difference," and perhaps what developed was an *utamaroho* that related to perceived "difference" intensely, xenophobically, and aggressively defensive. This relationship could have been both caused and effected by a world-view that scaled difference in terms of relative value: an *asili* that demands power. Accompanied by the mode of objectification, this encourages an ideology and political behavior that allows Europeans to feel justified in treating "different" peoples as devalued objects. Since the world-view has ideological strength, other world-views were (are) political threats, and so cultural aggression is necessary whereby the European world-view is imposed on "different" peoples. This theoretical model will be restated throughout this study. Its main thrust is the insistence on the intimate and causal relationship between (*utamaroho*), ontology, eidos, epistemology (*utamawazo*) and political/cultural behavior in the European experience.

Lovejoy says that Aristotle, in *De Anima,* suggests a hierarchical arrangement of all organisms, an idea that had a great influence on subsequent philosophy as well as natural history. The hierarchy was based on the "powers of the soul" possessed by an organism: those of plants were nutritive, those of "man" were rational. Each organism possessed the powers of those below it on the scale as well as its own additional and definitive "power."[135] Ultimately this results in a universe that constitutes a hierarchy with the most "natural" of beings occupying the lower positions of rank and the most "spiritual"—God and the angels—as the highest and "upper" beings. The human is unique in that he is both nature, flesh, and spirit and therefore among (animate) beings he is the most "rational" and therefore the "highest." The use of the term "spirit" is somewhat problematical. Niebuhr, Hegel, and Aristotle use it very differently from my use of the term. Their use connotes intellect and the rational, as opposed to nature. In my view spirit *is* nature and human as well as "supernature." It is the metaphysical. It accounts for human moral sense, commitment, value, and emotion: for human creativity and culture. It constitutes the substratum out of which the intellect is born and by which it is properly grounded.

Platonism, Christian theology, and the Chain of Being cosmology all contain a conception of the human as not being at home in the natural world. They are not "at peace" with themselves because of the "dualistic" nature—the coexistence in the person of two conflicting essences; "the flesh and the spirit." Lovejoy says, of the concept of the human being's place in nature generated by the "Chain" idea;

> . . . torn by conflicting desires and propensities; as a member of two orders of being at once, he wavers between both, and is not quite at home in either. He thus has, afterall, a kind of uniqueness in nature; but it is an unhappy uniqueness. He is, in a sense in which no other link in the chain is, a strange hybrid monster; and if this gives him a certain pathetic sublimity, it also results in incongruities of feeling, inconsistencies of behavior, and disparities between his aspirations and his powers which render him ridiculous.[136]

And when the "spiritual" entities are removed from the picture—as they usually are once the cosmology is constructed—what is left is a hierarchy with human beings at the top looking down over nature (their own special kingdom). Lovejoy quotes from a textbook of scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages: "As man is made for the sake of God, namely, that he may serve him, so is the world made for the sake of man, that it may serve him."[137] Once "god" is postulated

to give the impression of spiritual priority and the feeling of intellectual satisfaction that comes to the European mind from an absolute first principle, "he" is eliminated and, for all practical purposes, the human being becomes this god. Page duBois says,

> It must be remembered that not only barbaroi, foreigners were seen by Plato to be deprived of reasoning ability. Women and slaves as well as animals formed part of a "chain" which descended from the Idea of the good, from god. The hierarchy which Plato fixed among kinds endured for many centuries and still operates in Western discourse about difference . . .
>
> The clarification of ideas of superiority and inferiority in terms of sexual, racial, and species difference is an important step in the history of Western philosophy and of social relations of dominance and submission for those who follow in the tradition.[138]

The European conception of nature, the cosmological consequences of this conception, and the place that the human being has in this cosmology are all significant ingredients of the European mythoform. Herein are raised several critical ontological issues that relate to European thought, behavior, and value (ideology). Europeans assume a very special place for "themselves" in the universe and at the same time feel "uneasy" in that universe. If there is anything "natural" in them it is opposed to and in conflict with what is considered to be the most valuable part of them. This line of thought (and it must be kept in mind that it is among the deepest, most conscious—i.e., reflective—as well as unconscious assumptions of European belief, has several cultural implications. First, the European ascribes to the abstraction "man" priority in the universe, and throughout the history of European civilization there has been the tendency to translate this idea concretely into that of the priority of European "man" in the universe of "men" (humans). As other "nonrational" creatures exist to serve "man," so other, "less rational" people exist to serve European "man" (and women, of course, must serve them, since they are the least rational of the Europeans). This theme in its more blatant forms is pejoratively referred to in contemporary parlance as "racist" thought, and characterized as an aberration of "illogical" minds, in an effort to separate it from the best of the European tradition. But, to the contrary, such thought is "normal," even understandable and quite "logical," if one accepts the givens of the European *utamawazo*. The argument would go something like this: The European "man" is the most rational of people. It

is within him that the natural and the pathological are best controlled. Other people are closer to beasts in the Chain. The European, therefore, serves the rational plan of his god by guiding and controlling other people. American presidents always talk in terms of the American mission abroad being that of bringing "freedom" to all people. Anti-American revolutionaries are always equated with "barbarism," while America is seen as defending "civilization." These terms and arguments are all based on the same mythoform.

We have seen that the European conception is that of human beings at war with themselves and with their natural surroundings. This feeling is both reflective and productive of the "will-to-power" and the desire to control nature and other people and what is natural (emotional) in themselves. They have no place in a harmonious relationship to their environment since their conceptions do not allow them to experience the peace that such a relationship offers. Niebuhr says that the "essential homelessness of the human spirit is the ground of all religion."[139] What happens when that religion is inadequate? Unable to achieve peace and security from spirituality, the European seeks fulfillment in the will-to-power, in "mastery over" rather than "harmony with." Their effect on the world is one of discordance. Imperial ambitions and the structures they dictate are the symptomatic expression of a lack of spiritual peace. A being who is not at peace with itself, not at home in the universe, is compelled to disrupt that which surrounds it—to refashion and control that universe. The European seeks peace in human-made, imposed order, and, of course, does not find it. And so the imperial pursuit continues infinitely, as well as the pursuit of "progress." This as a malaise finds its origins even before its crystallization in Platonic culture, which was perhaps a result of a latent "ice-age" *utamaroho*. While Platonic conceptions facilitated the institutionalization of the European *utamaroho* and European supremacy in the world, there are other "pre" and "non" platonic expressions of this same *utamaroho* in the warrior mythology and behavior of Northern Europe in its "pre" -Christian experience. While the devaluation of nature may have been intellectualized by Plato, we find its "religious" expression in early Hebrew thought. (See Chap. 2.)

The objectification of nature is what allows for its exploitation and rape. In other cultures nature is experienced subjectively, as are other human beings. The European seeks the perfectly rational order—an order that has no place for the natural (as irrational) and that is the embodiment of the human nightmare. In majority cultures there appears to be an intuitive and sophisticated grasp of the impli-

cations of the exploitation of nature and of the creation of an antagonistic relationship between human and nature. The contemporary ecological discussion is pitifully naïve when expressed in terms of "detergents with low phosphates" and the recycling of paper. The real implications for ecological sanity touch the deepest beliefs of the European and the philosophical basis of their culture, as Theodore Roszak points out in *Where the Wasteland Ends*. The question is whether it is possible for them to alter their concept of nature and of their relationship to it. Such a change would, of course, imply corresponding changes in the total conceptual apparatus offered by the European world-view and would therefore involve many other aspects of European culture and ideology with which the concept of nature interrelates. (See Chap. 2.) The *asili* of the culture would change. The culture would cease to exist as it is now known. It would be a different "set" with different members.

Willie Abraham, in *The Mind of Africa*, suggests that there are two main views of human nature: They are the "essentialist" view and the "scientific" view. These two views help to provide the philosophical and ideological bases of two correspondingly different types of culture. The "essentialist" view is that "there is a constant element in man which is irreducible, and is the essence of being a man." African civilization, Abraham believes, is "essentialist in inspiration."[140] In the "scientific" view, human nature can be altered; the human can be resolved into elements; and it is possible to predict and control human reaction. "The scientific view depends on analysis, disintegration and then control of selected variables."[141] In this view it is possible to analyze human "material" into elements and then rearrange them according to a desired dominant principle. What are the implications of these distinctions for the "construction" of cultural models? Abraham characterizes European culture as "rationalistic" (scientific), and Akan culture (which he says is paradigmatic for African civilization), as "metaphysical" (essentialist).

"Humanism" in European discourse is usually assumed to represent the highest and most politically disinterested or "universalistic" approach to the human. In reality "humanism" has generally implied the typically European deification of the rational and the ascent of the human being to supremacy in the universe by virtue of her/his rational faculties. It is the intercultural implications of this line of reasoning that become politically significant. Abraham says:

> . . . . the essence of humanism consists in the replacement of God the creator with man the creator. . . . Culture in the age of enlightenment meant cultivation of the reason. . . . The idea underlying rational humanism is a rational one. It was already involved in Aristotle's account of man as a rational animal and the democratic political theory which he based on this idea. The idea is that *we* cannot think it accidental that we possess reason. . . to humans, this is a defining characteristic. This is what should be meant by calling reason a capacity, or a faculty, or a disposition, rather than a sequence of episodic acts.

The cult of rationalism is so deeply imbedded in European ontological and epistemological conceptions that it leads even to a "rationalistic ethics":

> Since the sensibilities were held to be subject to the reason. . . ethics and aesthetics were both accepted as being rationalistic. The culmination of this was in Kant's rationalistic ethics, which founded the validity of moral and aesthetic judgments on commands of reason."[142]

This, of course, is the working out of the Platonic imperative. It is the development of a theme. Abraham observes that in European culture, "art is identified with reality, supernature with nature itself, (and) ideals with mere truths." The artist may not have been banished from the State, but in serving the State he/she came to accept the Platonic conception of the "true." His creation began to reflect the rational order. On the other hand, in the Akan theory of the human," spiritual factors are primary," which contrasts sharply with European conceptions. For the Akan, says Abraham, the human being is "an encapsulated spirit, and not an animated body as the Genesis story has it."[143] This conception of human nature extends beyond the three-dimensional finite existence of the human being as conceived in Europe, which is one of the reasons European anthropologists have so misunderstood the African concept of Ancestor Communion. The African ancestors are not gods, but spiritual extensions of human beings on earth, representing another stage of human development. Eric Havelock discusses the Platonic model:

> The parables of the Sun, the Line and the Cave have been offered as paradigms which shall illuminate the relationship between ideal knowledge on the one hand and empirical experience on the other, and shall suggest to us the ascent of man through education from the life of the senses towards the reasoned intelligence.[144]

This ontological metaphor is so powerful that it has strongly influenced the European's perception of his own place in the uni-

verse. It has enabled him to speak of "high" and "low" cultures. In the former, people are closer to the "light" of civilization, while those in the latter wallow in the "darkness" of ignorance, aware only of what they "feel." Havelock describes the view of humanness offered in the *Republic* (compare it with Abraham's earlier description of the Akan conception of the human being):

> Here the conception of that autonomy is now elevated to a plane where the soul attains its full self-realisation in the power to think and to know. This is its supreme faculty; in the last resort its only one. Man is a "thinking reed."[144]

According to Havelock, this new definition of the human psyche that Plato sought to encourage signified not "man's ghost or wraith, or a man's breath or his life blood, a thing of sense and self consciousness," but "the ghost that thinks," that is capable of "moral decision" and of "scientific cognition"... something unique in the whole realm of nature.[145] It is not, after all, that the European considers human beings to be unique and special that is surprising, for each category of beings in the universe is unique and special; it is the importance that he attaches to this uniqueness that is so characteristically different. The epistemological mode that Havelock has described, that which became characteristic of European culture, presupposes a rationalistic concept of the human, whose proper function is not to feel, but to overcome feeling with "thought." Thought is only properly so called when isolated from feeling and when based on "objectification"; that is, separation of the "self" from the contemplated "object." Human nature is above all and most properly rational. This rational faculty gives humans power and independence. In the *Laws*, Plato says of "man":

> Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and the better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. [146]

And Plato's definition of human "freedom" would be realized when man is totally "rational"; that is, when "reason" rules "passion."

The height of arrogance is approached in the rationalistic conception of being and of the human. The European conceives of his god in his own image and not the reverse. Lovejoy says:

> Man is the creation in which God fully becomes an object to himself. Man is God represented by God. God is man representing God in self-consciousness. Man is God wholly manifested.

Europeans assume that their god created the universe according to the logic of scientific rationalism, their own invention. "The history we are to review is thus among other things, a part of the history of Western man's long effort to make the world he lives in appear to his intellect a rational one."[147] The Christian formulation of the European tradition is also, as we have pointed out, consistent with this conception of the human being. Lovejoy says,

> The recognition of the fact that man is a creature not in harmony with himself was not, of course, due primarily to the influence of the notion of the Chain of Being. Other elements of Platonism, and in Christianity the radical Pauline opposition of "flesh" and "Spirit," had made this dualistic theory of human nature one of the ruling conceptions in western thought.[148]

Again what we see is a consistent conception of human nature reinforced in the various modalities of the culture, making possible the most successful technico/scientific collasus in our experience. Friedrich Juenger says, "An advanced state of technology is accompanied by mechanical theories of the nature of man."[149] It would seem that in subordinating existential humanity to the machine, the European would end up with a low estimation of human worth. And of course, paradoxically, there is in a real and tragic sense, a corresponding devalorization of the human. But the European with political astuteness and ideological consistency deals with this problem by lowering his estimation of *other* people, thereby rationalizing his aggressive and demeaning behavior towards them. At the same time the part of him that might have been sensitive, and emotional, was also demeaned. Ontologically, the European sees himself as perfect through the perfection of the machine; he becomes the perfect machine. The efficiently operating machine becomes an extension of his ego. Its power to "make" and "produce" is his power. Since all knowledge was linked to the object, eventually this would effect ontological definitions as well: only the object existed. Plato's epistemology is also an ontology. The "True" is that which exists—"Being." Everything else is "becoming" or later "non-being." Ironically this led from an "idealist" philosophy to a materialist view of reality, since the only thing that existed was that which could be objectified. Spirit could not be made into object, could not be controlled so as to be known—it was not valued. Therefore it did not exist. Objectification

led to materialization where matter, studied "scientifically" was all that was left. Even human psychology and relationships would be governed by mechanical and physiological causation (Freud). Objectification leads to inorganic relationships.

The rationalistic conception of the human leads inevitably to the machine and to the technological order. A materialistic conception of the human is what rationalism becomes in the existential "acting-out" of culture, for rationalism denies human spirituality. It is only matter in isolation that ultimately has significance for the European mind; it is only matter that can be made to appear perfectly rational. So everything must be materialized. The European view of the human is rationalistic/materialistic, and the European concept of being involves the perfectly ordered universe—with meaning and value being derived only from this rationalistic material base. Scientific rationalism leads to technological rationalism; organization for efficiency.

Lovejoy's concluding comments present one of the most theoretically devastating critiques of the main currents of European philosophical thought. Of the "rationalist ontology" of Europe, he says:

> In so far as the world was conceived in this fashion, it seemed a coherent, luminous, intellectually secure and dependable world, in which the mind of man could go about its business of seeking an understanding of things in full confidence, and empirical science, since it was acquainted in advance with the fundamental principles with which the facts must, in the end, accord, and was provided with a sort of diagram of the general pattern of the universe, could know in outline what to expect, and even anticipate particular disclosures of actual observation.[150]

His estimation of the Chain of Being idea and its implications:

> the history of the idea of the Chain of Being—in so far as that idea presupposed such a complete rational intelligibility of the world—is the history of a failure . . . . The experiment, taken as a whole, constitutes one of the most grandiose enterprises of the human intellect. . . *as the consequences of this most persistent and most comprehensive of hypotheses became more and more explicit, the more apparent became its difficulties; and when they are fully drawn out, they show the hypothesis of the absolute rationality of the cosmos to be unbelievable.* . . . [italics added] It conflicts, in the first place, with one immense fact, besides many particular facts, in the natural order—the fact that existence as we experience it is temporal. A world of time and change—this, at least, our history has shown—

> is a world which can neither be deduced from nor reconciled with the postulate that existence is the expression and consequence of a system of "eternal" and "necessary" truths inherent in the very logic of being. Since such a system could manifest itself only in a static and constant world, and since empirical reality is not static and constant, the "image" [as Plato called it] does not correspond with the supposed "model" and cannot be explained by it.[151]

Lovejoy sees that rationalism admits of "rational" contradictions, and that in the attempt to exclude all "arbitrariness," it becomes "irrational." He says that the world of "concrete existence" is a "contingent" world and as such is the negation of "pure logic." "Will," he says, "is prior to intellect."[152] But if such is the case, why would Plato, Aristotle, and so many of their descendants spend so much time trying to prove the opposite, indeed, living as though the opposite were true?


Clearly, European forms of thought have worked, and they have worked well. The theorists had ideological commitments to a social order that would facilitate the rule of certain kinds of people. The *utamawazo* described in this chapter became a tool. The tool was so successful in one kind of enterprise that its shortcomings in other areas could easily be overlooked. Just as its definition of the human was one that encouraged the manipulation of human beings, but ignored "the human" at the same time. "The utility of a belief and its validity are independent variables"[153] The ethnological study of European thought demonstrates the power of its conceptions in the service of the expansionistic, confrontational, domineering *utamaroho, not* their truth or universal validity.

Alternative Models

But this is, after all, merely a description of the European *utamawazo,* and Europe represents a fraction of the world's ideological and cultural creations. There are other possibilities. Vernon Dixon contrasts the European-American and African "axiological worldviews" in the manner in Figure I (overleaf):[154]

The African universe is personalized, not objectified. Time is experienced. There is no infinite abstract and oppressive future; it grows organically from the past and present. Value is placed on "being" rather than "doing."[155] The universe is understood through phenomenal interaction, which produces powerful symbols and images, which in turn communicate truths. "Diunital logic" indicates that in African thought a thing can be both A and not A at the same time. Though Dixon does not say so explicitly, what he calls "diuni-

Figure I: Euro-American World-view



tal logic" can be understood as the recognition and affirmation of the ambiguity and multidimensionality of phenomenal reality. What is contradictory in Euro-American Aristotelian logic is not contradictory in African thought. The European *utamawazo* cannot deal with paradox.

This is not the place to discuss in depth the world-views of majority civilizations. It is appropriate, however, to make some obvious observations about what African, Amerindian, and Oceanic majority thought-systems have in common to the exclusion of European thought. All of the views mentioned are spiritual in nature, that is, they have spiritual bases and thereby reject rationalism and

objectification as valued epistemological modes. Obviously, they do have rationalistic and pragmatic aspects but these do not dominate. These views generate an authentic cosmology, the interrelatedness of all being. They reject Aristotelian logic as the primary path to ultimate truth, while recognizing the symbolic and not the literal mode as appropriate for the expression of meaning. Most clearly these peoples share a vision of a harmonious order achieved through balance, as they seek to understand and maintain that order. We who have been educated in European societies have grown up assuming that it is only with the triumph over such world-views that "true knowledge" begins. Yet, what should strike us as students of culture is the fact that of all the world's civilizations the European *utamawazo* world-view is the strangest (the minority view); it is most conspicuous in its materialism and rationalism. Max Weber called this "universalism." By what logic does anomaly become the norm? Obviously with the introduction of ideology and value-judgement. Weber mistook overwhelmingly successful cultural aggression for "universalism." The European world-view is far superior to the others mentioned in its ability to generate material accumulation, technological efficiency, and imperial might. That does not make it universal.

Fortunately, these are not the goals of all of humankind, nor the definition of all cultural *asilis* and other views of reality have led many to construct different models, to envision the possibility of new and different functional definitions. We have already seen that African-centered theory is moving towards new definitions of sciences.[156]

In *The Sacred Science,* De Lubicz offers an interpretation of ancient African philosophy. He calls it "Pharoanic Theology." It is a "sacred science" because it is concerned with "revealed" knowledge and with the "beginnings of things." It is founded on an irrational basis and therefore not a rational science. It rests on the assumption of a "common energetic origin to all bodies," an ultimate spiritual source "which alone is able to animate matter," "an undefined cosmic energy." De Lubicz recognizes two irreconcilable mentalities based on the separation of two concepts; one that "points to a kinetic energy immanent in matter," and the other that "calls upon an undefined cosmic energy."

> With absurd reasoning, our science sees in the universe nothing but a closed circuit, an agglomerate and a decomposition of the self same matter. Such a view is certainly less reasonable than admission of an undefined source of energy which becomes matter, although the latter solution poses a purely metaphysical problem.

> From there it is but a very small step to seeing a divine principle in the harmony of the world.[156]

The interpretations of both De Lubicz and Jaynes are antithetical: One understands the ancient Kemites to have had a heightened consciousness; the other says that they had no consciousness. That is because of the difference in perspectives. In De Lubicz's view, the materialist mentality splits from the spiritualist beginning with Xenophanes in the Eleatic school of philosophy, ca. 530 before the Common Era. With the split comes the beginning of the separation between science and religious thought and ritual. These are dichotomized in European thought so that "rationalistic religion" in Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. approaches the absurd, as great minds wrestled with the search for "scientific" and materialist proofs of the existence of the most spiritual of beings. Even now Christian thought suffers from a doctrine that overlooks the contradiction inherent in a "faith" based on secular historicity. European science ascended on the demise of spiritual religion.

In the early schools of what was to be considered "Greek Philosophy," the teachings of "Pharoanic Science" are evident, and what continued to be developed as "science" was heavily influenced by what had preceded in Kemet (ancient Egypt). What began to change, however, was the approach and attitude of objectification. The new forms had a different *utamaroho* (spirit life). The definition of the *utamawazo* became critical. The Greeks, unable to grasp the spiritual principle at the base of the "sacred science," simplistically "anthropomorphized" the cosmic truths. Their religious response resulted in the reduction of African philosophy, as expressed through the symbols of the Neters, through the attribution of "physical character(s) to metaphysical principles."[157] According to De Lubicz, those who rejected this adulterated version of ancient mysteries sought truth through an extreme rationalism. Two tendencies developed in archaic Europe: One group claimed a body of religious ritual whose base they could not understand; the other group took the pragmatic scientific aspects and developed them into a science without meaning. This is the chronic European split between faith and reason, which was to intensify throughout the centuries of European development. Rational doctrine led to the denial of the divine, the sacred. Yet rationality alone could never reflect cosmic truth and ironically could not give spiritual nor ultimate intellectual satisfaction. This had been understood in Kemet and is still understood outside of the European tradition. As De Lubicz argues, there must always be mystery involved; "an irrationality at the origin which makes rational philosophical construction impossible."[157] It is almost as though people outside of the European tradition (the majority) make up a collectivity who recognize and are comfortable with the tiny bit of "mystery" at the beginning and at the end. This view originates with human beginnings in Africa. Ayi Kwei Armah writes in *Two Thousand Seasons:* "We have not found that lying trick to our taste, the trick of making up sure knowledge of things possible to think of, things possible to wonder about but impossible to know in any such ultimate way."[158]

There are several theorists whose work touches on the striking difference between the European world-view and that of the majority; several who do not presume this to be an indication of the superiority of "Western civilization," that is, who do not approach the comparison eurocentrically. Often such theorists will contrast Eastern philosophies with those of Europe. Fritjof Capra, in *The Tao of Physics,* attempts to reconcile Western science and Eastern mysticism. In the process he characterizes these two views of reality, just as Dixon has done with the African and Euro-American views. In Capra's discussion, the Eastern view comes out on top: the Eastern (and early Greek) view is organic. All things are perceived as being interrelated and different manifestations of the same ultimate reality. The basic unity of the universe is the key to understanding phenomena, and one's aim becomes that of "transcending the notion of the isolated self, and to identify oneself with the ultimate reality." Spirit and matter are joined. Causal forces are intrinsic properties of matter.[159] One is struck again and again with the familiar sound of this characterization. It is almost identical to our description of the African world-view. How many of us have been compelled to ask, why the European world-view is the only one that differs so drastically from those of majority cultures. The European solves this problem by inventing the concept of "modernity," based on progress.

The following is Capra's characterization of "Western philosophy," in contrast to the "unifying" philosophy of the Milesians the ancient Indian and Chinese civilizations:

> The split of this unity began with the Eleatic school, which assumed a Divine Principle standing above all gods and men. This principle was first identified with the unity of the universe, but was later seen as an intelligent and personal God who stands above the world and directs it. Thus began a trend of thought which led, ultimately, to the separation of spirit and matter and to a dualism which became characteristic of Western philosophy.[160]

Capra, like De Lubicz, places the origins of this tendency in the Eleatic school. The tendency becomes a dominant theme and much later hardens in the philosophy of René Descartes, who further divides reality into "mind" and "matter." The results were the greater fragmentation of the universe in which we perceive "a multitude of separate objects and events." The mind having been separated from the body is given the task of controlling it. The human being is split into a "conscious will" that opposes our "involuntary instincts." The European experiences a mechanized universe constructed to deal with a world made up of mutually hostile parts.[161] This results as we have seen, in their being alienated from nature, while "physics" prior to the eleatic school did not include a word for "matter" "since they saw all forms of existence as manifestations of the 'physics,' endowed with life and spirituality." Capra says that the "roots of physics, as of all Western science, are to be found in the first period of Greek philosophy in the sixth century B.C., in a culture where science, philosophy and religion were not separated."[162] He is almost right. But his error becomes glaring when viewed from an African-centered perspective. Capra must know that Thales et al. did not grow from "nothing." As George James, and others have pointed out these "early" Greeks learned their "science" philosophy and religion from the civilization of the "sacred science." In those times everyone travelled to Egypt (Kemet) and studied there. Capra's omission of Africa in his comparison of philosophies is blatant.

Vine Deloria, in *God is Red,* contrasts the Native American world-view, which is "religious," with Western philosophy as expressed in Christianity. In the world-view of the Native Americans, all living things share a creator and creative process and, therefore, relate to one another.[163] Their spiritual quest is to determine the proper relationship that people have with other living things. The universe manifests life energies, "the whole life-flow of creation." The person is dependent on everything in the universe for his/her existence. Rather than the determination to subdue nature (European world-view), "the awareness of the meaning of life comes from observing how the various living things appear to mesh and to provide a whole tapestry."[163] We have seen that Europeans have problems with difference (Page du Bois). The Western "fragmented view is further extended to society, which is split into different nations, races, religions, and political groups." This results in conflicts that are an essential cause of present "social, ecological and cultural crises"[161] (Capra). This as opposed to the Native American approach that says that "in differences there is the strength of the Creation and that this strength is a

deliberate desire of the Creator."[164] Both these and a host of other writers have talked about the European's "alienation from nature" as opposed to the idea of the "identity and Unity of life" in which symbolism expresses reality.[165]

This cursory glance at different thought-systems is necessary, not only to demonstrate the possibility and existence of alternative world-views, but also to bring attention to the chauvinism in European interpretations of these world-views. We have seen repeatedly that European epistemological and ontological definitions are placed, by European theorists, in the context of "advanced" intellectual and cognitive development, as compared with what they call "ancient," "primitive," or "prescientific" thought. What this interpretation does is to preclude the viability of alternative definitions of reality, in so far as these same theorists represent a successfully aggressive culture that has the means to impose its interpretations on others. Let me bring home the point emphatically that this imposition was made by equating "European" with "modern" or "scientific" and all other cultures with "pre-European" or "primitive." According to Henri and H.A. Frankfort:

> The ancients, like the modern savages, saw man always as part of society, and society as imbedded in nature and dependent upon cosmic forces. For them nature and man did not stand in opposition and did not, therefore, have to be apprehended by different modes of cognition. . . natural phenomenon were regularly conceived in terms of human experience and [that] human experience was conceived in terms of cosmic events. . . the fundamental difference between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as regards the surrounding world is this: for modern, scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an "It"; for ancient—and also for primitive—man it is a "Thou."[166]

The Frankforts have camouflaged their cultural nationalism in universalistic terms. (No wonder there is no "modern god" for the European.) In this study, we have made European culture the focus, and therefore interpretations such as these become ethnographic data to be explained in terms of the European *asili.* They enable us to understand the nature of the European *utamawazo* and *utamaroho.* The question becomes that of why there is a need for Europeans to view themselves in a superior evolutionary position *vis-à-vis* other cultural selves. We will continue to address this question and others in the chapters that follow.

The Character of the European *Utamawazo*

We should not leave this discussion with the impression that Platonic thought ushered in vast and immediate changes in the nature of European culture. To begin with there was, in a sense, no "Europe" in his time. But in another sense, what we have identified as the European *asili,* the seed of the culture, had already been planted. The planting of this seed had to have taken place in the early days of Indo-European tribal development, where there was already a very definite *utamaroho,* or even earlier with the first homosapiens to inhabit the Eurasian Steppes and the Caucasus region for a long enough period to have become "non-African."

This means that Plato's work was all the more important in the definitional process of the *utamawazo,* because it had been prefigured in the germ of the culture, necessary if the *asili* was to be realized. It means as well, that as the culture, through its members, fought to assume a particular definition, it was developing according to a code already in existence, somewhat in the sense that we think of a particular combination of genes as determining a particular human form. The seed struggles to develop. The germ insists on fulfilling its formulative role. European history is a history of bloody internecine wars and battles fought to maintain a particular character and to eliminate opposing influences: "heretics," "infidels," "barbarians." It is a history of aggressive behavior towards other cultures. All difference threatens the realization of the *asili.* It is like a child's struggle to be born. The battle is fought because the *asili* exists, and Platonic thought is so significant (determinative) because it suited the *asili.* His epistemological theory helped in the formulation of an *utamawazo* that complemented the *asili.*

With Plato, epistemology became ideological. What is more, contrary to what some have claimed, Platonic conceptions did not make knowledge accessible to the masses through its desacralization.[167] What he did was to ensure that, at least until the "Gutenberg Galaxy," the few would have no threat from the many, because the many did not have access to the intellectual life of the State. This was due to the ascendancy of the literate mode coupled with the lack of printing and mass-production technology, as well as the fact that only the privileged few were trained to be "literate" in this sense. Plato's plan was foolproof; because even when the European masses gained access centuries later, the mechanisms of control were so tightly structured that the assumptions they had to assimilate in order to be considered "educated" guaranteed that they would think the way he had planned. It was as though his hand reached through centuries of

cultural existence, as the European cognitive style (*utamawazo*) became an extension of Platonism. Not only all European intellectuals but *all* intellectuals would be trained in the academy (Plato's legacy), a testament to the success of European cultural imperialism. The Academy has preserved a cultural tradition, a race of people, and a dominant society. No matter the internecine controversies and so-called political revolutions that might occur, the Academy ensures that the ideological infrastructure will remain intact.

The emergent theme is power. What begins to develop from this initial discussion is a portrait of the European *utamawazo* as responding to an *asili* that is power-seeking. A particular definition of power presents itself in the search for European predilection, temperament, and need. Power is here defined, not as the "power to do," which results from the giving and receiving of energy from forces in the universe and through interaction with these forces as they manifest themselves in the various modalities of natural being; it is instead defined as "power over" and is predicated on or rather originates in separation. This is the fanatical European objective. "Power to do" seeks balance and harmony. "Power over" functions only through the modality of control. It precludes cosmic, communal, or sympathetic relationship. It is essentially political and materialistic.

The *asili*-seed of the culture prefigures, then dictates, the development of structures, institutions, "arrangements,"[168] that facilitate the achievement of power-over-other. The forms that are created within the European cultural experience can then be understood as mechanisms of control in the pursuit of power. That is what they all have in common. That is the key to their cultural explanation. The ideological base of the culture is the will-to-power.

The *utamawazo* or culturally structured thought reorders the universe into relationships that "prepare" it for the illusion of control. Separation must come first. The *asili* forces its own self-realization through the cognitive structure of the *utamawazo* in the following manner:

Dichotomization. All realities are split into two parts. This begins with the separation of self from "other," and is followed by the separation of the self into various dichotomies (reason/emotion, mind/body, intellect/nature). The process continues until the universe is composed of disparate entities.

Oppositional, Confrontational, Antagonistic Relationships. The self "knows itself" because it is placed in opposition to "other," which includes the natural and affective part of the self. This "self-awareness" is the origin of European consciousness. "Other"—that which

is perceived to be different from the self—is threatening, therefore establishing an antagonistic relationship between all entities that are "different." This presents a principle of confrontational relationships in all realities. Indeed, cognition itself is made possible through confrontation.

Hierarchical Segmentation. The original splitting and separating mental process assigns qualitatively different (unequal) value to the opposing realities of the dichotomies and a stratification of value to all realities within a given set or category. This process of valuation and devaluation is accompanied by that of segmentation and compartmentalization of independently derived entities. The effect is to eliminate the possibility of organic or sympathetic relationship, thereby establishing grounds for the dominance of the "superior" form or phenomenon over that which is perceived to be inferior: the power-relationship. Abstracted from the larger whole, these opposing realities can never be perceived as either complementary or interdependent.

Analytical, Nonsynthetic Thought. The tendency to split and segment makes the European comfortable with the analytical modality in which realities are torn apart in order to be "known." This is an essential process within all cognitive systems on one level of understanding. But since organic interrelationship discourages the hierarchical thought patterns necessary for confrontation, control, and power, it becomes impossible, *within* the parameters of the European *utamawazo*, to comprehend the whole, especially as a cosmic reality. Culturally this tendency inhibits the movement to a higher, more synthesizing level of understanding. It is on the level of synthesis that opposition would be resolved, and given the fundamental premises of this cognitive system, there would no longer be any basis for knowledge: power-over-other.

Objectification. With these characteristics of the *utamawazo* an autonomous self has been created. This autonomous self is gradually identified with "pure thought." The conceptualization of "pure thought" is made possible by a cognitive emphasis on *absolutism* and *abstractification.* The self as emotionless mind creates the proper "objects" of knowledge through the act of controlling that which is inferior to it in a phenomenal sense. In this sense, everything that is "other" than the thinking self is objectified and is therefore capable of being controlled by that self; as long as the knowing self is careful to remain affectively detached. Therefore, through the mode of objectification, knowledge becomes a mechanism that facilitates power-over-other.

Absolutist-Abstractification. This also mandates the universalization as well as the reification of truths. This universalization is not to be confused with the inductive search for authentic principles of a cosmic reality; that is discouraged by the limited analytical and segmenting mentality. It is instead, a universalism dictated by the need to use epistemology as a power tool and as a mechanism of control.

Rationalism and Scientism. Extreme rationalism is not reasonableness; quite the opposite. It is the attempt to explain all of reality as though it had been created by the European mind for the purposes of control. It is the belief that everything can be known through objectification and that the resulting presentation of reality is an accurate picture of the world. If all of reality can be explained in this way, then we as thinking beings have control over everything. Intense rationalism is the ultimate experience of control for the European mind. Ideologically, it justifies the control of the European self over others.

Scientism is the merger of religion and rationality. Here the European god becomes the great scientist and the rationalist pursuit is the criterion of moral behavior. The need to experience control creates a scientistic *utamawazo* in which predictability and rationality help to defend the knowing self against any possible threat from the unknown. Intuitive knowledge is devalued and mistrusted since it is only possible through cosmic self-awareness; it does not guarantee control, it does not help to create the illusion of power-over-other. The intuitve modality is not uncomfortable with mystery.

Authoritative Literate Mode. The written symbol becomes authoritative utterance, enabling the European mind to further objectify reality as it universalizes European control. Reductionist symbols set in a nonsymbolic lineal modality help to further alienate the knowing self from its authentically affective environment. More control, more power. Conceptual lineality further secularizes the axiological aspects of the culture thereby linking it as well to the process of objectification.

Desacralization. This is a necessary by-product of all of the characteristics of the European *utamawazo*, as nature is alienated and objectified and approached with a *quantifying mentality*, that views the universe as material reality only, to be acted upon by superior "mind."

The characteristics outlined all issue from and result in the illusion of a despiritualized universe. European power is the negation of spirit, just as European control is threatened by the recognition of spirit. All of these characteristics when understood ideologically, that is, in terms of the nature of the European *asili*, yield the possi-

bility of power and create the illusion of control. The pursuit of power is the nature of the European *asili*. The *utamawazo* is one manifestation of the *asili*. It is created to assist in the realization of the *asili*. What remains to be demonstrated is the way in which these characteristics encourage the development of a technical order and imperialistic behavior towards other cultures. We must explain how the *utamawazo* couples with the *utamaroho* (energy force) to support the ideological thrust (*asili*) of the culture: the quest for dominance. The *asili* makes each aspect of the *utamawazo* political in its use (application), every action motivated by the *utamaroho*, both defensive and aggressive: the assumption of a confrontational reality.

We have identified the *asili*-logos and source of the culture; it is a seed that once planted dictates the logic of cultural development. In the chapters to come we will use this concept to explicate the relationship between the dominant modes of the culture, following the path along which the logos of the *asili* leads.

I am the way, the truth, and the light. No one comes to my Father but through me.

— John 14:6

There was a third white destroyer: a missionary who wanted to replace all knowledge of our way with fables even our children laughed at then. We told the white missionary we had such fables too, but kept them for the entertainment of those yet growing up - fables of gods and devils and a supreme being above everything. We told him we knew soft minds needed such illusions, but that when any mind grew among us to adulthood it grew beyond these fables and came to understand that there is indeed a great force in the world, a force spiritual and able to shape the physical universe, but that that force is not something cut off, not something separate from ourselves. It is an energy in us, strongest in our working, breathing, thinking together as one people; weakest when we are scattered, confused, broken into individual, unconnected fragments.

— Ayi Kwei Armah

Chapter 2

Religion and Ideology

A Point of Departure

Religion is integrally related to the development of ideology in the West. For that reason and because of the unique nature of European culture, it is critical to make clear what I mean by "religion." This is important because what is identified formally in the European experience as religion often has very little to do with what is understood generally as "the religious" in a phenomenological sense.[1] This discussion focuses on the European experience of religion as a formalized institution existing in relation to the other institutions of European culture, as opposed to "religion" as the expression of beliefs about the supernatural world and as the basis for ethical behavior, or as a determinant of value.

It is critical as well to distinguish between "religion" and "spiri-

tuality." Spirituality rests on the conception of a sacred cosmos that transcends physical reality in terms of significance and meaning. At the same time spirituality enables us to apprehend the sacred in our natural, ordinary surroundings: They become elements of a symbolic language. Religion refers to the formalization of ritual, dogma, and belief, leading to a systematic statement of syntactically suprarational tenets that may or may not issue from a spiritual conception of the universe. Most often it functions to sacralize a nationalistic ideology.

If one looks for a sense of the supernatural, the sacred, or extraordinary in European culture, undoubtedly the only area of experience that approaches the "religious" in this sense is that of "science." It is only what is considered to be science and scientific method that is regarded with the awe and humility that in other cultures represents the "religious attitude." Scientism, as such, is not the focus of this immediate discussion, but rather the institutionalized set of ideas and practices that Europeans refer to as "religion." Scientism will enter the discussion only as it functions normatively to provide the models or paradigms of European theology.

The other sense of "religion," i.e., beliefs concerning the nature of the human and the universe, have been discussed in Chap. 1 as metaphysical conceptions. The authentically normative European ethic is treated in a later section of this work. Such beliefs are not easily recognizable if one makes the mistake of looking for them only in what is labeled "religion" in an avowedly secular society. The two uses of the term will overlap occasionally, as has already become apparent in the previous chapter, and will do so more in the following discussion as we observe the way in which the themes of European epistemological and ontological premises find expression in the formalized religious statement of European culture.

To say that a culture is "secularly" based in European social theory is primarily to associate it with what in the terms of European ideology is the phenomenon of modernity. But an ethnological understanding of European culture using the concept of *asili* leads to a conclusion that is more far reaching than that understanding of "secular" would imply. We are not simply discussing the separation of Church and State. The relationship of European religion to other aspects of the culture is symptomatic of a persistent despiritualization and desacralization of experience and can be shown to be a characteristic of "Westerness" since its archaic stages. The European *utamawazo*, *utamaroho*, and European ideology determine the nature of the formalized religious statement in the West rather than the

reverse. That is what it means for a culture to have a "nonreligious" base. It means that the formal religious statement merely *reflects* fundamental metaphysical concepts and ideology. It is not their source. It is not identical with them as is the case in traditional and classical African and Islamic cultures. This secularization of European culture begins with the institutionalization of European religion. It begins with the Church.

This discussion begins, therefore, with the Platonic influences on the development of European institutionalized religion, its Judaic origins, and its solidification in the ideology and organization of the early Christian Church. Later we will discuss the ideological significance of European paganism. Throughout this treatment, however, our focus is on European institutionalized religion as a manifestation of the European *utamaroho*, *utamawazo* and ideological commitment. The concept of *asili* particularizes this "religious" statement, and exposes its legitimization of European behavior.

The Platonic Influence

For the most part, whatever dramatic imagery and spiritual profundity are traditionally associated with what is called "Christianity," originate in chronologically "older" cultures,[2] cultures that existed as established traditions centuries before the crystallization of archaic Europe or the establishment of Christianity. We are discussing here what Europeans isolated as valued characteristics of a proper religious statement. I will take the liberty of using the term Christianity to refer specifically to its European manifestations; that is, to the "European" uses and responses to the religious ideas presented by earlier cultural-ideological traditions. For, having changed the emphases and offering different interpretations, Europeans can indeed be credited with the creation of a formulation that uniquely responded to the needs of their cultural selves. In this sense, which emphasizes the ideological uses of religion (the *asili* approach), European Christianity was a "new" phenomenon.

The dialogues the *Euthyphro*, the *Apology*, and the *Republic* are all to some extent concerned with the problem of the moral justification of an individual's choice of action (*Euthyphro*, *Apology*) and of the State (*Republic*). In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates succeeds in convincing Euthyphro of the logical inconsistency of his appeal to "that which the gods love" as the criterion or definition of "the pious act." According to Socrates, Euthyphro's problem is that his gods are many, unpredictable, and, like men, fallible. Sometimes they do not agree with one another as to what "pleases them." And since they are

"many," what pleases one may not please another. Socrates demonstrates to Euthyphro that in looking for a proper "first principle" it is necessary to go beyond the gods to something prior to them as a reference point. "The gods love what they love *because* it is holy," and not the reverse. This priority is, of course, a logical one.

In the *Apology,* Socrates accounts for his actions by saying that they were divinely inspired: He was *made* to act as he does; he was compelled to "ask questions," an activity that apparently is threatening to the authority of the State. Socrates becomes the nemesis of the State as he demonstrates to the young Athenians that the politicians are the least wise of its participants. The point that we are concerned with is the way in which Socrates defends his actions. By identifying his behavior as having been made "necessary" by the order of the gods, he is, in fact, saying that he cannot help being Socrates, that he cannot help being as he is. Socrates is being charged with "impiety," and it is therefore necessary that he brings the gods to his defense; but more than that, *he does so because of the nature of that which he is defending.*[3] Socrates is, after all, defending an entire "way of life"; not merely one specific or concrete action which, in Platonic terms, is Euthyphro's mistake. To do this he must appeal to something that is outside of, greater than, independent of, that life; something to which it can be referred. The moral principle of justification for "all actions" cannot be in terms of anything "human," for that would be inconsistent, ambiguous, and imperfect, as Euthyphro was made to see. Socrates' appeal can only be made to the divine; that which is beyond space and time, that which "created" him.

> Now the duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon me by god; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of the divine power was never intimated to anyone. [Plato, *Apology,* 33]
>
> God orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men. [Plato, *Apology,* 28]

It is not that Socrates has suddenly become a priest. It sounds as though he is describing "the religious" in experience; the creation of meaning through transcendence beyond the ordinary, beyond the profane. But, if this were the case, clearly it would not represent a "new" human activity, nor a new conception of religion. Euthyphro has been in the habit of doing precisely that. In the Platonic view, the nature of this "god" or "principle" that Socrates seeks is an extension of the human. It is not "greater than" nor "outside" the ordinary.

Rather it is a logical necessity of human reason, that is, reason as Plato defines it. Socrates is talking about an absolute, unchanging reference point: the grounding of reason.

Both Euthyphro and Socrates appeal to the gods for the justification of their actions that are being challenged. But Socrates makes it clear that the logic of Euthyphro's argument is defective. Euthyphro does not make effective polemical use of the authority of the gods, while Socrates, in his own defense, uses the divine to construct a logically rigorous argument for the moral validity of his actions. This brings us directly to a critical component of European religion. It is the "syntax of the mathematical proposition," in Havelock's words, that becomes the model for the moral precept and idea. In this way the European "monotheistic ideal" comes into being, and its religious statement becomes rationalistic. The arguments of the *Euthyphro* and the *Apology* make the assumption that there is but one system of logic, one mode, and this comes to appear "logical" within the epistemological confines of European culture. Plato identifies the "good" with the "true," and for him this means that the *morally* true has as its methodological model the *mathematically* true. That is why it is important that the Guardians be trained first in "the art of number":

> The knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient . . . then geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.
>
> And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?
>
> Yes.
>
> And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?
>
> Yes, in a very remarkable manner.
>
> Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.[4]

The *Republic* is an "ideal" state because it is best and therefore what a state should be; but it is also "ideal" in the sense that it does

not and cannot concretely exist. The ideal state is itself a "Form" to be participated in, approximated, imitated, but never consonant with the becoming, that is, the experienced. The Republic is not in any way limited by the particular circumstances of human experience. Just as in the European conception, the philosophic and ethical "progressiveness" of the Christ image lies in its presentation of a model of moral perfection, to be imitated but never reached. So the Republic represents the perfect order towards which the European state must continually "advance." As "idea," as "normative model," it is not simply modeled after the "good," it is the embodiment of the "good." The problems in the *Euthyphro,* the *Apology,* and the *Crito* are created by the discrepancy in the world of becoming between the "moral" and the "natural." This problem is eliminated in the *Republic;* the State becomes totally moral because it is totally rational. Virtue is identified with "objectification"; spirit is reduced to matter and the ability to manipulate it.

This mode of thought that has worked so well to produce the kind of technical and social order that Europeans desire has also created a moral and spiritual disaster. The formal religious statement has taken on the form of the rational state and has left Europeans no access to the necessarily spiritual reservoirs of human morality. This tendency has intensified over the centuries; until now, when the West is faced with tremendous self-doubt.

But the point to be made here is that the epistemological model in which the Platonic abstraction was born (the normative "absolute") underlies the expression of the "monotheistic ideal," the "rational religion" syndrome, and written codification as values in the formalized Judeo-Christian religious statement.

Stanley Diamond succinctly states the reason for the "monotheistic ideal" as well as the reason for its failure as a religious vehicle in one sentence. "Absolutely pure monotheism exists in the realm of mathematics, not religion!" Precisely! And that is why it became the European ideal, since ("logically") pure monotheism can be understood as an attempt to express the Platonic abstraction as the necessary justification of all moral propositions. When European theologians took up from where Plato left off, they should have realized that they would be forever plagued with the dilemma of reconciling what should have remained two distinct philosophical-epistemological modes; Plato had mistakenly identified them as one.

Diamond says that this tendency toward the integration of mental and emotional life and the development of the "exalted and positive ethical idea" implies "progress" to the European mind and has

become one of the shibboleths of European culture. But this is a slippery point, if one is unfamiliar with the mode of ancient philosophy. For the Kemites (ancient "Egyptians"), other Africans, and many contemporary "non-European" peoples, there is an authentic integration of science, philosophy, and religion. The difference between these two kinds of "integration" is that one reduces spiritual reality to matter, while the other understands spiritual reality as the fundamental integrative principle of all being. The European view results in the desacralization of the universe and, by extension, the despiritualization of morality.

Monotheism for the European becomes a characteristic of superior philosophical belief. It is not important here that other cultures exhibit religious concepts that philosophically imply the spiritual priority of a single creative principle and that the idea of monotheism, of course, came to the West from other experiments with it. Even in European culture, where it is discussed so much, the "high god" concept is not experienced as an "unknown featureless quantity" that never changes: Several gods are called by one name, and they are personalized. But what *is* significant in this discussion is that absolute and "pure" monotheism is expressed as an ideal or value in Western European cultural chauvinistic expression, and that it serves as a basis for the devaluation of other cultures. In addition the expression of this ideal is, in part, a legacy of the Platonic abstraction.

Havelock's observation on the developmental relationship between the written media or "literate" mode and "objectification" as a dominant or preferred epistemological mode can be used to understand the uniqueness of the European, Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Religion, to be superior and worthy of the "civilized," had to be "knowledge" and have the nature of the eternal truth of logic. Its written codification helped to give it this character and so became to European's evidence of "true religion." (A student in my African civilization course vehemently protested that Christian belief was superior because it was "documented.") Where else but in the European mind would it seem so compelling that the "self" be separated from the "religious object" in order to achieve a proper religious statement. It could instead be argued from a different perspective that it is the very point at which the "individual" self and the experience of the "other" *defy* distinction that a sense of the religious is born. But for Europeans, even this experience has to be understood rationally, which ultimately robs them of the ability to recognize it. George Steiner says,

> The classic and the Christian sense of the word strive to order reality within the governance of language. Literature, philosophy, law, the arts of history, are endeavors to enclose within the bounds of rational discourse the sum of human experience, its recorded past, its present condition and future expectations. The code of Justinian, the *Summa [theologica]* of Aquinas, the world chronicles and compendia of medieval literature, the *Divina Commedia*, are attempts at total containment. They bear solemn witness to the belief that all truth and realness—with the exception of a small, queer margin at the very top—can be housed inside the walls of language.[5]

The European formalized religious statement was made to fit the conceptual mode that had become aesthetically pleasing to the European mind because of the Platonic influence, the diligence of Aristotle, and the nature of the *Utamawazo*. Arthur Lovejoy has this to say regarding Plato's relationship to the subsequent religious formulations:

> The interpreters of Plato in both ancient and modern times have endlessly disputed over the question whether this conception of the absolute Good was for him identical with the conception of God. Stated thus simply, the question is meaningless, since the word "God" is in the last degree ambiguous. But if it be taken as standing for what the Schoolmen called *ens perfectissimum*, the summit of the hierarchy of being, the ultimate and only completely satisfying object of contemplation and adoration, there can be little doubt that the Idea of the Good *was* the God of Plato; and there can be none that it became the God of Aristotle, and one of the elements or "aspects" of the God of most philosophic theologies of the Middle Ages, and of nearly all the modern Platonizing poets and philosophers.[6]

Plato's influence was most heavily felt in the early formulative work of Augustine, and Aristotle's influence was directly manifested in Aquinas and the Scholastics in their conceptions of the "self-moving Mover" and of "Final Cause," but most importantly in their laborious attempts to "prove" the existence of their god. These efforts become pathetic when it is understood that the need for "proof" itself is symptomatic of the human failing of the culture. Aristotle, in this way, becomes himself the "prime mover" of the "religion and rationality syndrome" that continues to plague European theology.

The Judaic Heritage

In Judaism we find the first conscious formalized and institutionalized statement of certain critical characteristics of European culture, tendencies, and values that intensified as the culture became an ever increasingly identifiable ethno-historical entity. This does *not* include the Qabbala, which is non-European in both a spiritual and a racial-cultural sense. In fact, a caveat to this discussion would be to raise the question of to what extent our knowledge of Judaism is determined by the tradition of the Khazars, who were *converted Jews*, and their descendants the Askenazim and contemporary European Jews. (See Arthur Koestler, *The Thirteenth Tribe*, 1976.)

Judaism is much more than a "religion" as that term came to be used in the European experience. It is a political and cultural ideology. It has within it the germ of a model for social organization designed for the energetic development of technological efficiency. It is the prelude to a cultural configuration that emphasizes that aspect of the human experience. The characteristics that can be identified within this tradition combine to give the culture of the early Hebrews the particular socio-technological direction that later became a definitive component of the Western European tradition.

The Judaic tradition is associated with a cultural tool that is generally termed "codification" in relation to the social norms, sanctioned behavior, and religion of the Hebrew people. The term "codification," however, properly refers to the systematic arrangement and preservation of certain aspects of culture. All cultures possess methods and media (songs, mythology, art, poetry, ritual) that act to standardize in this way; therefore, all peoples "codify" what they consider to be the valuable and necessary facts of their tradition.[7]

It is specifically the use of the medium of the written word in this respect that, in European parlance, is connoted by the term "codification" and that, in the minds of Europeans, is so reverently associated with their cultural heritage. Through the use of the written word culture becomes recorded, and this recording becomes an impressively cumulative activity, giving the impression that the culture itself is more cumulative and therefore within the logic of this same value system, evolutionarily superior to cultures that codify their traditions through other media.

Writing, of course, first developed neither in the context of Judaism nor any other part of the European cultural tradition. So that it is not merely the presence, knowledge, or "possibility" of this medium that is critical in identifying the peculiarity of the European configuration. More subtly, it is the way in which this tool figures in

the culture in question that is important here. In the European tradition writing takes on the features of a dominant value within the belief system of the group. It is not merely a tool among tools. The medium of the written word is so valued that it can itself impart value, much as religion does to the entire fabric of traditional cultures. Without the written media, how could the European "God" and all the pronouns referring to "Him" be capitalized?—a primary European expression of reverence. The same is true of Plato's "Forms." The act of writing and its importance become ideological in function. They become a frame of reference that acts to determine and, in many respects, limit the mode of perception of those caught up in this structure of values. We have already pointed to some of the implications of "lineality" in the European *utamawazo* as it relates to the written media. (See Chap. 1 of this work.)

The point to be made here is the way in which this valued activity related to other Western tendencies of the European *asili*, already prefaced in early Judaic culture. When written expression becomes a dominant value, words become binding through writing, and values are perceived laws. Laws preserved through written codification are more impressive to the European mind than mere "values." This circular process helps to maintain order in lieu of those mechanisms that would be binding in other cultures. Written laws became the mark of European religion. The literate mode helped to impart the illusion of historicity and therefore of "universal truth."

Written codification is necessary for the development and growth of a certain kind of ideology and a qualitatively distinct style of organization; not necessarily more complex, but in many ways more oppressive to the human spirit as it forces human activity to be increasingly technologically oriented. The Kemites (Egyptians) possessed a system that allowed them to keep written records thousands of years before the Hebrews. They also had a larger and more technologically accomplished culture. And for these reasons, Kemet might at first appear to be the ethnological precursor to the crystallization of European culture.

But Kemetic civilization is sacredly based, and its religion more cosmic, mythic, and symbolic in intent. The mathematical, astrological, astronomical, and philosophical knowledge of the Kemites, even the material colossus that was Kemet, were products of a total conception of the universe as spirit. It is for this reason that Kemet still remains a puzzle to the European mind. The African apprehension of the universe as cosmic harmony simply represents a philosophic approach that defies the European world-view. What is relevant here

is the difference between the uses of written codification and its value-place in Kemetic and Hebraic culture, respectively. What was written in the *Book of the Coming Forth by Day ("The Book of the Dead")* was to be buried with the dead and was intended for their benefit and use. But the philosophical essence of spiritual knowledge (which included science as well as theology) was represented by the Priest "schools" or Mystery Systems, and could only be transmitted orally—reserved for a small circle of initiates.

Written expression of these teachings was prohibited for two reasons: They were "secret," and they were "sacred." Writing, on the other hand, imparts two things to its content: (1) it publicizes, reveals, and spreads its content in a way that other (pre-electronic) media cannot (one never commits to writing that which one truly wishes to remain private); it "makes public" its content in this way. (2) The written media "profanes." Initiates into this system of spiritual wisdom pledged themselves to secrecy. This was interpreted to mean the prohibition of writing down what they had learned. It was only when individual Greek, Persian, and Ionian students (Socrates and Plato no doubt among them) gained access to Egyptian schools, and political control of Egyptian civilization, that acts of sacrilege were performed, acts that in the nascent European ideological framework of ancient Greece were compelling. As early as this in the European experience, the culturally exploitative use of the written media seems to have been recognized and utilized. And the European interpretation of these priestly Kemetic teachings became much of "Greek Philosophy" through the many strokes of many, many pens, as George James explains (1954). In this view we could almost say that classical European culture began with an act of profanation and plagiarism.

How profoundly different was the Hebrew conception of meaning from the Kemetic and other "non-European" conceptions. It was a conception that promoted the arduous activity of recording in writing the religious laws of its people and thereby gave birth to the idea of the "scriptures." Within the European context "culture" and "law" are reified and, therefore through writing, are deified; religion has greater force, is "truer," because it is codified in writing. Starting with other presuppositions, however, it would seem that it is only as laws become alienated from the human spirit that conformity to them requires that they be put on paper.

The Monotheistic Ideal; Incipient European Cultural Chauvinism

Our concern here is with "monotheism" as a culturally expressed value. In these terms the counterpart of the "good/bad" dichotomy of European value becomes that of "monotheism/polytheism." For Europeans the one-god idea, like written codification, represents a socio-technological "advance" along the evolutionary spectrum. Judaism proclaims this ideal. It is recognized as a Jewish concept—in spite of Akhnaten—for in Judaism, it becomes hardened ideology. The statement of this ideal expresses the European *utamaroho* dramatically. What follows is Hugh Schonfield's characterization of this "ideal":

> Messianism was a product of the Jewish spirit. It was inspired by the Hebrew reading of the riddle of the creation and the destiny of mankind. Though some of its features did not originate with the Hebrews, they absorbed them and brought them into relationship with a great vision of the ultimate Brotherhood of Man under the rule of the One God and Father of all men. The vision was not simply a cherished ideal; it was associated with a plan for its realisation. According to this plan God had chosen and set apart one nation among the nations of the world, neither numerous nor powerful, to be the recipient of his laws, and by observing them to offer a universal example. The Theocracy of Israel would be the persuasive illustration of a World Theocracy; it would be "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" witnessing to all nations. Manifestly, according to this view, the redemption of humanity waited upon the attainment by Israel of a state of perfect obedience to the will of God. By so much as Israel failed to meet the Divine requirements, by so much was the peace and well-being of mankind retarded.[8]

This characterization of Hebrew theology is an accurate statement of the European self-image: one type of person—one culture—whose task it is to "save" all people. This vision of a larger world in relation to a special culture (one's own) contains the germ of "universalism," the critical ingredient of European cultural imperialism. Early in Judaism the indication of this theme appears, a theme that we shall follow in this study as it develops both historically and synchronically through the various aspects of European culture. The Judaic statement also laid the groundwork for the secularization of history. By interpreting history as the unfolding of divine law, profane lineal time (historicity) rather than Hantu (sacred time and space) became the sanctioning force.

There is an important connection between the expression of the

"monotheistic" ideal and that of Plato's ontology as expressed in several of his dialogues. The humanness and inconsistency of the gods is illogical (*Euthyphro*) and, therefore, immoral. Value must be abstract, universal, unchanging. The Republic is perfect because it is modeled after such an abstraction. It is really not the *content* of the "ideal" so much as its "form" that is significant. The "logical" and ontological "authority" that issues from the "good" or from "God" must be monolithic. It is a more suitable structure, the ideally organized state for the growth and nurture of technology and for a particular kind of ideology. The concept of monotheism provides an ontological justification for the State as an efficient mechanism of assured control. While wars have always been (and will always be, although the rhetoric may become more subtle) for all people "religious" wars, and while religious statements have always been statements of cultural nationalistic ideology, the religious statement of the Hebrews corresponded to a qualitatively different nationalistic conception. Their religion put forth the proposition that all religions that did not espouse the one-god ideal were evolutionarily inferior. The adherents of this religious statement, in effect, declared war on (that is, opposed themselves to) all peoples who did not profess this idea. It is important here to reiterate a distinction that must be kept in mind between Jewish religion and others at this historical juncture.

All religions are by necessity culturally nationalistic in that they profess in some way the specialness if not the moral superiority of those who are "born into" them and, in fact (most importantly), involve an explanation of the sacred origins of the group. But there is a crucial difference between the way in which the European image of its culture represents its members as advanced on an evolutionary spectrum. This ideological thesis demands a vision of themselves in invidious comparison with others and therefore in relation to a larger order. One idea—the sacralization of the group—does not rule out the validity of a plurality of other groups. The other—evolutionary superiority—is a supremacist concept and allows only for a monolithic reality.

For the Jews, those who did not profess the one-god ideal—those who "worshipped images"—were in fact irreligious. It was impious and immoral to worship many gods. Moreover, it was stupid; it was backward. And, therefore, the violent hostility towards all other religions was not only justified; it was morally compelling. And here we find the first concrete statement of what can be called the dichotomy of European chauvinism, the evolution of which we can trace historically and ideologically.

According to the logic of European ideology as manifested in its early stage of Judaic culture, the cultural statement ofgood/bad, of we/they, becomes Jew/Gentile. To be Jewish was to be not only special and "chosen" but also "religious" and therefore culturally superior in an evolutionary sense. A Gentile is non-Jewish: a heathen and pagan, is idolatrous and actually irreligious (has no religion), is ignorant, is culturally inferior in an evolutionary sense. With certain critical amplification, this was later to become the logic that supported European cultural imperialism; and it has been alarmingly consistent, left intact for over two thousand years, an unchanging tradition in a culture that propagandizes itself as the embodiment of "change" and self-criticism.

The Jewish/Gentile dichotomy is the early form of expression on the continuum of the civilized/primitive dichotomy of European cultural chauvinism. Within the framework of this chauvinistic expression the concept of authoritative "scriptures" and the written codification of tradition, the monotheistic ideal and the Jewish/Gentile dichotomy all combine in unique configuration to reinforce each other in the logic of a belief system that can be identified as the earliest institutionalized manifestation of the European *utamaroho*—seeking to fulfill the *asili* of the culture.

Written codification and its promulgation encourages the linear mode of conception that in turn establishes a "logical" system that produces the thesis of evolution and advance. This thesis, in turn, introduces the deification of the written word; and so the circle continues. Monotheism, which had philosophical (not spiritual) appeal to the European mind and which served best the purposes of social control in a European context, was placed at the valued end of the "evolutionary" spectrum. It is again significant that Europeans have never left that aspect of social organization open-ended as a superficial understanding of *progress ideology* would imply but retain the monolithic image of their very first model.

The monotheistic ideal (and the thesis of its "evolutionary" superiority) then leads to and at the same time is recreated by the dichotomy of European nationalistic ideology. "We" become(s) the group that is "advanced," practices monotheism, deifies writing; "they" become *the rest of the world,* the group that is backward, idolatrous, irreligious, possesses no impressive body of written religious laws, and of course believes in "many gods." No punishment is too severe for this group, and "we" must go to great lengths to ensure that "we" are not contaminated by "their" backwardness. The Judaic statement of this position was a violently defensive one, since the threat

from without was, at that point, very real.

> If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast known, thou, nor thy fathers;
>
> Namely, of the gods of the people which are round and about you nigh unto thee or far off from thee. . .
>
> Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor harken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him:
>
> But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
>
> And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of Egypt, from the house of bondage.
>
> — Deuteronomy: 13:6—13:10 (See also 13:12, 13, 15, 16.)

> When the Lord thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations before thee, the Hittites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites, and the Persites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations greater and mightier than thou;
>
> And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee; thou shalt smite them and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make not covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them:
>
> Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto they son.
>
> Ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire.
>
> For thou *art* an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that *are* upon the face of the earth.
>
> — Deuteronomy 7:1, 7:6

In the Christian context this statement becomes stronger and more powerfully aggressive (yet at the same time more subtle, less explicit) as opposed to the adamently defensive nature of the Jewish statement, which seeks to protect itself against contamination. All of the necessary ingredients were already present, including the European self-image as "world-savior." Put into the context of European ideology this can be seen as an ideal vehicle for the cultural-imperialistic projection of the European objective, which, in fact, it became later. That is an African-centered interpretation of what in Eurocentric rhetoric is stated as "a vision of the ultimate Brotherhood of Man under the rule of One God and Father of all men."[8] The implication of this "vision" is, indeed, a European theocracy.

The Judeo-Christian Schism

The "Christian" formulation becomes the next identifiable stage in the development of the European *utamaroho* as expressed by institutionalized religion. Christianity owed much to the early Judaic tradition; so much, in fact, that the questions become: What exactly *was* the difference in this "new" religion? In what way was it new? Why did the followers of Jesus consider themselves distinct from, even antagonistic toward, other Jews and vice-versa?

According to European tradition the critical theological differences between the Jews and Jesus are fixed on his claim to be the "Son of God" and, correlatively, the refusal of the Jews to recognize him as the "Son" of their "God." But the ideological issue is lodged in the implications of Jesus' teachings for Jewish nationalism, and the cultural imperialistic implications of Paul's elaboration and interpretation of them. From this perspective the schism and resulting antagonism makes political sense. I do not impose consciously political motives on any of these teachings. I mean rather to point to the political implications of the ideas when put into the context of embryonic European nationalist and cultural behavior patterns. In other words, the point is that some religious statements can be used to support certain political objectives while others cannot.

For the Jews, while their god was projected as the one "true" god for humankind, the emphasis and essential feature of Judaism was not the possibility of world-wide application, but rather the specialness of the Jewish people. According to them it is only the Jews who had been "chosen" to fulfill God's prophecy:

> For thou an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that *are* upon the face of the earth.
>
> Deuteronomy: 7:6

But they were to fulfill this prophecy by presenting a normative example to other peoples, *not through conquest.*

The cultural-political implications of Paul's strategy or interpretation of Jesus' teachings were quite different. In Paul's view, converted Gentiles would be assured the same privileges as those enjoyed by the Jewish believers, and they would also inherit the reward and promises made to Israel.[9] The Christian organization also added an increased stratification to the Jewish model through a hierarchy created out of the need for "correct interpretation." This was not a primarily religious function for the Jews since their doctrine emphasized the "letter" of the written law.

The critical difference is to be found in Paul's attention to the Gentiles, a move that was both the cause and the effect of rejection by the Jewish nationalists. The many Jews who became the first "Christians" were not, of course, Jewish nationalists. It is in this context and at this point that a distinction began to exist between primarily self-deterministic Jewish nationalism and the more imperialistic European cultural chauvinism. This is a distinction that has remained consistent to contemporary times, for while the Jewish interest may seek power, it is not expansionistic in the sense of seeking converts.

The Judaic formulation was the ideal vehicle for the expressly limited objective of Jewish cultural solidarity, the solidarity necessary for the efficient socio-political organization and consolidation of the efforts of its members. It was the perfect statement of nationalistic expression to the Jewish people as it encouraged their identification with the group through an assumed historical (transcending the territorial) experience and destiny, and functioned as a defensive mechanism necessary for their self-determination—a need that was intensified by their extreme "minority" circumstance.

As the European *utamaroho* began to emerge in the wider context created by an ever-expanding self-image, itself defined in terms of ever-increasing power, the needs of European nationalistic/chauvinistic expression required much more than Judaism provided. Judaism did indeed promote and encourage several of the rather critical values viewed as necessary for the planted European *asili* but clearly its nationalistic statement was grossly inadequate for the expanding European self-image. While it was a statement of political

self-determination and defensive social cohesion, it was not a statement of world imperialistic objectives. The Judaic vision was elitist-isolationist; the expanded European vision sought the control and cultural exploitation of other groups. Terrence Penelhum says, "When Christianity appeared on the scene, it came not merely as one more religion but rather as an implacable rival to all others. It claimed total allegiance from all men . . . ."[10] Oswald Spengler makes this difference in political implication clear:

> Even in the first days the question arose which decided the whole Destiny of the new revelation. Jesus and his friends were Jews by birth, but they did not belong to the land of Judea. Here in Jerusalem men looked for the Messiah of their old sacred books, a Messiah who was to appear for the "Jewish people," in the old tribal sense, and only for them. But all the rest of the Aramaean world waited upon the Saviour of the *World*, the Redeemer and Son of Man, the figure of all apocalyptic literature, whether written out in Jewish, Persian, Chaldean, or Mandean terms. In the one view the death and resurrection of Jesus were merely local events; in the other they betokened a world-change . . . . In the Judaic view there was essentially no need for recruiting—quite the reverse, as it was a contradiction to the Messiah-idea. The words "tribe" and "mission" are reciprocally exclusive. The members of the Chosen People, and in particular the priesthood, had merely to convince *themselves* that their longing was now fulfilled. But to the Magian nation, based on consensus or community of feeling, what the Resurrection conveyed was a full and definitive truth, and consensus in the matter of this truth gave the *principle of the true nation*, which must necessarily expand till it had taken in all older and conceptually incomplete principles.[Spengler's italics.][11]

It is the European *utamawazo* (cultural thought structure) that makes the Christian statement appear to be conceptually more complete.

The significance of Spengler's observation is that while the overwhelming body of the Christian formulation, as taught by Jesus and interpretively elaborated by Paul, was consistent with and not contradictory to Jewish belief, two critical and related features were added. These additional features molded the Jewish idea into an ideological statement that supported and justified not only a nascent European definition of value, but also a new brand of imperialism, an imperialism that suited the European *utamaroho*. One of those features was the *rhetorically* universalistic and nonexclusive definition of the group (or "object") that "could be saved"; the other was the related feature of the mandate to proselytize. Christianity, then,

became the ideal formulation for the unlimited expansion of a culture with a supremacist ideology, and at the same time it provided the ideological tool for the control of the resultant empire through its rhetorical "universalistic" component.

Why did the Jews refuse to accept Jesus as the Messiah they had long awaited? Possibly because they refused to enlarge the cultural-national group with which they identified, and, in part, because they refused to become absorbed in (though always intimately ethno-historically related to) the larger ideological entity that was forming and that was to culminate in Western European culture. One refusal was dictated by the other, and the separation and antagonism between the two groups (Christians and Jews) can be seen as one of political identification and strategy worked out in religious terminology. The question then, as now, is one of allegiance. In so far as the Jewish people refuse to identify with the nationalistic expression and destiny of the larger and dominant group whose territory they share, they constitute a "thorn in the side" of that group and have been, therefore, mistrusted and, what is worse, terrorized. In spite of this victimization, and because of the similarity of value orientation and compatibility of *utamaroho* and *utamawazo* between the Jewish people and the larger Western European group, Jews are not referred to as "pagan" or "primitive" and are not considered to be "evolutionarily inferior" as other victims of Western European oppression have been. They are indeed totally "Western" in this sense. Even Rheinhold Niebuhr recognizes the fact that Christianity was inconsistent with Jewish nationalism, but he fails to observe the new nationalistic statement of Christian ideology, or rather he mistakes its cultural imperialistic expression for a morally superior "universalism."

> The freedom of God over the instruments of his will . . . is asserted according to insights of prophetic universalism, as against the lower level of nationalistic Messianism. It is significant, however, that Christianity does not finally purge itself of the nationalistic particularism until St. Paul asserts the right to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, rejects the validity of Jewish law for Christians, and substitutes the church for the nation as the "Israel of God."[12]

An interesting treatment of the difference between the Jewish and Christian statements is found in Schonfield's *The Passover Plot.* Schonfield is expressly concerned with documenting the evidence for his contention that Jesus, perhaps convinced that he was in fact the Messiah, devoted his short life to arranging his "crucifixion" and subsequent "resurrection," so as to guarantee the fulfillment of the

Jewish prophecy (which itself is from earlier non-Western traditions). Schonfield's avowed stance is one of "objective scholarship." He wants to "shed light" on a subject too long clouded by "religious bias." In his introductory statements he says that his objective is "to be of helpful service" and that of the "patient seeking after truth."[13] But, in fact, Schonfield's perspective is one of both Jewish nationalism (though he probably does not identify himself religiously as a Jew) and Western cultural chauvinism. His argument is that the Christian conception of Jesus as the Son of "God" de-Westernized the Hebrew formulation and was therefore a retrogression from the intellectual "advance" that Judaism had made from the "superstitions" of the "pagans."

> Christianity was still much too close to the paganism over which it had scored a technical victory to be happy with a faith in God as pure spirit. There had never been in the Church a complete conversion from heathenism. We might be living in the second half of the twentieth century, but the Gentile need remained for a human embodiment of deity. God had still to be grasped through a physical kinship with man and his earthly concerns, and there yet lingered the sense of the efficacy of the substitutionary and propitiatory sacrifice of a victim.[13]

We hear an echo of Spengler's analysis but interestingly enough with the reverse position. For Spengler, the Christian idea is "conceptually" more complete, while for Schonfield it is less "pure." Both are using Platonic rules consistent with the European *utamawazo*. They are ideologically committed to the same values. The civilized is represented by the technologically more efficient, the conceptually more abstract, the perceptively less subjective. In this critique of the Christian conception by Schonfield, an "apology" for the Jewish rejection of Jesus as the Messiah is a perfect and concise statement of the European religious ideal, and the correlative of the mode of European religion. Of the Christian image of Jesus he says,

> Such a man could have his god-like moments, but could never be consistently a reflection of the Divine except for those whose notion of deity would permit the gods to share our human frailties . . .
>
> Far too many Christians do not know God in any other way than through Jesus and their faith in God is imperiled or destroyed. The New Testament is not entirely to be blamed for this. The major fault lies with those who have pandered to the ignorance and superstition of the people in giving them a God created in the image of man. Yet Jesus and his nation, differently taught, could love and worship God without recourse to incarnation.[14]

Ironically, it is precisely the "mystical" ingredient of the Jesus legend that gives Christianity its religious appeal, as well as other aspects that are taken from prior cultural traditions. There is no sense in which Schonfield's statements above can be called "objective," even if it is agreed for the moment that "objectivity" is a valid concept. His use of the term "pagan" corresponds to that of not only Christian and Jewish theologians but to "nonreligious" and so-called objective European social scientists.

There are few terms common in both ordinary and scientific usage that so blatantly reveal the *utamaroho* (collective personality) and self-image of Europeans as does "pagan." It is perhaps the epitome of European arrogance and self-delusion that Europeans can with seriousness describe First World peoples as being "irreligious." Schonfield points out, disparagingly, that the Church has absorbed many so-called pagan customs and beliefs.[15] He does not, however, state the political significance of this fact: that much of Christian mythology comes from older cultural and religious traditions, which has aided the Christians in their "conversion" of Africans and other non-European peoples. This factor served the objectives of Western European cultural imperialism well, for while people of other cultures were in part being "converted" to *their own conceptions*, they were at the same time being absorbed into an organization that controlled them for the benefit of Europeans.

The Roman Cooptation: Two Imperialistic Ideologies

> At the close of the Principate the pagan world presented a great confusion of religious beliefs and doctrines. But the various pagan cults were tolerant of one another, for the followers of one god were ready to acknowledge the divinity of the gods worshipped by their neighbors. On the contrary, the adherents of Judaism and Christianity refused to recognize the pagan gods and hence stood in irreconcilable opposition to the whole pagan world.[16]

Politically, the Roman ideology was the perfect counterpart to this "religious" formulation, as Arthur Boak's *History of Rome* characterizes it. Just as the Christian projection was that of a benevolence that sought to share enlightenment in the form of the word with those unfortunate enough to have so far escaped it, so the Roman nationalistic image was that of a people in possession of "civilization" prepared to bestow its blessings on "barbarians."

Christianity offers salvation to all, providing they "come into the fold," accepting Jesus as the "Son of God," therefore gaining eternal life; the Romans offered citizenship to all, providing, as Aristides says, they possessed "talent," "courage," and "leadership" potential. "Cultural" boundaries did not matter. Both were offers of "civilization" and a supposedly evolutionary superior way of life. These formulations posited a perpetual opposition between those who did not share the ideologies expressed and those who did. Both statements, importantly, contained justifications and directives for the "conversion" and "recruitment" of those outside the cultural group with which they were identified. Perhaps the single most important ingredient shared by these "brother" ideologies (actually two arms of the same ideological weapon) is their vision of the world as the "turf" of a single culture. Any and everyone presently under the ideological and political control of the Christians and Romans was fair game. Never before had ideologies so explicitly stated this worldwide objective. This indeed was the "technical victory" to which Schonfield and Spengler allude. And this unique self-image that projects itself as the proper model for all, we can identify as European. This self-image and its projection are part of a centuries-old process through which Europeans miraculously become the universal paradigm for all humanity.

While it is clear that both the Christian and the Roman formulations could serve as ideological statements of a world imperialistic endeavor, it is also clear that the two could not coexist as competing ideologies. But this did not constitute an irreconcilable opposition. Their synthesis made much political sense. It was represented in the cooptation of the Church by and for the purposes of the State, or one can just as easily reverse this statement. The solution was, indeed, culturally, as well as historically, compelling. The two ideologies, put to the service of one cultural group and espousing compatible values and objectives, worked hand in hand, to command the same allegiances, to conquer the same world.

Constantine's conversion is often characterized by European historians as a "turning point" in European history. Norman Baynes says that Constantine's conversion is hard to explain based on what came before him and that he "diverted the stream of human history."[17] Ethnologically, it was not a "turning point," but the concretization of a tendency—a push in a direction already identifiable in the continuum of Western European development. Constantine's "conversion" was demanded by the European *asili*, the cultural seed. It was a necessary step for the growth and solidification of the Roman

Empire. The religious formulations that had existed previously in the state were not compatible with the socio-political objectives that guided the Roman leadership—they were not compatible with the Western ideal. These prior religious formulations did not share the imperialist vision.

According to Constantine's own account (if we are to use Eusebius as an authority), his conversion was intimately bound up with his immediate military objectives. In A.D. 312 Constantine was one of four competitors left in a bloody struggle for the rule of the Roman Empire. In that year he invaded Italy from Gaul and "gained control over the whole West by his victory over Maxentius at the gates of Rome."[18]

Eusebius says that Constantine had searched in vain for a god capable of assuring the success of his military endeavors. He decided to try his father's god: the Christian god. He prayed to this god, asking for a sign, and one appeared to him,

> he saw with his own eyes the trophy of a cross of light in the heavens, above the sun, and bearing the inscription, "Conquer by This. . ."
>
> in his sleep the Christ of God appeared to him with the same sign which he had seen in the heavens, and commanded him to make a likeness of that sign which he had seen in the heavens, and to use it as a safeguard in all engagements with his enemies. . . . The emperor constantly made use of this sign of salvation as a safeguard against every adverse and hostile power, and commanded that others similar to it should be carried at the head of all his armies.[19]

This, then, in a very real sense was the first "crusade." In 313 Constantine and Licinius agreed, in the Edict of Milan, to the official recognition of the Christian religion by the state. The agreement with Licinius was for "joint rule," but,

> While Constantine granted ever greater privileges and advantages to the Christians, Licinius gradually reversed his policy of toleration and initiated repressive measures. It became obvious that Constantine aimed to be sole emperor.[20]

Timothy Barne's view of these same issues in his book, *Constantine and Eusebius*, is that:

> It seems natural to conclude that he was converted to Christianity

> before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. But the moment of psychological conviction may have followed, rather than preceded, his own avowal: It perhaps occurred during the battle, at the moment victory became certain. In the ultimate reckoning, however, the precise details of Constantine's conversion matter little. After 28 October 312 the emperor consistently thought of himself as God's servant, entrusted with a divine mission to convert the Roman Empire to Christianity.[21]

This same servant of "god" probably later had Licinius, who was his brother-in-law, killed along with Licinius' nine-year-old son. Evidently this did not conflict with Constantine's "Christianity."

Barnes says that by 324, Constantine was taking every opportunity to "stress the truth of Christianity" because of his "religious sympathies," and he concludes that "an emperor with these convictions could not be expected to tolerate pagan practices which all Christians found morally offensive."[22] Barnes continues, "He established Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. . . . Christians received preference in official appointment. . . .Constantine forbade the erection of cult statues, the consultation of pagan oracles, divination of any sort, and sacrifice to the gods under any circumstances."[22] Not only was Constantine concerned with the spread of Christianity throughout the Empire, but he was equally concerned with ideological unity *among the Christians.* If institutionalized Christianity was to be of political benefit, its leaders must speak with one voice. Theological disputes were of little import in Constantine's view when the unity of the Church was at stake. His role was therefore one of mediation, and he mandated that the bishops settle their differences, calling the first ecumenical council of the Christian Church, the Council of Nicaea, in 325.

Arthur E. R. Boak gives *his* interpretation of Constantine's actions and convictions:

> It is clear that on the eve of the final encounter with Maxentius, he placed both himself and his army under the protection of the Christian's God, and that he was convinced that his victory then and his later success in winning the whole Empire were due to the power and favor of this divinity. From 312 A.D., he looked upon himself as designated by God to rule the Roman World. And in return for this divine recognition, he felt the obligation to promote the cause of Christianity in all possible ways. This meant that Christianity must receive official recognition as state religion; not only that, it must become the only state religion, for Christians could recognize no other gods but One. Thus Constantine saw in

> Christianity the religion which could and should provide a spiritual bond among his subjects as well as a moral basis for political loyalty to himself as the elect of God.[23]

It is compelling to add, "and a 'moral' basis for world imperialism." Boak continues.

> Having decided to make Christianity the one state religion, he also felt obligated to take the initiative in ensuring the unity of the Christian community itself. . . .Constantine made full use of his autocratic power to develop a totalitarian regime for which the foundations had been laid by earlier emperors.[24]

These accounts and descriptions of Constantine's "conversion" inadvertently (in spite of the intentions of their authors) point to the political expediency and suitability of the marriage of the Roman and orthodox Christian ideologies for the imperialistic ambitions of the Western nation of the fourth century. Constantine's association with the new god—the "European god"—gave him additional support afforded by religious sanction of his political and military power, and the religion he chose had the advantage of itself incorporating a vision of complete worldwide power and control. Eusebius says, "Thus then the God of all, the Supreme Governor of the whole universe, by his own will appointed Constantine, the descendent of so renowned a parent, to be prince and sovereign: so that, while others have been raised to this distinction by the election of their fellowmen, his is the only one to whose elevation no mortal may boast of having contributed."[25] This process, having been put in motion by Constantine, was further solidified by Theodosius, in the Theodosian Code.

> In the fifth century, the Senate was thoroughly Christian. As early as 380 A.D. Theodosius had ordered all his subjects to accept the Christian creed formulated at the Council of Nicaea in 325. In 391 he ordered the destruction of the image and temple of Sarapis in Alexandria, a step which sounded the death knell of paganism in the eastern part of the Empire. The following year he unconditionally forbade pagan worship under penalties for treason and sacrilege. Theodosius II continued the vigorous persecution of the pagans. Adherence to pagan beliefs was declared criminal, and in the Theodosian Code laws against pagans are included among the laws regulating civic life."[26]

Constantine had laid the groundwork for the proclamation of

Christianity as the religion of an orthodox Roman State. It was his brilliance to recognize the compatibility, rather than antagonism, between the political objectives of the Roman State and the Christian ideology. Many European historians, in fact, begin the Medieval period of European culture with Constantine's innovation.

Lest the identity of these ideologies remain too abstract or ambiguously stated let us offer here some very concrete ethnographic data, i.e., Constantine's own statements of his objectives and interpretation of his "new Christian" mission. Constantine says of those who did not worship his supreme god with fitting veneration,

> I will destroy and disperse [them] . . . . What can be done by me more consonant with my fixed resolve and with the duty of an emperor than, having dissipated errors and cut off all unfounded opinions, to cause all men to present the omnipotent God, true religion, unfeigned concord, and the worship which is his due.[27]

This is taken from a letter written by Constantine to a group of bishops at the Council of Arles regarding the official policy to be adopted toward "pagans" and Donatists. The Donatists were a Christian sect who opposed the alignment of the Church with the Imperial Government. This position is analogous to the attempt to set a sailboat on an "upwind" course. For the die had been cast: "Europeanness" was already set in motion—gaining momentum rapidly, its successful development (the fulfillment of the *asili*) demanded the monolithic model and ideological justification that this alignment offered. Constantine says,

> God sought my service and judged that service fitted to achieve His purpose. Starting from Britain God had scattered the evil powers that mankind might be recalled to true religion instructed through my agency, and that the blessed faith might spread under his guiding hand. And from the West, believing that this gift had been entrusted to myself, I have come to the East which was in sorer need of my aid.[28]

Licinius, in the East, who did not claim the Christian god, stood temporarily in the way of Constantine's unified control. Licinius' persecution of the Christians becomes understandable as a political necessity in his efforts to prevent Constantine's take over. By the same token, the realization of Constantine's ambitions were facilitated by his mission in spreading the faith.

> I knew that, if in accordance with my prayers I could establish a common agreement amongst all servants of God, then the need of the state would as the fruit of that agreement undergo a change in a consonance with the pious desires of all.[29]

Norman Bayne's interpretation of Constantine's objectives is stated as two separate aims: to overthrow Licinius and thereby "heal the body of the Roman world," and to "unite his subjects in one common religious belief."[30] He even remarks on the "close connection between the fortunes of the state and the unity of the Church," in the mind of Constantine.[31] Yet, this historian of early European development never explicitly interprets Constantine's motives as having been imperialistic. That is because this interpretation of European development does not serve the interests of European nationalism. It is quite clear, even from his own words, that the Christian cause gave Constantine a powerful tool with which to unify Rome under his control and to conquer those not yet within this Empire. For this reason Constantine is adamantly opposed to disunity among the avowed Christians: "Open to me by your unity the road to the East."[29] The recurring theme in his directives to his bishops is unity; for unity was the political necessity of the day. The world could not be made a European hegemony until European culture was itself solidified. Constantine says,

> For truly it would be a terrible thing—a very terrible thing—that now when wars are ended and none dares to offer further resistance we should begin to attack each other and thus give excuse for pleasure and for laughter to the pagan world.[32]

One of the internecine disputes within the Church during Constantine's reign had to do with who, in fact, was a Christian; particularly with regard to those who wished to convert. When Arius announced that he had "surrendered" to the Christian god, Athanasius did not want to accept him. Constantine wrote to Athanasius: "Now you know my will: to all those who desire to enter the Church do you provide free entry." This had to be official policy if the cloak of Christianity was to do its job for Western European imperialism. Its counterpart was the offer of Roman citizenship, to which everyone was to aspire, to the "elite" of other cultures. Both were inclusive in that no one was to be excluded from European dominion. Of Roman citizenship, Aristides, writing approximately two centuries before the time of Constantine (ca. A.D. 144 or 156) says:

> Dividing into two groups all those in your empire—with this sword I have indicated the entire civilized world—you have everywhere appointed to your citizenship, or even to kinship with you, the better part of the world's talent, courage, and leadership, while the rest you recognize as a league under your hegemony. . . . Neither seas nor intervening continent are bars to citizenship, nor are Asia and Europe divided in their treatment here. In your empire all paths are open to all. No one worthy of rule or trust remains an alien, but a civil community of the World has been established as a Free Republic under one, as into a common civic center, in order to receive each man his due.[33]

The previous quotations, taken from Constantine's own correspondence and statements, are included for the purpose of providing concrete examples of the potentially isomorphic relationship of the Christian and Roman world-imperialistic ideologies and the actual realization of their oneness of purpose through Constantine's policy. The source for these quotations is a lecture given by Baynes in 1930. His objective is to show that Constantine's primary concern was in bringing Christianity to the pagan world. This Baynes argues in opposition to the divergent interpretation that Edward Schwartz presents in *The Emperor Constantine and the Christian Church*. The following is Bayne's interpretation of Schwartz's analysis:

> He [Schwartz] has found the Open Sesame to the Understanding of the reign in Constantine's resolution to exploit in his own interest the organization which gave to the Christian Church its corporate strength: through alliance with the Church Constantine sought to attain victory and the sole mastery of the Roman World.[34]

The interpretation of Theodor Brieger (1800) is also a forceful statement of what Baynes terms the "view of purely political motivation." Schwartz is the "modern representative of this standpoint." But Baynes is adamant:

> I believe that his conception of the character and aims alike of Constantine and Athanasius is essentially inhuman. This prodigious simplification does scant justice to the complexity of human personality. The view that Constantine adopted in religious diplomacy as his principle of action the Roman maxim "divide et impera" I find impossible to believe.[35]

From an African-centered perspective, on the other hand, I find Schwartz's view of to be the most "human" of interpretations. It is Baynes' explanation, in his own admission, which fails to offer cultural-

historical continuity. His reluctance, in this instance, to do what he has supposedly been well trained to do as an historian, forces him to fix on the absolutely irrelevant and moot issue of whether or not Constantine was a "true convert!" It then becomes hard for him to explain Constantine, and so he resorts to the "great personality" theory:

> If the reconstruction of the past "difficulties" are, at times, caused by the interposition in the stream of history of outstanding personalities which resist rationalization and remain unexpected and embarrassing. . . [Constantine was] an erratic block which has diverted the stream of human history.[36]

Again, it is understandable, in ethnological terms, that interpretations of Constantine's religious policies as being politically motivated are unpopular within the tradition of European social theory. The interpretation of which Schwartz's view is representative (though virtually unrecognized) is consistent with the reality of human self-interest within the parochial context of a given culture and ideological setting. By the same token, such an interpretation is diametrically opposed to the "disinterested," "beneficient," and "altruistic" stance of European "universalism" that has been projected as a part of the propaganda of European cultural imperialism since the archaic states of that culture. Baynes' interpretation of Constantine, therefore, provides us with an ethnographic example of European nationalism.

The Threat of Non-Orthodox Christianity

One of the concerns of this chapter is the relationship between religion and national consciousness, i.e., behavior. Nowhere is this relationship better exemplified then in European cultural history. In no culture is the supportive relationship of formalized religion more successfully developed and elaborated. One of the correlates of this view of the relationship between religion and nationalism is that in order to understand the dynamics of a particular religious statement, one must first be aware of the ideological commitment of the people who identify with it, their *utamaroho* and their relationship to other cultures. This is, of course, a radical departure from the usual approach to the study of religion and in direct conflict with Christian theologians. Those who would argue the "revolutionary" political implications of Christianity (see Liberation Theology literature) also imply, rather unconvincingly, that the 2000-year imperialistic quest of Western Europe, then Euro-America, was successfully maintained *in spite* of a religion that spoke for more humanistic goals. That is sim-

ply implausible and it does not make sense. It is not contradiction but consistency that has made for Western European imperial success.

Elaine Pagels, in her interpretation of the significance of the developments of early Christianity, supports my view in that she points to the social and political implications of apostolic Christianism, as opposed to those of the Gnostic tradition that the orthodox church condemned, and over which it triumphed (although we must not confuse political triumph with spiritual triumph). Perhaps it would be more fitting to begin with a discussion of the African or Kemetic (ancient Egyptian) origins of Christian mythology and symbolism, though Pagels does not refer to these at all. But since we cannot take the time here for such a discussion, the reader is referred to the works of Gerald Massey (1973), John G. Jackson (1985), Yosef Ben Jochaman (1973), and others. Suffice it to say that the mythology and symbolism surrounding Usir, also known as Asar, and Osiris by the Greeks, introduced the concept of a resurrected savior 3000 years before the advent of Christianity. A study of this tradition also explains why the date of December 25 is used for the birthdate of Jesus, the symbolism of the stable as a place for his birth, the three "wisemen," and so forth.[37]

Clearly, however, there had to have been something "special," something "different" about the formulation of what is now accepted as biblical Christianity, or it would not have been so well suited to the archaic European *utamaroho* as expressed in the Roman State. In Pagel's book, *The Gnostic Gospels*, one of the things that we already know is reaffirmed: Gnosticism was unacceptable to, and considered heresy by, those who were in the process of establishing the orthodox Christian Church. These gospels were "written out" of the religion. Pagels offers us a plausible explanation, one that fits with my understanding of the Western European cultural reality. Gnosticism was not different enough from the Kemetic and other ancient origins. Its *utamaroho* was too close to these. It was neither politically oriented nor materialistic enough. Resurrection was understood symbolically and spiritually—much deeper than unending "physical" existence. Pagels tells us that the Gnostics believed that resurrection was to be experienced spiritually, that one experienced Christ on a spiritual level. "This may occur in dreams, in ecstatic trance, in visions, or in moments of spiritual illumination."[38] Rebirth for the ancients was after all a result of illumination and intense self-knowledge—a heightened spiritual level of development. But contrary to this, orthodoxy that opposed the Gnostic view, was indeed threatened by it, arguing as Tertuillian did, that "as Christ rose bodily from

the grave so every believer should anticipate the resurrection of the flesh."[39] Interestingly enough, this is precisely the criticism that Schonfield has of Christianity, when comparing it with Judaism.[40] But in this case the "materialization" of the god-concept serves not to bring it closer to the human, but facilitates its use as the justification for authority. Tertuillian insists that the resurrection of Christ is undeniably physical, material in a very real *earthly* sense. "Tertuillian declares that anyone who denies the resurrection of the the *flesh* is a heretic, not a Christian."[38] The Gnostic emphasis on personal, spiritual growth and development, along with its deemphasis of proselytization made it ill-suited for the imperial quest.

Pagels raises the compelling question: "Why did orthodox tradition adopt the literal view of resurrection?"[38] And I would add: Why were they so threatened by the Gnostic teachings and those of the ancient Kemites? Pagels opens the way to the answers. She tells us that upon his resurrection in the New Testament, Jesus "proves" to his disciples that he is "not a ghost," and "Thomas declares that he will not believe that Jesus had actually risen from the grave unless he personally can see and touch him."[38] But, she continues, other accounts in the New Testament could lead one to the conclusion that some people had experienced visions of Jesus' return. "Paul describes the resurrection as 'a mystery,' the transformation from physical to spiritual existence."[41] The related questions restated: Why did orthodox Christianity insist on the literal, physical interpretation as opposed to a more metaphysical transcendental one, and why did they label other interpretations as heretical?[41] The answer, according to Pagels, is that

> the doctrine of bodily resurrection also serves an essentially *political* function. . . . [Pagel's italics]
>
> It legitimizes the authority of certain men who claim to exercise leadership over the churches as the successors of the apostle Peter. From the second century, the doctrine [of bodily resurrection] has served to validate the apostolic succession of bishops, the basis of papal authority to this day.[41]

What Pagels argues is that the idea or claim of the resurrection of Jesus provided a source of authority for his earthly successor: Peter. It was crucial that some such claim be possible given the fact that the leader or absolute authority within the movement was gone, and hundreds of people were claiming to interpret his teachings in almost as many different ways. In order for Peter to be the estab-

lished "rock" or foundation of a structured, institutionalized organization, all other groups had to be discredited. What better way than through his *actual* contact with a *physically* resurrected Jesus, who had explicitly given him authority to begin the institutionalization of his (Jesus') teachings.[42] (See Matthew 16: 13–19.) Given this political necessity for a doctrine of physical resurrection, the Gnostic teachings of a more metaphysical and symbolic concept of resurrection were most threatening to the establishment of the church. Not only did the apostles get authority in this way, but they were the only ones who could confer it on those who succeeded them. Christians in the second century used Luke's account to set the groundwork for establishing specific, restricted chains of command for all future generations of Christians, concludes Pagels.[43] So that present popes must rely on their connection to Peter, who had originally witnessed the physical resurrection of Jesus, for their authority.

But the Gnostics were indeed heretical, because they did not seem to be concerned with establishing an institution that would exercise total control. They insisted that the resurrection "was not a unique event in the past: instead, it symbolized how Christ's presence could be experienced in the present. What mattered was not literal seeing, but spiritual vision."[43] And in this way they continued the tradition of the mystery religions that predated orthodox Christianity, which Constantine, Justinian, Theodosius, and others were so bent on destroying. The emphasis in the Kemetic (ancient Egyptian) and derivative religious forms was on initiation into a process of spiritual development and enlightment. The emphasis within orthodox Christianity was (and is) on the acceptance of a dogma that could be the basis of socio-political structure and control.

These insights of Pagels coincide with my analysis of the function of institutionalized religion in European development. The secular, historical emphasis within Christian doctrine, and this includes the various "non-orthodox" forms that evolved as a result of the "Reformation," is a direct result of the need to claim superiority to other religions, which, in turn imparts cultural and therefore political superiority or control. No Christian will accept an authentically "spiritual" or metaphysical interpretation of Christian teachings. Herein lies the telling contradiction of Christian theology. To be a "Christian" is to insist on a "historical Christ" (in a rigidly secular sense); yet this adjective should contradict the noun it purports to describe. The reason for this strange characteristic of Christianity, as it was interpreted in the development of archaic European civilization has to do with the *utamaroho* that was also becoming standardized,

as well as the ideological needs of the new order. The spurious dichotomy between history and mythology would become the handmaiden of the civilized/primitive dichotomy, so essential to Western European cultural nationalism and imperialism. According to European nationalism, other traditions and earlier ones were expressions of mythological beliefs only: Christianity was an expression of historical fact. To this day the most threatening appositional phrase that an avowed Christian can be presented with is "Christian Mythology." To accept its validity is to shake the ground of her/his belief.

The Gnostics, like the Africans and many contemporary non-Christians were concerned with the attainment of spiritual intuition, which would reveal the nature of cosmic reality. According to Pagels, they talked about, "the possibility of encountering the risen Christ in the present."[44] But imagine what that would do to the establishment of the apostolic Church as an institution if people could continue to "witness the resurrection!" The Gnostics claimed to have kept the esoteric aspect of Jesus' teachings, which were necessarily secret and could be revealed only to initiates.[45] This is, of course, how all the ancient African spiritual systems were organized, which still represents the basic structure of spiritual learning and development among Africans who adhere to their own "non-European" conceptions. It would seem reasonable to assume that Jesus himself was an initiate of a derived, albeit adulterated "mystery system" as his teachings can be interpreted as being consistent with these earlier traditions, and it was out of these traditions that Christianity evolved.

Both Pagels and I put emphasis on the institutionalization of Christianity. She says that, "the controversy over resurrection, then, proved critical in shaping the Christian movement into an institutional religion.[46] I share this emphasis because of the critical role of this institution within the matrix of European imperialism, especially in certain stages of European development. Gnosticism could not lead to the subsequent developments—the Roman cooptation, Constantine's "conversion"—that were necessary for the expansion of imperial techno-political control. For, according to Pagels, the Gnostics argued that "only one's own experience offers the ultimate criterion of truth. . . ." She tells us that "they celebrated every form of creative invention as evidence that a person has become spiritually alive. On this theory, the structure of authority can never be fixed into an institutional framework: it must remain spontaneous, charismatic, and open."[46] But that is not how empires are built. It does not suit the European *asili*, and the European imperial quest has been

more successful than any other, because it has always been based on the claim of superior culture. In the budding stages of the quest, as the European *utamaroho* took shape, a tightly structured, institutionalized and secularly codified religion was the key to this claim.

> . . . in terms of the social order. . . the orthodox teaching on resurrection had a different effect: it legitimized a hierarchy of persons through whose authority all others must approach God. Gnostic teaching. . . was politically subversive of this order: it claimed to offer to every initiate direct access to God of which the priests and bishops themselves might be ignorant.[47]

Certainly there is no universal or absolute moral imperative that dictates that it is culturally superior to recognize the existence of only one god. Therefore, in the ethnological analysis of European culture, we must look for tendencies within it that would make avowed monotheism desirable. We look to European ideology—more specifically to Rome at the time of its Christianization. A political/ideological interpretation of the significance of the monotheistic ideal, again, makes sense. Pagel's analysis fits: "As the doctrine of Christ's bodily resurrection establishes the initial framework for clerical authority, so the doctrine of the 'one God' confirms, for Orthodox Christians, the emerging institution of the 'one bishop' as monarch ('sole ruler') of the Church."[48] She argues that another aspect of the threat to orthodoxy posed by Gnosticism was their lack of recognition of the Church hierarchy. Valentinus says that the Gnostics "join together as equals, enjoying mutual love, spontaneously helping one another" as opposed to the ordinary Christians, who "wanted to command one another, outrivalling one another in their empty ambition," inflated with "lust for power," "each one imagining that he is superior to the others." While the "lust for power" is the nature of the European *asili*, Pagels tells us that the Gnostics refused to rank themselves "into superior and inferior orders within a hierarchy, and that they followed the principle of strict equality."[49] On the other hand, she says, Tertuillian, advocate of the orthodoxy, considered certain distinctions essential to Church order: namely, those between "newcomers and experienced Christians; between women and men: between a professional clergy and people occupied with secular employment; between readers, deacons, priests, and bishops—and above, between the clergy and the laity."[50]

The Gnostics emphasized spiritual attainment and said they related to a concept of god that was beyond that of the mere image of god to whom the ordinary Christians related. They called this lesser

god the "demiurge" and said that this "creator" made false claims to power. In Pagel's explanation of Gnostic thought, achieving *gnosis* involved "coming to recognize the true source of divine power—namely, 'the depth' of all being." But the god of Clement, Irenaeus, and Tertullian claimed, "I am God, and there is no other. . . . I am a jealous God." And to them the concept of a transcendent force reachable through initiation was "heresy" that "encourage(d) insubordination to clerical authority." To Irenaeus the meetings of the Gnostics were "unauthorized." The concept of authority is key. If spiritual growth had been the focus for Irenaeus and others, the Gnostics would not have been threatening. The Church represented a structure of authority, and that structure had to be monolithic. Therefore, in Pagel's words: "If God is One, then there can only be one true church, and only one representative of the God in the community—the Bishop."[51] This "One God" became the basis for the power of "One Emperor" of the "One Civilization" as well. Belief in *him* gave the emperor authority to conquer all nonbelievers in his name. In a sense Gnosticism was anachronistic, while orthodox Christianity was "right on time." Religious formulations that were more spiritual and transcendent, less political and secular in intent, were simply not expedient.

Augustine and Political Conservatism

The strength of the Christian ideological formulation in its function as a tool of European cultural imperialism is twofold: (1) It subtly justifies two kinds of political activity; that is, it appeals to two different layers of the world's population. (2) It unifies the conquerors while simultaneously pacifying the conquered. This, in part, is reflected in the strikingly different tones or "moods" of the Old and New Testaments in terms of their political possibilities for the Roman Empire. The Old Testament is extremely militaristic and aggressive. It is often an unveiled directive: the blatant command that a homogeneous and limited cultural group resist all alien influences through the prohibition of intermarriage and other social intercourse with cultural groups adhering to different ideologies. The task of the New Testament, on the other hand, is much more complicated. What was later interpreted as the directive for aggression is there stated as the desire to spread enlightenment. What developed into the mandate to bring those "who are *not like us* under our domain" is there molded into the rhetoric of "soul-saving," and at the same time, it sells passive acceptance to those "souls." The Christian statement, as an established aspect of European culture, is, after all, a nationalistic ideology (in that it is the expression of the ideology of a particular cul-

ture just as any religious statement is), and its function in this regard is to serve the interests of that culture. The docility and lack of aggression of the conquered peoples serves this interest, and so the Christian directive is dual in nature; while it provides a justification for a world-order in the service of a European god, its teachings encourage others to be nonpolitical and discourages their cultural nationalism (identification with their national gods and belief systems).

There is a curious characterization of Jesus as a "revolutionary" in the literature of Liberation Theology and Black Theology. Unfortunately, persecution and unpopularity do not necessarily make ideas revolutionary. The Jewish ideology in its stubborn nationalism could in this sense be considered more revolutionary in the face of Roman policy than that of Jesus and his followers. It would be very difficult to imagine, if we did not consistently put our data into the context of the European *asili*, how any historian or social theorist could identify the so-called "Christian virtues"; i.e., the "Christian ethic" or mode of behavior as being in any way new or innovative at the time of Jesus. The mandate to regard and treat one another as brothers and sisters (i.e., as members of a "family" kin group) had existed probably since the beginnings of human civilization in Africa. The African ideological statement, of this mode of behavior as an ethical imperative is much more philosophically profound than the Christian-European statement of it and, of course, so much more consistent and authentic. It originates in a spiritualistic world-view.[52]

What was "new" about the teachings that purported to have resulted from the activities of Jesus was that they proclaimed that one was to treat members of other cultural groups in this way, and, more importantly, one was to treat one's enemies in this (the same) way—"enemies" being those who were hostile to one's cultural group or one's "family." This directive is, of course, debilitating and castrating to political cultural nationalism and counter to the demands of self-determination. This feature, along with that of the direction of attention towards "another world" in which justice is sought, may certainly combine to form a new statement, but it can hardly be called a politically revolutionary one.

Otto Spengler concerns himself with this political duality of Christian doctrine in the *Decline of the West*. He accuses those in the West who would seek to apply the "brotherhood" and "love" espoused by Jesus to the "unfortunate" and "oppressed" in the society of his day of having in fact misinterpreted Jesus' teachings:

> Moralizing is Nineteenth-century Philistinism. To ascribe social purposes to Jesus is blasphemy. His occasional utterances of a social kind, so far as they are authentic and not merely attributed sayings, tend merely to edification. . . . *Religion is, first and last, metaphysic*, otherworldliness, awareness in a world of which the evidence of the senses merely lights the foreground. It is life in and with the supersensible.[53]

Spengler is arguing that the ostensible teachings of Jesus are irrelevant to European life; i.e., that they were not meant to be used in a way that would act against the self-interest of the ruling Western European elite. He gives examples of passages that in his opinion point to the apolitical (asocial) intent of the Christian teachings. It is the misinterpretaion of these teachings, so as to give them political relevance to the plight of the poor, the oppressed, and the racially despised, that Spengler objects to so vehemently:

> "My kingdom is *not* of this world," and only he who can look into the depths that this flash illumines can comprehend the voices that come out of them. It is the Late, city periods that, no longer capable of seeing into the depths, have turned, the remnants of religiousness upon the external world and replaced religion by humanities, and metaphysics by moralization and social ethics.
>
> In Jesus we have the direct opposite. "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" means: "Fit yourselves to the powers of the fact-world, be patient, suffer, and ask it not whether they are 'just.'" What alone matters is the salvation of the soul, "consider the lilies" means: "Give no heed to riches *and poverty*, for both fetter the soul to cares of this world." "Man cannot serve both God and Mammon"—by Mammon is meant the *whole* of actuality. It is shallow, and it is cowardly, to argue away the grand significance of this demand. Between working for the increase of one's own riches, and working for the social ease of everyone, he would have felt no difference whatever.[53]

It is indeed Spengler's interpretation that is consistent with that of the Roman State, from Constantine onward, and it is this same "potential" within the Christian ideology that has allowed it to be a consistent part of European culture, from that time to the present. But Spengler is needlessly critical. The Christian doctrine has only aided the imperialistic ideal, not hindered its realization. Anyone who has ever, with illusions of altruism, approached the battlefield armed merely with Christian rhetoric did so totally unprepared to do anything but further the objectives of European expansion.

The compatibility of "the Christian way" with the objectives of

the Roman State is argued for by St. Augustine in *The City of God.* This was one of the many "apologies" written in defense of Christianity against its non-Christian critics, as well as the Donatists. Through Augustine the political compatibility of Roman and Christian ideology and, therefore, the "counter-revolutionary" role of the followers of Jesus and Paul are clearly demonstrated. Augustine says that all earthly authority is "approved" by and "issues" from God. He quotes from the scriptures:

> Hear therefore, O ye Kings, and understand, for power is given you of the Lord and "Sovereignty from the Highest."
>
> Wisdom of Solomon vi, 3

> For there is no power, but God; the powers that be ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgement."
>
> Romans xiii, 1-2

Norman Baynes paraphrases the method of Augustine's argument,

> Because rulers are chosen by divine Providence, the servants of Christ are bidden to tolerate even the worst and most vicious of states, and that they can do by realising that on earth they are but pilgrims, and that their home is not here but in heaven.[54]

We must remember that Augustine's purpose is to convince the Church that the Roman State is its proper earthly vehicle, and, by the same token, to assure the politicians that Christianity was not meant to interfere with the State but, in fact, to complement it. In Baynes' words, "St. Paul had urged obedience to the state upon the ground that the state rewards the good and punishes the evil."[55] In Augustine's view, "God" had helped the Romans, for even though they were vain seekers of earthly glory, according to the relative standard of the earthly state, they were good people. And in rewarding them, "God" had in view a further purpose—that the Romans might on their own level be an example and an inspiration to the Christians.

> These things being so, we do not attribute the power of giving kingdom and empires to any save the true God, who gives the happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the pious alone, but gives kingly power on earth both to the pious and the impious, as it may please Him, whose good pleasure is always just. . .

> The same is true in respect of men as well as nations. He who gave power to Marius gave it also to Calus Caesar; He who gave it to Augustus gave it also to Nero; He also who gave it to the most benignant emperors, the Vespasians, father and son, gave it also to the cruel Domitian; and, finally, to avoid the necessity of going over them all, He who gave it to the Christian Constantine gave it also to the apostate Julian, whose gifted mind was deceived by a sacrilegious and detestable curiosity, stimulated by the love of power.[56]

Augustine writes this to Marcellinus:

> Let those who say that the doctrine of Christ is incompatible with the State's wellbeing give us an army such as the doctrine of Christ requires soldiers to be, let them give us subjects, such as husbands and wives, such parents and children, such masters and servants, such Kings, such judges, in fine even such tax-payers and tax-gatherers, as the Christian religion has taught that men should be and then let them dare to say that it is adverse to the State's well-being! Nay rather let them no longer hesitate to confess that this doctrine, if it were obeyed, would be the salvation of the State.[57]

It would be difficult to state the compatibility of these two ideologies more clearly than Augustine has. Niebuhr attempts to absolve Augustine of the implications of these writings. But even he cannot pretend to ignore the imperialistic nature of the Church-State alliance in the Middle Ages which Augustine justified, inspired and helped bring to realization.

> [Augustine identified] the City of God with the historic church, an identification which was later to be stripped of all its Augustinian reservations to become the instrument of the spiritual pride of a universal church in its conflict with the political pride of an empire. This identification had the merit of introducing a religio-political institution into the world which actually placed a check upon the autonomy of nations; but at the price of developing in that institution dangerous similarities to the old Roman Empire, and of establishing the pope as a kind of spiritualized Caesar."[58]

In Augustine's view it is paganism and the "immoralities of the pagan gods" that society must battle. On these grounds as well he justifies the suppression by the state of non-Christian religious practices. With the Church resides the authority to decide what the "true faith" is, which is the duty of the State to protect and defend. At the same time it behooves Christians to obey laws and pay taxes as long as their faith is not violated. ("Render unto Caesar. . . .") Augustine's

Platonic influence is evidenced in his conception of the Church, reminiscent of Plato's conception of the Republic. The Church represents those who are on their way to the celestial city. According to Baynes, "it is the organ and representative in the world of the eternal city of God."[59] And rigid class hierarchy, human exploitation, even slavery become for Augustine embodiments of "justice" in the "world of becoming" through the concept of sin.[60]

The similarity between the developmental roles of Augustine and Constantine are striking but not ethnologically surprising. To Augustine was left the task of "selling" the idea of the Christian-Roman merger, which Constantine had initiated. Constantine had convinced the non-Christian Romans. Augustine had now to convince the "non-political" Christians. He concerned himself with the unification and solidification of the Christian organization and, therefore, devoted much of his attention to the "clarification" of Church doctrine—especially in terms of its political implications and its suppression of dissidents.

Augustine's battle was with the Donatists and other "heretics" within, and with the Manicheanists (who were basically non-European culturally), for these voices represented the political threat of disunity. His task was that of forging a more dogmatic formulation of Christian teachings; it would be taken up again later by Aquinas. His philosophical influence was that of Plato via the neo-Platonists. His inherited ontological "monism" dictated a theory of being that would admit of only one principle—as opposed to the Manicheanites, who said that there were two ultimate principles: good and evil. Augustine's contribution to the orthodoxy and unity of the Church was consonant with his mission to assure its triumph as a political-ideological force, and he is probably most responsible for its early monolithic nature. Of African birth, he contributed to the development of the European empire, the Church, and European imperialism "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." [John: 3-16]

The gentile (pagan) of Jewish nationalism became the heathen (pagan) in its broader archaic Western European form under Christian doctrine. Many of the same criteria for this distinction are found in the new expression. The hypothesis of theological evolution is present in the Jewish formulation, based on the implied goal (i.e., superiority) of belief in and commitment to a god as an abstract principle or "pure spirit," and the accumulation of religious precepts documented in written form. In the Christian expression we begin to see an additional emphasis: the concept of "revelation." "Revealed

religion" begins to be closely associated with the idea of monotheism and its "progressive" nature. The illusion of the "objective truth" of Christian teachings is heightened. The Jews had no problem; they had been born the "chosen people." Christians had to create a criterion for admittance into the brotherhood, with its rhetorical inclusiveness and its pragmatic exclusivity.

Proselytization and Imperialism: "Saving" and "Ruling"

This concept of revelation is of interest both culturally (politically) and philosophically (metaphysically). Traditionally, anthropologists have regarded revealed religion as a characteristic of the state of "civilization." For Tylor, the related characteristic of belief in retribution was a mark that helped to separate the "civilized" from the "primitive." One should have to *deserve* the good ("after") life. This concept has strange ethnological implications. It cannot be interpreted simply as the Christian view of the "religious" or "extraordinary" experience (Eliade's hierogamy). The traditions of other cultures are filled with, often centered around, the transcendent as a category of human experience. Traditionally, one is born into a religion just as one is born into a culture. One's religion is considered a birthright. Culture is indeed the natural context for religious belief.

Christian ideology radically altered this concept and by so doing fashioned a religious statement that was potentially elitist, "intellectual" as opposed to "spiritual-emotional,"[61] and at the same time universal-imperialistic. One is not born a Christian, one must be baptized by the proper authorities. In some sects Jesus must be first accepted as "The Christ" in the hope that the Christian god will reveal himself to the properly pious. This idea is related to the imperialistic nature of Christianity. It is justifiable (and, in fact, an act of piety) for missionaries to proselytize the Christian religion, because, in their view, those whom they seek to convert have no religion, properly so-called.

It is only because of the political implications and related consequences that it seems so "immoral" to Tylor that there is no punishment-reward system associated with the after-life cosmology of many non-European religions. Unless Christianity is able to offer the blessings of "heaven," rather than the tortures of "hell"; unless Christians are able to convince people from other cultures that these are the alternative fates open to them, and that they (the Christians) have the key, then Europeans lose one of the most persuasive tools they have with which to control other peoples. In the words of Rheinhold Niebhur,

> . . . only in a religion of revelation, whose God reveals Himself to man from beyond himself and from beyond the contrast of vitality and form, can man discover the root of sin to be within himself.[62]

And Mbiti, in his discussion of African religions, says that,

> Traditional religions have no missionaries to propagate them, and one individual does not preach his religion to another. . . . Traditional religions are not universal; they are tribal or national. . . the propagation of a religion would involve propagating the entire life of the people.[63]

And Jomo Kenyatta says,

> In Gikuyu religion there is no provision for official priesthood, nor is there any religious preaching. Converting campaigns are, of course, a thing unknown. This is due to the fact that the religion is interwoven with traditions and social customs of the people. Thus all members of the community are automatically considered to have acquired, during their childhood teachings, all that it is necessary to know about religion and custom. The duty of imparting this knowledge to the children is entrusted to the parents, who are looked upon as the official ministers of both religious ethics and social customs.[64]

All religions promote cultural nationalistic expression, and Christianity is only universal in that European cultural nationalism is characterized by universal or international imperialistic ambition. This theme will recur again and again throughout our study. And its recognition is crucial to an understanding of the uniqueness of the European mind and political effectiveness of European cultural imperialistic ideology in the quest for world power. It is a theme that is masked and subtly expressed in the presentation of European culture. The international character of the European political ambition or objective has been continually and tragically (for its "objects") confused with the spurious universalism of European cultural and ideological identification. In many respects, of course, this is precisely the desired effect of such formulations that become part of the armaments of European imperialism. The proselytization of Christianity has perhaps the greatest culturally immobilizing and demoralizing effect on its "objects."

Since its inception, the Church has participated in and supported the European imperialist enterprise. European culture is no different from other cultures in this respect, since the relationship

between religion and nationalism is most certainly a universal cultural fact. No cultural group goes off to war without invoking the names of its national gods, and the reasons for declaring war are usually reformulated on a conscious level in religious terms or most certainly in terms that are consistent with the religiously stated ideology. The nature of this relationship in the European context is only "special" because European imperialism and European nationalism are so unique and intense. The uniqueness and intensity issue from the *asili* of the culture and the *utamaroho* through which it is expressed. But let us briefly trace the nature of the relationship between Christianity and the European imperialist venture.

We have looked at examples taken from the Old Testament which serve as evidence of the way that the religious laws and precepts of the Jews supported and encouraged their militantly nationalistic ideology. This ideology was stated in terms that were to become pivotal in the rhetoric of European cultural imperialism; e.g., the quest for the "universal good of mankind"—a good that, having been realized or at least recognized by Europeans (Jewish, Christian, "civilized," "religious" people), made it incumbent upon them to spread it among and thus "enlighten" (conquer, enslave, control) those less fortunate and "slower" than they ("gentiles," "primitives," "pagans," "heathens"). We have seen how the Christian formulation elaborated and altered the Jewish conception, enlarging it to suit the expanded European *utamaroho* and imperial world ambitions of the European. The Roman State had already conceived of the world-imperialistic objective politically, but Roman religion lagged behind—not yet sophisticated enough to support a world order. We have also seen in what manner the Christian formulation was coopted and used in the Roman pursuit.

My objective is not to argue that the Christian doctrine was consciously formulated for the purposes of European imperialism nor that Constantine was not in fact "a true convert" and came to believe in the Christian god. Speculation on that level is pointless and irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion. The obvious and significant cultural fact is that the Christian and Roman ideologies expressed the same values and political objectives, supported the same activities, and encouraged the same behavior of Europeans toward people of other cultures. The Judaic, Christian, and Roman conceptions constitute separate but culturally related developmental stages in European nationalistic expression. They coalesced in the European cultural *asili*. They meshed to give early definition to the European self-image and *utamaroho*, an *utamaroho* that demanded imperialistic behavior.

The role the Church has played has sometimes been that of the aggressor in a military and political imperialist pursuit. Most often and most successfully, though, it has been the protagonist in the drama of European cultural imperialism. The Church has taken a leading role in cultural aggression, because, of all the facets of European expansion, it has easiest access to non-European peoples and greatest potential for their ideological destruction. Only rarely, and never very effectively nor aggressively, has the Christian Church attempted to act against what it considered to be the excesses of European nationalism and even in these instances, by virtue of its conversionism, the Church still occupies a central position in the European offensive, for as has already been pointed out, European imperialist tendencies may be easily grafted onto Christian ideology.

It remains here to cite only a very few of the instances of the Church's support of the European imperialist venture. During the greater part of the Medieval period, Church and State were barely distinguishable, or more properly speaking, the Church was more powerful than the State, and the term "Christendom" reflected the intimacy of this relationship. The following statement is a characterization of the "Christian holy wars" from a Eurocentric perspective, one of the more obvious varieties of European nationalism.

> During the tenth century, when the Kings of Wessex were winning back the midlands and Northumbria from the heathen Danes, other heroic Kings were saving Christendom from its heathen enemies in the German lands. The Saxon King, Henry the Fowler, drove back the Danes in the north and the fierce Hungarian archers in the east. His grandson, Otto the Great, destroyed a great Hungarian army in 955. These men shared with the men of Wessex the honor of saving Christian Europe. And the defeated heathen were converted to the Christian faith.[65]

Generally, the First Crusade is set in the eleventh century, but the above is obviously a description of an earlier successful "Christian" imperialist campaign. The Crusades were, of course, the primary instrument of Western European expansion during the European Medieval period and at the same time remain an example of the most militaristic and aggressive expressions of the European conquering *utamaroho*. The Church not only condoned these actions in terms such as those in the statement above but was itself the initiator of these campaigns. The following description from William McNeill makes clear the stark reality of the intimate and inextricable relationship between Christian ideology and European expansion-

ism. The religious, military-political, and commercial institutions of the West meshed easily into a united imperialistic endeavor.

> The most spectacular early step in the expansion of Europe was the conquest of the eastern Mediterranean coast as a result of the First Crusade (1096–1099). The Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban II. . .
>
> The motives which impelled the Crusaders to embark on their venture were mixed. Religious enthusiasm, stirred up by the pope and by numerous preachers, played a decisive part. The aim of the Crusade was to free the Holy Land from Moslem rule, and Crusaders were promised absolution from their sins as a consequence of their service to a religious cause. Other motives, of course, were added to religious ones: the spirit of adventure, the hope of carving out new estates and principalities, the diplomacy of the Byzantine emperors who needed military help against the Turks, and, to some (small) extent, the commercial ambitions of a few Italian towns all contributed to the First Crusade. Yet, when due allowance is made for these subsidiary motives, it still seems safe to regard the First Crusade as a striking example of the power of the Church and of Christian ideals to inspire military and political action.[66]

During this period the Church was the spearhead of European expansion, and historically we can view the Crusades as one of the most important military ventures in the expansion of Europe. The internal politics of the Church was itself to become quite "worldly," creating the ironic and embarrassing situation of the "profanation" of European institutionalized religion. It is only reasonable to conclude that the effects of these cultural tendencies were far-reaching and that they have made themselves felt long afterward in the moral decay of the contemporary West. The period of intrapolitical maneuverings and power plays—extreme and sometimes violent competition for the papacy—was perhaps the height of "religious profanity" within European culture, but its legacy remains.

Christianity, colonialism and cultural imperialism: "Heathen," "Native," and "Primitive."

The next period of the involvement of organized religion in European expansion is that of colonization. The justification for the Church's involvement was always couched in terms of conversion. Many European historians identify conversionist sentiment with something they call "humanitarianism," which, in turn, is identified as

the universally altruistic motivation of behavior. Although this may sound contradictory, if understood as a manifestation of European nationalism, such interpretations of "conversionism" become, at least, ethnologically understandable in terms of the cultural *asili*. They represent the hypocritical semantics demanded by the commitment to a view of the culture as superior.

In *The Image of Africa*, Phillip Curtin quotes from proceedings in the British Parliament concerning the question of "aborigines" in 1935-7. The responsibility of the committee dealing with this question was to investigate government policy:

> Native inhabitants or Countries where British Settlements are made, and to the neighboring Tribes, in order to secure to them the due observation of Justice, and the protection of Rights; to promote the spread of Civilization among them; and to lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian religion.[67]

This is an example of what Curtin characterizes as the "humanitarian" concerns of the missionaries for the British Niger Expedition of the 1840s. He identifies "conversionist sentiment" with "Christian humanitarianism":

> [Between 1830 and 1870] The dominant British attitude toward Africa became more conversionist than ever. The Niger Expedition itself was a large-scale public effort to convert barbarians to Western ways. The middle decades of the century represent, indeed, the height of conversionist sentiment.[68]

The missionary interest group argued that "only a previous indoctrination with Christianity and the ways of 'Western Civilization' could prepare them [the Africans] for the impact of European Settlement. Furthermore, in their view, Christianity and civilization were inseparable."[69] "After 1870," says Curtin, "the idea of conversion declined. Humanitarian motives found new manifestations."[68] These examples from Curtin are helpful because they afford us the opportunity of making clear the relationship between what Europeans have termed "humanitarianism" (supposedly characterized by "altruism" and identification with a "universal good") and what I recognize as imperialistic behavior, the epitome, and most visible expression, of European *self*-interest.

The tendency to ignore the political implication of this kind of humanitarianism (so-called) is displayed consistently in Western social theory. In *Race: The History of an Idea in America* Thomas Gossett argues that the idea of the "unity of mankind" is inherent in

Christianity and that it has acted against "racism," which he sees as distinct from and somehow bad as compared with the good intentions of "conversionism."

> Slavery, it has sometimes been argued, was first considered in the colonies as an interim institution designed to convert both Negroes and Indians to Christianity. . . It is interesting, however, that among the colonies of the seventeenth centuries it is the heathenism of the Negroes and Indians, rather than their race, which is emphasized as a basis for their enslavement.[70]

The fine distinction between the connotations of "heathen" and "nigger" may well be interesting to Gossett, but from an African-centered perspective they become one and the same—both denote "objects" of European imperialism. Of the two, the concept of "heathen" is perhaps potentially more debilitating as it is more rapidly adopted by the oppressed herself and incorporated into her own self-image.

There are some few accounts, exceptional and difficult to find, which do not get trapped between Christian ideology and European imperialism. Let us take time to quote from a few of these, which together give a much more accurate picture of the historical relationship between the Christian Church and some of the more base manifestations of European nationalism.

Katherine George entertains a discussion of what she calls "ethnocentricism" as manifested in descriptions by Europeans of Africans written between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. To be more precise she is offering evidence of "Eurocentrism"; more accurately we might call it "Western European nationalism," which translates into a "culturalism" and, of course, "white racism." Her research affords us an excellent example of the supportive relationship of Christian ideology to the invidious comparisons fundamental to European cultural nationalism. The image of European peoples that Christianity presents has provided ideological support for the European's view of himself in relation to those who are not within his cultural group. This image is also essential to the Christian argument; it was upon this supposition of the moral and therefore "evolutionary" inferiority of all other people that the proselytizing mission was founded, a mission that provided moral justification for the expansionist mission of Western European imperialism. The author of the following statement was endeavoring to justify the Portugese slave trade:

> And so their lot was now quite contrary of what it had been; since before they had lived in perdition of soul and body; of their souls, in that they were pagans, without the clearness and the light of holy faith; and of their bodies, in that they lived like beasts, without any custom of reasonable beings—for they had no knowledge of bread or wine, and they were without the covering of clothes, or the lodgement of houses; and worse than all, through the great ignorance that was in them, in that they had no understanding of good, but only knew how to live in a bestial sloth.[71]

Of the above statement, Katherine George says:

> . . . Christianity did not eliminate older hierarchies based on race, nationality, class or occupational status, but it rather collaborated with such hierarchies and more frequently than not strengthened instead of weakening them—though it did introduce the complicating idea of a possible restatement of human relations in the society of another world. The availability of salvation to all properly indoctrinated souls alike, despite bodily inequalities—we find this gift of Christianity in the previously cited passage. But does it lessen the writer's prejudice? To the contrary. It enables him instead to commend actions (the kidnapping of helpless people) as morally virtuous, actions which to classical observers would have seemed merely expedient.[71]

To Serve The Devil is a two-volume work that documents American behavior and attitude—toward primary peoples. Here, an advocate of Hawaiian colonization writes on the mutually beneficial relationship between the American commercial interests and those of the missionaries in Hawaii:

> Christianity civilizes in the broadest sense. Commerce, industry, science and literature all accompany her majestic march to universal dominion. Thus, while it denies the suffiency of commerce alone to transform the savage, it encourages a legitimate commerce and even courts its alliance as one of the most important instrumentalities.[72]

In contradiction to Gossett's analysis, the authors of *To Serve The Devil,* Paul Jacobs et al., comment,

> . . . the destruction of the Indians was written into the first chapter of the successful white colonization in America. The pure ideals of Christianity were easily molded into a racist ideology that matched the economic and social needs of expanding settlers.[73]

The fact is that almost from its inception the continuous venture of European expansion ensued not only with the blessings of the Church but, where necessary, by its decree. In the early fifteenth century Pope Edward IV issued a papal bull "granting to the Crown of Portugal all the countries which the Portuguese should discover from Cape Non to India," to accommodate the "discoveries" of Prince Henry the Navigator, on the African Coast. After Columbus' "discovery," according to William Howitt, "His sponsoring Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, lost no time in applying for a similar grant. Alexander VI, a Spaniard, was equally generous with his predecessor, and accordingly divided the world between the Spaniards and Portuguese."[74] The Pope as earthly representation of Jesus Christ was supposed to have a right of dominion over the entire earth. Alexander VI, an infamous pontiff, was determined to stay in Ferdinand's good graces in order to ensure his own protection and accumulation of wealth. Anxious, therefore, to gratify Ferdinand and Isabella, he granted "full rights" to them to all the countries inhabited by "infidels" that they had discovered or would discover.

As the Pope's dominion was held to be worldwide, he had authority over vast regions he had never even heard of. To prevent this grant to Spain from interfering with lands already "given" to Portugal by a previous bull (issued by Pope Edward IV), he proclaimed that an invisible line existed from pole to pole, one hundred leagues west of the Azores, separating the two territories. Everything to the east of the line of demarcation he bestowed upon the Portuguese; all to the west of it went to the Spaniards. His motivation was supposedly his enthusiasm for the propagation of the Christian faith. In this way the Church divided up the world between two European powers.

The apologists for the Church cite the public emancipation of *two slaves* by Pope Gregory "the Great" as evidence of the Church's official position against slavery. This interpretation is very much out of tune with the historical/political reality. Chapman Cohen, in a work published in 1931, says:

> Not only were there thousands of unfreed slaves in the possession of ecclesiastics even a thousand years after Gregory had published this "death warrant" to servitude, but Gregory in person possessed at least hundreds, and perhaps thousands of slaves whom he did not free. Again, as Pope, he was trustee for the possession of thousands more, chattels of the Roman Church; yet he initiated no general papal movement for the liberation of Church serfs. On the contrary, ecclesiastical laws constantly opposed such a policy. . . .[75]

The English slave trade, like that of other European nations, was launched with the blessings of the Church. It is ironic but not contradictory that the first English slaver was named "Jesus" and that the first two rules Captain John Hawkins imposed on his crew were, to serve God daily, and to love one another. "The piety of the expedition," says Cohen bitingly, "was beyond reproach."[76]

There is no doubt that the Christian community gave its blessings to the slaving venture, participated in it and contributed to its success by embracing it within Western "morality." W. E. B. DuBois brings home this point when he says, in reference to West Africa, "Protestants of England, the Huguenots of France, and the Calvinists of Holland started mortal struggle for Guinea."[77]

Another valuable work, exceptional in European scholarship, is E. D. Morel's *The Black Man's Burden*, written in 1920. Here he comments on and offers a first-hand account of a slave raid by Europeans.

> The African was a heathen, and as such fair game for the prowess of the noble Christian Knights who opposed their steel breastplates, tempered swords and cross-bows, to his bare chest and primitive spear. Here is a typical account of one of these predatory forays:
>
> Then might you see mothers forsaking their children and husbands their wives, each striving to escape as best he could. Some drowned themselves in the water, others thought to escape by hiding under their huts; others stowed their children among the sea-weed, where our men found them afterwards, hoping they would escape notice. . . . And at last our Lord God, who giveth a reward for every good deed, willed that for the toil they had undergone in His service they should that day obtain victory over their enemies, as well as a guerdon and a payment for all their labour and expense; for they took captive of those Moors, what with men, women and children, 165, besides those that perished and were killed. And when the battle was over, all praised God for the great mercy He had shown them, in that He had willed to give them such victory, and with so little damage to themselves. They were all very joyful, praising loudly the Lord God for that He deigned to give such help to such a handful of His Christian people. [According to Morel, this comes from Portuguese chronicles.]
>
> Thus did Europe first bring the "glad tidings" to the African. It did not take long to ascertain that the spiritual consolation derived from converting the African to Christianity had its utilitarian counterpart.[78]

The contemporary European imperialistic endeavor, contrary to its projected image, is understood by its perpetrators precisely in the same terms as the Crusades and the subsequent period of colonizing ventures. The following is the text of a prayer for the American Special Forces in South East Asia:

> Almighty God, who art the Author of liberty and the Champion of the oppressed, hear our prayer-
> We, the men of Special Forces, acknowledge our dependence upon Thee in the preservation of human freedom—
> Go with us as we seek to defend the defenseless and to free the enslaved—
> May we ever remember that our nation, whose motto is "In God We Trust,"
> expects that we shall acquit ourselves with honor, that we may never
> bring shame upon our faith, our families, or our fellow men—
> Grant us wisdom from Thy mind, courage from Thine heart, strength from Thine arm, and protection by thine hand —
> It is for Thee that we do battle, and to Thee belongs the victor's crown.
> For Thine is the Kingdom, and the power and the glory, forever, Amen.[79]

From its inception Christian ideology has traditionally condoned and often mandated violent aggression and brutality on the part of the European. The members of the Special Forces are simply taking direction from the Bible.

> Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass. . .
>
> And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it [the City] into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword. But the women and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, thou shalt take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies which the Lord thy God hath given thee. . . of the cities of these people which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth.[80]

The European's invocation of his god to aid him in his imperialistic pursuits is consistent with his self-image and his image of those who are not like him. His "religion" itself is an expression of these dialectical images.

Of the historical relationship between Christianity and the enslavement of people of color by Europeans, Cohen says:

> (But) we have another slave system to deal with. This took its rise in Christian times. It was created by Christians, it was continued by Christians, it was in some respects more barbarous than anything the world had yet seen, and its worst features were to be witnessed in countries that were most ostentatious in their parade of Christianity. It is this that provides the final and unanswerable indictment of the Christian Church.[81]

Cohen, in contrast to Curtin, Gossett, Kovel (*White Racism: A Psychohistory*), and others, has correctly assessed the meaning of the Christian ideal of "the brotherhood of man":

> Its brotherhood of man never meant, even in theory, more than a brotherhood of believers, and in practice it did not always mean that. It recognized duties and obligations between members of the same church or sect, but outside these boundaries it applied a different code of ethics. What kind of brotherhood did Christians bestow on Jews and heretics for hundreds of years? Christians in their heyday of power would have looked with amazement on anyone who claimed consideration for either. What kind of brotherly attention did the inhabitants of ancient Mexico and Peru receive from the Christian conquerors? How fared the Redskins of North America, the Maoris of New Zealand, or inhabitants of Africa at the hands of their Christian brothers? In practice nearly always, and in theory often, Christians have shown that their doctrine of brotherhood meant little more than the mere brotherhood of a gang. Within the gang rules must be observed. Outside the gang they might be broken with impunity.[82]

The costly political error of non-Europen converts has been to think that they would ever be included in the European "Christian brotherhood" in the same way they were part of their own cultures.

Chinweizu admonishes us to "recall that European rule was entrenched in Africa by means of a Western Christian culture, a western political power structure, and a colonial economy."[83] The "holy alliance" left a defeated Africa in its wake,

> Because white missionaries of Christ working in Buganda clamored that their losing efforts to recruit black souls for the heaven of their white god needed to be protected by white troops, and because the British masters of Egypt were demanding that all of the Nile valley should be placed under British rule, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) was in 1890 granted authority by England to trade in and administer the territory of the headwaters of the Nile. The invading captains of the IBEA, in their quest for trading monopolies, attacked the sovereignties of the African Kingdoms of the upper Nile.[84]

As we have noted earlier, and Chinweizu agrees, the wide-scale destruction of African sovereignty necessitated the simultaneous destruction of an African consciousness. Here European Christianity had a unique advantage.

> To buttress and crown their creation, the founders of the colonial order embarked on a cultural reorganization of Africa. If the African auxiliaries of empire were to be docile and loyal servants, their allegiance to Africa had to be undermined. Total admiration for Europe had to be instilled into them. Besides the technical skills they would need to carry out their practical duties to the employers, they were to be taught Christian values of a servile-making sort. Unquestioning obedience to white men was presented as a cardinal virtue. The retooling of their minds and values was entrusted to the schools. Whether run by missionaries hunting for black converts for their white heavens, or run by colonial bureaucrats, these imperialist schools not only taught reading, writing and arithmetic to their inmates, they also stuffed the heads of their victims with church devotional hymns, filled their psyches with submissive Christian attitudes, and undermined their attachment to the culture of their ancestors. These schools inculcated in their wards a Christian theology and cosmology, and a western individualist ethos that weakened their African identity, destroyed their commitment to an African communalist ethos, and erased their sense of patriotic responsibility to Africa.[85]

The Christians had no compunctions about destroying indigenous religious movements not to their liking. They had done it before in Europe. Their creed was, after all, one of violent proselytization when called for. Chinweizu cites examples in Africa such as the burning of Bwiti chapels in Gabon, where this syncretistic religious movement was seen as a possible nurturing ground for African nationalism. Chinweizu comments that "especially at the beginning of the colonial era, the church was an arm of colonial destruction of African organi-

zations and movements."[86]

These passages reflect the direct and very political relationship between the European Church and European imperialism. It is a relationship between "brothers." Ironically it is the subtle aspects of this relationship that have proven to be much more devastating in the long run to indigenous forms wherever the expansionist West has sought to exercise its control.

The phenomenon of cultural imperialism, if it is to be distinguished from its strictly militaristic, political, and economic components, is that which strikes the "death blow" at a people's ability to resist aggression. There has never been, in the history of the human race, more expert dealers of that blow than Europeans. They alone have realized the full strategic potential of destroying the ideological life of a cultural entity. Christian ideology is an ideally fashioned weapon for the destruction of the self-image and value-system of African and other non-European peoples. With its delusionary rhetoric of "love" and "peace," its debilitating image of the non-white (non-European, "backward," "heathen"), and its false "universality," it has succeeded where guns never could in tearing people from the cultural base necessary for the formulation of an effective self-deterministic ideology. A Christian with a gun in the armed forces is one thing—he might end up with a spear in his back; but a missionary with a Bible and a well-meaning smile who speaks of "eternal love" is wholly different. It takes a great deal of political sophistication to recognize *him* as a potential menace.

> Disease played a major role in killing off the Hawaiians, especially venereal diseases. Measles and cholera swept through the population and alcoholism weakened the islanders so badly that they often succumbed to the common cold. But more important was the psychological sickness that struck the islanders as their culture and religion disappeared. "Nkanaka okuu wale aku no I kau uhane." ("The people dismissed freely their souls and died.")[87]

Christianity and European Paganism:

So as not to ignore a relevant stage of European development, we ask: What is the relationship between European Christianity and European "paganism" (a term that implies the Eurocentric and Christian perspective)? In the attempt to understand the *asili* of European cultural development, this aspect of European religious

tradition cannot be overlooked. I have focused on the institutionalization of religion in the form of the Christian Church because of the way in which it expresses the underlying ideology or mythoform of the culture. But for a moment let us take a brief look at non-Christian Europe.

"Violence and battle were always at hand in the lives of men of the heathen period in northwestern Europe."[88] This statement by H.R. Ellis Davidson allows us to glance at the warrior gods of Northern Europe: Wodan (Odin), Tiwas (Mars), Mercury, Tyr, and Indra of Aryan India. There are others, but the pattern is clear. War, the warrior, and violence were worshipped among these Indo-European antecedents of the present day Europeans. Odin—a warrior himself—held to be the divine ancestor of the Swedes and most of the Anglo-Saxon kings, rewarded those who served him and who died in battle with weapons, immunity against wounds, and a place in glorious Valhalla, the famous "warrior heaven." The beliefs of these "ancient Northmen" and women were a testimony to the glorification of war. Davidson quotes from Saxo Grammaticus, who in turn quotes a speech of the warrior Biarki,

> War springs from the nobly born; famous pedigrees are the makers of war. For the perilous deeds which chiefs attempt are not to be done by the ventures of common men. . . . No dim and lowly race, no low-born dead, no base souls are Pluto's prey, but he weaves the dooms of the mighty, and fills Phlegthon with noble shapes."[89]

The style of battle was very individualistic, emphasizing single combat. Confidence in one's war god gave psychological advantage akin to "possession."[90] In Davidson's words,

> Throughout the heathen period in northern Europe there was clear need of a god of war. The story of the Germanic peoples and the Vikings is one in which local battles, feuds, invasions, and wars of a national scale are the order of the day. The heroic literature is based on an unsettled society, accustomed to violence and shortness of life. . . . Clearly men reared in such a world were bound to turn to the god whom they served to protect them in the hour of battle. . . .[91]

The violence in this early European religion did not only express itself in terms of war and the killings of enemies but also through the enactment of bloody ritual sacrifice to the warrior god as well.

> In the earlier days of Germanic heathenism the terrible wholesale slaughter of captured forces and criminals implies a belief in a god of battles who demanded that blood should flow in his honour. Blood had to be constantly provided for the mighty deity, or else he would be compelled by his nature to seize on the lives of worshippers.[91]

Among the Heruli, worshippers of Odin (Wodin) practiced a ritual in which human beings were first stabbed and then burned.[92] Such practices were common among the warlike Indo-European tribes.

In spite of variations of detail in the many myths of these tribes, Georges Dumezil finds a consistency in what he calls the underlying "ideological datum" that explains the various myths. This is a crucial point, for it affirms and justifies the methodology and theoretical premise of this study. Dumezil's recognition of a common ideological base shared by Indo-European peoples also argues for a vital relationship of continuity between the consciousness of contemporary Europeans and their forbears of the classical and prehistoric periods. The "ideological datum" of which Dumezil speaks, in his book *The Destiny of The Warrior*, is related to Armstrong's concept of "mythoform." Is there a relationship between the mythoform of "pagan" and Christian Europe?

Dumezil points to the parallels in Roman and Aryan-Indian religions: between Indra and Tullus; Varuna and Mitra; Romulus and Numa. Of the beliefs, he says,

> What the Indian and Roman thinkers have maintained in clearest form are: (1) the idea of a necessary victory, a victory in a single combat in which, inspired by the grand master of the warrior function (either king or god) and for his sake, "a third hero triumphs over a triple adversary"—with stain implicit in the exploit, and with a purification of the "third" and of the society which he represents, so that he finds himself to be the specialist, the agent, and the instrument of this purification, a sort of scapegoat after having been a champion; (2) the idea of a victory brought off not by combat but by a surprise which follows upon a betrayal, betrayal and surprise succeeding one another under the pretext and within the context of a solemn agreement of friendship, with the result that the surprise act of revenge includes a disquieting note.[93]

Suppose we use this schema to interpret the crucifixion of Jesus and Judas' betrayal of him? Dumezil speaks of the "collective memory" of the Indo-European and of the moral and political doctrine that constituted their "moral conscience."[94]

But how then can we account for the supposed hiatus between Christian Europe and its pagan origins? Only to Christians does the appearance of "god" in human form explain this evolution. In what terms do Europeans usually express the difference/relationship? They do so always in terms of the dichotomy of European nationalism/chauvinism. Yes, even with regard to their own predecessors/ancestors. Davidson says: "Northern heathenism, that is, the pre-Christian beliefs of the Germanic peoples and the Scandinavians, came to an end in the eleventh century." In the nineth and tenth centuries we know that the Vikings were a great power, but, in Davidson's words, they were "a menace to Christian civilization."[95]

Christianity is associated with "civilization"; non-Christian religion is called "heathen" or "pagan," but very rarely, even in scholarly writing, are these latter terms defined. "Pagan" is, in some cases, simply used to mean "non-Christian," but looking to the dictionary, the ideological uses of these terms become explicit. The term "heathen" has the following uses:

> 1. an irreligious or unenlightened person; 2. an unconverted individual of a people that do not acknowledge the God of the Bible; one who is neither a Jew, Christian, nor Muslim; pagan; 3. (Formerly) any person neither Christian nor Jewish, esp. a member of the Islamic faith or a polytheistic religion.[96]

For the word "pagan" we find:

> 1. one of a people or community professing a polytheistic religion as the ancient Romans, Greeks, etc.; 2. a person who is not a Christian, Jew or Muslim; 3. an irreligious or hedonistic person.[97]

The Latin *pagus* means village or rural district, and so "pagan" has the derogatory sense of "peasant" or a person of the countryside. As we, in contemporary parlance, might say "bumpkin" or "hick," indicating one who lacks the "sophistication" of the cities.

"Christian," "heathen," and "pagan," therefore, do not merely represent religious differentiation. They indicate ideological differences, differences in world-view. They are culturalist terms defined from a Eurocentric or Arab nationalist perspective. European Christians consider Jews to be religious, even though they may disagree bitterly with them as to the nature of historical truth. (There is some ambivalence concerning Muslims, who are not considered "heathens," but who once were. They pose a cultural embarrassment since it was Muslim scholarship that "rescued" European civilization

from the "dark ages.") Why are the Europeans so hard on their so-called "pagans" and "polytheistic" forbears?

What, in the European context, represents the proper form of a religious statement is intimately involved with their concept of "civilization" or, as Europeans see it, the "civilizing" process. These ideas cannot be understood without reference to the two basic concepts of European ideology: evolution and progress.

One of the reasons that the terms "heathen" and "pagan" hold such reproach and are so derogatory from a Eurocentric perspective is that initially it was the European "past" to which they referred. Nothing requires defeat so much as the past in the logic of the European mythoform. It is the non-European in the contemporary world who becomes associated with the past in the European mind. (The anthropologists studied the "past," which meant non-Euro-Caucasians.) But we must remember that Europeans still practiced what in Christian parlance were "pagan" religions until the eleventh century. This means that these "backward" peoples were actually both within and outside the culture simultaneously. "Heretics" were culturally acceptable (though dangerous). "Pagans" were not. In this critical period of transition there could be no equivocation concerning the correct path toward progress; the shape of the new national culture.

This "paganism" did not die easily. Christians have always been willing to fight bloody battles and wars to "convert" others to their way of thinking, even their own people. Perhaps the threat of those who dared to persist in the religions into which they had been born issued from the fear that Christianity might not triumph as the ideological champion of the "new" European. Imagine the anxiety that this caused for those who were convinced of the necessity of "progress!"

An African-centered perspective forces us to look more closely at this history, this cultural development. We must make sense of it. Using the concept of *asili*, seemingly complex "paranoid" behavior on the part of the European becomes crystal clear and makes "sense," unfolding from the logic of European development. Why should a people who were non-Christians and who were slaughtering Christians become Christians themselves and begin to slaughter their brothers and sisters in order to make them so? What is the connection between this new religion and the ethos of the religions practiced by early and "backward" Europeans?

The concept of *asili* tells us to look for consistency; the consistency for which we search lies within the explanatory and generating

principle of European development. Europeans have always been involved in an unrelenting quest for power, political hegemony, expansion, and technical control. As this drive to conquer developed more intensely, the parameters of the conquering self and of the territory (world) to be conquered expanded. Constantine had ingeniously perceived the effectiveness of institutionalized Christianity as a supportive mechanism for the cohesion of the Empire. Later, Christianity would be fashioned as the appropriate vehicle for a much more expanded concept of imperialism, one which required a more refined concept of progress, and more importantly, *a more cohesive, and at the same time, expanded identification of the conquering culture: Europe.*

Davidson says, "Since they themselves [the 'heathens'] had no desire to make converts, they were at a serious disadvantage, and it was only a matter of time before the new religion replaced the old."[98] Whether knowingly or not, she is pointing to a *political* and *ideological* disadvantage. Conversely she hits on the political and ideological advantage enjoyed by Christians. "Pagans" do not seek converts. These "pagan" Europeans may have been "barbarian heathens," conquering others and even expanding their territories, but *they had not used their religions to do so.* The posture of their religions had not been imperialistic. It was not outer-directed. They had not understood the political uses of religion. (Africans and most other non-Europeans still do not. Arabs are the only non-Europeans to have used religion in this way.) Proselytization is inherently imperialistic; perfectly suited to supporting an expansionistic *utamaroho*. Now we can begin to understand in what sense "paganism" was "backward" from a Eurocentric perspective.

There are other dynamics to this phenomenon; other pieces to the puzzle of why Christianity and not paganism. Pagan Indo-European culture was violent, aggressive, xenophobic, and individualistic. Its religion called for the sacrifice of human blood, as did many religions. Is the answer then that Christianity was more suited to the European *utamaroho* because the Europeans became more peaceful, loving, and communalistic? That answer is illogical, for Europe has never been characterized by those values. To the contrary, European Christian behavior is equally xenophobic—in spite of its rhetorical xenophilia—and embraces war and violence in the name of the Christian god. In later periods it envelops the individualistic ethic of capitalist-materialism. And, what is more, it demanded human sacrifice!

But there *is* certainly a difference between European Christianity and European Paganism. The *utamaroho* of Pagan Indo-European cul-

ture is the same. The formal structures through which it is expressed are different in much the same way as European peasant culture and archaic European culture are different from the cosmopolitan culture of the European "multinational." It is a question of "sophistication," but not to indicate valued behavior in any universally valid sense. "Sophistication" refers to the hypocrisy that began to develop within the bowels of European culture. It was a matter of pragmatism and efficiency. Christianity was a more refined tool for the selling of European imperialism.

There are certain traits that have made for the success of European civilization in its quest for supreme dominance and control of others. It is a culture based on an ideology of superficial change. This allows its hegemony to expand while being maintained. If what can be called "modal changes" do not occur at strategic historical points, the objective of total domination will fail. The Platonic epistemological mode (*utamawazo*) put archaic European culture on the right track, as it were, towards successful imperialistic expansion by establishing the intellectual confines of that ideology. The aggressive *utamaroho* was already in place. It had to be harnessed for efficient performance. Herein lies the genius of Europe!

What classical Greece had achieved on the intellectual level, classical Rome must achieve politically. "Paganism" didn't fit. It was as simple as that. As the imperialistic goals of these fledgeling Europeans expanded, the various modalities of the cultural structure grew out of sync with one another. If they had not been reshaped, readjusted so as to form a cohesive unit, Europe would have failed—just another culture living peacefully in a culturally pluralistic universe. Unfortunately for the rest of us, it didn't. At least not at this juncture. (Medieval Europe represents a long period of dormancy; a loss of momentum, perhaps even intellectual ambivalence as far as the ideology of progress and change are concerned. But subsequently the culture regrouped itself and catapulted once again on to the road towards world domination through technological advance.) The Protestant revolution and the rise of capitalism represent the necessary creative responses at other such junctures in European history. The cooptation of Christianity was such a response in A.D. 312. Constantine was the shrewd strategist in question. And it worked.

Violence, aggression, and xenophobia could no longer be expressed in the form of European paganism if these nascent Europeans were to further develop their empire. The *utamaroho* was consistent. It still demanded control, aggression, and human sacrifice. But the *vision* was changing: the vision of what was possible and in

turn, what was necessary. *A more expanded vision required a more sophisticated technique.* This had been the immutable law of European development.

The European institutionalization of Christianity was something akin to a technological advance. It added the element of proselytization that more suited the objective of imperialistic expansionism within which those objectives could be hidden or camouflaged. Xenophobic, aggressive, and violent tendencies were molded into a more subtle statement that packaged them in a universalistic, peaceful, and moralistic rhetoric. In other words, "barbarian" Indo-European pagan religion became more "modern" in Christian formulation, more suited to the new demands of European "progress," progress clearly referring to ever greater efficiency of the mechanism for total control. European civilization can be understood as nothing more than the most efficient mechanism for that end.

As always, the *utamaroho* remains the same. That is the consistent, unchanging factor. The ideology is informed by the *utamaroho*, but must develop as the vision grows. For the *utamaroho,* is expansionistic; always seeking a larger space in which to be housed, a large "turf" to control. This brings us to a second aspect of the European political genius. *As the vision grows, so must the national consciousness.* This is critical, for the nature of the *utamaroho* requires an expanded definition of the self. We are talking about the growth of political consciousness. This is why cultural and political behavior can only superficially be separated. They are united in ideology. Political behavior on a national level requires the definition of the interest of the nation *vis-à-vis* other nations. The definition of the interest requires a national consciousness. Culture creates that consciousness through its ideological function.

In early European or Indo-European history we witness violent tribes or hordes whose lives were ordered by war. True, they tended to move at various points, on the more peacefully oriented, less aggressive peoples, generally of the south. After this southern invasion, when their *utamaroho* was implanted into the Mediterranean, what then? *They continued to move against each other!* Rome was eventually overtaken by these Germanic peoples. The culture went through periods of uncertain development, instability, and insecurity. Clearly, if the European hegemony was to be achieved this penchant for violent behavior must be turned towards "others." Christianity helped to define who the "others" were in a way that fitted the European progress ideology. Making a Roman, a Briton, a Frank, and so forth into a "European" would not be easy, but it was the order of

the day in terms of the logic of European development. First, orthodox Christianity provided the perfect structure within which the (sublimated) statement of aggression, even human sacrifice, and imperialistic ideology could be meshed; and lastly, it provided the perfect structure for the forging of a European consciousness that could carry out this vision of a European-dominated world.

Christianity achieved the unification of the new European self. It acted as a unifying element as it housed and solidified the nascent European *utamaroho,* one inherited from a northern, "heathen" past. It helped to redefine European nationalism as universal imperialism. (This is why the Jewish statement was insufficient.) European civilization has been so successful in part because of its ability to outer-direct hostility, another example of political genius. When this ability is hindered, the survival of the culture is threatened. The destructive tendencies within are so intense and so endemic to the culture that they must continually be redirected. The cooptation of Christianity represented such a redirection of aggressive energy.

Now the difference and relationship between European paganism and European Christianism can be placed in its proper context. Pagan religions were aggressive but not expansionist. They did not have this vision, and they were too separatist to be successfully imperialistic. Christianism took the concept of human blood sacrifice and raised it to the pinnacle of religiousity by sacralizing it in the symbol of Jesus; this acted as a sanction against the killing of other Christians. They then legitimized its actual practice by superficially (ideologically) dehumanizing non-Christian non-Europeans and then sacrificing them to their god.

But this change would not take place overnight and, as we have seen, well into the eleventh century, the more "sophisticated" Europeans, who had incorporated the vision of European hegemony and now identified as Europeans, would fight and kill their more "backward" brothers. First, Celts, Goths, Druids, Teutons, Angles, Saxons, etc., then finally and fiercely, the Vikings, who would wage constant battle to protect their national identities, as they defined them, unwilling to accept this new "European" consciousness, a consciousness that Saint-Simon would still be seeking to solidify in the early part of the nineteenth century. The identity of this long period of internecine wars can be understood then, not as the battle of the enlightened and the "civilized" against the unenlightened barbarians, but as a stage in the struggle to institute and consolidate a new imperial order.

Patriarchy in the Development of European Religion

Indo-European pagan culture did however contribute characteristics to European Judeo-Christian ideology. Although it is possible to identify practices of male dominance in most societies of the world, patriarchy, as an institutionalized value, as an intrinsic characteristic of *utamaroho* can be associated with Indo-European origins of Western civilization. One of the aspects of cultural development that demonstrates this most clearly is religion.

In the ancient religious traditions of Africa and other parts of the world, we find again and again the predominance of the mother goddess; the valorization of the female principle, the earth symbol. These traditions were well-developed before it was possible to speak of a "Western" or "Western European" peoples. The older, more "Southern" civilizations can be generalized into one cultural or ideological model in contrast to the younger and more aggressive Northern groups comprising what has been called the "Tumuli" civilization, associated culturally with the Indo-European and racially as the Aryans. It is this latter group with which we are concerned as they represent the cultural/racial forbears—the ancestors—of what we now call "Europe." These people came from "the regions North of the Black Sea, between the Carpathians, and the Caucasians," according to Mircea Eliade.[99]

A brief statement of Cheikh Anta Diop's "Two Cradle" theory of the origins of Civilization, will help to initiate our consideration of the theme of patriarchy in European religion. Diop's concern in his book *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* is with "the Domains of Patriarchy and Matriarchy in Classical Antiquity." For him these types of social order correspond to two contrasting "cradles" of civilization. These two cradles are areas of origin for two different kinds of civilization that reflect two different world-views and corresponding lifestyles. The differences between these two places of origin seem to originate in ecology, according to Diop's explanation.

The environment of the Northern Cradle was harsh, cold, and relatively infertile, lacking in opportunities for agriculture. Adaptation to this environment produced a series of cultural/social characteristics, among them aggressiveness, individualism, the predominance of meat in the diet, and monogamy. There were other characteristics, but they will be discussed more thoroughly, along with a deeper elaboration of Diop's theory in subsequent chapters. It is interesting to note, however, that Diop is arguing against Eurocentric interpretations of Bachofen, Morgan, and Engels concerning the origins of "mother-right" and polygyny.

Our focus here is on religion, and, according to Diop, the nomadic and transcient nature of the lifestyle of the ancient Indo-European had some interesting effects:

> In this existence which was reduced to a series of perpetual migrations, the economic role of the woman was reduced to a strict minimum; she was only a burden that the man dragged behind him. Outside her function of child-bearing, her role in nomadic society is nil. It is from these considerations that a new explanation may be sought to account for the lot of the woman in Indo-European society.[100]

This devaluation of the female role was incorporated into their religious practices. Among the nomads, who had no permanent residence, cremation took presidence over burial, and fire, which gave much needed warmth in a land with little direct or close sunlight, was "worshipped." Fire rituals can still be witnessed in some European communities. (See James Frazier's, *The Golden Bough*, New York: Mentor, 1964.) By contrast, according to Diop's theory, in the "Southern Cradle" the earth takes prominence as agricultural activity and fertility abound. The population is more peaceful, secure, and sedentary. Women play a critical part in the economy and in subsistence. The female principle is the foundation of the cosmological conceptions.

Mircea Eliade, in his work *A History of Religious Ideas*, Vol. I, identifies these warlike Aryans as the "Proto Indo-Europeans" and the "Indo-Europeans." These are the people of Diop's "Northern cradle." Eliade identifies them as the initiators of a destructive period of invasions into the Southern regions between 2300 and 1200 years before the Christian Era. This is part of what he calls the process of "Indo-Europeanization," which had an effect on the religious ideas and practices of the areas into which these people expanded. Eliade is concerned with delineating and understanding these effects.

In terms of an African-centered analysis, the process Eliade identified is part of the historically continuous process of European imperialistic expansion. This "Indo-Europeanization" of which Eliade speaks is the earliest expression of the European *utamaroho*. Eliade says,

> This characteristic process—migration, conquest of new territories, submission of inhabitants, followed by their assimilation—did not end until the nineteenth century of our era. Such an example of linguistic and cultural expansion is otherwise unknown.[101]

If we accept Eliade's statement as accurate, it would seem that as social scientists and historians, we should be curious as to the reason for the peculiar intensity of this phenomenon. What accounts for this atypical behavior and for its "success?"

According to Eliade, the Tumuli (Kurgan) culture developed between the fifth and third millenia and expanded westward about 4000 B.C.E. They then proceeded to "make their way into Central Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, Transcaucasia, Anatolia, and Northern Iran (ca. 3500–3000 B.C.); in the third millenium they reached northern Europe, the Aegean Zone (Greece and the Coasts of Anatolia), and the Mediterranean." These, he says were the Proto Indo-Europeans. This developing Indo-European culture was influenced by the more developed civilizations of Africa (the "Near East" is a misnomer) and the East.[102] They practiced agriculture, but "preferred to develop a pastoral economy." Eliade's explanation, contrary to Diop's, would imply that there was something other than ecological necessity that determined this predilection for the nomadic lifestyle, but he doesn't say what that factor might be. "Pastoral nomadism, the patriarchal structure of the family, a proclivity for raids, and a military organization designed for conquest are characteristic features of Indo-European societies."[102]

Eliade is interested in determining the relationship between a lifestyle of pastoral nomadism, war, and conquest, on the one hand, and the "emergence of specific religious values," on the other. He makes an attempt to reconstruct themes of a common Indo-European religion. He suggests the idea of celestial sacredness, light and height or elevation; the idea of creativity in its immediate meaning, the idea of sovereignty, the sky-god as supreme father, and that fire kindled by lightning is celestial in origin. "The cult of fire is a characteristic element of the Indo-European religions." Whereas, "Mother Earth as a religious concept is recent among this group." "The Aryans had no cities and knew nothing of writing. . . . Iron began to be used only about 1050 B.C."[103]

Rosemary Ruether goes even further in her analysis and identifies patriarchal tendencies in European religion with monotheism:

> It is possible that the social origins of male monotheism lie in nomadic herding societies. These cultures lacked the female gardening role and tended to image God as the Sky-Father. Nomadic religions were characterized by exclusivism and an aggressive, hostile relationship to the agricultural people of the land and their religion.[104]

While her analysis echoes those of Diop and Eliade in many ways, in neither of the other two theories do we see this connection between what for us are critical and characteristic aspects of European Christianity: patriarchy and monotheism. Clearly, monotheism is related to the monarch and monolith, to forms of power. Who is the monarch? Certainly the European answer would be that the monarch must be male.

In Ruether's view:

> Male monotheism becomes the vehicle of a psychocultural revolution of the male ruling class in its relationship to surrounding reality. Whereas ancient myth had seen the Gods and Goddesses as within the matrix of one physical-spiritual reality, male monotheism begins to split reality into a dualism of transcendent spirit (mind, ego) and inferior and dependent physical nature.[105]

Ruether points to one of the characteristics of the European *utamawazo* (which we discussed in Chap. 1): the tendency to "split" reality into valued and devalued categories, which are dictated by an *utamaroho* that must relate to phenomena as either the superior self or inferior other, so as to justify conquest and control.

> The male is seen essentially as the image of the male transcendent ego or God, woman is seen as the image of the lower, material nature. . . . Gender becomes a primary symbol for the dualism of transcendence and immanence, spirit, matter.[105]

Elaine Pagels also picks up the theme of the patriarchal nature of European Orthodox Christianity, but she correctly includes Judaism and Islam in her description. These three religious traditions are conspicious in their lack of positive female symbolism, whereas most of the world's religions "abound in female symbolism."[106] But what about the early Christian tradition? According to Pagels, the Gnostics combined the female and male principles in their image of the divine. Valentinus "suggests that the divine can be imagined as a dyad; consisting, in part, of the Ineffable, the Depth, the Primal Farther; and, in the other, of Grace, Silence, the womb and Mother of All."[107]

In the African view, we would speak of the harmonious interaction of the complementary Divine Feminine and Masculine. This idea of complementarity, so noticeably absent in the European worldview, was still present to some degree in the Gnostic (African-influenced, early Christian, pre-political) conception of deity. Pagels tells us that some Gnostics said that the Divine was "masculo-feminine—

the great male-female power;" others said that the divine had no gender; and a third group held that it was *either,* depending on which attribute you wished to emphasize.[108] Some Gnostics, she says, described their god as Mother, Father, and Son. This would resemble the African conception of Wsir (Osiris), Ast (Isis), and Heru (Horus). Feminine powers, for the Gnostics, were associated with thought, intelligence, and foresight.[109] Pagels refers to material from the "secret" gospels, revelations, and mystical teachings that, she says, are replete with feminine and sexual metaphor, and the valorization of female aspects of creation and godliness.

But the process of censorship by the self-acclaimed representatives of Jesus on earth then took place, and

> Every one of the secret texts which gnostic groups revered was omitted from the canonical collection, and branded as heretical by those who called themselves orthodox Christians. By the time the process of sorting the various writings ended—probably as late as the year 200—virtually all the feminine imagery for God had disappeared from the orthodox Christian tradition.[110]

The acceptance and sacralization of the feminine went hand in hand with greater involvement of women in the gnostic movement when compared with the orthodox church and more prominent positions of women in the organization. The orthodox leaders were outraged. Pagels quotes Tertullian: "These heretical women—how audacious they are! They have no modesty; they are bold enough to teach, to engage in argument, to enact exorcisms, to undertake cures, and, it may be, even to baptize!" Irenaeus chastises Marcus, a Gnostic, who "invited women to act as priests in celebrating the eucharist with him." (Marcus) "hands cups to women to offer up the eucharist prayer, and to pronounce the words of consecration." Tertullian speaks for the orthodox view, "It is not permitted for a woman to speak in the church, nor is it permitted for her to teach, nor to baptize, nor to offer [the eucharist], nor to claim for herself a share in any *masculine* function—not to mention any priestly office."[111]

Pagels says that "from the year 200 we have no evidence for women taking prophetic priestly and episcopal roles among orthodox churches."[112] From Judaism and Jewish values the Church inherited much of its patriarchal character, and though Paul recognized women as deacons and fellow workers, he "argues from his own—traditionally Jewish—conception of a monistic, masculine God for a divinely ordained hierarchy of social subordination: as God has authority over Christ, he declares, citing Genesis 2-3, so man has authority over

women."[112] In I Corinthians 11:7-9, "a man . . . is the image and glory of God; but woman is the glory of man. For man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman, but woman for man."

Pagels contrasts the position of women in Egypt, Greece, and Rome, where women enjoyed many rights with men or were in the process of being given more rights, with "women of the Jewish communities [who] were excluded from actively participating in public worship, education, in social and political life outside of the family."[113] (Actually , the position of women in Kemet was far superior to that of women in either Greece *or* Rome. So much so that travellers from these areas were appalled. See B. Lesko, *The Remarkable Women of Ancient Egypt,* 1987.) But the scriptures were to say:

> Let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness. I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over men; she is to keep silent.
>
> I Timothy 2:11-12

The Apostolic Church decided that no woman was to become a priest, and the orthodox view of women was as having come into being for man's fulfillment. This puts Christians in a bind. Clearly this concept of fulfillment is not spiritual, therefore women are created solely for the purpose of their sexuality; the same sexuality that is damned. It is women who are inherently evil and all of humanity who are caught in a hopeless contradiction. Why were women "created" in the first place? Pagels says,

> By the late Second Century, the orthodox community came to accept the domination of men over women as the divinely ordained order, not only for social and family life, but also for the Christian Churches.[114]

This period of formulation was of tremendous historical significance, and was impressively successful from the perspective of consistency and adherence to dogma. The history of the Church is proof that monolith makes for ideological control. In 1977, Pope Paul VI, Bishop of Rome, declared that a woman could not be a priest "because our Lord was a man."[115]

What we are observing throughout this study is the process of "Europeanization," a continuance of what Eliade has called "Indo-Europeanization." The mindset, the *utamawazo*, the *utamaroho*, the behavioral tendencies that this racial-cultural stock possessed was

continually creating and refining modes through which to express themselves. We are not surprised to see the connections between early Indo-European religion, social organization, and conquest, namely, seminal classical Greek thought, as expressed in Plato's writings, and the Orthodox church of the second century. They are all part of one ideological tradition; each influencing and helping to determine the next historical cultural form; a link in the chain that would become "Western civilization." More specifically, the devaluation of women is adumbrated in classical Greek thought, where it is explicitly elaborated in philosophic discourse by Plato and Aristotle. They paved the way, along with Jewish social values, for a patriarchal church. What may have happened in Greek society especially is that men attempted to incorporate the female principle within themselves, thereby relegating the woman to a merely physically different being who had little of value to contribute to the construction and maintenance of the State. In this way, men, who were the valued form of being, were not forced to look outside of themselves for wholeness, or so they led themselves to believe. In her book *Centaurs and Amazons,* Page duBois discusses this process of devaluation through an examination of the *Timaeus:*

> The philosopher maintains his closeness to the divine, moving upward in the scale of beings, while men who fail in the effort of philosophy are punished by becoming women in their second lives. No woman can be a philosopher. She must wait until after death, when her soul might be reincarnated in the body of a man.[116]

And again, of the*Timaeus,*

> The male sex is assimilated to the divine part of the soul; men, like that divine soul, must be protected from the miasma, the pollution represented by women. That worse part of the soul, likened to women, is superior to the worse of the body, which is like an animal. She says, "women were associated with the body, which was inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the head, the philosopher, the male."[117]

And from the *Republic,* she quotes: " . . . all those creatures generated as men who proved themselves cowardly (*deiloi*) and spent their lives in wrong doing were transformed, at their second incarnation, into women."[118] The fathers of the Church were merely continuing and further elaborating a tradition that reflected a particular view of reality, a view that had already surfaced in Indo-European culture and classical Greek thought.

The Religion and Rationality Syndrome

One of the consequences of the specious universalization of the Christian statement was that it—together with its adoption of the Platonic mode—launched the European into a fruitlessly unreasonable and senseless enterprise. In the words of E. L. Allen, "Socrates' greatest achievement to many is his insistence on the use of reason to decide moral questions."[119] Yet, while this may very well be one the most significant legacies of Platonic thought, it may also be the most misguiding, given the Platonic understanding of the nature of "reason." It is here that we can clearly recognize the definitive function/role of the European *utamawazo*. It shapes the consciousness and limits the possibilities of conceptual experience. The European identification of religion with rationality is a demonstration of this tendency, ultimately originating in the need to control. The European interpretation of this "use of reason" was bound to the attempt to remove the religious experience from its natural cultural base, and thereby was confronted with the task of "finding" (which in this case means "creating") the proper religious statement. Given the predominant perceptual mode of European thought, Europeans were destined to search within the confines of the abstract and the rationalistic.

Even Rheinhold Niehbuhr recognizes the dilemma posed by the attempt to approach and justify the religious by way of the rationalistic. And he is forced to attest to the Church's perennial susceptibility to this mistake:

> . . . obviously a view which depends upon an ultra-rational presupposition is immediately endangered when rationally explicated; for reason which seeks to bring all things into terms of rational coherence is tempted to make one known thing the principle of explanation and to derive all other things from it. Its most natural inclination is to make itself that ultimate principle, and thus in effect to declare itself God. Christian psychology and philosophy have never completely freed themselves from this fault, which explains why naturalists plausibly though erroneously regard Christian faith as the very fountain source of idealism.[120]

What Niebuhr does not want to admit is that Christian philosophy is plagued by this particular conception, because that conception is itself characteristic of the whole of European philosophy.

The Europeans had trapped themselves by assuming that religious truth consisted of nothing more than the philosophical systems of their own creation and therefore religious activity for them

seemed properly to be contained in their own "philosophical investigations." They had already established the criterion of "true" religion to fit into this framework when they declared that monotheism and revelation were more consistent, universal, and therefore "rational" religious conceptions than were polytheistic ones. But the religious statements that they themselves made became increasingly unsatisfying; for obvious reasons, these conceptions did nothing to fulfill them spiritually. Some examples from the ongoing European theological discussion will help to clarify the point.

Terence Penelhum has devoted an entire work to the subject of *Religion and Rationality*. The pursuit to "rationalize" religion in this way is a proper one in his opinion. His book is something of an historical survey of the many attempts of Europeans to "prove" that their god exists. The work offers excellent ethnographic material as it demonstrates in broad historical spectrum the peculiar flavor of European thought and the uniqueness of European theology.

Natural Theology represented the elaboration and refinement of a fusion of principles that had taken place when Plato identified the "true" with the "good." (In Kemetic [ancient Egyptian] thought, for instance, philosophy, theology and science were never separate. Their integration becomes only problematical because of the reification of the "Platonic Abstraction," which tends to reduce thought to a limited rationalism.) What does the attempted "fusion" do when rationalistically defined? The following passage is taken from the work of Aquinas:

> Now, since we have proved that God is the source of being to some things, we must further show that everything besides Himself is from Him.
>
> For whatever belongs to a thing otherwise than as such, belongs to it through some cause, as *white* to a man: because that which has no cause is something first and immediate, wherefore it must needs belong to the thing essentially and as such. Now it is impossible for any one thing to belong to two and to both of them as such. For that which is said of a thing as such, does not go beyond that thing: for instance to have three angles equal to two right angles does not go beyond a triangle. Accordingly if something belongs to two things, it will not belong to both as such: wherefore it is impossible for any one thing to be predicated of two so as to be said of neither by reason of a cause, but it is necessary that either the one be the cause of the other,—for instance fire is the cause of heat in a mixed body, and yet each is called *hot*;—or else some third thing must be the cause of both, for instance fire is the cause of candles giving light.

> Now *being* is said of everything that is. Wherefore it is impossible that there be two things neither of which has a cause of its being through a cause, or else the one must be the cause of being to the other. Hence everything that, in any ways whatever, is, must needs be from that to which nothing is a cause of being. Now we have proved above [He refers to Bk I, Ch. xiii where he says "there must needs be a first mover separate and altogether, immovable, and this is God," p. 31] that God is this being to which nothing is a cause of being. Therefore from Him is everything that, in any way whatever, is. If however it be said that *being* is not a unequivocal predicate, the above conclusion follows none the less. For it is not said of many equivocally, but analogically; and thus it is necessary to be brought back to one thing.[121]

Only within the context of the European *utamawazo* and *utamaroho* would such a statement be recognizable as having anything remotely resembling religion or spirituality as its subject matter. The need to "prove" the existence of the spiritually true is a European need. The inability to distinguish between the "logic" of the mathematical syllogism (proposition) and "reasonableness" or "truth"; and the inability to recognize the limitation of pure logical analysis points to a European conceptual weakness. One is tempted to view Aquinas' statement as the product of a strange dementia, but if it is, it is a dementia determined by the European *asili*, the ideological, cultural seed. It is characteristic of the European *utamawazo*, as discussed in Chap. 1, and becomes intelligible, if not totally "understandable," as one comes to know the European *utamaroho*. For when rationalism becomes sanctified, then, of course, formal theology must become rational, to be deemed suitable for superior minds. And, after all, that is what European culture is all about.

Here is another curious specimen of similar genre taken from Leibniz' writing in the *Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on Reason:*

> It follows from the supreme perfection of God that producing the universe He chose the best possible plan, containing the greatest order; the best arranged situation, place, and time; the greatest effect produced by the simplest means; the most power, the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness in created things of which the universe admitted. For as all possible things have a claim to existence in the understanding of God in proportion to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the most perfect actual world which is possible. Otherwise it would not be possible to explain why things happened as they have rather than otherwise.[122]

Again, the lack of sophistication or depth of spiritual insight striking here—areas so impressively developed in African, and othe First World-descendant philosophical systems. There is much in Leibniz that bears the stamp of Plato, while Aquinas is obviously much more in the debt of Aristotle and his "self-moving mover." But like Aquinas and Leibniz, Plato and Aristotle represent only slightly different manifestations of the same ethnological traditions and tendencies: All fit the *asili* and so were embraced.

In the introduction to his work *Primitive Religion,* Robert Lowie says that Leibniz' conceptions "belong to a different compartment" from that of "religion" and that, "In Leibniz religious flavor is singularly absent because his abstract propositions leave the *religious* consciousness cold."[123] His term "compartment" is well chosen for it implies at least a conceptual differentiation between the nature of spiritual and scientific activities. This is a differentiation necessitated by the European definition of science and the accompanying materialization of the universe. The problem is how one develops spiritual conceptions that can be applicable to a world that one has already effectively (or affectively) materialized. The solution is unavoidable: Reduce spirit to matter; the essence to its manifestation.

Most European theological and philosophical discussions make the same "compartment" or, to use Gilbert Ryle's term, "category mistake." For the European mind, operating outside of the rationalistic sphere means a loss of control. It necessitates the recognition of a power greater than itself, and such a possibility is contradictory to the European *utamaroho*. And so Europeans are faced with a dilemma, for religion has by definition to do with the awareness of the supernatural; i.e., a power that transcends the *mortal* self. Yet it is immanent within the *immortal* being/spirit. It is a dilemma never escaped in European theology, and Europeans end up with an image of the all-powerful or supreme being as "the most rational mind"—which is of course their image of themselves. Having inherited religious insights from older traditions, they were bound to misinterpret them.

It is the appearance of rationality that was added—a characteristic that only they needed. This characteristic exhibited in the statements from Leibniz were long before adumbrated in Platonic thought—symptoms that became more and more acute as the European tradition grew older and more hardened. The "coldness" of Aquinas and Leibniz reflect the coldness of a culture unequipped to provide its members with either spiritual perceptiveness or a related moral base. The "strength" of European culture lies in its fanatical

commitment to the technical-scientific. Its weakness lies in the ill-fated attempt to derive meaningful value from a mythology of the "eternal truths of a universal logic," the absoluteness of the rational mode.

Much of William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* bears on the problem of "religion and rationality" in that he is concerned with the way in which the religious experience is presented to human beings. Instead of making the mistake of assuming that it must properly occur within the confines of rationalism, James perceptively observes the relationship of the emotional to religious conviction. In the passage below, he is discussing the convincingness of certain "feelings of reality":

> They are as convincing to those who have them as direct sensible experiences can be, and they are, as a rule, much more convincing than results established by mere logic ever are . . . you cannot help regarding them as genuine perceptions of truth, as revelations of a kind of reality which no adverse argument, however unanswerable by you in words, can expel from your belief. The opinion opposed to mysticism in philosophy is sometimes spoken of as *rationalism*. Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds. Such grounds, for rationalism, must consist of . . . (1) definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite inferences logically drawn. Vague impressions of something indefinable have no place in the rationalistic system.

And further:

> If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the promises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely *knows* that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. This inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when against it.[124]

For this reason all of Schonfield's labors of documentation "proving" what he calls the "Passover Plot," and his attempted logical rigor, should not be able to convince a Christian that Christ was not the "Son of God" (or "Son of Man"), since faith belongs to the sphere of myth rather than to the category of secular history, which is merely temporal.[125] The matter becomes further complicated, however, in the European context, because the Christian claim is precisely that of possessing "historical truth."

James makes the distinction between what he calls "existential judgment" and "propositions of value" or "spiritual judgement." In his association of value with the spiritual, James is atypical; and so is his recognition of the fact that these two areas of judgment "proceed from the diverse intellectual preoccupations."[125] He is rejecting the European *utamawazo*—battling the logic of the European *asili*. And so he himself is rejected by the cultural traditions (and not included in the required reading of Philosophy 101, 102, or 103).

In terms of the European *utamawazo* religions became associated with belief (nonvalue), while philosophy was associated with knowledge (value). Therefore the task of the theologian was to give European religion the shape of European philosophy, so as to enhance its value. First, the European *utamawazo* artificially separated spirit from matter (known), then it devalued spirit (unknown) and attempted to redefine it in terms of material reality. The ancient Africans had done the reverse; for them all meaningful reality was rooted in the spiritual.

The rationalistic approach to religion is the counterpart of the European conviction that values are "discovered" intellectually rather than created via cultural activity. This ideological tendency has its historical and epistemological origins in Platonic thought and finds its development and interpretation in Aristotle and the Scholastics. This "syndrome" perhaps points more dramatically to the spiritual failure of European religious formulations than any other single aspect.

The Techno-Social Order

Though Judeo-Christian thought is always heralded as being tremendously influential in the development of the European tradition, it is not as often made clear in what ways this influence made itself felt. It is certainly obvious that the avowed belief in "universal brotherhood" and "peace" were not incorporated into European ideology; that this espoused Christian morality has not had a formulative influence on the European ethic is quite clear. To an extent it is again a question of the compatibility of ideological perspective and cultural tendencies. Christianity was, in the early stages of European development, conducive to the growth of technology. A religious statement that was not compatible with European development in this respect would not have been successful in the European context.

As with Judaism, Christianity functioned to support and pro-

mote the recording of tradition in written form as a valued activity. Doctrine was made authoritative by putting oral tradition into written form. Writing in this way acted as a sanction in the developing culture, and at the same time facilitated state organization.

The growth of Christianity in the early history of European culture was also associated with the cities in the same way that the European chauvinistic expression associated European culture with "city-life."[127]

The European ideological frame of reference seemed to house comfortably both the institutionalization of the Christian formulation and the growth of European technological society. It is a question of not only compatibility but, in the European context, one of necessity. There are most definitely religious formulations that are not conducive to the growth of technology as it occurred in the West.

The growth of cities, the use of writing as a preferred mode, and the general emphasis on technology as a social goal all go hand in hand with an assumption of and belief in the "idea of progress" in which the continued intensification of these social facts constitute absolute value. The Judeo-Christian formulation is based on precisely the same concept. Within this tradition "religion" is seen almost as a technological advance, and, therefore, is aided by and aids the growth of the technical order. Christianity, then, is in this sense, as well as others, quite "worldly" or "secular." It is the advantage of the "world religions," according to traditional European social theory, that they enable man to "discover" future time and, therefore, to achieve a higher stage of cultural development. These analyses do not raise the question of the conceptually limiting effects of a strictly one dimensional concept of time in combination with a progress ideology; a combination that implies the creation of a hypothetical future. European religion must deal with what is a European problem, the deeply ingrained assumption of an unknown and limitless future.

This conception of time and of an oppressive future functions culturally to direct the activities of a people toward the creation of an ever-increasing rationalized technical order. In so far as Christian ideology is predicated on lineal and not cyclical or repetitive conceptions, it supported this kind of development and was, therefore, an important aspect of early European development. For while the accelerated growth of the technical collossus may have been many centuries away, the ideological germs were already incubating, laying the groundwork for a more mature Westernization.

It is compelling here to diverge briefly, to mention the seemingly anomalous case of Islam, which has several of the same ideological features as Judaism and Christianity. Islam provides a model for social organization that promotes some of the characteristics associated with European culture: patriarchy, the monotheistic ideal, an emphasis on the accumulation of literature and institutionalized learning as opposed to traditional education. While Europe was going through the embarrassment of her "blind age," the Islamic culture was preserving and developing the tradition of scholarship that Europe had associated with her own history. Why, then, isn't Islam considered a "Western" religion? Or is it? It is never considered to be such in the textbooks in which Europeans define themselves. Europeans did not, of course, choose to follow Muhammad.

But, again, using the index of cultural chauvinism and ethnic identity, the case of Islam and its relationship to the Judeo-Christian experience becomes quite clear. The Islamic religion politically supported a statement of Arab nationalism and conquest, while the Jewish and Christian religions are statements of Jewish and Western European nationalism, respectively. Just as the Jewish religious statement was not meant for non-Jews, so the Christian religious statement was never meant to be and cannot tolerate an interpretation that encourages the self-determination or military solidification, defense, or aggression of any "non-Western," "non-European" peoples. The critical distinction between Islam and Christianity is racial-cultural, not theological-ideological. The vicious, prolonged, and bloody crusades constituted a series of racial-cultural ("ethnic") wars, "color wars." It is grossly inaccurate and misleading for them to be referred to as "religious wars" without reference to ethnicity, race, or cultural identification, as is usually done.

One of the most important connections between Christianity and technology since the colonial period is that missionary Christianism paves the way for capitalism and the European-centered market economy. This form of Christianization in areas such as Africa was an ideological preparation for acquiescence to the mechanisms of exploitation represented by colonialism. The colonies were needed for the economic growth and development of Europe, which meant that the indigenous population had to be convinced that they had been born to serve their European masters and, further, would benefit from such servitude. What better way to make this argument than by selling them on the superiority of Christianity, which could save them from the fate of being irreligious, sinful, backward, and black? Once convinced of this, the colonized begin to assimilate attitudes that help to prepare them to fit into European-style technological organization, because these attitudes are implicit in European Christianity.

One mark of the new mindset is the concept of time. For the African ordinary time is punctuated by sacred time, and time is valued according to what the community experiences. Therefore, we can speak qualitatively of different "times," because they are experienced differently. Christianization repudiates this concept as it demeans African culture and substitutes a secularized concept of uniform lineal time, suiting the more mechanized order, which the European colonizers and neocolonialists need to establish.

In his book *Breast of the Earth,* Kofi Awoonor has an excellent discussion of Christianity's role in this regard and tells us that "The school was the most important instrument of missionary work in Africa."[128] It was the key to the process that would strip Africans of their culture so that they could become part of the technical order; albeit at the lowest level. The school always took African children away from their elders and caused them to be ashamed of the very things that could have been a source of political strength and resistance to colonial rule.

The new technology of exploitation required that the African become an imitation of the European.[129] It required a total transformation that embodied new standards of success and social status.[130] Christianity, of course, meant "civilization." To be civilized was to become as much like the European as possible. Awoonor tells us that, "The converts were also encouraged to acquire European material culture . . . . The superiority of the European way of life was rigorously inculcated."[129] This included living in the townships that the missionaries established, in opposition to the very villages in which the African extended kin lived.

The missionary school discouraged the use of African languages. "Christian conversion meant cultural change," a change essential to the donning of the cultural clothing of European technology. "Christ was a white man; the saints were white; and the missionaries were white . . . . Continuously the African was told he was cursed in his adherence to the ways of his fathers, and because he was black-skinned, the implications were not lost to him. . . . The fundamental erosion of the African's confidence in himself began with the first Christian convert."[131]

One of the most important ways that missionary education prepared Africans for capitalism and the European techno-social order was by destroying the integrity of lineage organization that formed the basis of the traditional communal structure. Christianity stressed individual salvation and the "Judeo-Christian material culture," as Awoonor phrases it, and it denounced all communal forms such as

polygyny, the traditional educational system, and especially, economic communalism; i.e., the communal ownership and distribution of resources. Individualism was an implicit value of missionary Christianism as it revealed itself among those colonized by the Europeans.

The "civilized African" behaved and dressed and spoke like a European. He had been educated in European schools that began with the mission school and was therefore trained to uphold European values and to perpetuate European control: The purpose of any educational system is to perpetuate the society that it creates. The "*non-evolue*" or "uncivilized" African was an "unsaved," "uneducated" primitive and non-Christian and therefore "a usable chattel for mines and farms—" so thought the Europeans and their "civilized" Africans.[132] Missionary Christianism stripped colonized, "non-Europeans" of everything. In this psychologically insecure state they could then be immersed in the ideology of the technical order. And so many Africans themselves will speak of the "blessings" of Christianity, because they are sold on the "ideology of progress" to which its European adherents subscribe.

It is not only in terms of the specific technological tendencies manifested in the Christian lifestyle that the essence of this relationship lies (e.g., deification of writing, literacy, the growth of cities, etc.). The compatibility of the Christian doctrine and the development of technology in the West is found at a deeper and more critical level. Christian ideology is teleological, providing a conceptual model peculiar to the European *utamawazo*; both are based on and peculiar to a particular image of the human. The Christian-European interpretation of the human is of a being who derives meaning from his ability to move toward a universal goal—both "progressive" and "rational." It is this and not the "not-of-this-world," "do-unto-others" idea that operates as the motivating factor in Christian ideology; "other-worldliness" goes against the grain of technological "advance." The ideal, of course, is an abstraction; it implies unending movement itself. It is in some crucial way associated with the creation of power that is in turn associated with efficiency. Both power and efficiency are identified with the control of nature and people and the belief that it is the natural and proper destiny of humans to negate nature and/or the "primary" condition.

Rheinhold Niebuhr proudly declares, "The idea of progress is possible only upon the ground of a Christian culture."[133] Niebuhr intends here to point to a "positive," and culturally desirable, attribute of that ideology. He is not questioning the universal valid-

ity of the concept. Niebuhr never really repudiates the idea in terms of its ideological thrust; he merely nibbles a bit at the edges.

As noted in Chap. 1, Lynn White has pointed to specific periods in European development, and has presented an impressive case for the supportive relationship between European technology and European religion. "Modern science," which White identifies with European culture, is predicated on certain assumptions about the nature of the human and our relationship to the environment. Christian ideology supports these assumptions. In White's view, "Our [European] technological and our scientific movements got their start, acquired their character, and achieved world dominance in the Middle Ages."[134] The unique style in which these activities have been carried out in the West required particular ontological conceptions, conceptions that, White says are "religious" in origin. In his view, the ideas about nature, our relationship to it, and our destiny, which crystallized in Medieval Christian theology, were the dominant contributor to the ideological ascendancy of science and technology in the West, an ascendency that accounts for the present Western European "ecological crisis," since the technical order is essentially exploitative of the natural order.

But we can look to an even earlier period for the origins of the development. Judeo-Christian thought in the company of Platonic epistemology initiated the desacralization of nature that would allow for a dehumanized techno-social order and the materialist, mechanized conception of the universe on which European science depends. This desacralized cosmos was an early conception within the Hebrew tradition. Mircea Eliade says,

> Cosmic religiousity continued the most elementary dialectic of the sacred, especially the belief that the divine is incarnated, or manifests itself, in cosmic objects and rhythms. Such a belief was denounced by the adherents of Yahweh as the worst possible idolatry, and this ever since the Israelites' entrance into Palestine . . . . The prophets finally succeeded in emptying nature of any divine presence.[135]

This amounted to an attack on nature as an integral part of our human existence; an attitude that went hand in hand with the Hebrew submergence of the power of women. The Divine Feminine is associated with the fecundity of the earth and the centrality of the cyclical order and the workings of nature in our lives. The feminine, in other traditions, was symbolic of the force of nature, which is generative of all life. If the divine is identified with the fecundity of the Earth and

with nature, then, as Rosemary Ruether points out, the tendency in Judeo-Christian thought to desacralize nature would go hand in hand with the need to devalue the feminine and, therefore, to masculinize the conception of a god.[136] Ruether points out that in Genesis I, God commands Adam to "Fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over it."[137]

This masculinization in the Hebrew conception of "god" is linked to the need to believe that being can be mechanically, technically "created." And while this early Hebrew society may be distant in time from the technical colossus that we now experience, the view of reality on which this colossus was constructed was being put in place in the early Judaic statement. Two divergent world-views emerged: (1) the more ancient, in which nature was associated with meaningful experience; and (2) the Platonic, Judeo-Christian world-view, in which meaningful being was a human-controlled, "denatured" reality.

In his book *The Sacred and the Profane,* Mircea Eliade gives us a phenomenological view of the sacred and of the religious that directly contradicts this Judeo-Christian desacralization of nature. "For religious man, nature is never only "natural"; it is always fraught with a religious value." The gods "manifest(ed) the different modalities of the sacred in the very structure of the world and cosmic phenomena."[138] He says that to the religious person, the universe presents itself as a divine creation, as cosmos. "The cosmic rhythms manifest order, harmony, permanence, fecundity." Nature always expresses something that transcends it. It is "supernature," not nature.[139] We "become aware of the sacred because it shows itself as something wholly different from the profane . . . the manifestation of a reality that does not belong to our world." But this reality can be felt within objects that are part of the profane world.[140] Eliade then says something very revealing about culture:

> The modern Occidental experiences a certain uneasiness before many manifestations of the sacred. He finds it difficult to accept the fact that, for many human beings, the sacred can be manifested in stones or trees, for example.[140]

The sacred African tree, the sacred ancestral sculpture—(what Jews, Christians, and Muslims call "idols") are not merely *Kintu* (objects), they are "hierophanies."[141] Is the Christian cross an idol? Was Jesus an idol? Perhaps the true idols are the dollar bills in Euro-American society—literally "concretized" in one-hundred-story buildings. This is true idolatry: worship of the object.

Eliade says, "the wholly desacralized cosmos is a recent discov-

ery in the history of the human spirit. . . desacralization pervades the entire experience of the nonreligious man of modern societies and . . . in consequence, he finds it increasingly difficult to rediscover the existential dimensions of religious man in archaic societies."[142] If we substitute "European" for "modern" and "non-European" for "archaic," we have a formulation that leads towards a meaningful critique of European culture.

Lynn White traces the development of the ontological conceptions inherent in European religion, on which depends the European commitment to create an artificial, technically controlled environment. The Judeo-Christian world-view introduced an all-powerful "God" who created "man;" but, says White, it is "man" who "named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over them."

> God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's purposes. And, although man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of nature: he is made in God's image. . . . Christianity is the most anthropomorphic religion the world has seen. . . . Man shares in great measure, God's transcendence of nature. Christianity. . . not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends. . . . By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects. . . . The spirits *in* natural objects, which formerly had protected nature from man, evaporated. Man's effective monopoly on spirit in this world was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled.[143]

By the thirteenth century natural theology in the Latin West was "becoming the effort to understand God's mind by discovering how his creation operates."[143] In this way, "modern Western science was cast in the matrix of Christian theology. The dynamism of religious devotion, shaped by the Judeo-Christian dogma of creation, gave it impetus."[144] Because European ecological conceptions are implicit in the development of the technical order, "Christian" attitudes can be seen to have been its prerequisites. White says,

> We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim. . . . To a Christian a tree can be no more than a physical fact. The whole concept of the Sacred Grove is alien to Christianity and to the ethos of the West. For nearly two millenia Christian missionaries have been chopping down Sacred groves, which are idolatrous because they assume spirit in nature.[144]

I have said earlier that religion is the sacralization of ideology. The technical order is the rationalization of nature. It was a process hinted at long ago in European commitment. This commitment required moral sanction, and what was formally recognized as religion in the West, in turn, had to be compatible with this commitment, or it would have taken another form. In other words, the religious formulation cannot change without commitment changing, and vice-versa. As White says, "the present increasing disruption of the global environment is the product of a dynamic technology and science. . . their growth cannot be understood historically apart from distinctive attitudes toward nature which are deeply grounded in Christian dogma."[145] European science and technology are, then, ideologically dependent on this Christian arrogance toward nature.

> Our daily habits of action are dominated by an implicit faith in perpetual progress. . . rooted in and indefensible apart from Judeo-Christian teleology. . . .We can continue today to live, as we have lived for about 1700 years, very largely in a context of Christian axioms.[146]

Christian ideology has played a supportive cultural role in the uniqueness of Western European techno-social development at certain formulative periods in this cultural/historical process.

The Record Versus the "Apology"

The cultural/historical record of the European experience clarifies the interdependent relationship between the institutionalization of European Christianity and the European imperialistic endeavor, as well as the compatibility of Christian ideology with European cultural nationalism.

The efforts of Reinhold Niebuhr to salvage Christianity and cleanse it of this historical record are perhaps the most impressive of any Christian apologist, but in our view his failure is nonetheless evident. His discussion is helpful to us, as it is in his attempts to extricate the essence of Christianity from the history and character of the European imperial order that he touches on some of the most significant issues raised in our discussion.

One of these issues is that of the so-called universality of the Church. For Niebuhr, the historical evils of the West issue from "collective egotism," "cultural particularism," or "nationalism"; while the "universalism" of the Church is a tendency toward the good that can save us from these "evils." However, he is forced to admit that "the Church, as well as the state, can become the vehicle of collective ego-

tism."[147] Imperialists and slavers that they were, Popes Paul III, Paul IV, Pius V, Gregory, et al., in Niebuhr's view, were only embarrassing exceptions to the pattern. Certainly from an African-centered perspective, we cannot view them as such, for, as Cohen and others have pointed out, there were far too many of them, and if the "real" Christians had no part in the creation of the European empire and are not responsible for the inequities perpetuated by it, then one is forced to ask, where are they, and where have they been? If in fact they exist at all, surely they have not been part of the European "experience." And if the only "real" Christians are outside of Europe, then are they Christians? In other words, the question is raised as to whether the non-European values and ideas claimed by Christians like Niebuhr, who would exonerate Christianity from its militaristic and culturally aggressive aspects, can be identified with the European tradition at all!

"Christianity" is a configuration of values, attitudes and behaviors that are inseparable from the history of Europe.[148] Unhappily for non-European people, "real" European Christians do exist and have existed in large enough numbers to have successfully imposed their own brand of European cultural nationalism wherever they have ventured, inevitably backed with the armed might of the West.

Niebuhr employs what is perhaps the most ideologically affective tool and manifestation of European cultural imperialism in his use of the concept of "universalism." The subtle, but critical, issue raised by his claims is a philosophical-ideological one. It lies partially in the implicit value dichotomy he makes between nationalism and universalism. Nationalism in his view is "bad" and represents negative particularism in which the self (ego) is the source of motivation, sentiment, and behavior; while universalism is its positive opposite and represents the ability to identify with the universal good of all people, i.e., takes an abstraction called "humanity" as its inspirational source.

First, I challenge this formulation on the grounds that it, itself, is not a "universal" statement, though its value for the European lies in the fact it has all the earmarks of such. It is a moot question as to whether any such "universalism" is desirable even if it were possible. Nationalistic, i.e., (self) group identification, is positive because it is humanly feasible and originates in the concrete circumstance of cultural definition. Hope for humankind lies in the possibilities for fashioning nationalistic ideologies that are not definitionally predicated on the destruction of other cultural groups. European nationalism and above all its Christianism are therefore "negative" from this viewpoint. Second, even if the ability to identify with others is accepted as a normative goal, it is neither Christian thought nor European ideology that makes such identification possible. The European concept of self is an isolating one, and the Christian concept of spiritual enlightenment is individualistic, as opposed to being group or community oriented. Christianity is a European "nationalistic" (i.e., cultural imperialistic) statement in opposition to the "non-European" nationalists it wishes to conquer.

In other words, from the African-centered perspective, it is not nationalism (cultural particularism) that is negative, but the content that a particular nationalist ideology is given that makes it a threat to the survival of others. In this regard, it is clearly European nationalism, of which Christianity is an example, that has been most destructive of the peaceful coexistence of divergent cultural groupings. The projection of so-called "universalism" as an assumed goal of human behavior is not desirable or culturally meaningful, but it allows Europeans to thereby project European particularism as something other than it is. The claim to "universality," whether made by a Christian apologist, a social theorist, or a military leader, is merely a packaging device. The "struggle of the Christian religion against the pride and self-will of nations"[147] that Niebuhr wants to see does not exist, but by giving voice to this supposed "struggle" the impression is conveyed of the moral superiority of Christianity based on the implied invidious comparison between a nonexistent, abstract "universalism," "the embodiment of the good," and cultural nationalism, "the expression of evil." The real question becomes, Why has the European made so much of this claim of universalism? (See Chap. 10 of this work.)

Niebuhr criticizes the universalism of the "classical" philosophers of ancient Greece as being merely "the extension of their particular viewpoint," like that of "a modern communist" who "is a universalist in his hope that communism may become the basis of a world civilization."[149] But Christian "universalism" has precisely the same concrete implications in its existential acting out, and is of the same vintage. The *difference* that is so important to Niebuhr is only in its semantical/philosophical expression, and merely facilitates the extension of a particular viewpoint—namely, that of Christianity.

It is facilitated in that it can more thoroughly extend itself over a wider and more diverse arena of cultures. Europeans simply discovered the political value of not verbally identifying "god and nation"; that is not to say that this identification ceased to exist. Most other cultures have had no political ambitions that required such

rhetoric, and when they have, they were certainly not as successful or as "well-equipped" to carry them out. They therefore speak of "a god" in necessary relationship to "their nation" or culture. Niebuhr makes much of this terminological difference in Chap. 8, Vol. I, of *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* But to delete the article "a" from its usual position before "god" and to write it always with a capital "G" merely gives a quasireligious statement, like that of European Christianism, greater imperialistic potential. In one case a religious statement is openly identified with the cultural entity that is its source, and in the other, it is formulated to be put at the service of a cultural entity in its world imperialistic pursuits.

Niebuhr cannot avoid the imperialistic uses of Christianity, but his perspective obliges him to explain European imperialism as ultimately inconsistent with Christian teachings: "prophetic religion," he says, "had its very inception in a conflict with national self-deification."[150] However, it appears that the European Christian definition ("universalistic," absolutist, and monistic) is reinforced by the international ambitions of the European nation, the cultural supremism of the European ideology, and the expansionism of the European *utamaroho*. Far from "struggling" against "collective pride," I have argued that Christianity was ideally fashioned to express European "collective pride" (nationalism). This explanation, among other ethnologically satisfying characteristics, has the advantage of being consistent with the history of the Christian Church, while Niebuhr and other Christian apologists are hopelessly involved in the impossible task of explaining away millions of "unreal" Christians and centuries of characteristically "un-Chrisitianlike" behavior of the Christian world.

Conclusion: Religion and Power

The strength of institutionalized religion in the European experience is also its weakness. Morality in a secular society proports to be intellectual. In European culture its models are rational. It is despiritualized. Early in the developing European tradition, the advantage of a religious statement that rhetorically sanctioned its political objectives was discovered. But the result, as well as the cause, was a spiritual deficit in the culture. The Christian emphasis on a heavenly afterlife does not alleviate European anxiety concerning death, primarily because it is a remote abstraction rather than a lived belief and does not address itself to the spiritual isolation of individuals—which is the real basis of their anxiety. This anxiety is the price paid for the cognitive structure of European culture (the *utamawazo*), and the Christ image in this context is merely or triumphantly, depending on

one's view point, symbolic of the illusion of "progress," a constant striving for that which cannot be achieved. Perhaps this image of a resurrected savior, born in African metaphor, but intensified and reified in European mythology, unconsciously represents, as well, the "humanity" that was indeed sacrificed for European success.

But no other civilization has been as successfully imperialistic. No other has used its institutionalized religion as pragmatically in the support of its imperialistic objectives. The spiritual deficit does not appear to count for much, if one is impressed by world dominance. The *asili* demands power and is itself powerful. The modality and dogma of European religion have been mandated by the *asili*, which they, in turn, reinforce.

In African religion and in many other primary religious formulations, it is the spiritual-emotional needs of the people within the culture that are served. At the same time the values of the culture are sanctioned, and the mechanisms for its continuance are sacralized. Spiritual/philosophical conceptions such as ancestor communion, which help to explain the universe as a spiritual whole in which all life and being are periodically regenerated, give the African an emotional security and confidence that the European lacks. But such conceptions did not prepare the African, nor her Native American or Oceanic counterparts to deal politically with the aggression of the European. These conceptions have not been used successfully in the defense of culture. Non-European religions were not fashioned for worldwide acceptance nor for international propaganda. There is no superficial, merely rhetorical, component of these religions. Ethnologically, both European and "non-European" religions serve the ideological needs of the cultures in question as defined by their members. The radical difference between them issues from the differences in these two sets of ideology: One is based on the pursuit of world dominance; the others seek to use the forces of the universe to ensure a harmonious existence. The two types of ideology involve two different conceptions of power. Europeans are culturally nurtured with a keen political sense that is simultaneously defensive and aggressive. The *utamaroho* comes with an awareness of "others." It is therefore intensely political.

What begins to emerge in these first two chapters is a pattern in which, at critical points in the development of European culture, when its ascendancy appears to have been threatened because of ambivalence, confusion, or a malfunctioning of the "machine," masterful adjustments had been made that brought new clarity of purpose, a reconsolidation of energies, retrieving focus so that the

machine would once again be efficient. These adjustments were sometimes in the form of what I have called "modal changes," sometimes creations of political genius, fanatically devoted to the objective of total control.

We have, to some degree, traced the intimate relationship between religion and *utamaroho* in European development from its Indo-European pagan origins, through its initial nationalistic statement in Judaism, its Roman cooptation by Constantine, and the battle against the apolitical interpretations of the Gnostics, the Donatists, and others. At another critical point Augustine sells the idea of the merger of Church and State, and Europe is well on its way to the creation of a national consciousness with a religious statement supportive of its imperialistic ambitions. At each juncture a monolithic doctrine was required, and it was created. The threat of dissension and disunity were dealt with. Threats would continue, but the mechanisms were in place with which to destroy them or keep them in check: The three "great" inquisitions (initiated by Pope Gregory IX, 1231; Pope Sixtus IV, 1478; Pope Paul III, 1542) merely represented some of the more infamous and blatantly sadistic methods of such control.

The objective of this study is to identify and understand the *asili* of European development. A history of Europe would disclose other junctures, set backs, and personalities who were instrumental in the creation of the empire. The fall of Rome is a setback because the focus is deflected as the "Europeans" become disunified, perceiving themselves as Germanic and Asian "tribes." Clovis the Frank (481) becomes a Christian and unifies the Franks. Charles Martel reunites the Merovingian Kingdom, establishing the Carolingian line. In the 600s, Charlemagne increases the size of the Frankish Kingdom, again spreads Christianity, and together with the Pope in the year 800 declares himself the Emperor of the New Holy Roman Empire.

The process continued through the Norman Conquest (1066) and beyond. During this early period, throughout the Middle Ages, Christianity was used to forge and solidify a European consciousness. Later, in the Renaissance and into the modern period, both the physical and social sciences would be used in the same way, the Church no longer occupying a central position in this process. The establishment of a scientific ideology and the various disciplines of the European Academy through which to promote it, takes over there. Institutionalized religion, so essential to the construction of the imperial order and the creation of a European consciousness in the early stages of European development, will become almost obsolete,

taking a back seat to Science: the new religion.

We have seen that religion, as associated with European culture, is shaped by *utamawazo* and *asili,* which shape the culture itself. That, of course, is what we would expect. The concept of *asili* tells us that it is possible to identify the seed/germ of the culture, which is at once its explanatory and generating principle. Once we understand that germinating core, all aspects of the culture fall into place. Institutionalized religion in the European experience poses confrontational dichotomies for the purposes of proselytization and dominance. It is absolutist, offering an abstraction as the proper object of religious devotion. It struggles to present a rationalistic proof of the existence of its deity. The literal mode becomes religiously authoritative. Lineal conception, which valorizes secular, historical time, becomes a validating mechanism for religious superiority. In the process of the unfolding of this religious tradition it desacralizes nature, denies the vision of a cosmos to its adherents, thereby alienating nature and paving the way for the technical order.

The focus in this chapter has been on the institution of religion as it related to early European cultural and political imperialism. The normative intracultural ethic is not to be found in this earlier Christian statement. It is not until its reformulation in Protestantism that European institutionalized religion becomes to some extent a verbal reflection of the European way of life. In Protestantism it becomes a functioning directive of internal behavior; that is, *within* the culture. This issue will surface in Chap. 7.

In the chapters that follow we turn our attention to the mechanisms of value-definition and look at the images provided by the cultural mythoform that act to support the pattern of behavior towards non-European peoples. I attempt to paint the portrait of an *utamaroho* that has already begun to emerge from the previous discussion of religion and ideology in early European development and from the themes of the European *utamawazo.*

. . . That our left eye should be set to see against its twin, not with it—surely that is part of the white destroyers' two thousand seasons of triumph against us? That the sight of the eye should be unconnected, cut off from the mind's embracing consciousness; that the ear's hearing should be blocked off from the larger knowledge of the mind, that the nose's smelling and the tongue's tasting should be pushed apart from the mind's whole consciousness—what is that but death's whiteness in delirious triumph?. . . the walls of whiteness built to separate sense from sense. . .

— Ayi Kwei Armah

Chapter 3

Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols

The Meaning of "Aesthetic"

There are two uses of the term "aesthetic" that will have relevance in this discussion corresponding to its usages in European culture. First, we want to identify the European conception of beauty, in the sense of the forms, images, and experiences that evoke positive emotional responses from those who have been enculturated in the tradition. This sense of the European aesthetic is closely related to value; that is, its themes are "expressions" of European value. This is the aesthetic that reaches to every layer of the culture. The values and images involved are not limited to the ordinary person, although they are more consciously expressed in the media that addresses itself to the "nonintellectual"—and to the popular art forms. But this should not confuse the issue, because (perhaps unconsciously or at least nonverbally) this aesthetic affects the "intellectual" as well.

Because of the peculiar nature of European culture, we have to include another meaning of the term "aesthetic." In characteristic European fashion there is not only the experience of the beautiful, but there is the "objectification" of that experience as well. In keeping with the *asili* of the culture, it follows that there must be a "science" based on this objectification. So that our discussion must touch on aesthetics or Western European philosophical thought about the nature of the beautiful and its apprehension, insofar as it is relevant to our overall objective.

These two senses of "the European aesthetic" interest us at various points. Consistent with the dynamics of European culture, this "scientific" or "philosophical" aesthetic seeks to influence and control the emotional experience of what Europeans consider beautiful; while, on the other hand, the philosophic aesthetics takes its shape, its form, and its style from those habits of mental organization that are "emotionally" appealing to the European mind: the *utamawazo.*

The mode of "rationalism" itself forms an important part of the European aesthetic. It is not possible to understand this *utamawazo,* nor the construct of the culture, unless it is realized that its standards of thought, behavior, and social institutions are all touched by this predilection for rationalistic forms. Max Weber discusses "rationality" in Western art forms:

> The rational use of the Gothic vault as a means of distributing pressure and of roofing spaces of all forms, and above all as the constructive principle of great monumental buildings and the foundation of a *style* extending to sculpture and painting, such as that created by our Middle Ages, does not occur elsewhere. The technical basis of our architecture came from the Orient. But the Orient lacked that solution of the problem of the dome and that type of classic rationalization of all art—in painting by the rational utilization of lines and spatial perspective—which the Renaissance created for us."[1]

A discussion of the experience of the beautiful in the context of European culture illuminates this point well. On a conscious level the attempt is made to separate this experience and raise it "above" its effectively emotional aspect. That presents special problems as even the European philosopher is forced to recognize that the person must react initially to what she considers to be beautiful with her senses and with her feelings; i.e., that one apprehends beauty initially as sensation. Therefore philosophers in the European tradition found themselves in the position of intellectualizing; that is, making

"conscious," in a technical sense, even the emotional aspect of the perception, apprehension—the experience of "beauty."

Again, as with the attempt to merge rationalism and religion, the results are very strange. One consequence has been "aesthetics" or the "science" of the aesthetically valid: a rationalistic discussion of the rules by which the experience of the beautiful takes place, of what properly constitutes "beauty" in a "logical" sense. Of course, this discussion purports to have universal significance. European philosophers never claim to describe their own aesthetic experiences (and in truth one doubts that they could possibly be), but they do claim to prescribe the proper rules for determining "the beautiful" and to describe the nature of "true" aesthetic experience. They are setting the "standards" for judgement and criticism. But none of these discussions is satisfying to anyone other than European philosophers. One questions their motives and the reason the subject occupies the attention and energy that it does. The answer is that this speculative/philosophic activity functions in its own way to reinforce and validate the cultural *asili* and to strengthen the national consciousness; the collective self-image as superior to others, a universal standard for humanity.

A reading of Kant's "analytic of the beautiful," in the *Critique of Judgement,* gives one the impression that the things he is trying so desperately to define, to verbalize, to "enclose within the word," as Steiner says (cited in Chap. 1), do not lend themselves to the forms of thought he employs, and moreover, that aesthetic experience itself is in no way connected to this discussion and certainly not aided by it.

> The beautiful is that which pleases universally without (requiring) a concept. If we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its transcendental determinations. . . [We say that] the purpose is the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is its purposiveness (form finalis). . . the tone of mind which is self-maintaining and of speculative universal validity is subordinated to the way of thinking which can be maintained only by painful resolve, but is of objective universal validity.[2]

These are only a few statements from a lengthy and incredibly abstruse treatise, but they are exemplary of the work. One wonders if the work itself is necessary for Kant to come to conclusions that appear intuitively obvious.

> There can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine, by means of concepts, what is beautiful. For every judgement from this source is aesthetical; i.e. the feeling of the subject, and not a concept of the object, is its determining ground. To seek for a principle of taste which shall furnish, by means of definite concepts, a universal criterion of the beautiful, is fruitless trouble, because what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory.[3]

Then why this effort? Why does what Europe considers to be one of its greatest minds concern himself with an "analytic of the beautiful?" There appears to be no ultimate purpose other than that this exercise itself gives to a segment of society a strange kind of pleasure. The analytical and the "rational" are so valued that they become a part of the emotional experience of pleasure among a select group of people. There is no doubt that the undergraduate who is required to read the *Critique of Judgement* gets no pleasure from the experience and in fact may regard it as punishment; but the power of the sanctions in the culture should not be underestimated, for if the student pursues philosophy until the end of her college career and into graduate school, she will no doubt begin to consider the *Critique* a "work of art" and be convinced therefore of the pleasure it should convey, at least to "understand" it (if not to read it).

The Tyranny of Rationalism

This attempt on the part of Europeans to reflect on the nature of beauty spills over into their experienced culture, and a further consequence is the intellectualization of the artistic experience. In European culture "art" becomes the domain of the intellectual elite, because it is they (in the tradition of Plato's *Symposium* and Aristotle's *Poetics*) who determine the criteria of its perfection; it is they who say what its attributes should and should not be. The ordinary participant in the culture does not have access to, nor is he considered capable of enjoying, "true" art. What he does enjoy is not considered to be "art"; nor is it "beautiful." Again we return to Platonic definitions and find the precedent for a rationalistic aesthetic. For "beauty," as well as the "good," is identified with the "true." All are apprehended by the same method. The position relegated to the emotional experience is a low one. It is "reason" that triumphs.

As the result Europeans are taught to approach the aesthetic experience through analysis. They objectify the experience; they tear it apart; they verbalize it, incessantly, and teach and are taught that in this way they come to understand the experience more—to better appreciate it. Yet for most people it is the sensually immediate and

not the intellectually mediated that gives pleasure, that evokes emotional response. The intensification of this tendency leads to the actual replacement of the authentic emotional sensitivity with an artificial intellectual aesthetic; and people lose the ability to respond emotionally and to create that to which others can, indeed, respond. This is a consequence of the cultural value and *utamawazo* that splits human faculties into the "rational" and "emotional," and then dictates that the emotional be controlled, "weeded" out, ignored if possible—its existence being recognized only because the European begrudgingly acknowledges that the "human" is afterall part "animal."

But very different philosophical premises inform the art forms of other cultures and the ideas about the aesthetics they generate. The awakening of the human spirit in emotional communion with the sacred, however that may be defined, is its primary goal. There are several authors worth mentioning whose comparisons help to elucidate some of the characteristic features of the European aesthetic experience.

Willie Abraham says of the Akan art form:

> . . . they expressed their philosophico-religious ideas through art, through the timeless, immemorial, silent, and elemental power so characteristic of African traditional art. Indeed this is the main reason why it was not lifelike in a representational sense. Forms had to be distorted. In art there was a moral-philosophical preoccupation which led it to portray forces of the world, and to portray a force it was essential that it should not be treated like something assimilated, and consequently like something overcome, as the rendering of it in life-like figures would have been.[4]

In the African view of the human, the emotional-spiritual and the rational-material are inextricably bound together, and if anything, it is a human being's spirituality that defines her as human, providing the context within which she is able to create art as well as technology. Such a view leads to a very different emphasis in artistic expression. The emotional identification with, and participation in, the art form by the person and the community are primary values that help to determine its shape. In this way the form itself becomes less of an "object." In European culture the tendency and emphasis are much the opposite. While artists may still attempt to evoke certain isolated emotional responses from their audiences, these responses theoretically have very little "cultural" or "moral" significance, and the entire experience from the creation of the *objet d'art* to its pre-

sentation is much more "individualized." The artist creates out of his own particular response to his environment, and his work is appreciated by separate and distinct "individuals," who reach into their distinct experiences for whatever identification they can find.

As Abraham says, this is the mark of a "secular art." What the culture as a whole does for the individuals involved is to suggest that they "objectify" their experience, isolate the "object," and approach it analytically. That is really the only preparation they are given by their cultural experience. And so the circle of people who participate in this exchange for pleasure (who derive pleasure from it) is very small. The aesthetic sense of the rest is aroused by that which is not "art," and they have no "taste," or so their culture says. Abraham's distinction between "secular" and sacred or "moral art" is very significant, and the European has always approached the art of other cultures as though it were meant to be as "amoral" as his own. Abraham says,

> When critics like Gombrich say that the African artists were incapable of realistic presentation, they quite miss the point of African art. If they seek life-like representation, they should turn to secular art, the art which was produced for decorative purposes or the purposes of records, rather than moral art, the art whose inspiration is the intuition of a world force.[4]

Awoonor says that African art expresses the relationship between humans and the Creator. It expresses our will and wishes to the Creator; is "an assertation of (our) own temporality as a *living* being, and more importantly, an articulate statement of that spirituality through a cyclic order within (our) cosmos."[5] Art (carvings) at shrines are instruments that affirm the divine link between us and our Creator.[6]

In earlier European development artistic expression is also intimately bound to religious understanding. This interrelationship reaches its height in the medieval period, though theorists debate as to the degree of secular humanism and religiousity in Renaissance art. In earlier periods there is even a strong communal aspect to musical creations. But with the advent of scientism, that is, the triumph of scientific-rationalism, initiated by Bacon and others, the assault on the remaining vestiges of the sacred and the communal begins. What is emphasized in this discussion are the tendencies in the European aesthetic experience that began to emerge with Abelard and expanded throughout the Renaissance, reaching dominance by the Enlightenment. (DaVinci's misgivings about the separation from and

ascendence of science over its spiritual grounding did not have the cultural backing to resist the ideological momentum of the European *asili.*) European art, already heavily rationalistic, was to become secular, individualized, and elitist.

The more intellectual, individualized, and individual art became in the West, the more technical it became. The artist regarded his work as an object to be made technically perfect. That is, his ideas of perfection were much more influenced by the concept of technical and mechanical perfection than in other cultures, and this is primarily the way in which the European artist is presently shaped by his culture; these are the models with which he is presented and he perceives them "rationalistically."

Sorokin says that as European art searches for diversity and ever-increasing variety, it loses "all harmony, unity and balance," which become "submerged in an ocean of incoherency and chaos." These trends, he continues, lead to an emphasis on the technical means of production rather than the art itself. These tools become increasingly complicated ends in themselves.[7]

In his view, European art becomes increasingly "a commodity manufactured for the market" tending toward the vulgar. We should point out that the interesting contradiction in European culture is that its art may be commercially inspired ("the artist must live, after all"), geared to consumption, inspired by the desire for recognition, and at the same time remain an elitist form; that is, essentially separated from the people, because the art, like the culture, creates (controls) the people, rather than the reverse. According to Sorokin, in the artist's tendency to disregard religious and moral values, the art itself

> comes to be more and more divorced from truly cultural values and turns into an empty art known euphemistically as "art for art's sake," at once amoral, nonreligious, and nonsocial, and often *antimoral, antireligious,* and *antisocial.*[8]

This "amorality" is directly connected to the "nonsocial" character of European art. It is symptomatic of the character of the culture and can be traced from Platonic misconception, as evidenced in Havelock's work in praise of Platonic epistemology. In Havelock's view it was a "discovery" and an "advance" when the Greeks were "able" to conceive of the individual psyche as the seat of rationally determined moral judgements. But there can be no such thing as a morality lodged primarily by or initiated in the "individual." "Reason," if it is to be distinguished from emotion and feeling, is sorely insufficient to dictate "human" moral behavior. The source of human moral-

ity must necessarily be in the interaction of human beings. It must be communal, which, more than "social," implies a joining of persons. This basic fact of human existence is of primary importance in other cultures and informs their modes of organization. The lack of authentic community, i.e., the substitution of the social for the communal, accounts for much of the atrophied development of the West. Art that is noncommunal cannot be moral, and a rationally, individually conceived "ethic" is humanly, even personally, inadequate.

Daiseti Suzuki makes some observations on the comparison of European and Buddhist symbolism that help to further delineate the nature of the European aesthetic. He presents a *haiku* by an eighteenth century Japanese poet, Basho, and discusses its poetic and philosophical significance. The *haiku* form contrasts dramatically with European verbal art forms, because of its extreme simplicity and directness of intent.

Oh! Old Pond!
A frog leaps in,
The water's sound!

Of this *haiku* Suzuki says the following,

> Basho was no other than the frog when he heard the sound of the water caused by its leaping. The leaping, the sound, the frog, and the pond and Basho were all in one and one in all. There was an absolute totality; that is, an absolute identity, or to use Buddhist terminology a perfect state of emptiness (i.e. *Sunyata*) or suchness (i.e. Tathata).[9]

This sense of identity is most difficult for those nurtured in European culture to comprehend, because the culture dictates the necessity for experience to be continually mediated through concepts, through "the word," and it must be analytically absorbed. And so, it is difficult to imagine how Kant's "Analytic" or Aristotle's *Poetics* could relate to the *haiku,* for just as the mode of *haiku* reflects the principles of Buddhist philosophy, the understanding and approach of these philosophers reflects the nature of the European *utamawazo.* It follows, then, that the European idea of "symbol" is not adequate to explain Buddhist symbolism. Suzuki continues,

> . . .do we call "the old pond" or the water's sound or the leaping frog a symbol for ultimate reality? In Buddhist philosophy there is nothing behind the old pond, because it is complete in itself and does not point to anything behind or beyond or outside itself. The old pond (or the water or the frog) itself is reality. . . .
>
> Buddhist symbolism would. . .declare that everything is symbolic, it carries meaning with it, it has values of its own, it exists by its own right pointing to no reality other than itself.[10]

But lineal, causal, purposive thought presupposes a relation between "objects," and a reality that is "other than" and "outside of," them. Since this is characteristic of European ontology, it effects European art. Wade Nobles characterizes the African "symbolic method" as involving a "transformation-synchronistic-analogic modality," while the contemporary European cultural understanding of "symbol" is as a "representational-sequential-analytical" mode.[11]

Suzuki describes the feeling of exaltation that comes from identification with the pond and simultaneously with the universe itself. But in the European experience, exaltation is achieved from feelings of "control over" a passive object-and separation from it. For this reason, there is no precedent in the European tradition for identification with other people; that is, the culture does not support such identification. Suzuki points out that like *haiku,* which fixes on the immediate rather than the mediated experience,

> Zen Buddhism avoids generalization and abstraction. . . . To Buddhists, being is meaning. Being and meaning are one and not separate; the separation or bifurcation comes from intellection, and intellection distorts the suchness of things.[12]

The habit of analysis does not make room for this kind of apprehension, and the predominance of the analytic mode in the European experience has all but eliminated the sensitivity to immediately perceivable beauty and its definition. It is the European conviction that an experience of art must be difficult; that profundity is only comprehended through intellectual struggle.

Willie Abraham says,

> The amount of get up, preparation and education which the modern European mind requires to resuscitate its sense of *rapport* with the beautiful and the sublime, the arid technicalities of his sophistication is artificial sensitivity. It is only when sensitivity is natural that it is immediate, effortless, picturesque, non-nostalgic, and intuitive. The sophisticated sensitivity must tear apart what it contemplates. It is analytic inquisitive, carving-knife sensitivity.[13]