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Interconnectivity in the Region of Eurasia: Mongolia's Presence in the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 after breakdown of the socialist system and the Soviet Union as a new form of cooperation between former socialist countries in Eurasian region. Mongolia joined the SCO in 2005 with an observer member status. Since 2007, Presidents of Mongolia began to participate every year to the Summit of the heads of SCO member states. By the initiative of Mongolian President, in 2014 the tripartite format of the meetings of the leaders of three countries: Russia, China, and Mongolia were established. In June 2016, during the third meeting of the leaders of Russia, China, and Mongolia in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), "The Russia-China-Mongolia Economic Corridor Program" document was signed. This program is aiming to develop the infrastructure of three countries, ensuring the competitiveness of products on the world market, and strengthening the Eurasian integration. The content of this program is combining the main ideas of Chinese "Belt-Road" megaproject, Russian initiative for developing of Eurasian economic integration and Mongolian "Steppe Road" project. The main goal of the "Steppe Road" initiative is to involve Mongolia to become the transit territory for transportation of natural gas, oil, and other products between Russia and China. In conclusion, the author gives some comments regarding the issue of full membership status of Mongolia to the international organization—SCO.

Keywords: multi-pillar policy, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the tripartite format of the meetings of the leaders of Russia, China, and Mongolia, Russia-China-Mongolia Economic Corridor Program, "Steppe Road" project initiative

Introduction

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 as a challenge to new changes occuring on vast Eurasian space after collapse of the socialist system and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, the emergence of the new international order, the normalization of Chinese-Russian relations, the rise of terrorism, and other circumstances created the need for search of mutual understanding between the states of the Eurasian continent, creation of new structures for dialogue on issues of regional cooperation, global challenges of world politics and international relations.

The original purpose of "Shanghai Five" was the struggle against international terrorism, nationalistic separatism, and religious extremism. Since life is multifaceted and brings forward new challenges, in the process of forming the SCO as an international organization, its activities subsequently covered the spheres of economy and humanitarian aspects. Since January 2004, the SCO has started functioning as a full-fledged

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international structure with its own working mechanism, staff, and budget. The SCO is not a military bloc or an open regulatory conference on security issues, so it occupies an intermediate position. As a new mechanism for dialogue and cooperation between states, the SCO fulfils its main mission to strengthen stability and security in a broad space which unites participating states in combating terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, developing economic cooperation, energy space, scientific and cultural interaction. Therefore, this international organization was formed as an optimal mechanism for dialogue and development of joint decisions concerning a huge range of tasks.

Relations Between Mongolia and the SCO

With the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes have taken place in the internal situation, politics, and international relations of Mongolia. With the collapse of the world socialist system and the USSR, Mongolia was given an opportunity to conduct an independent foreign policy which expressed the fundamental interests of the Mongolian people. The country was given an opportunity to pursue a balanced policy with regard to neighbouring states, avoid participation in their bilateral conflicts that do not affect the interests of Mongolia, formulate new "policy of a third neighbour", pursue an active foreign policy in international relations, and promote its own interests. During the Cold War, Mongolia was involved not only in the international confrontation between the West and East, but also directly involved in ideological first, and then a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and China, which had a negative impact on national security of the country. Since the late 1980s, Soviet-Chinese relations began to normalize with a positive effect on normalization of Mongolian-Chinese relations.

The "Foreign Policy Concept of Mongolia", adopted by the country's parliament in 1994 and updated in 2011, indicates that the country will adhere to basic principles of peace, openness, multi-pillar policy and independence. Article 14.1 of the Concept defines the priority objective of the foreign policy of Mongolia as friendly relations with Russia and China, with which it will pursue a balanced policy in the spirit of good neighbourly relations and the development of large-scale cooperation. At the same time, historical traditions and specifics of economic cooperation with these states will be taken into account. Deepening international relations and cooperation with its two neighbours, Mongolia is developing relationship of strategic cooperation with Russia since 2009 and with China since 2011.

Adhering to the principles of openness and multi-pillar policy, Mongolia expressed desire to cooperate with the SCO, in which two great neighbours of our country play a big role: the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China. In June 2004, at the Summit of heads of SCO member states in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the organization expanded accepting Mongolia as a new member with observer status. It's remarkable that our country became first member-state with observer status in history of SCO.

In 2005, at the Fifth Summit of the SCO heads of state in Astana (Kazakhstan), the Declaration of the heads of SCO member states was signed recording further consolidation of efforts and strengthening of coordination, which expressed the desire of SCO for expansion and improvement of its activities.

Starting from this Summit on, delegation of Mongolia's representatives began for the first time to participate in the annual meetings of the SCO as an observer country. This participation was a clear expression of deep interest of our country in active engagement in the process of political and economic cooperation of the SCO member countries which later allowed expansion of Mongolia's relations with Central Asian countries. Since the start of permanent involvement in the activities of the SCO, Mongolia has been paying great attention

to improving relations between the SCO member states and observer countries, seeking ways and opportunities to expand cooperation with the SCO member states. From this position, Mongolia expresses its gratitude to all members of SCO for understanding of the observer-state's position regarding development of trade and economic cooperation with the countries of the SCO on a mutually beneficial basis.

It should be noted that the SCO observer-states are entitled to participate in the meetings of the Ministers and the heads of the SCO member states, because the SCO Secretariat invites Mongolian delegation to participate in such meetings and other events. This opens up new opportunities for Mongolia to establish business contacts at various levels of cooperation, to obtain necessary information for promotion of a permanent mechanism of interaction. Here we can give a detailed example.

The SCO supported Mongolia's initiative to hold a regular meeting of the SCO Business Council in Mongolia's capital Ulan Bator. A regular meeting of the SCO Business Council was held on December 23, 2010 in Mongolia, in which the heads of national business councils of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan participated. The meeting discussed for the first time the issue of the possibility of the SCO observer-country participating in projects implemented within the framework of Business Councils. Particular attention was paid to expanding cooperation in areas of energy, transport, minerals, and health. Ulaanbaatar meeting was of great significance for Mongolia since it gave a new impetus to exchange of information between member-states and observer-countries of the SCO, establishment of business relations between the businesses of these countries and providing information for the SCO member-states on the prospects of intensification of Mongolia's participation in multilateral cooperation.

In 2007, President of Mongolia Enkhbayar Nambar for the first time attended the Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) Summit of the heads of states of the SCO. From 2009 to 2017, President of Mongolia Elbegdorj Tsahia actively participated in the annual Summits of the SCO heads of state. In 2012, Mongolia proposed to organize SCO Forum in Ulaanbaatar with the aim of intensifying cooperation between the member states and observer countries of the SCO.

In the spring of 2014 the President of Mongolia Elbegdorj Tsahia proposed the "Ulaanbaatar dialogues" initiative for the purpose of establishing new mechanism of Mongolia's dialogue with the two neighbouring countries—Russia and China at the highest level. This initiative was supported by the leaders of the two neighbouring states Xi Jingping and Vladimir Putin. In September 2014 at the Dushanbe (Tajikistan) Summit of heads of member states of the SCO, the first meeting of leaders of the Russian Federation, People's Republic of China and Mongolia took place. During the meeting, the need for development of cooperation in such format was stressed and it was agreed to continue to hold such meetings on regular basis. During this meeting, President Xi Jinping supported the proposal of the Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsahia on the possibility of linking the Chinese "One Belt—One Road" megaproject with the Mongolia's "Steppe Road " project initiative. It is noteworthy that the leaders of the three states met within the framework of the SCO Summit, which confirms the need to further strengthen Mongolia's multilateral cooperation with the SCO member-states.

During the first meeting, the leaders of the three countries stressed for the first time the importance of linking interests of each of the three sides, as manifested in the desire to integrate Chinese "Belt-Road" megaproject, the Russian policy of development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Mongolia's "Steppe Road" initiative. The goal of the Mongolia's "Steppe Road" project is active participation of Mongolia in the transit transportation of goods from Europe to Asia.

The second meeting of the leaders of the three countries of Mongolia, China, and Russia took place in July 2015, again at the annual Summit of heads of state of the SCO member-states in Ufa (Bashkiria) during which all sides agreed to further promote trilateral format of cooperation aiming to develop concrete proposals and practical projects.

During the third meeting in June 2016 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the leaders of Russia, China, and Mongolia—Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Elbegdorj Tsahia signed "The Russia-China-Mongolia Economic Corridor Program" document. The main objective of the program is to ensure conditions for development and expansion of tripartite cooperation among China, Mongolia, and Russia through implementation of joint projects. Implementation of the program shall ensure competitiveness of products on the world market and make easier trans-boundary transportation for development of infrastructure. While in the period of socialist construction (1921-1990) the Soviet Union was the dominant political and economic ally for Mongolia, during the last 20 years China became the main trade and economic partner of the country. In such conditions, the successful implementation of the Russia-China-Mongolia Economic Corridor Program which takes into account specific needs of each of the three countries will undoubtedly contribute to Mongolia's balanced development and enhance efficiency of economic growth. Implementation of this program will facilitate creation of the space for joint mutually beneficial economic development, thereby contributing to fulfilment of the SCO goals and shall serve as a good example of successful cooperation of SCO member countries with observer states. On June 9-10, 2018 in Qingdao, China, the next Summit of the SCO Heads of State took place in which Battulga Khaltmaa, elected President of Mongolia in 2017 participated for the first time. During the Summit of the SCO Heads of States, the fourth meeting of the leaders of the three countries—the Russian Federation, Mongolia, and China was held. During this meeting, President Battulga Khaltmaa put forward a number of proposals:

- On the issue of practical implementation of the Russia-China-Mongolia Economic Corridor Program, he stressed the need for mutual coordination of contacts at the level of ministries and departments of the three countries, implementation of agreements already reached at all levels, promotion of tripartite contacts aiming on implement more than 30 joint projects outlined in this program.
- President Battulga Khaltmaa expressed Mongolia's interest in becoming an active participant in the transit of natural gas, oil, and other products between Russia and China through Mongolian territory.
- Furthermore, he raised a practical proposal to involve Mongolia in the international highway Naushki-Tianjin, which would pass through the territory of Mongolia and contribute to the development of its transport infrastructure.
- With regard to the status of Mongolia's membership in the SCO, the President clearly expressed his view that Mongolian society is engaged in active debate over membership in this international organization.

Participation of Mongolia in activities of the SCO, the tripartite format of the meetings of the leaders of Russia, China, and Mongolia, adoption of the Russia-Mongolia-China Economic Corridor Program, the launching of practical projects, active exchange of views on international security, regional and global interaction, establishment of new relations and development of Mongolia's cooperation with other members of the SCO states are, in my view, a clear example of development of Eurasian integration.

Conclusions and Some Comments

In conclusion, the author would like to say a few words about possibility of full membership of Mongolia

in the SCO. It was often asked this question during presentations at international conferences. As you know, in 2017, the SCO accepted as full members 2 observer-states—India and Pakistan. Many experts believe that Mongolia is a real candidate for full membership in the SCO.

It must be said that there are both external and internal circumstances. Mongolian society has not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Among the Mongolian politicians, scholars, experts, there are differing approaches to this issue. Some believe it's time for Mongolia to become a full member of the SCO. Others expressed a view that we need to wait; it's not yet the time or that we need to wait for the right moment to address this issue. Issues related to foreign policy and national security are solved in the national parliament—the State Khural (Assembly) of the country. At the moment, this question was not put on the agenda of the discussion in the Parliament. So the question of the membership of Mongolia in the SCO is open.

Regarding external circumstances, today the Russian Federation and China maintain a very stable and friendly relationship of strategic partnership, which is a very favourable international factor for Mongolia. Doubts exist that the SCO membership will affect Mongolia's balanced foreign policy with respect to two neighbouring countries: Russia and China. There are also concerns that full membership may lead to increased pressure or dominant position of one or two major SCO players in Mongolia. Unfortunately, Mongolia had a bitter experience in this respect in its historical past.

Some Mongolian experts believe that as long as Mongolia is not able to fully meet the basic criteria for full membership in the SCO which are set out in the organization's charter on membership requirements adopted in 2010 at the Summit of the heads of State in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). Among the eight main criteria, Mongolia may be subject to criticism in relation to the clause on establishment of active relations in trade-economic and cultural spheres with the member-states of SCO. This refers to the issue of Mongolia's cooperation with the rest of Central Asia, with the exception of Kazakhstan, with which our country maintains closer cooperation.

More than once the SCO is criticized as allegedly nothing more than a "discussion club". Scholars and experts from different countries are putting forward interesting proposals for further improvement and expansion of SCO activities.

The author thinks it is necessary to listen to critical remarks and rational proposals. Then the mechanism of development of the SCO will be more pragmatic and the goals advanced will be realized in practice. If the SCO management and coordination mechanisms are improved in the future, it may well become the world's largest integration bloc due to its vast potential.

Thus, the SCO could transform into a real alternative to Western hegemony and become the basis of a new just world order in form of successful mechanism for integration efforts over the vast Eurasian space.

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China in Africa: A Partner or Patron Ethiopia in Focus

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This study examined Africa-China relation by taking the post-1991 Sino-Ethiopia relations as a case study, in light of patron-client relationship. Methodologically, the study employed qualitative research methodological approach and case study research design. Accordingly, the study has used secondary source of data collected from books, journal articles, government reports, and other pertinent internet sources. Given the data gathered are qualitative; the study employed qualitative data analysis techniques specifically document and discourse analysis. The findings of the study show that although both countries evoked the rhetoric altruistic principles of strategic partnership, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, Ethio-China relation is asymmetrical. Party-to-party relations is more apparent and thus from the Ethiopia aspect, regime sustenance is prior agenda than State sustenance and interest. This foreshadows patron-clientelism. This study, therefore, suggests the need of pragmatic engagement and adoption of countering strategy of patronage and "clientelism". Falling to do so would mean blessing "clientelism".

Keywords: patron-client, development partner, China, Africa, Ethiopia

Introduction

African-China relations have evoked much discussion and become a contentious issue in contemporary literatures. Although the relation of China with Africa dates back to ancient times, the year 1950's was the turning point of their relation (Gedion & Mathews, 2010). Since 1950's the Sino-African relation was turbulent and it was on the eve of end of Cold War that Africa and China vividly entered into a new relations.

In the aftermath of the end of Cold War, China pays high attention to the continental Africa (Fantahun, 2013). Since then China engagement in Africa is unprecedented. The multifaceted and the very contentious China-Africa relation began to be studied since the "rise of China" in Africa and particularly since the end of the Cold War. While much of current scholarship has been preoccupied with China's deepening presence in Africa and the threat, this poses to Western interests in the continent (Dijk, 2009), Chinese as a new colonizer or partner (Fantahun, 2013), the motive of China in Ethiopia (Seifudein, 2012); the debates have failed to situate and view China-Africa, in particular China-Ethiopia, relations in light of patron-client relations. Likewise, Tegegne (2007) studies the impacts of Chinese imports on domestic producer largely from economic point of view. As well, Gofie and Venkataraman (2015) examined Ethio-China trade relations from economic sphere. These aforesaid studies neglected the interplay of politics and economics. Thus, the departure of this study is that the politico-economic relation of and "political game" between Ethiopia and China can be understood in light of patron and client. Thus, earlier studies give only scant attention and overlook an important insight and in turn leave deficiency in the available literature. Thus, it is the intention of this study to

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examine Africa-China relation, Ethiopia as a case study, in light of patron-client relationship.

To this end, the study has eight parts. The first part is introduction. The second is a conceptual analysis. The third part depicts Ethio-China historical relations. The fourth and fifth parts examine Ethio-China relations in light of patron-client relations. The sixth and seven parts are about the challenges and prospects of Ethio-China relations. Final, the paper has concluding remarks.

Patron-Client Relationship: A Conceptual Framework

This paper's analysis of Ethio-China relations is contextualized by patron-client relationship approach. It is conventionally believed that patron-client relationship and inter-state relations are oxymoron. Nevertheless, patron-client relationship may be used as an analytical tool beyond intra-state relations. Although contemporary literatures, most often, treat patron-client relationship as synonymous with "patrimonialism", for the purpose of this paper, patron-client relationship can be defined as an asymmetric relation, reciprocal exchange of benefits and as a "give- and take- relations". According to Fukuyama (2014, p. 59), "a patronage relationship is a reciprocal exchange of favors between two individual of different status and power, usually involving favors given by the patron to the client in exchange for the client's loyalty and political support". Although Fukuyama's definition of patronage and other scholar's (Szeftel, 2000; Kiser & Sacks, 2011) theoretical literature focuses primarily on intra-state "clientelism", the model is an important insight to examine the relations of highly unequal and asymmetrical inter-state relations. Lyons (1986), for instance, goes beyond the conventional meaning of patron-client relations and he used patron-client relations as a unit of analysis in examining Ethio-U.S. relations. Thus, it is possible to examine asymmetrical inter-state relations in light of patron-client relationship. In inter-state relations, patron-client relationship may be manifested through the provision of material support, aid, unconditional loans and protection from the stronger state (the patron state) and reciprocally a degree of deference, access to resource, political and ideological support from its weaker partner (the client state) (Ciorciari, 2013). Consequently, this asymmetric and reciprocal relation may erode the sovereignty and autonomy of the so-called "client state".

In this regard, the "rise of China in Africa" led scholars and politicians to warn African leaders to counter the danger of patron-client relationship between China and African countries. Particularly in Western discourse, China is regarded as a new-colonizer of Africa, new imperialist and new-mercantilist. For instance, Yan and Barry (2007), in their studies of the "China-in-Africa discourse", used the title "The Forest for the Trees[1]" to illustrates reciprocity in Sino-African relations. Likewise, *A New York Times Editorial*, as cited in (Zeleza, 2008, p. 175; Yan & Barry, 2007, p. 9) used the title "Patron of African Misgovernment" to depict China-Africa relations. Moreover, this suspicion and danger has been official notified by U.S. president Barack Obama[2] by saying "So many Africans have told me... We don't want patrons; we want partners who help us build our own capacity to grow". Thus, his speech foreshadows the existent of a patron-client relation between Africans and others be it China or other Western countries. Thus, it is the central objective of this paper to examine whether China is a development partner or a patron of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular.

[1] This indicates that the "Forest" which symbolizes China—a dominant and central figure—protects the tress and; the tress—countries of Africa—also reciprocally supports the China.

[2] Obama's speech to the people of Africa at the African Union Headquarters on July 28, 2015. Accessed September 2016 from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/28/remarks-president-obama-people-africa.

The Genesis of Ethio-China Relations: A Historical Perspective

Though there is no consensus among historians and scholars about the initial contact of China and Africa, Sino-Africa relations have ancient roots[3]. Although Sino-Africa relation can be traced back to ancient times, it was the Bandung Conference[4] of 1955 which was marked as a watershed in Sino-African in general and Sino-Ethiopian relations (Dent, 2011; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). Following the conference, China sent Chinese People's Cultural and Art Delegation to African countries including Ethiopia (Wei, 2011). In these earlier periods, though China was perceived as "Other" due to ideological reason, Ethio-China relations has undergone and opened a new chapter. During the imperial regime of Ethiopia, China denounces the Fascist invasion. Ethiopia, on its side, abstained from voting to China in the quest of admission to the UN as a sole representative of all the Chinese people. However, Ethiopia voted later for Chinese (Shinn, 2014).

Despite such progress, Ethio-China relations during the imperial period was an up and down relations. Moreover, Chinese and Ethiopia interest in international issues had also been different, if not contradictory. The USA interest in the horn of Africa and its amicable relation with the imperial Ethiopian government on one side and the establishment of China-Somalia diplomatic relations, and the signing of the a protocol for economic and technical cooperation between China and Somalia in 1969—all in all contributed for the delay of official diplomatic relations between China and Ethiopia (Wang, 2014; Wei, 2011). Though there were some kinds of relations between the two countries, diplomatic relationship was only established in 1970.

In 1974 the military council, *Derg*, came to power via revolution. Thus, the regime change in Ethiopia has its own repercussion for the government at Beijing. Although amicable relations have been manifested in the aftermath of the coming power of the *Derge* regime, their relations were eroded as of 1976 and 1977 due to Chinese support for Somalia and Ethiopian alliance with the Soviet Union (Shinn, 2014). Thus, China-Ethiopian relations both under the imperial and military *Derg* regime were problematic due to the domestic, regional, and international conditions or simply because of the interplay of domestic and international politics.

In 1991 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democracy Front (EPRDF) came to power by overthrowing the military *Derg* regime. China has become a new partner of the Ethiopia's new government. Different factors contributed for this new relation: (a) to gain international recognition and support, (b) the need of socio-economy recovery thru foreign assistance, (c) Chinese motif to return to Africa, (d) Chinese as an alternative of Western countries (Shinn, 2014). Thus, due to these reasons, the new Ethiopian government regarded China as the best candidate for future economic relations. Their relations have reached climax level with the visit of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to China in 1995 and reciprocated by the president Jiang Zemin of China who visited Ethiopia in 1996 (Wang, 2014; Wei, 2011; Fantahun, 2013). Therefore, the year 1995 was a watershed because this was the period which marked the beginning of a new dimension of Ethio-China bilateral relation. Ethiopia-China relations also strengthened with the launch of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was held in Beijing. In this regard, Ethiopia organized the second ministerial conference of FOCAC in 2003 in Addis Ababa (Fantahun, 2013). In view of that, from Chinese

[3] For Dent, Sino-African relations traced back to the 10th century BC and there was a bilateral trade between Alexandria, city of Egypt and China. In contrast, Lumumba-Kasongo traced China's first contact with Africa as old as the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century.

[4] The Bandung Conference was an Asian-African summit held in April 1955. The conference was attended by 29 countries of which six countries were from Africa; Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan.

perspective, Ethiopia is seen as a unique partner. However, in reality China used Ethiopia as means to an end.

China as a Development Partner of Ethiopia

Scholars regarded the growing engagement of China in Africa as predominantly obsessed by resource for its growing economy and a market for its manufactured goods. Taylor (2006) contends that the key Chinese interest in Africa is resource particularly oil. Similarly Corkin (2008) stated that the underlying motives for current Chinese growing engagement in Africa is the growing need for raw materials and oil to feed China's burgeoning economy. Thus, for most of, if not all, Western analysts, the main driving force behind China's involvement in Africa is for natural resources and thus, China focuses on a few resource hubs African countries. However, China has a growing relation with non-resourceful African countries such as Ethiopia. Ethio-China relations have been growing with unprecedented degree since 1995 (Fantahun, 2013). The increasing role of China in Ethiopia and the growing tendency of Ethiopia towards China have its own ground. Thus, China in Ethiopia—why China in Ethiopia?—may depict a new insight in identifying the lust of China in Africa.

On both sides, their relationship is motivated by economic, diplomatic, strategic, and ideological considerations. Both have their own intrinsic goals to be achieved, though their relation is asymmetrical. According to Gedion and Mathews (2010), the growing propensity of Ethiopia towards China is due to economic assistance, alternative partner to the West and role model. Cabestan (2012) also contends that for Ethiopia, "partnership with China mainly serves the internal political and economic purposes of the regime that has been in place since 1991" (p. 52). First, the growing involvement of China is an opportunity for Ethiopia in the areas of foreign aid, loans, and investment. In this regard, China is providing aid, credit finance, unconditional loan, and also debt reduction without any politico-economic requirements to be fulfilled by Ethiopia. Second, Ethiopia regarded China as an alternative to the Western powers. Third, Ethio-China relation is more of pragmatic (Shinn, 2014; Gedion & Mathews, 2010). Both countries underlined altruistic principles such as solidarity, cooperation, mutual benefit as the core guiding principles of their relations. Moreover, China has been providing direct aid in building projects and offering scholarships for Ethiopian students to study in China. Although some regarded the rise of China in Africa as a new wave of colonialism where African countries supply their raw materials to China while the latter sends its manufactured goods to Africa, Ethiopia is not as such a resource full country as compared to other resource endowed African countries. Thus, why China in Ethiopia? What is the very lust of China in Ethiopia if its interest driver is resource?

For China, Ethiopia is in its list of strategic partner. First, Ethiopia's vital role in Africa political history and its strategic location as the seat of Africa Union, United Nations economic commission for Africa, different international and regional organizations, and diplomatic missions—all make Ethiopia a potential candidate to be a strategic ally and partner of any external actors in the continent (Seifudein, 2012; Gedion & Mathews, 2010). Thus, Ethiopia, a country being the diplomatic capital of Africa, is well situated for a country like China to influence the continent. Without doubt, Chinese growing relations with Ethiopia, the diplomatic hub and water tower of African country, has a symbolic significance for the government at Beijing. Second, Chinese quest for raw material particularly oil is one driving force of China in Ethiopia. Third, China interest in Ethiopia as elsewhere Africa is to halt the diplomatic relation between African countries and Taiwan and in turn to get the support of African countries for its "One Chain Policy" (Shinn, 2014; Gedion & Mathews, 2010). Thus, for China, economic and trade cooperation with Ethiopia is not an end in itself rather it is viewed as a means.

Is China a Patron?

The presence of China in Africa is the subject of different and varying interpretations. Contemporary scholarship illustrates China as neo-colonialist and new imperialist. For instance, *New York Times* in 2007 (as cited in Zeleza, 2008, p. 175) describes China as "Patron of African Misgovernment". Another study (Assogbavi, 2010) also portrays China as Sudan's, particularly the ruling National Congress Party's, key patron during the Darfur crisis. Thus, historically, a patron-client relation is not new in Sino-African relations. In this regard, Ethiopia is not exceptional rather there exist complex relations between China and Ethiopia. Do patron-client relations depict such relations? Is there any foreshadow impetus of patron-client relations? These are the core questions of this paper. Although the engagement of China in Ethiopia is not new, the scope, scale, and area of post-1991 Chinese involvement in Ethiopia is unprecedented. Since 1995, China has broadened its relationship with Ethiopia in numerous areas: aid, finance (loan and grant), investment, trade, development assistance, technology transfer, training and education, and cultural exchange. Despite the rhetoric "altruistic principle" of equality, held by both countries political leaders, the underlying conditions are highly asymmetrical (Seifudein, 2012). From China perspective, Ethio-China relation is win-win cooperation, however their relation and engagement is far from win-win. Thus, their relation remains asymmetrical and very complex.

Such asymmetrical relations may have a danger of patron-client relations. One distinct features of patron-client relation is that the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status, and it is also based on the principle of reciprocity (Ciorciari, 2013). In this regard, there is a foreshadow impetus of a patron-client relationship in the contemporary Africa-China in general and Ethio-China relations in particular. First, reciprocity is manifested in Sino-African relations. The government of China has been increasingly encouraging Chinese corporations to play a role in broad Sino-Africa ties. Reciprocally this empowers China to maintain its commercial and political links with African countries. An important "spin-off" of this is to create a patron friends and adherents which will give both moral and political support to their patroniser within the international system. On the side of China, it is the very lust of China to have African countries as a counterbalance strategy against the U.S. global hegemony. On the side of African countries including Ethiopia, absence of political conditionality and aid either in the form of grant or loan would enable the ruling elite to consolidate their power and in turn to ensure their life presidency and engage in administrative mal-practice. Though African countries have friendly relations with China, the Ethiopia case is different, if not similar. Ethiopia particularly the government is perceived as a friend of Beijing in a special way. In the views of Chinese political leaders, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who said in 2006 FOCAC, "China is not looting Africa", was regarded as an effective expositor and even defender of China as a model and partner for Africa (Seifudein, 2012). Thus, their relation is a form of "tit for tat". Second, the observed intimacy and intense political relations between political elites in China and numerous African countries may have a danger of patron-client relations. This is particularly true in Ethio-China relations. One of the elements which underpin Ethio-China relation is party-to-party relations. Although China and Ethiopia are different in ideology, they are similar in practice. Not surprisingly, EPRDF and Chinese communist party (CCP) have a strong relation (Shinn, 2014; Lejeune, 2015). They have also signed a memorandum of understanding on Exchange and Cooperation between the CPC and EPRDF in 2010. CCP also sent delegations to the EPRDF's Organizational Conferences in 2008, 2010, and 2013. Moreover, Ethiopia also learns the media practice of China which is totally against

freedom of press (Lejeune, 2015). Realistically speaking, Ethiopian's media practice is a carbon copy of Chinese[5].

Shinn (2014) stated that "China provides technical assistance and jamming equipment to help Ethiopia's Information Security Network block signals from anti-government radio stations and, from time to time, the Amharic-language programs of the Voice of America and Deutsche Welle" (p. 11). On the side of China, CCP promised to extend the CCP's support in party capacity building, leadership skill training, and experience sharing in various areas. In reciprocity, the Ethiopian Parliament passed a resolution in support of Chinese Anti-Secession Law in 2006 (p. 11).

China looked Ethiopia and also African countries as a way to ward off Western criticism of its human rights record by maintaining a patron friend. On Ethiopia side, EPRDF uses China as a fortress against criticism and disavowal of the West. This is clearly manifested in the aftermath of the 2005 Ethiopian general election[6]. While the Western criticized the ruling party, China became the major trading partner of Ethiopia (Seifudein, 2012). Thus, party-to-party relations are another manifestation of patron-client relations. And such party-to-party relation may pose a patron-client relation. Moreover, the asymmetric relations may unintentionally become a patron-client relation, at least in the near future.

Challenges of Ethio-China Relations

Ethio-China relationship has been growing with unprecedented degree. However, their relationship is not without difficulties and challenge. For the moment, political leaders at both Addis Ababa and Beijing are more or less Sino-optimists in their bilateral relations. However, there is a growing scholarship which viewed Ethio-China relations from Sino-pessimistic and Sino-pragmatist perspectives. This is, without question, imputes of new wave of challenge in Ethio-China relations.

Symmetric or Asymmetric Relations?

Despite the rhetoric principle of mutual benefit invoked by the political leaders of China and Ethiopia, Ethio-China relations are largely asymmetrical. From the economic point of view, the nature of trade relations between China and Ethiopia is highly imbalance and in favour of China. A study by Gofie and Venkataraman (2015), for instance, putted the negative balance of trade facing Ethiopia as follows:

> Ethiopia was reported to have recorded a trade deficit of 2,366 million USD in the fourth quarter of 2012. Balance of Trade for Ethiopia was reported to be 1,556 million from 2006 until 2012, 956.70 during the second quarter of 2007 and 2,366.20 million in the fourth quarter of 2012. (p. 10)

All in all the balance of trade is overwhelmingly negative for Ethiopia while it is totally positive for China. Despite the rhetoric aspiration of reciprocal (mutual) benefits from China-Ethiopian relations, in the area of trade, their relations is asymmetrical. However I'm not rebuffing the growing trade and capital flow in Ethio-China relations rather I'm arguing that one of the contentious issues in their relations is trade imbalance and this in turn further exacerbates the country's problems. I'm not a "*fortune-teller*" but the already existed asymmetrical relation is foreshadowing "clientelism".

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[5] Although Ethiopia publicly declared press freedom, it remains ineffectual. Thus, the practices of Ethiopia and China in areas of mass media and other social media are similar, though they purse different medial policy.

[6] While the Western regarded the 2005 general election of Ethiopia as authoritarian and undemocratic, China refrains from critiquing it and continues its relation even with an alarming rate.

West Beijing or South Beijing?

Since the Cold War period, Chinese official documents unanimously tried to distinguish Chinese engagement, its aid and political cooperation, with Africa from the Soviet Union and the Western countries practice (Liu, 2010). Paradoxically, the reality shows that China shares some practices of the West. In this regard, China unprecedented engagement and an expected openness and optimistic view on the part of African leaders may make China a "West Beijing". This is true with regard to its provision of credit finance. In Ethiopia, Chinese credit finance is much larger than its foreign direct investment. So, what makes China different from the West is a question, although the rhetoric win-win partnership still prevails. Despite Chinese claims of a truly South partner different from the West, its engagement remains in question.

The Two Facet of Corruption

It is undeniable fact that corruption has become one of the greatest challenges of Ethiopian development. On one hand, corruption may affect the active engagement of Chinese companies in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the engagement of China in Ethiopia and its aid may further exacerbate administrative mal-practice. Although it is not the deliberate intention of China, some Chinese companies have established patronage system with public officials. In this regard, Gofie and Venkataraman (2015) stated that;

> there are significant amount of Chinese products that are imported through contraband trade by rent seeking China's business persons owing largely to the low import tax for items imported from China. This has also led to business practices such as illegally laminating on items imported from Europe the word "Made in China" in order to evade import taxes. This raises the issue of the need for appropriate tariff arrangements that does not allow for illegality but retaining the essentials of market mechanisms. (p. 9)

Thus, corruption both in Ethiopia and Chinese engagement as aggravating factors of administrative mal-practice is another challenge. This may further led to absence of demarcation between legal and illegal, private and public activities and this in turn unintentionally led to patron-client relations.

Different But Similar Ideology

It seems difficult to situate Chinese and Ethiopia's ideological difference and similarity. On one hand, Ethiopia and China are following different ideological paths (Gedion & Mathews, 2010). Ethiopia is following politically revolutionary democracy while economically democratic developmental state. Unlike Ethiopia, China is a communist state. Paradoxically, Ethiopia and China are practicing a similar ideology. Both regimes' are presuming state-led development as a compulsory condition for lasting regime stability. Not surprisingly, both countries dream is similar; Ethiopia prophesies the so-called Ethiopian Renaissance while China's aim is achieving National Rejuvenation.

This similarity further helped by the launch of party-to-party relations. Thus, both countries underline what is known as "the end justifies the means". If both countries are striving for the end by any means, it would be possible to follow any kind of relationship, be it strategic partnership or patronage. But the question is that how the two countries relations can be viewed as strategic partnership. This may suggest that their ideological confusion but similar practice may paradoxically lead them to patronage and clientelism.

Prospects of Ethio-China Relations

Ethio-China relation is very contentious and complex in its nature. The rise of China provides both the opportunity and challenge for Ethiopia. In this regard, what challenges will face Ethiopia and what

opportunities Ethiopia will have with its engagement with China may not be seen different from other African counties relations with China. Thus, both the opportunities and challenges of the rise of China in Africa would be determined by each of African countries level of engagement, political will and commitment, united strategy to engage China, having common stance and say (Cheru & Obi, 2010). The rise of China in Africa would be beneficial for Africans if and only if Africans are in a position to defend their interest, pursuing an alternative strategy to engage China. Moreover, African peoples must be aware of the fact that the official China and African ruling elite relations may lead to the unintentional establishment of a patron-client relations. Thus, examining China-Africa relations from Africans people perspective has paramount importance. In this regard, the case of Ethiopia is not different from that of other African countries. Therefore, there is a need to have a strategic way of engagement aimed at countering the perceived patron-client relations between China and Ethiopia particularly between the two countries ruling party. Falling to adopt countering strategy may be quoted as officially acknowledging "clientelism". Moreover, in the words of Cheru and Obi (2010), it would be also "neo-colonialism by invitation".

Conclusion

In this paper, attempt has been made to examine China-Africa relations by taking Ethio-China relations as a case study. For the present moment, China is regarded as a development partner of Ethiopia and other African countries; however there is a sign of a patron-client relation between African ruling elites and China. Thus, Chinese role in Ethiopia and other African countries should not be treated in terms of the rhetoric "altruistic" principles invoked by African ruling elite and Chinese. In this regard, the very China growing presence in Ethiopia should be viewed in light of Ethiopia people's interest, aspiration, and development rather than in terms of party-to-party relations and aid that comes from China. It will be "naïve" to negate the positive role of China in Ethiopia in terms of its involvement in various sectors, building of infrastructures and various projects, growing trade relations, investment and aid; but we should examine whether Chinese presence in Ethiopia as elsewhere in Africa is as a means to an end or an end in itself.

This will depend on the reality and our own interpretation; if the reality is that Chinese growing presence in Africa further exacerbates the intra-inequality and if Chinese aid is being used to further consolidate life presidency and the power of the ruling elite, then it is possible to situate China African relations as a patron-client. Though it seems too difficult to deny the rhetoric of strategic partnership, mutual benefit, win-win cooperation, China-Africa relations is a kind of asymmetrical relationship. Thus, in contemporary Ethio-China, in general China-Africa relations, there is a need on the part of Africa to reconsider their relations with China. The undeniable fact is that there is a manifestation of patronage and "clientelism" in contemporary Africa-China relations indirectly. Thus, African countries should have a countering strategy of patronage and "clientelism". Falling to do so will mean blessing "clientelism".

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Policy Framework for Community and State Policing in Combating Rising Security Challenges in Nigeria

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Viability of decentralizing policing in Nigeria had been on the front burner of security discourse since Nigeria returned to democratic governance in 1999. Valid points had been put forward by both those in support and those in opposition. The Community Policing Department of the Nigeria Police had remained more of an administrative unit with little impact beyond the Police Community Relations Committee activities. Rising cases of herdsmen attacks of various communities, terrorist insurgency in the North-East, kidnappings across the different geo-political zones had resulted in the need to interrogate the efficacy of effective community policing and state policing as viable options to combating rising security challenges. The study adopted qualitative method, and being a library research relied entirely on secondary data. Sources of data included journals, relevant textbooks, newspapers, magazines, and materials downloaded from internet. The paper argues that the traditional security agencies had failed to effectively combat the many security challenges that Nigeria faces. The combination of the official security agencies and the military had failed to effectively combat insecurity in the country. The local vigilante groups on the other hand had made valuable inroad in curtailing some of the security challenges including terrorist insurgency as a result of their knowledge of the terrain. The paper concludes that to effectively combat the many security challenges, there is a need for new policy framework at the federal and state levels that would decentralize policing and give legal backing for collaboration between the official security agencies under the federal government and state security outfits including the vigilante.

Keywords: community policing, state policing, security challenges, policy framework, vigilante

Introduction

It is generally accepted that the principal role of government in any society is to provide security. No doubt, security is the ultimate for all times, climes, peoples, and nations and "unless one can be assured of his physical security or safety, everything else will be meaningless" (Kupoluyi & Nwogwugwu, 2015). According to Imobighe (2003), without security, individuals within a state will find it difficult to engage in productive activities. Similarly, without security, the state is bound to experience great difficulty in harnessing its human and material resources towards meaningful development and the promotion of the general well-being of the people. The internal or domestic security of a country is very crucial for the attraction of foreign investments, as well as nation-building and national development. Foreign investors would prefer to go to investment

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destinations that are regarded as secure (Kupoluyi & Nwogwugwu, 2015).

Over the last decade, Nigeria had experienced tremendous security challenges, ranging from militancy in the South-South geo-political zone, ethnic conflicts across the different geo-political zones to terrorism and insurgency in the North-East geo-political zone of the country. The terrorist insurgency in the North-East appears to be Nigeria's worst security threat in the last few decades and had exposed some deep-seated lapses that had long existed in the governance process in the country (Nwogwugwu & Abioye, 2015). The UNDP observes that the incidence of citizens not trusting the state to adequately perform its statutory duty is not a uniquely Nigerian problem; rather it is something that had been observed amongst several states.

The security agencies in Nigeria appear to lack the capacity to proactively pre-empt possible attacks and nip them in the bud before execution, as they are more of reactionary in their operations. There have been reported cases where terrorist and sometimes armed robbers gave notice of where they intention to attack specific locations and still succeeded in executing such attacks undeterred. The situation where security agencies only react after the terrorists or other criminals have finished unleashing mayhem across communities and local governments leaves residents of such communities petrified at the utter helplessness of the security agencies and makes them unwilling to return those communities even after the places have been reported as having been recovered from the terrorists (Kupoluyi & Nwogwugwu, 2015). This has been the case in several communities in the North-East region of the country, where residents have refused to return to their communities for fear that the terrorists although reported to have been dislodged may still attack them in future.

Since 2015, though there has been reported improvement in the capability of the Nigerian Army to engage and checkmate the excesses of *Boko Haram* terrorist group, as confirmed by the report by *Daily Post* (2016) that seven hundred *Boko Haram* members surrendered while Ugwuanyi (2016) cited a US Bureau of Counterterrorism and Counter Violent Extremism (2015) that its ability for territorial control had been degraded. However, the terrorists have resorted to attacks at their targets from time to time without taking effective control of such targets. As such the number of local governments under their control in Bornu and Adamawa States has become minimal.

Historically, policing and police work did not start as a paid profession. Rather, it started as a noble, incorruptible profession with considerable responsibility and distinction (Newburn, 2004). Just as leadership mirrors the state of a given society, policing in Nigeria had always reflected the society that created it. The primary purpose of the police was to advance the economic and political agenda of the colonialist. It is historically accepted that, the police engaged in the brutal subjugation of communities and the suppression of resistance to colonial rule. Thus, the use of violence and repression from the beginning of colonial era marked a dislocation in the relationship between the police and local communities, which had characterized law enforcement practices in Nigeria ever since (Kupoluyi & Nwogwugwu, 2015).

The Nigeria Police which is centrally controlled, has over the years metamorphosed to a state where it is allegedly characterized by various social vices such as graft, corruption, robbery, and indiscipline (Tunde-Awe, 2005). All these have posed and still pose serious security threats, resulting in loss of confidence by the citizens on the government and its security agencies. This has in turn continued to fuel agitations for the decentralization of the police for effective and efficient safeguarding of lives and property. It is view of the fore-going that the paper interrogated policy framework for community and state policing in Nigeria as mechanism for achieving effective security of lives and property in the country. In this study which is a library research, we rely on secondary qualitative data gathered from journals, relevant textbooks, newspapers,

publications of relevant institutions charged with responsibility for security issues at international and national level, as well as relevant materials downloaded from the internet. We analyzed our data employing the interpretative analytical approach, linking the major variables of study policy framework, community and state policing and security challenges. Our study is presented under the following sub-sections: introduction, theoretical background, theoretical framework, methodology, appraisal of the debate on state policing in Nigeria, pro-community policing debate, new policy framework for security management in Nigeria, conclusion and recommendations.

Theoretical Background

Policy

Governments across the globe in modern societies have the responsibilities of ensuring that their societies are secured and that the citizenry have the enabling environment to achieve their individual and group objectives. In ensuring that the goals of the government are met, in the face of varying challenges, the government equally has to ensure that its plans and programs are not executed in a haphazard manner. As a result, the government resorts to the use of policies to give direction and focus to its actions in order to ensure that set goals and objectives are met. This has become of utmost importance as societal development thrown up in an increasing manner various security challenges which the government has to battle with, if it is to fulfill one of its key responsibilities of securing the lives of its citizenry and their property.

Policy like other concepts in the management and social sciences has been subjected to varying definitions based on the perspective of each scholar. Presthus (1975) defined policy "a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future decisions" (p. 14). William Jenkins defines public policy as "a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors, concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve' (Sharma, Sadana, & Kaur, 2012, pp. 633-634).

However, the later definition provides the emphasis that policies are usually made for specific situations or issues. The specific issue of concern for this paper is security, which is adjudged one the key responsibilities of the government of a state.

Policy is not made in a vacuum. Those who are in charge of formulating it are constantly subject to influences of various kinds. First and foremost influence on policy making is that of the environment in which the political system operates. Environment broadly comprises institutions (economic and social), history, law, ethics, philosophy, religion, education, tradition, belief, values, symbols, myths, etc., which may be described as material as well as non-material culture (Sharma, Sadana, & Kaur, 2012, p. 640).

Policing

Analytically, policing refers to measures and actions taken by a variety of institutions and groups (both formal and informal) in society to regulate social relations and practices in order to secure the safety of members of community as well as conformity to the norms and values of society. It is, therefore, a sub-set of control processes which involves "the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance, either immediately or in terms of the initiation of penal process or both" (Reiner, 2000, p. 3). Where the members of community feel insecure, or that the various mechanisms put in place lack the

capacity to guarantee their safety, it becomes a major subject of concern for such a society. A given society must be seen as having the capacity to counter and sanction deviance of various kinds in order to avoid falling into a state of anarchy.

State agencies designated as police, as well as community groups, are involved in policing. But not all community policing groups that carry out activities aimed at safety and social order constitute police. Given the strategic importance of policing for the proper functioning of a society, no modern society can do without policing. Several scholars have made worthy contributions to the subject of policing from various perspective including Tamuno (1993; 1985; 1970), Newburn (2004), Obiekezie (1986), and Nwolise (2004). In Nigeria, policing is regarded as the responsibility of the federal government which is the reason why the policing function is officially centralized. This had resulted in various dilemmas where the state governors are regarded as Chief Security Officers of their states, while the State Commissioner of Police reports to the Inspector General of Police at Abuja, who in turn reports to the President and Commander-in-Chief. So, the state governors are nominal security chiefs without direct control of policing in their states. However, when there are major breaches of security within a particular state, the state governor is blamed for not ensuring the safety of lives and property in the state.

Community Policing

The notion of "community policing" stems from the argument that government alone cannot provide all the needed requirements of descent living and security of life and property. This calls for collaborative efforts by different communities and government or security agencies. This is borne out of the understanding that peoples' security is the best form of security and as such could complement the role of government in securing lives and property. According to Amadi (2014), community policing,

> is a philosophy of policing based on the idea that–if the police and citizens in the community work together in creative ways to fight and prevent crime, then crime-related problems of the community would be solved, fear of crime would be reduced, community residents would feel safer, and the physical conditions as well as the quality of life in the community would be better. (p. 19)

According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report (2014) community policing is an organizational strategy or instrument that aims at promoting partnership that is based collaborative efforts between the police and the community to ensure safety and security.

The central role of community security made it to form one of the seven dimensions of human security elaborated in the 1994 Human Development Report. The emphasis is on the security that people derive from the groups they belong to, which in turn provides a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values. The UNDP broadens the perspective by including both group and personal security, focusing on ensuring that communities and their members are "free from fear". Those who live in fear cannot be said to be secured, even though there may not be evident crisis or violence in their environment.

Djudjevic-Lukic (2014, p. 2) writes that community policing consists of two complementary core components. These are community partnership and problem solving. It is therefore of utmost importance as he rightly observed that the police and the community collaborate to encourage and preserve peace and prosperity. This cannot be achieved without the establishment and maintenance of mutual trust within the community and between the police and the group. In societies such as Nigeria where the average citizen does not really trust the police, community policing becomes a major bridge that could provide the platform for building such relationship.

Writing on the importance of community policing, Udefuna, Madu, Akalefu, and Jumare (2014, p. 262) posit that crime detection becomes easier when communities are adequately involved. This is due mainly to the fact that members of a given community could easily detect strangers and criminals among and report same to community police officers among them. In this way incidences of crime will be reduced, law and order maintained and peace achieved.

Community policing has its own challenges. First, it could be used to settle old grudges within a community as records abound of local vigilante engaging on extra judicial killing, like the Bakassi Boys experience in Aba, Abia State during the tenure of Orji Uzor Kalu as governor (1999-2007). Second, it might lead to proliferation of small and light arms and ammunition that could be deployed in intra or inter community rivalry. Third, given that they may not be adequately trained, cases of accidental discharge cannot be eliminated.

Nonetheless, these challenges are not insurmountable given that the police could regulate the firearm at the disposal of the vigilante, give them proper training, and can be remunerated adequate to sustain their loyalty while the membership of the group must be nominated from the Community Development Association or the traditional ruler. Writing on community policing in USA, Amadi (2014) emphasized the role of police partnership with citizens to ensure the achievement of safer environments. Such partnership require that police work with local community leaders, in identifying residents who could be of value in security related issues of the community for adequate training for community policing responsibilities. Furthermore, such partnerships would result in situation where

> the police become a catalyst in the development of community projects such as neighborhood watch programs, neighborhood revitalization projects, and youth-oriented educational and recreational programs. Citizens on their part may become involved as volunteers, reserves, or auxillaries on an individual basis or as groups in the collaborative effort with the police. (Cordner, 1995, p. 505 cited in Amadi 2014, p. 22)

The Committee of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology provides very clear distinction between vigilante group, even when it is under the control of the state, and the formal police system. According to the institution, state police is as a,

> specially organized and highly trained body, acting under state rather than local authority, and constantly employed in the prevention of crime, the apprehension of criminals, and the protection of life and property generally throughout the state and especially in the rural and sparsely settled districts. (Corcoran, 1924, p. 544)

State police became prominent due to a number of reasons going by the experience of the United States of America, as stated by Corcoran (1924):

> (1) The movement responds primarily to the increasing consciousness on the part of dwellers in rural and suburban districts of a need for a greater degree of police protection. The coming of the automobile and improved highways has widened the range of crime and rendered its control more difficult.
>
> (2) Local sheriffs and constables are not adequate or especially fitted for this work.
>
> (3) State militia is a clumsy and extremely expensive agency and is not trained for police duty. It is designed primarily as a supplement to the standing army for national defence.
>
> (4) It is a movement toward centralization of government for the purpose of economy and efficiency. (p. 544)

The implication is that in the development of a nation, certain security situations may necessitate the

review of the existing security system with a view to adopting new one that would be more functional and able to adequately secure the society.

Theoretical Framework

In interrogating the variables of this study, we adopt the social conflict theory as the theoretical construct of this paper.

Social Conflict Theory

Social conflict perspective in social theory postulates that society is divided into groups and classes with common interests in some areas and conflicting interests in many fundamental areas, including the organization, mobilization and distribution of economic and socio-political resources within a given society. Social conflict theory proposes that conflict within and between groups in a society can hinder peaceful co-existence amongst them and further hinder efforts as achieving progressive development of such society. When there are clashes of values and interests, as well as tension between what exists and what various groups expect, the conflict between "vested interest groups" or "special interests" may result in emergence of new groups demanding their share of power, wealth, and status (Coser, 1957).

Following the proposition of Coser (1957), it has been argued that the underlying motive for the establishment of the police in any given society will determine the nature of its relations with the different strata of the society and the perception that they have of it. In this light, in societies like Nigeria where "the police were not created to serve the entire 'society' or the 'people' but to serve some parts of society and some people at the expense of others" (Institute for the Study of Labor and Economic Crises (ISLEC), 1982, p. 12), there is the tendency that the police would exhibit the attributes of domination and suppression of sections of the population.

The variation in attitudes towards the police reflects the differential services rendered by the police to different segments of society. Police roles vary across societies with different political and economic organizations. For example it has been argued that in capitalist societies: The main function of the police has been to protect the property and well-being of those who benefit most from an economy based on the extraction of private profit. The police were created primarily in response to rioting and disorder directed against oppressive working and living conditions (ISLEC, 1982).

According to Bowden (1978, p. 19), the roles of police include the repression of the poor and powerless in order to protect the interests of the rulers. The police roles, therefore, include standing as a "buffer between elite and masses". Brodgen (1989, p. 203) puts this view more forcefully, stating that "Police forces are structured, organizationally and ideologically to act against the marginal strata". This explains why the police in Nigeria respond faster and show a high degree of efficiency, when the interests of the federal government and its officials are affected, or where the rich who are at the corridors of power are affected. Pecuniary benefits are expected to follow such speedy responses, as against situations where people of the lower cadre or those who have no direct access to government have their right infringed upon or crimes committed against them. The Nigeria Police have sometimes been reported to provide excuse to the citizens who come to report cases that they are incapacitated from immediate response to emergency because of lack of fuel for the official vehicle.

The existence of this structural defect, which is traceable to the motive for the establishment of the police,

would not have the capacity to effectively protect the ordinary citizens in the country. This brings to the fore the need for the adoption of a new mechanism that would ensure that the interests of the ordinary citizens who comprise the vast majority of the populace are adequately catered for in terms of securing lives and property in the country.

Appraisal of the Debate on State Policing in Nigeria

Nigeria over the years has been experiencing increasing rate of insecurity and other social malaise in spite various efforts by different governments. The reality is that the federally government controlled police seem to lack the ability to adequately secure the entire country effectively by countering insecurity plaguing different states in the country. This is complicated by the fact that the state governors seem powerless in exercising their constitutionally roles as the chief security officers of their states, as they have no control over the police. As a result, there have been arguments from various quarters that the only solution to the security threat of Nigeria is to embrace the federating principle of state policing.

Would the police be adopted by state officials to defend their criminal activities, as insinuated by the antagonists of state police? Or will state police serve as an antidote to the security challenges being experienced by the country as anticipated by the protagonists of state police? Therefore, it is pertinent to critically understand the two points of views for better analysis.

The strongest argument in favor of the establishment of a state police is that it accords with the principle of federalism on which Nigeria styles its constitution. As a federal state, the power of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is divided between the central government called the federal government and the 36 states of the federation in Section 2 subsections 2 of 1999 Constitution. Several scholars have put forward arguments on the need for the state to be charged with the responsibilities for policing their territories since the governors are recognized as the chief security officers of their state (Onwuzuligbo, 2012). State policing is operational in other federal states such as United States of America. Some have argued that the development of technological capabilities that have resulted in need for more proactive action at the local levels encourages the need for state policing (Ehindero, 2012). Others argue that the centralized police system lacks the capacity to tackle security challenges proactively (Adedeji, 2012).

Another school of thought argues against state police, citing the fact that Nigeria is not ripe for such an experiment. They refer to the various abuses of militia groups and some state vigilante services by the state government in which such groups are deployed for fighting political enemies as a major reason why state policing should not be approved in Nigeria (James, 2011). It is also further argued that given the inability of the states to mobilize resources for capital development, the enormous resources required for security management would be too much for states to mobilize (Adetumbi, 2012). However, the argument can be faulted on the basis of the enormous success that has been achieved by Lagos State government with its Security Trust Fund through which it has been able to mobilize resources from the private sector organizations to finance security agencies in the state. It shows that with proper planning and collaborative efforts with the private sector, the state governments can actually fund the security operations of a state police, if they are given the opportunity through the enabling law.

Pro-community Policing Debate

The centralized system of managing the security system in Nigeria has failed to curb security challenges in

Nigeria, with the worst exposure being the sacking of communities in the North East, by *Boko haram* terrorist group with the security agencies seemingly helpless to curtail their forays for some years. The factors that were identified and factors that facilitated the overrunning of the communities included bad governance, corruption by public officials in the face high level of poverty among the populace, inadequate equipment of the security agencies leading to lack of capacity to effectively combat security challenges, and lack of security consciousness by the citizens.

Community policing is a paradigm shift that seeks to focus on constructive engagement with people who are the end users of the police service and re-negotiate the contract between the people and the police thereby making the community co-producers of justice and a quality police service (Okeshola & Mudiare, 2013, p. 134). According to Ikuteyijo (2009), community policing entails community partnership in creating a safe and secure environment for all. It is policing whereby the people take active part in their own affairs. With community policing, the police are not seen as a stranger whose presence stands for danger and imminent hazard, but as partners in development. This brings about residents ownership of the strategies adopted in securing their environment, since they are involved in the decision making process including the design of the appropriate techniques and tactics to be adopted.

Obeagu (2014) writes that community policing groups, known in some quarters as vigilante or neighborhood watch, have excelled since the formal inauguration of the system in 2004 in specific areas such as protection of neighborhoods against armed robbery. Although, he identified some abuses in terms of extra-judicial punishment of apprehended criminals, with proper grooming the system could be more useful to the society given the trust that the members enjoy among the residents.

In highlighting the difference between vigilante services and neighborhood watch, Okeke (2013) writes that community policing encourages the use of neighborhood watch which is an organized group of citizens devoted to crime and vandalism prevention within a neighborhood and is different from Vigilante services. Vigilantes engage in extra-judicial punishment of apprehended criminals whereas neighborhood watch hands over apprehended criminals to the police to face the law and not execute punishment by themselves. Adoption of nationally approved policy framework that incorporates Nigeria Police, state policing and community policing will result in complete elimination of the many incidences of jungle justice or extra-judicial killings experienced in Nigeria as a result of the activities of some vigilante groups that take the law into their hands.

The non-involvement of communities in their security is a lacuna in the present security system operational in the country, which is a very major challenge. The fact that the security agencies do not have very close affinity with the communities created a situation where they were not able to tap into local resources in the process of intelligence gathering. The security agencies are too far from the people to be able to be seen as part of the community, to be seen as partners with the local communities to work for the good of the communities. There was equally lack of trust in the security agencies as the people see them as collaborators with the corrupt politicians, unworthy of being depended upon to protect the people.

The adoption of a collaborative mechanism between the police and various neighborhood watch groups has helped in curtailing armed robbery attacks in some areas in the country. Adoption of a new security structure which is more robust and involving the communities through the community development associations (CDAs) and the vigilante groups becomes the viable option for effective community policing.

Community policing would make policing closer to the people, and a massive re-orientation of the citizenry on techniques of security consciousness and need to always communicate with the community

policing agencies of suspected security threats would go a long in curbing possible threats to security in various societies. Involvement of community development associations in local security would create community buy-in, and forestall any efforts to usurp the community policing agencies as tools of oppression by some disgruntled rulers/elements.

New Policy Framework for Security Management in Nigeria

As stated by Guy Peters, "the social and economic systems of a country place boundaries on the actions of a government...By defining what in government is good and bad, the culture may virtually mandate some actions and prohibit others" (Sharma, Sadana, & Kaur, 2012, p. 640). This is of relevance in the present context as the culture of the Nigerian society which believes in the spirit of brotherliness may not support the total use of force on those with aberrant behaviour or who engage in activities that threaten the security of the state as some members see them as their sons and daughters and would view some actions as being too high-handed, whereas such actions may be acceptable in some other societies as they are viewed in such societies as enemies of the state.

In undertaking the investigation of the most appropriate policy framework for security management in Nigeria, it is not enough to employ only the cost benefit analysis of the policy alternative. There is need to equally engage in the social impact and environmental impact assessment of the various policy options/alternatives (Eneanya, 2013, p. 17). According to Finsterbusch and Motz (1980), considering the social and environmental impact assessment would require the measurement of the range of impact that the policy would have on the people, various groups, organizations, and the society as a whole. This is because, security policies have impact on all sectors of the society directly or indirectly and the nature of the society would determine the success of such policies as well.

Since the current centralized system of security management in Nigeria has failed to effectively combat security challenges across the length and breathe of the country, there is need for massive reform of the security sector to make the sector effective. This will involve the development of a new security framework that will proactively combat all forms of threat to security at local, state and national levels of the country. Such a framework would involve the devolution of powers from the centre to component units in line with Nigeria's federal structure. Security at the state level should be controlled completely by the state governors, while the federal security apparatus will play complimentary role, especially where inter-state crimes are involved (Nwogwugwu & Abioye, 2015).

The envisaged new security framework at the state level will involve collaboration and building of synergy among the state police command, the state operations of the Department of State Services, state operations of NSCDC, vigilante/neighborhood watch, private security or guard companies, relevant security related Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government and civil society organizations (CSOs). Such collaboration would include sharing of relevant intelligence information amongst the organizations and agencies thereby building a synergy that would be difficult to beat by any gang, sect or group (Nwogwugwu & Abioye, 2015).

The various state governors controlling the state security agencies and organizations within their domain would ensure that there is quicker intervention when there are any threats to security or breach of security, rather than the current dispensation where they have to get approval from Abuja before any meaningful action would be undertaken. It is only when the security challenge is of a national magnitude or has external

implications that the federal security operatives would be mobilized.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Nigeria's current centralized security management system, which has been based on the traditional security framework, has over the years failed to proactively combat security threats including the many ethno-religious crises, militancy, and terrorist insurgency, amongst others. Valuable time has been lost as the security agencies look up to their high command for approval before they can react to threats. The implication is that the government has not been responsive to the needs of the citizens in terms security provision even though it is recognized that security is at the pinnacle of the duties of any government.

Many countries of the world are developing more dynamic approaches to combating security threats especially in the post September 11 era. Some of the strategies adopted by these countries have included granting of greater responsibility to emergent non-military security related Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) with a view to facilitating greater intelligence gathering so as to proactively combat the threats to security before they become prominent.

In light of the fact that other federal states such as USA, whose federal system Nigeria claims to be copying, operate a decentralized security system which has been effective to a great extent, we recommend decentralization of the security sector in order to make the sector responsive to the needs of the citizenry. State Police should be constitutionally approved within the confines of a new security framework that is based on collaboration among agencies. Community policing which should be part of the state police system should be given force of law, and the citizenry made to become active stakeholders in the security system able to provide intelligence information that would proactively curtail threats to security.

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A Comparative History Partnership From a Historical Institutional Theory View—A Brief Introduction of Three Experiments Beyond Conventional City Planning 1970-1991 in Kotake-Mukaihara District, Tokyo

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Institutional development and the substantial governance outcomes have continued to be a big theme in Political Science. This paper focuses on partnership practices in public works construction and decision-making cases in city and urban settings (as a socio-political environment). In these settings, the management of policy regarding space and time should conduct on understandings of the various dimensions of institutional settings. We are going to emphasize institution and coordination in the public policy process. So, this paper attempted to describe chronological restrictions that were generated by long-term interactions and institutional transformation's patterns from a historical institutional view. As much as possible, we have analyzed the following micro-institutional experiments, participatory governance (Case I) and public works executions (Cases II and III) to show the institutional development patterns precisely.

Keywords: city (urban setting) and policy, institution and coordination, institutional development and resilience, partnership in participatory governance

Introduction

At first, the author will mention two situations of government reform in the Japanese-style context, in 1960s-70s as follows:

(1) One was proposed by left-wing intellectuals.[1]

(2) The other was conducted as a local government reform by liberal-oriented governors.

In those days, a former governor of Tokyo had started to advocate "participatory governance" in Tokyo.

The Theme in This Paper: Three Stories Regarding Partnership Practices in Public Works Construction and/or Decision-Making

Currently, this area is around Kotake-mukaihara[2] Station (Tokyo Metro).

Kotake-Mukaihara District became an example where two public works would be executed, and the next

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[1] We shall refer the two intellectuals, Tsuji (1972) and Shinohara (1972) in this paper.

[2] Nowadays, the station name is describing in English "Kotake-mukaihara," in, formal. However, each town name is "Kotake" and "Mukaihara" in, formal.

three projects were tested. We show the location of the Radiation Route of Road 36 in the metropolitan road network (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the location.

This district was a part of the example area where (1) former Governor of Tokyo, Ryokichi Minobe, who advocated for "democratic city planning", performed a trial of institutionalizing (introduction of the referendum) for the participation-oriented government of Tokyo, in Toshima, Itabashi and Nerima Ward, Tokyo.

This district became two public projects stages as follows:

(2) In the extension of the metro line, it was located at the turning point where two routes crossed (the Tokyo Metro (the Teito Rapid Transit Authority [TRTA] of the day) Yurakucho Line and the Seibu Yūrakuchō Line (additionally, Fukutoshin Line, was opened on June 2008), and it became the stage of the larger-scale new MRT station setting (Kotake-mukaihara Station) in the upper MRT line.

(3) A prefectural road (is a part of the network) was constructed.

Residents' organizations joined both the public works process. The central partnership relations were created across a struggle for a long time.

The residents wanted to minimize the environmental degradation of their quiet residential areas, while the government wanted to execute public work projects. This struggle was a big local issue in Tokyo.

The Structure of This Paper

This section shows theoretical background and techniques of the observation.

The Theoretical Background

As a theoretical consideration, we focus on the management of space and time in city and urban settings as policy and political issue.

City (urban setting) and policy. In the context in the research of social movements and urban politics, "more interpenetration between various research traditions (sociology, political science, urban studies, geography, etc.) and worlds of political action (North, South, East, and West) is urgently needed" (Mayer & Boudreau, 2012, p. 287). "Strategically-organized confrontation", for example, local action and transnational

struggles (Mayer & Boudreau, 2012, p. 288) is a big issue related to the people and the meaning.

On the other hand, in the context of urban governance, the scholars argue that "the constraints on institutional capacity and political leadership are considerable" (Pierre & Peters, 2012, p. 72). Surely, the institutional factors will bring huge impacts to the urban politics and the policy outcomes as follows (Pierre & Peters, 2012, p. 73):

(1) Local governments are embedded in national (or transnational) institutional and policy frameworks;

(2) The political constraints are linked to nature of policies that the difficulties in addressing many public problems within the confines of individual urban areas;

(3) These economic, institutional, and political constraints on cities define a rather limited scope of local policy choice.

Likewise, "the urban governance perspective is focused on the role of those institutions[3] in steering and coordinating the local community" (Pierre & Peters, 2012, p. 74).

We will focus on giving significant consideration regarding institution and coordination as a kind of institutional urban policy study.

Focus on "time" and chronological description-historical institutional view. Pierson (2004) said that focusing on time and observing "institutional development" in the institutional change process, revision, or binding mechanism in the long-term, is an essential matter in political institution studies. Pierson indicated five crucial points in regards to the institutional development are as follows:

(1) Deep equilibria (p. 157);

(2) Menus of institutional change (p. 159);

(3) Institutional coupling (p. 161);

(4) Long-term process of institutional change (p. 164);

(5) From institutional development to policy development (p. 165).

The concept of institutional development is focusing on both the binding or restriction force and the exchanging force (reflecting the functional benefit). These are explained based on the stakeholder's "accumulations" (the results of calculations). In addition, he argued that analysts can expand to policy analysis in the study of political institutions.

For example, Japan and the UK, in central and local governments, disagree that they have witnessed (ideologically based) conflicts "to address a particular societal problem" (Pierre & Peters, 2012, p. 73). These conflicts situation can be explained by not only by the change-oriented but the maintenance-oriented force. Institutional development refers to both of them, and investigates the combination and the mechanism. Analysts can base their work on this premise.

This report is not aiming at a description of the history, but to analyse institutional development.

The Targets of the Investigation

We shall narrow it down from these premises and focus on specific targets of the investigation.

Focusing on the core relationship. At first, we focused on "the core relationships"; it includes "reputation, trust, and reciprocity as they affect cooperation" (Ostrom, 2007, pp. 200-202).

These are because the existence of the core relationship affect "To identify potentially deep equilibria"

[3] They pointed to the institutional importance of the jurisdictional responsibility, as "accountability, transparency" (Pierre & Peters, 2012, p. 84), etc., or "some normative benchmarks" (Pierre & Peters, 2012).

(Pierson, 2004, p. 160) and these may cause "long-term process of institutional change" (p. 164).

Ostrom's (2005, p. 154) statement model included that potentially cumulative patterns that can affect individual expectations. The micro and actor-based institutional situations are described as an analogy of "game" as follows:

(1) The shared strategies game adds a set of shared strategies.

(2) The norms game adds a cooperation norm to the base situation. Stakeholders share a "norm". It may include the shared criteria or understandings.

(3) The rules game adds a cooperating rule, a monitoring norm, and a sanctioning norm to the base Prisoner's dilemma game.

For example, the author can say that the stakeholders share the "rules game" in the third settings.

These situation definitions are helpful to create a precise analysis regarding (negotiation) interaction situations.

We shall describe negotiation situations using the three game situations, and the investigation of existence of the "regularity oriented actions". The reason for doing this is that the "regularity" action tendency is necessary to join the "game".

In addition, Ostrom predicted that the third game setting, the rules game, would be effective to conserve the best condition of resources, as space "commons".[4] As a policy outcome, Ostrom's theory may show similar tendencies in cities and/or the urban environment.

We will prove that the interaction-based institutions with shared understandings (these including strategies, norms, and rules) improve the relationship in the long-term when it comes to the core relationship.[5]

Besides, we would like to show an expectation of institutional change or continuity based on Pierson's compromise.

Institutional stability and/or mobility as "cost calculation" and the institutional outcome. Pierson's compromise, regarding long-term institutional developments and/or constraints, these could explain the stakeholders' calculation. The institutional continuity may depend on, not only positive intentions (interests or desires), but also negative expectations (for example, rising cost calculation).

When we apply the compromise between the institutional settings and the individual expectations, we can find "a combination of settings" as follows (include the following two choices and two items):

(1) The capability of being mobile is high (= a), or low (= b).

(2) The capability of being stable is low (= 1), or high (= 2).

The brief explanation of the combination of settings is as follows. The logical combination includes a1 (Stakeholder's benefit calculation is high and the cost is low, hence weakest binding setting), a2, b1, and b2 (Stakeholder's cost calculation is high and the benefit is low, hence strongest binding setting).

By using these distinctions, we will show the expectation of institutional change or continuity. Then, we shall compare the substantial results of each case.

Trends of policy outputs. Pierson (2004) suggested the importance to think of major public policies as important institutions. So, we tried to deal with picking up the diversity of the issues and doing additional

[4] Ostrom (2005) pointed the relationship between the game (micro-institutional) settings and the outcome of the CPRs conservation or degradation.

[5] Another type of relationship in "coproduction" is obviously different. In the context of "coproduction", only people (consumers) can be involved, because "the active involvement of the consumer is a requisite input for the production of a high quality good or service" (McGinnis, 1999, p. 7).

comparative descriptions of policy outcomes in this case study, from timing, typology, and institutional settings.

The Methods and Materials

In the following part, we will give a brief introduction, regarding the methods and materials used in this paper.

The process tracing and the complete enumeration of negotiation interactions. We adopted two methodologies to describe the history of the partnership in the long-term.

(1) Process tracing. The description of the matter's sequential pathway and/or decision-making process related to the transformation from causal settings to effective settings (Evera, 1997/2009, p. 66). Besides, we made the research design based on "method of difference" using positive and negative examples.[6]

(2) Causal-process observation rather than data-set observation, as follows: The approach needed to control the variables by the number of observations that mean "adding 'piece of data'" (Brady, Collier, & Seawright, 2004, p. 252). With this method, it is always possible to increase the number of qualitative observations as long as these follow a logical consistency. Opposite, the latter control the variable by the number of examples, and statistics is the basic logic, so sometimes observing with leaving out unsuitable data for statistical analysis (Brady et al., 2004, p. 252).

We worked on the events cited in our study by focusing on negotiations interactions policy process, as a kind of cause and effect process observation (process tracing). These procedures were applied to all available data, and the detailed interaction negotiations were analyzed (the complete enumeration of negotiation interactions).

Using an abundance of records. There are the theoretical backgrounds for more appropriate ways "to analyze practices".

Wagenaar and Cook (2003) pointed out the importance of analyzing the origins of "value", and they discuss the meaning of practice analysis. Compared with the rational approach that the lack of analysis of value origination (with the command and control stance), practice-oriented approach attempt to understand "local actors' intimate knowledge of the complexities of situations" (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 171).

As a result, the analyst can find policy origination (and the policy is sustained by the practices) and origins of value as follows: "Practice ... involves people's values, emotions, and sense of identity" (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 171).

This study will add different vocabulary by the practice-oriented policy analysis (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 170) using an abundance of records.[7]

Summary of this part. Lastly, the author summarizes this part as follows:

(1) We shall try to compare partnership histories to the patterns of interactions, or core relationship;

(2) We are going to focus on the long-term "process";

(3) We shall follow appropriate ways of analysis to focus on "practice".

A Brief Introduction of Three-Experiment Story: Beyond Conventional City Planning[8]

The next section concerns three cases and they are as follows:

(1) Case I is about the participatory governance and related affairs, and these will show the former governor

[6] I settle Case I the negative one. And then, Case II and III are both infrastructure project, however, the facility (and authority in charge) is the difference. I will consider regarding these differences.

[7] For example, see Appendix of this paper.

[8] Please refer to the detailed negotiation interactions of each case in Yamada (2018, June, pp.7-20, 26-40).

of Tokyo's advocacy (1970-1975).

(2) Case II is about the public works execution (1), and it will show "a railway work process in Kotake-Mukaihara District" (1975-1985).

(3) Case III is about the public works execution (2), and it will show "a roadwork process in Kotake-Mukaihara District" (1979-1991)

There is the introduction of this city planning in a document collections of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs (1982) as follows:

(1) In 1927, the road that ran the same course as Road 36 (etc.), there was a road construction plan of a 15-meter wide road.

(2) And, the plans were changed twice after 1927. In 1946 and 1966, two decades between the two the road planners continued to change the road width, routes, and other traffic conditions. By 1966, the road plan has evolved into a main road plan to be included in the metropolitan road network. "The road commonly known as '36 Doro (Road 36)'" can connect with emission route 35, supporting route 78 which will become the emission highway that links the Omiya bypass to the Ikebukuro Station west exit.

(3) Under the Road 36 plan, there was a plan to excavate subway tunnels for MRTs linking Narimasu, Nerima, and Ginza. Constructions for the MRT underground railway No.8's Ikebukuro to Ginza 1 Chome track was authorized by the government in 1970.

(4) The authorities (government and/or the planning division) intended to construct the road and the MRT underground railway simultaneously.

Road 36 Issue "generated the issue with Road 35・36" (pp. 1-4).

We can understand the complicated history of the infrastructure projects. This road had four decades of history.

Due to the vast amount of material, we will give a short history of each case in this paper.

Case I: The Referendum Planning of Tokyo and the Participatory Governance 1970-1975

Road 36 Issue began with the Tokyo Metropolitan Governments' released plan that the MRT underground railway works and Road 36 roadwork construct simultaneously. The stakeholder made a lot of petitions.

Receiving it, the former Governor Ryokichi Minobe promoted his Advocacy "democracy-like governance with Metropolitan citizens" and told the citizens that the government needs the strong support of the metropolitan citizens.[9]

At first, he held Town Meetings. A lot of residents' or residents groups joined the governments' meetings. However, they could not reach a consensus.

And 2nd, he released a plan for a referendum, and the 36 Research Committee established.[10]

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[9] Based on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs (1982, p. 301).

[10] In "Hosha 36 Go Doro no Jumin Tohyo ni Kansuru Chosa Kai Secchi Yoko (official guideline for the establishment of the committee relating to conducting a referendum for Road 36)," the following statement was stipulated. (1) Purpose: To conduct investigations to contribute to conducting the referendum, and purposely to find out public opinions, etc. (2) Organization: The Commissioned members include eight people (people of experience or academic standing) and 4people (residents' representative in Itabashi and Nerima ward, whom the chief of ward recommended). (3) Themes of the research: ① The method of the referendum relating to Road 36 Project; ② Any other necessary matter. (4) Meeting: The meetings of The 36 Research Committee shall be called and sponsored by the Governor of Tokyo. (5) The office works: The office work relating to the 36 Research Committee is dealt with Tomin-Shitu (Citizens-room). (6) Application: This guideline applies it from December 22, 1972. (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 1982, p. 95)

The body showed the basic principle of the road construction[11] during the early stages as follows:

(1) Environmental assessment;

(2) Freedom of information (accessibility of information);

(3) Citizen participation.

The 36 Research Committee conducted researches (environmental assessments, a public opinion poll, etc.) and managed public relations activities (making a participation opportunity, putting into accessibility of information through release mini-communication paper[12], etc.), and reached the last stage, i.e., submitting their report dated March 12, 1975 to the current Governor, Mr. Minobe. That is to say, Mr. Minobe hoped to embed these rules into the conventional city planning procedure.

Lastly, we mention the result of the experiment.

At first, the government made a decision-making that they prioritize MRT underground railway works (not road-works).

And second, regarding residents, only four residents (or groups) involved the governments' committee. Other residents (or groups) became public relation's targets.

Lastly, an excluded non-committee members group was formed, so they can express their opposing opinions on the activities of the government's committee.[13] These people are the ones most affected by the actions of the committee and the former governor.

Case II: The Execution of the MRT Underground Railway Works, 1975-1985

The government decided to prioritize the MRT underground railway work (1975). Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA) started information sessions for residents in July 1976, by residents' demand.

Received it, The Committee for Quality Control of The MRT underground railway No.8 and No.13 construction (The 8.13 Residents' Committee)[14] was established in 1976. They made basic demands that the TRTA should sign a series of contracts; otherwise they would not agree to accept the investigations, moreover asked for the return. "If TRTA promise, we will approve only this railway plan and we will cooperate".[15]

The formal (and hard) negotiation started (1976/10/22). After repeated negotiation, Memorandum (1977/03/18) was established {11}.[16] After that land investigation was approved.

Through negotiation interactions, crucial rules were established in the cooperation agreement (1978) between TRTA and the organization.[17]

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[11] Based on "Introduction of Interim Report (1973)" in Machi to Doro (City and Road), No.1 (1973/09/15).

[12] The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's newsletter, Machi to Doro (City and Road) No.1 (1973/09/15)-No.11 (1975/09/20) were published regularly.

[13] They distributed their newsletters widely among residents. For example, in an article titled "The Public Opinion Poll was settled", they especially captured the poll results that indicated that 70 percent of the citizens wanted the government to hold the resident's opinion in high regard. We can find newsletters: Oshirase (Information), No.1 (1970/07/28)-No.19 (1976/07/02) (Tokyo: The 35・36 Residents' Meeting).

[14] In their organization, the 90% stakeholders would join through the chance to get negotiation between TRTA (Document for a press release, dated 1980/11/15 by The 35・36 Residents Meetings, liaisons).

[15] They argued TRTA had: (1) A technological problem; (2) An attitude to prioritize earning a profit; (3) Necessity to change disregard attitude; and (4) The necessity to show an introspective posture through the negotiation process, also. ("Renmei Shuisho" dated 1976/09/16 (The prospectus))

[16] We referred following newsletters: Kaiho (The Measures' information), No.1 (1976/09/03)-No.53 (1985/01/08), (Tokyo: The 8.13 Residents' committee) in this section. I show as follows: {number}.

[17] The number of negotiation were 107 times (Document for a press release dated 1980/11/15) or the number of formal meetings were 55 (Written request dated 1978/10/24).

Through these negotiation interactions, the 8.13 Residents' Committee obtained crucial rules.[18] After these contracts were established, TRTA started the construction procedure. Through the process, the stakeholder's consultation made additional design item dealing, as negotiations.[19] After that, some issues (The MRT ground railway's new station naming issue) repetition harmed projects' efficiency and stakeholders' trustworthy.

The first railway (the part of Tokyo Metro Yurakucho Line: Ikebukuro—Kotake-mukaihara—Eidan narimasu) was opened on June 1983.

Lastly, we show the results of the negotiation. By repeated negotiation interaction, the residents involved stakeholders. The residents asked to be included in the execution process to modify the rail works' construction plan, in order to ensure a livable environment. They had their own principle (livable, ecological-oriented, basic policy) regarding urban problems. Moreover, they hoped democratic-oriented problem solutions.

Case III: The Execution of Road 36 Works, 1979-1991

The Government of Tokyo started to find out the residents' opinions in 1979. Informal negotiation meetings were held repeatedly.

Receiving it, the residents' group established The Committee for Quality Control of Road 36 construction (The 36 Residents' Committee) in 1980. They submitted Requisition (1980) as crucial stem items regarding the roadwork.[20]

The former Governor Shunichi Suzuki received it, responded to the requisition by sending an official written response (1980).

The Government and the Residents' Committee signed their Film commitment (on July 1981) before signing of "Agreement". In this commitment, crucial items (or rules) set.[21]

After the establishment of Mutual agreement (September 1981), the roadwork advanced through negotiations in the 36 consultation. Through the negotiation process, they added policies. For example, the environmental assessment instruction manual that was made by the residents' Committee and the Government of Tokyo was included {6, 7, 8, 9, and 10}.[22]

Besides, a sidewalk "Four Seasons Street" was constructed at first in 1985 {15}.

Only the main roadwork construction remained at last. It included critical problems. So, the residents' desired keeping on writing precise documentation of any events. After that, new Agreement (1987/03/20) and Mutual agreement (1987/03/20) were signed in 1987.

Lastly, we mention the results of the negotiation.

Stakeholders endeavored to maintain not only the rules but also a strong relationship and partnership-philosophy. In the latest agreement, they recorded what had happened in the public document in

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[18] These include, (1) The insurance rule; (2) The starting rule; (3) The consultation rule; (4) The consensus making rule; and (5) The suspending rule. (The cooperation agreement dated 1978/07/07)

[19] See Yamada (2018, June, pp.15-16).

[20] These include, (1) The road structure and function (anti-pollution, environmental consideration), (2) Site compensation issues, (3) Construction management issues, (4) Environmental impact assessments, (5) House damage control issue, (6) Negotiation procedures, (7) Consensus making of road service opening duration.

[21] These include, (1) The consultation rule (continuing post road service), (2) The responsibility range (necessary road planning items, construction management planning), (3) A provision of dealing in doubt to pursue the project, (4) The consensus making rule about road service beginning duration.

[22] We referred following newsletters: 36 Renmei News (The Committee's News), No.1 (1980/11/04)-No.20 (1987/06/15), (Tokyo: The 36 Residents' Committee) in this section. I show as follows: {number}.

1987, and had continued to relate to managing the road.

A Comparative Partnership in Chronological Order by Micro (Interaction-Oriented) Institutional View

Before we move on, we will mention the constraints related to urban politics (Basically, these based on Section 1) as follows:

(1) Local government is constrained by the central government.

(2) Authorized city planning may be had strong resilience.

(3) In Japanese, local governance the setting may be as follows:

a. The local governments' autonomy has not been able to be practiced for a long time (Tsuji, 1972, p. 146).

b. Japanese modern society (in the 1970s) may have been authoritarian settings (Shinohara, 1972, p. 112).

We shall see whether these urban political constraints will or will not relate to the results of negotiation interactions, in these cases, indirectly.

The Investigation of the Interactions in Public Works

We will try to compare regarding partnership histories and the patterns of interactions, in other words, core relationships.

In conformity following settings, we consider the details of each negotiation interaction as typical core relationship building processes, to be questioned, as follows.

Q1. How were the negotiation patterns generated?

We shall observe patterns based on Ostrom's statement models, strategies, norms, and rules game.

Q2. Whether or not the core relationship established regarding "reputation, trust, and reciprocity" (Ostrom 2007)?

Q3. How were institutional developments patterns generated?

(Descriptions of micro institutional development (ID): As the long-term "interaction negotiation" patterns)

Q4 How were policy outcome patterns generated?

(The tendency of the policy transformation)

Q5. Was making partnership (core relationship) practice accomplished or not?

(Comparative Evaluation in Conclusion)

Summary: The Investigation of the Interactions in Public Works

We summarized the result of Q1, Q2, and Q3.

In Case I, exclude only four resident group committee members, almost all citizens became just the public relation target. The setting was "no (negotiation interaction) game" (Q1), and "no core relationship" (Q2). The consultant body of governments—the 36 Research Committee showed essential criteria or guidelines, but the core relationship was not able to be made (Q3).

In Case II, the relationship improved moderately and the rules game established (Q1). However, there were lacks of reputation, trust, and reciprocity, and these made the vulnerable relationship (Q2). The residents had the higher desire and interest to change policy from the default position (a1); however, they shifted (to b1). The authority's stable attitude was to maintain conventional project procedure (b2); however, they compromised (to b1). Therefore, both stakeholder's choice was not stable. ID was accomplished, but both positions were no stable and fragile (Q3).

In Case III, after repeated interactions, the residents' position changed (from a1 to b1). The factor that made residents change was the documentation of "rules" through repeated reliable negotiations, and the rules game established (Q1). Each stakeholder had endeavored to maintain "reputation, trust, and reciprocity" from the beginning to the end (Q2). The governments had a stable attitude, to reflect the residents' opinion of the construction process. They could change the conventional city planning process. They already had the guidelines by the 36 Research Committee's submissions (the default position was b1). Opposite, the residents hoped to stop the roadwork. There was a chance that the residents might change their original positions (from b1 to a1). ID was established in the circumstances that the government's position was stable and the resident's organization's position was not stable (Q3).

Summary: Interactions Beyond Conventional City Planning in Kotake-Mukaihara District, Tokyo

Next, the author arranged and compared the policy issues generated by the government and the resident's interactions, and the policy outcomes (Q4).

We can find such as additional "original solutions" (as institutional solutions, and additional policy in city planning and execution procedure) in these public works (see Table 1).

Table 1

Transformation of the Policy Issue in Kotake-Mukaihara District (1970-1991)

The policy issue	Case No.	Original solution type
Democratic city planning procedure [institutional design]	Case I	□
Civil engineering and compensation	Case II, Case III	
Detailed construction planning management [Partnership] (management procedure making)	Case II, Case III	□◎
Environmental policy (Environmental Assess./Landscape)	(Case II) Case III	◎
Livable city planning (facilities)	Case III	◎
Post-railway construction [consultation continuation] ok.	Case II	□
Post-road construction [consultation continuation] ok?	Case III	(□)

Notes. Original solution (not conventional city Planning) included two types of solutions, as follows:
(1) Institutional solution: [ ], □, and (2) Additional policy: (__), ◎.
Nevertheless, after these solutions were conducted, some residents' anxieties remained post- the service start. "ok." connote it was solved (Case Ⅱ). "ok?" connote it was not solved (Case Ⅲ).
(by Yamada, 2018, June, revised)

In other words, these solutions were not the same as conventional city planning, as we shall see below:

(1) Addition of democratic procedures;

(2) Addition of policies (The difference between Case II and Case III was significant).

In the railway works, the residents' livelihood, improvement of the local environment, and the decrease of construction damage were big concerns.

In the roadwork, facility design, the environmental impact assessment items were making, and environmental conservation, as the antipollution measure, etc., were added.

Moreover, as the additional explanation, we refer as follows:

First, in the roadwork, the pressure of assurance by the residents' was stronger than the former railway works. Also, second, the necessity of keeping reciprocity to maintain the local area post-construction was stronger, too.

In the above view of (difference of) constraints, the author concludes that the constraining forces were not

the same in the MRT underground railway works' and the Road 36 roadworks'. In general, we may be able to point out that administrative planning to construct social infrastructure facilities has, as a typical policy, a strong binding force.

Conclusions

We concluded two crucial items, as follows:

Regarding "Government"

Policy constraints. The prefectural city planning was old, and the roadwork plan, established through a bureaucracy that constraint, may become stronger over time (The policy has been installed for many years the government since before WWII).

The Pierson's hypothesis, constraints become stronger over time is supported.

A trial by the former governor of Tokyo. The city planning procedure development, by the former governor of Tokyo, was a trial to challenge the constraints.

The will of the development became clear in form, through the setting up of a committee. These led to the formation of concrete guidelines as "the basic principle of road constructions", before the consultant body carried out investigations.

Regarding "Partnership"

The democratic governance. The part of the essential criteria was inherent in the latter public works by each stakeholder. Mostly, making the rules game seems that contributed to keeping repeated negotiation, simultaneously the establishment of some rules included the original guidelines.

In the trial of partnership era, between the Government of Tokyo and the 36 Residents' Committee endeavored to keep "reputation, trust, and reciprocity". This situation looks like a lifeline of their institutional setting (repeated negotiation interaction)'s stability.

Following observation, we conclude that partnership (core relationship) practice was accomplished surely in the Case III than in Case II. (Q5)

Additional hypothetical configuration descriptions. "Documentation rule" in the rules making process might be the necessity. This process seems that made stronger the institutional resilience within the transparent and accountable game settings.

Also, to solve the bounds of the past social-political environment (Tsuji, 1972; Shinohara, 1972), setting the norms game or the rules game may become an effective way in general.

Progressing the logical connection between ID and Statement (game), and describing policy issue transformation, we shall show another paper.

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Appendix

List of materials in use—The document collections relating to Road 36 Issue: chronological order
1. Documents: formulated written demands, returns, and agreements, etc.
a. MRT underground railway No.8, No.13, Seibu-Yurakucho Line ● "Renmei Shuisho" dated 1976/09/16 (The prospectus). (The 8.13 Residents' Committee) ● Memorandum dated 1977/03/18. (The 8.13 Residents' Committee, TRTA's planning division, and the construction office land division was signed) ● The cooperation agreement dated 1978/07/07. (TRTA and the 8.13 Residents' committee signed) ● Written request dated 1978/10/24: Regarding the No.8 underground railway works. (The 8.13 Residents' Committee: to the Governor of Tokyo, Ryokichi Minobe) ● Certificate dated 1979/03/06. (signed by all stakeholders (TRTA official, the residents & three construction companies)
b. Road 36 ● Requisition dated 1980/10/27. (The 36 Residents' Committee) ● Document for a press release, dated 1980/11/15. (The 35・36 Residents Meetings, liaisons) ● Official written response dated 1980/11/15. (The Governor of Tokyo, Shunichi Suzuki) ● Firm commitment dated 1981/07/03. (The Government of Tokyo (Bureau of Construction) and the 36 Residents' Committee signed) ● Mutual agreement dated 1981/09/29. (The Government of Tokyo and the 36 Residents' Committee) ● Agreement dated 1987/03/20. (The Government of Tokyo and the 36 Residents' Committee) ● Mutual agreement dated 1987/03/20. (The Government of Tokyo and the 36 Residents' Committee)
2. Newsletters
(Case I) 1973-1975 Machi to Doro (City and Road), No.1 (1973/09/15)-No.11 (1975/09/20). Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government Tomin-Shitu (Citizen's Room). 1970-1983 Oshirase (Information), No.1 (1970/07/28)-No.19 (1976/07/02), and No.19 (1983/04). Tokyo: The 35・36 Residents' Meeting.
(Case II) 1976-1985 Kaiho (The Measures' information), No.1 (1976/09/03)-N0.53 (1985/01/08). Tokyo: The committee for Quality Control of The MRT underground railway No.8 and No.13 construction (The 8.13 Residents' Committee).
(Case III) 1980-1987 36 Renmei News (The Committee's News), No.1 (1980/11/04)-No.20 (1987/06/15). Tokyo: The Committee for Quality Control of Road 36 construction (The 36 Residents' Committee).

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The Cooperation Between China and Afghanistan Under the "Belt and Road Initiative"

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Afghanistan is a neighboring country to China. The Afghanistan issue has had an important impact on China's national security. Since the establishment of the new Afghan government in 2001, China has been committed to promoting Afghanistan's economic, social, and security reconstruction, and has invested heavily resources in Afghanistan's reconstruction. The main cause of the Afghan problem is that the Afghan government lacked enough resources and can only rely on the foreign powers' aids. Afghanistan eventually loses its independence, and triggers interference in big powers. At present, Afghanistan still has not escaped this predicament. Near 50% of the Afghan government's revenue comes from foreign aids. In 2013, the "Belt and Road Initiative" proposed by China provided opportunity for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as the crossroads of the land Silk Road and the heart of Asia, has become more prominent in its geopolitical status for "Belt and Road Initiative". By participating "Belt and Road Initiative", Afghanistan can help to activate its own economic vitality and promote the cross-border trade. It has changed the situation that Afghanistan is highly dependent on external aids. This helps to solve the problems of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Keywords: China, Afghanistan, Belt and Road Initiative

The Rise of Afghan Problem: From the Cross of Silk Road to Buffer State

From a geographic perspective, Afghanistan is a crossroads of Asia (Carter, 1989) and the hub of the ancient Silk Road. Afghanistan has created splendid civilizations in history, such as the Graeco-Bactrian culture, Persian and Islamic civilizations (Peng & Huang, 2000). At the same time, Afghanistan has become one of the centers of the Eurasia Empire civilization. The glorious civilization of Afghanistan is inseparable from the Silk Road, especially the civilization exchanges on the Silk Road. The ancient Silk Road gave Afghanistan its position as a trade hub for the Eurasian continent, which in turn created a series of ancient civilization cities, such as Herat, Balkh, Kabul, and Ghazni. On the other hand, the Silk Road also made an important contribution to the prosperity of Afghan culture in history. Afghanistan has many important remains of Hellenization (Aruz, & Fino, 2012). The integration of Buddhist culture and Greek culture has produced the famous Gandhara culture which has an important influence on the Buddhist statue art. Therefore, Afghanistan has created such a splendid civilization on relatively barren and mountainous lands, which is largely dependent on the Silk Road.

The historical development of Afghanistan and even Eurasia experienced a turning point in the 16th century. First, the ethnic migration in Eurasia has gradually ceased. Second, the Silk Road declined. Third, some large empires have emerged around Afghanistan. This has led to the economic decline in the Afghan

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region, and Afghanistan has become a "buffer state" (Rubin, 1988) for the first time in history. At that time, four empires raised in the Islamic world: the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Safavid Empire, the Mughal Empire, and the later Uzbek Khanate. Afghanistan is under the fight of the Persian, Mughal, and Uzbek Khanates. Therefore, it has become a buffer state for these empires. The decline of the Afghan civilization took place gradually, and it became a target for the competition among the surrounding great powers.

At this point, Afghanistan's economic development has gradually lost its autonomy and increasingly dependence on external resources. Durrani Dynasty, established in 1747, was the last Afghanistan Empire. Afghanistan achieved a brief revival. But the dynasty relied on the plundering of India. That is to say, the Durrani Dynasty seized India's wealth and distributed it to the Pushtun tribes. Durrani Dynasty sustained its rule by this system. The reason is that, Durrani Dynasty was a tribal state; it relied heavily on tribal support and was unable to collect taxes from the tribes. Conquering was an important way to maintain the rule of the Durrani Dynasty (Rubin, 1988). However, with the British's colonial expansion in South Asia, Afghanistan gradually lost its independent status. After the British established colonial rule in India, Russia gradually annexed Central Asia. As a result, in the second half of the 19th century, Britain and Russia have a great game for Central Asia especially Afghanistan lasted nearly a century (Wyatt, 2011). Until the signing of the Anglo-Russian Treaty in 1907, for this reason, Afghanistan was twice invaded by Britain.

After Abdul Rahman became Shah of Afghanistan in 1880, Afghanistan gradually achieved stability. Abdul Rahman has recognized the dilemma faced by Afghanistan as a buffer state. In order to strengthen the control over the country and fight against rebel of the tribe, Abdul Rahman had to rely on Britain. Thus, the Britain controlled Afghanistan's diplomacy, and Rahman received subsidies from Britain. Rahman used these external subsidies to integrate Afghan society, combat tribal forces, and built a strong army and government.

In 1929, after the establishment of the Musahiban Dynasty, Afghanistan is in golden age of modern times. However, Afghanistan's modernization and state building have also not escaped the historical problem. That is, Afghanistan still relies heavily on external resources. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union fought in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, because of its special geopolitical status, also receives a lot of aid from the United States and the Soviet Union (Williams, 1988). These aids became the pillars of Afghanistan's economic development in the 1950s to 1970s (Rubin, 2002). However, this has also led to an increase in the penetration of the United States and the Soviet Union toward Afghanistan, which led to the loss of Afghan neutral diplomacy, and eventually triggered Afghan problem.

Therefore, with the decline of the ancient Silk Road, Afghanistan's modernization was facing a severe challenge. Afghanistan belongs to the category of "strong society and weak state"; the country cannot collect too many taxes on tribal society, especially Pashtun tribal society. Once the country is involved too much in tribal affairs, tribal society may rebel. Therefore, Afghan modernization depends to a certain extent on external aid. The aid itself is not stable enough and often has a political purpose. This has also become a deep cause of the Afghan problem. In fact, this is still a serious challenge for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. China's Belt and Road Initiative (B & R) and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have in fact provided important prospects for Afghanistan's reconstruction and prosperity. This article first reviews the evolution of relationship between China and Afghanistan.

The Modern Relationship Between China and Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a neighboring country to China. Both countries were linked by Silk Road. There is a long

history of cultural exchanges between Afghanistan and China. In the 2nd century BC, the Silk Road was opened by the Chinese ambassador, Zhang Qian. He went to the Western Regions of China and reached Afghanistan. In the Tang Dynasty, the Master Monk of China, Xuanzang (Wriggins, 2004), once arrived in Afghanistan and has detailed accounts of Afghanistan in his famous book *Buddhist Records of the Western World* (Xuanzang, 1985). At the beginning of the 15th century, China's Ming Dynasty also had direct contacts with the Heart kingdom. Both countries made frequent communications. After the establishment of the Durrani Dynasty in 1747, Qing Dynasty of China and Afghanistan send messengers to each other for several times.

In modern times, the official relationship between China and Afghanistan was established in 1944. At that time, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government and the Afghan government signed the *Agreement on China-Afghanistan Friendship*. The two countries formally established diplomatic relations and sent ambassadors to each other. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the relations between China and Afghanistan developed rapidly. Afghanistan recognized the People's Republic of China in 1950, was the one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China.

People's Republic of China attached importance to relations with developing countries. In 1955, China established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In January 1957, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Deputy Prime Minister He Long led a delegation to visit Afghanistan. The two countries issued a joint communiqué, pointed out that the two countries will further strengthen ties and reaffirmed the principles of the Bandung Conference (Wang, 2007). This is the first time that Chinese leaders have visited Afghanistan. In 1975, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan of Afghanistan led a delegation to visit China and was received by China's Chairman Mao Zedong. Afghanistan recognized the One-China Principle and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory. Afterwards the political links between China and Afghanistan have developed rapidly. China's Vice Premier Chen Yi visited Afghanistan in 1960 and 1965. In 1966, China's Chairman Liu Shaoqi visited Afghanistan. In 1964, Shah Mohammed Zahir of Afghanistan visited China. Through these visits, China and Afghanistan have signed the *China-Afghanistan Border Protocol*, the *China-Afghanistan Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement*, and the *China-Afghanistan Cultural Cooperation Agreement*, which resolved the territorial disputes between the two countries in the Wakhan Corridor. These visits strengthened the bilateral relationship between the two states.

The active political relations between the two countries have also promoted cultural and economic communications (Zhang & Chen, 2012). For example, in 1956, a Chinese cultural and arts delegation visited Afghanistan and attended the 38th anniversary of the Independence Day of Afghanistan. In the same year, the Chinese delegation participated in the first session of the International Industry Fair of Afghanistan. The two countries also signed a trade payment agreement and have established close economic and trade ties. After 1957, China began sending students to Afghanistan to study Afghan language and literature. Most of these international students became well-known scholars who focused on Pashto, Afghan literature, and Afghan history in China. For example, Che Hongcai studied in Afghanistan in 1959 and later became professor of Pushtu literature. He devoted to his life time to compiling the *Pashto-Chinese Dictionary* (Che & Zhang, 2015). Professor Zhang Min, who was studying in Afghanistan during the same period, wrote *Culture and Society in Afghanistan* (Zhang, 2007). During this period, although China's economy was also difficult at the time, China continued to assist Afghanistan. China provided economic aid to Afghanistan and helped build a number of factories and infrastructure. From 1950 to 1966, China provided $73 million aids to Afghanistan, ranking fifth behind the Soviet Union, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the World Bank (Williams,

1988). The China's aids were mostly interest-free loans and grants without any other conditions. Among them, Parwan water conservancy project has still operated in 2001.

In 1960s and 1970s, the relationship between China and Afghanistan suffered setbacks (Wang, 2007). The Cultural Revolution took place in China in 1966, the relationship between the two countries cooled down. The relationship was improved in early of 1970s, high-level visits between the two countries were frequent, and a series of agreements on bilateral trade and civil aviation were signed. However, the Saur Revolution took place in 1978, and then-President Mohammed Daoud Khan was overthrown by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Afghanistan was in turmoil. China recognized the new government. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Sino-Afghanistan relations fell to the bottom. The Chinese government denounced the invasion of the Soviet Union, while refusing to recognize the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Party regime and retaining only the embassy in Afghanistan (charge level); the formal official relations with the Afghan regime were broken off, with only consular visas. The PDPA regime pursued a policy of pro-Soviet and anti-China, constantly criticizing China's Vietnam policy. The Chinese government supports the Afghan people's struggle against the Soviet Union, and has been providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees (Peng & Huang, 2000). After the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Afghanistan quickly fell into a bloody civil war. Afghan Mujahideen took over the government in 1992, relations between China and Afghanistan normalized. But soon the clashes between the various guerrilla groups took place, and the civil war has intensified. For security reasons, China evacuated the staff of the embassy in Afghanistan in February 1993, and normal intercourse between the two countries was interrupted.

In sum, China has established good political relations with Afghanistan since 1950. This relationship is based on mutual respect for territories and sovereignty, which is the basis of China's diplomatic policy, especially good-neighbor diplomacy. Compared with political relations, China's economic and trade ties with Afghanistan are limited. The outbreak of the Afghanistan issue directly affected China's national security, and the relationship between the two countries experienced setback. China increased its investment in Afghanistan's reconstruction after 2001. The two countries have also established closer bilateral relations.

China's Policy on Afghanistan's Rebuilding

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan started its reconstruction process. China is involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. China's aid has not deployed military forces in Afghanistan and has not any political conditions. All-round cooperation relationship was established between China and Afghanistan, to promote the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

After the new Afghan government was established, China actively developed political relations, economic and trade relations, and security cooperation with Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2010, Afghan president Karzai visited China four times. Political communications between China and Afghanistan are frequent. China has also actively participated in the process of Afghanistan's reconstruction and participated in the main international mechanism for Afghanistan reconstruction. China's involvement is relatively modest (Zhao, 2012). Some scholars believe presently China is not as actively involved in Afghanistan as western countries are (Mière, 2010). For a long time, China has pursued the principle of respecting the sovereignty of other countries and no-interfering in the internal affairs of other countries for long time. China has been cautiously involved in the Afghan issue and has not participated the military operations in Afghanistan. As China's former Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi pointed out "China has actively supported, promoted and participated in Afghanistan's post-war peace and reconstruction effort."[1]

First of all, China has paid more attention to establish close diplomatic and political ties with Afghanistan, and laid the foundation for promoting the development of bilateral relations. After the establishment of the Afghan Interim Government in 2001, China and Afghanistan restored diplomatic relations. The political ties between the two countries have become increasingly close. China dispatched a working group to Afghanistan in 2001. In 2002, Afghan President Karzai visited China, and China promised to provide $150 million aids to Afghanistan in the next five years.[2] In February 2002, the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan reopened. In May 2002, Chinese former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Afghanistan and met with Karzai as chairman of the interim government, and Zahir as the former king. In December 2002, China also signed the *Declaration on Good Neighborliness and Friendship* with other neighboring countries of Afghanistan, which respects the territorial and sovereign integrity of Afghanistan, supporting Afghanistan's reconstruction, and encouraging Afghanistan's transit trade.

In 2006, President Karzai visited China and signed 14 agreements with Chinese. Both countries also announced *Joint Statement Between China and Afghanistan*. Both countries announced the comprehensive partnership, which included the cooperation of Combating transnational crime and terrorist, economy and trade, agriculture, culture, tourism, and other fields. China helps Afghanistan to train police and army, and receives the Afghan international students. During this visit, both countries signed the *Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*[3], which is the foundation of China-Afghanistan relations. This treaty pointed out the direction of bilateral relations. The main content of treaty includes four parts.

1. China and Afghanistan respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and comply with the *Border Treaty of the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Afghanistan* signed in 1963.

2. The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc nor shall they embark on any such action, including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which compromises the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other contracting party. Neither sides of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used by a third country to jeopardize the national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other contracting party. Neither sides of the contracting parties shall allow the setting up of organizations nor should gangs on its own soil which shall impair the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other contrasting party and their activities be prohibited.

3. Both countries will promote bilateral cooperation of economic, cultural, and anti-terrorism.

4. The Treaty supersedes the *Sino-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression* signed in 1960.

Second, China takes the principle of win-win cooperation and strengthens the cooperation with Afghanistan in economy, energy, technology and trade field, in order to promote the economic prosperity of Afghanistan. The areas of cooperation between China and Afghanistan mainly include: agriculture, infrastructure building, hydroelectricity, and natural reserves. China began to increase its economic aid to

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[1] Yang Jiechi attends the regional summit on Afghanistan. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t654281.shtml

[2] China Promises Karzai $150 Million Aid. *VOA News*, https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2002-01-24-19-china-66453357/551205.html

[3] Full text of joint statement between China, Afghanistan. http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-06/20/content_315724.htm

Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2009, China provided $205.3 million aids, and 19.5 million dollars as loan to Afghanistan (Tahiri, 2017). On the other hand, China actively encourages Chinese enterprises to invest in Afghanistan and strengthen trade with Afghanistan. In 2008, China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Corporation Limited (JCCL) obtained the mining rights of the Ainak copper mine of Afghanistan, one of the world's largest copper mines. Two corporations will invest more than $30 billion.[4] The project is the largest foreign investment project in Afghanistan. The project will produce 220,000 tons of refined copper annually. The construction period of the project is five years and the mining period is 30 years

In addition, China is also working on different other projects enhancing the economic power of Afghanistan. China has also begun investing in Afghanistan's energy sector. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was the first foreign oil company to invest in Afghanistan energy field, and it cooperated with Watan Oil & Gas of Afghanistan to explore the oil fields in northern Afghanistan. In 2010, China's companies invested 400 million U.S. dollars in oil fields in the Amu Darya Basin in northwestern and northern Afghanistan. This project will give annually $304.35 million to Afghan government (Bukhari, 2012). Chinese telecommunication companies, such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), updated 200,000 Afghanistan's analog telephone lines to digital.

China's trade with Afghanistan has developed rapidly. China gives Duty free s to some Afghani goods, in order to promote the export of Afghan goods. In 2006, China allowed 287 kinds of goods in Afghanistan to be exported to China with zero tariffs.[5] China has become Afghanistan's most important trading partner. From 2002 to 2010, the trade volume between the two countries increased from 17.34 million U.S. dollars to 170 million U.S. dollars, increased of 10 times.

Table 1

Trade Between Afghanistan and China, 1999-2009

Year	Chinese export to Afghanistan (USD millions)	Chinese import from Afghanistan (USD millions)	Total value of trade (USD millions)
1999	16.68	2.9	19.58
2000	19.89	5.4	25.29
2002	19.92	0.08	19.99
2003	26.45	0.61	27.06
2004	56.97	0.95	57.92
2005	51.21	1.56	52.77
2006	100.47	0.19	100.66
2007	169.00	2.00	171.00
2008	152	3	155
2009	215	1	216

Note. Bukhari, S. W. H. (2012).

China fully involved in the Afghan reconstruction, and established all-round cooperation relationship with Afghanistan since 2001. China respects Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Politically, China opposes to interfere the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. At the same time, China has developed economic, trade, and security cooperation with Afghanistan. China has provided a large number of aids to Afghanistan,

[4] Is there still hope for China, Afghanistan's long-stalled US$3 billion copper mining deal? *South China Morning Post*, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093852/talks-aim-jump-start-china-miners-stalled-afghanistan

[5] Embassy of China in Afghanistan, *The Outline of Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Afghanistan*, http://af.china-embassy.org/chn/zagx/ztgk/t1097560.htm

invested in the field of infrastructure construction and energy, in order to promote the sustainable development and prosperity of Afghanistan's economy.

China–Afghanistan Relationship Under "Belt and Road Initiative"

China proposed the "Belt and Road Initiative" in 2013. One of the goals of this Initiative is to rejuvenate the trade along the ancient Silk Road, to promote the prosperity and development of the countries and regions, to build community of shared future for mankind. China's President Xi Jinping pointed out that the "Belt and Road" is a road of cooperation, and it is also a road of hope and a win-win.[6] As a result, some scholars believe that the "Belt and Road Initiative" is China's globalization scheme. Afghanistan is the cross of the ancient Silk Road, and benefit from this road. The root of the modern Afghan problem is partly from that Afghanistan's economy has not been self-reliant, but heavily depended on external aid. The China's "Belt and Road Initiative" is an important opportunity for Afghanistan's prosperity and stability. In recent years, under the "Belt and Road Initiative", bilateral relations between China and Afghanistan have developed rapidly.

Since 2011, Afghanistan's position in China's diplomatic strategy has improved. The relationship between China and Afghanistan has reached an unprecedented height. First, as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, the security situation in Afghanistan was worse. Afghanistan is neighboring country of China. Recently, Afghan issue further threatens China's security. Second, China has proposed the "Belt and Road Initiative" and the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor". Afghanistan is a crossroads of the Asian continent, and an important factor affecting Pakistan's northwest border security. Third, China has played its part as a major and responsible country. In recent years, China has provided more public goods for the surrounding areas, and contributed Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance. Therefore, the cooperation between China and Afghanistan has been significantly strengthened. China pays more attention to Afghan reconstruction.

Firstly, both countries upgrade their relationship from friendly cooperation to strategic cooperation. Two countries signed the *Joint Declaration Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Establishing Strategic and Cooperative Partnership* in 2012.[7] The main content of declaration includes three parts:

1. The two sides have undertaken to firmly support each other on issues concerning national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and not allow their respective territory to be used for any activities targeted against the other side.

2. The two sides agreed to continually strengthen the pragmatic cooperation in such fields as resources and energy development, infrastructure development, engineering, and agriculture. China will as always provide assistance to Afghanistan within the realm of its capabilities, and continue to encourage capable Chinese enterprises to participate in the construction and development of Afghanistan.

3. The two sides expressed strong rejection of all forms of terrorism, extremism, separatism, and organized crimes. The two sides agree to intensify exchanges and cooperation in security by way of jointly combating such transnational threats as terrorism, illegal immigration, illegal arms, and drug trafficking, and enhancing intelligence exchanges and border management.

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[6] http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-09/05/c_129696479.htm

[7] Joint declaration between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on establishing strategic and cooperative partnership. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China*, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t939517.shtml

In addition, China and Afghanistan have signed a series of agreements and joint declarations to build political mutual trust and support, which has built a platform for economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries. China also actively participates in the international multilateral mechanism for Afghan issue. In 2014, the fourth foreign ministers' meeting of the Istanbul Process was held in China. China also actively absorbed Afghanistan's entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 2012, Afghanistan became observer states of the SCO. Most of the SCO member states or observer states are closely related to the Afghan issue. Some countries are Afghanistan's neighbors. Therefore, the Afghan issue is a major issue that SCO cannot evade. SCO is the most important regional organization on the Afghanistan issue.

Secondly, China and Afghanistan reached a consensus on the "Belt and Road Initiative". Both countries jointly promote this initiative. Afghanistan is the crossroads of Asia, connecting Central Asia and South Asia, East Asia and West Asia. The prosperity of regional commodities and energy trade will inevitably promote the development and prosperity of the Afghan economy. This will help Afghanistan to reduce the dependence on external aid. Therefore, after China put forward "Belt and Road Initiative", Afghanistan showed great interests. China is also actively integrating Afghanistan into the framework of the "Belt and Road Initiative". In 2012, China gave zero tariff treatment to 95% of the products exported to China. Afghanistan is trying to integrate itself into regional economic and energy cooperation.

In 2017, Afghanistan's ambassador to China, Janan Mosazai pointed out that Afghanistan is part of the "Belt and Road Initiative".[8] China and Afghanistan have begun cooperation under the "Belt and Road" framework. They signed the *Memorandum of Understanding for Jointly Promoting the Construction of the "Belt and Road Initiative"*. In 2016, China and Afghanistan freight trains opened. The train arrived in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan from China and eventually arrived in northern Afghanistan. It carried industrial products and electronic products that Afghan merchants purchased from China. When the train returned, it carried Afghanistan's marble, saffron, dried fruits, and carpets to China. The communication between China and Afghanistan are also very frequent. On average, China annually trains 600 Afghan professionals in various fields and provides 150 Afghan international students with scholarships for further study in China. These personnel have played an important role in building mutual understanding and trust.

Table 2

Global Imports by Afghanistan June, 2017

Country (imports from)	Trade value (thousands)	Share (%)
China	174,505	17.59
Pakistan	153,913	15.51
Kazakhstan	121,868	12.28
Japan	88,064	8.87
Malaysia	73,091	7.37
Iran	69,786	7.03
United Arab Emirates	47,566	4.79
India	47,042	4.74
Uzbekistan	44,229	4.46

Note. Afghanistan Major Trade Partners, http://countries.bridgat.com/Afghanistan_Trade_Partners.html.

[8] Belt and Road will benefit Afghanistan, ambassador says. *Chinadaily*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017twosession/2017-03/05/content_28441163.htm

In recent years, China has actively intervened in the Afghan issue with special way, and pays more attention to mediation of the Afghan conflict. In particular, China has used its special influence to mediate the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[9] As we know, Afghanistan and Pakistan have a lot of contradictions on the Pashtunistan issue. The two countries fought for this for more than half a century. The conflict between these countries will do harm to the stability of region. Therefore, China's mediation has positive influence on the security and stability of South Asia. In short, China's investment and attention on the Afghanistan issue has increased significantly, and China-Afghanistan relations have reached an unprecedented height. The development of regional trade and cooperation will contribute to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Historically, the ancient Silk Road linked Afghanistan and China, and witnessed the friendly relations and common prosperity of the two countries. In 2013, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" initiative provided an important opportunity for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to resolve problems of modern Afghanistan. This initiative will further integrate Afghanistan into regional trade, and contribute to the prosperity and stability of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the "crossroads" of Asia and an important country for "Belt and Road Initiative". In addition, Afghanistan, as a neighbor of China, also affects the security and stability of China's frontier to a certain extent. Despite the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, the complex geopolitical game has restricted the further cooperation between China and Afghanistan. However, in recent years, China has gradually increased its investment and assistance to Afghanistan. China and Afghanistan have cooperated extensively in the fields of security, economics and humanities exchanges, and have achieved certain results. In short, under the "Belt and Road Initiative" initiative, China and Afghanistan share common interests and great potential for cooperation. The cooperation between two countries will promote regional prosperity and stability.

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