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Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security

Manu Lekunze

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New Security Challenges

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University of Warwick
Coventry, UK

The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

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Manu Lekunze
University of Aberdeen
Aberdeen, UK

New Security Challenges
ISBN 978-3-030-26924-1 ISBN 978-3-030-26925-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgement

I acknowledge Prof. Bruce Baker's contributions to Chap. 3 of this book. Some of the arguments made in Chap. 3 are derived from a joint article by Prof. Baker and Dr. Manu Lekunze submitted to the *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* in October 2017. While the paper was accepted with minor corrections (of which all corrections have been made), the paper has not been published.

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CFA	*Communauté financière d'Afrique*
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross domestic product
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDP	Internally displaced people
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
ISWAP	Islamic State West African Province
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional economic communities

RUF	Revolutionary United Front
TNC	Transnational Cooperation
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WSA	World-system analysis

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

With the growth of Islamic terrorism and the ensuing war on terror, the 24-hour news cycle, the internet and smartphones, attention to security is perhaps the most it has ever been. News on a security incident goes many times around the world in mini seconds. Political careers are made and destroyed on security matters. Businesses, governments, politicians and policymakers all over the globe thus pay keen attention to security. Unprecedented amounts of money continue to be spent on security. Indeed, the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs at Brown University estimates that by the end of the fiscal year 2018, the USA would have spent 5.6 trillion dollars on wars in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan (Watson Institute for International & Public Affair 2017).

The rise of China (Asia in general) and a more assertive Russia (as seen in the case of Syria and Venezuela) had begun to test some national security assumptions which were taken for granted. The attention paid to Africa by a rising power such as China has stirred interest from other global powers especially Europe and the USA. The trade war now witnessed between Trump's America and China are bound to reflect on Africa as the worldwide supplier of raw materials which power the global economy. Indeed, China is now considered as a revisionist power by the USA. This means China's activities in Africa will increasingly be interpreted through a strategic lens. This may have severe national security implications on African states (as they are forced to choose between China and

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_1

the West). The case of Huawei is one whose penetration is already deep in Africa (including African states considered US allies).

The exploitation of Africa by external powers has been a significant source of external security challenge. From slavery through colonisation to neo-colonisation, Africa was exposed to extreme exploitation and a hostile international environment. Recently, there have been arguments on 'Africa rising' (though with many critics). It has some of the fastest growing economies in the world. The African middle class is expanding. By implication, national security for African states and regional security for African sub-regions is of prime importance to secure the economic and developmental gains made and provide a secure environment for economic and developmental progress. For Africa to rise, it must get national security right. Continuously investigating African security is, therefore, a worthy academic endeavour.

The world in general and Africa in particular is witnessing an increase in armed conflict of various forms (IMF 2019, 25). Africa has always been at the top of the charts as concerns conflict. However, in the 2000s, it witnessed a decrease in war. This trend has not been sustained as from 2010 conflict in the world, and Africa has been increasing. In fact, in 2010, there were 2200 conflict-related deaths in Africa. But from 2014 to 2018, the average war-related deaths stand at 14,000 a year (IMF 2019). This is lower than the levels seen in 1990 but signifies an increase from the levels seen in the 2000s. These figures show the continuous importance of studying African security (IMF 2019).

These realities of security, therefore, make a comprehensive (yet accessible) book on African security (firmly anchored in International Relations) an absolute necessity. This book aims to introduce African Security Studies as a sub-discipline of International Relations. It focuses on some of the theoretical debates and inherent security threats in Africa. Considering that African Security has thus far been studied from too many different perspectives, this book serves as the one place where the various topics in African Security are introduced. It hopes to serve the needs of emerging African security scholars.

A review of existing literature on security in Africa (which is not the essence of this book) gives an impression similar to the Indian fable of 'Blind Men and the Elephant'. As the blind men touch and feel a different part of the elephant's body, their description of the elephant is limited to their experience. In effect, their description of the elephant is entirely

different from each other. A holistic approach to African security has to emerge. This book hopes to contribute to that effort.

This book argues that to avoid such analysis, it is essential for efforts to be made to bring African security into the Security Studies as a sub-discipline of International Relations. This book is hoped to be a contribution to this effect by addressing the definition of the African state and security and providing a holistic framework for analysis. The continent is made up of 54 independent states, the majority of whom were formed at the end of European imperialism in Africa. As discussed above, the understanding of the African state and its place in international security studies is particularly nuanced. However, the geostrategic importance of Africa to global powers cannot be overemphasised.

Security Studies and Africa

Most African states have experienced few real external military threats from other countries. For Cameroon, for example, its long border with Nigeria has been its primary source of military threats. For many years, there was tension between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula (UN, 2006). Nigeria, a major African state, except for this Bakassi case, faces little in real external threats from other countries. In general terms, most of the African regions (such as the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region of Nigeria and Cameroon) fear no external threats from other states.

However, with the advent of Islamic terrorism, African states are increasingly facing armed groups emanating from outside their borders. The sophistication of some of these groups requires the full force of the military. While the probability of Nigeria invading Cameroon is very small, Boko Haram originating from Nigeria poses a significant military threat to Cameroon. This is similar to the case of Somalia and Kenya, where Al-Shabaab poses a threat to Kenya, but Somalia does not. These cases are repeated in the Sahel and North Africa in the case of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and the Islamic state. In general, non-state external sources of threats continue to grow in Africa.

Furthermore, in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, real threats emanating from other states continue to be a significant national security threat. Attacks of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by Rwanda in the name of pursuing *genocidaires* are widely documented. Burundi

continues to decry external intervention by its neighbours in its internal affairs. Besides, hydro-politics in the Nile Basin region holds significant potential for armed inter-state confrontations over disputes on the use of the Nile water.

While elements of traditional security have always been present in Africa, most traditional security scholarship ignores Africa. This book argues that African security can be explored from both tradition and broader perspectives. In effect, the discussion in this book theoretically underpinned the traditional, Copenhagen and human security approaches. In other words, the realists, constructivists and critical security studies. When issues such as poverty and underdevelopment are conceptualised as security (as done by the Human Security school), it is challenging to ignore Marxist perspectives in International Relations. The dependency theory and Wallerstein's World System Analysis explain some of the structural difficulties faced by periphery states (of which most African nations are) in providing human security.

It is argued that the sectors of security espoused by the Copenhagen school (Buzan 1991a, b) make the understanding of security in Africa more comprehensive and capture the junctions which shape the production and experience of security. It is inferred from their arguments that the complex interaction of issues from the sectors of security, the interplay of actions undertaken by the various actors (be it state or non-state) from these sectors, regional and global security conditions and the interface of both external and internal influences are a significant determinant of security at a specific location and time. Human security concerns such as crime, environmental degradation, infectious diseases and poverty are argued to be legitimate security concerns. It has also been acknowledged that these concerns have an impact on national security conceived in the traditional sense.

Africa is hugely diverse and complex to fit in any particular theoretical box. Different International Relations theories are relevant in different parts and different circumstances. In essence, the arguments in this book use arguments from Realist, Liberalist Constructivism and Marxist approaches in International Relations. However, the realist perspective on the competition for scarce resources for survival is fundamental to the thinking in this book. It is argued that some of these arguments and concepts are applicable to internal politics. A good example that will become clear in the course of the book is the security dilemma concept.

Drawing from core International Relations theories, some specific theories of civil conflict such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Posen (1993) and Fearon and Laitin (2006) and the many case studies of conflict in Africa (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Boege et al. 2008; Cummins 2013; Mallett 2010; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Meagher 2012; Baker 2008, 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Francis 2005; International Crisis Group 2010, 2014), it is maintained that, in broad terms, there are two primary sources of security threats in Africa. The most common are armed struggles over scarce resources needed for individual or group survival. The second is rebellion against the government or a status quo that allocates these resources in peace time.

In other words, in pursuit of survival, individuals or groups will engineer technologies to maximise their well-being. In some circumstances, it is possible to survive cooperatively; in other circumstances, it is more rational to pursue survival through war (Wittman 2000, 869). This applies to groups within a state. But it also applies to nations as groups competing with other nations to maximise the well-being of their citizens. Some conflicts may take an ethnic or religious form. In most cases (few exceptions), the ethnic or religious form is only a vehicle of organisation rather than a cause of conflict. The central research questions are, therefore, what is security, security for whom and what are the inherent national security challenges (intra-state or inter-state) to African security?

A Turbulent Neighbourhood

As a starting point, the interconnected nature of African security is an essential attribute to understand at the beginning of an African scholarship endeavour. This section provides more information on the different African security regions and the security issues, which are interconnected. The interconnections of security issues in specific geographies are what Buzan (1991b) refers to as regional security complexes.

In line with this thinking, this book argues that Africa can be divided into several regional security complexes. However, thanks to the development of systems theory and complexity science in the social science (Lekunze 2019; Byrne and Callaghan 2004), it is argued that it is more appropriate to use regional security systems instead of regional security complexes. A systems' approach addresses some of the problems encountered by linear analysis of African security. In essence, insights gained from

complexity science form part of the thinking that goes into the examination of security in this book.

Geopolitically, Africa can be broadly divided into the obvious, North, East, West, South and Central Africa regions. However, due to similarities and unique security issues and following the line of thinking presented in Buzan's regional security complexes, Africa can be divided into several security regions. From the North is the North Africa regional security complex or the North Africa regional security system as preferred in this book going forward. It is also often associated or considered to be part of the Middle East. It includes major African states such as Egypt, Morocco and Algeria and problematic countries such as Libya and Sudan.

North Africa is separated from the rest of the continent by the Sahara Desert. Immediately 'in' and below the Sahara Desert is the Sahelian regional security system. It is perhaps the most security challenged region of African. The Sahel region stretches from the African east coast of the Red Sea inwards to the West African coast of the Atlantic Ocean. This region includes states such as Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea which have many and diverse inherent security challenges. This area is plagued by issues of poverty, political violence nomad-ism, weak governments and Islamic terrorism. Some have argued that the region is now home to the most substantial contingent of Daesh (an Islamic terrorist group which started in Northern Iraq and Syria) (Guennoun and Bassou 2017). As a result, international forces led by France have been deployed to the region to fight terrorism. States like Mali could have collapsed without French intervention.

In the middle of Africa, four regional security systems are located. To the west is the Gulf of Guinea regional security system which stretches from Senegal and traces coastal states such as the Guineas, Burkina Faso, Ghana Nigeria, Cameroon, right down to Angola. This is the oil-rich part of Africa (especially for countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Nigerian and Angola). It is also home to the world's most dangerous maritime region (Chatham House 2013, 1). This region also has some of the longest serving African heads of state such as in Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and most recently Angola. In Togo and Gabon, a son has continued the long rule of his father. This maintains the same family in power for close to 50 years.

To the Centre West is the Lake Chad Basin region which includes countries such as Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria. The security dynamics of this region are generally dominated by Nigeria (Africa's most populous and biggest economy). The internal difficulties of Nigeria including herdsmen violence, ethnic clashes, political violence, maritime criminality and Islamic terrorism in the form of Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) pose some of the most significant national and regional security threats in this region. The inability of the Central African Republic to emerge as a state since independence remains a severe security challenge in this region. All of these issues are interconnected and do not respect state borders.

At the Centre of Africa is the Great Lakes region. It includes countries such as Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda and Tanzania. This region is home to the most intricate ethnic conflicts in Africa. The region has witnessed a genocide of Hutus in Burundi and a genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. The tension between ethnic groups continues to shape politics and security in the many states of the region. Almost as soon as the DRC gained independence, it plunged into security crises. It continues to suffer from various security challenges to date. It is also one of the most natural resource-endowed nation on earth. In territorial and population size, the DRC is the biggest country in the Great Lakes region. In effect, the instability in the DRC constitutes a substantial security challenge for all the states for the region.

The Great Lakes region has experienced more than its fair share of decrepit leadership in the form of Mobutu and Idi Amin. These two can be argued to be among the most depraved of African leaders. The region still finds it challenging to implement democracy as leaders in the region continue to manipulate constitutions and electoral systems to perpetuate themselves in power. This is the case in countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Until recently the former president of the DRC resisted stepping down even after he had exhausted his two terms in office. President Kabila only agreed to step down after manipulating the constitution to retain significant influence even outside of the presidential palace.

To the east of the middle is the East African regional security system. It includes countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. It contains the sub-region often referred to as the Horn of Africa which includes Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia. This region comprises of Somalia, which is

an example of a typical 'failed state'. The destabilising effect of the failed state of Somalia remains the most severe source of national and regional security threats. Islamic terrorism has taken advantage of the ungoverned spaces to establish Al-Shabaab. This group is one of Africa's most active terrorist groups. It has orchestrated spectacular terrorist attacks in places like Uganda and Kenya. This includes the bombing of bars in Kampala during the Football World Cup Finals of 2010 and the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013.

At the south of the continent is the Southern Africa regional security system. It contains countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia which were settled by Europeans. The dynamics between European Settlers and indigenous Africans have been a substantial determinant of national and regional security of that region for most of its history. Apartheid and the fight against apartheid in South Africa led to many interventions to the internal affairs of other states of the region by the apartheid government of South Africa.

The racist government of South Africa was determined to show that black Africans are incapable of governing themselves to justify their apartheid policy. To date, the interest of South Africa remains a significant force in politics and security in the South African regional security system. South Africa remains the most unequal society on earth (Scott 2019). This may have long-term security implications for both South Africa and the South African regional security system.

As can be seen in the different security regions of Africa outlined above, security in Africa is interconnected. Many African countries belong to more than one regional security system. All regional security systems in African have some degree of significant security concerns that can destabilise many states within that regional security system. The circular nature of these security challenges means that they are challenging to resolve and can spread. In other words, every single African state resides in a turbulent neighbourhood.

Take Cameroon for example, it is located in both the Gulf of Guinea and the Lake Chad Basin regional security systems. The northern part of Cameroon is part of the Lake Chad Basin regional security system. This regional security system is at the forefront of climate-induced poverty with security consequences due to the shrinking Lake Chad. Boko Haram and ISWAP also pose significant challenges in this region. As indicated above, the Gulf of Guinea has been argued by some to be at the top of maritime insecurity in the world (Chatham House 2013, 1).

The problems of the LCB regional security system are different from those of the Gulf of Guinea. Consequently, Cameroon finds itself being pulled by multiple issues from different security complexes. Indeed, it suffers from issues arising from the collapse of the Central African Republic, Islamic terrorism, maritime insecurity from the Gulf of Guinea and separatist's violence which has an impact on its neighbours such as Nigeria. The example of Cameroon is typical of many African countries such as Tanzania and Kenya in East Africa and the Great Lakes regional security systems (Hendricks and Keïta 2017, 8).

The Historical and Contemporary Security Context of Africa

Most Africa states emerged into statehood in the 1960s after the fall of the European empires. Some of these states emerged as a result of devastating anti-colonial wars. The colonial powers created African countries without any consideration of the reality of the peoples that inhabited these territories. The overriding interests of the imperial powers were the riches of the territories rather than the peoples. The emphasis was on the territory. To the new leaders of independent Africa, there was an immediate shift from a focus on the territory to a focus on the people. The disparate people that occupied these territories become a significant problem in forming collegiate groups which can take collective action for the benefit of the entire population of the country. The inability to create a critical mass on any issue continues to be one of the most significant inherent security challenges to contemporary Africa.

Unfortunately, these states embarked on reconstruction and nation building in the context of the Cold War (where every action was interpreted on the bipolar lens). The inexperience of the new independent leaders', failed experiments in socialism and interference (of the superpowers) in the internal affairs of these new states were the essential determinants of security in newly independent Africa. Poor management and extreme external inference made Africa a region of deprivation and war.

Consequently, shortly after African independence, states began to plunge into conflict one after the other. From the start, Congo faced challenges in creating and running a government. Also, some parts of the country unilaterally declared independence from the early days of

nation building. In wars such as the Biafra war in Nigeria, in 1967–70 millions were killed.

The inability to create adequate systems on how to select leaders and how to change leaders when they are already in power led to the establishment of one-party states across the continent. With no room to peacefully change leaders, the continent witnessed a significant rise in armed rebellions and coups d'état with devastating security implications. States such as Nigeria, Ghana and the Central African Republic experienced more than five coups d'état. The Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leon and Sudan all witnessed the emergence of armed rebellions against the government. Rebel groups and private militias or armed gangs of various types and aims became the mainstay of African politics.

Consequently, many African leaders were drawn from a pool of young, poorly educated military or rebel militias: this significantly increased political violence and the onset of civil wars. Africa became synonymous to civil war and the consequent poverty, disease and general human suffering. This did not abate until the end of the Cold War (in the late 1980s and early 1990s). This was also coupled with the positive effect of the structural adjustment programmes.

At present, the critical security issues taking place on the continent include the fallout of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led intervention in Libya in the North. The intervention without any serious post-Gaddafi plan immediately resulted in the failure of the Libyan government. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other nefarious interests infiltrate the civil war that ensued. The internationally recognised but fragile government in Tripoli is currently battling to stay alive from attacks emanating from the east. A counter-government group led by a former general in Gaddafi's army; General Khalifa Haftar continues to mount attacks against the government. There are no signs that the civil war will end soon.

The Arab spring that unleashed the ousting of Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Gaddafi has not completely died down. The democracy of Tunisia is yet to be consolidated. Egypt experimented with democracy but quickly reverted to 'strong man' rule through a military coup d'état that brought the current president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The fallout from this is still working its way through the system. The Arab Spring in 2011 spared the strong man of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika. However, in 2019 widespread protest evicted him from power. The security situation is still tensed in Algeria as elections are awaited.

The manner of which this transition period is managed holds potential security challenges to Algeria with regional and international implications. While popular protest ousted figures such as Abdelaziz Bouteflika or Omar El-Bashir, it appears the stronghold of the regimes remains. Only the head or the face of the government has been sacrificed to protect the government. The system in both countries seems determined to stay in power to the disappointment of many citizens who risk their lives in protests. The current violence in Sudan shows that the situation in Algeria and Sudan is particularly dangerous in the short term (Ferguson 2019).

Tribal armed conflict has a long history in the Sahelian region of Africa. The legendary Tuareg rebels and various jihadist groups in the Sahelian region are gaining notoriety in violence. This violence is engulfing countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. There has been a long list of tribal conflict in this region with continuous Tuareg raids. As early as 2005, the US military described the area as 'the new front in the war on terrorism' (International Crisis Group 2005, i). The rise of Islamic terrorism globally and specifically the emergence of the Islamic State in Northern Iraq and Syria had a significant impact on the revitalisation of Islamism in the Sahel. The weakness of the majority of the Sahelian governments has not assisted the situation.

The situation in the Sahel deteriorated to a point where external intervention was needed to keep states such as Mali alive. Spearheaded by France, the UN Security Council adopted the resolutions 2359 and 2391 on the deployment of a military force in the region dubbed the G5 Sahel Joint Force. It combines troops from five states of the region, namely, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. It has been in operation since 2017, and its main aim is to fight against terrorism and transnational criminal networks (France Diplomatie 2019).

As indicated above, the recent popular protest which ousted Sudan's military dictator of more than 30 years does not seem to hold too much promise for both the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions. In addition, the issues in the West of Sudan have not completely disappeared. The current political predicament in Khartoum is feared to reignite fighting in the west of Sudan. Sudan's problems do not exist or occur from a vacuum; Sudan has been at the centre of some of the critical determinants of security in Africa as a source of Islamic terrorism. Indeed, Sudan provided a sanctuary for several Islamist groups around the world. These groups included Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, Gamaa Islamiya (Islamic Group)

and the Muslim Brotherhood expelled from Egypt (Zahid and Medley 2006).

The ideas of how to create an Islamic state as an alternative to the Western model left behind by the European imperialists were popularised by Sudanese figures such as Hassan Turabi. The incubation of the Muslim Brotherhood ideas of political Islam in the National Islamic Front (NIF) which garnered great influence in Sudan played a key role in inspiring later Islamic groups claiming to form Islamic states or caliphates such as Boko Haram and ISIS. Furthermore, Sudan maintains controversial relations with its neighbours. This still has destabilising effects on the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions. Poor relationships with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya in the 1990s contributed significantly to exaggerating security issues in these regions.

Africa's newest state, South Sudan, plunged into a civil war almost as soon as it gained its independence. While South Sudanese united to fight the mostly Islamic North, they immediately focused on their ethnic difference as soon as the threat of the North disappeared. South Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups. The Dinka form about 35 per cent of the total population. The Dinka have, therefore, used their majority to control the government. The second biggest ethnic group in South Sudan is the Nuer. In 2013, the current president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir (of Dinka extraction), accused Riek Machar (of Nuer extraction) of an attempted coup d'état. Machar (then vice president) fled the country. There has been no peace in South Sudan since.

The Central African Republic, plagued by depraved governance under leaders such as Bokassa and numerous coups d'état, finally totally collapsed in 2013. Since then, two main rebel groups have emerged on religious lines, the Séléka (who claim to be Islamic) and the Anti-Balaka (who claim to be Christian). The Central African Republic has witnessed a series of attempts at ethnic cleansing. Next door to the Central Africa Republic, it is becoming more apparent that Cameroon is locked into a civil war in its two English-speaking regions. Cameroon also suffers from the fallout of the conflict in the Central African Republic. Rebels from the Central African Republic regularly breach its eastern border. In the North of Cameroon, Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to threaten Cameroon's territorial integrity and create insecurity for the population.

The situation in the Central African Republic has led to Russia's first deployment of troops in Africa since the end of the Cold War. Considered as a French sphere of influence, the actions of Russia in the Central African

Republic (CAR) indicate a turning point in the International Relations of the parties involved. This may have severe security implications for the Central African Republic and its regional security system. Indeed, the relationship between France, Russia and Francophone Africa could be significantly impacted by Russian and French activity in CAR.

Nigeria is the biggest economy and most populous African state. It has some of the most intricate internal contradictions which continue to harbour potentially severe security challenges to African security. The division between the mostly Muslim North (who seem to dominate politics and the military) and the primarily Christian south could be a significant source of national security threats to Nigeria with regional and international implication. In recent years Nigeria continues to suffer from armed conflict emanating from militant groups in its oil-rich south regions, Boko Haram from the North East and Fulani herdsmen from the plateau regions. Political violence and general armed crime continue to be a challenge to Nigeria. As Africa's most populous and biggest economy, any security challenges in Nigeria could have reverberation across the continent.

Similar to the Sahel mentioned above, issues of weak governments and Islamism plague the Lake Chad Basin region. Also identical to the G5 Force in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin region has the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) made of forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The MNJTF is focused mostly on tackling the threat posed by Boko Haram and its splinter groups in the Lake Chad Basin. It must be noted that both Niger and Chad struggle with terrorism from the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin security systems. Islamic terrorism pressure, underdevelopment, poverty, increasing population without matching opportunities and climate change are rendering the states of the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin region vulnerable to many other national security threats as will be shown in subsequent chapters.

At the heart of Africa is the Democratic Republic of Congo which is Africa's fourth most populous country (after Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia) and one of the biggest in terms of territory (World Population Review 2019). As indicated above, this mineral-rich country plunged into civil war almost as soon as it gained independence in the 1960s. Though it enjoyed periods of relative peace under the decrepit rule of General Mobutu Sese Seko, it has never quite fully gotten out of conflict (since independence). One of the rare cases of inter-state war in Africa occurred in 1997 when supported the removal of the former president of then Zaire

Joseph Sese Seko Mobutu. At the time of writing, the authority of the Congolese government continues to be challenged by armed groups in many parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

One of the greatest scourges to twentieth-century African history is the genocide that took place in Rwanda in April 1994. Before then, after the killing of hundreds of Tutsis by Hutus in Marangara and Ntega, in August 1988, the Burundian army (which mostly Tutsi) slaughtered over 20,000 Hutu. Also, in 1972 the Burundian military carried out nationwide extermination of Hutu elites. Between 80,000 and 200,000 Hutus were killed (Bhavnani and Backer 2000, 285). The ethnic tensions in the Great Lakes region continue to pose a momentous threat to the entire region with significant national, regional and international security implications.

While the Great Lakes region currently enjoys some relative peace (except the DRC and Burundi), the historical complication between the relationships between Hutu and Tutsi and the implications for the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania have not been sustainability resolved. The threat of another genocide (as the Rwandan and Burundian genocides of 1994 and 1972, respectively) continues to be real. The long-standing rule of key political leaders such as Paul Kagame, Yoweri Museveni, Paul Nkurunziza and Joseph Kabila (who recently stepped down but is rumoured to have reserved much power to himself and his party) does not help the situation.

The 'failed state' status of Somalia has made it possible for terrorist organisations such as al-Shabaab to use the empty ungoverned spaces to train and organise attacks in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Somalian civil war, Islamic terrorism and piracy in the Gulf of Aden made the Horn of Africa one of the most dangerous places on earth. Also, significant is the bombing of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, by Al-Qaeda operating from the Horn of Africa. This drew Africa into the global war on terror. This has reshaped security priorities in Africa, especially in East Africa and the Horn of Africa notably.

Lusophone countries such as Angola and Mozambique failed to gain independence at the same time, which most African countries gained independence in the 1960s. They had to engage in bitter wars of independence, with Cold War machinations that caused significant destruction. These countries finally gained independence in the 1970s, during

which a degree of violence continued. Angola remained relatively stable under the (close to four decades) rule of former president José Eduardo dos Santos. In 2017 Angola experienced its first change of president by the ballot box. However, observers are still waiting to understand the consolidation of democracy in a country that has known just one ruler for many decades. A relapse may have significant national security implications.

Mozambique and Angola have a similar background (in terms of colonial heritage and anti-colonial wars). Mozambique continues to be fragile and vulnerable to several security threats. The white settler in countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa prevented majority rule for many years. This led to significant security implication, which included meddling in the internal affairs of countries such as Mozambique and Angola. The black majority waged a dangerous guerrilla war against the white minority in South Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe). The struggle against white minority rule was led by figures such as Robert Mugabe. The subsequent unwillingness to leave power by Mugabe significantly weakened Zimbabwe exposing it to several security vulnerabilities.

The fight against apartheid in South Africa also contributed to some of the security threats in South Africa. Arguments over land rights and the distribution of economic power between the different races that inhabit this region hold severe threats to national security with regional international implications. In South Africa, economic dominance, including land ownership, continues to reside in the hands of the white minority. The voices of people arguing for the expropriation of land without compensation in South Africa continue to rise (Gerber 2019). If the economic condition of the black majority does improve significantly or worst still deteriorates, the potential for a repeat of Zimbabwe in South Africa is significant.

In the 2019 general election in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) registered its lowest share of the vote ever (Burke 2019). While the ANC continues to be the dominant political party since the end of apartheid in 1994, in recent years, its percentage of the vote (its market share in economics terms) has increasingly decreased. While this may be good for democracy, as it eases the grip of the ANC (which has effectively turned South Africa into a one-party state), it also opens the door to the possibility of other political views in the management of South Africa. These new views or parties may wish to depart from the conciliatory

approach taken by the ANC since the end of apartheid. Opening up apartheid-era abuses may plunge the country into turmoil. In other words, the displacement of the ANC can bring opportunities as well as dangers.

Summary of Chapters

The essence of this book is to provide a comprehensive yet accessible introduction to inherent and contemporary challenges to African security. This is achieved through well-discussed sources of security threats or security sectors (as explained by the Copenhagen school). As this book seeks to contribute to the study of African security with the discipline of International Relations, it draws on debates and theories in International Relations and its sub-discipline of Security Studies. The book also takes a broad approach, arguing that most of the causes of security in Africa revolve around competition for scarce resources. The competition for the actual resources or over the structures which allocate resources is at the core of most African conflict with national security implications.

In effect, this book starts with a discussion on the status of the African state in International Relations. While the African state and African governance have been discussed widely in African Studies literature, its discussion in International Relations is limited. In many cases, International Relations theorists have brushed it aside, arguing that states do not quite exist outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Building on Clapham (1996) and Buzan (1991b), Chap. 2 of this book addresses issues with the African state in International Relations. It also explores International Relations theories as it applies to the arguments (African security) in this book. This chapter serves as the foundation for the analysis in subsequent chapters.

As indicated above, at the heart of any security study is the three questions, what is security, security for whom and what constitute a security issue. In effect, Chap. 3 uses existing literature to situate the understanding of security in the African context. It also answers the question of security for whom by suggesting the adoption of different referents for security at different levels. However, it is argued that security levels are interdependent. Empirical evidence from Cameroon is used to exemplify the complexity and contested nature of the concept of security. The subsequent chapters then focus on the third security question, which addresses inherent security challenges.

Chapter 4 discusses societal sources of security threat such as identity. It is argued that African states are state-nations with multi-layered identities. While national identities have been consolidating in most parts of Africa, what this book refers to as umbrella ethnic group identities have also been growing. These identities allow for political entrepreneurship and hatreds, which may result in conflict with national security consequences. Examples of such conflicts are made to emphasise the problem. It concludes that identity politics have inherent security challenges which will continue to affect Africa.

Chapter 5 argues that the form of African governments is significantly contested. The totalitarian nature of governance of many pre-colonial polities and the link of governance structures to traditions and ethnicity continue to challenge peace and stability in Africa. It also argues that the evolutionary inability to change leaders remain a potent security threat to most African states.

In summary, the problem of democracy and governance (how to gain power and how to exercise power). The ability to always split in the time of conflict in pre-colonial political development has left some African traditions without indigenous inter-group conflict management and resolutions methods and experience. This must not be confused with legendary traditional intra-group (person to person) conflict resolution mechanisms.

Chapter 6 focuses on the political economy (actual competition over resources, on an individual and group level). It investigates the economic resources available to African states against the need. It is argued that for various reasons, the resources and opportunity to pursue and meet needs are not available for many Africans. With the scarcity of resources, competition is thus a natural progression, and it is fierce. Where cooperation fails, violence becomes an option, hence the high levels of civil conflict. This competition allows for ethnic manipulations, as discussed in Chap. 4. The damages caused by competition for resources further exacerbate the problems governance addressed in Chap. 5.

Chapter 7 presents the environment as not limited only to the physical environment. It is argued that the environment of security includes the physical environment, the social environment, the institutional frameworks at the state and international levels and the geopolitical framework of global politics. It is further contended that different conditions of the environment of security (climate change, environmental degradation, global warming, melting glaciers, the anarchical international system,

national and international institutional frameworks) have the potential to exacerbate the societal, economic and political issues discussed in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6. In effect, the environment of security is not a primary security issue but act either as a 'threat multiplier' (malign environment) or a 'threat inhibitor' (a benign environment). This explores the security environment of African to make conclusions on its specific character.

The conclusion of the book brings together the threats discussed in isolation in the proceeding chapters to argue that security does not happen in a vacuum. It is contended that security is an emergent product or property of a complex adaptive system. In effect, the national security of each African state is a function of the security system in which it resides. It is surmised that almost every African country finds itself in a turbulent neighbourhood. Irrespective of how good a single state may be at managing its national security, it is still exposed to events happening in neighbouring countries which are beyond their jurisdiction or control. The case of Boko Haram and the Central African Republic rebels in Cameroon highlights such an argument.

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CHAPTER 2

African Security Studies in International Relations

Introduction

This book intends to situate African Security Studies within International Relations. The discussion in this book, therefore, starts with a perspective on the African state and theories of International Relations. The debate on the place of Africa in International Relations continues. While there has been significant commentary and scholarship on African security, the literature is of no discipline or multidisciplinary. Since Africa is gradually being recognised in International Relations, it is vital for an approach to African security, which is appropriately grounded in International Relations to emerge. At the core of this book is determination to contribute towards such an approach in the analysis of inherent security challenges in Africa. Both this chapter and Chap. 3 serve the purpose of evaluating the debates in International Relations theory to properly situate (theoretically) the arguments and conclusions made in the subsequent chapters of this book.

This chapter starts with an attempt to define a start in a manner that covers the majority of African states. It builds on arguments made by scholars such as Christopher Clapham and Buzan to address the issues of the African state in International Relations (Clapham 1993, 1996, 2001; Buzan 1991b). The chapter also investigates core International Relations theories as it is relevant to security in Africa.

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_2

The African State

Traditional International Relations (IR) deifies the state. Both realism and liberalism argue favourably to the importance of the state in security production or insecurity prevention. In consequence, it is the cornerstone of International Relations and a source of much debate to why the IR discipline is distant to Africa (Harman and William 2013). The state, according to the realists' school, is based on the Westphalian configuration undergirded by Hobbes' theory of the social contract and Weber's analysis of the state in his much-read essay, "Politics as a Vocation" (Weber 1919). Many scholars have argued that this type of state does not exist outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Boege et al. 2008, 2). It has been argued that in parts of Africa the state does not enjoy a monopoly over violence (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Baker 2008, 2010; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Krahmann 2005).

The above paragraph raises the question of whether the rigid conceptualisation (OECD standards) of a state should persist in post-modern International Relations. Can the applicability of statists approach to International Relations in Africa be dismissed simply because all African countries do not entirely conform to OECD standards? This book argues to the contrary. It proposes a definition and conceptualisation of the state to sufficiently capture the majority of states in the international system. The Montevideo Treaty offers such an approach as it conceptualises a state as an entity which has 'a permanent population, a defined territory, government and the capacity to enter relations with other states' (OAS 2017).

If one thing is stable for most African countries, it is the boundaries of defined territories. The inviolability of African state boundaries is at the core of African statehood. Even when (in particular circumstance such as the Congo) a break-up of the country may be beneficial to governance, many wars are fought to maintain boundaries as inherited from colonialism. Per the Montevideo Treaty, African states fulfil the criteria of defined territories. Even in countries like Somalia (which is the typical example of a failed state), no one is in doubt of what the defined territory of Somalia is.

On the government as an attribute of a state, all African countries have a government. The strength and reach of these governments may be debated, but their existence cannot be. However, the issue of government and governance in Africa has enjoyed significant pontification with abundant literature.

For the study of African security, the issue of government as an attribute of the state has to be explored further. Most importantly, the government is not a state. A state is an entity with all the attributes listed in the Montevideo Treaty, while a government is the institutions and individuals who act on behalf of a state. While the government acts on behalf of the state, a state is more than a government. Using Freedom House data, McFerson (2010, 53) shows that in 1989 33 African states were rated as 'not free' while in 2008 only 14 African countries were rated as 'not free' (2010, 53).

With regard to a permanent population, while Africa remains a sparingly populated continent, all of its states contain a permanent population. Some states have a nomadic population; however, cross-border nomadic lifestyles are limited. Most nomadic people move from place to place within their 'tribal lands'. Historically Fulani herdsmen are known to move around mostly in Northern Nigeria, and the Tuareg mostly in Northern Mali, for example. For most African states, their populations continue to grow (The World Bank 2017).

The capacity to enter relations with other states varies from country to country in Africa. However, no African country lacks the essential ability to enter into relationships with other nations. Most African countries have embassies around the world, especially in important capital cities such as London, Paris, Washington, Moscow and Beijing. All are a member of the major international organisations such as the UN. They are a party to numerous international treaties and participate in multiple fora in the global system. Once more, even Somalia and South Sudan have UN representations.

Of the attributes of the state, the most contested for African countries is sovereignty. Is the African state a sovereign state? The question sovereignty has garnered significant literature. It is, therefore, important for this book to address this issue comprehensively. To begin with, it must be noted that the sovereignty of a state stems from the fact that the state is the supreme authority within its territories and does not recognise a supreme authority outside its borders. Sovereignty construed, thus, it is clear that there are two elements; supreme authority within a specific territory and does not recognise a superior authority outside that territory. In other words, a distinction between internal and external sovereignty exists.

Using examples such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is argued that African state surrendered an extensive amount of sovereignty to external powers (lack external sovereignty) (Thomson 2010). They took and still take orders from the IMF, in exchange for financial support. Most African countries were forced to undertake actions which they perhaps will not have considered (Lekunze 2019). This external coercion was demonstrated in the area of marketisation (privatisation) and fiscal policies. Governments were forced to sell off state-owned enterprises and to cut budgets for essential services such as education, health and even the police and the military with significant consequences on security (Lekunze 2019).

The case of the purchase of presidential jet in Cameroon is a typical example of how sovereignty was surrendered to the IMF and the World Bank. In an attempt to circumvent the World Bank and the IMF penalties for spending money on a presidential jet, several schemes were set up to hide this procurement. This led to high-level corruption which ended up with an investigation nicknamed *operation empervier*. As a result, many senior cabinet ministers are now imprisoned, including a former prime minister, secretary general at the presidency (effectively deputy president) and a minister of finance. Does sovereignty not mean that a government should be able to purchase an aeroplane if they choose? If there is a higher authority to take permission before purchasing a plane, does that country still enjoy sovereignty?

Part of the agreement for France to guarantee the convertibility of the CFA (*Communauté financière d'Afrique*) franc states that the CFA Zone states must hold a certain percentage of their foreign currency reserves at the French Treasury (The Economist 2018). It has often been argued that this agreement, and the various military pacts already mentioned, is evidence of curtailment of sovereignty (Lekunze 2019). Which sovereign state bequeaths its defence to another state? Should that not be the prime role of a sovereign state? Questions such as these accentuate the exclusion of Africa from International Relations with the argument that they lack sovereignty.

On the issue of external sovereignty, therefore, it is clear that African states voluntarily and, in some cases, involuntarily (coerced) recognise superior authority outside their territory. However, it must be noted that sovereignty is 'not static or absolute…; it is not like virginity, which you

have it or not have it'. It is contended that the nature of sovereignty can change in different spheres, in different levels and at different times (Græger 1996).

For a myriad of reasons, many states around the world, including powerful countries in Europe and North America, have engaged in international agreements and arrangements which curtail or share sovereignty. In the modern international system, 'sharing or pulling' sovereignty is not a disqualifier of statehood. It is part of surviving in the post-modern international system.

Internal sovereignty is often the key for disqualification of African states from statehood in International Relations. The existence of challenges to a government of African countries from armed groups within the borders of such a state is used as justification to label the state, weak, fragile, failing or failed to deny it of its status as a state. On this note, this book contends that the mere existence of armed groups is an insufficient statehood disqualification. It is argued that many countries around the world have active and well know armed groups but are not labelled as failed or and their statehood theoretically invalidated as African states often are. At the height of the Northern Irish crisis, when parts of the UK were made extremely difficult to govern by paramilitary groups, the UK was never labelled a fragile, weak, failing or failed state. The UK was never excluded from International Relations scholarship or theories.

With the proliferation of Islamic terrorism (around the world), more states are experiencing violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups from within and without their borders. In a post-Cold War era, it is, therefore, necessary to be clear on what and when a state may be said to lack internal sovereignty. This book argues that a state loses internal sovereignty only when a non-state armed group takes and keep part of the territory of that state for an extended period. During this period, that non-state armed group must have the capacity to fully substitute the state (in terms of providing services, collecting taxes and running an economy) in the occupied territory.

In the absence of taking and holding territory and substituting the government, it is argued that a state retains its internal sovereignty even in the case of the presence of armed groups with the ability to cause violence within the defined territory of that state. For example, while Al-Shabaab is both active in Somalia and Kenya; Somalia is not an internally sovereign state, but Kenya is. In parts of Somalia, Al-Shabaab substitutes the govern-

ment. This is not the case in Kenya. While Al-Shabaab is active in Kenya, it does not take and keep Kenyan territory nor substitute the Kenyan government in any part of Kenyan territory.

Aside from territory, population and government, the ability to enter into relations with other states and sovereignty as attributes of a state is what Barry Buzan (1991b) and Christopher Clapham (1996) have described as the 'idea of the state'. It is argued that part of the fabric that makes a state is the intangible notion of that state which exists in the minds of its citizens. On this note, there is ideological totalitarianism in the conceptualisation of identity in Africa.

There is this profound misunderstanding that an African should have just a single identity. This identity should only stem from the national or civic identity (say Cameroonian, Nigerian or Kenyan). The proponents of such thinking seem to think that a Kenyan identity is mutually incompatible to that of a Luo. If an African expresses strong sentiment towards his or her Luo identity, it is immediately concluded that his/her affiliation to the Kenyan identity is weak or non-existent.

The fact that many African states are made of multiple nationalities is used to argue that the idea of an African state is weaker. Such argument posits the Luo or Kikuyu nationality trumps a Kenyan nationality, for example. In other words, in Africa, ethnicity trumps a national identity. This thinking supports the argument that the idea of the ethnic nation is stronger than that of the civic nation. In effect, the idea of Kenya is weak because of the existence of ethnicities such as Luo, Kikuyu or Kalenjin. Again, this book refutes such assumptions. It is argued that this approach to the idea of the state is Eurocentric and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Africa.

The nature of African polities has always been one encompassing multiple identities combined under one umbrella identity. With a nation such as the Yoruba, multiple identities exist, affiliation to an Ijebu identity does not nullify one's 'Yorubaness'. This book argues that multi-layered identities are characteristic of African society, and ethnic identities are not antithetical to civic identities. In other words, the idea of a Luo nation does not diminish the idea of a Kenyan nation identity. A citizen of Kenya is capable of maintaining a strong idea or sense of Kenya and an ethnic Luo nation. Both are not mutually exclusive.

The concept of the 'nation state' is Eurocentric and insufficiently conceptualises post-World War II (WWII) statehood in the International Relations discourse. African states as well as Asian states (arising from the

collapse of European imperialism (after WWII)) are what some have referred to as 'multi-national states' or 'state nations' (Rejai and Enloe 1969). This means while citizens of a state may enjoy a national identity (say Nigerian or Cameroonian), they may also enjoy a sub-national identity (such as Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Anglophone, Francophone, Sawa or Beti). In India, an individual could be Indian yet is Hindu, Buddhist or Muslim, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu or Punjabi. Even in the UK, the British Identity encompasses sub-identities such as English, Scottish or Welsh.

The idea of state can even exist when other aspects of state have collapsed. Somalia (which is the typical case of a 'failed' state) is an excellent example to indicate that the idea of Somalia and Somali nationality continues to exist long after the government collapsed. Most can point to Somalia on a map and a Somali can be pointed at on the street. The government is weak and, in many parts, non-existent, but the idea of Somalia is strong. In many ways, the Congo has struggled to maintain statehood since independence, but what has persisted without change is the idea of Congo. Whether it is called Zaire or the Democratic Republic of Congo, most know what is being talked about when referring to this country. Even with the changing names, the idea of the Congo remains strong. In other words, the idea of African states is strong and stable.

Going by the Montevideo Treaty and the discussion of sovereignty above, it is clear that the majority of African states enjoy statehood. This assertion invariably raises the question of what type of statehood? Of what use do the labels of weak, fragile, failing and failed help the understanding of African statehood? On this note, this book puts forward another consideration; it is argued that the confusion between a state and a government, as indicated above, could and perhaps does have security implications. Therefore, it must be made clear that the African state as construed in the paragraphs above is not weak, fragile, failing or failed. The permanent population, defined territory, ability to enter into relations with other states, sovereignty and the idea of the state are not weak, fragile, failing or failed.

In reality, these attributes cannot be. What is weak, fragile, failing or failed are some African governments. To reiterate, a government acts on behalf of a state, but as seen above, a state is more than just a government. Due to the *l'etats c'est moi* attitude and the interminable rule of some African governing individuals, their weakness or strength has been (in some scholarship) a substitute to the weakness or strength of the state which they act on behalf of. The dissociation of some citizen from such

regimes is argued (by some scholars) to be evidence of the weakness of the idea of the African state.

Also, rebellions that arise against the often-autocratic rule of such leaders (and non-existence of a peaceful means to remove them from power) are again used as evidence of lack of internal sovereignty. The number of guerrilla movements has decreased significantly. Except countries such as Mali, South Sudan Libya, Nigeria, the DRC, CAR and Somalia, the number of countries significantly challenged by sub-national armed groups have reduced considerably. Countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone once considered 'failed states' are now enjoying a degree of internal sovereignty over its entire territory.

In Africa, similar to other parts of the world, the strength of governments varies. Weak or strong government come and go. Since the general election of 2017 in the UK, the government can be described as weak. While many analysts are confident in referring to Prime Minister May's government as weak, no serious analyst refers to the UK as a weak, fragile, failing or failed state. Even when the threat of the dissolution of the union that forms the UK is significantly high under Mrs. May's prime ministership, no scholar has labelled the UK a failing state.

The weakness of African government should not be confused with the weakness of the African state. While African governments remain relatively weak, Africa is witnessing growth in the strength of its governments and governance. This is true for states such as Kenya, Rwanda, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania Gabon, Malawi and South Africa. Significant economic growth and a degree of democracy consolidation in countries such as Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa, for example. Despite some irregularities witnessed in African democracies, it is a fact that the number of incumbents replaced through the ballot box continues to increase since the 1990s (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018).

The language of weak states or strong states, weak or strong powers as used in Buzan (1991b), can be extremely confusing. In the context of Africa and to ease understanding, this book recommends the use of weak government to refer to what Buzan calls weak state. The state in itself can only be a weak power or a strong power; it cannot in itself be a weak state. In line with the thinking proposed in this book, a state can only exist or does not exist (according to the criteria or definition set out above). The state in itself cannot be quantified. The strength of the government (or other attributes of the state) can be quantified and term weak, strong, evil, good, democratic or authoritarian but not the state itself.

To finalise this debate on the failed state narrative, it is essential to note that the African state should not be seen as a failed attempt at something else but rather a product of its histories, cultures, values, environment and practices. While it may sound paternalistic, African states are relatively young in the context of states. A child may be feeble in many ways when compared to adults; a child is not a failed adult. It is preposterous for a scholar to consider it as a failure the inability of a one-year-old girl to run as fast as her nine-year-old sister. African states are not failed European states. The government of African governments may be feeble in many ways when compared to European governments, yet the African state remains remarkably and surprisingly strong.

In conclusion, while there are areas of weakness in many African states, it is argued here that a definition of a state such as in the Montevideo Treaty and interpreted as in the above paragraphs is more suitable for the variety of states witnessed around the world. In this regard, an interpretation of traditional International Relations theories applies to a majority of African states.

International Relations Theory and Security in Africa

In trying to explain the cause of war, realists (such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli historically; Hans Morgenthau, Edward Carr, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt) have often referred to human nature, the anarchic international system and the distribution of power in the international system. They argue that different combinations of these factors will create security or insecurity (Walt 1991; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1995; Morgenthau 1985).

The human nature perspective argues that, in International Relations, states behave as though they are human. They posit that human nature is not inherently benevolent; instead, it is competitive and self-serving. The state seen in this light sets out to maximise its interest and in so doing is a potential threat to other states. States exist in a world with limited resources, thus have to compete for this scarce resource to provide security. The competition for resources is inherently volatile, therefore causing insecurity. These arguments will become more evident as it is argued in subsequent chapters that conditions of the environment (as conceptualised in this book) shape African security.

The anarchic perspective argues that there is no government or police force to enforce rules in the international system, thus exposing states to live with the constant risk of insecurity. This anarchic system festers distrust which encourages states to rely only on themselves. In the competition to ensure national security, states often create insecurity for themselves and other states. In this context, the international system is prone to war/conflict. In other words, 'the international system is in a relentless state of security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background' (Mearsheimer 1995, 9). The prime objective of the state in such an international system is survival (Mearsheimer 1995, 9–11).

Considering the 'state nation' nature of African states, the anarchic international system perspective can be interpreted in the African context in two ways. First, the African state resides in this anarchic international system as every other state. Due to poor development, the small size of countries and structural exploitation, African nations struggle to rely on themselves in the international system. This itself exposes them to extreme insecurity conditions. Second, in internal politics, there is competition between different nations within the state. In the event of a power vacuum at the central government level, there is a possibility of temporal anarchy, such as described in the anarchical international system perspective. In such circumstances, sub-national groups may be faced with the same dilemma, such as that suffered by states in the anarchical international system (Posen 1993).

With particular reference to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, Barry Posen (1993) argues that in the state of transition such as after the death of General Tito, a state of anarchy (as in the anarchical international system perspective) appears. In this space, a multinational state such as Yugoslavia (where national security is dependent on a strong central government) will be kept together or torn apart based on relationships between its sub-national groups. In effect, Posen replaces states as construed in International Relations with sub-national groups such as Serbian, Albanians or Croats. This conceptualisation is particularly relevant to African countries because of its many sub-national groups such as the Igbo, the Yoruba, the Fulani or Hausa in the case of Nigeria.

Some realists such as Morgenthau and Mearsheimer have always considered power as the means through which a state secures itself. To gain, use and maintain power are the essential roles of the state in pursuing security in the international system. The realists argue that a balance of power is the medium in the international system, which guarantees security

(Morgenthau 1985). The concept of the balance of power in the international order is questioned by the Copenhagen school and liberals in general. What is balance? It is argued that the balance of power is hard to define and near impossible to achieve or preserve. Most liberalists and constructivists argue that instead of the balance of power, it is rather interdependence and international organisations which maintain peace in the international system (Oneal et al. 2003).

This approach to power in the international system can also apply to the internal politics of state nations (Levy 1989). Different groups within the state are always competing for power because it guarantees access to resources. In most cases, this competition is cooperative and peaceful. Occasionally cooperation and peaceful options fail, then competition turns to an armed struggle. The emergent rebellion against the central government creates a civil war. Such arguments will become clearer in subsequent chapters as this book discusses inherent and contemporary challenges to African security.

The international system conceived by the traditional study of security has an inherent propensity to a rivalry arms build-up without any natural saturation point. Indeed, the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition, which could lead to tense political relations, creating conducive conditions for insecurity (Palme 1982, 138). This could eventually result in a reduction in security for all concerned—a typical case of the security dilemma (Herz 1950, 157). The security dilemma, therefore, constitutes a significant source of conflict for the state in the international system. This is also the case in state-nations where different sub-national groups compete for power.

Marxist approaches to International Relations build on the work of Karl Marx, with contributions from Friedrich Engels. Marx's primary interest was in the study of the conflict between social classes, particularly the relationship among the proletariat (working class) and the bourgeoisie (capital-owning class). For Lenin, the existence of capitalism lay at the root of all problems. He claimed that advanced capitalist states needed to become imperial powers to maintain economic growth and thus exploited the colonies (mostly Africa and Asia) for their raw materials (Lenin 2010). In International Relations, this dichotomy can be made in terms of core and periphery states. In internal politics (at a societal level and intersocietal bases in heterogeneous societies of which most African countries are), the dichotomy can apply to the core and periphery ethnic groups.

In essence, there is some dependence between the core capitalist states which import raw materials from the periphery colonies or former colonies. This forms the basis of what is referred to as the dependency theory.

Most variants of dependency theories divided the world into two types of states: core and periphery. The core or developed nations exploit the resources of the periphery or developing countries. Marxists argue that despite decolonisation (the absence of direct military control of African nations), the core countries maintains the dependency of the periphery through a series of informal controls. In Lenin's simplistic model, capitalism thus created colonialism (and neo-colonialism) and would inevitably lead to war between the central colonial powers (as seen in World War II). In others, the disparities created with the state nations and states of Africa will ultimately result in a war between the core and periphery sub-national groups.

Further to the Marxists approach to International Relations, Wallerstein approached the world as a system. He argues that the international system is an exploitative system where core countries exploit semi-periphery and periphery countries, while semi-periphery countries exploit periphery countries. In other words, the international system is dominated by a capitalist system, which is exploitative. This he referred to as World System Analysis (WSA). The interest of this research is, therefore, the approach of identifying and understanding systems in International Relations which have implications for both the security of the individual and the security of the African state. The characterisation of the system as an exploitative system is relevant to security as the inherent nature of such exploitative systems to cause insecurity (Wallerstein 2004).

The co-optation of African states into the exploitative capitalist system (first with slavery, the production of cash crops and the supply of cheap labour and raw material) has severe security implications for Africa. Indeed, the nature of the international system itself is problematic to internal security. The Cold War (a hegemonic war) had severe consequences for African states. The impact of Cold War mechanisation in Africa continues to influence security in Africa today (Tiyambe 2008).

The Marxist approaches to International Relations also hold potential in explaining behaviour in the internal dynamics of African states. Some traditional African societies were organised around powerful kings. Where these existed, the colonial powers used them for the administering of the society which perpetrated the privileges of these kings and their families. In post-colonial Africa, members of the government (some of which have linked to traditional kings) continue to dominate society. It can be argued that inequality has created tiers of citizenship on an individual basis and in some cases on an ethnic group level.

This inequality can be described using Marxists language such as core, semi-periphery and periphery. As ethnicity often is located on a specific territory, there are regions within African states which can be described as periphery, semi-periphery or core to the politics and governance of the state. Language such as 'politically relevant' is common in literature on ethnic conflict in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 2002).

Interpreting International Relation Theories

Consider the concept of self-help; realists argue that states exist at their mercy. They have to rely only on themselves for their survival. Security is provided through the reliance on the state's capacity to defend itself and provide security for its citizens (Waltz 1979, 111). Time and again, it has been seen that whenever African governments are in trouble, they know someone to call. Francophone Africa, for instance, has military pacts with France, which means they can call for help in times of external threats. The many French interventions in Africa demonstrate this. The intervention in Mali to defend the government against the conflict that arose as a result of Tuareg rebellion, ethnic clashes between mainly the Fulani and Dagon tribes in the North is an excellent contemporary example (Tran 2013).

It has been seen time and again when countries in Africa have gone to the international community, whether the UN or individual states such as the UK or the USA begging for assistance. All this makes it clear that there is an emergency phone for several African countries to call. In the fight against Boko Haram, it has already been said that France, the USA, China and Russia are in assistance of the African states involved. In the fight against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, many non-African countries are also included.

The realist idea of self-help is exceptionally challenging to sustain in the context of Africa. The international system for Africa is not anarchic; rather, it is structured (albeit not always overtly). Such a system comes with opportunities but also with its security implications. Continuous research is needed to explore the security implication of the nature of the international system in Africa. There is also a need to understand the disadvantage of the absence of 'self-help' for African states. What is Africa losing in return?

Both realists and liberalists have often argued that the international system is anarchic. This means there is no world government or that there is

no higher authority above the nation-state. Indeed, the idea of an anarchic structure of the international system is the basis of Waltz's structural realism (Waltz 1979). It is posited that the structure of the global system is what determines the behaviour of states in the global system. Waltz argument is contrary to Morgenthau's argument that the behaviour of states in the international system replicates human nature. While liberalists agree to the anarchical structure of the international system and how such a structure can determine the behaviour of states, it argues that such conditions can be remedied through means such as institutionalism and international law.

It has already been conceded above that African states struggle with external sovereignty. However, that alone is not sufficient to dismiss African states from International Relations. Indeed, it can be contended that the situation aligns with the liberalist arguments of shaping states' behaviour through liberal institutionalism. There are well-established rules to tame their behaviour. If these countries need help, they know whom to call. There are, indeed, higher authorities than the African states. The number of African leaders tried at The Hague compared to the rest of the world is evidence of this argument. There is also an emergency number for these states, exemplified by how these states come running to the international community when they face challenges such as Boko Haram.

Rather than perceiving the IMF, International Criminal Court (ICC) or individual state in the international system such as France, the UK, USA or China as curtailing Cameroon's sovereignty, it can be perceived as a display of the success of liberal institutionalism, international law, alliances and a harmony of interests as per Liberalist thought in International Relations. Construed in this manner and aligned to liberalism, African states are relevant to International Relations theories. On the other hand, the fact Omar al-Bashir of Sudan has successfully evaded ICC arrest for many years now is a clear indication that the African states can exercise their external sovereignty, however limited. Such a situation should stimulate more research into the security implication on Africa.

Consequently, while the traditional International Relations theories (realism and liberalism) may face several challenges to its applicability to Africa, generally speaking, aspects are of significant relevance to Africa. Indeed, these theories already contribute significantly to the understanding of security in the African context. Chapter 4 will discuss the multilayered group and individual identities. The balance of power between groups and the security dilemma that arises from that are significantly relevant to the analysis of contemporary security challenges in Africa.

Behaviour can be both passive and active. In International Relations, states can actively cultivate behaviour (rational and proactive) while others may simply be present in the international system. Their nature alone determines how other countries shape their behaviour (foreign policy). The weakness or strength of one state forces other states to shape their behaviour to address this situation appropriately. In other words, the near-anarchic nature of the DRC is the determinant of how all countries (including the most powerful in the world) are forced to relate with the DRC. Any relations with the DRC cannot escape this reality. The behaviour of DRC in the international system is that which its near-anarchic nature determines. The behaviour (foreign policy) of the USA, China or the EU to the DRC is that which its near anarchical internal political nature determines.

In effect, African states have more impact on the international system and International Relations than their limited capabilities, actions or participation may suggest. Consequently, International Relations cannot ignore sub-national dynamics which determine the nature of the African state. As already indicated above, the balance of power and security dilemma aspects of realism apply to civil conflict, which may have national and international implications.

Conclusion

In the effort to advance African Security Studies as a sub-discipline of International Relations, this chapter has addressed the issue of the African state in International Relations. It has proffered a definition of the state which is argued to be more suitable for developing states (non-OECD states) such as those in Africa. This is because it has maintained that specific conceptualisations of the African state are misleading. This chapter has situated African Security Studies into International Relations. In doing so, it has summarised the International Relations theories and concepts relevant to the study of security in Africa. These theories provide the insight to look for challenges to African security and the framework to enhance its analysis.

Consequently, the succeeding chapter starts with societal issues with implication to national security. It investigates how relationships between groups within a state pose a national security challenge. The succeeding chapters examine the economic and environmental sectors for national security challenges in Africa.

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CHAPTER 3

What Is Security? An African Security Perspective

Introduction

Central to any study of security is the question 'what is security?' (Baldwin 1997, 12–18). The concept of security is perhaps one of the most contested concepts in International Relations (Baldwin 1997, 12–18). Many scholars from different schools over the centuries have answered these questions in a variety of ways. These debates on the concept of security are often scattered in many articles and books, making it very difficult for security students to follow these debates comprehensively.

As a result, it is essential for this chapter to evaluate the debates on the concept of security within Security Studies to lay the foundation for the proceeding chapters of this book. It also seeks to contribute towards a concept of security for African Security Studies. It considers the realists', constructivists' (as elaborated in the Copenhagen school) and critical security approaches in International Relations. A vernacular perspective augments this with the use of empirical data from the South West Region of Cameroon (as a case study). The concept of security is contingent on time and space.

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_3

The Concept of Security

'Security, like risk, is a capacious concept, perilously capable of meaning all things to all comers' (Zedner 2003, 176). It is often maintained that the concept of security defies a single definition. Indeed, some have even gone so far as to proclaim that security can never be adequately defined (Freedman 2003, 731). Others argue that security is fundamentally a contested concept (Baldwin 1997, 10). The Copenhagen school pursues broader definitions such as 'Security is the pursuit of freedom from threats' (Buzan 1991b, 18). Similarly, Williams defines security as 'alleviation of threats to acquired values, particularly those threats that are considered to have a degree of urgency and necessity' (Duit and Galaz 2008). This section evaluates these arguments to distil a security concept for Africa.

The concept of security in International Relations has traditionally been concerned with the study of war and conditions of peace (See Walt 1991). Security issues are construed to be only those of external military concern. It focuses on the conditions that make the use of force possible, the ways that these force affect states and societies and how specific policies prepare for, prevent or engage countries into war (Walt 1991, 212). The creation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) meant traditional security focused on how states could use WMDs as instruments of policy. This also led to the extensive debate on issues of deterrence, coercion and escalation. In response, there is also debate on alternative strategies (Walt 1991, 214).

At the centre of the traditional concept of security are the primacy of the state and the centrality of the military as a means of achieving that security. It holds the state as its primary referent in security. In other words, security begins and ends with the state. The state is the prime actor in International Relations and security.

Consequently, the security of the individual, society, environment, property is therefore seen as a consequence of the security of the state. No particular attention is paid to anything else than the states and military threats that come from other countries. Military power becomes an instrument for the demonstration of strength, to guarantee domestic security, protection of territorial integrity, the maintenance of peace and the preservation or acquisition of prestige. In terms of the conduct of international relation, military power becomes a tool for diplomatic negotiations

and political propaganda and could be very important for the pursuit of economic interests (Saleh 2010, 230).

The conceptualisation of security as concerned with predominantly issues of military security between states is often associated with the realist school of thought in International Relations. Thus, the traditional concept of security is also considered to be a realist concept of security. Realism propagates an argument that the nation-state is the primary actor in International Relations. It holds that states act only in their national interest. In other words, states in the international system are rational (as their actions are only intended to maximise their self-interest). They pursue power to ensure their self-preservation (or call it security) (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Seen as such, states are the ultimate authority in International Relations capable of security or other actions such as resolving conflicts between states, the understanding of national security and armed conflicts in the international context.

Following the traditional school, security is defined in narrow military terms. For example, Stephen Walt posits that the concept of security is concerned with 'the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt 1991, 212). This definition regards security as freedom from objective military threats to the state. Walt concedes that the utilisation of military means has severe effects on both the state and society (Ibid.). In this context, most African nations experience few real external military threats from other African countries (Williams 2011). Security conceived as such will exclude most African states from security studies.

The traditional concept of security has several weaknesses (for the African context). First, it presupposes that the referent of security is the state and that security threats can only come from other countries in the military format. The state, according to the realist school, is based on the Westphalian or Weberian model, which earlier chapters have argued to be a Eurocentric approach. In the African context, most threats are intra-state involving non-state actors. Furthermore, most external threats also involve non-state actors. The traditional approach seems to completely ignore the individual when it conceptualises security. Such a position is extremely problematic in the African context. This will become clearer as the arguments in this chapter, and in this book in general, progress.

Second, there is also the argument that the state is not and never was the only security actor in the international system. Neither are the threats that the state face all from other sovereign states (Keohane 1984). In the

twenty-first century, actors such as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) participate in creating security or insecurity. Most countries in Africa are threatened by actors such as terrorist groups and organised crime syndicates (e.g. ISIS Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab). These threats could be more significant than any danger that may come from another state (for most African countries).

A Critical Approach Confounded by the problematic nature of security in general and the issues with the traditional concept of security highlighted above, a chorus of scholars such as Booth (1979), Ashley (1980), Beaton (1972), Hoffmann (1978), Bull (1961), Buzan (1991a) and Waever (1995) argue for the broadening and deepening of the concept of security. The broadening scholars have come to be known as the Copenhagen school. The proponents argue that the concept of security needs to move away from the realist concept of security. This school originated from the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (principally). Contributions continue to be made by scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob (1997).

Whereas the traditional concept of security focuses more on threats coming from other states in the military sector, the Copenhagen school argues that the limitations of security to the military sector suggest that security is all about defence. Security construed in this manner gives the concept of security a severely narrow scope (McSweeney 1999, 20). Security is supposed to defend as well as empower (Booth 1991). It is therefore argued that (aside from the traditional political and military sectors) it is possible to broaden the study of security to include threats which may arise from other security sectors such as economic, societal, environmental and cyber. Indeed, they argue that it will be ignoring empirical evidence should such sectors be excluded.

Economic security is defined at different levels. At the individual level, economic security is defined as 'ready access to the means necessary to meet basic human needs (food, water, shelter, education)' (Buzan 1991b, 237). Buzan also adds the firm as well as the class as referents for economic security (Ibid., 38, 39, 40). At the state level, economic security is defined as 'access to the means necessary for survival' (Ibid., 38, 39, 40). States may contain much of what they need to sustain themselves. For example, natural resources such as oil, agricultural land, timber, gold and diamonds

in the absence of these, states must trade to create the necessary means to survive. This trade then exposes the state to many other severe threats such as supply chain disruptions (Buzan 1991b, 242). Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and Aden is now one of the biggest threats to maritime transport in Africa (Chatham House 2013). This has severe implication to Africa's supply routes.

Economic security, therefore, is access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare for the population and enhance the power and prestige of the state (Buzan 1991a). In reverse, economic insecurity is, first, the economic weakness that leads to the inability to sustain basic human needs of the population; second, the disruption caused by price fluctuation and uncertain earnings from exports of primary products; and third, the inability to resist the policy pressures of outside institutions in return for needed capital (Buzan 1991a, 446). Economic weakness forced African states to accept sweeping economic reforms (often detrimental to its population) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. All of these constitute sources of insecurity.

As an amalgamation of many cultures and identities, most African states are imbued with societal challenges with inherent security implications. Societal security refers to threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture (Buzan 1991a, 447). 'A societal security threat is, therefore, anything that does not align with the sustainability of accepted conditions for the evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and custom' (Buzan 1991b, 19).

Buzan argues that at the core of these threats in the twenty-first century are issues of migration and the clash of rival civilisational identities. Samuel Huntington argued that a clash of civilisations (particularly the clash between Islamic civilisations and the Western civilisation) would be the next source of conflict at the scale of the Cold War (Huntington 1993). Also, this research found that culture and customs play a fundamental role in security in Cameroon. In the case of Cameroon, a security paradigm which ignores the culture, customs and traditions is therefore incomplete.

Africa's geography is one of the most diverse in the world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has repeatedly warned that a significant body of research demonstrates that climate change is having and will increasingly have severe impacts on social systems. Jon Barnett and Neil Adger (2007, 640) indicate to (Brauch 2002;

Gleick 1992; Homer-Dixon 1991; van Ireland et al. 1996), who argue that this could cause violent conflict. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Copenhagen school argues that there are elements of the environmental sector, which could serve as a source of threats to both national and human securities. For example, climate change has been argued to pose new security threats to Africa (Brown et al. 2007).

The critical approaches (particularly the Copenhagen school) seem to have been focused mainly on the effects of climate change. This book acknowledges the environment to mean the physical, social, institutional, geopolitical and virtual worlds (context) in which security or insecurity happens. In other words, the environment of security includes the mountains, forests, seas, lakes, climate and the cyber worlds (created by Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and other social media platforms). This environment also includes national and international institutions and the geopolitical dispensation in which these institutions function.

This thinking is in line with the thinking of Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that physical environmental and political factors are crucial to the onset of civil war. It is argued that governments which are financially, organisationally or politically weak become a target for political entrepreneurs or insurgents. Geographical elements such as rough terrain, mountainous regions, deserts and enclaves provide the ideal environment for groups to mount an armed rebellion against a perceived weak government.

In Cameroon, for example, the Anglophone crisis highlights the typical grievances discussed by Collier and Hoeffler. Since reunification, the Anglophones complain of marginalisation by the majority Francophone groups which have maintained political power since independence. The existence of natural resources such as oil, gas, timber, gold and diamonds in Cameroon means there is always the potential for greedy individuals both internally and externally to attempt to capture the state for their private enrichment. Such a long-standing grievance provides an 'opportunity' for exploitation, as indicated above.

Notwithstanding the efforts in broadening the concept of security from the traditional military sense, proponents of the Copenhagen school continue to argue that, a security issue must have the ability to affect conditions of peace and war. This means there must be an element in the economic, societal and environmental sectors which creates threats linked to the military sector to qualify them to be considered as security sectors. Furthermore, the Copenhagen school continues to insist that as a criterion for a security threat, regardless of which sector the threat originates,

the threat has to be existential to qualify as a security threat (Ayoob 1997). Though a departure, it is a departure which is fully anchored on the traditional conceptualisation of security.

Kenneth Booth argues that in addition to survival, the concept of security should encompass the provision of the conditions to pursue cherished political and social ambitions. Security should be defined in such a manner which reflects a condition of survival-plus, 'The plus being some freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore space to make choices' (Booth 2007, 102). Indeed, the case study from the South West Region of Cameroon will show that individual demand for safety works hand in hand with the need for conducive conditions for the pursuant of ambitions.

It is concluded that the combined interplay of issues arising from the cyber, economic, societal, environmental, political and the military security sectors are the ultimate determinant of the production of security by individuals, groups or states for the experience/enjoyment of individuals or states. It is this debate about the complex interaction of issues from these sectors; the interplay of actions undertaken by the various actors (be it state or non-state) from these sectors; regional and global security conditions; the interface of both external and internal influences, which form the bone of this research. This expresses itself in the form of state security at the national level and human security at the individual level.

The expansion of the critical approach includes the human security approach to the definition of security; it conceptualises human security as, 'protection of humans (individuals) from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards' (UNDP 1994, 22). Furthermore, human security was defined as safety from chronic threats such as disease, repression and hunger. On the other, human security is defined as protection from sudden and harmful 'disruptions in the patterns of daily life' '(whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities)' (Ibid., 23). Besides, human security refers to 'the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both freedoms from fear and freedom from want' (Kaldor et al. 2007, 273).

Human security means 'both the protection of people from severe and pervasive threats (both natural and societal) and the empowerment of individuals and communities to develop the capabilities to pursue informed choices to act on their own behalf' (Ogata and Cels, 2003, 274). This is said in other words, by Ken Booth, who uses the word emancipation to describe a situation where individuals and groups are liberated from constraints (tangible and intangible) which inhibit actions which would have

been chosen freely (Booth 1991, 319). In addition, most scholars conceptualise human security as a combination of freedom from fear, want, harm and violence. These definitions thus emphasise the negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to) aspects of the concept of human security.

The Commission on Human Security defined human security as the 'protection of the vital core of all human lives and fundamental freedoms which are the essence of life' (Commission on Human Security 2003, 4). Furthermore, there are definitions from Ogata and Cels (2003) and Alkire (2004, 360) where human security is defined as 'protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment'. Some benchmarking is seen in this version of the definition of human security. Everything does not apply; it must be 'vital core' or 'essential to life' (Alkire 2004, 360). This thus severely narrows the concept of human security.

At the core of human security is the recognition of threats other than those emanating from the military security sector. Threats are therefore seen as issues that negatively affect the well-being (safety and dignity) of individual human beings. This may include threats such as those posed by drugs, disease, terrorism, pollution, poverty, environmental degradation, the proliferation of weapons and failed states (Ogata and Cels 2003, 276–279). Indeed, Mary Kaldor posits that severe threats to human security range from genocide and slavery to natural disasters (such as hurricanes, droughts or floods) to colossal violations of the right to food, health and housing (Kaldor et al. 2007, 273).

In this light, threats are viewed in the sense of a globalised world where everything is interconnected and interdependent. Security issues emanate from any security sector, from any part of the world. This could be on a national, regional or global scale. Furthermore, it could then create a vicious circle of causes and effects. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, 16–17) argue that human security threats are global in scope (Ibid., 207). This strengthens the case that while the focus of this research is on the production and experience of security in a particular location and time, the context in which this takes place cannot be ignored.

Critics argue that it is misguided to have the individual at the centre of security (such as in the case of human security). While it is true that the state has declined, and that there has been a proliferation of organ-

isations acting in a state-like manner, the state remains the most significant actor when it comes to security. Indeed, as already mentioned above, Buzan argues that states have demonstrated such superiority over individuals and all other types of political organisations to an extent where it is regarded as the universal standard for political legitimacy (Buzan 1991b, 58).

To place individual fears and wants at the centre of security opens up the concept of security to what Ole Waever refers to as political securitisation. This may not always be beneficial to the individual. Securitisation moves security to the realm of politics (making it whatever the elite chose it to be). Indeed, it is quite common for politicians to invoke national security to achieve political aims, irrespective of whether there is the existence of real threats or not. Any elite could declare anything to be a security threat in pursuit of ulterior motives (Waever 1995). It is therefore prudent to apply caution to what is accepted as a legitimate human security issue.

Critics also argue that looking at the evidence on the rhetoric and practice of human security; there is a substantial indication that First World states predominantly formulate the concepts and policies; developing nations, on the other hand, have predominantly resisted human security. They contend that evidence indicates that states that frame arguments based on human security seem to stress more of the freedom from fear (violence, often militarised violence) than the freedom from want (mostly to do with issues of poverty, diseases and food security etc.). They invoke human rights to justify military interventions in the name of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The argument for R2P-based intervention is always in freedom from fear terms (military terms) never based on freedom from want. They conclude that behind human security is not some radical liberal internationalism or idealism, it is age-old cold *realpolitik* (Black 2006, 58–62).

Rory Keane seems to suggest that looking at the EU-Africa relationship, it is difficult to tell whether it is characterised by realism or human security (despite the human security rhetoric (Keane 2006, 42, 43)). Besides, although countries such as Japan and Canada have championed human security within the international community, substantive policy milestone has not been achieved. A coherent, consistent, distinct human security practice has not emerged, or a comprehensive theory (Tzifakis 2011, 354). Sceptics could conclude that invoking freedom from fear,

powerful states give themselves the excuse to pursue their national interests while sugar-coating their actions with lip service to freedom from want. This is done with full knowledge that in the current global economic and political arrangement, total freedom from want for all peoples of the world is unachievable.

Security for Whom?

This chapter has outlined some of the contrasting definitions and approaches to security. The traditional school insisted on national security and the importance of the military. It holds the state as the only referent to security. The Copenhagen school has demonstrated the importance of the state in security though with broadened security sectors and the acknowledgement of internal, external, regional and global security dynamics. The human security school has also demonstrated the importance of the individual to the security discourse. What, then, is this book's conceptualisation of the security referent (security for whom?).

The sectors proposed by the Copenhagen school make the understanding of security in Africa more comprehensive and capture the junctions which shape the production and experience of security. However, the insistence on existential threats seems to ignore those who argue that security cannot be limited to survival. The case set by the Copenhagen school is strong. It is inferred from their arguments that the complex interaction of issues from the sectors of security, the interplay of actions undertaken by the various actors (be it state or non-state) from these sectors, regional and global security conditions and the interface of both external and internal influences are the ultimate determinants of security in particular location and time. It is also evident from their arguments that the state is vital for the organisation or production of security.

Though one thinks, the security of the state cannot be an end to be pursued at all cost as proposed by the traditional school, the security of the state is necessary for the production of security for the individual. It has been seen through liberalists arguments that while the state remains relevant to security, there are other actors involved in security to a certain extent. It is also evident that security issues in Cameroon (as will be seen in the case study below) are defined (by end-users and security actors) consistently to the Copenhagen school arguments for the broadening and deepening of security.

Criticism notwithstanding, it is evident that the argument for the individual to be the referent for security is equally valid. It is clear that the ultimate end of security is the security of the individual. As indicated above, empirical evidence from Cameroon will show that individual demand for safety works hand in hand with the need for conducive conditions for the pursuant of ambitions.

Politicians, the military and the general public are increasingly accepting human security concerns such as crime, environmental degradation, infectious diseases and terrorism are legitimate security concerns. It has also been acknowledged that these concerns have an impact on national security conceived in the traditional sense. This is widely reflected in the national security estimates in the USA, the foremost military power in the world. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have expanded the scope of their security functions to include the fight against terrorism, international peacekeeping, refugee resettlement, migration, development and the promotion of civil society (Krahmann 2005, 11). It is therefore logical for this research to uphold the security of the individual as the ultimate end of security albeit conceived in line with the narrow definition of human security.

This book, therefore, works within a paradigm where the security of the individual is the ultimate end. Nonetheless, the security of the state cannot be ignored simply because the security of the individual is the ultimate end. Considering that weak or government failure has been one of the leading causes of war in Africa, an understanding of security in Africa cannot ignore the security of the state as argued by realists. States are vital to the production of human security, irrespective of whether it is rowing or steering. The state itself can be a source of insecurity. In many cases, the production processes and actors involved are as important as the end product itself. Therefore, the security of the production process (that includes the state) is of vital concern to security.

At the subnational level, security is required as a pre-condition of internal order. Security is also necessary for the protection of the individual against fear and want and creating the conditions for the pursuit of cherished ambitions in a particular geographic area within the bounds of a

specific state. This is conceived in line with the narrow concept of human security discussed above. In my opinion, the debate above has clearly shown that the broad definitions of human security may not be achievable, especially for developing countries such as those in Africa.

Attributes of Security

Relational Freedman notes that 'Security is inherently a relational concept. Physical conditions that are favourable to a secure existence can be identified, but these can only be properly assessed in relation to the capabilities and intentions of possible adversaries' (Freedman 2003, 731–732). For instance, A could have all the conditions that should make it secure in theory; however, A will only feel secure if B does not possess the capability to attack A's security. In other words, A's security is not dependent on what A is capable or incapable of, but somewhat reliant on the capability of its adversary, B.

The relational nature of security often leads to what John Herz referred to as the security dilemma (1950, 157). The security dilemma is a situation where: as state A tries to increase its security (because of perceived vulnerabilities), state B may interpret this as actions in preparation to attack or undermine B's security. B will then commence its security upgrade. The continuous security upgrades, which may include an increase in arms, could lead to more insecurity than security.

Change The concept of security is one that changes not only in context but over time. Emma Rothschild argues that the concept of security has often been revamped after massive international wars with considerable debate in the inter-war years. For example, at Vienna in 1815, after the French revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars; at Versailles in 1919 after the World War I; at San Francisco in 1945 after World War II; and at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In the post-Cold War era (with the rise of Islamist terrorism), the concept of security is yet again undergoing intensive debates (Rothschild 1995, 53). During the Cold War, security was primarily traditional, with issues of a nuclear deterrent at its core. 'If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not

relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics' (Baldwin 1997, 9). After the Cold War, the security debate has shifted to include broader issues such as 'economic security, environmental security, identity security, social security' and human security (Baldwin 1997, 23).

Space and Time Furthermore, it is argued that security is conditioned on space and time. Security means different things to different people at different places at different times. This is especially true across the various states of Africa. While security in Africa shows some broad patterns at a macro level, it varies significantly from state to state and over time (Zedner 2003, 154). In a survey conducted in 2015 in the South West Region of Cameroon, the current Anglophone crisis did not exist (as will be seen below). Boko Haram appeared as the most mentioned security threat. While the threat from Boko Haram still exists, it is clear that if the survey was conducted again, using the same questions, the same people and the same location, the conceptualisation of security threats would be completely different due to their experience of violence from the Cameroon Army and separatist militias. Their perspective on security would have changed over time.

Vernacular There is an argument that there is a vernacular turn in International Relations. This refers to the study of how ordinary individuals (end-users) construct knowledge (Jarvis and Lister 2012). In the case of security, the vernacular refers to how security or insecurity is understood and experienced (by ordinary people) in the course of everyday life. In other words, the concept of security restricted to a particular geographic area, ethnic group, gender, class or culture at a specific time is what is referred to as vernacular security.

An understanding of vernacular security is therefore formulated through a complex process of accommodation, rejection and reformulation of notions of security which could be personal, communal, national or international. This process takes place in the context of the political history and current political reality of that geography and the local ontologies of the perception of danger, risk and (in)security (Bubandt 2005, 276). It is, therefore, the objective of this chapter to establish the vernacular understanding of security in Africa.

A vernacular approach to knowledge generation necessitates an end-user approach with regard to security. This is at odds with traditional approaches which favour the perspectives of the actors such as the military and the state. The individual (end-user) is often ignored. Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens (2016, 40) argue that individuals (citizens or end-users) are increasingly recognised as central to security in policy rhetoric of British National Security Strategies. However, they contend that 'technocratic methods by which risks and threats are assessed and prioritised do not consider the views and experiences of the end-users.' Using South West Cameroon as a case study, this chapter, therefore, closes this gap identified by Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, by including an end-user approach to the study of security.

Objective and Subjective As seen above, security definitions often acknowledge both the objective and subjective nature of security (Zedner 2003, 155; Wolfers 1962, 149; Wood and Shearing 2007, 4). Subjectively, an end-user could feel secure or insecure irrespective of whether there is objectively security or insecurity. Indeed, images of a solid object such as a lock, alarm or weapon used to protect or defend against intrusion or attack are often associated with security. Similarly, security also denotes investment in property, shares and pensions and children (in some cultures). These images may stimulate the subjective feeling of security, regardless of reality (McSweeney 1999, 13).

Political It must also be added that security in Africa is also politically dependent. Historically, politics in Africa has often been securitised. It will be shown in subsequent chapters that competition to govern or to control the government could (in many cases) lead to civil war in Africa. The number of military regimes that have existed in Africa, the number of ex-military men who have become 'civilian' presidents and the number of presidents who rely on coup-proofed armies to stay in power are evidence that militarism dominates African politics. The politicisation of security and the securitisation of politics is an African mainstay.

In effect, there is often securitisation of opposition to the government. Protests from ordinary people or criticisms to the sitting government are often interpreted as attempts to destabilise the state. Autocracy substitutes the incumbent into the state. Thus any actions against that individual are

understood as actions against the state with treasonous implications. Countries which have suffered violence like Rwanda make it easy to tarnish all critics as *genocidaires.*

International Historically, African security has always been connected to outside actors. Slavery was something common in different African societies. It was used mainly as punishment for crimes or spoils of war. However, outsiders such as Arab (trans-Sahara traders) and European entrepreneurs turned it to a global trade (which resulted in one of the most extreme scourges of human history). African undersoil resources (which for many years have been more valuable to outsiders than to Africans) remain the main source of conflict in Africa.

The fact that most African states were created by European imperialism and continue to be shaped by neo-colonialism means that these countries keep turning to their former colonial power for security assistance. Examples include Cameroon who turned to France for support, such as in the struggle to end the *Union des populations du Cameroun* (Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) (UPC) insurgency between 1959 and 1971, the strikes in demand for multiparty democracy and in protest of perceived rigged elections in the early 1990s and in the struggle to gain Bakassi from Nigeria (Lekunze 2019). The support given to Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia by Britain in the case of Boko Haram and Ebola, respectively, also supports this argument.

Africa's dependence on outside security assistance is also demonstrated in the coalition of countries partaking in the fight against Boko Haram. These include a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) made up of Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Niger and supported by China, France, Germany, Russia and the USA (Lekunze 2019). States intervene to advance their foreign policy (interests) by propping up weak governments or support rebels to replace government not desired. The current propping up of weak governments in the Sahel and the support of rebels against Gaddafi in 2011 are good examples. Even groups that rebel against governments still turn to external support. This support could also be from MNCs interested in resources or NGOs promoting minority rights (Carment et al. 2009, 67).

As mentioned earlier, the entire Francophone African countries are known for their well-established security and military pacts with France. At the height of Boko Haram attacks in both Cameroon, Niger, Chad and

Nigeria, it was in Paris, France, where the leaders of the countries affected by Boko Haram met to discuss solutions to the Boko Haram threat. The combination of all these issues, the meddling, leverage and influence which comes with security assistance, demonstrate how the international dimension shapes local understandings and experience of security in Africa. This will be shown in subsequent chapters.

As indicated above, security in Africa always has a regional dimension. This is because of the ease of security issues to slide through borders. Trouble in one's neighbours could quickly become trouble in one's own country. This is true in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regional security systems (in the case of Islamic terrorism and ethnic conflict). The cross-border nature of threats further demonstrates the international dimensions of security in Africa.

These international realities materialise in the framing of threats in Africa. As seen in the survey of South West Region of Cameroon in 2015, there was the conceptualisation of security in terms of civil war, prolonged political instability, genocide and sustained inter-ethnic conflict. These are security issues which (at the time) Cameroon had little or no experience, yet these are still construed as security threats to Cameroonian security end-users. This is because Cameroonians (like other Africans) are acutely aware of what happens in their neighbourhood. The insecurity experienced by Nigeria, Chad and the Central African Republic reminds Cameroonians what they do not desire.

The Concept of Security: A Case Study of the South West Region of Cameroon

Due to challenges on conducting an African-wide security survey, this research decided to use data from a specific region of a particular country to inform what a vernacular perspective on African security may be. Based on data from the South West Region of Cameroon collected in 2015, this chapter exposes some insights of security which can be compared with data from other parts of Africa to formulate a vernacular security meaning for African Security studies.

Security Is Contested When security end-users were asked to list five issues, which made them feel insecure, listing the most severe first, their responses clearly showed that security meant different things to different people. Figure 3.1 shows the security threats mentioned, which constitute 3 per cent or more of the total number of issues mentioned.




Fig. 3.1 The principal security threats (Others threats which form less than 3 per cent of the total threats mentioned were: tribal/cultural differences; exclusion; mob justice; western culture/demise of local values; rape; poor mobile phone connection; rain; injustice; homelessness; lack of opportunity; assault; pollution; death; disputes; bad neighbours/neighbourhoods; natural disasters)

A hallmark of the data is how small the degree to which end-users agreed as to what security/insecurity was. Out of the 1525 threats mentioned by the 407 respondents, there was no single threat that more than 50 per cent of the respondents agreed on. Less than 20 per cent of the end-users agreed on a single threat as the most critical threat. All aspects of security in Cameroon show diversity. This confirms the long-held view that security is a highly contested concept (Zedner 2003; Owen 2004; Booth 1999; Buzan 1991a; Baldwin 1997). Such diversity of views constitutes a challenge to those designing security reform programmes since there may well be a divergence between the security goals of programmers and the people.

Security Is Subjective Despite listing surrounding threats of attacks by armed robbers or being involved in a road traffic accident (which secondary data confirmed as objectively realistic), people frequently spoke of feeling secure. This was because they believed they were in the hands of God or protected by charms. A significant majority of those surveyed invoked

religious certainties as grounds for their feelings of security. Interviewees said, for instance, 'my security is in the hands of God, so I am not worried'; 'I pray before I get into a car so I cannot have an accident'; and 'my house is covered with the blood of Jesus, armed robbers cannot attack us.' There was a widespread belief that good behaviour brought protection from the Christian God or the local gods and ancestors and that bad behaviour brought their punishment.

Such religious belief is an integral aspect of the understanding of security in Cameroon. Historically, security has always had to do with maintaining specific codes of conduct steeped in customs and traditions, which are designed to keep everyone safe and protected. There is a long history of belief that the breaking of these customary codes attracts certain types of punishment, such as misfortune, illness and curses. As Ebune has noted, 'The religious beliefs make people conscious of the fact that good fortune could only come if they adhered to their tradition by doing the right things that will not offend God or the spirits of the ancestors' (Ebune 2015, 11).

The belief that the breaking of the codes will cause these types of punishments is vital to the understanding of how security is produced and experienced in Cameroon. Confidence in God or the supernatural system ensures that whatever the objective levels of insecurity, people can and often do feel secure in the hands of God or charms. The inclusion of the belief in the supernatural (God and witchcraft (juju)) is not limited to Cameroon. This is consistent with findings by other African scholars such as David Francis (Francis 2005).

Turning to subjective feelings of *in*security, it is perhaps surprising that the Nigerian-based terrorist group Boko Haram was the most frequently mentioned threat by respondents. All respondents were from the South West Region of Cameroon, and yet there have been no terrorist attacks in the South West Region by Boko Haram. Boko Haram has been contained in the Far North Region. The reality is that Boko Haram poses little or no threat to these end-users, yet Boko Haram is constructed as the principal threat.

The subjective aspects of security explain the importance attached in Cameroon to religious leaders and family heads as security providers. Both offer threat alleviation, not with physical protection, but by delineating the conduct necessary for a person to ensure being rewarded with security. They prescribe the rituals and moral codes that assure security for the

individual and their community. If an individual fails to comply, then insecurity will follow. Should insecurity arise, then it is due to a failure of individual behaviour and not a failure of the system (i.e. not a failure of God or charms to protect those that have sought their help). So, when armed robbers break into a person's house, it is perceived as either the result of the person's transgressions or a result of their weak faith that has to be strengthened by testing. It is never the fault of God or his representatives on earth. Insecurity points the finger at the victim rather than to any external security provider. Similar observations have also been made in Nigeria (Osaji 2016).

Security Is Communal Security in Cameroon is strongly communal. In answer to the question: 'what do you think security is?', responses were varied and complex. Social harmony was something that Cameroonians aspired to. In a society where the community is essential if not vital to identity and livelihood, peaceful relationships are given priority. A selection of quotes from respondents reflect this theme: 'Security is a peaceful situation with no crime and witchcraft'; 'security is when people walk around freely without fear of harm'; 'it is a state of people being at peace with each other and the environment'; 'the feeling of being happy and at peace'; 'peace, harmony, love and freedom from sickness'; 'when people are able to live peacefully and in harmony in the town village or home'; and 'interacting in peace and harmony'.

Beyond social harmony, two features stood out in the survey: the role of relationships and responsibility in communal security and the importance given to certainty and stability at both the personal and the national levels. First, the role of relationships and responsibility in communal security. A distinguishing characteristic of security for those living in Cameroon is its collective nature. Security is not left to the individual alone. The individual is always part of a community, a network of family, neighbours and the clan/tribe. Inside this network, the individual both receives and contributes security. Of those surveyed, 17.7 per cent agreed that relationships were an essential aspect of their understanding of security. On the other hand, outside this network, there is no promise of security. Said one Nigerian migrant: 'I am not secure at all because I am a foreigner from Nigeria. I don't feel secure because the indigenes don't like strangers.'

However, this view of security places great importance on maintaining good relations within this collective network. A selection of quotes from

respondents reflect this theme: 'security to me means strong relationships, having connections with people who can assist you'; 'I believe security comes from within, how I control myself and the people I hang out with'; 'security is about having good friends and making good decisions; family, home and abroad'; 'it is a communal achievement'; 'when you have a good job, true love and true friends'; and 'a country, family and relationships where there is peace love and mutual respect'.

What is found in Cameroon is only what is typical across West Africa. As James Vincent found in Sierra Leone, 'Despite (or perhaps because of) the devastating impact of the war on human security, rural communities remained intact. Food, medicines, education, physical security were all handled as a community and approached in a participatory manner (interactive and community owned)' (Vincent 2012, 3). Good relations ensure support, whereas bad relationships jeopardise this. Bad behaviour not only reduced the likelihood of support from others; individual perpetrators of certain crimes could be punished by God/gods or charms created to punish such crimes. As a result, the entire family or village could be punished or cursed for a crime committed by an individual within that family or village. Indeed, the soil of a village could be contaminated by a crime.

In one village surveyed, a young woman had been accused of having had an abortion. The villagers believed that an abortion could invite a curse on the entire village, even though this was a private act. The fear was of crop failure, increased deaths and strange illnesses resulting from this woman's action. Hence the village held a cleansing ceremony, in which special prayers and sacrifices were made to the ancestors to cleanse the village of the 'atrocity' and prevent negative consequences. Both good rewards and bad fortune are shared.

Security in Cameroon reveals that a communal security network does not absolve individual responsibility. It enhances it. In a mutually dependent system, an individual is capable of jeopardising not just their security, but that of the community of which they are an integral part. In a security network, therefore, there is an individual responsibility for good behaviour if the community is not to be exposed to insecurity.

Security Favours Certainty and Stability Zygmunt Bauman has drawn attention to the German word *sicherheit*, which can mean not just safety and security, but certainty (Bauman 1998, 118–120). Certainty, predictability and order are undeniably part of what Cameroonians mean by security. Prominent in the understanding of security was the importance of

certainty; of an assurance that order would be maintained without disruption. The desire for order and certainty was implied in the importance respondents attached to the rule of law and the absence of arbitrary rule. This provided them with a degree of predictability. Of those interviewed, 19.9 per cent saw the rule of law, the enforcement of statutory law, as crucial to their security.

Like the expanding circles of a disturbed pond, this was something attached to the person's immediate context but stretched out to the national context and even the heavenly context. A selection of extracts from the surveys reflect this theme: 'Safety is a state of being in total assurance of the steps ahead of you'; 'I think of financial security first and spiritual security'; 'I think of heaven, a place where there is no crime and sickness or hurt, only love and more love'; 'having enough money to protect yourself and family and staying away from trouble'; 'good health, trust in the almighty God and avoiding bad company'; 'I believe in God that nothing will harm me'; 'when laws are enforced, and people abide by it'; 'religion and Christianity should be spread all over the world fast so that all could be God-fearing and live in harmony'; and 'security solely depends on God'.

How respondents described the areas where certainty was desired indicated two distinct views. There were those who sought certainty primarily in the narrow personal sense. For this, they identified (as their principal security providers) the police, vigilante groups, God, strong families and good neighbours. These actors were seen as the ones that could ensure their personal certainty of safety in the home, the village or on the road. Others sought certainty primarily in a broader social sense. For this, they identified state services as their principal security providers. These actors were those who could ensure a degree of structural certainty as regards the availability of peace, jobs, good health institutions and response to disasters and that minimised loss of life or property.

Cameroonians desire both personal stability, for which people turn to God and known local actors, and national and structural stability, for which they turn to the state and its agents. This view is, therefore, at variance with security programmes that focus *only* on the security forces. Such programmes may provide structural security, but they offer only a minor role in personal security. This highlights the importance of defining security in the African context.

Security Has a Broad View of Threats Cameroonians' view of security is much more akin to human security than the traditional view of security, with its focus on personal safety only. Historically, security threats are formulated by the elite. As Ole Waever said, 'by definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so' (Waever 1995, 55). It is they, through 'speech acts', who define what a security threat is and they who enjoy protection from it. Security end-users were asked to list five issues which made them feel insecure, listing the most serious first (see Fig. 3.1). Though less than 20 per cent of the end-users agreed on one single threat as the most severe threat, physical and livelihood threats stand out.

As might be expected, a widely held security threat was *physical danger*. Fears centred on the rebel group Boko Haram, the possibility of instability in Cameroon, violent protests, armed robbery, assaults and road accidents. As regards the latter, it was a sobering fact that all end-users of security (asked about accidents) had a family member or knew at least one person who had died in a transport accident. It may be that sexual violence, and domestic violence against women is also a widely held danger, but the research did not record this. This may be due to the genuine absence of the phenomena; under-reporting; that interviewees have recorded it as 'bad relationships' and 'assault'; or social tolerance of the practices.

Where security differs from political elite perceptions is in its identification of the seriousness of livelihood threats. Four areas were prominent among the respondents. First, *welfare concerns*. Money, sickness, hunger and lack of good food were frequently mentioned. Specifically, 23.8 per cent mentioned money as a source of security. As regards sources of insecurity, 18.5 per cent mentioned poverty, 9.3 per cent unemployment and 2.5 per cent lack of opportunity. Second, with regard to public service failure, 29.1 per cent cited the lack of good roads, 20.4 per cent lack of electricity, 19.0 per cent lack of good health facilities and 13.3 per cent corruption. Third, with regard to *environmental concerns*, 11.1 per cent mentioned natural disasters and 2.7 per cent pollution. Fourth, with regard to *economic concerns*, a general lack of economic opportunity and jobs and fear of unemployment were both significant sources of insecurity.

Cameroon's security is not parochial (or not only parochial). It is striking how often the fears went beyond the local to the national. Often mentioned in response to the survey questions were expressions of fear such as:

I am 'worried about stability in Cameroon'; 'the state of emergency now in Cameroon'; 'the presence of too many military officers'; 'the increase in the rate of drug addicts'; and 'the ineffectiveness of the police force'.

As noted above, Boko Haram was the most frequently mentioned threat, despite the lack of activity by the terrorist group in South West Region of Cameroon. It shows a clear connection between local constructions of security, with an international construction of security. Fear circulates from the global to the local Invalid source specified. What is feared globally comes to be feared locally, irrespective of the factual substance of the threat. 'By alerting citizens to the risk and scattering the world with visible reminders of the threat of crime, it tends to increase subjective insecurity' (Zedner 2003, 163). The construction of security threats based on imagined threats, such as terrorism and war, and the international dimensions to these imaginations, is further fuelled by the fact that countries with very turbulent histories surround Cameroon.

A Security Concept for African Security Studies

As can be seen in the literature explored above and the case study from the South West Region of Cameroon, it is clear that security cannot be limited to the traditional school only. The traditional school and the critical approaches such as the Copenhagen and Human Security schools have much to offer African Security. This book proceeds on the understanding that security in African express attributes of traditional security broadened security and human security at different times and in different places.

The sectors of security espoused by the Copenhagen school make the understanding of security in Africa more comprehensive and capture the junctions which shape the production and experience of security.

Human security concerns such as crime, environmental degradation, infectious diseases and terrorism (issues which disproportionately affect Africa) cannot be ignored by African security scholars, policymakers and practitioners. Consequently, all these concerns are legitimate security concerns. It has also been acknowledged that these concerns have an impact on national security conceived in the traditional sense.

Considering the above perspectives on security, this book acknowledges that security is the preservation of the state's ability to create the environment in which individuals within its borders can enjoy freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to pursue socio-economic and political

ambitions. This definition covers basic human needs, freedom from street crime, arbitrary state actions and state terrorism. It also includes the freedom to nurse and pursue cherished ambitions. This could be to achieve both economic and political progress in their lives as individuals. This means the individual who does not have the opportunity to better himself or herself does not enjoy security. He/she who is not free to express political opinions is not secure. This definition holds the state as the provider and guarantor of this security. As a result, the definition ties together the security of the state and the individual.

National security is a product of the national security architecture or system of a state, and the security of the individual is dependent on the security of the state (McSweeney 1999, 14). This book also acknowledges that security conceived in this manner is time and space constrained, both objective and subjective, existential yet must create conditions for the pursuit of ambitions, freedom from and freedom to, communal at the same time individual, favours certainty and is relational (Lekunze 2019).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined some of the contrasting definitions of security and approaches to its study. It has considered both traditional and critical perspectives on what constitutes a security challenge. It analysed data from Cameroon, to show a vernacular concept which is consistent with some notions of security from both the traditional and the critical perspectives. It has related these findings to research from other parts of Africa. It has also provided the different dimensions and security sectors for which security threats can be conceptualised. The synthesis of all these perspectives allows this chapter to provide a working definition of security for African Security Studies.

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CHAPTER 4

Multiple Layers of Individual and Group Identities

Introduction

Diversity has been common in most human organisations since the Egyptians and the Babylonians (Williams 2013). People of different ethnicity, religion and, in some cases, languages have lived together and continue to do so peacefully in states for centuries. Some of the conflicts referred to as ethnic are, in most cases, only superficially ethnic. These conflicts are usually motivated by a combination of non-ethnic factors such as economic (mainly) and political. In other words, ethnic conflict is just the appearance of a conflict, not the cause. That is why this chapter will discuss identity politics and its security implications instead (Carment et al. 2009, 65).

To think of diversity in Africa, consider Cameroon a small country with a population of over 25 million (World Bank 2018); it has over 280 ethnic groups, cultures and over 24 different languages groups (Mbaku 2005, 5). Arbitrary border, vast unconnected territories lumped together in a country on paper created a diversity of disparate proportions. This continues to pose one of the greatest threats to national and international security (Daley 2006). The focus of this chapter is to investigate the national security dimension of group diversity in Africa. The question for this chapter is, therefore, what are the key factors which make group diversity a national security challenge in Africa?

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_4

To answer this question, this chapter starts with mapping Africa's diversity (in terms of ethnicity, language and religion). It is noted that ethnic traditions or religions provide an identity, an ideology and a mode of societal (or state) organisation. The competing identities, ideologies and modes of societal organisation add to the issues of resource scarcity to create inherent security challenges to African security. The focus is on the investigation of the factors which account for inter-group conflict with national security implications.

It is argued that the nature of African states has created multiple layers of group identities. Depending on the gains, the different composition of these identities may conflict. It is argued that most of these identities are not primordial, thus portable. The portability of such identities provides a constant source of national security challenges as there could always be a group formulation that is against any issue at any time. In other words, as argued by Rothschild (1981) and Horowitz (1981), primordial markers, language or religion provide organisational foci for political entrepreneurs to seek political aims. This is irrespective of whether these political interests stem from genuine grievances or otherwise.

Conflict Literature and Security in Africa

Scholarship on the causes of conflict points to a plethora of issues that could cause conflict. Some of these include resource scarcity; availability of natural resources; neo-patrimonialism; sovereignty; ethnicity; religion; colonial legacies; weak, fragile, failed or failing governments; weak security structures; poor political governance; human rights abuses; underdevelopment and political exclusion or marginalisation (Mbembe 1992; Mamdani 1996; Botha 2015; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). To emphasise, the plethora of causes pointed to by different scholars is an indication that generalisation in Africa is extremely problematic. While similarities and patterns can be observed across the continents, variations are also clear. In effect, this book progresses on the acknowledgement that conflict is always a perfect storm (Lekunze 2019).

As mentioned above the security dilemma is a key concept in realism in International Relations. Posen (1993) modified this theory to explain ethnic conflict. It is argued that in state-nations such as those in Africa, internal security is maintained through a balance of power between the different ethnic groups within the state. It argues that the regulation of this balance lies with the central government of the state (the central authority).

However, there are circumstances in which this central authority may be incapable or unwilling to effectively provide its regulatory role (provide security for all its citizens (Carment et al. 2009, 66)). In these circumstances, anarchy (such as that described in realists' argument in International Relations) occurs.

In the anarchical environment created by the absence or ineffective central authority, trust of different groups will be limited. In determination to survive, different groups engage in competition for power. This competition to balance the power of other groups may lead to the classic security dilemma. In other words, this competition leads to insecurity instead of the security pursued by the different groups. It must be noted that while Posen refers to ethnic conflict, it is possible to apply this theory to any group within the state that seeks to survive in an anarchical system. These may be ideological, religious, linguistic or otherwise constituted groups.

The case of Rwanda running up to and after the shooting down of the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana (increasingly weakened central authority and collapse of authority) provided the anarchy as discussed above. This anarchy enabled the competition between the two main ethnic groups. For the Hutus, it was to retain the privileges they enjoyed in the post-colonial Rwanda. For the Tutsis, they needed to rebalance power to ensure that they do not continue to be disadvantaged in the prevailing circumstance. This competition resulted in one of the worst ethnic conflicts in Africa.

To a certain extent, Cameroon offers a good contemporary (and ongoing) example of Posen's theory. Cameroon can be internally geopolitically divided into four broad groups: the North (made up of mainly the Fulani ethnic groups), the South (made up of mainly the Beti-Ewondo and Sawa groups), the West (made up of the Bamiléké (grass field peoples)) and the Anglophones (made up of a mixture of grass field peoples and the Sawa).

The current regime is mainly constituted of a coalition of the North and the South (the ethnic groups dominated by the Beti-Ewondo, the Sawa groups from the South and supported by Fulani and Kirdi groups from the North). Power is balanced between the other ethnic groups by sharing the senior post in the Government. The president of the Senate is from the West (Bamilékés), and the prime minister is from the Anglophone region. The speaker of the National Assembly is from the North. The president is from the South. This formula allows for all the regions to be represented at the top table of government. However, this proves that

there is power competition and the need to use a formula like this to settle the different competing regions.

At present, the status quo has been in place for over 36 years. The current president, Paul Biya, is over 86 years old and looks visibly tired. The inevitable transition could provide an unstable period. Terrorist groups are pushing in from the North of Nigeria. Armed groups from the collapse Central African Republic are pushing in from the east. Separatist in the North West and South West Regions challenge the government. The combination of these factors has created an environment where the central government appears weak and incapable of providing the central regulation that is needed for the balance of power between the different groups. In effect, it can be argued that anarchy is setting in gradually.

In conditions of anarchy, as discussed by Posen (1993), competition among different groups should set in. In Cameroon, the competition for power between different groups is now clearly visible. The ruling coalition (cruelly referred to by opponents as Sardinards and Mutonistans) is clinging to power, while the Bamiléké and the Anglophones are fighting to ensure that the balance of power after Biya does not disadvantage them as the current status quo. The current anglophone crisis and the fallout of the dispute 2018 elections which resulted in the imprisonment of a presidential candidate who came second in official results, Maurice Kamto (from the West), are proof of this competition.

While Posen focused on the anarchy that arises during regime transition, Fearon and Laitin (1996) focused on what they refer to as in-group policing. The argument is that positive inter-group relations are maintained through a mutual expectation that transgressions by member groups are observed and punished by members of the same group. In other words, other groups will not be involved. Therefore, no need for inter-group conflict. It is argued that this balance (or equilibria) implicitly moderate the frequency and scale of episodes of both intra-group and inter-group conflict. The downside to this is raised by Bhavnani and Backer (2000, 292) who argue that reverse in-group policing can force members of one group to commit violence against the out-group. The example of the Interahamwe in Rwanda who attacked the people who sympathised with Tutsis during the 1994 genocide supports this case.

Fearon and Laitin (1996) also argue that mutual fear of each other keeps groups from fighting. This means that each group will always try to balance the power of the other group so as to maintain this fear. Providing the signals to other groups that the group is capable of standing up to any

eventuality becomes a deterrent to conflict (Gould 1999). This links back to the security dilemma theory of ethnic conflict proposed by Posen. The two approaches proposed by Fearon and Laitin and Posen require well-differentiated ethnic groups with clear rules of engagement in inter-group relations. The reality is that such institutional approach is rare in Africa.

On the specific issue of identity, which forms the main topic of this chapter, Hendricks and Keïta (2017) argue that post-colonial elites in African states operate in both primordial and civic publics. These elites plunder the civil public for the benefit of the primordial public, which accords psychological security. In effect, the state of affairs emphasises duties while rights and freedoms are squeezed out of the civil public. This is argued to raise ethnic identity awareness while suppressing civic identities. With multi-ethnic states, it argued that such politics is a store of security challenges. In such societies, the state is a means to an end. The end being mainly 'primitive accumulation'. This exposes the state as something to be captured for those who pursue 'primitive accumulation' (Hendricks and Keïta 2017, 4).

It can be observed from the different literature above that a variety of factors are responsible for the onset of conflict. In Africa, the circumstances of each country are different and must be studied in its context. One theory may apply to one conflict but not necessarily to other conflicts.

Societal Diversity in African States

Most African countries, especially those south of the Sahara, emerged into statehood from European colonisation. The initial demarcation of African territories was done to avoid conflict between European powers. The aim was to give clarity to other powers which territory belongs to whom. It was not envisaged that in the future these territories might desire to be like Europeans who created them.

A focus on Cameroon provides a clear example of how their colonial heritage significantly shapes the nature of African states. The Germans declared Kamerun as their colony in 1884. It expanded the territory from a relatively coastal concern deep into the Congo forest and up north to the Southern side of Lake Chad. In 1911 the Fez treaty between France and Germany gave parts of French territory to Germany. These included areas which are now part of present-day Nigeria, Central African Republic, Gabon and Congo. This disparate geographical expanse captured diverse peoples, cultures, flora and fauna. Thanks to this history, Cameroon is

extremely diverse in peoples, cultures, languages and physical geography rendering it with significant potential of conflict arising as a result of this diversity. In this regard, the focus of this chapter is to consider the issue of group diversity and its implications for national security in Cameroon.

While the history of Cameroon is slightly more colourful, thanks to its tripartite colonial heritage, most African countries share similar histories of imperial expansion focused on territory rather than peoples. These states were formed in a similar manner of combining different ethnic groups, languages and religions. Except for Somalia, almost every other African state is multi-ethnic. In other words, Cameroon is typical of Africa as it stems from European imperialism and is formed from a combination of different ethnic groups and religions.

This section is important to this chapter as it provides the opportunity to underscore the heterogeneity of groups or even nationalities within African states. This allows for the application of aspects of International Relations theories such as the security dilemma to internal group relations within a state. As will be seen below in the discussion of the circumstance of group conflict, a security dilemma between groups within a state can be a serious challenge to national security.

Ethnic Diversity What constitutes an ethnic group is a contested topic with several definitions in scholarship. Williams (2013) defined an ethnic group as a group which its members share several traits; 'a common name, a believed common descent, elements of a shared culture (most often language or religion), common historical memories, and attachment to particular territory' (266). On the other hand, Pevehouse and Goldstein (2017) defines ethnic groups 'large groups of people who share an ancestral origin, language, cultural, or religious ties and a common identity' (155). Furthermore, Anthony Smith (1986) defines an ethnic group as a 'named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of a common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of solidarity'.

Going by this definition, it is clear that a broad range of groups can be considered ethnic. According to primordialism, 'ethnicity is embedded in inherited biological attributes, a long history of practising cultural differences, or both.' In this context, 'ethnic identity is seen as unique in intensity and durability and as an existential factor defining individual self-identification and communal distinctiveness' (Encyclopaedia

Britannica). Following the primordial approach, Africa is made up of thousands of different ethnic groups.

While violent ethnic clashes have significantly reduced in Africa (from the 2000s), it has a long history. The history of many African states is riddled by ethnic conflict. Ethnic violence continues to be a perennial issue in countries such as Nigeria. The massacres in Matabeleland of the Ndebele by Mugabe's mostly Shona militias trained by North Korea (Simpson 2008) is a further example. Another popular clash in recent memory is the violent clashes between the Luo and the Kikuyu in the aftermath of the disputed presidential elections in 2007 in Kenya (Gettleman 2007). Before then were the politically motivated ethnic divisions with violent consequences promoted by former President of Kenya Arab Moi. Ethnic divides dominate Ethiopian politics. The recent murder of the Army chief of staff in an attempted coup in the Amhara region exemplifies these issues.

At the heart of ethnicity as a contemporary security challenge in Africa is the Great Lakes region of central Africa. In fact, other scholars have gone as far as saying 'there will be no peace in the Great Lakes region unless one takes the task of shedding light on the circumstances, the scale and the consequences of the genocide of Hutu by Tutsi in Burundi (1972), of Tutsi and Hutu by Hutu in Rwanda (1994) seriously, and of Hutu by Tutsi in Congo (1996–1997)' (Lemarchand 1998, 3). Ethnicity has generally shaped the history of post-colonial Great Lakes region of Africa. Ethnicity continues to shape how events unfold in contemporary Great Lakes region states. While ethnic challenges are present in most African state as has been shown above in the case of Cameroon, it has been a noteworthy source of conflict in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The interplay of ethnic politics, especially in Burundi and Rwanda, ignites complex ethnic relations which have now engulfed the entire region. Following an aborted Hutu-instigated uprising with the death of several Tutsis between April and November 1972, an estimated 100,000–200,000 Hutu were killed in what some have referred to as Africa's first post-independence genocide (Lemarchand 1998, 6). It is argued that this event led to the massive exodus of almost all educated Hutu population of Burundi to other countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and the then Zaire.

The above events formed the foundation for the anti-Tutsi backlash in Rwanda, which resulted in the seizure of power by Juvénal Habyarimana in 1973. The 1972 Hutu genocide in Burundi also fuelled the rise of

Hutu radical political groups among Hutu refugees. An example of this is the *Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu* (commonly known by its acronym, Palipehutu), formed in Tanzania. Such groups set the scene for more extreme groups such as the Interahamwe that emerged during the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

In 1994 the world witnessed one of the most severe genocides of the twentieth century. In the space of three months, over 800,000 people were killed, the majority of whom were Tutsis (BBC 2011). After the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down, Hutu extremist seized the opportunity to express their long-held hatred of the Tutsis. They accused the Tutsis of killing their president and set out to eradicate the Tutsi population of Rwanda. A Tutsi-led militia later marched into Kigali defeating the Hutu extremist. Rwanda is now one of the most peaceful countries in Africa. Indeed, ethnicity is banned in Rwanda. All Rwandans are just Rwandans. However, it has been argued that underlying ethnic tensions that led to the genocide persist.

The Belgian classification of the Tutsis as superior to the majority Hutus in Rwanda created the resentment of Tutsis by Hutus and a sense of entitlement to rule by the Tutsi. At present, in the Great Lakes Region, the Tutsis continue to be a minority in all the countries which they exist (such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Tanzania). However, Rwanda and Uganda both have a Tutsi president. Until recently, the DRC had a president, Joseph Kabila, whose father, Laurent Kabila, was assisted by Rwanda and Uganda to topple the infamous dictator of Zaire, Joseph Mobutu. In effect, the minority Tutsi continue to retain significant power in the region. This contributes to continuous conflict in the DRC, Burundi and parts of Uganda.

Rwanda, in particular, has always explained its involvement in the conflict in the DRC in terms of its war against the *genocidaires*. Politics in countries such as Burundi is still determined on Tutsi and Hutu basis. While ethnicity is banned in Rwanda; it is still clear that power is in the hands of the Tutsis in both Rwanda and Uganda. This research found Ugandans who were outspoken against what they termed the '*Ungandisation* of Tutsis and the *Tutsification* of Uganda'. These types of politics continue to pose a severe security challenge to Africa. The reliance on Uganda for peacekeeping missions in countries such as Somalia and South Sudan and the effectiveness of managing genocide guilt have almost

given President Museveni of Uganda and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda a free hand to do as they wish in their respective countries.

This section has attempted to show the potency of the belief in primordial ethnicity as a contemporary security challenge in Africa. It has highlighted several African countries with simmering ethnic challenges. It focused on the Great Lakes region to demonstrate how the Hutu-Tutsi divide has shaped its history and continue to be a key driver of the security agenda in central Africa with continent-wide implication. How to manage ethnicity and the associated ethnic politics in countries such as the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Sudan remains a challenge with important security implications. As with most security challenges, the threat posed by ethnicity is also linked to other security threats. This book will show the links between ethnicity and climate-induced challenges and governmental sources of security challenges.

While the paragraphs above focused on the Great Lakes region, it must be noted that ethnic politics and conflict is pervasive in Africa generally. It is not limited to one region. The Great Lakes region has been used in this case as an example. The widely known Rwandan genocide, makes the Great Lakes region a good example.

Linguistic Diversity Scholars such as Tiyambe have long argued that colonial history has an implication on post-colonial security (Tiyambe 2008, 2). For most of Africa, linguistic diversity has not been a problem. Ethnicity, which is linked to language, has played more of a key role. However, in countries such as Cameroon and South Sudan, language has posed a significant problem. In Sudan, the imposition of Arabic on the then Southerners was one of the key issues that led to the breakaway to form South Sudan. The South Sudanese argued against the imposition of Arabic and the declaration of Sudan as an Islamic state. The divide between those who wanted to practise Christianity and speak English as an official language was one of the key drivers of the protracted conflict in Sudan which led to the eventual break-up of Sudan to create South Sudan in 2011.

In Cameroon, the claim to adhere to certain values, Anglophone and/or Francophone, has been a continuous source of tension in Cameroon (Konnings and Nyamnjoh 1997). The English-speaking regions argue that they are marginalised economically and in the affairs of the state (Konnings and Nyamnjoh 1997). Periodic violent skirmishes have occurred almost as soon as the two former British and French mandated

territories were reunited. At the time of writing, it can be argued that there is an ongoing civil war in Cameroon initiated by secessionist demands for self-determination based on the linguistic divide in Cameroon.

A conflict such as the case of Cameroon is rare in Africa. However, it must be noted that the ability to use similarities no matter how spurious to form groups which can claim specific grievances as an organising tool to achieve particular political aims continues to pose a significant contemporary threat to security in Africa. Examples of self-determination claims include Eritrea and South Sudan who now enjoy self-determination. The case of Somaliland, Western Sahara, Cabinda (Angola) and the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger are ongoing (Hendricks and Keïta 2017, 5).

Religious Diversity Many different religions and variations of the same religions are found in Africa. These include a broad category of Christianity, Islam and Animist religions. In most cases, individuals who follow Christianity do not follow Islam and vice versa. However, it is possible to have Animist Christians as well as Animist Muslims. These interconnections and mixing of faiths provide immense complexity in understanding religion and security challenges in Africa.

Aside from the Animist beliefs, the main religions with a significant number of followers across many countries are Christianity and Islam. It is noted that while these carry the name Islam or Christianity, these religions are by no means homogenous in Africa. Islam or Christianity varies significantly within countries as well as across the continent. Most African countries (if not all) have a percentage of their population, which has Christianity and Islam as a major faith. The entirety of North Africa is made up of states which have Islam as the majority religion for its citizens. Immediately below the Sahara, African states have a significant Muslim population. However, as you move further south, the population of Muslims relative to Christians decreases (Love 2006). For example, the Muslim population of Senegal forms 92 per cent of its total population, while the Muslim population of South Africa is only 1.5 per cent of its total population.

By and large, Islam and Christianity co-exist peacefully in most African state. However, in some instances, Africa has witnessed inter-faith conflict in countries such as Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt (Love 2006, 621). One of the most recent cases is the case of the Anti-Balaka and the Séléka fighting in the Central African Republic. This has led to the virtual collapse of the country. Fighting between the Christian-dominated South and Islam-

dominated North of Sudan led to the break-up of Sudan to form Africa's newest state of South Sudan. Inter-religious (Muslim against Christian) skirmishes continue to occur from time to time in Nigeria. The bombing of churches in Egypt is also recurrent.

Intra-faith conflict is also an issue in Africa, such as in the examples of prominent issues between Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims in countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Libya. It is also important to separate from the above forms of religious conflict, religiously inspired politics with violent consequences (terrorism). All the religion-related conflicts pose challenges to national, regional and global security.

Organised purposeful anti-Christian or anti-Islam groups remain limited in Africa. However, typical terrorist organisations (groups inspired by religion, with political aims and use violence in an attempt to achieve these aims) are numerous and growing in strength. The explosion of bombs outside of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, drew the world's attention to terrorism in Africa. It became clear that radical Islamic activities in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa have to be taken seriously (Lyman and Morrison 2004).

Notable among the terrorist groups operating in these regions are Al-Shabaab in East Africa (the Horn of Africa), ISIS in North Africa, Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin region and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (North Africa). Christian terrorist groups are fewer relative to Islamic terrorist groups. Examples include the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which originated from Northern Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Sierra Leone (Love 2006, 624). Recently the Central African Republic has seen the rise of religious-inspired armed groups such as the Séléka and Anti-Balaka rebels.

In general terms, these organisations propose a form of governance which is inspired by their sacred text (Bible for the Christians and Quran for the Muslims) and approved of by their deity represented by its messengers on earth, emirs, sultans, chiefs, pastors, 'Men of God' or bishops. In the Islamic case, inspiration comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, a long-established political Islam group which prescribes how a Muslim family, community and state should be organised. These sorts of organisations were active in Africa before colonialism and have become more prone to violence since the Europeans imposed prefabricated states on Africa.

The prefabricated states assumed 'a separation of state from the church'. In most of pre-colonial Africa, governance was related to religion (mostly

Islam and Animist religions). These religions were built into the fabric of societal organisation. The sultan, emirs or chiefs and village elders were rulers appointed or approved of by a deity. Most of them double as political and religious leaders. To different degrees, Christian organisations have also proposed their means of governance as approved by God. However, Animist and Muslim governance traditions have been present in Africa for a longer time.

The main difference between terrorism in Africa and perhaps the West is in the fact that while European terrorist organisation are fighting for the imposition of an Islamic-inspired form of governance in Europe, African terrorist organisation such as Boko Haram are fighting for the restoration of a former form of government and governance shaped by their cultures, traditions and religion (against an imposition of Western-Christian-Capitalist inspired states which are more alien to some of these areas). The mode of governance proposed by Boko Haram, as inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood before it, actually has a more extended history in Northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Southern Chad. This area is more accustomed to governance inspired by a deity, customs and traditions than one inspired by rights, markets, individualism, freedoms, emanating from Europe.

The current wave of global terrorism may have emanated from the Middle East and wider Asia. However, it is becoming clear that it may find a home in Africa. Indeed, the sanctuary provided by Sudan to earlier Arab Jihadist returning from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Carney 2005, 123) shows the role Africa can play in such cases.

Many African states are still soul searching for what is the most appropriate form of governance for them. As will be shown below, Africa continues to struggle on how to choose and remove leaders. They also continue to struggle on deciding on what form of state is most appropriate for the complex issues they face. As seen in the debates relating to the Nation of Islam and the emancipation of African Americans in the USA, it is not a stretch of the imagination to think that Africans may turn to religion as they decide on how best to emancipate African states.

The debates on continuous decolonisation of Africa have already included voices who argue that for Africa to emancipate itself, it has to dissociate itself from Western-imposed governance practices completely. They argue that ascribing to European governance traditions perpetuates neo-colonialism. The consolation provided by religious forms of governance such as those seen the pre-colonial caliphates and sultanates of Africa may provide a source of

inspiration for emerging African states. It is also noteworthy that religion is also associated with ethnicity pointed out earlier. For example, most Animist religions are specifically espoused by a specific ethnic group. It is often one of the factors that distinguishes from other ethnic groups.

In some regions of African nations, entire ethnic groups are Muslim or Christian. For example, it is rare in Nigeria to find an Igbo who is a Muslim. It is also rare to find a Hausa or Fulani Christian. In this sense, religion forms part of ethnic identity and constitute the concept of multi-layered identities defined in this chapter. Religion provides a sub-national identity in most countries, national identities in countries such as Sudan, Somalia and most North African states and cross-national identities in cases such as the Lake Chad Basin region of central Africa. The intricacies of these identities and the link between religion, ethnicity and traditional modes of societal organisation provide a fertile ground for explosive security challenges.

The end of the Cold War, the relative decline of the West and the rise of Asia may seem, at last, to usher in Samuel Huntington's clash of civilisations (albeit not as initially conceived). The clash of western civilisation against the Islamic civilisation in the specific case of how to organise society or states is a fundamental contemporary security challenge in Africa. In most of Africa, a belief in the supernatural has been a constant in societal organisation. This is irrespective of whether the source of this belief is Animist, Islamic or Christian. Leaders have always seen the need to supplicate to higher powers. In other words, the state was never separated from the church. This is already manifesting itself in Sudan with the toppling of Bashir. While Bashir imposed himself in power mainly by the force of the army, it also had significant backing from religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

With the fall of Hosni Mubarak and the election of Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt was immediately plunged into the conflict of how to draw the line between religion and the state. The election of Morsi (through what was termed relatively free elections) is an indication that perhaps most people prefer the religious organisation of society. Subsequently, religion (the Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi) was overthrown by the army (tacitly welcomed by the international community). This could also indicate the lack of appetite for Islamic states by the international system. These issues have not been resolved sustainably. The arguments of a stolen revolution continue to resurface, especially after the death of Morsi in a courtroom after arriving from prison (Aljazeera 2019).

Across Africa, there are vast regions such as the Lake Chad Basin Area, the Sahel and the Horn with serious Islamic terrorist organisation. Some of these groups have a significant popular following. They fight for a type of societal organisation or governance, which is inspired by Islam. The introduction of Sharia Law in a Northern Nigerian state proved to be so popular that within a short time, sharia was adopted in 12 states (Lyman and Morrison 2004, 79). In all of these regions, there is a concerted global effort (including global powers such as France, Britain, China, Russia and the USA) to push back on all the challenges to the boxset states left behind by colonialism.

As indicated in earlier chapters, in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa regions, the form of the state preferred by Islamic terrorist groups are traditional and religious. The boxset states or forms of societal organisation maintained by the 'anti-terror coalitions' are recent, less consolidated and generally secular. It is therefore clear that there is a rift between what these groups and their supporters propose and what the Western-backed coalitions maintain for societal organisation. There is, indeed, an emerging clash of civilisations of Cold War proportion in Africa. How this pans out in the long term is a crucial determinant of security in Africa.

Identity Politics and Its Security Implications (Inter-Group Conflict) in Africa

As shown above, many scholars have written on ethnic, religious or linguistic conflict in Africa. However, the more this literature is explored, the more it is clear that it is essential to group this diversity under the term of identity politics. This is because the politics of defining groups in order to include or exclude others is at the centre of these types of conflicts. It is irrelevant whether identity is formed around ethnicity, religion or language. In effect, the focus of this section is on inter-group conflict or the conflict that arises from identity politics. As indicated above, African states are multinational states or state-nations rather than nation states. This means while a national identity may exist, affiliation to other sub-national identities is always present. The configuration of such sub-national identities and the circumstances of each state may have significant national security implications.

The nature of the African state predisposes it to diversity with possible security implications. For example, it has been argued that diverse societies (ethnically or religiously) find it challenging to organise collectively. Consequently, state-nations such as those in Africa often have to result to force to keep society or a government in place. They also rely on force to displace an entrenched government. The challenges of collective action for good or for evil creates sectarianism in societies with inherent national security implications.

It has been argued that multi-ethnicity (within a society) poses some degree of security threat to multi-ethnic states (states with heterogeneous populations) (Roessler 2011). This is partly due to the natural competition for scarce resources which could sometimes be viewed in ethnic terms. This is exemplified by the case of Rwanda where Hutu versus Tutsi rivalry and hatred led to one of the most vicious conflicts in Africa in 1994 (Tiyambe 2008).

Roessler argues that the manner in which power is distributed among the tribes (nations) within a country has significant consequences on the onset of civil war or coup d'état (Roessler 2011, 305). Cameroon has occasionally experienced low-scale ethnic clashes such as the confrontations between the Bali Nyonga and the Bawock accounted for by Page, Evans and Mercer (Page et al. 2010, 351). The clash between the Mbororos and the 'grass field' peoples of the North West Region of Cameroon is another example.

Instrumentalism The focus of identity politics is in the distinguishing factors between groups. This phenomenon is of instrumental value to political entrepreneurs with significant national security implications. In other words, groups only fight to preserve privileges or to gain access to privileges they have been denied access to (Carment et al. 2009, 71).

For most African states, the primordial conceptualisation of an ethnic group is no longer relevant to national security. Indeed, it can be argued that the excessive number of ethnic groups in some African countries has a favourable implication on national security. No ethnic group is big enough to threaten the rest of the other ethnic groups. In other words, the rest of the country is always bigger than any single ethnic group. This is particularly true in the case of Cameroon. If a group frames its grievances on ethnic terms, they will be confronted by the rest of Cameroon who will immediately accuse them of tribalism. These findings in Cameroon align

with findings made by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Ellingsen (2000) in their analysis of the relationship between the level or amount of ethnic diversity and the likelihood of the onset of civil war.

As shown above, this does not mean that ethnicity does not cause conflict. Especially in countries where there are two big dominant ethnic groups such as in the countries of the Great Lake regions, the competition for control has significant security implications. The Tutsi and Hutu divide is prominent and cut across the boundaries of many states. The cross-border nature of ethnicity here raises issues of irredentism and secessionism (Carment et al. 2009, 64).

Emerging Umbrella Groups A phenomenon where groups band together to form 'umbrella ethnic group' rather than primordial ethnic groups is changing politics in Africa. Umbrella ethnic groups may not necessarily share biological traits, a common language or culture, but who share similar language family, cultures, neighbouring territory and religion and have similar historical experience under colonialism and post-colonial state building. These umbrella ethnic groups embody the multi-layered identities which form the topic of this chapter and discussed in earlier sections. Also, the umbrella ethnic groups may also overlap. A particular primordial ethnic group could find itself a member of more than one 'umbrella ethnic group'. Furthermore, today's seemingly 'primordial' ethnic group may itself have been an earlier agglomeration of different ethnic groups (Page et al. 2010, 360).

To further understand these groups, they should be imagined as the solar system where the principal ethnic group is at the centre, and other groups are satellites around the central ethnic group. The bonds of culture, religion, language, history and so on are stronger or weaker depending on how far the orbit of that particular ethnic group is from the centre. In most cases, the centre of the system can be obvious, but the orbit of various groups within the system of the umbrella ethnic group cannot always be determined with precision. However, the behaviour of the umbrella ethnic group is often determined by the core elite of the central ethnic group and the interest to which they pursue.

Most African countries can be divided into these umbrella ethnic groups. Nigeria, for example, can be divided into the Yoruba (South West), the Igbo (South East) and the Hausa-Fulani (North). Nigeria can

also be divided simply into Christian and Muslim. However, the religious element of organisation is still weaker in most Africa states than the ethnic sentiments for organisation. Cameroon can be divided into five different umbrella ethnic groups. The Sawa-Beti (Christian in the south), the Fulani-Kirdi (Muslim North), the Bamiléké (Christian West) and the Anglophones. Kenya can be primarily divided into Luo, Kalagen, Masai and Kikuyu umbrella ethnic groups. These patterns are repeated in many different African states.

The security implication of the emergence of umbrella ethnic groups is that ethnicity still plays a role in the politics of a vast number of African states. While ethnic ties have weakened over the decades, they have not disappeared. This has implication for politics. Do people vote on ethnic (albeit umbrella ethnic) lines or do they vote on issues? If citizens vote on ethnic lines, does that constitute a democracy? These questions notwithstanding, the imminent security challenge is seen when these umbrella ethnic groups form inter-ethnic coalitions that give them the numerical majority to dominate the politics of a particular state.

The Yoruba and Fulani-Hausa umbrella ethnic coalition has enabled these groups to dominate Nigerian politics for many decades. The perceived marginalisation of the Igbo continues to pose a significant security challenge to Nigeria. This is primarily on the issues with Igbo secessionism and militancy in the Niger Delta region. This is similar to the situation in Kenya where a successful Kikuyu and Kalenjin coalition has enabled a perception that the Luo have been sidelined. As was seen in 2017, this can have severe consequences on national and regional security. In Cameroon, the French established a South and North coalition which has persisted from independence till date. Cameroon's only two presidents since independence have received unfailing loyalty from both the North and the South. Most political activities in the West and the Anglophone regions have been conveniently ignored. The results are now seen in the ongoing civil war (Lekunze 2019).

The coalition formed between umbrella ethnic groups creates a situation where other groups can be conveniently ignored leaving them with little or no other option than to seek for self-determination as seen in the case of the English-speaking regions of Cameroon and the Igbo regions of Nigeria.

Language As indicated above, the official language for most African countries is a European language such as French, English, Portuguese and Spanish. For most Africans, the acquisition of the common language (the official language) has often been a matter of acquiring a vocabulary so as to translate their African tongue. Meaning and thinking are conducted in their African language. This communication challenge has a psychological effect in that citizens only say what they can rather than what they intend to say. While there has been little research on this, the frustration of not being fully able to express yourself in the politics of your own country could have an implication on the onset of conflict, the scale of violence and conflict resolution. The issue of language can also affect inter-group communication, especially on crucial security issues. Misinterpretations due to language challenges could start, escalate or prevent a war from ending.

Sacred Terrorism It has been shown above that Africa's diversity extends to religion. In effect, the global phenomenon of sacred terrorism, which has been a historical constant throughout the world, is also present in Africa. Different groups who claim to adhere to Islam or Christianity (Africa's primary religions) cause violence for political purposes in Africa. At present, there is significant activity from Islamic terrorist groups which continues to challenge African security. The case of the different version of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, ISIS-affiliated groups, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab continues to challenge African security.

It will be shown in subsequent chapters that the contested nature of the African state provides an opportunity for groups to create alternative states based on the prescription of their holy books. Such traditions existed in Africa before the arrival of the Europeans. The desire to go back to a golden age remains a strong temptation for many Africans, especially the ones with strong traditions to return to. Often these are Africans who have practised Islam for long. In effect, Islamists terrorism finds home in Africa and may become one of Africa's most protracted security challenge going forward.

Migration A major consequence of conflict in Africa is the movement or displacement of people both internally and externally. Displacement of people often comes with significant implications to societal and economic

security. For example (as mentioned above and discussed in another chapter on climate change and its effects), it also has an effect on tax revenue collection and the cost of making provision to internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. The figure of internally displaced persons, asylum seekers and refugees has more than tripled in the last three decades. In the 1980s the figure was fewer than 5 million. However, by 2017, the figure now stands at over 18 million (IMF 2019, 29).

Most IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers originating from sub-Saharan Africa settle in Africa. This has an impact on the identity issues discussed in the sections above. In fact, over 3 per cent of Chadian and Ugandan populations are made up of refugees (IMF 2019, 30). This is significantly high compared to other parts of the world. The number of IDPs continues to grow (rising from less than 2 million to more than 10 million over the past two decades). The number of IDPs stands at over 4.4 million in the DRC, 1.9 million in South Sudan and 1.7 million in Nigeria. These figures are only comparable to conflict ravaged countries such as Syria and Iraq. In 2017, IDP and refugee figures stood at 6.2 million and 2.6 million, respectively (IMF 2019, 30).

Migration, for instance, has the potential to threaten communal identity and culture, in its ability to directly alter the ethnic, cultural religious and linguistic composition of the population. Indeed, Buzan argues that most of our modern-day societies are a product of earlier human migrations. Most Cameroonian towns and cities are made up of a mixture of more than 150 ethnic groups. 'Migrants are usually welcomed, and the cultural diversity that they bring is celebrated up to a point. Beyond a certain level, migration becomes a question of numbers and the locals (indigenes) can feel overwhelmed. A significant migrant influx may threaten the ability of the existing society to reproduce itself in a manner which the locals are accustomed to' (Buzan 1991, 447). Inter-tribal skirmishes as a result of the influx of new people into tribal areas are witnessed in Cameroon from time to time (Nyamnjoh 1999). There is the long-standing dislike of the so-called Graffi people in the South West Region of Cameroon. African scholars have often highlighted the politics of autochthony or indigeneity and belonging.

Population Growth Extensive population growth in Africa has begun to tip the balance between groups which may have maintained a significant majority but now witnessed their majority reduced relative to other groups

due to population growth. Previously marginalised minorities are now being increasingly vocal only due to the increase in their numbers. The case of the Anglophones who have witnessed a significant increase in the Diaspora population now has serious security implications back in Cameroon. African Diaspora has been growing in the past decades. This can have severe security implications, especially in the case of providing start-up capital for armed rebellions (Carment et al. 2009, 67).

Governmental Conflict The issue of identity politics also affects governmental conflict because long-established governments (such as that in Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Uganda, Burundi and the previous military dictatorships in Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria) excuse their rule on the basis that a strong (most often autocratic) government is necessary to hold these different identities together. Without the regime, the country would fall into ethnic rivalry and conflict (Nyamnjoh 1999). Paul Williams argues that the most significant source of conflict in Africa arises from the nature of state-society relations. Consequently, the regime continuously creates, manipulates and alters state-society relations, which may exacerbate underlying tensions (Williams 2011, 7). This is the reason why some have argued that most contemporary conflicts (what Mary Kaldor refers to as new wars) have been intra-state rather than inter-state (Kaldor 1999, 69).

States which are dominated by internal identity politics also have an identity politics inspired foreign. This may have significant security implication for that state and its neighbours. For example, the internal ethnic politics of apartheid South Africa meant that South Africa was determined to prove (using other African states) that black Africans are incapable of ruling themselves. This was meant to justify the cruelty of apartheid policies. South Africa's foreign policies led to interventions in the internal politics of countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe with serious national security consequences for all involved.

It has been argued above that both religious groups and traditions have alternatives to the prefabricated governance or societal organisation modes left behind by colonialism. The constant challenge of these authorities by sub-national groups for various reasons remains a constant threat to many African governments.

Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the diversity of African states. It argues that Africa is made of states and individuals with multi-layered identities. Ethnicity, language and religious markers only act as a source of the multi-layered identities which provide political and military entrepreneurs with the organisational foci to achieve political aims. This chapter also outlined religious and tradition conceptualisations of the state that are challenging the prefabricated states left behind by colonialism.

It is argued that the emergence of umbrella groups could threaten the nature of the African state. Identity politics in Africa offers instrumental value to both internal and external political entrepreneurs who wish to exploit Africa for their ends.

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CHAPTER 5

Contested Governments and Governance Modes

Introduction

In the introduction of this book, it was argued that there are two primary sources of conflict in Africa (the struggle over resources for survival and rebellion against the state or status quo). It is important to note that these sources of national security threats are also linked to each other. It is the role of the government to make an institutionalised attempt at managing scarce resources for the equitable benefit of all citizens. In effect, when there is rebellion against a government, it is due to a difference in perspective on how scarce means for survival is allocated. In other words, a rebellion against a government is still a type of struggle for access to the means for individual and group survival. This observation has been crudely referred to as 'politics of the belly' by Bayart (2009).

This chapter is focused on government and governance as a source of national security challenges. Most African states, as constituted at independence, continue to hold. However, the mode of governance and governments continue to be contested for various reasons. Even before colonisation, who governs and how to change who governs was a constant source of national security threats to African states. Africa is deficient in technologies of how to peacefully gain power (democracy) and technologies of peacefully exercising power (McFerson 2010, 51).

In effect, this chapter is mainly focused on the challenges of government and governance and their national security implications. It is argued

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_5

that, for centuries, mechanisms of changing leaders constitute one of the most severe sources of national security threats for African polities of various types. Evidence from the past and present is used to support this argument. In effect, it is contended that if Africa is unable to find a sustainable solution to governance, inappropriate or poor governance will continue to be a crucial source of security challenges.

Governance and Civil Conflict Theories

Previous chapters of this book have discussed the state simply as an entity with a defined territory, population, government and an ability to form relations among other states. The government, in essence, is the individuals and institutions who act on behalf of the state in the fulfilment of the duty of the state which includes the provision or maintenance of security (in the scope of this book, national security). As a consequence, governance is the act of governing or the act of performing the role of the government. In common English, the word 'governance' is used to refer to the management and control of any institution or organisation, whether family, commercial companies, national state agency or large international organisations. It is seen as the steering, piloting or directing of these communities in the pursuit of collective goals such as common security (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 2).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sees governance as a framework of rules, institutions and practices that set limits on the behaviour of individuals, organisation and companies (UNDP 1994, 8). A broader definition is that governance involves 'all processes of governing undertaken by a government, markets, or networks; over a family, tribe, corporation, or territory; and by laws, norms, power, or language' (Bevir 2013, 16). Governance is the processes of interaction and decision-making that lead to the creation, reinforcement or reproduction of social norms and institutions (Hufty 2011, 405). Governance could also be defined as 'shaping, regulating or attempting to control human behaviour in order to achieve collective ends' (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 2).

Picking from the above definitions, other similar definitions and the work of Börzel and Risse (2010, 114), this book defines governance as 'the various institutionalised modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules or to provide collective goods'. Consequently, they highlight that governance embodies both structure and process. As already indicated, the process of producing security is

fundamental to this book. The role that the state plays in the process is also vital for governance outcomes.

From the definitions of governance highlighted in these paragraphs above and the nature of the African state, it is clear to see how different individuals and groups within an African state may disagree on what type of institutions and norms to reinforce. Most African states are multi-ethnic and multi-religious. As indicated in chapters above, religion and ethnic traditions have incorporated means of societal organisation. In effect, disagreements on who governs and how to govern are inherent in the nature and history of the African state. This argument sets the background to how this chapter proceeds. In effect, governance and modes of governance are contested continuously in many parts of Africa.

In other parts of the world, democracy has come to be accepted as the flawed but necessary mode of governance which fosters peace and security. As a mode of governance, what is democracy? First, Ranney (1996, 94) defines democracy as 'a form of government organised by the principles of popular consultation and majority rule'. Second, Keane (1993, 245) posits that 'a democracy is a multi-layered political and social mosaic in which decision makers at the local, regional, national and international levels are assigned the job of serving and codifying the *res publica*, while, for their part, citizens living within civil society are obliged to exercise vigilance in preventing each other and their rulers from abusing their powers and violating the spirit of the Commonwealth.' Lastly, Jackson and Jackson (1997, 77) argue that democracy is applied to a political system which manages to reconcile competing political interests rather than impose one interest on another.

Based on the definitions above and the literature on democracy, this book infers that democracy is a form of government where competing forces gain and administer power through predetermined and accepted rules. The predetermined rules guarantee fair play and universally accepted freedoms and rights for individuals and groups within that nation-state. Power is required to be responsive to the needs of the citizens expressed in a civil way within the predetermined rules. Predetermined rules are studied and reformed continuously to reflect the changing needs of individuals and groups within the state. This book asserts that this sort of governance does not exist in Africa, but for a few countries such as Botswana and South Africa. In effect, it will be shown below that the absence of this form of governance in Africa is an inherent threat to security.

On the other hand, dictatorship or authoritarian rule is defined by Heywood (1997) as a practice of government from above in which authority (power) is exercised regardless of popular consent. Furthermore, Jackson and Jackson (1997, 81) posit that authoritarian rule is an old form of regime usually associated with tyrants, despots, monarchs, sultans, tsars. Complete loyalty and obedience are required of the citizens. It asserted that contemporary and historical evidence from Africa suggest that such governance modes are more appropriate in the description of governance in most African states (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018; Ibrahim 2003).

In this light, this book argues that African states can be divided into states with totalitarian and states with authoritarian governments. The totalitarian governments are few while most governments can be characterised as authoritarian (to varying degrees). It is further submitted that the authoritarian government can be better understood by locating them into a 'dictocratic' spectrum. It is posited that a 'dictocracy' is a type of authoritarian government which is responsive and progressive (to a certain degree). In other words, dictocracy engage in some limitedly democratic acts to appear pro-democratic to the opposing forces. Such acts are always calculated to placate the opposition and the masses to suppress the actual or anticipated rebellion. Despite occasionally doing what the people want and engaging in developmentalism, 'dictocrats' are still acting on their own and what they think is right or needed. That personalisation poses essential challenges to security.

In a dictocratic society, historical evidence shows that other competing forces always exist, albeit kept in check by the soft and hard coercion. Overtly or covertly, forces competing for power are continuous. The revisionist forces (opposition) are continuously looking for opportunities to increase their power to bring down the dictatorship while the dictatorship is continuously looking for opportunities to crush the opposition. There is a constant state of gains and losses for all the competing powers within that society or state. For instance, in the case of South Africa, Apartheid did not wholly eradicate black resistance (anti-Apartheid movement). In the case of Libya, resistance from Benghazi persisted all through Gaddafi's years of dictatorship.

In the absence of democracy in domestic politics, international institutions are an essential way of advancing peace. Liberals note that the states that launched World War I were all autocracies ruled by aged emperors. In effect, Liberals posit that the promotion of worldwide democracy is an essential task to reduce the risk of war. Building on the early works of Thomas Paine (Common Sense, 1776) and especially Immanuel Kant (Perpetual Peace, 1795), they argue that democracies were unlikely to start wars. Statistically, there have been few incidents where democracies have gone to war with each other. This observation led to the development of the democratic peace thesis (Maoz and Russett 1993; Levy 1989, 88).

In internal as well as international security, Liberals in International Relations find democracy to be particularly useful in doing security. Promoting democracy at home and abroad is, therefore, an act of doing security. The question is, does governance in Africa qualify to the democracy required by the democratic peace thesis? If not, then according to Liberalists, Africa will continue to experience severe security challenges resulting from governance issues. In other words, governance will continue to be a source of inherent security challenge.

Several theories have attempted to account for conflict that arises as a result of political factors. The first group of theories is the rational choice theories which highlight repression, inequalities, collapsing institutions, discrimination or informational problems as the factors which cause internal conflict. In multi-group or state nations such as African states, groups which want to survive (in the face of the conflict factors mentioned) have to make rational choices on whether to support or rebel against a particular government. If a group is a dominant group, it is also faced with the choice of whether to resist rebellion violently or make concessions.

Some conflict studies have argued that a state of anarchy (such as the case of the anarchical international system cardinal to realism in International Relations) arises at the point of a breakdown of a regime before a new regime is established (Posen 1993). Examples can be made of the cases of Algeria and Sudan at the moment and the period of transition from Mubarak to Morsi and to Sisi in Egypt. The typical example often used in such analysis is the case after the death of General Josip Broz Tito in the Former Yugoslavia.

The period of transition renders such states as African states anarchical. During this window, realists' concepts of the security dilemma, human nature, competition for power or security, balance of power, distrust, survival and self-interest become the determinant of the behaviour of the different groups (irrespective of how these groups define themselves) that form these states. As in the international system, the state of anarchy is plagued with insecurity. This reasoning is behind the argument in this book that changing regimes is an inherent security challenge to African security.

While explaining an economic approach to civil war in countries such as those in Africa, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) focused on the causes of rebellion against a government. They argue that a combination of greed and grievances in conditions where there is the availability of natural resource are significant factors to the onset of civil war. The focus on governments and rebellion against a government is why Collier and Hoeffler (2002) are of interest to this chapter. It reinforces the fact that African governments and governance modes are continually contested by various groups internally and externally (other states and multinational corporations). The lack of an established and accepted form of government that individuals aspire for (such as democracy in the UK) is an inherent security threat.

At the core of the grievance approach, is the fact that groups are always calculating how or if rebellion can address their grievances, which can be due to political, economic, or both factors. This approach argues that if one group appears to derive advantages from relative deprivation, limitations on political access, income or land inequality, discrimination or repression of other groups, the disadvantaged groups will be motivated to rebel. The stronger the disadvantages endured by the discriminated group, the stronger the motivation to organise a rebellion (Gurr 1994; Lichbach 1984; Moore 1998; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001).

It must be balanced that, in a rational context, the cost and benefits of rebellion are always calculated by those who wish to rebel. The dominant group also calculates the cost and benefits of the use of violence to maintain its dominant position. As indicated above, greed or grievance is not sufficient to cause a civil war. It is only when there are resources to make the sacrifice pay off that a war is likely (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978; Collier 2000; Gurr 1993; Regan and Norton 2005).

Following this thinking, the articulation of grievances is, therefore, political calculation meant to make both political and economic gains for the group articulating the grievances. The motives of those articulation grievances are difficult to ascertain as it might be due to genuine or

exploitation of grievances to satisfy their greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). The existence of grievances on its own means little to the onset of civil. In other words, the securitisation of greed or grievance by the elite is what causes war. A typical contemporary example is a current war in Cameroon. Since independence, Cameroon is imbued with certain internal complications. While these contractions are relevant to security, it takes the articulation and concerted effort of the elite to turn such complications to armed conflict.

The modernisation theory of democratisation argues that socio-economic factors (level of modernisation) are paramount to democratisation (Lipset 1959, 69–105). It highlights that development is a vital factor to democratisation (a country's transition to democracy). As a country grows economically, the chances of it to become and to stay a democracy are higher than one which does not grow economically. In fact, it propounds the belief that industrialisation and economic development lead directly to positive social and political change (Lipset 1959).

Huntington (1996) argued that the modernisation theory is correct in its argument that economic development unleashes profound social changes. However, Huntington argues that the modernisation theory is wrong to assume those changes would necessarily be benign or progressive. Indeed, such economic development could sometimes lead to high instability if not outright violence. Huntington stresses that positive outcomes can only be realised where healthy political institutions capable of harnessing the forces unleashed by economic growth exist.

In summary, the theories on the governmental cause of conflict reveal governmental issues which are relevant to security. These include the absence of or weakness of institutions, the absence of or weakness of democracy, the availability of resources, multiple sub-national groups competing for power, greed and grievances. As a result, the following section investigates government and governance in Africa to understand how these issues interact in reality to produce security or insecurity.

A Historical and Contemporary Context of Governance in Africa

It is argued that to understand many phenomena in Political Science (such as governance), it is essential to understand the culture and environment from which these phenomena originate (Fukuyama 1995). Indeed, culture

is argued to be a crucial determinant of the history, identity and destiny of a society (Prah 2001). As the previous chapters and sections above show, history and identity derived from ethnicity and religion are critical determinants of the political culture of a given society and the consequent national security challenges associated with such a political culture. This section, thus, explores evolution of political and cultural influences on security as far back as possible. However, it must be borne in mind that Africa is vast and different governance modes existed in different parts of Africa.

Clapham (1996) argues that in the formation of states, dominant groups capture smaller groups where they are assimilated to create bigger groups. In such groups when dissidents disagree to the mode or manner of governance in the society or disagreement of a specific issue, they can capture the leadership by killing the incumbent. In other cases, due to the availability of land (forests and Savanah), the dissident group can breakaway with their followers to form a different village or kingdom.

As one travels through rural Africa, many small villages can be seen. While in some cases these villages could have mutually intelligible languages and cultures, in most cases, these villages are quite similar to each other. Such an observation gives the impression that such villages would have arisen out of breakaway groups as a result of conflict. In Cameroon, for example, there are so many villages that some need 'surnames' to be differentiated from their neighbours. For example, there are several Balues in the South West region, namely, Dikome Balue, Mofako Balue, Ndono Balue, Betenge Balue (to name a few). There are also several villages with the 'surname' Mbonge. In the North West and West regions, there are also several villages with the 'surname' Bali.

In the case of Bali, the legend is that the founders of all these villages are all related (brother who split as a result of conflict). Different brothers took their supporters (part of the population) in search of new land to form a new village. The name of the leader of the group (alpha male) was added to the word Bali as the name of the new village. The lesson to be drawn from this is that some parts of Africa and Africans have found it extremely difficult to live in groups bigger than a specific number. When the specific number of members of the groups (population size threshold) is exceeded, conflict seems to appear naturally. Indeed, it has been argued that some African tribes actively split when their number reaches a certain number (membership is limited at 50 people). Such practices continue

even when the risk of conflict is high (Sahlins 1968). This state of affairs provides inherent challenges to security.

While some groups settle and only move when there is conflict, other groups are naturally mobile without a culture of restriction to a particular territory. The concept of territory or boundaries is alien to these groups. Their cultures are consistent with the fable that 'wherever the camel goes, that is Somalia' (Clapham 1993). It can be seen in both Somalia and Sudan that attempts at creating (states in the nature of which most parts of the world have taken for granted) is extremely challenging. The traditional methods of societal organisation are antithetical to a sedentary institutionalised organisation. The essence of life itself is not to be sedentary. The clan system in Somalia prevails over a state-nation or nation-state model. Even as the most homogenous of African states, Somalia remains an area of Africa which has found it most challenging to emerge as a state.

Where Africans succeed to create states, the historical evidence shows that leadership was more authoritarian and autocratic. This was true in small villages, kingdom or microstates (such as in the small kingdoms of Western Cameroon, the Somalian and Sudanese clans) and major states (such as the large Islamic states of the Lake Chad Basin areas, the Kingdoms of the Great Lakes region and the states in the Sahel, North Africa, Zulu Kingdoms of Southern Africa). Authoritarianism is also associated with the powerful pre-colonial African states such as the Empires of Mali, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Songhai. The primary means of changing leaders was death by natural causes or violence perpetrated by contenders to power.

How to change leaders while they are still alive has continuously been a challenge in African political history. Indeed, at its zenith, the Songhai Empire controlled territory the size of present-day USA. Its principal city Timbuktu was the global centre for Islamic scholarship. There were no non-violent means of changing the emperor who was an absolute monarch who was the head of state, head of government and commander of the armed forces. Rarely was there any non-violent means of power succession aside from death of natural causes.

The Ethiopian empire goes back many years, and modern Ethiopian (Ethiopia remains an African country with one of the longest history) history is well documented. Throughout this long history, the change of power in Ethiopia has been through the death of natural causes or violence. However, recently there has been a peaceful, non-violent change of prime ministers in 2018. The positive development notwithstanding, shortly after taking office peacefully, there was an attempt at assassinating

the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (BBC 2018a). An attempted coup in the Amhara region (which killed Ethiopia's army chief of staff) is regarded as resistance to the changes introduced by Abiy (BBC 2019b).

At the core of these examples is that (in most cases) pre-colonial African societal organisation had the means of designating leaders but without effective non-violent means of removing these leaders. In present-day Africa, constitutions have been written with this specific problem at its core. However, it has been seen across Africa how specific leaders have attempted or changed or manipulated the constitution to ensure the perpetuation of their rule.

Even in the 1990s and 2000s when it was argued that there was a wave of democracy in Africa, states such as Zambia, Namibia, Malawi, Nigeria, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Egypt, to name a few, attempted to or change their constitutions to allow incumbents to continue in power. It is also clear that a deeper understanding of human behaviour (especially with regard to group formation and living in groups) is needed to understand governance in Africa and how it serves as a source of national security threats.

An examination of the political culture of Africa exposes several governance characteristics. These include a lack of institutionalisation, rules, the view of the state by the elite as a means to power and wealth. It also exposes the universal resort to personal, accumulation or autocratic rule and patrimonial practices ('you scratch my back I scratch yours' type of mentality) or politics of the belly (Bayart 2009; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Van de Walle 2001; Clapham 1986). It has been claimed that in the absence of strong institutions and ideology, culture becomes the focus of understanding state-society or state-individual relations (Carment et al. 2009, 73). The arbitrary nature of some of these relations makes the individual particularly vulnerable to insecurity.

In other words, the vast majority of governance modes in Africa were (and are) authoritarian (albeit at varying degrees). Considering Heywood's (1997) definition of dictatorship above, this book considers authoritarianism in the African context to refer to a situation where a single force overwhelmingly dominates all the other forces that compete for power in a particular society. This overwhelming force could be personified in a single person as in the case of a pre-colonial African King or post-colonial regimes such as the case of Joseph Mobutu or Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda or Gaddafi or Libya. The overwhelming force could also be tradition or an

institution (as in the case of apartheid in South Africa) that oppresses and subjugate the masses to achieve its ends.

Leadership is shaped by political culture, which is, in turn, shaped by the traditional cultures relating to leadership. These were reinforced over many years by leadership practices and process in pre-colonial Africa (Matlosa 2003, 86; Jackson and Jackson 1997, 98; Lekunze 2019). Lekunze (2019) has made an example of the case of Cameroon where leaders (both Presidents Biya and Ahidjo) got themselves crowned 'Fon of Fons' (king of kings) and are referred to as *pere de la nation or* father of the nation. Such actions show that, in the understanding and performance of its role, the president sees himself or herself as the chief of a rather big village (country). Leaders conceive themselves and their roles in customary terms. As in the pre-colonial villages and kingdoms, leadership often involves the use of coercive forces (militarism). The historicity of Africa, therefore, influences the will to step down as leader when demanded by the people.

In this context, leadership is exercising responsibilities in a position for which power is rendered through spirituality. Leadership is carried out through a system of chieftaincy or a form of traditional polity regulated through both kin and non-kin ties with the power bestowed on ancestral royal lineages, clans and family groups. Indigenous leadership emerged from the ground up within the local community and was beyond the formal state, central state politics and the conventional definitions of government and governance.

In other words, leadership was exercised through ancestrally sanctioned spiritual and political power. Such ancestral power is bestowed and also earned through community recognition of deeds. It could be revoked or withdrawn through what is perceived to be a betrayal of ancestors, and the process would start when local peoples lose faith in the holder of a traditional office.

The Contemporary Context of Governance in Africa The post-colonial state set out to imitate the colonial masters who created them. The traditional methods of choosing leaders by hereditary or seniority were discarded. At independence, many African states conducted elections to choose leaders. They supported forms of governments aligned to the ones inherited from the colonial masters. These systems were and, in some cases, still similar to what pertains in the metropole of the departing

colonial master. In most parts, the rise of the African state occurred smoothly in the early 1960s.

When the late 1960s and 1970s did not meet the hopes raised by decolonisation, it became clear to ordinary Africans and elite, that perhaps the form of government and the leaders of these governments were not the right fit for the achievement of such hopes and dreams. In line with the historicities argument put forward by Bayart (2009) and concurred by Clapham (1994), it argued that African leadership take great inspiration and meaning from the traditional monarchies (chieftaincies) that went ahead of them.

Thanks to Cold War politics of the 1960s and 1970s, it was dangerous to change governments as there was the risk of government switching sides. It was important that pro-capitalist African states were maintained with the support of the USA and its allies. The Soviet also supported the maintenance of pro-communist regimes. In effect, the incumbents sat tight, leaving the people and other pretenders to power no other option but to rebel against these regimes. In effect, the most common means of changing governments in Africa in this period was through coups d'état and rebellions. It is reported that between 1956 and 2000, there were 80 successful coups, 108 failed attempts and 139 reported coup plots (McGowan 2003). The national security implication of this is significant.

The above paragraphs establish two constants: African people who do not want particular leaders and particular forms of governance and leaders, forms of state and borders determined to remain unchanged. After all, how many African kings in history have voluntarily stepped down? Due to the constant presence of the threat of and actual rebellion, incumbent governments engage measures aimed at stifling rebellion. Some of these measures included one-party states stuffed with regime loyalists. Such practices almost guaranteed that the incumbent will always get the support of the party. Examples include at an early stage Nkrumah in Ghana, Nyerere in Tanzania, Ahidjo in Cameroon and the list continues. The enforcement of such a system (designed to frustrate the will of the people) required immense repression with severe national security challenges. 19th century African leadership systems were used to justify authoritarianism.

While the one-party state prevented the possibility of popular candidates seizing power through the ballot box, it could not prevent seizing power by the gun. To prevent the seizure of power by the gun, the incumbent had to find a balance between having Sufficiently powerful militaries

to fight off sub-national armed groups but who are not strong enough to seize power in the capital. The challenges to societal organisation outlined above necessitate the use of militaries in politics. Leaders argued that force is needed to keep the disparate groups, which made up their countries together. To maintain the borders left behind by the colonial system also needed force.

Hence, from the pre-colonial African states to the post-colonial states of today, militarism has been a crucial part of governance. Militarism in African politics is evidenced in the number of coups d'état the continent has experienced. Many African leaders started their professional lives as either military men or rebel leaders. They take their militarism into politics, using force to resolve political issues. At present, the presidents of Nigeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, Chad, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville are either former military men or armed rebel leaders. Furthermore, at the time of writing, Algeria and Sudan are ruled by a military council.

Even in states where the leaders are not former military men or rebels, there is a heavy reliance on the military for governance. It is argued that militarism in Africa has corroded the power of institutions and led to poor civil-military relations with a rise in violence (Ibrahim 2003, 5). In the 1990s, even in the 'wave of democracy' in some cases, it was military men who exchange their uniforms for suits. The cases of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana and Obasanjo in Nigeria are good examples. This demonstrates that militarism is a hallmark of African politics. This has significant security implications.

Militarism in Africa also created a situation where mostly poorly educated men seized power exposing African to violent and arbitrary leadership. Good examples include those of Samuel Doe in Liberia, Idi Amin in Uganda, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and a string of Nigeria military leaders (Ibrahim 2003, 11). It often means that Africa has experienced more than its fair share of poor leadership and, consequently, poor governance. This constitutes a source of inherent and contemporary security challenges.

The engagement in coup-proofing became a very delicate business for the incumbent regimes. As indicated in the case of coup-proofing, the uncertainty created by the lack of a mechanism to change leaders means incumbents put immense effort and resources into protecting their personal rule. This often has an effect on the institutions of the state, therefore, rendering the state weak and more vulnerable in the long run. For their own personal preservation, African strongmen welcome the portrayal

of their countries as weak and fragile, so that they can argue that they are the only person who can build consensus to keep these disparate groups together.

By the end of the 1980s and early 1990, the incumbents were ageing, and the end of the Cold War reduced the incentive for an outside power to continue to support certain types of regimes. The combination of these two factors tips the balance between the rebellion and the suppression of the rebellion. In effect, the late 1980s and 1990s saw the fall of long-established regimes in Ethiopia, Algeria, Zaire, Zambia, Sudan, Central Africa, the Republic of Congo and South Africa. This period also saw the dismantling of the one-party systems mentioned earlier and the introduction of multi-party and universal suffrage elections in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria and the list continues.

During this time, the international community and mostly the IMF and World Bank also intensified calls for good governance. In the pursuit of good governance, African governments embarked on what they termed democracy. However, the contentions with African democracy are now well documented, as shown above. A good example is Cheeseman and Klass (2018). Even countries such as Ghana which are often used as beacon of African democracy are now accused of undermining democratic institutions. It is argued that the threat of autocracy is growing in Ghana (Cheeseman and Smith 2019).

Confronted with pressure (economic difficulties, increasing educated population, information, extreme brutality, external pressure, UN sanctions, etc.) to reform and democratise, many African states engage in both brutal repression and dictocracy. In many cases, dictocracy is necessitated by an impasse. In some African countries (such as Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Togo, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Uganda), a degree of dictocracy solved the impasse created by pro-democracy pressures and government resistance. Such a state of affairs allows the dictator to continue business as usual. Some of these leaders, including Biya of Cameroon and Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, rode the wave and are still president at present thanks to dictocratic strategies. Over its history, the apartheid system in South Africa employed several dictocratic strategies such as attempts to extend limited rights to Indians and Coloureds (to a lesser extent) and the idea of Bantustans to break such impasse created by anti-apartheid movements.

However, dictocracy does not work for all African dictocrats. In those cases, these countries turned to what this book refers to as ‘franchised

dictocracy' or what Markoff (1996) refers to as nascent democracies. By franchised dictocracy, this book refers to the institution of multi-party elections where it is possible to change power through a ballot. However, in a franchised dictocracy, there is an absence of the institutional framework to sustain democracy as defined above. Consequently, there are still many similarities between a franchised dictocracy and a dictocracy.

A typical example of a franchised dictocracy is Nigeria. While the ballot box can change leaders in Nigeria, it is a stretch of the imagination for governance in Nigeria to be described as a genuine democracy. Per the definition of democracy given above, Nigeria does not qualify as a democracy, hence its description as a dictocracy.

This book argues that there are few totalitarian regimes (such as Equatorial Guinea) in Africa. The majority of governance forms are authoritarian within the dictocratic spectrum. Such an assertion is consistent with Ibrahim's (2003) findings from the study of democracy in Anglophone West Africa. Ibrahim (2003) argues that many of the alleged democratic transitions in Africa have not led to rule by the constitution or the type of democracy defined above (2003, 2). As shown above, franchised dictocracies are deficient per Lipset (1959) and Huntington (1996).

Again, as indicated above the critical problem is removing leaders when they take office. The vibrant leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who rode the 'wave of democracy' to power are now the sit-tight leaders of the 2010s. While some African countries have been able to change leaders through elections, a significant number of sit-tight presidents persist. President Biya of Cameroon has been in power since 1982. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has been in power since 1985 (State House of Uganda 2018), Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea has been in power since 1979 (BBC 2014), Paul Kagame of Rwanda (BBC 2018b) and Denis Sassou Ngueso of the Republic of Congo have all been in power for over 15 years. Only recently was Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria (Francis et al. 2018) and Sudan's Omar Bashir were removed from power (News24 2019). Kabila of the DRC stepped down after unconstitutionally extending his term limits under the pretext of the difficulties in organising elections.

Even where leaders have been changed, power continues to reside in a small elite such as in the case of Gabon, Togo, Nigeria, Egypt and the ANC of South Africa. Indeed, Cheeseman and Klass (2018) argue that the percentage of the opposition parties who win elections where the incumbent is a contestant is significantly low. The domination of the politics of a country by a single party or an individual is, pervasive in Africa.

The hereditary monarchical pre-colonial states, one-party states, presidents for life and 'elected' autocracies of African governance have created a ruling elite which continues to hoard power while the population expands, and they shrink relatively. For example, the current president of Cameroon has been in power for close to 36 years. Before then he was prime minister and chief of staff at the presidency for a combined 15 years. In other words, President Biya has been at the helm of Cameroon politics for half a century. The president before him was in power for 23 years. The ranks of African leaders who have been in power for more than 15 years include Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, Idriss Déby of Chad and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea.

In places like Gabon and Togo, the current presidents (Ali Bongo Ondimba and Faure Gnassingbé Eyadéma) inherited the presidency from their fathers (Omar Bongo Ondimba and Gnassingbé Eyadéma). Until recently in 2019, the president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, inherited the presidency from his father (Laurent Kabila who seized power from Mobutu). In Nigeria, with a population of over 170 million people, two individuals have become president twice; Olusegun Obasanjo in 1979 and again in 1998 and Muhammadu Buhari in 1983 and again in 2015. The case of the previous countries is similar to the case of Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast who was prime minister in the 1990s and now president since 2010. In Ghana and Kenya (which are seen as democracies), the current presidents (Nana Addo Akufo-Addo and Uhuru Kenyatta) are sons of previous leaders in their respective countries. Also, in Botswana (one of Africa's most stable democracy) a son and father have both been presidents.

As the new leaders brought in by the democratic wave after the end of the Cold War age, it is expected that another wave of change will sweep out the 'dead wood'. It can be argued that the removal of 'dead wood' has already been recorded in the case of Algeria and Sudan where ageing presidents had been removed through widespread protests in 2019. The political impasse in these two countries has caused a crisis which may have national security implication. In Algeria, candidates to replace the former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika as stipulated by the constitution are rejected by the popular uprising due to their closeness to the former regime. In response to the popular demands, the younger brother of the former presidents Said Bouteflika and two intelligence chiefs have been arrested. The protesters continue to put pressure on the military to completely clean out the Bouteflika regime.

Similarly, to Sudan, the protest continues to reject a military council set up to rule the country after Omar al-Bashir was removed from power. The protesters claim that the new leaders were too close to the former regime. They demand a complete break from the past. These protesters have learned lessons from Mugabe where Mugabe was replaced with a former collaborator of his and has not departed much from Mugabe's tactics of brutal repression of popular protest and election manipulation. However, on 13 June 2019, *The Guardian* reported at least 124 fatalities and 700 people injured in the violence in Sudan. There have extensive reports of 'sexual violence, mass arrests, gunfire in medical facilities and bodies floating in the river Nile'. The Janjaweed militia famous for atrocities in Darfur has resurfaced in Khartoum as Gen. Mohamed Hamdan is the key figure in the ruling Transitional Military Council (Ferguson 2019).

The list of ageing and unwell leaders in Africa (including Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad) is long. It is feared that the events of Algeria and Sudan may extend further south to engulf some of these nations. These waves of popular unrests to unseat the status quo form inherent national security challenges for Africa. However, while leaders in Algeria and Sudan and perhaps other ageing leaders may be on their way out, there are worrying trends across Africa, indicating several regimes taking measures to entrench personal rule.

In 2019, in Benin the opposition parties were disqualified from participating in legislative elections. It was argued that only parties linked to the current president, Patrice Talon, were allowed to participate (BBC 2019a). In Togo, the constitution has been changed, making it possible for the current president Faure Gnassingbé Eyadéma to continue to be president till 2030 (Aljazeera 2019). Such an act makes the Eyadéma family the longest-serving dynasty at the helm of an African state. Guinea (Conakry) currently has two term limits of which the current president, Alpha Condé, is coming to the end of these two terms and attempts are made to change the constitution for him to run again (Reuters 2019). In 2017, the constitution of Uganda was amended to remove age limits so that Museveni can stand for another term (BBC 2017).

Inherent and Contemporary Security Challenges

As has been noted above, evolutionary and historical tendencies predisposed African states to a challenging governance environment. It has already been indicated above the constraining or lack of resources available

to African states. It has also been noted that the imposition of artificial borders does not only lump disparate cultures together; it also limits secession, which was a pre-colonial dispute resolution mechanism. At the core of security in Africa, as indicated above, is the fallout of competition over scarce means. In effect, the limitations and opportunities provided by the large post-colonial states bear even greater inherent sources of national security challenges.

Inability to Form Large Groups Traits of societal organisation (secessionism as a form of dispute resolution and nomadism) have been shown above that impede the formation of large groups. While in the past there existed large and organised African states, for most of the tribes, big groups always came with contentions that lead to breakups and formations of new groups. The constant breaking up and formation creates and replicates violence. The high number of active secessionist groups in Africa at present is a testament to this argument. This book, therefore, argues that such challenges constitute inherent and contemporary security challenge to African security.

While this is more apparent in Africa, the inability to form big groups seems to be human. Societies which have succeeded to form large groups (sizable nations) have done with the use of technology (various technologies over many years). In other words, they have done so by devising methods that augment nature. Africa's lack of and reluctance to adopt technology contributes to holding her back in advancing societal organisations of scale. The small population size of many African polities robbed it of the economic scale that can trigger a virtuous security cycle.

Lack of Inter-group Non-violent Conflict Resolution Mechanisms As seen above, in some societies, hierarchies existed but can always be contested without an effective means of removing the incumbent. Dissidents often break away to form their kingdoms or conquer a weaker one which they will impose their ideas of governance (Clapham 1996, 29). The ability to break away without resolving the issue that created disagreement endowed Africa with two complications with national security implications. These include an imbued secessionism and an inability to resolve large group conflict.

While African justice systems perfected the means of resolving conflict between individuals and small groups, the many cases of inter-ethnic conflict seen across the continent show that most large group conflicts were generally resolved through secession. Fearon and Laitin (1996) note that information is exchanged more within groups than between groups. The lack of information in inter-group relations is responsible for the inability to evolve inter-group conflict resolution mechanisms. Colonialism created large groups rapidly, and also ended rapidly. The colonial and post-colonial dispensation created the need for inter-group relations overnight.

While for most European states, their nation states emerged mostly out of in-group socialisation, African states have the more significant challenge of creating states through managing delicate inter-group relations of groups lumped together forcefully and precipitously. To manage these relations, the colonial masters instilled dictatorships in the colonies and encourage dictators when they left. This dispensation left Africa without an established method of changing leaders. It also left Africa with a deficit in large group conflict resolution mechanism.

Compounding the lack of means to change leaders non-violently, and the deficit in large group conflict resolution mechanisms, is the problem of boundaries. With territorial boundaries that enclosed large disparate groups, the probability of conflict increased. The inviolability of territorial boundaries (that have been seen in Africa since colonisation) also destroyed secession as a large group conflict resolution mechanism. The consequences of this have manifested itself in many different conflicts in Africa.

Inability to Change Leaders The fear of plunging a country into conflict if a leader is changed has created a situation where incumbents find means to hang on to power, often by force. This means the incumbent becomes less responsive and accountable to the people they govern. This situation often leads to impunity and bad governance. The lack of good governance from a regime which is not willing to relinquish power, in turn, provides an incentive for rebellion.

In other words, changing leaders constitutes a source of national security threats, and maintaining leaders in power who perpetuate bad governance also constitutes a source of national security threats. This puts African states in a catch 22 position where a change of government is vulnerable to civil war due to squabbles on who should be the next

president and the dilemma of a group rebelling due to a sit-tight regime which refuses to relinquish power.

As seen above, many African incumbents continue to manipulate constitutions to perpetuate themselves in power. Several African states have removed presidential term limits so that incumbents can stand for elections as long as they want. The concept of president for life is more accurate in Africa than most parts of the world. What is the point of a constitution if it cannot be respected? Why stipulate term limits when the constitution can be changed to allow as many terms as the incumbent desires?

At any time in Africa, incumbents are fighting to hang on to power (maintain the status quo), while the opposition plots to gain power (revisionists fighting to change the status quo). In effect, two counter waves are blowing through Africa, one of hope in the toppling of long-established regimes as seen in Sudan and Algeria and one of despair in the already too familiar manoeuvres of African leaders to perpetuate their stay in power. This is similar to the observations made by Ibrahim (2003, 3) in the study of democracy in Anglophone West Africa. Again, these conflicting waves embody significant security implications as it inspires rebellions to remove ageing leads and rebellions to resist leaders trying to perpetuate themselves.

Mass protests with fatalities were witnessed in Benin, Togo, Sudan and continuous repression in Uganda Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt (to name a few). Inevitable change is imminent in some of these countries as the current crop of leaders age. The consequences of protests and the anarchy created by the departing leaders are argued to be an inherent governmental source of national security challenges to African security.

The Absence of Democracy This book argues that the apparent democratic wave witnessed in the 1990s is in most part dictocracy rather than democracy. It is asserted that genuine change towards democracy is limited. The age-old governance issues persist while dictocracy is used to postpone issues than resolve them. However, dictocracy does not work always. When dictocracy and repression fails, the incumbent has to step down. This transition period holds significant security challenges, as argued by Posen (1993) in his security dilemma theory of ethnic conflict.

It is argued that franchised dictocracy is not sustainable for democracy nor security. The dictocracies and franchised dictocracies of Africa lack the socio-economic development proposed by Lipset (1959) and the

institutions proposed by Huntington (1996). The coup against Mohamed Morsi (former president of Egypt) and his subsequent death in Court (from deteriorated health with arguments that his detention conditions contribute) is definite proof of the fragility of franchised dictocracies. This fragility makes it possible for the rebellion discussed by Collier and Hoeffler (2002). In other words, franchised dictocracies (as seen in most African states) are detrimental to long-term national security. It lacks the institutional framework to sustain the type of democracy consistent with the thinking in the democratic peace thesis. In summary, the government and governance continue to be a source of inherent security challenges in Africa.

Small Elite Pool The narrow elite pool invariably leads to tensions between maintaining the status quo and forces which seek to revise the status quo. In this context, the status quo refers to the form of government favoured by the elite who preside over it. Revisionists are emerging elite, who may or may not have risen through the formal structures of government. These elite are locked out of power by the incumbent. They seek to revise the status quo so that a role for them is created in the new version of the status quo.

It is argued that revisionism met with resistance from the status quo is an inherent source of conflict in Africa. The case of Ambazonia in Cameroon and rebel groups in the Central African Republic are just a few examples of a broader problem across Africa. As states refuse to change voluntarily, the problem is bound to exacerbate not relent. Similar to the argument in International Relations theory, the tension between status quo powers and revisionist powers hold significant international security implications. Status quo versus revisionists competition applies to the national security context.

An extremely severe consequence of revisionism is the vicious cycles it unleashes. Wars initiated by revisionism and incumbent resistance will necessitate the establishment of a strongman for stability and peace (Rwanda); in the long run, this will, in turn, inspire new revisionism and incumbent resistance, which will eventually lead to war again, and the cycle continues. It is, therefore, concluded that revisionism and incumbent resistance would continue to be a significant source of conflict in Africa. Opportunist political entrepreneurs use such reality to exploit Africa for personal gain.

Militarism The challenges faced by African governments and governance, as shown above, means that many African governments rely on force to keep their countries together and themselves in power. The inequality emphasised by the small size of the African elite means the majority will always want to revise the status quo. This constant threat forces African governments to use the military in politics. As indicated above, the use of the military in politics predisposes these governments to intimidation, brutality and widespread violence. Such practices create grievances, radicalises and feed new conflicts. Militarism also means that peaceful means of changing governments are limited. An opportunity to change the incumbent always holds some violence in these circumstances.

Paradoxically, militarism also requires coup-proofing strategies which ultimately weaken the army and other government institutions in the long term. The military weakness and consequent government and institutional weakness make the probability of rebellion even more likely (Bausch 2018). In a militarised state, the constant tension created by the risk of actual rebellion and preparation against rebellion constitute an inherent national security challenge.

Africa Lacks a Security Sector Despite the militarism discussed in this chapter, a security sector is still substantially underdeveloped. For example, for most African states, military spending is abysmal. Furthermore, most spending is on expenditure (not investment). The biggest African military spender spends 1/1000th of US spending (IISS 2019). Without the ability to provide meaningful security, the level of stability needed to provide other forms of security will not be possible. The lack of a military-industrial complex in itself is an inherent challenge to African security. This is because adequate security provision in Africa always relies on external supplies. When other states play politics with supplies, outcomes of conflict may arise, which are not preferred by the parties in conflict.

Generally Weak Governments African governments (though often referred to as states in existing literature) are described as weak, fragile, failing or failed. Eight out of the ten most fragile states (governments) in the world (according to the World Bank) are in Africa (Hendricks and Keïta 2017). African governments cannot provide the services needed by its people. It also cannot provide the security which is needed to create an investment

climate that could create the resources which can be taxed to provide better public services.

External Interference While in principle states are not supposed to infer in the internal affairs of other states, in practice states are always interested in what happens in other states. For various reasons, states and international corporations show an interest in one leader and not the other (Pevehouse and Goldstein 2017, 135). As a critical source of strategic resources for global powers, what happens in African governance remains of prime importance to states outside Africa. Interference in the natural evolution of African politics (since the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism) continues to constitute a significant inherent and contemporary threat to African security.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the historical and contemporary context of governance in Africa to expose the political culture that shape governance in Africa. It argued that governance in Africa is generally authoritarian. In the authoritarian context, there are constant tensions between the governed and the government exposing the state and the individual to several security challenges.

It asserted that due to multicultural or ethnic nature of African states, governance is always contested as different groups within the state may have different governance traditions. Furthermore, due to the fact that Africa is a source of strategic resources for global power, interference into African governance is common. This impedes indigenous political development in general. Militarism is a common characteristic of African governance as incumbents fight to stay in power or revisionists fight to take power. These governance circumstances create inherent challenges to African security.

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CHAPTER 6

The Political Economy of Africa and Its Security Implications

Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the societal and political issues inherent to African states. It was argued that these issues have the potential to create national security challenges. While for analysis basis, these issues can be isolated and discussed separately, in reality, security challenges are often caused by a combination of factors. In effect, this chapter investigates economic factors which affect security in Africa. However, it is made clear that the economic issues are related to the issues discussed in earlier chapters. It is a medley of these issues based on the specific circumstances of each state which challenge security (cause war).

For most African countries, security issues are linked to economics or the economy. Resources in Africa are often referred to as a curse. Competition over access to resources continues to be a top source of violent conflict in Africa. Africa is disproportionately affected by poverty (defined as 'a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services' (Shinn 2016, 16)). The metric often used to measure the population affected by poverty, is the amount of dollars spent per day (the section of the population that lives on less than 2 dollars per day, is the poor section).

This chapter argues that the nature of the African political economy predisposes it to adverse economic outcomes (slow growth and income,

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_6

extractive activity by the elite and exploitation by externals). This economic dispensation does not promote security, and it feeds into political governance and societal issues that exacerbate security challenges (Blomberg and Hess 2002, 76). Economic growth does not sufficiently produce meaningful jobs or create the necessary government revenue to provide necessary public services.

Conflict Literature and Economics

Literature which associates economic factors to conflict continues to grow. Individual and group rational behaviour in competition for resources or means to resources is argued to determine the incidence or scale of civil war or inter-state war. Scholars use different economic variables and models to analyse conflicts relating to economic gains or losses (for individuals or groups) (Sandler 2000). Some of this literature which applies this approach includes Blomberg and Hess 2002; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier 2000, 2007; Hirshleifer 2000; Levine and Smith 2000; McGuire and Olson 1996; Sandler 2000; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Wittman 2000. The essence of this section is to explore some of this literature to identify the key trends that can be applied to the political economy of subsequent sections to highlight the economic sources of inherent and contemporary security challenges to African security.

Economic theories of civil war focus mainly on resource scarcity (the impact of socio-economic factors) and level of economic development on the onset, scale and duration of the conflict. Many economic models have confirmed the relationship between poverty, slow economic growth and a higher probability of the onset of civil war. It is noted that states with higher per capita income are less likely to experience civil war, while the reverse is true for states with lower per capita income (Blomberg and Hess 2002; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Hendricks and Keïta 2017). In other words, more intense resource scarcity means more intense competition for resources. Competition heightens the risk of conflict (Collier and Sambanis 2002, 6).

Several studies identify greed as an essential motivation for war (especially war in Africa). It contended that groups rebel against the government due to rational calculation of material gains they may acquire by taking control of the government or sites of natural resources controlled by the government. In this line of thinking, it is argued that greed needs an opportunity. The availability of natural resource, the weakness of a government's military, the existence of a grievance to exploit, a charismatic

opposition leader and start-up capital all provide the opportunity for the actors motivated by greed to pounce (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Gurr 1994; Lichbach 1984; Moore 1998; Ellingsen 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). To Collier and Sambanis (2002), opportunity is more important to the onset of war than real grievances (2002, 5).

An important observation made by Collier (2000) which is particularly relevant to Africa is the relationship between the availability of natural resources and conflict. The availability of natural resource provides the circumstance that these resources are there to be looted by individuals or groups with the power to do so. The availability of 'lootable' resources in itself is a security threat, since the process of doing so may involve violence. There are many examples of organised crime groups, predatory MNCs and governments who create violence in the exploitation of natural resources in Africa, hence the phrase 'resource curse'. Because rebel groups can acquire financial gains from resources, then use this finance to control the resources, which maximises rewards for rebellion. Potential enrichment from natural resource rents provides a strong incentive for rebellion in resource-rich African states. In other words, the incentive to rebel is stronger in resource-rich African states and hence a high likelihood of civil war.

Secondly, the availability of natural resources distorts the economy of many African states. It divides the economy into two economies; there is the economy where goods and services are produced and exchanged (the entrepreneurial economy), then there is the economy of harvesting natural resources for rents (rentier economy). For most African states, the extraction of natural resources is more capital intensive and of less concern to the general public. The rents collected on these resources are used by the elite to buy support or buy off opponents. In effect, the incumbent can focus more spending on repression technologies rather than providing service to the masses. In such circumstance, the elite can afford to ignore popular demands using force (using prepared armies). The freedom for the elite is because the elite has enough money from natural resources outside of the entrepreneurial (non-extractive) economy (Collier 2000, 840).

In economies not distorted by natural resources, the focus of the economy is on the creative entrepreneurial activities of individuals and firms. It is, therefore, crucial to the government to provide the necessary environment for investment and prosperity as this will provide more revenue for

the treasury through taxes. Should the elite choose to loot the treasury, they have enough to loot as indicated in the banditry analogy provided by McGuire and Olson (1996, 72). However, there is the balancing mechanism that if a regime appropriates too much, there will not be enough money to provide the services that made the wealth creation possible in the first place. In those circumstances, the population may rebel. Rebellion, in turn, necessitates the use of resources for repression, which leaves both the regime and the population worse off. In other words, in such systems, too much appropriation is counterproductive (Sandler 2000, 724).

Blomberg and Hess (2002), find that there is a negative relationship between economic growth and civil war. They argue that weak growth or decline in growth makes the incidence of war more likely. As will be shown in sections below, economic growth continues to be challenging for most African states. Different constraints put pressure on economic growth. These pressures include mismanagement, population growth, capital-intensive extractive activities, predatory elite, lack of secure property rights, low life expectancy and a high birth rate (McGuire and Olson 1996, 73). These factors hold down the economy, which creates a higher probability of civil war. Civil war itself also exacerbate these pressures, reducing economic growth, which further increases the likelihood of war (2002, 75). In other words, poor economic performance leads to war, and war leads to poor economic performance. It has been argued that a history of civil war increases the probability of a repeat of war (Collier and Hoeffler 2002).

Wittman (2000) focuses on the geographical and population size of a state. It is argued that there is a territorial and population size necessary for the economics of scale needed to expand an economy. If a country is too small in terms of population, it may not be able to sustain the economies of scale needed to finance security. Insecurity, as a result of the lack of finance, further exacerbates the poor security situation. The lack of finance further makes it even more challenging to build a growing economy.

Wittman also argues that multi-ethnic groups such as those in African states may have a diverse preference that inhibits economies of scale, albeit with a bigger total population of such a state. Wittman notes that the cost of inter-group economic activities could be a hindrance to economic growth. In the specific case of African economies, intra-African trade is full of barriers. Trade barriers make it costly for African states to trade with each other. However, the African Union has recently launched an African-wide free trade zone (African Union 2019).

The Political Economy of Africa

At the heart of the political economy of Africa are its geography, its politics and its history. The current political map of Africa reflects its colonial history. It is divided into 44 different countries. These countries retain economic and political systems instituted by their former colonial masters (European imperial powers, mainly France, Britain and Portugal). Africa is (mostly) sparingly populated. Even with its growing populations, Africa remains one of the least densely populated continents on earth. It will be shown below that the small geographic and population size of some countries predisposes these countries to tough economic conditions. Geography, population and resources, and how to grow and allocate these resources are crucial to Africa's political economy.

The history of modern African economy goes back to the slave trade and earlier general trading with Europe and Arabia. Intra-African, intra-tribal and inter-tribal slave trades existed in Africa before the trans-Saharan slave trade. The use of slaves in production in Africa predated both the trans-Sahara and trans-Atlantic slave trade (Alexander 2001). In other words, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was in some ways the globalisation of the African political economy. With the rise of mass plantation in the Americas, Africa became the primary source of labour to power agriculture, which was at the centre of the global economy at the time.

It can also be argued that European imperialism furthered the integration of Africa in to the global economy. Africa was divided into territories belonging to European imperial powers. The focus was much on the territory itself and the resources that can be extracted from those territories. Essential to this partitioning of Africa were economic and strategic interests for the imperial powers. The disparate polities left behind by colonialism in itself constituted significant artificial trade barriers. This is pointedly detrimental to the economies of independent African states.

European imperialism designed African economies to be extractive. The nature of these economies principally benefited the metropole (the imperial powers). It served mainly as a source of natural resources and cash crops. Most economic activities were (and is, in many cases) organised to serve a specific purpose for the bigger economy of the metropole. In this

regard, mono-crop economies were common in Africa. African states gained independence with these constraints to their economies. Reorienting their economies to meet their own needs rather than those of the former imperial powers is a challenge that African states are still dealing with today.

For over 50 years, the artificial trade barriers (official international boundaries) and the extractive orientation of the economies are particularly stubborn to disappear. Since the integration of the African economy into the global economy through slavery and imperialism, Marxists argue that the structure of the international economic system is skewed against Africa and other post-independence states. In fact, in discussions of poverty in Africa, there is often the argument that there are 'global causes of local poverty' (Jones 2005, 987). Disparate, ill-suited political and economic institutions have been argued to be part of the reasons of the retarded economic progress witnessed in Africa (especially from independence in the 1960s to the 1990s) (Collier 2007).

Considering the framework from which most African states came to existence and integrated into the global economy, most African economies are relatively underdeveloped. Consequently, most African economies are dominated by agriculture and the extractive industries. Most other economic activity is related or dependent on these two primary industries. The economies suffer from a low industrial base, inadequate diversification, low use of technology, import of finished goods and export of raw materials. Most economic activity is subsistence and small scale. The different economic sectors are poorly integrated. As indicated above, trade with neighbours is full of official obstacles.

Within the constraints of colonial heritage and the Cold War ideological context of the 1960s and 1970s, the newly independent African states were engaged in different economic experiments. Countries such as Ghana and Tanzania embarked on a socialist's approach. Attempts at socialism later proved to be a miscalculation with detrimental economic consequences. The Francophone African states stayed aligned to the French economy with mixed economic systems. Most of these states maintained a significant role for the state in their economies with often poor performing state or parastatal corporations. The added burden of the overvalued *Communaute Financière d'Afrique* franc (CFA franc) guaranteed long-term economic difficulties for these states.

Most of the Lusophone states did not emerge out of colonialism at the same time (in the 1960s) as most of Africa did. Instead, they were plunged into devastating civil wars which prevented them from constructing any meaningful economic base. The civil wars destroyed assets, the business environment, plundered resources and sow the seed for future conflict (as it has been argued that a history of civil war makes the onset of civil war more likely).

The North African economies were made up of a mixture of capitalism (state capitalism, crony capitalism and a degree of free private capitalism) and a degree of command systems. In the Southern Africa, countries were dominated by political problems linked to apartheid South Africa. Interference by apartheid South Africa into the political and economic affairs determined to show that black Africans were incapable of ruling themselves contributed significantly to disrupting economic progress in that region.

In general terms, most African states experiment with different combinations of socialism and capitalism with few free capitalist states. The exceptions were South Africa and some of the North African states. As a result, most Africa economies struggled and lagged behind other regions of the world, throughout the 1960s to the 1990s. Only from the 2000s that some progress on the continent was seen.

Natural resources loom large in the political economy of Africa. The abundance of natural resources in Africa has been linked to high macroeconomic volatility. Volatility has implication to growth and, consequently, economic security. A study showed that since the discovery of oil, Nigeria has been among the 10 most volatile economies in the world (Collier 2007, 16765). The discovery of oil in Nigeria has led to the decline of non-oil sectors such as agricultural with devastating effects on livelihoods and food security. Furthermore, the presence of natural resources encourages political entrepreneurship to control the government to control the rents from these resources. It is argued that this has contributed to the high political violence experienced by countries such as Nigeria.

Even in the so-called age of democracy in Africa, evidence has been shown that windfalls from natural resources have tended to provide cash for the elite to use to pervert democracy (Collier 2007, 16765). The buying of votes in countries such as oil-rich Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea has become an art form. The natural resource curse seems to follow Africa into every aspect of society. The previous chapter has already

made the argument that lack of democracy or a proper means of selecting leaders (who serve the interest of the many, not the few) is an inherent security threat. It follows here that the rentier nature of the African economy does not help the situation.

The Congo is an embodiment of the resource curse Africa has come to be known for. Abundant natural resource in the DRC means that there is extensive internal and external competition for control or access to the Congo's strategic natural resources. There is significant interest from disparate armed groups from within the DRC. Due to the availability of strategic minerals (such as nuclear materials and vital metals needed for the electronic economy), major global states such as China, the USA, France, Great Britain, India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Russia are all interested in the internal affairs of the DRC.

The interest in the internal affairs of the DRC is not limited to states; there is also significant interest from non-state actors including terrorist and organised crime groups. Indeed, at some stage, the financing of Al-Qaeda came from the smuggling of precious metals from the Congo Sierra Leone and Liberia with the help of states such as Liberia, Burkina Faso and Sudan (Carney 2005). ISIS is currently present in the DRC mostly for the resources it can loot to fund its global jihad (Callimachi 2019). Predatory Multinational Corporations continue to operate in the DRC with damaging consequences to the environment and security.

The use of income from natural resources to subvert democracy and proper functioning of institutions constitutes an inherent security threat as it feeds into all the issues discussed in earlier chapters and subsequent chapters of this book. The intersection of natural resource income, the environment to which these natural resources are derived, the people of which the natural resource originate from their subsoils and the politics which manages these natural resources is key to the understanding of inherent national and regional security challenges facing contemporary Africa.

About 18 African states have a population of fewer than 5 million people. Among the 18, about 10 states have a population less than 2 million. In other words, there are 10 African states whose combined population is less than that of Beijing, for example. Five African states, namely, Djibouti, Réunion, Comoros, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, have population less than a million people. Close to half of Africa's population is located in only five countries, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, the DRC and Tanzania.

It has been argued that while the size of the population is not necessary for a country to be rich, sustained development as the level needed to transform African economies to provide its needs requires economies of scale. Furthermore, it is argued that the risk of state collapse due to economic reforms is higher in states with smaller populations (Collier 2007, 16766). Africa is bigger than the USA, most of Central and Eastern Europe, India, Japan and China combined. However, there are more people in India alone than there are in the entire continent of Africa. A small population also means a shortage of the necessary skills needed for a diverse and vibrant economy. The bite-size nature of African states makes economies of scale extremely difficult to achieve.

As a result of the structural challenges left behind by colonialism, poor policy and management from early African economic leaders and neocolonialism, economic performance continues to be abysmal in Africa (Collier 2007, 16765). Nonetheless, in terms of GDP growth, for more than a decade now, some African countries have registered significant growth rates. However, growth on the continent remains uneven. Most of the growth stories in Africa are restricted to a few countries.

Smaller economies and some non-resource intensive states such as Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda continue to grow at record levels (over 6 per cent). As a result, it is often overquoted that some of the fastest growing economies in the world are in Africa. Indeed, this growth is the basis for the 'Africa rising' narrative. Considering the characteristically uneven nature of growth in Africa and from a security perspective, it leaves the question of whether propagating the 'Africa rising' narrative is good for Africa or not?

In addition, Africa's large economies such as Angola, Nigeria and South Africa are growing below the levels required for sustained changes in living standards. These are economies which were 'once hailed as engines of growth' (IMF 2019). Also, the relationship between GDP growth and employment has been shown to be weak in countries such as Kenya (Kimenyi et al. 2016, 136) Furthermore, the continent is growing from a shallow base (Pillay 2015, 60), and population growth continues to be among the highest in the world. In effect, the level of economic growth needed to meet Africa's challenges is not witnessed in most countries in Africa.

The IMF (2019) argues that the African economy as a whole is generally characterised by inadequate human capital despite population growth.

For example, while there is significant variation from country to country, the average years of schooling in sub-Saharan Africa are among the lowest in the world. Also, the African economy is characterised by low labour productivity. The African economy is in general terms an economy dominated by the informal sector. Informal economic actors continue to experience limited access to resources such as land, electricity and finance. Firms in African economies also suffer from a high regulatory burden, weak governance, bad business environment and uncertainty. All of these factors conspire to retard economic growth and development.

In security terms, the 'Africa rising' narrative can be problematic. A generalised narrative without acknowledging the uneven nature of economic growth in Africa can lead to the assumption that all is well everywhere. Unfortunately, conflict or insecurity can be contagious. Even an economy that is doing well may be subject to security problems emanating from other countries. To assume that Africa (as a whole) is rising, because of a few states, may give the impression that Africa can address its security challenges when in truth most of the African states cannot afford to finance their security. It is also argued that the 'Africa rising' narrative draws Africans into a false promise of development and decent livelihoods which current levels of economic growth can never provide. When the promise is not fulfilled, protests, rioting and armed rebellion may become options. Such conditions may have severe national security implications.

Uneven growth is not an issue that only exists between different countries; it also exists between different regions within the same country. Some regions in Nigeria, for example, are more prosperous than others. The economy of Lagos state continues to grow at a disproportionate rate compared to that of Borno or Imo state. The Lagos' economy is bigger than that of most African states. In other words, if Lagos was a state, it will be the seventh biggest economy in Africa. Bigger than the economy of Kenya, which is the biggest economy in East Africa (Pilling 2018).

Considering that regions with Nigeria or other African states are always linked to ethnicity and religion, this type of uneven growth is also linked to the societal security issues discussed in previous chapters. Uneven growth also means uneven development. The disparity in development creates disparities between living standards and livelihoods within the same country. The more prosperous areas enjoy better living standards, facilities, amenities and opportunities.

Due to the links between ethnicity regions, economic opportunity and living standards can also be divided along ethnic lines. Consequently, Africa

continues to have some of the most unequal societies on earth. South Africa, for example, is the most unequal nation on earth (Pillay 2015, 69). The uneven or enclave development (Pillay 2015, 63) creates tier systems within the population. These tiers of ethnicities can inspire hatreds and eventual conflict when the opportunity arises.

While Africa has registered a high level of GDP growth continentally, it has also consistently maintained high levels of current account deficits which continue to grow. For example, Kenya, a relative vibrant African economy, maintained a current account deficit of 1.75 per cent in 2006. However, in 2015, the current account deficit has risen to 10.8 per cent (close to tenfold rise) (Kimenyi et al. 2016). The fact that Africa's imports continue to outpace its exports creates significant structural problems that prevent some economies from reaping the full benefits of their GDP growth. In the case of Kenya, the current account deficit is financed by short-term capital inflows, which are argued to expose the Kenyan economy to external vulnerabilities.

The Vicious Cycle of Economic Challenges and (In)security

This section outlines the economic factors related to inherent cases of war in Africa. It is argued that these factors are critical to contemporary challenges to African security. They are drawn from the theoretical and actual analysis of Africa's political economy in the above sections.

Colonial Legacy As discussed above, the nature of the integration of Africa into the global economy through imperialism predisposes African economies with structural challenges which continue to hinder economic progress with national security implications. One of the legacies of colonialism is the concentration on primary product production and the extractive orientation of African economies. This colonial legacy burdens Africa with economies, which were little more than mono-crop economies (in some cases) or a few product economies. Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are more or less petro-economies.

Since independence, these economies continue to struggle with diversification. Economic self-sufficiency as a source of security is far from reality for most African states. The lack of diversity in African economies exposes them to international price volatility and an unbalanced economy.

This furthers the dependency that imperialism created between the core and periphery states.

Inability to Achieve Economies of Scale As shown above, the territorial focus in the founding of colonial possessions in Africa disadvantaged Africa in the determination to create post-independence 'nation-state' economies. The lack of economies of scale translates to small, less productive and weaker growth. Consequently, the human development factors reliant on the economy are generally weak in Africa. Also, the weak economies cannot produce the level of finance needed for the development of traditional security (military sector). Collier (2007) argues that 'a typical African state is too small to provide internal security unless other conditions are benign.' This is argued to be the reason why Africa experiences more civil war than Asian states or other developing parts of the world (Collier 2007, 16766). An inability to achieve significant economies of scale, therefore, constitutes an inherent security challenge to contemporary Africa.

Economic Growth While African countries have been among some of the fastest growing economies in the world, it is noted that the high rates of growth are due to small base (Pillay 2015, 60; Kimenyi et al. 2016, 112). Indeed, the GDP of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is projected to grow at 3.4 per cent for 2019. While this represents recovery from the downtown that started in 2015, the level of economic growth needed to meet Africa's challenges is not yet achieved for most African economies. In other words, African economic growth is not sufficient to finance both traditional and human security. As indicated above, an economic system creates the means to pay for the political and security systems. When the economic systems lack the level of growth needed to pay for the other systems, the entire overarching state system is challenged.

Economic security can be considered a key indicator as to the general security of a state. Poor economic performance (as seen in Africa for many decades) progressively reduces the power of that state. It also increases vulnerability to those states that have excellent economic performance. For example, Buzan argues that it was good economic performance that gave Europe the edge over other civilisations in the 1500s. It could also be

witnessed in the shift of balance between Japan and China, North versus South Korea and likewise in North and South America (Buzan 1991, 242). It could also be argued that economic weakness in the Soviet Union emboldened states within Communist Block to declare independence, precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Economic growth provides both economic security and finance for national security (in the traditional sense). When developed countries and African countries are compared, it is clear that with economic security, national security becomes easier to achieve. Indeed, the poor economic performance of African countries encourages opportunistic internal and external groups to rival the government for better management of the state. Equatorial Guinea witnessed a situation where armed mercenaries attempted a coup d'état to replace the government, which they argued was not performing well. The ringleader of the coup, Simon Mann used the words, 'things were diabolically bad here, and a regime change was a crying need…. the regime was faltering, in a state of collapse' (Mann 2011). Poor economic performance thus exposes African countries to 'vultures' (coup plotters) such as Simon Mann, with dire consequences on security.

Uneven Economic Growth Between States and Within States In line with the dependency theory suggestion of core and periphery states, uneven development within a country creates core regions and periphery regions within the same state (Pillay 2015, 66). The citizens or ethnic groups or religions which occupy the core regions (enjoying the economic and developmental benefits thereof) become some sort of superior citizens (higher tier) while those who inhabit the periphery regions become some sort of second tier citizens. This can create envy with potential security implications. Economic inequality between individuals, regions and states is part of the mix of inherent human and consequently human security challenges in Africa.

Poverty In terms of human security, it has already been argued above that the lack of means due to poor economic performance results in the poor provision of food, health and education. Lack of food or poor nutrition, for example, is linked to health issues such as stunted development among children. This creates cognitive challenges when these children become adults. It is possible such stunted adults may become easy recruits for organisations such as Boko Haram and other armed militias on the conti-

nent. Health conditions as a result of poverty also contribute to reducing the productivity of the economy which in effect further recreates the economic conditions which created the malaise in the first place.

Africa remains the poorest continent on earth, with 40 per cent of the population living on less than $1.25 per day (IMF 2019, 18). While it is argued that the middle class of Africa is growing, the middle class is considered to be individuals who live on over $2 a day (Pillay 2015, 69). This is significantly low.

As pointed out above, scholars have argued that scarcity and scarcity caused by conflict and the history of conflict are significant factors to the conflict in Africa. Civil wars (of which Africa has experienced many) 'impose immeasurable human suffering and large economic and social costs' (IMF 2019, 25).

Security-Development Nexus It is essential to discuss development or the security-development-nexus separately from poverty (and other issues) above because it is vital to capture the aspirational aspect of development. The definition of security provided in Chap. 3 of this book emphasised the importance of 'freedom to'. Discussions of poverty as security threat focus mostly on the absolute deprivation (want) aspect of poverty. This approach emphasises both the 'freedom from want and freedom to pursue cherished goals'. This argument is why development or the lack thereof is crucial to African security.

Quoting (Nisbet, 1980), Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal define development as 'a process of biological evolution, signifying the ultimate fulfilling of the process of becoming what one is supposed to be' (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 11). Nexus means connection, tie or link. For African states and individuals, development is more of a determination to achieve progress. In other words, it is a determination to achieve levels of development and standard of living only imagined.

The catch 22 for African states is that states need a minimum level of security to harness the conditions necessary for development. Similarly, individuals within states need a level of security to nurse and strive to achieve their dreams of better living conditions. As shown above, for a plethora of reasons, Africans and African states are predisposed to an environment which does not provide the basic security needed to pursue

more security. Instead, states and individuals are prone to insecurity, which begets more insecurity. For both states and individuals, the juncture through which the conditions for security mutually reinforce those for development and progress is referred to as the security-development nexus (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 17).

Proponents of the human security concept argue that human security is intrinsically linked to development. Security is necessary for development and development is necessary for security. As will be shown in the succeeding chapter, security and development issues and policies, both external and local, shape the context or environment in which security happens. Approaching the production of security as an emergent property of a system, it becomes clear how everything feeds into everything. In some sort of feedback loops, development issues feed into security issues and vice versa. The outcome of the interaction of these issues from the different systems (political, economic, environment or military) is not always linear. Emergent chaos is a possibility (Lekunze 2019).

Historical Incidents of Civil War War causes the destabilisation (displacement of labour) of human resources (capital), the destruction of physical infrastructures such as road and bridges. The political instability ushered in by war dissuades investment and long-term planning and disrupts normal business operation patterns. This affects productivity and trade. Most African economies often rely on the extraction of raw materials or the export of agriculture products.

Most of the primary product export economies of Africa rely on road, rail, seaport and airport infrastructure. Often the supply routes may rely on more than one of these infrastructure types. It is actually a war strategy for rebel groups in African to attack crucial bridges, seaports and airports. In other words, part of the rebel strategy is always to attack vital infrastructure in order to cripple the government or bring them to the negotiation table. If, for example, rebels destroy a bridge on a major route that helps transport cargo to the airport or seaport, products cannot leave a region or country. The interruption in trade has significant detrimental effects on the economy as a whole.

The interruption of trade routes is common among rebel groups in the DRC. In the war in Cameroon between the Anglophone separatist and the Cameroonian government, key routes have often been blocked. Important agriculture corporations have been forced to cease activities

due to attacks from the separatists. In the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin regions, ancient and traditional trade route vital to their economies are continually interrupted by terrorist activities from groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once more, economic challenges beget conflict and conflict begets economic problems.

Low Tax Revenue, High Debt and Fiscal Challenges As indicated above, African governments are generally weak. They lack the capacity to collect taxes. Due to the disproportionate high activities in the informal sector, corruption, activities of predatory organised crime groups, clever tax avoidance and evasion scheme of MNCs, significant revenue is lost by African states. The generally poor performance of the economies also means there is little revenue to be collected in the first place.

High intensity conflict (which has been prevalent in some African countries) can decrease tax revenues by up to 10 per cent relative to non-conflicted affected countries (IMF 2019, 26). Increasing military spending due to conflict means the little that is collected is depleted on the military. By implication, more borrowing is needed to perform the role of the government.

As shown above, low revenue leads to more borrowing. In Africa in general, the debt to GDP ratios, in 2018 rose in more than half of sub-Saharan countries. In a third of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the debt to GDP ratio was above 60 per cent (IMF 2019). These debts are generally owed to organisations and states which may have political interests. In effect, interference into the internal affairs of Africa is pronounced, perhaps more than any other region of the world. As shown in previous chapters, it can be argued that many African states lost their sovereignty to the IMF and the World Bank (which are proxies of their powerful states who are their shareholders) in the structural adjustment programmes.

The political instability and weak GDP growth caused by conflict ensure that terms of borrowing are less favourable. High interest from non-concessionary borrowing contributes to the high cost of debt. This leads to the high cost of national debt servicing. The servicing of expensive national debt creates an extra burden on the economy. Managing debt in general terms is a challenge to many African states. In fact, the IMF argues that in conflict-affected countries, there is an average increase of 9 per cent in the ratio of public debt to GDP (IMF 2019, 35). More debt and expen-

sive debt servicing further causes the deterioration of the fiscal position. Such a condition weakens the economy, sparking more competition for means of survival. Such competition, again, leads to conflict, which further exacerbates the unfavourable economic conditions. Unfavourable conditions spark conflict. This condition sets in the famous 'debt trap'. This book argues that such a condition is an inherent challenge to African security.

If anything is synonymous to post-colonial African governance, it is fiscal difficulties. Fiscal challenges have a direct impact on war and war, in turn, a direct impact on the fiscal health of a state. A weak fiscal position makes it difficult for most African states to perform their duties as other states in the world. As argued in the previous chapter, many African governments are argued to be weak. This weakness is mostly due to the weakness of fiscal health. In effect, war is more likely due to the weakness of the government.

A war which may have arisen due to fiscal challenges, among other factors, creates physical challenges to tax collection. The killing of humans and destruction of economic activity that occurs in high intensity wars literally depletes the tax base. The political instability caused by war reduces the efficiency of tax administration. The emergency of war can lead to the suspension of inculcated fiscal prudence procedures. Furthermore, war also diverts government spending away from capital spending (investment) to military spending (expenditure). Indeed, 'an increase in conflict intensity is associated with, on average, 9 per cent higher real budgetary military spending (or about 0.6 per cent of GDP), while real capital expenditures decrease by about 9 per cent' (IMF 2019, 35).

In summary, considering how dependent security is on money, it, therefore, stands to reason that the production and experience of security are much influenced by the general circumstances of the political economy of Africa. Consequently, it can be argued that a state is made up of three primary (macro) systems. These systems include an economic system (that creates means), a political system (that allocates means) and a security system (that secures the means).

Pivotally, all the other systems are paid for by the economic system. In other words, whether it is traditional or human security, a vibrant economy is needed to pay for it. While economic issues could be security issues on their own right, it is imperative to underscore the link between economics and all other security sectors and issues, ranging from health to

war. It has already been pointed out the 'politics of the belly' constitutes a significant component of conflict in Africa.

Poor Education Many studies in Africa have linked poor education to conflict. It has been argued that the availability of cheap labour (poor or non-educated labour) is one of the causes of the onset of war in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). It has also been recorded that in conflict-affected countries, primary school enrolment for females is 13 percentage points lower than in countries not affected by conflict. For males, it is nine percentage points lower in conflict-affected countries than in countries not affected by conflict. Again, less primary school enrolment means, a greater supply of cheap uneducated labour. This is a catalyst for conflict. Conflict creates low enrolment rates; low enrolment rates create cheap labour needed for the onset of war. The vicious cycle continues. Such issues are what this book refers to as inherent security challenges for Africa. How to break these cycles remains the holy grail for African security.

High Population Growth Furthermore, population growth in Africa continues to be among the highest in the world. While populations in the developed are ageing, the majority of Africans are under the age of 35. Africa's 'youth bulge' (population between 15 years and 35) is the biggest section of the population. It has also been shown that Africa's GDP growth creates significant inequality among its growing population.

The youth bulge offers both challenges and opportunities. The question is whether this youthful section of the population will become the workers and entrepreneurs to grow Africa's economy, or will they become ready recruits of rebellions and terrorism? Or will they continue to leave Africa to inspire nationalism and racism in other parts of the world? Most people in Africa are employed in the informal sector. In most cases, the work is casual, contracts are temporal and there is little protection for labour. The fight by companies to keep the cost of labour low and to attract investment creates precarious conditions for labour, as shown in Kenya (Kimenyi et al. 2016, 127).

The large population continues to make it more difficult for the economy to provide the needs of society. This has profound effects on development and related security issues. In other words, the limited economic resources create an environment of competition that may result in conflict. In search of stability to enable natural resource extraction, author-

itarian regimes are encouraged to maintain the status quo through neo-patrimonialism. On the other hand, the lack of opportunity for a growing youthful population and rapid urbanisation without appropriate amenities encourages revisionism to allow new people into the system. The dynamics from these intricate relations constitute a significant security threat.

How to grow Africa's economy to enable it to provide opportunities to its mostly young and growing population is in some views one of the biggest challenges facing Africa (and the world to a large extent). It has many implications, one of which is migration (intra-national migration, including the issue of IDPs, Intra-continental migration and inter-continental migration). This chapter conceptualises migration as mainly a consequence of poor economic performance in Africa. The issue of migration is fuelling xenophobia in Africa and nationalism in Europe and North America.

External Dependency and Exploitation Economic dependency exposes many African states to external price fluctuations, crippling foreign debt, excessive foreign interference and the undermining of sovereignty. The pegging of the CFA franc to the Euro, for instance, unnecessarily exposes many Francophone African states to economic threats in the Eurozone which they have no control over (The Economist 2018).

Abundant Natural Resource The literature on economics and conflicts discussed above highlights the economic and governmental distortions caused by the abundance of natural resources. In cases such as Nigeria, it has been clear that the discovery of oil led to the Dutch disease (a situation where other industry declines thanks to the discovery and development of other industries). The re-orientation of economies towards specific natural resource extraction, such as the case of Nigeria, is not beneficial to the whole economy in the long term. This phenomenon is an inherent and contemporary security challenge to most natural resources endowed African states such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Zambia and the DRC.

Natural resources help African governments to circumvent the constraints put on governments who rely on taxes emanating from the entrepreneurial economy (as discussed above). This is because they rely on rent from natural resources to finance their repression technologies. They do not rely on the productivity of the economy (labour of the masses) as the extractive processes of natural resources are generally capital rather

than labour intensive (Sandler 2000, 724). Taxes collected from the entrepreneurial economy are a bonus. It is argued that in some countries such as Cameroon, the business environment is deliberately made hostile to prevent income outside of government patronage. In that way, the government keeps tabs on who has enough money to do what.

Uneven Distribution of Resources The ratio of natural resources to population is high in Africa. However, these resources are not evenly distributed to all countries. The disparity in geography and distribution of natural resources (as basic as water) pose different challenges to different countries making economic prosperity extremely challenging.

Dispossession One of the legacies of colonialism in Africa is the extractive and agricultural nature of the economy. The expansion of extractive activity or farmland has often resulted in dispossession. Some economists describe such a phenomenon as 'accumulation by dispossession' (Pillay 2015, 63). African traditional livelihoods are often well embedded in specific areas and land. Their shrines and ancestral graveyards (with spiritual significance) are often located on this land. The expansion of a mine or a plantation in pursuit of GDP growth often disregards such considerations for local people. The pursuit of growth trumps every other consideration. Such a state of affairs creates grievance. The displaced people who move to new areas may cause conflict between the strangers and the locals, as discussed in other chapters of this book.

Landlocked Resource-Scarce States Due to its size, Africa is home to both landlocked and coastal states. Looking at growth globally, Collier (2007) argues that landlocked resource-scarce states have generally performed less than other categories of states such as coastal resource-rich or coastal resource-scarce states. In essence, natural and political geography is a determinant of economic prosperity. The lack of economic growth (or the unsatisfactory performance) in the landlocked resource-scarce states creates security implications which can be detrimental not only to themselves but also to their relatively good performing neighbouring coastal states (resource rich or resource scarce).

Economic Alienation Samir Amin (2014), a prominent Egyptian Marxist thinker, argues that economic 'alienation' is a specific form of capitalism that reproduces society in its entirety not only the economic system. Amin posits that the laws of value govern all social life in this society. In other words, the worth of a person is measured by his or her economic value. Such dehumanisation has pervasive implications for the value systems of previously traditional African societies. Money, for example, has come to replace other symbols of value. The pursuit thereof suppresses traditional morality. The pursuit of the rewards of a money economy has exploited and destroyed traditional values. In other words, the commodification of things that were otherwise not ascribed a monetary value is reshaping African society in a way yet to be understood (Pillay 2015, 62). The security implication of this transformation may not become apparent until when it is too late.

Absence of a Military-Industrial Complex The link between economic security and military security has been argued to be essential to security. It is submitted that it is easy to see that military security is dependent on economic security due to budget constraints and limits. Referring to mercantilism, Buzan posits that, poverty reduces the economic base for military strength (Buzan 1991, 236). On the one hand, industrialisation, which provides economic security, also provides financial, technological and a production foundation for military strength. In pursuit of economic self-reliance as a defence option, economic security is enhanced as a consequence (Buzan 1991, 236). On the other hand, the pursuit of military supplies creates a military-industrial complex (Ibid., 244), which in turn boosts the economy.

A healthy economy provides better living conditions for the people and more money for the military. This sets off a virtuous cycle of enhanced security and better opportunities for the individual. African countries lack the economic benefits of the military-industrial complex. Instead, they are heavily dependent on imports, foreign expertise and technology for the exploitation of their underdeveloped commodity-based economies and development of their militaries.

In other words, due to the lack of the military-industrial complex in Africa, most military necessities are imported. Indeed, military spending could instead drain resources from other sectors of the economy. Importing for the military creates fiscal and foreign currency challenges. It also cre-

ates problems with current account deficits and balance of trade distortions. The drain on foreign reserves can have an impact on the real economy with significant implications on economic and, consequently, national security.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered some of the literature that associates economics to war. It explored the crucial aspects of the political economy of Africa to identify the relevant factors to African security. Such an effort enabled the outline of inherent and contemporary security threats to African.

It was found that crucial economic factors (such as disruption of trade, lack of investment, political instability caused by conflict, weak fiscal position, lack of infrastructure due to destruction or diversion from capital spending to military spending, poverty and a lack of finance to provide services and finance security) all add up to impact the economy adversely (in GDP terms). Low growth leads to conflict and, in turn, conflict leads to low growth. This creates a vicious cycle of low growth and conflict. The average annual GDP growth in countries affected by conflict is 3 per cent less than countries free of conflict. The compounding effect of this translates to a decrease to real per capita GDP growth by 12 per cent over 5 years (IMF 2019, 30).

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CHAPTER 7

The Environment of Security in Africa: A Threat Multiplier

Introduction

It is argued that environmental security should not only focus on the natural ecology but rather the environment (or context) in which security happens (insecurity or security is produced). In other words, all the environmental factors which influence security. These includes the physical (territorial-chemical and biological), social infrastructure (at the individual level), the national institutional framework (at the state level), the intergovernmental institutional framework (at the regional level, e.g. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), AU, EU, etc.), the geopolitical environment of which all states inhabit and the emerging cyber environment (as a virtual extension of the real world or everything mentioned before).

It is contended that the environment in which security occurs is as essential to security outcomes as the actors involved. The environment shapes actors and events which, in turn, affect security outcomes. In this case, the different components of the security environment (mentioned above) become a crucial component of that security itself. In this light, issues relating to climate change, deforestation, desertification, loss of species, the ecology, global warming, melting glaciers, sea levels, institutional frameworks, geopolitics and technology become crucial security issues. However, the context of security is not a primary security issue (such as the greed, grievance, poverty and terrorism discussed in previous chapters)

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_7

but becomes a strategic security concern based on its ancillary role to primary security concerns (Allenby 2000).

In other words, environmental factors can either amplify or inhibit a conflict (enhance security or insecurity). For example, if the growth of bacteria is considered as a specific security issue, the introduction of the bacterium into a microbial culture multiplies the bacterium rapidly (speed and scale are enhanced). If the same bacterium is introduced into a sterile environment, it dies quickly (speed and scale are diminished). Because the bacterium or security threat is undesired, the microbial culture is a malign environment while the sterile solution is a benign environment. Consequently, a benign environment is a 'threat inhibitor' while a malign environment is a 'threat multiplier'. The security environment for individuals and states can be benign or malign. The pursuant of a benign environment is thus a strategic concern.

This chapter starts with a comprehensive mapping of Africa's physical, institutional and geopolitical environment. It discusses the added complexity of the cyberspace and the link to diaspora populations. It goes further to analyse the impact of the environment on different security sectors (systems) and their implication on national security. It is maintained that a challenging environment adds a layer of complexity to already very challenging African politics exacerbating security outcomes.

The Environment and Security Literature

Many studies have failed to establish a direct causal link between climate change and conflict. However, the association of conflict with particular environments (physical or otherwise) is prevalent in conflict literature (Hegre et al. 2001). Africa's diversity is not limited to its societal diversity and governance types. The physical and societal environment in which African state inhabits is exceptionally diverse. It is composed of deserts, forests, mountains, savannahs and geopolitical environment shaped by interest from the West, Russia and rising Asia. This diversity in physical geography and geopolitical environment gives rise to equally diverse challenges with national security implications.

As indicated in the introduction above, the use of the word environment in this book is not limited to the physical. It covers the context of security in general. In essence, at the national level, physical environment, the social environment and the institutional framework of that state provide the context or the environment of security. This means issues discussed

in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6 combined with the physical environment, the geopolitical environment and the cyber dimension to form the environment of African security. In effect, this chapter brings together everything discussed in previous chapters to demonstrate that the production of security occurs in a system. The separation of sectors or systems achieved in this book is only for analysis purposes. All aspects of security must be thought of holistically.

Following this reasoning, the changes witnessed in economies around the world, where some states are newly industrialised while some are moving away from manufacturing to more knowledge-based economies, are changing the social contract between firms and workers (labour) (Drucker 1997). Changing technology is also challenging the established relationship between the citizen and the state in many countries. Strong pillars of International Relations such as borders of nation-states, distinct nationalities and sovereignty are evolving in the contemporary global environment. Such changes have opportunities and threats to different states depending on their circumstances.

The geopolitical environment for most African countries was shaped by imperialism, where the structure of their integration into the international system is characterised by the exploitative relationship between core and periphery states (Wallerstein 2004). The core and periphery analysis describe a global order in which Africa is hugely disadvantaged. It is contended in line with arguments made above that the international system as conceived by Marxists is a malign environment for Africa. Consequently, this environment amplifies Africa's primary security issues (as conceptualised in preceding chapters).

At independence and the onset of the Cold War, African states found themselves in a geopolitical environment determined by superpower competition between the (West led by the USA) and the East (led by the Soviet Union). It has already been indicated above that Cold War machinations and proxy wars affected Africa negatively and disproportionately. The environment of security was not necessarily benign. Many wars and support for depraved, brutal dictators by superpowers took place in African thanks to the geopolitical situation created by the Cold War (Allenby 2000).

At present, it could be argued that with the rise of China, a more assertive Russia, the geopolitical environment is once again changing. It remains to be seen the security implications of the waning of US global preponderance. The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is an indication that the World may be moving towards

multipolarity. Classical realists contend a multi-polar world is more stable (Waltz 1979, 127; Morgenthau 1985). In effect, a multi-polar world may usher in a benign geopolitical environment. The dividends of such an environment may improve the outcomes of security for states. However, change always has limits in terms of what the current international system can cope with and the physical and psychological limits of what the individual can cope with (Allenby 2000, 6).

Chapters 5 and 6 focused on the government and economy, showing that these are generally weak. Weak governments demonstrate the weakness of national institutional frameworks in Africa in general terms. All regions in Africa now have regional economic communities (RECs). However, due to financial issues, reluctance on the part of African governments to share sovereignty with their counterparts, these RECs are relatively underdeveloped. The continental organisation, the African Union (AU) significantly relies on external funding. Many African states struggle to pay their dues to the African Union. In summary, the African-based institutional framework for security is significantly weak.

Turning to the physical environment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has repeatedly warned that a significant body of research demonstrates that climate change is and will increasingly have severe impacts on social systems. Jon Barnet and Neil Adger quote (Brauch 2002; Gleick 1992; Homer-Dixon 1991; van Ireland et al. 1996), who argue that this could cause severe violent conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007, 640). Consequently, scholars such as Barry Buzan concur that it is appropriate to cast physical environmental issues in security terms where these issues threaten to overwhelm the conditions of human existence on a large scale (Buzan 1991, 450).

Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that environmental degradation, floods or droughts caused by climate change can lead to massive and spontaneous migration or displacement of individuals. This environmental migration can cause conflict within states or between states because of the increased competition for scarce resources in the recipient community or state. In Africa (as shown above), security issues are anchored around identity, competing forms of government and governance, and competition for scarce resources. In effect, the environment exacerbates such matters.

In fact, specific environmental factors can and do support rebellion, disadvantage certain groups, create exploitation and biophysical variability (Brown et al. 2007, 1142; Homer-Dixon 1999; Releigh and Urdal 2007;

Theisen 2008; Salehyan 2008). Put differently, the potency of the environment as a national security threat relies on the inherent security threats discussed in the previous chapters. It multiplies the inherent security challenges which form the subject of this book.

Scholars have extensively debated the usefulness of securitising physical environmental challenges such as climate change (Adeoye 2019). For some, the securitisation of these environmental issues leads to militarisation, thus raising the stakes and limiting the policy options available to resolve the environmental problems. Others argue such that the securitisation of physical environmental issues rather demilitarises security, increasing the possibilities of tackling broader security issues with new approaches. The global diplomatic processes needed to address global environmental problems are agued to increase cooperation and build bridges among states. The cooperation and bridges can be transferred to other protracted issues (Adeoye 2019).

On the other hand, global and local environmental politics has increased both the monetary and social cost of industrialisation. Current environmental degradation is argued to have been caused by the most industrialised states. However, the current high cost of industrialisation is borne by developing countries still trying to industrialise. This puts the least industrialised nations of the world at an unfair disadvantage. This is because they are paying for a 'crime' (a high cost) to which they did not contribute. This state of affairs of global environmental politics is malign to the least developed countries (such as those in Africa) because it increases the cost of their development. This generally unfavourable (malign) environment in which African states reside is argued to be essential for challenges to African security.

A vital aspect of the environment of security is its transnational nature. On environmental issues, most states are interdependent. This interdependence challenges the core focus on nation-states and sovereignty in International Relations. How can a flood, drought or tsunami be stopped at the border? Can a passport be required from a river before it burst its banks into another country? What sovereignty does a downstream country such as Egypt have over the Nile? These are complicated issues that traditional diplomatic and military approaches are not prepared to suitably address. The standard international law (treaty) process which addresses issues between states is not sufficiently developed in addressing environmental issues (Græger 1996, 112; Allenby 2000, 8).

Furthermore, scholars have noted that the negotiations necessary to address physical environmental issues take too long (Græger 1996, 112; Allenby 2000, 6). By the time agreement is reached on how to address the known issues, new issues that need redressing emerge. More so, barriers to addressing environmental issues are often not law, diplomacy or technology but mostly culture. Culture change takes time (Allenby 2000, 8). Also, the states most concerned about specific environmental issues are the states most vulnerable to these issues. In effect, they negotiate or play environmental politics from a weaker position (Græger 1996).

The paradox of the physical environment and security is that it is possible that the act of preparing or providing security can in itself be a danger to the environment. The production of the material for nuclear weapons, for example, is harmful to the physical environment. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 and the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 demonstrate the risks of nuclear contamination. Furthermore, production standards for military purposes are incredibly high. The only consideration when producing for the army is optimal performance on the battlefield. The damage that such a production process may have on the physical environment is not of concern. The main concern is the advantage it gives over the enemy (Allenby 2000, 8).

Secondly, the concept of the security dilemma in International Relations is an environment security concern. This is because the determination to provide security by the balance of power creates a situation where there are too many weapons in the system (environment), making everyone more vulnerable. While the nuclear deterrent creates security, the very existence of those weapons constitutes an extreme security threat to the whole of humanity.

Africa and Its Environment

In terms of territory, the continent of Africa is only second after Asia in the world. It is bounded by two major oceans (the Indian and the Atlantic) and major seas such as the Mediterranean and Red seas. The equator divides Africa into almost two equal parts. Africa is made up of eight physical regions. The Sahara at the northern tip of the continent is mostly desert. It is the largest physical region of Africa, cutting across to the top of the region from East to West. Just below the Sahara is the Sahel, which is a semi-arid region. Similar to the Sahara, the Sahel is large and cuts across the continent from East to West.

Other physical regions such as the Ethiopian Highlands, the savanna, the Swahili Coast, the rain forest, the African Great Lakes and Southern Africa are smaller and restricted to specific locations inside the continent. These regions do not cut across the continent, such as the Sahel or the Sahara regions. For example, the rain forest region is located mostly in the Congo River basin region (right in the middle of the continent). The Great Lakes is restricted around the areas where Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo and Tanzania are found.

The Met Office of the UK identifies six different climate zones (equatorial, arid, mediterranean, snow, polar and temperate). Four of these zones are represented in Africa (Met Office, UK 2019). In other words, 66.66 per cent of the world's global climate zones are represented in Africa. Due to these many climate zones, it is undoubtedly that a changing climate will affect Africa. Indeed, many studies already put Africa at the forefront of global climate change (Brown et al. 2007, 1141).

Thanks to the above paragraphs, Africa can be broadly divided into four climatic zones or regions based on a combination of temperature, precipitation and evapotranspiration. The arid and semi-arid climate zones cover the Sahel region and the Southern Africa region (Kalahari and Namibian desert regions). The tropical savanna zone covers sub-Saharan Africa and Central Southern Africa regions. The equatorial climate zone covers the Congo region and the East African highlands. Finally, the temperate climate zone covers the South Eastern tip of South Africa.

Rain (precipitation) is a critical component of Africa's environment. It constitutes a key ingredient in life (drinking, agriculture and hydropower production). Due to the central part agriculture plays in livelihoods in Africa and the fact that most of Africa's agriculture is rain-fed, variability in rainfall means variability in the environment of life in Africa. In effect, Africa is exposed to the adverse impacts of climate change such as long-term decreases in rainfall and seasonal rainfall variability.

An increase in rainfall may create floods directly, increase the flow of rivers which may exceed their banks. This can flood areas currently used by the local population for agriculture or habitation. If a river changes course entirely, it can flood regions which were not previously part of the riverbed,

distorting internal boundaries and (in some cases) international borders. For example, in 2012, 32 of the 36 states in Nigeria were affected by floods (Campbell 2018). In 2018 the floods were feared to be as devastating as the 2012 floods (Campbell 2018). The floods in Nigeria, for example, created many complicated issues. It led to severe economic and infrastructure damage. It also led to massive migration out of the affected regions.

Floods also increase the risk of water- and vector-borne diseases. This is because, during a flood, drinking water sources may be contaminated. The displacement caused by floods can also push populations into poor sanitation practices. This can contribute to the outbreak and transmission of diseases. This was witnessed by the floods in Mozambique in 2000 and 2013 (BBC 2013). Flooding such as the ones in Nigeria (the Niger Basin region) for the past years (including 2018) leads to reduced agricultural productivity. Low food supply creates hunger and malnutrition. This undermines human health by affecting the affordability and availability of nutritious food. Stunting (related to malnutrition) is also associated with retarded cognitive ability and poor health into adulthood (Cohen et al. 2008).

Variability in rainfall in Africa has negative consequences for the environment. Africa has been home to some of the most devastating droughts in recorded history. The droughts and consequent famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s exemplify this argument (Reid 2018). The effects of droughts are similar to that of floods because droughts may render land inhabitable due to scorching temperatures. As agriculture is mainly dependent on water, droughts also have an effect on agricultural productivity with similar consequences as indicated above. Because most African agriculture uses traditional methods, variability in the timing of rainfall (even if the total amount of rainfall does not increase or reduce) can still have devastating effects on crop production and yield. African news is full of the effects of the late or early arrival of rain, which caused havoc to harvests (Business Daily 2019). Water shortages in Cape Town South Africa caused international headline news in 2018 (Mahr 2018).

Similar to floods, droughts can also lead to diseases that did not previously exist in specific areas. For example, it has been argued that prolonged and repeated droughts have introduced malaria-carrying mosquitoes into parts of the highland of East Africa (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya) where malaria did not previously exist. Drought has

also been correlated to outbreaks of Rift Valley fever (Caminade et al. 2019). Furthermore, many African cities are coastal cities with livelihood designed around the sea. Droughts reduce the amount of fresh water that carries nutrients into the sea to feed sea life. The increasing temperatures also run the risk of increasing sea levels. Low and declining rainfall continues to be associated with the rural exodus to cities witnessed in most African states (Barrios et al. 2006).

For some parts of Africa such as the Sahel and the Kalahari in Southern Africa, desertification has become a serious environmental challenge in the past decades. Again, as with droughts and floods, desertification reduced habitable and agricultural land. Also, desertification reduces or dries up subsoil water sources. Consequently, grassing land is also reduced. Most residents of the northern regions of the Sahel region states maintain pastoral lifestyles. They are typically dispersed and mobile. The reduction in grassing land thanks to desertification has severe destabilising effects on their mode of life. This has been argued to be linked to high levels of poverty and terrorist activity in this region.

Most of the people living in the immediate basin of Lake Chad (citizens of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) significantly depend on the lake for their livelihoods. They are involved in fishing in the lake for food and to sell. They rely on the fresh water of the lake for agriculture. In the past decades, the lake has shrunk tremendously. This has significantly reduced fish stocks and the fresh water needed for agriculture. Reduced fish stocks, water and consequently arable land means subsistence lifestyles are increasingly challenged in the Lake Chad basin region.

The shrinking of the lake combined with the activities of Boko Haram has rendered 'over 15 million people in the northeast of Nigeria to food insecurity. Out of this 15 million, 5.2 million are chronically food insecure'. Most of the IDPs in the North of Nigeria or from the North of Nigeria can only afford one meal a day (Hendricks and Keïta 2017, 9). The combined effect of all of this has destabilised the entire Lake Chad Basin region. It is now one of the most security-challenged areas of Africa. This lead to a UN Security Council mission to the Lake Chad basin from 1 to 7 March 2017 UN Resolution 2349 of 31 March 2017.

The Great Lakes region (Lake Victoria basin region) includes countries such as Burundi, Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. In the past decades, this region has become accustomed to recurrent droughts and flooding associated with increased rainfall variability. The Great Lakes

region is also the main source of the Nile. The Nile is the main source of water for over 11 different states. The hydro-politics around the use of the Nile holds a real potential of inter-state war (something that is rare in Africa).

Chapter 3 above discusses the internal human or social environment of African states. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to cover that part of the environment in this chapter. However, it is relevant and essential to discuss the international environment in which African states reside. International Relations approach this from different perspectives. On the specific point of the international system or the international environment for which states reside, it can be argued that there are two main perspectives. The first is the anarchical international system of which realists (mainly) and liberalists are proponents. As shown previously, realists argue that this system is inherently insecure.

Secondly, the Marxist approach to International Relations espouses a structure of the international, which creates adverse effects for the environment of security for periphery states. The dependency theory argues that the international environment is constructed around a core and periphery in which the relationship of the core is exploitative to the periphery. Following this approach, most African states constitute the periphery. The core is mostly Western states such as the former imperial powers and the USA. In other words, African states inhabit an international geopolitical environment in which their relationship with their counterparts from other parts of the world is exploitative and predatory.

As shown in Chap. 2, this approach has been slightly modified by Immanuel Wallerstein in which a semi-periphery is added to the core and the periphery discussed by dependency theorists. In this configuration, the core countries exploit semi-periphery and periphery countries, while semi-periphery countries exploit periphery countries. In other words, the international system is dominated by an exploitative capitalist system. In this approach, some African countries such as South Africa and Egypt, for example, become semi-periphery states. This means some African countries are capable of exploiting other African countries. Some activities of South African link business in countries such as the DRC can be argued to be exploitative akin to the exploitation that usually comes from the West. This further complicates Africa's geopolitical environment.

The Cyberworld as a Virtual Extension of the Environment of Security

The cyberspace is emerging as an additional dimension to the 'real world' as indicated above. Cyberspace constitutes an integral part of security consideration. The internet's ability to bridge boundaries and connect far-flung peoples is especially essential to the transformation of security outcomes thus relevant to this conceptualisation.

Due to the underuse of computerised systems in developing countries such as those in Africa, cyber security is not yet a significant security concern. In Cameroon, for example, internet penetration was only 9.8 per cent in 2013 (Internet Live Stats 2013). However, the internet and social media, in particular, is providing Africans with a new platform to transform the political and security environment of Africa. Cyber-based identities (Facebook profiles, Twitter handles and WhatsApp groups) are participating in politics in ways that may not be possible physically. The internet is also bridging the distance between citizens or people of African descent living in other parts of the world to get involved in what is happening in the continent.

The internet has made it easy for African-based militias to be coordinated from abroad. Internet-based money transfer systems have made it easy for money to be transferred to these militias quickly and timely. The availability of start-up capital from the Diaspora has removed one of the hurdles to the onset of war. The internet has also made the organisation and circulation of information across borders easy. As a consequence, several African countries now consider the internet and internet-enabled smartphones as security weapons. This has led to a number of countries cutting off the internet or parts of the internet during a crisis. In January 2017, Cameroon cut off the internet, as the Anglophone crisis escalated in the South West and North West regions (Blomfield, Telegraph 2017). Chad is still without internet for over a year now (Adeoye 2019).

The current Anglophone separatist war and the contested presidential elections in Cameroon can be used to demonstrate how the Diaspora and cyber space is changing the environment for politics and security in Africa. In 2016 teachers and lawyers started a protest against the use of French in schools and courts in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon. The government responded with brutal repression. However, Cameroonians turned their smartphones into the eyes and ears of their brothers and sisters at home and abroad. For the first time, almost all actions of the

government were shared around the world in almost real time. This made it extremely difficult for the government to quell protest through rehearsed practices used in previous similar circumstances. The government was so baffled it simply disconnected (unplugged) the internet cable connecting the Anglophone regions.

The videos, pictures and audio tapes shared through mainly Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp inspired active anti-government protest in Washington, London, Brussels, Geneva and Paris, just to name a few. The diaspora presence means that protests in global capitals were quite easy to organise. Protesters have gone as far confrontation with Biya's close protection team in a Geneva hotel. Since 2016 Anglophone uprising and the post-election crisis of 2018, Cameroonians abroad actively promote and finance insurgency and protests back home.

Previously in Cameroon and Africa, authoritarian regimes were able to maintain significant control over information and finance. To create threats to a regime, individuals or groups needed to secure access to a means of spreading information and raise funds (mostly from foreign sources). Social media and economically viable diaspora have changed this. Individual and groups have completely undermined government efforts to control information. At the onset of the conflict in Cameroon, the insurgency was entirely funded by individual donations from mainly Cameroonians living abroad.

Electronic waste dumped in Africa is beginning to pose as a security threat to both Africa and the western countries who dump their electronic waste. Indeed, there have been breaches of Western information security, as a result of a rise in electronic waste circulation. For example, certain people in Ghana have searched information from discarded hard drives from western nations for extortive purposes. In fact, a US Congressman Robert Wexler (Democrat-Florida) was contacted by a Ghanaian, who attempted to blackmail him with information retrieved from a discarded hard drive which made its way to Ghana (Warner 2011, 737).

African-based cyber scammers have made global news headlines. This new generation of con men poses as suppliers of cash crops, minerals, artefacts, protected wildlife and even orphans for adoption. Their targets are usually Europeans and Americans, both individuals and organisations (Voice of America 2011). Also, there are emerging reports of widespread cyberspying on citizens by some African governments. An example is a report on BBC Newsnight about Uganda's use of cyber surveillance to crush the opposition (BBC 2015).

Environmental Security

From the arguments made above, it can be deduced that environmental security is concerned with national security threats which arise from the nature of the environment and variation to the environment such as in the case of climate change-induced events (such as floods, hurricanes, droughts and desertification). Environmental security is also concerned with the national security implications of anthropogenic-induced environmental degradation such as pollution and deforestation. This section, therefore, highlights some of the environmental factors or concerns which are inherent and contemporary challenges to African security.

However, it must be argued that there is no straight-line progression from climate change to conflict across Africa (Salehyan 2008). The contribution of environmental factors to conflict is heavily influenced by the nature of the biophysical environment and also by already existing susceptibility to conflict. It is also dependent on the capacity of the government and the population to adapt to changing conditions. Furthermore, it was briefly indicated above that climate change in itself is not an original (primary) cause of conflict with national security implications. It is instead a threat multiplier.

Scarcity It is suggested that when conditions of scarcity as a result of either increased consumption (as a result of population growth) or environmental factors, competition for those scarce resources can exacerbate existing sources of conflict. For example, the reduction of grassing land in the North of Nigeria has pushed Fulani herdsmen further south. This has already registered clashes in several states including Benue, Edo and Delta. The issue and some solution proposed can have severe implication for national security in Nigerian (Daka et al. 2019).

In more extreme conditions, scarcity caused by environmental factors can lead to competition to control the government that regulates access to the scarce resource. In the example made of the grassing land issue in Nigeria, armed groups can compete with the government to gain control over the regulation of grassing land. The control allows groups to either secure access or refuse access to land. The case of Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria is a good example. Such politics constitutes the rationale of framing physical environmental issues as national security issues.

For some time now, Lake Chad has been shrinking. The lake is an excellent resource for Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger. Indeed, it was once described as an inland sea. It is estimated that over 20 million people depend on the lake for their livelihood. The shrinking of the lake has seen dwindling fish stocks and the scorching of the land that was fed by the lake. This has severe human security effects on the people who depend on this lake. With Boko Haram and ISIS active in this area, it is clear that poverty and desperation induced by the shrinking lake could push individuals into the waiting hands of Boko Haram and ISIS with significant regional and even international security implications.

Homer-Dixon argues that scarcity caused by climate change could contribute to rebellions, ethnic clashes, urban strife and other forms of violence, especially in the developing world (Homer-Dixon 1999). In this context, the Copenhagen school argues that environmental issues should be included as security issues. Climate change now forms part of military thinking and planning.

Massive and Spontaneous Migration As seen in the paragraphs above, the lack of rain, changes in rainfall patterns, flooding and desertification can push affected populations to migrate to other areas. Due to the sudden nature of some of these changes, migration can be sudden and in large numbers. In Africa, ethnic identity is not the reserve of humans. Space (land) also has an ethnic identity. African states have internal borders between ethnic groups, albeit unregulated officially. The breaching of such boundaries has security implications. For example, Nigeria has ethnic groups such as Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani. These ethnic identities are situated in specific geographies within Nigeria. These can be referred to as Igboland, Yorubaland, Hausaland and Fulaniland.

Desertification or drought problem affecting the north of Nigeria may appear on the surface as a Nigerian problem, but underneath is mostly a Fulani and Hausa problem (as it is the Hausaland or Fulaniland that is affected by desertification). In effect, migration from the affected regions to the unaffected regions may ignite pre-existing ethnic competitions and hatreds. Indigenous versus stranger competition has historical precedence in these regions. Repeat conflict is, therefore, highly probable. Displaced

people also experience a sense of lost identity and lose their social ties. This makes them more vulnerable. As a threat multiplier, the environment, therefore, multiplies the risk of ethnic conflict which can have national security implications.

The Great Lakes region (Lake Victoria basin region) includes countries such as Burundi, Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. This region is one of the most densely populated regions of Africa. As shown in Chap. 4, it has one of the most intractable ethnicity issues on the continent. Droughts in this area have led to an increase in diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea. Climate change could allow malaria-carrying mosquitos to survive and spread malaria to densely settled highland of East Africa (Chaves and Koenraadt 2010). The combination of high population, pressure on limited resources due to climate change, disease, ethnic clashes and a history of war exacerbates the national security threats of the countries involved and regional security in general.

In the case of Nigeria, the areas currently significant affected by desertification are areas predominantly occupied by Muslims. The south (which still experiences enough rainfall) is mostly Christian. An influx of Muslims from the north contributes to some of the religious clashes witnessed in Nigeria over the years (Blomfield 2018). Similar to ethnic conflict, the environment also multiplies the risk of religious conflicts. These issues are already national security issues in Nigeria. The case of Nigeria, as explained above, is identical to Cameroon. Internal population movement caused by desertification in northern Cameroon is already having a severe impact on economic security, well-being and in some cases minor violent conflict over grazing rights. Southern Chad is also mostly Christian, and desertification from the Sahel pushed Muslims down South. This further put pressure on the diminishing lake Chad, which is a crucial source of water for the south.

The mostly nomadic people of the Horn of Africa have been forced by environmental factors to move further afield in search of suitable grassing land for their cattle. Somalia, for example, is a mostly Muslim country; migration of such nomadic people into Christian countries such as South Sudan and Kenya may also raise the risks of societal security challenges with national security implications in a region already plagued with different types of conflict.

Radicalisation and Terrorism The environment of the Sahel (especially desertification) has been argued to cause poverty which is linked to the

increase in radicalisation and the violent Islamic groups that have emerged in this region. Indeed, it has long been argued that there is historical marginalisation of the people who inhabit the Bandiagara plateau of the Sahel. Furthermore, there has been little government engagement in this area. These conditions are argued to have contributed to the ease of which the people take arms against the state. Such conditions also explain their desire to organise their society in a way they see fit (resorting to religion, which is most familiar to them) (de Bruijn and Van Dijk 2003).

Unfortunately for Niger, it suffers desertification in the North (which is part of the Sahel region). In the South, it is also affected by the shrinking size of Lake Chad. This situation puts the massive country (land mass) in a precarious poverty position. This poverty has, in turn, made it momentously tricky for the government to wholly and sufficiently control its territory. It has been argued that such poverty and ungoverned spaces facilitate the recruitment of young and unemployed people into groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP. It also provides the space and the liberty to train and plan terrorist attacks. The environment is, therefore, at the core of the attraction of the Sahel region to global terrorism.

Weak Governments The environment also has an impact on the strength of governments. It has already been argued that climate change has an impact on the economic and societal sources of conflict. The societal system of a state can be weakened by its environment (environmental factors). A society at war costs the government money, lives and political capital in the attempt to stabilise. A weak economy due to depletion of resources as a result of climate change eliminates the base for the government to raise fund to provide services, especially security. All these factors combine to render a government weak. This weakness, in turn, makes the government vulnerable to internal rebellion and external attack or exploitation.

The case of Niger mentioned above is by no means isolated; it is contended that the weak government and governance in Sudan is related to environmental. This contributed to exacerbating the crisis in Darfur. At some point in 2012, the government of Mali almost collapsed. Only thanks to the timely intervention of France that the government was propped up (France 24 2012). It was argued that environmental factors contributed to the government weakness in Mali. This, in turn, allows vast

territories ungoverned giving the Tuareg rebels space and time to plan attacks on the government. This is also true for the mountainous and forest environment of the DRC, which allows for effective guerrilla war tactics on the part of the rebels making it very difficult for the government forces to defeat the rebels.

As indicated in Chap. 2, African states have proven that they cannot rely on themselves in the anarchical international systems. Historical exploitation of Africa through slavery to imperialism and contemporary neo-colonial practices guarantees an environment that keeps African governments weak. Due to African natural resources, there is also an interest from certain quarters in the international system to keep some African governments weak. The purpose is to deny Africa the power to demand higher rents for their natural resources.

All the above notwithstanding, a specific environment on its own does not cause citizens to take up arms against each other. Instead, the poverty caused by a malign environment makes it much easier for groups peddling pre-existing ideologies against the western models of the state (left behind by colonialism) to take advantage of poor people in order to achieve their political aims. For Cameroon to be specific, the Boko Haram conflict has not spilt over to any other region, but the region affected by the reduction in the economic benefit of Lake Chad and the former Sokoto Caliphate. It can be comfortably argued that it is the mixture of the issues caused by the shrinking lake and Islamic terrorism that makes it a national security issue rather than the environment on its own.

Weak Economies Most African economies are based on agriculture and natural resource extraction. This makes the economies extremely reliant on nature (the physical environment). The reduction of arable land due to droughts or floods or even a disruption of rainfall patterns has a significant effect on agriculture. In Africa, 60 per cent of people in employment are employed in the agriculture sector (Diop 2016). The agriculture sector constitutes Africa's biggest economic sector. In GDP terms, Mckinsey and Company reported that the agriculture sector represents 15 per cent of total GDP of the continent (the equivalence of more than $100 billion annually) (Kartik Jayaram et al. 2010).

For smaller states such as Cameroon, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, the export of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, banana or rubber form a significant portion of their economies and exports. As of 2011, the contribution

of agriculture to Ghana's GDP stood at 54 per cent (many times more than the continental percentage). Agricultural products also constitute over 40 per cent of Ghana's export earnings (FAO 2019). As these countries do not trade in their currencies, they are extremely reliant on foreign currency earners such as agriculture.

In other words, reduced arable land leads to reduced production of a cash crop such. The reduction in the export consequently leads to a reduction in foreign currency earned and reserves. Foreign currency issues can then initiate a current account deficit. The lack of production and export also depletes the tax base leading to fiscal challenges. These complications show how the environment can set off ripple effects throughout the whole economy.

Many African countries are also heavily dependent on power generated from hydroelectric power plants. Consequently, droughts that affect food and cash crop production also affects electricity production. The combination of lack of organic power (food), financial power (earnings from exports) and electrical power is a triple blow to the economy that often cripples the economy as a whole.

Economic woes feed into less money for governments. Consequently, governments lack the resources to exercise their governance role, resulting in weakness. In effect, poor economic performance feeds into the societal and political sectors security threats as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Poor economic performance leads to poverty, lack of revenue for the government, which in turn results in a weak government. Limited revenue and government weakness makes rebellion, recruitment into an extremist organisation or an ethnic conflict more likely. It is for these reasons that this book argues that the environment is a multiplier of inherent security threats (challenges) in Africa.

The abysmal economic performance of some sub-Saharan African states in the twentieth century has already been partly blamed on rainfall decline (Brown et al. 2013). In general, some have argued that by 2050, over half of the currently cropped land in most African nations will fall under climate regimes currently absent within those countries. It is projected that there will be up to 50 per cent reduction in the production of Africa's main staples, such as maize, wheat, sorghum and millet. Furthermore, increasing temperatures due to climate are agued to aggravate civil war in already troubled areas such as Mali.

Infrastructure Damage ('Un-Development') Tropical cyclones have peeled off paved roads, thrown down power poles, interrupted hydroelectricity production plants and flooded hospitals. For example, in March 2019 tropical cyclone Idai swept through Southern Africa, affecting countries such Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It damaged transmission lines which supply South Africa with 1100 MW of electricity in northern Mozambique and peeled off several kilometres of paved roads in Zimbabwe (Fitchett 2019). Previously in February 2000 tropical cyclone Eline caused four ships to sink off the coast of Mozambique. This type of disruptions usually wipes hard earned development. It also adds clean-up and humanitarian cost on the local government. All of these have severe economic implication with potential national security consequences (Fitchett 2019).

Some African coastal cities such as Alexandria in Egypt, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Mombasa in Kenya are low-lying cities. These are essential cities for trade and tourism for the respective countries. Extreme conditions such as sea level rises can destroy port infrastructure and beaches with significant damage to the economies that rely on this infrastructure. The flooding of beaches has been recorded in Mombasa in Kenya and Cotonou in Benin. African ports such as those in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa often do not only serve the country in which they are located. They turn to serve multiple states if not an entire sub-region. The destruction of port infrastructure, for example, can have regional economic implication with severe national, regional and international security consequences.

Malign International System In terms of geopolitical environment discussed above, realists argue that by nature, the anarchic international environment is inherently insecure. In such an international environment, survival is the utmost goal of a state. However, this survival is Darwinian (survival of the fittest). The realist sees fitness through the lens of military capabilities. A strong military is expensive, thus needs a strong economy to pay for it. Most African economies lack the resources to pay for effective militaries. In other words, African states are less fit in this anarchic international environment. Consequently, they are most exposed to the insecurity of the anarchic international system.

From a Marxist approach, exploitation in itself renders these states insecure. This is because exploitation robs them of the resources to use to

secure themselves and provide for their citizens. Furthermore, exploitation inspires the desire to revise the systems which exploit them. Revisionist tendencies and actions, therefore, render the entire international environment less secure for all involved (especially those already less fit).

Inter-State War In Africa, objective military threats coming from other states are rare. However, hydro-politics in the Nile Basin is threatening to provide an alternative narrative. Many African states remain in shared river basins. Shared water management regimes are absent or weak. In the cases where these regimes exist, they are not effective and do not keep up with the fast-changing environmental challenges. A typical example is the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which is unable to implement even its recommendations.

The river Nile, which flows through many countries, is currently a source of conflict over water removal rights. The increase in the usage of water in Sudan/Ethiopia is reducing the volume of water available for Egypt downstream. Egypt and Ethiopia continue to suffer tensions as a result of the competition for the use of the Nile (Brown et al. 2007, 146). Indeed, the disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia have risen to the levels of threats of military attacks. By extension, these threats involve the Great Lakes region (source of the Nile).

However, it must be noted that the mere existence of shared water sources such as in the Nile Basin, the Lake Chad basin and the Congo Basin does not cause conflict. In fact, in many river basins in the world, water management treaties (river basin treaties) provide the regions with the necessary tools to be more resilient to variabilities in water quantities due to climate change (De Stefano et al. 2012).

A Physical Environment That Supports Guerrilla War Enclaved forested areas such as Lebialem in the South West Region of Cameroon continue to be the area where Anglophone armed rebels mount their fiercest fighting against the Cameroon government forces. Boko Haram in the Far North region of Cameroon and the North of Nigeria exploits the Mandara mountains and the Zambesi forest to mount attacks at both the Cameroonian and Nigeria government forces. The arguments that the nature of the physical environment can enhance or inhibit conflict are valid for African states (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 1996).

Diaspora Element to Politics and Security As indicated above, most African countries now have diaspora outside of Africa who are free from the constraints of local politics. Thanks to technology, they can keep abreast to politics in the sending country. For those in Europe and North America, they can afford to contribute financially to life and politics in their country of origin. In extreme cases, the Diaspora population can finance rebellion. The start-up capital provided by the Cameroonian diaspora to Ambazonian separatist in the North West and South West regions of Cameroon is an excellent and contemporary example.

Conclusion

This chapter has framed the environment to cover more than just the physical environment. It has been argued that the environment (context) of security involves many factors from the societal, economic, military and political sectors. While the environment is not a primary security issue, the context in which security occurs is vital to security. In this sense, this chapter showed that the environment is, indeed, a strategic for African states. It argued that the conceptualisation of environmental security in this manner enhances the understanding of the concept of environmental security in the context of African Security studies.

Having established the reason behind associating the environment to security and how this should be done, the environment of Africa is explored to identify the factors relevant to security. The general argument that emerges from this exploration is that Africa enjoys a malign environment. Several issues from a variety of sectors were outlined as evidence for this argument. The final section showed how the primary security described from the exploration of Africa's environment can be amplified by the generally maligned security environment inhabited by African states. To enhance African security, it is essential that security policy acknowledges the environment of security.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

This book has addressed the issue of the African states in International Relations. Using the Montevideo Treaty, it proffered a definition of the state which is argued to be more suitable to the diverse states in the international system. In line with theory and thinking in International Relations, the different attributes of the African states are analysed to show how they fit into the current body of work in International Relations. The conclusion is that there is no reason why African states and African Security Studies should not be firmly situated in International Relations. The interpretation of International Relations theories offered by this book serves as a foundation for the study of security in Africa.

From the beginning of the book, it was made clear that security must be considered as a product of a system. It was argued that a state should be conceived of like a giant system with three vital systems. These include the political, economic and security systems. These systems are interconnected and interdependent in the security production process. Less than optimal performance in one system affects performance in other systems. It was also argued that these systems are also interdependent on regional political, economic and security systems. In effect, Buzan's regional security complexes were rephrased into regional security systems. Unfortunately for most African states, they are found in turbulent neighbourhoods (regional security systems).

Thanks to the vernacular approach in International Relations, it has become clear that security is time and space contingent. In that effect, this

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8_8

book has provided a definition of security that is suitable for Africa and African Security Studies. The different attributes of this security were also clearly shown. While Africa retains some unique attributes, most other attributes are consistent with general security literature. In defining security, it surmises that security must guarantee freedom from want, freedom from fear, but also it must create the conditions to pursue cherished ambitions.

This book also contends that the ultimate goal of security must be the security of the individual. However, it argues that the state is vital for the production of security. In that sense, the security of the production process of security is crucial to security itself. Consequently, the security of the state and that of the individual are interdependent, therefore, equally important to the study of security. It is therefore not a simple process, in practice, to disentangle the security of the individual from that of the state. It is posited that the dichotomy in human security may not be significantly useful in practice. Only a careful balance of human and traditional security can create security for both the state and the individual. In other words, the individual and the state remain security referents at their different levels.

After situating security in International Relations and providing a definition for security, it was clear what direction to seek literature and evidence of inherent and contemporary security challenges. The chapters on the analysis of inherent security challenges considered the society, the economy, politics and the environment. With regard to society, it has been argued that the diversity and the multi-layered nature of identity in African states provide political and military entrepreneurs with the opportunity to manipulate different groups for political and ultimately financial gain. It was made clear that the mere existence of different identities does not always lead to conflict but creates the opportunities that can be exploited by nefarious interests.

The issues of government and governance are perennial problems that continue to distress Africa. This book makes clear that Africa has failed to secure an appropriate mode of governance that can create a conducive environment for the achievement of developmental goals. Africa has also failed to secure a peaceful means of changing leaders. The combined effect of these factors is that, for post-independence history, most African leaders have been young, poorly educated men, from the military or rebel groups. This situation has created a leadership deficiency in Africa that continues to retard its progress.

Essential to the political argument is the issue of secessionism. While seen in negative terms in contemporary African politics, this book contends that for many years; it was a dispute resolution tool. For some reason, Africans have found it challenging to live in large groups historically. Breaking away to form new groups after a specific population size is reached, seems to be natural in African societal development. In effect, this secessionism (breaking away as a result of conflict) constituted a method of dispute resolution in pre-colonial Africa. The imposition of borders by the colonial system created limitations to this natural progression of societal development.

The imposition of the sedentary mode of societal organisation in the post-independent African states effected the natural mode of life for nomadic populations. Groups who have generally migrated with their animals following natural weather patterns now have to be restricted within defined states. Groups who may have settled in a particular part of African territories unaware of boundary restrictions now find themselves separated from their kin by borders which define states. This disorientating factor (especially for Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia) also has security implications.

On the economic sources of inherent and contemporary security challenges, it was clear that scarcity remains a significant challenge in Africa. The investigation of Africa's political, economic situation makes it clear that Africa continues to face several microeconomic and macroeconomic challenges. Growth in Africa is uneven and grows from a minimal base. Investment into Africa disproportionately favours the extractive sector. For example, The mining sector is capital intensive, not labour intensive, thus creates few jobs. In effect, heralded GDP growth may have little meaning to the man on the street. Poor economics creates a dilemma where governments are unable to provide services (especially security).

Weak economies are also incapable of supporting development issues. Security provision is also an expensive service to provide. Without a strong economy, there is not enough tax revenue for the government to provide appropriate security. The lack of security creates conditions for more adverse economic conditions. These deficiencies further create conflict which exacerbates the economic condition and creates more conflict. This vicious cycle is argued to be a significant challenge to African security.

Somewhat departing from the most common conceptualisations of environmental security, this book argues that environmental security should not be limited to the physical environment (climate change, global warming, ecological loss and environmental degradation). It is argued that

in addition to the physical environment, the national and regional institutional frameworks, cyberspace and the geopolitical dispensation of the international system must be considered as the environment of security. The environment or context of security is as important as the security itself.

It was further noted that the environment is not a primary security issue but rather a threat inhibitor or multiplier. Different environmental conditions can inhibit or multiply threats, irrespective of whether these challenges are political, economic or societal. Fundamentally, an environment could be benign or malign. For most African states, their security environment is malign. In other words, the conditions of their security environment multiply pre-existing security challenges making the situation even worse.

Despite the separation of the sectors of security for analysis purposes, this book holds that in reality the combined interplay of issues arising from the cyber, economic, societal, environmental, political and the military sectors are the ultimate determinants of the production of security by individuals, groups or states for the experience or enjoyment of individuals or states. The complex interaction of issues from these sectors, the interplay of actions undertaken by the various actors (be it state or non-state) from these sectors, regional and global security conditions, the interface of both external and internal influences form the engine that produces security or insecurity. The result of these interactions produces both opportunities and challenges.

Following the thinking in the paragraph above, it is clear that security is a product of many different interacting actors and factors. Some of these factors are not immediately apparent. Due to the complexity of these interactions, civil war is always a perfect storm. Multiple issues interacting is a malign environment that leads to conflict. The plethora of literature proving and disproving the same factors as causes of conflict in Africa is evidence of the inefficiency of bivariate analysis of causal factors of war. Instead, this approach to African security argues that many factors, including statistically insignificant factors, contribute to the eventual perfect storm that is war.

Following the argument made in Lekunze (2019), it is further emphasised that discounting factors because they are statistically insignificant is failing to take the holistic approach needed to understand the causes of war. Based on the thinking embedded in Edward Lorenz's butterfly effect, it is argued that when certain factors are present, even factors which are statistically insignificant and may not even be immediately apparent to

the observer are capable of starting a war. As a butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon can cause a tornado in Texas, a fruit seller in Tunisia can cause an Arab spring that has removed dictators, destroyed states, killed millions and displaced many more millions of people. In searching for challenges to security, scholars should be looking for a soup of factors, not ingredients.

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Appendix A: Survey Questions

PARTICIPANT NO	

1.	In terms of security, list the things that make you feel safe, secure, protected and hopeful. (Most important first)
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

2	In terms of security, list the things that make you worry, feel insecure, unsafe, and exposed to danger. (Most important first)
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

3.	Which of the following do you turn to for security, safety, protection, justice?						
1	Police/gendarme/BIR			8	Quarter head		
2	Court/magistrate			9	Local chief		
3	DO/SDO			10	Paramount chief		
4	Antigang (vigilante group)			11	Pastor/priest/imam (religious leader)		
5	Traditional doctor			12	Kontri meeting		
6	Family head			13	NGO		
7	Mob justice			14	Mayor/government delegate		
	If any other, please specify:						

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8

4.	List the reasons for your choices in Question 3 above.
1	
2	
3	

5.	What types of issues are reported to the following? For example, land dispute to chief, theft to police/gendarme/BIR and so on.		
1	Police/gendarme/BIR	8	Quarter head
2	Court/magistrate	9	Local chief
3	DO/SDO	10	Paramount chief
4	Antigang (vigilante group)	11	Pastor/priest/imam (religious leader)
5	Traditional doctor	12	Kontri meeting
6	Family head	13	NGO
7		14	Mayor/government delegate
	If any other, please specify:		

6.	Have you, or know anyone who has, taken an issue to one of the above and is referred to another?
	If yes, give details.

7. On a scale of 1 to 5, how do you rate the following on safety, security and justice issues? 1-Very bad, 2-bad, 3-Average, 4-Good, 5-Very good.

Police/gendarme/BIR	1 2 3 4 5	Court/magistrate	1 2 3 4 5
Local chief	1 2 3 4 5	Paramount chief	1 2 3 4 5
DO/SDO	1 2 3 4 5	Antigang (vigilante group)	1 2 3 4 5
Pastor/priest/imam/rabi	1 2 3 4 5	NGOs	1 2 3 4 5

8. On a scale of 1 to 4, how secure, safe or protecteddo you feel? 1-Extremelyinsecure, 2-Insecure 3-Secure, 4-Extremely secure.

At home	1 2 3 4	In the street	1 2 3 4
In this town/village	1 2 3 4	Generally in this division	1 2 3 4

9. Relating to Q.8 above, are things getting better or worse? 1-Better, 2-Worse, 3-No difference. 1 2 3

10. How often does mob (jungle, street) justice happen? 1-Not often, 2-Often, 3-Very often: 1 2 3

11. Does crime reduce after a suspect is killed in a popular street? 1-Increase, 2-Decrese, 3-No effect: 1 2 3

12. When people talk of security, what do you think of?

Appendix B: Survey Participants

The tables below show a breakdown of the respondents to the survey conducted in the South West Region of Cameroon. It shows the division of residence, the profession, level of education, age group and gender of the participant.

Division

		Frequency	*Per cent*	*Valid per cent*	*Cumulative per cent*
Valid	Fako	185	45.5	45.5	45.5
	Meme	154	37.8	37.8	83.3
	Ndian	68	16.7	16.7	100.0
	Total	407	100.0	100.0	

Profession

		Frequency	*Per cent*	*Valid per cent*	*Cumulative per cent*
Valid	Unemployed	135	33.2	33.2	33.2
	Unskilled	60	14.7	14.7	47.9
	Skilled	136	33.4	33.4	81.3
	Trader	76	18.7	18.7	100.0
	Total	407	100.0	100.0	

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M. Lekunze, *Inherent and Contemporary Challenges to African Security*, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26925-8

Level of education

		Frequency	*Percent*	*Valid per cent*	*Cumulative per cent*
Valid	None	49	12.0	12.0	12.0
	Primary	73	17.9	17.9	30.0
	Secondary	178	43.7	43.7	73.7
	Degree	88	21.6	21.6	95.3
	Post graduate	19	4.7	4.7	100.0
	Total	407	100.0	100.0	

Age group

		Frequency	*Per cent*	*Valid per cent*	*Cumulative per cent*
Valid	20–30	179	44.0	44.0	44.0
	31–40	126	31.0	31.0	74.9
	41–50	56	13.8	13.8	88.7
	51–60	29	7.1	7.1	95.8
	61–70	15	3.7	3.7	99.5
	71–80	1	0.2	0.2	99.8
	91–100	1	0.2	0.2	100.0
	Total	407	100.0	100.0	

Gender

		Frequency	*Percent*	*Valid per cent*	*Cumulative per cent*
Valid	Female	180	44.2	44.2	44.2
	Male	227	55.8	55.8	100.0
	Total	407	100.0	100.0	

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