
ASHGATE
Guarding the Guardians
Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa
Mathurin C. Houngnikpo
ASHGATE e-BOOK

GUARDING THE GUARDIANS

This page has been left blank intentionally

Guarding the Guardians

Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa

MATHURIN C. HOUNGNIKPO
National Defense University, USA

ASHGATE

© Mathurin C. Houngnikpo 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Mathurin C. Houngnikpo has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.

Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
Suite 420
101 Cherry Street
Burlington
VT 05401-4405
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Houngnikpo, Mathurin C.
Guarding the guardians : civil-military relations and democratic governance in Africa.
1. Civil-military relations--Africa. 2. Military government--Africa--History. 3. Democratization--Africa. 4. Africa--Politics and government.
I. Title
322.5'096-dc22

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Houngnikpo, Mathurin C.
Guarding the guardians : civil-military relations and democratic governance in Africa / by Mathurin C. Houngnikpo.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4094-0414-9 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4094-0415-6 (ebook)
1. Civil-military relations--Africa. 2. Africa--Politics and government--1960-3. Africa--Armed Forces--Political activity. I. Title.

JQ1873.5.C58H68 2010
322'.5096--dc22

2010007093

ISBN 9781409404149 (hbk)
ISBN 9781409404156 (ebk)II

Mixed Sources
Product group from well-managed forests and other controlled sources
www.fsc.org Cert no. SGS-COC-2482
© 1996 Forest Stewardship Council

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

Contents

Preface *vii*
Acknowledgements *ix*

Introduction 1

1 Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 23

2 Civil-Military Relations in Africa 47

3 Explaining Army Intrusion in African Politics: An On-going Debate 73

4 The African Military and Modernization 89

5 The Performance of Civilian and Military Regimes: A Comparative Assessment 105

6 Towards New Civil-Military Relations in Africa 125

7 Legitimacy and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Africa 145

Conclusion 163

Bibliography *173*
Index *215*

This page has been left blank intentionally

Preface

Africa was swept up in the frenzied round of regime transformations that were set off by the thaw of the Cold War in the early 1990s. However, while well over half of Africa's states embarked on some form of democratization, the process lost steam for many soon after it started. Two decades later, it has become amply clear that democratization in Africa has arrived at something of a crossroads. Even countries that generated some optimism are now facing serious challenges of consolidation. More importantly, the democratization process has failed to adequately address the key feature of African politics: military intervention. Contrary to conventional wisdom or expectation, African militaries in recent years have felt emboldened to take out civilian leaders when certain military officers saw it in their interests. Despite the African Union's 2007 Democracy Charter resolving not to recognize unconstitutional changes of government, the military continues to stage coups. Democratic norms have not yet taken hold. In fact, the new trend in Africa is what I call the "democratic coup" which amounts to staging a coup, making a tactical withdrawal to hold elections, and then "wining" these elections to become a legitimate elected leader—to the accolades of both regional and international organizations.

Whether African militaries can ever accept civilian control is the thrust of this book. I have always been leery about military commitment to democratization in Africa and recent reversals through military coups only reinforce my view that the subordination of the military to political control is still decades away. Yet, without civilian control of the military, democracy is unlikely to mature and consolidate. The challenge in addressing civil-military relations and democratic governance in Africa, thus, remains a critical priority.

Civilian control of the military is a doctrine that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than military officers. Given that broad strategic decisions, such as the decision to declare a war, start an invasion, or end a conflict, have a major impact on all citizens of a country, legitimate civilian leaders, guided by the will of the people, are the best authority of what is in the national interest. The proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by this civilian authority is a prerequisite feature of a stable liberal democracy. The actual level of control employed by a civilian leadership depends not only on their legitimacy, but may also vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. Regardless, the military serves as a special government agency, which is supposed to *implement*, rather than *formulate*, policies.

In a democracy, a well-crafted, well-understood, and carefully protected separation between political and military decisions should allow a civil supremacy of the military. Wise civilian leaders, in turn, understand that operational issues such as weapons procurement, manning levels, conditions of service in the armed forces, or strategic security planning decisions, should be left to military professionals. Just like their civilian counterparts, the armed forces in a democracy have a direct responsibility to the law, to parliament and to the public. While civil supremacy in a democracy is enforced through the constitutional, legislative and budgetary mechanisms—it ultimately depends on military leaders accepting these principles—the essence of military professionalism. Military acceptance of civilian authority remains the "missing piece" of the democratic transition puzzle in Africa.

Under no illusion that it could be overtaken by events in Africa, this book seeks to add a key parameter to the civilian control debate: the legitimacy of the civilian leaders tasked with controlling the military. Ultimately, true civilian supremacy goes beyond mere control. All three branches of government must have some control over the military, and the system of checks and balances maintained among the other branches would serve to help control the military and give a genuine chance to democracy in Africa.

MCH
Washington, DC (USA)
2010

Acknowledgements

Any undertaking that attempts to take stock of such a complex issue must depend on the generosity and wisdom of others. First and foremost, I owe this book to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies that gave me the opportunity, as Chairs of the Departments of Security Studies first and of Civil-Military Relations later, to better grasp not only the security challenges facing Africa, but also to sharpen my keen understanding of civil-military relations on the continent. In fact, I benefited tremendously from my intellectual exchanges with Africans, both civilian and military officials, who participated in the Africa Center's programs.

Several colleagues and friends, too numerous to mention individually, have humbled me by providing invaluable insights, factual corrections, inspiration and advice. Nonetheless, I would be remiss without at least mentioning Joe Siegle at the Africa Center, Amy Eckert at Metro State College in Denver, Boubacar N'Diaye at the College of Wooster, and Abdoulaye Saine at Miami University of Ohio. To anonymous reviewers whose pertinent comments improve the manuscript, I am grateful. None of these, needless to say, bears the slightest blame for any part of the content of this book.

I also wish to express my gratitude to my extended family for their unconditional support. Finally, my sincere thanks and appreciation go to the able staff of Ashgate Publishers for their patience, courtesy and solicitude throughout the process.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Introduction

> With democratisation and the end of Cold War interventions, the political environment in [sub-Saharan Africa] in the 1990s was dramatically different from the earlier post-colonial decades. Much of the recent literature on African politics has examined these hopeful trends. Unfortunately, when it comes to military interventions, the 1990s are an instance of *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.[1]

The demise of the Soviet bloc and the thaw of the Cold War have triggered fundamental change in the world in general and in Africa in particular. For quite a while, the intense turmoil and violence within the periphery did not seem to have disturbed what some viewed as the longest peace. In Gaddis's words, "the long peace of the Cold War is far and away one of the most stable kinds of peace ever to emerge between well-armed hostile states engaged in what many feared would be a cataclysmic arms race."[2] Because proxy wars by definition are fought outside the boundaries of major powers, the post-World War II era was characterized as a Cold War that only ended or thawed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The "long peace" and the "democratic peace"—the idea that democracy and well-being mitigate war—theories seem to have ushered in a new era: a *Pax Democratica*. Several donor countries appeal to democracy, hoping that it will reverse several decades of misfortune. By adopting the refrain of democracy and/or good governance as prerequisites for their help or assistance to African countries, both donor nations and multilateral financial institutions seek some leverage over political and economic systems of the so-called developing nations. Whether it is because democracies tend not fight each other[3] or because of democracy's contribution to economic development,[4] the fact remains that democracy is viewed as a key requirement for Africa's seemingly intractable woes.

---

1 Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'état: 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2003), p. 348.

2 John Gaddis, "The Long Peace," *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1986), pp. 99–142.

3 See Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1795; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 4 (1986), pp. 1151–1196; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall … Are the Freer Countries more Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4 (1994), pp. 617–648; and Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4 (1994), pp. 649–664.

4 See Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959), pp. 69–105. See also Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegle

Because Africa is not a monolithic entity, both the pace of democratization and military interference in politics vary not only from sub-region to sub-region but also even within each sub-region. However, the last two decades have demonstrated that democracy's journey on most of the continent is treacherous, and that the military remains, in most African countries, especially in the Western and Central sub-regions, an important entity to be reckoned with.

As Diamond rightly points out, governance in Africa is in a state of transition. Between the two main trends competing for dominance, one is the longstanding organization of African politics and states around autocratic personal rulers; highly centralized and overpowering presidencies; and steeply hierarchical, informal networks of patron-client relations that draw their symbolic and emotional glue from ethnic bonds. The other is the surge since 1990 of democratic impulses, principles and institutions.[5] But even in countries that are formally democratic, such formal trappings of democracy as free, fair and competitive elections seem to be coexisting with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic mobilization and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents.[6] While the role of the military within an autocratic rule could be negotiated with the ruler, democracy requires a civilian control over the security forces to be effective. For the new or newly-emerging democracies without much experience in combining popular government and civilian control, the challenge is more difficult: how to assure that the military will not attempt a coup, or defy civilian authority. In many former autocracies, the military has concentrated on internal order, or been deeply involved in political life, sometimes preying on the society rather than protecting it. Then the chief requirement is to establish a tradition of civilian control, to develop an ironclad system of political neutrality within the military establishment, and to prevent or forestall on a permanent basis any possibility of a coup or military intervention in political life.[7]

Although most African countries are in the process of political transition, the diverse nature of the transitions defies generalizations. Similarly, military intrusion in politics in Africa varies according to sub-regions. While West and Central Africa suffered tremendously from military interference, the southern cone of Africa has somewhat escaped the "diktat" of men on horseback. However, in all transitions, whether from single party politics to more pluralistic systems, from military to civilian government, or from war to peace, the military seems a key variable. The military has influenced, dominated, or participated in politics to varying degrees in many African countries, and this legacy in part affects

---

and Michael Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, 2nd ed., New York, NY: Routledge 2009. These authors maintain that democracy is not an enemy but rather an essential ally of development.

5 Larry Diamond, "Progress and Retreat in Africa: The Rule of Law versus the Big Man," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2008), p. 138.

6 Ibid.

7 See http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html.

the role played by the military in the on-going processes of political transition. Other potentially determining factors include the nature of politics in individual countries, how political power is perceived and obtained, the interface between political institutions, prevailing civil-military relations, and how new political leaders develop relations with military establishments.

While much of the current literature tends to give full credit to civil society, the reality is that peaceful democratic transition occurred only in countries where the military has consented to democratization. Although the military's record in African politics is not exemplary, the military did play an important role in peaceful political transition in such countries as Benin, Mali, and Niger in the 1990s. Regardless of its past behavior, recent coups d'état in Mauritania (August 2007) and Guinea (December 2008), the military coup de force in Madagascar (February–March 2009), the tragic events (March 2009) and unhealthy civil-military relations agitations (March 2010) in Guinea-Bissau, and the coup d'état in Niger (February 2010) prove that until the military is brought under civilian control at a later stage of democratic consolidation, the military leadership needs to be given political incentives to play a positive role in democratization.

Because the merits of civil society include political participation, state accountability, and publicity of politics, civil society has the potential to interrogate the state.[8] As an ideal site for the production of a critical rational discourse to challenge the state, democratic theory privileges civil society as a vital, though not a sufficient, precondition for the existence of democracy.[9] Whether the state can be made accountable to its citizens depends greatly upon the self-consciousness, vibrancy, and political vision of civil society.[10] Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom on democratic transition in Africa, civil society alone does not trigger democratization. The military's weight in African politics and history makes the armed forces and their leaders' attitudes and positions a critical factor for embarking on a democratic path.

While the dynamics of the emerging international system are still unfolding, the very authority of the state is being challenged, both from within and from without. There are new expectations that the autocratic African state will give way to a more responsive state capable of fulfilling its basic functions However, the window of opportunity for genuine renewal in several African countries seems to be slowly closing because converging interests are preventing both African leaders and their external sponsors from initiating true democracy. As Joseph puts it, "the shoring

8 Jean-François Bayart, "La Revanche des Sociétés Africaines," *Politique Africaine*, vol. 11 (Septembre 1983), pp. 99–100.

9 Mahmood Mamdani, "A Critique of the State and Civil Society Paradigm in Africanist Studies," in Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-Dia-Wamba, eds. *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy* (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1995), p. 611.

10 Mark Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power*, London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 22.

up of the African state system, even at the expense of stalled democratization, became a point of convergence between the self-interest of African regimes and the geopolitical interests of Western powers."[11]

After many years of mismanagement and misrule, most of sub-Saharan Africa is still struggling with undergoing a fundamental transformation of its sociopolitical order. In recent years, some African countries experienced positive economic growth and moved toward multiparty electoral systems. This has brought greater expectations for peace, prosperity, and stability across the continent. Building on the new wave of democratization, the donor community, no longer locked in to the Cold War competition, began to seek better ways to dispense aid. At the same time, the African people found new resolve to vigorously challenge oppressive regimes and their corrupt leaders. Incumbent governments that had long been able to fend off internal and external demands for political reforms were finally forced to liberalize their systems. Through popular movements, Africans hoped to chart a new course for their future. Their yearning for peace, justice, and development translated into a proliferation of democracy or civil society movements. Some have hoped that in view of the global demands for change and transition to democratic governance, the power of despots and tyrants would be diminished.[12] Many African leaders seem to fear and consequently resent true democracy and political reform. As they are being pushed by outside demands and internal societal pressures, some resist energetically; others stall, and still others play charades with both internal and external critics.[13]

Indeed, the early 1990s brought high hopes about the prospects of Africa, but, two decades later the balance-sheet reveals serious concerns. Once again some African leaders, because of obvious incentives to resist change, have displayed their inability and/or unwillingness to grasp the opportunities that presented themselves, leaving the impression that Africa remains politically immature. With the end of the Cold War and consequent disappearance of superpower conflict from the African political and security equations, there was a belief, now shown to have been over-optimistic, that a major and malignant influence had been removed from the continent. This was seen as a golden opportunity for Africa to make a new start politically and to achieve a greater level of continental, regional, national, and human security than it had previously enjoyed. Unfortunately, this opportunity seems to have been missed and Africa has descended once again into disguised

11 Richard Joseph, "The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa," in Richard Joseph, ed. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 63 (pp. 57–80).

12 See Arthur A. Nwanko, *African Dictators. The Logic of Tyranny and Lessons from History*, London, UK: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1990.

13 See Larry Diamond, *op. cit*. See also Thomas M. Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place," in J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds. *Africa in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 59.

autocracy and despair.[14] While African leaders are lip-synching the democratic tune, they do not mean to see profound political reforms on the continent because of the stakes and implications of such changes. Amid a great deal of rhetoric, there is very little genuine alteration of behavior as demonstrated by several attempts, some successful, to amend constitutions in order to keep power. Even those believed to be "dynamic and assertive," the best representatives of Africa's "new leaders," and the epitome of a new generation of statesmen,[15] have yet to show a serious alternative to the failed policies of their predecessors.

Even a furtive glance at recent events on the continent point to resistance to true reforms in several countries where incumbents are engaged in delaying tactics to cling to power. Still others are amending constitution to prolong their reign. In fact, *Freedom House* maintains that 2008 was a year of regression for sub-Saharan Africa. After a few years of modest improvement, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a year of substantial reversals for democracy.[16] The decline affected several of the continent's largest and most influential countries and stemmed part from military coups, ethnic conflict, and violent attempts to suppress civil society.[17] The checkered state of democratization on the continent led Mills Soko to state:

> Although Africa has made remarkable strides towards embracing democracy over the past decade, autocratic and self-serving rule continues to be a defining feature of politics in many parts of the region. African leaders cannot claim to be active champions for reform in global economic governance while domestically induced problems of political misrule, endemic corruption, human rights abuses, high levels of capital flight and gross fiscal mismanagement continue to linger on unchecked.[18]

In spite of the realities on the ground, optimistic advocates of democracy see a "new Africa" emerging, a reborn continent that provides fresh opportunities in a region long darkened by violence, repression, corruption, weak leadership, and inept governance. According to Radelet, the United States has, since the late 1980s, helped promote and strengthen democracies, both as an end in itself and as a means towards other ends, such as the protection of human rights and the cessation of civil

---

14 Keith Somerville, "Africa: Is there a Silver Lining?" *The World Today*, vol. 50, no. 11 (November 1994), p. 215.

15 Marina Ottaway, *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, p. 1.

16 Arch Puddington, "Freedom in the World 2009: Setbacks and Resilience," Overview Essay, Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2009, p. 6.

17 Ibid.

18 Mills Soko, "Promoting African Trade: Issues, Prospects and Challenges," in Terence McNamee, Greg Mills, Monde Muyangwa, and Kurt Shillinger, eds. *Trade, Development and Security in Africa: Report of the 2005 Tswalu Dialogue*, Macclesfield, UK: RUSI, 2005, p. 78.

conflict, with the ultimate objective of strengthening regional and global security.[19] As far as the World Bank is concerned, it contends that Africa can claim the 21st century because increasing political participation, through democratization, opens the way to greater accountability. However, there was an important caveat to the World Bank speculation: Africans' ability to innovate.[20]

According to a select panel of U.S. experts speculating on Africa's future, democratization is on the right track on the continent:

> Democratization will continue to be a driving force in Africa. It is stunning just how quickly democracy has come to monopolize the political marketplace in Africa. Two decades ago, there were still some principled arguments in favor of one-party rule and authoritarian leaders, either military or civilian, ruled much of the continent. Today, almost all African countries have had multiparty elections, albeit of dramatically varying qualities, and there is no one making the argument that African countries cannot become democratic. While the substance of democracy (e.g. quality of elections, viability of basic democratic institutions, such as courts and legislatures) in Africa may be low on average (albeit variable), there is now a strong African norm against elected regimes being overthrown.[21]

While this assessment is optimistic, recent military coups in Mauritania, Guinea and Niger and the military intervention in Madagascar remind us that some military leaders have failed to read the "no-more-coup" memorandum or simply refuse to heed to the African Union's clear and loud message regarding military takeovers on the continent. Traditional excuses used to topple civilian leaders continue to prevail.

In the first years of independence, there were high hopes that the end of colonialism would bring freedom, social regeneration, rapid economic growth, and both qualitative and quantitative change. Unfortunately, *Uhuru*[22] never materialized. Instead, Africa confronted a number of problems, including inefficient, state-centered economic systems, frequent military coups, ethnic strife, and corruption. What was known as *yibana mayele*, or to steal cleverly (in *lingala*[23]), a distinct feature of Mobutu's Zaire, seems to have gradually taken over the entire continent. It is not an exaggeration to state that the politics of "uncivil

19 Steve Radelet, "Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), p. 173.

20 See The World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000.

21 See, National Intelligence Council, *Africa in 2020: National Intelligence Council 2020 Project*, Summary of Discussion by Select Panel of US Experts, January 9, 2004.

22 Freedom in Kiswahili.

23 Language widely spoken in the Democratic Republic of Congo, former Zaire.

nationalism"[24] espoused by their leaders prevented Africans from enjoying the fruits of victory over colonialism. After decades of unfulfilled promises, bad governance and patrimonial rule of their countries, Africans seem more determined now than ever to alter the nature of politics on their continent. In his depiction of the new fight for political freedom in Africa, Press summarized eloquently the fervor:

> A long-simmering discontent and anger with politics as usual boiled over in Africa at the end of the Cold War in 1989. Pervasive poverty and international and domestic pressures for democracy set the stage for change to some degree, but mostly it was the power of an idea, the idea of freedom, that changed the shape of African politics more than at any time since independence. Africans caught a fever of freedom which spread rapidly across the continent, prompting confrontations and other challenges to longtime authoritarian rulers. Ordinary people, not just political opposition leaders, stood up for democracy, often against great odds, sometimes against brutal force.[25]

In the same vein, and probably because of the excitement democracy has generated, Welch, Jr. suggested that democratization has brought a waning of the military's endemic involvement in African politics:

> The rule of the "man on the horseback" is declining, as a consequence of the global political and ideological changes … Civil-military relations are changing dramatically with the spread of the call for democracy around the world. Although armed forces remain primary political actors in most states, their direct political roles have been reduced in recent years. The result, to overstate the case, is fundamental transformation and nowhere is it more marked than in developing countries. The Third World is now witnessing the slow, difficult, but significant consolidation of civilian governments after, in many cases, several decades of military rule.[26]

In the early 1990s, hopes for Africa's future revived following widespread political and economic reforms. A few years later, however, the pace of reforms had slowed down and such regions as West and Central Africa resumed with violent conflict and military takeovers. Evidently, the process of political transition is a delicate one, since latent economic and ethnic issues have overshadowed the daunting political challenges faced by the new democratic regimes, not the least of which,

---

24 Bruce Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs*, vol. 97, no. 388 (July 1998), pp. 305–341.

25 Robert Press, *The New Africa: Dispatches from A Changing Continent*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999, p. 3.

26 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Changing Civil-Military Relations." In *Global Transformations and the Third World*, eds. Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz and Steven R. Dorr. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 71.

considering African recent history, is the possibility of military intervention in government. Besides a few writers such as Samuel Huntington who gave some thought to the question of civil-military relations in emerging democracies,[27] most scholars assumed the disengagement of the armed forces from politics.

For many observers, the hopes of the first half of the 1990s seem to be gradually fading away, in part as a result of disappointment over the course of African democratization. Clearly, Africa has made advances in the apparent competitiveness of elections with the renewed participation of opposition parties. However, only in a few instances do elections represent real opportunities for the population to determine who governs. In Joseph's words, "there was a sharp learning curve after 1989 as authoritarian regimes mastered the script of contemporary democratization while finding ways to neutralize and disable its transformative mechanisms."[28] They quickly learned to manipulate the electoral process and divide the opposition, creating what Joseph calls "soft authoritarianism," an implicit compromise between the unwillingness of African autocracies to undergo more than "political decompression" and the wish of bilateral and international aid agencies for greater "presentability" in some regimes.[29] Describing what he calls "pseudo-democracies," Larry Diamond argues that governments on the continent have and continue to play a "cat-and-mouse game with international donors, liberalizing politically in response to pressure while repressing as much as they can get away with in order to hang on to power."[30] Several African leaders continue to delay true democratization out of concerns over the survival of their dysfunctional regimes. A disappointed Richard Joseph wrote in 1998 that Africa's democratic opening at the beginning of the decade had resulted, with few exceptions, in "virtual democracies." These may have the surface characteristics of liberal democracy, such as regularly scheduled elections, but "their governments systematically stifle opposition behind a mask of legitimacy."[31] Another decade later, Joseph's arguments still hold true. In his assessment of democracy's journey in Africa, he observes that as the December 2007 tragic events in Kenya have shown, governments facing the prospects of a peaceful dismissal by the people can allow the doors of democracy to open further, but such governments can also seek to slam them shut.[32] While the institution of elections is beginning to matter, most elections create a transition without change in which a "frozen-in-

27 See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

28 Joseph, "Reconfiguration of Power," *op. cit*., p. 61.

29 Ibid.

30 Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 31–32.

31 Richard Joseph, "Africa, 1990-1997: From *Abertura* to Closure," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 2 (April 1998), p. 6.

32 Richard Joseph, "Progress and Retreat in Africa: Challenges of a 'frontier' Region," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2008), p. 95.

place majority party" continues to control the game. This "fallacy of electoralism" generates questionable democracies in which elections coexist with systematic abuses of political rights and the disenfranchisement of much of the population, leaving the impression that Africa is not ready for competitive democracy but only for a lesser system that French-speaking scholars derisively call *démocratie tropicalisée* (tropical/water-down democracy).[33]

Besides civil wars, the early euphoria over democratization is dying down because of diverging interests of incumbent leaders, the international community, and Africans. To their dismay, Africans who welcomed the new era are learning that there is a huge gap between professed devotion or commitment to democratization and concrete actions. Many who believe in the vibrancy of civil society to build a democratic society in Africa rightly declared war on dictatorship. However, they realized that authoritarianism, both civilian and military, has yet to surrender to popular demands. Whether it is the civilian leadership, in connivance with the armed forces, or the military itself at the helm of power, there is no desire to step down, be it in the name of democracy. In the face of growing threats to their hegemony, African dictators mounted effective counteroffensives, derailing democracy in several instances.

For decades, bullets and compulsion, as opposed to ballots and persuasion, have served as the bases for government decision-making and for changes in rulers in Africa. The importance of the military in explaining Africa's problems is an undeniable fact and Akande is right when he states:

> The military is central to this profile of African States in two major respects. Most African states had at one time or the other come under military rule with its attendant maladministration and consequent legacy of economic underdevelopment. Besides, the military had appropriated disproportional national resources, a phenomenon [known as] the Military Extractive Ratio (MER). The military question therefore constitutes a major problematic for Africa's development.[34]

While there seems to be a welcome change in attitude on the part of the military in some countries, and that is quite encouraging, Juvenal's question of two millennia remains as important as ever: *Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?* Who will guard the guardians themselves? Until that question is adequately dealt with, democracy or simply put, politics remains volatile. So far the democratization process is more or less treacherous depending on whether the country involved is a civilian or military dictatorship. Hutchful maintains that:

---

33 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Democratization in Africa*, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 12.

34 Adeolu Akande, "The Military in African Conflicts," posted on http://dpmf.org/military-adeolu.html, viewed on 12/16/05.

> Although it is possible to concur with Robin Luckham that military regimes should be viewed within the perspective of the general phenomenon of authoritarianism, with Henry Bienen that so-called military regimes do not constitute a generic regime type, and with Claude Welch that it is virtually impossible to differentiate military and civilian regimes on the basis of their structures, ideologies, and practices, transitions from military rule nevertheless differ from those commencing from civilian forms of authoritarianism in several respects.[35]

Furthering his explanation, Hutchful elaborates on why democratic transitions from military rule are intricate:

> First, they raise the problem of the subordination of the military to democratic control by civilians following an active role and the associated problem of how to prevent reentry into politics by the military. In this sense transitions from civilian authoritarian regimes have the crucial advantage of building upon already existing traditions (however fragile) of military subordination to civilian rule. Second, at least in Africa, military dictatorship has had particularly corrosive effects on military institutions, professionalism, and efficiency, posing tricky problems of military order for incoming civilian administrations. Third, the struggle against military authoritarianism has often spawned not democracy, but particularly vicious and debilitating new forms of militarism and militarization.[36]

Hutchful's views corroborate the salience and timeliness of a study of civil-military relations and democratization in Africa. In most instances, the movement towards democracy on the continent contains within itself the seeds of its own defeat. Civil society has sought to impose a "transition from below," at times with no regard to the military's attitude, through such surrogate constituent assemblies as national conferences to set the pace and procedures of democratization. While in some countries, some change has occurred, in others (Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger to name a few), the armed forces remain the biggest hurdle:

> Some of the old-guard incumbents got wise to the new democratic movement. Having seen electoral defeats of incumbents in other parts of Africa, they learned quickly how to adapt, how to make just enough political concessions to take the heat off for a while, how to tamper with the electoral machinery just enough to win again. Some heads of state used outright force or had the potential to do so, which is why there were few pro-democratic victories against military regimes.

---

35 Eboe Hutchful, "Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition," in Marina Ottaway, ed. *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 44.

36 Ibid.

> Most civilian authoritarian regimes were more subtle, calling elections quickly, before opponents could get organized, or not allowing potentially broad-based parties to run for various reasons, or passing laws designed to prevent particular strong potential candidates from running.[37]

Much to civil society's chagrin, peaceful transition to democracy ran aground in several countries not only because genuine democratization tolled the knell of incompetent civilian leaders, but also because some incumbent military leaders turned out to be a formidable counterweight to the forces of liberalization. Consequently, most of Africa seems stuck with dictatorship or at best a milder form of authoritarianism. In a vicious cycle, the lack of true democratization continues to extend the tenure of corrupt and inept military leaders, who in turn, prevent democracy from becoming a reality in their lifetime. One important aspect affecting the progress and quality of democracy in Africa is the military, because expanded military prerogatives lessen the prospects of affirming civilian control, "a necessary condition for polyarchy."[38] A newly democratic regime may display all the institutions necessary for the regular practice of competitive elections, but high levels of military prerogatives will severely curtail its democratic nature.[39] According to Huntington, genuine democratization can result in improved civil-military relations, marked by limitations of the armed forces' political involvement, their restructuring towards military missions, reductions in size, and enhanced professionalism.[40] However, that outcome has eluded Africans since the early years of independence.

Concurring with Huntington, Elaigwu maintains that:

> In order to ensure a conducive milieu for peace, stability and development, it has become a political imperative for African states to review the nature of civil-military relations. As the wave of democratic governance blows across Africa, democratic institutions must be embellished by such values as would make them durable or sustainable. Given the history of military interventions in politics and the subsequent shrinking of the parametres of the ballot box and the over-extension of the boundaries of the barracks, it has become clear that a new pattern of civil-military relations needs to be established. This means that the State (and its people) and the Armed and Security Services must clearly understand their rights and their obligations to each other. A new pattern of civil-

37 Press, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

38 Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 250.

39 Felipe Aguero, "Transition Pathways: Institutional Legacies, the Military, and Democracy in South America," in J.F. Hollifield and C. Jillson, eds. *Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, New York, NY: Routledge, 2000, p. 74.

40 Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 4 (October 1995), pp. 9–17.

> military relations based on mutual understanding and trust must be established to provide an appropriate context for peace and orderly development in African States.[41]

The role of the military and its relationships to government policy-making are central to true democratization in Africa. Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of civil control necessary for meaningful democracy. Civilian government officials, including legislators, often do not have the background and training necessary to perform their military oversight roles effectively or to develop the respect of military counterparts. In most developed nations the military's well-defined mission is primarily external. However, such less-developed nations as those in Africa do not universally accept this view. Often, constitutions mandate that militaries play an internal security role, and frequently militaries perform civic action programs, such as building roads, providing rural health care, or engaging in police activities. All too often such an armed presence within normally civilian parameters has gone awry to become the source of repression, human rights violations, and corrupt practices.

Regardless of the lens used, the military is undeniably central in African politics. Until recently, the main problem of civil-military relations has been the "praetorian problem … the need to curb the political power of the military establishment and to make the armed forces into a professional body committed to providing for the external security of the country."[42] While liberal and emerging democracies must guard against the ancient and persistent problem, they more usually need to concentrate on how to manage civil-military relations after the power of the military has been curbed.[43] Because of persistent pockets of antidemocratic forces on the continent and military control of the political system, democratic pressures persist while authoritarian rules prevail. The seeds of "authentic" democracy have yet to germinate in the "psyche" of Africa's civilian political class, and the military is also reluctant to return to its barracks.

While the discourse on democratization continues to dominate the minds of those who are genuinely interested in how Africa's development can be accelerated, a key ingredient to reaching a sustainable democratic Africa remains collaborative civil-military relations on the continent. These days, it is almost a

---

41 See Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, "African Responses to Good Governance, Peace, and Security in the Region : Towards Confidence Building Measures," Paper presented at the Seminar on *Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter?*, New York, October 16, 2002; Posted on http://disarm.igc.org/Elaigwu.pdf, viewed on 12/18/05.

42 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 231.

43 Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1999), p. 13.

fact of life to write about Africa's experiment with democracy, given the continent recent political history. But before embarking on the journey to democracy in Africa, there are crucial questions to grapple with. Whether or not democracy, a system of government that allows the people to hold authority/power, in deciding its own fate through free, fair and periodic multiparty elections, can be achieved in Africa without the endorsement of the military has been addressed in an earlier work.[44] Not only is the military acceptance of democratization necessary, but the very progress or survival of democracy seems intimately linked with the whims of the military leadership. In other words, regardless of how strong and vibrant civil society, the private sphere that challenges state behavior[45] is, it still has to rely on the cooperation of the military to bring about democracy in Africa.

Before democratic structures began to take root in Africa, the military was heavily politicized. For better or worse, many regimes used, and some continue to use, the military as an instrument for clinging to political power. Utilizing national armies to further national leaders' personal and ambitious objectives led to a gulf between not only between leaders and followers, but also between the armed forces and the people, especially the political élites who formed the opposition parties. Aware of the defiance and mistrust between the armed and the people on whose behalf they are supposed to be fighting, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) embarked on a mission. As part of its continent-wide project that was launched in October 2001 entitled "The Promotion of Civil-Military Relations in Africa: A Factor of Peace & Security,"[46] the UNREC held a landmark workshop for members of Parliamentary Defense Committees in West Africa in April 2004. The purpose of the gathering was to begin the process of capacity building within the context of enhanced peace and security in Africa through the establishment of harmonious and functional relationships between the civilian and military authorities on the continent.

To get to the crux of the issue, the workshop examined a set of key questions that form the basis of the civil-military relations project:

---

44 See Mathurin Houngnikpo, *Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001.

45 Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State" *World Policy Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 279–307; Edmond J. Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives." *Africa Insight*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1995), pp. 224–230; and Pearl T. Robinson, "Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of Politics." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 1 (1994), pp. 39–68.

46 The United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), created in 1986 at the request of OAU member states to promote and support disarmament, security, and peace measures in Africa, envisages the development of a program to reinforce the OAU decision condemning military coups.

- Is the military institution the solution for peace and stability in Africa, or is it part of the problem of conflict, political instability and underdevelopment?
- To what extent has the trend of democratization in African countries involved the military institution?
- To what extent are the checks and balances a relevant tool for reigning in the abuses of the military?
- What are the roles of the judiciary and legislative bodies in the control of the military institution?
- What is the role of the parliamentarian in the control of the military institution and can this role contribute to a climate of peace, stability and security in African countries?[47]

Evidently, these very questions highlight the relevance of the military in African political and economic development. While there was a consensus that a well-trained and professional army can indeed be a guarantor of peace and stability in a country, it is also true that the military institution in Africa today must lend itself to the process of democratization at a pace commensurate with that of other state institutions.

In the early days of what was considered by many[48] as the "second independence" or "second liberation" of Africa, the military's irrelevance and/or defeat was assumed. The euphoria and the rediscovered sentiment of freedom that came with democratization blurred an adequate analysis of how things came to being.[49] Several academic textbooks praised the role of civil society in democratization. In a collection of essays on civil society in Africa, Harbeson hails civil society's role in pressing for change on the continent:

> African peoples stand once again on the threshold of an era of profound political change. Not since the crescendo of nationalist political movements during the twilight of European colonialism has popular demand for political transformation been so deep or widespread … Today, grassroots movements have arisen in

47 See Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, "African Responses to Good Governance, Peace, and Security in the Region: Towards Confidence Building Measures," paper presented at the Seminar on *Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter?*, New York, October 16, 2002; Posted on http://disarm.igc.org/Elaigwu.pdf, viewed on 12/18/05.

48 See Stephen Riley, Stephen P. "The Democratic Transition in Africa," *African Demos*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1991), pp. 5–8; Chris Allen, "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: Democratic Renewal in Benin," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 54 (1992), pp. 42–58; and also John A. Wiseman, *The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa*, Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1996.

49 Georges-Marie Chenu, "La Démocratie en Afrique," *Revue Juridique et Politique, Indépendance et Coopération*, vol. 45, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 7.

> nearly every sub-Saharan country to remove autocratic, repressive governments and empower African peoples to reclaim control over their political destinies.[50]

In a more nuanced statement, John Clark reminds us of the complexity of military intervention in politics in Africa:

> In the early 1990s, a wave of political reform began to sweep the continent, robbing military rule of its legitimacy in most African states. During that decade many military rulers were overthrown, either by civilian-organized "revolutions," as was the case in most of these states, or by other military officers who promised rapid political liberalization, as in Mali. Only in a few nonreforming states such as Sudan have military rulers remained in power with no promise of competitive elections. These political reforms, if sustained, could lead to a demilitarization of African politics—yet the postcolonial experience of military intervention and rule in many African states has created a culture in which military officers may still feel that interventions are legitimate.[51]

Clark's hopeful message is balanced against African realities. Given the track records of the military in African politics,[52] it is quite difficult, indeed malapropos, to think of the military as a force that might subscribe to democratization, even for the sake of its own interests. As Luckham rightly contends, "the military and repressive apparatuses of the state may not seem the best vantage point from which to study democratization."[53] The military, whether colonial or post-colonial, has always been heavily involved in politics on the continent, most of the time, at the expenses of the population. However, democratization progress on the continent seems to be more and more cast into the nature and the state of civil-military relations.

Arguably, democracy seems to be the best system allowing a constructive dialogue between rulers and the ruled, and promoting development goals. Explaining why democracy has become the new trend in the world, Stepanek contends that:

---

50 John Harbeson, "Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa," in John W. Harbeson, D. Rothchild, and N. Chazan, eds. *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1994, p. 1.

51 John F. Clark, "The Decline of the African Military Coup," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 18, no. 3 (July 2007), p. 141.

52 See Dennis Austin, "The Underlying Problem of the Army Coup d'État in Africa," *Optima*, vol. 16, no. 2 (June 1966): 65–72; Henry S. Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978; William F. Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics*, London: Methuen, 1969; J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*. New York: Praeger, 1969; and Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

53 Robin A. Luckham, "Democracy and the Military: An Epitaph for Frankenstein's Monster? *Democratization*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1996), p. 13.

> Democratic governments honor universal human rights as values based in law. Democracy is also fundamental to progress because it welcomes initiative, creates ownership, and builds consensus. Democracy is the foundation of development because it defines a process of consensus building and, in turn, ensures that benefits are shared. Centralized control of power, incentives, and distribution is unsustainable.[54]

When in the early 1990s, Africans dared to take to the streets through protest movements and popular demonstrations, they were clearly demanding greater political freedoms and democratic transitions, and elected governments in countries formerly ruled by military-backed civilian dictators and soldier-politicians. They had faith in democracy and expected important positive changes. However, democracy's appeal has yet to attract African leaders in general and military ones in particular. Despite civil society's challenges, quite bold in some countries, a few military leaders refused to heed their people's loud cry for authentic political reforms. Consequently, the window of opportunity offered by the thaw of the Cold War seems to be gradually closing without expected outcome.

When colonial governments yielded to indigenous political élites in the 1960s, few observers predicted a prominent role for the post-colonial army. Oblivious of the colonial experiment and the daily use of the military for administrative duties, some were still hoping to see a professional army under civilian oversight. The apparently insignificant size and limited experience of the armed forces beguiled scholars into minimizing the military menace.[55] Coleman and Brice, for example, were quite blunt in their belief of the army to be a non-factor in the political realm of the continent when they state that:

> Armies have been the last of the authoritative structures of government to be created in all but a few of the forty-odd political entities of Sub-Saharan Africa. With few exceptions, national armies are either non-existent, or they are fragile structures still heavily dependent upon external support for their maintenance and development. This embryonic and underdeveloped character of Africa's military establishment, coupled with the precipitate and unexpected termination of European rule, underscores the ominous power vacuum that exists throughout that vast continent.[56]

---

54 Joseph Stepanek, *Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, p. 159.

55 P.C. Lloyd, ed. *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 9.

56 James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 359.

Unfortunately, this prognostic soon proved untenable. The wishful thinking that imperial legacy would create professional armies on the continent dissipated as soon as it was formed.

Following the failure of the civilian leaders' professed commitment to the goals of rapid modernization and development, several African military officers embarked on a "mission" to end poverty, illiteracy, and disease. In a dramatic transformation, the perceived "weak and fragile" African military became a powerful political force. The frequency of both real and imaginary military coups leaves the impression of a permissive political culture on the continent. If not ruling directly, the African military became the behind-the-scene king maker, turning itself into the unchallenged arbiter of who should govern and under what conditions and terms.[57] However, the economic performance of the African armed forces failed to match their success in *coups d'état*. They deplored civilian rule and its management of the African state, only to take their countries to dead ends. Nevertheless, when the wave of democratization sought to sweep away military autocracies, incumbent leaders stalled the process. Counting on uneasy, unstable, and contentious relationships between civilians and the armed forces, some military leaders are determined to either block progress where democracy somehow has emerged, or prevent its advent.

With democratization still in fits and starts on the continent,[58] unlocking the mystery behind persistent autocracy or democracy's sluggish performance in Africa remains important. The intransigence of strong military forces poses a serious threat to democratic emergence and consolidation. According to Brautigam, it is "clear to observers of Africa that democratic consolidation is likely to be problematic in countries whose militaries have a history of intervention. Without firm civilian control over the military, there is little chance that a democracy will survive for long."[59] The early mainstream scholarship as seen in the works of Lipset (1959), Almond and Verba (1963), Moore, Jr., (1966), Dahl (1970),[60] and scores of other distinguished scholars focused on the search for the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the emergence of a stable democracy. Recent writings have been rather concerned primarily with the dynamics of democratic transition and

---

57 Simon Baynham, "Security Issues in Africa: The Imperial Legacy, Domestic Violence and the Military," *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 3 (1991), p. 184.

58 Christopher Fomunyoh, "Democratization in Fits and Starts," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), pp. 37–50.

59 Deborah Brautigam, "The 'Mauritius Miracle': Democracy, Institutions, and Economic Policy," in Richard Joseph, ed. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 141.

60 Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 69–105; Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963; Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966; Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

consolidation.[61] Chazan, for example, sees consolidating civil society and the state as Africa's democratic challenge.[62] This book revisits the search for prerequisites and seeks to explore a key variable in explaining democracy's travails in Africa: the military institution. However, it goes beyond mere call for civilian control of the military, suggesting rather that military obedience should be to a legitimate authority capable of exercising effective democratic oversight.

Arguably, the military is the most important state institution in Africa because of its capacity to exercise substantial force. While it is the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty and liberty when a country is confronted by external aggression, it also has the potential to overthrow democratically-elected civilian authorities, thereby destroying democracy.[63] Evidently, this paradox is less of a problem in established democracies, but has great significance in African nascent democracies. If the emerging and fragile democracies on the continent are to be strengthened, African armed forces must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps towards the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. The transition from military to civilian rule denotes undoing military intervention in politics as a preliminary step in recreating democratic institutions. Heavy militarization in Africa had severe consequences for democratization, and, ironically, the transition from authoritarianism involved military extrication from government, and, consequently, a large military role in the transition.[64]

Africans look forward to a day where what Mosca a century ago called "[the] most fortunate exception in human history,"[65] i.e. the existence of civilian control of the military, becomes again the norm. As long as distrust between soldiers and civilians remains a preoccupying concern for many African countries, democracy's birth and longevity will be problematic. Africa's past displays examples of politically ambitious soldiers who have intervened in civilian government with disastrous socio-economic consequences stemming largely from soldiers' lack of experience with government and consequent inability to effectively address public policy issues. The persistence of military meddling in politics ultimately led the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to adopt, during the July 1999 OAU Heads of State Summit in Algiers (Algeria), a deterrent measure forbidding coup leaders

---

61 See Pierre Dabezies, "Vers la Démocratisation de l'Afrique," *Défense Nationale* (Mai 1992), pp. 21–33; Carole Pateman, "Democracy and Democratization." *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 1 (1996), pp. 5–12; Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997; Gérard Conac, *L'Afrique en Transition vers le Pluralisme Politique*, Paris: Economica, 1993; Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Afric*a, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

62 See Naomi Chazan, Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State, *World Policy Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1990), pp. 279–307.

63 For a historical perspective, see Simon Baynham, ed. *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa,* London: Croom Helm, 1986.

64 Aguero, *op. cit*., p. 77.

65 Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 235.

from participating in future OAU/African Union meetings and proceedings.[66] Unfortunately, while laudable, this measure failed to prevent subsequent coups in Central African Republic (March 2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (July 2003), Guinea Bissau (September 2003), Mauritania (August 2005 and 2007), Guinea (December 2008) and Niger (February 2010). These and other events since the democratization process "suggest the ominous possibility that the pendulum may well be swinging back toward at least limited forms of remilitarization."[67] These events constitute a vivid reminder of how much remains to be done in civil-military relations in Africa. Clearly, until there is an effective way of preventing military intrusion in political matters in Africa, democratic governance remains a treacherous adventure. Ensuring civilian control of the military is actually one of the oldest problems of political science. It is raised by Socrates in Plato's *Republic* in his discussion of the "guardians," who are described as having the virtues of a well-bred guard dog, "dangerous to their enemies [but] gentle to their friends."[68]

Although civil-military relations in Africa have been subjected to studies by outstanding scholars, the intrigue nature of the relationships among the political leadership, the armed forces and society at large has failed to put this issue to rest. Because of its multifaceted nature, the topic seems to be eluding theoretical underpinnings. No single theory can effectively address the complexity of civil-military relations in Africa, and false starts and/or fake democratization do not improve our understanding of civil-military relations and democratic control on the African continent.

Organization of the Book

To grasp the role that African militaries might play in the democratization process, it is first necessary to examine how they have thwarted it. To set the stage, the very first chapter covers basic concepts and theoretical issues addressed in the book. The second chapter explores the theory of civil-military relations in order to allow a deeper understanding of the military factor in hindering democratic advent and progress on the continent. It also reviews the intrusion of the armed forces in African politics by looking first into the organization and role of the army in pre-colonial and colonial eras, before examining contemporary armies and their impact on society. Several traditional societies have had "reservists" to call upon when needed, or standing armies for defense and/or invasion purpose. Because the prime goal of a monarchy is to expand, most African empires and

66 AHG/Dec. 141(XXXV).

67 Eboe Hutchful, "Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition," in Marina Ottaway, ed. *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 44.

68 Ashbrook Center, "Editorial: Civilian Rumsfeld, Overseeing the Military," July 2003.

kingdoms use force to achieve their objectives. In most instances, the head of the army was under the control of the monarch. Although there was no written document on separation of powers, it was understood that military leaders should take orders from civilians. However, colonization brought a different dynamic to civil-military relations with lasting consequences for the continent.

Chapter 3 revisits various explanations of military takeovers in Africa. In their litany of reasons, the military always cite civilian leaders' inaptitude to achieve the development goals. In all fairness, the civilian leadership has failed its mission to the point where some wonder whether post-independence leaders have ever had in mind to improve the welfare of their compatriots.[69] Before a dismal performance by corrupt and inept leaders, the military sought to right years of wrong by taking over. But, the righteousness of their "patriotic" mission failed to deliver Africa from its nightmare. Rather, military intervention into African politics made matters worse because it led to an "armed authoritarianism" that confiscated or violated regularly fundamental rights.

Chapter 4 disentangles the notion of the military as *the* modernizing force. As the new states emerged out of de-colonization, some have seen a vital role for the military. Whether as a revolutionary force, as a stabilizing force, or as a modernizing force, the military was perceived of as the only organized and disciplined group, with the necessary skills to uplift newly independent nations. Proponents of such positive views on the military contend that beyond the maintenance of internal order and the needs of national defense, the armed forces are committed to industrialization and to free political institutions. Unfortunately, the ink has hardly dried up when events in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular falsified the hypothesis of the army as a modernizer.

Chapter 5 compares and contrasts the performance by both civilian and military leaders. Having initially collaborated with the colonizers, hoping to be given the baton of command, civilian élites finally turned against their former masters and join forces with peasants to challenge colonialism. Naturally they replaced Europeans at the helm of their countries after independence. But soon, the military moves in, on sound grounds of mismanagement, corruption, and nepotism. The armed forces were first seen as the cleanest and most disciplined group that could effectively tackle Africa's serious development challenges. Sadly, the military leadership turns out to be as corrupt as, if not more than, their civilian counterparts.

Chapter 6 conveys the necessity of new civil-military relations in Africa. In the face of setbacks and pushbacks, it focuses on the need to democratize not just the military *per se*, but the entire security sectors. While Africa has experienced a recent wave of democratic transitions and popular movements in support of open

69 Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa*,Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996; Axelle Kabou, *Et Si l'Afrique Refusait le Développement*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991; Kofi Buenor Hadjor, *On Transforming Africa: Discourse with Africa's Leaders*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 1987.

government, the encouraging trend has been reversed in several countries. Only in a handful of countries have the African armed forces served as the midwife of political change rather than its opponent.

The last chapter calls not just for civilian control of the military but rather democratic oversight of the security forces in Africa. It maintains that even if the military is best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat, only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society. Also, Civil-military relations represent a "game of strategic interaction" with civilian leaders and military agents making moves based on preferences over outcomes and expectations of how the other side is likely to act.[70] However, political power and influence of the military rises and declines with the weight of coercion in governance. The weight of coercion in governance is a function of legitimacy of nation-state and its rulers (both civilian and military), and the ability of government to rule effectively, as well as the level and success of economic development.

As Africa pursues the democratic option, questions about the political role of the armed forces are likely to linger until competitive systems become firmly consolidated, and roles and responsibilities between the civilian authorities and their military counterparts are clearly delineated. Were the setbacks suffered by *de facto* regimes of the past severe and widespread enough to dissuade coup attempts in the future? Has the transition to democracy already heralded a new era of civil-military relations or is it prefiguring a cyclical reversion to the past? After leaving office, did the armed forces nonetheless preserve their capacity to constrain or even undo elected regimes? Are military political thoughts changing in step with democratization, lagging behind it, or not changing at all?[71] These are some of the key questions this book seeks to address.

The military variable persists in part because most African militaries have yet to be transformed into professional armies, devoid of political motivations. Even the most professionalized armies have been neither politically inert nor passive. For a region marked by decades of military praetorianism, it would not be realistic to expect the armies to be overnight fully cleansed of political bias. As a pressure group with interests and ideologies to defend as well as a near monopoly on defense-related matters, African armed forces will likely be part of the political equation for some time to come. However, the critical questions are: how much a part, and on whose terms will this participation occur? This is the Gordian knot of civil-military relations in Africa.

With all the excitement about political renewal on the continent, for African democracy to succeed, not only must civil-military relations be transformed, but

---

70 See Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1996), pp. 149–178 and *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

71 See David Pion-Berlin, "The Armed Forces and Politics: Gains and Snares in Recent Scholarship," *Latin America Research Review*, vol. 30, no. 1 (1995), pp. 147–162.

the whole security apparatus should be reformed. Armies have long been a major obstacle to democracy in Africa, seizing power with depressing frequency and often dominating the political process even under civilian regimes. Because the army will rightly remain a political actor and a potential threat, reforming civil-military relations and the overall defense apparatus will boost the chances of democracy's sustainability. While rarely easy, civil-military relations are nevertheless essential to democratic governance, founded on agreed roles and responsibilities, and require a steady level of cooperation based on mutual respect, transparency and continuing education of civil and military leaders *together*.

Chapter 1
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

> In order for the colonial powers to extract economic largesse from their newly acquired territory, they needed to install a repressive state apparatus. In this way, the colonial state was above all a military state. Colonisation was often imposed by force of arms, or through intimidation based on the threat of force. The colonial order established by conquest was typically a military order which coerced the colonised peoples into a state of submission.[1]

Despite democratic hopes and aspirations, Africa continues to face the praetorian problem, i.e., the need to curb the political power of the military establishment and to confront the challenge of transforming the armed forces into a professional body committed to providing for the external security of the country. Civil-military relations have been strained in most African countries, perpetuating a pattern of estrangement between the military and society. As the continent transitions slowly towards democratization, the state of civil-military relations is likely to dictate the pace of reform. It is therefore imperative to rethink civil-military relations in order to establish the adequate institutional framework conducive to effective interaction between society and its defense and security forces. While not a panacea, democracy, through its values such as transparency, accountability and participation, offers the best opportunity for realizing human security. While the meaning of democracy is a hotly contested subject, its merits are now widely accepted and many African countries have, since the early 1990s, embarked on democratic transitions. However, even as the democratic transition has encompassed many African countries, it is important to recognize that African countries are on different trajectories in their transitions.

Because Africa's threat environment is constantly changing, the security needs of African societies evolve. While the long-term goals of achieving peace, stability, and economic prosperity across the continent are likely to remain relatively consistent, the methods for reaching them almost certainly will change to reflect Africa's own evolving definition of what security means. Because human security should be a public good, democracy offers the best tool to address security concerns on the continent. Specifically, the openness of democratic systems allows both civilian and military leaderships to start closing the security divide between them. Despite its timid steps on the continent, democratization might lead to genuine democratic transitions and better days for Africa. This is at least the hope of many on the continent, and this book seeks to contribute to the new discourse on healthy

1 Hussein Solomon, "Overcoming the Achilles Heel of the African Renaissance: The Legacy of the Colonial State," *Conflict Trends* April 1999, p. 28.

civil-military relations. At the outset, let us introduce some basic concepts and explore theoretical issues required to grasp the thrust of the discussion.

Basic Concepts

The relationships among the military, political leadership and society at large, as old as humanity itself, remain filled with intrigue, evolving from the moment society had to depend on part of its population to fight external aggression to contemporary instances where nations choose to invade others for various perceived interests. Because a conceptual study of civil-military relations within a democracy provides methodological challenges arising from the very nature of such relationships and definition of some key concepts and theories, this first chapter sets the stage by embarking on both epistemological and theoretical groundings of the book.

Civil-Military Relations

The legacy of colonial armies set civil-military relations in independent Africa off such a bad start, spawning 25 *coups d'état* in the first decade of independence.[2] By the twilight of Europe's scramble for Africa, the military had gained ascendancy over civilian leaders in many indigenous governments. According to Hull "the great leaders of Africa were no longer men of peace and statesmanship, but of war."[3] A few years after independence, government in Africa changed hand from charismatic civilian leaders to the military. Having experienced the use of colonial armies for civil repression, tax collection and conquest functions, new leaders were perplexed about the role the military should play in the overdue development process. Overall, the rise of the African military is well captured in McGowan's study. Between 1956 and 2001, there have been 80 successful *coups d'état*, 108 failed coup attempts and 139 reported coup plots in sub-Saharan Africa.[4]

In a broad sense, civil-military relations are about the interface between the security sector and the different segments of the society in which the security forces exist and operate. The relations focus especially on the processes, institutions and mechanisms by which the security sector is brought under constitutional civil authority. This includes how the security forces interface with other state institutions, civil society, the media, and social classes, as well ethnic and religious groups. Given Africa's history with civil-military relations, it is this broader meaning of civil-military relations that has applicability to the continent,

---

2 See Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'état: 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 41, no. 3 (2003), pp. 339–370.

3 Richard W. Hull, *Modern Africa: Change and Continuity.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980, p. 26.

4 McGowan, *op. cit*.

if security, democracy and development (social, economic and political) are to be realized. The civil-military relationship ranges from civilian supremacy over the security forces or vice-versa, to the mutual interfacing with each other for the benefit of a nation as a whole while simultaneously safeguarding the corporate interests of the military and those of civilians. Until the recent wave of democratization, most African countries fell somewhere between civilian supremacy and military domination.

A key factor in the state of civil-military relations in Africa has been the extent and nature of military's involvement in national politics and governance. The rash of military coups during the 1960s through the 1980s rendered complex the rapport between the nation's armed forces and its polity. This subverted civilian government and, in doing so, drove an even bigger wedge between the military and civilian populations and institutions. Whatever the reasons for the intervention, military involvement in politics generally has had the unfortunate effect of linking the military with the turmoil that many African countries have endured since independence. Not surprisingly, the military is associated with the political repression and endemic human rights abuses that characterized Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Confidence-building measures leading to a de-militarization of politics in Africa will have to be instituted to help repair this relationship and allow a genuine democratization.

Demilitarization and Democratization[5]

Similar to other political organizations in the state, the military participates in politics to protect its own corporate interests. This point is driven home by Uzoigwe when he contended and demonstrated (with cases) that "in no state, traditional or modern, is the military totally divorced from the political structure. The degree of integration, however, of the military and politics varies from state to state."[6] The military has, therefore, historically been a crucial political institution within the state—one that has never been totally divorced from politics as many people would like to believe. In essence, the military intervenes in the politics of all modern states—advanced industrial as well as non-industrial and developing.

Given the military's involvement and influence in African politics, current literature on democratization on the continent deals mainly with de-militarization which implies the "disengagement" or "withdrawal" of the military from the political arena.[7] For several decades, Africa has been dominated by militarization

5 This section draws on Said Adejumobi's unpublished paper entitled *Demilitarization and the Search for Democratic Stability in Nigeria*, Nigeria, 1999. Available on http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../UNPAN009003.pdf.

6 Godfrey Uzoigwe, "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa: Comparative Perspective," in Ali A. Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Africa op.cit*, p.23.

7 Adekson Bayo, *Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System*, Gower: Westview Press, 1998, p. 13.

or militarism. Militarization is viewed as the armed build-up and engagement of society, through military coups, authoritarian regimes, war, armed conflicts, internal military intervention and the dominance of patriarchal powerful military and repressive state apparatuses; while militarism refers to the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values, and discourses validating military power.[8] It is widely hoped that through de-militarization of African politics, the military will withdraw from politics. Consequently, these identified practices and norms associated with militarization and militarism would be vitiated and the polity and society would seek a civil balance.[9]

The problematic of this definition arises primarily from its simplistic casualty or symmetry between militarization/militarism and military rule.[10] The point to emphasize is that the practice of militarization and militarism is not synonymous with only military rule (but present also in civil regimes) hence, the withdrawal of the military from the political arena does not abrogate these practices. More especially, post-military states usually have entrenched norms and practices of militarism which are not easily deconstructed or eradicated with the formal transfer of political power from the military to civilians.[11] Consequently, the conceptualization of demilitarization must transcend the idea of the formal withdrawal of the military from the political arena. It must include the deconstruction of the ideological and institutional structures of militarism and authoritarian ethos, and the reassertion of civil control and democratic culture over the organs of the state, economy and civil society.[12] Civil society usually gets acculturated with the symbols, language, values and norms of militarism under military rule, which require being addressed and deconstructed in a post-military era. Conceiving demilitarization in this broader sense facilitates a linkage with the concept of democratization.

In Adejumobi's view, demilitarization and democratization are set in an organic linkage on two basic grounds. First, they share the same background and object. They both constitute attempts at the reconstruction of the political order from an autocratic, to a relatively more open political system. Second, they are in real senses, products of social and political struggles, meant to emancipate a people. The end result of both when properly concretized, should be the establishment of a democratic political order and society.[13]

---

8 See Robin Luckham, "The Military Militarisation and Democratization in Africa; A Survey of Literature and Issues," in Hutchful, Eboe and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds. *The Military and Militarism in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998, pp. 14–15. Also see, Willett, Susan, "Demilitarization, Disarmament and Development in Southern Africa," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 77 (1998), pp. 409–430.

9 See Said Adejumobi, *Demilitarization and the Search for Democratic Stability in Nigeria*, *op. cit*.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 See P. Batcher and S. Willet, *Disarmament and Defence; Industrial Adjustment in South Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1998.

13 Adejumobi, *op. cit.*

The Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Africa

The post-Cold War demand for reconstituting the political order in accordance with the principles of freedom and justice spread to Africa where conditions of authoritarian rule had persisted despite civil society's struggle to alter political dispensation on the continent. In many African countries, activists who had been detained in the past for their opposition to government gained more freedom to speak out. As political groups began to articulate their displeasure with dictatorial methods of rule, they quickly received popular support. It became clear that democracy or democratization—the process that leads to democracy—had gained a new momentum in Africa. Scholars' understanding of democratization became more sophisticated, emphasizing the dynamic aspects of the process. Democratization is no longer regarded as a mechanical journey toward a predestined outcome, but rather a means to an end that can "enable the mass of citizens to exert control over those governing in their name."[14]

Although the early euphoria has died down due to recent disappointments with the state of democratization on the continent, it is undeniable that a new era has begun in Africa.[15] In his attempt to describe the political transformation Africa experienced, Lewis summarized how African regimes were confronted with concerted pressures for democratization:

> The end of the Cold War disrupted the external alliances and rivalries that had long stabilized many governments. A combination of domestic opposition and global influence induced a majority of regimes to either liberalize their political systems or concede a transition to democratic rule. The ensuing political shifts proved beneficial to some countries but detrimental for a number of others. Most of the region's military and single-party states shifted toward some form of competitive politics, although in several instances regime change yielded new instability or increased conflict.[16]

However, the roots of such a change remain unclear. While several scholars attribute the political reforms to a more vibrant civil society, the very fact that democratization only occurred in countries where the military has either embraced or at least condoned it suggests alternative source of political change in Africa.[17]

Explaining why democracy is appealing to the world, Stepanek contends that "democratic governments honor universal human rights as values based in law. Democracy is also fundamental to progress because it welcomes initiative, creates

---

14 Robin Luckham and Gordon White, eds. *Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 3.

15 John A. Wiseman, *The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa*. Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1996, p. 35.

16 Peter Lewis, "Introduction: Development and Change in Africa," in P. Lewis, ed. *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change, Boulder*, CO: Westview Press, 1998, p. 6.

17 Chuka Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 73.

ownership, and builds consensus. Democracy is the foundation of development because it defines a process of consensus building and, in turn, ensures that benefits are shared. Centralized control of power, incentives, and distribution is unsustainable."[18] Three important aspects of conceptual concern emerged from recent theories of democratization: first, structural and contingent factors that create cracks in the edifice of both authoritarian and totalitarian rule;[19] second, the relative importance of élite behavior versus mass mobilization strategies of reform;[20] and, third, diffusionist explanations of change.[21] The first conceptual explanation maintains that structural and contingent factors usually create cracks in the edifice of personal rule forcing an authoritarian regime to open up. The second pits the relative importance of élite behavior versus mass mobilization. Here democratization engineered by élites from above is contrasted with the determination of the masses, from below, to toll the knell of a dictatorship. The last explanation, the diffusionist or domino theory, implies that the thaw of the Cold War has generated a new era of liberalization and democratization that affects every corner of the globe. In other words, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the thaw of Cold War inspired mass protests and serious challenges to inept and corrupt leadership.

At the expense of the military institution, contemporary scholars appear almost unanimous in their view that democracy and civil society have a dependent relationship. According to Yoshikazu Sakamoto, the struggle for and process of democracy underway in almost every society in the world could also take two different forms. One is "democratization from above" in which the initiatives, at least at the onset, are taken by the élite. The other is "democratization from below" caused by the popular struggle for democracy.[22] Whether it is from above or below, democratization, in Sakamoto's view, is triggered by civil society. Embracing to varying degrees these conceptualizations, the literature on democratization in Africa can be traced back to *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*, edited in 1987 by Peter Anyang' Nyong'o.[23] In the book, several essays by respected African scholars detail the emergence of democratic movements, but attribute

---

18 Joseph Stepanek, *Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, p. 159.

19 See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

20 See Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America" *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no. 1 (October 1990), pp. 1–21.

21 See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

22 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "The Global Context of Democratization," *Alternatives*, vol. 16, 1991, p. 121.

23 See Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, ed. *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. New Jersey, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1987; also P. Anyang'Nyong'o "Democratization Processes in Africa." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1991), pp. 13–17.

the phenomenon to the revolt of the popular masses. In his introduction, Anyang' Nyong'o argued that "broad-based movements of a popular alliance type ... can restore democracy to a country run down by dictatorship."[24]

A year later, Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset published *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*.[25] In their book, the editors employed a framework of comparative historical analysis. In an effort to link the prospect for durable democracy to the sources of democratization, contributors were asked to make "an exhaustive examination of all the historical, cultural, social, economic, political, and international factors" that "fostered and obstructed the emergence, instauration, and consolidation of democratic government around the world."[26] In each of the twenty-six countries explored, particular attention was paid to the cultural traditions, colonial heritage, and post-independence history "in order to explain the overall path of a country's political development."[27]

All along, the emphasis has been on civil society and its crucial role in democratization. As a matter of fact, Diamond maintained that a rich and vibrant associational life has developed in many African countries independent of the state, and such pluralism in civil society "has become the cutting edge of the effort to build a viable democratic order."[28] He went on to say later on that "the only absolute requirement for [political] transition (short of foreign conquest and imposition) is a commitment to democracy on the part of the strategic élite."[29]

In his quite elaborate description of the cause of the new wind of change in Africa, Wiseman focuses squarely on civil society, hardly mentioning the military:

> The pro-democratic movements of most African states in the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a remarkable coalescence of political participation by all levels of society from élite to mass élite. At the élite level, pressure came from educated groups that had managed to retain or were able to assert, some degree of autonomy from state control. Church leaders were especially prominent in a good number of cases. Enjoying a high level of popular respect in highly religious African societies, church congregations often represented one of the few legal ways of bringing people together in large numbers: the "political sermon" became common in this period. Professional associations, especially those organized by lawyers, medical staff and academics, played an important

---

24 Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, ed. "Introduction,"*Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. New Jersey, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1987, p. 15.

25 See Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol. 2: Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.

26 Ibid., p. xiii.

27 Ibid., p. xiv.

28 Ibid., p. 26.

29 See Larry Diamond, ed. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.

> role in the pressure for political reform. Members of these associations, along with students and journalists, were often prominent in the large numbers of groups established to promote the linked causes of democracy and human rights.[30]

After several attempts at understanding and explaining the fall of democratic regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead,[31] through their four-part series, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*, gave a major new impetus to the field of transition studies. Following the modernization theory's vanguardist role given to the supposed innovators of change in the development process, this book champions the strategic élite explanation of democratization. Intra-élite division, loss of legitimacy by incumbent authoritarian regimes, and a readiness on the part of dissatisfied élites to "overthrow" the regime are seen as necessary and sufficient conditions for democratization. Although the book also discussed the role of the military in democratic transition because the impetus for democratization in Portugal in the late 1960s emerged from within the armed forces, the emphasis is clearly placed on civil society. An entire chapter is devoted to resurrecting civil society. As a matter of fact, the book's praise of the "critical" role played by groups and individuals in civil society during democratic openings is frequently cited by analysts of popular protest and political reform in Africa.[32]

The appeal to civil society as an organizing concept is not puzzling. Indeed, there is widespread agreement across a range of theoretical perspectives that political accountability is an essential condition for democracy, and that the degree of accountability depends on the capacity of a robust and autonomous civil society to curb the hegemony of the state.[33] Having lost interest in civil society in the 1970s because of the rise of the party-state and personal rule, most Africanists began in the 1980s to once again associate civil society with the prospects for limiting state power.[34] Besides Anyang' Nyong'o and his co-authors who argue that "popular struggles" will smash "the neocolonial state," Robert Fatton, Jr., characterized civil society as a potentially subversive space in which dissidents

30 John Wiseman, "Introduction." in J. Wiseman, ed. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa,* New York, NY: Routledge, 1995, p. 5.

31 See O'Donnell et al., *op. cit.*

32 See for example Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle," Popular Protest and Political Transition in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 24, no. 4 (July 1992), pp. 419–42.

33 See John Lonsdale, "Political Accountability in African History," in Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 126–157.

34 See Dwayne Woods, "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power Through a Public Sphere," *African Studies Review,* vol. 35, no. 2 (1992), pp. 77–100.

grounded in private routes to power and wealth may, under certain conditions, force an autocratic regime to accept a democratic pact.[35]

Clearly, the significance of a lively civil society in achieving democracy, cannot, and should not, be ignored. But, the literature on democratization has over-emphasized the importance of civil society in African polity. Contrary to widely held views, democratization does not simply depend on civil society's behavior. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. To even burgeon, democracy in Africa requires the cooperation of the military as an institution or of military regimes,[36] and the fact that several emerging democracies, in countries where the military remained on the sidelines, reversed to military dictatorships testifies to that observation.

Democratization is the process of establishing, strengthening, or extending the principles, mechanisms, and institutions that define a democratic regime. It involves a liberalization of the political system, i.e., the opening of an authoritarian regime mostly under the ruler's own initiative, leading to a form of "limited authoritarianism." Liberalization is the first act of expansion of individual rights in authoritarian system. It is only after liberalization that democratization is possible. During democratization, the incumbent regime goes beyond expanding rights to establishing a popular political regime. There are four stages of democratization: a) decay; b) transition; c) consolidation; d) maturation. Out of these four steps, the most critical is the second phase during which only delicate rounds of negotiation can lead to a successful democratic transition.

For several decades, some have maintained that democratization has some prerequisites.[37] Among those social requisites that lead to higher prospects for democracy are industrialization, wealth, and education. By the same token, the linkages among poverty, development and democratization remain a subject of heated debate. When Samuel Huntington, in 1984, argued that it was unlikely for more countries to democratize, his assumption was that because poverty does not allow democracy to flourish, poor nations are stuck with authoritarian rule.[38] Barrington Moore's slogan of "no bourgeoisie, no democracy" conveys a similar message.[39] In Africa, that debate crystallized itself in the passionate dialogue

35 See Robert Fatton, Jr., *Predatory Rule: The State and Civil Society in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

36 Chuka Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 1.

37 See Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 69–105.

38 See Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1984), pp. 193–218.

39 See Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966.

between Anyang Nyong'o and Mkandawire in the early 1990s, on whether liberal democracy is possible in Africa without bourgeoisie.[40]

Despite renewed interest in democracy, adherents have failed to address questions such as whether democracy must be conceived as liberal democracy, whether democracy can only be applied to 'governmental affairs' (and not to the economic, social and cultural realms as well), and whether the most appropriate locus for democracy is the nation.[41] Although democracy seems to have scored an historic victory over alternative forms of government,[42] it remains an essentially contested concept.[43]

Democracy

Despite the elation generated by the new wave of democratization, there is little agreement on what democracy entails. Democracy has been controversial since its early stages. Even from the introduction of *demokratia* around the 5th century BC in several Greek city-states, disagreement surrounded the essential elements of democracy. The fact that slaves and women were not allowed to vote in ancient Greece raised a fundamental question about who "the people" were. Only after several centuries of social movements did suffrage become universal in the 20th century. Another bone of contention concerns the manner in which the people should rule: direct, liberal, representative or constitutional democracy? In Greek, Democracy means *Kratos* (authority) to *Demos* (the people). It is defined as a system of government that allows demos to decide its own fate through free, fair, and periodic multiparty elections. In contrast with the rule by the few (oligarchy), by one individual (monarchy or tyranny), or by the privileged/gifted (aristocracy), democracy is equated with "the rule by the people." According to Abraham Lincoln's definition (November 19, 1863), democracy has an all-embracing, all-encompassing definition and means "government of the people, by the people, for the people." However, the lack of consensus on the definition of the "people" led the French sociologist, Maurice Duverger[44] to suggest that Lincoln's citation be rather read as "government for the people by an élite derived from the people."

---

40 See Peter Anyang Nyong'o, "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa," *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1988, pp. 71–86, and Anyang Nyong'o, Peter, "A Rejoinder to the Comments on Democracy and Political Instability," *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988), pp. 83–87; also, Thandika Mkandawire, "Comments on Democracy and Political Instability," *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 3, 1988, pp. 77–82.

41 David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995, p. v.

42 Ibid., p. 3.

43 W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Aristotelian Society*, no. 56 1956, pp. 167–198.

44 See Maurice Duverger, *Les Partis Politiques*. Paris, France: Armand Colin, 1951.

Several contemporary scholars have also attempted to define democracy.[45] To Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.[46] Robert Dahl maintains that democracy is a system of political equality that promotes the freedom of individuals to live under laws of their own choosing.[47] Terry Karl believes that democracy is a political system with four critical characteristics: a) contestation over policy and political competition over office; b) participation of citizenry through partisan, associational, collective action; c) accountability of rulers through the ruled by mechanisms of representation; and d) civilian control of the military.[48] To Adam Przeworski, it is a system of processing conflicts in which parties that lose elections accept outcome and wait for next election.[49] Bratton and van de Walle see democracy as a minimal set of political procedures that allow citizens in a modern state to govern themselves.[50]

Several scholars and politicians including Hamilton, Madison, Montesquieu, and Kant, have all harbored some reservation/suspicion about democratic systems. However, a democratic political system seems to be the only system that allows greater freedom of choice and guarantees genuine civic rights to citizens. Although any political system can claim to further people's interest, and monarchy is a good example, only democracy allows the majority to rule, and not just benefit. While its meaning is contested, democracy does have merits that continue to enjoy wide acceptance and make democracy the system best suited to protecting the ruled or followers or citizens.

African scholars have also made their contribution to the debate. In Ali Mazrui's view for example, analyzing the prospects of democracy in Africa must distinguish between ultimate goals and necessary instruments for achieving them. It would make sense for African scholars to distinguish between fundamental rights and instrumental rights. The right to vote, for example, is an instrumental

---

45 For a historical overview of democracy, consult Roland N. Stromberg, *Democracy: A Short, Analytical History*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996; See also, George Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1993; and for a contemporary view, see Anthony H. Birch, *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, 2nd ed (London; New York: Routledge, 2001 Edition).

46 See Joseph A. Schumpeter. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London, UK: Allen and Unwin (Reprint in 1976).

47 Robert H. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics,* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

48 See Terry L. Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no. 1, October 1990, pp. 1–21.

49 See Adam Przeworski, "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Gordon, eds. *Democracy's Value.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

50 See Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

right designed to help achieve the fundamental right of government by consent.[51] By the same token it is important to distinguish between democracy as means and democracy as goals. The most fundamental of the goals of democracy are, according to Prof. Mazrui, four in number. The very first goal of a democracy is to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies. The second is to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers and in regulating their actions. The third is to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; and the final goal is to make the social order fundamentally just and equitable to the greatest number possible.[52]

Among those "who killed democracy" in Africa, Mazrui mentioned "the cultural half-caste who came in from Western Schools and did not adequately respect African ancestors."[53] He deplored how institutions were inaugurated without reference to cultural compatibilities, and new processes introduced without respect for continuities. Ancestral standards of property, propriety and legitimacy were all ignored. Above all, ingredients of democratic rule existing in traditional power, seriously downgraded under colonialism, were simply put to death. Clearly, traditional rulers understood the importance of having the support of their subjects. Mostly monarchical in nature, power in pre-colonial Africa nevertheless took into account the will of the people. Traditional political systems demonstrated tolerance, accommodation and peaceful coexistence, as embodied in checks and balances on the power of monarchs.[54] Although there still is a debate about the extent to which pre-colonial Africa was democratic, given the elements of caste, slavery, and gender discrimination found in pre-colonial societies, ancient African communities had several ingredients of democracy.[55] Without claiming that all traditional African societies were democratic, because some of them were ruled by despotic and vicious kings, it has been evidenced that many of them were relatively democratic in their practices.[56] Several prominent scholars, Africans and non-Africans alike, such as Ibn-Battuta, Cheikh Anta Diop, Lucy Mair, and Basil

---

51 See Ali A. Mazrui, "Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns for the Future," *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 1 (February), pp. 15–23. Available on http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs_site/dirton9.html accessed on 1/1/10. Also, a discussion on fundamental rights may be found in Milton R. Konvitz, *Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers/Rutgers University, 2001.

52 Ibid.

53 See Ali A. Mazrui, "Who killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future." *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 1, February 2002, pp. 15–23.

54 See George B.N. Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1992.

55 Kunz, Franz A., "Liberalization in Africa: Some Preliminary Reflections," *African Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 359 (1991), p. 227; also Lucy Mair, *African Kingdoms,* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977.

56 Onwumechili, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–14.

Davidson, to name a few, have eloquently argued that African history is replete with examples of fair and accountable governance that vanished with colonialism.[57]

Without reminiscing too much about the past, some have nevertheless called for modern democracy with an African touch on the continent. Making a unique case for African democracy, the late Claude Ake argued that Africa's democracy must reflect African realities.[58] While arguing that the tide of democracy is running strong in non-Western states, making military men uneasy in office, putting single-party presidents on the defensive, and revolutionary leaders on the run, Dennis Austin admits that Western democracy, although flattered by imitation, is unlikely to take root in non-Western societies. He maintains that to succeed, Africa's democracies must be homegrown.[59] Indeed, every single democracy is unique and must be adapted to the local context. However, democracy, because of its general principles, is very well suited to build on traditional African values and norms on accountability, public service, tolerance, dialogue and debate, and representation.

While exciting, the democratic opening in Africa is far from complete. There are several challenges facing Africa's current democratization process. Nigerian political scientist Ihonvbere doubts the genuineness of Africa's democracy because institutions, structure, and social relations or political culture remain unchanged.[60] Another Nigerian scholar, Adejumobi believes that as long as elections remain the

---

57 Specific treatments of African democracy may be found in Obioma M. Iheduru, ed., *Contending Issues in African Development: Advances, Challenges, and The Future.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001, and Teodros Kiros; with a preface by K. Anthony Appiah, *Explorations in African Political Thought: Identity, Community, Ethics.* New York: Routledge, 2001; and for a cultural approach, see Daniel T. Osabu-Kle, *Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa* (Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2000). Other works are: Eshetu Chole and Jibo Ibrahim, *Democratizaton Processes in Africa: Problems and Prospects*, Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995; Patrick Chabal, "A few considerations on Democracy in Africa," *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no.2, (1998), pp: 289–303. Goran Hyden, "Democratization and the Liberal Paradigm in Africa," *Africa Insight*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1997, pp. 162–163. Sadig Rasheed, "The Democratization Process and Popular Participation in Africa; Emerging Realities and the Challenges Ahead," *Development and Change,* vol. 26 (1995), pp. 333–354; G. Ntalaja, Nzongola and Margaret Lee, eds. *The State and Democracy in Africa*, Harare; AAPS, 1997.

58 See Claude Ake, "Rethinking African Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 33–44; also "The Unique Case of African Democracy," *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 2 (1993), pp. 239–244.

59 See Dennis Austin, ed. *Liberal Democracy in Non-Western States*, New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1995.

60 See Julius O. Ihonvbere, "On The Threshold Of Another False Start? A Critical Evaluation of Pro-Democracy Movements in Africa," in E. Ike Udogu, ed. *Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 21st Century*, Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1997, pp. 125–142. Also, "Where Is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa's Non-Transition to Democracy," in John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, eds. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change*, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998.

only criterion of democracy, Africans will simply experiment with a fading shadow of democracy.[61] In fact, some wonder whether Africa is on the threshold of another false start. The good news, however, is that recent evidence by Gyimah-Boadi and his colleagues suggest that hope is allowed.[62] Africans have overwhelmingly chosen democracy as their choice of government;[63] whether their choice is being honored is another issue. Ultimately, most scholars agree that democratic governance should create a political atmosphere in which none of the major political actors considers no alternative to democratic processes, and in which no institution or group can veto the action of democratically-elected decision makers. Besides competition, inclusiveness, and civil liberties, Africa's emerging democracies must create a socio-economic environment capable of sustaining political stability and protecting the ruled from both the ruler and any type of threats.

The spread of democracy in Africa has been one of the most heartening trends of recent years. Democracy can ensure that a country's political and economic affairs are conducted in ways compatible with the interests and wishes of the people. Democracy provides the environment within which fundamental rights are protected. While democratic regimes may not always be virtuous, autocratic governments can never be trusted with the citizens' welfare. In Anyang's view, the built-in accountability of democracy can lead to more responsible use of public resources and hence, high levels of development.[64] Africa needs democracy not only because democracy is desirable in itself, but because it will greatly facilitate development.[65]

In Africa, the post-Cold War democratization wave was dubbed the "second liberation." When massive demonstrations first called for a new political order, some scholars gave democracy no chance on the continent. Concurring with the idea that "outside the core [industrialized nations] democracy is a rarity … [and] with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached."[66] However, Africans beat the odds, as centralized and incompetent authoritarian governments gave way to democratic regimes with legitimacy and a mandate to attempt to right so many years of wrongs in Africa. Frustrated by declining economies and degrading standards of living, Africans demanded an end to corrupt and misguided rule. All over the continent, the advent of democracy

---

61 See Said Adejumobi, Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy? *International Political Science Review,* vol. 21, no. 1 (2000), pp. 59–73.

62 See Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, ed. Democratic *Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

63 See Afrobarometer recent surveys available on http://www.afrobarometer.org/.

64 Peter Anyang, "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa," *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1988), pp. 71–86.

65 Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1996.

66 Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 218.

brought a genuine sense of relief and hope. While the process continues to unfold, many Africans for the first time in a generation had an opportunity to engage, if imperfectly, in the political life of their nations.

In this book, democracy is conceptualized as political democracy defined in the conventional Schumpeterian or representative sense, in which the emphasis is on free and universal suffrage in a context of civil liberties, on competitive parties, on the selection of alternative candidates for office, and on the presence of political institutions that regulate and guarantee the role of government and opposition.[67]

Theoretical Issues

There is consensus that African democracies should be aiming at "civil control" of security institutions, defined by civil supremacy and oversight of defense and security, the political sterilization of the armed forces and other security agencies, and respect for human rights. This aspiration is embodied to various degrees in many of the new "democratic" constitutions on the continent. In an outstanding book edited by Robin Luckham and Gavin Cawthra and entitled *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, several scholars explore the challenges of establishing democratic accountability and control over the military and other security establishments in countries which have either been the victims of authoritarian military rule or wracked by violent internal conflict.[68]

Prof. Eboe Hutchful has fleshed out the semantic complexities of the issue of democratic control of the security sector.[69] Clearly, while governance has a fundamental role in security sector reform, the principles of good governance of the security sector—democratic and civilian control of the security sector; transparency, oversight, and accountability for security policies, decisions, and practices; respect for human rights; compliance with international law; and legitimacy of the security sector in the eyes of the public—remain largely aspirational, as no state will perfectly adhere to such standards at all times. For added complexity, basic receptivity of local parties to these good governance

67 Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin (Reprint in 1976), p. 269.

68 See Robin Luckham and Gavin Cawthra, eds. *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan and Zed Books, 2003.

69 See Eboe Hutchful, "Democratic Control of the Security Sector in Africa," paper presented at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Senior Leaders Seminar, Gaborone, Botswana, 2005.

principles is a necessary precondition for governance reform as well as its desired end state.[70]

Civil Supremacy or Control?

While there seems to be an agreement that under a democratic system, some sort of control of the security sector is required, there still is a debate around whether there should be civil supremacy or control. According to Prof. Hutchful, several questions come to mind regarding the issue of control: what is "civil supremacy"? Why civil supremacy (or "control")? How is "civil control" to be implemented or realized? According to Aguero (1997), civil supremacy implies the ability of government to:

a. conduct general policy without interference from the military and security institutions;
b. define the goals and organization of security institutions and the policies to govern them;
c. determine the best personnel charged with these tasks or functions; and
d. monitor and review the implementation of policy.[71]

In other words, civil control consists of the right of the political authorities to initiate policy and define strategic goals (roles and missions), determine the deployment of armed forces, decide budgetary and resource levels, and undertake monitoring (audit), evaluation and review of defense policy, structures, and performance. However, although the concept of civil control is accepted as routine —even axiomatic—in Western democratic discourse, it is both counterintuitive and historically problematic, and far from obvious to countries undergoing democratic transitions.

According to Prof. Hutchful, *control* is a slippery concept, especially if interpreted in the narrow and adversarial Anglo-Saxon fashion of direction and authority. In reality, *control* in a wider sense refers to concepts of inspection and oversight. In effect, *control* if it has much meaning, refers to the establishment of a hierarchy of status and function, rather than day-to-day hands on management. It refers to the position that the military and the security sector have with regard to other parts of the political system.[72] Since a number of different formulae have been put forward, and different terms are often used, sometimes with the

70 See Madeline England, "Security Sector Governance and Oversight: A Note on Current Practice," A Stimson Report, September 4, 2009. Available on http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/SSR_Governance_oversight_security_sector_4sept09_FINAL.pdf.

71 See Felipe Aguero "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America," in Larry Diamond et al., eds. *Consolidating Third Wave Democracies*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 1997.

72 See Hutchful, 2005, *op. cit*.

same apparent meaning, a few simple definitions may help. The word *civil* in this context refers to the state, of which the security sector is a part, at the disposal of the elected government provided it acts in a legal and constitutional fashion. Thus, *civil control* exists when the government controls the budgets, administration and operations of the agencies of the security sector and these agencies act according to the government's direction. *civil control* can exist in any political system, whether democratic or not.[73]

This is often confused with civilian control, a concept which is difficult to define and not very helpful. There is, after all, no reason of logic or ethics why civilians should be in control of military forces rather than the military. Civilians are not inherently nicer or more democratic than the military are. Moreover, 'civilian' control of the wider security sector is a messy and awkward concept, since many parts of that sector are run by civilians anyway. And many policemen would be uncomfortable with a definition which implies that they existed in a category apart from the community they serve. If the concept has any utility, it is probably in reminding us of the practical importance, in a democracy, of having elected politicians, properly advised by civilian political experts, in control of the security apparatus. It is also desirable that a government should have such people answerable to parliament across the whole range of government activities, including security. Thus, *civilian control* exists when major decisions about the functioning of the security sector are taken, or at least endorsed, by civilians. Again, this does not imply that the state concerned is a democracy.[74]

Constitutional control differs from 'civilian control' in that it entails two further properties. The first is the exercise of key functions of oversight and regulation by the legislature or the elected representatives of the people. The second element is the use of force in a manner in keeping with the maintenance of *constitutional* rights. However, as several commentators have pointed out, the admission of African legislatures into the defense and security policy game has not always led to the necessary transparency and empowerment of the public and civil society. By contrast, democratic control (or *oversight*) goes beyond parliamentarism to empowerment of civil society and media. All three elements of the "civil"—executive, legislature, and public—are present, and need to be if the interests of the public are to be served. In democratic countries, then, *civil control* takes the form specifically of *democratic control*.[75]

Finally, democratic control is another slippery concept, which cannot imply that parliament controls the security forces in any real sense; that would be not only practically impossible, but doubtful constitutionally. What is really at issue here is the way in which the government runs the security sector, which should in principle be the same as it runs any other part of the state in a democracy. Thus, *democratic control* exists when the security sector is subject to broadly the same

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.

pattern of checks and balances as any other organ of government in a democracy.[76] Under democratic control, the security sector serves the public as guided by their elected representatives.

Taming African Militaries

While democracy has revived some degree of hope on the continent, its future depends on civil or democratic control of the military, which, according to Welch, means that "the government, headed by a civilian, makes the key decisions which the armed forces are expected to carry out, loyally, efficiently, and unquestioningly, within their professional capabilities."[77] In other words, although the military influences matters of direct concern to its functioning, it acts within constitutionally defined and accepted channels, following a recognized chain of command in which ultimate power rests in the head of the government.[78] Because of its importance in African politics, the military plays a critical role in achieving sustainable democracy on the continent. Indeed, if democratization is to succeed, the military, like other state institutions, must acknowledge and accept civilian oversight of its activities. However, the new paradigm should also resolve the issue of legitimacy of those who are supposed to be exercising democratic oversight. Civilian control should not be seen as an entitlement but rather flow from power/authority gained through the population as expressed via genuine free and fair elections. Combating the traditional military control of the civilians in Africa should also be true of civilians, most of whom came to power through illegitimate means, dictating their rules to the military. The issue of civil-military relations, successfully addressed in Western democracies, has remained a taboo in Africa. But with new hopes and expectations, it has become central to the political and economic development of the continent. Contrary to conventional wisdom, constitutional processes are insufficient to lead to democratic transition or consolidation, without improved civil-military relations.

There seems to be a love-hate relationship between the African military and society on the one hand, and between the military and government on the other. What remains crucial is that civil-military relations need to be restructured in order to ensure sustainable peace and security within society.[79] While an army is necessary to the defense and protection of a territory, its involvement in politics when not under civilian control, could and did prove disastrous to national development as

76 Ibid.

77 Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms: Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, p. 12.

78 Ibid., p. 13.

79 Naison Ngoma, "Civil-Military Relations: Searching for a Conceptual Framework with an African Bias," in G. Chileshe, M. Chimanse, N. Ngoma, P. Lwando, eds. *Civil-Military Relations in Zambia*, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p. 6.

well as the African continent as a whole. A key principle in Clausewitz's views on war is that politics should always be in command. While the general must advise civilian authorities, especially on questions of feasibility, the setting of political goals remains in the civilians' hands.[80] After decades of military control of civilians, it is now time for civilian supremacy. Building and maintaining stable civil-military relations is a cardinal principle of democratic governance because it allows a civil supremacy over the armed forces. The military accepts its subordination to the elected civilian authorities, and appropriate mechanisms are established to ensure civil oversight without civilian interference. However, John Clark's assertion regarding the likelihood of coups on the continent reminds keen observers of African politics that bringing the military under civilian control will be a daunting task:

> There are countless incentives for military officers, and sometimes ordinary soldiers, to seize power in African states. Successful coup-makers stand to gain the psychological satisfaction, status, and material riches that accrue to African rulers without having to take on the drawn-out and often frustrating task of building a political constituency. In virtually every African army, a charismatic military figure must at some time ponder the prospect of seizing power. Also, many African societies are so inured to military intervention as not to regard it as aberrant.[81]

Because their most fundamental purpose is to wage armed conflict, military institutions are designed for violence and coercion, and over the centuries have developed the organizational structure, operating procedures, and individual values needed to succeed in war. Authority in the military emphasizes hierarchy so that individuals and units act according to the plans and decisions of commanders, and can succeed under the very worst of mental and physical circumstances. While many of the military's personal values—courage, honesty, sacrifice, integrity, loyalty, service—are among the most respected in human experience, the norms and processes intrinsic to these institutions so diverge from the premises of democratic society that the two exist in what is often an uneasy partnership in many African countries.[82] Clearly, an understanding of civil-military relations provides insight for the military strategist into the interplay between politics and the military as an institution. A framework of how civilian leadership and the military relate in formulating national security objectives may prove useful not only in developing military strategies but also in keeping the military under civilian control.

---

80 Michael G. Roskin and Nicholas O. Berry, IR: *The New World of International Relations,* 6th ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005, p. 200.

81 John F. Clark, "The Decline of the African Military Coup," *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 18, no. 3 (July 2007), p. 141.

82 Richard H. Kohn, "An Essay on the Civilian Control of the Military," 1997. Available on http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html.

Military Subordination or Civilian Interference?

Among the oldest problems of human governance has been the subordination of the military to political authority: how a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or physical force. Since the earliest development of organized military forces in ancient times, governments, particularly republican or democratic governments, have been vulnerable to either being destroyed, overturned, or subverted by their armies. All forms of government, from the purest democracies to the most savage autocracies, whether they maintain order and gain compliance by consent or by coercion, must find the means to assure the obedience of their military—both to the regime in power and to the overall system of government.

In a Clausewitzian tradition, war would be merely the continuation of politics by other means, making the military a tool of policy. Scholars have long known that the ways in which civilian political leaders relate to their military establishments can have a powerful effect on policy. As a tool of statecraft, military force is, however, well-suited to certain tasks and ill-suited to others.[83] Nevertheless, men bearing arms and/or on horseback have always played major, direct political roles in practically all societies, including African ones. Armed forces are regular, recognized participants in the political process of most countries, even if the precise roles they have played and responsibilities they have exercised vary. The nature and extent of military involvement in politics are neither constant nor uniform.[84] In ancient times, aggression was acceptable, even expected, and undeclared wars were a way of life. Powerful monarchies demonstrated their greatness by raising imposing buildings or by waging successful wars. Military campaigns were used to increase prestige and display sheer superiority. They also served the economy by ensuring a flow of foreign goods. Often, military strength was viewed as necessary for diplomatic negotiations. Initially, the army would invade to seize whatever booty was available, not to annex land. Seldom were garrisons of troops stationed in conquered territories, because these remained in local hands. Before leaving, conquering power extracted a promise from the invaded land to send an annual tribute. There was, however, little incentive to comply without a continued army presence.[85]

This system of raid and retreat allowed domination without expansion or imperialism. Gradually, emperors subdued territories, cowed the population with harsh measures and installed governors to rule the conquered people, adding troops

83 Noboru Yamaguchi and David Welch, "Soldiers, Civilians, and Scholars: Making Sense of the Relationship between Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy," *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2005), p. 216.

84 Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, p. 1.

85 Bob Brier and Hoyt Hobbs, *Daily Life of the Ancient Egyptians*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999, p. 201.

to their army with every conquest. Society had to change to match the new reality. A warrior society conscripted every able-bodied man to fight for the monarchy. The transformation from *ad hoc* armies to standing ones altered civil-military relations in a profound way. War had become a major industry, and an empire's worth was mainly based on its ability to wage war. Besides blacksmithing and shield making that rose as new prominent occupations, a warrior tradition came to life.

While some rulers were imperialistic and conquered for the sake of personal aggrandizement, others inherited confederacies and empires created by their predecessors but not institutionally or constitutionally consolidated. They needed a very strong army to keep the newly conquered areas under their control. African peasant and servile populations paid the price of conquest through draft and those who resisted conscription had to take refuge in stockaded villages. In some regions, outlying farms were no longer tended and became unproductive.[86] The Trans-Saharan Trade faded out of concern over militarism since merchants feared to travel unarmed or alone.

By the eve of the European scramble for Africa, the armed forces had gained ascendancy over civilian leaders in many indigenous governments. Greatness was no longer represented by attitudes toward peace and statesmanship but depended rather on ability to win wars. According to Hull:

> In the 1870s, King Kabalega of Bunyoro and others like him, created large standing armies, depleted state treasuries on increasingly sophisticated weaponry, and transferred military responsibilities from the chiefs to new groupings of professional soldiers. Yet the chiefs still were expected to contribute a growing number of fighting men, arms and war materiel … These unfortunate victims [draftees] would either be impressed into the army or sold into bondage in order to finance purchase of more materiel.[87]

The growing power of the military rendered the relationship between African armed forces and civilians quite difficult. A policy of unquestioned subordination to the military gradually gave way to resentment and insubordination. Charged with defending the national interest and the homeland, the military put itself above any other institution within society. At the root of the idea of the national interest lies the principle of national security and survival. Because the defense of the homeland and the preservation of territorial integrity presumed that all other policy preferences are subordinate, the military gained undue respectability and influence in most African societies. From collaborative, civil-military relations took a bellicose turn, with devastating consequences.

Interaction between civilians and the military remains a critical as well as controversial relationship in any country, whether democratic or authoritarian.

---

86 Richard Hull, *Modern Africa: Continuity and Change*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980, p. 25.

87 Ibid, p. 26.

In principle, civilians and the military are from two distinct realms, each with a specific set of functions. While the decision to go to war is made by the civilian political establishment, the actual conduct of war on the battlefield lies in the hand of the armed forces.[88] Yet this relationship is not as simple as it appears at first glance. There often emerge situations in which the traditional division of labor between civilians and the military becomes blurred.[89] These situations may range from differences in the nature of a country's political system to the type of external threat facing a country. As a consequence, the dichotomous relationship between civilians and the military can move towards either giving civilians or the military greater control over decisions of war. While the West has managed to put a lid on the military's behavior, Third World countries in general and African in particular continue to struggle for the appropriate *modus vivendi*.

Consequently, a key issue in contemporary emerging democracies in Africa concerns the nature of civil-military relations. Often fraught with tension, these relations depict years of animosity, violence, and suspicion. The military and political leadership typically represent groups which, because of divergent interests, have engaged in the past in direct acts of violence against each other, and remain, to a great extent, very suspicious of each other.

But even where there is a military will to collaborate with civilian authorities to restore democratic oversight over the armed forces, parliamentary defense committees and other civilian authorities charged with making sure the military is within its constitutionally defined boundaries may not be fulfilling their responsibilities. Decades of military authoritarian rule seem to have left severe marks on the civilians. They not only lack expertise in military matters, but also display no desire to acquaint themselves with their mission and tools and take responsibility for providing oversight and direction to the military. This generates frustration among army officers because civilians continue to shy away from the military out of ignorance or fear.[90]

Decades of military involvement in politics have made withdrawal a Herculean task, especially when there is no clear demarcation between roles, and civilian leaders continue to misbehave, giving all kinds of excuses to the armed forces to step in. An exclusive emphasis on civilian control and military subordination in these situations is likely to be resented and resisted by senior officers. The military

88 Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

89 This has been referred to as the "civil-military problematique" by Peter Feaver who argues that there is an underlying tension between what civilians want and what the military wants. Sometimes maintaining a balance between the two becomes quite difficult and may give rise to a conflictual relationship between civilians and the military. This problem has been elaborated in Feaver's "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1996), pp. 149–178.

90 See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "Civil-military relations in Nicaragua: report of an NDI delegation," unpublished paper, March, 1993.

hierarchy regards new forms of control as political interference which undermines their personal integrity and that of their profession. Stability in civil-military relations therefore requires a deliberate effort to build mutual trust. In this sense, the term "confidence-and security-building measures," which usually applies to inter-state relations, also has domestic application in emerging democracies.[91]

It might be a wishful thinking to expect the military to remain completely out of politics in Africa. As Claude Welch, Jr., proffers, economic, historical, sociological, and political facts have encouraged endemic military intervention in changing governments. Although citizens in consolidated democracies have been accustomed to seeing the military under civilian control, it cannot be assumed that the armed forces can ever be totally divorced from political issues, i.e. from the exercise of power.[92] In Welch's view, "all armed forces are politically significant. They protect national frontiers, defend domestic order (as defined by those in control) at times of national turmoil, lobby for and consume national resources, and serve as channels of mobility for selected individuals."[93] The problem in most African countries is that the military goes beyond these responsibilities, becoming the maker and breaker of governments.

Even in stable democratic societies, the armed forces are not a neutral and passive instrument for implementing government decisions. Senior officers invariably seek to advance their institutional interests in competition with other state bodies, and to contribute to the formulation of defense policy on the basis of their functional expertise. What is critical is how the rapports between the armed forces and civilians are constructed, and also how and why the military expand their role in society. To avoid the feeling of civilian interference in military domain or military encroachment in civilian realm, an expression of mutual uneasiness and apprehension, civil-military relations clearly must be based not only on control or oversight but also on dynamic interaction and co-operation between the military and civilian leadership.[94]

---

91 See Laurie Nathan, "With Open Arms: Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Southern Africa," in: *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa*, Disarmament, Topical Papers No 14, New York: United Nations, 1993, pp. 118–134.

92 Welch, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

93 Ibid.

94 Laurie Nathan, "The New Partnership: Stabilising Civil-Military Relations in Africa," Conference on *Military and Civil Society*, Africa Leadership Forum, South Africa, September 23–25, 1996.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 2
Civil-Military Relations in Africa

> Many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organizational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal grievances. One direct corollary is that when the military assumes power it is frequently not able to provide an efficient, nationally oriented and stable administration.[1]

Until recently, African military history was understudied. Very little was known on how traditional African states fought their wars and with what forms of organization. In an edited volume, *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*,[2] Ali Mazrui and his colleagues tried to grasp the full range of the meeting point between culture, war, and politics in Africa. They documented the warrior tradition on the continent as a "sub-system of values and institutionalized expectations which define the military role of the individual in the defense of his society, the martial criteria of adulthood, and the symbolic obligations of manhood in time of political and military stress."[3] The coming of statehood in Africa absorbed the warrior tradition into a larger complex of military organization, thereby assigning a different mission to the military in society. Gradually, the military gained more influence in society, although it remained under civilian control until the era of colonialism.

While recent involvement and behavior of the military has generated some animosity between civilians and their armed forces, the army has been involved in politics for quite a while in Africa. The politicization of any society involves some form of militarization. The organization of the warriors' functions, rights, and privileges becomes an essential aspect of the very polity. Both economic and political survival demand stability and military preparedness. The pursuit of competitive advantage, security, and glory, as discussed by Hobbes as the basic instinct of human nature (competition, diffidence, and glory) became the denominator of the survival equation. Warfare became the best avenue to further the interests of monarchies all over the world. According to Mazrui, "the politicization of society had its origins less in economics than in combat … The emergence of political authority was linked more to the dictates of military survival than the

---

1 Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 14–15.

2 See Ali Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977.

3 Ibid., p. 2.

impulse of economic self-sufficient."[4] In any society, the principle of expanding authority had to do with military strength and prowess.

Civil-Military Relations: A Review of the Literature

Although the degree and extent of military influence and involvement in politics differ from society to society, in one way or another the military has always been involved in national politics, regardless of whether the military is operating in the developed or developing world. As politics is about the authoritative allocation of values in a society, no military would want to opt out from participating in the political process in some way at any time. A military's involvement in politics covers a whole continuum, from minimal to maximal influence, depending on the ability of the civilian political leadership to hold on to power, the state of internal and external threats, and the officer corps' image about its role and place in society.[5]

According to Clausewitz and most constitutions, soldiers, while not necessarily apolitical, are the servants of civilian political leaders, not vice-versa. They do make political judgment and express political opinions, far more common than civilian leaders making military judgments.[6] According to Feaver, the central task of the study of civil-military relations is to determine whether it is possible "to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what the civilians authorize."[7] However, a mere distinction between assertion and delegation is not enough. Even under an assertive regime, the military could find ways to act in their own preferences, rather than those of their putative civilian masters. Similarly, under a delegative regime, civilians will find ways to somehow trump the military's judgment. The assertion-delegation distinction simply does not tap into deeper issues, such as the degree to which civilian and military leaders differ from each other, or from society as a whole, on their understandings of what constitutes, and what will serve the "national interest."[8] In reality, this is the Gordian knot of how readily the military will comply with civilian direction.

One of the fundamental and enduring concerns within the literature on civil-military relations is that of securing and maintaining civil supremacy over the military. In short, civil supremacy is based on a set of ideas, institutions and behaviors, which limit the potential for military intervention in political affairs and provide a system that endows civilian officials with the authority,

4 Ibid., p. 19.

5 Ibid.

6 Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p. 219.

7 Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 2.

8 Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p. 222.

and mechanisms to exercise supremacy in military affairs. This concern with civil supremacy has become more pronounced in the past decade with the triumph of democracy on a global scale, the resolution of many of the cold war related conflicts and the preoccupation with de-militarization, peace-building and sustainable development. In general, the literature on civil supremacy is preoccupied with the mechanics of controlling the armed forces, such as legislative oversight and military professionalism. A few case study analyses of the factors and processes contribute to the maintenance of civil supremacy (or the lack thereof) over extended periods of time.[9]

The literature on civil-military relations reflects two sets of concerns: first, the degree of autonomy of the military from civilian power and its influence on democratic and civilian control of the military; and, second, the propensity of the military to interfere in civilian affaires and stage coups. In his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues that civil-military relations are shaped by three key variables: the functional imperative (high or low external threat); ideology (whether society as a whole was liberal or conservative); and constitutional structure (whether the civilians are united as in parliamentarian systems with majority governments, or divided, as is the case when the executive and the legislature share oversight responsibilities).[10] Different configurations of variables produce different patterns of civilian control ranging on a continuum.[11] To tackle the first set of concerns, Huntington suggests a civilian control of the military through either "subjective" or "objective" control. While subjective mechanisms of control occur through the maximization of civilian power in undemocratic settings, it is likely to politicize the military because powerful civilian actors might use the military as a chessboard for influence. Conceivably, under subjective control the military could play civilians off against each other, effectively undermining the very principle of civilian control.[12] In contrast, objective control, according to Huntington, allows the military to cultivate expertise relatively free from civilian interference, thereby establishing a virtuous cycle: greater professionalism would lead to greater subservience, leading to greater autonomy and trust, leading to even greater professionalism.[13] In Huntington's view, objective control in a democracy results from professionalism, a clear separation of responsibilities between civilian and military sectors. He asserts that the military officer in Western societies meets the ideal characteristics of professionalism: expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. As Kurt Lang points out, "the concept of professionalism provides a useful framework for the analysis

9 See Claude E. Welch, ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976; also C.P. Danopoulos, ed. *Civilian Rule in the Third World*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

10 See Huntington, *op. cit*.

11 Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p. 222.

12 Ibid., p. 223.

13 Ibid.

of many aspects of the military ethos and officer behavior, including how willing they are to limit their political role to expert advice of strictly military issues."[14]

As an expert in the management of violence the military professional is unique in the society, but he or she is loyal to the state, obedient to civilians, and dedicated to using his expertise for the protection of the state. As such, the professional soldier is politically neutral.[15] The military's political neutrality is therefore guaranteed by its professional ethos.[16] By definition, military involvement in politics evidences a failure of professionalism. Besides political neutrality, "the issue of professionalism of the military is a crucial one because the ability of the military institution to read the emerging political terrain and to develop a coherent strategy to negotiate protection of its core and legitimate professional interests is an essential aspect of the transition process."[17] However, If Huntington's view holds true in Western countries, its utility in disentangling civil-military relations in Africa is quite limited. As pointed out by Decalo,[18] the military's subordination as hypothesized by Huntington has not worked very well on the continent, because most African states tend not to operate within an established framework of viable and widely based institutions, even when they have been legitimized.[19]

Challenging Huntington's assertion, Morris Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier*, contended that changes in technology, society, and missions had rather led to an inevitably more political role for the professional soldier.[20] He argues that a politicized officer is actually a more adequate representation of civil-military relations in the developing world. Military professionalism meant something quite different in the nuclear era than it did in the heyday of the muskets and canon. Military professionalism in a conscript army differed significantly from military professionalism in an all-volunteer army. Janowitz does agree with Huntington that the key to civilian control is a close fit between civilian and military values, because if a gap emerged between the two, the military would become alienated from civilian authority, and tempted to act according to their own lights.[21] For Janowitz, the military officer is required to have skills comparable to those of

---

14 Kurt Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972, p. 31.

15 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 26, nos. 1–2 (1991), p. 2.

16 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957.

17 Hutchful, *op. cit*., p. 55.

18 Samuel Decalo, "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 1989), p. 558.

19 Kisangani N.F. Emizet, "Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000), p. 204.

20 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional: A Social and Political Portrait*, London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.

21 Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p., 224.

civilian administrators and political leaders without necessarily becoming political. Evidently, politicization of the military inevitably generates a challenge to civilian supremacy. Clearly, the healthy debate between Huntington and Janowitz, because they both provided important insights into civilian and military attitudes to the use of force, advanced our understanding of civil-military relations theory. In Feaver's words, "where Huntington provides a static, ideal model of civil-military relations, Janowitz posits a dynamic military organization that changes with different sociopolitical conditions."[22]

Still dismissing Huntington's contention, Bengt Abrahamsson posited that the military is far from being apolitical, but rather a politicized and active interest group. In Abrahamsson's view the key to maintaining democratic control over the armed forces is to acknowledge, first and foremost, the military's political nature and design appropriate control mechanisms that allow civilian governments a fair choice in their defense options.[23] In his attempt to design a unified theory of civil-military relations, Douglas Bland challenged the very assumption of a confrontational relationship between the military and civilian authorities, advocating regimes of "shared responsibility" between civilian leaders and military officers.[24]

Other scholars have explored the second point, the military's involvement in *coups d'état*. One of the most useful contributions is Samuel Finer's *The Man on the Horseback*. Finer argues that military involvement in politics cannot be understood solely by reference to the military; rather, military involvement is inversely related to the level of a country's political culture. He finds a correlation between military intervention and political culture, and contends that civilian control of the military appears stronger in countries with high political culture, while coup-prone countries are those of low political culture.[25] In a similar vein, Riggs maintains that states emerging from colonial rule manifested unbalanced institutional development and were coup-prone, because the institutions of state control, the military and civilian bureaucracy, were more highly developed than comparable institutions of popular participation. The military is encouraged to intervene because of the incompetence of politicians and political institutions.

Following this lead, Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* links the likelihood of a military coup to societal evolution. Military intervention in politics, "political disorder," is the consequence of a failure of a country's political

---

22 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civil Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 154.

23 Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, London, UK: Sage Publications, 1972, p. 160.

24 See Douglass Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 7–25.

25 Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.

institutions to cope with rising demands for expanding political participation caused by rapid social change. Contrasting "civic society" with "praetorian society," Huntington suggested that high levels of institutionalization and low levels of participation prevent the military from getting involved in politics in the first environment, while low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation propelled the military into politics.[26] The specific role that the military plays in the politics of a particular nation-state, and the degree of military intervention is a function, therefore, of the relevant level of political development of the state.[27]

Other contributors to this debate have focused on the importance of external threats in influencing military intervention in politics. Back in 1941, Harold Lasswell hypothesized that in the future, the world of the garrison states would prevail—power to the specialists of violence. They would acquire skills of civilian management, rule autocratically, equalize income for solidarity. Lasswell argued that high levels of external threats create a "garrison state" more prone to both military involvement in politics and popular acceptance.[28] Conversely, Stanislav Andrzejewski maintained that an idle military, with no external threat to address, is more likely to interfere in domestic political matters.[29] More recently, Michael Desch has sought to improve on Huntington's models in two important ways. First, by treating internal threat as an additional independent variable; and second, by testing his revised model across a range of cases.[30] He suggests that high levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat lead to stronger civilian control of the military, while high levels of both external and internal threats result in poor civilian control. He also believes that low levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat result in the worst civilian control while low levels of both external and internal threats result in mixed civilian control.[31]

Agency theory, advocated by Feaver, a disciple of Huntington's, represents the newest attempt to grapple with civil-military relations theory.[32] This theory draws on the principal-agent framework to explain how economic masters (principals) influence the behavior of the subordinates (agents) to whom they have delegated specific responsibilities. According to agency theory, civilians or principals, granted primacy by democratic theory, enter into a contract with the military

---

26 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order and Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

27 Kennedy and Louscher, *op. cit*., p. 3.

28 Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 46 (1941), p. 455–468.

29 Stanislav Andrzejweski, *Military Organization and Society*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1954.

30 Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

31 Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

32 See Feaver, *op. cit*.

agents to protect from threats. When military agents do what civilian principals want them to do without undermining civilian authority, they are "working." But, if *a contrario*, military agents failed to obey or faithfully execute orders, they are "shirking."[33] Agency theory does not however assume military obedience. It recognizes that civilian principals and military agents interact strategically in a bureaucratic setting. Military agents have their own preferences over policy, and these may or may not converge with civilian preferences. According to Yamaguchi and Welch, "agency theory has the virtues of parsimony and generality, as well as the crucial advantage over earlier models of being able to provide a compelling account of how civilian control plays out on a day-to-day basis."[34]

Out of all these views emerged three basic models of civil-military relations. The first, Roman Kolkwoicz's interest group approach, treats the military like any other interest group with a particular set of discrete interests, including the maintenance of the standard of living of the military forces, a big portion of the government budget, a high level of domestic and international tension, and a great deal of autonomy to manage its own affairs. This model predicts unstable civil-military relations. The second model, William Odom's institutional congruence, envisages basic harmony between civilian and military authorities because they arrive at a consensus of common challenges and goals facing the state. Finally, Timothy Colton's participatory model foresees cooperative or contentious relations, depending on circumstances and stakes, between civilian and military authorities.[35]

Ultimately, Bienen suggests going beyond accommodation and control in civil-military relations, and exploring the impact of such relations on the widest set of political processes and outcomes. A military's own understanding of its corporate interests is critical to its very definition in society and its relationship to the state.[36] He further maintains that there are many gradations and a good deal of flux in the determination of power between military, police, civil service, and civilian politicians:

> Military-civilian relations range across a wide spectrum with regard to relative power positions. There is a variability with regard to military functions in both military and civilian regimes conventionally denoted. The reasons for military intervention are various, and the military's performance in power is affected by

33 Quoted in Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p. 226.

34 Yamaguchi and Welch, *op. cit*. p. 227.

35 Choudhury M. Shamim, "Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Democracy in Bangladesh," J*ournal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1994), p. 353.

36 Henry S. Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 24.

> the type of initial interventions, by the power of social groups to aid or to impede the military, and by the military own internal characteristics.[37]

For decades, bullets and compulsion, rather than ballots and persuasion, have served as the bases for government decision-making and leadership change on the continent. Now Africa seems to be undergoing a fundamental transformation of its socio-political order with a steady move, albeit slow, towards democratic governance. While the jury seems still out on how to characterize civil-military relations in Africa, there is nonetheless an agreement on the fact that these relations have been unstable for most of the post-independence era.

Civil-Military Relations in Africa

As Africa continues to pursue the democratic path, questions about the political role of the armed forces are likely to linger until competitive systems and proper checks and balances are firmly consolidated on the continent. Despite the democratic mood and setbacks suffered by past military attempts, officers in some countries have yet heeded the loud message by their societies. Democratic transitions have not yet dissuaded some military personnel from trying to topple elected governments. Africa remains between a new era of civil-military relations and a cyclical reversion to the past. Even where the military has been forced to stay in its barracks, the armed forces have retained their capabilities to harm a democratic process. The historical traditions of military praetorianism in the region, the legacy of authoritarianism, and the terms of democratic transitions all seem to have made civil-military relations very complicated.

Drawing upon Finer's and Janowitz's positions, Robin Luckham argues that there is no key variable to civil-military relations in Africa. In his study, he made the analytic distinction between the army as the custodian of the national interest and the praetorian-type army which is sucked into politics.[38] Ruth First observed that regardless of the political background to a *coup d'état*, the army acts primarily for professional reasons, in addition to any it may espouse.[39] Samuel Decalo scrutinized First's observation and posited that "though they may be predominant, secondary, or merely coincidental with civic unrest, corporate and personal motives are invariably present in coup situations and cannot be ignored."[40]

---

37 Ibid., p. 15.

38 Robin Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 7.

39 Ruth First, T*he Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'État*, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 20.

40 Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 19.

Military incursion into politics in Africa was, until recently, the norm rather than the exception, a phenomenon with deep roots in Africa's colonial history.

Justifying military engagement in politics in Third World countries, Zolberg starts from the premise that coercion plays a paramount role in developing countries, and therefore, the military can never be isolated from politics. He pointed to the *coup d'états* as "institutionalized pattern of African politics," in which military seizures of power "do not in themselves affect the fundamental character of the society or of its political system."[41] What he characterizes as "an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features"[42] spawns continuing use of force, and renders short-lived any efforts by civilians to curb military political activity.[43] According to Zolberg, military intervention in African politics should be expected because of the nature of society.

The full range of possible scenarios for military intervention in Africa has produced unforeseen combinations of circumstances. An underrated factor has been the effective presence of a single military leader whose personal idiosyncracies, skill or possibly his state of mental or physical health has changed the course of events. The colonial experience added to arbitrary military take-over gave the armed forces a negative image. The desire to prevent military interference in the political realm was clearly on the minds of some new leaders. Kwame Nkrumah's initial reluctance to Africanize his officer corps, until external factors brought a change or overrode his instinctive caution, indicated his awareness of the dilemma of which Nyerere was to be made acutely conscious at the time of the East African mutinies in 1964.[44]

At independence, rare were the cases in which the withdrawing colonial power educated its successors in the conventional merits of the military as an organ of state. In Murray's words, the new military establishments seen as "expatriate officers, anachronistic equipment, inglorious responsibilities, paucity of authentic tradition," needed time to gain acceptance as potentially legitimate national players. The assumed stereotype of the military officer as essentially dedicated to the public interest, patriotic and perhaps puritanical and capable of self-denial was afar cry from the attitudes at independence.[45] The legacy of fear and distrust of soldiers resurfaced with more potency. Nationalist leaders saw them as remnants of imperial rule. Though they have won glory by serving overseas in the two World Wars, their imperial "credential" caused them to be regarded in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as mercenaries in the service of a foreign power.

---

41 Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, no. 1 (1968), pp. 77–8.

42 Ibid., p. 70.

43 Welch, Jr., 1987, *op. cit*., p. 14.

44 William F. Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1975, p. 4.

45 Ibid., p. 6.

On many fronts, the military was viewed and treated as an alien. Its role in assisting colonialism in its last ditch effort to maintain control over African populations seems to have lingering effects. The impression that the army is in bed with former colonial masters lingers. According to Gutteridge:

> that impression was assisted by a recruitment policy which preferred subjectively defined 'martial races' or those who were 'worthwhile as soldiers.' The ensuing tribal imbalance necessarily made more difficult than it would otherwise have been the army's achievement of national status as an institution. The presence after independence of a high proportion of expatriate officers even in executive positions not only reinforced these factors, but also provided in practice a major obstacle to conspiracy and unconstitutional action.[46]

Because the military had no positive role to play in the process of de-colonization and the achievement of independence, the rate of Africanization of senior posts in the army fell behind that in the civil administration. Restructuring the officer corps was at the bottom of the new leaders' priorities, and the shortage of these officers was perceived as a blessing.

Of the entire tropical African countries only Sudan had a significant proportion of African officers at independence because the British had been providing military training since 1918. By contrast, even Ghana with its relatively large educated élite had only about 10 percent indigenous army officers in March 1957. The worst case was that of the *Force Publique* in the Belgian Congo where more than 24,000 men had not a single African officer. While the initial shortage of African officers could be attributed to the lack of appropriately educated recruits, anti-military sentiments are also to blame.

To draw a distinction between the military as an institution and the social structure of society might be misleading because the armed forces, especially in small and developing countries are integral part of that structure and their leadership élite is not significantly different from their civilian counterparts. At the same time, the military do possess special qualities and skills which deployment makes intervention in politics possible. The peculiar skills of the military have been regularly shown to induce a sense of separateness which may isolate them at a time when the need for identification is paramount in order to overcome the barriers set up by the physical segregation created in an elitist tradition. This did not help already difficult civil-military relations.

According to Schraeder, "the range of military involvement in African politics and society is best characterized as a continuum of civil-military relations, in which each successive model represents a greater degree of military influence over civilian politicians."[47] Drawing on Liebenow's work, Schraeder offers five models

---

46 Ibid.

47 Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 248.

of civil-military relations in Africa. At one extreme is the "civilian supremacy model," in which the military is firmly under the control of civilian politicians. The second type, known as the "watch dog model," represents a greater degree of military intervention within the domestic political system. In the "balance wheel model," which represents a civil-military coalition, the military plays a stronger role. The military officers who adhere to the "direct rule model" of civil-military relations assume that the overthrown civilian leaders, including the heads of individual bureaucracies, are "creatures of their own pasts" and therefore incapable of providing adequate leadership for the country. The final form of civil-military relations, known as the "social transformation model," resembles direct rule in that military officers take charge of individual bureaucracies and government agencies.[48]

As far as Welch, Jr. is concerned, the following points characterized patterns of civil-military relations in tropical Africa, as imposed in the colonial period and as carried on after independence:

1. The major colonial powers used military might to impose and ultimately to sustain their rule.
2. The rank and file were essentially drawn from colonial subjects but officers came from the metropole, to insure political obedience to the respective European governments.
3. Commissioning of indigenous officers started late in the de-colonization process; those selected were inculcated with values of political disengagement.
4. Serious efforts were made during the colonial period to separate the armed forces from their social contexts – that is, to ensure "integral" boundaries of the military as an institution.
5. The relatively peaceful achievement of independence by African states meant the armed forces remained on the political sidelines, neither needed by the metropolitan power to suppress nationalist movements nor countered by guerrilla or liberation armies sponsored by indigenous politicians.
6. In the absence of revolutionary objectives introduced into the armed forces from its command structure, the institutional conservatism characteristic of the colonial period was carried over after self-government was achieved; "localization" of the officer corps generally entailed the promotion of African officers who had served many years under European guidance.
7. Where revolutionary struggle took place, naturally enough, the armed forces inherited from the former colonial regime were eliminated, being replaced by the guerrilla forces of the nationalist movement; under such circumstances, the military would serve direct revolutionary functions.[49]

---

48 Ibid.

49 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Emerging Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Radical Coups d'Etat and Political Stability," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed. *African Security*

Regardless of the scenario, civil-military relations remained bruised by decades of colonization and early post-independence unhealthy rapports between the armed forces and their civilian counterparts. Gradually, officers have acquired pivotal positions from which they were very difficult to displace. Finer has provided a superb distinction between the "disposition to intervene" and the "opportunity to intervene." The disposition inherently precedes the opportunity. The strongest inhibition against the disposition to intervene is a belief in civilian supremacy.[50] To quote Finer:

> Where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak … By the same token, where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope—both in manner and in substance … Where the parties or trade unions are feeble and few, where the procedure for the transfer of power irregular or even non-existent, where the location of supreme authority is a matter of acute disagreement or else of unconcern and indifference: there the military's political scope will be very wide.[51]

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, a combination of circumstances yielded great opportunities for intervention. Development of a sense of civilian supremacy never occurred and mistakes and shortcomings of civilian politicians serve as an invitation into politics, altering for good civil-military relations in Africa. A few years after independence, Africans started challenging their leaders. But their resentment of post-independence regimes took a milder form, with the hope that "consensus" that is supposed to prevail in African societies would help open a dialogue. Unfortunately, all their complaints and demands fell on deaf ears. Having inherited power from the colonizers and tasted it, the new civilian leaders found all kinds of excuses to remain the sole decision-makers. With no will to share, their absolute power corrupted them absolutely.

Faced with such a situation, civil society, the private sphere that challenges state behavior,[52] started searching for ways and means to be heard. But the lack of organization and strong resolve thwarted civil society's chance of changing the

---

Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 129.

50 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics," in Michael F. Lofchie, ed. *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa*, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1971.

51 Samuel E. Finer, "The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd, 1962, p. 21

52 See Jean-François Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," in P. Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 109–125; Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 279–307; and Robert Fatton, Jr., *The State and Civil Society*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

course of events. Civil society's failure to influence new leaders opened up the door to "military" society. On behalf of their post-independence constitutional duty as the guarantor of the nation, the military moved in. Early *coups d'état* were welcomed—if not praised—by Africans, who, fed up with the deplorable political, economic and social conditions of their continent, embraced the military to make a difference. Unfortunately, it took only a few years to notice the similarity between corrupt civilian leaders and military dictators. Actually, the military leadership turned out to be worse, since the legitimate use and control of weapons gave it a *carte blanche* for any action with no regard for the populations' reaction.

In his argument, Desch maintains that in societies in which there is low external threat and high internal threat, the norm of civilian control is likely to be weak. If this remains true, civil-military relations in Africa face tremendous challenges for decades to come because most African countries face serious internal rather external menaces and therefore are likely to have morbid civilian control of the defense and security forces. Desch, however, acknowledges that structural considerations will not predict a pattern and falls rather on cultural parameters. While various competitive theoretical perspectives seem handy in addressing civil-military relations in the West, none has so far been able to effectively explain military intrusion in African politics. Maybe agency theory, because it subsumes both Huntington's and Desch's structuralism on the one hand, and Huntington's and Janowitz's sociology on the other, might begin to offer a cogent explanation of Africa's civil-military relations. According to Feaver, the civilians set oversight measures to monitor the behavior of the military and the military responds based on the probability of its behavior being discovered and its expectation of punishment from civilian leadership. The major question for the principal is the extent to which he or she will monitor the agent and whether monitoring will be intrusive or non-intrusive. This decision is affected by cost: The higher the cost of monitoring, the less intrusive the monitoring is likely to be. But it also depends on the legitimacy of the principal or civilian.[53]

There is, however, another important variable to bring into the debate over civil-military relations in Africa: the link between civilian control and legitimacy. The question of the military and the problem of legitimacy tackled by Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn remains as important as ever several decades later.[54] Given the nature of politics on the continent, the battle for political control of the military seems more like a battle for legitimacy. When civilian politicians rigged an election and defy civil society, it is difficult to demand military subservience to an "illegitimate" regime. On the other hand, there is a germinal issue regarding "whether the traditional legitimacy of the military is still acceptable in a situation where the armed forces are increasingly alleged to be a dysfunctional element

53 See Feaver, *op. cit*.

54 See Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn, *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 1976.

within society."[55] Ultimately, outlawing coups in and by itself will not enhance civil-military relations in Africa. The notion that the military must obey civilian orders regardless of how the civilian came to power and how he or she is using it is not realistic. While the military is being asked to remain in the barracks, civilian politicians also need to play by the rules and remain loyal to the constitution. Until each actor adequately plays its partition, civil-military relations are likely to remain unhealthy on the continent.

The Army in African Politics

African armies have undergone significant changes since independence. From mainly small constabulary forces, relegated to maintenance of internal order, African armed forces have become larger, more modern organization in response to growing perception of external threats. However, African armies have often been protectors of regimes rather than true guardians of states and nations, frequently suppressing internal discord and competitive politics. They have contributed to the stability and survival of the state, in a narrow sense because when they are in power themselves, they protect a specific group to remain "in power for an acceptable duration, regardless of the regime suitability, representativeness, or effectiveness."[56]

During colonialism, African troops were recruited and trained to serve Europeans goals, quelled indigenous resistance and maintained the local version of *Pax Britannica* (Britain) or *Pax Gallica* (France). As "armies of Africans" as opposed to "African armies" they were rather loyal to European powers, and were deployed on European fronts such as both World Wars. The same loyalty was expected of African militaries after independence. When the "White man's burden" yielded to the indigenous political and bureaucratic élites, few observers predicted a prominent role for the post colonial army. In a 1961 speech to the cadets of the Ghanaian Military Academy, President Kwame Nkrumah conveyed his vision of the armed forces' subordination:

> You must have confidence that the Government is doing what is best for the country, and support it without question or criticism. It is not the duty of a soldier to criticize or endeavour to interfere in any way with the political affairs of the country; he must leave that to the politicians, whose business it is. The

55 Ibid. p. 4.

56 Bruce Arlinghaus, "Introduction: African Armies—An Analytical Approach," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 4.

> Government expects you, under all circumstances, to serve it and the people of Ghana loyally.[57]

At an Ibadan University conference in 1964, Lloyd declared that "in few of the independent [African] states is the military élite much in evidence in the social and political life."[58] The initially dilatory pace of officer indigenization and the continued employment of expatriate staff in the military hierarchy "encouraged both apathy and ignorance about the armed forces among the emerging African élite."[59] The apparently insignificant size, the limited experience and expertise of the new states' embryonic armies beguiled both scholars and politicians into ignoring or minimizing the military threat.[60]

Unfortunately, remnants of the presumptively non-political lingered only a few years. Since the mid-1960s, African militaries have managed to assume significant roles as managers and arbiters of political conflict; in some countries, their roles overwhelmed many other governmental institutions.

As Claude Welch, Jr. contends:

> In the early days of independence, few African heads of state found it necessary to utilize military strength to quell internal dissent. But as African presidents recognized the importance of coercion and decided to support their rule further by directly ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces, the veneer of noninvolvement disappeared entirely. The departure of Europeans opened the way to making official what had already been true. The military in Africa had always served political ends; now it could be done under indigenous rather foreign auspices. Only with formal independence and the significant diminution of colonial pressures could African armed forces begin to seize power.[61]

In a similar vein, Baynham states:

> Early predictions to the effect that the imperial legacy in Africa was likely to create armies in the image of the colonial powers—and as such unlikely to interfere in politics—have had to be hastily revised. Throughout much of

57 See Kwame Nkrumah, *Politics is not for Soldiers*, Accra, Ghana: Government Printer, 1961.

58 P.C. Lloyd, ed. *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 9.

59 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 10, no. 2 (June 1972), p. 206.

60 Simon Baynham, "Security Issues in Africa: The Imperial Legacy, Domestic Violence and the Military," *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 3 (1991), p. 185.

61 Claude Welch, Jr., "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': The Evolution of Military Forces in Africa," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 17.

> the continent … militaries, no matter how small, represent virtually the only disciplined organizations at large. As such, even if not ruling directly, they are almost unchallenged umpires of who should govern and under what conditions and terms.[62]

However, the military has not always enjoyed such potency in African history. In their study of the "armed bureaucrats"[63] on the African continents, historians and political scientists proceed from different perspectives and make widely divergent assumptions about the relationships of the military to society.[64] More often than not, both historians and political scientists explain the behavior of African armies through the legacy of the colonial and post-colonial periods, paying little, if any, attention to Africa's past. But as Ogot and Uzoigwe suggest, understanding the nature and role of the military in post-independence Africa requires grasping the characteristics of pre-colonial Africa's armies and examining the role and behavior of the colonial armies in Africa.[65] As Uzoigwe puts it, "the historian who studies the African military as distinct from socio-politico-economic structure does so at his peril."[66]

In no state, traditional or modern, is the military entirely divorced from the political structure. The warrior in traditional society was more of a political animal than the rank and file of the citizenry. He saw politics as state power and recognizes the art of politics as the way to acquire, wield effectively, and preserve power. By the 19th century, militarism and warfare became important in pre-colonial Africa. In the conduct of intra-African affairs, military strength served as a tool in diplomatic negotiations and the conquest of new territories.[67] By definition, an empire strives to enlarge itself, and a huge army instills an enormous amount of fear and respect in the minds and hearts of the potential conquests.[68] Although some imperialistic rulers conquered purely for the sake of aggrandizement, most leaders inherited confederacies and empires that they could maintain only through

---

62 Baynham, *op. cit*.

63 Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development," *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 179–193.

64 Robin Luckman, "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 2 (September 1994), pp. 13–76; and Chuka Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, pp. 37–38.

65 See Bethwell A. Ogot, ed. *War and Study in Africa: Ten Studies*. London: Frank Cass, 1972, and G.N. Uzoigwe, "Pre-Colonial Military Studies in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1975), pp. 469–481.

66 Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa," in Ali Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977, pp. 20–21.

67 Richard W. Hull, *Modern Africa: Change and Continuity*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980, p. 24.

68 Robert S. Smith, 1976. *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*. London: Methuen, 1976, p. 43.

a strong military presence. Several pre-colonial African monarchies were conquest states that easily integrated the military and politics.

From Cheikh Anta Diop's description of the military organization in pre-colonial Africa, one can safely speculate that the civilian monarch was in charge of the army. He maintains that in the kingdoms of Mali and Songhai, the king who appointed the generals was himself the commander-in-chief of the army and personally directed military operations:[69]

> In each kingdom, each nation, the army was divided into several corps assigned to the defense of different provinces, although under command of the civil authority. Thus, each provincial governor had at his disposal a part of this army to which he could assign tasks under the orders of a general whose powers were purely military. On the lower level, below the king, in political or administrative affairs, the distinction between civilian and military powers was thus very clear.[70]

In his evaluation of the army's role and position in pre-colonial Africa, Onwumechili contends that the army's size and structure depended on the needs of the community:

> In most traditional Africa, the nature of the community's needs determined whether a standing or an *ad hoc* army was used … Traditional communities that were engaged in frequent warfare found it necessary to maintain permanent armies (Kingdoms of Zulu, Borno and Kongo …). However, in less war-prone kingdoms such as Yorubaland and the Ashanti kingdom, the *Omo Ogun* (War Boys) in Yorubaland and the *Akonsani* and *Hiawuo* of Ashanti were small scale armies who mainly guarded the king's palace and formed the core of a larger army, which was raised on an *ad hoc* basis when needed.[71]

The army served war-fighting purposes in traditional Africa but lacked an administrative role. Consequently, military coups occurred only rarely. Most of the time, the African military was under the control and subordination of the civilian administrative authority.

Although much of the damage to civil-military relations occurred during the colonial era, the roots of military siege go as far back as the sixteenth century when the Turkish Ottomans had just conquered Mediterranean North Africa in 1599 and transformed peaceful coastal states into garrison politics. According to Hull:

---

69 Cheikh Anta Diop, *Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States*, translated by Harold J. Salemson, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1987, p. 115.

70 Ibid.

71 Onwumechili, *African Democratization*, p. 5.

> Ruthless military leaders bearing the title of bey had gained ascendancy over the civilian ca'ids. Egypt, Tunis, and Tripoli had effectively fallen under the heel of military juntas. Westward, in the Sultanate of Morocco, Ahmad al-Mansur (1578-1603) had just defeated the Portuguese and his southern neighbor, the empire of Songhay, after creating a formidable war machine. The great intellectual centers and trade emporia of Timbuktu and Jenne were now ruled by military governors, who preyed upon the local merchants and farmers and harassed the Muslim intelligentsia. To the east, near Lake Chad, the King of Borno, Idriss Alooma (1564-1595), had expanded his territories by waging a series of bloody wars against the region's non-Muslim ethnic minorities … Southward, at the forest edge in what is today Nigeria, the rulers of the nascent Oyo empire had just extended their authority over their Yoruba neighbors and Nupe.[72]

Clearly, the growing power of the military within Oyo and other empires posed a serious challenge to traditions of civilian control.

In West Central Africa, the vast Mbundu kingdom of Ndongo had become a battleground for local slave-trading warlords aided by avaricious Portuguese conquistadors. The entire region was torn by civil war, and the King of Kongo, whose predecessors had ruled democratically, boasted a standing army of five thousand. Deeper in the interior, the militarily minded Luba and Lunda warriors were destroying villages as they forced peasants into their new imperial states. Farther east, the Omukama of Bunyoro and the Kabaka of Buganda used the warrior values in their societies to consolidate their hold on newly acquired territories. In Bunyoro, or Bunyoro Kitara, *Kitara* means a sword but has historically come to signify an empire worn by the sword by individuals possessed of excessive virtue.[73] Buganda outdid its rivals only by instituting a strong garrison state. Warrior-king Ntare II of Buganda, according to Hull, terrorized the farmers of the Lake Victoria region:[74]

> Along the once-tranquil coast of East Africa, the sophisticated Swahili city-states were under siege by Portuguese mariners from the Indian Ocean and Zimba marauders from the interior. By 1599, the Zimba were also spreading turmoil in the Zambezi River valley, disrupting the gold and copper trade and dislocating thousands of villagers. Under siege, Rusere (1596-1627) the *mwene mutapa*, or king, of a huge empire centered at Great Zimbabwe, had to turn to Portuguese gunrunners for military support. Not long afterward, the empire degenerated into a military state and eventually collapsed.[75]

---

72 Richard W. Hull, "Foreword," in A.B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present*, New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001, pp. ix–xx.

73 Uzoigwe, *op. cit*., p. 24.

74 Hull, *op. cit*., p. xx.

75 Ibid.

In Zululand, militarism and politics went hand in hand in that the chief and his officials were commanders of their people in war and political leaders in peace. According to Uzoigwe:

> A chief was usually a great warrior, and his officials were appointed, in large measure, as a result of their military valour. In the pre-Mfecane Zulu state, therefore, the military and politics were dangerously fused. The ordinary citizens had no means of removing an unpopular government.[76]

Whether it is in Southern Africa where the Sotho *indunas* (military chiefs) had gained ascendancy over their civilian counterparts or in the Horn of Africa where General Sertsa Dingel had militarized the Solomonid kingdom of Ethiopia after a horrific war against Eritreans and their Turkish allies, real power has passed to military figures embracing a warrior ethic.[77] Hull believes that:

> Africa has never fully recovered from this terrible disruptive era. During the brief colonial interregnum in the first hall of the twentieth century, African militarism receded. After the conquest and partitioning of the continent, Europeans replaced Africans as military leaders, but in most cases they were subordinate to civilian colonial authorities. However, the ideologies and institutions of indigenous militarism were never entirely destroyed and indeed they made a rapid recovery in the postcolonial era.[78]

A few years before European conquest, Africa suffered from internal aggression. In East Africa, Ethiopian King Menelik II's army defeated and occupied the Ogaden.[79] In southern Africa, Mzilikazi, the chief of the *Khumalo*, used his powerful army to impose his will on Mashonaland. Shaka's regiments, closely drilled and highly disciplined, frequently harassed the Nguni and the Sotho. According to Schraeder:

> The reign of Shaka is widely renowned for his creation of a militaristic Zulu empire that expanded its authority by conquering neighboring peoples and absorbing their warriors into the national army. Those warriors refusing to pledge direct allegiance to Shaka were put to death on the battlefield. The national army was designed around a series of military-oriented age-sets, and successfully used military innovations such as *assegais* (short spears) on the battlefield. A

76 Uzoigwe, *op. cit*.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. xxi.
79 Gérard Prunier, "Violence et Histoire en Afrique," *Politique Africaine*, vol. 42 (Juin 1991), p. 10.

> standing national army and a militaristic ethic fostered a sense of unity that was strongly tied to Shaka's personal rule.[80]

In West Africa, offensive wars by the empires and kingdoms of Mali, Songhay, Ashanti, Oyo, Danhomê, Benin, and others, are well-documented.[81] The link between economic and military survival was evident in the Ashanti kingdom where statehood and imperial ambitions reinforced the military factor. Fortes's comment shows the centrality of war in the definition of statehood:

> The Ashanti state was created and maintained by war, and a military ideology remained a central feature of its structure to the end. Guns and gold were its training foundations. As imported firearms spread among the populace, the chiefdom which could muster the largest supplies of guns and ammunition had every chance, if ably led, to triumph in the intertribal wars.[82]

Among the Akans command hierarchy was important, and the role of military organization is reflected in Owusu's remarks about Agona states: "The organization of stools and swords in Agona is nothing but military formation based on the logistics of war developed by the people. Political organization is ipso facto military organization."[83]

Parts of the continent escaped the ravages of war but without question, warfare and militarism existed in Africa before colonialism. Contrary to contemporary Nigeria where the armed forces pursue coups d'état out of ambition, military intervention in the politics of 19th Century Yorubaland was of a different nature, more a response to a clearly disturbed political situation.[84] The army was generally called in to prevent or confront invasion or aggression. Wars constitute one of the dominant themes in the history of Yorubaland during the 19th century, and the typical "Yoruba state was either at war with another or responding to the aggression of an external enemy."[85] However, like in other parts of the continent, the army was mostly under the control of the monarch.

Like Bunyoro, Buganda, and Zulu, the Oyo empire is a conquest state from whose inception the military played a vital role. The warrior was relentlessly cultivated because the *Alafin* (king) had to exhibit militarism or lose his throne. According to Uzoigwe:

---

80 Schraeder, *op. cit*., p. 73.

81 Onwumechili, *African Democratization*, p. 6.

82 M. Fortes, *Kinship and the Social Order*, Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963, p. 140.

83 Quoted in Uzoigwe, *op. cit*., p. 42.

84 Smith, *Warfare and Diplomacy*, p. 39.

85 Toyin Falola and G.O. Oguntomisin, *Yoruba Warlords of the 19th Century*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001, p. 3.

> To ensure that the disaster which occurred in the reign of Onigbogi was not repeated, the Alafins of Oyo began a policy of military reorganization and militant expansion of Oyo influence. Conquered areas were placed under the effective administration of the *Ajele* (political residents). It was during this period that Alafin Ajagbo created the position of Are Ona Kakanfo (generalissimo of Oyo's army). The Kakanfo (as he was popularly known) was expected to wage war regularly, to win each war "within three months or be brought home dead." By mid-eighteenth century Oyo had become the largest state system in Yorubaland. It had also become a military machine which, if not properly controlled, could prove dangerous for political stability.[86]

The African warrior was a political animal *par excellence* because of the fusion of the state and the armed forces. To many soldiers, excellence as a warrior could lead to political offices, wealth, glory, and honor, since the warrior tradition was the bedrock of statehood, and politics revolves around the warriors. Despite its potential power and leverage in overthrowing unpopular regimes, the military engaged in only a handful of military takeovers. However, the rise of standing armies and professional warriors/soldiers in the 19th century changed that situation. The oppressive nature of the colonial and post-colonial states and the over-politicization of the armed forces transformed civil-military relations on the continent.

Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Africa

Until African societies had standing armies, the ordinary citizen was called upon to defend his/her territory, which created a special relationship between society and its *ad hoc* military. From stable and collaborative, that relationship became gradually contentious and got worse under colonialism. Concerning francophone Africa, for example, Le Vine maintains:

> The military training and traditions of francophone officers, both abroad and in-country, do not stress discussion of a basic rule governing armies in a democracies, that is, unquestioning subordination to civilian authority. Not only French political history replete with examples of overt military involvement in politics … but colonial rulers and regimes … operated in concert with their security apparatuses. Though the new civilian rulers may not have intended I that way, for the most part their armies and officers were political from the start, and if they were not, they soon became politicised as postindependence

86 Uzoigwe, *op. cit*., p. 26.

> problems began to confront the new regimes and often threatened to overwhelm them.[87]

If Europeans intended the armed forces to be subservient to civilian authorities, they did not try hard enough. Civil-military relations in colonial and post-colonial Africa can be divided into at least three distinct phases during which civilian supremacy eroded.[88] The first phase covering the initial conquest and imposition of colonial rule lasted from the mid-1880s to the end of World War I. During that period, characterized by *de facto* military rule, European powers met resistance and protest from African kingdoms and chiefdoms with sheer military power. Because the Berlin Conference[89] required European powers to demonstrate "effective control" or "pacification" over their colonies and territories in order for their colonial claims to be recognized, heavy land and naval artillery and other types of weapons became necessary to impose an effective order.

As critical instruments of conquest, military outposts not only warded off competing colonizers, but also suppressed rebellion by Africans. Accordingly, the nascent colonies grew out of military *diktat*. The first administrative structures of pre-World War I Africa combined military and civil functions, and were often run by military officers in disregard for the principle of separation between civilian and military roles and missions. The typical colony had a military governor, a sparse administrative structure in the hands of expatriate officers, and a colonial army composed of African soldiers with European officers.[90]

During that phase of military occupation, the state and the military became indistinguishable. The unchallenged mandate given to the governor or executive authority and the administrative agents, who were active duty officers, was such that the military, although theoretically under the control of external civilian officials, exercised tremendous autonomy in policy formulation and implementation in the colonies. For quite a while, military rulers assumed responsibility for a wide range of political and military issues.[91]

French politicians realized that a policy of economic development was incompatible with a continuing policy of unbridled conquest pursued by the army, but it took drastic measures to impose France's desire on the army.[92] However,

---

87 Victor F. LeVine, *Politics in Francophone Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 297–298.

88 See Houngnikpo, *op. cit.*

89 The Partition of Africa took place in a Conference chaired by Bismarck (German Chancellor) in Berlin from December 1884 to January 1885.

90 Arthur W. Lewis, *Politics in West Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965; and John Chipman, French *Power in Africa*, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

91 Baffour Agyeman-Duah, "Military Coups, Regime Change and Interstate Conflicts in Africa," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16, no. 4 (1990), pp. 547–570.

92 Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Afric*a, 1895–1930, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 35.

France ultimately replaced civilian governors with active duty or former military officers. Such a system of a strong external civilian control and a powerful internal military rule left Africa with three unfortunate enduring legacies. First, the overlap of political and security duties undermined clear demarcation of military and civilian responsibilities and prerogatives. Second, the colonial armies developed a tradition of wide jurisdictional boundary *vis-à-vis* other security forces.[93] While engaged in territorial defense, they were simultaneously involved in internal security during their conquering and pacifying mission. Consequently, the army obtained a legitimate domestic role and also a high level of politicization. Third, there was a clear and deliberate absence of countervailing institutions, because there were enough outside forces to meet army revolts and mutinies in a particular colony. European powers could use their own imperial armies as well as colonial troops from neighboring territories to quell mutinies.

The second phase, during the inter-war years, witnessed the consolidation of the military's role in internal affairs. The bureaucracy was "civilianized" but lacked clear demarcation between military and civilian authorities. At the same time, the military's involvement in internal affairs for economic purposes was reinforced.[94] By then the League of Nations' mandate demanded that colonies be developed. European governments initially promoted self-sufficiency for native populations because of the League's injunction but soon faced pressure from their own constituencies to make colonies and territories economically self-sufficient. The new urgent mission required competent administrative officers and exacerbated military involvement in internal affairs.[95]

Although there was a rationalization of the bureaucracy and professionalization of the administrative cadre, retired military officers replaced active duty officers in gubernatorial and administrative posts. New administrators continued to use colonial armies to promote economic policies not necessarily related to national security. Besides aiding district officials in collecting taxes and enforcing labor regulations, colonial armies more often suppressed African revolts. With the traditions of the first phase—overlapping civilian and military responsibilities, wide military jurisdictional boundaries, and a lack of countervailing institutions—carried over the second phase, "civilian" governors who took over the authoritarian regimes did not need to define military and civilian spheres. Their external basis of power and authority rendered civilian supremacy in colonial administration in Africa futile.

The final phase that lasted from the end of World War II to the 1960s saw the disintegration of the colonial system. The political context shifted dramatically

93 See Jendayi E. Frazer, "Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweights in Regime Stability in Africa," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1994.

94 Simon Baynham, *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, London: Croom Helm, 1986.

95 Pascal Chaigneau, *La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique*, Paris: Centre des Hautes Études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes, 1984.

as a result of social unrest that challenged colonial rule. Indigenous populations demanded new political institutions and the governor's powers in security affairs devolved to other officials. Yet, military might somehow remains palpable. Colonial powers appointed defense ministers to the executive councils and the legislative councils gained greater oversight of military expenditure and defense matters. By late 1950s and early 1960s when most African countries became independent, the struggle to transfer the government and civilian bureaucracy into African hands intensified. However, and unfortunately, years of military control of the civilians have complicated the rapports between civilian and military administrations. African military officers who witnessed European armies in action on the continent learnt almost too well how to rule in society.

The reality of civil-military interactions in most African states, be they civilian or military, according to Welch, Jr., is quite complex because it covers a wide variety of interactions.[96] So-called "military regimes" in Africa are mere coalitions between selected officers and co-opted civilians that become "mixed" governments that should not be tagged "military regimes," without really looking at how decisions are made and implemented.[97] Tackling the question of who governs in a "military" government, Finer has published a fascinating typology. His first category, *military-supportive regimes*, includes regimes "which in law are constitutional and party-competitive, but where the constitutional guarantees are suspended for long periods," and countries "with a constitutionally appointed chief executive or head of state who is, however, exquisitely reliant on the active support of the military." *Intermittently indirect-military regimes* are marked by "powerful and self-confident armed forces that have intervened from time to time in the past and will do so again, when they feel it their duty or interest to "correct" the course that the civilian forces are steering." In *indirect-military regimes*, civilian governments "attain, hold, and exercise power only in consequence of behind-the-scenes military muscle and power." Finally, there are *military regimes* proper, led by "openly and flagrantly military men who were installed, initially at any rate, as a result of a coup by the armed forces."[98]

Concurring with Finer, Ravenhill maintains that:

> To classify regimes as military since their origins lie in a *coup d'état* serves to obscure the multitude of differences between "military regimes" on such characteristics as civil-military relations, ideology, political organization, etcetera

96 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Military and the State in Africa: Problems of Political Transition," in Zaki Ergas, ed. T*he African State in Transition*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 194.

97 Ibid.

98 Samuel Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds. *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, p. 283.

> … Military rule should be viewed as one manifestation of military intervention and influence on the political process … The ideal-typical dichotomy drawn between civilian and military regimes has not been fruitful for theoretical analysis; in contemporary Africa it serves only to obfuscate the heterogeneity of political processes and regime types.[99]

The above picture depicts the complexity of interactions between civilians and the military on the continent. Regardless of the type however, the African army became either the political ruler or at least the "umpire", often in the name of cleansing society of its malicious actors or activities.

99 John Ravenhill, "Comparing Regime Performance in Africa: The Limitations of Cross-National Aggregate Analysis," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1980), pp. 124–125.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 3
Explaining Army Intrusion in African Politics: An On-going Debate

> Military rule is by definition authoritarian and is often very corrupt … and the historical record shows that military rulers 'govern' no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse. Because African militaries in power often fail to create political order, they are part of the problem, not its answer.[1]

In many Third World countries, the lack of effectiveness and authority of civil governments led to their breakdown and their substitution by military regimes. With its control over instruments of force, and in the absence of a strong constitutional tradition, the military was an effective contender of power.[2] Even in regimes where civilian authority was established, real power lies in the hands of military leaders. In the views of Almond and his colleagues:

> The military's virtual monopoly of coercive resources gives it great potential power, even if it chooses to exercise it behind the scenes. Thus, when agreement fails on aggregation either through democratic or authoritarian party systems, the military may emerge by default as the only force able to maintain orderly government. The soldiers remain the basic force underpinning the personal tyranny of a civilian president or a dominant party. Or the armed forces may use their power to further institutional or ideological objectives. Military rulers may try to create military and/or bureaucratic versions of authoritarian corporatism, linking organized groups and the state bureaucracy with the military as final arbiter of disagreement. They may undertake "defensive" modernization in alliance with business groups or even undertake more radical modernization.[3]

There is ample empirical evidence of the military intrusion in politics in Africa. However, the rationale behind such intervention remains enigmatic. The August 2005 coup in Mauritania, for example, has put pundits and scholars to test. While several coups, both real and imaginary, have been foiled in the past due to the tense political environment, nobody expected Ould Taya's own "close associates"

---

1 Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'état: 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2003), p. 340.

2 Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, and Russell J. Dalton, *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 8th ed., New York, NY: Pearson/Longman, 2004, p. 94.

3 Ibid.

to oust him. In Guinea, subsequent developments of the December 2008 coup conveyed the complexity of military coups that can uncover mistrust, suspicion and downright betrayal.

In general, coups have been symptomatic of protracted state failures, especially the inability of political leaders to institutionalize power, eradicate mass poverty and promote socioeconomic development.[4] As Magyar reminds us, "*coups* are merely the most frequent expression of utter frustrations encountered in nationbuilding in Africa, attempted under the most severe socio-political conditions," and Hutchful's statement reflects the difficulty in arriving at a consensus on causes of military coups in Africa:

> Militarisation has reflected a daunting kaleidoscope of problems in Africa: economic mismanagement and decline, weak national integration, ethnic and class conflict, weak political institutionalisation, lack of political accountability, corruption, abuse of human rights, and so on. Name it, and it has been cited as a cause for one *coup* or other. Further, these 'causes' have been combined in shifting and highly specific combinations that can only be understood in their particular national and historical contexts. Militarisation is therefore a complex and highly dynamic phenomenon – a moving target – and therein lies both its analytical challenge and conjunctural political appeal.[5]

In the Third World in general and in Africa in particular, the causes of military coups have eluded scholars. Even coups that have been studied tend to be those carried out by disgruntled senior officers. Coups from below[6] by subaltern ranks were largely unexplored although their implications for the transformation of praetorian violence from a tool of domination to a means of criminal expropriation were important. In Kandeh's eyes, armed subalterns "represent a retrograde political force that is more likely to terrorize society and felonize the state than rescue the latter from decomposition or establish legitimate political institutions."[7] Yet, "lumpen" coups received very little attention. Amid speculation, explanations of military interventions have defied theory. The only certainty is that the military did alter the political scene in Africa and Mazrui is right when he describes the soldier who came in from the barracks:

> On the eve of independence, African soldiers had been grossly underestimated as a political force. Even after military mutinies had occurred in 1960 in the former Belgian Congo, African elites were slow to recognise the short distance

4 Jimmy D. Kandeh, *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa*, New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004, p. ix.

5 See Eboe Hutchful, "Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues," *African Security Review*, vol. 6 no. 2 (1997), pp. 5–19.

6 For a detailed account of coups by subaltern ranks, see Kandeh, *op. cit*.

7 Kandeh, *op. cit*., p. 3.

> from an army mutiny to an army coup. By 1963, Togo had not only a coup but also Africa's first presidential assassination: the murder of Sylvanus Olympio. It was the year of the birth of the Organisation of African Unity and the charter condemned "*political assassination in all its forms*." Yet by January 1966 Nigeria, African's giant, also had its first coup. A month later Kwame Nkrumah, the icon of Pan-Africanism, was overthrown in Ghana. A string of other coups followed.[8]

The history of civil-military relations in African states since 1960 has exposed more clearly than ever before the range of variables involved in determining military decisions to intervene in politics. Such factors as the degree of military preparedness for independence, the state of Africanization of the officer corps, and the rate of post-independence expansion of the armed forces are important additional criteria to look into in figuring out the behavior of the army. Related to the speed of expansion of the army is the attitude of civilians to budgetary allocations for new forces, weapons and training programs which in turn may have been affected by the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy. Military intervention might even lie in the performance of the new army in dealing with frontier or internal security problems and the way in which the political leadership has chosen to deploy it.[9]

Motives for Military Intervention

Among books that attempted to provide a rationale for military intervention in politics is Finer's *The Man on Horseback*, in which he developed a model combining disposition and opportunity. However, a crucial third element, the ability to intervene successfully, is missing from Finer's model.[10] The military's disposition to intervene depends on two conditions. First, the motives for intervention must outweigh those against it. Second, the armed forces must have the will to act. While such motives as professionalism, acceptance of the principle of civilian supremacy, and fear of unintended consequences can inhibit military intrusion, an army that personifies the nation with a manifest destiny to be its savior, the perceived need to defend a national interest through intervention, and the perceived need to defend a sectional interest can all favor military intervention.[11]

---

8 Ali A. Mazrui, "Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future," *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 1 (February 2002), pp. 18.

9 Gutteridge, *op. cit*., p. 21.

10 E.O. Joseph McMillan, "Armies in Transition: Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies," Student Paper, National War College, March 1992.

11 Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–52.

According to Huntington, the main factor in discouraging military intervention is professionalism. There are three essential characteristics of the professional military that can remove the armed forces from politics. First, the military's expertise in the management of violence requires full-time study and practice over an extended period. Second, the military recognizes a responsibility to use its skills according to a set of professional values for the security of society as a whole, not for personal or organizational gain. Third, members of the professional military are a corporate body with a "sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen."[12] The assumption here is that the professional military is so exclusively concerned with its special role in defending the nation against external enemies and so cognizant that is has no expertise in other areas that it becomes a neutral, sterile tool of the state rather than a domestic political asset.[13]

History shows, however, that professionalism is not enough. Many military forces that were highly "professional" by the criteria outlined above have intervened in politics. The weakness of Huntington's reliance on professionalism alone is that professional officers by definition see protection of the interests of the nation-state as among their highest values. It is not difficult to conceive of situations in which the officer corps may see the national interest as conflicting with the decisions of the duly constituted civilian authorities. These situations frequently arise in a "praetorian" polity.[14] The crucial complement to professionalism is explicit acceptance by the armed forces of the principle of civilian supremacy. Professional officers must see themselves as servants of the constitutional government in power, not merely of some abstract conception of the state or nation.[15]

Another motive that can inhibit intervention is the officer corps's fear of the unintended consequences of intervention: erosion of the army's ability to meet external threats, loss of internal cohesion, civilian retaliation should intervention fail, and public backlash against either the intervention itself or the lack of progress in solving problems once the military is in power.[16]

On the contrary, a clear motive for military intervention is a belief among soldiers of many armies, and often shared by society at large, that the armed forces are the true manifestation of the nation and that it is the soldier's destiny to be the savior of his country. Closely related to this romantic vision of the soldier is the concept that there exists a true, identifiable national interest that is above group interests and partisan politics. Where either of these views prevails, even professional soldiers who consider themselves strictly apolitical may be

12 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, *op. cit*., pp. 8–16.
13 Ibid., p. 71.
14 McMillan, *op. cit*.
15 Finer, *op. cit*., pp. 21–24.
16 Ibid., pp. 26–27.

tempted to intervene against the constitutional government in the higher name of the nation.[17]

Soldiers may also intervene on behalf of more selfish sectional interests, such as the interests of a dominant social class or region from which the officer corps may be drawn, the interests of the armed forces as an organization, or the selfish personal interests of one or more officers.[18] It is this type of intervention that a professional ethic is most likely to discourage. The other half of the disposition to intervene is the willingness to do so. A military's mood to intervene is largely a function of frustration, either with the country's role and image in the world, with the inability of national institutions to deal with political, social, and economic problems, or with the military's own role in society. Whatever its source, frustration can lead to anger among military officers, who then psychologically shift the focus of this frustration to civilian leaders. Combined with a balance of motives in favor of intervention, the armed forces then have a disposition to intervene.[19] The conditions inspiring frustration in the military are often the result of socio-political praetorianism.

Besides a disposition, the military must have the opportunity to intervene. Often, the weakness or ineffectiveness of civilian political institutions, what Huntington calls "praetorianism"[20] is the window of opportunity that the military seizes. In a praetorian polity, social forces operate directly in the political arena rather than through agreed, legitimate political structures. There are no commonly accepted rules of the game, so each group uses whatever means it has available to bend the system to its own ends. Consequently, the praetorian state is characterized by political corruption, politically motivated strikes and demonstrations, and military coups. In short, praetorianism is not so much a characteristic of the armed forces as of the polity itself; in Huntington's words "countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations."[21]

However, above all, the army must have the ability to intervene. According to Finer, such inherent political advantages as cohesion, prestige, and overwhelming relative power enable the military to intervene successfully in political affairs. However, not all armies possess these characteristics. Military forces are not always *cohesive* or prestigious, nor do they always enjoy a monopoly of arms. It is by weakening the military's cohesion, prestige, and relative power, that is through "subjective control" that many governments have sought to keep the military out of politics, particularly militaries that do not accept the legitimacy of the political system.[22] Cohesion can be undermined by penetrating military organizations with

17 Ibid., pp. 28–34.
18 Ibid., pp. 34–52.
19 Ibid., pp. 54–63.
20 Huntington, *Political Order*, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–97
21 Ibid.
22 McMillan, *op. cit*.

political personnel. The effectiveness and prestige of the armed forces can be reduced by constraining budgets and by hostile public relations campaigns. The armed forces' monopoly of violence can be broken by establishing other well-armed institutions outside the military's control.[23]

If in general explaining military intervention is tricky, it is even more complicated in Africa and Ostheimer is right in stating:

> If we have learned anything from the early years of independence, it is that deterministic theories are too simple as explanations of military behavior. Hypotheses about conditions supposedly "conducive to coups" are disproved by enough cases to make them suspect. It is easy, as a result, to accept Samuel Decalo's argument that military interventions in African politics are idiosyncratic: Most African political systems are so fragile that any one of them can be overthrown at any time, given appropriate motives and tactics.[24]

Offering his take on coups motives, Gus Liebenow maintains that:

> Hoping to make amends for the absence of prescience with respect to the politicization of the military, Africanist scholarship has produced a virtual flowering of both broad and narrow gauged theories about the African soldier's role in politics. In analyzing more than fifty cases of successful intervention and a greater number of abortive coups, one is struck by the idiosyncratic nature of civil-military relations in Africa. The conditions and identifiable causes of intervention are considerably varied, as is the level within the military which provides the coup leadership.[25]

As far as Le Vine is concerned, "crises; politicized militaries in competition for resources; demonstration effects, including the accumulation of interventions; and, at least initially, some genuine patriotic motives all appear to … be commonalities for which reasonable empirical warrant can be established."[26]

There is another independent variable, often overlooked, that explains military coups in Africa: outside influence. For quite a while, and still to some extent, former colonial powers bent on defending their national interests spared nothing to help overthrow regimes that were in their way. Besides anecdotal evidence, several written unclassified documents support the thesis of French and British involvement in several military takeovers on the continent. In such cases, if there

---

23 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, *op. cit*., pp. 81–82

24 John M. Ostheimer, "Peacekeeping and Warmaking: Future Military Challenges in Africa," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 33.

25 J. Gus Liebenow, *African Politics: Crises and Challenges*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986, p. 238.

26 Le Vine, *op. cit*., p. 298.

is no motive for military leaders to act, it has to be created, and many soldiers were manipulated. Even in the era of democratization, national interests continue to supercede democracy and the military can still be used, in some African countries, to pursue key alien objectives. Le Vine states that "there is no lack of accusation claiming that France, through the *Élysée* (French Presidential Palace) or its embassies or its military missions and Africa-based forces, was involved with or responsible for various attempted and successful coups."[27]

Before revisiting the enigma of military intrusion in politics, let us explore the extent to which the armed forces can initiate political and socio-economic change. This interesting debate reveals once again the complexity of explaining why the military gets into politics.

The Military as an Agent of Change

Political scientists have been fascinated by the political role of African armies. Lee argued, soon after the first round of military takeovers, that African armies were necessarily a political topic because of the weakness of civil order in the new African states. In his words:

> It therefore seems hardly appropriate to treat African armies as if they were the military expressions of an established order. The states which they may be called upon to defend are in many cases extremely vulnerable to outside forces. The interest of the subject does not lie in their fire-power or professional skills, which are of little importance, but in their contribution to the whole process of political development after decolonization.[28]

The military was arguably established as part of the post-colonial African state apparatus with the task of defending the body politic against external aggression. Because the main *raison d'être* for organizing the military was the territorial defense of the state, the armed forces were expected to metamorphose into a nationalistic and non-partisan force loyal first and foremost to the state.[29] Unfortunately, the military failed to keep this ethos becoming in several African countries instead a factionalized, ethnicized, and partisan force beholden to myriad particularistic interests.[30] According to Onwudiwe:

---

27 Ibid., p. 299.

28 J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*, New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1969, p. 22.

29 George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Introduction: The Military Albatross and Politics in Africa," in George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 1.

30 Ibid.

> A comprehensive range of motivations behind coups is yet to be captured beyond a shadow of the doubt by any theory. In general, the first systemic explanation holds that domestic socio-economic and political problems in weak states are responsible for attracting some military elements to usurp national political power. The second points to certain superior characteristics peculiar to the organized military and which are said to qualify it to play the role of political saviors from corrupt and inept civilian governments. In the 1960s, it was fashionable for political scientists to claim that in Africa and in other developing polities, the military was the ideal institution for initiating and implementing programs on political, social and economic development.[31]

Although the literature on military coups is rich with justifications and rationalizations aimed at explaining what are nothing more than illegal assumptions of state power,[32] the roots of military takeovers go back to the colonial experience.

Europeans' plans to create an African officer corps did not include clear policies and institutions to exercise political control over new national armies. Given the colonial army's behavior in Africa, "apolitism," in terms of non-intervention in partisan politics, was a foreign concept to African armies.[33] The clear separation between civilian and military authorities found in Europe did not exist in independent Africa. The legacy of colonial armies got civil-military relations in independent Africa off such a false start, spawned several coups d'état in the first decade of African independence.[34] By the twilight of Europe's scramble for Africa, the military gained ascendancy over civilian leaders in many indigenous governments. According to Hull, "the great leaders of Africa were no longer men of peace and statesmanship, but of war."[35] At independence, government in Africa was almost equivalent with the military. Having experienced the use of colonial armies for civil repression, tax collection, and conquest functions, new leaders were perplexed about the role the military should play in the development process.

While African leaders still wondered about the proper avenue for a rapid political and economic transformation of their continent, policy-makers and scholars in the West urged the military to participate in Third World politics. As Bienen rightly posits, "a good deal of writing on the military as a modernizer in developing countries took place in the 1960s and early 1970s in an empirical

---

31 Ebere Onwudiwe, "Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research," in George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 18.

32 Ibid.

33 Uma O. Eleazu, "The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of Existing Theories and Practices," *Journal of Developing Areas*, vol. 7, no. 2 (April 1973), pp. 265-286.

34 Luckham, "The Military, Militarization," *op. cit.*

35 Hull, *Modern Africa*, p. 26.

vacuum."[36] As early as 1962, Lucien Pye already favored the military's involvement in governmental affairs when he praised military leaders for having the potential of being more pro-Western, that is, pro-modernity, than their civilian counterparts.[37] Pye drew a legitimate distinction between the army as a modern organization and the army as a modernizing force. The status of the army as a modern organization was clearer than its modernizing impact on the rest of society. Pye saw the military establishment as something as close to the ideal type of an industrialized and secularized enterprise.[38] In other words, "the need for discipline within the armed forces, the necessity for them to relate means to ends, the need for technical skills and co-ordination of effort, all convened the military establishment into a modern organization."[39]

Even Edward Shils,[40] who had praised intellectuals as the creators of political life in their new countries, later divided them into two categories: the politicized intellectuals (civilians) and the technical-executive intelligentsia (including the military). In Shils' view the armed forces could allow the emergence of a stable and progressive civil society. Because of their modern education, commissioned officers of the armed forces "have become the major representatives of modernity in technology and administration. When the state flounders and civilian politicians make a mess of things, these officers feel that the standards given them by their training are affronted."[41] Similarly, Gaile argues that because the military often exhibited greater leadership and organizational skills than civilian politicians, it could more effectively pursue the goal of national integration in the developing world.[42]

Following that line of thinking, theories on the role of the military in the development process received extensive scrutiny. Many other scholars shared Shils' and Gaile's views that the military ought to play an extensive role in political life.[43] There was an implicit notion that the military could draw on its administrative and

---

36 Henry S. Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 5.

37 See Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 69–89.

38 Ali Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers," in Ali Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977, p. 237.

39 Ibid.

40 See Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 7–67.

41 Ibid., p. 23.

42 Charles M. Gaile, "The Military in Developing System: A Brief Overview," in Monte Palmer, ed. *The Human Factor in Political Development*, Waltham, MA: Ginn and Co., 1970, p. 342.

43 See Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics*, and Janowitz, *The Professional*.

managerial skills to contribute to society.[44] That notion was applied to the African continent by Lefever when he bluntly asserted:

> African armies tend to be the most detribalized, westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive institutions in their respective States. The army is usually the most disciplined agency in the State. It often enjoys a greater sense of national identity than other institutions. In technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army is the most effective agency in the country … A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution, or the parliament, the army often evokes more popular sentiment than a political leader.[45]

This view rested on the core assumption that the Western type of army organization, which the new African states copied had a hierarchic structure that emphasized discipline and unity of command. On this assumption, the military, imbued with the spirit of rigor and hard work, should help African military leaders adapt more easily to the problems of modernization. However, as Kandeh maintains, the emergence of the military as a serious contender for political power "nailed the coffin of earlier myths that saw African armies as puritanical, decisive, efficient and self-sacrificing agents of development."[46]

However, voices of dissent have been raised. Some believe that even if the military is seen as an agent for modernization, it might not necessarily translate into the political development of societies, and Huntington's distinction between modernization and political development was influential.[47] By the mid-1970s, the theory of the military as a modernizer started crumbling. In Welch's words, "it is clear that the armed forces have not fulfilled the predictions of some social scientists, put forward during the early 1960's, that their organization, modernity and nationalism would make them the leaders of the modernization process in their countries."[48] The "modern" organizational characteristics ascribed to the army did not make any difference, because coup leaders face the same difficulties over which their civilian counterparts stumbled, without necessarily benefiting from greater advantages.[49] As far as Lee is concerned, he did not see African

---

44 Isaac J. Mowoe, *The Performance of Soldiers as Governors: African Politics and the African Military*, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980, p. 15.

45 Ernest W. Lefever, *Spear and Sceptre: Army, Police and Parliament in Tropical Africa*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1970, p. 21.

46 Kandeh, *op. cit*., p. 2.

47 Mazrui, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

48 Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations*, North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974, p. 256.

49 Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed. *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 59.

armies as a modernizing force, and maintains that "there is little evidence that African armies make better instruments of 'modernization' than their civil servant counterparts. Indeed, all the organizations of the State appear to face a common threat of problems."[50]

Despite strong reservations, proponents of the modernization thesis continue to believe that swords could turn into ploughshares. Unfortunately, the first wave of military coups and interventions disappointed the proponents of military rule. Once in office, the military's performance did not differ from the civilian governments, belying the prognostications of the organizational model. The charge of corruption and misappropriation was frequently made to justify military coups. The question has never been whether corruption existed, because it was clearly endemic in most states, but whether it was of any great importance in inducing military intervention. Gutteridge asked whether relatively comfortably placed army officers living in former European-style residences were necessarily affected by corruption.[51] A blatant manifestation of extravagance amid austerity measures could indeed be impolitic and give the military a reason to seize power. Often, military regimes that stress the corruption of those they have overthrown have seen the charge turned against them when they fail to live up to their own precepts.

From his assessment of several successful military seizures of power, Welch, Jr. identified three sets of variables: intramilitary factors, such as military cohesion, recruitment and promotion practices, salaries, deployment, and the like; domestic factors, such as ethnic and class cleavages, internal violence, economic distribution, and fragmentation of institutional boundaries; and international factors, especially external aid, reference group ideas, and "contagion" from adjacent countries.[52] Looking at the predictability of coups d'état in Africa, Jackman concluded that political instability was not random with respect to political and social structure. In other words, social mobilization, multi-partyism, and the presence of a dominant ethnic group were destabilizing, notably with low electoral turnout.[53] Expanding on Jackman's study, McGowan noted two destabilizing features of African armed forces: their cohesion, measured both through ethnic dominance and through the size of the military establishment, and their political centrality; and two stabilizing factors: pre-independence electoral turnout and the mid-1970s degree of political pluralism. When economic performance was factored in, stability tended to mark "African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not much mobilized before independence and that have maintained some degree of political

50 J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*, London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 1969, p. 184.

51 Gutteridge, *op. cit*., p. 18.

52 Welch, Jr., 1986, *op. cit*. 18.

53 See Robert W. Jackman, "The Predictability of Coups d'État: An Example with African Data," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72, no. 4 (1978), pp. 1262–75.

participation and pluralism while keeping their military forces small and non-politicized."[54]

To these findings, Claude Welch, Jr. added three "soft" characteristics, all related to attitudes held prior to intervention:

> First, members of the armed forces came to believe—and, more importantly, to act on the belief—that the military had a special responsibility to "the nation," but also to itself, to assume direct control. Grievances over existing policies and leaders, combined with a sense that political action by officers was needed, formed the first step. In other words, they rejected the apolitical standard espouses by Nkrumah. The "disposition to intervene," as S.E. Finer aptly deemed it, thus characterized the threshold. Second, the risks of intervening appeared low, domestically and internationally. The success of coups d'état elsewhere made clear that few major obstacles stood in the way of officers determined to gain control. Third, politically and socially significant sectors accepted—and at times urged in advance—the military's assumption of control. In the absence of other means for changing governmental personnel or policies, coups d'état became functional equivalents of elections, with civilians frequently pressing officers toward intervention.[55]

Overall, economic problems, corruption, political schisms, and general disillusionment have combined to create the climate in which coups have successfully taken place in Africa. Regardless of what it preached, the military has failed to redress whatever wrong it came to address. In the end, the military did not perform better than civilian counterparts. In fact, it fared much worse. Consequently, another generation of studies arose to explain the military's behavior in Africa.[56]

Military Intervention as an Enigma

While many of these studies produced good profiles of the military establishment in particular countries, and in the process challenged previous assumptions, they

54 Pat McGowan, "The Predictability of African Military Coups d'État, 1960–1982: A Replication and Extension," Unpublished paper presented at the 24th annual meeting of the ISA, Mexico City, Mexico, 1983, p. 27. Quoted in Welch, Jr., *op. cit*.

55 Welch, Jr., 1986, *op. cit*., p. 19.

56 Henry S. Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa*, New York: Africana Publishing, 1979; Claude E. Welch Jr., "Soldier and State in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1967), pp. 305–322; and Robin A. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations." *Government and Opposition*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1971), pp. 5–35.

failed to agree on the main cause of military's intervention in African politics.[57] The rash of military coups in the 1960s has conclusively exposed the futility of the hopes that Africa would somehow avoid the praetorian experience elsewhere. Military interventions and coups seem inseparable from political modernization whatever the continent and whatever the country.[58] According to Huntington, the prevalence of coups rendered unpersuasive many of the commonly advanced causes for their existence. He therefore maintains that trying to explain military intrusion in politics was a futile exercise:

> It is … fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening. Morris Janowitz, for instance, looks for the causes of military intervention in politics in the "characteristics of the military establishment" of the country and attempts to relate the propensity and ability of military officers to intervene in politics to their "ethos of public service," their skill structure, "which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture," their middle-class and lower middle-class social origins, and their internal cohesion. Some evidence supports these connections, but other evidence does not.[59]

While some officers could have been motivated by high ideals of public, others have clearly been led by private gains. In spite of the difficulties in reaching an agreement on the causes of coups, several scholars have explored the issue. According to the literature, two main themes explained the military's involvement. These centered on military professionalism and the causes of coups. In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington compared the professionalism of the Western military to the non-professionalism of Third World military, and attributed the military's intervention in Third World politics to this lack of professionalism.[60] However, he gradually moves away from professionalism to stress the importance of the wider social and political environment in which the armed forces live, arguing "that the most important cause of military intervention in politics are not military but political."[61]

In his approach to the analysis of civil-military relations, Finer vigorously disputes Huntington's initial assertion that military intervention in politics is contrary to professionalism, arguing from numerous historical examples that greater professionalism enhances the likelihood of *coups d'état*. He maintains that

---

57 Abdul K. Bangura, "Explaining and Predicting the Causes of Military Coups d'État in Africa: A Meta-Analysis," in Abdul K. Bangura, ed. *Research Methodology and African Studies*, Vol. 1. Lanham: University Press of America, 1994.

58 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 192.

59 Ibid., p. 193.

60 Huntington, 1957, *op. cit.*

61 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit*., p. 194.

military intervention is largely regulated by what he calls the degree of public attachment to civilian institutions. Using political culture as the main independent variable, Finer contends that the military intervenes only in countries with weak institutional frameworks.[62] In societies with relatively well-developed institutions of state coercion, but with poorly-developed institutions for popular participation, the military's involvement in politics arises from the failure of the political system to handle increased demand for popular participation. Out of this debate, it appeared that military's intervention is a direct function of the level and degree of a country's political development.[63] In other words, "the greater the degree of political modernization, the fewer opportunities the military has for intervention and the less support it will receive. Concomitantly, the lower the development of a well-mobilized public opinion, the more numerous the opportunities for military intervention and the greater the likelihood of public support."[64]

In a dissenting opinion, Samuel Decalo stresses rather the idiosyncratic and individualistic causes of coups in sub-Saharan Africa. He believes that most coups occurred because the leaders were conditioned by their socio-economic backgrounds.[65] However, Mbaku disputes this contention, arguing that far from being "irrational buffoons," military leaders involved in coups are rational agents seeking to maximize well-defined goals.[66] Baynham adds his voice to the debate, blaming military frequent intervention on "the virtual monopoly of organized violence enjoyed by the military (and police) forces in societies where the central political symbols and institutions are weak," and also on "the concentration of government buildings, party officials and symbols of the state in the capital city."[67] As far as Luckham is concerned, he recommends an analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of military organizations *vis-à-vis* civilian political organizations, because one has to take into account the character of the boundaries, and the nature of the transactions between the military and its societal context.[68]

---

62 Finer, *op. cit.*

63 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit.*; and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

64 Baynham, *op. cit*., p. 86.

65 Samuel Decalo, "The Military Takeovers in Africa," *International Problems* (September 1974), pp. 80–90; "The Morphology of Radical Military Rule in Africa." *Journal of Communist Studies* (December 1985), pp. 23–35; "Socio-Economic Constraints on Radical Action in the People's Republic of Congo," in John Markakis and Michael Waller, eds. *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*, London: Frank Cass, 1986; and "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1989), pp. 547–578.

66 See John M. Mbaku, "Military Coups as Rent-Seeking Behavior," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 241–284.

67 Baynham, *op. cit*.

68 Robin Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter 1970), p. 18.

In his evaluation of military interventions in Africa, Welch, Jr. suggests eight factors that could prompt coups:

1. Declining prestige of the major political party exemplified by (a) an increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance, (b) a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces, and (c) a consequent denial of effective political choice.
2. Schisms among prominent politicians, weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former colonial power.
3. The lessened likelihood of external intervention in the event of military uprising.
4. "Contagion" from seizures of control by the military in other African countries.
5. Domestic social antagonisms, most obviously manifested in countries where a minority group exercised control.
6. Economic malaise, leading to "austerity" policies, which most affected articulate, urbanized sectors of the population (members of trade unions, civil servants, etc.).
7. Corruption and inefficiency among governmental and party officials, a corruption especially noticeable under conditions of economic decline.
8. A heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.[69]

Although the combination of factors varies from country to country, it remains true that institutional weakness, a basic debilitation of the political system, creates favorable conditions for military coups.

A military coup has been, until recently, one of the most common methods of regime change in Africa. However, its causes and motives have eluded scholars, and the impressive literature on the causes of military coups in Africa testifies to that. The opportunity and means for the violent overthrow of civilian regimes fail to explain why soldiers actually do so in some countries and not in others. The causes, motivations, and rationales behind military intrusion in politics on the continent range from economic crisis, persistent poverty, regional or ethnic rivalries, government repression and corruption, mal-administration, to personal and corporate ambitions. According to de Villiers, "military take-overs in Africa have many divergent causes, but the major pattern that crystallizes revolves round power squabbles within governments and the status to some extent of the Army within a particular community."[70] What remains clear is that "the interventionist inclinations of the military in post-independence Africa are, to an important extent,

69 Welch, Jr., 1971, *op. cit*., p. 219.

70 Cas de Villiers, *African Problems and Challenges*, Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers, 1976, p. 65.

a legacy of the way in which the continent was divided during the last part of the nineteenth century."[71]

In a brilliant overview of security and civil-military relations issues in Africa, Howe explores the ambiguous order on the continent, by examining the links between the lack of military professionalism and the proliferation of civil and interstate violence in the post-Cold War period. In reviewing the historical roots of military weaknesses and exposing the various predicaments that beset African regimes following the withdrawal of superpower protection, Howe observes that forced to choose between competent armies and loyal ones, insecure rulers have almost always chosen short-term, patronage-based loyalty at the expense of organizational and technical competence. Consequently, most African governments were either incapable of quelling domestic insurgencies or (mis)used their armies to pillage their weaker neighbors' resources.[72]

Overall, the frequency with which military leaders have succeeded in toppling either a civilian regime or their own fellows testifies to the difficulties faced by practitioners and scholars alike in making educated guesses about "who, when, and why" with regard to military intervention in African politics.[73]

71 Baynham, *op. cit*.

72 See Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

73 Gus Liebenow, *op. cit*., p. 239.

Chapter 4
The African Military and Modernization

> In all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension: the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas and practices.[1]

Scholars concerned with development and leadership in developing countries have articulated a wide range of goals which the processes of development are presumably directed. Although economists initially sought growth for the Third World, the question of equity within states came rapidly to the fore. Colonial experience and subsequent uneven development in most African countries render equity crucial for any social development. Two sub-goals were then set up: (1) reduction in absolute poverty and (2) reduction in inequality. The fastest road to these important objectives was through modernization. The socio-economic gap between colonizers and colonized has grown so much apart that catching up became extremely important. Modernization as a type of social change is not specifically political in its character. Rather the argument is that as societies become more modern these antecedent conditions will produce changes in the structure and function of their polities. Ideally, modernization will produce demands for increases in political participation which will be met by changes in the character and availability of political institutions.

Modernization theory was promoted by social scientists within the liberal tradition as the key to the development of Africa. In a widely-cited book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rostow argues that all countries evolve through the same stages of growth as leaders seek to transform "backward" agriculturally based societies into modern industrial economies.[2] The sum total of the economic, social, and political components of modernization theory is the firm belief that the newly independent African states were on a path leading the creation of industrialized, modern, and pluralist democracies.[3] In a very optimistic mood that modernization theory was the blue-print required for

---

1 Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped* Countries, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 80.

2 Walt W. Rustow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

3 Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*, Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000, p. 25.

Africa's development, most scholars designated the armed forces as the most suited body within society to have better chances of undertaking the endeavor. The new states of sub-Saharan Africa became productive laboratories for an analysis of the behavior of leaders of armies without traditions and with limited capabilities as modernizing and stabilizing forces in their relations with civilian officials and institutions.[4]

While more and more armies are electing to join democratizing forces on the continent, the military has not always played a positive role in Africa's development even though it has often seized power on the assumption of rectifying years of misrule and mismanagement. Unwillingly, several scholars have ascribed to the military in Africa a role it has failed to play: a redeemer embarked on the modernization of the continent.

Modernization Theory

En vogue in the 1960s and 1970s, modernization identified certain processes of social change that occurred in the Western world. Proponents of modernization theory argue that differences among "developed," "developing," and "underdeveloped" countries, or more crudely, between "modern" and "backward" nations, lie in the philosophical orientation about the world.[5] Beyond a purely political change, modernization theory maintains that as societies become more modern, antecedent conditions will produce changes in the structure and functions of their polities. In particular, modernization should generate demands for increases in political participation which will be met by changes in the character and availability of political institutions. Modernization was a multi-faceted process involving, in addition to politics, changes in economic, cultural, technical, psychological, and intellectual aspects of human relations.[6]

The experience of the Western world suggested a linear path toward development. Because "progress" occurred in the West through successive stages of development, the Western world believed that it could civilize other less developed areas, and conquest and expansion combined with the spread of European values to these remote areas.[7] While Max Weber contrasted traditional and modern societies, Talcott Parsons offered dichotomous variables so that astrictive statuses, diffuse roles, and particularistic values of traditional society

4 John J. Johnson, "Introduction," in J.J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 6.

5 Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1986, p. 349.

6 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London, UK: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 335.

7 Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981, p. 278.

were juxtaposed with achievement statuses, specific roles, and universalistic values of modern society. These and other scholars associated modernization with a highly differentiated political structure and the diffusion of political power and authority into all spheres of society.[8]

The ascension of modernization theory coincided with the Western capitalist nations' desire to shift their interest in the poorer nations from profits, extraction of raw materials, and new markets, to radical transformation.[9] After World War II, it was assumed that massive financial and technical assistance would alter the agricultural subsistence societies into modern industrial societies. Inherent in the modernization theory are some premises: through change higher levels of order may be achieved, change continuously and necessarily occurs through a sequence of stages and toward certain qualities characteristic of Western Europe, and change emanates from uniform causes.[10]

Most scholars measure progress by looking at economic, political, and social spheres of a nation. Economic development, according to modernization theory, was equated with industrialization as well as with the attainment of GNP and GNP per capita levels equal to those of Western nations. The basic task for poorer countries was to find ways to emulate the West and gradually close the divide between rich and poor nations. Besides the move away from agricultural dependency toward urban-centered industrialization, other indicators of development performance included high per capita levels of road networks, electrical or mechanical tools and appliances, the progressive concentration of working forces in urban and capital-intensive production centers, and in general a higher standard of living.[11]

Rostow, the most influential proponent of economic modernization, outlined five developmental stages: (1) traditional society, (2) preconditions for takeoff, (3) takeoff, (4) drive toward maturity, and (5) age of high mass consumption. The takeoff stage is especially relevant to new nations because it appears when "resistances to steady growth are finally overcome."[12] A decade later, Rostow added a sixth stage called "the search for equality."[13] Other scholars such as Organski and Black have adopted Rostow's stage theory. In his *Stages of Political Development*, Organski examined four developmental stages: (1) primitive national unification, (2) industrialization, (3) national welfare, and (4) abundance. He viewed development as the increasing government efficiency in mobilizing human and material resources toward national ends. While Black concurs with

8 Ibid., p. 279.

9 Ibid.

10 See Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969.

11 Couloumbis and Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

12 Rustow, *op. cit*., p. 7.

13 Chilcote, *op. cit*., p. 279.

Rostow, he described phases of modernization in a way that avoids the unilinear and evolutionary implications of the simplistic stage theory.[14]

In the study of political development, Western scholars have consistently sought to equate modernization with democratic/competitive political systems. Consequently, political modernization in the West has been measured most often by indicators of political participation. A polity is therefore considered modern if its citizens are allowed to vote. The more people vote, the more they are informed, interested, and eligible to participate in public affairs.[15] By and large, political development was associated with high levels of voluntary political participation, the presence of two or more political parties competing for power, the safeguarding of such fundamental human rights and freedoms as free press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression, which provide for genuine competition among political parties. Political development also implies a measure of political institutionalization, which permits the growth and spread of strong, durable, and specialized institutions that check and balance one another's power and prevent an inordinate concentration of power in any one individual or institution.[16]

In the social realm, backward or primitive societies were characterized by informal institutions, a concentration of power in the hands of a few chiefs and elders, the absence of political participation and self-government, low levels of literacy, subsistence agriculture, low levels of artisanship, communitarian living, high birth and death rates, verbal rather than written agreements, and very low social and demographic mobility. For almost two centuries now, the secularizing influences of science and control over nature have altered economic and social systems and shaped political cultures. This trend toward cultural modernization continues to have powerful effects as it penetrates societies that have been shielded from it. Exposure to modernity through work, education, and the media shapes an individual's personal experiences. It encourages citizen participation, a sense of individual equality, the desire for improved living standards and increased life expectancy, and government legitimacy based on policy performance.[17]

According to Inkeles and Smith, the modern individual is an informed participant citizen. A person who identifies with the newer, larger entities of region and state, takes interest in public affairs.[18] Economists define modernity in terms of GNP per capita while political scientists saw it in terms of effective institutions for governance. Beyond politics, the modern individual performs differently from

---

14 Ibid., p. 280.

15 Couloumbis and Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

16 Ibid., pp. 352–353.

17 Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, and Russell J. Dalton, *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 8th ed., New York, NY: Pearson/Longman, 2004, p. 58.

18 Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, "Becoming Modern," in Mitchell A. Seligson and John T. Passé-Smith, eds. *Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 211.

the more traditional person in many realms of action having practical bearing on the process of societal modernization. For example, the more modern person is quicker to adopt technical innovation. A change in attitudes and values is one of the most essential preconditions for substantial and effective functioning of those modern institutions development hopes to establish.[19]

The somewhat simplistic view that modernization represents "progress" has certainly been challenged by most discerning observers. Couloumbis and Wolfe maintain that criteria for social development should be qualitative as well as quantitative and that social development should be viewed more as a collective state of mind than as merely a set of conditions that can be observed and measured. In their views:

> One could perhaps assume with some confidence that genuinely developed societies are those in which material and spiritual values are relatively balanced. These are societies in which values such as freedom, friendship, beauty, work, leisure, learning, love, community, family, self-respect, and health are valued as much as, if not more than, commodities such as big homes, large gardens, flashy cars, foreign travel, calories, caviar, massage parlors, and other forms of conspicuous consumption.[20]

Andre Gunter Frank disagrees with Rostow's stage theory because of its assumption that underdevelopment is an original stage of traditional society when in fact underdevelopment in poor countries is the consequence of the economic and social expansion of Europe since the fifteenth century. He believes that stage theory ignores both historical conditions as well as the dialectical relations between developed and underdeveloped countries.[21] Although, it was eventually admitted that building a development theory that permits the differentiation among societies was extremely difficult, modernization theory has already gained such currency that it became the main prism through which everything was explained.

Stretching Modernization Theory

A certain reading of Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*, in which he argues that the foundation of all states are good laws and good arms[22] and that good arms are necessary because it is the only guarantee that the citizens would obey the laws,[23] supports a prominent role to the military in creating the environment

19 Ibid., p. 214.

20 Coumoumbis and Wolfe, *op. cit*., pp. 357–358.

21 See André Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," *Catalyst*, vol. 3 (Summer 1967), pp. 20–73.

22 See Nicollo Machiavelli, *The Prince* chapter 22.

23 Ibid.

for development. Clearly, one could infer from Machiavelli that the military is the best institution to enforce the laws and to embark African countries on the modernization path, and several scholars did ascribe to the military the role of a modernizer. In Mullins's view, "many authors who did see a military role were in fact optimistic about the impact of military as an agent of change whose rational procedures, technical training, and ethic of patriotism would more than make up for the authoritarian nature of its organization."[24]

Rustow suggests that the incentives leading to military interventions are not to be found in "the historical background of the armies," but in the nature of the army's interaction with the "political structure" in the context of political modernization.[25] Countries undergoing political modernization proceed ultimately and ideally towards a system where, on the one hand, the government is able to address effectively social, economic and political problems, and on the other hand, the people view the government as a legitimate source of authority, and therefore respect and obey it.[26]

The optimism about the impact of military involvement on development was derived from a belief that military personnel would be more patriotic, ethical, efficient, and technologically competent in jobs than their average bureaucrat of civilian background. Yet, Nordlinger concludes that "military rulers are fundamentally unconcerned about most types of social change and generally opposed to those working for reform."[27] Mullins states that "by the 1970s, it was generally acknowledged that military personnel had no corner on methods, expertise, or standards of behavior that enabled them to outperform their civilian counterparts."[28] Given the strong correlation between development and stability, the very failure of the military to resolve violent conflicts on the continent put the armed forces in a difficult position in claiming the title of modernizer. According to Akande:

> African post-colonial states inherited the military institution as part of the apparati of the state bequeathed by the colonial powers. The management of the military however soon constituted part of the political problems that confronted newly independent African States. It took few years before the military made incursions into the political arena and established itself in government. Both under civilian control and as the new political elite, the military has failed as a guarantor of stability for the states. Whatever the myriad of factors that galvanized African states to armed conflicts, the fact remains that the inability of the military of these respective states to contain their crises is a factor for the

24 A.F. Mullins, Jr., *Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 3.

25 Rustow, *op. cit*. p. 175.

26 Ibid.

27 Mullins, *op. cit*., p. 5.

28 Ibid.

> multiplicity of armed conflicts on the continent. A number of factors account for this inability of the African military. One, their ethnic combination in the context of the heterogeneous character of African states affected their perception by the society and their own performance.[29]

With the end of colonialism it appears to have been the assumption on all sides that the alien colonial regimes would be replaced by democratic governments. Few were prepared to dispute democracy's preeminence. Democracy appeared to be associated with wealth, power, and progress, leading to either or both of the assumptions that democracy opened the door to these desirable goods or that other countries would follow in the democratic path as they rapidly moved ahead in their new-found independence.[30] The widespread assumptions that democratic governments would take over on the demise of colonialism have proved to be largely faulty, and the actual outcome has been a grievous disappointment to those who pinned their hopes on democracy.[31] The failure to create sustainable democratic institutions led to the introduction of another important concept in the political development lexicon: modernization.

In the 1950s, many scholars expressed the views, mainly derived from events in Latin America and the Balkans, that the armed forces were the repositories of authoritarian if not reactionary values, and were administratively incompetent organizations. However, by the 1960s, these views have tremendously shifted. Many analysts were increasingly inclined to see the military as a dynamic force capable not only of modernizing traditional societies, but also of maintaining stability and restraining Communism.[32] Proponents of modernization theory maintained that the political burden on state institutions is lightened considerably when the basic dynamism for economic transformation is supplied by an autonomous entrepreneurial class outside the state. Although the state frequently plays an important facilitative role, for example in creating a protective climate for infant industries, the stimulation of economic growth is not a governmental function. Even in the absence of democratic institutions, a socioeconomic transformation from rural-agrarian society to a more urbanized and commercial pattern is necessary for African countries to get out their poverty. Undertaking such a delicate mission requires that leaders effectively unify their people, provide for government institutions that respond to people's needs, and ensure an adequate distribution of wealth, power, and property. According to several scholars, the

---

29 Akande, *op. cit*.

30 Rupert Emerson, "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa," in Michael F. Lofchie, ed. *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971, p. 240.

31 Ibid., p. 242.

32 Bienen, *op. cit*., p. 16.

segment of society most qualified for such a task is the military because of its strong will and discipline.[33]

In Pye's view:

> In all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension: the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas and practices. The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of this process, which involves the movement out of the particularistic relationships of traditional life and into the more personal and universalistic relationships of an industrialized society.[34]

Even revolutionary armies sought to transform themselves from paramilitary forces into standing professional armies tasked with modernizing their nations.

Until doubt was cast on the actual orientations of many armed forces in the Third World towards development and growth, the arguments about the military as a modernizing force prevailed. Indeed, armed forces were often seen as the only bulwark against instability. As problem solvers, they were perceived as more willing to cut the Gordian knots and to impose difficult solutions, by force if need be:[35]

> A number of arguments were put forward as to why militaries were modernizers. They were said to be the most well-organized institution in society; they were said to be rationally and technologically oriented; that is, for those who accepted a distinction between modernity and tradition based on achievement/ascription, universalistic/particularist, and industrial/non-industrial dichotomies, militaries were the most modernized forces in relatively non-modern societies. Militaries were said to socialize to the norms of modernity and to be development oriented.[36]

The association of African armies' failure to break ties to Western powers with their desire to keep a structure of state capitalism has led some to argue that "military

33 See John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962.

34 Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 80.

35 Henry Bienen, *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 17.

36 Ibid., p. 16.

regimes often provide the most efficient route to rapid industrialization."[37] Evidently, this argument relies on the premise that the military is industry-oriented and a stabilizing force in politics, and that it can guarantee through external capital the order it requires. Because the military can repress social conflict, it is attractive to foreign direct investment and is perceived of as a modernizing force within society.[38] However, as Bienen reminds us, the links between nationalism and military regimes are often exaggerated:

> Military regimes, some argue, would be nationalistic because armed forces see themselves as the carriers of nationalism, because they identify with the nation-state rather than with parochial interests. Furthermore, because their mission is national security, they move to guarantee that security through modernization, industrialization, and control of indigenous resources. Many of these arguments were dismissed when it was shown that armed forces were not modernizers *par excellence*, that output of industry did not necessarily increase under military regimes, and that investment rates did not rise with military takeovers.[39]

Even the effectiveness in dealing with communal and class conflict resolution that the military was credited with has been debunked:

> Frequently, military leaders express a rhetoric that they are above ethnicity, that the armed forces embody the whole society. Armed forces put a high premium on corporate autonomy and the maintenance of their own organization. Militaries express a fear of factionalism and a determination to socialize individuals to the values of the organization per se rather than to those of subgroups … But militaries do not always successfully socialize individuals, nor do they always maintain corporate cohesion and professionalism.[40]

If anything, the failure of African militaries to deal adequately with the realities of communal cleavage in society and within their own ranks exposes "the mismatch between proclaimed ideas about the institution being 'above ethnicity' and the realities on the ground."[41]

According to Chtena, military intrusion in politics can be seen as an outgrowth of one particular aspect of modernization,[42] "the general politicization of social

---

37 James H. Mittleman, "Dependency and Civil-Military Relations," paper presented to the conference, *Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality in Developing Countries*, Buffalo, October, 1974.

38 Ibid.

39 Bienen, *op. cit*., p. 113.

40 Ibid., pp. 147–8.

41 Ibid.

42 Aira Chtena, "The Military in Modern Turkey: A Lasting Political Force," *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*, 1998–1999; posted on http://jspc.library.wisc.edu/

forces and institutions" in the absence of effective political institutions that could coordinate their interactions.[43] The increasing and uncontrolled involvement of agencies such as religious institutions, universities, bureaucracies, corporations and, of course, the army with overall political problems and not specific to their interests is due to the lack of "autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability" of political institutions.[44] Countries that pursue modernizing strategies seek to establish a government that can exert power effectively, provide for public order and a reasonable level of public services, and withstand eventual changes in leadership. Attaining these goals constitutes political development, a great challenge for new nations. Because the development process is intrinsically unsettling it exposes governments to chronic instability, especially during periods of rapid social and economic transition. Consequently, the military was viewed by many as the best agent to such fundamental challenges as nation-building, state-building, participation, and distribution.[45]

While armed forces may take on explicitly political and economic tasks of modernization, they are often unwilling or unable to perform necessary political and administrative roles to see them through. In a highly centralized power system or within a homogenous society, the role of a political oligarch is easier than a decentralized and multiethnic environment. But even under favorable circumstances, the military is often unable to perform the requisites of rule. As Bienen contends:

> Militaries that take over without any programs for rule or through the impetus of their own trade union- type demands are not likely to undertake far-reaching social changes, at least deliberately. Militaries who take power in order to arbitrate between different social, ethnic, and political factors have a hard time extricating themselves from their mediating roles, and officers are vulnerable to countercoups. Where military coup and countercoup have become the only way to change players, again, it is not likely that structural transformations will be brought about by the game of officers' musical chairs.[46]

The expansion of political participation that usually accompanies economic and social reforms in praetorian societies contributes to the chaos, because more social actors are added to a stage that has no clear mediator. In such an institutional vacuum, the social groups intervene in politics, and as each of them deploys its own device, the military resorts to the device of a coup. Regardless of their rhetoric and that of their supporters, many military leaders aimed at, not modernization,

---

issues/1998-1999/article5.html.

43 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit*., p. 194.

44 Ibid.

45 Thomas M. Magstadt and Peter M. Schotten, *Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions, and Issues*, New York, NY: St. Martin's/Worth, 1999, pp. 221–222.

46 Bienen, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

but at retribalization or "retraditionalization" of society.[47] Looking at the evidence, the military cannot be proud of its performance in Africa. It did not convert its "good" intentions into reality.

The Evidence: The Military Debacle

Whenever the military wrestled power away from civilians, the putschists have justified their action essentially as a "messianic mission" designed to salvage an affected country form the abyss of civilian incompetence. In other words, soldiers rationalized military interventions as a patriotic and selfless exercise to rid the continent of corrupt, inefficient, incompetent and decadent politicians.[48] Nevertheless, both the military's motives for intervention and its performance as a modernizer are subject to dispute. Mullins believes that most authors, particularly in the early years, overestimated the military's impact on modernization and underestimated its willingness or ability to overthrow civilian regimes. These scholars failed to ask fundamental question on whether it makes sense to consider the separation of military and civil authority outside the context of developed states.[49]

Military intrusion in African politics stems from so many sources, it is practically impossible to distinguish bad from good reasons for intervention. According to Potholm, it is not advisable to rely on the statements of the military themselves. No matter what the real motivation for a particular coup, virtually all claimed the desire to stop misguided governance or to fill a political vacuum.[50] Whether the military has intervened in African politics because of internal institutional characteristics of the military, like its size, cohesion, hierarchical command, and corporate interests, or because of societal conditions such as low economic development, social cleavages, and low political culture and institutionalization, the military has ruled most of Africa most of the time. Such a usurpation of African politics and government prevented acknowledgement of the military for its contributions, which include either actively or passively allowing the democratization process in Africa to succeed.

With a preponderance of coercive force, military leaders conspired, hijacked and monopolized political and economic power. In the process, they mismanaged the economy, dismantled the educational system, abused their fellow citizens and, through pointless coups and counter-coups, destabilized their countries. As an

47 Ali A. Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as a New Political Class," *Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March 1973): pp. 1–12.

48 Kieh, Jr. and Agbese, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

49 Mullins, Jr., *op. cit*., p. 4.

50 Potholm, *op. cit*., pp. 198–9.

"untamed tiger" in a jungle of lawlessness, the military ruled unchallenged, and Nwagwu's analogy is quite appropriate:

> Untamed tigers are marauding the African jungles, where there are no laws and might is right. Based on its physical prowess, the tiger is unquestionably the king of the jungle. Virtually unchallenged and unbridled, it preys on the other animals in its immediate environment, thereby threatening the viability of the entire ecological system. It must be domesticated, taught how to co-exist with the other animals in the animal kingdom.[51]

According to de Villiers:

> A paradoxical situation often arises in Africa in that military leaders intervene in a genuine bid to end undemocratic civilian (or even military) dictatorship: but their very intervention and subsequent establishment of a military dictatorship is equally undemocratic and often assumes an even harsher form than the old civilian dictatorship. More often than not initial pledges by the military to "restore" democracy fail to materialize.[52]

A classic example of this paradox occurred in Ethiopia in 1974 where the empire could be viewed as an extreme case of authoritarian, autocratic, and undemocratic rule. When it took over, the military had a particularly delicate problem in that the incumbent ruler had established an exceptionally strong personality cult during more than 50 years on the throne. It took the military several months to end the undemocratic rule of Emperor Haile Selassie. When it finally did it, the military included the customary character assassination in their post-coup communiqué in which it claimed that the Emperor "has abused the authority, dignity and honour of office for the personal benefit and interest of himself, his immediate family and retainers."[53] Arguably, the Ethiopian empire was not democratic. But, the military regime of Menguistu Haile Mariam was not either. In fact, Menguistu's regime turned out to be worse than the emperor's.

Unfortunately, military governments are as dictatorial as the regimes they overthrow if not more. Under such circumstances, only another coup can break their autocratic hold on power. To avoid that outcome, "military leaders have usually proved astute enough to neutralize potential rivals by regularly changing posts and by other means."[54] Both the late Mobutu and Bokassa used this technique

---

51 'Emeka Nwagwu, *Taming the Tiger: Civil-Military Relations Reform and The Search for Political Stability in Nigeria*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002, p. xx.

52 Cas de Villiers, *African Problems and Challenges*, Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers, 1976, p. 58.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 60.

with extraordinary success, keeping an eagle eye on their military subordinates. Because the restoration of civilian rule after a period of military dictatorship is after all dependent on military decision rather than on civilian coercion, popular resistance or civilian agitation has been a dynamic force for re-instituting civilian rule.

The military rulers invariably seek to explain their continued control through the claim that it is impossible to remedy overnight the chaotic situation they inherited. They maintained that they can only restore civilian rule when firm foundations have been laid and that this will inevitably take several years. There are very few tangible benefits the African military has brought to the continent. On the contrary, in many instances, the fate of several African countries under military rule has left to be desired. Enahoro believes that the military rhetoric on bringing positive change is a sheer elusion:

> Military regimes create a false sense of unity and security. Contemporary African societies are too segmented and loyalties too parochial for anyone to think that he can weld them into true national unity simply by waving a baton before cheering crowds.[55]

While some states have seen benefits from military rule, the harvest is quite meager. In lieu of the malpractices of civilian rules and the ills of civilian dictatorships, Africans experienced the harsh realities of military dictatorships. Although military governments have the advantage that their decisions can be executed rapidly and without the hindrance of democratic institutions, military rule did not help the continent as political frustrations and economic problems explode into renewed demands for truer and meaningful independence. In Lumumba-Kasongo's view:

> Soldiers in power tend to claim that they come to power to restore law and order, maintain the unity of the country, and restore bureaucratic integrity and honesty. The African civilian regimes have been perceived by soldiers as highly corrupt and corruptible. However, the social and economic conditions that military regimes have created in countries such as Nigeria and Zaire are worse than those created by any elected civilians.[56]

The military intrusion in politics, far from providing a relief to the populations, became an unending nightmare that democratization continues to fight. Agbese's evaluation of the performance of the armed forces in Africa speaks volumes about the damage done to the continent:

---

55 Peter Enahoro, *Africa*, April 1971; quoted in de Villiers, *op. cit*., p. 62.

56 Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, *The Rise of Multipartyism and Democracy in the Context of Global Change: The Case of Africa*, Westport, CT: Praeger 1998, p. 108.

> Decades of autocratic military rule have left a legacy of monumental corruption, lawlessness, mass poverty, gross human rights violations and intense political instabilities in many African countries. Virtually every African state which has been infected by the virus of military dictatorship has suffered severe economic dislocations, outrageous external indebtedness, gross underdevelopment, and massive ethnic and religious strife. It is clear that military rule has been an unmitigated disaster for Africa. Moreover, given the depth of the socioeconomic and moral depravity in which Africa now finds itself on account of military mismanagement of state and society, it will take many nations several decades to correct the disastrous legacies of military rule.[57]

For Ergas, the military sees itself playing the function "of educator, of guardian of the secular character of the state, and guarantor of political stability and honesty in government."[58] However, as Huntington maintains:

> Military leaders can easily envision themselves in a guardian role; they can also picture themselves as the far-seeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But, with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer … Their goal is community without politics, consensus by command. By criticizing and downgrading the role of politics the military prevent society from achieving the community which it needs and they value.[59]

If Akande's assertion is accurate, the military in Africa has very little to show for its rhetoric:

> The political leadership in many of the African states involved the military as a political instrument in the political chess game thereby compromising their integrity and created them as a possible source of recruiting the political leadership. Many of the military institutions were themselves afflicted by the social malaise of corruption, indiscipline, factionalism, ethnicity etc and other vices that compromised their professionalism. The African military is also lacking in the manpower, training and resources needed for a disciplined and mobile force. Because of these complex factors, the military has repeatedly failed as a safety net for many African states at crisis points.[60]

---

57 Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Keeping the African Military at Bay: Current Trends in Civil-Military Relations," in J.M. Mbaku and J.O. Ihonvbere, eds. *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle*, Westport, CO: Praeger, 2003, p. 153.

58 Zakis Ergas, ed. *The African State in Transition*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 314.

59 Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–244.

60 Akande, *op. cit*.

Overall, the military, with all its discipline and unique talents, has failed to distinguish itself from the civilians since both leaderships took the continent to the brink of disaster.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 5
The Performance of Civilian and Military Regimes: A Comparative Assessment

> Although civilian regimes may be no better than military ones, however, on balance, it is more useful to have civilian regimes than military ones. This is because the incumbency of a civilian regime, even if it has a nominal constitutional tapestry, provides some political space for promoting the democratization project.[1]

For several decades, the armed forces controlled civil society or society in general in many countries. In what looked like a competition to determine who was more corrupt and dictatorial between civilian and military bureaucrats, the military establishment won squarely. According to Edie, "under both civilian and military regimes, élite rule has continued despite reconstitution of state power. Economic changes under military regimes have frequently taken the form of a redistribution of economic power among the élite, with the armed forces taking a larger share than before."[2] While the kaleidoscope of African social movements is complex and broad, these movements' histories have strong common threads: the experience of past oppression and the constant struggle for an identity that encompasses survival. Right after independence, some crucial socio-political and economic policies were required in Africa for faster and sustainable economic growth and development.

In his study of African élites, focusing on armies, bureaucrats, politicians and business groups, Bangura noticed that intellectuals have played major roles in influencing social change and in helping governments to formulate polices that regulate social behavior even if the academic population in Africa tends to be very small *vis-à-vis* the other dominant social groups.[3] Intellectuals and technocrats have tried to lift their countries to higher ground. As a self-appointed redemptive force, the military has also tried to play its hand in improving the socio-economic conditions of the continent. Unfortunately, neither has resisted corruption and the systematic looting of the meager resources of their state. According to de Villiers, "the big question is whether military rulers are better able to handle the political

---

1 Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Soldiers as Rulers: Military Performance," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 86.

2 Carlene J. Edie, *Politics in Africa: A New Beginning?*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003, p. 78.

3 See Yusuf Bangura, *Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change. Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy*, Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1994.

and economic problems of developing Africa than the civilians, whether they will be more immune to corruption, whether they will be less inclined towards dictatorial rule and whether they can ensure a place in the sun for the teeming millions of Africa."[4] With very few exceptions, the governments that military coups put into power have been as corrupt, inept, and brutal as the civilians' they replaced, resulting in great wealth for the ruling élite and their generals but abject poverty for the population.

Civilian Leadership in Africa

Grasping the extent to which civilian leadership has failed the continent requires an overview of the last days of colonialism in order to flesh out what the main tasks were. Imperialism arose from the commercial, industrial, financial, scientific, political, journalistic, intellectual, religious, and humanitarian impulses of Europe compounded together. It was an outthrust of the entire white man's civilization. It was supposed to take civilization and enlightened living to those still in the darkness. Whether it was in the form of the British *White Man's Burden*, the French *Mission Civilisatrice*, or the German *Kultur*, imperialism had become a crusade. Social Darwinism and popular anthropology had taught that white races were "fitter" or more gifted than non-whites. Missionaries, explorers, and individual adventurers first opened Africa to the world. As a *terra nullius*, Africa was to be claimed by the first European settlers. By the time Europeans were forced to switch their policy from direct to indirect exploitation, the damage was beyond imagination and it was evident that colonialism had more to do with the search for raw materials and new markets than the spread of civilization.

The newly independent states of Africa, despite their many differences, share a common inheritance at the point of transition from colonial rule. Among the constraints leaders had to deal with the artificial nature of the political boundaries that reflect more the ambitions and capabilities of European powers than any geographical or social realities of the continent. The second legacy, associated with the first, is the multiplicity of ethnic groups within new states. The new boundaries not only divided existing political entities but, more significantly, compelled groups with no history of on-going ties to live together. The third historical constraint was the burden of economic weakness. Colonial rule was accompanied by fundamental change to the traditional economy through cash crops. The fourth legacy was heavy dependence on outsiders. New states failed to design their futures independent of foreign considerations. This external dependence was compounded by a fifth inheritance: the creation within the continent of a small, Western-educated élite quite distinct from the bulk of the population.[5] Education became the best tool in Europeans' tactic of "divide and rule."

4 De Villiers, *op. cit*., p. 62.
5 Chazan et al., *op. cit*., pp. 27–28.

The sixth constraint lies in the fragility of the state institutions. Not only was the colonial framework alien, but it was also underdeveloped, because the colonial state serves the minimum necessary to ensure a semblance of control. Mechanisms for the extraction of resources were refined, those for distribution rudimentary. Military and police forces were used as effective instruments of rule; participation in political life was actively discouraged. Thus although the colonial state was highly centralized, its apparatus was not necessarily suited to the needs of independence. A seventh, and particularly burdensome, inheritance was the absence of a shared political culture. Colonial rule, while varied in intensity, severity, and intrusiveness from one part of Africa to another, was fundamentally authoritarian. Government was imposed rather than participatory, instructive rather than consultative. The final historical legacy lies in the psychological realm. The collective memory of colonialism associated with humiliation gave rise to an organized backlash against foreign rule and captured the hopes of independence, but did not furnish a substantive adhesive for the attainment of the new aspirations.[6]

Clearing these hurdles requires a great deal of creativity and most African leaders failed the task. According to Chazan et al.:

> At independence, individual Africans, social groups, and government agencies had to deal simultaneously with the need to define their identities, consolidate their positions, assure their access to resources, interact with each other, delimit the parameters of their autonomy, augment their productive capacities, and confront the outside world. Although communities and institutions, leaders and citizens, producers and managers brought different tools to bear on these nearly overwhelming tasks and often had contrary objectives in mind, they all shared in the ongoing effort to find ways to adjust to changing and uncertain circumstances.[7]

One way to clearly gauge African leaders' performance will be to find answers to a set of questions posed by Chazan and her colleagues:

> How did they meet [the] separate challenges, with what results, and with what implications? How did social and political actors organize to grapple with these issues? What rules did they devise to regulate their interaction? How, in fact, did they interrelate? How have these patterns affect economic production and distribution? What have been the consequences for Africa's position in the global arena?[8]

It is true that new African leaders received a structure of control but lacked a power base from which they could effectively establish priorities and pursue policies.

---

6 Ibid., pp. 29–30.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

Within this context of power impoverishment and political fluidity, civilian leaders had to deal with power consolidation. With their own legitimacy tenuous, demands and expectations heightened, resources meager, external vulnerability pronounced, and allegiances uncertain, new leaders faced almost insurmountable obstacles. However, the desire to concentrate power in their hands compounded their difficulties. By weakening or eliminating participatory institutions, albeit imperfect, inherited from colonialism, civilian leaders alienated further their base, embarking on a journey that took the continent to a dead end.

Many of the new rulers felt the need to dismantle important constitutional provisions that allow opposition to have a voice. The notion of a loyal opposition, alien to the colonial and decolonization experiences of most new leaders, was equated with dissent and a threat to their power. Consequently, to reduce opposition was to outlaw rival political organizations based on particularistic, sectarian, or ethnic interests. In Schraeder's view, "the dismantling of institutional checks-and-balances usually culminated in the outlawing of all opposition political parties and the creation of a single party system subservient to the presidential mansion."[9] In their fight against regionalism, they placed local government directly under the aegis of central institutions and eliminated regional political bases. According to Chazan and her colleagues:

> Very elaborate means of thwarting opposition … had the effect of profoundly altering the function of participatory and representative institutions. National assemblies and parliaments, packed with ruling party supporters, were downgraded in many cases from legislative bodies to decree-sanctioning organs. Although careful efforts were made to maintain some notion of representation, parliamentary debates mostly offered opportunities to express support or to allow for a certain measure of bargaining. They rarely permitted real engagement in policy formulation or even constructive commentary on the direction of government policies.[10]

Because of what Schraeder terms the "great expectations-minimal capabilities" paradox, newly elected leaders had to content with popular expectations that the fruits of independence, most notably higher wages and better living conditions, would be quickly and widely shared after the departure of the colonial powers. To resolve that paradox, most civilian leaders agreed that such challenges as the rapid achievement of socioeconomic development, the creation of a sense of "nation" among numerous ethnic groups, and the maintenance of political-military order, required the creation of powerful, centralized states.[11]

---

9 Schraeder, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

10 Chazan et al, *op.cit*., p.50.

11 Schraeder, *op. cit*., pp. 218–219.

While Africans have previously taken to the streets before to demand greater freedom, the revolts of the 1980s were marked by greater intensity.[12] A few years after independence, Africans raised concerns about the direction the continent was taking under the guidance of new African leaders. Their resentment of post-independence regimes took a milder form, with the hope that "consensus" would help open a genuine dialogue. Unfortunately, their complaints fell on deaf ears.[13] Africans saw colonialism as "an exploitative, repressive, and cruel system, established primarily to enhance the ability of Europeans to extract resources from Africa for the benefit of the metropolitan economies."[14] At the end of colonialism:

> many Africans, especially the historically marginalized and deprived believed that independence was a genuine opportunity to rid themselves of not only the Europeans, but also of their laws and institutions and then, develop and adopt, through a democratic process (i.e., a people-driven, bottom-up, participatory, and transparent institutional reform process), institutional arrangements based on their own values, aspirations, traditions, and customs.[15]

The expectation was that the new dispensation would serve the needs of the people by dealing more effectively with mass poverty and deprivation. Unfortunately, independence turned out to be a missed opportunity to dismantle what had been instruments of exploitation and plunder. The new élites, for the last 50 years "have engaged primarily in opportunistic and reluctant institutional reforms, which have improved their ability to monopolize political power and the allocation of resources."[16] Having inherited power from the colonizers and tasted its sweetness, new leaders found all kinds of excuses to remain the sole decision-makers.[17] While new élites used the state and its coffers as their ATM machines, their compatriots got poorer. Faced with such a situation, civil society, silenced or tamed in many countries, searched for ways to make itself heard. However, its lack of organization and resolve, and the coercive apparatus new leaders put in place thwarted any

---

12 Jean-Jacques Kabaya-Katambwa, "La Conception du Pouvoir et de la Démocratie en Afrique Noire après les Indépendances," *Le Mois en Afriqu*e 245–246 (Juin 1986), pp. 23–38; and Kofi A. Busia, *Africa in Search of Democracy*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967.

13 Maxwell Owusu, "Democracy and Africa–A View from the Village," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3 (1992), pp. 369–396.

14 John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Introduction: Issues in Africa's Political Adjustment in the 'New' Global Era," in J.M. Mbaku and J.O. Ihonvbere, eds. *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle,* Westport, CO: Praeger, 2003, p. 1.

15 Ibid., p. 2.

16 Ibid.

17 Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Where Is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa's Non-Transition to Democracy," in John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, eds. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change*, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998, p. 10.

chance of changing the course of events. The creation and rapid expansion of a coercive apparatus, comprising a wide variety of security, serve as a critical component of the concentration of power.

A key cause of the debacle of civilian leadership lies in the creation of personal rule networks, a system of governance in which power is ultimately vested in an individual charismatic leader, as opposed to legally based institutions. Such a system is necessarily "based on a series of concentric circles of patron-client relationships, in which the leader at the center of the system personally selects senior government appointees, who in turn select their appointees, and so on … as long as the leader is capable of maintaining and increasing the level of political and economic resources provided through the patronage network, he can at least ensure his continued domination of the political system."[18] This judicious use of political-economic rewards and sanctions led to a severe crippling of the state.

Gradually, Africans realized that the root cause of their agony lies in the nature of the leadership, and specifically how it uses the state to attain its own selfish goals, forcing civil society to take matters in its own hands. According to Schraeder:

> The rise of centralized, authoritarian African states at the expense of civil society was significantly challenged during the 1970s and the 1980s by a series of economic, political, and military developments often referred to as the crisis of the African state. African leaders found their hold on power simultaneously threatened by the economic demands of faltering national economies, the resurgence of civil society, and in some cases the emergence of civil unrest and conflict. Hobbled by decades of corruption and economic mismanagement, the predatory states of the earlier independence era increasingly proved incapable of maintaining control over their respective territories, and became known as lame leviathans and shadows.[19]

The rules of the political game were trampled underfoot as civilian political rivals resorted to every means at their disposal to gain a decisive advantage. Politicians resorted to questionable methods and displayed their willingness to play the tribal card to reach their selfish objectives, instead of being genuine leaders concerned about the welfare of their compatriots. Consequently, the growing inability of the state to provide a wide variety of social goods led to dissatisfaction first and eventually to violence and conflict, creating a window of opportunity for the military to step in.

18 Schraeder, *op. cit*., pp. 226–227.
19 Ibid., p. 227.

Military Experiments in Africa

From the shadows of obscurity during the 1950s, African militaries became the most important institutional actors in African politics and society. The transition from colonial armies to national ones did not occur right away. In Coleman and Brice's opinion:

> African states lack what many other new states of the former colonial world have had, namely, an army which could be a modernizing and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a last stand-by reserve which could be called in, or could take over, to prevent external subversion or a total collapse of the political order.[20]

It did not take long before such views dissipated. Almost as though the armies heard the call for action, the African military embarked on its "mobilizing and stabilizing" mission. Unfortunately, the cavalier attitude of civilian politicians made things quite easier. Through numerous *coups d'état*, the military has imposed itself as a force to reckon with. According to Schraeder:

> By the end of the 1960s, military leaders had launched over twenty-five successful coups, ushering in a period of militarization that soon left more than 50 percent of all African countries governed by military regimes. Even in cases where they led their troops back to the barracks after turning over power to elected civilian regimes, military leaders maintained—and often enhanced—their newfound levels of political influence. Once having enjoyed the fruits of power, military leaders, often referred to as the **men of horseback** or **leaders in khaki** (bold in original), were prone to return to presidential mansions in later coups, leading foreign observers to characterize African militaries as the primary forces for change throughout the African continent.[21]

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the military failed Africa in several ways. They failed to provide security against both internal and external threats. They misled Africans in giving them false expectations through rhetoric that turned out empty. It is supposedly against the widespread erosion of democratic politics in the newly emergent states in Africa that the military stepped in. Potholm's description of the praetorian impulse in Africa gives a vivid scenario of a typical coup in Africa:

> It is 2 A.M. in the capital city of one of Africa's new nations. The streets are almost deserted as two jeeploads of soldiers arrive at the presidential residence.

---

20 James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 359.

21 Schraeder, *op. cit*., p. 245.

> Several dozen armed men go through the gates and into the residence. They seize the president and capture his bodyguard. At the same time, other soldiers have seized the radio station and an armed squad has taken over the airfield, closing it of incoming traffic. When the citizens of the new nation wake up, they will learn that the previous government has been overthrown and that a new Revolutionary Council, headed by military personnel, has been formed "to wipe out corruption and get the country moving again." By noon, the airfield will be open again and shops and market stalls will be doing business. Another African government has been overthrown by the military.[22]

Invariably, one of the first unkept pledges given by coup leaders is a speedy return to civilian government. Potholm's script explains the rash of coups, coup attempts, and counter-coups in Africa. For whatever else the widespread military intrusion signaled, the wholesale involvement of the military in African politics, the ease with which it supplanted the civilian authorities indicated the fragility of most of these systems, and the extent to which political decay and the erosion of democracy had already occurred. Regardless of the differences of political systems and military interventions, the army's role on the African continent is symptomatic of political devolution.[23]

When civilian leaders lost control of the situation, providing no safety valve elections, swimming within widespread corruption, and lacking the ability to deliver on their promises, the military emerged as a powerful counterweight. However, military leaders failed to do better. Rather, they hijacked politics and government in Africa thanks to their monopoly over violence, and did very little. According to Edgerton:

> Since independence, some African armies and many rebel militias have justly earned a reputation for savagery, for the slaughter of helpless women and children, for rape, looting, and destruction of every kind. In armed combat, however, few have provided evidence of either discipline or courage. Capable of torturing and murdering any number of unarmed civilians, including anyone who criticized the government or belonged to an opposing ethnic group, they have demonstrated little appetite for fighting well-armed foes.[24]

Initially, many Africans who resented civilian dictatorship relied on the military to redress years of injustice, nepotism, and mismanagement. Through a well-crafted rhetoric, the military succeeded in convincing many that Africa was on the wrong track with inept civilian leadership. Civil society's failure to alter the

---

22 Christian P. Potholm, *The Theory and Practice of African Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979, pp. 196–7.

23 Ibid, p. 198.

24 Robert B. Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy, A History from 1791 to the Present*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002, p. 4.

political system opened up the door to "military" society, as the military moved in. Early *coups d'état* were widely welcomed[25] because Africans were fed up with the deplorable state of affairs. Ironically though, militaries who thought that they were creating revolutions by executing leaders of the ancien regime found that either structural change does not take place *ipso facto* or that only by organizing inchoate social forces and creating new administrative and political instruments will social change be realized. Consequently, civilian politicians who were blamed are brought back, under military aegis, to deal with intractable problems.[26]

These military interventions gave a new twist to civil-military relations. The lack of clear boundaries between civilian and military roles, inherited from colonialism, became evident. As army discipline broke down and civil-military boundaries fragmented, the military took upon itself the responsibility to fulfill the unfamiliar role of government, sometimes under pressures from the wider society. On assuming power, the military typically suspends the constitution, dissolves the civilian government and parliament, disbands the existing political parties, and detains—or euphemistically "holds in protective custody"—the political leaders of the previous regime. The military also establishes a new structure of control, topped by a military council, and rules by decree.[27] However, the task is harder than expected and Welch, Jr. gives a full picture of the complexity:

> If military regimes set themselves up as doctors of the body politic, they risk being infected by the ills from which the previous civilian government suffered—or, should the patient fail to improve, the physician may be discharged. There is thus a dual danger. On the one hand, military regimes may fall prey to corruption, unwarranted use of force, electoral or ethnic manipulation, or the denial of political rights—all weaknesses that helped justify (or at least, rationalize) the toppling of the civilian government. To avoid such "infection," the army may prefer withdrawal. On the other hand, the popular welcome that accompanied the military takeover may soon be exhausted. The medicine prescribed for the cure may well prove unpalatable. Accordingly, to avoid forcible eviction and to retain some public support, the armed forces may wish to stage a graceful retreat.[28]

Because of its limited experience, the military tends to still rely heavily on the former bureaucracy, whose middle-class attitudes and values its members are likely

---

25 Robert H. Bates, Robert H. 1994. "The Impulse to Reform in Africa," in Jennifer Widner, ed. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 19.

26 Bienen, *op. cit*., p. 27.

27 William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa,* 3rd ed., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 194.

28 Welch, Jr., 1971, *op. cit*., p. 219.

to share, making the military "the armed wings of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie."[29] Ultimately, the policies pursued by the military will depend on its character and aims. According to Martin Dent, the military can establish a caretaker, corrective, or revolutionary regime:

> A 'caretaker' regime is pledged to restore constitutional integrity and clear up the mess left behind by the politicians; a 'corrective' regime seeks to correct certain profound deficiencies in the old civilian order (such as the four-state basis of the federal constitution and the regional nature of the political parties in pre-1966 Nigeria); and the revolutionary regime aims to transform the structure of society and to end the prevailing pattern of elite rule.[30]

Hale offers a different typology of military regimes ranging from the least intrusive to the most: moderator or veto regimes, guardian regimes and ruler regimes:

> Moderator or veto regimes exercise veto power without formally taking over power. These regimes are usually supportive of the status quo; they may have carried out a 'displacement coup' to replace a civilian government that is undesirable in their eyes by one that is more acceptable. Guardian regimes take over direct government power, but declare that they intend to exercise it only for a limited time span (perhaps two to four years). These regimes tend to be authoritarian and limit civil rights, but the mutual expectation of a limited period constrains their degree of control over social and economic structures. Ruler regimes stay in power for longer, and they try to exercise much wider political control (their leaders often see themselves as radical modernizers).[31]

According to Potholm, many military regimes in Africa have had to create their own legitimacy, beyond their control of weapons, as rulers and not simply overthrowers:[32]

> This had led to a much wider variation in the style and role of military rule, ranging from caretaker governments of short duration, to mixed civilian-military

---

29 Christopher Clapham, *Third Politics: An Introduction*, London, UK: Croom Helm, 1985, p. 121.

30 Martin J. Dent, "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective," in S.K. Panter-Brick, ed. *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, London, UK: Frank Cass, 1978, Ch. 4.; quoted in Tordoff, *op. cit*.

31 Quoted in Emanuel de Kadt, "The Military in Politics: Old Wine in New Bottles? An Attempt at Stocktaking," in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds. *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London, UK: Zed Books, 2002, p. 315.

32 Potholm, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

> cooperation governments, to regimes in which the military have created the same trappings as civilian regimes.[33]

The most abiding characteristic of military regimes, and the most abiding self-justification for their intrusion in politics, is that they regard themselves as final arbiters of the political process, final judges as to whether a particular turn of events is acceptable from their standpoint as the guardians of national integrity.[34]

In his contribution to the debate about military typologies, Perlmutter maintains that the praetorian army can assume two different natures: that of a "ruler" or an "arbitrator," although it can ultimately become the "guardian."[35] According to his taxonomy of civil-military relations, the ruler army ventures to alter the existing political order, doubts its legitimacy, and is unwilling to return executive power back to civilians. The arbitrator army, on the contrary, is committed to "fixing" the existing order, ready to leave office after a limited period of time during which it has restored law and order. It has no intention to increase army power, is prone to continue to influence the civilian government, and is concerned about civilian retaliation. The army in this case is loyal and obedient to civilian rule even when the latter is rather disorganized, but does not threaten the existence of the state. The coup is treated as the last resort by an army that prefers to be a pressure group thereby minimizing the chances it will have to intervene physically.[36]

But very soon the increasing degree of social complexity hinders the army "to exercise power effectively and to seize power successfully."[37] As more social groups become visible and participatory in political affairs, society becomes more differentiated and difficult for the military to manipulate. Consequently, the military becomes "one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces," that have moreover developed methods of counteracting military action. Therefore, the degree of physical violence involved in a coup decreases, but it becomes more "virulent" in terms of the scope of arrests, trials, and censorship.[38] Moreover, military intervention can occur under the condition that the civilian and military institutions are "distinct," which is an inevitable effect of the modernization of society, division of labor, increase of governmental scope and mounting "complexity of warfare and administration."[39]

As society undergoes higher levels of differentiation soldiers are further removed from civilian roles. Under such circumstances the military assumes

---

33 Ibid.

34 de Kadt, *op. cit*.

35 Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 104.

36 Ibid.

37 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit*., p. 229.

38 Ibid., p. 230.

39 Rustow, 1967, p. 175.

the role of the guardian, the "purifier of the existing order" in response to political "corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion."[40] The loss of the government's legitimacy and the presumed incapability of it to perform its tasks successfully are adequate incentives for the generals to intervene. The military can afterwards assume the role of "an informal, or even explicit umpire between competing political parties and groups."[41] The guardian coup has only a "temporary" stabilizing effect in the political process.[42] Soon after the coup, a division among the ranks of the military between radicals and moderates appears, especially over the issue of abandonment of power. The radicals wish to stay in power longer and reconstruct the political system. The moderates have short-term goals and after eliminating the problems that prompted their intervention want to leave office. Therefore it is typical for coups to be threatened by the possibility of "sub coups" within their ranks initiated by the radicals aiming at deposing the moderates that took power initially, or indeed experience such sub coups.

According to Tordoff, certain conclusions concerning military behavior once in power command wide acceptance. First, the military's hierarchical command structure and the habits of discipline and obedience of its members may lead a military regime to take obedience for granted. Second, because it lacks organized popular base and an easy means of communicating with people, the military may forge an alliance with the police, a force more scattered among the people. Third, military regimes seek to compensate for their relative isolation and lack of experience in government by gaining the support of groups not too closely identified with the previous regime. Fourth, to remedy its lack of a popular base and to strengthen its claim to rule once the initial euphoria which greeted its seizure of power has evaporated, the military regime may acquire civilian trappings. Fifth, "civilianization," may, however, merely serve to increase the difficulty, which all military governments face, of maintaining organizational cohesion. This phenomenon has the potential of generating the danger that army officers involved in government become divorced from the army command structure, leading to conflict over policies.[43]

Sixth, the military, despite its image of moral integrity and puritanical spirit, may not provide cleaner and more honest government than its civilian predecessor. Military regimes generally improve the pay and conditions of service of the rank-and-file in order to quench their thirst for power and to prevent a counter-coup. At the same time, army leaders, like civilian politicians before them, have often enriched themselves at the public expense. Last, but not least, even a military regime which claims, with some justification, to have intervened to restore stable and democratic government may be sucked into politics and refused to return to

40 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit*., p. 225.
41 Janowitz, 1977, p. 83.
42 Huntington, 1968, *op. cit*., p. 231.
43 Tordoff, *op. cit*., pp. 195–197.

barracks, sustaining the view that its take-over is just another way to take its part of the national cake.[44]

Military intrusion in politics in Africa is such that Welch, Jr. believes disengagement to be nearly impossible. His prognostication arose from a set of factors:

- The colonial "apolitical" heritage was both shallow and misleading. It applied to only a small number of officers, most of whom have retired or been supplanted, and was an inaccurate description of their responsibilities.
- The fragmentation of military-civilian boundaries illustrates that intervention cannot be reversed in the short run. The armed forces proved to be the major arbiters of personnel and policy change and will be cultivated by groups aspiring for power from all social sectors.
- The appetite for power exists among many officers, despite their protestations of political neutrality.
- Coups d'état have become institutionalized in Africa. No short term solution exists.[45]

In retrospect, Welch got it right. The institutionalization of intervention prevailed, especially in "praetorian" states in which "the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup."[46] Through populist authoritarian regimes, the military sought to execute deep changes. However, despite its populist orientation, the military has failed to make a difference.

The mark left on the African political glossary might be military populism, "a special brand of populism similar to 'populist authoritarianism' but run by a military oligarchy that is usually undemocratic, commandist, and intolerant of opposition by training and prior exposure."[47] Like their civilian counterparts, populist military regimes have found creative means to remain in power:

> by a powerful combination of often direct military interference into politics, highly politicized bureaucracies, overwhelming powerful if not solely official political parties, and doctored elections in which the winners and losers are predetermined. The regime relies on a series of elements that are highly conducive to authoritarian politics. Its survival is dependent on the longevity of an autocratic leader with a penchant for political manipulation, a personally loyal military keeping the regime's opponents at bay, and an official political party

44 Ibid.

45 Welch, Jr., 1986, *op. cit*., p. 23.

46 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 196.

47 Mbaku and Ihonvbere, *op. cit*., p. 36.

> designed to generate mobilized support for the regime but itself an inseparable part of the bureaucracy.[48]

Unfortunately, the similarity between corrupt civilian leaders and military dictators soon became apparent. The military leadership turned out to be worse since its legitimate use and control of weapons gave it a *carte blanche* for all kinds of brutality, regardless of the population's reaction.[49] Hit with such a reality, civil society resumed its struggle, but from a different perspective this time. Since the governments had taken away such basic freedoms as free association, free speech, and freedom of the press, and opposition had to be covert, only underground organizations could carry on the struggle against incompetent military dictators. Civil society took a harder stance in countries where corrupt civilian leaders retained power.[50] Although neither open actions nor underground challenges really removed perverted leaders, they did weaken their regimes before the wave of political transition from Eastern Europe tolled the knell of these leaders' power.[51]

While recent literature on democratization glorifies civil society for its tenacity, the military has played a key role in some African countries. Civil society's determination is necessary but not sufficient for successful democratic transition on the continent. Its vibrancy is good for the survival of democracy, if it continues to play its role as a buffer between state and society. However, its dynamism should not downplay the military's contribution to democratization process. Because of the military's centrality there can be no democratization without its consent, even if a country possesses a vibrant civil society and a dynamic political culture.[52] Both civil society and the military should work together to take Africa back to where it should have been were it not for their equally negative role in the current fate of the continent.

---

48 M. Kamrava, *Politics and Society in the Third World,* London, UK: Routledge, 1993, p. 19.

49 Jean-François Bayart, "La Revanche des Sociétés Africaines," *Politique Africaine*, vol. 11 (September 1983), pp. 95–127 ; also Onwumechili, *op. cit*., p. 17.

50 Samba S. Koné, *1990: Une Année Pas Comme les Autres*. Abidjan: Presses de la MICI, 1990; and Colin Legum, "The Coming of Africa's Second Independence," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 129–140.

51 Gérard Conac, *L'Afrique en Transition vers le Pluralisme Politique*, Paris: Economica, 1993.

52 See Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, *Determinants of Democratization: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2001; John R. Heilbrunn, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2 (1993), pp. 277–299; and "Togo: The National Conference and Stalled Reform," in Clark, John F. and David E. Gardiner, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

Civilian or Military Leadership: Different Methods Same Outcome

Since independence from colonialism, several African countries have been ravaged by the rule of brutal and corrupt governments, most of them achieving power through the barrel of the gun or rigged elections, not free and open contests. Like their civilian counterparts, the military has been incapable of bringing about a regime able to develop a viable economy. Instead, these military governments have typically reduced the economies of their countries to chaos, enriching their leaders and their supporters, while they detained, tortured, and killed those who opposed them.[53] Military rulers who come to power via a *coup d'état* take their personal security very seriously and do everything possible to keep their subordinates happy in order to avoid a counter-coup. There also is, according to Le Vine, the tendency for military regimes to resort to coercion as standard operating procedure, something that elicits grudging obedience at best, and evasion coupled with precipitous delegitimation at worst. The civilian side of the military succession dilemma is represented by authoritarian regimes that have come to lean on their militaries to stay in power, even perhaps owing them to their very existence.[54]

According to Rivkin:

> The military-supported as well as the direct military governments have had little success in developing local institutions and local-level government councils and administration that would involve more and more people in public affairs. Nor have they had much success in inducing economic initiatives at local levels throughout the country. The reason for the lack of success is quite clear: either development, the devolution of power to local levels, or the encouragement of independent initiatives and accumulation of economic power … would threaten the concentration of power at the center, the *sine qua non* for military rule generally and particularly in Africa.[55]

Much to the frustration of those who assigned to the military a unique mission, that of modernizing their respective countries, the armed forces made little difference in improving the living conditions of the African population, or in taking African countries to higher standards. Mullins maintains that:

> Military governments rarely exercised direct administrative control below the upper levels of the bureaucracy and were, even there, susceptible to the same

53 Robert B. Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy, A History from 1791 to the Present*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002, p. 4.

54 Victor T. Le Vine, *Politics in Francophone Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 295–296.

55 Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969, p. 74.

> corruption and inefficiencies as their predecessors. In short, their performance was, on average, indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts.[56]

For quite a while, the main distinctive feature of African politics has been personal rule in political systems that lack effective political institutions. Some of the characteristics of these autocratic regimes, either civilian or military, include political conspiracies to overthrow the rules, frequent coups, factional and clientelistic politics with highly personalized patron-client relationships, rampant political corruption, frequent purges from the government, the party, and the military of those deemed disloyal, and maneuvering for succession.[57] If the performance of most African countries has fallen short of the vision of progress and well-being held forth by the leaders of anti-colonial movements, the reason lay at the doorstep of African leaders, civilian and military alike.

First of all, there are many varieties of military regimes and the mix of civilian-military authorities varies within military regimes and within civilian ones, as well as between them. In Bienen's view, the taxonomic dichotomy between military and civilian regimes can hardly stand. There are societies in which civilian regimes depend increasingly on the military or part of it to secure their power. There could be a narrow civilian leadership operating on top of a military regime, or a military regime using civilian élites. The lines between military and civilian regimes in Africa are often blurred.[58] As Welch, Jr. maintains, "'civilian' and 'military' governments are, in the real world, not totally exclusive but overlapping phenomena."[59] Evidently, civilian leaders did not live up to their promises. However, military officers' performance also fell short of expectations.

de Villiers maintains that:

> some states have seen benefits from military rule but the harvest is a meager and a temporary one. It is also a relative one for instead of the malpractices of civilian rulers being corrected through the democratic process, the ills of civilian dictatorships have been all too often been replaced by the equally harsh realities of military dictatorship.[60]

African leaders have experimented with many ideologies and political philosophies in the hopes of altering the terrible conditions of their continent. In the early days of independence, most leaders, aware of the circumstances under which the colonial powers left Africa, sought to gain full control over their countries by

---

56 Mullins, Jr., *op. cit.* p. 5.

57 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. *Understanding Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1987, p. 41.

58 Bienen, *op. cit*., p. 15.

59 Welch, Jr., 1987, p. 11.

60 de Villiers, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

instituting a centralized power. Nkrumah and Sékou Touré were among the first to establish one-party states in order to accelerate nation-building. They were quickly followed by their peers, and centralization became the order of the day. Unfortunately, centralization, because of its nature, allowed a personalization of power and a heavy reliance of bureaucratization, with such corollaries as dictatorship, mismanagement, and violence. While some have espoused African socialism, others have even put their countries on a Marxist path of development, all in the name of rapid progress.

In retrospect, the desire to establish strong authoritarian regimes hurt more than help Africa. Ideologies aside, authoritarian politics dominated the domestic scene in the first decade after independence. Despite its perhaps noble intent, the one-party system permitted several deviances. Competition over access to and control of state resources nurtured an instrumental view of politics in which *res publica*, or the public domain, was seen as the best channel for individual or partisan enrichment. Zero-sum patterns of interaction led to the muzzling of loyal oppositions and to an intolerance of dissenting opinions. Left with no choice, armed resistance became the best tool to deal with incumbent governments' autocratic rule.[61]

Violence led to insecurity and lack of effective control over territories, and to subsequent military interventions to bring about political change. Virtually every African state has been subjected to an attempted coup, if it has not experienced a military take-over. Even such countries as Côte d'Ivoire, thought until recently to be immune to military intrusion in politics, experienced its successful coup when in December 1999, General Guéi put an end to Konan Bédié's rule. Here also, the promise to withdraw once constitutional integrity has been restored, corruption eliminated, and the economy revived, failed to materialize and it took force and outside pressure to remove Guéi. However, this military intervention and other factors have put Côte d'Ivoire on a treacherous path it has yet succeeded in negotiating out of.

The military filled, or claimed to fill, a guardian-type role and, as a custodian of the national interest, intervened to save the country from corrupt and inefficient politicians. In reality, the military regimes display no greater capacity in promoting political, economic, or social development than their civilian counterparts. As Nelson puts it, even "coups in time of widely recognized national crisis accord a regime temporary and contingent legitimacy, and some political generals have successfully built institutions to capitalize on and provide more durability to that legitimacy. But most have not tried, or have tried but failed."[62] There seem to

---

61 Naomi Chazan et al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa,* 3rd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 13.

62 Joan M. Nelson, "Political Participation," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. *Understanding Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1987, pp. 146–147.

be limitations inherent to the military profession and Almond and his colleagues rightly maintain:

> the major limitation of the military in interest aggregation is that their internal structures are not designed to mobilize support across a range of issues or outside their coercive control. The military is primarily organized for the downward processing of commands under threat of coercion. It is not set up to aggregate internal differences, to build a compromise, to mobilize wide support of government policy, or even to communicate with social groups outside the command hierarchy. Nor does the military regime have the surface claim of legitimacy that elections provide … Thus the military lacks many of the advantages in mobilizing voluntary support held by party systems.[63]

As Decalo rightly maintains, whatever the type and declared objectives of military regime under consideration in Africa, "examples of Ataturk-style socio-economic transformation of new nations are extremely rare."[64] As Tordoff has demonstrated, civilians have no monopoly over bad behavior and corruption in Africa:

> In Ghana, the later Acheampong years (1975–8) were marked by massive corruption, with cocoa revenues embezzled on a scale never previously experienced. In Nigeria, by 1975, the name of state governor had become a byword for corruption. The subsequent shock tactics of Murtala Mohammed only proved salutary in the short-term and corruption in public life quickly resurfaced; it [remained] rife under Abacha … The human rights record of most military regimes is no better (and may often be worse) than the civilian governments which they supplanted. In respect of both corruption and human rights abuse, the civilianisation of erstwhile military regimes (as in Mobutu's Zaire) has substantially diminished the validity of the distinction between military and non-military regimes.[65]

Whether it under a civilian or military regime, African states have failed to reach their economic and social goals. The sad reality is that "governmental capacities have not improved markedly during these years. In many countries, top-heavy administrations run by civilian or military leaders wielded very little authority, and the power of their governmental institutions had remained weak."[66] According to Rimmer:

> With few exceptions, African countries are believed economically to have languished, or even retrogressed. Their administrations are regarded as having

63 Almond et al., *op. cit*., p. 95.
64 Quoted in Tordoff, *op. cit*., p. 204.
65 Tordoff, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
66 Ibid.

> become incompetent and corrupt; their governments, which are often self-appointed, as authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, and commonly dependent for their survival on external support. The policies that have been followed are seen frequently to have been economically wrong-headed. Africa is perceived as beset by intractable problems—runway population growth, diminishing capacity to feed its people, deteriorating physical environments, crushing burdens of external debt.[67]

The early and understandable expectation was to see a type of leadership different from that of colonialism. As a technique for maintaining rule over a subordinate population and a separation of the ruling group from the subject population, colonialism has to be unjust and discriminatory. Colonies exist to serve the needs of the colonizing power and as such occupy a servile role. The colonial governments were evidently self-appointed, necessarily arbitrary and violently oppressive. This is what independence was supposed to correct. Africans expected new governments based on consent rather than force, able to observe the rule of law and provide basic freedoms. Unfortunately, they got just the opposite.

The corrupt and self-important nature of African leadership has become commonplace, allowing some to create a caricature that reflects nevertheless some truth. In a *Washington Post* piece, Blaine Harden described "His Excellency the African Leader," as follows:

> His face is on the money (the national currency). His photograph hangs in every office in the realm. His ministers wear gold pins with tiny photographs of him on the lapels of their tailored pinstripe suits. He names streets, football stadiums, hospitals and universities after himself. He carries a silver-inlaid ivory mace, or an ornately carved walking stick, or flywhisk, or chiefly stool. He insists on being called "doctor" or "conqueror" or "teacher" or "the big elephant" or "the number one peasant" or "the wise old man" or "the national miracle" or "the most popular leader in the world." His every pronouncement is recorded on the front page. He sleeps with the wives and daughters of powerful men in the government. He shuffles ministers without warning, paralyzing policy decisions as he undercuts pretenders to his throne. He scapegoats minorities to shore up popular support. He bans all political parties except the one he controls. He rigs elections. He emasculates the courts. He cows the press. He stifles academia. He goes to church … He is—and makes sure that he is known to be—the richest man in the country … His rule has one overriding goal: to perpetuate his reign as Big Man.[68]

---

67 Douglas Rimmer, "Thirty Years of Independent Africa," *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1991), p. 90.

68 *Washington Post*, December 9, 1990, p. K5; quoted in Edgerton, *op. cit*.

In their own way, Butts and Metz described the caricature of the African leaders, and here again the picture is less than flattering:

> the dominant political image in Africa is often that of the "big man" or "president for life," whisked by sunglassed bodyguards into a Mercedes limousine with darkened windows, on his way to join the waiting brothers, cousins, friends, and cronies he has appointed to government posts. At best, leaders play the part of a benevolent and enlightened father, caring for "their" people. At worst, they are psychotic dictators mistaking fear for respect and power for support. Nearly always, though, wisdom and power are the personal property of leaders, hopefully to be exercised in a benign fashion but in reality often used for repression or self-aggrandizement. If images, myths, and traditions are windows on the truth, Africa's would not seem to bode well for democracy.[69]

While these depictions of the African leader, civilian or military, might be perceived of as an exaggeration, it remains true that many of the characteristics described did and continue to exist on the continent. In all fairness, there are exceptional efforts in some former dictatorships. However, authoritarian tendencies explain why democratization is facing an uphill struggle on the continent. Autocratic rule is confronted with democratic governance and where military rule has prevailed, democratization is experiencing serious challenges because civil-military relations have yet to be disentangled.

According to David Chuter, where the state is the prize, the military will be as assiduous in looting the public coffers as the civilians they replaced.[70] An ideological military government will persecute its perceived enemies, but generally leave others alone. Indeed, most military governments are military in name only, and depend on widespread civilian acquiescence for their survival. In practice, it is almost impossible for the military to institutionally rule a state. In most cases, those who do not actively oppose the regime are left alone. Some military regimes have been conspicuously liberal and have safeguarded human rights. And finally, those who have blundered into power often cling to it helplessly, discrediting themselves, but frightened at the consequences of handing power back.[71] In the meantime, military rule damaged not only civil-military relations but also rapports among different segments of the security sector. The impacts of military regime on society require new civil-military relations in Africa.

---

69 See Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, "Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa," available on http://www.resdal.org/archivo/d000105.htm, viewed on 12/18/05.

70 David Chuter, "Understanding Security Sector Reform," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 4, no. 2 (April 2006), p. 13.

71 Ibid.

Chapter 6
Towards New Civil-Military Relations in Africa

> The role of the military and its relationship to government policymaking are central to a country's democratization. Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy. Civilian government officials, including legislators, often do not have the background and training necessary to perform their military oversight roles effectively or to develop the respect of military counterparts.[1]

For African democracy to succeed, civil-military relations must be reformed. As Claude Welch, Jr., posits, "if there is any single truism, it is that planned disengagement from politics rests primarily upon the willingness of ruling officers to reemphasize their professional as contrasted with their political responsibilities."[2] Peaceful successful democratic transition depends not only on the incumbent autocrats to give up their power, but more importantly on voluntary returns of the military to their barracks. Armies have long been, and remain in some cases, *the* major obstacle to democracy in Africa, seizing power with depressing frequency and often dominating the political process even under civilian regimes.

Despite democratic aspiration on much of the continent, autocratic tendency still lingers in some corners.[3] To the frustration of most Africans, total military disengagement from politics remains a dream. Recent military takeovers or attempts in the Central African Republic (March 2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (July 2003), and Guinea Bissau (September 2003), the February 2005 short-lived military coup in Togo, both August 2005 and 2008 military takeovers in Mauritania, the December 2008 military takeover and current confusion in Guinea, the March 2009 military intrusion in Madagascar's politics, and the February 2010 military coup in Niger, represent not only the grim realities of politics on the continent, but also a bad omen for Africa's nascent democratic renewal. The thin ray of hope that African

---

1 USAID/Center for Democracy and Governance, *Democracy and Governance: A Theoretical Framework*, Washington, DC: USAID, 1998, p. 21.

2 Claude E. Welch, Jr., "'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies,'" in Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 20.

3 For instance, the armies of Burundi, Guinea, Lesotho, Congo, Zaire, Togo, Cameroon, and Nigeria have obstructed democratization and political reform. See Michael Chege, "What's Right with Africa?" *Current History*, vol. 93, no. 583 (May 1994), p. 194.

militaries are gradually turning from enemies to promoters of democracy in several countries is dimmed by such military intrusion. Despite the vibrancy of civil society organizations in Benin and Mali, the positive role by the armed forces turned out to be the key to democratic transition in these nations.

The importance of the military's contribution to democratic transition cannot be overestimated. African militaries are and will remain crucial political actors. Decades of bullying and usurpation by the military cannot negate its role in designing a new political order on the continent. "The question is not," according to William Gutteridge, "whether armies will participate in politics but to what extent and by what means."[4] Similarly, Welch and Smith captured quite cogently the role and place of the armed forces in society when they argued that "the military's political role is a question not of whether but of how much and of what kind."[5] Their role in the promotion and sustainability of Africa's fragile democracies is thus pivotal: Africa's militaries are vital allies for any individual, state, or organization supporting open government.

Democratic Civil-Military Relations

In all societies, decisions about the goals to be pursued, the rules to be followed, and the distribution of responsibilities and benefits between members have to be made. Democracy is the best tool for collective decisions. As such democracy entails the twin principles of popular control over collective decision-making and equality of rights in the exercise of that control. Historically, most Western states became liberal before they became democratic, in other words, they achieved a liberal constitutional order before they granted universal suffrage or developed mass political parties. The most important features of a democratic society are the subordination of government or state institutions to the laws approved by an elected parliament; guaranteed rights of the individual to due legal process and to the freedoms of speech, assembly and movement; a judiciary with sufficient independence of both parliament and executive to act as guardians of the law and of these individual rights.[6]

---

4 William Gutteridge, "Undoing Military Coups in Africa," *Third World Quarterly,* vol. 7, no. 1, January 1985, p. 79. See also Claude E. Welch, Jr., *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, p. 4; and John W. Harbeson, "Military Rulers in African Politics," in John W. Harbeson, ed. *The Military in African Politics*, New York: Praeger, 1987, p. 2. That point is also echoed in *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995 p. 15.

5 Claude Welch Jr. and Arthur Smith.

6 David Beetham and Kevin Boyle, *Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers*, London, UK: Polity Press, 1997, p. 14.

Democratic government is more likely than any other type of government to meet the ordinary people's needs. The more say people have in the direction of policy, the more likely it is to reflect their concerns and aspirations. One of the key tasks of democrats in a representative system is to find ways to make more effective the various mechanisms of popular control over the government, and the rule of law or constitutionalism allows democracy to be a fair arbiter within society. The rule of law keeps the government and state institutions in check. As Beetham and Boyle state:

> A government in a modern state has enormous powers at its disposal. Whatever its popularity, if it is not kept subject to the law like everyone else, or if it is not required to seek approval for legislation from parliament according to established procedures, or if it does not respect the liberties of its citizens, however unpopular on occasion their exercise may be, then people will rapidly lose the capacity to control it. Democracy is not a system that gives the people whatever they demand at a given moment, or in the shortest possible time, but one that secures the conditions for their influence and control over their government on an ongoing basis.[7]

As a state organ and intrinsic part of society, the armed forces are also subject to the rule of law. While it can at best provide a short-term palliative to society's problems, the military cannot be a long-term solution. For a while the military has been perceived of as the chief agency of economic modernization and nation-building, in contrast to the corruption and divisiveness of democratic politics. Yet the armed forces have proved incapable of providing a source of legitimate authority for government.[8] Although democracy is in principle antithetical to secrecy in government, states have understandably maintained secrets for *raison d'état*. The military leadership evokes secrecy and other reasons to remain off the radar screen. However, maintaining military subordination to elected politicians remains a crucial element of democratic governance.

In a democracy, a well-crafted, well-understood, and carefully protected separation between political and military decisions should allow a civil supremacy of the military. Besides such issues as weapons procurement, manning levels, or conditions of service in the armed forces, or strategic decisions, the military should take orders from the elected civilians. Just like their civilian counterparts, the armed forces in a democracy have a direct responsibility to the law, to parliament and to the public. As Beetham and Boyle put it:

> Everything … hangs on the issue of political control. It is not sufficient for security operations to be covered in the general accountability of the relevant minister or ministers to parliament. There needs to be a special committee of

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 84.

> parliament, meeting as necessary in secret, to supervise such activities and ensure that publicly justifiable guidelines are being adhered to.[9]

Civil supremacy of the armed forces in a democracy embraces the idea that the will of the people is paramount. The military is subordinate and accountable to civilian officials who are elected by the people. This ensures that the state in question is in a position to base its values, institutions, and practices on popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on the need for internal order and external security.[10] In a democracy, military leaders obey the government as they accept the basic national and political goals of a democracy and because it is their duty and profession to fight.[11] Traditionally, civil supremacy in a democracy is enforced through the constitutional, legislative and budgetary mechanisms, as well as by means of military professionalism.

The road to democracy as well as the pace of democratization in Africa still depends largely on the armed forces.[12] The transition from military to civilian rule in Africa requires undoing military intervention in politics as a preliminary step in recreating democratic institutions.[13] Since independence, African armies assumed significant roles as arbiters of political conflicts and their disengagement will have to be negotiated. Civilian control of the military is necessary to establishing accountable political systems in Africa. The military remains a potent political actor, working to defend its own interests and those of its allies.[14] Louis Martin argues that for democracy to succeed, civilian leaders must establish a stable relationship with the military and institutionalize control.[15]

In the same vein, Huntington believes that to impose "objective civilian control" over the military and render it, consequently, "politically sterile and

---

9 Ibid., p. 85.

10 Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4 (1997), p. 141.

11 Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 79.

12 Eboe Hutchful, "Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition," in Marina Ottaway, ed. *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, Marina. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; also Samuel Decalo, *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960–1990*. Gainesville: FAP Books, 1998.

13 Robin Luckman, "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," *African Studies Review,* vol. 37, no. 2 (September 1994), pp. 13–76; and William J. Foltz, "Democracy: Officers and Politicians," *Africa Report*, vol. 38, no. 3 (1993), pp. 65–67.

14 Stephen Riley, "Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure: Democratic Politics and Political Choice in Africa," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1992), p. 541.

15 Michel-Louis Martin, "Operational Weakness and Political Activism: The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John P. Lovell and David E. Albright, eds. *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997, p. 96.

neutral," civilian leaders need to work with the military at the initial stage of democratization:[16]

> [c]ivilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of officer corps … The essence of objective control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.[17]

Diamond agrees that negotiating gradual democratization may be a fruitful strategy where the military retains control.[18] The future of democracy in Africa depends on civilian control of the military. As Condoleezza Rice maintains, problems of civil-military relations are salient to any transition, and building sound civil-military relations rests on three pillars: a) tight normative constraints on military's political activity; b) clear lines of jurisdiction between civil and military institutions; and c) clear differentiation among institutions of socially sanctioned violence designed to ensure that the military role remains restricted to external defense.[19] The issue of civil-military relations is central to both political and economic development because it is the determinant of the dialogue between civilian politicians and the military leadership. Ironically, the military's disengagement is taken as a given and democratization efforts focus more on constitutional reform of electoral rules rather than minimizing military power.[20]

After decades of mistrust, the military and civilian politicians will need to redesign their relationships for a smooth political transition of their country. Diamond and Plattner make a good case for a new civil-military relationship in Africa, arguing that civilian leaders must define the military's role, including its planning, practices and level of armaments.[21] Civil control of the military is maintained through the sharing of control between civilian leaders and military officers. This theory of shared responsibility, suggested by Bland, rests on two assumptions. First, the term "civil control" means that the sole legitimate source for the directions and actions of the military is civilians outside the military/defense

16 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1957, pp. 84–66.

17 Ibid., p. 83.

18 Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 1 (December 1989), p. 147.

19 See Condoleezza Rice, "The Military under Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 27–42.

20 Jendayi Frazer, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition," *Africa Today*, vols. 1 and 2 (1995), p. 39.

21 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil-Military and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. xx–xxi.

establishments. Second, civil control is a dynamic process susceptible to changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues, and personalities and to the stresses of crises and war.[22] Ideally, a professional military should hold the defense of state security as paramount and foster values of order and hierarchy internally to support that goal.[23] However, military intervention in politics has made the division between the armed forces as an institution and as government a critical issue in African politics.

In a democracy the civilian government's challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to provide defense with a military subordinate civilian control.[24] On the other hand, the military's challenge has been to embrace the whims of society, which may blunt the capability of the armed forces, or to risk alienation from the very people it purports to defend if it impedes social change. While popular wisdom on the topic of civilian control of the military would deny any political role to the military, as evidenced in the concept of "apolitical" armed forces, the typical African army has a direct stake in politics. Only a redefinition of boundaries and more astute management by civilians will prevent the military from intervening continuously in the political process.

Security Sector Reforms (SSR)

While what is meant by the "security sector" continues to be debated, a slow consensus seems to be referring it to those institutions and organizations to which the state has allocated a legitimate role in the use, or threat of use, of exercise of coercive force in society to tackle external or internal threats to the security of the state and its citizens. Consequently, it encompasses: military and paramilitary forces, intelligence services, national and local police services, border guards, customs services, as well as penal institutions and the judiciary. It is also understood to comprise those civil structures mandated to control and oversee these agencies.[25]

In a March 2009 paper focused on West Africa, Jake Sherman demonstrates how the absence of effective, democratic governance of the security sector can be a significant causal factor in cases of state fragility and civil war.[26] This situation leads

22 Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1999), p. 10.

23 Huntington, *op. cit*., pp. 59–79.

24 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 149.

25 Owen Greene, *Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean*, GFN Paper No. 12 (March 2003), p. 3.

26 See Jake Sherman, *Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, New York, NY: Center on International Cooperation, 2009.

to increasing public demand for better security sector governance. Meanwhile, there is concern that the SSR discourse promoted by donor governments insufficiently reflects the norms, values, and historical experiences of West African society and its citizens. According to Sherman, many civil society actors engaged in SSR in the region and in their own countries have also expressed frustration that their own considerable achievements, including the promotion of parliamentary oversight, are not sufficiently acknowledged.[27]

According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) definition, the security sector comprises four clusters of actors: (i) core security actors, including the armed forces and the police service; (ii) management and oversight bodies, such as executive, legislature, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies, and civil society organizations; (iii) justice and the rule of law institutions; and (iv) non-statutory security forces, including liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, tribal militias, and political party militias.[28]

In Sherman's view, professionalization and governance of the security sector, the two pillars of SSR, mutually reinforce each other. They require a simultaneous rather than sequential approach. Yet SSR has tended to focus on restructuring and training militaries and police services, rather than on security sector governance, particularly in post-conflict environments. To promote a more holistic approach from the outset, mediators should ensure that oversight dimensions of SSR are included in political settlements.[29] Sherman stresses ways to improve the technical and political skills of legislative committee members to effectively represent their constituents and exercise oversight over security actors. Strengthening legislative capacity democratizes oversight, counterbalancing executive authority, promoting power-sharing and compromise, and protecting minority interests; all of which are essential components of conflict management and peace-building.[30]

On the technical side, Sherman makes a few observations: legislative capacity building programs must account for frequently low levels of educational attainment among parliamentarians, which can inhibit their efficiency and effectiveness. Second, they should train professional security sector committee staffs to provide advice to legislators and continuity when committee members are newly elected or reshuffled. A critical but limited third priority is supporting access to information through well-resourced libraries, the Internet, networks of civil society experts, and citizens. A toolkit of basic oversight skills, with guidance on how to draft security oversight acts, conduct a budget review, as well as question government officials

27 Ibid., p. 1.

28 OECD, "Security System Reform and Governance," DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, (Paris: OECD 2005), pp. 20–21.

29 Sherman, *op. cit*.

30 Ibid.

and external experts, would provide a readily usable resource for legislators and research staff.[31]

Parliamentary capacity building frequently is approached as a purely technical exercise, without consideration for the political dynamics motivating committee appointments, governing parliamentary procedures, and defining constituent relations. More work is needed to promote procedures and identify incentives for political party leadership to make more qualified and sustained committee appointments. Training initiatives should incorporate skills and structures enabling parliamentarians to improve constituent outreach and engagement. Equally, strategies for strengthening legislative oversight should include initiatives to strengthen demand for accountability by civil society and the public at large.[32]

Ultimately, security sector reform aims to support the development of efficient and effective security institutions that serve the security interests of citizens, society, and the state while respecting human rights and operating within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.[33] A conceptual underpinning of this goal is the belief that a democratic, accountable, and efficient security sector reduces the risk of conflict, thereby creating an enabling environment for economic development.[34]

A liberal democratic state fulfills its protective role within the political community by instituting a rule of law enforced by punishment. To retain its authority, the state must protect its citizens from foreign threats, not least of all by means of an effective military establishment. Ironically, the military itself is quite often the very threat citizens need protection from. While it is important that the military be strong enough to protect the state, the armed forces cannot be left uncontrolled by the state. Freed from state restraints, the military might pose an internal threat to sovereign power.[35] Neither should the military be entirely dominated by the state because it might then be forced to follow civilian authorities' passions that might sap military strength and consequently military security.[36]

One way to overcome such a dilemma is to reform the entire security sector by taking into the new concept of security: human security. Security concerns perceptions of both individual and collective well-being and of the assurance of the "core values" central to the self-definition of communities.[37] Another dimension

---

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 2.

33 M. Caparini, "Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement," *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, cited in Peake and Scheye 2005, p. 299.

34 OECD/DAC Handbook, *op cit*., p. 13.

35 James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Fall 2002), p. 8.

36 Ibid.

37 Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in Brian Job, ed. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 14–15.

of security inescapably intertwined with the first, hinges on the issue of "whose security," and Job's distinction makes defining security a complex issue:

> In principle, four or more distinct securities may be at issue simultaneously: the security of the individual citizen, the security of the nation, the security of the regime, and the security of the state. For a society composed of communal groups, with distinctive ethnic or religious identifications, their perceived securities may also be at stake, making the interplay and competition among the various players even more complex and unresolvable.[38]

While it is the state, in the Weberian tradition, that holds the right to maintain and exercise coercive force to keep order and to settle disputes, national agencies or bureaucracies such as the military can take violent acts on behalf of the state or the people.

For several centuries, security has been defined as politico-military threats within the strict realm of the security apparatus. Nowadays, a new concept is emerging, human security as a response to the challenges in today's world. Policies and institutions must respond to growing insecurities in stronger and more integrated ways. Evidently, the state continues to have the primary responsibility for security. But as security challenges become more complex and various new actors attempt to play a role, we need a shift in paradigm. The focus must broaden from the state or regime security to the security of people—to human security. Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf. To do this, it offers two general strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making. Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing, and both are required in most situations.

Human security often complements state security, furthering human development and enhancing human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. By looking at "downside risks," it broadens the human development focus beyond "growth with equity." Respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security. Promoting democratic principles is a step toward attaining human security and development. It enables people to participate in governance and make their voices heard. This requires building strong institutions, establishing the rule of law and empowering people.

38 Ibid., p. 15.

The political aspects of security imply the existence of linkages between security and effective leadership, respect for human rights, political inclusion, regional cooperation, and good governance. Related issues include accountability, transparency, protection of rights and, especially, the rule of law. Although the military obviously has a principal role in maintaining state security, a broader understanding of security, and particularly the security of the individual, cannot be seen in purely military terms. Indeed, at the local level, the military is unlikely to be the principal guarantor of security. The needs of people will essentially determine what constitutes security for them. Increasingly, such problems as lack of economic opportunity, unemployment, violent crime, and HIV/AIDS have turned out to be the most serious threats to the security of ordinary Africans. African leaders should also be cognizant of the gender dimensions of security, and ensure that the needs of women, as well as their role in promoting security, are taken into account.

African countries need to adopt realistic and credible security (human security) arrangements, based on a determination of what state and individual security should be. This will influence the role that the military and other security institutions should play. While a reasonable amount of attention has been paid to the military, far less has been devoted to other security institutions. Given that civil security is of paramount importance, these new bodies should strongly endorse the need for accountable and professional police forces and stress the imperative of impartial justice. Too often, those in power act with impunity while ordinary citizens are denied access to justice. Although the state obviously has significant responsibilities with regard to security, civil society also has an important role to play in promoting and maintaining security. A strong civil society provides a counterbalance to political authority and can help guard against abuses of power that contribute to insecurity. Citizens need to be stakeholders in security, and their role in ensuring it should be recognized.

However, taking a wider view of security should not lead to a diminished role for security forces, or to their neglect, since weak and under-funded security establishments can be—and often have been—a significant source of insecurity. Professional, effective and efficient militaries, able to perform their legitimate and constitutionally-defined functions are an essential element of national security strategies. In many countries, and especially those that have known military rule, the military and other security forces are distrusted and civil-military relations are poor. Moreover, a lack of transparency leads to public misunderstanding of security issues and defense policy. The African Union and sub-regional institutions could make a significant contribution to strengthening security forces and improving civil-military relations in Africa by highlighting the important contribution of the military to national and regional security and bringing military and security issues into the public domain. Because of the nature of civil-military relations in Africa, encouraging the withdrawal of the military from politics should be

managed through a process of complex compromises, involving careful civilian scrutiny over aspects of military and other security sector budgets and operations, and extreme caution about holding military officers to account for past abuses.[39] However the very fact that extra-judicial killings by sections of the security forces continue in some countries indicates that security has yet to be understood as a public good.

Security as a Public Good

Since independence, security forces in most African countries have suffered because of poor governance. Often, political interference eroded their professionalism and led to ethnically or geographically biased recruitment. Other times, political leaders attempted to buy the loyalty of special forces at the expense of national militaries. Contrary to popular belief, military regimes in particular tended to undermine the effectiveness of security forces, while single party states demanded party loyalty over military professionalism. Frequently, military regimes paid relatively little attention to the role and mission of the security forces or their effective management. At times security forces were used as an employer of the last resort, resulting in large but poorly-educated and ill-trained military establishments. Given an almost complete disregard for civil security**,** the police usually fared even worse than the military. In most instances security, of both the state and the individual, suffered, and relations between security forces and society deteriorated.

Although most African countries are in the process of political transition, both the nature and the process of transition, and the role of the military in it, are determined by a range of factors which make generalizations difficult. However, the military is a key player in all transitions, whether from single party politics to more pluralistic systems, from military to civilian government, or from war to peace. Historically, the military has influenced, dominated, or participated in politics to varying degrees in African countries, and this legacy in part affects the role played by the military in the on-going democratization processes. Other potentially determinative factors include the nature of politics in individual countries, how political power is perceived and obtained, the interface between political institutions, prevailing civil-military relations, and how new political leaders develop relations with military establishments.

With democratization, the military seems to be undergoing significant change in many countries. Nonetheless, improving governance in the security sector is an on-going process, and that security forces—in Africa as elsewhere—must constantly evolve to meet new challenges. In real terms, what is required is transformation of the security sector. However, this cannot be achieved in isolation, but must be embedded in a broader process of political reform and improved public sector

39 Greene, *op. cit*., p. 4.

governance. It must also extend to an evaluation of what constitutes security, and the role of the security apparatus in achieving it.

African leaders, democratic and autocratic alike, continue to define security in terms of the survival of their regimes. If to be secure is to be safe and protected, only an assault on poverty can really provide a genuine sense of security on the continent. The new security agenda of the post-Cold War period requires a review of civil-military relations that goes beyond the traditional notion of subordination of the armed institution to elected civilian leaders. The increasing use of the world's militaries in non-combat roles is a phenomenon of the last decade that has significant fiscal and governance implications.[40] There is an urgent need to bring civil-military relations into the development dialogue.

The challenges of the new civil-military relations include such issues as dealing with the professional mercenaries working for international consortia to keep order and allow for the extraction of wealth. Challenges also include paramilitaries that are often subsidized by official military organizations who use these groups to perform acts of terror and repression that they can not perform due to their concern with public opinion. In some parts of the world, dismantling the armies of the post-conflict period challenges the whole subject of civil-military relations as thousands of newly released soldiers are reintegrated into civilian life. There are also the growing ranks of peacekeepers, civilian police, and international monitors who are part of the new civil-military relations dynamic.

In a state that has undergone a recent transition to democracy, it may be premature to assume that the armed forces will be willing to take a back seat to civilian institutions which are still in their formative stage. When militaries remain the major presence of the state outside the capital city, the question is how to develop transitional steps to allow them to withdraw from these broad roles and return to the more appropriate role of defending the state from foreign enemies. Similarly, the use of military forces must not become the long-term solution for controlling internal enemies, when civilian police could be developed as a credible force to safeguard citizen security.

According to Elaigwu, the security sector transcends the military. In fact, at both individual and collective levels, security is political, social, economic, environmental and military. Thus, in order to seek genuine reforms and to establish practical confidence-building measures, in Africa, it is critical for security reforms to encompass all aspects of society.[41] Lack of good governance alienated the people from their governments and led to problems of security. Repairing relationship between civilians and the security

40 See James R. Graham, ed. *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993.

41 Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, "African Responses to Good Governance, Peace, and Security in the Region: Towards Confidence Building Measures," Paper presented at the Seminar on *Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter?*, New York, October 16, 2002; Posted on http://disarm.igc.org/Elaigwu.pdf, viewed on 12/18/05.

sector will require some bold measures to restore trust between the two sides. The first confidence-building measures are those which restore mutual confidence between the government and the citizens. Good governance becomes, as both the African Union and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) have acknowledged, a very cardinal practical set of confidence-building measures.[42] In addition, the security sector needs to be de-mythicized of its secrecy and de-personalized in its operation and loyalty. The security sector must realize that regime security is not the same as state security. The main duty of the entire security sector is to ensure the security of the state. The components of the sector must have the capability to deal with the apparent overlap between the two in their daily operation. This also means that the security sector gets institutionalized and de-personalized. In Africa, the mechanisms of control, transparency and accountability as delineated earlier need to be applied to it. These forms of good governance may generate new patterns of mutual confidence between security sector and the civil society.[43]

Towards New Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

It is gradually becoming accepted, at least in theory, in African states that military coups as a mechanism for changing constitutional governments can no longer be condoned. It is also a fact, that coming from a background of inheritance of western liberal model of civil-military relations, many African states have accepted the concept of an apolitical professional military, subject to democratic civil control, not just civil control. Given their past tense history, it has become absolutely necessary to establish a form of contract between military and civilian élites. This process involves a Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services. This is precisely what the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) based in Lomé, Togo, tried to do. With the assistance of some donor agencies, the then OAU and the UN, UNREC organized in Lomé a seminar on a Code of Conduct for African Armed Forces in March 2002. It followed this up with an experts' workshop and came out with a draft code of conduct that covers five basic chapters:

I. Regulatory framework governing democratic control of armed and security forces;
II. Relationships between Armed and Security Forces;
III. Relationships between armed and security forces and the civilian population;

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.

IV. Armed and Security Forces, human rights and international humanitarian law; and
V. Implementation.[44]

If accepted and implemented by the Assembly of Heads of States and governments of the African Union, UNREC expects this code to contribute to:

i. a better understanding of the armed and security forces of national and international rules and regulations which regulate their behavior in the exercise of their duties;
ii. socio-political stability through the elimination of one of the causes of conflict and political violence in Africa;
iii. the professionalization of the armed and Security forces in Africa; and
iv. the harmonization of relations and mutual trust between the Armed and Security Forces and civilian populations, human rights and law.[45]

African leaders are finding out that they must not only adhere basic values of good governance as they domesticate the principles of democracy, they must establish a new pattern of civil-military relations. Political leaders must accept that they have as much obligation to the military as the military has to them, as symbols of the State. They must politically educate the military to know their rights and obligations, and the limits of their powers under the constitution. Equally important is the education of the civil populace on the military.[46]

Given the various dialogues between soldiers and civilians, which the Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR), Jos, Nigeria, has organized, it is clear that greater interaction between the two groups would reduce stereotypes and build strong bridges across waters of misunderstanding. Even though the draft Code of Conduct for African Armed Forces includes some of these points, it is pertinent to reproduce them as Africa seeks to establish new patterns of civil-military relations.[47] Very often, there is an emphasis on the duties of the armed and security forces to the state. A code of conduct must clearly specify the obligations and rights of the Armed and Security Forces to the State, and vice versa. This duality of obligations and rights are most likely to help establish mutual confidence between military and civilian élites. Secondly, it is important to distinguish between African states which have experienced military regimes and those which have not. The challenges for both types of states are not always the same.[48]

---

44 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, *Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces* (Lomé, March 2002).
45 Ibid.
46 Elaigwu, *op. cit*.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.

It is a fundamental premise of democratic civil-military relations that civilian control of the military is clearly possible without democracy, but democracy is not possible without civilian control of the military. This reality is truer in Africa than anywhere else and Africans need to be cognizant of that dichotomy. There are fundamental steps to be taken to establish healthy civil-military relations within a democracy. Civil supremacy is enforced through the constitutional, legislative and budgetary mechanisms, as well as by means of military professionalism. However, the greatest problem remains civil society's ignorance of military and security sectors. As Howe correctly observed:

> Lack of knowledge restricts oversight; civilians must be able to understand the military to oversee its activities. Yet few African parliamentarians, reporters, and civic groups have specialized knowledge of military doctrine, strategy, tactics and equipment.[49]

Decades of (mis)rule have allowed the military to get an edge over civilians. The military understands the civil society better than the civil society understands the military. During the decades of military rule, the Nigerian armed forces, for example, have lost nearly all semblance of professionalism and become thoroughly corrupted. Senior officers all become immensely rich through theft, while junior officers and enlisted men live in poverty. Today, there are no civil-military relations in the normal sense of the phrase. The military is incapable of self-reform and cannot lead democratization. Only a radical transformation of the military and the wholesale replacement of the officer corps could open the way to democracy. Unfortunately, there is no force capable of doing this, and the Nigerian political economy, in which political office is seen primarily as a gateway to wealth, militate against sustainable democracy.[50]

Butts and Metz reject the notion that the political culture of African states allows or even encourages military intervention in politics.[51] Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in sub-Saharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. Stable democracies use a sliding scale of appropriate military involvement in policy-making. On issues concerning military operations, civilians usually defer to military leaders. On military organization, doctrine, strategy, force composition, acquisition, and budget, there is a somewhat firmer civilian hand. On national security strategy

---

49 Herbert Howe Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 279.

50 Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, "Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa," on http://www.resdal.org/archivo/d000105.htm, viewed on 12/18/05.

51 Ibid.

and foreign policy, the military usually provides advice, but is seldom the primary decision-maker. On non-security economic, social, and political policy, most modern democracies accord the military a very small role in decision-making if any at all.[52]

The key to this is cultivation of appropriate perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. Americans who seek to help Africans consolidate democracy must overcome infatuation with the formal dimension of civil-military relations. Constitutions, laws, regulations, and organizational structures may be important, but the crux is psychological. Specific perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs undergird healthy civil-military relations. The military, for instance, needs to believe that civilian leaders were selected by legitimate means and are fair, competent, and honest. Armed forces should see their allegiance as holistic, i.e. to the nation as a whole, rather than to specific regions, groups, or individuals, believing the military budget is fair and their service adequately rewarded given the overall economic situation of the nation.[53]

The military needs to be respected, its counsel adequately considered on strategic issues, its autonomy adequate on matters that are strictly internal to the military, and to believe that civilian leaders and society as a whole consider soldiering an honorable profession. Finally, the military must believe that civilian rule is almost always preferable to military rule, and that active involvement in politics is incompatible with military professionalism and detracts from the promotion of national security. Similarly, civilian officials must believe that military leaders are competent, honest, and effective, and that they deserve autonomy or authority over certain internal issues. They should consider adequate funding of the military important. And, civilians too must consider soldiering an honorable profession and believe that politicization of the military would detract from national security and political stability even though it might bring short-term gains to civilian leaders who manipulate it. The entire society needs to share these beliefs, and should feel that the military represents the nation as a whole rather than one region or segment.[54]

According to Elaigwu, the on-going dialogues between the military and civilians in Nigeria have produced the following observations and recommendations:

1. Challenges of the Military in States Where the Military has Intervened in Politics

The *democratic State* in transition usually faces a number of challenges in states where there have been military regimes. These include:

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.

a. the depoliticization of the military and the reduction of the impact of societal cleavages on members of armed and security services;
b. the restoration of mutual trust and confidence in the barracks, in order that the armed and security forces can play their constitutional roles;
c. the restoration of discipline and hierarchy within the forces;
d. creating a new sense of nationalism, patriotism and *esprit de corps*
e. spending money in reprofessionalization (increased fire-power; training and retraining); and
f. restoring the institutional self-confidence of the Armed and Security Forces.[55]

2. Control of Armed and Security Forces

a. the constitution of the State should clearly stipulate the *supremacy of civil authority* over the military;
b. the legislature (parliament) must clearly define the secondary role of the military;
c. the State must embark on a continuous process of value re-orientation of the Armed and Security agencies for democratic governance; military training institutions should be used for espousing new democratic and military values;
d. the state should encourage interaction among senior military officers and civilian political élites, in order to establish mutual confidence among them;
e. the state must position the Armed and Security Agencies for active roles in national development—for example, the engineering, medical and signals corps—can be transformed into active agencies for development;
f. the legislature must have the final authority for allocating funds for the military and monitoring its increase in fire-power; and level of professionalism;
g. the state (personified by the executive) must ensure that the deployment of these forces (for purposes of internal order) are clearly spelt out in terms of the scope of operation and rules of engagement;
h. civilians should not interfere in, or politicize professional matters of the Armed Forces;
i. the elected civilian President (or Head of State) shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and shall be responsible (through his appointees) for the regular operation of these forces. Details of such relationship shall be provided in the Constitution of the state;

55 Elaigwu, *op. cit*.

j. the President shall be responsible for the deployment of these forces and the declaration of war and their engagement therein. The Constitution of the State shall provide for checks and balances to such presidential action.[56]

3. Duties of Armed and Security Agencies to the State

a. The Armed Forces shall be subordinate to democratic civilian authority, from whence comes its power;
b. The primary duty of the Armed Forces shall be the protection of the sovereignty of the nation and its territorial integrity;
c. The Legislature or Parliament of the State shall make laws governing the secondary duties of the Armed Forces, which may include service:

   i. in the preservation of life, health and property;
   ii. in the preservation and protection of the environment;
   iii. in response to international obligations—peace-keeping, enforcement, or protection of human rights, in other lands;
   iv. in the provision or maintenance of essential services; and
   v. in support of national efforts for economic fulfilment.[57]

d. The Armed Forces shall be prepared for prompt intervention in cases of emergency or national disaster;
e. The Armed Forces should be disposed to playing the role of a development agency; to this end, its, medical, engineering, signals, and other skills may be used to initiate or support development programmes of the nation, without prejudice to its primary professional roles;
f. The Armed and Security Agencies *must not* engage in an adventure into the political arena. The Constitution of each state shall provide detailed laws and punishment for the contravention of this provision;
g. The Armed Forces shall always behave as "officers and gentlemen" and should do nothing that detracts from their honour as individuals, the credibility of their services and the integrity and honour of their country (whether within or outside the country);
h. The Armed Forces shall be *politically neutral* at all times, and shall act as the symbol of the nation. Each State shall make such rules and regulation as will govern the behaviour of its armed forces, while ensuring their rights as citizens; and

56 Ibid.

57 These emanate from, The Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Draft Constitution of 1995, vol.1*, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1995) pp.123–4.

i. No member of the Armed and Security Forces shall belong to militias, crime groups, secret cults or such other groups as are likely to undercut their oath of allegiance to the nation.[58]

4. Rights of Armed and Security Agencies

All members of the Armed and Security Services shall have the:

a. right to regularly paid salaries;
b. right to paid leave;
c. right to paid pension, either for invalidity or retirements;
d. the rights of the average citizen, including the right to hold opinions (but not to propagate such);
e. right to be protected by the State from violent threats to life, insult and others;
f. right to reject unlawful orders, based on its clearly defined roles in a democratic setting;
g. right to full medical treatment, and burial, while on active duty;
h. right to have appropriate wherewithal as will enhance the performance of his duties—of course within the limits of the country's purse; and
i. right to, at least, minimum welfare as will inspire or motivate officers and men in their job.[59]

According to Professor Gregory Foster, civil-military relations remain the postmodern challenge that any democracy faces.[60] There are enduring concerns about what militaries do and look like, where they properly fit in society, and how they are used and kept in check. If the purpose of the state is to govern society and the goal of government is to preserve the state, where does the military fit? What is the military role in preserving the state? How does an inherently authoritarian institution that employs violence on behalf of the state, subscribes to an ethos of obedience, wraps itself in secrecy, and demands exclusivity, is brought under democratic civilian control? The answers to these critical questions lie in four imperatives that ought to govern the Military in any society.[61]

The Military must be operationally competent and able to perform adequately its missions. A military that not only manages effectively violence on behalf of the state but is also strategically effective in serving the larger aims of society:

---

58 Emanate, in part, from the *Malian Code of Conduc*t for its Armed and Security Agencies.

59 Elaigwu, *op. cit*.

60 See Gregory D. Foster, "Civil-Military Relations: The Postmodern Democratic Challenge," *World Affairs*, vol. 167, no. 3 (Winter 2005), pp. 91–100.

61 Ibid.

1. *The Military must provide sound advice primarily on military matters to decision-makers*

- But also on issues dealing with strategic national security
- Here, civilians need to be informed or educated in military or strategic thinking: military literacy and civic literacy (strategic literacy)
- A need for a transparent dialogue: secrecy and stealth vs. confidentiality.

2. *The Military should be socially responsible*

- It should be a reflection of society: balanced ethnic composition
- It should be an affordable military: one that can be fielded and maintained without draining or diverting vital national resources from other key strategic aims such as education, public health and safety, infrastructure, environmental protection, and research and development
- The military should earn enough prestige to be respected by society
- Its members should demonstrate moral superiority without arrogance
- It should enjoy enough professional autonomy to perform without alienating itself from society
- It should abide by national, regional, and international instruments of human rights
- It engages in, and is expected to engage in, responsible dissent without crossing the line into disobedience
- It should be part of the overall system of checks and balances.

3. *The Military should be politically neutral*

- Political neutrality means no involvement in partisan politics
- Political neutrality means political participation without political intrusion
- While society might allow those in uniform to vote, they ought not to be involved in political campaigns nor to endorse political candidates.

There is a new hope that African leaders will keep faith with their declarations to adhere to democratic principles, and that the peer-review mechanism as contained the documents of NEPAD would help instill political sanity in the domestic affairs of states. Building on the new determination of African leaders, it is possible to argue that the future looks bright, but they must be able to transform their declarations into practice in order to allow the average African to feel socio-economically, politically and environmentally secure.[62]

62 Elaigwu, *op. cit*.

Chapter 7
Legitimacy and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Africa

> The relationship between civilian authorities and the military establishment is a critical element of democratic governance. Yet in too many transitional countries, the balance of knowledge and power weighs heavily in favor of the military establishment, allowing the military to exercise inordinate political influence. Where the military is able to operate with a large degree of autonomy, without transparency or civilian oversight, it is nearly impossible to delimit its role in national politics and to ensure it operates within democratic parameters.[1]

Africa's civil-military relations continue to evolve as militaries have significantly withdrawn from political decision-making in many states. However, debate continues as to the armed forces' proper security and political roles. There are also important lingering issues surrounding the efficacy of *coup d'états* or military regimes and of unconstitutional civilian leadership. Clearly, the military remains an important actor on the African political scene. In 2000, N'Diaye maintained that despite a changed international system built around democracy/liberalization and neo-liberal economic development, the centrality of the military as an institution in the politics of African states has not receded.[2] I underscored elsewhere the importance of the military in the politics of African states and the potential threats defense and security forces might pose to democratization/liberalization.[3]

Because of the lack of uniformity among both the military and the civilians, relations between these groups in the security sector are arguably very complex and quite nuanced leading to shifting patterns of power relationships both within and between these groups. While in most societies, the military (or the security sector in general) tend to be among the most-respected elements of society, the situation in Africa is different. In many instances, defense and security forces have been greatly unpopular, because they were seen as oppressors of society. In principle, the situation is straightforward. In a democracy, the legitimate government requires control of the organs of the state to do its job; it cannot have the defense

---

1 USAID/Center for Democracy and Governance, "Foreword" in *Civil-Military relations: USAID's Role*, Washington, DC: USAID, 1998.

2 See Boubacar N'Diaye, "The Military in the Politics of West Africa," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 2 (Winter 2000), pp. 187–90.

3 See Mathurin Houngnikpo, "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 2 (Winter 2000), pp. 210–229.

and security forces deciding for themselves what their priorities are. Because of recent military history in Africa, it is understandable why most scholars concern themselves with establishing democratic control and civilian supervision of the security sector.

Across Africa, the absence of effective, democratic governance of the security sector has been a significant casual factor of state fragility or civil war. Consequently, there is increasing public demand for better security sector governance through civilian supremacy. However, this chapter calls not just for civilian control of the military but rather democratic oversight of the security forces in Africa with the assumption that the civilian leadership itself enjoys some legitimacy. It maintains that even if the military is best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat, only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society. Also, civil-military relations represent a "game of strategic interaction" with civilian leaders and military agents making moves based on preferences over outcomes and expectations of how the other side is likely to act.[4] However, political power and influence of the military rises and declines with the weight of coercion in governance. The weight of coercion in governance is a function of legitimacy of nation-state and its rulers (both civilian and military), and the ability of government to rule effectively, as well as the level and success of economic development.

The Issue of Legitimacy in Military and Civilian Leadership

While concerted efforts are currently being made in several African countries to bring the military under some form of civilian control, the fact remains that democratic control of the defense and security forces hinges heavily on the legitimacy of civilian institutions. To effectively perform their duty, civilian leaders must gain their power through undisputed lawful means and demonstrate their willingness to provide accountable and transparent leadership and create conditions conducive to meeting the basic human needs of their compatriots.[5] The issue of the legitimacy of the military has been extensively explored. In fact, it has generated a great deal of theoretical discussion as well a rich variety of empirical evidence.[6] In Africa, the debate has a peculiar significance because of the claim of "innate" legitimacy by the military.

Armed forces consistently display a superiority of organization over other civilian institutions. Their traditional monopoly of arms, their expertise as managers

4 See Feaver, *op. cit*.

5 George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 15.

6 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn, *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, London, UK: Sage, 1976, p. 3.

of violence and their strong sense of corporate identity, create an exceptionally powerful force. Should this force be employed in praetorian politics so that the military successfully intervenes in the domain of the civil power, then the obvious question becomes how the subsequent rule of the soldiers is to be legitimated and to whom can they look in search of legitimacy?[7]

Definition of Legitimacy

Legitimacy, or the lawfulness by virtue of being authorized or in accordance with law, can be defined as an attribute of government gained through the application of power in accordance with recognized or accepted standards or principles. Political legitimacy is the general belief that the government has the right to rule/exercise authority. Because power is the ability to impose one's will on another, it implies a capacity for force or violence. However, such capacity lies in authority, the power to enforce laws, to exact obedience, to command, to determine, or to judge, which itself depends on legitimacy. Consequently, legitimacy is an attribute of government gained through the application of power in accordance with recognized or accepted standards or principles.

Max Weber identified three sources of legitimacy for authority known as tripartite classification of authority (i.e., reasons why people followed the orders of those who gave them): Traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. Traditional authorities receive loyalty because they continue and support the preservation of existing values, the status quo. Charismatic authority grows out of the personal charm or the strength of an individual personality; and legal-rational authorities receive their ability to compel behavior by virtue of the office that they hold. It is the office that demands obedience rather than the office holder.

Since the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy has become an international norm to an unprecedented extent with the hopes that requirement for legitimacy, a key feature of a liberal democratic regime, will lead to fewer military interventions in politics. One of the most prominent contemporary liberal thinkers in this field, David Beetham, argued that the exercise of power becomes legitimate if and when: 1) it is in accordance with existing rules; 2) if these rules can be justified by shared beliefs; and 3) if there is evidenced consent to the arrangement.[8] The first requirement is one of lawfulness, which seems beside the point because constitutions are made to reflect what the most powerful actors at the time consider an appropriate regime. Hence it cannot be used to evaluate whether the same system is legitimate. The second and third parts are effectively linked. If there is no consent, there must be a lack of shared beliefs about how power should be distributed and exercised. In essence, Beetham's definition thus depends primarily on subjective evaluation of the people and the main élites.

7 Ibid.

8 David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 16.

In Perlmutter's view, legitimacy is the foundation of governmental power. It is a source of support, exercised universally by rational and complex bureaucratic organizations.[9] The regime that elicits obedience is an organization that regulates its authority relationships, that is the system which causes the people to accept the regime. If the legitimacy of the state is determined by the rectitude with which the polity applies both good governance and control in the appropriate proportions, there would very few legitimate states on the continent. A legitimate state provides its population with an environment in which citizens are secure and can prosper while exercising its legal authority to protect the population and prevent challenges to its supremacy. The citizens within this society identify themselves with the polity, participate in the political process, and recognize the state's right to rule. [10]

Africa's history is replete with instances where both civilian and military regimes ruled with no regard to their citizens' feelings. If one were to go by Manwaring's definition of legitimate governance, the situation in Africa becomes depressing:

> governance that derives its just powers from the governed and generates a viable political competence that can and will effectively manage, coordinate, and sustain security, as well as political, economic, and social development. Legitimate governance is inherently stable because it has the political competence and societal support to adequately manage internal problems, change and conflict that effect individual and collective wellbeing.[11]

Instead of establishing a democratic legitimacy based on good governance as a more effective and enduring strategy, several African regimes in a recent past and some current ones have elected to derive their political legitimacy from state coercion and control measures. It is a well-known fact that post-independence leaders took over the political kingdom in its enticing form and emulated their colonial masters. Well versed with a repressive and oppressive past, they embraced the single party system as an essential mode of rule.[12] Political plurality and ethnic diversity were decried as bottlenecks for the project of "nation-building" and national unity. Arrested, in the process, was the growth of vibrant social, political and economic institutions. Traversing across a range of crises, states have nearly lost the legitimacy so necessary for sensible governance. The transfer of

---

9 Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 22.

10 See Douglas Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared*, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.

11 Cited by Jonathan Hastings and Khrishnamurti Mortela, "The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting it Right in the Philippines," Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, CA, 1998.

12 Seyoum Hameso, "Issues and Dilemmas of Multi-Party Democracy in Africa," *West Africa Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 3.

power took the route of military *coups d'état* or more lately the growing ranks of rebellion armies. In effect, the political foundation of the post-colonial states became military autocracy, personal rule or both, with very little regard for good governance.[13]

Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos, acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs. Poor governance, on the other hand, is characterized by arbitrary policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption. Contrary to expectations, several African leaders openly betrayed the ideals of Pan-Africanism and greatly disappointed their fellow compatriots. Ihonvbere's description of African leadership speaks volumes about the root of the continent's dismal performance:

> The African elite and leaders did little or nothing to restructure the distorted, disarticulated, dependent, and underdeveloped structures of the African social formation. They did little to empower the peoples of Africa. They did little to challenge foreign domination and imperialist penetration and exploitation of Africa. They did almost nothing to challenge the cultural bastardization in the continent. They did little to strengthen or reconstitute the neo-colonial state. They confused the expansion of the armed forces, the importance of outdated military and security gadgets, and the establishment of violent security structures with the strengthening of the state. They foolishly confused the harassment of opposition elements, the asphyxiation of civil society, and criminal looting of the treasury with power.[14]

While a democratically elected government is always trying to get the highest rate of legitimacy possible, autocrats, *in contrario*, are more concerned about the survival and longetivity of their regimes. Such undemocratic rule can and has been used by the military to step into the political realm.

Legitimacy and Military Rule

Quite often, the argument has been that the failure of civilian regimes provides the motive and opportunity for military intervention. This view has been espoused by such noted writers on civil-military relations as Finer, Nordlinger and Crouch. According to Crouch, it is often argued that military intervention in politics only takes place when civilian governments prove unable to govern effectively. Rarely,

13 Ibid.

14 Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990's?" in George A. Agbango, ed. *Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, Development, and Democratization*, New York: Peter Lang, 1997, p. 344.

if ever, does the army take over simply to fulfill its own ambitions. Even when the military is already politically oriented and its officers politically ambitious, military intervention normally follows the failure of civilian governments to preserve political stability and achieve satisfactory growth.[15] This failure leads to a loss of legitimacy which makes them susceptible to violent change. The failure of civilian regimes thus provides not only a motive for intervention but also the opportunity. Conversely, a strong, effective civilian government which successfully maintains its legitimacy seems virtually immune to the possibility of a military coup.[16]

As much as the military might use that excuse, there is nothing, no empirical proof nor a conceptual argument to suggest that military governments have ever been successful in any of the tasks they have set for themselves, including providing security (nor enhancing their legitimacy). The use of force achieves its best results when combined with political initiatives; the pursuit of political goals must guide armed action. A government that is in effect an instrument of coercion, however benignly led, becomes a government of one policy, the use and the threat of use of force. While the political élite's failings undermine democratic transitions, military leaders are by no means innocent bystanders. Contemptuous of civilian leaders and impatient to regain absolute power, military leaders have played an active role in subverting the democratic process.

In his book, *Praetorianism: Government without Authority*, David Rapoport explained the fact that the military establishment plays a dominating role without sufficient public support and political trust. According to van Doorn, such terms as authority, consensus, compliance, authoritativeness, could be synonyms of legitimacy in that they indicate in one way or another a normative approach to the political order and its incumbents or, more generally, to power structures within social systems.[17] There are invariably two parties, one claiming legitimacy in the sense of right to exercise authority, to call for sacrifices and to receive recognition, and the other accepting this right and showing its readiness to accord recognition to the other's legitimate claims. Legitimacy therefore includes both a normative and an evaluative orientation. However, the party demanding legitimacy must also possess the requisite capacities, while the empowering party must show by its actions or support that recognition is more than simply paying lip service to the idea.[18]

Dasgupta maintains that there is an absolute benchmark in civil-military relations that civilians have a right to be wrong. Advocates of military rule in general have argued that civilian leaders have failed to do their job in providing

---

15 See Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 4 (1979), pp. 571–587.

16 Ibid.

17 Jacques van Doorn, "The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy," in Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doorn, *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, London, UK: Sage, 1976, p. 19.

18 Ibid.

security, economic development, and arguably, even social cohesion. Such an utter failure invites the military to take over to remedy decades of civilian incompetence.[19]

According to Dasgupta, the concept of modern statehood and governance has two consecutive levels of agency. The first is accorded by the people, presumably through free and fair elections, to elected leaders. This is a very broad appointment of agency, that is, the people empower the elected leaders to make decisions on their behalf.[20] The second act of agency is accorded by elected representatives to specialized bureaucratic institutions such as the military. This is a narrow agency, called an "administrative agency," and requires the agent to follow the directions of the principal, in this case the civilian leadership, to good and bad decisions.[21] Militaries take over power by arguing that they are temporarily violating the second order of agency to be able to protect the first. The argument is predicated on the military officers' claim that the civilian leadership has violated their trusteeship of public confidence, and in order to repair that primary relationship, the secondary administrative relationship must be broken as well.[22]

Unfortunately, two wrongs do not necessarily make a right and the military has never been able to know when to exit, gradually losing whatever legitimacy, it might have gained. Legitimacy does not flow automatically to any regime just because a certain form of a constitution has been adopted in a referendum or because international law recognizes it as legitimate. Political legitimacy must in some sense be 'earned' by regimes, and not all societies necessarily regard procedural democracy as a primary value. The military experimentation with politics in Africa demands that some type of control be imposed on the defense and security forces.

Different Types of Control

According to Naidoo, a prominent diagnosis for Africa's post-colonial developmental crisis has been the absence of good and democratic governance among its member states.[23] A familiar attribution for this absence has been the inappropriate and counter-productive involvement of the military in institutions of governance. Indeed, to examine the military as an institutional actor in politics,

---

19 See Sunil Dasgupta, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Pakistan," *The Friday Times*, Lahore, December 21, 2001.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 See Sagaren Naidoo, "The Role of the Military in Democratic Governance in Africa," Chap. 5. Available on: http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/122CHAP5.PDF?link_id=21&slink_id=2998&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3.

democracy and, ultimately, governance would not be axiomatic in analyses of major Western democracies. But to omit the role of the military from this subject in some African states would constitute a significant oversight. In parts of Africa, the military, as an institution of the state that enjoys the "monopoly on violence," lacks legitimacy as an agent of good and democratic governance. At the same time, the military's institutional footing within these states is unlikely to disappear, and it can hardly be terminated. The subsequent challenge, therefore, is to determine how the military can play a positive role in enhancing and promoting democratic governance and development. The basic challenge that most African countries face is how to institutionalize sound civil-military relations that provide the fundamental basis for the legitimization of the military as an actor and promoter of democratic governance.[24]

The State, with which the soldier, in early civil-military discourse, had a troubled relationship, is best understood pragmatically as the permanent apparatus for the administration of the political entity, available to the recognized government of that entity to carry out legitimate tasks.[25] The military is therefore in principle part of the state apparatus, as are the police and the intelligence services. This State is known sometimes as the civil power (from the Latin *civis* = state), and hence Civil-Military Relations were the problem of the military not being an obedient part of the State, but rather seeking to dominate it. Often, this was because military officers were ideologically linked to traditional patterns of wealth and power which were under threat, and because they regarded themselves (and were often regarded by others) as somehow responsible ultimately for the safety of the nation.[26]

In several African countries, major state positions are awarded to those to whom political or financial favors are owed. Likewise, the clear distinctions posited between the military as part of the state, and civil society, may not exist either; indeed, in African militaries, "informal links and structures of power based on such factors as ethnic, family and political connections count for much more than formal hierarchy and lines of command."[27] It has even been argued that in Africa there is "no genuine disconnection between a structurally differentiated state and a civil society composed of properly organised and politically distinct interest groups."[28]

---

24 Ibid.

25 See David Chuter, "Understanding Security Sector Reform," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 4, no. 2 (April 2006), pp. 1–22, http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/issues/jofssm_0402_chuter.pdf?CFID=1900877&CFTOKEN=24184542.

26 Ibid.

27 Eboe Hutchful, "Understanding the African Security Crisis", in Abdel-Fatua Musah and Kayode Fayemi (eds), *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*, London, Pluto Press, 1999, p. 211.

28 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford, James Curry, 1999, p. 18.

For liberal democracy to strive in Africa, it will have to effectively prevent the monopoly over political power by one faction of the élite and provide an ideal avenue for opposing factions of the same class to deploy their resources to peacefully compete for votes and alternate in political office. Among other necessary steps, the security sector needs to be firmly governed. According to Ball, security sector governance is highly political and involves altering power balances between civilians and security personnel, between the executive and legislative branches of government, within the executive branch, and between government and civil society.[29]

Therefore, the challenge in consolidating security sector governance is to "develop both effective civil oversight mechanisms and affordable security bodies capable of providing security for the state and its citizens within the context of democratic governance".[30] At the same time, objective civilian control of the military requires professional military establishments strong enough to avoid being *sucked* into politics, yet not so strong that they could disregard civilian élites. Indeed, the constraints to achieving this objective are, to a large extent, the same as those hindering better governance in other sectors of the state.

Within this context, the roles of the different state institutions or government structures in operationalizing effective civil control over the armed forces are significant. The classic understanding of civil-military relations is about the balance of power between the civilian political authority and the military. Democratic civil-military relations necessitate that the military is subordinated to a democratically elected civilian government. Various constitutional and institutional measures are put in place and civilian oversight becomes a key aspect of the relationship.

Since independence, security forces in most African countries have suffered because of poor governance. Often, political interference eroded their professionalism and led to ethnically or geographically biased recruitment. Other times, political leaders attempted to buy the loyalty of special forces (presidential guards for example) at the expense of national militaries. Contrary to popular belief, military regimes in particular tended to undermine the effectiveness of security forces, while single party states demanded party loyalty over military professionalism. Frequently, military regimes paid relatively little attention to the role and mission of the security forces or their effective management. At times security forces were used as an employer of the last resort, resulting in large but poorly-educated and ill-trained military establishments. Given an almost complete disregard for civil security**,** the police usually fared even worse than the military. In most instances, security, of both the state and the individual, suffered, and relations between security forces and society deteriorated.

---

29 Nicole Ball, *Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for the UNDP*, 2002, p 13, http://undp.org/jssr/docs/undp_ssr_concept_paper_oct_9_2002.doc.

30 Ibid.

The effective governance of the security sector is a crucial issue in most countries of the world, but even more so in the emerging democracies of Africa. Military and other security institutions hold within them the monopoly of state violence, which, if not properly directed and controlled can become a force unto itself. The proper governance and regulation of the security sector therefore requires an informed and active legislature, a clear governmental policy framework and laws, effective civilian executive authorities and an active civil society to keep the security sector accountable, transparent and efficient. The ultimate purpose is to ensure that security institutions (armed forces in particular) are governed according to the principles of democratic control and accountability.

People and states must be secure from the fear of violence at the local, national, regional and international levels if an enabling environment for sustainable political and economic development is to be created. This means both that states must be adequately protected against aggression and internal subversion, and that the lives of ordinary people must not be crippled by state repression, violent conflict, or rampant criminality. There are many ways to provide physical security. One of these is by creating security services mandated to use force to protect the state and its population. It is important for every society to ask if it needs security organizations and if so, what kind of security organizations should be created and how these security organizations should be governed.

It is particularly important for African countries to ask these questions because since the beginning of the colonial period, African security organizations have frequently been a cause of insecurity for both the state and its population, rather than a means of guaranteeing individual and collective security. African governments have often failed to abide by the rule of law in their relations with their neighbors or their own populations. Many of Africa's recent wars have their roots in élite attempts to protect their privileged positions domestically or to undermine other African governments whose foreign policies are viewed as injurious to the ability of these élites to remain in power.

What is more, African historical experience demonstrates that if internal and external securities are not viewed as two sides of the same coin, it will be difficult to create societies that function on the basis of the rule of law and protect individual security. All too often, the armed forces have been given—or have appropriated—the responsibility for guaranteeing law and order. While there are conditions under which the armed forces can provide aid to the civil power, domestic policing is not a task for which they are well suited. Attempting to assume this task can also hamper their ability to carry out other constitutionally mandated tasks, such as protecting the state. This problem has been compounded by the failure to provide police and *gendarmerie* forces and other portions of the public safety/criminal justice system with the resources they require to guarantee law and order.

The challenge for African countries is to develop a process for allocating both tasks (roles and responsibilities) and resources among the different security organizations that protect both the state and its population, acknowledging that this process might even take place in an environment where the state no longer has a

monopoly over the means of violence. While the military seems to be undergoing significant change in many countries due to democratic transition, improving governance in the security sector is an on-going process, and security forces must constantly evolve to meet new challenges. In real terms, what is required is a transformation of the security sector. However, this cannot be achieved in isolation, but must be embedded in a broader process of political reform and improved public sector governance.

Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector

My approach is drawn from Hutchful's,[31] which is itself influenced in part by Stepan's concept of a "*democratic strategy toward the military*."[32] This strategy emphasizes the negotiation of pacts between contending civilian interests, as well as between civil groups and the military, the need for civilians to empower themselves to challenge the claims of the military establishment to military secrecy and exclusive expertise over military affairs, and the demarcation of specific roles for civil society and political society in the democratic subordination of the military.

Obviously, newly democratizing regimes in Africa face many challenges in subordinating unruly military establishments and restructuring dilapidated and inefficient military infrastructures. The re-organization of civil-military relations is also likely to take place in the context of a multi-faceted crisis: economic crisis and resource constraints, constitutional disputes, human rights issues, contested legitimacies, and so on. These objectives call for a fundamental reassessment not only of structures of civil-military linkage and control, but also of force doctrine, mission and structures, and even the existing military model as such.

There seems to be consensus that the military is an arm of the state and a tool of state policy, not the other way round. This Clausewitzian position maintains that war is the pursuit of politics by other means, hence the gun must serve politics, not the other way round. It also reflects Mao's dictum that although political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, politics controls the gun, not the other way round. More than anywhere else, the nature of relations between society and its armed forces demand protection *by* the military, on the one hand, and protection *from* the military, on the other. By restricting civilian authorities and the military each to a particular sphere of influence, mutual trust and collaboration, rather than mutual suspicion and competition, prevails.[33]

---

31 See Eboe Hutchful, "Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues," *African Security Review*, vol 6, no 2, 1997.

32 See Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988.

33 See Feaver, *op. cit*.

Arguably, the armed forces are merely the instrument of the political authorities, which must determine the deployment of the military and the uses to which it is put, as well as its resources and prerogatives. As such the armed forces deserve an area of professional autonomy within which to pursue its craft. According to Agbese, the mission, role and responsibilities of the military are, under the classical model, established by civilian authorities and enshrined in the constitution.[34] However, a key feature of military involvement in African politics has been the recurrent attempt to legitimize military rule on the claim that the military is the custodian of national unity and morality.[35]

In established democracies, the terms "political control," "civilian control," "constitutional control" and "democratic control" are used almost interchangeably. Hutchful maintains that in the African context the concept of "civilian control" is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, "civilian control" suggests that civilians are *prima facie* more "virtuous" and/or knowledgeable than the military and thus appears to confirm a popular civilian bias. Second, the term has adversarial connotations and gives the unfortunate impression of civilians lording it over the military. Third, and more importantly, civilian control in Africa typically means *executive* control or "executive civilism."[36] According to Hutchful, "civilian regimes" have often been among the most repressive and militarized on the continent. This is one reason why it is often precisely those regimes with the greatest capacity for "civilian control," which also have the greatest difficulty in making transition to democratic control.[37]

The expression "democratic control of the armed forces" is generally understood as the subordination of the armed forces to those democratically elected to take charge of the country's affairs. In its fullest sense it means that all decisions regarding the defense of the country—the organization, deployment and use of armed forces, the setting of military priorities and requirements and the allocation of the necessary resources—are taken by democratic leadership and scrutinized by the legislature in order to ensure popular support and legitimacy. The ultimate aims are to ensure that armed forces serve the societies they protect and that military policies and capabilities are consistent with political objectives and economic resources. While a subject in its own right, the democratic control of armed forces, exercised through parliaments, must be seen as an essential part of, and indeed, a reflection of, the broader relationship between armed forces and the societies they protect.[38]

---

34 Agbese, in Keih, Jr. and Agbese, *op. cit*., p. 188.

35 Ibid. *op. cit*., p. 184.

36 See Eboe Hutchful, "Democratic Control of the Security Sector in Africa," paper presented at the Senior Leaders Seminar, Gaborone, Botswana, 2005.

37 Ibid.

38 See Simon Lunn, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Principle and Practice," in Hans Born, Phillip A. Fluri and Simon Lunn, eds. *Oversight and Guidance:*

Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector

Parliament embodies democracy. It is the central institution through which the will of the people is expressed, laws are passed and government is held accountable. For parliament to play its role effectively, it must be elected and must be representative of all components of society. It must have the requisite powers and means to express the will of the people through its law-making and oversight functions. In this way, it can contribute effectively to guaranteeing the people's rights and liberties, securing civil peace and ensuring harmonious development.[39]

Many African parliaments have recently become more open and responsive to their electorates, and more relevant to meeting their needs in a rapidly changing world. In particular, these examples show that parliaments are striving:

- to be more inclusive in their composition and manner of working, especially in relation to women and minority and marginal communities;
- to be more effective public communicators, through opening more of their work to the media, and through the development of their own websites and broadcasting channels;
- to experiment with new ways of engaging with the public, including civil society, and enabling the public to contribute to the legislative process;
- to recover public confidence in the integrity of parliamentarians, through enforceable codes of conduct and reforms in party funding;
- to streamline the legislative process without limiting the proper scrutiny of bills;
- to exercise more effective oversight of the executive, including in the increasingly important field of international policy;
- to be more active in transnational collaboration, so as to provide a more effective parliamentary component in regional and international organizations, and in the resolution of violent conflicts.[40]

Understandingly, new parliaments in Africa spend a considerable amount of their time on approving legislation, because it is necessary, and this is what parliaments are expected to do. Unfortunately, they tend to forget that even more important than drafting and approving legislation is to keep a critical eye on the wellbeing of the democracy and the people. They have yet to fully realize that parliamentary oversight is indeed a core activity of an effective parliament. The development of effective oversight of the security sector is a challenge, both for parliaments and governments. Though they should play different roles, they are both responsible

---

The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reforms, Brussels/ Geneva 2003, p. 13.

39 See David Beetham, *Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century: A Guide to Good Practice*, Geneva: Inter-Parliament Union, 2006.

40 Ibid.

for the functioning of the security sector, and its ability to ensure a stable and secure society. To achieve this, a parliament must not only monitor the government and the security sector, but it must also approve and support the proper implementation of a coherent security policy and relevant legislation. Such oversight should lead to an intensive dialogue and mutual understanding among the government, the security institutions and the assembly.

In any society that seeks to uphold the rule of law, parliamentary and governmental oversight of the police must be based on a series of principles. In a democratic society, state-like authorities usually have a legitimate monopoly of force. This means that outside the police, private citizens do not have the right to use violent weapons against fellow citizens. Citizens are to rely fully upon the police whenever they are seriously threatened and may not use or even possess any weapons, unless they have a special permit. The use of force by the competent authorities should be closely monitored in order to avoid any deviations from government policy. The defense and security forces are directly accountable to the government through relevant ministries. The government is in turn held accountable by the parliament, which ensures the development of security policies and reviews. As the ears and the eyes of the citizens, parliamentarians must at all times check that principles of good governance and the rule of law apply to the defense and security forces.

Ultimately, the Legislature exercises parliamentary oversight by passing laws that define and regulate the security services and their powers and by adopting the corresponding budgetary appropriations. Such control may also include establishing a parliamentary ombudsman or a commission that may launch investigations into complaints by the public. Although progress has been made in terms of better civil-military relations in transition countries on the continent, significant problems remain. In many African countries, democratizing or not, parliament is merely regarded as a place where parliamentarians simply deliberate and express opinions. Unfortunately, the formal acceptance of democracy and parliamentary systems are no guarantees that Western models would work. In fact, even well established democracies still have imperfections pertaining to the control of the security sector. In many cases, when parliament enforces its oversight capacities, the executive sets up new bodies to circumvent legislative authority. Indeed, a cat and mouse game exists between the legislative and the executive, which are both competing to achieve a more powerful position.

The hope in Africa is that on-going security sector reform will enhance democratization by the creation of a legal framework which subordinates the security services to the legitimate political authority as well as defining and limiting its purview. Installing a legal framework which affirms civilian supremacy may be regarded as the bottom-line and point of departure for successful democratization efforts in countries in transition. In principle, the legal framework rests on two core values: accountability and transparency. The relations between the political

leadership and the security services should be governed by these important twin concepts of democratizing security.[41]

When it comes to civilian supremacy and democratic governance, parliaments fulfill a crucial role. Due to parliamentary involvement and debates, civilian oversight becomes democratic oversight. It is a way to give voice to the people's needs and concerns in the debates about security. In fact, parliamentary involvement makes the difference between civilian oversight and democratic oversight, or, between good governance and democratic governance. It is important to make this distinction. Civilian oversight is a necessary, but insufficient condition for democratic oversight.[42]

Ideally, a parliament constitutes the cornerstone of democracy in order to prevent autocratic rule and serve as a vital check on radical policies pursued by the executive branch. It is in that framework that former French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau once stated that "War is a much too serious matter to be entrusted to the military"[43] Beyond its humorous side, this statement recalls that in a democracy, the representatives of the people hold the supreme power and no sector of the state should be excluded from their control. A state without parliamentary control of its security sector, especially the military, should, at best, be deemed an unfinished democracy or a democracy in the making. As the security sector deals with one of the state's core tasks, a system of checks and balances is needed to counterbalance the executive's power. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is thus an essential element of power-sharing at state level and, if effective, sets limits on the power of the executive or president.

Because of the nature of politics on the continent, the role and authority of parliaments in several African countries remain severely compromised, especially in relation to oversight of security institutions such as the military. As the security sector is a highly complex field, and not all parliamentarians have sufficient knowledge or expertise for effective oversight, the oversight role of parliament is often quite weak. In a case study that sought to assess the contribution of Ghana's emergent parliamentary oversight of the security sector in preventing insecurity and promoting stability, Aning and Lartey explored why parliamentary oversight has not contributed to increased democratization and development as much as might be expected, focusing predominantly on defense and police.[44]

While pro-democracy movements may be able to force the dismantling of military and authoritarian regimes, they may well find that realizing the principles

---

41 Hans Born, Phillip A. Fluri and Simon Lunn, eds. *Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reforms*, Brussels/ Geneva 2003, p. 7.

42 Ibid.

43 Statement made in Paris in 1886, quoted by Lunn, *op. cit.*

44 See Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey, "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana," available online: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/CIC%20Ghana%20SSR%20FINAL.pdf.

of democratic control as enshrined in the new constitutions to be altogether another—and perhaps less easily surmounted—challenge.[45] The reasons for failure to realize democratic control include:

- Lack of institutional capacity: Civil control, to be effective, presumes the existence of the requisite institutions, expertise and capacity-building in the civil sector. From that point of view, it is obvious that the greatest challenge to democratic control in Africa is the weakness of governance institutions in the security sector. This lack of capacity is particularly obvious in the case of parliaments. While the principle of parliamentary oversight is common to various degrees to African constitutions, there is often a wide gap between constitutions and reality; often "parliamentarians seemed to exercise little genuine oversight of the military."[46]
- Unclear constitutional roles and powers: Many constitutions are parsimonious or even silent on how Parliament should go about exercising its powers and functions, and indeed even the extent of those powers. Most legislatures have no independent defense policy role, generally reacting to initiatives from the executive branch;
- Lack of resources: many parliamentary committees have limited funding, administrative infrastructure and support and access to expertise. In turn, this means low capacity for policy development or budget and operational analysis;
- Poor or non-existent institutional links with the armed forces, which makes it difficult to extract information (most legislatures lack independent access to information);
- A tradition of executive dominance (executive civilism), perhaps most pronounced in the Francophone system, where defense and security are specified in the constitution as the "reserved domain" of the Presidency. This more often than not, leads to rivalries between the executive and the legislature, and can complicate strategies and processes of expanding civil influence *vis-à-vis* the armed forces and their prerogatives.[47]

However, African parliaments are gradually turning the corner. In a 2008 article in the *Journal of Democracy*, Joel Barkan filled an important gap in the scholarship on the relationship between legislatures and democratic consolidation. Through a comparative analysis of legislative development in six African countries (Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda), Barkan demonstrated why

45 See Hutchful, 2005, *op. cit*.

46 See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa," Washington: NDI, 1997.

47 See Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997.

some legislatures have evolved into effective and politically significant institutions while others have not.[48] The good news in his study is that while rubber stamp parliaments still exist on the continent, effective legislation is on the rise to give true meaning to democratic control.

Under democratic control, accountability flows both ways: in terms on the one hand of the responsiveness of the security agencies to political and policy direction; and on the other hand in terms of the obligation of the political authorities to make available to the services the resources that they require to execute their mandate, and to civil society and the media the information required to make critical inputs into, and evaluation of, security and defense policy. To paraphrase Sherman,[49] by creating opportunities for citizens to have a voice in and exercise control over security/defense policy and provision, through parliament, the package of policy options should help bridge divisions between society and state institutions, building trust and legitimacy through greater transparency and accountability—essential components of establishing healthy civil-military relations and ultimately preventing conflict.

48 Joel Barkan, "Legislatures on the Rise?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2008), p. 125.

49 Jake Sherman, *op. cit*., p. 1.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Conclusion

> The new parliaments that have emerged in many African countries can enhance civilian control over the armed forces through parliamentary oversight. Such legislative oversight however, requires adequate knowledge on military issues.[1]

During the 20th century, military interventions in politics occurred in much of the developing world. A common underlying condition in all these countries was a high degree of political ineffectiveness and the failure of the civilian government to contain the army, creating a situation known as praetorianism.[2] In modern praetorianism, the military is prone to intervene in political life because certain factors pull it in. At first the military takeover was regarded as a short sharp remedy for the kind of abnormal situation. But coups gradually were no longer viewed as "short" or a "remedy," even though they have become more frequent and bloodier. They were considered an intrinsic part of African political culture and soldiers became the logical alternative to politicians. In the Nigerian parlance, "khaki politicians" replaced "agbada politicians."[3] Consequently, a military coup has become a recurrent instrument for changing top political leadership and for effecting dramatic changes on the continent.

During the immediate post-independence period, newly formed African militaries were drawn to the center of the continent's political evolution. The unexpected trajectory of the African military has troubled most observers, and Kieh and Agbese maintain that:

> As part of the state formation process in post-colonial Africa, the military was ostensibly established as part of the state apparatus with the primary mission of defending the body politic against external aggression. In other words, the principal *raison d'être* for organizing a military was for the territorial defense of the state. Accordingly, the military was expected to metamorphose into a nationalistic and non-partisan force with its loyalty first and foremost to the

---

1 Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 207.

2 See Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.

3 A.E. Afigbo, E.A. Ayandele, R.J. Gavin, J.D. Omer-Cooper, and R. Palmer, *The Making of Modern Africa, vol. 2 The Twentieth Century*, 6th ed., Essex, UK: Longman, 1992, p. 63.

> state. Regrettably, the post-colonial era in Africa has witnessed a deviation from this ethos by the military establishment in several African States: since the dawn of the era of "political independence," the military in several African States has become a factionalized, ethnicized and partisan force beholden to myriad particularistic interests, to the detriment of the body politic. A reflection of this is the military's determination that its primary function is to "cleanse the body politic of incorrigible politicians."[4]

According to Agbese, "soldiers, through the instrumentality of dictatorial and autocratic military rule, dominated politics and society in many African states for much of the 1970s and 1980s."[5] The circumstances under which militaries have overthrown civilian governments in Africa are peculiar to each country. In many instances, the military has intervened to quell civil unrest when factors such as ethnic competition, a lack of national integration, regionalism, or poor economic and social management combine to stoke popular demonstrations and insecurity. Soldiers often act at the request of or in coordination with, civilian political actors. Respect for civilian authority is, for most African soldiers, a poorly understood and rarely practiced ideal. Consequently, the level of distrust between civilians and the military has risen. Neither side respects the other, and for many civilians the military is viewed as inherently anti-democratic and conditioned to violations of human rights.

The spread of democracy across Africa in the early 1990s brought a new urgency to the impetus for military reform and improved civil-military relations. Increased participation in peacekeeping operations on the African continent and elsewhere has offered fresh opportunities for once politically active militaries to reorient their mission and gain professional expertise. As the new democracies that substituted authoritarian rule in country after country during the seventies and eighties grow out of infancy, scholars have shifted their focus from the analysis of transitions out of authoritarianism to problems of democratic consolidation.[6] While much of the previous scholarship was anchored on examinations of the political processes occurring in the closing phases of authoritarian rule and on the manner in which the change to the democratically elected governments occurs, current queries center on how really democratic the post-transition political institutions are and on

---

4 George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Introduction: The Military Albatross and Politics in Africa," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 1.

5 Pita Ogaba Agbese, "Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, p. 184.

6 See J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions", *Working Paper*, no. 150, December 1990.

their long-term prospects, i.e., whether they are prone to succumb to a new round of authoritarian rule or whether they will prove to be stable or "consolidated." The modalities assumed by the transition, the way in which political actors are organized, and the various political institutions that emerge or reemerge during the course of the transition are understood to make a significant difference for the long-term viability of newly democratized regimes.[7]

However, this is simply a shift in perspective and not of the basic question being addressed; for both the old and the new discussions are ultimately about the broader problem of the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. This process is obviously not over when democratically elected authorities assume power, because this does not necessarily inaugurate *ipso facto* a democratic regime.[8] By 1991, it "was a veritable tidal wave, methodically transforming the political map of the continent."[9] Autocratic governments were replaced by democracies in more than thirty countries that experienced pro-democracy uprisings, many leading to substantial reforms if not outright democratization. However, formidable threats persist because the military, because of the consequences of its intrusion in politics, remains a potent menace in several African countries.

Pita Agbese summarized quite well the central features of military involvement in African politics:

1. The violent or other unlawful overthrow of civilian governments or military regimes by a faction of the armed forces;
2. The rationalization of military coups by the coupists on the grounds of incompetence, poor governance, general maladministration and/or corruption;
3. Vigorous attempts to legitimize military rule on the claim that the military is the custodian of national unity and morality;
4. The promotion of a militarist ideology that emphasizes notions of military efficiency, incorruptibility, competence and patriotism;
5. The allocation of substantial economic resources to the defense sector;
6. The development of patterns of civil-military characterized by military supremacy over civil institutions;
7. The worsening of the socio-economic and political problems which military rule was supposed to deal with in the first place;
8. The military's use of state power as an instrument of corrupt private enrichment, which in turn, makes political power highly attractive and accordingly, promotes a cycle of coups and counter-coups;
9. Gross violations of human rights through repressive policies and practices;

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa," *African Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 362 (January 1992), p. 7.

10. Putative attempts by the military to disengage from politics;
11. Swift return to power by the military even after a prolonged and tortured disengagement process;
12. Creation of a culture of violence with a corresponding decline in dialogue, consultation, and compromise as avenues for conflict resolution;
13. Employment of various nefarious strategies, including self-succession bids, to entrench military rule; and
14. A proliferation of small arms throughout the continent.[10]

Because of these and other challenges faced by newly elected governments, democracy in Africa is far from irreversible. Without genuine external assistance, the trend toward open government can easily become a temporary interregnum from dictatorship.[11] To play a role in African political reform, Western powers such as the United States must hone their understanding of the forces promoting and opposing democracy. While the ability of American officials to encourage, shape, and influence the reform of African civil-military relations will be limited, with focused, well-thought-out policies and programs organized into a coherent strategy, the United States can play an important role. By examining both successful and failed democratic transitions and the role the military played in them, American decision and policymakers can frame policies that reflect a clear, historically-grounded understanding of African civil-military relations and thus slightly increase the chances that open government will be sustained.[12] Ultimately, the decision to pursue open government in Africa must be made by Africans and cannot be imposed by outsiders. If they do make the decision to build and consolidate democracy, they must simultaneously move toward the type of civil-military relations inextricably associated with it. Neither the United States nor any other Western nations can force such reform on unwilling African militaries, but should be ready to offer as much help as possible to those who undertake such a transformation. A strategy of democracy support built on a foundation of clear policies and carefully-constructed institutions can be the locomotive of such help.[13]

The military is undoubtedly the single most important institution or actor in the emergence or demise of democracy in Africa. The relationship between civil and military leaders, specifically the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority, continues to plague Africa's efforts to achieve political stability and democracy. Decades of use and abuse of the armed forces in the political realm

---

10 Agbese, *op. cit*.

11 Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa," *op. cit*. p. 8.

12 Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, "Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa," available on: http://www.resdal.org/archivo/d000105.htm, viewed on 12/18/05.

13 Ibid.

have negatively affected civil-military relations on the continent, and emerging democracies' failure to address the army's insertion in the democratic process will be detrimental to the transition process. Whether the military is viewed as a "coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers … [marked by] overriding preoccupation with personal and corporate aggrandizement in a context of acute scarcity and intense competition from other élites,"[14] or claimed to be a modernizer or an umpire, it cannot be ignored if genuine democracy were to take hold in Africa.

After all, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no wall between the military and civilians. According to Gus Liebenow:

> Like the mythical walls between church and state in a liberal democracy or between government and the economy in capitalist-oriented societies, the political division between the domain of civil and military authorities even in a society committed to the civilian supremacy model is not hard and fast. The military, after all, is central to the political objective of maintaining the independence of the state community. Like other actors in society it makes political claims against the financial and other resources of the state in carrying out its primary mission. Conversely, regimes that are characterized as "military governments" in fact must normally either co-opt a wide range of civilian technicians or retrain soldiers to take on civilian skills in coping with the day to day concerns of society.[15]

At independence, the major tasks confronting Africa's new leaders included constructing stable political regimes and focusing the skills and resources of their territories on raising the standard of living of their peoples. The ideal of national unity informed their political speeches, but the diversity of their populations called for guarantees of political pluralism. However, most African leaders quickly abandoned democratic institutions adopted at independence. While Africans were euphoric about the end of colonialism, their euphoria wore out soon when they realized that the state bequeathed to them was plagued with myriad crises of underdevelopment. The new leaders placed the problems of political unification and economic development ahead of the creation of a fair multiparty system of government. Soon, power passed into the hands of a political élite, made up of civilian politicians and ambitious military leaders. Authoritarian regimes set in, bringing only instability and misrule. African leaders sought ever-greater power by manipulating parliaments, extorting state funds for their personal enrichment, and creating mass parties designed to serve and glorify them. Little or no political freedom existed, and enemies, both real and imagined, ended up in jail or assassinated. Lack of real political stability led to on-going civil and military violence.

---

14 Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, *op. cit*., pp. 14–15.

15 Gus Liebenow, *op. cit*., p. 250.

Decades of Machiavellian politics, internal and external pressure brought personal rule to a providential halt. Against their will, African leaders had to introduce political and economic reforms. Unfortunately, real changes are yet to occur because democracy, even when genuine, cannot by itself right several decades of wrongs. Similar to the early days of independence, the celebratory mood of the 1990s over democratization and renaissance seems to be dwindling because civilians and military leaders are not on the same wavelengths. One of the main hurdles African democracy faces is the military's attitude towards democratic transition. Unhealthy civil-military relations, characterized by decades of uneasiness and apprehension, continue in many countries to hold democratization hostage. Arguably, the military moved in because the civilians have been incapable of addressing years of precarious conditions. However, replacing corrupt and inefficient civilians politicians turned out o tougher than the military anticipated. According to Kieh, Jr. and Agbese, "amidst the burgeoning crises of underdevelopment, the military intervened in the political arena, wrestled away power from the civilians and became the governors. The putchists justified their intervention in politics essentially as a 'messianic mission' designed to save the affected countries from the abyss of civilian incompetence."[16]

Because of its track record on the continent, the military is perceived not only as the enemy of the state, but also of the people. The military is "commandist in structure and paternalistic in orientation."[17] According to Anya, the basic norms and value of the military run counter to the objectives of a democratic polity, and it is "unrealistic to expect the military class with its coercive mentality to effectively oversee a transition to a government requiring wide consultation and popular participation."[18] Discarding the view that the military might be a catalyst for democratic reforms, Ake went even further, viewing the military as a dialectical opposite of democratic values.[19]

While this position might reflect public aversion towards the military, the reality is that not a single country managed to introduce and sustain democratic transition in Africa against the will of the military. Maybe, "military dictators can no longer flout popular will with impunity, and for the foreseeable future the classic form of military dictatorship may no longer be a viable proposition."[20] However, as Hutchful contends, the road to democracy remains rocky:

> The unquestioned political domination exercised by a professional army fed by imports of foreign arms, has disappeared under the weight variously of the

16 Keih, Jr. and Agbese, *op. cit*., p. 7.

17 See Olatunde Odetola, *Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1978.

18 Anya O. Anya, "Re-inventing Nigeria for the 21st Century," Obafemi Awolowo Memorial Lecture, *Nigerian Tribune*, May 24, 1995.

19 Claude Ake, "A Plausible Transition," *Tell 39*, September 25, 1995, p. 35.

20 Hutchful, *op. cit*., p. 47.

> democratic surge, the diffusion of the instruments of violence, the desacralization of weaponry, and the erosion of the charisma associated with the bearers of institutionalized violence. These gains may again prove short-lived, however, if the new democracies are unable to subordinate their militaries to the authority of the elected civilian institutions.[21]

Whether civilian political and civil society leaders like or not, democratization process will have to take into account the military factor. After all, as Claude Welch, Jr. contends:

> From the outset, we should view the armed forces as major, direct actors in politics. Armed forces are never totally apolitical, given their role in national defense and security, their quest for professional autonomy and budget resources, and their historical roles in many states as leading agents of governmental personnel and policy change. Their "intervention" is an extreme form of "involvement."[22]

Civil-military relations need to be restructured to give a genuine chance to democracy and bring new hope to the continent. Africa needs a positive, rather than a zero-sum approach to repair the state and empower civil society while welcoming the military's contribution. All military regimes are top-down highly hierarchical systems that dilute rank, command, seniority for recruitment to jobs when they apply norms that are explicitly political, and by so doing threaten their own institutional unity and corporation coherence. All institutions, both civilian and military, have internal contradictions and tensions as they interact with the societies in which they live.[23] To avoid that these tensions and inconsistencies take a different meaning, African institutions and leaders need to work out a compromise that allows security to be dispensed appropriately.

As Le Vine maintains, while it is possible to identify key factors that may or may not have played a role in particular military interventions, it remains that continent-wide, longitudinal evidence offers little empirical warrant for broad generalizations about such events, and that convincing cause-effect conclusions are best sought in the details of each coup.[24] He also believes that the military and/or security forces act as corporate players on the local political stages. Taming the African militaries is a daunting task that needs to be undertaken. Karl rightly states that civilian control of the military is a key ingredient of sustainable democracy.[25] The ideal democratic military-civilian relationship is to have militaries unconditionally

---

21 Ibid.

22 Welch, Jr., 1987, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

23 Bienen, *op. cit*., p. 28.

24 Le Vine, *op. cit*., p. 300.

25 See Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no. 1 (October 1990), pp. 1–21.

subordinate to civilian power, to the point where to have a military establishment as a corporate player in politics becomes unthinkable.[26]

In many African countries, the armed forces remain corporate political players that use the instruments of coercion at their disposal to dictate their will to civilian authorities. Democracy requires a new security sector understanding in Africa for its survival. The new paradigm should lead to a unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of action, because the ultimate goal that both civilian and military leaders pursue should be the overall well-being of the populations. That common goal demands a transparent and accountable collaborative dialogue through a strong constitution that stipulates clearly different roles. However, the mere existence of institutions does not guarantee stability and peaceful transfer of power. Human beings need to believe not only in the institutions but also, and more importantly, in the rule of law.

I concur with Butts and Metz that reforming civil-military relations hold the key to true reforms on the continent:

> Reforming civil-military relations in Africa will not assure the success of democracy but not doing so will guarantee the collapse of open government. Western scholars and Africans themselves have long held that expecting African militaries to adopt the "western" model of civil-military relations is ethnocentric. Today, such relativism should be abandoned. Admittedly, colonialism dealt Africa a bad hand. Admittedly, the problems faced by current African political and military leaders are extraordinarily complex. Still, the relativism that dominated U.S. thinking for several decades, with its all-too-easy acceptance of corruption, repression, and political intrigue by African military leaders is inimical to democratization and economic development. The "western" form of civil-military relations has nothing to do with culture, race, or region—it is not really "western" at all. There is, in fact, a democratic model of civil-military relations that transcends culture.[27]

African civil-military relations should be based on Rebecca Schiff's "theory of concordance"[28] or Douglas Bland's "shared responsibility."[29] According to these scholars, society has three partners: the military, political élites, and the citizenry, and only an agreement among these three partners make military intrusion less likely. Civil-military relations should be conceived of and bound by history, culture, and national politics. Both theories highlight dialogue, accommodation, and shared values and objectives.

---

26 Ibid.

27 Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, *op. cit*.

28 See Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7–24.

29 Bland, *op. cit*.

A new partnership is necessary for democracy to strive on the continent, partnership ascribing specific new roles to the three main segments of society: civilians, the military, and civil society organizations.

The new African military should, among other things, be:

- A military organized, equipped, manned, and trained for the traditional mission of warfighting, i.e., preventing war, providing security, securing and preserving peace
- Also prepared for such other missions as peacekeeping, nation building, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response
- A military that distinguishes between secrecy and confidentiality, cooperates with appropriate civilian authorities, and obeys the laws
- Ultimately, a professional army under democratic civilian control.

The new civilian leadership should:

- Institute a competent, responsible, and transparent civil governance
- Abide by the laws and maintain an independent judiciary
- Encourage public debate and participation
- Forge policy without interference by establishing effective vehicle for asserting civilian control
- Avoid intruding in military affairs or using the military for egoist purposes.

New Civil Society Organizations should:

- Engage in responsible and effective political participation
- Make sure that the media display a high level of professional journalism
- Maintain a high degree of civism
- Obey the laws.

Reasserting democratic control over the military should be part of an overall program of security sector reforms, and Agbese believes that such reforms should aim at:

1. Redefining the parameters of civil-military relations to enhance the ability of political leaders to subordinate soldiers to civil authority
2. Restoring *esprit de corps* (emphasis added) within the armed forces
3. Enhancing military professionalism
4. Reducing or eliminating the military's propensity to intervene in politics
5. Creating a new military that conforms to the new democratic ethos
6. Saving the military from self-destruction induced by rivalry and jockeying for political power
7. Ending the practice of ethnic domination and control in the armed forces

8. Reducing defense expenditures to free up needed resources for economic growth and development; and
9. Recasting civil-military relations to put an end to abuses by military personnel against their civilian counterparts.[30]

The mission, the role and responsibilities of the new African military should be enshrined in the constitution. As Agbese maintains, "the use of the military is determined by clearly established democratic rules and procedures. Accountability and oversight do not end at the parliamentary level for ultimately, the citizens themselves have a right to vet national security policies."[31] A true new dawn for democratic transition in Africa demands that civilian supremacy go beyond mere control. In what Foster calls "control plus," all parties to the civil-military relationship are involved in oversight: public oversight of legislative oversight of executive oversight of the military.[32] Only comprehensive civil-military relations with a new life, form, and meaning, involving all partners can enhance both security and democracy on the African continent, and hopefully bring overdue happiness and prosperity to Africans.

30 Agbese, *op. cit*.
31 Ibid., p. 188.
32 Foster, *op. cit*.

Bibliography

Abate, Yohannis. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations in Ethiopia." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 380–400.

Abrahamsson, Bengt. 1972. *Military Professionalization and Political Power*. London, UK: Sage Publications.

Adedeji, Adebayo. 1991. *Preparing Africa for the Twenty-first Century: Agenda for the 1990s*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: ECA.

____, ed. 1993. *Africa Within the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence*. London, UK: Zed Books.

____. 2002. U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, NEPAD forum 2002, *Nairobi, Kenya, 26–29 April*.

Adejumobi, Said. 1999. *Demilitarization and the Search for Democratic Stability in Nigeria*, Nigeria, 1999. Unpublished paper, available on http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../UNPAN009003.pdf.

____. 2000. "Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?" *International Political Science Review,* vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 59–73.

____. 2001. "Guarding the Guardian? The Obasanjo Regime and Military Reform in Nigeria." *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin*, vol. 13, no. 3 (September), pp. 17–19.

Adekson, J. 'Bayo. 1976. "Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957–1966." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 251–272.

Adekunle, Julius O. 2000. "Education." In Toyin Falola, ed. *Africa Vol. 2: African Cultures and Societies Before 1885*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Ademuwagua, Zaccharus A. 1971. "Education for Social Change." *Ghana Journal of Education*, vol. 2 (October), pp. 36–46.

Adepoju, Aderanti, ed. 1993. *The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Population of Africa*. London, UK: UNFPA.

Agbaje, Adigun. 1991. "A Quarantine for the African State." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 723–727.

Agbese, Pita Ogaba. 1992. "With Fingers on the Trigger: The Military as Custodian of Democracy in Nigeria." *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 220–253.

____. 2003. "Keeping the African Military at Bay: Current Trends in Civil-Military Relations." In J.M. Mbaku and J.O. Ihonvbere, eds. *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle*. Westport, CO: Praeger.

____. 2004a. "Soldiers as Rulers: Military Performance," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

____. 2004b. "Democratic and Constitutional Control of the Military in Africa," in George K. Kieh, Jr. and Pita O. Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Aguero, Felipe. 2000. "Transition Pathways: Institutional Legacies, the Military, and Democracy in South America." In J.F. Hollifield and C. Jillson, eds. *Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. 1990. "Military Coups, Regime Change and Interstate Conflicts in Africa." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 547–570.

Aka, Philip C. 1999. "The Military and Democratization." *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 71–86.

Akande, Adeolu. 2005. "The Military in African Conflicts," posted on http://dpmf.org/military-adeolu.html.

Ake, Claude. 1990. "The Case for Democracy." In Richard Joseph, ed. *African Governance in the 1990s: Objectives, Resources, and Constraints*. Atlanta, GA: Carter Center.

____. 1991. "Rethinking African Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 33–44.

____. 1993. "The Unique Case of African Democracy." *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 239–244.

____. 1995. "A Plausible Transition." *Tell* 39, September 25.

____. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.

Akiwowo, Akinsola. 1977. "Military Professionalization and the Crisis of Returning Power to Civilian Regimes of West Africa." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Summer), pp. 643–654.

Albright, David E. 1980. "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations." *World Politics*, vol. 32, no. 4 (July), pp. 553–576.

Allen, Chris. 1992. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: Democratic Renewal in Benin." *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 54, pp. 42–58.

Allen, Chris et al. 1992. "Surviving Democracy?" *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 54, pp. 3–10.

Allison, Lincoln. 1994. "On the Gap between Theories of Democracy and Theories of Democratization." *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 8–26.

Almond, Gabriel and Sydney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel, Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, and Russell J. Dalton. 2004. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 8th ed. New York, NY: Pearson/Longman.

Andreski, Stanislav. 1968. *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation*. London, UK: Michael Joseph Ltd.

Andrzejweski, Stanislav. 1954. *Military Organization and Society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Anglin, Douglas G. 1990. "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 28. no. 3, pp. 431–55.

Anya, O. Anya. 1995. "Re-inventing Nigeria for the 21st Century." Obafemi Awolowo Memorial Lecture, *Nigerian Tribune*, May 24.

Anyang' Nyong'o, Peter, ed. 1987. *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. New Jersey, NJ: Zed Books Ltd.

____. 1988a. "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa." *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 71–86.

____. 1988b. "A Rejoinder to the Comments on Democracy and Political Instability." *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988), pp. 83–87.

____. 1991. "Democratization Processes in Africa." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 13–17.

____ 1992. "Africa: The Failure of One-Party Rule." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 90–96.

Arlinghaus, Bruce. 1986. "Introduction: African Armies—An Analytical Approach." In Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press

Aron, Raymond. 1979. "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 347–359.

Ashbrook Center, 2003. "Editorial: Civilian Rumsfeld, Overseeing the Military." July.

Ateba, Ema. 1999. "Growth and Development in Africa: Potential Role of Institutions." *Canadian Journal of Development*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 277–306.

Austin, Dennis. 1966. "The Underlying Problem of the Army Coup d'État in Africa." *Optima*, vol. 16, no. 2 (June), pp. 65–72.

Ayittey, George B.N. 1990. "La Démocratie en Afrique Précoloniale." *Afrique 2000*, no. 2, pp. 39–75.

____. 1992. *Africa Betrayed*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.

____. 1998. *Africa in Chaos*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.

Ayoade, John A.A. 1986. "The African Search for Democracy." In Dov Ronen. ed. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Azarya, Victor. 1988. "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement." In Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bakary, Tessy. 1992. "Une Autre Forme de Putsch: La Conférence Nationale Souveraine." *Géopolitique Africaine*, no. 15 (September–October), pp. 25–32.

Baker, Gideon. 1998. "Civil Society and Democracy: The Gap between Theory and Possibility." *Politics*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 81–87.

Ball, Nicole. 1981. "The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How." *World Development*. vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 569–582.

Banerjee, Abhijit V. 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 112, no. 4, pp. 1289–1332.

Bangura, Abdul K. 1994. "Explaining and Predicting the Causes of Military Coups d'État in Africa: A Meta-Analysis." In Abdul K. Bangura, ed. *Research Methodology and African Studies*, vol. 1. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Bangura, Yusuf. 1994. *Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change. Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy*. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.

Barber, Benjamin R. 1993. "Global Democracy or Global law: Which Comes First?" *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (September), pp. 119–137.

Barkan, Joel. 2008. "Legislatures on the Rise?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 124–137.

Barkey, Henry J. 1990. "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 169–192.

Bayart, Jean-François. 1983. "La Revanche des Sociétés Africaines." *Politique Africaine*, vol. 11 (Septembre), pp. 95–127.

____. 1986. "Civil Society in Africa." In Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1989. *L'État en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre*. Paris: Fayard.

____. 1990. "L'Afro-pessimisme par le Bas." *Politique Africaine*, no. 40 (Décembre).

____. 1991. "La Problématique de la Démocratie en Afrique Noire: La Baule et puis après?" *Politique Africaine*, no. 43 (Octobre), pp. 5–20.

____. 1993. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London, UK: Longman.

Baynham, Simon J. 1978. "Soldier and State in Ghana." Armed Forces & Society, vol. 5, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 155–168.

____, ed. 1986. *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*. London, UK: Croom Helm.

____. 1991a. "Geopolitics, Glasnost and Africa's Second Liberation: Political and Security Implications for the Continent." *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 263–268.

____. 1991b. "Security Issues in Africa: The Imperial Legacy, Domestic Violence and the Military." *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 180–189.

Becker, Gary S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 76, no. 2 (March–April), pp.169–217.

Beckman, Bjorn. 1989. "Whose democracy? Bourgeois versus Popular Democracy." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 45, pp. 84–97.

____. 1993. "The Liberation of Civil Society: Neoliberal Ideology and Political Theory." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 58, pp. 20–33.

Beetham, David. 1994. "Conditions for Democratic Consolidation." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 60, pp. 157–172.

____ and Kevin Boyle. 1997. *Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers*. London, UK: Polity Press.

Benno, Ndulu and Nicolas van de Walle et al. 1996. *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal*. Washington DC: Overseas Development Council.

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. 1984. "African Political Systems: Typology and Performance." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 121–151.

Berman, Bruce J. 1998. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." *African Affairs*, vol. 97, no. 388, pp. 305–341.

Bermeo, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking Regime Change." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3 (April), pp. 359–77.

____. 1993. "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 24, no. 3 (April), pp. 273–291.

Berton, Georges. 1992. "Afrique: L'État de la Démocratisation." *Croissance* (October), pp. 25–28.

Bienen, Henry S. 1979. *Armies and Parties in Africa*. New York, NY: Africana Publishing.

____. 1984. "Military Rule and Military Order in Africa." In Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, eds. *Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

____. 1985. "Populist Military Regimes in West Africa." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 357–377.

____. 1989. *Armed Forces, Conflict, and Change in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1993. "Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 108, no. 2 (Summer), pp. 271–282.

____ and Jeffrey Herbst. 1991. "Authoritarianism and Democracy in Africa." In Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson, eds. *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

____ and William J. Foltz. 1985. *Arms and the African: Military Influences' International Relations*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bilver, Singh. 2000. "Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst Continuity." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 4 (Summer), pp. 607–633.

Binnendijk, Hans. 1987. "Authoritarian Regimes in Transition." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 153–164.

Birch, Anthony H. 2001. *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge.

Bland, Douglas L. 1999. "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 7–25.

Blumenson, Martin. 1980. "The Development of the Modern Military." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer), pp. 670–682.

Boahen, Adu. 1991. "Military Rule and Multi-Party Democracy: The Case of Ghana." *Africa Demos*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 5–9.

Bratton, Michael. 1989. "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa." *World Politics*, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 407–30.

____. 1995. "Are Competitive Elections Enough?" *Africa Demos*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 7–8.

____ and Nicolas van de Walle. 1992. "Popular Protest and Political Transition in Africa." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 24, no. 4 (July), pp. 419–42.

____. 1992. "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Response." In Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____. 1994. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." *World Politics*, vol. 46 (July), pp. 453–489.

____.1998. *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Brautigam, Deborah. 1999. "The 'Mauritius Miracle': Democracy, Institutions, and Economic Policy." In Richard Joseph, ed. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 137–162.

Breytenbach, W.J. 2002. "Is there an Easy Explanation for the Continent's 'Resource Wars'?: Rulers, Rebels and Mercantilists." *Africa Insight*, vol. 32, no. 2.

Brier, Bob and Hoyt Hobbs. 1999. *Daily Life of the Ancient Egyptians*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Brown, Andrea. 1998. "Democratization in Tanzania: Stability Concerns during Transition and Consolidation." *Peace Research*, vol. 30, no. 3 (August), pp. 91–103.

Brown, Michael B. 1996. *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Buijtenhuijs, Rob and Elly Rijnierse. 1993. *Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–1992: An Overview of the Literature*. Leiden, The Netherlands: African Studies Center.

Buijtenhuijs, Rob and Céline Thiriot. 1995. *Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1992–1995: An Overview of the Literature*. Leiden, The Netherlands: African Studies Center.

Burk, James. 2002. "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 7–29.

Busia, Kofi A. 1967. *Africa in Search of Democracy*. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Butts, Kent Hughes and Steven Metz, "Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa." http://www.resdal.org/archivo/d000105.htm.

Callaghy, Thomas M. 1991. "Africa and the World Economy: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place." In J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds. *Africa in World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1994. "Africa: Back to the Future." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 133–145.

____ and John Ravenhill, eds. 1993. *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Campos, Edgardo J. and Donald Line. 1999. "The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters." *World Development*, vol. 27, no. 6, pp.1059–1067.

Carlton, Eric. 1997. *The State Against the State: The Theory and Practice of the Coup d'État*. Hants, UK: Scholar Press.

Caron, B., A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, eds. 1992. *Democratic Transition in Africa*. Ibadan: CREDU.

Carter, Gwendolen M. and Patrick O'Meara, eds. 1985. *African Independence: the First Twenty-Five Years*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Carter Center. 1989. *Beyond Autocracy in Africa*. Atlanta: Emory University.

____. 1990. "African Governance in the 1990s," Working Papers from the Second Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program. Atlanta, GA: Emory University.

Cartwright, John R. 1983. *Political Leadership in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Catt, Helena. 1999. *Democracy in Practice*. London, UK: Routledge.

Chabal, Patrick, ed. 1986. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1991. "Pouvoir et Violence en Afrique Post-Coloniale." *Politique Africaine*, no. 42 (Juin): 51–64.

____. 1994a. *Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

____. 1994b. "Democracy and Daily Life in Black Africa." *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 83–91.

____. 1998. "A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa." *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 289–303.

Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, London, UK: James Currey/Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Chaigneau, Pascal. 1984. *La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique*. Paris: Centre des Hautes Études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes.

Chan, Steve. 1994. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall … Are the Freer Countries more Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 617–648.

Chan, Sylvia. 2002. *Liberalism, Democracy and Development: The Relevance of Liberal Democracy for Developing Countries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Charlick, Robert B. 1991. *Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Charlton, Roger. 1983. "Dehomogenizing the Study of African Politics: The Case of Interstate Influence on Regime Formation and Change." *Plural Societies*, vol. 14, nos. 1–2, pp. 32–48.

Chazan, Naomi. 1982. "The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 169–189.

____. 1989. "Planning Democracy in Africa: A Comparative Perspective on Ghana and Nigeria." *Policy Sciences*, vol. 22, nos. 3–4, pp. 325–357.

____. 1992. "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 279–307.

____. 1994. "Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy." In Larry Diamond, ed. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Chazan, Naomi, P. Lewis, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill, D. Rothchild and S.J. Stedman. 1999. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Chege, Michael. 1994. "What's Right with Africa?" *Current History*, vol. 93, no. 583 (May), pp. 193–197.

____. 1995a. "Between Africa's Extremes." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, pp. 44–51.

____. 1995b. "The Military in the Transition to Democracy in Africa: Some Preliminary Observations." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 13, pp. 7–9.

Chenu, Georges-Marie. 1991. "La Démocratie en Afrique," *Revue Juridique et Politique, Indépendance et Coopération*, vol. 45, no. 1 (January), pp. 3–12.

Cheru, Fanta. 1989. *The Silent Revolution in Africa*. London, UK: Zed Books.

Chikoulo, Bornwell C. 2000. "Corruption and Accumulation in Zambia." In Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. and Bornwell C. Chikulo, eds. *Corruption and Development in Africa*. London, UK: Macmillan Press, pp.161–182.

Chilcote, Ronald H. 1981. *Theories of Comparative Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Chimutengwende, Chen. 1997. "Pan-Africanism and the Second Liberation of Africa." *Race and Class*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 25–33.

Chipman, John. 1989. *French Power in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Chole, Eshetu and Jibo Ibrahim, *Democratizaton Processes in Africa: Problems and Prospects,* Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995.

Chtena, Aira. 2001. "The Military in Modern Turkey: A Lasting Political Force," *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*, 1998–1999; available on http://jspc.library.wisc.edu/issues/1998-1999/article5.html.

Chuter, David. 2006. "Understanding Security Sector Reform." *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 4, no. 2 (April), pp. 1–22.

____. 2009. "Civil-Military Relations: Is There Really a Problem?" *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 7, no. 2 (November), pp. 1–17.

Clapham, Christopher. 1985. *Third World Politics: An Introduction*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

____. 1993. "Democratization in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 423–38.

____. 1996. *African and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1998. "Discerning the New Africa." *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 263–284.

____ and George Philip, eds. 1985. *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*. London, UK: Croom Helm.

Clark, John F. 1993. "Theoretical Disarray and the Study of Democratisation in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 529–534.

____ 1997. "The Challenges of Political Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical Overview." In John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1998. "National Conferences and Democratization in *Francophone* Africa." In J.M. Mbaku and J.O. Ihonvbere, eds. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa*. Bookfield, VT: Ashgate.

____. 2007. "The Decline of the African Military Coup." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 18, no. 3 (July), pp. 141–155.

Clark, John C. and David Gardinier, eds. 1997. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Clarke, Walter S. 1995. "The National Conference Phenomenon and the Management of Political Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa." In Harvey Glickman, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa*. Atlanta: ASA Press.

Clausewitz, Karl von. 1976. *On War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, Saul B. 2003. *Geopolitics of the World System*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Coleman, James S. and Belmont Brice, Jr. 1962. "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa." In John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 359–405.

Collier, Paul. 1955. "The Marginalization of Africa." *International Labour Review*, vol. 134, nos. 4–5, pp. 23–45.

Collier, Ruth B. 1978. "Parties, Coups, and Authoritarianism Rule: Patterns of Political Change in Tropical Africa." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 62–93.

____. 1982. *Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Conac, Gérard. 1993. *L'Afrique en Transition vers le Pluralisme Politique*. Paris: Economica.

Conteh-Morgan, Earl. 1997. *Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. 1992a. "History and Historiography of Politics in Africa: The Need for a Critical Re-reading regarding Democracy." *Politique Africaine*, no. 46 (June), pp. 31–40.

____. 1992b. "Trente Années Perdues ou Étapes d'une Longue Évolution?" *Afrique Contemporaine*, vol. 164, no. 4 (Numéro Spécial), pp. 5–17.

Couloumbis, Theodore A. and James H. Wolfe. 1986. *Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Cox, Robert W. 1999. "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order." *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, pp. 3–28.
Crocker, Chester A. 1974. "Military Dependence: The Colonial Legacy in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 12, pp. 265–286.
Curtright, Phillips. 1963. "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 2 (April), pp. 253–264.
Dabezies, Pierre. 1992. "Vers la Démocratisation de l'Afrique." *Défense Nationale* (Mai), pp. 21–33.
Dahl, Robert A. 1970. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
____. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
____. 1992. "The Problem of Civic Competence." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 45–59.
____. 1998. *On Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Daloz, Jean-Pascal and Patrick Quantin. 1997. *Transitions Démocratiques Africaines: Dynamiques et Contraintes (1990–1994)*. Paris: Karthala.
Danopoulos, Constantine P., ed. 1992. *From Military to Civilian Rule*. London, UK: Routledge.
____, ed. 1992. *Civilian Rule in the Developing World: Democracy on the March?* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Decalo, Samuel. 1974. "The Military Takeovers in Africa." *International Problems.* (September), pp. 80–90.
____. 1985. "The Morphology of Radical Military Rule in Africa." *Journal of Communist Studies* (December), pp. 23–35.
____. 1986a. "Socio-Economic Constraints on Radical Action in the People's Republic of Congo." In John Markakis and Michael Waller. eds. *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*. London, UK: Frank Cass.
____. 1986b. "The Morphology of Radical Military Rule in Africa." In John Markakis and Michael Waller, eds. *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*. London, UK: Frank Cass.
____. 1989. "Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 547–578.
____. 1990. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, 2nd ed., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
____. 1991a. "Towards Understanding the Sources of Stable Civilian Rule in Africa: 1960–1990." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 66–83.
____. 1991b. "Back to Square One: The Re-Democratization of Africa." *Africa Insight*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 153–161.
____. 1992. "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa." *African Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 362, pp. 7–35.
____. 1994. "The Future of Participatory Democracy in Africa." *Futures*, vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 987–992.

____. 1997. "Benin: First of the New Democracies." In John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1998. *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960–1990*. Gainesville, FL: FAP Books.

de Kadt, Emanuel. 2002. "The Military in Politics: Old Wine in New Bottles? An Attempt at Stocktaking." In Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds. *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*. London, UK: Zed Books, pp. 313–332.

de Kock, Petrus. 2000. "*Globalisation and Dominant Discourses*." In Hussein Solomon and Ian Liebenberg, eds. *Consolidation of Democracy in Africa: A View from the South*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, pp. 203–228.

Dent, Martin J. 1978. "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective." In S.K. Panter-Brick, ed. *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, London, UK: Frank Cass.

Desch, Michael. 1999. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

de Villiers, Cas. 1976. *African Problems and Challenges*. Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers.

Di Palma, Guiseppi. 1990. *To Craft Democracies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Dia, Mamadou. 1996. *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciliating Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Diagne, Pathé. 1986. "Pluralism and Plurality in Africa." In Dov Ronen *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry. 1987. "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (December), pp. 567–96.

____. 1988. *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic*. London, UK: Macmillan.

____.1989a. "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 1 (December), pp. 141–163.

____. 1989b. "Beyond Autocracy: Prospects for Democracy in Africa." In Carter Center, ed. *Beyond Autocracy in Africa*. Atlanta, GA: Emory University.

____. 1992. "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered." *American Behavioral Scientist*, no. 35, pp. 450–499.

____, ed. 1992. *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World*. New York, NY: Freedom House.

____, ed. 1993. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____. 1994a. "Towards Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 4–17.

____. 1994b. "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy." In Larry Diamond, ed. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
____. 1996. "Is the Third Wave over?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 20–37.
____. 1997. *Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute, Stanford University.
____. 1998. "Africa: The Second Wind of Change." In Peter Lewis, ed. *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
____ and Marc F. Plattner, eds. 1993. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
____, eds. 1996. *Civil-Military and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
____, eds. 1999. *Democratization in Africa*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
____. 2008. "Progress and Retreat in Africa: The Rule of Law Versus the Big Man." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 138–149.
____, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset. 1988. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol. 2: Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Diop, Cheikh Anta. 1974. *The African Origin of Civilization*. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company.
____. 1987. *Pre-Colonial Black Africa*. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company.
Dowden, Richard. 1993. "Reflections on Democracy in Africa." *African Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 369, pp. 607–613.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
____. 1987. "The Evolution of Democracy: How its Axioms and Institutional Forms Have Been Adapted to Changing Social Forces." *Daedalus* vol. 116, no. 3, pp. 119–148.
Doyle, Michael W. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I and II." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12: pp. 205–235 and 323–353.
____. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 1151–1169.
Dunn, John, ed. 1978. *West African States: Failure and Promise*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
____, ed. 1992. *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Duvall, Raymond and John R. Freeman. 1981. "The State and Dependent Capitalism." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 99–118.
Easton, David. 1981. "The Political System Besieged by the State." *Political Theory*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 303–325.
Easton, Stewart C. 1964. *The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Eckert, Paul, ed. 1991. "Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s: Continent in Transition." Special Issue, *Fletcher Forum*, vol. 15 (Winter), pp. 1–81.

Eckstein, Harry. 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 3, pp. 789–804.

Edgerton, Robert B. 2002. *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy, A History from 1791 to the Present*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ekeh, Peter. 1992. "The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics." In B. Caron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, eds. *Democratic Transition in Africa*. Ibadan: CREDU.

Ekins, Paul. 1992. *A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change*. London, UK: Routledge.

Elaigwu, Jonah. I. 2002. "African Responses to Good Governance, Peace, and Security in the Region: Towards Confidence Building Measures." Paper presented at the Seminar on *Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter?*, New York, October 16.

Eleazu, Uma O. 1973. "The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of Existing Theories and Practices." *Journal of Developing Areas*, vol. 7, no. 2 (April), pp. 265–286.

Ellis, Stephen. 1995. *Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Where Did It Come From? Can It Be Supported?* ECDPM Working Paper, no. 6. The Hague, The Netherlands: European Center for Development Policy Management, September 7.

____. 1996. *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*. London, UK: James Currey.

Emerson, Rupert. 1960. *From Empire to Nation; the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

____. 1971. "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa." In Michael F. Lofchie, ed. *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa*, Berkeley, CA: University Of California Press.

Emizet, Kisangani N. F. 2000. "Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo. *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 203–227.

Ergas, Zakis, ed. 1987. *The African State in Transition*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham. 1998. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London, UK: Penguin Books.

Falk, Richard. 1995. *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Falola, Toyin. 1996. "Africa in Perspective." In Stephen Ellis, ed. *Africa Now: Peoples, Policies, Institutions*. Portsmouth, UK: Heinemann and Currey.

Falola, Toyin and G.O. Oguntomisin. 2001. *Yoruba Warlords of the 19th Century*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Fanon, Frantz. 1966. *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated by Constance Farrington. New York.

Fatton, Jr., Robert. 1990. "Liberal Democracy in Africa." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 105, no. 3, pp. 455–473.
____. 1991. "Democracy and Civil Society in Africa." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 83–95.
____. 1992. *Predatory Rule: The State and Civil Society in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
____. 1995. "Africa in the Age of Democratization: the Civic Limitations of Civil Society." *African Studies Review*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 67–99.
Faure, Yves. 1993. "Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d'Ivoire." *Africa*, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 313–329.
Feaver, Peter D. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 149–178.
____. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Feit, Edward. 1968. "Military Coups and Political Development." *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 2 (January), pp. 179–193.
Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd.
____. 1967. "The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations." *Government and Opposition* vol. 2, no. 4 (December): pp. 491–508.
____. 1982. "The Morphology of Military Regimes." In Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds. *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*. London, UK: George Allen and Unwin.
First, Ruth. 1970. *Power in Africa*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
____. 1970. *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'État*. London: Allen Lane.
Foltz, William J. 1993. "Democracy: Officers and Politicians." *Africa Report*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 65–67.
Fomunyoh, Christopher. 2001. "Democratization in Fits and Starts." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 37–50.
Forrest, Joshua. 1988. "The Quest for State 'Hardness' in Africa." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 423–442.
Fortes, Meyer. 1963. *Kinship and the Social Order*. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company.
Fortman, Bas de Gaay. 1994. "Conceptualizing Democracy in an African Context." *Quest*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 31–47.
Foster, Gregory D. 2005. "Civil-Military Relations: The Postmodern Democratic Challenge." *World Affairs*, vol. 167, no. 3 (Winter), pp. 91–100.
Frank, André Gunder. 1967. "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology." *Catalyst*, vol. 3 (Summer), pp. 20–73.
Frazer, Jendayi E. 1994. "Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweights in Regime Stability in Africa." Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University.

____. 1995. "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition." *Africa Today*, vol. 42, nos. 1–2, pp. 39–48.

Friedman, Steve. 1999. "Agreeing to Differ: African Democracy, its Obstacles and Prospects." *Social Research*, vol. 66, pp. 823–841.

Frimpong-Ansah, Jonathan H. 1992. *The Vampire State in Africa: The Political Economy of Decline in Ghana*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London, UK: Penguin Books.

____. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Gaddis, John. 1986. "The Long Peace." *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 99–142.

Gaile, Charles M. 1970. "The Military in Developing System: A Brief Overview." In Monte Palmer, ed. *The Human Factor in Political Development*. Waltham, MA: Ginn and Co.

Gallie, W.B. 1956. "Essentially Contested Concepts." *Aristotelian Society*, no. 56, pp. 167–198.

Geisler, Gisela. 1993. "Fair? What Has Fair Got to Do with it: Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 613–637.

Gershonil, Yekutiel. 1996. "The Changing Pattern of Military Takeover in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no 2 (Winter), pp. 235–248.

Gleditsch, Nils P. 1995. "Geography, Democratic, and Peace." *International Interactions*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 318.

Glickman, Harvey. 1988. "Frontiers of Liberal and Non-Liberal Democracy in Tropical Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 23, nos. 3–4, pp. 234–254.

____, ed. 1991. "Challenges to and Transitions from Authoritarianism in Africa: Issue on Political Liberalization." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 5–53.

____, ed. 1995. *Ethnic Conflict and democratization in Africa*. Atlanta, GA: ASA Press.

Glossop, Ronald J. 1997. "Democratic Politics: Alternative to War within Nation-States and for Planet Earth." *Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 3 (August), pp. 12–21.

Goldsworthy, David. 1981. "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa." *African Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 8, pp. 49–74.

Good, Kenneth. 1997. "Development and Democracies: Liberal versus Popular." *Africa Insight*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 253–257.

Gordon, Donald L. 1996. "African Politics." In April A. and Donald L. Gordon, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Graham, James R., ed. 1993. *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, Washington, DC: National Defense University.

Greene, Owen. 2003. *Security Sector Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean*, GFN Paper No. 12 (March).

Griffiths, Ieuan Ll. 1995. *The African Inheritance*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Griffiths, Robert J. 1995. "South African Civil-Military Relations in Transition: Issues and Influences" *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 395–410.

Guie, Honore Koffi. 1993. "Organizing Africa's Democrats." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 119–129.

Gutteridge, William F. 1969. *The Military in African Politics*. London, UK: Methuen.

____. 1975a. *Africa's Military Rulers*. London, UK: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

____. 1975b. *Military Regimes in Africa*. London, UK: Methuen.

____. 1985. "Undoing Military Coups in Africa." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 121–146.

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. 1998. "The Rebirth of African Liberalism." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 18–31.

____, ed. 2004. *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Halperin, Morton, Joseph Siegle and Michael Weinstein. 2009. *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, 2nd ed., New York, NY: Routledge.

Hameso, Seyoum. 2002. "Issues and Dilemmas of Multiparty Democracy in Africa." *West Africa Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 10–25.

Hanneman, Robert A. 1985. "The Military's Role in Political Regimes." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 29–51.

Harbeson, John, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan. 1994. eds. *Civil Society and the State in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn and Jacques van Doorn. 1976. *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*. London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Harrington, M. 1992. "What Exactly is Wrong with the Liberal State as an Agent of Change?" In M. Petersons, ed. *Gendered States Feminist Re/Visions of International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Harrison, Graham. 2002. *Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Struggle and Resistance*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harsch, Ernest. 1993. "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp.31–48.

Hatch, John. 1974. *Africa Emergent: Africa's Problems since Independence*. London, UK: Secker & Warburg.

Hauss, Charles. 1997. *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*. 2nd ed. New York, NY: West Publishing Company.

Haynes, Jeff. 1991. "The State, Governance, and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 535–539.

Hayward, Fred. 1987. *Elections in Independent Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Healey, John and Mark Robinson. 1992. *Democracy, Governance, and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective*. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

Hegel, George W.F. 1942. *Philosophy of Right*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Held, David. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

____. 1991. "Democracy and Globalization." *Alternatives*, vol. 16, pp. 201–208.

____. 1993. *Prospects for Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

____. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Helman, Gerald B. and Steven R. Ratner. 1992–93. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy*, vol. 89, pp. 3–20.

Herskovits, Melville J. 1958. *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Hicks, John F. 1992. "Supporting Democracy in Africa." *TransAfrica Forum*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 69–77.

Higley, John and Michael G. Burton. 1989. "The Élite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 54, pp. 17–32.

Hirst, Paul Q. 1996. "Democracy and Civil Society." In Paul Q. Hirst and Sunil Khilnani, eds. *Reinventing Democracy*. London, UK: Blackwell.

Hitchcock, Peter. 1997. "Postcolonial Africa? Problems of Theory." *Women's Studies Quarterly*, nos. 3 and 4, pp. 233–244.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1950. *Leviathan*, New York, NY: E.P. Dutton & Cie, Inc.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1993. "Democracy in Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 18–38.

Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. 1999. "Peaceful Democracies on Trial in Africa." *Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4 (November), pp. 33–43.

____. 2000. "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 29, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 210–229.

____. 2000. "Stuck at the Runway: Africa's Distress Call." *Africa Insight*, vol. 30, no. 1 (May), pp. 5–12.

____. 2001. *Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

____. 2001. *Contemporary Problems Facing Africa and Viable Strategies for Redress* (with H. Kyambalesa). Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

____. 2001. *L'Afrique au Passé Recomposé*, Paris : l'Harmattan.

____. 2001. "Democratization in Africa: Double Standards in Benin and Togo." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer), pp. 51–65.

____. 2002. "Africa's Political Renaissance: Myth or Reality?" *Black Renaissance Noire*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 137–144.
____. 2003. "*Pax Democratica*: The Gospel According to St. Democracy." *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 49, no. 2 (June), pp. 197–210.
____. 2004. *L'Illusion Démocratique en Afrique*, Paris: l'Harmattan.
____. *2004. Des Mots pour les Maux de l'Afrique*, Paris: l'Harmattan.
____. 2006. *Economic Integration and Development in Africa* (with H. Kyambalesa). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Howe, Herbert M. 2001. *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hull, Richard W. 1980. *Modern Africa: Change and Continuity*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
____. 2001. "Foreword." In A.B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1956. "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement." In Eldersveld S. Eulau and Morris Janowitz, eds. *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
____. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
____. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
____. 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring), pp. 193–218.
____. 1987. "The Goals of Development." In Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. *Understanding Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little Brown & Co.
____. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
____. 1992. "How Countries Democratize." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 106, pp. 4–17.
____. 1995. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 4 (October), pp. 9–17.
____. 1996. "Democracy for the Long Haul." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 3–13.
____. 1997. "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 3–12.
Hutchful, Eboe. 1997a. "Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition." In Marina Ottaway, ed. *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
____. 1997b. "Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues." *African Security Review*, vol 6, no 2, pp. 5–19.
Hyden, Goran. 1997a. "Democratization and the Liberal Paradigm in Africa." *Africa Insight*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 162–163.

____. 1997b "Foreign Aid and Democratization in Africa." *Africa Insight*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 233–239.

____. 1999. "Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order." In Richard Joseph, ed. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____ and Michael Bratton, eds. 1992. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Iheduru, Obiama M. 1999. *The Politics of Economic Restructuring and Democracy in Africa*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1996. "On the Threshold of Another False Start? A Critical Evaluation of Pro-democracy Movements in Africa." *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, vol. 31, nos. 1–2, pp. 125–142.

____. 1997. "Democratization in Africa: Challenges and Prospects." In George A. Agbango, ed. *Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics*. New York, NY: Peter Lang, pp. 287–320.

____. 1998. "Where Is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa's Non-Transition to Democracy." In John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, eds. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.

Ijomah, B.I.C. 1977. The Rationale for an African Military High Command. *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Summer), pp. 633–642.

Ikenberry, G. John and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. "Socialization and Hegemonic Power." *International Organization*, vol. 44, no. 3, p. 283–315.

Imam, Ayesha. 1992. "Democratization Processes in Africa: Problems and Prospects." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 54, pp.102–105.

Inkeles, Alex and David H. Smith. 1998. "Becoming Modern." In Mitchell A. Seligson and John T. Passé-Smith, eds. *Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 209–217.

Jackman, Robert W. 1978. "The Predictability of Coups d'État: An Example with African Data." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 1262–1275.

Jackson, Robert. 1986. "Explaining African Coups d'État." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 1, pp. 225–232.

____. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982a. *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

____. 1982b. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist." *World Politics*, vol. 35, pp. 1–24.

____. 1984. "Personal Rule Theory and Practice in Africa." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 16, no. 4 (July), pp. 421–442.

____. 1985. "Democracy in Tropical Africa: Democracy versus Autocracy in African Politics." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 293–306.

____. 1994. "The Political Economy of African Personal Rule." In David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, eds. *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.

Janowitz, Morris. 1964. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Jeffries, Richard. 1993. "The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Governance in Africa." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 20–35.

Jenkins, J. Craig and Augustine J. Kposowa. 1992. "The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, pp. 271–291.

Job, Brian L. 1992. "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World." In Brian Job, ed. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 11–35.

Johnson, John J., ed. 1962. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, Thomas H., R.O. Slater, and Patrick McGowan. 1984. "Explaining African Military Coups d'État, 1960–1982." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 622–640.

Joo, Rudolf. 1996. "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces." *Chaillot Papers.* Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

Joseph, Richard. 1983. "Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria." *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 21–38.

____. 1987. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____, ed. 1989. *Beyond Autocracy in Africa*. Working Papers from Inaugural Seminar of the African Governance Program, February 17–18. Atlanta, GA: Carter Center.

____, ed. 1990. *African Governance in the 1990s*. Working Papers from the Second Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program, March 23–25. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center.

____. 1991. "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 11–24.

____, ed. 1994. *The Democratic Challenge in Africa*. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center.

____. 1998. "Africa, 1990–1997: From *Abertura* to Closure." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 3–17.

____. 1999. "The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa." In Richard Joseph, ed. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 57–80.

Kaba, Lansiné. 1986. "Power and Democracy in African Tradition: The Case of Songhay." In Dov Ronen, ed. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kabaya-Katambwa, Jean-Jacques. 1986. "La Conception du Pouvoir et de la Démocratie en Afrique Noire après les Indépendances." *Le Mois en Afrique* 245–246 (Juin), pp. 23–38.

Kabou, Axelle. 1991. *Et Si l'Afrique Refusait le Développement*. Paris: l'Harmattan.

Kabwit, Ghislain C. 1979. "Zaire: The Roots of the Continuing Crisis." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 381–407.

Kandeh, Jimmy D. 2004. *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa*, New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Kant, Immanuel. 1795. *Perpetual Peace*. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no. 1 (October), pp. 1–21.

Karsten, Peter. 1998. *Civil-Military Relations*. New York, NY: Garland Publishers.

Karunaratne, Niel D. 1982. "Growth Euphoria, Academia and the Development Paradigm." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 2 (April), pp. 268–284.

Kasfir, Nelson. 1983. "Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview." In K. Nelson, ed. *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa.* New York, NY: John Wiley.

____. 1992. "Popular Sovereignty and Popular Participation: Mixed Constitutional Democracy in the Third World." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 587–605.

____. 1998. "The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique." In K. Nelson, ed. *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives*. London, UK: Frank Cass.

____, ed. 1998. *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives*. London, UK: Frank Cass.

Kaunda, J.M. 1998. "The State and Society in Malawi." *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 48–67.

Keller, Edmond J. 1993. "Towards a New African Order." *African Studies Review*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 1–10.

____. 1995. "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives." *Africa Insight*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 224–230.

____. and Donald Rothchild, eds. 1987. *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kemp, Kenneth W. and Charles Hudlin. 1992. "Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 7–26.

Kennedy, Charles and David Louscher. 1991. "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 26, nos. 1–2, pp. 1–10.

Khagram, Sanjeev. 1993. "Democracy and Democratization in Africa: A Plea for Pragmatic Possibilism." *Africa Today*, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 55–72.

Kholi, Atul. 1993. "Democratic Transitions in the Developing Countries." *Politica Internazionale*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 19–34.

Kieh, Jr., George Klay and Pita Ogaba Agbese. 2004. "Introduction: The Military Albatross and Politics in Africa." In George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Kilson, Martin. 1976. Politics of the African Military. *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 333–336.

Kim, Young C. 1964. "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 26, pp. 313–364.

Kimenyi, Mwangi S. 1989. "Interest Groups, Transfer Seeking, and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political Instability." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 339–349.

____. 1997. *Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State: The African Dilemma*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Kiros, Teodros, with a preface by K. Anthony Appiah. 2001. Explorations in *African Political Thought: Identity, Community, Ethics*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2001.

Kisangani, N. F. Emizet. 2000. "Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 203–227.

Klein, Martin A. 1992. "Back to Democracy: Presidential Address to the 1991 Meeting of the African Studies Association." *African Studies Review*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 1–12.

Kohn, Richard H. 1997. "How Democracies Control the Military." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 140–153.

Koné, Samba S. *1990: Une Année Pas Comme les Autres*. Abidjan: Presses de la MICI.

Konvitz, Milton R. 2001. *Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers/Rutgers University.

Kpundeh, Sahr John, ed. 1992. *Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices*. Summary of Three Workshops organized by the National Academy of Science. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Kraus, Jon. 1991. "Building Democracy in Africa." *Current History*, vol. 90, no. 553, pp. 209–212.

Krieger, Winfried Jung Silke, ed. 1994. *Culture and Democracy in Africa South of the Sahara*. Mainz, Germany: V. Hase and Koehler Verlag.

Kunz, Franz A. 1991. "Liberalization in Africa: Some Preliminary Reflections." *African Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 359, pp. 223–235.

____. 1995. "Civil Society in Africa." Review Article, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (March), pp. 181–187.

Kurer, Oskar. 1996. "The Political Foundations of Economic Development Policies." *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 645–668.

Kuznets, Simon. 1995. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." *American Economic Review*, vol. 45, no. 1 (March), pp. 1–28.

Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 86, no. 1 (March), pp. 24–37.

Lancaster, Carol. 1991/1992. "Democracy in Africa." *Foreign Policy*, vol. 85, pp. 148–165.

____. 1993. "Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 38–50.

Lang, Kurt. 1972. *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Lasswell, Harold. 1941. "The Garrison State." *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 46, pp. 455–468.

Lasswell, Harold. 1962. "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today." In Samuel Huntington, ed. *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, New York, NY: The Free Press of Glencoe, pp. 51–70.

Lawson, Stephanie. 1993. "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 183–205.

Lee, J. M. 1969. *African Armies and Civil Order*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Lefever, Ernest W. 1970. *Spear and Sceptre: Army, Police and Parliament in Tropical Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Leftwich, Adrian. 1994. "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World State in Theoretical Perspective." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 55–74.

Legum, Colin. 1986. "Democracy in Africa: Hopes and Trends." In Dov Ronen, ed. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____. 1990. "The Coming of Africa's Second Independence." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 129–140.

____. 1999. *Africa since Independence*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lemarchand, René. 1968. "Dahomey: Coup within a Coup." *Africa Report*, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 46–54.

____. 1972. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64, no. 1 (March), pp. 86.

____. 1976. "African Armies in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives: The Search for Connections." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 261–275.

____. 1978. "The Militarization of African Politics." *Armed Forces and Society* vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 311–316.
____. 1990. "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 177–191.
____. 1992a. "African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim (and Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment." *Africa Insight*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 178–185.
____. 1992b. "Africa's Troubled Transitions." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 98–109.
____. 1994. "Managing Transition Anarchies." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 581–604.
Leonard, David K. and Scott Strauss. 2003. *Africa's Stalled Development*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Levine, Daniel. 1988. "Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy." *World Politics*, vol. 40, pp. 377–394.
LeVine, Victor T. 1967. *Political Leadership in Africa*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
____. 1980. "African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 657–673.
____. 1987. "Military Rule in the People's Republic of Congo." In John W. Harbeson, ed. *The Military in African Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
____. 2004. *Politics in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Lewis, Peter. 1992. "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Summer), pp. 31–54.
____. 1998. "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa." In Peter Lewis, ed. *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Liebenow, J. Gus. 1986. *African Politics: Crises and Challenges*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Lijphart, Arendt. 1969. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2 (January), pp. 207–225.
____. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
____. 1984. *Democracies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Linz, Juan J. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
____. 1990. "Transitions to Democracy." *Washington Quarterly* (Summer), pp. 143–164.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (March), pp. 69–105.
____. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
____. 1990. "The Centrality of Political Culture." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 80–83.

____. 1995. "Economic Development." *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, vol. 2, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Lloyd, PC, ed. 1966. *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Lofchie, Michael F. 1968. "Political Theory and African Politics." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 3–15.

Londregan, John and Keith Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the Coup Trap and the Seizure of Executive Power." *World Politics*, vol. 42, pp. 151–183.

Lonsdale, John. 1981. "States and Social Processes in Africa: An Historiographical Survey." *African Studies Review*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 139–225.

____. 1986. "Political Accountability in African History." In Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 126–157.

Looney, Robert E. 1990. "Militarization, Military Regimes and the General Quality of Life in the Third World." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 127–139.

Loong, Wong. 1991. "Authoritarianism and Transition to Democracy in a Third World State." *Critical Sociology*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer), pp. 77–102.

Luckham, Robin A. 1971. "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations." *Government and Opposition*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 5–35.

____. 1975. *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972*. London, UK: Frank Cass.

____. 1982. "French Militarism in Africa." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 24, pp. 55–84.

____. 1994. "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 2 (September), pp. 13–76.

____. 1995. "Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization in Africa." *IDS Bulletin*, no. 26, pp. 49–61.

____. 1996. "Democracy and the Military: An Epitaph for Frankenstein's Monster? *Democratization*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 1–16.

____ and Gordon White, eds. 1996. *Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

____ and Gavin Cawthra, eds. 2003. *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*. New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan and Zed Books.

Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. 1998. *The Rise of Multipartyism and Democracy in the Context of Global Change: The Case of Africa*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Luttwak, Edward. 1968. *Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook*. London, UK: Allen Lane.

Lutz, James. 1989. "The Diffusion of Political Phenomena in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 99–104.

Macgaffey, Wyatt. 1966. "Concepts of Race in the Historiography of Northeast Africa." *Journal of African History*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1–2.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2004. *The Prince*. London, UK: Penguin.
Madsen, Wayne. 1999. *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa, 1993–1999*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Magang, David. 1992. "A New Beginning: The Process of Democratization in Africa." *The Parliamentarian*, no. 4, pp. 235–239.
Magstadt, Thomas M. and Peter M. Schotten. 1999. *Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions, and Issues*. New York, NY: St. Martin's/Worth.
Mair, Lucy. 1958. "African Chiefs Today: The Lugard Memorial Lecture for 1958." *African Affairs*, vol. 28, no. 3 (July), pp. 195–206.
____. 1977. *African Kingdoms*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Makumbe, John Mw. 1998. "Is there a Civil Society in Africa?" *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 305–317.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1986. "Peasants and Democracy in Africa." *New Left Review*, no. 156 (March-April), pp. 37–49.
____. 1990. "The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 28, pp. 359–374.
____. 1992. "Democratic Theory and Democratic Struggles in Africa." *Dissent*, vol. 39, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 312–318.
____. 1995. "A Critique of the State and Civil Society Paradigm in Africanist Studies." In Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-Dia-Wamba, eds. *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.
____. 1999. "Indirect Rule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma." In William G. Martin and Michael O. West, eds. *Out of One, Many Africas: Reconstructing the Study and Meaning of Africa*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
____ and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, eds. 1995. *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.
Marchal, Roland. 1998. "France and Africa: The Emergence of Essential reforms?" *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 355–372.
Markakis, John and Michael Waller. 1986. *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*. London, UK: Frank Cass.
Markovitz, Irving L. 1977. *Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977.
Martin, Guy. 1995. "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1–20.
____. 1998. "Reflections on Democracy and Development in Africa: The Intellectual Legacy of Claude Ake." *Ufahamu*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 102–109.
____. 2002. *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.
Martin, Michel-Louis. 1986. "The Rise and 'Thermidorization' of Radical Praetorianism in Benin." In Markakis, John and Michael Waller, eds. *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*. London, UK: Frank Cass.

____. 1990. *Le Soldat Africain et le Politique: Essai sur le Militarisme et l'État Prétorien au Sud du Sahara*. Toulouse, France: Presses de l'Institut d'Études Politiques.

____. 1995. "Armies and Politics: The 'Lifecycle' of Military Rule in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa." In Anthony Kirk-Greene and Daniel Bach, eds. *State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence*. London, UK: St. Martin's Press.

____. 1997. "Operational Weakness and Political Activism: The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa." In John P. Lovell and David E. Albright, eds. *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Matthews, Sally and Hussein Solomon. 2002. "Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria." *Africa Insight*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 10–17.

Mauck, Gerardo L. 1994. "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective." *World Politics*, vol. 47 (April), pp. 355–375.

May, John D. 1978. "Defining Democracy: A Bid for Coherence and Consensus." *Political Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1–14.

Mazrui, Ali A. 1973. "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as a New Political Class." *Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March), pp. 1–12.

____, ed. 1977a. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

____. 1977b. "Soldiers as Traditionalizers." In Ali Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 236–258.

____. 1986. *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*. London, UK: BBC Publications.

____. 1995. "The Blood of Experience: The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 28–34.

____. 2002. "Who killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future." *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 1 (February), pp. 15–23.

Mbachu, Ozoemenam 1994. "Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Overview." *Coexistence*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 147–157.

Mbaku, John Mukum. 1992. "Political Democracy and the Prospects of Development in Post-Cold War Africa." *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, vol. 17, nos. 3–4, pp. 345–371.

____. 1993. "Political Democracy, Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Africa." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 49–64.

____. 1994a. "Military Coups as Rent-Seeking Behavior." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 241–284.

____. 1994b "Africa after More than Thirty Years of Independence: Still Poor and Deprived." *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 13–58.

____ and Julius O. Ihonvbere, eds. 1998. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa*. Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate.

____. 2003. "Introduction: Issues in Africa's Political Adjustment in the "New" Global Era." In J.M. Mbaku and J.O. Ihonvbere, eds. *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle*, Westport, CO: Praeger.

Mbembe, Achille. 1990. "Democratization and Social Movements in Africa." *Africa Demos*, vol. 1, no. 1 (November), pp. 4–18.

McCaskie, Thomas. 1995. *State and Society in Pre-Colonial West Africa*, 2nd ed. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

McFerson, Hazel M. 1992. "Democracy and Development in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 241–248.

McGowan, Patrick. 1975. "Predicting Political Instability in Tropical Africa." In *Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting*. New York, NY: Praeger.

____ and Thomas H. Johnson. 1984. "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 847–882.

____. 1986. "Sixty Coups in Thirty Years: Further Evidence Regarding African Military Coups d'État." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 352–371.

____. 2003. "African Military Coups d'état: 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 339–370.

McLean, Iain. 1994. "Democratization and Economic Liberalization: Which is the Chicken and Which is the Egg?" *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 27–40.

McMillan, E.O. Joseph. 1992. "Armies in Transition: Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies." Student Paper, National War College, March.

Meyns, Peter and Dani Wadada Nabudere. 1989. *Democracy and the One-Party State in Africa*. Hamburg, Germany: Institute for African Studies.

Mittelman, James H. 1974. "Dependency and Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented to the conference, *Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality in Developing Countries***.** Buffalo, NY, October.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 1988. "Comments on Democracy and Political Instability." *Africa Development*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 77–82.

____. 1999. "Shifting Commitments and National Cohesion in African Countries." In Lennart Wohlgemuth et al., eds. *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*,, Uppsalla, Sweden: Nordic Institute of African Studies.

Moore, Jr., Barrington. 1966. *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Morgenthau, Ruth S. 1961. "Single-Party Systems in West Africa." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 978–993.

Moss, Todd J. 1995. "U.S. Policy and Democratization in Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 189–209.

Mowoe, Isaac J. 1980. *The Performance of Soldiers as Governors: African Politics and the African Military*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Mshomba, Richard E. 2000. *Africa in the Global Economy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Muller, Edward N. 1988. "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 50–68.

____ and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Civic Culture and democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 3, pp. 635–652.

Mullins, Jr., A.F. 1987. *Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Munck, Geraldo. 1994. "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 26, no. 3 (April), pp. 355–375.

Munslow, Barry. 1983. "Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?" *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 218–228.

____. 1993. "Democratization in Africa." *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 478–490.

Murdock, George P. 1959. *Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultural History*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Mwaipaya, Paul A. 1980. *The Importance of Quality Leadership in National Development, with Special Reference to Africa*. New York, NY: Vantage Press.

Naidoo, Sagaren. 2006. "The Role of the Military in Democratic Governance in Africa: The Need to Institutionalise Civil-Military Relations." In Cheryl Hendricks, ed. *From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges*, ISS Monographs Series, no. 122 (April), pp. 33–47.

Naidu, M.V. 1994. "'Initial Development:' An Attempt at Conceptualization for Comparative Analyses of Models of Development." *Peace Research*, vol. 26, no. 1 (February), pp. 1–9.

____. 1996. *Dimensions of Peace*, Oakville, Ontario, Canada: MITA.

Nannan, Sukhwant Singh. 1992. "Africa: The Move towards Democracy." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 1221–1232.

Nathan, Laurie. 1993. "With Open Arms: confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa." In *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa*, Disarmament, Topical Papers No 14, New York: United Nations, pp. 118–134.

National Intelligence Council. 2004. *Africa in 2020: National Intelligence Council 2020 Project*. Summary of Discussion by Select Panel of US Experts. Washington, DC.

Ndue, Paul Ntungwe. 1994. "Africa's Turn towards Pluralism." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 45–54.

Nelkin, Dorothy. 1967. "The Economic and Social Setting of Military Takeovers in Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 2, nos. 3–4, pp. 230–244.

Nelson, Joan M. 1987. "Political Participation." In Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. *Understanding Political Development*. Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., pp. 103–159.

Neocleous, Mark. 1996. *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power*. London, UK: Macmillan Press.

Nettl, J.P. 1968. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 509–592.

Newbury, Catharine. 1994. "Introduction: Paradoxes of Democratization in Africa." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 1–8.

Ngoma, Naison. 2004. "Civil-Military Relations: Searching for a Conceptual Framework with an African Bias." In G. Chileshe, M. Chimanse, N. Ngoma, P. Lwando, eds. *Civil-Military Relations in Zambia*, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies.

Ninalowo, Bayo. 1990. "On the Structures and Praxis of Domination, Democratic Culture and Social Change: With Inferences from Africa." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 107–117.

Nisbet, Robert A. 1969. *Social Change and History*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1961. *Politics is not for Soldiers*. Accra, Ghana: Government Printers.

Nnoli, Okwudiba. 1986. *Introduction to Politics*. Harlow, UK: Longman.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. 1992. "Africa in a World of Democracies: Interpretation and Retrieval." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 316–334.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1970. "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1138–1148.

____. 1972. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ntalaja, Nzongola G. and Margaret Lee, eds. *The State and Democracy in Africa,* Harare: AAPS, 1997.

Nwanko, Arthur A. 1990. *African Dictators. The Logic of Tyranny and Lessons from History*. London, UK: Fourth Dimension Publishing.

Nwagwu, Emeka. 2002. *Taming the Tiger: Civil-Military Relations Reform and the Search for Political Stability in Nigeria*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Nyang'oro, Julius E. 1994. "Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 133–150.

____. 1996. "Critical Notes on Political Liberalization in Africa." *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, vol. 31, nos. 1–2, pp. 112–124.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. 1990. "The Changing Nature of World Power." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 105, pp. 186–197.

Nzouankeu, Jacques-Mariel. 1991. "The African Attitude to Democracy." *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 373–385.

____. 1993. "The Role of the National Conference in the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Benin and Mali." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 21, nos. 1–2, pp. 44–50.

____. 1994. "Decentralization and Democracy in Africa." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 213–227.

OAU. 1981. *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*. Geneva: International Institute for Labor Studies.

Obadan, M.K.I. 1998. *The State, Leadership, Governance and Economic Development*. Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan.

Odetola, Olatunde. 1978. *Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies*. London: Allen and Unwin.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1993. "On the State, Democratization and some Conceptual Problems." *World Development*, vol. 21, no. 8, pp. 1355–1369.

____, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ogot, Bethwell A., ed. 1972. *War and Study in Africa: Ten Studies*. London, UK: Frank Cass.

Ogunjimi, Bayo. 1990. "The Military and Literature in Africa." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 18 (Winter), pp. 327–341.

O'Kane, Rosemary H. T. 1981. "A Probabilistic Approach to the Causes of Coups d'État." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 287–308.

____. 1987. *The Likelihood of Coups*. Brookfield, VT: Avebury.

____. 1989. "Military Regimes: Power and Force." *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 17, pp. 333–350.

Okpaku, Sr., Joseph. 1994. "Creating a desirable 21st Century Africa: The Role of Leadership and Governance." *Futures*, vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 999–1010.

Okumu, Washington A.J. 2002. *The African Renaissance: History, Significance and Strategy.* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.

Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 1996. "L'Économie Morale de la Corruption en Afrique." *Politique Africaine*, no. 63 (Octobre), pp.97–116.

____. 1999. "A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 25–52.

Olsen, Gorm R. 1997. "Western Europe's Relations with Africa since the End of the Cold War." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 299–319.

____. 1998. "Europe and The Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold War Africa: How Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?" *Africa Affairs*, vol. 97, no. 388, pp. 343–367.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 567–576.

Onwudiwe, Ebere. 2004. "Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research." In George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds. *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Onwumechili, Chuka. 1998. *African Democratization and Military Coups*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Orkand Corporation. 1983. *Analysis of the Cause of Coups d'État in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–1982*. Silver Spring, MD: Orkand Corporation.

Osabu-Kle, Daniel T. 2000. *Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa*. Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press.

Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1998. *Structural Adjustment, Civil Society, and National Cohesion in Africa*. Harare, Zimbabwe: African Association of Political Science.

Ostheimer, John M. 1986. "Peacekeeping and Warmaking: Future Military Challenges in Africa." In Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 32–51.

Ottaway, Marina. 1993. "Should Elections Be the Criterion of Democratization in Africa?" *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 145, pp. 1–5.

____. 1997. "African Democratisation and the Leninist Option." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1–15.

____, ed. 1997. *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

____. 1999. *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Owusu, Maxwell. 1992. "Democracy and Africa—A View from the Village." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 369–396.

____. 1997. "Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and Constitutionalism in Africa." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 120–152.

Palmer, Monte. 1970. "Development: Political, Economic, Social – An Overview." In Monte Palmer, ed. *The Human Factor in Political Development*. Waltham, MA: Ginn & Cie.

Pateman, Carole. 1971. "Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 291–305.

____. 1980. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1996. "Democracy and Democratization." *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 5–12.

Perlmutter, Amos. 1977. *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Pion-Berlin, David. 1995. "The Armed Forces and Politics: Gains and Snares in Recent Scholarship." *Latin America Research Review*, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 147–162.

Plattner, Marc. 1991. "The Democratic Revolution." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, pp. 35–52.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. *The Development of the Modern State*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Pope, J., ed. 1997. *National Integrity Systems: The TI Source Book*, 2nd ed. Washington DC: Transparency International & EDI/The World Bank.

Post, Ken. 1964. *The New States of West Africa.* Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books Limited.

Potholm, Christian P. 1979. *The Theory and Practice of African Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Press, Robert M. 1999. *The New Africa: Dispatches from A Changing Continent*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Price, Robert M. 1971. "Military Officers and Political Leadership: The Ghanaian Case." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 361–379.

Prunier, Gérard. 1991. "Violence et Histoire en Afrique." *Politique Africaine,* vol. 42 (Juin), pp. 9–14.

Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Gordon, eds. *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 51–69.

Puddington, Arch. 2009. "Freedom in the World 2009: Setbacks and Resilience." Overview Essay, Washington, DC: Freedom House.

Pugh, Michael and Neil Cooper, with Jonathan Goodhand. 2004. *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Pye, Lucian W. 1962. "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization." In John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Quantin, Patrick, ed. 1994. *L'Afrique Politique, 1994: Vue sur la Démocratisation à Marée Basse*. Paris: Karthala.

Radelet, Steve. 2003. "Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different." *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 171–187.

Randrianja, Solofo. 1996. "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy." In Stephen Ellis, ed. *Africa Now: Peoples, Policies, Institutions*. Porstmouth, UK: Heinemann.

Rapoport, David C. 1968. "The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 83, pp. 551–72.

Rasheed, Sadig. 1995. "The Democratization Process and Popular Participation in Africa: Emerging Realities and the Challenges Ahead." *Development and Change*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 333–354.

Ravenhill, John. 1980. "Comparing Regime Performance in Africa: The Limitations of Cross-National Aggregate Analysis." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (March), pp. 99–126.

Redner, Harry. 1990. "Beyond Marx-Weber: A Diversified and International Approach to the State." *Political Studies*, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 638–653.

Reed, William C. 1995. "The New International Order: State, Society and African International Relations." *Africa Insight*, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 140–148.

Reno, William. 1995. *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Rice, Condoleezza. 1992. "The Military under Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (April), pp. 27–42.

Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 1997. "Individual Leadership and Structural Power." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 30, no. 2 (June), pp. 257–280.

Rijnierse, Elly. 1993. "Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Literature Overview." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 147–64.

Riley, Stephen P. 1991. "The Democratic Transition in Africa." *African Demos*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 5–8.

____. 1991. *The Democratic Transition in Africa: An End to the One-Party State?* London, UK: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

____. 1992. "Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure: Democratic Politics and Political Choice in Africa." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 539–551.

Rimmer, Douglas. 1991. "Thirty Years of Independent Africa." *Africa Insight,* vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 90–96.

Rivkin, Arnold. 1969. *Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Robinson, Pearl T. 1994a. "The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 575–610.

____. 1994b. "Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of Politics." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 39–68.

Rodney, Walter. 1974. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.

Ronen, Dov. 1974. "The Colonial Elite in Dahomey." *African Studies Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 55–74.

____. 1975. *Dahomey: Between Tradition and Modernity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

____. 1980. "Benin: The Role of the Uniformed Leaders." In Isaac J. Mowoe, ed. *The Performance of Soldiers as Governors: African Politics and the African Military*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

____, ed. 1986. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Roniger, Luis. 1994. "Civil Society, Patronage, and Democracy." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 35, nos. 3–4, pp. 207–220.

Roskin, Michael G. and Nicholas O. Berry. 2005. *IR: The New World of International Relations,* 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Ross, Andrew L. 1987. "Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 561–578.

Rostow, Walt. 1960. *Stages of Economic Growth*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rothchild, Donald. 1987. "Hegemony and State Softness." In Zaki Ergas, ed. *The African State in Transition*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.

Rothchild, Donald and Naomi Chazan, eds. 1988. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Rothchild, Donald and V.A. Olorunsola, eds. 1982. *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. *The Social Contract*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Rummel Rudolph J. 1985. "Libertarian Propositions on Violence within and between nations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, pp. 419–455.

____. 1995. "Democracies Are Less Warlike than Other Regimes." *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 457–479.

Ruschmeyer, D., E. Stephens and J. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Oxford, UK: Polity.

Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 337–364.

Rustow, Walt W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sahn, David E., Paul A. Dorosh, and Stephen D. Younger. 1997. *Structural Adjustment Reconsidered: Economy Policy and Poverty in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Saine, Abdoulaye S.M. 1996. "The Coup d'État in The Gambia, 1994: The End of the First Republic." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 97–111.

Sakamoto, Yoshikazu. 1991. "The Global Context of Democratization." *Alternatives*, vol. 16, pp. 119–128.

Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1987. "Personnalisation du Pouvoir et Stagnation Capitaliste: L'État Africain en Crise." *Politique Africaine*, no. 26 (Juin), pp. 15–37.

____. 1988. "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 337–364.

____. 1990. "Taming the African Leviathan." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 673–701.

Sarkesian, Sam C. 1981. "Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West." *International Political Science Review*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 283–97.

Scarritt, James R. 1986. "The Explanation of African Politics and Society: Towards a Synthesis of Approaches." *Journal of African Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 85–93.

Schiff, Rebecca L. 1995. "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 7–24.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1994. "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 57–74.

____ and Terry L. Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is... and Is Not?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 104–110.

Schmitz, Gerald and Eboe Hutchful. 1992. *Democratization and Popular Participation in Africa*. Ottawa: North-South Institute.

Schraeder, Peter J. 1994. "Élites as Facilitators or Impediments to Political Development? Some Lessons from the 'Third Wave' of Democratization in Africa." *Journal of Developing Areas*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 69–90.

____. 1997. "France and the Great Game in Africa." *Current History*, vol. 96, no. 610, pp. 206-211.

____. 2000. *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*. New York, NY: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London, UK: Allen and Unwin (Reprint in 1976).

Seitz, Steven. 1991. "The Military in Black African Politics." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 26, nos. 1–2, pp. 61–75.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 3–17.

Shamim, Choudhury M. 1994. "Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Democracy in Bangladesh." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter), pp. 351–366.

Shapiro, Ian and Casiano Hacker-Gordon. 1999. "Promises and Disappointments: reconsidering Democracy's Values." In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Gordon, eds. *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Share, Donald. 1987. "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 525–548.

Sherman, Jake. 2009. *Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa*. New York, NY: Center on International Cooperation.

Shils, Edward. 1962. "The Military in the Political Development of the New States." In John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

____. 1991. "The Virtue of Civil Society." *Government and Opposition*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 3–20.

Shin, Doh Chull. 1994. "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research." *World Politics*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 135–170.

Shivji, Issa G., ed. 1991. *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*. Harare, Zimbabwe: SAPES Trust.

Sigelman, Lee. 1974. "Military Intervention: A Methodological Note." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 275–281.

Sklar, Richard L. 1983. "Democracy in Africa." *African Studies Review*, vol. 26, nos. 3–4, pp. 11–24.

____. 1986. "Democracy in Africa." In Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

____. 1987. "Developmental Democracy." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 686–714.

Smith, Robert S. 1976. *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*. London, UK: Methuen.

Smith, Tony F. 1993. "Making the World Safe for Democracy." *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 16, pp. 197–214.

Snyder, Richard. 1992. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 379–400.

Soko, Mills. 2005. "Promoting African Trade: Issues, Prospects and Challenges." In Terence McNamee, Greg Mills, Monde Muyangwa, and Kurt Shillinger, eds. *Trade, Development and Security in Africa: Report of the 2005 Tswalu Dialogue*, Macclesfield, UK: RUSI, pp. 71–78.

Solomon, Hussein. 1999. "Overcoming the Achilles Heel of the African Renaissance: The Legacy of the Colonial State." *Conflict Trends* (April), pp. 28–29.

Somerville, Keith. 1991. "Africa Moves Towards Party Pluralism." *The World Today*, vol. 47, nos. 8–9, pp. 152–155.

____. 1994. "Africa: Is there a Silver Lining?" *The World Today*, vol. 50, no. 11 (November), pp. 215–218.

Sorensen, George. 1993. *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Spalding, Nancy J. 1996. "State-Society Relations in Africa: An Exploration of the Tanzanian Experience." *Polity*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 65–96.

Starr, Harvey. 1991. "Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democratic in the International System." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 356–381.

Stepanek, Joseph. 1999. *Wringing Success from Failure in Late-Developing Countries: Lessons from the Field*, Westport, CT: Praeger.

Stromberg, Roland N. 1996. *Democracy: A Short, Analytical History.* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Sundhaussen, Ulf. 1998. "The Military: A Threat to Democracy?" *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 329–349.

Theobold, Robin. 1982. "Patrimonialism." *World Politics*, vol. 34, pp. 548–559.

____, ed. 1990. *Corruption, Development and Inequality: Soft Touch or Hard Graft?* London, UK: Macmillan Press.

Therborn, G. 1977. "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy." *New Left Review*, vol. 2, no. 10, pp. 3–41.

Thom, William G. 1984. "Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Environment." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Fall), pp. 32–58.

Tilly, Charles, ed. 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Tordoff, William, 1997. *Government and Politics in Africa*, 3rd ed., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Toulabor, Comi M. 1995. "'Paristroika' and the One-Party System." In *State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence*, eds. Anthony Kirk-Greene and Daniel Bach. London, UK: Macmillan.

Udogu, Ike E. 1996. "Incomplete Metamorphic Democracy as a Conceptual Framework in the Analysis of African Politics: An Explanatory Investigation." *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, vol. 31, nos. 1–2, pp. 5–20.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. 2002. *Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces*. Lomé, Togo.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 1990. *The Democracy Initiative*. Washington, D.C.: USAID.

USAID/Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998. *Democracy and Governance: A Theoretical Framework*, Washington, DC: USAID.

Uzoigwe, Godfrey N. 1975. "Pre-Colonial Military Studies in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 469–481.

____. 1977. "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa." In Ali Mazrui, ed. *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 20–47.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 1985. "The Military and Social Science Theory." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 132–143.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1990. "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions." *Working Paper* no. 150, December.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 1994. "Political Liberalization and Economic Reform in Africa." *World Development*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 483–500.

van Hoek, F. and J. Bossuyt. 1993. "Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Search for a New Institutional Set-Up." *African Development Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 81–93.

Verba, Sydney and Lucien Pye, eds. 1965, *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Volman, Daniel. 1993. "Africa and the New World Order." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 1–30.

VonDoepp, Peter. 1996. "Political Transition and Civil Society: The Cases of Kenya and Zambia." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 31, pp. 23–36.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *The Capitalist World Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill, Inc.

____. 1991. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory." In Robert L. Rothstein, ed. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations.* Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 21–37.

Walzer, Michael. 1991. "The Idea of Civil Society." *Dissent*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 293–304.

Wamala, A. S. 1992. "The Role of Workers in the Struggle towards Multi-Party Democracy: Africa's Colonial and Post-Colonial Experience." *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (January), pp. 46–61.

Weede, Erich. 1984. "Democracy and War Involvement." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 849–664.

Welch, Jr., Claude E. 1967. "Soldier and State in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 305–322.

____, ed. 1970. *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

____. 1971. "Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics." In Michael F. Lofchie, ed. *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa*, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press.

____. 1972. "Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2 (July), pp. 203–222.

____. 1975. "Continuity and Discontinuity in African Military Organization." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 229–48.

____, ed. 1976. *Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

____. 1983. "Military Disengagement from Politics: Lessons from West Africa." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 541–54.

____. 1984. "Emerging Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Radical Coups d'Etat and Political Stability." In Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed. *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1985. "Civil-Military Relations: Perspectives from the Third World." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 183–197.

____. 1986. "From 'Armies of Africans' to 'African Armies': The Evolution of Military Forces in Africa." In , Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds. *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1987a. *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

____. 1987b. "The Military and the State in Africa: Problems of Political Transition." In Zaki Ergas, ed. *The African State in Transition*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, pp. 191–213.

____. 1991. "The Single Party Phenomenon in Africa." *TransAfrica Forum* (Fall), pp. 85–94.

____. 1992. "Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 18, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 323–42.

____. 1993. "Changing Civil-Military Relations." In Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz and Steven R. Dorr, eds. *Global Transformations and the Third World*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____. 1995. "Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria: Pains of an Unaccomplished Transition." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Summer), pp. 593–614.

____ and Arthur K. Smith. 1974. *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations*. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.

Welch, Stephen. 1993. *The Concept of Political Culture*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.

Wells, Alan. 1974. "The Coup d'État in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960s." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 871–887.

____ and Richard Pollnac. 1988. "The Coup d'État in Sub-Saharan Africa: Changing Patterns from 1956–1984. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 43–56.

White, Gordon. 1994. "Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground." *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 375–390.

Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. "Concerning International Support for Democracy in the South." In Robin Luckham and Gordon White, eds. *Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Widner, Jennifer A., ed. 1994. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

____. 1994. "Two Leadership Styles and Patterns of Political Liberalization." *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 151–174.

Wiking, C. 1983. *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1994. "Cultural Pluralism Can both Strengthen and Weaken Democracy." In Frederick D. Weil. ed. *Research on Democracy and Society*, Vol. 2: Political Culture and Political Structure – Theoretical and Empirical Studies. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Williams, Gavin. 2003. "Reforming Africa: Continuities and Changes." In *Europa Encyclopedia*, pp. 3–11.

Wiseman, John A. 1986. "Urban Riots in West Africa, 1977–1985." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 509–518.

____. 1990. *Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival*. New York, NY: Paragon House.

____. 1993a. "Democracy and the New Pluralism in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Significance." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 439–449.

____. 1993b. "Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 657–660.

____, ed. 1995. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. New York, NY: Routledge.

____. 1996. *The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa*. Brookfield, VT: Avebury.

Wohlgemuth, Lennart et al., eds. 1999. *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*. Uppsalla, Sweden: Nordic Institute of African Studies.

Wood, E.M. 1995. *Democracy against Capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Woods, Dwayne. 1992. "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power Through a Public Sphere." *African Studies Review*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 77–100.

Woodward, Peter. 1994. "Democracy and Economy in Africa: The Optimists and the Pessimists." *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 116–132.

World Bank. 1989. *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

____. 1992. *Governance and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

____. 2000. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Wunsch, James S. and Dele Olowu, eds. 1990. *The Failure of the Centralized State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Yamaguchi, Noboru and David Welch. 2005. "Soldiers, Civilians, and Scholars: Making Sense of the Relationship between Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy." *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 213–232.

Young, Crawford. 1982a. *Ideology and Development in Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

____. 1982b. "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class and Ethnicity." *Daedalus*, vol. 111, no. 2, pp. 71–98.

____. 1994a. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

____. 1994b. "Democratization in Africa: The Contradictions of a Political Imperative." In Jennifer A. Widner, ed. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

____. 2004. "The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics." *African Affairs*, vol. 103, no. 410, pp. 23–49.

Young, Tom. 1993. "Elections and Electoral Politics in Africa." *Africa*, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 299–312.

Zartman, William I., ed. 1992. *Europe and Africa: The New Phase*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

____. 1995. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Zeleza, Paul T. 1994. "Reflections on the Traditions of Authoritarianism and Democracy in African History." *Afrika Zamani*, new series, no. 2, pp. 223–240.

Zimmerman, Ekkart. 1979. "Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d'État." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 384–413.

Zolberg, Aristide R. 1966. *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Co.

____. 1968. "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 70–87.

____. 1992. “The Specter of Anarchy: African States Verging on Dissolution.” *Dissent*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 303–311.

Zunes, Stephen. 1994. “Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A New Kind of Revolution.” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 403–426.

Index

Abrahamsson, Bengt 51
accountability 6, 30, 33, 36, 158
African armies 60, 79
African Union 17, 134
Africanization 56, 75
Agbese, Pita O. 102, 164, 172
agency theory 52, 59
Alafin 66
Andrzejewski, Stanislav 52
Aning, Kwesi 159
Anya, Anya 168
armies of Africans 60
Ataturk 122
Authoritarian politics 121
authoritarian regimes 117, 119, 121, 159
authoritarianism
    armed 20
    limited 31
    populist 117
    soft 8

balance-sheet 4
Bangura, Yusuf 105
Barkan, Joel 160
barracks 141
Baynham, Simon 86
Beetham, David 147
Benin 3, 126, 160
Berlin Wall 1
Bland, Douglas 51
Brice, Jr., Belmont 111
buffer 118
bullying 126
bureaucratic bourgeoisie 114

caricature 123
carte blanche 118
censorship 115
Central African Republic 19
centralization 121
charades 4
Chtena, Aira 97
civil society 110, 118, 126, 131
civil supremacy 38, 48–9, 127
civilianization 116
civilization 106
Clémenceau, Georges 159
clientelism 2
Cold War 4, 14
Coleman, James 111
colonialism 107–8, 119
colonization 18, 58
Colton, Timothy 53
commandist 117
concentration of power 110
consensus 109
conspiracies 120
constitutionalism 127
control
    civil 49, 39–40, 52, 128–132, 153
    civilian 127, 153
    democratic 51, 132
    objective 49
    subjective 49
corporate ambitions 87
corruption 2, 105–6, 112, 116, 120, 122
counter-coup 119
coups d'état 24, 51, 59, 85, 111–3, 149
coups from below 75
Côte d'Ivoire 121
Crouch, Harold 149

Darwinism 106
Dasgupta, Sunnil 150–1
Decalo, Samuel 54, 86, 122
decolonization 107
delegitimation 119
democracy 1, 126–7
    true 3
democracies,

emerging 31, 36, 44–5
pseudo 8
virtual 8
demokratia 32
democratic transition 118
démocratie tropicalisée 9
democratization 2, 4, 6, 124, 127, 129, 135, 159, 168
Dent, Martin 114
dependence 106
Desch, Michael 52
development, 108
economic 1, 21
political 91–2
Diamond, Larry 2, 8, 29, 129
dictatorship 121
Diop, Cheikh Anta 63
divide and rule 106
Doorn, Jacques van 59, 150

Edgerton, Robert 112
Edie, Carlene 105
Elaigwu, Jonah 136, 139–40
Élysée 79
Enahoro, Peter 101
epitome 5
Ergas, Zakis 102
esprit de corps 141, 171
executive civilism 156
expectations 111
exploitation 109

fallacy of elections 9
Finer, Samuel 51, 75, 86, 149
Force Publique 56
foreign rule 107
Foster, Gregory 143
Frank, Andre Gunter 93
Freedom House 5

Gaile, Charles 81
garrison state 52, 64
Ghana 160
glossary 117
good governance 149
Guéi, General 121
Guinea 3, 6, 10, 74, 125
Guinea-Bissau 3, 125

Harden, Blaine 122
Howe, Herbert 138
human rights 5, 27, 37, 92, 124
human security 132–3
Huntington, Samuel 8, 31, 49, 77, 85, 128

IGSR 138
independence 108–09
indigenization 61
indunas 65

Janowitz, Morris 50
Joseph, Richard 8

Kaleidoscope 105
Kandeh, Jimmy 75, 82
Kenya 160
Khumalo 65
kitara 64
Kolkwoicz, Roman 53
Konan Bédié 121
Kultur 106

Lartey, Ernest 159
Lasswell, Harold 52
leaders in khaki 111
League of Nations 69
Lefever, Ernest 82
legitimacy 8, 37, 59, 108, 110, 114, 116, 146–151
Le Vine, Victor 78
Liebenow, Gus 78, 167
lip service 150
looting 105, 124
Luckham, Robin 54, 86
Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi 101

Machiavellian politics 168
Madagascar 3, 6, 10, 125
Mali 126
Martin, Louis 127
Mauritania 3, 6, 10, 73, 125
Mazrui, Ali 47, 75
Mbaku, John 86
men on horseback 2, 42, 111
militarization 25–6
military,
council 112

coup 2, 106, 117
dictators 118, 168
establishment 2, 23, 81
intervention 2, 15, 20, 52, 55, 75, 85, 88, 115, 128, 149
intrusion 2, 75, 85, 117
leadership 3, 20
praetorianism 21
professionalism 128
regimes 115–7, 120, 124, 135, 153
rulers 119
succession 119
takeovers 7, 78–80
mismanagement 112, 121
Mission Civilisatrice 106
Mobutu 6, 100, 122
modernization 89, 92–99, 127
theory 89–1
monopoly over violence 112
Mullins, A.F. 94
Mzilikazi 65

Naidoo, Segaren 151
nation-building 121, 148
N'Diaye, Boubacar 145
Nelson, Joan 121
NEPAD 137, 144
nepotism 112
new markets 106
Niger 3, 6, 10, 125
Nigeria 139
Nkrumah, Kwame 55, 60, 121
Norlinger, Eric 94
Nwagwa, Emeka 100
Nyerere, Julius 55

Odom, William 53
one-party states 121
open government 126
opposition 107–8
Organization of African Unity (OAU) 18
Ostheimer, John 78
oversight 152, 172
civilian 16, 40, 159
democratic 18, 40, 44
parliamentary 128, 157, 159
overthrowers 114
paramilitaries 136
Parsons, Talcott 90
patron-client relations 2
patronage network 110
Pax Britannica 60
Pax Democratica 1
Pax Gallica 60
peace-building 131
Perlmutter, Amos 115, 148
personal rule 120
pledges 112
plunder 109
political culture 118
political-military order 108
polyarchy 11
Potholm, Christian 111–2
primitive societies 92
purges 120
Pye, Lucien 81, 96

Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? 9

raison d'état 127
Rapoport, David 150
raw materials 91, 106
regionalism 108
renaissance 168
res publica 121
resentment 109
Rice, Condoleezza 129
Rimmer, Douglas 122
Rustow, Walt 89

São Tomé and Príncipe 19, 125
Schiff, Rebecca 170
security sector reforms 130–2
Sékou Touré 121
Senegal 160
shared responsibility 51, 129, 170
Sherman, Jack 130–1, 160
Shils, Edward 81
soldier-politicians 16
South Africa 139, 160
subordination 136

terra nullius 106
The Prince 93
theory of concordance 170
Togo 125

transparency 158
trappings 116

Uganda 160
Uhuru 6
UNREC 13, 137–38
usurpation 126

Villiers, Cas de 87, 100, 120

Weber, Max 90, 147
Welch, Jr., Claude 40, 42, 45, 49, 57, 61, 70
White man's burden 60, 106
World Bank 6

yibana mayele 6

Zaire 6, 122
zero-sum patterns 121