

ROUTLEDGE
GLOBALIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
A propositional political approach
RETHINKING Globalizations
Ann El Khoury

Globalization Development and Social Justice

Are there existing alternatives to corporate globalization? What are the prospects for and commonalities between communities and movements such as Occupy, the World Social Forum and alternative economies?

Globalization Development and Social Justice advances the proposition that another globalization is not only possible, but already exists. It demonstrates that there are multiple pathways towards development with social justice and argues that enabling propositional agency, rather than oppositional agency such as resistance, is a more effective alternative to neoliberal globalization. El Khoury develops a theory of infraglobalization that emphasizes creative constitution, not just contestation, of global and local processes. The book features case studies and examples of diverse economic practice and innovative emergent political forms from the Global South and North. These case studies are located in the informal social economy and community development, as well as everyday practices, from prefigurative politics to community cooperatives and participatory planning.

This book makes an important contribution to debates about the prospects for, and practices of, a transformative grassroots globalization, and to critical debates about globalization and development strategies. It will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, globalization, social movement studies, political and economic geography, sociology, anthropology and development studies.

Ann El Khoury is Honorary Associate and Sessional Lecturer in the Department of Geography and Planning at Macquarie University, Australia.

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This pioneering and insightful book resources a new style of political imagination, practices of politics and a politics of hopefulness.

Richard Le Heron, *Professor of Geography, University of Auckland, New Zealand*

Ann El Khoury's work lays out a cogent philosophical platform for a more diverse, less deterministic, and scalar-sensitive means for analysing global economic and social change, and, in doing so, gives voice to those who have for too long been forced to the margins of analysis and debate.

Neil Argent, *Professor, School of Behavioural, Cognitive and Social Sciences, University of New England, Armidale, Australia*

Globalization Development and Social Justice

A propositional political approach

Ann El Khoury

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Foreword

'Globalization', whether seen as an economic, political, cultural, ideological or ecological process, has been a growing focus of academic enquiry for some two decades or so. For many on both the political right and the political left, it is seen to be the 'natural outcome' of the expansive nature of capitalist accumulation, portrayed either as part of a Fukuyaman 'end of history' or a Leninist 'highest stage of capitalism' phenomenon. In such views, capital – in the shape of transnational corporations – is typically viewed as the prevailing force behind recent developments in the way in which the planet's economy is interconnected. For sure, some labour unions and other organizations have been given credit for trying to stanch its planetary spread. But, for the most part, corporations and their allies in government in various nation states are seen to be driving the globalization bus whilst everyone else is pretty much just a passenger.

But globalization as a process and as a concept is slippery. For one thing, it often seems that, as with Humpty Dumpty's explanation of the benefits of linguistic legerdemain to the young Alice, the term 'globalization' can be taken to mean pretty much whatever its user wishes it to mean – neither more nor less. Thus, is globalization simply about me being able to eat Thai food and drink a British beer and watch the World Cup being broadcast live from Brazil whilst sitting in my abode in Athens, Georgia? Or does it mean something else, a more fundamental challenge to the power of the nation state so that it has now become necessary to talk about 'globalization' rather than old-fashioned 'internationalization'? If we have a new terminology, is this because we have had to invent a fresh language through which to describe a new world which is presently being made, or does this new lexicon simply represent a fad, the use of new words because we are bored with the old ones? Moreover, just how global is this globalization talk and the phenomenon that it is supposed to unproblematically represent, that being the 'process of globalization'? What is the geography of its origins and of its spread? Does it mean the same to people who are presumably on the receiving end as it does to those who are on the giving end?

Coming out of such questions are a number of issues that speak fundamentally to the nature not only of globalization but also of comprehending it. Thus, how is globalization represented and known? And with what purpose and outcome? These are not merely esoteric matters. Rather, they are fundamental to the kind

of world many of us would like to help build or see not built, for how we think about something will shape how we behave. This fact has certainly not been lost on many advocates of corporate globalization, who have published books with such provocative titles as *The Borderless World* (Kenichi Ohmae), *The World is Flat* (Thomas Friedman), and *Market Unbound: Unleashing Global Capitalism* (Lowell Bryan and Diana Farrell), books which serve both to putatively describe the present state of the world but, more importantly, to try to convince people that the emergence of such a world has been inevitable and so we should not try to fight its further unfolding on the stage of world history. Constantly suggesting that the world is 'inexorably going to become more globalized', then, is an important element in the kind of self-fulfilling prophesy chatter in which such authors are engaging.

Concomitantly, discussion of globalization is not just about what type of globalization – that of capital or that of proletarian internationalism – might be afoot but also how we understand the nature of 'the global'. Is the global a pre-existing scale to be colonized or is it something that must be made? Whichever of these two perspectives we adopt – and my own view tends towards the latter notion, that the global is made and not simply revealed or occupied – will have significant implications for how we come to know the global and represent it. Equally, should we view transnational corporations as 'global' entities or as 'multi-locational' ones and how does this shape what we think is possible to do and thus our own behaviour? – a corporation that is understood to be a 'multi-locational' entity will probably appear easier to challenge than one which is understood to be a 'global' one, which seems a much more substantial challenge.

Into this fray has stepped Ann El Khoury. Whereas much of the analysis of globalization has assumed that it is driven by capital and has focused upon the highly visible actions of the 'big guns' of globalization, together with the large-scale feats of resistance to this engaged in by 'counter-globalization' and 'anti-globalization' entities such as – to name just a few – labour unions, the World Social Forum, and the Occupy Wall Street phenomenon that has spread, rhizome-like, across the political and economic landscape, in this work she seeks to do a number of important things when considering the debates over globalization. Drawing upon ideas of social legibility and illegibility and the concept of public transcripts, El Khoury takes a third James C. Scott idea – that of infrapolitics (the everyday forms of resistance that Scott has called the 'small arms fire' in the class war) – and develops the notion of *infraglobalization* to analyze the contemporary scene.

The concept of infraglobalization, she suggests, presents a way of thinking about globalization which seeks to critically intersect ways of seeing, ways of knowing, and ways of doing so as to 'look below the surface of apparent accommodation by the dispossessed to recognize how outward consent can mask practices of subversion'. Rather than focusing upon public transcripts of globalization, transcripts which have traditionally been seen in academic and popular accounts to have been written by large institutions and their representatives, the concept of infraglobalization allows us – nay, forces us – to look at the world beyond these to activities which are more opaque, though no less real. Infraglobalization,

then, is not so much Other to the public transcript of corporatist globalization as it is 'another and arguably much larger layer of social reality occupying the same physical space, whose practices corporatist entities such as the neoliberal state cannot necessarily infiltrate, regulate or subsume'.

In exploring such ideas and presenting, for empirical substantiation, a case study of the economic and social development successes made in Kerala, India, during the past few decades, El Khoury compels us to do several things. First, she obliges us to judiciously examine the notion of globalization, what it is and who and what drives it. Second, in so doing she calls upon us to contemplate more carefully the notion of social agency and how the everyday actions of ordinary people play important roles in shaping how processes of globalization unfold and thus how the world is being remade in the early twenty-first century. Third, drawing upon critical human geography, she challenges us to not reify the global as a scale of social action but, rather, to consider how it is both made as a social product and how it is then represented to shape what is considered to be possible in terms of political and economic actions – just who has the power to 'go global' and what does that even mean, anyway?

Finally, she emphasizes that critically re-evaluating how we think about globalization requires addressing questions of both ontology (what is globalization?) and epistemology (how do we understand it?) and that one way to do this is to draw inspiration from ideas in quantum physics about indeterminacy and probabilistic models of reality. Thus, rather than assuming that we live in a world in which causes and events can be clearly identified and fully known (a deterministic model of being and knowing) we should, she avers, adopt a plural ontology and post-positivist, post-Newtonian/Cartesian views of being and knowing in which understanding is always partial and situated and in which causes may not be reducible to specific actions.

All in all, then, this is a book worth reading.

Andrew Herod, Distinguished Research
Professor of Geography and Adjunct Professor
of International Affairs and Anthropology
Athens, Georgia, USA

Preface

In this book I seek to make a contribution toward transforming and democratizing globalization praxis by introducing the idea of infrageographies in the political–geographical imagination and by developing infraglobalization as a propositional praxis. As this book goes to press, the centenary of the First World War is being marked. It has been a long twentieth century, and in many ways it still has not quite yet ended. Collectively, we are still grappling globally with the same types of conflicts, nationalisms, imperialisms and colonialisms, the effects of fossil-fuel based industrial growth, the growth of executive and corporatist power as well as entrenched and widening inequalities, and the extended depth and reach of capitalist financialization.

There are a number of other continuities. The long twentieth century has been bookended by Anglophone hegemonic interventions in Iraq. The current turmoil in the Middle East is turning the promise of the vaunted Arab Spring into a fixation on the apparent Jihadi Winter, with the bloody unstitching of Sykes–Picot, a direct legacy of the aftermath of the Great War. The war also gave rise to the emergence of the discipline of International Relations and its central concern with creating world orders that could be configured to promote peaceful interaction and prevent further mass conflict, and to understand and shape globalization and global order.

The present moment of contemporary empire shows this project is still being grappled with. The need for a peaceful and progressive propositional politics negotiated from the grassroots rather than imposed from the practitioners of 'high politics' in the advanced capitalist states of the 'Global North', as it was in the aftermath of the First World War, is still very much in order. It is a key argument of this book that people's actions across various scales help make the world in various ways and also co-produce space. These active constructions are often underplayed in scholarly and corporate accounts, and those of transnational corporations, banks, non- and inter-governmental institutions and states are often overstated. I present infraglobalization as a way to account for the greater socio-spatial reality of globalization, and assert that alternatives to corporatist globalization are not merely about oppositional strategies such as 'resistance', a depiction which tends to ossify actors into a reactive stance, but rather seeks to re-direct the focus to cultivating and subventing alternatives as more enduring propositional strategies. I argue that infraglobalization is not merely a speculative enterprise – though

it is also a normative project – but a living, breathing and existing phenomenon that pertains to already existing alternatives, as showcased in the major empirical exploration of Kerala. It is significant that many sources of innovative political and economic forms are emerging from less advanced capitalist states, or the Global South, which historically have been the focus of development interventions by the North. What I call a propositional politics is observable in a number of contexts depending on how one looks, which informs the politics of knowing and of agency.

Infraglobalization is thus advanced as an alternative way of seeing, knowing and doing that emphasizes creative constitution, not just contestation, of globalization processes. The book investigates the prospects for a transformative globalization praxis that is multi-site and ground-up, and argues infraglobalization is both achievable and in process. In Chapter 1 I develop a template for thinking about globalization and grassroots agency that involves a shift between three syndromes of global development I call subsumption, subversion and sub rosa subvention. I argue that the third, sub rosa subvention, offers the best prospects for enacting progressive propositional politics. Like the less visible but nevertheless large part of the visual spectrum, infraglobalization is posited not only as a form of actually existing globalization but one that also constitutes more of the spectrum of social reality than the corporatist projection of globalization, the focus of Chapter 2. It is introduced here as a socio-spatial imaginary and heuristic that applies and extends James C. Scott's complementary notions of infrapolitics, the public and hidden transcripts, and *mētis*, all of which underline the role of informal order and sub rosa agency in social organization, the focus of Chapter 3. This book engages with a more hidden globalization that often underwrites more publicly visible processes, but which I argue is also a fertile source of processes and sub rosa socio-spatial ordering itself. I suggest recognition of multiplicity and indeterminacy in socio-spatial ontologies is informed by post-positivist worldviews that may be more fruitfully embraced as a way to open up agential possibilities, explored in Chapter 4.

In the book I extend infrapolitical agency to denote not just the realm of surreptitious resistance but also of enabling strategies and cultural agency. I argue these can foster community development as a domain of diverse economic practice and innovative emergent political forms, as explored in the Chapter 5 historical and economic geography case study on Kerala. Endeavouring to be mindful of how the way we imagine space has direct agential implications, I argue that strategies are often best incubated infrageographically lest they be co-opted or crushed by corporate capital or repressive functions of the state, but that the state may have a facilitative role to play, as the case of Kerala shows with its participatory planning programme and community-led microenterprises. Infraglobalization also denotes a rethinking of the sufficiency of the oppositional politics of 'resistance' and an endeavour to shift focus towards more propositional strategies of replication, reclamation, recognition and redistribution. The book aims to both contribute to a more progressive socio-spatial conceptualization of globalization as well as rethink a well-known development case study by examining some of its challenges and innovative responses within the rubric of globalization.

Acknowledgements

Original empirical research in the book draws primarily on qualitative fieldwork conducted in several towns and villages throughout the southern Indian state of Kerala first in 2002 and in follow-up interviews and correspondence by email and telephone with interviewees. My fieldwork consisted of field visits, in-depth formal and informal semi-structured interviews, participant observation, cultural immersion and critical self-reflection. I thank my interviewees first and foremost for their generosity and hospitality, and to field guides and translators. I am also indebted to Global Exchange who have organized reality tours to Kerala and have made possible access to key interviewees I may not have otherwise had in a shorter time frame than is the case for more extensive ethnographic fieldwork, for example.

The Kerala case study draws on additional *ex-post facto* research, including keeping up to date with the institutionalization of the People's Plan Campaign. Fieldwork conducted in the north Australian township of Maleny, considered the 'cooperative capital of Australia', was initially considered as a contrasting case study. Ultimately, time and length constraints precluded developing the Maleny study as a full chapter, but the fieldwork plays an important role in informing my research and, in particular, thinking about strategies and alternatives. I was fortunate to meet a number of inspiring community activists and witness the workings and daily operations of major cooperatives in both places. In particular I would like to thank my Kerala interviewees and guides: Dr T. M. Thomas Isaac, Dr P. K. Michael Tharakan, Ms M. Valsala, Dr Joy Elamon, Mr S. P. Sreedharan, Professor T. P. Kunnikkannan, Associate Professor K. N. Harilal, Mr Suresh Kumar and Mr K.P. Sreeraj. In Maleny I would like to acknowledge in particular the late Jill Jordan, Ann Jupp, Peter Pamment and Marcelle Holdaway.

This work was influenced by and owes an intellectual debt to a number of ground-forging scholars. The scholarship of James C. Scott above all bears acknowledgment as a major stimulus to my thinking in considering that there is more to informal order than what is legible through the corporatist projection of globalization. I found that two of Scott's major and influential studies on informal order and resistance were rarely considered together and sought to incorporate them in developing a new conceptual framework. I was intrigued by the idea of sub rosa spaces and strategies that gave people more credit and capacity than conventional accounts and even some critical accounts did. Further, I found it striking that plurality, indeterminacy

and parallel worlds are reflected in cosmologies that have been increasingly influential in post-normal science and poststructuralism alike.

This is closely followed by the important bodies of work of Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (Chapter 2), Kathie Gibson and Julie Graham (Chapter 3), Alexander Wendt and William Peterman (Chapter 4) and Thomas Isaac and Richard Franke (Chapter 5). My sincere appreciation is extended to Bob Fagan, Richard LeHeron, Andrew Herod and Neil Argent for constructive criticism on a previous draft, and to William Peterman for his receptive and helpful suggestions on Chapter 4, as well as to Alex Wendt for his generous correspondence on his latest work just before this book went to press. The usual non-implicating disclaimers apply, and my syntheses, interpretations and any errors remain my own.

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Abbreviations

ABCD	Asset Based Community Development
ACORN	Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (US)
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATTAC	Association pur la Taxation des Transactions financiers pour l'Aide aux Citoyons (English: Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens)
BPL	Below Poverty Line
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ('Mad Cow's Disease')
CapDecK	Capacity Development for Decentralization in Kerala
CDFI	Community Development Financial Institution
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
Chindia	China and India
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIAL	Cochin International Airport Limited
Co-op	Cooperative
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSS	Centrally Sponsored Schemes
DITS	Dinesh Information Technology Systems
DIY	Do It Yourself
DRPs	District Resource Persons
EIPE	Everyday International Political Economy
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPI	Foreign Portfolio Investment
FRIENDS	Fast, Reliable, Instant, Efficient Network for Disbursement of Services
FSM	Free Software Movement
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAO	Government Accountability Office (USA)

GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GST	Goods and Services Tax
HCBPL	Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Proprietary Limited
HDI	Human Development Index
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ID	(Personal) Identification
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRTC	Integrated Rural Technology Centre (Kerala)
IT	Information Technology
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
KDB	Kerala Dinesh Beedi Workers Central Cooperative Society Limited
KILA	Kerala Institute of Local Administration
KRPs	Key Resource Persons
KSSP	Kerala Sasthra Sahithya Parishad (People's Science Movement, Kerala)
LDF	Left Democratic Front (Kerala)
LETS	Local Exchange Trading System
LIC	Less Industrialized Country
LSG(I)	Local Self Government (Institution)
MAI	Multilateral Agreement on Investment
MGI	McKinsey Global Institute
NABARD	National Bank for Agriculture and Development (India)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N.d.	No date
NED	National Endowment for Democracy (USA)
NEP	New Economic Policy (Russia)
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
NHGs	Neighbourhood Groups
NIDL	New International Division of Labour
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NSC	National Security Council (USA)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Older Industrialized Country
Pers. comm.	Personal communication
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
PPC	People's Plan Campaign
RIPE	Regulatory International Political Economy
Rs.	Rupees
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement

SAS	Special Air Service (Special Forces of the British Army)
SC	Scheduled Caste
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SEWA	Self Employed Women's Association (India)
SHG	Self-Help Group
SIV	Structured Investment Vehicle
ST	Scheduled Tribe
TARP	Troubled Asset Relief Program
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDF	United Democratic Front (Kerala)
UFC	Union Finance Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US(A)	United States (of America)
USD	United States Dollars
VAT	Value Added Tax
WCP	Women's Component Plan
WEF	World Economic Forum
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Introduction
Infraglobalization

> What looks the strongest has outlived its term
> The future lies in what's affirmed from under
>
> (Seamus Heaney)[1]

Another globalization is not only possible, it already exists. This book advances what I term *infraglobalization* as a catalytic socio-spatial concept and practice with emancipatory potential for greater grassroots agency. In this book I build a case for a propositional praxis for the reclamation of ground-up globalization, which involves multiple pathways towards development with social justice. As an interpretive framework, infraglobalization is conceived as a contrapuntal way of seeing, knowing and doing that can contribute to the creative constitution of global and local processes. From the outset my argument adheres to the idea that strategically asking the question 'what is already being done?' rather than 'what is to be done?' may be a more enabling entry point that helps foster greater autonomy for various grassroots groups and movements. With the southern Indian state of Kerala as my principal empirical locus, I investigate a number of already existing alternatives as well as the prospects for a plurality of successful strategies, which also may exist in parallel with 'neoliberal' restructuring. These include participatory planning and community-led microenterprises as an alternative to corporatist-led microfinance.

In this Introduction, I outline this book's *problématique* and aims, as well as lay out an alternative framework I have developed for apprehending globalization and grassroots agency. These contours, which I suggest have moved from subsumption to sub rosa geographies, are both descriptive and normative. In developing my argument, I call into service a spectral metaphor,[2] wherein the 'infra' prefix underlines the value of the less visible (as specifically refracted through what I identify as the 'public transcript', corporatist lens) as well as the informal, which seeks to strategically broaden the subjects, spaces and constituency of globalization. Infraglobalization – which might also be suitably described as the infrageographies of globalization – is conceived as a propositional socio-spatial interpretative framing; I abjure the oppositionally framed terms such as 'counter-globalization' and 'anti-globalization' (less so the more satisfactory

'alter-globalization') and make the case that 'infra' is more enabling and more accurately reflective of reality. Infraglobalization is introduced as a socio-spatial imaginary and heuristic that applies and extends James C. Scott's complementary notions of infrapolitics, the public and hidden transcripts, and *mētis*, all of which underline the role of informal order and sub rosa agency in social reality.

Infraglobalization is presented as a contribution towards developing a propositional politics of development and a socio-spatial grammar of instauration. It contributes to rethinking globalization and agency through refraction (ways of seeing), ontological politics (ways of knowing) and, to showcase but one template of a propositional and prefigurative politics (ways of doing), Kerala's democratic decentralization and social economy experiments. These three dimensions coincide with Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the propositional heart of this book, in contradistinction to Chapter 2, which outlines the oppositional case. My focus is on the active prefiguration of alternative spaces and practices in the present, of 'worlding' in the here and now rather than a predetermined politics of deferment and waiting.[3] Worlding is here employed as a verb rather than a subject-object, reflecting a process-based orientation that involves reading and bringing the increasingly shaped possibilities of the future into the present. It is informed by the notion that we – and I use 'we' throughout the text invitationally – need to imagine and enact new worlds if we are to break free from subordination to the imperatives of capitalist accumulation.

This book is also a contribution to the argument about the production of space and how the way we imagine space has direct agential implications. I seek to employ the infraglobalization heuristic as a *layered* spatial differentiation that recognizes the importance of depth as well as breadth in imaginaries framing globalization, informed by the idea that manifold realities may inhabit the same space. This spectral metaphor is thus also very much spatial, one that draws on space and social processes as multiplicity rather than singularity. In doing so, I assert that this is a way globalization may be reclaimed and redeemed from a singular and narrowly sectional corporatist representation underpinned by what I identify as a 'command and control' ontology of dominatory space. This works to produce an ideologically limited circumscribing of agency, extrapolated from a view of space as subject to necessarily only one, all-encompassing trajectory, whether it is imperial or neoliberal.

Perceptions of space frame epistemological parameters and thus help shape the way power, authority and agency are understood and enacted. Different ways of seeing globalization itself contribute toward bringing it into being, in the same manner time-zones operationalize what is really a constructed imaginary. While much attention has been focused on the practices of power and domination that attach to this singular conception of space, this book is an acknowledgement that greater attention might better be directed to the production of progressive space that corresponds with fomenting and amplifying grassroots agency. This book takes as its point of departure the disabling limitations of what I call conventional interpretations of social and political space for investigating contemporary practices within the framework of globalization. I will focus on prospects for human agency and preclude 'posthuman agency' – while I am sympathetic to the strategic

decentering of human beings to bring in considerations of nature and processes, I am also concerned at over-inflating the concept of agency for my purposes here, such that any 'actant' has agency, including inanimate objects.[4]

The book endeavours to contribute towards a socio-spatial framework more appropriate to meet this challenge, recognizing that the organization of space has clear political impacts, that socio-spatial imaginaries matter and that representations of space help circumscribe our self-perceptions, ways of ordering the world and behaviours. With agential concerns in mind, a number of argument summaries and propositions follow. The following summaries preclude detailed references, which appear in the corresponding chapters. These argument summaries and propositions are grouped around what I have identified as the following three syndromes of globalization and grassroots agency (Figure 1.1) in which a shift from *subsumption* to *subversion* to *sub rosa subvention* is both discerned and advocated. Throughout the text these are embedded in, rather than tightly circumscribing, the organization of chapters, and the book bears their imprint in the manner of a research argument watermark. I also attach the qualification that these three syndromes, which will each be examined in turn, are not envisaged as an unproblematic linear progression – all three may exist contemporaneously in different contexts and across various places, spaces and scales. I assert that the third, sub rosa subvention, offers the best possibilities for constructing enduring global grassroots autonomy.

Subsumption

> The assumption of this form of globalization is that the whole world is headed along the same path. In such a framing imagination the whole uneven geography of the world is reorganized into a historical queue. Geography (a spatial simultaneity of differences) is turned into history (seen as a single succession). Both space and time suffer here: on the one hand the contemporaneity of space is obliterated; on the other hand temporality is reduced to the singular. There is one historical queue (one model of development, say), and it is defined by those 'in the lead' (there is one voice). An evident result of this manoeuvre is that those supposedly 'behind' in this queue have no possibility (no space, precisely) to define a path of their own. Their future is foretold.
>
> (Doreen Massey)[5]

Reflecting dramatic changes from the early 1970s onwards, capitalist globalization has become a mainstay concern in the social sciences. Whether variously or




Figure 1.1 The 'sub' syndromes.

at once understood as cliché, leitmotif, axial organizing principle (regulation and restructuring), a set of material processes, a historical period, and a set of discourses, this conception of globalization has as its main assumption that globalization takes only one major form – which is characterized here as corporatist – to which other forces can only react or accommodate and which necessarily erases the contemporaneous heterogeneity of the world. The global spatiality of what I define as corporatist globalization is an extension of this singular linear progression described by Doreen Massey in the quote above. In this book, I employ the term 'corporatism' to denote a subsumptive approach that can characterize both state and market players, with the common characteristic of a totalizing singularist occupation of socio-spatial reality. Subsumption is also understood here in its wider adjectival meaning as 'the act of subsuming or the state of being subsumed' rather than in its specific, albeit similar, application in Marxist social theory.

This highly particularist but conventional projection of globalization subsumes all other reality into its self-conceived purview, which marginalizes and buries other ways of understanding, constituting and participating in global processes. After Scott, I have adapted a concept to describe this conventional representation of globalization as 'public transcript' globalization.[6] The majority of public processes and events, including resistance and civil society, are here consecrated to the public 'official' transcript, upon which conventional social scientific research mainly focuses, in contradistinction to the offstage critique by subordinate groups in what Scott describes as the 'hidden transcript'. I argue that this distinction offers a way to think beyond the hegemonic narratives and dominant accounts of globalization and structural geopolitics, accounts that tend to be narrowly sectional and both reflective and reproducing of dominant power structures. These conventional accounts often leave out the rest of the body politic, treating only the public event. It also corresponds with 'great man' theories of 'high politics' that commonly reduce complex global phenomena to the designs and proclivities of the most visible actors and institutions.[7]

Conversely, some presentations may so privilege structure over agency, even in critical accounts, that they are purveyors of a subjectless structuralism that hides the agency of the powerful as well, and instead attributes causality to abstractions, which may suit an ideological purpose. Whether actors at various scales are privileged, marginalized, hidden or excluded, orthodox globalization can imbue impersonal processes and institutions with agency rather than people, impelling an acceptance of the seeming inevitability of what I will identify as the neoliberal political project. These structures are endowed with superhuman agency out of which there may only be a resultant fatalism – this is much closer to medieval than modern modes of thinking! Without denying the importance of structure or entering into the perennial structure–agency debate, the degree to which this focus on 'restructuring' has colonized discourse is apparent in the lack of a corollary concept to restructuring. To wit, there has been no equivalent concept of 're-agencying', which has generally been denoted by the term 'post-structuralism'.

This depiction is also crucially one of clear and total universalizing capitalist hegemony, expressed in critical accounts in such concepts as 'neoliberal market

civilization' (Stephen Gill, 1995) and 'capitalocene' (Jason W. Moore, 2013), a way of organizing nature.[8] In the latter, Moore views as problematic the notion of the Anthropocene – where humanity is assigned as a geological agent in a short two-century modernity– and argues a more fitting term is Capitalocene, where capitalist 'world-ecology' is situated in a historical long-view 'shaped by relations privileging the endless accumulation of capital . . . a civilization that joins the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the production of nature as an organic whole'.[9] Capitalist world-ecology is a world-praxis that sees capitalism *as* environment-making process, and these environments 'include factories no less than forests, homes no less than mines, financial centers no less than farms, the city no less than the country'.[10] Similarly, in Nitzan and Bichler's conception, dominant capital (defined as the wealthiest 0.01 per cent) do not merely mould or shape the social order, they create the order, or 'creorder' in their neologism.[11]

These are all powerful and percipient critical characterizations, but my contention is that descriptions like these may foreclose on progressive political possibilities. Capital has been conferred with unprecedented power to define not simply our political economy but has become an assignation that characterizes our contemporary civilization and 'world-ecology'. While it is true that virtually anything that can generate an income stream can be capitalized and thus subsumed, including nature, DNA and the future, it need not colonize our imaginations and ability to conceive and practice alternatives also. So while I do not contest the subsuming nature of dominant capital, I do consign it to one bandwidth of reality that does not nearly make up the whole spectrum. For example, I take on board Nitzan and Bichler's cogent characterization of capitalism as a mode of power, but I would also seek to qualify this insight. First, I identify layers to this creative ordering which takes the creordering monopoly away from dominant capital and confines it to the public transcript. My argument is that it is not simply the purview, prerogative or power of dominant capital, through capitalization, to creorder the world, to which all of us are subject and straitjacketed. Informal order, I argue, may be the 'dark matter' of what is a manifold creordering, present but not as visible or quantifiable, and yet more greatly constitutive of what exists.

Second, in recognizing the way much oppositional work re-inscribes the discursive dominance of capitalist reality, neoliberal capitalism is characterized as an ideology that structures the coordinates of the reality it purportedly merely describes. Here, social Heisenberg principles are at play with neoliberal measures and assumptions; human beings are not the atomistic, rational self-seekers and individualistic maximizers of these ideologies, but neoliberal structures are performing the human subject into its own image. Re-appropriating this process of re-subjectification is a key strategy explored in Chapter 3. Also, as Peck and Tickell point out, as the primary ideological rationalization for corporate globalization, or its 'operating software', neoliberalism is a system of metaregulation that self-defines and passes itself off as a system of non- or anti-regulation.[12] It is a project that in Thomas Lemke's words 'endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists'.[13] To what extent can we reboot and reinstall this ideological operating software or challenge the perceived primary of this platform?

Corporatist globalization also bears the imprint of the rationalist high modernist impulse, which consists of the belief that the social order can, and should be, redesigned in accordance with supposedly scientific universal laws, often presented as inevitable and incontestable. This extends Scott's observations about the state's high modernist schemes to the market, whereby market and transnational institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) may be replacing the state as the imposer of subsumptive legibility, evidenced in the one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter development prescriptions emblematic of those institutions.

As well as extending rationalism to neoliberalism and corporatism's global marketization project, as John Ralston Saul has also intimated, an ideology of supremacy that has the same subsumptive impulse informs both military and economic doctrine – from 'full spectrum dominance' to neoliberal structural adjustment policies.[14] Material and martial thinking alike can be seen to be informed by the subsumptive impulse, and the policy of full spectrum dominance, the avowed US military policy of pursuing omnipotence announced in 1997, could be viewed as the military expression of subsumption.

Recalling Doreen Massey's point in the quotation above, the high modernist translation of spatial heterogeneity into a uni-linear temporal sequence – wherein different countries are situated along a progress 'queue' behind the West – draws directly from a rationalist command and control ontology. This involves mastering, conquering and colonizing what is essentially closed and singularly conceived space rather than creatively co-inhabiting it. This view of space also draws directly from classical scientific laws, not simply from space as a Euclidean container but also on the Newtonian premise that no two objects can occupy the same physical space at the same time. With space fixed or immobile, corporatist capitalist relations can more easily subsume all – or spurn spaces not deemed useful to dominant, oligarchic capital. This more easily begets processes of servitude, control and zero-sum power. This cosmology is important in constituting power relations – and it is also crucial, I argue, in reconstituting them (see Chapter 4).

Both the exercise of capitalist globalization and the rationalism that animates it is here recognized as a form of domination, without which there can be no appropriation – or accumulation for that matter. Rationalism is a central pillar of modernity; its domination is not intrinsic to rationalism but is produced when all other things are subsumed to it, when it becomes instrumentalized. The interesting question of the tyranny of instrumental rationality is outside the parameters of this book and is necessarily only alluded to here. Suffice to say, as an ordering mechanism and philosophical impulse, part of the tyranny of rationalism, as Michael Oakeshott has observed drawing upon Blaise Pascal, is 'not its recognition of technical knowledge, but its failure to recognize any other'.[15] This speaks directly to the subsumption purveyed by this projection of globalization.

Despite its tendency to scientism and scientific pretensions, neoliberal globalization is certainly itself not devoid of normativity, but can be deftly presented by its exponents as already existing reality (if not inevitability), thus accordingly enacted through the way perception powerfully affects and shapes reality.

Hence, globalization is commonly represented as a powerful set of forces from beyond the more local community and the nation state, to which there are few realistic alternatives (as if each individual alternative needed to be a behemoth to supplant all of capital 'G' corporate globalization!). From about the 1990s, this representation of globalization has become entrenched as a discourse that normalizes certain ways of looking at the world and what is possible within it. This includes the greatly trumpeted role of global civil society and the role of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), which I argue have to a significant degree been made captive to the public transcript of globalization. Largely co-opted sections of civil society take on an essentially ameliorative and limited role in this corporatist subsumption.

The best non-capitalocentric processes can get in this conception is Lilliputian status while the corporatist 'giants' retain top billing. On the one hand, it is true that to examine globalization is to also examine neoliberal theory and practice, as many of its exponents have actively sought to conflate neoliberal principles with globalization in privileging the regulatory mechanisms and norms of the (globalized) market over the nation-state. On the other hand, a large part of the critical literature in social science has been solely oppositional in intent and content, competently demonstrating the flaws of neoliberalism but sometimes locked into critique and even appearing to accept and reinforce its perceived dominance by default. Part of my argument is that examining the fragmented and uneven nature of 'actually existing neoliberalisms',[16] though a valuable endeavour, is only part of the repertoire of strategies toward enacting just policies. I argue we should also apply our attention to its actually existing alternatives as well, studying health and not just disease; that globalization should be, and is, also about non-neoliberal realities often unrecognized or consigned to the local scale, clearly no match for the goliath globalization its advocates have used to try to ideologically colonize the global scale.

These strategies are testament to realities outside that are presented and shaped solely by corporatist interests. If it is accepted that the corporatist state and market can subsume all space, then it is being imbued with far more power than the informal order that it is in fact undergirded by. To what extent do we, as scholars, activists, ordinary citizens, allow neoliberalism and neoconservatism to colonize our social reality? Does only corporatist capitalism make its order to which we are all subsumed?

The limits of conventional globalization: beyond subsumption

The key propositions here are that the conditions of global possibility may partly be shaped and conditioned by corporatist capitalist socio-spatial relations, amongst other influences, but are not subsumed by them: there is a world, or worlds, outside of the 'public transcript' representation of globalization, currently dominated by neoliberal conceptions and practice, which has always existed and continues to exist.

Recognizing the role of socio-spatial imaginaries in legitimating certain power configurations is also a recognition that contemporary imperial representations of

global reality serve to reproduce social inequality, and that it is in the interests of social justice that progressive scholar-practitioners frame their own understandings towards a more genuine democratization of globalization praxis. This project involves decolonizing globalization from a high modernist command and control ontology, and producing heuristics that might better ferment progressive political enactments.

Subversion

> To exist is to resist
>
> (Unknown)[17]

A conceptual intermediary between subsumption and sub rosa geographies, subversion seeks to challenge processes of subsumption but may not succeed in escaping the gravitational pull of conventional globalization. I argue that this is because subversive movements may over-rely on reactive resistance rather than cultivating propositional alternatives. Oppositional politics and resistance are important strategies but may nevertheless persist in ontologically privileging the primacy of conventional, public transcript globalization, in which subsuming corporatism is dominant. The way resistance and alternatives are represented is itself problematic and can be bound by the same frameworks and ontologies that undergird conventional globalization accounts. This plays out in a number of ways, including in terms of strategies: when set up as marginal or minute, it is not surprising that alternative, overlapping and parallel systems such as local currencies or fair trade systems are easily dismissed, derided as marginal, as wanting to 'wish away' or 'write out' capitalism. But such discourses of 'resistance' and 'local alternatives' are sometimes deployed in 'straw man' arguments; actors may not seek to replace corporatism with another singular subsuming narrative but to change the totalizing singularity of all systems and to create space for alternatives.

Departing from the traditional historiography of asymmetric power relations and resistance among dominant and subordinate groups, James C. Scott argues that a dissident political culture develops through potentially subversive cultural practices in disguised forms, which he terms 'infrapolitics'. This may include subversive satire, vernacular languages, tax evasion, foot-dragging, folklore, jokes, songs and sabotage. Like infrared rays, infrapolitical activity may not be visible or legible to those who wield public power nor fit into their narratives, which he terms the public transcript. It is infrapolitical because practices and discourses are illegible to state and official authority and invisiblized in the public transcript – legibility here translates into visibility. Infrapolitics is offered as a way to look below the surface of apparent accommodation by the dispossessed to recognize how outward consent can mask practices of subversion. Wielded as 'weapons of the weak', infrapolitics operates in what Scott identifies as 'hidden transcripts', or offstage discourses of subordinate groups. Subversive, covert and surreptitious resistance is less well documented and its illegibility to power-holders in the public transcript often has tactical advantages.

Human agency and resistance here may take many forms, often ingenuous and hidden – and ingenuously hidden, with a 'hidden in plain sight' quality. Open, 'declared', political action is often only the visible tip of the iceberg and Scott significantly posits infrapolitics as the elementary, foundational form of politics, the 'building block for the more institutionalized political action that could not exist without it'.[18] Tactical invisibility can provide requisite cover to incubate and eventually to publicly mount strategies. The disguising of resistance in the hidden transcript may not however lend itself to historical or social scientific documentation, at least not in the public transcript, and Scott avers that subordinate groups themselves may even be complicitous in contributing to a sanitized official version in order to cover their tracks. The upshot is that apparent and outward compliance does not necessarily mean capitulation, and that subversion can occur with an apparently less obtrusive corrosion of hegemony.

The idea of a hidden transcript underscores the role of informal order in constituting more of the spectrum of reality, including globalization, than is conventionally represented in the public transcript. The representation of socio-spatial processes has been dominated by formal institutions and official actors, which the work of a number of social scientists has highlighted and sought to remedy. This informal order is animated by a long incubated yet adaptable grassroots intelligence and 'folk wisdom' Scott calls *mētis* after the ancient Greeks.[19] In wielding high modernist ideology, applied from Prussian forestry techniques to the imposition of surnames upon villagers, central governments have often destroyed or lost this crucial local knowledge by attempting to force legibility on their subjects in the course of statecraft. In conjunction with a number of other conditions, grand statist schemes often fail when they fail to heed mētis. Pointing to such cases as the planned city of Brasilia and its unofficial counterpart city that sustains it, Scott asserts that the modernist project itself routinely relies on an unacknowledged 'dark twin',[20] within which one could include modern capitalism.

This also underscores how ways of seeing matter: what outwardly looks like consent can mask fertile acts of resistance. What looks like capitalism's subsumptive domination of everything conceals (and crucially depends on) systems of mētis, mutual aid, informal order. When it comes to the capitalist behemoth, in other words, the object appears larger than it really is. Informal practices that make up the bedrock of reality on the other hand, are concealed and are variously insubordinate and illegible to the former which it quietly parallels, and without which capitalism could not operate.

In globalization praxis, this segues with the roles of resistance and informal order, with two major points to draw out about its extensibility. The first is the apparent similarity between the notion of mētis and that of social capital. In understanding mētis as local know-how and practical *savoir faire* that exists infrageographically – outside the reach of the public transcript – it might be considered as a mode of knowing and doing that is deeper than social capital, particularly social capital as it is understood and played out in the public transcript version of global civil society. I thus consider there are at least two layers of informal order, that underneath the public transcript's civil society with its more visible social capital

there are infrapolitical processes and spaces informally governed by the native intelligence of mētis.

Second, infraglobalization is not here conceived as simply a 'gap' between state and market, as civil society is sometimes framed. Aligning with Scott's original conception, infrapolitics is recognized here as the foundational form of politics rather than as interstitial spaces and practices that occur between the public transcript corporatist mainstays of 'market', 'state' and 'labour'. I make the case that infraglobalization may be intersectional and interstitial depending how you look, and whether it is refracted through the conventional globalization lens. It is here acknowledged as a major section of the spectrum of order and reality in its own right.

The optical dimension of this argument is also related to how the ideological hegemony of dominant groups is predicated upon projecting a particular way of seeing the world and upon then apparently having it accepted and internalized by subordinate groups as common-sensical or natural.[21] This not only inverts the relationship between the dependency of the formal upon the informal, but within the purview of this book it also relates to how initially grassroots innovations and concepts like social capital and microfinance can be appropriated and colonized, such that critical development accounts may refer to them as 'paradigmatic of neoliberalism'. This could also be described as the formal order's attempt to mimic and replicate for its own purposes the properties of the informal order, its mētis.

Yet the notion that a hidden globalization underwrites public transcript-visible processes is one where it essentially plays a supporting rather than leading role. Sites and circuits of the informal economy, from households to community cooperatives, local economies to transnational networks, may effectively underwrite the formal, more public-official processes but, I argue, are also important in their own right and not simply as subordinate adjuncts to public transcript processes, which are presented as *the* reality. A hidden transcript replete with resistances may succeed in disrupting the naturalized hegemony of the formal sphere of economic activity, its claimed correlation with the global scale and comprehensive universal application across diverse socio-spatial spectrums, successfully subverting the idea that corporatism subsumes all, but its disruptive effects stop short of efforts at creation and construction.

Historically, recognizing the public transcript order as an arbitrary power configuration is a crucial first step in developing political consciousness and to developing alternatives: undoing the perceived hegemony of corporatist globalization is exposing its uneven, heterogeneous, contradictory, fragmented and partial character that is belied by the appearance of cohesion and contiguity. There are however discernible limits to subversion, from its cooption and weakening of dissent through the covert planting of official propaganda to the funding of 'astroturf' groups that mimic the appearance of and effectively manufacture fake grassroots movements (so named as astroturf is a Monsanto product of artificial grass turf). Corporatist interests can covertly act in ways that range from 'controlled opposition' such as the use of gatekeepers and planting moles, to the US

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and neocon foundation funds that have gone towards exploiting the genuine resistance in the various international 'colour revolutions', for example, such as the 'Orange' and 'Rose' revolutions in the Ukraine and Georgia respectively.

It is also significant by way of appropriation and subsumption that international organizations and financial institutions have strategically imbibed social movement and community-inflected language, such as 'participatory', 'community', 'capacity building' and 'self-help'. Critics have charged that 'participatory boosterism', for example, fails to address questions of power, inequality and poverty and serves to depoliticize conflicts, enabling the smuggling in of aggressive neoliberal practices. Pablo Leal, for example argues that it is no coincidence that participation 'appeared as a new battle horse for official development precisely at the time of the shock treatment of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) inflicted . . . by the World Bank and the IMF'.[22] The adaptability of progressive forms to different contexts means they are also at risk of being captured by neoliberal ideology. Several processes have both a cooperative and a corporatist conception in which the latter appropriates, co-opts and makes it legible for the public transcript, such as decentralization and corporatized microcredit. Decentralization in the hidden transcript occurs in the context of fostering autonomy and reducing reliance on or subjection to the coercive state apparatus and/or corporatist capital. Self-help in the corporatist public transcript has been appropriated in the context of welfare roll-backs. My contention is that any claimed relationship between neoliberalism and practices such as decentralization is ideological, it is not natural or given.

Similarly, one of the foundation myths of capitalism is that it either invented or has a monopoly on entrepreneurship, or that it is the only system that has, or exemplifies, a 'market' economy, such that even the term 'market' is often used synonymously with it. Cooperatives and informal order did not come into being as 'anti-capitalist' forms. These forms pre-existed contemporary neoliberal capitalism. While practices can be appropriated and manipulated to give a self-responsibility patina to justify the retreat of state and corporate responsibility, the point is that neoliberal ideology has no monopoly on process and meaning.

The spaces that attach to subversion have been recognized in social science as socially constructed, and relational rather than pre-given or absolute.[23] Subverting corporatist singularity and its colonization of the global scale has also involved recognition in scholarship of the inseparability and co-implication of the local and global; that the global is not just aggregative (the sum of local processes or their network connections) but also generative, that is, measured in terms of extension of influence. Places and communities as constituted by the complex networks and multiple social relations that span across the globe are thus global through those processes, and through the carriage of their influences and effects. In other words, the global is not just 'out there', networks of various reach, scope and intensity are co-present and co-constitute everyday practices.

Subverting the corporatist production of space rather than conceding it to be 'free' for neoliberal capital is an important step, a recognition that an impoverished

view of space-time also impoverishes the spectrum of political possibilities. More than that, it erases realities, lifeworlds, voices and multiple pathways. The conception of space as closed, immobile, depthless, the opposite of time rather than inseparable from it (as the most contemporary conceptualizations even in physics have had it for decades) has increasingly been challenged by the emergence of alternative post-Euclidean imaginations of space and scale. I argue that these emergent subversive efforts are promising but bear full fruit in a modality where they are recognized as meriting independent consideration, not only as reactions to that which they challenge.

Subversion can also more easily be controlled through the subsumptive impulse when located within the same singularist spatial ontology. Valuable approaches such as standpoint epistemology rightly highlight the importance of voices from the 'margins' that can afford insights not accessed at or from the 'centre'; these may multiply perspectives yet still be rooted in the same singularist spatial ontology, however. An imaginary that is characterized by a radical multiplicity of realities, rather than simply perspectives within a singular reality, may help challenge these limitations.

Up the ante, transcend the anti

The key proposition here is that the efficacy of grassroots agency within globalization praxis depends upon a 'both-and' amalgam of propositional and not just oppositional action. Agency is richer than conventional accounts allow and the 'infra' framing is a way of breaking the conceptualization straitjacket of globalization as domination versus resistance, which often locks communities and movements into a limited reactive, oppositional mode. Following on from this, globalization's informal order – what I have termed infraglobalization – crucially underpins and is the greater parallel to the formal public transcript globalization. Grassroots strategies such as decentralized governance and microenterprises succeed insofar as they allow the cultivation of, and do not harm, this informal order, which may be deeper than civil society as represented in public transcript accounts and are less amenable to conventional social scientific measure. The informal order's relative invisibility when viewed through the conventional lens is recognized as a representational artifact of the public transcript and belies the fact that, like gravity, it is akin to a force that helps hold everything together. An overregulated, top-down control and command globalization can stifle and destroy the informal order upon which it is often parasitical.

It is possible and productive to distinguish between the corporate framing of globalization and globalization's progressive enactments beyond a limited 'anti-' or 'counter-' framing. Disentangling globalization from its corporatist colonization with which it has been ideologically conflated challenges the monochrome rendering of global reality. The next steps toward taking back the power to author, enact, bargain, perform and create involves a more vivid palette of colours that I argue more closely matches lived realities, and offers greater scope for agency.

Sub rosa subvention

> Never again will a single story be told as if it is the only one.
>
> (John Berger)[24]

In this modality, infraglobalization is elevated from an interstitial phenomenon, or one merely underlying formal global processes, to an imbricated reality that is a vibrant and fertile source of creative alternatives and both incipient and pre-existing parallels in its own right. Infrageographies are envisaged as an expansive, experimental and effervescent socio-spatial form, and its spaces conceived as multidimensional, contingent and constructed by human activity, unlike a subsuming conception of singular space based on the static Cartesian grid. If, as the book advances, space matters in how we constitute realities and engage with the world, new ways of imagining spaces outside of capital control is central to the projects for producing viable alternatives. This cannot be done, I suggest, within the rubric of dominant capital's subsuming spatial frame.

A propositional politics of infraglobalization requires the long-view, and experiments and mētis may gestate over a long time-horizon. Laclau and Mouffe argued 30 years ago that plural democratic movements were shifting from a 'strategy of opposition' to a 'strategy of construction of a new order',[25] and this process as understood here as a slow cooking hearty historical brew informed by such sensibilities as varied as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) phrase 'building a new world in the shell of the old' to 'do what you can where you are', to paraphrase Ted Roosevelt.[26] The worlding of futures by enacting alternatives in the here and now could be viewed as infraglobalization's key strategy of forward-looking prefiguration to capital's forward-looking capitalization – the process by which expected future gains are monetized by present measures. In this vein, Gélinas similarly sees alternative political-economic forms as the seeds of a future order in which they may be the more prevalent modes:

> Just as capitalism matured within the feudalism over several centuries before asserting itself as the dominant system, the alternative economy will likewise need to develop slowly within capitalism before gradually asserting itself in a community, a region, a country and finally throughout the world.
>
> (Jacques Gelinas)[27]

These infrageographies are produced outside official arenas and consist of spaces and sites that are an important but under-represented part of the spectrum of globalization. These may include, but are not limited to, the spaces of the community economy and the informal sector. They may involve utilizing grassroots circuits for information-sharing, solidarity, knowledge production, resource-pooling and policy development as seen, for example, in the World Social Forum movement. Supporting and subventing these strategies becomes a priority for a number of groups to respond more autonomously and in innovative ways as agents actively producing and ordering global reality. There are a wealth of local laboratories

of democratic decision-making, cooperative enterprises, alternative forms of exchange and participatory budgeting. Going by the measures of an old-style progressive politics, the figures may look discouraging, such as the decline in major political party and trade union membership over the past quarter century. But over this same period, the numbers involved in worker-owned businesses, for example, has dramatically increased: even in the heartland of capitalist empire, the US, the numbers of worker-owners involved in cooperatives is estimated to have increased from 250,000 in 1975 to 11 million in 2014; and over a third of the US population are members of a cooperative.[28] A new form of propositional politics is slowly supplanting the old politics.

Experiments may be discontinuous, ebbing and flowing with the dynamics of local institutions, the reshuffling of state and municipal governments and external influences, but their effects can be long lasting and have extensive reach. This can be seen both in the Porto Alegre model of participatory budgeting which lasted a decade and a half in Brazil (1991 to 2004) and spread as an adapted practice to countless cities and municipal councils around the world (see Chapter 3); and in Kerala's decentralization, participatory planning and social economy experiment which was launched in 1996 and also went through spurts and setbacks depending on the see-saw swing of which state government presided every five year term (see Chapter 5).

Infraglobalization does not exist in dualistic opposition to public transcript globalization as much as it is another and arguably much larger layer of social reality occupying the same physical space, whose practices corporatist entities such as the neoliberal state cannot necessarily infiltrate, regulate or subsume. Parallel practices may include community-led alternatives to the market-determined and state-led appropriations of such practices as microfinance. I argue that microfinance is not circumscribed or 'owned' by neoliberalism nor is its wholesale corporatist commercialization and financialization inevitable. This book does not debate or document the clear shortcomings of donor-dependent corporate microfinance and cooperatives which are locked into formal financial circuits, but it bears emphasizing that there is nothing that auto-circumscribes practices such as microcredit, 'self-help' and decentralization as political technologies of neoliberalism, as the Kerala case study highlights. Similarly, the role of women and social reproduction can be recognized as central to global development because they happen to assume great importance in the integral informal order, rather than because they are the ideal-typical corporatized microfinance subjects. Practices can be hijacked by neoliberalism, or they can be harnessed more progressively in the service of socially just policies: the point is that they are neither ideologically pre-determined nor pre-disposed.

In view of these propositions, I ask how amenable is understanding Kerala's contemporary development through an infraglobalization lens? What are the prospects for planning as a participatory democratic enterprise (applied infraglobalization?) and asserting autonomy over finance capital, as illustrated in a corporate finance-poor state like Kerala? Has Kerala's experience of subventing homegrown cooperatives and decentralized budget-supported participatory planning

as alternatives to corporatist globalization and microcredit been successful, and further, can it be replicated elsewhere? If so, what is it about Kerala's cultural-political milieu that makes its articulation of radical democratic practice and microenterprises possible? How does a state pursuing a redistributionist agenda fare in an ostensibly neoliberal period? Can governments and other governing agents abide by the principle and practice of *primum nil nocere* – first, do no harm – non-maleficence in at least protecting the mētis of communities? The book argues that while conventional social scientific frames may not be able to quantify or definitionally capture mētis, states can nevertheless still act to protect rather than destroy it.

Infraglobalization is also an imaginary suggesting greater attention be duly directed to people's lived experiences with political spaces both of their own making and those that may also be circumscribed by others. The 'everyday' and sphere of social reproduction here also matter in constituting reality and in initiating processes that may take on extra-local reach. It engages directly with the idea – and ideal – of greater autonomy, and the question of the degree to which social movements and communities develop alternatives outside a system apparently tied to the desires and whims of corporatist elites. What are the possibilities for building strategic translocal, global alliances and cultivating subaltern agency and capacity to shape processes and help effect coordination at a distance?

The previous section foreshadowed the important role played by mētis, which here refers to grassroots cultural forms, norms and practices, and to vernacular wisdom, know-how and knack. It is a practical experiential knowledge that may never be fully comprehended in the public transcript. A mētis-based infraglobalization acknowledges that: first, social relations, like ecological systems, are far more complex than can be modelled or conventionally represented; and second, that local knowledge is often not easily written down or 'proven' according to positivistic scientific conventions, thus rendering it invisible in the corporatist worldview, to be devalued and often destroyed by high modernist planners. Exploring the experience of Kerala Sasthra Sahithya Parishad (KSSP) or People's Science movement is an interesting vehicle for examining how mētis might be harnessed rather than harmed, particularly in Kerala's successful literacy campaign which drew on indigenous cultural forms and social practices rather than imposing a top-down program that might have ignored the population's existing strengths.

Infraglobalization also implicitly recognizes the problem of over-determination inherent in public transcript representations of power. There are multiple ways various actors engage with, create and experience global flows – it is not simply about perpetrator/victim in terms of corporate capital and communities respectively for example, nor only about accommodation versus resistance. It is also about sub rosa development wherein portability, adaptive replicability and networks of social movements and community strategies are possible. In other words, infraglobalization strategies travel too – why only confer mobility to corporatist forms?

These interweaving layers may parallel as well as intersect and overlap with civil society and social capital in its more public transcript guises, while not being

defined or subsumed by either. The point of distinction is that communities and movements may organize and operate in ways incommensurable with the public transcript rendering of reality, which requires practices to be legible for the purposes of corporatist (state or capital) recording, classifying, containing, controlling and monitoring, often through force. They produce sub rosa geographies by virtue of their illegibility to corporatist forms.

In positing infraglobalization as a sub rosa socio-spatial ordering of reality, I make the case that ontology matters. It is significant, I suggest, that there is support for the radical multiplicity of reality in ascendant post-classical worldviews informing our ability to conceive of multiple realities occupying the same space. Infraglobalization accommodates co-existing contemporaneous multiplicities and manifold vernacular realities rather than making the ontological assumption that there is one true reality, as rooted in the *classical* Western tradition. If bodies and objects help produce, and not just occupy space, then it is possible to envisage different layers of socio-spatial reality which may overlap or intertwine around various orbits people and groups generate. This then relates to the conception of space that attaches to infraglobalization, as superposed, imbricated layers of reality that may be intersectional as well as parallel, criss-crossing with other practices and spaces. These are contemporaneous rather than palimpsestic, the latter implying linear temporal succession.

In exploring the progressive catalytic potential of an infraglobal socio-spatial framing, I underscore its experimentality. It might be envisaged as a social incubus, with spaces of experimentation and incubation, and capacity-building *towards* greater transformation: not every incubatory experiment may achieve successful transformation, but its gestation may generate highly beneficial social effects and contribute to mētis. This is perhaps how mētis has in fact been produced historically, through a good deal of trial and error, and an intimate and long-nurtured knowledge of practices rooted in particular times and places, and with mistakes simply adding to the store of grassroots knowledge.

Constituted at various scales, infrageographies are presented as sites of innovation and not just amelioration, where subjects are posited as capable of initiating, and not simply interpreting. I am conscious to try not to reify or romanticize the subaltern, and recognize that socially or ethically regressive practices and customs may also exist infrageographically. This may, in turn, serve as a justification for not always warranted or appropriately executed state intervention, such as with the Roma people. This lies outside the purview of this book, wherein I employ the notion of a subaltern in a way that actually mainstreams the marginalized such that the numerical majority of people may identify both as and with the 'subaltern'. In Kerala this strategy has historically played out with activists identifying with and embracing the struggle of the 'untouchables' rather than spurning people of this caste as external, with an inclusivist struggle that has helped to ferment Kerala's remarkable history of social activism.

This book does not suggest that an advocacy of informal power should let formal power 'off the hook' or that it entails accepting any socially regressive rolling back of state functions such as a social safety net. The struggle to reform

public, putatively representative, institutions is an important one, particularly as these institutions have often corroded the very values they have been set up to promote. Vigilance about formal power and holding it to account certainly need not preclude informal capacity building. Formal institutional state power is more complex and less monolithic than oversimplifications may imply, and while I have anarchist sympathies I in fact suggest the state may have a constructive, facilitative role to play as the case of Kerala illustrates, especially when there is a credible policy commitment from state representatives and agencies.

From critique to construction

The key propositions in this modality are as follows. Progressive politics requires a progressive time-space, which I have identified as comprising already existing and rich infrageographies that are incubatory, deep, and seek to achieve safe distance from corporatist surveillance, in part through illegibility. Infraglobalization is advanced in this book as a potentially progressive and multidimensional political space, a layer of socio-spatial reality and of informal sub rosa ordering that corporate forces cannot always regulate, dominate or even reach. This recognizes not all spatial forms or differentiations can be derived or caused from the logic of capital accumulation nor in fact *any* singular and putatively all-subsuming logic. Resignifying space as deeply and dynamically layered and imbued with a multiplicity of form concomitantly helps multiply political possibilities – and actualities. Agents are recognized as capacious subjects who bring global processes into being, cultivate and nourish mētis, and build the terrain as they move. I argue that strategies are often best incubated infrageographically lest they be co-opted or crushed by corporate capital or repressive functions of the state, but that the state may have a facilitative role to play, as the case of Kerala shows with its participatory planning programme and community-led microenterprises. The relationship with the state, depending upon the context, can be both facilitative and fraught, both productive and vexed.

It is not surprising many forms of social capital, both as concept and as asset, are too valuable not to be appropriated and instrumentalized by corporatism. I suggest that creating alternative practices involves a large degree of covert capacity-building, drawing upon and cultivating mētis, until and unless institutional safeguards and commitments from the state are in place. This proposition will be explored in the case of Kerala (Chapter 5).

How the book is organized

The rest of the book is organized by four substantive chapters, followed by a brief concluding chapter. The chapters correspond with the three syndromes just outlined, with some overlap. The book seeks to distinguish between globalization as a more conventional onto-epistemology (Chapter 2) and as a 'catalytic' onto-epistemology (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and reflects the key aims of the book toward fostering viable social alternatives and alternatives-in-waiting, both established

and experimental. In devoting four chapters out of five to advancing alternatives to corporatist globalization, while only one describes the nature of the beast, I endeavour to circumvent the trap capable critical social scientists sometimes fall into of an over-focus on that which they are ostensibly trying to transcend. Neoliberalism is but one story of economic globalization and it is time the globalization debate is epistemologically decolonized and alternatives accorded due attention.

In the book, my intersectional approach is drawn primarily from the disciplines of politics and human geography, but is also informed significantly by anthropological and sociological contributions. I have endeavoured to bring to bear my interdisciplinary background; while this has advantages it also means the main empirical case study, about one quarter of the book, might assume less weight than conventionally expected in some disciplines relative to the theoretical framework and conceptual contribution that I also explicitly seek to make. This book accordingly places considerable value on the contextual research surrounding issues raised in a study of Kerala as well as on their application in Kerala itself. The aim is to achieve a measure of breadth appropriate to the nature of an interdisciplinary research *problématique*.

In Chapter 2 I examine how corporate globalization currently prevails as the public transcript of capitalist political economy and social reality. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has been a historic opportunity portal to observe how corporate capitalism and the neoliberal project work as a system of power. While neoliberalism is its ideology, I have adopted the broader term corporatist globalization rather than neoliberal globalization to include other corporatist iterations such as what I identify as the neoliberal-neoconservative convergence. Focusing upon corporatist globalization also means scrutinizing capital accumulation crises which attend its functioning, and that have become more globalized and financialized since the early 1980s. Corporate-led, neoliberal globalization is situated against a number of larger currents and frameworks for grouping global sociospatial change, such as strategies for accumulation, patterns of regulation and the idea of periodic profit crises being instrumentalized. I argue that the 'neo-neo' convergence has served as a stop-gap resolution of recent capital accumulation crises, although it benefits different sections of oligarchic capital differentially, and that extreme financialization entails a violent, extractive, undemocratic and inequitable system that is neither sustainable nor successful by its own public transcript market measures, although it has amply rewarded sections of capital who have had a very good crisis. It has also entrenched and increased wealth-based inequalities, as well as created new tensions and contradictions.

Chapter 3 articulates an alternative way of seeing and doing that recognizes and reflects a more enabling, agentially-aware globalization praxis. It posits both a project of transformation and transformational act of recognition in the way we see agential possibilities within globalization by rethinking the sufficiency of oppositional 'resistance' and shifting focus towards facilitating propositional geographies of enablement. Building upon work that recognizes parallel and 'interstitial' geographies, I assert that examinations of human agency would do well to accord due weight and attention to sub rosa sites and processes and to

everyday actors for their crucial role in initiating, constituting and reproducing global processes. Advanced as a form of creation and not simply contestation, this chapter develops the idea of infrageographies of globalization, extending James C. Scott's concept of infrapolitics and examining the idea of informal order. Against the identified limitations of what I have termed oppositional praxis, another way of seeing is proffered: rather than either accepting prevailing structures or simply 'resisting' them, I argue that grassroots agents have created alternatives as well as the spaces for alternatives. Further, I propose that while many of the processes of the informal order effectively subsidize formal order, informal sector actors wherever possible might fruitfully redirect more energy and resources toward subventing and incubating their own forms and practices, with a number of strategies to achieve this explored.

In Chapter 4 I focus on the ontological politics of grassroots globalization and identify an ontological turn in the framing of globalization theory and practice. In this chapter I assert that new agential possibilities are informed by and related to the ontologization of the globalization debate. In particular I consider what an ontological politics informed by quantum mechanics might look like and how this metaphysical framework is relevant to enacting, sustaining and reproducing development alternatives. I develop the idea that ontological pluralism is at the heart of what distinguishes grassroots infraglobalization from conventional corporate praxis, and that a more plural ontology has a direct bearing on configuring globalization as a more participatory, democratic, transformative, agentially-centred epistemology. This is refracted through an exploration of related debates which highlight the reciprocal co-constitution between the empirical and epistemological, such as method and representation, worldviews and worlding, theory-as-practice, space and scale and debates about how globalization is represented. These debates have important and interesting implications for agency and subjectivity and for the production of knowledge about globalization. Further, I argue these debates can directly inform processes fostering horizontality, plurality, sub rosa and parallel development, mutuality, self-governance and participatory development.

In Chapter 5 I focus upon the southern Indian state of Kerala's recent initiatives in participatory planning, decentralized democratization and micro-enterprise initiatives as key strategies for capacity-building toward a propositional grassroots globalization. Kerala has long attracted well-deserved attention for its remarkable achievements in human development. The southern Indian state has achieved unusually high social and human development indicators – first world levels of literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality – at a fraction of first world incomes. The classic Kerala model, primarily concerned with redistributive policies, struggled however to induce significant economic or industrial development. In dealing with this challenge and with second-generation development problems such as educated unemployment, gender inequality and industrial development, the state undertook one of the boldest experiments in participatory decentralization ever undertaken in the subcontinent, and one of the largest in the world. These initiatives expressly seek to combine social and productive objectives at the local level,

with cooperatives and Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs) as major development agents and community capacity-builders. In this chapter I suggest Kerala's development can also be understood by situating its contemporary experience in an emergent 'regime of empowerment' which is markedly different from its 'classical' period. I propose that Kerala's institutionalization of this experiment can offer lessons and prospects by way of alternative, parallel developmental and social economy pathways, and that Kerala's experience illustrates the importance of both public and infrageographical action to its success, which cannot simply be adduced to responsible government action or the role of epistemic elites. Kerala's experimental politics can be understood as collective prefiguration – to be worked out and determined by its citizen-planners as a living, breathing, open-futured process.

The book now turns to Chapter 2, which examines how corporatist capitalism is often presented and accepted as a singular force, as a referent that describes a variety of relations between the state and the economy that nevertheless occurs within a monist ontological framework. The chapter examines how crises are increasingly functional to the operation of neoliberalism in what has been termed, since the so-called Global Financial Crisis, its 'zombie' phase. It also spotlights the commodification of social capital, wherein the work of emergent community development organizations, intentionally or otherwise, serves a reform and ameliorative capacity within co-opted sections of civil society. Much of this 'NGO-ism' may be essentially non-threatening to the established order, existing within the same ontological framework as corporatist globalization. I also argue corporatist globalization is a militarized globalization, and examine the apparently increasing subsumptive convergence between neoliberalism and neoconservatism since the turn of the millennium.

Notes

1 Seamus Heaney, 'From the canton of expectation' in *The Haw Lantern poem* (1987), *Opened Ground: Selected Poems, 1966–1996* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 295. This book employs the short title reference method in footnotes. In the first instance a work is cited in full; thereafter, by its short title and specific page number where applicable.

2 The meaning of spectral here is principally intended to be an adjective for spectrum, but its other meaning might also be appropriate, pertaining to the fact that infrageographies may appear ghostlike when apprehended through the corporatist lens.

3 The term prefigurative politics was coined by Carl Boggs. See Carl Boggs, 'Marxism, prefigurative communism, and the problem of workers' control', *Radical America*, Vol. 11, November 1977, p. 100.

4 Unsettling 'humanocentric' politics is not my aim here – I am explicitly focusing upon human agency, albeit striving to be attentive to the more-than-human entities, forces and processes that exist. There is an interesting and paradoxical set of co-existing conceptions of anthropogenicity with posthuman conceptions that see agency as extending beyond the human and a quantum theory that may include panpsychist notions of minded matter (see Chapter 4). The reference to the term 'actant' is from Actor Network Theory which is not examined or employed in this book; see John Law and John Hassard (Eds.), *Actor Network Theory and After* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) and

Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

5 Doreen Massey, 'Is the world getting larger or smaller?', *OpenDemocracy*, 15 February 2007.

6 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

7 The origin of 'high politics' (military security) and 'low politics' (economics and social affairs) is Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

8 Moore has a sizable body of scholarly work but on this particular question see Jason W. Moore, 'Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Part III', Jason Moore, 19 May 2013, accessed at <http://jasonwmoore.wordpress.com/2013/05/19/anthropocene-or-capitalocene-part-iii/>; see also Stephen Gill, 'Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neoliberalism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 24 (3), 1995, pp. 399–423. Gill predicted however that this would 'constitute a temporary politics of supremacy in the emerging world order' (p. 399).

9 Jason W. Moore, 'Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Part III'. The Anthropocene is an informal term denoting a new geological era succeeding the Holocene that marks the extent to which human activities have had a significant global impact on the Earth's ecosystems, particularly from about the time of the Industrial Revolution. There have been precursor terms (such as 'anthropozoic' in the 1870s) but Anthropocene seems to have gained the most currency. The term was coined in the 1980s by ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer and has been widely popularized by the atmospheric chemist, Paul Crutzen. They both used the term in print in 2000 in a newsletter of the International Geosphere–Biosphere Programme. See Paul J Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer, 'The "Anthropocene"', *Global Change Newsletter*, Vol. 41, 2000, pp. 17–18. See also Jan Zalasiewicz et al, 'Are we now living in the Anthropocene?', *GSA Today*, Vol. 18 (2), 2008, pp. 4–8.

10 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature, or: how I learned to stop worrying about "the" environment and love the crisis of capitalism'. In: Christian Suter and Christopher Chase-Dunn (Eds.), *Structures of the World Political Economy and the Future of Global Conflict and Cooperation* (Berlin: LIT, 2014), p. 287.

11 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, *Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder* (London: Routledge, 2009). See especially Chapter 14 for a discussion on dominant capital as well as a slightly different measure of dominant capital employed in Bichler and Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', *Real-World Economics Review*, issue 60, 20 June 2012, pp. 18–63. Dominant capital is approximated by the top 0.01 per cent of all US-based corporations as ranked by market capitalization (p. 27). See also the paper's Appendix for an explanation of why this measure of dominant capital was employed, pp. 51–2.

12 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Neoliberalizing space', *Antipode*, Vol. 34 (3), 2002, p. 400.

13 Thomas Lemke, 'The birth of bio-politics: Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collége de France on neoliberal governmentality', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 30 (2), 2001, p. 207.

14 See John Ralston Saul, *The Unconscious Civilization* (Ringwood, VIC: Penguin, 1997). Even though some advocates (and practitioners) of neoliberalism may not conceive of themselves as globalists, I argue that the universal instrumental rationalism that underpins their ideological beliefs is an extension of all-subsuming high modernism. It is telling, then, that neoliberalism has also been termed 'economic rationalism', especially in Australia and New Zealand. See Michael Pusey, *Economic Rationalism*

in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). It also extends to imperial efforts at 'global democracy promotion' and the logic of military invasion and intervention, which presumes to impose democracy, or the appearance of it, in what are usually very limited or trumped-up elections, as a high modernist top-down scheme.

15 In the quote cited, Michael Oakeshott is describing the thought of Blaise Pascal in *Rationalism in Politics* (London: Methuen, 1967), p. 20. This is in turn cited in James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 340, who may have misattributed the quote directly to Pascal. Blaise Pascal was a seventeenth century philosopher and mathematician who rejected the sufficiency of both pure reason and pure empiricism, advocating for other ways of knowing the truth than the emerging Cartesian rationality in his posthumously published notebook *The Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets* (1670). See Blaise Pascal, *Pascal's Pensées*, Introduction by T. S. Eliot (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958).

16 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 'Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism"', *Antipode*, Vol. 34 (3), July 2002, pp. 349–79.

17 Social movement slogan of unknown origin.

18 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 201.

19 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*. As a loan word in usage throughout the book it hereafter appears sans italics.

20 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 261.

21 As Antonio Gramsci noted, hegemony involves cultural forms of domination, which serves to convince people that certain elements of the social order are imperfect but inevitable, monolithic rather than malleable, given rather than open to contestation and change.

22 Pablo Alejandro Leal, 'Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neoliberal era' in Andrea Cornwell and Deborah Eade (Eds.), *Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords* (Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing and Oxfam, 2010), p. 90.

23 See, for example, Doreen Massey, *Gender, Power and Space* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994) and *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, [1974] 1991) and 'Reflections on the politics of space', *Antipode*, Vol. 8 (2), May 1976, pp. 30–7; John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995).

24 Quoted in Notes From Nowhere (Eds.), *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism* (London: Verso, 2003), p. 14.

25 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed (London: Verso [1985] 2001), p. 189.

26 Drawing on the constitutional preamble which states 'By organizing industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old', the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) states that it believes 'that by acting in solidarity, in union, we are building a new world in the shell of the old'. See the Preamble of (IWW) Constitution and the About Us page on their website, <http://www.iww.org/about/official/abc>.

27 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics: Understanding Predatory Globalization*, trans. Raymond Rabitaille (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 224.

28 Gar Alperovitz, 'After Piketty, the ownership revolution', *Al Jazeera America*, 17 June 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/piketty-capital-cooperativeownershipworkerowned.html>.

2 Corporatist globalization

A world in its own image

> In fact, when I consider any social system that prevails in the modern world, I can't, so help me God, see it as anything but a conspiracy of the rich to advance their own interests under the pretext of organizing society. They think up all sorts of tricks and dodges, first for keeping safe their ill-gotten gains, and then for exploiting the poor by buying their labour as cheaply as possible. Once the rich have decided that these tricks and dodges shall be officially recognized by society – which includes the poor as well as the rich – they acquire the force of law. Thus an unscrupulous minority is lead by its insatiable greed to monopolize what would have been enough to supply the needs of the whole population . . .
>
> (Thomas More, 1516)[1]

> The [Bush administration] aide said that guys like me were 'in what we call the reality-based community', which he defined as people who 'believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality'. I nodded and murmured something about Enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 'That's not the way the world really works anymore', he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do'.
>
> (Ron Susskind)[2]

Capital is a symbolic representation, and very real manifestation, of power. It is a vendible commodity that projects the commodification of power, increasingly anchored in the fictitious and nominal, rather than in the means and assets of 'real' production. With the increasing disjunction between speculative and productive economic activity particularly from the 1980s onwards, financialized capital has increasingly become more prominent, and is identified in many accounts of globalization as effectively spearheading the processes of contemporary economic globalization. The growing density and depth of market transactions apparently extends the calculus of capitalization, accumulation and profitability to as many domains as possible, from public utilities to warfare to public institutions. The 2000s and 2010s has also see a new arsenal of accumulation strategies that involve the instrumentalization of crises, where the operative word may indeed be 'arsenal'.

Situated within the historical frame of long phases of capitalist accumulation, my focus in this chapter will be on the predatory financialization of capital since the mid-1970s and, suggestive of Susskind's encounter in the quote above, capital's putative constitution of social reality, reminiscent of the Marxist concept of subsumption. Since Marx – who thought that illusory or fictitious capitalization was secondary to understanding real capital such as commodities and the means of production measured in the value of labour time – financialization has become the template for the contemporary power of dominant capital, broadly understood as the top 0.01 per cent of US based corporations ranked by market capitalization.[3] Financialization has been understood as a 'pattern of accumulation in which profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production'.[4] Related to this, securitization is defined as the process of bundling up assets so they will yield defined income streams. While financialization is understood as a contemporary phenomenon, it is in many ways the apogee of a long capitalization process that started in the burghers of Europe six centuries ago and codified mathematically in the mid-nineteenth century.[5]

In corporate capital's public transcript – the way it views itself and disseminates its myths – dominant capital creates its own order, its own reality, measured and quantified in terms of accumulation and the capacity to be commodified and exploited, and defines it for all others. Marx's dictum that we make our own history, but not under conditions of our own choosing, prompts the question: who or what creates those conditions? In the 'steamroller' conception of globalization, only capital has substantive agency to create historical realities, becoming a singularity to which everything is subsumed. This subsumption forms the basis for what I have grouped as conventional theories of globalization: those theories that share the postulate that only capital's agents and processes really have the capacity to create the major spatial-historical realities to which all the rest of us play only bit-parts: adopting, adapting, ameliorating or resisting (or, as Susskind's hubristic correspondent suggests, consigned to studying it!), but never really shaping or creating in the same fashion. This book rejects this notion, and without simply 'wishing away' or ignoring these tendencies, I argue that the great majority of us who do not deal in complex 'high' finance or conglomerate corporate capitalism – what I describe in this chapter as dominant or oligarchic capital – also create our own global realities outside the reach of this 'public transcript' projection of globalization. I assert that this projection buries other realities that also lie outside of the often corporatized notion of a global civil society.

In the subsumptive view, modern contemporary civilization itself becomes defined as one cohered by capital as value-in-motion, one that appropriates and organizes nature and strives to make a world in its own image. The self-actualizing dynamic of making value commensurate across space and time injects a logic of equivalence so that money will continue to be the same thing across time-spaces. Capitalism is a system that both internalizes as well as externalizes costs: it externalizes nature's 'free gifts' (human and physical nature and unpaid labour) yet also strives to internalize everything into its purview for subsumption and appropriation. Maximizing the appropriation of unpaid work – work outside of

the formal circuits of capital – is central to the subsidy and surplus of capital, yet over time also increases the costs of accumulating capital and becomes a bottleneck, as more relations of reproduction once outside these formal circuits become monetized.[6] This unpaid work is a central part of the 'cheap labour' Jason W. Moore identifies as one of the Big Four 'cheaps' of labour, food, energy, and raw materials in capitalism's 'cheap nature' strategy central to the cyclical renewal of capitalist accumulation, a dynamic that involves capital setting in motion 'a civilization that aims to maximize the unpaid "work" of life outside circuits of capital, but within reach of capitalist *power*'.[7] Capitalist appropriation is predicated upon controlling but *not* completely capitalizing life-making reproduction as unpaid work, because it is only against this unpaid work that capital can accumulate, despite the contradictory movement to monetize these relations. Unpaid work is vital because '(v)alue only works when most work is not valued'.[8] Gender and physical nature have of course been central to this appropriation.[9]

At this juncture it may be useful to unpack what is meant by capital as a prelude to similarly unpacking globalization from its ideological garb. I make a number of simple distinctions. The first is to distinguish between smallholder capitalism and conglomerate capitalism. Though it is the former, more plural, template that is usually invoked as the ideal, it is the latter, more oligarchic than genuinely competitive version that crowds out and corrodes the former, swallowing self-employed small to medium businesses over time. This is reflected in the patterns of profit over time: the net profit of a 'Fortune 500' firm was 500 times bigger than the US average in the early 1950s; by the late 1990s, it was around 7,000 times larger, a 14-fold increase.[10] The tendency toward oligopoly and monopoly is suggested in Karl Marx's observation: 'One capitalist always kills many'.[11] As Barry Lynn notes for more contemporary times and with a focus on the United States,

> Another sign of a free market is the expansive space it provides for entrepreneurs. But from 1948–2003, self-employment in America dropped from 18.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent. Indeed, among developed nations only Luxembourg has a lower rate of self-employment than we [US] do. There has been a new 'enclosure' movement, as the spaces that used to be occupied by small retailers, farmers and manufacturers have been colonized by the conglomerates.
>
> (Barry Lynn)[12]

The second distinction, arising from the first and applied in the second half of the chapter, is to differentiate between different fractions of dominant capital. Dominant capital is not monolithic and may pursue different strategies for accumulation. While some fractions of capital have traditionally favoured stability as a precondition for profits, more recently we have seen a more aggressive strain that instrumentalizes and overtly profits from crisis, and from a marked increase in financialization since the 1980s, where production is less important to the realization of profits. Both General Motors and General Electric have increasingly made more of their money from their financial operations on the side, for example, than from their production *raison d'être* of cars and consumer goods respectively.[13]

Over the past century, capital has become increasingly financial in form. Dominant conglomerate capital has fabricated a whole new arsenal of accumulation techniques such as corporate amalgamation and complex financial instruments such as derivatives. The consequence of this disjunction between the material facts of production and financial accumulation, which was spurred by the emergence and growth of corporations as the principal form of business ownership, is described by Bichler and Nitzan:

> Present-day capitalists own not the 'means of production', but a financial claim on corporate earnings. [Note that that the 'objects' owned by the corporation, such as factories and structures, are merely instrumental to profit: they derive their capitalization not from their 'productivity' or their cost of production, but from the earnings they are expected to generate.] This fact is true for all capitalists, whether they own an automobile company, a software firm, a bank, a media conglomerate or a diversified financial portfolio. In this sense, we can no longer differentiate between 'industrial', 'commercial' and 'financial' capitalists.
>
> (Bichler and Nitzan)[14]

This goes to the heart of defining corporatist capitalism: capitalization is explained less by its productive articles that make up its assets than by what they can earn, and at what risk. The imperative of accumulation goes beyond production, and capital is financial rather than material, counted in earning power and risk rather than productive units and machines. Capital then is measured by the current market value of risk-adjusted earnings rather than the perceived (market) value of its productive assets. Bichler and Nitzan go further in their description of capital as a mode of power rather than the labour and utility theories of value of Marxism and liberalism respectively, to declare that '(a)ll capital is finance and only finance, and it exists as finance because accumulation represents not the material amalgamation of utility or labour, but the continuous *creordering* of power'.[15] For Peck and Tickell similarly, capital's structural shaping power is directed through '(n)eoliberal rule systems . . . [which] have the capacity to constrain, condition and even constitute political change'.[16]

As a process, capital functions as 'forward-looking' capitalization, which refers to the fact that asset prices are based upon what they are *expected* to earn in the future, a ubiquitous financial ritual that discounts expected future earnings to a singular present value. This principle of 'discounting' the future on the stock market prevails over trading on assets on the basis of today's figures, which is described as backward-looking and 'puts investors at the tail end of social dynamics'.[17] Capitalization acts as a 'time transformer': it condenses the long future into the singular present . . . [and] encapsulates their complex social and ecological causes into a single value – and then sends it back to the present'.[18] Similarly, prices are the calculative language dominant capital use to express that power and its expected trajectory; it is the instrument by which qualitative power converts into and is reflected in quantitative accumulation.[19] The subsuming power of this

system can be seen in the fact that any and every stream of expected earnings is potentially a candidate for capitalization, expressed in prices, from civil war to genetic codes – '(n)othing escapes the eyes of the discounters. If it generates expected future income, it can be capitalized, and whatever can be capitalized sooner or later is capitalized'.[20]

The emergence and rapid development in recent decades of a secondary market that involves financial instruments such as derivatives has led to endemic problems of instability arising from financialization, leveraging and surplus liquidity. Yet this instability is also a source of sabotage-based profitability. Here, the profit motive is insufficient to explain capitalism's drive: since power is relative, it is *differential* accumulation that dominant capitalists seek in order to beat the average rate of profit.[21] Strategic sabotage is built into the capitalist imperative and involves more than the conventional assumption that capitalists always desire *growth* for profits. As Bichler and Nitzan aver: 'if we think of capital as power, exercised through the strategic sabotage of industry by business, the relationship becomes nonlinear – positive under certain circumstances, negative under others'.[22] What we may be seeing, in Saskia Sassen's words, is a more 'brutal capitalism increasingly dominated by a financial logic that goes well beyond conventional understandings of capital accumulation'.[23]

Taking this on board, it is useful to query the notion of accumulation, which leads to the third basic distinction, which is the notion of differential accumulation. While pre-twentieth century accumulation could be conceived in absolute terms, one can do so far less reliably with twentieth and twenty-first century accumulation. Differential accumulation is the process by which dominant capital groups are driven to *beat* rather than simply meet the average rate of return, which is currently normalized as 3 per cent,[24] because this has a direct result on an economic entity's distributive market share: differential accumulation in fact 'implies the existence of a "dominant capital" group which accumulates faster than the average'.[25] Bichler and Nitzan employ the concept to mark out what sets dominant capital apart from other capitalists: 'For the leading accumulators, success and failure are a matter of differential profit. Their goal is to "beat the average", and that makes them judge the world based on relative earnings'.[26] The idea of differential accumulation became the compass of modern capitalism toward the end of the nineteenth century, 'when corporations grew large enough and became sufficiently intertwined with state organizations to engage in systematic strategic sabotage'. It is also a process of social transformation.[27]

From the perspective of money power, the world is increasingly subjected to a unitary logic and viewed through a singular perspective – an exploitable corporate totality over the economy, nature, humans and the production of space. By totalizing I mean in the sense of being all-encompassing and defining – which includes its own class. The imposition of that logic arguably serves to make dominant capital more predictable, and its actions more deterministic. The naturalization and global spread of the capitalization of power results in apparently more and more deterministic processes. As Nitzan and Bichler assert:

> To rule means to see the world from a singular viewpoint, to be locked into a unitary logic, to be subservient to your own architecture of power. Dominant capital cannot deviate from the boundaries of this architecture, even if it wants to. Its individual members are forced to accept the very logic they impose on the rest of humanity. And the more effective they are in imposing that logic, the more predictable they themselves become . . . And as the capitalization of power spreads and penetrates, the world seems increasingly 'deterministic' . . . It is the determinism of the ruling class, and only of the ruling class. It works only insofar as the ruling class rules. Admittedly, that happens most of the time. However, human beings do have the capacity to understand the fictitious nature of this 'determinism'.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[28]

This reinforces the apparent structuralism of the public transcript of corporate global capitalism, and pits poststructuralist accounts and seemingly inadequate strategies against corporate capital's verisimilitude. The extension of market relations is seen less as the temporary triumph of markets over states or society in a historical see-saw nexus,[29] but as the wholesale attempt to permanently remake society *as* market. This danger of the belief in the sufficiency of the market was foreseen by Karl Polanyi and has been given contemporary expression by a number of social scientists such as John Agnew ('marketplace society').[30] The power to order society becomes capitalized through central systems of property and hierarchy, which fundamentally operate on exclusion. It becomes the means by which dominant capital makes the world legible, and apparently extends this legibility across more spheres.[31] Capitalization could thus be described as a process of making the world legible for dominant capital. Table 2.1 suggests a rough-cut periodization by decade of corporate globalization, identifying neoliberalism and its later phase-shift amalgamation with neoconservatism as its animating ideology.

Origin of the specious: a lexical note

> What's fire? You can tell me about oxidation, but that doesn't tell me a thing.
>
> (Joseph Campbell)[32]

When asked what he would do if he ruled, Confucius replied that he would rectify the language. Socrates also noted that to understand a thing, one must first name it. In this chapter, while abjuring the use of globalization in its singular,

Table 2.1 A periodization of corporatist globalization by decade

1970–80	Neoliberal globalization: precursors
1980–90	Neoliberal globalization I: the ascendancy
1990–2000	Neoliberal globalization II: the consolidation
2000–10	Neoliberal-neoconservative globalization I
2010–20	Neoliberal-neoconservative globalization II

benign form, without a qualifying descriptor such as 'neoliberal', I also subscribe to Arjun Appadurai's observation that 'the word *globalization* and words like *freedom*, *choice* and *justice*, are not inevitably the property of the state-capital nexus'.[33] This reinforces the fact that neoliberal capitalist globalization is only one version of globalization – and may even be fragmented by variants of its own as suggested by Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore's notion of path-dependent 'actually existing neoliberalisms'.[34] I also endeavour to qualify my application of the term 'corporate' (and its adjective 'corporatist'), which in its original sense simply refers to a functional community, and in a social and economic sense, has also been widely applied to describe tripartite negotiations and arrangements between business, labour and the state in setting economic policy. Its more contemporary usage is increasingly understood as referring to business corporations and to plutocracy, which is the sense in which I employ it here.

The way 'globalization' is represented is inherently political; the way it is characterized influences how it is reproduced and imposed. I identify conventional accounts as ones that ascribe most structural and agential influence to dominant capital, which may include otherwise insightful and valuable critiques that simply cede a great deal to the perceived power of dominant capital. Neoliberalism's hegemony as a mode of discourse, as David Harvey notes, 'has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world'.[35]

I suggest that the neoliberal project in fact inverts reality when viewed as a wider spectrum of socio-spatial practices outside of the narrow public transcript, and this is facilitated by a legion of misnomers peculiar to it. Neoliberalism is decidedly *il*liberal in the classical sense, and specifically in the notion that free trade promotes harmony among nations: the global 'free' market has often been imposed through war, invasion, the imposition of conditionalities and crisis manipulation (if not crisis creation). The corporate colonization of the debate reflects a perversion of language that involves cynical cooption and abuse of democratic slogans and tropes that are adopted and accepted even by critical analysts such as 'free' market, 'liberty', 'competitive' and 'reform'. The saliency of the distinctions between 'liberal' and 'conservative' and the 'neo' prefix that distinguishes their putative resurgence have also not been without contention.[36] This appropriation of terms seeks to confer legitimacy, universality, neutrality and verisimilitude of the ideological actions of highly sectional interests: everyone is for 'sustainable development', 'empowerment' and the benign- and beneficial-sounding 'reform'.

'Free market' and 'free enterprise' for example, have come to mean almost the opposite, an oligopolic system that is more serfdom-like with increasing debts for most and fewer opportunities, and decidedly unfree for all but a minority around the world. (This brings to mind another definitional distortion in categorizing countries as developed or developing; where appropriate I choose to adopt the typology of Bangladeshi photojournalist Shahidul Alam who coined the terms majority and minority worlds in the early 1990s, or Global North and South.)[37] In an effort to avoid conflating corrupt crony capitalism with free markets I thus avoid employing the term 'free' market, and describe it instead as an *unregulated*

market, defined by what it lacks rather than by what it purports to be.[38] I similarly abjure the uncritical use of such terms as 'innovations' when referring to complex financial instruments. The applied technology in missile warheads is also complex: outside of military circles, does one commonly see nuclear weapons referred to as 'innovations'?

In contrast to an understanding of economics as a set of socially constructed practices, the phrase 'market economy' belies the fact that it does not exist in unalloyed form, that all large economies are mixed economies.[39] The language of deregulation commonly involves such phrases as the 'freeing' up of world trade and flows while government actions are framed as an 'intervention', somehow outside the normal and natural flow of things. The economy may be growing through the conventional measures such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but many people on average are becoming worse off. Recent 'recoveries' such as the stock rebound after 2002 have been jobless and reflect the inherent class bias in measures of ostensible 'recovery' (read: profit restoration by sectional class interests).[40]

Reflecting the fact that the corporatist globalization project is one advanced by very narrow sectional interests, it has been attended (and abetted) by the shift from representative to executive powers within the state-finance complex in many advanced industrialized states. A pillar of formal-legal democracy, a contract-based legal system, is rendered meaningless when corporate rights, having taken on legal personhood, can routinely trump human rights and labour contracts can be scrapped with impunity through legal loopholes. Similarly, the notion of the sanctity and protection of private property is juxtaposed against the reality of literally millions of home foreclosures in the US alone. The ideological myths about markets as inherently more efficient, sufficient or self-regulating will not be explored here; suffice to say that as Bill Moyers has noted, 'plutocracy and democracy don't mix. Plutocracy too long tolerated leaves democracy on the auction block, subject to the highest bidder'.[41]

Unpacking globalization

> It was prettily devised of Aesop: The fly sat upon the axletree of the chariot wheel and said, 'What a dust do I raise!'.
>
> (Francis Bacon, 1580)[42]

Definitions are important because they speak to the politics of knowledge construction. It enables us to challenge the privileging of a particularist globalization worldview as the sole vision and set of practices. People, places, processes, actors and scales are marginal*ized*, they are not margin*al*. This highlights that particular agents are *doing* the marginalizing, that it is a political act for a purpose. By way of illustration, Samir Amin posits that the global growth in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), was actually driven by Third World development, and dubs it the *Bandung era*.[43] In a similar fashion, a *Financial Times* editorial in 1998

acknowledged, 'perhaps western pensions will be financed from the toil of the Chinese masses'.[44] Viewed this way, who is really the engine of global economic growth and development, the financiers, or the toiling waged workers?[45]

As Peter Dicken has encapsulated, globalization is the most used, the most misused and the most confused word.[46] This may in part arise from the fact that globalization is advanced as both the 'explanandum' and the 'explanans' of social change – embodying both the 'what' and the 'why', or both the question as well as the answer to the question. In this short critical survey, I will seek to be necessarily selective and leave out a number of important conceptions outside the purview of my focus of corporate globalization. Here, it is accepted that a global shift, marking qualitative transformations from prior historical movements toward internationalization, has taken place. This chapter does not debate about whether one has taken place, about which an ample literature exists.[47]

Economic globalization is conventionally represented as the ongoing processes produced from the restructuring crisis that enveloped the industrialized countries, as well as a loaded idea privileging a particular idea about the economy's proper or natural role in social life. In accounts that focus on formal economic sphere institutions, actors (such as transnational corporations) and processes, these global processes consist in part of the increased volume of international and transnational trade, technology and financial flows. The increasingly complex and spatially extensive geography of production, distribution, investment and consumption has been underpinned by rapid technological change in communications and information technology and the reordering of economic, political and social relations such that economic relations between nation-states are now relatively less significant.

Other indices of corporate-driven globalization also include the growing share of a transnational corporation's (TNC) foreign sales, employment, foreign direct investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) as well as the organizational and locational offshoring of firms and the relative importance of TNCs as non-state actors. The transfer of resources from the public to the private sector, the decline of manufacturing employment relative to the services sector and the increasing relocation of the former to industrializing countries, increasing inequality and economic polarization both within and between countries and regions and apparent socio-cultural homogenization are also included. Though by no means exhaustive, these processes taken together are purportedly contributing to the accelerated integration of the world into a more interconnected – and newly hegemonic – global space, and as an intensifying and deepening of the processes of internationalization, producing greater qualitative integration of a world political economy that has effectively been internationalizing over the past 500 years.

In contrast to the invocation of corporate globalization as a single, inevitable, unidirectional, unqualifiably progressive, all-pervasive and all-powerful socio-spatial logic, critical scholarly definitions emphasize process, contention and contingency rather than an end-state or inevitable, teleologically determined result.[48] Influential typologies of globalization have ranged from Held et. al's widely cited 'skeptics, hyperglobalists and transformationalists' to the insightful, if initially confronting, idea of 'queerying' corporate globalization as an act of

capital penetration akin to rape (Gibson-Graham), to the idea of globalization as triadization[49] (Dicken, et al.), extending an earlier literature differentiating national and regional variants of capitalism (Cox, Turner and Trompenaars).[50] Connected debates include the earlier New International Division of Labour (NIDL) thesis, which theorized the global shift from within the rubric of internationalization.[51]

Modes of regulation, regimes of accumulation

Regulation theory and the debate about Post-Fordism have also accompanied the globalization debate and the question about what type of shift has taken place.[52] For the regulation theorists, the Fordist era (1950s to the early 1970s) has been a particular focus, including its associated technologies of mass production and patterns of mass consumption as the engines of economic growth. The focus included the development by each major advanced industrialized country of its distinct variant of the broadly Fordist mode of regulation, which coalesced around a Keynesianesque consensus about the desirability of state involvement in economic life. The debate about Fordism's successor seemed to place greater emphasis upon localization processes in the emergence of Post-Fordist 'new industrial spaces' characterized by 'flexible specialization' and 'flexible accumulation' (Harvey), exemplified by complexes like Silicon Valley and the 'Third Italy'.[53]

As indicated in the cycles shown in Figure 2.1, modes of regulation reached their apogee during boom periods; during recessionary 'bust' or crisis periods in the cycle downswing, they were increasingly exposed to dysfunction and subject




Figure 2.1 Kondratiev long waves of regulation.

Source: Adapted from Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*, 6th ed. (London: Sage, 2011), p. 79.

to various attempts at amelioration until a new mode of regulation emerged, with each era characterized by an often defining set of technologies or innovations.[54] Kondratiev long waves of development segues with the idea of systemic crises of capital accumulation in the global 'core' as the locomotive of world economic development, with contemporary economic globalization represented as the fifth Kondratiev wave triggered by economic crises in the 1970s. Contemporary globalization can thus be conceived as a development following the disarticulation of the Fordist–Keynesian spatio-temporal fix.[55]

Identifying different modes of regulation within this pattern is a useful means by which to differentiate and periodize systems of regulation within capitalism, and it serves as an important reminder of how regulatory requirements change as capitalism changes. Adam Smith wrote on behalf of a growing commercial middle-class and called for greater laissez-faire in the market at a time when capitalism was in its infancy and there was a greater symmetry in the trading and wealth of nations. The regulatory requirements of neoclassical economics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are decidedly different than they are for current times, as E. H. Carr suggested in a traffic control metaphor in his classic 1939 work *The Twenty Years Crisis*:

> The tacit presupposition of infinitely expanding markets was the foundation on which the supposed harmony of interests rested . . . traffic control is unnecessary so long as the number of cars do not exceed the comfortable capacity of the road.
>
> (E. H. Carr)[56]

Another distinction useful for historicizing capitalist development and accumulation strategies is to differentiate between global regimes of breadth and depth accumulation. According to this schema, global accumulation has oscillated between two broad regimes of merger (breadth) and stagflation (depth) over the past century (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). In certain periods, corporate mergers (breadth accumulation) rather than economic growth has become the main engine of differential accumulation; and in other periods, dominant capital benefits from inflation and stagflation (depth accumulation). These regimes tend to move countercyclically (Table 2.3), the conditions that are conducive for depth are not conducive for breadth, and vice versa.[57]

These conceptions challenge the notion that green-field growth and price stability are always favoured strategies, and the authors assert that inflation

Table 2.2 Regimes of differential accumulation

	External	*Internal*
Breadth	Green-field	Mergers and acquisitions
Depth	Stagflation	Cost-cutting

Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', *Review*, Vol. xxix, 2006, 1–86, table on p. 48. Reprinted by permission.

Table 2.3 Periods of dominant regimes of accumulation by type

Period	*Dominant regime of differential accumulation*
1890s to 1910s	Breadth and depth
1920s	Partial breadth
1930s	Depth
1940s to 1960s	Breadth
1970s to early 1980s	Depth
Late 1980s to 1990s	Breadth
2000s	Depth

Source: Adapted from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', *Review*, Vol. xxix, 2006, p. 62.

(sparked by conflict and crises through the instrument of the price of oil) can be a major instrument of redistribution and a mechanism for differential accumulation:

> Conventional views of accumulation often identify the gradual deceleration of green-field investment over the past century as an accumulation crisis. From the viewpoint of capital as power, however, this deceleration is a sign not of weakness, but of strength. Excessive capacity growth is disastrous for capitalist power. It needs to be carefully regulated, and corporate amalgamation, in addition to its direct contribution to differential accumulation, does precisely that: it keeps capacity growth checked at its moderate, Goldilocks range.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[58]

Examining the long-view of crisis and accumulation strategies allows patterns to be gleaned as well as historically specific conditions that attach to particular cycles of accumulation examined for its relevance to the present and future. Accumulation strategies that worked at the beginning of a cycle may be progressively exhausted and require revision or new strategies by the downswing, and between cycles. In the pendulum swing between breadth and depth as preferred regimes of accumulation, the most recent shifts have occurred at the turn of the millennium, from the neoliberal global (cross-border) merger boom towards conflict-sparked stagflation:

> The most recent phase, which lasted through much of the late 1980s and 1990s, was clearly one of breadth. In that period, dominant capital benefited greatly from the opening up to corporate takeover of the former Soviet Union and other 'emerging markets', as well as from the collapse of the welfare state and the massive privatization of government services. This breadth cycle, with its emphasis on neoliberalism, deregulation, sound finance and disinflation, came to a close at the turn of the new millennium.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[59]

Capitalist power is again here predicated on strategic sabotage rather than growth, using crises and unemployment, among other tools, in its redistributional battle. Based on an empirical examination of this relationship in the US since the 1930s, one reckoning is that 'the best position for capitalists is not when industry is fully employed, but when the unemployment rate is around 7 per cent'.[60] Nitzan and Bichler identify four major expansionist merger waves (Table 2.4) where buying (mergers) was preferred to building, throughout which the 'buy to build' ratio as a percentage of gross fixed capital accumulation has grown exponentially. As another expression of this, about three-quarters of all direct foreign investment in the 1990s occurred through corporate merger.[61]

While inflation is usually regarded as bad for profit, in this schema inflation is found to be a powerful engine for differential accumulation that has correlated with a 'systematic redistribution of income from workers to firms, and from small firms to large firms'.[62] The inflation strategy is more risky and socially destabilizing; crisis-based accumulation through prices and inflation tends to emerge 'only when there is 'no alternative'.[63]

> [W]hy, in the absence of any real 'shortage', are buyers willing to pay higher prices? The short answer is that usually they are not willing; they are forced. And the way to force them is by creating, imposing and maintaining various forms of social crisis, apparent or real. Military hostilities during the First World War, the reparation crisis of Germany in the 1920s, the global oil crises of the 1970s, rising unemployment in Israel during the 1980s, political instability in Russia circa 1990s, debt default in Argentina in the 2000s are all illustrations of such inflation-triggering crises. The effect of these crises on inflation is twofold. On the one hand, they undermine the power of most people to resist price increases. On the other hand, they enable a 'consensus' to emerge within dominant capital that inflation can be used with 'impunity'. In this sense, stagflation is the macroeconomic appearance of 'accumulation through crisis'. Stagnation and unemployment, along with other forms of instability, conflict and force, constitute the necessary backdrop for differential accumulation through differential inflation. But the process is highly perilous. More inflation usually requires a more intense crisis and therefore implies mounting hazards.
>
> (Bichler and Nitzan)[64]

Table 2.4 Merger waves of capitalism

Merger wave	*Period*	*Spatial and organizational extent*
Monopoly	1900s	Individual industries
Oligopoly	1920s	Sectoral
Conglomerate	1960s	Cross-sectoral
Neoliberal	1980–90s	Global

Source: Adapted from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', *Review*, Vol. xxix, 2006, p. 51.

Underpinning these shifts are deliberate policies and often coordinated strategies, and ones that can have dramatic social and political consequences, especially if persistent and permanent unemployment is part of the redistribution strategy. Giovanni Arrighi's observation that periods of financialization have historically preceded shifts in hegemony makes this period of financialization even more interesting in its implications, which will be briefly explored later in the chapter.[65] In keeping with their typology, Bichler and Nitzan similarly aver,

> During the past century, every transition from a major bear market to a bull run was accompanied by a systemic reordering of the political economy: the 1920–1928 upswing marked the transition from robber-baron capitalism to big business and synchronized finance; the 1948–1968 uptrend came with the move from 'laissez-faire' capitalism to big government and the welfare-warfare state; and the 1981–1999 boom coincided with a return to liberal regulation on the one hand and the explosive growth of capital flows and transnational ownership on the other.
>
> (Bichler and Nitzan)[66]

In their conception, as we have seen, the capitalist mode of power transmutes between breadth and depth regimes; between major bear markets as it approaches an asymptote or never-quite-reached limit; and accumulation often occurs not through growth or dispossession but by redistribution – driven by a compulsion to ever-increase their distributive share of total wealth as well as beat the average rate of return. In an otherwise steady course of contemporary accumulation, there have been only two brief periods in which dominant capital experienced differential decumulation since the 1950s by their reckoning, in an otherwise steady course. The first occurred from the late 1970s, to the early 1980s, where there was a 20 per cent drop in differential accumulation, a decline that was arrested and reversed with the election of Ronald Reagan, portending two decades where policies of monetarism and neoliberalism held sway. The second decumulation occurred during the early 2000s, when the process again started to slow down with a significant drop between 2007 and 2009 that saw the differential income of the top 200 firms plunge by over 30 per cent.[67]

Unemployment has been one key tool in the arsenal of strategic sabotage and plays an instrumental role in differential accumulation; Bichler and Nitzan's finding is that for every 1 per cent increase in unemployment, there is 0.8 per cent increase in the capitalist share of domestic income three years later.[68]

> If unemployment causes the price/wage ratio to decline, capitalists will fall behind in the redistributional struggle, and this retreat is sure to make them impatient for recovery. But if the opposite turns out to be the case – that is, if unemployment helps raise the price/wage ratio – capitalists would have good reason to love crisis and indulge in stagnation.
>
> (Bichler and Nitzan)[69]

On a similar note, David Harvey has recently cited Alan Budd, an economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher, who in an apparently unguarded admission confessed that anti-inflation policies of the 1980s turned out to be 'a very good way to raise unemployment . . . what was engineered . . . was a crisis of capitalism which recreated a reserve army of labour and has allowed capitalists to make high profits ever since'.[70] These characteristics have intensified over the past quarter century, both in global spatial extent and depth. It is this major shift to which we now turn our attention for consideration in more detail.

Global shift

The conventional depiction of the scenario characterizing the material basis of the global shift needs only to be briefly reviewed. The post war 'long boom' in Older Industrialized Countries (OICs), lasting roughly from about 1950 to 1970, was a relatively stable period underpinned by Keynesian policies and dominated by Fordism – a system of mass production of standardized goods in large, vertically integrated, typically Taylorist factories. Fordism's heyday coincided with a Pax Americana of the non-communist world – a US hegemony based upon a coherent system of political-economic structures inaugurated at Bretton Woods, which provided world stability and order.

Capital accumulation was conducted largely within national boundaries until the early 1970s. Conditions for profitability and accumulation under Keynesianism and Fordism reached their zenith by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s and came to be increasingly corroded by underconsumption, overproduction, rising production and wage costs, and greater labour organization. The reconstruction of Europe and Japan and the rising wages, suburbanization and burgeoning market in North America had staved off major crises for nearly a quarter of a century.[71] The very success of the long boom eventually produced the conditions for its break down – expressed as the 'tendency for the rate of profit to fall' in classical Marxist terms or, as economist Clément Juglar once put it, 'the only cause of depression is prosperity'.[72]

One of Keynesianism's basic premises was that the economy could be rescued from crises by measures carried out by governments who could guarantee next to full employment. This came undone with the onset of stagflation – unprecedented simultaneously high inflation and high unemployment – and the 'fiscal crisis of the state': governments were in danger of going bust pump-priming the economy. The inflationary impacts of the Vietnam War contributed to undermining the US dollar as the world's reserve currency, and subsequently led to the demise of the Bretton Woods regulatory apparatus, notwithstanding the continuation of institutions such as the World Bank.

The market saturation, rising production and wage costs and increasingly unwieldy, over-centralized and hierarchical mode of accumulation resulted in sustained no or slow growth, which, in corporate capitalism, by definition portends crisis. Firms were increasingly compelled to respond with rationalization

and restructuring. From the late 1970s, the international liberalization of financial markets, the emergence of the Eurocurrency, new financial instruments and increased foreign direct investment resulted in a dramatic re-patterning of profit. The ratio of foreign-held assets to world GDP took off, effectively doubling every decade: it increased to 25 per cent in 1980, shot to 50 per cent in 1990, and climbed to over 90 per cent by 2000. US corporations' surplus capital increasingly went offshore from the mid-1960s, a process that was stepped up into the 1970s. US-based firms in the 2010s currently receive about one third of their earnings from their foreign subsidiaries, up from about 5 per cent in the 1950s, but down from 60 per cent in the 1970s.[73] With less emphasis on local activity and reliance on domestic sales, Keynesian policies started to lose traction.

A corresponding sea change occurred in the macroeconomic policies of OICs, signaling the ascendancy of a policy culture influenced by neoliberal ideology. This effectively ended the willingness of most governments to engage in deficit spending as a tool for economic stimulus, instead embarking upon a paring back of the welfare state, selective deregulation and privatization. Also conceptualized as the shift from 'roll-back' to 'roll-out' neoliberalism,[74] the general ideology was that market forces should be 'liberated' from government interference to operate more efficiently, and benefits would trickle down to the rest of the population. What was a crisis of capitalist profitability was packaged as a crisis of governance.[75] As stagflation and unemployment bit, labour and urban social movements across the advanced industrialized world organized for reform and state intervention, which alarmed corporate elites who feared that the faltering social democratic model might give way to more radical alternatives.[76]

A rising tide lifts all yachts: the neoliberal counter-revolution

> The major western democracies are moving towards corporatism. Democracy has become a business plan, with a bottom line for every human activity, every dream, every decency, every hope. The main parliamentary parties are now devoted to the same economic policies – socialism for the rich, capitalism for the poor – and the same foreign policy of servility to endless war. This is not democracy. It is to politics what McDonalds is to food.
>
> (John Pilger)[77]

Neoliberalism operated on the margins of economic orthodoxy for decades until the crisis of capital accumulation of the 1970s. The crisis gave proponents an opening to propagate its ideological tenets, to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation. A key indicator for this project can be seen in the fact that by the early twenty-first century, the corporate tax rate has reverted to roughly the same level as it was in the 1920s, before the establishment and expansion of the contemporary welfare-warfare state.[78] Neoliberal prescriptions were commonly presented by governments and business advocates as an *imperative*, and, from the 1990s using the globalization smokescreen, as *inevitability*. The model is most closely associated with but not limited to the 'Chicago school of economics'

and Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*, an economic playbook long on unfettered market triumphalism and short on its effects on real people. In this model, even before it became a political project, crisis or shock is recognized as transforming the 'familiar world' in which the period of disorientation that follows allows a government to do what might have otherwise been impossible under normal circumstances. Writing in the preface to the 1982 reissue of his manifesto, *Capitalism and Freedom*, Friedman articulated the strategy thus:

> Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.
>
> (Milton Friedman)[79]

The model was deployed domestically within the US and UK particularly, as well as imposed internationally. The first neoliberal state restructuring experiment was kicked off in 1973 in Chile, one of Latin America's most advanced industrial economies, by the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende social democratic government. General Pinochet orchestrated the military coup with the support of the US government, forcing Chile's overnight transformation by bringing in the 'Chicago Boys' to manage the economy.[80] The prototype for this 'first experiment with neoliberal state formation' was the CIA-backed coup of 1965 in Indonesia, which saw Suharto ousting Sukarno.[81] The Allende government, like the Sukarno government, was a 'barrier to be overcome' by capital to use Marx's famous phrase in the *Grundrisse*. Neighbouring Argentina was also at the receiving end of force and pressure to dismantle its developmentalist policies, and opposition and dissent were quashed through large-scale murder and torture.

In July 1979, Paul Volcker's tenure at the US Federal Reserve precipitated a dramatic change in monetary policy, which included activating the use of monetary policy as an instrument of crisis creation and manipulation. The Volcker tactic of raising interest rates domestically in the US, for example, served to dramatically increase the foreign earnings that borrowing countries like Mexico had to put into interest payments, pushing it into bankruptcy and austerity. Under the direction of then US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, a new generation of neoliberal economists based at Harvard intervened further afield, setting up fire-sale privatizations in countries from Russia to Bolivia. Deregulation also provided a window of opportunity for the rapid rise of China, which David Harvey considers as an unintended consequence of the neoliberal revolution.[82]

In addition to informing their foreign policy prescriptions and interventions, the new neoliberal orthodoxy most notably animated public policy domestically in the US and UK from 1979. As implemented and promulgated by the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the US and UK respectively, it provided an ideological rationale for government moving away from the politics of social distribution towards that of the putative imperatives of economic growth.

Policies included deregulation, tax breaks for the wealthy, privatization, cutting back on public and welfare spending, floating currencies, removing tariffs and subsidies, curtailing the power of unions and replacing centralized award wage-determination with flexible 'enterprise bargaining'. Privatization extended to core state functions and strategic sectors such as security, defence and infrastructure, not to mention health, education and transport. By way of illustration, between 1984 and 1988, the British government privatized British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways, the British Airport Authority and British Steel, and sold its shares in British Petroleum.

Yet, in the UK and US, neoliberal policies were not simply imposed, although they did encounter a great deal of protest, particularly from unions. The manufacturing of consent played an important role in sustaining otherwise polarizing policies, particularly amongst the middle socio-economic classes in the US and UK. The ideological captivation of an influential segment of the population who were seeing salaries and savings affected by double-digit inflation was critical: home ownership, private property, individualism and nationalism (stoked by the Falklands war in the UK, and the Cold War in the US) also inclined middle sections of the population to be more receptive to the prescriptions.[83]

After 1980, financial asset growth accelerated, marking a shift from the pattern of most of the twentieth century, when financial assets had for the most part grown at about the same pace as GDP. From 1980 to 2007, global financial assets such as equities, bank deposits and private and public debt nearly quadrupled in size relative to global GDP.[84] Global capital flows similarly expanded in an unprecedented fashion. This growth has reflected a number of interrelated trends, including advances in information and communication technology, financial market liberalization, and the growth in complex instruments in financial products and services. Accelerated financial deregulation and floating exchange rates ultimately made the market more speculative and volatile. Susan Strange noted this shift to what she dubbed 'casino capitalism':

> The speculation and the mobility of capital across frontiers meant that the value of any currency came to depend much more on financial flows moved by the moods of the market than on those moved by the balance of trade in the real economy.
>
> (Susan Strange)[85]

US financial deregulation compelled other governments to follow suit, courtesy of being tied into the now global financial system as well as through imposition by indirect force and crisis. The predication of policy upon the 'confidence' of markets and private bond-rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's stemmed from the increasing and largely self-induced compulsion of states to procure finance as a result of its own diminishing tax base. States were thus pressured into facilitating neoliberal policies in order to realize the promise of material gains from neoliberal globalization. The ideology was reinforced by an echo chamber of management writers, private-sector think tanks and business schools. Economists at

institutions such as the World Bank and IMF reframed development to fit neoliberal prescriptions and what came to be known as the 'Washington Consensus'[86] (elsewhere dubbed the 'Wall Street–Treasury–IMF Complex')[87] with the promotion of austerity, floating exchange rates and a deregulated financial system billed as necessary to obtain and maintain credit worthiness. Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became the major international institutional mechanism to set neoliberal rules in the world economy. New financial ideas such as microfinance, originally innovated by Muhammad Yunus's Grameen Bank, were co-opted and corporatized for promotion in poor countries by the World Bank and United Nations (UN) agencies, subsuming 'poverty capital' into formal circuits.[88]

While inaugurated by the politically right-wing administrations of Thatcher and Reagan in the 'greed is good' 1980s, neoliberal policies were consolidated by US Democratic (Clinton) and British Labour (Blair) administrations throughout the following decade. In the 1990s, globalization was increasingly presented as political justification for the state relinquishing control in some areas and ceding it to the market as a superior allocative device rather than some kinds of economic intervention and regulation. Neoliberal globalization was presented as the positive, progressive force and an integrative (on its own terms) inevitability, one that is supposedly futile and self-defeating to contest.[89] By implicitly presenting the global, national and local scales as quintessentially the domains of capital, state and labour respectively; 'top-down', unidirectional power relationships appeared to be discursively – and operationally – locked in.

For all its grandiose rhetoric from its advocates about the primacy and promise of economic growth, global growth rates for the 1980s and 1990s fell from previous decades and averaged only 1.4 and 1.1 per cent in each decade respectively.[90] Keeping in mind that growth is not always the optimal or preferred accumulation strategy by dominant capital, as we have seen, the 4.9 per cent average annual rate of growth of global GDP during the long boom had dropped to 3 per cent in the period 1973–89.[91] The volume of speculative capital – money chasing money – well and truly eclipsed the productive economy during this period. By 2006, the levels of extreme financialization resulted in the inflated value of financial assets being four times the value of GDP in the United States and Europe: 456 per cent of GDP in the US and 356 for the European Union (EU). Europe's financialization has grown at a faster rate than the US, though from a lower level, with its compound annual growth rate in the decade between 1996 to 2006 hitting 4.4 per cent, in contrast with the US rate of 2.8 per cent.[92]

From 1973 to 1995, there were 11 major financial crises.[93] Financial disasters in the 1990s alone included the 1994–95 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis of economies previously dubbed 'miracles' of development,[94] and the 1998 Russian and Brazil crises, rounded off by the mismanagement of Barings Bank, the protests at and inspired by Seattle in 1999 and Prague in 2000, and the collapse of Enron in the same year. The apparently greater frequency of endemic and systemic crises may partly reflect the assertion that they never really resolved but simply moved around geographically; as David Harvey asserts: 'capital never solves its crisis tendencies, it merely moves them around'.[95]

Amid this, wage-workers have suffered an absolute decline in living standards in a number of countries. In the US, the real weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers (in 1992 dollars) fell from $315 in 1973 to $264 in 1989, reaching $271 in 1999, which remained lower than the average real wage in 1962. Between 1980 and the early 1990s, real wages similarly fell in a number of South American countries: 53 per cent in Venezuela, 68 per cent in Ecuador, 14 per cent in Argentina, 21 per cent in Uruguay, and 73 per cent in Bolivia.[96] Meanwhile, a US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report suggests that between 1998 and 2005, roughly two thirds of all corporations operating in the US paid no taxes at all.[97] Corporatocracy has emerged as a pejorative term against the selective hollowing out of the state and the domination of politics by the interests of business corporations.

Toward the end of the 1990s there was a real sense that dogmatic market fundamentalism was being undermined in both the centres of neoliberal orthodoxy, the UK and the US. This was reflected in the emergence of a 'third way' rhetoric (if not in practice) between the state and the market, particularly in the UK.[98] Even ex-advocates such as George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz and John Gray were propounding the dangers of unfettered global free markets and the increasing instability and social costs of global capitalism.[99] Deregulation in the UK's agricultural sector, for example, likely had a direct causal impact on the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or 'mad cow' disease, because the Department of Agriculture had cumulatively closed half of its sanitation centres.[100] The effects of deregulation were coming back to bite.

Despite the failure of its promise of generative economic growth – recalling that the rate of economic growth deemed optimal for profit being at or above 3 per cent per annum – the neoliberal revolution has however succeeded in restoring dominant capital class privilege, and in fact has seen grotesque concentrations of wealth and power over the past three decades. A key feature of the neoliberal project according to Jason Moore has been to create new conditions for what he has called the 'four cheaps' and the exhaustion of a regime of accumulation can be read through the signals of rising prices of the Big Four inputs of energy, food, labour and raw materials.[101] The current crisis is defined more broadly then as not simply one of capitalist accumulation, but of capitalism exhausting its civilizational cheap nature strategy: '(t)hat process of getting extra-human natures – and humans too – to work for very low expenditures of money and energy is the history of capitalism's great commodity frontiers, and with it, of capitalism's long waves of accumulation'.[102] Labour is also becoming increasingly exhausted in its capacity to deliver unpaid work to capital, with declining fertility, psycho-social problems, the inability to 'switch off', and related problems.

The capitalist share of income and power is at historic highs – but does this also indicate it is close to an asymptote in the term Nitzan and Bichler have used? On their figures, the top 0.01 per cent of the wealthy had a market capitalization to national income ratio of 100 per cent in 2010, up from 20 per cent in the early 1950s, and down from 160 per cent in the early 2000s; in the same period, the after-tax profit share of the top 0.01 per cent in national income in the US

increased threefold, from 2 to 6 per cent,[103] nearly three times higher. If capitalists are structurally conditioned to increase their share even more, this would 'require an avalanche of mergers and acquisitions and/or intense measures to increase differential markups more and more – an already tall order that will grow even taller with every further increase in the differential size of dominant capital'.[104]

Internationally, US administrations have continued using the same instruments such as monetary policy. Through its dollar hegemony in particular, the US government has continued to deftly finance its burgeoning balance of payments deficit through the global financial system, imposing the cost of its deficit on those who hold dollar reserves, and in effect absorbing the post-war economic surpluses of Japan and Germany. This situation is causing more than a small deal of disquiet, with increasing speculation of a currency war and moves to destabilize US dollar hegemony, an issue that will be briefly revisited later in the chapter.

Post Cold war détente: the promise of global civil society in the 1990s

> A veritable associational revolution seems underway at the global level that may constitute as significant a social and political development of the beginning of twenty-first century as the rise of the nation state was of the nineteenth century.
>
> (Lester Salamon)[105]

Flush from the *annus mirabalis* of 1989, the idea of global civil society seemed to gain traction in the 1990s. The events surrounding the felling of the Berlin Wall, the release of Nelson Mandela and the official end of the apartheid era in South Africa, and an apparent easing of Cold War tensions with Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*, preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, all portended a decade of greater optimism in what citizen action could achieve. This was bookended at the end of the decade and the start of the next by the victory of civil groups against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the unprecedented protests in 1999 and 2000 in Seattle, Genoa, Melbourne, Prague and elsewhere where the so-called 'anti-globalization' movement is supposed to have started with the 'watershed' 1999 Seattle WTO meeting, and a key element of emerging global civil society, the inaugural World Social Forum (WSF) during January 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. This was accompanied by the corporate collapses of Enron and Worldcom and the popular uprisings in Argentina, to name a few key events.

In this brief consideration, I suggest that the idea of global civil society became attractive for a number of reasons. First, it potentially offered an alternative global moral vision and space to that of marketization and nationalism, or what I will identify as the amalgam of neoliberal-neoconservative globalism. It had a clear appeal to the traditional left who had historically been committed to internationalism and solidarity and greater equality across national borders. Second, it also challenged the notion that corporations had become the standard-bearer agents of

globalization, with aggregated citizen activity in the civil sphere not uncommonly overtaking membership of major political parties in older industrialized countries, reflecting increased dissatisfaction with traditional, national-scale formal political institutions and the veneer of Left–Right adversarial politics, especially as neoliberalism had been embraced by mainstream political parties of both left and right in many countries.[106]

With a number of civil society organizations (CSOs) astutely rejecting the reactionary-framed moniker of 'anti-globalization', global civil society has also been referred to by such terms as the People's Justice Movement, the 'citizen sector', a Movement of Movements and globalization from below, and may or may not include non-government organizations (NGOs) depending upon the conceptual basis of its definition. While a neologism of the end of the millennium, 'civil society' has a longer lineage, with a long history of cosmopolitan exchange and the reciprocal co-constitution and interaction of local and distant events, peoples and places.[107] By one definition, global civil society is seen as broadly encompassing the 'ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market, and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities and economies'.[108] John Keane characterizes global civil society as a 'vast, interconnected, and multilayered non-governmental space that comprises many hundreds of thousands of self-directing institutions and ways of life that generate global effects'.[109]

Another neologism closely attached to civil society has been the idea of social capital. Advocates such as Robert Putnam have promulgated the concept as being critical for social cohesion and economic development. Putnam distinguishes between 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital within and between communities respectively, defining social capital as 'connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them'.[110] For Putnam, social capital works with and through the market and state rather than replacing them[111] and thus is conceived as basically compatible with, and legible to, the public transcript of neoliberal globalization.

Critics wary of the concept of social capital, and of the professionalization of social change as manifest in the proliferation of NGOs in the 1990s, have pointed to the amorphous meaning of the term. Ben Fine dubs social capital 'the McDonaldization of social theory' – ubiquitous, bland, homogenized and intellectually un-nutritious.[112] Katharine Rankin regards it as not just a politically expedient but harmful concept, pressed into service by neoliberal ideologues to cast a progressive veneer over the rollback of the state:

> the social capital framework enables the architects of neoliberal economic policy to cast the reconfiguration of state-society relations in progressive terms – local capacity building, local self-reliance, net social benefits from reduced transaction costs and increased returns to human capital. As such, social capital can be expected to fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of the welfare state in countries around the world.
>
> (Katharine Rankin)[113]

The proliferation of NGOs and their insinuation into various community processes has similarly been regarded warily, particularly when seen to be filling the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the state's social provision responsibilities. Tina Wallace asks whether NGOs have acted as a 'Trojan horse of neoliberalism', in the early 2000s Gereffi et al. dubbed the phenomenon the 'NGO–Industrial Complex' and in 2014 a critical piece in *The New York Times*, by capitalist scion Peter Buffett, examined the 'charitable-industrial complex' and 'conscience-laundering'.[114]

A distinction between social change NGOs and service-oriented NGOs may be usefully applied here: within the latter, a kind of NGO-vanguardism has developed among some professional campaigners according to activist Patrick Reinsborough, the belief that social change is best left to experienced policy wonks. As he puts it, 'NGOism is the conceit that intermediary organizations of paid staff, rather than communities organizing themselves into movements, will be enough to save the world'.[115] In this view, 'NGOism' promotes complicity rather than simply cooption, growing to become part of the corporatist system. One cited example is the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) lending legitimacy to oil companies by providing a green seal of approval.[116] The involvement of celebrities and popstars such as Bono in corporatized campaigns such as Make Poverty History and the attempted reinvention of Jeffrey Sachs from a practitioner of shock therapy to a development guru also illustrate the cooption of genuine desire for positive political change into the public transcript.[117]

Defenders of the role of NGOs in emerging civil society might point to the perceived positive impacts of reforming the business sector, such as the increased number of transnational corporations releasing sustainability reports, from seven in 1990 to 487 in 2001.[118] Other successes include the Nestlé and baby breast-milk campaign, and the growth of ethical investment and fair trade products is also seen as reflective of the increasing influence of CSOs.[119] For the purposes of this book, my point is not that global civil society entities such as NGOS do not have their place or are not carrying out worthwhile work; it is that they have tended to have a limited range of actions based on reforming, civilizing, humanizing, influencing, adapting; and that their legibility and cooption within public transcript globalization limits the degree to which they can offer transformatory rather than merely palliative possibilities from the grassroots.

Given what appeared to be global civil society's promise throughout the 1990s, what then changed? Almost exactly a year prior to September 11 2001, the S11 protesters converging in Melbourne to shut down the World Economic Forum (WEF) were riding high. The momentum had exploded at the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting, with 50,000 people converging with the aim of disrupting and shutting down WTO meetings. An international, web-facilitated, broad-based coalition across many cities and countries had formed which would continue in Prague. Subsequent WTO meetings were forced to implement a mini police-state around summits – encapsulating for many what corporate globalism is all about, with the freezing of civil liberties and the setting up of no free speech and no free assembly zones. These events and protests succeeded in putting corporate globalization on the public agenda and making it a subject of debate.

The World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks effectively stymied the further development of this aspect of global civil society, particularly the momentum of the direct action protests. The September 11, 2001 attacks were exploited by the Bush administration to generate fear and to curb the burgeoning movement's influence. This can be seen in the reductions in civil liberties and the increasing criminalization of resistance – terrorists and resisters were made to look the same and 9/11 became the answer to all questions or protestations. The extension of police state-like provisions could be seen in the US Patriot Act I and II, which has applied not only to the US but has authorized the US government to act against citizens of other countries as well.

Yet it may be premature and misguided to write off the concept of global civil society. I agree with Appadurai's separating out of grassroots globalization and global civil society which he then nevertheless sees as necessarily going hand in hand: 'The idea of an international civil society will have no future outside of the success of these efforts to globalize from below'.[120] This is suggestive of the notion that global civil society can and should be built upon a requisite infraglobalization that I argue should first be cultivated; I contend that global civil society will likely be vulnerable to being subsumed unless it nurtures informal order of forms illegible to corporatist power, an idea explored in the next chapter. In this respect I argue that the remedy to the depredations of corporate capitalism is genuine deliberative democracy, but that formal electoral democracy is insufficient on its own.

The empire strikes back: the 'neo-neo' strategic alliance and crisis capitalism

> For globalization to work, America can't be afraid to act like the almighty superpower it is . . . The hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist – McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
>
> (Thomas Friedman)[121]

> Terrorism is the war of the poor, and war is the terrorism of the rich.
>
> (Peter Ustinov)[122]

Throughout the 1990s, the unexpected end of the Cold War had initially precipitated triumphalism in some quarters that the West had 'won', exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's essay, 'The End of History'.[123] The demise of the Soviet Union and bipolar arms race that attended the superpower rivalry also led to declining military expenditures in the US – and brought with it expectations of a peace dividend. Military spending in the US throughout the 1990s did fall, from an average of 4.5 per cent of GDP in the first half of the 2000s, down from 7 per cent in the 1980s, accompanied by a great deal of rationalization in the arms industry. During the 1990s according to the Budget Authority for National Defense figures

it declined every year except for 1999; in the 2000s it increased every year and only dipped slightly in 2005 and 2009.[124] With the end of the Vietnam war, the US government was less to underwrite US military firms through military contracts and Middle Eastern oil increasingly became the new source of financing for the weapons trade, which from the early 1970s replaced South East Asia as the primary destination of global arms exports.[125] The US post-war 'permanent arms economy' was maintained such that by 1990 the value of the weapons, equipment and factories devoted to the Department of Defense in the US was 83 per cent of the value of all plants and equipment in US manufacturing.[126]

Yet at the turn of the millennium, there was a sharp U-turn in both economic and policy rhetoric from 'growth' and 'peace' to 'stagflation' and 'wars'.[127] (This is qualified by the recognition that in many respects the preemptive strikes, policies of regime change, and disregarding of international law are not confined to the 2000s and that US unilateralism in many respects commenced under the Clinton administration and prior.) The two entry points for augmenting neoliberalism and neoconservatism both occurred on September 11, just under two decades apart: 1973 in Chile and 2001 in New York. The criminalization of the burgeoning and promising protest movement represented by Seattle in 1999 was enabled by the stunning effect of the events of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington DC, as 'terrorists' and protestors were made to look identical.[128] Even before the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centres, a shift had occurred with a constitutional coup of sorts in 2000 with the US Supreme Court ruling that eventually saw George W. Bush become the US President over rival Al Gore.[129]

Neoconned: the neoconservative coup

In the lead-up to such an apparent U-turn from the 1990s, the ascendancy of the neoconservatives in US politics bears mentioning: I submit that neoconservatism can be seen as an extension of corporate globalism. A group of former Trotskyists who had turned to the Right during the Cold War anti-communist crusade, the neoconservatives had their origins in a section of the Jewish émigré intellectual scene in New York during the 1930s, and later joined with a number of Gentiles.[130] Neoconservatism can be summarized in six propositions:

1. a theory of history that invested the Shoah with perpetual contemporary significance;
2. the necessity and irreplacability of military force;
3. there are no alternatives to US global leadership;
4. a cultural politics of deference to authority;
5. crisis is a permanent condition requiring urgent action; and
6. strong statesman-like leadership is the only decisive antidote to crisis.[131]

The neoconservatives were also largely likudnik zionists: it was in a 1996 policy paper for Benjamin Netanyahu's then incoming Likud government that the group

of core neoconservatives headed by Richard Perle outlined their political agenda via the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic Political Studies. Entitled 'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm', the group advised Netanyahu to directly challenge existing US policy, advocating a break with the ongoing Oslo 'peace' process. They explicitly encouraged strikes against Lebanon and Syria as a 'prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East' and called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq. 'Whoever inherits Iraq', they wrote in a related paper, 'dominates the entire Levant strategically'.[132] In a few years, many of the letter's signatories would assume key or shadow positions in the Bush administration, ready to act on their recommendations.[133]

The broad blueprint for how to carry out these recommendations was laid out in a 90-page report, 'Rebuilding America's Defences', published by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), whose founders included future vice-president Dick Cheney, future defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and future deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Promoting US global leadership, according to PNAC, entailed higher military spending. The US needed a major 'military transformation' – although such transformation was 'likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbour'.[134]

The events in New York of September 11, 2001 tilted the policy climate toward the neoconservatives, giving them their 'Pearl Harbour' style crisis to change the balance of power in the administration. Hitherto marginal – they had been dubbed the Crazies in the first, George Bush Senior, administration[135] – they successfully used the trauma to reorient policy. The neonconservatives waged a concerted campaign, both within and outside the Bush administration, to put Iraq on the policy table after September 11, 2001.

The readiness of the neoconservatives stood in contrast to the establishment realists. Their superior coordination and policy-preparedness cohered ideologically and politically to overcome their more fragmented realist opposition. Propagating the sham evidence eventually used by the administration, the neoconservatives made full use of their informal and formal networks to organize and short-circuit policy. They succeeded in tilting US national security discourse in the uncertain climate of post 9/11 policy, with an echo-chamber of boosters in the media, academia and thinktanks reinforcing the message.[136] On a deeper level, the neoconservatives ultimately succeeded by appealing to and appropriating the totems of US nationalism, tapping into the messianic Manifest Destiny view of its role in the world, in tune with George W. Bush's later subsumptive proclamation that values the US promulgates, such as (putative) freedom, 'are right and true for every person in every society'.[137]

The invasion of Iraq: a war for oil?

In 2002, the Bush administration announced the doctrine of 'pre-emptive action'. It was eventually used to justify the invasion of a sovereign state, Iraq, on the pretext – since proven false – that Iraq *might* have been developing weapons of mass destruction. The doctrine of pre-emption would see the twentieth century

bookended by colonial brutality and Anglo-American imperial folly in Iraq, and conditions for a 'colonial present' in this and other parts of the world.[138] The prevailing view among many, though by no means all, sections of the Left in the lead-up and after the invasion of Iraq was that the real reason for the war was to secure the physical prize of Iraq's oil reserves.

Yet there was no evidence of Big Oil – referring to the largest oil firms – lobbying for the war.[139] To be clear, oil is certainly a key commodity of geopolitical significance but the oil determinism argument or assumption is problematic and misleading. Although it is outside the purview of this book, the invasion of Iraq and the so-called 'global war on terror' was not primarily about oil or the physical control of resources and more about the Anglo-American-Israeli colonial axis.[140] That business interests such as Big Oil stepped in afterwards is more incidental rather than causal. In contrast to those who surmise that it must be 'all about oil' and overlook the crucial *realpolitik* that involves regional hegemony and the Israeli regime's role, the facts are that contemporary production of oil in Iraq has not even reached pre-war levels.[141] Additionally, George Bush Sr., and his Secretary of State, James Baker – both 'oil men' whose modus operandi for business profits is stability rather than civil war and the 'Salvador Option' – deliberately avoided occupying Iraq.[142]

The invasion of Iraq also confounds the otherwise more convincing Disaster Capitalism thesis expounded by Naomi Klein, again in part because the assumed primacy of neoliberal ideology and business interests in the Iraq war overlooks the role of Israel and the Israel Lobby in the US. Dick Cheney, for example, was not a Friedmanite. No-bid contracts in Iraq have had more to do with corruption than ideological commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy and a global 'free' market. There are certainly many connections between the two but disentangling these two impulses avoids the erroneous assumption that war profiteers like Cheney and Rumsfeld were somehow dutifully committed to Friedmanite free market ideology.[143] It also makes it possible to criticize each distinctly as well as to see where neoliberalism was latched on to neoconservative policies.

While military hardware and materiel (military products) firms in this case merely capitalized upon, rather than deliberately brought about, the disaster in Iraq, the distinction is not always clear as Stephen Holmes notes: Lockheed Martin's stock price nearly tripled between 2003 and 2007 following the chairing of a committee agitating for war with Iraq by a former vice president of the firm.[144] 'In conflicts passed', Arundhati Roy has quipped, 'weapons were manufactured for war. Now, wars are manufactured to sell weapons'.[145] If the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan can be situated in the process of capital accumulation, how exactly do they fit?

The 'neo-neo' convergence

The ascendant neocons exploited the fissures between the corporate managers, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) represented by the Business Roundtable, who tend to value stability and avoid risk-taking – and the new men of money, the faction

of capital comprising entrepreneurs who came to prominence with the administrations of Nixon and Reagan. This newer faction tended to resent the establishment's inherited entitlements and sense of class superiority.[146] Unlike the more stability-favouring establishment CEOs, the emergent entrepreneurs tended towards the economic opportunities generated from crises.[147] In this way, these newer money men were more naturally aligned with the neoconservative philosophy.

Apart from the economy, a loose alliance had formed between the neoconservatives and liberal interventionist hawks that started with Bosnia – an intervention that, in the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle supported and Colin Powell opposed. The 'right to interfere', *droit d'ingérence*, served as the bridge between the neoconservatives and liberal interventionists, leading critics to dub the notion of so-called 'humanitarian intervention' as effectively humanitarian imperialism.[148] 'In today's America', the late Tony Judt wrote, 'neoconservatives generate brutish policies for which liberals provide the ethical fig-leaf'.[149]

The compatibility of neoconnery and the neoliberal creed in what I have termed the neo-neo convergence is evidenced in a number of key similarities, and mitigated by a number of differences.[150] First, neoliberalism and neoconservatism may well be described as the kissing cousins of contemporary post-2001 empire. It is no accident that the hegemonic neoliberal governments of the US and UK have also pursued neoconservative policies. David Harvey opines that neoconservatism may make neoliberalism more governable, conferring stability through coercion over the chaos of multitudinous individual interests.[151] Both are not averse to applications of massive violence as an instrument of social and economic change, including but not limited to the 'neoliberal war' hybrid. Neoconservatives have advocated supply-side economics.

Yet there are also a number of contradictions. Notwithstanding 'military Keynesianism', military and economic intervention is ostensibly against the philosophical position of neoliberalism, recalling that Milton Friedman was against even the intervention of institutions like the World Bank and IMF, although Friedmanite economists came to occupy some of the top positions in those institutions. Another contradiction is that the construction of a borderless world for corporate capital, in the neoliberal vision, ironically depends upon the prior deployment of territorialized state power. Putative deregulation, at least in some sectors, occurs amidst metaregulation in others, such as border protection and law and order controls. Borders are more important after 9/11, not less. The spatial imaginaries of neoliberalism and neoconservatism also collide: neoliberalism's borderless spaces versus neoconservatism's spaces of border discipline.

Another contradiction can be discerned in that the extraterritorial implications of neoliberal policy in many ways presume, and in turn define, imperial authority. The free market claims of those advocating less government are sharply at odds with the fact that it requires a set of institutional arrangements that can only be underwritten by statist organizations. This also speaks to the underplayed militarism of the neoliberal globalization project. Domestically within the US 'permanent war economy', there has long been a general correspondence between US military spending and economic growth rates throughout much of the past century. Preparation for war and military conflict has been cited both as an economic




Figure 2.2 'They're having problems with their economy again'.

Source: Ron Cobb cartoon *c*.1970. © Ron Cobb All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.

stimulant and as an economic drain. Military spending has been an established fiscal tool particularly throughout the post-war years of Military Keynesianism, marked by NSC–68.[152] It has been accepted as a legitimate form of government 'intervention' by big business as well as organized labour, particularly in communities around the US 'gun belt'.[153] Similarly, successive recent US administrations have long been using its territorial–military power to shore up its waning economic power, effectively using its military power to buy time and space.[154]

There are also a number of qualitatively new developments. While the revolving door between intelligence agencies and private industry has continued, there is also the unprecedented outnumbering of public US military personnel by private contractors in Iraq. The creation of a disaster capitalism and homeland security complex – a new economy in surveillance, privatized war and disaster – could be seen as an extension of the older military industrial complex.[155]

Companies producing products such as hi-tech fences, unmanned drones, biometric IDs, video and audio surveillance gear and services such as air passenger profiling and prisoner interrogation systems are booming, but the overlap is deeper and more extensive, infecting even ostensibly consumer civilian goods like snack foods.[156] In the homeland security complex there is clearly a powerful economic incentive to exploit fear and threats, as well as to manufacture them, from anthrax to bird flu and swine flu, to airport scanners. In the disaster capitalism complex, the hegemonic state is not just the transmission belt but also a clear engine of capital accumulation. In 1999–2000 there were only nine companies with federal homeland security contracts in the US. By 2003 it was 3,512. By 2006 there were 33,890. Since 2000, $130 billion of contracts have been dished out.[157]

Globalization as empire and endgame

> The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.
>
> (Samuel P. Huntington)[158]

> This is another thing that empires do which too often goes unmentioned in the historical and political literature of countries like the United States, Britain and France. Empires impoverish whole populations and kill lots and lots of innocent people . . . The purpose of all this killing is to prevent alternative, independent, self-defining nations from emerging. So the empire uses its state power to gather private wealth for its investor class. And it uses its public wealth to shore up its state power and prevent other nations from self-developing.
>
> (Michael Parenti)[159]

Since the 2000s the concept of empire has seen something of a rehabilitation. In 2003 *The New York Times Magazine* ran the headline 'American empire: get used to it' on its January 5 cover. The unapologetic hubris was arguably also on display in 2005 when then British Treasurer told the *Daily Mail*: 'the days of Britain having to apologize for the British empire are over. We should celebrate'.[160] The concept of imperialism has been a mainstay in the social sciences in the last century, with the work of Hobson, Hilferding, Luxemburg, Kautsky, Lenin and later the Monopoly Capital school (Baran and Sweezy, Kalecki, Magdoff).[161] In 1902 Hobson wrote:

> The economic root of Imperialism is the desire of strong organized industrial and financial interests to secure and develop at the public expense and by the public force private markets for their surplus goods and their surplus capital. War, militarism and a 'spirited foreign policy' are the necessary means to this end.
>
> (John A. Hobson)[162]

While imperialism never really went away as a key plank of US and general Western foreign policy, the intervening era of decolonization and liberalization belies the fact

that at the start of the last century, it was a respectable, legitimate policy position. US administrations have been responsible for bombing over 25 countries, attempting to overthrow over 50 governments, and have crushed over 30 popular movements against despotic regimes. In an oft-cited internal US State Department memorandum of 1948, with particular reference to Asia, the realist George F. Kennan wrote:

> We have 50 per cent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 per cent of its population . . . In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment . . . Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will allow us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security . . . We should dispense with the aspiration to 'be liked' or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism . . . We should cease to talk about vague [and] unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.
>
> (George F. Kennan)[163]

The collapse of the Eastern bloc has left the remaining superpower far outspending all military rivals, and has seen it extend its military presence in over 700 US military bases around the globe.[164]

The use of unimaginable violence in service of US empire has resulted in stupendous destruction abroad, greater tyranny at home, and heightened anxiety for millions around the world. There will likely be reverberations for decades to come. As Beatrix Campbell points out, violence is a resource in the performing of both neoliberalism and hegemonic masculinity (and I might add neoconservative policies); thus it is no coincidence that the richest country on the planet is the most armed and has the highest rate of incarceration, with most of the prison population male.[165] The genocidal sanctions against Iraq over more than a decade between invasions saw more than a million children die and 5,000 Iraqis per month perish. Since the invasion and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, US military misadventures have extended to additional theatres of war from Pakistan to Yemen. These have also effectively included green lights for the Israeli invasions of Gaza and Lebanon in 2006 and 2009, and again in 2014. People outside the West, who are more invisible and marginal in the public transcript of globalization, are more readily presented as expendable, as 'unpeople' (Mark Curtis) who can more readily inhabit the 'spaces of the exception' (Giorgio Agamben) of permanent emergency powers, the US Patriot Act and Guantanamo Bay and who haunt unreported atrocities courtesy of the servility of the corporate press.[166] Bearing mention here is Gandhi's apposite response when asked what he thought of Western civilization. He replied that he thought it would be a good idea.

Imperial globalization has characteristics common to past imperialisms, according to Neil Smith, with a hegemonic 'third moment' from the 1970s onwards involving 'market pacification' of the world following the first two waves marked by the Woodrow Wilson and FDR administrations.[167] In Stuart Corbridge's description:

'The "war on terrorism" provides cover for many of the world's remaining closed spaces to be opened up to market forces and American capital'.[168] The difference however is that there may now be an endgame: Neil Smith saw the invasion of Iraq as the endgame of the US government's imperial imposition of its vision of globalization. US military and economic domination is culminating in a final 'hegemonic fix' of US globalism, and one that is unlikely to succeed: 'In retrospect it may be that September 11 [2001] comes to stand not as the beginning of a new phase of American empire but as its dénouement, the beginning of the end for this particular moment of imperialism'.[169] Notably, Smith has described the 'war on terrorism' as a 'war to fill in the interstices of globalization'.[170]

In contrast with the (Thomas) Friedmanite 'flat world' optimism of corporate globalism, the global literature now seems to abound with books, websites and writing regarding impending catastrophes: we surely have more than four horsemen of the Apocalypse – peak oil, climate change, overpopulation, food price spikes and shortages, environmental degradation, financial crises, runaway pandemics and ecocide.[171] The possible effect of peak oil on growth-predicated global capitalism, for example, has been the subject of speculation for its expected economic effects and consequences for globalization. Nitzan and Bichler foresee the prospect of sudden systemic collapse from just a small economic deceleration or tipping point:

> Once humanity passes the threshold of peak oil, economic growth must turn negative – and, at that point, the assumption of ever-growing credit and debt breaks down. Investors suddenly realize that, looking forward, their assets have an inherently negative yield. And since this realization inverts the basis on which the whole society operates, the result is not a gradual decline but sudden collapse. The first to tank are the equity and debt markets; these are followed by mutually reinforcing reverberations and the eventual rupture of money, trade, investment, communications and other critical infrastructures; and the process is then sealed by conflict, war and die-off (as argued for example by Jay Hanson).
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[172]

The incredible violence of renewed imperial capitalism cannot simply be adduced to a capital overaccumulation crisis. There are certainly important and complex cultural and political causes involved. The 'neo-neo' overlap has however increasingly brought economic and military rationales together in new ways. One method has been through the pricing of oil.

New arsenals of accumulation: a tale of two capital factions?

> It is a sad world indeed where the fate of all mankind depends upon the fight between two competing groups within American big business. This, however, is not quite new: many far-reaching upheavals in human history started from a cleavage at the top of the ruling class.
>
> (Michal Kalecki)[173]

Throughout the past quarter century there has been an unambiguously tight correspondence between oil prices and the global distribution of profits (Figure 2.4). During the stagflationary energy crisis of the early 1970s, the oil companies' share of global profits, when the cost of crude petroleum shot up, was 20 per cent: not bad for stagflationary 'crisis' times! Charting the course of these fluctuations, Nitzan and Bichler assert that as the accumulation cycle moved from breadth into depth accumulation, inflation fell and oil prices also fell, with the share of oil company profits falling to a mere 3 per cent by the end of the Clinton presidency, when what they call the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition of dominant capital prevailed.

The reversal came during the Bush administration, when breadth accumulation crashed, and the Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition faction of dominant capital switched to inflation-driven depth accumulation.[174] The change in the outlook of dominant capital could not have happened without the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, Nitzan and Bichler assert, and their timing was uncanny:



Figure 2.3 Cartoon by Tohby Riddle.

Source: © Tohby Riddle. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.

> The attacks came after the stock market had been punctured, after the merger boom had collapsed, after the neoliberal rhetoric had begun to backfire in 'emerging markets', and after deflation had emerged as a threat. When the Twin Towers came down, the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition was already in tatters, its profits melting, its neoliberal vision tarnished. Dominant capital was finally ripe for a 'regime change' in the nature of differential accumulation, ready to accept the resurrected Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition as its new locomotive, ready to shift from 'peace dividends' back to 'war profits'.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[175]

In the intervening period when the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition and strategies prevailed, the Weapondollar–Petrodollar coalition was regrouping and rationalizing, with mergers fusing a number of the military giants.[176] Simultaneously, policy hawks and neoconservatives were busy formulating their blueprint for future scenarios of preemptive wars. With mergers apparently having entered a deep freeze and corporate pricing power at historically weak levels, the previously pooh-poohed prospect of deflation became a fear.

Nitzan and Bichler's findings are that *every* military conflict in the Middle East was followed by a period in which the oil companies beat the average return on equity as pitted against Fortune 500 profits (see Figure 2.5).

> During the depth era of the 1970s and early 1980s, differential accumulation was fuelled by stagflation and driven by conflict. The leading faction within dominant capital was the Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil firms. In this context, the oil companies managed to beat the average comfortably, with only occasional setbacks which were quickly corrected by Middle East conflicts.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[177]

In Figure 2.5, the 'danger zone' refers to differential decumulation against the growth accumulation average of Fortune 500 companies. All major Middle East conflicts since the late 1960s, according to Nitzan and Bichler's findings, were followed by a period during which the Petro-Core beat the Fortune 500 average. 'In this sense, and whatever their ultimate "cause", these were all "energy conflicts" . . . The important thing to note here, though, is that "energy conflicts" have led not to higher oil profits as such, but to higher differential oil profits'.[178]

New indirect linkages, far more subtle, have now apparently been forged between capital accumulation and military conflicts. An update on the older idea of a relationship between the two, Nitzan and Bichler's thesis in part is that wars spark up inflation and generate large profits. They point to the distributional consequences of inflation prompted by the price of oil, which have resulted in the ratio of profit to wages rapidly rising by 250 per cent since 2001, bringing the overall share of profit in GDP to its highest level since 1929:




Figure 2.4 Oil prices and the global distribution of profits. Reprinted by permission.

Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars', *Tikkun,* drawing on figures from Datastream with following series codes: OILINWD (integrated oil companies), TOTMKWD (all companies); IMF: L76AA&z@C001 (price of crude oil), L64@C111 (US CPI), article url: http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/20090327094921768/.

> The neoconservatives sent their army to the Middle East, the price of oil soared, and inflation – although hesitant at first – eventually started to follow. The distributional consequences weren't lost on investors and workers. While wages remained flat, profits – particularly those earned by dominant capital – surged . . . The huge distributional impact of a small increase in inflation is symptomatic of the new order.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[179]

Oil companies have been major beneficiaries, but not through physical ownership or even access to oil, which a number of pundits on the Left assumed was the real reason Iraq was invaded. The crucial link is the *price* of oil, rather than the *possession* of it. Prices have come to play an immensely important part in the




Figure 2.5 The petro-core's differential accumulation and Middle East 'energy conflicts'.

Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', *Review*, p. 75. Reprinted by permission.

process of accumulation: the key to profits of oil companies is not volume but price: physical control of the region's oil reserves has not in itself made the oil companies more profitable. From the time of the oil crisis in the early 1970s, oil profits have become more dependent on price than output. Conflict and the threat of conflict tends to elevate the price of oil, increasing oil companies differential profits, and 'for oil to become more expensive, the Middle East must be kept in 'turmoil'.[180]

Conflicts have now assumed a new role as 'a turnkey mechanism for triggering inflation' according to Nitzan and Bichler.[181] It is their provocative assertion that the 'current shift toward war, and in particular the rekindling of conflict in the Middle East, is intimately connected with this new arsenal of accumulation'.[182]

Financialization and capital accumulation: 'we're all finance capitalists now'

> United States Steel Corporation is not in the business of making steel. We're in the business of making profits.
>
> (Steel magnate David Roderick, former President of US Steel, now USX)[183]

> Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!
>
> (Karl Marx)[184]

Financialization has been the lynchpin of corporatist globalization since the 1980s. Broadly defined as the gravitational shift in economic activity from productive sectors to finance, it marks a form of capitalism that sees an exponential rise of the role of finance in the operations of corporate capital. The perennial crises of over-production and under-consumption have spurred increasingly aggressive financialization: overaccumulation is the point at which the reinvestment of capital produces diminishing or no returns; devaluation occurs when a market is flooded by capital and is saturated with products. Surpluses of devalued capital and labour co-exist with seemingly no way to bring them together, as Harvey notes:

> Surplus capital and surplus labour exist side-by-side with seemingly no way to put them back together in the midst of immense human suffering and unmet needs. In midsummer of 2009, one third of the capital equipment in the United States stood idle, while some 17 per cent of the workforce were either unemployed, enforced part-timers or 'discouraged' workers. What could be more irrational than that!
>
> (David Harvey)[185]

Conventionally understood, this could be resolved in one of two ways: through a new spatial fix or through the creation of new markets. The tension and gap between downward pressure on wages (and thus purchasing power) and the need for consumer markets was partially resolved with the rise of consumer debt and the burgeoning credit card industry. New markets were also created through the invention of new financial products that could be grouped under the description of 'shadow banking': currency derivatives, credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, all of which have only sprung up relatively recently in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The shift from asset-based to debt-based financialization has occurred in many spheres: from the US dollar as the reserve currency, to the lifting of caps on interest rates from the 1970s, to the widespread debt peonage of households to mortgages and other consumer subscriptions such as cable television and mobile phone plans. The growth in the debt-based economy has been compounded by the fact that debt finance exists at both the beginning and end of the accumulation

cycle, fuelling both supply and demand. In other words, there has been a crisis both in effective demand (temporarily solved through the debt economy which has led to huge increases in household indebtedness) and in the financial system that has been managing the effective demand. Let us examine both 'ends' in turn.

The legalization of usury – the 'big deregulation that precede[d] all other deregulations' as Thomas Geoghegan puts it – kicked off the rounds of aggressive deregulation in the 1980s. Its importance has been underplayed according to Geoghegan:

> The problem was not that we 'deregulated the New Deal' but that we deregulated a much older, even ancient, set of laws . . . which had existed in some form in every civilization from the time of the Babylonian Empire to the end of Jimmy Carter's term.
>
> (Thomas Geoghegan)[186]

Deregulation and anti-labour laws in the US particularly resulted in people effectively trading in their 'union cards for credit cards'.[187] Coupled with this was what Lohmann describes as an 'arms race' to develop new financial techniques, starting in the 1970s, for commodifying uncertainty and making profit:

> The relevant mode of 'production' was what might be called 'quantism': the material and social processes of isolating, laying claim to, objectifying, simplifying, abstracting, quantifying, commensurating, pricing and reaggregating masses of unknowns by which derivatives were manufactured and financial uncertainty commodified. Computers and top mathematical talent were given free rein in greatly expanded efforts to break down, reframe, mathematize, diversify across, appropriate and charge rent for the future.
>
> (Larry Lohmann)[188]

The financial system bundles as many credit-card holders and mortgage-holders as possible into investment instruments. Bankers shed risk by selling repackaged loans to external investors, which also enables them to garner fees at almost every stage of the 'slicing and dicing' chain. In shedding risk, regulators then permitted them to make more loans – allowing more credit to be pumped into the economy, and creating even more bank fees.[189] One of these new, specialized products was a financial instrument known as 'collateralized debt obligations of asset-backed securities' or CDOs, a bundle of mortgage-linked bonds, often mixed with other credit derivatives. Rather than being traded on the market, most were sold to banks' off-balance-sheet entities such as 'structured investment vehicles' (SIV) – or simply left on the books. Novel and byzantine speculative instruments like derivatives increasingly escaped monitoring and regulation and other capital controls, augmenting the increasingly unregulated power of finance capital.

From the corporate bank perspective, customers' ability to make payments on the credit card or mortgage is less important than securing a certain number of these loans into 'investment products'. The real estate boom, which had gone

global by the early 2000s, had seen a five-fold increase in the annual issuance of asset-backed securities – much of it involving repackaging of mortgage-backed instruments – from $532 billion in 2000 to $2.5 trillion in 2006.[190] Banks were making inadvisable loans to customers with poor credit histories, producing a greater number of 'toxic loans' which 'has allowed investors to reap trillion-dollar profits on the backs of modest-income people'.[191] Banks were also lending more on less deposits: by the mid-2000s, the debt-deposit ratio loosened to 30 to one, effectively resulting in a greater amount of fictitious capital, and reflecting the massive growth of complex speculative instruments and the funnelling of investment towards financial speculation arbitrageurs and speculators.

Internationally, financialization was marked by the increase in financial depth indicators – the ratio of assets to GDP. In 2000, less than a dozen countries had financial assets that exceeded 350 per cent of GDP. By 2008, this figure had more than doubled to 25.[192] Coupled with this, banks increasingly funded their liquidity outside their national market. About two thirds of cross-border loans are for maturities of less than one-year: loans of short duration are sometimes dubbed 'hot money' because they can be withdrawn more quickly if banks and financial intermediaries sense risk as occurred in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. By the new millennium, over 90 per cent of global foreign exchange transactions involved short-term speculation.[193] By 2008, the fastest-growing component of capital flows has been cross-border lending and deposits, increasing from $900 billion in 2002 to $6 trillion.[194]

The spread of financialization has also been driven by footloose speculative capital taking advantage of differentials in interest and foreign exchange rates in different capital markets. By way of illustration, hedging is the activity that describes the arbitrage involved in making a profit from exploiting differential prices, such as buying on the New York Stock Exchange to resell elsewhere at a better price. Hedged transactions can realize profits with virtually no risk, exploiting gaps and spatial-temporal and legal differences in the market. Armed with market knowledge, IT systems and lawyers, traders are employed to spot these anomalies in what are increasingly complex markets, and to exploit them for profit. In recent years, high frequency automated trading or 'mechanical arbitrage' has even seen traders set up business outside of the hubs of London, New York and Tokyo to places like Siberia and locations in central Africa. Because trade depends upon speed, the most optimal locations to exploit even millisecond fluctuations, scattered across the globe, are often those between two major exchanges.[195]

The subprime mortgage crisis punctured this situation. The limits of speculative finance are that it boils down to trying to squeeze more value out of an already created value instead of creating new value, which is precluded by overproduction. This can only work for so long before the bubble bursts on such things as overvalued subprime mortgages and a correction is enforced. As Saskia Sassen notes, 'The financializing of more and more economic sectors since the 1980s has become both a sign of the power of this financial logic and the sign of its auto-exhaustion'. Nitzan and Bichler also express the limits of this financial

logic: 'from the viewpoint of the leading corporations, most of the redistributional processes – from the aggregate to the disaggregate – are close to being exhausted'.[196] When all else has been extracted and financialized, there is only one other source, Sassen surmizes: 'When everything has become financialized, finance can no longer extract value. It needs non-financialized sectors to build on. The last frontier is taxpayers' money – which is real, old-fashioned, not (yet) financialized money'.[197] The public purse was duly targeted in the financial 'bail-out' that followed, made possible by the financial oligarchy that has captured US politics.[198]

It is worthwhile noting that the most current wave of financialization significantly reverses the experience of much past political-economic history, as Sweezy observed in 1994 (emphasis added):

> I said that this financial superstructure has been the creation of the last two decades. This means that its emergence was roughly contemporaneous with the return of stagnation in the 1970s. But doesn't this fly in the face of all previous experience? Traditionally financial expansion has gone hand-in-hand with prosperity in the real economy. *Is it really possible that this is no longer true, that now in the late twentieth century the opposite is more nearly the case: in other words, that now financial expansion feeds not on a healthy real economy but on a stagnant one?* The answer to this question, I think, is yes it is possible, and it has been happening.
>
> (Paul M. Sweezy)[199]

Global financial crisis: the end of corporate capitalism, or its consolidation?

> Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that the current crisis is in the strictest sense a crisis of globalization, fostered and transmitted by the rapid and deep integration of very different economies. Fast-growing developing countries with underdeveloped financial systems were exporting savings to the developed world for packaging and re-export to them in the form of financial products.
>
> (McKinsey Global Institute)[200]

A global financial crisis erupted in the middle of 2007 and escalated in September of 2008, precipitating an economic recession throughout much of the industrialized world. The financial crisis and worldwide recession had only just halted and put in limbo an almost 30 year expansion of global capital markets. The financial crisis was triggered by the bursting of the US housing bubble, leading to a fall in consumer spending and mushrooming into a broader financial crisis and raising questions about the future of globalized finance. The crisis spread in part due to the pivotal role played by US consumer spending as the 'consumer of last resort' and financial assets in global capitalism. Given the complexity and opacity of modern finance, and the fact that bubbles are not anomalous to capital markets,

was it a crisis *in* or *of* the system? The financial crisis of 2008 may have helped to quash the myth – but not the ideology – of neoliberalism, leading to what many observers started characterizing as 'zombie' tenets, such as 'zombie economics' (John Quiggan) and 'zombie neoliberalism' (Jamie Peck) where the 'living dead of the free-market revolution continue to walk the earth'.[201] The crisis also brought into sharper relief the connection between urbanization and macro-economic development, including 'mutations' described as 'austerity urbanism'.[202]

As overaccumulation becomes global, markets have to internalize demand, in part through new markets based on credit, debt and complex financialization. The creation of fictitious markets like derivatives on derivatives and carbon trading cannot however last, nor are toxic loans sustainable. By mid-2007, defaults had started to rise on US subprime mortgages. Somewhat perversely, this may have partly come as a result of the manipulation of measures ostensibly designed to enhance transparency: as James C. Scott notes, bond rating agencies had made their rating formulas available to investment firms. With these procedures in mind – and in some cases even directly hiring the raters, investment firms were able to 'fix' the system by reverse-engineering bonds with the formulas, achieving top AAA ratings for exceptionally risky financial instruments.[203] In the midst of the crisis, agencies such as Standard & Poor's cut ratings for mortgage-linked products and admitted that their models were malfunctioning. The admission sent shockwaves and caused money market fund investors to stop purchasing notes issued by shadowy 'off-balance-sheet' vehicles such as SIVs. Fear and disorientation began to infect 'real' banks, which investors came to realize were exposed to SIVs in unexpected ways.[204]

While financial assets dropped by an unprecedented 8 per cent (by $16 trillion in 2008 to $178 trillion), most types of capital flows actually reversed, and fell by more than 80 per cent.[205] The average government deficit in OECD countries rose to almost 8 per cent of GDP, and in the US, it reached 12 per cent.[206] The steep drop-off in cross-border capital flows included foreign direct investment, purchases and sales of foreign equities and debt securities, and cross-border lending and deposits as foreign assets were sold by investors, companies, and banks and other financial institutions, who brought their money back to their home countries.[207]

By the middle of 2008, the sub-prime mortgage crisis had led to the demise of major Wall Street investment banks, either through change of status or through forced mergers, and the outright bankruptcy of Lehman that triggered a worldwide collapse of confidence in financial institutions. The contagion then spread outwards from banking to the major holders of mortgage debt (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) along with insurance giants like AIG, hitting the rest of the economy towards the end of 2008. By early 2009 the export-led industrialization model that had generated such spectacular growth in East and South East Asia was also contracting; and many stalwarts of US capitalism, such as General Motors, were close to bankruptcy.

In housing, the bubble had burst. There had been rapid appreciation in house prices in a number of countries, even those outside 'mature markets' such as




Figure 2.6 Cartoon by Agim Sulaj. © Reprinted by permission.

South Africa, where the price values of houses more than doubled between 2000 and 2007.[208] Of the more than seven million home loans in the US currently going unpaid, 2,055,000 have already commenced foreclosure proceedings, leading to widespread tent cities and 'financial Katrinas' in many cities of the United States.[209] 'The US may have been one of the principal motors of neoliberal globalization', Gary Younge notes, 'but its citizens are also its victims'.[210]

The countries that averted the worst of the housing-led financial crisis were those where there was massive infrastructural investment, such as in increasingly urban China – which has accounted for 50 per cent of the world's cement supplies in the last five years for its urban boom, for example, and with positive knock-on effects for economies supplying it such as Australia and Chile.[211] The crisis cascaded throughout OICs but China and India were not as affected, most notably, because their economies had not integrated their financial systems into the global financial network. The crisis did however adversely affect food markets; driven by the commodities bubble, food prices soared, forcing an estimated 100 million people into hunger and sparking food riots throughout the world.[212] The crisis was one of corporate profitability, but the costs were not primarily (or at all) borne by dominant capital.

The excessive power of too-lightly regulated finance capital was only compounded by the large-scale economic 'bail-out' interventions of governments in various stimulus packages as a response to the financial crisis. The fiscal stimulus

seemed to come out of the Keynesian deficit economy playbook, with General Motors dubbed 'Government Motors', but it was overt '*aidez-faire'* corporate welfare to Wall Street rather than providing any direct relief to Main Street. Aided by big finance-friendly appointees in the Obama administration, including Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Larry Summers, firms that became symbols of the financial excesses and venality of corporate vulture economics enjoyed an implicit government guarantee on the grounds of being 'too big to fail'.

Following the AIG bailout, ex-Goldman Sachs CEO and architect of the bailout Paulson announced a US federal bailout for the financial industry: the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which involved a $700 billion plan. In order to qualify for bailout monies, the two large remaining Wall Street investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted from investment banks to bank-holding companies, a move that allowed them access not only to billions in TARP funds, but to lending from the discount window of the Federal Reserve and publicly-backed funding.[213] Yet this was publicly described as the banks ostensibly desiring to be 'subject to far greater regulation'![214]

TARP has been one of the largest transfers of wealth in modern history. With taxpayers' money the last frontier for extraction, it constituted a 'five-fingered' resolution to the latest 'crisis' (or creordering project for redistributional gain, to use Bichler and Nitzan's 'creorder' term). For some observers, it was capital re-accumulation by corporate theft, recalling the saying that 'the best way to rob a bank is to own one'. Journalist Matt Taibbi called TARP a 'giant-scale financial fraud' and swindle;[215] David Harvey described it as a 'financial coup, against the government and the population of the US' and a 'massive consolidation of financial power'.[216] Finance capital has increasingly supplemented – and sometimes supplanted – accumulation through production with 'accumulation through dispossession'.[217]

By stepping in to bail out, governments entrenched the 'privatization of profit, socialization of debt' dynamic that encouraged banks to continue taking the same risks that created the crisis. As Saskia Sassen notes, 'even within a capitalist logic, giving more funds to the financial sector in order to solve the financial "crisis" is not going to work – for it would just deepen the vortex of financializing economies'.[218] In other words, extreme financialization is the problem, and more of it is not the solution. Sassen sees an endgame to financialization:

> every time governments (that is, citizens and taxpayers) have bailed out the financial system since the first crisis of this phase – the New York stock-market crash of 1987 – they have given finance the instruments to continue its leveraging stampede. There have been five bailouts since the 1980s; on each occasion, taxpayers' money was used to pump liquidity into the financial system, and each time, finance used it to leverage. This time, the end of the cornucopia is near – we have run out of money to meet the enormous needs of the financial system.
>
> (Saskia Sassen)[219]

The view of a finance-led crisis of excesses has also been challenged. Nitzan and Bichler see as misleading the scenario whereby a distorted bubble of fictitious capital in the housing sector moved to the inflated wider financial market and the rest of the economy. A 'distortion' presupposes that 'real' value can be measured. There is a mismatch myth – the discrepancy between nominal finance (fictitious capital) and the 'real', productive economy – because the real economy is not amenable to direct measurement either: market values, reflected in price, cannot measure intangible assets such as technology directly:

> The economists would have the laity believe that the 'real thing' is the tangible quantities of production, consumption, knowledge and the capital stock, and that the nominal world merely reflects this 'reality' with unfortunate distortions. This view . . . has nothing to do with the reality of accumulation. For the capitalists, the only real thing is nominal capitalization, and what lies behind this capitalization is not the production cost or productivity of capital goods, but the fist of capitalist power.
>
> (Nitzan and Bichler)[220]

Notwithstanding this possibility, these systemic profitability crises now seem to be instrumental to capitalist reproduction rather than anomalous to accumulation. In 2009 the top hedge fund managers had their third-best year on record; in his own words, George Soros was 'having a very good crisis', and Goldman Sachs staff raked in the largest bonus payouts in the firm's 140-year history.[221] 'Simply put', Bichler and Nitzan state, 'US capitalists are not worried about the crisis; they love it'.[222] In the heart of empire, US-based dominant capital was also uniquely cushioned and enjoying an extended systemic privilege, albeit increasingly under challenge, based on US dollar hegemony.

Dollar hegemony and currency wars: new global configurations?

> Finance is the new form of warfare . . . It is a competition in credit creation to buy foreign resources, real estate, public and privatized infrastructure, bonds and corporate stock ownership. Who needs an army when you can obtain the usual objective (monetary wealth and asset appropriation) simply by financial means? . . . Victory in today's monetary warfare promises to go to whatever economy's banking system can create the most credit. Computer keyboards are today's army appropriating the world's resources.
>
> (Michael Hudson)[223]

An 'exorbitant privilege' accrues to the issuer of the major international currency, such that, as Richard Portes notes, then US Treasury Secretary John Connally could openly state in 1971: 'The dollar is our currency, but your problem'.[224] Notably, John Maynard Keynes' proposal for a neutral global currency was rejected by US government representatives at Bretton Woods in 1944, and the replacement of the

asset-based gold standard with dollar-denominated and debt-based US Treasury bills transformed the global financial system. Michael Hudson notes:

> The Treasury-bill standard effectively made the United States immune from the usual balance-of-payments and financial constraints, enabling its capital markets to become more highly debt-leveraged and 'innovative'. It also enabled the US Government to wage foreign policy and military campaigns without much regard for the balance of payments.
>
> (Michael Hudson)[225]

If capital accumulation is once again at an historical inflexion point, as David Harvey suggests,[226] it comes as a process that includes the US dollar as the world's reserve currency increasingly being brought under question. If capital is a symbolic quantification of power, does this portend a hegemonic shift towards new global power configurations, such as the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) bloc? Is the world moving away from mono-imperialism and the hegemonic decline of an overextended US empire?

The US is still the 'controlling shareholder in global capitalism'.[227] Current indicators suggest the 'Americanization of global capital' might still be a better descriptor than the 'globalization of capital', as US structural power has globalized and increased with globalization.[228] This is evidenced in a host of indicators; US ownership accounts for almost half (46 per cent) the world's top 500 corporations, and US firms make up 18 of the 25 broad sectors of the top 2000 corporations in the world.[229] When in August 2011 the credit rating agency Standard and Poor's stripped US sovereign debt from its top-tier triple-A rating and downgraded it to AA+, investors continued buying up US government debt, simply because there is no comparable asset. Neither China nor Japan have this Treasury bill (T-bill) privilege nor the density of interlinkages with other countries and firms. As Starr argues, indicators that held true in the era of national capital are less relevant or no longer hold in an era of global capital.[230] As seen in Table 2.5, US-based financial services and banks rebounded after the Global Financial Crisis. US debt-driven consumerism has contributed to US growth rates, enabled by large supplies of credit from China and East Asia which in turns maintains the demand for its export-oriented industrial sector based on cheap labour. China, East Asia and Saudi Arabia in particular are still effectively subsidizing US debt, much of which is military as Michael Hudson argues:

> Growth in central bank reserves and sovereign-country funds has taken the form of recycling of dollar inflows into new purchases of US Treasury securities – thereby making foreign central banks (and taxpayers) responsible for financing most of the US federal budget deficit. The fact that this deficit is largely military in nature – for purposes that many foreign voters oppose – makes this lock-in particularly galling. So it hardly is surprising that foreign countries are seeking an alternative financial system.
>
> (Michael Hudson)[231]

In this currency battle, a number of countries are attempting to make a transition away from the US dollar and diversify toward trade denominated in a basket of other currencies, as well as investing in the establishment of alternative development banks.[232] Yet the stewards of the US economy still have monetary policy at their disposal. One *Financial Times* observer, Martin Wolf, has already called the battle in favour of the existing hegemon:

> To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world's surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.
>
> (Martin Wolf)[233]

Hegemonic transitions are epochal and infrequent. They happen gradually and usually carry a large range of repercussions, bringing with them uncertainty and instability. The extent to which we may be witnessing significant ruptures in first world-dominated globalization with 'Chindia', the BRICS, and the possible emergence of regional configurations and shifts of power particularly but not exclusively towards East Asia is a matter of debate. The question of whether the US has had its 'unipolar moment' has also gone through something of a series of see-saw phases. In the first half of the 2000s the US-centred empire literature reflected the lead-up to and aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively.[234] Yet within a decade, the rise of the BRICS and the Global Financial Crisis saw declinism make a return, recalling Paul Kennedy's imperial overstretch thesis in the late 1980s.[235] In the declinist debate, many of the same themes from the 1970s and 1980s featured, with Iraq replacing Vietnam and the rise of China replacing the rise of Japan as signalling a possible shift of economic power eastward.[236]

An increasingly independent (from the US) Latin America has rejected the neoliberal doctrine, and current cooperative efforts both intra-regionally and outside the region recall the historical Latin American-led push for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s and 1980s. For the first time since the promulgation of the Monroe doctrine, Latin America is breaking free. The BRICS countries are increasingly contributing to a possibly parallel system: China has brokered deals with Russia, Turkey and Brazil to start direct trading without the US dollar, between the yuan and ruble, lira and real respectively, for example.[237] NATO's rival organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), linking Russia, China and the Central Asian Republics, might become a potential counterbalance to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially given past US and Israeli administration sabre-rattling against Iran. Iran's 2008 application for full membership of the SCO was prevented by UN sanctions, although it has observer status.

Amid these broad-brush geopolitical movements, the ascent of China stands out unmistakably. China's financial markets are now the world's third largest after the US and Japan. Also the world's biggest creditor (the US is still the world's biggest debtor), China briefly surpassed US banks in the top 10 list of the world's largest banks in terms of capitalization. Table 2.5 shows the short-run

Table 2.5 Global shift? Top 20 banks by origin and market value: 1999, 2009 and 2014

	1999		*2009*		*2014 $m as at 31 March 2014*		
	Country	*Financial institution*	*Country*	*Financial institution*	*Country*	*Financial institution*	*Market value*
1	USA	Citigroup	CHI	Industrial & Commercial Bank of China	USA	Wells Fargo	261,217.50
2	USA	Bank of America	CHI	China Construction Bank	USA	JP Morgan Chase	229,897.90
3	UK	HSBC	CHI	Bank of China	CHI	Industrial & Commercial Bank of China	200,179.40
4	UK	Lloyds TSB	UK	HSBC	UK	HSBC	191,251.30
5	USA	Fannie Mae	USA	JP Morgan Chase	USA	Bank of America	181,086.30
6	USA	Bank One	JAP	Mitsubishi UF J Financial	CHI	China Construction Bank	174,465.70
7	USA	Wells Fargo	SPA	Banco Santander	USA	Citigroup	144,627.30
8	SWI	UBS	USA	Goldman Sachs	CHI	Agricultural Bank of China	141,661.80
9	JAP	Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi	USA	Wells Fargo	CHI	Bank of China	118,616.70
10	USA	Chase Manhattan	CHI	Bank of Communications	AUS	Commonwealth Bank of Australia	115,695.00
11	USA	Morgan Stanley Dean Witter	CAN	Royal Bank Canada	SPA	Banco Santander	110,278.00
12	SWI	Credit Suisse	CHI	China Merchants Bank	AUS	Westpac Banking	99,587.50
13	UK	Barclays	AUS	Westpac Banking	FRA	BNP Paribas	96,085.60
14	USA	First Union	FRA	BNP Paribas	CAN	Royal Bank Canada	95,246.20
15	USA	Charles Schwab	BRA	Itau Unibanco Banco Multiplio	UK	Lloyds Banking Group	88,822.70
16	USA	Freddie Mac	CAN	Toronto-Dominion Bank	CAN	Toronto-Dominion Bank	86,509.00
17	UK	National Westminster Bank	AUS	Commonwealth Bank of Australia	AUS	ANZ Banking	84,083.10
18	SPA	Banco Santander	BRA	Bradesco	SWI	UBS	79,420.60
19	JAP	Sumitomo Bank	ITA	Intesa SanPaolo	USA	US Bancorp	78,007.50
20	USA	Goldman Sachs	SWI	Credit Suisse	JAP	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial	77,980.80

Source: *Financial Times*, FT Global 500 1999, 2009 and 2014, ft.com.

dominance of Chinese banks after the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis before US banks rebounded by 2014. The temporary surge reflects the fact the Chinese government had the second largest economic stimulus in the world after the crisis, channeled largely through its banks.[238] That China's ascendancy occurs in a globalizing era conditions the nature of its rise in very different ways from the earlier ascendancy of the US in a national era. Despite China being the largest electronics exporter in the world for nearly a decade, for example, over 90 per cent of China's high-technology exports are by foreign, not Chinese, firms.[239] The slowing of rural-to-urban migration and rising wages means China may not be able to sustain its high industrial growth rates based on these factors.[240]

Germany also offers something of an alternative economic and political template to that of the US. It has, for example, the most social democratic ground-up worker participation of any European country, which has coexisted with its remarkable export figures, and has probably contributed to them. Geoghagen lauds Germany's creation of a high-wage, unionized economy, which it has achieved without shipping all its jobs abroad or creating a massive trade deficit. In Germany, the economic recession was managed by putting into place *kurzarbeit* or the short workweek program, with the German government paying people to stay on the job when they otherwise might have been let go by companies.[241] In what would be harder to imagine occurring in the US, at least in contemporary times, a number of Germany's rich also recently petitioned for higher taxes for the wealthy to help fund social and economic programmes to bolster Germany's economic recovery.[242] This is an implicit recognition of the important role of collective consumption, to use Manuel Castell's phrase,[243] in maintaining the economy and recycling the surplus, and stands in marked contrast to the management of class cleavages through force and physical separation, such as in gated communities.

In aggregate, EU states produce nearly a third of the world's economy, which is almost equivalent to the US and China combined. The EU has more Fortune 500 companies than either the US, China or Japan and is less energy profligate than the US. Some are more sanguine about Europe (Thomas Geoghegan) than others (David Harvey, who sees the EU as very neoliberal). Geoghegan makes an interesting connection between those European countries that followed the economic US model and supported the invasion of Iraq, and their current economic misfortunes:

> People in the countries that are in trouble now economically were the ones willing to go to Iraq – and there is a connection. These are the countries that were much more inclined to go the American route, going into debt heavily, using housing speculation as the engine of the economy, and opening their economies big time to global bank debt and finance.
>
> Goldman Sachs poured tons of money into Greece, and other New York, London and German banks poured money into Spain. None of the bubbles occurred in Germany and in the 'old Europe' that Donald Rumsfeld wrote off. Part of Europe is in trouble to the extent – and only to the extent – that

> it's involved in the American model. Those countries most resistant to the American model are doing fine.
>
> (Thomas Geoghegan)[244]

Despite these emerging configurations, the problem of effective demand remains. The capitalist economic system has historically expanded at a 2.5 per cent compound rate, and optimal compound growth is currently defined at 3 per cent. At a global scale, is 3 per cent compound growth possible or feasible? As David Harvey asks, 'What spaces are left in the global economy for new spatial fixes for capital surplus absorption?'[245] Financial assets in emerging markets – mostly in emerging Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa – constituted only 20 per cent of the global total, but accounted for almost 50 per cent of the global growth.[246] China has been the big standout, with the financial asset growth rates of other BRICS countries also recording growth rates of 20 per cent or more annually from 2003 to 2008.[247] Emerging markets commonly have higher GDP growth rates, infrastructure investment requirements and high savings rates. A McKinsey report hints that there are still untapped markets for capital among the populations of 'emerging markets':

> Bank deposits also constitute an asset class with enormous growth potential in the developing world, where large swaths of the population have no bank accounts. McKinsey estimates that in emerging markets, there are 2.8 billion adults with discretionary income who are not part of the formal financial system.
>
> (McKinsey Global Institute)[248]

As more financial capital is being raised outside of the financial hubs of New York, London and Tokyo, we may eventually see a re-orienting of the world economy towards a more multi-polar system in the longer-term, where the centre of economic gravity will shift towards the East. This is also where the majority of the world's poor are located, and where solutions to unconscionable post-scarcity poverty and to the system failure (or profitable deliberate maintenance) of reversed capital flows through still crippling Third World debt may yet be addressed. Proposals such as a Tobin-style tax may be developed (as ATTAC have advocated, and similarly by Thomas Piketty),[249] or a deeper, more systemic challenging of the imperative of endless compound growth may yet emerge. For China's contemporary embrace of (state) capitalism, dynastic China was also the place where the merchant class was kept in its place.

Outlook – peak appropriation?

> In place of the converging crises model, we may instead view our era's turbulence as a singular crisis – of capitalism as a way of organizing nature – with manifold expressions. Food and climate, finance and energy represent not multiple, but manifold, forms of crisis emanating from a singular civilizational project: the capitalist world-ecology.
>
> (Jason W. Moore)[250]

Corporatism often functions to paralyze transformative progressive political agency and effect a kind of fatalism and apathy. Jamie Swift thinks of neoliberal globalization as a 'necessary myth because it provokes a sense of political paralysis among those who might otherwise imagine alternatives to an unstable world economy dominated by currency speculators and transnational capital'.[251] The attempt to shoehorn global activists into the local scale while corporatists colonize the global scale by dubbing movements and activists 'anti-globalization' has been one past strategy. Another has been to label all groups who oppose ostensibly 'free' trade agreements (corporatist par excellence) as backward and protectionist. Of course, arguments against 'free' trade do not automatically amount to advocacy of protectionism, merely to the fact that there are other and more equitable and sustainable ways to conduct trade across various borders.[252]

Will corporatism, driven by extreme financialization and underpinned by violence, reach its asymptotic limit and undermine itself as a mode of accumulation-cum-governance? We recall that Bichler and Nitzan invoke the mathematical term asymptote to denote a ceiling or limit that is approached but never quite reached.[253] Asymptotes correspond with the last four major historical 'bear' markets they have identified, including the current and ongoing crisis that they identify as having started in 2000 rather than 2008.[254] Jason Moore also identifies the faltering of neoliberalism's strategies for reducing the Big Four input prices started at least five years prior to the global financial crisis of 2008.[255] At the current juncture, accompanied by the deepening of commodity relations in the sphere of reproduction, the shift towards financialization 'has been a powerful way of postponing the inevitable blowback of modernity's cheap nature strategy'.[256]

Despite the ongoing crisis, the power of dominant capital has increased and remains at record levels. Herein lies the paradox of greater power – the more you have, the harder it is to keep, and increase. While the corporate tax rate in the US was reduced from 55 to 20 per cent in the last century, owners were able to boost their after-tax profit by 78 per cent.[257] This stunning success also makes dominant capital vulnerable and undercuts their continued viability however, particularly as 'the patterns suggest that dominant capitalists now realize that their record profit-share-read-power has become unsustainable, hence the decade-long collapse of their forward-looking capitalization'.[258] Bichler and Nitzan speculate:

> Capitalist power rarely if ever reaches its upper limit . . . however, the closer capitalist power gets to its limit, the greater the resistance it elicits; the greater the resistance, the more difficult it is for those who hold power to increase it further; the more difficult it is to increase power, the greater the need for even more force and sabotage; and the more force and sabotage, the higher the likelihood of a serious backlash, followed by a decline or even disintegration of power.
>
> (Bichler and Nitzan)[259]

This is reflected in unprecedented levels of inequality which in the US is currently at its highest, and rivals Russia and Iran.[260] In a memo to 'my fellow zillionaires',

a self-identified member of the plutocracy Nick Hanauer, warns of pitchforks if inequality continues unchecked:

> . . . the problem isn't that we have inequality. Some inequality is intrinsic to any high-functioning capitalist economy. The problem is that inequality is at historically high levels and getting worse every day. Our country is rapidly becoming less a capitalist society and more a feudal society. Unless our policies change dramatically, the middle class will disappear, and we will be back to late 18th-century France. Before the revolution.
>
> (Nick Hanauer)[261]

Leading capitalists, reading the signs, have been struck by systemic fear: 'Peering into the future, they realize that the only way to further increase their distributional power is to apply an even greater dose of violence'.[262] Heikki Patomäki also foresees greater pain in a platter of scenarios: 'If the "recovery followed by neoliberal business-as-usual" scenario proves right, the underlying super-bubble that has already lasted for three decades will continue to grow, gradually creating conditions for an even bigger crash in the late 2010s or early 2020s'.[263] Globalization as endgame may involve a closing of the current capitalist accumulation frontier-regime in a potentially asymptotic situation, which may or may not also be compounded by the various peaks and the effects of climate change. As we have seen at the outset of the chapter, what Moore characterizes as the declining ecological surplus represents the contraction of dominant capital's opportunities to appropriate unpaid work: 'The "peak" that capitalism cares about is peak appropriation: the moment when the contribution of unpaid work is highest, relative to the abstract social labour (capital) deployed'.[264]

> Put simply, the Great Frontier that opened the capitalist epoch did so by making nature's free gifts – human natures' too – more or less cheaply available to those with capital and power. The end of the frontier today is the end of nature's free gifts, and with it, the end of capitalism's free ride.
>
> (Jason W. Moore)[265]

Wider afield, this may also be reflected in the scramble to clinch monopoly property rights and the buying up of huge swathes of fertile arable land in Africa that has been described by Massimo De Angelis as 'new enclosures' and James Boyle as 'the second enclosure movement'.[266]

The intensification of two forms of labour sabotage, unemployment and penality, can be seen as movements by dominant capital pushing against its class limits. This is reflected in the fact the correctional population in the US is over seven million, with two million inmates and five million more on probation or parole.[267] The criminalization of poverty such as the reappearance of debt prisons is coupled with the normalization of precarious, contingent labour, or what Guy Standing has dubbed the precariat.[268] We can attempt to extrapolate current trends that suggest continued rising inequality in income and political influence, and the concern

with inequality has in many respects been mainstreamed, from Joseph Stiglitz to Wilkinson and Pickett to Thomas Piketty.[269] The visibility of these developments has also influenced the widespread positive reaction to the Occupy movement, inspired by its ongoing South European and South American movement precursors.

People versus plutocracy

> The system ain't broke. It's fixed.
>
> (An Occupy slogan)

The late 2000s and 2010s has seen unprecedented action contesting both state and market corporatist structures and practices, particularly as a response to the wave of austerity measures rolled out by Western governments as part of the 2008 global financial crisis, such as in Spain, Greece, Iceland and the US state of Wisconsin; as well as its attendant crises in the majority world, such as the spikes in food prices in Egypt, Indonesia, parts of Africa and elsewhere; and has resulted in the toppling of authoritarian state regimes in the 'Arab Spring' (Tunisia, Egypt), although with varying aftermaths. Juan Cole foresees a long gestation period for promising Arab millennials – those born roughly around 1980 to 2000: 'Two or three decades from now, the twenty-somethings of Tahrir Square or the Casbah in Tunis or Martyrs' Square in Tripoli will, like the Havels of the Middle East, come to power as politicians'.[270] These are but a small sample of the multiple global protest movements which have focused on economic and social inequality, precarity and corporate power. Since October 2011, almost a thousand cities in over 80 countries have started Occupy movements.[271]

Drawing inspiration from the protests that characterized the Arab Spring and the Indignados (the 'outraged') movement in Spain and elsewhere in southern Europe, the progressive populism of the Occupy movement that started in September–October 2011 has seen a form of political contestation involving gathering near or occupying sites of iconic public power, such as Wall Street, in improvised camps situated in symbolic and public spaces. From Tahrir Square in Cairo to the privately-run public Zuccotti Park in New York, the occupation of public space as an act of political resistance has been significant. Initially convoked via magazines (Adbusters) or social media, Occupy has been an acephalous movement with mass appeal, pitched to the majority 99 per cent of the population who do not hold extreme wealth.

In the month following the occupation of Zuccotti Park in September 2011, a series of demonstrations were held in cities across Europe, particularly in countries especially affected by austerity such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Iceland. Significantly, Occupy protests also occurred in places where there was an absence of extreme austerity, such as Berlin in October, where up to 10,000 people participated in the Occupy demonstration on October 15. The Occupy movement's eschewal of concrete demands may denote a recognition that the movement was and has been about more than single issues that could be expediently addressed

by quick-fix legislation. Pickerill and Krinsky also state that Occupy's absence of specific demands can be interpreted as a refusal to 'recognize the legitimacy of the state as an agent capable of or willing to implement policy'.[272] Given that tear-gassing and beating of unarmed protested and campers were not uncommon, that intuition may well have been a prudent strategic choice. In 2012 the extent of the crack-down collusion between state and market corporatist structures became clearer: the US non-profit organization Partnership for Civil Justice Fund filed a Freedom of Information (FoI) request that revealed that there was a coordinated network to crack-down on Occupy protesters, involving the US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and police. Banks, campus police and university administrations closely partnered with the FBI to funnel and collect information about protesters.[273]

Looking at the glass half-full, Lawrence Cox sees a legitimation crisis in which large parts of the globe are not only protesting but have actually broken free from neoliberalism's ideological grip:

> The Zapatistas have held their territory for some 16 years. The Northern anti-capitalist movement is now some 11 years old, and has not retreated in the face of the turn to warfare and criminalization; rather, the 'leaders of the free world' remain in hiding at their regular summits. On a larger scale, the 'New World Order' has both lost control of large parts of South America, traditionally the US's backyard, as well as facing severe problems with European and Muslim allies alike in its Middle Eastern wars. The past decade has seen warfare as a way of life, neoliberal capitalism and ecologically destructive policies – all central movement targets – suffer massive losses in terms of popular consent.
>
> (Lawrence Cox)[274]

In addressing this legitimation crisis, the challenge may well be to transform the Indignados to instaurators, a proposition that will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In the public transcript projection of globalization examined in this chapter, people and alternatives have been placed on the putative margins of the framed-as-global, corporatist economy. This projection arrays a violent and hierarchical worldview that subsumes space and social processes into a singularist command and control ontology. The implicit acceptance of this projection even by critics who crucially leave unchallenged its perceived dominance means that subversion often fails or can be co-opted when it is forced into an oppositional stance. Representation matters in the way a singular representation of global reality stymies the radical heterogeneity of possibilities. For more than three decades, there has been a concerted effort to reconstitute not just the globalized capitalist economy but to re-shape the whole social structure of governance and process of accumulation. Neoliberalism

has been an orthodoxy disproven as an intellectual project by real events. In its more recent policy adaptations, I have argued in this chapter, neoliberal capitalist orthodoxy seems to have merged with the neoconservative project of endless war. Neither endless accumulation nor endless war is feasible, sustainable or desirable for the great majority of the world's people. This chapter has sought to disentangle corporatism from its deliberate conflation with globalization. In so doing my task has included disturbing the universalist and globalist pretensions of corporatism's projection of globalization, which includes an exploding financial sector and bubble-based crises that increasingly feed on stagnation.

At this juncture, it is becoming highly apposite to challenge the neoliberal and neoconservative projections of globalization, and to envision and enact a grassroots and humane globalization. In Chapter 3, I argue that efforts by an emerging global democratic movement have moved from merely opposing and contesting the social costs of the neoliberal, corporatist globalization agenda towards building globalization from the grassroots. A progressive propositional politics would see networked communities and movements invest in cultivating their capacities and incubating their ideas, and where possible subventing strategies for networked economic initiatives.

Notes

1 Original quotation in Latin, translated by Paul Turner. Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin, [1516] 2003), p. 130.

2 Ron Susskind, 'Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush', *The New York Times Magazine*, 17 October 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/17BUSH.html>.

3 The term 'dominant capital' is from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, who approximate it to the top 0.01 per cent of US-based corporations in terms of market capitalization, emblematic of Occupy's 'one-percenters'. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, *Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder* (London: Routledge, 2009), Chapter 14 as well as a slightly different measure of dominant capital employed in Bichler and Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', *Real-World Economics Review*, issue 60, 20 June 2012, pp. 18–63.

4 Greta R. Krippner, 'The financialization of the American economy', *Socio-Economic Review*, Vol. 3 (2), 2005, p. 174.

5 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', *Real-World Economics Review*, no. 61, September 2012, pp. 76–7.

6 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature, or: how I learned to stop worrying about "the" environment and love the crisis of capitalism'. In: Christian Suter and Christopher Chase-Dunn (Eds.), *Structures of the World Political Economy and the Future of Global Conflict and Cooperation* (Berlin: LIT, 2014), p. 302. The rapidly increasing participation of women in the labour workforce in the industrialized countries – 50 per cent from 1975 to 1995 in the United States – increased the double-duty they performed of paid and unpaid work and coincided with the wage repression policies central to neoliberal policy. Moore makes the point that this was 'also a *one-shot deal*. The commodity frontier is a one-way ticket. Frontiers, once appropriated and commodified, are no longer frontiers – they do however move on, as we've seen in the roll out of the proletarian relation for women across the Global South since the 1980s'.

7 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 293.
8 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 291.
9 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 304. As Moore summarizes: 'In the heartlands, the appropriation of women's unpaid work was central to the cheap reproduction of labour-power; in the hinterlands, the appropriation of extra-human natures (forests, soils, mineral veins) was often primary'.
10 Similarly, a typical dominant capital firm in the 1950s commanded a profit stream about 5,000 times the income of an average worker. By the late 1990s, the figure had multiplied fivefold to 25,000 times. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', *Review*, Vol. xxix, 2006, pp. 45–6. 'Fortune 500' refers to the annual ranking of the top 500 corporations worldwide by Fortune magazine, as measured by revenue.
11 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique Of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1909), p. 836.
12 Barry Lynn, *Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).
13 Thomas Geoghegan interviewed on 'Infinite debt: how unlimited interest rates destroyed the economy' on *Democracy Now!*, 24 March 2009, audiovisual and transcript, <http://www.democracynow.org/2009/3/24/thomas_geoghegan_on_infinite_debt_how>.
14 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. 10 (2), August 2004, p. 262.
15 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', *Real-World Economics Review*, no. 61, September 2012, p. 83.
16 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Neoliberalizing space', *Antipode*, Vol. 34 (3), 2002, pp. 380–404.
17 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Systemic fear, modern finance and the future of capitalism', *Dissident Voice*, 26 July 2010, <http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/systemic-fear-modern-finance-and-the-future-of-capitalism>.
18 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Systemic fear, modern finance and the future of capitalism', p. 32.
19 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'The scientist and the church', *Mimeograph, Montreal and Jerusalem*, July 2005, <http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/185/>, p. 10.
20 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', *Real-World Economics Review*, no. 61, September 2012, pp. 76–7.
21 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 258.
22 Shimshon Bichler, and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', p. 77.
23 Saskia Sassen, 'Pulling the economy down into our communities', *Z-Net*, 17 July 2009, accessed at <http://www.zcommunications.org/pulling-the-economy-down-into-our-communities-by-saskia-sassen>.
24 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (London: Profile Books, 2010), p. 27.
25 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 272.
26 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 258.
27 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', p. 60.
28 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', pp. 29–30.
29 See for example Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to Political Economy* (London: Pinter, 1988).

30 See John Agnew, *Hegemony: A New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). In Karl Polanyi's classic work, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, [1944] 1971), Polanyi argues that the emergence of market liberalism – the idea that markets are self-regulating and can be disembedded or abstracted from society at large – emerged as a means of managing the problems of industrialization. Polanyi rejected the notion that the economy can be abstracted from society, warning against supplanting social relations with a purely economic logic: 'The control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence . . . it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system' (p. 57). The goal of a putatively self-regulating disembedded market, which involves the commodification of people and nature, is a utopian (one could argue dystopian) project, against which his idea of the 'double movement' was developed, referring to the movement toward markets requires an alternative movement to stabilize it, which may include the state, and more recently, civil society through concepts like social capital.

31 The concept of legibility as it is applied here is drawn from James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State* where it is principally applied to the state.

32 Joseph Campbell, *The Power of Myth* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), p. 39.

33 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization and the research imagination', *Public Culture*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, p. 17.

34 See for example Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 'Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism"', *Antipode*, Vol. 34 (3), July 2002, pp. 349–79.

35 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 3.

36 Conservative Chris Patten similarly objects to what he sees as the hijacking of the term 'conservative': 'The one thing that neoconservative does not mean is conservative. As is often the case, "neo" means not "new" but simply "not"'. Chris Patten, *Not Quite the Diplomat* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 238. In contrast, Robert Cox calls this current phase of global capitalism 'hyperliberal' rather than neoliberalism because it tries to subsume all social life within the economic. See Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power* (London: Routledge, 2002).

37 Russell Leong, 'Majority world: new veterans of globalization', *Amerasia Journal*, Vol. 34 (1), 2008, pp. vii–xii; Shahidul Alam, 'Majority world: challenging the west's rhetoric of democracy', *Amerasia Journal*, Vol. 34 (1), 2008, pp. 89–98. See also <http://www.shahidulalam.com/>.

38 As a point of interest, the term 'free market' was barely used in Adam Smith's major works, appearing only once in *The Wealth of Nations* as 'open and free market'. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1776] 1976), p. 705. Nor does it make much of an appearance in Marshall, Hayek or Schumpeter: it is in Milton Friedman that the term's multiple use plays a 'starring role', a point made by Barry C. Lynn, *Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction*, p. 141.

39 This also speaks to the myth of pure capitalist markets: all advanced industrial economies depend to a large degree on activity outside markets. Much of this activity also makes formal activity possible. For its continued operation, the market economy depends upon public services and public institutions, the very institutions the ideology of neoliberalism serves to undermine through privatization.

40 David Harvey, 'Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition', *Interface*, Vol. 2 (1), May 2010, p. 247.
41 Bill Moyers, Howard Zinn Memorial Lecture, Boston University, 29 October 2010, text accessed at <http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/92657:bill-moyers-welcome-to-the-plutocracy>.
42 Bacon may have misattributed this great line to Aesop as it is found in the *Fables* of Laurentius Abstemius, which were annexed to an edition of Aesop's Fables in 1580. Francis Bacon, 'Of vain-glory', *The Essays, or Counsels, Civil and Moral*, Brian Vickers (Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Chapter 54, p. 119.
43 Samir Amin, *Re-reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), p. 14.
44 *Financial Times*, 'Pangloss on globalization', 7 March 1998, p. 8.
45 This is in stark contradistinction to those like Ayn Rand, whose protégés included Alan Greenspan, who held that the opposite was true. Ayn Rand's *The Fountainhead* (New York: Plume, [1943] 2005) and *Atlas Shrugged* (New York: New American Library, 1957) revolved around this theme that there were two classes of people: the producers and the parasites. The producers were, to her mind, the great industrial figures who created businesses and commercial empires, and it was everyone else who were somehow feeding off them.
46 Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*, 5th ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), p. 3.
47 This question is examined in such works as David Held, Anthony G. McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, [1996] 2000); and Peter Dicken, Jamie A. Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Unpacking the global' in Roger Lee and Jane Wills (Eds.), *Geographies of Economies* (London: Arnold, 1997), Chapter 12.
48 David Harvey, 'Globalization in question', *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol. 8 (4), Winter 1995, p. 2; Peter Dicken et al., 'Unpacking the global'; and Robert H. Fagan, 'The region as political discourse', Plenary Paper, Institute of Australian Geographers Conference, Newcastle Town Hall, Newcastle, Australia, September 1995, p. 8.
49 By 2004 the Triad produced 86 per cent of the global GDP. TNCs account for about two-thirds of world exports of goods and services, a significant share of which is intra-firm trade. Peter Dicken, *Global Shift,* pp. 39–40.
50 Robert Cox, for example, identifies three salient forms of capitalist political economy: the Anglo-American individualistic-competitive form; the European social market form and the Asian mercantilist form. Cox identifies hyperliberalism as the ideology of the first. See *The Political Economy of a Plural World*, p. 89. See also Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, *The Seven Cultures of Capitalism: Value Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands* (London: Piatkus, 1994).
51 Amongst other things, the NIDL thesis erred in oversimplifying the connection between manufacturing decline in OICs and TNC offshore migration to cheaper, globally optimal locations, downplaying the importance of *in situ* restructuring. Firms were compelled, as the General Electric manufacturing arm motto became in the early 1980s, to 'automate, emigrate or evaporate'. The portrayal of a placeless capital's footloose hypermobility in its game of ruthless, exploitative and mercurial arbitrage with

nation-states contrasted with the depiction of the relative immobility and powerlessness of labour and the state. There is no doubt however that the increased volume of world trade (particularly between TNCs), genuinely global financial flows (neglected by NIDL) and a more international division of labour between more knowledge-intensive production in the older 'triad' markets of North America, Western Europe and Japan, and the low cost production in the so-called NICs have been features of this period. See Robert H. Fagan and Michael Webber, *Global Restructuring: The Australian Experience* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994).

52 Regulation theory was developed in the 1980s by French structuralist sociologists such as Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz and taken up by Anglophone social scientists such as Bob Jessop. The regulation approach suggests that capitalist economies have moved through long waves (also known as Kondratiev waves after the Russian economist) of techno-economic change that confer stability: they are not simply economic cycles but describe the dominant modes of regulation, governance, production, and major technologies associated with each identified period (see Figure 2.1). See Michel Aglietta, *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience* (London: Verso [1976] 1979); Alain Lipietz, 'Behind the crisis: the exhaustion of a regime of accumulation. A "regulation school" perspective on some French empirical works', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. xviii, Spring and Summer 1986, pp. 15–16; Robert Boyer, *La Théorie de la Régulation: Une analyse critique* (Paris: Ladécouverte, 1986); Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, *Beyond The Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies In Their Place* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006); Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (Eds.), *Régulation Theory: The State of the Art* (London: Routledge, 2002).

53 According to proponents of Post-Fordism, globalization and restructuring within OICs has contributed to the re-emergence of regional economies and 'new industrial spaces' based upon smart, knowledge intensive 'sunrise industries' commensurate with the decline of traditional, blue collar, 'smokestack' industries. This development has also been described as constituting a 'second industrial divide'. See Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1984) and David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

54 The contemporary information economy is especially important to capital accumulation: profits often result from spatio-temporally mediated information asymmetries. Digital technologies and the Internet are deeply involved in these changes. The idea of a 'knowledge economy' and 'information age' coincided with the neoliberal political project. Yet it is worth remembering that both the Internet and its subset the World Wide Web was entirely government funded: initially, commercial use was in fact strictly forbidden and private enterprise came into the picture relatively late in 1989.

55 The notion of globalization having a spatial fix, whereby space and scale have roles in processes of crisis formation and resolution, is an ongoing question examined by David Harvey in his notion of a spatial fix (and later a 'spatio-temporal fix') to capitalism's contradictions: 'The very real possibility exists that the global pace of accumulation can be sustained through compensating oscillations *within the parts*' (emphasis added). David Harvey, *Limits to Capital*, 2nd ed (London: Verso, [1982] 1999), p. 428. The processes of globalization in this conception not only manifest as uneven impacts of restructuring, they in turn feed off that spatial unevenness.

56 E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, [1939] 1995), p. 45.

57 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', pp. 58–9.
58 They continue: 'The exponential growth in the Buy-to-Build Ratio also helps put in context the gradual shift of state policies. While official rhetoric in the United States and elsewhere has remained loyal to the "national interest" of growth, policy practice has increasingly tilted in favour of amalgamation via deregulation (and re-regulation in other forms), privatization, subsidies, and tax incentives'. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', p. 58.
59 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars', *Tikkun*, 9 August 2006, <http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/205/01/20060806nb_cheap_wars_tikkun_web.htm>.
60 Shimshon Bichler, and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', p. 79.
61 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', p. 51.
62 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 284.
63 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', pp. 286–7.
64 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 286.
65 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times* (London: Verso, 1994).
66 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Contours of crisis: plus ça change, plus c'est pareil? Part II', *Dollars & Sense*, 31 December 2008, <http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2008/1208bichlernitzan.html>.
67 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Can capitalist afford recovery? Economic policy when capital is power', *Working Papers on Capital as Power*, No. 2013/01, October 2013, p. 29.
68 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'How capitalists learned to stop worrying and love the crisis', *Dissident Voice*, 22 November 2013, <http://dissidentvoice.org/2013/11/how-capitalists-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-crisis>.
69 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'How capitalists learned to stop worrying and love the crisis'.
70 Cited in David Harvey, 'Afterthoughts on Piketty's capital', *Reading Marx's Capital with David Harvey*, 17 May 2014, <http://davidharvey.org/2014/05/afterthoughts-pikettys-capital> with no originating reference included by Harvey.
71 Even prior to but especially since the 1980s, suburbanization and urban transformations have been a huge sink for capital surplus absorption, albeit in an uneven process. The economic crisis has also been an urban crisis, particularly in the US where federal programs to address the urban crisis were drastically cut in many cities, leading to job loss, riots and social unrest. The experience of New York City in the 1970s and 1980s is particularly illustrative: City governments had increased borrowing but in the mid–1970s, investment bankers, who did not like community organizations' increasing power to shape urban environments, started refusing to lend. The aim was to 'discipline' the city and to enact their own corporate designs. This led to neoliberal city islands of privilege (Manhattan) in a sea of urban delapidation (the Bronx) and produced immense inequalities that governments were finding harder to ameliorate. David Harvey, 'The Crises of Capitalism', Lecture at The Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA), London, 26 April 2010, <http://davidharvey.org/2010/05/video-the-crises-of-capitalism-at-the-rsa>.
72 As cited by Joseph Schumpeter, *Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes* (London: Routledge [1952], 2003), p. 252. A search of Juglar's works does not

yield this exact phrase; though it may have been expressed in Schumpeter's words, however, it does not preclude that Schumpeter was summarizing Juglar's thought. See Jürg Niehans, 'Juglar's credit cycles', *History of Political Economy*, Vol. 24 (3), 1992, pp. 554–5, <http://hope.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/24/3/545.pdf>.

73 Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, *Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 52–3, Table 2.1. See also Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', *Real-World Economics Review*, Vol. 60, June 2012, p. 46, the reference for the 1970s figure.

74 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Neoliberalizing space', pp. 400–1.

75 David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 16.

76 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 15.

77 John Pilger, Sydney Peace Prize address, Sydney Opera House, 5 November 2009, <ttp://johnpilger.com/articles/breaking-the-great-australian-silence>.

78 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 32.

79 Milton Friedman, 'Preface, 1982' in *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1962] 2002), p. xiv.

80 Notably, while the neoliberal acolytes were brought in, General Pinochet did not reverse Salvador Allende's nationalization of the copper mines. He was a nationalist as well as neoliberal.

81 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 7.

82 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 121.

83 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, pp. 39–63; Walden Bello, 'A very capitalist disaster: Naomi Klein's take on the neoliberal saga', *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 15 (5), December 2008, pp. 881–91.

84 Since 1980, companies and financial institutions have increasingly turned to capital markets for financing, with equities and private debt accounting for most of the increase in financial assets. The total value of global financial assets reached a peak of US$194 trillion by 2007, equal to 343 per cent of GDP. McKinsey Global Institute, 'Global capital markets: entering a new era', September 2009, <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/gcm_sixth_annual_report/executive_summary.asp>.

85 Susan Strange, 'From Bretton Woods to the casino economy' in Stuart Corbridge, Nigel Thrift and Ron Martin (Eds.), *Money, Power and Space* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p. 59.

86 John Williamson, who coined the term 'Washington Consensus' has asserted that it has come to mean something different from that which he intended, and is worth quoting at length: 'Audiences the world over seem to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery . . . My own view is of course quite different . . . For the most part they are motherhood and apple pie, which is why they commanded a consensus. The three big ideas here are macroeconomic discipline, a market economy, and openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI). These are ideas that had long been regarded as orthodox so far as OECD countries are concerned, but there used to be a sort of global apartheid which claimed that developing countries came from a different universe which enabled them to benefit from: (a) inflation (so as to reap the inflation tax and boost investment); (b) a leading role for the state in initiating industrialization; and (c) import substitution. The Washington Consensus said that this era of apartheid was over . . . I of course never intended my term to imply policies like capital account liberalization . . . monetarism,

supply-side economics, or a minimal state (getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution), which I think of as the quintessentially neoliberal ideas'. See John Williamson, 'Did the Washington consensus fail?', Speech at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 November 2002, <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488>.

87 Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, 'The Asian crisis: The high debt model versus the Wall Street–Treasury–IMF complex', *New Left Review*, Vol. 228, March/April 1998.

88 The phrase 'poverty capital' is from Ananya Roy's *Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

89 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).

90 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for all* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2004), cited in David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism*, p. 42.

91 Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 2001), p. 126 cited in James Crotty, 'Why there is chronic excess capacity', *Challenge*, Vol. 45 (6), November–December 2002, p. 25 who notes that the UN, 'Using a different measurement procedure from Maddison's . . . estimates that world GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.4 per cent in the 1960s, 4.1 per cent in the 1970s, 3 per cent in the 1980s, and 2.3 per cent in the 1990s'.

92 Saskia Sassen, 'Too big to save: the end of financial capitalism', *OpenDemocracy*, 1 April 2009, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/too-big-to-save-the-end-of-financial-capitalism-0>.

93 Wayne Ellwood, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization* (London: New Internationalist Publications, 2001), p. 76.

94 Pre-crisis, South East Asian countries Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea were 'star pupils' of the Washington Consensus. The East Asian financial crash exposed flaws in the promise of neoliberal globalization. The crisis resulted from 'hot money' overinvestment in real estate, which led to panic withdrawal, devaluation of currencies, factory shutdowns and the slashing of public services. The crash pushed 20 million Indonesians into unemployment and haemorrhaged funds out of affected countries. Rather than power or strength, global capital markets here conveyed weakness, panic and volatility, albeit with powerfully devastating social consequences. Crisis capitalism involves the buy-up of assets, commonly by foreigners, at bargain basement prices, as seen in the foreign purchasing of over half of Korean companies and all of its banks. Rudi Dornbusch, a US economist, crowed, 'Korea is now owned and operated by our Treasury'. See 'Asian crisis spurs search for new global rules', *Economic Justice Report*, July 1998, cited in Wayne Ellwood, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization*, p. 89.

95 David Harvey, 'The crises of capitalism', *Lecture at The RSA*, London, 26 April 2010.

96 See Dollars & Sense, *Real World Macro*, 18th ed (Cambridge, MA: Dollars & Sense, 2001), Appendix 3; Duncan Green, *Silent Revolution* (London: Cassell, 1995), p. 91 and Appendix A, cited in Minqi Li, 'After neoliberalism: empire, social democracy, or socialism?', *Monthly Review*, Vol. 55 (8), January 2004.

97 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 'Tax administration: comparison of the reported tax liabilities of foreign- and US-controlled corporations, 1998–2005', GAO-08-957, 24 July 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-957>.

98 See Antony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

99 See John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (London: Granta, 1998); George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (New York: Perseus, 1998); Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

100 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics: Understanding Predatory Globalization*, trans. Raymond Rabitaille (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 216.

101 Jason W. Moore, 'Wall Street is a way of organizing nature: interview', *Upping the Anti*: *A Journal of Theory and Action*, no. 12, May 2011, p. 48. See also Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature'.

102 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 308.

103 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 27.

104 Shimshon Bichler and, Jonathan Nitzan, 'Can capitalists afford recovery? Economic policy when capital is power', Working Papers on Capital as Power, October 2013/01, p. 29.

105 Lester Salamon, 'The global associational revolution: the rise of the third sector on the world scene', *Occasional Paper 15*, Institute for Policy Studies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University), 1993, p. 114.

106 John Clark points to Greenpeace's UK membership rising to a third of a million in 1990, in contrast with Labour's membership of 280,000, for example. John Clark, *Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization* (London: Earthscan, 2003), p. 71.

107 In the last hundred years, there has been a two hundred-fold increase in civil society organizations operating on a world scale. (John Keane, 'Global Civil Society?', p. 26.) The Union of International Associations in Brussels estimates that currently there are about 25,000 international organizations. Some have had long continuous histories, such as the International Typographical Union, established in 1852, or the International Committee of the Red Cross, established in 1863 (John Clark, *Worlds Apart*, p. 97). Civil societies in both the 'East' and 'West' have a long lineage that goes back before the nation-state. The historical lens through which an emergent Global Civil Society is apprehended is undoubtedly a Eurocentric one. Global Civil Society institutions are concentrated in North-Western Europe. See Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, 'Introducing Global Civil Society' in (Eds.), *Global Civil Society 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 7.

108 Helmut Anheier et al., 'Introducing global civil society', p. 17.

109 John Keane, 'Global civil society?' in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and, Mary Kaldor (Eds.), *Global Civil Society 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Chapter 2, p. 20.

110 Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), p. 19.

111 See Robert Putnam, 'The prosperous community: social capital and public life', *American Prospect*, 21 March 1993.

112 Ben Fine, *Theories of Social Capital, Researchers Behaving Badly* (London: Pluto, 2010).

113 Katharine N. Rankin, 'Social capital, microfinance, and the politics of development', *Journal of Feminist Economics,* Vol. 8 (1), 2002, p. 10.

114 Tina Wallace, 'NGO dilemmas: Trojan horses for global neoliberalism?', *Socialist Register*, Vol. 40, 2003, pp. 202–19; Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson and Erika Sasser, 'The NGO-industrial-complex', *Foreign Policy*, no. 125, July–August 2001, pp. 56–65; Peter Buffett, 'The charitable-industrial complex', *The New York Times*, 26

July 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/opinion/the-charitable-industrial-complex.html>.

115 Patrick Reinsborough, 'Decolonizing the revolutionary imagination: values crisis, the politics of reality and why there's going to be a common sense revolution in this generation', *Journal of Aesthetics and Protest*, August 2003, Vol. 1 (2), p. 196. Reinsborough is ambivalent about certain NGOs and believes that they are regressive to the goal of social as opposed to concessionary change: 'NGOism views change in reference to existing power relations by accepting a set of rules written by the powerful to ensure the status quo. These rules have already been stacked against social change . . . NGOism institutionalizes the amnesia of the colonized imagination. After all, who needs a social movement when you've got a six-figure advertising budget and "access" to all the decision-makers?'.

116 Patrick Reinsborough, 'Decolonizing the revolutionary imagination', p. 198.

117 Japhy Wilson, 'The shock of the real: the neoliberal neurosis in the life and times of Jeffrey Sachs', *Antipode*, Vol. 46 (1), January 2014, p. 316. For Wilson, other examples of 'neurotic neoliberals' includes Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern (p. 318, endnote 22).

118 *The New York Times*, 28 March 2002, cited in John Clark, *Worlds Apart*, p. 103.

119 Oxfam International, *Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against Poverty* (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2002).

120 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization and the research imagination' in (Ed.) *Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 3.

121 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, p. 373.

122 Peter Ustinov, *Achtung! Vorurteile* (Hoffmann and Campe, 2003). In the original German: 'Der Terrorismus, der im furchtbaren 11. September kulminierte, ist ein Krieg der Armen gegen die Reichen. Der Krieg ist ein Terrorismus der Reichen gegen die Armen' and truncated as: 'Terrorismus ist der Krieg der Armen und der Krieg ist der Terrorismus der Reichen'.

123 Francis Fukuyama, 'The end of history?', *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, no. 16, pp. 3–18, subsequently expanded in Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, [1992] 2006).

124 US military spending figures expressed as a percentage of GDP are drawn from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars'; the Budget Authority for National Defence figures (FY 1948–2009) are drawn from the US Department of Defence and Congressional Research Service cited in Travis Sharp, 'Current US defence spending vs. spending since 1948', The Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 26 February 2009, <http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/022609_fy10_topline_growth_since48/>.

125 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'The scientist and the church', p. 17.

126 Chalmers Johnson, 'Why the US has really gone broke', *LeMonde Diplomatique*, February 2008, <http://mondediplo.com/2008/02/05military>. On the permanent arms economy in the US see Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); M. Kidron, *Western Capitalism Since the War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968); Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); see also Seymour Melman's body of work which includes *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); *The War Economy of the United States: Readings on Military Industry and Economy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971); *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline*

(New York: Simon and Schuster. [1974] 1985); and 'In the grip of a permanent war economy', *Swans*, 2003, <http://www.swans.com/library/art9/melman01.html>; and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

127 See Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'New imperialism or new capitalism?', pp. 1–86.

128 With more than two million of its citizens in prison, the extension of the so-called Patriot Acts, erosion of civil liberties and habeas corpus, as well as race, class, wealth disparities, the public transcript of Empire and its corporatocracy is at sharp odds with reality: 'We don't torture' – torture and extraordinary rendition happens; 'we are democratic' – civil liberties have been at their lowest levels with the effective abolition of Habeas Corpus. This illustrates Hannah Arendt's observation that 'though tyranny, because it needs no consent, may successfully rule over foreign peoples, it can stay in power only if it destroys first of all the national institutions of its own people'. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace and Company [1948] 1968), p. 8.

129 The US Supreme Court ruling of December 12 2000 in *Bush v Gore* ultimately halted the Florida recount of votes.

130 Its figures included Max Shachtman, Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol and Irving Howe. By the end of the Second World War, their radical anti-Stalinism had given way to liberal anti-Communism and clandestine co-operation with the CIA as part of the culture war against the Soviet Union. At the end of the Vietnam War, however, their liberalism was abandoned for 'neo'-conservatism. Second generation neoconservatives included both Jews and Gentiles, including military 'hawks' Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.

131 Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 73–8. These propositions are based on Bacevich's reading of Podhoretz. See Norman Podhoretz, 'Making the world safe for communism,' *Commentary*, April 1976; *Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1979); 'The neo-conservative anguish over Reagan's foreign policy', *The New York Times Magazine*, 2 May 1982; and 'Appeasement by any other name', *Commentary*, July 1983.

132 Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), 'Coping with crumbling states: a western and Israeli balance of power strategy for the Levant', 1996, <http://www.iasps.org/strat2.htm>.

133 I refer specifically to the Office of Special Plans (OSP), a shadow ad hoc agency for Iraq war planning created by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. It was a conduit to the White House that operated outside official intelligence channels and provided the Bush administration with alarmist reports on Saddam Hussein's administration in Iraq. It had close ties to a parallel intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon's office in Israel. See Julian Borger, 'The spies who pushed for war', *The Guardian*, 17 July 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/17/iraq.usa> and Sourcewatch, 'Office of Special Plans', accessed at <http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Office_of_Special_Plans>.

134 PNAC, 'Rebuilding America's defences: strategies, forces and resources for a new century', *Project for a New American Century*, September 2000, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>, pp. 50–1.

135 See Ray McGovern interviewed by Amy Goodman, '"The crazies are back": Bush Senior's CIA briefer discusses how Wolfowitz and Allies falsely led the US to war',

Democracy Now!, 17 September 2003, <http://www.democracynow.org/2003/9/17/the_crazies_are_back_bush_sr>.

136 The neoconservatives' unwillingness to separate sectional Israeli interests from US interests eventually led to non-Jewish neoconservatives such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Francis Fukuyama to defect. Fukuyama would go on to write *After the Neocons* (London: Profile Books, 2006).

137 George W. Bush, 'The national security strategy of the United States of America', 17 September 2002, published at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (active for then current year 2002–3 only, not archived at that link) and accessed at <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2320.htm>.

138 Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).

139 See The Economist, 'Iraq's oil: don't mention the o-word', 12 September 2002; Steve Schifferes, 'War in Iraq and the economy', *BBC News*, 8 November 2002; Anthony Sampson, 'Oilmen don't want another Suez', *The Observer*, 22 December 2002; Maureen Lorenzetti, 'A risky business', *Oil & Gas Journal*, 21 October 2002; Editorial, 'Oil, war, and Iraq', *Oil & Gas Journal*, 17 February 2003.

140 The role of the Israel Lobby in the US, unlike the far better documented role of the military industry lobby, is a large lacuna in many accounts of US hegemony and imperial designs, mitigated in part by the publication of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008). See also Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, 3rd ed (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1993).

141 See for example David Harvey who argues that the control of Iraqi oil was a means to arrest US hegemonic decline, and Neil Smith who marshals it in his Empire argument in *The Endgame of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005). In contrast, Derek Gregory's *The Colonial Present* evinces a greater awareness of the role played by the Israeli regime.

142 George Bush Senior, James Baker and Lawrence Eagleberger saw the invasion as undermining US strategic interests. See Michael Lind, 'How neoconservatives conquered Washington – and launched a war', *Antiwar.com*, 10 April 2003, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/lind1.html>. The 'Salvador Option' involves, in this case, using ethnic and sectarian death squads who have been US (and Israeli- and UK-) trained against recalcitrant communities, which has contributed to fomenting a civil war in Iraq. In January 2005, Newsweek reported the Salvador Option was being considered by the Bush Administration (Michael Hirsh and John Barry, '"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may put special-forces-led assassination or kidnapping teams in Iraq', *Newsweek*, 5 January 2005). See also Tom Gibb, '"Salvador Option" mooted for Iraq', *BBC*, 27 January 2005; John Pilger, 'The Salvador Option has been invoked in Iraq', *New Statesman* and *John PIlger.com*, 4 May 2006; Ali Al-Fadhily and Dahr Jamail, 'Government death squads ravaging Baghdad', *InterPress Service*, 19 October 2006; *The Washington Post*, 'Editorial: Iraq's death squads', 4 December 2005; Julian Borger, 'Israel trains US assassination squads in Iraq', *The Guardian*, 9 December 2003; Dahr Jamail, 'Negroponte's 'serious setback', *Truthout*, 3 March 2006; David Batty and Jamie Doward, 'Iraq war logs: UN calls on Obama to investigate human rights abuses', *The Guardian*, 23 October 2010. In contrast, there is little evidence that the oil establishment ever lobbied for invasion. Notably, James Baker co-chaired the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which recommended a phased US military withdrawal from Iraq. See James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairs), *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006.

143 See Stephen Holmes, 'Free-Marketeering', *London Review of Books*, 8 May 2008, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n09/stephen-holmes/free-marketeering> for a review of Klein's *The Shock Doctrine*. See also Alexander Cockburn, 'On Naomi Klein's "The shock doctrine"', *Counterpunch*, 22 September 2007, <http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn09222007.html>.

144 Stephen Holmes, 'Free-marketeering', *London Review of Books*, 8 May 2008. As Holmes goes on to note, 'the single most profitable event' in the history of Halliburton was the Iraq war, in which Dick Cheney, former CEO, still retains stock options.

145 Arundhati Roy, 'Peace and the new corporate liberation theology', Sydney Peace Prize Address, 4 November 2004, accessed at <http://peoplesgeography.com/2004/11/04/arundhati-roy-peace-prize-lecture-transcript/>.

146 Sidney Blumenthal, *The Rise of the Counter-Establishment* (New York: Sterling, [1986], 2008), Chapter 3 and 4.

147 Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (London: Penguin, 2007).

148 The propagation of humanitarian intervention helped the neoconservatives present themselves as idealists rather than as cynical realpolitikers. For more on humanitarian intervention as humanitarian imperialism, see Jean Bricmont, *Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006).

149 Their support for Bush's pre-emptive war makes more sense, Judt writes, 'when one recalls their backing for Israel: a country which for fifty years has rested its entire national strategy on preventive wars, disproportionate retaliation, and efforts to redesign the map of the whole Middle East'. Tony Judt, 'Bush's useful idiots: on the strange death of liberal America', *London Review of Books,* Vol. 28 (18), 21 September 2006, pp. 3–5. Elsewhere Judt notes: 'neoconservatives culpably overestimated America's capacity to dominate the actual world . . . almost no one in these circles had any military experience, so there was a natural disposition to exaggerate the scope for military action and minimize its risks'. Tony Judt, 'Dreams of Empire', *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 51 (17), 4 November 2004, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/nov/04/dreams-of-empire/>.

150 This is my own term and should not be confused with the 'neo–neo' debate in International Relations theory between the neorealists and neoliberal approaches.

151 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 81–6.

152 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC–68) was a classified report issued by the United States National Security Council in April 1950 during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. It became a blueprint for US foreign policy in the Cold War for the next 20 years and shaped the US as a National Security State. It signalled a shift in US foreign policy to a comprehensive containment strategy that involved both covert and overt financial, economic, political, and military warfare, underpinned by huge increases in military expenditure. Domestically, it called for US military preparedness to be placed on a perpetual wartime footing. The original document can be accessed at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

153 See Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell and Sabina Deitrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Identified as a crescent stretching from Washington state through to California, the south-west desert states, Texas and the Great Plains, Florida and up the east coast to New England, the US 'gunbelt' is defined as communities whose economies are dependent upon military industries.

154 Stuart Corbridge, 'Bearing witness: the global spigot, American empire and the colonial present', *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11 (1), 2006, p. 165.

155 Gary Stoller, 'Homeland security generates multibillion dollar business', *USA Today*, 10 September 2006, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/2006-09-10-security-industry_x.htm?csp=34>.

156 See Nick Turse, 'War's shopping cart', *LA Times*, 9 May 2008, accessed at <http://www.nickturse.com/articles/misc_shoppingcart.html>. See also his *The Complex: How the Military Invades our Everyday Lives* (New York: Metropolitan, 2008).

157 Paul Harris, 'How US merchants of fear sparked a $130bn bonanza', *The Observer*, 10 September 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/10/september11.usa>.

158 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 51. Critiquing Huntington's highly flawed and problematic book of a 'clash of civilizations' is outside the scope of my book but this quote is probably one of the few assertions from Huntington with which I would agree. Significantly, in the 1960s Huntington advocated an authoritarian rather than democratic path to economic development – see *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). In the 1970s he co-authored with Michel Crozier and Joji Watanuki, *Crisis of Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies* (New York: New York University Press, 1975) in which he argued that an excess of democracy was a disease of the US body politic, producing a 'democratic distemper' partly as a result of 1960s civil right and students movements. This endangered US projection of global power as the manifestations of the 'distemper' could 'have already stimulated uncertainty among allies and could well stimulate adventurism among enemies' (p. 106).

159 Michael Parenti, 'What do Empires do?', Michael Parenti website, 2010, <http://www.michaelparenti.org/WhatDoEmpiresDo.html>.

160 Benedict Brogan, 'It's time to celebrate the Empire, says Brown', *Daily Mail*, 15 January 2005, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-334208/Its-time-celebrate-Empire-says-Brown.html>.

161 The work of the Monopoly Capital school (Baran and Sweezy, Kalecki, Magdoff) is cited earlier; for Hobson, Hilferding, Luxemburg, Kautsky, and Lenin see John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: James Pott and Co., 1902), <http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Hobson/hbsnImpCover.html>; Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, Ed. Tom Bottomore (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1910] 1981); Karl Kautsky, 'Der imperialismus'. In: *Die Neue Zeit*, 32 (1914), Vol. 2, pp. 908–22; Karl Kautsky, 'Imperialism and the war', trans. William E. Bohn, *International Socialist Review* [Chicago] 15 (1914), <http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/war.htm>; V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, [1916] 1997); Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to an Economic Explanation of Imperialism*, Ed. W. Stark (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul [1913] 1951).

162 John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: James Pott and Co., 1902), Part I, Chapter VII, section 23.

163 United States Department of State Policy Planning Staff, Policy Planning Study 23, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 524, section VII. Also known as Memo PPS23, it was written by Kennan on 28 February 1948 and declassified 17 June 1974. To be

fair, Kennan reportedly opposed both the Vietnam and Iraq wars and the totality of his scholarly and policy work is more nuanced than this oft-cited précis. Nevertheless, it is indicative of and relevant to stated US policy and policy recommendations, though it should be read where possible in its entirety and I have endeavoured not to truncate the quote too much. See Gilles d'Aymery for some well-noted caution on its use, 'Context and accuracy: George F. Kennan's famous quotation', *Swans.com*, 28 March 2005, <http://www.swans.com/library/art11/ga192.html>.

164 See Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).

165 Beatrix Campbell, 'After neoliberalism: the need for a gender revolution' in Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey and Michael Rustin (Eds.), *After Neoliberalism? The Kilburn Manifesto* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2014), <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundings/pdfs/manifesto_gender_revolution.pdf>. See also Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'No way out: crime, punishment and the capitalization of power', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, Vol. 61 (3), April 2014, pp. 251–71.

166 See Mark Curtis, *Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses* (London: Vintage, 2004); Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power And Bare Life*, trans. by D Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) and *Ëtat d'exception: Homo Sacer* (Paris: Seuil, 2003).

167 Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization*.

168 Stuart Corbridge, 'Bearing witness', p. 167.

169 Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization*, p. 209.

170 Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization*, p. xiv.

171 See, for example, Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates Of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, [1999] 2005) and *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (London: Penguin [2005] 2011); Derrick Jensen, *Endgame, Vol. 1: The Problem of Civilization* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006); Bill McKibben, *The End of Nature* (New York: Random House, [1989] 2006); William R. Catton, *Overshoot: The Ecological Basis Of Revolutionary Change* (Illini Books/University of Illinois Press, 1982); James Howard Kunstler, *The Long Emergency: Surviving the End of Oil, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 2005); James Lovelock, *The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning* (New York: Basic Books, 2009) and Richard Heinberg, *Peak Everything: Waking up to the Century of Declines* (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2010). There has also been a proliferation of energy and peak oil websites in the past decade. See for example <http://www.peakoil.net>; <http://www.theoildrum.com> and <http://jayhanson.us>.

172 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Systemic fear, modern finance and the future of capitalism'.

173 Michael Kalecki, 'Vietnam and US big business' in *The Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism* (New York: Modern Reader, 1967), p. 114.

174 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', pp. 255–327.

175 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 320.

176 The 1990s saw a great deal of mergers and rationalization in the US military industry. Currently the world's largest defence company, in 1995 Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta, which also included Martin Marietta's own previous purchases of General Dynamics Space and GE Aerospace in 1993. In 1996 Lockheed Martin also acquired electronics company Loral, who in turn had also previously acquired several

defence companies. The second largest company, Boeing, merged with Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas and Northrop-Grumman is the result of a merger of Northrop, Grumman, Westinghouse and TRW. The three occupy the top three of the Top 100 US Federal Government Contractors, which Lockheed Martin has topped every single year from 2001 to 2012 (the last year accessed at time of printing). For data see <http://www.fedspending.org> and select drop down list of Top 100 Contractors by year. See also Sam Perlo-Freeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, 'The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world excluding China, 2012', *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, January 2014, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100>.

177 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars'.

178 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', pp. 310–11.

179 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars'.

180 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', pp. 304–6. As Bichler and Nitzan point out, price is so important that George Bush Senior in 1986 made an emergency trip to Saudi Arabia to persuade the kingdom to cut oil output in order to increase the price of oil. So much for free markets.

181 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Cheap wars'.

182 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Dominant capital and the new wars', p. 258.

183 Cited in Jack Metzgar, 'Would wage concessions help the steel industry?', *Labor Research Review*, Vol. 1 (2), Article 8, p. 26, < http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/lrr/vol1/iss2/8/>.

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188 Larry Lohmann, 'When markets are poison: learning about climate policy from the financial crisis', *The Corner House Briefing*, 40, September 2009, p. 19.

189 Gillian Tett, 'Lost through destructive creation', *Financial Times*, 9 March 2009.

190 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the American Securitization Forum (ASF), the European Securitization Forum (ESF), and the Australian Securitization Forum (AuSF) and McKinsey & Company, 'Restoring Confidence in the Securitization Markets', 15 October 2008, pp. 3–4, cited in Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Contours of crisis: plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?'.

191 Saskia Sassen, 'Too big to save: the end of financial capitalism'.

192 McKinsey Global Institute, 'Mapping global capital markets: fifth annual report', October 2008, <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/fifth_annual_report/fifth_annual_report.pdf>, p. 8.

193 Wayne Ellwood, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization*, p. 72.
194 McKinsey Global Institute, 'Mapping global capital markets: fifth annual report', October 2008, <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/fifth_annual_report/fifth_annual_report.pdf>.
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196 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 48.
197 Saskia Sassen, 'Too big to save'.
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200 Gillian Tett, 'Lost through destructive creation'.
201 John Quiggan, *Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jamie Peck, 'Zombie neoliberalism and the ambidextrous state', *Theoretical Criminology,* Vol. 14, 2010, p. 109.
202 Jamie Peck, 'Austerity urbanism: American cities under extreme economy', *City*, Vol. 16 (6), 2012, pp. 626–55.
203 James C. Scott, *Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity and Meaningful Work and Play* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 119.
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206 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Can capitalists afford recovery?', p. 10.
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amanmadefamine> and 'Food rebellions: mozambicans know which way the wind blows', 4 September 2010, <http://rajpatel.org/2010/09/04/food-rebellions-mozambicans-know-which-way-the-wind-blows>; Johann Hari, 'How Goldman gambled on starvation', *The Independent*, 2 July 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-how-goldman-gambled-on-starvation-2016088.html>; World Development Movement web site, 'Food speculation: briefings and reports', <http://www.wdm.org.uk/stop-bankers-betting-food-and-causing-hunger/briefings-and-reports>.

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214 Andrew Ross Sorkin and Vikas Bijaj, 'Shift for Goldman and Morgan marks the end of an era', *The New York Times*, 21 September 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html>.

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219 Saskia Sassen, 'Too big to save'.

220 Nitzan and Bichler, 'Contours of crisis: plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?'

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225 Michael Hudson, 'Why the US has launched a new financial world war – and how the rest of the world will fight back', *Counterpunch*, 11 October 2010, <http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson10112010.html>.

226 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital*, p. 147.

227 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital*, p. 36. Also illustrative of the fact is the number of corporations each country has in the 'Fortune 500' or alternatively the *Financial Times* (London) FT Global 500: the US has in the past had almost twice as many as its each next rival and is still currently well ahead of the next country, China. The 2013 top 10 list by country and number of Fortune 500 companies are: (1) USA: 132; (2) China: 89; (3) Japan: 62; (4) UK: 37; (5) France: 31; (6) Germany: 29; (7) Netherlands: 22; (8): Switzerland 14; (9) South Korea: 14; (10) Canada: 9. See <http://fortune.com/global500/>.

228 Sean Starrs, 'American economic power hasn't declined – it globalized! Summoning the data and taking globalization seriously', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57 (4), December 2013, p. 827.

229 Sean Starrs, 'American economic power hasn't declined – it globalized!', p. 825 and 823.

230 Sean Starrs, 'American economic power hasn't declined – it globalized!'.

231 Michael Hudson, 'Why the US has launched a new financial world war'.

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240 The Economist, 'The end of cheap China: what do soaring Chinese wages mean for global manufacturing?, 10 March 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21549956>; Vikas Bajaj, 'Bangladesh, with low pay, moves in on China', *The New York Times*, 16 July 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/business/global/17textile.html>; *The Economist*, 'The boomerang effect: as Chinese wages rise, some production is moving back to the rich world', 21 April 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21552898>.
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242 BBC, 'Rich Germans demand higher taxes', 23 October 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8321967.stm>.
243 See Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach,* trans. Alan Sheridan (London, Edward Arnold, [1972] 1977).
244 See Terrence McNally interviewing Thomas Geoghegan, 'Why Germany has it so good'. Of the countries currently in financial trouble, Ireland is officially neutral, although the Irish government allowed the passage of over 100,000 heavily armed US troops in the preparation for and the conduct of the US-led war against Iraq, and use of Irish airports and Shannon airport in southern Ireland, for example, has been used for at least a decade to refuel US war planes.
245 Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital*, p. 217.
246 McKinsey Global Institute, 'Mapping global capital markets', p. 14.
247 McKinsey Global Institute, 'Mapping global capital markets', p. 19.
248 McKinsey Global Institute, 'Global capital markets', p. 30.
249 ATTAC in French stands for Association pur la Taxation des Transactions financiers pour l'Aide aux Citoyons or Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens. It was formed in France in June 1998 and is now in thirty countries, with 30,000 members in France alone. Thomas Piketty also suggests a global wealth tax that he deems 'utopian'. See *Capital in the Twenty-First Century: The Dynamics of Inequality, Wealth, and Growth*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014).
250 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 290.
251 Jamie Swift, *Civil Society in Question* (Toronto, Ontario: Between the Lines with South Asia Partnership Canada, 1999), p. 62.
252 See editorials that appeared in the *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* on 17 November 1993 and 16 November 1993 respectively. The North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) treaty was enacted on 1 January 1994, the same day as the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, southern Mexico. The strident promotion of NAFTA by major corporate lobbies, for example, involved the mainstream corporatist media, with the aforementioned editorials not only extolling the virtues of NAFTA but also declaring that those not embracing it would be abdicating the US's historic role

in spearheading international liberalization and peace! According to the way NAFTA is promulgated, rejecting it would represent a backward step into isolationism and the US national interest was best served by 'national internationalism' – an update of the dictum 'What is good for General Motors is good for America'. This contrasts with vigorous opposition from anti-NAFTA coalitions united in support of a more participatory decision-making process about the global trade regime. These groups of students, environmentalists, labour unions, and other community groups advocated not protectionism as much as greater participation and consultation, in solidarity and horizontal networking with their counterparts in Canada and Mexico, hardly 'isolationist'.

253 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 20.
254 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 23.
255 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 301.
256 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 308.
257 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 43.
258 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', pp. 27–8.
259 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', pp. 20–1.
260 Joseph Stiglitz, 'Of the 1 per cent, by the 1 per cent, for the 1 per cent', *Vanity Fair*, May 2011, <http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105>.
261 Nick Hanauer, 'Memo: from Nick Hanauer to: my fellow zillionaires – the pitchforks are coming . . . for us plutocrats', *Politico*, July/August 2014, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-108014.html#.U6-T1kBP3Wj>.
262 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The asymptotes of power', p. 48.
263 Heikki Patomäki, 'Exploring possible, likely and desirable global futures: beyond the closed vs open systems dichotomy' in Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010), Chapter 9, p. 160.
264 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 297–8.
265 Jason W. Moore, 'The end of cheap nature', p. 303.
266 See Massimo De Angelis, 'Separating the doer and the deed', *Historical Materialism*, Vol. 12, 2004, pp. 57–87 and James Boyle, 'The second enclosure movement and the construction of the public domain', *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 66 (1–2), 2003, pp. 33–74.
267 Bichler and Nitzan, 'No way out: crime, punishment and the capitalization of power', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, Vol. 61, 2014, pp. 251–71.
268 Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
269 See for example Joseph Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers our Future* (W. W. Norton, 2012) and 'Of the 1 per cent, by the 1 per cent, for the 1 per cent'; Richard Wilkinson and Kate Picket, *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always do Better* (London: Allen Lane, 2009) and the aforementioned Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century.*
270 Juan Cole, 'The Arab millennials will be back: three ways the youth rebellions are still shaping the Middle East', *TomDispatch*, 29 June 2014, <http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175862/tomgram:_juan_cole,_waiting_for_the_arab_summer>.
271 See infographic summary in 'How Occupy Wall Street began', *Occupy Theory* website, 17 February 2014, <http://occupytheory.org/how-occupy-wall-street-began/>, accessed July 1, 2014.

272 Jenny Pickerill and John Krinsky, 'Why does Occupy matter?', *Social Movement Studies*, Vol. 11 (3–4), 1 August 2012, p. 283.

273 The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, 'FBI Documents Reveal Secret Nationwide Occupy Monitoring', 22 December 2012, < http://www.justiceonline.org/commentary/fbi-files-ows.html>. Naomi Wolf, 'Revealed: how the FBI coordinated the crackdown of Occupy', *The Guardian*, 30 December 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/29/fbi-coordinated-crackdown-occupy>.

274 Lawrence Cox, 'The interests of the movement as a whole: response to Harvey', *Interface*, Vol. 2 (1), May 2010, pp. 305–6.

3 Infraglobalization and the sub rosa

From another world is possible to many worlds already exist

> Those who crusade, not for God in themselves but against the devil in others, never succeed in making the world better but leave it either as it was, or sometimes even perceptibly worse than it was, before the crusade began. By thinking primarily of evil we tend, however excellent our intentions, to create occasions for evil to manifest itself.
>
> (Aldous Huxley)[1]

> Far away from the glare of global media, ordinary people are making history, not by organizing arms to fight a brutal empire but by self-organizing their lives – their resources, their cultures, their economies – to defeat the empire by turning their back to it, rejecting its tools and its logic, refusing its chains and its dictatorship.
>
> (Vandana Shiva)[2]

> The only true voyage of discovery, the only fountain of Eternal Youth, would be not to visit strange lands but to possess other eyes, to behold the universe through the eyes of another, of a hundred others, to behold the hundred universes that each of them beholds, that each of them is; and this we can contrive with an Elstir, with a Vinteuil; with men like these we do really fly from star to star.
>
> (Marcel Proust)[3]

If globalization is a primary hub around which we are re-making our world, its contested construction crucially involves its actors as much as its structures. Agency is at the heart of the project to remake globalization by more democratic determination, and to enact a more participatory and people-centred development from the ground-up. In taking agency seriously, this chapter extends Chapter 2's spotlighting of the more organized, visible formations of civil society to 'what lies beneath'. Our attention is now directed to the often hidden and publicly underrepresented sections of the spectrum of global processes and social order, and seeks to conceptualize these deep sub rosa geographies by advancing a notion of infraglobalization. As the prefix 'infra' suggests, we examine a geographical reality that, like infrared light in the electromagnetic spectrum, is very much constitutive of reality but may be out of immediate visual range. Put another way, these hidden or invisible geographies are analogous to white light in normal visual range becoming, upon closer examination, a spectrum of colour.

The first purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that different ways of seeing may yield surprising results at significant variance with what I have described as conventional accounts. Recognizing the often thriving 'subaltern' in the infrageographies of social reality offers another way of seeing that challenges the status quo. Positionality matters in the way marginalized voices and processes can reveal insights and illuminate global socio-spatial reality in a way corporate elite-centred accounts lack; as Chapter 4 argues, an ontology of multiplicity transforms the idea that knowledge is merely situated and produced at a single point, which tends to multiply perspectives within a singular ontology. I argue here, and in Chapter 4, that this also has implications for our ideas about how space is organized and produced, and also can inform our ideas about the constitution of social reality.

A second aim is to put forward the notion that the majority of the populace have far more power – more precisely, empowerment – than is often represented, and that conventional analyses and even ostensibly critical accounts may confer a very limited and narrow conception of agency. It is a manifestly worthy endeavour to challenge the apparent ideological domination of one presentation of globalization praxis over other representations. It is an aim of this book to posit that the next step should be to invest more of our intellectual and practical energies in sketching, building, recognizing and replicating alternatives. In doing so, we may also put forward a presentation of globalization that is far more representational across the full spectrum of human activity. Therein, I submit, also lies liberatory and transformational potential.

Infrapolitics: the greatest story never told?

> . . . society is a very mysterious animal with many faces and hidden potentialities . . . it's extremely shortsighted to believe that the face society happens to be presenting to you at any given moment is its only true face. None of us knows the potentialities that slumber in the spirit of the population, or all the ways in which that population can surprise us when there is the right interplay of events, both visible and invisible.
>
> (Václav Havel)[4]

There is a developed system of social scientific conventions – both generically and in disciplinary canons – for representing the visible. The 'invisible', in contrast, is far less codified. The idea and reality of 'hidden', 'submerged', 'interstitial' spaces and parallel people's geographies has however found contemporary expression in the social sciences, such as humanist Human Geography, Social History (in particular, the *Annales* School) and Planning, particularly the work of Jane Jacobs, which has also highlighted the importance of grassroots processes. In Human Geography, David Harvey advocated the notion of a people's geography in 1984:

> The geography we make must be a people's geography, not based on pious universalisms, ideals and good intents, but a more mundane enterprise that reflects earthly interests, and claims, that confronts ideologies and prejudice

> as they really are, that faithfully mirrors the complex weave of competition, struggle, and cooperation within the shifting social and physical landscapes of the twentieth [and twenty-first] century . . . Such a people's geography must have a popular base, be threaded into the fabric of daily life with deep taproots into the wellsprings of popular consciousness. But it must also open channels of communication, undermine parochialist worldviews, and confront or subvert the power of the dominant classes or the state.
>
> (David Harvey)[5]

These ways of seeing are coming into a number of disciplinary frames: In Political Economy, Hobson and Seabrooke distinguish between 'everyday international political economy' (EIPE) and the more conventional, orthodox 'regulatory international political economy' (RIPE), wherein sources of everyday action may get blurred in a lens that structurally favours certain actors and where in fact objects may often appear larger than they really are, recalling Gibson-Graham's important work on resignification, and expressly building upon the work of Murphy and Tooze.[6] In Geography, Richard LeHeron describes 'progressive spaces'; Alan Pred links what he calls the situated practices of everyday life with 'invisible geographies that are every bit as real as their visible counterparts'; after Warner, Noel Castree identifies a 'global counter-public' whose views are not represented as the (constructed) mainstream; and drawing upon her experience of attending the WSF, Michal Osterweil sketches an emergent politics she calls 'place-based globalism', to cite but a few examples.[7]

One of the most compelling theorizations of sub rosa activism and dissent, James C. Scott's infrapolitics, warrants greater examination. Developed in his work *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Scott's infrapolitics offers a way to think beyond the traditional narratives of globalization and structural geopolitics, accounts that tend to be sectional and reflective of dominant public power structures and actors. In this chapter I put forward the idea of sub rosa geographies, as reflected in the infra prefix, which can help us interpret and decode the contradictions of power relations and offers a doorway into rethinking resistance and grassroots agency. Here, we consider that grassroots globalization could be described as the hidden transcript for which corporate globalization – as well as some sections of global civil society – is but the visible tip of the iceberg. This section explores Scott's work in greater detail, and then examines the implications for how we think about agency, power and the production of space and knowledge, building towards a notion of infrageographies of globalization. This is then considered alongside the increasingly acknowledged importance of the everyday and of informal order as elemental to the constitution of global processes.

In examining power and resistance, domination and dissent, Scott distinguishes between what he terms the public and hidden transcripts. The official, public transcript is corporatist and governing elite-authored, framed, disseminated, filtered and stage-managed. Certain norms and ideological justifications for social inequality upon which their claims to power are based are disseminated through key

social institutions, including corporate media (encapsulated, as Robert Fisk notes, in the ever ubiquitous phrase in mainstream journalism, 'officials say') as well as other displays and rituals of power such as official celebrations.[8] In this conception, official policies and processes that are normally the primary foci for social scientific analysis is but one layer, the public transcript.

The public transcript is akin to the officially sanctioned record that presents the *apparent,* surface reality of superior-subordinate relations, the public face where the majority of people appear to acquiesce to unequal power relations and give consent to be governed. The public transcript amounts to the 'self-portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves seen'.[9] Certainly, the outward-appearing stability and apparent efficacy of a given system of domination may say little about its legitimacy or mandate. The naturalization of power is made possible and plausible by presenting a unified, cohesive front; it requires, in Max Weber's phrase, the 'psychological reassurance of legitimacy', not simply the act of domination itself.[10]

In the context of globalization, this is perhaps best represented by corporatism as examined in Chapter 2. In a sense, the public transcript exists as public performance and euphemized power.[11] Appearances do not necessarily reflect circumstances; not only are 'the powerless . . . often obliged to adopt a strategic pose in the presence of the powerful', but the powerful in turn 'may have an interest in overdramatizing their reputation and mastery'.[12] If hegemonic public discourse is almost always overstated according to this 'roleplaying', it holds that hegemony itself may be overstated and that hidden transcripts reveal more capacity than is usually acknowledged.

In parallel, there also exists a 'hidden transcript' of actors and spaces wherein everyday acts of enacting economic and social difference and diversity are enacted without necessarily issuing openly declared contestations against hegemonic groups. Scott has coined the term 'infrapolitics' to describe these everyday acts and alternatives. This refers to the shifting dynamics of (outwardly) dominant-subordinate relations, where contestation is often implied rather than declared, and which should not be mistaken for acquiescence.[13] Scott describes offstage, infrapolitical activity in the hidden transcript as 'surreptitious resistance' whereby it may be strategically beneficial not to declare avowed subversion, non-adherence to corporatist elite norms or parallel grassroots systems.[14]

Patterns of domination and dissent exist in almost all societies, albeit in different degrees and forms. Concomitantly, human agency also exists in even the most repressed societies, where repression often requires and fosters in dissidents and ordinary people an experimental spirit, a capacity and willingness to 'exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences and lapses available to them'.[15] In contemporary Western societies, too, publicly aired dissent represents only a fraction of greater infrapolitical activity, and repression has been a long feature in modern political history, from anti-communist hysteria in the 1950s to 'anti-terrorism' after 2001, as national and transnational border controls, surveillance technologies, racial profiling and war continue to mark differentiations between 'cherished life' and 'expendable life'.

The hidden transcript represents discourses and practices excluded from the public transcript of subordinates – that is, their public face – by the exercise of power.[16] In the dramaturgy of power, a dual culture develops: 'the official culture [is] filled with bright euphemisms, silences and platitudes and an unofficial culture that has its own history, its own literature and poetry, its own humour, its own knowledge of shortages, corruption and inequalities that may, once again, be widely known but that may not be introduced into public discourse'.[17]

The hidden transcript may escape the reach of hegemonially directed socialization or simply operate in parallel with it, with sites as varied as the local hall, pub, home, place of worship, club and even streets (one thinks of the infrapolitical car code of flashing headlights to fellow motorists to warn of nearby police patrols). These more autonomous sites are not simply interstices left empty by public transcript elites however, despite the 'interstitial' (from the public transcript perspective) characterization; they are often actively fought for and created. In Scott's words, these more secure, unpatrolled, comparatively autonomous social spaces that nurture dissent and alternatives are a 'social creation, not a social given'.[18]

The hidden transcript is often 'hidden in plain sight' but may be in coded or disguised form, especially in situations where open rebellion might be foolish. Scott suggests that hidden transcripts may still be expressed openly, though not necessarily in overtly hegemonic spaces and sites. In disguised form they may appear as implicitly subversive jokes, gestures, folktales, sayings, song, theatre, gossip, forms that 'insinuate a critique of power', all the while protected by the cloak of 'innocuous understandings of their conduct'.[19] An awareness of words or practices in everyday or 'folk' culture may be required to pierce the strategic ambiguity, as dissent and alternatives do not necessarily involve physical distance as much as the deploying of illegible linguistic codes and gestures. As Scott asserts: 'By the subtle use of codes one can insinuate into a ritual, a pattern of dress, a song, a story, meanings that are accessible to one intended audience and opaque to another'.[20]

Even where a seditious message is clear to the publicly powerful, it may be sufficiently ambiguous or cloaked so that innocence can still be plausibly claimed. The verbal facility in rap music and folk tales, for example, shows how intentionally cryptic and opaque words can conceal and code defiance. A subversive couplet implicitly challenging privilege around the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381 demonstrates how a critique of the status quo can be artfully insinuated:

> When Adam delved and Eve span,
> Who was then the gentleman?[21]

Indeed, subordinate groups may often be 'complicitous in contributing to a sanitized official transcript, for that is one way they cover their tracks'.[22] The dominated themselves may often have an interest in keeping up hegemonic appearances, because 'ideological resistance can grow best when it is shielded from direct surveillance'.[23] Subordinates have a strategic interest in not publicly discrediting

or challenging these hegemonic appearances. 'The logic of infrapolitics', Scott writes, 'is to leave few traces in the wake of its passage'.[24]

The existence of the hidden transcript means that extraction of *outward* compliance is less likely to be a reliable or valid guide to 'offstage', or hidden transcript, sentiment. Putative subordinates may behave dualistically, which is not necessarily to say duplicitously, but rather discreetly. This is particularly so in power-laden contexts such as a colonized society, where 'a misplaced gesture or misspoken word can have terrible consequences'.[25] Historically, serfs and slaves have dared not contest their subordination openly; but behind the scenes 'they are likely to create and defend a social space in which offstage dissent to the official transcript of power relations may be voiced'.[26]

Protective and expedient displays of compliance are here not tantamount to active consent but are adopted in order to make a living, to keep one's job, or simply to survive. Everyday resistances may not overthrow public systems or lead to 'official emancipation' – it need not have this declared intent. Petitioning to power publicly may in fact rattle an insecure regime, with often fatal consequences as can be seen in such varied instances as the 1905 Russian Revolution, Bloody Sunday in Ireland in both 1920 and 1972, the 1988 Tiananmen Square massacre in China and the popular protests against the Gaddafi and Mubarak regimes in 2011.[27] Often 'speaking truth to power' is strategically unwise or inopportune at a particular point in time. Indeed, relatively safe, open and declared political dissent is both rare and recent if one takes a larger geographic and longer historical view.[28]

The concealing practices of resistance and alternatives is often an important way of prolonging them, and subordinates' ability to neutralize or reverse the dominant ideology may in fact be predicated upon continued concealment. The fact that an often-thriving black economy of 'illegal' economic transactions exists in most states is one such example. As subordination and privilege is not merely symbolic but is anchored in material practices, 'low profile stratagems' to minimize or even overturn appropriation have included theft, pilfering, poaching, nonpayment of taxes, foot-dragging, work slowdowns, the black market, squatting and payment evasion. Clandestine actions may be outside the ability of corporatist entities such as companies or even large unions to control, patrol or prevent, and can include whistle-blowing, wildcat strikes, leaks, absenteeism and sabotage. Thwarting material appropriation may take myriad forms of disguise that may not register upon the public transcript: evasion of taxes and tithes and foot-dragging will not necessarily register on the public transcript as a contested claim to status and legitimacy as a tax riot would.

In some cases public officials may be aware of non-cooperation and do not call public attention to it, for to do so would be an admission of the tenuousness or diminution of institutional authority. Authorities can often tolerate a large degree of private non-conformism as long as it does not publicly challenge hegemonic appearances. Just as the Catholic Church is aware that many Catholics live out of wedlock or do not attend mass regularly, '(m)any forms of authority can tolerate a remarkably high level of practical non-conformity so long as it does

not actually tear the public fabric of hegemony'.[29] Choosing not to formally get married, for example, is not tantamount to a wholesale repudiation or challenge of the Church's authority on the sacrament of marriage. Institutional elites also crucially have an interest in maintaining a façade of cohesion lest subordinates exploit weak links to renegotiate power relations. Hence, the *appearance* of unanimity is important; publicity has in these cases suited neither public officials nor subordinate groups.[30]

Infrapolitical acts may encompass a wide range of activities from dissident arts and media to squatting to satire to gossip; one can distinguish between systematic and more episodic and sometimes symbolic covert resistance, such as a subversive yet potentially incendiary saying. Other examples of alternatives might include the Egyptian *sha'b* – familial ties that inform the distribution of resources and that runs parallel to the state, and the openly parallel social systems operated by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Even in more overtly repressive societies, infrapolitics can help account for and explain deep spaces of autonomy and agency. Azadeh Moaveni's memoir of returning to Iran after living in the US details the rich infrapolitical lives of people away from the repression and scrutiny of the morality police,[31] highlighting Scott's assertion that even '(s)ubordinates in such large-scale structures of domination nevertheless have a fairly extensive social existence outside the immediate control of the dominant'.[32] Forms of resistance not only exist but also thrive in the most repressive and apparently acquiescent societies with strategic disguising of insubordination where open resistance would be imprudent and counter-productive.

Depending upon the severity of domination, there are varying degrees of disparity between the public and hidden transcripts. It is conceivable that the stronger the grip of official policies of neoliberalism, for example, with the erosion of individual and welfare rights these policies have wrought, the stronger the offstage activity will likely be. The corrosion of the social contract and pauperizing of the social safety net in some Western industrialized states, for example, may in fact be the most pronounced in the heart of Empire: with two major theatres of war and a number of others, the US economy has see-sawed decidedly toward guns and away from butter, suspended habeas corpus and enacted 'Patriot' Acts I and II in the 2000s and extended in the 2010s. In the UK, the government in 2008 sought to extend detention without charge to 42 days in the *Counter-Terrorism Act 2008*, the longest period for any representative democracy. The previous limit of 28 days had already surpassed other parliamentary democracies; the measure was subsequently dropped and the annual renewal of the legislation was allowed to expire, so that from January 2011 the pre-charge detention limit of 14 days was reinstituted, which still exceeds pre-charge detention terms of comparable countries.[33]

The hidden transcript allows for greater dimensionality in the constitution of subjects and sites, including for the fact that agential role-playing can commonly occur in keeping up appearances for strategic purposes. It recognizes, for example, that we may act out a public performance at variance with our infrapolitical activities, such as holding a day job at a large corporate firm in addition to being a

cooperative organizer, or a public servant who publicly upholds official narratives yet also maintains a political blog or who contributes to Wikileaks.[34] Action, both covert and overt, presupposes a little 'acting'. For Scott, this has also involved subordinates playing along in order to extract more concessions or thwarting elites by deliberately playing dumb and/or even playing up to stereotypes.[35] The purpose in maintaining this apparent conformity and tactical, outward compliance is often to survive while nourishing one's own, offstage culture.

Infrapolitical practices are excluded, ignored and/or marginalized from the public transcript by the ideological parameters in which the public transcript is cast. The public transcript of privileged governing elites denies by omission the viability of autonomous social action outside of its ideological boundaries. To cite two examples, complementary community currencies are often very successful and rarely have the more subversive intent of *replacing* the official currency. Despite supplementing rather than supplanting the official currency, corporatist interests may however be threatened, such as when the Board of the Bank of Thailand pressured the Thai government to order the Northeast villages of Kud Chum district to give up their local currency system, the Bia, in 2000.[36] In the US, of a number of successful complementary currencies in the country, the 'liberty dollar' has operated more subversively with its founders initially forming to challenge the constitutionality of the privately operated US Federal Reserve. In 2009, its offices were raided by the FBI, its commodity-backed paper bills confiscated, and its founders arrested, with legal action taken.[37]

Infrapolitical activism, alternatives and forms of challenge are often understated and informal, but they may also extend and 'hatch out' into open defiance and direct resistance as well. Their informality does not mean that they are disorganized, only that they tend to originate and occur outside of official and professional public politics. It is a contention of this book that openly declared public political action and alternatives, including those described within the rubric of 'global civil society', is but one, more publicly visible layer, and constitutes only a fraction of alternative and dissident praxis. The displays of apparent domination and apparent consent played out in the public arena are not nearly the definitive social reality; there is more than meets the eye.

As well as a prologue to more public action, Scott conceives of infrapolitics as an elemental building block of social reality in contrast to the tip of the public transcript iceberg, and as a foundational groundwork incubator: 'It is the building block for the more elaborate institutionalized political action that could not exist without it'.[38] Infrapolitical activities are often the unsung tide of actions that enable, and are the underpinnings of, a visible, public transcript-registering breakthrough. It was only the persistent behind-the-scenes grassroots actions of several citizens groups that enabled the *formal* political ending of the apartheid regime in South Africa, for example.[39] Infrapolitical activity could be characterized perhaps as the silent achiever to its louder public, declared resistance twin, or as Scott puts it: 'each realm of open resistance to domination is shadowed by an infrapolitical twin sister who aims at the same strategic goals but whose low profile is better adapted to resisting an opponent who could probably win any open confrontation'.[40]

Imagining and enacting a counterfactual social order often requires the safety of incubation away from corporatist elite surveillance and control. In this way, infrapolitical sites may function as an important innovation 'import-substitution' where alternatives are allowed to incubate in an offstage setting before unveiled more publicly. This allows for the protection and germination of an idea, an action, even an institution, before optionally bursting out on the scene to register on the public record. Cooption may occur if an activity's success is not protected, such as with the corporatization of the Mondragon cooperatives system and the corporatization of microfinance, which still thrives as a grassroots community endeavour, as the experience of Kerala and elsewhere demonstrates. Cooption or rejection is not the only possible set of consequences of an action crossing the threshold from private to public transcript however. The fertility of the hidden transcript and the possibility of tolerated non-conformism suggest that infrapolitics may simply continue to thrive as a parallel to the public transcript. How does this square with the purported hegemony of the public transcript and how we think about power?

Rethinking power, hegemony and agency

> Live with your head in the lion's mouth. I want you to overcome 'em with yesses, undermine 'em with grins, agree 'em to death and destruction, let 'em swoller you til they vomit or burst wide open . . . Learn it to the young 'uns.
>
> (Ralph Ellison)[41]

The broad aim of all hegemonic ideology, including that of the corporate globalization narrative, is to encourage a naturalization or normalization of domination patterns in which alternatives are marginalized or dismissed.[42] Through the public transcript, governing corporatist (both state and non-state) elites strive to legitimize the status quo and marginalize any social order-challenging alternatives as self-evidential quixotic absurdities; as Pierre Bourdieu has noted: 'Every established order tends to produce . . . the naturalization of its own arbitrariness'.[43] That there is a fundamental irreconcilability between the impunity of power and subversive truths and practices that would challenge it tends to reinforce the presence of a hidden transcript. For Scott, the very existence and practice of domination is self-validating: 'the process of domination generates the social evidence that apparently confirms notions of hegemony'.[44] This itself implies there is more to power and empowerment than is presented by the self-validating public transcript account of globalization. A more covert dialogue with established power is suggested.

While an extensive theoretical examination of power is outside the scope of my inquiry, the omnipresence of power *relations*, not just structures, means agency cannot be examined without also detailing how power and empowerment can also be re-thought. Power relations are certainly far more complex than domination and resistance, ruler and ruled. Put simply, however, the power of governing elites is conventionally understood to be exercised in their material appropriation and control, surveillance and scrutiny, and dissemination of values and ideology

(that is, symbolic reach), all backed up by force. Outward consent and compliance is a combined result of the internalization of norms, punishment, reward and surveillance; the basic antagonism that comes as a result of the differential in power relations and privilege is held in check with combinations of the carrot and stick. An ideology that makes claims to hegemony also involves making promises and justifications to subordinate groups about why a particular social order is in their best interest and ought to be supported. The limits of power are continually probed, tested, and occasionally breached.

Often most illuminated only when attempts are made to destabilize or challenge them, power relations can themselves also be invisiblized. The ideology and practices of neoliberalism, for example, has been cloaked by rhetoric of 'efficiency' and 'free trade'; the extent to which putatively 'natural' market laws are in effect the result of deliberate actions and manipulations by big economic entities serving their own singular interest serves as another (currency speculators, for example, are considered to be more responsible for driving up the price of oil rather than operation by 'normal' supply and demand).[45] For all its appearances, corporate hegemony is never a monolithic behemoth – there is always interdependence in power relations, and neither the practices nor the discursivities of corporatist globalization constitute a totalizing, subsuming force.

Through the ideological grip and reach of governing elites, hegemony is what convinces people that certain elements of the social order are imperfect but inevitable, monolithic rather than malleable, given rather than contested. Ideological hegemony is successful less at overt dominating, but rather delineating, in people's minds, what is deemed 'conventional' wisdom, and what is accepted as naïve, impossible or seemingly unrealistic to change. Contingent relations and processes become taken for granted as givens, and subordinate groups are assumed to simply accept their lot and even to justify it in a kind of 'face-grows-to-fit-the-mask' dynamic.[46] In this conception, the individual's agency is thus compromised with the agent *becoming* the role they are assumed to be always acting, with the ability to preserve an autonomous self outside of this assumed role considered compromised. The individual is here thought to be no better than or little outside of the roles imposed upon him or her, and the hidden transcript serving a mere social safety valve function.[47]

Without the notion of sub rosa geographies, ideological hegemony might appear to be all-encompassing – in a word, subsuming – and it appears the majority of people only serve to perpetuate the system with daily compliance, with appeals for reform incorporated only within boundaries deemed acceptable by corporatist elites. The rich reality of infrapolitics and the hidden transcript is not recognized or registered. As this book argues, this is not nearly the dominant or definitive extent of our reality. A lack of public contestation does not mean that the hegemony goes unchallenged. The hegemony of the public record often involves an effacing from the public sphere practices whole swathes of people know are carried on but are as yet unacknowledged officially, such as piracy or tax evasion or independent, unlicensed production. These acts do not register as simple compliance or defiance, and suggest that there is a quieter corrosion of the

hegemonic status quo without full scale, open defiance. Rather, it can be more about generating a plurality of alternatives and options that can serve to dilute the reach of the dominant ideology without directly or openly challenging it.

In structuralist theories and in the Western liberal democratic brokerage model of representation, the majority of people do not really speak or act, they are spoken and acted for; and even lumping them into one single corporate category of 'the people' or 'middle class' allows corporatist leaders to claim to express their ostensibly unified interest. The problem with seeing hegemony in the thick Gramscian sense is that it hardly allows for grassroots social change; progress would simply not occur or would occur anomalously. As Scott encapsulates, within this way of viewing power, 'it is difficult to explain how social change could ever originate from below'.[48] Similarly, Willis points to the limits to hegemony thus:

> Structuralist theories of reproduction present the dominant ideology (under which culture is subsumed) as impenetrable. Everything fits too neatly. Ideology always pre-exists and pre-empts any authentic criticism. There are no cracks in the billiard ball of smoothness.
>
> (Paul E. Willis)[49]

Those 'cracks' are what made possible a whole number of breakthroughs that hatched out into the public transcript – the felling of the Berlin Wall, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the successful agitation of Egyptians to oust Mubarak (albeit fraught in the aftermath), for example, all came about from concerted grassroots campaigns that made the more visible public transcript breakthrough possible. These popular explosions are but the most visible manifestations of a fertile infrapolitical environment:

> So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared, we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion. To do this is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt, and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of subject classes. It is to focus on the visible coastline of politics and to miss the continent that is beyond.
>
> (James C. Scott)[50]

In this book, it is argued that power can be re-cast and reclaimed with respect to agency as the acts of empowerment and ability to enact alternatives, and not simply that of 'resistance'. Empowerment confers authorship and moral ownership; 'resistance' simply sets up a status of opposition to an always-governing corporatism, of state or market. The difference is both a more affirming *and* transformative view of power and agency: power becomes an enabling, progressive force rather than a repressive, restraining force, and one that can be positively exercised rather than negatively wielded.

Is resistance fertile?

> Look at Egypt. Look at the way it ended for Muslims who cast their vote for [deposed President] Mohammed Morsi and believed in your democracy, in your lies. Democracy doesn't exist. Do you think you are free? The West is ruled by banks, not by parliaments, and you know that. You know that you're just a pawn, except you have no courage. You think of yourself, your job, your house . . . because you know you have no power.
>
> (M, ISIS Fighter)[51]

> You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.
>
> (Attributed to R. Buckminster Fuller)

As the hallmark of revolutionary high modernist politics, resistance is often romanticized and lionized; I suggest that while it has its place, by itself, oppositional resistance has limited utility and strategic value. As I think Jan Nederveen Pieterse rightly asserts, 'From resistance there are not too many places to go other than "anti-globalization"'.[52] In looking at grassroots globalization, my suggestion is that attention may productively be directed at ways power can also be expressed as enabling and plural, not just as repressive or *disciplining*. Where it is expressed as empowerment rather than power, need it necessarily be framed within a binary that requires a countervailing force in the Newtonian sense, as encapsulated in the Foucauldian phrase 'where there is power, there is resistance'?

Domination–resistance is framed as a dualism on the *dominator's* terms. Resistance *may* on occasion break the chains of repression and domination, but is ill-equipped to put something in its place that does not revert to the same dynamics, particularly if all energy has been focused upon resisting rather than creating. In contrast, the aim in propositional praxis is to transmute resistance strategies towards substantive acts of creation, to make resistance secondary to the more enduring goal of building processes and structures that embody the fought-for ideals. Gesturing towards prefigurative politics, it recalls Adlai Stevenson's wry observation that it is sometimes far 'easier to fight for principles than to live up to them'.[53]

The anti-war protests that preceded the invasion of Iraq in 2003 exemplify the strategically limited and ultimately politically impotent position of resistance. In sections of the Left, Slavoj Žižek observes a 'strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance': those in power not only took the protests in their stride, Žižek claims, but profited from it – then US President Bush could claim for example that the mass demonstrations were precisely what he was trying to bring to Iraq. The protests against the war in Iraq

> fitted all too smoothly the space allotted to 'democratic protests' by the hegemonic state and ideological order. Which is why they did not, even minimally, scare those in power. Afterwards, both government and protesters felt smug, as if each side had succeeded in making its point.
>
> (Slavoj Žižek)[54]

Resistance has also been instrumentalized in service of hegemonic goals. Movements can be fractured through divide and rule strategies, as well as strait-jacketed within a hamster wheel cycle of repression-resistance-repression. By way of instrumentalization, resistance can, for example, lend itself to what is known in the intelligence game as psy-ops (psychological operations), black-ops and false-flag operations. An example might include agents posing as locals with a covert agenda, such as to foment sectarian division, carry out extra-judicial assassination or death squads. In Iraq, many suicide bombers, a virtually unheard of phenomenon prior to the 2003 invasion led by the US and UK governments, are reportedly from outside the country, as well as a large number of foreign fighters.[55] In 2005 two British Special Air Service (SAS) snipers with explosives in their car were caught out posing as Iraqis, with their mission still unknown.[56] Fears and suspicions about US government designs to quell insurgents by fomenting a civil war were not helped by the appointment of John Negroponte as US Ambassador to Iraq. Negroponte's term as US Ambassador to Honduras during the first half of the 1980s included what came to be known as 'the Salvador Option' of death squads.[57]

The infiltration of resistance movements via collaborators, moles and agent provocateurs may also serve to prolong low-intensity conflict in service of hegemonic aims. In this scenario, conflict is not meant to achieve decisive victory, conventionally conceived, as much as destabilization in order to divide and weaken. This strategy may be seen in Occupied Palestine, with the fractured Hamas/Fatah resistance, which has seen a number of periodic attempts at reunification. Fatah has been supported by the US Government, and Hamas, despite its designation as its enemy, has in the past reportedly been funded covertly by the Israeli regime, with the aim of attempting to counter the more secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[58]

Just as in the case of a number of 'colour-coded' revolutions such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, opposition forces are not uncommonly supplied with funds from the CIA and right-wing US-based foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). It is within these counter-subversive dynamics that overt resistance tends to exist on the terms of that which is being resisted. Resistance movements that also take up propositional strategies, I suggest, are more likely to stay galvanized as an organized and cohesive force in pursuit of enduring goals to sustain them beyond that of simply going against an aggressive enemy, such as in the case of Lebanon's Hezbollah; and may be less vulnerable to divide and rule.

The influence of postcolonialism: hybridization and mimicry

> I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fibre and liquids and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.
>
> (Ralph Ellison)[59]

A more enabling framework for resistance may perhaps be seen in postcolonial praxis. In contrast to overt resistance-as-defiance, a more covert strategy

of resistance-as-mimicry, or as Scott calls it, 'symbolic ju-jitsu' exists whereby subordinates use the dominant elite's own discourse to entrap them when they are legally or ideologically bound by their constructed norms of behaviour. This may involve strategic appeals to the normative discourses of the governing or otherwise dominant elites in order to vault through the subordinate's own agenda, such as in the decolonization movements that appealed to discourses of self-determination and liberalism.[60]

As well as the popularization of the notion of subaltern, the influence of post-colonial studies can be seen in other developed concepts that describe both spaces and subjects in globalization: translation, interpretation, mutation, adaptation, indigenization – all of which go towards showing that globalization is not a uni-linear process or ever unproblematically about homogeneity or westernization, that the colonized often subvert the subsuming efforts of the colonizers. In this scenario, if concepts and practices can percolate up, they can also be strategically appropriated from ideological norms and adapted.

Infrapolitics might also be characterized as the vernacular of action; Appadurai similarly employs the aural metaphor in his 'vernacularization' to describe processes that involve the filtering and adaptation of public transcript ideas into a group's own practices and strategies.[61] Ahluwahlia uses the term hybridized post-colonial 'inflections' to describe African engagement with modernity in response to the failure of Western models of analysis regarding Africa.[62] These conceptualizations contrast with the 'univocality' of corporate globalization and are a reminder about the historic and ongoing relative inaudibility of others in white male *voice*-dominated societies. Continuing in this aural metaphor, in progressive media and investigative journalism, we are exhorted to go 'where the silence is', in journalist Amy Goodman's phrase, and one recalls Martin Luther King's observation that rioting is 'the language of the unheard'.[63]

The notion of mimicry as camouflage, as illustrated by Frantz Fanon in the phrase, 'black skin/white masks', or as 'mimic men' by V. S. Naipaul, also has infrapolitical dimensions. In *The Location of Culture*, Homi Bhabha examines the 'ambivalence of colonial rule' and suggests that it enables a capacity for resistance in performative mimicry and 'sly civility' especially with regard to the 'English book'. Bhabha's concept of mimicry highlights the contradictions in colonial discourse to reveal the colonizer's ambivalence toward the colonized Other, towards disrupting and displacing hegemonic cultural forms. For Bhabha, hybridity is the process by which the governing colonial authority undertakes to translate the identity of the colonized (the Other) within its own singular universal framework, but the translation becomes one reclaimed and authored by the colonized themselves.[64]

'Of human action but not of human design': informal order

> Every step and every movement of the multitudes . . . are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.
>
> (Adam Ferguson)[65]

Beyond the impossible billiard ball smoothness of subsumptive hegemony and limited agential strategies such as resistance, I argue that the informal order provides rich resources for greater autonomy and the possibilities for greater grassroots (self)-governance. In this section, I explore the notion that the sub rosa geographies of the informal order are animated by a deeper cultural property than the public transcript commodification of social capital, a property which James C. Scott has called mētis. The apparently spontaneous, delicately complex processes and practices that animate these infrageographies of informal order play an elemental, foundational yet under-acknowledged role in constituting the bulk of global reality, and are usually inimical to the centralizing corporatist tendency to render them legible.

It is remarkable to note the degree to which key practices of the formal order appropriates the language of, and tries to mimic, informal order practices, even as it corrodes these informal foundations. The presentation of the 'hidden hand' of the market, for example, as generative (of spontaneous order and equilibrium) in classical liberal and later neoliberal theory is an illustration of how this description may in fact reflect informal order rather than a dynamic intrinsic to the market.

Informal order

> The first thing to understand is that the public peace – the sidewalk and street peace – of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary control and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves . . . No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down.
>
> (Jane Jacobs)[66]

In examining the informal processes that undergird civil safety and life, Jane Jacobs describes how order in a neighbourhood is informally yet crucially maintained by 'eyes on the street', with the everyday vigilance and basic solidarity of public-spirited people each going about their usual business and in so doing, contribute to sustaining public order. In this scenario, it is ultimately not formal policing that makes a neighbourhood safe – their prominent presence might even be evidence of its breakdown – but residents, parents with children, shopkeepers and passers-by.[67] This 'mutuality without hierarchy' ideal of anarchists and autonomous communities is enacted everyday at a basic and seemingly banal, yet vital level, with small exchanges and simple neighbourliness. What might seem trivial in isolation is anything but in aggregation, Jacobs asserts:

> The sum of each casual, public contact at a local level . . . is a feeling for the public identity of people, a web of public respect and trust, and a resource in time of personal or neighbourhood need. The absence of this trust is a disaster to a city street. Its cultivation cannot be institutionalized.
>
> (Jane Jacobs)[68]

Elemental civic practices and foundational forms of social coordination rooted in reciprocity and trust are the invisible glue holding together socio-spatial processes, for which no formal institution can ever be substituted; yet informal order can be disguised or taken for granted. If planning and governance in the public transcript order are dependent upon a whole host of informal practices, often these practices are not codified and may even be illegal. These practices can be seen across all scales, from copyright infringement practices to the arrangement and operation of everyday life in whole cities. Social life would in fact be impossible without these crucial informal and reciprocal micro-trust relations and processes. Indeed, these elementary forms of public life and public trust are the essential precondition for any successful operation of formal organizations and processes. Scott invokes these practices of daily trust as an 'elementary form of self-government'.[69]

This voluntary organization of public life is largely spontaneous and probably cannot be deliberately planned: indeed, attempting to top-down socially engineer this informal order is, in Jacobs' terms, akin to 'social taxidermy'.[70] The production of social order is essentially 'supplied from below as a skein of behaviour and habits',[71] for which it is an essential foundation, such that, as Scott avers, 'No designated social order can remotely match the complexity and intricacy of an actually functioning social order of some historical depth'.[72] If Proudhon is right to assert that liberty 'is not the daughter but the mother of order', the apparent over-regulation of more areas of social life in countries such as the UK may be an indicator of less liberty than one would expect from more conventional indicators or indexes of democracy.[73] It suggests that liberty and order is in part a *culture* that needs to be assiduously cultivated, rather than simply legislated.

Kinship and place-based community ties may also sometimes unconsciously impart ways of being and doing and associational norms of behaviour that may be innate to human co-habitation, about which we may be only subliminally aware. Scott likens these processes of informal social order to the owl of Minerva: 'they tend to remain undiscovered or taken for granted until the moment when their erosion begins to have massive, discontinuous effects'.[74] If social capital refers to the civic trust, reciprocity and associational norms with these informal processes, I propose that mētis extends and deepens our awareness of the crucial role of informal order to include practical knowledge and other forms of knowing and doing that defy legibility to corporatist social arrangements.

Recognition of the role of informal order is also partly reflected in contemporary notions of collective intelligence and complexity, from self-ordering systems and emergence, to self-organizing 'smart mobs' and the 'wisdom of crowds'.[75] According to Rheingold, examples of smart mobs are the street protests organized by the anti-WTO movement which used dynamically and real-time updated websites and mobile phones in 'swarming' tactics in the 'battle of Seattle', Genoa, Davos, Prague, Melbourne and elsewhere; it could also be seen in the use of social media by a million self-organizing Filipinos who toppled President Estrada in public demonstrations organized through text messages.[76] The activism that exploded into the public transcript in the wake of Argentina's 2001 economic crisis was also self-organizing: people responded with neighbourhood assemblies, barter

clubs, mass movements of the unemployed and workers taking over bankrupt companies and reopening them under their own management.[77]

This recalls George Rudé's earlier work in *The Crowd in History*, where Rudé aimed to show that those who took to the streets in protests were ordinary, sober citizens, not criminals. By taking such a view, the history of the French Revolution was transformed; 'common' people were being taken seriously as important historical actors in their own right. In contrast, Le Bon's work cultivated the cliché of the irrational crowd and equation of populism with a lack of education and poor judgment: 'by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization'.[78]

The fact that the wisdom of the many can exceed that of the (elite) few may seem counterintuitive, but it has been shown to be probable and not only possible, particularly if the group or community is decentralized, cognitively diverse and autonomous.[79] It is significant that this description approximates to grassroots globalization's community ideal-type. For Scott, informal 'street-level trust' relations are similarly underwritten by diversity in urban use, radically informal in their 'unsupervised severalty'.[80]

Mētis versus legibility

> Good order results spontaneously when things are let alone.
>
> (Chuang Tzu)[81]

It is common-sensical that those at the coalface will tend to possess stores of practical knowledge and know-how; the intimate, situated and local knowledge of social space that only comes from direct experience over an appreciable length of time and which often cannot be codified. Scott calls this a 'homely' insight and employs the Greek term mētis to approximate to this form of knowing which is more tacit and embedded in specific contexts, practices and local experience. Mētis is the 'mode of reasoning most appropriate to complex material and social tasks where the uncertainties are so daunting that we must trust our (experienced) intuition and feel the way'.[82] Practices may derive from intimate, local understandings of the environment which give rise to complex farming practices such as intercropping. Such practices are entirely sensible within the contexts in which they have been developed and practiced but may be illegible to central authorities, particularly the state.

Corporatist denigration and mistrust of mētis exists not just because informal practices are illegible to corporatist actors but also because their complexities and contingencies would disrupt the imposed order and its surface legibility. Informal social order and its mētistical know-how is the dark matter that makes up most of reality yet is scarcely acknowledged in the public transcript, and may even be actively denied, outlawed or suppressed, even where it supports and subsidizes the operation of the formal order. Recognizing a similar argument posited by John Gray, Scott summarizes the paradox of liberal-democratic order: that it is a 'self-liquidating project in the sense that its survival rests on social processes

that it cannot reproduce and that in fact, it is eroding by virtue of the logic of its operating assumptions'.[83]

Legibility is a central métier of statecraft and involves a wide variety of practices or techniques of corporatist governance through which state subjects are rendered 'legible' to the central authority, and which may range from the apparently innocuous to ones that more actively involve suppression.[84] These practices have historically had the ongoing function of arranging the populace in ways that simplifies the modern state's classic functions of taxation, conscription and the quelling of dissent. A case could also be made that these functions are crucial for modern governance, and have included the standardization of national languages; the requirement of the use of surnames; census-taking and the registration of births, marriages and deaths; the standardization of weights and measures, the establishment of land cadastres; and the mapping, naming and numbering of roadways.

In simplifying reality to make it more manageable however, long-cultivated grassroots governances and local knowledges often critical to managing the complexities of social life and the natural environment are substituted with standardized administrative categories. Scott likens the difference between corporatist planning and informal and often deeply embedded and decentralized practices as akin to the difference between grammar and actual speech.[85] Through these techniques, the state not only 'reads' society, but also simultaneously gives shape to it, creating specific relations of power and remaking rather than merely reflecting reality: 'a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its ability to give its categories the force of law'.[86] This process is also often one of destruction of pre-existing forms of social arrangements since, as Scott notes, 'most states are, broadly speaking, "younger" than the societies they purport to administer' and as such these societies will typically have independently evolved 'a diversity, complexity, and unrepeatability of social forms that are relatively opaque to the state, often purposely so'.[87]

These 'standardized formulas legible from the centre' are, however, destroying mētis. For Scott, this 'is virtually inscribed in the activities of both the state and large-scale bureaucratic capitalism' and its underlying logic 'is one of control and appropriation':

> Local knowledge, because it is dispersed and relatively autonomous, is all but unappropriable. The reduction or, more utopian still, the elimination of mētis and the local control its entails are preconditions, in the case of the state, of administrative order and fiscal appropriation and, in the case of the large capitalism firm, of worker discipline and profit.
>
> (James C. Scott)[88]

Mētis can interfere not only with legibility but also extractive goals. Codifiable abstractions and standardized simplifications can facilitate private property and commercial relations, which the market requires as a mode of coordination. John O'Neill illustrates this contradiction:

> Local and often unarticulated knowledge of soil conditions and crop varieties that have considerable value for long-term sustainability of agriculture has no value in markets and hence is always liable to loss when it comes into contact with oil-based agricultural technologies of those who do have market power.
> (John O'Neill)[89]

In development terms, Scott argues,

> much of the social planning embedded in the great development schemes of the erstwhile 'Second' and 'Third Worlds' . . . can be read as attempts to replace a local social order that was quasi-autonomous, resistant and 'illegible' with a planned social order that was, by contrast, designed to be dependent, compliant, hierarchical and 'legible' from the centre. The purpose . . . was to create a social landscape of residence and production that would facilitate control, appropriation, and manipulation from above . . . the creation of a social landscape legible to state authorities implied the destruction of informal, nonstate structures of trust and cooperation.[90]

Projected outward to development schemes, the flat corporatist developmentalist worldview tends to impose legibility by occluding differences between countries. In his decidedly Eurocentric, teleological and linear trajectory of development, Karl Marx famously wrote that the industrially advanced countries only show the less developed nations 'the image of their own future'.[91] In these epistemologies, the fate of industrializing societies is essentially to follow that of the first industrializers, presupposing a singular model of development. Difference becomes an indication of backwardness in the linear temporal queue rather than a potentially fruitful source of alternatives. 'They are dragooned into line', Massey notes, 'behind those who designed the queue'.[92]

What is interesting and significant is that much of our current condition can be read as inverting or challenging the linear development trajectory (led by the West) model, leading to an optical reversal as to where people look to for future possibilities. Successful practices are coming from historically unconventional places and contributing to a radical rethinking of strategy in both low- and high-income communities and countries. Microcredit, for example, originated in the global South, reversing the directional assumption of cognitive innovation and linearity of corporatist development, and is now being adapted in the older industrialized countries after its success in lower-income countries. To cite another example, the extensive and self-financed community kitchen movement that started in Peru in the 1980s has exported its model to Quebec.[93] As Appadurai notes, 'the more marginal regions of the world are not simply producers of data for the theory mills of the North'.[94]

When Cuba has been more hurricane- and disaster relief-ready than New Orleans and is training doctors and health workers, even from the West; when the southern Indian state of Kerala has equivalent social indicators with the US without the first world income; when many countries in the so-called 'third world'

seem to be better equipped to deal with the possible 'power-down' scenarios that might eventuate as the cheap and readily available fossil fuel supply that underpins our material affluence dwindles; one has to question this modernist assumption that continues to pervade even some critical thinking, particularly with growing income gaps in industrialized countries such as the US.[95] Elsewhere, a number of the Latin American examples are also offering alternative pathways that show how mētis-respecting institutions might effectively operate to harness collective intelligence rather than harm it: only 20 years ago Chile, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela were run by dictators and forcibly made laboratories of neoliberalism; they are currently hosting a number of progressive policies in many areas such as indigenous rights, the social economy, participatory planning, the right to the city and deep democracy movements.

Authoritarian, large-scale 'high modernist' planning projects in particular have often failed in their goals to improve the human condition by violating complex local and grassroots human arrangements of sustainable social order, which are incomprehensible, or 'illegible', to planners.[96] These schemes are often parasitical on the very mētis upon which it relies yet destroys, 'which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it would not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain'.[97] While practical knowledge is not 'the product of some mythical, egalitarian "state of nature"', the point is that 'formal schemes of order are untenable without some elements of the practical knowledge they tend to dismiss'.[98]

This inversion of the real direction of dependency can be illustrated in a number of settings: the high modernist twentieth century in particular has been replete with authoritarian social engineering that has tended to wholly ignore this important substrata of informal local practices and knowledge. Taylorism and technocracy captivated and aroused the hubris of the Soviet and US governments alike. The 'global city', for example, is often implicitly presented as if it was the magical source and standard-bearer of Progress, Cosmopolitanism and Modernity, yet crucial relations with other places are what confer this appearance and sustains this status. Doreen Massey notes in relation to London, 'In the most mundane of ways, London could not survive a day were its relations with those places to be cut off'.[99] The creation of the city of Brasilia, supported by its unofficial counterpart city without which it could not survive, also symbolizes the hubris of the belief that experts can rationally design an optimal social order without regard for tradition or accident.[100]

To cite another example, the centrally planned collective farms of Soviet Russia were underpinned by the desperate and illegal improvisations of growing illegal crops on the side. Soviet collectivization involved the often-violent 'replacement of an existing (often quite ancient) community that was illegible to the centre with a collective farm the uniformity and simplicity of which was ideal for central control'.[101] Yet the fledgling kolkhoz was saved by illegal informal improvisations – the very local knowledge the Bolsheviks sought to replace. But for these improvisations, the communist New Economic Policy (NEP) would have fallen flat on its face and a great many more families starved. 'What is perhaps most striking about high-modernist schemes, despite their quite genuine egalitarian and

often socialist impulses', Scott writes, 'is how little confidence they repose in the skills, intelligence and experience of ordinary people'.[102]

While mētis is not anti-scientific – scientific findings may also be used if and where appropriate – the machineries and ideology of narrow scientific rationalism has compromised the development of mētis and democratic sensibility, encouraging the surrendering of autonomy to 'experts' and external consultants. It is, Scott asserts, 'the *combination* of the universalist pretensions of epistemic knowledge and authoritarian social engineering' which have led to the failure of many top-down high modernist schemes to enact appropriate development.[103] In Chapter 5, I explore how the state government of Kerala has sought to forge a path of protecting and encouraging mētis in the context of participatory planning, demonstrating that the state can have a constructive role to play.

The gender dimension

> The degree of women's emancipation is the natural measure of the general emancipation.
>
> (Friedrich Engels, after Charles Fourier)[104]

High modernism, the practical implementation of instrumental rationality, includes tendencies toward a commitment to progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders under standardized conditions of knowledge and production. The lopsidedness of high modernist instrumental rationality has seen the plans of Lenin and Le Corbusier, Robert Moses and Robert McNamara prevail over those who were effectively their opposite numbers, such as Rosa Luxemburg, Jane Jacobs and Rachel Carson. It is striking that many of these advocates have been women. While my book's focus precludes a fuller examination, I engage with the important gender dimension here briefly as it specifically relates to the informal sector.

The instrumentally rationalist form of knowledge and control upon which corporatist governance is based essentially entails a narrowing of vision, simplifying an otherwise far more complex reality into dualisms, which makes phenomena legible and more easily and carefully quantified, analyzed and controlled. Dichotomous thinking such as that between formal and informal order is intimately related to the distinction between genders in our society, to their assigned characteristics, and to the power relations maintained between them. The implications, I argue, are also highly agential, and the politics of what is conventionally included and excluded from globalization's purview is also very much related to wider intellectual currents and a more detailed exploration of the reconfiguring of our world-views and gender can be found in Chapter 4.

For the purposes of this discussion, a dichotomy is commonly constituted in terms of a presence and an absence, a binary that takes the classic form of A/not-A where the presence is often imbued with subsumptive dynamism. As Nancy Jay argues, the consequences of the use of logical dichotomy as a mode of constructing difference works to the advantage of certain social groups:

> almost any ideology based on A/Not-A dichotomy is effective in resisting change. Those whose understanding of society is ruled by such ideology find it very hard to conceive of the possibility of alternative forms of social order (third possibilities). Within such thinking, the only alternative to the one order is disorder.
>
> (Nancy Jay)[105]

In the public transcript refraction of reality, women, subaltern and everyday actors are usually deemed political actors and conferred with political agency only if they are seen as active in the *formal* political arena. With its emphasis upon officially recorded activities consecrated to institutional memory and history, formal activities are also accorded greatest visibility and meaning, reinforcing unequal gender relations: in the hegemonic masculinist framing, a gendered division between the public political arena and private domestic spaces exists which defines politics as something intrinsic to the public sphere. The private domestic sphere has historically been circumscribed within patriarchy as the 'natural' domain of women, contrived for the convenience of hegemonic masculinist political culture and structure.[106] Because women are correlated with the private sphere, they are defined out of politics as narrowly circumscribed by the formal public arena.[107]

In the privileging of public over private, the actions of women and subaltern groups as well as that of the informal sector have tended to be obscured, written-out and buried by the focus upon publicly recorded, officially sanctioned activities. With regard to the economy, Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson call this process and result a 'capitalist myopia', whereby it is assumed that formal sector corporate capitalism is all encompassing and the saliency of non-capitalist spheres and actors is robbed.[108] In contrast to this presentation, the authors assert that the sites and circuits of economic restructuring that underwrite the formal circuits of globalization cross all scales and include community cooperatives, households, local economies and transnational networks.[109]

The representation of globalization is gendered as masculinist because top-down, corporatist formal sector strategies, actors and institutions are privileged to the exclusion and marginalization of the informal sector. Processes and sites such as the household and communities that crucially underwrite and constitute the public spheres of globalization have been gendered in the feminine, with corporatist accounts particularly painting a picture of these spaces as smaller, weaker and passive recipients of 'global' forces such as transnational capital.[110] Not only are these sites and circuits very much a part of globalization, but a strict partitioning between the formal and informal sectors does not, and has never existed.[111] Illuminating this crucial subsidization reverses the presentation of enablement, if not power.

While the informal sphere can in many ways be correlated with the feminine, it is both men and women who are marginalized in this sector and excluded from conventional accounts. Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson suggest that activities in this sphere subsidize global capitalism and that '(g)ender is central to this subsidy'.[112] Subsidization is increasing with the rolling back of the welfare state

during the past two decades in many countries; women in particular underpin and subsidize corporatist processes through the range of activities encompassing the social services; healthcare, education, food, housing and as homeworkers and casualized labour.[113] Feminizing the economy would involve more than simply adding on and counting in previously excluded activities (such as the household and reproductive sector, the gift and non-monetized economies), but involves the reconceptualizing of the economy as a diverse socio-spatial reality of which capitalist relations are but one aspect.[114]

The marginalization of the numerically majority world as well as the numerically majority sex are closely intertwined if one symbolically correlates the global South with the feminine to the global North's masculine. If the marginalization of private spaces and of women and women's work is intimately related, feminist and post-structuralist scholars have also shown how predatory economic relationships can also be seen as an extension of hegemonic masculinity, with the feminization of poverty and of 'developing' countries – there to be variously conquered, controlled, penetrated, exoticized, subjugated. The primitive accumulation of capital is predicated upon the use of violence, with violence against women being intrinsic, rather than anomalous to, an exploitative sexual division of labour, one for which dowry debt, wife-bashing, casualized and home-worker exploitation, rape and sex tourism are a part.[115]

The processes of corporatist globalization have seen an intensification of the already historically disproportionate burden of women. Women have also been associated with flexible accumulation, exulted in some quarters throughout the 1990s as a new phase of capitalism, which Doreen Massey has dubbed Flexible Sexism.[116] In presenting this brief survey, I acknowledge that applying a gender lens may help illuminate not just these disparities, but also the possibilities related to informal sector processes. I assert that gender may also inform fruitful ways of framing infraglobalization, with sub rosa infrageographies offering a way to disrupt the binary of 'global/not-global' and 'pro-' and 'anti-globalization'. These considerations will be returned to at the end of the chapter.

Towards infrageographies of globalization

> Change life! Change Society! These ideas lose completely their meaning without producing an appropriate space. A lesson to be learned from soviet constructivists from the 1920s and 30s, and of their failure, is that new social relations demand a new space, and vice-versa.
>
> (Henri Lefebvre)[117]

It is with the importance of the role of informal order in mind that infrageographies of globalization is framed as more creative grassroots sites for actually existing (and incubating) alternatives. In this section I seek to put forward infrageographies as a socio-spatial concept that might inform new thinking about agency and globalization, building upon work that is alert to informal order and everyday microsites as significant and legitimate terrains of analysis. I assert

that these spaces are deep spaces for social action, that hidden topographies of alternatives-in-place can be made visible by different ways of seeing and knowing, and that while processes of struggle have fashioned our socio-spatialities, it is not the only shaping factor: creation is even more potent and powerful.

In Scott's compelling infrapolitics thesis, the insinuation of a critique of power by subordinate groups is conceived mostly as a form of insubordination. I have extended this heuristic to describe sites that feature alternatives rather than those where public transcript practices are only resisted. I posit that the hidden transcript includes but is not limited to being a 'labour of neutralization and negation', in Scott's words, and extend it to one of creative incubation of innovative alternative practices.[118] I endeavour to present them as sites of creation, not simply contestation where, in contrast, a minimalist conception of infrapolitics might only be a reactive space in relation to the public transcript order. The local is here conceived as the active and dynamic constituent of the global, in some cases driving it, and not simply its passive receptacle.

As geographers have argued, space is constituted through social relations and the spatial form of the social in turn has causal effectivity: in other words, the spatial is itself a 'principle of explanation' and the ways we perceive space are neither accidental nor incidental.[119] If spatialization is a political act, it follows that it can be deployed strategically too: representations of space are instrumental to authority and control but also to empowerment and emancipation projects. Spatial imaginaries are, in Soja's words, a 'storehouse of epistemological power'.[120] If, as Massey asserts, '(t)hinking the spatial in a particular way can shake up the manner in which certain political questions are formulated',[121] then the spatial project attached to infraglobalization and its geographies is important in its own right.

Infrageographies are conceived as a form of spatial differentiation that encourages a praxis of multiplicity of overlapping rather than discrete spaces: these may not be *physically* sequestered social sites as much as several overlapping socio-spatial realities inhabiting the same space. Space is inherently multiplicitous because the social assumes relations with others, and a series of superimposed social spaces means that space can host several social relations, which in turn produces space as a 'simultaneity of difference'.[122] Infra is thus not a physical segmentation as much as an optical differentiation, recognizing overlapping multiplicities in social-space. Another way of saying alternatives is saying multiplicities, which can co-exist contemporaneously. The multiplicity of relations and experiences is a more natural occurrence, I suggest; it is the imposition of a rationalist spatial imaginary that attempts to obliterate this organic complexity. These deep and layered spaces may not be readily apprehended through the lens of corporatist globalization yet may harbour great socio-spatial depth; infrageographies may *appear* interstitial when viewed from the public transcript perspective, as apertures that glimpse into whole realities lived by people that are only partly or wholly unaccounted for in what is presented as the public transcript.

The fact that these infrageographical layers of overlapping realities parallel to the corporatist authorship of reality and control of social space and its ordering are not always legible to corporatist power may be a source of strength.

The corporatist imagination of space implicitly frames space as fixed, closed, immobile, the residual or opposite of time; space is only a static container to time that is a causal, dynamic force. Space here is occupied by only one totalizing trajectory that produces agents who tend to be either power-holders or power-beholders, and which shuts down multiplicity in political alternatives.

Alert to the possibility that places can be the catalyst for their own spatial logic with indeterminate trajectories independent of state or capital direction, infrageographies utilizes a processual definition and conception in which space is continuously being produced. Space here has the property of elasticity and accretion, it is not fixed. Because relations are processual, spaces are continually made, and remade, and negotiated, with greater accommodation for spaces that are and that are yet to be, sources of mētis, creativity, ferment, *jouissance*; spaces where protocols of official provenance do not necessarily apply or govern human behaviour.

It is presented as both a depth as well as breadth imaginary that can accommodate horizontal extensity and vertical intensity, and may enable a greater accounting of a wider spectrum of globally extensive processes, agents and sites across both informal and formal spheres. Its layers of interwoven hybridity, under- and over-layered like a cross-hatch, recalls Lefebvre's description of the polymorphic character and 'superimposition and interpenetration of social spaces':

> We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as 'social space'. No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldwide does not abolish the local . . . Thus social space, and especially urban space, emerged in all its diversity and with a structure far more reminiscent of a flaky mille-feuille pastry than of the homogeneous and isotropic space of classical (Euclidian/Cartesian) mathematics.
>
> (Henri Lefebvre)[123]

The relationship between mētis and the production of space may be reflected with spatial forms that tend towards the decentralized, grassroots, local and networked in layered spaces of incubation and experimentation. More adaptable spaces may reflect more adaptable and complex subjects, and the fact that people have several identities and may formalize or informalize behaviour according to setting and place. This can also be applied to virtual space, with the web functioning as a multilayered hidden transcript full of informal, perhaps even mētistically knowledgeable, wikis and open and closed forums. While the Edward Snowden revelations in May 2013 revealed the unprecedented extent to which the US National Security Agency (NSA)'s PRISM (and other) programs of cyber mass surveillance collects private citizen data, privacy measures such as PGP-keys, the Tor browser and other encryption tools are still among technical means to circumvent surveillance.[124]

Infrageographies is informed by and builds on a number of related imaginaries which merit mention. These include the notion of 'autonomous geographies', which Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton have described as spaces and sites that

are constituted but not altogether defined by oppositional 'resistance' but also of creation. Autonomous geographies are defined as 'those spaces where there is a desire to constitute non-capitalist, collective forms of politics, identity and citizenship, which are created through a combination of resistance and creation, and the questioning and challenging of dominant laws and social norms'.[125] It is significant that Pickerill and Chatterton define these geographies as an amalgam of resistance and creation, one of the few imaginaries to vitally move beyond oppositional resistance as a necessary but insufficient (on its own) strategy, to acknowledge the importance of creation. In a similar vein, Hakim Bey has put forward the idea of 'temporary autonomous zones' (and subsequently 'permanent autonomous zones'). The phrase is attached to the carnivalesque and joyous street parties of the UK Reclaim the Streets Movement in the 1990s, wherein the street party embodied both a protest and a solution. Significantly, Bey saw the 'Temporary Autonomous Zones' spatial form as breaking the mould of social change patterns:

> These went against the grain of the expected curve, the consensus-approved trajectory: revolution, reaction, betrayal, the founding of a stronger and more oppressive state . . . [it] suggests the possibility of a movement outside and beyond the Hegelian spiral of that 'progress' which is secretly nothing more than a vicious circle.
>
> (Hakim Bey)[126]

Foucault's 'heterotopia' describes heterotopic spaces that are envisaged as places of enigmatic multiplicity in which life can be experienced differently than general, such as market gardens deep in the suburbs.[127] The idea of a 'liminal' hybrid 'third-space' also draws upon interstitiality and marginality. Bhabha posits hybridity as a form of liminal or interstitial, in-between, 'third' space, where the 'cutting edge of translation and negotiation' occurs.[128] Culture is found in the third space of the marginal spaces between dominant social formations. It is described as 'third' because it subverts the rigid coding of dualistic categories and colonial binary thinking. Similarly with his use of 'thirdspace', Soja seeks to an approach that challenges the stranglehold of dualisms through a Lefebvre-influenced spatial trialectics of 'thirding': strategically drawing from two binaries to open new alternatives; also alluded to in Fine's phrase 'working the hyphens'.[129]

Everyday geographies

> Whatever you do will be insignificant but it is very important that you do it.
>
> (Unknown – may be misattributed to Gandhi)

The everyday is an elemental part of the constitution of reality and daily practice is crucial to the conduct, constitution and reproduction of the social order. Daily life and its relations are a critical terrain of struggle and creation and a source of both creativity as well as obstacles, and the ground upon which processes

are enacted and understood. While its transformative potential can dissolve into partisan subjectivity, the everyday can yield a concrete universality and basis for common experience. What is more global than the everyday? Everyday life is not simply synonymous with the local scale; by virtue of global interconnections, transborder flows, and multiple identities, the local contains the global and is also the scale where globally extensive processes are initiated.

What does it mean then to incorporate the everyday realities and politics of globalization, to bring people back in? It may involve, I suggest, directing more attention to creative and networked community development such that it will be possible to imagine social forms without the subsumption of either 'the predatory mobility of unregulated capital or the predatory stability of many states'.[130] Rather it is an affirmation that citizens and everyday acts have more than a hand in co-constituting reality and enacting greater place-based autonomy.

The antecedents of the ideas of autonomous, everyday and thirdspace geographies can be found in scholarly traditions such as in humanist geography, the Annales School and planning. Annalistes advocated a more comprehensive approach to a historical issue or epoch that included people's lives and habits; geography, material culture and the *mentalités* of the times were as important a focus as diplomacy, statesmen and war. In planning, the work of Jane Jacobs, as we have seen, has been infused with the importance of the everyday, helping one observer see 'how the ordinariness of life is so important; that patterns of behaviour and human thoughts that are so small on the individual level are so powerful on the aggregate'.[131]

The everyday is not just the realm of a 'garden variety' dissent, indicating slightly common, negative or mundane connotations, but can often be the seedbed of change where the cumulative and aggregated effect can be spectacular and highly significant – the sum of microsites may often be more compelling in constituting socio-spatial processes than one dressed-up public transcript event. The everyday and communities are fertile sites and sources of infrapolitical activism, where people are active agents rather than passive sheep shepherded by the disciplinary forces of neoliberal market, yet traditional ways of evaluating human agency may be inadequate and fail to recognize its dynamism and success. Even in major historical events, human agency can leave a small public transcript footprint; Francois Rochat and Andre Modigliani have documented what they call the 'banality of goodness' as a 'contrasting but noncontradictory conception' to Arendt's concept of the 'banality of evil', describing the under-registered acts of 'ordinary goodness' in a French village that resisted Vichy attempts to persecute minorities and resulted in the saving of thousands of refugees.[132]

As Bleiker contends, the effects of everyday acts cannot necessarily be understood via causal analysis – the existence of multiple causes and effects means action and outcome may not be simply determined. An illustration can perhaps be seen in the simple act of refusing a plastic bag when shopping and instead using one's own bag. This individual act may not register as human agency when viewed by traditional approaches – it causes no civil disturbance, no immediate change in plastic bag provision, it is not a crime or social aberration, not a moral

dilemma or high act of conscience.[133] Further, there is no simple and identifiable agent and causal relationship in this everyday situation. No single shopper or even group of shoppers can be identified above all, nor can one singular target be identified in this act – is it the supermarket, all supermarkets, the producers of plastic bags, government authorities, or other plastic bag-using customers? Or is it the cultural economy within which a practice can go so unchecked? Nor is the space within which this act occurs and against the establishment parameters of conduct it opposes necessarily distinct – it operates in the same terrain as the 'adversary'. While an action can 'jump scale' to effect change from its initial catalyst point, it is still part of that scale of origin – 'jump' implies removal from one to the other, rather than being in two or more scales simultaneously. The individual shopper did not cause an event or directly produce an outcome per se.

Yet even Lilliputian acts and strategies are well and truly capable of shifting the Gulliver of entrenched practice. The aggregate effect of individual shoppers refusing plastic bags, even in the absence of formal political campaigns, has seen supermarkets, regulatory authorities and producers eventually start to adjust to community values, which they will describe as 'market conditions'. The manifestations that issue from such actions may have a slow transformative gestation, changing values and norms over time. The current popularity and prevalence of cotton and ex-kite silk bags attests to the fact that the giant can be moved, and that much action involves the slower transformation of values and norms, in what Ley has referred to as the taken for granted 'culture binding routines of everyday life'.[134] Localized and everyday acts can cascade outside their immediate spatial environs, into globally extensive systems of production, trade and investment, and may only become apparent over time. Actions are extendable through geographic distance as well as consequential reach, resulting in the potential geographic enlargement in the relationship between doer and deed; this recognizes a capacity to shape our immediate as well as wider environments and that even apparently micro-acts can have macro-consequences.

Everyday acts may enact sub rosa processes and geographies without openly declared contestations against hegemonic groups, but may also serve to reform existing public transcript structures. Sallie Marston details how middle-class white women in the US drew from the household to effectively help redesign the nineteenth-century US state system, an example of everyday acts percolating upwards and outwards and influencing institutional structures.[135] Activist community housing organizations during the late 1980s and early 1990s in the US also succeeded in changing how a state engages with, in this case, international regimes: in the wake of Savings and Loan collapses, US advocacy groups such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) re-occupied abandoned housing in protest against unfair housing practices and loan discrimination. These actions and strong community advocacy percolated up to Congressional committees who effected a coupling of fair housing with financial re-regulation.[136]

The question of how deeply ways of thinking are embedded in our material conditions is an interesting one. For Marx, consciousness was inextricably

tied to material conditions with people constrained by the material relations and institutional conditions of capitalism. The challenges of constructing contemporary alternatives is, for David Harvey, inescapably mired in the material relations of the present social order, with daily life often an obstacle rather than fertile ground:

> [T]he fierce spatiotemporalities of daily life – driven by technology that emphasize speed and rapid reductions in the friction of distance and of turnover times – preclude time to imagine or construct alternatives other than those forced unthinkingly upon us as we rush to perform our respective professional roles in the name of technological progress and endless capital accumulation.
>
> (David Harvey)[137]

By drawing this out, I underscore that daily life is itself a site for contestation, but also of creativity. In responding to Harvey, A. K. Thompson insists, 'daily life both predates and permeates all the others. It is their social base and their condition of possibility. And it's on this basis that it must be given both analytic and strategic primacy'.[138] Amid these constraining circumstances, Harvey sees a fertile resource for thinking about alternatives in the tradition of Utopian thinking, with the 'insurgent architect' as a key agent – a subversive who acts as a fifth columnist within the system while ascribing to alternative agendas.[139] The next section endeavours to re-examine agency in ways that might best be suited to infraglobalization.

From unpeople to everyday activists: re-imagining human agency in grassroots globalization

> The struggle of people against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.
>
> (Milan Kundera)[140]

The optimism surrounding the formation of a global civil society during the 1990s was significantly muted during the militarized globalism and global war on terror in the decade that followed.[141] As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, this brought into sharper relief the 'neo-neo' convergence and corporatist globalization's contradictions, including the re-emergence of Empire at a time when 'bringing democracy' and 'liberation' were expressly invoked in service of justification of its goals. At the heart of Empire is a devaluation of agency of peoples both in the advanced industrialized and less industrialized states, whose lives are implicitly and explicitly viewed as worth less than others. A number of groups of people have conventionally been rendered voiceless and invisible, particularly women and non-European peoples.[142]

These groups historically constitute what Mark Curtis has termed UnPeople – those who populate the majority world and get in the way of imperial designs, and who are commonly deemed by colonizers as expendable for imperial sectional

interests.[143] This derogation can certainly still be seen in current times, including in the forcible removal and the denial of return of inhabitants from their homes in Diego Garcia by the British and US governments, for example, and in the callous disregard of Levantines in the Middle East by the Likudnik colonial designs of the neocons and 'liberal hawks' alike in imperial centres. It is against these (ongoing) colonial as well as neoliberal processes that grassroots agency in both the Global South and North merits attention.

Notably, a number of key terms have been used to describe publicly voiceless and invisiblized actors and agents, from *homo sacer* (one excluded from civil rights) in classical Roman law to Fanon's *damnés de la terre* (the wretched of the earth) to Gramsci-Spivak's 'subalterns'.[144] Prescriptions and strategies have also ranged widely, from Fanon's injunction to revolutionary violence to the more covert action of Scott's infrapolitics. Originally coined by Antonio Gramsci and subsequently taken up by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak to which it owes much of its currency and influence, subaltern is now a staple of postcolonial and social movement studies. For Gramsci, subaltern was borrowed from military parlance and employed to denote proletarians whose voices were structurally 'written out' of the capitalist narrative.[145]

In Spivak's 1988 essay, 'Does the Subaltern Speak?' Spivak highlights the suicide of a young Bengali woman and her failed attempts at self-representation within existing patriarchal channels in which her voice was not supported or understood, or rendered illegible within those frames of reference. Insomuch as *speaking* is a two-way 'transaction between speaker and listener' and not simply an unheard cry, Spivak concludes in her paper that the 'subaltern cannot speak'.[146] Not simply another word for 'Other', Spivak deploys it as a descriptive rather than prescriptive term to refer to those who are not simply discriminated against and who merely want to claim a larger piece of the pie, but a condition to be overcome.[147]

There are several important reasons why a more agentially-focused globalization should give due attention to subaltern agents, not least of which is because the treatment of women, immigrants and guest workers, returned servicemen and women, the ill or mentally or physically incapacitated – often the weakest and most vulnerable in our society and international community – usually serves as an accurate barometer of how truly progressive and civilized social life really is. As the aphorism rightly suggests, 'a civilization can be judged by the way it treats its minorities'.[148] In another inversion of language, 'minority' can often refer to numerical majority. Waged workers are not a minority, for example, and as a category, labour has also been recognized as a capacious agent of economic change.[149] It is against these still ongoing processes that we examine grassroots agency.

Subsequent studies have built upon these earlier concepts, bringing to life communities and Do It Yourself (DIY) activism as living and breathing alternatives-in-practice from their abstraction in marginal categories. Rey and Anderson identify the 'cultural creatives', for example, actors in advanced capitalist states whom espouse community, green and feminist values, reject traditional careerism and big business and who have been both the drivers and products of the social

movements of the 1990s onwards. By Rey and Anderson's reckoning, there are far more of these progressives than there are those that support the Big Business paradigm in the US population, at a ratio of 36 to 14 per cent.[150] This optimism about agents flies in the face of evidence that decision-making and influence over the conditions in which we live are increasingly being taken away from citizens, even in ostensibly 'democratic' and Western liberal countries. It is not my suggestion that this latter description is categorically inaccurate as much as woefully incomplete.

Another study is Mansbridge and Flaster's development of a notion of 'everyday activists' to define who they see as important but under-theorized enactors of social change. Mansbridge and Flaster envisage everyday activists as making change and creating meaning typically outside of engagement with formal politics. In the authors' conception, everyday activists do this first through cognitive acts of selection: concepts or practices that may have originated in social movement epistemic enclaves (of the more 'organized activists') are selected and deployed in micro-negotiation in everyday life situations in the home, community and workplace. The authors define everyday activists as 'anyone who both acts in her own life to redress a perceived injustice and takes this action in the context of, and in the same broad direction as, that social movement'.[151]

Specifically through an investigation of the use of the term 'male chauvinist' in everyday talk, Mansbridge and Flaster examine the role of interpersonal mores and how a term that was first coined in one identified organized activist enclave (in this case the Communist Party of the US circa 1934) was taken up by everyday users for decades thereafter. They tracked the use of the term 'male chauvinist' in selected newspapers over time as well as in in-depth interviews with women, most of whom had relatively low formal political involvement. It was found that every respondent who reported having used the term, even in jest, also took seriously the criticism about what the term embodied about the assumption of male superiority and often-attendant derogation of female autonomy.[152] Although the use of the term 'male chauvinist' peaked and fluctuated in the manner of most 'vogue words', it helped spread political lessons and consciousness about equality.[153] In a kind of personal politics of 'naming', one woman reports how her conservative husband was surprised at the term initially, but upon thinking about it, 'he guessed he was a little . . . I don't think he wanted to be that way, especially since he values my intelligence and that is why he married me. I think he has improved'.[154]

By using a term that was 'going around', Mansbridge and Flaster demonstrate that as 'everyday activists' these women were invoking and implicitly referencing a critique of a gendered order larger than her household. This follows on from what they identify as the first phase of this discursive dynamic, where concepts often originate in an epistemic enclave partially protected from the hegemonic reach of prevailing orthodoxies, and the intermediate phase whereby media picked up and helped the term's transmission, though it need not have done so with this intent, and simply reflected novelty and increasing usage. The results are mutually beneficial: 'the social movement lifts to salience the ideals that lead people to take up the term, and the spread of the term promotes the ideas in the

social movement'.[155] In this example, these 'everyday' practices were crucial in effecting change at the grassroots and ranged from raising consciousness to changing behaviour. This was achieved not through 'resistance' but through cognitive persuasion. Moreover, the primary actors are capacious and thoughtfully discerning everyday activists rather than simply *objects* of the organized activists' mobilizing efforts.[156]

This cognitive persuasion is acknowledged as a deliberative and deep agency, a trackable and successful application of discursive concept to practical change through memetic micro-negotiation of everyday life that cumulatively shapes both the intellectual and the practical landscape.[157] These everyday activists shaped both their daily lives and the wider world in significant ways, with an important shaping effect on changing gender relations.[158] The role of the everyday activists is demonstrated to be critical in disseminating the concept and translating into everyday results outside of policy outcomes, which is the public transcript measure of efficacy.

It is worth noting, however, that these everyday activists are seen less as authors than as selectors, which happens in conjunction with the 'creative ferment of organized activists generating ideas in protected enclaves'.[159] This is why, I suggest, everyday activism is such an encouraging but still limited conceptualization of agential possibilities, as it does not entertain the possibility that everyday actors may *themselves* be authors through their own creative ferment and that they too might have an epistemic role. While it may in some cases be harder to trace, there are memetic tropes and memorable framings whose origins are either unattributed or unknown, and may have originated in folklore and other sources of 'folk' wisdom: the household, the community hall, the suburban action group, in public art, street theatre and other venues.

One such example of an everyday activist-as-author is suggested in the case of Lila Watson, to whom the following quote and important idea of solidarity-as-equals is attributed: 'If you have come to help me, you are wasting your time. If your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together'. In the early 1990s, this Aboriginal activist quote went globally viral, cited by various activist groups and disseminated through the web. A US-based justice art poster collective, Northland Posters, set about to locate the author for permission to set the quote to an art poster.

When Ricardo Levins Morales of the Northland Poster Collective tracked her down, Lila explained that the quote had come out of her part of an Aboriginal rights group in Queensland in the early 1970s and that the group had come up with the phrase in the course of their organizing work. As the tracker explained,

> She could not remember the exact process of how it had come about. She was quite clear, though, that she was not comfortable being credited for something that had been born of a collective process. After some back and forth we came to an agreement on how it could accurately be credited. Now our poster simply attributes the words to 'Aboriginal activists group, Queensland, 1970s'.
>
> (Ricardo Levins Morales)[160]

One wonders how many other terms, concepts, tropes and sayings have been similarly authored by everyday activists themselves rather than from discrete epistemic communities? Empowering grassroots actors, it is suggested here, involves acknowledging their creative authorship *as well as* their roles as selectors of concepts and their role in practical enactment; and wider geographies of knowledge production can be recognized to incorporate communities as epistemes. A project of grassroots globalization praxis takes everyday epistemologies seriously, and communities are thus viewed as epistemic sites as well as sites of practice.

Folk sayings, often unattributed or anonymous, nursery rhymes and other grassroots epistemic sources can be found in most cultures. Apparently authorless sayings or texts can ignite the public imagination and can often help to catalyze subsequent practices, from the lyricism of the masked subcommandante of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico to the 'Scarlet Pimpernel' of visual art, Banksy; to the now identified fruit seller in Tunisia Mohammed Bouazizi, who, in self-immolating himself, sparked the riots that ousted that country's leader in 2011.

Oral messages in stories, wisdom in humour, rebellion in satire – all have catalytic potential. A number of illustrative examples include those that wryly acknowledge the importance of cumulative and cascading causality from an apparently micro-act with wider scalar ripple effects (a poetic preemption of the 'butterfly effect' of chaos theory?):

> For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
> For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
> For want of a horse the rider was lost.
> For want of a rider the battle was lost.
> For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
> And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
>
> (Nursery rhyme, unknown origin)

The following verse, of unknown origin but conjecturally thought to be from the Upanishads, also expresses this causal chain elegantly:

> Watch your thoughts, for they become words.
> Watch your words, for they become actions.
> Watch your actions, for they become habits.
> Watch your habits, for they become character.
> Watch your character, for it becomes your destiny.
>
> (Unknown)

Our picture of human agency is far more complex and multidimensional than the heterodox economic self-interested utility-maximizer, or even the archetypal activist as the pamphleteering, slogan-chanting, Molotov-cocktail-wielding, flag-waving radical. Progressive geopolitics is not simply about protest but about how to achieve propositional community change. If structures, agents and processes all mediate and produce social reality, then it is fruitful to see globalization as

not just a set of structural shifts only, but as transformations in and of agency and processes as well, with a more consciously diverse globalization praxis is populated by capacious three-dimensional agents, and not simply consumers. This may mark another transition in how we envision and participate in globalization praxis, from Grand Event to everyday practices, and towards a more constructivist mindset that says 'Do not *wait* for another world. *Create* one'. It offers the possibility of DIY development in the best sense rather than the pre-fabricated, off-the-shelf form of global corporate organization.

'One no and many yeses': subventing sub rosa development

> It is not necessary to conquer the world. It is sufficient to make it new.
> (Subcommandante Marcos)[161]

In this chapter I have so far argued that the way we read and understand globalization – and by which we create infrageographies – can be very productively enriched by giving due attention to the informal sector, which includes, but is not limited to, households, shop floors, family businesses, hospitals, schools, weekly markets and cooperatives. Not only does it counterbalance the undue and heavy emphasis upon financialized markets, banks, corporations, development agencies and states – conventionally presented as the natural inhabitants of the global scale in corporatist accounts – but it also allows treating people as complex and capable political subjects. In this section, I extend this assertion to the proposal that subventing this sector is a crucial next stage, and explore a number of capacity-building measures.

In examining some of the tools, techniques and strategies that are making possible greater community self-governance and participatory development, I identify the informal or social economy as central to the project of building a grassroots infraglobalization, with strategies including community cooperatives, local currencies and the innovative use of communication technologies. With these strategies, I argue that communities are already effecting a shift from critique to construction, from strategies that attempt to subvert subsumption to those that aim toward resignification (economy) and resubjectification (self).

Strategy is also important because it may influence and shape form, helping to bring about greater participation, deliberative democracy, horizontality, mutuality and self-governance. These are the core operational principles common to many community development organizations (CDOs). As foregrounded in Chapter 1, I suggest that infrageographical CDOs, movements, organizations and actors may best opt for depth strategies and *then* go for breadth, as appropriate, some of which may burst forth to supplant the old order gradually. Gélinas similarly sees various alternative economic forms as the 'alternative order's first drafts' which often require 'a long nurturing period'.[162] Eric Olin Wright's typology similarly distinguishes three transformation strategy types – ruptural, interstitial and symbiotic, and for him these generally correspond with the communist, anarchist and social democratic traditions respectively. For Wright ruptural strategies are least likely

in mature capitalist societies; interstitial strategies build parallel institutions and practices such as cooperatives generally outside the ambit of the state, while symbiotic strategies act in concert with the state to bring about progressive social change.[163]

These alternative economic forms and strategies presume the existence of autonomous spaces, which abound when refracted through an infrageographical lens, within which emancipatory parallel processes can operate in a way akin to the emergence of capitalist relations in the interstices of feudal society. The experience of Kerala sits squarely at symbiotic in Wright's typology, having been through a ruptural stage in the overhauling of its caste system and land reforms, and having drawn on its interstitial strategies which have helped produce and account for its remarkable history of civic involvement and high social indicators.

Strategies include well-established experiments as well as those involving communities in new developmental paths. A significant number of communities and movements are already living alternatives and are contesting neoliberalism in the process, such as Brazil's landless movement (MSF) and Argentina's *autoconvocados* (the self-convened ones). In a key strategy of supplantation and crowding out with plural alternatives, for example, various actors are practicing a kind of political 'import substitution', mobilizing their own assets and ideas and sidestepping and diluting 'imported' hegemonic values and materials rather than imbibing them. I suggest there is increasing acknowledgement of the limits to resistance and of merely jamming the control mythology; efficacy of strategy is rather to be found in constructing meaning and substituting one's own affirmative and potentially transformatory practices, experiences and narratives.

These strategies differ from the direct contestation mould in part through populating the terrain with more alternatives and diluting rather than forcibly dismantling corporatism, thereby weakening its saliency. This is somewhat reminiscent of approaches such as deglobalization (Walden Bello) and delinking (Samir Amin). It makes sense for communities to consider such strategies as unplugging where possible from dependency on corporate credit and on military sector employment, for example. The lineage for this strategy might well be a certain Chinese philosopher who should be reclaimed back from the management schools, for community rather than corporatist strategy, namely Sun Tzu's advice to win without having to fight – rather, build. Directly confronting empire and corporate globalization on its own terms is indeed often naïve and ineffective. Building with tools of community's own making may help shift the strategic balance, rather than fighting with weapons of the corporate empire, such as military might and speculative capital.

A key programmatic plank of grassroots globalization is self-reliant and participatory development, which will be seen in the Kerala case study in Chapter 5. It is significant that the general tenor of much public policy has overwhelmingly been to presuppose that the economic and political health of regions and localities depends upon the health of the national economy, rather than the other way around. Local communities are here commonly presented as the (end) site of global *impacts* rather than as initiators or originators of policies. Where community is begrudgingly included as a global player it is usually located against and as reacting to the 'global' processes. This book takes the position that the quality

and success of large-scale democracy and of economic development in fact vitally depends upon strong democratic *local* community economies and governance. This is antithetical to the corporate public relations that big business alone provides the lifeblood of the community.

Refracted through a singularist or subsumptive lens, the social economy is represented as marginal in mainstream public transcript representations. Its spatial extent is commonly represented as corresponding with self-consciously local-scale intentional efforts; and when it becomes too big or successful, is vulnerable to cooption, corporatization (Mondragon) or state repression. In the public transcript conception, informal and third sector economic practices and institutions such as local economic trading systems (LETS) are commonly positioned as existing only in interstitial spaces left behind by traditional financial institutions or in places with enough 'post-material' affluence to sustain them. A host of examples, including Kerala, show that viable social economic institutions need not be simply reactions to failures of mainstream economic policy, they can be instituted for their own sake, not as a Plan B. Infrageographies of practices and strategies exist that are not merely cracks in the corporate pavement. This is a departure from the praxis that emphasizes strategies and resistances that arise only in the interstices of the dominant power structure, as if episodic and incidental, amid what Lash and Urry have termed 'disorganized capitalism'.[164]

Reform and the limits of overcoming?

Arguably straitjacketed within a singularist subsumptive framework are a number of otherwise excellent critiques. Drawing on Nancy Fraser, Katharine Rankin argues 'actually existing remedies for injustice operate either in an affirmative register – leaving undisturbed the underlying structural frameworks that generate inequitable outcomes, or in a transformative one – correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework'.[165] One of the biggest obstacles here seems to be that the 'constantly self-revolutionizing' character of capitalism subsumes grassroots innovation. Consider Doreen Massey's observations:

> This problem for the left is compounded by the way in which so many of the radical challenges it made to the post-war hegemony (feminism, the rejection of an undifferentiated 'public', the acknowledgement of heterogeneity, the stress on flexibility and flow rather than rigidity) . . . have been in a thousand ways recuperated into the current hegemonic project, taken up in ways we never meant, turned to use as flexibilized labour, selfish individualism, and arguments against collectivism and the state. 'Liberation' turned into lifestyle capitalism.
>
> (Doreen Massey)[166]

David Harvey similarly laments: 'the central problem is that in aggregate there is no resolute and sufficiently unified anti-capitalist movement that can adequately

challenge the reproduction of the capitalist class and the perpetuation of its power on the world stage'.[167] The key word here is '*anti*-capitalist'. What, then, is this movement '*pro*-'? Harvey asserts that we need a 'revolutionary politics that can grasp the nettle of endless compound capital accumulation and eventually shut it down as the prime motor of human history'.[168] A great idea: but then what?

Also: 'Again and again, political movements have constructed alternative spaces in which something seemingly different happens, only to find their alternative quickly reabsorbed into the dominant practices of capitalist reproduction'.[169] This is perhaps where the critical importance of covert strategies and sub rosa substitution is highlighted. In all these arguments, the prospects for subversion and overcoming are very limited, I argue, within what is constructed as a singularist framework: it is only when we have an ontology that allows for multiplicity that we can imagine and enact multiple frameworks rather than simply assume a single subsumptive framework, which is structurally stacked towards corporatism.

In conjunction with sub rosa development, however, reform efforts that include regulation remain important. Legal reform includes proposals to remove legal corporate personhood, re-implementing anti-usury laws and capping interest rates that can be charged on credit cards. Saskia Sassen makes the case for definancializing our economies; Thomas Geoghegan has proposed splitting corporate capital by pitting the manufacturers against the financiers in a kind of anti-trust manoeuvre, and has proposed that public guardians be appointed as directors at the banks and other financial firms given taxpayer-funded 'bailouts'.[170] The possibility of creating a central global clearing bank as an international regulatory agency for financial markets, for which Jane D'Arista is an advocate, has also been proposed; and the Tobin Tax is another means by which short-term speculation could be discouraged.[171] Co-determined boards are also an idea now mandated at German companies with 2,000 employees or more, where half of the co-determined board consists of people elected by and from the workers, with the other half elected by the shareholders. According to the German labour minister Günther Horzetzky, 'Our biggest export now is co-determination'.[172]

These institutional and regulatory reforms are important and offer critical means to secure socially just and equitable policies. In positing capacity-building strategies, I do not suggest that public political reform and accountability be abandoned: they have a crucial place. Community-based capacity-building is not intended to supplant these efforts, but aims at a different ball game: to create multiple new pathways upon which communities and movements can draw for *thrival* (a wonderful neologism attributed to Buckminster Fuller) and not simply *survival*.[173] It is to these strategies to which we now turn.

Community-based capacity-building

> We live . . . in the lap of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium.
>
> (John Dewey)[174]

The rhetoric of community has become a mantra chanted by both Left and Right across the traditional political spectrum from the 1990s through to the 2010s.[175] Community here refers to those that are geographically bounded, usually contiguous, place-based communities as well as communities of *interest*, which also have geographic characteristics. Most people identify with belonging to at least one community in addition to and outside the nation-state. The elasticity and ubiquity of the word community is problematic, and like 'globalization', can be used as an ideological masking term under which rollbacks in welfare and the social wage occur and are transferred to 'community groups'.[176]

What then is a *progressive* community? For our purposes, it is posited as one in which the normative values and operational goals are the rule of law, greater equality of opportunity and self-determination, the peaceful resolution of conflict, representation by deliberative-democratic determination, a commons that is not privately held by a few individuals, and most importantly, one in which participation is such that people have both a hand and a voice in governance. This represents one of the most important differences between corporate and grassroots globalization: the latter has as its aim the shortening of the distance – both physical and metaphorical – between the decision-makers and those whom the decisions are affecting. In contradistinction to corporatist globalization's greater ease with a plutocratic core of distant and unaccountability-deficient decision-makers and 'scientific management principles', the yardstick for the health of community includes the ability of citizens to express, participate in and act upon decisions affecting them.

Participatory processes involve a trust that people most affected by policies can effectively contribute to their design and implementation, with space sanctioned for active, deliberative-democratic participation and reflective practice in problem formulation, implementation, and civic affairs. Ongoing participation and active civic engagement may also be a key avenue to further foster and disseminate mētis between communities. Associational capacity is an important factor in local economic development; in his well-known work, Robert Putnam makes the case that successful regions tend to have stronger civic engagement and more horizontal than hierarchical networks. Putnam points to the success and high civic indicators of regions such as Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in contrast with their less civic regional cousins Sicily and Calabria.

According to Putnam, regions like Emilia-Romagna did not become civic because they were rich; rather, the opposite – they became prosperous because they were civic.[177] Similarly, Oliver conducted a study that found that economically diverse locales tended to have higher local participation rates.[178] Putnam's research on Italy in the 1970s is probably the most well-known case study of decentralization and civil society, yet it only goes to the provincial level. Kerala's experiment, its architects claim, has gone far deeper in involving local communities than comparable decentralization initiatives in other countries.[179]

In Table 3.1, I sketch some of the qualitative differences I distinguish between mētis, as discussed in the first half of the chapter, and social capital, and propose that the more public transcript-legible social capital depends upon the cultivation

Table 3.1 The differences between social capital and mētis

Social capital	*Mētis*
Attribute (e.g. trust, reciprocity)	Skill, know-how
Focuses on exchange	Focuses on capacity
Legible to corporatist forms	Partly or wholly illegible to corporatist forms
Generalizable across communities	Highly context specific, yet may be adaptable and portable to other locales

and strength of mētis. Strong civic participation may be the *sine qua non* of more effective, deliberative (not just representative) democracy, which also depends upon a community's capacity. It may also in turn depend in part upon the distribution of wealth. In their work, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Picket argue that in the countries with the most unequal distribution of wealth, the social fabric is generally worse for *everybody*. Inequality undermines community and social trust and is corrosive to social cohesion overall but especially so to those at the bottom of the hierarchy.[180]

While economic equity and distribution of income and resources matters, so does what people are able to do with those resources – their 'capabilities', in other words, among which Amartya Sen lists literacy, nutrition and the 'power to participate in the social life of the community'.[181] In this view, inequality of power matters as much as inequality of resources or income, and for Sen it is important to have substantive freedom, as opposed to the 'negative' freedom from external interference. In Sen's capabilities approach, freedoms and their enlargement are viewed both as the end as well as the means of development:

> Individual agency is . . . central to addressing these deprivations [of development]. On the other hand, the freedom of agency that we individually have is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us. There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements . . . we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment.
>
> (Amartya Sen)[182]

Unlike a narrower approach which focuses on material indicators and outcomes such as GNP and growth, Sen's approach enlarges upon the view, ends and processes of development – in his view, it is nothing less than a process of expanding people's real freedoms. Sen posits development *as* freedom, not development divorced from freedom such as the 'liberalize first, democratize later' strategies of countries such as China and some of the Asian Tigers.[183] Significantly, Sen defines poverty both as a lack of material resources as well as powerlessness or incapacity to influence events and shape forces in one's life. Moreover, in his view, gender equality is intrinsic to development, in contradistinction to the austere view of development and human rights that sees democracy as a 'luxury' to be ill-afforded at a country's critical juncture of rapid development in industrializing countries.

A number of techniques are being employed by various communities to strengthen their capabilities, and toward community capacity building. These techniques operationalize principles that recognize that flourishing communities foster commodious individuals and vice versa. These characteristics include participatory and deliberative democracy, decentralized decision-making, autonomy, networked solidarity, gender equality, economic equity, power-sharing, nonviolent and ethical development, environmental sustainability, populist and technical education and an experimental spirit. It involves, to paraphrase Theodore (Ted) Roosevelt, an ethos of doing what one can, with what one has, where one is.

One key technique is the Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) praxis that seeks to uncover and highlight the strengths, skills and resources within communities.[184] It is a capacities-focused rather than 'needs' based approach to map and mobilize these resources in innovative ways. Rather than an approach that would focus on the community's deficiencies and problems, it involves a view of the community as inherently capacious, and capable of coordinated creativity and action. The inventory of community members' skills and resources in a particular locality can result in a number of practical actions that may typically involve the creation of enterprises and initiatives. In doing so, this methodology and strategic approach is more likely to foster self-reliant and enduring change by drawing upon their own mētis and know-how, and avoids paternalism and dependence. These start from a 'glass half full' approach that builds confidence to further develop what is already in the community in terms of skills and resources.

A second key strategy is decentralization. The relationship between decentralization and democracy is important because it assigns local communities and organizations with the responsibility for their decision-making, making it experiential rather than remote and even alienating, aiming toward a transition from *delegative* to *deliberative* democracy.[185] On this measure, the villages of Kerala may be more democratic than the suburbs of Sydney or Seattle. Like microcredit, decentralization also has its corporate counterpart: decentralization is one of the magic solutions propagated by external multilateral agencies which critics, like Rankin, have charged serve the conventional neoliberal interest of 'cutting back the state'. I would contend that the rhetoric of community and autonomy by government is indeed empty without a measure of devolution of resources to communities. Rankin is wary about what she describes as the 'fragmenting effects of devolving responsibility for local economic development onto populations that are differentially capable and endowed'.[186] Similarly, David Harvey also charges that '(d)ecentralization and autonomy are the primary vehicles for producing greater inequality through neoliberalization'[187] – my contention is that this is actively made and appropriated through these channels, it is not intrinsic to them. In my empirical research in Chapter 5, I explore the experience of Kerala to show that decentralization can work when funds are also devolved, not just functions, particularly with the state putting in place effective coordination mechanisms for poorer regions and a social safety net.

Within decentralization, a key operational principle is subsidiarity, a tenet with roots in Catholic theology whereby 'subsystems' are encouraged to make

decisions themselves without referring them to a higher authority. At any social scale, there must be a compelling reason to remove authority in any matter from a more local to a less local jurisdiction. It is the notion that nothing should be done by an agent or complex organization at a larger scale or site that can already be done at the local level by smaller organizations. Any unnecessary corporatist 'top-down' action violates the principle and practice of subsidiarity; it presumes local competence rather than insufficiency and protects against corporate or top-down decision-making encroachment, identifying 'authority-at-a-distance' and its usual unaccountability as one of the major sources of loss of autonomy.[188]

This capacity-building and cultivation approach is at odds with policies favouring imposed external authority purporting to know what is best for any given community or proxy decision-making from distant deciders, including NGOs. Community development may be undertaken with some NGO or state funds, and this relationship will be duly negotiated. In the case of the state, allusions to financial 'assistance' can be misleading as the state levies taxes from the community. The involvement of various NGOs can be problematic in a number of ways. NGOs who are heavily dependent upon external donors can become more answerable to these donors than to their constituents and intended beneficiaries. Where the preponderance of reliance is on external funding, it may shift accountability away from local responsibility and moral ownership towards international body regulation and lose subsidiarity. Gélinas makes a relevant distinction between 'warm money' self-generated by the community and 'heated' by local people's work, and 'cold money' from outside sources and its impacts:

> NGOs with several decades of experience in implementing saving and loan cooperatives in the Third World have drawn the following lesson: development projects fail every time an ill-considered contribution of external capital disturbed the internal dynamics of community cooperation and development. In contrast to 'warm money' generated by local savings and 'heated' by local peoples work, 'cold money' from outside has a negative impact on the development of cooperatives.
>
> (Jacques B. Gélinas)[189]

The possibilities for generating 'warm money' are also explored in the Kerala case study in Chapter 5.

One of the greatest advantages of community and civic groups relative to global corporate capital's competitive imperative and predatory mobility – and an under-utilized one according to Appadurai – is that, unlike capitalism, they do not need to compete with each other and their scope for collaborative networks is greater.[190] As Appadurai notes, these emergent social forms are part-movements, part-networks and part-organizations.[191] Networking reduces risk, increases support, pools efforts and skills, can help create a critical mass. Deeper collaborative networks also serve to better democratize the flows of knowledge about globalization, and help publicize the possible. In contradistinction to Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy',[192] the network is a more enabling and democratic organizational

form, able to foster a more horizontal rather than hierarchical exchange. Local groups and communities can pursue particularistic as well as global issues – a neighbourhood recycling program, for example, is a global-local issue encountered everywhere. It allows for a greater cross-pollination of ideas and strategies and place-based nodal 'peer-review'.

What is particular to the contemporary era that distinguishes efforts from previous eras is that a number of groups and communities have been able to more effectively harness contemporary conditions and technologies associated with globalization in service to the cause of building grassroots globalization. On the one hand, the ever-growing complexity of social life is possibly resulting in corporatist overreach: states and dominant capital cannot control everything. On the positive side of the ledger, projects of enacting greater economic autonomy are supported by a growing and unprecedented cultural infrastructure, particularly with electronic media and regular event fixtures as the WSF and its regional offshoots that have been a hub for many of these projects.[193] Herein also lies the tension examined in Chapter 1 between big capital's need to commoditize relations and the simultaneous predication of profitability on the appropriation of unpaid (not commodified or monetized) work. It is also a strategy available to a growing movement of 'freegans' who have experimented successfully with either living without or minimizing money and refusing to participate in formal circuits of capital, effectively demonetizing their participation in social spheres and spaces.[194]

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) may also extend opportunities for political engagement independent of public transcript agendas, with webloggers and organizers even in countries with notoriously tight regulation such as China often able to bypass state Internet controls.[195] Can digitization help community economies? The digital divide exists but is being overcome in innovative ways such as through communal Wi-Fi and the free software movement.[196] Excellent use of community informatics toward urban and rural connectivity can be seen in Kerala, where the Indian chapter of the Free Software Movement (FSF) was inaugurated July 2001 in Kerala's capital, Trivandrum.[197]

Many of these elements come into play in one contemporary worker's cooperative in Australia, which is currently running a crowd-funding campaign through social media networks. The Earthworker Cooperative aims to establish renewable energy manufacturing, particularly of solar hot water systems, through a network of country-wide community-owned cooperatives, including Australia's first worker-owned solar hot water manufacturing cooperative, 'Eureka's Future' in Morwell, Victoria. The symbolism of a cleaner energy initiative starting off in a coal-burning region, the La Trobe Valley, is significant; the Earthworker website also features the lede, 'Working our way out of climate emergencies'. The solar water systems will be made available as an in-kind wage payment as part of Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs), a result of negotiations between trade unionists and small manufacturers. Earthworker expressly aims to foster 'fair, democratic workplaces, local manufacturing, strong communities and sustainable technologies'.[198]

The role of art and artisanal knowledge is also an important element in producing infrageographies. The role of the arts has an important part to play in capacity-building, participation and cultivating mētis, helping to feed the imagination to envision alternatives: it helps to be 'driven by imaginations as supple as art rather than as stiff as dogma'.[199] Various art forms, including culture-jamming acts, often use humour, spectacle and symbolism and play an important role in participatory culture. As Christy Rodgers notes in her experience about the significance of the arts:

> What struck me most about the brief upsurge of mass organizing in the US . . . beginning in Seattle, was the amount of creative expression that accompanied it. It was as if the medieval carnival, which the Russian critic Bakhtin identified as the *wellspring of democratic and participatory culture*, had melded with the march, the sit-in and the lock-down, as if somebody was finally trying to say: look, *this is not just part of what we want, but of what we are. Not bread and circuses, but bread and roses.* But what was even more inspiring was the realization that the conscious carnival was not just a kind of elite fin de siècle phosphorescence that cropped up at these ultimately quixotic but still necessary mass mobilizations. *It was actually going on all the time, far below the myopic radar of the mass media or of much of the left itself. Beyond the intermittent demonstration, in the everyday life of the street, public art, or community art, was at work in every corner of the country making our creative abilities collective and expressly putting them at the service of society* [italic emphasis added].
>
> (Christy Rodgers)[200]

The social economy

A centrepiece of community capacity or collective mētis is the informal or social economy. Also grouped under such terms as the social, parallel, restorative or third sector economy and with some definitional overlap with the 'shadow economy', community economies are defined by Gibson-Graham as 'simply economic spaces or networks in which relations of interdependence are democratically negotiated by participating individuals and organizations; they can be constituted at any scale'.[201] Strategies in this area may have the ambitious task of consciously creating alternative modes of surplus appropriation and distribution, or simply a complementary community currency, but they share the goal of re-embedding the economic into social terrain based on community determination. A multiplicity of these strategies and projects exist to 'take back the economy'[202] that aim towards practical propositional strategies from Community Land Trusts (CLTs) to Cross-Sectoral Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).[203]

There are many arrows in the quiver of the social economy. It can consist of cooperatives, household and voluntary labour, voluntary organizations, mutual societies, foundations, fair trade, public markets, street vendors, eco-villages, barter, gifts, community resource management, squatters, cohousing, microcredit:

these are all important and count in grassroots economics, though are not necessarily reflected in the official national account. All these ubiquitous examples of economic activity are commonly marginalized in the public transcript yet make up the bulk of economic reality. As Gibson-Graham have argued in their work, formal labour and market transactions are only the visible tip of the economic iceberg. Noncapitalist economic spaces and practices include household economies, alternative and microfinance, barter, self-employment, gift-giving and cooperatives are actually more constitutively prevalent and dominant, and most are globally extensive.[204] Similarly, Gélinas dubs the social third sector as the 'hidden side of the third world economy'.[205]

The informal sector in the majority world is significant. One study puts the average size of the informal economy, as a per cent of official Gross National Income (GNI) in the year 2000 at 41 per cent in less industrialized countries, at 38 per cent in transition countries and 18 per cent in OECD countries.[206] By virtue of their informal nature and operation outside of regulation, figures estimating the size of the informal economy are indicative only, and are reliant upon reporting institutions. With this caveat, the second edition (2013) of an International Labour Organization (ILO) report on the informal economy found informal employment in South and East Asia (excluding China), to constitute more than 60 per cent of total non-agricultural employment in all reporting countries, except Thailand, where it is reported as 42 per cent. In India, it is 84 per cent; in Africa, it ranges from 33 per cent in South Africa to 82 per cent in Mali. In Latin America and the Caribbean, it ranges from 40 per cent in Uruguay to 75 per cent in Bolivia. For North Africa and the Middle East, informal employment in the three reporting countries/territories also constitutes a significant proportion of employment, from 31 per cent in Turkey to 51 per cent in Egypt and 58 per cent in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.[207] In India, there are twice as many jobs created in the informal manufacturing sector as the official sector.[208] Established in 1972, the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) trade union in India has an estimated 1.9 million members (2014) and has established a bank and other offshoot organizations.[209]

The United Nations (UN) estimates that 800 million people are members of cooperatives, and 100 million are employed by them; in contrast, the world's largest 100,000 corporations are estimated to employ about 3 per cent of the world's workforce.[210] Italy has the largest cooperative sector in the world according to one survey, larger than the Basque region's Mondragon system, which has over 160 cooperatives, and 30,000 worker-members.[211] In northern Italy, cooperatives account for one-eighth of the regional economy of Emilia-Romagna.[212] In Uruguay, there are 600,000 members of the Confederation of Cooperative Entities who are responsible for almost all the country's milk, sugar and honey production. They constitute, collectively, 10 per cent of Uruguay's agricultural production and 3 per cent of its GNP.[213] North America has an estimated 50,000 cooperative organizations involving 12 million people. In addition, the US has about 200 cooperatives completely owned by its workers.[214]

The contours of economic activity are shaped not only by the market economy, as feminist and other analysts have long shown. As Ironmonger has asserted,




Figure 3.1 A graphic of Quaker origins depicting the value of cooperation.
Source: © Religious Society of Friends in Britain, 2014.

non-market transactions and unpaid household work are estimated to make up 30 to 50 per cent of economic activity.[215] In terms of unpaid labour in households, Murgatroyd and Neuburger estimate that the value of domestic work in the UK is at least 40 per cent of GDP and may be as much as 120 per cent;[216] in the US, unpaid senior care and health care exceeds that of nursing and home care programmes combined.[217]

Local Economic Trading Schemes (LETS) and many cooperatives and micro-enterprises operate outside official monetary circuits. LETS first developed as a community currency system in Canada in 1983, and has now been adopted (often with novel and place-reflecting currency names such as the Bunya in Maleny,

Australia, after the sub-tropical bunya pine tree) in over 2,000 communities. Official money is not wholly replaced, but supplemented with a local currency unit for exchange outside of official monetary circuits. Another example is the Ithica HOUR, established first in New York by Paul Glover in 1991 and based on an hour of labour. Tens of thousands of HOURS have been successfully created in what Glover calls the Grassroots National Product.[218] Links have now been established with over 100 US and international communities to promote the concept and the effects have been tremendous:

> HOUR Town's 1,500 listings, rivalling the Yellow Pages, are a portrait of our community's capability, bringing into the marketplace time and skills not employed by the conventional market. Residents are proud of income gained by doing work they enjoy. We encounter each other as fellow Ithacans, rather than as winners and losers scrambling for dollars . . . We regard Ithaca's HOURS as real money, backed by real people, real time, real skills and tools. Dollars, by contrast, are funny money, backed no longer by gold or silver but by less than nothing – $5.5 trillion of national debt.[219]

Peer-to-peer finance via web-based social lending platforms (such as Zopa in the UK, and Smava in Germany), and local complementary currencies and Islamic banking practices that draw upon Muslim principles such as 'zakah' and the repudiation of usury are also becoming more popular.[220]

Credit access is important for income generating activities, particularly when access to formal banking channels is limited due to lack of collateral. There are a number of disincentives faced by formal lending institutions in loaning to the poor. Small savings and loans are an unattractive business proposition for most formal banking institutions. Formal-banking institutions' transaction costs are high due to difficulties in screening the credit worthiness of the micro-borrowers, in monitoring the utilization of funds and in enforcing repayment. In addition to disincentives faced by the banks, there are also problems faced by the poor in accessing loans from formal banking institutions.

Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are an emergent and growing source of financial self-reliance. CDFIs refers to a variety of institutional forms that involve funnelling and creating credit in communities that are either under- or inappropriately served by traditional commercial lenders, and includes community banks, credit unions and microcredit programmes. These are facilitating and enlarging the possibilities for viable and thriving community economies. Successful microcredit development enterprises such as Bolivia's *Banco Solidario* have been well established.[221] The bank adheres to the principle of solidarity microcredit and community development based on co-responsibility of the small loan lent to small borrower groups, and shows that the Grameen Bank is not the only model for example.

A key strategy with informal economies is to shift from 'attracting' jobs to the region to creating them. This involves helping to create a climate where the sufficiency of conventional capitalist development is not presumed by first

recognizing the insufficiency of capitalist economic development to the task of sustaining a community; second, by resignifying in positive and capacious terms multiple sources of economic identity. This goes toward transforming constituents and communities from victims to creators, from deficient to capacious, from needs to assets. Walden Bello explicitly advocates 'enshrining . . . subsidiarity in economic life'.[222]

Paradoxically, more economic activity is at once more local as it is tied to global flows, and many service professionals are not tied to or *directly* affected by international trade such as school teachers, carpenters, plumbers, local council employees, gardeners and hairdressers.[223] Thomas Michael Power estimates that in the US, about 60 per cent of economic activity is local, providing residents with the goods and services that support their wellbeing: 'Almost all local economies are dominated by residents taking in each other's wash'.[224] This seems a very different picture from that presented by corporatists about the imperative to plug into a very narrow rendering of the global economy.

The role of the state

> I am suggesting that two centuries of a strong state and liberal economics may have socialized us so that we have largely lost the habits of mutuality and are in danger now of becoming precisely the dangerous predators that Hobbes thought populated the state of nature. Leviathan may have given birth to its own justification.
>
> (James C. Scott)[225]

Increasingly self-financed and self-developed, there are varying degrees of autonomy and interdependence between community enterprises and the state. It would be misleading and partial to describe the growth of the informal economy as simply a response to the paring back of the state or the effect of neoliberal policies. Sassen speaks of global cities' 'regulatory fractures' within which informal economies are thriving as an 'outcome of the new types of organizational, spatial, and temporal requirements that are in fact entailed by the growth of those cities' global sectors'.[226] In many other instances, however, the social economy exists by its own virtue, as a Plan A, not simply as a fallback when formal development policies have failed.

Governments at municipal and state-levels have also supported and pursued more equitable policies in an ostensibly neoliberal era and against those pressures, and not always just as an ameliorative measure. One example is the municipalization of electric utilities in Boulder, Colorado – what Gar Alperovitz has called 'localized nationalization'.[227] Venezuela's participatory communal councils (*consejos comunales*) as a key aim in the Bolivarian socialist project might also present examples of possibilities facilitated rather than obstructed by the state.[228] The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) may also represent alternative configurations of interstate cooperation and power.[229]

Elsewhere, the role of a facilitative state is seen in the participatory practices Brazil has institutionalized whereby there is a 'right to the city' clause in the

Brazilian constitution, enshrining the right to citizen consultation, participation and budgetary input.[230] With elements of the Brazil Workers' Party, the Landless Workers Movement (MST in Portugese) has helped form educational and social institutions including schools and day care organizations, and sustainable farming practices.

Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting experiment that commenced in 1989 came about to address inequality and promote democratic and transparent administration of public municipal funds. It has since seen global take-up, with participatory budgeting estimated to have been implemented in 1,500 cities and has become official government policy in Venezuela, Peru and even in the UK and US, such as with Chicago's 49th ward in 2009.[231] In the two decades between 1990 and 2008, almost half of Brazil's biggest 250 cities took up participatory budgeting. Wampler and Touchton compared cities that adopted participatory budgeting in Brazil with those cities that did not adopt it and found that those municipal governments who practiced participatory budgeting spent more on education and sanitation in areas that needed it most and saw decreases in infant mortality; cities without participatory budgeting had infant mortality rates closer to Brazil's average. Like Kerala's experience detailed in Chapter 5 however, participatory budgeting fared better when the mayor was from the more committed Workers' Party rather than their ideological opposition parties.[232]

The role of the state is important not least because community-based credit unions are commonly subject to the regulatory framework and ideology that also governs finance and law. Often regulatory compliance is necessary but practices can also occur illegally or 'underground', such as the black economy or everyday breaches of copyright that are impossible to police. The regulatory reach and arm of the law is quite long, but cannot, however, micro-govern everything. Some forms of the social economy thrive with the blessing of the state, yet others operate outside the state's ambit. While a good deal of practitioners advocate a semi-autonomus relationship from the state-capital nexus, Leyshon and Thrift foresee the necessity of alternative economic organizations using the same methods as capital and coming to some accommodation with formal financial circuits:

> so many of these attempts have foundered on a general lack of coherent and reliable income streams that can be projected into the future and can therefore provide the necessary faith that they will endure . . . alternative modes of finance can strengthen their position by means of three strategies. First, they must identify assets with long-term streams of income that, through securitization, can be converted into a lump sum which can then be used to deepen and widen alternative economies. Of course, to do so means that participants in local currency systems must come to an accommodation with the wider financial system . . . Second, to make such income streams viable they must ensure that they enrol a wider section of the population than has hitherto been willing to commit to such projects to ensure that such income streams can be leveraged in ways that have traction in capital markets . . . Third, they need to find common software packages that will aggregate assets to such a

> degree that they are valuable . . . if alternative economic systems are to be successful, they have to scale up, and to reach less well off people (the two being connected).
>
> (Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift)[233]

We recall that the edifice of modern states has often been built on top of already existing and older communities that already had social integration and self-definition. The reformation by way of radical-democratic reconstitution of the state is another strategy for advocates of greater autonomy and grassroots globalization, whereby recognition of key elements of this older order and community can be codified and operationalized. For instance, in recognition of the role and weight of the sector, the French government created a Ministry of Social Economics and Solidarity in June 2000. Japan has 600 complementary currency systems, including a government-initiated smart card system for aged care. Similarly, in recognition of the role of the social economy, the EU now requires member states to support the sector.[234] Official recognition of the sector's influence is also reflected in the UN designation of 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives.

If the state has a constructive role to play, ways of rethinking the role of institutions and participation to become more at ease with multiplicity and indeterminacy might be in order, rather than planning conceived in control ontology. (The latter approach might be encapsulated in a phrase by Karl Mannheim, who described planning as the 'rational mastery of the irrational'.)[235] With this suggestion in mind, Wayne Parsons observes an interesting contrast between two approaches in Reith lectures given almost three decades apart, one delivered by Antony Giddens in 1999 and the other by Donald Schön in 1970. Schön stresses the need for adaptable learning institutions, while Giddens emphasizes control over an unruly world:

> Both are concerned about change and the ability of institutions to deal with growing instability and uncertainty – issues which, according to the governance narrative(s), are defining characteristics of the transition from government to governance – but they come up with very different answers. Giddens sees the problem as how to achieve 'greater control over a runaway world', whereas Schön believed that the 'unstable' state was less about imposing control than facilitating a process of public learning. Giddens's lectures see the problem of the runaway world as to do with the control or 'transformative capacities' of institutions (very New Labour), whereas Schön's lectures argued that the 'unstable state' involved facilitating 'self-transformation' (very non-New Labour).
>
> (Wayne Parsons)[236]

Perhaps new ways of imagining the role of the state is also in order, in conjunction with principles and practices such as decentralization, participatory planning and budgeting, self-determination and subsidiarity.

Framing, resubjectification and resignification

> The diverse economy catapults multiplicity and economic differentiation to the fore and helps us to counter the ingrained belief that capitalist economic relations are the only driving economic force. Once this one-way street toward development becomes just one among a number of avenues, economic innovation proliferates.
>
> (J. K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink)[237]

If we are to recognize the viability and render the visibility of non-capitalist economic entities and activities, generating this diverse field means actually reflecting the full spectrum of economic reality more accurately. For Gibson-Graham, this centrally involves a 'project of economic resignification'.[238] They identify a 'capitalocentrism' privileging certain agents and spatialities of globalization, against a project of economic resignification that they argue can more accurately reflect the global ubiquity of informal and social alternative economic practices. This fundamentally challenges the old ontology of a single totalizing mode of economic activity (capitalism), which is alone coextensive with the social space. One of the challenges then is to definitionally dethrone capitalism so that it no longer subsumes plurality and diversity and clears space for the many other forms of economic activity, reframing of the economy as a proliferative, heterogeneous and social space where the economic landscape is populated with multiple representations of economic plurality.

In theorizing economic difference, Gibson-Graham develop an approach that populates the economy as a space of difference and one which abjures what they see as the prohibitive binary opposition of mainstream and alternative. They see the invisible bulk of the economic iceberg as mostly non-capitalist. If less than half of the total product of most economies is produced under the rubric of capitalism, Gibson-Graham argue, referring to them as 'capitalist is a violent act of naming that erases from view the heterogeneous complexity of the economy'.[239] This definitional deficit stems from a singularist ontology, wherein capitalism is represented as an economy of sameness, which stifles and marginalizes different economic modes. They call into question what constitutes mainstream economic activity with an understanding of the economy as a more differentiated economic landscape populated by a variety of non-capitalist and alternative capitalist activity. These activities do not carry the presumption of dominance and subordination as they do in capitalism, which ontologically forecloses their imagined viability.

Gender equity is an important part of this equation. We recall that for Amartya Sen, when you improve gender equity, you invariably improve the whole wellbeing of any given society, and that gender equality is inseparable from development. The case could be made that the devaluation of women and devaluation of the informal economy are also connected. Unremunerated care giving, the rearing of children, family and household management represent a very high proportion of economic activity. One of Gibson-Graham's techniques to address this is by rereading already existing productive activities such as domestic and reproductive labour for difference, with new activities brought to light.

Gibson-Graham advocate dislodging neoliberalism as the 'master signifier' and discourse of globalization, and replacing it not with another master discourse but an epistemological and ontological multiplicity that allows many worlds to be possible. As will be suggested in Chapter 4, a key strategy to address the hegemonic representation (and performance) of 'capitalism as an obdurate structure or system, coextensive with the social space'[240] is by discursively producing a pluralist ontology of difference and multiplicity. This serves to highlight the ubiquity and extensity of nonmarket and noncapitalist practices which exist alongside the variety of capitalist forms.

This project also involves addressing the question of to what degree the social economy is 'performatively' marginalized? If the social economy is conceived as contingent, interstitial and structurally vulnerable against a more dominant economy, alternativeness becomes easily subject to dismissal and erasure. As Stephen Healy asserts, 'While alternative economic institutions are conceived as existing only in contingent circumstances, the presumed dominance of mainstream financial institutions creates the appearance that they exist autonomously, independent of conditions'.[241]

Based on the constructivist concept of performativity, in which discourse participates in producing (or 'performs') the reality it purports to represent, the marginalization of the informal economy is performatively constituted, so that language, framing and representation take on *strategic* importance. Since our worldviews are actively constructed, it stands to reason that they can be reconstructed; a key strategy thus involves ontological re-framing as a discursive strategy. Performativity theory 'reveals the extent to which the discursive limits the conceivable and, by extension, the doable'.[242]

In posing the question of whether people choose to expand visions of social possibility or choose to more fearfully cling to a singular (received) capitalist identity, it is not suggested that the mere act of thinking differently, on its own, is all that is required to create alternatives. Rather, it is recognition that the way in which capitalism is invoked serves to stifle the study and practice of alternatives and is itself part of what keeps capitalism dominant, where power and capacity is presumed to inhere only in capitalism. Capitalism is strengthened as a consequence of its representation, both deliberate and unintended:

> If we create a hegemonic globalization script with the multinational corporation, the financial sector, the market and commodification all set up in terms of mutual reinforcement, and we then proclaim this formation as a 'reality', we invite particular outcomes. Certain cues and responses will be seen as 'normal' while others will be seen as quixotic and unrealistic.
>
> (J. K. Gibson-Graham)[243]

Making visible the subsidy of the formal by the informal sector may be an empowering act of illumination so that capacity is revealed. Recognition of community and informal economies and the household helps break down the false separability of productive and (what are falsely deemed) non-productive activities and

their underpinning of the formal sector. As Nagar et al. point out, 'It is precisely the *relations between* high and low skill work, between formal and casualized economies, between production and caring work, between globalized and marginalized places . . . that have allowed global capitalism to assume its contemporary forms'.[244] This may facilitate the shift from subsidizing the formal sector to subventing processes in the social economy.

The project of enacting a more diverse social economy – the project of economic resignification as Gibson-Graham describe it – is then also one of resubjectification, where both structures and agents are remade.[245] As St. Martin demonstrates in his work on fisheries resource management, a view of the individual as a self-interested utility-maximizer leads to a regulatory approach that generates more risk-taking by crews and produces the very behaviour it presumes to control.[246] This is a project of resubjectification of our role in relation to polity and economy, recasting agency as capable actors, as 'subjects of capacity rather than debility, subjects whose range of economic identifications exceeds the capitalist order'.[247]

Epistemological strategies and implications

Reading difference and recognizing diversity in the service of greater equity is reflected in approaches that might also function as epistemic strategies, and include standpoint epistemology, engaged pluralism, participatory action research and discursive framing strategies. While the scope of my book precludes a detailed engagement with all of these approaches, I will briefly be exploring framing strategies in this section.[248]

That language is itself a site of political action means that the framing of values is not neutral but is itself a political act. Even the vocabulary used to discuss practices is largely in the service of the value system at hand. The term 'contentious politics', for example, is framed in the negative; orthodox policies are defined as 'shaping' and 'reforming' (what is so 'consensual' about the so-called Washington Consensus?) while those outside the prevailing public power structure are marginalized through language as 'interfering' and 'disrupting'.[249] I assert that communities and activists can abdicate their own authority simply by accepting or imbibing the language disseminated by the public transcript power structure.

The discursive framing process shepherds in (or out) certain practices and values can be reframed and transformed in service of a political goal. Lakoff defines frames as 'mental structures that shape the way we see the world . . . When you hear a word, its frame is activated in your brain . . . In politics our frames shape our social policies . . . Because language activates frames, new language is required for new frames'.[250] Because language structures thought, adopting the language of proposition rather than of power or of protest helps rewire our mindsets and cognitive patterns.

The written and spoken word matters because it does not merely have explanatory or revelatory power, it is in itself an act of agency, with practical consequences as demonstrated allegorically in this Confucian parable: 'When the names for things are incorrect, speech does not sound reasonable; when speech

does not sound reasonable, things are not done properly; when things are not done properly, the structure of society is harmed'.[251] In one compelling example of the practical implications of linguistic structure, 'European scientists whose languages lump processes with substances as nouns, took much longer to account for vitamin deficiencies than for germ diseases, partly because "I have a germ" was a more natural locution than "I have a lack of vitamins"'.[252]

In conscious framing strategies, practitioners employ terms couched in future-positive terms to re-imagine people as active producers rather than passive consumers, the market language used. Currently there is a dearth of positive terms for well-being and long-term sustainability that are not defined as a negation, such as 'non-violence' (a rare term is the aforementioned neologism attributed to Buckminster Fuller, 'thrival', which is far more replete with capacity than mere 'survival'). As Reinsborough remarks, some of the answers and strategies for social movements lies in a requisite exploration of how

> pathological values have shaped not only the global system but also our ability to imagine true change. The system we are fighting is not merely structural, it's also inside us, through the internalization of oppressive cultural norms that define our world view.
>
> (Patrick Reinsborough)[253]

In order to undo this and reclaim our power to narrate and define (or be defined) from the corporate colonization of language, we need a language of make-ability, possibility and probability, enactment, and do-ability. Cultivating viable visions can involve story-telling and thought experiments as strategy. David Harvey, for example, proposes thought experiments in which we imagine how it is to be, act and think differently.[254] Featured particularly in Future Studies, scenarios can also be a powerful motivating tool. One way to think differently is through extending agency through the paradoxical practice of mainstreaming marginality, the focus of the next section.

'We are all subaltern': extending agency and leveraging inequality

> Do you not get it, lads? The Irish are the blacks of Europe. And Dubliners are the blacks of Ireland. And the Northside Dubliners are the blacks of Dublin. So say it once, say it loud: I'm black and I'm proud.
>
> (The Commitments)[255]

> The self-determination of the other is the other-determination of the self.
>
> (Viveiros de Castro, Pederson and Holbraad)[256]

My first proposal here is to point to the value of reclaiming subaltern in its apt original meaning as 'off the map', rather than as a negative condition to be overcome, as in Spivak's formulation. In contrast to Spivak's meaning, I suggest that it may be transmuted by being embraced and extended, reclaimed and celebrated.

This may also serve to usefully obviate any tendency toward romantic portrayals of subalterns as always morally good political subjects; by widening the term; it can encompass diversity and multidimensionality of political subjects as well as myriad complex traits, both progressive and regressive. Identifying with the beleaguered brings the struggle home in ways each of us can relate and which can promote the cause. The 'We are all Khaled Said' sentiment in the wake of the horrific beating to death of courageous Egyptian youth Khaled Said galvanized much of the country, for example, leading to unprecedented change effected from the ground.

The original meaning of the term holds value not only through the socialist and feminist understanding that those at the margins have a unique and often greater insight into the machinations of power, but in an 'I am the Other' radical solidarity strategy of leveraging inequality and making an asset and virtue of illegibility. Solidarity activism is important for a number of reasons, one being that activists often risk their lives. With death squads and assassinations of activists, activists are confronted by the stark reality of state repression. As Tom Mertes points out, it is usually the case that 'Northerners have a better chance of getting home safely after a demonstration'.[257]

International solidarity in campaigns can lend moral and material support and help bring to bear international pressure and scrutiny, and possible leverage. This can be seen in international accompaniers using their privilege to assist and shield local residents from state or other violence, such as the Christian Peacemaker Teams in various parts of the world.[258] Resource-poor localities and movements may garner benefits from an enabling connectivity and solidarity with communities in other locales, utilizing a sort of agential arbitrage that makes a strategy and virtue of geographic unevenness, harnessing the paradoxical possibility of transforming inequality *through* inequality.

This can also be seen in the case of the Zapatistas and with international accompaniers and solidarity activists. The central Mexican state thought the 'rebellion' could be quashed with air raids, heavy artillery and the military. Transnational advocacy and activist networks worldwide 'swarmed' physically and virtually to prevent a bloodbath, with the Internet serving as an inverted panopticon scrutinizing the actions of the Mexican military and transnational banks such as Chase-Manhattan. In a report that directly referenced the Zapatistas, the Rand Institute warned about swarming as a network strategy alongside 'Battle Swarm' as a strategy in military theatres.[259]

The Mexican state tried to write off the struggle as a local, ethnic dispute; the Zapatistas couched it in universal terms: herein lies the potential of mainstreaming the marginalized. What started as a struggle for indigenous rights and self-determination became enlarged in scale and scope to become a world campaign for alternatives, generating two intercontinental campaigns in Chiapas and Spain in 1996 and 1997 that attracted thousands of international activists. The use of the Internet to promote self-determination in Chiapas was mostly through international activists, in solidarity with the Zapatistas, whose representatives such as Subcommandante Marcos issued often-lyrical *communiqués* posted on over 45,000 Zapatista-related web sites in more than 26 countries.[260]

Some epistemological implications of infrapolitical illegibility

One of the major implications suggested by the existence of a fertile hidden transcript is that the fluency of human geographies and infrapolitical activities cannot be captured by hegemonic accounts. If sub rosa realities are presented in publicly oblique or muted form, such as in the case of web anonymity, the implications for social science research are that, in Scott's reckoning, 'the hidden transcript of many historically important groups is irrecoverable for all practical purposes and we must rely upon what they have released, albeit in veiled form, in the public sphere'. Because of this, we are compelled to confront an ideological debate about justice 'in which one party has a severe speech impediment induced by power relations. If we wish to hear this side of the dialogue we shall have to learn its dialect and codes'. This entails, Scott suggests, a grasp of the 'arts of political disguise'.[261]

There is already some social scientific recognition that these rich realities are not always amenable to capture in research. Nigel Thrift, for example, posits that practical activity is not always open to theorization, and cites Giddens' description of 'tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively'.[262] This is suggestive of a hidden transcript and infrapolitical activities whose impact it may be difficult to measure by traditional means. Literary representation makes up only a fraction of the spectrum of communication and how we are represented: African-American verbal traditions, for example, are often more important than the written word, reflecting a tradition rooted in the denial of literacy.[263]

The public invisibility of the seemingly obvious, the everyday, taken for granted and folk wisdom can also seem so much a part of the ground on which we stand and the air which we breathe. Chris Bright expresses how the taken-for-grantedness of everyday success and change often does not register as such:

> Profound change for the better does occur, even though it can be difficult to see because one of the most common effects of success is to be taken for granted. What looks perfectly ordinary after the fact would often have seemed liked a miracle before it.
>
> (Chris Bright)[264]

If we acknowledge there is a submerged social reality existing outside of, imbricated with, or parallel to public relations of domination, the disguising of resistance and alternatives may present problems for research. While the discourses and events of the publicly powerful are 'consecrated to the official transcript', as Scott puts it, the presentation of anything less dramatic than outright rebellion or challenge may be mediated by corporatist elites, which means that representation is skewed and will almost always tend to confirm their apparent hegemony.[265] 'Unless one can penetrate the official transcript of both subordinates and elites', Scott asserts, 'a reading of social evidence will almost always represent a confirmation of the status quo in hegemonic terms'.[266] Moreover, it may be almost

impossible to know from the official transcript the degree to which apparent acquiescence is strategic manipulation and to what degree it represents consent.[267]

This illegibility is often mutually deliberate, and has important implications for scholarship and representation. As the Notes From Nowhere editors write in the introduction to *We Are Everywhere* (my emphasis): '*The powerful look at our diversity and see only miscellany* . . . Rather than one dominant voice, one dogma, one party line, we present you with a collision of subjectivities'.[268] Feminist scholars in particular seem attuned to the strategic benefits of illegibility; writing as a feminist geographer, Heidi Nast affirms, 'For a number of reasons, we do not attempt to make all things apparent to all people'.[269] Cindi Katz also recognizes a danger in making the 'practices of the oppressed visible to those who dominate'.[270] Feminist geography's 'commitment to the everyday'[271] as a legitimate terrain for political analysis is also suggestive of an affinity between the feminine and the less visible, as well as the process of hegemonic invisibilization. The spatiality of the hidden transcript and infrapolitical acts is also an important dimension here, as reflected in Gillian Rose's suggestion that the female experience of space is not adequately reflected in existing geographical metaphors and spatial concepts.[272] Infrageographies may go some way towards addressing this deficiency.

How conducive should infraglobalization ideally be to academic legibility? Can scholar-activists practice a Scarlet Pimpernel social science? Koopman's idea of bodily international accompaniers might be suggestive here, pointing to the possibility that knowledge production could itself contain mechanisms to serve as a bodyguard of infrapolitical knowledge, or knowledge at risk, perhaps through participatory action research, engaged pluralism or through what Bent Flyvberg has put forward as a contemporary interpretation of Aristotle's concept of phronēsis, similar to mētis, to denote practical wisdom experience and judgment. For Flyvberg a phronetic social science would reject, and constitute an alternative to, the epistemic natural science model to which it is ill suited.[273]

This may involve a willingness to embrace an experimental spirit, which may involve learning to be comfortable with a degree of not knowing with ostensibly scientific certitude, or perhaps even unknowing where appropriate. In other words, the new sensibility and progressive ethic wrought by infraglobalization is not just about embracing different and diverse ways of seeing, but may involve ways of *un*seeing too, inasmuch as it serves to foreclose on political possibilities.[274] After Sedgwick, Gibson-Graham advocate a strategic orientation to theory that involves weak theorizing and cultivating a deliberate epistemic insufficiency to open up possibilities by

> refusing to extend explanation too widely or deeply, refusing to know too much. Weak theory could not know that social experiments are doomed to fail or destined to reinforce dominance; it could not tell us that the world economy will never be transformed by the disorganized proliferation of local projects.
>
> (J. K. Gibson-Graham)[275]

Radical scholars have an obligation, DeMartino asserts, 'to produce theoretical accounts that reveal opportunities and not just constraints'.[276] An approach to theorizing that counter-intuitively 'tolerates "not knowing"' and refusing to give in to the strong synthesis or certainty of a pre-determined politics allows for greater 'contingent connection and the hiddenness of unfolding'.[277] This involves, in Gibson-Graham's words, an 'ebullient' approach that involves thinking creatively rather than thinking 'critically in a debunking mode (describing what something is and should not be)'.[278]

As explored earlier in the chapter, gender constitutes another epistemological implication in the existence of the hidden transcript. Women's power has traditionally been more private, concealed and expressed behind a wall of social proprieties that has allowed male and hegemonic masculine domination of the formal public sphere. In some respects, infrapolitics is strongly suggestive of a feminized epistemology and ontology in that it is characterized as hidden and unobtrusive, as well as by its focus on multiplicity and the micro, characteristics traditionally associated with the feminine. Scott also alludes to infrapolitics as the more typically feminine mode of dissent to its louder, more vocal masculine protest and public campaign counterpart in describing it as the '*unobtrusive* realm of political struggle' (emphasis added).[279] With its connotations of public strength, rigidity and reaction, resistance could be seen as a more masculinist ontology where infrapolitics is more ontologically feminine.

If infrapolitics is an epistemologically more feminine impulse, it might productively enhance what Nagar et al. call a 'feminist analytic of globalization'.[280] In fact, we may consider that women have been more prominent as infrageographical agents in informal, local, sustenance and community economies, marginalized in public transcript accounts. This social existence outside the public transcript has been neglected in mainstream social science and yet provides fertile ground for theorizing alternatives and global processes and flows. The recovery of otherwise invisible actors and muted voices, even if only amongst other grassroots hidden transcript actors, is important for recognition, restitution and successful replication. Infraglobalization does not simply have an ontological affinity with the feminized mode of dissent but is also intimately entwined with race and class and all those traditionally disenfranchised from representation in the public transcript.

Conclusion

Within an enlarged spectrum of global and everyday transformative action this chapter has put forward the notion that there reside hidden histories and everyday geographies of 'ordinary' people co-creating their worlds, including subterranean actions not immediately legible to conventional readings. I have argued that conventions of seeing matter in showing the sub rosa realities of these verso geographies of globalization. Mētis is recognized as intrinsic to the informal order that sustains life and upon which authority and public order and governance have an unacknowledged dependence. I have suggested that investing in informal order processes is critical to fostering a multiplicity of alternatives within the richness of

infrageographical reality. The chapter has presented the social informal economy as an already existing, ubiquitous, spatially extensive and intensive reality. Infrageographies are presented as deep, heterogeneous spaces imbued with layers of intersecting social relations and phenomena not always legible to public transcript representations.

Through employing different ways of seeing, the possibilities for human agency amid uneven geographies of power are greater than suggested in most of the conventional globalization literature. Everyday activism signals a shift from representation to narration, from political passivity to participation, and challenges the tendency to view the everyday as spaces limited to *impacts* rather than *initiatives.* By developing their own practices, actors at the grassroots can create epistemic communities as well as communities of practice, and in so doing may rob corporatist actors of an attempted monopoly on meaning and representation related to globalization. I have argued that infraglobalization is a globalization where the task of a reconstructive geopolitics falls to everyday actors, not to elites or vanguards. In this more capacious view of agency, people at the grassroots of processes affecting them are entrusted to create more suitable and context-appropriate practices for their communities. People are recognized as creative and able agents who go beyond resisting and towards re-orienting, where processes are not just contested but created through more deliberative and democratic participation.

This is a key element of propositional politics and recognizes the geography of ubiquity in which everyday actors operate, which speaks to the fact that fairer, community-informed and rooted, ground-up, democratic and participatory social-economic order is not only a realistic endeavour but is also more likely to take into account the range of human and material realities which neoliberalism as an ideology and set of policies marginalizes or simply ignores. As a proliferative social space and foundational form of political order, infraglobalization is situated in a strategic ontology of multiplicity that promotes propositional thinking and practice, a topic explored in Chapter 4.

Notes

1 Aldous Huxley, *The Devils of Loudun* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961).
2 Vandana Shiva, *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005), p. 182.
3 This quotation is commonly attenuated and rendered in English as 'The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes'. Its provenance is Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past (À La Recherche Du Temps Perdu*), Volume 5: *The Captive (La Prisonnière*), Chapter 2, 'The Verdurins Quarrel with M. De Charlus', originally published in French in 1923 and first translated into English by C. K. Moncrief. See the text in full at Project Gutenberg, <http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300501.txt>.
4 Václav Havel, 'History of a public enemy' trans. Paul Wilson, *Disturbing the Peace* (New York: Vintage, 1990), excerpt published in the *The New York Review of Books*, 31 May 1990, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/may/31/history-of-a-public-enemy/>.

5 David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 116–17 first published in *The Professional Geographer*, 'On the history and present condition of geography: a historical-materialist manifesto', Vol. 36 (1), February 1984, pp. 1–11. Upon checking to confirm the correct possessive of the word people, the verdict of grammarians seems to be that since 'people' is already plural, the correct term is people's rather than peoples'.

6 The authors argue everyday actions are shaping global processes and advocate for a more agential post-elite dominated disciplinary framework with which to examine political economy. See John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (Eds.), *Everyday Politics of the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapter 1.

7 See Richard le Heron, 'Globalization, governance and post-structural political economy: perspectives from Australasia', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 48 (1), April 2007; Alan Pred, 'Scientists without borders' in Hank Van Houtom (Ed.) et al., *B/ordering Space* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), Chapter 9; Noel Castree, 'Geography's new public intellectuals?', *Antipode*, Vol. 38 (2), March 2006, pp. 404, 407, drawing upon Michael Warner, *Publics and Counter-publics* (New York: Zone Books, 2002); Michal Osterweil, 'Place-based globalism: theorizing the global justice movement', *Development*, Vol. 48 (2), 2005, pp. 23–8.

8 Robert Fisk, 'The farcical end of the American dream', *The Independent,* 18 March 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-farcical-end-of-the-american-dream-470295.html>. These ideological justifications may also importantly make governing elites liable to social criticism and contestation when they or the state fail to live up to their claims and/or adequately ameliorate inequality or maintain social order.

9 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 18.

10 Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, [1922] 1993), p. 107.

11 See James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Chapter 3.

12 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. xii.

13 In addition to *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, see James C. Scott's *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) and *Weapons of the Weak*: *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

14 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 200.

15 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 138.

16 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 27.

17 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 51.

18 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 125.

19 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. xiii.

20 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 158.

21 Attributed to a sermon by John Ball, an English priest who took a prominent part in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. Interestingly, Father Ball was a follower of theologian John Wycliffe and the Reformationist Lollardy movement, which held that there was an invisible 'community of the faithful' who constituted the true faith; this overlapped with but was not the same as the official Catholic Church, which was a target for their critique. The Lollards were a decentralized movement and had no official doctrine: among other things they advocated a lay priesthood and the translation of the Bible into the vernacular.

22 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 87.
23 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. xii.
24 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 200.
25 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. x.
26 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. xi.
27 Historically, religious beliefs that contravened and circumvented the official transcript were especially popular among the poor and disenfranchised. Some of the strength of religious conviction during the feudal order might be explained because it envisioned the sacred world as a reversal or dissipation of the worldly order. Religious beliefs could also work with the social order: the myth of the Great Tsar-Deliverer in Russian society, for example, and the appeal of benign paternalism goes toward explaining the longevity of monarchical social organization in Russia. According to this cosmology, the Tsar was not to blame for grinding poverty and the arbitrary exercise of power according to the loyal sections of the populace, but underling officials who must have deceived or withheld knowledge about their conditions. This finds something of a parallel with Anglo-American leaders Bush, Blair and Howard and faith among their supporters that they were not to blame for the demonstrably false claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, it was the 'faulty intelligence', a myth which held well after it was proven to be manufactured.
28 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 199. A rupturing of the public transcript occurs when dissent reaches tipping point in such events as the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, English Civil War and Spanish Republic of 1936. 'Only under the most extraordinary historical circumstances, when the nearly total collapse of existing structures of domination open new vistas of now realistic possibilities', writes Scott (p. 102), 'can we expect to find anything like an unguarded discourse by subordinate groups'.
29 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 204.
30 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, pp. 55–6, 89.
31 See Azadeh Moaveni, *Lipstick Jihad: A Memoir of Growing up Iranian in America and American in Iran* (New York: Perseus, 2006). Visiting post-revolutionary Iran where social reminders of the restrictive hand of the Mullahs was ever-present in public life, Moaveni found that 'having a facade is normal, because being honest is such a hassle'. Yet, 'at some historic moment impossible to pinpoint, around the turn of the millennium, Iranians' threshold for dissimulation and constriction sank, and people simply began acting differently'. Intellectuals began writing 'vicious satire and stinging commentary . . . people of all ages turned up music in their cars, caroused with the opposite sex'. Tehranians learned how to navigate and manoeuvre around the mullahs' rules and the police such that a 'culture of transgression' flourished: women learned they could flout the limits on dress and comportment 'in the right neighbourhood, at the right time of the day or month, in the right way', just as young couples learned they could circumvent prohibitions 'with the right verbal pretexts, at the right times, in the right places'. The revolution had the ironic effect of making 'a huge segment of Iranian society more tolerant', Moavani contends. In fact, in comparing her two countries, the US and Iran, she describes political awareness and press freedom in Iranian society as far more politicized: 'your average person reads a bunch of newspapers . . . and thinks about these things . . . So even if the government would crack down on the press, people defended the press. Here [in the US], media is beleaguered. Even the mainstream media is being attacked, and most people don't seem to care!' See Michal Lumsden, 'Lipstick Jihad: an interview with Azadeh Moaveni',

Mother Jones, 9 March 2005. Iran's thriving blogosphere is also testament to infrapolitical activity in repressed societies, especially with more than two-thirds of the population under the age of 30. Persian is now reportedly the fourth most widely used language on weblogs.

32 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, pp. x–xi.

33 Liberty UK (formerly known as the National Council for Civil Liberties), 'Extended pre-charge detention', Liberty website, n.d. (accessed 30 July 2014), <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/countering-terrorism/extended-pre-charge-detention>.

34 Since its establishment in 2006 Wikileaks has been one of the key venues for what it claims are untraceable mass document leaking. See <https://wikileaks.org>.

35 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 133.

36 Wanlop Pichpongsa and Menno Salverda, 'Bua Kud Chum: a tool for creating strong, self-reliant communities', *LEISA Magazine* Vol. 17 (2), July 2001, <http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/global/go-global-or-stay-local/bia-kud-chum-a-tool-for-creating-strong-self>; Jeff Powell, 'Printing our own money', *New Internationalist*, issue 329, November 2000, < http://newint.org/features/2000/11/05/printing/>.

37 Evansville Courier & Press, 'Liberty dollar office raided', 15 November 2007, <http://www.courierpress.com/news/2007/nov/15/liberty-dollar-office-raided/>; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Defendant convicted of minting how own currency', US Attorney General's Office, 18 March 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/defendant-convicted-of-minting-his-own-currency>.

38 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 291.

39 While substantive political and economic equality remains as an ongoing challenge in South Africa, the formal ending of political apartheid was an achievement of many hands.

40 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 184.

41 Ralph Ellison, 'Advice of a grandfather on his deathbed' in *Invisible Man* (New York: Vintage, 1952), p. 16.

42 The aim of entrenched power is also to keep subordinates divided and disaggregated. In the public transcript, dyadic patron-client power relations (boss-worker, lord-vassal) are represented as hierarchical yet vertical relations to prevent horizontal cross-subordinate linkages being drawn. 'Seditious assembly' was seen as threatening to elites in various contexts, with meetings and movements moving underground to operate more covertly. Historically, there has been a deliberate atomization sought by elites of subordinates, the former fearing that congregation of subordinates would foment dissatisfaction, allow them to 'compare notes', embolden them to more autonomous action. See James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, pp. 61–4.

43 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 164 cited in James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 75.

44 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, pp. 27 and 77.

45 While often acknowledged as one factor among a panoply of factors, the case that this factor assumes greater weight is made by F. William Engdahl and Ismail Hossen-Zadeh, among others. See F. William Engdahl, 'Perhaps 60 per cent of today's oil price is pure speculation', 2 May 2008, *Financial Sense*, <http://www.financialsensearchive.com/editorials/engdahl/2008/0502.html>; and Ismail Hossen-Zadeh, 'Are

they really oil wars?', *Payvand*, 18 June 2008, <http://www.payvand.com/news/08/jun/1152.html>. In 'Why we're suddenly paying through the nose for gas', Michael Klare writes: 'But the Administration's greatest contribution to the rising oil prices is its steady stream of threats to attack Iran if it does not back down on the nuclear issue. The Iranians have made it plain that they would retaliate by attempting to block the flow of Gulf oil and otherwise cause turmoil in the energy market. Most analysts assume, therefore, that an encounter will produce a global oil shortage and prices well over $200 per barrel. It is not surprising, then, that every threat by Bush/Cheney (or their counterparts in Israel) has triggered a sharp rise in prices. This is where speculators enter the picture. Believing that a US-Iranian clash is at least 50 per cent likely, some investors are buying futures in oil at $140, $150 or more per barrel, thinking they'll make a killing if there's an attack and prices zoom over $200' (*Alternet*, 21 June 2008, <http://www.alternet.org/story/88945/>).

46 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 76.

47 The existence of 'levelling' rituals such as those in the European Middle Ages and in other times prompts the question as to whether the hidden transcript too might constitute something of a safety valve that is but a temporary reprieve from the social order, and in fact might serve to prolong the hegemonic order by otherwise releasing some of the tension inequalities produce. This assumes that the 'safe' expression of resentment will yield sufficient satisfaction and be cathartic so as to reduce pressure and redirect rebellion against the real object of frustration. Scott considers but does not give much credence to this notion. Within the range of infrapolitical activities, the aim of dissent is neither an open renegotiation of power relations, nor is it simply to 'vent' or just a psychological coping mechanism. Scott asserts that there is little social-psychological evidence for catharsis-through-displacement that helps entrench the status quo. See Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, pp. 186–187. In contrast to Scott, Jonathan Spence suggests some catharsis (though it may not necessarily constitute a safety valve and may be historically specific) in the temporary reversal of social roles within the 'Lord of Misrule' custom in the European Middle Ages and summarizes the custom thus: 'The person chosen was expected to preside over the revels that briefly reversed or parodied the conventional social and economic hierarchies . . . When the brief reign of misrule was over, the customary order of things would be restored: the Lords of Misrule would go back to their menial occupations, while their social superiors resumed their wonted status . . . sometimes the idea of Lord of Misrule would spill over from the realm of revel to the realm of politics . . . the apprentices took over from their guild masters for a reckless day or two . . . gender roles were reversed for a day as the women took over the tasks and airs normally associated only with men'. See his *Mao* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999), pp. xii–xiv.

48 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 78.

49 Paul E. Willis, *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids get Working Class Jobs* (Farnsborough: Saxon House, 1977), cited in James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 78.

50 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 199.

51 Interviewed by Francesca Borri, 'Behind the black flag: current, former ISIL fighters speak', *Al-Monitor*, 23 June 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/syria-iraq-isis-aleppo-mosul-war-radical-terrorism.html>.

52 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Globalization and emancipation: from local empowerment to global reform' in Barry K. Gills (Ed.), *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 192.

53 Adlai Stevenson, speech to the American Legion convention, New York City, 27 August 1952, quoted in William Safire, 'Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson defines the nature of patriotism' in *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), pp. 79–80.

54 Slavoj Žižek, Letter response to critics of 'Resistance is surrender', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 30 (2), 24 January 2008. Additionally, sabotage can certainly work both ways; as Žižek opines: 'Was it really an accident that, at the very moment that a strong, self-organized collective of those outside the law emerged, it was soon corrupted by hard drugs from African American ghettoes after the rebellions in the 1960s and Italian cities after the workers' unrests of the 1970s up to today's favelas? And the same holds true even for Poland after Jaruzelski's coup in 1980. All of a sudden, drugs were easily available, together with pornography, alcohol, and Eastern Wisdom manuals, in order to ruin the self-organized civil society. Those in power knew full well when to use drugs as a weapon against self-organized resistance'. See Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 201.

55 See Juan Cole, 'Egyptian, Sudanese Jihadi volunteers suspected by Iraq', *Informed Comment*, 16 July 2007, <http://www.juancole.com/2007/07/egyptian-sudanese-jihadi-volunteers.html>; Ned Parker, 'Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined', *LA Times*, 15 July 2007 and Alan B. Krueger, 'The national origins of foreign fighters in Iraq', Princeton University and NBER, 30 December 2006.

56 See *BBC*, 'Iraq probe into soldier incident', 20 September 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4264614.stm>; John Pilger, 'John Pilger blames Basra on the British', *New Statesman*, 3 October 2005, <http://www.newstatesman.com/200510030009>; Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, 'British smash into Iraqi jail to free 2 detained soldiers', *The Washington Post*, 20 September 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/19/AR2005091900572.html>; Jon Basil Utley, 'Iraq: who might be shooting at both sides? thirteen groups that favour chaos in Iraq', *Antiwar.com*, 26 December 2006, <http://www.antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=10221>.

57 John Barry, 'The Pentagon may put special forces-led assassination or kidnapping teams in Iraq', *Newsweek*, 7 January 2005, <http://www.newsweek.com/pentagon-may-put-special-forces-led-assassination-or-kidnapping-teams-iraq-117209>; Michael Hirsch and John Barry, 'The "Salvador option"', *Newsweek*, 8 January 2005, reproduced at School of the Americas (SOA) Watch, <http://www.soaw.org/site/newswire_detail.php?id=652>; David Teather, 'US considers 'Salvador option' to tackle Iraq insurgents', *The Guardian*, 10 January 2005; *Democracy Now!*, 'Is the U.S. organizing Salvador-style death squads in Iraq?', 10 January 2005, <http://www.democracynow.org/2005/1/10/is_the_u_s_organizing_salvador>.

58 Ali Abunimah, 'The American proxy war in Gaza', *The Electronic Intifada*, 3 February 2007, <http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6494.shtml>; Scott Wilson, 'Fatah troops enter Gaza with Israeli assent: hundreds were trained in Egypt under U.S.-backed program to counter Hamas', *The Washington Post*, 18 May 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/17/AR2007051700419.html>; Richard Sale, 'Analysis: Hamas history tied to Israel', *UPI International*, 18 June 2002, <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/06/18/Analysis-Hamas-history-tied-to-Israel/UPI-82721024445587/>.

59 Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man*, prologue.

60 John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (Eds.), in *Everyday Politics of the World Economy*, p. 17.

61 Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large*: *Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

62 Pal Ahluwalia, *Politics and Post-Colonial Theory: African Inflections* (London: Routledge, 2001). Drawing upon and adapting Bhabha, Hobson and Seabrooke also posit a similar concept of 'hybridized mimicry' (*Everyday Politics of the World Economy*). Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of polyphony is employed in folklore and anthropology, see Deborah A Kapchan and Pauline Turner Strong (Eds.), 'Theorizing the hybrid', Special issue, *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 112, no. 445, 1999.

63 The phrase 'going to where the silence is' forms the title of Chapter 12 of Amy Goodman with David Goodman, *The Exception of the Rulers* (London: Arrow, 2004); Martin Luther King interviewed by Mike Wallace, 27 September 1966. The video clip and interview transcript is accessed at CBS News, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mlk-a-riot-is-the-language-of-the-unheard/>.

64 See Homi Bhaba, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).

65 Adam Ferguson, 'An essay on the history of civil society', 1767, available online at <http://www.constitution.org/af/civil.htm>, p.122.

66 Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1961), p. 31.

67 James C. Scott identifies small proprietorship as the sine qua non of organic public order, but does not think that his or Jacob's identification of a petty bourgeoisie is tantamount to an appeal for 'untrammeled market forces', merely that small property-holders tend to form the underpinnings of public order. James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust, geographies of hierarchy' in Mark E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 281.

68 Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, p. 56.

69 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust, geographies of hierarchy' in Mark E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 9, p. 278.

70 Cited in James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 279.

71 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 280.

72 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 286.

73 P. J. Proudhon, *Proudhon's Solution to the Social Problem* (New York: Vanguard, 1927), p. 45.

74 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 274.

75 See James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations* (New York: Doubleday, 2004). The aggregation of information in groups, he argues, results in decisions that are often better than could have been made by any single member of the group.

76 Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2002).

77 See Peter Ranis, 'Factories without bosses: Argentina's experience with worker-run enterprises', *Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas*, Vol. 3 (1), 2006, pp. 11–23.

78 See George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848* (New York: Wiley, 1964) and Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (London: T. F. Unwin, [1897] 1921). Le Bon continues: 'Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd he is a barbarian – that is, a creature acting by instinct'.

79 To cite but one example from popular culture, the audience in the international television program *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire* is found to be right 91 per cent of the time in contrast to 65 per cent for 'experts'. See Michael Sherman, 'Common sense', *Scientific American*, December 2004, p. 38.

80 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 280.

81 Also spelt as Zhuangzi (369–268 BCE), cited in Murray Rothbard, 'Concepts of the role of intellectuals in social change toward laissez faire', *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Vol. IX (2), Autumn 1990, p. 46.

82 'Usually translated, inadequately, as "cunning", mētis is better understood as the kind of knowledge that can be acquired only by long practice at similar but rarely identical tasks, which requires constant adaptation to changing circumstances'. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 327. Mētis may in a sense be the precursor of scientific knowledge and is not anti-scientific, and it will adopt the fruits of scientific research when and where they are appropriate.

83 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 274.

84 According to Scott, 'Legibility is a condition of manipulation. Any substantial state intervention in society – to vaccinate a population, produce goods, mobilize labour, tax people and their property, conduct literacy campaigns, conscript soldiers, enforce sanitation standards, catch criminals, start universal schooling – requires the invention of units that are visible. The units in question might be citizens, villages, trees, fields, houses, or people grouped according to age, depending on the type of intervention. Whatever the units being manipulated, they must be organized in a manner that permits them to be identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated, and monitored'. *Seeing Like A State*, p. 183.

85 'Grammar by itself cannot generate speech; we do not learn to speak by learning the rules of grammar and then following those rules to produce speech. Grammar codifies the rules of thumb that can be abstracted from the regularities of acceptable speech practice; it is, in a real sense, parasitic on speech'. James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 287.

86 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, p. 3.

87 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, pp. 183–4.

88 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, pp. 335–6.

89 John O'Neill, *Markets, Deliberation and Environment* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 192–3. O'Neill continues: 'The undermining of local practical knowledge in market economies has also been exacerbated by the global nature of both markets and large corporate actors who require knowledge that is transferable across different cultures and contexts and hence abstract and codifiable . . . the demand for commensurability and calculability runs against the defence of local and practical knowledge'.

90 Scott qualifies this by inserting a reminder that many such informal structures were not in fact democratic or even egalitarian, involving hierarchies based on lineage and gender, for example. What they were replaced by, however, tended to be even more hierarchical and with the disadvantage of being schematically thin and authoritarian. James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 283.

91 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Chicago: C. H. Kerr & Co., 1909), p. 13. Marx was one of the first modern thinkers to enunciate a theory that geographic space equaled developmental time, a premise essentially shared by later, though ideologically different, modernist developmental models such as W.W. Rostow's 'stages of development'.

92 Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005), p. 82.
93 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics: Understanding Predatory Globalization*, trans. Raymond Rabitaille (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 217.
94 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization and the research imagination', *Public Culture*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, p. 5.
95 A report from the United Nations Development Program in October 2009 concluded that the US ranked third among states with the worst income inequality. As number one and number two, Hong Kong and Singapore, are both essentially city-states, rather than countries, it is the US who effectively ranks number one in countries with the most inequality in the distribution of income. Bruce Einhorn, 'Countries with the biggest gaps between rich and poor', *Business Week*/*Yahoo News*, 16 October 2009, <http://finance.yahoo.com/banking-budgeting/article/107980/countries-with-the-biggest-gaps-between-rich-and-poor>. See also Thomas Piketty's work on wealth and income inequality *Capital in the Twenty First Century*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
96 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of Trust', p. 288. Scott characterizes high modernism as a totalistic 'aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society' inspired by a hubristic, scientific self-confidence (*Seeing Like A State*, p. 88).
97 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, pp. 103–46.
98 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, p. 7. Scott explores why so many large-scale, top-down, corporatist state schemes are so destructive. Policy disasters have often been the result of a singular faith in scientific and technocratic approaches to knowledge (episteme and techne) combined with a wilful disregard for other more tacit forms of knowing.
99 Doreen Massey, 'Is the world getting larger or smaller?', *OpenDemocracy*, 15 February 2007, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-vision_reflections/world_small_4354.jsp>. See also Doreen Massey, 'London inside-out', *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture*, issue 32, Spring 2006, http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/articles/massey.html.
100 See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, Chapter 4.
101 James C. Scott, 'Geographies of trust', p. 284.
102 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, p. 346.
103 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, p. 34.
104 Friedrich Engels writes that Charles Fourier was 'the first to declare that in any given society the degree of woman's emancipation is the natural measure of the general emancipation'. See 'Socialism: utopian and scientific' in Robert C. Tucker (Ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, [1880] 1978), p. 690.
105 Nancy Jay, 'Gender and Dichotomy', *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 7 (1), Spring 1981, p. 54.
106 I invoke the term hegemonic masculinity from Connell as a useful way to differentiate between forms of masculinity construction that does not tar all masculinity with the same brush. See R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* 2nd ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1995] 2005).
107 The numbers and proportions of women in formal sector leadership in all governments of the world are still disproportionately low. Implicit in the gender construction of the saying 'Behind every great man there is a great woman' is an understanding that women may be active, as long as it is in the private sphere. Men operate best in the public sphere and are imbued with far greater agency because of the hegemony of activities in this sphere (for example, public sphere activity is included in GDP, home caring and running a family is not). The implication is that men can best change or

influence the world, and women can best influence men. The scale of the individual here is obviously interrelated with cultural mores at the societal scale.

108 Richa Nagar, Victoria Lawson, Linda McDowell and Susan Hanson, 'Locating globalization: feminist (re)readings of the subjects and spaces of globalization', *Economic Geography*, Vol. 78 (3), July 2002, p. 263.

109 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating Globalization', p. 260.

110 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating Globalization', p. 260.

111 The Cartesian partitioning of public/private, formal/informal and a host of other foundational binaries we have inherited from the advent of modernity and the Enlightenment still persist, of course, and the rise of 'capitalocentric discourse' (J. K. Gibson-Graham) with scientific culture – both marginalize and even actively discredit other systems. The informal sector may be less measurable (Enlightenment/scientific revolution/modernity inheritance) by conventional indices. The work of Gibson-Graham is referred to in the plural, as it comprises two researchers, Katherine Gibson and the late Julie Graham, who assumed a single authorial pen-name in their collaborative work. See J. K. Gibson-Graham, *The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996) and *A Postcapitalist Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) as the major books among their body of work, as well as the Community Economies website <communityeconomies.org>.

112 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating Globalization', p. 261.

113 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating Globalization', p. 261.

114 Jenny Cameron and J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Feminizing the economy: metaphors, strategies, politics', *Gender, Place and Culture*, Vol. 10 (2), 2003, pp. 145–57.

115 See Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986).

116 Doreen Massey, 'Flexible sexism', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* Vol. 9 (1), 1991, pp. 31–57.

117 Henri Lefebvre*, The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge: Mass: Blackwell, [1974] 1991), p. 59.

118 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 111.

119 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, pp. 48 and 275.

120 Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), p. 67.

121 Doreen Massey, *For Space*, p. 9.

122 Doreen Massey, 'Is the world getting larger or smaller', *OpenDemocracy*, 15 February 2007.

123 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, pp. 86 and 88.

124 Glenn Greenwald, *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSW and the US Security State* (Metropolitan Books, 2014); Oslo University Library, 'Global surveillance: annotated overview of the revelations following the leaks by the whistleblower Edward Snowden', <http://www.ub.uio.no/fag/informatikk-matematikk/informatikk/faglig/bibliografier/no21984.html>; *The Guardian*, 'The NSA files', <http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files>; Andy Greenberg, 'How to anonymize everything you do', *Wired Magazine*, 17 June 2014, <http://www.wired.com/2014/06/be-anonymous-online>.

125 Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton, 'Notes towards autonomous geographies: creation, resistance and self-management as survival tactics', *Progress in Human Geography,* Vol. 30 (6), 2006, p. 730. See also Autonomous Geographies Collective

(Paul Chatterton, Stuart Hodkinson, Jenny Pickerill), 'Beyond scholar activism: making strategic interventions inside and outside the neoliberal university', *ACME*, 2010, Vol. 9 (2), pp. 245–75. Soja also hints at a similar imaginary in describing 'counterspaces' as 'spaces of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized position'. Edward W. Soja, *Third Space: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996, p. 68). More recently, Harvey considers that an interstitial activism resides 'in the interstices of uneven geographical development [which] hide a veritable ferment of opposition'. But, to his reckoning, '(t)his opposition tends to be particularist and prone to succumbing to exclusionary politics'. David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 71.

126 Hakim Bey, *T. A. Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, [1985], 2003), p. 98 also accessed at <http://www.altheim.com/lit/taz/toc.html>. See also Hakim Bey, 'Permanent TAZs', *Talkingmail 5*, Winter 1994, <http://dreamtimevillage.org/articles/permanent_taz.html>.

127 Michel Foucault, The *Order of Things*: *An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge [1966], 2002).

128 Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 38.

129 Edward Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996); Michelle Fine, 'Working the hyphens: reinventing self and others in qualitative research' in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994).

130 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization', p. 6.

131 Cullen Murphy, 'The books that changed me', *Sun Herald*, 1 June 2008, pp. 10–12.

132 François Rochat and Andre Modigliani, 'The ordinary quality of resistance: from Milgram's laboratory to the village of Le Chambon', *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 51(3), Autumn 1995, pp. 195–210.

133 Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent*, *Human Agency and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 211–12. Bleiker identifies three types of action: teleological, causal and intentional – not every action needs an identifiable agent causing a visible outcome (p. 40).

134 David Ley, 'Fragmentation, coherence and limits to theory in human geography' in Audrey Kobayashi and Suzanne Mackenzie (Eds.), *Remaking Human Geography* (Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 229.

135 See Sallie Marston, 'The social construction of scale', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24 (2), 2000, pp. 219–42.

136 Leonard Seabrooke, 'The everyday social sources of imperial and hegemonic financial orders' in John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (Eds.), *Everyday Politics of the World Economy*, p. 95.

137 David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, p. 237. In the early 1980s, Derek Gregory's objection to humanistic human geography's focus on the everyday included what he saw as an 'exasperating interrogation of the mundane and the transparently trivial, devoid of any attempt to locate social actions in wider sequences of social reproduction and transformation'. While his critique in 1981 may have missed the infrageographies of agency, Gregory's point that it is the interrelations between the everyday and wider sequences is an important one that has since been taken on board. Derek Gregory, 'Human agency and human geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 6, 1981, p. 2.

138 A.K. Thompson, '"Daily life" not a "moment" like the rest: notes on Harvey's "Organizing for the anti-capitalist transition"', *Interface*, Vol. 2 (1), May 2010, p. 274, <http://interface-articles.googlegroups.com/web/3Thompson.pdf> p. 277. He then qualifies this by asserting: 'However, as a political category, "the everyday" has always traced a hazardous course between concrete reckoning and self-valorizing subjectivism. Indeed, the events of May '68 reveal just how easily the tremendous energetic outbursts of a movement focused on daily life might be reabsorbed by the shrewd manoeuvres of constituted power and the seemingly infinite flexibility of capitalism'.

139 David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, p. 238.

140 Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, trans. Michael Henry Heim (New York: Knopf, 1980).

141 The early literature on global civil society often involved nascent and sometimes nebulous efforts to describe grassroots agency within global civil society. In concepts such as Hardt and Negri's 'multitude' or an optimistically conceived 'third force', 'the people' are commonly (and necessarily) abstracted as categories. This tendency to abstraction without accompanying empirical development may have reflected at the time a dearth of confidence in being able to then expound the concept and real-life examples further: that is, it may have reflected an intuition rather than extensive empirical work which has since emerged. Hardt and Negri, for example, admitted in *Empire* that theirs was a theoretical project, hinting that a more empirical focus would follow once their theoretical framework was sketched: 'Even when we manage to touch on the productive, ontological dimension of the problematic and the resistances that arise there, however, we will still not be in the position . . . to point to any already existing and concrete elaboration of a political alternative to *Empire*. And no such effective blueprint will ever arise from a theoretical articulation such as ours. It will arise only in practice'. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 206.

142 The differential placed on the value of lives is and has always been the essence of racism, colonialism and empire. From slaves once being counted as 'three fifths of a person' in colonial America to the existence of slavery in human trafficking today, this racism, whether criminalized or institutionalized or internalized, can be seen in how people's worth and agency are derogated according to their race, sex, creed, ethnicity or other forms of identity. See Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

143 Mark Curtis, *UnPeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses* (London: Vintage, 2004). Curtis uses the term to describe those whose lives are seen as expendable in the pursuit of *Empire*'s economic and political goals, focusing on how Britain has been complicit in the deaths around the world of millions of people. He has calculated that the government of Britain bears significant responsibility for around 10 million deaths just since 1945 (in a period when its empire was on the wane), including that of Nigerians, Indonesians, Arabs, Ugandans, Chileans, Vietnamese and many others, and, in contemporary focus, Iraqi, Congolese, Afghani and Palestinian lives.

144 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1961] 1967).

145 Antonio Gramsci, 'Notes on Italian history' in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers Company, 1971) and 'Some aspects of the Southern question' in *Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 313–37.

146 Gayatri Spivak interview with Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean 'Subaltern talk: interview with the editors' in (Eds.) *The Spivak Reader* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 287–308.

147 That subalternity is not to be claimed but overcome is suggested in an interview with Spivak after the publication of her 1988 paper, 'Can the subaltern speak?' For Spivak, 'Who the hell wants to protect subalternity? No activist wants to keep the subaltern in the space of difference . . . You don't give the subaltern voice. You work for the bloody subaltern, you work against subalternity'. Gayatri Spivak in interview with Leon de Kock, New Nation Writers Conference in South Africa, *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature*, Vol. 23 (3), 1992, pp. 29–47.

148 This is sometimes attributed to Gandhi but there is no verifiable source available. A number of commonly cited phrases have been misattributed to Gandhi; see Wikiquotes <http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Mahatma_Gandhi>.

149 Andrew Herod, 'The agency of labour in global change' in Hobson and Seabrooke (Eds.), *Everyday Politics of the World Economy*, Chapter 2. Herod also challenges the construction of TNCs and an increasingly footloose financial capital (as opposed to less mobile productive capital) as emblematic of globalization and emphasizes being cognizant of just how we conceptualize different actors and how much power we ascribe to them. As Herod shows, workers have played an active role in shaping the new international division of labour and the transnationalization of labour in many ways predates that of capital. Herod argues that it is labour's organizing in key industries that has in part served to propel TNCs towards more transnational operations, tilting power and capacity towards labour. See Andrew Herod, 'Labour as an agent of globalization and as a global agent' in Kevin Cox (Ed.), *Spaces of Globalization*, Chapter 7, p. 188.

150 Paul Rey and Sherry Ruth Anderson, *The Cultural Creatives* (New York: Harmony Books, 2000). Also see <www.culturalcreatives.org>. For Rey and Anderson, these 'new progressives' desire authenticity, ethical trade, natural products, organic food, personal growth, cultural transformation and community values.

151 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', *Critical Sociology*, Vol. 33, 2007, p. 629. While most studies have focused upon the (important) work of organized activists, Mansfield and Flaster argue that social movements are also crucially composed of people 'who have never taken a public stand supporting the movement' (p. 628).

152 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse', p. 629. 'Everyday activists are . . . more likely to select from the organized activists' productions a teasing admonition like "male chauvinist" that can be used . . . "chucklingly", than the more serious "sexist" or a concept like "patriarchy"' (p. 632).

153 In *The New York Times*, use of the term 'male chauvinist' or variations thereof appeared less than a dozen times before 1968. In 1970 alone it appeared 48 times, in 1971 in 76 articles. It peaked in 1972 with 130 mentions, slowly decreasing thereafter, following the trajectory of a memetic vogueword. Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse', pp. 636 and 645.

154 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', p. 652.

155 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', p. 637. The authors are dismissive about the fit of their study to framing theory, and indeed are ambivalent towards James C. Scott's work.

156 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', p. 654.

157 Memetic is used here to describe, as its coiner Richard Dawkins described it, self-replicating units of cultural transmitted through imitation. The term is a transliteration of the Greek mimētēs, meaning imitator. A similar term referring to a unit of

social evolution (from Greek mneme, 'memory', first appeared in 1904 in a work by the German biologist Richard Semon, translated into English in 1921). See Richard Wolfgang Semon, *The Mneme* (London: George Allen & Unwin, [1904] 1921) and Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), Chapter 11.

158 The authors argue that though their individual acts are not coordinated as with organized activists, their acts still constitute collective action. While constrained to some degree by hegemonic power, everyday activists also have 'power and persuasive resources at their command, including their relational links with other everyday activists like themselves'. Indeed, when aggregated, their 'subtle processes of mutual influence' often results in as important results as does more coordinated movement action. Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', p. 631.

159 Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, 'The cultural politics of everyday discourse: the case of male chauvinist', p. 654.

160 Ricardo Levins Morales, 'If you have come to help me', *Northland Poster Collective*, 16 December 2006, accessed December 2008, <http://northlandposter.com/blog/2006/12/18/lila-watson-if-you-have-come-to-help-me-you-are-wasting-your-time-but-if-you-have-come-because-your-liberation-is-bound-up-with-mine-then-let-us-work-together-2/>.

161 'One no and many yeses' is attributed collectively to the Zapatistas for whom Subcommandante Marcos has been such a lyrical spokesperson and representative in his numerous communiqués. Cited in Subcommandante Marcos and Žiga Vodovnik (Ed.), *Ya Basta! Ten Years of the Zapatista Uprising: Writings of Subcommandante Insurgent Marcos* (Oakland: AK Press, 2004), pp. 19 and 200.

162 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics*, p. 223.

163 Eric Olin Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias* (London: Verso, 2010).

164 Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).

165 Katherine Rankin, 'Reflexivity and post-colonial critique: toward an ethics of accountability in planning praxis', *Planning Theory*, Vol. 9 (3), 2010, p. 192, citing Nancy Fraser, *Justus Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

166 Doreen Massey, 'The political struggle ahead', *LW Reading Room*, 2010, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ReadingRoom/public/massey.html>.

167 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (London: Profile Books, 2010), pp. 226–7.

168 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital*, p. 228.

169 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital*, p. 242.

170 Saskia Sassen, 'Too big to save: the end of financial capitalism', *OpenDemocracy*, 1 April 2009, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/too-big-to-save-the-end-of-financial-capitalism-0>; Terrence McNally interviewing Thomas Geoghagen, 'Why Germany has it so good ', *AlterNet*, 14 October 2010, <http://www.alternet.org/story/148501/why_germany_has_it_so_good_--_and_why_america_is_going_down_the_drain>. Geoghagen's prescription: 'You've got to get returns down in the financial sectors and returns up in manufacturing sectors. That's the key. And proposing that will split the business community in this country in a very healthy way'.

171 See for example Jane D'Arista, 'Rebuilding the framework for financial regulation', EPI Briefing Paper #231, 1 May 2009, <http://www.epi.org/page/-/pdf/bp231.pdf>.

The 'Tobin tax' was first proposed by James Tobin as a currency transaction tax in 1972. Tobin revised his idea in 2001, summarizing it thus: 'The tax on foreign exchange transactions was devised to cushion exchange rate fluctuations. The idea is very simple: at each exchange of a currency into another a small tax would be levied – let's say, 0.5 per cent of the volume of the transaction. This dissuades speculators as many investors invest their money in foreign exchange on a very short-term basis. If this money is suddenly withdrawn, countries have to drastically increase interest rates for their currency to still be attractive. But high interest is often disastrous for a national economy, as the nineties' crises in Mexico, Southeast Asia and Russia have proven. My tax would return some margin of manoeuvre to issuing banks in small countries and would be a measure of opposition to the dictate of the financial markets'. The idea was revived by Ignacio Ramonet in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis (see 'Disarming the markets', *LeMonde Diplomatique*, December 1997) and taken up by the alterglobalization movement (see <tobintax.org>) which Tobin himself was more than ambivalent about and did not endorse. The tax was described as unenforceable in *The Guardian* editorial, 'Jospin in fantasy land over Tobin tax', 30 August 2001.

172 Quoted by Thomas Geoghegan in interview with Terrence McNally, 'Why Germany has it so good . . . '.

173 This word is attributed to Buckminster Fuller in a number of sites but no source is available to verify this.

174 John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1959), p. 219.

175 See for example Tom Morton, 'Beware the C-word', *Sydney Morning Herald Spectrum*, 4 November 2000.

176 Some communities may be far from progressive and be places of intolerance, a stifling conformity, and be insular and inward-looking. For critics like Morton, the cult of community may sanction discrimination, allowing in 'creeping moral authoritarianism' alongside communitarian values. Morton cites some church-based job network providers in Australia discriminating against gays as an example of increasing interference in an individual's private lives. 'Every time I hear the word community', he writes, 'I want to reach for a revolver . . . Community has become a cult, an object of warm-and-fuzzy ritual worship for politicians of all stripes . . . All too easily, the rush to "strengthen community" can become a pretext for enforcing conformity'. Tom Morton, 'Beware the C-word'.

177 See Robert Putnam, 'The prosperous community: social capital and public life', *American Prospect*, 21 March 1993.

178 J. Eric Oliver, *Democracy in Suburbia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

179 Thomas Isaac and Richard Franke, *Local Democracy and Development: The Kerala People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 198–9.

180 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Picket, *The Spirit Level*: *Why More Equal Societies Almost Always do Better* (London: Allen Lane, 2009).

181 Jonathan Derbyshire, 'Amartya Sen', *New Statesman*, 23 July 2009, <http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2009/07/sen-interview-smith-income>.

182 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. xii.

183 Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom,* pp. xi–xii.

184 See John Kretzmann and John McKnight, *Building Communities from the Inside Out* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993) and Jill Jordan 'Community and economic development: towns shaping their destiny', Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, *ACCORD* Paper No. 4, June 2001, <http://www.cacom.uts.edu.au/publications/ACCORD_MalenyPaper_4.pdf>.

185 See David Held, 'Democracy and globalization' in D. Archibugi et al. (Eds.), *Reimagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) and John Clark, *World's Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization* (London: Earthscan, 2003).

186 Katherine Rankin, 'Critical development studies and the praxis of planning', *City*, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 219–29.

187 David Harvey, *Rebel Cities* (London: Verso, 2012), p. 83. Simon Springer also levels a similar charge: 'David Harvey, for his part, actually poisons the well of decentralization by pre-emptively refusing its possibilities and positioning every movement towards a more autonomous political arrangement as a device that somehow necessarily greases the rails for a neoliberal future'. Simon Springer, 'Human geography without hierarchy', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 38 (3), June 2014, p. 403.

188 Geoff Mirus, 'UN, EU, World Court, Supreme Court: Subsidiarity, Anyone?', *Catholic Culture*, <http://www.catholicculture.org/highlights/highlights.cfm?ID=38>. Subsidiarity may be another case of corporatist forms imitating those arising elsewhere, with the EU enshrining it as a principle in Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that formally established the European Community.

189 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics*, p. 215.

190 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization and the research imagination' in (Ed.) *Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 17.

191 Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots globalization and the research imagination', p. 17.

192 Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan, [1915] 1962). Michels was a student of Max Weber, building on his work on bureaucratization, although Michels' later political involvements would be significantly different from Weber's. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

193 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies: performative practices for "other worlds"', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 32 (5), October 2008, p. 614.

194 Freegans advocate strategies for sustainable living through non-monetary networks (such as Freecycle and food foraging and guerrilla gardening) and reclamation of waste (such as 'dumpster-diving' for food discarded by restaurants and retailers) and shelter (such as squatting of vacant spaces); and avowedly embrace an anti-consumerist praxis. The compound word freegan is derived from free and vegan, as the word originally and still mostly applies to those who avoid products from animal sources. See Freegan.Info: strategies for sustainable living beyond capitalism website, <http://freegan.info/>.

195 The web is an every person medium, the most global and democratic media the world has had, and has become an intrinsic part of people's everyday lives. There is the potential for a dot commons or commonwealth of resources open to all on the web, with community informatics, communal Wi-Fi access and open source software and freeware improving access. In free telecentres using Linux in poor areas of Sao Paulo, Brazil, for example, users are allowed one free hour per day, helping to foster computer skills.

These new technologies can also help make place-based decentralization more possible and feasible.

196 Proprietary software is often prohibitively expensive, yet there are also alternative operating systems such as Linux. Free software is moreover widely recognized as more reliable and secure than its proprietary counterparts, and may lend itself to more collaborative, community-based development. The Open Source and Free Software movements allow access to source code: anyone can contribute. There is user freedom to run, copy, adapt, distribute, study and improve the software – 'free' thus refers to liberty and not just price. The philosophy of open source is that the communal can be at least as durable and efficacious as the commercial. On a tangential note, Wi-Fi is not an abbreviation of 'wireless fidelity' and is simply a play on 'hi-fi'.

197 Vellanad village near Kerala's capital Trivandrum became the first fully computerized grama panchayat, or village, in India in 2002. Rural connectivity schemes mean villagers will not have to travel all day to the capital or nearest city. This makes possible a community database for local planning, intercommunity linking, quicker dispersal of benefits and pensions and e-commerce whereby traditional handicrafts made by cooperatives can be sold internationally.

198 See the Earthworker website at <http://earthworkercooperative.com.au/>. The 2014 crowdfunding campaign can be found at <http://startsomegood.com/earthworker/>.

199 Rebecca Solnit, *Hope in the Dark: The Untold History of People Power* (Melbourne: Canongate, 2005), p. 61.

200 Christy Rodgers, 'Thoughts on organizing through the lens of culture', *Dissident Voice*, 16 July 2009, <http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/thoughts-on-organizing-through-the-lens-of-culture/>.

201 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies: performative practices for "other worlds"', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 32 (5), October 2008, p. 627; Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, Claudio E. Montenegro, 'Shadow economies all over the world: new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007', Policy Research Working Paper no. 5356, *The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and Inequality Team & Europe and Central Asia Region Human Development Economics Unit*, July 2010.

202 The phrase 'take back the economy' is the title of J. K. Gibson-Graham, Jenny Graham and Stephen Healey's work *Take Back The Economy: An Ethical Guide for Transforming our Communities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), which surveys a number of practical strategies to enact ethical community economies.

203 For a good overview of these initiatives and strategies in the US context see the Community Wealth website <http://community-wealth.org/strategies/index.html>.

204 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies', p. 617.

205 See Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics*, p. 212.

206 See Friedrich Schneider, 'Size and measurement of the informal economy in 110 countries around the world', Paper presented at an Workshop of Australian National Tax Centre, ANU, Canberra, Australia, 17 July 2002. More recent figures can be found in Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, Claudio E. Montenegro, 'Shadow economies all over the world: new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007', Policy Research Working Paper no. 5356, *The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and Inequality Team & Europe and Central Asia Region Human Development Economics Unit*, July 2010.

207 ILO, 'Women and men in the informal economy: a statistical picture' 2nd ed, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2013, <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_234413.pdf>, pp. xi–xii.

See also Jacques Charmes, 'The informal economy worldwide: trends and characteristics', *Margin*: *The Journal of Applied Economic Research*, Vol. 6 (2), May 2012, pp. 103–32.

208 Jacques B. Gélinas, *Juggernaut Politics*, p. 213.

209 The 1.9 million figure membership is cited in SEWA Newsletter no. 55, January 2014, reporting an item presented at the SEWA Annual General Meeting 2014. See the main SEWA website at <http://www.sewa.org/> and SEWA Bank at <http://www.sewa-bank.com/>.

210 See United Nations, 'Cooperatives at work', n.d., <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/social/cooperatives/documents/CoopsAtWork.pdf>. The employment figure for the world's largest corporations is cited in Amory Lovins, *Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Social Movements Confront Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 2001), p. 226.

211 Tim Huet, 'Can cooperatives go global? Mondragon is trying', *Dollars and Sense*, Vol. 214, November/December 1997, pp. 16–19, 41–2. Size and success may become an issue when cooperatives expand and become so successful that they are tempted to pit themselves directly against the larger corporations on corporate terms and rules of engagement, as with what has happened with Mondragon. Mondragon was established in 1956, with 30,000 members and annual sales of US$5 billion. Mondragon is now a cooperative *corporation*. When a cooperative chooses to compete in the neoliberal economy as a corporation it is compelled to operate on neoliberal terms. Mondragon looked to be first doing this when some of the cooperative arms wanted to hire non-member workers for less pay and conditions than member workers in the early 1990s. See <http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/>.

212 Based on 1989 figures, cited in Piero Ammirato, *La Lega: The Making of a Successful Cooperative Network* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), p. 2.

213 Amory Lovins, *Naming the Enemy*, p. 96.

214 Thad Williamson, David Imbroscio and Gar Alperovitz, *Making A Place for Community Local Democracy In A Global Era* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 192.

215 Duncan Ironmonger, 'Counting outputs, capital inputs and caring labour: estimating gross household output', *Feminist Economics*, Vol. 2, 1996, pp. 37–64.

216 Linda Murgatroyd and Henry Neuburger, 'A household satellite account for the UK', *Economic Trends,* Vol. 527, October 1997, pp. 63–71, cited in J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies', p. 618.

217 Peter Arno, Carol Levine and Margaret M. Memmott, 'The economic value of informal caregiving', *Health Affairs*, Vol. 18, 1999, pp. 182–8 cited in J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies', p. 617.

218 Paul Glover, 'Creating economic democracy with local currency', n.d., <http://www.ratical.org/many_worlds/cc/CED.html>.

219 Paul Glover, 'Creating economic democracy with local currency', n.d., <http://www.ratical.org/many_worlds/cc/CED.html>.

220 See Zopa and Smava's websites respectively at <zopa.com> and <http://www.smava.de>. On Islamic banking see for example Julian Knight, 'Non-Muslims snap up Islamic accounts', *BBC*, 17 December 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6168800.stm>; Jeremy Harding, 'The money that prays, part 1', *London Review of Books*, 30 April 2009, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n08/hard01_.html>; Robin Brant, 'Is Islamic finance the answer?', *BBC*, 11 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8025410.stm>; Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic banking: opportunity or threat?', *Islamica Magazine*, Issue 20, 2008–9, n.d., p. 59, <http://islamicamagazine.

com/?p=764>; and Monem Salam and Melanie Rayne-Merz, 'Islamic finance and the global economic storm', *Islamica Magazine*, Issue 21, 2008–9, n.d., p. 102, <http://islamicamagazine.com/?p=865>.

221 See Banco Solidario, <http://www.bancosol.com.bo/>.

222 Walden Bello, *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy* (London: Zed Books, 2004), p. 114.

223 Williamson et al., *Making a Place for Community*, p. 28.

224 Thomas Michael Power, *Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies* (Washington DC: Island Press, 1996), p. 37.

225 James C. Scott, *Two Cheers for Anarchism*, pp. xxii–xxiii.

226 Saskia Sassen avers that this is driven *in part* by economic deregulation: 'what we describe as deregulation at the top of the system is informalization at the bottom'. Saskia Sassen, 'Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global', *Public Culture*, Vol. 12 (1), 2000, p. 221. Sassen also refers to a previous work, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998), Chapter 8.

227 Gar Alperovitz, 'After Piketty, the ownership revolution', *Al Jazeera America*, 17 June 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/piketty-capital-cooperativeownershipworkerowned.html>.

228 See Doreen Massey, 'Concepts of space and power in theory and in political practice', *Documents d'Analisi Geografica*, Vol. 55, 2009, pp. 15–26.

229 Launched in 2004, ALBA was proposed by Venezuela's government led by then President Hugo Chavez to constitute an alternative to the US government-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As at 2014, its membership consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela, with Haiti and Suriname assuming special guest or observer status with a view to full membership.

230 David Harvey, 'Is this really the end of neoliberalism?', *Counterpunch*, 13 May 2009, <http://www.counterpunch.org/harvey03132009.html>.

231 Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Ernesto Ganuza, 'Participatory budgeting as if emancipation mattered', *Politics & Society*, Vol. 42 (1), March 2014, p. 30.

232 See Sónia Gonçalves, 'The effects of participatory budgeting on municipal expenditures and infant mortality in Brazil', *World Development*, Vol. 53, January 2014, pp. 94–110 and Michael Touchton and Brian Wampler, 'Improving social well-being through new democratic institutions comparative political studies', *Comparative Political Studies*, published online 27 December 2013.

233 Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, 'The capitalization of almost everything', *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 24 (7–8), December 2007, pp. 110–11.

234 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Social Economy in February 2009. See the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the EESC Social economy category, <http://www.socialeconomy.eu.org/spip.php?rubrique190&lang=en>.

235 Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reason* (London: Routledge, 1960).

236 Wayne Parsons, 'Relevant knowledge and the craft of building policy capacity and coherence', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 63 (1), March 2004, p. 49.

237 J. K. Gibson Graham and Gerda Roelvink, 'An economic ethics for the anthropocene', *Antipode*, Vol. 41, 2010, p. 330.

238 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'An ethics of the local', May 2001, *Community Economies*, <http://www.communityeconomies.org>, p. 20.

239 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'An ethics of the local', p. 11.

240 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies', p. 615.

241 Healy goes on: 'Perhaps the persuasiveness of the argument that capitalism is the real economy, while the alternative economy is fanciful celebration, is the ultimate confirmation of performativity'. S. Healy, 'Economies, alternative' in Nigel Thrift and Rob Kitchin (Eds.), *The International Encyclopedia Of Human Geography* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), p. 339.

242 Healy continues: 'Something that is as ubiquitous as nonmarket exchange remains hidden only because it is configured discursively as subordinate. Interestingly, when it is revealed to be ever-present it is dismissed as unimportant, dependent upon capitalism, or (from a progressive standpoint) not subversive enough. The perceived expansiveness and dominance of market exchange is performatively constituted even (perhaps especially) by those who are critical of it'. S. Healy, 'Economies, alternative', p. 342.

243 J. K. Gibson-Graham, *The End Of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy* (Cambridge: MA: Blackwell, 1996), p. 145. The technique of 'reading for difference rather than dominance' can in part be achieved through the deconstructive 'queerying' technique outlined in *The End of Capitalism* to destabilize capitalocentrism. Feminist geographers such as Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson have similarly argued that a 'focus on formal sector economic processes reinscribes the centrality of corporations, markets, and financial and development institutions even as they [are] critiqued . . . ' (Nagar et al., 'Locating globalization', p. 101). This approach has not come without its detractors who doubt the power of performativity. Ron Hudson, for example, characterizes the approach as being one where Gibson-Graham and others simply want to 'wish away the structural power of capital'. Ron Hudson, 'On what's right and keeping left: or why geography still needs Marxian political economy', *Antipode*, Vol. 38 (2), 2006, p. 389. Almost a decade before, Lovins was similarly dismissive about post-structuralism: 'At about the same time as academic leftists took up post-structural mud wrestling, first world nations started dismantling the social contract and third world elites were wooed into levels of debt that have locked them in dependency relations. So now post-structuralists and neoliberals speak resonantly, denying that market structure is determining'. Amory Lovins, *Naming the Enemy*, p. 1.

244 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating globalization', p. 263.

245 See J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'An ethics of the local', pp. 12–34. Gibson-Graham's work on resubjectification also involves a consideration of the psychological aspects of retrenchment and building a life after it. After Connolly, they point to the functioning of the small amygdala brain at the base of the cortex as the biosocial trigger for fear and resistance. The visceral register manifests our bodily dispositions as a site of reaction and response to social processes and change. It can be a source of creativity and cultivation, as well as fear and limitation. When operating from fear, panic and negative uncertainty, the visceral register consists of 'stubborn, unspoken bodily resistances' that are a formidable obstacle to 'individual becoming and social possibility'. It influences whether we fearfully cling to a singular capitalist identity even when it crumbles during job retrenchment for example, or whether we are able to transmute fear and uncertainty into an openness for expanding our visions of social possibility, and of ourselves. An amygdalic panic can be transmuted into creativity with some training.

246 Kevin St Martin, 'Making space for community resource management in fisheries', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 91 (1), 2001, pp. 122–42.

247 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'An ethics of the local', pp. 14–15, 30. Gibson-Graham's work in LaTrobe (Australia) and the Pioneer Valley (US) involved focus groups talking about economic and social changes in the late 1980s. Discussion shifted from victim-centred and negative stories about being acted upon by globalization and downward

pressure restructuring, to more optimistic talk of the region's capacity for enterprise, and its people's ingenuity. Participants began to see themselves as capacious rather than victimized actors and numerous examples of community based economic alternatives started to emerge.

248 A method for analyzing inter-subjective discourses, standpoint theory is an approach that recognizes the cognitive bias inherent in race, class, gender, location and that knowledge is locationally situated; participatory action research involves collaborative research and action in which participants are enrolled collaborators in the process capable of self-representation rather than having a voice conferred by the researcher. This sets participatory action research apart from action research, as distinguished by S. Kindon, R. Pain and M. Kesby (Eds.), *Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting People, Participation and Place* (London: Routledge, 2007).

249 As put forward by Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly and Doug McAdam, contentious politics refers to disruptive techniques within the formal domain such as strikes, riots, demonstrations, insurrections and civil disobedience. The concept has been taken up and developed elsewhere by Leitner et al., whose adapted definition I find much more full-bodied and satisfactory than that first put forward by Tarrow et al. To illustrate, Tarrow et al. define contentious politics as: 'public, collective and episodic interactions between makers of claims when: (a) at least some of the interaction adopts non-institutional forms; (b) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims; and (c) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants'. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Performances* (Boulder: Paradigm, 2007), p. 5. In contrast, Leitner et al.: 'Contentious politics refers to concerted, counter-hegemonic social and political action, in which differently positioned participants come together to challenge dominant systems of authority, in order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries'. See Helga Leitner, Eric Sheppard and Kristin M. Sziarto, 'The spatialities of contentious politics', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 33 (2), April 2008, p. 157.

250 George Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know your Values and Frame the Debate* (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004).

251 Cited in Steven Poole, *Unspeak* (London: Little, Brown, 2006), p. 1.

252 David Lowenthal, 'Geography, experience and imagination: towards a geographical epistemology', *Annals: Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 51 (3), September 1961, pp. 241–60.

253 Patrick Reinsborough, 'Decolonizing the revolutionary imagination', p. 164.

254 David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, p. 238.

255 *The Commitments* is a movie about a rhythm and blues band made up of working class kids in Dublin, Ireland.

256 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Morten Axel Pedersen, and Martin Holbraad, 'The politics of ontology: anthropological positions', Fieldsights – Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, 13 January 2014, <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/462-the-politics-of-ontology-anthropological-positions>.

257 Tom Mertes, 'Grassroots globalism' in *Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* (London: Verso, 2004), p. 245. This certainly does not mean that Northern activists are completely safe either, as the Israeli army killings of Rachel Corrie, Tom Hurndall and James Miller in Palestine have shown for example, but in relative terms they enjoy more safety and privilege. See also see Mark deSocio, 'Geographers mobilize: a network-diffusion analysis of the campaign to free Ghazi-Walid Falah', *Antipode*, Vol. 42 (2), 2010.

258 See the Christian Peacemaker Teams website <http://www.cpt.org/>, see also Sarah Koopman, 'Making space for peace: international accompaniment as alter-geopolitics', *Antipode*, Vol. 42 (1), January 2010, pp. 231–5.
259 See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Swarming and the future of conflict', RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2000, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf>.
260 This is a conservative estimate from Naomi Klein, 'The unknown icon', *The Guardian*, 3 March 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/mar/03/politics>.
261 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 138.
262 Nigel Thrift, 'On the determination of social action in space and time' excerpted in Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory (Eds.), *Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of Inquiry* (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 384.
263 See P. H. Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
264 Chris Bright, 'A history of our future' in Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2003* (London: Earthscan, 2003), p. 9.
265 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 87.
266 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 90.
267 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 94.
268 Notes From Nowhere (Eds.), *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise Of Global Anticapitalism* (London, Verso, 2003), p. 14. '(T)his is a movement of untold stories', they write, 'for those from below are not those who get to write history, even though we are the ones making it' (ibid).
269 Heidi Nast, 'Women in the field: critical feminist methodologies and theoretical perspectives', *Professional Geographer*, 1994, Vol. 46 (1), p. 60.
270 Cindi Katz, 'Playing the field: questions of fieldwork in geography', *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 46 (1), 1994, p. 71.
271 Heidi Nast, 'Women in the field', p. 59.
272 Gillian Rose, 'On being ambivalent: women and feminisms in geography', in C. Philo (Ed.), *New Words, New Worlds: Reconceptualizing Social and Cultural Geography*, Conference Proceedings of the Social and Cultural Geography Study Group of the Institute of British Geographers, St. David's University College, Lampeter, 1991.
273 Bent Flyvberg, *Making Social Science Matter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
274 This may be reflective of different approaches to knowledge; to generalize, the West's experience is exemplified by Plato's exhortation 'virtue is knowledge'; juxtaposed by Eastern thinking with Chuang Tzu's dictum 'If you try to know it, you have already departed from it'. Cited in Wes Nisker, *Crazy Wisdom* (New York: Ten Speed Press, 1990), p. 63.
275 Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies', p. 618 after Eve Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, and Performativity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
276 George DeMartino, 'Ethical economic engagement in a world beyond control', *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol. 25 (4), 2013, p. 490.
277 J. K. Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitalist Politics*, p. xxxi.
278 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'An ethics of the local', *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol. 15 (1), 2003, p. 71.
279 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 183.
280 Nagar, Lawson, McDowell and Hanson, 'Locating globalization'.

4 Alternative ways of knowing
Reframing globalization

> I readily believe that there are more invisible than visible Natures in the universe. But who will explain for us the family of all these beings, and the ranks and relations and distinguishing features and functions of each? What do they do? What places do they inhabit? . . . Meanwhile I do not deny that it is helpful sometimes to contemplate in the mind, as on a tablet, the image of a greater and better world, lest the intellect, habituated to the petty things of daily life, narrow itself and sink wholly into trivial thoughts. But at the same time we must be watchful for the truth and keep a sense of proportion, so that we may distinguish the certain from the uncertain, day from night.
>
> (Thomas Burnet, 1692)[1]

To reconstitute globalization with greatest efficacy, a case can be made that one might fruitfully do so from its paradigmatic sources and cosmological roots. I assert that these can inform ways of knowing about globalization in less obvious but powerful ways. This chapter examines the 'ontologization' of globalization and seeks to extend the alternative ways of seeing globalization advanced in Chapter 3 by examining its deeper philosophical underpinnings as well as how they are influenced by recent developments and debates. I argue these are helping effect a shift to a more pluralist and participatory onto-epistemology. Specifically I consider the effects of the shift between a classical to a post-classical cosmology as the metaphysical framework within which contemporary scholarship and practice operates. This contributes to the larger concern of advancing an affirmative and transformative recognition and replication of subaltern, infrageographical agency in globalization praxis. It does so by seeking to draw a connection between the ways we frame agential concerns and the way these directly inform and enable infrageographies of globalization. In doing so, the primary aim is to advance the reframing of globalization from an ontology of control to an ontology of creative emergence.

To this end, this chapter posits a number of key arguments. The overarching argument is that the shift from a Cartesian–Newtonian to a more participatory epistemology has implications for globalization praxis. It involves a move away from the command and control ontology of public transcript globalization with its corporatism, high politics, authoritarian planning and focus on formal

sector economic and activity spaces – often shared by the oppositional politics of 'resistance' – to a more complex, contingent, context-dependent and relational ontology that can better inform creative, transformational and generative possibilities. In this conception, globalization is reframed and reconstituted as more multiple and diverse, paradoxical, simultaneous and containing sometimes hidden and unquantifiable realities. This shift is both normatively advocated as well as argued to be in process.

Within this argument, I assert that first, ontological pluralism is eminently suited to apprehending globalization because of its multivariate nature and best reflects its complexities. Grassroots infraglobalization more readily takes root and is grasped within a pluralist ontology. In contrast, in the mono-ontological framework characteristic of conventional understandings of globalization, complexity and agentiality strain to survive. Second, making a case for ontological diversity also involves a concomitant broadening and deepening of our conceptions of space and scale and a number of emerging socio-spatial imaginaries will be examined.

Thus far, the *hidden*, the *micro* and the *multiple* have been identified as three major elements of infraglobalization which, I will seek to illustrate, also correlate with conceptual developments in social scientific and wider cosmological debates. These broad epistemological developments and debates have an important bearing on how people see the world, how scholars and practitioners 'do' research and how we produce knowledge about globalization. I argue that while ways of seeing and knowing global processes is in many ways still mired in the classical worldview, the post-positivist shift currently in process is making possible a radical reconfiguration of globalization praxis.

Towards this aim, some of the sources of the ontological turn will be examined, with a consideration of (a century old!) 'New Science'. In particular, I consider some of the *philosophical* implications for the social sciences of quantum physics which, superseding classical physical explanations, provides the best currently available description of the operation of physical reality. Quantum mechanics has revolutionized our understanding of the deep structure of reality, as well as the nature of human agency and causality. Its influence includes a radical rethinking of the interplay between physical and social realities and a challenge to the correspondence theory of reality. Most social scientific disciplines have already embraced post-positivist programmes of research, yet an explicitly post-classical social science is still emerging.

In particular, I spotlight some of its implications for the disciplinary delta in which I operate, Geography and Politics, where questions of power, the organization of social relations and society-nature relations are common concerns. The levels of analysis problem in International Relations (IR) has some parallel with the scalar analysis debate in Human Geography (HG), for example, especially relating to ontological questions about structure, agency and causality. Questions of order, hegemony, authority and agency are also important to both disciplines and indeed across the social sciences. The exploration draws particularly from the contributions of William Peterman (HG) and Alexander

Wendt (IR), who each demonstrate, respectively, an earlier approach and a more recent literal exploration to applying quantum theory. My own positionality does not preclude a productive drawing from neighbouring cognate disciplines such as anthropology, economics, the philosophy of science and so on, which have all contributed to and are informed by these important social scientific debates.

The ontologization of globalization

> The universe is plural. It hangs together, but in more ways than one.
>
> (Louis Menand)[2]

It is fruitful to highlight interconnections between globalization as epistemology and many key metaphysical assumptions we hold about the world. All disciplinary approaches and research perspectives make ontological assumptions about the nature of reality, representation and agency. As Robert Cox has put it, 'Ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry'.[3] Ontology in many respects prefigures the epistemological focus of any subject and the project of reframing globalization is well served, I suggest, by a strategic archaeology of its ontological and cosmological roots.

Theorizing about globalization has predominantly reflected the Western ideal-type of academic discourse as universal and objective. Yet, as Chapters 1, 2 and 3 sought to demonstrate, this knowledge production has also been very sectional. As we have seen, this narrow sectionality has resulted in the wholesale failure and inability to represent whole sections of people, processes and spaces that are left out, rendered invisible, marginal or outside the bounds of 'legitimate' knowledge about globalization. It also bears remembering because it illustrates the linkages between ontology and 'world-making', and the reciprocal co-constitution of knowledge and political subjectivity or agency.

Post-positivist approaches have increasingly informed contemporary disciplines in the social sciences. This shift leaves behind, although sometimes residually falls back on, a classical ontological conception where a single objective reality consists of divisible and discoverable parts which exist independently of the observer. In its multicausal, multiconsequential and multiscalar processes, globalization would seem to lend itself well to an ontological multiplicity. A key distinction is made here between *epistemological* pluralism or multiplicity and *ontological* pluralism or multiplicity. Ontological pluralism, it will be argued, is more than increasing epistemological interdisciplinarity or simply the employment of more than one approach to describe and examine various complex phenomena. A state of ontological multiplicity is reflected, for example, in the recognition of infrageographies and layered, imbricated spaces, and more radically of recognition of multiple realities in socio-spatial imaginaries, not simply multiple *perspectives* that may still be located within a monistic ontology. A brief examination of ontological politics follows as a backdrop to exploring the ontologization of globalization.

The ontological shift

> We cannot strip nature bare to reveal her secrets, as conventional views have held, for no matter how long the striptease continues or how rigorous its choreography, we will always find under each veil . . . more veils.
>
> (Sandra Harding)[4]

Ontology is a philosophical term for a science or study of being, relating to the nature and relations of being, which defines what is reality or the conditions of possibility within which we live. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has argued that the Western modernist tradition of thinking has had an impoverished notion of ontology, in contradistinction to epistemology, which has hampered the ability to conceive alternatives:

> The Cartesian rupture with medieval scholastics produced a radical simplification of our ontology, by positing only two principles or substances: unextended thought and extended matter. Such simplification is still with us. Modernity started with it: with the massive conversion of ontological into epistemological questions that is, questions of representation – a conversion prompted by the fact that every mode of being not assimilable to obdurate 'matter' had to be swallowed by 'thought'. The simplification of ontology accordingly led to an enormous complication of epistemology. After objects or things were pacified, retreating to an exterior, silent and uniform world of 'Nature', subjects began to proliferate and chatter endlessly: transcendental Egos, legislative Understandings, philosophies of language, theories of mind, social representations, logic of the signifier, webs of signification, discursive practices, politics of knowledge – you name it.
>
> (Eduardo Viveiros de Castro)[5]

For most of the time the modern social sciences have existed, the ontology of given reality has been conceived as stable, fixed, singular and universal. With this has come an axiological assumption of permanent building blocks of reality that could be uncovered by reason and scientific investigation. Particularly from the Scientific Revolution onward, reality was to be uncovered and controlled, measured and mastered.[6] This onto-epistemology of linear progress and control has informed the same hegemonic thinking underpinning globalization, and there are real world consequences of employing a control ontology within critical globalization research. Ontology matters.

In critical globalization scholarship, we can still find ample evidence of this ontology. The language and framing of many social scientists often invokes or reflects control ontology; for example, the description of first world 'alpha' cities as 'ordering and control centres',[7] and in concepts like resistance and contestation such as encapsulated in the commonly used phrase 'politics of contestation'. These sustain the privileging of analysis and agency at the public transcript level and may also serve to ontologically privilege corporatist globalism by default by implicitly presenting them as the creative initiator against which the progressive

political group necessarily *reacts*. Singular control ontology is still the preferred modus operandi within a number of approaches, which, in embracing a monistic worldview, have often pushed aside competing explanations.[8] (Here I specify my use of 'monist' in the sense of a singular methodology and ontology, so it is not confused with a stance where monist may suggest a progressive stance that places the researcher as part of the same world as the object of research.)

Yet, key debates point toward a reconfiguring of this ontology. A major ontological shift has moved towards the notion that there is no reduction to a universal set of reconciling principles untethered from time and space and that the plurality of explanations are irreducible to a single, monistic account of the world. These ontological politics has implications for the production of knowledge about, and practices of, globalization, and informs the developing alternative socio-spatial imaginaries and agential strategies. For Annemarie Mol, ontological politics relates to the way in which the 'real' and the conditions of experiential possibility are implicated in the political, and vice versa.[9] As Mol notes:

> If the term 'ontology' is combined with that of 'politics' then this suggests that the conditions of possibility [of the world that we live in] are not given. That reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within these practices.
>
> (Annemarie Mol)[10]

One of the key elements of the ontological shift has been the calling into question of the separation of subject and object crucial to conventional scientific protocols, connected to a number of other key binaries that have served to limit thinking by, in part, underplaying the vast realities in-between, and forsaking complexity for categorical simplicity. This challenge, and the greater awareness of ontological politics, has facilitated a greater relational and process-based epistemology. For instance, Ingold highlights how certain Indigenous ontologies see people as intrinsically part of the relational field of their surroundings rather than separating self and environment, an ontological mainstay of the Cartesian–Newtonian worldview. In Indigenous pictograms of the North American Plains, for example, the movement of the sun across the sky is depicted by emphasizing as much the path as the sun itself; the sun is in fact defined as the path of its movement.[11] In this process-based ontology, living things and beings 'make their way *through* a nascent world rather than *across* its pre-formed surface'.[12] In this sense, people *are* the paths they forge, and this ontology implicitly recognizes the fundamental role of its spatial expression as they instantiate processes. This ontology also more readily recognizes that as agents, people are also space- and scale-makers who bring the world into being rather than being separate from it.

On metatheory, method and manifold multiplicity

> May God us keep
> From Single vision, & Newton's sleep!
>
> (William Blake)[13]

A philosophy of science or metatheory informs the metaphysical assumptions underpinning social enquiry, which includes basic assumptions about reality and causality.[14] Debates about the nature of social science involve reflecting not only on such things as methods narrowly defined, such as interviews or statistical data-gathering, but on the method of theorizing itself, which involves a double hermeneutic.[15] Positivism and realism are both philosophies of science that have been adopted in the social sciences, and it is important to distinguish between positivism as *one* philosophy of science and other approaches that are avowedly in opposition to and post-positivist, such as scientific realism and one of its influential developments, critical realism.[16] Science and positivism have often been conflated as synonymous; as well as disentangling the two I also take 'science' to mean the study of reality, not the narrower physical science sense as represented by a small number of disciplines such as physics and chemistry.

It is also important to note that the term 'realism' here refers specifically to a philosophical orientation and is not a political theory. It bears no *philosophical* relation to the Realist and Neorealist political schools in IR for example, which may adopt a competing positivist philosophical orientation. Wight and Joseph describe positivism as an *anti-realist* philosophical position because it limits knowledge claims to what can be empirically observed rather than a depth realism that seeks to go beyond appearances. For them, *empirical* realists commit the epistemic fallacy of 'giving an epistemological category an ontological task'.[17]

Scientific and critical realism inform the ontology, epistemology and methodologies of several post-positivist theories such as constructivism, critical theory, postmodernism, historical sociology and feminism.[18] A realist philosophy of science advocates an emergent, depth ontology from a stratified reality in which causality at one level is irreducible to other levels.[19] Influenced by but not limited to Roy Bhaskar's critical naturalist philosophy of social science, it is committed to:

> ontological realism (that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced); and judgmental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible, in principle, to choose between competing theories).
>
> (Wight and Joseph)[20]

In considering how we frame infraglobalization, are the multiple, mind-dependent, materially embedded processes more constitutively resistant to being subsumed in a singular account, or through a single methodological approach? Protocols for enquiry frame and thus help produce reality and this makes methodological inquiries productive and relevant to human agency. This also speaks to the challenge of capturing complexity and to the representational adequacy and efficacy of current methodologies. Within the palette of post-positivist approaches, standpoint epistemology may be useful to draw upon, particularly as a bridge between multiperspectival approaches within a singularist ontology and a deeper pluralist ontology. Standpoint epistemology aims to invert and subvert the dominant/marginalized binary whereby

one studies conventional power structures to understand a society rather than those groups considered to be at once at the political margins yet are also often its bedrock, generating the informal order that subsidizes and underpins the formal order.

Methods are here recognized as not merely measuring or describing social phenomena, but also informing, framing, 'performing', directing and even determining reality and how we see and operate in it. Hence, they are also political, rather than neutral or non-interfering. To a significant degree, scholars and activists can choose the ways in which method intervenes and ask ourselves which realities we wish to help create into becoming. Put another way, we can more consciously engage in an ontological politics. Theories of social reality have been critical and in some cases pivotal in helping to produce the realities they set out to describe. This aligns with post-positivist and constructivist insights that reality and truth are actively produced and not simply discovered, and that reality is itself constituted by our theories and worldviews.

That theories can function as self-fulfilling prophecies is both common-sensical as well as less prosaic. If human agents regard a given premise as true, they will act accordingly and reproduce that reality; structure and agency are continuously co-constructed. We make the world as much as it makes us, and sometimes, counter to the oft-cited phrase from Marx, in conditions of our own co-construction and choosing. As Thomason describes the relationship: 'The sense we make of social reality transforms and constitutes a world at the same time as it just interprets the world. We "make" our world by "making sense" of it, and we make sense of our world by making it. The two are completely intertwined'.[21]

The instruments of investigation themselves can contribute toward making the very reality they purportedly and outwardly describe or where none might have previously existed in the absence of those indicators, such as the proclamation of a recessional reality depending upon what economic indicators one uses. Methods can be viewed as social Heisenberg principles in that they perform and transform the very reality they purport to measure, becoming themselves forces in the world and also are in danger of being diluted in the process of 'colonizing behaviour', in Scott's words.[22] Another good example employed by Law and Urry points to the social production of public opinion, a phenomenon that did not effectively exist prior to the Second World War because it was never really measured as such.[23] Recognizing the limits of empiricism is not to deny its own reality; it is simply to acknowledge that this singularist totalistic conception is by no means the measure or extent of all possible worlds. It is but a small slice of the possible. This speaks to the awareness of the partiality of any one vision and greater acceptance of the existence of multiple and sometimes incommensurable truths. As Law and Urry put it:

> The real is real enough. It is obdurate. It cannot be wished away. But it is also made. And in some measure that which is socially real is made by, and through, the instruments of social analysis . . . If methods help to make the realities they describe, then we are faced with the question: which realities might we try to enact?
>
> (Law and Urry)[24]

Reflecting this emergent sensibility, J. K. Gibson-Graham similarly posit that 'ideas about what is really real are judgment calls, not the manifest truth of an unfolding world'.[25]

What realities do contemporary social scientific methods help produce or erode? Do different methods tend to produce different realities? Currently, the prevailing set of methods may be described as producing a single, 'Euclidean' world in the sense of discrete entities and discrete social spaces.[26] Here, it is significant that the virtually concurrent creation of both academic specializations and nation-states was indelibly influenced by the Euclidean conception of socio-spatial reality as discrete entities. Within modernity people have been habituated to arrangements whereby only a single modality naturally occupies a space – a single state, a single-family unit. There have not been many contemporary instances of shared co-equal jurisdiction; the tendency has been towards sole spatial sovereignty.

While the global may be thought of as a Euclidean container in one sense, the global – again, recalling Ingold's sun – is also crucially brought into being through various processes, practices and theories, from NGO conferences and campaigns to iconic images in the media, invoking a process-based methodology and ontology.[27] As Chapter 3 sought to show, these processes and agents go deeper than the public transcript of globalization. Law and Urry consider that Euclidean categories of social science are 'less productive of "global" (let alone post-colonial and civilizational) realities at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a world that enacts itself to produce unpredictable and non-linear flows and more mobile subjectivities'.[28] How, then, might social science move on?

Speaking to this question, Law and Urry argue that current 'standard social science methods are not particularly well adapted to the realities of global complexity' in the following ways:

> Current methods do not resonate well with important reality enactments. They deal . . . poorly with the *fleeting* – that which is here tomorrow and gone tomorrow, only to reappear the day after tomorrow. They deal poorly with the *distributed* – that is to be found here and there but not in between – or that which slips and slides between one place and another. They deal poorly with the *multiple* – that which takes different shapes in different places. They deal poorly with the non-causal, the chaotic, the complex . . . and the sensory . . . the *emotional* . . . and the *kinaesthetic*.
>
> (Law and Urry)[29]

I assert that an ontological template for the imbricated, emergent, sub rosa and informal – all properties of an infrageographical socio-spatial ontology – is a step toward making these methods possible.

Law and Urry entertain the possibility of some research practices producing multiple, sometimes incommensurable and yet not entirely disconnected worlds. This is challenging when we are still conditioned to conceiving of a single reality 'out there':

> If method is interactively performative, and helps to make realities, then the differences between research findings produced by . . . different research traditions have an alternative significance. No longer perspectives on a single reality, they become instead the enactment of different realities . . . The shift is from epistemology (where what is known depends upon perspective) to ontology (what is known is also being made differently). It is a shift that moves us from a single world to the idea that the world is multiply produced in diverse and contested social and material relations. The implication is that there is no single 'world'.
>
> (Law and Urry)[30]

More importantly, the use of binaries as embedded in the dualistic worldview of Cartesian philosophy and classical physics has had serious material consequences and real-world implications. This involves a key process in rationalist and structuralist thought, whereby differences of degree are relinquished for two qualitative distinctions, producing the tendency toward categorical rather than relational thinking. Dichotomies can be misleading representations of reality because they are polar opposites and, while they may helpfully categorize and simplify reality, their use can disable an understanding of the in-between. As Wes Nisker has suggested, in all the major binaries, global–local, space–time, matter–energy, reality is effectively represented in the dash.[31]

Infrageographies may have a contextual, content-based and conceptual role in addressing this. The implications of ontological singularity and discrete single-modality Cartesian spaces have constrained scholarship and straightjacketed political responses. A monistic ontology makes possible a worldview of globalization where all transactions and discourse can be subjected to the singular logic of commercial profitability, for example, and has limited political responses to reactive resistance and public transcript reform as the previous chapters sought to show. Healy expresses similar sentiments, writing that '(t)he epistemological insistence on one true, all-encompassing vision finds resonance in an equally constrained politics, which while outwardly democratic, is in practice retrogressive, pathologically intolerant of difference'.[32] Roger Lee also avers that singular methods muzzle radical politics:

> the tendency to singularity – and hence certainty – in critical modernist thought may be inimical to radicalism in a society which, though shaped by highly and ever more structured (and singular) relations of evaluation, is also represented and practiced through decentralized and increasingly individualized social relations.
>
> (Roger Lee)[33]

Although the terms are elsewhere understood as interchangeable, multiplicity is here understood as more than perspectival pluralism within a singular sociospatial ontological framework. As stated at the outset, a distinction is made between ontological and epistemological pluralism whereby the latter is a limited,

qualified multiplicity that exists within a singular ontology. In contrast, the advocacy and understanding of epistemological pluralism here extends this multiplicity of *perspectives* (within one singular reality) to the multiplicity of *realities*. While perspectivalism has been a step forward breaking away from a monopolistic version of truth as a singularity, as Mol asserts, 'it did not multiply *reality*, it multiplied the eyes of the beholders'.[34]

The multiplication of reality is not as fantastical as it may sound. It simply reflects other ways of knowing and, I would argue, makes more accurate conceptual provision for what already exists. It also makes conceptual space for alternative realities occupying the same, multi-layered space, which already well accords with the notion that the local is constitutively global, for example, and vice versa. As Mol asserts, 'alternative realities don't simply coexist side by side, but are also found inside one another'.[35] An ontology of multiplicity also calls for and enables new socio-spatial imaginaries that, far from being novel, more accurately reflect reality. Already, these are conceptualizing globalization as a superimposition of an indeterminate multiplicity of imbricated spaces. In his outline of a scalar structuration for example, Neil Brenner refers to globalization as a 'reconfiguration and re-territorialization of superimposed spatial scales';[36] Dixon et al. refer to 'multipliciticians',[37] and several social scientists have employed the 'rhizome' notion of unbounded multiplicity by Deleuze and Guattari.[38] In contrast to the earlier description of global cities as 'ordering and control centres', consider for example the alternative description of cities as 'open time-space intensities of social relations, themselves encompassing and interlocking a variety of sub-time-spaces of different groups and activities'.[39] These two conceptualizations may yield very different methods and results.

In contrast to a monistic perspectival epistemology, a deeper epistemological pluralism facilitates the recognition that multiple potential realities are already implicit in our structures and actions: which we choose and which prevail, and how free or constrained we are in shaping what realities prevail is what defines ontological politics. As Healy notes,

> Epistemological pluralism surmounts the constraints imposed by adherence to narrow representational perspectives, and the methods that attach to them, by legitimating and facilitating the deployment of other relevant perspectives and methods in parallel with them . . . This should not be interpreted as a denial of the veracity of scientific insights but is rather to highlight their partiality and how, consequently, they are best deployed in contexts not structured and determined by science and that allow other knowledge to complement it.
>
> (Stephen Healy)[40]

This requires attention to methodologies that meet the challenge of framing globalization in a more participatory fashion, in which democratizing knowledge about globalization and onto-epistemological pluralism go hand-in-hand. Research and knowledge-production is a political act of world-making. As Chapter 3 sought to highlight, people are actively world-constituting, meaning-assigning agents.

Recent debates have broached this issue, seeking to move beyond a shallow pluralism to which little more than lip service is paid to a deeper 'engaged pluralism'.[41] Increasingly syncretic disciplinary approaches in the social sciences may more easily offer the opportunity to apprehend the world through a deeper epistemological pluralism than the refraction engendered by attempting to view it from a privileged Archimedean standpoint within a monistic worldview. Recent scholarship includes work towards 'non-substantialist' ontologies, 'alter-ontologies' and 'non-representational' theories, for example.[42]

From worldviews to worlding

> No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes.
>
> (Alfred North Whitehead)[43]

Research agendas and programs have usually involved a particular way of seeing and knowing about the world: a worldview. It can also be understood as the systemization of experience and reality that holds sway at any given time and place for a community of people, and is thus perspectival and positional in time-space. A worldview is metaphysical in the sense that it is the prevailing interpretation of physical reality. The classical worldview makes a number of key assumptions that all have a bearing on social reality and agency, about the physical environment and our place in it, such as the materialism of matter, reductionism, determinism and the subject-object separation.

Worldviews are also intimately related to and frame human agency: it emplaces us in the universe and thus helps determine the parameters within which we think we can act. The way we order the world powerfully affects and frames human conduct, both individually and institutionally. People render experiences intelligible within a certain constructed (and permitted) framework of understanding, without necessarily revealing the ways in which this framework has been constituted and normalized, which shows how discourses can crucially serve as masking agents.

For our purposes, how the interpretation of physical reality is *politically* extrapolated and translated is important. It is not simply of philosophical import but has a practical bearing on every aspect on our lives. We all 'do' ontology – metaphysical assumptions are rooted in our theories and routed through practices – ontology and metaphysics are boundaries within which legitimate social inquiry can be performed and knowledge produced. This is particularly important in the social sciences when phenomena studied are not always physically observable objects, such as the state.

The notion that epistemological and empirical developments tend to correlate with one another further points to the utility of examining the paradigmatic archaeology – and *onto-epistemological* grassroots – of globalization. Both social and physical branches of knowledge fundamentally share the same paradigmatic precepts and this can be seen in a number of reciprocal conceptual correlations, such as the technocratic beliefs that laws are to be discovered in both the physical

and social realms and that both nature and human affairs are things that can be managed through control. Even in seemingly disparate applications, a concept can share the same precept enabled by the same cosmology – such as the idea of an infinitely expanding universe and an infinitely expanding economy, for example.

Similarly, we find parallels in the destruction of absolutes, from monarchies to mechanical universes. Contemporary calls for ontological pluralism and decolonization from master concepts finds some parallel in political decolonization in the latter half of the twentieth century, demonstrating the reciprocal relationship between empirical and epistemological developments. Here I will argue that analyzing global relationships becomes richer if we apply precepts informed by post-classical ways of knowing, in part informed by the New Science such as quantum and complexity theories but also indigenous and feminist epistemologies and an embracing of pluralism in the formative methodological, research and advocacy program of infraglobalization.

From the meaning of cosmology to the cosmology of meaning: the classical worldview

> Almost unknowingly, we think about and describe the world using the language of classical physics, separating subjects from objects, bodies from souls, and human thought from physical action . . . Ideas about forces and masses create a real world.
>
> (William Peterman)[44]

The origins of control ontology can be found in the order-through-rationality of Enlightenment modernity, and a brief overview is appropriate at this juncture. The philosophy-physics of the classical period from the Scientific Revolution to the contemporary era is eponymous to René Descartes and Isaac Newton respectively (to which the scientific method of Francis Bacon may also be added). In this worldview framing, globalization is a *deus ex machina* for the world, one that operates to fixed rules and is governed by discoverable laws. The metaphysical assumptions underpinning both social and physical sciences has been of a deterministic universe with mechanical laws, linear cumulative progress and human perfectibility based on the application of rationality and reason. This worldview envisaged detached privileged observers able to stand objectively at a transcendent vantage point removed from the subject of study, above geography and outside of history.

In terms of agency, by dint of imagining a rational universe, the Cartesian–Newtonian worldview also effectively installed the authority of the inquiring human mind, even as humans were increasingly relativized in importance in a larger cosmos and rendered as cogs in the machine and subject to physical laws. This also lent itself to the ascendant political belief in universal equality, albeit heavily qualified and tightly circumscribed at the time. The Cartesian–Newtonian universe involved new scientific tools that conferred unprecedented confidence that humans could discover and measure all reality and that infinite linear progress was possible.

Contemporary social science is constructed within this material, dualist metaphysical edifice that has informed all branches of knowledge, including the subject-object binary separation that has been at the heart of Cartesian–Newtonian objectivist epistemology. The imprint of dualistic thinking on many of our contemporary problems is congruous with the wider history of ideas. The mind/body split is one of the foundational dualisms that has engendered others (correlating with the classical separations between feminine and masculine, thinking and emotion, spirit and matter, matter and meaning, self and world, theory and practice, nature and culture). The body in the Cartesian worldview has been seen as a bounded entity and site of property rights rather than a being with porous boundaries that is actively transformative in relation to its environs, which in turn help produce, influence and sustain it. The self's fundamental separation from the rest of the world has been reinforced by most languages wherein a subject-object relationship inheres in the noun-verb structure, implying the distinctiveness and separation of actor and action.[45]

It is worth outlining the contours of the worldview that has dominated classical metaphysics. While there are risks of oversimplifying Newton's theories and reducing them to a deterministic and mechanistic philosophy, what matters here is their *translation*. (Far from the image of a rational scientist per excellence, Newton himself had a number of occult interests and added in his *Principia*, the text most associated with the imaginary of the world as a clockwork-like closed system, that the motion of the planetary system should not be understood as being regulated 'by mere mechanical causes' alone.)[46] It is also worth noting that while this worldview often bears Newton's name, his work in some important respects was simply the apogee and culmination of a long pedigree originating from the atomistic philosophy of ancient Greek philosophy, from the theorems and axioms of Euclidean geometry to later thinkers.

The classical worldview can be summarized as follows:

- all physical reality is material and all objects and processes are made up of matter and energy (materialism) that is divisible into smaller units (atomism);
- causality is local and subject to laws (determinism) of force (mechanism);
- objects exist independently of human perception and experience (objectivism).

It has engendered a physical and social system in which discrete bodies (from particles to people to planets) have been understood to move in orbit according to fixed, gravitational laws, where phenomena is pre-determined, knowable, and open to both prediction and retrodiction. This has translated into a fixed order based on certitude, determinism, structure and status.

The social and political translation of Newton's physics are important because the socio-political order was aspirationally mimetic of the Scientific Revolution of the time. Belief in linear progress and a rationally ordered society mimicked the conceptualization of time-space as an absolute and homogeneous container existing independently of and prior to the agents' interactions. The Newtonian worldview generated a powerful symbolic economy that legitimated a sociopolitical

order and agency based on individualism, hierarchy, laws and linear causality, all within a closed system of absolute and homogeneous space and time.

Dualistic thinking in this classical worldview habituates seeing and knowing in terms of division and duality rather than relational integration and connectedness. The classical scientific revolution encouraged neat, clinical categories that downplayed linkages and inter-categorical relations, and the mechanical universe corresponded with the division of knowledge into disciplinary specializations. This material, 'objective' way of ordering the world became synonymous with intellectual freedom, a universe stripped of myth, shorn of superstition and unencumbered by religious strictures.

To date, global reality has similarly been perceived through the framing of what I have earlier called conventional accounts of globalization as cognitively rationalist and problem-solving as well as statist and centred on formal processes, albeit increasingly under challenge. The social scientific imagination and research practice of the past two centuries has been animated by the perceived need to fix problems, demarcate, draw boundaries, analyze and systematize. That capitalocentric discourse and practice developed in tandem with classical scientific culture is perhaps significant: both have marginalized (and often actively discredited) other systems, presenting themselves as the sole authority. Whilst positivist social science has most obviously employed the methodology of classical science – utilizing a 'method in which removed objective observers search for deterministic local causal explanations of the real world'[47] – less positivist approaches have often also shared the same paradigmatic-ontological precepts.

Engendering a worldview

In this worldview, nature was conceived as feminine – to be controlled and subjugated – and this has been amply reflected in social gender relations. While not *all* elements have been negative or are undesirable in this modern worldview (this is not a simplistic assigning of wholesale blame of perceived civilizational ills to Western norms and more privileged white males!), I think it is nevertheless appropriate to consider the gender dimension as an integral part of this worldview – and its crisis. As feminist scholars have pointed out, the worldview upon which much of the classical Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment are predicated involves a control ontology of mastery of mind (masculine) over matter (feminine).[48] Enlightenment and Renaissance humanists put a reflection of themselves at the centre of the universe, and declared the white European male ideal-type as the measure of all things, the privileged agent of theory formation and knowledge production. The white, Western, bourgeois, heterosexual and able-bodied European male ideal-type was privileged because only white male subjects were permitted to transcend their corporeality and the container grid of Cartesian space in order to obtain an 'objective' view of the world, with the ability to un-anchor their knowledge from material space-time processes. They were endowed with the privilege of writing from *sub specie aeternitatis* – from the viewpoint of eternity, with knowledge production from this vantage point accorded global universality.

This has also been significant because it meant that the privileged knower was not required to be accountable. It served to reinforce a hegemonic masculinist ontology of putative omniscience, which detached the researcher from his subject. In short, it produced a rational, context-independent and disembodied masculine subject who created knowledge that was more likely to be monolithic, totalizing and universal. Consequently, masculinist modes of human agency have prevailed and we see this reflected in orthodox globalization that speaks with a decidedly male voice, and a very narrow hegemonic version at that. This has also translated into the co-constitution of masculinist and neoliberal (as well as many 'progressive') identities in corporate globalization and reflects gendered characteristics of knowledge practices. Conventional indices of development privilege male actors and formal sectors, for example, and the Global South has been conceived as ontologically feminine within this violent control framework, to be subdued, destroyed, made dependent, exploited, plundered.[49]

The consideration of gender relations is important to globalization, both epistemologically and ontologically, and this brief overview serves to underscore its significance in the classical worldview. The spatial structuralism of a masculinized modernity and conventional globalization tends to express the territorial logic of patriarchy; an emphasis upon boundaries and stable fixed borders expresses a singular socio-spatial ontology.[50] These mostly align with hegemonic masculinist agendas and interests that have systematically ignored the contributions to global processes, policies and practices of women.

Consequently, women have rarely been positioned as active agents of social progress or as significant contributors in critical numbers, and this exclusion is archetypal.[51] The narrow conception of the universal ideal-type subject (white male) served to restrict the diversity and creativity of human agency and fed into the instrumental rationality ethos underpinning the industrial age, corrosive of other cultures and of nature. As intimated in Chapter 3, feminine (and -ist) epistemology in many respects coincides with and characterizes our epistemic zeitgeist – hidden, participatory, informal, with a more feminine sensibility of relationality that connects seemingly distinct scales of the 'global and the intimate'.[52]

The shift could thus also be characterized as one that incorporates a more feminine sensibility to balance the past predominance of (one projection of) the masculine, reflected in an emphasis upon the unknown and less visible, mysterious, indeterminate, fuzzy logic and the infrageographical. Paradigmatically, the archetypal goal posts are perhaps shifting towards more feminine-inflected ontologies that are informing the way we produce knowledge about globalization and practice global processes. This may also be reflected empirically in the prominent role women play in the informal economy.

Parallels

As previously broached, the shared ontology of the physical and social sciences is reflected in a number of striking parallels; the physical-social sciences have had a number of key reciprocal doctrinal counterparts and canonical correlations.

For example, Western philosophy in many of its branches has attempted to bracket uncertainty and imitate the logical deduction of Euclidean geometry.[53] In classical political economy, the Newtonian paradigm can be seen in how the economy was perceived with the same template as a closed autonomous system akin to clockwork, in which economic events constituted a reality independent of the observer.[54] Weisskopf suggests that the notion of the invisible hand was a Newtonian model attempt to mitigate the unknowability of the future: 'The fiction of the "invisible hand" was and is a technique of Newtonian thinking in economics to protect itself from the mystery, indeterminacy and uncertainty of social action'.[55]

The concurrent emergence of the modern state as a distinctly demarcated sovereign entity which contained and regulated all legitimate political life both implicitly and explicitly reflected the understanding of political spatio-temporality and causality of the time. R. B. J. Walker also makes this point – that Newtonian-influenced spatial constructs had a decisive role 'in determining the cultural forms of European civilization', particularly the 'linkage between ideas of state sovereignty and a sense of inviolable and sharply delimited space'.[56]

The insertion of a universal arrow of time in physics by nineteenth century thermodynamics also directly informed the corresponding idea of irreversible historical processes. This is reflected in the Marxist model of history as a progressive succession of modes of production. The atomization inherent in this worldview is evidenced in the ordering of other processes such as Taylorism, wherein production is basically broken up into its constituent parts and atomized rather than holistically crafted by a single person. For as long as this worldview has predominated, problems have tended to be solved within the framework of paradigm maintenance.[57]

A worldview in transition?

> Whatever advances have been made in quantum physics, chaos theory, and other contemporary branches of science, we are even now, to some extent, struggling within and against the confines of Newtonian notions of order.
>
> (Robert Markley)[58]

The mounting contradictions and crisis of the Cartesian–Newtonian worldview has been gradual and is still in process. It is important to note that it is not being suggested here that this worldview is being entirely superseded; post-positivist and in particular quantum-scale realities operate *in parallel with* classical spatial reality in which the latter is the macroscopic expression of a physical reality which is now best described by quantum physics. Rather, its paradigmatic *primacy* is being challenged and has been under challenge from post-structuralist and other post-positivist approaches in the social sciences over a considerable time throughout the twentieth century and well into the twenty-first century. The values under challenge include the desirability and inevitability of linear human progress, the moral justifiability and tenability of the human exploitation of nature, empirical science as totalizing universal truth, the problems associated with exclusively

endowing the white male as universal subject and civilizer, as well as the practical tyrannies that abide in conceptual totalities, teleologies and binarisms.

For our purposes, this worldview in crisis applies and extends to the study and practice of globalization when conceived in terms of omniscience and determinism.[59] Concepts of control (from Taylorism to governmentality to resistance) are gradually being challenged by a more creative and contingent ontology that is in emergence, elements of which I have summarized and furnished in Table 4.1.

There is now significant movement, I suggest, toward concepts that better account for the hybridity and prodigious complexity of the world rather than some unified fictional entity, a development with deep implications for ways of seeing and knowing the global and human and more-than-human agency within it. The influence of Kuhnian and Feyerabendian philosophies of science, and of the advent of quantum mechanics as the prevailing understanding of how physical reality operates, has both contributed to and reflected this post-positivist turn, as familiar frames of reference lose their relevance and utility. With it, as Law and Urry assert, 'the understanding of the character of social investigation and its methods has also moved on. The sensibilities of the nineteenth-century inheritance, though still informing much social inquiry, are under pressure from an alternative, complex and performative sense of social enquiry'.[60] It is this topic that we now consider.

Table 4.1 A summary of the shift

Previous worldview	*Emerging worlding sensibility*
Cause-effect determinism	Probability and contingency
Objective and representationalist	Performative
Masculine	Masculine/feminine
Denigration of pre-scientific knowledge	Consider and value past and contemporary indigenous belief systems
Man; master of nature	Human; part of nature
Humans as material beings	Humans as material and spiritual beings
Results-oriented	Process-oriented
Uni-directional	Multi-directional
Power as dominance of self over others	Power as empowerment of self and others
Representative democracy	Participatory democracy
Adversarial	Mediated
Categorical	Categorical and relational
Competitive	Cooperative
Uniformity	Diversity
Material	Post-material
Ontology of control; monistic ontology	Ontology of contingency; plural ontology
Mindless matter	Minded matter (panpsychism)
Predetermined politics	Prefigurative politics
Hubris	Humility
Epistemology and ontology	Onto-epistemology
Totalizing	Imbricated
Perspectival worldview	World-making

Sources of the ontological shift

> A revolution so amazing in our ideas concerning the physical world must inevitably carry its echoes into other fields of human knowledge. New truths cannot be quarantined.
>
> (William Bennet Munro, 1927 American Political Science Association Presidential Address)[61]

A revolution in intellectual history has occurred over the past century, one that is resulting in a very different view of reality, causality and space from that produced in the classical Cartesian–Newtonian worldview. I consider that quantum mechanics has affected and informed our ontological politics and cognitive horizons, not simply our view of the physical world. As William Peterman posits, it constitutes a revolution both in knowledge and in how conceptions of knowledge can be legitimately expressed.[62] Quantum theory is part of the 'New Science', which includes an ensemble of new approaches increasingly familiar to social scientists, such as complexity theory and other emerging ideas that are informing a new conceptual order and also constitute a creative metaphor for apprehending reality.[63] Notwithstanding cautionary tales implicit in the Sokal Affair, New Science theories such as quantum and complexity theories have contributed to, as well as been results of, this emergent mental architecture of post-positivism.[64] These are developments with *philosophical* rather than simply physical import, just as map-making is intrinsically philosophical as well as empirical.

By the early twentieth century social scientists had imbibed the metaphysical assumptions of the classical worldview – namely materialism, determinism, atomism and objectivism. This influence was however by no means one-directional. The influence of both 'branches' of knowledge (physical and social) *has always been reciprocal*, and natural science has in fact always waded into the same prevailing epistemological pool to draw and develop its concepts.[65] To further illustrate this two-way flow between the social and physical sciences and the humanities – what C. P. Snow described as *The Two Cultures* – it is worth noting, for example, that a number of quantum theoreticians were influenced by existentialist philosophy, such as Niels Bohr who was influenced by and critically appreciated the existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard.[66] In the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin was deeply influenced by the models of economists Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith that Stephen Jay Gould argues Darwin imbibed into his theory of evolution.[67] In the twentieth century, quantum physicist David Bohm had numerous dialogues with and was influenced by Theosophically-raised Jiddu Krishnamurti.[68] While quantum theory is the result of a century-long development in physics, in a number of its key features it has precursors and parallels in other systems of thought, and in some ways only systematically codifies precepts that have long been a part of other belief systems such as Buddhism. The multiverse idea in particular has had an established lineage well before Everett formalized it in quantum physics, from Leibniz, for whom the multiverse contained one

world made real by God, to Blanqui in political praxis, to Borges in literature.[69] Key quantum concepts also have notable parallels with social scientific schools such as humanistic Human Geography and the 'possibilism' of the French school of geographers.[70]

Why should sophisticated social scientists more closely examine physical theories? Social and political life obviously takes place in the physical world. The physical environment modifies human behaviour and social forms in significant ways, and all disciplines within the social and physical sciences alike are subject to a physical or 'physics constraint' on physical reality. This simply means that the operation of social scientific phenomena must necessarily be consistent with physical law, to which all known reality is subject. While not all elements of this metaphysical 'closure' principle are agreed upon, such as the role of emergence, almost everyone agrees with a basic construal of physicalism.[71] The physical closure principle or reality constraint is ontologically significant, but it does not mean that the social sciences are or should be 'scientistic' or reducible to physics.[72] As Alexander Wendt points out, this constraint

> does not entail that social scientific theories must be reducible to physical theories . . . [but] I know of no interpretivist, post-modernist, or other critic of naturalist social science who says that social phenomena can *violate* the laws of physics, or that social theories should allow for such possibilities.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[73]

The New Science is relevant to the post-classical update of the physical constraint, particularly quantum theory and its interpretations. These may address what the classical constraint necessarily excludes and can better account for in what makes our experience human – consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality and capacity for social behaviour.[74] The classical physical constraint has been under challenge on a number of fronts, including the classically intractable mind-body problem, in which the existence of consciousness cannot be accounted for in a material cosmology. The puzzle of consciousness and failure to reconcile it with a classical worldview is important because classical cosmology gives us a reality that has no place for living, conscious, mind-dependent phenomena like social structures.[75] It could be argued that physical scientists within the classical tradition have effectively written themselves out of their own worldview. The failure to account for consciousness is also more than a large lacuna and has had spill-over effects into the modern worldview and its attendant alienation. As Wendt puts it, 'given that being conscious is widely seen as a defining feature of being human, that also means there is no place for *us* in Nature, either – that we are not "at home in the universe"'.[76]

A necessarily brief summary of the quantum revolution will suffice for our purposes here. Quantum mechanical theory emerged from a search to explain the observed behaviour of basic elements of nature such as light particles and energy packets that came to be known as 'quanta'. Its advent can be traced to experiments conducted by Max Planck to account for blackbody radiation in

1900, which dramatically disproved the classical assumption that measurement interactions are continuous. Planck proposed instead that energy is 'quantized' and exchanged in discrete amounts. This discontinuity or apparent 'quantum jump' – known in physics as 'Planck's constant' – marked the discovery of the fundamental discontinuity of nature.[77] The discovery of quanta led to the formulation of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics, which became the prevailing interpretation for much of the remaining twentieth century before a number of alternative interpretations became influential.[78]

Its key concepts – these include wave-particle duality, complementarity, probability, 'non-locality' and indeterminism – have turned what we have conventionally known about space, causality and consciousness on its head. Non-locality, for example, refers to the fact that subatomically, events affect other subatomic events even when separated by great distances in space-time. Reality is in this sense radically interconnected. In 1927 Weiner Heisenberg established his Uncertainty Principle based on the finding that the more precisely the *position* of a particle is determined, the less precisely its *momentum* can be known. Determinism in one results in indeterminism in the other, and vice versa. In measurement, when using one apparatus this means not all aspects of a system can be viewed simultaneously because only certain features can be viewed or measured at the expense of others. Another apparatus might similarly accurately measure a complementary aspect but in a way that the features measured in the first apparatus are obscured. This is the basis for Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity. In this respect, quantum theory suggests a process rather than a substance ontology.[79]

In the 'double-slit' experiment that predates, but is at the heart of quantum mechanics, it was demonstrated that light exhibits both wave and particle properties depending upon what is used to measure it. In other words, the properties of a system depend upon the nature of the apparatus and the way it is being observed. These elementary entities could at times be described as particles (physical to our senses), and at other times as waves (non-physical form). They manifest as physical particles only when we are looking at them. Again recalling Ingold's sun consisting not just of itself but also of its movement across the sky, an atom and its wave function are understood as the same thing.[80]

The indeterminate and complementary wave-particle quantum world morphs into the determinate classical world through what is called 'decoherence' of the wave function. Wave functions are structured sets of states of possibility and probability consisting of a space or states that involve more than the four-dimensions associated with normal space-time.[81] Quantum reality is described in a wave function, an equation which formalizes all the ways a system can potentially evolve. Until it is measured, particles can exist in a multitude of locations, whereupon it appears to collapse to produce a single outcome. Initially formulated by David Bohm in the early 1950s and later developed in the 1980s, decoherence is an explanation for the appearance of probabilistic wave function collapse at the quantum level into the concrete world humans perceive, reducing the physical possibilities into one outcome.[82] The apparent collapse of the wave function in quantum outcomes has no apparent classical-physical cause – the very acts

of perception and measurement seem to precipitate it. (It is important to qualify that decoherence is not put forward as a claim that provides a mechanism for the actual wave function collapse, but one for the *appearance* of wave function collapse.[83] Wave function collapse, like determinism, is interpretation-dependent.)[84] Remarking upon these developments, Weiner Heisenberg stated that

> we can no longer speak of the behaviour of the particle independently of the process of observation . . . the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively.
>
> (Weiner Heisenberg)[85]

These findings challenge the classical tenets interpreting physical reality in a number of ways. In the classical philosophy of science, we recall that if two competing descriptions are mutually exclusive, at least one must be wrong. In the classical world, a wave and particle are mutually exclusive – an object can be either localized (particle) or extended (wave), but not both. Larger objects also exist both as particles and waves, but the effect cannot be apprehended on the classical, macroscopic scale. At the subatomic level, matter is found to disappear into wave functions which are non-locally entangled with one another. This challenges the atomism and mechanical causality of the classical worldview; entangled particles behave as parts of a 'superposition' that incorporates them as individual entities. Waves in quantum theory denote potentialities rather than actualities and thus may not even be considered material. Particles too cannot be said to have properties or even to exist in the classical sense prior to measurement. This in turn challenges the materialism of the classical worldview.

This has also served to codify probability rather than determinism as elementary entities have neither precise location nor motion and are best understood in the sense of probability: an examination of one precludes the other, and particles cannot be observed with certainty, which had been a mainstay of the modern scientific method. Here, it is worth noting that probability is understood differently than how it is grasped in positivist quantitative analysis. In the latter, statistical variation simply results from errors of *measurement* rather than constituting a fact of nature.[86] This produces a seeming paradox of probability as a causal determinant – constituting causality without *determination*. Wave and particle realities exist at once as probabilities; *probability here is accorded full ontological causal status*, it is not simply an error as it is conceived in positivism.

This signals that both physical scientific and social scientific discomfort with ambiguity and uncertainty is changing, and has led to the acceptance of indeterminacy as a normal feature of systems, rather than as an aberration arising from errors that result in accurate measurements of phenomena. Related to this probability, within quantum theory it is implicit that events are never fully predictable or knowable. 'As opposed to positivist science', Peterman notes, 'quantum theory suggests that there are no unique set of facts which if known can

be used to fully determine any outcome. Rather, what flows from any set of observations should be thought of as an *"ensemble" of existing possibilities*' [emphasis added].[87] Indeterminacy pokes holes in one of the pillars of positivist theory-making: predictability. This sensibility invokes Ingold's assertion that 'The very goal of prediction . . . rests upon the conceit that the world can be held to account'.[88]

Yet, unlike classical metaphysics, what quantum theory is saying about the deep structure of reality is not definitively certain and is subject to a dozen or so interpretations. Depending upon the interpretation, one has to take as plausible such radical notions as time reversibility, human consciousness affecting the behavior of subatomic particles, and the splitting of the universe into innumerable parallel worlds or multiverses at each measurement (Everett's 'Many Worlds' interpretation). All these are at odds with classical physics.[89] None of the current interpretations have been definitively ruled out, and as Wendt notes, 'this uncertainty poses a second-order problem for social scientists, in turn, since some interpretations may have many social implications, and others none'.[90]

Most interpretations are predicated upon what happens when an observation or measurement is made on a quantum system. The wave function is a mathematical formula describing the state of a system and gets reset when a measurement is made. When this happens, the multiple possibilities that the mathematics describes appear to collapse or actuate into one tangible, macroscopic result (decoherence). A quantum interpretation tries to explain why this happens, and some interpretations speculate as to whether the wave function itself is physically real or something mathematical or conceptual, interacting with a measuring apparatus 'in an analogous way as a concept interacts with a human mind'.[91]

Quantum theory has placed human consciousness and the act of observation in a central role, as it now became understood that the very act of observation would affect that which was being observed. Unlike classical physics, where mind is discounted, in most interpretations the consciousness of the observer is central to quantum outcomes. The act of observation is not only an intervention (rather than constituting an objective act), it has also served to rupture classical cause and effect, and to effect a shift where events move from imposition to superposition: that is, the superposition of two states of actuality and potentiality.[92] In the famous thought experiment, this would see Schrödinger's cat as being both dead and alive – the two states in a sense simply represent different dimensions of reality, which decoheres into one macroscopic, classical outcome. Our state of perception normally prohibits an apprehension of both superpositions. Yet these superimposed states are entangled and correlated with one another.

Quantum weirdness

> And whereas in our one world this order is found to be so marvelous, would you believe that there exist innumerable worlds above, below, on the right and on the left, in front and behind, some unlike this, some exactly like it, and that just as we are at this moment close to Bauli and are looking towards Puteoli,

> so there are countless persons in exactly similar spots with our names, our honours, our achievements, our minds, our shapes, our ages, discussing the very same subject?
>
> (Cicero, *Academica*)[93]

> And just as the same town when seen from different sides will seem quite different, and as it were multiplied perspectivally, the same thing happens here: because of the infinite multitude of simple substances it is as if there were as many different universes; but they are all perspectives on the same one, according to the different point of view of each monad.
>
> (Leibniz, *The Monadology*)[94]

As described, some startling possibilities have emerged within the interpretations of quantum mechanics, including that of multiple realities and the notion that our minds in a sense create reality. If the idea of a multiplicity of realities is radical – a *multi*verse superseding the idea of a *uni*verse – the paradoxical and co-existing idea of an internally mapped *you*-niverse is even more so: it is the notion that it is fundamentally the observer's mind that creates reality by virtue of the fact that it is human consciousness which collapses the wave function to resolve a quantum state of multiple potentialities into actuality through the act of observation. A corollary may be the social scientific term pluriverse or plural universe.[95]

Consider the classical definition of objectivity as 'not dependent on the mind for existence'.[96] This is challenged if we now accept the evidence for the notion that the reality of the physical world is not at all divorced from the mind and that the observer's consciousness is in fact central to the determination of reality, both individual and collective, consensual reality.[97] In one quantum-interpretative sense then, consciousness creates reality: '(t)he human being knows not the world-in-itself but rather the world-as-rendered-by-the-human-mind'.[98] Alistair Rae describes this startling implication at greater length:

> it is difficult to hold this position while still assigning any reality at all to anything outside our consciousness. Every observation we make is equivalent to a quantum measurement of some property which apparently has reality only when its observation is recorded in our minds: if the state of a physical system is uncertain until we have observed it, does it mean anything to say that it even exists outside ourselves?
>
> (Alistair Rae)[99]

Knowledge is obtained *per modum cognescentes* – with the cognitive faculties of the knower. Perception involves actively selecting and omitting; it is an act of editing. In this conception, we are not passive receptacles but *active editors* even in the act of knowing, let alone doing. As Haule observes, 'We unconsciously maintain our world and prevent it from changing through an internal monologue that tirelessly asserts a few central features and distracts us from evidence that the world can be seen differently'.[100] Our mental selectors are to a large degree

shaped by cultural values, social placement, geography, ideals and ideology. This accords with humanistic and post-structuralist assertions that knowledge is more subjective, emplaced and radically interpretive than previously permitted in classical metaphysics.

Notwithstanding this fact and the danger of putting it all 'in our heads', it remains that we choose to exclude and include objects and meanings into frames of reference when apprehending the world. These are often political choices. People constitute knowledge, and in turn, it constitutes us. Our actions and discourses are 'world-making'. Yet, while consciousness is central, we would do well to qualify this with the importance of the unconscious.[101] Most cognitive processing is thought to take place below the threshold of consciousness, not readily available to the thinking 'I'. Neurophysiologists have, for example, come to the remarkable conclusion that it is the subconscious mind that makes the real decisions, even prosaic ones, and that the signals in the brain necessary to take any physical actions begin one and a half seconds *before* the conscious mind thinks it has made the decision to move a limb or to get up.[102]

The radical indeterminacy of measurement and the fact that the act of observation itself alters and affects that which is being observed has involved making significant conceptual leaps from conventional ways of thinking about the world, including, in the case of the famous Schrödinger's cat thought experiment, having to conceptualize a half-dead, half-alive cat! There is now a physical scientific basis for the assertion that what we see depends upon how we measure it. This signals a qualitative break in our attitude towards, and knowledge about, how we interact with the physical environment. It suggests that there is no truly transcendent knowledge that we can produce outside of what Martin Heidegger called our 'being in the world'.

Since Marx and his contemporaries, the representation of material reality has become less fixed and more contingent. 'All that is solid melts into air' has its ontological counterpart in physical knowledge, with the finding that solidity is an illusion and the atoms that comprise matter are overwhelmingly, to our five senses, 'empty'. As Haule puts it:

> We have barely accustomed ourselves to remember that the solid-looking table in front of us is actually comprised more of space than of matter, with subatomic particles arranged like countless little solar systems. Now we are asked to imagine that those tiny planets and suns that comprise the wood of the table are actually not 'there' at all. They are only clouds of probabilities, invisible little packets of energy vibrating in multiple dimensions.
>
> (John Ryan Haule)[103]

The post-classical and post-positivist worldview reflects emerging metaphysical axiomatics that knowledge is partial and provisional, not total and fixed, and that subjects are embedded in time and place. It has ruptured, among other Cartesian–Newtonian staples, the notion of a world formerly supposed to contain distinct parts with a fixed nature, intrinsic to the object, as well as other classical precepts.

Key descriptors of this worldview also align with recent theories and research agendas pertaining to global processes, reflecting and acknowledging greater indeterminacy, contingency, interconnectedness, and interpenetration of mental and physical phenomena.

A quantum social science?

> . . . contemporary social science is philosophically incoherent. Its accounts routinely invoke intentional phenomena at the individual and structural levels that help explain social life, yet those phenomena lack any apparent physical basis and as such should not exist. The root of this incoherence lies in the classical worldview that has infused social science from the start. It is time to move on from this founding mistake, and explore the possibility that social life has a quantum basis instead.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[104]

> I've asked myself, would I go into science again . . . And, I'm not at all certain now because science does not seem to be relevant to this crisis [that humanity is facing].
>
> (David Bohm)[105]

There is an increasing sense that neither 'wing' of classical scholarship, physical or social science, has satisfactorily accounted for the complex and multidirectional transformations or global challenges of recent times. Siloed academic disciplines and the discounting of intentionality and consciousness in classical science have variously caused or compounded this inadequacy and highlighted the need for greater genuine cross-, trans- and post-disciplinarity across the divides. This is thus not a genuflecting approach to the 'new physics', as Doreen Massey has cautioned against, nor an endorsement of E. O. Wilson's problematic 'consilience' approach that would see the social sciences explained in terms of, and effectively subsumed by, the physical sciences; but rather a case that all disciplines operating from a classical platform have been restricted in their capacity to deal with global complexities.[106]

In the mid-1990s, the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences suggested social inquiry should break down disciplinary distinctions to more accurately account for complexity, and to reflect the less hierarchical and more hybridic integration of human and social systems and relations with nonhuman and natural ones, or what has been termed 'panarchy'.[107] Similarly, speaking to the study of world politics but also applicable more widely, James Der Derian has argued that it is past time for a post-classical approach:

> This new world is full of non-linear and emergent effects, random and unexpected events, and multivariant and multiversal causes . . . The linear notion of causality, correspondence theory of truth and materiality of power [have] failed to account for many of the transformative events of the last fifty years.
>
> (James Der Derian)[108]

Increasing numbers of scholars have indeed sought to apply post-classical precepts and proto-quantum approaches can readily be identified in contemporary scholarship. In early 1980s and 1990s globalization literature in politics, geography and sociology, a number of complexities and creative contradictions have been conceptualized in post-positivist 'both-and' recognition: one thinks of 'distant proximity', 'fragmegration' (Rosenau) and 'glocalization' (Swyngedouw), to list but three examples.[109] During the 1990s, exploratory work considering quantum theory figured in both Politics and Geography: in Human Geography, William Peterman's cogent contribution in *Professional Geographer* asked 'can quantum theory provide a scientific basis for human geography in a way that the limitations of positivist science are avoided?'[110] Peterman asserted many areas in Human Geography already implicitly carry notions of quantum holism, nonlocality and indeterminacy, especially in the environmental literature and in environmental assessment techniques.

In Politics, the idea of quantum politics as a paradigmatic shift resurfaced with Theodore L. Becker's edited volume on *Quantum Politics* in 1991, a decade before Akrivoulis put forward a metaphorical consideration of quantum politics in his research.[111] These contributions bookended the close of a century whose start had seen interest in quantum theory since the 1920s, as evidenced in Munro's 1927 APSA address. And in the 2010s Alexander Wendt has compellingly considered a stronger form of quantum politics, one that explores a more literal application of quantum theory as a keystone to addressing two major challenges in the social sciences, expressed from this 'heretical thought: what if the limitations of contemporary social science and philosophy of mind alike lie in their common assumption that the relationship of mind (ideas) to body (the material world) must be compatible with classical physics?'[112]

Social scientists across disciplinary canons are increasingly harnessing concepts informed by the New Science, such as complexity theory, and applying concepts such as openness, feedback, non-linearity and emergence. In International Relations, for example, Complex International Relations (CIR) is an emergent approach informed by complexity theory.[113] Its employment forms a claim by one proponent that complexity has contributed to the launch of the fifth great debate in the discipline, the basis for which involves 'cross-pollination between the natural and social sciences'.[114] The employment of complexity in Human Geography and Sociology since the turn of the millennium has included work by a number of scholars who have drawn on complexity concepts for research into the uneven processes of contemporary globalization.[115] Bichler and Nitzan also use new physics metaphors with regard to political economy, drawing on Bohm's concept of enfoldment and Denis Gabor's idea of a giant hologram.[116] In the burgeoning Big History field, the identification of 'thresholds of complexity' also speaks to greater cross-disciplinarity and incorporation of post-classical concepts in its macrohistorical approach.[117] We can also see this implicit acknowledgement of plurality and polymorphy reflected in the establishment of an interdisciplinary journal named in the plural: *Globalizations*.

Can quantum theory inform a post-classical politics? Der Derian explicitly calls for integration of new insights from chaos theory, complexity theory and quantum theory towards a post-classical approach to war and peace. These, he argues, would more satisfactorily account for 'a contingent world that seems to function in a very different way from the predictable, explainable and quantifiable methods of traditional social science, in which every effect can be traced back to a single cause'.[118] Der Derian in particular focuses on 'quantum war' as an 'indeterminate, probabilistic and observable-dependent form that defies fixation by word, number or image'.[119]

Alexander Wendt's recent ambitious exploratory work examines the possibilities of a quantum social science, including the possibility that human beings are effectively quantum systems, or walking wave-particle functions. Wendt argues that beyond an otherwise useful (but limited) analogical approach, 'we face a real choice, about whether the extraordinary kinds of physicality found in quantum theory – like action at a distance and . . . backwards causation . . . are admissible in a social scientific context'.[120] Citing Bohm-influenced philosopher of mind Paavo Pylkkanen who posits, 'part of what it is like to be a thinking human being is to have direct experience of the effects of quantum theory', Wendt argues that if social life exhibits qualities of the quantum world, it 'would *require* a 'quantum social science for their proper understanding'.[121]

In a quantum social science, mind and matter correlate with the wave and particle aspects of quantum mechanics, which are complementary to each other in both cases. 'When thinking about world politics from the standpoint of ideas we are in the realm of wave descriptions', Wendt states, 'and from a material standpoint in the realm of particle descriptions'.[122] Regarding the question of corporate identity and collective consciousness, Wendt asserts that 'a quantum social science might justify attributing consciousness to collectives, and specifically self-consciousness, which is essential if we are to think of reflexivity at the social rather than just individual level'.[123] Extending the quantum holographic perspective to the international system, Wendt explores the notion that the state can be seen as a holographic virtual reality in a flat yet participatory ontology. Here, individual pixels are people who are in non-local holographic relationship to each other through the shared meanings conveyed by language.[124] In this view,

> human beings are 'pixels' or monads that mirror and instantiate the wave functions of social structures. What we 'see' when we 'observe' the state, therefore, is not something really real, but a holographic projection of informed minds onto practices, a 'virtual reality' that can only be seen from the inside by those who already know it is there.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[125]

Like other intentional, 'fiat' objects, the state exists as a set of practices rather than a physical, visible institution in the mind-independent, classical material object sense.[126] Mind-dependent social structures and corporate actors are instantiated by practices invisible in the classical object sense wherein 'seeing is believing'.

As a fiat object, Wendt points out, the state is dependent upon the reverse, where believing is seeing.[127] From a quantum perspective, 'states and other putative corporate actors are not really actors, but holographic projections by individuals'.[128] Like quantum entities, the state exists both in its subjective wave aspect and objective particle aspect that must be taken together.

Mirroring the quantum wave-particle duality, individuals also have both a physical aspect as well as being seats of consciousness enfolded into the implicate order whole, to which they are connected non-locally – 'both descriptions are necessary to capture the whole truth . . . since human beings live in both worlds simultaneously. The relationship between the two is therefore not one of interaction (dualism) or reduction (materialism), but correlation'.[129] In the social context, the non-local entanglement of observer and observed occurs through shared meanings; Wendt explores the case that language, like visual perception, is also quantum mechanical.[130] Wendt also examines how a collective unconscious could inhere in social system wave functions:

> Our wave functions themselves, then, would correspond to our unconscious, understood . . . in the . . . general sense of all the background knowledge we have about ourselves and our environment of which we are not aware when we are conscious . . . our knowledge of ourselves – our identity or sense of Self – does not have determinate properties at any given moment, but only becomes determinate when we act into the world (collapse) . . . before that point the Self is a superposition of multiple and mutually incompatible desires and beliefs.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[131]

Quantum consciousness?

> Our best physical theory – quantum theory – raises the question of what to do with consciousness in a very direct way . . . what quantum consciousness theory suggests is that two of the deepest mysteries facing the modern mind – the problem of interpreting quantum theory and the problem of explaining consciousness – are related or even two sides of the same coin.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[132]

Since the early 1990s, quantum consciousness theory has developed the idea that consciousness is a quantum event. As Wendt notes, this involves two key proposals; quantum brain theory (that the brain operates as a quantum computer) and panpsychism – the notion that, unlike the lifeless matter of materialist cosmology, consciousness inheres in matter.[133] (Alfred North Whitehead also subscribed to a similar notion that matter was not inert and was partly self-directed, which David Ray Griffin has termed pan-experientialism.)[134] Quantum consciousness theory confers consciousness with epistemic recognition and may also go towards more satisfactorily addressing the 'hard problem' of consciousness through the suggestion that matter is minded rather than merely material. The proposal

that consciousness is a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon means consciousness would be given a naturalist basis.

Quantum consciousness theory constitutes an 'epistemological double-movement' approach to the mind-body problem, characterized by a 'bottom-up' movement as represented by quantum brain theory and a top-down movement with panpsychism; the first 'projects known facts about quantum phenomena from the micro level upward to the macro' while panpsychism 'projects known facts about the human mind from the macro level down to the micro'.[135] By suggesting there is a life force that goes all the way down as in panpsychism, quantum consciousness theory challenges a basic metaphysical assumption of classical science, 'that all explanatory principles must be "dead"'.[136] Notably, the parallel between this 'quantum vitalism' (a term from Hameroff)[137] strikes Wendt as an 'updated version of the *Lebensphilosophie* of Goethe and nineteenth-century Romantics, and subsequent ideas of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans Jonas and others'.[138]

This ambitious enterprise is still extremely speculative however, and Wendt reminds the reader that he is effectively proceeding on a 'bet' that the quantum consciousness hypothesis is true and 'exploring what its implications for social science might be'.[139] Even if the hypothesis is true, Wendt qualifies, the implications may not even scale up to the social level, '(h)owever, in my view if the first bet is justified then the second probably is as well, since consciousness is the basis of social life. The implications for social science could be profound'.[140] Drawing this out further Wendt asserts, 'If the quantum consciousness hypothesis is true then the elementary units of social life, human subjects, are quantum systems – not just metaphorically or by analogy, but really are'.[141] This bold, experimental, 'what if' approach may yield some compelling results and indeed have far-reaching implications for social science.

Reconstructing reality? Other implications

Quantum theoretical concepts are also applicable to notions of order. In David Bohm's typology of explicate and implicate order, the explicate order is the classical world we can apprehend through our physical senses, while the implicate order is the deeper, quantum world of potentiality from which the explicate order emerges.[142] In some ways this offers a striking parallel to formal and informal order, within which the former emerges from and is the more visible of the latter. In terms of how space is conceptualized, quantum theory is significant in two ways as suggested by Peterman: the idea of superimposed space; and the idea of enfolded spatial realities.[143] (This is contrasted with classical science's concern only with the explicate order, spatially represented by the Cartesian grid.) This also complements the idea of infrageographies, which are at once more hidden and less readily amenable to conventional social scientific analysis, as suggested in Chapter 3.

The application of quantum theory has been notable in many areas, including life systems, and has been applied in areas as diverse as informatics

and computing to mind, language and consciousness. The role of quantum properties such as tunneling and entanglement in biological systems has been found to play a part in one of the most important processes supporting life, for example – research since the mid-2000s led by Graham Fleming has found a form of quantum computing at play in the process of photosynthesis.[144] In search engine algorithms and the use of language generally, quantum properties and processes can be seen at play. According to Diedrich Aerts, 'The structure of human conceptual knowledge is quantum-like because context plays a fundamental role'.[145] Like the properties of atoms, conceptual and linguistic meaning is inherently contextual and relative to a measuring apparatus and minds respectively.

In terms of agential implications, just as Newtonian physics had a commensurately rational individual as its assumptive ideal type, quantum theory correlates with a more contradictory, layered, multidimensional, complex and unpredictable human being.[146] Politically, our more active roles in the construction and transformation of our reality are highlighted. In contrast to the Baconian–Cartesian–Newtonian worldview, human agents are at once spectators and participants. We can never completely and accurately measure the world because our very measures change it. The agential implications involves a recognition that if the economy is perceived as part of the same mechanical worldview from whence classical physics sprang and to which it contributed, we will continue to be trapped by mechanical, iron-clad laws through the invocation of inevitability rather than contingency, by putatively universal and timeless laws rather than place-sensitive and context-contingent conditions. If we see Economy through a post-Newtonian worldview on the other hand, multiplicities may become possible where universal singularities once held sway.

Quantum precepts also accord with theory-as-practice, by seemingly confirming that we actually alter things by changing the way they are observed or perceived. Quantum complementarity conceptually accommodates for something being in two places at once, and for *being* two seemingly distinct things at once. It has ruptured the 'object constancy assumption' whereby an object can only assume one form and is consistently one form to all people and over time.[147] The contemporary post-classical worldview now has greater conceptual accommodation for multiplicities and simultaneous alternatives operating, and for what David Lewis has called an 'ontology of possibilia'.[148]

Quantum theoretical influences have also conferred a cosmological basis for relationality as important in apprehending the environment. Recalling Althusser and Balibar's later metaphysical assertion in the social sciences that 'the truth of the object is not in the object',[149] Ernest Mach suggests:

> We recognize what we call time and space only through certain phenomena . . . spatial and temporal determinants are achieved by way of other phenomena . . . we conceive of position from what happens in the eye . . . every phenomena is a function of other phenomena.
>
> (Ernest Mach)[150]

It is also worth remembering that the relationality of the human mind to the world as one that is not separated and split but participatory in the western canon has its lineage in Goethe, Hegel, Coleridge, Emerson and Steiner. A number of quantum physical precepts are merely codifying what other thought traditions have long been saying.[151]

The shift to a post-classical worldview informed by the quantum revolution has enabled such previously unthinkable – for classical rationalism – notions as a 'collaborative intelligence'[152] and an anima mundi, the idea of a living soul of the universe that animates the Gaia hypothesis. Further, it may open conceptual space to take self-organization seriously and to see mētis as an integral part of informal order. In digging into some of the significant influences of this shift, we find fertile sources of contingency, alternative and multiple worlds, multiple causality, indeterminacy, ambiguity and spatial superimposition – the idea of many realities occupying a single space. Amongst other post-classical sources, and with the caveat that I am not advancing it as some sort of panacea, I have argued that the philosophical implications of quantum theory has influenced a more philosophically constructivist and participatory epistemology and a more contingent, interconnected, indeterminate, complementary, pluralistic, holistic, post-materialistic scientific worldview rather than an absolute and deterministic one.

In review, I suggest we are slowly becoming more habituated to accepting a necessarily incomplete state of knowledge and to allowing for radical contingency and uncertainty. I would argue that this has been as a result not simply of post-structuralism or post-modernism which some social scientists might suggest, but is attributable to a deeper and wider shift affecting all branches of knowledge. I have sought here to highlight the practical consequences of our philosophic ordering, and assert that the quantum conceptual revolution has influenced our post-positivist ways of knowing in a number of important ways, which I deem to be significant breaks rather than simply glitches from within the older Baconian–Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm. Quantum theory reflects, and even tries to incorporate the existence of, paradox and incommensurability in our physical experience. It may also help make conceptual space for multiple ways of operating in the same space, with no singular or hegemonic 'way' possessing sole spatial sovereignty. It has informed a newly probabilistic social science where reality and the *representation* of reality (or its performance and construction) incorporate potentiality, not simply actuality. Through a quantum-influenced philosophical realism, it is easier to imagine how what is not yet or *in potentia* inhabits reality. Reality is open and unfinished rather than closed and fixed, and has both an ideational and a material basis.

From correspondence to performativity?

As we saw in Chapter 3, the notion of infrageographies and of mētistical informal order challenges the Enlightenment assumption that society is legible and visible in each of its constituent parts and as a whole. The 'hidden' or 'infra' may not be amenable to classical social scientific research in part because it has not been

recognized by its protocols and ontologies. That is, 'infra' is often outside both public transcript visibility as well as the conventional bounds of knowledge. This challenge is compounded by the problem of language and representation. That many communication norms tend to favour the powerful and marginalize others has been earlier broached, and this has been a contentious topic in linguistics if we consider Sapir and Whorf's hypothesis that language shapes perceptions of reality as much as vice versa.[153] Have we come to the limits of (existing) language in capturing plural realities in classical thought and is the distortion of reality in social enquiry a necessary and inescapable fact? Edward Soja has expressed this frustration in reflecting simultaneously co-existing multiplicity:

> What one sees when one looks at geographies is stubbornly simultaneous, but language dictates a sequential succession, a linear flow of sentential statements bound by the most spatial of earthly constraints, the impossibility of two objects (or words) occupying the same precise place.
>
> (Edward Soja)[154]

The classical worldview produced the correspondence theory of reality, whereby the strict separation of subject and object enabled the observer, in theory at least, to objectively represent what was going on in external reality. This 'epistemic fallacy' assumes that reality corresponds to the knowledge that we have about it.[155] The putatively progressive slogan of the 1970s 'no reality without representation!' might be the high water mark of classical representationalism. The pitfalls of mere representation is that it maintains the classical separation of subject and object with attendant problems of preventing an understanding of the complementarity of matter and meaning, as Karen Barad argues:

> as long as representation is the name of the game, the notion of mediation – whether through the lens of consciousness, language, culture, technology, or labour – holds nature at bay, beyond our grasp, generating and regenerating the philosophical problem of the possibility of human knowledge out of this metaphysical quarantining of the object world.
>
> (Karen Barad)[156]

The tension arising from this classical separation and its political consequences is also expressed by Rob Walker, wherein

> modern political life is sustained by a multidimensional and multiscalar desire to find a politics of the world, even though just about every value that is significant for modern political principles is predicated on a constitutive distinction between man and world.
>
> (R. J. B. Walker)[157]

A post-classical metaphysics and ontology seeks to go beyond merely representing reality to a more performative metaphysics that acknowledges, in Karen

Barad's term, an agential realism that involves 'intra-action' rather than the classical concept interaction between separate entities.[158] Barad's agential realism builds upon the metaphysical dimensions of the philosophy-physics of Niels Bohr in which the description of the phenomenon requires an account of the apparatus of its production. We cannot therefore describe or represent a pre-given reality per se, what is always being described according to Barad will be an *agential reality*. In other words, phenomena observed are a product of intra-actions of which the research apparatus is a part. In this conception, the subject-object distinction is not pre-given but is emergent from the process of measurement itself, making a contingent 'cut' in a previously undivided whole.

A quantum social science would not do away with objectivity, Wendt suggests, it would merely recognize objectivity as inherently situated, as feminist epistemologists such as Karen Barad, Donna Haraway and others have persuasively argued.[159] Barad's contribution addresses how performativity theory relates to material reality, and may give the poststructuralist 'participatory epistemology' approach in social inquiry a naturalist quantum basis, codifying how, in Wendt's words, there 'is no agent before agency; we only become agents in and through performances'.[160]

If quantum approaches result in a radically different reality constraint, what implications might this have for a realist philosophy of science? This is not a question I take up here, except to pose it as one question that will no doubt be part of future research and debate. In part this also reflects that the question of a quantum social science is very much an exploratory, experimental and speculative enterprise, which is only starting to reconfigure the grounds of debate. Perhaps that is a fitting metaphor as it relates to Wendt's quantum social science project wherein he speculates that one result may be a 'non-foundationalist foundationalism'.[161] For Wendt's part he posits that

> at this point we don't know if the quantum hypothesis is true, and so in one sense a realist interpretation is not yet warranted – at most we can say that human beings are 'as if' quantum systems. But we have more reason to follow this conjecture up if the suspicion is that we 'really are' quantum.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[162]

In reviewing Wendt's current project, it may be worthwhile to highlight how it may influence at least one debate between positivists and interpretivists. In his 1999 work *Social Theory and International Politics* Wendt had tried to 'find a *via media* between positivism and interpretivism by combining the epistemology of the one with the ontology of the other', which was not received especially well by advocates of either.[163] Regarding the distinction between ideas and material conditions, Wendt asserts that a 'quantum approach offers a better solution [than dualism], treating them as two aspects of one underlying reality'; more significantly, he sees this ontology as being 'compatible with both the Third Person epistemology of positivism and the First Person epistemology of subjective experience, while avoiding the reduction of either'.[164] Here, complementarity replaces *via*

media as the relationship between ideas and materiality for Wendt, and between Explanation and Understanding.[165] Further,

> the *Methodenstreit* between positivists and interpretivists is based on a false, classical premise. In quantum theory it would be absurd for the 'particle guys' to fight with the 'wave guys' about who has the truth, since the knowledge each offers is understood to be inherently partial, and so must be complemented with the other for a complete description.
>
> (Alexander Wendt)[166]

In sketching just some of the ontological and metaphysical implications of a quantum social science, I suggest that the ontological turn stimulates an alertness towards ways of knowing, seeing and being that can be characterized by, but I suggest cannot be reduced to, a difference of 'worldviews'.[167] The shift is thus from a description of perspectival worldviews to a focus on 'worlding' as an active practice, both in research practice and in community practice. Empirically, the focus of ontological investigations is on world-making capacities, which eschews the assumption that the world pre-exists representational practices. Rather, it focuses on practices that perform the world. Yet others reverse this relation and make ontology itself emergent – up-ending the relation between ontology and the world we make.[168] As Gibson-Graham put it,

> When ontology becomes the effect rather than the ground of knowledge, we lose the comfort and safety of a subordinate relation to 'reality' and can no longer seek to capture accurately what already exists; interdependence and creativity are thrust upon us as we become implicated in the very existence of the worlds that we research.
>
> (J. K. Gibson-Graham)[169]

This problem of representation extends to space and the debate about which sociospatial heuristics can best serve the presentation and enactment of liberatory global realities. Critics charge that the globalization debate has resulted in a reification of the global scale that has served to disable progressive politics. In particular, a number of geographers have questioned the value of continuing to apply scale as a superordinate heuristic. In the next section, we will examine whether the quantum revolution may have resulted in greater conceptual accommodation for simultaneous, paradoxical and diverse realities that occupy the same, yet overlapping, spaces in sociospatial imaginaries.

Framing scale and space: the post-positivist production of space

> How we represent space and time in theory matters, because it affects how we and others interpret and then act with respect to the world.
>
> (David Harvey)[170]

The spatial imaginaries scholars bring to globalization draw from and are informed by an ontology that, as we have examined, has significantly shifted. How is this post-classical cosmology reflected in how we inhabit and produce our spaces? Can existing conceptions of scale-spatiality adequately account for imbricated space and infrageographical realities? There have been a number of emerging conceptual provisions and emerging spatial imaginaries such as 'phase space', 'third space' and recombinatory, polytemporal assemblages and sites. In this section, I argue that recent debates are implicated in the ontologization of globalization research, and I seek to explore some of the ontological issues of creating alternative spaces and propositional political strategies. I propose that the debate about scale in particular may be symptomatic of the ontological shift and the epistemological crisis of an older socio-spatial ontology. In this reading, the recent scale debate in Geography may be read as a reflection of the crisis in the use of singularist scale ontology. I sketch out an infrageographical socio-spatial ontology amid an appraisal of new spatial imaginaries that may better reflect parallel, plural and imbricated realities rather than corporatism's singular spatial-totalities.

As an organizing principle of social life and human action, spatial imaginaries are important for framing globalization. Space has moved from being understood as a passive backdrop or container, directly informing control-ontology processes that required a 'mastering' or 'managing' of space to conceptions of space as an active property and constituent of social processes, all of which has agential and processual consequences. The production of new spatialities is significant in part so that the notion of the 'global' more fully encompasses the experience of the majority of people. Spatial imaginaries also have practical, material, agential consequences; the production of power and the production of space are intimately connected. In a description similar to infrageographies, Lefebvre writes:

> Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be 'purely' formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes *whose traces are not always evident on the landscape* [italic emphasis added].
>
> (Henri Lefebvre)[171]

A monistic conception of reality and space as singular container of that reality has held sway throughout modernity, rather than one of spatio-temporal multiplicity, of space as holding a plurality of realities. The move away from rational control ontology towards relational contingent ontology is evidenced in how we think about space. In the socio-spatial ontology of neoclassical economics for example, a spatial equilibria and view of space as endogenous to the economy is assumed that was directly informed by Cartesian space.[172] This reflects how the prevailing worldview influences our conception of such directly material matters as the economy, and how socio-spatial processes are represented and reproduced. In contrast, post-positivist geographers and scholars influenced by the poststructuralist

and cultural turns see space as central to the constitution of the capitalist – and alternative – space economies.[173]

Infrageographies can be seen as parallel realities coexisting with conventional public transcript globalization. Although not as easily apprehended or documented, these spaces are nevertheless not only just as real, they arguably constitute a broader spectrum of reality than does the public transcript representation. Like quantum-scale phenomena, they are to be seen when one knows *how* to look. A socio-spatial ontology of infraglobalization is one that recognizes the paradox of sub rosa processes and invisible geographies: of seeing and knowing that which is hidden. I describe infrageographies as creative spaces of creation and incubation that are often under- or un-registered on the public transcript, typically populated by everyday activists, sympathetic epistemic agents and characterized by a radical public intelligence of what works. These sites can be networked, often allied with similar communities or even assisted by state agencies. I am not suggesting that all communities are fully autonomous or can or should operate separately from the state. But they are characterized by a high degree of social enterprise innovation and self-sufficiency, characteristic of the Kerala case study in Chapter 5.

They are also characterized by a high degree of informal order, and notably are sites of creation as well as dissent. Their processes may be similar to, yet not exactly accounted for, in conventional and some critical globalization accounts. Microcredit and cooperatives, for example, have flooded the field, but their operation in infrageographical sites is a markedly different experience from that propagated and described by their more public, corporate counterparts. Infraglobalization is importantly about *deep* processes, including the sub rosa and what is often left out or overlooked. It is also an ontology that recognizes overlapping, multilayered realities that may be enfolded in the same physical space, with agents who can assume markedly different roles in each layer of space. The notion of infrageographies seeks to incorporate and extend emergent ideas about space and scale, and their relation to social processes, to inform a progressive politics of globalization. These emergent properties include but are not limited to relationality, multiplicity, topologicality and emplaced everyday experientiality. These are briefly appraised in turn.

Relational conceptions of space recognize that processes and social relations operate across scales rather than within them, as if they were discrete, bounded, separate spatial entities.[174] More radically, they involve envisioning multiple potentials as well as acknowledging factors that constrain and order space.[175] Relationality has become something of a truism in contemporary critical and radical geography debates. As Pred notes,

> No site of human activity may be reduced ontologically to its locational coordinates, to the precise space it occupies, and nothing more. No such site may be divorced from its situation, from its actual relations to its near and distant surroundings.
>
> (Alan Pred)[176]

Yet it is easy to overlook how relationality constitutes such an important and radical departure from spatial totality and in dissolving boundaries between objects and space.[177]

It is also an implicit recognition that space does not exist separately but is rather a property of material objects and of agents, which accords greater human agency and everyday consequentiality to scale- and place-making abilities.[178] In this representation, scale is constructed by spatially embodied practices by actors; scalar articulations are performed from everyday practices and processes. The characterization of people as scale-making agents recalls, for example, de Certeau's act of walking as a space of 'enunciation' – it serves to appropriate the urban topography and contributes to the process of a spatial realization of place. This also recalls the older expression of the same principle, 'We make the path by walking'. As Nielsen and Simonsen put it:

> walking practices cannot be seen only as simply movements in space, they spatialize . . . They weave places (and scales) together. While a pre-given spatial order can organize an ensemble of possibilities and interdictions, the walker actualizes some of these possibilities. S/he makes them exist as well as emerge. But s/he also moves them about and invents others, since the improvisation of walking privileges, transforms and abandons spatial elements. Thus the walker creates discreteness, whether by making choices among the signifiers of the spatial 'language' or by displacing them through the use of them. In this realization and appropriation of space, the walker also constitutes a here and there; s/he constitutes a location and in relation to that a location of an 'other', this establishing a conjunctive and disjunctive articulation of places.
>
> (Nielsen and Simonsen)[179]

In this infrageographical grassroots spatial-scale production, *people* instantiate and produce scales. As actors who are scale-producing agents, acts at one scale can also instantiate effects at other scales in a multi-scale plurality. It is not simply a world-making and meaning-assigning privilege accorded to capital and the state as the imagined primary agents of scale-construction in even some critical analyses.[180]

Multiplicity and topologicality are also key features of the emerging socio-spatial ontology. Drawing from Deleuze and others, Martin and Secor assert that '[a] basic insight of topology is that there are a multiplicity of possible spaces, or manifolds, of which the Euclidean plane is but one'.[181] The debate has moved appreciably from when Roland Robertson framed globalization as 'the relatively specific path that the world has taken in the direction of becoming *singular*' [emphasis added].[182] *Global* need not mean *universal*, and debates increasingly envision space as networks, flows and relations, in contrast to an older topography in which territoriality was dominant, as Amin et al. suggest.[183] The project is still in process, with Jones suggesting, 'the spatial project for relational thinkers is to replace topography and structure-agency dichotomies with a topological theory of space, place

and politics as encountered, performed and fluid'.[184] In contrast, Katz advocates a *counter*-topographical approach to accommodate for multi-scalar analysis.[185]

In this multi-scalar analysis, agents may operate across different scales, often markedly differently at one than another, such as in the case of diasporic communities. This involves a conception of multiple and emplaced locals and globals, with scale as a concept that inherently incorporates multiplicity. As Fagan puts it: 'the idea of discursive and material construction *through* social relations and politics incorporates *multiple constructions* into the concept of geographical scale'[186] [emphasis added]. Collinge notes, 'Localization, for example, is not conceived in terms of the "local", but as the site actualized out of a complex number of connective potential processes'.[187] Contestation over the construction of spaces and scales of globalization has been crucial for agency debates; apprehended within a singular ontology, mono-scalar determination 'treats the differences at that scale as the fundamental line of political cleavage'.[188] The challenge is to break out of the control-resistance matrix to which many accounts all too easily default.

Like the elastic term 'global', the definition of scale is also at times elastic and even perhaps indeterminate. Scale may be defined as a socially produced and *provisionally* bounded space metric and material and social representation that differentiates space. It is constructed, contested, produced, contingent and relational. Scale has been represented as size, level, relation, network, site, assemblage and lived experience.[189] It can also be characterized as an abstraction, material vantage point, sociopolitical construction, dimension of experience, methodological tool, epistemological ordering frame and 'a diverse array of material and representational practices'.[190] Scale is a 'way of framing conceptions of reality'[191] and a representational trope; it is 'a way of framing political-spatiality that in turn has material effects'.[192] We recall that causality need not result in determination. Even if scales are 'intuitive fictions',[193] they can be powerful heuristic abstractions in the same way time zones are and make a whole host of activities possible as they are operationalized as constructs. In this way, scale could also be fruitfully conceptualized as a contingent yet stable quantum holographic projection held by numbers of people and instantiated in practices.

Since the 2000s there has been diverse scale research and attempts to better theorize scale. There has been at once an enlargement of scale thinking and linkages, as well as a seizing up of the debate in the proposal to do away with scale in response to what has been described as the scale 'fetishist juggernaut'.[194] These contributions have capped increasingly sophisticated debate on scale and space from work by a whole host of geographers and other social scientists, which has included, for example, the political-economic role of spatio-temporal fixes in displacing and deferring capitalist contradictions and conflicts.[195] It is not my aim here to offer a comprehensive overview on the scale literature, but rather to focus on the ontological turn within the scale debate.[196] I suggest that this debate is of more than esoteric significance for the rest of the social sciences and has theoretical relevance particularly to the articulation of globalization alternatives.

To selectively illustrate the range of scale research; earlier within this period, from the early 1990s, Neil Smith's linking of the body with the urban and national

scale in his work on homelessness and global processes drew attention to the social and cultural elements attendant with research on the home and the body.[197] Around the middle of this period, Sallie Marston focused on the household and drew attention to social production and consumption, not just production.[198] The debate about scale in 2001 between Brenner and Marston and Smith, including ensuing responses is of particular interest.[199] By 2005, and partly in response, Marston et al. had developed this debate in a new direction.

The ontological turn in the scale debate

The challenge by Marston et al. in 2005 represents an explicit ontological turn in the scale debate, with questions of agency and globalization intimately connected.[200] The authors questioned the ontological status of the global and what they perceive as the shortcomings of globalization's existing spatial ontologies, in which they find what they consider the pre-determination of both horizontal and vertical hierarchies problematic. For them, established conceptions of geographical scale are trapped in ontological verticality and foundational hierarchy. Conceptually pre-given scale approaches then become a case of form determining content. They considered deeply problematic what they saw as the privileging of scale over other spatialities (such as place and network) or, since the mid-1990s by their reckoning, as some sort of spatial master concept, and argued that it trapped scholars into representing causality as top-down, either explicitly or implicitly smuggling in the notion that hierarchical power is inevitable.

To address this, Marston et al. proposed the discarding of both the scalar and network imaginaries that are attended by a 'centering essentialism that infuses not only the up-down vertical imaginary but also the radiating (out from here) spatiality of horizontality'.[201] The authors proposed to supplant what they see as a hierarchical scale model with a flat ontology of sites catering for 'complex, emergent spatial relations'.[202] Indeed, this flat ontology is at least linguistically informed by social physics: 'Manipulating a term from topology and physics, these consist of localized and non-localized event-relations productive of event-spaces that avoid the predetermination of hierarchies or boundlessness'.[203] The authors drew upon Schatzki's 'site ontology', which defines the site, they argue, in a way that also incorporates contingency and possibility in our ideas about space and are more amenable to conceptualizing a 'processual bricolage' of change: 'A site is a creature of a different sort from a clearing, a space of possibility, a plenum, or a bounded domain. A site is a context, some or all of whose inhabitants are inherently a part of it'.[204]

The limitations of scale concepts also have agential implications; Marston et al. are concerned that a vertical ontology delimits political entry points 'by preassigning it to a cordoned register for resistance':

> hierarchical scale (de)limits practical agency as a necessary outcome of its organization . . . Invariably, social practice takes a lower rung on the hierarchy, while 'broader forces', such as the juggernaut of globalization, are

> assigned a greater degree of social and territorial significance. Such globe talk plays into the hands of neoliberal commentators . . . [and] managers, who when submitting to interviews about outsourcing, are likewise eager to appropriate 'globalization' in relieving them and their corporation of social responsibility.
>
> (Marston et al.)[205]

Critics charged that the critical scale debate had already moved on from the past practice of according the 'global' more causal force and emphasized the production of the global through local and transnational processes. Scale-centrism, when framed as the main organizing spatial ordering principle, has also been critiqued by a number of geographers, including Brenner, Latham and Leitner and Sheppard.[206] As Leitner and Miller point out, many authors had already repudiated the notion of a top-down hierarchy in the operation of scales of power, and of the assumption that the global frames and the local accommodates.[207]

With respect to the perceived limitations of the global-local scale imaginary, these have been subject to much debate and nuanced qualification that is already incorporating elements of the ontological shift. In addition to its established status in geography as an important concept, scale is used colloquially as a descriptor within everyday experience. It is actively constructed both materially and discursively on a daily basis. In agents' own conceptions, when practicing politics people tend to imagine and expressly identify a discrete bounded space and invoke a shared notion of its characteristics.[208] It is thus important to be mindful that scalar articulations are made from everyday practice that cannot simply be legislated away. This debate has however certainly generated interesting questions, and more fluid, flexible, and multi-faceted spatial imaginaries and conceptions of scale may be the result.

Polymorphic spatialities: a survey of new spatial imaginaries

> Within the fractal complexities of actual geography the map can see only dimensional grids. Hidden enfolded immensities escape the measuring rod.
>
> (Hakim Bey)[209]

Conceptualizing parallel, multiple and imbricated spaces – what I have described as the infrageographical – involves developing a propositional 'spatial grammar', in Neil Smith's phrase, of grassroots globalization.[210] This involves conceptions of space that are better able to accommodate complexities and contradictions, are agentially centred and political progressive, and are engaged with justice and represent the bulk of realities rather than representing an ideology as a socio-spatial totality. A number of promising spatial imaginaries have recently been offered. Jessop et al. have made a promising and propositional attempt to move out of the theoretical quagmire emerging around scale and expressly sought to reframe the debate on theorizing socio-spatial relations, understood as polymorphic and multidimensional.[211]

In an approach reminiscent of the complementarity principle whereby the privileging of scale precludes or dulls other heuristics, Jessop et al. have questioned the privileging of any single dimension as prohibiting in its methodological limitations. Their stated challenge was to overcome a methodological one-dimensional fallacy that involves the one-sided privileging of one, albeit important, category which reductively subsumes all socio-spatial processes and relation within its limited rubric. The aim was to explore the co-constitutive relations between the categories rather than what they see as the 'one-dimensionalism' of simply fine-tuning one category as much past debate has apparently done.[212] The authors suggested that monodimensional place-, territorial-, network- or scale-centrism may have served to prohibit social theory from developing more rigorous, thick-descriptive research frameworks and strategies.

To this end, Jessop et al. have made the case for polymorphy with a recognition of the multiplicity of socio-spatial relations, suggesting as a provisional heuristic framework four key spatial dimensions in a polymorphic analytical ensemble: territories (T), places (P), scales (S) and networks (N), or TPSN. The TPSN heuristic framework may be deployed as 'strategic selective . . . ensembles',[213] combining different dimensions to approach a 'thicker' analysis.[214] The authors are also concerned to advance geographical and social scientific research 'in a manner that permits researchers to explore more precisely their differential weighting and articulation in a given spatio-temporal context'.[215] This is not a panacea for one-dimensionalism, they suggest, but simply a start.

Quantum state 'in-betweenness' is also reflected in the more established social scientific term 'liminality'. Etymologically from the Latin word *līmen*, meaning 'a threshold', liminality has been cited in recent literature to denote a subjective psychological, neurological or metaphysical conscious state of being on the 'threshold' of or between two different existential planes. As enunciated by Turner – drawing on a concept introduced in 1909 – it is a concept to describe in-between spaces and transitory states where one frame of reference has been left behind and a new frame has not entirely emerged.[216] The liminal state is characterized by ambiguity, openness and indeterminacy, the very state of Schrödinger's cat. (Recalling the quantum state of Schrödinger's cat, Thrift has stated, 'we now live in almost/ not yet world'.[217] Complexity and quantum theories, Thrift asserts, can contribute to a 'reframing of space-time, as a series of possible worlds . . . It is remarkable how little attention has been given to these kinds of cultural imaginings by social scientists'.)[218] That the concept has gained traction is reflective, I suggest, of the ontological shift: it is a recognition that major transformations often occur at crossroads and other liminal places, at least partly because liminality, being less fixed and stable, can pave the way for access to esoteric knowledge or understanding of both sides.

As broached in Chapter 3, 'third space' describes interstitial space between activism and the academy, a space in which an individual exists between the day-to-day and other worlds.[219] It is envisioned by some as a provisional and more fluid space that allows researchers to move between the two worlds of their research and their activism, to produce a collaborative, participatory, transformative

space of hybridity.[220] According to Khan, third space is a 'politicized, creative, in-between, fluid space'.[221] As well as bridging the 'two worlds' of a researcher, it can also provide an opportunity to bridge North and South, a topic taken up by Appadurai.[222] Similarly, Lavie and Swedenburg conceptualize a 'third timespace' to describe the experience of migrants.[223]

Martin Jones calls for phase space as an ensemble ontology within a relational turn in which a more 'open-ended, mobile, networked and actor-centred geographic becoming' is advocated.[224] Jones's 'phase space' approach draws from Prigogine and Stengers's theory of ensembles and notably incorporates potentiality: it 'encompasses current spacetime (instances of the actual) and imaginative or mental spacetimes of the future'.[225] It is a conception of space that contains alternative scenarios in different contingent circumstances, or a space 'of the possible' to use Cohen and Stewart's characterization.[226] Phase spatiality may be applied to regionalism as rounds of region-building (Paasi), for example, or as a series of successive 'phase portraits' (Stewart).[227] This chimes with related notions of 'rounds of accumulation' (Massey) and 'layered human occupancy' (Johnston), which incorporates temporal depth into deployed ideas about spacetime.[228]

In a similar vein, Whatmore employs the descriptor 'wormholes', spatio-temporal tunnels between the past and the present and the distant and the local. Luke employs the term 'multitorialities' to describe complex, flexible and discontinuous territories, in distinction to 'monotorialities'.[229] Chettiparamb has argued for the use of fractals in theorizing sociospatial relations and points out that scale is not metaphorical in fractals.[230] While scale continues to generate debate and deployment, the flattening of the spatial register is an ongoing project, which includes the exploration of sites and assemblages. Simon Springer advocates an 'anarchist flat ontology' for its 'ability to embrace the rhizomic notion of a processual politics that is conceived through its actual practice' and for 'the potential that exists within a flat ontology of immediacy wherein social structures, power relations, and hierarchies become identifiable, accessible and ultimately transformable'.[231] Saul Newman has also put forward a post-anarchist conception of political space as 'a space of becoming'.[232]

These heuristics are promising, and the production of more autonomous, self-legislated spaces is especially important in the wake of reterritorialization of the world along corporatist lines, involving everything from land grabs to environmental degradation. Epistemological questions and ontology matters to propositional politics: I assert that a pluralistic socio-spatial ontology directly informs and shapes a pluralistic progressive politics. These spatio-temporal conceptualizations recall the Zapatista's poetic injunction to 'make a world where there is room for all worlds'.[233]

Conclusion

Globalization has at once resulted in and reflected both a set of epistemological as well as empirical shifts. Yet much of both conventional corporate and critical social theory approaches to globalization have shared the same subsumptive onto-epistemology. In

this chapter I have sought to make a distinction between methodological multiplicity within a singular monistic ontology and within a plural ontology. I have sought to show that a transformative research and practice agenda for globalization can be influenced by schools of thought as varied as quantum mechanics and pre- and post-classical cosmologies, and that conceptual revolutions bear importantly on agency and globalization, turning worlds 'upside down' – and inside out.

This chapter has extended the agential concerns of Chapter 3, arguing that ontological debates about space, agency and globalization are important and that examining underpinning philosophies and alternative theoretical frameworks can alert us to different ways of seeing, knowing and being in the world. These have practical consequences and impact upon process, protocol and context, and may yield distinctive insights and suggest creative political strategies to be generated within a repertoire of propositional politics. In recognizing theory *as* practice, this chapter has also aimed to show that reconceptualizing globalization helps remake it and in this way, the propositional politics of infraglobalization can be elevated from subtext to superposed reality in its own right. In other words, infra-globalization is advanced here as a propositional politics of the otherwise which is accorded full ontological weight.

I have also sought to sketch some of the key spatial dimensions and implications of a plural ontology, one that can accommodate for the informal, the disguised, the hidden, often undeclared, everyday, multiple, sometimes deliberately (sometimes unintended) illegible infrageographical agency and processes. Thinking and seeing propositionally is to recognize the existence of multiplicity and to embrace an experimental spirit rather than the safety of singular certitude; to recognize multiplicity is to enlarge rather than fracture the world.

In endeavouring to represent a fuller spectrum of reality than narrow corporatist accounts, I argue that spaces of global justice and alternatives need to *do* justice to representing sub rosa infraglobalization. To this end, I have here sketched a contribution towards an ontological conception of infrageographies of globalization that incorporates and gives due recognition to probability and indeterminacy as important variables of multiple realities, and seeks to move beyond ontological singularity and methodological monoculture. This contributes towards reframing the globalization debate, away from a control ontology and towards a cooperative, participatory ontology befitting a more cooperative, participatory progressive politics, one enactment of which we now consider.

Notes

1 Translated by Coleridge and inserted into the preface to his 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'. It is also cited in a different translation in C. Gregory Knight, 'Geography's worlds' in Abler, Marcus and Olson (Eds.), *Geography's Inner Worlds: Pervasive Themes in Contemporary American Geography* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 10: 'I readily believe that there are more invisible Natures in the universe than visible ones. Yet who shall explain to us this numerous company, their grades, their relationships, their distinguishing features and the functions of each of them? What should they do? What places do they inhabit?'.

2 Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America* (New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), p. 377.
3 Robert W. Cox with Timothy Sinclair, 'Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 144. Notably, Cox goes on to say 'I choose "global politics" deliberately to avoid certain ontological presuppositions inherent in other terms such as "international relations", which seems to equate nation with state and to define the field as limited to the interactions among states'.
4 Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 12.
5 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 'Cosmological perspectivism in Amazonia and elsewhere', lecture delivered 10 March 1998 at Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, accessed at <http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/masterclass/article/view/106/134>.
6 I take the Scientific Revolution to cover from about the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries, bookended with major publications by Copernicus (1473–1543) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727), namely Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* (1543) and Newton's *Principia* (1687) and *Opticks* (1704).
7 Ash Amin, 'Placing globalization', *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 14 (2), 1997, p. 130.
8 As an alternative, Helen Longino has come up with the notion of 'local epistemologies'. See Helen Longino, *The Fate of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
9 Ontological politics is a composite term coined by John Law in *Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002) and developed by Annemarie Mol in 'Ontological politics: a word and some questions', *Sociological Review*, Vol. 46 (S), 1998, pp. 74–89.
10 Annemarie Mol, 'Ontological politics: a word and some questions', p. 74.
11 Tim Ingold, 'Rethinking the animate, re-animating thought', *Ethnos*, Vol. 71 (1), March 2006, p. 15.
12 Tim Ingold, 'Rethinking the animate, re-animating thought', p. 17.
13 William Blake, 'Letter to Thomas Butts, 22 November 1802', quoted in Geoffrey Keynes (ed.), *The Letters of William Blake* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 79. Available on the Internet Archive <https://archive.org/details/lettersofwilliam002199mbp>.
14 Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, 'Introduction' and M. Kurki, 'Critical realism and the analysis of democratisation: does philosophy of science matter' and in Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 2 and 129.
15 Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge [1984] 1992), pp. 2 and 35; Antony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (Cambridge: Polity, [1976] 1993).
16 See the works of Roy Bhaskar especially, as well as Andrew Sayer. Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 2nd ed (London: Verso [1975] 1997); *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*, 3rd ed (London: Routledge [1979] 2005); Andrew Sayer, *Method in Social Science* and *Realism and Social Science* (London: Sage, 2000). For Scientific Realism see, for example, Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2010).

17 Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, 'Introduction' in Joseph and Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, pp. 9–10. As Wight and Joseph note, Bhaskar has identified this transposition of epistemological into ontological arguments as an 'epistemic fallacy'. See Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 2nd ed (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 36–8.

18 Steve Smith, 'The self-images of a discipline: a genealogy of international relations theory', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 1–37.

19 Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, 'Introduction', p. 12. Wight and Joseph aver that 'IR theories underpinned by positivism – realism, neo-realism, neoliberal institutionalism, interdependence theory and so on – exhibit a shallow, surface or flat ontology that operates at the level of events without examining underlying causes. By focusing on the constant conjunctions of these events, or empirical regularities, mainstream theories of IR reduce ontology to behaviour and its outcomes, or conflate reality itself with their own theories of law-like regularities' (p. 18).

20 Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, 'Introduction', p. 9.

21 B. C. Thomason, *Making Sense of Reification: Alfred Schultz and Constructionist Theory* (Atlantic Highlands: New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1982), p. 168. Structuralism can circumscribe its results; theory can function *as* practice. Structural or disciplinary framing is important yet can be circular. As Burke puts it: 'The theory of the structure dictates what "facts" shall be, and all values and assessments of results are internal to the structure. Since theory "creates" facts, and facts prove the theory, the argument of science is circular'. James Burke, *The Day the Universe Changed* (Boston: Back Bay Books [1985] 1995), p. 336.

22 James C. Scott, *Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity and Meaningful Work and Play* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 114–15. See especially Chapter 5 for an argument against standardized tests.

23 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the Social', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 33 (3), 2005, pp. 393–4. Law and Urry are among those social scientists who explore the possibilities of a shift toward, and a need to imagine, a more 'fluid and decentered' social science. They have found tools for accounting for complex and non-linear relationships developed within the 'new science' (they cite chaos and complexity theory), yet they find that they have as yet only 'falteringly' been applied in social science. Law and Urry, 'Enacting the Social', p. 400.

24 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the Social', p. 396. For Law and Urry research methods are performative in that 'they have effects; they make differences; they enact realities; and they help bring into being what they also discover'. (p. 393). This approach acknowledges that methods can produce outcomes that are performed into being (pp. 393–6).

25 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Author's response to Roger Lee, Andrew Leyshon and J. K. Gibson-Graham, classics in human geography revisited: the end of capitalism (as we knew it)', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 34 (1), 2010, p. 123.

26 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 396, 398.

27 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 399.

28 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 399.

29 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 403. 'The social sciences need to re-imagine themselves, their methods, and their 'worlds' if they are to work productively in the twenty-first century where social relations appear increasingly complex, elusive, ephemeral and unpredictable' (p. 390).

30 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 397.
31 Wes Nisker, *Crazy Wisdom* (New York: Ten Speed Press, 1990), p. 143.
32 Stephen Healy, 'Epistemological pluralism and the politics of choice', *Futures*, Vol. 35, September 2003, p. 694.
33 Roger Lee, 'Radical and postmodern? Power, social relations and regimes of truth in the social construction of alternative economic geographies', *Environment and Planning D*, Vol. 32, 2000, p. 993.
34 Annemarie Mol, 'Ontological politics: a word and some questions', p. 76.
35 Annemarie Mol, 'Ontological politics: a word and some questions', p. 85.
36 Neil Brenner, 'Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's geographies of globalization', *Public Culture*, Vol. 2, 1997, p. 159.
37 Deborah P. Dixon, Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones III, 'On the other hand . . . dialectics', *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 40 (11), 2008, p. 2550.
38 As a philosophical concept, rhizome is developed in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between arborescent and rhizomatic thought; the 'arborescent' denotes a one-directional tree-like vertical ontology of binary thinking and totalizing principles. This is in contradistinction to the 'rhizome', which is characterized by a horizontal ontology and non-hierarchical patterns of association.
39 Doreen Massey, 'Space-Time, "Science" and the Relationship between Physical Geography and Human Geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 24 (3), 1999, p. 262.
40 Stephen Healy, 'Epistemological pluralism and the politics of choice', *Futures*, Vol. 35 (2003), p. 694.
41 In International Relations, see for example Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2010), especially his appeal for greater pluralism in the conclusion. In Human Geography, Barnes and Sheppard's appraisal of economic geography, for example, produces a distinction between fragmented, Balkanized pluralism and more 'critically engaged' pluralism: Trevor Barnes and Eric Sheppard, '"Nothing includes everything": towards engaged pluralism in Anglophone economic geography', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 32 (2), 2010, pp. 192–214. See also Paul Plummer and Eric Sheppard, 'Geography matters: agency, structures and dynamics at the intersection of economics and geography', *Journal of Economic Geography*, Vol. 6, 5 November 2006, pp. 619–37.
42 On non-substantialist ontology, see for example Laura Zanotti, 'Governmentality, ontology, methodology, re-thinking political agency in the global world', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 38 (4), November 2013, pp. 288–304. Dimitri Papadopoulis sketches an 'alter-ontological politics' to 'create different forms of knowledge production that act as constituent forces of political change: forces aiming to craft alternative regions of objectivity' (p. 178). See 'Alter-ontologies: towards a constituent politics in technoscience', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 41 (2), 2010, pp. 177–201. See also Nigel Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory* (London: Routledge, 2008), in which Thrift describes non-representational theories as a 'radically empiricist' practice theory (pp. 5, 8).
43 Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, [1933] 1967), p. 197.
44 William Peterman, 'Response to commentaries', *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 47 (2), 1995, p. 222.

45 Peter Russell, *The Global Brain: The Awakening Earth in a New Century*, 3rd ed (Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2008), p. 118.

46 In the 'General Scholium' of his *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1686/87), Newton wrote: 'it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular motions . . . This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One'. *Newton's Principia: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, trans. Andrew Motte (1729), Vol. 2, book III (New York: Daniel Adee, 1846), p. 504, digitized at <https://archive.org/details/newtonspmathema00newtrich>.

47 William Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography: what can Dr. Bertlmann teach us?', *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 46 (1), February 1994, p. 8.

48 Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science is a thriving field; for but a sample see Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* (op. cit.); Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).

49 Maria Mies identifies three colonies of capital: women, the Third World and nature. These 'colonies' are quite often intertwined as can be seen with biopiracy in India, in which the advocacy of women like Vandana Shiva is prominent. It can also be seen in the way feminine and Indigenous pharmacologies and botanical knowledge were appropriated by western colonizers. See Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, *The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalized Economy* (London: Zed Books, 1999) and Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986).

50 See Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography* (op. cit.) and *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

51 This is put forward in Richard Tarnas's *The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that have Shaped our Worldview* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993); see especially the Epilogue. The ontological shift toward greater multiplicity has certainly been informed by feminist approaches. Gender is pertinent both as subject and as an epistemological dimension to post-positivist and poststructuralist framings of globalization. Like Tarnas, Harding concludes that the 'epistemological crisis of the West is actually also the epistemological crisis of masculinity'. See Sandra Harding, 'Postcolonial and feminist philosophies of science and technology: convergences and dissonances', *Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 12 (4), December 2009, p. 411.

52 G. Pratt and V. Rosner, 'Introduction: the intimate and the global', *Women's Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, 2006, pp. 13–24.

53 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 321. Descartes famously wrote: 'Those who seek the road to truth should not bother with any object of which they cannot have a certainty equal to the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry'. René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of Mind*, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica, [1701] 1971).

54 Walter Weisskopf, 'The method is the ideology: from a Newtonian to a Heisenbergian paradigm in economics', *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 13 (4), December 1979, p. 870.

55 Walter Weisskopf, 'The method is the ideology', p. 870.

56 R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 129.

57 'Paradigm' is understood here as a framework of assumptions, research findings and working practices accepted by scholarly consensus as 'normal', a term Thomas Kuhn used to denote an era of accepted knowledge rather than knowledge being progressive or cumulative. What is normal in one epistemic era is not necessarily so in another. Moreover, Western methods relying upon observation rather than experience have tended to produce informative rather than transformative knowledge. For Kuhn, science cannot provide a method or universally applicable explanation of reality that is valid for all time. One 'truth' (paradigm) is eventually superseded by another. Science is the artefact of each structure. See *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

58 Robert Markley, *Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 1660–1740* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 259.

59 Within this determinism rubric, I would also include the social scientific concept of over-determination, which has also served, as James C. Scott suggests, to diminish the contingency of human affairs: 'A historical event or state of affairs simply *is* the way it is, often appearing determined and necessary when in fact it might easily have turned out otherwise. Even a probabilistic social science, however careful it may be about establishing ranges of outcomes, is apt to treat these probabilities, for the sake of analysis, as solid facts'. Scott, *Seeing Like A State*, p. 344.

60 John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the social', p. 403. On the question of performativity see also Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997) and Bruno Latour, 'Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 30, 2004, pp. 225–48. In relation to performativity and the economy see Timothy Mitchell, 'The work of economics: how a discipline makes its world', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 46, 2005, pp. 297–320, and 'Rethinking economy', *Geoforum*, Vol. 39, 2008, pp. 1116–21. See also M. Callon, 'What does it mean to say that economics is performative?' in D. Mackenzie, F. Muniesa and L. Sui (Eds.), *Do Economists Make Markets? On the Perfomativity of Economics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 311–57.

61 William Bennet Munro, 'Physics and politics – an old analogy revisited', Presidential Address, American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington, DC, 28 December 1927, reprinted as Chapter 1 in Theodore L. Becker (Ed.), *Quantum Politics: Applying Quantum Theory to Political Phenomena* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

62 William Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography', p. 3.

63 As a survey, these include 'dissipative structures' (Prigonine), chaos theory (Lorenz et al.), non-locality (Bell), the ecology of mind (Gregory Bateson) and the participatory universe (Wheeler). I attach the qualification that chaos theory may not necessarily qualify to be part of this 'new science' suite since, as William Peterman states, 'chaos equations are second order differential equations and are fully deterministic'. William Peterman, *Pers. comm.*, 17 June 2011. On the use of quantum metaphors in International Relations see Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis, 'The quantum politics metaphor in international relations: revising "American Newtonianism"', PhD thesis, University of Kent (UK, July 2002).

64 This refers to the publishing hoax by physicist Alan Sokal in 1996, who submitted an article to a journal of postmodern cultural studies, *Social Text* for their special 'Science

wars' issue. Despite misgivings, the editors published it, before Sokal subsequently revealed it to be a hoax in the journal *Lingua Franca*. See Alan Sokal, 'Transgressing the boundaries: towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity', *Social Text*, Vol. 46/47, Spring–Summer 1996; 'A physicist experiments with cultural studies', *Lingua Franca*, May 1996, both accessed at Alan Sokal's homepage at <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/index.html>. See also Stephen Hilgartner, 'The Sokal affair in context', *Science, Technology and Human Values*, Vol. 22 (4), Autumn 1997, pp. 506–22; and Mara Beller, 'The Sokal hoax: at whom are we laughing?', online commentary, n.d., <http://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/BohmHome/sokalhoax.html>.

65 Lest physical science forget its 'superstitious' origins, neurophysiology developed from phrenology, astronomy from astrology, and chemistry from alchemy. Conversely, the religious roots of social theory can be seen in such concepts as just war theory and subsidiarity, both with roots in Christian theology. Another example comes in modern dialectics which emerged in medieval France from religious study, with Pierre Abelard and others seeking to apply the new dialectic technique striving to synthesize contradictory elements in the Bible. Perhaps most interesting of all are the mystical and occult inclinations of Isaac Newton, regarded as the quintessential scientist. After economist John Maynard Keynes successfully bid for an auction lot of Newton's non-scientific papers and read them, he memorably declared in an address to the Royal Society Club in 1942 that 'Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians'. See *The Wall Street Journal Bookshelf*, 19 February 1998, p. A20. I thank Dean Cutting for pointing me to this reference.

66 See Richard Rhodes in *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon and Schuster, [1986] 2012). In one passage Rhodes draws a direct parallel between Bohr and Kierkegaard's thought (p. 76): 'The separate, distinct electron orbits that Bohr called stationary states recall Kierkegaard's stages. They also recall Bohr's attempt to redefine the problem of free will by invoking separate, distinct Riemann surfaces. And, as Kierkegaard's stages are discontinuous, negotiable only by leaps of faith, so do Bohr's electrons leap discontinuously from orbit to orbit'. It is also notable that that Wolfgang Pauli was interested in Jungian psychology and contemporary physicist Fred Alan Wolf is interested in shamanism, for example. Parts of ancient, folkloric and indigenous knowledge, often considered sites of superstition by Newtonian science, are arguably coming into greater convergence with the New Science. See, for example, Fred Alan Wolf, *The Eagle's Quest: A Physicist's Search for Truth in the Heart of the Shamanic World* (New York: Touchstone, 1991); Wolfgang Pauli and Carl G. Jung, edited by C.A. Meier, *Atom and Archetype, The Pauli/Jung Letters, 1932–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Lindorff, *Pauli and Jung: The Meeting of Two Great Minds* (Wheaton: Quest Books, 1994). For C. P. Snow, see *The Two Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1959] 1998).

67 Gould supported the claim 'that the theory of natural selection is, in essence, Adam Smith's economics transferred to nature'. Stephen Jay Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/ Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 122.

68 David Bohm and Jiddu Krishnamurti, 'Questioning Krishnamurti: Conversation 1550', Brockwood Park, England, 11 June 1983, <http://www.jkrishnamurti.org/krishnamurti-teachings/>.

69 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *The Monadology*, 1714, accessed at Early Modern Texts, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf>. See Louis-Auguste Blanqui's

combinatorial multiverse in *Eternity by the Stars: An Astronomical Hypothesis* trans. Frank Chouraqui (New York: Contra Mundum Press (1872) 2013). See Jorge Luis Borges, *The Garden of Forking Paths* (Internet Archive, 1941), <https://archive.org/details/TamstergJorgeLuisBorges-TheGardenofForkingPaths>. Physicist and novelist Andrew Cramey has a survey of the idea of the multiverse in literature, to which I would add the work of Olaf Stapledon, which predated the 'golden era' of 1950s science fiction and Everett's 'many worlds', especially *Star Maker* (London: Victor Gollancz, [1937] 2004). Cramey notably cites physicist Seth Lloyd meeting Borges and asking him about how his novel so uncannily predicted Everett's work. Lloyd reports Borges as responding that no, he 'had not been influenced by work on quantum mechanics, [but] he was not surprised that the laws of physics mirrored ideas from literature. After all, physicists were readers too'. See Seth Lloyd, *Programming the Universe: A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos* (New York: Vintage, 2006), cited in Andrew Cramey, 'Quantum suicide: Walter Benjamin and the multiverse', talk given at 'Literature and mathematics: figures, topoi and transferences across the disciplines', Aberdeen University Centre for Modern Thought, 11 June 2010.

70 William Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography', pp. 1 and 5. Peterman notes that the development of the French school was contemporaneous with quantum theory in the first quarter of the last century and waded in the same pool of philosophical ideas of the time. In French geography, the notion of possibilism stands in contrast to the more deterministic bent of other schools.

71 This metaphysical reality constraint is also known as the causal completeness of physics (CCP) and the closure of physics (CoP). There are both strong and weak construals of this metaphysical principle of physicalism, which states very basically that all physical effects have physical causes. For a discussion see David Spurrett and David Papineau, 'A note on the completeness of "physics"', *Analysis*, Vol. 59, 1999, pp. 25–9 and Augustin Vicente, 'On the causal completeness of physics', *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 20, 2006, pp. 149–71; Robert C. Bishop, 'The hidden premise in the causal argument for physicalism', *Analysis*, January 2006, Vol. 66 (1), p. 44–52. One objection to the closure element of the principle is raised by Spurrett and Papineau (p. 25): 'If we tie the meaning of "physics" to any specific details of present physical theory then it seems unlikely that physics is complete. A short glance at the history of science reveals that proposed lists of fundamental forces and basic entities usually turn out to be wrong . . . it seems that [advocates] need to say something more about the shape of ideal or future physics, lest their thesis of the completeness of physics lose all substantial content'. For a critical reflection on the CCP see Massimo Pigliucci, a biologist and philosopher who subscribes to a naturalist ontology which he distinguishes from an entirely physicalist position: see 'On the causal completeness of physics', *Rationally Speaking weblog*, 27 February 2013, <http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com.au/2013/02/on-causal-completeness-of-physics-part-i.html>.

72 In a 1948 paper, Eric Voegelin defined scientism as 'the scientistic creed which is characterized by three principal dogmas: (1) the assumption that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which all other sciences ought to conform; (2) that all realms of being are accessible to the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all reality which is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary'. Eric Voegelin, 'The origins of scientism', *Social Research*, Vol. 15 (4), 1948, p. 462.

73 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015), pp. 13 and 18. Please note pagination may vary in the final published version and cited pages refer to a pre-publication draft.
74 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, Part I.
75 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 51.
76 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 30.
77 Cf. later formulations after the introduction of the idea of decoherence, such as H. Dieter Zeh, who asserted there were no 'quantum jumps' nor particles and sought to explain their apparent appearance as such through his development of decoherence. See Dieter H. Zeh, 'There are no quantum jumps, nor are there particles!', *Physics Letters A*, Vol. 172.4, 1993, pp. 189–92, <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/zeh/No_Quantum_Jumps.pdf>.
78 While the Copenhagen Interpretation has held sway for the middle and latter part of the twentieth century, this is likely no longer the case, but, like the quantum measurement problem, may depend which survey one uses! A number of recent surveys have been conducted at conferences to ascertain to which interpretation of quantum theory practitioners subscribe. Due to the very different results produced from conference to conference, there is some conjecture that these surveys are only nominally indicative, and reflect the particularities of a single conference rather than accurately representing the field. A survey of one conference in Austria in 2010 produced an apparent preference for the Copenhagen interpretation (42 per cent), with none choosing the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation. Other quantum physicists at a conference in Germany in 2012 (with results published 2013), however, largely chose the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation (63 per cent) over the Copenhagen one (only 4 per cent). In order of survey see Maximilian Schlosshauer, Johannes Kofler and Anton Zeilinger, 'A snapshot of foundational attitudes toward quantum mechanics', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, Vol. 44 (3), 2013, pp. 222–30; C. Sommer, 'Another survey of foundational attitudes towards quantum mechanics', *arXiv:1303.2719*, March 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.2719; and Travis Norsen and Sarah Nelson, 'Yet another snapshot of foundational attitudes toward quantum mechanics', *arXiv:1306.4646*, June 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4646. See also Max Tegmark, 'The interpretation of quantum mechanics: many worlds or many words?', *Fortschritte der Physik*, Vol. 46 (6–8), 1998, pp. 855–62.
79 Alexander Wendt, 'Social theory as Cartesian science: an auto-critique from a quantum perspective' in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (Eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 195. Hereafter this chapter is referred by its short title 'Auto-critique'.
80 Bernard Haisch, 'Quantum mechanics and consciousness: a new measurement', Society for Scientific Explorations (SSE) Talks, 29 July 2009, <http://www.scientificexploration.org/talks/27th_annual/27th_annual_haisch_quantum_mechanics_consciousncon.html>.
81 Jill North, 'The structure of a quantum world' in David Albert and Alyssa Ney (Eds.), *The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 184–202. North argues for a wave function space realism in which its space is the fundamental physical space from which the three-dimensional space of human experience emerges.
82 David Bohm, 'A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden variables"', *Physical Review*, 1952, Vol. 85, pp. 166–79.

83 To my lay understanding, decoherence is more formally defined as the appearance of a wave function collapse in which a quantum system interacts with its classical environment in a thermodynamically irreversible way (the arrow of time) and in such a way that no interference between states of the system can be observed – individual particles, for example, are not, in human observation, actually seen as superpositions of particles in different states. See Maximilian Schlosshauer, 'Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics', *Review of Modern Physics*, Vol. 76, 2004, pp. 1267–305.

84 Max Tegmark, 'Many lives in many worlds', *Nature*, Vol. 448 (5), 5 July 2007, pp. 23–4. Tegmark points to more recent demonstrations of collapse-free superpositions in systems such as carbon-60 molecules.

85 Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 15.

86 F. Lukermann, 'The "calcul des probabilities" and the ecoles francaise de geographie', *The Canadian Geographer*, Vol. 9, 1965, p. 133.

87 William Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography', p. 7.

88 Tim Ingold, 'Rethinking the animate, re-animating thought', p. 18.

89 See Paul Davies, *Other Worlds* (London: Abacus, 1982); Roger Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Fred Alan Wolf, *Taking the Quantum Leap* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989); Hugh Everett, '"Relative state" formulation of quantum mechanics', *Reviews of Modern Physics*, Vol. 29 (3), 1957, pp. 454–65.

90 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 187.

91 Diederik Aerts, 'Interpreting quantum particles as conceptual entities', *International Journal of Theoretical Physics*, Vol. 49, 2010, p. 2953, cited in Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 72.

92 Within Newtonian determinism, we understood that a large change in causes produces a large change in effects: classical action and reaction. In quantum and complexity theory, by contrast, the effects of an apparent localized change can have hugely variable, unpredictable and large consequences. Effects are also often incommensurate with causes: tiny or imperceptible causal triggers may cascade into enormous consequences as chaos theory suggests. The proportionality between causes and effects is not necessary or inevitable, or even uni-directional.

93 Marcus Tullius Cicero, *The Academics of Cicero*, trans. James S. Reid (London: Macmillan, 1880), digitized at <https://archive.org/details/cu31924026475206>.

94 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *The Monadology*, section 57, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf>.

95 G. Esteva and M. S. Prakash, *Grassroots Postmodernism* (London: Zed Books, 1998). See also William James, 'A pluralistic universe', Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy, 1909, <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/j/james/william/plural/>.

96 Oxford Dictionaries definition, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/objective>.

97 Consciousness-based quantum measurement theory assumes that human consciousness is unique among animal species and behaves quite differently from anything else in the universe.

98 Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind*, p. 417.

99 Alastair Rae, *Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality?*, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 67.

100 John Ryan Haule, *Perils of the Soul: Ancient Wisdom and the New Age* (York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1999), p. 79.

101 Psychoanalysis introduces the idea of the unknowing subject, and acknowledges the critical importance of the un- and subconscious in human agency. For Freud, the human mind and ego is only a recent development out of the primordial id and much human experience is determined at the unconscious level. The seat of all human experience is the psyche. As Carl Jung wrote, 'So much is at stake and so much depends on the psychological constitution of modern man . . . Does the individual know that he is the makeweight that tips the scales?' Carl Jung, 'The undiscovered self' in *Collected Works of Carl Gustav Jung*, Vol. 10 cited in Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind*, p. 413. Depth psychology increasingly figures in contemporary social scientific analyses, from housing to gender. Steve Pile views psychoanalysis as 'a kind of humanism', from which the scholar-agent can facilitate 'depth hermeneutics'. See Steve Pile, 'Human agency and human geography revisited: a critique of "new models" of the "self"' in Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory (Eds.), *Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of Inquiry* (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 425–6.

102 See the work of Benjamin Libet in *Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

103 John Ryan Haule, *Perils of the Soul*, pp. 10–11.

104 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 56.

105 David Bohm and Jiddu Krishnamurti, 'Questioning Krishnamurti: Conversation 1550', Brockwood Park, England, 11 June 1983, <http://www.jkrishnamurti.org/krishnamurti-teachings/>.

106 Doreen Massey, 'Space-time, "science" and the relationship between physical geography and human geography', p. 273. I am arguing that classical and one-dimensional approaches in all disciplines have run into trouble. This includes physical scientific forays into social science, such as Wilson's unity-by-reduction consilience notion in which a metaphysical physicalism would explain the whole of human experience through the physical sciences. See Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience* (New York: Knofp, 1998).

107 Immanuel Wallerstein, *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 61–3. The Commission recommended social inquiry be 'based on the dynamics of non-equilibria, with its emphasis on multiple futures, bifurcation and choice, historical dependence and . . . intrinsic and inherent uncertainty'. Panarchy has been used in several contexts. I cite it here in its International Relations and governance usages. See L. H. Gunderson and C. S. Holling (Eds.), *Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002) who define it as 'an antithesis to the word hierarchy (literally, sacred rules). Our view is that panarchy is a framework of nature's rules, hinted at by the name of the Greek god of nature, Pan' (p. 21). For a discussion of panarchy in global governance see John Urry, *Global Complexity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) and Jim Whitman, *The Limits of Global Governance* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 45–64.

108 James Der Derian, 'From war 2.0 to quantum war: the superpositionality of global violence', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 67 (5), 2013, pp. 573–4.

109 See James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Erik Swyngedouw, 'Globalization

or "glocalization"? Networks, territories and rescaling', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17 (1), April 2004, pp. 25–48 and 'Neither global nor local: "glocalization" and the politics of scale' in Kevin Cox (Ed.), *Spaces of Gobalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local* (New York: Guilford Press, 1997).

110 Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography', p. 7. Peterman cites McHarg's environmental analysis method in this regard: see I. McHarg, *Design with Nature* (New York: Doubleday, 1969). Humanist Human Geography, which sought to recover agency and dignity of humans from the positivist passive model of human subjects, in particular accords with key quantum theory precepts, such as radical indeterminacy, the importance of the observer's consciousness and in viewing meaning as context-specific. The humanist geographers sought to re-orient the human subject as central, the producer and product of social life, as intentional, active, self-conscious and reflective. See David Ley and Marwyn Samuels, *Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems* (Chicago: Maaroufa Press, 1978), p. 7. As Ley recognizes, 'the facts of Human Geography cannot be viewed independently of a subject whose concerns confer their meaning, a meaning that directs subsequent action'. D. Ley, 'Behavioural geography and the philosophies of meaning' in G. R. Cox and R. G. Golledge (Eds.), *Behavioural Problems in Geography Revisited* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 214.

111 See Theodore L. Becker (Ed.), *Quantum Politics: Applying Quantum Theory to Political Phenomena* (New York: Praeger, 1991) and Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis, 'The quantum politics metaphor in International Relations'.

112 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 180.

113 See for example Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, 'Of parts and wholes: international relations beyond the human', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, June 2013, Vol. 41 (3), pp.430–50; Cudworth and Hobden, 'More than a metaphor? Complexity in the social sciences', *International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences*, Vol. 4 (4), 1999, pp. 59–70; Neil E. Harrison and David J. Singer, 'Complexity is more than systems theory', in Neil E. Harrison (Ed.), *Complexity in World Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). For a survey of the literature to 2006–7, see Emilian Kavalski, 'The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of international life', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20 (3), 2007, pp. 435–54.

114 Emilian Kavalski, 'The fifth debate', pp. 449–50.

115 In Sociology, see for example Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) and Law and Urry, 'Enacting the social'. In Geography see Eric Sheppard 'Geographic dialectics?', *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 40 (11), 2008, pp. 2603–12; Martin Jones, 'Phase space: geography, relational thinking and beyond', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 33 (4), August 2009, pp. 1–20; Nigel Thrift, 'The place of complexity', *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 16, 1999, pp. 31–70 and *Knowing Capital* (London: Sage, 2005); M. Batty, *Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); J. Phillips, 'Divergence, sensitivity, and non-equilibrium in ecosystems', *Geographical Analysis*, Vol. 36, 2004, pp. 369–83; J. Portugali, 'Complexity theory as a link between space and place', *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 38, 2006, pp. 647–64; J. Stallins, 'Scale, causality, and the new organism-environment interaction', *Geoforum*, Vol. 43, 2012, pp. 427–41.

116 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 'Capital as power: toward a new cosmology of capitalism', *Real-World Economics Review*, no. 61, September 2012, pp. 76–7.

117 See especially the pioneering work of David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History* (Berkeley, CA: UC Press, 2004). See also David Christian, Cynthia Brown, Craig Benjamin, *Big History: Between Nothing and Everything* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2013); Fred Spier, *Big History and the Future of Humanity* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) and the Big History Institute <bighistoryinstitute.org>. See also the 'world-ecological perspective' of Jason W. Moore, who seeks to illuminate how capitalism and globalization are themselves world-ecological projects. See <jasonwmoore.com>.
118 Der Derian, 'From war 2.0 to quantum war', p. 573–4.
119 Der Derian, 'From war 2.0 to quantum war', p. 574.
120 Alexander Wendt, 'Flatland: quantum mind and international system', in Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt (Eds.), *New Systems Theories of World Politics* (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Chapter 11, p. 282.
121 Paavo Pylkkanen, 'Can quantum analogies help us understand the process of thought?' in Gordon Globus, Karl Pribram and Guiseppe Vitiello (Eds.), *Brain and Being: at the Boundary Between Science, Language and Arts* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), p. 185 cited in Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 3.
122 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 211.
123 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 204.
124 Alexander Wendt, 'Flatland', p. 294.
125 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, pp. 74–5.
126 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, pp. 45–8.
127 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 48.
128 Alexander Wendt, 'Flatland', p. 301.
129 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 205.
130 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, pp. 74–5: 'this leads to a distinctive view of social interaction, as measurements by quantum individuals of each other (which might be modeled formally by quantum game theory). These interactions not only collapse shared wave functions into practices, but because the properties of quantum individuals are also indeterminate prior to measurement, they produce well-defined (i.e. classical) agents as well – at least for a moment. It is through interaction, in short, that both agents and social structures are materialized, which makes quantum social ontology ultimately process- rather than an agent- or structure-centric'.
131 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', pp. 195–7.
132 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, pp. 69–70.
133 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, pp. 62–3, p. 82.
134 David Ray Griffin, *Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 97. The idea of plant sentience has also been entertained in Peter Tompkins and Christopher Bird's popular work in the 1970s, *The Secret Life of Plants* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). The book has been regarded as semi- or pseudo-scientific by critics and deals with other topics such as the paranormal and Kirlian photography. See A. W. Galston and C. L. Slayman, 'The not-so-secret life of plants', *American Scientist*, Vol. 67, 1979, pp. 337–44 and K. A. Horowitz, D. C. Lewis, and E. L. Gasteiger, 'Plant primary perception', *Science*, Vol. 189, 1975, pp. 478–80. Yet the idea of plant perception, usually based on polygraph methods used by Cleve Backster, has not been disproven either, and there is some contention about whether perception can be characterized anthropomorphically in terms of thinking and remembering. See Victoria Gill, 'Plants can "think and remember"', *BBC News*, 14 July 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10598926> cf. Ferris Jabr, 'Plants cannot "think

and remember", but there's nothing stupid about them: They're shockingly sophisticated', *Scientific American Blog*, 16 July 2010, <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2010/07/16/plants-cannot-think-and-remember-but-theres-nothing-stupid-about-them-theyre-shockingly-sophisticated/> which both cite more recent experiments conducted at Warsaw University of Life Sciences by Stanislaw Karpinski. See for example S. Karpinski and M. Szechynska-Habda, 'Evidence for light wavelength-specific systemic photoelectrical signalling and cellular light memory in Arabidopsis thaliana', *Acta Biologica Cracoviensia: Series Botanica*, supplement 51 (2), p. 47.

135 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science,* pp. 68–9. This typology is indebted to Wendt's overview of quantum consciousness theory in Chapter 1 of his forthcoming *Quantum Mind and Social Science* (2015). For bottom up approaches cited by Wendt see in particular Stuart Hameroff, 'Biological feasibility of quantum approaches to consciousness' in P. van Loocke (Ed.), *The Physical Nature of Consciousness* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001), pp. 1–61 and Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose, 'Conscious events as orchestrated space–time selections', *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 3 (1), 1996, pp. 36–53. See also Mari Jibu and Kunio Yasue, *Quantum Brain Dynamics and Consciousness* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1995); Guiseppe Vitiello, *My Double Unveiled* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001); Henry Stapp, 'The hard problem: a quantum approach', *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 3 (3), 1996, pp. 194–201.

136 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 70.

137 See Stuart Hameroff, 'Quantum Vitalism', *Advances: The Journal of Mind-Body Health,* Vol. 13 (4), 1997, pp. 13–22.

138 Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, p. 70.

139 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 181.

140 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', pp. 193–4**.**

141 In an experimental but determined spirit, Wendt admits that the quantum consciousness hypothesis 'is a radical, even desperate conjecture, for which there is only the most slender evidence so far' ('Autocritique', p. 215).

142 David Bohm, *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* (London: Routledge, 1980); David Bohm and F. David Peat *Science, Order and Creativity*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, [1987] 2000).

143 The concept of an 'enfolded' space or an 'implicate order' was developed by Bohm and Peat and based on fractal analogy. See references cited above. Peterman even conceives how the discipline can be viewed through this lens, how '(m)odern humanistic geography may be viewed from this perspective as seeking to go beyond that which is explicate in order to uncover that which is implicate or enfolded'. Peterman, 'Quantum theory and geography', p. 7.

144 Gregory S. Engel, Tessa R. Calhoun, Elizabeth L. Read, Tae-Kyu Ahn, Tomá Manal, Yuan-Chung Cheng, Robert E. Blankenship and Graham R. Fleming, 'Evidence for wavelike energy transfer through quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems', *Nature*, Vol. 446, 12 April 2007, pp. 782–6; Mohan Sarovar, Akihito Ishizaki, Graham R. Fleming and K. Birgitta Whaley, 'Quantum entanglement in photosynthetic light-harvesting complexes', *Nature (Physics)*, Vol. 6, 2010, pp. 462–7.

145 Cited in Mark Buchanan, 'Quantum minds: why we think like quarks', *New Scientist*, 5 September 2011. To borrow from an example used in the article, classical logic would not be able to distinguish between the different contexts of the uses of the word 'red fury' from 'red wine', for example. A sapling is a plant, but a tall sapling is not a tall plant; the 'tall' changes meaning by virtue of its relation to the object.

146 David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 99.

147 Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood, *The Reality of Ethnomethodology* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 11–12. Mehan and Wood refer readers to Aron Gurwitsch's 1966 study for a more detailed discussion of the concept at work. See Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

148 Lewis was an advocate of 'modal realism', a thesis of infinite worlds of which our world is but one. See David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) and *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). See also Barney Warf, 'The way it wasn't: alternative histories, contingent geographies' in Rob Kitchin and James Kneale (Eds.), *Lost In Space: Geographies Of Science Fiction* (London: Continuum, 2002).

149 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London: New Left Books, 1970).

150 Ernst Mach, *The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its Development*, 5th ed (London: The Open Court Publishing Co., [1907] 1942), cited in James Burke, *The Day The Universe Changed* (Boston: Back Bay Books [1985] 1995), p. 295. Perhaps ironically, Ernst Mach was a hold-out for positivism and did not think atoms and molecules existed, preferring to rely on sensory perception alone. Mach was influential in the ideas of the 1920s Vienna Circle, which sought to apply a philosophy based on logical positivism.

151 I assert this mindful that a number of physicists, though not nearly all, resent what they see as the social scientific intrusion into 'their' territory via the philosophy and sociology of science, and which has produced some acrimonious debates and a hoax in the aforementioned Sokal Affair, which sought to debunk 'postmodern nonsense'. Yet the physical and social sciences do not exist in silos and have always influenced each other. The vaunted scientific method, effectively launched by Francis Bacon, was itself not produced by a physical scientist per se; Bacon was a philosopher, and a jurist.

152 Susan Griffin, *The Eros of Everyday Life: Essays on Ecology, Gender and Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), p. 39.

153 At its simplest, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis acknowledges that the structure and patterns of language influences thought and behaviour; at its strongest it is associated with linguistic relativity. The work of Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf has had a mixed reception in linguistics. In a representative passage, Sapir argued in 1929: 'Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached . . . We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation'. Edward Sapir, 'The status of linguistics as a science' in Edward Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1929] 1958), p. 69.

154 Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 1–2.

155 Bob Jessop, 'World market, world state, world society: Marxian insights and scientific realist interrogations' in Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, Chapter 11, p. 187.

156 Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*: *Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 374–5.

157 Rob Walker, 'Critical exchange on R. B. J. Walker's after the globe, before the world (2010)', *Contemporary Political Theory*, Vol. 10, 2011, p. 306. In a reflection on his most recent book Walker soberly asserts: 'If the achievements of modernity are indeed predicated on claims about the distinction between man and nature, for example, it is going to be very difficult to sustain these achievements while demanding that modern man simply reunite with some more naturally given world from which he has achieved some kind of autonomy' (p. 305).

158 See Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, especially Chapter 5.

159 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', pp. 213–14. With reference to Donna Haraway's theory of 'situated knowledges' (1988), Sandra Harding's 'strong objectivity' (1991), Keller's 'dynamic objectivity' (1985), and Helen Longino's 'contextual empiricism' (1990), in *Meeting the Universe Halfway* (p. 44), Karen Barad notes that 'feminist science studies scholars in particular staunchly oppose epistemological relativism, with an intensity shared by scientists (a fact that may come as a surprise to scientists and others who have not studied the feminist literature), though few have embraced realist positions. These feminist science scholars are apt to see 'epistemological relativism as the mirror twin of objectivism, and both as attempts to deny the "embodiment of knowledge claims"'. See Donna Haraway, 'Situated knowledges: the science question in feminism as a site of discourse on the privilege of partial perspective', *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 14 (3), pp. 575–99; Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives* (op. cit.); Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Helen Longino, *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

160 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 189, p.195.

161 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 212. Wendt credits Andreas Behnke for this phrase.

162 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 194.

163 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 179.

164 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 210.

165 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 216.

166 Alexander Wendt, 'Auto-critique', p. 213.

167 Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, 'The wrong bin bag: a turn to ontology in science and technology studies', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 43 (3), June 2013, p. 322.

168 This point is made by DeMartino in relation to Gibson-Graham. George DeMartino, 'Ethical economic engagement in a world beyond control', *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol. 25 (4), 2013, p. 490.

169 J. K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse economies: performative practices for "other worlds"', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 32 (5), 2008, p. 620.

170 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 205.

171 Henri Lefebvre, 'Reflections on the politics of space', *Antipode*, Vol. 8 (2), May 1976, p. 31. See also Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge: MA: Blackwell, [1974] 1991).

172 As Plummer and Sheppard note, 'space is taken to be exogenous to the economy, and generally homogeneous, in much the same way that in physics Newton (unlike Leibnitz and Einstein) took space to be an external Cartesian grid'. See also K. Hoover, *The New Classical Macroeconomics: A Skeptical Inquiry* (Oxford: Blackwell 1988) cited by Plummer and Sheppard, 'Geography matters', p. 621.

173 Plummer and Sheppard, for example, seek to explicitly 'consider what it means to conceptualize the capitalist space economy as a complex spatial system'. Plummer and Sheppard, 'Geography matters', p. 619. They continue: 'Furthermore, we must accept the possibility of, and explore the implications of, the proposition that the geographical space economy may be a complex, non-linear system; one in which space is no longer Newtonian and time is an emergent property of the dynamical system rather than an exogenous coordinate system' (p. 625). They then explore the possibilities of this proposition as applied to a quantitative research program in geography, conceptualizing the capitalist space economy not as linear but as a 'structurally complex evolving dynamical system' (ibid.).

174 Philip Kelly, 'The geographies and politics of globalization', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 23 (3), 1999, pp. 381–2.

175 Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 7.

176 Alan Pred, 'Scientists without borders: or moments of insight, spaces of recognition: situated practice, science, and the navigation of urban everyday life' in Henk van Houtum, Oliver Kramsch and Wolfgang Ziefhofer (Eds.), *B/ordering Space* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2005), p. 142.

177 Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 5.

178 That space-time exists not outside of processes but is contained within and contingent to them is one of David Harvey's dialectical propositions in *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996).

179 Esben Holm Nielsen and Kirsten Simonsen, 'Scaling from below: practices, strategies and urban spaces', *European Planning Studies*, Vol. 11 (8), 2003, p. 919.

180 Esben Holm Nielsen and Kirsten Simonsen surmise that this is as a result of the political economy turn, which tilted the scale debate toward a bias in privileging the power of capital and the state. See 'Scaling from below', p. 916.

181 Laura Martin and Anna J. Secor, 'Towards a post-mathematical topology', *Progress in Human Geography*, June 2014, Vol. 38 (3), p. 430.

182 Roland Robertson, 'Globalization as a problem' in F. J. Lechner and J. Boli (Eds.), *The Globalization Reader*, 2nd ed (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 98. Robertson also describes global complexities and contradictions as 'a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism'. Roland Robertson, 'Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality' in A. D. King (Ed.), *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 73.

183 Ash Amin, Doreen Massey and Nigel Thrift, *Decentering the Nation: A Radical Approach to Regional Inequality* (London: Catalyst, 2003), p. 6.

184 Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 6.

185 Katz sees these countertopographies as 'linking different places analytically in order to both develop the contours of common struggles and imagine a different kind of practical response to problems confronting them'. See Cindi Katz, 'Vagabond capitalism and the necessity of social reproduction', *Antipode*, Vol. 33 (4), 2001, p. 722.

186 Robert H. Fagan, 'Labour geographies', paper presented at Geography's New Frontiers conference, Sydney, 21–22 March 2003, p. 3.

187 Chris Collinge, 'Flat ontology and the deconstruction of scale: a response to Marston, Jones and Woodward', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 31, 2006, p. 248.

188 David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, p. 79.

189 See for example Richie Howitt, 'Scale as relation: musical metaphors of geographical scale', *Area*, Vol. 30, 1998, pp. 49–58. For scale as lived experience see Mark deSocio, 'Geographers mobilize: a network-diffusion analysis of the campaign to free Ghazi-Walid Falah', *Antipode*, Vol. 42 (2), 2010, pp. 310–35.

190 Helga Leitner and Byron Miller, 'Scale and the limitations of ontological debate: a commentary on Marston, Jones and Woodward', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 32 (1), 2007, p. 119.

191 D. Delaney and Helga Leitner, 'The political construction of scale', *Political Geography*, Vol. 16, 1997, p. 95.

192 Katherine Jones, 'Scale as epistemology', *Political Geography*, Vol. 17, 1998, p. 27.

193 Richard G. Smith, 'World city actor-networks', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 27 (1), 2003, p. 35.

194 Sallie A. Marston and Neil Smith, 'States, scales and households: limits to scale thinking? A response to Brenner', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 25 (4), 2001, pp. 615–19.

195 For a discussion of the term and how it has developed, see David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982); *The Urbanization of Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985); 'Globalization and the spatial fix', *Geographische Revue*, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 223–30; and *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). To see how the term has been applied and adapted by scholars, see, for example, Neil Smith, *Uneven Development; Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, 3rd ed (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, [1984] 2008); Neil Brenner, 'Between fixity and motion: accumulation, territorial organization, and the historical geography of spatial scales', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 16, 1998, pp. 459–81; Andrew Herod, 'From a geography of labour to a labour geography: labour's spatial fix and the geography of capitalism', *Antipode*, Vol. 29 (1), 1997, pp. 1–31; E. Schoenberger, 'The spatial fix revisited', *Antipode*, Vol. 36, 2004, pp. 427–33; Giovanni Arrighi, 'Spatial and other "fixes" of historical capitalism', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. 10 (2), Summer 2004, pp. 527–39; Bob Jessop, 'Spatial fixes, temporal fixes and spatio-temporal fixes' in Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (Eds.), *David Harvey: A Critical Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 142–66; and J. Glassman, 'Recovering from crisis: the case of Thailand's spatial fix', *Economic Geography*, Vol. 83, 2007, pp. 349–70.

196 For a good mapping of the constellation of the scale debate, see Danny Mackinnon, 'Reconstructing Scale: towards a new scalar politics', *Progress in Human Geography*, February 2011, Vol. 35 (1), pp. 21–36. MacKinnon argues the political-economic and poststructuralist perspectives on scale can both offer complementary insights and advances an alternative 'scalar politics' that emphasizes the strategic deployment of scale by various actors for specific political purposes. See also Simon Springer for a cogent analysis: 'Human Geography without Hierarchy', *Progress in Human Geography*, June 2014, Vol. 38 (3), pp. 402–19.

197 Neil Smith, 'Contours of a spatialized politics: homeless vehicles and the production of geographical scale', *Social Text*, Vol. 33, 1992, pp. 54–81; 'Homeless/global' in Jon Bird et al. (Eds.) *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change* (London: Routledge, 1993) and 'Spaces of vulnerability: the spaces of flows and the politics of scale', *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol. 16, 1996, pp. 63–77.

198 Marston developed a case study centred on the household to illustrate importance of scale outside nation, region and locale. See Sallie A. Marston, 'The social construction of scale', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24 (2), 2000, pp. 219–42.

199 Brenner had charged that scale was being overstretched to the point of indistinguishability from other spatial concepts such as territory, place and locale. He expressed concern about the apparent analytical blunting of the concept, that researchers may be employing scale terminology when they may in fact be referring to place, site or other geographic units, for example. Brenner importantly posited that there are two ways of approaching scale: singular and plural (intra- and inter-scale respectively) and characterized Marston as having a singular approach to the household rather than a plural one. See Neil Brenner, 'The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 25, 2001, pp. 591–614. The responses that ensued in this debate are subsequently referenced but I draw out a couple here, including Purcell's mediation in which he calls the Marston and Brenner exchange a non-debate and an example in which islands of practice operate to limit researchers' intellectual vision beyond their own practices and prohibit substantive engagements with one another. Purcell suggests a more synthetic methodological program to obviate this and sees the divisions as methodological rather than theoretical. For Purcell, both arguments hold insights yet are unable to heed the other's critique. See Mark Purcell, 'Islands of practice and the Marston/Brenner debate: toward a more synthetic critical human geography', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 27 (3), 2003, pp. 317–32. See also Scott William Hoefle, 'Eliminating scale and killing the goose that laid the golden egg?', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 31 (2), June 2006, pp. 238–43.

200 Sallie A. Marston, John Paul Jones III and Keith Woodward, 'Human geography without scale', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 30 (4), 2005, pp. 416–32.

201 Sallie A. Marston et al., 'Human geography without scale', p. 422.

202 Sallie A. Marston et al., 'Human geography without scale', p. 422.

203 Sallie A. Marston et al., 'Human geography without scale', p. 424.

204 Woodward, Jones and Marston, 'The politics of autonomous space', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 36, no. 2, April 2012, p. 210. On sites, see Theodore R. Schatzki, *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 146–7 cited in Marston et al., 'Human geography without scale', p. 425.

205 Marston et al., 'Human geography without scale', p. 427.

206 Helga Leitner and Byron Miller, 'Scale and the limitations of ontological debate', p. 121; Neil Brenner, 'The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 25, 2001, pp. 591–614; A. Latham, 'Retheorizing the scale of globalization: topologies, actor-networks, and cosmopolitanism' in Andrew Herod and Melissa Wright (Eds.), *Geographies of Power: Placing Scale* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 115–44.

207 Helga Leitner and Byron Miller, 'Scale and the limitations of ontological debate', p. 117. See also D. Delaney and Helga Leitner, 'The political construction of scale', *Political Geography*, Vol. 16, 1997, pp. 93–9; Andrew Herod, 'The production of scale in United States labour relations', *Area*, Vol. 23, 1991, pp. 82–8, as well as his 'Labour's spatial praxis and the geography of contract bargaining in the US East Coast longshore industry: 1953–89', *Political Geography*, Vol. 16, 1997, pp. 145–69; and *Labour Geographies: Workers and the Landscapes of Capitalism* (New York:

Guilford Press, 2001). See also Hilda Kurtz, 'Scale frames and counter scale frames: constructing the social grievance of environmental injustice', *Political Geography*, Vol. 22, 2003, pp. 887–916; J. McCarthy, 'Scale, sovereignty and strategy in environmental governance', *Antipode*, Vol. 23, 2005, pp. 731–53; Byron Miller, 'Political action and the geography of defense investment: geographical scale and the representation of the Massachusetts miracle', *Political Geography*, Vol. 16, 1997, pp. 171–85; Byron Miller, *Geography and Social Movements: Comparing Antinuclear Activism in the Boston Area* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Robert B. McMaster and Eric Sheppard in (Eds.), 'Introduction' to *Scale and Geographic Inquiry* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 1–22 and 'Scale and geographic inquiry: contrasts, intersections, and boundaries', pp. 256–67; Erik Swyngedouw, 'Neither global nor local: "glocalization" and the politics of scale' in Kevin Cox (Ed.), *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local* (New York: Guilford Press, 1997).

208 Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 8.

209 Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (New York: Autonomedia, 1991), 1985, <http://www.altheim.com/lit/taz/toc.html> p. 101.

210 Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 24, although he has used the term in much earlier work such as *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space* (New York: Blackwell, 1984), p. 75.

211 Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones, 'Theorizing sociospatial relations', *Environment and Planning D*, Vol. 26 (3), 2008, pp. 389–401.

212 Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones, 'Theorizing sociospatial relations', p. 391.

213 Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones, 'Theorizing sociospatial relations', p. 395.

214 They cite some examples of this happening, such as A. Paasi, 'Bounded spaces in the mobile world, deconstructing "regional identity"', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, Vol. 93, 2002, pp. 137–48 and Peter Dicken et al., 'Chains and networks, territories and scales: towards a relational framework for analyzing the global economy', *Global Networks*, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 89–112.

215 Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones, 'Theorizing sociospatial relations', p. 393.

216 Drawing on ethnographer Arnold Van Gennep's 1909 work *The Rites of Passage*, Victor Turner re-introduced the concept of 'liminal space' as a transformatory space and state between phases of separation and reincorporation. See Victor Turner, 'Liminality and communitas', in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction Press, 2008) and 'Betwixt and between: the liminal period in rites de passage', in *The Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967). See also Arnold Van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960).

217 Nigel Thrift, *Spatial Formations* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 257.

218 Thrift asserts: 'seen . . . in a direct line of scientific thinking from topology through Einsteinian relativity theory, quantum theory and the like . . . [complexity theory] has now become a part of a progressive recasting of popular Euro-American beliefs about time and space as dimensions open to possibility . . . [giving] way to a new disclosive sense of time and space in which "order is not the law of things but their

exception" . . . [and] which also allows certain kinds of emergent order to become possible and to be more easily acknowledged . . . '. Nigel Thrift, 'The place of complexity', *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 16 (3), June 1999, p. 59. Thrift cites Lewis (1973)'s 'unactualized possibilities' and what Casti (1991, 1996) calls 'would-be worlds' (p. 58). See David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); John L. Casti, *Searching for Certainty: What Scientists can know about the Future* (London: Scribners, 1991) and *Would-Be Worlds: How Simulation is Changing the Frontiers of Science* (New York: John Wiley, 1996).

219 Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).

220 Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*.

221 Shahnaz Khan, *Muslim Women: Creating a North American Identity* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2000), p. 126.

222 See Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination' in *Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), Chapter 1, pp. 1–21.

223 In Lavie and Swedenburg's work on migrants, people experience a 'third timespace' spatiotemporality that can be identified neither with their homeland nor with the timespace of the host country. S. Lavie, and T. Swedenburg, 'Between and among the boundaries of culture: bridging text and lived experience in the third timespace', *Cultural Studies*, Vol. 10 (1), 1996, pp. 154–79.

224 Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 1.

225 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out Of Chaos: Man's new Dialogue with Nature* (New York: Bantam Books, 1984); Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 13.

226 J. Cohen and I. Stewart, *The Collapse of Chaos* (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 200.

227 This accords with notions that regions are not passive mediums but are actively constructed and recreated in political, cultural, economic, administrative practices and frameworks. See A. Paasi, 'Europe as social process and discourse: considerations of place, boundaries and identity', *European Journal of Urban and Regional Studies*, Vol. 8, 2001, p. 9, cited in Martin Jones, 'Phase space', pp. 13–14. See also Ian Stewart, *From Here to Infinity: A Guide to Today's Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) cited in Martin Jones, 'Phase space', p. 14.

228 Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production*, 2nd ed (Houndmills: Macmillan, [1984] 1995). R. J. Johnston, *A Question of Place: Exploring the Practice of Human Geography* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). There is however some prior reference in time-geography; see, for example, D. N. Parkes and Nigel Thrift, *Times, Spaces and Places: A Chronogeographical Perspective* (Chichester: John Wiley, 1980). See also 'state space' in Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary* (Edinburgh University Press, 2004) and passing mentions in John Urry's *Global Complexity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), cited in Jones, 'Phase space', p. 14.

229 See Timothy W. Luke, 'Fixing identity, fabricating space: sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War', Conference paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers, March 27–April 2, 1994. Luke writes, 'The hitherto simple-singularization of territory as monotoriality, or one essentially empty dimension of only autonomous political activity must be modified. Territories are multitorialities, or complex-pluralizations with many full dimensions of heteronomous and diverse activity. State sovereigns might try to police all of these manifold spaces by compressing their diversity into one relation – being inside or outside of politically bounded spaces. Nonetheless, these ranges of various means and diverse ends lap in and out of sovereign territorialities; indeed, their heteronomous

differences often link into other contradictive formations inside and outside of state jurisdiction'.

230 Chettiparamb advances a nonmathematical, nonmetaphoric and descriptive view of fractal spatialities from a realist position; see A. Chettiparamb, 2013, 'Fractal spatialities', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 31 (4), pp. 680–92.

231 Simon Springer, 'Human geography without hierarchy', p. 408.

232 Saul Newman, 'Post-anarchism and space: revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones', *Planning Theory*, Vol. 10, 2011, p. 355.

233 See for example the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón jungle by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Mexico, 2005, which has had various translations that vary slightly. Marcos's words in this communiqué include: 'And we want to tell the world that we want to make you large, so large that all those worlds will fit, those worlds which are resisting because they want to destroy the neoliberals and because they simply cannot stop fighting for humanity'. *Enlace Zapatista* <http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/sdsl-en/>.

5 Paradox in paradise

Participatory development and the social economy in Kerala, India

Kerala is a state in India best known for having achieved some of the highest indicators of social development in the industrializing world, with near first world levels in literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality. The classical Kerala 'model' promulgated a social justice model of development that was achieved in spite of a relatively low average annual income – about one seventieth of that of the United States – and a narrow industrial base. Additionally, over a fifth of the state's economic product has been drawn from international remittances, money from income received and remitted from migrants working overseas back to their place of origin. Kerala's development success has been achieved with little foreign aid, and continues into the twenty-first century against the backdrop of increasing economic liberalization since the early 2000s by the national Indian government. Its development successes have primarily been achieved through both popular grassroots movements and progressive state interventions. Since the formation of Kerala as a state in November 1956, successive governments have been spurred by Kerala's vigorous civic and activist culture to implement wide-ranging land reforms, universal education and health care and extended social protection. Public action and the role of women have been critical to Kerala's development experience and in its literacy, people's science and decentralization movements.

Situated near the southern tip of the Indian sub-continent and stretching along the Indian Ocean on the southwest shore of India, Kerala is a densely populated, verdantly green state of 33.4 million inhabitants (2011) with an equable, moderately tropical climate. The state is bordered by the Western Ghats mountain range on its eastern edge, which drops westward toward the Indian Ocean, creating a huge alluvial plain of interconnected rivers, lakes and shallow canals that constitute the famous Backwaters. One of 25 constituent states within the federal structure of India, Kerala occupies just over 1 per cent of its land area and about 3 per cent of India's population. With just under a third of its land area forest cover, Kerala is a land-scarce, educated, labour-surplus economy with an abundance of coconut trees. The state's name is in fact thought to mean 'land of coconuts' in Malayalam, the language spoken by Keralites, deriving from *kera* (the 'coconut tree') and *alam* ('land' or 'earth'). Leafy banana trees and cardamom, pepper, rubber and tea plantations also dot the 'rururban' landscape. Its 900 kilometres of



Figure 5.1 A map of Kerala state within India and India (inset).

Source: Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.

backwaters services cargo, public waterways transport and tourism; in the larger cities autorickshaws and cars constantly honk their horns throughout a warren of crowded streets that feature slum-like dwellings alongside more stately, significantly remittance-funded 'Gulf' houses, amid a flurry of colourful saris and white dhotis.

Why is Kerala significant?

> I needed its example to think more boldly about my home place.
>
> (Bill McKibben)[1]

Kerala has been global in ways significantly outside the neoliberal frame: through its history of international trade and influences, through labour migration and remittances, cash crops, and the international attention paid to its remarkable development experience. Has the state been able to sustain and improve upon

its remarkable human development record from the classical Kerala model? This social development template helped deliver First World levels of literacy and life expectancy, low birth rates and infant mortality, an effective public food distribution system, and land reform that helped transform Kerala's pre-Independence casteist society into one of India's most plural and civically active. Plagued by high rates of 'educated unemployment' and anemic industrial development however, the vaunted classical model had reached its zenith by the early 1990s. As this chapter examines, the state is in transition to a twenty-first century development experience involving the institutionalization of a radical and bold experiment in democratic decentralization and participatory planning.

In the framework of this book, I argue that Kerala offers new ways to think about and understand agency and development within the rubric of globalization. One of the key lynchpins of the People's Plan Campaign (PPC), which this chapter spotlights, has been to draw upon one of the state's most important assets – its rich grassroots movements – to foster propositional responses to corporate globalization and a parallel pathway to development that challenges conventional understandings of global development (Chapter 2). Kerala's experience illustrates the possibilities of pursuing efficiency *with* equity alongside initiatives to draw upon and institutionally preserve its rich associational culture.

An examination of Kerala's development experience might also demonstrate ways of treading more lightly in the creation of a decent life using fewer resources, highlighting a pluralistic human development paradigm as a credible alternative to neoliberal structural adjustment policies and a preoccupation with national income accounting as the sole yardstick of development. Kerala does not only challenge conventional notions of development, in the spirit of this book it provides hints towards possibilities that are more equitable, viable and participatory. The state 'gives lie to the idea that only endless growth can produce decent human lives', McKibben writes, appropriately adding the qualification that 'It is a clue, not an answer'.[2]

Kerala's contemporary experience spans both the more conventional civil society public transcript of subsidiarity and social capital (Chapter 2) as well as that of 'offstage', infrapolitical mētis (Chapter 3). I argue that a large part of Kerala's success lies in long cultivated, deep infrageographies of informal grassroots order, punctuated with complementary state involvement. Kerala's experience is also significant because it has put great store in the capacity of ordinary people to deal with everyday governance. Kerala's experience can illuminate how a more canny relationship can operate between informal infrageographical order and formal public order, as well as highlight the pivotal role played by democratic deepening, not just formal democracy, in participatory development.

Kerala's strategies are centred upon cultivating the social economy with a focus on cooperatives and neighbourhood self-help groups in developing capacity, drawing upon community economies and social audits as key tools (Chapter 3). Framing the Kerala experience as a propositional parallel also draws upon arguments from Chapter 3 related to discursive strategies. Kerala's participatory development and decentralization embodies an experimental spirit and micro-approach

that is the antithesis of high-modernist development yet also incorporates the role of epistemic communities such as planners and Kerala's people's science movement in guiding the process. With more than a passing nod to pluralism and the multiplicity paradigm emergent in metaphysical worlding (Chapter 4), people's planning is reflective of an ontological shift from command and control to a more participatory ontology in both development theory and practice. Recognition of the importance of gender development as critical to overall development additionally balances the ontologically masculinist, one-sided western model.

Kerala's historical and classical development template will be examined briefly in turn, as they help form an important backdrop for a critical appraisal of Kerala's current development, and specifically its experiments in participatory planning and the social economy. Applying Devika and Thampi's term, it is argued that Kerala's development has gone through successive 'regimes of empowerment' that have framed periods of its development.[3] Within these framing periods, the vaunted 'public action' phase of Kerala's successes is located and posited as but one regime of empowerment that has in some ways been superseded by an emergent regime that may offer greater explanatory value in apprehending Kerala's contemporary development shifts.

I then turn to the PPC of the Left Democratic Front (LDF)-led government during the Ninth Plan between 1996 and 2001. The second half of the chapter examines the challenges and prospects for Kerala's experience as successive state government by turns institutionalize many of the processes of the PPC, or seek to limit funding and roll back some of these processes, which has not gone uncontested. Throughout the chapter, original structured and unstructured interviews with a number of key planners, academics and activists, political leaders and residents are drawn upon.[4]

Global entrepôt: historical overview

Historically, Kerala has served as a trade entrepôt, with a rich history of interaction with the outside world, particularly through the spices trade. Kerala's open-minded and outward-looking culture, receptive to new ideas and influences, is in part due to its history of trade and religious plurality.[5] The Port of Cochin, for example, long served as a gateway to trade with countries such as China, Egypt, Greece, Portugal and Holland. This also helped create a tradition of cultural pluralism and religious acceptance, with a distinct lack of communal violence more commonly seen in other Indian states. As Akash Kapur writes,

> Merchants and sailors brought with them not just the baubles of Western fashion but also the latest intellectual currents and religious teachings. The result is a remarkably outward-looking culture, receptive to new ways of understanding the world, and prone to bouts of self-reinvention.
>
> (Akash Kapur)[6]

Kerala has a predominantly Hindu culture, but with large Christian and Muslim populations: Hindu Keralites make up just under 60 per cent of the population

Table 5.1 Selected glossary

Glossary (selected key terms)	
Akshaya	Name of the e-literacy programme initiated by the Government of Kerala
Ayurveda	System of medicine indigenous to Kerala
Block	Administrative unit that consists of two to 15 villages
Crore	10 million
Dalit	Name, which means 'oppressed', that is preferred by Scheduled Caste and Tribe activists for formerly untouchable castes
Grama	Village (Malayalam: *gramam*)
Grama Panchayat	Village Government, local governments at the village or small town level in India, the foundation of the Panchayat System
Grama Sabha	Village assembly
Kalajatha	Artistic procession usually for a political cause
Kudumbashree	Name of the Kerala Government's poverty eradication programme, which literally means 'prosperity of the family'
Lakh	100,000
Malayalam	Language spoken in Kerala
Malayalees	People of Kerala
Panchayat	Literally means a group of five; in Kerala it refers to the local elected councils at the village, block and district levels
Panchayati raj	System of local governance with district, block and village as three tiers – Gandhi coined the term and promoted the concept
Rupees	Indian unit of currency, a prefix abbreviated as Rs
Sabha	Assembly
Scheduled Caste	Former untouchable caste members listed for affirmative action and remedial benefits in schedules or lists of the Indian national constitution
Scheduled Tribe	Formerly untouchable tribal populations listed for affirmative action and remedial benefits in schedules or lists of the Indian national constitution, also known as an adivasi

Table 5.2 Kerala towns – place name changes

Old name	*New name*
Alleppey	Alappuzha
Calicut	Kozhikode
Cannanore	Kannur
Palghat	Palakkad
Quilon	Kollam
Tellicherry	Thalassery
Trichur	Thrissur
Trivandrum	Thiruvananthapuram

in contrast with an all-India average of 88 per cent.[7] At just under a fifth of the population, Christians have had a presence in the state since around the fourth century courtesy of Syrian Arab Orthodox Christian arrivals; 'three hundred years', Amartya Sen notes, 'before there was a single Christian in Britain'.[8] Similarly, there has been a small Jewish community in Cochin for hundreds of years. British colonialism was weaker in out-of-the-way Kerala (with the exception of the Malabar region),[9] and the Portuguese, who arrived before the British, contributed Catholic-style social service programs and schools. In the 1820s, European missionaries also brought printing skills and employed print to make converts. Because of this, some principally credit Christianity as a major contributor to the progressive Kerala template.[10] In my view it is an important factor within an amalgam of influences that includes but is not dominated by cosmopolitan religious interaction.

Pre-independence Kerala was divided into three governing units from around 1800 to 1949, Malabar, Travancore and Cochin. During this period, Kerala had a line of progressive maharajas who instituted free, universal education.[11] Women had a generally better status than in other parts of the subcontinent as reflected in higher literacy rates and a slew of comparative historical figures such as lower female infanticide and higher life expectancy: by the turn of the previous century, female literacy in pre-independence Kerala was already much higher than anywhere else in India.[12] In 'old' Kerala, more than half of the Hindu population followed a matrilineal and matrilocal system of family and inheritance, which emulated the matrilineal female ownership of property for an influential part of the Hindu population, the Nairs.[13] As Robin Jeffrey points out, matriliny was not matri*archy* but it did confer a measure of autonomy to women, including the respected right to an education, assured property rights and recognized sexual freedom.[14] Girls and boys were educated in village schools and during the 1860s to 1890s the three regions' governing elites extended free vernacular education.[15]

Could this historical matriliny have influenced Kerala's contemporary development success? Recall the proposition that the status of women is a barometer of social progress for any society and, as Drèze and Sen argue, that gender equality and women's agency is critical for socioeconomic development.[16] 'The position of women under matriliny, and the legacies of that experience', historian Jeffrey writes, 'were the yeast in the recipe that produced Kerala's unusual politics and development'.[17] As well as the much earlier arrival of patriarchal Brahminical culture of the Aryans who migrated to India around 1500 BC, British over-rule in fact yielded a negative result for the status of women in Kerala. The decline of matriliny resulted from the subsequent system of male-centred monogamy promoted by British rulers and the spread of patrilocalism. After 800 years, during which 15 to 20 per cent of Kerala's population were Nairs at the height of matriliny,[18] its practices were on the wane into the twentieth century and legally ended in 1976, though vestiges remain.

From its cosmopolitan international interaction, Kerala was crucially able to adapt and assimilate foreign ideas to strengthen the best indigenous traits. As Kapur describes,

> the Brahminical respect for education, for instance, was initially extended to the lower castes by Christian missionaries, whose schools were open to all sectors of society. Likewise, Kerala's reformist rulers were inspired in part by liberal notions of good governance that were just then becoming popular in the West: among the policies they instituted were the abolition of slavery and the adoption of Western-style judicial processes.
>
> (Akash Kapur)[19]

Yet while a radical movement of peasants, workers and students has animated the state's social and political life for a century, this has probably been because, rather than in spite of, the fact that Kerala had one of India's most rigid and complex social hierarchies, with some of the worst caste-based oppression in the subcontinent. On a visit in 1892, nineteenth-century Hindu reformer Swami Vivekananda described the state as a 'madhouse' or 'lunatic asylum' of rigid casteism in India.[20] In the Travancore Kingdom, which took in modern-day southern Kerala and neighbouring state Tamil Nadu and in which the state's capital city Trivandrum is situated, caste rules included 'distance pollution' and had the power of law.

A century before Independence, 'untouchables' and other low-castes in Kerala began demanding the right to education and access to temples, among other rights. The remarkable success of their struggle has meant that in few other places in the subcontinent has untouchability – the 'greatest blot on Hinduism', as Gandhi described it[21] – been as successfully subdued as it has in Kerala, although economic indicators are still lower than they are for the rest of the population. The caste-divided movements gradually gave way to organized political movements. By the early twentieth century, Christians, Muslims and Ezhavas – the largest Hindu community in Kerala – came together to form the Civil Rights League and later the Joint Political Congress. Taken with gender, the subduing of caste discrimination in Kerala may have had a positive effect on the status of women since, as Sylvia Hale correlates, 'male containment of women is essential to ensure the continuity of caste'.[22]

After Indian independence in 1947, states were reorganized on a linguistic basis. Malayalam-speakers in Malabar, which was under direct British rule as part of the Madras Presidency, combined with other Malayalees in the two princely states of Travancore and Cochin to form the state of Kerala in November 1956. In 1957 a century of radical consciousness saw Kerala become the first state in the world to democratically elect a communist government. (India's national government intervened to dissolve the administration after only 2 years in office.) A land reform program in the 1960s abolished tenancy and transferred more than 2 million acres to 1.5 million households, formally limiting ownership to 8 hectares per family.[23] In a state that had formerly had India's most rigid and elaborate caste system, land reform proved a major breakthrough. The reforms eliminated rents paid on land used by peasants for their gardens and houses. Although designed by Communist-led governments, much of the land reform was instituted by non-left governments, pressured through land occupations, demonstrations and other direct grassroots action.[24]

It is this history of organized grassroots participation, with caste reform associations, trade unions and peasant groups active in petition campaigns, strikes, street processions and self-help programs that saw public food distribution networks and workers protection acts established alongside radical land reform. The success of a subsequent major mass literacy campaign was similarly due in part to the strength of political mobilization in the state. A large part of the reason for Kerala's development success in this period lies in what Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze call 'public action',[25] a high rate of participation that underscores Kerala's impressive quality of life indicators, generating a high level of citizen activism that is reflected in a plethora of indicators such as high rates of community participation and volunteerism, high voter turnout (at a 75 per cent average, it is 15 per cent above the average for other Indian states) and high levels of media readership and circulation.[26] As this chapter posits, public action and the place of women are two of the core elements that underpin the classic Kerala model, possibly the keys to the puzzle of Kerala's remarkable development.

Radical governance? The role of the state

> While the Indian state obfuscated class conflicts, the state in Kerala has given them institutional expression.
>
> (Patrick Heller)[27]

The role of the state in Kerala has been significant in land reform, health, education and in establishing a public distribution system. In Kerala, formal power has see-sawed between 2 coalitions; the Communist-Party of India (Marxist)-led LDF and the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by the Congress Party. The two fronts have effectively alternated being in government since Indian Independence with neither winning a consecutive term in more recent times. The tendency of Kerala's voters to alternate between LDF and UDF-led coalitions every five years has resulted in a sustained political trajectory of redistributive policies and development with bipartisan support for this agenda. As Thomas Isaac, the principal architect of the People's Plan and Kerala's erstwhile Finance Minister (1996–2001, 2006–11) describes:

> Kerala is a very peculiar state. The Left has the support of 40 per cent of the population. Power alternates between the left and the right. But such is the hegemony of the left in the past . . . that it is very hard for the right to roll back. They are not that right-wing, by Indian standards. The right will come and slow it down, but not overturn it. If they challenge these reforms they'll lose support.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[28]

Kerala's Communist Party investment in education and government-financed healthcare has formed the bedrock of progressive policies in the State, becoming so popular and part of the landscape that when the political opposition came

Table 5.3 Kerala's governing coalitions and successive five year plans

Period	*Coalition*	*Plan*
1986–91	LDF	Seventh
1991–6	UDF	Eighth
1996–2001	LDF	Ninth
2001–6	UDF	Tenth
2006–11	LDF	Eleventh
2011–16*	UDF	Twelfth

Note: *Projected at time of press.

into power they effectively continued the policies. Both Congress and Communist Party-dominated political formations in Parliament have been compelled to anchor their policies in mass-based politics and to vie for working class support. The relationship between popular movements and state programmes in Kerala has probably been one of the most osmotic and even symbiotic in recent history. Thomas Isaac asserts that within the state 'the divide between state and civil society is blurred. Here, the state would function *as* civil society'.[29] In a state notable for its vigorous associational life and high levels of social capital, this may constitute a bridging of the state-civil society binary and recalls the Gramscian formulation that the state should rest on a strong civil society.[30]

Yet the broad-based character of grassroots mobilization means that public goods and action cannot be principally attributable to the penetration of the state. Social justice and redistributive policies are public action-demand driven, and in turn state-directed at certain intervals. Patrick Heller also concludes that Kerala's post-Independence state programmes have been people-led: 'the organized militancy of lower class groups eroded traditional structures of domination, clearing the path for state penetration. The bureaucratic–legal capacities of the state were in effect activated and extended by mobilizational pressures from below'.[31] A marked tendency in Kerala has been for civil society to combine participation with struggle ('bharanavum samaravum'). As Harilal suggests: 'The tension between participation in government and the need to carry on the struggle against the state has been an important feature of Kerala's experiments in democratic politics, producing a certain immunity to cooption'.[32]

This impetus underwrote the state's programs and in effect institutionalized popular mobilizations; put another way, the strength of the state derived from mobilizational politics, and in turn was mutually reinforcing. Kerala's culture of participation has been foundational to its vibrant associational life and democracy, and has formed the constant radical element in the political culture against the fluctuating twists and turns of formal party coalitions and governments. Critical reforms in education and land ownership were not singularly achieved from above. In education for example, there was a substantial system of indigenous schools before schools were established by government policy. Jeffrey argues that the 'acceleration of literacy in Kerala resulted first from the exploitation of

existing cultural strengths'[33] [italic emphasis added] which in turn generated attitudes that were transferred to other caste groups in Malayalee society. Similarly, as Ramachandran argues, land reforms were achieved after decades of struggle 'by people's organizations that were based on powerful village-level organizational units'.[34]

An early advocate of Kerala's success, Amartya Sen prefers calling Kerala's development approach an experience rather than a model: 'To call something a model is to hint at some alleged un-improvability. That is not the case with Kerala's experience. Despite its tremendous achievements, Kerala's educational experience has serious enough problems, which have to be investigated and addressed'.[35] In contrast, if model is defined as 'a means of representing with the intention of intervening', Govindran Parayil argues that Kerala can be looked upon as a model if it is taken in the post-Newtonian worldview rather than neoclassical sense as 'simply a construction of the human mind to represent social reality' and a 'normatively circumscribed description of an entity that can be emulated and features of which can be replicated by others, taking into account their own specific contexts'.[36]

A useful way to locate Kerala's changing development experience is to identify and situate it in a number of distinctive 'regimes of empowerment' with their own characteristic instruments of change, following Devika and Thampi's efforts to distinguish between distinct but overlapping periods in Kerala's history:

> By 'regimes of empowerment' we refer to larger socio-political and cultural frameworks that shape specific sorts of 'empowerment'. These regimes are shaped not just by changing local needs and structures, but perhaps, more importantly, by changes in the national and global development agenda and the changing priorities of global capitalism. This implies that empowerment will not be a stable, but a changeable category; rather, the specific larger framework through which it emerges will crucially determine its form and content. Every regime of empowerment creates specific sorts of inclusionary conditions, which may be redone within another regime.
>
> (Devika and Thampi)[37]

Understanding Kerala's contemporary development as framed by different modalities or regimes of empowerment at once acknowledges the 'public action' explanation of Kerala's success posited by Amartya Sen and others, but also recognizes that it is but one of a shifting series of historical phases in which conditions, both internal and external, have changed dramatically. It also serves as an acknowledgement that an explanatory template that was valid in one period may not be as efficacious in another. Devika and Thampi propose to apply this to viewing Kerala's history since independence in the mid-twentieth century; I extend the timeframe for a longer-view application and furnish additional dimensions, as seen in Table 5.4.

The next section examines the much-celebrated classical Kerala model or experience, foundational elements of which were laid in the first regime of empowerment and crystallized during the second.

Table 5.4 Kerala's regimes of empowerment

Regime of empowerment	*Period*	*Instruments and agents of change*	*Successes and characteristics*	*Limits*
Matriliny and progressive maharajas	Nineteenth century and prior	Benevolent monarchs and ancient Hindu cultural practices (matriliny); indigenous school system and Malayali culture; missionary-based education	A limited amount of social and sexual freedom for Hindu Nair women in pre-colonial, pre-Independence states and public education for girls as well as boys by royal decree in 1817.	Matriliny phased out with modernity and limited to one sector of population; rigid caste discrimination rife and some of the worst in India.
Public action (Sen), political society (Chatterjee) and public politics (Jeffrey)	Twentieth century, particularly post-Independence	Organized male labour struggles	High education and social indicators; high levels of civic and political participation (mostly male); international remittances from Kerala's highly educated and regarded labour from Gulf and elsewhere.	Fiscal crisis of the state, sluggish industrialization; decline in formal sector and shift from agriculture to services; limited visibility and public participation of women; high incidence of educated unemployment, limits of central planning.
The People's Plan: Decentralization	1990s–2000s	Local Self Governments (LSGS) and Self Help Groups (SHGs) – shift towards females in informal sectors	High water mark PPC 1996–2001 but also encompasses precursor initiatives (New Democratic Initiatives and Ernakulam literacy success; preceding UDF government enacting 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments).	Campaign mode, microenterprises weak in manufacturing; interruption in commitment with change of government; cultural conservatism about male primacy in public politics cannot be legislated away.
Post PPC Institutionalization	2000s and beyond	Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs) and LSGS	State-supported civil society and panchayat-based development; IT enabled development and e-literacy; greater capacity-building at three tiers of government supporting 50 per cent reservation of seats for women.	Possible double burden on women; ongoing tension between participatory governance and struggle ('bharanavum samaravum') and partisan rivalry (e.g. Kudumbashree vs Janasree).

The classical Kerala 'model'

> Kerala has shown to the people of India that an economy need not wait indefinitely for the benefits of economic growth to 'trickle down' to lower levels so that it can enjoy universal education, primary health care, minimum food and social security, at least a hutment land to build one's house, minimum wages, access to formal credit and the abolition of the worst forms of social un-freedom.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[38]

> It's literacy that comes first. We had our sequential priorities wrong. We thought we could start with capital investment; we should have started with investment in education . . . This is not a chicken and egg case: I would be quite categorical in saying that it is the choice of how scarce resources are used and they should be used for human development.
>
> (John Kenneth Galbraith)[39]

The Kerala 'phenomenon' of low-income well-being has attracted a great deal of attention in development circles.[40] Kerala's human development indicators have confounded the received conventional 'wisdom' that expects a higher standard of living to result only after rapid economic growth, challenging the presumptive claim on a positive relationship between GDP and human welfare indices.[41] For Franke, Kerala can offer lessons 'about the uses of public action to get the greatest efficiency in quality of life out of the lowest growth [which] amounts to a kind of fuel efficiency'.[42] Several analyses have tellingly referred to Kerala as a paradox; a 1965 publication by D. R. Manekar for example dubs the state 'the Red Riddle';[43] a *Scientific American* review described the state as a 'mystery inside a riddle inside an enigma'.[44] Well after the zenith of the 'classical' Kerala model in the late 2000s, a journalist rhapsodized: 'At a time when the world is looking for alternatives to market fundamentalism, Kerala may hold the secret to sustainable growth and development'.[45] An examination of some of these 'classical' indicators follows as a requisite backdrop to the PPC.

Within India, Kerala has the lowest population growth rate and, in demographic and development terms, the most favourable sex ratio.[46] Life expectancy exceeds 70 years, which is comparable to wealthier OICs,[47] and infant mortality rates are half the national Indian average of 44 deaths per 1,000 births. Kerala's low fertility and mortality rates means the state has reached the third stage of demographic transition within two decades, with a demographic bulge in the working age population.[48] The state has a network of western and traditional medical clinics with four times the number of hospitals and twice the number of beds (160 patient beds per 100,000 people) in India as a whole and an extensive public food distribution network that includes fair-price shops.

A comparative summary follows, with figures compiled by Kerala scholars Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin to express what I have termed the classical Kerala model (Table 5.5).[49]

An 'indicator board' with more current figures indicates that the same trends have more or less continued (Table 5.6).

Table 5.5 Quality of life indicators, 2000–1

Indicator	*India*	*Kerala*	*USA*	*Low income countries*
GDP per capita US$	460	566	34,260	420
At PPP $	2,300	2,943	34,260	1,990
Adult literacy rate (%)	58	91	96	39
Life expectancy in years				
Males	63	68	74	59
Females	64	74	80	
Infant mortality per 1,000	65	12	7	80
Birth rate per 1,000	29	17	16	40

Source: Kerala State Planning Board, *Economic Review*, 1999, 2000, and 2001; Indian Census of 1991; World Bank Report for 2002: 232–3; UNDP Report for 2002.

The springboard for Kerala's contemporary development has been the mass literacy movement that has produced nearly universal literacy: 91 per cent in contrast to the Indian national average of 65 per cent. In some communities, adult literacy is close to 100 per cent. High literacy has contributed to and mutually reinforced favourable health and education indicators: since education is an important factor governing the utilization of public health services, this has also served to help reduce infant and overall mortality rates, as well as raise life expectancy. The pivotal role of women in making the state literate and in the demographic transition has thus effectively spearheaded Kerala's development success. It is worth examining Kerala's successful literacy campaign in more detail.

Mass literacy and the KSSP: Paving the way for the PPC

> To educate a daughter is like watering another man's garden.
>
> (Chinese saying)

> Literate men have literate sons; literate women have literate children.
>
> (Saying of unknown origin)[50]

Kerala's innovative and internationally acclaimed literacy campaign formed part of the New Democratic Initiatives that served as a precursor to the PPC.[51] The New Democratic Initiatives were loosely connected experiments to generate action for development by mobilizing Kerala's vast civil society resources, the thousands of non-profit, nongovernmental organizations that occupy the space between government and market. These included trade unions, caste associations, temple committees, farmers' groups, women's groups, student and youth organizations. Kerala's tradition of social activism was tapped into with only minimal state government coordination. As we have seen, this informal order is commonly rendered invisible in the public transcript of global development, yet constitutes

Table 5.6 Quality of life indicators, 2010–12

Indicator	*India*	*Kerala*	*USA*	*Low income countries*
GDP per capita (2011 at 2005 PPP)[a]	3,235	3350[b]	42,480	1,633
Life expectancy at birth (2012)[c]	65.8	76.8[d]	78.7	59.1
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)[e]	44[f]	12[f]	7	71
Global Hunger Index[g] (2010)	24.1	17.6[h]	–	73
Voter turn-out (per cent)	58[i]	74.4[j]	58[k]	–
HDI[l] (2012)	0.554	0.790[m]	0.937	0.466
Adult literacy[n]	62[o]	93	99	–
Sex ratio (females per 1000 males)[p]	940	1084	1030[q]	–

Source: Government of India Economic Survey, UNDP, World Bank, the Economist, IFPRI.

Notes:

a World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://data.worldbank.org>. Compiled at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>.

b Figures for Kerala are for 2008. Source: <http://www.economist.com/content/indian-summary>. See also <http://www.ecostat.kerala.gov.in/docs/pdf/stateincome/2013/gsdpreport_1112.pdf>, p. 16 and <http://www.spb.kerala.gov.in/~spbuser/old/html/Economic%20Review%202010/CHAPTER%20-%203.pdf>.

c UNDESA (2011), 2010 Revision of World Population Prospects. Compiled at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables>. See also WHO, <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.688?lang=en>.

d 2011 life expectancy figures for Kerala from UNDP, 'Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index for India's States 2011', United Nations Development Programme, 2011.

e UNDP, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>, 2010 figures.

f Government of India, *Economic Survey 2012–13*, Chapter 13, pp. 276–7, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2012-13/echap-13.pdf>, 2011 figures for Kerala from *Economic Survey 2012–13*, p. A121, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2012-13/estat1.pdf>.

g Source: IFPRI Global Hunger Index 2010. <4: Low Hunger, 5–9.9: Moderate Hunger, 10–19.9: Serious problem; 20–29.9: Alarming, 30 or more: Extremely alarming; <http://www.spb.kerala.gov.in/old/html/Economic%20Review%202010/CHAPTER%20-%2020.pdf>

h 2008 Global Hunger Index figure for Kerala. Purnima Menon, Anil Deolalikar and Anjor Bhaskar, 'The India State Hunger Index: Comparisons Of Hunger Across States', *International Food Policy Research Institute*, 14 October 2008, p. 5.

i <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=IN> for 2009 elections.

j Various media. For 2011 elections.

k 2012 Presidential election, US Election project, <http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2012G.html>.

l From 2010 onwards the Human Development Index combines three dimensions: life expectancy at birth; an education index that includes average and expected years of schooling, and standard of living as measured by GNI per capita (US$ PPP). See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi>.

m The HDI figure for Kerala is for 2007–8 and has risen in recent years according to recent media reports. See, for example, *The Hindu*, 'Kerala example draws UN praise', 12 June 2013. The 2008 figure is drawn from Government of India, *Economic Survey 2011–12* (Union Budget and Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, 2012), pp. 310–11. Government of India, Ministry of Women and Child Development, HDI and GDI Estimates for India and the States/UTs: Results and Analysis, accessed at <http://wcd.nic.in/publication/GDIGEReport/Part2.pdf>.

n Adult literacy figures from UNDP, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>.

o 2010 figures for India, from UNDP, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>.

p Government of India, *Economic Survey 2012–13*, Chapter 13, pp. 276–7, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2012-13/echap-13.pdf>.

q Figure converted from per hundred measure from CIA World Factbook, which indicated the total ratio of males to females at 97 (2013 estimate). See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>.

a broader spectrum of social reality than is credited in even some civil society representations.

These initiatives included District Councils and three innovative mass campaigns: total literacy, smokeless chulhas and the people's resource mapping program. Smokeless chulhas (stoves) reduce wood burning and help to preserve more trees as well as improve health conditions in kitchens. Resource mapping aimed to audit each village and create local databases on land, water sources and usage, vegetation, mapping land use and assets, land forms, soil depth, environmental appraisal and socio-economic household surveys. Resource maps and a brief report were then prepared in the 25 pilot panchayats.[52] I will highlight one of these three precursors, the literacy program.

The prime mover in the literacy campaign, aside from participants themselves, was one of the most influential voluntary associations in the state and India, the KSSP.[53] The KSSP guided the campaign for total literacy throughout Kerala in December 1988. Initiated in Ernakulum District, it mobilized nearly 22,000 volunteer activists who organized jathas (processions), meetings, street plays, songs, drama presentations and literacy classes in the neighbourhoods where illiteracy was concentrated.

Over a three-year period more than 350,000 volunteers took blackboards and textbooks to fishing villages, city slums and remote tribal areas, staging plays that adapted scenes from traditional myths and everyday life, thus making learning more readily accessible. To promote a people's science, KSSP's modus operandi included participatory action research and learning-by-doing using communication methods that utilized accessible art forms (such as the Kalajatha or art caravan), a mix of culturally-attuned art and science that simultaneously tapped into and in turn helped create third spaces. The mobilization was also influenced by the participatory and reality-based methods of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, wherein everyday experiences in people's lives were used to provide effective teaching material.[54]

The jathas and artistic performances helped create an atmosphere in which people felt they could present themselves, admit their illiteracy and join the classes. Illiterates were also encouraged to display any talents they had, helping to promote their self-esteem. These methods helped 135,000 of Ernakulam's 174,000 illiterate citizens to read, do simple arithmetic, and understand the basics of health, sanitation and inoculation. A simultaneous immunisation programme brought near 100 per cent levels of protection against measles, tuberculosis, diphtheria and polio, highlighting the reciprocal and mutually reinforcing benefits of literacy and improvements in health. Ernakulam was declared totally literate in February 1990 and an expanded statewide campaign brought total literacy to Kerala in 1991.

Informal infrapolitical order

> To see the Kerala model as an outgrowth only of 'wise policies' . . . is to miss its most significant feature: the organization, mobilization and active participation of millions of the state's ordinary people.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[55]

Central to Kerala's development success and interrelated with its historically high literacy is its strong informal sector and vigorous associational life. Kerala has developed high levels of social and infrageographical capital and mobilization, with an impressive density of civic and cooperative organizations. Half the state's population is estimated to belong to at least one grassroots organization.[56] In this development approach, grassroots democracy is an important, nay essential, part of the developmental process, rather than an afterthought or liberal privilege. As interviewee Michael Tharakan (Kannur University) describes it,

> In spite of the fact that India was poor and underdeveloped, the freedom movement itself was highly democratic and participatory, because of the influence of Mahatma Gandhi, and this was followed by his immediate successors.
>
> If you compare us with China – which went through serious structural changes – India did it a different way, influenced by the Westminster model. Political freedoms were ensured to a greater degree in India, even though greater poverty persisted. But within India, there was a spectacularly different experience in Kerala.
>
> First, in 1957, a communist and opposition ministry were elected and second, Kerala had a development process in which social indicators of progress (mortality, education, health) were achieved in a very brief period after independence, challenging the conventional wisdom in development theory that you first had to create wealth.
>
> (Michael Tharakan)[57]

This vibrant civic culture flows into the economy, with an extensive cooperative movement that includes worker production cooperatives, distribution cooperatives and cooperative finance. Kerala also boasts a network of village libraries estimated at 15,000 branches and India's largest per-capita circulation of newspapers and magazines.[58] A thriving literary and film culture also exists in the state, and the Sahitya Pravarthaka Cooperative Society or the Writers' Cooperative of Kerala is one of the largest and most successful in the world.[59]

This has all been achieved with, until recently, one of the lowest industrial growth rates in India. Since Indian independence, Kerala has arguably experienced two distinct economic phases; one of low growth and one more recently of markedly improved growth that exceeds the national average. A number of studies have used different cut-off points to distinguish the two periods. Sachs et al., for example, have pointed out that the net state domestic product of the state grew at 2.5 per cent between 1980 and 1990 and double that at 5.2 per cent between 1992 and 1998.[60] In the second half of the 2000s decade, Kerala's growth rate has crossed the national Indian average. Kannan argues that the low growth argument is a red herring – Kerala's growth rates have been comparable to other Indian states and that without factoring in redistributive policies, growth statistics would have stood out.[61] Two recent Human Development Reports for Kerala nevertheless identify Kerala's primary economic and development challenge as resolving the 'lopsided development' – high social development with low economic

growth – that has characterized the state's economy till the early 1990s, and building on a relatively undeveloped industrial sector.

Mounting limits

> Let not the praise that scholars shower on Kerala for its achievements divert attention from the intense economic crisis that we face. We are behind other States of India in respect of economic growth, and a solution to this crisis brooks no delay. We can ignore our backwardness in respect of employment and production only at our own peril.
>
> (E. M. S. Namboodirippad–first Chief Minister of Kerala in 1957)[62]

A number of mitigating factors have dogged the classical Kerala development path. First, Kerala's high population density and land scarcity has made land-intensive industrialization difficult. Second, the state's reputation as a labour-militant state, perhaps undeserved but nevertheless a persistent perception, has in the past made it one of the least attractive industrial investment destinations in India.[63] Third, the state exports crops such as coconuts and rubber, which makes it quite vulnerable to falls in international commodity prices. Until recently with a greater emphasis upon Information Technology (IT) and tourism, traditional industries have dominated the state's economy and most of the state's industrial exports are drawn from these traditional agro-processing industries: coir (coconut fibre, most of which is in the cooperative sector), cashew-processing, rubber-processing, handicrafts, handloom-weaving, tea, coffee and beedi (Indian cigarettes). Kerala is India's leading fish-producing state, employing 1.2 million Keralites; additionally the state accounts for over 90 per cent of India's production of natural rubber. Fourth, the national government's pursuit of economic liberalization policies has often acted against the interests of the state, particularly after commencement of the WTO regime in 1995 and with a number of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).[64]

In terms of income and employment however, Kerala's economy is no longer predominantly agrarian; the primary sector accounts for only 26 per cent of the State income and 32 per cent of employment (in 1999–2000). The largest shares of income (55 per cent) and employment (40 per cent) are generated in the service sector. Also significant is the fact that from the mid-1970s, the state's economy has been receiving a significant amount of remittances from overseas. International labour migration is very significant in Kerala, as well as generating multiplier effects for the state economy. Since the 1990s, Kerala has accounted for 40 to 60 per cent of Indian contract workers in the Gulf region.[65] International remittance income into Kerala is estimated at just over 20 per cent of Kerala's state domestic product.[66] In conjunction with the value of export income, the 2005 Human Development Report for Kerala estimates that 'quite possibly . . . around or more than 40 per cent of Kerala's domestic income is being generated directly or indirectly through its integration with the outside world'.[67]

The extent to which remittances has an impact upon Keralites is reflected in the estimate that one in four households in Kerala have a direct experience of international migration through one or more of its members.[68] Emigration has contributed to further improvements in educational levels, yet has also exacerbated educated unemployment, since the educated are more likely to refrain from low-paid, unskilled labour. This has been a contributing factor in Kerala's unemployment doubling between 1999 and 2004, with internal migrants from neighbouring states meeting the demand for some hard labour jobs.[69]

Reflective of lower work participation figures overall for women, a Gulf migration study estimated that only 10 per cent of migrants from the State in 1998 were women. Women had a higher representation among internal migrants.[70] Tharakan outlines one of the disincentives for women:

> The Keralan economy is very much supported by women, especially in teaching and nursing. In Cologne, Germany, there are over 5000 Keralan nurses . . . In the US and Gulf region too . . . There is a reversal of gender roles in the context of globalization – men want to marry educated women but feel their masculinity diminished and take it out on women, beat up their wives and sisters. Remittances sent home by older daughters is used to marry off younger sisters. The older sister's marriage age passes – her parents are not interested in marrying her off because she is the income source – she is unwanted when she comes home for the holidays because she is unmarried and they don't want the neighbours to know they are supported by their daughter.
>
> (Michael Tharakan)[71]

Although women have been critical to catalyzing Kerala's development success, the status of women in Kerala is still far below that of men in a deeply patriarchal and conservative society, albeit still comparatively higher than other states in India when measured by levels of literacy, health and education. In fact, Kerala currently lags behind other states in a number of gender indicators, in particular the Indian women's work participation rate. While the female work participation rate average in India increased from 19.7 per cent to 22.7 per cent between 1981 and 1991, in Kerala it actually declined from 16.6 per cent to 15.9 per cent for the same period.[72] Labour market discrimination along gender lines is starkly evidenced in unemployment rates. Unemployment among women with middle to secondary levels of education is two and a half to four times higher than men with the same educational attainments in rural and urban areas respectively.[73] Despite the acknowledged and remarkable contribution of women in achieving Kerala's developmental capabilities – literacy, the demographic transition and reducing population growth, schooling and life expectancy – social opportunities for enhancing women's participation in the public realm have been limited.

By the early 1990s, when the central government began embracing more neoliberal economic policies, the LDF, led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), announced a change of direction. Remarkable though the results of its early development vision had been, four decades later an alarming economic

situation had developed in the State and the LDF called for Kerala to take stock and re-orient its policies. Questions about the fiscal sustainability of the classic model were raised as a result of the Centre, as the Indian government is known, cutting revenue-sharing and pushing IMF- and World Bank-influenced privatization. These policies threatened to erode the social gains that Kerala had achieved in literacy, land reforms, public distribution systems, roads, infant mortality rates, higher social status of women, minimum wages, universal school education and quality of education.

Into the new millennium, Kerala has faced a set of significant new challenges. Its economy has been more vulnerable to falling international commodity prices. Kerala's unemployment rate has been one of the highest in the country. In a putatively progressive political environment, there have still been relatively few women in public roles and an alarmingly high prevalence of educated unemployment amongst both sexes, but more markedly for women. The challenge for Kerala has been how to preserve past gains, tackle 'second generation' development challenges and build a sustainable and strong social economy. The People's Plan, as the Ninth Five Year Plan from 1996 to 2001 was dubbed, became a proposal to address these challenges.

Extending the gains: the PPC

Since independence in 1947, India has engaged in vaguely Soviet-style 5-year plans, with most states additionally adopting their own state-based five-year plans. Even before the collapse of the Eastern European bloc of state socialism, however, many Kerala leftists had come to the conclusion that overemphasis on centralized planning contained inherent weaknesses. As identified in one Ninth Plan document, centralized planning

> degenerated into uncoordinated, mutually exclusive schemes by various government departments . . . that did not provide optimal utilization of resources . . . Was bureaucratic and gave people no say in its formulation or execution . . . Led to overlapping programs, duplication and waste of resources, and laxness in monitoring.
>
> (Kerala State Planning Board)[74]

The Ninth Five Year Plan, or People's Plan (*Janakeeya Aasoothranam*) as it became known, was a response to the classical Kerala 'model' having reached its zenith. Launched in campaign mode with a 'big bang' approach, it was a culmination of years of discussion and debate and analysis on Kerala's challenges and shortcomings. Kerala's epistemic communities as well as international scholars assumed an important role, particularly via the first International Congress on Kerala Studies in Thiruvananthapuram hosted by the CPI (M) in 1994. The Congress was intended to open a dialogue between scholars involved in studies about Kerala and socio-political representatives concerned about the state of its economy and what might be done to effect positive change.[75]

After decades of sluggish economic gains, decentralization was considered as a way forward out of the logjam of 'lopsided development' that characterized the period between the late 1950s to the early 1990s, as well as a means by which to facilitate local level development by mobilizing people and resources to strengthen the productive base.[76] Decentralization was conceived as a popular movement to transfer power to ordinary people, not just to lower-level officials, and one that could succeed in Kerala due its strong civic culture, drawing upon Kerala's high levels of social mobilization and mētis.

A conjunction of events and processes made the PPC (hereafter also abbreviated as Plan or Campaign) possible. At the national scale, Kerala's decentralized development pathway was facilitated by constitutional provisions of the Indian Constitution specifically mandating decentralization through the 73rd and 74th Amendments in 1993.[77] This illustrates the (national) State's or Centre's complex and sometimes dual role, constraining constituent cash-crop exporting states like Kerala in its pursuit of neoliberal policies yet also enabling in its legislation to constitutionally mandate greater powers and responsibilities for local self-government. After passing the two constitutional amendments, the task of decentralization fell to state governments, most of which implemented reforms that had little substantive impact. The most notable exception was Kerala. During the same period, the Sen Committee Interim Report commissioned for the state explicitly embraced subsidiarity as a principle in decentralization recommendations.[78]

Kerala's radical experiment also occurred at a significant global historical juncture: namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc, which also coincided with an assault on many of the welfare gains of the mid-to late-twentieth century. It also occurred as the World Bank was holding up the Asian tiger economies as examples to emulate in the early 1990s. A number of these 'miracle' economies crashed in 1997, just as Kerala embarked on its decentralization program. Along with austerity and privatization, decentralization was also being trumpeted by the IMF and World Bank, but of a qualitatively different kind.[79] In contrast, Kerala's decentralization in the PPC was designed to genuinely devolve powers as well as funds on a large-scale, aiming to create a radically democratic parallel of the decentralization of corporate globalization practitioners. Thomas Isaac saw decentralization as a complement to globalization, extending a tradition that drew from Gandhi:

> Decentralization is the more flexible complement to globalization. Gandhi mobilized people against the British, using a decentralization strategy from the village level.
>
> Decentralization can be used for an anti-globalization agenda, or for a globalization agenda, it can work both ways. If possible we want to build an alternative model to the ADB [Asian Development Bank] agenda.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[80]

Marx meets Mahatma Gandhi: the PPC

On returning to power in March 1996, the LDF coalition government immediately moved to fulfill one of its most important campaign pledges by launching the

'People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning'. All 1,214 local governments in Kerala – municipalities and the three rural tiers of district, block and village gram panchayats[81] – were given new functions and powers of decision-making, and were granted discretionary budgeting authority of 35 to 40 per cent of the state's developmental expenditures, the rest slated for large scale projects like major electrification and port dredging. The Campaign went well beyond the devolution of governance functions as structured by the implementing agency, the Kerala State Planning Board (KSPB). It was intended and designed to create an active, participatory role for local citizens in shaping local development policy-making and budgets.

From the governing left's point of view, it was anticipated that the Plan was not only a path toward more democratic, participatory development but also simultaneously an instrument to challenge corporate globalization through capacity building. A key aim of the Plan was to 'generate the maximum direct participation of the people in daily governance'.[82] As Franke describes it:

> progressive activists by the 1990s came to the conclusion that the energy and creativity of local democracy might be tools to advance a development agenda independent of corporate-dominated globalization. Their agenda had to be consistent with both Marxist goals of egalitarianism and Gandhian ideas of local autonomy and maximum self-sufficiency within the constraints of the international capitalist system.
>
> Already in the 1980s an LDF Ministry had experimented with local initiatives in cooperative farming, environmental projects, local planning assemblies and elected District Councils to try to decentralize the bureaucratic State government and bring political power to more local levels. The PPC was an enormous 'going to scale' of these local experiments.
>
> (Richard W. Franke)[83]

Decentralization refers to the devolution of functions and resources of the State from the centre to the elected governments at subsidiary levels so as to facilitate greater direct participation by the citizens in governance – and, in Kerala's case, the social economy. In contrast to the decentralization promulgated by agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, decentralized planning in the Plan did not mean an abrogation of higher official level responsibilities. The goal was rather a meaningful relaxation of central control and substantial local-level community empowerment. Ninth Plan theorists Thomas Isaac and K. N. Harilal describe the campaign as leading to 'a system of multi-level planning, where the lowest unit is allowed to plan and implement everything that can be performed most effectively at that level and only the residual is left to the higher levels'.[84] Isaac explicitly uses the word 'experiment' to describe the state's subsidiarity:

> A lot of resources and money in Kerala has been given to local self-government. Even with the limited resources we have, we are striving to build a self-reliant economy. In this global era, we will utilize decentralization to

> give confidence to people. It is possible to build an alternative. What we do now may not be an alternative, but every small thing we achieve will raise the confidence of people.
>
> We are trying a number of experiments. The first is real democracy. Not just formal legal democracy but an opportunity for people to participate in everyday decision-making.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[85]

To accomplish this, the sovereignty of village assemblies needed to be central. As envisaged by the Sen Commitee Interim Report, the three tiers of local government are set up to be functionally, financially and administratively autonomous and complementary. The Sen Report was a key part of an epistemic community's contribution to the vision for decentralization: maximize direct participation, practice subsidiarity, clarify the roles of each tier, observe accountability through social auditing, transparency and uniformity of norms and criteria.[86] The state's administrative organization spans district to ward level (Figure 5.2).

The Kerala Panchayat Raj and Municipality Acts of 1994 set out the provisions for a decentralized three-tier panchayat system in designated rural areas (village, block and district) and for the cities, one tier of municipality or municipal 'corporation'. The large cities (municipal 'corporations') do not come under the jurisdiction of the district panchayat system, with separate administrative entities for rural and urban areas set out as follows (the current number of units is indicated in parentheses in Figure 5.3).

The decentralization campaign was underpinned by a trust that local planning could make more efficient use of existing local resources, and that more efficient




Figure 5.2 Kerala's levels of governance.




Figure 5.3 The panchayat system.

and sustainable use of resources could in fact *only* occur with active local-level support and participation, particularly in places where people depend more directly on their local physical environment. In short, in contrast to top-down planning, the expectation was that local people understand local needs best and could better ensure efficacy of development responsive to their needs. With training, access to technical assistance and measures in place to safeguard transparency, Kerala's public social and infrageographical milieu – its high literacy and associational life – could lend itself well to self-help groups and participatory planning. Isaac gives the relationship between democracy and economic development expression thus:

> Even the poor can have the dignity of being free. That is very important: self-respect. If they feel they can make a decision and feel involved, then we can facilitate a self-reliant economy.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[87]

Under the PPC, significant planning and budgetary functions, which had previously been controlled by state-level ministries, were devolved to the most elementary tier of government: municipalities in urban areas and gram panchayats (village councils) in rural areas. Many local service-based institutions (schools, primary health care centres, child care centres) were transferred to LSGs. So that the process did not simply strengthen local elites rather than help its intended beneficiaries, part of the grant-in-aid was mandatorily set aside for scheduled castes and tribal sub-plans, with special component plans for women, scheduled castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs) and regulations to ensure marginalized groups had a degree of decision-making control.[88] In particular, the Women's Component Plan (WCP) required a gender effects evaluation of each project and 10 per cent of local planning funds to be earmarked for women's development, with women-only sub-committees within the village assembly deciding how this should be spent. Additionally, women were mandated a third of seats in all elected local bodies.

In Kerala, LSGs had a relatively high degree of fiscal autonomy even before the PPC but the campaign extended this, with development fund plan grants amounting to double the amount of the LSG's own resources. Plan grant-in-aid was not intended to be the only resource – a major aim of decentralized participatory planning has been to promote local resource mobilization, including generating voluntary services and beneficiary contributions, as well as income generating activities. This is reflected in the fact that local plans financial dependence on grant-in-aid fell from 77 per cent in 1997–8 to 65 per cent in 2000–1.[89]

While the funds to the panchayats were untied, the State Planning Board asked the panchayats to follow broad guidelines for sectoral allotments in the plan outlay in order to redirect development investments in productive sectors. Guidelines recommended that 40 to 50 per cent of the grant-in-aid should be spent for productive projects in agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, small-scale industry; 30 to 40 per cent for social services (education, health, sanitation, drinking water supply, housing); and only 10 to 30 per cent for infrastructure.[90]

Partly reflecting these guidelines, a major part of PPC expenditure was on crop cultivation, education, minor irrigation, healthcare, sanitation, housing, transport and animal husbandry.[91] By the end of the Plan's campaign in 2002, 'productive' sectors received 28 per cent of the grant-in-aid (industry, crop and animal husbandry, fisheries and minor irrigation), down from 42 per cent in 1997. Infrastructure and services made up about 28 and 44 per cent respectively, correspondingly increasing their shares.[92]

The entire process of planning was now to start from the village outward, going through many phases and tiers of co-ordination to final approval at the district level. The grama sabha (the village assembly consisting of all the voters in the village) was the primary unit of planning (though not in themselves the budgetary decision-making bodies), with clear powers over the grama panchayat, the elected representative body of the village. In other words, the grama sabha became the deliberative body, the grama panchayat the representative body. Neighbourhood groups thus became the primary unit of democratic governance and the central element in taking power to the grassroots, effectively embodying micro-governance in the world's largest democracy. This process was not so much about making public policy more accessible than about making it more meaningfully constitutive of people's real needs and more sensible to a local context. Underpinning it was the notion that participatory *planning* is emptied of substance if it is not also participatory *budgeting*, and that people should be directly involved in managing and determining priorities for public funds. Through the PPC, Kerala in fact became the most fiscally decentralized state in India and second in the world only to Colombia by one measure.[93]

The PPC was implemented in four phases to facilitate 'planning from below': the grama sabha assemblies, local development reports, task forces and annual plan finalization. Local governments were charged with designing and implementing their own development plans (which included designing and financing projects across the full range of development sectors), aided by a comprehensive series of participatory exercises. The building block of this process was the holding of the two annual grama sabhas, one at the beginning of the planning cycle and one at the end of the budgeting process. This required that every gram panchayat organize open village assemblies twice a year through which citizens could express their 'felt needs' and participate in formulating planning priorities, goals and projects. This was explicitly designed to invite and foster local-level participation, and bridge the gap between local development and the self-identified needs of people. Village assemblies were inaugurated with street theatre and coconut lamp processions, creating a festive and inviting atmosphere. Trained facilitators encouraged discussions in the grama sabhas within topic groups such as agriculture and irrigation. An appreciable bipartisanship was achieved: opposition party-dominated panchayats did have lower rates of participation in the first two grama sabhas during the Campaign's first year but this was dissolved by the second year.[94]

A local social auditing phase involved resource-mapping and data collection activities that were conducted toward the preparation of Panchayat

Development Reports. Three quarters of all panchayats carried out a 'transect walk', marking major environmental features of their village and identifying resources available for addressing the problems enunciated in the grama sabhas. Elected resource-mapping and local data gathering representatives prepared the reports, leading to 990 panchayat development reports, typically between 75 to 100 pages and produced to a high standard.[95] Task forces were then set up to draft project proposals. As well as taking stock of available resources, transect walks and audits would reveal such vital basic information as which houses lacked modern sanitary latrines, an important amenity and major factor in reducing water- and air-borne disease. In total, the PPC saw over 413,000 sanitary latrines constructed in contrast with 125,000 during the 8th Plan.

The local plans of 990 village panchayats were integrated in 152 block panchayat plans and 14 district panchayat plans. Block- and district-level government officers went through the panchayat reports and plans in order to identify areas that required coordination and that were suitable for complementary projects. In addition, the development schemes of the central government had to be integrated. Tapping into community human resources, especially retirees, plans were duly appraised with the help of the voluntary training corps of retired technical experts resident in Kerala's villages. Once projects were approved, project notices and the selection criteria had to be printed, circulated in media and displayed in public places. In contrast to the earlier system, where public works were awarded to private contractors, these were to be supervised and administered by the people themselves through the Plan's new system of beneficiary committees.[96]

To carry out identified projects, the committees relied on the newly established voluntary technical corps of more than 4,000 retired civil servants, engineers, doctors, academics, professionals and other technical experts who responded to the call to commit to at least one day per week to help advise and evaluate local projects.[97] As well as the formation of a voluntary technical corps of educated retirees as expert resource persons, the State Planning Board orchestrated a massive training exercise, which has effectively constituted one of the largest and most extensive informal adult education programs in the world.[98] In the first year of the PPC, in seven rounds of training at state, district and local level, 15,000 elected representatives, 25,000 officials and 75,000 volunteers were given training.

About 600 state-level trainees or Key Resource Persons (KRP) received nearly twenty days of training. Additionally, 12,000 district level trainees – District Resource Persons (DRP) – received 10 days of training and at the local level more than 100,000 people received at least five days of training. In subsequent years, these training programs were extended, and were more specifically targeted toward women and Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) – in some ways the most subaltern of Kerala and Indian society. Technical skills such as running and organizing a meeting, drafting a report, simple cost-benefit analysis, budget preparation and many other technical and practical skills were on the training agenda.

At project 'clinics', panchayats with advanced projects shared their experience in how-to seminars, including on water conservation, sanitation and health.

Michael Tharakan describes his experience in training and drawing ordinary people into development planning:

> I was involved in training elected representatives, in such things as setting up budgets. The right balance of training was important. If you train too much for too long, you'll never hand over responsibility. As we say, 'You will never learn swimming by standing on the shores of the lake'. There will be mistakes, but no worse than the mistakes of centralization. The training was elaborate and run by the Kerala State Planning Board. They tried to institutionalize it at KILA [Kerala Institute of Local Administration].
>
> (Michael Tharakan)[99]

At every stage of this process, a range of civil society organizations have played an active role. Most notable has been the role of the KSSP, which has an organized presence in almost every village in Kerala, and is by far the most active and influential non-party affiliated, secular organization in the state. In addition to playing an active role in the campaign itself (supplying for example many of the local Key Resource Persons) the State Planning Board also crucially drew from the stock of practical knowledge, ideas and experiences developed over 25 years of local-level experiments in sustainable development conducted by the KSSP.

In conjunction with deploying these trainers, Campaign organizers utilized newspaper, radio and television, local conventions, posters and exhibitions, school quizzes, musical performances, street theatre, traditional drum announcements, coconut oil lamp processions, and hand-written invitations delivered to each household in the ward. Rates of participation were high, and persisted from the first year of the campaign to the second. Grama sabhas attracted an average attendance of 160 people per assembly statewide.[100] Two million people attended the first grama sabhas of August–December 1996. In the second assembly six months later there were 1.8 million in attendance and in the third, 2.1 million. These numbers equal 10 to 11 per cent of the voting age population according to Kerala's State Planning Board figures and accounts for perhaps 20 to 30 per cent of households being represented in the first three grama sabhas from September–December 1996 through to September 1997.[101] By Chaudhuri and Heller's reckoning,

> In the first year of the campaign, nearly 7 per cent of Kerala's rural population participated in the planning Grama Sabhas held in each ward of each panchayat. With those eligible to vote representing about 67 per cent of the population (from the 1991 census), this suggests that over 10 per cent of the rural electorate participated. Furthermore, with about 3.5 voters on average per household in rural Kerala, it is possible that close to a third of the households had an adult member who attended the grama sabha . . . Given the level and intensity of effort involved – grama sabhas last between 5 and 7 hours, and in addition to formal presentations, involve elaborate small groups discussions of the full range of developmental issues – these seem to us to be very significant levels of participation.
>
> (Chaudhuri and Heller)[102]

A civic-intensive function such as grama sabhas presented some obstacles to and higher costs of participation for some groups, especially women, but it also increased benefits and opportunities. Although women in Kerala have the highest literacy rates and the highest life expectancy in India, barriers to female participation are culturally persistent, including the practice of 'social purdah' – forms of patriarchal control over women's access to public spaces remains pronounced.[103] Women's access to public forums is constrained by culture and the threat of ostracism and loss of reputation of status and reputation from male guardians. As Kannan observes, 'Women in leadership positions in the panchayats have often felt the heat from men and some have been forced to abdicate'.[104]

The formation of women's neighbourhood self-help groups was designed to mobilize and capacitate women to address this and to promote their participation in grama sabhas. Not only did the participation rates of both traditionally subordinate groups, women and members of SC/STs, increase substantially, in the case of SC/STs, participation rates in the second year were higher than those of the general population in 80 per cent of the panchayats.[105] One of the major turning points in addressing the public participation deficit of women came with the constitutional amendments that mandated women a one-third of the seats in these local elected bodies, which increased to 50 per cent from September 2010.

In Payanoor, the second largest panchayat in Kerala, Ms Judee, the then President and Chair of the panchayat presided. Initially elected on a woman-only designated safe seat of the third reserved for women, she was subsequently re-elected on an open seat. An accountant by profession, she took leave from her position in a cooperative bank and took a major pay cut in the process: from Rs. 11,000 per month at the bank to a council stipend of Rs. 4,500 per month for her civic role. Asked why, Judee cites her father, a freedom-fighter, as an inspiration, and that she wants to continue social justice work. At the monthly panchayat meeting I observed proceedings,



Figure 5.4 A panchayat meeting in Payannor.



Figure 5.5 Thomas Isaac addresses attendees.



Figure 5.6 Female delegates at the grama sabha in Mararikulam.



Figure 5.7 Women form break-out discussion groups.

counting 12 women and 22 men, including five male heads of the standing committees on finance, development, health, public works and social welfare.
In Mariikulam, Dr Isaac addressed a grama sabha meeting in the Kallapurathu ward (Figure 5.5), where delegates from SHGs also attended a training day. The Muhamma Panchayat President Mr C. K. Bhaskaran was joined by the former President Mrs Jalaja Chandran, who had become the leader of Kanjikkuzhy block panchayat, to address the gathering of women from 13 SHGs. Women there attested to increased confidence, ability and legal literacy with rules and procedures of local governance. In surveys of women particularly, there was a dramatic difference – a five-fold increase – between 1995 and 1998 in respondents' confidence as a result of the Campaign's learning by doing that saw women engaging with officials, facilitating meetings and interacting with the public.[106]

As a mass campaign that was predicated upon the skills and energy of ordinary people for its efficacy, local participation was crucial and increased participants' confidence. The process demystified planning and brought it to an everyday level. People's participation has played an important role both in framing development priorities as well as in the implementation of solutions proposed, and draws a number of benefits. First, it is more likely to bring into consideration local knowledge and culture, and more likely to be based on contextually appropriate choices of methods, technologies and practices: the mētis mentioned in Chapter 3. Second, participation also helps place people in propositional mode, which tends to be more creative and constructive than simply resisting and reacting. Third,

mass participation draws upon the multiplicity paradigm, demonstrating there is a plurality of different ways of doing.

The PPC helped generate a wealth of grassroots experiments. As one Kerala scholar put it, 'the campaign turned Kerala into a giant laboratory of individual experiments'.[107] Drawing from citizens, local councils, the KSSP, non-government organizations, cooperatives and other bodies in a very active civil society, many Plan ideas started off as single-village experiments, percolating up through the tiers to serve as innovative models that might be emulated, rather than being directionally top-down. Taking a longer term view, the innovation was made possible, in Isaac and Franke's view, 'because many of the planning techniques, appropriate technologies and organizational forms had been developed experimentally in numerous local development projects spread over earlier decades'.[108]

The local plans in 1997–98 saw nearly 68,000 projects, from developing cooperative vegetable gardens to introducing water-sealed latrines, establishing women's micro-enterprises and reviving ritual traditions.[109] A number of projects addressed basic, fundamental physical needs such as housing, safe water, sanitation and mosquito control. Problem-solving forums tapped into the native intelligence of people: in one example, farm workers in Chapparappadavu managed to build a stable and viable bridge without the help of trained engineers.

This ground-up planning was not quite in the Keynesian mould, which presupposes a centralized public works approach. One of the drinking water projects may help illustrate the contrast between a decentralized and centralized Keynesian approach. In Olavanna Panchayat, a project I visited, a drinking water model was developed in an area where 70 per cent of the 10,000 households faced acute drinking water scarcity during the dry season from December to May. Despite the fact that a river runs through this lushly vegetated panchayat, there was inadequate infrastructure to access drinking water. Fed up with petitioning the state with no results, villages dug wells into the villages' slopes and pumped water into small overhead tanks. The project was self-financed by the beneficiaries who registered as societies and raised money, subsidizing Below Poverty Line (BPL) households. The project involved the creation of small-scale, piped water societies from 10 to a few hundred households. The experiment to establish such societies with only minor start-up costs resulted in bringing safe drinking water to 1,500 of the 7,000 households facing shortages at an estimated average cost up to 90 per cent lower than with a large-scale government public works approach.[110]

The project has increased the accessibility to clean drinking water so that it does not have to be collected by villagers from two kilometres away, measurably improving the health of residents: the KSSP found a reduction in water-borne diseases after surveying households in 1987 and 1997.[111] T. P. Kunhikannan, an academic and translator who accompanied the visit to the village, asserted that while the project had not been affected too much by the subsequent change of government in 2001–2, funding to extend the benefits of the successful project had been cut. If the project had started under the then current administration (UDF-led coalition), he asserted, it might not have got off the ground.[112] Olivanna's drinking water initiative has become one of the PPC's beacons, prompting the World Bank to initiate other water programs based on Olivanna's experience.

The PPC produced a number of 'beacon' panchayat projects. One such innovative experiment and cooperative project is the labour bank (or Labour Contract Society) in Kunnathukal village, was also one whose establishment PPC funds supported. The Labour Bank's 'customers' are farmers with smallholdings, and its 'capital' is human labour. The Bank was established in the context of land fragmentation and the precarious financial situation of many small farmers that made it difficult for farmers to provide a full day's work for farm workers. A register of trained agricultural workers who could work at short notice was set up, and in return for a 25 per cent concessional reduction in wages, they received a guaranteed 21 working days per month from participating farms, ensuring stability of income. Any employment gaps could be made up with inviting labourers to work on People's Plan projects such as constructing houses and road repair.

The Campaign helped produce a wide range of economic activity, the majority of which were cooperative microenterprises. These included such microenterprises as a cooperative dairy station (Janatha Milk) and a women's bookbinding cooperative. Two experiments that influenced and were an outgrowth of the PPC cooperatives strategy respectively have been Kerala Dinesh Beedi (KDB) and Mararikulam. Because it influenced and provided inspiration to the PPC, KDB will be spotlighted in the next section, before examining the impact of the PPC on the social economy.



Figure 5.8 Products from a PPC initiative: soap produced by Samatha Self Help Group.



Figure 5.9 Milk pouch from Janatha Milk cooperative.

Kerala Dinesh Beedi

The Kerala Dinesh Beedi Workers Central Co-operative Society Limited, KDB for short, is a successful 30-year experiment in decentralized workplace democracy. It is India's largest industrial cooperative and its operation has provided inspiration and insights for the People's Campaign, particularly as an enduring and viable worker's cooperative. Founded in 1969 during a lockout by private beedi employers, it has grown from a few hundred workers to 42,000 workers at its height during the 1980s and over 30,000 members during the 1990s. As at 2014, KDB employs over 12,000 workers full-time and an additional 100,000 indirectly. The workers cooperative exports primarily to neighbouring states Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and other parts of south India.[113] Except for a small number of years (at 2002 it was only four), KDB has made a profit in every year since 1969. Its close ties with the larger social and labour movement are important to its success.[114]

Beedis are small cigarettes widely smoked throughout India and South Asia. The beedi is tobacco rolled in a special leaf rather than in cigarette paper. At about six centimetres long they are about half the size of commercial cigarettes. Known as 'poor man's smokes', in the mid 1980s it was estimated that 1.4 billion beedis were smoked daily, equivalent to one million beedis being lit per minute

in India.[115] The private sector beedi industry is one of India's most exploitative and is known to employ child labour. India's 1.5 million private sector beedi workers tend to be extremely poor and unorganized, and are subject to low wages and fraudulent exactions from contractors. They tend moreover to work in poorly ventilated, filthy conditions that lack basic amenities. Numerous occupational health hazards such as asthma, bronchitis and tuberculosis have been reported.[116]

KDB's experience is markedly different. Co-op member-workers have stipulated hours with flexible schedules, with guaranteed lunch and tea breaks, and paid leave days and other worker benefits. The sites I visited were clean, well-lit and ventilated, with cement backrests. KDB workers receive pensions, paid holidays, death benefits and maternity leave benefits. The co-op also has its own thrift fund from which workers can borrow and are entitled to a lump sum or monthly pension based on length of time employed, as well as to a death benefit payable to the worker's family.

Beedi production involves low mechanisation: scissors and a bamboo tray are all the equipment that is required. It is skilled work, requiring nimble hands and concentration. Skilled workers can make one to two thousand beedis in a workday. Workers usually cut wrapper leaves for two or three hours in the morning, and then shift to rolling and tying. Stacked onto drying trays, the rolled beedis are then checked for quality before being dry-baked in a charcoal oven, packed and labelled. In 2010, wages were Rs.160 (including benefits) per 1,000 beedis.

KDB's structure is of a central cooperative with federated local cooperatives, a federal three-tier structure of worker centres, primary headquarters and central



Figure 5.10 Worker-members of the KDB cooperative preparing beedis.



Figure 5.11 Worker-members of the KDB cooperative preparing beedis.

cooperative.[117] KDB workplace democracy is strongly participatory, with both direct and indirect decision-making power related to all aspects of the business operation. Supervisors emerge mostly from among shop floor workers and are paid only slightly more than the workers they supervise. Members elect directors of the primary societies and delegates to the central society. A 22 member general body elects five of seven directors of the general society. Elections are held every two years; each worker has one vote no matter how many shares they have. Only KDB workers can own shares and every worker must own at least one share. All five current worker-elected directors are experienced shop-floor beedi rollers and union activists. The state government appoints the other two directors of the Central Cooperative.

KDB has seen a number of challenges particularly since the 2000s. The first has been a slowing of beedi sales due to the greater awareness of health effects of smoking.[118] Beedis, like commercial cigarettes, are harmful to health and an addictive substance. Health effects have also affected workplaces with the danger of inhaling airborne particulates that contain benzoapyrene. This has prompted an ambitious and steady diversification drive launched in 1996 to secure KDB's long-term viability, with non-beedi production units set up. These include sites that produce processed foods, spices, school materials as well as software development (see catalogue snapshots and site photographs).[119] A coconut milk extraction unit was established in 1997, curry powder and pickle unit during 1998, a fruit processing and IT unit, Dinesh Information Technology Systems (DITS), during 1999, an umbrella assembling unit in 2000 and a software development centre




Figure 5.12 KDB's food catalogue from their food processing headquarters.




Figure 5.13 KDB's food catalogue (inside sleeve).

in 2001, which provides e-banking and applications to hundreds of branches of cooperative banks in the state.[120]

Other challenges have included those shared in common with many co-ops – dealing with the problems of oligarchization and competition from large cigarette multinationals. While oligarchic degeneration has been largely avoided, the worker-management relationship has not been without its problems and tensions,



Figure 5.14 KDB's brochure for its umbrellas.



Figure 5.15 KDB food production units.

such as that over qualification-based wages and the lack of women among the directors.[121] Female representation on the director boards stands at only 10 per cent despite the fact that 60 per cent of KDB's production workers are female. Even with worker-elected boards of directors, there are cultural obstacles to women's trade union leadership and election to boards, and practical obstacles such as household and family duties clashing with trade union meetings outside of work hours.

Both KDB's challenges and successes – and its innovations such as the thrift fund – have provided useful lessons for ongoing experiments in Kerala's social economy. Its federated structure suggests that with a multitude of what might amount to 'only' microenterprises, viable and fair economic enterprises can form within the stewardship of a larger program, and that may include regional and international links.



Figure 5.16 KDB food production units.

Decentralization-for-development: the social economy and self help groups

That formal economic public transcript figures only tell only part of the story, as this book has suggested, is particularly true in Kerala. The informal economy and infrageographical spaces that sustain its vibrant civic culture and public action-driven policies reveal much more of the spectrum of reality. After Amartya Sen, whose capability approach has drawn on the experience of Kerala, PPC planners sought to harness democracy as a vehicle for effective economic development rather than as a separate development to it, in order to 'go beyond what government funded projects can accomplish'.[122] This is an interesting implicit acknowledgment of the benefits of cultivating capability and resources in the informal sector through a more guiding than heavy-handed state role. Heller appraises work in the informal sector as 'rooted in a configuration of social relations largely beyond the reach of the bureaucratic state and modern political institutions'.[123] The experience of Kerala raises the possibility that the state can have a meaningful role in facilitating rather than overrunning infrageographical mētis, with sustainable employment and poverty alleviation the primary goals, particularly in rural areas where formal wage employment is scarce.

Kerala has a strong informal economy, and there are currently estimated to be over 20,000 cooperatives in the state.[124] Throughout the state and particularly in the cities, one is struck by the ubiquitous advertisements for cooperatives, kuries and chitties (mutual funds): Kerala's cooperatives can be found in almost

every sector from fishing to coir to banking. Only 10 per cent of the labour force of around 12 million can be counted in the formal economic sector[125] – in manufacturing, more than three quarters of women are in the informal sector.[126] The cooperative movement both in India and in Kerala has been an enduring presence since it began a century ago. In Kerala, the state's coir (coconut fibre) workers created the first trade unions, which contributed to the bedrock of the state's progressive policies and movements. Isaac notes the role of the cooperative movement in breaking predatory capital in traditional industries: 'The co-operative network successfully extended credit to rural areas, undermined the hold of usury capital and helped to reorganize the traditional industries by removing the middlemen'.[127]

Cooperatives are envisaged not simply as a response to the impacts of corporate globalization, but also as a propositional alternative, with cooperatives often functioning as Plan implementation vehicles.[128] In a 'micro' and 'multitude' approach, the Campaign aimed to spur economic growth by improving production through thousands of cooperative experiments in the traditional and agricultural sectors as well as the IT and service industries in more recent plans. In addition to credit, cooperatives have played an important role in establishing hospitals, health care centres, unions, educational institutions, and labour contract agencies such as the Kunnathukal Labour Bank. In the context of Kerala, the strategy of cooperatives may help with persistently high unemployment.

Although a comprehensive appraisal of the cooperative movement is outside the scope of this book, it suits our purposes to note that cooperatives in mixed economies usually have three characteristics: owner-worker participation in decision-making, employee ownership and profit-sharing. There are strong and weak forms of cooperative enterprises depending upon the degree to which these three characteristics are present.[129] Cooperatives usually face a number of key challenges. One is viability and profitability; typically, less than a third of cooperatives in India have been operating at a profit.[130] Another challenge is of succeeding in making the cooperative sector an act of creation, not merely mitigation. Cooperatives in India and in Low Income/ Less Industrialized Countries (LICs) may be qualitatively different from those in the OICs in that they may have more active state support. In 1991, India had 300,000 cooperatives with 146 million members. Credit cooperatives made up a third of these, and two thirds of the membership.[131] Industrial cooperatives constitute nearly 15 per cent of India's manufacturing sector.[132] Related challenges include financing of microenterprises, coordination so that several cooperatives do not produce the same product, and oligarchization.[133]

Self help groups

Kerala endeavoured to meet some of these challenges in the PPC through its neighbourhood SHGs. The plan placed cooperative microenterprises through Women's SHGs as the major development and poverty reduction vehicles in its economic development approach. SHGs began forming in 1998 as an integral part of the Campaign. The rationale for organizing the co-ops through women is that women

are usually the least employed and the income generated would have greatest strategic impact on the household. The emphasis on women's employment also contributes to bringing about greater gender equality in a way that benefits male household members rather than threatening them. SHGs are thus also important because of cultural limitations. Mainstream trade unions tend to prioritize the interests of permanent male workers and even in relatively progressive Kerala, women are more political but still peripheralized.

Ms Valsala, a Women's Welfare Officer for Trichur Block panchayat, outlines the rationale for SHGs and the process of their activities, which she monitors:

> They [women] are not equally treated. Within decentralization, women . . . still have the household and family to have enough time for public life. They are sidelined because of this. Our societal attitudes are changing however. I help set up self-help groups and help them in getting subsidies and in acquiring knowledge and know-how.
>
> With loans, women can start self-employment ventures in making curry powders, bakery items, ice cream and fruit salad and weaving. There are 200 self-help groups in my block, with 10 to 20 women in each group. I helped arrange loans and subsidies for 60 groups.
>
> One woman from each house is represented, between the ages of 18 and 60. The groups meet weekly, normally Sunday afternoon. Groups organize around helping each other, discussing collective matters, reading the paper and current affairs issues, and loans.
>
> (Ms Valsala)[134]

Mindful that slow cultural change often percolates up from the micro, household level, the question about who actually took care of the accounts was raised and what savings and thrift protocol was in place:

> I would say both. Traditionally, it has been men. Now, it is both in most households. Decentralization has resulted in greater active participation of women.
>
> Each woman contributes 10 rupees on behalf of their household every week and deposits it in a joint bank account. After six months this becomes a substantial amount. Any family can draw from it in urgent need and pays it back.
>
> [The money] is used for emergency, for credit, for household goods, school fees or stationery. Part of my job is to visit every panchayat each month and monitor the accounts.
>
> (Ms Valsala)[135]

The goal is to stimulate economic growth and development in part by setting up cooperatives along the lines of the well-established 30 year worker's cooperative Kerala Dinesh Beedi and inspired by the Grameen Bank model, but with some important differences. The most important difference is that SHGs were part of

an integrated political programme in which these units were not simply economic units devoid of linkages to the wider welfare and wellbeing of women. As Isaac states:

> Our experiment is also to build a network of women's groups to discuss issues . . . The space for women is small. It is very surprising, given [favourable] education and fertility rates. Women need a public space, to come together. Every household is represented by a woman, who meet weekly. We are trying to devise a new micro-level organization which will make the grama sabha effective. We find that women meeting and networking is more sustainable [than men]. So this is the democracy experiment going on. We want to develop women's groups constantly monitoring village panchayats.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[136]

As with decentralization and recognition of the role of women as agents of development, the World Bank has also been promulgating the practice of women-centred microcredit units, but disembeds the economic from the social:

> This is part of a larger program. The World Bank is also trying to develop a women's micro-credit organization. The World Bank thinks this is a good way to give credit to the poor. We are saying that these groups are not just economic units, microcredit receivers; they are also community groups, political units.
>
> Women's Self-Help Groups are springing up all over the world. This is a way of helping the poor. Multinational banks are willing to lend to the poor if they pay it back. They will utilize Self Help Groups as an instrument to promote a market solution, to further financial liberalization 'reforms'.
>
> For us, Self-Help Groups are an instrument of struggle against globalization . . . We are not going to oppose multinationals. But we are not going to rely on them. We are not going to oppose TNC investment but we are not going to pay a price for them.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[137]

Isaac outlined the rationale and situates the SHGs within the broader PPC, anticipating network integration:

> We are going to use this [campaign] as an instrument for social mobilization, for self-reliance.
>
> We want to build an integrated panchayat network. We feel this will generate employment and establish fair trade. It will also serve to agitate – others will say, why aren't you paying fair wages?
>
> Another component is decentralized social security. The ILO has agreed to collaborate with us on this. We are using this network of Women's Self-Help Groups to produce social security. We want to decrease morbidity by half, and to link the Women's Self-Help Groups to hospitals to achieve

> preventative health education. Instead of expensive insurance, we can bring it down and lower the insurance premium. Sanitation, nutrition, and clean drinking water – it's an ambitious program, which will create an alternative model.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[138]

Kerala's more holistic approach anticipates that only where linkages are made between literacy, political empowerment and economic empowerment can SHGs be successful in poverty alleviation and empowerment. That may be why some Indian states may not have had as successful a SHG movement as Kerala, because it needs an integrated approach.[139]

Recognizing that women's engagement in local accountability systems cannot simply be legislated into existence, Self-Help Groups' benefits are recognized as social and political as well as economic. SHGs can be a platform to enable women to address any social problem faced by its members, such as domestic violence, alcohol, the dowry system, schools, water supply, health and sanitation and help pool and foster skills like book-keeping. They can also encourage women to become active in village affairs, and to challenge the traditional barriers that women face.

It is also worth noting that the groups initially functioned primarily to promote democratic and transparent spending decisions about public funds devolved to the local communities during the campaign. By 1999 and 2000, some groups began 'collecting thrift', small weekly or monthly individual deposits that were used for emergency loans to group members, from which small-scale microcredit cooperative businesses could be launched. Putting thrift and savings at the heart of the moral politics of SHGs brings together people who combine political force and display material commitment to their savings circle, building capacity from the grassroots and making them a political force to be reckoned with by institutions that have adapted to cater to them.

The first step in creating viable cooperative microenterprises in the Kerala template is to organize people to generate capital. What may seem like meagre contributions when counted individually, when aggregated over time the collective capital generated builds an estimable pool of funds sufficient for credit-matching for a start-up or to draw upon by members. Amounts may be small, but savings have to be a regular and continuous habit with all the members, in accordance with the credo 'Savings first – credit later'. The savings are to be used as loans to members, with the purpose, amount, and rate of interest to be decided by the group itself. In 2001 thrift savings on average generated US$6.94 per person per year. A 2002 survey of 1,137 groups by Franke found that savings resulted in a total capital pool of Rs. 15 million. Networked with local cooperative credit institutions, SHGs had access to 27 million rupees to augment savings for production microenterprises throughout the Ninth Plan period.[140]

The village council considers the project within the local annual plan with the idea of distributing the investments to maximize interconnections and to avoid overinvestment in any particular activity. Upon project approval by the village

panchayat, financing sources are organized and matched: the village panchayat draws from its decentralization funds, supplemented by micro-financing by the participants themselves through a rotating credit association and a loan from a local or state cooperative bank.[141] Using the thrift funds as start-up capital, groups can then choose to manufacture soap, school supplies, umbrellas, candles, incense, sandals, clothing, some electrical equipment and processed foods, or a service such as a teashop or cooperative store.

Crucially, the local community has to be persuaded that the items would have a reasonable market. In Chapparappadavu, one SHG set up a poultry unit while another began the manufacture of 'hot boxes', a rice cooker invented by Kerala scientists that uses 50 per cent less fuel and takes less cooking time. The power of social auditing was demonstrated in Pallichal village, with the very act of surveying members generating the interest to sustain a cooperative: before deciding on the number of people who could join a newly established women's weaving cooperative to manufacture school uniforms, the council conducted a household survey to find out how many parents would agree to purchase at least one school uniform from the local unit if it were started up. The act of conducting the survey itself led to substantial community interest and pledges of enough uniforms to open the SHG to 120 members.[142]

It is important to note that not all SHGs have been able to run viable microenterprises. Local conditions, the artisanal and higher educational qualifications of members, the nature of the activity, connections to networks, and previous experience all weigh in as determining factors. Other problems of this development approach include the potential for replication of the same activity in a number of groups, and the exclusion of the very poorest families who are unable to meet the weekly savings prerequisite for membership.[143]

The Grameen Bank model employs similar aims and methods of social peer monitoring and marshalling of local surplus into generating sustainable income to bring people out of poverty. While it influenced planners, the PPC sought to extend and move past the Grameen model's weaknesses. First, the Grameen Bank model is far more dependent upon outside funds to launch the self-help process. The lending agency may have an agenda of its own, such as World Bank micro-credit programs, which have, for example, required privatization of participating lending agencies.[144] Second, promoting any single group of five women to engage in any particular kind of economic activity does not necessarily help the development needs of the local community. The borrowers are united only in terms of repaying the loans and may have no other generic links to each other. Third, the Grameen Bank and commercial microcredit schemes tend to market to women working in lone enterprises, usually with little or no technical and marketing support. Fourth, the fewer number of women typically in a group (of five) means greater vulnerability to being hijacked by what male household members dictate. There is the problem of some male relatives pressuring women into loans for purposes other than stipulated and violence sometimes resulting. In one study, Rahman found that 70 per cent of Grameen-style microcredit loans were not used for the purpose for which they were requested.[145]

Kerala's plan to facilitate income-generating cooperative microenterprises has a number of differences. The Kerala approach extends and moves beyond the Grameen model by harnessing members' own pooled savings to leverage additional funds from community organizations. Using members own thrift funds eliminates the need for collateral and constitutes a key difference with the Grameen model inspired SHGs elsewhere in India. The transaction costs of the loans are reduced for both lenders and borrowers. In this approach, microenterprise women are the decision-makers, distributors and receivers of their own surplus. Lending is organized and coordinated by elected committees of women rather than by an external bank bureaucracy, which, unlike the Grameen model, manages to obviate some of the power inequality that inheres in donor-beneficiary relationships.

The resulting network of women's cooperatives is potentially developing into a strong movement of democratic development and self-reliance. Additionally, in Kerala it may help constitute a parallel alternative to the market for multinational products. In 2000–1, for example, the World Bank and USAID launched their Washing Hands project in India, with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and multinationals that included Unilever, Procter and Gamble and Colgate Palmolive as partners. The project's brief was to save lives by halving the incidence of diarrheal disease, a major cause of death in less industrialized countries, through the promotion of soap. Of all the states to choose to launch in, however, they selected Kerala – the state with the highest level of education and hygiene in India. Critics like Vandana Shiva charged that the plan was simply a marketing scheme to sell soap produced by multinational corporations. In 2002 she wrote:

> Kerala has the highest access to safe water, highest knowledge of prevention of diarrhea because of high female literacy and local health practices such as use of jeera water . . . The World Bank project is an insult to Kerala's knowledge regarding health and hygiene. It is in fact Kerala from where cleanliness and hygiene should be exported to the rest of the world.
>
> (Vandana Shiva)[146]

The World Bank's misguided clean hands campaign in Kerala is illustrative of policies that ignore existing mētis, local particularities and needs, and seeks to impose a world view that may be far removed from the target group. Moreover, as Shiva argues, the top-down scheme threatens the indigenous systems of knowledge, which constitutes the infrageographical mētis of the informal order to the formalized corporate control approach:

> Kerala has the richest indigenous systems for non-chemical, non-polluting natural hygiene products – from biodiversity such as shikaki, a herbal soap, to natural soap-making at the small-scale level. The project is thus an attempt to destroy indigenous knowledge, indigenous biodiversity and indigenous economies. It is a project to destroy lives, not save lives by destroying employment in local cottage-based industries as well as introducing chemical-based toxic detergents from global corporations.

> The project is also launched to legitimize water privatization through private-public partnerships, which are aimed at undermining people's water rights and the State's duties to protect water and people's water rights. The case of Coca Cola destroying water in Kerala by extracting 1.5m litres per day for its bottling plant is an example of how 'private-public partnerships' are a recipe for over exploitation of scarce fresh water resources and a threat to people's water rights and a recipe for creating thirst and disease.
>
> (Vandana Shiva)[147]

Yet the scheme to promote multinational soap by backdoor means failed to meet a receptive market in a state that not only has the best health and hygiene standards in India, but also is less captive because it has been developing its own soap products through the burgeoning network of groups. The World Bank attempt to impose legibility failed because Kerala's already successful systems were illegible to it. This example illustrates the efficacy of investing in building a propositional parallel, subventing indigenous systems and alternatives rather than being fatally preoccupied by resisting and subverting.

A soap-making microenterprise: the Mararikulam initiative

A number of SHGs have mobilized to produce soap, an eminently viable cooperative product particularly in Kerala given the abundance of coconuts for coconut oil. Soap is an ideal product for microcredit cooperatives provided not more than an optimal number of SHGs undertake soap-making as their activity. It uses relatively simple technology and is an essential item, making it an ideal microenterprise product.

In one of Kerala's very poorest areas, I visited the Mararikulam poverty-reduction and development project, which incorporated this pursuit into the wider aim of transforming SHGs into worker-owned cooperatives producing items for sale in the local economy. The Mararikulam project consisted of an integrated set of poverty-alleviating and employment-generating projects designed to make substantial reductions in poverty in the eight villages and two towns of the Aryad and Kanjikuzhy development blocks in the central coastal region of Kerala, over the years 2002 to 2005. It marshaled 1,500 neighbourhood savings groups with 20 to 40 women each in one of state's poorest areas. 60 per cent live under the poverty line of US$480/year (2002), yet literacy rates are over 90 per cent and life expectancy is over 70 years, with low infant mortality.

Following thrift collections, even Mararikulam's very poor households generated amounts of capital adequate to start up microenterprises. When aggregated, the collective surplus was sufficient to capitalise a small cooperative unit like soap-making. Of the project outlay of almost Rs. 500 million over 2002–5, local government and own savings made up two-fifths of start-up funds with the remainder from international and local agencies. Foreign funding made up only six per cent of total outlay.[148]

16 SHGs were selected through the local village assemblies, two in each village, to become local soap producing cooperatives. Veterans of the 1996–2001

People's Campaign had volunteered to provide unpaid support and the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC) in Kerala, a research institution of progressive scientists, came forward with soap-producing technology kits and helped with training. By May 2002, all 16 units were producing several batches of soap per week. In one hour, a team of women can produce several moulds full of soap. The quality is comparable to the corporate multinational product, yet it is cheaper, and helps stimulates the local economy. With the incidence of diarrheal diseases related to water quality and water-borne diseases, the soap-making also meshes in well with the ongoing campaign to promote hygiene and sanitation.

It is also significant that the project was consciously conceived as an alternative to corporate market-dominated globalization. On 11 May 2002, 30,000 women gathered at the soccer field of Saint Michael's College in Mararikulam to pledge their solidarity, taking the Maari Soap Pledge as a conscious affirmation of the self-reliance concept of Mahatma Gandhi and as act of resistance to corporate dominated globalization. Led by Kerala feminist novelist Sara Joseph, they pledged to use only Maari soap and to create a new model of sustainable development.

In the Janani microenterprise for example, 20 members have formed a soap-making cooperative unit. Coconut oil is procured locally, and the caustic soda and sodium silicate made available by the IRTC. All that is needed to add is magnesium silicate, perfume, colour and rainwater. The initial capital outlay in 2005 was Rs. 25,000 for six soap moulds, with lime and sandalwood soap-bars selling for just under Rs. 10 each, and Rs. 60 for 20 soaps. The women, whose husbands are mostly coir workers, produced the soap from Monday to Friday and



Figure 5.17 A member of Janani SHG producing soap.



Figure 5.18 Maari soap purchased from the Mararikulam initiative.

sold it on Saturdays, either at local markets or by door-to-door. The goal is to generate income to bring households above the poverty line and to diversify into semi-processed foods, school bags and stationery and umbrellas and with aspirations to distribute state-wide and internationally through fair trade networks.

Evaluating the People's Plan

The People's Planning process has been a bold and innovative initiative in sharing powers, functions and resources with the aim of boosting local economic development and enhancing capability and agency. Overall, the PPC has been a general resounding success, with demonstrably positive effects for participation and social inclusion, revolutionizing the conventional planning process by giving direct involvement to Kerala's citizens in development planning. This has included the fixing of local priorities, identification of viable schemes, direct involvement in implementation of projects, the selection of beneficiaries, and the ongoing monitoring of projects.

Smartly building upon and drawn from Kerala's decades of struggle for social justice, it has succeeded in generating a greater sense of capabilities and optimism about people developing their immediate and wider communities. Trust in the capacity of people and the cultivation of capability is the basic presumption of this template, rather than top-down paternalism or mistrust of the ability and agency of ordinary people who have most to lose or gain from government policies.

The generally favourable developmental impact of the initial experiment, especially in infrastructure and services, has also improved awareness of the public system to local specificities and the 'felt needs' of Kerala's educated, informed, politically conscious and well organized populace. Kerala's participatory development experiment has improved the delivery of public services, helped reduce caste inequality, facilitated the entry of women into public life and enhanced democratic practice. Breakthroughs in the provision of public services include improvements in roads, drinking water, hospitals and health care centres, sanitation and education. By the third year the Campaign began to generate local employment by improving upon the famous Grameen Bank microcredit idea to bring households above the poverty level. The Campaign achieved a modest but laudable 2.26 per cent reduction in formal sector unemployment over the period of the Ninth Plan.[149] By one reckoning, Kerala has also witnessed an industrial growth spurt over the timespan of the PPC, led mainly by small and medium industries. The Annual Survey of Industries estimates that between 1990 and 2000 for example, the number of factories increased by 40 per cent from 3,484 to 4,853, predominantly small and medium units.[150] During the first three years of the Campaign, from 1996 to 1999, over 315,000 new acres of land were brought into cultivation, up almost 6 per cent. This is important in the context of declining agricultural production, which in 1998–9 went up by almost 4 per cent compared with an average of 1.3 per cent in the previous three years. Franke asserts that industrial growth too was boosted by 7.2 per cent, with more than 100,000 new jobs created.[151]

Significantly, participants themselves rendered predominantly positive appraisals. In 1999, almost 2,500 participants were polled about various aspects of Kerala's decentralization: beneficiary selection received high ratings on a five point scale, with a 20 per cent improvement in average ratings from the Campaign's first year to its third. Monitoring, which had received the lowest score during the first year of the Campaign, had risen by 30 per cent in the third. All components registered significant improvements over time except for local resource mobilization, which stayed the same.[152] As confirmed by performance audit teams and inquiries of the disallowance committee, the PPC succeeded in reducing local corruption and nepotism in beneficiary selection, reflected in the reduced number of complaints about selection and selection procedure.[153] One way it achieved this was simply by reducing the opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour. Isaac and Franke found that irregularities in the first year of campaign more likely resulted from inexperience and teething problems than corruption.[154]

The Campaign was not without its problems. The LDF-led government and wider Left movement in Kerala had decided on an alternative path to development in 1994 at a time when the Central government was determined to push ahead with neoliberal economic policies that militated against such an approach. One major problem that was encountered early in the campaign was that plan formulation and the subsequent allotment of the panchayat funds were delayed by more than six months, resulting in sluggish project implementation and spending in some panchayats. Delays continued for the subsequent annual plan in 1998–9.

Timely disbursement of funds was not always achieved by the state and glitches and delays resulted.

Nor was the concerted effort to move from clientalism to cooperative development without resistance from previous beneficiaries of corruption. Some hostile state departments resisted deploying their staff to the village councils.[155] There were also less than desirable outcomes in terms of investment in agriculture and industry and generating sustainable employment in these sectors. Marketing of microenterprise products and services posed a significant challenge, as well as overlap and duplication of projects amongst the other constraining factors.

Teething problems and imperfect coordination in such a large project were to be expected. A more serious issue was the perception among more middle-class members that the PPC was solely a poor person's project also saw many withdraw from local assemblies, taking their skills with them.[156] Supplementing local know-how, technical knowledge was often crucial in project design, implementation, monitoring and auditing but not always readily available or matched appropriately. Related to this, other weak links included sometimes poor record-keeping.

Has participatory development been effective in terms of economic development? Kerala's 2008 Development Report found that it was difficult to measure the development impact of the decentralization programme in the absence of a reliable comparative frame to assess the differential impact between LSG, and to isolate the impact of Plan initiatives given other confounding variables.[157] Yet I think it is eminently possible to glean some results from observation, original interviews, empirical studies and considered appraisals. On the differences between panchayats, for example, there have certainly been variable results, with some panchayats more successful than others. Kannan estimated that during the Ninth Plan there were over 100 (the top 10 per cent of the 990) village panchayats at the forefront of implementing decentralization planning with imaginative projects backed by effective participation from locals, elected representatives and voluntary organizations. Another 30 to 40 per cent of the 990 panchayats had some record of effective implementation, with the remaining 50 per cent having not as much to show except spending money: '(t)hey pose the most formidable challenge to the institutionalization of democratic decentralization'.[158] As Isaac attests:

> Democratization is going to be a long process. We accept that there are going to be setbacks. I see ourselves as pace setters. We develop group practices here. Our target is to create – of the 1000 panchayats – 100 remarkable panchayats. If we can do that, then we have laid a solid basis for a New Left agenda.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[159]

The PPC has shown that given the genuine opportunity, people will actively participate in development. In one empirical study, Justino found that collective action in Kerala constituted an overall positive endogenous effect on economic

development and that labour market activism had in fact resulted in improvements to economic growth:

> A particular beneficial outcome in Kerala was the implementation of social policies that promoted human development and widespread socio-economic security. This confirms the widely accepted view that collective action and public participation are important conditions for successful economic development . . . [but] this relationship may not hold for all economies at all times.
>
> (Patricio Justino)[160]

The Plan's focus on SHGs as socially embedded economic units may also be instructive. The main difference between Kerala's experience and cooperatives and microenterprises elsewhere is that they tend not to be connected with an overall development plan for a community or region. In this regard Kerala may offer lessons, particularly for the recognition of the role of gender relations (which is as much subject to improvement in Kerala as elsewhere!) and its role in wellbeing. As Isaac asserts:

> If such interventions are not accompanied by significant changes in gender relations and gender consciousness, then not much will change, so women will take loans, but men will spend it and go into debt.
>
> Micro-level development organizations creates new opportunities for gender relations. In the absence of all these activities, it would be very difficult to improve gender relations.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[161]

In terms of the efficacy of participation, Tharakan described what he thought were some of the weaknesses of the decentralization program:

> One of the purposes of the People's Plan was to bring in these marginalized groups: women, the lower caste, the Indigenous population. Training them was not enough – it was necessary for them to develop their own organizations, to bargain, to organize politically. Some sections still feel marginalized and ask, 'How does decentralization help better than centralization?', so I think that is the major weakness of the program. Women have been gainers from this process but perhaps not so much the other groups.
>
> (Michael Tharakan)[162]

Against the backdrop of Kerala's remarkable achievements, disparities still persist in outlier minority communities such as SCs, STs and fisher folk. Nevertheless, deprivation among both these communities and the general population has however come down to 40 and 52 per cent for SCs and STs are respectively, and to 22 per cent for Kerala as a whole.[163] What is interesting in one study is that the social capital approach was found not to be the most fitting explanatory framework in accounting for inter-panchayat differences in participation. This may point also to the insufficiency of

public transcript social capital in explaining or accounting for deeper infrageographical capital that has cultivated in Kerala. In Chaudhuri and Heller's estimation:

> Presumably, communities with high levels of social capital would have maintained relatively higher levels of participation than communities with lower levels of social capital, but that is not the observed pattern. And the social capital approach would have great difficulty explaining the sudden and dramatic increase of subordinate group participation.
>
> (Chaudhuri and Heller) [164]

As the Ninth Year Plan term of participatory development drew to a close, Isaac reflected the following in its aftermath:

> The LDF's People's Campaign succeeded in its primary objectives. The full impact of the decentralization experiment could not be realized in a period of five years. But during that period we did show what decentralization could achieve. But its most important achievement was that it created a consensus in the State in favour of decentralization so much so that even the UDF, which was highly critical of the campaign and even tried to disrupt it, after coming to power, dillydallied without doing anything for one year. Now they have come to the conclusion that they have to carry forward decentralization under a different name.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[165]

Electoral defeat: the LDF relinquishes reins as UDF steers Tenth Year Plan

> There are many who believe that there is no alternative to unbridled marketization and privatization. They seem to hold the view that the Left in Kerala has had its say, that it has played its historical role of initiating and implementing the process of decentralization in the State, but they have no agenda for economic growth. We in the last LDF government had a democratic alternative for economic growth for which we said we would preserve our past achievements and take them forward through people's participation, decentralized planning and devolution of powers to local communities. Plus, we were clear about areas where the State had a comparative advantage, like IT, light engineering, hospitality industry – where we invited private participation. But we were clear that we were not going to give away our heritage. In fact, we wanted to build on that.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[166]

The optimism and momentum generated by the PPC generated new levels of confidence and public action. The LDF had good grounds for expecting to become the first in the state's history to win a second consecutive term in the 2001 state

election.[167] Towards the election however, the bipartisanship the Campaign had managed to attain disappeared in the lead-up to the poll. Opposition-aligned dailies picked up on stories of local plan weaknesses and implementation lapses. A number of opposition coalition leaders, seizing on a political opportunity, petitioned the state's Electoral Commission for a stay in plan implementation, on the charge that local bodies were trying to influence voters. This halted the grama sabhas in many districts and prevented plan implementation until after the election.[168]

By its very nature the Plan process aimed for economic impacts that would develop over the long term. In the short term, collapsing crop prices, the mishandling of a controversial education reform, and the national government's withholding of transfer funds on the eve of the election (which made it difficult to pay state workers and fund plan projects) all negatively impacted the LDF's re-election prospects. Kerala's history of revolving governments saw a UDF victory with 49 per cent of the votes to the LDF's 44 per cent. The external shock of falling commodity prices may have also played a role in electoral defeat according to Isaac and Franke.[169]

While the LDF-led coalition's electoral defeat clouded the future of the PPC, the new government eventually decided however to continue the initiative, albeit re-badged under a different name, the 'Kerala Development Programme'. This is reflected in the fact that grant-in-aid to LSG steadily increased from Rs. 4614 crore in the Ninth Plan to Rs. 6784 crore in the Tenth Plan of the UDF-led government.[170]

In 2006 the LDF's electoral fortunes were reversed, with the coalition able to win a decisive 98 out of 140 Assembly seats in the state election of that year. Isaac attributes the defeat of the Congress Party-led government to their fiscal consolidation program, which involved a structural adjustment loan from the Asian Development Bank that required draconian expenditure cuts, arousing massive popular opposition.[171] The re-election of the LDF in 2006 with the architect of Kerala's democratic decentralization at the helm of the Finance Ministry put people's planning back on the agenda, facing a new set of challenges as the process that started in campaign mode could now start to be institutionalized to a much greater degree. It is to this to which we now turn our attention.

Challenges and prospects: post PPC development challenges

Kerala's experiment in democratic decentralized planning has successfully completed two five-year plans in which it received explicit state government support and sponsorship (Ninth, Eleventh) from the LDF coalition and spanned two others under the UDF coalition in which programmes continued, albeit with less funding and institutional support. The extent to which grassroots agency can continue to be effective within decentralization may be as contingent upon the institutional context as it is upon mētis. Kerala's planners have thus been concerned to preserve the gains of the People's Plan, and in doing so help shape the future formation of citizen capabilities. This process involves institutionalizing the processes and programmes of decentralized development to preserve the gains of

participatory planning, including programmes promoting poverty reduction and the social economy.[172]

In endeavouring to institutionalize decentralized development, what are the major challenges and prospects for Kerala's development? Has Kerala's enabling conditions – demographic dividends, remittances from emigration and a number of positive economic growth indicators in sectors such as IT and tourism – led to the possibility of 'virtuous' growth in Kerala – where human development and economic growth start reinforcing one another positively? I will focus here on the institutionalization of participatory planning and decentralization. A key initiative that has continued from the Ninth Plan onwards to become institutionalized has been the Kudumbashree Mission, which will be examined in greater detail. A number of key challenges and prospects for the state are also surveyed, including the agrarian crisis, the state's economic growth outlook, social and gender progress, and the constraints of federalism.

Institutionalizing People's Planning

One of the primary instruments of institutionalization is incorporation into law, such as the *Kerala Decentralization of Powers (Amendment) Bill 2000*, legislating transparency by deeming all documents to be considered public which any citizen could access. This has also involved the setting up of an ombudsman, seven-member committee to check any malfeasance in local government and order any corrective measures, as well as an Appellate Tribunal to look after appeals about licenses and permits.[173] Institutionalization has also involved taking up the recommendations of the Sen Committee to absorb major campaign elements into Kerala's government apparatus,[174] codifying into law the decentralization pillars of autonomy, subsidiarity, complementarity and role clarity and creating legal mechanisms for transparency and reducing corruption.

Guidelines have been progressively transformed from recommendations to mandates, such as the earmarking of 10 per cent of the general grant-in-aid for the Women's Component Plan (WCP) from year one of the campaign to year two, and the institutionalization of the resoundingly successful beneficiary system. Grama sabhas have been raised from two to four per year, and the quorum raised from 50 to 100 people, or 10 per cent of voters, whichever is less. Other mandates have been bettered, such as the more recent achievement of 50 per cent reservation of seats for women.

In addition to legislation, Isaac anticipated that institutionalization would also require sustained grassroots pressure 'to overcome the inertia of bureaucracy and of electoral politics'.[175] One major initiative to support the state's efforts to institutionalize capacity building for democratic decentralization and devolution of powers to local bodies has been Capacity Development for Decentralization in Kerala (CapDecK). With the involvement of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in partnership with the Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA), CapDecK was inaugurated in 1999 and concluded in December 2009 after achieving its aims. It was envisaged as a 'project that can be replicated in and adapted to other states of India, as well as in other South-Asian countries'.[176]

In the social economy, Plan spending guidelines to ensure spending on productive sectors has also been stipulated:

> a major concern regarding the quantum of investment in the productive sectors has to be noted. The sectoral guidelines have to be modified to insist a minimum of 40 per cent of the plan grants be spent on productive sectors and the investment in roads and infrastructure should not to exceed 20 per cent.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[177]

One of the key problems SHGs face, according to Isaac, is their limited prospects and duration, which better institutional-organizational linkages is anticipated to help address:

> the present experience is that most of the units do not survive due to problems related to technological choice, inadequate technical and managerial training, inconsistent quality and marketing problems. Cluster development with effective linkage has to be established between community polytechnics, engineering colleges and research institutes for providing technology and finding solutions to problems that crop up and umbrella marketing organizations at the district and block level have to be set up.
>
> (Thomas Isaac)[178]

Improving microenterprises has also been a major undertaking. SHGs have been institutionalized under the organizational umbrella of Kudumbashree, the state's key poverty eradication and developmental programme and are now more commonly referred to as NHG in Kerala.[179] It is also worth noting that in the wider Indian context, the SHG movement in India is now effectively the largest microfinance program in the world, institutionalized through linkages with the National Bank for Agriculture and Development (NABARD).[180]

Kudumbashree: from SHG to NHG

> It was the emergence of Kudumbashree that enabled many women to start a bank account and gave them the courage to perform in various organizations.
>
> (P. K. Jayalekshmi, Minister for Tribal Welfare)[181]

Launched in 1998, Kudumbashree has been important in supporting Kerala's decentralization and participatory development initiatives. A key part of the emerging regime of empowerment, Kudumbashree is based on the NHG as the successor to the self-help group of earlier plans, with the main point of difference being its institutionalized links with the institutions of local self-government. Kudumbashree stands for prosperity (shree) of the family (Kudumbam) and represents a scaling up of the earlier Community Development Society (CDS) model in urban Alappuzha and in rural Malappuram. Based on neighbourhood groups of around 15 to 25 primarily 'below poverty line' women, these groups are



Figure 5.19 Kerala's levels of participatory development governance.

federated at the electoral ward level into area development societies (ADS), and at the municipality or *panchayat* level, into CDS.

The Kudumbashree mission network of community organizations currently covers about half of the total households in Kerala, with over 200,000 NHG. The mission has facilitated the creation of a state-wide series of cooperative micro-enterprises, all owned and operated by women from below poverty line families, including direct marketing, dairy units, canteen services, soap-making, coir carpet-making and photo album production units.[182] By 2005 over 4,000 NHG of poor women had mobilized savings that reached over Rs. 2.5 crore in August 2004 (equivalent to US$500,000), channelling financial assistance amounting to Rs. 2 crore (about US$430,000) from NABARD and other agencies.[183]

NHGs perform three major functions. First, they are active thrift-collecting and credit societies; second, they are micro-enterprise groups (with subsidized credit and other state benefits differentiating them from other microenterprise groups elsewhere around the world); and thirdly, they engage in participatory planning and the day-to-day activities of the local self-government institutions. The more comprehensive nature of their 'remit' makes Kudumbashree's NHGs a more comprehensive model of local economic development, setting them apart from World Bank-approved microfinance groups for whom state sponsorship is less important than private funding and whose links with local and state governance is not emphasized.[184]

Kudumbashree has aimed to help women identify and launch enterprises suited to particular areas, and has embraced both traditional as well as more contemporary service sectors. In the agricultural sector, the Samagra project involves the cultivation of the traditional Nendran variety of bananas in Thiruvananthapuram and cultivation of Pooja Kadali bananas in Thrissur, significant particularly in the context of diminishing biodiversity – in a country that is the world's largest producer of bananas.[185] Sangha Krishi, or the practice of group farming, has also been a successful Kudumbashree initiative involving the farming of nearly 10 million acres of land by a 250,000 women. Initiated in 2007 to enhance local food production, half a decade later over 44,000 collectives of female farmers have formed, leasing fallow land and undertaking to rejuvenate and farm it. Produce grown is then either sold or used by the groups themselves. Earning an average Rs.15,000 to 25,000 per year, this has resulted in more women leaving underpaid wage-work in other sectors to become independent producers.[186]

Kudumbashree has also facilitated the creation of more than 200 ICT-based microenterprise units, which can be found across the entire state. By 2006 there

were 236 units spread over the 14 districts. Based on average income, Pillai and Shanta conclude that as a poverty alleviation measure, the new information technology venture for poor women is highly promising, with the social and economic cohesion of the women a strong enabling factor for their success.[187] Techno World in Kumarapuram is one such successful Kudumbashree IT microenterprise. Formed in 1999, the initiative started with a budget of Rs. 290,025 raised through members' contributions, a bank loan and a small subsidy. The unit repaid all its initial loans after three years of operation, and now employs a large number of other women besides the members doing data entry work on a piece-rate basis.[188] By 2007 the unit had acquired 27 workstations networked to three servers, Internet connections, printers and other peripherals and software. The main activities of the enterprise are data entry (such as digitization of public sector records) and training, and the units have helped to modernize governance via IT, with clients that include government offices, panchayat and other local self-government institutions, banks, students and other private parties. In turn, these microenterprises have made training and IT access to the poor more affordable. Kerala is now aiming towards universal e-literacy.[189]

The fact these deliberative spaces have been state-sponsored has been a basis for critical discussion. Are the NHGs open to political capture, or 'bureaucratic capture'?[190] Williams et al. describe the mission's activities, originally intended as a 10-year poverty alleviation project, as 'attempts to engineer participatory citizenship through engagement with the local state'.[191] While these fora may be state-supported participatory spaces, with the state lending the institutional backing and template, it is however up to the participants themselves to create and sustain. The state cannot legislate deliberative spaces or 'engineer' culture; rather, it can only strive to tap into and cultivate the women's own capabilities, and facilitate their ability to harness them. In this regard, the groups potentially build on subterranean mētis as well as the previous regime of empowerment's tradition of public action, albeit male-dominated.

On the one hand Kudumbsahree mission activities have increased the visibility of women in the public space. As Devika and Thampi assert, the fact the women are doing 'government work' confers a degree of social legitimacy and room to challenge conservative norms. While they acknowledge many Kudumbashree women have acquired skills and self-confidence through their participation however, they wonder whether it will really serve their interests or whether 'it may at times primarily serve to reduce the cost of programme administration'.[192]

Others argue that the fact NHGs are connected to local government actually prevents their political capture and enables them to better inform local development needs: Mukherjee posits that

> [integration] helps ensure that local development reflects the needs and aspirations of communities, who are not reduced to mere executors of government programmes . . . It is transforming the socio-political space that women inhabit who in turn transform that space in vital ways.
>
> (Ananya Mukherjee)[193]

Kudumbashree has notably been subject to partisan political pressures through the see-sawing change of government every five years, particularly when the UDF (Congress Party-led) government attempted to undermine the mission by introducing a Congress-Party sponsored version named Janasree after their 2011 election. The UDF government hiked up the interest rate on government loans to NHGs under Kumumbashree from 4 to 12 per cent. The LDF government of 2006–11 had initially fixed the Budget allocation for Kudumbashree at Rs 50 crores (which was subsequently doubled to Rs 100 crores in the 2010 'Gender Budget')[194] and charged only 4 per cent interest on government loans to NHGs.

Moreover, with units in 98 per cent of wards, Kudumbashree has been well placed in its selection as the nodal agency for implementation of the Centrally-sponsored National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM), yet the UDF government attempted to overturn its selection by appeal to the same-party governed Centre. Despite this, the UDF government was compelled to present Kudumbashree as a successful example of 'targeted development' in order to receive financial aid from the same national government. Kudumbashree will also be giving micro-enterprise consulting services to the National Rural Livelihood Mission of the Centre's Union Rural Development Ministry.[195]

The UDF's attempts to undermine and sideline an established and successful programme provoked a 'day-and-night agitation' (*rapakal samaram*) organized by Kudumbashree groups. Led by the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) and supported by the CPI(M), 2,500 women gathered to strike in front of the State Secretariat in Thiruvananthapuram during the first week of October 2012, forcing the government on the ninth day of the strike to sign an agreement in favour of their demands.[196]

The support of the Congress Party governed national government of the programme muddied the attempts by their state counterparts to undermine it. The strike may also illustrate continuity with previous regimes of empowerment in the tendency of civil society to combine participation and struggle ('*bharanavum samaravum*'). In previous regimes of empowerments, women have had a passive relationship with the welfare state, and limited public visibility. Whether this possibly emergent regime of female-focused empowerment will significantly change this remains to be seen, and is an interesting development to monitor.

The dark side of Kerala's success

In considering the developmental impact of participatory planning in Kerala, the dark side of Kerala's success also bears noting. Social impacts include India's highest suicide and alcoholism rates. The high life expectancy and low infant mortality of the Classical Kerala Model uneasily and persistently coexists with one of the highest morbidity rates in India. With relatively high suicide, mental illness and alcoholism rates, it is ironic that Kerala seems to have some of the social ills of richer societies too, albeit a major cause of which is financial bankruptcy. The suicide rate of Keralan women is twice the national average, and

the overall suicide rate, the highest in the country, is more than three times the national average.[197]

There are 3.5 million Keralites who are what the development reports in Kerala call educated unemployed. While 18 per cent of educated men seeking work remained unemployed, the figure for educated women was 71 per cent (2003).[198] Educated unemployment and mental stress and illness are linked: there is a marked mismatch between people's expectations arising from educational qualifications and job opportunities available in the state. This is reflected in mental health indicators where depression and domestic violence, as well as alcoholism and suicide rates are all on the rise in the state.[199] Kerala is now the number one state in India in the per capita consumption of liquor. This is not helped by the fact that more than 40 per cent of state revenues come from the sale of liquor, with a state monopoly, the Kerala State Beverages Corporation, the state's major outlet.

Gender progress

While democratic decentralization has steadily helped to improved outcomes for as well as participation by women and continues to make inroads into Kerala's patriarchal institutions, there has been an admission that '(i)n some ways, the PPC has continued in the old Kerala model of improving women's lives indirectly while not transforming gender relations'.[200] The high levels of development among women have not translated into comprehensive gender freedom.[201] This is important because, as C. V. Padmarajan of the Kerala State Planning Board rightly notes: 'While Kerala's record in reducing and even eliminating gender disparity in many socio-economic indicators is commendable, the problem of gender justice continues to remain intimately related to several aspects of development'.[202]

The dissonance between educational achievements and opportunity for self-actualization is marked. Kerala produces the largest number of female post-graduates in India. But these strides in women's education and health are only meeting with frustration due to deeply rooted patriarchal practices and the lack of opportunity. The invisibility and marginality of women in the social and political spheres persists: increasing levels of gender based violence, in particular domestic violence; the spread of dowry; the high burden of the 'care economy' and the growing incidence of women-headed households are all taking a toll.

Against this backdrop, another contradiction is contained in the focus on women in this emergent regime of empowerment. High social indicators relative to the rest of the country may have actually acted against Malayali women advancing, as Kerala scholar Anna Lindberg hypothesizes:

> About women's relatively late (and perhaps also weak) organizations in Kerala, I am sure that women's high social indicators play a decisive role. Not that women did not need to fight for empowerment, but that the national narrative about women's unique and high position has been so strong that it was difficult for women to even think about getting organized in order to improve their conditions.

> Why should they? They were much better off than in most other parts of India. Well, here we can, of course, point out the highly gender segregated society when it comes to public space – the unwritten rule seems to be that women should be home after dark. I do not have the same feeling in, for example, Mumbai. And all the violence against women speaks its clear language. That is a question that really needs to be taken seriously by politicians and others.
>
> (Anna Lindberg)[203]

As we have seen, the formal sector work participation among women in Kerala is 22.9 per cent, one of the worst of all Indian states.[204] This low labour force participation rate is accompanied by the highest rates of unemployment in India, with a wide gender gap. Yet much of the success of the classical – and contemporary – Kerala experience rests on women. They are the unacknowledged informal order upon which public formal order rests and without which it cannot function.

In subsequent years however, and in the emerging regime of empowerment, the focus has been more on gender transformation. Projects have included the formation of *jaagratha samithas* (watchdog committees) of both women and men to reduce violence against women and the practice of dowries. As previously mentioned, this has been institutionalized in CapDecK in partnership with KILA, which is mandated to mainstream gender issues into local governance. The Eleventh Plan included, for the first time, a separate project for gender awareness creation with a proposal being considered that every panchayat be encouraged to prepare a women's status report.[205]

Another constitutional landmark will help facilitate institutionalization: in September 2009, Kerala's legislative assembly unanimously passed two bills, the *Kerala Panchayati Raj (Second Amendment) Bill 2009* and the *Kerala Municipality (Amendment) Bill 2009*, to reserve 50 per cent seats in local bodies for women. Kerala is not the first but the sixth state to pass such a law.[206] The Government of India's Cabinet also approved a proposal to move a bill to amend the Indian constitution to increase the number of seats in panchayats reserved for women from one third to 50 per cent across the country.[207] This is a remarkable scalar ping-pong effect of progressive changes. Making women the focus of development activity is noteworthy, but mandating 50 per cent of political seats be reserved for women in a still deeply patriarchal society is an achievement that exceeds that of most older industrialized countries. Cultural change may take longer, but Kerala's track record means it is better equipped than many other states to deal with the challenges ahead.

Other challenges to institutionalization of decentralization and participatory development in Kerala are external, namely the political economy of Centre-State relations in India, with a greater impingement of fiscal federalism from the national scale. At the heart of the problem, the focus of the following section, is an imbalance that has developed between revenues and the responsibility for expenditure for India's constituent states, which includes land, water, law and order, education and health, agriculture, transportation and social insurance.

Because Kerala tops many social indices and has met most of its Millennium Development targets, it may not get its fair share of plan outlay from the central government. Additionally, many States are governed by a different political party from that at the Centre and there have been regular charges of political bias. The Centre's role is contradictory because it has constitutionally mandated decentralization yet a number of its fiscal and trade policies may effectively undermine the ability of states like Kerala to pursue decentralization. Yet it has also acted to thwart the UDF government in Kerala's attempts to undermine Kudumbashree, given its efficacy and success.

Fiscal federalism: thwarting decentralization?

> The fiscal crisis of the state governments and Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary Management (FRBM) Act constrain the state governments from devolving greater funds to Local Self Governments and this is dramatically exhibited by the experience of Kerala, who nobody can criticize of lack of political will for devolution . . . The fiscal devolution to LSGs cannot be isolated from the restructuring of centre-state fiscal relations.
>
> (Thomas Isaac and P. Shaheena)[208]

> How absurd is the practice of planning from Delhi for education and health in Kerala which has a glorious tradition?
>
> (Thomas Isaac, 2010 state budget).[209]

The Indian Union, commonly referred to as the Centre or Union government, comprises 28 states and seven Union Territories (which includes the National Capital Territory of Delhi). In what appears to be a highly asymmetrical federalism, the Constitutional division of responsibilities between the Government of India and the States is such that the revenue-raising capability of the Union is substantially higher than that of the States. The Indian Constitution anticipated and assumed this fiscal imbalance between Centre and States, and provided that transfers be made to the states via the federal Finance Commission. These transfers have been fraught with a number of problems, including perceived political interference with the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) as well as a steady decline in the percentage of transfer relative to state income. Central government transfers to states have amounted to more than the States' own tax revenues and have constituted over a third of the States' public expenditure. (This also comes against the well-established tendency of many states to under-report their income because of these financial arrangements.)[210] Transfers from Centre to States are therefore very significant, yet have declined as a percentage of GNP from 9.3 per cent in 1985–6 to 5.4 per cent in 1999–2000. They have also declined against the revenue receipts of the central government.[211] Central government transfers as a share in the total revenue declined from an average of 38.2 per cent in the period 1970–5 to 25.8 per cent in the period 2000–4.[212]

Kerala's decentralized participatory planning and budgeting is increasingly coming up against the countervailing tendency toward greater centralization in a number of areas by the Government of India. It is charged that the Centre has often used the funds for centrally sponsored schemes as a tool to enhance its political visibility at the State level.[213] Problems regarding centrally sponsored schemes include poor monitoring and too many schemes.[214] Through transfers, the Centre may also be seen as impinging upon the allocation decisions of the states because the transfers are increasingly going through various other channels outside the statutory transfers recommended by the national Finance Commissions.[215] Many of these transfers are not only discretionary; they are directly going to district authorities and societies, bypassing the State budgets.

The direct *j'accuse* from Kerala's erstwhile Finance Minister is that a number of centrally sponsored schemes are encroaching upon the fiscal autonomy of State governments, and that the States are increasingly finding it difficult to pursue an independent fiscal policy.[216] Isaac has charged that the conditions of the centrally sponsored schemes are against the spirit of democratic decentralization and should not be used for micro-managing local self-government institutions or to compromise the fiscal autonomy of State Governments. As Isaac and Shaheena assert:

> Instead of [the] constitutional instrument Union Finance Commissions (UFCs), the central government is utilizing Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) and loans from multi-lateral development agencies for devolution. Many of these schemes impose conditionalities that are against the spirit of democratic decentralization and are unacceptable on social and economic grounds.
>
> (Isaac and Shaheena)[217]

The assignment of tax powers in India is also based on a principle of separation, that is, tax categories are exclusively assigned either to the Centre or to the States. Most broad-based taxes have been assigned to the Centre; only the tax on the sale of goods has been significant for State revenues and States cannot levy taxes on services.[218] Yet while sales tax is the major source of revenue for the States, the introduction of a national value-added tax (VAT) has been detrimental to State revenue because it has reduced the sales tax rate for manufactured consumer goods from 22 to 24 per cent to 12.5 per cent.[219] In Kerala, services-sector growth is thus not significantly increasing the government's modest revenue base because of the structure of taxes, which tend to go toward the federal government in areas like finance and communications. While overhauling the tax collection machinery can mitigate some of this, the structural problem of the fiscal imbalance remains. The share of central taxes for the State declined from 3.875 per cent in the annual award from the 10th Finance Commission to 3.057 per cent from the 11th Finance Commission and again down to 2.665 in the 12th Finance Commission award.[220]

There is thus palpable frustration within Kerala's government at being thwarted by fiscal federalism and the Centre's contradictory stance on decentralization. Isaac and Chakraborty file a slew of complaints: fiscal changes have not only restricted States' ability to pursue independent tax policy, it has also burdened the

States with additional expenditures to absorb the shock of corporate globalization and trade liberalization pursued by the Centre including social security and other safety nets, while, it is charged, the central government is withdrawing from its traditional role of investment in heavy industries and physical infrastructure.[221] It is charged that financial commitments have not matched political decentralization: 'Despite the constitutional amendments, the local bodies in India are a far cry from the constitutional ideal of self-governing units. Generally, functions have been devolved without concomitant devolution of finance'.[222] Against this backdrop, Kerala faces a number of economic constraints and prospects, the focus of the following section.

Economic outlook

In the classical Kerala model, the problem was low growth undergirding high social indicators. Kerala's economic growth in more recent years, by contrast, has been higher than the rest of India. Driven by information technology, services, and tourism, the state's growth rate in the second half of the 2000s has averaged between 6 and 10 per cent, keeping pace with and sometimes overtaking the national average.[223] By 2007, the state also had the highest rate of increase in bank deposits and per capita income has moved above the national average.[224] One study had found that unemployment in Kerala had dropped from 19.1 per cent in 2003 to 9.4 per cent in 2007.[225]

Yet these figures may belie the fact that growth is concentrated in limited service sectors and urban areas.[226] While Kerala now ranks among the top three in India for consumption levels, the state is consuming more – fuelled by remittances – and producing less. The growth of the tertiary sector – over 7 per cent per annum between 1987–8 and 2003–4 – has also been largely remittance-driven. As Isaac qualifies however, 'the remittances need not be considered as purely an exogenous factor. The success of external migration itself may be viewed as an outcome of the better human resource endowment of the region'.[227]

As remittances keep increasing every year, inequality is growing. In some districts such as Malappuram, the percentage of households with either an emigrant or a return emigrant is as high as 71 per cent.[228] Just over a quarter of households in the state directly benefited from emigration and two fifths from combined emigrants plus return emigrants.[229] Yet a 2007 KSSP study shows that almost 75 per cent of the growth in assets is only benefiting the top 20 per cent. The vice chairman of the Kerala State Planning Board, Prabhat Patnaik, has warned that the gains that Kerala made with its development model may be under threat.[230]

A large portion of remittances are spent on gold, real estate, education and consumer goods rather than commercially invested. About 40 per cent of bank deposits are those of non-resident, expatriate Keralites.[231] Non-resident Keralites are however being viewed as an important source of savings that can potentially be tapped.[232] Programmes to mobilize their savings for investment modeled after Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL) were a part of the LDF's proposals in their 2006–11 term.[233] Return emigrants numbered 890,000 in 2007.[234]

Harnessing the development potential of returned migrants into productive areas, both in terms of human skills as well as investments presents a challenge for Kerala's development prospects.

Moreover, mindful of the past dependency on remittances in what has been dubbed a 'money order economy', Isaac asserts, '(t)here is a fallacious argument that the future growth of the Kerala economy can be based on the buoyancy in the tertiary sector alone. The current growth in the services sector is dependent on the inflow of remittances and attendant un-certainties'.[235] Such a scare came in late 2009 with a shakier Dubai economy, where many Keralites work.[236] The global financial crisis did not however affect Gulf remittances yet the vulnerability to regional developments in the Middle East was demonstrated during the 1991 invasion of Iraq that led to Keralites being sent home. If Gulf remittances, the main source of overseas income from émigrés, dries up, the Keralan economy will be hit hard, as well as present a problem of reabsorbing a large number of reverse Malayalee migrants.

It is not just the Gulf that is a destination. In the last five years, as many as 25,000 nurses from Kerala have moved to the US and UK.[237] Around 1.84 million Keralites were working abroad in 2005, making up a hefty 15 per cent of Kerala's work force or one and a half times those working in the formal/organized sector.[238] In 2008, Keralites in the Gulf countries numbered more than 2.5 million, who annually send home a sum of US$6.3 billion.[239] One 2008 estimate of remittances puts it at Rs. 25,000 crores (250,000 million Rupees).[240]

With a significant part of Kerala's workforce abroad, reverse migration and remittances is also becoming a phenomenon, with increasing numbers of internal migrants coming to work in Kerala from other Indian states into the 2010s. One draw card is the increase in the wage rates of unskilled workers – the average unskilled to semi-skilled labourer can earns between 300 to 500 rupees (five to six US dollars) per day in Kerala, which is higher than wages in many other states.[241] One study in 2013 estimated the migrant labour population at 2.5 million, matching the number of outgoing Kerala migrants working abroad. Local demand and shortages are particularly marked in the construction sector where 60 per cent of workers are reportedly from other states.[242] One might speculate the number of internal migrants might be higher without the language barrier: Malayalam is only spoken in Kerala.

The current economic objectives of the state rest upon a two-pronged strategy of reviving traditional industry as well as pursuing high tech and services growth. While new growth sectors include IT, biotechnology and tourism, 40 per cent of the state is employed in traditional industrial sectors and the previous state government paid a heavy political price for neglecting them. As Isaac notes, 'any strategy of growth that neglects agricultural and traditional sectors and undermines the public social infrastructure and social security is not socially accepted in Kerala'.[243] Additionally, a strong agricultural focus is important for the state also because of food insecurity, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that food products from the state account for 25 per cent of India's total food exports and food processing is considered a thrust sector.

A key challenge for Kerala is to harness the high human development gains in health and education toward knowledge-intensive economic sectors in the economy. The state has some advantages that lend themselves to the development of sectors such as IT, which is an identified sunrise industry, along with biotechnology and food processing.[244] These include lower operational costs compared to other states, availability of low-cost professionals at the entry level, and excellent connectivity. An international gateway presence at Kochi (Cochin) is a major landing point for undersea cable carriers for Internet and international telephone traffic.[245] Weaknesses include shortage of middle and senior-level professionals, inadequate quality of power supply, and the residual perception of the State as a poor industrial investment destination. The IT industry is accelerating in Kerala, though not as dramatically as in neighbouring states such as Karnataka.

Kerala's prospects in tourism are promising. Currently, it is one of the world's fastest growing tourist destinations. Named by *National Geographic Traveler* as being one of the 50 'must see' destinations of a lifetime, it receives more than 12 per cent of the total number of foreign tourists of around 2.4 million arriving in India, up from 2.7 per cent in 1980. Tourism accounts for 14 per cent of the value of exports for the state and 6.2 per cent of total employment.[246] Maximizing this potential has been recognized by the state government, with tourism policies and campaigns put in place, including eco-tourism and what has been identified as the state's 'ABC' assets: Ayurveda, Backwaters and Culture and Cuisine.[247]

Kerala has high potential in the field of health tourism, in particular in combining Ayurveda and eco-tourism. A positive and highly successful harnessing of Indigenous innovation involves the active ingredient in a plant *Trichopus zeylanicus* collected by the tribal Kani people in tropical forests. The Tropical Botanic Garden and Research Institute in Kerala learned of the tonic, which boosts the immune system, in 1988. The active ingredient was tested, isolated and incorporated into a compound that has been christened Jeevani (giver of life). A major Ayurvedic company in Kerala now manufactures the tonic, with an agreement struck in 1995 for the institute and tribal community to share 2 per cent of net profits and a license fee.[248] Export destinations of Ayurvedic products from Kerala include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), UK, Malaysia and Russia, with a total export value of around Rs. 150 million.[249]

Agriculture

In terms of global markets, Kerala accounts for 4 per cent of the country's exports as a whole and accounts for 95 per cent of the country's production of natural rubber, which includes the large cooperative Rubco. Kerala continues to be a significant exporter of primary commodities like coir, cashew, rubber, pepper, spices and arecanut, whose prices have declined in the world market.[250] As at 2007, more than 80 per cent of agricultural produce of the state is exported. Except rubber, the productivity of most of the perennial crops declined in the 2000s.[251] Policy changes from India's national government, including trade liberalization, have fuelled an agrarian crisis that resulted in thousands of farmer suicides in Kerala

and other Indian states. Market liberalization, plant disease and the imposed reduction of import restrictions have all had an impact on farmers' livelihoods.[252]

Agriculture is not only declining in its sectoral share of the economy (from 56 per cent in 1960–1 to 13 per cent in 2003–4), but in the declining average size of holdings.[253] The share of agriculture in the Net State Domestic Product also sharply declined from 21.5 per cent in 1999–2000 to 12.9 per cent in 2003–4[254] – effectively halving in just half a decade. Prices of commercial crops like coconut, pepper and rubber have been subject to severe fluctuation and falls in prices on the world market – with severe consequences. According to Valsala,

> Cash crops is a big issue, such as black pepper, and the impact of the reduction of world prices. We are looking for alternatives. There are farmers suiciding due to loss of cash crops. They can't cope with repayment of bank loans. They are aware of the menace of global impacts, it is affecting them directly now. Before they did not pay much attention to globalization talk. There was not much suicide in this district, or the surrounding districts.
>
> (Ms Valsala)[255]

There were a total of 11,516 farmer suicides in Kerala from 1997–2005.[256] Farm suicides were overwhelmingly cash crop farmers – growers of cotton, coffee, sugarcane, pepper, vanilla groundnut; suicides have been fewer among food crop farmers – such as growers of rice, wheat, maize, pulses. According to the National Sample Survey, farmer households in debt doubled during the decade of neoliberal 'economic reforms', from 26 per cent of farm households to 48.6 per cent.[257] Kerala created a Debt Relief Commission soon after the change in government there in 2006. The Commission held a case-by-case scrutiny of the debt problem, while the government halted aggressive loan recovery measures by banks and moneylenders. The government also decided to declare the entire Wayanad revenue district distress-affected, and wrote off debts along with other measures in the Agricultural Debt Relief Act. By 2007, Kerala was one of the few major affected states where farmer suicides had virtually stopped.[258]

The Gulf boom has actually exacerbated the agricultural crisis: with remittances flowing in and going toward real estate, land prices became so high that selling agricultural land for real estate development was more profitable.[259] Land tenure problems have also become one of the biggest shortcomings in the state: the flipside to the successes of abolishing land tenancy and privilege has been the extreme fragmentation of landholdings and the consequent decline in farm production. There has been a gradual shift in land ownership from households that have a livelihood interest in agriculture to those that have no major interest in cultivation.[260]

The biggest potential threat to Kerala's cash crops may be the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) free trade agreement. India will be bound to drastically reduce tariffs on edible oil, pepper, tea and coffee and by 2018, eventually to zero. Along with the hike in cost of inputs, it will be harder for farmers to get a profitable price for their products. Prices for almost all the cash crops

have plunged as a result of to the conditions imposed by the WTO and a number of Free Trade Agreements – Indo-Sri Lanka, Indo-Thailand and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). These include many countries that produce the same cash crops as Kerala. Coconut farmers are also being adversely affected by the national government's reduction of import tariffs of edible oils, ostensibly in order to contain inflation in the markets of northern Indian states – this has resulted in the influx of cheaper, subsidized palm oil as a competitor to coconut oil.[261] Kerala accounts for 46 per cent of the coconut area in India, which has recently suffered the root wilt disease and eriophid mite attacks, both of which have taken a heavy toll on the yield of coconut in Kerala.

From literacy to e-literacy: IT and development

> The Government wishes to encourage the judicious use of open source/free software that complements/supplements proprietary software, to reduce the total cost of ownership of IT applications/solutions without compromising on the immediate and medium-term value provided by the application . . . to make IT truly a part of the daily lives of the people of the State.
>
> (Kerala Department of Industries and Commerce, 'Information Technology Policy', 2005)[262]

Kerala was the first state to have public telephone exchanges in each village by 1997 and information kiosks in every village panchayat. Kerala has India's highest telephone density (11 per 100 people, twice the national average).[263] This is augmented by the state's embrace of the free software movement, which segues in well with a commitment to more democratic, free and appropriate technology rather than paying the high cost of proprietary software to large multinational corporations. Kerala has been an early adopter of free software in India, with the first Free Software Foundation (FSF) chapter in India founded in Trivandrum.[264] The FSF movement has aided IT access by helping to make software available in Malayalam: the availability of computing tools and digital content in Malayalam helps bring the benefits of IT to more people. Phone books in Kerala are produced with free software tools and the State is using open source software for many of its e-Government initiatives. Currently, Kerala is at the forefront of e-governance programs to facilitate IT-enabled, citizen-friendly services such as FRIENDS (Fast, Reliable, Instant, Efficient Network for Disbursement of Services) that integrates tax and utility payment services. A number of schools across the state are also using open-source software on PCs, including over 40 schools in the Kannur district.[265]

Kerala's Akshaya e-literacy project has the aim of capacity-building people's participation through e-governance. Launched and piloted in Malappuram district to promote e-literacy, the project has evolved into one of the major public-private partnerships in the State, generating at least 15,000 job opportunities. This integrated approach addresses the issues of access, basic IT literacy and skills and the availability of relevant content in Malayalam. It also opens up an avenue for poor

women to participate in the gains from technology development. The initiative aims to bridge the digital divide and create an e-literate citizenry with at least one person in each of the 6.5 million (65 lakh) families in the State reaching a standard of IT-literacy that involves familiarity with the basic use of a computer and ability to access e-content. This involves 615 Akshaya e-learning centres, one in every two panchayat wards, and 6,500 e-centre information hubs spatially distributed in strategic areas in order to reach the remotest areas of the state, located within a maximum of 2 kilometres for any household.

The Akshaya initiative is also poised to improve the state's prospects in cultivating the IT industry. The number of jobs created in and around IT in the last decade is around 250,000, higher than any other sector in the state. About 40,000 are directly employed in government-owned Technopark in Trivandrum and Infopark in the city of Cochin, with indirect employment of about 200,000 (IT is estimated to have a labour force multiplier of 1:4), and, Kerala's *Economic Review* posits, potential for a higher number of jobs. Technopark is the largest IT centre of its kind in India, and one of the largest in Asia.[266]

Kerala's efforts in community informatics as a springboard both for economic and social development continues its strong tradition of public society and public action. Jeffrey poses an interesting question in relation to economic development and the print media. In what he identifies as its third, 'mass' stage, print is described as a vehicle for entertainment and advertising rather than political organization. 'Does the fact that Kerala has moved into this stage help to explain the stasis that confronts its economy and politics? And does the World Wide Web (WWW) offer hope of a fourth stage in which print, transformed by electronics, regains a capacity to be a vehicle for interactive, citizen-engaging political discussion, organization and change?'[267]

Conclusion

Kerala's experience highlights the positive developmental impact of an organized citizenry that encompasses the role of both mētis and public action in combination with the strategic guidance, rather than a heavy hand, from the state. The chapter has also underscored the limitations of redistributive strategies of sub-national development in a dependent economic relationship with the larger Indian economy. Yet even within those constraints, the participation rates of the PPC during the Ninth Plan and subsequent plans demonstrate that local people can and have become development participants rather than recipients.

Eschewing the old left model of the necessity of a vanguard enacting top-down policies, the Government of Kerala has embarked upon a remarkable decentralization program involving not just decision-making but budgets. This has succeeded in both drawing upon and encouraging the mētis of the populace. A vast initiative with multiple levels meant that to maximize success, it needed to tap into a greater spectrum of reality, including Kerala's infrageographies. The success of Kerala's experiments in participatory development may have resulted from the fact they span both the spectrum of the public transcript and the infrageographical; and

that with respect to the latter, while involving the state, at its centre is the drawing upon and mobilization of grassroots mētis. This may also point towards the limits and sufficiency of public transcript directed action. Kerala's decentralized governance and participatory development is built upon, and made possible with, this strong associational civic culture and mētis. Kerala may illustrate a developmental pathway based on formal and informal order working with rather than against each other. This view also implicitly recognizes the importance of agency and the co-production of reality and complementarity of state and civil society, two impulses that recall the quantum theoretical concepts examined in Chapter 4.

A stark alternative to the neoliberal imposition of state economic austerity, Kerala's development credo has been based on social justice, greater gender equality, economic equity and people-centred public policy. Its classical model has confounded the classical growth-equity dilemma and has shown that democratization has been an intrinsic part of economic development, rather than following it. While Kerala has not been untouched by the growth-equity tension in economic development policy, the experience of Kerala has shown that a high quality of life and greater equity can be achieved even on modest incomes. Panchayat raj is India's constitutionally mandated subsidiarity, but it goes further and deeper and with fewer resources in Kerala than the European practice of subsidiarity, and also goes deeper than in other Indian states.

The Kerala case study highlights a number of key propositions put forward in this book. One relates to the pivotal role of ordinary people as development catalysts, formed from a more intimate awareness of their particular social and cultural reality, and thus potentially optimizing their opportunities for shaping it. The second proposition highlights capability. Kerala has cultivated a particularly strong and self-critical grassroots activist culture, punctuated with complementary state involvement. Kerala's current experiments in participatory development endeavours to heed mētis, understood as space- and place-contextualized know-how and common sense. The state's involvement shows the possibility that policymakers can more deftly employ mētis-aware strategies that crucially engage and incorporate the local context instead of imposing centralized, formulaic top-down interventions that may be far removed from the everyday lived experience and knowledge of the citizens at whom policies are directed.

At the outset I identified the incubation and subventing of social economic development as intrinsic to propositional politics in practice. Kerala exemplifies how formative periods of human capability formation, effective public policy that includes support for education, and a supportive cultural climate is a potent combination for enacting creative alternatives. The experience of Kerala also highlights the importance of addressing capability deprivation, which Amartya Sen has most notably argued is a better indicator of poverty than low income and that these capabilities are constitutive of freedom and development rather than their result per se, a proposition which seems to bear out in Kerala. This chapter further illustrates the efficacy of propositional praxis by highlighting the links between collective capabilities and governance: there is unlikely to be deep agency without deliberative, participatory democracy.

This chapter has also explored and sought to appraise challenges facing economic development in Kerala. While the community-led model of microfinance has managed to circumvent many of the problems of the Grameen model, microenterprises through cooperatives and neighbourhood groups have been more successful as tools for poverty alleviation rather than eradication, with variable results. Yet benefits may incubate over the longer-term in cultivating mētis. The challenges posed by relations between central and provincial governments are also considerable although not unlike similar tensions in other federal political systems. The national scale has been constraining in its taxation arrangements while enabling in its constitutional treatment of decentralization.

The status of women in Kerala has been critical to its developmental success, but it still has a great deal of room for improvement. Kerala's historically stronger gender equality has been instrumental to its favourable social indicators, but may also have paradoxically served to stymie contemporary progress. Reserved seats for women and the mainstreaming of gender in decentralized planning demonstrates the importance of and central focus on women in Kerala's emergent regime of empowerment. While women are becoming the focus of neoliberally-directed development programmes elsewhere, Kerala's experience of decentralized development and participatory planning might prove to be a different one given the integration of groups as political as well as merely economic units – continued policy analysis and research in this area will be beneficial.

The labour market's malabsorption of educated women and men poses one of Kerala's biggest challenges. Aside from emigration, this is being addressed



Figure 5.20 Kerala's lush green landscape in the capital Trivandrum.

to some degree through development of employment opportunities in both IT industries and tourism. Nevertheless, agriculture, fishing and traditional industries remain important. Kerala has a high physical quality of life index and a large reservoir of qualified and educated residents. Yet Kerala needs a stronger economic productive base in order to leverage these strengths.

Perhaps Kerala's development experience may be its most important 'export' and offering to the world, opening up spaces for alternative pathways to development and dignity. It is also a good foundation for its own future development. As Kerala shows, the best way to resist predatory corporate globalization is to parallel it with a resilient reality of alternatives based on *Janadhikara* – the Malayalam word for people's power.

Notes

1 Bill McKibben, *Hope, Human and Wild: True Stories of Living Lightly on the Earth* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), p. 124.

2 Bill McKibben, *Hope, Human and Wild*, p. 127. See also Srikumar Chattopadhyay and Richard Franke, *Striving for Sustainability: Environmental Stress and Democratic Initiative in Kerala* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2006).

3 See J. Devika and Binitha V.Thampi, 'Between "Empowerment" and "Liberation": The Kudumbashree Initiative in Kerala', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, Vol. 14, January 2007, pp. 33–60.

4 Interviews in Kerala were conducted in and since November 2002, and include subsequent follow-up interviews with key interviewees primarily by email. Fieldwork consisted of planned and informal meetings throughout Kerala in both major towns and rural areas in the early 2000s. I visited various projects and panchayats (villages), including small-scale coir-weaving units, a cooperative dairy unit, soap-making cooperative, a Labour Bank, the Kerala Dinesh Beedi (KDB) beedi-rolling and food-producing units, schools and healthcare centres. My research itinerary included the capital city of Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) and the cities of Thrissur (Trichur), Kozhikode (Calicut), Alapuzzha (Aleppey) and Kannur (Cannanore). (Anglicized place names are in parentheses and used interchangeably according to participant and source – see Table 5.1.) I conducted interviews and research in the village panchayats of Maloor, Payyanoor, Olivanna, Mararikulam, Kannathukal, Muhamma, Panjal and Kalliasseri. I was also an observer in a number of panchayat and grama sabha meetings, and conducted both active and passive participant observation.

5 Kerala has the oldest Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities in India, and the largest church in Asia, the Basilica Lady of Dolours in Thrissur.

6 Akash Kapur summarizes Cochin's historical role. 'Along the shore, fishermen in loincloths make their living with funnel-shaped nets suspended from intricate wooden structures, a method imported by Chinese merchants in the thirteenth century. Inland, adjoining the Dutch villas that are home to Cochin's elite, is a church built by Franciscan friars in 1503. Deep within the city's labyrinth of sinuous alleyways is a synagogue, established by a Jewish community whose roots stretch back some 2,000 years. The ships that harboured at Cochin came in search of gems, tea-leaves, spices, and rare Keralan teakwood, which is said to have been used to build the palace of Nebuchadnezzar . . . Such commercial exchanges were accompanied by a robust traffic in ideas . . . It is this cultural porousness that must take much of the

credit for Kerala's open-mindedness. In contrast to the rest of India, with its history of invasions and foreign occupation, Kerala has been exposed to the outside world primarily through trade and missionary activity. When newness has come to the state, it has come as an unthreatening insight or idea, as a friend'. Akash Kapur, 'Poor but prosperous', *The Atlantic*, September 1998, <http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98sep/kerala.htm>.

7 Keralite Christians and Muslims account for a greater share within the overall population of the State than in other Indian States. In the 2001 Census, they accounted for 19 per cent and 24.7 per cent of the population, respectively.

8 R. Krishnakumara, 'A Kerala experience', *Frontline*, Vol. 18 (1), January 6–19, 2001, <http://www.flonnet.com/fl1801/18011130.htm>.

9 The British government entered into treaties with the princes of Travancore and Cochin, two of the three regions that make up modern-day Kerala, in 1792.

10 Bob Stern, Pers comm., Sydney, December 2004. Professor Stern is a retired South Asian specialist.

11 Traditionally only the 'higher' castes – the Namboodiris, Nairs (also spelled Nayars) and Syrian Orthodox Christians, could expect to be educated. The progressive Hindu rulers of the Travancore province responded to European Christian missionaries education efforts by setting up their own schools, thus extending access to education. By royal rescript in 1817, the 15 year old Regent Queen Rani Gauri Parvathi Bai (1802–1853) decreed that 'The state should defray the entire cost of the education of its people in order that there might be no backwardness in the spread of enlightenment among them, that by diffusion of education they might become better subjects and public servants and that the reputation of the state might be enhanced thereby'. Cited in C. M. Ramachandran, *Problems of Higher Education in India* (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987), p. 91. A few decades later the Maharaja of Travancore echoed this sentiment in 1881, stating, 'No civilized government can be oblivious to the great advantages of popular education, for a government which has to deal with an educated population is by far stronger than one which has to control ignorant and disorderly masses. Hence education is a twice-blessed thing – it benefits those who give it and those who receive it'.

12 Robin Jeffrey, 'Women and the Kerala model: four lives, 1870s–1980s', *South Asia*, Vol. 12 (2), 1989, p. 15.

13 Historically, Kerala has had several prominent women in influential positions pertaining to political and social activities. Examples include K. R. Gouri, Revenue Minister in 1957 Communist Government that launched the Kerala Agrarian relations Act and a minister in four administrations, and Mary Poonan, the first woman in India to head a government department in 1924 (chief medical officer of Travancore, studied medicine in Britain). But this is still the exception with cultural limitations on the public involvement of women. See Robin Jeffrey, 'Legacies of Matriliny: the place of women and the Kerala model', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 77 (4), Winter 2004–5, pp.647–64; Robin Jeffrey, 'Women and the Kerala model', pp. 13–32 and Drèze and Sen 1995, *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 142.

14 Within matriliny, the eldest male member was still the manager of the matrilineal joint family. Women were however entitled to all the assets of their natal home in pre-British Kerala. A woman's sexual partners would visit her in the home of her birth (thus matrilocal), and her children's male guardians were not their biological fathers but their uncles. Children lived with their mother. See Robin Jeffrey, 'Women and the Kerala model', pp. 13–32.

15 Granted, the intent of the maharajas' progressive education policies such as vernacular schools was to make their subjects easier to govern. Nevertheless, the policies were dramatically progressive for their time.
16 Drèze and Sen, *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995).
17 Robin Jeffrey, 'Legacies of matriliny', p. 660.
18 Robin Jeffrey, 'Legacies of matriliny', p. 649.
19 Akash Kapur, 'Poor but prosperous'.
20 Swami Vivekananda, 'The future of India', *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda* (Calcutta: Advaia Ashrama, 1955–1960), Vol. 3: Lectures from Colombo to Almora, p. 294. The Swami's dismay with what he witnessed in his visit is demonstrated in the extended passage: 'Was there ever a sillier thing before in the world than what I saw in Malabar country? The poor Pariah is not allowed to pass through the same street as the high-caste man, but if he changes his name to a hodge-podge English name, it is all right; or to a Mohammedan name, it is all right. What inference would you draw except that these Malabaris are all lunatics, their homes so many lunatic asylums, and that they are to be treated with derision by every race in India until they mend their manners and know better. Shame upon them that such wicked and diabolical customs are allowed; their own children are allowed to die of starvation, but as soon as they take up some other religion they are well fed. There ought to be no more fight between the castes'.
21 Mahatma Gandhi, 'The untouchables', *Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, edited by Ronald Duncan (London: Faber and Faber), Chapter 6, p. 167.
22 Sylvia M. Hale, 'Review: the status of women in India', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 62 (3), Autumn 1989, p. 379.
23 V.K. Ramachandran, 'Kerala's development achievements and their replicability' in Govindran Parayil (Ed.), *Kerala: The Development Experience; Reflections on Sustainability and Replicability* (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 99.
24 The Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI (M) successfully pushed for three major reforms in the 1960s and 1970s: land reform, education and healthcare. This was not without its opposition and delays: after the Communist Party was elected on a land reform-dominated platform, its 1959 land reform bill attracted fierce opposition from land-owners and the central Indian government intervened, effectively blocking the implementation of land reform for 10 years. In 1969 they were back on the agenda, with a 'land to the tiller' redistribution that limited each family to eight hectares and meant most now owned the land in which their house stood. There have been CPI-led governments in Kerala during the following terms: 1957–59, 1967–70, 1980–82, 1987–1991, 1996–2001 and 2006–11.
25 Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (Eds.), *Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
26 Richard W. Franke, 'Fuelling economic growth through democratic participation: three lessons from Kerala, India', Chautauqua Institution Lecture Series, 10 August 2001; see also Renata Serra, 'Social capital: meaningful and measurable at the state level', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36 (8), 24 Feb–2 March 2001, 693–704. For Kerala's high media circulation and readership, see Robin Jeffrey, 'The three stages of print: testing ideas of "public sphere", "print-capitalism" and "public action" in Kerala, India', Proceedings of the 15th Biennial Conference Association of Australia, Canberra, 29 June to 2 July 2004.
27 Patrick Heller, 'Social capital and the developmental state: industrial workers in Kerala' in Govindran Parayil (Ed.), *Kerala: The Development Experience*, p. 74.

28 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.
29 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.
30 This Gramscian formulation of the proper relation between the state and civil society is one where the state rests upon the support of an active, self-conscious and plural civil society, which, in turn, sustains and promotes the development of the constructive forces in that society. This may be at variance with the civil society against the state discourse in some contemporary development studies (or the positing of civil society as a Western phenomenon in postcolonial theory). See P. Heller, K. N. Harilal and S. Chaudhuri, 'Building local democracy: evaluating the impact of decentralization in Kerala, India', *World Development*, Vol. 35 (4), 2007, pp. 632–3.
31 As Heller puts it, 'The political leverage of the working class . . . resides in its "associational autonomy" rather than the clientalistic exchange of material rewards for political subordination that characterizes authoritarian-corporatist regimes'. Patrick Heller, 'Social capital and the developmental state: industrial workers in Kerala' in Parayil Govindran (Ed.), *Kerala: The Development Experience*, p. 71.
32 K. N. Harilal, 'Confronting bureaucratic capture: rethinking participatory planning methodology in Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLVIII, 7 September 2013, p. 54. 'Democratic movements in Kerala did not resist the temptation to participate in local and regional governments for the fear of cooption', Harilal writes, 'what they vowed to do instead was to combine participation and struggle (*bharanavum samaravum*) so that there was immunity to cooption'.
33 From the first censuses, Cochin, Travancore and Malabar (the three constituent areas of modern Kerala) showed higher literacy rates than India as a whole. Jeffrey adds, 'In Cochin, [when] an unfamiliar system of English education was attempted in the 1870s, people avoided it . . . Governments, to be sure, influenced their subjects, but rarely, I suspect, directed them down paths they were not already inclined to go'. Robin Jeffrey, 'Government and culture: how women made Kerala literate', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 60 (3), Autumn 1987, p. 469.
34 V.K. Ramachandran, 'On Kerala's development achievements' in Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (Eds.), *Indian Development*, p. 300. This is also the view of Associate Professor Harilal who credits public action, Pers. comm.
35 Cited in R. Krishnakumara, 'A Kerala experience', *Frontline*, Vol. 18 (1), 6–19 January 2001.
36 Govindran Parayil (Ed.) in *Kerala: The Development Experience*, pp. 12–13.
37 See J. Devika, and Binitha V. Thampi, 'Between "empowerment" and "liberation": The Kudumbashree Initiative in Kerala'.
38 Thomas Isaac, 'An agenda for sustainable equitable and rapid growth in Kerala', 2007 from finance minister's site, n.d. <www.minister-finance.kerala.gov.in/articles/fmar011.pdf>, p. 2 (accessed 2010 – no longer online).
39 John Kenneth Galbraith*, India Today interview*, 31 March 1981 cited in O. Österling and J. Persson, *The Indian Non-Formal Education Programme: An Evaluation* (SIDA, Education Division documents No. 3, March–April 1982), unnumbered page in front matter.
40 John Ratcliffe and Drèze and Sen were early advocates of Kerala's development experience, tying its success to the efficacy of public action and to more than simply statist provision and redistribution of public goods. John Ratcliffe, 'Social justice and the demographic transition: lessons from India's Kerala state', *International Journal of Health Services*, Vol. 8 (1), 1978, pp. 123–44. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995) and *Indian Development:*

Selected Regional Perspectives (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). See also M. D. Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). Economic historian Morris David Morris formulated a Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) in the mid-1970s which comprised of three indicators that he argued were the best indicators for physical wellbeing: life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy. The only non-country to be included in his work was Kerala because of its anomalously high PQLI relative to income. Morris's work also helped bring the experience of Kerala to the attention of development scholars and policymakers.

41 The absence of fast economic growth aside, Kerala's transformation has also occurred peacefully and democratically, making it all the more remarkable. Kerala's experience stands in stark contrast to the dark side of the Asian Tiger 'miracle' economies: suppression of dissent, flagrant exploitation, social upheaval and economic meltdown.

42 Richard W. Franke, 'Fueling economic growth through democratic participation: three lessons from Kerala, India'.

43 In *The Red Riddle of Kerala* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965), p. 26, R. D. Mandekar describes the population of the state as 'an alert, vigilant, politically conscious electorate, over whose eyes the politicians cannot draw the wool'.

44 Paul Wallich, 'A mystery inside a riddle inside an enigma', *Scientific American*, March 1995, p. 37.

45 Shirin Shirin, 'Economic woes? Look to Kerala', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 10 December 2008, <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5728>.

46 Sex ratio is one of the most salient yardsticks regarding the status of women in any society, but particularly in India and China because it indicates the degree to which female foeticide and infanticide are practiced. It is deemed a healthy sex ratio because it indicates that female foeticide is not prevalent as it is in other parts of India. Within India, where the status of women has generally been low and female infanticide is not uncommon in some states, Kerala has occupied a unique position with regard to sex ratio with females consistently – for over a century – outnumbering males. According to the 2001 census, for example, there are 1058 females per 1000 males. This is deemed a 'favourable' sex ratio not because females outnumber males, but it is a valuable indication about the decline in the female infant mortality rate and the increase in life expectancy of women.

47 Life expectancy at birth for Kerala males increased from 44 years in 1956 to 70 years in 1995, an increase of 26 years in a span of 40 years. For females, it increased even more dramatically – from 45 years to almost 76 years, up 30 years. During the same period, average life expectancy at birth in India as a whole also increased by 25 years, bringing the life expectancy for males and females to 60.4 years and 61.8 years respectively, but is still considerably behind Kerala. Centre For Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005* (Thiruvananthapuram: State Planning Board, 2005), p. 24.

48 Kerala made a remarkable achievement in the demographic transition within a short period of time. In 1951–61, the crude birth rate was 44 per 1,000 population and declined by 60 per cent to 18 per 1,000 population in 1995–2000. Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 22. Moreover, Kerala's fertility rates achieved without compulsion are now lower than those in China and countries in the 'upper middle-income' bracket.

49 Compiled by Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, 'Kerala fact sheet 2002', unpublished brief, 2002. In terms of national indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI), Kerala has held its own against a slump from India, with India's ranking

slipping to 134 in 2009 from 128 in the previous year. Although Kerala's per capita income lagged behind the all-India average until very recently, Kerala has ranked first among major Indian States in the HDI at several time points in the past three decades, including 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2013. This hints at the inadequacy of conventional economic growth or indices alone as the main measure of development, with the HDI and Gender Development Index (GDI) increasingly significant measures. While human development is deeper and more complex than any single composite index can measure, the HDI and GDI provide salient alternatives to GDP per capita as a summary measure of human wellbeing. Kerala Planning Board, *Economic Review*, 2009, p. 444. See also *The Hindu*, 'Kerala example draws UN praise', 12 June 2013, which has Kerala's state HDI for 2013 at 0.854.

50 Cited by V. K. Ramachandran, 'On Kerala's development achievements' in Jean Dréze and Amartya Sen (Eds.), *Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 271.

51 These initiatives included elected district councils – a first step towards decentralization – popularization of high-efficiency stoves (chulhas), the establishment of a nongovernmental research and action centre – the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC), the People's Resource Mapping Programme, and the Kalliasseri people's planning experiment.

52 Thomas Isaac and Richard W. Franke, *Local Democracy and Development: The Kerala People's Campaign For Decentralized Planning* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 31–2.

53 With its motto as 'Science for Social Revolution', the KSSP or Kerala Sasthra Sahithya Parishad was established in 1962 as the people's science movement of Kerala. At the time of its founding it was a 40-member group consisting of science writers and teachers with an interest in science from a social perspective. Over the past four decades it has grown into a mass movement with a membership over 45,000. The literacy campaign attracted international acclaim, receiving UNESCO's literacy prize in 1991. The KSSP was the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award in 1996, a prize that has been called the 'alternative Nobel prize'. KSSP projects run from adult literacy classes to developing appropriate and environmentally sound technology. The KSSP has also promoted the status of artisanal science and indigenous knowledge. Also instrumental in rural development, low cost housing and solid waste management. See the KSSP website (content in Malayalam and English <http://www.kssp.in/> and the Friends of KSSP: <http://www.kssp.org/>.

54 See Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Continuum, [1970], 2000).

55 Thomas Isaac, Richard W. Franke and Pyaralal Raghavan, *Democracy at Work In An Indian Industrial Cooperative: The Story of Kerala Dinesh Beedi* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 18.

56 Thomas Isaac and Richard W. Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*.

57 Michael Tharakan, Pers. comm.

58 Kerala reportedly has India's highest newspaper circulation. See Robin Jeffrey 'Indian language newspapers and why they grow', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28 (38), 1993, pp. 2004–11; and Robin Jeffrey, 'The three stages of print: testing ideas of "public sphere", "print-capitalism" and "public action" in Kerala, India', Proceedings of the 15th Biennial Conference Association of Australia, Canberra, 29 June to 2 July 2004.

59 The first of its kind in Asia, the Writer's Cooperative of Kerala was founded in 1945 with 12 members and has since grown exponentially. The Society pays the highest royalty in the world: author-members of the Society receive 30 per cent of the price of books.

The Society's About page nevertheless reveals extant sexism: it is a 'co-operative of men of letters'. See <http://spcskerala.in/subpage.html> (accessed 3 March 2010).

60 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Nirupam Bajpai and Ananthi Ramiah, 'Why some Indian states have grown faster than the others', Centre for International Development, Harvard University, 2002, p. 15 cited in Narendar Pani and K. Jafar, 'Mass education-led growth and non-agrarian villages: long-term results of the Kerala model', *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 38 (1), March 2010, pp. 25–42.

61 K. P. Kannan, 'Political economy of labour and development in Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33 (52), 26 December 1998.

62 E. M. S. Namboodirippad, inaugural address to the International Congress on Kerala Studies, 1994.

63 Kerala's share of India-wide FDI during 1991–2002 amounted to 1 per cent, mostly in IT and textiles. Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2008), p. 37.

64 The practice in Kerala is to refer to the national government as the Centre. Centre-State tensions are often referred to in the State's government policy documents. See Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 32 and 2010 Budget address for example.

65 P. R. Nair, 'Return of overseas contract workers and their rehabilitation and development in Kerala (India). A critical account of policies, performance and prospects', *International Migration*, Vol. 37 (1), 1999, p. 210. Reflecting the importance of migration to the Gulf, Kerala is the only state in India where government schools offer Arabic as a subject.

66 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 45.

67 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 128.

68 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 129.

69 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 45.

70 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 110.

71 Michael Tharakan, Pers. comm.

72 In Gender Empowerment Measures, Kerala is at or near the top. This index endeavours to measure the extent to which women are able to use their basic capabilities to exercise decision-making. Yet on more direct measures of autonomy, including household decision-making, mobility and access to/control over money, Kerala has trailed the state of Gujarat, which had much lower levels of literacy. Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 113.

73 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 165. Perhaps paradoxically, women from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) have higher labour force participation rates than do women from majority castes, though as a fraction of female workers, SCs/STs still constitute a minority. The entry of SCs/ST women into the labour force is qualitatively different than for women in general because the former are concentrated in low-skill, low status manual labour where the rate of unionization is high, and where the CPI (M) in particular has been very active. See K. P. Kannan, 'Political economy of labour and development in Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33 (52), 26 December 1998, L61–L70.

74 Kerala State Planning Board, 'Ninth Plan, People's Plan, a review of the first year's activities', Kerala State Planning Board People's Plan Campaign Cell, 1997, p. 6.

75 The 1994 International Congress involved 1,600 attendees, including almost 700 scholars from over 24 disciplines and delegates from 23 countries. Just over a decade later,

CPI (M) general secretary Prakash Karat renewed the call at the second International Congress on Kerala Studies held in Thiruvananthapuram from December 9 to 11, 2005, with the purpose of asking Keralites to chalk out a new 'non-sectarian' Left agenda for its development during the next 10 years 'to protect the gains of the past and craft a viable path to the future'.

76 K. P. Kannan, 'People's Planning, Kerala's dilemma', *India-Seminar.com*, 2000, <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/485/485percent20kannan.htm>.

77 Like other states, Kerala passed the corresponding legislation (the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act of 1994), held local elections in the three tiers of panchayats at the village, block and district levels (in 1995), and delegated 29 administrative functions to the local bodies. Altogether, the legislative basis for democratic decentralization included the national government's Constitutional Amendments (73 and 74), the Kerala Municipality Act (1994), the Sen Committee Report (1996) and the Amendment Acts (1999).

78 The Sen Committee was commissioned to recommend measures for the implementation of the decentralization process, chaired by the former Vice Chairman of the West Bengal State Planning Board, S. B. Sen.

79 To place it in the context of the forms of decentralization currently discussed in the development literature, three forms of decentralization can be discerned: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Decentralization by deconcentration is largely a bureaucratic reshuffling that does not alter the power relations between bureaucrats and the people at the local levels. Decentralization by delegation usually involves privatization of functions by the central authority to semi-autonomous or independent organizations. Kerala's decentralization takes the third form: devolution. Authority is transferred to autonomous or semi-autonomous local governments, granting them powers to plan, make decisions, raise revenues and monitor activities. Deconcentration has been the main form of decentralization promulgated for practice by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. See John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries* (Kumarian Press, West Hartford: 1999).

80 Thomas Isaac, Pers comm.

81 At the time the PPC was inaugurated, the state had 990 rural panchayats (the number has since increased to 999), 152 development blocks, 58 municipalities and corporations, and 14 districts. Kerala panchayats average 20 to 30 square kilometres with an average population of 20,000–30,000 that is divided into wards of between seven and 15.

82 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 20.

83 Richard W. Franke, 'Local planning: the Kerala experiment', in Chris Spannos (Ed.), *Real Utopia: Participatory Society for the 21st Century* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2008).

84 Thomas Isaac and K. N. Harilal, 'Planning for empowerment: people's campaign for decentralized planning in Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 32 (1–2), 4–11 January 1997, p. 53.

85 Thomas Isaac, Pers comm.

86 S. B. Sen passed away before completion of the final report but the LDG-led government in 1996 took up the recommendations of the interim report. Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, pp. 171–2.

87 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.

88 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 455.

89 There is some evidence, however, that the devolution of funds from the state may have served to discourage local collection of taxes, thus undercutting a potential source of revenue for village panchayats. Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 450.
90 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.
91 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 47.
92 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 452.
93 P. Heller, K. N. Harilal and S. Chaudhuri, 'Building local democracy: evaluating the impact of decentralization in Kerala, India', *World Development*, Vol. 35 (4), 2007, p. 631.
94 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 167.
95 Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin, 'Is the Kerala model sustainable? Lessons from the past, prospects for the future' in Govindran Parayil (Ed.), *Kerala: The Development Experience*, p. 34.
96 Nissim Mannathukkaren, 'The "poverty" of political society: Partha Chatterjee and the People's Plan Campaign in Kerala, India', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (2), 2010, p. 305.
97 See Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin, 'Is the Kerala model sustainable?', pp. 34–6.
98 Shubham Chaudhuri and Patrick Heller, 'The plasticity of participation: evidence from a participatory governance experiment', July 2002, p. 6, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/13892_chaudhuri_heller.pdf>.
99 Michael Tharakan, Pers. comm.
100 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 2.
101 Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, 'The Kerala decentralization experiment: achievements, origins, and implications, presented at the International Conference on Democratic Decentralization', 23–28 May 2000, Kerala University, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, <http://chss.montclair.edu/anthropology/keralaexperiment.htm>.
102 Shubham Chaudhuri and Patrick Heller, 'The plasticity of participation: evidence from a participatory governance experiment'.
103 Vanita Mukherjee, 'Democratic decentralization and associative patterns', unpublished paper, Trivandrum, 2002.
104 K. P. Kannan, 'People's Planning, Kerala's dilemma'.
105 Shubham Chaudhuri and Patrick Heller, 'The plasticity of participation: evidence from a participatory governance experiment', p. 8.
106 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 165.
107 Richard W. Franke, 'Democratic decentralization: the Kerala experience in international perspective', presented at A Decade after the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (Seminar), A. K. G. Centre for Research and Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, 18–19 May 2002.
108 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 27.
109 René Véron, 'The "new" Kerala model: lessons for sustainable development', *World Development*, Vol. 29 (4), 2001, pp. 601–17; Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, 'Power to the (Malayalee) people: Kerala's 9th Plan – People's Plan Campaign for local democracy', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 32 (48), 29 November–5 December 1997, pp. 3061–8.
110 The figure cited at the village was 15 to 20 times more; the 90 per cent estimate is from Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, 'The Kerala decentralization experiment: achievements, origins, and implications', presented at the International

Conference on Democratic Decentralization, 23–28 May 2000, Kerala University, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala.

111 T. P. Kunhikannan, Pers. comm.

112 T. P. Kunhikannan, Pers. comm.

113 Most current figures derived from the KDB website at <http://www.keraladinesh.com> (accessed January 2014). The 'Dinesh' in KDB derives from Sanskrit, literally meaning 'lord of the day' and also denotes the sun.

114 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, p. xii.

115 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, p. 6.

116 Richard W. Franke, 'Democracy at work in an Indian industrial cooperative: the story of Kerala Dinesh Beedi', paper presented at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, 21 November 1997, Washington DC, <http://chss.montclair.edu/anthro/kdb.htm>.

117 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, p. 193.

118 Naren Karunakaran, 'Marx to market', *Outlook India*, 4 October 2008.

119 The diversification decision was made democratically by the workers after local meetings and seminars at all the production centres and included a provision that no worker would be laid off and that retooling to new products would be voluntary. A goal was set to transfer 25 per cent of the workforce within 10 years from tobacco to other products. By 2000 substantial progress had been made.

120 See Dinesh Information Technology Systems (DITS) <http://www.keraladinesh.com/dits/> and <http://www.keraladinesh.com/dinesh-software/services/software-development>.

121 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, pp. 119–21.

122 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 5.

123 Patrick Heller, 'Social capital and the developmental state: industrial workers in Kerala' in Govindran Parayil, (Ed.), *Kerala: The Development Experience*, p. 79.

124 The cooperative sector exists within the provisions of the *Kerala Cooperatives Act 1969*, with subsequent amendments passed in later years. The State Cooperative Bank was formed in 1956. See Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 36.

125 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 128.

126 Government of India Planning Commission, *Kerala Development Report 2008*, p. 46.

127 Thomas Isaac, 'An agenda for sustainable equitable and rapid growth in Kerala', p. 2.

128 Isaac and Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 167.

129 See Bernstein's workplace democracy participation scale, which ranges from the suggestion box to worker veto over management decisions. Paul Bernstein, *Workplace Democratization* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transmission Books, 1980).

130 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, p. 15.

131 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, pp. 14–15.

132 Isaac, Franke and Raghavan, *Democracy at Work*, p. 15.

133 This refers to the 'degeneration' hypothesis suggested by Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' and Weber's work on bureaucratization and routinization of charisma. This is a key challenge of institutionalizing participatory democracy and worker ownership and preserving the original formative ideals of the movement, as the cooperative's organizational form may, over time, operationally resemble a capitalist firm. Can cooperatives circumvent or obviate the tendency toward oligarchization? As Franke puts it: 'In economics, the degeneration hypothesis predicts that worker-owned businesses in a capitalist economy have an inherent tendency to degenerate into capitalist-like

companies no matter what their intentions. In sociology, a companion theory predicts that "goal displacement" or the "iron law of oligarchy" will reassert capitalist style hierarchy after a few years or a single generation of radical or utopian worker management and egalitarianism'. Richard Franke, 'Democracy at work in an Indian industrial cooperative'.

134 Ms Valsala, Pers. comm.

135 Ms Valsala, Pers. comm.

136 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.

137 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.

138 Thomas Isaac, Pers. comm.

139 T. K. Rajalakshami, 'Self-help doubts', *Frontline*, Vol. 24 (5), 10–23 March 2007.

140 Richard W. Franke, 'The Mararikulam experiment: women-owned cooperatives in Kerala, India – a people's alternative to corporate dominated globalization', *Grassroots Economic Organizing*, Issue 57, March 2003, <http://www.geo.cooperative/archives/kerala503.htm>.

141 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 153.

142 Richard W. Franke, 'Fueling economic growth through democratic participation: three lessons from Kerala, India', Chautauqua Institution Lecture Series, 10 August 2001, <http://chss.montclair.edu/anthro/fuelinggrowth.htm>.

143 Centre for Development Studies, *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 156.

144 Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000), p. 296.

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170 Kerala State Planning Board, *Economic Review 2008*, p. 522.
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174 Thomas T. M. Isaac and Richard W. Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 160.
175 Thomas T. M. Isaac and Richard W. Franke, *Local Democracy and Development*, p. 19.
176 See <http://sdccapdeck.in/index.html>.
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178 Thomas Isaac, 'An agenda for sustainable equitable and rapid growth in Kerala', p. 42.
179 Kudumbashree is a poverty eradication project officially launched by the Government of Kerala in 1998 with the active support of the Central Government agencies for wiping out absolute poverty from the State. See <http://www.kudumbashree.org/>.
180 SHGs have formed India-wide to save regular small sums of money, mutually agreeing to contribute to a common fund and to meet their emergency needs on the basis of mutual help. Members make small regular savings contributions over a few months until there is enough capital aggregated in the group to begin lending. Funds may then be lent back to the members or to others in the village for any purpose. Group members use collective wisdom and peer pressure and support to ensure proper end-use of credit and timely repayment. Once they have accumulated a deposit of their own capital and have established a track record of regular repayments, they are eligible for NABARD's SHG-bank-linkage program, through which they are able to borrow from participating banks.

NABARD also lent institutional support and coordination mechanisms. NABARD's linkage program is particularly strong in southern Indian states, with Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka accounting for 57 per cent of the SHG credits linked during the financial year 2005–6. As at March 2006, 2.2 million SHGs representing 33 million members nationally had benefited from credit linked to this programme. See C. Fouillet and B. Augsburg, 'Spread of the self-help groups banking linkage programme in India', International Conference on Rural Finance Research, Rome, 19–21 March 2007. NABARD was established in 1982 as a development bank, in terms of the Preamble of the Act, 'for providing and regulating credit and other facilities for the promotion and development of agriculture, small scale industries, cottage and village industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts and other allied economic activities in rural areas with a view to promoting integrated rural development and securing prosperity of rural areas and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto'.

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6 Conclusion

> I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Man's. I will not Reason & Compare; my business is to Create.
>
> (William Blake)[1]

The concept of infrageographies of globalization has been presented as a propositional socio-spatial praxis for apprehending a greater spectrum of globalization, which also crucially involves a more enabling view of political agency. A key research aim of this book has been to reclaim globalization as a catalytic concept and practice with emancipatory grassroots potential and enactments, a project of multiple pathways recognizing the coproduction of reality by more autonomous subjects. Within this broad research aim, I have sought to develop infraglobalization as a heuristic that renders a sub rosa socio-spatial ordering of reality with layered depth and global breadth, in which people are recognized as creative and capacious agents. In this short concluding chapter I draw out the principal elements from the research trajectory of this book, and both summarize and offer reflections. This research also suggests a number of potential lines of further enquiry.

This book has sought to make a contribution to the body of knowledge about globalization in a number of ways. First, I have developed the notion of an extended infrapolitical agency capable of propositional rather than simply oppositional strategies which I have argued makes a vital difference to the efficacy of movements, communities and networks working towards greater autonomy and equity. Related to this, I have described an original tripartite 'sub' heuristic as a way to recast power, agency, ontology, strategy and the role of informal order. I have argued that the third modality, sub rosa subvention, offers the best prospects for enduring progressive enactments, which includes but is not limited to when it is infrapolitically incubated, depending on context.

Second, I have sought to apply different ways of seeing and knowing with a view to reclaiming and producing globalization as a progressive and plural political space, towards strategically catalyzing a manifold globalization outside corporatism's subsumptive frame. I have argued that this multiplicity and manifold nature of praxis is central to envisioning and enacting a more enabling grassroots

globalization and economic development with social justice. Third, my major empirical case study has focused on Kerala's experience of subventing cooperatives and decentralized budget-supported participatory planning as a vehicle for exploring the viability and success of home-grown alternatives to corporatist globalization. I sought to evaluate whether Kerala's experience shows that praxis can be constituted by more constructivist and democratic determination from the ground-up, rather than from the bottom-line.

In my reckoning, Kerala's participatory decentralization programme and its successes and shortcomings provided an opportunity to evaluate the possibilities of enacting one such set of propositional responses within the rubric of globalization. Kerala's overall accessibility to detailed investigation presents an opportunity for sustained investigation within the framework of propositional praxis as outlined in Chapter 1, and there is greater potential for exploring its mētis in future research, particularly in how the institutionalization of the PPC will continue to depend upon Kerala's citizen capabilities being developed in the process of setting of economic and social priorities, as well as from mētis, and how the two interact.

I focused on Kerala because in the course of my research I found it spanned the spectrum of informal and institutional order. Drawing upon what might be seen as 'public transcript' reports for primary sources does not in themselves disprove or detract from the proposition of a hidden transcript. These primary sources mostly measured and reported on outcomes rather than sub rosa processes I argue account for some of these outcomes, but the point was that Kerala's experience exemplified how development could span the spectrum of hidden and public – the false choice would have been in thinking that I had to abjure government or official sources altogether rather than judiciously drawing upon them in tandem with consultations of community-based activists.

A reflection upon my own positionality and how this may have influenced my research and approach and situatedness within a larger community of researchers is perhaps also appropriate: acknowledging the positioned and partial nature of research surely also points to its plural nature. The situational context of this production of knowledge is in an academic milieu with a strong postsructuralist strain and there is a conscious placement of my research within poststructuralist geopolitical economy. My research is also situated in a time-space in which there are shifts in how we know, how we place human agents in the world, and how enquiry affects practice and these developments have also shaped my research. I am also an agent of knowledge production with a physical positioning in Australia, an Anglophone setting that is nevertheless distinct from North European and North American contributions. The question of whether Australia (and New Zealand) can offer its own special insights into or distinctive approach to the investigation and theorization of globalization is not one I engage with or can do justice to here: others such as Raewyn Connell have addressed this question in works such as *Southern Theory*.[2] The colonial legacy of Australia's history may in many respects have given way to a far more cosmopolitan engagement with the world – able to draw from Northern knowledge production but also able to fashion a

distinct contribution. My own activist and Middle Eastern background has also sensitized me to being aware that knowledge production should not simply be for its own sake but with a view to social justice and transformatory application. In straddling two distinct but overlapping cultural worlds, my Australian and Middle Eastern identities have also, I think, served to produce a third-space that may have influenced my outlook and research orientations. One take-away from the notion of a layered, imbricated infraglobalization is that multiple subjectivities can co-exist in manifold time-spaces. We all contain complex multitudes, to paraphrase Walt Whitman.

The book attests to the need to frame a broader notion of political agency, no longer restricted to a mass collective subject long left behind by poststructuralist research, an agency where even seemingly small actions and networks can have sweeping global effects, and rapid large-scale change can emerge from diffuse local transformations. Ironically, these new understandings of political agency come at a time of renewed global imperium, which perhaps makes their realization even more important and urgent. Apparently agency-averse implications of some post-modern theory notwithstanding, this book has found that post-positivist representations of human agency can be both affirmative and transformative, signalling a promising shift from more dogmatic, essentialist, grand-theoretical representations to more fluid, constructivist, contingent and multi-perspectival understandings.

I have argued that a vital part of framing understanding towards a more genuine democratization of globalization praxis is to produce socio-spatial imaginaries that might better ferment progressive political agency. In contributing towards the production of progressive spatial praxis, I have posited infrageographies of globalization as a way of articulating sub rosa strategies and more hidden hubs and networks. I have advanced infraglobalization as an imaginary of agential depth with global breadth. In this praxis, both space and subjects are recognized as active rather as passive recipients of processes. The local in this conception is recognized as innovative and not simply ameliorative or resistant. The infrageographical imaginary is a response to finding that new ways of imagining spaces outside the control of capital is central to projects for producing viable alternatives. Resignification of spaces, subjects and strategies may also help disrupt the public transcript alignment of macro-scales with formal sectors.

Another globalization, indeed globalizations, is not only possible, as asserted at the start of this book, it already exists. I have found the neoliberal corporatist, and more specifically neoliberal, projection of globalization and its colonization of public transcript reality buries a far richer order. The conventional optic of globalization reveals a very limited, narrow spectrum of reality and this narrowing is inherently political, with profound implications for human agency. The book has proposed that there is more to effective progressive globalization praxis than resistance, which is too often reduced to simply cataloguing capitalism's greed and diabolical devilries; instead, agency is richer than conventional accounts allow and the efficacy of transformative grassroots agency within globalization praxis depends upon both propositional and oppositional action.

Challenging the discourses, epistemes and practices in which people – as citizens, communities or social movements – are positioned as powerless is an important endeavour, but, as I have argued, an incomplete one. Propositional strategies confer authorship and capacity, and offer people the dignity and power of being constructivists rather than malcontents. I have proposed that informal order and mētis might be considered as a mode of doing and knowing that is deeper than the idea of social capital, and upon which thriving communities are predicated.

In seeking to advance new ways of seeing and knowing about globalization, I have argued that as subjects, people are bringing globalization *into being*, in part through covert creation and incubation of informal order. I have asserted that denial of *visibility* does not necessarily affect *viability*, it may even aid in its incubation and development, and illegibility (to the public transcript) may aid the articulation of infraglobalization praxis. Different dimensions of experience are imbricated layers of reality that can co-inhabit the same space, akin to multiple television and radio frequencies which may only be heard or seen by those 'tuned in' to their frequency.

This book has argued that globalization praxis is co-determined. It is neither received wisdom nor is there is one single imaginary of the global, particularly one that can be imposed by reference to purported inevitability. The concern with praxis also intimates recognition in the book that theory (and method) take on an important relation to action – to understand the world is to change it and imagining alternatives is to help create them. Academic research itself participates in bringing new realities into being. Communities may also in themselves be important epistemic sources, and the book has recognized mētis as a contextual, tacit knowledge that can serve as an important alternative to the subsumptive tendencies of instrumental rationalism.

Throughout the book I have argued that globalization, as well as processes conflated with or described as neoliberal such as decentralization and microfinance, may be reclaimed and redeemed from a singular and narrowly sectional corporatist representation underpinned by what I identify as a high modernist 'command and control' ontology of dominatory space. The book has concluded that social relations cannot be transformed primarily through government action, such transformation being contingent on the informal order and mētis of communities, but that the role of the state can be highly significant and positively facilitative as has been seen in the case of Kerala.

Finally, I have found ontology is a keystone to the central book argument – it forms a key axial differentiation in the tripartite 'sub' heuristic of subsumption to subversion to sub rosa subvention. The first 'sub' rests on a singularist ontology, to which I have argued the second is also captive, while the third bears an ontology of multiplicity. In summary: subsumption takes as its premise that globalization can and must take only one major form, the essence of corporatism. I have argued that the conditions of global possibility may *partly* be conditioned by corporatist capitalist socio-spatial relations, amongst other influences, but are not subsumed by them. Second, the subversion modality puts its store in oppositional

politics and resistance; I have argued these strategies have their importance but are insufficient and may persist in ontologically privileging the primacy of conventional, public transcript globalization, in which subsuming corporatism is dominant. Third, in what I have identified as the sub rosa subvention modality, strategies consist of developing a community's own forms rather than effectively subsidizing, and thus maintaining, the corporatist order. On the question of spatial ontology, I also found and as well as normatively advocate a shift from subsumptive praxis (deterministic, totalistic, enclosed, command and control, singular) to sub rosa praxis (possiblism, contingency, contextual, multiple, manifold). Rather than a singularist spatial ontology, infraglobalization provides a heuristic framework characterized by a radical manifold multiplicity of coexisting contrapuntal realities, rather than simply plural perspectives within a singular reality.

In arguing that the neoliberal vector of globalization is neither inevitable nor sustainable, particularly with the functionalization of crises, I sought to highlight the contingency of neoliberalism – things *can* be and *are* otherwise and there are other hubs and vectors of globalization. Overlapping branches of crises increasingly brings into question the prevailing plutocratic 'neo-neo' model of human development and global governance; and I concluded in Chapter 2 that the monomethods of totalizing corporatism stifle the complex agential capacities of the majority of people. Global civil society, I argued, has offered an initially promising development that may be revived provided it can be mētis-led rather than market-led. I concluded that the cultivation and protection of mētis is the requisite for a successful and sustainable civil society, which can be built only insofar as it nurtures the informal order upon which it is predicated.

I found that corporatism is the imitator, not the innovator, of many socio-spatial forms and strategies that it tends to subsume. Neoliberal modalities of the same processes (such as microcredit and decentralization), I argued, are not the definitive versions that spoil progressive possibilities. The value of Kerala's experience is to show how microfinance can be done differently from the neoliberal rendering and that not all microfinance need be instrumentalized, coopted and thus, circumscribed by neoliberalism. While microfinance can take on more cooperative forms, a dominant focus of recent literature seems to be on its neoliberal hijacking.

Hence, Chapter 2 argued that corporatist globalization is not nearly the dominant or definitive extent of reality. Prospects for economic democracy are to some degree linked to curtailing and finding alternatives to the corrosive corporate financialization of the economy and authoritarian appropriation of more resources by a corporatist oligarchy. But, I asserted, progressive scholars and practitioners would do well to go beyond a fixation on neoliberalism toward giving alternative ways of seeing and knowing about globalization their due attention.

Chapter 3 sought to bring into play some different ways of seeing, bringing into view invisible geographies, informal order and the importance of the everyday. The chapter explored a number of strategies of covert capacity-building toward fostering viable social alternatives and alternatives-in-waiting, both of established and experimental forms. Infraglobalization was explored as an heuristic

device employing an optical shift in looking at power relations, social order and socio-spatial organization, such that an important dimension of successful grassroots globalization is to see the everyday as a site of initiatives, not simply of impacts (to be 'resisted'); and not just 'responses to' but authors of global processes. This may signal an ontological and epistemological break with previous analyses of dissent and human agency, wherein there has been a tendency of conceptualizing everyday practices and dissent as a reaction to the 'main event' – a slipstream to the mainstream. This has rendered many crucial agential practices invisible, unacknowledged and under-theorized. In examining the role of informal order in grassroots governance, it could not be said that no *formal* order means any order at all. This is akin to saying cold is a force. Cold is not in itself a force, merely the absence of heat. In the same way, the informal order of infrageographies may be the 'heat' that warms communities, though sub rosa geographies may not always be amenable to conventional quantification.

Chapter 3 also sought to highlight that multiple strategies and alternatives exist within the rubric of the cultural and economic politics of agency. It surveyed a number of strategies in a suggestive sketch of possibilities, both already existing and emerging. These strategies take on renewed import as we have witnessed the failure of decades of top-down development through corporatist globalization and the dangerous attachment to one yardstick of development, one uni-verse of meaning and possibilities, which leads to getting stuck in solutions that seem to require outside economic intervention, or are more vulnerable and susceptible to them. In summary, thinking and doing differently is an important part of the repertoire of grassroots strategies.

Chapter 4 examined an ontological turn in globalization praxis, focusing on methodological questions. I advocated an ontological pluralism to enable imagining (and enacting) worlds outside the neoliberal singularity. My research suggests that cultivating a grassroots globalization may require markedly different conditions than currently prevail within the protocols of knowledge production, but which are nevertheless emerging. Globalization is not a singular frozen framework where social life occurs. Rather, it is actively made, framed, reframed and given meanings in social and individual action. Globalization is being reframed from the ontological outwards. Indeed, to invoke Nitzan and Bitchler's term, ontology could itself be viewed as a powerful creordering device, sanctioning and shaping knowledges and practices and playing a key role in 'worlding'.

Methodological questions are significant because they call into question the constitution of reality, globalization and governance and our capacity to engender change at different levels. The one-dimensional hegemony of rationalism, which closely informs public transcript corporatist globalization, is being challenged by new cosmologies. I found that the corrosive power of economic and scientific rationalism are inextricably linked, yet the hegemony of rationalism is being undermined and challenged even within physical science, and this has repercussions and openings for other ways of seeing and knowing.

In going beyond Euclidean spatial imaginaries and high modernist rationalist imaginaries to those influenced by post-positivist conceptions that accommodate

and recognize multiplicities, I argued that the debate about knowledge production shows that epistemology and ontology are not just abstractions but have practical consequences. Conceptualizing 'multi-verses' may enable strategies attached to 'other worlds are possible' and help foster new ways of thinking about praxis, empowerment, positionality, representation of reality and methodologies. I explored the intellectual influence of quantum mechanics, for example, in contributing to a sensibility that permits holding and perceiving more than one reality simultaneously, and of the possibility of being two things at once in the hidden and public transcripts.

Decades after its vaunted development experience first registered international attention, Kerala still offers lessons in its developmental efforts outside the subsumptive neoliberal frame and in its model of community development against the mainstreaming of corporatized microfinance. Specifically, Chapter 5 showed Kerala's experience with participatory planning, cooperatives and community-led microfinance offer viable alternative modalities. The most important lesson from Kerala's experience may be that alternative development paths are eminently possible for other communities, in addition to its own.

Chapter 5 explored how Kerala differs in its development strategies from the often eulogized, sometimes maligned, Grameen Bank model and found it had much to do with Kerala's integrated approach which includes skills training, education and market linkages. I found Kerala's PPC has allowed citizens, the primary bearers of practical knowledge, greater scope and voice. Kerala's experience underscores that even a society with a once rigid caste hierarchy can self-transform into one of the most participatory and progressive places in the world. It was inspiring to witness how organized groups of Keralite women saw themselves as constructing globalization.

It is significant that Kerala combines strong infrageographies of informal order *and* a strong progressive state. Decentralized participatory planning would not have succeeded, I assert, in a society with a strong state and a weak civil society or one that was market-determined rather than mētis-respecting. Insofar as they have succeeded, I have found that Kerala's large scale state-guided but people-led efforts at participatory planning have done so because they have drawn upon Kerala's mētis and rich existing informal order. It will be interesting to track to what extent this success will continue given the project's institutionalization program to preserve its gains.

Kerala also typifies the experimental spirit of grassroots globalization and Chapter 5 highlighted Kerala's experiments in democratic decentralization and participatory planning. I found the KSSP to be a 'mētis-friendly' institution: various local planning projects have also significantly drawn upon a voluntary training corps of retired and other resident technical experts, which can be seen as deploying mētis and cultivating grassroots governances. Kerala's ambitious experiment to crystallize the lay of the land *into* the law of the land, rather than the reverse, demonstrates how genuine empowerment can be cultivated and harnessed through culture rather than against it.

Kerala also illustrates what a state can do constructively, how it can do more than act amelioratively but also innovatively in strategies that would see microfinance be used in a way that it does not come tied with the disciplinary regimes of donor aid. Kerala's robust democracy includes a trust that residents could draw on their own mētis. The state served as logistical facilitator, rather than the authoritarian and paternalistic prime mover. Kerala's PPC was crucially mediated through the large-scale institutional form of the state. I found that Kerala is less directly subject to the disciplinary pressures such as austerity imposed from multilateral agencies typically imposed on other states and more from unfair tax-sharing arrangements from its own national government. Ways to address this obstacle might constitute a further line of research inquiry.

This book has aspired to address a number of research aims and questions, and in so doing, raises a number of possibilities for further research. The further development and application of the 'sub' syndromes presents one possible area. Exploring the implications and strategies for social science and the production of knowledge regarding the hidden transcript and illegibility is another, as are the prospects for felicitously linking mētis with a phronetic social science. While my intention in this book has been less to explore the nature of interactions between formal and informal globalization and to redress the imbalance by focusing on the latter, these linkages would also be an interesting and worthwhile area to pursue further research.

The prospects for infraglobalization strategies and their portability may be another fertile area for research as well as collaboration between those in the field and academy, and those who straddle both areas. What is working best in various communities and in capacity-building? What local currencies, incubation models, community informatics, off-grid energy systems, food production and other strategies can work well in other communities? More research might also be pursued on the relationship between participatory planning, informal order and the cultivation of mētis in various communities. Can information technologies be used to cultivate community informatics or in the service of networked participatory planning? Could the Internet be considered a hidden transcript, and if so, can virtual infrapolitical strategies be further developed and harnessed to protect and extend local knowledges?

In the opening passage of her book *Hope in the Dark* Rebecca Solnit reflects on Virginia Woolf's diary entry at the start of World War I, the anniversary of which has highlighted parallels and legacies to this day. Solnit's lyrical note about the future describes an outlook that sees unknowability as an open-ended opportunity:

> On January 18, 1915, six months into the First World War, as all Europe was convulsed by killing and dying, Virginia Woolf wrote in her journal, 'The future is dark, which is on the whole, the best thing the future can be, I think'. Dark, she seems to say, as in inscrutable, not as in terrible. We often mistake the one for the other. Or we transform the future's unknowability into something certain, the fulfilment of all our dread, the place beyond which there is no way forward. But again and again, far stranger things happen than the end of the world.[3]

From the dark part of the experiential spectrum – dark because it is less scrutible to the public transcript and its narrow bandwidth of experiential reality – I have argued that there are fertile prospects for, and thriving successes within, grass-roots globalization. This book has been less about the ending of a world than the creation of many worlds, within which people as propositionalists can embrace social and economic possibilities, reclaiming human agency, reclaiming space and converting heterodox envisionings to plural enactments.

In advancing people as co-globalizers of our own determination rather than as passive recipients of globalization through corporatist colonization, I have sought to explore the social and economic spaces of 'offstage' dissent and creation in the strategically hidden topography of the informal order, rendered visible through non-orthodox ways of seeing, knowing and doing. People at the sub rosa grass-roots can embrace the open unknowability of the future, not as a singular *tabula rasa*, but as a superposition of possibilities, probabilities and actualities that sees them reclaiming and creating their futures. I hope this book contributes to those worthwhile efforts.

Notes

1 William Blake, 'The words of Los', Chapter 1 of *Jerusalem: The Emanation of The Giant Albion*, printed by W. Blake Sth Molton St. 1804, <http://www.blakearchive.org/exist/blake/archive/erdgen.xq?id=b1.16>.

2 Raewyn Connell, *Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

3 Rebecca Solnit, *Hope In the Dark: The Untold History of People Power* (Melbourne: Canongate, 2005), p. 1.

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