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Table of contents:

Editor's note 9

I. Thematic articles

Theo Neethling
Regional Agency and Hybridisation in African Peacekeeping: Revisiting the Cases of AMIS and UNAMID in Sudan.....11

Faith O. Olanrewaju, Oluwafunke M. Folarin, Sheriff F. Folarin
Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria: An Introductory Analysis 35

Ketil Fred Hansen
Regime Security in Chad. How the Western War on Terror Saved the Chadian Dictatorial Regime 55

Melissa Jennings
Regional Security Theory: The East African Experience. A Look Back at the Challenges Entering the New Millennium.....71

Vakhtang Maisaia, Eka Beraia
General Implications of Russia-USA Geostrategic Approaches Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: "Soft Power" vs. "Hard Power" Strategies in Action (Sudan Case-Study) 87

Martin Rupiya
SADC's Intervention and Relapse in Madagascar's Political Crisis 2009-2014 and the Revealed Role of France? 101

Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Risk of a War in the Horn of Africa 121

Maria Todorova
Terrorism in West Africa: Prerequisites, Actors and Opportunities.....147

Khatuna Chapichadze
Democratization as a Positive Process for Security Consolidation Perspectives in Developing Countries: Success Stories from Georgia and Kenya.....155

Sebastian Szamol
Sub-Saharan Africa in Powermetric Analysis 163

Natalia Tomaszewska
Last Decade in Polish Foreign Policy Toward Africa 173

II. Guest articles

Bartosz Bobek
Ideology of the Hungarian Far Right on the Example of Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary 201

Wojciech Łysek
Geopolitical Ideas and Energy Security of Central-Eastern Europe 215

III. Reviews

Charles Manga Fombad (Eds.), *The Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, ss. 414 (Reviewer: Beata Belica) 229

Oliver Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*, Lexington Books, 2015, ss. 268 (Reviewer: Isabela de Andrade Gama) 233

IV. Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski College's Department of the National Security

Structure of the Department of the National Security in the academic year 2017/18.....235

For Authors..... 237

For Reviewers..... 239

EDITOR'S NOTE

African chances, threats and challenges

Africa indeed is the land of opportunity. Even though the African continent is one of the poorest World regions the World Bank and International Monetary Founds prognosis leave no doubt, that in 2025 the majority of African states will reach the middle-income countries status. In recent years, six of the world's fastest growing economies were nations on the African continent. The continent, that has a great advantage in the economic context, which is an exceptionally rapid population growth. Africa is extremely rich in raw materials and natural resources, many still un-exploited. The vast economic growth and development is highly visible in Sub-Saharan states.

Africa is also the continent of crises. Ethnic tensions, international and domestic conflicts have a devastating impact on the states of the Sub-Saharan Africa. Protracted international armed conflicts and civil wars destabilize the economies, state administrations and societies of this part of globe. They obstruct economic development, the use of natural resources and are the cause of the slow fall of the statehood.

The Authors from African and European universities and scientific centres decided to share their points of view on the topics of military assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa, the threat of terrorism and insurgency, key factors and key players in the international relations of Sub-Saharan states, and the regional security theory. Sub-Saharan Africa is still an undiscovered field of research but we believe that the newest "Ante Portas – Security Studies" volume, titled "Security Issues of Sub Saharan Africa" will manage to bring the subject matter a bit closer.

Enjoy your reading!

Editorial Board
„Ante Portas – Security Studies"

I. THEMATIC ARTICLES

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2017, No 2(9)

Theo Neethling[1]
South Africa

REGIONAL AGENCY AND HYBRIDISATION IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING: REVISITING THE CASES OF AMIS AND UNAMID IN SUDAN

Abstract:
The aim of this article is twofold. On the one hand, the article revisits peacekeeping in the Sudan as a case relating to a greater desire for African agency in regional security governance captured in the notion of African solutions to African problems. On the other hand, it explores the need and importance of hybridisation in security governance and the quest for strengthened partnerships between peacekeeping actors on the African continent and the international community at large. In view of the above, the first focus area or case study under review is the establishment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), a first ever for the African Union (AU) which was launched in accordance with a decision of the AU in 2004 after negotiations among the warring factions under the auspices of the AU. The second focus area concerns the creation of the UN/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 as a hybrid UN–AU operation to bring stability in the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan where the AU was falling short. Specifically, an assessment and appraisal is made of the first three years of UNAMID deployment (2007–2010).

Keywords:
African agency, African peacekeeping, hybrid peacekeeping, Sudan, African Union, UNAMID

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Hopes were high for the success of this all-African operation, the first ever by the A.U., created in 2004[2].

Introduction

The establishment of the UN/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was certainly one of the most significant peacekeeping operations in the field of security co-operation and hybrid arrangements in the post-Cold War era involving combinations of both regional and global powers – specifically the UN and the African Union (AU). To put this in perspective: on 31st October 2007, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, put this in context when he stated that the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations had initiated a major reform of the support aspects of peacekeeping, and had begun mounting "two new, highly unique and complex operations" in the Darfur region of Sudan and Chad/ Central African Republic (CAR) respectively.

Guéhenno explained that these two operations (Darfur and Chad/CAR) would be deployed over extended supply lines stretching almost to the central parts of Africa in inhospitable terrain and that nowhere were the risks more apparent than in Darfur. The operation in Darfur – the UNAMID – "carried the greatest risk in the past 10 years of peacekeeping and it was imperative that the United Nations rose collectively to meet the challenges, or it would fail"[3]. As far as Chad/CAR was concerned, Guéhenno further indicated that the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) would be deployed in close concert with the European Union (EU). On 15 March 2009 the UN took control of the military component of MINURCAT, thereby replacing the EU-led operation whose year-long mandate expired on this date. Both these operations, he stressed, called for intensive collaboration between partner organisations and would thus be very challenging[4].

The establishment of UNAMID was also significant for another reason. In 2005, two years before the establishment of UNAMID, one of the key actors in the Darfur conflict, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, claimed that Africa had not "asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy

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[2] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change'*, 19.01.2006. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/sudan0106web.pdf, 3> (22.11.2017).

[3] *Momentous year for United Nations peacekeeping as it mounts two unique operations in Africa, sustains 18 more, restructures department, Fourth Committee told. Report by the UN Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping to the UN General Assembly*, United Nations Department of Public Information, GA/SPD/382, New York, 31.10.2007, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gaspd382.doc.htm> (20.11.2017).

[4] *Ibidem.*

troops in Darfur. It's an African responsibility and we can do it"[5]. This represented a clear aspiration by the AU to become involved in attempting to mediate the Darfur crisis. The continental organisation accordingly created the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view to moving towards greater African agency in regional security governance. Indeed, in the words of David Mickler, Darfur was "a good opportunity for the AU to put its money where its mouth is", but it soon transpired that the AU was ill equipped institutionally and under-resourced for the political and military challenges in Darfur[6].

The aim of this article is, firstly, to revisit peacekeeping in Sudan as a case relating to a greater desire for African agency in regional security governance as captured in the notion of African solutions to African problems. Secondly, the article aims to explore the importance of hybridisation in security governance and the need for strengthened partnerships between peacekeeping actors on the African continent and the international community at large. Two focus areas or case studies are under review. The first focus area is the establishment of AMIS while the second focus area concerns the creation of UNAMID in 2007. Specifically, an assessment and appraisal is made of the first three years of UNAMID deployment (2007–2010).

This article is situated in the scholarly field of peace and conflict studies as it attends to peacekeeping institutions and processes that can facilitate or lead to a more desirable human condition. In this regard, the notion of hybridisation – as a form of (better) security co-operation – is of special interest. The article is also situated in the field of military strategy which relates to the quest for a balance between the political level (*ends*) and the military level (*means* and *ways*) in Darfur. After all, strategy implies a harmonious balance between the political objectives (*ends*), assessment of the economy of force (*means*), and the considerations on the application of force (*ways*). Put differently, strategy is fundamentally about the ways in which military power is applied or used to achieve political objectives[7]. That being said, political demands on the one hand and implementation constraints on the other have always been at the centre of challenges relating to a better balancing of ends and means in post-Cold War African peacekeeping operations.

Background: Towards African agency in peacekeeping

Since the UN forces experienced a setback in 1993 in Somalia, it became apparent that the UN was no longer prepared to contemplate complex

[5] D. Mickler, *UNAMID: A hybrid solution to a human security problem in Darfur?*, "Conflict, Security and Development" 2013, Vol. 13, No. 5, p. 494.
[6] *Ibidem*, pp. 492-494.
[7] H. Edström, D. Gyllensporre, *Political aspirations and perils of security: Unpacking the military strategy of the United Nations*, Basingstoke, 2013, p. 2.

intervention operations that might require the use of force – especially on the African continent. This reality was reflected in the declining number of UN peacekeepers globally. At the same time, the decline in the number of UN peacekeepers was accompanied by an increase in the number of non-UN peacekeeping operations. The UN also increasingly 'delegated' the large-scale, personnel-intensive functions to regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian conflict and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Balkans. In this context, Mark Malan identified the following major trends that characterised peacekeeping in the African context[8]:

- a withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the African continent;
- an increase in robust, but ineffective multilateral military interventions by willing African coalitions, with the blessing of the UN Security Council (UNSC);
- the advent of bilateral military interventions, supposedly under the auspices of sub-regional organisations, but with UNSC approval; and
- the propagation of African peacekeeping capacity building initiatives.

In Liberia, for instance, ECOWAS and its military arm, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) deployed a robust peace enforcement mission in the early 1990s to stabilise the conflict zones, which effectively paved the way for the UN to follow with a more multi-dimensional peacebuilding mission[9].

Following peacekeeping in Liberia by regional actors, the peacekeeping role of the AU in Burundi has been a particularly interesting and relevant case relating to the evolving AU playing a more direct role in African peacekeeping operations. On 7th October and 2nd December 2003, two ceasefire agreements were signed between Burundi's transitional government and the main rebel group, which called for the deployment of an international peace force and the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to assist the parties in the implementation of the agreements.

It should be noted here that, since the establishment of the AU in 2001, there have been many pronouncements and much publicity by African leaders on the quest for African solutions to African problems pitted against the background of arguments that 'local' initiatives seem to work more effectively than foreign strategies, which tend to disregard or ignore African realities and cultures[10]. This paradigm shift indicated a much more proactive and pragmatic response to conflict resolution and coincided with a need on the African continent for greater African responsibility and political will to develop 'local'

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[8] M. Malan, *Leaner and meaner? The future of peacekeeping in Africa*, "African Security Review" 2013, Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 48.
[9] *Ibidem.*
[10] A. V. Mansaray, *AMIS in Darfur: Africa's litmus test in peacekeeping and political mediation*, "African Security Review" 1999, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 36.

or regional conflict prevention and management capabilities. In the macro political context, the birth of the AU marked an aspiration for greater African agency in continental security governance. Agency, in this context, refers to a desire to provide for and give effect to regional (African) mechanisms of governance – including security governance – on the continent. This coincides with the political objective and related notion of African solutions to African problems with specific reference to the protection of vulnerable civilian populations[11].

Following a formal decision by the AU to deploy the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in February 2003, the transitional government and the AU signed a status-of-forces agreement in March 2006, whereafter the AU mandated the deployment of troops from three countries, namely Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa[12].

AMIB was basically a hybrid between a traditional peacekeeping and a complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation as it operated in a complex mission environment with a peacekeeping mandate. Although it did not perform any of the multi-dimensional civilian functions typically associated with a complex peacekeeping operation, it provided the security dimension alongside a UN political office in Burundi[13].

With hindsight, AMIB was affected by considerable challenges at both the political-strategic and the military strategic levels. The mission's logistical sustainment and funding were problematic, owing to the lack of substantive support from relevant African and international role-players. In terms of its own end-game, AMIB cannot be said to have fully facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, nor was it able to fully ensure that the defence and security situation in Burundi was generally stable and well managed by the newly created national defence and security structures. The mission was also unable to fully support the disarmament and demobilisation process and to advise on the reintegration of ex-combatants. Yet AMIB should be credited with efforts towards the stabilisation of large parts of the country. This way, it was able to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire agreements and, to its credit, contributed to the creation of conditions suitable for the deployment of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004 – a considerably stronger force than AMIB, which had expanded to a total of 4,656 peacekeepers from 45 countries by February 2006[14].

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[11] D. Mickler, *op. cit*., pp. 492-494.

[12] *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi*, United Nations Secretary-General, New York, 04.12.2003, pp. 5-6.

[13] C. de Coning, *Refining the African Standby Force concept*, "Conflict Trends" 2004, Issue 2, pp. 21-22.

[14] F. Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union peacekeeping operation*, "Conflict Trends" 2004, Issue 2, p. 14; Henry L. Stimson Center, *Future of peace operations program: UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB)*, 2007, <www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP20040408637> (26.02.2007).

Even though the UN took over from the AU in Burundi, AMIB demonstrated that the continental body can in fact make useful, albeit limited, contributions to peacekeeping interventions in Africa[15]. Cedric De Coning argues that the practice whereby the AU deployed AMIB in 2003, followed by a UN mission (ONUB) in 2004, seemed to point towards a readiness on the part of African regional organisations to contribute towards stabilisation operations, especially when African actors have been involved in brokering a ceasefire and then wished to build on that momentum. However, because the AU lacked the staying power and multi-dimensional capability of the UN, it had to strategically pursue the alternative of burden-sharing with the UN[16].

What is evident is that developments relating to the establishment of AMIB and especially ONUB coincided with the AU's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which specifically provides for the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to cooperate and work closely with the UNSC. The CADSP also provides for the PSC to cooperate and work closely with relevant UN agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa[17].

In recent years, the AU deployed missions of its own to a number of conflict theatres, namely those of Darfur, Somalia, Mali and the CAR. De Coning remarks that these theatres represent a significant demonstration of capacity and experience. In all cases, these missions were undertaken and supported by the UN, European Union (EU) and bilateral partner organisations. This means that they also reflect a growing body of experience and frameworks of partnerships and corroborative action[18]. In fact, realising the continental shortcomings in the peacekeeping arena, the AU engaged the EU in recent years and hence the latter has increasingly become a recognisable security actor on the African continent[19].

While it is important to note that African leaders and regional organisations have recognised the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises and armed conflict, "the AU did not have the resources or capacity to intervene on a large scale" in armed conflict of a serious nature on

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[15] T. Murithi, *The African Union's foray into peacekeeping: Lessons from the hybrid mission in Darfur*, "Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development" 2009, Issue 14, <https://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-conflict-and-development/issue-14/theafricanunionsforay.pdf> (26.11.2017), p. 6.

[16] C. de Coning, *The future of peacekeeping in Africa*, "Conflict Trends" 2006, Issue 2, pp. 6-7.

[17] *Solemn declaration on a common African defence and security policy*, African Union, 28.02.2004, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf> (20.11.2017), pp. 16-17.

[18] C. de Coning, *Enhancing the efficiency of the African Standby Force: The case for a shift to a just-in-time rapid response model?*, "Conflict Trends" 2014, Issue 2, p. 37.

[19] M. Brosig, *The African peace and security architecture and its partners: A survey*, "African Security Review" 2014, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 234.

the African continent[20]. In other words, there has never been a harmonious balance between the political objectives (*ends*), the economy of force (*means*), and the application of force (*ways*). This is explored further in the section below – with specific reference to peacekeeping in Darfur.

African agency in Darfur: AMIS

The Sudanese government and two rebel groups in Darfur – the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement – signed an AU-mediated humanitarian ceasefire agreement on 8 April 2004. This agreement provided for the AU to send military observers to monitor and report on the ceasefire. This followed the displacement of about two million people who had been expelled from their homes by the Sudanese government's military operations against the rebel groups in the name of counterinsurgency – operations that turned into crimes against humanity and campaigns of "ethnic cleansing". The government forces were backed by militias, known as the Janjaweed, and all of the above-mentioned actors as well as opportunistic bandits subjected Darfur's civilian population to abuse and insecurity[21].

Genocide was often associated with events in Darfur since conflict started in February 2003 and the word gained currency among members of the international community. Clearly, Darfur was a humanitarian crisis that required robust international response as it was characterised by mass killings, massive displacement of civilians, the rampant raping of women, looting and destruction of property[22].

Mickler rightly argues that the crisis in Sudan's Darfur area could be understood as a challenge to the practice and efficacy of African agency[23]. The AU's efforts to develop its own continental security architecture to deal with conflicts have been welcome news to many, specifically with regard to war-ravaged places like Liberia, Uganda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur[24]. Indeed, hopes were high for the success of a full all-African peacekeeping operation[25]. In response to the widespread death, displacement and human insecurity in Darfur, the AU deployed a small ceasefire monitoring team in 2004 – all in accordance with the organisation's nascent doctrine of 'non-indifference' to insecurity in its member states[26]. In

[20] B. Prinsloo, D. van Niekerk, *UNAMID: An African solution to a complex case of geopolitical dynamics*, "African Security Review" 2015, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 244.
[21] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change*…, *op. cit.*
[22] A. V. Mansaray, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.
[23] D. Mickler, *op. cit.*, pp. 487-489.
[24] A. C. Mansaray, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[25]Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[26] D. Mickler, *op. cit.*, pp. 487-489.

this regard, the AU established AMIS initially as a 120-person ceasefire monitoring commission with more than 5,000 AU peacekeepers.

The numbers of peacekeepers grew to about 7 000 in September 2005, but AMIS never really succeeded in bringing security to the war-torn Darfur province[27]. Media coverage became progressively critical. Reports on AMIS generally pointed towards the mission as overstretched and that the civilian population continued to face human rights abuses ranging from killings, rape to forced displacements. Amnesty International, for instance, stated that AMIS had been left without having the personnel or the resources to protect the people of Darfur in a rapidly deteriorating situation and that in some cases it had not even been able to protect itself[28]. Another Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Refugees International, likewise reported, "AMIS' shortcomings have come into full focus. AMIS does not have the ability or the resources to carry out its job of monitoring a ceasefire that is widely and regularly violated by all sides in an escalating conflict"[29]. In October 2004, the AU increased the number of AMIS personnel and changed the mission mandate and structure. AMIS was thereby transformed from a contingent primarily consisting of unarmed military observers into a mission consisting of armed force protectors, unarmed civilian police and support teams.

The problem, however, was in the effective implementation of the mandate in terms of the required ends and means. AMIS personnel lacked training and suffered in the areas of operational capacity, logistics and planning. In addition, bad weather conditions compounded the mission's problems and hampered its impact from the start. Otherwise, political initiatives to achieve the mandate through proactive measures within the mission's rules of engagement were also falling short. In this regard, a continuous lack of respect for the ceasefire agreement made the implementation of the mandate extremely difficult.

AMIS was clearly faced with potential failure as a high-profile African undertaking and hence the organisation decided in the first quarter of 2005 to make significant chances to its approach. This coincided with an AU-led assessment mission in March 2005 with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the EU, the U.S., Canada and other international partners[30]. The findings of the assessment were that AMIS was hard-pressed to implement its mandate effectively while three weaknesses were specifically highlighted:

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[27] R. Sharamo, *The African Union's peacekeeping experience*, "Conflict Trends" 2006, Issue 3, p. 51.

[28] Amnesty International, *Sudan: Obstruction and delay – Peacekeepers needed in Darfur now*, 22.10.2006 <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-obstruction-and-delay-peacekeepers-needed-darfur-now> (23.11.2017).

[29] Refugees International, *No power to protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, November 2005 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/44FCEC1891339 2BB85257155006EDFB1-ri-sdn-18apr.pdf> (23.11.2017).

[30] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change*…, p. 4.

command and control, logistical support and operational practice[31]. During a May 2005 conference, international donors further pledged over $ 312 million to enhance the mission strength from 3 320 personnel to a total of 7 700 personnel[32]. A third phase of deployment was also envisaged, namely to bring the total strength of AMIS to 12 300 military, police and civilian personnel[33].

The assessment and intended strengthening however did not bring AMIS to the end of its challenges, namely shortcomings with regard to human resources and logistics. The full deployment of AMIS that was to have taken place by September had not been achieved. In December 2005, another assessment was conducted by the AU, the UN and other relevant actors. A key conclusion from the assessment was that AMIS should provide a much more aggressive response to the ongoing violence in Darfur and that the peacekeepers had to be equipped and supported to do so[34].

From its inception, AMIS experienced problems with its mandate. In this context, many role-players and observers advocated a more robust mandate that would enable the mission to extend its protection to civilians in Darfur. Having suffered fatalities towards the end of 2005, critics increasingly contended that the AMIS mandate was not robust enough. It became clear that AMIS was not able to keep the ongoing violence in check and consequently displacement camps were becoming larger and more permanent with some very negative consequences as a vicious cycle of dependency developed in displacement camps[35].

The following observations capture much of what was generally observed and said about the role of AMIS in Darfur. Adekeye Adebajo stated that "[t]he ill-equipped and poorly resourced AU peacekeepers deployed in 2004 – with a restricted ceasefire-monitoring mandate – in a region the size of France have scarcely been able to protect themselves, let alone Darfuris"[36]. Daniel Pepper and Abraham McLaughlin observed that "AU troops are only allowed to use force to protect themselves – or civilians in their immediate vicinity. Most

[31] H. Boshoff, *The African Union Mission in Sudan*, "African Security Review", 2010, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 60.
[32] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change...*, *op. cit*., p. 4.
[33] H. Boshoff, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
[34] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change...*, *op. cit*., p. 5.
[35] S. Mann, *When will we learn the lesson?*, "Journal of International Peace Operations" 2006, Vol. 2, No.1, p. 8.
[36] A. Adebajo, *Tread warily through the politics of peacekeeping*, "Sunday Times" 29.04.2007, p. 21.

experts agreed that this limited mandate severely hampered their ability to secure the area"[37].

The mission situation involved the dynamics of a complex emergency short of genocide, i.e. serious crimes against humanity and a considerable amount of war crimes. To that end, the situation required the equivalent of a UN Chapter VII (peace enforcement) mandate – also implying the utilisation of light and medium-armoured vehicles or mechanised infantry.

Increasingly, international public debates centred on the question as to whether AMIS could and should be transformed into a non-AU institution, and the cash-strapped AU mission in Sudan thus came under pressure to hand over its Darfur operations to the UN. The rationale for such drive centred on the need for better ways and means pertaining to fiscal stability, reasons of logistical enhancement as well as the well-established and tested command and control structure of the UN that was needed for a large mission in Darfur[38].

Allan Vic Mansaray rightly points out that AMIS lacked the military material and support mechanisms that should have served as a deterrent not only to the government forces, but also the Janjaweed, which challenged AU personnel on several occasions. He quoted a former AMIS sector commander who attributed the main problems of AMIS to a "seriously constrained concept of operations, a chronic lack of resources and serious strategic and operational gaps"[39].

The problems AMIS encountered in Darfur were not limited to the strategic and operational levels. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and his government opposed a UN peacekeeping operation but then indicated that they were willing to discuss UN involvement after the conclusion of a peace accord in the talks in Abuja, Nigeria, where the Sudanese government entered into an agreement with the largest rebel force in May 2006[40]. The Sudanese government also made it very difficult for funds to be transferred from Addis Ababa to AU troops on the ground. Practically, this caused a long-winded route before funding could reach AMIS personnel and the delayed remittance of funds created some apprehension among the troops, which resulted in low morale at ground level. Another challenge at the political level concerned the AU itself. Although it is not unusual for differences to arise when conflicts develop and have to be addressed in a multinational context, the Darfur crisis seemed to have caused tensions between African leaders who favoured a hard

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[37] D. Pepper, A. McLaughlin, *AU struggles to calm Darfur*, "Christian Science Monitor", 12.12.2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1212/p06s01-woaf.html> (23.11.2017).

[38] Human Rights Watch, *The African Union Mission in Sudan, imperatives for immediate change...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[39] A. V. Mansaray, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[40] United Nations News Centre, *UN moves on several fronts to reinforce peace accord*, 15.05.2006 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18482#.VIypuKMV_4g> (26.11.2017).

line against the Sudanese government and those who favoured a soft approach[41].

In the final analysis, one can summarise the predicament of AMIS as follows. There was a clear political aspiration for an early African response to Darfur, but the AU found itself in a situation, where it was ill equipped institutionally and under-resourced to resolve the conflict situation successfully or even play a meaningful role in conflict facilitation. The AU's proactive role enjoyed Western support but as a continental organisation, it was not able to marshal the required means and ways with regard to funds, troops, and equipment to conduct a large-scale civilian protection operation. The material constraints were especially evident, but the political constraints imposed upon the mission also constrained the mission in Darfur[42].

In the mission area, insecurity remained the order of the day in much of the Darfur area. In June 2007, after much political arm-twisting in Khartoum, President al-Bashir and the Sudanese government consented to the establishment of UNAMID as a joint or hybrid UN–AU peacekeeping force with a personnel strength of 26,000 to be deployed to Darfur. Practically, this represented a significant development in African peacekeeping as UNAMID was intended to become one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations in history, while the UN and the AU also sought to assemble a force that would represent a predominantly 'African character' in an effort to retain both the impartiality and competency required to undertake this challenging mission[43].

Hybridisation in Darfur: UNAMID

UNSC Resolution 1769 of 2007 called for the creation of an UN–AU hybrid force that would replace AMIS with UNAMID. Resolution 1769 of 2007 authorised a force which would incorporate AMIS personnel and consist of up to 19 555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and a civilian component including up to 3 772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each[44].

The following objectives and tasks were identified for UNAMID[45]:

- Help restore security conditions for economic development, provide humanitarian assistance and return internally displaced persons;

[41] A. V. Mansaray, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[42] D. Mickler, *op. cit*., p. 494.
[43] *Momentous year for United Nations peacekeeping as it mounts two unique operations in Africa…, op. cit*.
[44] *UN Security Council Resolution 1769, 2007, adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting, on 31 July 2007, New York*, p. 3.
[45] S. Kreps, *The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and prospects for success*, "African Security Review" 2007, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 70-71.

- Protect civilian populations under imminent threat of violence and prevent attacks against civilians;
- Monitor and observe compliance with the Darfur peace agreement;
- Assist with the political process;
- Promote respect for and protection of human rights and the rule of law in Darfur;
- Monitor, verify and report on efforts to disarm the Janjaweed militia; and
- Monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the CAR.

UNSC Resolution 1769 of 2007 also provided for unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, while also allowing for command and control structures and backstopping to be provided by the UN. This essentially meant that the AU would run the day-to-day operations while the UN would be in overall control of the mission[46]. The mission force was, as far as possible, sourced from African countries. In this regard, countries such as Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda gave early indications of their interest to serve as troop-contributing countries[47]. Eventually, the main military- and police-contributing countries were Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia – thus mostly African states with the rest from countries in the developing world[48]. In fact, the largest number of troops earmarked for UNAMID was from Nigeria. In total, 3,700 Nigerian personnel were eventually deployed to the Darfur region to serve in the UNAMID force, which was strongly motivated by U.S. assistance in relation to debt relief for Nigeria. UNAMID was, however, lacking strategic assets and specifically in serious need of assets such as helicopters and transport vehicles. The U.S. took a leading role in approaching countries such as Ukraine as one of a very few countries in the world that possessed a significant number of transport helicopters. However, negotiations did not succeed as the Ukrainian government had to deal with a major economic crisis[49].

On 31st December 2007, AU peacekeepers were officially transformed into UN peacekeepers and the UN Secretary-General announced "a new and

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[46] T. Othieno, N. Samasuwo, *A critical analysis of Africa's experiments with hybrid missions and security collaboration*, "African Security Review" 2007, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 33.
[47] S. Kreps, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[48] *UN Mission's contributions by country, month of report*, 31.01.2009, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2009/jan09_5.pdf.> (15.02.2009).
[49] M. E. Henke, *Great powers and UN force generation: a case study of UNAMID*, "International Peacekeeping", 2016, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 480-487.

profoundly challenging chapter in the history of United Nations peacekeeping"[50]. The command structure also reflected a strong African presence[51]. UNAMID was authorised to take the field in January 2008 with a UN Chapter VII mandate. However, as far as means and ways were concerned, the mission experienced considerable challenges from the start. In fact, so poorly provisioned were UNAMID personnel that they even had to buy their own paint to turn their green AU helmets into the UN blue at the time of so-called rehatting[52]. Politically, the Sudanese government demanded that the mission be entirely African, save for Pakistani and Chinese contributions. The Sudanese government also placed onerous restrictions on the operational scope of the hybrid deployment, banning night movement and requiring official permission to conduct flights. A week after boots got on the ground, the Sudanese army even fired at a truck convoy from the peacekeeping force in western Darfur, near the Chad border. Moreover, with the neighbouring Chadian air force having bombed Sudanese army positions inside Darfur in late December 2007, the borderlands in Darfur have become the proverbial hornet's nest and a potential source of interstate conflict between Sudan and Chad, backed by China and France, respectively[53].

Logistically, serious challenges confronted the peacekeepers. Towards the end of November 2008, only about 12 000 of the newly mandated force of 26 000 peacekeepers were deployed and some key elements of UNAMID were still not in place. Furthermore, airport infrastructure and aircraft handling capacity, as well as deteriorating runway conditions posed serious challenges to the number of daily flights into Darfur. While the capacity for road convoy movement of contingent-owned equipment was increasing, difficult road conditions within Darfur posed particular challenges for the transportation of heavy equipment. It became clear that UNAMID peacekeepers were operating in a very challenging operational environment as the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) admitted that it had been difficult to attract and retain staff because of the security situation and harsh living and working conditions. Many security challenges faced the peacekeepers in the form of high levels of banditry, carjacking, military engagements and deadly attacks on UNAMID forces. UNAMID members and patrols further continually faced restrictions on their

[50] *United Nations peace operations: Year in review 2007*, Peace and Security Section of the UN Department of Public Information, New York, March 2008, p. 1.
[51] *Darfur - UNAMID - Facts and Figures*, United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, New York <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html> (16.02.2009).
[52] A. Onoja, *Peacekeeping challenges in Africa*, "Conflict Trends" 2008, Issue 3, p. 42.
[53] S. Roughneen, *Chad, Sudan and a risky Western game*, "ISN Security Watch", 04.02.2008, p. 1.

freedom of movement by Sudanese government officials[54]. By the end of 2009, UNAMID had managed to acquire several civilian helicopters, but was still in need of 18 utility helicopters and six attack choppers in order to fulfil its mandate[55].

These were not UNAMID's only problems. UNAMID was under constant pressure from the Sudanese government after the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, indicated that President al-Bashir could be indicted for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Thus, UNAMID not only suffered from a battle with shortages of resources to carry out its mandate, but also from political heat generated by the Sudanese government over a possible warrant to be issued for President al-Bashir[56].

On the ground, governmental aerial bombardments and clashes between the Sudanese armed forces and armed rebel movements continued. Furthermore, sexual and gender-based violence continued to occur, often in tandem with impunity and a lack of action from law enforcement authorities. As far as the humanitarian situation was concerned, the UNSG reported "critical humanitarian challenges" and mentioned that humanitarian aid organisations continued to struggle to maintain existing programmes and expand operations to accessible areas[57].

Many observers were highly critical of the hybrid UN–AU peacekeeping mission. Tim Murithi argued that UNAMID was confronted with similar problems that beset AMIS. He also argued that since July 2008, Darfur has experienced a deterioration of the security situation and that violence included high levels of banditry, occasional military engagements and ethnic clashes. Fierce attacks on UNAMID forces from the Government of Sudan also resulted in the death of civilians. Moreover, the food security situation in the region remained precarious. All of this coincided with the fact that UNAMID faced key challenges in terms of its ability to transport personnel and equipment[58].

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[54] *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, United Nations Secretary-General, New York, 12.12. 2008, pp. 1-7.

[55] B. L. Prinsloo, *The AU/UN hybrid peace operation in Africa – a new approach to maintain international peace and security*, Doctoral thesis, Potchefstroom Campus, South Africa, March 2012, p. 250.

[56] A. V. Mansaray, *op. cit*., pp. 35-36.

[57] *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, United Nations Secretary-General, New York, 10.02.2010, pp.10-12.

[58] T. Murithi, *op. cit.*, p.13.

Three years after the deployment, even the UN Secretary-General expressed his frustration with the lack of progress in Darfur[59]:

It has been more than six years since the situation in Darfur came to the forefront of the Security Council's agenda. The conflict in Darfur remains among the most complex facing the international community. For several years, progress towards ending the crisis in Darfur has been fluctuating. In spite of the best efforts of the African Union-United Nations Joint Mediation, since the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006, attempts to generate broader buy-in for a negotiated peace have remained frustrated by the fragmentation of Darfur's armed movements and by ongoing military operations on the ground, which have caused additional displacement and suffering among the civilian population and further undermined trust between the parties and exacerbated their intransigence with regard to the peace negotiations.

As far as the political level is concerned, Rebecca Tinsley asserted that the UN's "conciliatory attitude" towards the Sudanese government and related "willingness to appease President Bashir" undermined the UN effort in Darfur. She expounded that before a single soldier set foot in Darfur, the UN had conceded to al-Bashir's demand that his government would dictate the terms of deployment. She observed that, "after removing UNAMID's teeth" by dictating the terms, Bashir then delayed the mission's arrival by refusing to provide land for bases, stopping equipment leaving airports, delaying visas by six months or more, and randomly imposing restrictions on movement. The UN on its part, she argued, instead of applying sanctions that had been approved by the UNSC long ago, favoured "regional conflict management" that in effect meant using inexperienced and outnumbered African troops, some of whom went without remuneration for months[60].

Since its inception in December 2007 until February 2009, a total of 25 UNAMID peacekeepers lost their lives in Darfur, namely 16 troops, 6 police officials, 1 military observer and 2 local civilians[61]. In his report to the UNSC on the deployment of UNAMID, dated 10 February 2009, the UNSG Ban Ki-moon stated that conditions in Darfur were characterised by a dramatic deterioration in the security situation. He also referred to an escalation in the level of violence, which signalled an investment in conflict rather than a serious commitment to peaceful negotiations[62].

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[59] *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, United Nations Secretary-General, New York, 14.07.2010, p. 15.

[60] R. Tinsley, *The failure of UNAMID*, "The Guardian", 01.01.2009 <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/01/darfur> (26.11.2017).

[61] *Darfur - UNAMID - Facts and Figures…, op. cit.*

[62] *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfu*r, New York, 10.02.2009, p. 6, 11.

In 2010, three years after the establishment of UNAMID, the total strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 17 199, which amounted to 87 percent of its mandated strength. The civilian staff personnel stood at 4 261, which boiled down to 77 percent of the approved strength. The strength of police officers stood at 2 820, which was 74 percent of the authorised strength[63]. Despite an improvement in the strength of UNAMID since 2009, the UNSG emphasised the logistical shortcomings of the peacekeeping operation: "The military contingent-owned equipment capabilities of the units in Darfur have continued to be a challenge as some contingents remained critically underequipped and did not meet the desired serviceability and self-sustainment standards as required under the approved contingent-owned equipment manual"[64].

Still, the UNSG did not seem to be discouraged by the progress made in relation to finding peace in Darfur and commended UNAMID on the work made towards facilitating an agreement between the warring parties. He also reported that UNAMID continued its work on promoting human rights issues and the rule of law, both with the Government of the Sudan and Darfurian society more generally[65].

In the final analysis, it needs to be said that UNAMID as a 'hybrid solution' to the challenges in Darfur – especially in the first two years of deployment – did not provide real or notable improvements for the ordinary citizens on the ground. The overall human rights situation remained of serious concern owing inter alia to clashes and aerial bombardments between the government of Sudan and the armed rebel movements[66]. Thus, UNAMID was inadequate in resolving the crisis in Darfur in its first years of deployment and unable to find the required balance between its political objectives (*ends*), the economy of force (*means*), and the application of force (*ways*). Ongoing violence and mass population displacements remained the order of the day and the UNSC's role in the indictment of President al-Bashir even led to tension between the hybrid partners. In view of the above, UNAMID found itself embroiled and entangled in many of the same political and military challenges that confronted AMIS and battled to give effect to its tasks and responsibility as outlined by the UNSG and the AU Commission[67].

However, UNAMID did seem to find its feet after three years of deployment and in this regard James Sloan observed that earlier arguments that

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[63] *Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*, United Nations Security Council, New York, 18.10.2010, p. 13.
[64] *Ibidem*, p. 14.
[65] *Ibidem*, pp. 12-13.
[66] *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, United Nations Secretary-General*, New York, 10.02.2009, pp. 6, 11.
[67] D. Mickler, *op. cit.*, pp. 503-505.

"UNAMID was not the appropriate way forward in 2007" were of little assistance and a withdrawal of UNAMID – despite its limitations – would have left people in the refugee camps without protection and food. In the words of Sloan: "It would, of course, be unimaginable to pull out UNAMID and replacing it with nothing"[68].

Appraisal and evaluation

Following a strategy between political, strategic and military role-players is usually a daunting task. Formulating and implementing a strategy between multinational political and military actors is almost impossible. Still, the question is: what can be learned from the above as far as ends, means and ways in African peacekeeping are concerned. In other words, what insights from this research can contribute to making better sense of military strategic challenges in the African peacekeeping context?

In a seminal work on peacekeeping operations, De Coning *et al*[69] highlight two matters of major importance. Firstly, that the AU have had to respond to increasingly to complex conflicts or security environments over the last decade. Secondly, that contemporary and future peacekeeping operations will see the ongoing development of partnerships between African actors and actors in the international community, such as the UN and the EU.

From the above it is clear that events have taken place in Africa where the AU or sub-regional organisations were the first to respond to emerging crisis situations. As far as AMIB and UNAMID were concerned, African actors undertook short, robust stabilisation or peace enforcement operations, and after some time, these operations were transformed into multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations[70].

The above-mentioned cases of hybridisation also coincided with developments since the mid-1990s as far as African states started to play more important roles in UN peacekeeping operations, especially on the African continent. Despite the many shortcomings, African states progressively provided sizable contingents for UN peacekeeping operations, thereby increasing the representativeness, perceived impartiality and legitimacy of such operations[71]. If Africa's position is considered in the international context, it needs to be noted that the increase in troop contributions to the UN in the early

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[68] J. Sloan, *UN peacekeeping in Darfur: A quagmire that we cannot accept*, "E-International Relations" 03.06.2014 <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannot-accept/> (24.01.2017).

[69] C. De Coning, L. Gelot, J. Karlsrud, *Towards an African model of peace operations* [in:] *The future of African peace operations*, ed. C. de Coning, L. Gelot, J. Karlsrud, London, 2016, pp. 135-136.

[70] C. De Coning, *Refining the African Standby Force concept*…, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[71] M. Malan, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

1990s was mainly the result of developed states contributing troops to peacekeeping operations. At the beginning of 1991, out of the top ten contributors, only two were developing states, namely Ghana and Nepal. Ten years onwards, in 2001, the overwhelming majority of the top ten contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide were developing states. Moreover, three of these states were from Africa, namely Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana[72].

Yet, the case of Darfur also illustrates that much more than political will and commitment to troop contributions is needed as peacekeeping operations are immensely costly affairs played out in messy theatres. As far as the AU is concerned, the peacekeeping experience in Darfur clearly revealed that the organisation[73]:

- Suffered from a lack of strategic management capacity;
- Had no effective mechanisms for operational level mission management;
- Had insufficient logistical support and ability to manage logistics;
- Lacked capacity in communication and information systems; and
- Was wholly dependent on external partners in specific technical fields.

The crux of the matter is that African leaders may well be willing to deploy their forces, but if they do not have the necessary airlift capability, logistical support and financial assistance, their efforts are highly unlikely to be realised or successful. In other words, without the required means they would not be in a position to work towards a balance between their political aims and objectives on the one hand and, the economy of force and application of force on the other. Practically and logistically, adequate funding for airlift resources, for instance, is crucial in rapid deployment and is indeed a cause for concern in the African context. The absence of an airlift capability means that virtually no peacekeeping operation is possible − to mention only one of many pressing operational factors. Currently, very few African states have any strategic lift capabilities worth mentioning. Moreover, the problem is that not even the potential locomotives of Africa's development and stability – countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt – have the commensurate military capacity to shoulder the troops and monetary means required for peacekeeping deployments on a sustainable basis. Moreover, these countries face considerable domestic security challenges that are either a greater priority than security challenges elsewhere, or exceed the security capabilities they can muster[74].

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[72] *Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Monthly summary of contributors*, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 28.02.2001, <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/feb.htm> (21.03.2001).

[73] M. Malan, *op cit.*, pp. 6-7.

[74] J. Cilliers, *The 2014 South African Defence Review: Rebuilding after years of abuse, neglect and decay*, "ISS Policy Brief" No. 56, 25.06.2014, p.5.

In addition to the above, the case of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is particularly instructive and insightful. The experiences of AMISOM also shows that AU operations are usually "defined by great ambition but deficient resources"[75]. On 19 January 2007, the AU mandated a force of 8,000 plus civilian elements to form AMISOM with a view to keeping the peace in Mogadishu after Ethiopia had invaded Somalia at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government to defeat the network of Islamic courts which had taken control of large parts of the country. However, only two battalions provided by Uganda had been deployed in 2007, followed by two battalions from Burundi in 2008. Nigeria and Ghana made commitments to provide a total of 1,200 troops but had no transport resources to deploy the troops to Somalia[76]. Expectedly, observers were quick to contend that the AU and African countries had failed to deliver. In view of the above, Murithi observed as follows: "The limitations of the AU's fledgling institutions have been exposed by the entrapment and limited functionality of AMISOM in Somalia"[77]. By early 2009, additional AMISOM troops were indeed deployed to Somalia, but AMISOM had very limited capabilities and had been "generally accepted as a non-threatening presence insofar as it does not represent a threat to armed interests in Mogadishu"[78]. It should also be noted in this regard that the UN showed a clear unwillingness to take over the responsibility in Somalia from AFRICOM in view of the fact that a comprehensive peace agreement could not been reached[79].

At the same time, it should be clear that the involvement of the UN cannot be regarded as the only remedy to solving the prevalence of violence, the targeting of civilians and the maintenance of peace in Africa[80]. It would also be wrong or short-sighted to disregard some positive aspects about UNAMID[81]. Prinsloo and Van Niekerk correctly point out that the mission showed renewed solidarity among African states through the AU and presented a fresh approach to solving conflict on the continent. UNAMID was a compromise for both the AU and the larger international community. On the one side the AU did not have the resources or capacity to intervene on a solid footing in Darfur. On the other hand the international community did not have the political legitimacy to intervene by itself without African partners. The success of UNAMID thus lies in the fact that it allowed the AU to work equally with the broader international

[75] C. Hull, E. Svensson, *African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union peacekeeping challenges, Swedish Defence Research Agency User Report*, 2008, p. 9.
[76] *Ibidem*, p. 8.
[77] T. Murithi, *op. cit.*, p.17.
[78] Refugees International, *Somalia: RI statement to UN Security Council*, 03.04.2008 <http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-ri-statement-un-security-council> (16.02.2009).
[79] C. Hull, E. Svensson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[80] T. Murithi, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[81] B. Prinsloo, D. van Niekerk, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

community with a view to addressing the complexity of conflict dynamics in Darfur and collectively taking charge of the continent's peace and security challenges.

Lastly, it is important to consider the African voice on the international stage as far as future international, strategic partnerships are concerned. There is a need on all sides to clarify the long-term political objectives between African and non-African actors. In addition, all relevant actors or partners must have a common understanding of the objectives they are pursuing in a context of strategic coherence with a view to ensuring that all actors are playing a role towards the achievement of the larger objectives. Thus, there must be consultations among relevant partners on shared political objectives beyond urgent peacekeeping priorities[82]. As such, this matter cannot be a mere case of African actors doing the heavy lifting and the UN playing the management role.

Conclusion

A positive aspect of Darfur was certainly that African actors and the AU were demonstrating both agency and responsibility in their approach to conflict and insecurity on the African continent. However, the AU and AMIS had not been able to fully respond to the demands of the situation in Darfur. Whereas strategy is fundamentally about the ways in which military power is applied or used to achieve political objectives, the case of Darfur is clearly one where there was a gap between the desires of the AU to assume more agency in security governance on the African continent. Even the UN – the world's preeminent organisation in the field of peace and security – was taking on a task where it could not boast of sufficient military capacity – implying that there was never a balance between the political level (*ends*) and the military level (*means* and *ways*). In both peacekeeping operations – AMIS and UNAMID – political and policy demands on the one hand and budget-related constraints on the other were at the centre of challenges relating to a better balancing of ends and means.

From the above it can be argued that the African continent and the AU as a peacekeeping actor cannot 'go it alone' in providing the stability which is essential for security and development − even though hybridisation does not offer a panacea for Africa's peacekeeping challenges[83]. After all, the case of Darfur (UNAMID) did not realise any substantial or even notable short-term improvement to the situation as far as protection of civilians and human rights challenges were concerned. Also, as argued above, UNAMID found itself embroiled and entangled in many of the same challenges that confronted AMIS.

Still, from the above it is also clear that the creation of UNAMID as a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan)

[82] C. de Coning, L. Gelot, J. Karlsrud, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
[83] T. Murithi, *op. cit.* p. 17.

should be considered or recognised as one of the most notable efforts in the field of contemporary security governance and hybrid arrangements involving both African regional and global peacekeeping actors and resources. It is also clear that hybridisation in international peacekeeping offers wider possibilities and broader international involvement in conflicts. Potentially, it also leads to better ways of burden-sharing among the relevant actors, as well as dialogue and co-operation between the AU and the UN, and even actors such as the EU. In view of the above, the importance of hybridisation in security governance and the need for strengthened partnerships between peacekeeping actors on the African continent and the international community remain of great importance and scholarly concern to researchers and practitioners alike.

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INSURGENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS

Abstract:
The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia designed a state system on the twin-principles of territoriality and sovereignty. Sovereignty accords the state unquestionable but legitimate control over the nation and polity, and gives it the latitude to preserve and protect its territorial domain from both internal and external threats. However, asides the fact that globalisation and the internationalisation of the globe have reduced the primacy of these dual principles, there have also been the problem of ideological and terrorist networks that have taken advantage of the instruments of globalization to emerge and threaten state sovereignty and its preservation. The security and sovereignty of the Nigerian State have been under threat as a result of the emergence and activities of insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram in the Northeast and other militant groups in other parts of the country. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper examines the security challenges Nigeria faces from insurgency and the impact of this on national peace, security and sovereignty. The study shows that the frequency of insurgent attacks has resulted in collateral damage on the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of the state. It finds also that the federal government has not been decisive enough. This places urgent and decisive demands on the government to adopt new management strategies that will address and contain the insurgent and terrorist groups. It is recommended that the government at all levels should awake to its responsibilities, ensure

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adequate funding and training of the security agencies, as well as the fortification of the armed forces with sophisticated weapons that will effectively outmatch the firepower of the terrorists. Government must also ensure the tightening of the borders to check the influx of people into its territory.

Keywords:
Boko Haram, Insurgency, International Terrorism, National Security, Nigerian State

Introduction

The return to democracy in Nigeria in May, 1999 brought hopes of development and political stability to Nigeria. The last decade in Nigeria has experienced an increase in violent conflicts and criminality, which have tended to undermine those expectations. The violence and criminality have come in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and militancy, among other acts of criminality that undermine national security. Internal security has been significantly undercut by violent activities of civilian-in-arms against the Nigerian State. These have included radicalized religious and regional youth groups, prominent among which are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), O'Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Kato', and Ombatse, among others[4].

The rise of these groups has had significant influence on the numbers of ethnic and religious conflicts Nigeria has witnessed. The exact number of ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in the country is not known due to lack of adequate statistics and records on this subject-matter. However, Onuoha has averred that about 40% of ethno-religious crisis has occurred in Nigeria's Fourth Republic[5]. There has particularly been an increase between 2012 and 2014 in the occurrences of terrorist attacks in the country with government's insignificant success in curbing the menace. By this, the focus and scope of the discourse in this paper therefore, give the discourse contemporary relevance. It is against this background that the paper explores the phenomenon of terrorism/insurgency in Nigeria, its adverse impact on nationhood and security, and recommends new management strategies for the Nigerian government.

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[4] F. C. Onuoha, *The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend,* "Security Journal", No. 25(2), 2012, pp. 134-151.
[5] *Ibidem.*

Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

In this section, concepts central to the discourse, such as insurgency, terrorism, security and the state are briefly discussed.

Insurgency

Insurgency is an ambiguous concept. The United States Department of Defence (2007) defines it as organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed conflict[6]. This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existing government for the control of power, resources or for power sharing[7].

Terrorism

According to Ekaterina, terrorism is a sort of violence that uses one-sided violent approach against civilians[8]. It also engages uneven violent confrontation against a stronger adversary, which could be a state or a group of states. Chomsky defines terrorism as "the use of coercive means aimed at populations in an effort to achieve political, religious or even other aims"[9]. The US State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience"[10]. The United Nations (1992) defines terrorism as "an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi- clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – In contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets"[11].

For Lesser, international terrorism can be referred to as an act in which terrorists cross national borders to perpetrate attacks within the territory of other states. The targets of attacks could be embassies, individuals, schools, government parastatals, security institutions, international organisations, et cetera. Terrorists could also hijack ships on the high sea and planes in the air. Therefore, terrorism is an act that aims at achieving social, political, religious,

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[6] P. Hellesen, *Counterinsurgency and its Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces. A Thesis for the Naval Post Graduate School*, Monterey 2008, p. 14.
[7] L. J. Siegel, *Criminology: Theories, Patterns and Typologies*, Belmont 2007, p. 328.
[8] A. S. Ekaterina, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects*, New York 2008.
[9] N. Chomsky, *9-11*, New York 2001, s. 19.
[10] A. Isyaku, *Terrorism: A New Challenge to Nigeria's Stability in the 21st Century*, "International Affairs and Global Strategy", No. 12, 2013, pp. 17-18.
[11] L. J. Siegel, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

economic and even psychological goals through the use of coercive and intimidating acts outside the context of legitimate warfare activities that conveys some forms of messages to an audience[12].

Security

According to Francis, security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values[13]. Imobighe opines that security is the freedom from threats and a nation's capability to defend and develop itself, promote its values and lawful interest[14]. For Zabadi, security is a state in which people or things are not exposed to the dangers of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline[15]. This view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other words, the state has the responsibility of the use of force and power for the safety of its territory and its people.

Furthermore, there is the crucial need to define national security. Held gives a traditional meaning of national security. He describes national security as "the acquisition, deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals"[16]. Romm describes it as the lack of danger or risk to held standards, values and ideals and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked now or in the future[17]. Thus, national security is the preservation of the values a nation holds as it relates to the defence of its territory from human as well as non-human threats. The values also guide in the pursuit of it national interest in the international system.

State

The term state is derived from the Italian word *"lo stato",* a term coined by Niccolo Machiavelli to depict the social order that oversees and rules over a political entity or a country. According to Ekanem the "state is a permanent specialized organization of men armed with rules and means of coercion for maintaining order over a population in a defined territory over which this

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[12] I. B. Lesser, *Countering the New Terrorism*, Santa Monica-Washington 1999, p. 6.
[13] W. O. Alli, *The Changing Environment of Nigeria's Foreign Policy,* [in:] *Beyond 50 years of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and prospects*, ed. C. E. Osita, Lagos 2010, p. 73.
[14] T. A. Imobighe, *Doctrine for and Threats to Internal Security*, [in:] *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems*, eds. A. E. Ekoko and M. A. Vogt, Lagos 1990, p. 224.
[15] S. I. Zabadi, *Understanding Security and Security Sector Dynamics*, Baltimore 2005, p. 3.
[16] D. Held, A. McGrew, *The End of the Old Order?,* "Review of International Studies", No. 24, 1998, p. 226.
[17] J. J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Non Military Aspect,* New York 1993.

organization exercises power"[18]. For Max Weber, the state is an essential political union that has a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory[19]. Evident in these definitions are the characteristics of the state such as territorial authority, sovereignty, government, population, independence, the right to relate with other states and very importantly, the monopoly of the use of instruments of force.

The Character and Identity of the Nigerian State

Nigeria is a union of separate ethno-cultural units that occupied land terrains that were former British colonies. The Nigerian State is pluralistic in nature, that is, it is a multi-ethnic state or nation-state with over 300 groups, of diverse ethnic and religious identity. Every group is dissimilar to another based on the uniqueness of culture, language, religion and value system[20]. These differences amongst the various social groupings have remained a major determinant of social relationships.

It is worthy of note to state that social relations between and amongst the various groups have been characterised by cooperation, aggression, discrimination, conflicts, mistrust and prejudice. Even though Nigeria's motto is unity in diversity, yet from the beginning, the country has not been able to successfully accommodate the interests of all the divergent groups within its territory. There have been various insurgencies, rebellions and public revolts that seem to have been entrenched in the multicultural nature of the Nigerian State. Examples of public uprisings include the Tiv-Jukun/Fulani Conflict (2003), the Gwantu crisis (2001), political violence and unrest in Yorubaland in western Nigeria between 1960 and 1966, the Nigerian Civil War, the census crisis, the post presidential election crisis of 2011, the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in the 1980s, and the Yan Tatsine riots in the early 1980s. Other theatres of conflict included, Zango Kataf in Kaduna State in 1992, Zaria Shiites outbreak, Jos Mayhem, Kaduna religious riots, Maiduguri onslaughts, Kano violence of 1953, ethno-religious massacre in Kano, Kaduna

[18] O. Ekanem, *The Dialectics of Underdevelopment and Instability in Africa*, "Calabar Journal of Politics and Administration", No. 1(1), 2001, p. 55.
[19] M. Shaw, *War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society*, Massachussetts 2003.
[20] E. O. Ojo, *A survey of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria and its implications for democracy*, [in:] *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E. O. Ojo, Ibadan 2006, pp. 368-378; M. A. O. Aluko, *Threats to Nationhood: The Nigerian experience*, "Journal of the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association", Vol. 1&2 (1), October 1998, pp. 78-84.

and Plateau in the wake of the adoption of a sharia judicial system, Nupe-Yoruba conflict in Kwara and the Boko Haram insurgency[21].

Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria

As earlier mentioned, the phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious ethnic militias like the Bakassi Boys, O'dua People Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys; the Ijaw Youth. Congress (IYC); the Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Igbo People Congress (IPC) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), amongst others[22]. The surfacing of these militia groups has made religious intolerance and fanaticism more violent and disturbing. The two most notorious terrorist groups that have challenged Nigeria's national security, territoriality, sovereignty and unity have been the Niger Delta militant group and Boko Haram.

Insurgency in the Niger Delta

Without any doubt, the Niger Delta region is blessed with numerous natural resources including crude oil. It accounts for over 80% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. Rather than these resources translating into wealth, it has translated into poverty, degraded environment and the region wallows in poverty. This contrast originates from the contaminated perception of politics as a platform of wealth accumulation[23]. MNCs, rather than perform their corporate social responsibilities and contribute to the development of the region, have undermined the development of the region and caused massive environmental and economic degradation as oil spills from oil explorations polluted the waters meant for fishing and lands meant for farming. Gas flaring has also diminished agricultural productivity, thereby making the people

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[21] K. Tijani, *Future Dynamics of Good Neighbourliness or a Future Source of Threat: Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours*, [in:] *Beyond 50 years of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*, C. E. Osita (ed.), Lagos 2010, pp. 187-220; A. E. Ojie, C. Ewhrudjakpor, *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies in Nigeria*, "Antropologist", No. 11(1), 2009, pp. 7-14.

[22] B. Salawu, *Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies*, "European Journal of Social Sciences", No. 13(3), 2010, pp. 345-353.

[23] M. M. Duruji, F. O. Oviasogie, *State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security: An Appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria,* "Journal of Sustainable Society", No. 2(1), 2013, pp. 20-30; B. Thom-Otuya, V. T. Eremie, *Amnesty to Niger-Delta militants: Challenges and opportunities for future peace missions*, "Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy", No. 13, 2011.

occupationally displaced and developmentally impotent[24]. The conditions and feelings of alienation from the long years of abandonment, environmental degradation, coupled with the massive unemployment, destruction of aquatic ecosystem, the alteration of the soil quality, air pollution, socio-economic disorganization, the inconsiderateness of successive governments and exploitation by the oil companies produced a capricious atmosphere in the 1990s, characterized by frustration, anger and aggression that manifested in unconstitutional and violent protests and conflicts in the region[25]. The protests took different dynamic forms and phases.

The first phase was between the early and mid-1980s. According to Azigbo, the agitation actually began as peaceful protests by community development committees of a range of host communities to multinational oil companies[26]. The period saw the adoption of legal actions against the oil companies by the communities affected by reckless oil explorations. The legal actions basically requested for compensations for the destroyed properties by the oil companies. The second phase of the protests saw the use of peaceful protests and the occupation of flow stations. The objectives of the protest was to get the oil companies to fulfil their promises of providing amenities in the communities and provide employments to the indigenes of the Niger Delta. Despite the peaceful nature of the protest and the legalities of the demands, the oil companies called the police and military to attack the protesters. Security operatives destroyed properties and killed civilians. Following this, peaceful protests however degenerated into forceful agitations from the mid-1990s till 1998 when the requests of the groups as regards the development of the region were slow in coming. The agitations were heightened by the massacre of the nine Ogoni leaders and Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha, who had ignored all international and local entreaties and appeals to commute the death sentence of the environmentalists. By 1998,

[24] A. M. Adeyemo, *The Oil Industry, Extra-Ministerial Institutions and Sustainable Agricultural Development: A Case Study of Okrika LGA in Rivers State*, "Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics", No. 2(1), 2002, pp. 60-78.

[25] N. Nwogwugwu, O. E. Alao, C. Egwuonwu, *Militancy and Insecurity in the Niger Delta: Impact on the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment to Nigeria*, "Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management", No. 2(1), 2012, pp. 23-37; S. Folarin, H. Okodua, *Petroleum, the Environment, and the Economics of Nationalism in the Niger Delta*, [in:] *Marginality and Crisis: Globalization and Identity in Contemporary Africa*, A. G. Adebayo, O. Adesina, R. O. Olaniyi (eds.), Lanham 2010, pp. 225-238; S. Joab-Peterside, *On the Militarisation of Nigeria's Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State*, "African Conflict Profile", No. 1(2), 2005, pp. 20-29; I. S. Ibaba, *Alienation and militancy in the Niger Delta: Hostage taking and the dilemma of the Nigerian state*, "African Journal on Conflict Resolution", Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008, pp. 11-34.

[26] O. Azigbo, *Paying Lip Service to Niger Delta Development*, "Vanguard", 18.02.2008, p. 18.

anarchy overwhelmed most of the Niger Delta region[27]. The Niger Delta militants arose to take up arms against the government to fight for their rights. Militants forcefully occupied flow stations, seized tug boats and vessels belonging to the oil companies. They also kidnapped oil workers. Lastly, the fourth phase saw the demand for resource ownership and control[28]. It is quite unfortunate that the government has for decades remained insensitive to the needs and demands of the oppressed people of the Niger Delta.

Well-known among the belligerent groups operational in the area were the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Martyrs Brigade, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom and the Bush Boys, among others[29]. The underlying issues of contention by the armed militant groups were the greater control of the oil resources in the Niger Delta region by the people, fair allocation of the revenue from oil exploitation, ending the oil spills and gas flaring, compensation for the decades of ecocide, as well as ensuring the physical and infrastructural development of the region. However, the Nigerian government saw their protests as acts of sabotage to the revenue generation of the nation[30].

The activities of the groups in the Niger Delta manifested in diverse ways such as militancy, kidnappings, killings, bombing, hostage taking, demolition of oil and gas facilities, pipeline vandalisation and illegal oil bunkering[31]. The militants launched attacks on the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Chevron and Total Final Elf (IFE) staff and facilities. MEND killed oil workers at Chevron, Total Final Elf (IFE), damaged a rescue helicopter sent to rescue employees, killed naval officers, injured soldiers, attacked police stations like the Mini-Okoro Elenlewo, killed some officers on duty, attacked five-star hotels, and carried out a bomb attack on the Eagle Square, Abuja on October 1, 2010 during the fifty year anniversary of independence. Between 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage incidents were recorded in the region[32].

The sophistication of the weapons plus the dexterousness of their operations questioned the security apparatuses of the Nigerian State. Despite the seeming prevailing calmness of the region at the moment, as regards the

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[27] S. Folarin, *Niger Delta: Environment, Ogoni Crisis and the State*, "The Constitution: Journal of Constitutional Development", Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 37-61.
[28] I. S. Ibaba, *op. cit.*
[29] E. J. C. Duru, *The Poverty of Crisis Management Strategies in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A focus on the Amnesty Programme*, "African Research Review: An International Multidisciplinary Journal", Ethiopia, No. 6(2), 2012, pp. 162-170.
[30] I. O. Cyril, *Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Conflict*, "Africa Development", Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, 2009, pp. 103-128.
[31] E. J. C. Duru, *op. cit*.
[32] U. M. Ogbonnaya, U. K. Ehigiamusoe, *Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency: National Security in Nigeria*, "Global Security Studies", No. 4(3), 2013, pp. 46-60.

issues of terrorism, the outstanding issues of resource control and allocation, poverty alleviation and environmental security remain potential sources of explosive situations. Incidentally, while the amnesty package, and rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants were beginning to mitigate the situation in the country, the Boko Haram uprising began.

The Boko Haram Challenge

The Boko Haram issue started as an insignificant agitation of an Islamic sect with a strange commitment to non-conformist standards of social organization in Muslim-dominated Bauchi and Borno states. It began in Bauchi State on July 26, 2009 and since that time, the group has extended its activities to other Northern states as well as to other parts of Nigeria. Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws set out in the Koran[33]. This group believes Islam detests western civilisation and that western education is blasphemous. Literally, "Boko Haram" means 'western education is a sin" or "forbidden".

Going by its alleged creation and sponsorship by a famous politician in Borno State in the early 2000s and its socio-religious outlook and agenda, Boko Haram is thus an Islamist insurgent group that arose from political, social and religious discontent within the Nigerian State[34]. The recruits of the sect are mostly youths from the northern parts of Nigeria that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social status quo. They include unemployed youth, stark illiterates, and refugees from neighbouring African countries. Thus, the sect exploits the social-economic negativities of the country to recruit and radicalize its members[35].

Eso observes that the push factor to recourse to terrorism in the bid to influence public policy is beyond sectarianism[36]. He buttresses this by arguing that most of the attacks of the sect have been focused at the state, its institutions, and the civilian populations. It has launched attacks on military institutions such as military barracks, police stations (including the Force Headquarters in Abuja); it has also swooped on educational institutions at all levels, government establishments, places of worship (both churches and

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[33] A. Walker, *What Is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace Special, Report 308,* June 2012, pp. 1-16.
[34] A. O. Adesoji, *Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State*, "Africa Australia", No. 57(4), 2011, pp. 99-119.
[35] A. Nicoll, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Growing New Headache,* "Strategic Comments", No. 17(9), 201, pp. 1-3.
[36] H. Eso, *Boko Haram: The Enemy Within*, <www.kwenu.com/moe/2011/boko_haram_ enemy_within.htm>, (30.01.2018).

mosques) and has assassinated key political figures, statesmen and religious leaders that oppose their philosophy. Their strategies have included kidnapping, targeted killings, assassinations, suicide bombings, bombings with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), VBIEDS, ambushes, and drive-by shooting.

The escalation of Boko Haram's terror began in 2009 after the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf the originator of Boko Haram sect. Violence and torture against the sect by the Nigerian security forces bred fear in the minds of the surviving members who fled to neighbouring countries such as Niger, Algeria, Mali, Chad and Somalia for reinforcement and support from external jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab), Taliban in Afghanistan, Ansaru in Algeria and AQIM splinter group, Hezbollah terrorist cell, AQIM in northwest Africa the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Ansar al-Din in the region of northern Mali amongst others. From these groups, Boko Haram got trainings on kidnapping, suicide bombings, bomb making, the use of internet for propaganda and the use of IEDs and other explosives. From 2014, there was a shift in the sect's operations from unconventional guerrilla warfare tactics to the use of asymmetric assaults against agencies of government and civilians.

The internationalization of the sect from the same period also expanded it sources of funds and support for its activities. Boko Haram funds it escalating terror through illegal activities such as micro-financing the less privileged in northern Nigeria, external funding/sympathizers, bank robberies, extortion, and illicit trafficking of arms and drugs as well as kidnappings for ransom. Musa argues that the porous state of the borders in Yobe and Borno states have been used by Boko Haram to smuggle arms for its activities and increase its military hardware. The international benefactors and foreign supports are mostly from al Qaeda, al-Shabaab in Somalia and local al-Qaeda affiliates. One of the most notable supports from NGOs as at 2012 was from the UK-based Al-Muntada Trust Fund and several other organisations based in the Middle East. It is essential to establish that these illegal activities are often perpetuated through Nigeria's porous borders. The porosity of the Nigerian borders can be traced to colonial creations meant for the pursuit of its political and economic motives. These however have turned to national security threats today[37]. The borders also helped the sect to facilitate the fluidity and movement of members of the group from one neighbouring country to another. One of the challenges in preventing the flow of illegal migrants across the borders is the lingual and culture compatibility as communities with cultural proximity and homogenous languages are found at different sides of the borderline. This makes them capable of changing their identity when they feel like. This also makes it

[37] F. C. Onuoha, *op. cit.*

difficult to put in place immigration laws and curb the use of mercenaries and the recruitment of foreign fighters by Boko Haram[38].

In their own analysis, Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe aver that the attack launched on the United Nations Office in Abuja in 2011 gave the militant group a face similar to that of the Al-Qaeda[39]. Locally, the sect is referred to as the 'Nigerian Taliban' due to the gravity and tenacity of its operations. More importantly is the strong link the group has with other transnational extremist groups, including Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Crucial aspects of their relations with other transnational militant groups include training, funding, strategic knowledge on planning and tactical attacks and activities, ideological influence and human power resources[40].

While the Niger Delta militancy was a struggle for equity, that of Boko Haram has been a struggle for the control of the state and superiority over the security forces. Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe thus infer that what the two terrorist groups represent in terms of the global potential and feasibility for non-state actors as security challengers with destructive capabilities rivalling those of the state is alarming[41]. The tenacity of events between 2011 and 2014 reveals that the Nigerian State has not effectively equipped its security institutions with 21st century equipment and that it has not given its military personnel the requisite training for the much needed capacity to defend the country from internal insurrections and external threats. Furthermore, the government has not lived up to its responsibility in handling these challenges and ensuring security. Militancy in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram have thus facilitated and aggravated the irony of sectional indifference. During the heightened militancy in the Niger Delta, the North did not care much about the fate of the victims and not until the increasing terror of the Boko Haram in Nigeria did the rest of the country began to be worried about the amount of terror in the Northern part.

The mind-set of a united Nigeria and the need for unity in diversity are usually lost in the face of terror and oppression of a group. This attitude of sectarianism, coupled with the weak and slow response of the Nigerian government *abintio*, was what probably gave an impetus to the insurgency and its metamorphosis into a mainstream terrorist organization. The rest of Nigeria has however, come to realise that the terror group is indeed a threat to the security, sovereignty and stability of the Nigerian State and not just the North. Adibe captures the profundity of the challenge the Nigerian State faces when he argues that, the state: "is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as

[38] F. O. Olanrewaju, *Boko Haram terrorism and the crisis of internal displacement of women in Nigeria*, An unpublished doctoral thesis, 2018.
[39] U. M. Ogbonnaya, U. K. Ehigiamusoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-60.
[40] *Ibidem.*
[41] *Ibidem.*

Boko Haram's bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting, organized labour, inducing university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept 'brown envelops' to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy"[42].

The implications of Boko Haram's operations include the slowdown of the country's economic growth and development, worsened unemployment, food scarcity due to the inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South due to insecurity reasons, increase in fear and a false sense of security, recourse to self-help by people and citizens on most occasions such as the emergence of "Civilian JTF in Borno", loss of life and damage to properties, and so forth[43].

In the bid to address the menace of terrorism, the Federal Government engaged development partners, including the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and Israel, to step-up the war against terror. Nigeria also got proposals of assistance from Britain, Canada, China, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN, to assist in locating the over 234 abducted Chibok secondary school girls in Borno State. The US, France, Pakistan, and Britain have also offered to assist with counter-terrorism training[44]. In addition, the US Department of Defence has recently provided funds to Nigeria for the development of a counterterrorism infantry unit[45].

Furthermore, in the light of the terrific violence and human rights violations by Boko Haram, various counter terrorism approaches have been adopted by the government in Nigeria's fight against terrorism. At first, the response of government to the Boko Haram issue was not prompt. As usual, the response was an attitude of dismissal. This was with the mind-set that the Boko Haram phenomenon was a phase in the nation's life that would pass away swiftly. However, rather than passing away, it degenerated into full blown national insecurity crisis. Efforts have afterwards been made by the government

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[42] U. O. Uzodike, B. Maiangwa, *Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Casual Factors and Central problematic*, "African Renaissance", No. 9(1), 2012, pp. 91-118.
[43] D. O. Alao, C. O. Atere, O. Alao, *Boko-Haram Insurgence in Nigeria*, "Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies", No. 1(4), 2012, pp. 67-87.
[44] O. Ajayi, W. Igbintade, U. Ukpong, R. Otokpa, *Insecurity: Nigeria to Buy Fighter Jets*, "National Mirror", 15.10.2014.
[45] United States Embassy in Nigeria, *Boko Haram and US Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria*, <www.nigeria.usembassy.gov/mobile/factsheet_05142014.html> (30.01.2018).

to resolve the crisis following the regeneration of the phenomenon. Some of the responses include dialogue and the declaration of the state of emergency. On 14 May 2013, the state of emergency was declared in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Also, the multinational joint task force of military personnel was assembled by the government to fight Boko Haram[46]. The JTF succeeded in driving the sect out of the cities to remote villages which made it difficult for the government forces to overcome them. Other efforts include political negotiation with all stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict, attempts by Jonathan's administration to establish a 26 member amnesty oriented body, the establishment of the committee on dialogue and peaceful resolution of security challenges in the north. This committee was made up of former and then current government officials, human rights activists and religious leaders who had the mandates of convincing Boko Haram fighters to lay down their arms within three months. This was not successful as Shekau stated that they were not offenders that should be forgiven and that the jihad would not end until Nigeria becomes an Islamic state under sharia law[47]. However, the failure of both dialogue and amnesty led to the launching of full military offensives against the sect.

A security-only military approach which seemed to be the last resort has been the mostly adopted strategy. The effects have been contrary to democratic culture as human rights have been violated. It has also succeeded in strengthening the collective resolve of its members and further radicalized the sect. In addition, coercive approach have intensified opposition to government and deepened the vicious cycle of violence and terror. Examples supporting the argument that a security only approach intensifies violence against governments are, terrorism in Northern Ireland, Chechnya and Israel. The War against Terror by the Bush administration in the US intensified the global jihadist movements in terms of supplies of ammunition, recruitment of terrorists as well as jeopardized the cooperation in the fight against terrorism[48]. Also, the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the creator of the sect while in police custody and the arbitrary arrest and torture of members of the sect by security forces in 2009 exposed the sect to international collaborations, global sponsorship, adoption of violence and terror on the Nigerian people rather than on state institutions as they did before the death of Yusuf. In response to this, Abubakar Shekau, the second in command to Yusuf and the groups present leaders sent disturbing warnings in a video released in June 2010, stating: "do not think Jihad is over; rather Jihad has just begun"[49]. This paper therefore argues that although terrorists should not be negotiated with, yet

[46] M. A. Sergie, T. Johnson, *US Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739> (30.01.2018).
[47] D. E. Agbiboa, *Is Might Right? Boko Haram, the joint military Task Force and the global Jihad*, "Military and Strategic Studies", No. 5(3), 2014, pp. 53-72.
[48] *Ibidem.*
[49] *Ibidem*, p. 61.

other conciliation methods that identify the causes and motivations of their struggles and grievances such as reducing poverty, unemployment, negotiation with state sponsors, implementing social reforms and promising change should be embraced. This is because a military deterrence will not be effective in winning against fighters who are determined to die in their struggle to convert the secular Nigerian state to an Islamic state.

Combating and Ending Insurgency/Terrorism in Nigeria

The regularity and enormity of the terror unleashed by insurgents in various parts of the country make it expedient for strategies and solutions to be formulated. First, there is the need to tow the path of countries in the industrialized world, particularly those who have gathered enough experience in the course of the fight against international terrorism, by building a potent Intelligence Gathering Infrastructure. In 2012, Nigeria had publicized plans for a new intelligence gathering centre that would be saddled with the responsibility of coordinating, improving and integrating intelligence gathering and sharing across security agencies and other aspects of government. Although this, if it eventually comes to fruition, will be helpful in curbing crime, it however has to be pursued side by side with sustainable infrastructure such as ICT and efficient power supply to back it. Lack of commitment, wrong prioritization of public policy and corruption may have slowed down the implementation of this promising plan. These have remained the major obstacles in the fight against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. Nevertheless, Nigeria should endeavour to improve its intelligence gathering technology.

Moreover, all insurgents and terrorists caught or who surrendered must be fully prosecuted and adequately punished, as a situation in which justice does not prevail and offenders are freed on grounds of amnesty or pardon will send the wrong signals to the society; these could even encourage more acts of terrorism or motivate more insurgent groups to emerge and strike at the state. One of the reasons it has taken so long to break Boko Haram, is not only because of the known sponsors who are sometimes shielded and walk free; it is also because many detained Boko Haram fighters and commanders disappear from detention facilities reportedly, by the aid of collaborators in government and the military. Such commanders return to the terrorist camps to fortify and lead their cells in the sustained fight against the state.

Another point that should be noted is that training complements modern equipment. Once the intelligence infrastructure and military hardware are provided, the training of military personnel in their effective and civilized or disciplined use is also required. Media reports have shown how low the morale of the troops has been with regards to the inferior weapons and poor training they go through. These have caused poor motivation and weak responses up to

the point of flight in the face of superior threat from the Boko Haram fighters[50]. In line with the above, the armed forces should be empowered and trained with the ability for swift response to attacks. There have been incidents of the armed forces not coming to the aid of the victims during assaults by militants. A vivid instance was when students of the Federal Government College in Buni-Yadi in Yobe State were killed in an operation that lasted for four hours and none of the security forces came to their rescue.

In addition, selection into the security organizations should be entirely based on merit, mental and emotional strength of the individual applicants. Physical stability or strength should also be considered, given the vital role the armed forces play in securing the country from both external and internal hostility and threats. Due to the delicate nature of the armed forces, it is recommended that only proficient, zealous, enthusiastic, patriotic and dedicated applicants should be enlisted. According to Akande, the insurgents have higher morale than the Nigerian troops because they are more organized and have more sophisticated weapons[51]. One of the basic factors for high morale is moral and financial inventive. Soldiers are not well financially motivated which killed the spirit of the armed forces and culminated in strings of losses. They are placed on half salaries and are tried in a General Court Martial for every act. They are allegedly buried in mass graves. Sometimes, the superiors give them wrong orders that end up in disastrous offensives and lead to their ambush, as have been widely reported in the ongoing war on terror in Nigeria. Thus, the welfare of military personnel should be considered so that they can be dedicated to their job and not be vulnerable to corrupt practices.

Furthermore, rather than adopt a security-only military approach, the Nigerian government should wake up to its socio-economic responsibilities. Nigeria is ravaged by underdevelopment, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, lack of basic social amenities, corruption, increased cost of living, high population growth and the incapacity of government to deal effectively with non-state actors/groups. These have instigated grievances against the system and created breeding ground for terrorism[52]. If these issues are squarely addressed, there is the possibility that terrorism will not be attractive to the future generation. Put differently, for the state to sustainably ensure peace and security, the state must endevour to employ a blend of anti-corruption drives, poverty reduction strategies, military engagement and dialogue particularly in

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[50] S. Folarin, *Still on the War on Terror,* "National Mirror", 17.08.2014.

[51] B. Akande, *Nigeria On Auto Pilot, Let's Rally To Save her by Chief Bisi Akande*, <http://apc.com.ng/index.php/media-center/latest-news/item/586-nigeria-on-auto-pilot-lets-rally-to-save-her-by-chief-bisi-akande> (30.01.2018).

[52] E. I. Onah, *The Nigerian state as an equilibrium of violence: An explanation of the BH insurgency in Northern Nigeria*, "African Journal on Conflict Resolution", No. 14(2), 2014, p. 63-80.

the troubled north-eastern geopolitical zone and other parts of Nigeria rather than adopt a security-only military approach.

Additionally, tightening the security at the borders becomes quite essential. Protecting the borders by ensuring a close monitoring of inflow and outflow of people will reduce the possibility of influx and outflow of foreigners with sinister motives. This will also help cut off terrorists' supply of arms that are transported through the borders with neighbouring countries.

Finally, the government at all levels needs to be more prudent in its management of information on terrorist groups and security matters. For instance, the government, through the media, announced that the location where the abducted Chibok girls were kept was known without first strategizing on how to rescue the girls. The leakage of the information did not do Nigeria any good. The girls were relocated by the terrorists and could not be rescued until a recent publicized truce between the government and the Boko Haram negotiators and the promise by the latter to release the girls in exchange for Boko Haram prisoners. The discretion in the management of information will thus help in tackling insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria.

Conclusion

From the numerous cases of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, it is obvious that insecurity beclouds the Nigerian State. The principle and myth of the state's monopoly of the use of force have been shattered by the by desperate terrorist and insurgent groups pursuing parallel goals to that of the state. While the capability of the Boko Haram group was limited to shootings and improvised explosives, the government did not realise the need to create order. Fortunately the intensification of terrorist attacks, the frequency of the attacks, the collateral damage to the country and the expanded scope of the activities of insurgents and terrorists have forced the government to acknowledge the dilapidated state of security in Nigeria and the urgency in recent times, to restore order before Nigeria becomes a failed state.

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REGIME SECURITY IN CHAD. HOW THE WESTERN WAR ON TERROR SAVED THE CHADIAN DICTATORIAL REGIME

***Abstract**:*
This article discusses how the western war on terror contributed to save the president Déby and his regime in Chad. After a brief look at central security issues in Chad around the 2008 coup d'Etat attempt, the article gives a particular focus to the last few years. The article describes and discusses how President Déby is manoeuvring in the war-against-terror landscape in the Sahel region. International military cooperation and participation is discussed in relation both to fighting terror and to regime survival. Towards the end, the article looks at more domestic safety oriented approaches to regime survival.

***Keywords**:*
Chad, Sahel, Boko Haram, Déby, fight against terror

Introduction

The US department of State launched an updated *Travel advisory* on 10 January 2018 telling US citizens that Chad is a high-risk country and: "We want you to know the danger of travelling to high-risk places and to strongly consider not going to them at all. Travelling to high-risk locations puts your life, and possibly the lives of others, in jeopardy. Travelling to high-risk areas puts you at risk for kidnapping and hostage taking-"[2].The agency further stated that: "Reconsider travel to Chad due to crime, terrorism, and minefields. Violent crimes […] have been reported. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting foreigners, local security forces, and civilians. They can

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[2] *Travel to High-Risk Areas*, U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/before-you-go/travelers-with-special-considerations/high-risk-travelers.html> (30.01.2018).

easily cross borders, including Lake Chad region, and borders may close without notice […]"[3].

Half a year earlier, on 24 September 2017, the Trump administration put Chad on the list of non-welcoming citizens. Heavily criticized by the African Union, Chadian authorities and many international embassies, apparently including the US embassy in N'Djamena, the US Homeland Security administration did not repeal the travel ban for Chadian nationals[4]. Hilary Matfess at Stratfor argues that "the travel ban threatens to erode the goodwill built up between Chad and the United States" built up during the last years[5]. Just a few weeks after the travel ban for Chadian citizens, on October 16, the US inaugurated their brand new embassy in Ndjamena, covering a total of 4500 m^2 within a 12 acre heavily fenced and protected plot close to the former National Assembly, *Palais du 15 Janvier*.

Why this fear and mistrust combined with massive interest? Chad is run by a democratic dictator in power since December 1990[6]. President Déby is famous for his firm grip over the political opposition in Chad, using his various polices and military forces to interrupt political rallies and intimidation his adversaries. The regime is well known for its human rights abuses. Frequently, agents from the *Agence National de Securité* (ANS), Chad's secret police and intelligence, arrests individuals of the political opposition without valid reasons[7]. In their 2016 Human Rights report the US reports that "human rights abuses included arbitrary killings by security forces and use of torture; politically motivated disappearances; arbitrary arrest and detention, incommunicado detention, and lengthy pre-trial detention; denial of fair public trial; and executive influence on the judiciary"[8]. In fact, the bureaucracy functions more on relationships than on rule of law, and merits[9]. At the same time, the US has invested heavily in the oil sector in the country and is the most

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[3] *Chad Travel Advisory*, U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/chad-travel-advisory.html> (30.01.2018).

[4] At the time of writing the ban is still valid.

[5] H. Matfess, *Chad's Inclusion in the 'travel ban' Jeopardizes Stability in the Sahel*, Stratfor.com, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/hilary-matfess/11122017-chad-s-inclusion-travel-ban-jeopardizes-stability-sahel> (30.01.2018).

[6] K. F. Hansen, *A democratic dictator's success. How Chad's President Deby defeated the military opposition in three years (2008–2011)*, "Journal of Contemporary African Studies", Vol. 31, No. 4(2013), pp. 583-599.

[7] See e.g. *Amnesty International Report Chad 2017/2018*,<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/chad/report-chad/> (30.01.2018).

[8] *Chad 2016 Human Rights Report*,<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265450.pdf> (30.01.2018).

[9] H. Dickow, *Autoritäre Structuren im Tshad: macht aus Sicht dere, die sie nicht haben*, "Sociologus", No. 64(1), 2014, pp. 53-78.

important buyer of oil from Chad[10]. In addition, since 11th of September 2001, Chad has been a trusted American ally in the fight against terror. Especially after Khadafy was murdered, Déby has come to play an even more important role in the fight against terror, or Muslim fundamentalism, in the Sahel[11]. This explains broadly the US's fear and mistrust together with massive interest in Chad.

This article discusses how the western war on terror contributed to save president Déby and his regime in Chad. After a brief look at central security issues in Chad around the 2008 coup d'Etat attempt, the article gives a particular focus to the last few years. How is President Déby manoeuvring in the war-against-terror landscape in the Sahel region? First we look at the increased militarised security put up by the regime after 2008 before we describe and analyze Chad's participation in major military operations in the region. Towards the end we catch a glace of some domestic safety oriented approaches to the regime's survival while indicating some treats President Déby faces.

Fieldwork carried out by the author in Ndjamena in May 2017 and in January/February 2018 informs this article. In addition, the author has read, on a weekly basis since 2008, a large number of blogs and Facebook postings about politics and societal developments in Chad. The article also make good use of the growing, both quantitatively and qualitatively, number of academic texts and advocacy reports concerning politics and security in Chad since 2008.

Securitisation of politics; the February 2008 coup attempt and beyond

Surrounded by upheavals in Libya, warring factions in Darfur, insurgents in the Central African Republic and horrors committed by Boko Haram in Northern Cameroun and Northern Nigeria, Chad may seem like a stable country in a troubled region. In fact, Idriss Déby Itno, president in the country since December 1990, has been re-elected six times, last in April 2016, making some sort of stability. The stability of the president is however, not echoed in the ministries and top governmental positions. In fact, politics in Chad is personalized with the extended family of the president, including his numerous wives, in-laws and children, filling many important public functions and the president rule largely by decree. At the will of the president ministers, top

[10] A. Behrends, *The Devil's Money. A Multi-level Approach to Acceleration and Turbulence in Oil-Producing Southern Chad*, "Social Analysis", No. 61(3), 2017, pp. 57-73; K. F. Hansen, *Oil for Education in Chad*, [in:], *Savoir et Corruption*, L. Holtedahl, R. Djesa (eds.), Paris-Karthala 2017, pp. 59-72; S. Pegg, *Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse?*, "African Affaires", No. 105(418), 2005, pp. 1-25.

[11] M. Debos, N. Powell, *L'autre pays des "guerres sans fins": une histoire de la France militaire au Tchad (1960-2016)*, "Les Temps Modernes", No. (693), 2017, pp. 1-46; K. F. Hansen, *Political and Economic Effects of Qaddafi's Death on Chad,* The Institut français des relations internationals (IFRI), 30.12.2013.

ranking governors, down to sub-prefects, and even university directors are nominated or "released from their function". Déby has signed more than 2000 presidential decrees annually the last years involving high personnel turnover in governance, bureaucracies and public offices. The so-called "decretées" within bureaucracy, those nominated by decree, are formally loyal to the president and it is difficult for members of civil opposition to gain trustworthy positions within the state system. How, then, does the regime deal with militarised opposition?

In February 2008 Chad's President Idriss Deby Itno was very close to be ousted by three conjoint rebel movements. The main reason why the coup was not successful was that the leaders of the two most important rebel movements, the Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (RFC) led by Timane Erdimi and the Union des Forces pour la Democracie et le Developpement (UFDD) headed by (former) General Nouri, could not agree over who should become Chads next president.

General Nouri, a goran former minister and ambassador for Chad, was militarily the strongest. Timan Erdimi, a zaghawa formerly trusted nephew of President Deby, would not live up to the aspirations of his own zaghawa combatants if he gave the power to Nouri. French military asked for a decision. Erdimi and Nouri continued discussing. Without an agreement among the two leaders of the "movement politico-militaire", as rebel movements are normally called in Chad despite the fact that they have never claimed to support any political ideology nor any other cause except that they always want to get rid of state corruption, despotic governance and mismanagement of the state's resources, France decided to sustain president Deby militarily. The rebellion was crushed over the first weekend of February 2008[12].

Some of the rebel leaders negotiated positions within Déby's regime, others returned to Sudan to prepare for new coups. After another unsuccessful attempt to take power later in 2008, Khartoum lost trust in Nouri and Erdimi was selected to lead a new union of rebels, "*Union des forces de la résistance tchadienne*" (UFR) on 24 January 2009. However, political rapprochement between Chad's Déby and Sudan's El-Bashir in the course of 2009, ending with a signed and lasting peace agreement on 15 January 2010, stopped Sudanese support for UFR and Erdimi who, together with other Chadian rebel leaders until then supported by Khartoum, were now expulsed from Sudan. Nouri, Erdimi and other military rebels installed themselves in Qatar on the invitation

[12] M. Debos, *Living by the gun in Chad*, London 2016; K. F. Hansen, *A democratic dictator's success…*; A. Koulamallah, *La bataille de N'Djamena*. Paris 2014; J. Tubiana, M. Debos, *Déby's Chad. Political Manipulation at Home, Military Intervention Abroad, Challenging Times Ahead,* "Peaceworks", No. 136, 2017.

of the regime[13]. For ten years now, Nouri and Erdimi and their collaborators and/or politico-military competitors have prepared another coup, just waiting for the perfect timing. Yet, as long as both the US and France support President Déby, there will never be a perfect timing.

At the time of writing, both Erdimi and Nouri are believed to train troops, or rather armed civilians, in Southern Libya/North-Eastern Chad. In addition, Mahamat Mahdi Ali, a 53 year-old-always-rebel-leader, heads the 1500 strong *Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad* (FACT) which trains in about the same region. The Islamic State, apparently, backs Chadian rebel movements with money and weapons. Believing that Qatar also funds the rebels, on 23 August 2017 President Déby ordered the Qatari embassy in N'Djamena to close down and staff to leave Chad within ten days. However, in February 2018, the diplomatic ties were restored.

Re-arming Chad

After the close-to-successful Coup in February 2008, President Déby decided to re-arm Chad. Using the massive amounts of money poured into the state coffers due to the high oil price at the time, Chad spend 773$ million (all sums here in constant $ in 2014 value) on military equipment in 2008. Three years earlier, in 2005, military spending in Chad was only 10% of the 2008 spending, 77$ million. After 2008, Chad's military budgets are always high, both compared to earlier budgets and compared to Chad's GNI, while never reaching the 2008 spending[14].

In addition to increase substantially the military budget, Déby has re-organised the security apparatus in Chad. When he came to power in the successful coup d'Etat in December 1990, his rebel group, MPS, contained mostly young zaghawa fighters from villages in Eastern Chad or North-Western Sudan. Today many of them have retired or opted for a civilian life. The security apparatus now is professionalised and divided and Chad's military is considered one of the best in Africa[15]. The National Army of Chad (ANT) consists of some 15.000-25.000 troops[16]. An even more important part of the security apparatus is the *Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité des Institutions de l'Etat* (DGSSIE), until 2005 known as the Republican Guard. The DGSSIE receives its budget directly from the president himself and reports

[13] K. F. Hansen, *A democratic dictator's success…*; R. Marchal, *An emerging military power in central Africa? Chad under Idriss Déby*, "Societes Politiques Comparees", No. 40, 2016, pp. 1-20.
[14] *Military expenditure by country*, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf> (30.01.2018).
[15] C. Griffin, *Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram: French Counterterrorism and Military Cooperation in the Sahel*, "Small Wars & Insurgencies", No. 27(5), 2016, pp. 896-913.
[16] This section draws heavily on J. Tubiana, M. Debos, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

directly to the president. Its troops are as numerous as the regular army, the ANT, but is better equipped, better trained and better paid. This army is characterized by a US Air Force employee as one of the "best performers in countering terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in Africa"[17]. In N'Djamena ordinary people seems to have a hate/love attitude towards their soldiers. They fear the soldiers since they are brutal and cruel and the regime may use the soldiers against them, but they are proud of them as well because the Chadian soldiers have a reputation of not fearing anything and never give up let alone surrender[18]. That is may be why Roland Marchal claims "Chadian military are more warriors than soldiers […]. They obey their leaders, not always the officers"[19].

President Déby is certainly important for US anti-terror initiatives. According to Burgess, Déby "has been doing what is necessary to maintain regime stability and attack external and internal adversaries that threaten his hold on power"[20]. At least half of the troops and most of the leaders in the DGSSIE are ethnic zaghawas from president Déby's own sub-clan beri and thus supposedly 100% loyal to him[21]. In addition, one of Déby's sons, Mahamat Kaka, commands the DGSSIE, making an internal mutiny against Déby implausible.

To complement these two different structures, well-equipped and well-trained 3.000-4.000 men strong National Nomadic Guard (GNT) is also directly under the president's control, and headed by one of his cousins[22], Mahamat Saleh Brahim. The GNT takes part in international peacekeeping operations, as do the DGSSIE, gaining both experience and training compared to the regular army the ANT. A 5.000-strong gendarmerie and a police force of some 10.000, unarmed due to the president's lack of trust in their degree of loyalty, supplements the security apparatus in Chad[23].

A secret police, the *Agence Nationale de Sécurité* (ANS), makes the security apparatus complete. The ANS functions also as an intelligence together with the regular polices intelligence services (les RG, renseignements généraux) and a newly established intelligence called B2 (Bureau numéro 2).

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[17] S. F. Burgess, *UN and AU counterterrorism norm acceptance: Comparative security policies of Uganda and Chad,* "Comparative Strategy", No. 35(4), 2016, p. 316.
[18] Numerous conversations in N'Djamena, May 2017, January/February 2018.
[19] R. Marchall, *op. cit.,* p. 18.
[20] S. F. Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 322.
[21] N. Powell, *Battling Instability? The Recurring Logic of French Military Interventions in Africa*, "African Security", 2016, p. 19.
[22] *TCHAD: Le Népotisme et le clientélisme érigé en mode de gouvernance au Tchad*, <http://www.letchadanthropus-tribune.com/tchad-le-nepotisme-et-le-clientelisme-erige-en-mode-de-gouvernance-au-tchad/> (30.01.2018).
[23] J. Tubiana, M. Debos, *op. cit.,* pp. 13-15.

Participation in international military operations

In addition to re-arm and restructure the security apparatus, President Déby has strengthened his more or less private regime by engaging in various international militarised security arrangements. Déby gains global recognition by taking part in UN organised peacekeeping missions and regional military operations to fight terror. Some include active participation from parts of the Chadian army (G5 Sahel, MNJTF, MINUSMA) while others implies especially political deals concerning militarised security including armament and training (AFRICOM, Operation *Barkhane*). I will here look briefly into these engagements analysing them in relation to the fight against terror and regime survival in Chad.

G5 Sahel

Five Sahelian countries, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, regrouped in February 2014 to form the G5 Sahel, a mean to increase development and trade as well as combat Islamic insurgents and get hold of trans-border smuggling in the aftermath of the fall of Colonel Khadafy in October 2011. The establishment of the G5 Sahel was instrumental in Chad's acquiring a more central position in global and regional initiatives in the Sahel security architecture after being previously somewhat sidelined. For example, Chad had been excluded from the EU Sahel initiatives (because the EU prioritised Mauritania, Mali and Niger), and from the regional Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region (which included only Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger).

Supported politically and to a lesser degree financially by the African Union, the G5 Sahel has become an important regional security factor[24]. Lack of funding has numerous times post-phoned the G5 Sahel November 2015 decision to create its own standing counter terror force. However, in December 2017, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million and the US pledged $60 million to support the creation of a 5000 strong force. Together with financial support from others, most importantly the EU, the AU and France, the planned force has, as of end February 2018, a pledged budget of some 400 $ million. An estimated 500$ million is necessary for the first year of operation.

The active membership in the G5 Sahel gives president Déby a global stage to express his security concerns in addition to external funding to pay his specially selected troops.

[24] N. Desgais, *La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), Ou l'émergence d'une architecture de défense collective propre au Sahel*, <https://www.csfrs.fr/sites/default/files/nicolas_desgrais_v2.pdf> (30.01.2018).

Multinational Joint Taskforce – MNJTF

Created in Nigeria in 2014 to fight Boko Haram in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, Chad sent early January 2015, 1.500-2.000 troops supported by 400 military vehicles and a few combat helicopters to the *Multinational Joint Taskforce* in northern Cameroon[25]. On 17 January 2015, the AU authorised the transfer of the headquarters of the 8,700-strong force from Northern Nigeria to N'Djamena and on 6 March the same year, approved an increase of up to 10.000 troops.

Prior to these decisions, no attacks by Boko Haram had materialized on Chadian territory. However, during the course of 2015, numerous attacks with significant fatalities took place in Chad. The most severe were two simultaneous attacks on 15 June 2015 in N'Djamena, when assaults on a police station and a police school killed 38 and wounded around 100. A month later, on 11 July, a male Boko Haram suicide bomber dressed as a woman, killed 15 and wounded around 80 people at the entrance of "Le Grand Marché" in N'Djamena. These incidents made a good excuse for the Chadian regime to increase security, searching at random people and places, and imposing state of emergency in parts of the country. Additionally, strong police and military surveillance have proved effective to stop attacks by Boko Haram on Chadian territory. Indeed, no deadly incident resulting from terror attacks took place on the Chadian territory during the year.

The military contribution to peace in the Sahel is costly for Chad. An estimated 10 – 16,5 $ million per month is used only to combat Boko Haram[26]. For the time being, no international donor has taken up Chad's bill for fighting Boko Haram. President Déby uses all occasions to remind France, the EU, the US and others that Chad is impoverished after the fall in the oil price and as Boko Haram is posing a global treat to security, it is unfear that Chad should bear the costs[27]. Still, the fight against Boko Haram gives Déby's regime both international acclaim and excuses to tighten the control over its populace.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Early 2013, the Malian state asked for international support against Islamic militias approaching the capital and threatening to take over the state. France deployed rapidly but needed assistance. Déby quickly sent 2.250 of his troops to Mali where they swiftly gained international acclaim for their brave

[25] J. Tubiana, M. Debos, *op. cit.; Le Tchad menace de retirer ses troupes des opérations de la Minusma et du G5 Sahel*, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/451131/politique/tchad-menace-de-retirer-troupes-operations-de-minusma-g5-sahel/> (30.01.2018).
[26] J. Tubiana, M. Debos, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[27] See *Le Tchad menace….*

operational courage against the Islamist insurgents[28]. The UN Security Council passed resolution 2100 on 25 April 2013 allowing the establishment of a stabilising force to support the political transition in Mali[29]. Troops from France and Chad made up the most important contingents in the military force from the very beginning. Rewarded for Chad's important role in Mali, former Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahamat Saleh Annadif, assumed the leadership of the 11.000 troops string MINUSMA operations from January 2016. By the end of 2016, some 1.550 Chadian troops participated in the UN security forces MINUSMA[30].

The UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA, has become one of the most dangerous peace operations in the Organization's history. From 2013 to 2017, 155 peacekeepers have lost their lives in the West African nation. Forty-seven of them were from Chad. On a UN official webpage the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, states that "We pay tribute to the Chadians who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of peace"[31]. Indeed, in 2017 Chad held one of the best-equipped and best-trained armies in Africa. One important reason for this was the practical training the troops receive in Mali.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

After the "War on Terror" launched by the US after the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, President Déby Itno has also become a US protégé. In 2007, the United States Congress approved 500$ million for the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) over six years to support countries involved in counterterrorism against threats of Al Qaeda operating in African Sahel countries, making it one of the most important anti-terror programs in Africa. A year later TSCTP transforms into the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Two of its main goals is to degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel and fight Boko Haram.

The US offers advice, training, intelligence and equipment to Chad's military forces. In total, Pentagon has proposed spending $200 million this year to help train and equip the armies and security forces of North, Central and West African countries[32]. An important part of this training is the annual

[28] See e.g. J. Irish, D. Flynn, *Chad emerges as African power broker as France steps back*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-chad/chad-emerges-as-african-power-broker-as-france-steps-back-idUSBRE94707C20130508> (30.01.2018); *Hollande's Franco-African farewell*, <http://www.dw.com/en/hollandes-franco-african-farewell/a-37110365> (30.01.2018).
[29] *About MINUSMA*, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/about-minusma> (30.01.2018).
[30] *MINUSMA Personnel*, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/personnel> (30.01.2018).
[31] *Service and Sacrifice: Chadian peacekeepers on a UN mission for peace in Mali*, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/01/1003031> (30.01.2018).
[32] H. Cooper, *Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says*,

Exercise Flintlock. Both in 2015 and in 2017 this massive, tree week long military exercise, including some 1300 troops from more than 20 countries, took place in Chad. Troops trained in combat patrols and practiced real-world counter-terrorism missions, supposedly aimed against Boko Haram.

Operation Barkhane

France regards Chad and Déby's regime as important to support to keep stability in a troubled region. France share intelligence with Deby's regime. In addition, N'Djamena is the home of France's *Operation Barkham*, by the end of 2017 containing some 4000 troops, 5 drones, 8 jetfighters, 17 helicopters in addition to some six hundreds logistical vehicles and armoured cars[33]. *Operation Barkham* took over when *Operation Serval* in Mali and *Operation Epervier* (established 1986) in Chad merged on 1 August 2014. The goal is to protect French interests in the region as well as to contribute to combat terrorism in the Sahel. Based in the Chadian capital N'Djamena, the operation has also liaison offices with forces in Niamey (Niger) and in Gao (Mali), but also bases in the Chadian town Abeché and Faya. One should, however, not be lead to think that this French military interest in Chad is of recent date connected to fight Islamic terror in the Sahel. In fact, since 1976 France has a valid military agreement with Chad stating that France will "ensure the sovereignty of the Chadian state"[34]. The fact that French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, made four official visits to Chad in 2016, indicates the importance of Chad for French military engagements in Africa[35].

By their military presence and cooperation, France contributes substantially to increase the effectiveness of the Chadian army[36]. However, some analysis focuses on the mutual military dependency between France and Chad. Powell even argues that Chad is such an important ally in the war against terror that "French security policy has become dangerously dependent on Déby's continued survival"[37].

The fact that Chad participates actively in the war against terror, by supporting UN military missions, AU missions and fighting actively other regional Islamic insurgents, increases seriously the Chadian troops quality and

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<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haram-and-isis-are-collaborating-more-us-military-says.html> (30.01.2018).

[33] *Opération Barkhane. Dossier de presse*, Ministère des armées, France, Paris 2017.

[34] K. F. Hansen, *Chad*, [in:] *Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2014*, A. Mehler, H. Melber, K. v. Walraven (Eds.), Vol. 11, Leiden 2015, p. 205.

[35] K. F. Hansen, *Chad*, [in:] *Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2016*, A. Mehler, H. Melber, K. v. Walraven (Eds.), Vol. 13, Leiden 2017

[36] C. Griffin, *op. cit.*

[37] N. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

effectiveness. In addition, president Déby's global legitimacy proliferates despite his rather loose legitimacy at home. This last point will be addressed in this final section.

President Déby's remarkable international standing

In most international rankings regarding corruption and human rights, Chad scores very low. In 2017, Chad ranked 180/190 on the World Banks doing business report[38]. Especially to start a business in Chad is both time consuming and costly and only one country in the world has a more difficult tax regime than Chad. Transparency International ranked Chad 165/180 on their corruption perception index for 2017[39]. The overall corruption score estimates that corruption gets more and more serious every year. On the Economist's Democracy Index for 2017, Chad figures 165/167 and the least democratic in Africa[40]. On a possible score from 0 to 10, Chad gains zero score on both civil liberties, electoral process and functioning of government, but better on political culture and political participation, giving Chad an overall score of 1,5.

Still, both the US, the EU including France regard Chad under Déby's regime as an important collaborator and partner in international politics and especially in the fight against terror. All French presidents, from Mitterrand, via Chirac, Sarkozy and Holland to Macron, have received Déby numerous times in Paris to discuss both military collaboration and humanitarian aid. Germany 's Chancellor Angela Merkel invited President Déby to Berlin in October 2016, promising Chad close to 9 million Euro in humanitarian aid. In fact, President Déby accomplished 37 international official visits during 2016, more than any other African president.

The UN General Assembly elected Chad a seat on the UN Security Council from 2015 to 2017. This was controversial in many quarters since the Déby regime had disregarded the UNSC's warrant for the arrest of Sudan's President Omar al Bashir for crimes against humanity. Déby even hosted al-Bashir in Chad in 2015. Critics asked how a state that did not respect the rulings of UNSC could become one of its ten rolling members. Most observers believe that Chad's active engagement in UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and its international collaboration in fighting terrorism probably gave the votes needed to secure its seat.

In most of Africa, President Déby also enjoys a high standing among his peers. He chaired the regional G5 Sahel group the first year after its inception. He was elected Chairman of the African Union for 2016. As a sign of respect

[38] *Economy Rankings*, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings> (30.01.2018).
[39] *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017*, <https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017> (30.01.2018).
[40] *Democracy Index 2017*, <http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index> (30.01.2018).

and importance, 14 African heads of state were present in N'Djamena when Déby was sworn in as president for the sixth time, on 8 August 2016.

President Déby enjoys international goodwill and global legitimacy due to Chad's active and firm participation in fighting Islamic insurgents in the Sahel. In addition, the lack of viable political alternatives to govern Chad makes the international community reluctant to criticize president Déby as they (we) need him to keep at least one part of Central Africa quiet. The civil political opposition at home, however, is not reluctant to criticize the regime.

Internal civil opposition

While the politico-military movements are training in the border region between Chad, Sudan and Libya are awaiting the right moment to attack the regime, youngsters in urban areas are less interested in waiting. For many years civil movements, especially in N'Djamena, have used a variety of strategies to challenge president Déby and his regime; protests, public meetings; encouraging "ville morte" (dead cities), whistle-campaigns. Still, 2016 was a particularly active year. Just to give some examples. Protests against the regime started when "untouchables", sons of high-ranking civil servants and ministers, gang-raped a 17 year-old schoolgirl in February 2016. Demonstrators asked for "Justice for Zouhoura" and posters with "je suis Zouhoura" were frequent both in the streets and on Facebook. Police brutality during the demonstrations killed two.

The protests gained force as Déby prepared for his fifth presidential re-election in April 2016. When Déby launched a tough crackdown on protestors, banned demonstrations and imprisoned the initiators of the demonstrations, the international community remained silent[41]. Déby won his fifth presidential election on 10 April 2016 with 60% of the votes, five times more than his closest competitor Saleh Kebzabo (12,8 %). While all political opposition in Chad declared widespread fraud and described the elections as an "electoral hold-up", the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the elections as "free and fair".

On 31 August 2016, the Government introduced sixteen austerity measures to reduce an important state budget deficit. The result was a boost in anti-regime protests organized both by established and newly created civil society organizations. All of them opted for the departure of president Déby and restoration of democracy by non-violent means. Yet, many Chadian urban youth who have distanced themselves from the regime see few alternatives. They protest against the regime but are, in one way or another, still in dialogue with the regime loyal power holders. If they choose to leave Chad and join the Chadian diaspora in France or elsewhere, Mirjam de Bruijn and Jonna Both

[41] *Hollande's Franco-African farewell…*

argue "they become caught up in deferring to actors who reinforce the Chadian state's legitimacy"[42].

Conclusion

We may not see any signs of president Déby preparing his own departure. Nevertheless, we can see signs of president Déby preparing for his family when he is no longer there. In January 2017, France granted Hinda Déby, Déby's favourite wife and Chad's first lady, and their 5 children French nationality[43]. Why, this sudden demand for French nationality? Rumours about President Déby's untreatable cancer flourishes in the Chadian capital. Speculations about who would take power in the case of Déby's death rocketed in N'Djamena, without anyone being able to give a clear answer. For the time being, president Déby represents a stable spot in the midst of a troubled region. Déby has already skilfully managed to stay in power for 27 years. As long as his personal health is good enough and as long as the West needs him in the fight against terror, Déby will stay president in Chad. However, the day when either of these is no longer the case, Chad will turn into a nightmare of violent power struggles.

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[43] K. F. Hansen, *Chad's President Déby was perfectly safe a year ago: Not so today…*, <https://presidential-power.com/?p=7055> (30.01.2018).

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REGIONAL SECURITY THEORY: THE EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE. A LOOK BACK AT THE CHALLENGES ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Abstract:
This paper will discuss different theories of regional security and how they have evolved over time along with the successes and challenges of regionalism efforts in East Africa. A case study will be used to contextualize the utility of a regional security analysis. Through an analysis of the theory of regional security, this paper will answer the following questions: does East Africa qualify as a security complex? Can the theory of Regional Security be useful in understanding the multitude and varied security issues? Is the preoccupation with regionalism a luxury for those regions that do not face threats to survival or a necessity for regions that do? Can regional-based efforts combined with a shared sense of regionalism improve security in East Africa?

Keywords*:*
Regional Security, East Africa, Regionalism, Security Organisations

Regional Security – evolution of theory

Different forms of collective security have existed throughout history; it is after all the basis of communities, settlements and social groupings. It was the Enlightenment thinker Rousseau who articulated the political dilemma of collective security through his stag hunt parable: If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithfully at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within the reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple and, having caught his own

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prey, he would have cared very little about having caused his companions to lose theirs[2].

Traditional Realists were quick to utilize this dilemma as proof that international cooperation was implausible and unlikely to be taken seriously when formulating security policy. A conclusion that was rarely disproven until the European World Wars in which collective security in the form of coalition warfare was ultimately successful in defeating a common enemy. The Cold War intensified regional groupings initially by recognizing existing organisations that promoted unity such as the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. Later 'spheres of influence' based on ideological camps dispersed around the world gained precedence. The definition of regionalism would further expand over time to include states united by shared experiences, in the case of the Non Aligned Movement, a shared condition of colonialism and marginalisation. For states in the Global South, Regionalism theory offered a means to participate in international security dialogue through what Buzan has called a "diffusion of power in the contemporary system" which in turn raises "the importance of the actors at the bottom of the power hierarchy for the functioning of the system as a whole"[3].

'New Regionalism' in the post-post-Cold War era, was largely shaped by economic, identity, cultural and environmental factors as increasing marginalization resulted from an accelerated globalisation process, becoming a greater threat than international security for many states. This phenomenon coincided with a global Neo-Liberal democratization process, the "New World Order," which also helped to facilitate cross border cooperation, as integration was seen as a tool to prevent conflict and to promote dialogue through increased civil society participation.

Kelly makes a case for using a regional level of analysis in IR as most states worry about their neighbours as opposed to other international actors. This, paired with a general loss of autonomy, the global rejection of imperialism and colonialism, the high costs of foreign interventions, and the fact that systemic IR is "too abstract and distant" for practical use[4]. Increased openness of systems, weak governance structures along with proximity make regional analysis more appropriate than traditional theories because: 1. Regions are structurally open to intervention from above, 2. Threats are unevenly geographically distributed, 3. Regional organisations facilitate joint repression in weak states rather than integration[5].

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[2] J. J. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, [in:] *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*, S. M. Cahn, Oxford 2002, pp. 517-532.
[3] B. Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, Sussex 1983, p. 113.
[4] R. E. Kelly, *Security Theory in the New Regionalism*, "International Studies Review 9", No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 197-229.
[5] *Ibidem.*

Buzan's theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC), suggests that a region chooses the actors, the actors do not choose the region[6]. The RSC is defined by the dominant role that local issues and relations play in defining national security priorities and international disputes.

While the discourse on Regionalism has been traditionally Euro-Centric, the language of the theory also comes from alternative perspectives. The starting point for many African theorists such as Salih, Deng and Sesay is recognition that internal security is primary and interstate cooperation is secondary, success and failures of security complexes are thus judged on this understanding. Whereas, the Western theoretical approach led by Buzan, Fawcett and Hurrel, presumes the supremacy of Westphalian political organisation as a starting point for mutual understanding between states. The importance of recognizing this distinction regards stability and applicability. In the "New Regionalism" era no Western nation has been fundamentally undermined by internal threats, therefore the assumptions of the scope of the theory are limited to Western experience.

Unlike other International Relations theories like Realism and Liberalism which are characterised by well defined and widely accepted parameters, Regionalism is subjective and open to a wide range of interpretations. Shaw has coined the phrase 'regionalisms' in response to this subjectivity: *"*[R]ecognition of the trilateral character of all social relations, especially since the end of the Cold War and the concomitant hegemony of neoliberal values, is an essential attribute (and advantage) of new regionalisms. 'States' here include official governmental organisations, from local to global (e.g. IFI and UN systems); economies include informal (and illegal?) sectors, as well as the more familiar world of MNCs; and societies incorporate not only indigenous and international NGOs, but also charities, cooperatives, grassroots groups, medias, new social movements, professional associations, religious organisations and sports clubs"[7].

Given the subjectivity of the theory, the parameters for analysis are fairly flexible. Unlike Buzan and Waever's updated security complex, Fawcett has defined a region as sharing identifiable traits, "commonality, interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation"[8]. Much like Shaw, she has identified the plurality of regionalism as "a policy or project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region"[9]. All actors involved in the construction of regionalism would aim at "promoting common goals in one or more issue areas," either through 'soft' regionalism (raising

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[6] B. Buzan, *op. cit.*


[7] T. M. Shaw, *New regionalisms in Africa in the new millennium: Comparative perspectives on renaissance, realisms and/or regressions*, "New Political Economy 5", No. 3 (Nov 2000), pp. 399-416.

[8] L. Fawcett, *Regionalism in Historical Perspective*, [in:] *Regionalism in World Politics*, eds. L. Fawcett, A. Hurrell, Oxford 1995, p. 24.

[9] *Ibidem.*

awareness) or through 'hard regionalism' (formalized arrangements)[10]. Whereas Regionalisation is about processes "which do not proceed from transfers of sovereignty nor result from the dynamism of multinational or transnational corporations"[11]. These processes have also been described as 'trans-state interactions," common in East Africa as they rely primarily on social, ethnic or religious bonds "that challenge state sovereignty through their capacity to avoid, penetrate or permeate state structures"[12]. In security terms, regionalisation is a process of redistribution of power. The following diagram illustrates Fawcett's analysis of regional security, the diagram uses Buzan's terms of a state comprising of identity, institutions and population in this example as applied to a region which is subject to the influence of constructed Regionalisms and organic Regionalization.

Diag. 1. Regional security



Source: own work.

[10] *Ibidem.*
[11] D. Bach, *Global Politics of Regionalism in Africa*, [in:] *Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice*, eds M. Farrell et al., London 2005, p. 173.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 174.

Africa and East Africa

This section will provide the context for analysing the applicability of regional security analysis in East Africa through a discussion of why it constitutes a region. Beyond Pan-Africanism, which appeared in its African form during the independence struggles of the 1960s, the ambiguity of Africa as a region, or an "imagined community"[13] is the starting point for an analysis of what constitutes East Africa. The idea that Africa is a region is rejected given the commonly accepted definitions of what constitutes a region, namely a common history, culture and conflict paradigm with direct interaction between members (i.e. Somalia and Sierra Leone have never had any level of interaction outside of the artificially constructed African Union)[14]. Africa is a continent but not a region, while its members do share some commonalities, as a regional security complex, the states are not interdependent and therefore do not constitute a region according to Buzan and Waever, Shaw, US policy makers and African regional organisations.

East Africa

References to regionalism in the context of East Africa can be found in Buzan and Waever, Iyob, Salih and Francis. Because of a shared history, identity, sometimes language and religion but above all security/insecurity interdependence, many East African countries including Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Eritrea have much closer ties with the Middle Eastern security complex than with that of Western Africa or Southern Africa.

Historically, the nations of East Africa were not created at independence; this 'region' of the world is home to some of the oldest civilizations on earth. Longstanding political structures, rivalries, cultural and regional interactions have existed dating to the ancient kingdoms of Nubia, Axum, Kush and Buganda. In addition to historical identity, demographic distribution, cultural identity, informal trade networks have always fostered a sense of regional identity rather than nationalism. Most states worry about their neighbours, this couldn't be truer than it is in the East African region. These states have much more in common than mere proximity and their differences have been deep enough to lead them past the brink of war on numerous occasions; postcolonial era conflicts over the status of Eritrea in 1952, Somali nationalism over British border commission with Ethiopia in 1954, civil war in South Sudan in 1955. All of these conflicts created refugee pressure in the region and the formation of rebel groups supported by host countries and other parties external to the

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 174.
[14] B. Buzan, O. Waever, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*, Cambridge 2003.

region. The 1960s and 70s were defined by tyranny and rebellion, with various rebel groups being supported by various heads of state in a complicated web of diplomatic deceit and political backstabbing in an attempt to cling to power. The 1980s saw the rise to power of enlightened rebels, often called "the new breed of African leaders." Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Eritrea's Isaias Afworki and Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi all underwent military training in Mozambique and Tanzania, attended the University of Dar es Salaam and took over their respective countries via a popularly supported coup d'état. The Neo-Liberal West celebrated the "New Breed" for the first two decades and was quick to turn a blind eye to actions they would have otherwise found disagreeable during this new era of cooperation in a region that was now being run by an amicable group of friends and colleagues. The honeymoon period ended with the cross border interference and plundering of neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, political violence in Ethiopia, plummeting development indicators in Eritrea, an unending civil war in Uganda and retaliatory marginalization and violence in Rwanda. Renewed border tensions, an escalation in rebellion and insecurity were the result of each regime in the area trying to undermine the stability of the other.

The literature suggests that Africa has been forced to look inward after being abandoned in the post Cold War policy shift. Such a shift in identity is a regionalism imposed on weak states through the construction of organisations. However, the literature also points to the more organic formation of trans-state regionalism, a process that undermines illegitimate regimes and reinforces ancient bonds between communities: What Hurrel has termed "prescription vs. description"[15]. Unlike other actors in the Cold War, the end of the era did not result in a significant shift of threats. East Africa in the Post Cold War Era and now in the Post 9/11 world has been faced with the continuity of the same old conflicts with the same root causes. The expansion of what constitutes a security threat has also determined the boundaries of the East African region: "The new regionalisms pose challenges to a range of more applied perspectives with profound policy implications. They do so, first, for development studies and policies, which are no longer concerned just with sustainable development or structural adjustments and liberalisations but also increasingly with more flexible varieties of regionalisms, along with the causes and consequences of increasingly protracted conflicts; hence the growing focus on, say, human development and security"[16].

This expansion to include human security issues in the regional security agenda will be further discussed in the analysis section.

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[15] A. Hurrel, *The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory*, [in:] *Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice*, eds M. Farrell et al., London 2005, pp. 38-54.

[16] T. M. Shaw, *op. cit.*

Regionalism in East Africa

East Africa is a corner of the world that is continually defined externally by its regional institutions, international stakeholders, NGOs and Western foreign policies for security and strategic self interest[17]. Thus, the parameters and geography of which countries are included in the region are rarely consistent nor is the name; the (greater) Horn of Africa, Greater East Africa, the Great Lakes region, North East Africa. The literature on regional hegemony is also varied, Francis has pointed to Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia because of their historical imperialism in the region, Deng and Zartman to Ethiopia, de Waal to Kenya. Moving beyond the imagined African community, the East African region is a more natural, rational grouping, with populations across borders in all of the above mentioned states, shared history and common threats. This section will examine the key regional security organisations, their successes and challenges.

Security Organisations

There is a monumental task in creating security organisations in a region described as "a textbook illustration of the classical security dilemma, in which one party's efforts to achieve security merely increases insecurity – and hence countervailing security efforts-of its neighbours"[18]. The desire to do so was in part motivated by a New Regionalism approach formulated by former UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjöld, in which preventative diplomacy should "keep localized international disputes from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers"[19]. However, practice has proven otherwise with various foreign interventions, observer mission and fact finding missions in the region from Somalia, to Rwanda to Uganda to Sudan, the strategic self interests of individual states in the region have often crossed into the international overlay. This region is often defined by the membership within its security organisations which include the East African Commission (EAC), the Inter Government Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), These organisations have been described as "practical expression to the concept of 'try Africa first'"[20] a shift away from international interventionism

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[17] D. J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: building regional peace and security systems,* Aldershot 2006.
[18] F. M. Deng, W. I. Zartman, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement,* Washington 2002, p. 26.
[19] D. J. Francis, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
[20] A. Sesay, *Regional and Sub-Regional Conflict Management Efforts,* [in:] *Africa in the post-Cold War international system,* eds. S. Akinrinade and A. Sesay, Herndon 1997, p. 47.

led by the United Nations (UN) and the AU. The failed attempts of the 'international community' to prevent or end conflict in Rwanda and Somalia along with a lack of resource and personnel commitments and from Neo-Liberal states led the international security organisations to look to Africa for local expertise and commitments that might be more successful. Again, this encouragement to further development regional security recommendations was applied through international regionalism and internal regionalisation.

The EAC was originally founded in 1967 by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in an attempt to ward off super-power intrusion, in this way it is a responsive organisation, a reaction against what is seen as a external threat to sovereignty rather than an organic process of regionalisation. Described by Deng and Zartman as one of the "earliest and most ambitious experiments in regional cooperation in Africa,"[21] the early collapse of the EAC in 1977 was seen as symptomatic of deep-rooted mistrust in the region. In 2000 the EAC, was resurrected with 2 new members, Rwanda and Burundi added in 2007, along with a new mandate recognizing the importance of linking security and development in its "Memorandum on Foreign Policy Co-ordination." The coordination of Foreign Policies, which has been signed by Foreign Ministers from the original three countries, later expanded to the two newest members involves "taking a common stand at international fora in assisting each other in countries where they do not have Missions. This means that any of the three member states can appoint one Mission to represent their interests abroad. Nationals from the three countries will also be able to have visa applications processed in any of the Missions representing the region"[22]. This has coincided with justice initiatives including expedited extradition of wanted or suspected criminals and addressing the flow of small arms and human trafficking within the region. The EAC thus plays a central role in promoting practical cooperation with the common goal of sustainable development through improved security in the region. Unlike the AU and IGAD, the EAC is primarily an internally focused regional stability organisation, focused on shared responsibility among the five member states to achieve its 15 very specifically regional goals with a very modest international presence.

Comprising of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda, IGADD first formed in 1986 as the International Authority on Drought and Development but "failed to monitor any substantive progress towards its stated mandate of promoting food security and environmental protection"[23]. This was largely a result of ongoing tensions between states in the Horn, although an early warning system was set up, with a lack of resources and member participation (i.e. the well documented Sudanese and Ethiopian governments forcibly moving populations to manipulate

[21] F. M. Deng, W. I. Zartman, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[22] *Profile: East African Community*, <Iss.org>, July 2006, (13.04.2009).
[23] D. Bach, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

humanitarian aid) prevention and response could not be carried out. In 1996 along with dropping drought form its acronym, IGAD expanded its mandate to include 4 areas of focus: Food security and environmental protection; infrastructural development; regional conflict prevention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs. It is now regularly used as a regional forum/interface for AU, European Union, UN and US initiatives[24]. Geographically, the boundaries of constructed East African states cut across many ecosystems, livelihood systems (i.e. seasonal grazing routes and ancestral tribal lands); therefore the rationale behind the creation of IGAD, regionally speaking, is sound. East Africa is home to the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world with an estimated 160 million people struggling to gain access to quickly diminishing arable land in a region of which 70% is either arid or semi-arid. In the past, 80% of conflict in the region has been a result of well armed pastoralists fighting over scarce resources[25], mitigating these conflicts had been the traditional role of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning mechanism (CEWARN). As such, IGAD has no mandate "to force member states to take appropriate action to prevent a potential humanitarian emergency or outbreak of violent conflict"[26]. The creation of the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), as part of the AU African Standby Force Protocol is a mechanism to intervene in state level security scenarios as outlined by the AU and is thus less an East African security mechanism. According to IGAD's website, it is merely a coordinating body to the brigade. Beyond standardization of training and doctrine among the troop contributing countries, the mandate of EASBRIG remains ambiguous.

Excluded from the East African Bloc, Egypt has historically had a negatively influential presence in the security of the region. From ancient contacts with the Nubians and slave trading in South Sudan, many wars with the Christian kingdoms of Ethiopia to overt/covert support of government and rebel groups in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda; Egypt has played a major role in shaping the insecurity of today. In no way is this exemplified better than the 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia which was later linked to the Sudanese government[27]. Egypt's motivating interest is control of the Nile headwaters, the Blue Nile in Ethiopia and the White Nile in Uganda, both of which originate outside Egypt's borders.

In another more recent example, through various attempts to reward the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) with scholarships and development projects, the Egyptian government has a vested interest in seeing the separation of the South from the Khartoum administration with plans to drain the Sudd marsh, where an estimated 25% of the White Nile evaporates, and increase

[24] *Ibidem.*
[25] D. J. Francis, *op. cit.*
[26] *Ibidem*, p. 224.
[27] F. M. Deng, W. I. Zartman, *op. cit.*

supply to Egypt in exchange for its assistance[28]. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), started in 1998 includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, D.R. Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Kenya has been an attempt to "achieve sustainable economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources"[29]. In terms of security, inroads have been made in renegotiating the terms of the original 1929 Nile Water Agreement drafted by the British, thus mitigating tensions over perceptions of inequitable accessibility.

Successes for Regional Security

Given the failure of the New World Order of international Neo Liberalism to produce security and stability, regional attempts have seen some success in Eastern Africa. Previously taboo subjects including human security issues such as state sponsored violence are now being addressed as preconditions to attaining sustainable development targets[30]. Sincere initiatives to incorporate representatives from civil society, academia, nongovernmental organisations and corporations through track 2 and 3 diplomacy have proven successful in negotiating non-proliferation treaties, cessation of hostilities and memorandums of understanding on human security issues.

The Nairobi Declaration, signed in 2000 by the 10 countries in the region has been heralded as a success in regionalism. The Nairobi Declaration envisages a broad partnership between governments, multi-lateral agencies and representatives of civil society groups to stop the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) throughout the region. The Declaration aims to provide a "comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy" including "improvement of national laws and regulations governing the manufacture, trade, acquisition, possession and use of arms; weapons collection and destruction programmes; capacity building for law enforcement officers, such as the police, border control officers and customs officials." The Declaration also outlines provisions for "monitoring of arms transfers through the establishment of national databases and communication systems. Information exchange between regional law enforcement officers and public awareness programmes"[31]. Although the Declaration is neither comprehensive nor particularly well coordinated as of 2003, it is seen as a step in the right direction in terms of inclusion of various actors in the regional security dialogue.

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[28] This is a very brief summary of various events and initiatives over months working as an editor for the *Khartoum Monitor* newspaper.
[29] *Nile Basin Initiative*, <www.nilebasin.org> (30.01.2018).
[30] D. Bach, *op. cit.*
[31] T. Thusi, *Assesing Small Arms Control Initiatives*, "African Security Review 12", No. 2 (2003), p. 17-26.

One of the biggest successes in East African regional security has been IGAD's 'frontline states' strategy, delegating responsibility for mediation to the states that have the greatest vested interest in a particular conflict and its resolution. An example of IGAD's mediation efforts is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After many years Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea played a big role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Khartoum Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2005[32]. The CPA, which included provisions for political power sharing, a Joint Integrated Defence Force, universal and minority rights for all Sudanese and Demobilization, Disarmament, and Rehabilitation projects was a hard fought achievement for regional reconciliation and cooperation efforts.

Mbabazi, McLean and Shaw stress the importance of recognizing the role of Track 2 and 3 diplomacy, which they define as diplomacy involving a range of actors including NGOs, civil society, think tanks and Universities engaging in field based peace building initiatives. This has been the major success of regional security in the case of East Africa, the ability to meaningfully include increasing numbers of non state actors, stakeholders and civilians in the security dialogue, regionally, at the AU and internationally. This is a success not replicated at the international level or in Africa more broadly.

Challenges for Regional Security

The challenges to maintaining and improving regional security in East Africa primarily include sovereignty issues around intrastate conflict, resource deficiencies, and historical mistrust among member states. Inter-state conflict, although an anomaly on the continent in general, when it has occurred it has been in East Africa (Tanzania and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and Somalia). The greater issue for all states has been the suppression of internal conflict and direct challenges to regime legitimacy. Briefly, these include Somalia separatists in Puntland & Somalialand; Ethiopian rebellions in Ogaden & Afar; the Uganda civil war in Acholiland; Sudanese disenfranchisement in the South, Darfur and the East; Djibouti's Afar population seeking greater central government control; Eritrean Islamic fundamentalist movements; the implosion of D.R. Congo; Tanzania's political struggle and appeasement with Zanzibari separatists; Kenya's 'ethnically' charged political climate, and the battle between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. These security threats have been exacerbated by the uncontrolled flow of arms into and around the region and as Hiroko concludes, "people are indiscriminately struggling for natural resources without considering the

[32] D. J. Francis, *op. cit.*

consequences"[33]. To dismiss environmental insecurity as a secondary security concern is dangerous as it is often the flashpoint for conflict and a real threat to national and regional stability; it has created a climate of permanent emergency.

The regional security organisations, like the states themselves, are resource deficient so that even the traditional threats that can be agreed on are still difficult to mitigate. Shaw has cited the 1977 collapse of the EAC as a lesson to be learned regarding the imposition of regionalism citing that it was "a state-centric and highly formalized enterprise that could not survive the serious political quarrels among its member countries…the folly of rely on state based institutions"[34]. Iyob has pointed to sociological factors, the "social fabric of the societies of the Horn…remains patterned by the norms, mythologies and institutions that have justified exclusion based on ethnicity, religion, and regionalism." The clash between older and newer (North and South) states within the region "as they interact in a modern international state system premised on the legal equality of all its members"[35], has been one of the root causes of the human security problem.

Analysis

This section will examine the utility of regional security theory in the East African context. In terms of theoretical preconditions, new security threats, the process of region status and the future of regional security.

Peace as a precondition for Regional Security

On one side of the debate or as de Waal has termed it, the objective side, conflict "can only be resolved in a regionally orientated and comprehensive manner rather than a country-centred approach"[36]. Regime survival rather than long term stability is the goal of most heads of state in the region. De Waal has pointed out the flaw in the theory of objective security communities: that peace is the starting point. De Waal argues: "before Africa can begin to develop inter-state pluralistic security communities, its states need to consolidate themselves as internal 'amalgamated' security communities themselves"[37]. Due to the

[33] A. Hiroko, *Forced Displacementand the Prevention of Further Conflicts: lessons form the African Great Lakes Region and Kosovo,* [in:] *Containing conflict: cases in preventive diplomacy*, ed. S. Hideo, Tokyo 2003, p. 140.
[34] T. M. Shaw, *New Regionalism in Africa*, [in:] *New Regionalism in Africa*, eds. J. A. Grant and F. Söderbaum, Burlington 2003.
[35] R. Iyob, *The Foriegn Policies of the Horn: the clash between the old and the new*, [in:] *African foreign policies: power and process*, eds. G. M. Khadiagala and T. Lyons, Boulder 2001, p. 123.
[36] A. Hiroko, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
[37] A. de Waal, *Demilitarizing the Mind: African agendas for peace and security,* Asmara 2002, p. 25.

historical absence of trust, de Waal views this objective conditionality based on conditions that are constructed (regionalism) through future settlements based on the aim of securing a "regional order for peace"[38]. Alternately, subjective conditions are pre-existing, by identifying, defining and pursuing security interests based on interests and core values, threats faced, vulnerabilities and capabilities. However, military regimes generally do not have long term aims, and it is necessary to "stimulate long-term security thinking in a manner that is realistic, practical and rooted in African realties. This means clear thinking about power"[39].

Because of the permanent state of emergency outlined earlier, people in the region have therefore been forced to choose between "total collapse through civil wars or political survival with an uncertain future. Both choices have been detrimental to human security and have at times augmented insecurity"[40]. The assumption with this conclusion is two fold; that individuals in East Africa have a role in the security policy decsion making process at a national level and that they wilfully choose civil war or poor governance structures, unaffected by the external forces of regionalisms. A starting point would be defining long term national security goals, beyond regime survival, which needs to be representative of all members of society. This is where track 2 and track 3 diplomacy are crucial in building security capabilities to expand the dialogue of security down to the individual level rather than focusing on regime survival.

National Security vs. Human Security

The state is a threat to individual security both directly (violence) and indirectly (orchestrated famine, corruption, inaction). There is a common saying among Sudanese, that everyone leads two lives, a public and a private, this is true of national versus regional security as well. Politicians and diplomats participate in summits and organisations of collective security speaking the language of cooperation, human rights and equality. However, as national leaders, they are inclined toward policies of self interest and national preservation which are carried out in direct opposition to commitments that were made in public. IGAD is a response to the Western strategic theorist analysis of Africa, that conflict in the region is irresolvable. The legitimacy granted to IGAD by those same analysts is a testament to its success in helping to create an environment that fosters development based on human security. For example, pressing human security issues such as refugees, there is "no African mechanism that permits individual refugees to bring claims against host state

[38] *Ibidem.*
[39] *Ibidem*, p. 35.
[40] M. A. M. Salih, *The Horn of Africa: Security in the New World Order*, [in:] *Globalization, Human Security, and the African experience*, eds. C. Thomas and P. Wilken, Boulder 1999.

governments or combatants for violating their human rights. Until such structures are instituted, the international community would be well-advised to question the authenticity of African governments' and regional actors' attempts to tackle problems associated with the plight of displaced persons"[41]. For IGAD, the EAC and The NBI to be legitimized by civil society in terms of building human security long term insecurity issues, like refugees, must be addressed effectively.

In terms of the future of Human Security, Kenya, the nation traditionally looked on internally and externally as corrupt but stable, slid into devastating post-election violence last year despite being the headquarters of IGAD and the EAC and despite its role as mediator in regional conflicts. What does this say about the future of regional security? No East African state is immune from insecurity, conflict or in fact collapse and all states are vulnerable to the insecurities of their neighbours making regional security of the utmost importance. Martin Kimani, a Kenyan journalist with the East African, a leading regional newspaper, has expressed a sense of failure to prevent insecurity through application of theory and rational analysis in the region citing the internal conflict that individual East Africans harbour as a reflection of the internal struggles the region faces concerning identity, history, proximity, power, culture and how ordinary civilians are turned into "killing machines." The self assurance that 'Kenyans are not like Rwandans,' until Kenya reaches a tipping point after elections in 2008: "[S]imilar acts of violence were committed in Kenya and the explanations that had seemed to work so well in Rwanda now seemed inadequate when used in my own country… In the weeks that Kenya appeared to teeter on the edge of all-out war, most people felt a need to keep tabs on the rising body count, on the numbers of attacks recorded, of the towns and villages thousands were fleeing from…Abdalla Bujra, identified by a New York Times reporter as a "retired Kenyan professor who runs a democracy-building organisation," was quoted in that newspaper as saying, "We've had tribal fighting before, but never like this …it reminds me of Rwanda"… Ultimately coming to a reckoning of what has happened to us and what we are, and indeed whether we can live together peacefully, will require more than erecting commissions named Truth, Justice or Reconciliation"[42].

East Africa is a constructed region as a result of regionalisms based on external perceptions (Africa as a continuous bloodbath), systems (Neoliberal policies, colonialism) and policies (War on Terror, Humanitarian Interventions) and victimization (a permanent state of emergency), East African individuals, groups and states are also faced with internal regionalization of refugee flows, parallel economies, violence and culture. East Africa is currently being

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[41] J. Maxted, A. Zegeye, *Human Stability and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, "African Security Review 11", No. 1 (2002), pp. 95-109.

[42] M. Kimani, *The banality of evil revisited: Killing our fellow Kenyans*, "The East African Magazine*",* (August 2008), p. 1-6.

constructed as a region from the outside: a place where violence, poverty, ethnic tensions, etc is part of the "culture" of Africa. The identity that East Africa has is then one that is defined from outside at the same time as it is being transformed from within through participatory process and assertions of traditional economies, lineage and identity.

Conclusion

The theories of Regional Security are very useful to Africa, in that "if appropriately nuanced or informed, can throw light on the diversities of political economy and culture on the continent which other established approaches fail to discern"[43]. As a theoretical framework for understanding internal and external causality, outcomes and future threats, regionalisms provide matrix for sorting through the complex social, political, historical, economic and environmental causes of conflict. By examining cooperative structures, Regional Security provides a more positive examination of relationships between and within nations other than conflict or poverty centered analysis. Regionalisms and regionalization may not lead to a more secure East Africa, but do frame a dialogue around the interconnectedness and interdependence of states, the relationships between state, non-state and individual actors and provides a opportunity for increased inclusivity of civil society in the regional security dialogue. Greater understanding of the construction of regionalisms and the process of regionalisation will contribute to future planning within East Africa's regional security organisations and assist with minimising the challenges to effectively maximizing security in the region.

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GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA-USA GEOSTRATEGIC APPROACHES TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: “SOFT POWER” VS. “HARD POWER” STRATEGIES IN ACTION (SUDAN CASE-STUDY)

Abstract:
Due to the escalation processes in Middle East and Persian Gulf, situation is being deteriorated and fueled in Sub-Saharan Africa and geopolitical uncertainties corroborating with emergence of asymmetric challenges (including illegal migration to the EU countries, spillover military conflicts from the Middle East region, fierce geopolitical competition between Russia and USA for dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa, ISIS and Al-Qaeda profound presence in the area linked with spreading international terrorism in this area, failed states dilemma, etc.) more transforming the region into “Rim of Instability” of global level. Despite of the international community efforts to deal with these challenges(particularly, with the great effort of the all four global power centers – the USA, Russia, EU and China as the national interests of even survival origin are foreseen in the region), it makes no sense to endorse stability climate and promote peacebuilding at the regional level. It is interesting to note that two global powers – Russia and USA are tailoring and exploiting in order to achieve their proper national interests and foreign policy missions, to implement new instrumental forms in order to promote these goals in aegis of the hybrid warfare strategies and to increase their so-called “soft power“ leverages thereof. Herewith interesting to mention that both Russia and USA have different approaches toward regional engagement with proper leverages and Hard Power vs. Soft Power is a real description of the engagement cases.

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Keywords:
USA, Russia, "Soft Power" concept, "Hard Power" concept, asymmetric challenges, energy security, private-military company, Jihadist militant, geostrategy, Sudan

Introduction

The African region named Sub-Sahara has been drawn extensive attention after processes taken places in MENA from international society and Global Powers due to geostrategic and geopolitical implications. It is important to underscore that it represents the gravitational center of geopolitical games not only at global but mostly at regional scale. In Sub-Sahara region emerge on big scale new threats referred as "asymmetric threats" or "asymmetric challenges". This has been causing immense security drawbacks at any political levels. According to lately adopted definition "asymmetry depicts the – situations in which states or agents with unbalanced power capabilities are in opposition to one another. For instance, the U.S. war against Al-Qaeda or ISIS is widely regarded as an asymmetrical conflict[3]". Therefore Authors develop other term "asymmetric warfare" understand as unconventional type of warfare that aims at approaching strategic initiative with light model of warfare elements with deflation of stronger foe in time and in space. After explaining key definitions like "asymmetry" and "asymmetric warfare", must be indicated a new type of threat classification – "asymmetric threat or challenge" that fully fit situational complexity arisen in the region of Sub-Sahara. As the definitions depose it has the clearest meaning "asymmetric threat – type of threats that impossible to predict its consequences". These types of threats have some particular characteristics specified as follow:

- They are very unusual and irrelevant
- They have non-standard content in aegis of the classical conventional warfare doctrinal points
- They are very controversial and is impossible to deter from casual military capability provision
- This is very tricky to precisely and promptly counterstrike against them
- Their efforts are focusing in subvert an adversary's supremacy not only in military, but also in informational and political context[4].

In that aspect "asymmetric threats" have emerged in the region and are widely transfer from local and regional into global level. Among regional level

[3] J. S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, New York 2007, p. 286.
[4] G. Magradze, V. Maisaia, *21st Century International Politics and "Cooperation Security" Theory: Myth and Reality – Regional and Global Levels*, Tbilisi 2017, pp. 25-26.

it is necessary to underline several ”globally” threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environments. These are the following:

- Illegal Migration – from Sub-Saharan Somali have been immigrated to Yemen, i.e. Middle Eastern areas from 180 thousand till 2 million refuges causing humanitarian catastrophe at the regional level[5]. Mass migration, mainly illegal, constitutes one of the greatest security challenges to Euro-Atlantic Community. At the same time, the flow of refugees and migrants from the MENA region has been redirected to Egypt and Libya as a result. It is important to note that the instability of the MENA region is also closely interconnected with the political, economic and security evolution of other parts of Africa (notable Sub-Saharan Africa). For example, the threat posed by the Islamist extremist group “Boko Haram” which is based in north-eastern Nigeria and is also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon, has spillover effects into neighboring parts of Africa. Three years of civil war in South Sudan have created Africa’s largest migrant crisis with some 1.5 million refugees[6]
- International Terrorism
- Illegal Arms Trade
- Narco Trafficking
- Human Trafficking
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Violent Extremism
- Piracy
- Political Islam (Jihadist trend) – some African countries from Sub-Sahara, including Sudan, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Chad and Eritrea share a controversial issues: the relative religious, social and political positions of Muslim and non-Muslims. These Sub-Saharan countries are located on the “periphery” of Arab centers of political and commercial power, places that historically experienced long periods of Arab political and commercial dominance. They straddle an African geographical and cultural Arab/non-Arab division, located approximately 15-20 degrees north of the Equator[7]. There are some dangerous and ideologically and politically motivated Jihadist networks, including such international terrorist organizations as are: ISIS affiliated al-Shabaab (Islamist militant group al-Shabab is battling

[5] Y. Satanovskiy, *Kotol s nepriyatnostyami. Blizhniy Vostok dlya "chaynikov"*, Moscow 2016, p. 188.
[6] J. M. Calha, *Tackling The Challenges From the South*, nato.int, <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-challenges-south-miranda-calha-report-171-pcnp-17-e-bis> (30.01.2018).
[7] J. Haynes, *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion*, Edinburgh, 2013, pp. 307-308.

the UN-backed government in Somalia, and has carried out a string of attacks across the region. The group, which is allied to Daesh and created a special Jihadist alliance network under the Daesh leadership, has been pushed out of most of the main towns it once controlled, but it remains a potent threat[8]), Boko Haram, separately active "National Islamic Front", "the Tablighi Jamaat", etc.

These threats and challenges emanated from the Sub-Sahara region are considered by the Global Powers as the key indications to deter and to provide so-called non-military approaches in way of "soft power" strategy as one of the most efficient and increase influence on the place of engagement.

"Soft power" and capability to influence on geostrategic missions of global powers

In order to perceive the correct meaning of "soft power" capabilities it is necessary to identify: "what is power, and why does it matter?". In that respect, there are some interesting definitions of power and one of them implies that it is ability to affect others to get the things you want. It is possible to do that in three ways: one can use coercion, sticks; one can use payments, carrots; or one can use attraction and persuasion, soft power. In the XXI century, the ability to combine these as smart power will be one of the main challenges not just for the United States but for any other actors in international politics. Today international society faces two big shifts in how power is used in global relations. "These shifts, which are the result of the information revolution and globalization, are power transition among states and power diffusion from states to non-state actors"[9]. Generally saying, the concept of power has been associated with special jargon of international relations and the term affiliated with nation's ability with national, social-psychological and economic capabilities. In studies under international security there are three concepts of power:

- Hard Power
- Soft Power
- Smart Power[10]

"Hard power" has been the traditional form of foreign policy tool, but in the 21st Century, a new and more flexible foreign policy tool – "soft power"

[8] *Who are Somalia's al-Shabaab*, bbc.com, 22.12.2017 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689> (30.01.2018).
[9] J. S. Nye, *The future of power*, <https://www.amacad.org/publications/bulletin/spring2011/power.pdf> (30.01.2018).
[10] G. Magradze, V. Maisaia, *op. cit.*, 31.

has been emerged. Many scholars have studied "soft power" as a behavior influence outcome in the post 9/11period[11].

Despite Nye[12]'s concept's popularity, current power scholarship is still divided about the nature of power. Some scholars see capabilities as the most important factor and others see it as a behavior outcome deriving from Nye's concept. As a neo-liberal school scholar, he built his concept as a behavior outcome, or as he calls it "relational power concept" on multiple faces of power.

As power literature has developed, so did Nye's initial definition of soft power. Earlier versions of Nye's soft power definition were: "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment, which included culture, values and foreign policies[13]". Later, Nye extended his definition into "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes[14]" While further developing his concept of soft power, Dr. Nye has been focusing on the outcome of "soft power". Nevertheless, the "hard power" remains still coercive instrument and efficient tools to promote national interests (on case of the Russian Federation).

Soft and hard power literature has also been divided according to effectiveness and usefulness of such capabilities. Some scholars claim that soft power is effective and it sometimes reinforces and occasionally interferes with hard power, while others strongly believe that, soft power is emerging and getting more influential in today's global information space and it has less hard power support. However, in real political life and mainly in real geopolitical realm the "soft and hard Power" strategies could be characterized with unique specifics and the global actors could enact in proper manner. Regarding Sub-Sahara region, those actors whose influences flexes beyond the regional scope tailor three concrete leverages of the strategies:

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[11] R. T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Washington 2005, pp. 105-110.

[12] The definition of soft power has been closely linked with Joseph Nye, Jr. who first coined this term. Dr. Joseph Nye, Jr., a noted foreign policy scholar and practitioner, coined the phrase "soft power" in 1990. Nye has served as the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard; Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; and Assistant Secretary of Defense in Bill Clinton's administration. He has written and lectured extensively on the idea and usage of soft power. Nye describes soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion." He sees strong relations with allies, economic assistance programs, and vital cultural exchanges as examples of soft power.

[13] E. Beraia, *Foreign policy-making processes in 20-21st centuries: Theoretical and Practical Background on the example of the USA, "*Journal of Humanities" 2017, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 19.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 20.

- Energy security – provide protection and secure energy infrastructure and capability provisions and get accessed to energy reserves of the region
- Humanitarian intervention[15] – with involvement light mechanisms in way of private military companies
- International Aid – as a key tool for achieving foreign policy missions and goals

Three main Global Powers (super-powers) that are eligible to foster their geostrategic missions and promote stability and peace in stalemate areas are indicating the approaches to these three leverages. These three powers are USA, Russia and recently expressing grave interests toward African affairs China. Mainly China is promoting not only her own national but also multilateral ties for keeping peace with two other competitors. The same imperatives influenced China's participation in multilateral international organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the China-Arab Countries Cooperation and the China-Africa Cooperation Forums[16]. Moreover, fierce geopolitical competition over getting control for the Sub-Sahara African territories are being mitigated with promoting "soft power' above-mentioned instruments and leverages and their competition in that stance reached quite solid and impressive scopes. Once a largely neglected region of the world, sub-Saharan Africa has quietly become the center of a struggle for influence between what are arguably the world's chief powers: China and the United States. In 2013, for example, trade between China and Africa totaled roughly $200 billion, with Chinese electronics goods and textiles flowing into African nations, while African natural resources were shipped off to China. Remarkably, Chinese-African trade was more than double the trade level between the United States and Africa[17]. The fact clearly highlighted the reality of battle for Africa. Moreover, on case of Sudan one of the richest, poorest and unstable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which get under the status of "rogue state" is also good case-study for illuminating how these Global Powers are implementing their vision of "soft power" and "hard power" strategies in respect manner. With the future involvement of China in the regional affairs, a classical balance of power game could be foreseen among the Global Powers (lately China has also underpinned its global geopolitical missions which are

[15] Humanitarian intervention is defined as a threat or use of force by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the international human rights of individuals. Regarding Sub-Saharan case is added rights of corporate and economic rights of the actor.

[16] J. Cheng, *A Chinese View of China's Energy Security*, "Journal of Contemporary China", 2008, Vol. 17, No. 55, pp. 297-317.

[17] J. Burnett, *China is Besting the U.S. in Africa*, 24.03.2015, <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/24/china-beating-us-in-race-to-invest-in-africa> (30.01.2018).

declared and light shed in its national mega-project "One Belt, One Road"[18]) and where new trend "smart power" is to be added to the geopolitical games over the Sub-Saharan region. But, at time being, based on scrutinizing only two Global Power policies and strategies on case of involvement into Sudan politics it is possible to reflect what are the real implications and approaches of this involvement.

USA's "soft power" strategy and its implications to the region


The U.S. geopolitical interests toward African continent have been vividly indicated in new National Security Strategy that has been recently adopted by the President Trump's Administration. The American policy-makers have underlined three priority actions: political, economic and military-security. The preamble of the document linked with Africa announces: "Africa remains a continent of promise and enduring challenges. Africa contains many of world's fastest growing economies, which represent potential new markets for U.S. goods and services. Aspiring partners across the continent are eager to build market based economies and enhance stability. The United States seeks sovereign African state that are integrated into the world economy, able to provide for their citizens' needs and capable of managing threats to peace and security"[19]. At the same time, in new National Defense Strategy in special reference "Support relationships to address threats in Africa", the Trump Administration underscores those concrete asymmetric threats emanated from the Africa, including Sub-Saharan Africa, and addressing with necessary to use "soft power" leverages. Among these threats, the document implies – degrade terrorism, build the capability required to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity and illegal arms trade with outside assistance and limit the malign influence of non-African powers (presumable Russia and China)[20].

One of the classic examples of American soft power is considered to be the Marshal plan. In order to protect Western European nations from the aggressiveness, the USA had to provide new leverages as foreign policy instruments. One of the efficient ones became the Marshall Plan, included humanitarian aid, such as food and medical care and attempt to rebuild destroyed infrastructures, such as transportation and communication networks and public utilities. Besides of that the USA then Administrations led by

[18] P. Stephens, *A Train That Proclaims China's Global Ambition*, 20.07.2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/ed033dae-6c69-11e7-b9c7-15af748b60d0> (30.01.2018).
[19] *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 2017, p.52, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> (30.01.2018).
[20] *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 2018, p. 10, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> (30.01.2018).

Truman, Eisenhower and later Kennedy considered also "cultural values and practice" sharing and indoctrination to the European sole that was a predisposition of the contemporary foreign policy leverage, labeled as "soft power". The consistent elements of Cold War period "soft power" included – movies, soft drinks (like, American Coca-Cola), fast-food chains, etc. Namely cultural communication knot between the American and Western European communities transformed into new geopolitical dimension named as "Euro-Atlantic Community" based on such core values as freedom, independence and openness that had promoted business and communication dynamics in aegis of the Community. Later the mission has been transposed by the internet as American version of freedom of expression as one of the consistent instruments of "soft power" in Post-Modernist epoch, covering certainly Sub-Saharan Africa. As for how the USA implements "soft power" in case of Sudan is seen in realization of its national energy security goals and missions. In 20th century in 1970s new oil fields were discovered in Sudan that had sparked the USA's interests toward the Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1983 when President D. Nimeiri executed coup d'etat and endorsed Sharia law, Reagan's Administration engaged in confrontation with authoritarian and Islamist regime of President Nimeiri. At the same time, South Sudan Christian population launched its own resistance against the regime and after creation of "Sudanian National Liberation Army" led by American graduate from Fort Benning John Garang (died in 2005) liberation war for gaining independence protracted till proclamation of independence on 9 July 2011. During the civil war in Sudan, American government provided full-pledged support to South Sudan rebels with involvement of the American oil merger "Occidental Petroleum" and military-private corporation "Halliburton" as well as with involvement of other military-private companies "Executive Outcome", "Defense System", "Air Scan International", etc. sided with rebel forces[21]. Actually the USA has achieved its national interests in the region and get access to South Sudan energy reserves. Here is a chart shortly describing how the USA used its "soft power" leverages in Sudan in classification: Supported Party-Concrete Leverages-Tackling Concrete Asymmetric Challenges:

Diag. 1. USA "soft power" in Sudan



Source: own work.

[21] *The Voice News Winstead*, 04.01.2001.

Russia's "hard power" strategy and its implications to the region

Unlike the USA, Russia is more tailoring classical way to achieve its national interest at any parts of the world. Hence, for the official Moscow flexes its "hard power" strategy is casual case. This narrative has been stipulated from its modernized "Military Doctrine" paper where even though the Kremlin mentioned that in order to protect its national economic interests it can use its military power[22]. However, Russia also expresses its willingness and readiness to exploit its version of "soft power". Based on the documents attached, especially with several new ones – f. e. the latest document introduction of new draft of "Information Security Doctrine of Russian Federation" adopted in 2017 and "Main State Policy of Russian Federation for International Information Security till 2020", key priorities of the Russia's "Soft Power" strategy implies to dominate on information-telecommunication sphere at least in Post-Soviet space and last in Global political level. However, with regard involvement into African affairs, the Russian authorities, inherited from the Soviet legacy, exploits elements of "hard power" strategy. Russia's engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa has had mire historic origins. During the Cold War the Soviet Union engagement into Sub-Saharan African country affairs was significant. The Soviet Union military intervention in Somali and in Ethiopia in 1977 and in 1978 as well as in Egypt 1965-1973 and in Algeria in 1962-1966 were pure indications of reflected the region as one of the key geostrategic area for conductive military operations against USA/NATO and later in 1975 in so-called "Ogarkov Military Doctrine" where the Sub-Sahara African was sought to be labeled as the first zone combat strategic operative theater in war-game scenario against USA and its Allies. The Soviet legacy has also remained unchanged in contemporary Russia's Military Doctrinal rhetoric. Current version of the military intervention opportunities is linked with achieving not only pure military-political strategic goals but also performing energy security and economic missions. As it is known, decisive point of Russia's military modernization and star-up provision affiliated with 2010. Russia's Military Doctrine (renewed version), the third pillar of the National Security System after National Security and Foreign Policy Concepts was published in delay on 5 February 2010 soon after the Russo-Georgian August war in 2008. New document has endorsed the principle of protection national energy security missions with by military capabilities. This is to be novelty in Russia's military strategic thinking and planning. The Military Doctrine 2010 directly indicated two important decisive implications:

- Possibility to use of Armed Forces outside Russia to protect national interests and Russian citizens;

[22] *Voyennaya doktrina Rossiskoy Federatsii*, 05.02.2010, p. 15, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461> (30.01.2018).


- Creation and training of special units from the Armed Forces and other troops (presumably doomed private military corporations, like "Vagner" Group – note by authors) for use in the interests of Russia economy"[23]

The latter provision is probably related to protecting energy infrastructure and energy assets outside Russia and possibly also with an eye toward securing future resources, such as those in the Arctic region[24] and presumable in Sub-Sahara region. Currently Russia has expanded its presence in the region with assistance of "soft power" instruments. On 17 December 2017 Rusatom Overseas (a company of ROSATOM) and the Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation and Electricity of the Republic of the Sudan signed an agreement on the development of NPP construction project in Sudan. The document was signed by Musa Omer Abu Elgasim, Deputy Minister of Water Resources, Irrigation and Electricity of the Republic of the Sudan, and Dmitry Bazhenov, Head of Business Development at Rusatom Overseas[25]. The feasibility study for the NPP construction project envisages site screening and establishment of key project parameters including technology, capacity, configuration, deadlines and project' stages, as well as the financing scheme. Nuclear technology development will allow Sudan to cope with a problem of energy security in the Republic. This is a large-scale project that has a strategic meaning and determines the character of relations between our countries for a long period", pointed out Dmitry Bazhenov[26]. A month before the President of Sudan Omar al Bashir paid official visit in Moscow[27]. The Russian energy merger "LukOil" also emerged in Sudan and is seeking to boost up its engagement in energy sector[28]. In the Sub-Sahara region in Libya from Egypt appeared the Russian private military company representatives, namely RSB-Group company militaries led by former Spetnaz officer Oleg Krynitsin have been discovered to aid to General Khaftar regime and provide all necessary military support. Near Libya-Egypt border in 100 km distance in Egyptian city Sidi-Baranni at

[23] *Russian Military Doctrine*, 2010, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf> (30.01.2018).
[24] M. De Haas, *Russia's New Military Doctrine: A Compromise Document. Russian analytical digest*, 4.05.2010, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-78.pdf> (30.01.2018).
[25] *Op. cit.*
[26] *Op. cit.*
[27] *Sudan and Russia signed Agreement on Development of NPP Construction Project in Sudan*, <http://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/sudan-and-russia-signed-agreement-on-development-of-npp-construction-project-in-sudan/> (30.01.2018).
[28] T. Paraskova, *Sudan in Talks with Foreign Oil Firms To Boost Crude Production*, 14.11.2017, <https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Sudan-In-Talks-With-Foreign-Oil-Firms-To-Boost-Crude-Production.html> (30.01.2018).

military airport emerged Russian regular militaries with unknown mission[29]. It is clear as like USA, the Russia has its own agenda in the region and with structure like below.

Diag. 2. Russian policy in Africa



Source: own work.

Conclusion

In summary it is essential to underline that Sub-Saharan Africa has reached New Cold War wave where the Russian and American interests are competed. Here is emerging new actor in the scene like China who has its own agenda to pursue its national energy security and geostrategic missions. That is why "soft power" strategies are becoming more dominant factor for these Powers to successfully achieve their proper national interests in the area focusing on deterring asymmetric challenges emanating from the region itself. How the missions are to be pursued in cooperation or collusion manner is another question but time will tell. Having considered above-mentioned issues is possible to conclude that both USA and Russia have their own geostrategic interests toward the region but with different means to achieve. If the USA is more prone toward exploitation of "soft power" instruments (for instance, corporate business engagement, financial and humanitarian assistance, cultural intervention, etc.), the Russian side operates on "hard power" instruments (for instance, corporate warriors, state mergers, direct military assistance, etc.). However, both power strategies have particular mission to tackle those asymmetric challenges, pose concrete problems to them as well as to local national authorities.

[29] O. Matthews, *Taynyye armii Putina uchastvovali v voyne v Sirii — a gde oni budut voyevat' v sleduyushchiy raz?*, <http://inosmi.ru/military/20180122/241239434.html> (30.01.2018).

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SADC'S INTERVENTION AND RELAPSE IN MADAGASCAR'S POLITICAL CRISIS 2009-2014 AND THE REVEALED ROLE OF FRANCE?

Abstract:
This article is a reinterpretation of the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar between March 2009 and October 2014 plaguing the country into a political and security crisis. The chain of events had begun with the forced removal from power of the incumbent, President Marc Ravalomanana on 17 March 2009. Barely three days later, the leader of the civil society protest group, Andry Rajoelina, announcing that he had assumed power and the presidency. Almost immediately, the sub-regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during its Extraordinary Summit in Swaziland on 30th March 2009, invoked Article 30 of the July 2002, African Union (AU)'s Constitutive Act, suspending Madagascar's membership and imposing sanctions until the constitutional order was restored. SADC's mandate to intervene in order to maintain peace and security in any of the fifteen Member-States was provided under Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of the AU's Constitutive Act. Adopting the position taken by SADC, imposing sanctions on the political developments that involved the military unconstitutional change of government, the AU, the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization of Francophonie States (OIF) and the United States also followed suit, effectively isolating the island state from continental and global, diplomatic, economic relations. However, what was not clear then was the role France had played behind the scenes in creating the crisis. Furthermore, it was not fully appreciated how Paris continued to influence and undermining the SADC intervention throughout the period of impasse. It was only at the end of the impasses, when Paris' proxy and protégé was installed back in power that this became apparent. The common thread running through the French intervention was to dissuade SADC from adopting military measures to restore constitutional order. In achieving this constant, France had invited the United States to become complicit in propping up its foreign policy interests towards

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perpetuating its "le village Francafriquie" policy in Madagascar, Mayotte and Reunion.

***Keywords**:*
Madagascar, SADC intervention versus French "le village Francafriquie" policy

Introduction

In the area of diplomacy and international relations, it is rare for researchers to get insights into intelligence data and its subsequent transmission to metropolitan capitals for purposes of appropriate informed decisions bodies[2]. Amongst the many documents gathered by Julian Assange, the founder of the Wikileaks, included "a quarter million diplomatic cables" released in November 2010, can be found evidence of the works of diplomats in situations of political crises[3]. Significantly, some of the diplomatic cables will be available for historians and researchers after 25 years. However, given the early release of data through the action taken by Julian Assange, researchers are able to develop empirically grounded analysis from the available data. Our interest on the available documents was the seeming inability of SADC[4], through its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and the chief mediator, former President Joachim Chissano in the intervention in Madagascar's political and military situation during 2009 until 2014. Then it appeared that SADC's attempts to carry out its sub-regional security role faced with the crisis in

[2] B. Dewar, S. Massey, B. Baker, *Madagascar: Time to Make a Fresh Start*, "Africa AFP", 1/2013, pp. 13-15.
[3] J. Assange, *Release of Diplomatic Cables*, <www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Julian_Assange> (30.01.2018). Currently J. Assange is hiding inside the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, where he was granted asylum and citizenship since 7 December 2010.
[4] The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty, established on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia whose focus is to "Economic Integration and Development" also now includes, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Treaty was amended on 9 March 2001 to include the Organ on Politics, Defence & Security whose mandate is: "responsible for promoting peace and security; steer and provide Member States with direction regarding matters that threaten peace, security and stability in the region." The Organ operates under the Summit Troika, organized around three Heads of State comprising the Outgoing, the Chair and the Incoming to ensure continuity as the Chairperson's tenure rotates annually, in line to that of the Summit Chair. SADC is the successor to the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference (SADCC) of 1 April 1980 that had emerged from the 1977 Front Line States (FLS) comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, countries that had assisted in the national liberation of southern Africa. See: *About SADC*, <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/org/> (31.05. 2018).

Madagascar were being subtly undermined by the former colonial power, France. "However, in the light of the new evidence, we can begin to unravel the parallel existence of an active and aggressive continuation of France's Francophonie policy that appeared to have successfully undermined SADC's intervention initiative" (Madagascar's Political Crisis Diplomatic Cables). Meanwhile, SADC emerging under the auspices of the former Front Line States (FLS) is known for its radical anti colonial states and desire to consolidate self-determination. This ideological stance clashes with France' *le village* neo-colonial aspirations which had been challenged in the intervention the Democratic Republic of Congo during 1999 and later in Madagascar after 2009[5].

On 17th March 2009, Marc Ravalomanana the President of Madagascar was removed from office, 'at gunpoint as I never resigned' and 'deliberately handed over power to the military," in his own words. Immediately after handing over power under duress Ravalomanana fled the country to South Africa whereupon he reported the forced seizure of power to SADC. Meanwhile, the HAT has to immediately decided, to hand over the power to the leader of the protest movement and Mayor of the capital, Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, a television station owner popularly known as "TGV". Rajoelina declared himself the new president on 21st March 2009.

On 30th March 2009, a SADC Extraordinary Summit was held in Swaziland to deliberate on the political and security events in Madagascar that had resulted in the unconstitutional change of government, a development that is violates the AU protocol[6]. This was also true of SADC, with violations mediated through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which had the mandate to maintain peace and security in all Member-States invoking Article 30 and Article 4 (h) and (j). In July 2002 African Union (AU) Constitutive Act suspended Madagascar's membership while imposing sanctions until constitutional order was restored[7]. Taking a cue from SADC and the AU, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the USA and Organization of Francophonie States (OIF) also followed suit, adopting the stringent trade and diplomatic isolation posture with Madagascar. As subsequent evidence was to reveal, this was precisely what France, in pursuing

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[5] D. Kadima, *The DRC & Lesotho Crises: Some Lessons for the SADC*, "Lesotho Social Science Review", Vol. 5, No. 1/1999, pp. 65-82; M. P. Guy, *Continuity and Change in Franco-African relations*, "Journal of Modern African Studies", Vol. 33, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1-20; M. P. Guy, *France's African Policy in Transition: Disengagement & Re-Deployment*, Special Collection, University of Virginia, <http://www.uca.edu.ar/uca/common/grupo21/files/02martin.pdf> (20.12.2017).

[6] S. A. Dersso, *Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Unconstitutional Practices in Africa*, "Report on the Future of Peace Missions in Africa", Paper No. 2, June 2016.

[7] J. Lunn, *Madagascar's Political Crisis, SN05962,* International Affairs & Defence Section, House of Commons Library, London, 01.05.2012; B. Dewar, S. Massey, B. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

its proxy relations with Rajoelina in the removal of Ravalomanana, did not wish to happen as revealed later by French Ambassador to Mozambique, Christian Daziano and Presidential Africa Advisor, Remi Marechaux[8].

Meanwhile, the former Anglo and Lusophone colonial states making up the Front Line States that later morphed into SADC after June 1994, had resorted to armed struggle to secure independence in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent in South Africa. After 1994, the maintenance of peace and stability remained a primary concern to the member states with active military deployments in support of the constitutional order. Examples include SADC's deployment in Mozambique during its civil war of the 1980s, which ended through the signing of the Rome Treaty of 1992. The deployment of SADC military forces in Lesotho under *Operation Boleas* in September 1998 when over six hundred South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops crossed into Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, later joined by forces from Botswana. In 1999, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe under the SADC flag also deployed troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo[9]. It is against this background of SADC's preparedness to use the military option in Southern African that worried France and its determination to remain in its former colony Madagascar. This concern was revealed in the documents now available, capturing the discussions between Andrew R. Young and Ambassador Daziano. The French, African Presidential adviser, Remi Machuax at the Elysee Palace, had earlier expressed the same sentiment. On the question of a possible reinstatement of Ravalomanana, Paris was explicit, arguing "it was impossible" for this to happen although his supposed nemesis, Andry Rajoelina was himself "only nominal in power with no real support and popularity. On this point of 'impossibility, one is never certain whether or not France would be prepared to directly parry the SADC effort or work through proxies, including mercenaries to stop the deployment. France's increasing concerns was to prevent political deterioration as this could result in a second military coup. Furthermore, on this question, French parallel assessment of Rajoelina's popularity on the ground, both from the crowds and the military that "based entirely on demands for the ouster of Ravalomanana (now revealed) shallow backing and (perceived popularity) eroding quickly" Marechaux briefing to the US also intimated that: "based on four independent consular

[8] Wikileaks, *French Ambassador (Christian Daziano) discusses Madagascar & Maputo I talks*, 2009-08-27, Ref. 09MAPUTO0960; Wikileaks, *Former FM Simao Discusses Madagascar Talks*, 2009-08-14, Ref. 09MAPUTO916.

[9] T. Neethling, *Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas & Beyond*, "The Online Journal of Peace & Conflict Resolution", Issue 2.2, May 1999 <www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/> (30.01.2018); J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, Bloomington 1986; S. Naidu, *Mozambique: Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, "Working Paper Series, Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael", Hague 2001, pp. 5, 7-12; D. Kadima, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70; J. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, Basingstoke 2002.

reports: Rajoelina had received muted reception when he visited the country after the coup; French Ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner had also described Rajoelina as "viewing himself as messianic" one called to save the country" – yet with no administrative experience, immature and with "authoritarian habits" – with no real leadership grip." Meanwhile, "the economy had halved with donors suspending 50% of budget support and the IMF and WB cut their aid from November 2008 and indicated that after the March 2009 coup, no further funds would be released. France however, was unable to bail out HAT payroll and other expenses.' Furthermore, there were now fears of a possible "quasi-Trotskyite" counter revolutionary, in support of the departed Ravalomanana[10].

Given this candid assessment of their proxy, the French were also determined to remain in Madagascar, even when relations with Ravalomanana had broken down to include the closure of the French Embassy in Antananarivo. In the view of Remi Marechaux, comments that were also supported by a cited Ministry of Foreign Affairs position paper that was submitted to the mediation talks on Madagascar at the African Union in Addis Ababa on 30th April 2009, "France had direct equity and investment in Madagascar; had the responsibility to respond to between twenty and twenty-five thousand French nationals spread out in the three locations of Madagascar, Mayotte and Reunion.

This is the context in which the decision taken by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was adopted on 30th March 2009, partly unaware of the fact that in Madagascar, the sub-region would be faced with intrusive and underlying French post-colonial le village Francophonie policy which had been intricately woven into United States foreign policy.

However, in the next five years, SADC, was continually second guessed and deflected from finding a lasting solution to the conflict in French Madagascar. Precisely why this was not clear at that time, for an organization boasting huge experience such matters as demonstrated in Mozambique before the Rome Treaty of 1990; in the conflict in Zaire *now Democratic Republic of Congo* in September 1998 and in Lesotho during August 1991. In these scenarios, SADC had intervened and succeeded to restore law and order through military means and yet in Madagascar, this could not be achieved. Why?

The article argues that, determined and active French post-colonial policy known as the le village Francophonie functioned, aligned in a sophisticated manner, with the interests of the United States, to effectively block SADC's intervention to restore the constitutional order in Madagascar between March 2009 and October 2014.

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[10] Wikileaks, *French Ambassador (Christian Daziano) discusses Madagascar & Maputo I talks*, 2009-08-27, Ref. 09MAPUTO0960; Wikileaks, *Former FM Simao Discusses Madagascar Talks*, 2009-08-14, Ref. 09MAPUTO916

In making the above argument, this discussion is divided in three sections, beginning with the background to the March 2009. In this, the research takes into account the troubled history of French and Ravalomanana rise to office against President Didier Ratsiraka in June 2002 to early January 2009 when he was facing similar street protests following the loss of his TIM party from representations in the capital Antananarivo. What is significant during this epoch however, was Ravalomanana's success in submitting an application and admission to the SADC Treaty area. In a single stroke, Ravalomanana had cancelled the famous four secret agreements that all former French colonies entered into according to Por Guy Martin which included: France retained monopoly on Foreign Policy; Economics; Defence; and the choice of alliance partners that a former colony would enter into agreement with. The second section begins in late 2008 until Ravalomanana's ousting in March 2009, isolating the role of France based on the Wikileaks diplomatic cables made available in November 2010. Finally, the discussion examines the aftermath of the mediation attempts, leading to the September 2011 Road Map by SADC that specifically signals the abandonment of the military option in resolving the crisis in Madagascar, revealing the triumph of French overseas policy before, again one of their perceived proxy's was returned to power through the ballot box, effectively ensuring the status quo.

In entering the political fray in Madagascar, by default, SADC joined that faction of political and military actors who had decided to eject French, political and socio economic dominance, led by Marc Ravalomanana[11]. In this attempt, SADC would find itself against deeply embedded French interests, manifest in the defence outpost infrastructure of the air base and natural harbour as well as the significant resident community[12]. Stated simply, SADC was confronting the continued re-deployment of French Africa policy also known as *le village de la Francophonie* as aptly argued by Martin Por Guy[13]. As if this was not enough, France took the deliberate decision to calibrate and align its policy to that of the United States getting the global power on its side. Evidence of this emerges in the constant and repetitive references to "our policy is similar to yours" and "We Share the Same Objectives" hammered into the ears of US operatives by the African Adviser to the French Presidency, Remi Maremaux and his staff[14].

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[11] P. D. Schmmitt, *From Colonies to Client-States: The Origins of France's Postcolonial Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, 1940-1969*, doctoral thesis 2011, unpublished, University of Maryland, USA.

[12] Wikileaks: *French Worried by Madagascar*, 2009-04-29, Ref. 09PARIS598; M. P. Guy, *France's African Policy in Transition…*; L. Ploch, *Madagascar's 2009 Political Crisis*, US Congress Research Service, 2009-10-07, Ref. R40448, <www.crs.gov> (30.01.2018).

[13] M. P. Guy, *Continuity and Change…*; Idem, *France's African Policy in Transition…*

[14] Wikileaks, *Madagascar: French Support Political Consensus Leading to Elections*, 2009-06-23, Ref. 09PARS848; Wikileaks, *Madagascar: The US & France "Share the Same Objectives"*, 2010-01-22, Ref. 10PARS66.

It is significant to note the historical, "cyclical pattern from crisis to crisis but each phase getting shorter in between"[15].

Background to Conflict, Crisis and SADC intervention: French policy, participation and partnerships?

Madagascar's political history since independence on 26 June 1960 has been characterized by organized marches and protests around the capital Antananarivo that then draw in repression from the incumbent government and military units' participation, leading to calls for military coups as part of the political succession. This has since established a discernable trend. For example, after the first President, Phillbet Tsiranana, by May 1972, his government was subjected to unrest and he was forced to dissolve his administration and hand over power to a High Authority of the State (HAT)[16]. Viewed subsequently, this is the period that established the phenomenon of handing over power to HAT in Madagascar when the country is in crisis. For Tsiranana, by May 1972 citizens unhappy with his rule and massed on the streets and in the capital forcing him to hand over power to Army Chief, General Gabriel Ramantsoa. The next phase was shorter as, in June 1975, Ramantsoa was, again from seemingly popular street protests, forced to hand over power to Vice Admiral Didier Ratsiraka in June 1975[17]. In August 1991 as the winds of multiparty democracy were spreading, mass protests visited Madagascar, resulting in Ratsiraka handing over to the HAT led by Albert Zafy who later became Head of State.

However, in 1996, the same tendency reared its head, with mass demonstrations calling for a military coup to replace Zafy who faced impeachment. The following year in 1997, Ratsiraka returned to power and yet his end set the tone for our discussion as he was tussling with the Mayor of Antananarivo at the time, Marc Ravalomanana. In December 2001, Ratsiraka faced the youthful businessman in the presidential elections, Ravalomanana. The result was disputed and resulted in marches around the countryside and capital. The protests continued to escalate, drawing even more people to its ranks and the military by January 2002. As the stalemate continued, it was only when the military abandoned Ratsiraka for Ravalomanana that the impasse was broken[18].

Marc Ravalomanana as mayor of Antananarivo and with an acknowledged business empire in Madagascar appears to have been the only leader who had assumed office without direct French support. In the disputed elections of

[15] International Crisis Group (ICG), *A Cosmetic End to Madagascar Crisis,* Africa Report No. 281/2014, p. 1.
[16] J. Lunn, *op. cit.*
[17] L. Ploch, *op. cit.*
[18] International Crisis Group (ICG), *A Cosmetic End…*, p. 2; L. Ploch, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

December 2001, Ravalomanana claimed to have defeated the incumbent, Ratsiraka who refused to step down. He approached the courts seeking relief whilst in parallel, because of his popularity, based on his *Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM) "I Love Madagascar"* political party, and was able to bring people on the streets in protest on the perceived rigged election. Sensing victory, in February 2002, Ravalomanana declared himself president of unleashing a civil war in the country. Eventually, the deteriorating clashes where resolved in June 2002 when, "the military abandoned Ratsiraka and coalesced behind Ravalomanana." Shorn of the important military support, in July 2002, Didier Ratsiraka fled in exile in Paris[19]. Clearly the role of the military in politics in Madagascar played a determinant role as the decisive swing constituency.

Afterwards, the Elysee Palace refused to recognize Ravalomanana's administration drawing the ire of the new incumbent and setting the tone for strained relations. Meanwhile, the United States proceeded to officially recognize Ravalomanana's government in a development that acted as a catalyst for Germany, China, the United Kingdom and five other African governments, which followed suit. France reluctantly joined in the official recognition.

However, for Ravalomanana, almost as a development to consolidate the self-determination position of Madagascar, embarked upon the radical and fundamental reorientation of the country's foreign policy, economic relations, language and cultural relations with France. To this end, his application to join SADC, approved in 2005 became one of the most radical ruptures of French-Madagascar foreign, defence and security relations since independence. Acceptance in the former liberation movement and largely Anglophone organization placed Madagascar squarely under the ambit of the African Union's African Peace & Security Architecture (APSA) whose sub-regional arms include SADC but has a direct anti-colonial and solidarity agenda. Stated differently, in one stroke, Ravalomanana had cancelled the import of the most important four agreements that were reached with weak African leaders by Paris after 1960. As Martin Por Guy and Paul Daniel Schmmitt point out, the nominally independent African remained subject in their foreign policy in which they would only engage any external powers via Paris; had handed over all matters of defence and security to the metropolis; economic policy and agree not to into any alliances except with France[20]. It is also significant to note that when eventually Ravalomanana was forced to flee at gunpoint, he was not only able to trigger the AU's "unconstitutional removal of an elected government"

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[19] International Crisis Group (ICG), *A Cosmetic End…*, p. 2; L. Ploch, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[20] M. P. Guy, *France's African Policy in Transition…*; P. D. Schmmitt, *op. cit.*; N. Frank, *Ivory Coast's Founder: Lavish Funeral*, "The New York Times", 07.02.1994; D. Caglar, *From Francafriquie to Eurafrique with Sarkozy – Not Much Difference?*, "The Turkish Weekly Journal", 11.03.2008, <www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2343> (30.01.2018).

restraints on Madagascar but also was the first leader to seek refuge in southern Africa and not Paris. As a consequence, even where SADC appeared weak in its intervention, it was able to frustrate Paris by preventing the selective recognition of Rajoelina's administration.

On the economic front, when Ravalomanana embarked on his radical transformation, it is argued that he confronted the monopoly cartels that had been established since independence. Now, these were made up of over 140 major corporations and in excess of 5 000 small to medium sized businesses owned and operated by French citizens. Amongst these two large and small to medium sized business, the economic market in Madagascar left no room for domestic players. Furthermore, the same businesses also operated in the two islands of Mayotte and Re-Union. On the question of language and culture, Ravalomanana decreed that the schools programme include English, reducing the centrality of French.

In December 2006, Ravalomanana swept the polls securing a 55% vote, based on an increasing popularity and political organization throughout the island state. Armed with this popular mandate, it simply served to allow him to accelerate the implementation of his policies to a point where he became authoritative. In July 2008, Ravalomanana closed down the French Embassy and expelled its Ambassador, Gildas Lidec. The Embassy was to remain closed for the next eight months.

Meanwhile, analysts have argued that, even as Ravalomanana revelled in his new found popularity leading the Tiako y Madag (I love Madagascar) party, he failed to build sufficient connection and alliances with the French business community and the crust of Madagascar elite that included senior military officers. His policies therefore only succeeded to provoke and alienate both France and a significant portion of the leading military "junta joining forces with the amateurish Andry Rajoelina to force him out by March 2009.

However, while the period reviewed of December 2001 until late 2008 laid the basis of antagonism between Paris and Antananarivo we need to understand from the new evidence how an alternative relationship emerged between the metropolis and Andry Rajoelina. The latter appeared to play a cameo role as derided by the French Presidential Africa Advisor[21]. But before we examine this we need to better understand the question as to how important was/is Madagascar to France?

Strategic, Cultural and Economic Importance of Madagascar to France?

When the winds of change heralding decolonization in Africa occurred during the early 1960s, "France was not ready"[22]. Instead, while Paris publicly

[21] Wikileaks, *Madagascar: The US & France "Share the Same Objectives*, 2010-01-22, Ref. 10PARS66.

[22] D. Caglar, *op. cit.;* M. P. Guy, *France's African Policy in Transition…*; P. D. Schmmitt, *op. cit.*

provided "wholesale independence" to all her former colonies, different arrangements were secured behind the scenes. Part of this was to identify key satellite countries that would execute some of its interests. By 1960, France had established a sub-regional security zone on the island of Madagascar that managed the other two neighbouring protectorates of Mayotte and Re-Union. On the island of Madagascar, France had established defence infrastructure comprising the Ivato military airfield near the capital Antananarivo, a deep sea natural harbour of Antsiranana on the northern end of the island as well as installing satellite radar and communications equipment for military, naval and air surveillance of the southern hemisphere and going north up to the Equator. France also divided into separate categories those countries of vital importance and the rest in which she would not invest dedicated effort and resources.

In this, Madagascar was graded in the higher category that included: Berlin, Madrid, Rabat, Rome London, Washington, and Dakar-Senegal. Given this high categorization, France was simply never going to 'walk away' from its interests that were tied in with its influence and infrastructure in Madagascar. Furthermore, France had more than 20 000 citizens resident in the three islands with the majority in Madagascar conducting commercial and other business organized in more than 5 000 small to medium sized companies.

In terms of finding alternative levelling off alliance partners to equalize the unequal power relations, Ravalomanana, by placing Madagascar under SADC had made an unprecedented achievement in which the latter had sufficient political will and capacity to confront the metropolis.

From 2007, the politically and economically affected French expatriates whose work permits and visas were becoming increasingly difficult to renew joined by local white commercial business reacted aggressively, demanding change. Soon this sentiment openly began a spirited campaign calling for leadership renewal by "anyone-but-Ravalomanana." In the same year, Ravalomanana's TIM party lost political control of the capital, abbreviated as Tana, to a local disc jockey, Andry Nirina Rajoelina who owned a television station. This private communication medium began to muster opposition against the government around the new and brash leader[23]. From this point, the French appeared to have discovered a local proxy through which they would now confront Ravalomanana amidst allegation of handing large tracts of land to the South Korean Company, "Daewoo"; the purchase of a presidential jet for USD$60 million and other issues of alleged corruption[24].

In the midst of the turmoil, in late December 2008, Andry Rajoelina television station conducted an interview with the exiled Ratsiraka. The Ravalomanana administration took serious umbrage and promptly closed the

[23] L. Ploch, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[24] Wikileaks, *Madagascar: GoM (again) Denies Daewoo Land Deal*, 2008-12-19, Ref. ANTA787; Wikileaks, *Madagascar Abandoning Ravalomanana*, 2009-02-09, Ref. ANTAN90.

station. This had the opposite effect, triggering even bigger demonstrations against government.

To conclude on the historical turbulent political and military history of succession in Madagascar, in January 2009 street protests visited the country, with crowds calling for Ravalomanana to step down and troops opened fire killing several score. Some units based around the capital, at Camp Capsat protested at the repressive use of force resulting in mutinies. These elements were to become part of the mutinous forces by March. Subsequently, the Army Chief gave the squabbling politicians 72 hours to find a solution. However, before this was over, the Army Chief was deposed and early during 16-17 March, Ravalomanana was forced to relinquish office, handed over power to the Military Council who sat on the HAT before fleeing the island state. With more than eight military coups occurring since 1972, Madagascar political environment "reflected a cyclical pattern from crisis to crisis – but significantly, with each period getting shorter"[25].

In each of the scenarios of power changes, evidence of external and French involvement has always been mooted but never proven or documented from primary evidence. Overall, underlying the weak governing structures in former Madagascar is what Paul Daniel Schmitt's thesis has attempted to document related to the specific dynamics of decolonization in the former French colonies which took a distinctly different form, reflecting a "… result (that) was increasingly cynical support of despotic regimes friendly to French interests, in an effort to maintain political influence in Africa after decolonization"[26].

However, based on the freshly available sources, here is what was/is the French view as enunciated by Remi Machuax, Africa Presidential Advisor who had earlier worked as a Madagascar and southern Africa, desk officer before being promoted in 2007. The same had also been an Exchange Diplomat in Washington with the Department of State and now operating from the Elysee Palace in Paris.

The March 2009 Putsch in Antananarivo, SADC intervention and competing French interests?

The events leading to the putsch that followed traditional Madagascan way of carrying out a coup accelerated towards the end of 2008. Based on the Wikileaks cables evidence on the diplomatic discussions, several developments that occurred can now be better understood. This section will review the interlocking local, regional and international dynamics around the crisis in Madagascar manifest in power struggle between Ravalomanana versus Rajoelina and each with their alliance partners. The latter is revealed in the diplomatic cables reflecting on the roles of the military, France and that of the

[25] International Crisis Group (ICG), *A Cosmetic End…*, p. 1.
[26] P. D. Schmmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

United States and finally, the SADC response. Of primary concern was the struggle between France's le village foreign policy versus SADC' emancipation and self-determination quest for citizens of Madagascar.

France, the 'military junta' and Rajoelina axis leading to the removal of Ravalomanana from power.

December has also witnessed further escalation of the rivalry between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina when the latter's TV Station broadcast an interview with exiled former President Didier Ratsiraka. Ravalomanana' administration promptly closed the station down. Furthermore, the government then sought to arrest Rajoelina who quickly went into the French Embassy for protection. Even from the safety of the derided French Embassy in the eyes of Ravalomanana's administration, Rajoelina continued to organize and publicly call for more demonstrations, announcing planned workers shut down on 24-25 January 2009.

By late January and early February 2009, the political and security crisis in Madagascar reached "a point of no return" amidst developments that France's role and influence was becoming more explicit[27]. This assessment was further confirmed by the tragic events of 7 February 2009 when "at exactly 1444 hours GMT, elements from the Presidential Guard opened indiscriminate fire on a crowd of about 10 to 20 000 protestors on a road adjacent to the US Embassy, killing 50 and 172 seriously wounded. The fatalities figure was to eventually rise to an estimated 135 dead"[28]. The opposition to advantage of this carnage in order to whip up anti-government sentiment when, "on the Monday, at 10 00 am, they organized a public body viewing spectacle. This effectively turned the tide against Ravalomanana's government.

However, already a difference in strategy had emerged with the French trying very hard to dissuade Rajoelina from going ahead with the 7th February 2009 March as the French where now convinced that a 'Third Force' acting on behalf of Ravalomanana was orchestrating the events to a level that would not be manageable[29].

In parallel with the deteriorating situation, France's presence in Madagascar increased, in spite of the Embassy that had been shut in July 2008 and the Ambassador expelled by Ravalomanana. A delegation led by senior

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[27] Wikileaks, *Diplomatic Effort Reveals Full Blown Malagasy Political Crisis*, 2009-01-23, Ref. ANTAN60.

[28] Wikileaks, *President May Be Open to Meeting – But Not to Real Dialogue*, 2009-01-30, Ref. ANATAN68 & 69; Wikileaks, *Engaging With the New "government"*, 2009-03-18, Ref. ANTAN187 (citing Ordinance 2009, 001 of 17 March conferring full powers to the Military Directorate); L. Ploch, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[29] Wikileaks, *President May Be Open to Meeting – But Not to Real Dialogue*, 2009-01-30, Ref. ANATAN68 & 69.

representatives of the *Francophonie* arrived in Antananarivo closely followed by the new French Ambassador, Jean-Marie Chataigner. Both were able to meet Rajoelina who was still leading the protests. The parallel campaign by French business community of "anyone-but-Ravalomanana" was also in full swing behind Rajoelina.

Meanwhile, parallel meetings amongst the diplomatic corps, comparing notes on the deteriorating security situation continued with increasing frequency. During one of the diplomatic meetings, the US Ambassador reported that they had begun to undertake emergency evacuation measures during which "a town hall type meeting had been held with all US citizens including Peace Corps volunteers, diplomats and families engaged in non-critical areas in order to gauge sentiment and allow those wishing to leave early to do so"[30].

In contrast to the intended US action, the French Ambassador informed the meeting that "it was not feasible for France to evacuate as its nationals constituted a large percentage of the expatriate community. Instead, all French nationals had simply been warned to remain in the 'bunkers' and out of sight"[31].

The US Embassy/Ambassador and the Senior Military Officers' parallel, political discussions

In January 2009, crowds were calling for Ravalomanana to step down and troops opened fire on demonstrators killing several demonstrators on the streets that bordered the United States Embassy. As a result of the deaths of civilians, units based around the capital, Antananarivo protested at the repressive measures. This culminated in some of the units forced to mutiny and refused to take orders. Faced with the disintegration of key institutions including the armed forces, on 10 March 2009, the Army Chief, General Edmond Rasolomahavdry gave the squabbling politicians 72 hours to find a solution to the political disputes. The next day on the 11th March, 'opposition soldiers' from Capsat Army Corps, Personnel Administrative & Technical Services stormed Army Headquarters and forced General Edmond to resign, laying the foundations of an imminent civil war.

A significant development behind the scenes was the now exposed role of the military in the forced political succession of Marc Ravalomanana from power in March 2009. The lead up to the event and the personalities emerge from the discussions held with the US Ambassador and his officials by the generals particularly from the first week and accelerating during the actual change over period of 16th to 18th March 2009.

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[30] Wikileaks, *Diplomatic Effort Reveals Full Blown Malagasy Political Crisis*, 2009-01-23, Ref. ANTAN60.

[31] *Ibidem;* Wikileaks, *President May Be Open to Meeting – But Not to Real Dialogue*, 2009-01-30, Ref. ANATAN68 & 69.

As the dispatches noted: "Paris gravely concerned with Madagascar on the brink of upheaval as the violence targeted Police and Civilian authorities – some of whom appeared desperate to provoke further repression"[32]. Citation of the above is important, locating the different but coalescing military and civilian led protests in which the French appeared to be involved.

Exactly a month earlier, on 8 February 2009, Naval Chief, Abdel Radavison had visited the US Ambassador claiming "he was there on behalf of the Defence Chief" to advise that preparations for military intervention in the political crisis "were at an advanced stage."

Following the recent massacres, Radavison again engaged the Ambassador, anxious to stress that, "whatever intervention undertaken in future would be in line with the constitution. But, the forces had lost all respect for Ravalomanana given his idiosyncrasies and strange decisions"[33]. Some of the reasons advanced for abandoning Ravalomanana 'was his decision to purchase the presidential jet and the perception that he had already invited and deployed foreign forces from South Africa who were responsible for the mass shootings on Malagasy citizens." For senior generals, holding this view that was not supported by facts did not appear contradictory but simply served to reinforce their already adopted positions[34].

After the departure of the military, another Ravalomanana confidant, identified as one of the three secret negotiators arrived. This was the Environment Minister, Harrison Randramanana who appeared to be in "a state of deep despair advising that "…he had been hiding in a friend's house, and ready to collapse as he was bedridden with hypertension and under doctor's orders (to rest). He then foretold of coming resignations and openly debated whether he too should follow suit? He said he was reluctant to resign, only because he did not want to give momentum to the Mayor's initiative"[35].

From Harrison's intransigent message, from 8 March 2009, "elements from the Army joined the public protests on the streets.

The significance of this is that foreign diplomats where privy to the highest political infighting amongst the elite, depicting a weak and disorganized government. Furthermore, this line of inquiry also reveals that behind the street protests were active considerations being taken by key institutions of the establishment.

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[32] Wikileaks, *French Envoy's Negative View of Mozambique*, 2009-09-04, Ref. 09MAPUTO986.
[33] Wikileaks, *Madagascar Abandoning Ravalomanana*, 2009-02-09, Ref. ANTAN90.
[34] *Ibidem;* L. Ploch, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
[35] Wikileaks, *Madagascar Abandoning Ravalomanana*, 2009-02-09, Ref. ANTAN90.

The Change of Guard – the role of the Military 16-18 March 2009.

The military faction that had moved away from supporting Ravalomanana, in true Madagascar fashion as we have argued, on 17th March "visited Ravalomanana's office and – at gunpoint – asked him to resign and transfer power to Rajoelina"[36]. Soon afterwards, Ambassadors representing the US, South Africa and the UN Mediator, Drame also arrived at Ravalomanana's offices where he showed them the Ordinance transferring power to the Military Directorate.

Later, Ravalomanana called the US Ambassador "breathless from a hiding place – believed to be somewhere in Antsirabe – now claiming "I was forced to sign this by the military who came to my office and threatened me, 15 minutes before you came in. (Handing over to) The Military Directorate idea was a way not to do what they wanted" he said, "then I barely got out before they came back after you left"[37].

However, on the above point, the Military Directorate almost immediately passed on power to Rajoelina as leader of HAT who was then requested to seek a High Court decision in order to confirm the constitutionality of his ascension to presidential office. This decision was made in his favour confirming the intention of French influence to remove Ravalomanana and install his nemesis.

After Ravalomanana had fled to SADC, important governmental appointment and policy changes were made by Rajoelina to reflect the restoration of French influence in the affairs of Madagascar. Part of the early actions taken were also intended to destroy Ravalomanana's TIKO political party, accused of owing the state a huge tax debt. Furthermore, the newly appointed Finance Minister demanded USD$ 600 000 debt, owed by Ravalomanana. There were also fresh allegations of "failure to account for the purchase of the presidential jet, "Force One II." Next, a decision by the new Education Minister, Julien Razafimanazato, who was living in Paris was instructive: "instructing that the first language of instruction was going to be French." This reversed efforts by Ravalomanana who had introduced English and other languages into the curriculum for the first time.

However, the distinct role of the military could not be handled by Rajoelina as, "his appointment of the Minister of Defence, General Raonenantsoamampianina was quickly vetoed by the military as "deemed unacceptable." This remonstration was taken without resistance[38].

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[36] Wikileaks, *Madagascar/Ravalomanana: I Did Not Resign!*, 2009-03-20, Ref. ANTAN195.
[37] *Ibidem.*
[38] Wikileaks, *Madagascar Transitional Cabinet Partially Formed*, 200-04-18, Ref. ANTAN283.

SADC Mediation frustration – Road Map Sept 2011 and relapse October 2014

The feared SADC tendency to deploy the military, restore the political order as well as law and order following its 30th March 2009 meeting in Swaziland did not materialize. The difficulty of mounting a military operation was revealed in telling comments between the US Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael Koplovsky and Zambia's Foreign Affairs, Africa Division senior official, Awa Lubundi during a formal meeting organized in Lusaka on 23 June 2009. With the discussion captured in the diplomatic cables, constituting "verbatim notes by Koplovsky," SADC sought to leverage international cooperation towards resolving the crisis in Madagascar rather than go it alone. This was to shape SADC's approach to the crisis which later guided the thrust of the appointed Mediator, former Mozambiquecan President, Joachim Chissano in the Maputo I and II subsequent meetings that began in August of the same year. But simply citing the diplomatic discussions is illustrative of the thinking and alternative considerations that guided SADC's actions: For example "…Lubundi inquired how the USG might respond to possible SADC military intervention in Madagascar?" Koplovsky asserts that, "our response was to reiterate that the US advocates for peaceful resolution to this crisis". Lubundi conceded that sending a SADC brigade was something that they leaders had considered during their 20th June Summit in Johannesburg they later found this "unrealistic an option"

Curiously also, SADC had refrained from pushing for the reinstatement of Marc Ravalomanana and instead suggested an interim arrangement, partly recognizing the historical role that HAT plays in that country's troubled political transitions[39]. Furthermore, this position of 'realism' by SADC stemmed from previous failed intercession attempts in Lesotho during 1998 and the perception that the Brigade may well be resisted by ordinary Malagasy people and therefore likely to result in bloody clashes and failure. It is also important to note that this lack of effectiveness of SADC's military capacity towards resolving political crises is something that is not generally publicized and only available in the unblemished diplomatic talks expected not to be in the public domain. This posture is contrasted by the comments French Ambassador Daziano then makes in Maputo on the sidelines of the August 2009 meeting when he asserts: "it would be impossible to reinstate Ravalomanana"[40].

Instead, the next significant event was the scheduled Meetings in Maputo beginning in August 2009 chaired by former President Joachim Chissano. In

[39] Wikileaks, *Zambia Does Not Rule Out Military Intervention in Madagascar*, 2009-06-24, LUSAKA450.

[40] Wikileaks, *French Envoy's Negative View of Mozambique*, 2009-09-04, Ref. 09MAPUTO986; Wikileaks, *Former FM Simao Discusses Madagascar Talks*, 2009-08-14, Ref. 09MAPUTO916.

this gathering, for reasons best known to the French, all past presidents in exile in Paris turned up in Maputo with "Didier Ratsiraka, complete with family and a large delegation attended, courtesy, special plane provided by France. Former President Zafy was also in attendance[41]. A second session, Maputo II was held on 17 August 2012 at which military generals from Madagascar attended. This was in preparation for the Road Map agreement reached in September 2011 which created consensus and time lines for holding elections as the preferred outcome from the crisis. However, because Rajoelina had been in power for several years, although the Road Map had provided for both the two leading protagonists not to stand, the two were able to put forward proxies. Effectively, French le village Francophonie had survived and SADC, through attrition had been muscled out of being a central player in the resolution of the crisis in Madagascar by October 2014.

Conclusions

The political and security crisis that occurred in Madagascar during March 2009 until the election of former President Andry Rajoelina who was aimed at restoring French interests. These would be managed by proxy, through pliant officials elected after the October 2013 elections and presidential run of of December. In the election, former Rajoelina's Finance Minister was the candidate, succeeding to garner 53.5% against Ravalomanana's ally, Jean Louis Robinson who had 46.5%. From October 2014, it was clear this administration was happy to accelerate the implementation of pro-France policies as we had noted in early April 2009. Soon after winning the presidential electoral run-off, the new regime announced military promotions, perceived to have been its way to offer rewards to the supporting officers. In this way, the temporary rupture of French policy in Madagascar that had been brought about by Ravalomanana had been quashed. In Madagascar, the events in the background of the March 2009 military coup only came to the surface, thanks to the Julian Assange, Wikileaks which released diplomatic cables in November 2010. Using this fresh evidence, this article has attempted to provide another interpretation of the events based on these previously unavailable materials. What had been in the public domain or gathered through word of mouth was that, President Marc Ravalomanana's administration, in power since February 2002 had fallen out with the French when he tried to re-direct the economy, language and culture from the traditional stranglehold of the colonial power. The Elysee Palace in Paris, acting in concert with French business interests in Madagascar had launched a campaign to remove the president called, "anyone but Ravalomanana." This was soon spearheaded by the young and brash local mayor of the capital, Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, owner of a Television station popularly known as "TGV" referring to the fast French rail.

[41] J. Lunn, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

Circumstantial opinion ranged from: distance, of the island state and therefore a crisis out of sight, escaping, physically affecting the southern African region; the predominant use of the French language by a largely Anglophone sub-regional community; lack of political will by SADC, frustrated by the intransigence of the main parties in dispute in Madagascar or even, the perceived competition between the confusing lead mediation countries of Mozambique and South Africa. But, the real reasons why SADC's intervention simply relapsed, even against its illustrious history as the Front Line States (FLS) with the determination and sacrificial capacity to assist sister countries to gain independence in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa remained unclear.

However, it was only after the trove of documentary evidence contained in the Wikileaks released by Julian Assange that were able to have insights of what actually happened to successfully thwart SADC's intervention into the political and military crisis that engulfed the island state of Madagascar from March 2009 when the then President Ravalomanana fled into exile to South Africa until his return in October 2014. When he returned, his nemesis, Andry Rajoelina appeared to have established himself with proxy players in order to maintain the status quo.

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GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM AND THE RISK OF A WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Abstract:
In the climate change context, controlling water sources is one of the most explosive challenges to the stability of the security environment. In its quasi-totality, human civilization was born in the basins of the great rivers, which provided humans with both the basic survival and development resources and natural protection against invasions. Such a watercourse is the Nile, in whose basin the great Egyptian, Nubian and Ethiopian civilizations were born. If, until recently, Egypt was the main beneficiary of the Nile's ”gifts“, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, still in construction on the Blue Nile, will radically change the status quo in region. How will GERD going to influence the regional hydro-policy? Is there any risk for a regional war outbreak? And, if the answer to the previous question is a positive one, what could be the impact of an Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict on regional security?

Keywords:
Nile River, Blue Nile, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Sudan, China, Horn of Africa, War, Migration

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Motto:
*The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is **water**.*
Anwar el Sadat, 1979

In their quasi-totality, the banks of the great watercourses have been the cradles of the mankind, from Tiger and Euphrates to Indus and Ganges, from Danube and Tiber to Amu Darya and Syr Darya, from Colorado and Mississippi to Amazon and Orinoco, from Yangtze and Mekong to Amur and the Volga, from Nile and Congo to Zambezi and Okavango. Within these riverbeds, the first human inhabitants of the planet found food and development resources as well as natural protection against invasions. In other words, human civilization was, and still is, a civilization of water, water sources' controlling imperative shaping the political behaviour of individuals and states.

This imperative acquires explosive connotations in semiarid and arid regions such as the Middle East and the Levant, where the main conflicts' stake has been the control of the rivers basins of Jordan, Tiger and Euphrates. Therefore, any intervention aimed at altering the flows of these watercourses in the exclusive favour of a riparian state automatically becomes a source of conflict. For example, the tensions between Turkey, from whose territory the Euphrates is springing, and the other two downstream riparian states, Syria and Iraq. These tensions ignited in 1983, due to Ankara government's unilateral decision to build the *Atatürk Dam* and subsequently to control river's flow in the lower part of the stream. These tensions are, even now, considered to hide Turkey's double game in the conflicts that ended up by the failure of both Arab states. So it becomes obvious, that the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) hydro-technical project on the Blue Nile might become a "time bomb".
How will GERD going to influence the regional hydro-policy? Is there any risk for a regional war outbreak? And, if the answer to the previous question is a positive one, what could be the impact of an Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict on regional security?

Short hydrographic and economic data on the Nile Basin

The Nile – "father of the African rivers" springs south of the Equator, from a rainy mountainous region located in East Africa, between Rwanda and Burundi (see the map in the Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Nile River Basin



Source: *Nile River Basin* <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ EXTAFRNILEBASINI/Images/map_full_size.jpg> (22.01.2018).

The Nile flows towards North, along the North-Eastern coast of Africa, and consists of two segments:

- the first one, called the White Nile due to the clay silts that give him a milky appearance, is delimitated between the Nile springs and the place of confluence with the Blue Nile, his main affluent (at the North of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum);
- the second one, called the Nile, bounded between the confluence place and the shedding place.

The Nile crosses eight African states: Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, and flows into the

Mediterranean Sea through a delta stretching over an area of over 24 000 km^2, where lives approximately 85% of the Egyptian population.

With a length of 4132 miles / 6650 km, the Nile is the longest watercourse in the world[2]. Also, the Nile has an impressive basin, consisting of dozens of tributaries and lakes, covering a total area of 3 112 380 km^2, representing about one-tenth of Africa's total area[3] (see the map in the Fig. 1). Among these tributaries, the most important are:

- on the left bank: Bahr al-Ghazal and Wadi al-Malik (Yellow Nile);
- on the right bank: Atbara (Black Nile), Blue Nile and Sobat.

The Nile is partially navigable due to cataracts, waterfalls and marshes generated by both the tectonic activity within the Rift Valley and the low river flow of only 2 830 m^3 per second, which reaches only 2% of Amazon's flow and only 15% of Mississippi River's flow. At its shedding into the Mediterranean Sea, 86% of Nile's flow is fed from Ethiopia through the Blue Nile's waters. However, the rainfalls that feed Blue Nile's high flow[4] are available just in the monsoon season and only over a part of the Ethiopian territory, which is why Ethiopia is often confronted with dramatic drought followed by famines and violence[5].

More than 300 million inhabitants from the 11 riparian states (Burundi, RD Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) live in the Nile Basin and another 140 million, from their immediate vicinity, are partially securing their water needs from Nile's affluents. The river is the water source for 32 major cities including Cairo, Alexandria, Khartoum, Kampala, Giza, Asyut, Mwanza, Juba, and the main water source for the Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian, Egyptian and Sudanese populations. Demographic forecasts say that by 2025, the approximately 568,3 million inhabitants of this region will continue to be absolutely dependent on the Nile's water[6].

Nile's waters are used for both household and economic activities, from irrigation and fishing to electric power generation, river transport and tourism. But the main use remains agriculture, either through the well-developed irrigation systems in Egypt and Sudan, or through the alluviums of its periodic floods, especially in the upper basin, where subsistence agriculture

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[2] H. E. Hurst, C. G. Smith, M. M. El-Kammash, *Nile River*, Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nile-River> (25.01.2018).

[3] *Nile Basin Initiative: Water Resources Planning and Management Project*, http://www.ess.co.at/WATERWARE/NILE/background.html, (25.01.2018).

[4] A. Carlson, *Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia's History-Changing Dam*, vol. 6, 06.03.2013, <http://origins.osu.edu/article/who-owns-nile-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia-s-history-changing-dam> (25.10.2015).

[5] D. Das Neves, *The food situation in Ethiopia is also of great concern*, UNDP, 30.05.2017, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2017/5/23/La-situation-alimentaire-en-Ethiopie-aussi-est-extr-mement-pr-occupante.html> (25.01.2018).

[6] *Nile Basin Initiative: Water Resources Planning and Management Project, op. cit.*

predominates. Since whole riparian states are predominantly agricultural, poor, underdeveloped and some them surrounded by arid areas, any change of Nile's flow, even on short run, can generate major economic, social and political consequences, with wide and profound impact upon the societal structure, upon the stability and security of the region.

Brief history of regional hydro-politics[7]

The race for Nile waters' control dates back to antiquity, when the Egyptian pharaohs conquered the Nubian kingdom[8] and, along with it, the upper course of the river, becoming the indisputable hegemons of the region. Over time, this status has been perpetuated transforming itself into a custom, Egypt being associated within the collective mentality with the Nile and with the indisputable right to fully benefit from its waters. But the competition over Nile's waters has been reborn by the interference of colonial powers in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Although they partitioned Africa through the common accord of the Berlin Conference (that took place between November 1884 and April 1885), French colonists continued to be dissatisfied with the British dominance over continent's North-Eastern region, from Nile's springs to its delta. Therefore, they decided to build a bridgehead in Sudan. This agreement violation has generated a strong British reaction, which decided to send, in 1898, an expeditionary force near the Sudanese town of Fashoda to destroy the French military force cantonated there[9].

A year later, the two colonial powers reached an agreement, with France taking control of the Congo River's basin, and England taking control of the White Nile basin. Besides region's control stakes, this conflict was amplified by British false impression that Nile's springs would be exclusively originated from Victoria, Edward, Albert, and Kyoga lakes. In fact, English colonists' interest in securing and extending the fertile areas within Nile basin's outskirts was a strictly economic one, explained by the dependence of the British textile industry on cotton imports. This economic interest was part of a much more important stake for the British Empire which aimed at the:

- control of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden, whereby the maritime route between the metropolis and India was halved – Egypt having an


[7] Concept introduced by Dutch publisher Harry Verhoeven; see: H. Verhoeven, *Africa's Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia's Power Plays*, 12.04.2015, <http://ogadentoday.com/?p=6991> (27.02.2018).

[8] B. Trew, *Archaeologists' race to save Nubian history from Nile waters*, The Times, 6.03.2017, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/archaeologists-race-to-save-nubian-history-from-nile-waters-q6r2rnckw> (27.02.2018).

[9] J. Jones, *The Fashoda Incident*, West Chester University, History, <http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/lectures/ fashoda.htm> (27.02.2018).

exceptional strategic position in the middle of this distance, in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa (whose harbors were compulsory stopover places for ships and turntables for the regional trade);
- control of the Levantine Mediterranean, targeted by the Russian expansionism – which had become the main threat to the British supremacy in Asia.

Fig. 2. Jonglei Canal



Source: *Economic dimension of the conflict*, <http://www1.american.edu/faculty/singerman/eagleeyeondarfur/economicdimensionsmain.html> (12.01.2018).

But, as the White Nile's flow has never been an abundant one, due to intense evaporation within the marsh regions and scarce rainfalls, in 1930, the English colonists designed the Jonglei Canal[10] (see the map in Fig. 2), which was meant to become one of the most expensive hydro-technical constructions on the continent. The channel would have had to cross the great marshes and to irrigate the arid lands of Sudan and Egypt. Initiated in 1978, the canal's construction was interrupted in 1984 following the outbreak of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). In 2008, canal's construction was theoretically resumed, with Egyptian technical support, without being completed yet.

Also, in 1929, during the colonial rule of the region, Egypt and other East-African British colonies signed the 1929 Exchange of note between His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian government on

[10] D. Doran, *The Jonglei Canal Project: A Case Study on Water Security in Southern Sudan*, Peace Operations Training Institute, <http://www.peaceopstraining.org/cotipso/theses/the-jonglei-canal-project-a-case-study-on-water-security-in-sou/> (27.02.2018).

the use of Waters of the Nile for irrigation, also known as the Nile Water Agreement[11]. According to this agreement, Egypt has gained the *veto power* regarding all upstream hydro-technical projects and received the right to use 48 billion cubic meters of Nile's water annually and all the waters from the dry season, and Sudan received the right to use 4 billion cubic meters of water annually.

Patronized by the English colonists, the agreement was signed without consulting the Ethiopian side. Thirty years later, the deal was renegotiated. The new agreement, entitled the 1959 Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, was even more generous with the states of former Egyptian-Sudanese British condominium which have received 99% of the average river's flow. According to this new agreement, Egypt has received 55,5 billion cubic meters per year and Sudan has received 18,5 billion cubic meters annually. Also, three hydro-technical projects have been approved: the construction of the Aswan Dam (1971) in Egypt as well as the construction of the Roseires (1966) and Khashm al-Girba (1964) dams in Sudan.

But, the upstream states considered this new agreement an abuse. Once more, Ethiopia has not been among the signatories of the agreement. Moreover, as protest, Emperor Haile Selassie I (1892-1975) forced the separation of the Ethiopian Orthodox National Church from the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria[12]. Also, the other sub-Saharan riparian states, based on the Clean Slate Doctrine or the Nyerere[13] Doctrine of the Succession Treaty that relieves the successor state from the benefits or the obligations stipulated by the treaties of the predecessor state[14], have challenged the obligation to apply the treaties signed under the rule of the former colonial power.

In reply, Egypt encouraged the Islamic secessionism in Eritrea and Somalia's claims over Ogaden region. Furthermore, in 1979, Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat (1918-1981) declared that whoever challenges his country's historical right to benefit from Nile's waters will have to bear the consequences of the war[15]. The tension increased in the 1980s when drought

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[11] A. T. Wolf, J. T. Newton, *Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Nile waters Agreement,* Oregon State University, Institute for Water abd Watersheds, <http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Nile_New.htm> (27.02.2018).

[12] M. W. Lewis, *Religious Change and Tension in Ethiopia,* GeoCurentts, 21.06.2013, <http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/religion/religious-change-and-tension-in-ethiopia>, (27.02.2018).

[13] Doctrine formulated by Tanzanian President Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999).

[14] A. Bisima, *A critical review of the 'Nyerere Doctrine of State Succession'*, Graduates Brain – box, 24.02.2011, <http://graduatesbrain-box.blogspot.ro/2011/01/nyerere-doctrine-of-state-succession_24.html>, (27.02.2018).

[15] P. Kameri-Mbote, *Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Lessons From the Nile River Basin (No. 4),* Wilson Center, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/water-conflict-and-cooperation-lessons-the-nile-river-basin-no-4> (27.02.2018).

decreased Nile's flow, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians died of hunger and Egypt faced the hunger and energy collapse as a result of Lake Nasser decreased level.

On the other hand, Nile waters usage has been the subject of several international conventions and agreements[16] that have used the *equitable shares* term. However, Egypt and Sudan continue to benefit of the "lion's share" from the average annual river's flow, with 85% of this water coming from the Ethiopian plateau.

Moreover, in the 1990s, Hosni Mubarak's administration decided to build the Toshka irrigation Canal, a "second valley of the Nile", and one of the most expensive hydro-technical constructions in the world, which uses over 10% of Lake Nasser's water for irrigation within Western Egypt[17]. The completion of Toshka project has boosted tensions with Ethiopia and with the rest of the Sub-Saharan riparian states, which decided to sign a framework co-operation agreement[18] on Nile water use called *the Nile Basin Initiative* (NBI).

This agreement has stipulated the establishment of a multinational commission with censor role and with *veto power* over future hydro-technical projects (canals, irrigation, dams) within Nile's basin. The multinational commission, headquartered in Ethiopia's capital, Addis-Ababa, was designated to work in co-operation with World Bank representatives, the main funding organization of this new structure. But the provisions of the new agreement have been rejected by Egypt and Sudan, becoming virtually inoperative.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

At almost 25 miles from the border with Sudan, in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, along the Blue Nile, Ethiopia is about to complete[19] the largest dam on the African continent (1800 m long and 155 m deep[20]), contesting Sudan's and Egypt's legal and historic right of almost exclusively use of Nile's waters. Ethiopia's decision was also supported by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania, from whose territories other Nile's tributaries spring.

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[16] It is the Helsinki Agreement of 1966, the United Nations *Convention on the Law* of the *Non*-navigational *Uses* of International Watercourses of 1997 and the Nile Basin Initiative 1999.

[17] *Toshka Project – Mubarak Pumping Station, Egypt*, water-technology.net, <http://www.water-technology.net/projects/mubarak/> (27.02.2018).

[18] *Cooperative Framework Agreement*, Nile Basin Initiative, <http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/nbi/cooperative-framework-agreement> (20.01.2018).

[19] M. Xuequan, *Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam 60 pct completed***,** Xinhua, 08.08.2017, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-08/08/c_136506781.htm> (20.01.2018).

[20] *Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project*, <https://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/in-progress/dams-hydroelectric-plants-hydraulic-works/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-project.html> (25.01.2018).

In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced its intention to build, in cooperation with China, several dams on the Tekeze, Omo and Gibe rivers. On the same occasion, Addis Ababa leaders announced their intention to build, with national funds, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile[21] (see the map in Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Ethiopia's Map with GERD



Source: J. Kumagai, *The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Gets Set to Open*, IEEE SPECTRUM, 30.12.2016, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/policy/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gets-set-to-open> (27.01.2018).

Considered to be the largest hydro-technical project on the African continent, estimated at about $ 5 billion, GERD is going to include a 74 billion-m³ reservoir, which will be filled between 5 and 15 years[22], and a 6000-megawatt hydro power plant[23]. Projected to be completed in 2015, GERD construction encountered delays due to Egyptian lobby political pressure over potential international financiers (World Bank, European Investment Bank,

[21] D. Nisman, *China's African Water Scramble*, Huffington Post, <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-nisman/chinas-african-water-scra_b_2248874.html> (27.01.2018).
[22] J. Kumagai, *The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Gets Set to Open*, IEEE SPECTRUM, 30.12.2016, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/policy/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gets-set-to-open> (27.01.2018).
[23] *Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, op. cit.*

African Development Bank[24]). But it seems that the Ethiopians have received financial support from China through Exim Bank, which is playing this "ace" in relation with Egypt and Sudan[25]. At the present time, over 60% of GERD project has been completed[26].

The geopolitical impact of GERD construction

Obviously, Nile waters' problem has become a geopolitical one due to GERD's long-term implications.

On one hand, Ethiopians claim that GERD will reduce Nile's evaporation, will increase river's flow, will control floods to the Sahel, will provide cheap energy to both Ethiopia and neighbouring countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen), becoming a prosperity' vector.

On the other hand, Egypt argues that this dam will provide to Ethiopia a state power projection tool, especially in the context of the projected demographic growth in the Nile Basin of over 600 million inhabitants by the middle of this century[27].

Analyzing Ethiopia's geopolitical rise of the recent years, it becomes obvious that GERD will radically change the power relations within the region, to the detriment of Egypt. The situation becomes explosive in the context of climate warming and of the anticipated demographic growth in the Nile Basin that might initiate Egypt's strong reaction with major geopolitical and geo-economical impact, if we only take into consideration the Suez Canal, which connects the Indian Ocean with the North of the Atlantic one.

In 2015, Egyptian President's, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, administration signed with Ethiopia and Sudan a preliminary agreement on GERD, stipulating parties' commitment to avoid damaging each other and to offer reciprocal compensation in case of losses. But the Egyptian part continues to assert that the Ethiopian decision to build GERD violates the provisions of the 1959 Treaty in which Egypt had the right to *veto* every hydro-technical projects throughout the Nile Basin.

While president el-Sisi adopted a more diplomatic language, reminding the Ethiopians that Egyptian citizens' lives are totally dependent on Nile's waters

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[24] A. Swain, Q. Jamali, *The China Factor: New Challenges for Nile Basin Cooperation, "New Routes: Water – a source of development and conflict"*, Volume 15, Life & Peace Institute, 3/2011, pp. 7-10, <http://ecopeaceme.org/uploads/New_Routes_March_2011_Published_Article.pdf> (27.03.2018).

[25] D. Nisman, *op. cit.*

[26] A. Aman, *Cairo taps World Bank to mediate Ethiopian dam dispute*, AL-MONITOR, 12.01.2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/egypt-world-bank-intermediary-ethiopia-renaissance-dam.html> (27.01.2018).

[27] H. Verhoeven, *Africa's Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia's Power Plays*, 12.04.2015, <http://ogadentoday.com/?p=6991> (27.02.2018).

and that "no one can touch Egypt's share of water"[28], Mohamed Nassr Allam's speech, former minister of waters[29] has been different. Allam strongly condemned Addis Ababa government's decision saying that GERD will have catastrophic effects on Egypt. In Allam's opinion, the filling of GERD's reservoir lake will considerably diminish the level of Nasser Lake of the Aswan Dam[30], will reduce electricity production, will lower river's flow and will reduce soils' irrigation capacity, causing erosion phenomena on hundreds of hectares, small farmers' bankruptcy and a crisis of the drinking water supply of the Egyptian population. Or, in other words, "GERD will provide Ethiopia's control over Egypt's food and energy security, turning itself into a threat towards Egyptian state's national security and into an undisputed regional power vector for Ethiopia".

As much as the GERD building project is coming to an end, the Egyptian mass-media is revealing information about the Sudanese financiers of the Ethiopian project as well as the ones from Qatar[31]. However, it seems that the main financier is China, as it was revealed in a telegram published by *Wikileaks* in September 2012, where the Egyptian Ambassador in Lebanon was speaking about his country's decision to attack the Chinese funded GERD[32].

In this context, Meles Alem, Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, pointed out that Ethiopia doesn't have to ask anybody's permission to benefit or not from its natural wealth, while rejecting the idea of GERD's external funding from Qatar[33]. Moreover, the Ethiopian representative criticized Egypt's point of view, arguing that it is based on an act signed during the colonial period, when the British colonists have dictated the regional politics. In turn, Sudan, which is economically benefiting from GERD, has rallied to Ethiopia's position and has begun, in turn, to challenge the validity of the old treaty.

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[28] S. Magdy, *Egypt warns Ethiopia Nile dam dispute is 'life or death'*, 18.11.2019, Times of Israel, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-warns-ethiopia-nile-dam-dispute-life-or-death/> (27.01.2018).

[29] G. Witte, *Egypt sees Ethiopian dam as a risk to water supply*, The Guardian, 18.06.2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/egypt-ethiopia-dam-blue-nile> (27.01.2018).

[30] Placed at the Egyptian-Sudan border, the Aswan Dam was built by the Egyptians in the 1960s, with Soviet support, to regulate floods, generate electricity, and store water for periods of drought.

[31] M. Asal, *Qatar funds Ethiopia's dam to escalate crisis with Egypt*, Egypt Today, 14.11.2017, <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/32555/Qatar-funds-Ethiopia%E2%80%99s-dam-to-escalate-crisis-with-Egypt> (25.01.2018).

[32] D. Nisman, *op. cit.*

[33] *Ethiopia denies receiving funding from Qatar to build Renaissance Dam*, MEMO Middle East Monitor, 24.11.2017, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171124-ethiopia-denies-receiving-funding-from-qatar-to-build-renaissance-dam/> (25.01.2018).

In reply, the Egyptians called for World Bank (WB) mediation, as Nile Basin Initiative's funding institution, asking WB to validate the impact studies submitted by the Ethiopians and the Sudanese[34] and to initiate new tripartite negotiations with Sudan and Ethiopia[35].

But the situation is far from being solved. Every day, the regional "game" is getting more complicated due to the intervention of both state actors – as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the US, the Russian Federation, Israel as well as of highly influential non-state actors – as the World Bank and the Islamist organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seems to be one of the "keys" of the whole issue.

The pan-Islamic ultra-conservative political-social movement called *Jama 'At Harakat Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Ikhwan) – The Muslim Brotherhood*[36] (MB) was the initiator and the main beneficiary of the wave of anarchy that destroyed the secular Arab world, known as the "Arab Spring". In the 30th of June, 2012, MB became Egypt's official ruling force, due to Mohammed Morsi's victory in the presidential elections. Former associate professor of California State University, Northridge[37], with a doctorate in engineering, Morsi was the president of Liberty and Justice Party – affiliate to the Muslim Brotherhood. But Egyptian army – loyal to the secular values of the Atatürk-Nasser doctrine, with the support of Saudi Arabia and of other states in the region[38], was successful in removing Morsi from presidency on July 3rd, 2013, reinstating the Egyptian secular state. Therefore, MB's local militants have regrouped in "haven states" such as:

- Turkey – where, MB represents the leading force since 2003 through the *Justice and Development Party* (AKP)[39] and through Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan, former AKP president and current state president[40];

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[34] A. Aman, *op. cit.*

[35] *Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to meet on Monday for Nile dam talks*, MEMO Middle East Monitor, 28.01.2018, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180128-egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-to-meet-on-monday-for-nile-dam-talks/> (25.01.2018).

[36] F. Ozyagli, *Hassan Al-Banna: The man who started it all*, World Bulletin, <http://www.worldbulletin.net/personage/115124/hassan-al-banna-the-man-who-started-it-all> (29.03.2017).

[37] *Mohamed Morsy Fast Facts*, CNN Library, 23.06.2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/28/world/meast/mohamed-morsy---fast-facts/index.html> (27.02.2018).

[38] D. Greenfield, *Muslim Brotherhood claims Saudi Arabia, Israel, America and Iran are behind coup*, Frontpage, 10.08.2013, <https://www.frontpagemag.com/point/200089/muslim-brotherhood-claims-saudi-arabia-israel-daniel-greenfield> (25.01.2018).

[39] A. I. Catrinel Popescu, *The decline of Kemalism and Turkey's „grey zone" destiny*, „Geostrategic Pulse" Supplement, no. 237, 20.05.2017, INGEPO-Consulting Braşov.

[40] P. Tremblay, *Muslim Brotherhood crumbling around Erdogan*, AL-MONITOR, 24.01.2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/turkey-muslim-brotherhood-last-bastion-crumbling.html> (25.01.2018).

- Tunisia – where, in 2012, the *Ennahda Movement* and its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi[41], were very influential;
- Sudan – where, General Omar al-Bashir's regime was brought to power and supported by the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood[42], despite the clashes between al-Bashir and MB's local leader, Hassan Abd Allah al-Turabi[43];
- Jordan – where, the Hashemite monarchy is subject to the pressure exerted, after 1948, by the Palestinians (most of them naturalized, which now exceeded 2 million out of total 9,5 million of Jordan citizens[44]), many of them members and supporters of *Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islāmī - Islamic Action Front*, MB affiliated party[45];
- Morocco – where, after winning the 2016 poll, MB's affiliated *Party of Justice and Development* became the country's main political force, also obtaining the post of prime minister for Abdelilah Benkirane[46];
- Yemen – where, Islamic Reform Congregation *Al Islah* – the political branch of the *Islamic Front*[47] (a ultraconservative militia affiliated to the MB), has been a major actor during the 2011 Yemeni's "spring" and within the subsequent instability;
- Qatar – where is functioning one of the oldest and the most powerful subsidiaries of the organization[48], financially and logistically supported by members of the al-Thani dynastic house. Actually, Qatar's constant support for the Brotherhood was the real cause of the fracture within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), between Qatar and the other monarchies aligned with Saudi Arabia and hostile to Doha's ambitions. Thus, in an unprecedented gesture, in July 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Bahrain, as well as Egypt, Yemen and the

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[41] H. Ibish, *Is this the end of the failed Muslim Brotherhood project?*, The National, 5.10.2013, <https://www.thenational.ae/is-this-the-end-of-the-failed-muslim-brotherhood-project-1.478124> (25.01.2018).

[42] *National Islamic Front*, <http://www.sudanupdate.org/WHOSWHO/NIF.HTM> (7.07.2017).

[43] *Hassan al-Turabi, Sudan opposition leader who hosted Osama bin Laden, dies*, The Guardian, 6.03.2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/06/hassan-al-turabi-sudan-opposition-leader-who-hosted-osama-bin-laden-dies> (25.01.2018).

[44] UNRWA, *Where We Work*, 01.12.2016, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan> (25.01.2018).

[45] C. Ryan, *Jordan's Islamic Action Front Presses for Role in Governing*, Carnegie Middle East Center, 19.08.2008, <http://carnegie-mec.org/sada/20919> (7.07.2017).

[46] *Justice and Development Party: Morocco*, 26.02.2016, InternationalRelations.org, <http://internationalrelations.org/justice-and-development-party-morocco/> (8.07.2017).

[47] S. P. Yadav, *Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood and the perils of powersharing*, Brookings, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Yemen_Yadav-FINALE.pdf> (7.07.2017), p. 1.

[48] C. Alexander, S. Dodge, *Muslim Brotherhood Is at theHeart of Gulf Standoff With Qatar*, Bloomberg, 7.06.2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-muslim-brotherhood/> (7.07.2017).

Maldives interrupted diplomatic relations with Qatar due to Doha's support to the Muslim Brotherhood[49] and its global Islamic projects[50]. At the same time, the Saudis published a list of 12 organizations and 59 persons affiliated to the MB and accused of terrorist activities, including some of the al-Thani dynasty members[51];

- Palestine – where, the local Muslim Brotherhood was and is still headed by *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya - Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas*[52], as well as in other states, where the MB subsidiaries were well represented and tolerated by the authorities.

Benefiting from influential positions in the "haven states", the Muslim Brotherhood declared its hostility towards Egyptian President's regime, both through political affiliated leaders from the hosting states[53] and directly within the conferences organized in Istanbul and Lahore[54].

In this context, it becomes obvious that, any revolt ignited by even a moderate economic impact of GERD on the Egyptian farmers will immediately be instrumentalised by the Islamists, who will try to stir up a new Egyptian "spring". Hereby, Khartoum leaders' decision to join Ethiopia in this potential conflict must be understood not only in terms of commercial benefits but also through MB's intervention, which has officially been governing Sudan since 1993.

And things do not stop here. Among "haven states'" leaders, who condemned the Egyptian secular putsch, the most vocal was President Erdoğan, who decided to suspend diplomatic relations, at the ambassador level, between his country and Egypt[55]. This decision must be taken into consideration in

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[49] T. Qiblawi, M. Tawfeeq, E. Roberts, H. Alkhshali, *Qatar rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt cut diplomatic ties*, CNN, 27.07.2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatar-terror/index.html> (7.08.2017).

[50] M. Kedar, *Why the Saudis and Muslim Brotherhood Hate Each Other*, Arutz Sheva, 13.05.2014, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14994> (7.04.2017).

[51] *Terror list: 59 individuals and 12 Qatari-affiliated entities as listed in the Saudi, UAE, Bahraini, Egyptian statement*, Arab News,<http://www.arabnews.com/node/1112391/saudi-arabia> (7.08.2017).

[52] N. Masalha, S. Hamid, *More than just the Muslim Brotherhood: The problem of Hamas and Jordan's Islamic Movement*, BROOKINGS, 6.02.2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/more-than-just-the-muslim-brotherhood-the-problem-of-hamas-and-jordans-islamic-movement/> (7.07.2017).

[53] *International reactions to Morsi's removal*, Al Jazeera, 5.07.2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373223029610370.html> (7.04.2017).

[54] M. Al-Youm, *Brotherhood international organization meets to examine escalation against Egypt*, Egypt Independent, 26.09.2013, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/brotherhood-international-organization-meets-examine-escalation-against-egypt/> (7.01.2018).

[55] *Egypt downgrades diplomatic relations with Turkey, expels ambassador*, Hürriyet Daily News, 23.11.2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egypt-downgrades-diplomatic-relations-with-turkey-expels-ambassador-58413> (7.01.2018).

conjunction with the inauguration, in late 2017, of Turkey's largest military base[56] (outside the national territory) in Somalia, which will operate in conjunction with the already operational one in Qatar. In turn, Qatar has developed a tense relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia's allies in the GCC due to Doha's support for MB.

The situation is even more complicated by US foreign policy re-settlement on its traditional, pro-Israel, way. US President's Donald Trump declaration of recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state[57] has triggered a wave of hostility within the Muslim world, starting with the Palestinian leaders[58] and ending with their more or less conjuncture allies, including Turkey and Iran[59]. This statement must be analyzed in the context of US administration's ongoing offensive against global Islamist network – identified with the MB, suggestively described by Riyadh Summit's group photography, from May 2017, with the US President Trump, Saudi King Salman and Egyptian President el-Sisi[60] (see the picture in Fig. 4).

[56] *Turkey sets up largest overseas army base in Somalia*, Al Jazeera, 01.10.2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-base-somalia-171001073820818.html> (7.01.2018).

[57] M. Landler, *Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's Capital and Orders U.S. Embassy to Move*, The New York Times, 6.12.2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html> (7.01.2018).

[58] *Palestinians call 'days of rage' over US Jerusalem move*, Al Jazeera, 6.12.2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/palestinian-days-rage-trump-jerusalem-plan-171206103433314.html> (7.01.2018).

[59] O. Beavers, *Iran votes to declare Jerusalem 'capital of Palestine'*, The Hill, 27.12.2017, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/366601-iran-votes-to-declare-jerusalem-the-capital-of-palestine> (7.01.2018).

[60] *Riyadh summit discusses ways of rooting out terrorism*, Al Jazeera, 21.05.2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/riyadh-summit-discusses-ways-rooting-terrorism-170521132843998.html> (7.01.2018).

Fig. 4. Symbolic Photography of the Riyadh Summit



Source: B. Johnson, *Al-Qaeda Slams Trump as 'Hateful Crusader Master,' Issues Fresh Call for Jihad*, PJ Media, 23.05.2017, <https://pjmedia.com/homeland-security/2017/05/23/al-qaeda-slams-trump-as-hateful-crusader-master-issues-fresh-call-for-jihad/> (25.10.2015).

Also, it is important to remember that MB's Supreme Leader, Muhammad Badie, sentenced to life imprisonment for numerous offenses including terrorism, said before the Egyptian court that "Palestine is our primary cause. Liberate us and we will release Jerusalem and Palestine"[61]. And, it should also be noticed French President's, Emmanuel Macron, and other European leaders' firm attitude against Washington's decision[62], as well as the pro-Palestinian street protests in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan, countries where the MB is well represented.

Another "key" of the potential conflict belongs to Beijing. On one side, Chinese Banks are among the financiers of the master plan that will develop and transform Ethiopia into an East-African regional power. On the other side, the Chinese are interested in taking control over the commercial traffic through

[61] A. A. el-Fetouh, *Jerusalem is lost only in the eyes of the insolent*, MEMO Middle East Monitor, 19.12.2017, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171219-jerusalem-is-lost-only-in-the-eyes-of-the-insolent/> (25.01.2018).

[62] P. Beaumont, P. Wintour, *Macron tells Netanyahu that US recognition of Jerusalem is threat to peace*, The Guardian, 10.12.2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/10/benjamin-netanyahu-visits-europe-after-us-recognition-of-jerusalem-israel-capital> (7.01.2018).

the Suez Canal and becoming Egyptian government's main partners in major sustainable development projects[63].

In fact, China's involvement in Nile's hydro-policy should not surprise anyone. Since 1991, the year of the unravelling of the Soviet Empire and of international system's reconfiguration, China has massively moved in Africa, taking over the areas formerly controlled by the Soviets, Romanians and by other competitors. Thus, through a supportive smart power policy that combined the economic, political and educational-cultural components with the military support, China has become a geo-strategically active player not only in the African states of the former Communist bloc, but also in the states known for the pro-Western views, such as Nigeria or South Africa, as a result of the, already traditional, US administrations' Afro-scepticism[64].

Consequently, Beijing's ambitions to turn the Sub-Saharan Africa into a second China, could not have bypassed Ethiopia, subcontinent's informal diplomatic pole, which hosts of the African Union headquarters and of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa[65]. This special status of Ethiopia is an attraction for any geostrategic player interested in influencing the decision-making process of international institutions operating at regional level, a matter that could not have been escaped unnoticed by the Chinese diplomacy.

Besides, China's investments in Ethiopia are not just about hydro-energy infrastructure, they also target other economic sectors, from railways and telecommunications, to agriculture and mining sector[66], the African state being one of the pillars of "*One Belt One Road" Initiative*'s Southern Corridor.

And, last but not least, we have to mention Chinese military presence in Djibouti (where Chinese owns a functional military base) as well as in other African states, military presence which I have described in a paper I published in 2017, entitled *"Control of Key Maritime Straits – China's global strategic objective"*[67]. This military presence must be corroborated with Chinese need to secure their investments and domination of the Horn of Africa, as well as with Beijing's interest in taking control of maritime traffic in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden, an interest that has driven China's transformation into the main partner of the Egyptian government in implementing major sustainable development projects[68].

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[63] A. I. Catrinel Popescu, *Control of key maritime straits – China's global strategic objective*, Geostrategic Pulse Supplement, no. 225, 25.11.2016, INGEPO Consulting.

[64] Afro-scepticism: the tendency to marginalize Africa's geopolitical and the geostrategic importance and to strictly reduce it to raw materials supplier status. It has been noticed since 1979 as a result of mutations in Islamic area, and has grown over the last 27 years.

[65] *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*, <https://www.uneca.org/pages/contacts> (7.01.2018).

[66] H. Tibebu, *Ethiopia: Ethio-China Dynamic Economic Relations*, The Ethiopian Herald, 18.02.2017, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201702180271.html> (7.03.2018).

[67] A. I. Catrinel Popescu, *op. cit.*

[68] *Ibidem.*

Another "key" stands in Moscow, whose troops are stationed in the Sinai Peninsula, within the Multinational Force provided by the terms of the 1978 *Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement*. Also, Russia received the right to use Egyptian military bases for operations airplanes against Libyan Islamic terrorists/rebels and not only[69]. In the mean time, Russia is one of Ethiopia's traditional economic partners. Recently, in June 2017, Russia and Ethiopia signed a memorandum on nuclear cooperation[70].

A very important "key" can be found in Washington, where the Republican administration has declared its support for both the secular regime of President el-Sisi[71] as well as for the development of the strategic partnership with Ethiopia[72]. It is important to mention that, besides the political and economic presence, the US also has a consistent military presence in the region, focused around Camp Lemonnier-Djibouti military base, which is subordinated to USAFRICOM.

Also, another two players should not be forgotten. One is Israel, usually a silent player, but very active in the region due to its direct security interests. Recently, through Prime Minister's Benjamin Netanyahu voice[73] Israel declared its global political dimension. The second one is Iran, a declared adversary of the Jewish state and the Saudi monarchy. Iran is already projecting its force in neighbouring Yemen (through the Houthis rebels) as well as in Syria and Lebanon (directly and through the Hezbollah militia).

And, last but not least, the international organizations which are operating in the region, from the African Union and the Nile Basin Initiative to the UN, the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council. Though they don't have a "key" (due to the fact they don't share the same interests as the state and non-state actors), these international organizations become influential players in the pre-conflict phase by providing the framework for political dialogue and mediation between the parties and, especially, in the post-conflict phase, when they provide peacekeeping troops, and are involved in the reconstruction.

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[69] D. D. Kirkpatrick, *In Snub to U.S., Russia and Egypt Move Toward Deal on Air Bases*, New York Times, 30.11.2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/middleeast/russia-egypt-air-bases.html> (7.01.2018).

[70] *Russia and Ethiopia sign a Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy*, ROSATOM, 19.06.2017, <http://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/russia-and-ethiopia-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-on-cooperation-in-peaceful-uses-of-atomic-ene/> (7.01.2018).

[71] R. Revesz, *Donald Trump praises Egypt President al-Sisi and plans trip to Cairo*, INDEPENDENT, 21.05.2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-praises-egypt-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-safety-visit-cairo-saudi-arabia-meeting-a7747171.html> (7.01.2018).

[72] *U. S. Relations With Ethiopia*, US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, 10.05.2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm> (7.01.2018).

[73] *Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu Full Speech at UN 9/19/17*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_JF9cWmjgEc> (7.01.2018).

However, it should be remembered that these international organizations have a limited capacity to intervene, due to the divergent interests of their key members, most of them among the active geostrategic players mentioned above.

Therefore, GERD's geopolitical impact exceeds the dimensions of a local dispute and the regional prospective analysis doesn't seem to be positive, at least if we take into account a report, published in 2010, by the Inter-Action Council (IAC) – a consultancy group of former heads of state and government from 40 states of the world. In that report IAC was drawing attention towards potential global water crisis which will have a "devastating future" impact on peace, political stability and future economic development of the planet[74].

What could be the impact of an Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict on regional security? There is only one answer: devastating. The interference of a multitude of geostrategic players with opposite interests among which some are Islamists and others are Middle East key players' interested in their own security imperatives, risk to transform Egypt and Ethiopia into failed states, as Syria and Somalia.

In such a situation, a regional instability quadrilateral would emerge. This quadrilateral would be delimitated, on the northern side – by a hypothetic axis that unifies Syria and Libya, passing through Egypt, and on the southern side – by a hypothetic axis that unifies Yemen and Ethiopia, passing through Somalia and Eritrea. The emergence of the regional instability quadrilateral:

- would affect maritime flows through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait with all economic and strategic consequences,
- would export instability by amplifying inter-confessional tensions in Central Africa, which would create a Trans-African "belt of instability" by unifying with unstable Western and Northern African regions already under Islamists' control,
- would intensify the pressure of migration in Europe and would lead to EU's implosion due to the deepening of the already existing divergences between the European states.

Is it possible to witness the outbreak of a regional war?

In the short term (0-3 years), given the network of interests and, in particular, the consequences of such a conflict on the strategic balance in the Levant, Mediterranean Africa and the Horn of Africa, the answer is negative. But, however, the initiation of potential hybrid, non-kinetic actions cannot be ruled out, in order to increase tensions between the two countries or to ignite discontent among the Egyptian population.

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[74] *Former world leaders, including Jean Chretien, sound alarm on global water crisis*, thestar.com, 10.09.2012, <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/09/10/former_ world _leaders_including_jean_chretien_sound_alarm_on_global_water_crisis.html> (27.02.2018).

However, in the medium to long term (3-20 years), the risk of such a conflict increases, especially if the forecasted demographic pressure exerted by more than 600 million potential inhabitants of the area, will be amplified by the following favourable circumstances:

- a treaty on the distribution of Nile waters, accepted by all riparian states, will not come into force;
- Egyptian economy will continue to be predominantly agrarian, dependent on Nile waters;
- there will be no regional master plan of hydro-technical works designed to combat the evaporation of the Nile waters;
- climate change will accelerate desertification;
- Nile dispute will be amplified by inter-confessional and inter-ethnic connotations;
- political forces interested in creating the semicircle of instability in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean will re-emerge.

Anyhow, GERD completion represents Ethiopia's birthday as regional power and the end of Egypt's domination in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, based on eco-crisis triggering mechanisms[75] analyzed by Thomas Homer-Dixon, it becomes obvious that in the absence of effective political, hydro-technical, economic and military measures, the Nile Basin might transform into a potential "clock bomb" – a "clock bomb", that could seriously affect the strategic, political and demographic balance in one of the "hottest" global areas.

Therefore, only more efficient water resource management and finding consensus formulas between group policies "will enable humanity to better respond to all the problems issued by the warming of the planet"[76] – as former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien has stated, in 2012, during one of the IAC meetings.

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[75] T. F. Homer-Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflicts: Evidence from Cases*, Part 1, *"Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University of Toronto International Security"*, Vol. 19, No. I (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40, <http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/2855/Environmental_Scarcities_and_Violent_Conflict.pdf?sequence=1> (25.03.2018).

[76] *Former world leaders, including Jean…op. cit.*

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TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA: PREREQUISITES, ACTORS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Abstract:
Countries in West Africa region are colligated not merely in compliance with the geographical logic in the strictest sense of the word. Their ancient heritage and unique national and cultural shapes of nowadays extend the classic understanding of this part of the Sahel region as a concentrated geographical aggregation. Local prerequisites for sustaining safe and predictable community environment unite whilst abstract Sahel state members as a subject and object to international relations. The purpose of the article is to investigate the local development and manifestation of standard social markers and processes (such as the political system, cultural and religious specifics, economy – including employment rate, national and ethnic neighbourhoods and connections). The author should be able to study and explore the non-static nature of terrorism as a local concept including a) the impacts it accepts and extends; b) the typical regularity in the life cycle of this antisocial phenomenon. Actors and understandings (both local and international) about the rationale, motives and objectives of terrorism in the West Africa region would be analyzed for the purposes of a paper which aims to identify whether viable individual and social opportunities exist as an alternative course and how they should be sourced and handled.

Keywords:
terrorism, culture, religion, motivation, economy

Defining terrorism

This paper aims at analyzing terror as a phenomenon of actual social dimension by endeavouring to identify its contours and these of its

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consequences beyond the abstract understanding we may usually have about this anti-social occurrence.

Subject and object to the analysis are selected among societies inhabiting Africa's territory to the West and South of the conditional border historically set by Sahara desert. Concept of terrorism as a regional phenomenon sets the need for a scientifically grounded look on particular specifics valid for West Africa communities. The adequate assessment of the common socio-economic, cultural and historical scenarios would accomplish the hypothesis of local prerequisites, heroes and alternatives that would, on their part, materialize terrorism beyond the schematicity of a doctrine and would practically make it assessable as per classic civilizational criterion.

Functionality of terrorism organically depends on the type of social and political texture of society's own functioning. Spectre of social tolerance towards individual, cultural, national, religious and ethnical variety is linked to both individual and common maturity (as well as to the level of comfort between them). The local development and manifestation of standard social markers and processes (political system, cultural and religious specifics, economy (including employment rate), national and ethnic neighbourhoods and connections) compound the list of significant symptoms and factors indicating society's health.

Understanding terrorism as a concept should start with taking notice of the historic and emotional connotation set by the very etymology. "Terrorism" origins directly from the Latin word of *terrere* which laconically, yet unambiguously, means "to fear". Fear of the abstract figure of the foreigner, who invades to depolarize pillars of familiar mainstay, is atavistic. Potential encroachment, which is planned and communicated so as to destabilize this mainstay, could be powerful mobilizer of feelings such as panic, disorientation and horror. Man is psychologically motivated to categorize unexplored people, circumstances and situations by trying to work them in their own individual cognitive experience's matrix when tending to solidify their own navigability. Categorization ("terrorism"/"terrorist" in the particular paper) requires a thorough analysis of an individual behavioural reaction. "The basic cognitive process in stereotyping is categorization, the structuring of sense data through grouping persons, objects and events (or their selected attributes), as being similar or equivalent to one another in their relevance to an individual's actions, intentions or attitudes", state Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams[2]. They further insist: "They help us to predict when and how various aspects of these categorizations fit or do not fit requirements posed by the need to systematize the information which individuals receive or select from their environment".

When being analyzed through the multiple leveled specter of a social phenomenon, terrorism requires scientific formulation of essence and aspects impacted by it so as to enable a precise scientific prognosis in regards to its

[2] M. A. Hogg, D. Abrams, *Intergroup Relations*, Ann Arbour 2011, p. 134.

sustainability. The following description was offered by the United Nations General Assembly in 1994: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them"[3].

Boaz Ganor, director of International Institute for Counter-Terrorism assumes that "terrorism is a modus operandi in which deliberate violence against civilians is used for the purpose of achieving political goals"[4].

Key words requiring special deliberation in this statement is the generalized image of "civilians" on their stated capacity of an object to (and apparently a tool for) political ambitions. Apparently there should be clear difference made between "the man" and "the men" as objects. With preserving the spotlight on the characteristics ("civilian" people), we would refer to the explanation about "the crowd", as offered by Gustave Le Bon in his book "Crowd Psychology"[5]. He states that crowds' choices are exclusively motivated by unconscious, being deprived from the advantages of keeping its reflexes under control. Le Bon assumes that crowd is, in contrast to individual, not provided with preliminary manifested rationality. Reactions towards external exciters of particular emotions (such as fear) may, therefore, dramatically differ from those of the individual whose emotions would preliminary be "framed" on base of their own cognitive experience.

However, in cases when the audience is subject of or object to arrangements on behalf of a collectively psychological integrity, motives in favour of one or the other behavioural choice apparently require different perusal. Subsequently terrorist organizations, the objects of their collectivity and the subjects to their activities need to be analyzed in the very context of the emotional reasons behind this integrity.

Types of terrorism

Minding the non-static understanding about terrorism, we would note that any precise dissection by specific indicators appears to be time consuming process. However, it generates potentially important knowledge about the very phenomenon hence working counter reactions to be systematized so as to guarantee measurable and effective safety.

The Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, USA, is seen to be describing terrorism as "a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat

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[3] *U. N. General Assembly 84th plenary meeting on 9th December 1994*, <https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm> (31.01.2018).

[4] B. Ganor, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, "Essentials of Terror Medicine", January 2009, pp. 13-26.

[5] G. Le Bon, *Psikhologiya na tulpite*, Moscow 2004, p. 25.

thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes"[6]. The Task Force put disorders and terrorism in six categories. Philip Purpura refers to a definition that describes terrorism as domestic and international[7].

Membership: Why?

What encourages or urges members to join or to sympathize to terrorism? In-depth rooting the profile of a potential terrorist as a collective image or a unit (yet noting the conditionality of such a generalization) is essential to understanding the realistic motives which may predetermine and stimulate the social phenomenon.

Host community's reactivity

Should we revert to the etymological root of "terrorism", we would colligate it to the observation that turning an individual or a group of individuals in horror and panic state requires appropriate context to create appropriate prerequisites. The phenomenon could logically be discoverable in environment pending solid political structure which could be eligible to prevent and to neutralize prerequisites to the emergence of fear and lack of confidence. For mono-product economies where full range of natural resources are yet to be fully exploited, vulnerability emerges with the possible over exploitation of one source of wealth to the account of others. Former periphery areas to earlier European metropolises' industrial expansion – or states to the South of Sahara today – have democratic traditions to deal with which are not genuinely a result to their own experience. Youth unemployment rate, challenged access to qualitative education and healthcare, dynamics in the political conjuncture, the typical cultural, ethnical and national heterogeneity could be seen as productive environment for radical movements to flourish. The relative remoteness of some Sahel countries to geographic alternatives (such as mass refugee flows) may keep the unresolved internal conflicts hermetic by isolating yet eventually intensifying their energy. What is common between the three organizations subject to this paper is the outgoing effect they pursue and radicalism in the set of tools they seem prepared to apply. Another unifying thesis is the rejection of the Western civilizational model. They imply a contrasting set of symbols, messages and suggestions eventually capable to materialize the effect of this rejection. Nigerian group of "Boko Haram" (the name is compound from Hausa and Arabic), which is majorly active in Northern part of the country, aims at

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[6] M. L. Madigan, *Handbook of Emergency Management Concepts: A Step-by-Step Approach*, Boca Raton 2017, Chapter 10.

[7] P. Purpura, *Terrorism and Homeland Security: An Introduction with Applications*, Burlington 2007, p. 17.

affirming Sharia as a generally valid religious and political order on local ground – on account of the pro-West type of social structure. It is stated that late leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf "benefitted immensely from the timing of this message, that coincided with the public resentment precipitated by the social uncertainty arising from excruciating poverty, and so was able to lure many vulnerable, religiously-inclined youths to embrace his new, emerging 'utopia', that promised better alternatives to their misery"[8].

Dr. Benjamin Nickles reportedly concluded that terrorist groups in Africa are sharing three common features in illustration to their essence: marginalization, access to crucial regional links and political vulnerability[9]. He uses the so called "push and pull factors" when analyzing motives of the potential terrorist.

How would all these factors manifest in the cases of the three Sahel active terrorist groups?

Boko Haram in Nigeria apparently has on spotlight (and as a major driving environment) territories widely affected by youth unemployment with every social complications. Noting the stated unemployment and "galloping poverty"[10] we could assume that the attractive (or so called, "push") power of Boko Haram within environment of limited social alternatives is not only subject to religious fundament but also through opportunities for social integration it seemingly bestows. A similar impression is shared by Mohamed Yahya, Regional Programme Coordinator, UNDP Africa who highlights that the shared sense of deprivation is connecting youths who opt for joining Al-Shabaab in Somalia; as well as shared lack of confidence with the constructive role of the state[11]. Newsweek cites U.N. envoy to the Sahel, Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, who had (back in 2015) reportedly claimed that as many as 41 million young people "face hopelessness"[12]. Analysts are quoted by "USA Today" that al-Quaeda is interested in expanding its positions in Sahel[13].

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[8] A. O. Salaam, *The Psychological Make-up of Mohammed Yusuf*, E-ir.info, 4.11.2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/04/the-psychological-make-up-of-mohammed-yusuf/> (31.01.2018).

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[12] C. Gaffey, *Which Jihadi Groups Operate in Africa's Sahel Region?,* Newsweek.com, 6.06.2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/isis-africa-al-qaeda-africa-boko-haram-621443> (31.01.2018).

[13] J. Wirtschafter, K. J. Gadiaga, *Africa becomes the new battleground for ISIS and al-Qaeda as they lose ground in Mideast*, Usatoday.com, 25.10.2017,

Lack of confidence apparently sets a reputation issue on national, regional and even global levels. One may be able to assume that lack of confidence in what is preached by regular norms could reshape trajectory of loyalty. It could be assumed that the consequences might, in reflection, keep the affected regions under the stigma of lasting isolation to best practices which are normally the standard.

Potential impact beyond host territories

Globalizing world has gradually been affirming some of the typical specifics of informational society as seen by Alvin Toffler in "The Third Wave". Significance of information as bargaining chip would discover more and more flexible channels to offspring and to connect those hungrier and hungrier for it in a larger and larger volume. Social networks with accessible news feed as well as humans' growing mobility in global aspect are able to sustain public agenda whereas messages require next to zero resource in order to be convertible. This all neutralizes the chances for their effect to stay purely regional. Information about smouldering terrorist movements around the globe may potentially cement host's image of a place which is objectively challenged to offer sustainable (and predictable) business climate which may and should, in the long run, help produce a rationale for followers. The image of the mythical leader, the soldier who is heavily armed, powerful, distant and practically unreachable whilst still accessible and close to the souls of some of the most vulnerable groups does – in contrast – seemingly compensate the subjective sense of productive social anchor's absence.

Counter terrorist measures should be able to include namely this subjective, the face-to-face (before peer-to-peer) diagnosis and work on the issue starting with the very root of the issue. Handling symptoms may not merely mean over investment of resources; it may eventually encourage meaning and power of the mythical social ascetic determined to a civilizational choice by radical means which would already have been justified in the minds of those who would follow or suffer them.

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DEMOCRATIZATION AS A POSITIVE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CONSOLIDATION PERSPECTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SUCCESS STORIES FROM GEORGIA AND KENYA

Abstract:
Consolidated democracy as already well-established and, to our belief, predominantly endogenous setting, represents one of the influential arguments in favor of ensuring peace and stability in more developed countries, obviously perceived as such not only in economic or social sense. There is even much stronger evidence on the global scale to almost confirm that democratic states are not conducting war against each other as also quite popular liberal perspective suggests through the Democratic Peace Theory in the theory of international relations. Democratic transition or democratization processes taking place mainly in developing countries that can be seen through the lenses whether of organized Westernization, or of a mimicry in the same context (however both are conventionally referred as exogenous efforts), may provide less clear guarantees for safeguarding security within the considered societies and in their foreign policies. Nonetheless, democratizing trends are assessed in any case more positively than other tendencies, especially, apparently of antagonistic, i.e. non-democratic nature. Another question is how lasting and viable such positive results eventually would be, which seems to essentially depend on the success of democratization itself. The article addresses the issues concerning education on corruption, efficient anti-corruption strategies and integrity among one of the most significant segments of a society – students, youth and other social groups in Georgia and Kenya, as well as targets community integrity building (CIB) and social accountability activities in the respective countries from the point of view of more needs-oriented, and at the same time advanced, thus, greatly significant democratization components in the mentioned states, particularly important for the long-run efficiency perspectives. Therefore, in the paper there are analyzed success stories of

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implemented at the Georgian Technical University in 2015-2016 project entitled, "GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School and CIB & Social Accountability Activities" on one hand, and on the other, "Improving Education in Kenya" project and other relevant initiatives being undertaken in the Sub-Saharan African country. These projects in both countries have been financed by the Integrity Action, the international non-governmental organization (INGO), based in the United Kingdom.

Keywords:
democratization; developing countries; Georgia; Kenya; Sub-Saharan Africa; consolidated democracy; Democratic Peace Theory; Westernization; anti-corruption education; community integrity building (CIB) activities; social accountability activities; Integrity Action; "GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School and CIB & Social Accountability Activities"; "Improving Education in Kenya" project; Integrity Action's Community Integrity Building programme (CIB); integrity club; Library-Cultural Center for People with Disabilities "TANADGOMA"; National Taxpayers Association (NTA); Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC)

Introduction

Consolidated democracy as already well-established and, to our belief, predominantly endogenous setting, represents one of the influential arguments in favor of ensuring peace and stability in more developed countries, obviously perceived as such not only in economic or social sense. There is even much stronger evidence on the global scale to almost confirm that democratic states are not conducting war against each other as also quite popular liberal perspective suggests through the Democratic Peace Theory in the theory of international relations.

Democratic transition or democratization processes taking place mainly in developing countries that can be seen through the lenses whether of organized Westernization, or of a mimicry in the same context (however both are conventionally referred as exogenous efforts), may provide less clear guarantees for safeguarding security within the considered societies and in their foreign policies. Nonetheless, democratizing trends are assessed in any case more positively than other tendencies, especially, apparently of antagonistic, i.e. non-democratic nature. Another question is how lasting and viable such positive results eventually would be, which seems to essentially depend on the success of democratization itself.

There stands as important objective – first of all to raise in the agenda and discuss predominantly with the future of society (youth, in two selected countries – Georgia and Kenya), the problems related to such highly-praised

aspects of democratization as are anti-corruption education, integrity education, community integrity building (CIB) and social accountability activities.

Case Study of Georgia. Problems Identified

Despite very successful anti-corruption policy implemented by the previous Georgian Government led by the former President Mikheil Saakashvili since 2004, one of the major outcomes of which was practically overcoming horizontal corruption in the country, the vertical corruption in Georgia is still one of the biggest challenges in its way towards Westernization and democratic development. The dramatic internal impacts of the corruption are connected with the increasing social inequality and social tension that often puts Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations under a question in a broader foreign policy context as well.

Thus, taking into consideration how vital in many regards is fighting against corruption in Georgia, it is more intolerable that there is a huge lack of knowledge and education on corruption, efficient anti-corruption strategies and integrity among one of the most significant segments of the society – students, youth and other public in the country. There are very few number of educational courses, syllabi and, moreover, curricula on corruption, anti-corruption policy and/or legal regulations, and especially on integrity at the universities in Georgia. Although the problem is being addressed only by a few individuals and this is being done mainly only within the formal education framework, which with all the aspects apparently may not be sufficient contribution especially to the whole country needs, I (at Georgian Technical University – GTU) and several of my colleagues (at other universities in Georgia) are working on elaborating integrity education syllabi and introducing them in the existing educational curricula at different universities in Georgia with the support of the Integrity Action.

Along with the great lack of relevant knowledge and education, there are even less cases of any social accountability and, moreover, CIB activity conducted especially by the students in Georgia, which might be very useful for raising awareness, sensitizing, and motivating, first of all, their peers and other groups in the society to boost and hold similar initiatives and activities with brighter long-term prospects for the country[2].

Therefore, according to the above mentioned needs, I, Dr. Khatuna Chapichadze, Project Author/Trainer/Facilitator made a relevant project proposal shaping the following goals and objectives:

[2] K. Chapichadze, *Some Problems of Academic Integrity in Georgia on the Example of One State University* [in:] *Materialy plenarnogo zasedaniya: „Dobrosovestnost' v deystvii: rossiyskiy i zarubezhnyy opyt": Vtoraya mezhdunarodnaya nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya, Novosibirsk, 21-23.04.2016 g.*, Novosibirsk 2016, pp. 31-33.

Goals:

- Raising awareness on corruption and its costs, efficient anti-corruption strategies and integrity among GTU, other university students, youth and other social groups in Georgia; in particular, providing GTU students with appropriate knowledge and education through employing non-formal teaching and learning techniques along with the formal ones during the Camp/School and CIB & Social Accountability Activities;
- Supporting and implementing GTU students' CIB and social accountability activities that would be greatly valuable for raising awareness, sensitizing, and motivating first of all their peers (not only at GTU) and other groups in the society;
- Promoting the effective monitoring and increase of the quality, adequacy and efficiency of teaching and learning at GTU.

Objectives:

- Organizing GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School, within the framework of which selected GTU students (approx. number – 12-13) would be taught what is Integrity, values and ethics, compliance and integrity, the Fix-Rate, CIB & Social Accountability Activities for Students and Citizens with a special emphasis on Citizen Report Cards, definition of corruption, anti-corruption approach and typology of corruption, as well as they would practice CIB & social accountability activities, Citizen Report Cards, Academic Integrity and Integrity Action case studies;
- Conducting Camp/School Participants' CIB & Social Accountability Activities, during which Camp/School participants would do School Report Cards among other GTU students at the former Business-Engineering Faculty, other GTU faculties wherever possible (approx. number of students surveyed – 500) through Survey Questionnaire.

Project Outcomes:

- 1st Stage of the Project: GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School
  GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School was based in the office of the Library-Cultural Center for People with Disabilities "TANADGOMA" (Tbilisi, Georgia) and took place in November 26-29, 2015. It hosted 13 Participants: 11 GTU students selected through an open competition and 2 beneficiaries of the Library-Cultural Center for People with Disabilities "TANADGOMA". The Camp/School included thematic Study Sessions on integrity, corruption and anti-corruption using such full-class teaching techniques as are:

Lecture/PPT, Guest Speakers, Case Studies, Films, Critical Debates, and applied such interactive and experiential teaching methods as are Analytic Teams, and Role-Play. Within the framework of the Camp/School students were also introduced to various CIB & Social Accountability activities for students and citizens with a special emphasis on Citizen Report Cards.

- 2nd Stage of the Project: Camp/School Participants' CIB & Social Accountability Activities (School Report Cards)
  During the GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School, the Participants along with the Trainer elaborated initial draft for School Report Cards Questionnaire in order to survey their peers – other GTU students (at the former Business-Engineering Faculty, other GTU faculties wherever possible) and assess their needs regarding integrity and anti-corruption at GTU, as well as to find out efficient solutions to corruption practices.
  The Camp/School Participant Students along with the Trainer and Facilitator elaborated the final version of the Questionnaire for School Report Cards throughout December, 2015 and the first half of January, 2016, and with the facilitation of the Trainer started to conduct the activity itself, i.e. surveying other GTU students through the School Report Cards, primarily, at the former Business-Engineering Faculty and also 4 other randomly selected faculties (i.e. at 5 faculties in total among 10) of GTU: Faculty of Informatics and Control Systems, Faculty of Chemical Technology and Metallurgy, Faculty of Transportation and Mechanical Engineering, and Faculty of Power Engineering and Telecommunication. Conducting of the School Report Cards took place from January 12 to 26, 2016.
  As the former Business-Engineering Faculty of GTU used to be the biggest one among other faculties taking into account the number of students (more than 5000) and we especially focused on that faculty from the very start of our project, the dominant part of the Surveyed Students were the students of the former Business-Engineering Faculty representing 10 specialties (among 13) as follows: European Studies, Law, International Relations, Economics, Mass Communication, Public Relations, Business Administration, Banking and Finance Technology, Journalism, and Public Administration. The total number of the questionnaires was 500, while the total number of the Surveyed Students was 445 as another 55 did not fill in the forms. 27 students avoided to name their faculties and specialties as it was optional to provide this information in the Questionnaire.
- Project Follow-up: Establishing GTU Integrity Club (with the participation of European Studies, International Relations, Business

Administration, PR, Law, etc. students studying at the biggest former – Business Engineering Faculty of GTU).

The Trainer made a presentation on potential Integrity Club during the GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School, which would be established at GTU with the participation of European Studies, International Relations, Business Administration, PR, Law, and other students of GTU. The Participants of the Camp/School expressed their interest and willingness to be part of that initiative and actively participate especially in organizing and leading consultations for other students/professors/GTU staff members on integrity problems at GTU.

During and after the GTU Students' Integrity Autumn Camp/School, as well as while conducting the School Report Cards and afterwards, significant number of other students, including the surveyed ones also expressed their interest and wishes to contribute to the work of the GTU Integrity Club[3].

Case of Kenya

In order to meet sometimes basic needs and solve such problems of vital significance in Kenya as are for example, incomplete classrooms[4], vital development funding for primary schools in Homa Bay County[5], etc., National Taxpayers Association (NTA) in Kenya has been implementing Integrity Action's Community Integrity Building programme (CIB) since 2014, providing insights for how this work could improve and expand. In parallel with this, there seems to be also interesting to find out the potential and progress NTA has made in integrating CIB with integrity education at both school and government level.

As reported by the Kenya Learning Paper – 2015: Closing the Loop and Combining Community Integrity Building with Integrity Education[6], NTA was

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[3] K. Chapichadze, *Evaluating „GTU Students" Integrity Autumn Camp/School and CIB & Social Accountability Activities" Project – Lessons Learned at the Georgian Technical University"* [in:] Materialy plenarnogo zasedaniya, Dobrosovestnost' i dobrososedstvo: vyzov sovremennosti: tret'ya mezhdunar. nauch.-prakt. konf.: Novosibirsk, 18-21.04.2017, Novosibirsk 2017, pp. 26-35.

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working to scale up its activities in educational institutions. Within the framework of the implementation of the "Improving Education in Kenya" project, NTA has trained 100 school head teachers, 100 teachers and 200 parents to use the School Report Card. NTA used to support those individuals so they could lead monitoring and community efforts at engaging with key stakeholders to bring about improvements in schools. Furthermore, NTA aimed at sensitizing county government officials including the County Education Board and the County Teachers Service Commission (TSC) Director. The findings of monitoring were planned to be shared with public officials from Kenya's Ministry of Education in order to attempt and secure their support targeting the problems resolution.

At the same time, NTA prioritized working with existing integrity clubs in 10 educational institutions, including 2 universities, 2 teaching colleagues, 3 secondary schools and 3 primary schools under the Integrity Clubs project. These integrity clubs, providing the opportunity to combine Integrity Education and CIB for the first time in the Sub-Saharan African country, have already been established by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). NTA would ensure that at least 10 members of each integrity club were trained on integrity education as well as CIB in order to become able to monitor 50 projects. Cooperating with the EACC, and their already established integrity clubs, is believed to save time and effort by not having to "reinvent the wheel" and establish new clubs, whilst also improving chances for success and sustainability for NTA's pilot by engaging with a national level institution which could support the clubs to resolve identified problems. Furthermore, while this pilot with NTA would initially only operate in 10 educational institutions, the opportunities for expansion seem to be huge with EACC as a partner in such an initiative as they have impressively established their clubs in almost 2,000 schools across the country. Despite the fact that these clubs in reality lack functioning in most cases, as well as the support of the teachers and head teachers in many schools, successful results in the initial 10 educational institutions could enable a wider reach across the whole country. In order to establish a working relationship with educational authorities, NTA planned to also train 10 County Government Education Officials in 2 counties.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN POWERMETRIC ANALYSIS

Abstract:
This article was written to determine the strength (power) of sub-Saharan Africa and its share in the global balance of power. For this purpose, sub-Saharan Africa was compiled with other world's regions. The methodology of regions division was based on the adopted criteria by the World Bank. The time horizon included in this article is twenty-three years. This period has been examined in three points. The beginning of the research was in 1992, whereas the end was in 2015. Halfway of the research period was set for 2003. The calculated main measures of powermetric come from the first powermetric report published in 2017 in Poland. The general and military power has been used in calculation of the rate concentration.

Keywords*:*
global balance of forces, the model of Sułek, general and military power, concentration index, powermetric

Introduction

One of the most important elements of the international system is power. The overriding interest of each state seems to be its constant development and survival. Increasing the power, positions the political unit among other participants of the global system. This phenomenon can be compared to a living organism. As Professor Mirosław Sułek[2] believes, "just like single people, smaller or larger social groups, they live and function in a world of limited resources, which makes them a subject of competition"[3]. This work presents the

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[2] Mirosław Sułek – Titular Professor, economist, praxeologist, strategic studies analyst. Creator and propagator of powermetric in Poland.
[3] R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017. Międzynarodowy układ sił w procesie zmian, Raport Potęgometryczny,* Warszawa 2017, p. 19.

distribution of power in the world in geographical terms. The main analyzed area was the sub-Saharan Africa[4]. The powermetric approach was chosen as a calculation method. The calculated basic measures (general and military power) were used to determine the concentration index. The system of forces was analyzed in dynamic terms. The research period covers twenty-three years therefore the tendencies of changes in investigated sub-Saharan region could be demonstrated. The accuracy of the research was based on the assumption of not analyzing the quality of the formal model and published data. The main purpose of writing this article is to analyze the role of the sub-Saharan Africa in a global power structure.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa is a compact continent located mostly in the eastern hemisphere. In terms of size, it is the second biggest in the world, right after Asia. It is positioned almost symmetrically on both sides of the equator. Africa is separated from Europe by the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the Red Sea and the Suez Canal separates it from Asia. A natural factor dividing Africa is the Sahara Desert. Because of that we can distinguish two large sub-regions of North and South Africa.

South Africa is also called Black Africa because of its residents, Negroids and Sub-Saharan due to its location on the south of the Sahara.

As a result of the decolonization, about fifty new countries were formed on the African continent in 1950s. One of the main problems was the ethnic diversity that did not allow the new countries to integrate. The creation of a bond in the new arose community required a long time horizon and development of a coherent idea among African leaders. The economic problems, which did not give chances for the development of social status, were another factor that significantly limited this process. The constitutional mechanism was, to a large extent, a decline after colonial traditions taken over from American, British or French standards. Unfortunately, these systems were not adopted because of a different political culture and that resulted in the assimilation of authoritarian forms. That, combined with the lack of public control over government activities, led to the alienation of power. Legislation was also implemented. As Wiesław Lizak writes, "African states, gaining independence, in most cases adopted constitutions guaranteeing the existence of democratic mechanisms for creating institutions and exercising state power"[5]. This resulted in the emergence of one-party system as well as military attempts

[4] Due to the availability of data, geographical regions were ranked according to the World Bank database. According to this division, North Africa was captured along with the Middle East.

[5] W. Lizak, „*Państwo w Afryce*", [w:] *Państwo w Teorii i praktyce stosunków międzynarodowych,* eds. M. Sułek, J. Symonides, Warszawa 2009, p. 375.

to seize power, authoritarian forms or systems based on socialism. Democratization in Africa is proceeding slowly, and the negotiations of this process remain uncertain. The emerging political thought in the 1990s refers to "democratization, development of civil society and the importance of trade unions in politics, the contemporary role of traditional power, women rights in politics, peaceful co-existence of different cultures"[6].

Sub-regional states of high importance are South Africa and Nigeria. However, they belong to the groups of developing countries which are characteristic for the entire continent. These countries mainly "are characterized by a low and very low level of economic development shown for instance in a small Gross Domestic Product per one inhabitant"[7]. The GDP per person was USD 566.9 in 1992 in comparison to USD 531 in 2003. In 2015, GDP amounted to USD 1655 USD. For comparison, the world average was USD 77832 USD. On a global scale, the population standards of living are at a very low level. This is manifested in malnutrition and limited access to health care. The average population density in sub-Saharan Africa was 43.7 people per square kilometre in 2016, compared to 22.9 in 1992, which is a 90% increase in over twenty years. The dynamics of demographic growth strengthens the mentioned problems. The birth rate in Africa is one of the highest in the world, so is the death rate. The average life expectancy in 2015 was 59.9 years compared to 49.9 years in 1992. By contrast, the average life expectancy in the world in 2015 was 71.9 compared to 65.4 years in 1992[8].

In the further part of the article, powermetric study will be carried out to determine the changes occurring in the South African sub-region countries compared to other regions of the world. The study time has been set from 1992.

Determination of general and military power

The applied research method is a mathematical calculation using the Sułek's model, which allows determining the size of the general and military power. These studies are the main element of science, i.e. powermetric, which is a sub-discipline of geopolitics. It deals, among others, with modelling and measurement of power. Its name "binds power and measurement, and in this sense it is analogous to other – built on this principle of names"[9]. Modelling consists in "mapping the essential features of the studied object (properties,

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[6] K. Trzciński, *Demokratyzacja w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej perspektywa zachodnioafrykańskiej myśli politycznej*, Warszawa 2013, p. 11.

[7] *Stosunki międzynarodowe w Afryce*, red. J. Milewski, L. Lizak, Warszawa 2002, p. 19.

[8] *The World Bank, World Development Indicators*, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=SSF> (30.01.2018).

[9] M. Sułek, *O potęgonomii i potęgometrii,* p. 4, <http://geopolityka.net/o-potegonomii-i-potegometrii/> (30.01.2018).

interrelationships, structural or functional parameters) relevant from the point of view of purpose and research"[10]. The main problem of this process remains the degree of similarity between the model and the object being mapped. The measurement in turn organizes, knowledge about the world or "it is a procedure in which, according to specific rules, numerical values – numbers or other symbols – are assigned to empirical (variable) properties"[11].

The importance of the power of the state has become inseparably associated with economic, military and political capabilities as a determinant of the position and power relations in the international system. The state's aspirations can be included in the statement of Raymond Aron, who described the three timeless goals of states, i.e. security, power and glory. The determination of the international position takes place with the help of the formal model of the precursor of power metrometry in Poland, Professor Mirosław Sułek. It is characterized by high transparency, relatively low degree of complexity. General and military power is used for analysis. The term general and military power is used interchangeably in the article. The model takes the following form:

$$P_o = D^{0,652} \times L^{0,217} \times a^{0,109}$$
$$P_w = W^{0,652} \times S^{0,217} \times a^{0,109}$$


where:
P_o – general power,
P_w – military power,
D – Gross domestic product,
W – military expenditure,
L – population,
S – number of active service soldiers.
a – area of the country,

In order to make a comparative analysis between individual political units, it was assumed that the world's power is equal to 1. The values for states obtained in the course of calculations are therefore a fraction of this value. The obtained results were multiplied by 1000 (world = 1000)[12]. Introduced unit 1 mM (milimir) is a thousandth of the world. Changes in the system of forces, i.e. the sums of increases and decreases are equal to zero. This results from the assumption that "the struggle for power is a zero-sum game, which means that the increase in the power of some countries is accompanied by a decrease in the power of the others"[13].

[10] *Ibidem* p. 3.
[11] *Ibidem.*
[12] For the purposes of this article, it was assumed that the world equals 1.000, thus recognizing that the world is one state.
[13] R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017…,* p. 15.

The general power of regions in Africa and the world is shown in chart 1. The results are relative to the world.

Chart 1. Global system of forces based on the general power[14], in the years 2000-2015 (world = 1000) expressed in mM



Source: R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017…,* p. 58

The share of Sub-Saharan Africa in the global power distribution is at a comparable level with Middle East & North Africa. The comparison with the rest of the world shows large disproportions in the distribution of general power. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, shows growth over the entire period. In the period 1992-2003 it amounted to only 1 mM. A definite improvement in the general power can be observed in the period 2003-2015, which amounted to 15 mM. The percentage of shares in Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison with the East Asia & Pacific region, which was the best in this ranking, is respectively for individual years – 16.02 %, 2003 – 14.68 %, 2015 – 15.89 %. The growth dynamics of the general region of sub-Saharan Africa was 4 % for the period 1992-2003 and 57.69 % for the period 2003-2015. For comparison, the

[14] The following codes are used in the article for the following regions of the world: ECS - Europe & Central Asia, NAC - North America, LCN - Latin America & Caribbean, EAS - East Asia & Pacific, MEA - Middle East & North Africa, SSF - Sub-Saharan Africa, SAS - South Asia.

dynamics of the East Asia & Pacific region was 13.46 % for the period 1992-2003 and 45.76 % for the period 2003-2015. The table 1 below presents the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with the highest values of the general power in particular periods.

Tab. 1. Values of Sub-Saharan African countries with the highest general power in 1992, 2003, 2015

	1992		2003		2015	
		[mM]		[mM]	Country	[mM]
	World	1000,000	World	1000,000	World	1000,000
1	South	6,580	South	6,122	Nigeria	9,819
2	Nigeria	2,966	Nigeria	4,000	South	5,882
3	Ethiopia	1,354	Sudan	1,349	Sudan	2,451
4	COD[15]	1,160	Kenya	1,052	Angola	2,409
5	Angola	0,977	COD	0,968	Ethiopia	2,297
6	Sudan	0,936	Tanzania	0,965	Kenya	1,848
7	Kenya	0,910	Angola	0,952	COD	1,641
8	CIV[16]	0,904	Ethiopia	0,934	Tanzania	1,608
9	Tanzania	0,670	CIV	0,872	Ghana	1,071
10	Ghana	0,604	Ghana	0,554	CIV	0,947
	sum	17,061	sum	17,768	sum	29,973

Source: own elaboration based on: R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017…,* pp. 42-46.

The countries with the greatest general power in sub-Saharan Africa are South Africa and Nigeria. We can observe an increase in the importance of Nigeria in 2015. We also observe an increase in the general power of other countries. In 1992, four countries exceeded the value of 1 mM. In 2015, there were nine of them. The sum of the general power also increased, which amounted to 29.97 mM in 2015 compared to 17.06 mM in 1992. The table 2 below presents the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with the highest values of military power in particular periods.

[15] Democratic Republic of the Congo.
[16] Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Tab. 2. Values of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with the greatest military power in 1992, 2003, 2015

	1992		2003		2015	
		[mM]		[mM]	Country	[mM]
	World	1000,000	World	1000,000	World	1000,000
1	South	3,887	South	3,505	South	3,207
2	Nigeria	2,585	Sudan	1,284	Sudan	3,027
3	Sudan	2,065	Nigeria	1,181	Nigeria	2,193
4	Tanzania	1,284	Ethiopia	0,993	South	2,031
5	COD	0,960	Kenya	0,565	COD	1,474
6	Kenya	0,795	Cameroon	0,564	Kenya	1,022
7	Uganda	0,679	COD	0,554	Ethiopia	0,915
8	Zambia	0,334	Botswana	0,544	CIV	0,901
9	Burkina	0,285	Uganda	0,468	Namibia	0,621
10	Congo,	0,264	CIV	0,446	Zambia	0,574
	sum	13,138	sum	10,104	sum	15,965

Source: own elaboration based on: R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017…,* pp. 59-61.

The countries with the greatest military power in sub-Saharan Africa are South Africa, Sudan and Nigeria. In 1992, only four countries exceeded the value of 1 mM. In 2015, there were six countries with a value above 1 mM, and the next two (Ethiopia, CIC) reaching values above 0.9 mM. The total military power of sub-Saharan African countries in 1992 was 13.13, in relation to 15.96 mM in 2015.

Structural measures – concentration and polarization

The distribution of the power of political units at a given moment of time refers to polarization. In other words, we can call it the structure of the system or "distribution of energy and substance in space and time"[17]. It is characterized by stability or lack of it, which leads to peace or war, respectively. Based on the analysis of the actors of the international system (relative power, allied relations, foreign policy), we can determine whether a given structure is stable or not. We can analyse these in two ways. Energomaterial (general and military power) – "as states defined in terms of energy and mass"[18] and structural (concentration / polarization index) – "as states defined in terms of structure,

[17] M Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe,* Warszawa 2010, p. 164
[18] *Ibidem.*

i.e. distribution of energy and substance in space and time"[19]. The term concentration means the density of energy and matter. We can talk about the lack of concentration in the situation of an even distribution of general and military power among political units. However, the maximum concentration means a non-uniform (extreme) distribution of power. Concentration affects polarization (polarity in the world), which means that a high concentration of power in one country favours unipolarity. Decreasing the concentration is favoured by the formation of multipolarity. This dependence is calculated on the basis of the formula used in the Correlates of War (CON) program:

$$con = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{i=N} (s_i)^2 - \frac{1}{N}}{1 - \frac{1}{N}}}$$

Signs:
CON – concentration indicator,
s_i – share of the power held by the state in the system (decimal number),
N – the number of countries in the system.

At least two countries are required to calculate the concentration ratio. The values of the index range from 0 to 1. The power is distributed evenly, if it is closer to 0. The closer to the value of 1, the distribution of power will be less even. Table number 3 illustrates the concentration index for two groups of countries with the largest global and military power in the scale of the world.

Tab. 3. Concentration of power for selected groups of countries in 1992, 2003 and 2015

YEAR	GENERAL POWER		MILITARY POWER	
	For 5 countries	For 10 countries	For 5 countries	For 10 countries
1992	0,357	0,287	0,465	0,420
2003	0,366	0,310	0,366	0,383
2015	0,344	0,317	0,413	0,384

Source: Own elaboration based on: R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *Potęga 2017…,* p. 58.

Based on the calculations contained in table number 5, we can observe the following dependencies characterizing selected countries of the world:

[19] *Ibidem.*

The concentration index is reduced when we take into account a larger number of countries.The concentration of the general power grew over the entire period, while the concentration of military power decreased in 2003 in both groups. For the group of 5 countries there was another increase in 2015, and for the group of 10 countries the value remained at a similar level. The concentration of the general power is smaller than the concentration of military power.

Table number 4 illustrates the concentration index for two groups of Sub-Saharan African countries with the highest values of general and military power.

Tab. 4. Concentration of power for selected countries of sub-Saharan Africa in 1992, 2003 and 2015

YEAR	GENERAL POWER		MILITARY POWER	
	For 5 countries	For 10 countries	For 5 countries	For 10 countries
1992	0,405	0,341	0,240	0,286
2003	0,380	0,323	0,341	0,290
2015	0,323	0,293	0,135	0,192

Source: own calculations based on tables 1 and 2.

Based on the calculations, contained in table number 4, the following dependencies characterizing sub-Saharan Africa can be noticed:

The general indicator of power concentration is reduced if a larger number of countries are included.The concentration of the general power decreased in both groups throughout the research period, while the concentration of military power increased in 2003 and then decreased in 2015. During the research period, the concentration of the general power decreased for 5 and 10 countries. The concentration of military power increased in both groups however there was a significant increase for the 5th group in 2003. The decrease in concentration in 2015 was greater for the group of 5 countries and it was lower than in the group of 10 countries. The concentration of the general power is greater than the concentration of military power.

On the basis of the collected calculations, the differences and similarities in the rate of the concentration indicator between sub-Saharan Africa and the strongest countries in the world are visable:

- Similarities: In both sets, the concentration index decreases when analyzing larger groups of countries.
- Differences: Sub-Saharan Africa has a smaller concentration of military power than the concentration of general power.

That dependence is the opposite regarding the strongest countries in the world. The concentration of military power for the countries of Sub-Saharan

Africa decreased in the whole period in the face of an increase and stabilization for the countries of the world. The greater value of the concentration of the general power for Africa and the smaller concentration of military power in comparison with the countries of the world can be also noticed

Summary

Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region in the world. The economic growth of this region remains at the lowest level among the regions examined in the article. However, it is worth noticing, that the emerging upward trends in recent years allow us to hope for improvement. The outgoing economic changes found their mapping in the values of the general power. The dynamics of changes in general power, especially in recent years, was competitive for other regions. The results, which present only the values of power, are unambiguous. Sub-Saharan region is still influenced by the main political actors in the world. The research of military power in this area has not shown the strength such as the one in European countries. However, there is a gradual improvement in this matter. The study of power concentration showed the decrease of these values at the background of the strongest countries in the world. This region was characterized by a smaller concentration of power due to the lack of dominant states in the region.

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LAST DECADE IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Abstract:
Polish relations with Africa are important but rather overlooked topic. Article deals with political and economic relations with this continent. The Author delves into the topic, analyzing, among other, statements of politicians, exposes of foreign ministers or official visits. In the economic aspect, Author put emphasis on the activity of private Polish companies on the local markets. Author compares Poland's exports on national scale to African countries from 2008 to 2016, also considering what specific products are exported.

Keywords:
polish-African relation, Polish foreign policy toward Africa, economic relation with Africa

Introduction

Africa for decades was in centre of global policy, first as the subject of decolonization, than as bottomless pit for charity help, as the most underdevelopment, affected by famine, diseases and civilization backwardness. We can observe how the image of Africa evolves toward worth to investing in continent. Although Africa is extremely diverse, with difficult history full of civil, religious and ethnic wars, one of the bloodiest pogroms in the history of humanity, she slowly begins to emerge from the traps of history. Polish foreign policy toward Africa seems to be too broad concept for one article. However the author's intention is to make an introduction to these issues, to signal key elements in further analyze of this area of Polish foreign policy.

Author of this article focuses on last decade in Polish foreign policy and on economic relations between Warsaw and African countries. Especially will put the emphasis on last years, when Poland increases the business expansion and also the political relations starts to be more popular in the media. In this cross-

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sectional analyze Author will present the general conceptions of foreign policy in last 10 years, will indicate the role of Presidents and Foreign Affairs Ministers in this relations. Also will be raised the strategy of promoting and gaining support for Poland as the non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council among African countries.

In case of economic relations author will focus on Polish companies that enter and strengthening their position on the African market. Increasing economic relations are also a key factor in strengthening political relation between particular countries and Poland.

Polish foreign policy after 1989 was mainly directed at her closer neighbourhood. The most crucial aims were the membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in European Union (EU)[2]. These goals were achieved in 1999 and in 2004. Despite this, before and after their implementation these two factors create the directions of Polish foreign policy and totally subordinated our actions on international scale to them.

After 14 years of membership in EU we can say with absolute certainty that Poland is one of the pillars of European Union. The contemporary challenges and threats, political and economic development of Poland, commitment to global security and expectations of role she wants to play in region, cause that attempts to only understanding world are simply not enough[3]. Poland had to face of the new role in which she will actively participate in creating it. The emanation of it was the participation in war in Afghanistan, Iraq, realization the conception of Three Seas or active seek of chances in Chinese Silk Road. Also an example of undertaking actions in many directions was the increasing diplomatic and economic relation with Africa.

Political aspects of relations with Africa

Relations with Africa are dominated by prism of Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). It is visible in public agenda, especially when Arab world struggle with non-democratic regimes during Arab Spring since end of 2010. Direct interest of European Union of MENA as part of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and possibilities of energetic cooperation create a situation in which relations with Africa was understand mostly by countries like Libya, Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco. Despite this, we can distinguish many actions, not only of Polish government but also private business sector toward other than North, regions of Africa.

The background of Polish foreign policy should be started from 1989 however it is not a thematic scope for one article. Still, must be underlined that

[2] A. Turkowski, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w perspektywie podejścia systemów-światów,* „Studia Polityczne", Nr 2 (42), 2016, p. 193.

[3] *Polska polityka zagraniczna: kontynuacja czy zerwanie*? <http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/kont.pdf> (10.04.2018).

after 1989 relations between Africa and Poland was dominated by political and ideological issues. Condemnation of colonialism and its new forms, support of national liberation movements, establishment of diplomatic relations with new states prevailed in these relations. However, Africa has been pushed out to the periphery of both Polish politics and directions of economic expansion[4]. That is why Author wants to analyze last 10 years in external relation of Poland. From 2006 till 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was led by Anna Fotyga. 11th May 2007 in her expose, she underlined the strong role of EU, as one of the area of implementation of Polish political and economic interests, especially connected with energetic security.

European Union plays an important role not only in speech of Minister Fotyga but also in policy of whole government in that time. One of the priorities of Polish government was exact defining the competences of the EU institutions, and increasing the solidarity among member states in case of energy issues. Despite clearly pro-European attitude Anna Fotyga also mentioned the importance of other regions, like Africa.

Since 2006 Poland assign financial help for humanitarian aims and development actions to ensure peace and security not only for countries to the east and south of ours borders, but also for Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and African countries[5]. In 2007 Poland transfer for humanitarian aims 4,07 million zlotys, which is 1,46 million dollars (global humanitarian assistance in 2006 reached 8,9 milliard dollars[6], Poland's budget for 2007 was 236,4 milliard zlotys[7] this numbers can show what part, both of Polish budget and global humanitarian assistance was the help form Poland). Main addressees of this assistance were among other Sudan, Afghanistan and Moldova[8]. Staying in topic of Africa, the help for Sudan amount to 360 thousand dollars, which was intended for refugees in West Darfur camps. Also Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs found 20 deep wells in Kulbus, which allow 15 thousand people access to drinking water[9].

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[8] *Polska pomoc humanitarna 2007*, <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Pomoc,humanitarna,2007,623.html>, (22.01.2018).

[9] *Pomoc humanitarna dla Sudanu*, <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Pomoc,humanitarna,dla,Sudanu,651.html>,(22.01.2018)

Mentioned earlier energetic security was one of the reasons to strengthen cooperation with potential suppliers of energetic resources[10]. This refers to North Africa, especially Algeria. Although in that time we can point out many diplomatic meeting between prime minister or minister of foreign affairs and the representatives of governments of African countries, the main points of talks were energetic security and diversification of sources.

Fotyga ensures in her expose that Poland is strongly committed to develop of democracy in African countries, as much as is devoted to fight against terrorism, which was one of the main problem in Nigeria. We also put the effort to "help many countries, building the image of Poland as a solidary country with those in need. An important role in the implementation of the foreign aid program, especially for the African countries, is played by non-governmental organization and Polish missionaries and missionaries whose humanitarian activities are and will be supported by the government"[11].

Since the November of 2007 the prime minister of Polish government was Donald Tusk, in that time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was led by Radosław Sikorski. In his expose in May 2008, 2009 and 2010 we can find many similar issues, from which the most significant and most often mentioned was the relation with EU.

It can be stated beyond any doubt that "government of Donald Tusk represents the general pro-European strategy which was consequently realized since 2007 till 2015. Implementation of Polish aims was possible only in cooperation inside the EU, which was clearly shown also in economic policy in that time"[12]. In Sikorski's expose from 2008 we can distinguish few crucial parts. The role of EU is one of it. The so called "catch up" the rest of Europe in economic, political and civilization sense, involvement in integration process inside the EU member, and solidarity in decision process are next elements pointed out during the speech in Parliament. "A common European foreign policy, in order to be effective on any dimension of importance to the Union—be it in regards to China and the whole of Asia, to the Mediterranean world and the Middle East, or to Latin America and Africa—requires intra-Union consolidation. Large member states, among them Poland, have an important role to play in this process"[13]. The general shape of policy toward distance regions like Latin America or Africa should be established on European level.

[1010] *Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa Polski po 1989 roku*, red. Cziomer E., Kraków 2015, pp. 112-114.

[11] *Expose 2007,* <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/c/MOBILE/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose_2007/>, (23.01.2018).

[12] A. Starzyk, N. Tomaszewska, *Conception of Intermarium in Polish foreign policy in XXI century*, "International Studies", No. 1 (10), 2017, pp. 15-28.

[13] *Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2008,* <https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=8741>, s. 16, (30.01.2018).

The geographical determinism constitute that Polish foreign policy should be focused on Europe and her neighbours. Especially on eastern neighbours, where Poland, can become a bridge between state like Ukraine or Belarus and Europe, leading to the intensification of the cooperation and integration process. "Greater integration should proceed hand-in-hand with an ever-greater role for the Union in its own neighborhood and on a global scale. We are concerned that the European Neighborhood Policy is properly shaped, especially as it applies to the East. This is a result not only of Poland's geographical location on the Eastern boundaries of the EU, but also from our consciousness that East of our borders lie European neighbors, while to the South-in North Africa and the Middle East-lie neighbors of Europe. This is a fundamental distinction"[14]. In 2009 and 2010 Africa was much less discussed topic in Sikorski's expose. The only mentions we can find are those concerning the very general assurance of continuing the engagement in humanitarian and development cooperation with African countries. Also what seems to be consistent with the main points of expose from 2008, Poland want to use the diplomatic facilities of other European countries in states where our presence is rather negligible.

23rd September 2009 Sikorski came to Rwanda, Egypt and Kenya with diplomatic visit. Main points were the appointments with authorities of this countries (Prime minister of Rwanda – Bernard Makuza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya Moses Wetangul and the Prime Minister Rail Oding, General Secretary of the League of Arab States in Egypt Amrem Mousse, and Egypt Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmand Abul Gheit[15]) visit in schools and other educations facilities building from Polish development help. In Kibeho in Rwanda Polish financial help enable to open a facility for blind children, which would not be possible without the Congregation of the Franciscan Sisters Servants of the Cross. In Africa many other organizations engage into assistance activities, like "Center for Youth Research of the University of Warsaw in cooperation with the Foundation Partners Poland and the Economic Foundation Poland-East Africa. This last foundation has realized, among others project involving the renovation and construction of a primary school in the Kawangware slums"[16].

In expose of Minister Radosław Sikorski from 2012 we cannot find a single mention about Africa. The Polish foreign policy focuses more than before on European Union, on our nearest neighbours, and on strategic cooperation between Poland and other European countries. Sikorski claimed

[14] *Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2008,* <https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=8741>, s.14, (30.01.2018).
[15] *Sikorski z czterodniową wizytą w Afryce*, <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-sikorski-z-czterodniowa-wizyta-w-afryce,nId,867719> (03.02.2018).
[16] *Ibidem.*

that "thanks to European Union Polish power of influence multiplies"[17] which refers to Eastern Partnership and possibilities to finance the cooperation with partners' country. During the session of parliament 29th March 2012, exceptional activity, conferring to Minister Sikorski, demonstrated deputies, who asking questions, submitting interpellations or appearing on the parliamentary podium.

Tab. 1. Deputies appearances in Parliament 29 March 2012

Deputy	Main elements in speech
Cezary Grabarczyk	− increasing interesting among Polish businessmen of Africa; − indication on unstable conditions and pursuit of economic activities and the lack of current information about market investment; − an important element of Polish foreign policy should be the establishment of economic contacts through intergovernmental arrangements. This is the only way to increasing Polish companies presence in Africa;
Maciej Orzechowski	− promotion of democracy, especially taking under consideration Arab spring;
Bożenna Bukiewicz	− presenting the Arab Spring matter; − the aim of Polish foreign policy should be support and solidarity for all those who fight for freedom, democracy and human rights, not only governmental help but also by non-governmental organizations and volunteers; − Poland as guide for African countries on way to democratic changes and support the building of civil society; − no reforms can be made without embedding in culture; − the results of revolutions are migrant crisis or problems with energetic resources supplies, that is why Poland should increasing her activity on field of common European policy toward Africa, to support democratic changes and stabilize the region; − act on development cooperation can be an effective tool to create a mechanism of financing and maintaining business continuity, e.g. by giving the opportunity to conduct long-term development projects;

[17] *Expose 2012*, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose_2012> (31.01.2018).

Roman Kotliński	– asking the deputies how ministry of foreign affairs use the potential of students from Arab states and Africa?;
John Abraham Godson	– Africa need partnership, not help; – Africa is marginalized in Polish foreign policy, should be more important for Polish government – especially in face of efforts Poland undertake to become a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council; – every year thousands students from Africa leave their countries to study abroad. What action Polish government undertake to increase in Poland the number of African students;
Killion Munyama	– Sub-Saharan Africa should become a market for Polish products, Polish companies should have the information's about this absorbent market and Polish authorities should create conditions for lively international exchange between Poland and African continent; – despite fact, that absorptiveness of the market and possession of strategic natural resources, necessary for the development of any industry, Polish products are not promoted, and the awareness of Polish businessmen about the possibility of expansion into the African market is negligible; – Poland cooperate with EU on realizing the common strategy toward Africa, established in Lisbon 2007, however this cooperation is not proportional with the potential of Poland; – Africa is no more poor and underdevelopment continent, her economic growth amounts 5,5%-11%, 6 on 10 the world's fastest growing countries were in Africa, the World Bank predicts that Africa can be on an economic trampoline, as China – 30, and India – 20 years ago. Africa gained on the export of raw materials: she has 10% of the world's oil, 80% of chromium, platinum and uranium, about 50% of gold and 30% of diamonds and more than 80% of the coltan needed for the production of many electronic devices. African economies are developing because many countries are reducing trade barriers and lowering taxes for entrepreneurs; – Polish enterprises can satisfy the demand of good and cheap technical solutions necessary in such fields as

	agriculture, transport, industry with profit for African countries and Poland[18];

Source: own work, based on: *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 11. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 29 marca 2012 r.,* <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/098143BF99F8DB23C12579D100082E1E/%24File/11_b_ksiazka.pdf> (30.01.2018).

The list of deputies appearances in 29th March 2012, taking under consideration the fact that this date is the time of Sikorski's information for Parliament about Polish foreign policy, is rather short. To general statements with lack of details have a small contribution to the development of the discussion about Polish engagement in Africa. However two deputies K. Munyama and J. A. Godson underlined many important issues, which were more than actual 6 years ago. J. A. Godson as first, mentioned about the politic potential of the Africa during the effort to become non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council – one of the most crucial aim for Polish foreign policy since 2004, was partially depend from all countries in this continent. The profits from increasing the economic presents in Africa or from making Poland more attractive for African students, was also highlight.

The importance of Africa for Polish economy has no reflection in speeches of the minister of foreign affairs. After omission of this topic in 2012, Radosław Sikorski tries to show his priorities as less Europocentric. In 2013 he claimed that Poland will always support the democratization process as much as look of concern on domestic war in Syria or using chemical weapon in Damascus. Also he underlines the big and still not fully used potential of Africa. Although minister speak about the increasing export to Africa – 16% compared to last year or speak about Poland participation in European policy toward Africa we cannot find any details about this cooperation or on expected development of relation and implemented any programs for economy and Polish entrepreneurs[19]. The activity of deputies is also rather insignificant. Only J. A. Godson and K. Munyama present not only knowledge about the continent but also are engage in developing the relations between Poland and Africa. Constantly for years fulfilling the mandate of the MP, they try to convince to increase Polish presence in this region, and bring it to the level of strategic goal, especially for economy.

[18] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 11. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 29 marca 2012 r.,* <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/098143BF99F8DB23C12579D100082E1E/%24File/11_b_ksiazka.pdf> (30.01.2018).

[19] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 11. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 20 marca 2013 r.,* <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/48239696DF9135D8C1257B350004E792/%24File/36_a_ksiazka.pdf> (30.01.2018).

Tab. 2. Deputies appearances in Parliament 20 March 2013

Deputy	Main elements in speech
Tadeusz Iwiński	– presence of Poland in Arab states and Africa (Libya or Egypt) is insufficient; – he criticized the strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reduce the number of Polish embassies on south of the Sahara[20];
J. A. Godson	– quick economic growth in Africa – 5-6%, many Africans who are business and political elites in their countries were studied in Poland. We should find the way to use these absolvents to improve our relations with African countries, e.g. give them opportunity to opening honorary consulates in African countries, where there are no Polish embassies; – lack of trade departments at embassies (3 in North Africa, 1 in South Africa)[21];
K.Munyama	– Poland from years provides Africa not only humanitarian help, but also substantive and professional support for democratic transition; – financial help is mainly granted to non-governmental organizations, which help directs among others to early school children and women; – economic cooperation – as crucial element for African continent and for Poland[22];

Source: own work, based on: *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 11. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 20 marca 2013 r.,* <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/48239696DF9135D8C1257B350004E792/%24File/36_a_ksiazka.pdf> (02.02.2018).

Year 2013 was successful in Polish-African relations, although in parliament speeches we could observe the lack of this topic. First since 2007 visit of Prime Minister in African countries, accompanied by a strong group of Polish entrepreneurs, was an important image signal that Poland is present in Africa and will build her potential there. The table below shows what were the assumed goals and that were the elements of visits.

[20] B. Popławski, *Afryka w exposé Sikorskiego*, <http://afryka.org/afryka/afryka-w-expos--sikorskiego,news/> (30.01.2018).
[21] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 11. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 20 marca 2013 r…*
[22] *Ibidem.*

Tab. 3. Foreign visits of Polish politician in Africa in 2009-2013

Name of politician	Date and place of visit	Description
Donald Tusk	10-12.04.2013 Nigeria	− Prime Minister came with representatives of 30 Polish companies from the industry of: energy, armaments, transport, construction, agriculture (PKN Orlen, Grupa Lotos, Bumar, Łucznik, H. Cegielski, Kulczyk Holding, Ursus S.A., Solaris, Dawtona, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, Fibris, Izodom 2000 Polska, Trustee, Navimor, Ancora, Cenzin, Energoprojekt – Katowice and Consus); − a cooperation agreement was signed between 1. the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency and the Nigerian Investment Agency, 2. the Polish Ministry of Economy and the Nigerian Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, 3. The agreement on strategic partnership between Polish and Nigerian Ministries of Foreign Affairs. All agreement concern: condition of cooperation, investment project, annual consultation; − Tomasz Ostaszewicz director of promotion and bilateral cooperation in the Ministry of Economy announces the launch of the government program "Go Africa" to encourage Polish companies to invest in Nigeria[23]; − D. Tusk made promises to apply for Nigerian membership in the UN Security Council; − according to the Government Information Center, talks with Goodlack Jonathan concerned strategic economic cooperation, regional policy, including involvement in the conflict in Mali and the fight against

[23] T. Chojnowski, *Tusk w Nigerii. Tamtejsze media milczą, a polska prawica kp*i, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,13723351,Tusk_w_Nigerii__Tamtejsze_media_milcza__a_polska_prawica.html> (30.01.2018).

		terrorism, as well as climate issues; – D. Tusk open the Polish-Nigerian Economic Forum Abuja. The Forum will be attended by representatives of the most important companies from both countries[24];
Beata Stelmach	6-9.05.2013 Angola	– promoting the development of Polish-Angolan economic, scientific and cultural relations; – meeting with graduates of Polish universities; – a visit of the Maritime Academy in Namibe, built by Navimor from Gdańsk[25]; – organization of the Polish-Angola Economic Forum, the program assumed the presentation of participated institutions and companies, direct meetings of Polish companies (16 Polish companies from the mining, agricultural and construction sectors) with interested Angolan partners;
Donad Tusk	15.10.2013, Republic of South Africa (RSA)	– meeting with president Jacob Zuma and vice-president Kgalem Motlanth; – main priorities: trade and economic relations, as well as European Union relations with South Africa and with Africa as a continent in general, regional topics; – signed: an Interstate agreement on economic cooperation (assuming, inter alia, appointment of the Joint Economic Commission), Cooperation agreement between Polish Investment and Trade Agency and its South African counterpart Industrial Development Corporation and between the Warsaw School of Economics and Wits Business School; – Republic of South Africa is the largest economic partner of Poland in Africa, maintaining a high level of trade reaching

[24] *Po wizycie w Nigerii*, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/po-wizycie-w-nigerii.html> (30.01.2018).
[25] *Wiceminister Beata Stelmach z misją gospodarczą w Republice Konga*, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/wiceminister_beata_stelmach_z_misja_gospodarcza_w_republice_konga>, (30.01.2018).

		USD 800 million. The most important South African investments in Poland include SAB Miller's investment in the brewing industry (Browary Tyskie and Browary Lech) as well as the Fra-Mondi consortium in cellulose, paper and wood plants (Zakłady Celulozy i Papieru w Świeciu Celuloza SA)[26]; - Polish representatives of business (also in Zambia): transport sector: Ursus i Newag; mining industry: Famur; mining companies: Kopex Group and Kulczyk Investments; defence sector: Wojskowe Zakłady Inżynieryjne, Wojskowe Zakłady Uzbrojenia, Wojskowe Centralne Biuro Konstrukcyjno-Technologiczne and Polski Holding Obronny; engineering and construction companies: H. Cegielski Poznań and Zakłady Mechaniczne RUFUS; furniture industry: FM Bravo, Meble VOX, Profile VOX i AS Ćmielów; - RSA is also interesting in cooperation in field of maritime economy, ships and yacht construction, development of port infrastructure, and training of specialists[27];
Donald Tusk	19-21.10.2013 Zambia	- meeting with President Michael Sata; - opening ceremony of Business Forum in Lusaka during which a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Izodom (company producing building materials for energy-efficient houses) and two Zambian companies – GladRich Investments Limited (developer) and Alinaswe Developments (an architectural company); - It is planned to launch a local Izodom construction elements plant, the companies

[26] *Premier z wizytą w RPA*, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/premier-z-wizyta-w-rpa.html>, (30.01.2018)
[27] *Ibidem.*

		decided to pilot a construction of 20 houses in the suburbs of Lusaka[28];

Source: Own work based on official government articles.

After active year in sphere of political and economic relations with Africa R. Sikorski in expose from 8th May 2014 pointed out much more issues than in 2013:

- Presence of polish armed forces in Mali and in Central African Republic, which is connected with strategic partnership with France.
- In the countries of Africa and the Middle East, Poland will continue to call for respect for the rights of religious minorities, especially Christians.
- Intensification of economic relations with selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, according to government programme "Go Africa".
- Attempts to organize Congress of African graduates of Polish universities – to include them into system promoting Poland and Polish-African relations.
- Undertaking actions to create scholarship offer addressed to Africans and other students from outside of Europe, who today make up more than 1/3 of foreign students.
- Creating new facilities and improvement of activities of already existing, in economical and non-traditional formulas[29].

Although Minister has more detailed speech, we cannot say the same about deputies. Only in very general appearance in Parliament Grzegorz Schetyna highlight the Poland's presence in Arica, possibilities to increase it and the necessity of supporting polish companies and entrepreneurs.

One year after, in new government lead by Ewa Kopacz, mentioned deputy G. Schetyna becomes the ministry of foreign affairs. 23rd April 2015 he presents the main assumption for this part of government activity. As crucial he recognizes four spheres:

1. Sphere of political dialogue, oriented towards building lasting, multidimensional bilateral relations with our non-European partners.
2. Bigger influence on the European policy towards Asian countries, Africa, Latin America and Oceania.

[28] *Wizyta w Zambii: premier na Forum Gospodarczym w Lusace* <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/wizyta-w-zambii-premier-na-forum-gospodarczym-w-lusace.html>, (30.01.2018); *Wizyta w Zambii: premier spotkał się z prezydentem Michaelem Satą*,<https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/wizyta-w-zambii-premier-spotka-sie-z-prezydentem-michaelem-sata.html>, (30.01.2018).

[29] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 67. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/757955B50A87A1BDC1257CD3000B2502/%24File/67_b_ksiazka.pdf>, (30.01.2018).

3. Establish substantive and long-term cooperation in relation to non-European regional organizations.
4. Building a consensus of state and local governments, scientific and economic environments for global priorities of Polish foreign policy[30].

In accordance with mention above spheres G. Schetyna pointed out few points directly connected with Africa. From the most general statements[31], to more specific elements like enumerate countries which are main partners for Poland: the Republic of South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia and Senegal, development of the network of Polish diplomatic facilities, starting from Senegal or the intensification of dialog with regional organizations. What is worth to highlight, are planned business meetings with Angola, Republic of South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia, which is the exemplification of repeatedly emphasized intentions to increase economic relations[32]. Poland is also active involvement into elaboration of a new development agenda after on United Nation Summit in 2015[33].

Table 4 present the most substantive speeches of deputies during the session of Sejm 23rd April 2015. Again J. A. Godson shows the biggest concern of Africa issues. These taking under consideration of permanent attempts to strengthen Poland position on the African market prove that Polish MPs do not see the opportunities.

Tab. 4. Deputies appearances in Parliament 23.04.2015

Deputy	Main elements in speech
Marek Krząkała	– stability in North Africa is our and European priority;
Andrzej Gałażewski	– issue of illegal migrants from Africa trying to get to Europe;
Piotr Polak	– point on tragic situation of migrants from Africa;

[30] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 91. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 23 kwietnia 2015 r*, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/07D5239CA45617BCC1257E31000FA59E/%24File/91_b_ksiazka_bis.pdf>, (30.01.2018).

[31] Like difficult international situation, unstable regions like Middle East, Africa, Easter Europe, difficulties connected with migrant crisis, need of more sufficient European Neighbourhood Policy as the answer for challenges coming from North Africa or necessity to increase Poland's political and economic presence in Africa, also in cooperation with other European countries

[32] D. Boćkowski, *Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec świata muzułmańskiego – próba definicji problemu*, [w:] *Polityka zagraniczna III RP. 20 lat po przełomie*, t 1: *Koncepcje, bezpieczeństwo, kwestie prawne i polonijne*, red. A. Jarosz, K. Olszewski, Toruń 2011, p. 113-116.

[33] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 91. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 23 kwietnia 2015 r*, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/07D5239CA45617BCC1257E31000FA59E/%24File/91_b_ksiazka_bis.pdf>, (30.01.2018).

J. A. Godson	– increasing the presence of Africa in public and parliament debate; – intensification of diplomatic visits and economic cooperation with Africa, launching the program "Go Africa"; – without support of Africa Poland will not become non-permanent member United Nation Security Council; – historical occasion to build strong relation with Africa, thanks to having two deputies in Polish parliament from Africa; – challenges for polish economic relations with Africa: lack of consular infrastructure and diplomatic staff, restrictive visa regime, double taxation, no financial and credit guarantees;

Source: own work, based on: *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 91. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 23 kwietnia 2015 r.*, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/07D5239CA45617BCC1257E31000FA59E/%24File/91_b_ksiazka_bis.pdf> (03.02.2018).

After elections in 25th October 2015, the minister of foreign affairs becomes Witold Waszczykowski. In his expose 29th January 2016, he outlines the general view of foreign policy not only on 2016, but also for the whole term of new government. This policy will be based on principles of state sovereignty and solidary cooperation with partners for achieving common goals, primacy of international law, common and universal democratic world values, economic diplomacy and mutual knowledge of societies, also those very distant, which can be also understand in terms of geographic conditions[34]. This is direct reference to relation with Africa. We can specify some issues relating to mentioned continent:

- migrant crisis, as one of the most important challenges for Poland and Europe;
- Africa is continent of many opportunities and challenges like political instability, regional conflicts, terrorism, uncontrolled migrations, activities of large organized criminal groups;
- support from African countries for Polish attempts to become non-permanent member of Security Council UN;
- opening or restarting of some diplomatic facilities, e.g. in Tanzania and Senegal, or even in Zambia;

[34] *Sejmowe expose ministra Witolda Waszczykowskiego*, <http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,462714,sejmowe-expose-ministra-witolda-waszczykowskiego.html> (30.01.2018)

- in 2016 Poland will strengthen relations with Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Senegal;
- continue and develop the "Go Africa" program[35].

Again Killion Munyama underlined the positive aspect of increasing the number of diplomatic facilities, and highlight the fact that embassy should be open in Zambia, which is very well connected with Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia[36]. One year later W. Waszczykowski in his expose accenting the dramatic situation in south of Europe, instability in North Africa and Middle East and increasing the activities of terrorist groups. More detailed statements refer to development of a network of diplomatic facilities, like reactivation of embassies in Senegal and Tanzania, or visits of Macky Sall, the President of Senegal and planned in 2017 by minister Waszczykowski visits in: Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.

Tab. 5. Selected foreign visits in Africa of Polish authorities 2015-2017

Name of politician	Date and place of visit	Description
Bronisław Komorowski	29.05.2015 Tunisia	- official visit of President to participate in march against terrorism after tragic attack on Museum in Bardo, where also were killed Polish citizens; - meeting with Al-Badżi Ka'id as –Sibsi, the President of Tunisisa, Francoise Holland, the president of France, Matteo Renzi, prime minister of Italy and Ahmud Abbas for Palestinian Authonomy[37];
Witold Waszczykowski	23-26.11.2017, Algeria and Tunisia	- situation in region, especially uncontrolled migrations and terrorism - meeting with prime ministers Ahmed Ujahia, Jusef Szahid, and ministers of foreign affairs Adbelkader Messahil and

[35] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 10. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 29 stycznia 2016 r.* <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter8.nsf/0/6A4CD2F71231A36FC1257F4D003FECA4/%24File/10_b_ksiazka_bis.pdf>, (30.01.2018).
[36] *Ibidem.*
[37] *Polska uczestniczy w działaniach przeciw terroryzmowi,* <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-bronislawa-komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,380,polska-uczestniczy-w-dzialaniach-przeciw-terroryzmowi.html>, (30.01.2018).

		Chemais Dżinawi, and with President of Tunisia Bedżi Kaid Essebi[38]; – main priorities: bilateral cooperation, situation in Sahel, Mali, and perspectives for Libya and Syria, current challenges for Arabic world support from Algeria and Tunisia for Polish candidacy to UN Security Council; – signing agreement with Algeria on the establish Joint Intergovernmental Commission for economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation, which will allow efficient management of bilateral economic cooperation[39];
Andrzej Duda	7-9.05.2017, Etiopia	– 9th May President Andrzej Duda appeared on the forum of African Union (AU); – increasing the political presence on African continent, for example by opening new embassy or permanent participation on summits of AU; – co-financing common development project, also by program "Go Africa"; – Poland as the candidate for member on Security Council want to listen and represent the African interests; – highlight the issues connected with security: access to drinking water, conflicts over natural resources, economic inequalities, health protection, and connected with criminality; – Polish foreign policy is focused on promoting the democracy, and values like freedom, dignity, solidarity (development and humanitarian help)

[38] *W sobotę szef MSZ udaje się z wizytą do Algierii i Tunezji,* <http://msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/c/MOBILE/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/w_sobote_szef_msz_udaje_sie_z_wizyta_do_algierii_i_tunezji>, (30.01.2018).
[39] *Ibidem.*

		and equality; – the slogan of polish campaign in Security Council is "Solidarity – Responsibility – Involvement"[40];

Source: own work.

Significant meaning has the visit in 26-28.10.2016 of the President of Senegal Macky Sall[41], with strong political and economic representation[42]. A huge number of accompanying persons was not only the prove about the importance of the visit, but also about the great expectations, especially in economic relations, both sides have. The measurable results were signing memorandums on the Agreement:

- on political consultations between Ministry of Foreign Affairs Poland and Senegal,
- between the Minister of Sport and Tourism of the Republic of Poland and the Minister of Tourism and Air Transport of the Republic of Senegal,
- between the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Poland and the Minister of Agriculture and Equipment of the Republic of Senegal on cooperation in the field of agriculture
- Memorandum of Understanding between Polska Agencja Inwestycji i Handlu and *Senegal's Agency* for the *Promotion* of *Investment*[43].

Other elements of visit consist of opening the Polish-Senegalese Economic Forum or meeting with Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Marshal of the Senate Stanisław Karczewski.

Issue that cannot be neglected is the intensification of Polish campaign to become a non-permanent member of Security Council UN. Directly involve in it was the President of the Republic of Poland, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Active in this sphere were Polish diplomatic facilities, as much as Special Envoys, who works in regions were

[40] *Prezydent Andrzej Duda w Etiopii. "Afryka jest kontynentem o dużym potencjale"*, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/130/5788/Artykul/1762860,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-w-Etiopii-Afryka-jest-kontynentem-o-duzym-potencjale>, (30.01.2018).

[41] *Andrzej Duda: Wizyta prezydenta Senegalu impulsem do rozwoju relacji gospodarczych*, <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,386,wizyta-oficjalna-prezydenta-republiki-senegalu-w-polsce.html> (30.01.2018).

[42] Among them: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Industry and Mining, Minister of Water Supply and Sewerage, persons involvement into cooperation representatives of *Senegal's Agency* for the *Promotion* of *Investment, President of Seaport in Dakar*, President of the National Council of Employers, President of the National Confederation of Employers, President of the National Union of Traders and Industrialists of Senegal.

[43] *Ibidem*.

Poland does not have an extensive network of diplomatic missions (Africa, Pacific) and by some degree parliamentary deputies[44]. All this entities put effort to organize series of meetings with ambassadors accredited to Poland, prepared promotional materials in official UN languages, showing our commitment to the work of the Organization. Poland convince, also in Forum of AU, that her representatives will not forget the granted support and will gladly use the experience and knowledge about the region from Africans during her work in Council. However we cannot forget that this issue was raised since 2012.

In Polish parliament was established a Group on Africa 8th November 2011. It was create in purpose of supporting exchange between the African continent and Poland in cultural, scientific-educational and economic fields, promoting cooperation between government institutions and organizations, non-governmental organizations and enterprises, monitoring development cooperation between Poland and Africa and promoting intercultural tolerance[45]. Since 14th December 2011 till 22nd November 2017 the group has conduct 37 sessions. The topics of meetings were differential, among others can be distinguish substantive analyzes, reports, opinions in the field of economic cooperation, meetings with ambassadors, governors, with representatives of non-governmental organizations, missioners, students organizations, but also with Parliamentary members or Ministers. Group members participate or organizing cultural and educations events, which confirms not only political-economic character of Polish-African relations.

Political relations with Africa since 2008 were increasing through years. An attempts to looking other markets and countries to invest were connected with political possibilities to not only establish new relations, but to strengthen existing ones, which has been measurably beneficial due to the support of African countries for UN voting. Policy in case of Africa is inseparably linked with economy. Non agreement could be implemented without political support. This opinion shares Karol Zarajczyk the Director of Ursus Company: "Every visit of the head of state, like the visit of President Andrzej Duda here in Ethiopia, drives economic contacts between us, entrepreneurs from Poland and local companies. A recent visit of the President of Senegal in Poland was a very clear signal for business"[46].

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[44] *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 35. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 9 lutego 2017 r.*
<http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter8.nsf/0/8E7E4FB126949A76C12580C3000D81A5/%24File/35_b_ksiazka_bis.pdf>, (30.01.2018).

[45] *Parlamentarny zespół ds. Afryki. Regulamin*,
<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/zesp_afryka/$file/zesp_afryka.pdf>,(30.01.2018).

[46] *Prezydent Andrzej Duda z wizytą w Etiopii. Zachęcał polskie firmy do ekspansji w Afryce*, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/42/273/Artykul/1761747,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-z-wizyta-w-Etiopii-Zachecal-polskie-firmy-do-ekspansji-w-Afryce>, (30.01.2018).

Economic aspects of relations with Africa

Political expansion of African market cannot be detached from economic diplomacy – the promotion of Polish companies and entrepreneurs. Foreign policy and attempts to strengthen relations with any country should be bounded with economical interest. Efficient policy in case of Africa cannot be developed without parallel economic activities. At the same time, none significant contracts or agreements can be concluded without the support of the authorities. Expanded network of diplomatic facilities is a big support for any Polish businessmen, especially in case of providing information helpful for conducting economic activity, such as: economic situation in particular country, legal regulations, local operating conditions or partners potential for cooperation, initiating and supporting the establishment of bilateral chambers or business clubs, support investment projects[47].

As the official webpage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed trade exchange between Poland and Africa systematically grew. In 2007 trade with this continent amounted to 1.47 billion USD, and till 2011 grew to 2.21 billion USD[48], despite this, trade with Africa in 2011 was rather insignificant – 0,97% of general export, and 0,79% of general import[49]. However in 2012-2014 the export to Africa increase by 37%, and assumed about 4.47 billion USD[50].

The best to way to show the significant change in Poland-Africa trade are numbers. According to Izabela Marczak, the largest increase in trade relations was 90,98%, and it was recorded with Algeria, next was Nigeria, where the trade increase by 47,05%, Zambia – 44,25%, Senegal – 16,4% and South Africa – 11,6%[51]. Although the growth with RSA was definitely smaller then with for example Nigeria, we must remember that South Africa was and still is one of the main partners in Africa in general, the trade relations between these two countries are stable with tendency to growth.

In 2016 the total trade with Africa amount 2.52 billion USD. The date we can find on Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) testify about a certain decrease of trade with Africa after 2015 (see the Chart 1). However to talk about a kind of collapse of trade with Africa, we must wait for the exact data for 2017. Despite that, I. Marczak claims that trade with Africa will increase by

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[47] *Czym jest „dyplomacja ekonomiczna”?,* <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/polityka_zagraniczna/dyplomacja_biznes/>, (30.012018).

[48] *Where does Poland export to?,* <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/pol/show/all/2007/>, (30.01.2018).


[49] *Priorytety polskiej polityki ekonomiczno-handlowej*, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/inne_kontynenty/afryka/priorytety_pl_polityki_ekonom_handlowej/?printMode=true> (30.01.2018).

[50] I. Marczak, *Afryka staje się jednym z ważniejszych partnerów biznesowych Polski, wartym już prawie 5 mld zł rocznie*, <http://innpoland.pl/119525,afryka-juz-nie-taka-dzika-przynajmniej-nie-dla-polski-wartym-juz-prawie-5-mld-zl-rocznie>, (30.01.2018).

[51] *Ibidem.*


3% till 2019[52]. The omnipresent optimism about cooperation with Africa has not yet been transform into its huge share in Polish trade, in which Africa will not play, a significant role for a long time. Nevertheless, the beginnings seem to be promising, especially when economic expansion is supported by political and economic diplomacy.

Chart 1. Trade with Africa in billion Dollars 2008-2016



Source: own work based on <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/> (06.02.2018).

Tab.2. Trade with Africa in compare with Poland's trade in general



Source: own work based on <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/> (06.02.2018)

[52] *Ibidem.*

One of first Polish businessman in Africa was Jan Kulczyk, who bought the only gold mine in Namibia[53]. Grupa Asseco very well known on Polish and European market company, id already present with success in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Angola. Asseco often establish companies in other countries belonging to the main group, like in Nigeria, where they create Asseco Software Nigeria (ASN). ASN is present in Nigeria since 2013, one of the first big contract was signed with Access Bank, second with Wapic Insurance, next with Zenith Insurance[54]. All of this is connected with IT systems for banks, local administration, insurance and telecommunication companies. Creating the IT infrastructure, data processing centers, system of management of documents and business processes gives the Nigerian partners necessarily "know-how", which not only influence of development of Nigerian market but also on development of cooperation between Asseco and African countries. One of the products Asseco delivers to their partners is Kompleksowy System Informatyczny ZUS (KSI ZUS), started in Poland, is now develop on other countires. The program "is a dedicated, multiplatform and multisystem system developed for the Social Insurance Institution. KSI ZUS is the country's largest IT system, both in terms of the amount of collected information, and in terms of the number of people using the system and the frequency of such usage. KSI ZUS is a centralized system that can be compared to the IT system of a bank managing ca. 100 million accounts, with each account having several operations per month"[55]. In 2017 they provide the "Unmanned System for Long Distance Photogrammetric Missions, ordered by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Lagos State in Nigeria. The System will capture photogrammetric data from the vast urban agglomeration area which then will be post-processed and made available through the geoportal. It will enable, among others, a more effective planning of the regional development and management of land administration resources as well as monitoring of environmental pollution. The portal will also provide an easy access to information for the general public and investors"[56]. Polish companies are no interested in exploitation but in the development of Africa. Transfer of technology and needs which Polish companies satisfy, prove the fact that the profile on consumers in Africa had dramatically changes. Although Africa still need help e.g. food and agriculture products however she reaches for the new technologies, which will help in her development, and by this will help in build her potential and power in future.

In Ethiopia Asseco cooperates with Information Network Security Agency (government agency, which focus on national security, building and developing

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[53] G. Nowacki, *Kulczyk kupuje kopalnię złota*, <https://www.pb.pl/kulczyk-kupuje-kopalnie-zlota-745303>, (30.01.2018).
[54] *Company*, <https://ng.asseco.com/company/>, (30.01.2018).
[55] *Social security*, <https://ng.asseco.com/offer/public-institution/social-security/>, (30.01.2018).
[56] *Asseco to Provide Unmanned Systems to the Nigerian Local Government*, <https://pl.asseco.com/en/news/asseco-to-provide-unmanned-systems-to-the-nigerian-local-government-2480/>, (30.01.2018).

IT competences). This cooperation includes actions for the construction of a modern energy market in Ethiopia, under which the proprietary software of Asseco Utility Management Solutions will be delivered and implemented[57].

Ursus is the largest Polish manufacturer of tractors and agricultural machinery, which conquers the African market. In 2013 first factory was open in Ethiopia, where the agreement amounted to 3 174 and 390 trailers. In 2017 Ethiopian factory was visited by Polish President A. Duda, which denotes the fact that Polish companies have the support of authorities in case of expansion on African market. In 2015 Ursus signed another agreement, this time with Tanzania amounted to 2400 agricultural machine, where the company commit to not only open the assembly room but also, hire and train staff there. Next state in Africa where Ursus want to become an icon of mechanization of agriculture is Zambia, where they signed the agreement with Industrial Development Corporation for 2694 tractors and 250 agriculture machines[58]. Ursus plans the cooperation with Dobre Holding in Namibia and Karmag Industrie in Algeria.

Among other companies dynamically operating in Africa we can distinguish OSM Łowicz, Polfarma Lubawa SA or Polish Snail Holding.

As it was mentioned before, after 2014 we can observe a kind of decreasing trade exchange with African countries. When we look on table 3, we can observe how to particular countries has change the polish export. Expressed in percent numbers confirm theses that African countries are rather stable partners. However, especially with North Africa we see the negative changes in case of export.

Tab. 3. Polish export in general to selected African countries 2008-2016

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Morocco	22%	8,0%	7,5%	11%	11%	11%	15%	11%	12%
RPA	22%	21%	24%	30%	24%	21%	21%	18%	22%
Algeria	16%	13%	15%	19%	19%	15%	24%	15%	12%
Egypt	14%	20%	13%	9,8%	9,6%	11%	10%	17%	15%
Tunisia	5,3%	5,7%	4,8%	4,0%	4,1%	4,1%	4,0%	4,0%	5,5%
Nigeria	4,8%	6,8%	4,2%	6,4%	4,8%	4,8%	4,7%	3,6%	3,5%

Source: own work based on: <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/> (07.02.2018)

Exported products are consistent with the general policy of Poland toward Africa and mentioned in article the spheres in which Poland has big potential.

[57] K. Marszałek, *Asseco: nowy projekt na rynku afrykańskim*, <https://www.crn.pl/aktualnosci/asseco-nowy-projekt-na-rynku-afrykanskim>, (30.01.2018).

[58] S. Ogórek, *Ursus podpisał rekordowy kontrakt. Tysiące ciągników i maszyn pojadą do Zambii*, <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/ursus-zambia-kontrakt-umowa,25,0,2283289.html>, (30.01.2018).

Since years the most popular is export of machines by which we can understand most of all office machines, computers, carbon-based electronics, sound recordings, valves, electric batteries, telephones, refrigerators.

In case of economic relations between Poland and Africa we cannot forget about the governmental program "Go Africa", which in almost every political speech occurs as efficient tool in improving relation with African partners. According to Deputy Killion Munyama this program attracted a huge number of organizations, entrepreneurs and NGOs in terms of improving relations between Poland and Africa. This portal provide polish entrepreneurs in all necessity information starting from general information like climate conditions, natural resources, infrastructure, visa policy, through business law, bilateral cooperation, economic situation or access to the market. Every from 54 countries has an extensive and detailed description being the basis for anyone who wants to start their activity there[59].

Tab. 4. Polish products exported to Africa 2008-2016

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Machines	29%	40%	46%	39%	40%	37%	39%	35%	28%
Transportation[60]	17%	15%	15%	12%	15%	16%	12%	15%	17%
Paper Goods[61]	23%	9,9%	4,3%	5,0%	8,5%	10%	10%	11%	8,1%
Stone and Glass[62]	8,8%	9,1%	7,5%	4,9%	4,3%	3,2%	4,9%	5,0%	3,5%
Chemical products[63]	6,8%	6,0%	6,9%	7,5%	10%	11%	9,6%	8,8%	12%
Foodstuffs[6]	2,5%	3,4%	2,1%	2,7%	4,4%	4,5%	6,7%	7,6%	12%
Metals[65]	2,9%	7,4%	4,7%	5,9%	3,7%	3,4%	3,4%	2,9%	5,0%
Mineral products[66]	0,35 %	1,1%	3,7%	14%	1,7%	2,5%	4,4%	2,9%	2,6%

Source: own work based on: <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/> (07.02.2018)

[59] *Go Africa*, <http://www.goafrica.gov.pl/>, (30.01.2018).
[60] Delivery trucks, cars, vehicle parts.
[61] Toiled paper, brochures, shaped paper, paper containers.
[62] Laboratory, ceramic ware, refractory bricks, rock wool, safety glass.
[63] Beauty products, hair products, shaving products, packaged medicaments, cleaning products, perfumes.
[64] James, chocolate, baked goods, fruit juice. Vegetable food: wheat, tea, spices, frozen fruit and nuts, coffee.
[65] Flat-rolled iron, razor blades, small iron pipes, iron structures, hand saws.
[66] Coke, Cement, refined petroleum.

Summary

Africa start to be recognize as continent of huge opportunities. This continent, especially when we look on the number of population, need of rapid development of its infrastructure and improve the acquisition and processing of food, is the obvious direction for any developing companies. "As for Africa, we are focusing on the agri-food sector, including agricultural machinery. Polish companies [can also] target contracts for infrastructure, construction or energy projects"[67],

Although Africa is a continent rich in resources and large human resources, they have an existential challenge – to feed their people. Polish companies investments in Africa, are not only the results of cheaper labour and transport. European market shrinks', any promotion and investments cost a lot, but gives no assurance of success. The profile of African consumer also change, which gives the opportunity to open for new products. Mentioned help of government to increase the relations with authorities of African states, diplomatic and information help form embassies are not insignificant.

Since 1989 polish foreign policy had few crucial elements that define our action for years. However Africa was never one of them. Even now when polish companies storm the African market it is hard to see increasing concern among not only Polish politician, but also Polish society. The fact that Poland is not a global player does not mean she cannot have global interest. Investing in Africa is one of such global interests with effective future. Author sees the lack of presentation in this article of technical-scientific cooperation, also in sphere of education concern not only students, but also scholarship programs or international projects, like Southern African Large Telescope or construction and equipment of Naval Academy in Namibia. Also could be raised the military cooperation and the meaning of Polish military presence in African countries. However this article is only the basic for further considerations on given topic.

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- ✓ *Prezydent Andrzej Duda z wizytą w Etiopii. Zachęcał polskie firmy do ekspansji w Afryce*, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/42/273/Artykul/1761747,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-z-wizyta-w-Etiopii-Zachecal-polskie-firmy-do-ekspansji-w-Afryce>
- ✓ *Sejmowe expose ministra Witolda Waszczykowskiego*, <http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,462714,sejmowe-expose-ministra-witolda-waszczykowskiego.html>
- ✓ Sikorski z czterodniową wizytą w Afryce, <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-sikorski-z-czterodniowa-wizyta-w-afryce,nId,867719>
- ✓ *Social security*, <https://ng.asseco.com/offer/public-institution/social-security/>
- ✓ *Where does Poland export to?*, <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/pol/show/all/2007/>
- ✓ *Wiceminister Beata Stelmach z misją gospodarczą w Republice Konga*, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/wiceminister_beata_stelmach_z_misja_gospodarcza_w_republice_konga>
- ✓ *Wizyta w Zambii: premier na Forum Gospodarczym w Lusace*, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/wizyta-w-zambii-premier-na-forum-gospodarczym-w-lusace.html>
- ✓ *Wizyta w Zambii: premier spotkał się z prezydentem Michaelem Satą*, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/wizyta-w-zambii-premier-spotka-sie-z-prezydentem-michaelem-sata.html>,
- ✓ *W sobotę szef MSZ udaje się z wizytą do Algierii i Tunezji* <http://msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/c/MOBILE/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/w_sobote_szef_msz_udaje_sie_z_wizyta_do_algierii_i_tunezji>

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II. GUEST ARTICLES

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
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Bartosz Bobek[1]
Poland

IDEOLOGY OF THE HUNGARIAN FAR RIGHT ON THE EXAMPLE OF JOBBIK, THE MOVEMENT FOR A BETTER HUNGARY

Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to describe the profile of the far right political party Jobbik, which has been an integral part of Hungary's political scene since 2009 and the third political power in the country since 2014. The article defines the party's ideology and presents its key proposals. The paper analyses the rhetoric of leaders and makes an attempt at describing the party's approach towards such issues as foreign policy and historical policy, which is an important reference point for the activity of the party. Moreover, the article shows who the real voters of Jobbik are and at the same time illustrates dynamics of support development for this movement.

Keywords*:*
Jobbik, movement for better Hungary, far right, extreme right, elections, foreign policy

Introduction

Since the end of the 80s of the 20th century, the influence of the extreme right has been increasing continuously on the old continent, particularly in poorer circles of the society. In countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it concerns nationalism that was popularized there in the 30s. The turn towards radical political parties can be seen not only in outcomes of elections, but also in the fact that members of those parties are filling more and more positions in the government. This situation explicitly proves that analysis of extreme

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movements, which has mostly concerned theories and ideologies, has to be expanded to include a practical aspect of those parties' functioning[2].

The Central and Eastern European far right expresses a very strong ethnic vision of national identity. This vision is very often accompanied by claims based on territorial foundation (f. e. Greater Hungary). In some cases, their extreme antipathy towards communism is laced with a positive relation with interwar governments, for instance, the Horthy era in Hungary. It is very often that their ideological programmes contain critique of methods, in which governments approach free-market economy, as well as anti-Semitism and racism towards the Romani minority. They criticise elites and preach business slogans connected with concerns about the country's security (crime level). Moreover, one of their characteristic traits is to promote ethnocentric ideology, a symbiosis between nationalism and xenophobia that rejects the European Union completely. The far right also believes in nativism based on defending and separating the cultural identity from others. Nationalism, racism, and ethnic pluralism are the core of those parties' ideological principles. It is worth indicating that contrary to biological racism, ethnic pluralism does not create national groups, but states that mixing and combining them leads to social problems. While rejecting the vision of a multicultural society, ethnic pluralism recommends supporting autonomic development of separate nationalistic groups within a country[3]. Cas Mudde suggests adding authoritarianism and the tendency of extreme right parties to use uncompromising language to their ideological skeleton. He notices that while extreme movements express their commitment to democracy, they have issues with accepting the liberal compound of political systems. It is their belief that pluralism should be replaced with a confined community and the modern individualism with conventional roles in the society[4].

The Hungarian extreme right

Right movements started to appear immediately after the fall of communism in Hungary. At the very beginning, their activities and ideologies that often related to, for example, anti-Semitism, were at the margin of public life. Generally, most of them found a foreign patron for themselves, who followed the ideology of fascism, and simultaneously became his/her reflection

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[2] M. Alauf, *Skrajna prawica i populizm w europie – co to oznacza?*, Docplayer.pl, 10.05.2017, <http://docplayer.pl/24518636-Skrajna-prawica-i-populizm-w-europie-co-to-oznacza.html> (30.01.2018).

[3] A. Lipiński, *Radykalizacja czy „patologiczna normalność"? Ugrupowania i ruchy radykalne a partie polityczne w Polsce i Europie Zachodniej. Ekspertyza przygotowana w ramach projektu: „Organizacje skrajne w demokratycznym państwie i społeczeństwie 2012-2013"*, Warsaw 2013, p. 5.

[4] C. Mudde, *The populist radical right: a pathological normalcy*, "West European Politics", Vol. 33, No. 6, 2010, p. 1178.

in the Hungarian backyard[5]. In the times of communism the extreme right had its followers in Hungary, but due to the ruling regime it was condemned to political non-existence, thus not being able to contribute to the abolishment of the system at that time. This probably explains the fact that after 1989, the extreme right wanted to hide their lack of participation in preparation of the Hungarian transformation, and their lack of engagement into its nation's fight during the uprising of 1956, under the veil of extreme anti-communist rhetoric. A multiparty system introduced in Hungary as a transformation of the system and the creation of free press enabled the far right to promote its ideas[6]. They maintained contacts with former members of previously fascist, basically Nazi, Arrow Cross Party – the Hungarian Movement (Hungarian: Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom), called the Arrow-Crossers (Hungarian: nyilaskeresztesek).

The first extreme right party in Hungary called Magyar Igazsag es Elet Partja (MIEP) – Hungarian Justice and Life Party was founded in 1993 by writer Istvan Csurka, who previously was the chairman of the central right political party called the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Radical nationalism and anti-Semitism that can be seen in Csurki's rhetoric, and that of his peers, started to be compelling for some groups of the Hungarian society. This way, his extreme right political party gained 85431 votes in the general election of 1994, what came to 1,58% of social support[7], but in the next elections four years later, MIEP gained 248 901 votes (support of 5,47%),what gave them 14th position in the Hungarian parliament. In the following elections, MIEP came close to the score from four years earlier (4,37%), but none of its delegates entered the parliament because it didn't exceed the election threshold. There's no doubt that the lack of growing support for the extreme right was caused by a brutal attack on the ruling coalition, which was accused by the far right of signing international agreements with countries that emerged after the fall of Yugoslavia, which approved the current boarders. Meanwhile – from their point of view – the Hungarian nation should have used the situation to change to any extent possible the territorial status quo that was the result of the Treaty of Trianon (1920).

After failure in the elections it became clear for MIEP, which didn't introduce any delegates to the chamber in the general elections, that the extreme right needed changes. The first stage of the new action plan was the foundation of an organization named the Movement for a Better Hungary by a

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[5] A. Kovács, *The Post-Communist Extreme Right: the Jobbik party in Hungary* [in:] *Right-Wing Populism in Europe Politics and Discourse*, eds. R. Wodak, M. Khosravi Nik, B. Mral, London 2013.

[6] K. Laszlo *The radical right in Hungary*, [in:] *Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989*, ed. S. P. Ramet, Pennsylvania 1999.

[7] T. Gabor, E. Zsolt, *The election to the Hungarian National Assembly, 1994: analyses, documents and data*, Berlin 1999, p. 124.

group of extreme right students (Hungarian: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik). A year later, an independent student organization transformed itself into a political party, which entered into collation with MIEP in the elections of 2006. The coalition MIEP-Jobbik gained only 119007 votes, that is 2,2% of support, so too little to enter the parliament. Nonetheless in 2009, Jobbik took advantage of the economic crisis of 2006 and managed to gain 427773 votes in the European Parliament elections, what corresponded to 14,77% of social support. Due to that, the party managed to introduce three of its representatives to the parliament.

Constantly growing support for Jobbik resulted in gaining 16,67% votes in the elections to the state parliament in 2010, and 20,22% in the elections of 2014[8].

Ideology and rhetoric

Initially, the ideological structure of Jobbik was based on highlighting the boundary between them and mainstream parties. While other parties both left and right, created their image of defenders of the new democratic order, Jobbik questioned the way in which reforms were introduced after 1989, indicating that the old regime was still functioning under the veil of newly appointed institutions. Therefore, one of the main slogans is to finish the transformation in a proper way by breaking the elites' monopoly of power. The next element of Jobbik's ideology is to promote redefinition of a conventional political division between right and left wing parties, and putting a new division in its place based on "old" (global) and "new" (national) entities. Jobbik opposes globalization that's represented by communist and post-communist elites. Their message calls for the need to form new, young national elites. Jobbik's ideology is mostly based on national conservatism that bears relations with Christian values. Therefore in their opinion, the current situation of Hungary is unlawful and it's necessary to create a new one that will appeal to traditions of the Hungarian crown. Their programme also promotes ideas of correcting privatisation and renegotiating main branches of the economy[9].

In matters connected with immigrants, Jobbik's leaders are all-out opponents of accepting people from other cultural and religious circles into their country while at the same time they promote the idea of religious education. Moreover, the party also has a very negative attitude towards Hungary's membership in the European Union. In this case, Jobbik's politicians compare the accession to the Union with lose of sovereignty and leaving their fate in the hands of the bureaucracy of Brussels. In documents from 2010 (Jobbik – Radical Change, 2010), Jobbik included a plan to

[8] A. Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
[9] S. Bertelsmann, *Strategies for combating right – wing extremism in Europe*, Gütersloh 2009, p. 298.

renegotiate the treaty of accession to the EU, where they state, "previous governments betrayed the idea of social prosperity for profits of major corporations. We opened our food market in return for low subsidies. That's why we're going to introduce changes to provisions of the accession treaty that are currently unfavourable for Hungary, and therefore, we want to raise a question about the necessity of our future membership in the UE"[10]. In the case of their march to power, they consider a national referendum on leaving the European Union and ending military cooperation with NATO. Instead, they want to replace it with their own army and military capabilities. It is plainly visible that in their programme Jobbik highlights features typical for such a conservative message, that is, defence of the country and the nation.

Therefore in 2007, Jobbik created a paramilitary organization called the Hungarian Guard Movement (Mágyar Garda)[11]. The objective of the Guard in times of peace is to protect civilians and work with youth.

When their members were being sworn in in the assist of the police antifascist organizations and Romani people protested in Budapest. Jewish community also expressed their protest. At that time, voices questioning the legality of such an organization appeared in public debates. The Hungarian Constitution prohibits the existence of paramilitary organizations, but founders of the Guard found a way around it emphasising their independence from any political party. In 2007, the court made a decision to disband Jobbik's militia however in 2009 its leaders announced the reactivation of their organization, increasing the number of its members.

Jobbik's actions raised concerns among groups that were the aim of the party's campaign characterized by hatred. For instance, the Jewish community living in Hungary turned attention to one of Jobbik's politicians, Krisztina Moravi, a member of the European Parliament known for her particularly harsh political speeches of anti-Semitic nature. The following is an excerpt from one of her speeches: "We have only one homeland. Hungary. Here, we are at home. We shall take our homeland from those who made it their hostage. Most of you, foreigners, don't like the fact that we, Hungarians, don't take kindly being sentenced to a colonial fate, we don't react to your boss' lecture, Szimon Peres' lecture, about buying out Hungary with words: shalom, shalom, we invite you to our country, please feel at home"[12]. Jobbik even proposed to write a national list of Jewish delegates in the parliament, who might pose a threat to the

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[10] D. Kasprowicz, *Europejska (de)konstrukcja – ewolucja programowa partii skrajnie prawicowych wobec kwestii europejskich*, Annales, „Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis Studia Politologica VII", 2012 p. 162.

[11] W. Guy, *Anti-Roma Violence, Hate Speech, and Discrimination in the New Europe: Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary*, [in:] *Realizing Roma Rights,* eds. J. Bhabha, A. Mirga, M. Matache, Pennsylvania 2017.

[12] M. Syska, *Partie skrajnej prawicy w Europie Środkowowschodniej*, „Nigdy Więcej", No. 18, 2010.

country, and in 2013 they protested against the World Jewish Congress that took place in Budapest[13]. The Romani community living in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania also expressed their concerns about such rhetoric feeling threatened by Jobbik's nationalist propaganda. In their eyes, it leads to increase in the number of physical attacks on members of their community. By frequently using the reluctance of the Hungarian society towards Romani minorities, Jobbik is trying to lower the political capital. That was the case in 2006, when one of teachers was beaten by a group of Romani men in a village where he had accidentally hit a Romani girl while driving his car[14]. This event was the beginning of an avalanche of "moral panic" and the wave of criticism from the right wing media, which stated that the government's policy towards Romani minority is terrible. Jobbik with iron consequence made this incident public and was publicizing it for the next four years, what allowed them to unify most of radical groups that preach anti-Semitism and racism. According to Jobbik, many things are in the way of building strong Hungary, and one of them is the Romani minority. Phrases such as "Romani terror" or "Romani crime" can be found in the party's rhetoric. It means that the Romani minority terrorizes ethnic Hungarians, particularly in the northeast part of the country, and commits crimes such as assault with a knife, usury, wood and scrap metal theft[15]. Jobbik sees its great historical role in stopping the conspiracy of silence that concerns crimes of the Romani minority, and believes that the only solution to this problem is for people of this minority to return to the way of labour, law and education. Those Romani people, who are not willing to accept that have two options in Jobbik's eyes – leave the country or go to prison[16].

An element of Jobbik's ideology is also, apart from radical nationalism and anti-globalisation, the critique of being part of the Western community. To do that, the party in its rhetoric employs anti-Americanism and reluctance towards Israel. Moreover, at the same time, it shows its pro-Russian, pro-Palestinian and pro-Iranian attitude. In the eyes of Jobbik's politicians, western societies have succumbed to the process of globalisation and liberalization, and therefore Hungary should engage into dialogue with the western part of the world, what is a clear reference to the idea of turanism[17]. Jobbik's critique frequently

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[13] A. Rybińska, *Europa skręca w prawo*, Nowakonfederacja.pl, 17.07.2014, <http://www.nowakonfederacja.pl/europa-skreca-w-prawo> (17.12.2017).

[14] J. Zolnay, *Abusive language and discriminatory measures in Hungarian local policy*, [in:] *The Gypsy "menace": populism and the new anti-Gypsy politics*, ed. M. Steward, London 2012.

[15] P. Krasztev, J. Van Til, *The Hungarian patient. Social opposition to an liberal democracy*, Budapest 2015.

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] Turanism – according to the turanian idea „Hungarians are a nation of the East that descends from Asian steppes and is related to (or even originates from) ancient Huns. Moreover, Hungarians are blood brothers of other "turanian" nations such as Turks, Azerbaijanis, Tatars, nations of Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhs), sometimes also Bulgarians,

concerns the USA. As it is commonly believed in the party, the United States don't respect sovereignty of such countries as Iraq and Libya, and realize their particularistic interests in a brutal manner under the veil of democracy. According to Jobbik, the US foreign policy is subject to pro-Israel lobby, and considers Israel a terrorist country that violates human rights[18].

According to the Hungarian extreme right, the reason of many problems in the West is that it has lost itself in the process of losing its own identity[19]. According to Jobbik's politicians, the source of this state of matters is walking away from traditional values. In their opinion, one of the solutions is to be opened to the East, where tradition is still fighting the pressure of globalisation and liberalism. One of the Gábor Vona's concepts, which in his eyes should be adequate for the development of a proper system of values in Hungary, is to combine the essence of the European character with Asian mentality.

Moreover, it can be successful not only in Hungary, but also in Russia, which could combine European and Asian values. According to Jobbik's leader, since the end of the cold war the aim of Western politics is to control the Eurasian continent. To justify this view, he refers to the United States' foreign policy, which in his opinion is under the influence of representatives of neo-conservatism, who are trying to impose a new world order and promote values of the American culture while doing that. According to Jobbik, such representatives of neo-conservatism encourage the US to use force in order to build democracy, like in the case of American military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan[20].

The critique concerns all communities of western countries, which in Jobbik's opinion play the role of an aggressor on the international stage while having blood on their hands for destabilization of the Middle East and triggering the Ukrainian conflict. According to Martyn Gongosi, one of the main politicians of Jobbik, the western world is responsible for starting the Ukrainian crisis, because the country was supposed to get financial and media support to abolish president Janukowicz as a consequence of his refusal to sign the accession agreement with the European Union.

Jobbik preaches the creation of a Eurasian alternative that would become an alternative for the Euro-Atlantic union. Gábor Vona, in an interview with a Russian geopolitical portal stated, "At this time, we Hungarians are sick

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and even the Japanese, Koreansor Tibetans. See: M. Kowalczyk, *Turanizm węgierski – zarys problematyki,* [w:] *Wieloaspektowość badań kluczem do rozwoju nauk o polityce*, ed. P. Łubiński, Cracow 2016, p. 168.

[18] Idem, *Krytyka Zachodu ze strony węgierskich nacjonalistów. Przykład partii Jobbik*, „Eryda" 2015, I(1), ss. 62-74.

[19] Idem, *Turanizm węgierski…,* p. 168.

[20] *Ibidem.*

passengers on the sinking European ship that has lost its values"[21]. In his opinion, the objective of the European Union is to colonize Hungary and exploit cheap labour force, and the European Union in itself doesn't bring anything mentally valuable from the Hungarians' point of view. The outcome of this – as he states – is Hungarians living in a pathetic world of capitalism. Jobbik believes that Russia represents Europe better than the United States and the European Union, because it guards its traditional values and doesn't base everything on money, while Europe has become a slave of the American economy. In Russia, Gábor Vona sees an element that balances the expansion of Americanism, and according to his statement the country will have to make a decision in the coming years whether it wants to remain in the EU.

Attitude towards historical policy

One of the factors that determined Jobbik's electoral successes was the efficient historical policy, which expressly corresponds to the ideas of conservatism and revisionism. One of its main elements is to refer to the cult of a strong leader, such as Miklos Horthy. In the face of occurrences such as displeasure with oligarchic government in Hungary, alleged lack of national elites or social and economic issues, his popularity is still growing. One of the breakthroughs in referring to Horthy and his politics was the reveal of the regent's monument in November 2013 with active participation of the Jobbik party. During the event one of Jobbik's politicians – Martin Gyongyosi stated, "Miklos Horthy brought the country back to surface after the deadly madness of communism that started along with the end of the First World War and the Trianon catastrophe that is the darkest card in the history of our country"[22]. Those words expressly relate to an earlier statement that Gábor Vonahad made on Horthy. He had said: „Right after the Trianon tragedy, in times of Christian and conservative government of Admiral Miklos Horthy, Hungarians were able to unify their forces at an exceptional pace. Horthy's government freed the creative energy within the nation and in a very short time Hungary were able to rebuild its infrastructure, industry, army and police, allowed the economy to strive making the Hungarian crown one of the most stable currencies in Europe, created an educational system that's strong and capable of withstanding any competition, cultural life was growing rapidly"[23].

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[21] W. Trojanowski, *„Euroatlantyzm musi być zastąpiony euroazjatyzmem" – wywiad z liderem Jobbiku*, Nacionalista.pl, 09.06.2013, <http://www.nacjonalista.pl/2013/06/09/euroatlantyzm-musi-byc-zastapiony-euroazjatyzmem-wywiad-z-liderem-jobbiku/> (9.11.2017).
[22] W. Gribowskij, *Wasilij Gribowskij: Polityka historyczna*, Geopolityka.pl, 30.07.2015, <http://www.geopolityka.org/analizy/wasilij-gribowskij-polityka-historyczna> (30.07.2017).
[23] *Ibidem.*

Another element of Jobbik's historical politics is its extreme rejection of communism. In the opinion of the party, communism is a system that strikes at the nation's heart. In one of his interviews, Gábor Vona stated that the soviet period was „an era of anti-values", therefore Jobbik repeatedly negatively assessed the government of Janos Kadar, who ascended to power after suppressing the 1956 revolution. One of the more important directions of Jobbik's historical policy is also to condemn the post-communist elite. A prevailing belief of the party members is that along with the fall of Horthy's government the country lost its national elite. In the opinion of Gábor Vona, during five decades of communism Hungary were governed by internationalist elite, which had immense influence on the consciousness of the Hungarian nation. A similar view has been expressed by Gyongyiso: "After the fall of communism in 1989, political heirs of Bela Kun, Matyas Raosi and other communist criminals sold our country to foreign colonists"[24].

In its historical agenda, Jobbik has often spoke about the tragic treaty of Trianon, which made Hungary lose 2/3 of its territory, and more than 60 % of citizens found themselves beyond the country's borders[25]. According to Jobbik, the situation of Hungarians living outside their country requires immediate action. Jobbik convinces that neighbouring countries have a duty to recognize rights of the Hungarian minority to autonomy and at the same time improve their living conditions. Jobbik's leaders convince that it's necessary to grant Hungarian national minorities autonomy, which should have been confirmed in constitutions of countries where Hungarian live. The party's activists take up this topic during mass events and thus mobilize their followers, that is, their voters.

At one of rallies commemorating the national tragedy of 1920, one of Jobbik's politicians who are members of the European Parliament, Gabor Staudt, declared that: "the Hungarian society has never accepted the consequences of the peace treaty of Trianon"[26], he also indicated that the revision of borders is one of the slogans of the Movement for a Better Hungary.

Foreign policy in Jobbik's view

According to Jobbik's opinion, after the fall of communism in Hungary politicians focused on three main priorities. The first was connected with

[24] *Ibidem.*

[25] The Treaty of Trianon meant the partition of the Kingdom of Hungaryand the end of its historical borders. Currently, 93.000 of 282.000 km^2 of land remain within Hungary. According to the resolutions of the treaty, Romania acquired the whole Transylvaniaand Szeklerland, Czechoslovakia was given 63k km^2, and the New Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes got Bačka, the Baranya County and the western part of Banat. See: P. Lendvai, *Węgrzy. Tysiąc lat zwycięstw w klęskach*, Cracow 2016.

[26] *Ibidem.*

Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. The second concerned the development of proper relations with neighbours, and the third to integrate itself into the Euro-Atlantic union. Jobbik's politicians believe that the Hungarian politicians of that time put too much pressure on the process of accession to western structures, and thus lost its historic chance to take care of other matters. In their opinion, no balance of power between Hungary and the European Union was established, what in turn translated to the close of partial Hungarian sovereignty[27]. In Jobbik's eyes, foreign policy should be built on new foundations directed towards strengthening national sovereignty. At the European level, Jobbik supports the concept of the European Union but only and solely on condition of cooperation between free nations. The party believes that great powers such as Russia, Germany and Turkey are responsible to a significant extent for the shape of Central Europe. Germany is a political and economic leader in Europe located close to Hungary. On the other hand, Russia is an important player on the stage of global politics that at the same time ensures Hungary's energetic safety, and Turkey is the playmaker in its region.

When it comes to being part of NATO, Jobbik's position is rather decisive. Leaders of the party believe that this kind of organization can give Hungary and the world safety only when it acts according to its original principles, and at the same time supports types of solutions that release tension between NATO and Russia. At the same time, Jobbik is aware that currently there is no other alternative for Hungary, which does not possess its own defence capabilities[28]. Jobbik is approaching the involvement of its soldiers in military missions all over the world with a dose of scepticism, and at the same time turns attention to the number of military Hungarian personnel believing that it's too small. In the opinion of Jobbik's politicians, art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty doesn't guarantee peace and support, that's why in their eyes Hungary has to take up future actions that will aim at improving the country's defence. Collective defence is an illusion in the eyes of Jobbik, and history points to the fact that Hungary cannot rely on anyone. In the opinion of the party, international treaties can apply in real life only and solely when they are in line with interests of other countries. Thinking about the aid of great powers should be forever disregarded[29].

Jobbik's voters

Young people are a very large group of Jobbik's voters. In 2009, the party was 3 times more popular among people under 30 years of age (23%)

[27] Jobbik, *Foreign Policy – old values, new objectives,* Jobbik.com, 10.05.2017 <http://www.jobbik.com/policies> (10.05.2017).
[28] Jobbik, *NATO has become an offensive alliance but there is no real alternative now,* Jobbik.com, 10.05.2017, <http://www.jobbik.com/nato_has_become_an_offensive_alliance_but_there_is_no_real_alternative_now> (10.05.2017).
[29] *Ibidem.*

than among voters of the older generation (8%), thus becoming the greatest threat for Fidesz party in the struggle for gaining young voters' support. Although Jobbik is still very popular among young people, it has recently gained the support of middle-aged people (40-49, 50-59). In 2010, Jobbik gained the support of 14% of people between 40-49 years of age and 17% in 2015. The 50-59 age group experienced an even greater increase, because in 2010 the support came to 11% and currently it's at the level of 16%[30]. The division of votes for Jobbik shows that the party is more popular in small and middle-sized cities and less popular in bigger ones. This disproportion is one of the main factors that make it hard for Jobbik to win the elections. Despite the fact that Jobbik's support has increased in western Hungary (the most symbolic example of that can be winning elections in the Tapolca constituency), their biggest stronghold is still north-east part of the country, which at the same time is the poorest and most densely populated by the Romani minority.

Conclusions

Jobbik's radicalism and rhetoric have brought surprising effects. Soon after its foundation, the party gained parliamentary representation and at the same time built its background on multiple fronts. Soon, apart from strengthening its group of voters in northeast of the country, Jobbik started to gain followers in the west. Another success was the fact that Jobbik has outrun socialists (MSZP) during elections of 2014, thus becoming the leader of opposition and the second most important party in Hungary. According to a common belief, Jobbik came into prominence only and solely because of the economic crisis and votes of people, who due to their displeasure with their current material status became vulnerable to radical slogans preached by that party. Is this, however, a justifiable statement? According to Gergely Karacsony's work „The secret of Jobbik. Reasons behind the rise of the Hungarian "radical right", apart from the low material status of its voters, more important factors that were decisive when it came to voting for the extreme right was the expressed attitude against the elites, nationalism, and a negative approach towards the Romani minority[31].

[30] A. Bíró-Nagy, T. Boros, *Jobbik goingmainstream; strategy shift of the farright in Hungary*, [in:] *The extreme right in Europe*, ed. J. Jamin, Brussels 2016, p. 252.
[31] G. Karácsony, D. Róna, *THE SECRET OF JOBBIK. Reasons behind the rise of the Hungarian radical right*, „Journal of East European and Asian Studies. Democratic Institutionalism", vol. 2, no. 1, February 2011, pp. 61-92.

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GEOPOLITICAL IDEAS AND ENERGY SECURITY OF CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

Abstract:
The paper addresses the issue of geopolitical ideas in term of energy security in the area Central and East Europe in the early 21st century. Main point of academic paper focuses on geopolitical dimension of "Nord Stream" and the chance of success of "Energy Intermarium" conception. Hence a considerable part of paper applies to the historical ideas and their influence on independence of states in Central Europe ("Intermarium" idea), especially in the face threat of cooperation between Germany and Russia.

Keywords:
energy security, Central and Eastern Europe, geopolitics

Energy security

An issue of energy security gained unique status at the beginning of the 21st century. Especially population of Central and Eastern Europe were recipients of popular analysis, reportages, news and public speaking was given this question. In accordance with the Act „Energy Law" with the 10th April 1997, energy security[2] is defined as the state of economy designed to accommodate demand on fuel and energy in technically and economically viable way, under the following conditions of environmental protection"[3].

The central importance of energy security has two elements: geographical (connection with supplies of energy resources with different directions and region) and infrastructural (connection with the necessity of creating technical

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[2] See: J. Ciborski, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne* [in:] *Energia w czasach kryzysu*, ed. K. Kuciński, Warszawa 2006, pp. 129-130.
[3] *Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r. – Prawo energetyczne*, Dz. U. 1997, nr 54, poz. 348, art. 3, pkt. 16.

infrastructure for transport of raw materials). Diversification of supply shall be understood with reference to entrench and secure supplies in the varied shape and with different direction, in an amount, which covers demand on domestic market[4].

Conventional resources of gas in Poland are estimated at about 145 bn m^3, and annual consumption of gas reaches a level 14.5 bn cubic meters [5]. It should be noted that gas in the Polish structure of consumption energy accounts for about 14%. As a comparison, consumption of gas in the United States is 24 %, and similarly in the European Union[6]. The Polish market can be regarded as prospective for suppliers of this raw material. The proportion of natural gas fuels will gradually increase in the next years. It is a consequence, above all, peer pressure to reduce emission of environmental pollution by manufacturing plants, which are intertwined with thermal energy or industry[7].

"Geopolitics of pipelines"

Raw materials are the most important instruments of foreign policy of state in the twentieth and early 21st century. In the past a military factor was the salient instrument of foreign policy key function. Nowadays economic indicators play key role in this regard.

Transmission network of energy resources influences its potential recipients in Central Europe. The region is dominated by latitudinal trails of natural gas with gas fields on the East. "Geopolitics of pipelines" is one of last remnants of bipolar security system in Central-Eastern Europe[8], which was built since the '70s of the 20th century.

During the Cold War pipelines were built on the westward in order to supply the Red Army with hydrocarbons to enable it to attack toward European Atlantic coast as well as operate efficiently and quickly in the event of war with NATO[9]. A dense network of pipelines stretched out from deposits of mineral resources (Siberia, Central Asia), across the Slavic republics of the Soviet Union and client states on the Central Europe, which were members of the

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[4] A. Toś, *Polska polityka dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu ziemnego – rozwiązania alternatywne*, Geopolityka.org, 20.08.2010, <www.geopolityka.org/analizy/544-polska-polityka-dywersyfikacji-dostaw-gazu-ziemnego-rozwiazania-alternatywne> (30.01.2018).

[5] *Polska zasobna w gaz niekonwencjonalny*, PolskieLupki.pl, <http://www.polskielupki.pl/aktualnosci-polska/89099/polska-zasobna-w-gaz-niekonwencjonalny> (30.01.2018).

[6] See more: P. Janusz, M. Kaliski, M. Sikora, *Wpływ dostaw LNG z USA na europejski rynek gazu ziemnego*, „Polityka Energetyczne" 2017, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 27-38.

[7] A. Toś, *op. cit.* (30.01.2018).

[8] This statement is consciously referred to book entitled *Geopolityka rurociągów. Współzależność energetyczna a stosunki międzypaństwowe na obszarze postsowieckim*, ed. E. Wyciszkiewicz, Warszawa 2008.

[9] Cf.: J. Batko, M. Kędzierski, *Energetyka wyzwanie dla Polski*, the 2nd seminar – 13.05.2011, „Instytut Aurea Libertas", presentation possessed by author.

Warsaw Pact, up to the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, it is still missing north-south connections over time.

This state of things threatens with Russian monopoly on supplies of energy in Central and Eastern Europe. It is often forgotten that the exporting country is addicted to the sale of natural resources. It sometimes leads to extreme situation, which are stipulated as: „petro-state"[10] or „the Dutch disease"[11].

In spite of what might seem prima facie, in reality Russia is not in a comfortable situation. Although the Russian Federation channels the most raw materials on domestic market, the biggest profit it gains from the sale of natural gas to Europe. Above described addiction is quintessential feature for developing state. The Russian Federation, which is shaping the European security architecture, fulfils conditions of being "petro-state". Among factors defining "petro-state" a particular attention should be paid to significant share of fuel sector in GDP, underdevelopment of other sectors of the economy and low level of state institutions. The last factor plays important role in Russia[12]. Hence, not only Europe cares that Russian gas flows to consumers.

"Nord Stream" as security threat

The most famous and token thing that undermines energy security of Eastern Europe states is gas pipeline "Nord Stream", which Radosław Sikorski (in 2006 the Polish Defence Minister) summarized during summit between the European Union and the United States with the following words: „Poland is particularly sensitive to the Corridor and agreement over our heads. It was a tradition of Locarno and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. We don't want a repeat"[13]. For Central-Eastern Europeans such recall of the interwar period agreements is being associated with discrediting, by Germany, relatively short, only twenty years, Central-Eastern Europe subjectivity.

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[10] *Ibidem.* See more: I. Martinez, *The course of the petro-state: the example of Venezuela*, EconLib.org, 05.10.2005, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Martinezpetro.html>, (30.01.2018).

[11] „The Dutch disease" – the phenomenon was observed in the Netherlands in the 1950s of the 20th century. Amineral deposit was discovered in the Dutch exclusive economic zone of the North Sea. In the following years the Netherlands constantly grappled with excessive appreciation of currency. It was a consequence of growing export incomes coming from selling of to the hydrocarbons. The excessive appreciation of Dutch currency made its export unprofitable. In extreme case it may even lead process of deindustrialization. G. Kaliszuk, *Holenderska choroba Rosji*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia" 2009, vol. VIII, no. 6, pp. 67-73.

[12] See: Idem, *Rosyjskie surowce – biznes czy gra*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia" 2010, vol. IX, no. 1, pp. 55-61; Idem, *Holenderska choroba...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-73.

[13] A. Szczęśniak, *Donośny głos ministra Sikorskiego*, Szczęśniak.pl, 02.02.2018, <http://szczesniak.pl/node/94> (30.01.2018).

It should be noted that the comparison of gas pipeline "Nord Stream" with the agreement with 1939 seems to be problematic[14]. If we consider statement of the Polish Defence Minister as speech addressed to the public opinion in states of this region, it is clear that comparison fulfils its role. The statement let communicate inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe clear message, which appeal to their emotions: building of gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea could have an important consequences for independence of region. In this context comparison "Nord Stream" to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seems to be accurate.

Construction of gas pipeline "Nord Stream" will entail loss of transition position by countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which concerns mainly: Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. The previous pipeline system enabled some influence on Russian authority, represented by Gazprom[15], and extorted moment of reflections before taking decision to turn the gas tap off. In this way the Russian corporation deprived of supply not only its unreliable customers, as Kiev and Minsk, but also reduced gas transport for the most important partners: states of Western Europe, above all Germany[16].

Construction of gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea is connected with other danger for states located on the coast of the sea. Namely, it is increased risk of environmental disaster, which will be enormous on account of minor and self-closed nature (the Danish straits) of this body of water. Thus, threat of disaster is not only an instrument of defence weaker Central and Eastern Europe states on the European Union forum but also a real challenge[17].

It should be mentioned that in the vicinity of "Nord Stream" pipeline are remains of chemical weapons and other explosives laid there during the Second World War. Details are not known because the Red Army did not map. Apart

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[14] See: B.T. Wieliński, *Niemcy wściekłe na Sikorskiego*, Wyborcza.pl, 04.05.2006, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,3321425.html>, (30.01.2018)

[15] A good deal of books was dedicated to the topic of Gazprom's relations of with Russian establishment. For this reason, it is sufficient to recommend: W. Portnikow, *Dmitrij Miedwiediew. Władca z przypadku?*, Wrocław 2009.

[16] Suspension of supply to Ukraine also meant reduction of gas transported to Germany. Then it is possible that German companies, which are stakeholder of Gazprom, knew in advance about the plan reduction in gas exports during crisis in Ukraine and Belarus. According to some experts gas crisis was caused to prove that transit states are unreliable. In this way the Western Europe woul become more inclinedto construct "Nord Stream". See more: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji a interesy Polski 1991-2004*, Kraków-Warszawa 2008, pp. 558-559 – there are links to other sources.

[16] *Oceany i Morza, Encyklopedia geograficzna świata*, ed. Z. Otałęga, R. Andruszko, E. Ryżewska et al., t. VII, Kraków 1997, p. 87; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

[17] See: T. Walat, *Dzień w którym wypłynie ryba*, Polityka.pl, <http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/dzien-wnbsp;ktorym-wyplynie-ryba,375502.html>, (30.01.2018).

from that the German Democratic Republic disposed the chemical warfare agents on the coastline until the late '60 of the 20th century[18].

Central Europe states cannot depend on the solidarity with Western European countries on energy security[19]. It is a result of one factor. Our region is dependent on imports of Russian hydrocarbons far more. The average is not lower than 50-60% of total gas imports[20]. The situation looks different, from the Western Europe's point of view. Share of imports of gas from Russia fluctuates around 30% of total gas consumption/imports. Hence, for Western European politicians supply security is more important than diversification of sources of supply[21]. The best option for Central Eastern Europe states would be achievement of similar situation as in France. This country has four main suppliers of natural gas (from 18% with Algeria to 28% from the Russia Federation)[22].

It should be noted that economical cooperation between Germany and Russia reminds Central Europe of Treaty of Rapallo. This distant memory is a symbol of economic dependency of weak Central Eastern European states to powerful neighbours in Moscow and Berlin and shows the threat for small states. A figure that brought back the bad memories was a man who served as German Federal Chancellor between 1998 and 2005 – Gerhard Schröder. Firstly, he lobbied for "Nord Stream" as a head of government. Next he took up a position of chairman of the supervisory board of this project[23]. This symptom is becoming increasingly widespread phenomenon in the Western Europe. Politicians accept the point of view of corporation rather than state that they should represent.

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[18] See: P. Świeboda, *Strategiczne wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej. Kształtowanie zewnętrznego wymiaru polityki energetycznej*, Warszawa 2006, p. 9.

[19] It confirms fact that off-take gas for Germany took place with Russia on the Odra River and not on the Bug River. See: G. Kuczyński, L. Wojciechowski, *Energetyczne Międzymorze* w: *Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, ed. J. Kloczkowski, T. Żukowski, Warszawa-Kraków 2010, p. 444 et al.

[20] See: *Rurą w płot*, „Tygodnik Forum", 9-15.01.2006, pp. 4-6 [in:] N. Buckley, "Financial Times", 04.01.2006.

[21] See more: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 570 et al.

[22] There are links to other sources: *Rurą w...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; *Spółka Kreml zgarnia wszystko*, „Tygodnik Forum", 18-24.07.2005, pp. 12-19 [from:] N.P. Walsh, "The Guardian", 06.07.2005. It is worth noting that Gazprom routinely opts for long-term agreements with no possibility to resell gas to the third party in order not lose its influence. This policy is beneficial for Russia, because it secures supplier and make consumers in Central and Eastern Europe dependent on the imported resources. It can be added that Gazprom has enormous reserves of gas and busy magazines in key points of Europe. It this context Austria and the Netherlands may be mentioned.

[23] See: *Wiara w rurę*, „Tygodnik Forum", 07-13.01.2008, pp. 4-5 for: „Die Zeit", 03.01.2008; *Wielkie rury Europy*, „Tygodnik Forum", 26.05-01.06.2008, pp. 4-8 for: J. Schmidt, „Suddeutsche Zeitung", 18.03.2008.

The extension of transmission infrastructure

The analysis of supplies directions indicated that the transmission network in Central and Eastern Europe was rather poor in 2008. Poland stood alone negatively incomparison to other countries – it had no interconnectors with Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, the Czechs Republic or even Germany and Slovakia[24]. Establishing common European natural gas market would ensure safe delivery to member states of the European Union, solve problem of diversification and eliminate exerting pressure of Gazprom on individual countries, which independently made a deal on supply[25].

The lack of interconnectors made rise of investments in energy industry beyond the region impossible. Their advantage is huge assets. It is worth to mention the project of network of interconnectors, that is combining small gas markets of Central Europe states[26].

In the source literature the plan has a name „Energy Intermarium"[27]. This concept is associated with idea of 'Intermarium', which was introduced in the interwar period by Józef Piłsudski. At that time this conception was understood as cooperation between Central and Eastern Europe states, above all, at political and military levels and among states situated between the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany[28].

The principal challenge in plan of building so-called "Energy Intermarium" are interconnectors, in other words, pipelines connecting separated systems or markets. Resources can be shipped by interconnectors in both ways. They appear useful in case of crisis or time interval of supplies[29]. Their functioning would encourage the largest energy companies to invest in infrastructure transmission of energy resources. It would increase strength of region in case of emergencies and allowe trade between the main consumers in extreme cases.

Origin of construction of interconnectors is bound to series of crises between Ukraine and Russia. The most serious crisis took place on 2009. Then

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[24] T. Leszczyński, *Dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu ziemnego w unii europejskiej*, „Biuletyn Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki", July 2008, pp. 5-6.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 5.
[26] I. D. Metzner, *Nabucco plus czwartym projektem energetycznym*, DW.World.de, 03.02.2011, <www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14814276,00.html> (30.01.2018); *Rurą w...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
[27] G. Kuczyński, L. Wojciechowski, *Energetyczne Międzymorze* [in:] *Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, ed. J. Kloczkowski, T. Żukowski, Warszawa-Kraków 2010, pp. 443-455.
[28] See: P. Okulewicz, *Koncepcja „międzymorza" w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918-1926*, Poznań 2001.
[29] See: J. Bjørnmose, F. Roca, T. Turgot, D. S. Hansen, *Gas and oil pipelines in Europe*, Brussels November 2009, pp. 20-21.

the Balkan countries and also Slovakia felt victim to reduction of gas supply[30]. Hence, Slovakia, which was ruled by Iveta Radičova, initiated construction of interconnector joining this country with Poland[31].

Representatives of both governments signed an agreement in support of research into construction of gas interconnector on January 2011. The final decision was made in 2012, and the connection between two countries is to be established in 2018. In this period Warsaw is going to create similar inteconnector with Lithuania[32]. Besides, the Polish authority completed project with Ukraine on gas pipeline Ustiług-Zosin-Moroczyn in 2006. Latent defect of interconnector is low capacity (17.5 mln m^3 gas per year)[33]. At the same time, negotiations about inteconnectors had been conducted between Hungary, Croatia and Romania[34].

Leaders of Visegrad Group met in 2009 on Energy Security Summit in Budapest. The declaration on the European energy security was signed by Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia and, of course, four states included in the Visegrad Group[35]. The ministers of economy of the signatory states committed to lobby on the European Commission forum in favour of support construction of gas, oil and

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[30] *Russia accuses Ukraine of siphoning gas to Balkans*, NYTimes.com, 02.01.2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/iht/search/?iht2009> (14.01.2009); *Russia warns of oil supply cut-off through, says Slovakia*, France24.com, 28.10.2009 <http://www.france24.com/en/20091228-russia-warns-oil-supply-cut-off-through-ukraine-says-slovakia-petrol-europe> (30.01.2018).

[31] P. Bajda, M. Cichocki, P. Ukielski, A. Wołek, *Nowa Europa Środkowa? Analiza polityki państw regionu i ich miejsca w UE: krajobraz po wyborach na Węgrzech, Słowacji i w Czechach*, Kraków 2010. The record of discussion is held by author. See: *Slovakia, Poland look into 'Visegrad pipeline,* EurActiv.com, 17.01.2011, <www.euractiv.com/en/energy/slovakia-poland-look-visegrad-pipeline-news-501292> (5.03.2011).

[32] *Od kwietnia gaz będzie mógł płynąć z Niemiec do Polski*, Biznes.Onet.pl, 21.03.2014, <http://biznes.onet.pl/od-kwietnia-gaz-bedzie-mogl-plynac-z-niemiec-do-po,18567,5610287,1,news-detal> (30.01.2018).

[33] D. Grala, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski na przełomie XX i XXI wieku w aspekcie dostaw surowców z obszaru postradzieckiego*, „Sprawy Wschodnie" 2007, no 1-2, p. 14; *108 mln euro na Gazociąg Polska-Słowacja,* Biznes.Alert.pl, 20.12.2017, <http://biznesalert.pl/unia-wesprze-kluczowe-projekty-energetyczne-tym-polaczenie-gazowe-polski-slowacji/; http://biznesalert.pl/108-mln-euro-gazociag-polska-slowacja> (2.02.2018).

[34] *Minister Szijjarto: Węgry będą mogły importować gaz z Rumunii*, Gazeta.Prawna.pl, 09.02.2018, <http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/energetyka/artykuly/1103403,minister-szijjarto-wegry-beda-mogly-importowac-gaz-z-rumunii.html> (30.01.2018).

[35] A. Sęk, *Ja mam 20 lat, ty masz 20 lat, przed nami siódme niebo!*, Blogcim.WordPress.com, 16.02.2011, <blogcim.wordpress.com/2011/02/16/ja-mam-20-lat-ty-masz-20-lat-przed-nami-siodme-niebo> (30.01.2018).

electric power interconnectors combining with the North with the South of continent[36].

Member states of Visegrad Group desire to engage the European Commission in realization of the project of North-South energy route through assignation of the EU's funds. The first stage of the energy corridor is a construction of gas pipeline connecting the Czech Republic and Poland. The next stage will be an interconnector between Slovakia and Hungary. Overall, sixteen gas pipelines will be joined within the corridor. In this way, there will be a direct gas pipeline connection between the gas terminal in Świnoujście will and the gas terminal situated at the Croatian island of Krk[37].

Important element of "Energy Intermarium" is the gas terminal in Świnoujście. Its opening was planned on June 2014. However, it was opened on December 2015. Then, first supply of LNG was delivered by Qatargas Company[38].

However, one important problem complicated functioning of the gas terminal in Świnoujście. The Federal Office of Navigation and Hydrography issued a license on laying "Nord Stream" pipes in area, where "Nord Stream" criss-cross the Szczecin and Świnoujście ports approaching route. There is as threat, that this decision will disturb the gas carriers' disembarkation. Decision made by Germany threatens the safety of ships, which demand fairway almost 14.3 m deep.

The stance of the Polish authorities to require burying pipeline on the seabed was supposedly known to the German side. Nonetheless, the spokesman of the Federal Office declared that the possibility of solution was not considered. He justified that „burying the gas pipeline could be dangerous on environmental grounds". The statement of German bureaucrat gave an investors' attitude towards Poland. It turned out that in other places, where gas pipeline intersect with shipping lines (for example nearby Gotland), appropriate safety solutions were adapted, and the danger of buried pipelines was not a question at all[39].

Pragmatism of medium-sized countries

The cooperation in energy policy in the Central and Eastern Europe is not so good as the project of Visegrad Group might suggest. It is sufficient to

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[36] *Grupa Wyszehradzka w sprawie projektów energetycznych*, EurActiv.com, 27.01.2011, <www.euractiv.pl/politykaregionalna/wywiad/grupa-wyszehradzka-w-sprawie-projektow-energetycznych-002389> (30.01.2018).

[37] A. Sęk, *op. cit.* There are links to other sources.

[38] *Pierwsza dostawa katarskiego LNG dotarła do Polski*, Defence24.pl, 15.01.2016, <http://energetyka.defence24.pl/281495,pierwsza-dostawa-katarskiego-lng-dotarla-do-polski> (30.01.2018).

[39] A. Ścios, *Gazoport. O wierze ministra Pawlaka*, BezDekretu.Blogspot.com, 27.01.2010, <bezdekretu.blogspot.com/2010/01/gazoport-o-wierze-ministra-pawlaka.html> (30.01.2018).

provide examples of two states. The Czechs decision-makers strive to construct interconnector with Poland in an area called Cieszyn. On the other hand, the same policy makers plan extension of "Nord Stream" with Germany to the Czech Republic – so-called gas pipeline "Gazela"[40]. This conception seems to be bad. The country of natural gas origin will not to be diversified. It is still delivered only from Russia. However, the collection of Russian gas via Germany increases the guarantee of supply continuity. Russians treat German partner better than small and weak Central and Eastern European states. The other state which refused solidarity with the Central Europe in the issue of energy security is Latvia. This country as the only one Baltic states joined to the project "Nord Stream" and secured its access to offshoot of "Nord Stream"[41].

Taking into account Marek Cichocki's opinion appears to be correct. Medium-sized states pursue pragmatic policy. Within certain limits they try to secure themselves in different ways, looking for strategic ally[42]. The position of Germany raises concerns in Central-Eastern Europe[43], but, on the other hand, the Germany is concurrently perceived as a priority partner, with many advantages. The main ones are good relationship with Russia (in generally on economic ground) or leading role on the forum of the European Union.

Poland took action on gas supply from the West. The Yamal pipeline can ship gas from Germany to Poland since April 2014. Then it was finished development of measuring station in Mallnow. In opinion of the Polish management of gas sector this solution fulfils a role of 'insurance certificate' in case of crisis. If this scenario has occurred, Poland would buy gas for example in Germany, France or the Benelux countries. This option gives the possibility of transmission of 5.5 bn m^3 gas per year. For comparison, Poland imports a little over 10 bn cubic metres[44]. Idea of gas pipeline Bernau-Szczecin does not

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[40] G. Kaliszuk, *Co niedobre dla Gazpromu*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia" 2011, vol. XV, no 1, p. 82 et al.

[41] J. M. Nowakowski, cooperation: M. Fita-Czuchnowska, D. Ćosić, M. Michaliszyn, *Energetyczna zimna wojna*, "Wprost" 2006, no 19, Wprost.pl, 14.05.2006, <www.wprost.pl/ar/90039/Energetyczna-zimna-wojna> (30.01.2018).

[42] P. Bajda, M. Cichocki, P. Ukielski, A. Wołek, *op. cit.* Record of discussion are held by author.

[43] Personal preferences make no difference in purchasing energy resourcesThe chief factor here is security. For example Bulgaria does not express commitment to Russian initiative. Together with Romania it has a plan to build LNG terminal in Konstanca, where will be delivered gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Romania hold negotiations on participation in the project AGRI. According to this idea Azeri LNG gas will be exported across Georgia to Romania. In 2010 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania signed an agreement in Tbilisi on 12 May 2010. Cf. G. Kaliszuk, *Na południu Europy rozgrywa się batalia o dostawy gazu dla Unii…*, PolskaTimes.pl, 22.11.2010, <http://www.polskatimes.pl/ artykul/335273,na-poludniu-europy-rozgrywa-sie-batalia-o-dostawy-gazu-dla-unii,id,t.html> (20.03.2014).

[44] *Od kwietnia gaz będzie...*, (22.03.2014).

create new possibility of diversification of gas supply due to country of origin, however it is well assessed by expert on account of low cost of investment[45].

Summary

It is necessary to pay attention on the East-West gas pipelines domination in Europe (over the North-South lines) which is a remnant of the Cold War. This situation indicates perceiving the world in terms of the East and the West. As a result it makes idea of "Energy Intermarium" difficult to conduct. Only reformulation of our mental maps, will demonstrate numerous completely new opportunities in energy security sphere. But it will take time.

Rancour among Central and Eastern Europe states on political level may become some obstacle. It seems that cooperation Visegrad Group, which was starting in the early 90', undergoes redefinition before our very eyes. These states set the goals, which will be implemented basing on existing institutional foundations existing institutional base.

It is high time to look at the bigger picture. At that time we will break the pattern and take advantage on a larger scale with import of hydrocarbons from the Southern countries. Modern technology makes import of energy resources easier. Presented solutions have a chance to be implemented. The earliest opportunity is „Three Seas Initiative", which was inaugurated on the 25-26 August 2016 in Dubrovnik.

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III. REVIEWS

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
2017, No 2(9)

Beata Belica[1]
Poland

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, ED. CHARLES MANGA FOMBAD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD 2016, SS. 414

One of the authors, and at the same time the editor of this reviewed publication is Charles Manga Fombad, professor of law, scientifically associated with the University of Pretoria. The author's team consisted also of James Fowkes, Francois Verter, Conrad Bosire, Sylvester Shikyil, Fernando Bastos, Andre Thomashausen, Cofi Quashigas, Ameze Goubadia, Assef Fiseh, Walter Ochieng, Nico Horn, Jreffrey Jowel, Horace Adjolohoun and Michaela Hailbronner. Each of the authors professionally and scientifically deals with the subject of the constitutionalism and separations of powers in Africa. Both scientists working at the universities as well as the persons occupying additional functions (e.g. Jeffrey Jowell – Director of the Birningham Centre for the Rule of Law, Professor Emeritus at University College London), have contributed to the creation of the publications.

Charles M. Fombad gained his knowledge and experience at the University of Yaounde, University of London and University of Uppsala. Before working at the University of Pretoria, Fombad had been connected with the universities in Botswana and Cameroon. Professor Charles M. Fombad is the laureate of many awards, which express the appreciation for his scientific achievements. The most important award should be recognized by the University of Botswana, awarded three times by the Research Awards Committee for excellence in research. In addition, professor Fombad is a member of many scientific bodies, such as the South African Academy of Sciences, the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies (STIAS) and the International Association for Constitutional Law (IACL). Professor Fombad was accepted as an associate member of the International Academy of Comparative Law in

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2017. His scientific interests include constitutional law, legal union, and the law of legal harmonization. This confirms his academic achievements, which include many items regarding the division of powers and the constitutional system in African countries.

One of the latest monographs of Charles M. Fombad's is the book „The Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism", published by the Oxford University Press in 2016. This publication is a development of the concerns raised by the author in numerous articles on the constitutional separation of powers in African countries. The publication consists of five parts, which contain chapters on specific issues that are a part of the problem. However, it begins with the introduction to the Series of Manuals of African Constitutional Law Stellenbosch and the preface. Next, the publication contains a list of cases, which are described in the content of the monograph. These cases are divided according to the national key and ordered in an alphabetical order, with the date of the ruling and the page number on which reference is made to each of the indicated cases.

The author appeals not only to African, but also to other countries, among others to the United States of America, Great Britain or France, and thus to the states that had important interests in the past in Africa. The author also refers to the judgments of international courts and tribunals on this list. The time range of the analysis covers a wide period of time. The author, delving into the issues discussed, refers not only to the most recent events, but also to the judgments and decisions that were published in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the publication contains a detailed list of the legal provisions to which the Author refers in his monograph. Similarly to the previous list, this one also contains legal regulations organized by countries. The author indicates both the type of legal act referenced on a specific page and a specific provision of the act. He also included a list of abbreviations used in the text. Each chapter ends with a bibliography used by the author.

The authors begin their deliberations by pointing out that within the last two decades Africa had dealt with many blockages that hindered its development. At the same time, they note that African countries have problems with an overly centralized authority. On this occasion, the authors are tempted to indicate the reasons that determine this tradition of power consolidation. They indicate colonialism as the main cause of this (p. 17): *The fact that the colonialist sought to establish in the former colonies, the only system of government which they knew and rightly or wrongly assumed was the best and not necessarily that adopted to the needs and peculiarities of the particular country, was a problem.*

The legacy of colonialism is the domination of the party system existing practically on the entire continent. One-party traditions and the popular ideas of revolution have caused African "socialism" to develop in African countries. In the first part, the author generally regards the formation of African

constitutionalism referring to the past. It also indicates at what stage the constitutional division of powers in African countries is nowadays.

Part 2 describes the relations between the legislature and the executive. In this part, co-authors point to differences in the identification of the sources of the constitutional power in relation to the executive and legislative power in the Anglophone African countries. The next two chapters consist of the case studies – Conrad Bosire describes the Kenyan bicameralism and the path this country went through to build its political system, while Sylvester Shikyin describes the case of Nigeria.

Part 3 deals with the relations between judiciary and political authorities in Lusophone Africa. The introductory chapter to this part discusses the relationship between the judiciary and executive in this part of the continent in general, and in Ghana. Next, the question of super-presidentialism in Angola is raised. The authors also address the issues related to Nigeria and the assessment of the system of relations between political and judicial authorities. They do the same in regard to Ethiopia. The authors also make reflections on the role of current relations between the judiciary and other authorities in Africa and the development of African countries. In addition, this section contains a chapter on the Kenyan case after the 2010 elections and the situation of the judiciary in the country.

Part 4 – the last one, reflects on the independence of African political institutions. This section contains a chapter on the responsibility of individual institutions in the system of powers division in Africa. The following chapters concern the prosecutor's office and the role of law and Anglophone and Francophone Africa. This section, as well as the entire publication, is concluded by Michaela Hailbronner, regarding the constitutional conditions related to the division of authorities. The author was also tempted to prepare a forecast on at how the situation related to the division of powers will develop in African countries in the future.

The entire publication contains an index, thanks to which the reader can easily find a fragment about the issues of his interest. This is extremely valuable in the case of such a vast work like the publication named: 'The Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism'. In addition, we shall pay attention to the thought-out and transparent structure of the text. In the first part an outline of the historical formation of the constitutional division of powers, as well as the characteristics of modern constitutionalism in Africa were made.

In the next part, reference is made to the relationship of the legislature and executive to characterize the relationship between the judicial authorities with previously presented legislation and the executive. It is worth appreciating that the content referring to the whole continent and the prevailing trends related to the mutual relations between the authorities are interwoven with some interesting case studies, such as Kenya after 2010.

The last part concerning the independence of the individual constitutional institutions is a kind of a summary of the knowledge presented so far, and describes the most important trends related to the subject. In addition, it presents the bodies that uphold the independence of political institutions in African countries.

The great value of the publication is a thorough analysis of the factors and historical experiences which influenced the shape of the modern constitutionalism in Africa. This allows the reader to understand the depth of the problems faced by individual African countries. It also gives a specific background, which is the analysis of dependencies between the branches of the authorities. Thanks to the inclusion of cultural influences affecting the constitutional system in Africa, the book, despite the legal character, becomes interesting not only for lawyers, but also for political scientists, internatiologists, historians and culture experts.

Each part has been designed to suggest that the authors are outstanding specialists in a given field. It should also be noted that the subject complements a large gap in the non-African publishing market in this field. Only few items that holistically take into account cultural, historical, political, and legal issues, have been translated into English so far. Thus, the publication is highly commendable.

„Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem”
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Brasil

OLIVER STUENKEL, *THE BRICS AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER*, LEXINGTON BOOKS, 2015, SS. 268

The book “The BRICS and the Future of Global Order” written by Dr. Oliver Stuenkel was first released in English by Lexington Books in 2015 and in 2017 in Portuguese by Brazilian publisher Paz e Terra. Professor Oliver Stuenkel has been researching the role of the BRICS countries for several years and this work represents a very interesting and deep analysis about this group of states.

The group of states well known as BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has been highly analyzed in International Relations during the last years. The acronym first created for economic purposes by a Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neil as BRIC became synonym of an anti-hegemonic movement in different areas.

Professor Oliver Stuenkel could write a very interesting book about the historical origins of the BRICS group. He gives a detailed historical account of the development of the group since its inception until the present moment. For those who are interested in the “post-western world”, or in subjects related to the “non-western world” this is a plateful of references for International Relations analyst.

The book brings details of the most important moments in the “evolution” of this semi-coherent group of states with a great variety of facts about the meetings of this group until now. Stuenkel tries to show that it’s not the most coherent group, not even well institutionalized, although the BRICS has a great potential to counter balance the global order.

In order to make sense of this analysis Professor Oliver Stuenkel tries to show with his historical and theoretical analysis the increasing relevance of the group in economic and geopolitical terms. The book highlights especially the moments in which the BRICS countries could succeed such as in economic cooperation, creation of infrastructure, among other features.

Beyond the successes of the BRICS concrete initiatives, also Stuenkel illuminates what the BRICS countries as a semi-institutionalized group are

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doing in terms of norms changing. In this respect, the Professor brings to light the example of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Responsibility while Protecting, and so the importance of the emerging powers in the regard of the use of international norms and how they can be developed or not.

Beyond the norms and the concrete features of the BRICS, one of the most important aspects of the book is to show the possibility of the emergence of a renovated multipolarity, and a new world order not brought by "Western" countries. From this book, Professor Stuenkel does a good job trying to show, also, that it's not yet an institutionalized group, but can be at a certain point. And to create this base of his argument he puts how the group is working on projects together, attending around thirty meetings per year, cooperating in a variety of projects, developing norms and trying to sooth the disagreements inside the group. Probably, one very important aspect of the dissonance of the group can be in relation to sensitive security issues regarding foreign policy. In this sense Professor Stuenkel puts how these countries are succeeding in, for example, voting harmoniously at the UN Security Council when sensitive issues for the members of the group were on the table, so he writes about the position of the BRICS countries in face of resolutions like 1973 on Lybia and resolutions on other countries in relation to humanitarian interventions.

BRICS group has gained momentum notably since the launching of the project of the New Development Bank of BRICS to help finance the group infrastructure projects. The BRICS Development Bank can be of a great relevance in world politics since it has the ambition to counterbalance "Western" institutions such as IMF and the World Bank. In this sense, it's interesting to note that the book has a great detailed assessment of the evolution of this group of states, since the first time the group BRICs was mentioned, still without South Africa until now when large scale projects are being put in practice.

However, the leading purpose of the book is to assess the future of global order with the BRICS, and it seems that the book couldn't reach this goal successfully, maybe it needs more time to see clearly which role the BRICS will play in the future. Or maybe the analysis misses a component of comparison to other groups of countries which have a similar purpose and how BRICS can impact or influence other institutions like G20, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among others.

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