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GENDERING DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION



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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Study of Gender, Diplomacy and Negotiation

Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns

1.1 Introduction

One of the most striking patterns of contemporary diplomacy is the over-representation of men and the gross underrepresentation of women in senior diplomatic and negotiation positions. While this may reflect the highly gendered character of diplomacy as an institution, this pattern also matches wider trends in global politics. Despite significant inroads of women into a number of public political spheres in recent decades, statistics still reveal a grim picture of inclusive political representation and gender equality: approximately 77% of the world's parliamentary seats are occupied by men;

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90% of heads of state or government are men, as are 82% of senior ministers (UN Women 2017). International organisations and institutions also have poor track records on women in senior diplomatic positions. For instance, the United Nations appointed its first-ever female mediator Mary Robinson only in 2013. The External Action Service of the European Union is headed by Federica Mogherini, but all nine Special Envoys are men (2017). Eighty-five per cent of the ambassadors in the world are men.

This bleak picture is changing, however. For one, women are seeking out diplomatic careers in increasing numbers, and they are rising in rank within diplomacy. A number of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) across the world are taking active measures to encourage female applicants and to recruit women. The landmark resolution of the United Nations Security Council 1325, which was endorsed in 2000, is a significant milestone in the quest for inclusive representation and participation in peace negotiations. The resolution catapulted the problematic of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) on to the global agenda of the international community. The resolution underlines the important role women do and should play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations and wider peace support operations. Moreover, it puts strong emphasis on the goals to achieve gender equality and the incorporation of gender perspectives in all UN peace and security efforts. Consequently, as part of the WPS agenda, the UN and other regional organisations have made serious attempts to gender-mainstream their organisations. Countries such as Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, have also pushed the WPS agenda, which now constitutes one of the core pillars of their foreign policies (True 2016).

This book takes off from the inspirational and poignant question raised by Cynthia Enloe (1990) over two decades ago: "Where are the women?" In the field of diplomacy and international negotiation, this problematic has received surprisingly scant attention. Lately, a number of relevant policy reports have been issued on women's participation in peace processes (e.g. UN Women 2012) but academia still lags behind with very few studies that analyse gender and women in diplomacy and international negotiation (Boyer et al. 2009; Babcock and Laschever 2003; Enloe 1990; Florea et al. 2003; McCarthy 2014; Neumann 2008 and 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). This "gender blindness" has prevailed despite the rapidly expanding field of feminist studies in the subfield of International Relations (IR). Hence, the overarching rationale of this volume is ambitious, first in its quest to fill this void in research, and second in its aim to advance a

novel research agenda on gender, diplomacy and international negotiation. In short, by utilising a gender-sensitive approach, the book aims to map where women are located and to analyse the ways in which diplomatic culture may contain gender norms, rules and practices. Although the empirical focus is on women, such an analysis is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and femininity (Bjarnegård 2009).

Three core research questions set the overall framework of this book and guide the contributing chapters in their work to empirically map, analyse and conceptually advance theory. *First*, where are the women located and positioned in contemporary diplomacy and international negotiation? In this book, we strive to identify the location of women with regard to status, tasks and contexts as well as how these patterns may have changed over time. In this empirical mapping, the book makes visible broader gender patterns in contemporary diplomacy. At the same time, the rich empirical case studies, which range from Sweden, Brazil, the United States, Turkey to the UN, the EU and Russia, may point to diverse patterns and contexts.

The *second* question focuses on the diplomatic infrastructure and to what extent diplomatic norms and practices of negotiations are gendered. Here, we shift to paying more attention to dominant norms and gendered expressions that guide diplomatic practices. Our interest is to explore to what extent diplomatic culture contains gendered scripts and may pose structural barriers for female diplomats and negotiators. To what extent does homosociality pervade gendered institutions and pose as an obstacle for women? For instance, it may be hard to visualise women in leading diplomatic positions because they break with gender norms and homosocial diplomatic environments. In cases where women hold senior positions, they may also have to adapt to masculine norms and practices in order to advance in diplomacy. Such gender dynamics express a kind of "hegemonic masculinity" (Connell 1987) and can, for instance, partly explain the underrepresentation of women at the negotiation table. Peace negotiations, in particular, tend to have specific institutional characteristics, as gender roles in times of conflict become polarised (Aharoni 2011: 411). In short, these dynamics tend to legitimise a diplomatic hierarchy as well as a relational and gendered division of labour. Hence, it provides a deeper understanding of the central organising discourse and gendered meaning of diplomacy.

The *third* question explores to what extent the practice of diplomacy and international negotiation changes with a broader and more diverse

group of diplomats. Obviously, women have more to gain from a more heterosocial diplomatic milieu, whereas an increased presence of women implies a loss of institutional power for men (Bjarnegård 2009: 21). For sure, the entry of women as diplomats in larger numbers in some countries, particularly above the threshold of tokenism, has brought changes to diplomacy as an institution. But to what extent are different diplomatic activities associated with masculinity and femininity? Here our focus shifts towards analysing gender as performing rather than being (Cohn 2013: 9). Such a shift is necessary in order to identify different gendered modes of negotiations without sliding into essentialism.

1.2 Diplomacy and Negotiation in Transition

> Including more women in peacemaking is not just the right thing to do, it's also the smart thing to do. (Hillary Clinton 2011)

Diplomacy is an institution containing practices of negotiation, representation, information gathering and communication. The origin is unclear and debatable but can be traced back to ancient Greece, from where some of the diplomatic vocabulary and practices emanate. Roman law and later Italian customs shaped much of the diplomatic practices, such as protocols, procedures, ceremonies and diplomatic rules. The professionalisation of the diplomatic corps also evolved during these times. Yet, for a long time, diplomacy was viewed as an art based on tradition, historical precedents and practices by elites with a trained intuition (Berridge 2010). During most of the twentieth century, academics and practitioners alike have debated the extent and implications of the changing nature of diplomacy (e.g. Aggestam 2009; Sharp 2009; Melissen 2005; Pigman 2013). Overall, these debates have centred on definitions, contents and practices of diplomacy. The main dividing line concerns the implications of democracy and to what extent traditional diplomacy has transformed due to the shifting international contexts of the twentieth century. Some argue that modern diplomacy is an amalgam of old diplomacy, whereas others contend that these changes have generated a new diplomacy, distinguished by publicity, transparency and new actors. For instance, a great number of non-governmental actors (NGOs) and international actors are today participating in modern and multilateral tracks of diplomacy, generating a re-conceptualisation (e.g. track-two, para-, intersocietal, catalytic diplomacy) of its contents and practices (e.g. Badie 2013;

Hocking 1999). However, although issues of democracy and representation have been discussed at length, gender as an analytical category and women as political agents have surprisingly been ignored.[1]

In contrast to the lacunae in research, the policy deliberations on gender have widened and deepened among diplomats, policymakers and practitioners in the last decade as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 put a new threshold of action on gender representation, equality and mainstreaming in international politics. Inclusion is now a central theme resurfacing in many contemporary policy discourses (Anderlini 2007). Yet, as Thania Paffenholz et al. (2016) underline, the quest to include more women in diplomacy and negotiation is more than increasing numbers. Feminist political theorists also make the point that inclusion is not only about counting women but involves the reframing and restructuring of diplomacy (De Alwis et al. 2013). Peace negotiations, for instance, may be seen as a critical opportunity to redefine relationships and empower groups by working towards equitable distribution of power. Ultimately, inclusion in diplomacy and negotiation aims to build a more just, durable and peaceful international society.

There are several visible expressions of how contemporary policy discourses on gender and the WPS agenda have triggered, to different degrees, foreign policy change in several countries. By way of illustration, Hillary Clinton, during her tenure as the US Secretary of State, launched a new doctrine, which framed the subjugation of women as a security threat to the United States (Hudson and Leidl 2015). The foreign ministers of Australia and the United Kingdom, Julie Bishop and William Hague, also pushed the WPS agenda and gender mainstreaming in international fora. Recently, the Swedish government has taken one step further by declaring that the country is pursuing a feminist foreign policy (Government Offices of Sweden 2015). Foreign minister Margot Wallström in particular has taken on a normative entrepreneurial leadership role in diplomacy where one of the top priorities is the inclusion of women in peace negotiations (*Huffington Post*, 29 January 2016). As part of that endeavour, the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Island) have mobilised and launched a new women's network of Nordic mediators in cooperation with women in the Global South. The network is to serve as a resource pool as well as to make women peacemakers more visible so they can be assigned as leading international mediators (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2016).

Two major lines of arguments on women's participation can be delineated in the contemporary policy discourses. The first is a right-based approach, which argues that women have a right to participate in diplo-

macy, international organisations and global forums. Women constitute 50% of the population, and this should be reflected more fairly on the international scene and for sure in matters of peace and security that affect women's everyday life. As mentioned, peace processes open up opportunities to renegotiate repressive structures towards gender equality and an emancipatory peace (Franks and Richmond Oliver 2008; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Again, diplomats and mediators are centrally positioned to redesign diplomacy and peace processes towards greater inclusion. In short, it is argued, actions taken in that direction do not need any further justification since they concern principles of justice and fairness (Charlesworth 2008; El-Bushra 2007).

The second line of argument, which is more prevalent and visible in contemporary international policy discourses, relies mostly on instrumental reasoning. Here, the presence of women is believed to bring something valuable to diplomacy and peace is seen as intimately linked with equality between men and women. For instance, after the successful conclusion of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in 2015, Federica Mogherini stated that "[h]aving many women at the table in key positions … helped us to be concrete and pragmatic the whole way" (*New York Times*, 8 July 2015). Indeed, there is a widespread assumption about a positive correlation between female participation, successful negotiations and sustainable outcomes. Some of these arguments also reflect an idealised version of "femininity," where women are assumed to be efficient diplomats and negotiators, particularly in the "soft" humanitarian spheres of foreign policy (Anderlini 2007; Maoz 2009).

But according to critics, such an instrumental view risks prioritising women's agency within a particular framework and restricting participation to a certain type of women. The WPS agenda has allegedly also contributed to the securitisation of women's representation (e.g. Hudson 2012; Shepherd 2011). A few policymakers seem to be well aware of the dangers of making women's participation contingent upon positive outcomes, but they argue that such instrumental reasoning is necessary as the most effective way to push forward towards a broader representation of women on the global diplomatic scene (Hudson 2012: 46). Thus, one central task for academia is to probe these underlying assumptions about gender, performativity and outcomes. Initial research in this area seems to indicate a correlation between inclusive representation in negotiations and sustainable peace since the root causes of conflict are addressed more thoroughly (Nilsson 2012). Also the visibility of gender issues and gender-

specific languages in peace agreements are traced and correlated with durable peace (Bell 2015). Yet, the results are still preliminary and much more research is needed. As True (2016) correctly states, it is not all that clear what the relationship is between descriptive representation of women and substantive representation in which women's political interests in policymaking and outcomes matter. This is one of the conundrums that this book sets out to explore.

1.3 State-of-the-Art in the Study of Diplomacy and Negotiation

The academic interest in gender and diplomacy started slowly in the early 1990s with a growing body of scholarship on gender or women in diplomacy, following the uptick in women entering the diplomatic arena in greater numbers during the same period. However, much of this work, as we will show below, falls within diplomatic history, which focuses primarily on the historical negotiating efforts of individual women, on the informal labour of diplomat wives or on national histories of opening the diplomatic profession to women. The scholarship on contemporary gender dynamics in diplomacy is much more sparse. Despite the growing body of scholarship on women or gender and diplomacy, many questions still remain unaddressed.

Gender scholars have contributed greatly to diplomatic history, a lively subfield within the discipline of history (e.g. Costigliola 2012; Daybell 2011; Dean 2001 and 2012, De Souza Farias 2015**;** Hickman 1999; Jeffreys-Jones 1995; Kiddle 2015; McCarthy 2009 and 2014; Shibusawa 2012; Sluga and James 2016; Wilson 2012; Wood 2005 and 2007). Often to explore broader questions of gender in diplomacy, much of this research focuses on the remarkable lives and efforts of individual women, such as Lady Anne Fanshawe, ambassadress of England at the Court of Madrid (1664–1666), Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna, the Russian Tsar's sister and unofficial state diplomat during the early nineteenth century, or Pamela Churchill, Winston Churchill's daughter-in-law, who helped forge the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain during the Second World War (Oliván Santaliestra 2016; Schedewie 2016; Costigliola 2012). While rarely enjoying the formal designation as state representative, this scholarship shows, women have nonetheless long filled important functions as unofficial envoys, behind-the-scenes negotiators and informal mediators.

The diplomatic history scholarship also explores gender in the emergence of the professionalised and bureaucratised modern MFAs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Calkin 1977; De Souza Farias 2015; McCarthy 2009 and 2014). With the development of the modern Foreign Service organisations, diplomatic wives "became the mediators of the informal diplomacy crucial to the operation of a Foreign Service that was rapidly expanding and evolving" (Wood 2007: 506; see also Enloe 1990). Diplomacy came to depend on a certain kind of heterosexual marriage, with a diplomat's wife expected to contribute to her husband's diplomatic mission, without pay. Hosting social functions, providing the congenial environment in which male ambassadors and other diplomats could develop important relationships, and serving as the husband's "eyes and ears" at public functions were some of the expectations placed on diplomat wives (Enloe 1990: 97). A number of studies have also charted the opening of the diplomatic profession to women in the first half of the twentieth century, generally with a focus on the history of individual MFAs (e.g. Calkin 1977; De Souza Farias 2015; McCarthy 2014; McGlen and Sarkees 1993: 62–66; Neumann 2012:ch5).

In short, diplomatic history scholarship demonstrates clearly that gender and sexuality structure the formal relationships between state representatives and the informal—but nonetheless central—relations that were the terrain of women. Indeed, the very practices and institutions of diplomacy were and continue to be gendered. Writing in 1990, Enloe (1990: 96) claims that "the diplomatic wife seems a fixture of international politics." The women who pioneered into the role as official diplomats were confronted with a homosocial and masculinised environment. As Kiddle (2015) has pointed out, the masculine culture of diplomacy hemmed in and constrained female official diplomats who emerged in the early twentieth century, making their postings fraught with difficulties that their male colleagues did not have to face.

The period of interest to diplomatic historians is a period during which very few women operated as official representatives of state, whether as official negotiators or Foreign Service officers. Indeed, the point of departure in diplomatic history is the absence of women in formal diplomacy and negotiation. The much smaller body of scholarship on the contemporary period (1980s–present) has instead noted the small but increasing number of women in official roles in diplomacy, turning to questions about the effects of a growing group of female diplomats and

negotiators. A few studies explore whether these women have had different priorities, policy preferences and behaviours than their male colleagues during negotiations or in the Foreign Service (e.g. McGlen and Sarkees 1991, 1993 and 2001; Bahsevkin 2014; Kolb and Coolidge 1991; Acker 1990; Weingarten and Douvan 1985).

In a pioneering study of this kind, McGlen and Sarkees (1991) asked whether adding women to the top echelons of the US Departments of State and Defense would change the foreign policy output. Comparing attitudes among men and the few women in these top positions in the 1980s, they concluded that the men and women of the State and Defense Departments were more similar than different in their policy attitudes. The gender gap in the general population was thus not reflected within these foreign policy institutions. In fact, at the State Department, women political appointees were more conservative than the men, although the female career civil servants were somewhat more moderate than their male colleagues (see also McGlen and Sarkees 1993 and 2001 on the same 1980s data). In a similar vein, Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker (2012) find that individual-level differences in negotiation behaviour between men and women are often small and inconsistent compared to the large variations within the two groups.

Yet, it is notable that despite the obvious academic interest in gender and diplomacy, there is exceptionally little research charting and analysing where the women (and men) are located in the Foreign Service organisations and in the international negotiation process. McGlen and Sarkees (1993) and Jeffreys-Jones (1995: 176–178) provide some discussion of the numbers and location of women in the US State Department in the 1980s. Sjolander (2001) likewise tried to identify where the women were found in the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) between 1984 and 1993. The top diplomat was male. But the analyses of the US State Department and the Canadian DEA provide a picture that is over 25 years old, and we know that the overall numbers of women have increased significantly since then. What is more, the research is almost exclusively focused on Europe and North America, with a few notable exceptions in diplomatic history (e.g. De Souza Farias 2015; Kiddle 2015). Neumann (2008 and 2012) provides a fascinating analysis of the gendered culture of the Norwegian MFA in the 2000s, focusing on the multiple scripts of masculinity and femininity operative in the organisation and highlighting the "inherent tension between the statuses 'women' and 'diplomat'"

(2012: 162). However, the study says little about the location of women and men in the Norwegian MFA.

Research on gender and diplomatic negotiation is also scarce, although an awakening interest can be noted (see e.g. Farias 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). In contrast, policymakers and practitioners have generated a number of interesting reports on women's representation in negotiation (GIZ 2014; Paffenholz et al. 2016; UN Women 2012). For instance, UN Women's study of peace negotiations during 1992–2011 is often referred to and shows that 2.5% of the chief mediators and 9% of the negotiators were women (UN Women 2012). These studies also reveal that women are mostly concentrated at the lower levels of the negotiations (see also Weingarten and Douvan 1985). Yet, we know little about the roles and perspectives of women as low-level negotiators and mediators, which contribute to making women's participation invisible.

1.4 In Theory: Gender, Diplomacy and Negotiation

In this book, we take as our point of departure the scholarship on gendered institutions and some of the insights generated therein about how gender tends to operate in institutional processes and practices (e.g. Acker 1990 and 1992; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; McGlen and Sarkees 1993; Krook and Mackay 2015). We use the concept of institution in its two central meanings: on the one hand, an institution can refer to an established, formal organisation with clear aims and rules specifying chains of command and work roles with responsibilities, authorities and tasks. The MFAs that are the subject of the first half of this volume are institutions in this formal organisational sense. On the other hand, an institution can also refer to a less formalised but nonetheless sustained set of practices, relationships or behavioural patterns (Sharp 2009; Jönsson and Hall 2005; see also March and Olsen 1989). Diplomacy as international negotiations, the subject of the second half of the volume, can be approached as an institution in this sense, as such negotiations consist of somewhat predictable sets of practices, relationships and behavioural patterns even if these are not formalised into an organisation (see also Adler and Pouliot 2011).

Institutional scholarship has demonstrated that institutions in either sense of the term can be gendered, containing "collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations" (March and Olsen 1989: 161). Indeed,

feminist institutionalist scholarship has demonstrated that gender norms and gender relations can become institutionalised and thus help define desirable and expected behaviour for men and women (and those who transgress these categories, even if the institutionalist scholarship on transgender, gender fluidity or gender-queerness is more sparse). Institutions themselves, and not just the people working as diplomats, are bearers of gender. Gender thus helps shape expectations and practices of individuals into relatively stable and predictable patterns.

It is important to underscore that in defining the roles and expectations of men and women, and in distributing status and capacities between different gender roles, gender is power-laden. We focus on two power-laden processes in this volume: differentiation between "male" and "female" spheres and practices, and the hierarchical ordering of men and women. On the one hand, as a great deal of institutionalist scholarship has revealed, men and women in public institutions tend to differentiate: men tend to congregate in what is considered "hard" fields of military and finance, whereas women often cluster in allegedly "feminine" or "soft" fields traditionally "linked to the private sphere and/or to women as a group" (Krook and O'Brien 2011: 13; see also e.g. Wängnerud 1998; Towns 2003). Many public institutions have thus come to be characterised by a division of labour, with men assigned to stereotypically "male" tasks and positions and women to putatively "female" assignments. For instance, in a discussion of the entry of women into the Norwegian MFA, Neumann (2012: 138) describes the channelling of women first into positions as typists and then into civil servant positions with specific portfolios (e.g. culture and legal inheritance issues). In the US Department of State of the 1980s, the Civil Service was also predominantly staffed by women, whereas the Foreign Service was predominantly occupied by men (McGlen and Sarkees 1993: 75–76).

There are some parallel studies on gender roles, which have found differences in the way men and women approach negotiations in a broad sense. Kolb and Coolidge (1991) argue that women tend to take a more "relational" view of others in negotiations, and that they prefer more problem-solving dialogue than men. Likewise, Florea et al. (2003: 230) stipulate that women favour a relational approach, and that they bring a personalised component of empathy—that is frequently undervalued in male-dominated settings—to negotiations (see also Boyer et al. 2009). Masculine traits are frequently associated with competitive transactional negotiation behaviour, whereas feminine characteristics are linked to

cooperative transformational problem-solving. "Masculine" characteristics typically include self-affirmation, competition and dominance, while feminine characteristics entail cooperation and inclusion (Barron 2003; Babcock and Laschever 2003; Florea et al. 2003). These propositions also resemble a classical distinction in negotiation theory between distributive and integrative negotiations (Naurin 2010; Hopmann 1998) and in mediation theory between power and pure mediation (Aggestam 2002).

A second related trend is that men tend to end up in more prestigious positions and assignments, whereas women cluster in the less prestigious ones (e.g. Putnam 1976; Bashevkin 1993; Studlar and Moncrief 1999; Hawkesworth 2003; Connell 2006). Men and women are not simply differentiated, in other words—they are also hierarchically ordered. Forty years ago, Robert Putnam proposed the now classic generalisation about political elites, "the law of increasing disproportion," which holds that the numbers of women will decrease with each stop towards the apex of power (Putnam 1976: 33). Sylvia Bashevkin (1993) has subsequently referred to this trend as "the higher, the fewer." In a discussion of cabinet rankings, Krook and O'Brien designate foreign affairs as a whole a high prestige area because it offers individuals the potential for sustained "visibility and significant control over policy" (2011: 14). This helps us understand why there have been so few women in diplomacy over all until recently. But once women enter the diplomatic arena, prior scholarship suggests that we should expect hierarchical gender patterns to emerge within diplomacy as well. In an examination of the Canadian DEA in 1988, Sjolander (2001) demonstrates precisely this. At this time, only 15% of Foreign Service officers (FSOs) were women. The great majority of them were concentrated at the lower assignment levels. In the management categories, only 3.9% were women, and there were no women directors-general at all. In fact, in terms of the representation of women in the management categories, "External Affairs ranked thirty-second out of thirty-three government departments, behind National Defence but ahead of National Revenue" (Sjolander 2001: 227). The US State Department exhibited similar gender hierarchies. In 1989, women constituted 24.3% of US FSOs (McGlen and Sarkees 1993: 76). However, in senior ranks, only 6.9% of the officers were women (ibid). These high status departments were indeed slow to include women in their ranks, particularly at the top.

One might object that the absence of women in diplomatic positions of power and status may simply be a result of women having entered into

diplomacy late. After all, one often starts with assignments and posts of lesser status to gradually work one's way up the career ladder. With more time, some of the hierarchical differences between men and women may even out. This claim is not without merit—with more women entering diplomacy over a longer period of time, the number of women in more prestigious positions is bound to increase. At present, given that women have entered into diplomacy in larger numbers for decades, this should be reflected also in larger shares of women in positions of prestige and power. However, there are also reasons to believe that some gender hierarchies may be reproduced and thus resistant to change. At least during the past century and a half, public status positions have generally been occupied by men, often with the understanding that they are the bearers of masculine traits necessary to fulfil the public function (on the trend towards excluding women from public office and political posts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Towns 2016). Positions of status and influence continue to be associated with alleged traits of masculinity and, in extension, with men, whereas femininity is more often linked with positions of subordination and lesser status. Such legacies do change, but often slowly. Hierarchical gender patterns may be the cumulative effect of individuals' career choices (as preferences are also shaped by gender), biased recruitment patterns, male homosocial networks, outright or subtle discrimination, the gendered division of unpaid labour or a combination of these factors. None of these factors disappear simply because the number of women increases over time. Among diplomats, we thus suspect that women may be channelled towards more "feminine" and less prestigious positions, whereas men are favoured to status assignments and tasks that allegedly require "masculine" traits—for example, divisions of political and military affairs within MFAs. Ann Tickner (1992) underlines that rationality, realism, power, domination and competitiveness are most often associated with masculinity and are characteristics highly valued by government officials who engage in international negotiation and mediation. As a consequence, a distributive "masculine" style of negotiation is favoured, which emphasises status, difference and coercion.

Crucially, what is considered "male" and "female" can vary contextually and by institution, and it is not always immediately clear to the outside observer why certain assignments and duties are understood as "male" rather than "female." Institutions are furthermore dynamic, so that even though they may tend towards stability and routines, they are not fixed or completely stable entities—what is considered appropriate changes over

time and across space (e.g. Katzenstein 1990; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). One of the central concerns of this volume is thus to explore inductively where the women and the men are in the MFAs and diplomatic negotiations that are the subject of this volume. Rather than developing more specific theoretical expectations about "male" and "female" duties, tasks and practices a priori, we thus prefer to work more inductively, using the empirics of the chapters to work out some propositions about commonalities and differences in the concluding chapter.

1.5 Outline of the Book

The book is structured around the three core questions outlined above and divided in two main parts: the first section focuses on MFAs, and the second section on international negotiations. Each section starts with a chapter that presents global trends of women's representation in diplomacy, negotiation and mediation. The first part, on MFAs, begins with a chapter by Ann E. Towns and Birgitta Niklasson that focuses on global patterns in ambassador appointments in order to get a sense of where women and men are located in the Foreign Service around the world in terms of power and prestige. Any ambassadorship is a position of prestige and esteem, and for career diplomats, the ambassador position is the apex of a diplomatic career. The analysis—of almost 7000 ambassador appointments around the word in 2014—shows that women now make up 15% of these top diplomatic positions, which is far from parity, but yet a sizeable minority of appointments. There is great variation among sending states, however. Not surprisingly, the Nordic countries stand out with an average of 35% female ambassadors. The states of the Middle East have the smallest share of women among their ambassadors, with only 6%. There are also great variations within regions, with the Philippines (41%) appointing almost as many women ambassadors as Finland (44%) and nearly twice as many as Denmark (22%). South Africa (27%) and Colombia (28%) are other notable examples. The chapter also establishes that women are underrepresented in the most prestigious ambassador postings and overrepresented in the less prestigious ones.

The ensuing chapters take a closer look at gender patterns in a number of individual MFAs, namely those of the United States, Sweden, Brazil, Turkey and Japan. The presence of women varies considerably in these ministries, ranging from 56% in the Swedish MFA to much lower shares in Turkey and Japan. Asking where in the organisation these women are

located, the chapters show that women tend to cluster in positions of less prestige and influence. The degree to which this is so seems to vary, however. Surprisingly, as Birgitta Niklasson shows in her chapter on the Swedish MFA, Swedish women are much more underrepresented in prestigious ambassador appointments than their foreign colleagues on average. Having a feminist foreign policy and a large number of women in the MFA is thus no guarantee for an equitable distribution of status among men and women. The chapters also focus on the gendered rules and cultures of these MFA as well as the national contexts within which they are embedded, as well as on the struggles and strategies of female diplomats for egalitarian change. Sylvia Bashevkin discusses litigation as one strategy pursued by US women diplomats to battle sex discrimination at the US State Department. Brazilian women diplomats recently published an open letter with a 14-point reform programme to make the Brazilian MFA more accommodating to women, as Souza Farias and Carmo show. In Turkey, women navigate through the male-dominated institutional structure as best they can, as Suleymanoglu-Kurum and Rumelili point out. There are indeed multiple ways to engage and seek to change these institutions that have been male-dominated for so long, as the chapters show.

The second part turns to the representation and participation of women in international negotiations. The first chapter by Karin Aggestam and Isak Svensson presents a unique global mapping of women mediators in international negotiations during 1991–2014. While a causal relationship has been established in research on gender equality and peace, there is virtually no scholarly work that examines gender representation and peace mediation. The study identifies 36 cases (8% of all international mediation efforts), at the most senior levels of international mediation. Moreover, these mediators have intervened in 24 different armed conflicts around the globe, but no specific pattern is detected regarding gender and the type of conflict mediated. Yet, an interesting observation is made regarding the nationality of the mediator. Nordic, the United States and African mediators are overrepresented and constitute two-thirds of the total number of interventions. The reasons for this may be manifold, but some tentative explanations relate to the larger number of female diplomats in the Nordic countries, to the fact that the United States has had three women acting as Secretary of States, and the large number of conflicts in Africa in recent decades. Despite the gross underrepresentation of women as international mediators, the global trajectory still indicates a modest increase over time, particularly after the passing of resolution 1325.

The following chapters contain rich and diverse empirical analyses of gender, women and negotiations. Thania Paffenholz's chapter makes use of unique data emanating from a research project "Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation," which shows that women's inclusion is not limited to participation at the formal negotiation table but often occurs through multiple modalities, along several tracks, and throughout different phases. A strong presence of women, even directly at the negotiation table, does not automatically translate into an ability to assert strong influence, Paffenholz argues. The next chapter, by Sarai Aharoni, provides an in-depth analysis of Israeli women's participation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, which highlights the informal recruitment of negotiators, the gendered division of labour within the official negotiation bodies, and the effects of secrecy that tend to limit transparency and regulatory capacities. In the next chapter, by Daniel Naurin and Elin Naurin, the empirical focus shifts from bilateral peace negotiations to multilateral negotiations within the European Union. It maps the descriptive representation of women at various levels and in different policy areas during negotiations in the European Council. Compared to many other international negotiations, the Council relies on highly institutionalised procedures and long-term interactions. Torunn Tryggestad's chapter sets out to analyse the negotiations and leading actors behind UNSCR 1325 and the paradigmatic shift it represents in international relations. She pays particular attention to the role of transnational advocacy networks and how small states promoted such a new normative agenda within the Security Council. The last chapter in this section by Erika Svedberg analyses a specific case of bilateral negotiation in a Western-post-Soviet Russian context. She highlights the absence of women and the striking homosocial environment of these negotiations. By way of conclusion, she advances two modes of masculinities that seem to reoccur in the negotiation process: the benevolent and authoritarian masculinity.

The final concluding chapter by Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns pulls together insights from the rich contributions in the volume to provide some tentative answers about the broader gender patterns and gender norms in diplomacy as well as about the potential effects of the increasing numbers of women in the diplomatic field. The chapter also sets out a clear research agenda, making suggestions for different directions for future research on gender, diplomacy and negotiation. The chapter ends with a number of policy relevant avenues for research which may lead to gender-just diplomacy.

Notes

1. To note, some of the recently published textbooks on diplomacy do not to any greater extent elaborate on gender and women (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013; Cooper et al. 2013; Kerr and Wiseman 2013).

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PART I

Gender in the Foreign Service

CHAPTER 2

Where Are the Female Ambassadors? Gender and Status Hierarchies in Ambassador Postings

Ann E. Towns and Birgitta Niklasson

2.1 Introduction

In the introduction to this volume, Aggestam and Towns drew on feminist institutionalist scholarship to argue that women tend to cluster in less prestigious assignments and work roles, whereas men tend to cluster in the more prestigious ones. Gender thus centrally involves the distribution of social power and prestige among actors, they contend. The aim of this chapter is to explore whether there are such gender patterns in ambassador positions: are men posted in positions of higher military and economic status than women? Ambassadors serve as heads of diplomatic missions, representing a sending state's interests abroad. Any ambassadorship is a position of prestige and esteem (Krook and O'Brien 2011: 14). Being a

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politically appointed ambassador carries great status, and for career diplomats, the ambassador position is the apex of a diplomatic career. Given the general trend of male overrepresentation in high-status positions, a general overrepresentation of men in ambassador positions would not be surprising. But clearly, not all ambassadorships are of equal weight. Some appointments, generally those for states at the center of military and economic power, are considered much more weighty than others. Being appointed ambassador to Washington, DC, or London is clearly not equivalent in significance to being posted in Maputo or La Paz.

Focusing on ambassador appointments, the chapter addresses some fundamental questions about where men and women are positioned in diplomacy. After mapping out the basic numbers and where female and male ambassadors are stationed geographically, we examine whether women tend to cluster in ambassadorships of lesser status while remaining underrepresented in the ambassador positions of power and clout. How many female ambassadors are there in the world? Where are male and female ambassadors posted, especially with respect to positions of power and prestige? In other words, are there gender patterns in ambassador appointments? In answering these basic questions, we seek to broaden the knowledge base about men, women and diplomacy, helping to fill the gaps in the scholarship on gender and diplomacy identified in the introductory chapter.

It is worth emphasizing that our study is based on a unique data set containing all ambassador appointments made by the 50 highest ranked countries in terms of GDP in 2014 (the states that appointed most ambassadors). We have coded almost 7000 ambassador appointments as the foundation of our analysis. It is also worth underscoring that although the chapter maps out variations in numbers of female ambassadors, it does not seek to explain why some states appoint relatively high levels of women while other states do not. We set this important question aside for future studies, focusing on the equally interesting question of where the women and men who *are* appointed end up in terms of the prestige of the position.

Our inquiry also speaks to the concern in international relations scholarship with questions of gender and international hierarchies. In diplomacy, the gender norms and practices of specific Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) come into contact with those that guide inter-state interactions. As organizers of social relationships, gender norms are power-laden in terms of distributing social power and prestige between different gender roles. The prestige of ambassador positions is in turn in large part a function of international military and economic hierarchies, hierarchies that are fundamentally international in nature. Filling ambassador positions, women and

men are channeled into these hierarchies. We argue that if women end up in low prestige positions and men in high status ones, this not only reflects gender norms and processes in individual states—it also reflects and reinforces the equation in international politics between men and high status and women and lower status. We thus point to an additional practice—ambassador appointments—whereby the gender of international hierarchies is produced and potentially challenged.

The rest of the chapter proceeds in five sections. We begin by discussing our design, unique data, and methods for mapping ambassador appointments. The following section shows the share of women ambassadors by region in terms of women sent and women received as ambassadors. The third section analyzes gender, ambassador appointments, and economic status, whereas the fourth looks at military status. The fifth and final section provides a concluding discussion of the implications for gender, diplomacy, and international hierarchy.

2.2 Design and Data

The analyses in this chapter are based on a unique data set containing all ambassador appointments made by the 50 highest ranked countries in terms of GDP in 2014.[1] These 50 countries are selected primarily because they have the financial means to send out a substantial number of ambassadors, which allows enough variation in the variables under study. The average number of appointments made by these states is 96, varying between 33 (Singapore) and 165 (China). As a comparison, five of the lowest ranked GDP countries in the world—Comoros, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, and Tuvalu—only appoint on average four ambassadors each, and information about these appointments is hard to come by. Lower ranked countries are therefore excluded from this study, something that of course limits its generalizing scope. We are nonetheless convinced that an analysis of the ambassador appointments made by the top 50 countries is still highly relevant for improving our understanding of the role gender plays in the international game of which these appointments are an important part. After all, the great majority of the ambassador appointments in the world are made by these 50 countries.

In total, 6990 ambassador appointments have been coded. Of these, 4730 will be used in most of the analyses, for several reasons. First, several positions were vacant at the time of the data collection. Second, ambassadors posted in the home MFA have been excluded, primarily because it has not been possible to find information about all ambassadors posted in

the sending states' home MFAs. Third, not all ambassador appointments are unique, as some ambassadors act as envoys to several countries simultaneously. In these cases, we have only regarded the position where the ambassador is actually stationed, since we assume that this is their most important position.

We apply two categories of gender: women and men. There is no missing data on this variable, which means that we have been able to identify all ambassadors in the data set as either women or men. We have found no instances of ambassadors that openly present as transgender. The coding has been based on their names, pictures, and presentations of the ambassadors available on the embassies' websites. We have also used Google and Google Images when the embassy websites have not posted pictures of the ambassadors and we have been unable to decide their gender just based on their names. On those few occasions when we have not been able to find any pictures or any other leads (e.g. gendered titles like Mr, Mrs, or Ms) on the web either, we have contacted people with the relevant linguistic and cultural expertise and asked them whether they are able to decide the ambassadors' genders just based on their names. They have always been able to do so.

What is the hierarchy among ambassador positions? Which capitals are most prestigious for an ambassador outpost? To some extent, this may vary country by country (and even by individual). But as others have pointed out before us, the pecking order of ambassadorships is also established in the context of international politics and is therefore in large part shared among states (e.g. Adler-Nissen 2013: 73; Klingvall and Ström 2012). In this chapter, we thus make a simple and presumably uncontroversial assumption: the relative military and economic weight of states will be reflected in the relative status of ambassador positions. In other words, being placed in capitals of militarily or economically powerful states will be considered more prestigious than being posted in poorer and/or militarily less significant states. The hierarchy we examine is thus a hierarchy widely acknowledged among international relations scholars. To be clear, this means that potential variations in how individual states value and rank ambassador postings (including for neighboring states) do not enter into our study. However, while conceivable, we find it unlikely that the overall findings would change considerably if this were to be factored in.

The economic status of a country has been measured in three different ways. First, we have looked at the GDP rank of different countries provided by the World Bank (2015, Data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table). Second, to gauge economic status, we have coded if an actor is one of the G20

members or not, since G20 members represent economies "whose size or strategic importance gives them a particularly crucial role in the global economy" (OECD 2015, G20/About). G20 does not only include countries, however; the EU is also a member. We have therefore coded the EU as a G20 member, but not all of the 28 EU member states. However, those EU countries that are also individual members of the G20 have been coded as G20 members in our analysis. The third economic measure is based on the level of trade (import + export) that passes in and out of a specific country. The level of trade represents the value of all goods and other market services that are received and provided to the rest of the world. This includes the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personnel, and government services. This information has been retrieved from the World Bank (2015, Indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD, Indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.CD).

The military status of different states is operationalized through their military expenditure, which we have retrieved from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database (2014, Milex data). Based on these figures, we have ranked the countries; the state that spends the most is ranked number 1, the state that spends the second most is ranked number 2, and so on. Apart from this, we will also use permanent membership in the UN Security Council as an indicator of high military status.

2.3 Male and Female Ambassadors—an Overview

We start out by offering a general overview of the share of female ambassadors and where they are sent. From this first analysis, it is clear that women are overwhelmingly underrepresented in ambassador appointments made overall in the world. Indeed, women occupy only 15% of these top positions.

There are regional differences, however (see Fig. 2.1). The Nordic countries stand out as those who appoint the most women as ambassadors (35%), a share that stands in sharp contrast to the female ambassadors of the Middle East (6%) and Asia (10%). Several countries in the two latter regions (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Iran, and South Korea) actually had no women ambassadors at all in 2014. Still, it is important to note that there are exceptions to this general regional pattern; 18% of Israel's ambassadors are women, for example, as are 41% of the Philippine ones. The Philippines thus appoint almost as many female ambassadors as Finland (44%) and nearly



Fig. 2.1 Share of women (%) of different regions' ambassador appointments (Note: The number of cases for the regions are North America = 317, South America = 457, Nordic countries = 347, Europe = 1696, Middle East = 565, Africa = 247, Asia = 1020, and Oceania = 81.)

Table 2.1 Share of women (%) of ambassador appointments in 2014

Country	*Women*	*Men*	*All*
USA	30	70	100 (137)
Japan	3	97	100 (135)
Brazil	16	84	100 (110)
Turkey	13	87	100 (120)
Sweden	40	60	100 (95)
Israel	18	82	100 (83)

Note: Number of cases in parenthesis

twice as many as Denmark (22%), whereas Russia, which is included as a part of Europe, appoints almost no women (1%). Other exceptions worth mentioning are South Africa, which sends out 27% female ambassadors, and Colombia with 28% female ambassadors.

In Table 2.1, we specify the share of female ambassadors appointed by the six countries discussed in this book: the USA, Sweden, Turkey, Brazil, Japan, and Israel (as a case of negotiation). Just like in the regional comparison, the Nordic country, Sweden, appoints the highest share of female

ambassadors (40%) and the North American country, the USA, follows with 30%. The country that sends out the lowest share of women is not the Middle Eastern country Israel (18%), though, but the Asian country, Japan (3%).

If we now turn to looking at where the ambassadors are sent, the general picture remains. The figures in Fig. 2.2 follow a similar if weaker pattern with regard to which regions receive the highest and lowest proportion of female ambassadors.

The Nordic countries turn out not just to belong to the region that sends out the most women; they also receive them to a greater degree than the other regions. 22% of the ambassadors placed in the Nordic countries are women, compared to 15% of the ambassadors overall. Similarly, fewer women are sent to Middle Eastern (10%) and Asian (11%) countries, these also being the two regions that appoint the lowest share of female ambassadors. This implies that there may be some degree of reciprocity in the ambassador exchanges; countries may be more willing to send female ambassadors to postings from where they also more likely to receive women. As an illustration, none of the 42 foreign ambassadors



Fig. 2.2 Share of women (%) of the ambassadors received by different regions (Note: The number of cases for the regions are North America = 368, South America = 312, Nordic countries = 171, Europe = 1233, Middle East = 446, Africa = 926, Asia = 839, and Oceania = 111. For information on the classification of countries into regions, see the Appendix.)

posted in Saudi Arabia are women and, as noted above, Saudi Arabia sends none. There are of course outlier cases. Fifteen percent of the ambassadors posted in Qatar are women, even though Qatar also is one of the countries without any female ambassadors of its own. Curiously, the Philippines, which is one of the countries that appoints the most women, only receives 5% female ambassadors.

The issue of reciprocity in turn raises the interesting question of whether women are more likely to be placed in ambassadorial posts in countries with higher levels of gender equality. Our data suggest that yes, this is indeed the case.[2] (Also, the more gender equal countries are, the more likely they are to appoint female ambassadors—but this is a question that lies beyond the scope of this chapter).

One region that diverges noticeably with regard to the share of female ambassadors sent and received is North America. Twenty-five percent of the ambassadors appointed by this region are women, but only 16% of the foreign ambassadors that are posted there are female. This difference can probably in large part be accounted for by the case of the USA. Although the USA appoints 30% female ambassadors, only 6% of the ambassadors posted in Washington, DC, by other states are women. The USA thus receives the lowest share of female ambassadors of all the six countries included in this book (see Table 2.2), but it appoints the second most. Being a country that scores relatively well on a number of gender equality measures, we suspect that this imbalance is caused by the very high economic and military status of the USA. However—again—the aim of the chapter is not to explain why women are underrepresented in particular postings.

After this quick review of the geographic distribution of ambassador appointments, we now move on to a deeper analysis of where ambassadors

Table 2.2 Share of women ambassadors (%) received in 2014

Country	*Women*	*Men*	*All*
USA	6	94	100 (49)
Japan	10	90	100 (48)
Brazil	13	87	100 (47)
Turkey	9	91	100 (47)
Sweden	22	78	100 (45)
Israel	8	92	100 (36)

Note: Number of cases in parenthesis

are sent. Do those women who actually succeed in acquiring an ambassador position reach positions associated with the same level of prestige as those of their male counterparts? We will answer this question by testing whether female ambassadors are less likely than their male counterparts to be appointed to economic and military high-status countries.

2.4 Economic Status and Ambassador Appointments

Let us start with the economic status of the receiving states. Again, the idea is that women will be appointed ambassadors to countries with high economic status to a lower degree than men. We test this by looking at the GDP rank, the G20 membership status, and the level of trade of the receiving countries (World Bank (Export) (GDP Rank) (Import) 2015).

Table 2.3 shows the results for the first of these measures: the GDP rank. In this first analysis, we look at how female and male ambassadors are distributed between five evenly sized groups of receiving countries. The groups are based on GDP rank, the highest ranked countries being placed in Group 1 (rank 1–38), the lowest ranked countries in Group 5 (rank 155–192), and the other countries in the groups in between.

The figures in Table 2.3 reveal that more than 50% of women as well as men are sent to countries in Group 1 or 2, whereas only 4% are placed in Group 5 countries. Sending countries apparently prioritize securing diplomatic relationships with the most economically important states. Interestingly enough, they display a slight preference for using male

Table 2.3 Share of female and male ambassadors (%) in groups of receiving countries divided by GDP rank in 2014

	Group 1 (rank 1–38)	*Group 2 (rank 39–77)*	*Group 3 (rank 78–116)*	*Group 4 (rank 117–154)*	*Group 5 (rank 155–192)*	*All*
Female	35	28	21	12	4	100 (642)
Male	39	27	19	10	4	100 (3625)
Gender diff.	−4	+1	+2	+2	±0	

Note: Number of cases in parenthesis. Receiving countries have been divided into five groups with an equal number of countries in each group. Group 1 includes the highest ranked countries and Group 5 the lowest ranked ones. $p = .068$, Kendall's tau-c. Source: World Bank (GDP Rank) 2015.

ambassadors when doing so. The difference is not large; 35% of the women compared to 39% of the men are appointed to Group 1, but the difference is significant (p = .068, Kendall's tau-c)[3]. A comparison of the average ranks of female and male ambassadors' appointments confirms this pattern. The average rank of male ambassadors is 61, while it is only 65 for female ambassadors' postings (p = .099, two-tailed t-test).[4] This gender pattern reoccurs in the appointments of all the countries included in this book, except for those made by Israel. Israeli female ambassadors are sent to countries with a lower GDP average (49) than their male counterparts (52). However, this is because Israel appoints a greater share of women to Group 2 countries (40% of the women compared to 29% of the men). Male ambassadors stand a better chance at being appointed to the most prestigious Group 1 countries (43% of the males compared to 40% of the females), just like in the other countries. There is no obvious sign of women being hidden away in the most low status countries, however, even though female ambassadors are somewhat more likely to be sent to all groups except Group 1, the highest status group.

Our last measure of economic status is the level of trade of the receiving country. The figures are presented in Table 2.4 and they show that the average trade (export + import) of the countries to which men are appointed is significantly higher (p < .01, two-tailed t-test) than that of the countries to which women are appointed. The average of the male ambassadors' postings is 474 billion US dollars, whereas it is only 368 billion US dollars for women ambassadors.[5]

If we divide all receiving countries into five groups based on the size of their trade, the pattern is less clear (see Table 2.5), even though there is

Table 2.4 Average trade (in billion US dollars) of the receiving countries where female and male ambassadors are stationed in 2014

	Female ambassadors	*Male ambassadors*	*Difference*
Import	181	234	-53
Export	186	240	-54
Total trade	368	474	-106

Note: The number of female ambassadors is 632 and male ambassadors 3504. Total number: 4136. Two-tailed t-tests show that the differences are significant, p < .01. Source: World Bank (Export) 2015 and World Bank (Import) 2015.

Table 2.5 Share of female and male ambassadors (%) in groups of receiving countries divided by trade (in billion US dollars), 2014

	Group 1 (trade > 619)	*Group 2 (trade 182–619)*	*Group 3 (trade 70–181)*	*Group 4 (trade 20–69)*	*Group 5 (trade 0–19)*	*All*
Female	17	23	20	21	20	100 (632)
Male	22	19	21	19	20	100 (3504)
Gender diff.	-5	+4	-1	+2	+/-0	

Note: Number of cases in parenthesis. Receiving countries have been divided into five groups with an equal number of countries in each group. Group 1 has the highest level of trade (more than 619 billion US dollars) and Group 5 has the lowest (less than 20 billion US dollars). p = .151, Kendall's tau-c. Source: World Bank (Export) 2015 and World Bank (Import) 2015.

still a larger share of male ambassadors who are appointed to the most trade-intensive countries.

We have thus tested whether women are more frequently placed in countries with lower economic status in three different ways: the countries' GDP rank, their G20 membership status, and their level of trade. The differences between the postings of female and male ambassadors are not great, but they consistently point in the same direction, namely that men are to a greater extent appointed to the most prestigious economic positions.[6] We therefore conclude that there is support for our first claim.

2.5 Military Status and Ambassador Appointments

The second part of the analysis regards the military status of the receiving countries. We will test if women are more often appointed ambassadors to countries with lower military status than their male counterparts. Military status is measured in mainly two ways: military rank based on military expenditure and permanent membership on the UN Security Council. The results are presented in Table 2.6.

We start looking at the ten highest ranked countries. This analysis shows that there is a significant ($p < .01$, Kendall's tau-c) difference between the female and male ambassadors. Ten percent of the men but only six percent of the women are sent to these prestigious posts. The same pattern appears

Table 2.6 To what extent (%) different regions send female and male ambassadors to high and low military status countries in 2014

Receiving country is…	*…of top 10 military rank*			*…permanent member of the UN Security Council*			*…of bottom 10 military rank*		
	Yes	No	All	Yes	No	All	Yes	No	All
				South Am. (N = 536)					
Female	9	91	100	5	95	100	6	94	100
Male	12	88	100	6	94	100	4	96	100
Gender diff.	-3	+3		-1	+1		+2	-2	
				Africa (N = 247)					
Female	5	95	100	2	98	100	67	33	100
Male	13	87	100	7	93	100	33	67	100
Gender diff.	-8*	+8*		-5	+5		+34	-34	
				Asia (N = 1020)					
Female	7	93	100	4	96	100	3	97	100
Male	10	90	100	5	95	100	2	98	100
Gender diff.	-3	+3		-1	+1		+1	-1	
				Oceania (N = 81)					
Female	5	95	100	5	95	100	5	95	100
Male	15	85	100	7	93	100	2	98	100
Gender diff.	-10	+10		-2	+2		+3	-3	
				Nordic countries (N = 347)					
Female	6	94	100	5	95	100	2	98	100
Male	15	85	100	6	94	100	0	100	100
Gender diff.	-9**	+9**		-1	+1		+2	-2	
				Middle East (N = 565)					
Female	6	94	100	3	97	100	3	97	100
Male	11	89	100	5	95	100	2	98	100
Gender diff.	-5	+5		-2	+2		+1	-1	
				Europe (N = 1696)					
Female	5	95	100	4	96	100	3	97	100
Male	9	91	100	4	96	100	3	97	100
Gender diff.	-4***	+4***		+/-0	+/-0		+/-0	+/-0	
				North Am. (N = 238)					
Female	3	97	100	0	100	100	9	91	100
Male	9	91	100	5	95	100	4	96	100
Gender diff.	-6**	+6**		-5**	+5**		+5	-5	
				All regions (N = 4730)					
Female	6	94	100	4	96	100	4	96	100
Male	10	90	100	5	95	100	2	98	100
Gender diff.	-4***	+4***		-1*	+1*		+2*	-2*	

Note: $^{*}p < .1$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$, Kendall's tau-c

if we turn to the average rank of the countries to which women and men are sent. The average military rank of the countries that male ambassadors are posted in is 51, compared to 56 for the females ($p = .001$, two-tailed t-test).[7] The figures regarding the permanent members of the UN Security Council point in the same direction, even if the difference between female and male ambassadors is small; 4% of the women and 5% of the men are sent to one of these military powers. On the bottom of the scale, the pattern is the opposite; it is more common for a woman to be sent to one of the ten lowest ranked countries than a man (4% compared to 2%).

So, if we look at the receiving countries with the highest and with the lowest military status, female ambassadors appear to stand a lower chance of being appointed to the first of these groups than to the latter, a pattern that is consistent across all geographic regions. The question is what happens if we include the whole spectrum of states. Does the overrepresentation of male ambassadors increase gradually, or is there an equal share of males and females, except for when it comes to the most prestigious positions?

In Table 2.7, we have divided all receiving countries into five groups based on their military rank. The results indicate that women are less likely to be appointed to higher ranked countries.[8] Women are slightly overrepresented in the two groups with the lowest status, a little less overrepresented in the middle ranked countries, and clearly underrepresented in the highest ranked countries. The differences in Group 2–5 are very small, however. It is primarily when we reach the highest ranked group—Group

Table 2.7 Share of female and male ambassadors (%) in groups of receiving countries divided by military rank in 2014

	Group 1 (rank 1–27)	*Group 2 (rank 28–53)*	*Group 3 (rank 54–80)*	*Group 4 (rank 81–107)*	*Group 5 (rank 108–134)*	*All*
Female	25	28	22	16	10	100 (584)
Male	30	27	21	14	8	100 (3172)
Gender diff.	-5	+1	+1	+2	+2	

Note: Number of cases in parenthesis. Receiving countries have been divided into five groups with an equal number of countries in each group. Group 1 includes the highest ranked countries and Group 5 the lowest ranked ones. $p = .004$, Kendall's tau-c

1—that something happens. Twenty-five percent of the female ambassadors are sent to this group compared to 30% of the males.

Thus, we find support for our second claim as well as the first one; women are less often appointed ambassadors to countries with the highest military status. [9] The differences are small, but they consistently point in the same direction.

2.6 Summary

We will conclude this empirical section with a combined analysis of the economic and military status of the receiving countries. Figure 2.3 shows the share of female ambassadors in receiving countries of different economic and military status, measured in GDP and military rank.

A first observation in Fig. 2.3 is the striking, but perhaps not so surprising correlation between GDP and military rank. The only two outliers



Fig. 2.3 Share of female ambassadors in receiving countries of different GDP and military rank (Note: the average of female ambassadors equals 15%.)

are Costa Rica and Panama. Both score relatively high on GDP rank but low on military rank. In both Costa Rica and Panama, the share of female ambassadors exceeds the average 15%.

Overall, the pattern in Fig. 2.3 is consistent with our previous findings in the sense that there are small differences between the postings of female and male ambassadors. Countries that receive 15% female ambassadors or fewer are spread more or less evenly across the board, but the pattern looks slightly different in the lower left corner, where the most prestigious postings are found. In this little cluster of high-status receiving countries, only France—with 21% female ambassadors posted in Paris—receives more than the average share of female ambassadors. Given the status of Paris as a Class One posting (Morin 1994), being the old capital of European diplomacy, this exception is an important one, but the fact remains that it is an exception. The rest of the countries of similar economic and military dignity[10] receive a noticeably lower share of women.

2.7 Conclusion

The share of female ambassadors is low, glaringly so. Eighty-five percent of the world's ambassadors are male, making this high prestige post yet another international post that is still dominated by men. The share of female ambassadors is not distributed uniformly among countries and regions, however. Overall, the Nordic countries send out the most women, followed by North America and Oceania, in contrast with Asia, which sends particularly few women. To be sure, there are individual countries that break this general pattern, such as the Philippines. As the number of female ambassadors seems to be on the increase at a relatively rapid pace in the twenty-first century, however, the world of ambassadors may not remain as male dominated much longer.

The main aim of this chapter was to focus on the women (and men) who *are* appointed ambassadors to explore into what positions they are channeled. Do the women who do become ambassadors end up in lower status positions than their male counterparts? Our results—whether one looks at the economic or military status of the receiving country—consistently point in the same direction: women are less likely than men to end up as ambassadors in countries with the highest economic and military status. The pattern is not gradual but rather follows a glass ceiling form. While women are underrepresented among the highest status ambassadorships,

they are not particularly overrepresented among the lower status postings. A question for future research concerns whether this pattern would change if the study took into consideration potential variations among states in how ambassador postings are ranked. We cannot see any obvious reasons to expect that the pattern would look different.

It is of course important to point out that while consistent, the gender differences in status appointments are not enormous. It is not as if women cannot reach the top at all; some female ambassadors clearly do succeed in reaching the most prestigious economic and military postings, but women's prospects for doing so are worse than for their male counterparts. The bigger challenge clearly remains the overall low level of women appointed as ambassadors at all, rather than where they end up once appointed.

This is particularly true in Asia, where the difference in economic and military status between the women's and men's postings is less obvious. In several of the analyses, female ambassadors appointed by Asian countries stand out in that they appear to be sent to countries of equal, or even higher economic and military status than their male counterparts. This pattern calls for further studies, since Asia is also one of the regions that appoint the lowest share of female ambassadors.

Out of the six countries included in this book (the USA, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, Sweden, and Israel), Israel is the country where the economic and military prestige of the ambassador appointments made differ the least between men and women. Sweden and the USA appoint a greater share of female ambassadors, but both countries tend to send their female representatives to countries of lower status than their male ones, whereas this gender pattern is less obvious in the ambassador appointments made by Israel.

However, with men holding 85% of the ambassador positions, and particularly the most prestigious ones, there is little reason to doubt that the diplomatic community continues to reproduce the link between men and power that is predominant in international relations. How and the extent to which they do so may vary regionally and contextually. As we have shown in this chapter, there is a lower share of female ambassadors posted in the Middle East (10%) and Asia (11%) than in the Nordic countries (22%). What is more, individual high profile ambassadors—such as US ambassador to Japan, Caroline Kennedy—may help challenge predominant assumptions about men, women, and international power.

There is little evidence from our study to support the claim that gender is irrelevant in the world of diplomacy. Women *are* less likely to be appointed to the highest status postings. And they constitute only 15% of the ambas-

sadors. Precisely why this is so is not a question our study is designed to answer, but it seems highly unlikely that these patterns would have nothing to do with the institutional norms, rules, and practices of diplomacy and the MFAs themselves. What is more, while the formal marriage ban on female diplomats may have been lifted in most states, in practice, the combination of life as a Foreign Service officer and a marriage (especially with children) continues to be particularly problematic for women.

2.8 Appendix

Figure 2.1. Complementing note on which sending countries are included in which regions:

The Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.
Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK.
The Middle East: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq.
North America: The USA, Canada, and Mexico.
South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.
Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.
Oceania: Australia.

Figure 2.2. Complementing note on which receiving countries are included in which regions:

The Nordic countries: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland.
Europe: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, South Ossetia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the UK.
The Middle East: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Iran, Yemen, and Iraq.

Africa: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

North America: Antigua and Baruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the USA.

South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Paraguay, Peru, Surname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Asia: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taipei, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Oceania: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

Notes

1. This means that the lowest ranked sender country has the rank of 51, since Hong Kong, which is ranked 39, is not an independent country with foreign representation of its own.
2. The difference is statistically significant on a 90% confidence level (two-tailed t-test) regardless of whether gender equality is measured according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the GDI female to male ratio of the Human Development Index (HDI), or the Gender Inequality Index (GII). The average GDI female to male HDI ratio in the states that the female ambassadors are sent from is, for example, 0.961 compared to

0.946 in those that send males and the corresponding figures for the states that receive female and male ambassadors are 0.949 and 0.935. Higher figures indicate higher levels of gender equality.

3. We will test the statistical significance of our results throughout the empirical analysis even though we are not working with a random sample, but with the whole population such as we have defined it. These tests are therefore primarily used as indicators of how robust observed differences between various groups in our population are, not whether these differences are significantly different from zero in a statistical sense at a certain significance level in our population.
4. This gender pattern is the same in almost all geographic areas studied (see Figure 2). The only exception is female ambassadors appointed by Asian countries. The average rank of their postings is 55 compared to 63 of their male counterparts. This difference is not quite significant, however (p = .111, two-tailed t-test).
5. The pattern is the same for all countries included in this book and all geographic regions, with two exceptions: the Asian female ambassadors are sent to countries with a higher import rate and female ambassadors from Oceania are sent to countries with a higher export rate.
6. We have also reached the same conclusion when we have tested the economic status of the receiving countries in the three following ways: the receiving country is (1) one of the three highest ranked GDP countries, (2) a G8 member, and (3) an oil exporter.
7. This gender pattern reoccurs in all geographic regions except in Asia. The average military rank of the countries to which Asian female ambassadors are sent is lower than those of their male counterparts (46 compared to 51), but not significantly so (p = .196, two-tailed t-test). Israel also stands out as an interesting exception; the countries to which Israeli female ambassadors are appointed have a lower average rank (48) than those of the male ambassadors (50). Again, the difference is not significant (p = .843, two-tailed t-test), but at least it does not point in the opposite direction, which is the case for all the other countries included in this book.
8. This pattern is more or less consistent across all geographic regions, with the exceptions of Asia and the Middle East. Female ambassadors from these two regions are more frequently sent to Group 1 countries than their male counterparts, but the differences are not statistically significant (p > .154, Kendall's tau-c). Again, the ambassador appointments made by Israel also break the gender pattern; Israeli female ambassadors do not appear to stand a lower chance of being sent to high status military countries, which seems to be the case in all other countries included in this book.
9. We have reached the same conclusion when operationalizing the military status of the receiving country in the following two ways: the receiving

country is (1) one of the top three military ranked countries and (2) a nuclear power.

10. The countries surrounding France are: Brazil, China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the UK, and the USA.

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CHAPTER 3

The Taking of Foggy Bottom? Representation in US Diplomacy

Sylvia Bashevkin

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines women's numerical and substantive representation in the domain of US foreign policy, focusing on the Department of State (known colloquially as Foggy Bottom) as the main institutional pivot of American diplomacy.[1] In response to the first question posed by Aggestam and Towns in the introductory essay, it argues that despite increases over time in appointments to senior roles, women's proportions remained relatively low in positions commanding greater impact, cachet and remuneration (such as elite ambassadorial and secretary of state posts) than in those with less clout, prestige and pay (such as clerical work). Even after more females attained top jobs in the 1970s and following, they were often assigned responsibility for small, weak or uncontentious states with limited influence in international politics.

With respect to Aggestam and Towns' second and third questions, feminist influence on foreign policy since 1980 has tended to ebb and flow depending upon which party's candidate resided in the White House. In

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general, Democratic administrations have tended to support a reproductive choice agenda on the global stage, while Republican presidencies have opposed US funding for non-governmental organisations that perform or promote abortion services under any circumstances, anywhere in the world. Although increased rhetorical attention has been directed during recent decades towards the rights of women and girls living in situations of civil strife and military conflict, including by Republican political executives, this shift has not led to US ratification of key international initiatives such as the UN's CEDAW framework (see Baldez 2014; Bashevkin 2014).

An additional dimension considered in this chapter is the emergence of institutional competitors within the realm of American diplomacy. Over time, the State Department's role has been increasingly constrained by the much larger budget and staff complement of the U.S. Department of Defense and the enhanced size and influence of the White House National Security Council. These trends mean that even as more women have reached elite positions, the ability of State Department leaders to shape foreign policy has itself been challenged. As a result, we conclude, substantive impact on American diplomacy remains variable and contested, contingent on factors including the party holding executive power.

Our discussion opens with a look at women's initial entry to various strata of State Department positions. We then examine two developments dating from the post-war decades: first, allegations of systemic discrimination against women that culminated in extensive court litigation; and second, a clear partisan divide in US foreign policy over matters of women's reproductive health. The next section focuses on Madeleine Albright's appointments as US ambassador to the United Nations and as the first female secretary of state in the Clinton years, paying particular attention to her willingness to champion feminist policy directions in both roles. We conclude by examining the two most recent presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, focusing on the relevance of the partisan complexion of the US political executive as well as the emergence of strong institutional challengers for foreign policy primacy.

3.2 Early Developments in the Department of State, 1920s–1960s

Although the formal rule prohibiting women's participation in the US diplomatic corps was lifted in 1920, upward mobility towards senior positions proved to be exceptionally slow. Elite professional positions at the

rank of Foreign Service Officer were held primarily by white men, a situation reinforced by efforts to discourage women from taking the entry-level Foreign Service test and by views that females were ill equipped to serve as diplomats (see Good 1981). As McKenzie (2015) notes, "Access to the service is by examination run by the service itself." Limiting entry meant in historical terms that parallel with patterns reported in Chap. 5 on Brazil, only white men were considered as appropriate candidates, and managed to succeed in significant numbers on the test. According to McKenzie (2015), "Senior officers in the Foreign Service employed the Foreign Service Exam to prevent women—and black men—from serving for decades."

In 1922, Lucile Atcherson became the first woman to be admitted to the diplomatic service of the United States. She and others who passed the Foreign Service examination during this early period were routinely denied overseas assignments and upward mobility in the profession, in part because of widespread attitudes among State Department veterans that women could not keep secrets, faced physical risk in foreign postings, were unable to network effectively given restrictions on access to elite clubs in many locations and relied too heavily on emotions to function in a cerebral and rational field of endeavour (see Good 1981: 47). By 1930, a total of six females had entered the Foreign Service but turnover was so frequent that only two of them were still employed a year later (see Nash 2016: 223).

The obstacles Atcherson and others faced at the stages of examination and posting were compounded by an unwritten rule that prevented married women from serving. According to Nash (2016: 223, italics in original), the provision was "not just a practice, but rather a *de facto* State Department rule, lasting until 1971." The prohibition against married women diplomats that paralleled patterns in Brazil between the 1930s and 1960s (see Chap. 5) compounded informal barriers outlined above which, taken together, help to explain frequent resignations from the service and short average tenures for the few females who remained (Nash 2016: 223).

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Ruth Bryan Owen in 1933 as chief of mission to Denmark and Iceland, she became the first American woman to represent the country at the rank of minister. Owen was an experienced Democratic Party activist who had served in Congress, meaning she did not ascend through professional diplomatic ranks in order to reach the position. Her specific posting reflected a calculus on the

part of the political executive making the appointment that her destinations were minor powers in which women's status appeared comparatively advanced—a rationale that resembles current Swedish practices described in Chap. 3.

Similar thinking seemed to underpin many subsequent nominations, including Roosevelt's naming in 1937 of Florence Jaffray Harriman as chief of mission to Norway. Also a veteran Democrat, Harriman was posted to a small country with progressive politics. Both early appointees worked hard to address doubts as to their diplomatic capacities; they adopted a populist approach to representing the United States that bypassed not only local elites but also the men on their own staffs who questioned their ability to perform the job. Owen, for instance, engaged in people-to-people diplomacy by travelling extensively and becoming the first American minister to visit Greenland (Nash 2016: 225). Harriman stood out for her willingness to join Norwegian cod fisherman on their annual Arctic expedition (Nash 2016: 226). Yet upper echelon roles of the type these two individuals reached were far from the norm, since most women working for the State Department held lower level, primarily secretarial posts. During World War II, for example, the number of females working around the world in clerical jobs attached to Foggy Bottom reached 800 (see Wright 2005).

Opportunities widened in the post-war era. During the Truman administration, Eugenie Anderson became the first woman appointed as chief of mission at the level of ambassador. She served in Denmark from 1949 until 1953, and was later named during the Kennedy years as ambassador to Bulgaria. Like Owen and Harriman, Anderson had a strong background in Democratic Party politics (see Nash 2016).

In 1953, President Eisenhower named Frances Willis as ambassador to Switzerland, making her the first female career diplomat to be appointed as a chief of mission. Parallel with the trajectories later on of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice (none of whom moved up via the professional diplomatic corps), Willis earned a PhD in political science and held a university teaching position in the field before beginning her foreign policy career. She passed the entry test to the US Foreign Service in 1927 and, whether because of personal preference or the rules prevailing at the time, never married.[2]

Table 3.1 reveals the pattern of appointments before and after Willis' breakthrough. Consistent with the destinations of earlier diplomats coming from political backgrounds, Willis and her successors tended to be posted to small states that wielded minimal international clout and that

Table 3.1 "Firsts" for women in US diplomatic roles

1933	First female chief of mission at the minister rank: Ruth Bryan Owen, Denmark and Iceland
1949	First woman chief of mission at the ambassador rank: Helen Eugenie Moore Anderson, Denmark
1953	First female career diplomat chief of mission: Frances Willis (FSO), Switzerland
1953	First woman ambassador to major American ally: Clare Boothe Luce, Italy
1961	First female chief of mission outside of Europe and first to South Asia: Frances Willis (FSO), Ceylon
1962	First woman to attain the rank of career ambassador: Frances Willis (FSO)
1965	First female African-American ambassador: Patricia Harris, Luxembourg
1969	First female ambassador to a Caribbean country: Ellen Roberta Donovan (FSO), Barbados
1971	First woman appointed to an international organisation: Betty Dillon, representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization
1972	First female ambassador to an African country: Jean Wilkowski (FSO), Zambia
1973	First female assistant secretary of state: Carol Laise Bunker (FSO), Public Affairs
1975	First female ambassador to a Pacific Island nation: Mary Olmsted (FSO), Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands
1977	First female Hispanic-American ambassador and first female ambassador to a Central American country: Mari-Luci Jaramillo, Honduras
1977	First female undersecretary of state: Lucy Benson, Security Assistance, Science and Technology
1978	First female ambassador to a South American country: Nancy Ostrander (FSO), Surinam
1979	First female ambassador to an Asian country: Patricia Byrne (FSO), Burma
1981	First female U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations: Jeane Kirkpatrick
1985	First woman to head a geographic bureau: Rozanne Ridgway (FSO), Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
1994	First female Asian-American ambassador: March Fong Eu, Micronesia
1995	First female ambassador to a Middle Eastern country: Frances Cook (FSO), Oman
1997	First female secretary of state: Madeleine Albright
2005	First female African-American secretary of state: Condoleezza Rice
2009	First female Director of Policy Planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter

Sources: Adapted from Wright (2005) and material on the public record. FSO indicates Foreign Service Officer

had a history of cooperative relations with the United States. Moreover, few reached top levels. As Wright (2005: 2 of 10) notes, "In the first 42 years (1933–1976) following the Owen appointment as chief of mission, women were appointed to 31 senior positions (ambassadors or assistant

secretaries of state) in the U.S. diplomatic corps." In relative terms, this total figure spread over multiple decades represents less than 4%, or a tiny fraction, of the number of women serving in secretarial jobs inside the same organisation during the 1940s.

Data in Table 3.2 confirm the ongoing rarity of women's ambassadorial appointments. They show that from the outset of diplomatic relationships between the United States and other countries through 2016, females held less than 10% of total ambassadorships. In addition, the positions women attained tended to be based outside the capitals of major American allies in the Western Hemisphere or Europe, and outside the capitals of important strategic powers in the Middle East.

Pressures to reduce US exposure to Cold War threats often focused on the heightened risk ostensibly posed to national security by single females and homosexual males in the diplomatic corps. This emphasis on the danger of compromising sexual liaisons led to a halving of women's representation as Foreign Service officers during the 1960s, from 10% to 5% (McKenzie 2015: par. 15). During the decade from 1961 to 1971, women represented only 7% of the State Department's new foreign office recruits ("The Palmer Case," 2015). In 1962, the number of females holding Foreign Service officer rank by either writing the entry test or via a lateral transfer from, for example, military service reached 293, or 8% of the officer cadre (Nash 2016: 227).

As Nash (2016: 227) notes, most of these women were clustered in lower posts well below the status of chief of mission. Yet the limited

Table 3.2 US ambassadorial appointments by gender and destination region, from beginning of bilateral diplomatic relations through 2016

Appointment		*Men (%)*	*Women (%)*
Overall	4633	91	9
South and Central Asia	197	83	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	852	84	16
East Asia and Pacific	536	86	14
Europe and Eurasia	1408	94	6
Western Hemisphere	1246	94	6
Middle East	394	94	6

Source: Pew Research Center. 2016. "South and Central Asia has had the highest share of woman ambassadors" (July 21). http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/22/few-american-women-have-broken-the-glass-ceiling-of-diplomacy/ft_16-7-22-womenambassadors/. Accessed September 30, 2016

number who made it through the recruitment process began to organise during this period, creating the Women's Action Organization (WAO) in the late 1960s. The WAO worked with the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA, the professional association of current and retired diplomats) to abolish two of the most discriminatory practices that restricted opportunities: first, the rule that prohibited married women from entering the Foreign Service; and second, the policy that women in the Foreign Service who chose to marry could either resign or be summarily dismissed (see Enloe 1989: Chap. 5).

With the advent of second wave feminism, organised efforts to identify and press back against inequality began to take root inside the pivotal institution of American diplomacy. This process was most visible in grievances and litigation that unfolded beginning in the 1960s, championed by a Foreign Service professional who was willing to confront long-standing barriers to entry and promotion.

3.3 Challenging Discrimination in the State Department

Alison Palmer began working at the State Department as a clerk typist in 1955 and, after passing the requisite entry exam in 1958, reached the status of junior Foreign Service officer within five years. In 1960, Palmer became vice consul in Leopoldville, Congo just as crisis engulfed the country. Her efforts in that post, according to McKenzie's (2015: par. 1) account, helped to save the lives of "several young American men" as well as a number of citizens of other nations. Even though Palmer gained experience as a Foreign Service officer in embassies elsewhere in Africa as well as in Southeast Asia, multiple US ambassadors turned her down for positions on their staffs in the mid-1960s (McKenzie 2015: par. 22). Accepted by the envoy to Ethiopia, Palmer found she was expected to serve as social secretary to the ambassador's wife (Alison Palmer Papers: 2 of 20). An American man posted to the same country confirmed in a 1982 interview that when he saw Palmer in Addis Ababa, "she was treated as a sort of an assistant to the Ambassador's wife, not as a substantive officer. The old days were not very good for women."[3]

Palmer and other professional diplomats were ostensibly denied higher positions in Africa because of concerns that white North American women were vulnerable to sexual advances and possibly assault by African men.

Yet Palmer maintained this was not a relevant concern given her experiences. Instead, she argued, the main sources of "harassment and sexual threats" came from other Americans employed by the US government (McKenzie 2015: par. 25). She filed an internal grievance against the State Department alleging sex discrimination.

In 1969, the Equal Employment Office in the department concluded its investigation in her favour, although the decision was neither made public nor noted in her personnel file (Alison Palmer papers, page 2 of 20). Palmer then appealed in 1971 to the Civil Service Commission, which held hearings that resulted in her receiving a promotion as well as a retroactive salary payment (ibid.). According to Gamarekian (1989), Palmer was the first person ever to lodge a formal sex discrimination suit against the State Department.

Palmer's actions combined with concerted efforts by the WAO led the State Department to abolish the prohibition against married women working as officers. Yet upward mobility remained limited, and Palmer initiated a class action suit in 1976 together with eight other plaintiffs. The group alleged the department discriminated against women at the point of recruitment, offered women measurably less promising career assignments after they joined, and rewarded them with weaker performance ratings and honours once in rank. A federal district court in 1985 rejected the claim, but it was upheld in subsequent appeals and district court rulings pursued by the class action plaintiffs (see Alison Palmer et al. 1986).

At the point of the initial judicial decision, according to Gamarekian (1989), "41 per cent of the men in the Foreign Service were political officers and 16.2 per cent were consular officers. Only 22.9% of Foreign Service women held political jobs, while 36.9 per cent were in consular positions. Just 3% of senior officers were women." Other 1985 data indicate the US Foreign Service was composed of 20% women and 80% men, with the males overwhelmingly white (72%) and only weak percentages African-American (5.4%), Hispanic (3.4%) or Asian-American (0.7%; A More Representative Foreign Service 2015).

By mid-1989, Palmer had spent about $150,000 of her own funds as lead litigant in the anti-discrimination effort (Gamarekian 1989). Costs for the class action suit later exceeded $200,000 and half of Palmer's pension (McGlen and Sarkees 1993: 289). Her campaign achieved at least two major objectives: first, a court ruling required the State Department to undertake corrective action, which meant 600 women were notified that they might be eligible for "court-ordered relief" including

re-assignment to higher positions; and second, public acknowledgement that women failed sections of the Foreign Service examination at higher rates than men, which in turn led the department to cancel the test entirely for 1989 and redesign it for future rounds (Gamarekian 1989; see also Chap. 5 below, p. 8).

Since the US government appealed sections of the 1989 decision that favoured Palmer, the case dragged on for decades.[4] In late 2009, Palmer and her attorneys announced they were terminating the lawsuit. The US District Court for the District of Columbia then dismissed the case on the grounds that all parties agreed the State Department had met the terms of earlier judicial orders. Actions that constituted compliance with court decisions included offering restitution (including retroactive pay) to women who had been denied promotions, opening prestigious political (as opposed to administrative or consular) positions to women as well as reforming recruitment practices in ways that diversified the composition of the professional diplomatic corps (see McGlen and Sarkees 1993, Chap. 2).

Palmer's willingness to contest discriminatory practices was hardly applauded in all quarters. In a 1993 interview, the man who chaired AFSA during the litigation period described Palmer as "a difficult person for me to communicate with … She could be difficult—I would say even vicious."[5] A senior woman policy coordinator at the State Department argued in 2010 that Palmer's allegations of unfair testing procedures prompted reforms that were counterproductive, since these actions ultimately undermined the status of women professionals in the Foreign Service:

> Interestingly, Alison used the 1975 exam … as evidence of exam discrimination, a charge I always had trouble with. In my view, the exam tested for knowledge relevant to a diplomatic career and aptitude; the problem is that most women at that time did not have backgrounds or degrees or experience in economics, management, political science, and exotic cultures. I would not have done as well as I did had I not been indirectly associated with the Foreign Service. If preparation matters at all, then at that time, women as a group were not as well prepared academically or experientially to pass the exam as men. But was this purposeful "sexual discrimination?" I never thought so. And those of us who did it the hard way paid a heavy price in male resentment and ridicule for years afterward because of all those women who "got in for free" or got "free promotions."[6]

In short, the controversy surrounding Palmer's initial grievance and her subsequent class action lawsuit continued even after litigation was suspended in 2009. What cannot be disputed is women's upward mobility in the State Department during the period in which Palmer lodged her allegations. In 1973, the first woman reached the level of assistant secretary of state and, four years later, the rank of undersecretary of state. The year 1985 also saw the appointment of America's first female geographic bureau chief, when Rozanne Ridgway was named head of the European and Canadian section. Between 1985 and 1989, the proportion of females holding senior posts rose from 3% to 6%. At the level of Class I officer, which ranks just below elite status, numbers rose from about 20 women at the time class action litigation commenced in the 1970s to roughly 150 by the late 1980s (Gamarekian 1989).

These increases in the presence of women in career diplomatic positions unfolded at the same time as feminist activists in the United States were demanding more women be appointed to high profile cabinet roles—including those that carried responsibility for the making of foreign policy. A series of firsts beginning in 1981 reflected the impact of changing expectations with respect to women and American diplomacy. At the same time, these appointments revealed the extent to which female bodies in senior positions could not be equated with pro-feminist policy action by the United States on the global stage.

3.4 Substantive and Numerical Representation, 1980s–Present

3.4.1 Conservative Politics of the 1980s

Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 marked the beginning of a distinct partisan divide in American domestic as well as international policies towards women's rights. As social conservatives assumed growing influence within the Republican Party, decision-making at multiple jurisdictional levels and in varied branches of the federal government moved in directions consistent with traditionalist preferences. At the global level, the summer 1984 announcement of the Mexico City Policy offered a clear sign of retrenchment with respect to the priorities of organised feminism. Officially launched at an international population conference held in the Mexican capital, the provision stipulated that US international aid would be withdrawn from any group that either provided or endorsed abortion services

for any reason, at any location in the world. The prohibition applied to organisations that might have directed support from other sources, such as governments outside the United States, towards abortion (see Bashevkin 1998: 41–44, 68–74, 76).

At the same time as Ronald Reagan pursued directions consistent with socially conservative views, he also responded to feminist demands that more women be appointed to senior positions in the political executive. Reagan nominated Jeane Kirkpatrick as US ambassador to the United Nations and as a member of his cabinet and senior foreign affairs advisory group. Once she was confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kirkpatrick became the first American woman to reach political executive status in the domain of international relations. She served through the start of Reagan's second term.

Kirkpatrick worked prior to her appointment as a political scientist at Georgetown University, where she published extensively on American women legislators and party activists. Like Reagan, she had a long history as an engaged Democrat but, over time, grew disenchanted with what she saw as the party's naïve approach to Cold War rivalry with the USSR and its allies. Kirkpatrick's writings and public statements suggest she was a moderate or liberal feminist, sympathetic towards the Equal Rights Amendment but opposed to what she saw as attempts by more radical, women's liberation streams of the movement to shape the policy agenda of the Democratic Party (see Collier 2012).

At the same time as Jeane Kirkpatrick was not central to promoting the anti-feminist agenda adopted by the United States at the international level, she proved unwilling to oppose it as a member of the Reagan cabinet. This pattern by which a Republican president staked out regressive positions with respect to women's rights but also advanced the career mobility of a senior female foreign policy leader continued after 2000. As discussed below, George W. Bush reinstituted the Mexico City Policy after it was rescinded during the Clinton years. Bush also elevated Condoleezza Rice to two positions which Kirkpatrick sought but did not achieve after her service as UN ambassador—those of national security advisor and secretary of state (see Collier 2012).

In terms of numerical representation, as shown in Table 3.3, women remained a small minority of US diplomats and particularly chiefs of mission through the Reagan years. According to Enloe (1989: 117), only 5% of senior officers and fewer than 7% (9/133) of chiefs of mission were female in 1987. As McGlen and Sarkees (1993: 90) argue, internal

Table 3.3 Women as US chiefs of mission by administration, 1933–2004

President	*Female chiefs of mission appointed*
Franklin Roosevelt (1935–1945)	2
Harry Truman (1945–1953)	2
Dwight Eisenhower (1953–1961)	4
John Kennedy (1961–1963)	2
Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969)	4
Richard Nixon (1969–1974)	4
Gerald Ford (1974–1977)	7
Jimmy Carter (1977–1981)	18
Ronald Reagan (1981–1989)	22
George H. W. Bush (1989–1993)	28
Bill Clinton (1993–2001)	87
George W. Bush (2001–2009)	118
Barack Obama (2009–2016)	138

American Foreign Service Association (2016) Tracker: Ambassadorial Appointments. http://www.afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments. Accessed 30 September 2016

advancement to senior levels at the State Department generally occurred via the political route or cone—yet most women were channelled into less promising consular and administrative streams.

3.4.2 Feminist Diplomacy in the Clinton Years

Following the defeat of George H.W. Bush in the 1992 election, Democrats returned to the White House for two terms. Bill Clinton's initial nominee as ambassador to the United Nations was Madeleine Albright, a veteran foreign policy advisor to party candidates including Geraldine Ferraro in 1984 and Michael Dukakis in 1988. Albright had served at Georgetown University during the 1980s as inaugural director of an academic programme that sought to train more women in international relations, which was created with the explicit goal of increasing women's participation in the US diplomatic service. Albright thus assumed the UN ambassadorship carrying a sense of gender consciousness that had been fostered through her work at Georgetown. In turn, her feminist credentials were reinforced by strong social networks Albright built with women students, colleagues, policy advocates and party activists (see Albright 2003).

As an international decision-maker, Albright situated her advocacy for global women's rights in the context of both 1990s liberal feminism and

the Clinton team's emphasis on political and economic reform in newly democratising states. She argued that the stability of post-Soviet systems required more than simply open economies. In her view, the chaos that upended the old communist order held specific, often dangerous consequences for women. Over time, she helped to insert gender considerations into what President Clinton, speaking in December 1996, termed "the mainstream of American foreign policy" (Clinton as quoted in Garner 2012: 122).

Decisions by the new administration reflected efforts to reverse the directions of previous Republican presidencies. Clinton's executive orders removed the Mexico City limitations affecting non-governmental organisations that received American development aid. They also made it possible for US military personnel to obtain publicly funded abortions in armed forces hospitals located overseas (see Bashevkin 1998: 214–215).

These shifts reflected the broader left/right dynamics of American public policy. Just as Kirkpatrick had served in a Republican administration that was determined to restore US primacy by withholding dues to the United Nations, limiting the influence of oppositional states and movements in that institution, and acting unilaterally in order to defend national interests, so was Albright central to a Democratic regime that advocated more multilateral and humanitarian strategies for engagement on the global stage. The actions she pursued as UN ambassador and, in the second Clinton term, as the first woman secretary of state mirrored this outlook.

In the language of gender and politics scholarship, Albright was a critical actor who repeatedly intervened in public debates in order to improve women's status—a repertoire that helped to embolden others to take similar steps (see Childs and Krook 2008; Dahlerup 1988). Her approach was explicitly feminist in that it sought to prioritise the rights and autonomy of female beings, including by creating groups of women leaders to advance that cause. As discussed below in greater detail, she created networks of decision-makers to lobby collectively for change, initially drawing together female ambassadors to the UN and, later on, female foreign ministers.

Arguably the most significant outcome of Albright's efforts was training an international spotlight on violence against women in the former Yugoslavia, and finding effective ways to curtail that violence—including by prosecuting those responsible. As UN ambassador, she insisted the systematic use of rape against Muslim women in Bosnia demanded the attention of America, its top allies as well as the global community, to the

point that she eventually convinced Clinton and other members of his cabinet to endorse NATO's first ever military intervention in the organisation's 50-year history. Albright (2003: 232) urged her staff at the US mission in New York to contribute to the work of a new body established to investigate events in the former Yugoslavia (known as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia or ICTY), notably by assisting with the legal dimensions of that large and complex process.

The network Albright created in the early 1990s of female UN ambassadors numbered only seven emissaries from the more than 180 UN member states with permanent representatives. It met monthly and pressed for the appointment of the first ever woman chief prosecutor on the ICTY. Canadian jurist Louise Arbour, whom Albright (2003: 247) describes as "tenacious," went on to indict Serb leader Slobodan Milošević. A subsequent network Albright initiated brought together women foreign ministers, who discussed issues including trafficking in women and girls (Albright 2003: 433). According to Albright (2003: 434), none of the matters raised by female diplomats was easy to move forward; in her words, "We had, it seemed, to work doubly hard to be taken seriously, and triply hard to actually push our agendas through."

Consistent with the Clinton administration's pro-feminist orientation, the number of elite diplomatic appointments grew markedly after 1992. This pattern can be clearly discerned in Table 3.3, which shows that the number of female chiefs of mission more than tripled from the Bush to the Clinton eras. Wright (2005) notes that compared with 33 women named to chief of mission or other senior positions through the Reagan years and 37 in the George H.W. Bush administration, women won 116 such posts during the Clinton presidencies.

3.4.3 The George W. Bush Era

The return of a Republican president following the 2000 election brought more than simply the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy. Two patterns that complicated questions of gender and international relations became clear. First, challengers to State Department dominance grew in prominence such that decision-making reflected weaker State Department and stronger National Security Council and Pentagon influence over foreign policy. Second, Republican leaders began to employ the rhetoric of liberal feminism far more than they had in the past, notably in efforts to defend military intervention in Afghanistan beginning in the fall of 2001.

Both trends were neatly refracted through the contributions of Bush's closest foreign policy advisor. Condoleezza Rice, who joined the administration in 2001, had been recruited two years earlier as an international relations tutor for the prospective candidate by his father, George H.W. Bush. Once elected, George W. Bush named Rice as the first female national security advisor to a US president and, in his second term, as the first African-American woman to serve as secretary of state.

From a small handful of people during the Truman years, the US National Security Council had expanded by Rice's arrival in 2001 to about 100 staff members who were responsible for coordinating policy across line departments. Moreover, the Department of Defense had grown to even more vastly overshadow the State Department. As Rice (2011: 15, 19) notes, the Pentagon budget at the start of the new millennium was almost 40 times larger than that of Foggy Bottom such that it supported 700,000 civilian employees alone at Defence compared with a total staff around the world of only 57,000 at State.

The use of liberal feminist language by Republican leaders marked a second important development. The Bush administration increasingly justified military action in Afghanistan as a defence of the rights of women and girls, even though critics viewed this rhetoric as not just hollow but also misleading (see Brenner 2009; Finlay 2006). In the realm of diplomacy, the leading party of American conservatism had since the Reagan years systematically refused to fund overseas contraception and abortion services (see Bashevkin 1998).

In numerical terms, Bush named 118 women to chief of mission posts. By 2003, women constituted one-quarter of the senior Foreign Service. A year later, 16% of chief of mission roles were held by women, whether professional diplomats or political appointees. Similar to the pattern described by Niklasson and Robertson in Chap. 3 (p. 66) with respect to Sweden, however, no female had as yet been named to head the policy planning unit at the State Department nor to serve as ambassador to a major power such as China, Russia, Germany or India (Wright 2005).

3.4.4 The Obama Years

First elected in 2008, Barack Obama led two presidential administrations with unprecedented numbers of women in top foreign policy positions. His nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton as secretary of state and Susan Rice as UN ambassador represented a clear break with precedent, since

either but not both positions had been held at the same time by female appointees. Clinton named Anne-Marie Slaughter as director of policy planning in the State Department, the first time a woman had reached that post. After Clinton stepped down at the end of his first term, Obama promoted Rice to the position of national security advisor and Samantha Power to the role of UN ambassador.

These developments were mirrored in greater gender diversity across the State Department. By 2011, females held 22% of upper echelon posts at Foggy Bottom and 29% at the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Women were 50 of 171 chiefs of mission, or 29% (Zenko 2011). The modest size of State as compared with Defence continued to loom large, however. As Clinton (2014: 24, 26) observes, as many Americans served in military bands during the Obama years as in the country's diplomatic service. The three million employees of the Pentagon vastly overshadowed the roughly 70,000 working for State and USAID.

Despite these challenges, Clinton and others measurably elevated women's rights considerations—arguably to a degree unprecedented in US foreign policy history. The first Obama administration not only reversed the Mexico City Policy but also projected a view of global politics which located women's security at the crux of national as well as international security (see Hudson and Leidl 2015). Yet this gender pivot was not without its detractors. Much like the early women diplomats dispatched by American presidents to small friendly countries in Northern Europe, Hillary Clinton practised a populist style of diplomacy that reached over the heads of formal leaders. Critics who were more comfortable with a view of international relations as state-to-state communication condemned, for instance, Clinton's decision on a 2009 trip to South Africa to spend twice as long at a women's housing project in Cape Town as with the country's president (see Coleman 2010).

3.5 Conclusion

In many respects, women had made enormous progress in the realm of US foreign policy in the decades between a tiny handful of pioneering diplomats in the inter-war years and the initial decades of the twenty-first century. Yet numbers at higher levels remained far short of parity even in the Obama era, and efforts to inject a substantive pro-equality agenda continued to face significant obstacles. The consistent rolling back of that agenda during Republican presidencies beginning in 1981 demonstrated that from the perspective of feminist interests, the taking of Foggy Bottom remained a work in progress.

Notes

1. I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for supporting this study and to Jason VandenBeukel and Amy Barlow for their assistance.
2. According to Nash 2016: 232, Willis did not marry because "she enjoyed her career too much."
3. Samuel R. Gammon, III, Executive Assistant to Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, 1971 to 1973, as quoted in "The Palmer Case."
4. See Gamarekian 1989 and Alison Palmer et al. 1986.
5. Ambassador William C. Harrop, former chairman of AFSA, as quoted in "The Palmer Case."
6. Stephanie Smith Kinney, Policy Coordination Team, Office of the Director General, 1976–1979, as quoted in "The Palmer Case."

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CHAPTER 4

The Swedish MFA: Ready to Live Up to Expectations?

Birgitta Niklasson and Felicia Robertson

4.1 Introduction

When the new Social Democratic government stepped into office in 2014, it declared itself to be a feminist government (the Government Declaration 2014), of which half of the ministers were women. The minister for foreign affairs, Margot Wallström, was one of them, as was the minister of foreign aid, Isabella Lövin, who served at the same department: the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). Together with their two female state secretaries, they soon made the statement that "a feminist foreign policy will permeate all work at the Swedish MFA, the aim being to strengthen women's rights, increase women's access to resources, and improve women's representation" (Foreign Politics Declaration 2015).

The aim of this chapter is to take a closer look at the organisation that sets out to accomplish these goals. As we have seen in the chapter on ambassador appointments (Towns and Niklasson, Chap. 2), Sweden displays a comparatively gender equal face to the world in this respect. Forty per cent of Swedish ambassadors are women. From an international

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perspective, Sweden is thus one of the countries that has been the most successful when it comes to promoting female diplomats. It is also interesting to note that the placements of Swedish female and male ambassadors follow the same international pattern that indicates that women are less likely to become appointed to the most prestigious economic and military positions. The question is whether this gender pattern reoccurs when it comes to the status and tasks of female and male employees in other parts of the organisation. To what extent are women represented at different levels and parts of the Swedish MFA? How has this changed over time?

Previous studies of the Swedish MFA have generated valuable insights about the diplomatic work of individual female ambassadors (Klingvall and Winai Ström 2010a) and how they think about their professional careers (Gustavsson Wahlund and Lennung Malmqvist 2014), as well as about what life is like as a diplomatic wife (Biltekin 2016a). However, we largely still lack basic systematic knowledge of how many women the Swedish MFA has employed over time and what tasks they have been assigned. The main purpose here is therefore to analytically describe the development of the Swedish MFA as an organisation, focusing on the status and the division of labour between its female and male employees. The results will be discussed in relation to the situation in other countries, the rest of the Swedish civil service, and the total share of female employees at the Swedish MFA.

The analysis will focus on the gender balance of ambassador appointments, management positions, tasks, and functions. Such an analysis makes up an important piece of the puzzle when describing to what extent an organisation is gendered and how, even though it cannot tell us the whole story. We will, for example, not be able to test any causal explanations to the patterns observed, although potential interpretations will be discussed.

Our main conclusion is that the Swedish MFA has come a long way with regard to gender equality, particularly from an international perspective. At the same time, the organisation appears to have moved in this direction reluctantly. The recruitment of women, as well as their promotion to manager and ambassador positions, started relatively late compared to other parts of the Swedish civil service. Once changes started to occur, however, they occurred very rapidly. Possible explanations for this early resistance and subsequent rapid change may involve social norms, formal rules, the closed recruitment system, pressure from internal and external actors, and the fact that the female employees carry out low status tasks and functions to a higher degree than males.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: first, we will briefly recount the claims that have been made previously regarding the organisation, social composition, and gender equality of the Swedish MFA. This depiction is based on secondary sources. Thereafter, we continue with an analysis of original data that we have retrieved from yearly publications including information about Swedish agencies (*Sveriges Statskalender*) and bibliographic information on MFA officials,[1] which the MFA publishes every other year (*Utrikesdepartementets kalender*). Apart from 2014, data have also been collected for 2005, 1995, 1985, 1980, and 1971.[2] Ideally, the time series would have been both longer and contained more measure points, but this time series still allows us to follow the development from when women constituted a quite marginalised group within the MFA—only 4% of the employees were women in 1971—to the situation in 2014 when women make up 59% of the workforce.

4.2 Introducing the Swedish MFA

4.2.1 The Organisational Structure

The first Swedish embassy opened in Haag in 1616 (the MFA Homepage 2014). The organisation of the diplomatic work at that time was very different from now, however, and it was not until the ministry reform of 1840 that the MFA was given its modern form and name. It was then one out of seven ministries (the others being the ministries of justice, land defence, sea defence, finance, education, and internal affairs) (Premfors and Sundström 2007, p. 27; Berggren 2008, p. 255). Since then, the MFA has been headed by the minister for foreign affairs assisted by the cabinet secretary (the state secretary) and the Director General of Administrative Affairs (Berggren 2008, p. 256; MFA Homepage 2014). The work was, for a long time, organised according to four divisions: politics, trade, consular, and fiscal, but several re-organisations took place during the 1900s, the most important one being the replacement of divisions by geographical and functional departments in 1996 (MFA Homepage 2014). This contributed to a greater degree of flexibility and specialisation in the organisation (Berggren 2008, p. 564).

An organisational aspect that survived the 1840 ministry reform and that still remains, however, is the unity of the MFA with those agencies that answer to it. The MFA thus constitutes the only exception to the dualist system that otherwise characterises the Swedish central administration (Berggren

2008, p. 259), a dualism which means that policies are formulated by the ministries, but implemented by the agencies with a high degree of discretion (Premfors and Sundström 2007, p. 25; Niklasson and Pierre 2012). Members of Cabinet may not, for example, interfere in agencies' administration of specific cases. Thus, minister rule does not apply, with the exception of the MFA. Embassies, which formally are agencies headed by a Director General, are still considered a part of the MFA, which means that the minister has the right to direct and interfere in their daily activities. This privilege is one distinctive characteristic of the MFA (Berggren 2008, p. 259).

4.2.2 The Composition of Staff

Something else that has set the MFA apart from the rest of the ministries is the privileged social background of its staff. The nobility completely monopolised the minister and cabinet secretary positions of the MFA until the beginning of the 1900s (Berggren 2008, pp. 466, 484). In a parliamentary debate in 1906, Hjalmar Branting, who became the party leader of the Social Democratic Party the following year, made the observation that the recruitment to the MFA very often appeared to be based on "birth and relations and some barely adequate law degree … " (Berggren 2008, p. 265) and even though the recruitment became more socially diversified in the twentieth century, the diplomat Charlotta Sparre still noted that the MFA leadership: "was strongly dominated by elderly distinguished men from the upper classes dressed in dark suits" when she entered the MFA in 1986 (Sparre 2014, p. 199).

The nobility used to be clearly overrepresented in other parts of the central administration too, of course (Berggren 2008, p. 465). In the military sector, for example, there were noble family dynasties that passed military positions down the family line. This was never the case at the MFA (Berggren 2008, p. 568). Rather, the MFA was inhabited by a network of upper class and nobility members who married one another (Berggren 2008, p. 485). The county governors constitute another example of a group who were often of noble birth in the early 1900s, but just like in most parts of the civil service, people with other kinds of social backgrounds were more and more frequently appointed to these positions, a change that did not occur quite as rapidly at the MFA (Berggren 2008, pp. 467, 480). It was even strongly resisted, but among those who were accepted to the diplomatic education programme at the end of the twentieth century, none was nobility or estate owner (Berggren 2008, p. 479).

Today, the MFA employs the largest number of people of all the ministries (about 2600). It is, for example, more than four times as big as the second (the Administrative Unit: 597 employees) and third (Ministry of Finance: 501 employees) largest units (the Government Offices Homepage 2015). Those who are stationed in Stockholm keep their offices at the Palace of the Hereditary Prince since 1906 (Premfors and Sundström 2007, p. 38). This group consists of about 750 people. The majority of the MFA employees are stationed abroad, however (Biltekin 2016b, p. 45). About 500 of these are Swedes placed at one of the 100 foreign missions and 1300 are hired locals. The greatest share of the employees are officials dealing with policy matters (73%, not counting the locals). Of the rest, 11% are managers, 14% perform basic functions (such as drivers, caretakers, phone operators, and assistants), and 2% are specialists (the MFA Homepage 2012).

The officials are almost exclusively recruited internally, which is another distinguishable feature of the MFA. Whereas the civil servants at the other ministries move around within the Government Offices in order to advance their careers, the MFA officials start as aspirants when they are relatively young and then work their way up through the MFA hierarchy (ALVA 1993, pp. 5–6). This may be one explanation for why the average salary at the MFA is lower than at the rest of the Government Offices (ALVA 1993, p. 44; *Aftonbladet* 2013), since such a closed recruitment method is likely to make the employees more dependent on their superiors and more loyal to the organisation. Another possible explanation is the fact that the MFA is an extremely attractive workplace, which is revealed by the highly competitive recruitment of aspirants to the Diplomatic Programme; sometimes as many as 1200 people apply to the 10–20 positions that open every year (ALVA 1993, p. 6; Nilsson 2012). But there is also the glamorous image of the diplomats as too genteel to ever break a sweat or even care about their salaries (Rosén 1994), an image that perhaps further contributes to the salary gap.

4.2.3 Women Enter the MFA

Women first entered the MFA as typists in the 1870s. It was not until 1948, however, that they were accepted into the education programme that, since 1912, serves as the main recruitment pool of diplomats and it would take even longer before more than just a few exceptional cases were promoted managers (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 'Firsts' for women in the Swedish MFA

Year	*Event*	*Source*
1633	Catharina Stopia Möller becomes the first female ambassador when she replaces her deceased husband who was stationed in Moscow.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1870s	Women are employed as typists.	Larsson (1990)
1920	Women are allowed to work as officials handling policy matters in the civil service.	Government Investigation (2007, pp. 69, 108)
1948	Barbro Selldén is recruited as the first woman to the diplomatic education programme.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1949	Women are recruited as officials who handle policy matters at the MFA.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1955	Alva Myrdal becomes the first politically appointed female head of mission (envoyé) in modern time. She was placed in New Delhi, India.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1958	Agda Rössel becomes the first female ambassador at the Swedish UN representation in New York.	Almgren (2010)
Early 1970s	Female diplomats stationed abroad do no longer have to choose between moving home and or quitting their job entirely when they marry.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1976	The MFA equality group consisting of representatives from the employer, the labour unions, and the employees is formed.	Rosén (1978)
1976	Karin Söder (the Centre Party) becomes the first female minister for foreign affairs.	Zetterberg (2010)
1977	The first year when the same number of women and men (nine) are accepted to the diplomatic education programme.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1978	Ethel Ringborg Wiklund becomes the first female career diplomat who is appointed head of mission (Reykjavik, Iceland).	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1982	The first year when there are more women (seven) than men (five) accepted to the diplomatic education programme.	Klingvall and Winai Ström (2010b)
1988	Margareta Hegardt becomes the first female assistant cabinet secretary.	MFA (2010), p. 324
1996	Yvonne Gustafsson and Gun-Britt Andersson become the first female state secretaries (subordinated to the cabinet secretary) at the MFA. They are responsible for trade and migration.	MFA (2010), pp. 323–324
2014	Annika Söder becomes the first female cabinet secretary.	MFA (2010), p. 323

When Sweden entered the second millennium, only 35 women had ever been appointed mission heads (Berggren 2008, p. 461; Klingvall and Winai Ström 2010b, p. 223). One formal constraint that contributed to this slow development was the marital rule that prevailed until the early 1970s, which prohibited women from continuing working at foreign postings when they married (ALVA 1993, p. 4). Female applicants to the Diplomatic Education Programme in the 1960s were thus informed that there were "some difficulties for female civil servants in combining family life with an occupation where one has a duty to serve abroad" (Groth quoted in Biltekin 2016b, p. 138). This marital rule was not unique to Sweden at the time though; it was also applied in the USA, for example (Bashevkin, Chap. 3).

Another possible explanation to women's slower career development is simply gender discrimination and prejudice. Karin Söder (the Centre Party), minister for foreign affairs 1976–1978, reported that she had to convince others that women are capable of loving their children and having a professional career at the same time. Her experience was that the requirements were higher for women than for men (Zetterberg 2010, p. 67), an experience that is shared by other female diplomats (see e.g. H.B. 1987).

The closed recruitment system has also been mentioned as one reason for the slow promotion of women (Biltekin 2016b, pp. 139–140; interview with Ulla Gudmundson). Since the majority of the managers have been men and homosocial behaviour makes senior men more likely to identify with junior men than junior women, it has been easier for younger men to gain support and career opportunities.

The slow career advancement of women at the MFA has even been pointed out as particularly poor compared to that of other parts of the civil service. In 1994, for example, the MFA was awarded the Fredrika Bremer Society's embarrassing Boo (BU) prize for: "in speech and action having shown that equality is of no interest to them" (Feuk 1994, p. 8). Only 11% of the manager positions were held by women and Inge Garstedt, the president of the Fredrika Bremer Society at the time, claimed that MFA staff daily expressed views like: "pity those men who would be passed over if more women were promoted" (Feuk 1994, p. 8). Garstedt thus tartly pointed out that: "Somebody should read the law to the MFA leadership. True, the MFA is situated at the Palace of the Hereditary Prince, and the minister is a woman, but there should be place for more women among the managers. We will follow the development closely" (Feuk 1994, p. 8).

The impression from the secondary sources that we have recounted here thus signals that the gender image of the Swedish MFA has not always been as high profile historically as it is today. On the contrary, the story here is rather that of an organisation that has resisted women's aspirations to work as diplomats. The feminist statement by Margot Wallström, quoted in the introduction, indicates that this might have changed, however. That fact that women make up 59% of the MFA staff today, which equals the average for the staff of all the ministries (60%) (Stensöta 2010, p. 15; the Government Offices Homepage 2015), also points in this direction. The question is to what extent this growing number of female employees is noticeable at all parts and levels of the organisation and, in that case, when this change occurred. In the following section, we analyse original data on the positions, tasks, and functions of MFA staff over time in order to gain a richer understanding of this phenomenon.

4.3 Analysing Gender Equality at the Swedish MFA

4.3.1 Women and Men at Leading Positions

The Swedish MFA has been a growing organisation for most of the time under study (see Fig. 4.1). Between 1971 and 2005, the number of employees more than doubled from 405 to 1080 and the share of female staff has steadily grown with it. Going from being a quite marginalised group of only 4%, women now make up the majority (56%)[3] of the MFA employees and they have done so since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The organisation actually entered the 40–60% span, which is often used to define a gender-balanced organisation (Dryler and Gillström 2012, p. 12; the Government Offices Homepage 2016), at the end of the 1990s. Still, it is interesting to note that this change occurred relatively late at the MFA compared to the other ministries, as the Government Offices overall were female dominated in 1990 already (Larsson 1990).

Having more women in the organisation has not automatically led to a higher share of female managers and ambassadors, however. For a long time, there was not much action on this front at all. In 1985, when 23% of the employees were women, only 12% of the managers and 5% of the ambassadors were so. These figures thus barely changed since the beginning of the



Fig. 4.1 Share of women at leading positions in Swedish diplomacy 1971–2014. *Note*: The total number of employees for the different years are 1971: 404, 1980: 628, 1985: 695, 1995: 807, 2005: 1080, 2014: 1038. The reason why the share of female ambassadors is lower than in Towns and Niklasson (Chap. 1) is because (1) the data for that study were collected earlier (in January 2014) and (2) that analysis only includes ambassadors who are posted at foreign embassies, not those who are based in Stockholm.

1970s, and the MFA found itself struggling to meet the Government Offices' new policy goal of having at least 20%[4] female managers by 1995. The other ministries achieved this goal in 1992 already (ALVA 1993, p. 41). There were forces pushing for change, however.

In 1987, the Network was formed (Nätverket 1987). The Network was an informal club for all female officials who handled policy matters at the MFA and the purpose was to promote women's careers. They invited senior MFA officials, even the cabinet secretary, to meetings on gender equality, wrote opinion pieces in the staff magazine, *UD-kuriren*, and successfully pushed the Director General of Administrative Affairs to carry out a survey on men's and women's career developments (Berggren 2008, p. 620; interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016). Thus, this group built pressure from within the organisation for promoting more female managers. Similar pressures have been observed in other MFAs (Bashevkin, Chap. 3; Farias and Carmo, Chap. 6).

The political focus on gender equality also intensified in the 1990s. In contrast to the US and Brazilian MFAs, the possibilities for women to

hold leading positions in Sweden have not fluctuated as much depending on the political leadership (Bashevkin, Chap. 3; Farias and Carmo, Chap. 6). That said, some administrations have put more stress on this issue than others. Foreign ministers Lena Hjelm-Wallén (1994–1998, Social Democratic Party) and Anna Lindh (1998–2003, Social Democratic Party) are often pointed out as two of the ministers for foreign affairs who have done most to improve gender equality internally (Al-Nadaf 2010; Klingvall and Winai Ström 2010b; Mälarstedt 2010; interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016). When asked by *UD-kuriren* one year after she was appointed what she wanted to do in order to increase the share of female managers, Hjelm-Wallén replied: "Now, we will make conscious efforts to notice women who have been overlooked previously. Women will become more visible" (Höglin 1995, p. 10).

The pressure on the MFA to increase gender equality now came from at least three directions: from the female employees, from the political leadership, and, as we have seen before, from outside the organisation through negative publicity like the Boo prize. Gender equality "was in the air, in the public debate" (interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016). This caused some concern within the organisation. Lena Sundin, who was one of the five new female ambassadors appointed in 1995, testifies that: "I have heard that some male colleagues are worried, and claim that the MFA only promotes women now" (Rosén 1995, p. 26). The total share of female ambassadors in 1995 was only 9%, however, although this was to change rapidly.

From 1995 to 2005, the share of female ambassadors grew from 9% to 30%, a remarkable increase, but not as dramatic as that which occurred with regard to other kinds of management positions ten years earlier. In 1995, 37% of the managers were women, compared to only 12% in 1985. The share of female managers in 1995 thus mirrored that of the female employees in the organisation. This situation did not last, however. As the share of female ambassadors grew, the development among other management positions stagnated; it even became slightly negative, so ten years later, there were only 35% female managers. It is unclear what caused this drop. Perhaps the gender equality efforts in the later half of the 1990s focused so hard on ambassador appointments so that other management positions were pushed into the background? Another possibility is that those actors who had been promoting women felt content with their achievements when it came to management positions and stopped pushing the issue, or that their efforts finally hit the glass ceiling. The Network

phased out all their activities around this time, for example. Ulla Gudmundson, who had been an active member but who was stationed abroad at the time, assumes that the members perceived that the group had served its purpose, at least for the time being, and that "things were now in motion" (interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016).

We observe, however, that the gender balance at management positions never reached the same level of representativeness again after 1995. The share of female managers is higher today (42%), but so is the share of women working in the organisation (56%). One way of looking at it is therefore that women are more underrepresented in management positions today, since they make up more than half of the workforce, but hold only a minority of the leading positions. At the same time, women at the MFA now appear to be as successful in their careers as those working at other ministries (Government Offices 2014, p. 62) and probably even more so than female diplomats in other countries (see e.g. Bashevkin, Chap. 3). We may therefore conclude that the promotion of women to leading positions in the MFA has come a long way since 1971. According to the figures presented here, the MFA today does not appear to be particularly backwards when it comes to gender equality, neither by a national nor by an international comparison.

4.3.2 Tasks Performed by Women and Men

The next step is to look at what tasks women and men carry out in the Swedish MFA. One of the main arguments made by Aggestam and Towns in the introduction is that women and men will be assigned different tasks once women enter a new organisation. This is a pattern that is confirmed in the Swedish case. As Table 4.2 shows, there are two kinds of units in which women are consistently overrepresented: functional and administrative units, whereas the opposite is true for men at the embassies.

The fact that the share of women is somewhat lower at the embassies is perhaps not so surprising. Since the 1970s, the Swedish MFA has been criticised for not doing enough to secure the professional development and the pensions of the partners who accompany the MFA staff abroad (Berggren 2008, pp. 379–388). It was long taken for granted that the partner, who was almost always a woman, would be content as a housewife during the family's stay abroad, but as the public debate in Sweden became more focused on gender equality and women became more important actors on the labour market, the MFA was pushed to

Table 4.2 Share of women (%) at different kinds of units in the Swedish MFA (1971–2014)

Units	*1971*	*1980*	*1985*	*1995*	*2005*	*2014*
Political	0 (0)	0 (0)	13 (1)	**38 (3)**	31 (4)	**63 (12)**
Geographical	–	11 (2)	6 (1)	**38 (15)**	49 (63)	52 (71)
Functional	**7 (4)**	**20 (17)**	**30 (42)**	**41 (80)**	**60 (162)**	**58 (156)**
Embassy	2 (5)	12 (47)	15 (55)	29 (106)	44 (88)	53 (250)
Administrative	**11 (5)**	**36 (38)**	**43 (57)**	**52 (92)**	**63 (95)**	**62 (87)**
Other	**5 (1)**	0 (0)	9 (3)	9 (2)	**75 (6)**	13 (1)
All Units	4 (15)	17 (104)	23 (159)	37 (298)	51 (555)	56 (577)

Note: Number of women in parentheses. Figures in bold indicate units in which the share of women is higher than the share of women for all units that year, that is, those units in which women are overrepresented. In 1971, there were no geographical units. Examples of the category "Other" are: civil servants who are at the minister's disposal without having a particular placement, advisers (analysts) at the minister's office, or inspectors at the minister's office.

take steps to mitigate the negative effects that a foreign placement has for the partner's professional career and pension (Biltekin 2016a). The situation for the partner is still complicated, however, and it seems harder for women to convince their families to accompany them abroad (Magnusson 2010; Farias and Carmo, Chap. 6; interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016). The Swedish diplomat Maria Velasco is one of those who had to leave her family behind in Sweden when serving at a foreign mission. She recounts how appalled a male Nordic ambassador was when she told him of her family situation, even though he himself had made the same choice to go alone. When she wondered how their decisions differed, he answered: "But you are a *mother*!" (Velasco 2014, p. 52, emphasis in the original). This incident indicates that the option of going alone is less socially acceptable for women. The warning to those women who aspired to enter the MFA in the 1960s may thus still apply; even without the abolished marital rules, it is still particularly difficult for women to combine family life with a diplomatic career.

Working at a geographical unit at the ministry in Stockholm could have been an alternative to a foreign placement for those women who nurse a special interest in a particular geographical region. However, as Table 4.2 shows, women have not been that common at these kinds of units either. The Swedish MFA did in fact not have any geographical units until 1972 (Berggren 2008), even though this was a common way of organising MFAs in other countries, for example in the USA. The Swedish MFA was

too small before the 1970s to have people focusing on particular geographical regions, but once the ministry started growing, this became possible.

The share of women working at the geographical units initially grew very slowly, however. In 1985, only 6% of the people specialising in a geographical region were women, which was the lowest share of women at any kind of unit in the whole organisation. Today, women constitute the majority of the staff at geographical units (52%), just like they do at almost all kinds of units, but they are less dominating here than in, for example, the administrative and political ones.

Since the number of women working at geographical units has been fairly low for most of the years under study and the organisation of the geographical units has changed over time in order to match the international situation, it is hard to see whether there is a pattern when it comes to the kinds of geographical units where women have been working. The data indicate, however, that women are overrepresented at units focusing on Africa and the EU.

Political units are not political in the sense that people working there are party loyalists. These units are made up by civil servants who coordinate the work between different kinds of units in order to create a consistent and coherent foreign policy. They also constitute an important link in the communication between the political leadership and the rest of the organisation. The three Director Generals, who are the senior officials responsible for the coordination of the functional and geographical units, are, for example, placed at political units. Today, all three of them are women, as are 63% of their staff. The political units were thus the most female dominated ones in 2014, which may be interpreted as an important signal from the new feminist political leadership saying that gender equality should now be taken seriously also within the organisation. According to Table 4.2, this may indicate an interesting organisational change, since the share of women at political units has been relatively low over time.

The most common assignments for women have instead been either at one of the administrative or the functional units. The overrepresentation of women at the administrative units is hardly surprising, given that this is a gender pattern that is found in many other government agencies and organisations; women often end up on positions that aim to serve those who carry out the core activities. This result is also in line with that presented by the Arbete av Lika Värde (ALVA) study of the MFA in 1993 and, as the authors point

out, this division of labour is likely to have slowed down women's careers, since administrative tasks are less prestigious (ALVA 1993, p. 40).

The high share of women at the functional units is more interesting though. Why have these kinds of tasks been more commonly assigned to women? The gender pattern might become easier to understand if we distinguish between different kinds of functional units. We will therefore take a closer look at what kinds of functional units women and men work at.

4.3.3 Functions Performed by Women and Men

Functional units are organised around areas of expertise that are not related to a particular geographical region, for example trade, human rights, developing aid, international security and so on. The number, level of specialisation, and exact focus of the units have been different for almost every year under study, but Table 4.3 represents an attempt to group similar functions in order to enable a comparison over time.

Table 4.3 Share of women (%) at different kinds of functional units in the Swedish MFA (1971–2014)

Functional unit	*1971*	*1980*	*1985*	*1995*	*2005*	*2014*
International trade and promotion of Swedish business	4 (1)	4 (1)	26 (19)	35 (28)	57 (31)	44 (22)
Communication with the media and the public	0 (0)	**23 (3)**	**43 (6)**	**60 (9)**	**70 (19)**	**67 (22)**
Multilateral development cooperation, international law, human rights, treaty law	**17 (3)**	**35 (10)**	**44 (12)**	**46 (28)**	**64 (40)**	58 (52)
Disarmament, non-proliferation, and international security	–	14 (1)	0 (0)	36 (5)	51 (27)	50 (24)
Protocol, consular affairs, and civil law	0 (0)	17 (1)	**33 (3)**	36 (4)	**63 (45)**	**74 (36)**
Other	–	11 (1)	22 (2)	**46 (6)**	–	–
All functional units	7 (4)	20 (17)	30 (42)	41 (80)	60 (162)	58 (156)
All units	4 (15)	17 (104)	23 (159)	37 (298)	51 (555)	56 (577)

Note: Number of women in parenthesis. Figures in bold indicate those functions in which the share of women is higher than the share of women for all units that year, that is, those units in which women are overrepresented in relation to how many women are working at functional units. A dash means that this kind of unit did not exist in a given year. The category "Other" is mostly international organisations.

Table 4.3 reveals that even though women are often overrepresented at functional units, this is a truth with modification. The functions that mainly occupy the female employees are development cooperation, international treaties, and communication with the media and the public, a pattern that is in line with that presented by the ALVA study (1993, p. 43). For example, sixty-seven per cent of the staff responsible for communication in 2014 are women. Tasks related to protocol, consular affairs, and civil law also seem to have been more commonly assigned to women than to men lately. Today, these are the kinds of functions in which women are the most overrepresented, as they constitute 74% of the staff at these units. Something that all these functions have in common is that they focus on people, human well-being, and human relations. Perhaps it is not so surprising that women cluster in these units, since these are issues that women often work with also in other kinds of organisations. They are also considered less prestigious than other kinds of functions, although the importance of consular affairs has received more recognition after the evacuation efforts following, for example, the tsunami catastrophe in Thailand in 2004 (interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016).

At the most prestigious functional units, however, more precisely those dealing with money and weapons (interview with Ulla Gudmundson 2016), women are almost always slightly underrepresented, both in relation to their share at the functional units and to their share of the MFA workforce overall. This pattern seems to follow the same gender logic that previous research has pointed to, namely that women are not associated with trade (e.g. Göransson 2006; Government bill 2014/15:1, App. 3) or militarism (e.g. Sjoberg 2012) to the same degree as men. Female ambassadors are, for example, less likely to be stationed in countries that play a pivotal part in global trade (Towns and Niklasson 2016), or that are involved in some kind of military conflict (Niklasson and Towns forthcoming). The results in Table 4.3 show that this gender pattern is discernible throughout the whole MFA organisation and not just at the level of ambassador appointments. Functions are divided between female and male employees in a systematic manner that may disadvantage women. However, it is also important to keep in mind that women make up at least 50% of nearly all functional units today.

4.4 Conclusion

In September 2016, we attended a workshop at Lund University. The keynote speaker was Ann Bernes, the gender equality ambassador responsible for coordinating Sweden's feminist foreign policy. The speech focused on how the implementation of the policy has been organised and received so far.

Bernes's opening sentence was a quote by Mahatma Gandhi: "First, they ignore you. Then, they laugh at you. Then, they fight you, and then, you win." The rest of her speech did not touch on the first three stages of this process, however. Apart from a little bit of surprise and anxiety about what this feminist foreign policy would mean for the everyday work at the organisation, Bernes mentioned no strong reactions worth speaking of. No laughter, no struggle—as if the organisation simply asked the minister how high she wanted them to jump.

Bernes is, of course, an official representative of the organisation and she is therefore unlikely to express any critical views of the internal work process in public. Still, if we suppose for a moment that her description of the process actually is correct, we may wonder about the lack of resistance. Why was there no fight? A possible interpretation is that the struggle has already been fought and won and that the idea of gender equality is now thoroughly embedded in the MFA. If we look at how the inclusion of women into the organisation has developed over time, this might actually be case.

Women as potential diplomats were indeed ignored for a long time. Even when they started making their way into other parts of the civil service, the door to the MFA remained closed. The gates to the Palace of the Hereditary Prince first opened to female diplomats at the middle of the 1900s, but only ajar. Few women successfully squeezed their way in, and some of those who did describe how they faced a "cold wind of negative attitudes" on a daily basis (*UD-kuriren* 1978, p. 6). The gender equality situation at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), an agency with a similar public mission as the MFA, was perceived to be better. A Sida employee told *UD-kuriren* in 1978 that "[t]he greatest progress we have made at Sida is that nobody laughs at gender equality nowadays" (Rosén 1978, p. 11). The implication being that this was not yet the case at the MFA. Neither of the organisations was very successful at promoting their female employees to leading positions, however; the MFA hardly appointed any female managers or ambassadors at all until the middle of the 1980s. The rapid change that started around this time and

continued until the beginning of the 2000s was dramatic, however, and this is also when the open struggle is likely to have taken place. As women made up a growing number of the first-time appointments of managers and ambassadors, the men in the organisation started to feel threatened and openly expressed their concern and discontent. The forces in favour of greater gender equality were strong, however. The female diplomats, the political leadership, and the public debate climate all pushed the MFA in the same direction and our data indicate that they were relatively successful, from a national as well as from an international perspective.

This said, men still hold the majority of the management and ambassador positions and they also enjoy the privilege of more or less monopolising some of the most prestigious ambassador positions, like London, Moscow, and Paris. The division of labour that channels a greater share of the female employees to lower status tasks and functions may be one explanation for this gender imbalance.

The explanations discussed here need to be tested properly, though. Our quantitative data has only enabled a description of the gender balance at different positions, not of its causes. How female and male employees perceive their work environment and to what extent the organisational culture is characterised by gender equality are further examples of important questions that have been beyond the scope of this chapter and that still remain to be answered.

In conclusion, it is not unlikely that Wallström's feminist foreign policy statement in 2014 is received by an organisation that has already walked the long road, passed the stages of silence, ridicule, and struggle to now embrace the idea of gender equality and the importance of women's representation. The Swedish MFA organisation may very well be at a stage when it is ready to live up to the feminist expectations raised by the new foreign policy. Time will tell if it will.

Notes

1. Only civil servants employed by the MFA have been included in the analysis. This means that we have not collected information about staff that carries out basic functions, such as caretakers, drivers, or phone operators, nor experts placed as extra resources at the embassies, but who actually work for other government ministries or agencies, for example,. the ministry of defence and the Swedish International Developing Cooperation Agency

(Sida). Politically appointed advisers who come and go with the minister have not been included either.

2. This means that we have consulted *Sveriges Statskalender* and *Utrikesdepartementets kalender* for the next following years (2014/15, 2006, 1996, 1986, 1981, and 1972), since the information in these publications is based on the previous year.
3. The reason why the share of female employees is lower here than previously mentioned (59%) is because the figure 56% is based on the civil servants only, not on all staff, and the figure is of 2014, not of 2015.
4. The reason why the share of female managers reported in the ALVA study was not 20% in 1995 is because they included ambassadors as well as other kinds of managers. They also applied a stricter definition of managers; they did not include managers for groups or sections for example. If we apply their definition, the share of female managers for the years under study is 1971: 1%, 1980: 3%, 1985: 6%, 1995: 16%, 2005: 28% and 2014: 40%.

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CHAPTER 5

Women and Gender in Turkish Diplomacy: Historical Legacies and Current Patterns

Bahar Rumelili and Rahime Suleymanoglu-Kurum

5.1 Introduction

"There is only one profession on earth that women cannot do, and it is the diplomatic profession."

In her memoirs, female diplomat Hüner Tuncer, who served in the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs during 1977–1997, recounts that her decision to pursue a diplomatic career had received the above reaction from her uncle. On top of such universalistic assumptions about the nature of the profession, Turkey's female diplomats also encounter cultural assumptions that women in a Muslim society like Turkey would be further inhibited in a diplomatic career. Yet, the historical record, as well as the gender distribution of Turkey's current diplomatic corps, proves both assumptions wrong. Not only informal diplomatic roles and functions

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have historically been performed by Ottoman/Turkish women in various capacities, but female diplomats are also making their presence increasingly felt in the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) at levels on par with many European countries. However, in establishing this growing presence, Turkey's female diplomats have to navigate through multiple structural barriers, which emerge at the intersection of masculinist practices in diplomacy with patriarchal norms in society and to some extent Turkey's status in international society. These barriers shape the female diplomats' career paths and professional strategies. It appears that, as a result, the growing presence of women in the MFA has not undermined the masculine norms in Turkish diplomacy to the same extent.

This chapter examines the status of women in Turkish diplomacy in three dimensions. In the first section, we historically trace the presence and role of women in Ottoman/Turkish diplomacy, relying mostly on secondary literature. Our analysis shows that the forms and levels of women's participation in diplomacy have historically changed and varied, mostly along with European trends. In the second section, we draw on data obtained in 2015–2016 from the Departmental Directorate of Human Resources (DD-HR) in the Turkish MFA and interview with Ambassador Fatih Yildiz, the head of the DD-HR (Yildiz 2016), to analyse the gender distribution of Turkey's diplomats across rank and missions currently served. In the third section, we analyse published interviews and memoirs of female ambassadors and diplomats to understand how they are affected by and navigate through the gendered structures of diplomacy. The anecdotes indicate that the primary structural barriers female diplomats faced at different points in their careers were at the intersection of masculine attitudes in the Turkish MFA and the patriarchal norms of Turkish society. Turkey's female diplomats navigate through these barriers by "leaning in," generally downplaying the importance of gender differences and adopting masculine norms and practices.

5.2 The Evolving Role and Position of Women in Ottoman/Turkish Diplomacy

While dominant narratives may lead us to expect that non-Western women lag behind their Western counterparts in terms of diplomatic experience and prowess, the forms and levels of Ottoman/Turkish women's participation in diplomacy have historically changed and varied, mostly along with European trends. Women of the Ottoman court performed informal

diplomatic functions in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries; afterwards the formalisation and bureaucratisation of Ottoman diplomacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries turned it into an exclusively male profession; following that, with the status of women becoming a marker of the newly founded Republic of Turkey's modern identity in the early twentieth century, the first woman diplomat entered the MFA as early as 1932; and yet, until the 1990s and 2000s, the share of female diplomats and ambassadors in the MFA remained very low.

Similar to their counterparts in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Sluga and James 2015; McCarthy 2014), women in the Ottoman court played critical diplomatic roles as mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters. Even though the Ottoman Empire began accepting resident European diplomats in 1583 (Arı 2004: 45, 47), it did not have embassies in European countries until the eighteenth century. This is because the Ottomans did not recognise the notion of equality of sovereignty until the eighteenth century and maintained a unilateral non-reciprocal system of diplomacy with the European states as a statement of superiority (Yurdusev 2004: 21; see also Arı 2004: 43–44). This asymmetry in diplomatic relations opened up space for women of the Ottoman court to act as intermediaries between the resident European male ambassadors in Istanbul and the Ottoman Sultan. Their correspondence created direct contacts with the often inaccessible sultan (Peirce 1993: 222). Women's activities became strategically useful when the Ottomans needed diplomacy (Peirce 1993: 219).

Women of the Ottoman court were generally slaves of European origin. Like their European counterparts, they were active agents in matrimonial and epistolary diplomacy. A well-known example is Hurrem sultan, the principal wife of Suleyman the Magnificent, who maintained contacts with her native Poland. During her period as principal wife, Poland sent more ambassadors to the sultan than any other power and was able to maintain peace with the Ottomans. Later, the mothers of Murad III and Mehmed III, who were of Venetian origin, were very influential during the reigns of these sultans (Peirce 1993: 226). They were successful in preventing a possible Ottoman invasion of Crete, which was then a Venetian possession (Peirce 1993: 221).

As its military superiority in Europe declined in the late seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire started to develop a positive approach to diplomacy. After having to sign a series of peace agreements following defeats, the Ottomans started to accept the equality of sovereignty and

reciprocity of relations (Arı 2004: 52–53; Yurdusev 2004). An informal diplomatic protocol and tradition developed in the Ottoman Empire during this period (Arı 2004: 59). The envoys were always male, came from important positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy, and were expected to show the magnificence of the Empire (Arı 2004: 48–49). The first resident Ottoman mission was established in London in 1793. Later, resident ambassadors were also sent to other capitals such as Berlin, Vienna, and Paris (Kürkçüoğlu 2004: 134). In the nineteenth century, following European patterns, the conduct of Ottoman foreign policy became further professionalised. During the Congress of Vienna, a codified hierarchy of diplomatic rank, indicating the different diplomatic titles, their ordering, and rules of precedence and protocol, was agreed on (McCarthy 2014: 30). Soon after, in 1836, the Ottoman Empire established *Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs); for the first time designating a separate ministry for foreign affairs. Later in 1859, the all-male *Mekteb-i Fünun-u Mülkiye* was established, with the sole objective of training civil servants for various bureaucratic positions, including the Ottoman MFA.[1] Through professionalisation, diplomacy came to be defined as an exclusively male and masculine profession, just as in Europe.

In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law enforced segregation of the sexes, and deprived Muslim women of key fundamental rights. However, in the early twentieth century, prior to the dissolution of the Empire after the First World War, an active feminist movement emerged to promote the education of women and demand their integration into economic life. This movement succeeded in securing the right of women to work in paid labour in 1897 (Çakır 2011), and in getting two women hired as public employees by the Istanbul telephone company in 1913 (Arat 2008). Turkish women later secured the right to higher education and the first women's university was established in 1914.

In addition to securing these economic rights from the Ottoman state, this early feminist movement prepared Turkish women to demand and play active political, economic, and social roles in the modern Turkish republic, which was founded in 1923. One key figure was Halide Edip, who played an informal yet critical diplomatic role in the nationalist struggle waged by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) against the Ottoman sultan and the invading Western powers during 1919–1923. As a journalist responsible for publicising the nationalist struggle in the Anatolian News Agency, her competence in English and prior contacts made her the main contact person between Mustafa Kemal and the Americans. The importance of the

diplomatic role that Halide Edip played was also noted by Mustafa Kemal, who, in response to a foreign journalist's question, remarked that "we have women in Turkey who are as capable as men of occupying high posts such as that of ambassador. Halide [Edip] is one of these women, and it is certain that she could fill the office perfectly. The occasion to nominate an ambassador to the United States, however, has not yet presented itself to us" (Yılmaz 2015: 48).

For the Republic of Turkey, the status of women was a key arena to demonstrate its new identity as a modern, Western, and civilised state (Arat 2001: 28). Hence, far ahead of women in many Western countries, Turkish women were granted the right to vote in 1930, and the right to stand for election in 1934. Turkey was among the leading countries also in the introduction of women to diplomacy. In 1932, almost 20 years after Turkish women secured the right to public employment, Adile Ayda entered the MFA as the first female diplomat of modern Turkey. This was long before other countries; in 1933, only 13 countries had female diplomats, and one of them was Turkey (Bloch 2004). However, Adile Ayda could only remain in the MFA initially for two years. Similar to the pattern observed in Brazil (see Farias and Carmo, Chap. 6), limitations to women's active participation in the MFA were introduced shortly after. A regulation issued by then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1934 banned the posting of female diplomats to foreign representations. Consequently, Adile Ayda resigned in 1934, and returned to the MFA only in 1957 when this regulation was lifted.

As indicated in other chapters of this volume, after women gained access to the diplomatic profession in different countries, policies concerning marriage hindered their participation in diplomacy in growing numbers. Even though the Turkish MFA did not implement a formal marriage ban for female diplomats, its lack of family-friendly policies hindered women's participation. Until 1998, married diplomats could not work in the same embassy, or even in different diplomatic missions in the same city, and this restriction often led female diplomats to resign or take long leaves of absence to accommodate their husbands' career paths. Those who prioritised their careers either chose to remain single or had to endure long separations.

In the Turkish MFA, the promotion of women to the rank of ambassador did not occur until 1982, when Filiz Dinçmen was appointed as an ambassador to the Hague, in the Netherlands. The next promotion of a woman to ambassadorial position was delayed for another ten years, until

1992, when Solmaz Ünaydın was appointed as ambassador to Stockholm and when Fügen Ok was appointed as ambassador to Turkey's Permanent Representation at the UN Vienna Office. With Tansu Çiller becoming Turkey's first female Prime Minister in 1993, and later the first female Foreign Minister in 1996, the 1990s also marked the growing visibility of women in higher echelons of politics. The year 1998 marked a watershed for the role of women in Turkish diplomacy, as three female diplomats were promoted to the rank of ambassador in the same decree (Şule Soysal to Belarus, Veka İnal to the Philippines, and Fusun Çetintaş to Singapore). In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of female ambassadors. For instance, in 2014, four new female ambassadors were appointed, and in 2015, six (Anadolu Ajansı 2015).

Similar to the trends observed in the rest of the world, the ratio of female diplomats in the Turkish MFA began to rise significantly in the 1990s and 2000s. As of 1990, the percentage of female diplomats in the MFA was at 17.2%, but in the 1990–2015 period, the percentage of female recruits in the yearly intake averaged around 30%. As a result of this recruitment policy, by 2016, the ratio of female diplomats had risen to 31.2% (DD-HR 2016b). Intensive criticism of the Ministry's posting policies regarding married diplomatic couples led to a significant change in 1998. A regulation issued in 1998 allowed, but did not guarantee, diplomatic couples to be posted to the same foreign representation (Ergin 1998). Table 5.1 provides a summary of critical developments affecting the women's roles in Turkish diplomacy.

Table 5.1 "Firsts" for women in Turkish diplomacy (compiled by authors)

Year	*Event*
1897	Legal change allows women to become wage workers.
1913	Legal change allows women to work as civil servants in government.
1932	Adile Ayda becomes the first female diplomat of Turkey.
1934	Regulation prohibits the posting of female diplomats in foreign representations.
1934	With a constitutional amendment, women are granted suffrage rights.
1957	Change of regulation allows female diplomats to be appointed to foreign representations.
1982	Turkey's first female ambassador, Filiz Dinçmen, is appointed to the Hague.
1993	Tansu Çiller becomes the first female Prime Minister of Turkey.
1996	Tansu Çiller becomes Turkey's first female minister of foreign affairs.
1998	Three female diplomats are promoted to the rank of ambassador for the first time in the same decree.
1998	Regulation allowing married diplomatic couples to be posted to same foreign representation.

5.3 Women and the Turkish MFA in Numbers

Based on data obtained from DD-HR at the Turkish MFA, this section analyses the status, position, and roles of Turkish female diplomats. Women currently make up 31.2% of Turkey's diplomats, and the distribution of female diplomats across career categories, rank, and receiving countries manifests some interesting patterns. The Turkish MFA does not implement a gender-based quota in its recruitment policy. Interested candidates, who have scored above a certain number of points in the nationally administered multiple choice exam for all civil servant positions, are invited first for a written exam and then an interview at the Ministry. The selection process is claimed to be gender-blind. Successful candidates are recruited into the two position categories, career employees and consular and expert officers, which have different career trajectories. While those recruited into the consular and expert officer category can only rise to the ranks of "consulate general" in foreign representations and to "departmental director" in the centre, career employees can be promoted up to the rank of "ambassador" in foreign representations and Undersecretary in the centre. During their careers, diplomats at the Turkish MFA rotate between two-year terms in the "centre" and four year terms in "foreign representations." The rotation system implies that not all diplomats of ambassadorial rank are serving in foreign representations at a certain point in time.

The first notable gender-based pattern in the Turkish MFA is that the share of female diplomats decline with rank. Table 5.2 indicates current gender representations in different career categories in the Turkish MFA. In the more prestigious career employee category, where there is the prospect of promotion to ambassadorial rank, female diplomats currently make up 26% of Turkey's diplomats. However, in the less prestigious consular and expert officer category, where there is no prospect of

Table 5.2 Number and share of women (%) in different positions and rank in the Turkish MFA, 2015 (DD-HR 2015)

Category	*Total*	*Number of females*	*Percentage female (%)*
Career employees	1231	324	26.32
Consular and expert officers	965	352	36.47
Deputy experts	15	0	0
Ambassadors	227	31	13.65

Note: While there are currently no female deputy experts, recruitment in this category has only begun in 2013

promotion to ambassadorial rank, the share of female diplomats is higher, at 36%. A striking finding is that while female diplomats currently make up 26% of Turkish diplomats of the career employee category, the share of female ambassadors is currently at only 13.65%. Thus, in line with the findings of Towns and Niklasson, these figures indicate that the gender balance in the Turkish MFA improves in positions of lower rank and status, but worsens in positions of higher rank and status.

However, it should be taken into account that the diplomats promoted to ambassadorial rank today have been recruited into the Turkish MFA around 20 years ago.[2] Consequently, current recruitment policies are likely to take as long to be reflected in ambassadorial postings. According to DD-HR (2016b), in 1990, there were only 86 women in the career employee category, constituting 13% of the total number of 554 diplomats in that category. In the consular and expert officer category, there were 93 women, constituting 23% of the total of 400. While the number and gender distribution of diplomat intake has varied greatly over the years, on average in the 1990–2015 period, 29% of recruited career employees and 39% of recruited consular and expert officers have been female (DD-HR 2016c). While these figures still fall short of gender balance, as a result of this more balanced recruitment pattern, women have come to constitute 26% of career employees and 36% of consular and expert officers (DD-HR 2015), amounting overall to 31.2%.

The representation of women in ambassadorial rank has also improved rapidly in the 2000s. As of 2008, Turkey had 166 ambassadors, out of which only 16 were females, making the female ambassador share 9% (Başbakanlık 2008). By 2014, however, the number of total ambassadors increased significantly to 227 due to the Turkish MFA's expansion strategy. A higher proportion of these expanded ambassadorial posts were granted to women, and as a result the number of female ambassadors rose to 31 and the share to 13.65% (DD-HR 2015).[3] The most recent data obtained from the DD-HR (2016d) indicate a total of 39 female ambassadors.

A second notable gender-based pattern is in the gender distribution of diplomats in different categories of receiving countries. As Towns and Niklasson note in Chap. 2, not all ambassadorial posts are of equal weight in terms of prestige. Postings to countries which are more powerful in terms of their economic and military status are more prestigious than others. One possible way in which gender inequality manifests itself in diplomacy is the posting of women to less prestigious missions. When data on the current postings of Turkey's female ambassadors (DD-HR 2016d) are analysed according to the military and economic ranks of the receiving countries, a similar pattern emerges. As shown in Table 5.3, Turkey's

Table 5.3 Numbers of Turkish female ambassadorial postings made to groups of receiving countries divided by military and GDP rank and ratio of postings in each group to total postings (2016)

Military rank	**Group 1: (1–27)**	**Group 2: (28–53)**	**Group 3: (54–80)**	**Group 4: (81–107)**	**Group 5: (108–134)**	**Centre**	**IO**	**Others**	**Total**
Number	0	4	7	6	1	16	1	4	39
Ratio	0%	10%	18%	15%	3%	41%	3%	10%	
GDP rank	**Group 1: (1–38)**	**Group 2: (39–77)**	**Group 3: (78–116)**	**Group 4: (117–154)**	**Group 5: (155–192)**	**Centre**	**IO**	**Others**	**Total**
Number	3	3	10	5	0	16	1	1	39
Ratio	8%	8%	26%	13%	0%	41%	3%	3%	

Note: Data for military and GDP rank and the country groupings are adopted from Niklasson (Chap. 3). Others include countries where no data are reported in military rank and GDP rank. Turkey's representations in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are included in the others category. Turkey does not have a representation in the Republic of Cyprus. IOs stands for International Organisations.

current female ambassadorial postings tend to concentrate in countries that are generally ranked in the middle in terms of their military and economic capabilities. There are no female ambassadors posted to countries ranked in the top 1/5th militarily, and only 3 out of 39 female ambassadors are posted to countries ranked in the top 1/5th economically. This analysis confirms the Turkish female ambassador Sumru Noyan's words that, even though there is an increase in the number of female diplomats in recent years, female ambassadors are still not appointed to critical posts (Yinanç 2010).

However, when data on the postings of all diplomatic staff (DD-HR 2015) are subjected to a similar analysis, no discernible tendency to cluster women in receiving countries of lower significance emerges. As indicated in Table 5.4, women make up 26.3% and 27.9% of all Turkish diplomatic staff posted to Group 1 countries in terms of military and economic rank, respectively. These proportions do not change significantly in countries of lower military and economic rank, except in the group of lowest-ranked countries.

Ambassador Yildiz (2016), the male head of the DD-HR, indicates that they recruit both male and female diplomats on the basis of their ability and willingness to work in any geography and culture. However, he also acknowledges that the DD-HR takes some factors in the receiving countries into account in assigning female diplomats to foreign missions. The

Table 5.4 Number of total Turkish diplomatic staff sent to groups of receiving countries divided by military and GDP rank and share of female diplomats in each group (2016)

Military rank	**Group 1: rank 1–27**	**Group 2: rank 28–53**	**Group 3: rank 54–80**	**Group 4: rank 81–107**	**Group 5: rank 108–134**
Total diplomatic staff	460	223	168	107	44
% Women diplomats	26.30%	29.15%	28.57%	25.23%	15.91%
GDP rank	**Group 1: rank 1–38**	**Group 2: rank 39–77**	**Group 3: rank 78–116**	**Group 4: rank 117–154**	**Group 5: rank 155–192**
Total diplomatic staff	563	267	165	102	14
% Women diplomats	27.89%	23.22%	30.30%	23.53%	7.14%

first is gender norms. Yildiz (2016) explains that in order to obtain the maximum benefit from the diplomatic staff, they need to be present and active in the field and not confined to the offices of the missions, meet visiting delegations, conduct talks at the Foreign Ministry, and such. If gender norms in receiving countries prevent female diplomats from engaging in such activities, then those countries are considered less suitable for the assignment of female diplomats.

We also find that Turkish female diplomats and ambassadors are overall more likely to be assigned to missions in countries with higher levels of gender equality. Table 5.5 indicates the distribution of all female ambassadorial postings (DD-HR 2016d; DD-HR 2016e)—starting with the posting of Turkey's first female ambassador in 1982 and to the present—to receiving countries divided by gender equality rank. As can be seen, 29% of the MFA's female ambassadorial postings have been to countries currently ranked in the top 20% in terms of gender equality, and 55% have been to countries in the top 40%. Only 7 female ambassadors have ever been assigned to countries currently ranked in the lowest 20% in the history of the MFA (DD-HR 2016d).

When data on the postings of all diplomatic staff (DD-HR 2016a) are analysed in terms of the gender equality rankings of receiving countries, we observe a distributional pattern similar to ambassadorial postings. As Table 5.6 indicates, the percentages of female diplomats in countries ranked higher in terms of gender equality are significantly higher than the percentages in lower-ranked countries. These findings seem to corroborate Ambassador Yildiz's (2016) remarks about the importance of gender norms of the receiving countries in the decisions made about ambassador postings.

Table 5.5 Numbers of Turkish female ambassadorial postings made to groups of receiving countries divided by gender equality rank and ratio of postings in each group to total postings (2016)

	Group 1: 1–31	*Group 2: 32–62*	*Group 3: 63–93*	*Group 4: 94–124*	*Group 5: 125–155*	*IO*	*Others*	*Total*
Number	24	21	11	9	7	5	5	82
% Women	29%	26%	13%	11%	9%	6%	6%	100%

Note: Gender equality rank is determined according to United Nations Development Program's Gender Inequality Index (GII). The 155 countries ranked have been divided by authors into five groups with equal number of countries. Group 1 indicates the most gender equal countries and Group 5 the most gender-unequal ones. Others include countries where no data are reported for GII

Another factor, which affects gender-based assignment choices according to Ambassador Yildiz (2016), is the security situation of the receiving country. It appears from his remarks that female diplomats are less likely to be appointed to countries with high security risks. In countries with civil war and conflict, Turkish missions are organised as compounds, where diplomats live and work in the same place. According to Yildiz (2016), this is not a suitable setting for a female diplomat, yet he notes that a female diplomat has once been assigned to the compound mission in Kabul.

How paternalistic attitudes towards women in the Ministry and Turkish society constrain the posting of female diplomats to countries with higher security risk is well illustrated in an incident recounted by Yildiz (2016). He once assigned a female diplomat to the mission in Addis Ababa, which he considers to be one of the most suitable postings for female diplomats in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, the female diplomat experienced an attack in the field and suffered serious injuries to her hand. He notes that afterwards, he faced criticism for assigning a female diplomat to an unsafe location, even though he is certain that the same attack could have happened in the USA. He also believes that it would not be such a big issue if the diplomat was male.

In discussing patterns of gender-based assignments in the Turkish MFA, Yildiz (2016) also indicates that female diplomats are more likely to be assigned to representations at international organisations (IOs). According to Yildiz, this is because international organisations provide more sterile environments where female diplomats can demonstrate their issue-based competences and diplomatic skills without having to confront the challenges of the field. Indeed, as indicated in Table 5.6, female diplomats make up 31% of all Turkish diplomatic staff posted to IOs, and this is the

Table 5.6 Number of Turkish diplomatic staff sent to groups of receiving countries divided by gender equality rank and share of female diplomats in each group (2016)

	Group 1: 1–31	*Group 2: 32–62*	*Group 3: 63–93*	*Group 4: 94–124*	*Group 5: 125–155*	*IO*	*Others*	*Total*
Total	419	317	114	112	100	132	84	1278
% Women	28.88%	27.44%	28.07%	21.43%	17.00%	31.06%	26.19%	26.92%

Note: Others include countries where no data is reported for gender inequality index

highest percentage of female representation within the different categories of countries grouped above in terms of military, economic, and gender equality rankings. This pattern of overrepresentation is similar to that found in Japan (Chap. 7). However, Table 5.5 shows that female ambassadors have been assigned only to 5 IOs, and currently there is only one female ambassadorial posting to an IO (see Table 5.3).

5.4 Navigating Gender Structures in the Turkish MFA

In memoirs and interviews, female ambassadors of Turkey highlight how gender structures in the MFA intersect with patriarchal norms in Turkish society. In particular, patriarchal norms about gender roles in building and maintaining a family disadvantage women in Turkish diplomacy. Female ambassador Sumru Noyan recounts that she was asked during the recruitment interview: 'This job is not suitable for married women. You are not going to get married, are you?' This interaction confirmed to her that in Turkey "being a woman and making a career in diplomacy [was] seen incompatible." (Yinanç 2010)

As a result, the challenges of work-life balance fall disproportionately on the shoulders of female diplomats. According to female diplomat Hüner Tuncer (2007: 22–23), male diplomats are quickly able to establish families, usually before their first foreign mission assignments, while for female diplomats, coupling their career with family life poses difficult challenges. Reflecting the gendered societal norms about family roles, spouses of male diplomats are more willing to follow their partners in foreign mission assignments and perform the role of a diplomatic spouse. In contrast, the non-diplomatic spouses of female diplomats are often unwilling to leave or take a break from their Turkey-based careers during their partner's foreign mission assignments. According to Tuncer, those non-diplomatic partners who follow the female diplomat in foreign mission assignments usually cannot adjust to the role of diplomatic spouse and fall into depression. The difficulties that female diplomats face in foreign missions lead them to prefer postings in the centre. The head of DD-HR, Ambassador Yildiz (2016), has also indicated that female diplomats with non-diplomatic partners tend to prefer longer stays in the centre than the usual two years in the centre and four years in foreign mission posting policy of the Ministry.

Marriages to male diplomats provide a more convenient arrangement for female diplomats, and therefore married diplomatic couples are quite

numerous in the Turkish MFA. Until 1998, the MFA did not allow married diplomatic couples to serve in the same mission or in different missions in the same city. Therefore, female diplomats have indicated that married diplomatic couples face long and periodic periods of separation (e.g. Tuncer 2007: 22–23), which leads many female diplomats to resign or take extended leaves of absence (Ergin 1998). The 1998 decree allowed but did not guarantee the posting of married diplomats to the same mission. Many female diplomats, including Turkey's sixth female ambassador Inal, fourth female ambassador Soysal, and first female ambassador to Africa, Ugdul, were posted to locations distant from their partners. According to female ambassador Sedef Yavuzalp, the assignment of diplomatic couples to the same mission or to different missions in the same city "demonstrates the importance that our Ministry attributes to family union and female diplomats and [has made it possible] for many women to advance to the highest ranks both in the centre and in foreign missions" (Anadolu Ajansı 2016). Ambassador Yildiz, the head of DD-HR, also confirms that greater care is now being shown to assigning married diplomats to the same mission than before. However, he also underlines that there are limits because the presence of couples confounds the diplomatic hierarchy especially in smaller missions. What is also not clear is how being appointed to the same diplomatic mission would affect the promotion prospects of the female and male diplomats if they were of equal rank and seniority (Ergin 1998).

Even when married diplomatic couples are accommodated in this fashion, patriarchal norms about family roles continue to disadvantage female diplomats in relation to their male colleagues. This is indicated clearly in the memoirs of Melahat Baydur, who was both a diplomatic wife and is the mother of Turkey's second female ambassador Solmaz Ünaydın. On the one hand, Baydur proudly considers her role as a diplomatic wife a career and underscores the importance of the responsibilities that diplomatic spouses perform in foreign mission assignments. She notes that the expression "behind every successful man there is a woman" applies most strongly in the diplomatic profession (Baydur 1998: 14), and that she "started [her] diplomatic career at the highest level when, shortly after [their] marriage, [her] husband was appointed as an ambassador to Bonn" (Baydur 1998: 13). On the other hand, reflecting on the experiences of her own daughter, Baydur underscores that female diplomats are unlikely to get the same support from their spouses:

> In our time, our husbands used to do their formal duties, while we, as women, used to run the social aspects of their business. However, our female ambassadors have to do both their formal business, while they also have to organise the never ending official receptions, tea parties and other social activities, by thinking of every little detail … This does not change if they are married, and their husbands are also diplomats. (Baydur 1998: 170)

In addition to patriarchal norms in Turkish society, gender structures in the MFA intersect with Turkey's status in international society. In interviews, diplomats make clear associations between the status of female diplomats in the MFA and Turkey's status in European international society. For example, in an interview given in 1998, Turkey's first female ambassador Filiz Dinçmen underlined her satisfaction with the increasing numbers of female diplomats and ambassadors by noting that "today, in our ministry, the female civil servant ratio is above many Western countries, for example Austria" (Ergin 1998). Female ambassador Şule Soysal attributed this success to the republican regime and Atatürk's reforms (Ergin 1998). It is possible that professional concerns about maintaining a particular image of Turkey, coupled with the fact that negative pre-conceptions about Turkey's identity often revolve around the status of women, keep female diplomats from being vocal about gender-based discrimination issues in the MFA.

At the same time, it appears that the association of the status of female diplomats in the MFA with Turkey's status in European international society also leads the MFA to attach greater importance to the visibility of Turkish diplomatic women. This parallels the symbolic importance attached to the participation of Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni as a woman to gain legitimacy in the UN, described in Chap. 10. Ambassador Fatih Yıldız, the head of DD-HR, proudly underscores that in terms of gender distribution, the Turkish MFA is leading in its region (i.e. Middle East) and the share of female diplomats in the Turkish MFA is in line more with Western countries. However, he anticipates that if asked, Western diplomats would probably guess that the gender distribution of the Turkish MFA is more uneven than it really is. According to Yildiz (2016), this is an effect of certain established misconceptions about Islam and about Muslim-dominant countries like Turkey. The growing visibility of women in Turkey's foreign missions is important for eradicating such misconceptions.

The predominant way in which female diplomats navigate through gender-based structures in the Turkish MFA is by "leaning in." Leaning

in in the MFA involves downplaying the importance of gender differences and working harder than male colleagues. In her memoirs, Hüner Tuncer states that "our superiors did not treat us any differently than our male colleagues. In other words, males and females were not assigned to different duties because of their gender, and it was not the case that we were assigned to easier duties because we were females" (Tuncer 2007: 11). Strongly reacting to the question itself, Veka İnal, Turkey's sixth female ambassador firmly states that "male-female distinction is something that I never felt in my professional life. Neither was I made to feel it, nor did I perceive it. You should do whatever is necessary to come to certain ranks in the profession" (see Ergin 1998). Likewise, female ambassador Sumru Noyan, noted that "I have never been positively or negatively discriminated against because I was a woman" (Yinanç 2010). While stating that they did not face any discrimination, Turkish female diplomats acknowledge that they shouldered the burden of proof in demonstrating their professional competence. Sumru Noyan, for example, stated that "my other [female] colleagues and I had to prove that we could be equally capable and competent. So we worked much harder" (Yinanç 2010). During a period when a Foreign Minister opposed to working with women was in office in the 1970s, Noyan indicates that "Some of my female colleagues resigned. I was stubborn. I continued" (Yinanç 2010). While most female diplomats at the time were either single or without kids, Noyan indicates that she adopted the motto of "I can have it all," got married, and gave birth to two sons (Yinanç 2010).

While many of her female colleagues downplayed the importance of gender in the MFA, Turkey's second female ambassador, Solmaz Ünaydın, has chosen to be more explicit about the difficulties she faced. In an interview she gave in 2006, she drew on her own experience to underline how the MFA limited the opportunities for women diplomats. She noted that when she entered the diplomatic service in 1967, female candidates were subjected to longer interviews at the recruitment stage in order to limit the number of female candidates entering the profession (Pamir 2006). She further argued that it took her much longer to be promoted to the rank of ambassador in comparison to her male colleagues, and that she had to confront negative campaigning against herself, which she believed would not have happened if she was a man (Pamir 2006). Solmaz Ünaydın, however, agrees with her colleagues that the appropriate strategy to adopt is leaning in. She noted in that interview that women diplomats tend to be more successful, because they have to invest an extraordinary effort to survive in a male-dominated world (Pamir 2006).

There is one reported incident of women diplomats taking collective action, to change the foreign mission assignment policies of the MFA. Female ambassador Sumru Noyan indicates that jointly with her female colleagues, they worked in the early 1990s to prevent legislation that would prohibit the husband of a female head of mission from working in the same city (Yinanç 2010).

Finally, the accounts of Turkish female ambassadors also indicate that women could advance in Turkish diplomacy not by challenging the gender norms of diplomacy but, rather, by adopting masculine norms and practices. For example, in a magazine article, Turkey's first female diplomat, Adile Ayda, was praised as giving a difficult time to male diplomats at the negotiation table. She herself acknowledged that diplomacy is a generally male profession, by commenting that "now, I am trying to manage being male and female at the same time" (Köknar 1962). Likewise, masculine practices helped Sumru Noyan surpass the difficulties she experienced as the highest ranking female official at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna in 1994. When her "male colleagues showed resistance to working with [her]," Noyan recounts that she made deliberate efforts to penetrate the men's world at the UN: "I had to find a common language with my male colleagues. This is when I started to follow football matches," she said. Luckily, her stay in Vienna coincided with the Turkish team Galatasaray's European championship, and Noyan hung the club's flag in her UN office (Yinanç 2010).

Additionally, in certain instances, Turkish female diplomats choose to invoke the advantages of their gender identity for certain diplomatic tasks. In doing so, they simultaneously reproduce essentialised understandings about womanhood and motherhood. For example, in the Directorate General of Consular Affairs, where the majority of diplomatic staff are women (Hürriyet 2016), second secretary Emel Akan stressed in a published interview that "[their] sensitivity due to being a mother and being a woman makes them more responsive" to issues that arise in consular affairs (Hürriyet 2016).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter represents the first attempt to systematically analyse the position and role of women in Turkish diplomacy. Three key findings have emerged from this analysis. The first is that apart from the formal positions in the Turkish MFA that women have begun to occupy in growing numbers in recent decades, there is a much longer historical legacy of informal

diplomatic roles played by Ottoman/Turkish women. Second, the gender distribution of Turkey's diplomatic corps across rank and foreign missions manifests some gender-based patterns. Third, despite their growing numbers, women diplomats in the MFA continue to face structural barriers that emerge at the intersection of gender structures in the MFA and patriarchal norms in Turkish society. These barriers shape the career paths and the professional strategies of women diplomats in significant ways.

Notes

1. This all-male institution graduated its first female student in 1933.
2. Promotion to ambassadorial rank takes a minimum of 18 years.
3. Towns and Niklasson have analysed the number of ambassadors in Turkey's foreign representations, not including those in the centre due to the rotation system. According to their figures, as of 2014, Turkey had 121 ambassadors working in foreign representations and only 15 of them were females, making the female share 11.5% (see Towns and Niklasson, Chap. 2).

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CHAPTER 6

Brazilian Female Diplomats and the Struggle for Gender Equality

Rogério de Souza Farias and Gessica Fernanda do Carmo

6.1 Introduction

In 2014, 203 Brazilian female diplomats came together and wrote a letter with a 14-point reform programme to the head of Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores—MRE*). The first demand was a research agenda to understand the obstacles to the career of female diplomats and a more equal work environment. Other demands included the creation of an ombudsman office to review harassment cases; more flexible working hours; a room for breastfeeding and childcare; more support on the theme of health and safety, particularly before being posted abroad; a more family-friendly posting system, including at least six months of notice before a new posting; language training for diplomats and their families; support for spouses and dependents to find jobs abroad; and better planning to replace diplomats who need to take parental leave abroad—by law men have 20 days and women 6 months.

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Their struggle led to the creation of the Management Committee on Gender and Race (MCGR). Since then, the MCGR has been active in promoting the agenda of gender and racial equality in Itamaraty. It created the first training course on race and gender in diplomacy and selected several representatives in different branches of the organisation to participate in its activities. In 2015, members of an informal Facebook group of female diplomats collected more than 100 reports of moral and sexual harassment. They took the cases to Itamaraty's Secretary General. He welcomed the initiative but worried about the issue being discussed outside the institution. The matter, however, reached the press, with several articles discussing the theme—most of them criticising the organisation. Itamaraty fought back with a press release, stating they were isolated cases. Tellingly, representatives from the informal Facebook group were not consulted in the crafting of this response (Alecanstro 2015; Gallo 2015; MRE 2015; Spektor 2015).

This case underscores the activism of female diplomats in taking responsibility for changing their professional environment and points to how the role of women in the Brazilian diplomatic corps has changed since 1918, when the first woman (Maria José de Castro) started to officially work for Itamaraty. This chapter will focus on the challenges of that process. First, we will introduce a brief history of how the organisation tackled the issue of women in its workforce. The second and main part of the chapter will analyse where the men and the women are in the hierarchical structure of Itamaraty, exploring the application patterns, career paths and postings. This contribution is part of a broader research agenda on Brazilian diplomats. It is based on a database with information of 2601 diplomats who entered the organisation from 1902 to 2010 and retired or stayed in the organisation until 2015. We retrieved the data from several sources, particularly the *Diário Oficial da União* (from 1902 to 2015), *Relatórios do Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (from 1902 to 1952), *Anuários do Instituto Rio Branco* (from 1951 to 2013) and *Almanaques de Pessoal do Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (from 1918 to 2010). All sources are available at Itamaraty's libraries in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro and at the *Biblioteca Nacional* headquarters. The data comprise date and place of birth, educational background, recruitment process, gender, previous professional experience, promotions in the career, postings abroad, work experience in Brazil and how and when the career ended. Most of our analysis here will be directed to those who entered in Itamaraty after 1954—the year women were permanently allowed to apply for the entrance exams. All tables and quantitative data from this chapter are from these sources, unless otherwise noted.

6.2 1918–1954: A Nonlinear History of Advances and Setbacks

When Maria José de Castro succeeded in her exams in 1918, Itamaraty had three branches—diplomatic, consular and home office (*Oficial de Secretaria*). From 1918 to 1937, the year before the three careers merged into one, 87 women worked at the Itamaraty Palace in Rio de Janeiro. What they did had the marks of the gender divisions of that time. Women rapidly filled the ranks of typists, secretaries and telephone operators. Several women entered the *Oficial de Secretaria* career. In 1931, this career merged with the consular branch and almost all women became consuls. Consular activities had less prestige than those of the diplomatic career, but it permitted women to be posted abroad, something that improved their visibility and led an increasing number of women to apply for the exams (see Table 6.1).

Eleven women succeeded in four different exams for the *Oficial de Secretaria* and consular careers from 1930 to 1937. In three of them, they managed to have a better rate of success than their male colleagues. This positive development did not last, however. Increased competition for jobs in the public sector during an unprecedented economic crisis in Brazil resulted in setbacks. A group of male students asked the government to "regulate" the role of women in the public service. The rise of authoritarianism, moreover, empowered conservative groups and halted the advance of women in the labour market. The excuse was to "preserve their honour," beginning with the prohibition from working in night shifts. Another measure was the regulation of female employees' geographical movement. According to the department in charge of the civil service, "it would be inadequate for young ladies to constantly move from one place to another" (A mulher no serviço 1940; Educação e ensino 1941).

Table 6.1 Female and male performance in entrance exams for the Itamaraty, 1930–1937

Year	*Candidates (A)*		*Approved (B)*		*Rate of success (B/A*100)*	
	Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male (%)*	*Female (%)*
1930	21	6	4	1	19.05	16.67
1934	55	8	7	2	12.73	25.00
1935	55	11	5	5	9.09	45.45
1937	69	15	7	3	10.14	20.00

With increasing constraints on women's spatial mobility and labour rights, it was only a matter of time before their advancement in Itamaraty was attacked. This happened in an unorthodox move. In 1938, the existing consular and the diplomatic branches merged into a unified diplomatic branch. The decision was a double-edged sword. Suddenly, all women already working as consuls were transferred to the new diplomatic career. But, heeding to the pressures from conservatives, the career was closed for more women.

After a protracted legal and political battle, the prohibition was lifted in 1954 and women could finally apply for the entrance exam again.[1] But the victory was not complete. Several regulations had negative effects on the recruitment process and on the career of female diplomats. Since the 1930s, for example, if a female diplomat married a colleague, one of them had to resign—in all cases we know, this meant the wife. This rule changed and, in 1966, a decree stated that if a diplomat was posted abroad, his/her spouse would take a leave of absence instead of being dismissed. In 1985, Itamaraty lifted this measure, but the salary of the couple would be capped abroad, a restriction that would end only in 1996 (see Table 6.2).

The end of formal legal barriers soon revealed that the professional diplomatic ethos itself had a gendered bias. As we will show below, women from this second generation (1954–1985) struggled in their work environment. They had to work more, display more professionalism and face worse work conditions than their male colleagues. Even in 2002, a Brazilian female ambassador complained that despite legal advances women still suffered in the career because of prejudice (Quintella 2002; Bandeira 2011).

In the following section, we will present quantitative and qualitative data that will show the advances and setbacks of Brazilian female diplomats. We believe the case shows how the end of formal barriers is just the first step in the quest for gender equality. Before we continue, however, we should point out how the Brazilian Foreign Service is peculiar among Latin American countries.

The first aspect to underscore is the long tradition of exams for the diplomatic corps. After 1918 it became a regular strategy for recruitment, despite the competition with the traditional patronage system. The Brazilian diplomatic academy (*Instituto Rio Branco*) was created in 1945 and after 1949 no diplomat was hired without succeeding in public exams. A second aspect is the nature of the diplomatic profession. As a response

Table 6.2 "Firsts" for women in Brazilian diplomacy, 1918–1996

Year	*Event*
1918	Maria José de Castro becomes the first woman in MRE.
1931	The *Oficial de Secretaria* and the Consular careers merged. As a result, women could be posted abroad.
1934	Zorayma de Almeida Rodrigues is posted in the Brazilian Consulate at Liverpool.
1938	Beata Vettori Esteves is posted in the Brazilian Embassy at Buenos Aires, becoming the first woman to officially work in a diplomatic post.
1938	The Consular career merges with the diplomatic career. Women already in the organisation became diplomats, but henceforward only men could apply to a position. It also introduced the "one federal employee per couple" provision. If husband and wife were government employees, one of them had to quit.
1945	The diplomatic career is opened for women.
1946	The diplomatic career is (once again) closed for women.
1948	Vera Regina do Amaral Sauer becomes the first female diplomat to head a consular post (Philadelphia).
1949	Odette de Carvalho becomes the first female chief of cabinet of MRE.
1954	The diplomatic career is reopened for women.
1956	Odette de Carvalho becomes the first woman to reach *Ministra de Primeira Classe*, the highest rank in the career. Five months later she becomes head of the Political Department, one of the most prestigious positions in the organisation.
1961	Odette de Carvalho becomes the first female diplomat to head a diplomatic post abroad as an ambassador.
1966	Decree 69 states that if a diplomat is posted abroad, his/her wife/husband would take a leave of absence. This is an advance if compared to the previous situation where marriage meant resignation. Now, the career would just freeze.
1985	If husband and wife are diplomats, they can be posted abroad together, instead of one taking a leave. One would have a salary reduction, however (usually the woman).
1996	Husband and wife diplomats can be posted abroad together without salary reductions.

to political patronage, the career was shielded from outside pressure. As a result, it is almost impossible to lay off diplomats, even in cases of blatant misconduct—like sexual harassment. In addition, the career offers great salary, retirement plan and other perks. The result is a system in which people enter in the career and usually remain until retirement or death. This means that it is difficult to learn anything from differences in retention rates. Suffering gender discrimination can be a silent predicament in the Brazilian Foreign Service.

6.3 1954–Present: Slow Advances

One way to approach the situation for men and women in Brazilian professional diplomacy is to look at gender patterns in the entrance exam to the Foreign Service.[2] Men have always been the majority of candidates. But the proportion of women changed in the late 1960s, going from 15% to 40%—a level of participation that remains until today. So why are women only 40% of the candidates for the Foreign Service exams? One potential explanation is found outside of Itamaraty. Brazilian society, even in the wealthy sector from which diplomats are recruited, expects women to perform the lion's share of domestic activities. According to a recent study, 69% of Brazilian women with a university degree are responsible for taking care of elderly relatives; 23% of their annual income is spent in this activity (Bruschini 2000; Hewlett and Rashid 2011; Ribeiro and Marinho 2012). In a career demanding recurrent travels and long stays abroad, the incentives for bright young women to apply for the diplomatic career exams are probably affected by their care-taking expectations.

Another potential explanation concerns the gendered image of the profession. In history books, the diplomat is represented as an older, white male. Itamaraty continues to project that image. As an illustration, we studied the first frame of 120 videos posted on Youtube by Itamaraty in 2015 (MRE 2016). Only 14 of them displayed the image of female diplomats (12%). One might assume that this reflects the reality of the organisation. But this would be wrong, as women currently hold 25% of all management positions and make up 20% of all top three stages of the career.[3] The organisation, therefore, downplays the role of women in social media. While making up 40% of the candidates for the exam, they only make up 21% of the diplomats accepted into the Foreign Service. This is a stark contrast to the cases of Sweden and even to the United States presented in the previous chapters. What could explain the discrepancy? One explanation might be found in the nature of the tests. The literature on gender and education, particularly in college admissions testing, has presented evidence on how women might be more risk-averse than men, something that could affect their performance in standardised tests (Linn et al. 1987; Wainer and Steinberg 1992; Bridgeman and Lewis 1994; Hyde and Kling 2001; Willingham and Cole 2013; Hiss and Franks 2014; Smith 2015; Letukas 2016).

We now turn to gender patterns among the men and women hired between 1954 and 2010. First, male and female recruits were on average the same age

(26 years and 27 years, respectively). Men, on average, performed slightly better in the exams. When we look at the academic background of each group, the situation is different. Before 1994, 78.31% of women attended university while only 72.78% of men did.[4] Women had a more diverse academic background, with an important group with degrees in languages and literature (19.28%). Men with university degrees, on the other hand, came overwhelmingly from law school (42.60%), with economics being a distant second (7.86%). After 1994, both groups had similar profiles, but women had international relations degrees to a greater extent than men.

Another difference is from what academic institutions they graduated. Female diplomats came from a narrow number of universities, the majority of which from Rio de Janeiro, Brasília and São Paulo—cities where the best preparatory "cram courses" for the career are located. The concentration worsened in the 1990s. After 1994, for instance, 25.28% of female recruits came from the University of Brasília—the same city where the diplomatic academy is located (13.29% for men). This situation might be related to a general pattern of constraints in female spatial mobility. Although there is no hard data on this topic, it might be the case that women face difficulties in moving to cities where they can adequately prepare themselves for the exam after graduating from university.

Brazilian diplomats work in an environment where education is highly valued. A great number pursue studies in MBA and Ph.D. programmes in Brazil and abroad. Twenty per cent of female diplomats who entered Itamaraty before 1994 attained a higher degree—almost the same as men. After 1994, however, they surpassed men with 41.67% against 35.11% (see Table 6.3).

We now turn to an examination of gender patterns in the careers of Brazilian diplomats. Studies on the labour market usually highlight how the nature of work and promotion track is generally gender-differentiated. In technology firms, men usually write code while women manage projects; in law firms, men usually prospect and interact with clients, while women take care of cases; in universities, men are proportionally more focused on research while women take care of administrative committees and the well-being of students. In all these cases, men perform activities correlated with higher visibility and promotion (Ibarra 2012; Williams 2014; Moschkovich and Almeida 2015). In previous chapters, Sylvia Bashevkin and Birgitta Niklasson presented how women in the American and Swedish Foreign Services perform activities with less impact and prestige. Does Brazilian diplomacy present similar features?

Table 6.3 Diplomats with an MBA, MA or Ph.D. by gender and period of accession to Itamaraty, 1954–2010

Area	*Before 1994*		*After 1994*	
	Female (%)	*Male (%)*	*Female (%)*	*Male (%)*
None	80.12	79.04	58.33	64.89
International relations	6.02	4.78	12.22	11.40
Law	0.60	2.51	8.33	4.86
Management and public policy	4.22	2.39	5.00	3.80
Political science	1.81	2.62	2.78	1.52
Others	1.20	1.25	6.67	4.41
Languages and literature	1.81	1.37	1.67	1.52
Economics	1.20	3.87	2.22	3.80
Social sciences	1.81	1.14	1.67	1.82
History	1.20	1.03	1.11	1.98

Table 6.4 Distribution of assignments by gender and position in Itamaraty, 1954–2015 (for diplomats who entered the Foreign Service from 1954 to 2010)

Position	*Female (%)*	*Male (%)*
Advisory bodies, the minister's and secretary general's cabinets	6.74	8.86
Undersecretaries	6.68	7.27
Departments	14.39	13.90
Divisions, coordinating bodies and others	72.19	69.97

To answer this question, we need to delve into the activities each diplomat performs and where they are posted. Table 6.4 displays the distribution of assignments by gender at four different levels of Itamaraty's hierarchy in Brasília. The positions that enjoy greater prestige are the minister's cabinet, the secretary general's cabinet and high-level advisories bodies. At the pinnacle of the organisation, they formulate Brazilian foreign policy and have oversight over all administrative apparatuses. Below, we have all undersecretaries and their offices. They are the connection between the minister's and the secretary general's cabinets and all departments, divisions and coordination units (the least important offices). Over all, there is a trend of male overrepresentation in the more prestigious positions (advisory bodies, the minister and secretary general's cabinet and the undersecretaries), whereas there is a male underrepresentation in the less prestigious positions (departments and divisions).

Table 6.5 Distribution of time spent in assignments outside of Itamaraty and regular activities in the organisation (for diplomats who entered the career between 1954 and 2010)

Gender	*Regular activities (%)*	*External activities (%)*
Female	97.64	2.36
Male	95.37	4.63

Receiving an external assignment outside the Itamaraty to advise international organisations, other branches of the government and state and municipal administrations is another kind of prestigious activity. Such external assignments furthermore help the diplomat with faster promotions within the MRE. These coveted assignments are difficult to attain. To do so, one needs access to powerful political networks outside the organisation. We have data on the average distribution of time spent in these activities by gender and it is important to note that female diplomats are appointed to these prestigious external assignments to a significantly lesser degree than men (see Table 6.5).

Diplomats spend only part of their career at Brasília—much of a diplomat's work is performed abroad. The analysis thus turns next to patterns in where men and women are posted abroad. A study of American female executives showed that women receive fewer offers to move abroad as a consequence of the belief that they are not willing to move (Groysberg and Abrahams 2014). Brazilian female diplomats also spend less time in foreign postings than men. Women spent on average almost 55% of their career abroad, while men spent on average approximately 60%.

The Brazilian diplomatic network of missions, embassies and consulates rose from 97 in 1950 to 212 in 2014. A hierarchy has developed in terms of the prestige of each post for the diplomatic career. Most prestigious is a small cluster of posts characterised by interesting activities, high-visibility tasks and good networking opportunities—informally called the "Elizabeth Arden Circuit" by Brazilian diplomats—including all multilateral missions and the embassies in Buenos Aires, Washington, Rome, Paris, London, Berlin, Lisbon, Tokyo and Vatican City. Interestingly, as we show in the tables below, the postings of male and female diplomats did not differ significantly in terms of prestige. Even if we break down all postings by region, the experience of the two groups was not that different. This is a situation in contrast to the one presented by Niklasson and

Table 6.6 Number and proportion of postings of female and male Brazilian diplomats who entered Itamaraty from 1954 to 2010

	Female	*Male*
Elizabeth Arden	29.42% (1120)	28.93% (6619)
Others	70.58% (2236)	71.07% (13,957)

Table 6.7 Number and proportion of postings abroad of female and male Brazilian diplomats who entered Itamaraty from 1954 to 2010, by region

	Female	*Male*
Africa, Asia and Middle East	12.97% (286)	16.11% (2077)
Latin America	55.69% (1228)	53.80% (6938)
North America and Europe	31.34% (691)	30.09% (3881)

Robertson on the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this volume (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7).

Studies on women in the labour market highlight that women tend to take more leaves than men and the negative effects on their careers. This can be seen in our database. From 1954 to 2010, we have a total of 161 licenses to leave distributed between 373 female and 1617 male diplomats. These do not cover health and parental leaves. The result is similar to what the literature finds in other work environments: an overwhelming proportion of leaves in the female group—0.20 licenses to leave per woman against 0.05 for men. The median of their duration is also different—three years for women against two years for men. But we should add that female diplomats had to take mandatory leaves from the 1960s until 1985 if their husbands were diplomats and were posted abroad. That explains why women took 45.54% of all leaves from 1954 to 1985 (they were 14.76% of all who entered the organisation in the period) and 41.67% after 1985 (21.45% of all diplomats from 1985 to 2010).

One aspect of utmost importance in observing the gendered structure of the diplomatic career in Brazil is the promotion track. As in other government bureaucratic structures, the diplomatic career has a pyramidal structure with proportionally few members at the top. From the bottom up we have six levels: Third Secretary, Second Secretary, First Secretary, Counsellor, Second Class Minister and First Class Minister.

Using the data of those who entered Itamaraty between 1954 and 2010 and already left the organisation (528 cases, 64 of them women), we

can detect how different the career of women in Brazilian diplomacy is. Two-thirds of all women left when they were in the first four stages of the career; only 19.70% of them managed to reach the final step of the career (First Class Minister) before retiring. Forty-five per cent of men reached the pinnacle. There is no question we are facing a classic glass ceiling. The constant "leaking" in the promotion pipeline for women means that besides being a minority at the beginning of the career, fewer of them managed to be in a position to change the organisational culture towards a more gender-friendly environment. This situation is similar to other foreign services, particularly Sweden and the United States—see Niklasson and Robertson's and Sylvia Bashevkin's chapters in this volume (see Fig. 6.1).

Differences between female and male diplomats in education and work experience were too small to explain the shocking differences in professional trajectories. As Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns argue in the introduction of this volume, this institutional puzzle can be explained by understanding the formal organisation in its gendered structure.

One reason might be the truncated professional life—a consequence of the number of leaves. This situation is similar to what happens in other foreign services. According to a British diplomat, "a woman who reasonably chooses to take some years away from diplomatic work to raise a family or do something else simply has less sharp-end experience. She is a rather less credible candidate for the highest jobs than a men (or woman) who has toiled at the diplomatic coal-face non-stop" (Crawford 2014).

Another explanation is related to the number of years devoted to the career. As we observed before, the median age of the Brazilian diplomat when entering the Foreign Service between the two groups was almost the same from 1954 to 2010: 26 for men and 27 for women. But if we analyse the career duration of those who already severed their ties with Itamaraty, we will detect a big difference between the two groups. The median for the men's career was 455 months (38 years), while the women's was 380.5 months (31 years) (see Fig. 6.2).

The difference might be explained by several factors. The first is the discriminatory practice that existed until 1966 which forced female diplomats who married diplomats to resign. This affected 5 of 64 women who retired in this period. The second reason is the regulation of the minimum retirement age. Brazil is one of the 49 countries in the world that apply different criteria for retiring women. Female diplomats can retire as young as 55 years old, while men need to wait at least until they are 60 years old. Research has showed that this system is pernicious



Fig. 6.1 Position of female and male Brazilian diplomats who entered the service between 1954 and 2010 in the career structure at the moment of death in duty, retirement or dismissal



Fig. 6.2 Career duration in months for female and male diplomats who entered the organisation between 1954 and 2010 and already severed their employment relationship with Itamaraty

for promoting women (World Bank 2014). It is a vicious cycle. They receive less investment to take leadership positions from their supervisors because it is expected they will not stay for long. This lack of investment ends up becoming a reason why they get frustrated and decide to retire as soon as possible.

A third aspect is the work environment itself. The organisation embraces meritocracy, and few diplomats question whether this concept may be gendered. Physical presence in the office, face-to-face interaction and personal sacrifices are highly valued as metrics of productivity and competence (French 1995; Collins and Singh 2006; Favero and Heath 2012). A central aspect is how formal work hours in Itamaraty (from 9 am to 7 pm) are an exception in the public service. Even worse, there is an informal rule—that applies particularly to the top echelon of the organisation—that diplomats have to wait for their hierarchical superior to leave in order to also withdraw. Willingness to accept the long hours are seen as signs of independence, power and a metric to measure merit—all "masculine" attributes. Those who defend a better balance between work and personal life are seen as weak, problematic, emotional and slacking (Bruschini 2000; Ribeiro and Marinho 2012).

Family sacrifice is another important aspect. The Brazilian Foreign Service has no official policy on the topic of spouse employability. There is no preparation before assignments, and spouses are left to fend for themselves to find jobs and organise their life abroad. Niklasson and Robertson showed in this book how the Swedish foreign service discussed this issue in the 1970s (see Chap. 4). In Brazil, the discussion is more recent. This is a legacy of the past, when it was expected that a spouse (woman) would have to support the professional needs of a diplomat (man) as a full-time responsibility. This framework endures, affecting particularly female diplomats, who find it difficult to convince their spouses to give up their careers in Brazil. As a 2008 study on British female diplomats stated, "it seems that it is particularly difficult for a male spouse to accompany his wife overseas. Men, to a greater extent than women, are reluctant to work in areas outside their expertise or in badly paid jobs" (Coles 2008: 139).

In sum, Brazilian female diplomats currently do not face formal obstacles in their careers. They have access to leadership positions and all posts abroad. Using data from those already retired, however, we can detect a glass ceiling—few managed to get promoted to the top, despite having almost the same professional background as their male colleagues.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the evolution of the role of women in the Brazilian diplomatic corps using two guiding questions of this volume: where are the women located and to what extent are formal and informal professional rules and practices gendered in diplomacy. We showed that women increased their participation in Brazilian diplomacy, being 21% of all graduates from the diplomatic academy after 1985. The trend, however, stagnated in the last years. If the current situation persists, it will take decades to reach parity in the career as a whole. A puzzle we found is the distance between the rate of female candidates (40%) and graduates from the diplomatic academy (21%) in the last years. We provided several hypotheses to explain this discrepancy. They all point to the role of women in Brazilian society and how the nature of the diplomatic career is framed in a gendered context.

Female diplomats had and still have better and more diversified academic background than men and do not have any particular disadvantage in terms of rank when they enter the Foreign Service—the position in the diplomatic class matters for the first round of promotions and postings. But when we looked at where Brazilian diplomats worked within the Itamaraty between 1954 and 2015, it turned out that men were proportionally assigned to more prestigious positions than women. Women also spent on average less time abroad. Interestingly, however, their experience in foreign countries was not so different from that of their colleagues in terms of region and relevance.

In all aspects presented above, the difference between men and women as candidates were not significant. So what explains the choking difficulty Brazilian female diplomats have had in rising through the hierarchy? The first was the truncated professional lives, as women took proportionally much more leave than men. The second was career duration. Women left Itamaraty much sooner than men for a variety of reasons.

Between 1954 and 2013, despite the growing number of women entering in the Foreign Service, there was no organised movement to demand reforms and counter cases of discrimination and sexual harassment. In 2013, however, as we discussed in the introduction to this chapter, an organised movement of female diplomats emerged. The availability of the Internet, their work experience and a more open environment helped shape the activism of the group. In 2014, they presented their 14-point reform proposal to the head of Itamaraty. The ground-breaking initiative tackled several problems we presented in the second part of the chapter,

but faces difficulties to be implemented. The Management Committee on Gender and Race has only consultative status and its plan of action must be approved by the minister (MRE 2014).

The situation of women in Brazilian diplomacy, in a nutshell, is much better today than it was in the past. Steady advancements led to the overturn of discriminatory rules. Nowadays, most challenges female diplomats face are not enshrined in law or internal regulations. Some diplomats—even women—voice privately that today the career is a level-playing field based on meritocracy. If you are a great professional, have good connections and work a lot, you will rise—they say. Those who embrace this discourse fail to grasp how informal rules considered neutral are, in fact, highly gendered. As Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns aptly reason in the introduction of this volume, a gendered framework of norms and relations can be reproduced by hierarchical imbalances and, as a consequence, become impervious to change. The biggest challenge for Brazilian female diplomats, therefore, is not limited to increasing their numbers in the diplomatic career, particularly at the top—there is a need to overhaul the organisational culture itself.

Notes

1. After the demise of the Estado Novo in 1945, a brief window of opportunity opened and one woman was hired. She was the only one who entered between 1938 and 1954.
2. We have data on 43 tests from 1918 to 1985 and 27 from 1986 to 2010. We used *Diário Oficial da União* as the main source on these exams.
3. We did not consider the videos in which there is no career diplomat in the first frame.
4. In 1994, Itamaraty conditioned the entrance exam to the presentation of a university degree.

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CHAPTER 7

Women in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Petrice R. Flowers

7.1 Introduction

> I firmly believe that enabling women's latent high degree of ability to blossom fully will be a driving force that puts Japan, which has had the feeling of being caught in an impasse, on a growth track once more. … My strategy features the major goal of having no less than 30 per cent of leadership positions in all areas of society filled by women by 2020—Prime Minister Abe, Speech on Growth Strategy at the Japan National Press Club April 19, 2013.
>
> –(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013)

Japan offers a sharp contrast to the trend among some states of significant growth of the number of women in the elite levels of Foreign Service. Japan has had two female foreign ministers, but they served a combined total of less than three years in office in the early 2000s. In Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as MOFA, the number of women has risen significantly in recent years. The number of women to enter the ministry on the career track—those who will be eligible for promotion to ambassador level positions—has not yet had discernible effects at the higher levels of the organisation. For instance, data from 2011 to 2015 show that

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fewer than 3% of Japan's ambassadors were women. In September 2015, there were only four female ambassadors (Brunei, Uruguay, Iceland, and Ireland) and three consuls general (Brisbane, Australia; Melbourne, Australia; and Milan, Italy) representing Japan abroad (see Table 7.2).

Until recently, foreign services around the world looked more like Japan than Sweden and the United States and the Japanese MFA did not stand out as more male-dominated than others. Today, however, the recent entry of large numbers of women into the foreign services of some countries puts MOFA in a different light, a point that is not lost on Japanese policy-makers. An increase in women diplomats is now an express goal, and MOFA boasts in its most recent Diplomatic Blue Book that 30% of all its employees are women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015).[1] In terms of gender patterns in Japanese diplomacy, one remarkable trait is Japan's appointment of at least 50% women to its diplomatic missions to the United Nations since 1995. This sets Japan apart from other countries with low overall levels of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). However, it also sets Japan apart from some of the states that generally appoint higher shares of female diplomats, as UN postings are prestigious and central to Japanese foreign policy. In the past, MOFA has been amenable to implementing global norms of participation that other, more conservative government institutions have resisted (Reimann 2003). This suggests that MOFA might be more amenable than the Ministry of Justice, for example, to international normative influences on the organisation's culture. This may help us understand what otherwise appears as a puzzling discrepancy between the high ratio of women in the UN missions and the much lower ratio in other foreign postings.

The aim of this chapter is to provide the first ever account of women in the Japanese Foreign Service. The chapter begins with a discussion of the twentieth-century entry and historical development of women in MOFA. The second section analyses the contemporary state of women in the foreign ministry, followed by a brief discussion of what Japanese female ambassadors have said about their role in diplomacy, before turning to the puzzling phenomenon of the high numbers of women in the missions to the UN. The concluding discussion provides suggestions for future research.

Before discussing the history of women at MOFA, a brief note on my sources is in order. This research is based on my own reading of archival materials in the original Japanese; these include government publications, newspapers and other texts. Tables and figures are largely based on data

from government sources including Japan's Gender Equity Bureau and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs online archived web pages. The exceptions are figures 1 and 2, which are based on data from a scholarly article written in Japanese and supplemented by additional data from MOFA. Some of the sources were only available in Japan and were accessed during a research trip in summer 2016. The preliminary arguments in this chapter will be further developed after future research at the Diplomatic Archives in Tokyo.

7.2 The History of Women at MOFA

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the oldest foreign ministry in Asia; it was established in 1869, one year after the Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Restoration marks the beginning of what is often referred to as "modern" Japan, when the country restored the emperor to power and began to shift the focus of its international relations to relations with the West. The first diplomatic mission from Japan to the United States and Europe after the Meiji Restoration, the Iwakura Mission, took place between 1871 and 1873. The goal of the mission was to introduce and legitimise the restoration of imperial rule in Japan and the Emperor Meiji, to begin the process of renegotiating the unequal treaties with the West, and to study political, industrial, educational, and military systems to aid in Japan's modernisation project. In addition to government officials, 53 students participated in the mission including five females. The youngest, a seven-year-old Tsuda Umeko, was one of several who remained in the United States to study. Tsuda returned to Japan when she turned 18. She went on to found one of Japan's most prestigious private women's colleges, Tsuda College. Three of the first class of seven women chosen to enter Japan's Diplomatic Training Institute were Tsuda College graduates.

From its inception, MOFA personnel were recruited from the elite of Japanese society with Tokyo Imperial University—later the University of Tokyo, Japan's premiere university—the prime recruiting grounds. In recent history, graduates of the University of Tokyo's Faculty of Law continued to dominate government agencies including MOFA. In fact, so many of the University's graduates entered government service that former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi (1991–1993) who was himself a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University's Faculty of Law, reportedly ordered government agencies to reduce the percentage of employees who had attended the University of Tokyo's Faculty of Law to below 50% in

Table 7.1 "Firsts" for women in the Japanese foreign ministry

Year	*Event*
1949	First women allowed to enter diplomatic training institute—seven selected
1950	First woman to pass MOFA career track entry exam—Yamane Yoshiko
1980	First female ambassador—Takahashi Nobuko
1986	First female consul general—Mitsuhashi Noriko
1987	First female bureau chief—Kurokōchi Hisami
2001	First female foreign minister—Tanaka Makiko

an effort to promote diversity (Shūgiin Gaimu Iinkai 1949). Moreover, women were not admitted to the University of Tokyo until 1946 (see Table 7.1).

During the post-World War II Occupation of Japan, which lasted seven years until 1952, sweeping changes in the name of democratisation took place at a dizzying pace. In the April 20, 1949 meeting of the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting, Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru requested that the committee consider whether women should be allowed to enter the diplomatic training institute (House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee 1949).[2] He stated that in other countries, women were serving in diplomatic missions abroad and given Japanese women's gradually increasing interest in foreign affairs, he wondered if Japanese women might also be interested in the profession. Three days later, on April 23, the major national newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that women would be allowed to enter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Training Institute beginning in June. In a May 25 article, the *Yomiuri* reported that seven women working in the domestic administrative section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in jobs related to budgeting, accountancy, translation, and research, would enter the diplomatic training institute. They were all graduates from colleges and universities where they would have learned English or other languages and five of the seven were graduates of the top women's universities in Japan: Tokyo Women's University, Tsuda College, and Japan Women's University. These seven women ranged in age from 29 to 37 years. After completing the Diplomatic Training Institute, two of the seven were posted abroad. Tashima Sumiko, who was 34 when she entered the institute, was sent as a secretary to Japan's consular office in New York in February 1950. She later served in MOFA's United States-Europe Bureau and its Cultural Information Bureau. The second woman to be posted

abroad, Yoshimura Kazuko, (a 31-year-old graduate of Tokyo Women's University when she was chosen to enter the training institute in 1949), became the deputy chief of Japan's mission in China in November 1952 (Gaimushō Shokuin Ryoku 1943, 1952, 1953). In 1964, she served as an interpreter for a meeting between Prime Minister Yoshida and Chiang Kai Shek (Niwa 2008). So little is written about these women that there are cases where we do not have detailed information regarding their work at MOFA before or after their time in the Diplomatic Training Institute.

A second class of five women working within MOFA was selected to enter the Diplomatic Training Institute in 1950; they began six months of training on December 13 of that year. This class of women ranged in age from 22 to 36, with four of the five in their 20s; overall, this class was much younger (Yomiuri Shimbun 1949). None of them were posted abroad after completing their training. After completing training, Hashimoto Eiko worked in the Treaty Bureau, Masui Yoko worked in the United States-Europe Bureau, Takahashi Kiyoe and Togawa Yukie worked in the Foreign Minister's office, and Ukai Shoko worked in the Information and Culture Bureau (Gaimushō Shokuin Ryoku 1952, 1953). In addition to these two early classes that were hand-selected from within MOFA to attend the Diplomatic Training Institute, women also began taking the career track employment exam to enter MOFA on their own accord. The first to pass was Yamane Toshiko, a graduate of the prestigious Tsuda College in Tokyo, who passed the exam on March 15, 1950. Yamane is widely credited with being Japan's first female career diplomat; she became Japan's first female diplomat to serve abroad that same year. In 1954, she then joined Japan's UN Delegation and represented Japan in the fifth meeting of the United Nations Technology Assistance Meeting. Yamane served as part of Japan's mission to the United Nations until her untimely death in an airplane crash in 1956 (Geocities Japan, n.d.).

Mano Hisami passed the exam for career employment at MOFA in 1957, seven years after Yamane, and began training on April 2, 1958. Mano received significant media attention as a female career diplomat. Articles with titles such as, "New Field of Work: Female Diplomat," "News Update: Female Diplomat," and "Person of the Week: Miss Diplomat" publicised her unusual position. Seven years later, in 1965, Ishida Miyoko began work as the Vice-Consul in Japan's Consulate in Los Angeles. In 1968, Ogata Sadako, who was not a career diplomat but who would become the longest serving United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1990–2001), was appointed to Japan's UN mission and

represented Japan in the General Assembly on several occasions in 1970. In 1976, Ogata became Japan's ambassador to the UN.

News reports served as reminders that the number of female career diplomats remained small and women passing the exam remained remarkable for many years. An October 26, 1977 *Yomiuri Shimbun* article noted, "First Female Diplomat in 20 Years." An article from the same newspaper one year later on October 28, 1978 announced that of 16 people who passed the exam, two were women. By the time Nishimura Atsuko, Japan's current ambassador to Luxemburg, entered the Foreign Service as a career diplomat in 1979—30 years after Yamane—the number of women was still extremely low. Nishimura recalls: "I remember when I passed the special exam to become a career diplomat, there were less than 10 female career diplomats out of several hundred career diplomats" (*Luxemburger Wort* 2014). As recently as 2000, only four women passed the exam for career track employment.

In 1950, Takahashi Nobuko attended the fourth meeting of the UN Committee on the Status of Women as an unofficial observer. Thirty years later, Takahashi, who was not a career diplomat, became Japan's first female ambassador when she was appointed to lead Japan's delegation in Denmark. Takahashi's position became part of the argument for Japan to sign the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women at the Second World Conference on Women held in 1980 in Copenhagen, Denmark, as part of the United Nations' Decade for Women (Flowers 2009). The October 24, 1981 *Yomiuri* informed readers that "Two women succeeded in passing the Foreign Service Exam this year as well." In October 1986, readers learned that of the 28 people to pass the prestigious exam that year, three were women. The April 16, 1986 *Yomiuri Shimbun* relayed the notable news that the first female Consul General, Mitsuhashi Noriko, was appointed to the Los Angeles Consulate. The next year, on October 14, 1987, another milestone was reached when Kurokōchi Hisami became MOFA's first female bureau chief. Appointed in 2001, Tanaka Makiko was the first female foreign minister in Japan. Tanaka served for less than one year between 2001 and 2002. She was succeeded by the second female foreign minister, Kawaguchi Yuriko, who served for a slightly longer term between 2002 and 2004. There has not been a female foreign minister since 2004.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the number of men and women to sit for the career track exam and the number of men and women to pass the exam from 1948 to 2000. Over the course of these 52 years, women have



Fig. 7.1 Number of men and women to sit for MOFA career track exam 1948–2000



Fig. 7.2 Number of men and women to pass exam for MOFA career track 1948–2000

accounted for just under 10% of the 20,218 people to take the career employment exam. Until 1976, the largest number of women to take the exam was 10. After 1976, there is a steady increase in the number of women to take the exam. Within one year, from 1977 to 1978, the number of women taking the exam doubled from 17 to 34. The number of women taking the exam entered the triple digits, with 118, for the first time in the year 1993. Yet, only three passed. The number of women taking the career exam dipped back into the double digits in 1998 when there was a significant decrease—107 women took the exam in 1997 but only 67 took it in 1998. Only 71 women passed the exam during these 52 years.

The first woman passed the career diplomat exam in 1950 and the second in 1957. It would be 20 years before two more women passed the exam in 1977. In 1983, no women were among those who passed the exam despite 42 women (the third highest number until that point) having sat for the exam. The year Japan ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1985, also marked the highest number of women (59) to sit for the exam since 1948. Between 1948 and 2000, the largest number of women to sit for the exam in one year was 139 in 1994, with 22% women. Twenty-seven people passed that year; three of these were women. A record number of women, six, passed the exam in 1991 when 319 men and 59 women sat for the exam; 27 men passed.

Recent developments are more promising for bringing a higher number of women into MOFA. The most recent data show that in 2014, 21 men and 5 women (19%) passed the career track exam. In 2015, 18 men and 8 women (31%) passed. In 2016, 18 men and 10 women (36%) passed.[3] If this trend continues, we might see the numbers of men and women who pass the career exam for MOFA gain parity soon.

7.3 Women in the Contemporary MOFA

Today, there are three routes into MOFA: taking the exam to become a permanent employee on the career track, taking the exam to become a permanent employee on the non-career track, or by becoming a contract employee hired for a specific position in Tokyo or abroad. These three statuses—career, non-career, and contract—allow for placement abroad but differ in terms of possibility for promotion. Career track employees are eligible for promotion to the highest leadership positions, non-career

employees have limited opportunities, and contract workers do not have any. The small numbers of women who have taken the exam to become MOFA career employees and the miniscule number of women who have passed it goes a long way to explaining why there are so few women in leadership positions at the ministry. To round out the picture, we will examine the numbers of women in Japan's Foreign Service for the 40 years between 1975 and 2014 and the numbers serving as top diplomats over the five years 2011–2015. Then, we will consider how women ambassadors themselves understand what it means to be a woman on the world stage.

Though still small, the number of women in Japan's Foreign Service has increased steadily from 1975 to 2014 (see Fig. 7.3). In 1975, there were 1540 people in Japan's Foreign Service; 1490 were men and the remaining 50 (3%) were women. Twenty years later in 1995, there were nearly twice as many Foreign Service Officers—2978—of which 279 (9%) were women. Over the course of 20 years, the number of women in Japan's Foreign Service saw a fourfold increase. By 2014, there were 3385 people in MOFA, of which 569 (17%) were women.



Fig. 7.3 Men and women in Japan's Foreign Service 1975–2014

In 1975, Japan had a 42-person UN delegation comprised of 7 women and 35 men. Twenty years later in 1995, there were nearly twice as many in the UN delegation at 72. The increase in the number of women was significant: 40. Over the 20 years between 1975 and 1995, there were six times as many women in its UN delegation. Another 20 years later in 2014, the 167-member UN delegation had 107 women and 60 men.

As illustrated in Table 7.2, the Japanese MFA maintains embassies and consulates in seven regions across the world: Asia, Oceania, North America (Canada and the United States), Central and South America (includes Mexico), Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. During the five year period 2011–2015, there were 37 or 38 missions in Asia, 12 or 13 in Oceania, 20 or 21 in North America, 25–27 in Central and South America, 51–55 in Europe, 18 or 20 in the Middle East, and 31–35 in Africa.

For four out of the five of these years, there was a woman serving as ambassador or consul general in Asia; these two women served in Brunei and Laos. In three of the five years, women served in top positions as consuls general in Oceania—always Australia. In two of these years, 2014 and 2015, there were two women each year serving as consul general, in Brisbane and in Melbourne. In two of the five years, 2014 and 2015, there was one woman in a top position in Central and South America. Tanaka Keiko served as ambassador to Uruguay in both these years. Europe is the only region where there was always at least one woman serving as ambassador or consul general in each of the five years 2011–2015. Finally, no women served as ambassador or consul general in North America (Canada and the United States), the Middle East, or Africa during the five-year period.

In part, the lack of women in leadership positions in Japan's embassies and consulates is due to demographics, as there are more women in the lower ranks of diplomacy than ever before. They have to work their way through the ranks before they are eligible for promotion to ambassador level positions. We cannot assume, however, that just because there are more women in the lower ranks of the foreign service that more will make it to leadership positions; the fact that there are still fewer than 10% of women in business leadership after more than 30 years of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) suggests that we should temper our expectations. If we think of the question in light of why those few women who are already at the ambassador level have been placed where they have been, this invites us to think less about why there are so few women in Japan's Foreign Service and more about where women are placed and why.

As Towns and Niklasson suggest in Chap. 2 and as several of the other contributors to this volume have shown, there seem to be connections

Table 7.2 Numbers of Japanese women ambassadors and consuls general by world region 2011–2015

Region	*Year*				
	2011	*2012*	*2013*	*2014*	*2015*
Asia	19 Embassies 18 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Laos)	19 Embassies 18 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Laos)	19 Embassies 18 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	20 Embassies 18 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Brunei)	19 Embassies 19 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Brunei)
Oceania	7 Embassies 5 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	7 Embassies 5 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	7 Embassies 5 Consulates 1 Woman Consul General (Brisbane Australia)	8 Embassies 5 Consulates 2 Women Consuls General (Brisbane, Melbourne Australia)	8 Embassies 5 Consulates 2 Women Consuls General (Brisbane, Melbourne Australia)
N. America	2 Embassies 19 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	2 Embassies 19 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	2 Embassies 18 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	2 Embassies 18 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	2 Embassies 18 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General
Central & S. America	21 Embassies 5 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	21 Embassies 6 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	21 Embassies 5 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	21 Embassies 4 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Uruguay)	22 Embassies 4 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Uruguay)

(*continued*)

Table 7.2 (continued)

Region	*Year*				
	2011	*2012*	*2013*	*2014*	*2015*
Europe	39 Embassies 13 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Lithuania)	38 Embassies 14 Consulates 1 Woman Ambassador (Lithuania) 1 Woman Consul General (Milan Italy)	38 Embassies 12 Consulates 2 Women Ambassadors (Lithuania, Slovenia) 1 Woman Consul General (Milan Italy)	39 Embassies 12 Consulates 4 Women Ambassadors (Iceland, Slovenia, Lithuania, Luxembourg) 1 Woman Consul General (Milan Italy)	43 Embassies 12 Consulates 2 Women Ambassadors (Iceland, Ireland) 1 Woman Consul General (Milan, Italy)
Middle East	15 Embassies 3 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	15 Embassies 3 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	15 Embassies 3 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	15 Embassies 3 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General	17 Embassies 3 Consulates No Women Ambassador/Consul General
Africa	31 Embassies No Women Ambassador/Consul General	32 Embassies No Women Ambassador/Consul General	33 Embassies No Women Ambassador/Consul General	35 Embassies No Women Ambassador/Consul General	35 Embassies No Women Ambassador/Consul General

between gender and geopolitics. These connections may help explain why there have been no Japanese women in ambassador or consul general positions between 2011 and 2015 in North America (Canada and the United States), the Middle East, or Africa. MOFA understands the North America region to consist of the United States and Canada. Both of these are Western countries with the accompanying assumptions about women's rights and gender equality being upheld. Even though there is still a small number of women serving in the US Congress and in other leadership roles, the high profile of women in the State Department since Madeleine Albright became the first female Secretary of State in 1997 is in line with the idea that many Japanese hold about the role of women in the West and in the United States in particular. Yet, the lack of women in top positions in Japan's embassies and consulates in the region suggests that gender equality norms in these receiving countries do not guide whether Japan sends male or female representatives. Although the first Japanese women to be appointed to Vice-Consul in 1965 and Consul General in 1986 were both posted at the Los Angeles consulate, there were no women in these positions in the United States or Canada between 2011 and 2014.

Japan's relationship with the United States is undoubtedly one of its most important political and economic relationships, and it is the most important security relationship. The Japanese government sends what MOFA considers to be its top diplomats to serve as ambassadors to Washington, DC. Understanding how gender shapes what constitutes "the most qualified," those who are assigned to ambassadorships in the capitals of Japan's most important allies, is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter.

As an important source of oil for Japan, diplomatic appointments to the Middle East also remain geopolitically important. In this light, it may not be surprising that Japan has posted no female ambassadors in the region. The potential effects of the geopolitical importance may be exacerbated by a general sense—supported by a number of kidnappings and killings of Japanese nationals in the last 15 years—that the region is dangerous, too dangerous for women. If this is the case, it would parallel the reasoning informing Turkish appointments as discussed in Chap. 5. Gender norms in both Japan and the oil producing countries of the Middle East suggest that there is no immediate value or incentive associated with assigning women to diplomatic posts in the region. It is not clear what, if any, the relationship between gender norms and religious conservatism might have on assignments. The fact that Japan has assigned a woman to the ambas-

sadorship of Brunei, a predominantly Muslim country in Asia, suggests that cultural context is as important as religion insofar as either matters for determining assignments.

7.4 A View from Female Ambassadors

Japan's Diplomatic Blue Book 2015, an annual report of Japan's foreign policy and related activities, devotes space in Chap. 3, "Japan's Foreign Policy to Promote National and Worldwide Interests," to discussing women. The chapter begins with: "Japan is promoting various measures at home and abroad, with the aim of creating 'a society in which women shine,' so that all women can make the most of their individuality and abilities" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015). Under Section 1, "Efforts for Peace and Stability of Japan and the International Community," there is a sub-chapter simply titled, "Women." Most of the section summarises Japan's efforts to address and promote women's issues internationally, mostly through the United Nations and UN initiatives. Then, at the end there is a separate "Column," "Female Ambassadors Playing Shining Roles in the World—Roundtable Discussion on Paper by Five Female Ambassadors." This addendum is reminiscent of a special column in a women's magazine reserved for short and interesting features that are perhaps not long enough for a full article but are included because of their relevance as a trending issue. The main title of the piece continues with the slogan of letting women shine. The subtitle indicates that this is a Q&A with five female ambassadors, but it neglects to tell us that these were *the* five who led five of Japan's 134 embassies at the time and were five of six female ambassadors that year (see Table 7.2). The five included in the roundtable are Nishimura Atsuko (Luxemburg), Shiraishi Kazuko (Lithuania), Iki Noriko (Brunei), Shino Mitsuko (Iceland), and Tanaka Keiko (Uruguay). Jomori Shigemi (Slovenia) was not part of the roundtable.

The placements indicate that although there were four ambassadors in Europe, where Japan maintained 39 embassies in 2014, none of these served as top diplomat in any of the G20 countries with which Japan has significant trade relations or economic interests and which Japan identifies as its peers (see Table 7.2). Four women ambassadors in one region, Europe, is extraordinary for Japan given that in 2014, there were a total of only six female ambassadors. There was not one woman in Africa, the region that hosts the second largest number of Japan's embassies (35 in 2014).

In the Blue Book, the female ambassadors were asked three questions. First, they were asked "How do you feel to be working as a female ambassador?" When asked about how they *feel* being a female ambassador, three of the five indicated a level of comfort associated with the high numbers of women officials in the countries where they serve and do not mention the numbers of women (or lack of women) in their own missions abroad or in the Foreign Service in general. Interestingly, Nishimura who is Japan's longest serving female diplomat and is counted as Japan's second female ambassador discusses the importance of human relations and talk to diplomacy when she replies, "in the sense of developing interpersonal connections amongst the diplomatic corps, our strength lies in having the ability to converse with other women at meal gatherings that include the spouses of diplomats." Nishimura's comment indicates that not only are there few women in Japan's delegation but also in the delegations of other countries. The interpersonal connections with other women that Nishimura speaks of are connections with diplomats' wives who are also valuable to the art of diplomacy.

In response to the second question, "Could you tell us some of the difficulties that you have encountered in your work, and some of the issues that you feel should be addressed by MOFA?" four of the five explicitly mentioned balancing work and family, with specific mention of childcare and elder care responsibilities. The fifth, Ambassador Tanaka alluded to these issues by mentioning the benefits of private sector employer flexibility, such as allowing telecommuting and how these might benefit government organisations and the civil servants who staff them. These comments confirm that these very successful women diplomats still had to confront the social norms and expectations that they, as women, are responsible for childcare and elder care. Their comments demonstrate that they did not escape these challenges and suggest that there are others whose careers may have been interrupted due to family responsibilities.

Finally, the female ambassadors were asked whether they could provide "a message for women who aim to play active roles in the international community in the future?" The answers to this question share a common theme of urging women to take up the challenge and opportunity of working internationally. At least two of the responses are worth quoting in full. Ambassadors Tanaka and Shino focused on how one's status as a woman can be an asset when working internationally. Ambassador Tanaka (Uruguay) replied, "I think that the ease with which we can gain trust is the strength of Asian women in the international community. Although

there is a tendency to think that Japanese women playing active roles in the international community are still the minority, I hope that you can take advantage of that and take more and greater leaps right into their midst." Ambassador Shino (Iceland) answered, "I think that MOFA is the best workplace for women. On the one hand, the contents of the work does not make one conscious of one's own gender, but on the other hand, it is quite common to attract more attention at international conferences because you are a woman. I think there are places where we can shine amidst an environment of diverse values." Ambassador Iki (Brunei) spoke in more personal terms about how one might balance work and family when pursuing an international career: "I think that it is important not to limit the possibilities of your career 'because you are a woman' or 'because you have children.' At the same time, it is also important not to give up on major life events such as marriage and having children simply because 'work is too tough.' Even in situations where it is difficult to achieve work-life balance, having the will and motivation to pursue possibilities and constantly upgrading yourself so that you can grab the next chance to play an active role, will open up the roads to the future." While the answer is meant to be encouraging, it places the burden on women to make their own way and suggests that they do not have to choose between having a family or having a career. If they are persistent, they *can* "have it all." What is missing is attention to the structural barriers, including societal gender norms that continue to make it difficult for women to pursue having a family and a career. Given the demands of diplomacy—that one move every two to three years with little say in assignment—female diplomats face even greater pressure from societal gender norms. Diplomatic life requires that spouses and children move frequently and with no guarantees that the spouse will find work at postings abroad, let alone be able to develop and sustain a career.

7.5 The United Nations: Where the Women Are

The large percentage of women in Japan's UN delegation sets Japan apart, even from those countries with significant numbers of women in their Foreign Services. This section will cover the importance of the United Nations for Japan's foreign policy, offer comparative analysis of the composition of Japan's diplomats in general and its UN delegation in particular, and explore why women have consistently comprised such a large proportion of Japan's UN delegation. From the end of the US

occupation of Japan in 1952 until the early 2000s, Japan treaded lightly in its international relations. Japan has relied on multilateralism, tied especially to a UN centric foreign policy and security alliance with the United States to reassure its neighbours while re-establishing its standing in the world. Even today, uncertainty in how to lead without threatening is a significant issue for Japan. For example, Japan is consistently criticised for its "chequebook" diplomacy and faces pressure from the United States to become a "normal nation." Yet, gestures in this direction continue to antagonise its neighbours.

In 1950, Japan sought to re-join the international community and joining the United Nations was seen as essential to attaining this goal. Given the brutality of Japan's colonial pursuits and wartime occupations, a post-war foreign policy with multilateralism at its core was really the only option for the country. Thus, gaining entrance to the UN and maintaining UN membership was very important to Japan; this was successfully achieved in 1956. During the period 1957–1972, Japanese diplomacy was focused on reconnecting with the world community and the process to achieve this was based in the UN. In its first Diplomatic Blue Book, published in 1957, "a commitment to the ideals of the UN system and to multilateralism" was identified as one of three principles that would guide its engagement with the world. Moreover, Prime Minister Kishi (1957–1960) (Prime Minster Abe's grandfather) advanced the importance of the United Nations as one of the country's three pacifist principles.

Given the centrality of the UN to Japanese foreign policy, the overrepresentation of women in Japan's diplomatic missions to the United Nations compared to the overall number of women among Japan's diplomats is surprising. There is a marked contrast between the numbers of Japanese women engaged in UN diplomacy, and those in Japan's Foreign Service overall, including serving as top diplomats (ambassadors or consuls general) in Japan's 134 embassies and 61 consulates. In 1975, the first year for which I have data, 3% of Japan's regular diplomats and 17% of Japan's diplomats in the country's mission to the United Nations were women (Fig. 7.4). Japan's regular diplomats only reached 17% in 2014—40 years later (!). In 1995, the number of Japanese women diplomats at the United Nations reached a tipping point when it exceeded 50% (52.6%). Since that year, women have constituted more than half of Japan's delegation to the United Nations, yet the percentage of women among the regular diplomats remained just under 10%. Two years later, in 1997, the percentage of women diplomats finally reached (and surpassed) the 10% mark with 12%



Fig. 7.4 Men and women in Japan's UN delegations 1975–2014

of the diplomats consisting of women. That same year, women were 58% of Japan's UN mission. In 2000, the percentage of women in Japan's UN delegation reached 60% for the first time; by 2014 it had grown to 64%. The percentage of women among Japan's regular diplomats still had not reached 20% in 2014, when only 569 or 17% of the 3385 members of the diplomats were women.

What we do not know is what this means for women diplomats and their career paths. How does a posting at the UN figure into and shape a diplomat's career trajectory, how do diplomats themselves understand a posting at the UN? Japan's focus on UN-centred multilateral foreign policy suggests that a posting at the UN is significant. In addition to being at a high-profile international organisation that enjoys high prestige among the Japanese public, the UN post also requires a high level of skill—including fluency in English. However, relatively large numbers of women diplomats with UN experience do not go on to top positions at MOFA. How can we explain this? (see Fig. 7.5).

How can we explain this vast discrepancy in the ratio of women to men in the ranks of Japan's UN delegation and the broader group of



Fig. 7.5 Percentage of women among regular Japanese diplomats and in UN delegation 1975–2014

diplomats? As Aggestam and Towns discuss in the introduction, women in public office are often found in positions related to what is stereotypically considered women's work or women's interests. These "feminine" policy areas are furthermore generally considered less prestigious than the "male" ones. In this case, however, because of the importance of the UN and multilateralism to Japan's foreign policy, we would not expect a significant number, then a plurality, then a majority, then an overwhelming majority of the country's UN delegation to be women. More detailed study is needed to understand how and why this is the case but we can speculate here. One possibility is that although the UN is a significant pillar in Japan's foreign policy, Japan's UN delegation might not figure prominently in the processes that matter. Prestige may not correspond with power and influence. Another reason why the large number of women who serve in Japan's UN delegation might not translate into more women in high ranking positions at MOFA is their employment status. Many women might be employed on MOFA's non-career track or there might be a large number who apply directly as contract workers. Finally, perhaps the Japanese government takes advantage of the visibility of its

UN delegation to raise its own status by assigning a large percentage of women to its delegation, which is valued by the UN and the international community more broadly. The norm of women figuring prominently in the UN and the UN agenda, especially since the 1990s, might contribute to a need to demonstrate that women are prominent in the delegation.

7.6 Conclusion

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's recent calls for increasing the number of women in all leadership areas of society have ushered in a flurry of media attention, including attention to women of Kasumigaseki, the area in Tokyo that is the home to MOFA and used as shorthand to refer to the institution and the people working there. Almost as an afterthought, Abe appointed five women to his cabinet (two subsequently resigned due to "scandal"); and none of these were appointed to the post of foreign minister. Most recognise that Abe's focus on women is not about furthering gender equality. His main concern is increasing economic growth and he views women's labour as central to that goal. Despite this narrow concern, Abe's 30 by 20 plan has called attention to the role of women in leadership in Japan. Just as women have gained a high profile in diplomacy in some countries, we are becoming aware of how few women there are in leadership positions in MOFA.

This article is the first account of women in Japan's foreign ministry. Because leadership roles in MOFA are reserved for career diplomats, increasing the number of women in these positions in MOFA requires increasing the number of women who take and pass the exam to become career diplomats. This begs the question of why so few women take and pass the exam. Once women enter MOFA on the career track, how can the numbers who move into leadership ranks be increased? The answers to these questions require that we understand which career trajectories result in promotion to leadership roles and who has access to these paths to advancement. The large percentage of women among Japan's UN delegation over many years suggests that this prestigious post does not necessarily contribute to an increased share of leadership positions for female diplomats at MOFA. More research on these issues is required and this chapter raises more questions than it answers. The questions raised here are meant to map a research agenda to improve what we know about women in MOFA in particular and women in Japan's powerful bureaucracies in general.

Notes

1. All employees include those who are not on the career track and so have limited opportunity for promotion.
2. Yoshida is most noted for instituting an income-doubling plan when he was prime minister. This plan is widely credited for improving the living standards of Japanese and turning people's attention away from the contentious politics of the 1960s and towards a focus on economics. His role in integrating women into Japan's diplomatic corps is never mentioned by political scientists. The House of Councillors is the upper house of the Japanese Diet (parliament).
3. Data for the three most recent years, 2014–2016, available at the Japan National Personnel Authority Web site www.jinji.go.jp/saiyou/sougou/saiyou_sougou02_link/saiyoukyou-sougou26_28.pdf accessed November 3, 2016.

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PART II

Gender in International Negotiation

CHAPTER 8

Where Are the Women in Peace Mediation?

Karin Aggestam and Isak Svensson

8.1 Introduction

Peace agreements have long-term repercussions for post-conflict politics. Therefore, peace negotiations are frequently framed as "an opportunity", which can redefine relationships and empower groups towards peaceful democratic societies. At the same time, only 2.5% of all chief mediators and 9% of the negotiators are women in peace processes according to UN Women (2012: 13). This underlines the specific context of peace negotiations, which seems to trigger barriers for women to participate. In recent years, a number of global and regional declarations have been adopted that call for the need to include more women into peace negotiations. Peace mediation in particular is viewed as the "weapon of inclusion" (Wallström 2016) as it concerns the ability, authority and leadership to access and use power to redesign peace processes (Potter 2008). Hence, there has been noticeable mobilisation in international forum

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on promoting women's participation in peace processes (Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond 2016; Tinde 2009).

The research field of gender and peacebuilding has also expanded greatly in recent decade (e.g., Anderlini 2007; Karim and Beardsley 2013; Potter 2008; Olsson and Möller 2013; Karim and Berdsley 2013). Recent scholarship points to a strong relationship between gender equality and peaceful societies, which shows that countries with a higher degree of equality between men and women have a tendency to be more peaceful in terms of less external armed conflicts (Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2000), less internal armed conflicts (Caprioli 2005), less humans rights abuse in the domestic arena (Melander 2005; Hudson et al. 2012), better conditions for peacekeeping (Gizelis 2009, 2011), and a stronger capacity for the democratic system itself to resist armed conflict (Bjarnegård and Melander 2011). In addition, scholars probe to what extent gender-specific languages in peace agreements contribute to a durable peace (see, for example, Bell 2015). Consequently, some argue that wider inclusion of women in peacebuilding should be viewed as "smart diplomacy" (Clinton 2011) because of the assumption that more women will generate sustainable peace (Wallström 2016). Yet, many of the findings are still tentative and much more research is needed in this field. As Jacqui True (2016) points out, we need to advance knowledge about the ways descriptive representation of women impacts substantive representation, that is, to what extent women's political interests are taken into consideration.

However, academia is lagging behind in regard to studies of women, gender, peace negotiation and mediation. There are nearly no studies that empirically have mapped where women are located in the mediation processes. With a possible exception of Diaz (2010) and O'Reilly and Ó Súilleabháin (2013), as far as we know, there do not exist any systematic empirical studies, which highlight women per se as international mediators specifically. The few studies that have been done on gender and international mediation utilise simulation and experiments due to the low number of empirical cases of women as mediators (Boyer et al. 2009; Florea et al. 2003; Weingarten and Douvan 1985).

Consequently, the overarching ambition of this chapter[1] is to address this research gap by mapping where women act as peace mediators. As such, it relates to the first questions posed in the introductory chapter

regarding the descriptive representation and positions of women as peace mediators. To guide the empirical inquiry, three research questions are raised: (1) Where are women mediating and in what type of conflict; (2) what are their organisational basis and rank as mediator; and (3) to what extent are the negotiations leading to agreements that include gender provisions?

While theory development is beyond the ambition of this chapter, we do seek to make a contribution in the field of international mediation by conducting an empirical analysis that specifically will respond to the question: Where are the women in international mediation? In the next section, we apply a gender-sensitive approach in order to map and highlight the overarching patterns where women have participated as international mediators in the last two decades. The analysis focuses specifically on the identification of women mediators, the diverse contexts of mediation and various outcomes of peace negotiations. The chapter presents a unique list of 36 women acting as mediators in the last two decades in 24 different conflicts around the world. Not surprisingly, the general trajectories show that women participate in very small numbers as mediators; yet their frequency has increased over time. Interestingly, Nordic, American and African mediators tend to be overrepresented in comparison to other regions. The chapter ends with a note on future avenues for research on gender and international mediation.

8.2 Where Are Women Acting as Peace Mediators?

The empirical study maps and provides an overview of women acting as peace mediators. The aim is to identify significant trends that have taken place in the last two decades. We argue that this presents a first important building block in an otherwise underresearched area. We have chosen to focus on the questions where and when women mediate in regard to the (a) type of conflict, context and culture; and (b) the mediator's rank, organisational basis and mandate. In addition, we map and analyse (c) outcomes of negotiations; specifically addressing (d) the presence of gender provisions in peace agreements as these may provide an indication to what extent women's inclusion affects outcomes of negotiations. Again, the rationale is to spur further studies in this area, which can provide additional pieces to the peace puzzle of women as mediators.

8.2.1 Data and Coding

For the analysis, we examined three datasets of internal armed conflicts: Regan et al. (2009); Bercovitch and deRouen (2005) and Svensson and Lundgren (2015). However, these data sources do not list the gender of mediators, only countries and organisations. So, the gender of mediators was traced by names and other specificities. Furthermore, we have consulted reports produced by NGOs that specifically focus on women mediators, gender equality and UN 1325 to corroborate our list of cases (e.g., Anderlini 2003; Diaz 2010; O'Reilly and Ó Suilleabhain 2013; Porter 2003; Potter 2008).

Three principal coding decisions were made regarding the inclusion of data. First, we define mediation in a broad sense, which includes various forms of interventions, from hosting formal negotiations, conducting shuttle diplomacy to facilitation. This wide criterion for inclusion is used to identify the diverse roles women play at the top level of peacemaking. Moreover, it corresponds with the Management of Low-Intensity Conflicts (MILC) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP). At the same time, it should be noted that the UN rarely utilises the official title of mediator, but instead appoints mediators via titles, such as special representatives and personal envoys of the UN Secretary General. Also the mapping of women at the top level of mediation does not imply that all of them are chief mediators. Hence, we decided to include women who also act in the capacity of formal witnesses and signatories to peace agreements in cases where such positions overlap with tasks associated with third-party interventions and mediation processes. Still, the mediators should be able to express themselves at the negotiation tables. Hence, it is not sufficient to be only silent observers to the negotiations. For instance, in the "Juba peace process", mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan, between the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda and the government of Uganda, there were some representatives of women's organisations at the negotiations, but they were not allowed to intervene during the negotiation talks.

Second, we have delimited the empirical case study to include only official international mediation interventions (Track 1) as there are nearly no studies made in this area. At the same time, we recognise, as many other studies do as well that women play crucial roles both as individuals and in civil society based organisations as part of wider peacebuilding efforts and in other multiple but unofficial tracks of diplomacy. For instance, there are numerous accounts of women participating in back-channel activities as well as in public campaigns to end war. The movements of "mothers",

which have been observed in several armed conflicts, are illustrations of such anti-war mobilisation.

Third, we have excluded mediators who simultaneously represent one of the sides in the conflict. For instance, in the peace process in Guatemala, Luz Mendez participated at the negotiation table and assisted to craft important gender provisions. However, she was also representing the rebel-group Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Still, we do include insider-partial mediator (Wehr and Lederach 1991), such as women's interest groups that are more actively striving to bridge between the parties in order to reach mutually beneficial agreements, including gender provisions. As such, the study explores the interplay between internal and external mediators as well.

8.3 Results and Discussion

From our data, 36 cases were identified between 1991 and 2014 (see Table 8.1). This is about 8% of the total number of mediation interventions, which is remarkably low. Still, this figure differs somewhat from UN Women's study from 2012, which indicates an average 2.5% as peace mediators. The reason for this is partly because our study reaches beyond 2012 to 2014. But it probably also relates to the difference in operationalisation of peace mediation. We have noted that among most policy makers and practitioners, mediation is frequently understood in a more restricted way whereas in academia a more inclusive definition of mediation is used, ranging from facilitation, formulation to more powerful mediation, which therefore result in more cases.

Despite the low number of cases, we still detected a clear trend in the last two decades of an increasing number of women acting as peace mediators, particularly since the launching of UN resolution 1325 where the frequency of cases nearly doubled (from 11 to 25). To make the trends over time more visible, we broke down the cases in five-year cycles (see Fig. 8.1). Also in contrast to other studies (Diaz 2010; Anderlini 2003), we have systematically included official mediation by representatives of states because this is where most women act as peace mediators. For instance, the former US Secretary of States Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton, and the former High Representative of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) Catherine Ashton have on many occasions acted as mediators in armed conflicts; yet they have not been included in previous studies.

Table 8.1 Women in peace mediation

Conflict	*Unit*	*Mediator*	*Year*
Angola	UN	Margaret Anstee	1992–1993
Azerbaijan	OSCE	Terhi Hakala	1995–1996
Bosnia-Hercegovina	UK	Pauline Neville-Jones	1995
Burundi	UN	Carolyn McAskie	1999–2000
Central African Republic	UN	Margaret Vogt	2012–2013
Colombia	Norway	Rita Sandberg	2014
Cyprus	UN	Ann Hercus	1998–1999
Cyprus	UN	Lisa Buttenheim	2013
Democratic Republic of Congo	UN	Mary Robinson	2013–2014
Georgia	EU	Heidi Tagliavini	2008–2009
Democratic Republic of Congo	NGO	Liberata Mulamula	2008
India-Pakistan	US	Hillary Clinton	2009
Guinea-Bissau	Sweden	Ulla Andren	1998–1999
Israel	Norway	Mona Juul	1992–1993
Israel	US	Madeleine Albright	1997–1999
Israel	US	Hilary Clinton	2009–2013
Israel	EU	Catherine Ashton	2010–2014
Israel	EU	Federica Mogherini	2014
Israel	US	Condoleezza Rice	2006
Israel	US	Condoleezza Rice	2005
Israel	EU	Helga Schmid	2011–2012
Kenya	African Union	Graça Machel	2008
Liberia	AU	Adwoa Coleman	2003
Liberia	NGO	Theresa Leigh Sherman	2003
Macedonia (FYROM)	EU	Anna Lindh	2001
Papua New Guinea	NGO	Ruby Mirinka	2001
Russia	EU	Tarja Halonen	1999
Philippines	Norway	Elisabeth Slåttum	2014
Serbia-Kosovo	EU	Catherine Ashton	2011–2013
Sierra Leone	Organisation of African Union (AU)	Adwoa Coleman	1999
Somalia	Sweden	Marika Fahlén	2007–2008
Somalia	NGO	Asha Hagi Elmi	2000; 2002–2004
South Sudan-Sudan	EU	Rosalind Marsden	2012
Sri Lanka	NGO		2002
Sri Lanka	Japan	Yoriko Kawaguchi	2003
Sri Lanka	Norway	Kjersti Tromsdal	2000–2005
Sri Lanka	India	Indira Gandhi	1983–1984

(*continued*)

Table 8.1 (continued)

Conflict	*Unit*	*Mediator*	*Year*
Sudan	NGO		2006
South Sudan-Sudan	NGO	Mary Robinson	2012
Sudan	Norway	Hilde F. Johnson	2001–2005
Sudan	EU	Rosalind Marsden	2010–2013
Uganda	EU	Anna Sundström	2006–2008
Uganda	Norway	Heidi Johansen	2006–2008
Ukraine	EU	Catherine Ashton	2014
Ukraine	EU	Federica Mogherini	2014
Uganda (LRA)	Government of Uganda	Betty Bigombe	1992–1994; 2004–2006
Ukraine	OSCE	Heidi Tagliavini	2014
United Kingdom-Argentina	US	Hillary Clinton	2010
United Kingdom	Political party	Monica McWilliams	1998
United Kingdom	Political party	Liz O'Donnell	1998



Fig. 8.1 Number of women mediators 1991–2014

8.3.1 Senior Peace Mediators Breaking the Glass Ceiling

One of the more interesting results we found is the overrepresentation of Nordic, African and American mediators, with nine cases for the first two and six cases of North American mediators (see Fig. 8.2). This result also corresponds with Towns and Niklasson's chapter on women ambassadors, where the total share is only 15% globally; yet Nordic countries and North America came out on top of the list with 35% and 25% respectively. Hence, it seems more likely that women act as mediators when they have advanced in greater numbers to senior positions in diplomacy more generally.

The reasons why Nordic countries are overrepresented as mediators are many, but we argue that there are two major contributing factors. Firstly, Nordic countries enjoy a relatively high degree of gender equality in their societies. Secondly, these countries have historically held a strong commitment to international institutions, such as the UN, and long-term engagement in global peacemaking. Our study also indicates that most of the interventions by Nordic mediators have taken place in Africa, whereas others have been conducted in regions such as Asia, Europe, Middle East and South America.

We also found a high number of African mediators. This partly reflects the fact that a large number of conflicts have taken place in that region during the studied time period. Yet, it may also be related to the traditional cultural authority, which some African women seem to benefit from. This is a point that Paffenholz et al. (2016) also underline in their



Fig. 8.2 Background of mediator

comprehensive study on factors that strengthen women's agency and negotiation capacity.

In three of our empirical cases, women acted on behalf of NGOs, which explicitly pushed for gender equality at the negotiation table (Congo, Somalia, Sudan). Betty Bigombe provides a case in point. She first represented the Ugandan government, but later became an independent mediator in the conflict between government and the LRA. The other five cases of African mediators also concerned conflicts which have taken place in Africa.

Most cases of European mediators (excluding the Nordic cases) acted on behalf of the European Union (EU). In four of these cases, the mediators were from the UK, such as Rosalind Marsden as Special Representative to Sudan; and Catherine Ashton, then High Representative of External Action Service, mediating between Serbia and Kosovo. Whereas Federica Mogherini now heads the EU's External Action Service, all nine Special Representatives in 2016 are still men.

We found six cases of American mediators, which reflect the fact that three of the women have held the position as US Secretary of States, namely Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton. Furthermore, they have been particularly active as peace mediators in the Middle East (four of the six cases), whereas the others concerned mediation in Angola and Cyprus. Finally, the last cases identified are dispersed among mediators from Canada, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.

In sum, based on the analysis above, we can note the prevailing underrepresentation of women in diplomacy and mediation. It shows how difficult it is for women to break "the glass ceiling" in advancing to senior diplomatic positions in general and in peacemaking in particular. The specific context of peace negotiations tends to generate exclusive processes, which makes it even more difficult for women to be included. Despite the effort of the UN in recent years to recruit more women to leading positions in the organisation, there are also worrying indications. For instance, senior Swedish UN diplomat and mediator Karin Landgren (2015) has warned that the push towards gender parity in the UN may be lost since 92% of all senior UN positions during 2015 were appointed to men. At the same time, there are many positive signals coming from the new UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres that gender parity will be one of his top priorities.

If we look specifically at the patterns of position, organisational basis and rank, we find in our study five main groups of peace mediators.

The first comprises *high-ranking representatives* of international organisation, such as Graça Machel representing the African Union in Kenya (2008), Margaret Anstee representing UN in Angola (1992–1993) and Dame Ann Hercus in Cyprus (1998–1999) representing the UN. Not all of them where chief mediator, but served as part of the mediation teams, such as Terhi Hakala in the Finnish co-chairmanship mediation team in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1995–1996, and Pauline Neville-Jones who co-chaired with the EU in the Dayton negotiation talks over former Yugoslavia in 1995. Second are *lower-level mediators* from small states, such as Mona Juul in Israel-Palestine (1991–1993) and Ulla Andrén (1998) in Guinea-Bissau. The third group is composed of *high-ranking ministers* from small- or middle-sized countries, such as the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh in Macedonia 2001, the Ugandan minister Betty Bigombe in Uganda 2004–2006 and the Norwegian development minister Hilde Johnson in Sudan 2001–2005. The fourth category is the *power mediator*, such as Catherine Ashton, representing the EU in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo 2011–2013; and recurring mediation efforts by American mediators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and mediation by Condoleezza Rice during the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006. Fifth are *internal mediators*, who frequently have been empowered by women's groups included at the negotiation table. One such example is Asha Hagi Elmi, who represented the NGO "the Sixth Clan" (a clan represented by women to complement the traditional five Somali clans all dominated by men) in the Somali mediation process during the Arta peace talks in 2000 and in the Mbagathi Conference in Nairobi between 2002 and 2004. Theresa Leigh Sherman and Ruth Sando Perry, both representing the West African NGO the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), signed the Accra peace process that ended the conflict in Liberia in 2003.

The internal mediators constitute 6 of the 36 cases, which indicates that the greatest push for women to participate as peacemakers is in the role of external mediator. At the same time, the external and internal dimensions tend to interact in practice. For instance, in Kenya, the inclusion of a woman, Graca Machel, as peacemaker at the top level of the mediation process, created an opportunity to widen the peace process and make it more gender-inclusive both for women participating in Track II processes and for women representing the two main parties, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Party of National Unity (PNU), at the negotiation table.

8.3.2 Regional Variations

When it comes to the type of conflict that is mediated and regional contexts, the results (see Fig. 8.3) seem to follow the general conflict pattern, that is, mediation takes place where most conflicts occur.

Interventions have taken place in both armed conflicts over governments (e.g., Burundi and Guinea-Bissau) and over territory (e.g., Southern Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine). We also note that there are slightly more cases of mediation in territorial conflict (19), compared to interventions in governmental conflicts (17). Moreover, we observe a substantial variation across contexts of conflicts where mediation has taken place in state-based armed conflicts (Central African Republic in 2013), in low-intensity conflicts at risk of escalating (Macedonia in 2001), frozen conflicts (Cyprus in 1998–1999 and again in 2013) and non-state armed conflicts (Kenya in 2008). Seven of the territorial interventions concerned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which indicate the high level of American engagement in this conflict. Half of the mediation interventions took place in Africa (18), followed by the Middle East (8) and Europe (7). Again, these figures correspond to the overarching pattern where armed conflicts have occurred in recent decades. What stands out is the underrepresentation of Asia, both regarding the number of armed conflicts and in terms of its underrepresentation of women in senior diplomatic positions and mediators. Again, this pattern corresponds with the findings from Towns and Niklasson's study on women ambassadors. We only identified one case of mediation in Asia during this time period conducted by the Norwegian Special Envoy, Elisabeth Slåttum, in the Philippines in 2014.



Fig. 8.3 Mediation and regional context

Finally, two cases were found in Oceania (Papua New Guinea, mediated by the local peacemaker Ruby Mirinka) and South America (in Colombia mediated by the Norwegian diplomat Rita Sandberg).

8.3.3 Practice of Mediation

Focusing more on the practices of mediation, we identified four different types: formal witnessing, facilitation, shuttle diplomacy and formal negotiation. Most of the cases concerned active *formal negotiations*, which frequently concerned mediation by representatives of international organisations, such as EU, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN. Margaret Anstee served as chief mediator in the UN-led peace process in Angola in the early 1990s; Federica Mogherini represents the EU in the Peace Quartet since 2014; Carolyn McAskie served in the UN mediation team in Burundi 1999–2000; and Heidi Tagliavini as the OSCE representative in the negotiations on the Ukrainian conflict in 2014. In addition, we included the category of formal witness/signatory to peace agreement in cases when such positions moved beyond merely observing the negotiation process and its outcome; thus, it was combined with a more active mediation engagement. In such capacity, we found eight cases, for example Adwoa Coleman from Ghana (OAU, predecessor to AU) in the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, Anna Sundström (EU) and Heidi Johansen (Norway) in the Uganda's Juba Peace Process 2008. Rita Sandberg from Norway served as a guarantor to the Colombia-FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) peace talks 2014, where Norway shared the position as a witness to the peace talks together with Cuba.

Seven of the women in our dataset were actively *facilitating* mediation efforts. The facilitation included broad-range activities, such as providing a confidential negotiation environment to the more practical issues of arranging meals for the delegations when the negotiations intensified. By way of illustration, the Swedish diplomat Ulla Andrén facilitated such talks between the government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta in 1998. In a similar fashion, Mona Juul, the Norwegian mediator to the Oslo channel, facilitated a secret milieu in Norway for a small group of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators during 1992–1993 (Juul interview 1994). Another example of facilitation is provided by the case of the Tanzanian diplomat Liberata Mulamula, who represented the International Conference on the Great Lake Region with five others facilitated peace talks in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008. Also Margaret Vogt,

representing the UN, travelled together with the AU to ease tensions between the parties in the Central African Republic in 2013. Rosalind Marsden (EU) teamed up with Mary Robinson, who represented the NGO "The Elders" to facilitate peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 in a joint effort to resolve the conflict over borders. The division of labour was that Marsden and her mediation team should support the AU-led peace talks while Robinson together with Martti Ahtisaari and Desmond Tutu should further the negotiations between the conflicting parties. On *shuttle diplomacy*, strictly defined, we found only two cases and both represent the UN intervening in the Cyprus conflict. These mediation interventions were conducted by Ann Hercus from New Zealand in 1998–1999 and Lisa Buttenheim from the US in 2013.

8.3.4 Peace Agreements and Gender Provisions

In the international discourses on the promotion of women in peace processes, the chief mediator is seen as a critical agent to exercise great influence on the process as they engage directly with the leadership of the conflicting parties (Wallström 2016). There is also an assumed correlation that women's participation increases the likelihood that gender-specific terminology and provisions will be adopted (UN Women 2012). Since one of the overarching tasks of a mediator is to design, structure and facilitate the negotiation process, it provides a window of opportunity to secure women's participation in negotiation. Hence, mediators are critically positioned and have unique opportunities to enforce the requirement of UN resolution 1325. Most importantly, they have the leverage to bring in gender expertise, which can link and coordinate women's groups at the community level with Track 1 peace negotiations; thus reinforcing women's agency, empowerment and interests in peacemaking. Consequently, in our study we have probed two propositions. The first one assessed whether there is any pattern between the presence of women mediators and the outcomes of the negotiation. Of our 36 cases, we found agreements (ceasefire, partial or comprehensive agreement) reached in 61% (22 cases), whereas no agreement in 39% (14 cases).[2]

It is interesting to note that a slight majority of outcomes results in agreements. This departs somewhat from the overarching pattern where most mediation interventions end with failure (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). Still, this relationship needs to be further explored as mediation is a highly contingent practice depending on a broad set of factors, not least

the parties' willingness to negotiate an end to conflict (Zartman 1995). At the same time, Thania Paffenholz et al. (2016) have found a positive correlation in cases where women have been able to exercise a strong influence on the peace negotiations and in the drafting of peace agreements. But they also underline that we need to be wary with giving too much weight to numerical representation. In their study, they did not find a correlation between greater representation of women and influence over the negotiation process. For instance, female "observers" to peace negotiations have recently been increasing, but research shows that they rarely are able to influence the process in any meaningful ways. Hence, Paffenholz et al. underline that rather than counting women the focus should be on assessing women's activities and degree of influence on decision-making bodies at the negotiation table. As such, these activities relate to what extent women are able to influence the start of peace negotiations; to set the negotiation agenda; to add gender provisions to an agreement and to push for it to be signed. In this regard, nationwide public consultation seems to be of essence as illustrated most recently in the case of Colombia's successful conclusion of a peace agreement. Most important is to assess the gender-sensitivity of an agreement and to what extent it addresses women's rights and other gender issues. Women's right are intimately linked to women's political representation in post-conflict phases.

A second proposition we assessed was the underlying argument in contemporary international policy discourses, which underscore that the presence of women as negotiators and mediators increases the likelihood of including gender provisions in peace agreements. Paving way for such an analysis, we made use of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAX) Project, which has collected peace agreements between 1990 and 2015 (www.peaceagreeement.org). Here we found seven cases where gender provisions are clearly spelled out (Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Central African Republic, Uganda). When we compared the list of mediators from our study with the PAX data on peace agreements,[3] two observations were made. First, we did not detect a significant pattern between women as mediators and the quality of peace agreements regarding gender provisions due to the low number of cases. Yet, we did observe that women mediated four of the seven peace agreements that included gender clauses. At the same time, it is important to stress that the majority of the agreements lacked specific provisions on women's rights during this time period (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 Gender of mediator and women's rights

	Women's rights included in the peace agreement	*Women's rights not included in the peace agreement*
Female mediator	4	3
Male mediator	3	23

N = 34

Still, there is a noticeable trend of an increasing number of peace agreements with gender provisions since the launching of UN resolution 1325 in 2000 (Bell 2015). There is also a growing positive development among a number of states (e.g., Sweden, Norway, Australia, Canada, UK) and international organisations (e.g., UN Mediation Support Unit, EEAS, AU) to include gender expertise as part of their negotiation and mediation delegations. For instance, in the case of Liberia it is interesting to note that the first ceasefire and framework agreement between the government of Liberia and the two main armed opposition movements in 2003 did not mention women or issues pertaining to gender. Yet, two months later a comprehensive agreement was signed, which did include some provisions on women's participation in the transition process. Also one provision specifically related to women as a vulnerable group entitled to particular attention with regard to rehabilitation. Still, considering the scope and details of the agreement, surprisingly few gender provisions were included.

One of the major challenges for gender-sensitive peace agreements lies in the quest for implementation. As Christine Bell (2015: 1) states: "often agreements with the most 'holistic' references to women are often highly internationalised agreements in which there is little real 'agreement' between the parties to the conflict, and where as a result there is chronic implementation failure, both of the agreement and of its women provisions." For instance, in the case of the Libreville agreement in 2003, it was the first of its kind where the conflicting parties committed to ending gender-based violence and paying reparations to victims of these crimes. Yet, as O'Reilly and Ó Súilleabháin (2013) point out, these clauses were not implemented. Moreover, despite efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), AU and others to ensure the inclusion of women in the negotiating delegations and to make women's voices from civil society heard at the table, these efforts were rejected. Instead the

government of national unity, created after the peace talks, contained fewer women than the one before (O'Reilly and Ó Súilleabháin 2013: 8).

In sum, the results of our empirical study indicate some small positive changes taken place regarding an increase of women participating as mediators. Also there seems to exist a link between the presence of women as mediators, and the likelihood that peace agreements will be reached. Particularly in cases where women have been able to exercise a strong influence over the negotiation process, gender provisions are more likely to be included. With that said, we still need to probe and corroborate these findings with additional studies.

8.4 Conclusion

Gender, peacebuilding and international relations are today thriving fields of research. In parallel, there exists a widespread interest among diplomats, politicians and practitioners to promote more women in global peacemaking. For instance, since 2012 all UN mediation support teams have included women. Recently, the Nordic governments launched a network of women peace mediators. At the same time, there are strikingly few studies on women and international mediation. Hence, this chapter has addressed this lacuna in research by mapping and analysing women as peace mediators in international conflicts. Our study identified 36 cases where women have been actively engaged as mediators between 1991 and 2014, which constitutes around 8% of the total mediation interventions. The number is still very low and reflects the barriers women encounter when trying to advance to more senior diplomatic and negotiation positions. At the same time, our study indicates a noticeable trend towards an increase, although modest, that has taken place from 2000 onwards, coinciding with the adoption of resolution 1325.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the empirical study. First, no major gender impact was observed regarding context and the type of conflict. The overarching trends regarding where women mediate, and in what types of conflicts follows the global patterns of conflict and mediation. This can partly be explained by the fact that mediators in Track 1 diplomacy act in a formal state capacity (high-ranking minister or diplomat) or as a representative of an international organisation (senior practitioner). As such, gender preferences regarding the type of conflict and context are likely to have less of an impact when a mediator acts on behalf of a state or international institution. Furthermore, women mediators

have been engaged in most regions, yet Africa (50%), Middle East (22%) and Europe (19%) stand out. Women have also mediated nearly equally as many armed conflicts over governments (17) as conflicts over territory (19), including quite diverse settings, such as state-based, low-intensity, frozen and non-state conflicts.

Second, it is notoriously difficult at this stage to draw any major conclusion regarding gender and outcomes of mediation as well the quality of peace agreements due to the low number of cases in our study. Yet, we do note that in cases where gender provisions are included in peace agreements, women mediated more than half of them.

Third, what seems to matter is the nationality of the peace mediators. Nordic, African and American mediators constitute approximately two thirds of all our cases. This generates a number of interesting propositions, which should be further explored. The Nordic countries have more gender equal societies and combined with a strong commitment to international peacemaking it seems to support the advancement of women as mediators. Also there seems to be a correlation between the number of women acting as foreign ministers and mediators. For instance, it is strikingly apparent in the case of US mediators and the pattern can also be found in other countries (e.g., India, Sweden). Finally, traditional cultural authority (Paffenholz et al. 2016) may be an additional source of power for women to advance as peace mediators, which may explain why we see a higher number of African mediators.

As the discussion above already indicates, these propositions need to be corroborated by additional studies. We therefore suggest that a research agenda on gender and peace mediation should advance knowledge about (1) the interplay between gender and styles of mediation; (2) the institutional contexts and various sources of power, which enable and restrain women to act as mediators; and (3) the interrelations between descriptive and substantive representation. Finally, as this chapter presents some overarching trends and patterns we hope that this will spur more systematic, comparative and in-depth single case studies that can advance the state-of-the art on gender and peace mediation.

Notes

1. We would like to thank our research assistants Anna Brandt and Jakob Frizell for outstanding and diligent research assistance. The listing of authors' names is in alphabetic order.

2. Note that the unit of analysis here is individual women mediators, and in cases where there were several women mediators involved in a successful peace process, that success counts several times.
3. Note that there is a difference between the number of women and number of mediation interventions including women. For example, in agreement of Liberia 2003, there were three women mediation interventions although it is here counted as one peace agreement including women mediation.

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CHAPTER 9

Women in Peace Negotiations

Thania Paffenholz

9.1 Introduction[1]

Women remain significantly underrepresented in peace negotiations. The adoption of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000 managed to bring Women, Peace, Security (WPS) onto the UN agenda. This landmark resolution called for increased awareness of women as actors for peace, rather than only as victims of armed conflict. The WPS agenda has since received a surge of attention in both academic and policymaking circles. However, as a UN Women publication stated in 2012, women's participation in peace processes "remains one of the most unfulfilled aspects of the women, peace and security agenda" (UN Women 2012: 1). There is still a lack of evidence-based knowledge on how women can achieve enough influence to have a significant impact on peace processes. In past processes, women have often been included merely due to normative pressure applied by women's groups and international actors.

Yet, research shows that it is not the inclusion of women per se, but rather women's actual influence on peace negotiations that is positively correlated with a higher likelihood of reaching sustainable peace

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agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016: 6). This research found that at and beyond the negotiation table, there are multiple different entry points into peace negotiations for women, such as direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, and public decision-making. These different entry points can be categorised to form seven modalities of inclusion. The study also identified a set of factors that affect the ability of women to be included in and have influence on peace processes, such as selection criteria and procedures, decision-making procedures, and coalitions. Other factors are based on the specific context in which the peace process takes place, such as elite support or resistance, public buy-in, and societal attitudes to women and gender roles.

This chapter thus aims to address a gap in the current academic and policy fields and, in doing so, contributes to the overarching research questions of this book, and particularly the first and third questions, by providing insights on how women participate in and influence peace negotiations, and on the impact of women's inclusion and influence on peace negotiations. As such, this chapter focuses on the various avenues through which women can be included in peace negotiations. It begins with a general overview of recent policy developments and existing academic studies on women in peace negotiations. Most policy and academic debates tend to focus on women's presence in, rather than their actual impact on, peace processes. The following section discusses the critical shift of emphasis from "counting women" towards "making women count" and subsequently presents some of the major insights on women's inclusion in and influence on peace negotiations derived from a multi-year comparative research project on inclusive peace and transition processes. The chapter then discusses seven modalities of women's inclusion in peace processes, illustrated with relevant examples. The final section is dedicated to explaining the process and context factors that can either enable or constrain women's participation in a peace process.

9.2 Counting Women

The inclusion of women in peace negotiations has only recently gained attention at the UN, regional organisations, and amongst other mediating and negotiating parties in peace processes. UNSC resolution 1325 was widely hailed as a milestone and unprecedented achievement, as it marked the first time the UNSC recognised the importance of including women in all aspects of conflict prevention, peace negotiations and

peacebuilding. Indeed, resolution 1325 called on all actors to adopt measures "that support local women's peace initiatives … for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements". However, women's inclusion in peace processes still remains a side issue for the UN, and the majority of UNSC resolutions on WPS[2] have continued to portray women as victims rather than as agents for peace.

Although progress remains slow, resolution 1325 has led to some important further developments in the WPS field. For example, subsequent resolutions 1889 (2009) and 2122 (2013) turn their focus on women's participation. While the former includes a call to make greater use of gender advisors and to take women's empowerment into consideration during post-conflict planning, the latter requests the UN Secretary-General to support the appointment of women as mediators, and calls on parties to peace processes to "facilitate the equal and full participation of women at decision-making levels". Moreover, in 2010, the UN Secretary-General released a report on women's participation in peacebuilding, which contains seven commitments to increase women's representation and to include a gender aspect in peace negotiations (UNSG 2010). The first of these commitments is a call for greater women's participation in peace processes (UNSG 2010: 8). This commitment entails four specific measures, two of which are aimed at increasing the number of women involved directly in negotiations, both as chief mediators and as participants. The other two measures call for increased consultation with women's civil society groups and for the inclusion of gender expertise at senior UN levels (UNSG 2010: 9–10). However, the report has since been criticised for solely addressing women's participation in terms of quantity (how many women were represented), rather than focussing on the quality of their inclusion, that is, how they influenced the process (True 2013).

This trend of "counting women" in peace processes continues. Two years after the Secretary-General's report, UN Women released a comprehensive document on the inclusion of women in peace processes. Like the Secretary-General's report, this study focused on the low number of women participants in peace processes and on ways to increase them. Its authors analysed 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, and found that women only made up around 4% of signatories, 2% of chief mediators,[3] and 9% of negotiators (UN Women 2012: 3). As they note, "underrepresentation of women at the peace table is much

more marked than in other public decision-making roles" (UN Women 2012: 3). The report also highlights, however, that the number of women within mediation teams has increased, and that more consultations with women's groups have taken place in recent years (UN Women 2012: 3). In 2015, the "Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325", a result of resolution 2122, marked the fifteenth anniversary of resolution 1325. The Global Study includes a chapter on "Women's Participation", which refers to women's inclusion in peace processes. UNSC resolution 2242, also adopted in 2015, addresses women's roles in countering violent extremism and terrorism, improving the Security Council's own working methods in relation to women, peace and security, and taking up gender recommendations made by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study. Notably, it *"encourages* those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks".

Most academic studies on the impact of resolution 1325 have, similar to UN documents, also focused on the number of women involved in peace processes, rather than on their influence. As Bell and O'Rourke (2010) have argued, resolution 1325 has played a central role in the growing number of references to women and gender issues in peace agreements. While before the year 2000, only around 11% of peace agreements made a specific reference to women, this has since increased to 27% (Bell and O'Rourke 2010: 954). Ellerby (2013) makes a similar observation regarding the impact of resolution 1325. While only 10% of peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010 have fulfilled the criteria set forth in the resolution regarding participation of and reference to women, this number has increased in recent years (Ellerby 2013). Nonetheless, that number remains very low. Only 65% of peace agreements contain *any* reference to women or gender (Ellerby 2016). As Waylen (2014: 17) notes, "gender-blind peace agreements are still the norm, rather than the exception."

Where an agreement is gender sensitive, women have greater access to representation in post-conflict governance (Domingo et al. 2015: 22). Anderson and Swiss (2014: 53) have found that women's inclusion in the peace process has a positive effect on their post-conflict representation. They also found that in peace processes which include a greater number of women, the final agreement is more likely to contain commitments to women's rights and other gender issues, such as gender quotas for future

representation in government. Stone (2014) found that the use of gender quotas and increased representation of women have a positive impact on the durability of peace. Her research is based on logistic regression analysis of 156 signed peace agreements between 1989 and 2011 and found that when women were included in the peace process, the short-term durability of peace, measured as non-commencement of armed conflict within one year, increases.[4]

As the Global Review of resolution 1325 (2015: 14) states: "much of the progress toward the implementation of resolution 1325 continues to be measured in 'firsts', rather than as standard practice." While many observers recognise resolution 1325 as a "groundbreaking achievement" for the recognition of women's roles in peace and security (Tryggestad 2009), many also warn that its substance will take a long time to be realised (Miller, Pournik and Swaine 2014: 15). The developments over the past 15 years have shown that this warning is especially relevant for the recognition of women's participation in peace processes. Where women's roles as active participants are recognised at all, they largely focus on the presence of women involved in a peace negotiation, instead on whether women were able to actually influence the process.

9.3 Making Women Count

In recent years, the focus has begun to shift from "counting women" towards "making women count" (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Waylen (2014: 517) has argued that women need to be represented in diverse roles and at all levels in negotiations, including within administration and technical support. Ellerby (2016: 8) states that "a seat at the table is not enough". While women may be present in negotiations, their voices are often excluded or they may not focus on women's issues specifically. A comparative study on how and why women can and have been included in (or excluded from) peace negotiations resulted in some novel and significant findings regarding women's inclusion in peace negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016).

This analysis distilled research from the Broadening Participation project, a multi-year comparative research project at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Amongst 40 in-depth qualitative case studies under review for this project, 28 included a measurable involvement of women. The cases focused on official high-level political negotiations comprising the pre-negotiation, negotiation and

implementation phase (if any). Thus, each case study constitutes a negotiation case, rather than a country case. The case selection was based on the following criteria: the occurrence of different types of peacemaking, constitution-making and major political reforms leading to political transitions; coverage of a range of geographic regions; and the featuring of at least two modalities of inclusion. Data were collected from primary and secondary sources, as well as through in-depth interviews with mediators, negotiators, included actors involved in the negotiations, and academics with experience relevant to the case study in question.[5]

This research examined the category of "women" as a distinct group included in peace, transition, and constitution-making processes. Women were defined as relatively organised groups, including delegations of women, women's civil society organisations, coalitions or networks, which sought inclusion in peace negotiations and the implementation of agreements.[6] Women's influence was defined as the ability of women's groups and networks to push for their preferences before, during, and after negotiations.[7] Women's preferences may include:

1. Bringing issues onto the official negotiation and implementation agendas;
2. Ensuring specific issues are written into agreements, and taking part in their implementation;
3. Pushing for negotiations to start or resume, and influencing the signing of an agreement.

The strength of women's influence was judged based on their activities during negotiations, rather than on whether an agreement was reached or implemented. Weak influence was defined as bringing only some items onto the negotiation agenda or trying to push for negotiations to begin or for an agreement to be signed within a specified timeframe. Strong influence was defined as bringing several significant issues onto the agenda and integrating proposals for an agreement, or strongly pushing for negotiations to begin or for an agreement to be signed.

Notably, the research findings showed the importance of differentiating between the mere numerical presence of women, and their actual influence over the peace process. They also demonstrated that even when women were well represented at the negotiation table in terms of numbers, this did not necessarily mean that they had any influence. Strong influence of

women on a peace process was found to be correlated with more agreements being reached and implemented.

In the examined cases, the inclusion of women in peace processes was often contested or met with indifference, rather than treated as a natural, self-evident procedure. When women were included in the process, this tended to occur for normative reasons. While there was a general awareness among mediation teams of the international normative framework pushing for women's inclusion in peace processes, it was rare for conflict and negotiation parties to actively push for women's meaningful participation in peace negotiations. Thus, women's groups tended to rely on their own efforts or on external support.

There are many reasons why certain groups are included or excluded from peace negotiation process. Peace negotiations tend to involve the major parties to a specific conflict, usually high-level political and military actors (in most cases, led and represented by men). As such, peace processes can be very exclusive in nature. However, peace and transition talks can also follow a broad-based model, including a wide range of actors. Contrary to common assumptions that exclusive processes more effectively lead to agreements, research from the Broadening Participation project shows that broader inclusion does not reduce the likelihood of reaching peace agreements (Paffenholz 2015). The exclusion of certain groups is often based on the strategic reasons of conflict or negotiating parties in order to overcome a lack of legitimacy or ensure public support. Societal and cultural attitudes towards gender roles also affect the predisposition of negotiators and mediators to women's inclusion in peace negotiations. Resistance towards women's participation has ranged from questioning their independence and the legitimacy of their presence to harassment and even serious threats. In cases where women had traditional authority or had acquired experience in unifying on women's issues, they tended to be more easily accepted and acknowledged as active participants in the peace process.

The research yielded valuable insights into how women have been included in and successfully exerted influence on peace processes, and why in other cases they were unable to influence the negotiations. The following sections thus provide an overview of the modalities and the process and context factors that determine whether women are included and how much influence they exert on a peace process.

9.4 Modalities of Women's Inclusion

Researchers and policymakers working on women's inclusion have so far concentrated on increasing the number of women at the negotiating table, as the official lieu of the peace process. However, the excessive focus on women at the negotiation table needs to be challenged. There exist a myriad of different ways through which women can meaningfully participate in and influence a peace process. One option is for women to be included directly at the negotiation table, for example as representatives of a main conflict party or as independent women-only delegations alongside other delegations. Women's groups may also be granted observer status at the negotiation table, or they may take on roles in sub-committees and technical committees, which form part of the peace negotiations. Other alternatives include more indirect means of influence by women's groups, for example through track 1.5, 2, and 3 activities that run parallel to the formal track 1 negotiations. These multiple entry points for women's engagement in peace processes can be clustered into seven modalities of inclusion (see Table 9.1). In each of these modalities, women have taken on a variety of roles.

1. *Modality 1: Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table*

Direct representation at the negotiation table, often referred to as the track 1 process, is the most conventional modality of inclusion in peace negotiations. Usually these formal negotiations include the main conflict parties, which may involve government representatives, as well as non-state actors. Direct representation tends to occur during the negotiation phase. However, in some cases, dialogues can also take place during the

Table 9.1 Seven modalities of inclusion

1. Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table
2. Observer Status
3. Consultations
4. Inclusive Commissions
5. High-Level Problem-Solving Workshops
6. Public Decision-Making
7. Mass Action

implementation of a previous agreement. Alternatives for the inclusion of women include participation in the official negotiation delegations of the main conflict parties or via the creation of a separate women's delegation right alongside other parties. Working groups, sub-committees, or technical committees focusing on specific issues can also facilitate the broader inclusion of different groups at the table.

The research results show that women's quotas provided for in the selection criteria for negotiation delegations have proved effective in increasing women's representation. Yet, women's quotas alone did not automatically lead to greater influence. In many cases, party loyalties took precedence over shared women's interests. Interestingly, women were more likely to exercise influence at the negotiation table when they had their own women-only delegation and/or when they were able to strategically coordinate among women across delegations in order to advance common interests. They did so by formulating joint positions on key issues, and/or by forming unified women's coalitions across formal delegations. In order to exert influence, women also needed to be part of decision-making bodies at the table.

2. *Modality 2: Observer Status*

Although observers have no official role in peace negotiations, their direct presence during negotiations can bring a number of advantages. Observers are mostly included during the negotiation phase, both in peacemaking and constitution-making negotiations. For example, they can follow the negotiations in the same room, informally advise mediators and the negotiating conflict parties if/when needed, and/or form alliances with other observer groups to help facilitate a final agreement (Paffenholz 2014). Groups included with observer status can exercise normative and/or political pressure on the conflict parties, or influence agenda-setting by lobbying for new issues to be added to the negotiation agenda. However, only a few groups are granted observer status in a peace process, and thus their selection is a crucial aspect of ensuring their meaningful participation. Moreover, observers are often co-opted in or sidelined from negotiations and due to the typically limited number of observers, it is difficult to achieve representativeness of all stakeholders in a peace process.

The cases examined show that granting women observer status has often been used as a means of including women in peace negotiations, although it has not been the most common approach among the seven

inclusion modalities. In the case of Liberia (2003) for example, women observers were influential mainly due to their close cooperation and the existence of a strong women's movement outside of the negotiations. However, research shows that women with observer status have rarely been able to meaningfully influence a peace process. The effect of issues related to the selection of observers or their broader representativeness on women's influence in peace processes is highly context-sensitive. The ways in which women were able to use their observer status during negotiations varied according to a set of specific factors, such as selection, influence on the negotiation delegations (mainly conflict parties), and coalition-building with groups outside of the negotiations to form a strategic alliance.

3. *Modality 3: Consultations*

Consultations can be elite-based; broad-based or public and may take place in different formats and constellations: during the preparations of, in parallel with, and/or after track 1 negotiations. They can constitute a formal part of the official process (with state- and/or non-state actors) or remain informal. Official and unofficial consultations can be representative to a greater or lesser extent and may be limited to elite groups, whereas public consultations are usually broad-based and thus more representative. Consultations can include a broad set of perspectives, thus conferring greater legitimacy on a peace process, and they can facilitate discussions on complex issues, providing a manageable alternative to official negotiations in cases where progress is slow or stalled. Yet, the results of consultations are not always taken into account on the formal negotiation table and consultative forums may also be co-opted by certain groups seeking to use civil society to push and promote their own agendas. Clear and effective transfer strategies, which systematically communicate the consultation's results to mediators and negotiation parties, need to be put in place, in order to ensure that consultations influence the process.

Consultations were found to constitute the most frequently used modality of inclusion in peace groups for all actors, including women's groups, among the case studies examined. In fact, most broad-based and public consultations included women. Women-only consultations were rare, although some underlined the importance of improving understanding of women's needs and demands. Women who were able to promote a joint position on women's issues and a clear explanation of women's demands within consultations were most successful in formally or informally influencing the peace process. The Women's National Coalition in South Africa

(1990), which conducted nationwide public consultations on women's issues, is a noteworthy example. The results of these consultations helped shape the publication of the Women's Charter for Effective Equality. The latter significantly influenced equality provisions in the 1997 constitution.

4. *Modality 4: Inclusive Commissions*

While inclusive commissions are usually set up after the signing of peace agreements, they are sometimes established before or during a negotiation process. In the latter case, they can be tasked with preparing or conducting a peace process. Commissions established in the post-agreement phase can have a crucial role during the implementation of a peace agreement through their contribution to transitional justice mechanisms, ceasefire monitoring, or constitution-making. Commissions can also serve as permanent constitutional bodies, as was the case with the inter-ethnic commission in Kyrgyzstan (2013) and the National Integration and Cohesion Commission in Kenya (2008), which both promoted equal rights for all ethnic groups in the country.

Gender equality provisions, such as quotas, had a significant impact on the presence of women in post-agreement commissions. It is important that such gender equality provisions be explicit, especially when there are many additional selection criteria in addition to gender. This also helps ensure the inclusion of highly qualified women in the peace process. Women participated in commissions in all negotiation phases. The research results showed that in order to exercise influence in commissions, it was necessary for women to get involved as early as possible. Explicit gender equality provisions such as specific quotas introduced from the outset can help ensure women's participation in all commissions and across all peace process phases. In turn, this can influence the language in the final peace agreement.

5. *Modality 5: High-Level Problem-Solving Workshops (Track 1.5)*

High-level problem-solving workshops can create an informal space for discussion for representatives close to leaders of negotiation parties and can thus serve as an alternative to a formal track 1 process when belligerents refuse to meet publicly (Paffenholz 2014b). They tend to be unofficial and unpublicised. Such discussion spaces can continue over several years. In many cases, they are organised and facilitated by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) or academic institutions, occasionally with local partners.

The research found that women were underrepresented in high-level problem-solving workshops. However, women were able to reach joint positions in workshops that were specifically designed to address and overcome tensions and grievances of women. As a result, women were also able to issue joint statements, which successfully influenced processes. This was the case in the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2002. Similar to consultations, the success of all actors, including women's groups, in problem-solving workshops is determined by the availability of efficient and effective transfer strategies, which bring the results of the discussions to the official negotiation table.

6. *Modality 6: Public Decision-Making*

In some cases, peace agreements and/or new constitutions are submitted for ratification through public decision-making processes, such as referenda, which tend to be binding. Moreover, strong public endorsement for a peace agreement can also increase its legitimacy, and help ensure public support and the sustainability of the agreement. However, a public vote rejecting the peace agreement can put the entire process on hold. This was the case in Cyprus, as the UN-developed Annan Peace Plan was accepted overwhelmingly by Turkish Cypriots, yet rejected by Greek Cypriots. In contrast, Northern Ireland's referendum to ratify the Good Friday agreement was overwhelmingly accepted.

Unfortunately, reliable gender-disaggregated data on women's voting patterns in public decision-making processes is rare, which poses difficulties for understanding how women influence such processes. According to Northern Irish survey data, women were not overwhelmingly more supportive of the peace agreement than men. In Guatemala (1989), where no gender-disaggregated data on voter participation was recorded, women's engagement in the peace process can only be inferred through a comparison with data from the 1999 Consulta Popular. Such a comparison suggests that women's participation in the referendum on the Guatemalan peace process was much lower than that of men (which would also reflect a worldwide phenomenon of gender disparities in public participation).

7. *Modality 7: Mass Action*

Mass action, such as public demonstrations, that mobilise large numbers of people, often through social media and mass media channels, can exert

strong public pressure on established and incumbent political elites. Such mass action is often based on grassroots, and bottom-up initiatives with a common goal, such as political reforms to end authoritarian rule, the cessation of war and armed conflict, and/or the signing of a peace deal (Paffenholz 2014b). Such mass action is not always necessarily pro-peace. Mass demonstrations in Nepal in 2006 pressured conflict parties to end the war and authoritarian rule, yet Sri Lanka's demonstrations in 2000 against peace negotiations were stronger and louder than pro-peace movements. That is, while the former case of mass action paved the way to the Nepalese Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the demonstrations in Sri Lanka resulted in the end of the negotiations.

Women have organised and performed mass campaigns in favour of peace deals more than any other group. There are many examples of women pressuring conflict parties to take up negotiations and reach peace agreements, including the extensive demonstrations at key venues by the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) in Liberia, which directly resulted in an invitation to the formal negotiations as observers. Although WIPNET ultimately turned down this invitation, its demonstrations increased the network's influence on the peace negotiations as they proceeded. Women's groups in Somaliland (1991) also regularly organised demonstrations at the negotiation venues, which brought them exposure and influenced decisions to include them as observers in the eventual Boroma conference. Their actions also helped them to voice demands that were substantially acknowledged in the creation of a national Guurtii (conference), which was then formalised in a national charter. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition was able to use mass mobilisation in order to successfully lobby for a positive outcome at the ballot boxes for the ratification of the peace agreement.

9.5 Factors that Enable or Constrain Women's Inclusion

In addition to modalities of inclusion, the study also examined why women were (or were not) able to assert influence on peace negotiations and their implementation in past peace processes. The research identified a set of process and context factors that may either enable or constrain the influence of women on peace and transition processes. While the first set of factors is related to how the process of inclusion is

designed, the second set of factors focuses on the context in which this inclusion takes place. Understanding these factors can help establish the conditions most conducive to facilitating the successful and meaningful involvement of women in peace processes, and help overcome obstacles to their inclusion. This, in turn, can have a positive overall impact on the peace process.

9.5.1 Process Factors

The various determinants affecting the ability of women to participate in and effectively influence peace processes can be regrouped into nine main process factors (Table 9.2).

1. *Selection Criteria and Procedures*

Selection criteria and procedures determine which actors are included in a peace process. Thus, they are one of the main determinants affecting women's participation in such processes, as they constitute a pre-condition for inclusion in any of the above-mentioned modalities of inclusion. The research found that selection criteria had direct influence on the representativeness of included groups, and had a significant impact on the level of women's influence in practice.

Table 9.2 Nine process factors

1. Selection criteria and procedures that include gender criteria
2. Decision-making procedures that allow women to make use of their presence
3. Coalitions and joint positions among participating women that enhance their influence
4. Transfer strategies that allow women's positions and inputs to reach the negotiation table, in particular in inclusion modalities farther from the table
5. Conflict parties and mediators that are friendly to the inclusion of women
6. Early involvement of women in the process
7. Support structures for women prior to and during negotiations as well as for the implementation process
8. Monitoring of women and gender provisions during implementation as well as monitoring of major gains in the peace process
9. Funding

2. *Decision-Making*

Decision-making procedures determine how participants' contributions and preferences are validated across all seven modalities of inclusion. They can make the difference between nominal representation and meaningful influence. Without procedures explicitly enabling women to influence decision-making processes, their influence can be substantially limited.

3. *Coalition-Building*

Through coalitions, women can mobilise around common issues, and thus achieve a unified, joint position or statement. Coalitions may take the form of an umbrella organisation (this was the case in Liberia in 2003, South Africa in 1990, in Kenya in 2008, and in Yemen in 2013), a separate group or clan (as in Somalia in 1999), a political party (as in Northern Ireland in 1994), or an organised block across delegations (as in DRC in 1999). The research found that women's coalitions who were able to negotiate as a unified group on issues of their interest, were much more likely to be heard and have their views taken into account.

4. *Transfer Strategies*

Transfer strategies are particularly important in relation to modalities outside of the negotiation table as they determine if and how actors' preferences feed into the peace process. Such mechanisms may occur through insider strategies, that is, the handing over of reports or non-papers to members of the formal track 1 process, or through outsider strategies, such as public reports, and press statements. The research showed that women were often able to increase their influence through the effective use of transfer strategies, especially through the creation of common documents combined with public outreach campaigns.

5. *Conflict Parties and Mediators*

The attitudes of conflict parties and mediators constitute a further enabling (or constraining) factor for women's inclusion in peace processes. Mediators with a positive disposition to women's inclusion could significantly affect women's inclusion, in terms of representation and actual influence. Experienced women mediators with a strong understanding of

gender can also provide strong support to women. This was the case with Graça Machel in the 2008 Kenyan negotiations. However, only around 2.4% of chief mediators selected for contemporary peace processes have been female (UN Women 2012).

6. *Early Involvement of Women in the Process*

Early involvement of women in a peace process—preferably beginning in the pre-negotiation phase—can set a precedent for the inclusion of women throughout the peace process, increasing their ability to meaningfully influence the outcomes. The research showed that women included during the pre-negotiation and actual negotiation phase (often through quotas) were also able to participate in the implementation phase, and in post-agreement political institutions.

7. *Support Structures*

Support structures, such as resource centres providing technical support like computers and internet access, as well as gender and other content-specific advice, were found to allow women to make more effective and differentiated quality contributions to a peace process. In fact, the research results showed that women benefitted more from such target support than did other participants. Such support structures were found to enhance women's influence before and throughout peace negotiations, as well as in the post-agreement phase.

8. *Monitoring*

Monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement is crucial. However, in most cases monitoring mechanisms are weak. Women's involvement in monitoring has also generally been very weak. Even in cases where women had significant influence on negotiations, successfully included provisions in the final agreement, and ensured a gender quota for implementation bodies, the translation of these achievements into practice was rarely monitored.

9. *Funding*

Funding affects women's action and inclusion throughout all modalities of inclusion, and it is a basic pre-condition for participation, especially

with regard to informal inclusion mechanisms. Adequate funding support can facilitate the preparedness of women, and it is often also necessary to cover travel costs to peace processes taking place in distant venues.

9.5.2 Context Factors

The research also identified nine context factors (Table 9.3), which can enable and constrain women's inclusion, whilst also shaping the trajectories of the peace process at large. These are often interlinked with process factors, as well as with different modalities.

1. Elite Resistance or Support

Elite resistance or support can be a game-changer in peace processes. Often inclusive peace processes are perceived as challenging existing power structures and accordingly, there tends to be resistance of elite groups towards change. The research found that with regard to broader inclusion and women's inclusion in particular, conflict parties and other elites were highly likely to attempt to determine the selection criteria and decision-making procedures in a way that would enhance their own positions, and decrease the influence of other groups' preferences.

2. Public Buy-In

The level of public buy-in can determine the success or failure of a peace process. Without public support, it is very difficult to implement a peace

Table 9.3 Nine context factors

1. Elite resistance or support
2. Public buy-in
3. Regional and international actors' influence on peace processes
4. Presence of strong women's groups
5. Preparedness of women
6. Heterogeneity of women's identities
7. Attitudes and expectations surrounding societal gender roles
8. Regional and international women's networks
9. Existence of prior commitments or gender provisions

agreement. Actors can attempt to influence the public buy-in in order to generate public momentum for their preferences. Women's groups can be strongly involved in such public campaigns. For example, in the run up to the Northern Irish referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition was in the forefront supporting the large-scale civil society campaign for an outcome in favour of the agreement.

3. Regional and International Actors' Influence

Powerful regional and international actors can have a considerable impact on peace processes. Such actors can be involved as mediators, groups of friends, observers, or parties to the negotiations, and they can have a crucial role in ensuring the participation of women and in bringing women's issues to the agenda. The European Union's influence on the Cyprus conflict was more significant than the UN's peace plan. In the Nepali conflict, the role of India led to greater involvement of the Nepali civil society movement.

4. Presence of Strong Women's Groups

The existence of strong women's groups, networks, or movements in a country prior to peace negotiations can have an impact on women's involvement in the process. In cases where such women's groups were already active before the peace process, women were able to draw upon existing experience and resources to push for their meaningful participation in the process through mass campaigns, facilitate the start of peace talks, and raise the necessary funds for continued involvement.

5. Preparedness of Women

Women's groups with significant experience and substantive expertise based on previous efficient organisation and/or mobilisation were more likely to influence peace processes in a meaningful way. In this context, seniority of women can thus play a role. A culture and tradition of strong civil society organisations encourages the strength of women's groups. In South Africa, women's organisations were formed as early as 1911, and this consequently had an important impact throughout the 1980s,

as unifying, non-racial women's organisations formed to work against the apartheid regime.

6. Heterogeneity of Women's Identities

Women's identities are inherently diverse, and although the heterogeneity of women's identifies has helped women to influence process in some instances, it has also sometimes worked against them. Gender is only one of a wide range of identity characteristics; however, it can intersect with and shape other identities as well. Women can also identify themselves as members of a faith, regional grouping or political party. However, in politicised processes, identifying with another identity or pushing for some of the same issues as an opposing negotiating party can be difficult. Such divisions can be overcome through process factors, including coalition-building, the role of mediators, and the availability of support structures.

7. Attitudes and Expectations Surrounding Societal Gender Roles

The inclusion of women can be facilitated or rendered extremely different due to social attitudes and expectations surrounding gender roles. In Papua New Guinea / Bougainville (1997), women had a recognised role as mediators in society and were thus invited to participate in the process, which also facilitated their ability to influence the outcomes. On the other hand in Yemen (2013), women's rights were contentious issues and female participants to the process were threatened, sexually harassed and assaulted. Women in the DRC (1999) and in Afghanistan (2001) reported similar experiences.

8. Regional and International Women's Networks

Local women's groups can benefit from support from regional and international women's networks. In the 2003–2011 Liberian peace process, women's networks organised a mass mobilisation in neighbouring Sierra Leone, thus outside the main peace negotiations. This was facilitated through the support of a regional women's network that was also active in Sierra Leone, which provided logistical assistance, as well as other forms of support.

9. Existence of Prior Commitments or Gender Provisions

Prior commitments to women's rights or gender provisions can determine the chances of future involvement of women's groups. Such provisions can give women a legitimate claim to participate in the process, and render it harder for other actors to argue for exclusion of women. The transitional governance agreement for Yemen reached by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2011 foresaw the participation of women in the upcoming National Dialogue Conference (2013–2014).

9.6 Conclusion

Recognising that women's influence can have a positive impact on peace processes is a crucial first step towards ensuring that women's contributions have a lasting impact on peace processes. Women can influence peace negotiations through various modalities, even if they are not directly present at the table. Moreover, a diverse set of process and context factors can enable or constrain women's influence. Process factors include: clear selection criteria and procedures for their inclusion; decision-making procedures that take women's voices into account; better transfer strategies of women's positions to the negotiation table; conflict parties and mediators who value women's inclusion; involvement of women from an early stage; support structures before and during negotiations, and during implementation; monitoring of women and gender provisions; and funding. Furthermore, context factors comprise: resistance or support by political elites; public buy-in; regional and international actors' influence on peace processes; presence of strong women's groups; preparedness of women; heterogeneity of women's identities; attitudes and expectations surrounding societal gender roles; regional and international women's networks; and the existence of prior commitments or gender provisions.

Despite the adoption of resolution 1325 and evidence that demonstrates women's added value to peace negotiations, many practitioners continue to be opposed to women's inclusion. Among them are negotiators and mediators, who often view women's inclusion as an obstacle to the signing of a peace agreement. Research has shown that even if women's inclusion still meets resistance or indifference by many negotiation parties and mediators, women have made substantial contributions

to peacemaking and constitution-building processes, and the implementation of agreements. In fact, this research found a positive correlation between women's strong influence on peace negotiations and the eventual implementation of peace agreements reached. The research also suggests that merely increasing women's participation is not sufficient for ensuring that their voices are heard and taken into account in peace processes. Thus, many recent discussions on women's participation in peace processes have been missing the point: it is not about counting women, but rather about making women count.

Notes

1. I would like to express my gratitude to Nicola Ann Hardwick for her substantial contribution in writing this chapter, as well as to Dominique Marion Fraser for her support with background research and proof-editing.
2. See UNSC Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013).
3. While no woman has ever been appointed as chief mediator in a peace process, some women have played a chief mediating role, for example as Special Representatives, or as part of The Elders (UN Women 2012: 7).
4. A limitation of this research is the inclusion of cases in which as few as one woman participated in the peace process, which renders the link between women's participation and the impact of the peace agreement on the short-term durability of peace questionable.
5. For more detailed information on the case studies and the methodology, see "Broadening Participation" at http://www.inclusivepeace.org/content/broadening-participation.
6. Delegations of women were defined as groups of actors set up for the specific purpose of women's inclusion into a negotiation or implementation process, and women's civil society organisation were defined as voluntary organisations interacting in the public sphere, focussing largely on women's and gender issues. The term women's coalitions was used to refer to women uniting over a specific cause or issue. Networks were considered as interconnected coalitions of different women's organisations.
7. Women's preferences can be either positive or negative. Positive preferences refer to women's push for negotiations and the signing and implementation of an agreement, while negative preferences mean an opposition to negotiations, their agreements, or their implementation.

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CHAPTER 10

Diplomacy as Crisis: An Institutional Analysis of Gender and the Failure to Negotiate Peace in Israel

Sarai B. Aharoni

10.1 Introduction

Diplomacy has been historically understood as an act of border-crossing that enables representatives to exchange ideas, delegate interests and negotiate conflicts. Women were largely absent from these crucial meeting points due to historical circumstances that made the assumption that women belonged in the private sphere nearly universal. However, the supposition that politics and diplomacy are interconnected with male authority and privilege was already challenged in the early twentieth century by powerful feminist liberal thinkers like Jane Addams, Olive Schreiner and Virginia Woolf. These women and many others noticed that the great historical events of their times, including the diplomatic ceremonial peace accords that ended World War I and World War II, were dictated, drafted or negotiated by men only.

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Though scholars and activists still debate controversial issues concerning women's representation and the relationship between women's rights and the patriarchal state, many agree that social change *can* transform political institutions. Consequently, institutional reforms of state policies, agencies and law have become central in both feminist theory and public policy. Yet, longitudinal evidence has shown that certain policy areas adapt more easily to demands posed by women's movements and international organisations than others. Until recently, security and foreign policy remained one of the most male-dominant spheres in national and global politics.

This is partly why feminist articulations of political representation in war- and peace-related political processes are so important. In peacetime diplomacy, feminist scholars not only challenged masculine stereotypes of authority and leadership but also attempted to better understand how gender is constructed and reproduced by the division of labour within national foreign policy institutions (Enloe 1989; Cohn 1987) and in the "space between states" (Grant 1991). These critiques engage moral questions about objectivity, asymmetry, power relations and justice in militarised diplomatic encounters. For example, Sara Ruddick (1995: 182) suggested that a focus on emotions is an important feminist contribution to the critique of realist models of peace negotiations, because by "taking an "objective" distance from the rage and fear of battle, conflict resolution negotiators are left without resources to understand the failure that leads to war and the preparations for war; nor can they manage the emotions of peace, that is, of life" (182).

Accordingly, the question "Where are the women" in the field of diplomacy is not only tied to broader political issues concerning women's descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. As Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns explain in the introduction, it calls attention to the way collective identity, interests and resources are delegated in the context of global politics in times of stability or crisis. It calls attention to norms. It calls attention to institutions. Assuming that women in various periods and locations *did* have an active (yet limited) role in political and economic negotiations, feminist curiosity is meant to uncover the political contexts and social norms that enable or restrict their patterns of participation and ability to make a difference.

This chapter attempts to follow these concerns by tracing historical shifts in a particular case study, the case of conflict-related diplomacy in Israel, and to describe women's presence in cross-national negotiations. By adopting a new-institutionalist perspective, it contends that Israeli

women's presence and absence from senior diplomatic encounters are related to the institutional framing of such encounters as militarised emergency settings and the secrecy, structurelessness and risk they involve.

After a short discussion of feminist contributions to new-intuitionalist theory, I explain why peace negotiations are an institution. I then describe three different institutional manifestations of such negotiations through a method of historical snapshots. These include the secret meetings of Golda Meir and King Abdullah in 1947/1948; the relatively unknown presence of women in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations during the 1990s; and the Annapolis Peace Summit in 2007. All three snapshots engage the subject of temporality and authority. Temporality is judged by the status of peace negotiations as a crisis *event* or a state of emergency, which determines both the actual abilities of women to participate and their authority to produce political narratives about successful or failed outcomes. Authority calls attention to who is responsible for producing institutional discourses on foreign policy; and how official discourses compare with multiple voices in unofficial documentation, such as in-depth interviews or "leaked" papers that were originally considered as classified (memos, protocols and minutes). I argue that both temporality and authority are important for understanding the ongoing marginalisation of women's presence and voice in foreign policy and peace negotiations, in spite of various demands for institutional reform.

10.2 New-Institutionalist Approaches to Gender and Foreign Policy

The emergence of the state—its bureaucracy, regulations, power—and the consequential change in women's access to rights, education, resources and leadership (as political and military leaders) created a whole new set of questions that apply to modern diplomacy and conflict resolution. Indeed, historical analysis of Western democracies suggests that the exclusion of women from civil service, a practice that has been long justified by the early modern state apparatus, was transformed through a combination of institutional modifications and normative shifts. Women's access to formal politics was achieved by various means, including legal reforms, national women's policy agencies and sex quotas. The far-reaching impact of these transformations was enhanced due to external challenges and the emergence of global concerns and standards associated with Western liberal values (Towns 2010).

Calling attention to the historical evolution of different types of states, institutionalists focus on the relationships between such institutions, ideas and behaviour in order to explain processes of stagnation, continuity and transformation. Although states differ in the degree of economic development, type of regime and definition of citizenship, all states have institutions. According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 938), institutions could be defined in several ways: as "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity"; as rational-based regulative bodies that can sustain enforcement mechanisms; or as "symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the "frames of meaning" guiding human action" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).

The idea that states should care for women's rights and gender equality has produced myriad demands and forms of state feminism. The feminist institutionalist turn which started in the late 1980s opened up new ways to think about these processes and about how gender is embedded, produced and reproduced within and by institutions at all levels (Acker 1990). Based on the assumption that women and men do not just bring with them a fixed set of beliefs and practices into an organisation, feminist institutionalists contend that "constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily life or logic of political institutions" (Mackay et al. 2010).

Feminist scholarship has particularly expanded several areas within new-institutionalism. First, by focusing on the way both formal and informal institutions are gendered, it highlights the interplay of formal mechanisms for the distribution of power and resources with informal norms, rules and practices. Second, feminists have rephrased the structure/agency problem to emphasise that agency involves "real people" who engage with material realities and employ a diverse set of "strategic, creative and intuitive actions as well as calculating self-interest" (Mackay et al. 2010: 583). Third, feminist institutionalists engage the question of asymmetry and power relations by drawing attention to the viability of women's engagements with state institutions and the ways in which male-dominated political elites create backtrack forums to shift the locus of power from formal to informal mechanisms, preventing women's access to formal decision making. This has been quite relevant to the field of diplomacy where "as women entered the world of diplomacy as wives, typists and diplomats" the homosocial male diplomat reaction "was to try to salvage as much as possible of the homosocial arena" (Neumann 2008: 681).

Empirical studies demonstrate that gender norms and gender relations can become institutionalised in order to define desirable and expected

behaviour for men and women in the male-dominated realm of foreign policy. Examples of external pressure to change such institutions are found in Sylvia Bashevkin's discussion (this volume) on litigation as a strategy pursued by US women diplomats to battle sex discrimination at the US State Department; or in the case of Brazilian women diplomats who demanded an Ministry of Foriegn Affairs (MFA) reform (Souza Farias and Carmo, this volume). However, some feminist institutionalists question the possibility of achieving gender equality through institutional reform strategies, such as gender candidate quotas, gender mainstreaming policies, equality blueprints, national machineries for the advancement of women or National Action Plan (NAPs). As pointed out in the introduction, this critique rests on the argument that women's participation within a particular framework or institution may actually restrict participation to a "certain" type of women and impede diversity. These demands may also backlash. For example, it has been argued that the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has unintentionally contributed to the securitisation of women's representation (Hudson 2012).

10.3 Peace Negotiations as an Institution

War, as a political event, has defined not only the scope of sovereignty, the territories of states and their militaristic values, but also the gendered logic of modern citizenship and nationalism. According to this view, women were left out of war-related political agreements because of the division between public and private and its particular manifestation in warfare—the constructed, gendered, distinction between "battlefront" and "home".

Peace delegations are often militarised and securitised in a way that determines and regulates the division between public and private. In addition, securitisation has been identified as the main reason for polarisation of gender roles and for the absence of women from the peace table. According to Christine Bell (2008), "Peace agreements are documents produced after discussion with some or all of the conflict's protagonists which address militarily violent conflict with a view to ending it". This definition indicates that the most frequent type of discussions that are qualified as "peace negotiations" are attempts to reach one of the following: a ceasefire or a pre-negotiation agreement; framework agreements which outline the arrangements for settling a conflict; or implementation agreements that address realisation of the framework agreement. Since

such issues are predominantly perceived as military or security related, the majority of protagonists within negotiation settings are men.

Concurrently, understanding women's roles in official negotiations should rely on knowledge gained from research on defence institutions. Annica Kronsell (2006) identifies these settings as "institutions of hegemonic masculinity" in which silence on gender is a determining characteristic. Indeed, recent comparative research has shown that similar to military institutions, women compose only 2–3% of chief mediators and that only 9% of the negotiators were women (UN Women 2012). These findings stand in sharp contrast to the well-documented involvement of women in civil society activities concerning peace, conflict resolution and dialogue.

An institutionalist analysis of peace negotiations reveals two other particular characteristics that should be taken into account: peace negotiations are highly restricted and secretive; and they are shaped by the logic of crisis and emergency. Conducted by a carefully selected, close-knit secretive group of two to fifteen people, such diplomatic encounters involve multiple actors that are not necessarily trained foreign-service diplomats or elected legislators: political leaders, military personnel, civilian representatives and others. Gender bias in these settings is so common that, as exemplified in the case study discussed below, women's involvement or absence may even go unnoticed.

Military dominance in transitional phases is also related to the fact that the overwhelming majority of peace accords are produced as "emergency texts" that involve commitments and understandings on ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, reintegration of ex-combatants, disarmament of paramilitary groups, security sector reform, etc. In states of emergency, the structure of political institutions is intertwined with the logic of sovereignty itself. Hence, the mere conceptualisation of war as "crisis" signals that everything that has to do with it—causes, motivations, actors and outcomes—carries the determination of an "event" that implies a specific qualification of history and serves as basis for future narration (Roitman 2013). Each and every word to appear in a final peace agreement is perceived to determine not only practical procedures of military disengagement or geographical boundaries—but is part of a verbal apparatus that can enable or prevent the future construction of collective identity, resources and regime type. Analysing the contents of and thematic preferences within peace agreements is one way to understand the larger impact of constituting negotiations as a masculine project. Many times, the structuring of negotiations around security issues renders provisions relating to "soft" aspects of peace as secondary.

10.4 Diplomacy and Armed Conflict in Israel

> Israel has no foreign policy, only a defense policy with international implications. (Moshe Dayan)
>
> Israel has no foreign policy, only a domestic political system. (Henri Kissinger)

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a historical and intractable conflict, which is part of a larger regional interstate rivalry known as the Arab–Israeli conflict. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been involved in Militarised Interstate Disputes (MIDs) every year, fighting an interstate war every several years. As demonstrated by the above citations, the ethno-national-religious conflict in the region has had an important impact on Israel's foreign policy, its strategic goals and institutional development, producing regular international and regional diplomatic encounters. Israel also administers one of the most prolonged cases of an institutionalised military regime, since the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and controls the daily lives of a large Palestinian non-citizen population.

An Israeli–Palestinian peace process, or the Oslo Process, was officially declared with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on September 1993. The agreement was designed as a gradual process to achieve a two-state solution by 1999. Although the Oslo Process had produced a series of interim agreements between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PA) established in 1994, the parties were unable to reach a Final Status Agreement to resolve what are known as the conflict's core issues: borders, security, refugees, settlements and the future status of Jerusalem. Consequently, the Camp David Summit (2000) marked the collapse of the peace process and a return to violence and unilateral measures.

Due to the duration of the conflict, peace negotiations and strategic dialogue were central mechanisms for sustaining disputes and achieving state security or regional stability in different time periods. This was the case for the Israeli–Egyptian–Syrian disengagement agreements mediated by Henry Kissinger in 1974–1975; the 1979 Israeli–Egyptian Peace Accords brokered by President Carter; the 1993 DOP and the Israeli–Jordanian Peace Accord of 1994. Therefore, Israeli foreign policy was developed and designed in accordance with the need to manage domestic politics, external security threats and to accommodate international pressure.

My reading of three different historical moments in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict is an attempt to add a gendered perspective to the

common gender-blind narrations of Israeli foreign policy. I argue that while the more successful of these peace deals were celebrated as a triumph of male leaders, women have been largely absent or associated with failure. I trace three possible typologies of such negotiations defined broadly according to their historical qualification as "event", "process" and "non-event." Each of these snapshots delineates the way gender is woven into the fragile and contextual nature of negotiating structures and mechanisms. Since institutional approaches are deeply concerned with the ways in which rules in social and political life are created, managed and transformed, I suggest that local historical context and memory is important. As seen in each of the examples discussed below, Israeli women did participate in negotiations, but their pattern of participation and visibility were determined by broader institutional constraints such as timing and duration of talks; organisational culture and cross-cultural interactions; dominant security networks, secrecy and incoherent negotiating structures; and the degree of symbolic attention to women's roles in public discourses on peace processes.

10.5 Negotiations as Event

I begin with a citation from a *Foreign Policy* article, which was published a few months before the 1973 war that ended Golda Meir's political career as one of the few women head-of-state in the twentieth century. The citation reveals how, in the context of a national liberation movement, secret negotiations were framed as an "event" in terms of their historical timing, dramatic circumstances and tragic outcome. The snapshot zooms into a secret meeting between Meir and King Abdullah, a meeting that has been recaptured in various historical accounts of the 1948 war as a tragic moment or last-minute missed opportunity to prevent the devastation to follow. The ultimate failure to reach an agreement and stop the disastrous 1948 war resonates Golda Meir's failure to predict the 1973 military attack on Israel, raising questions about the constraints of feminine leadership in times of crisis and the way it is has been attached with failure.

10.5.1 Golda Meir's Meeting with King Abdullah (1947/1948)

Golda Meir's public image in Israeli discourse resonated the early Zionist feminine ideal of a liberated, secular, socialist and committed woman who was both a loyal soldier and a devoted mother. Her exchange with King

Abdullah came to symbolise the inevitability of the 1948 war and the inability to overcome the culture-clash between the young, progressive and modern State of Israel and the old world of traditional Bedouin rule in the colonised Middle East:

> As late as 1947–48, we tried, in vein to avert the course of events. In November 1947, shortly before the Partition Resolution was adopted at the United Nations, King Abdullah of Jordan promised that he would never join the Arab states in a war against us and that after the U.N. Resolution was adopted we would meet to work out ways and means of peace and cooperation between our states. As late as May 10, 1948, just five days before the British were to leave Palestine, I crossed into what was already enemy territory—Jordan- and met the king in Amman. As I drove the road leading to Amman I could see the Mafraq camp and the Iraqi troops and guns massing there. At that meeting King Abdallah did not deny the promise given to me in November, but he stated that if we declared ourselves a state and insisted on unlimited Jewish immigration he would have no choice but to join a war against us. (Meir, 1973: 449)

The gendered aspects of this story are clear. Golda Meir was one of the first and few Israeli women known for having direct diplomatic contacts with an Arab leader. In her capacity as head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency (1946–1948), she met with the Jordanian King Abdullah twice before the war. Meron Medzini, her biographer, wrote that in the first meeting, special arrangements had to be made to legitimise the fact that the king was having a diplomatic encounter with a woman. It was decided that Golda and her delegation would be invited for lunch at the house of one Mrs Rutenberg, while the king and his aides will attend lunch at the neighbouring estate of Muhammad Zubeiti. Afterwards, the king will stop for tea with Mrs. Rutenberg where he will report a headache and be secretly led to meet Golda in a side room (Medzini 1990).

Interestingly, this snapshot reveals women's silence. In the 1973 article and in her own memoir, *My Life* (1976: 178–180), Golda Meir did not address her subjective experiences as a women leader. When describing her meetings and intense exchange of direct messages with King Abdullah, her gender is revealed only indirectly through the description of events and actions. On 10 May, four days before the declaration of independence, Golda Meir crossed the borders to meet Abdullah in person once again. Her passage to Jordan conveys the uncomfortable complications that gendered bodies create in times of crisis: she travelled by night and, in order

to avoid arousing the suspicions of the Arab Legionnaires at the various check posts, she had to disguise as a Muslim woman—dressed in a traditional dark Arab robe and veils. Finally, when they arrived at the Bedouin friend's home [Zubeiti], Golda immediately asked the king about his intentions. "Why are you in such a hurry to proclaim your state?" he asked her in return, and once again proposed a plan for limited Jewish autonomy under Jordanian rule. She replied "You know what we want and to what we aspire. If you can offer us nothing more than you have just done, then there will be a war and we will win it." Years later, it was told that King Abdullah said that "if any one person is responsible for the war, it is she, because she was too proud to accept the offer I made her".

Golda, a woman political leader, embodies the feminist institutional paradox of representation. Crossing borders on the one hand while maintaining a whole set of assumptions about cultural differences intact, Golda took upon herself to negotiate a pre-war agreement, which eventually stigmatised her as the person to blame for devastation and catastrophe.

10.6 Negotiations as Process

In research conducted in 2005, I tried to question the production of authority, historical knowledge and official narratives about the failed Oslo process by listening to the narratives of the very few Israeli women who participated in various levels of negotiations (Aharoni 2011). Although many of them felt personally empowered and professionally satisfied, their incorporation into negotiation teams was never publicly acknowledged. This was partly because their job was seen to be consistent with traditional definitions of gender roles (administrative or emotional support) and stereotypes (soft negotiators, maternal figures). The stories told by a small group of women who served as mid-level negotiators and administrative assistants, captured a very different reality than the extraordinary and dramatic circumstances that brought Golda Meir to meet with King Abdullah.

10.6.1 Invisible Women in the Oslo Peace Process (1993–2000)

The second snapshot is taken more than 40 years after the 1948 war and serves as a reminder of the somewhat optimistic decade of peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO. From a feminist institutionalist approach, this type of peace negotiation could be understood as a particular

manifestation of the problem of structure, offered in Jo Freedman's 1972 seminal work "The Tyranny of Structurelesness". Freedman's analysis concluded that "structurelessness becomes a way of masking power, and […] is usually most strongly advocated by those who are the most powerful […]. As long as the structure of the group is informal, the rules of how decisions are made are known only to a few and awareness of power is limited to those who know the rules" (Freeman 2013).

Clearly, official peace negotiations are very different settings than the women's groups that Freedman was criticising, but when incoherent negotiation bodies are formed as a result of crisis, then the "rules of the game" become important for women. This problem is linked with aforementioned concerns about silence, informal mechanisms of exclusion and hierarchy, as well as with the question of military expertise and securitisation in prolonged processes of negotiations.

Similar to other comprehensive framework agreements designed in the 1990s like the Dayton Agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland (1998), the various accords signed between Israel and the Palestinians were based on the idea of constructive ambiguity, gradual trust-building and constitutional reforms. This is important because process-oriented agreements involve long-term institutional dynamics that create opportunities for women to politically engage.

Yet, the initial breakthrough that signalled the beginning of this attempt to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was achieved by a group of negotiators that met for several months in an unofficial and secret channel established in Oslo during 1993. This pattern of communication, which was celebrated for its creativity and pragmatism, determined much of the later institutional design of Israeli and Palestinian negotiating mechanisms that remained secretive and tightly controlled by a small political and military elite throughout the 1990s. Four particular aspects of structurelessness appeared at this stage, all of which contributed to the invisibility of women negotiators and their contribution later on. First, minimal flow of information between different groups of negotiators created a clear disadvantage for women who were unable to create their own networks. Second, lack of coordinated or systematic planning of mid-level negotiations made it hard to follow their gender balance and means of appointment. Third, frequent organisational changes in structure and aims of negotiating teams contributed to the development of an unofficial

network of dominant negotiators that determined both the priorities and the composition of delegations. Finally and most important, the preference towards secret back-channel meetings that were not open for public debate created a smoke screen and prevented transparency.

Below is an example of a personal narrative I documented that captures the bureaucratic aspect of long-term negotiations that ended up as a devastating failure:

> It was a life project. I invested in it so much, on the expense of my family. So, when such a project is destroyed it illustrates the reality of war and it also exemplifies how it can suddenly collapse. One day we sit with them [the Palestinians] and negotiate and the next day it all crumbles down like a house of cards […] In the years from 1996 to 2000 I worked like a donkey, negotiating. Today I'm more realistic and cautious when drafting agreements that could be perceived as a great victory at the beginning but might not be followed at the end. (Lieutenant Colonel L.A., Israeli negotiator and legal advisor, Gaza Airport Committee, interviewed in 2005)

Similar to Golda Meir's account, the story that L.A. was telling starts from the end, from the failure to achieve a sustainable agreement and the violence it produced. Here is the story: on 12 December 2001, Gaza Airport, which was inaugurated in 1998 after a long process of bilateral negotiations, was bombed by the Israeli army. As part of a full-scale military operation that was launched in response to the Second Palestinian *Intifada*, the 60-million-dollar runway was completely destroyed by January 2002. Captain L.A. was a military legal advisor who chaired the bilateral committee that drafted the Gaza Airport Agreement and one of the few Israeli women negotiators who participated in Israeli–Palestinian negotiations in the 1990s. Her ambivalent standpoint represented the thoughts of many mid-level negotiators that were trying to settle their personal sense of success and achievement as negotiators with the national/collective failure.

Much of the knowledge I gathered through interviews appeared very different from public and media accounts of the peace process. The first thing I realised was that Israeli women's narratives about "peace work" lacked the authoritative voice which characterised the multiple memoirs published by men—Israeli, Palestinian and American—who were sitting next to the table. The interviews offered a rare opportunity for them to challenge this silence. By insisting on describing the institutional hierarchies and culture they encountered as women in a highly masculinised

environment, the everydayness of negotiations, their feelings of empowerment and despair, they insisted that material and institutional knowledge matters for understanding big politics. As I had argued elsewhere, the institutional setting positioned these women as "outsiders within". As domestic strangers, they were able to capture the incoherence of Israeli negotiating structures; the organisational tensions and competition between military men and diplomatic men and the competing masculine sub-cultures they came from. Most important, they saw the works of power and the asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

I also learned about the combination of institutional practices and beliefs that determined women's access to peace negotiations: dominance of security networks in Israeli polity, family–work balance, cultural perceptions of women's weaker negotiating skills and violent practices such as sexual harassment. From a policy perspective, no one took these issues seriously. Security and foreign policy issues were not included in the broader state-led institutional reform or national machineries for the advancement of women that were introduced at that exact time period.

This snapshot presents one of the implications of collective amnesia surrounding multilevel and complex negotiations—the absence of bureaucratic memory and transmission of knowledge. From a feminist institutionalist perspective, this may imply that women's invisibility as peace negotiators is not only related to the duration of talks or the professionalisation of delegations, but rather to their outcome as successful or failed processes. Possible comparisons could be made with more successful conflict resolution attempts, such as in Liberia or Northern Ireland, where women's participation is not only widely acknowledged, but was celebrated as a democratic form of political authority in the transitional period and a sign of a broader institutional commitment to gender equality (Garnett 2016).

10.7 Diplomacy as a Non-event

The third snapshot is taken from the Annapolis Summit, which I define as a *non-event*. While Golda Meir's meeting with Abdullah was described as an *emergency crisis* with historical qualities, and the Oslo Accords were designed as a *process,* which produced non-coherent institutional structures and enhanced hierarchy, the Annapolis Summit and its contribution to the resolution or continuation of the conflict remain a puzzle. From a feminist perspective, this non-event provides an important reminder how

the issue of "getting women to the table" is obscured by success stories that are treated outside the institutional contexts of gender inequality in ongoing conflicts.

10.7.1 Tzipi Livni and the Annapolis Summit (2007)

> We have a common future and a common goal of two states. The future of the region lies on our two shoulders. We need to show our responsibility to the future of Palestinians and Israelis as well. Part of the responsibility is to find a common ground and to reach an understanding that expresses the interests of both sides. We all need to avoid any kind of failure. The meeting in Annapolis is important for both sides and for third parties as well. According to these feelings and understandings I came today as a newcomer. (Tzipi Livni, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Minutes from Second Negotiation Team Meeting in Preparation for Annapolis*, 15th October 2007, Crowne Plaza Hotel, West-Jerusalem)

In early 2011, Al Jazeera was handed the biggest leak in the history of the Arab–Israeli peace process, later to be known as *The Palestine Papers*. This collection of internal emails, working papers, and meeting minutes offers a rare glimpse into the last serious negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, which began in late 2007 at Annapolis, Maryland and ended without any significant breakthrough. Contrary to memoirs and interviews that appeared in the previous sections, this collection contains detailed protocols displaying valuable evidence of informal aspects of Israeli–Palestinian interactions, including personal relationships.

The woman most associated with the summit was Tzipi Livni, head of the Israeli delegation to Annapolis. Similar to Golda Meir, she was also the only Israeli woman to ever serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2006–2009). Unable to assemble a strong coalition without the support of male-dominated religious parties, she was also the only one who came close to the title of Prime Minister in 2008. In view of changes in Israeli legislation from 2005, which were inspired by UNSCR 1325 to address some of the aforementioned barriers for women's participation in peace negotiations, this section questions the benefits and shortcomings of symbolic recognition.

What do we know about the Annapolis Summit? In 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made eight trips to the region with the intention of working with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PA President Mahmud Abbas to develop a "political horizon" and resume talks on a

permanent two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. After Bush announced his intention to host an international meeting to review progress towards building Palestinian institutions, the two delegations met regularly for four months to work on a declaration of principles on a final status (Migdalovitz 2007). In the summer of 2007, during the pre-negotiations period, the PA suffered a major schism when Hamas took control over the Gaza strip and established an autonomous political territory that was not bound to decisions taken by President Abbas in Ramallah. On 26 November 2007 the parties arrived in Annapolis to draft a joint declaration, which defined a short timeline for discussing the conflict's core issues.

The sudden American interest in the Israel–Palestinian conflict after several years of neglect by the Bush administration, "generated widespread suspicions regarding the intentions of the conference" and was perceived by many as a legitimising U.S. policy in the Middle East meant to counter some of the negative effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike the secretive nature of the 1947–1948 meetings or the early meetings in Oslo in 1993, the Annapolis Peace Summit was designed as a public event—a theatre in which the different sides were invited to publicly show their intentions. But the fast deadlock created a backlash and from a regional perspective, the Annapolis conference was a *failed media event,* another conference in a long row of unsuccessful peace summits (Eskjr 2009: 134).

As could be inferred from Tzipi Livni's opening speech at the pre-negotiation phase in October 2007, the two women who laboured to prepare the summit were technically, professionally and politically involved in what they thought was a genuine attempt to negotiate the parameters for a final agreement. Livni was a strong supporter of the unilateral disengagement from Gaza (2005) and later on became one of the more outspoken proponents of the two-state solution. Although she consistently presented a "professional, but gender-neutral, political persona, earning a reputation as a savvy, honest, and forthright politician", Israeli media repeatedly questioned her suitability to make political and military decisions under pressure (Halevi 2012: 201). When introducing Livni as one of Time Magazine's most influential 100 people in 2007, Condoleezza Rice mentioned their informal bonding as two unusual women leaders:

> Tzipi has not just been my colleague; she has become my friend. We have sat together for hours debating ideas—freely, openly, even combatively at times. I have learned of her deep pride in her children. We share an abiding respect

> for our now deceased fathers—mine, a successful son of the old segregated American South; hers, a defender of the Jewish homeland in its first days of independence. (Rice 2007)

I found it interesting that aside of anecdotal media reports, the appearance of these two women as protagonists in the Sisyphean struggle for peace in the Middle East, has gone generally unnoticed by feminist scholars of international relations. Possibly, this absence is both a by-product and a signifier of the non-event prototype paradox: from a mainstream perspective on Israel–Palestinian peace negotiations, Livni and Rice were too feminine to be taken seriously; from a feminist perspective they might have been identified as mere symbolic tokens. Indeed, tokenism and symbolic recognition of women's right to participate in peace negotiations have been widely discussed in international forums in the years that followed the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000, which makes this particular case even more relevant.

Israel was the first state to adopt the resolution in domestic law. In July 2005, the Knesset passed an amendment to the Women's Equal Rights Act of 1951 mandating the representation of women on public committees and "national policy-making teams", including "in any group appointed to peace-building negotiations". The amendment was drafted as an attempt "to create public awareness to women's roles in peace processes". Given the minor role that Israeli Jewish women played in previous peace negotiations, the lack of formal mechanisms to promote and ensure their full participation and the absence of bureaucratic memory concerning their roles as mid-level negotiators in the past, the 2005 amendment's focal point was to secure women's equal and diverse representation in future official peace negotiations.

Ironically, despite the political deadlock and failure of the Annapolis Summit to change the destructive cycle of conflict, Livni's participation *as a woman* was used to gain international legitimacy in an unfavourable UN environment. Official statements by Israeli diplomats in the 2006–2009 Security Council's thematic reviews of the WPS agenda manifest a rhetorical commitment to gender equality. These statements referred specifically to Tzipi Livni in a manner that could be defined as tokenism, for example: "Israel is proud that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is leading our peace negotiations with the Palestinians" (Shalev 2008).

The main institutional dilemma that this example presents, as phrased by Judy El-Bushra (2007), is whether the efforts of politicians and policymakers

to involve women in peace negotiations are based on a commitment to transform gender relations, or will these women serve as tokens? This question is linked with a broader concern about whether the inclusion of women in mainstream politics should be adopted as a broad strategy for transformation of conflict, the compromises involved in such a strategy and the risks of advocating symbolic mechanisms of representation on the expense of transformative politics that involves re-allocation of resources and a deeper commitment to non-violent ways of conflict resolution.

10.8 Conclusion

Research on women and peace negotiations has shifted the focal point from the role of elite women and men "in the room", to investigate the activities of other actors (civil society groups, donors, and media). By doing so, invisible forms of political activity and their outcomes have been revealed. Track II negotiations, informal education for peace, de-militarisation processes and resistance are all methods of unorganised paths that women in conflict zones have engaged with, including in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

But, given that official peace talks are important symbolic locations for women's participation and the growing interest in women's success stories, this chapter attempted to focus on women's failure to achieve neither peace nor recognition. As demonstrated by the example of Tzipi Livni and Condoleezza Rice, it is necessary to better understand the complex interaction between different levels of political institutions, for example, the absence/presence of women in official peace negotiations and the silence or vocal attention they receive.

Most important is the fragmented and non-linear development that these three examples present and the fact that failure is somewhat linked with the nature of sovereignty in war/peace. It seems that unlike other Israeli state institutions that developed over time to encompass various mechanisms for women's inclusion, the mere definition of peace talks as an emergency setting has determined their unstable nature. Clearly, the emergence of institutions is sometimes related to preferences of interest groups and individuals that may benefit from establishing clear rules of the game. Feminist institutionalism has shown that institutional change towards gender equality is easier to pursue within stable structures, functioning state bureaucracies, transparent nomination committees, etc. In such institutional environments, using professional tools, such as gender

mainstreaming, to lead an incremental process of redefining ideologies and goals has been identified as important and effective.

But, despite the attempt of international organisations to change normative approaches concerning women's participation in peace processes and the creation of standards for monitoring progress in this field, war and peace politics rarely fall under the definition of stable institutions. As shown in all three snapshots, emergency settings may create an institutional preference towards structurelessness and women may enter the stage when failure is imminent. This type of institutional preference is not a product of coincidental interaction between groups, ideas and interests that converge in a particular historical moment. Rather, it is embedded in a specific context of gender power relations that are constantly redefined by conflict, which include particular assumptions about masculinity/femininity, success/failure and certainty/risk.

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CHAPTER 11

Descriptive Representation and Negotiation: Gender Balance in the Committees of the Council of the European Union

Daniel Naurin and Elin Naurin

11.1 Introduction

The Council of the European Union (EU) has been called "the highest glass ceiling" for women in the political system of the EU (Kantola 2009: 396). It is arguably one of the most powerful political venues in European politics (Thomson 2011). All legislative acts of the EU, and many of the executive decisions, are negotiated in the Council. It consists of cabinet ministers of the (now) 28 member states, who meet and negotiate on all subject areas that fall within the competences of the EU. The bulk of the negotiations, however, is conducted by career diplomats and policy experts from the EU member states within a complex committee system that proceeds the meetings of the ministers (Hayes-Renshaw and

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Wallace 2006; Häge 2013). In this chapter, we analyse the presence of women and men at different levels, in different policy areas and over time in these negotiations. While the proportion of female cabinet ministers in European states has been analysed extensively in previous work (see, e.g. Krook and O'Brien 2012; Kantola 2010; Davis 1997), we know little about the gender balance in the negotiations of the committees and working groups of the Council, despite the fact that these are at the core of the EU negotiation machinery. The committee system is an extraordinarily non-transparent venue, and we are aware of no other study of the descriptive representation of men and women in this institution.

Much like the larger literature on negotiations in international relations (Aharoni 2011: 397), little if any research has focused on the role of gender for processes and outcomes of EU negotiations (Kantola 2010). Most research on legislative politics in the EU, including decision-making within the Council, uses models that are based on rational choice assumptions, without taking gender into account. Council negotiators are assumed to be promoting preferences relating to national (Naurin 2015a; Thomson 2011), party-political (Hagemann and Höyland 2008) or bureaucratic (Häge 2013) interests. Studies with a more constructivist orientation have emphasised the role of socialisation and the potential development of common group norms in the course of iterative human interactions (Checkel 2005; Lewis 1998). However, the focus in these latter studies (which have found little empirical support) has been solely on the transformation of national interests and identities, while gender as a social identity factor among negotiators has been ignored.

Descriptive representation of women (the presence of women in important decision-making bodies) is distinct from substantive representation (representatives acting in the interest of women) (Wängnerud 2009). The proposition that women have particular needs, interests and concerns that arise from their experiences of being women has been most forcefully argued by Phillips; women's interests will be "inadequately addressed in politics dominated by men. Equal rights to a vote have not proved strong enough to deal with this problem; there must also be equality among those elected to office" (Phillips 1995: 66). The empirical research on parliamentary assemblies is mixed regarding the causal link between descriptive and substantive representation, with some studies confirming such a relationship (Wängnerud 2015), while others find no such pattern (Bratton and Ray 2002; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012).

In the field of gender and negotiation, studies have found that it matters also for the outcome of the negotiations whether women are present or not. Gender roles seem to affect how men and women approach negotiations in a broad sense, where masculine characteristics typically include self-affirmation, competition and dominance, while female scripts entail cooperation, intimacy and inclusion. Kolb and Coolidge argue that women tend to have a more relational view of others in negotiations and that they prefer more problem-solving dialogue than men (see also Barron 2003). Florea et al. (2003: 230) also underline that women favour a relational approach and lift forward that women bring a personalised component of empathy, which is frequently undervalued in male-dominated settings, to negotiations (see also Boyer et al., 2009; Svedberg 2000). Also, male negotiators are associated with competitive distributive bargaining, whereas women are linked to cooperative problem-solving (Barron 2003; Babcock and Laschever 2003; Florea et al., 2003; Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012). Taken together, this literature expects and shows that the presence of women in negotiations potentially changes the way negotiation is done, as well as the outcome. However, as argued also in the introduction to this book, little empirical research exists on gender and negotiations in international relations.

In this chapter, we leave the discussion about possible effects on the output of varying degrees of gender representation in the Council committees for future studies. Instead, our purpose here is to describe the patterns of the descriptive representation of female and male negotiators, across time, sectors and states. We thereby provide the first comprehensive analysis of the presence of women and men in the intergovernmental negotiations of the Council of the EU. We study the inclusion of men and women in the different member states' delegations, at different hierarchical levels in the Council committee system, and in different policy areas. Our analyses are based on data on the composition of a selection of committees and working groups at five points in time in the period from 2003 to 2015. This means that we are also able to describe the patterns of gender representation over time.

We find not only that women are systematically underrepresented in the Council committee system but also that the number of women has increased significantly over time. Women comprised 21% of the negotiators in the selected committees and working groups in 2003, and 37% in 2015. Some of the patterns that we find follow well-known traits with respect

to the descriptive representation of women; we find fewer women in the higher-level committees, compared to the lower-level working groups, and we find more women in "soft" policy areas (such as environmental policy) than in "hard" policy areas (such as foreign and security policy). We also find a significant effect of gender equality at the domestic level on the gender balance of states' delegations in the Council committees.

Other patterns are more puzzling. In particular, we find a strong negative effect of the number of years a state has been a member of the EU on the presence of women in the committees and working groups. Newer member states are significantly more likely to have a balanced gender composition among the diplomats posted in Brussels, compared to the founding member states. One possible explanation may be that states that have been members of the EU for a longer period of time have developed a more gendered pattern in their relationship to the EU institutions. On the other hand, we also find that female representatives from newer member states have a harder time reaching the higher levels of the Council committee system. Before we describe these findings in more detail, we will give a brief description of the Council of the EU and the data that we use to map the presence of women within its committees and working groups.

11.2 The Council of the EU

The Council of the EU (or the Council of Ministers, as it is often referred to) is where ministers and national officials meet to negotiate and decide on the bulk of the EU's day-to-day businesses.[1] The Council holds both legislative and executive functions. No legislation is passed without the consent of the Council. Gradually, however, as the EU has increased the supranational features of its decision-making procedures, the Council has had to get used to sharing power with the European Parliament on most legislative issues.

Just like the EU itself the Council is not easily classified into any pre-existing political science category—not because it performs unfamiliar tasks, or does so in unfamiliar ways, but because the combination of tasks and procedures is rare. The Council is a "complex and chameleon-like beast" (Wallace 2002: 342). It is both-and, and depending-on: Both executive and legislative in its functions, both national and European in its interests and incentives, both intergovernmental and supranational in its procedures, much depending on the policy area and the policy agenda of the day.

At the ministerial level, the Council meets in ten different configurations, with different ministers attending depending on the items on the agenda. The meetings of ministers are only the tip of the Council iceberg, however. Responsible for the preparation of the meetings are the permanent representatives committee (COREPER), made up of the chief ambassadors of the member states' representations in Brussels. Their meetings in turn are prepared by some 150–200 working groups and committees consisting of member states' representatives. The meetings are attended also by European Commission officials, who are responsible for drafting the proposals under discussion. The meeting frequency of the Council committee system is intense. It is a permanently operating negotiation machine, with hundreds of officials meeting every day.

In the EU legislative process, after the Commission has forwarded its proposal to the Council it is normally first addressed by a lower-level working group. If agreement (which may be based on a qualified majority) is found already at this stage, the proposal is passed up through the Council hierarchy to formal adoption by the minsters without further ado. On other occasions, a proposal may travel up and down the Council system. After a COREPER, or a ministerial discussion, the proposal may come back to the working group for final polishing before it returns to the minsters for formal adoption.

The agendas of the ministers' meetings therefore consist of two types of items: A-points and B-points. The A-points concern proposals that have already been concluded at a previous committee meeting, and the ministers' role is only to formally adopt them. The B-points, on the other hand, are items that are open for discussion by the ministers. What should become an A- or a B-point is decided in the COREPER. That decision needs to balance the risk for overcrowded and ineffective meetings of ministers, with the possibility that politically sensitive decisions are taken at the civil service level.

Delegation of decision-making power to bureaucrats is inevitable in all political systems, but the EU is an outlier in this respect. Not only is the power to propose legislation delegated to an independent agency (the Commission), a large part of the actual decision-making—the negotiations in the Council—is conducted by unelected officials. The exact degree of bureaucratic power in the Council is difficult to measure. The most thorough attempt so far to answer the question "Who decides in the Council?" found that the ministers were seriously involved in somewhere in between 35% and 48% of all dossiers. The COREPER and other

higher-level committees were decisive in about 22% of the proposals, while the lower-level working groups were the primary decision-makers in 31–43% (Häge 2008). One caveat with respect to these figures is that while the ministers seem to be involved in relatively many proposals, they are most likely to focus only on some details of each proposal. The total share of legislative text being discussed by ministers is clearly much lower than 48%. On the other hand, those details are likely to be the politically sensitive parts of the proposal.

Our study of the descriptive representation of men and women in the Council focuses on the committees and working groups that prepare the decisions of the ministers. Regardless of the exact share of negotiations that are de facto concluded at this level, it is clear that this is a significant locus of power. Kantola notes that at the ministerial level "the representation of women is at its lowest of the EU institutions" (2009: 379). However, she is only focusing on the ministerial level, the gender balance of which is decided by the electoral outcomes and the prime ministers' cabinet formation in the member states. No previous study has focused on the gender balance in the Council committee system.

11.3 Data on Eleven Committees and Working Groups

The empirical analysis in this chapter uses the data collected by Naurin and Lindahl, who conducted a series of surveys with member state representatives over time in a selection of committees and working groups. The surveys have been used to analyse a range of research questions relating to intergovernmental negotiations in the Council committee system (see, e.g. Naurin and Lindahl 2010; Naurin 2010; Häge and Naurin 2013; Naurin 2015a). For the purpose of this chapter, we will not use the answers to the surveys, but simply the list of respondents and whether they are men or women.

Five rounds of surveys were conducted with three-year intervals over a 12-year period; 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015. The same eleven committees and working groups have been researched over time, thus securing comparability.[2] Both higher (including COREPER) and lower-level working groups and committees have been included in the sample. The selection was made in order to incorporate a broad variety of policy areas, and

variation with respect to the decision-making rules and degree of supranational commitment. The policy areas include economic policy, internal market issues, justice and home affairs, agriculture, foreign and security policy and environmental policy.[3] It should be noted that the selection of committees and working groups is not based on a random sample, which means that the generalisability of the findings shown in the next section, with regard to other committees and working groups of the Council, is uncertain. However, no official information exists regarding the composition of the working groups, except for some of the committees at the higher levels, and finding the lists of delegates to the selected groups is cumbersome detective work. We are therefore confident that the data used in this chapter are the best available so far for analysing the gender balance in the Council committee system.

Each survey approached all state representatives in the selected sample of committees and working groups. As all member states have one representative each, the number of respondents has varied in response to the enlargements of the EU. In 2003, the total number of respondents was 165 (15 member states × 11 groups). The pool of respondents subsequently increased as the EU membership rose to 25 states in 2004, 27 states in 2007 and 28 states in 2013. The latest survey round in 2015 included 308 respondents (28 member states × 11 groups). The total pool of respondents for the five rounds, therefore, amounts to 1342 representatives. In 22 instances, we failed to identify who a member state's representative was in a particular committee or working group, which means that our total sample on which we base the analyses consists of 1320 individuals.

It is important to note that these representatives are selected by each state without any interference from the EU institutions and with very little transparency. The selection takes place according to the formal rules and informal norms regarding diplomatic career paths in each member state and is therefore likely to vary between states. We can expect both self-selection dynamics and structural conditions set by institutions that are to varying degrees gendered, to affect the patterns that we see. The fact that the selection processes are generally sheltered from public visibility and electoral accountability means that little normative "credit claiming" can be expected from striving for an equal gender balance in these negotiations (Valdini and Shortell 2016).

11.4 Mapping the Descriptive Representation of Women and Men

Existing research shows that the descriptive representation of women in decision-making bodies is more common in positions with lower prestige than in positions with higher prestige, and that women more often deal with soft rather than hard issues (Wängnerud 2015; Borrelli 2002; Davis 1997). Also, political appointments of women to higher positions have been shown to be affected by whether the political institutions put pressure on nominators to include women or place women on certain portfolios (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Kenney 2013), or whether they are designed in a way that facilitates credit-giving to the nominator for selecting a women (Valdini and Shortell 2016). Furthermore, women's status in society and general norms about gender equality matters for women's degree of participation (Krook and O'Brien 2012), as does women's presence among political elites which shapes both the supply of and demand for female appointments (ibid).

In our empirical analyses, we will take account of several of these factors. We will first describe the presence of men and women in the committees and working groups over time. Thereafter, we will look at the variation between the EU states, and in particular the impact of two state characteristics: the length of EU membership and the level of gender equality at the domestic level. The subsequent analyses focus on descriptive representation of men and women across policy areas, and hierarchical levels, within the committee system. Finally, we tie the different explanatory factors together in a multivariate regression analysis.

11.4.1 Descriptive Representation Over Time and Across Member States

Figure 11.1 plots the share of women in the eleven selected committees and working groups over the five survey rounds. It demonstrates that women are clearly underrepresented compared to men over the whole time period. However, the continuous increase in the number of women taking part in the negotiations is striking. In 2003, only 21% of the negotiators were women, while in 2015 that figure had increased to 37%. As a point of comparison, this implies a more balanced gender representation than the average European national parliament, which only had 27% women in 2016.[4] Compared to the European Parliament, on the other



Fig. 11.1 Share of women in council committees and working groups 2003–2015. Note: Mean share of women over the five points in time

hand, the balance is similar, the latter having 37% women parliamentarians after the last election in 2014.[5]

During the time period studied here the enlargement of the EU membership to Eastern Europe occurred. In 2004 ten new member states were added, eight of which were former communist states in Eastern and Central Europe (the other two being Cyprus and Malta). Thereafter, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The Eastern enlargement was a major event in the history of the EU, which affected the overall figures regarding the descriptive representation of men and women.

However, as we shall see, the effect was not in the direction one might have expected. Compared to the states in Western and Northern Europe, the Eastern European countries have fewer women in their national parliaments. While the older member states had an average of 34% women in their national parliaments in 2016, the states that became members from 2004 and after only had on average 19% women in their national

parliaments. They are also ranked lower in terms of gender equality compared to Western and Northern Europe as indicated by the Gender Equality Index developed by Plantenga et al. (2009), although in this respect they are on par with most Southern European States.

Given the relatively lower level of gender equality in the Eastern European parliaments, one would expect the inclusion of these countries to lead to a decrease in women's presence in the Council committees and working groups. However, to the contrary, Fig. 11.2 shows that the new countries are in fact more likely to be represented by women than the older EU members. The vertical line in the figure indicates the average share of women in the Council committees among the states over the 12-year period (31%). The difference is rather striking: Among the 13 member states that became members of the EU in 2004 and after, 10 have more female representatives than average (the exceptions being Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia).

Furthermore, the inverse relationship between length of membership and the share of women goes beyond the most recent enlargements. Three of the four older (pre-2004) member states that have a higher than average number of women representatives became members only in 1995: Finland, Sweden, and Austria. All the six founding member states (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) are below average, and several of them are at the very bottom of the ranking.

Figure 11.3 illustrates the strong relationship between years of EU membership and share of women representatives. The bivariate correlation is −0.68 ($p = 0.00$). We can only speculate as to the reasons for this pattern. For example, Kantola has argued that women are more likely to be well represented in new political institutions, "where male dominance is not entrenched" (2009: 397). A similar pattern also comes from empirical research on the development on women's right to vote, where it is found that women suffrage was implemented earlier in the younger Western states of the USA than in the older Eastern states (Towns 2010). Thus, what we may see here is EU membership giving well-educated women, who struggle with gendered institutions in their home countries, opportunities to instead compete for new positions in the newly formed representations in Brussels.

Given the distinct pattern between new and old member states, in the subsequent analysis we revisit the development over time, taking length of membership into account. In Fig. 11.4, it becomes clear that the trajectory of the increase in female representation over time in the Council



Fig. 11.2 Share of women representing different member states in the Council committees and working groups. Note: Mean share of women over the five points in time: 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015



Fig. 11.3 The relationship between years of EU membership and share of women representatives in the Council committees and working groups

committees and working groups is different between the newer and the older member states. While the older member states have seen a continuous increase, the share of women from the newer member states dropped in 2009 compared to 2006, before catching up to a similar trend as for the older member states.

The Eastern enlargement thus positively affected the descriptive representation of women in the Council committees and working groups. This indicates that there is no simple relationship between gender equality at the domestic level, and the number of women in states' diplomatic delegations in Brussels. In Fig. 11.5, we analyse this relationship in more detail.

The upper left panel in Fig. 11.5 shows that there is in fact a negative correlation between the number of women in *national* parliaments and in the states' representations in the Council committees and working groups ($R = -0.18$, $P = 0.00$). Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden and Slovenia have a relatively balanced gender distribution in both political institutions. Other countries, on the other hand, have a larger share of



Fig. 11.4 Share of women in new and old member states 2003–2015. Note: Old member states refer to those states that became members before 2004

women in the national parliaments than in the Council committees (Spain and Belgium), or the reverse, a larger share of women in the Council committees than in the national parliaments (Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia).

However, when we compare the share of women in the Council committees and working groups with the number of women in the European Parliament (upper right panel), the relationship is the reverse (R = 0.14, P = 0.00). Again, Sweden and Finland score high on both accounts. However, compared to the national parliaments, most member states—and in particular the Eastern European states—have a more equal gender distribution in the European Parliament than in their national parliaments.

We also look at the relationship between the share of women in the Council committees and the Gender Equality Index developed by Plantenga et al. (2009). The index is based on Fraser's universal caregiver model (1997), in which gender equality is indicated by the equal distribution of paid and unpaid work, income and other monetary assets, equal access to decision-making power, and time for leisure and



Fig. 11.5 The relationship between the share of women in the Council committees and working groups and domestic indicators of gender equality

self-development. The index is a composite, including a range of indicators relating to these factors.

The lower left panel in Fig. 11.5 illustrates that there is no relationship between the Gender Equality Index and the number of women of the state's delegations (R = 0.01, P = 0.79). The expectation that more gender-equal states would have more women representing them in the Council negotiations is thus not confirmed in this simple bivariate analysis. However, as we will demonstrate below, a more robust multivariate analysis, taking other factors into account, gives a different picture of this relationship.

11.4.2 Descriptive Representation Across Policy Areas

Research on national parliaments has found a gender pattern in the committee assignments of men and women, with more women being present in committees relating to, for example, social affairs, and fewer in foreign



Fig. 11.6 Gender balance in different policy fields

and security policy, economic policy and legal affairs (Wängnerud 2015). Kantola found a similar pattern in the European Parliament in the period 1999–2009. She concluded that for the European Parliament, "committee work continues to be segregated on the basis of gender" (Kantola 2009: 392). To what extent is such a pattern visible also in the Council committees and working groups?

Figure 11.6 shows the distribution of men and women over the different policy fields that were included in the sample of committees and working groups. The upper left panel illustrates the assignments of the representatives of the new (post 2004) member states; the upper right panel includes the old member states, while the lower left panel shows how men and women are distributed across policy areas in the full sample. Looking at the latter panel first, the results indicate that there is indeed a gender pattern also with respect to the committee assignments in the Council. Committees and working groups relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU have the lowest share of women over the whole period (25%). Justice and Home Affairs (29%), Economic

Policy (32%) and Agriculture (32%) also have lower shares of women compared to questions relating to the common European Market (35%) and, in particular, Environmental Policy (41%).

The ranking is similar for new and old member states, except for agriculture, where there are comparatively more women in the older member states, and environmental policy, where the new member states stand out with a much higher share of women (64%). Again, we can only speculate as to the difference between new and old member states in this respect. One possible explanation may be that the status of these two policy fields differs between East and West in Europe. The Eastern European states have larger agricultural sectors per capita compared to the West, and are net beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, which makes it a more important policy area compared to at least some of the older member states. Environmental policy, on the other hand, is more salient in Western and Northern Europe than in the East. A lower share of women in policy areas with higher status is a well-known pattern from other contexts (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

11.4.3 Descriptive Representation Across Hierarchical Levels

Another common theme in the research on descriptive representation of men and women in political bodies is the distribution of more important posts, such as chairs, rapporteurs, heads of units and spokespersons. The Council committees and working groups are chaired equally by the member states according to a rotating quota system, which makes this a difficult indicator to use. However, there is a division between higher-level committees and lower-level working groups that may be indicative of how men and women are positioned within the Council committee system.

Figure 11.7 illustrates that the unequal distribution of men and women in the Council committees and working groups is stronger in the higher-level committees than in the lower-level working groups. However, again, the pattern differs significantly between newer and older member states. The share of women in higher-level committees (marked by circles in Fig. 11.7) representing old member states is lower than in the lower-level working groups (marked by triangles) for most of the period. However, the difference in 2003 was marginal, and in 2015 women from older member states are actually more frequent in higher than in lower-level committees. To the contrary, the difference is consistently large—and negative from the point of view of women—with respect to representatives



Fig. 11.7 Gender representation at different hierarchical levels

of the newer member states (mostly from Central and Eastern Europe). In fact, in 2015 the older member states have a larger share of women in higher-level committees (36%) than the newer member states (32%). In the lower-level working groups, on the other hand, the share of women from newer member states is almost twice the size of that of older member states (57% and 30% respectively). Thus, a gendered pattern with respect to the position of men and women in the organisation hierarchy, where women hold less prestigious posts than men, is much stronger in the new member states than in the old member states.

11.4.4 Multivariate Analysis

The analysis so far indicates that factors relating to the type of policy area, the position in the hierarchical structure of the committee system, and the length of EU membership of states all impact on the likelihood of finding women negotiators in the committee system of the Council of the EU. We also saw a significant increase in female representation over time.

However, we were unable to find a clear relationship with gender equality at the domestic level in the bivariate analyses.

In this section we perform a more robust test of the previous findings by means of multivariate regression analysis, including in the model the impact of time, hierarchical level, type of policy area, years of EU membership and gender equality. The unit of analysis is the individual representative (man = 0, women = 1). The variable Hierarchy denotes whether the representative sits in a higher (1) or lower (0) level committee, while Hard Policy indicates whether that committee is negotiating issues relating to foreign and security policy, economic policy, or justice and home affairs (1), or environmental policy, agricultural policy or internal market affairs (0). The variable Gender Equality Index consists of the Gender Equality Index of Plantenga et al. (2009) that was previously described, while *Year* denotes the year of the survey. Membership Years indicates the number of years of EU membership of each state, ranging (in 2015) from 58 for the six founding states, to 2 for the newest member Croatia.

Table 11.1 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis. *Year* is positive and significant, again confirming the positive trend over time regarding the descriptive representation of women in the Council committee system. *Hierarchy* and *Hard Policy*, on the other hand, are both negative, which also confirms the previous results. When we translate the coefficients of the logistic model into predicted probabilities, we find that the effects of the latter two factors are relatively modest. The effect

Table 11.1 What determines the likelihood of EU member states being represented by men and women in the committees and working groups (logistic estimates)?

	Model 1
Year	0.139* (0.063)
Hierarchy	−0.433** (0.157)
Hard Policy	−0.267* (0.109)
Membership Years	−0.029*** (0.004)
Gender Equality Index	0.021** (0.007)
Constant	−.680* (.478)
Obs	1198
Wald Chi2	59.41***
Pseudo R2	0.06
Log Pseudolikelihood (initial)	−749.200
Log Pseudolikelihood (final)	−704.372

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by member state.



Fig. 11.8 The impact of length of EU membership on the share of female representatives (predicted probabilities). Note: Predicted probabilities based on the model in Table 11.1, with all other variables held at their means. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals

of *Hierarchy*, holding all the other variables at their means, indicates an increase of nine percentage points in the likelihood that a representative is a woman, when sitting in one of the lower-level working groups compared to the higher-level committees. Similarly, the probability of finding female negotiators increases by six percentage points when turning from the hard policy areas to a working group or committee handling issues relating to the environment, agriculture or internal market affairs.

Membership Years is also significant and negative, which implies that the negative relationship between length of EU membership and female representation is robust when controlling for the other factors. The effect is also quite substantial. The decrease in the predicted probabilities of having female representatives, as the length of EU membership increases, is illustrated in Fig. 11.8. It shows that the probability that one of the founding member states, with 58 membership years, is represented by a

woman in the Council committees and working groups is only 17%, holding all the other variables at their means. For the newer member states, on the other hand, the probability is over 40%.

In contrast to the bivariate analysis, the effect of gender equality at the domestic level turns out to be quite substantive when taking the other relevant factors into account. Translating the logistic coefficient of 0.021 in Table 11.1 into predicted probabilities indicates that a (hypothetical) move from the lowest level of the *Gender Equality Index* of 33.7 (which corresponds to the level of Romania), to the highest level in the index of 74.2 (which is the level of Sweden), almost doubles the chances of finding a female representative, from a probability of 0.23 to a probability of 0.41. Gender equality at home thus strongly increases the chances that states send women representatives to the negotiations in Brussels.

11.5 Conclusion

The committee system of the Council of the EU constitutes the core of the intergovernmental negotiation machinery in the EU system. Formally, the committees and working groups only prepare the meetings of the ministers, but in practice the bulk of the negotiations take place in these venues. Our study shows that women are systematically underrepresented in these negotiations. Whether the gender bias affects the process and outcomes of the negotiations is beyond the scope of this study, although previous research gives us reason to think that is the case. However, we also saw a significant trend over time of states appointing more women to their representations in Brussels, which resembles the general trend in Europe towards a more equal gender balance in many political institutions (Krook and O'Brien 2012).

Our analyses indicate that several of the factors that we have discussed in this chapter contribute to explaining the descriptive representation of women in the Council committee system. For example, the probability of finding a woman is four times lower when the representative comes from an old (pre 2004) member state, and sits in a higher-level committee handling hard policy issues (here operationalised as foreign and security policy economic policy and judicial and home affairs), than if the same representative comes from a new member state, and sits in a lower-level committee responsible for other policy issues.

Some of the findings correspond to well-known gender patterns found also in other contexts. This includes the effect of hierarchy, where we saw

that relatively fewer women are found in the more powerful committees at the higher level, thus further aggravating the unequal gender distribution. The closer to the top, it seems, the thicker the glass ceiling, also in the Council committee system. However, the difference is most visible when it comes to representatives from newer member states, and it turned out to be relatively modest in the multivariate analysis. It should also be pointed out again that we did not include the ministerial level in this study, as the appointment of ministers follow a very different selection process compared to career diplomats.

We also saw that, similar to parliamentary assemblies (Wängnerud 2015; Kantola 2009), there is a gender pattern in the distribution of representatives across policy areas. Again, this difference was statistically significant, but relatively modest in substance. Whether this difference in turn can be explained mainly by self-selection on behalf of men and women (cf. Wängnerud 2015), or whether there are gendered institutional structures that put higher hurdles for women entering some areas compared to others, is beyond the scope of this study.

The fact that states with higher levels of gender equality at the domestic level also tend to appoint more women to represent them in the negotiations in Brussels should be no surprise. However, the effect was only visible in the multivariate analysis, which means that other factors weigh heavily, and may neutralise the effect of domestic gender equality. One such factor turned out to be the number of years a state has been a member of the EU, which had a surprisingly strong and negative impact on the descriptive representation of women in the Council committee system. Again, we can only speculate as to the reasons for this pattern, which deserves further scrutiny. One possible explanation that we suggest is that institutions may become more gendered over time. The older member states have had more time to develop their relationship with the EU system, while for newer member states the entrance into the EU implied that new arenas were suddenly opened for diplomatic staff. To the extent that the selection of diplomats to represent states in Brussels is affected by informal gendered institutions within the ministries, it is possible that women stand a greater a chance of being appointed to these venues when they have been less affected by gendering. EU membership may have provided well-educated and ambitious women in Central and Eastern Europe a new possibility of advancing outside of the more closed national positions already taken by men. However, the glass ceiling covering the more prestigious higher-level positions in the Council committee hierarchy seems more

persistent for these women than for those representing the older member states. We have to leave to future research to analyse more rigorously the puzzling variation between older and newer EU members with respect to a gender balanced EU representation.

Notes

1. This section draws on Naurin 2015b
2. The two exceptions are the Committee on the Eastern Enlargement and the Working Party for Relations with the Mashrek-Maghreb Region, which were included in the sample in 2003 but not in subsequent rounds. These two groups were replaced in the other survey rounds by the Article 36 Committee on Judicial Cooperation and the Working Party on Competition and Growth.
3. The higher-level working groups included are COREPER II and COREPER I (the ambassadors and the vice-ambassadors of the member states' permanent representations in Brussels), the Economic Policy Committee, the Special Committee on Agriculture, the Political and Security Committee and the Article 36 Committee (the latter dealing with judicial cooperation in the field of criminal matters, police cooperation, organised crime and terrorism). The lower-level working groups are the Politico-Military Working Party, the Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on the Environment, the Working Party on Tax Questions and the Working Party on Competition and Growth.
4. Authors' own calculation, based on data on national parliaments from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1 April 2016. Source: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm
5. The 2014 European Parliament election confirmed a slow, but steady, increase in the number of women parliamentarians; from 26 % in 1994 to 30 % in 1999, 31 % in 2004, and 35 % in 2009 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/gender-balance.html)

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CHAPTER 12

Negotiations at the UN: The Case of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

Torunn L. Tryggestad

12.1 Introduction

> Women's participation in those activities [peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding] is not a nice thing to do. It is not as though we are doing a favor for ourselves and them by including women in the work for peace. It is a necessary global security imperative. Including women in the work of peace advances our national security interests and promotes political stability, economic growth and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
>
> US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, the UN Security Council, 26 October 2010

The above quote is taken from Hillary Rodham Clinton's statement in the United Nations (UN) Security Council open debate commemorating the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in October 2010 (Clinton 2010), which calls for women's full participation in international

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conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The statement expressed a notable normative turn in the discourse on international peace and security. As late as the mid-1990s, it was unthinkable that the hypermasculine UN Security Council—the organ with overarching responsibility for international peace and security—might consider women's rights issues as an international security concern. At the time, violence against women, for example, was regarded as an interpersonal matter, or at best a concern to be addressed at the national level (Mackinnon 2012). By 2010, however, the advancement of women's human rights, including the protection of women from conflict-related sexual violence (CSV), had emerged as a legitimate international security concern and had become an integral part of the discourse on international peace and security (Hudson 2010; Olonisakin et al. 2011). Today UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions are formally referred to as the WPS agenda, a formal agenda item in the Security Council's work plan.

This book chapter sets out to analyse the key actors in advancing and negotiating the WPS agenda, with a particular emphasis on women and women's civil society organisations (CSOs). The chapter also explores how women's entry into international peace and security politics has changed not only the discourse on international peace and security but also diplomatic practices within the UN and beyond.

The commemoration of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in itself served as a good illustration of these changes. Since the resolution's adoption in October 2000, annual open debates on WPS had been held in the Security Council. During the open debate in 2010, however, a record number (at the time) of more than 90 statements were given by UN member states, UN officials, and representatives of CSOs and regional organisations (UN 2010). Also, statements were delivered by a record number of high-level government representatives—including US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton.[1] All of the statements were variations on the same key themes: that women's participation in matters of international peace and security is a prerequisite for sustainable peace and that there was an urgent need for more dedicated efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions.

In addition to the record number of diplomats and dignitaries present, the gallery of the Security Council chambers was filled to the last seat by CSO representatives, of which the vast majority were women. They enthusiastically applauded the statements of Clinton and those given on behalf of the CSOs. The combined effect of these factors resulted in an open

debate that was significantly different from Security Council proceedings in general and from the previous debates on WPS in particular.

In the years following the 10th anniversary, the WPS agenda has continued to gain ground in the diplomatic community, both within the context of the UN and beyond. This was most recently acknowledged by the Global Study on WPS (UN Women 2015). Indeed, as a normative framework, WPS is now in a process of rapid diffusion. A number of follow-up resolutions have been passed by the UN Security Council, system-wide action plans and guidelines for the implementation of these resolutions have been adopted within the UN Secretariat, and a steadily growing number of UN member states and regional organisations are adopting national and regional action plans for the integration and implementation of WPS in their peace and security policies.

Yet, and as discussed elsewhere in this book (see Aggestam and Svensson, Chap. 8), women are overall grossly underrepresented in international peace negotiations. This is also true in terms of who has formally represented UN member states (most notably in the UN Security Council) during the negotiations of the Security Council resolutions and other UN documents which together make up the WPS agenda. As of March 2016, only 37 (19%) of the 193 permanent representatives to the UN were women. Among the 15 ambassadors to the UN Security Council, there was only 1 woman (UN News Centre 2016). This low figure is the rule rather than the exception. In 12 out of the 16 years since UNSCR 1325 was passed, there was only one woman or no women representatives in the Security Council. In 2004, an unprecedented peak was reached with six women representatives. In the time period 2000–2016, the annual average of women representatives in the UN Security Council stands at 1.6. In spite of the low number of women diplomats, the WPS agenda still made its way into the Security Council chambers. At first sight this might appear as a paradox.

If we take a closer look at the WPS negotiations, however, what stands out as a characteristic trait—something that has made it different from other such processes in international diplomacy—is the informal involvement of women and women's CSOs. By helping Council members formulate the problem areas, drafting and redrafting the various texts to be negotiated and serving as intermediaries during negotiations, the women's CSOs played pivotal roles in setting WPS on the agenda of the Security Council (Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; Meintjes et al. 2001; and Porter 2007). These are processes of civil society impact which are

under-researched and unrecognised in much of the dominant literature on global governance and IR (Tryggestad 2014a).

12.2 UNSCR 1325 as an Outcome of Tripartite Global Governance

Inis L. Claude Jr's (1956) classical distinction of the relationships between the first UN (understood as the member states) and the second UN (understood as the Secretariat) has guided explanations of how ideas, norms, policies and practices emerge and shift within the organisation (Tryggestad 2009). In this model, UN member states were typically given prominence as the most influential actors. Weiss et al. (2009) argue that in today's world we need to move beyond the classical distinction between the first and the second UN, and pay more attention to the role of non-state actors, referred to as "the third UN", when new UN norms and policies are negotiated and developed. "The third UN" is defined as "those individuals and private organisations who have a continuing relationship with the first and the second UN and who seek changes in the UN's thinking, policies, priorities, or actions" (Weiss et al. 2009: 9). The main components of the third UN are non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and other expert consultants, and independent commissions of eminent persons.

Already in 2002, Thomas Risse referred to such collaborative arrangements as "tripartite global governance"—arrangements he claimed were replete within the UN system and would continue to grow in influence in the years to come (Risse 2002: 268–269). Both Risse and Weiss et al. emphasise the close and continuing relationships between these three groups of actors as a particularly interesting trait of contemporary global governance.

In the case of the WPS agenda, this tripartite arrangement has become so close that it at times is difficult to distinguish between the roles and identities of the actors involved. What the three actor groups have in common, though, is that women within each group tend to take a lead in advancing the agenda. Representatives of the three groups of actors have throughout the years worked closely together in formulating the issues of concern. Small states like the "women friendly" Nordic states, spearheaded by women diplomats, have been in the forefront, providing normative, political and financial support to the WPS agenda (Tryggestad 2014b).

Relevant UN entities have served as secretariat and provided technical expertise for various UN studies and reports. Women's CSOs have fed the broader UN membership with relevant background materials and drafted the texts of resolutions and other key documents. The CSOs have also been instrumental in bringing women from conflict zones to New York to testify before the Security Council (Tryggestad 2010). Often CSO representatives have also served as intermediaries during the negotiations of the final outcome documents and are regularly consulted by UN entities and invited to provide technical advice and training to UN staff on how to implement the WPS agenda.

The many actors involved in advancing the WPS agenda in and around the UN make up a distinct "community". It comprises a relatively small number of individuals, mainly women, who are instrumental in defining the agenda, who see themselves as "guardians" of the WPS narrative, and who have a strong sense of shared values and ownership of the agenda. Many of the members of this community find themselves in a revolving door, regularly changing positions from one day operating as activists, representing key NGOs at meetings and conferences, while the next day working as gender advisors within the most relevant UN entities[2] or taking up positions as analysts on WPS within think tanks or academic institutions. Among member states, on the other hand, you would find the strongest supporters of the WPS agenda typically nominating or seconding their own nationals (often politicians or diplomats with a track record of promoting gender issues) to positions within the UN system or as members of various expert panels or commissions on WPS.[3] Nominations and secondments are often made after close consultations with CSOs. Often the candidates are also recruited from within CSOs.

In the IR literature, the campaign to ban landmines is generally the most referred to example of civil society impact on peace and security policy development. However, it is most often portrayed as an exceptional case. McGann and Sabatini (2010: 70) even contend that "transnational advocacy groups are generally not well integrated into policymaking and tend to operate more like 'outsider groups'". The WPS case brings evidence to the contrary. Rather than being an "outsider group", women's CSOs have been closely intertwined with both the UN system and UN member states in formulating and negotiating the normative framework of WPS, and thereby prompting change in the UN discourse and diplomatic practises on international peace and security. Contrary to what much of the contemporary literature on global governance would hold on

tripartite collaborative relationships, this is a type of collaboration that is not new to the UN and the women's rights agenda.

12.3 Negotiating Women, Peace and Security on the UN Agenda

The UN has a long track of organising conferences and adopting policies uncovering "different layers of meaning surrounding an idea of gender equality" (Jain 2005: 1). The passing of UNSCR 1325 represented yet another building block in the sequence of such events. Until October 2000, however, these events had predominantly been confined to the more "soft" development pillar of the UN system. While the "hard" peace and security matters were allocated to the political departments within the UN Secretariat and the intergovernmental bodies they serve (such as the Security Council), women's issues were allocated to the social and developmental departments of the UN (Gierycz 2001). These latter departments had a long history of working closely with women's NGOs and individual women's rights activists.

The UN's work to promote women's rights can be dated back to the founding of the organisation in 1945 (Pietilä 2007). Already at that time women activists and women's CSOs played instrumental roles in lobbying and negotiating the text of the UN Charter. The Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter reaffirm the "equal rights of men and women" and that human rights and fundamental freedoms apply to all "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (UN 1945). Both Bunch (2007) and Skard (2008) document how women activists fought particularly hard to have what was regarded as gender neutral language such as "people" and "men" (understood as "people") replaced with words and phrases such as "women" and "men and women".

Many of the same activists were centrally involved in negotiating the establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946 and in having direct references to women included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Similarly, women, both within the UN system, among member states and in CSOs, played key roles in having the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted in 1979.

However, it was first with the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference, which gathered the largest number ever of CSOs, that "Women and

Armed Conflict" was defined as one of 12 "critical areas of concern". Not only did the CSO representatives lobby conference delegates. In many instances, CSO representatives were also included as members of the official national delegations to the conference, involving them formally in negotiating the outcome document. With its emphasis of women and war as a particular area of concern, the Beijing Platform of Action (UN 1995) became an important precursor to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 five years later.

In March 2000, a Special Session of the General Assembly, The Beijing +5, was organised in New York to take stock of progress with implementation of the platform. The discussions at this meeting were facilitated by the UN women's machinery, most closely associated with the CSW. It was generally agreed that too little progress was made and more had to be done to raise awareness of women's rights particularly in relation to international peace and security. A large number of CSO representatives were also present at this Special Session. Acknowledging the slow pace of implementation of the Beijing Platform of Action, representatives of these organisations decided to shift strategy "from getting armed conflict on to the UN 'women agenda' to getting 'women and armed conflict' on the main agenda" (Cockburn 2007: 140). A first important step was taken towards changing the UN Security Council's approach to international peace and security. To speed up the process, an organisation was formed in May 2000, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, which was an umbrella organisation for 16 well-recognised international women's and human rights organisations. Headquartered in New York, the NGO Working Group was mandated to advocate for a Security Council resolution on women, peace and security (see below for more on the NGO Working Group).

In parallel with the processes taking place within the political and social pillar of the UN, initiatives were also emerging within the UN security pillar. In the second half of the 1990s, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in close cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI, now UN Women), carried out a study on gender mainstreaming of multifunctional peacekeeping operations. Women in DPKO and OSAGI, together with women academics from amongst others Sweden, played key roles in driving the process forward (Tryggestad 2014b). So did the governments of Norway and Sweden, who provided the funding for the study. The preliminary findings were presented and discussed at a workshop in Namibia on 31 May 2000.

The outcome document of this workshop was the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" (UN. 2000b), which amongst others acknowledges women's important contributions to international peace and security and calls on member states to increase the number of women among UN peacekeeping personnel. The Windhoek Declaration became a key document to be referenced also in UNSCR 1325, which was adopted in October five months later.

12.4 WPS—A Normative Framework in Rapid Diffusion

Sixteen years on from its adoption, UNSCR 1325 and the normative framework on WPS are in a process of rapid diffusion. A tipping point was reached around the time of the 10th anniversary in 2010. The anniversary served as an important mobilising event, not only for the CSOs but also for the UN system, a number of UN member states and regional organisations. For an international norm to have reached the phase of diffusion, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that three types of institutionalisation most likely have occurred: institutionalisation in international law, institutionalisation in the rules of the multilateral organisations and institutionalisation in bilateral foreign policies of UN member states. In the case of WPS, all of these processes of institutionalisation can be observed, and women and/or women's CSOs have been centrally involved in all of them.

12.4.1 Institutionalisation in International Law

The adoption of Security Council resolutions is one form of institutionalisation of new normative frameworks in international law. Under the WPS umbrella, seven resolutions have been adopted subsequent to UNSCR 1325.[4] Each of these resolutions is more specific and prescriptive in terms of actions than UNSCR 1325. Together, these eight resolutions have firmly established WPS as a formal item on the agenda of the Security Council. Although regarded as soft law, the follow-up resolutions have reinforced the initial normative framework and strengthened the judicial status of the WPS agenda within international law. According to Aoláin, Security Council resolutions should not "be scoffed at". They emerge

"from the highest pinnacle of the international lawmaking apex, and communicate an evident normative weight" (Aoláin 2013: 59).

It is worth noting, however, that there was a time gap of eight years between the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 and the passing of the first follow-up resolution in June 2008. From 2008 to 2010, four Security Council resolutions on WPS were adopted. While the core message of UNSCR 1325 was that of women's representation and participation in all matters of international peace and security, the new resolutions had a primary focus on the WPS sub-theme of CSV. The renewed interest among Security Council members in adopting additional resolutions on WPS co-insides with the period when the US had two women Secretaries of State; Condoleezza Rice (2005–2009) followed by Hillary Rodham Clinton (2009–2013). Both Rice and Clinton were personally engaged in the issue of CSV and made the US the "penholder" of this sub-theme of the WPS agenda in the Security Council.[5]

Still, the transnational advocacy network on WPS, with the NGO Working Group in a central role, played an active and supportive role in advocating for the adoption of the additional resolutions by, for example, writing letters of concern to members of the Security Council and organising meetings with individual member states. CSO representatives were also instrumental in drafting the text of many of the new resolutions, organising workshops and seminars and producing background material, including policy recommendations. Since 2013, an additional three resolutions have been adopted under the WPS heading, which are more true to the core message of UNSCR 1325. Women's CSOs had for some time expressed a concern about the tendency of portraying women primarily as victims and not as actors in the many resolutions focusing on CSV. The new resolutions emphasised issues of women's representation and participation in peacebuilding, but also introduced new topics such as the role of women in preventing violent extremism.

Another form of institutionalisation of the WPs agenda in international law is the increased referencing to WPS in the work of the UN Security Council, beyond the adoption of thematic resolutions. This is evident in the language of presidential statements (PRSTs) and country-specific resolutions, as well as in the attention paid to the WPS agenda in thematic debates on, for example, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations (Peace Women Project 2010, NGO Working Group 2013). The "thickness" of the institutionalisation in international law can be questioned, though, as the Security Council seems to address WPS concerns in an

inconsistent manner. In its most recent mapping of WPS in the Security Council, the NGO Working Group reports that although WPS references have increased from 2014 to 2015, the content of the references continues to focus primarily on sexual and gender-based violence (NGO Working Group 2015). While WPS has been acknowledged as an important agenda by the Security Council, the degree to which WPS-related issues are incorporated and considered also seems to differ greatly depending on the conflict or crisis being discussed. The diplomatic practices of the Security Council are closely observed and documented by organisations such as the NGO Working group, and also referenced in the Secretary-General's progress reports on WPS to the Security Council. As such the CSOs play a very important role in holding the Council accountable to its promises and commitments.

12.4.2 Organisational Institutionalisation

In spite of inconsistencies in the institutionalisation of WPS in international law, there are a number of positive developments in terms of organisational institutionalisation. Initiatives and policies have been launched in recent years within the UN Secretariat in direct or indirect support of a more rapid implementation of the WPS agenda. One of the most noteworthy initiatives, heavily lobbied for by women's CSOs, is the reorganisation of what used to be called the UN Gender Machinery into a new organisational entity, UN Women.[6] UN Women is a composite unit of four previously distinct UN units that used to work on gender equality and women's empowerment.[7] The purpose of merging the four entities was to bring together resources and mandates for greater impact. Operational since January 2011, UN Women is headed by an Under-Secretary-General (USG), who is also a member of the UN Secretary-General's Senior Management Group. The upgraded status of UN Women as both an entity and its leader has contributed to strengthen the status of women's rights issues at the UN, including WPS. The USG position has also been held by high-ranking women with experience from international politics: first Michelle Bachelet (currently the president of Chile), who was succeeded by Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former deputy-president of South Africa.

Under the auspices of UN Women, a Standing Committee on WPS was also established in 2011. The Standing Committee consists of representatives of the major departments, funds, programmes and special

agencies within the UN system. It meets quarterly or on a need-based basis. The Standing Committee has a particular responsibility for following up on the Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security (2011–2020), which contains targets and indicators for the UN system-wide implementation of the WPS agenda. Representatives of the transnational advocacy network on WPS (including the NGO Working Group) are routinely invited to these meetings as observers. They can take active part in discussions but do not have any formal decision making powers. Still, their observer status puts them in a strong position to impact discussions and outcomes.

Another important organisational development within the UN Secretariat, which is also an outcome of close CSO collaboration, is the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SRSG on SVAC). The appointment of an SRSG was called for in Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) and had long been lobbied for by the women's CSOs. Although initially lobbying for the appointment of a SRSG with responsibility for the whole WPS agenda, and not only for one of its sub-themes, the eventual appointment of a SRSG on SVAC was welcomed. The CSO community was actively engaged in negotiating the mandate of the SRSG position and in identifying qualified candidates.[8] The mandate of the SRSG is to lead, coordinate and advocate for efforts to end sexual violence against women and children in conflict and war. The SRSG meets regularly with the Security Council, both in the format of annual thematic discussions on CSV and more conflict-specific contexts.

12.4.3 Institutionalisation in Foreign Policies of UN Member States

Successful diffusion of new international normative frameworks is dependent on member states' compliance with and implementation of the norms in their domestic and foreign policies. Several developments in recent years indicate that the WPS agenda enjoys growing normative support among member states and impacts their diplomatic practices.

The "Friends of Women, Peace and Security Group" (Friends of WPS), established in 2000 and coordinated by Canada, is still active. A growing number of member states seem to find this group to be an effective forum for the exchange of information on national policies and for discussion of various initiatives for the advancement of the WPS agenda.

The Friends Group is also used as a platform for advocacy and negotiations of gender-sensitive outcomes of various UN processes, such as the reviews in 2015 of UN peacekeeping operations and the UN peacebuilding architecture (Tryggestad 2016). In its early years, UN member states from the so-called Western European States and Other Group made up the overwhelming majority of the group. The diplomats representing their respective governments in the group have tended to be women diplomats. So has the Canadian coordinator of the group. For many years, the membership of the Friends of WPS was stable and counted around 30 member states. The criterion for becoming a member was a strong commitment to the WPS agenda (PRIO GPS 2010). In the years leading up to the 10th anniversary, the membership grew and more UN member states expressed an interest in joining. As with the meetings of the UN Women Standing Committee on WPS, CSO representatives are also invited to attend the meetings of the Friends of WPS, as observers. Among the NGOs invited is the NGO Working Group. Throughout the years the collaboration between the Friends Group and the women's CSOs based in New York has been close and intimate.

Another important, and perhaps more explicit, expression of norm institutionalisation in foreign policies is the growing number of National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted by UN member states. The first country to adopt a NAP was Denmark in 2005, followed by Norway, Sweden and the UK in 2006. In the years that followed, a number of European countries adopted NAPs. Most of these countries were also members of the Friends Group in New York. The majority of these NAPs have been developed in close cooperation or consultation with CSOs. In many instances, CSOs have also, through lobbying efforts, been instrumental in initiating the development of NAPs.

In the period 2009–2011, there was a particularly rapid growth in NAPs, which most likely can be ascribed to the mobilising event of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325. At the time of writing (October 2016), 63 UN member states have adopted NAPs.[9] Among these, we find the USA, a UN member state that usually does not adopt NAPs for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. Additional NAPs are underway, including from an increasing number of member states in the global South. What most NAPs have in common is that they often are initiated and drafted by domestic women's groups before being negotiated with their respective governments. Often these drafting and negotiation processes take place in close collaboration with the larger transnational

advocacy network on WPS, and are supported by relevant UN entities such as UN Women.[10] A number of post-conflict member states have negotiated their NAPs in close collaboration with various European member states. So-called twinning-projects, by which donor countries with NAPs support countries from the global South in developing their NAPs, are examples of such negotiations.[11]

An example of an influential CSO in relation to developing NAPs is the US-based Institute for Inclusive Security. Through their NAP Resource Center, they offer interactive training courses on how to go about developing NAPs (Institute for Inclusive Security 2016). They also provide technical expertise to CSOs or governments in the early phases of developing NAPs. The close collaboration between governments, CSOs, and international organisations such as UN Women in developing NAPs is a characteristic of the WPS agenda that is quite unprecedented in international diplomacy.

12.5 Negotiating UNSCR 1325: The Role of Women's CSOs

A steadily growing body of literature on the WPS agenda documents the central role of CSOs and individual activists in the campaign to have UNSCR 1325 adopted—and later, their role in the advocacy for its implementation (Cockburn 2007; Hudson 2010; Olonisakin et al. 2011; Kirby and Shepherd 2016). UNSCR 1325 is a remarkable resolution in the sense that it is one of very few—if not the only one—that has a global constituency of CSOs behind it (Barnes 2011). A number of prominent NGOs headquartered in Europe and North America have their own programmes, projects and campaigns to promote the WPS agenda globally.[12] Some of these organisations have also joined forces in the before-mentioned NGO Working Group on WPS, which is headquartered across the street from the UN Secretariat building in New York.[13]

The forerunner of the working group was the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, a group of international NGOs, coordinated by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Following the stock-taking Beijing +5 Conference in New York in March 2000, and the CSOs decision to start a campaign to have a Security Council resolution on WPS adopted, the Caucus changed its name to the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. Members of the group

were instrumental in putting together the first draft text of UNSCR 1325 and were actively lobbying and negotiating with Security Council members. At this early stage, emphasis was put on providing Council members with state-of-the-art research on the gender-specific impact of war and conflict on women.

In close collaboration with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (now part of UN Women), the NGO Working Group also invited a number of women from conflict zones to New York to give testimonies before the Security Council members in preparation for the formal open debate. The bringing in of women from conflict areas to testify before top-level politicians to influence and change their "hearts and minds" was first applied as an innovative strategy by human rights organisations at the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Geneva. The purpose at the time was to bring attention to the issue of CSV against women (Gierycz 2001). This mixed strategy of trying to influence and persuade states to change their policies by making use of both hard facts and testimonies is what Keck and Sikkink (1998) have described as the favoured "work method" of transnational advocacy networks.

Once UNSCR 1325 was adopted, the NGO Working Group changed its strategy and decided to take on an advocacy and watchdog role in relation to the actual implementation of UNSCR 1325. Through targeted advocacy, monitoring and gender analysis, they hold the Security Council, UN leadership and UN member states accountable (NGO Working Group 2016a). Their representatives meet regularly with those member states that are regarded as the most strategically important at any particular time and provide them with relevant background material and analysis on the gender dimensions of the issues at hand. Their widely distributed publication, the Monthly Action Points (MAPs), aims to provide the Security Council members with analysis and concrete suggestions on how to implement the normative framework of WPS in the country situations that at any time are on the Council's agenda (NGO Working Group 2016b). Today the NGO Working Group is acknowledged among UN diplomats in New York as the "go to" CSO on WPS matters (Tryggestad 2014a).

Equally interesting, particularly in relation to the scholarly discussions on the power and impact of CSOs in global governance, is the role the NGO Working Group is playing as observer in the meetings of both the member state-initiated Friends of WPS Group and the UN Women Standing Committee on WPS. Although formally ascribed the informal observer role, in practice, NGO Working Group representatives are taking

actively part in discussions and negotiations. This leaves the NGO Working Group with considerable influence on policymaking. By positioning itself as it has done, the NGO Working Group also offers an effective and influential channel through which grassroots women's organisations in conflict/post-conflict countries can access the strategic level of the UN and make themselves heard in situations where they have trouble establishing a line of communication with their own national governments, and perhaps also with local UN representatives (Barnes 2011; Tryggestad 2014b). The NGO Working Group's close working relations with the UN Security Council, the UN Women-Governed Standing Committee on WPS and the member state-governed "Friends of WPS" exemplify how the tripartite model for collaborative governance in the case of WPS has reached a high level of institutionalisation, although not formally recognised as such.

12.6 Conclusion

The trajectory of how UNSCR 1325 and WPS were born and now have become a formal thematic issue on the Security Council's agenda exemplifies how women's and women CSOs' entry into international diplomacy has changed the discourse as well as the diplomatic practices on peace and security. Less than two decades ago SVAC was not recognised as a weapon of war. And women's marginalisation from peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes was not recognised as a pressing security concern. Today, the strategic use of SVAC is codified in international law as a war crime, and women's participation and representation is acknowledged as critical to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts (UN SG 2016).

While some UN member states might still be reluctant to support the WPS agenda, it has become increasingly difficult to stay opposed or indifferent. A steadily growing number of member states express concern about the slow pace of progress in implementing the WPS agenda and call for more women to be appointed to high-level positions (UN Security Council 2016). The recent campaign to have a woman elected Secretary-General of the UN is an expression of such concerns (Campaign 2015). Initiated by a group of mainly women academics/experts on the UN and gender issues, the campaign enjoyed wide support from UN member states. The impact of the campaign could also be observed among the candidates to the position. All of them—including the male candidates—made gender equality and women's empowerment a key issue in their programmes. Although the campaign in the end failed to have a woman

elected, a change had nevertheless taken place. Never before in the history of the UN had gender issues featured so centrally in the election process. The role and impact of women and women's CSOs in WPS negotiations at the UN is remarkable, yet, still under-researched and largely unrecognised in the scholarly literature on the UN and global governance.

Notes

1. The open debate was initially scheduled for 29 October but was moved at the last minute to 26 October to accommodate the participation of Secretary of State Clinton, who insisted on giving the US statement herself.
2. These entities include, for instance, UN Women, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
3. Examples of some high-level nominations by the Nordic countries are Margot Wallström (politician, Sweden), the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence; Kristin Lund (general, Norway), the first woman Force Commander of a UN Peacekeeping Operation and Elisabeth Rehn (politician, Finland), Member of the High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study on WPS.
4. The additional seven resolutions are UNSCR 1820 (June 2008), UNSCR 1888 (September 2009), UNSCR 1889 (October 2009), UNSCR 1960 (December 2010), UNSCR 2106 (June 2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013) and UNSCR 2242 (2015).
5. In UN Security Council jargon being the "penholder" means that a member state takes the lead role in initiating and chairing debates on certain topics, including the negotiation and drafting of new resolutions.
6. The UN General Assembly agreed to establish the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (generally referred to as UN Women) in July 2010.
7. The four entities were the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI), the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW).
8. Margot Wallström (Sweden) was appointed the first SRSG on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict in 2010. She stepped down in 2012 and was succeeded by Zainab Bangura from Sierra Leone.
9. For an updated list of UN member states with NAPs, see http://peacewomen.org/member-states (last accessed 28 April 2016).

10. Examples of such processes are Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
11. Nepal's adoption of a NAP on WPS in 2011 is the of a twinning project with Norway.
12. Examples of such organisations are International Alert in London, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Geneva and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, coordinated from New York.
13. The founding members of the NGO Working Group were Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, the International Peace Research Association, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Later, the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice also became involved. An updated list of current members is available on http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/members/ (last accessed 3 November 2016).

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CHAPTER 13

East–West Negotiations

Erika Svedberg

13.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the merits of using feminist concepts to understand how international negotiations are gendered, regardless of whether there are any women negotiators to be found in the specific context. The empirical case of East–West negotiations is in fact void of women negotiators. Therefore, gender as a theoretical concept is here used to gain a relational understanding of the construction of masculinities as expressed in bilateral East–West cooperation projects in early post-Soviet Russia. First, upholding homosociality among negotiators is an important practice, which was reflected in the interviews with Western negotiators in Soviet- and post-Soviet Russia. Second, different masculinities are acted out in the hierarchical relationships established between professional organisational consultants in a restructuring project of a Soviet firm. This occurs in the wake of the immense changes on a structural level, which were set in motion by the policies of *Perestroika* and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union; on an individual level, there were intense inter-personal collisions as well as mutual learning taking place between negotiators.

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This chapter shows that in a study of international negotiations, which have no women negotiators, gender is a useful conceptual framework to uncover patterns of power relations in international negotiations. Gender as a conceptual framework is operationalised to unfold homosociality in the first part of the chapter. In the second part, gender is used to identify patterns of masculinities, expressed in two types of masculinities: the benevolent and the authoritarian leader.

The chapter utilises an actor-structure approach for analysing negotiations. It ties in with the overall second question of this volume, that is, to what extent are norms and practices of negotiations gendered. This chapter presents an institutional analysis, viewing the negotiations in the material as steered by highly gendered norms and practices. Gender is here treated as a social institution that structures power relations, not just between men and women but also between men.

The empirical material is set in a unique historical context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but it is argued that we can see these patterns in other contexts as well today. The material was gathered through interviews with two groups of negotiators. One group had many years of experience working with partners in the Soviet bloc countries and was at the time of the interviews working for the Swedish company Tetra Pak. The second group of negotiators interviewed were independent organisational consultants based in the United States/Canada or Moscow, thus not associated with the aforementioned firm. The interviews lasted for approximately one-and-a-half hours and took place in Moscow and Sweden in the period of 1991–93. The international negotiations in the cooperation projects were conducted at a time when cold war enemy images were strongly held, regardless of whether the negotiations were in the political or economic spheres. Furthermore, East–West cooperation projects were "male territory," where women seldom set foot, at least not in the capacity of negotiators.

13.2 The Homosocial Environment of East–West Negotiations

In the interviews with Western negotiators conducted in the early 1990s, all respondents declared that a prerequisite for a good negotiator to post-Soviet Union was to be male. To analyse the underlying historical and cultural structures why this is so, the terminology from political theory of the public/private spheres is used. The analogy of the public to the

international realm and the private sphere to the domestic realm is then explained. The aim is to make visible the underlying assumptions and biases regarding engendered power relations of male versus female. The need for maleness is likely to be strong in this empirical case because the international negotiations are seen to be with representatives of an enemy other (the Soviet Union). The perceived need of homosociality is thus heightened in the context of insecurity and enmity.

In the study, I wanted to explore what Western negotiators thought of Eastern negotiators. Therefore I began all interviews by asking the respondent to describe "the good negotiator" in a post-Soviet Russian context. How should a person act in order to function well in an East–West cooperation project or joint venture, in Russia? Without exception, all Western negotiators told me that the most important factor was that the negotiator had to be a man. In the interviews, I never spoke of gender, and there was never any mentioning of men or women on my part.

The notion that a Western negotiator in a post-Soviet context must be a man is interesting. What is it about being male and negotiating in a post-Soviet setting? Why is being male overwhelmingly expressed as a given and natural characteristic in this context? Does being a male negotiator give an upper hand in East–West negotiations? How come none of the interviewees expressed even the slightest bit of hesitation on the issue when women had de facto never been seen as negotiators in this setting? One reason may be that we tend not to question things that are obvious, self-evident and everyday-like (Keller 1983: 187; Hearn 2012). Assumptions and ideas about gender are so deeply engrained and socially institutionalised in everyday life that they become pre-cognitive and especially hard to avoid. Consequently, the answer that a good negotiator had to be male was always, and seemingly automatically, brought up. The interviewees could talk at length and motivate and describe why negotiators in the post-Soviet setting had to be male. Many of the negotiators interviewed had worked extensively in the business sector in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. According to these negotiators, there were at least two reasons why the negotiators would have to be male. First, Russia was a very macho society, which made it necessary to rule out women negotiators if you were to stand a chance at achieving profitable settlements with a Russian business partner. Second, since the negotiations often took place between two teams of men, the activities away from the negotiation table would often involve heavy drinking and situations that could potentially be dangerous for a Western woman. In addition, the dangers imposed on the

woman negotiator would mean an extra burden on her male negotiator who would be obliged to protect his female colleague, thus not being able to concentrate as well on the negotiations of reaching a good settlement. Thus, in the eyes of Western respondents, their team of negotiators would have to be all male. A situation of having women negotiators working either on their own or as part of a team was simply unthinkable. In short, the drive for upholding an organisational practice that kept reproducing a highly homosocial environment was starkly expressed in the interviews with Western negotiators. Furthermore, the explanation for this practice was placed in the description of the Soviet Other/post-Soviet Other as macho and misogynist.

To explain and unpack this homosocial pattern of everyday norm in the all-male setting of East–West negotiations, I have chosen to use (1) public/private dichotomy and (2) the concepts of just warrior/beautiful soul and the protector/protected binary. The aim is to reach a deeper understanding of a largely unquestioned social practice of international negotiations.

13.2.1 The Public/Private Spheres

The public sphere is more associated with masculinity than femininity. The public sphere of human life is understood as a place where men and masculinity naturally reign (Evans 1997; Connell 1995). The strict division between public and private originates in Ancient Greece where life was organised in the public polis populated by free and equal men involved in developing politics in theory and in practice, including war making. The private sphere was the apolitical closed world of households inhabited by women, children and slaves who were preoccupied with the practical aspects of the everyday. Nancy Hartsock (1985) describes this original division of society as hierarchical and misogynist. The private sphere was the feminine realm associated with the physical, bodily things, such as reproduction, shelter, food and hard physical work. The public sphere was for the lofty and abstract side of life, such as the soul, the intellect, discussing and actual theorising (Hartsock 1985: 187). This ancient cultural construction of the public/private sphere sets the stage for a long-lived gendered dichotomy of social and economic life that we still experience today. Carole Pateman pointed out in her influential work that by separating the domain as masculine and feminine, the public (masculine) becomes more important and the private (feminised) sphere occupied by women and reproductive types of work becomes devalued (Pateman 1987).

As such, the homosocial environment of East–West negotiations is an expression of these historical and cultural practices.

Much contemporary feminist work in International Relations (IR) underlines that there is an analogous thinking to be found between "the Public" in traditional political theory and "the International" in Diplomacy and IR. For instance, the state in neo-realist thinking is seen as an autonomous individual or actor in its own right, like a man conducting politics or business in the imaginary city square of the Public. In this analogy, the nation is the people in the domestic realm. The international realm is the public sphere, where sovereign states (men) come together to negotiate and make important decisions. Hence, the private sphere is the domestic. It is the homeland, the place and territory to which we have natural, familial access via formal citizenship. The negotiator (diplomat, businessman or politician) leaves the safe domestic (the private sphere) and is sent together with an all-male team of Western negotiators into the international (the public sphere).

Consequently, the public/private dichotomy uncovers the homosocial practices of East–West negotiations, which underline an over-arching gendered binary thinking. The nation, the West, becomes the private sphere inhabited by women and ordinary folk who are not part of the male elites of statesmen and businessmen who move and negotiate on "the international stage" (the public sphere). The national correlates with the domestic sphere and the international with the public sphere, populated by male elite groups. Already 20 years ago, Ann Tickner discussed the ramifications of the international being associated with male elites and ties this process to the need for securing the masculine state's sovereignty and identity on the international arena by differentiating the self from a devalued, female Other: "Just as sovereign man depended on the female other for his identity, so the state secures its identity through its relationship to identities of devalued and dangerous others. Both inside and outside its boundaries" (Tickner 1996: 151).

13.3 Just Warriors and Beautiful Souls Emerge in War Contexts

The need for Western male negotiators is paired with the cold war enemy image of the Soviet- and post-Soviet Other. Here Elshtain's images of just warriors and beautiful souls provide an additional analytical lens to the cold war context of East–West negotiations. The term "beautiful soul" was coined by Hegel. Originally, it referred to human beings and did not sin-

gle out women. These human beings possessed great unselfish goodness and purity and were apolitical with no power or influence over events in the world (see also Poulos 2009). The term beautiful soul later became associated with the idea of womanhood and an identity located in the private and apolitical sphere. Elshtain has developed a binary with beautiful souls by adding the term "just warrior" to connote the man/soldier upholding the tradition of Just War. According to Elshtain, the war-connected binary of Just Warrior/Beautiful Soul is instrumental in upholding separate and gendered roles for men and women within the boundaries of the state, in effect creating a gendered citizenship (Elshtain 1995a). Furthermore, war is central in the culture throughout history, "we continue to locate ourselves inside its prototypical emblems of identities—the just fighter, the heroine of the home front, the country united and the like" (Elshtain 1995b: 348). In Elshtain's analysis war and gender are closely intertwined. War and gender are co-constituting practices in the context of the nation as well as in the international and global setting.

At the time of the interviews in 1991–93, the cold war had barely ended and the enemy images of the Soviet Union had still a strong impact. In the description of experienced Western negotiators, the person to be sent to negotiate is like a younger officer; a smart, civilised, well-educated man and a team member (or a just warrior) and not a woman (or a beautiful soul). In any war, *womenandchildren* (Enloe 1989), or the beautiful souls, stay behind, they remain at home while the just warriors are sent off to conduct important missions in the interest of the domestic, which upholds everyday life back home. Hence, it is rational to send just warriors (young, able men) and not beautiful souls (women) likely to be in need of protection.

By applying feminist theory, we can begin to uncover what gender is and what role it plays in international negotiations. The homosociality concept refers to a social preference for members of one's own sex, but does not imply erotic attraction. Much work in the study of masculinity connects homosociality to the construction of a hegemonic masculinity, which is a culturally dominant ideal of the masculine as opposed to other subordinated men in male hierarchies (Connell 1995). In management studies, homosocial reproduction refers to the situation when managers promote persons similar to themselves (Kanter 1977). For example, Australian business schools have been found to promote a hegemonic "masculine ethic" (a term coined by Kanter) of management as a professional calculative guide. In a study by Roper (1996), flourishing

homosociality coincided with settings where the masculine ethic of management was strong. Hence, homosocial networks are often described as "old boys clubs" and work to sustain men's dominance of political and economic hierarchies (Flood 2008).

13.4 Exertions of Power in All-Male Teams

In the early 1990s, Western state agencies, international corporations and other organisations paid large sums of money for teams of consultants to go to former Soviet bloc republics to take part in the economic restructuring of the region. These were the days of many projects with high-flying dreams of setting into motion liberal-oriented political, social, economic and legal changes after the end of communist rule. Consultants of different professional backgrounds were easily spotted at airports as they lined up to board the flights to all major cities of the former Soviet Union. As different as they were professionally, one thing the consultants had in common was that they were all men. For instance, when travelling to Moscow in the early 1990s I was struck by the fact that most of the time I was the only woman passenger on board airplanes bound for Moscow.

Below, I present an intersectional analysis of the gendered power practices that came into play in these "democratisation projects." The case I analysed was a project, which began in 1991, primarily financed by a US economic foundation with the aim of introducing Western methods of privatisation. The empirical material consists not only of interviews with both teams but also diary entries from the chief negotiator of the Western team. In some cases, I was able to interview the negotiators on several occasions, which was extremely helpful as a way of seeing how the negotiators' thinking about the other team evolved and changed over time.

How are we then to understand the multitude of masculinities and how they interact? Murphy (1998) has identified six masculine personas in real-world international politics as well as in the academic study of IR. The masculine personas are the good soldier, the civilian strategist, the military son, the good comrade, the fashionable pacifist and lastly, the Sisyphean peacemaker (Murphy 1998). Hooper (1998: 33) points to four different historical ideal models of dominant masculinities: the Greek citizen-warrior, the patriarchal Judeo-Christian leadership, the honour-patronage model and the Protestant bourgeois rationalist model. According to Hooper, "[modern-day masculinities] have descended from these types, whose elements have been combined and recombined in different ways"

(Hooper 1998: 33). Moreover, Hooper suggests that these masculinities should be seen as related variations descending from one common source: "Just as members of a family may be said to resemble each other without necessarily all having any single feature in common, so masculinities form common patterns without sharing any single universal characteristic" (Wittgenstein, quoted in Hooper 1998: 33–34). Ashworth and Swatuk (1998) discuss the binary of rational masculinity versus hypermasculinity and argue that in the culture there is a tug of competition for domination between two schools of thinking about power. In this tug, much is at stake. Ashworth and Swatuk identify the analogy between the binary of rational masculinity/hypermasculinity on the one hand and the split within mainstream IR between neo-liberal IR (man is by nature a rational being) and neo-realist IR (man is by nature a self-interested, aggressive being) on the other. "The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which one is more masculine (real and objective) and the other which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)" (Ashworth and Swatuk 1998: 76).

In the interviews, negotiators on both sides described how they changed as a result of the interaction, giving specific examples of new strategies and behaviours they had adopted as a result of collaborating. According to Connell, masculinities are not fixed, but change and adjust depending upon the context: "Masculinity as an object of knowledge is always masculinity-in-relation" (1995: 44). Hence, masculinity is relational and a dynamic social practice that undergoes constant change in every society and historical context.

In the Stroypolymer case, gender came into play in the all-male negotiations. The early 1990s were marked by the unforeseen peaceful ending of the cold war. Here, the Western (winning) side took the lead and benevolently went to meet the stigmatised loser of the former Soviet bloc to help "him" rebuild a new and more prosperous society after the end of communism. This image constituted a cognitive backdrop for the stage upon which most early post-cold war East–West negotiations took place. Social anthropologist Sampson (1996) describes the multitude of projects as "a visible aspect of the east-west relationship" throughout the 1990s. There was usually a lack of self-reflection on the Western side. Sampson notes that in this "world of projects," Western donors often focused on theoretical models rather than reality: "[There was] the assumption that Western models reflected Western realities, that things in the West somehow work

according to the way they are depicted on project documents, tables, charts, plans and management diagrams" (Sampson 1996: 125).

The years of 1991–93 represented a unique time in East–West negotiations and the cooperation project at Stroypolymer was in many ways typical for this era. The Stroypolymer was a Soviet mid-size manufacturer of building materials, located 40 km outside greater Moscow. The privatisation of this plant involved roughly speaking five groups of people. The five groups can be divided into a patronside and a clientside. On the patronside, there was (1) the team of five or six US- and Canada-based organisation consultants, (2) the team of three or four Muscovite organisation consultants and (3) the US sponsors acting backstage. The clients were (4) the Soviet management of Stroypolymer plant, and (5) the Soviet workers (men and women) and the inhabitants of the nearby village who would all be affected by the coming changes at the plant. The true joint venture part of the cooperation was within the patron side of the project, between the US- and Canada-based consultants and their Muscovite colleagues. Together, the two teams of consultants were to assist with the restructuring of the plant in ways that would have far-reaching consequences in everyday life of the workers and villagers on the clientside.

The Stroypolymer cooperation project had an explicit experimental aim; to learn more about whether organisational development methods from the West were at all applicable to an internal post-Soviet industrial context. In this way, the Western team had a dual role. First, it was to carry out a restructuring (privatisation) of a large company. Second, based on the observations, it was expected to make recommendations to the Western sponsors regarding future involvement of US investors and entrepreneurs in the former Soviet bloc economy.

13.5 The Benevolent Leader and the Authoritarian Leader

As stated, the negotiators were all men and the case a pilot collaboration between former cold war enemies. Hearn (2012: 48) describes how some social phenomena are so obvious that we no longer see them, no longer bother to investigate how and why it is so, such as the linkage between masculinity and international negotiations. However, in this section we shall look at what took place in the cooperation as described by a handful of men. This can be described as expressions of the meeting of masculinities, learning and making adjustments in a realm of power and leadership.

The negotiators were mostly well-educated and experienced with fitting professional specialisations as psychologists, managers and organisational specialists. The Western group of men had long and extensive work experience of organisational consulting in large-scale companies. To the Muscovite team, being consultants in this type of processes was a novelty and a type of Perestroika phenomenon.[1] In comparison to their Eastern colleagues in the project, the Western side of the project had the upper hand by being better prepared for the challenges ahead. The Western men were experienced specialists on communication in organisations, human change and conflict resolution between groups and individuals. They also had a firm understanding of negotiations in terms of building relationships.

Hence, from the outset the Western team emphasised the relational aspects on cooperation and were very well prepared to handle the challenges connected to developing the East–West negotiation relationship. They were also well aware that the success of this project would depend on how well they could meet eye to eye with the Eastern team of men (Cederholm 1991). The Muscovite team was quite impressed by the work codex of the benevolent leader and saw early on a chance to enhance working skills and learn something useful. Two Muscovite organisation consultants described in interviews with me that they had noted that the Western team's work codex was building trust, being honest, responsible and displaying good listening skills.[2]

The other masculinity displayed was the authoritarian leader, which echoes a classical figure in European cultural tradition. The authoritarian leader resembles the Judeo-Christian patriarch with its emphasis on the domestic ideal of responsibility, ownership and an unquestionable authority of the father (Hooper 1998: 33). The authoritarian type of leader is an ancient cultural figure and has been well-documented in a number of disciplines. Hence, what is important to note is that this kind of authoritarian type of leader is in a sense universal. The masculine authority figure is found as head of organisations in many places around the world. The authoritarian leader is also expected to have a say in everything and will meddle in all matters—small and big—as part of his power. Powerful hierarchical positions are made visible and are openly cultivated. Strict discipline and adherence to his command are expected, as he summons his dependents from an untouchable position at the top. To the authoritarian leader, information is a resource to be safe-guarded and information is carefully guarded, not easily shared in the organisation.

13.5.1 Learning from Each Other

The analysis below will focus on the relational meeting of competing traditions that constitutes (the winning type of) masculine leadership. The initial phase of the collaborative project was described to me by both teams as a struggle between a non-compromising zero-sum outlook versus a more accommodating win-win outlook.[3] The first meeting between the two negotiation teams took place for a week in Moscow, with the aim to get to know each other and to work out a common strategy before going to the village and plant of Stroypolymer. The US team consisted of four men, and there were five men in the Muscovite team, all nine of them organisation consultants. The preparatory week was a hard struggle for all involved.

> The first six days of the project can only be described as intense pain. I made no entry in my diary until the seventh day, since we fell into bed every night after up to 18 hour workdays trying to convince each other of different realities… I experienced moments of feeling like an animal trapped between our need to create value for Stroypolymer and our U.S. sponsors and, at the same time, stay the course and work it out with the Russian colleagues. (Cederholm, diary entry, 1991)

At this stage, the Western men faced what was probably the biggest challenge of the project, namely, whether to change their "codex" for how to behave and instead become more firm. Would it be better to adjust to the more confrontational style of the other team and to give up some of their cooperative style? Would it be right to adopt a more authoritarian, order-giving style of leadership? The Western negotiators were torn between, on the one hand, their need to be able to get things done and create real value as expected by their Western sponsors. On the other hand, they were not willing to let go of the aim and purpose to prove that the cooperative style of leadership could work in a post-Soviet context of human and organisational change. The Western team was striving to be benevolent and thus questioned the righteousness of their actions. They recognised—and doubted—their role in the larger historical process of systemic change in far-away post-Soviet totalitarian places. The Western men recognised their role in a larger scheme of things, of "spreading democracy": "We repeated time and again that democracy is not who can shout the loudest with the most passion" (Cederholm, diary entry, 1991). In another paragraph, a similar experience is recorded:

> The end of two days of workshops was a two-hour discussion about life in the West, again driven by their curiosity and questions. We tried to represent the good and the bad and speculated with the managers how this society could avoid our traps and the negative consequences of freedom without responsibility. (Cederholm, diary entry, 1991: 14)

At the same time, towards the end of the preparation week the Western team consulted one another and agreed to be more clear and forceful in their communication to the other team what they wanted; in other words adopting some of the traits of an authoritarian leader. In this way, the Western organisation consultants took the lead in the collaboration project and kept leading it throughout also in the Stroypolymer setting. The four Western men justified becoming more authoritarian based on two arguments: first, after the initial week, it was clear that their Soviet colleagues did not have the experience needed to plan such interventions that they were about to launch at Stroypolymer. Second, it also became apparent that the other team could not agree internally, whereas the Western team had a stronger and clearer idea of how to proceed. One of the Western team members later wrote: "We needed to be intrusive and challenging, or we would not have been of much help … fulfilling the rule that the more fully aligned team will dominate in a joint venture, we Westerners assumed overall leadership in the effort" (Kolodny 1993). Consequently the Western team made a point of being transparent in their communication to the men in the other team and to take the lead: "We did introduce a highly structured approach to change based on solid theory. The Soviet partner seemed to learn more from us than vice versa since our deepest-held belief is that we, as a team, must be clear on our process if we are to understand Stroypolymer" (Cederholm 1991). What we may learn from this example is that the men in the Western team adapted and changed their "style" in the course of cooperating. This adaptation would seem to be a result of intense interaction and conscious face-to-face trouble shooting with the focus on reaching an understanding of the relationship between the two teams. The men from the former Soviet Union, on both the patron and client sides, also said they had changed as a result of the project. They adapted a more communicative, process-oriented (as opposed to outcome oriented) focus in their everyday management at the plant. After the project was concluded, the Western team conducted a written evaluation anonymously among the participating managers, which indicated signs of critical self-reflection regarding the authoritarian type of

leadership and interest in adapting some of the other style of leadership and management (Svedberg 2002: 167).

13.5.2 Information and Power

At the centre of the difficulties to collaborate in the joint venture of restructuring the plant at Stroypolymer was the problem of different perceptions of the proper use of information. In the eyes of the authoritarian leader, information should be withheld as a sign of power. To the benevolent leader, the view on information of organisational change should flow freely as it enables those involved to see the need for changing both their ways of reasoning and the way things are done. The Western team leader Cederholm noted that one of the top deputy managers acting as an authoritarian leader could go on talking for hours on end if not interrupted, while still carefully avoid giving any information regarding an ongoing conflict with another deputy (Cederholm, 1992: 5–6). The question of information sharing/non-sharing is a crucial element of negotiations in both types of masculinities. When the authoritarian leader treats information according to the motto "the less they know, the more manoeuvring space to me" the project may be stalled. With less information, the benevolent leader's hands are tied and the project cannot move forward. In practicality stalling the project by withholding information hurts the authoritarian leader more since the benevolent leaders (being foreign consultants) will in any case eventually leave, return home and no longer be part of the restructuring process.

> What a battle we have had, even with the most enlightened Russian consultants! They have insisted on editing all data because certain things must not be said, no matter how loud they scream at you. We refused to give in to the pressure, and now, when all is said and done, all marvel at the power of the truth and their discovery that criticism can be delivered in supporting ways. (Cederholm, diary entry, 1991)

13.5.3 Self-Reflection: Thinking in Terms of Similarities Rather than Differences

The East–West negotiations that took place in the immediate post-cold war context were marked with mindsets of enemy images and dealing with one another as representatives of the "other camp." In this setting,

it was extremely challenging for negotiators to think of the other in terms of similarities rather than differences. However, to the extent that they managed to see beyond the Othering constructions, it opened up the mind for self-reflections, which in turn helped the processes of collaboration and, in some cases, processes of change. In one of the interviews, two of the Muscovite organisation consultants reflected that after some time they came to realise that the Western men of the other team of the organisation consultants were actually not weak. Yet, from the way they acted they had initially appeared to be weak. However, after collaborating in the Stroypolymer restructuring, the group of Soviet men had developed a clear appreciation of the potential for power locked into the traits and techniques of the benevolent leader's masculinity. Looking back, one of the Muscovite consultants, a professional psychologist, remarked to me that he felt more powerful and no longer saw the need to collaborate with a Western partner. Having been exposed to it and observed this Western style of leadership, he now knew how to influence and lead effectively himself.[4] The Western team had underlined the need to analyse what the negotiators had experienced in the course of the project in terms of similarity and analogies rather than difference.

In sum, the Stroypolymer negotiations between two teams of organisational consultants were an unusual success. Most likely this can be attributed to the ability to learn and apply self-reflective methods on both sides. In a study of Western aid to Eastern Europe 1989–98, Wedel concluded that the low rate of successfully implemented projects was due to an underestimation of the importance of the relationship between teams involved (Wedel 1998).

13.6 Conclusion

As explained there were no women negotiators in any of the collaborations studied. What comes to the fore in this study of East–West negotiations are essentially two themes: one is the high need for male homosocial teams and the other is the re-enactment of two archetypical masculinities, namely the authoritarian and the benevolent leader. Homosociality among men, that is, the preference of working with men rather than women, is likely to matter more when an international negotiation is taking place in a setting, which is perceived to be "risky" or insecure. The Western

businessmen interviewed provided examples of many surprising and often uncomfortable experiences from doing business in Soviet and early post-Soviet settings. They argued that women had to be excluded based on ideology rather than practical experience as women had never been part of their teams. Furthermore, in interviews they also described how male negotiators were different from and superior to women. Women would need protection if they were sent to negotiate in a post-Soviet setting. These findings are in line with Flood's study of homosociality in a group of Australian cadets (Flood 2008). Masculinity is constructed in relation to an underlying gendered assumption that leadership is male. In times of crisis, insecurity, war or instability the leadership called for is more likely to be both male and in line with the authoritarian controlling protector-type of leader. However, in the Stroypolymer case, we also see the mise-en-scène of the benevolent (rational) and the authoritarian (hypermasculine) archetypical masculinities. In this round of competition between the two, the benevolent leader comes out on the winning side. He is in effect stronger and a more convincing leader of the two. Yet, the historical structural factors were at the time to the benevolent leader's advantage. In the wake of the end of the cold war, the tables were turned around at the micro-level of East–West negotiation in favour of the benevolent leader. The near dissolution of the Soviet Union had robbed the authoritarian leader of the realm of the Communist economic, social and political system. On both a micro and a macro level, one is struck by the familiarity of the two types of masculinities due to the fact that they constitute two major historic archetypes of masculinist leadership. It is a power-masculinity binary with worldwide and pre-historic roots, which is vividly present in today's global politics.

Notes

1. Interview with two Muscovite organisation consultants, Moscow, 12 February 1996. Interview with one Muscovite consultant, Moscow, 16 February 1996.
2. Interview with two Muscovite organisation consultants, Moscow, 12 February 1996. Interview with one Muscovite consultant, Moscow, 16 February 1996.
3. Interview with two Muscovite organisation consultants, Moscow, 12 February 1996.
4. Moscow, 16 February 1996.

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CHAPTER 14

Conclusion: The Quest for Gender Justice in Diplomacy

Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns

14.1 Introduction

Throughout history, diplomacy as an institution has been mediated by continuity and change in its norms and practices. In the last century, however, major changes have taken place, which have triggered debates among practitioners and academics alike regarding the diplomatic implications. One of them concerns the effect of the increasing number of women participating in diplomacy and international negotiation. As the contributing chapters of this book show, the gendered characteristics of diplomacy over the past century are distinguished by forces of both continuity and change. On the one hand, there have been some remarkable transformations in terms of the gender make-up of some Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) where some women have even reached the top echelons of diplomacy and

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negotiation, breaking the prior male monopoly of such posts. In addition, in the last two decades, there has been an amazing international mobilisation in support of the Women, Peace, Security (WPS) agenda in general and women's inclusion in peace negotiations in particular. The adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1325 presents a significant milestone in the quest for gender justice in peace processes and has greatly influenced norm diffusion in the spheres of diplomacy. On the other hand, women still remain a minority in most MFAs and are grossly underrepresented in top positions, with a global average of 15% ambassadors and 9% in peace negotiations. Hence, gender patterns do not disappear simply because women have entered into the realm of diplomacy and international negotiation.

One of the overarching ambitions of this book has been to map where women are located and positioned in diplomacy and international negotiation in order to make them visible as global actors. We note that there is presently a growing interest in the numerical representation of women in diplomacy and negotiation. Yet, the problematic of the gendered nature of diplomacy, its norms and practices, has provided much less interest among both scholars and practitioners. This is somewhat of a paradox, resting perhaps on an assumption that gender norms and practices within diplomacy will become more gender equal simply with an increase of more women. We view this as an open call for researchers to engage with practitioners on scrutinising such underlying causal assumptions.

Consequently, a second ambition of this book has been to fill this research gap by critically analysing the diplomatic infrastructure and to what extent diplomatic norms and practices of negotiations are gendered. As will be discussed below, gender patterns trigger structural barriers and gender-exclusive negotiation processes, which may either make it difficult to visualise women in leading diplomatic positions or force women to adapt to masculine norms and practices. That said, the institution of diplomacy has certainly changed by broadening and deepening its practices. Diplomacy today is a much more heterosocial milieu as a diverse set of actors has entered the diplomatic stage. This change is partly captured in the new terminology of the multiple tracks (1, 2, 3 and many more) of diplomacy. It is primarily here, in these additional tracks, that we find a growing number of women participating as part of civil society-based organisations.

In this last chapter, we draw out a series of more general propositions about contemporary gender and diplomacy from the contributions to this

book. It is our hope that these can advance the research agenda on gender and diplomacy. The concluding discussion is divided into four sections. We begin by providing a historical narrative on the exclusions and inclusions in diplomacy over time, suggesting the contours of general trends in the quest to end formal barriers and bring about gender parity. The chapter then proceeds to critically analyse the gendered diplomatic infrastructure and how it still tends towards masculinised norms, homosocial environments and gendered division of labour. We conclude with a discussion about the quest for gender justice in diplomacy and a note on some positive indicators that have been triggered by external as well as internal push factors. We also underline the long way that still lies ahead before reaching gender parity in diplomacy.

14.2 Exclusions and Inclusions Over Time

The scholarship on diplomatic history makes clear that women have served important roles in diplomacy for a very long time. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, when ties to the royal courts were pivotal for diplomatic credentials, diplomatic interactions among elites took place in networks of both women and men. In this context, women of the high European nobility exercised diplomatic influence and carried out many diplomatic tasks (e.g. James and Sluga 2016). They were trained in letter writing for official documents and to give speeches to foreign officials. Indeed, a range of women with relations to the courts were involved in foreign relations and served important diplomatic functions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Bastian 2016: 114). As Rumelili and Suleiman's chapter shows, women filled similar diplomatic functions in Ottoman diplomacy. European women were even occasionally appointed to ambassador posts. One early formally appointed female ambassador was French aristocrat Renée du Bec-Crespin, Countess of Guébriant, to Poland in 1645 (Tischer 2001).

However, during the nineteenth century, as the character of European states changed and as diplomacy was professionalised and shifted more firmly to MFAs, women lost much of their former influence in diplomacy. The emerging Foreign Service careers were generally only open for men, and women became barred from taking the Foreign Service exams. During most of the twentieth century, exceptionally few women thus served as diplomats or negotiators. Their main diplomatic function instead became that of the diplomatic wife, a seemingly peripheral role, which was

nonetheless central to diplomacy. It was during the twentieth century that the expectation developed that diplomatic wives move with their diplomat husbands to foreign postings, where they were expected to carry out a range of duties, such as giving luncheons and dinners and hosting other official events. Indeed, in many MFAs, diplomatic wives were required to undertake such official labour without any payment. Thus, even though official diplomacy was a sphere almost exclusively for men, women performed key support functions (e.g. Enloe 1990; Wood 2007).

14.2.1 The Quest for Gender Parity

We are still living in the aftermath and legacy of nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments of excluding women from diplomacy. Of the total ambassadors in the world, 85% are men, and approximately 90% of all peace negotiators and 95% of all chief peace mediators are male. Yet, the gender make-up of diplomacy continues to change, and the number of women acting as diplomats and negotiators is increasing. In terms of the countries included in this volume, the MFAs of Sweden and the United States have reached gender parity (i.e. the 40/60 range of men and women). Overall, 56% of the employees in the Swedish MFA are women and this is a number that has been stable for over a decade, as the organisation reached gender parity in the late 1990s. Likewise, roughly half of those accepted into the Swedish diplomatic programme between 2013 and 2015 were women (Regeringskansliets centralarkiv). In the United States, women make up 44% of Foreign Service employees and 31% of senior Foreign Service employees (US Department of State, n.d.). Of those entering in the last years to the Foreign Service, 45% are women.

In the remaining cases—Brazil, Japan and Turkey—the share of women is not yet as high but the trend points in the same direction, towards a significant increase in the share of women. Among these three, the Turkish MFA employs the highest share of women. In 2016, 27% of career diplomats were women as were 37% of consular and expert officers. In Brazil, women hold 25% of all management positions and make up 20% of the top three stages of the diplomatic career. Of those accepted into Foreign Service, 21% are women. The Japanese MFA employs fewer women: at present, 17% of career and non-career diplomats are women. However, as Flowers demonstrated, there has been a marked and rapid recent increase in the share of women passing Japanese Foreign Service exams: 19% in 2014, 31% in 2015 and 36% in 2016. The percentage of women in the Japanese MFA is set to rise significantly in coming years.

So when were the formal bans on women in the Foreign Service lifted? The cases in our book suggest the first half of the twentieth century. As Table 14.1 indicates below, Brazil lifted the ban in 1918 and Sweden and Japan did so in 1948 and 1949 respectively. There is no apparent relation between when the ban was first lifted and the present level of women as Foreign Service officers (FSOs). Both Brazil and Turkey reintroduced bans again from the 1930s until the 1950s, setting the integration of women into their MFAs back by decades. In Sweden, in contrast, women were let into the diplomatic career as late as in Japan and yet the Swedish MFA reached gender parity before any of the other cases. Clearly, an increase in the number of women in diplomacy is not simply a matter of time.

When lifting the general ban on women in the Foreign Service, a number of states nonetheless retained a ban on married women. Only single women were allowed to take the Foreign Service exams, and if a woman was married, she was forced to leave the diplomatic career. In our cases, these bans were lifted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as seen in Table 14.2. Interestingly, the Turkish MFA never employed such a ban. In her research on the Japanese MFA, Flowers has so far found no evidence of such a ban in Japan either. It is thus possible that the marriage ban became a norm primarily among Western states.

14.2.2 Senior Diplomatic and Negotiation Positions

The prestigious position of ambassador can either be the apex of a professional career or a political appointment made from outside the MFA.

Table 14.1 Year women were first allowed into the Foreign Service career

Year women were first allowed into the Foreign Service career	
1918	Brazil (then prohibited 1938–1954)
1920	United States
1932	Turkey (then prohibited 1934–1957)
1948	Sweden
1949	Japan

Table 14.2 Year the "marriage ban" for female diplomats was lifted

No ban	Turkey
No ban?	Japan
1966/1988	Brazil
1971	United States
Early 1970s	Sweden

Table 14.3 Year of first female ambassador and share of female ambassadors in 2014

Country	*Year of first female ambassador*	*Female ambassadors in 2014 (%)*
United States	1949	30
Sweden	1955	40
Brazil	1961	16
Japan	1980	3
Turkey	1982	13

In the countries studied in this book, the first female ambassadors started appearing in the second half of the twentieth century. In 2014, many decades later, a mere 15% of the ambassadors of the world were women, as seen in Chap. 2.

The number of women in senior negotiating positions is even lower, at the global level as well as in international organisations. In their analysis of the negotiations in the European Council, Naurin and Naurin show that women are systematically underrepresented in the committee system. At the same time, the significant increase over time should be noted. In 2003, women constituted 21% and the number had risen to 37% in 2015. Hence, the gender balance of the European Union (EU) "negotiation machinery," that is, the committees and working groups of the Council, is improving. Nonetheless, few women have been appointed to higher-level committees and to hard policy areas, such as foreign policy. Instead, women tend to cluster primarily in the soft policy areas, such as the environment. Another interesting and maybe unexpected finding from their descriptive mapping is the strong negative effect of the number of years a state has been a member of the EU. In other words, newer EU member states are significantly more likely to have a balanced gender composition than the founding states, which have been members of the EU for a longer period of time. This is surprising in light of gender parity on the national level otherwise lagging behind among the new member states. It seems that older member states may have developed more stubborn gender patterns in their relationship to EU institutions than the newer member states. Women from new and old member states alike nonetheless share similar barriers in terms of reaching the higher and more prestigious levels of the Council Committee system. Not surprisingly, the share of women at the very top ministerial level is the lowest of all EU institutions.

In the context of peace negotiations, women's representation is further restricted. A recent and often quoted study from UN Women (2012) shows that women constitute only 9% of all negotiators, 2.5% of all chief mediators and 4% of signatories. Similar patterns can be observed in international organisations. For instance, only 19% of the permanent representatives of the UN were women in 2016 (of the total 193). As Tryggestad points out, the pattern is even worse when it comes to the representation of women as UN ambassadors in the Security Council, which has a consistently poor track record of only one or no woman at all. The gendered pattern of recruitment to senior positions within the UN also seems to persist. In 2015, 92% of all senior appointments went to male candidates (Landgren 2015).

Despite these negative figures, the number of female diplomats continues to rise and we expect the share of women ambassadors and negotiators to increase as well. As observed by Aggestam and Svensson, there is a persistent if modest trend of an increasing number of women acting as peace mediators. Yet, as some of the other chapters have shown, there are additional reasons why women can drop off in the career path more frequently than their male colleagues. Hence, the entry of larger numbers of women in career diplomacy is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, step towards higher ratios of women in senior diplomatic and negotiating positions.

14.3 Gendered Diplomatic Infrastructure and Division of Labour

As discussed above, nineteenth- and twentieth-century diplomacy has largely been a man's world. Until recently, diplomats and negotiators have almost exclusively been male, with masculine norms and scripts giving shape to diplomatic interactions and practices. More fundamentally, diplomacy is gendered by its close association with masculinity, power and military affairs, which is reflected in most of the contributing chapters to this book. Putting an end to formal barriers and seeing an increasing number of women entering diplomacy and negotiation is a very important first step. But it is only a first step. As Paffenholz states in Chap. 9, "counting women" must be coupled with an effort to "make women count." Once women are in the MFAs and at the international negotiation tables, precisely where do they end up? Do women reach positions where they can make a difference? Pulling together the insights and results from the

chapters, it is clear that the distribution of men and women in diplomacy and negotiations follow some familiar gender patterns.

14.3.1 Power, Position and Gendered Hierarchies

As Towns and Niklasson show, men hold 85% of the world's ambassador appointments, the top position for career diplomats and a coveted political appointment. Furthermore, approximately only 9% of peace negotiators and merely 8% of mediators are women according to Aggestam and Svensson. Hence, the most visible and prestigious positions of power within diplomacy and negotiation remain almost exclusively in the hands of men. Despite the increase in women in diplomacy and negotiation, it remains true that women tend to hold less prestigious positions whereas positions of prestige continue to be filled primarily by men. Women are overrepresented in support functions while men are overrepresented in core positions of diplomacy. This is not unique to diplomacy—in many international organisations and work places, women end up filling positions whose aim is to serve and support those who carry out the main duties. The patterns Paffenholz describes, of women participating as observers and public consultants, whereas men carry out the core negotiating activities could be seen in this light. Aharoni's chapter also underscores how women's contributions to the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians are depicted as purely administrative and supportive.

In MFAs, for much of the twentieth century, women primarily performed secretarial and administrative work, as secretaries, typists and telephone operators. In the past few decades, they have also increasingly come to do more qualified administrative work such as in consulates. For instance, in the US Department of State of the mid-1980s, women served as consular officers to a much higher degree than did men. Rumelili and Suleymanoglu-Kurum show that in the Turkish MFA, more women serve as consular and expert officers than as career diplomats. In the Swedish MFA, despite the gender parity of almost two decades, women are still overrepresented in administrative units. This is of course not to say that nothing has changed since the early twentieth century. Clearly, women are also filling positions and rising in the ranks of career diplomacy. But the pattern of men in core and women in support functions is striking in diplomacy and international negotiation.

At lower levels of diplomacy, the picture is not quite as bleak. In the MFAs, the subject of the first half of this book, if we disregard the overall

general underrepresentation of women in some of these organisations, the gender differences between male and female diplomats were not enormous but they were consistent. In none of our cases were women overrepresented in positions of power and prestige. In Brazil, for instance, men were overrepresented in the more prestigious advisory bodies and cabinets and among the undersecretaries, whereas women were overrepresented in the less prestigious departments and divisions. Men were also overrepresented in coveted external assignments that accelerated promotions. In the Swedish MFA, the ratio of female managers reflected the overall ratio of women in 1995 (37%). However, this situation did not last—as the overall share of women grew even larger over the coming decade, the ratio of female manager stagnated at 35%. Today, 42% of the managers are female even though 56% of the employees of the MFA are women. Again, the underrepresentation of women in positions of power and prestige when compared with the overall share of women in these MFAs is not dramatic but it is consistent.

Looking at the career trajectory, Souza Farias and do Carmo argue that the Brazilian promotion pipeline leaks women to a larger extent than men, so much so that only 20% of female foreign servants reached the rank of First Class Minister, to be compared with 45% of the men. Although the data and time periods compared differ, this does not seem to be the case in the Turkish MFA. Suleymanoglu-Kurum and Rumelili note that it takes roughly 20 years to reach the rank of ambassador. In 1990, 13% of the MFA career employees were women, corresponding with the 13% female Turkish ambassadors today.

In most cases under consideration in this book, however, women continue to trail men in terms of career development and where they are positioned in the hierarchies of the MFAs. Some of this is likely a function simply of women not having entered diplomacy in larger numbers until relatively recently. As the larger numbers of recent recruits make their way through the career pipeline, we can expect more women in leading positions of power and prestige. However, institutional features of diplomacy are likely also at the core of the low levels of women generally or in leadership positions. Although the chapters in this book have not been able to probe these questions systematically, they provide suggestions that can be examined further in future research. Institutional gender norms may be channelling women in some direction and men in others. There may be sexual harassment, which usually disproportionately affects women, taking an emotional and psychological toll that may lead to less dedication to the career or even to leaving the career altogether. Established male networks

may set the terms for recruitment and career development—it is possible that homosocial institutional environments make senior men more likely to see, encourage and involve men as junior professionals, making it easier for junior men than women to feel supported and encouraged. However, many of the chapters discuss the subtle or overt signalling to women that they are ill equipped to serve as diplomats or negotiators. The notion that women cannot cut it in diplomacy and negotiation can have various foundations: there may be hesitancy to put women at risk in violent contexts, fear that women cannot network effectively in male-dominated environments, a view that women cannot adequately keep secrets or control their emotions, or the view that mothers should not pursue demanding careers. Diplomacy generally does not seem well organised to enable the combination of work and family life, which is particularly damaging for women as they continue to shoulder more care responsibilities than men.

Extra-institutional factors are at work as well in channelling women into less prestigious positions or out of diplomacy altogether. Care work, whether of children or relatives, continues to be the domain primarily of women. Virtually everywhere, women and men still tend to prioritise differently: women tend to be less likely to put career ahead of family than men, whereas many men are less likely to put time with children or a spouse's career ahead of their own than are women. Robust parental leave policies and childcare provision seem to be a necessary requirement to make diplomacy more gender equal. However, generous childcare policies are not sufficient. Generous childcare and maternity leave policies, such as those in the Japanese civil service, may indeed enable women to combine work and family responsibilities. However, unless career expectations change in the MFA, leave policies may simultaneously hold women back if their careers suffer as a result of taking the leave offered. Leave policies need to be combined with adjusted career expectations within the MFA as well as increased participation of fathers in the care of children.

There are some indicators that look quite promising for women in diplomacy, however**.** In Brazil, for instance, the women of the Itamaraty were just as likely as male diplomats to be posted in the so-called "Elizabeth Arden Circuit," the most prestigious embassies in Buenos Aires, Washington D.C., Rome, Paris, London, Berlin, Lisbon, Tokyo and Vatican City (see Chap. 6). Turkish ambassador Yildiz argues that female Turkish diplomats are more likely to be posted to international organisations as these are contexts in which women can presumably be effective, as Suleymanoglu-Kurum and Rumelili show in Chap. 5. This pattern, as

mentioned above, is also observed in the European Council, where newer member states send a higher share of women to the Council as negotiators than are present in their national parliaments. Women may at times even have a better representation in international institutions where male dominance is perhaps not as entrenched. Such reasoning may help us understand the dramatic overrepresentation of women in the Japanese delegations to the UN. In Japan, where women make up a mere 3% of ambassadors and 17% of diplomats overall, women have been in the majority on the UN delegations for some time. Indeed, as Flowers shows in Chap. 7, 60% of the Japanese UN delegation is made up of women, even though the UN is a cornerstone in Japanese foreign policy and thus presumably carries prestige.

14.3.2 Masculinised Norms and Homosocial Environments

Many diplomatic activities take place in homosocial environments dominated by men. Furthermore, several of these settings are informal and confidential. Female diplomats may therefore not be posted in some environments where they presumably cannot be very effective and where they may face undue risks. As Svedberg shows, homosociality and a masculine ethic were taken for granted and functioned as rationales for Western negotiators in support of not involving women in negotiations between the West and Russia in the 1990s. Consequently, the most important factor as a negotiator was to be a man. Russia was seen as a macho and misogynist society not suitable for female negotiators for two reasons. For one, in an environment that valued masculinity and its associated traits, it would presumably be difficult for women to be effective negotiators. And second, such an environment was seen as unsafe for women, as activities away from the negotiating table, such as heavy drinking, would potentially put women in harm's way. Similar arguments are made in the Turkish MFA, where there is an expressed policy of not posting women in strongly patriarchal societies. As Suleymanoglu-Kurum and Rumelili show, Turkish women diplomats are indeed posted to a greater extent to more gender-equal societies.

Peace negotiations are particularly ingrained with masculinised norms of power, as they are strongly associated with security interests and military affairs. In most cases, they take place in the midst of crises and are set in emergency settings, which trigger "exceptional politics." Exceptional politics is intimately related to securitisation where democratic politics, transparency and communication flows are put on hold (Agamben 2005; Aradau 2004).

Most importantly, securitisation is one major reason for the polarisation of gender roles and for the absence of women from the negotiation table. According to Aharoni, this kind of context creates an institutional preference towards "structurelessness" in peace negotiations. It tends to trigger informal and secret processes between selected groups of negotiators and military leaders. Unofficial male networks are often at play here, as the processes lack coordination planning of mid-level negotiations, which may have made it easier to track gender balance and negotiation appointments. Hence, the lack of structure and surrounding secrecy disguise power, making the peace negotiations per definition exclusionary. Similar patterns of gender exclusion were also found in Paffenholz's study of 40 in-depth cases of peace negotiations. Women's inclusion was viewed as highly contestable or met with indifference. Hence, their inclusion was never approached as something self-evident. Interesting to note, however, are the cases where women negotiators were more easily included and accepted as peace negotiators. In most such cases, the women negotiators were able to draw either upon sources of traditional cultural authority or on earlier track records of having the capacity to unify different actors on women's issues

In sum, the lack of transparency and the non-structured settings of peace negotiations pose a clear disadvantage for women, as they tend to exclude women and/or make them invisible. For example, the narratives of Israeli women working for peace lack the authoritative voice that the male negotiators and military leaders with experience from the Middle East peace negotiations receive from the Israeli public. Likewise, Svedberg notes how masculinity is constructed in relation to underlying gendered assumption, which partly explains why leadership so frequently is associated with men. Particularly in times of conflict and insecurity, the type of leadership that is called for is more likely to be male. Aharoni illustrates this point by analysing the Israeli media portrayal of the female lead-negotiator and politician Tzipi Livni during the Annapolis conference in 2007. Despite the fact that Livni consistently presented a professional stance based on a "gender-neutral" political position, she was constantly questioned in Israeli media about her suitability to make political decisions under pressure emanating from the negotiation process. At the same time, Livni's participation as a woman leading the Israeli peace negotiations was emphasised as "symbolic tokenism" by the media and the Israeli government in order to gain international legitimacy in what otherwise was perceived as an unsupportive UN environment and international context. To note, Israel was the first state to integrate UN Security Council resolution 1325 into domestic laws.

14.4 Towards Gender Justice in Diplomacy

Some of the significant changes that have taken place in the last decades may be related to international push factors. For one, governments take cues from one another, making note of the rising tide of women in politics and public administration internationally, which puts pressure on MFAs to change their recruitment patterns. Importantly, the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 put a spotlight on women's agency, particularly in the field of WPS. This has triggered a number of international initiatives and activities, which pushed for the appointment of more women to senior diplomatic positions, such as the UN Institute for Training and Research support for women in leadership and diplomacy at the UN headquarter in New York. The UN Security Council restated and passed a new resolution 2122 in 2103, requesting the UN Secretary General to mobilise support for increasing the appointment of women as chief mediators. Most recently, during the process of appointing the next UN Secretary General, all candidates made gender equality and women's empowerment a central issue as part of their candidate platforms. A Nordic women mediation network was launched in 2015, with the twofold ambition of, first, making experienced senior female mediators more visible and, second, enhancing women's inclusion more broadly in peace negotiations (Wallström 2016). This strong Nordic profile in peace mediation is corroborated by the empirical findings of Aggestam and Svensson in this volume. They found that Nordic women mediators make up nearly 25% of the total mediation interventions by women globally. The reasons for this high number are manifold, but three factors are central: first, there are now large numbers of women in senior diplomatic positions in the Nordic countries; second, there is a high degree of gender equality in their respective societies; and third, the Nordic countries have historically held a strong tradition and commitment to international institutions, such as the UN, and global peacemaking (see also Wallensteen and Svensson 2016).

Moreover, individual women and civil society organisations have provided critical input and power behind the international mobilisation. Tryggestad's chapter highlights the decisive roles that these organisations have played during the WPS negotiations and how they have triggered organisational development within the UN secretariat. On several occasions, women's organisations have taken the lead to advance the agenda and mobilised "women-friendly states" in providing normative, political and financial support. Today, the coalition of "Friends of WPS" consists of around 30 member states, which is coordinated by Canada. Also to note,

the diplomats representing their respective governments have mostly been female diplomats. The coalition expresses a strong commitment to the WPS agenda and functions as a platform for advocacy and negotiation in a symbiotic collaboration with NGOs that are invited to most events in order to push for gender-sensitive outcomes. The NGO Working Group on WPS, which is an umbrella organisation of 16 international women's and human rights organisations, has been particularly important in negotiating, and it succeeded in getting the UN Security Council to adopt additional resolutions, which put stronger emphasis on women's agency, representation and participation than the other follow-up resolutions to resolution 1325. This is a major advancement in comparison to earlier resolutions, which have portrayed women as victims rather than as active agents, for example, in relations to sexual and gender-based violence. Furthermore, the NGO Working Group provides an eminent example of how Track II diplomacy (civil society-based) interacts and gets access to Track I diplomacy (strategic official elite-level), which is of vital importance for making women's voices heard. As such, the NGO Working group has exercised a considerable influence on policy-making and international diplomacy.

As part of the international endeavour to enhance women's participation in peace negotiations, contemporary discourses have taken on an instrumental tone, emphasising "smart" diplomacy and effectiveness in peacemaking through the inclusion of women. By way of illustration, diplomats frequently use the hash tag #MoreWomenMorePeace. The presence of women at the negotiation table presumably brings added value to diplomacy and enhances the likelihood of sustainable peace agreements. Yet, there is not much gender-disaggregated data to support these claims. Hence, research is still far from verifying such causal assumptions. That said, in Chap. 9, Paffenholz showed that in cases where women have been able to exercise a strong influence on the peace negotiations, it correlated with a greater probability of peace agreements being reached. At the same time, she underlines that we need to be wary of focusing too much on numerical representation. In her study, there was no correlation between larger representation of women and stronger influence as women's voices were often just not heard. Numerical representation per se does not automatically provide for greater gender sensitivity and focus on women's issues. For example, in several instances where female "observers" have participated, they were unable to exercise any meaningful influence over the negotiation process.

In short, rather than counting women, the key concern according to Paffenholz should be on assessing women's activities and degrees of

influence on decision-making bodies at the negotiation table. These activities concern to what extent women are able to influence the start of negotiations, to set the negotiation agenda and to add gender provisions to an agreement as well as to push for the agreement to be signed. Most importantly, we need to assess how gender-sensitive peace agreements are regarding women's rights and other gender issues since they are intimately linked to women's political representation in post-conflict governance. In this regard, nation-wide public consultation seems to be of essence as illustrated most recently in the case of the successful conclusion of a negotiated peace agreement in Colombia (Bouvier 2016).

Important as international initiatives may be on women's inclusion, mobilisation and pressure from within MFAs and from civil society peace activists also seem crucial. In the United States, as Bashevkin discusses in Chap. 3, women within the State Department began to organise for change already in the 1960s, creating the Women's Action Organisation in the late 1960s and working to abolish the marriage ban. With the United States being a more litigious society than most others, it is perhaps not surprising that women in the State Department subsequently initiated legal action—including a class action suit—to fight discrimination and push in the direction of equality. After a protracted legal battle, the State Department agreed to offer retroactive pay to women who had been denied promotions, reformed recruitment practices to diversify the body of FSOs and opened the more prestigious political positions to women. At the same time, the role of FSOs and the State Department has been increasingly constrained in the United States. Power and resources have in recent decades been shifting to the Department of Defense, with a much larger budget and staff, as well as to the White House National Security Council. As Bashevkin argued, "even as more women have reached elite positions, the ability of State Department leaders to shape foreign policy has itself been challenged."

In Sweden, "the Network" was formed in 1987, an informal club for female FSOs in charge of policy, with the aim of career promotion and a larger number of female managers (see Chap. 4). In the early 1990s, Turkish female diplomats likewise mobilised to change a ministry regulation concerning the appointment of married diplomatic couples to different foreign posts, as Suleymanoglu-Kurum and Rumelili point out. As a result, starting in 1998, married couples could serve in the same foreign representation. In Brazil, mobilisation has emerged later but perhaps more forcefully. Before 2013, according to Farias and Carmo in this volume, there were no organised efforts to demand gender justice in the Itamaraty.

But then, in 2014, collective demands were voiced clearly and loudly as a couple of hundred female diplomats came together to write a letter with a 14-point reform programme to the head of the Brazilian MFA. This led to the creation of the Management Committee on Gender and Race, which has held training courses on gender and race in diplomacy.

There are indications that female diplomats have collaborated to improve conditions in the Japanese MFA as well, though we do not yet know the form and extent of these efforts. President Abe's recent goal of seeing no fewer than 30% women in leadership roles in all areas of Japanese society by 2020 has also stirred action in the Japanese MFA that may bring more women to the top of the organisation. It is indeed probable that change is most likely when the pressure to increase the number of women come from several directions, as Niklasson and Robertson argue in Chap. 4. When female FSOs mobilise, there is support from the political leadership of the MFA and there is outside pressure on the MFA, it seems reasonable to expect change.

In sum, despite major achievements and inroads of women in diplomacy and negotiation, the struggle for gender justice continues, as the overall global diplomatic representation remains low. Moreover, as reflected by the rich empirical analyses in this book, broader gender patterns and power hierarchies prevail in contemporary diplomacy, perhaps particularly in the context of peace negotiations. Hence, there is a need to pursue much more scholarly work in this field. It is our hope that this book first advances the research agenda on gender and diplomacy; second, that it makes a significant academic contribution by its set of rich empirical case analyses; and finally, that the book spurs more systematic empirical analyses of gendered patterns of diplomacy and negotiation as well as more ethnographic work on gendered micro-processes, institutional norms and diplomatic practices.

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