EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Soft Power at Work



Edited by

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

EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-34329-1

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First published in 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN 978-1-137-34330-7 ISBN 978-1-137-31514-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137315144

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: November 2013

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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FOREWORD

Nicholas J. Cull

Of all the scholarly tribes to have addressed the issue of public diplomacy the first and the most loquacious to date have been the historians. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, neither Europe nor the European Union has been a subject of this historical inquiry.[1] Scholarship has focused principally on the United States and its approach to the Cold War and most especially the early phase of that conflict. Europe figures loosely as a target of American persuasion and the terrain of the so-called Cultural Cold War.[2] The absence of such a discourse should not however be read as indicative that the experience of the European Union, its predecessors, and the region as a whole has nothing to offer the discussion around public diplomacy, or for that that matter that the discourse on public diplomacy has nothing to contribute to the future development of the European Union. This foreword is offered as a modest attempt to encourage exactly that exchange.

The concept of public diplomacy has distinctly American origins. The term acquired its contemporary meaning—a method by which an international actor can conduct foreign policy by engaging a foreign public—only in 1965 when a retired ambassador and newly minted college dean named Edmund Gullion struck on the phrase as a convenient alternative to the old and ugly term propaganda. The new term enabled Americans to continue to condemn those wicked Russians for their propaganda and simultaneously flesh out the shiny new American term, public diplomacy, with benign meanings. Despite this origin in euphemism the term really did evolve into a distinct set of practices that in the mind of its practitioners (if not its paymasters) had its own nonpropagandistic mores privileging exchange and listening rather than crude self assertion. Despite the novelty of the term the constituent elements of public diplomacy—listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting—had been part of sound statecraft for centuries. Europe has no shortage of examples.

The first and foundational way in which any international actor should engage a foreign public is by listening to that public. European folk history is full of examples of wise rulers who found innovative ways to gauge public opinion including sampling opinion personally by travelling abroad in disguise. Hungary's King Mathias the Just or Poland's Casimir III got to know their own people this way, while England's Alfred the Great reputedly infiltrated the ranks of the Danish invader disguised as a minstrel to better understand their mentality and morale. The second element in public diplomacy is advocacy—engaging a foreign public through the explanation of policy. Well documented European exemplars include William the Silent who worked to explain the Dutch Revolt against Philip II's Spain through an *apologia* published in multiple European languages or John Milton who interpreted the English Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell to European opinion as "secretary for foreign tongues." The third element of public diplomacy is cultural diplomacy: engaging a foreign audience by facilitating the export of an artistic, linguistic, or other cultural forms associated with an actor. European antecedents include the Roman Republic's efforts to diffuse its legal culture around the Mediterranean through the construction of law schools in Beirut and elsewhere or the Byzantine state's sponsorship of Orthodox Christian missionary projects in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Such policies were changing the international cultural landscape, long before European nations created their own cultural agencies like the Alliance Française, Italian Cultural Institute, British Council, Swedish Institute, Goethe Institute, or Instituto Cervantes. Along the way Britons reached out by exporting the rules to sports, Germans worked to present their vision of '*kultur*' through classic music,[3] and France honed its *Mission civilisatrice*. The fourth element is exchange: engaging a foreign public by two-way exchange of persons. Here the classic European examples are the child exchanges practiced for centuries by the Celts (called *altramas* [masculine] or *altramacht* [feminine] in Irish) and the Nordic peoples (*forsterage*), which seem to have played a key role in diffusing cultural practices and stability within their cultural regions.[4] The final element of public diplomacy is international broadcasting. Europeans pioneered the engagement of foreign publics through the state sponsorship of news beginning with their imperial broadcasting initiatives of Netherlands, France, and Britain in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Pre-electronic precedents can be found in the attempt of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II to present his view of the news of the era to the other courts of mid-thirteenth-century Europe through a newsletter. Finally one of the great insights of contemporary public diplomacy theory—that nothing succeeds quite like the "soft power" of attractive culture and morally admirable policies—is borne out by Europe's most successful ruler. Perceived moral value was part of the power of the man sometimes called the father of Europe: the first Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne (r. 800–14).

The abundance of European examples of the components of public diplomacy is hardly surprising. What is less well known is that these

activities played an active role in the formation of the European Union and its predecessor organizations. It began with listening. The architects of the original European project paid great attention to public opinion at home and abroad and the impetus underpinning the project owed something to pressure from the grass roots in core countries; witness the support within the six member states for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The role of advocacy is even more evident with the persuasive efforts of such advocates of European integration as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman or indeed the US government of the later 1940s and 1950s. Films, posters, and other kinds of publicity in support of European integration were an important part of the information work conducted under the auspices of the US European Cooperation Administration (the agency that administered the Marshall Plan) and the US Information Agency.[5]

Cultural Diplomacy had its own role in laying the foundations for European integration. Consider for example the role of the French poet Paul Valéry in establishing the International Institute on Intellectual Cooperation in the years following the Great War with his emphasis on using artists and intellectuals to overcome the differences that had so dramatically riven the continent a few years previously. "If we were to allow the intellect more scope and more real power in the things of this world," he argued "it would have more chance of recovering and of recovering more quickly." Exchange diplomacy had an even more practical role. Those seeking grassroots origins for European integration could do no better that to examine the web of people to people exchanges that sprang up between the populations of Germany and France following the Second World War—the *jumelage* or twinning of cities usually as a result of contact between like-minded church leaders or mayors. Mutual visits, sporting fixtures, school exchanges, and other contacts followed. Precedent for such special relationships between geographically remote European towns may be found in the bond between the French city of Le Mans and the German city of Paderborn, which dates back to a twinning of church diocese as early as 836.[6] Both cultural and citizen exchanges were given the authority of high policy in the Franco-Germany Élysée Treaty of 1963 with its creation of the Franco-German Office for Youth (*l'Office franco-allemand pour la jeunesse/Deutsch-Französisches Jugendwerk*) and other initiatives.

Even international broadcasting had its role in the process, with the establishment in 1950 of the European Broadcast Union to facilitate the exchange of radio and television materials between member states including news and entertainment, and thereby strengthen the shared cultural experience. Its most famous creation is of course the song contest first mounted by its Eurovision network in 1956 and repeated every year since, though many Europeans have equally fond memories of its light-hearted international team game show: *Jeux sans Frontières* (known in the UK as *It's a Knockout*), which ran on television from 1965 to 1999. While EBU

has no formal connection to the European Union or its predecessors and includes many non-EU members, its spirit of integration and exchange has been germane to the wider European project, and contributed to the task of transforming Europe into an imagined community. In a similar vein the Élysée Treaty of 1963 mandated television exchanges, which culminated in 1992 in the foundation of Arte (Association Relative à la Télévision Européenne) a Franco-German television network, an enterprise that celebrates and renders visible a European rather than nationally specific visual culture.

Finally, the engagement of the European public that took place during the years of convergence and growth would have been less effective without the soft power that flows from a sound policy. The experience of living in a continent at peace in which the positive changes brought by shared social policies became a matter of personal observation and experience doubtless played their part. One decade's achievement laid the foundation for the next decade's advance, and drew new participants to the project. EU enlargement is one of the clearest examples of soft power at work imaginable, and all the clearer for its continuation despite the present economic crisis. Thus, the tools and processes of public diplomacy and soft power played their part in the emergence of the European Union.

Yet the story does not end there. Just as the tools of public diplomacy played a role in facilitating the emergence of the EU so its failures may also be identified in the realm of public diplomacy. One may ask whether the European Union and its institutions have been good listeners. Certainly the Union seems to have failed to remain in step with its own population. Tiny turnouts at European elections and problems ratifying the EU Constitutional Treaty carry a clear message. One may ask whether the European Union has been a good advocate for itself or for shared European values. Despite valiant work by public diplomats attached to the European Union delegations around the world, budgets have been small.[7] Most of the world still does not understand how the European Union works, and neither do many EU citizens. Knowledge of its systems and processes is seldom seen as an essential part of citizenship education even within member states. Where, one might ask, are the European equivalent of the Boy Scout badges or other devices that nation states devised to dramatize their values and institutions for the rising generation? It has often been a similar story in cultural diplomacy. While individual European states worked to engage the public of other member states and the wider world through facilitating the export of language and artistic practices and achievements, the activity often seemed competitive rather than complimentary as if a German learning French at the Alliance Français was somehow a defeat for the Italian Cultural Institute. The European Commission has used exchanges to initiate foreign journalists and opinion formers into its mysteries—modeled on the highly successful system of International Leader Grantees operated by the United States, but such exchanges are small compared to the scale of the public opinion

challenges. International broadcasting played in a similar fashion to cultural diplomacy, which national broadcasters beginning with a competitive mindset and coming only relatively late to acknowledge the need for cooperation and coordination of effort towards overseas audiences. Finally, and most significantly the European Union has encountered serious problems with its soft power. For all the power of policies and institutions to attract by virtue of peace, prosperity, and the successful management of EU enlargement, there are persistent negatives associated with public perception of bureaucracy, clique-ism, corruption, navel-gazing, and other ills, which serve to repel. The recent association of the single currency with instability and impending economic disaster has done the image of the EU no favors within its own region or in other key quarters not least the United States. It seems easy to forget that at the same time citizens in many other regions of the world plainly envy what Europe has achieved with its relatively stable societies and admirable record of peaceful, stable, and informal relations within its own neighborhood.

Despite the underperformance of the EU in the field of public diplomacy, recent years have brought encouraging currents. In terms of listening, it seems clear that the European authorities are now well aware of the mismatch between their opinion on the street and the agenda of Brussels. In terms of advocacy, the Union is working well to advocate for its values if not its institutions. For some years now the EU had issued formal statements of protest against many executions around the world. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will have implications for EU public diplomacy, both public and private. The EEAS will not only provide a framework within which professional experience of diplomacy in all its forms may accrue, but will also provide a platform for the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs; the EEAS also includes elements designed to communicate and partner with others such as its Global and Multilateral Issues unit. The EU's democracy development projects are especially impressive. In terms of cultural diplomacy, positive signs include the emergence of EUNIC (European Union National Institutes of Culture) partnerships—alliances between the cultural diplomacy agencies of member states in key cities around the world, affirming commonalities even while showcasing the artistic output of a particular member. In terms of exchange, a truly remarkable foundation has been built through the creation of the ERASMUS program (*EuRopean Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students*) established in 1987 to enable students to easily transfer into university programs in other EU countries for semesters abroad. Over two million students participated in the first 20 years, with an associated network of friendships, experiences, expectations, and—humans being what they are—families forged at a European level.[8] Such programs are the building blocks of future and further convergence. Terms like "ERASMUS generation" have become synonymous with the notion of young people reviving the spirit of the Treaty of Rome. Even international broadcasting has its encouraging corners, having broadened

to include the new, transnational interactive media, which have an obvious role to play in sustaining continent-wide relationships. In 2006 the EU became an online international broadcaster in its own right with the launch of the European Commission's YouTube channel "EUtube."[9]

This work—and more in a similar vein—has the ability to transform the European experience, yet the architects of the EU's future would do well to consider the final element of soft power in their overall strategy. While success will doubtless strengthen the Union's soft power around the world, the EU should also recognize the benefits to its reputation that flow from its inherent internal diversity and principles of minority rights and subsidiarity. The perceived weakness and lack of coordination of Europe may not necessarily be a bad thing. It would be better to be perceived as diverse and marching to too many drumbeats to achieve much but actually be fairly well organized than to be the reverse as is the case with contemporary China and, increasingly, the United States. There is a clear correlation between strength and negative soft power, which is to say that people are repelled by hegemony. No one roots for Goliath. This accounts for many of challenges for both US and Chinese public diplomacy. Europe does well to be perceived around the world not in terms of its single market or combined gross domestic product, which despite its economic woes remains ahead of that of the United States, but in terms of the sum of its constituent parts. The optimal solution for the EU is to be seen as a glorious mosaic of 500 world-class cities or 250 regions or 28 member states rather than one blue and gold-starred leviathan, and yet have the central authority to truly benefit all the parts.

The European Union is forged from elements in which the arts of public diplomacy have been practiced for a millennium. Its origins were nurtured by public diplomacy. Its current ills owe something at least to a neglect of real public engagement but even within the present crisis there are important examples of effective EU public diplomacy working to the common good. Even so, the ultimate test remains one of policy. The European Union has to be and be seen to be a solution for its people and its regional neighbors to the east and the south.

Notes

1. For a pioneering piece see Giles Scott-Smith, "Mending the Unhinged Alliance in the 1970s: Transatlantic Relations, Public Diplomacy, and the Origins of the European Union Visitors Programme," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 6, no 14 (December 2005): 749–88.
2. For an anthology of short case studies on this theme see Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–60* (London: Routledge, 2004). Europe figures prominently in Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945=1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

3. Jessica Geinow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850–1920.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
4. For a convenient survey of the practice focusing on Viking Iceland see Jenny Jochens, "Fosterage," in *Women And Gender in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Margaret Schaus (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 296–7.
5. For examples of this work see Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6. Jean Lelièvre and Maurice Balavoine, *Le Mans-Paderborn 836–1994: Une amitié séculaire-un sillage de lumière* (Le Mans: Martin, 1994).
7. When this author examined the EU's budget for public diplomacy in the United States he found that for a five year period in first decade of this century they spent a sum equivalent to the subsidy given to Scottish dairy farmers on a single day.
8. The association of this program with the most natural kind of interpersonal relationship has earned it the nickname of Orgasmus in Spain and beyond. The whole experience was celebrated in the comic film *L'Auberge Espagnole* (Cédric Klapisch, dir.) 2002 (released in English as both *Pot Luck* and *The Spanish Appartment*.
9. http://www.youtube.com/user/eutube.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book benefited from two workshop events at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' in June 2011, and the University of Southern California in March 2012. We would like to thank the city of The Hague, the Clingendael Institute, the University of Southern California's Center for International Studies, Center on Public Diplomacy, School of International Relations, and Del Amo family for making these workshops possible. We are also grateful to the University Association for Contemporary European Studies and the ARENA Centre for European Studies for their support. Two USC graduate students—Molly Krasnodebska and Nicolas de Zamaroczy—provided valuable research assistance as did the staff at USC's Center for International Studies and Center on Public Diplomacy, especially Indira Persad and Stacy Ingber. During the publication process, we appreciate valuable feedback from an anonymous reviewer, editing services from Rebecca Solheim, and index preparation by Kathryn Simmons. We would like to thank the Committee of the Regions for facilitating a seminar in Brussels on the theme of this book.

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INTRODUCTION

Mai'a K. Davis Cross and
Jan Melissen

The nature of the European Union as a quasifederal entity, with both state and nonstate characteristics, makes it a unique actor when it comes to public diplomacy. There are numerous historical, ideational, political, and material variables that have an effect on how Europe, as well as the states, cities, and regions within Europe, communicates and engages with others. Governmental and nongovernmental public diplomacy occurs at the supranational, national, subnational, and transnational levels, with some degree of coordination between these layers. But do the various aspects of Europe's multileveled public diplomacy form a coherent overall image, or do they work against each other to some extent? Diverse actors within Europe share many of the same goals and values, but at the same time they operate independently and compete with each other.

In this book, we aim to push the literature on public diplomacy forward through a multifaceted exploration of the European case, which has been relatively neglected in the academic literature. Public diplomacy is typically defined as how a nation's government or society engages with external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics' perception of that nation. In the long run, public diplomacy that is successful should result in more soft power (a state's ability to co-opt or attract) and also result in favorable policies towards the nation that engages in it. The European region is rich with examples of both traditional and new public diplomacy strategies that aim to achieve a variety of outcomes, while at the same time, purposefully or not, craft an overarching image for Europe.

Through a case-study approach, the contributors to this book each shed light on key components of European public diplomacy to enhance our understanding of what this means for European image and power. This

body of research is important for both practical and theoretical reasons. On a practical level, the EU is working to make its presence known on the international stage as one of the most important players in world politics, yet it still clearly punches below its own weight. On a more theoretical level, European public diplomacy provides a strong example of norm diffusion, the influence of narratives, and identity creation. In the context of an evolving actor that is in many ways still a newcomer on the international scene, the European experience suggests that external image and internal identity are to some extent mutually constitutive.

This book seeks helps to fill a gap in the international relations (IR) literature. Much of IR, especially in the United States, tends to focus on hard or coercive power and state-to-state interaction. Some IR scholars have contributed to our understanding of soft power and processes of diplomacy, both themes in this book, but these areas of inquiry deserve much more attention in mainstream IR. We believe that it is worth exploring the interface between IR and the multidisciplinary study of diplomacy, and that some of the more intriguing questions for students of IR can be found in the practice of international relations.

Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" 23 years ago. The concept may therefore no longer be considered that hip by the latest generation of IR theoreticians in this fashion-conscious field of study, but even cursory observation of the behavior of states and other international actors makes abundantly clear that it has by no means lost its practical relevance. In the European Union, and perhaps even more outside Europe, soft power and the means to "attractive power" are seen to be instrumental in the strengthening of transnational links and the achievement of regional and international stability. In this book the European model, as far as it exists, is not seen as something to be transplanted to another country or place, but the variegated European experience is believed to be relevant for the wider world.

Public diplomacy is becoming increasingly prevalent as a result of the information revolution and the direct involvement of publics in transnational engagement. In light of the recent eurozone crisis and a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, a better understanding of it as a key process of soft power and diplomacy is particularly indispensible and goes beyond the impact of current developments on the degree of Europe's soft power.

The book begins with a chapter (Cross) on how to conceptualize public diplomacy from an international relations perspective, especially in the context of Europe. This chapter draws out the IR concepts most valuable to the study of public diplomacy, mainly based in the constructivist school of thought, and builds a framework of analysis at the intersection of identity, narratives, and norms. The subsequent six chapters explore the diplomatic laboratory of Europe, examining case studies at the level of member states, domestic society, and Europe. Chapter 2 (Pamment) focuses on three West European case studies—France, the UK, and

Germany—to show how long-standing and far-ranging public diplomacy strategies work alongside competition for leadership within Europe. As a counterpart to this, chapter 3 (Ociepka) considers the ten ex-communist countries to the east, shedding light on how nations relatively new to public diplomacy have dramatically reshaped their agendas while dealing with democratization, opening up of media markets, and membership in the EU. Chapter 4 (Huijgh) shifts to an under-recognized aspect of European public diplomacy—the domestic dimension—highlighting the different structures, policies, and institutional levels in the EU that have involved their domestic constituencies as partners in foreign policy. Related to this, chapter 5 (La Porte) zooms in on city diplomacy and public diplomacy specifically to argue that cities are increasingly the source of nonstate actor innovations in this field. At the supranational level, chapter 6 (Duke) addresses the fledgling role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a potentially powerful, but still nascent, instrument for future European public diplomacy. Chapter 7 (Fisher) adds a transnational dimension to this European-level exploration of public diplomacy through an assessment of networks engaged in public diplomacy, specifically the case of the European Union cultural relations institutes (EUNIC). The various approaches in these chapters include insights from communications, public relations, network analysis, and European integration studies.

The book ends with two chapters that investigate the theoretical and conceptual boundaries of how we can approach the study of public diplomacy and power. Chapter 8 (van Ham) reflects upon the nexus between the EU's aspirations to use its social power and the reluctance of member states and third countries to acknowledge and support the Union's leadership. Chapter 9 (Manners and Whitman) analyzes another dimension of influence important for Europe as a global actor: normative power. The conclusion of the book (Melissen) brings together all of these ideas, cases, and approaches to concisely draw some overarching insights. This final chapter also touches upon the question of what Europe tells us about other regions of the world engaged in public diplomacy.

In many ways, Europe has advanced more quickly than other regions in developing public diplomacy strategies at multiple levels. This observation is not infused by cultural chauvinism. In our view, there is thus much to gain from exploring the European laboratory as an example of how public diplomacy can achieve and enhance soft power, or how it can fall short of its objectives. Of course, there is much more to be said on the subject of European public diplomacy than can be captured in a single volume, but we do hope this book will generate new discussions on the questions we raise, both in European policy circles and in classrooms in Europe and other parts of the world.

CHAPTER ONE

Conceptualizing European Public Diplomacy

Mai'a K. Davis Cross

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has become a major global actor, but it faces a constant struggle to maintain a strong, coherent image of its place in international relations. For those who recognize its influence, the EU is a major normative and civilian power, playing a significant role in the areas of humanitarian aid, environmental sustainability, multilateralism, human rights, and development, among other things.[1] However, more often than not, the EU is seen in very pessimistic terms. There are a variety of reasons for this: from Europeans' self-criticism of their own efforts to the media's exaggeration of controversy among member states to occasional internal bickering about the path to further integration. Despite its struggles and numerous crises, the European region has been far more successful than other regions in the world that are also striving to achieve a sense of collective coherence, and in turn, regional soft power.

Nonetheless, there is still a significant gap between all that the EU has accomplished and how it is perceived around the world.[2] In 2005, only 38 percent of people in North America had even heard of the EU. It fared better in the Middle East where 86 percent of people had heard of it. For other regions, the percentage of EU awareness was 55 percent in Latin America, 56 percent in Asia Pacific, and 65 percent in Africa. The world average was 69 percent making it the most recognized international organization after the United Nations (UN), which had 83 percent recognition globally.[3] But in terms of humanitarian aid, the EU was thought to be the weakest when compared to the UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program, and UNICEF, with only 41 percent of those polled expressing a favorable opinion of the relative contribution of the EU. This is surprising given that the EU has been

Table 1.1 Global Attitudes towards the EU[4]

Region/Perception	*Positive (%)*	*Neutral (%)*	*Negative (%)*
North America	25	54	17
Asia Pacific	33	52	7
Middle East	42	20	29
Latin America	43	38	10
Africa	67	20	8

the biggest humanitarian and development aid donor in the world for some time, comprising over 55 percent of global contributions, and it is involved in hundreds of development initiatives, humanitarian programs, and crisis management missions globally. Overcoming this lack of global awareness of the EU's role will likely become more challenging as development aid budgets decline in light of the eurozone crisis and its aftermath. Moreover, European countries are increasingly competing with rising powers that are happy to provide aid with no conditionality. For example, in 2009 China agreed to donate money and resources to build the headquarters of the African Union, which opened in 2012. This action carried a great deal of symbolic value.

Global attitudes towards the EU more generally tend to be surprisingly neutral in many cases (see Table 1.1). It is viewed relatively well in Africa where it concentrates much of its humanitarian and development support, but is perceived in relatively neutral terms in the North American and Asia Pacific regions.

Overall, a cursory inspection of data suggest that the majority of external audiences find the EU's image to be at least neutral, and often positive. With developments since 2005—such as the failure to ratify the constitutional treaty, division over the recognition of Kosovo, and Europe's struggles during the global financial crisis, including subsequent bailouts and budget cuts—this image is drifting in a more negative direction today. Perhaps the silver lining to the doomsday, end-of-Europe rhetoric associated with the recent crisis is that awareness of the EU is now likely much higher globally. Nonetheless, one can still easily agree with Philip Fiske de Gouveia's observation in 2005 that "the European Union is punching well below its own weight in communication terms."[5]

There is a complex story behind the gap between the EU's image and the reality of its significance in world politics.[6] However, the consequence of this weak and often negative, external image is that the EU continually underperforms when it comes to soft power. Naturally, this is not just to the detriment of the EU itself, but also to the member states and regions that comprise it. When member states neglect to reinforce the EU and their membership in it, the EU becomes a more vulnerable target for negative perceptions, both from internal and external audiences. It also makes the EU and its citizens easier to ignore. The EU is clearly stronger

when its constituent parts seek to convey a united front, and are able to communicate to outsiders just how much they have in fact invested in their common European project. The EU has withstood numerous crises and stumbling blocks in the course of its over five decades of evolution, and the result has been more integration, even alongside enlargement of its membership. The international peace associated with this integration is surely one of the EU's greatest sources of soft power, if properly understood through strong public diplomacy (PD).

I now turn to an analysis of how International Relations (IR) theory, especially the constructivist school of thought, contributes to our understanding of PD. As part of this analysis, I will examine three main variables—identity, norms, and narratives—that I argue form the building blocks for strong PD.

Public Diplomacy and International Relations Theory

Although the practice of PD goes back to ancient times in the Middle East and Greece, including references to it in the bible, the academic study of PD is still in its infancy, especially as it pertains to IR theory.[7] Much of the research thus far is historical (Cold War) and US centric.[8] In recent years, PD has been of growing interest in fields such as communications, public affairs, public relations, and place branding. Thus far, only a small handful of articles examine PD from an IR perspective.[9] This is likely because mainstream IR scholars are mostly interested in states and institutions, and the systemic processes of war, peace, and cooperation. As IR theory becomes more and more positivist and strives to mimic the hard sciences in terms of methodology, especially in the United States, there is declining interest in studying complex social processes of relationship building that are so central to diplomacy and PD. While IR scholars often acknowledge the importance of diplomacy, it is rare for them to study the actual processes involved, and even rarer still for them to devote any attention to PD as a key part of diplomatic practice.[10] Thus, both have been sidelined in favor of other research questions that lend themselves better to mainstream social science methodology.

At first glance, it might be tempting to dismiss PD as just one type of policy initiative among many rather than as a significant international process that deserves sustained research attention. IR scholars put a premium on finding answers to big questions about the international system as a whole, and PD seems to be only a small part of this. To the extent that PD has been considered from an IR perspective, scholars have mainly focused on how PD is a tool for soft power, political influence, or discourse.[11] Through discourse, PD actors seek to change the frames of references that foreign audiences use to discuss their own country. The messages they deliver and the self-image they project are intended to persuade foreign publics to adopt a positive view. Mark Leonard and Nicholas Cull have

taken this further, arguing that PD must be a two-way street, involving both speaking and listening for it to be effective.[12] I would suggest that this ties into constructivist IR theory, which emphasizes how dialogue is necessary for norm diffusion, and norm entrepreneurs are the main actors who can persuade others of their norms.[13]

Indeed, the constructivist school of thought offers a potentially valuable perspective on PD, and brings to light the greater context in which PD operates. Unlike more rationalist or structural approaches, constructivists accept the premise that state preferences are socially constructed, and that international relations must be understood in terms of the social context of the time. Factors like norms, identity, social interaction, and perceptions are important to constructivists. PD fits well into this school of thought, as it is ultimately representative of a complex, social process. It gives credit to the notion that foreign publics' perceptions are crucial to determining state behavior and outcomes in international relations. The external image of an actor—which PD seeks to promote—is comprised of the package of norms that reflect its identity, values, and policies.

PD is essentially defined as how a nation's government and society engage with external audiences, typically with the aim of improving these foreign publics' perception of that nation. Joseph Nye identifies PD as one of the key tools of soft power.[14] Thus, it is one of many ways in which a state can attract others to want what it wants. Classic PD strategies involve educational, informational, and cultural programs designed to attract foreign audiences and promote mutual understanding. While PD often involves government programming, it also includes quasi- or nongovernmental activities that reach out to foreign publics.[15] In other words, PD can be government-to-people, people-to-people, or a hybrid of the two. It can also be more hierarchical or more network-based, as discussed extensively in later chapters.[16]

A variety of actors are involved in PD from trained PD practitioners to heads of state giving a press conference to children participating in an international art competition. Thus, the types of individuals who are involved in PD are virtually limitless. Special expertise or training is not a pre-requisite. PD actors are simply people who interact with foreign publics as representatives of their home states. They may or may not be successful in inculcating a positive image or gaining soft power for their country. For evaluation purposes, it is necessary to separate success or failure of PD from its definition or purpose.

Clearly, the boundaries of what constitutes PD are grey, especially when one considers all of the numerous people-to-people, horizontal, networked, and informal forms of engagement. However, I would suggest that it is useful to keep a broad perspective on what actually counts as PD. It might be tempting to draw distinctions such as purposeful versus nonpurposeful or official versus unofficial, but in practical terms this can be an almost impossible task, and the results are often too restrictive. Of more interest is the *process* of engagement itself, which lies at the heart of PD. I argue that

this process is essentially *the communication of narratives that embody key norms about a society.* As I will elaborate upon below, PD narratives gain legitimacy when they derive from the real *identity* of the people involved. *Narratives* are defined as the story of "the temporal character of human experience,"[17] and *norms* are defined as entrenched beliefs of what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Norms, in turn, are related to the creation of prevailing values of a society. The various ways in which PD narratives are communicated is broad and wide ranging, involving multiple approaches and varying external audiences, from small groups to whole nations. As Beata Ociepka argues in chapter 5, communication can happen through the popular media, publicity surrounding key individuals, development of historical narratives, diversity outreach programs, and so on.

The concept of narrative, as a form of benign and noncoercive communication, captures the underlying and overarching process of PD well. After all, the main characteristic of soft power tools, like PD, is that they must not be coercive. The concept of narrative also enables inclusion of formal and informal, governmental and nongovernmental, and purposeful and nonpurposeful forms of PD.

From a narratives perspective, as far as the impact of PD, we should expect that:

A. If the external audience finds these norms to be attractive, the population's government is more likely to respond through its policies towards the originator country in a positive way.
B. If the external audience does not understand the narrative, or finds the norms to be unattractive, then its government is less likely to respond with favorable policies.

In the case of the latter, the country conducting PD does not gain soft power from its efforts. Successful PD is of great significance to IR in that it is one of the key processes underpinning soft power, even though soft power may have other sources. The empirical study of PD can tell us when soft power might increase or decrease, and the extent to which and why norms spread.[18]

One caveat is in order. In this information age of constant media and social media attention, nearly every action a state or society takes is potentially visible to foreign publics. Even without any purposeful explanation or promotion of a given policy, foreign publics can observe it with little effort. It follows from this that a state's image forms and transforms with or without PD. The identities of citizens within a state are shaped and reshaped with or without PD. This means that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the impact of PD on its own. However, it is possible to trace over time the changing nature of narratives and norms shared between two countries, which makes the constructivist approach to understanding PD quite promising. I now elaborate further upon the crucial variables of identity, narratives, and norms in theorizing about PD.

Identity

Constructivists argue that identity is socially constructed. Thus, they disagree with the essentialists' or primordialists' assumptions that identity is somehow fixed by the happenstance of one's birth.[19] They do not assume that the outcome of identity construction will necessarily be positive or less confrontational, but they allow for the possibility of identity transformation. Given this premise, there are at least two important implications that stem from it.

First, while it may seem that internal (national) identity must be prior to the cultivation of external image in the outside world, identity creation and external image are actually mutually constitutive in significant ways. As Sonia Lucarelli writes, "The way we conceive our international role is functional to the way in which we conceive ourselves; at the same time, the way we 'perform' our role feeds back into our political identity."[20] In other words, there is a continuous feedback loop between image and identity. A legitimate and credible PD strategy is only possible if it directly reflects the identity of the people it represents. In turn, as external image is tangibly brought into focus through foreign policy, this impacts how European citizens view themselves. They begin to imagine themselves in the eyes of others and craft narratives of how they want to be perceived. This identity-image loop is particularly important in the European context, in which the development of a *Europeanized* identity alongside a European foreign policy is emerging. Of course, as with identity in all contexts, the Europeanization of identity is contested, and the dialectics of this process provide nuance to the concept as it continuously evolves. The historical and social experiences of the generations of people who came before influence this process.

The second, more specific, insight from the constructivist perspective on identity is that the act of engaging in PD influences domestic publics. PD can tell us much about how a society views itself. In effect, the social construction of identity occurs at the nexus of the domestic and international levels, and PD also lies at this intersection. And, in the longer term, an actor's soft power relies on both. PD narratives not only shape foreign audiences' perceptions, they also serve as indicators of changes *within* the originating society. Thus, constructivism allows for consideration of PD as both an independent and dependent variable.

Narratives

While a story is what actually happened, a plot arranges the events and connects them.[21] Narratives are even more nuanced than plots in that they focus on the perceived organization of events over time, as well as their underlying meaning. As Julie Reeves puts it, "a narrative is the story embedded in the story—frequently the narrative is hidden from view. The question to ask is what is the point being made behind the plot?"[22] To

paraphrase, the question of interest here is: what underlying point is being made through a nation's PD?

PD initiatives of all sorts convey narratives, and this can happen on multiple levels. To take the hypothetical example of a Hungarian touring music group that plays avant-garde folk songs around Europe, a number of narratives might emerge.

1. The sounds and lyrics of the music convey past and present, as well as the hopes and struggles of ordinary people.
2. The story of the musicians themselves, and how they came together to form their group, demonstrates what life is like in Hungary.
3. The existence of the musical group emphasizes the importance of musical expression and diversity in Hungarian culture.
4. A desire for Hungarians to share their music across Europe and make connections with others conveys the openness of Hungarian society.

As already mentioned, Leonard, Cull, and others argue that the strongest form of PD incorporates listening or two-way interaction. There are many examples of this, and several cultural organizations, like the Instituto Italiano di Cultura, have made this networked approach the cornerstone of their PD strategies. The concept of narratives sheds light on why this approach is often so effective. To return to the example of the touring, Hungarian music group, if they shifted their approach from performance (one-way) to collaboration (two-way) with local music groups, a different set of narratives would emerge, which might include:

1. The ways in which music is universal and techniques are shared across borders.
2. Appreciation of learning from different musicians, diffusing styles, and techniques.
3. The ways in which culture more generally is important to diverse societies.
4. The story of similarities and differences between the Hungarian musician's daily lives and those of the local musicians.
5. A completely new story created by the act of collaboration itself, which can be told as narratives in the future.

The quality of this second set of narratives is richer than the first set from a PD standpoint, as they involve the external audience *in* the stories. Even the notion of "audience" drops away from this form of engagement because everyone involved becomes both the audience and the performer.

Understanding two-way interaction through the lens of narratives is important because it is not necessarily self-evident that a nonhierarchical approach is more effective as a PD strategy. After all, hierarchical PD

enables conveyance of more information and closer control over the message. But a narratives perspective highlights that a networked approach enables the creation of *shared* stories. If a story incorporates both the storyteller and the audience, it cannot help but bring the two groups together in a process of socialization. By contrast, a carefully crafted message may sometimes fall on deaf ears.

Norms

Of course, the purpose of PD does not stop at mutual understanding through narratives. Ultimately, the aim of PD is still to gain soft power for the country that engages in it. But what gives narratives their power? I would suggest that narratives convey implicit or explicit norms that reflect greater values within society. When actors involved in PD diffuse these norms successfully, external publics accept them, or at minimum, understand and appreciate them. In effect, PD can be viewed as a process by which norm entrepreneurs (PD actors) attempt to diffuse certain norms to foreign publics.[23] These norms are conveyed through a vast multitude of narratives because the *norms are bigger than the specific PD activity*. In the case of Europe, it is not difficult to identify several examples of commonly held norms.

1. cultural and language diversity is important and should be protected
2. foreign policy should involve multilateralism whenever possible (especially if it also serves national interest)
3. human rights must be promoted globally, even if their protection requires the use of force
4. environmental sustainability should be pursued even at the cost of profit margins
5. education is a fundamental right and provides solution to many social ills
6. development leads to security
7. Europeans should help other regions with their cooperation or integration efforts
8. it is the duty of the state to provide welfare to citizens
9. EU integration is intended to benefit all Europeans and ensures peace in the region

Thus, the Hungarian touring music group conveys #1 through all of its various narratives. A Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to Africa, intended to protect the transport of UN food supplies to displaced people, would convey norms #2, #3, and #6 through PD. The EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, often issues press releases that clearly support norms #2, #3, #4, and #6. European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Commission initiatives nearly always relate their efforts to norm #9 in some way.

What do these norms have to do with soft power? As I have hypothesized above: If the external audience finds these norms to be attractive, that society's government is more likely to respond towards the originator country in a positive way. And if the "target audience" does not understand the narrative, or finds the norms to be unattractive, then it will likely not respond with favorable policies. The ultimate test for the success of European PD is whether PD actors are able to diffuse norms such that any future international relations crises or events are interpreted in light of these norms. All of this implies clear connections between PD and the normative power literature, as discussed in chapter 9.

In sum, an international relations perspective suggests that identity, image, policies, and PD (narratives and norms) are all interrelated. PD must run in parallel to actual policies and reflect real identity otherwise it will not be persuasive.[24] Two-way engagement is often the most influential kind of PD because it involves the creation of collective narratives. Finally, the long run outcome of successful PD is the promotion of national interest and achievement of foreign policy goals through soft power.

Conclusion

Many of the chapters of this book grapple with how the concepts of identity, narratives, and norms influence PD and vice versa. They also reveal that there is often more holding Europeans together than is generally acknowledged. There is a common assumption that the EU's image is inherently weak because Europeans have little in common or that they do not identify with Europe. Part of the reason for this is that national politicians have long been in the habit of taking credit for the EU's successes and using the EU as a scapegoat when things do not go as well as they had hoped. This gives them flexibility in garnering votes during election cycles, but it does not help the image of Europe, both internally and externally. This problem becomes more serious when the EU faces crises. At these times, there is little foundation in place to manage perceptions overseas through PD. The media then engages in EU bashing, amplifying any negative impressions or skepticism foreign publics already hold.

Considering that nearly 80 percent of European citizens have consistently supported the growth of a united Europe that speaks with one voice in the international arena,[25] there is every reason for the EU to pursue a more effective PD at the supranational level, providing a structure under which all of the other layers of PD can operate to common effect. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is actually one of the areas with the highest levels of support among EU citizens, even though it is little more than two decades old. Whatever its current troubles, the EU is certainly the greatest example of voluntary international cooperation among states in modern times, and as such, respected and envied by many outside of

Europe who experience a much more threatening international neighborhood. Indeed, this is the core reason why the EU deserved the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize (setting aside the varied reactions to this).

Research into the nature of European PD is very useful in understanding multinational PD more generally. There are numerous examples of regional organizations that may eventually seek to improve their own supranational PD strategies. I suggest that strong multinational PD must first stem from a sense of common purpose and identity. Strong supranational narratives should be supported with parallel narratives from member nations. In turn, the projection of a tangible external image will likely enhance internal identification with regional communities, garnering support for integration and further legitimizing it.

Notes

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CHAPTER TWO

West European Public Diplomacy

James Pamment

There are many kinds of public diplomacy (PD) currently practiced in Europe. Perhaps the most familiar of these is the national level advocacy and cultural promotion work conducted by foreign and cultural ministries. This chapter explores the PD policies of the "big three" in Europe: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). Although the UK is well represented in recent scholarly debates, there are surprisingly few studies of French and German PD in the English language.[1] In particular, there are no studies that assume a comparative perspective upon their PD as a whole; research has instead focused on cultural diplomacy and broadcasting.[2] My argument here is that comparison of these three countries can reveal important themes and issues in the evolution of PD debates that have not been sufficiently represented in contemporary scholarship.

Why are these three countries important? First, we are talking about three out of the seven largest economies in the world, and three of the top four national reputations in the Nation Brands Index.[3] Second, these nations were, back in the late nineteenth century, among the first to pursue systematic promotional activities. This positions them within a long history of political advocacy, cultural and exchange diplomacy, and news broadcasting.[4] Third, these three countries are neighbors broadly similar in size, power, and resources (although Germany is of course economically dominant), and this provides interesting opportunities for comparative discussion. Fourth, they are three of the main protagonists in the European project, albeit with different roles and relationships to integration. A comparative analysis of their PD policies can shed light on the current state of PD in Europe, and indeed on the nature of European cooperation.

Clearly, these are three countries that deserve greater attention within PD scholarship. The aim here is to discuss the differences and similarities in how their current PD policies have taken shape. This

chapter investigates some of the issues, contexts, and motivations behind policy choices. It looks at the ways in which a range of communication methods—including advocacy, branding, culture, exchange, and broadcasting—are bound into a national PD strategy. By directly comparing these issues, there is much that may be learned about PD as a theoretical concept, particularly in terms of alternative models to the classic *understand, inform, and influence*, and perhaps even to the *relational* communication models associated with new PD discourse.[5] Furthermore, there is an important theme of competition at the heart of national PD discourse that requires further investigation, particularly in light of the international banking crisis and its distinct impact on each of these nations.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the different terminologies in use in these countries. Contrary to what might be expected, the term *public diplomacy* is not in common usage and each country has its own vocabulary for describing its communication activities. A discussion of these differences begins the process of unpacking national cultures and motivations, and helps bring some areas of Anglo-American PD debates into question. The second section provides an overview of the funding and structures of the main PD institutions in each country. This includes a discussion of budgets, the relationships between foreign ministries and cultural and broadcasting bodies, the roles of the communication directorates, as well as an outline of press, communication, and digital work and the target groups they are designed to reach. In many respects, this provides an outline of what makes the three national PD approaches similar. The third section delves more deeply into the policies and practices favored by each nation. It discusses the recent debates in each country that led to current definitions, and analyses the priorities, motivations, and key issues underlying them. It also introduces some examples of current PD campaigns as well as a short discussion of the role of PD in relation to Europe. The final section draws together the core issues raised in the empirical material, discusses some of the emerging trends visible across these three countries, and considers their overall value for the future of the research field.

Terminology

PD debates in the United States at times seem to rely upon an implicit sense of universality when it comes to terminology and function.[6] A discussion of the PD activities of the big three in Europe demonstrates that such assumptions are misplaced. While the core components of PD hold similarities, there are substantial differences in terminology and emphasis that in turn reveal important distinctions in approach and objectives. These distinctions are upheld in part by linguistic spheres of influence, but also more importantly by foreign ministries that define their communicative

activities in terms of their own priorities rather than necessarily with reference to predominately Anglo-American debates. These factors contribute to a sense in which foreign ministry communication cultures possess specialized vocabularies, which may use the same words as other nations but that rarely mean the same thing. In order to cope with these terminological variations, use of the term *public diplomacy* in this chapter refers to the overarching *concept* of PD rather than to its practice, unless otherwise indicated.

The term PD is generally not used in French governmental circles, and its occasional mention is for the most part in reference to international debates rather than to the specifically French context. Instead, there are a number of separate terms that cover the foreign ministry's communicative apparatus. The first and most important is *diplomatie culturelle et d'influence*. This term has been enshrined in French government policy since 2011, under the notion of "radiating" or "promoting" (*rayonnement*) French influence abroad through diplomatic, cultural, academic, and linguistic cooperation.[7] It seems to have emerged from a degree of engagement with debates into *soft power*, which resonate with the historically preferred approach of using culture as a means of securing influence, particularly within Francophone territories. A key difference, however, is that France sees its cultural output as an alternative to American "cultural imperialism," in which French ideas, knowledge, and culture are converged with notions such as *solidarity* and *empathy*. In this sense, PD work is about creating an alternative to Anglophone dominance in globalization, and holds countercultural connotations.[8] A related term in common use is digital diplomacy (*diplomatie numerique*), which emphasizes the technological grounds for achieving a *diplomatie d'influence*. The preferred term for more general advocacy work is simply *communication*, although there is also an important notion of spoken, off-the-record comment (*du porte-parolat*) that supplements mass communication.[9]

German debates have engaged with Anglo-American conceptualizations but struggled with finding a satisfactory terminology. Ambassador Paschke used a direct German translation of PD (*öffentliche Diplomatie*) in his famous report from 2000, which he further clarified in the sense of the English terms "networking" and "lobbying."[10] Alternative terms describe PD as diplomatic or foreign policy public relations (*diplomatische* or *aussenpolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit*), although these are also conceptualizations that only cover part of PD's connotations.[11] The two key terms currently used by the foreign ministry are simply *communication* and *culture*. *Dialogue* and *cooperation* are also used to explain the purpose and spirit of German communication, to the extent that scholars have argued that such notions reflect a persuasive branding that has shaped internal institutional ideologies, rather than reflecting the reality of German advocacy.[12] Cultural policy abroad (*Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik*) has tended to be used for cultural diplomacy, which

was until the 1990s the dominant area of German PD. More recently, the notion of Germany's image abroad (*Deutschlandbild im Ausland*) has gained traction, particularly in light of the FIFA World Cup in 2006. This covers the broad spectrum of PD work under the overall goal of managing a consistent national brand, which suggests that an entrepreneurial spirit has entered PD debates.[13]

In the UK, use of the term PD has diminished somewhat since the mid-2000s, and it now refers most explicitly to the management of the relationship between the "PD partners," the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), British Council, and BBC World Service. Since 2002, PD has been closely related to the notion of *influence*, with successive definitions emphasizing this relationship.[14] However, the term *communication* (sometimes with the prefix *strategic*) has been preferred to *public diplomacy* since around 2010, and consequently the notion of influence has all but vanished. Business planning has become increasingly managerial, with a strong focus on objectives, outcomes, and value. This may be explained in part by changes in the leadership at the FCO Communication Directorate that pushed for a branding and marketing style led by commercial objectives. The Olympics and Royal Wedding, together with the change of government in 2010 as well as the debt crisis, provided an enabling environment for the return of promotional approaches.[15] The notion of PD as a mode of influence therefore receded from British debates to be replaced by more traditional strategic communication and promotional work with greater cross-governmental ties and strong links to the private sector. *Cultural relations* and *mutuality* are the preferred terms for the British Council's work.

Terminology is a loaded issue that presents some intriguing issues across these countries. A first point is that PD has itself become a less significant term that is not widely used in government circles. The reasons behind this may be linguistic, political, and perhaps relative to the interaction between scholars and practitioners in different cultures. Use of the term PD (and particularly "new" PD) in the mid-2000s tended to be aspirational in nature. It represented a period of reflexivity and experimentation over PD's tools and future direction prompted by factors such as 9/11 and the emergence of social media.[16] It often pointed towards ambitious programs of restructuring and realignment within foreign ministries aimed at meeting technological, political, and social change. However, despite temporarily providing a space for exploring the potential of the communication tools available, economic concerns (and particularly the crisis) changed the tone.[17] A decline both in the sense of "newness" as well in uses of the term PD points to a return to promotional and branding activities that generally have a more traditional, business-oriented flavor. Having by-and-large adapted to social media and integrated it into their everyday activities, the sense of radical potential enshrined in recent PD debates has vanished, and this may provide one of the reasons for the decline in use of the term.

What's in a Name?

Although *public diplomacy* has become the dominant term for the external communication activities of foreign ministries and other associated bodies in Anglophone debates, other Western European countries have responded to these debates in different ways. For example, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland use a direct translation of *public diplomacy* to their respective languages. Norway uses the term *public diplomacy* in English but words meaning *profile* and *reputation* for equivalent discussions in Norwegian. Denmark simply uses the English term *public diplomacy*, even in Danish. When assessing French, German, and British terminologies, it is worth giving some extra thought to the question of why and how different approaches appear in different contexts.

A related point is that even when the same terms are used, they tend to mean different things. *Influence*, for example, has become a key term in French debates just as it diminished in importance within British debates. Yet the connotations of the term are markedly different in the two cultures; the British version emphasizes measurable persuasion on specific advocacy issues, while the French refers to exposure to the Francophone sphere and the ideas contained within it.[18] Certainly, French uses of influence have little to do with the classic definition from the United States of understanding, informing, and influencing. A similar notion of a Teutophone sphere is historically central to German cultural and educational policy, but influence is seen from the German perspective more as using its power to create an interest and awareness of its political and cultural goals as a basis for dialogue. These subtle terminological differences demonstrate that PD, even within the narrow lens of national-level activities at three foreign ministries, is a polysemic concept that has substantially diverse connotations. Of course, PD practices are part of how these distinctions are upheld; 120 years of expenditure on cultural promotion has quite deliberately sought to reinforce and protect the profound cultural diversity of European nations. Consequently, it is important to underscore the ways in which such differences are institutionalized into the very conceptualizations of PD.

Funding and Structures

Before we discuss the differences in detail, it's worth pausing to outline the more fundamental similarities. First, we consider the budgets. In France, the overall budget for *diplomatie culturelle et d'influence* increased in 2011 from €595 million to €758 million, due to the reorganization of funding for cultural activities and some new initiatives for boosting

attractiveness in research and sport.[19] This is consistent with Germany's foreign ministry, which managed a communication and culture budget of around €600 million in 2007, but which has grown steadily to around €785 million in 2012. However, the total national budget for *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik* (foreign cultural relations and education policy) now stands at €1.5 billion, and includes funding for a wide array of actors that are not managed by the Federal Foreign Office.[20] Clearly, PD represents an important avenue by which German economic advantages are transposed to the international cultural sphere. In the UK, the PD budget has declined from a high of €625 million in 2009–2010 to around €575 million in 2011–2012. However, this does not include staff based at Embassies, advocacy funds devolved to Embassies, or the additional funds raised by the British Council and BBC World Service. [21] There are clearly differences in how budgets are calculated (and the specific components that are included and excluded), which make it difficult to compare the exact figures with any real certainty. Some points may be made, however. First, all three countries devote substantial resources to PD correlating to as much as 0.48 percent of the national budget in the case of Germany.[22] By way of comparison, national budgets for *official development assistance* aim to reach 0.7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI), but most fall short of this. PD, regardless of its apparent low profile, is a big deal. Second, it is interesting to note that, given the role of PD in boosting the attractiveness of countries, France and Germany responded to the economic crisis by increasing their budgets, whereas the UK made modest austerity savings. This reflects important political differences that will be returned to throughout the chapter.

In terms of structure, all three nations have a similar setup of the foreign ministry holding oversight of semiindependent cultural, educational, and broadcasting bodies. The French *ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes* (MFA) claims to manage the world's second largest diplomacy network, consisting of 160 embassies, 88 consulates general and 132 cultural establishments.[23] The state provides funding for public institutions (that may also generate their own funds) and has an overseeing board that "specifies their missions and modes of organisation and operation."[24] The *French Institute* (Institut Français) under the MFA manages France's cultural network abroad. It has the goals of promoting and supporting French culture, science, and ideas overseas, developing trade, distributing French creative works such as cinema and books, and teaching and promoting the French language. It was described, upon its creation in 2011, as "a new instrument of diplomatie d'influence."[25] *Campus France* was created as a public and commercial body under the MFA and Ministry of Education, and aims to promote France as a destination for foreign students and researchers, drawing upon diplomatic objectives and networks to facilitate exchange.[26] Since 2007, the "Audiovisuel Extérieur de la France" (AEF) has managed France's international broadcasting strategy. AEF acts as a state-owned holding company with partial or complete ownership

of channels under a board with a performance contract. It supports the film industry and key television providers such as TV5MONDE, France 24, ART, and Canal+. Radio France Internationale has 1,100 staff (compared to 4,000 at the BBC World Service), and its comprehensive reform program suggests that it has lost ground against competitors. The overall budget for audiovisual activities abroad dropped from €213 million in 2010 to €150 million in 2012.[27]

The German *Auswärtiges Amt* (Federal Foreign Office) manages 153 embassies and 55 consulates general. It coordinates the policies for promotion, cultural diplomacy, and education, but they are implemented by autonomous cultural actors with their own objectives under framework agreements.[28] The best-known actors within this area are the *Goethe Institut* and *Deutsche Welle*. The Goethe Institut has 150 branches around the world, and provides "knowledge and information" about Germany's culture, language, and policy positions. They also "take advantage of the opportunities offered by intercultural dialogue" to share views from abroad with Germany.[29] Deutsche Welle both presents "German and other points of view on important issues" and "promotes exchange and understanding between the world's cultures and people." It produces news in 30 languages reaching around 86 million people per week, but does not broadcast domestically. It provides, in addition to German language TV, radio, and Internet language courses based upon its programming.[30] Its budget of €271 million comes from a number of federal sources and some funding is channeled via the Federal Foreign Office for specific projects. The *German Academic Exchange Service* (DAAD) and the *Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations* (IFA) in Stuttgart are other key actors promoting research and cultural relations respectively. It may be noted in the German case that there are fewer official diplomatic offices than both the UK and France, but that the cultural, language, education, and broadcasting network is probably the largest of the three.

The British FCO runs 140 embassies and high commissions, 23 consulates general and deputy high commissions, and a network of 100 other consulates and diplomatic offices. It oversees PD partner organizations that receive funding and some guidance over strategic planning at "arm's length." This includes grant-in-aid funding of the *BBC World Service* and the *British Council*, and sponsorship of the *Wilton Park* conference centre. The British Council is a charity, which receives about 25 percent of its funding via the FCO, the rest being generated through commercial activity. It has over 100 offices around the world and its three main business areas for 2011–2015 are English, the Arts, and Education and Society. It covers areas such as language courses, language proficiency exams, and higher education applications in addition to development assistance and promotion of culture, exchange and the arts.[31] The BBC World Service is currently funded via the FCO but will receive funding from the BBC license fee from 2014. It is undergoing major relocation and cost-cutting exercises that saw 450 posts as well as 5 foreign language services closed during 2011.[32]

This brief overview demonstrates substantial similarities in the size of diplomatic, cultural, and broadcasting networks. All three nations have foreign ministries, which oversee aspects of the overall overseas promotional apparatus, and as such questions of coordination and centralization are an important theme. All three nations have comparable cultural and broadcasting organizations, many of which, particularly on the broadcasting side, have been working under the challenging context of reduced budgets, as well as restructuring for online engagement. Language is an important part of cultural engagement for all three: for the British Council as a form of financing; and as a means of promoting and accessing culture for France and Germany. In the German case in particular, a longstanding tradition of *foreign cultural policy* is expressed in the balance between its sizeable cultural network and diplomatic network. By way of contrast, the French and British diplomatic networks are often considered to be among the best in the business due to their reach, focus, and traditions.[33] This suggests a potential difference in how political advocacy is conducted in relation to other areas of PD, which will be explored further in this chapter.

Looking more specifically at the communication structures within the foreign ministries, there are also important similarities. At the French MFA, the Press & Communication Department is divided into a Press Department, which handles day-to-day inquiries and reacts to political crises, and a Communication Department that manages the website, organizes events, publications, and websites, as well as the relationship with different policy departments. At the German Federal Foreign Office, the Directorate-General for Culture and Communication has the responsibility "to plan, coordinate and steer German cultural relations and education policy, communication and media policy and public-relations activities in the political sphere," with the aim of directly reaching "people's hearts and minds."[34] The Directorate-General is divided into ten policy and regional sections. Regional sections deal with both culture and communication issues, whereas most policy sections deal with cultural and educational matters rather than with communication. A separate press section works directly with the leadership of the ministry. At the FCO, the Communication Directorate is divided into two departments. Press and Digital handles press and Minister requests, and responds to issues in the news. Communication and Engagement covers areas such as the web presence and stakeholder engagement. Common to all three is a specialized communication directorate, which manages firstly media relations under the heading of "press," and secondly a broader notion of "communication," which includes web engagement and planned communication.[35] There are differences in how this is organized—most significantly with the integration of culture into Germany's apparatus—but the overall similarities in centralized communication coordination are noteworthy.

Furthermore, all three nations have made similar efforts to modernize communication through online engagement. In France, *digital diplomacy*

(diplomatie numerique) has become a key focal point for producing a "new" public diplomacy via the Internet and social media. Since 2009, the MFA runs Twitter accounts in French, English, and (as of 2012) in Arabic. The MFA also has a presence on Facebook, YouTube, Dailymotion, Flickr, Foursquare, and Google+ accounts. The foreign ministry uses Facebook and Twitter accounts, and Twitter has been used to organize chats on special topics. Significant efforts have been made to improve the level of interactivity through social media, but moderation of the discussions is resource intensive. Around a hundred diplomatic missions are active on social media. The aim is to make foreign policy "more accessible" so as to "raise everyone's awareness of the diversity of its challenges." Furthermore, the MFA claims to be the leading digital department within government.[36] Germany has had a similar focus, and the official foreign ministry website is considered a significant tool of foreign policy. Two hundred missions have their own webpages, and the central website receives six million hits per month. Posts are given a ten-point checklist on how to use Facebook, along with recommendations for how to configure the page, use the correct language style, and moderate discussion.[37] Likewise, the FCO is attempting to be "recognized as world authority on theory and practice" in digital diplomacy. The theme of further integrating PD into diplomatic practices is enshrined in the objectives for web work, and every campaign has a "digital diplomat" assigned to champion the online platform. Digital diplomacy is defined as "solving foreign policy problems using the internet . . . It's conventional diplomacy through a different medium."[38] All three foreign ministries have therefore turned their attention to the Internet as a means of pursuing public diplomacy. This underscores the fact that, regardless of terminology, public outreach has become an important part of their work, and some of the technological expectations of the new PD have become business as usual.

Lastly, the nations are competing over their publics, which may be broken down into quite similar target groups. For the French MFA, the storytelling aspects of its culture, history, and politics are a fundamentally *public* asset. Hence "radiation" of national influence must include "the new players who burst onto the international scene: the media, universities, networks of experts, companies, local communities, NGOs, cultural institutions, and research" because mobilization and inclusion of all sorts of expertise is essential to expressing solidarity. The French language is considered desirable to political and media elites, which therefore also provides access to a core foreign target group of senior officials and opinion leaders.[39] The German Federal Foreign Office targets similar groups such as "civil society—particularly the spheres of culture, science, and the media—and the interested public." Efforts to promote a unified Europe include liaising with journalists and decision makers, and with intermediary organizations and partners "from academia, business, and civil society." Outside of Europe, this focuses upon the "up-and-coming centres of political and economic power."[40] Likewise, the FCO targets "NGOs,

think tanks, opinion formers, young people, businesses, and individual citizens." Specific target groups of major international campaigns run by the UK include tourists, business leaders, international students, and opinion shapers both in established friendly countries like the United States, France, and Germany, and in BRIC countries.[41] Together, this suggests that these three actors are in many respects competing over similar public groups; particularly the middle classes, the young, and the influential in the emerging economies, but also in Europe, elsewhere in the developed world, and at times domestically. With the possible exception of France's public diplomacy targeting the Francophone, citizens of poorer developing countries are not particularly important target groups.

In sum, it's clear that there are major similarities in funding, structure, efforts to modernize, and preferred target groups. However, this only really holds sway at the level of an overview. It is equally important, having established these similarities, to delve further into the differences. In support of this, we need to explore the cultures of communication, which inform and are expressed through national PD policies.

Recent Policy Developments

Common to each of these countries is a process of reports and inquiries into the future of the diplomatic apparatus, in which communication and PD play a lesser or greater role. For all three countries, the millennium provided the impetus for reenvisioning the purpose of foreign ministries. The French MFA sought to raise the profile of mass communication in diplomacy in order to reach wider audiences online, while the Foresight report outlined a program of internal reform for the FCO. Paschke looked at the future of German Embassies in Europe, emphasizing the value of public diplomacy.[42] Reform has continued at fairly regular intervals, which underscores the dynamic environment in which communication work takes place, and the constant external pressures and demands placed on communications staff. An overview of the evolving objectives of each policy reform can help unpack how debates have developed in each country, which in turn can aid the interpretation of the terms and motivations that have influenced debates. This section will explore those policy issues and bring in examples of campaigns in order to relate policy to practice.

The French government published a white paper in 2008 about the future of the diplomatic network. This established five priorities for external action: Europe, security, peace and human rights, globalization, and the promotion of French culture, language, and ideas.[43] Furthermore, it outlined 12 propositions designed to influence strategic direction in what it terms "external action." These included improved organization and cohesion between departments acting overseas, the coordinated promotion of French culture, ideas, language, and education, and, perhaps most tellingly, a foreign policy that was "more transparent, open and

controlled."[44] In a 2010 paper commissioned by the *Union for a Popular Movement* party (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, or UMP), which was ruling party until 2012, Frank Melloul contended that France needed "a new diplomacy: public diplomacy."[45] The following year, parliament created the *French Institute* (Institut Français) as part of a "comprehensive reform of our foreign influence," in which PD is not mentioned by name, but undoubtedly plays a significant role. Minister for Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner argued:

> Reform was necessary because how can we not see that culture and knowledge play an ever more decisive role in the global world? Do not hide the reality: there is now a battle of "soft power". The major Western democracies as well as emerging powerhouses know that if they want to count in tomorrow's world, they must be able to project their cultural content, to influence the agenda of ideas, promote their language, to attract future leaders in their schools and universities. They know that a great nation, as Hugo said, consists not only of a strong army and vast territory, but also has the ability to win hearts and minds.[46]

Reform has been based around greater collaboration between the ministries involved in culture and overseas promotion, through a unified brand identity centering on the French Institute. The principal change is that the Institute is funded via the foreign ministry, and hence is accountable to foreign policy goals. These changes were seen as "a tool for . . . promotion" capable of boosting the "visibility" of culture and language.[47] Reform in France has therefore been fundamentally a project of coordination and branding, of establishing consistency and unity in overseas promotion. *Diplomatie culturelle et d'influence* is formally expressed across four axes that reflect state priorities for external action: *Europe*, *security*, the broad area of *globalization*, and *cultural influence*. Since 2006, external action priorities are measured through performance indicators and monitored by Parliament. These indicators do not touch upon communication work per se but instead focus heavily upon measuring the impact of language, research, and broadcasting.[48] Influence is considered to be intrinsically linked to the spread of language and culture: "The influence of France is based on the use of French in the world . . . , education and university cooperation, and the dissemination of French cultural products."[49] The latter includes broadcasting and sport. This suggests that language and culture are considered a means of opening up the Francophone sphere, and that PD is considered part of a strategic process for bringing France to the world and vice versa. Although influence is a key term, this has little in common with *understanding, informing and influencing*.

There are some striking issues during this period of reform. First is the impact of successive cutbacks over the past decade, and particularly around 2007–2008. In 2011, an anonymous group of French diplomats

writing in *Le Monde* described the cuts to the diplomatic network as creating "an empty shell" and "a castle of sand." "Because of our lack of financial weight," they argued, "we have less and less influence in debates and decisions in African countries that are key for us… France is losing the battle of soft power."[50] At the same time, an overarching strategy sought to establish France as a normative power within globalization processes. Political advocacy appears to play a less central role in French PD than the strategy of exerting influence over common frameworks through multilateral organizations. Influence therefore takes a more subtle route, through shaping the "political, normative, economic, and administrative frameworks of our partners."[51] This is not seen merely in terms of self-interest, but as an act of solidarity that positions French influence as an antihegemonic form of soft power.

> Providing expertise and advice to foreign governments and international organizations is therefore an essential vehicle for the distribution of French norms and standards, whether they be related to social, legal, health or environmental affairs. French international expertise also gives influence to our social organizational model and our values.[52]

These evolving objectives suggest that there have been limited human resources for conducting PD although the 2011 reform did point to the specialized training of cultural diplomats.[53] Rather, closer coordination between political and cultural resources aims to "radiate" an alternative sphere that claims to be aligned with the needs of citizens all over the world, and particularly with developing countries within *La Francophonie*. It's a strong claim for a former colonial power, and one which seems to have its basis in resistance to American-led globalization. In this sense, *diplomatie culturelle et d'influence* appears to have assumed the self-styled branding of a citizen-led solidarity movement; what might be considered a French spin on the concept of public diplomacy:

> All this must be conducted in a context marked by great distrust that has moved against cultural imperialism, against the hypothesis of a unique culture—to speak plainly, American culture—which has not promoted peace and which, on the contrary, has enriched conflict.[54]

These overlapping themes are exemplified by a major PD campaign currently conducted by France that promotes issues related to the death penalty. France abolished the death penalty in 1981 and ratified its abolition in the constitution in 2007. In 2012, the MFA undertook a long-term PD campaign advocating abolition in other countries. Embassies, particularly those in countries that still have the death penalty, are encouraged, "depending on local opportunities and contexts, to issue statements,

organize events and take steps vis-à-vis the authorities." The campaign collaborates with civil society actors and the UN to push for change both multilaterally and bilaterally, with the aim of shaping "a global coalition of states in favour of abolition."[55] Although a relatively important area of advocacy on governance and human rights, this campaign has a very limited budget. It reflects the impact of cutbacks upon the organization, which has led it to more carefully select which issues to support and which objectives to follow.[56] However, it clearly draws upon the themes of normative power, solidarity, counterhegemony (some US states still enforce the death penalty), as well as coordinated brand positioning.

The German *Konzeption 2000* report stood for the government's post-9/11 reenvisioning of cultural relations as a component of foreign policy. Among other things, it increased coordination and exchanges of staff between the Goethe Institute and foreign ministry, thereby better integrating cultural and political work.[57] This solidified into the four priorities of improving perceptions of German cultural and educational policy, presenting a contemporary image (or "corporate identity") of Germany, conducting an intercultural dialogue on values, and promoting European integration.[58] Following a new *Konzeption* in 2011 aimed at embracing globalization, these goals further intensify "dialogue, exchange, and cooperation" through networks "in the fields of politics, business, science, the arts, or the media."[59] In particular, efforts surrounding language and education have come to the fore; for example, in India, where a recent *Year of Germany* has helped consolidate the school network; it is estimated that some million pupils will now read German: "we want to get young people interested in the German language and thus to open doors for them to Germany's scientific, economic and cultural scene."[60] This seems to suggest that culture and language are the vehicles for creating an environment conducive to political influence over the long term.

> Germany's aim is to secure its influence in the world and play a responsible part in shaping globalization. Cultural relations and education policy, in the sense of cultural diplomacy, can make a more substantive contribution than ever in this context. Using education, exchange and dialogue as our instruments, and basing our approach on the idea of partnership and mutual respect, we will be able to reach people directly and gain their appreciation for our country, our values and our ideas.[61]

This strategy is positioned under the MFA's overarching objectives, which are *strengthening Europe*, *securing peace*, and *managing globalization and its emergent actors*.[62] As with France, language and education are key means for securing entry to the Germanic sphere and its culture and ideas.[63] Since each of these areas implies elements of public communication, it is perhaps unsurprising that a strong sense of branding, public dialogue, and promotion of

values pervade policy definitions in each of these areas. This, of course, breaks with the long-term tradition of exerting influence solely through multilateral organizations and benign cultural exchanges.[64] "Globalization discourse"—such as competitive states, 9/11, the economic downturn, emerging BRIC economies, and the World Cup in 2006—established an "enabling condition" for this change in Germany's image politics, leading to culture being used instrumentally within branding exercises. The campaign *Germany—Land of Ideas*, which represents Germany as inventive, innovative, cosmopolitan, creative, and visionary, famously featured Claudia Schiffer's image on a billboard with the slogan "invest in Germany, boys."[65] The controversial aspect of this shift to nation brands is the ways in which traditional cultural tropes established between the 1950s and 1990s, such as dialogue and exchange, become rearticulated within an instrumentalist view of culture. In this sense, German uses of terms like *information* are relatively concrete, whereas *dialogue* is a more ambiguous term drawing upon a preunification foreign cultural policy that is no longer a reality for modern Germany. How does the entrepreneurial spirit rest alongside partnership and exchange?

Following 9/11, but building on practices established in the mid-1990s, Germany created a long-term campaign to promote a "European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue" or "Dialogue of Cultures." Characterized as a "preventive strategy" against confrontation, and aimed at building "mutual trust," the campaign emphasized "real dialogue" and collaboration "on concrete projects."[66] Deutsche Welle has some history of broadcasting to the Middle East since the 1950s, and it stepped up its activities in 2004, launching an Arabic television channel and revamping the Arabic language website. Researchers have contended that Germany's position as intercultural mediator "has always been a precarious one" due to its history; "One may argue, therefore, that the proposition of brokering a 'dialogue' with the Islamic world is a kind of a way-out for Germany permitting German foreign policy to present itself as a neutral player in the Middle East." This seems more than a little unfair, particularly when compared with the goals of many other major and middle powers in the Middle East. The point, however, is that such campaigns "may reflect a reassertion of the self-image Germany feels most comfortable with."[67] It provides an interesting twist on "globalization discourse" when that discourse takes place through a massive cultural network that is nonetheless informed by political and economic objectives, and hints at important tensions within policy formation circles.

Building on this question, critics have argued that discourses of partnership and dialogue "may easily remain in the sphere of institutional ideology." The risk is that statements of partnership become rhetoric and storytelling rather than genuine partnership.[68] These tensions may be seen in the following quote: "Representing German interests coherently, on the basis of transparent consultation processes and efficient instruments of coordination, is crucial to successful collaboration with our

partners."[69] On the one hand, self-representation and a strong government line provide the core of the PD exercise, but the notion of partnership quickly follows, as though it is a natural complement and consequence of self-representation. However it is unclear whether "partnership" refers to another country buying into German policies and following its lead, or whether Germany is, for example, prepared to change its policies as a result of dialogue. Given the Federal Foreign Office's status as policy advocate at home and abroad, as well as the complexity of federal policy formation processes and Germany's dominant position in Europe during the crisis, the latter seems unlikely. Partnership and dialogue seem to reflect a need to explicitly state that Germany is discussing, not telling.[70] However, I do not interpret this in the same negative way as some German scholars. Germany's PD is based around transposing an economic advantage into a cultural advantage in order to create further economic and political benefits. Legitimizing this process in terms of a cultural model of communication relates to how the self-interest is formulated; in this case, it is formulated as being benign, collaborative, and for the general good. France and the UK do not hesitate in promoting their version of the general good, so why should Germany?[71] Germany's post–Second World War cultural foreign policy tradition appears to be at a crossroads with its present needs to assert itself as a political power on the international stage, within Europe and beyond.

In the UK, reform has become business-as-usual over the past decade. As a recent study of New Labour's attitude towards the FCO suggests, "The story of the reforms is one of reviews, performance targets, business plans and strategic priorities intended to improve 'delivery,' 'relevance,' and 'accountability'."[72] Robin Cook's *Panel 2000* taskforce on the projection of Britain defined public diplomacy as "the projection and promotion of the UK's image, values and policies overseas." This definition, using nation branding-inspired words like "project" and "promote," reflected New Labour's obsession with modernizing the image of Britain, and captured late-1990s' debates around the notion of nation brands.[73] The Wilton review of the UK's PD capacities post-9/11 rejected the emphasis on promotion and pointed towards questions of *influence* and *outcomes*. Public diplomacy was redefined as "that work which aims at influencing in a positive way the perceptions of individuals and organizations overseas about the UK, and their engagement with the UK."[74] Perceptions therefore replaced promotion as the focal point of PD activities, shifting the emphasis from the outputs of PD campaigns to the values and attitudes of the publics engaging with them. During this period, significant restructuring took place within British PD, and questions were asked about the levels of coordination between the FCO, British Council, and BBC World Service.

Three years later, the Carter review highlighted the need to "inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom."[75] Arguing

that the changes since Wilton were not far-reaching enough, Carter recommended that all PD actors should work to common management and evaluation standards, although despite scoping exercises this proved too difficult to implement as a single system. Carter more closely reigned in the British Council within the FCO's lead, and the notion of concrete outcomes and accountability became thoroughly integrated into the working cultures of all the PD actors. New tools were developed for planning and evaluating PD, which increasingly came to be seen within a strategic communications approach designed "to develop solutions that shift attitudes and behaviours."[76] The focus on management objectives and outcomes was enshrined in British PD definitions by the end of the decade; PD was considered "a process of achieving the UK's international strategic priorities" through engagement and partnerships.[77] At times, the pace of change was so fast that projects were dropped before they were completed. For example, a pilot evaluation scheme was conducted at Carter's recommendation in 2009 at the cost of £140,000, but changes in leadership and objectives meant that the centralized process of funding and evaluating PD projects had been dropped by 2011.

The Foreign & Commonwealth Office describes itself as an advocacy organization that "protects and promotes UK interests."[78] It has three priorities: *national security*, *prosperity,* and *consular support*. It may therefore be noted that, whereas France and Germany both treat Europe as a priority, it does not feature in these objectives. Rather, European issues are subsumed within the overarching questions of security and prosperity.[79] It's a statement that expresses Britain's close ties to the United States and the Commonwealth in addition to Europe. Besides this crucial point, all three countries share a focus on security/peace and globalization/prosperity. France has an additional foreign policy objective on culture, while Germany emphasizes a "foreign cultural policy" across all its priority areas. British cultural policy is less prominent, and this reveals an important difference in conceptions of PD. For France and Germany, language, education, and culture are essential components of creating spheres of influence, leading to soft and normative power that can impact positively upon foreign policy objectives. For the UK, which has the luxury of a dominant language, these aspects are now framed within PD policy in almost exclusively economic terms. The British Council now earns a large percentage of its funding through selling English language courses, and promoting higher education is as much about maintaining a sector under financial pressure as it is about shaping future influencers. With the decline of *influence* from PD definitions, and the specter of the banking crisis leading to a greater emphasis on marketing and promotion, British PD policy does not share the strategic cohesion of its French and German counterparts, and works to an increasingly shorter timeframe.

Foreign Policy Priorities		
France	**Germany**	**United Kingdom**
Europe	Strengthening Europe	
Security	Securing peace	National security
Globalization	Managing globalization and its emergent actors	Prosperity
		Consular support
Cultural influence		

These priorities and motivations help unpack the relationship between conceptions of public diplomacy and perceptions of its role in globalization. While the FCO advocates a prosperity agenda aimed at making the UK wealthier, the German Federal Foreign Office "would like to enter into dialogue and cooperate in a spirit of partnership and equality to ensure that globalization proceeds fairly."[80] The French Foreign Ministry wants to help "the organization of a balanced globalization."[81] Germany frames its argumentation upon the notion of reciprocity with the emerging powers, so that it can work in partnership with them to reform international society and institutions. This appears to integrate cultural forms of public diplomacy into foreign policy processes; although as was noted above the relationship between self-interest and partnership may be a little more complex than this suggests. France seems to want its fair share of globalization, to ensure the Francophone sphere isn't bypassed and remains relevant. PD is seen as a way of expressing solidarity against American cultural imperialism, which is undoubtedly an interesting approach that, nonetheless, does not appear to be particularly radical in its application. The UK sees globalization as an opportunity to make gains through strategic communication, to promote wealth. Competitiveness appears to be a common motivator, and branding and coordination are common preoccupations. However, the interaction and integration of culture with political advocacy provides an important point of distinction. This suggests some interesting clues as to the competitive role of PD in foreign policy, and to the differing motivations and priorities that inform and are expressed through PD policies.

Britain's most significant current PD campaign is called *GREAT*. The GREAT campaign was timed to make the most of increased interest in the UK from the Royal Wedding in 2011, the Diamond Jubilee, the Olympics and Paralympics in 2012. This period "represent[s] a once-in-a-generation opportunity to promote the UK abroad, shape international perceptions and help deliver long-term trade and tourism benefits at home in Britain." The campaign aimed to "showcase Britain's

capabilities, to promote and enhance our reputation abroad and to maximise the economic potential of the Games."[82] The campaign highlighted a dozen thematic areas and branded them with the UK: e.g., *Countryside is GREAT Britain* and *Music is GREAT Britain*. Private sector partnerships have also been involved as a way of raising funds, and campaign areas associated with the brand have promoted specific companies; e.g., the *Shopping is GREAT Britain* segment worked with brands like Burberry and Paul Smith, and a *Bond is GREAT Britain* billboard cobranded the new *Skyfall* movie. Many celebrities have participated for free in a long-term branding exercise, which clearly relies upon the "substantial transfer of imagery and brand equity" which Anholt referred to as a key facet of the nation brand.[83]

These campaigns put some meat on the bones of the policies and strategies outlined above. In the case of France, the abolition campaign complements the "radiation" of normative power and solidarity. The German intercultural dialogue fits within a self-image of benign mediator, creating partnerships and dialogues in support of its policy goals. Efforts to brand the UK demonstrate the business-style approach to generating wealth that now dominates the PD agenda.

Similar trends may also be seen in approaches to Europe. For the French MFA, Europe is considered the "cornerstone of our foreign policy."[84] The focus is upon strengthening Europe's role in the world, and France's normative role in Europe. The German foreign ministry conducts promotional work supporting the EU in Germany, Europe, and around the world, lobbying for it as "a player in world affairs," a "community of values," for its economic power in the common market, and against "the folly of non-Europe." The relationship between self-interest and the general good is again glossed: "We will assert our common values and interests as Europeans, or not at all."[85] The FCO simply "works to develop British interests in the EU, and works constructively with the EU and its member states on issues like trade, the single market, and economic growth."[86] National PD policies again take on certain characteristics. French PD looks to play an important role, whereas German is involved in dialogues that nonetheless seem to see it speak and lobby for and on behalf of its partners. British PD works to explicitly national rather than European interests, and the trade agenda again comes to the fore.

Discussion

By way of a concluding discussion, I wish to raise a number of points related to the PD strategies presented here. First is the observation that *competition drives PD policies*. PD scholars are familiar with notions like soft power, "hearts and minds," and the battle of ideologies associated with Cold War and post-9/11 PD theory particularly in the US context. The terms of competition for these three countries have little in

common with those debates. Competitiveness is a question of reputation and attractiveness for tourism, trade, and investment. It is about influence over *frameworks*—normative and legal—as well as over agendas and terms of consensus, particularly within international organizations including the EU itself, where those frameworks impact upon the global political economy. It is about focused competition over the common assets of the international community, with emerging economies positioned as the ultimate prize. It is about Old Europe keeping its ailing economies alive by courting regions of growth. The idea that "favourable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials" only tells part of the story. On the contrary, this discussion demonstrates that it is precisely access to material resources that motivates the interest in image, reputation, and attractiveness.[87] How this is achieved differs, but it seems clear that the principle of "managing" globalization (i.e., securing influence over it) is intrinsically and indisputably bound to public diplomacy in these contexts.

A striking aspect of the communication activities of these countries is therefore their competitiveness with each other. Although the big three have developed broadly similar PD strategies, they have done so through their own terminologies and with the goal of promoting their own interests in many respects against one another. This may be seen in the issue of language teaching, where France and Germany are pushing for two foreign languages to be taught in schools; ostensibly, they are collaborating on the same goal, but they are also in competition over who gets the right to teach their language alongside English. Victory opens access to that country's culture and values, which is the decisive strategic entry point for influencing frameworks, promoting foreign policy and shaping globalization. It may therefore be appropriate to consider this in terms of spheres of influence characterized by linguistic traditions relating back to colonial times. The *Francophonie*, the *Commonwealth* (plus the United States), and the *Drang nach Osten* are each relevant to the respective spheres of influence, though not exclusively since there are other major emerging powers to compete over. At the risk of pushing the argument, there is perhaps even a sense in which competition over the favor of countries like China and India has a neoimperialist bent reminiscent of the late-nineteenth century. In any case, there is strong evidence to suggest that PD is thoroughly implicated in creating and maintaining new *spheres of influence* for the twenty-first century.

The procedural model of PD—*to understand*, *inform,* and *influence*—is brought into question by these communicative structures. France and Germany both support an entirely different model of communication that provides an important alternative to Anglo-American dominance in this regard. The principle is that through language and education, foreigners can gain access to the breadth of a national culture; to its ideas, values, and culture. Different to the UK, France and Germany

have linguistic spheres that must be lobbied for and defended, so for PD engagement to have any lasting success, educating young people in the language is the first step. Indeed, the principle of the overseas German school dates back to the origins of the modern German state.[88] When German PD policy speaks of engagement and dialogue, it is perhaps less a question of institutional ideology, as Zöllner argues, as much as it is an implicit expectation that if dialogue takes place in German, it is favorable to German interests in so many ways.[89] Access to the national cultural sphere is seen to enable inclusion in an alternative sphere of influence, and therefore potentially also to alternative structures for globalization. The dominance of the English language means that the British Council can monetize this asset, but this fails to grasp how the competition are working. By looking to the US context for direction in PD debates, the UK has minimized the potential of the cultural-linguistic component by simply seeing it in terms of an immediate revenue source. Yet, the Franco-German approach appears far more relevant to a country of its size, stature and goals. The "gift" of a million German speakers in India provides direct competition, which may, over the longer term, wear away at historical British advantages on the subcontinent. In short, I argue based on this analysis that language is a far more important factor for the PD of middle powers than perhaps has previously been acknowledged, and furthermore that models of PD influence need to better account for the ways in which access to linguistic and cultural spheres can provide reputational advantages when they are positioned within cohesive PD strategies. There is a great deal of relevant PD scholarship into collaboration and relationship building, but some of these important concepts may require reenvisioning on this basis.[90]

The question of cohesion raises issues about how the components of PD fit together. Branding and advocacy are usually considered centralizing and disciplining forces, whereas cultural diplomacy, language, and broadcasting are about diversity and mutuality. All three countries retain semiautonomous components, and this suggests that there is some diversity of message and approach. However, there is a question of articulation. What happens to cultural diversity when the message is articulated within a coherent PD structure aimed at managing globalization? In the UK, it has led to the appropriation of national resources under a unified brand, with consequences like a stuntman dressed as the Queen jumping out of a helicopter at the Olympic opening ceremony. Germany has also worked on branding, and there seems to be some tension between its cultural foreign policy agenda and the political and economic parts of its work. Since its cultural actors are so varied and proportionately dominant, there are strong indications that the tension between advocacy and partnership reflects domestic preoccupations over Germany's influence in the world, rather than anything substantively problematic in comparative PD styles. It is, however, important to note that both France and Germany are far

less overt in their formulations of political influence within PD than the UK or United States, and that their discussions of influence in terms of solidarity and partnership are closely aligned with the spirit of contemporary PD scholarship.

Theoretical work therefore needs to be carried out to explore alternative communication models that can better explain these approaches. Dialogical and collaborative models only tell part of the story, since at the heart of these three examples of PD policy is a deliberate and coordinated exercise of power aimed at managing globalization. Where do language and normative power fit in to this? How does the facilitation of expertise, experience, skills, and frameworks to multilateral organizations interact with traditional diplomacy to support the national interest? Terms like *soft* and *social power* provide an inroad to exploring hegemonic communicative practices, but how should we account for the antihegemonic spirit of French PD, for example?[91] Advocacy, branding, culture and language (as well as broadcasting, research, education, tourism, and commercial diplomacy) need to be approached less as components which are emphasized to a lesser or greater degree, but as interrelated forces that dynamically inform and rearticulate one another.[92] Culture does not mean the same thing in these three contexts because its place within overall PD strategies is different. These three approaches inform us that universal definitions of PD miss the point; just as PD promotes substantively different cultures, it also upholds them within foreign and cultural ministries.

What does this tell us about PD and the European project? First, competition lies at the heart of the PD policies of these three nations. Collaboration may be part of the strategy, but even collaboration has a competitive edge. Second, this appears to be taking the form of spheres of influence; spheres with some historical basis, but perhaps more importantly with a focus upon earning the consent and trust of emerging economies. This underscores the importance of collaboration with external powers for the long-term stability of European growth. Third, it tells us that these nations are using multiple forms of communication in support of their goals, and attempting to coordinate their usage to maximize returns. Cultural and political differences become the basis for brands, which discipline and focus national promotional actors. Fourth, these practices are moving faster than PD theory. The banking crisis appears to have pushed PD practice out of the open and exploratory "new public diplomacy" phase and into an area in which traditional distinctions between components are becoming uncertain. The overall articulation of components within a coordinated PD strategy is therefore a key issue. Together, this points to a sense in which PD is being bent into a potential solution to the crisis in each of these countries. There are similarities and differences, but for each country, PD is perceived as a means for managing globalization, and supporting growth and recovery.

Notes

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CHAPTER THREE

New Members' Public Diplomacy

Beata Ociepka

Introduction

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union (EU) symbolize the EU's shift to the east. They brought in 12 new member countries, including ten former communist states—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—constituting a region named Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This chapter focuses on the former communist countries (it does not cover Cyprus and Malta, which also joined the EU in 2004). Their public diplomacy (PD) makes a suitable object for analysis for four main reasons. First, the countries are newcomers to PD, as it was the EU accession process—and in some cases joining NATO[1]—that triggered the work on their strategies in this field, thus providing the study with a clear starting point. Second, the fact that these countries underwent the transition process to democracy after 1989 is reflected in their foreign policy strategies and their approach to PD. Transition to democracy should thus be defined as an important context for the analysis. Third, their PD—the countries are small or medium sized—has been strongly shaped by geopolitics, particularly by their relations with big neighbors. The trend has so far been reflected in their inclination to "bandwagon" in international relations. Fourth, marketing communication, branding, and public relations within the sphere of business, trade, and political communication on the internal stage preceded realization of the importance of using PD externally.

The group of countries is not homogenous, but the fact that they underwent transition to democracy at the same time and decided to join the EU results in the expectation that they will respond by similar means to the logic of the new international environment. PD will be one of these responses. Many similarities are anticipated in the concepts and strategies of PD in the region.

Focusing on the cases of new EU members, this chapter analyses PD as a tool aimed at positioning the countries within the European and transatlantic community, implemented to set the agenda of public debate, and to introduce the CEE countries' perspectives to the European discourse in order to gain visibility in international politics. In the process of implementation, CEE countries define their soft power assets. PD became a tool of governing and was used for the purpose of influencing public opinion abroad. The newcomers' PD also reflects the efforts of governments and nonstate actors to adjust to the logic of a networked society and globalization.

The development of PD in the majority of CEE countries was preceded by country branding, which was implemented with the purpose of achieving international visibility and to convince the Western public, during accession to the EU and while joining NATO, that the newcomers were not different from them.[2] The next step led to early strategies of PD, including the reorganization of ministries of foreign affairs. Not all of the countries developed structures and strategies of PD, but all now use the tools of PD.

Before the 2004 EU enlargement the countries represented a strong Eastern European identity that was seen as separated from the identity of the Western part of the EU. Shortly before the 2004 accession, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld named the former communist EU candidates "new Europe"[3] when all of them were included in the list of countries supportive of the United States' "coalition of the willing" during the intervention of Iraq.[4] Rumsfeld's "new Europe" reflected one of the cleavages among European countries and became relevant as it symbolized the different identity of Eastern Europeans and their willingness to support the United States. Since then, separation of the "new" from the "old Europe" has returned as an indication of a real or imaginary conflict within the EU, or as a symbol of difficulties in fostering a European identity. It stands also for a "soft bandwagoning" strategy, which CEE countries implemented in transatlantic relations. This concept explains the importance of "soft" strategies in the foreign policy of small and medium-sized states that lack military power and cannot rely on their economic power.

The West–East contradiction has been gradually deprived of ground since 2004 as Eastern Europe has come of age. Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia joined the monetary union and by the end of 2011 four new members had held the EU presidency. The regional Eastern and Central European identification within the EU weakened and the will to cooperate within a newcomer's group—as in the Visegrad Group—was fading. At the same time, the Eastern enlargements brought Western societies together, as was visible between Germany and the Netherlands. Both societies realized they shared the same values of "old" Europe when compared with the "others" from Eastern Europe. The Eastern "otherness" resulted in low acceptance for immigration and gave birth to a new wave

of antimigration populist movements, as in the Netherlands. For the CEE countries, negative media coverage, for example of Polish and Romanian *Gastarbeiter* in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,[5] created a new problem for their foreign image policy.[6] Finally, the financial crisis after 2008 left the new members that had not joined the monetary union outside the future decision center, again strengthening their newcomers' identity and evoking old fears of a two-speed EU.

The cultural and international (external) identities of CEE countries are decisive for their understanding of PD. The new ex-communist members are small or medium-sized countries, with large diasporas in the United States, Western Europe, and in neighboring countries. None of their languages plays a role as a language of wider communication. Three of the countries—constituting the Baltic States—had belonged to the Soviet Union, and so Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia strive against an image of post-Soviet republics. Small and medium-sized countries, as in CEE, are particularly inclined to adopt the soft-power means to improve their image abroad in order to facilitate achievement of their foreign policy goals—these findings have been confirmed by the works of Jozef Bátora,[7] and Mark Leonard and Andrew Small,[8] and with regard to the Czech Republic by Jana Peterkova.[9] PD is thus implemented as a means of making up for their lack of hard-power resources. As the core problem of small and medium-sized new members is their international invisibility, their branding strategy is aimed at capturing attention. In foreign policy these actors choose so-called niche diplomacy, including democracy promotion in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, and "diaspora diplomacy," because of the need to specialize and because it responds better to their limited resources.[10] J. Peterkova also stresses the importance of small countries' ability to cooperate with other actors as essential for their soft power.[11] Regional cooperation among small and medium-sized states contributes to their credibility.

Geopolitics plays an important role for the ex-communist states' PD, which concentrates on EU countries as their main target. In Poland, meanwhile, transatlantic relations have hardly lost any importance after Poland joined NATO in 1999. For Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, geopolitics focuses their PD on Russia.[12] Their attitude to their big neighbor affects the countries' image, for they have been perceived as Russophobe Western neophytes within the EU.[13] Living in fear of Russian energy cut-offs contributed greatly to this perception after their accession and explains their focus on energy security within the EU. As a consequence of the Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis in 2008 and 2009, for example, Poland introduced EU energy security into the priorities of the presidency of the European Council in 2011. At least some of the political elites in the Baltic States and Poland—such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland—still warn of Russian imperial politics. Distancing themselves from Russia thus became one of the main methods for rebuilding their image. Polish engagement in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004

and support for Georgia during its war with Russia in 2008 conflicted with Russian interests in the near abroad. Relations to Russia thus have an impact on adopting strategies such as "soft bandwagoning" with the United States during the Iraq intervention in 2003,[14] which explains the countries' strong transatlantic orientation and are reflected in the region's PD practice.

The Polish case draws attention to Germany as the second country of relevance in geopolitical terms, because Germany is Poland's main trading partner and investor. Germany's position within the EU and its economic power focus the newcomers' economic diplomacy on the country. For Poland, however, and to some extent for the Czech Republic, Germany also plays a decisive role in the "foreign politics of memory," which is an essential part of their PD. In Poland, the German neighborhood has played a role as a factor in election campaigns, mobilizing voters on the ground over fears of Germany that stem from their conflicting history and possible property claims in western and northeastern parts of Poland, which belonged to Germany before 1945.

Simultaneously, geopolitics influences the CEE countries' position in cross-border communication. The new EU members were recipients of US and Western European messages and before the fall of the Iron Curtain they belonged to the Soviet informational empire. Velvet revolutions did not change their role as informational peripheries. The diversity of their languages contributes to their peripheral position. Yet a middle-sized country such as Poland, striving for the position of a "middle power" in European politics, has an opportunity to play the role of an informational neighbor in relation to smaller CEE states and to improve its position in international communication by implementing television and radio media for democracy promotion. For example, Poland incorporated asymmetric international broadcasting as a tool of PD, with neoauthoritarian Belarus as a target country, when it launched radio and television stations (Belsat TV) aimed at the Belarusian audience.[15]

A geopolitical perspective thus provides a frame for PD strategies in this region, explains the adoption of "soft bandwagoning," and determines the target countries. It is also responsible for the inclusion of the foreign politics of memory into the new EU members' PD strategy.

The Importance of Branding

During the early phase of their transition to democracy, CEE countries implemented country branding to overcome their invisibility and receive recognition in the international community. Branding in the region must be seen in a wide perspective, as it reflects the processes of rebuilding national identities and repositioning the countries internationally. As such, it has had an important domestic dimension and sheds light on diverging approaches to self-identification.

Country branding was a new discipline for CEE countries, stemming both from public relations—as implemented in business and trade—and from social scientists' research on the public sphere and public opinion. In some approaches, it is seen as the outcome of Western normative power in CEE. Adopting neoliberalism was symbolized by the impact that Western advisers in public relations and place branding (such as Wally Olins and Simon Anholt) had on developments in the region.[16]

Some research done on CEE countries reveals the close relationship of branding to the redefinition of nationhood in the early period of transformation.[17] Transition countries then shared many similar problems in their efforts to reshape their image abroad. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia were new states when they regained or gained independence after 1989; Czechoslovakia split in 1991. The new country brand thus reflected the redefined national identity. Branding was also implemented to make the countries more distinguishable, as in the Baltic region. Baltic Sea countries based their new identity and country-branding campaigns on the concept of Nordic European hubs. The cases of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia illustrate the attempts to overcome the heritage of the Soviet Union in the Baltic region. Rebranding the countries meant stressing their Nordic (northeast in the case of Lithuania), Scandinavian, European identity as opposed to their post-Soviet, Baltic identity.[18] In this context, Estonia joining the monetary union marks a milestone. Distancing themselves from their Baltic identity is countered with the deep engagement of cooperation of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) countries, which gained a new speed after 2004.[19] It should not be overlooked that Baltic Sea cooperation, as with other regional networks, contributed greatly to the inclusion of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the international community after the Soviet Union's collapse, and secured for them the perception of reliable partners in regional networks.

The first branding campaigns in the region confronted the domestic public with the idea of European integration and the inevitable impact of the process on cultural identity. Still, branding efforts provoked discussions in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—in Poland and Hungary the discussions took place in 2000, because of presentations of both countries during the Hannover Millennium Expo; in Bulgaria discussions took place because of the 2002 Brussels Festival Europalia[20]—confronting an understanding of tradition with the anticipated results of European integration, which was seen as a modernization process, bringing with itself new social patterns and a new organizational culture. Slovenia—like other Balkan states—also introduced branding in the course of redefining its national identity (advised by Simon Anholt). Estonia launched the first efforts to brand itself in about 2000, advised by Interbrand, soon deciding to attract the attention of external publics as an IT nation.[21] Lithuania started its first branding campaign in 2006,[22] advised by Saffron and Wally Olins, who also advised Poland in 2004. Latvia relied on Simon Anholt's expertise

(in 2007), but in this case the implementation of country branding was preceded by an attempt to coordinate the efforts of government agencies in the field, as discussed by the Latvian ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in 2002 in a document named *Basic Principles of External Communication, 2002–2005*.[23]

Place and country branding won enormous popularity in the region as a result of the misguided belief that political marketing methods used internally—as during election campaigns—would work in the international environment. Analysis of basic documents on the priorities of CEE foreign policy shows that new EU members are still very much concerned about their image abroad and are conscious of the need for a foreign image policy.[24] New country brands have been permanently compared with "old" Europe as a target region and at the same time as a model of democratic and wealthy states—as "new" Europe would like to become. Having an eye on country branding in the region thus contributes to the understanding of their identity and reflects the attitude of their society to modernization.

New EU members of the 2004 enlargement achieved a rather positive image thanks to their economic performance (after the first shock of 2008, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia made impressive efforts) and newly gained political stability.[25] Now they continue their efforts while using the methods learned during the transformation and by implementing their soft-power tools to foster democratic change eastwards. The countries are no longer marginal in diplomatic terms. Former recipients of international propaganda campaigns and PD have now become communicators in their own right. At the same time, however, the countries of the 2007 enlargement—Bulgaria and Romania—suffer from predominating negative coverage that stresses corruption and organized crime.[26]

The public in the whole region remains very concerned with national image. Some countries, like Poland and Romania, were persecuted with an image of a cart pulled by a horse, symbolizing the poor development of their rural areas, in the run-up to joining the EU.[27] The picture suited their image as dark and gloomy places and the opinion about their agricultural sector as backward. Branding was supposed to reverse negative stereotypes and present the countries as destinations worthy of a visit.[28] It also played an important internal role, improving the self-image of the societies, while stressing their European identity and expressing their Euro-euphoria.

As Zala Volčič states, branding might thus be understood as "part of a 'commercial nationalism.'"[29] The persisting popularity of branding in the majority of the region's countries might be explained by the process of (re) definition of national identity, which was one of the most relevant issues after the collapse of communism and was followed by reshaping images of countries.

Structures: State and Nongovernmental

Nation branding was developed in the countries prior to PD and simultaneously with economic diplomacy, aiming to attract investors to the newly opened markets. The importance of economic diplomacy is reflected nowadays in the structures of the ministries of foreign affairs. Among the ten new EU member states, four have (as of 2012) departments of PD (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, and Romania), while four have departments of economic diplomacy (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The others have departments on information and communication, or public relations (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary have a PD and relations department within the ministry of public administration and justice).[30] Structures responsible for PD within governments reflect the attempts to coordinate the use of soft-power assets in foreign policy. One good example is the Council for the Promotion of Poland, which integrates efforts by ministries that are involved in PD, promotion, and economic diplomacy.[31] The body is lead by the minister of foreign affairs.

The inclusion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in PD is a fact in the region. For example, a body established by the Polish minister of foreign affairs in 2003 was supposed to guarantee cooperation with Polish NGOs, but the ministers hardly managed to incorporate it into a consultation process, as contacts between the new ministry agency and NGOs were rare. As a response, NGOs in Poland launched a forum called Foreign Group (*Grupa Zagranica*)[32] in 2004, which represents them in cooperation with the Polish MFA.

Although some of the countries created PD departments and the term "public diplomacy" is present in official MFA documents and speeches, it does not mean automatically that any coherent strategies of PD exist in the region. Still, PD tools are included in more general strategies of foreign policy. New EU members are focused on cooperation within the EU and on regional cooperation, with neighboring or associated countries, such as Ukraine and countries in the western Balkans.

The capability to cooperate provides the main advantage and is one of the core values, essential for the countries' new image. Regional cooperation started very early, replacing former communist chains of subordination to the Soviet Union. During the initial phase of transformation, the idea of *Mitteleuropa* was evoked, as both a concept for possible cooperation and a symbol of the German threat to CEE.[33] The ex-communist countries managed to focus on the creative power of *Mitteleuropa*, abandoning old fears disturbing any form of cooperation. For example, in 1989 the Central European Initiative was launched; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have constituted the Visegrad group since 1991; countries bordering the Baltic Sea are members of organizations of Baltic countries; the Danube strategy is supposed to link EU countries with neighbors

along the River Danube. Bulgaria's and Romania's involvement in initiatives for the western Balkans is one of their major foreign policy priorities, as well as Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Poland is a member of the Weimar Triangle with Germany and France, a rather symbolic network, with the goal in the beginning to achieve German–Polish reconciliation, taking the French–German case as a model, and then to include Poland in European politics. Slovenia announced building the European perspective of the western Balkans' countries as a priority of the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the EU in 2008.[34] Hungary and Poland promoted the Eastern Partnership in the same context. The idea behind these initiatives covers support for integration as well as inclusion of the EU's neighbors into regional cooperation, in order to achieve stabilization and prosperity in the region. As such, it reflects one of the dimensions of EU structural foreign policy. The Eastern Partnership is the first Polish initiative within the EU (with Sweden), proving the ability to cooperate, and illustrating an attempt to make the EU look eastwards. Belarus as a target country must be seen in this context as a difficult test case for PD, with emphasis placed on attracting Belarusian society to core values represented by EU countries. The Ukrainian case—as Ukrainians seem more attracted by the Russian than by the Western model—illustrates the failure of European normative power.

CEE countries implement their transitional know-how in the fields of economics and politics to promote democracy. This is one of the prospective and promising fields for their PD, which is present in the major foreign policy priorities of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia were targeted for democracy promotion before accession, and in recent years the target group has been included within the Eastern Partnership. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland have aimed their development cooperation at Afghanistan (Poland also at the Palestinian Authority since 2005). With the Arab Spring and the fact that Hungary and Poland presided over the Council of the EU in 2011, the CEE countries have also been faced with the transitions in Arab countries. During its EU presidency, Poland started to share democratic best practices with Egypt and Tunisia. The concept of promoting democracy in Africa is strongly supported by Polish NGOs, which have been criticizing Polish governments for some years now for their very limited interest in development aid, particularly for Africa. With the Arab Spring and Polish presidency in 2011, the trend seemed to be reversed, but as Marek Dąbrowski commented:

> Many politicians and experts, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, suggest that their Arab colleagues should learn from the post-communist transition of the early 1990s. However, while learning from others' experience is always a useful exercise, the geopolitical and socioeconomic context of the Arab revolution appears to be different, in many respects, from that of former Soviet bloc countries more than twenty years ago.[35]

Still, Polish NGOs continue the efforts, offering training for researchers and politicians from Egypt and Tunisia. The Polish MFA started talks with Al Jazeera in 2011 on presenting the experiences of the Polish transition to democracy in television programs.[36]

"Worthy or Not, Hungary Takes Over Presidency"

This quotation comes from a Reuters' commentary of January 2, 2011, the beginning of the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the EU. The year 2011 was pronounced as a year of Eastern Europe in the EU, as two new member countries from the East—Hungary and Poland—took over the presidency of the Council. The presidency country, which hosts the six-month rotating presidency, coordinates work within the Council of the EU and determines the agendas. For the new members of the EU, the presidency—although deprived of much of its influence by the Treaty of Lisbon—symbolizes their ultimate inclusion into the European Community—it stands for a symbolic act of "returning to Europe." While conducting the presidency for the first time, newcomers stage it to an important event at home and abroad.

The presidency has, among other purviews, agenda-setting powers and an opportunity to position the new members within the EU. The experiences of Slovenia (2008) and the Czech Republic (2009) were of much importance for the PD strategies of the other CEE countries. In Slovenia, the presidency gave a stimulus to developing a national brand campaign with a domestic dimension.[37] Domestic politics have now twice interfered with new EU members performing the presidency. The quotation above from Reuters about Hungary displays concern over Hungary's situation at the beginning of the presidency, as Hungary gained negative media coverage because of new media laws allowing governmental control over media and the fining of editors and publishers according to very unclear rules. On January 2, 2011, international media linked the Hungarian EU presidency to strong critiques of the new media law, which was intended to restrict freedom of the press in Hungary.[38]

During the Czech presidency, the incumbent party lost power and new elections were pronounced, contributing to lack of political stability. The Czech presidency attracted media coverage because of the motto "*We will sweeten Europe—We match Europe*" and the initial cultural event, which was a sculptural presentation based on controversial national stereotypes of EU member countries.[39] The Czech scenario was perceived as a pessimistic example for the Polish presidency, as—according to its political calendar—Poland also held parliamentary elections in 2011. However, the political campaign did not disturb its presidency and, for the European public, this provided proof of Poland as a politically stable partner.

The four EU presidencies prove the importance of the domestic dimension of PD. Some of the CEE countries implemented public relations to

explain foreign policy goals to domestic audiences. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia all included campaigns aimed at their country's public about the communication strategy of their presidencies. It was relevant to present the major priorities to the domestic public and to work on political consensus at home (this was supposed to be one of the major difficulties during the political campaign before Poland's elections in 2011).[40] The presidency as a European event gives impetus to the work on new EU members' PD strategy and contributes to the creation of brands. The impact of the presidency—taking into account the difference of scale—is in this case similar to the process of accession. In Poland, the presidency was accompanied by external and internal programs of cultural events (*I Culture*). It was prepared and conducted with nonstate actors, and provided a unique opportunity for the development of modes of cooperation with NGOs within the frame of public and cultural diplomacy.

Still, the presidencies of the new EU member states hardly pushed forward elaboration on a common approach to the EU strategy of PD. They were instead very much focused on country brands and strengthening the position of the country, which responds well to the primary goals of new member states' PD, but at the same time reveals lack of consciousness for the need for a common EU strategy in the field. In 2011, the presidencies were held by two countries from outside the eurozone, thus confronting the problem of their marginalization in European policy, which PD cannot be implemented to resolve.

International Broadcasting: Former Recipients Become Communicators

From the perspective of political communication research, PD is a strategy of international political communication that is adopted by democratic countries with open media systems. PD materializes as a choice of the strategy of international communication, following branding and public relations. There is evidence from Latvia and Slovenia that a public relations strategy was implemented in Eastern Europe both to explain and enable the process of acceptance of privatization, and to "reintroduce" the countries abroad.[41] Skills learnt from Western actors implementing public relations were used for domestic and foreign political purposes.

The fate of invisibility explains the new EU member states' focus on attracting international media attention and using it for country promotion. This explains why the promotional effect of the presidency of the Council of the EU is thus not overlooked, if not overestimated. The presidency gives new member states the opportunity to help set the agenda of European politics and of the media covering European politics. For the same reasons, new EU members stage events for joining the monetary union (Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia) and cultural or sport events. In

respect to this, Estonia was quite successful at the beginning of 2011 in gaining positive coverage from European media in stressing prospects for Estonia's growing economy and effective cuts in the state's budget. At the same time, the media reported on Tallinn as the European Capital of Culture in 2011.[42] Estonia implemented a kind of interdisciplinary strategy, as the introduction of the new currency was linked with a major event in European cultural life.

Belsat TV

Overestimation of the publicity dimension of presidencies and other EU events results from the experiences of former communist countries in the international flow of information before and after the Velvet revolutions. All the countries were recipients of Western and American PD messages from the period of informational PD.[43] They classified them as hostile propaganda, although the classification was not shared by all citizens who used to search for political news while listening to Voice of America (VoA) or the BBC. Based on its own experience as a recipient of democracy promotion campaigns, Poland launched a satellite television project called Belsat TV in 2007. The channel aims to compensate for the lack of uncensored information sources in Belarus. The channel is financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and broadcasts from Warsaw as a member of Polish public service television TVP. The program reaches up to 23 percent (as of December 2010) of Belarusian society via satellite dishes. It gained much publicity during the 2010 presidential elections in Belarus. Its viewers—according to surveys undertaken by Zerkalo-Info agency—were seeking alternative sources of information on politics.[44]

There are also two radio stations broadcasting from Poland, supported by the Polish MFA and the EU (Radio Racja, and European Radio for Belarus). Television and radio for Belarus follows the idea of American and Western European radio stations during the Cold War, operating for social change in authoritarian systems. However, because of the cultural identity of Belarusian society, the majority of whom speak Russian (and Belsat broadcasts in Belarusian), Russian media seem to hold more appeal. The European model hardly preserves its normative power in this context. Although Belsat stands out as an important tool of Polish PD, the station is recognized as Polish by only 13.9 percent of viewers.[45] Although functional in democracy promotion, and while providing alternative information on politics to Belarusian sources, Belsat promulgates the core values of the EU—such as democracy and freedom of the press—but at the same time is dysfunctional at branding Poland.

Cultural Diplomacy and the Foreign Politics of Memory

Cynthia Schneider describes PD as "all a nation does to explain itself to the world."[46] It might therefore be understood as the narration that the society presents abroad—the story the society has to tell the world—filtered through the political goals of the country, government, or incumbent political party. National versions of PD give insight into how societies translate their culture while using the means of international communication and cultural diplomacy.

Cultural Institutes Abroad

Historically, the countries of CEE have been involved in international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy at least since the end of the First World War. Poland established its first cultural institutes abroad before the Second World War. Some of them—as in Budapest—still operate, since 1994 as a network of institutes named Polish Institutes, under the umbrella of the Polish MFA. The small new EU member states place much emphasis on cultural diplomacy as one of their main means of both rebranding and PD efforts. Some use their cultural establishments abroad for this purpose, such as the Bulgarian Cultural Institutes, Czech Centers, Estonian Institutes, Hungarian Cultural Institutes, Romania Cultural Institutes, and Slovak Institutes.[47] Others support cultural institutes at home, enabling them for the tasks of cultural diplomacy (such as Poland's Adam Mickiewicz Institute and the Latvian Institute). Although drafted after Western European models, the cultural institutes of CEE countries have different goals, as they are less focused on teaching languages than *Alliance Française*, the British Council, or *Goethe Institut*. The CEE countries' languages do not play a role comparable to French, English, and German, as reflected in their institutes' role in cultural and PD.

The specific cases of the Baltic states, Poland, and Hungary rest on the importance of the narration of history in their foreign policy strategy. New EU member states, as well as the other Eastern European countries, stress the exclusion of the Eastern European experience from the mainstream European memory.[48] This exclusion is one of the results of Europe's pre-1989 bipolar system. PD strategies and the foreign policy priorities of new EU member states should convince us of the importance of "politics of memory," perceived as the agenda of the state in the region. The inclusion of Eastern European history frames into the mainstream in Europe is emphasized as an essential precondition for shaping the European identity. History frames might be expected to be potentially

counterproductive to any concept of EU PD, as new member states neither share the same frames of narration on history, nor learn to build a coherent message together on their diverse narrations.

The foreign politics of memory illustrate well the new EU societies' difficulties in explaining their identity internationally and translating their culture into the narratives of target countries in order to gain support. This applies specifically to relations with Russia. For some of the countries, the need to promulgate their interpretation of history might dominate their PD strategies, in the expectation that foreign publics would also be very much focused on history. This expectation was visible in Poland in 2005–2007, when the governing conservative party defined the foreign politics of memory as one of Poland's three PD priorities,[49] and at the same moment abandoned the previous government's plans for rebranding Poland. The focus on the past and the "proper" understanding of the Central and Eastern vision of history was very discernible during the European Parliament's term following Poland's 2004 accession (the first term for members from the CEE). Representatives of new EU member states consciously introduced information on historical events and their celebrations to the routine of the European Parliament's meetings in order to include the history of Eastern Europe in the European narration.[50]

The politics of memory also reveals differences in branding and PD, as understood in the region. Lithuania has not yet developed any PD strategy, but consequently implements the concept for a country brand, as developed by Saffron. According to this strategy, Lithuania's glorious past should be included in the message. Still, the document on branding Lithuania distinguishes the dilemmas of "heavy moments" in Lithuania's past:

> There is a long history of tolerance here, especially regarding Jews (Vilna having been the Jerusalem of the north and so on). But this is not something Lithuania is currently able to get full credit for, because it has not satisfactorily ironed out the reputational problems it got caught up in as a result of the World War II.[51]

The quotation illustrates the differences in approach to history of branding and PD. Branding, while constructing the message, simplifies in order to sell the country as a brand. A PD strategy would concentrate on explaining the "reputational problems" and resolving the problem, while introducing symmetric communication tools such as, for example, supporting cultural and academic exchange. Branding silences controversies, while PD tries to build on them by involving nongovernmental organizations.

New members' foreign politics of memory—as in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Hungary—have a geopolitical dimension. In the Polish case, this relates to Germany and Russia.[52] These politics are hardly a success, as there is a conflict of memories not only between new members and their big neighbor Russia, but also between the "new" and

"old" Europe, and among CEE countries themselves. It also confirms the expectation that narration on history is hardly translatable. Nevertheless, there are some positive cases supporting the idea of the significant role of nongovernmental actors in PD, such as the Polish–Russian Group on Difficult Matters, which since 2008 (the Group was launched in 2002 but did not achieve any success before new members from nongovernmental organizations were nominated in 2007) has elaborated on Polish–Russian conflict history. The Group has already contributed to reducing tensions in bilateral relations and attracted attention eastwards as a model for other small and medium-sized countries bordering Russia.[53]

The importance of cultural inheritance for the understanding of PD and its goals and the clash between the political dimension of PD and the logic of branding (implemented as the first tool or instead of a more complex strategy of PD) thus becomes visible. The politics of memory is linked to branding, as rebranding the nations (whether Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, or Slovaks) reflected redefinition of their national identity. The abandoned branding campaigns in Poland ("*Creative Tension*," by Wally Olins, which was abandoned in 2005) and Hungary (the Country Image Center, abandoned in 2002) reflect the cleavages in society on the understanding of national identity. These cleavages also contribute to contradictions in elaborating on a PD strategy. Modernity fights with tradition; a pro-European stance with a national–conservative position.

Conclusion: The Emerging Model of a New Public Diplomacy from the New Members' Perspective

Although PD is not a new term, nowadays it has gained a new understanding. New EU member states' PD results from adopting the means of strategic communication and the strong belief in the importance of images, building international identity, and promulgating the country's values abroad. The CEE countries' new PD priorities in many respects reflect their location and illustrate a clash of the neorealist focus on geopolitics and attention given to the perception of the country and its society in the international community, responding to the constructivist understanding of international relations. PD implementation makes a shift to modernization in the field of foreign policy, and at the same time means accepting the logic of mediated political communication internationally. The models for developing a PD strategy in the region diverge. Identity and visibility problems force the countries to implement branding as the first tool. Nongovernmental organizations are included at this stage in elaborating on promotion strategies. In the Polish case, they played the role of go-between for the MFA and business.

Work on PD strategies follows rather the centralized model, as hardly any public consultations were traced during research, whereas the EU as such would need the fragmented, inclusive model. New EU member states would have difficulties giving up their newly gained visibility within and thanks to the EU while contributing to an EU PD strategy. The high symbolic value of the EU presidency relates more to the benefits for a country's reputation than for the good of the EU. The EU's fiscal crisis created a new context for the CEE member states' PD, and in fact was counterproductive for the efforts of countries outside the eurozone to gain more impact on European policy while implementing their soft-power tools.

PD is adopted as a result of the need to coordinate the efforts of economic and cultural diplomacy and rebranding of the countries. Whereas restructuring and the integration of state and nongovernmental agencies has not yet been finished, Estonia and Poland have achieved positive effects in implementing country branding within the EU. New institutions and modes of cooperation have been established step-by-step. The background to the process of adopting new strategies of international communication is made by public discourse in the countries on their national identity, national history, and statehood—basic questions after regaining sovereignty and the creation of a public sphere.

The newcomers' PD strategies are prone to lack of continuation, however, as internal political conflicts between political parties and changing governments often hamper the follow-up of launched campaigns. Despite the development of civil society in the CEE region, it is the government that plays the role of the main communicator, just as in the fields of cultural diplomacy and foreign politics of memory. Nevertheless, the model includes NGOs. Democracy promotion gradually becomes a niche in which new members specialize, as well as the European Neighborhood Policy with eastern neighbors and the western Balkans as the main target audiences. There is an expectation that Poland's engagement in Egypt and Tunisia might broaden the list of target countries with regard to democracy promotion. The Arab Spring and the CEE countries' engagement in Afghanistan might also contribute to the development of a global context of European PD, which is underestimated in CEE.

Notes

1. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004.
2. It should not be overlooked that evoking affinity is not the main idea of branding, which builds on a country's exceptional qualities. Giving a country a brand means, in this chapter, making it recognizable by positive values of the people; places where they live; products they provide; and politics they conduct. Public diplomacy is thus seen as wider than branding in defining its goals.

3. See "Outrage at 'Old Europe' Remarks," *BBC World News* (January 23, 2003), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/.
4. A. Grigorescu, "East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: The Choice between 'Soft Balancing' and 'Soft Bandwagoning,'" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41 (2008): 282.
5. F. Barton, "The New Britons," *Daily Mail* (May 18, 2006), *Mailonline*, at www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-386567/; and F. Barton "Polish Workers: Help or Hindrance?," *BBC*, online at www.co.uk/Kent/content/articles/2006/12/11 (accessed December 13 2012).
6. Such as Geert Wilders and the PVV party in the Netherlands. See J. Bartlett, J. Birdwell, and S. de Lange, "The Rise of Populism in Europe Can Be Traced Through Online Behaviour," *Populism in Europe: Netherlands* (London: Demos, 2012), 22, available at www.demos.co.uk, (accessed December 20 2012).
7. J. Bátora, "Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-sized States: Norway and Canada," *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005), 97.
8. M. Leonard and A. Small, *Norwegian Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2003).
9. J. Peterkova, "Actual Development of Czech Public Diplomacy," paper presented at the ISA Conference, New Orleans (2010).
10. Bátora, "Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-sized States," 7.
11. Peterkova, "Actual Development of Czech Public Diplomacy," 3.
12. A.W. Malgin, "Stosunki między Polską a Rosją po 1990 r." [Relations between Poland and Russia after 1990], in *Białe plamy, czarne plamy: Sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918–2008)* [*White Stains, Black Stains: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations*], ed. A. D. Rotfeld and A.W. Torkunow (Warsaw: PISM, 2010), 696.
13. In 2007, M. Leonard and N. Popescu, while characterizing EU members' attitude to Russia, included Poland and Lithuania into a group of "new cold warriors." Since then, bilateral relations have improved. See M. Leonard and N. Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations," *ECFR Policy Paper* (November 2007), online at www.ecfr.eu.
14. A. Grigorescu, "East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War," 287.
15. See online at www.belsat.eu.
16. J. E. Grunig and L. Grunig, "The Role of Public Relations in Transitional Societies," in *Introducing Market Economy Institutions and Instruments: The Role of Public Relations in Transition Economies*, ed. R. Ławniczak (Warsaw: Piar.pl, Poznań, 2005), 4–5.
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18. G. Szondi, "Filary zarządzania reputacją: dyplomacja publiczna w Europie Wschodniej z perspektywy public relations" [Pillars of Reputation Management: Public Diplomacy in Eastern Europe from the Public Relations Perspective], in *Dyplomacja publiczna* [Public Diplomacy], ed. B. Ociepka (Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008), 83.
19. BaltMetPromo, "Place Branding and Place Promotion Efforts in the Baltic Sea Region: A Situation Analysis" (October 2010), available at www.baltmetpromo.net (accessed October 10 2012).
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21. BaltMetPromo, "Place Branding and Place Promotion Efforts in the Baltic Sea Region," 10 and 41.

22. The first Lithuanian campaign was launched in 1918, in order to achieve recognition by the United States. Lithuania was advised at that time by Edward L. Bernays. See J. E. Grunig, "Public Relations and International Affairs: Effects, Ethics and Responsibility," *Journal of International Affairs*, 1 (1993): 137–62.
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24. The concept of foreign image policy was derived from the article by Reiner Hülsse, "The Catwalk Power: Germany's New Foreign Image Policy," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12 (2009): 293. The MFA documents included in the analysis are: Bulgaria: Mission and Strategic Goals, www.mfa.bg/en/; Czech Report on the Foreign Policy (2009); *Koncepce zahranični politiky České Republiky* (April 28, 2011), www.mzv.cz; Estonian Foreign Ministry: Mission, Vision, Values, www.vm.ee; Hungarian Strategy of Foreign Policy: Hungary's Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency at the Council of the European Union 2011 www.mfa.gov.hu; Latvia's Foreign Policy Guidelines 2006–2010, www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy; Lithuanian Diplomacy in 2009–2012, www.urm.lt; *Kierunki promocji Polski do 2015*; Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016, www.msz.gov.pl; Key Policy Areas, www.mae.ro/en; Slovak Foreign Policy Guidelines 2011, www.foreign.gov.sk; and Slovenian Foreign Policy, www.mzz.gov.si/en.
25. In 2012, according to a special issue on nation brands, Poland achieved the highest progress of 74 percent in a year, being placed as the twentieth most valuable nation brand; see *Brand Finance Journal* (August 2012), online at www.brandfinance.com/docs, accessed September 10 2012.
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29. Z. Volčič, "Branding Slovenia: 'You Can't Spell Slovenia Without Love . . .,'" in *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the "New" Europe*, ed. N. Kaneva (London: Routledge, 2012), 148.
30. See online at www.kosmany.hu/en/ministry-of-public-administration-and-justice (accessed January 5, 2013).
31. See online at www.msz.gov.pl.
32. See online at http://zagranica.org.pl/en.
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34. See online at www.eu2008.si.
35. M. Dąbrowski, "What Can Arab Countries Learn from the Post-Communist Transition?," *MEDPRO Commentary* (May 31, 2012).
36. The seminars are financed by the MFA in the framework of support for Polish public diplomacy initiatives: "Democratic transition in Tunisia and Polish experiences" (July 27, 2011); and "Egyptian researchers on training at the IPA" (November 20, 2012). See Institute of Public Affairs, online at www.isp.org.pl/aktualnosci, accessed November 30, 2012.

37. Volčič, "Branding Slovenia," 153.
38. "Worthy or Not, Hungary Takes Over Presidency," Reuters (January 2, 2011); "Hungary Takes EU Helm," *Business Week* (January 2, 2011); "Who Will Confront the Hatred in Hungary?," *Observer* (January 2, 2011); and "Hungary Takes Over the EU Presidency Amid Controversy," *China Post* (January 2, 2011).
39. J. Peterkova, "EU2009.cz," paper presented at the conference Soft Power in International Relations, University of Wrocław (November 2010).
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41. Grunig and Grunig, "The Role of Public Relations in Transitional Societies," 17.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Public Diplomacy's Domestic Dimension in the European Union

Ellen Huijgh*

Introduction

Philosopher Jürgen Habermas struck a chord in his oft-cited speech "*Ein Pakt für oder gegen Europa*?" ("A Pact For or Against Europe?").[1] He criticized political elites for the incapacitation of Europe's citizens and pleaded in favor of switching from the present mode of administration to one entailing greater participation by Europe's citizens. His critique fits within a broader discourse on civil society participation and democratic legitimacy in European Union (EU) governance. Advocates of "democratic legitimacy," such as scholars of the public sphere, have oriented their research toward the EU political system. Civil participation is seen as a remedy to the perceived crisis of EU legitimacy.[2]

While Habermas's critique needs to be put into this perspective, it should not be considered a purely philosophical matter. Constitutional referendums and today's austere climate make the EU's tenuous situation in terms of public support all the more clear. Recent opinion polls underscore that what began in recent history as a sovereign debt crisis has ignited a full-blown crisis of public confidence in the benefits of European economic integration, the euro, EU membership, and the EU's future.[3]

The EU, however, has not turned a blind eye to this precarious situation, and is trying to remedy it. The building-sized flag "It's about Europe, It's about you: join the debate" located near the EU Headquarters on the Place Shuman in Brussels is just a small indication of the initiatives being undertaken as part of the European Year of Citizens 2013 to encourage dialogue among government levels, civil society, and business about Europe.[4] These efforts are not limited to a single year. The EU has delivered on attempts to rethink its citizen-involvement strategies and has launched several participatory initiatives over the years.[5] Another recent

attempt to "bring Europe closer to its citizens" is the "European Citizens Initiative," launched in April 2012. In the words of Maroš Šefčovič, vice-president and European commissioner for Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration:

> The European Citizens Initiative will introduce a whole new form of participatory democracy to the EU. It is a major step forward in the democratic life of the Union. It's a concrete example of bringing Europe closer to its citizens. And it will foster a cross border debate about what we are doing in Brussels and thus contribute, we hope, to the development of a real European public space.[6]

To what extent this initiative's rhetoric will outpace its operationalization remains murky. Whatever the outcome, lack of public support at home and abroad for policy choices and positions weakens self- and international legitimacy at all levels in the EU, not merely at the supranational level. At all levels, questions about citizens' engagement and domestic public support in the EU have become increasingly pertinent. In conjunction, the need to involve domestic citizens in broader (public) diplomacy projects and to see them as part of the concept, or public diplomacy's (PD's) domestic dimension, has also grown in importance.[7]

As (public) diplomacy theory has largely sprouted from practice, more can be learned about the domestic dimension through an empirical pursuit. Scholars have stressed the need for and the importance of empirical work and the accompanying conceptual implications.[8] This chapter is a further initiative to explore PD's domestic dimension empirically.[9]

While studies exist on diplomatic engagement by domestic citizens in the EU at these different levels, they focus on single case studies or intra-EU communication.[10] The case studies on EU member states' PD have also largely focused on the international side. Yet the EU presents a particularly interesting study for PD's international–domestic crossroads at its different levels. It comprises layers of traditional geopolitical sovereignty-based diplomatic rules challenged from above and below the nation-state, as well as more integrative collaborative forms of diplomatic practice with a public dimension. The EU is also characterized by a diverse constitution and the active role of its civil societies in international policy-making processes. Moreover, the blend of public involvement practices in the EU aimed at—sometimes identical—publics, which can be simultaneously domestic and foreign depending on the level of government, could also provide new avenues for PD study and broader reflection on more integrative and so-called intermestic (a blend of domestic–international) approaches.

In a nonexhaustive fashion, this chapter therefore investigates how PD's domestic dimension is currently experienced and practiced in the EU at the supranational level of the EU institution and at national and subnational government levels. The chapter is structured as follows: it

briefly outlines the conceptual framework; delves into the structures, policies, and practices of the domestic dimension; and then glances at the interplay between these levels around EU affairs and the challenges that accompany it.

In exploring the EU's domestic dimension, the chapter finds that differences among levels are dwarfed by their similarities. Regardless of level, and given coalescing views, more integrative approaches to public involvement are gradually gaining ground, but remain challenging to put into practice.

Demystifying the Domestic Dimension

Despite scholars and practitioners increasingly acknowledging its importance,[11] consideration of domestic citizens as part of the PD concept and project has been subject to dissent. Diverging opinions coexist and are coalescing. For some, the domestic dimension is a contradiction in terms; for others it is a precondition of successful PD abroad. These views derive from changes in and images of diplomacy, ensconced in different world perspectives.

A traditional (intergovernmental) image of diplomacy considers the domestic and international political environments to be separate. Public involvement is subordinate to core formal diplomatic tasks, with a hierarchical state-centered relationship between state and nonstate actors. Domestic and international publics are considered separate entities. They require different approaches serving different intents: "objective" informing of domestic constituencies through public affairs, versus influencing foreign publics through PD.[12]

In contrast, within a more globalist image of diplomacy, traditional diplomatic institutions and national sovereignty-based and geopolitical rules are pushed into the shadows by nonstate actors' role as producers of diplomacy. PD "for and by the people" is advocated—even idealized—in a globalized, mobilized world wherein domestic affairs become internationalized and vice versa. Nations become more diffuse and thus require cross-border approaches. Insulating domestic and foreign publics by separating "public affairs" from "public diplomacy" is considered counterproductive; yet merging them may also lead to diplomatic interference in domestic affairs, with fluid firewalls between diplomacy and domestic politics providing potential sources of conflict.[13]

Diplomacy scholars have recently drawn attention to a third, "integrative" image of diplomacy: a complex intermingling of old and new actors with multiple modes of interaction merging around various—sometimes conflicting—geopolitical and global policy agendas.[14] This integrative image backs up the significance of traditional diplomatic systems and processes, while recognizing the interface between domestic and international policy agendas and public arenas. Diplomats are considered both

internal coordinators and external boundary spanners in a more complex "intermestic" environment. In the selection of publics in diplomacy, the degree to which specific publics can become important partners and collaborators prevails over whether they are international or domestic.[15]

An integrative image of diplomacy requires thinking in terms of complementarities instead of compartments, including in its public dimension—not a new idea, but one that has grown more central. A more comprehensive approach combines internal and external, "old" and "new" PD practices. PD's international and domestic dimensions can thus be seen as a continuum of stepping stones leading to a more integrative approach to public involvement that is central to international policymaking and conduct. From an integrative view, the domestic dimension includes informational and network-relational practices implemented at varying speeds, which are logical steps in developing PD abroad.



Figure 4.1 The Public Involvement Continuum.

Source: Author's adapted figure applied to public diplomacy and based on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Citizens as Partner: OECD Handbook on Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policymaking* (Paris: OECD Publishing, October 2001); Amanda Sheedy, Mary Path MacKinnon, Sonia Pitre and Judy Watling, *Handbook on Citizen Engagement: Beyond Consultation* (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, March 2008); and IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum of the International Association of Public Participation at http://www.iap2.org/ and http://www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/IAP2%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf.

The domestic dimension's continuum of public involvement consists of different interconnected stages, with the degree of participation and public impact increasing at each successive level (Figure 4.1). Briefly put, the first stage is informational or educational (the government communicates) with little public involvement or impact (for example, fact sheets, brochures, websites, and open houses). The aim is to explain policy choices and positions, and provide the public (the targets of governmental PD) with information that raises awareness and helps them to understand the problem, alternatives, opportunities, and solutions. It also increases the government's visibility. The second stage consists of consultation and information gathering (the government listens) to obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives, and decisions (such as public comments, focus groups, surveys, public meetings, and sensitization campaigns). Activities in these two stages may not be directly linked to PD activities abroad, but indirectly contribute to them by increasing the domestic public's knowledge and understanding, and by building public support for international policy. The last stage includes more active participation by both the government and the public (partners of governmental PD), including discussions intended to exchange views and knowledge (speakers programs, organizing conferences and workshops, and policy e-discussions) through debate. It can also entail partnerships, with the goal of international policy cooperation and networking, joint decision making and outsourcing of activities to nonstate actors. Under the rubric of citizen engagement and public involvement with the highest level of public participation, domestic nonstate actors—whether individually or through organizations—are sometimes also seen as independent PD actors. While they can be competitors, if they combine their efforts with those of governments, the latter—when involved—fulfill more facilitative, supportive, and managerial roles.[16]

Many gray areas exist, but from an integrative approach of diplomacy, "combining" prevails over "choosing." In times of "doing more with less," finding efficiencies is vital, and can be derived from greater use of the domestic–international interface.

The following empirical section is set against this broader background.

Recurring Structures, Policies, and Practices

The mosaic of EU members' varied sociocultural and economic political features has been widely described. Its inherent diversity also bolsters scholars' arguments that European PD is not one but many cases at once. Certain functional features, however, are shared across levels—as also reflected in its domestic dimension. The structures, policies, and concrete activities through which EU governments at different levels have attempted to involve domestic publics in international policymaking

input and output processes tend to share certain characteristics, as demonstrated below.

Structures

The structures in which the domestic dimension is organized and practiced are simultaneously centralized, through the communication division and/or press office, and scattered, through different geographical and thematic sections.

The unit responsible for communication typically coordinates public involvement activities, as can be seen at the supranational level. The EU seeks to involve its member states' domestic publics through a multilayered system of EU institutions and agencies. Nevertheless, the Directorate-General of Communication of the EU Commission is mainly in charge of coordinating executive action. Its intra-EU communication aims to improve involvement by "EU citizens" and foster a sense of common European identity. The new European External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for developing European international policy communication, including external communication inside and outside the EU.[17]

The communication division of ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) is not only responsible for communication to foreign audiences, but domestic ones as well. The French MFA's communication directorate and spokesperson's office, for instance, is also responsible for PD ("*diplomatie d'influence*"), including press relations, explaining the government's position at home and abroad, and building social influence networks. "*Le Quai d'Orsay hors les murs*," for example, involves almost monthly cross-country debates with the minister's spokesperson on France's diplomacy, its actions abroad, and its international positions.[18]

With some exceptions, the overarching structure of the MFA's communication division is often divided into a unit responsible for public involvement abroad (the PD division) and at home (the public affairs or corporate communication division). A case in point is the Dutch MFA's communication division, which employs a single budget for public support for international policy both at home and abroad and situates them within a specific "PD and corporate communication" unit. Despite the potential of this overarching structure for an integrative approach, domestic and international public involvement tasks are developed separately from one another. Creating better flow between them—especially through digital and strategic stakeholder communication—is considered an area in need of improvement.[19]

There are exceptions, especially at the subnational level. Take, for example, the communication division of the MFA of Flanders, Belgium's federate entity. Flanders has far-reaching international policy competences compared to other subnational governments. It has actively been raising public awareness for its distinct position through several channels. The MFA finances an independent apolitical weekly magazine, *Flanders Today*,

for the (inter)national community in Brussels. It incorporates a Strategic Advisory Council, with prominent citizens advising the government on development, international cooperation, foreign affairs, and tourism. It also has structural agreements with the Flemish expatriate organization and leading universities. Although criticized for its lack of transparency, whole-of-government interactive online forums have consulted citizens and expatriates on how Flanders can become a top economic, ecological, and sociocultural region by 2020.[20] More importantly, Flanders has sought to turn its limited resources and lack of traditional power into advantages through a more integrative public involvement approach. As expressed by a high-level official:

> We're smaller, so we need to be smarter. We don't have the manpower or money to split publics in the communication division. We need to look at the big picture... Public diplomacy isn't a term. It's more a practice we direct at domestic and foreign citizens. It involves different actions from some of the sections of the ministry and other departments, and includes academic, economic, digital, and other forms of outreach. The communication division's main job is to manage it.

As well as the communication division, many domestic public involvement practices are performed by the foreign minister's press office, with the aim of increasing visibility of the minister's activities. Initiatives developed within this specific structure seek to raise awareness about and support for matters of international policy, but they often lack a direct link to PD's international dimension.

Tweeting and blogging by high officials and websites describing ministers' activities are just some of many examples. High-level officials not only play a role in creating support for the domestic dimension through personal participation online, but especially through supporting a culture of outreach. Such initiatives are more sensitive to changes in the government of the day. For better or worse and whether intentionally or not, they blur the firewalls between diplomacy and domestic politics and can partly serve electoral purposes.

Regardless of the governmental level, presswork, news management, and media relations are considered to be central elements of public involvement abroad and at home. Media continue to be seen as multipliers, bringing international policy to citizens. Initiatives vary from press releases, conferences, and hiring independent journalists in the MFA, to internships in international press offices and specific international correspondence or visitor programs. Such initiatives can be found at all levels. With the second largest concentration of journalists in the world, the EU's headquarters in Brussels is a true media mecca. Significant sums have been invested in well-established press offices, an online pressroom, media libraries, broadcasting and live media streaming, and many other facilities.[21]

Italy, which was long under the presidency of controversial media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, provides an illustration at the national level. Italy's MFA has no PD division, but the press communication service contains a specific office for relations with the public, which conducts a myriad of activities. A few journalists work in the MFA. Their task is to make foreign policy content and news more appealing to the public, including media-produced video clips discussed online by MFA staff, and video clips made in-house with questions and answers for the public.[22]

In Greece, the MFA's information and PD division's director is also the minister's spokesperson. PD, however, is being further marginalized because of budget cuts. As one interviewee eloquently put it:

> if the economic crisis is the Trojan war, then the government's Achilles' heel is its public diplomacy. It can be a strong tool to fight misunderstandings and negative stories in the press that reduce the entire crisis to maladministration . . . The Greek government has nearly enough money for "what really matters," like keeping people off the street; public diplomacy is the least of its worries and is more of a weakness than a strength right now.

Rather than the PD division, Greece's Secretariat General of Information and Communication, under the authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs, is responsible for the bulk of public outreach. It informs the government and its agencies, and domestic and foreign opinion, on Greek international relations and positions, and coordinates and directs the work of press and communication offices abroad. In essence, Greece's PD relies heavily on its diaspora organizations. To mention one of many initiatives, the Hellenic Diaspora Initiative (2012) brought Greek business leaders and prominent members of Greece's global diaspora together to fight for prosperity during Greece's time of crisis.[23]

As this case illustrates, public-involvement activities directed toward domestic audiences are not only centralized by ministers' press offices and communication units. The practice of PD directed toward domestic constituencies does not limit itself to a single division, but is part of a broader governmental structure that Brian Hocking labeled "the national diplomatic system."[24] PD at home also exists in fragmented forms throughout different geographic and thematic units. Activities typically involve domestic nonstate actors on the input side of international policymaking, namely stakeholder or public consultation.

Examples of stakeholder consultation at supranational, national, and subnational levels are abundant, but become evident in policy development and research units and the institutionalization of strategic advisory councils. The Finnish MFA's well-established policy planning unit stands out in this regard. It liaises with the international and national academic community, outsources research projects, organizes seminars, workshops and conferences, networks with the Finnish Parliament, public

administration, and civil society, and shares expertise with national policy planners in the EU.[25]

The EU exemplifies this on a large scale as it institutionalized far-reaching consultative bodies of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR).[26] While the EU's DG Communication has a steering role, all Commission directorates-general, parliamentarians, and other EU agencies consult civil society and other interested parties in their respective fields. This pushes Hocking's idea of "national diplomatic or whole-of-government systems" of public involvement past the national level of governments, yet a "supranational diplomatic system of public involvement" has so far been an elusive ideal rather than reality.

The domestic dimension also tends to bounce from one division to another in conjunction with departmental reorganizations and political priorities. This can be both an advantage and disadvantage for the domestic–international interplay in PD. For instance, the German MFA contained a PD unit with a subdivision to perform *Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit Inland* [domestic political public relations], although this was discontinued in 2007 because of budgetary restrictions imposed by the German Parliament on matters relating to the MFA's domestic tasks. The MFA's Culture and Communication Department is now responsible for PD, and the press office for informing the German public.[27]

In contrast, the small and young Estonian MFA's PD division was formerly the Press and Information Department, and its current mandate is both domestically and internationally oriented. Its PD tasks at home, although modest, include speaker programs, open-house days, traditional informational activities, and (inter)national media relations.[28]

Cases where PD and its domestic dimension are outsourced to a public–private structure are scarce, yet do exist. In the Spanish autonomous region of Catalonia, where Spain's economic crisis has escalated into a referendum on independence, the government's PD is mainly put into practice by the public–private consortium *Patronat Catalunya Mon*, which has recently been reorganized into the *Consell de Diplomàcia Pública de Catalunya* [Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, known as *Diplocat*] to add an international PD dimension to its existing domestic public involvement mandate, and to develop both.[29]

Policies

Policy documents show that different labels are now used to refer to the domestic dimension. Preferences are growing about using the terms "corporate communication," "strategic policy communication," and "domestic outreach" over "public affairs," as EU governments become more attuned to two-way communication. One can also notice a tendency toward emphasizing the intersection between involvement practices at home and abroad.

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) 2007–2010 promotion of a "new internationalism" at home as well as abroad, and diplomacy aimed as much at British citizens as foreigners, are well known. The "Bringing Foreign Policy Home" campaign of 2008 aimed to put the British government's rhetoric into practice, while taking advantage of new media. A series of public discussions and blogs with ministers and officials raised awareness of the impact of international policy on peoples' daily lives. According to some, however, the main thrust was directed at Muslim audiences against the background of the UK's counterterrorism strategy. Similar initiatives under the current coalition government are no longer part of one overarching program, but they continue to exist in a more fragmented fashion.[30]

There are other examples. The Danish MFA's 2010–2013 communication strategy explains that:

> communication targeted at a Danish general public and an international general public cannot and must not be kept sharply divided. Communication addressing a Danish general public will spread beyond Denmark's borders if it is of interest abroad. Communication addressing states and civil society abroad may easily find its way to the Danish general public. It is a challenge but also an opportunity to communicate across the three areas. We must make use of this opportunity in order to ensure effective and credible communication.

In making use of such opportunities, the Danish MFA's Public Diplomacy Department is responsible for drawing up and evaluating the external and internal communication policies, and regularly bringing together staff members in charge of communication. It aims to hold an advisory and sparring-partner function in daily communication work, and contributes to coordinating external communication at home and abroad in close cooperation with ministerial and executive secretariats and relevant units. Yet the Department still seeks to implement more efficiently the idea of "cross-communication" into its broader PD practice.[31]

Catalonia's foreign affairs strategy (2010–2015) explicitly mentions a domestic and international dimension to PD. From the belief that involving public opinion will help to improve Catalonia's efficiency and stature, the domestic dimension seeks to encourage consensus and debate on the PD approach and to gain cooperation from its Catalan civil society in developing it. *Diplocat* has therefore organized a series of forums and workshops with civil society stakeholders in various international areas and proposed a concrete PD action plan to the government. It also provides PD training at universities.[32] Simultaneously, the precarious financial situation has also renewed Spain's attention to PD as largely nation branding.[33]

While scholars' and practitioners' stances have differed toward the relationship between nation branding and PD and the role of domestic

societies in it,[34] policy documents and their implementation also often reveal a branding approach to PD, wherein the international dimension concerns projection of the image and the domestic dimension concerns identity building in the nation's brand story. Such an approach can be relevant for development of the domestic dimension of PD, especially if domestic civil society pushes the nature and direction of the brand. Effective branding that surpasses a promotional exercise is dependent on domestic public support in terms of reliability, credibility, and cooperation with domestic stakeholders who are active abroad.

To illustrate this, the Finnish MFA's PD division has no—official—domestic mandate, but its activities originate in branding "Finland as problem-solver of the world in 2030," based on broad civil society consultation. Despite the critique surrounding the brand's implementation, PD is not only rooted in Finnish society, it also relies on domestic partnerships for its execution. Citizens need to conduct 100 tasks to contribute to establishing the brand of "Finnishness," which is built upon functionality, nature, and education.[35]

PD driven by identity-related motivations is also relevant at the subnational level. Scotland's story as "bold, stimulating, and human" is woven into all materials to promote Scotland as a "great country to visit, study, live and work, do business with, and invest in." The policy is implemented through different PD actions with Scottish economic, cultural and academic, governmental and civil society partners, and expatriate organizations.[36]

Specific occasions also often warrant broader image campaigns involving the public abroad and at home, from the London Olympics' "GREAT Britain" campaign to Flanders' abundance of PD activities surrounding the First World War centenary, which is partially built upon Flanders' historical connection to the image of the poppy and the poem "In Flanders Fields."[37]

At the supranational level, European identity and values are central to domestic public-involvement activities. The Europe for Citizens program, for instance, aims to stimulate the emergence of a European identity, drawing citizens closer to the EU's policies and values. It supports (networks of) twin towns, structural support for think tanks and civil society organizations, joint projects (exchanges, training seminars, workshops, and high-visibility events), and employs innovative methods to collaborate on and debate common European issues at local and EU levels. To tailor the program to its partners' needs, the European Commission incorporates structured dialogue with key organizations that feeds into a broader annual event, the Europe for Citizens Forum.[38] The EU thus conducts public involvement similar to that of national and subnational governments, but on a larger scale, where the tools traditionally used by its members abroad (exchanges and twinning arrangements) are directed inward and developed as complements to regional initiatives.

Practices

Some Examples

- **Creation and distribution of information material and digital outreach**:
  Press/(mass)media work, websites, micro-blogging services, social networking
- **Organization** of open house days, visits to the headquarters with generalist and tailor-made programs, cultural events
- **Institutionalization of strategic advisory councils:**
  FCO's human rights advisory group, Flanders' Strategic Advisory Council on development, international cooperation, foreign affairs and tourism, etc.
- **Speakers' programs:**
  Europe Direct Network's "Team Europe;" the EU back to School Program; Norway's "Reflex"; the FCO's "Bringing Foreign Policy Home" initiative; France's "Le Quai d'Orsay hors les murs;" the Dutch "In Dialogue with the MFA;" Denmark's "Bestil Et Foredrag," etc.
- **Participation in conferences, seminars, and other expert meetings**
- **Public consultation:**
  Your Voice in Europe; European Citizens' Initiative; the FCO's topical policy e-discussions; Your Scotland—Your Voice; "Flanders In Action Plan" e-discussions, etc.
- **Domestic component of visitor and exchange programs:**
  EU Visitors Program; Germany's Besucherprogramm; Swedish Young Leaders' Visitors Program; Finland's Foreign Correspondent Program; Danish Competence Centre; "Flanders Inspires" International Visitor Program, etc.

While implementation of well-intended policies may not always be guaranteed, and rhetoric may not necessarily correlate with reality, similar means of engaging domestic publics in international policy appear at different levels. Activities frequently encompass multiple stages of the domestic dimension's public involvement continuum, as described above.

The information stage of the continuum is popular at all levels. It is usually directed at a larger audience with (sub)national governments or

the EU institution as the dominant communicator. A deluge of websites, brochures, publications, press releases, and "information overload" has become the norm. Besides traditional modes of information, significant investment is made in improving websites and incorporating social media platforms—some more popular than others. Depending on the degree of interactivity, digital outreach can also be categorized in the more active stages of the public involvement continuum. Potentially available to all audiences simultaneously, it may pressure governments to reconsider distinguishing between domestic and foreign publics, but in the EU, language barriers remain one way of distinguishing natives and nonnatives.

Sweden is often noted for its policy on, and high-end application of, social media. It has also profiled itself domestically and internationally (in the EU, UN Human Rights Council, Council of Europe, and the OECD) as an advocate of freedom, human rights, and internet security (one of its top international policy priorities). One of many Swedish actions is the Stockholm Internet Forum of 2012 and 2013, bringing together domestic and international civil society, activists, and business and technical community representatives.[39]

The EU has also been busy. Its "Take Part!" web portal aims to inform publics and connect them with the EU via social media. Several EU offices, agencies, and institutions have created official accounts on Facebook, MySpace, Hyves, LinkedIn, Europatweets, YouTube, Daily Motion, and EUTube. The "Europe Direct" network of online and offline initiatives consist of at least 480 information and 400 documentation centers across member states. The information centers offer general EU information and multimedia documents, organize awareness-raising events and publications, engage with local media, and handle public inquiries in person; the documentation centers support universities and research institutes in promoting and developing educational materials and research on European integration, and encourage them to take part in the debate on Europe.[40]

Another recurring informational initiative, found at different levels, is the organization of open-house days and visits to headquarters. Most EU institutions and agencies offer generalist and tailor-made programs and simulation models for broad and specific publics. The EU Parlamentarium, an interactive museum-like experience, opened its doors to young and old in 2011.

Several cases also illustrate efforts in the second and third stages of the public involvement continuum. Recurring initiatives vary from speakers' programs and public consultation to stakeholder engagement and exchange programs.

Speakers' programs allow MFA and EU institution staff to speak at schools, institutions, and other local organizations about their work and international policy topics. They also enable groups to take part in sessions at headquarters. The program aims to increase visibility and understanding of international policy and a government's and EU institution's work abroad, but also enables policymakers to remain better attuned to society.

Various examples exist, from the EU's Team Europe with more than 400 speakers, to Denmark, the UK, France, and Germany's federated entity of Bavaria.

Considering a non-EU member in the EU, Norway's PD has been described as selective and targeted, with little attention paid to broader domestic audiences.[41] Over the past six years, however, efforts have been made to remedy this. The Norwegian speakers' program "Reflex (*Refleks-utenrikspolitisk ordskifte*)," an initiative of the minister of foreign affairs in 2006, intends to stimulate debate on Norwegian foreign policy choices in Norway and on the international stage. Reflex I (2007–2010) primarily included stakeholder consultation through debates and a collection of external analyses, and resulted in a Norwegian foreign policy white paper. Reflex II (2010–2013), which remains active until new elections, targets broader publics. It includes a series of public debates on priority issues with the minister and experts, also live-streamed online, as well as grants to encourage NGOs and civil society to organize activities at home with international guests that stimulate debate on international policy issues.[42]

Countries such as Italy, Germany, and Belgium also conduct similar activities in a nonsystematic fashion. Driven by budgetary constraints, others—such as the Netherlands—are instead striving for greater alignment by streamlining similar initiatives that were previously fragmented across different programs. The Dutch MFA has bundled its different speakers' programs (EU Back to School, Rent an Ambassador, and Eye to Eye with Foreign Affairs) into a single program, "In Dialogue with the MFA," which is being implemented during 2012 and 2013.[43]

The added value of this popular formula is broadened access to and interest in international policy issues. It also appeals to a general domestic public outside the capital and covers topics outside media coverage. There are, however, limitations. Speakers' programs are organized to stimulate debate and are not necessarily intended for public input. There is no overall systematic basis for internal and external evaluation. They are cost-intensive and dependent on support from the highest governmental level, and are sensitive to changes in political climate.

While often directly connected to international policy content, speakers' programs are usually not directly connected with PD projects abroad. They do, however, indirectly contribute to PD's international dimension through seeking public support for, and raising knowledge and awareness of, international policy issues. This adds to the government's self and international affirmation and legitimacy. More directly, when the program includes grants to NGOs and civil society entities, these organizations are typically active abroad.

Public consultation is another often-used means, varying from specific to general, open to closed, ad hoc to institutionalized, and small to broad designs. It is criticized for its lack of transparency, as it often remains unclear how and whether input is used in policy decision-making processes. Consultation in the early stages of shaping policy nevertheless

allows for improving policy outcomes, while simultaneously enhancing involvement of interested parties and the public at large.

The EU Commission has institutionalized a framework to govern large-scale consultation of external parties. "Your Voice in Europe" is the single access point. Online consultation has become commonplace, including on international policy issues, such as with implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy. The Lisbon Treaty (December 2009) also includes another form of participation: the European Citizens' Initiative, as mentioned in this chapter's introduction, began in April 2012 and "invites European citizens" to offer proposals on EU competences to the Commission under certain conditions. A proposal must come from a committee of at least seven organizers from the 28 member states and be officially registered by the member states' governments, while at least one million EU citizens' signatures must be acquired within a year. The organizers must present their initiative at a public hearing in the European Parliament. The Commission adopts a formal response on the action it will propose in response to the citizens' initiative. The first initiated project, "*Fraternité* 2020," is currently collecting votes and aims to improve citizens' mobility through enhancing EU exchange programs.[44]

National governments are no strangers to public consultation either. The FCO's policy e-discussions are a fine case in point and have been providing thematic background information for over a decade. The public can post answers to a set of questions online on several topics, such as the 2005 PD review. The FCO also consults through its topical advisory groups, such as the Advisory Group of Human Rights, which the FCO established in 2010 to benefit from outside advice and feedback on its policy. It consists of nongovernmental experts discussing a wide range of issues, from counterterrorism and the Arab Spring to freedom of religion or belief. Its annual report informs the UK Parliament, NGOs, and the general public about the FCO's work and allows for debate.[45]

Public consultation is also a powerful tool for subnational governments. The Scottish government, for instance, used its institutionalized public consultation program "Your Scotland—Your Voice" in 2011–2012 for a six-month consultation with Scots on its independence referendum. The "Your Scotland, Your Referendum" consultation is directly related to Scotland's international relations—namely, whether Scotland should be an independent country within the EU. Questions, however, are limited to the referendum process and thus serve as a warm-up for the 2014 referendum.[46]

Similarly, public consultation has also served the desire for independence in Greenland, an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark, where governmental reorganizations are opening up PD positions with a strong domestic focus. Many public involvement practices at home and abroad were combined ahead of the November 2008 nonbinding referendum on self-governance, prior to adoption of the Self-Government Act.[47]

A more targeted and well-established form of holding discussions with greater government and public involvement is participation in conferences, seminars, and other expert meetings. These provide governments with opportunities to explain themselves and to hear external parties' views. Regardless of level, many authorities invest in exchanges with the academic world as part of their daily tasks through formal links, support of independent agencies, regular seminar and conference participation, and having staff work as fellows in academic bodies.[48] Diplomatic academies and international relations institutions (such as European studies' centers, the *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale* in Rome, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* in Berlin, the *Institut français des relations internationales* in Paris, and the Clingendael Institute in The Hague), supported by ministries or the EU, add to these debates.

The more intense that public participation becomes, such as in stakeholder engagement, the more targeted and selective they are with regard to publics and content, with special attention paid to media, business, and academics. One advantage of a more targeted approach is that public involvement practices at home and abroad are often better interconnected, turning domestic publics into partners abroad.

Within international visitors programs and exchanges, governments also cooperate closely with domestic nonstate actors with a focus on networking between domestic and international peers. Germany's *Besucherprogramm* is well-established. It was initiated by the MFA's Culture and Communication unit responsible for PD and is largely executed by domestic nonstate partners, such as the Goethe Institute and the *Europäische Akademie* Berlin. It engages annually in approximately 200 tailor-made trips to establish networks with more than 1,000 foreign parties, which are selected partly by German embassies and consulates-general. It builds upon systematic pre- and postactivity evaluations and follow-ups. The week-long "*Themenreisen*" [theme travels] on various topics, such as the EU crisis, blogging on international policy, and climate change, are seen as very successful. The MFA's Visitors Center also organizes debates with MFA staff.[49]

Variants of this are the Swedish Young Leaders Visitors Program, the "Flanders Inspires" International Visitors Program, the EU Visitors Program, and the Danish MFA's Competence Center.[50] In addition, EU governments have also invested in hubs to link domestic nonstate actors to their European and international contemporaries. Consider the established institutes that operate inside and outside the EU within the PD framework, such as the Goethe and Cervantes Institutes, the British Council, *l'Alliance Française*, the Polish and Italian Cultural Institutes, and the Czech and Catalan Centers.

Convergence of all this public involvement is often present around priority international policy issues and EU affairs. While public involvement by a given national or subnational government does not focus solely on the EU, a significant portion of its activities often relate to it. The following section touches upon this interplay.

The Interplay

EU Affairs

National and subnational governments involve domestic citizens in EU issues as part of the daily tasks of their MFAs' EU divisions. For instance, in the context of EU enlargement, in 2001 the Dutch MFA established the Europe Fund, providing funding to organizations in the Netherlands to promote debate on the EU. It was discontinued in 2012 because of increased Euro skepticism and associated political and budgetary reasons. The current Dutch government no longer views the fund and broad public campaigns as appropriate tools to stimulate Dutch public debate on Europe, and now concentrates on strategic policy communications with stakeholders through arms-length institutions like government-sponsored think tanks. The MFA has nevertheless officially started to participate in the EU Back to School program, an annual pan-European initiative supported by the Commission that sends the EU's and member states' officials back to their old schools to talk about various EU matters.[51]

The Finnish MFA's Unit for Europe Information and Civic Information and its 20 regional EU information offices offer a more grassroots case. Their activities include: (1) more than 200 yearly lectures by regional EU office staff; (2) countrywide discussions with experts from the MFA and other organizations; (3) one-day training seminars in Helsinki for teachers; (4) grants to NGOs for seminars/events; and (5) distributing publications to libraries, schools, and organizations via regional offices. Following budget cuts and associated reorganizations, however, most regional offices will be closed. Finland's focus will shift to making greater use of social media and training teachers to give lectures, with most of this activity conducted from MFA headquarters.[52]

The EU's economic crisis thus leads to tightened belts for some EU members' public involvement activities. Reduced public debate on the EU in the current atmosphere of crisis also partly stems from politicians trying to avoid public criticism. For others, such as Germany and France, the EU's economic crisis has moved EU issues even more to the forefront of their policies and politics, their actions and (inter)national image-building. The issue of the EU as a governmental priority tends to expand beyond MFAs' EU affairs desks to more whole-of-government approaches of inter- and intradepartmental cooperation. Leaders, with their cabinets, are playing an important role in public outreach at home and abroad and in the management of activities undertaken within and across governmental departments.

For subnational governments, the interplay with the EU is rather robust as it is a particularly important area in which they can expand their politico-economic powers. In Scotland's case, the EU is a stepping stone in its quest for independence. Scotland's PD on EU affairs seeks to show its citizens what the EU has to offer and vice versa. Within the framework of

its Action Plan on European Engagement of September 2009, several PD activities at home and abroad and one of Scotland's largest domestic public consultations—"Scotland's Future: A National Conversation"—were undertaken. More than 100 meetings were held across Scotland, where ministers responded to public questions, and more than 5,000 comments were posted on the government website's blogs. Other activities to implement the Action Plan vary from ministerial visits to European research institutions, accompanied by a small group of teachers to meet peers, to consultation rounds with stakeholders, awareness-raising events, and "road shows" across major cities intended to formulate official responses to the EU Commission's Green Papers.[53]

Besides the above illustrations of daily public involvement activities, additional PD exists at home and abroad surrounding EU presidencies and EU membership candidacies.

The Belgian MFA's PD division has never gained momentum. It did not receive the high-level support necessary to move beyond providing electronic newsletters and didactic material. Yet as a founding member of the EU and host of the EU's headquarters, Belgium developed a broad arsenal of complementary PD initiatives at home and abroad around its presidency of the Council of the EU. What makes this case interesting is that Belgium additionally placed focus on the tri-chaired EU presidency instead of employing it primarily as a forum to profile itself and its international image. A dedicated communication task force was responsible for merging all of the abovementioned forms of public involvement. More than 500 activities of Belgium's federal government and its federated entities with nonstate actors were organized to bring the European construct closer to Belgium's and other countries' citizens. The many popular initiatives included walking tours through the European capital of Brussels centered around EU themes, the "I Love EU" live simulcast dance choreography with the public in 12 cities, the Visionary Africa festival with Belgian African diasporas and embassies, the "U and Europe, Your Turn to Speak!" public e-consultation, seminar series with civil society organizations, and dialogue sessions between civil society representatives and ministers.[54]

Meanwhile, the Polish MFA's PD unit has no domestic outreach mandate, and informational public involvement activities are undertaken by the minister's press office. Yet a great deal of its public involvement activity has been structured around EU affairs and its EU presidency in particular, such as 100 days of debate prior to Poland's EU presidency, and the secretary of state for European and Economic Policy in the European Initiative returning to her childhood school in the "EU Back to School" program. Contrary to Belgium, Poland's EU presidency was primarily used as a self-promotion platform rather than to highlight the EU's collaborative effort within and outside the EU.[55]

The EU accession process is among candidate countries' most comprehensive PD endeavors, particularly with regard to the domestic dimension, for which specific EU funds—such as the EU citizen enlargement

projects—have been used. To join the EU, candidate countries not only need existing EU members' support, but also the support of their citizens, who will determine the referendum's outcome.

The Czech Republic, for instance, began thinking about the necessity of PD in the run-up to its 2004 EU accession. Its MFA created a Communication Strategy Department in 2000 to inform domestic constituencies about the EU and to present the Czech Republic to the EU. The Czech EU presidency also created additional opportunities for public attention. Nowadays, the Czech foreign affairs minister's cabinet continues to conduct public involvement activities—although limited—through the press office (at home) and PD unit (abroad).[56]

The preaccession period of the Slovak Republic (an EU member since 2005) also offered significant lessons in PD development, and awareness of its importance to the government. Consequently, in 2008, the MFA established a dedicated department within the Directorate General of the minister. Its PD approach aims to face inwards and outwards simultaneously to improve Slovakia's credibility and reach consensus on its foreign policy goals, of which EU affairs remains a key theme.[57]

Croatia, the EU's twenty-eighth member state (July 1, 2013), cannot be left unmentioned in this context. Despite some occasional spikes in Euroskepticism surrounding the EU financial crisis, a majority of Croats voted for EU membership in the accession referendum in 2012. Although Croatia's MFA has no specific PD department, a public relations and information department undertakes domestic public involvement activities, several of which were undertaken with local and nonstate actors to raise public awareness of the EU and accession, peaking in 2011 prior to the referendum. Activities included a two-day series of lectures for students entitled "Days of the EU," debates in every county, a free "Hello EU" hotline, a network of 129 info points on "Europe in Croatia," EU training for teachers, and the "Europe in the Classroom" project, which included more than 300 workshops for high-school students with MFA-trained instructors.[58]

These cases illustrate that EU affairs offer national and subnational governments additional opportunities for involvement with domestic and foreign publics, and occasionally issue-specific cooperation across government levels and with EU institutions. The scope of interplay between levels seems to be largely driven by the (geopolitical, global) nature of the issues. It also tends to fluctuate according to the government of the day and the political climate, prevailing societal values of the time and the associated attitude toward the European project, and the nature of the nation's historical or newly established bonds with the EU institution. While interlevel competition (most obviously by the subnational towards the national, and the national towards the EU)—using PD to attract the public's attention on certain issues—may continue to exist, it does not necessarily exclude collaboration on other issues. The interplay, however, will continue to produce challenges.

Challenging Boundaries

The domestic dimension of PD continues to move boundaries toward greater interplay of domestic and foreign publics, policies, and between subnational and national government levels and the EU institution.

EU domestic audiences can simultaneously be subnational, national, and supranational. The need to combine efforts to involve them across levels grows more pertinent when one considers societies' increasing heterogeneity and evolution toward more pluralistic and transnational areas of personal interest.[59] In essence, PD with a domestic consciousness in the EU is about diversity governance and dealing with identity pluralism—the EU's bread and butter.

This begs further reflection on how the domestic dimension in the EU may challenge tensions along the lines of sovereignty versus globalization, and territorial versus nonterritorial representation, or whether these tensions will come into greater perspective. As Simon Anholt noted, the paradox of sovereignty may be starting to resolve itself. It becomes harder for governments to pursue radically different agendas from the European community, as governmental issues increasingly cut across national sovereignty and as national governments are held to greater account on these shared challenges by their increasingly connected populations. Most EU member-state governments prefer to avoid incurring public disapproval elsewhere in the EU if possible, since disapproval reduces their ability to support their own country's interests.[60] These processes are also seen as forms of "reterritorialization," with traditional territorial entities diminishing in importance in favor of alternative territorial configurations.[61]

Given its importance in contemporary European federalism, questions arise as to how the principle of subsidiarity translates in the context of PD and its domestic dimension, and thus which level is best equipped to conduct public involvement toward domestic publics. Subsidiarity, as Paul Marquardt noted, may have been used as a frontline defense of national identity and sovereignty, yet it appears to promote centralization as much as guards against it. He notes that if subsidiarity works as intended, its principles are corrosive rather than supportive of a nation-state's sovereignty. Subsidiarity implicitly reduces the issue of sovereignty to one of efficiency, which may result in power sharing between the EU and subnational groups.[62]

In terms of efficiency, the scant literature on governmental levels' relations in PD suggests that the lowest level is best equipped to reach out to domestic citizens—thus decentralization.[63] Yet other research on the EU has shown that the public involvement argument has served the cause of both decentralization and centralization in subsequent periods, depending on the dominant values of the political culture of the time.[64]

In addition to subsidiarity, the EU's principle of proportionality may become more relevant to European PD with a domestic consciousness, when assuming that civil societies are indeed more closely associated with pluralistic life, serving individual and shared transnational interests.

Proportionality, here, is to be understood by its more universal meaning, rather than the specific interpretation ensconced in EU Law.[65] It involves a harmonious association of components within a whole. Balancing the existing tensions among levels, issues, and publics lies at its core. When used in this sense, it may become the leading principle in a more integrative and interlevel public involvement approach in diplomacy within the EU.

Conclusion

The last decade has seen change in the norm of PD: while they remain relevant, states are no longer the only players in the governmental sphere of PD,[66] and PD is no longer solely within the purview of governments. This is equally valid for the domestic dimension. Involvement by domestic publics in the input and output processes of international policymaking takes place above and below the level of traditional nation-state actors. This partial empirical mapping acknowledges variations within and between levels. It also tentatively indicates that the levels' differences are gradually being dwarfed by similarities.

Especially at the nation-state level, traditional attitudes toward the combination of diplomacy and domestic publics shine through. Above and below the nation-state, there seems to be less reticence about "intermestic" public involvement approaches. As relative newcomers, subnational governments enjoy certain freedoms in escaping traditional bureaucratic models, while the institution of the EU appears particularly introspective in its response to the perceived crisis of "democratic deficit." Subnational governments are arguably more driven by identity-related or internal legitimacy motivations (distinctiveness within a country), but nation-states and the EU share a similar interest in involving publics, so as to establish and reinforce a certain identity and legitimacy at home and abroad.

The gap in attitudes across levels toward the domestic dimension is slowly being bridged. In their quest to keep in tune with the times, some nation-states' narratives are transforming into acknowledging the importance of PD's international–domestic interplay, and the role of domestic citizens in PD. Additionally, while PD in the EU may not follow a one-size-fits-all model, practices of domestic public involvement at different levels reoccur. The means are not endless either. This can lead to the propagation of both effective and ineffective components of practices across different levels, as well as offer opportunities to learn from others' experiences.

The domestic dimension acquires its shape through both centralized and scattered forms, both as add-on programs and mainstreamed into broader diplomatic practices. Many recurring activities, however, remain parked in the initial informational stage of public involvement. To a varying extent, initiatives—mostly low-risk and customized to the specifics of a nation's public—are undertaken toward more active participation, such

as speaker programs and public consultations. Activities also tend to show a connection with the content of international policy, but—more often than not—lack a direct link to similar projects abroad.

While not all public involvement activities necessarily have to contribute directly to international policy cooperation abroad, or vice versa, room remains for greater alignment. Regardless of level, and given coalescing views, more integrative approaches to public involvement are gradually finding their way, but putting them into practice remains challenging. Nevertheless, to square the circle of how to do ever more with ever less and be more efficient, MFAs are forced to innovate.[67] To do so in broadening public support for international policy, the key is not to seek new things but to discover and maximize the interfaces of what already exists. In striving to harmonize (public) diplomacy with today's world, there is no place for a silo mentality. Greater alignment of public involvement practices at home and abroad, within and across levels in the EU, may continue to challenge traditional boundaries, but offers fundamental advantages during periods when the EU and its members are searching for efficiencies in modernizing diplomatic practices—and not just in times of austerity.

Notes

*This research is primarily based on information retrieved through 37 in-depth interviews and analysis of primary sources. The author is particularly grateful for cooperation by directors of the Communication, Public Diplomacy and European Affairs divisions of national ministries of foreign affairs and subnational administrations in charge of international relations in Belgium, Catalonia, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Scotland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the EU Commission's DG for Communication and the EEAS representation. The author also extends thanks to Philip Seib, Bruce Gregory, and Cameron Warriner for their feedback and advice.

1. Jürgen Habermas is an internationally renowned philosopher best known for his much-argued theory on the "public sphere." See Jürgen Habermas, *"Ein Pakt für oder gegen Europa?"* ["A pact for or against Europe?"] (presentation at the seminar on "Europe and the Rediscovery of the German Nation-state," organized by the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Berlin, April 6, 2011), available online at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Habermas%20PDF.pdf.
2. For a literature overview, see Barbara Finke, "Civil Society Participation in EU Governance," *Living Reviews in European Governance* 2, no. 2 (2007): 4; and Knud E. Jørgensen and Katie V. Laatikainen, *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power* (New York: Routledge, 2013).
3. On citation: The Pew Research Center, *Global Attitudes Project: Greeks and Germans at Polar Opposites. European Unity on the Rocks* (May 29, 2012), available online at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-European-Crisis-Report-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-May-29–2012.pdf.
4. See http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/.

5. Such as citizenship programs, the plan D/Debate Europe, the eParticipation Preparatory Action programme, and the Futurum online platform; Mundo Yang, "Europe's new Communication policy and the Introduction of transnational Deliberative Citizens' Involvement projects," in *Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures of EU Citizen Consultations*, ed., Raphaël Kies and Patrizia Nanz (London: Ashgate, 2013), 17–34
6. European Commission, *Commission Welcomes Agreement on European Citizens' Initiative,* IP/10/1720, (Brussels: European Commission, December 15, 2010), available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1720&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr.
7. More on this in Ellen Huijgh, "Public Diplomacy in Flux: Introducing the Domestic Dimension," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7, no. 4 (2012): 359–67.
8. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, "The Future of Diplomacy," *International Journal* 66, no. 3 (summer 2011): 527–42; and Stuart Murray, Paul Sharp, Geoffrey Wiseman, David Criekemans, and Jan Melissen, "The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 4 (December 2011): 709–28.
9. Primary sources were analyzed and interviews were conducted with the people in charge of domestic public involvement activities at the different levels. Exploratory in nature and broad in scope, the examples mentioned are not all-inclusive. This chapter only focuses on activities initiated by national and subnational governments (MFAs) and by the institution of the EU. It partially reflects the data retrieved through broader research by the author.
10. For annotated references on European public diplomacy, see Ellen Huijgh, Bruce Gregory, and Jan Melissen, "Public Diplomacy," in *Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations*, ed. David Armstrong (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013), more on http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com.
11. For conceptions and different cases, see Ellen Huijgh, ed., "The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* (Special issue) 7, no. 4 (2012): 359–497
12. See, for example, Ken S. Heller and Liza M. Persson, "The Distinction between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy," in *Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 225–33.
13. See, for example, Brian Hocking, "Reconfiguring Public Diplomacy: From Competition to Collaboration," in *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World*, ed. Jolyon Welsh and Daniel Fearn (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008), 71.
14. Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp, *Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, report no. 1 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," October 1, 2011).
15. See, for example, Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, "Defining Strategic Publics in a Networked World: Public Diplomacy's Challenge at Home and Abroad," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7, no. 4 (2012): 421–40; R. S. Zaharna, "The Public Diplomacy Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement," in *Trials of Engagement*, ed. Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 201–29; and R. S. Zaharna, Amelia Arsenault, and Ali Fisher, eds, *Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift* (New York: Routledge, 2013).
16. "Public involvement" is an umbrella term that generally refers to the spectrum of methods used to involve citizens and stakeholder groups in policy or program development

and output processes, complementing rather than replacing representative democracy (e.g., parliament). The idea of a public involvement continuum is applied and made operational in a myriad of sectors, such as health, trade, and development, and by different authorities varying from municipalities, cities, and national governments, to international organizations or associations. See, for example, Amanda Sheedy, Mary P. MacKinnon, Sonia Pitre, and Judy Watling, *Handbook on Citizen Engagement: Beyond Consultation* (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN), 2008), 4–7; Mary P. MacKinnon, Sonia Pitre, and Judy Watling, *A Learning Guide to Public Involvement* (Ottawa: CPRN, February 2007), 6; OECD, *Citizens as Partners* (Paris: OECD, October 2001), 14–16, 50–64; and OECD, *Engaging Citizens in Policy-making; Information, Consultation, and Public Participation* (Paris: OECD, July 2001), at http://www.oecd.org/governance/public-innovation/2384040.pdf.

17. Aside from the strategic communication division, the EEAS's headquarters has a dedicated "public diplomacy and election observation" division. Although the service is required to report directly to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/vice-president of the European Commission, public diplomacy is considered one of many instruments to support the EU's foreign policy.See http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf; Frederica Bicchi, "The European External Action Service: A Pivotal Actor in EU Foreign Policy Communications?," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7, no. 1 (2012): 81–94; Rosa Balfour, Alyson Bailes, and Megan Kenna, *The EEAS at Work: How to Improve EU Foreign Policy*, no. 67 (Brussels: European Policy Centre, January 2012); Adam Hug, ed., *Europe in the World: Can EU Foreign Policy Make an Impact?* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, February 2013).
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CHAPTER FIVE

City Public Diplomacy in the European Union

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"Cities, not nations, have been the main players during most of our civilization's existence, and cities may again overtake nations as the primary building blocks of Europe. Cities have to be at the heart of our plans to create a Europe that is prosperous, environmentally sustainable, and where no citizen is marginalized."[1]This declaration, by the regional policy commissioner of the European Union (EU), the Austrian Johannes Hahn, reflects not only a personal vision of governance, but also a feeling that is perceptible across the entire EU area. Currently the cities' role in social transformation has been stressed by the priorities set through the Commission.

Like their counterparts in other regions of the world, the cities of Europe are taking on the role of actors with political, social, and financial influence. European cities put forward patterns of "good praxes" that could inspire local governments all over the globe. Again in Commissioner Hahn's words,[2] cities are increasingly being used as "laboratories" in which different formulas can be tried out, and where new ideas and trends—both positive and negative—emerge. Some examples of this could be Copenhagen's solution to reduce energy consumption through smart grids, Sofia's integrated urban transport project, or the Vitoria-Gasteiz Ecotourism plan to preserve natural and cultural heritage.

At the same time, European cities show the open and positive attitude of the EU institutions, which, in line with European values and principles, not only stimulate substates' actions to lead social innovations within the European framework but also foster new ways of dialogue and interaction with counterparts outside the EU limits. The *District 11* program, between Barcelona and Sarajevo, succeeded in raising awareness on

women' rights among civil society; Eurocities includes cities from Turkey, Macedonia, and from the Balkan area (Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) in some of its projects.

The aim of this chapter is, precisely, to analyze the actions of Europe's cities and examine how they contribute to spreading a positive, innovative, and unified image of the EU. European cities offer innovative solutions to global problems. And at the same time they show the open and positive attitude of the EU institutions, which, in line with European values and principles, stimulate cities' actions within the legal framework of the European multilevel system.

From the perspective of this study, the diplomatic action carried out by cities is mainly public diplomacy (PD). Leaving aside the debate on whether the cities, in their role as substate actors, will develop truly authentic diplomacy or not,[3] we consider the fact that most of their international activities are clearly connected with persuasion, which means that the power cities have when they promote their interests abroad is, mainly, a power to influence (*soft power*), which is channeled through activities that are appropriate to PD.

Following the definition set by Cross in the first chapter of the book, PD is, precisely, "the act of communication that expands an organization with international or global political interests, to further the understanding of external audiences about the values and principles which inspire and influence the direction of its objectives."[4] Therefore, despite their increasing influence, the cities' ability to exert leverage rests mainly on the communication of ideas that are transmitted through their discourse and actions.

The communication involved in PD is articulated through discourses or narratives. The credibility of the narrative depends on its coherence with the identity of the actor or body that presents it.[5] As the first chapter explains, this harmonious integration of narratives and identity is what enables the building of a persuasive political-player image that is meaningful and convincing, and allows the player to promote its norms and principles internationally by exerting effective soft power.

Consequently, for European cities' initiatives and norms to prosper, they must be explained through narratives and discourses that permit the public to understand what is being proposed, and its coherence with European values.[6] In that sense, there is a twofold challenge facing European cities' PD actions when used as a "soft power" tool: first, they must look attractive, putting forward innovative solutions; second, they should explain their proposals using discourses that are consistent with the values and principles that define the European identity.

To achieve these objectives, the contents of this chapter are set out as follows. First, a specific definition of city diplomacy and a justification of its categorization as public diplomatic action will be presented. Next, the most characteristic features of European city diplomacy will be examined, with a brief comment on its history and the influence of the EU legal

framework. Third, PD activities will be analyzed in two areas: in Europe and outside Europe, and a quick reference will be added to the twinning projects developed in both areas. The conclusion will assess the image of the EU that city diplomacy projects abroad, and its possibilities of being an effective power for persuasion.

City Soft Power

Globalization has boosted the political relevance of the city.[7] On the one hand, municipalities have become significant partners for political actors dealing with the new international order of governance.[8] Effective measures to manage global threats such as environmental damage, the clash of cultures, or poverty are being implanted at a local level through regulations on waste recycling, social integration, or job creation. On the other hand, in a political context where individuals' voices matter, cities are considered valid interlocutors for international organizations that want to know what citizens have to say.[9] Global and local matters are more intertwined than ever before and national leaders and governments must give cities the space to act.[10]

An effective response to these new tests demands that the cities develop transnational relations[11] and find opportunities to act at a global level, both through close cooperation with state governments[12] and by promoting independent initiatives. This is the challenge that Europe's cities now face.

This global projection has gone beyond the reach of what was traditionally considered "city diplomacy." According to the most common definitions, city diplomacy was limited to the promotion of peace and prevention of conflict, as in the definition provided by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG): "City-diplomacy is the tool of local governments and their associations in promoting social cohesion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction with the aim to create a stable environment in which the citizens can live together in peace, democracy and prosperity."[13] The Committee of the Regions offered a similar definition in 2008[14] and so do others: "it has increasingly come to mean the involvement of local governments in peace-building."[15] Some also stress the cooperation-for-development dimension: "City diplomacy is all activities undertaken by local governments for their counterparts in other regions in the world aimed at creating peace and development."[16] Only Van der Pluijm seems to give a broader vision of this activity: "the institutions and processes by which cities engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another."[17]

Whatever the perspective, the study suggests that diplomatic actions carried out by cities may be considered mainly as "public diplomacy." Since it is becoming ever more difficult to distinguish between exclusively diplomatic activities and those corresponding to PD,[18] it is still relevant to point out that most of the international actions carried out by cities are consistent

with communication strategies, practical engagement, and interaction, all of which belong to the so-called new PD.[19] Therefore, they can be identified with the standard definitions of PD: acts of communication "to further the understanding of external audiences about the values and principles which inspire and influence the direction of its objectives." [20]or "to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance interests and values."[21] In conclusion, it can be asserted that the cities' ability to exert an influence is confined to the communication of values and principles that are transmitted through their local initiatives and actions.

In this work, the "act of communication" is taken to have the full significance of the "communication" action, and is not limited to the mere transmission of information. It thus includes the relational aspect of human communication and the attitude of the interlocutors (listening, transparency and openness, tolerance and respect), together with the means of establishing the dialogue and interacting with other parties[22]. With this view of communication as a starting-point, the discourse or narratives used to transmit objectives are constructed through both words (messages to explain objectives abroad, frames of reference) and behavior (attitudes and actions with which these messages are transmitted), and reflect the culture and social values of the place where the narrative is developed.[23] Consequently, when analyzing PD actions both the content of the discourse and the actions used to transmit it are significant.[24]

Regarding the content of the discourse, the ideas explicitly expressed in the proposals and projects are relevant. Regarding the actions, all the interventions in which this content is present are important, that is, both those directed towards the public (the organization of events or media broadcasting) and the negotiations with municipal employees, work groups with civil society organizations, or courses for technical training (lobbies, strategies of cooperation, or engagement).

As Cross argues in chapter 1, these narratives are more convincing and influential in as far as they respect and tally with the identity of the proposing institution; that is to say, when the narratives reflect the values and norms that identify and define the institution or organization undertaking the diplomatic action. This harmony creates an external image of the institution that is plausible, attractive, and convincing. This "plausibility" and "attraction" make the message persuasive and allow its intended public to voluntarily understand and fully assimilate the contents, approaches, values, and norms proposed.[25] To be precise, they permit an effective use of *soft power.*

In the case of the cities of Europe, values such as peace, democracy, rule of law, defense of human rights, and equality,[26] together with the social market economy and the interest in a neighborhood policy must be present in the project objectives and in the models of social, economic, or political behavior it proposes.[27] They must also appear in the actions involved in the development of the projects (dialogue and consensual decision making,

meetings with social leaders and program comanagement) and in the result of the actions (institution building, rule of law, innovations for the benefit of all citizens, visibility of minority cultural groups, substantial changes in the community legislation, and a rise in the democratic quality of the processes)[28]. In this way, the PD of European cities will contribute to spreading the values of this organization, absorbing, and handing on to others the patterns for actions (norms) that express European identity.

Two final comments on the nature of city diplomacy are in order. First, city diplomacy includes activities that clearly defend social or political interests (cooperation, conflict prevention) and those that may look technical at first sight, but are political in their sometimes unintended consequences. That is, an urban development project may mean mere practical cooperation or might constitute the first step towards the integration of radical elements in a city, which will result in peaceful living throughout the whole area. Second, city PD differs in essence from actions designed to promote the city as a brand: although both have positive consequences for citizens, the latter centers on the city as an entity and fosters the efforts made to present it in an attractive light,[29] whereas the first focuses on the interests of the citizenry and aspires to influence international political decisions that might affect city life.

Main Concepts

- PD is an act of communication.
- "Act of communication" includes the relational aspect of human communication and the attitude of the interlocutors, together with the means of establishing the dialogue and interacting with other parties.
- Diplomatic actions carried out by cities may be considered mainly as "public diplomacy": cities' ability to exert an influence is confined to the communication of values and principles that are transmitted through their local initiatives and actions.
- Narratives used in PD actions are more convincing and influential when reflecting the values and norms that identify the institution undertaking the diplomatic action. This harmony creates an external image of the institution that is plausible, attractive, and convincing. This "plausibility" and attraction" make the message persuasive and permit an effective use of *soft power.*
- City PD differs in essence from actions designed to promote the city as a brand: branding centers on the city as an entity; city diplomacy focuses on the interests of the citizenry and aspires to influence international political decisions.

European City Diplomacy Action as a Dynamic Model

The "multilevel governance" model is the EU's point of reference, both for the rest of Europe and for the whole world, in the process of political integration intended to assimilate into the decision-making process all those political entities that represent citizens' interests at every level of the public sphere.[30] The multilevel governance system stimulates interaction among actors located at different territorial levels, both in the domestic and the international arena, and in different sectors, both public and private. It is also called upon to encompass both vertical and horizontal dimensions of European activity. In short, as Van den Brande asserts, it is a "multi-level," "multi-actor," and "multi-chanelled" paradigm.[31] This model of governance generates a legal framework that greatly facilitates PD action by cities as it increases the possibilities of participating in the shaping of community policies: by creating platforms with other political actors in order to campaign for specific interests; by choosing the interlocutors within EU institutions that are regarded as the most suitable at any given moment; and by being able to intervene at any stage in the decision-making process.

Progressive Emergence of the European City

Historically speaking, cities have been an essential element in configuring European society. As Le Galès says, "Since the end of the Middle Ages, Western cities have been the crucible for the social, political, and economic organization of European nation-states."[32] As an agent of diplomacy, the city is the most ancient representative since its role as such dates back to Athens or Macedonia in Classical Greece, or to Venice and Milan in the Renaissance. The figure of the State that emerged with the Treaty of Westphalia shifted and limited cities' activity to specific actions, which were of little significance until after Second World War. At the end of this conflict, the activity of some cities on the border between France and Germany was effective in defusing local grievances.

From that moment onwards, twinning projects became widespread in Europe, as did bilateral collaboration agreements based on cultural exchanges or the sharing of experiences in order to solve common problems to both parties. Such projects, which have a long tradition in Europe, have involved a large number of cities,[33] both those situated on either side of national borders and those that are far away from each other.

In the mid-twentieth century, in addition to city-to-city cooperation, cities in Europe began the creation of networks and associations. This collaboration and the exchange of information among municipalities in multilateral organizations began to flourish; one example is the Council for European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR, 1951) or the International

Network for Urban Development (INTA, 1974). As of 1980, the city networks multiplied: in 1982 there were nine, and, in 2004, 49 were registered[34].

Since the 1980s, the EU has led city associations on the continent. Promoted by the new proposals of the Single European Act (1986), other organizations appeared, including Eurocities (1986); the European Networks of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy (REVES); the European Network of Medium Size Cities; and associations with more specific objectives, for example on media environment (the Council for Local Environmental Initiatives or Energie-Cités), climate (Climate Alliance), culture (Les Rencontres), urban policy (European Forum for Urban Policy) transportation (POLIS), or new communication technologies (TeleCities). In addition, the EU fostered associations united by their particular geographical position, like the Union for Baltic Cities or the Alliance of the Alps.[35] Other forms of city associations also appeared outside the EU framework, but within Europe (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe) or of global scope, under UN-Habitat project or within United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG).

Currently, the international actions of European cities are very varied and broad based; they create spaces where dialogue, exchange of experiences, and the organization of events with citizen participation favor public-city diplomacy. These activities may be considered a forward-thinking model that can provide, together with other initiatives, a point of reference for other regions of the world.

Institutional and Legal Frames

According to Papisca,[36] the EU boasts the most advanced legal recognition for local and regional governments and the greatest involvement of these in the development of programs and policies. This capacity for innovation is, largely, due to the earlier efforts of the Council of Europe,[37] which should not be ignored. The Council of Europe, through the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, must be recognized as the pioneer in the defense of local self-government and the precursor to the regulation of the international actions of local governments through its European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation (1980) and the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985), which were later improved by the addition of other conventions and protocols.[38] Particularly with reference to cross-border cooperation between local communities or authorities, the Council of Europe has succeeded in having states recognize local governments' right to international association when what is affected is the defense and promotion of citizens' interests.[39]

Building on this precedent, the EU has developed specific policies for promoting and institutionalizing the participation of local governments

in its institutional structure. The first and most important decision was to create the Committee of the Regions in 1994, as a direct result of the Treaty of Maastricht, which was intended to represent municipal and regional governments within the community framework. Its initial function was to act purely as a consultative body, but it has extended its powers over time, and has come to have a decisive influence. Recently, the Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced the power of the Committee of the Regions at the heart of the EU.

The European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) is a legal tool to promote cross-border, transnational, and interregional cooperation within the EU. It enables regions and cities authorities to team up for different purposes without any previous international agreement. As Papisca asserts, the EGTC "is the most advanced instrument on exercising territorial autonomy in the international system today":[40] first, because it is a real supranational legal instrument, not based on an agreement among states; second, because within the "European Grouping," local governments have similar ranking to states; and finally, because local authorities from non-EU members can join the EGTC if there is nothing in their legislation that contradicts European legislation. We must emphasize the influence of this last point in non-EU areas: not merely to acknowledge the power of town halls but to promote consistency with the European legal framework and the principles on which it is based.

Together with the EGTC, the EU is seriously committed to the "cohesion policy," already developed in the economic and social area, but also extended recently to the territorial concept. In this regard, the aim of the Union is to deliver "smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, while promoting harmonious development of the Union."[41] The "cohesion policy" is closely linked to the "Europe 2020" strategy, which is the European growth strategy for the next decade. An essential part of this policy occurs in the cities, through what is called the "Smart Cities" Project, which promotes sustained and integrated development, in which innovation and research have a major role to play.[42]

City Diplomacy in Action

To date, the European cities' interests in developing PD actions have focused mainly on self-interest matters, such as urban development (improvements in internal mobility, infrastructure or public spaces); sustainability and environmental issues (climate, energy and reducing pollution); and guaranteeing peace at their borders (conflict prevention and resolution, peace-building operations, postconflict reconstruction). But they are also involved in cooperation projects with developing countries (city-to-city cooperation, usually on municipal competencies). There are other dimensions, such as culture or business (exporting services,

knowledge, goods, or attracting investment, tourists, experts), which also draw other European cities' attention but which initiate activities that have usually been classified as city-branding.

The majority of these actions combine several interests, although some stand out as priority measures. For example, the construction of a sports stadium or a public square to promote the urban development of a city has implicit goals such as the integration of ethnic minorities, an improvement in political stability, conflict prevention and setting down principles in consonance with the social equality of its inhabitants.

There are four main types of strategies that European cities commonly develop: lobbying, by pressing international institutions—both at European or global level—promoting or implementing specific policies; knowledge-sharing, by exchanging ideas and practices among municipalities or joining others as project partners; cooperation, by training local councils from developing countries in municipal management or providing infrastructures; and mediation, by negotiating agreements between localities or as local problem-solving forums for specific social conflicts (community building, reconciliation, or social cohesion).

European cities principally act on the basis of three types of relationships: through bilateral agreements (city-to-city or twinning projects); participation in networks established with a thematic criterion or a common interest (European Coalition of Cities against Racism; Community of Ariane Cities for air transport or the Union of Capitals of the European Union); or within the framework established by the European institutions through working groups with stakeholders or multilevel governance arrangements. Lately, increased participation in global-governance networks is coming to the forefront, as is the case of UCLG, "Mayors for Peace" or UN-Habitat.

The size of the cities determines their field for action and amount of influence. Although many have direct representation in Brussels, the size of their population, the influence they have in the region to which they belong, or the human and economic resources they have at their disposal for European projects are determining factors. Thus, on many occasions small cities are excluded, at least within the EU context.[43] Their participation is also limited in the city networks: although some of these represent them directly (the European Network of Medium Size Cities), the majority demand a minimum of 250,000 inhabitants for inclusion as members (EUROCITIES, for example). On the contrary, the national capitals or those considered "major cities" due to their connections (Rotterdam, Barcelona, Milan, Frankfurt) invest considerable funds and efforts in their presence and influence and can be called "players in their own right and . . . underscore their role in the EU policy-making."[44]

European City Diplomacy: Main features

- Interests:
  - urban development
  - sustainability and environmental issues
  - guaranteeing peace at their borders
  - cooperation projects with developing countries
- Strategies:
  - dialogue at institutional level
  - knowledge sharing
  - cooperation
  - mediation

European City Diplomacy: Main scenarios

European city diplomacy occurs in different arenas. The simplest classification is geographical, which differentiates between two basic fields of action: activities inside Europe, the majority in the EU context; and actions carried out outside the borders of Europe. In a later section we will briefly discus the case of twinning projects, which occur in both areas.

Inside and Outside Europe

Within the European context, the primary aim of cities is to get community legislation and policies to favor their interests and to exchange experiences and knowledge with other cities on the challenges they face. Thus, their most frequent actions are exchange of ideas with European institutions and knowledge sharing. In short, the frameworks for these actions are two: programs designed by the EU and participation in city networks.

Channeling and Fostering Cities' Actions from Above

The Covenant of Mayors is an example of the first kind of initiative. In 2008, the European Commission provided the impetus for an agreement between mayors who undertake the task to encourage and support the efforts of local authorities in the application of sustainable energy policies,"[45] through regulations limiting carbon dioxide emissions. The Covenant of Mayors offers an opportunity to exchange experience, acquire prestige, and dialogue directly with the Commission, and is constructing a political and institutional framework to discuss environmental issues with a broad range of industries, business associations, and NGOs.[46]

Another initiative originated in the same way was URBACT, established in 2002 to promote the exchange of good praxes among cities and to help them to work together to find and share innovative, sustainable, and integrated solutions to major urban challenges.

The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC),[47] mentioned above, is quite different. In this case, the EU provides a legal framework to give and provide incentive to cross-border cooperation, cofinance part of the projects that are established, and supervise their results, but it also leaves space for the cities's initiatives in the area of activity they choose, and with whom they wish to sign cooperation agreements. This is a particularly effective framework for PD, because it requires collaboration to be established in accordance with European criteria, both in the area of values and aims, and in terms of the solvency of the local partner. Thus far, 30 projects have been developed within this framework: the most recent, created in March 2012 between Hungary and Slovenia, titled "Pannon," includes 47 towns in these two countries; it is aimed at promoting joint infrastructure development, cooperation in the health sector, local transport development, and employment, among other points.[48]

At the core of the Committee of the Regions, the cities' representatives defend their interests through participation in any of the six working commissions, plenary assemblies or platforms, and networks created. The Committee promotes transnational cooperation and the creation of clusters of cities with similar priorities and needs, but their participation cannot go beyond the discussion and proposal of ideas and frameworks for action.

Finally, EU institutions organize many forums, events,[49] and occasions for exchanging experiences between cities and other nonstate actors (companies, NGOs, professional associations), which also offer venues in which the cities' voices can be heard by the institutions. Open Days, EuropCom, and contact networks are the most usual channels for this, but direct contact with mayors is also important.[50] Nonetheless, the Committee of the Regions regards these channels as insufficient, and is exploring other, more modern and effective means of encouraging cities to participate, so that they can play a part above and beyond the prelegislative stages, and different participant categories will be recognized. .[51]

Influencing through Bottom-up Networks

Actions through transnational networks are of particular interest because they enable cities to act together, because they make their voice more effective and increase the pressure they can exert, and because they systematize activities that may still be considered innovative. As Saskia Sassen emphasizes, the influence of cities is greater when they belong to networks

that enable them to share and exchange know-how with other cities.[52] Networks are a specific frame for PD developments as their relations are characterized by processes that are more cognitive than bargaining.[53]

There are many criteria for the classification of the numerous networks existing in Europe: by mission, scale, actors,[54] and by leading organizations[55] (The Union of Capitals of the EU; The Council of European Municipalities and Regions); by type of relations, thematic area (European Network cities for Children) or membership type.[56]

There are two categories of dynamics inside any transnational municipal network:

- bottom-up dynamics, affecting the European policies in the favor of cities (lobbying),
- horizontal dynamics, which promotes the relationship between the cities in the network by discussing common problems and exchanging ideas regarding the main challenges they have to face (knowledge sharing).

In the first of these cases, bottom-up dynamics, the cities try to address the Commission directly,[57] but usually have to follow the above-mentioned routes already established by the EU. Their aim is to influence the deliberation and decision-making processes so that the resulting regulations will act in their favor and not against them. In these cases, the cities carry out different activities that are characteristic of advocacy communication or lobbying: first, direct contact through the regional offices in Brussels, or by contracting lobbying firms which act in the EU institutions area; second, indirect relations through member states, international or regional organizations, political parties, or more or less informal local networks; and finally, through the Committee of the Regions.[58]

An example of this is the current campaign developed by Eurocities. Eurocities is the network that brings together the major European cities and possesses the most prestige and influence.[59] Created in 1986, it currently includes over 140 municipalities with at least 240,000 inhabitants, from 30 different countries. The majority of its members belong to the EU, but cities in adjoining regions are also included: apart from Switzerland, there is representation from some of EU applicant states (such as Turkey, Croatia, and Macedonia) and from the Balkan area (Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).[60] In 2008, the Commission set up a scheme for a broad-ranging debate on the EU budget management in order to ensure it would be adequate for future demands. Because of this, EUROCITIES began to lobby tenaciously to, among other aims, permit cities to directly administer at least 5 percent of the budget assigned to each member state. The arguments put forward emphasize that the challenges presented at both a European and global level (social, economic, and climate changes; globalization . . .) are more significant

in the cities, which is where most of the population lives (approximately 75–80 percent). However, they also claim that the opportunities to bring about a clear change and to transmit European values are created at a local level.[61] The lobby strategy has been developed using the following factors: EUROCITIES has maintained frequent direct contacts with high-level Commission officials, has multiplied its involvement in different European media, and has created the "EU Budget Task Force" made up by representatives of EUROCITIES executive committee and also from the organization's thematic forums whose aim is to guarantee the coherency of its lobbying.

Aside from the results of this campaign, core European principles are displayed either by Eurocities' narratives (demanding subsidiarity, solidarity, and transparency) or by its actions (decentralization and multilevel governance). It must not be forgotten that the Eurocities area, as stated above, includes Turkish or Balkan cities, which may be inspired by these values. But the main achievement, according to Eurocities, is that it is contributing to the new discourses about and the image of Europe: "We are making cities part of a positive narrative about Europe's future, as crucial partners in delivering smart, sustainable and inclusive growth."[62]

In the second case, the horizontal relations between member-cities in the network encourage joint projects,[63] and the exchange of experiences creates knowledge and allows cities to promote new policies; the cities stimulate each other to apply measures for improvement and to develop coordinated public sensibility campaigns. Apart from the knowledge created by this *exchange*, the debates in the city networks can also *create new concepts* and policies, by behaving in a similar way to epistemic communities.[64] In this context, Eurocities is attempting to propose common European legislation on immigration. In doing so, first, it has first to bring together the vision of Northern Europe, where immigration is mainly for political reasons, and the South, where immigration is mainly motivated by economic factors.[65] Along the same lines, *Climate Alliance* has presented a methodology in its "10 Steps," to follow up climate change control, and also a Catalogue of Indicators to assess the measures applied.[66]

The transnational municipal networks have the power to persuade and influence their own members. Following Kern & Bulkeley's assertion:[67] networks do not have the authority to control or to sanction their members, thus they act by using soft or persuasive governing tools; therefore, actions must be exerted inside the transnational network to influence its own members. The most usual method is by giving awards or special mentions to those cities that are outstanding in some way. In Sweden, for example, a group of over 160 cities have created an independent commission, which awards those cities that manage to apply 50 percent of the practices for healthy cities established by the commission.

In terms of PD there is *raising society awareness* on problems that affect everyday city life. The thematic networks involved in environmental conservation are particularly productive in this area. *Energié-Cités*, for example, has a database for good praxis, which is available on its website, on CD-ROMs, or through its newsletter. It also organizes "study tours" for groups of municipal employees and politicians who want to visit a city in Europe where energy management is efficient and innovative.[68] *Climate Alliance* follows a similar strategy, not by merely giving information, but also by fostering successful initiatives in its monthly newsletter ("project of the month") and its award "Climate Star." Of special impact are out-of-the-ordinary events such as the "Car Free Day" or the "Mobility Week," organized by *Cities for Climate Protection* and *Climate Alliance*.

City Diplomacy Activity Outside Europe

In this final scenario, the diplomacy of the cities outside Europe and the PD that accompanies them, is usually carried out in three different ways: participation in projects of the European Neighborhood Policy, collaboration with organizations with global scope (UN-Habitat; United Cities and Local Governments), and, finally, cooperative programs with former colonies with which commercial or cultural links are maintained. In this scenario, the most significant mission is the transmission of European values and principles and the opportunity for other cultures to benefit from or be influenced by them. The most frequent actions are those of cooperation and mediation, depending on whether the project prioritizes social development or conflict prevention. Whether the projects are proposed by the EU or are initiatives of the cities, they imply dialogue and joint work with the communities designated for assistance and, therefore, is opportunities to develop that diplomacy that is proper to PD.

The opportunities of developing actions congruous to PD (dialogue and exchange, communication) mainly occur in three stages: in the project design, in its development and application, and in the effects the action has on the population. We can also state, in agreement with Kiel, that the helpful attitude of the European municipal employees in other places in itself reflects positively on the Union, and shows the plausibility of its principles of solidarity, equality, and defense of human dignity.[69] In both the project design process—always in collaboration with the local partner—and its development, the European and non-European municipal employees in charge of dialogue discuss and exchange experiences with each other and also with the local people, who are directly or indirectly involved in the project.

The majority of transfrontier contacts are developed in the framework of the *European Neighborhood Policy, ENP* or in that of the

Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Frameworks that have been created and managed by the Committee for the Regions, the European External Action Service, and the Neighborhood Policy of the Commission are the Mediterranean Partnership (ARLEM, 2012) and the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP, 2011) established with the Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Moldavia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.[70] These encourage cooperation between EU cities and those in neighboring countries, creating "spaces for justice, freedom and security" between nations that are linked together by migratory movements, thus making it simpler for citizens of non-EU states and member states to integrate and discourage illegal migration.[71]

One of the most effective projects in this framework established by the Commission and the Committee of the Regions are the CIUDAD project (Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue) and GOSPEL project, which aim to promote mutual understanding, dialogue, and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the Partner Countries of the Eastern and Southern Neighborhood. Specifically, its goals are to consolidate a concept of sustainable urban development, create partnerships among local authorities, and strengthen coordination between regional and municipal levels of government.

A good example is the "Sustainable Urban Development" project carried out by Poland to share its experiences with other cities located in Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia. Its aims were to promote underprivileged towns through the implementation of appropriate management and to increase the involvement of citizens in local development. The strategies of PD developed were the creation of working groups where consulting and advice were provided by Polish experts, strategic plans were presented to citizens and stakeholders, and published on the Internet and in booklets. Moreover, the involvement of NGOs was encouraged by a regranting program and engagement in 16 mini-projects in small cities. These projects have helped to attract the public to the process of strategic planning and to take into account the interests of young people, women, and the disabled. Simultaneously, placement of information in the media (93 pieces in print media, 14 videos, 52 pieces in online publications) was provided. European values such as citizen participation, transparency, accountability, and subsidiarity were exhibited throughout the whole action.

Europe has a significant *influence on global networks*. The European section of the UCLG (through the Council of European Municipalities and Regions) participates actively within the organization and collaborates in leading global initiatives. This is also the case of "Mayors for Peace," created to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the East Project where European cities share "good praxes" with Indian and Chinese municipalities through the organization of seminars. European cities also collaborate regularly with UN-Habitat. In addition, Europe houses a

significant number of global city networks headquarters: with reference only to sustainability, of 53 world organizations, 28 have their headquarters in Europe, mainly in Brussels (8), Paris (6) and Barcelona (4).[72]

Regarding participation in global fora, both the Commission and the Committee of the Regions have been extremely active, including delegations of mayors and other types of municipal representation at UN summit meetings such as Rio+20, in agreements with countries like the United States (United States Mayors Conference), or at international conferences organized in Europe such as that organized with Chinese cities in Brussels on September 20, 2012. As Thieule states, "It is a way of putting the European urban development model on the world stage."[73]

Cities also undertake a large number of *projects in the area of cooperation* for development. In most cases, these are carried out in cities of former European colonies (Spainish cities in Latin America, French cities in North Africa, and the Dutch cities in Indonesia) The type of collaboration generally depends on the specific development needs of the target area or awareness of conflicts. Some examples of the first type are the cases of Madrid, which provides help training local politicians in Ecuador through local NGOs,[74] and Barcelona, which has aided Maputo in setting up a system for organizing and classifying municipal registries and documents[75]

Cities in Europe has also developed—and is still developing—specific actions for mediation in cases of conflict: (1) within their own urban space, through social integration schemes;[76] (2) between different European cities, to regulate the movement of minorities and guarantee them protection and health care; (3) or beyond the EU borders. The Cities for Local Integration Policy (which includes 35 European cities and 6 universities) or the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East, amongst others, develop regular programs and events to foster relations among citizens beyond political discrepancies. The town of Dunkirk built a library and park in Gaza, and both the mayor of Gaza, Majed Abu Ramadan, and the Israeli mayor of Ness-Ziona, Yossi Shvo, acknowledge the positive effects of these facilities in promoting peaceful coexistence among the population.[77]

Another way to promote peace is to foster cultural exchange. Together with ARCADE—the culture and development program promoted by the Commission—there are others such as the European New Towns Platform, LabforCulture, or CulturCooperation e.V., whose main aim is the creation of numerous and varied events: consciousness-raising activities and publications and programs to promote exchange between artists and culturally creative people from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe in a local context. All of the above foster European values such as freedom of speech and the protection of cultural diversity, with clear effects in strengthening peaceful coexistence in multiracial or multicultural societies.

European City Diplomacy: Main Scenarios

- **City diplomacy in Europe**
- PD actions: Dialogue with EU institutions and knowledge sharing.
- Frameworks: Designed by the EU and participation in city networks.
  - EU initiative: Covenant of Majors; EGTC; Committee of the Regions.
  - Cities' initiative: Transnational municipal networks
    - Bottom up dynamics
    - Horizontal dynamics
- **City diplomacy outside Europe**
  - PD actions: cooperation & mediation
  - Frameworks:
    - European Neighborhood Policy & Euro-Mediterranean Conf.
    - Collaboration with global networks
    - City-to-city cooperation

The Traditional "Twinning Projects" Formula.

This is the most traditional type of PD between cities in Europe, and, after Second World War, they were extremely effective and produced peaceful relations between local communities in France and Germany. They have also been crucial in the European integration process, particularly through cultural exchange, where they demonstrated that the diversity of European culture did have a common denominator.

In fact, these projects have been useful in bringing to light those aspects that make up European cultural identity, while simultaneously emphasizing local diversity and pluralism. The actions developed in this framework are classics in cultural diplomacy: organization of exhibitions and events with displays of cultural heritage, the creativity of contemporary artists, or joint celebrations of anniversaries or commemorations of common European culture. A good example was the commemoration of the birth of Beethoven.[78] Birmingham, Bologna, Kraków, Kiev, Lyons, and Leipzig, thanks to their twinning programs, celebrated the anniversary by welcoming six quartets of young musicians who played a program of Beethoven's music.

Currently, twin cities in Europe are as not as active as before. The main objectives of these agreements have been assumed by the city networks and although many twin town projects still exist, they function at a friendship level. However, they are still a powerful tool for capacity building, learning, and economic and social development in developing countries.[79] This cooperation formula, also called city-to city cooperation (or C2C),

is the basis for many cooperative development projects. Thus, Marseilles (France) in cooperation with Split (Croatia), Hamburg and Trondheim (Norway) designed and built sports facilities for the disabled in the cities of Yerevan (Armenia) and Mahdia (Tunisia).

Conclusions: Projecting an Image of Europe

The analysis of the narratives of European city diplomacy and the way in which they have been carried out, lead to the following conclusions:

- On the whole, European cities transmit innovative ideas to the global community in terms of: (1) the effectiveness of overcoming national differences in order to defend common interests that directly benefit the people; (2) the importance of constant innovation, of sharing knowledge, and of education facilitating instruction rather than social or technical management; (3) the significance of acting in a joint, coordinated, and solidary way, through networks that allow for the production of common proposals and action; (4) the obligation to use initiative and independence to accept the new functions that globalization creates as a political and social agent, by intervening in the decision-making processes of international organizations and being involved in cooperation for development and peace; (5) the relevance of defending the environment in the urban area, creating healthy spaces that guarantee sustainable development and building awareness among the citizenry of the need to change some of its habits; (6) the obligation to preserve local diversity (language, culture, tradition) while simultaneously fostering unity in defense of basic common values; (7) the conviction that contribution to economic development and social interaction at a local level reduces possible conflicts and favors dialogue between communities; (8) the conviction that all international actions should be developed with multilateral planning; and (9) finally, they confirm that global problems are resolved at local levels.
- Bearing in mind the values we have identified as properly European (the active search for peace, cooperation with local civil society, defense of human rights, of cultural diversity and democratic principles, the exercise of the state of law, multilateralism and interest in developing a good neighbor policy), there seems to be a correct harmonious relationship between the identity of the EU or of European culture as a whole with the narrative used by the cities in their PD actions.
- On the issue of behavior, cities show a clear disposition to (1) dialogue at all stages of the design and accomplishment of the projects; (2) collaboration with the different representatives of civil society (NGOs, minorities, professional associations); (3) offering the knowledge

acquired through their own experience; (4) adaptation to local necessities and achieve mutual understanding through the involvement of the target audience in their aims; and (5) fostering interaction at foreign and domestic levels through an increase in the presence and participation of ordinary individuals.

In accordance with the conditions that define the effective exercise of the so-called new PD, European cities have great potential, with the capacity to heighten their ability to influence and engage others. European cities have experience in interaction with their audience and the establishment of networks and contacts among ordinary people: they are more effective than other political institutions in informing citizens and guaranteeing transparency, as well as empowering citizen participation. Cities are qualified to replace a unilateral information strategy (top-down information flow) with communication that facilitates listening and dialogue (two-way information flow or network communication),[80] allowing for real dialogue to take place at the local level. Municipalities are very effective in stimulating local activities and organizing events that easily involve ordinary people. By doing so, cities can give in-depth consideration to the views of domestic and foreign audiences and shape their international goals in accordance with those views.[81]

There is significant agreement on the current discourse of the EU, both on interests (sustainable development, cooperation, and peace in transfrontier areas, unemployment, social integration of minorities) and on fostering relations with the citizens and recognizing their concerns and needs. The cities, because of their proximity to citizens, their democratic legitimacy and above all their capacity to deliver, are effective representatives of the civil population, and their commitment and involvement with European policies guarantee that the citizens are aware of and debate those policies in harmony with the EU approaches and priorities, regardless of the debate between the member states and whatever disagreements may arise between them[82].

Notes

★ The author is very grateful for Joyce Baptista's helpful collaboration on this chapter.

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34. See J. Friedman, "Intercity Networks in a Globalized Era" in *Global City Regions-Trends, Theory, Policy,* ed. A. J. Scott (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2001), 119–36.
35. See M. Keiner and K. Arley, "Transnational City Networks for Sustainability," *European Planning Studies* 15, no. 10 (2007): 1369–95; P. John, "The Europeanization of Sub-national Governance," *Urban Studies* 37, no. 5–6 (2000): 877–94.
36. See A. Papisca, "International Law and Human Rights as a Legal Basis for the International Involvement of Local Governments," in Musk et al., *City Diplomacy*, 27–46.
37. The Council of Europe represents 47 countries and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities brings together over 200,000 local authorities.
38. See Papisca, "International Law and Human Rights."
39. Specifically, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities set a differentiation of areas of action: "cross-border cooperation," established with local governments of adjoining countries; "interterritorial cooperation," established with those from nonadjoining areas; and "transnational cooperation," which covers larger areas and involves at least two EU members and/or non-EU members.
40. Papisca, "International Law and Human Rights," 41.
41. See European Commission, "Conclusions of the 5th Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion,." Brussels, 9.11.2010 COM (2010): 642 Final.
42. Declaration from all EU capital mayors: Launch of new dialogue with EC on Europe's recovery. (February 28, 2013) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010–2014/hahn/headlines/news/detail
43. See C. Schultze, "Cities and EU Governance: Policy-Takers or Policy-Makers?" *Regional and Federal Studies* 13, no. 1, (2003): 121–47.
44. Schultze, "Cities and EU Governance," 122.
45. http://www.pactodelosalcaldes.eu/about/covenant-of-mayors_es.html.
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47. Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC)
48. http://www.pannonegtc.eu/
49. One example of this is the nomination of the European Culture Capitals, the "Golden Broom" for the cleanest cities, and the "Blue Flag" for the ones with the best environment.

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51. Conversation with Mr. Thomas Wobben. Head of Unit. Committee of the Regions. Directorate E. Horizontal policies and networks + European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation. July 11, 2012.
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57. Conversation with Paul Bevan. Secretary General of Eurocities. July 13, 2012.
58. Conversation with Bevan, July 13, 2012.
59. R. Payre, "The Importance of Being Connected. City Networks and Urban Government: Lyon and Eurocities (1990–2005)," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34, no. 2 (2010): 260–80; T. Baycan, A. Gülümser, and S. Kundak, 'Success Conditions for Urban Networks: Eurocities and Sister Cities," *European Planning Studies* 28, no. 2 (2010): 1187–206.
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62. See "Eurocities: Approach and Impact," September 2012.
63. See Baycan, Gülümser, and Kundak, "Success Conditions for Urban Networks."
64. K. Kern, "Transnationale Städtenetzwerke in Europa," in *Empirische Policy- und Verwaltungsforschung. Lokale, nationale und international Perspektiven,* ed. E. Schröter (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001). Quoted in K. Kern and H. Bulkeley, "Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks," *Journal of Communication Market Stu*dies 47. no. 2 (2009): 309–32.
65. Conversation with Ramón Sanahuja Vélez. Director. Immigration and Intercultural Service. Barcelona City Council. Director of the Eurocities' working group on "Immigration and Interculturality," July 4, 2012.
66. Climate Alliance. http://www.klimabuendnis.org/
67. Kern and Bulkeley, "Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance."
68. Energie-Cités, 2007.
69. W. P. Kiel, "The Case for Localized Public Diplomacy" in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. N. Snow and Philip Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 212–24.
70. These assemblies have two types of activity: facilitate guidance for actions of the Commission and promote participation of cities in the Commission's international activities. The two platforms are composed of local authorities from the countries that participate in the European Neighborhood Policy.
71. Conversation with Mr. Santiago Mondragón. Administrator. Committee of the Regions. Cabinet of the President. July 13, 2012

72. A. Gutierrez Camps, "The International Dimension of Second-Level Local Governments: The Case of the Province of Barcelona," paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Montreal, Canada (2011).
73. Conversation with Mr Laurent Thieule. Director. Committee of the Regions. Communication, Press, Events. July 12, 2012.
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75. Conversation with Mrs. Mónica Batlle, Deputy Director. Barcelona City-council. Department of International Relations, July 2, 2012.
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CHAPTER SIX

The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy

SIMON DUKE

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and public diplomacy (PD). The rationale for this particular focus lies in the confluence of the institutional changes within the European Union (EU) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, which has placed the EEAS as a core facilitator at the heart of the EU's external relations. The latent potential in the EEAS to instill more coherence, effectiveness, and visibility in the external actions of the EU may well have positive side-effects for PD.

The chapter acknowledges though that there are also profound challenges to the external aspects of EU PD. Many of the challenges are specific to the EU and a good number arise from uncertainties arising from the Lisbon Treaty itself, while others are more generic in nature and apply with equal force to PD elsewhere in the EU institutions, or even to the national context. In order to understand the potential impact of the EEAS on EU PD it is therefore necessary to briefly review the pre-Lisbon practices. The later sections will consider the EEAS itself and, in particular, the EU's delegations that are an integral part of the EEAS.

The contribution is divided into six sections. The first considers the meaning of PD with particular reference to the European level. The intermestic (one that blends the international and domestic aspects of a policy or issue) nature of the EU's PD is noted as a distinguishing feature.[1] The second section presents a brief overview of the pre-Lisbon practice of PD, its challenges, and shortcomings. The influence of the "pillarisation" of the EU on PD in particular will be considered. The third section will consider the post-Lisbon context and the core role of the EEAS with regard to PD. The following section will focus on the EU delegations that are at the

coalface in terms of the Union's external PD. The fifth section will briefly touch upon digital diplomacy, which is a growing aspect of PD, including in the EU context. The final section will consider the principal challenges facing the EU and, more specifically, the EEAS in its external PD.

Public Diplomacy and the European Context

A succinct version of the Commission's understanding of PD was provided as part of a booklet produced on the occasion of the EU's fiftieth anniversary celebrations:[2]

> Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU's goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media.

This rather broad definition captures the essence of the EU's internal and external PD. In essence, it is about self-image, or the image that a given actor intends to project to a third party. The EU's PD is complicated by the imprecise nature of the EU's overall *actorness* or, put more simply, the type of actor the EU wishes to become on the international stage.[3] This is in part due to the fact that the EU is an ongoing project, lacking *finalité* but may also lie in a broader post–Cold War existential crisis about who and what the EU is on the global stage.

To pick up on a theme from the first chapter, PD can be closely equated with the notions of identity, norms, and narratives. The three notions are actually interconnected in the sense that the identity of the EU is very much driven by the promotion of norms, or its core values and principles, and this is part of the metanarrative of the postmodern Union. But, as it stands, this is something of an idealized image of the EU's PD since, as will be explored below, all three notions are subject to contestation and even discordant narratives emanating from other EU institutions or the member states.

One of the complicating factors when considering the EU's PD is that, historically, it has been directed primarily inward. PD is more normally associated with its international aspect, "directed towards foreign publics and conducted abroad."[4] In the case of the EU the internal aspects of PD are very much part of the construction of the identity and narratives that are employed externally. As a result, the distinctions between the internal and external aspects of PD have become increasingly difficult to maintain, especially in a saturated media environment where domestic and foreign audiences have equal access to official information.

The complex linkage between the internal and external dimensions of EU PD is perhaps best thought of as a self-reaffirming process, whereby the messages communicated internally are also directed externally as part of the Union's ongoing internal identity construction. This melding of

the internal and external aspects of policies, or the intermestic dimension, applies with particular force to the EU's PD. The international projection of the EU relies heavily upon the promotion of the "domestic" Union as exemplar—"you too could be like us." The legitimacy of the internal identity construction, the acceptance of norms, and the consensus around narrative will therefore do much to determine the legitimacy of external PD to both EU citizens (who wish to see reflections of themselves) and to third parties (who wish to see the virtues of the European example reflected towards themselves).

The draft Communication Strategy for the EU's External Policy 2006–9, presented to the Commission by the then Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, makes the symbiotic nature of the internal and external aspects of EU PD clear:

> The task before us is therefore to . . . better inform a broader audience in third countries about the Union's policies, but also about its underpinning values and objectives as global actor [sic.]. This includes communication about the external consequences and projections of the EU's internal developments and policies.
>
> In addition, there is a need to maintain a more sustained, open dialogue with the public *within the EU on the Union's external policy*. A stronger focus on this area would reflect the increasing importance of the external dimension of the Union's activities.[5]

According to this logic, if the EU promotes itself as a paragon of peaceful coexistence, or an area of "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights," it must be seen to be so internally or else the external PD will ring hollow.[6] This notion is reinforced by the Treaty on European Union, which, if anything, is even more explicit about the external objectives and principles than the internal aspects.[7] The key external messages have either concentrated on exporting the EU's "model," which includes its normatively laden values and principles or, on more specific matters, it often takes the form of *infopolitik*.[8]

At a more practical level, the intermestic nature of the EU's PD is evident when it is borne in mind that the EU has no less than 164 national missions accredited to the EU and 36 international organizations and other representations—making it one of the largest diplomatic communities globally.[9] The first stop in terms of the external dimensions of the EU's PD is therefore Brussels itself where embassies, consulates, and missions, as well as foreign NGOs, are privy to internal debates and developments within the EU. The EEAS has made considerable efforts to engage with the international press located in Brussels, much of which is oriented towards the member-states themselves. A striking example would be a debate—to which press were invited—involving a critical assessment of French military operations in Mali and the weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in which senior European Parliamentarian and EEAS officials participated.[10]

The EU's efforts to conduct its PD have been frustrated on occasion by the PD of the member-states. Margot Wallström, at the time vice-president of the European Commission responsible for institutional relations and communication strategy, made the point rather directly:

> As you well know, national governments like to claim credit for EU decisions that prove popular and to blame "Brussels" for the unpopular ones. All too often they fail to explain to their citizens why and how these decisions were taken. The result is that too many people are ill-informed about European issues and many have a negative image of the EU. That can lead to big political problems.[11]

The problem is equally frustrating when it comes to the external dimensions of PD that, from a national perspective, is often viewed as an integral part of *national* diplomacy (even if at arm's length on occasion) aimed at "country projection and brand promotion" with relatively little focus on engaging civil society.[12] The inclusion of highly sensitive cultural aspects, such as those designed to foster the greater use of particular languages internationally (in the case of France this is a specific *foreign policy* aim which is echoed by Germany and Spain), can also shape individual national perspectives on the role and space for EU-level PD.

By way of contrast, the EU as well as other bodies like the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are more likely to focus more on transversal policy issues, such as climate change, migration, or human rights, which tends to demand a more diversified approach to PD in terms of the referents and policy scope. This is certainly the case with the EU where the intermestic nature of its PD implies the presence of many potential referents, across many themes and geographical areas, circumscribed by the parameters of PD as practiced by the EU's institutions and the member-states themselves.

EU Public Diplomacy Pre-Lisbon

Much has already been written on the pre-Lisbon aspects of EU PD, its actors, and their various roles.[13] This section will therefore only offer a brief review and will not attempt to be exhaustive. The key purpose of this section is to highlight a number of unresolved issues surrounding EU PD and to give the reader a clearer idea of the challenges ahead for the EEAS.

The first and most obvious characteristic of pre-Lisbon PD is that it was highly fragmented. The "pillarization" of the EU into distinct policy areas, of which foreign and security policy was one, meant that PD was conducted by the Council Secretariat and the Commission with variable degrees of connectivity. The Council Secretariat was represented primarily in this realm by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP from 1999 until 2009. He was supported by his spokesmen, a number of Special

Representatives appointed by the Council and a Directorate-General for Communication, Information Policy and Protocol.

On the Commission side PD relied heavily on providing "information" to both EU citizens as well as to a wider global public. The principal (passive) vehicle was the network of EU Information Centres (EU-i) first established in the 1960s. The EU-i centers originally started off under the aegis of the European Commission's DG Communications but responsibility for the external relations aspects were transferred to DG External Relations (Relex), which covered the Relex "family." The information centers now number over 500 worldwide, with multiple centers in the larger EU strategic partners. The centers have evolved from primarily documentation centers to more demand-driven computer-based services. This approach serves as a good example of the tendency to equate the notion of PD with *infopolitik*, which, bearing in mind the responsibility of DG Relex for providing a sizeable portion of the original staff for the EEAS, is a significant legacy problem.[14]

PD within the Relex *famille* was coordinated through the Relex Information Committee (RIC). The monthly meetings of the committee assembled the relevant personnel from other parts of the extended *famille*, which included DG Development, Trade, AIDCO (Europe Aid), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), ELARG (Enlargement), PRESS, ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), as well as Relex itself. The information budgets within the seven DG's represented in RIC represented around 70 officials and a budget of €30–40 million per annum.[15] The committee had a second equally important function, which was to ensure that the communications of the delegations to third parties reflected the views of the Commission as a whole and not only those of DG's Relex and Dev. At a more general level, the Inter-Institutional Group for Information (IGI) meets frequently at vice-president level to coordinate a variety of information issues.

In spite of the positive role of the RIC, the Commission's overall PD effort was disjointed. This gave rise to three principal challenges. First, as observed, there was a lack of horizontal devices to link PD across the EU institutions, including the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and, increasingly, the European Parliament as well.

The second problem, which stemmed from the pillarization of EU external relations, was the heavy emphasis upon community resources for PD. This led to the predictable situation where the foreign and security policy aspects (CFSP) had little in the way of resources and thus were stymied in their ability to present these critical aspects. The Commission's delegations were at the forefront of the Commission's PD efforts but since they did not represent the CFSP or ESDP aspects, this led to the development of a "consumer oriented" diplomacy, catering to the technical assistance and information for the local communities.[16]

The third weakness was the lack of a big picture or overarching strategic context within which to locate the EU's external PD. As a consequence there is little to indicate priorities or hierarchy between the 134 country strategies, numerous thematic (counter-terrorism, nonproliferation or

sustainable development) and even continental strategies (Asia, Arctic, or Africa) often led to confusion regarding the principal objectives of the Union's PD. One discernible theme for the EU's pre-Lisbon PD is often seen as stemming from the Union's normative nature, stressing the EU's values and principles. This has, however, frequently chimed awkwardly with the predominant trade or energy interests of the member states, as in the case of much of Asia or Russia. The default therefore tended to be the provision of "basic information" to media and policymakers.[17] This led observers like Dov Lynch to conclude that the EU "does not conduct PD. Its overall philosophy is that of information dissemination. This means that Union activities are information-led and passive. The focus falls heavily on 'what we say' rather than 'what they hear'."[18]

It is also worth noting that much of the pre-Lisbon PD was based around the Commission's 2006–2009 Communication Strategy, mentioned above. This has not been updated with any comprehensive Communication Strategy linking the different actors involved in the external aspects of PD. The lack of an overarching strategic perspective that informs and shapes the EU's external actions has reinforced the tendency to stress information dissemination *qua* PD.

EU Public Diplomacy and the EEAS

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty PD is no longer conducted exclusively by the Council Secretariat and the Commission, but also by the EEAS. The advent of the EEAS held the promise of linking together strategic communication, PD, and stakeholder engagements in ways that had hitherto eluded the EU with the intention of creating an overall communication culture extending across the EU institutions involved in external actions (which is nearly all). Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also a vice-president of the Commission, under the Lisbon Treaty contributed to these expectations in her "Step Change" document when she spoke about the need for "a professional communications structure in order to engage all stakeholders and public opinion. This is important within the EU as well as to the outside world." The EEAS must also, "above all," have a "strong and substantive media operation, in order to deal effectively with a global, 24 hour news culture that requires information and comment." She also noted the need to manage "dialogue with civil society, NGOs, and other nonstate actors, and make use of new electronic and social media, etc, in attracting interest, shaping debate and building understanding on foreign policy issues." Finally, she noted the need for better integration of the EU delegations "in the promotion of EU interests, requiring better briefing and debriefing of Delegations."[19]

Other ideas regarding the EEAS and PD soon landed on the table. A Greek so-called nonpaper (a discussion document not representing an official position), presented to the Political and Security Committee,

argued that there is a need to "ensure that the EU's means and resources in the field of PD are commensurate with the EU's new ambitions for a more coherent and active foreign and security policy."[20] The Greek non-paper had many positive attributes, but it also dodged some important questions. The first issue is *what* should be communicated in terms of the central themes of EU PD or, as it was put by Herman van Rompuy, the first president of the European Council under the Lisbon Treaty, "how to deal, as Europe, with the rest of the world."[21]

The essence of this question was posed by the Lisbon Treaty (amending the founding treaties of the European Union), which aimed to make a more coherent, effective and visible EU. These were also questions that EU leaders, heads of state and government, think tanks, and others were supposed to be debating. Whatever debates started were soon extinguished by the all-encompassing debates surrounding economic governance and the global financial crisis. In an unfortunate confluence, the more existential crisis about the EU's role in the world that existed prior to the Lisbon Treaty, was overtaken by a real-world crises (notably the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone), with as yet unclear consequences for the EU's PD.

It was against this almost perfect storm of an international system in flux since the end of the Cold War, the EU suffering from internal doubts due initially to the prolonged process of passing the Lisbon Treaty and then the "eurozone" crisis, that the EEAS was born. The EEAS was only part of a more substantial institutional upheaval in the external relations of the EU that also included the introduction of the role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice-president of the Commission (henceforth HR/VP). The treaty also saw the European Council become an institution in its own right, with a full time president. The virtual disappearance of the rotating presidency system, held by member states for six months, was a further significant change. The former role of the rotating presidency of the Council was now assumed by the aforementioned president of the European Council, the High Representative and a permanent chair of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).[22]

In PD terms the Lisbon Treaty changes offered the potential for a more consistent message, especially in the absence of the rotating presidency which tended to introduce new priorities into external relations following the proclivities of the particular member state for the duration of their tenure at the helm. On the other hand, the list of actors at the top levels remained extensive and would require considerable coordination between those aspects of PD falling under CFSP (involving the president of the European Council, the High Representative, the EEAS, and the member state) and those falling under the Commission (involving the president of the Commission and nearly all directorates-general that in some way, shape, or form have an external mandate). The challenge facing the potential actors at various levels vis-à-vis PD was therefore one of coordination if key themes and messages were to be disseminated effectively regarding the EU's external action. Going back to the discussion above, it

is also important to bear in mind that communicating the EU's external relations is at least as important within the EU as it is to third parties.

The role of the HR/VP, with her multihatted role spanning the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the EU aspects of external action, makes her PD role especially visible. During 2011, the first year of the Service's existence, the High Representative and the EEAS issued 593 statements and declarations (including 328 statements by the High Representative, 128 spokesperson's statements, 51 local EU statements and 86 declarations of the High Representative on behalf of the member states. The figures for 2012 were broadly similar.[23] The importance of her role in this context was foreseen in the lead-up to the creation of the EEAS.

The High Representative's March 25, 2010 draft Council decision establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS, stated that it would be responsible for "communication and PD" and that there should be a department for "information and PD"; an attached organigram, showing "Basic Structures" of the EEAS dutifully represented a box for communication and PD.[24] In the initial concept of the EEAS the newly appointed HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, recommended that within its central administration there should be "departments for inter-institutional relations, information and PD, internal audit and inspections, and personal data protection."[25] An annex to this document lists the departments and functions to be transferred to the EEAS from the Commission and Council Secretariat. These include "all information and PD sections and staff" from DG Relex's External Service (i.e., the delegations and Relex K staff).[26]

The draft was rapidly rejected by the European Parliament, necessitating a major redraft, which was then presented by the High Representative on July 26, 2010. The new draft also foresaw a department for "information and public diplomacy" and specified that all information and PD sections and staff in the (Commission's) External Service should be transferred to the Service.[27] Following the adoption of the decision by the Council and the approval of the necessary amendments to the financial and staff regulations by the European Parliament, the EEAS became a working reality on January 1, 2011. The EEAS's organigram includes a division called "Foreign Policy Instruments" (FPI).[28] The FPI includes responsibility for "Public diplomacy and election observation," which includes the budgetary aspects. Part of FPI's mandate is to implement tenders on "media relations and media promotion through notably audiovisual, web products and printed products, and well as through other communication and information initiatives related EU actions and policies in the field of external relations."[29]

The FPI was created by the Commission in October 2010 and falls under the political responsibility of the HR/VP (in her *latter* guise) but, "the Commission shall be responsible for their financial implementation under the authority of the High Representative in her capacity as vice-president of the Commission."[30] This is a slight oddity of the Service since PD in the EEAS is conducted through Strategic Communications

and the delegations, but the FPI manages the budgetary aspects of the EU delegations PD that fall under the Commission's budget. In spite of the fact that the FPI works very closely with the EEAS and other parts of the Commission, it seems increasingly anomalous for the FPI to retain the budgetary authority over a significant aspect of the Service's PD. The EEAS budget covers administrative credits and, within the existing budgetary structures, the only possible way of shifting the PD budget towards the Service itself would be to redesignate this part of the Commission's budget as administrative credits. To add to an already complicated situation, some aspects of PD fall directly under the HR/VP such as the communication and PD aspects of election observation missions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

The lack of an obvious link between the FPI, Strategic Communication and Strategic Planning, as well as the relevant desks in the crisis management bodies, leaves the HR/VP as the critical link. The attendant complications include potentially slow response time, by the time all of the parties are consulted, and it may also promulgate the top-down communications tendencies that have already been noted in the early years of the Service. The placement of the responsible structures and the funding authority within the EEAS (proper) would facilitate more effective "mainstreaming" of key messages that should apply to the horizontal and geographical desks and, beyond that, to the delegations themselves.

In practice, the EEAS's response to the "perfect storm," described above has been mixed. In the shorter term the sovereign debt crisis, or the "eurozone crisis" as it is often known, has undoubtedly thrown up some severe challenges for EU PD. Since the internal market is the core of post-war European integration, any threat to its stability or even existence is bound to have negative knock-on effects for the external aspects of PD.

A Crisis for EU Public Diplomacy?

The policies pursued under German leadership will likely hold the euro together for an indefinite period, but not forever. The permanent division of the European Union into creditor and debtor countries with the creditors dictating terms is politically unacceptable for many Europeans. If and when the euro eventually breaks up it will destroy the common market and the European Union. Europe will be worse off than it was when the effort to unite it began, because the breakup will leave a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility. The later it happens, the worse the ultimate outcome. That is such a dismal prospect that it is time to consider alternatives that would have been inconceivable until recently.

George Soros, The Tragedy of the European Union and how to resolve it. September 27, 2012 in "The New York Review of Books."

It would, nevertheless, be wrong to portray EU PD, or more specifically that of the EEAS, as in crisis. There have been, admittedly rare, opportunities for the Service to promote a positive image of the Union and to reinforce the centrality of norms and principles in the Union's external action. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 to the EU was an open goal in PD terms.[31]

At Last, Some Good News...

"I am delighted at the news that the European Union has been awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, in recognition of its work on reconciliation, democracy, promotion of human rights and in enlarging the area of peace and stability across the continent.

In the countries of the EU, historic enemies have become close partners and friends.

I am proud to be part of continuing this work. The creation of the European External Action Service has enabled us to develop a comprehensive approach to better promote Europe's core values throughout the world.

I will continue to work tirelessly to drive this process forward."

Statement by EU High Representative on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union, Brussels, October 12, 2012.

It would also be wrong to leave the reader with the impression that the positive aspects of EEAS PD are circumstance-driven or a matter of serendipity. One particularly striking example of a positive PD drive, based on wider policy initiatives shared across the EU institutions and with a number of international partners, is the "Working with women" initiative. This has multiple facets to it: a broad geographical spread, and is designed to foster awareness of women's issues over a sustained period of time. The tools of PD range from the well conceived website, to conferences in different venues, surveys, and cultural and awareness events built around key days, such as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women or International Women's Day.[32]

There are also examples of coordination challenges stemming from the first year of the EEAS's existence, which coincided with the crisis in Egypt in January 2011. The death of demonstrators in Egypt led to a statement by the High Representative on January 27, 2011, followed by another on January 28. The following day, January 29, 2011, the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, issued a statement on events in Egypt, saying pretty much the same as the statements of the High Representative. The situation was then compounded by

separate statements from Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy, again calling for the avoidance of all violence against unarmed citizens. It could be argued that the same essential message coming from multiple sources strengthens the EU's external actions, but in this case it led to consternation and confusion.

Any coherent external PD must also complement the internal PD efforts conducted through the Commission's DG Communication. Post-Lisbon coordination in this domain falls to the Relex Information Committee's successor, the External Relations Information Committee (ERIC), which carries out the same coordinating role as its predecessor under the aegis of the Strategic Communications Division in the EEAS. The same division produces the daily "Lines To Take" that are distributed to all heads of delegation and press and information officers. These are crucial to the work of delegations, especially if they are provided in a timely manner taking into account time differences with Brussels.

Although the EEAS should be the obvious center of gravity, Trade and Aidco quite clearly indicated their desire for arms-length relations with the EEAS from 2005 onwards. It remains, therefore, an open question as to whether DG Trade and DG Development and Cooperation (as it became on January 3, 2011 through the fusing of DG Development and DG EuropeAid) will take kindly to being coordinated via the EEAS in terms of PD. It could though be legitimately argued that any such coordination functions would follow from the HR/VP's specific responsibilities in her latter role, as well as her treaty-based duty of "coordinating other aspects of Union's external action" (TEU Article 18(4)).

The specific issue of providing PD for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is of particular importance since it is essential to be clear about why and how the EU intends to take action in the crisis management context, especially if the use of military force is involved. Prior to the advent of the Lisbon Treaty PD duties in this realm were spread between the High Representative, the rotating presidency, the Political and Security Committee, the European Commission, the member states (especially in the event of a framework nation operation) and the EU mission commander. At a more general level CSDP-related diplomacy was supported by the Council's Press Service and publications such as the EU Military Staff's *EU Security and Defence News* and the Council Secretariat's web portal with CSDP mission news.

In the post-Lisbon context the appointment of a managing director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination may provide one possible central point for the coordination of these aspects of PD.[33] The issuance of a "Handbook for Spokespersons in CSDP missions and operations" is also intended to harmonize the PD of the various crisis management structures that may be involved in missions or operations, such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EU Military Staff, and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. The PSC, mentioned above, has specific responsibility for drafting the specific tasks when it

comes "master message" that will then underpin the PD for a given CSDP operation.

The EU Delegations and Public Diplomacy

One of the most significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, from a PD perspective, was the advent of EU delegations following the attribution of legal personality to the EU by the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to this, the delegations had only represented those areas of external action represented by the Commission (in other words, not the CFSP aspects). In terms of PD the delegations are designed primarily to communicate the EU's "values, policies, and results of its projects towards third country stakeholders."[34] The intermestic nature of the EU's PD is also evident in the delegations where part of the mandate of the relevant press and information officer in the delegation is to explain EU external actions to the media of the EU members and not only the overseas media.[35]

The strategic elements of the EU's PD and information efforts in external relations are coordinated through the headquarters while the actual delivery and technical aspects are addressed by 142 delegations and their staff. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty these were delegations of the Commission but they are now delegations of the Union, meaning that they can represent the combined interests of the EU's external action. The sheer number of delegations is also worth noting, even if many are staffed by only a handful of senior administrators. The EU's global representation is far larger than the bilateral representation of most of the EU's members.

The role of the delegations has also been highlighted post-Lisbon with the disappearance of the rotating presidency of the Council in much of EU external relations. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the rotating presidency devoted substantial resources and effort to PD in order to promote the national priorities of the six-month period. Post-Lisbon the external representation of the EU has fallen to the delegations but with little in the way of extra resources and certainly nothing like those available to many of the member states. Cuts in the external relations budget in 2012–13 promise little significant improvement (with little prospect of significant change in the next financial perspective 2014–20).

The centrality of the delegations to post-Lisbon PD can be roughly estimated by the amount of the external relations budget that is earmarked for the delegations (it is though very difficult to ascertain exactly what portion of the expenditure can be attributed to PD since any such expenditure is likely to be spread across several headings). For 2010 the most relevant part of the budget is Title 19, Chapter 19 10, which covers policy strategy and coordination for the EU external relations area. These figures remain ostensibly unchanged for 2011.[36] Approximately €12.5 million was committed for information programmes for nonmember countries and an additional €2 million for "The EU in the World." The first figure

includes programs run from the headquarters such as the EU visitors programs, publications on external relations, audiovisual material, the development of electronic media, support for the information activities of "opinion leaders," and visits of journalists. The figure also includes the decentralized activities conducted by the delegations, which include relations with the media, information products, organization of events and cultural activities, newsletters, and information campaigns. The latter figure, although nominally external in nature, is fundamentally about convincing EU citizens that the Union is producing tangible benefits for EU citizens through external policies. By way of comparison, these figures are dwarfed by the €105 million spend on internal communication tools in 2010.[37] Put in rather general terms, most of the funding available for external PD goes to the delegations but this amounts to around 10 percent of the amount spent on information and communication within the EU.

In a notable effort to streamline the EU's external PD the EEAS (Strategic Communication Division) and DG DEVCO (Communication and Transparency Unit) jointly issued an *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations* in December 2012. The significance of this document lies in the combined provenance of the document but it also reminds the reader that the majority of the administrative staff in the delegations are not EEAS but Commission staff—primarily from DG DEVCO. In it, the delegations are encouraged to concentrate their "messaging and action" around five priority areas, "inspired by the promotion of EU values and based on the delivery of peace, security and prosperity."[38] They are as follows:

- Promoting the EU as a major partner in democratic transition (in particular in its wider neighborhood);
- Promoting the EU as the world's biggest cooperation and development donor;
- Promoting the EU as a global economic power responding to the crisis and using trade as an engine for change;
- Promoting human rights through high-level political dialogue with our partners and strategic cooperation programs;
- Promoting the EU as a security provider responding to global security threats.

Several challenges face the delegation staff in achieving these goals. The first and most obvious issue is that there are huge disparities in terms of staffing and capacities between the delegations. All delegations will have a Press and Information officer, but in some delegations this position may only be part of a wider mandate and the training and aptitude for such a role may be limited. Most of them will be locally engaged staff, supervised by the head of the relevant political section. This has the important advantage of allowing the EU top take advantage of local knowledge, languages, and to adapt communications to the local setting.

The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have also had an impact on the delegations due not only to the change in legal personality of the EU but also to the changed role of the rotating presidencies, which has meant an additional burden for the delegations. Among other factors, this now means that the amount of the press information budget that can be allocated to cultural events has increased from 10 to 20 percent.

A second challenge lies with coordinating EU PD with the member states. The delegations have been encouraged to share their PD strategy with the local EU member's representations. Most delegations will hold regular coordination meetings with the local EU member state press and/or cultural counselors. Where appropriate (and where staffing allows) tasks forces may be created to implement specific projects. Ideally this will lead to joint PD strategies, like those in Brazil or Mexico. At worst, the dangers of ill-coordinated PD result in a counterproductive bifurcation of efforts as in the case of North Africa where there is a "risk of reversion to old habits, whereby Brussels preaches on democracy and human rights, the member states pursue the short-term national interests, the North African countries note and exploit the hypocrisy, the European authority and influence fade."[39]

The third dilemma rests in the question of who the objects of PD are, especially given the diverse human and capital resources represented in the delegations. An increasingly important aspect of the delegation's outreach is dialogue with civil society and this is actively being promoted in particular parts of the world, like the southern Mediterranean. This is though often easier said that done. The small numbers of administrative staff may preclude the kind of extensive engagement with civil society often desired, especially since the Heads of Delegation find their time filled with financial management tasks. There is also the question of what constitutes "civil society," if the basic background to civil society groups is not known, along with their political and financial affiliations, well-intentioned attempts at engagement may be counterproductive. The "message" being communicated also has to resonate with the EU's overall PD, key strategic objectives (where defined), principle and values while, at the same time, it has to be tailored to the specific audience since local considerations, cultural aspects and the history of the EU's relations with the country or region in country will vary widely. An example of this would be the Al-Jisr project where the EU delegation in the Gulf has been supporting the Gulf Research Centre project on PD and outreach with the aim of increasingly mutual awareness and fostering EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relations.

As mentioned, the ability of an individual EU delegation to engage in PD activities varies enormously. An example at the top end of the scale is the delegation in Washington DC where there is a Press and Public Diplomacy (PDD) Section, created in January 2006. The delegation's website states:

> The Delegation's Public Diplomacy mission is a key priority because of the strategic importance of the EU/US partnership . . . To maintain

> these fundamental relations and make the partnership even more productive, it is important that we engage with each other on all levels of our societies. It is important that we continue to learn about one another: how our political, economic and social systems function and how we make decisions that advance our common goals.[40]

The section, all told, includes around 18 staff (roughly one-third of which are AD-level or equivalent). The Washington DC delegation was the first to explicitly embrace the term PD in their work, as opposed to the normal emphasis on information and public affairs. The size of this delegation and the presence of a dedicated PD team means that (in EU terms) they are able to offer an unparalleled range of support programs and instruments (but it still compares unfavorably with the larger EU member states representations in Washington DC).[41]

Programs tend to concentrate around outreach programs targeting youth, joint or collaborative events held with the EU member states' embassies and consulates and social media outreach. The *EU Rendez-Vous* program includes senior EU and US leaders discussing challenges of mutual concern for trans-Atlantic relations in the Washington DC area. Nine events were held in 2012 attracting more than 1,100 people.[42] Somewhat predictably Europe Day is a key date in the PD calendar with ambassadors and consuls of the EU member states travelling around the United States to promote awareness about the EU, its policies, and matters of common concern across the Atlantic. In addition, "open houses" (at the member state embassies) are organized around the May 9 celebrations. The open houses in 2012 attracted 23,600 visitors to the 28 venues (including Croatia), with the United Kingdom topping the list.[43] Perhaps more bizarrely, a Eurovision song contest watch party attracted 450 people. Beyond Washington DC, the ten EU Centers of Excellence established at prominent American universities serve as venues for more academic pursuits at the undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as general and local outreach programs.[44] On occasion member state consulates dotted around the United States are also used for outreach activities. The delegation undertook 255 speaking engagements in 2012, of which 40 were in Washington DC. The 2012 budget for all of the individual press and information activities, including those that are project based, amounted to €579,574. If other grant-based instruments are included, just under €1 million should be added, which is rather modest by the standards of the larger and some of the medium-sized member states.

Some of the other larger delegations are also able to offer increasingly sophisticated PD support and services. For instance, the delegation in Moscow has a Press and Information Department; Tokyo has a Press, Public and Cultural Affairs section, while Beijing has a Press and Information Section. These are, however, atypical since the vast majority of the other delegations have to suffice with one-person press, information, and cultural affairs officers. In all cases the EEAS HQ (Strategic

Communications) will provide a "daily flash" with broad lines to take and all delegations are provided with a handbook for PD. The daily flash includes the Commission's "Lines To Take." In particular instances, such as the conclusion of a Council meeting, heads of delegation may also be briefed by phone on the main outcomes of the meeting, especially if it pertains directly to their country or region. In specific instances these may be supplemented by engagement with local governments or civil society organizations through electronic and social media (particularly where the latter may be otherwise difficult to engage with).

The inclusion of the CFSP and CSDP elements into the delegation's PD is a further significant post-Lisbon development with implications for the EU's PD. This will obviously be of more concern for those delegations located in or proximate to crises or postcrisis countries or areas. In these instances the EU's PD has to clearly explain the rationale for any CSDP mission, its aims, objectives, and timeframe. In these instances delegation staff will liaise with the relevant authorities for the civilian or military missions in the region that may include a Special Representative who would incur much of the PD burden.

The on the ground challenges involve identifying the relevant interlocutors which may be obvious when it comes to government or official level contacts, but less apparent when it comes to civil society or potential agenda shapers. The question of how to approach PD has often been on a project-based service (following the DG DEVCO model) but this is now changing with the introduction of outsourcing to create a "single visibility campaign." This model has been followed in Indonesia and Brunei, to internal acclaim, but the obvious risk is that branding and public relations, which are part of PD, may detract from the building up and maintenance of long-term relations that should be at its heart.[45]

Other challenges will also depend upon the locale, but these may include the demographics of the country/region, literacy rates, and Internet penetration. In many instances the Internet and social media are becoming increasingly important and this poses the challenge of being able to communicate effectively using these important new tools (see below). Until recently the maintenance of up-to-date delegation, websites was a rather hit or miss affair (often depending upon the inclination and aptitude of the press officer) but this has now been improved with the introduction of a common template and joint management by the headquarters (including the FPI, EEAS, and DEVCO). Press and Information Officers can also access the daily midday press briefing held in Brussels, either by telephone or by video (web-streaming). This, alongside the Lines To Take, represents a significant effort towards communicating a coherent message to external partners (as well as to interested parties within the EU).

The inclusion of the whole gamut of the EU's external relations interests in the delegations will also require closer coordination with the diplomatic services of the member states so that activities and messages

may be coordinated. The coordination of the PD of the member states with that of the EU is a sensitive issue. It would of course be illusory to hope for a "single voice" since it has long been accepted that diversity is part of the character of the Union. The emphasis is therefore on fostering a "single message," wherever possible. The regular coordination between the delegations and the EU representations on EU PD strategy and the sharing of "Lines To Take" is designed to encourage the communication of a common EU position. On those cases where there is a clear common interest and position, such as in the immediate aftermath of North Korea's February 2013 nuclear test, the communication of a coherent message is relatively straightforward.[46] In this and other cases the EU's PD impact is magnified by the association of the acceding country (Croatia), the candidate countries (the former Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, Iceland, and Serbia), the potential candidate (Albania), the EFTA countries (Lichtenstein and Norway), members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Armenia, who often associate with the declaration. On other occasions the Ukraine has also associated.

It remains to be seen whether temporarily assigned national diplomats serving in the EEAS, who may be in the Service for 4–8 years, will lead to closer PD efforts on the part of the EU and its members. Up to one-third of the administrative staff will be temporarily assigned national diplomats. In mid 2012, 248 diplomats from the member states were serving in the EEAS (out of 920 authorized posts).[47] Thus, while national diplomats did not quite constitute one-third overall (26.9%) they nevertheless represented 37.8 percent of administrative staff in delegations (or 131 posts). Lord Hannay suggested that PD is an area where the national diplomats may be able to make a significant contribution:

> The demands of public diplomacy, which are clearly overtaking those of the more classical diplomatic tasks, will require an effective response from the [EEAS] if it is not to find itself playing second fiddle to those national diplomats who are more and more getting to grips with this new dimension.[48]

Most national diplomats will be used to thinking of PD as an integral part of diplomatic practice whereas for the EU official who has served in delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the main emphasis was on management and the effective and legal dispersal of funds. The advantages to the delegation may stem from the willingness of EU members to allow them to tap into existing national networks, especially in the foreign and security policy aspects that were not covered via the delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty. The experience of dealing with diverse groups or individuals may also play to the strengths of national diplomats. The new expanded role of the EU delegations may prove especially attractive to the smaller and newer member states since the EU delegation does not

represent the predominant views of any one member state. In this sense the EU delegations may be seen as carrying less "baggage" than a number of members, especially when former colonial dependencies are involved.

EU Digital Diplomacy

A growing aspect of diplomacy, as noted above, is "digital diplomacy," which has obvious applications for PD. The EEAS (as well as DEVCO and TRADE) have recognized the increasing importance of the media and established accounts on social networking and media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr.[49] Senior EU officials, like the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, have established enthusiastic followings on the Chinese Sina Weibo platform. An increasing number of EU delegations are present on social platforms with encouragement from the EEAS (and Commission) to do so. This is a role that the local staff could usefully expand upon since they will be best attuned to which communication strategies are likely to reach the desired target group(s) and, importantly, the local languages or dialects employed. Although this aspect of PD has developed relatively recently, it has now become established within the EEAS with communication on all Service-related issues on a systematic basis. More generally, when the EU is operating in countries with high Internet penetration, the emphasis is increasingly upon electronic information products, rather than paper products. This also implies the need to devote the necessary resources and time to updating and upgrading the relevant EU websites. This is currently not done on a systematic basis and much may depend upon the aptitude of individual staff members, the provision of the necessary skills and training, as well as the time and resources to maintain and update the various websites.

Since the medium should never be confused with the message "e-diplomacy" has its place in PD, but it also has limitations. The challenges with social-media engagement lie with the difficulties in maintaining sustained dialogues on often complex subjects through a medium that naturally condenses and simplifies.

Social Media—Convincing?

The EU remains fully committed to a strong and effective multilateral human-rights system that impartially monitors the implementation by all states of their human rights obligations. The EU will vigorously defend the universality of human rights and will continue to speak out against human rights violations worldwide.

EEAS shared link via UN Human Rights Council, February 25, 2013 https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService

A closer examination of the EEAS Facebook, Flickr, (where the EEAS maintains a photostream) or Twitter accounts shows evidence of some interactivity ("likes," retweets, and comments) but this is often not sustained. Many of the comments posted on the EEAS Facebook site elicit no reaction from the EEAS side. Much of the material on the social media sites qualifies as information, with links to official policies or documents. This is largely due to understandable human resource issues, but it also stymies the idea of dialogue and engagement as an integral part of PD. A number of the delegations could also consider greater engagement with local communities through social media and it may also provide useful feedback for the delegation staff. Twitter could be more useful if there were more accurate tools to track, measure, and measure social media results (like hootsuite). Social media may be an important tool in fighting for "rights and liberties" but it should also complement the relevant sectoral dialogues at official level.[50] Finally, there is also the question of cross-platform coordination to make sure that the efforts of the EEAS, DEVCO, and TRADE are communicating the same metamessages (which presumably falls under the aegis of the ERIC group).

Finally, the European Parliament has been particularly active in promoting the role of cultural diplomacy "in advancing the EU's interests and values in the world" and has also stressed that this should include "digital diplomacy."[51] The Parliament's Committee on Culture and Education has called for one person in each EU representation overseas to coordinate interaction between the EU and third countries on cultural relations. This aspect of PD has to be treated with sensitivity since member states attach particular linguistic or cultural significance to specific external partners, or they have well-developed forms of outreach such as BBC World Service, Radio France Internationale, Deutsche Welle or Radio Netherlands.

There are some specific fora promoting the cultural dimensions of PD such as the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) with its 2,000 branches in over 150 countries and the Consociato Institutorum Culturalium Europaforum Inter Belgas.[52] Although both are networks with a more general cultural mandate, it is clear that the priorities identified for both organizations, such as EUNIC's promotion of dialogue with civil society in the Middle East and North Africa, support the more general aims of EU PD and the work of the delegations.

Conclusion

The ability of the EU generally, and the EEAS more specifically, to respond to the relative decline of traditional diplomacy and the rise of PD will depend upon a number of inter-related factors. It is perhaps helpful at this juncture to return to the earlier notions of identity, norms and narratives.

First, effective PD depends upon a clear understanding of *what* is to be communicated. This implies a keener sense of identity or what exactly the EU stands for on the international stage. What is it that is distinct about the international role of the EU? If, as is often argued, the normative approach of the Union is its distinguishing factor, this has to be reflected systematically and the promotion of double standards avoided. The narrative of the EU has to be rewritten at the same time. The "founding myth" of the phoenix rising from the ashes of war is one that has increasingly less resonance with a generation of Europeans whose grandparents may not even remember Second World War, let alone to young Chinese or Indians whose perceptions of the world are changing very rapidly. This is a formidable challenge for PD that demands some fundamental strategic thought and direction if it is to stand any chance of success. In practical terms this implies adopting something akin to the Communication Strategy of 2006 entitled "Europe in the World." In the absence of such an approach, the only message that risks being communicated to the Union's external partners is one of confusion, the inability to address internal challenges accompanied by mounting doubts about the model of regional integration that the EU extols externally. This will compromise the legitimacy and authority of the EU's PD, both internally and externally.

The second consideration is that the EU's current external PD is highly decentralized with important parts of the EU, like Directorate-General Trade, conducting its own PD. There, are however, encouraging signs of attempts to link the external aspects of the EU's PD such as those of the EEAS and Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation, facilitated by ERIC. The key element in any centralization is the HR/VP herself. Centralization in practical terms means enhanced coordination between the EEAS, the Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament. This will clearly demand dedicated support within the EEAS to facilitate any such enhanced coordination and will also make it essential that the FPI fosters closer ties and working linkages with the offices for Strategic Planning, Strategic Communications in the EEAS, as well as the relevant Cabinets of the senior external relations actors. The work of ERIC is to be applauded, but it risks being compromised by ongoing resistance to more general political and policy coordination at various levels. In this context coordination between the "triangle" of trade, development and the EEAS (representing the CFSP and CSDP aspects) is of particular importance.

In principle, centralization is therefore desirable and the EEAS should assume a key role in this regard. As has been suggested, centralization should also go beyond the institutional aspects to include the presence of clear, convincing, coherent, and mutually reinforcing messages to communicate externally. In the event that there is no clear strategic view of the EU's global role, the relevance of centralization may well be reversed. In this scenario a more decentralized model of PD, emphasizing the role of the delegations, may come to the fore. This would be based on country and regional strategy

papers, with the horizontal or thematic ones woven in as appropriate. PD would then become "local." The danger of this lies in possible inconsistencies, which may become even more apparent due to mass communications. The possible dilution of key aspects, like human rights, would further erode the EU's identity and weaken its narrative and the legitimacy of any PD.

The danger of this type of inconsistency and weakening may also be promoted by the lack of coordination between the EEAS and the member states. The temptation of the members to offload the more normative agendas on to the EU, while they pursue their more pragmatic interests, should be avoided. The Lisbon Treaty, under Article 24.3 TEU does, after all, oblige the member states to both "support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity," as well as complying with "the Union's action in this area." Complementary PD at the European and national levels would be a visible way of demonstrating this treaty commitment.

Finally, the ability to respond to the challenges for PD outlined above will depend upon coordination, notably by the HR/VP, access to the requisite expertise, and the necessary resources. Any serious effort will involve giving PD a more central role within the EEAS proper, linking it to strategic communication and planning and, critically, to the delegations. The influx of national diplomats into the EEAS should be exploited to upgrade the general expertise in PD. More emphasis should be given to effective training for PD as well as for "e" (public) diplomacy. The question of whether this can realistically be done depends in part on the political will of the EU's leaders and those of the member states to define the EU's global role more accurately and to thus say something about the type of actor the Union is and should become. It also depends upon human resources, skills, and budgetary support at a time of mounting pressure at the national and EU levels.

Notes

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3. On the EU's actorness, see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), 223–48.
4. Ellen Huijgh, "Changing Tunes for Public Dipomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension," *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy –Facets of Diplomacy*, (Fall 2011):63.
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6. The Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version), The Treaty on European Union, Article 2, in *Official Journal of the European Union* C no. 83/17, (March 30, 2010).
7. See, in particular, Article 3(5) of the Lisbon Treaty.
8. On the use of this term see Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005), 8–9.
9. Numbers provided at the European Commission Protocol Service, List of all missions (updated February, 11 2011), at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/index.cfm?go=search.search&missions=1.
10. See Press Club Europe, Brussels at http://www.pressclub.be/.
11. "Communicating Europe in Partnership," Speech Margot Wallström, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional relations and communications strategy, ECAS Conference "Is the EU really listening to citizens?," SPEECH/07/602, October 3, 2007.
12. Jan Melissen, "Beyond the New Public Diplomacy," Clingendael Paper No.3, October 2011 (Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations), 10.
13. See Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005); Steffen Bay Rasmussen, "Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices," *Discussions Papers in Diplomacy*, (Den Haag: The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, "Clingendael," July 2009); Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *EU Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy*, November 2010, at http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Mai'a%20Cross%20EU%20PubD%20paper.pdf.
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17. *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012 Brussels, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 3.
18. Dov Lynch, "Communicating Europe to the world: what public diplomacy for the EU?" *EPC Working Paper* no. 21 (November 2005): 31.
19. The European External Action Service: A step change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty, (undated) available at http://www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit_en/267601-en.pdf
20. Quoted in Paul Sturm, "Shoring up the EU's public diplomacy in CSDP, in *European Security Review* no. 52, ISIS Europe (November 2010):.4.
21. Address by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, to the College of Europe, *The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World*, PCE 34/10, Bruges, February, 25 2010, 3 and 2, respectively.
22. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints the Permanent Chair of the Political and Security Committee Policy, Brussels, A 231/10, November 16, 2010.
23. Figures from David Spence, Evidence given to the European Union Sub-Committee for External Affairs, House of Lords, on the European External Action Service,

December 12, 2012, 48, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/EEAS/WrittenevidencevolumeEEASv1.pdf.

24. Proposal from The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council, *Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*, March 25, 2010, 8029/10, 7 and 17 (and Annex 'Basic Structures").
25. Ibid., 17.
26. The July 2010 Council decision lists in an annex those department and functions to be transferred to the EEAS which, in numerical terms means that for AD posts 585 will be transferred from the Commission (DG Relex), 93 from DG Development, and 436 posts transferred from DG Relex's External Service (i.e., the delegations). In addition 411 were transferred from the Council Secretariat. 118 new posts will be created in the period 2011–2013 at AD level. The total is number of positions created in the EEAS at AD level is therefore 1,643. Moreover, the Council decision states that "at least one third of the all EEAS staff at AD level" shall comprise staff from the Member States (and that permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60 percent of all EEAS staff at AD level). This implies that around 350 temporary agent posts will have to be filled by diplomats.
27. Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service, July 26, 2010 (2010/427/EU), Official *Journal of the European Union* L 201/30, 3 August 2010, Article 4, 9 (6) and Annex.
28. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf.
29. European Commission, Framework Service Contract Number FPIS 2011–01, March 2010.
30. Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service, 26 July 2010 (2010/427/EU), Official *Journal of the European Union* L 201/30, August 3, 2010, Article 9(6) and Annex.
31. For a full statement of the decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee see http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2012/announce-2012/.
32. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/special-features/features_working_women_en.htm.
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35. See http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/news/index_en.htm.
36. Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2011, Volume 3, Section III, Commission, p.III-792 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB_2011/EN/SEC03.pdf.
37. The three areas include Communication and the Media, Going Local Communication and Analysis and communication tools. It does not include the €112 spent on administrative support for DG Communication. See General Budget 2010, Volume 4, Section 3 (Commission), Title 16 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN17942/index.html.
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41. For an overview see "Engaging the World: The EU's Public Diplomacy," *EU Insight*, no. 42, July 2010 (Washington DC: Delegation of the European Union to the United States).
42. Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.
43. Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.
44. The grant of €3.1 million covers nine universities as well as a consortium of Washington DC area universities. For full details see http://www.euintheus.org/what-you-can-do/apply-for-a-grant/eu-centers-of-excellence/current-grantees-eu-centers-of-excellence/. EU Centers have also been established in Australia (3), Canada (3), Japan (4), New Zealand (1), and Russia (6).
45. See *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 20.
46. See *Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2013/88/CFSP amending Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, 7302/13, Brussels, March 8, 2013 and; *Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on nuclear threats and human rights in North Korea*, A133/13, Strasbourg, March 13, 2013.
47. Staffing in the European External Action Service, (Brussels: EEAS), June 1, 2012, 3.
48. Lord Hannay of Chiswick, "How will we know if the European Union's External Action Service (EEAS) has got off to a good start?," *Europe's World*, Autumn 2010, available at http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21730/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
49. See https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService; https://twitter.com/eu_eeas; http://www.flickr.com/photos/eeas/.
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51. Marietje Schaake (rapporteur), *Draft Report on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external action*, Committee on Culture and Education (2010/2161), November 29, 2010, 5.
52. For details of EUNIC please see http://www.eunic-online.eu/. The CICEIB currently represents Alliance Française, the British Council, the Cervantes Institute, the Danish cultural Institute, the Finnish cultural institute, the Goethe-Institut, the Italian cultural institute, the Louvain Institute, the Austrian Cultural Forum, and the Czech Cultural Center.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Network Perspective on Public Diplomacy in Europe: EUNIC

ALI FISHER

Introduction

Public diplomacy (PD) is at its core about influencing the actions and behavior of other people, whether that is in the short, medium, or long term. The study of PD is the study of relationships and communication between groups of people, whether communication is verbal or nonverbal and whether the actors are conceived as communities, networks, or populations.

As Manuel Castells has argued "power relationships are the foundation of society."[1]

With this in mind the focus on the communication, interaction, or engagement *between* groups makes the connection—the relationship—a key, if often overlooked, unit of analysis for PD research and strategy. The different actors, whether organizations or individuals, and the different types of relationships, which comprise this network create the multiple dimensions through which European PD is conducted.

Inputs into this multidimensional network come from the range of bodies which organize cultural activities including EUNIC, the EU External Action Service, and the Council of Europe. Activities are frequently facilitated by the collaborative clusters that have evolved between supranational institutions, national governments, cultural institutes, subnational groups, and private organizations, which take part in the delivery of PD in specific cities. As a result, the interconnected nature of European governance structures and cultural organisations at supranational, national and local levels create a multidimensional network with the potential to either help or hinder the various levels of European PD.

Cooperation and Competition in Cultural Relations

The network of European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) is one of the leading organizations wrestling with the way aspirations of creating networks based on cooperation and collaboration can be put into practice in the context of PD.

EUNIC describes itself as an "active network; encouraging members to implement shared projects" and a "partnering network; working with partners including the European Commission, European Parliament, the Council of Europe and partners around the world at many levels and to promote European Experience."[2]

How Would You Describe EUNIC?

- An active network: encouraging members to implement shared projects at many levels and to promote European Experience;
- A learning network: sharing ideas and practices between members;
- A partnering network: working with partners including the European Commission, European Parliament, the Council of Europe and partners around the world;
- An advocacy network; raising the awareness and effectiveness of building cultural relationships between people worldwide and advocating for perception of culture not as a tool but as a goal in itself.

Guidance notes on forming and running a cluster, EUNIC, November 2012

To build collaboration European cultural institutes form local 'clusters' to coordinate activities in a specific city. These EUNIC clusters "seek to improve and promote cultural diversity and understanding between European societies and to strengthen international dialogue and cultural cooperation with countries outside Europe."[3] This creates two dimensions to EUNIC activity, one dimension takes place within the EU and the other takes place outside the EU. Activities conducted by EUNIC clusters to achieve this objective range from, the European Day of Languages, and European Literature Nights, to a "Studio" focusing on Architecture and Town Planning, or using cultural activities to promote a more ecological use of resources.[4]

Language learning is a central part of many EUNIC members' activities. For example, the 2010 European Day of Languages (EDL) in Warsaw, one of the biggest in Europe, took place over eight days. During which

time 22 partners collaborated delivering 67 lessons and workshops for 1,500 students in 19 languages, showed 19 films in 12 languages, and held a conference for 360 participants.[5] The emphasis on language also runs through the European Literature Nights, which focus on contemporary literature and translation. In 2011, 20 different EUNIC clusters, including Hanoi, London, and New York ran events, in collaboration with respective local partners, to expand the market for translated literature.

In addition to the focus on language, other initiatives focus on environmental issues. In South Africa this took the form of a "studio" attended by architecture students who were mentored by architects from France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK, to look at strategies to improve and renovate an inner city building in Johannesburg. The results from this "studio" were subsequently presented to the public. Other environmental projects have included "Culture|Futures," the initiative lead by the Danish Cultural Institute, to attract attention to a new ecological use of resources.[6] Other EUNIC events have focused on themes such as multilingualism, migration, and mutual understanding.[7]

These activities rely on collaboration between national cultural institutes. European collaboration has occurred on a case-by-case basis with increasing frequency since the 1990s, and increased with the creation in 1997 of the Consortium of the National Cultural Institutes of the European Countries in Belgium (CICEB) and took its current form with the creation of EUNIC in 2006.[8]

While collaborations between cultural institutes have increased in frequency, many of the institutes, including the British Council, have their roots in competitive cultural promotion between European countries and in many cases this competitive stance has, to varying degrees, continued.[9] In 2008, Jozef Bátora and Monika Mokre argued in the background papers for a EUNIC sponsored conference: "A competition driven logic has been increasingly taking root in the work of national cultural institutes as most of them strive to outperform their peers in a respective foreign capital in attracting the local cultural audience."[10]

The coexistence of cooperation and competition between members of EUNIC creates a multidimensional network of influence. The multiple dimensions of the network are the different types of organizations, from embassies and government ministries to arms length cultural organizations, and the different relationships they develop. These relationships, for example, can be with full or associate EUNIC members, or with local organizations in the country a EUNIC cluster operates. The increasingly complex dimensions of the network stem from the same organizations being responsible for the "Cultural Relations in and of the European Union," to use Jozef Bátora and Monika Mokre's phrase.[11] This means at times collaborating with EUNIC members to influence the population represented by another EUNIC member, or creating collaborative relationships with some EUNIC members, while competing against other EUNIC members.

To demonstrate the multiple dimensions of this relationship, partners in the European Day of Languages held in Warsaw included the British Council and Goethe-Institut collaborating to achieve influence in Poland. Both organizations were also partners in the Language Rich Europe project. Along with organizations from Poland and EUNIC Brussels, this networking brings together 1200 policymakers and practitioners from 24 countries and regions in Europe to discuss and develop better policies and practices for multilingualism. One element promoted through this project, was the Visitors Handbook for the London Olympics, providing useful phrases translated from English into many languages. The multidimensional element of these relationships is that the handbook was also part of the "Britain is GREAT" campaign that included promoting the UK as a destination of study. This means collaborating with partners around discussions of multilingualism, while also competing to be a destination for international students. This competition has high stakes; a report published by the UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills estimated the value of UK education exports as "£14.1 billion in 2008/09."[12] As a result, the multidimensional nature of European PD produces an inherent tension that places collaborative relationships that revolve around European identity and languages alongside direct competition based on national interest.

This chapter will focus on EUNIC to analyze characteristics of the multidimensional web of influence that the contemporary activity of the network has created. To draw out these characteristics, the chapter analyzes two different levels of activity, the project level and the organizational structures that underpin EUNIC. The analysis will identify some of the contemporary characteristics and tensions within European collaborative PD.

Multidimensional Networks

PD, particularly in its collaborative form, draws on the exchange of information and the interaction between individuals—which results ultimately in the creation of an effective network capable of delivering results.[13] Elsewhere I have identified a range of factors that can influence individuals and communities.[14] These include the macrobehaviors and network architecture of a community. With the understanding of the network architecture public diplomats can be empowered as "bridges" between communities, by identifying and supporting structures and practices that facilitate the flow of information between those that have it and those that can use it.[15]

Faced with complex problems, limited resources, and an increasingly "small world" many private and PD organizations are seeking to increase their reach through partnerships or unlock their innovative potential through collaboration.[16] EUNIC is an example of an organizational

structure developed to facilitate collaborative cultural and PD initiatives. It is also where the concept of network multidimensionality is particularly relevant. The increasingly dynamic work on relational and multilateral approaches to diplomacy or PD[17] intersects with the most recent work on "network multidimensionality" in the study of communication.[18] Castells et al. emphasized the need to explore multidimensionality as "unidimensional networks often fail to capture the richness of the full set of relations."[19] The concept of network multidimensionality, in contrast, considers networks that have multiple types of connections between multiple types of entities. This multidimensional perspective is particularly relevant for analyzing European PD broadly and EUNIC specifically, given the number of different types of organizations involved and the range of relationships that they have created.

In practical terms, research applied to international communication has shown the structure and dynamics of global multimedia networks.[20] Yet, despite the importance placed on relationships and networks, very few PD projects described as building networks, relationships, or exchanges publish documentation that includes network based measures of impact, at either the planning or evaluation stages. Equally, few academic studies that emphasize networks in PD draw on relational data or network analysis. In addition, while the "last-three-feet" and analysis of the individuals engaged is important, the complex structures and macrobehaviors that result from the combined effect of the individual interactions are an equally relevant and important aspect of understanding emergent behavior and evaluating PD.

Understanding the form and cohesion of the network are important as this provides insight into the types of connections individuals and organizations develop.[21] As Krebs and Holley put it, "Communities are built on connections. Better connections usually provide better opportunities."[22] The connections provide the bridges for this innovation diffusion to occur but the position of the individual within the network will also influence the speed at which diffusion happens.[23] For an organization to be dynamic, it needs to be able to integrate a core of strong links with a large heterogeneous periphery of weaker ties.[24] This network architecture allows the organization to draw on the strengths of both core and periphery to drive innovation. For EUNIC this means drawing on the resources and experience of its core membership while partnering with local organizations with specific knowledge and skills and able to reach specific communities. For example, the EDL event in Warsaw was developed in collaboration with a local partner, the Foundation for Development of Education Systems. In addition, the Culture|Futures event in South Africa was produced in partnership with the municipality of Durban.[25]

EUNIC as a multidimensional network has within it a range of different types of organization and has to develop different types of relationships with these organizations. As Horia-Roman Patapievici, president of Romanian Cultural Institute, reflected in 2011 during his final speech as

president of EUNIC, the membership issue had been a source of long-running debate. The locus of the issue was the relationship between the cultural institutes and embassies within EUNIC clusters and the "the arm's length" principle that existed as part of the eligibility criteria for EUNIC membership. As Horia-Roman Patapievici noted, it was a stipulation of the constitution that "EUNIC's members are organizations who operate at arm's length from their governments."[26] However, while the length of that arm inevitably varied from case to case, "depending on the institutional architecture of the country in question," embassies obviously do not operate at arms length. A "flexible solution," as Horia-Roman Patapievici described it, was found by introducing criteria that preserved the autonomy of members in relation to governments. However, independence from government does not act as an exclusion clause. As the following case studies will show, this type of flexibility allows EUNIC to develop collaborations of varying lengths and with different types of organizations However, concomitant with this flexibility is the level of influence that governments have even in ostensibly "arms length" cultural relations.

In addition to the range of organizations that participate in EUNIC projects, the connections that make up the network are equally important. A conference on European external cultural relations in 2012, highlighted the hierarchical, projection orientated, nature of the communication between EUNIC members and local partners to deliver projects. Natalia Chaban speaking at the conference emphasised "the importance for Europe of speaking with and not at the other side, as well as listening intently to the other side."[27]

The Challenge of Collaboration for EUNIC

European cultural institutes have to revisit the fact that when they approach a local partner, they have often already decided what to do, and have brought their own agenda, without taking the prospective partner's thoughts and expectations into consideration. This rethinking can be accomplished if the European cultural institutes put the showcasing of national ideas, or what Europe is about, into second place, and focus instead on actually working together in cultural fields in a sustainable way.

Katharina von Ruckteschell-Katte, president of EUNIC sub-Saharan Africa

For Isabelle Schwarz, cocreation and cocuration were the key ideas. Speaking at the same conference she stressed that "new forms of engagement require of the partner organisations sensitivities and insights very

different from those of the past."[28] Hanna Schühle, noting conclusions from the conference, wrote;

> instead of taking the role of a teacher, EUNIC needs to continue to focus on dialogue, so that it is not seen as arrogant or paternalistic. In politically problematic countries, EUNIC needs to learn from institutions that are already engaged in successful projects.[29]

The findings of this conference, and the following case studies, highlight the challenges of developing the range of relationships required to support effective collaboration within a network that is made up of multiple types of organizations connected by multiple types of relationships.

Project Collaboration: "The Network Effect"

Collaboration at the project level focuses on working with other actors, whether Governments and PD organizations, or NGO and think-tanks to deliver a specific project or achieve impact on a specific issue. The project level collaborations adopted by EUNIC provide a practical demonstration of Brian Hocking's argument that the "traditional arrangements of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity are becoming supplemented by polylateral, multistakeholder diplomacy."[30] As a result, conceptualization of the multidimensional space in which PD occurs has extended well beyond the "two worlds of public diplomacy that intersect, overlap, collide and cooperate in a variety of contexts" of just a few years ago.[31]

Europeans are not alone in facing these challenges, US President Barack Obama highlighted the need to be "clear-eyed about the challenge of mobilizing collective action" as US National Security Strategy has moved to emphasize the need for smarter networks.[32] The focus on collaborative networks also appears in the US National Security Strategy, which emphasizes "diplomats are the first line of engagement, listening to our partners, learning from them, building respect."[33] The same could be said of European public diplomats, for example the chair of the British Council emphasizes the importance of "multilateral, multilevel partnerships to tackle big issues" in his introduction to the 2010 annual report. A key aspect of both empowering diplomats and analyzing European PD is finding ways to identify the complex multidimensional networks in which they work. This means shifting the focus from measuring only how many people a message was delivered to recognizing the complex multidimensional networks of relationships within which PD operates.

This case study seeks to locate some of the dimensions of European PD through the perspective of one PD project; a British Council initiated project known as The Network Effect (TNE), the latter stages of which were delivered during 2008 in collaboration with EUNIC clusters in Sweden and Russia.[34] TNE was created to "nurture networks between the next

generation of leaders." TNE used "a variety of methods, learning-by-doing, challenging content, teamwork, and online networking… to sustain a network of future European leaders committed to making a difference."[35] To achieve this objective, TNE events combined conference sessions with visits to organizations linked to the theme of the conference. For example, the conference in Russia was titled "the identity of cities." The speakers at the conference included Guerrilla Gardener Richard Reynolds and members of the Office of Subversive Architecture, as well as urban planners, journalists, and representatives discussing the particular case of Northern Ireland.[36] In keeping with the theme of the conference, participants visited the offices of Russian art and ecology organizations to understand how they were facing the challenges presented by the modern city.[37] As each event had a different theme and events were held in a range of European cities, different organizations collaborated with the British Council in delivering the events.

TNE Events, Location and Partner Organizations

Title and Location	Year	Partners
Media and Legitimacy in European democracy Sweden	2005	DEMOS SNS——Swedish Centre of Business & Policy Studies The British embassy in Sweden
Social diversity and cities Netherlands	2006	DEMOS KL- Kennisl and I Knowle dgel and
Good Europe? Power, participation, and the remaking of civil society Slovakia	2006	DEMOS IVO/Institute for Public Affairs——www.ivo.sk
Business and social development: how the two connect Turkey	2007	Sabanci University, and its Graduate School of Management Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey
Social innovation: key to social challenges of the: Estonia	2007	PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies
Fewer, older, more diverse? Europe's future society Germany	2007	cafebabel. com (Café Babel European Internet magazine) DEMOS

Exclusive culture, identity, and prejudice Hungary	2008	No partners found
European culture———Just do it Sweden EUNIC	2008	EUNIC (Goethe-Institut, I nsti tuto Cervantes) Kronika Gallery Poland Dutch Embassy ECF Amsterdam I ntercul t
Identity of cities Russia	2008	EUNIC The Government of Moscow the International Academy of PD (with Russian minister of Foreign Affairs in Presidium)

As the box above shows, some organizations only collaborated in one event, for example, the European Culture Foundation (ECF) Amsterdam and the International Academy of Public Diplomacy (Moscow), while others were involved in a number of the events, including the UK-based think-tank DEMOS was a partner organization in four events. In this case the British Council, as primary initiator of the project, had to be flexible in the delivery of TNE, working with partners willing to collaborate over different time periods.

This emphasizes the multidimensional nature of the relations and actors in the network. It also demonstrates the emerging methodology and activity of EUNIC clusters a year after the public launch of the network. This flexibility is a key element of the collaborative approach behind TNE specifically and also reflects one of the key aspects of the EUNIC network. As EUNIC President Horia-Roman Patapievici put it,

> As with all networks, members get out of it what they put in. The heads of EUNIC member institutes may all have their own reasons for joining the network, but all share the same desire to work together.[38]

EUNIC members worked together on two TNE events, each joining the initiative for their own reasons. As each organization had different reasons for involvement, following Horia-Roman Patapievici's logic, they were willing to contribute to the project for different lengths of time and seek to benefit in different ways from that involvement. This represents the range of connections in a multidimensional network.

Equally important was the range of organizations involved as a TNE partner. The role of think-tanks, including DEMOS, IVO, and PRAXIS highlight complex and multidimensional nature of European PD. These groups would fall outside many definitions of PD, yet they were involved in the delivery of TNE. In fact, the TNE events that involved EUNIC clusters also involved the Dutch Embassy and Government of Moscow. This highlights that the pragmatic flexibility around the "arms length" concept in EUNIC memership also extends to the organizations with which network members would collaborate. This is not unusual in contemporary PD, as collaboration and partnership often blur the boundaries between inclusion/exclusion criteria for PD echoing the argument articulated by Karine Nahone.[39]

The collaborative approach that EUNIC takes to activities within Europe creates the flexibility or fuzziness of inclusion/exclusion criteria that challenges traditional concepts of "target audience." For example, EUNIC members that collaborated in TNE came from the same countries where TNE was being delivered, and may have been conceived as the target audience in more traditional PD. However, in a collaborative approach to a multidimensional network the concept of audience is more complex and at times reversed. This is because TNE events were held in countries from which EUNIC members subsequently collaborated on TNE. For example, one of the 2007 events was held in Germany. The following year the Goethe Institute collaborated in the delivery of another TNE event as part of the EUNIC cluster in Sweden. Similarly, the Dutch Embassy and ECF Amsterdam collaborated in an event during 2008, while two years earlier TNE had been held in the Netherlands. As a result, members of the "target audience" in more traditional conceptions of PD are transformed from passive recipients of PD into active collaborators in the delivery of the project.

This section has highlighted the challenge of balancing input from various organizations in a collaborative initiative and it has shown that it demands alternative approaches to PD from those which focus on what R. S. Zaharna has referred to as "assertive" methods.[40] The interconnection between government and nongovernment in a multidimensional network leads to fluidity between "audience," "collaborator," and "participant." As the organizational structure of TNE demonstrates, collaborative initiatives within a multidimensional network demand greater flexibility, pragmatism, and a "connective mindshift" akin to the R. S. Zaharna's "associative" or Arsenault and Cowen's cooperative approaches.[41] These factors behind the European collaborative approach to PD at the project level, also underpin the multidimensional network of relationships that facilitate collaborative action at the organizational level in Europe.

Organizational Structures Underpinning EUNIC

The multidimensional nature of European PD is highlighted by the emergence of the collaborative global network developed by EUNIC. As noted

earlier, EUNIC was founded in 2006. The original idea of creating an association of national cultural institutes in Europe was mooted in 2004 and 2005 by some of the heads of national cultural institutes and a few important cultural activists, as Horia-Roman Patapievici recalled.[42] The creation of EUNIC and EUNIC Brussels built on the work of an earlier organization the Consortium of the National Cultural Institutes of the European Countries in Belgium (CICEB).[43] When EUNIC Brussels was created it was composed of the current CICEB members and was open to new members such as EU cultural institutes that did not have a representative office in Brussels.[44]

Creation of EUNIC

The ambitious idea of EUNIC is to prove that culture matters for European integration. We need to communicate to citizens in all EU-member countries how valuable and fascinating our cultural diversity is and why we benefit from supporting a common cultural space. EUNIC will facilitate cultural exchange by making use of the potential of national cultural institutes as assets and not as barriers for European integration . . . By acting together EUNIC will also create better chances for artists and creative people in EU-candidate countries and for partners' worldwide.

Emil Brix the Director General for Foreign Cultural Policies in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speaking at the official presentation of EUNIC in Brussels, 2006

The founding meeting of heads of EUNIC took place in Prague on May 18 and 19, 2006.[45] Since the creation of EUNIC with seven members in 2006, the network has grown to 30 members from 25 countries.[46] EUNIC is built around a series of clusters that focus around important geographic locations. Collectively EUNIC's member organizations have over 2,000 branches and employ over 25,000 staff working in over 150 countries. In each location, member organizations come together in "clusters" to develop local activities. A EUNIC cluster can be established when in a city at least three institutes of EUNIC-member institutions decide to do so.[47] The membership of each cluster varies depending on the geographic location as a result of the different level of resources and focus of EUNIC-member organizations (Figure 7.1).

There are over 80 clusters around the world in locations ranging from Afghanistan to Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Each cluster has a combination of members based on the priorities of the member organizations. For example, the Afghan cluster has three members, British Council Afghanistan, Centre Cultural Français de Kaboul, and Goethe-Institut



Figure 7.1 Membership of UNIC clusters.

Kabul, and supports activities such as the Afghan National Theatre festival.[48] In contrast, the cluster in Venezuela has four full members Alliance Francaise du Vénézuéla, British Council, Goethe-Institut Venezuela, and Istituto Italiano di Cultura along with six associated members. The activities run by the cluster include a virtual library, and events such as DJs from France, Germany, and Norway playing in Caracas, and pedagogical departments meeting to discuss the most effective use of interactive whiteboards in language teaching.[49]

As EUNIC President Delphine Borione put it at the 2012 EUNIC General Assembly, "It's from our presence in the world, on every continent, that we draw our strength."[50] However, the many advantages of a dispersed global network of clusters comes with the challenge of providing centralized support. As current EUNIC president argued at the 2012 EUNIC General Assembly there is a need for the network to "consolidate the link between EUNIC Global and the clusters . . . We must increase our ability to lead and support our network of clusters, provide them with more ongoing assistance."[51] According to figures produced by EUNIC 2 million people learn European languages through member organizations. With a combined turnover of over € 2.5 billion, EUNIC members seek to;

> facilitate cultural co-operation; to create lasting partnerships between professionals, to encourage greater understanding and awareness of the diverse European cultures and to encourage greater language learning.[52]

The collaborative, multihub, multidimensional nature of EUNIC is emphasized by the organizational structure. This structure is explicitly network based, and the intention that the organization is an active network, learning network, partnering network and an advocacy network.

To function at the organizational level EUNIC adopts the flexibility previously identified at the project level. Remaining flexible, rather than insisting all members are represented in all clusters, recognizes that some organizations will have greater resources and others will have a specific regional focus. This gives the organization great flexibility and means some organizations, such as the British Council, Goethe Institut, and Istituto Italiano di Cultura, have representation in many more clusters than the House of Cyprus or Nifin———the Nordic Institute.

Challenges to the "arms-length" Principle

While the flexibility around membership of specific clusters has advantages, as noted previously, it also creates challenges. Specifically how to maintain a concept of operating at "arms length" from government while a number of government ministries from countries including Slovakia,

Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus are EUNIC members. The EUNIC Guidance notes on forming and running a cluster indicate that;

> if there is no institute in a country for a member then the Head may nominate a representative. In many cases this may be the Embassy/ cultural attaché.[53]

In addition the creation of "associate" membership provides an alternative channel through which governments can become directly involved in EUNIC. The guidelines for EUNIC clusters states:

> Clusters can grant associate membership to representatives of the countries not represented in EUNIC at heads level. The institutes and embassies eligible for associate membership at cluster level are those from EU, EFTA (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and the official EU candidate countries (Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey).[54]

EUNIC guidelines further suggest that as some cultural attaches/embassies have an active cultural, educational or society program these activities can bring a benefit to clusters. The guidelines go on to state "it can be a benefit to have embassy cultural attaches in the associate category."[55] This recognizes that cultural and PD activity is not conducted in a uniform manner across EU countries but seriously undermines the claims of operating at "arms length."

The challenge to the "arms length" principle is demonstrated by the EUNIC cluster in New York. In New York, cultural institutes, consulates general, embassies, and missions to the UN all work together as part of a single cluster. To demonstrate the complexity, associated members include embassies of France, Portugal and consulates general of Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. The UK is represented twice, by the British Council as a full member and the UK Mission to the UN as an associate member. The Polish Cultural Institute and Polish Consulate General also have a similar relationship with EUNIC New York. France is represented by Alliance Francaise and the French Embassy, while Latvia is represented by both their consulate general and permanent mission to the UN, each having associate member status. The final dimension is the Delegation of the European Union to the UN, which is also an associated member of EUNIC New York.

As a result of the membership structure, in cities such as New York, EU supranational governmental representation, such as the Delegation of the EU to the UN, collaborates with both governmental and "arms length" forms of national representation to produce events including "Disapearing Act V," a European film festival featuring 24 contemporary films from

24 European countries, and the annual New Literature from Europe festival.[56] As the EUNIC New York example shows, there are multiple levels of networks involved in European PD creating a multidimensional endeavor that challenges the stated division between government and "arms length" cultural institutions. The decisions made by practitioners challenge scholars to conceptualize the multidimensional network which EUNIC activity creates.

This challenge of conceptualizing PD activity is not only created by EUNIC. Even organizations considered to operate at "arms length" can have close ties to government departments. For example, at the end of 2010, some British Council country directors also had a dual role as cultural counsellor at the UK Embassy———for example in France and United States with a number of operations run from high commissions or embassies.[57] This adds a governmental dimension to the activity of cultural institutes. It also means cultural institutes operating independently from their own government can be collaborating with government representatives or ministries from other EU member states. This creates a theoretical challenge to definitions of PD that exclude nongovernmental groups as EUNIC has both government ministries and "arms length" cultural organizations, which in turn are working with local partners to deliver projects.

The multidimensional nature of PD at the organizational level, similar to that at the project level, is also shown by the choice of locations where EUNIC has clusters and runs projects. For example, there are large EUNIC clusters in Germany (16 member organizations), France (15) and Belgium (Brussels) (13), with another slightly smaller cluster in the UK (11). Yet member organizations focusing on the UK or Germany are likely to also be collaborating with the British Council or Goethe Institut in other EUNIC clusters. As noted at the project level, EUNIC activity challenges the concept of a target audience, as what might be termed an "audience" in one location can be a collaborator or participant in another location.

At the organizational level collaboration and the resultant flow of influence within European PD create complexity, which outstrips one-way or two-way theoretical conceptualizations. Instead, the collaborative approach embraced by EUNIC emphasizes the importance of a multidimensional interpretation that recognizes the multiple types of actors—government and nongovernmental—and the different forms of relationships they create, including those that are at "arms length" and those that appear significantly closer.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown, through an analysis of EUNIC, some of the challenges that European PD faces in a multidimensional environment. They relate to the degree to which EUNIC can be considered to operate independently and the types of relationships EUNIC members develop.

Key Contribution of EUNIC

"EUNIC has a special responsibility to ensure that European countries promote and celebrate the diversity that makes each of us unique. But we will also work towards promoting those cultural values that we share in common with each other and other countries around the world. Maintaining cultural dialogue and understanding at a time of both international and intercommunity tension is a real challenge for Europe . . . EUNIC has a key contribution to make here."

David Green, president of EUNIC 2007

EUNIC has grown from seven members in 2006 to 19 members in 2007 and 29 members from 24 countries in 2013.[58] It has continued to develop clusters, growing from 75 in 2011 to 80 clusters around the world in 2013. EUNIC has a presence on every continent and pursues the objectives within and outside the EU.

To maintain a dispersed network of clusters across every continent, EUNIC has developed a "flexible solution" as one EUNIC president called it, to handle the multiple types of organizations seeking EUNIC membership. Through this solution EUNIC maintains the apparently contradictory position that it operates at "arms length" from government while also actively advocating the benefits of including embassies in EUNIC clusters and projects.

If EU cultural institutes only operated outside the EU and only worked with other analogous cultural institutes it would be possible to maintain a traditional unidimensional view of their cultural activities conceptualized within ideas of a one way or two way street. However, as this chapter has shown, European PD as practiced by EUNIC members is a multidimensional endeavor. In other words, as Karine Nahone has shown concepts of inclusion/exclusion in networks are "more complex than a static, binary dichotomy" or single dyadic relationship.[59]

As the study of communication moves to consider multidimensionality, so the study of European PD can embrace the multidimensional nature of EUNIC's activity and the environment in which EUNIC members operate. The relationships and interactions that underpin EUNIC activity, at the project and operational level, do not happen in isolation, but in a complex, multidimensional ecosystem of influence. In this multidimensional environment, interactions are not a series of separate, static, dyadic interactions, but a complex networked system that is constantly evolving.

Moving towards a multidimensional perspective allows the study of PD to embrace a community level analysis of the complex interactions that take place between EUNIC between full members, associated members, local partners, participants and other organizations seeking to influence

project participants. This additional level of analysis is important because we live in a networked world where the information seeking, decision making and resultant behavior of individuals takes place within a series of overlapping, dynamic networks, in which influence flows in multiple directions through multiple hubs.

Analyzing the nature of the different relationships that are developed during EUNIC activities is becoming an increasingly important part of PD scholarship. This includes understanding both the relationships between governmental ministries and cultural institutes operating at "arms length" and equally the relationships between EUNIC members and local partners. This latter form of relationship attracted increasing attention as a recent EUNIC conference. At the conclusion of that conference recommendations included that instead of "taking the role of a teacher, EUNIC needs to continue to focus on dialogue, so that it is not seen as arrogant or paternalistic." Indeed at the same conference, other speakers argued EUNIC should be "listening intently to the other side" and ensure calls for partnership were based on equality. The conference heard many examples that depicted European cultural institutes presenting a project to a potential partner "without listening to or taking in the ideas, concerns and expectations of the other side."[60] Brian Hocking has previously identified this as a traditional hierarchical approach and contrasted with the network model, which provides a "fundamentally different picture of how diplomacy works in the twenty-first century."[61]

This chapter has shown that European PD is multidimensional at both the project and organizational levels, as it contains numerous forms of relationships and actors. Through EUNIC organizations with different priorities, remits, and legal status collaborate on PD initiatives. EUNIC will continue to evolve as the organization approaches the tenth anniversary of its creation. In that time, further evidence will emerge of the way European organizations choose to collaborate, the structures they create to do so, and the way communities choose to respond to EUNIC projects. As these projects continue, the inherent tension between the European and national interests will also continue. Equally, the continued open cross-border movement of individuals within Europe will ensure that the future conduct of European PD will involve attempts to engage and collaborate with transnational communities with priorities of their own and the agency through which to pursue those them.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

The European Union's Social Power in International Politics

PETER VAN HAM

Introduction and Research Question

Today's public diplomacy (PD) fits well in a world where networks and fluid relationships among multiple actors with fuzzy roles abound. Where classical diplomacy centers on high-level talks and conferences, PD is about direct interaction with people rather than officials, even through blogs and music festivals. It is argued that this shift is because in a globalized, networked international environment, ordinary people have become increasingly important. In politics, state sovereignty is challenged by "people power," generated by the global triumph of democracy.[1] In economics, wealth is created more by weightless assets like knowledge and skills (which belongs to individuals), than by physical assets and resources (which belongs to states). Even in the area of security, human security and identity questions are crowding out classical interstate rivalry as the key concern and dominant paradigm.[2]

It is little surprise that in this world of PD, networks and fluid relationships, a postnational actor like the European Union (EU) should feel particularly comfortable. The EU is often portrayed as a laboratory where postmodern concepts are developed, tested, and evaluated. It is the first post-Westphalian entity experimenting with postnational democracy, majority voting, an open model of decision shaping based on so-called comitology, benchmarking, peer pressure, naming-and-shaming, scorecards, etc.[3] This new political model is born out of the necessity to accommodate a growing number of diverse member states and to avoid blockades based on national vetoes. But it also suggests that the EU's openness offers room for nonstate actors (experts, NGOs, lobbies, and other stakeholders) to engage with the Union in an effort to optimalize laws and regulations, whilst avoiding counterproductive confrontations

with third countries. As such, the EU puts itself forward as a model of regional governance that may be an inspiration for *global* governance. It also suggests that by merging so many conflicting interests, the EU position gains credibility on the global stage.[4] This raises the question whether we do indeed see the future when we go to Brussels. Does the EU offer a glimpse of the world to be, based on governance, rather than government?

According to Giandomenico Majone, the scope of EU power is primarily regulatory.[5] Under Majone's system, member states delegate certain regulatory powers to the EU's executive body, the European Commission, to insulate them from democratic pressures that could inhibit optimal policy outcomes. Arguably, this has worked rather well on low profile, technical matters. *The Economist* suggested in September 2007 that "Brussels is becoming the world's regulatory capital," mainly because the EU's approach "may better suit consumer and industry demands of certainty. If you manufacture globally, it is simpler to be bound by the toughest regulatory system in your supply chain."[6] Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe confirm that Europe is particularly well prepared to play a key role in international standardization due to its hierarchical and highly coordinated system.[7] On this issue, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has been quite outspoken: "I believe Europe should . . . shape a global system of clear rules that allows exporters and importers to trade GM crops and feed in confidence. Europe can and should play a leading role here."[8] Mandelson further suggests that it "is the rules of the single market which gives us the foundation to export our rules and standards around the world—an increasingly important part of my job as a trade commissioner. In short, no single market, no European project and no *Europe puissance*."[9]

As a regulatory power, the EU's track record is full of triumphs. This does not surprise since the European Commission's technocratic qualities are well known and highly regarded. These successes have raised Europe's ambitions and explain the EU's aspirations to become, for example, a "Green Superpower."[10] But these ambitions tend to overlook the fact that this technocratic mindset has its limits. The EU offers a bounded space where social power can roam freely. But its very openness and fluidity places limits on the Union's capability and determination to propose and instill its norms and interest abroad. This chapter examines the nexus between the EU's aspirations to use its social power and the reluctance of member states and third countries to acknowledge and support the Union's leadership. Social power is defined here as the ability to set standards, create norms, and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment.[11] This is closely related to the definition of leadership, as offered by Derek Beach and Colette Mazzucelli: "[A]ny action by one actor to guide or direct the behavior of other actors . . . towards a certain collective goal."[12] Inside Europe, the European Commission plays a central role in codifying the rules and

regulations that embody its norms, values, and interests. But can the EU also offer leadership abroad, and can it use its social power to be equally effective in the international arena?

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Social Power—A Definition

Social power can be defined as the ability to set standards, create values, and norms that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment. Soft power's core components are attraction and persuasion; social power clearly goes beyond that. Joseph Nye's notion remains agent centered, assuming that soft power remains largely based on resources, which can be used, applied, and wielded. Social power, on the other hand, also involves discursive power, drawing attention to the impact of framing, norm advocacy, agenda setting, the impact of media and communication, as well as practices like place branding and PD. Social power is derived from communication, social knowledge, and economic and political interaction. This implies that social power only works in relationships and is ultimately dependent upon the perception and socialization of others. For social power to become part of a strategic doctrine, policymakers must think carefully about how to *use* power. Policymakers realize that they can never take social power for granted, although they generally remain confused about how to use it. Moreover, since continuing relations give rise to social learning, social power inevitably is a long-term process, and should be studied as such.

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This chapter examines three cases. First, the EU's efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by strengthening existing treaties and international organizations in this area, and by adding a special clause to trade agreements with third countries. The EU's main strategic objective is to consolidate *existing norms and rules* that are undermined by the possible nuclear outbreak of Iran. Second, the EU's efforts to boost its standing as a Green Superpower by taking bold initiatives to set *new norms and rules* against climate change. Unlike WMD proliferation, where the EU is a bit out of its depth, the high profile support for global action against climate change can be considered a realistic test for the EU's social power in international politics. And third, the EU's aim to set rules for resource extraction in the developing world, and most notably in Africa. This is an area where *very few norms and rules* exist, and therefore offer opportunities to study the EU's role as a norm entrepreneur.

In all three cases, the EU makes an effort to implement and solidify its philosophy of "effective multilateralism," which emphasizes the importance of a rule-based international order, strict cooperation within international organizations, with the United Nations at the core. Effective multilateralism has formed the basis of the EU's international policy and law making since the onset, advocating the possibility of international policy cooperation, rather than competition or conflict. By strengthening multilateralism on a global scale, the EU aims to create an international environment where its preferred approach to power is privileged. The EU especially utilizes social power to upload and/or consolidate norms and standards to the global level, using the Union's self-declared normative leadership base. This chapter examines three modes of leadership.[13] First, *directional* leadership, based on unilateral action and the demonstration effects of leading by example. Second, *idea-based* leadership, based on problem naming and framing and the promotion of particular policy solutions. And third, *structural* leadership, based on creating incentives, costs and benefits in a particular policy area. It examines the EU's efforts to establish and/or consolidate these norms in the international community and how it uses diplomacy and economic power to convince other relevant actors that these norms are beneficial and superior.

This chapter concludes that the EU's lack of leadership, confused image and identity, as well as its internal openness, set limits to the actorness (or "agency") it can develop in international politics.[14] For effective idea-based and directional leadership, the EU has to demonstrate the feasibility and superiority of its preferred policy solutions. The reality of a shifting economic power balance implies that the EU has as much, perhaps even more, to gain from trade relations with emerging economies, which makes conditionality problematic. This complicates the EU's use of social power. The EU's economic, social, and political model is under pressure—and at times seriously questioned—ever since the financial crisis rocked the foundations of the European integration project. This has compromised the EU's role in framing problems, setting agendas, and claiming the upper hand in global policy debates. Social power and PD remain of the essence in any EU's strategy to play a global role. But the EU's ambitions will have to be toned down, and take into account that in an emerging polycentric world, Europe requires both social *and* hard power to defend its values and interests.[15]

1. WMD Proliferation: Justus Lipsius Meets Hard Security

Since the launch of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, the EU has taken great strides in developing a more coherent and effective approach to its external relations. The deliberations of the Council of the EU in Brussels' shiny new Justus Lipsius-building have become more authoritative, even on matters of "hard security" like WMD

proliferation. Although some modest progress was made to develop an EU WMD Strategy (in 2003, see below), a coherent and effective EU WMD policy proved difficult, if not impossible, to establish. The main reasons are internal: the EU comprises nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO states, and supporters and opponents of nuclear energy. The WMD agenda has therefore been instrumental for the EU to acquire a measure of actorness on hard security matters.[16] This has been a continued uphill struggle for the EU, since WMD policy remains capital based with national experts and representatives from member states playing a key role. Despite the significant institutional changes made to the CFSP in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, many member states remain unconvinced that the EU can be trusted with the hard challenge of devising and implementing a WMD nonproliferation policy that would yield better results than the current intergovernmental arrangement. Generating consensus has become a constantly reoccurring challenge for EU decision makers, mainly because decision making on CFSP issues is decentralized and the resources for policy implementation are dispersed. The EU's WMD policy remains largely intergovernmental with experts and representatives from the foreign ministries of member states playing a key role.

The institutionalization of the EU's WMD nonproliferation policy was triggered by the experiences of European leaders in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Disparity regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in intra-European and transatlantic schisms. EU member states realized that this row on foreign and security matters was damaging European cohesion, undermining confidence in the EU's aspiration to become a significant global actor. This gave rise to the first European Security Strategy (*A Secure Europe in a Better World*), as well as the EU's Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2003).[17] Since the EU often uses crises to advance towards more integration, these new strategic documents did not come unexpected. From the unambiguous phrasing of the WMD threat ("a growing threat to international peace and security"), it logically followed that meeting this challenge "must be a central element in the EU's external action" and that the EU "must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal."[18]

The EU's WMD Strategy offered a multilayered approach, based on effective multilateralism, promoting a stable regional and international environment and close cooperation with partners as well as strengthening the EU's own structures. Effective multilateralism was offered as the "cornerstone of the European [WMD] strategy," which was widely—and justly—considered a jibe at the leadership style of US President George W. Bush.[19] In February 2004, President Bush laid down a plan to introduce some radical changes to the existing nonproliferation regimes. His argument for doing so was straightforward: "These [rogue] nations pose different challenges; they require different strategies."[20] John Bolton, US

under secretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, further argued that "[a]rms control can be an important part of American foreign policy, but I think the real question is what advances our national interest. And in those cases where, for example, arms control treaties are ineffective or counterproductive or obsolete, they shouldn't be allowed to stand in the way of the development of our foreign policy."[21] The EU's WMD Strategy was therefore aimed at healing intra-European rifts, as well as offering European leadership by countering America's new policy of assertive counterproliferation.[22]

The EU's multilateral approach included pursuing the universalization and strengthening of existing nonproliferation treaties and agreements and providing political, financial, and technical support to verification regimes ensuring detection and compliance. In the past ten years the Council of the EU has adopted 20 joint actions to strengthen the role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), to reinforce the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540.[23] The CFSP budget has further assisted the CTBTO to set up and develop its monitoring facilities and has made the EU a large financial donor to the IAEA, aimed at, inter alia, promoting the conclusion of the IAEA's important additional protocols and the relevant adaptations to national legislation and regulatory frameworks. Joint actions have also been adopted to make some practical progress in nonproliferation capacity-building efforts in third countries and contributed to the construction of the Shchuchye chemical weapon destruction facility in Russia.

Backing up these treaties, organizations, and regimes is part of the EU's approach to strengthen WMD nonproliferation norms. These norms are anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as in the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and BTWC. This approach is in the EU's enlightened self-interest, since it aims to maintain a rule-based, multilateral international environment. The alternative—a glimpse of which was offered during the Bush administration—would be an interest-driven free-for-all based on Realpolitik, which would seriously hamper the EU's proclivity for social power.[24] The WMD Strategy was therefore part of the EU's idea-based leadership, trying to keep alive the notion of nonproliferation now that the system's benign hegemon, the United States, no longer offered unequivocal support for a UN-based multilateral approach.

At the same time, the EU has tried to buy more voice and influence within these frameworks by making itself an indispensable donor.[25] Most of the recipient organizations lack the financial and personnel resources to properly fulfill their tasks, which make additional EU support particularly crucial to sustain the institutional pillars of the multilateral system. The link between the EU's generosity and its influence in these fora remains,

however, ambiguous. In general, the EU does not have much of a say on how these funds are spent, apart from general objectives such as "strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol."[26] It does, however, seem clear that without the EU's continued support for these institutions, the normative basis of WMD nonproliferation would weaken. Without effectiveness, multilateralism as a philosophy and policy-approach will not endure. One could therefore argue that EU politics is based on "actorness by stealth," that is, becoming influential by strengthening and influencing other already existing organizations.[27]

But the EU's WMD Strategy also offered structural leadership based on the carrots-and-sticks approach of the so-called WMD clause. The EU argues that it "will consider the introduction of an effective carrot and stick policy linked to nonproliferation commitments in its relations with third countries. This will be done in particular in the context of cooperation agreements or assistance programmes."[28] In principle, the WMD clause aims to incorporate strategic thinking into EU policy, with the ultimate goal of turning *Zivilmacht* Europe into a full-fledged strategic actor, willing and capable of using its economic and financial clout to further its interests around the globe. The WMD clause was introduced under the term "mainstreaming," which boils down to the established practice of making trade, development assistance, and other elements of cooperation directly conditional on fulfillment of certain commitments and obligations, in this case in the area of nonproliferation. The clause stipulates that in case a third country does not comply with the "existing obligations under international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and agreements," the EU can, as a last resort, suspend the whole agreement.[29] This policy of mainstreaming applies the same conditionality as the EU uses to promote human rights and democracy in third countries. Effective mainstreaming is predicated on the understanding that the EU should actively defend its values and interests by making trade and aid contingent on "good behavior" of third parties. This goes beyond the EU's normal "leadership by example," which is based on diplomacy, persuasion, and argumentation. Instead, it uses structural leadership, since it is based on altering the costs and benefits of doing business with the EU and its member states.

To date, WMD clauses have been preliminarily agreed (but not yet signed) with China, Libya, South Korea, and several Central American states, while some progress has been achieved in negotiations with Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[30] Only two mixed agreements that incorporate the WMD clause have actually entered into force, and neither of them will have a significant impact since they involve poor countries without WMD capabilities and aspirations.[31] In relations with countries where a WMD clause could have a real impact,

negotiators from both sides have avoided framing the bilateral cooperation as "mixed agreements." For the past five years, the EU and India have been in negotiations for a far-reaching free trade agreement (FTA), but it was decided early on that the FTA would not be tied to any political conditionality.[32] India has made it clear that it will not allow the EU to coax it into accepting additional WMD commitments. Since the EU is likely to accept India's intransigence, this will further undermine the credibility of mainstreaming as a means of structural leadership. Obviously, the EU still needs to adjust to the new balance of economic and political power in the world—a new order in which Europe's influence is more limited and in which the EU's normative agenda is either distrusted or, even worse: simply ignored.

One of the key challenges to the WMD-framework has been Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program. In August 2002 clandestine nuclear activities were discovered by Western intelligence agencies in several Iranian nuclear facilities (in Natanz and Arak). Determined not to be sidelined as it was following the Iraq fiasco, key EU member states were keen to play a central role in the international community's efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. Foreign policy analysts considered Iran's nuclear ambitions a test case for the EU's CFSP and an opportunity for the EU to establish itself as an influential independent actor with global security ambitions.[33] In October 2003, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—the so-called E3—travelled to Tehran to open discussions and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. This visit took place during the debate on the European Security Strategy and WMD Strategy. At the same time, EU member states were divided on Iraq's alleged WMD program and the legality of the US-led ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime. The E3's initiative vis-à-vis Iran was therefore informed by the desire to rise above these differences and to find consensus. Since the United States aimed at isolating Iran, the EU's long-standing (since 1992) "critical dialogue" with Iran offered a unique advantage. The EU–Iranian relationship involved a formal human rights dialogue, negotiations on a trade and cooperation agreement (TCA, since December 2002), as well as a political dialogue.

The initiative for direct negotiations with Iran on nuclear matters by the E3 met with few suspicions and with no significant resistance within the EU. The specter of a so-called *directoire* leading the EU's foreign and security policy did not raise its head, confirming a tacit agreement that something had to be done to avoid a new European imbroglio *à la* Iraq. Although EU involvement was kick-started by the E3, it also soon became clear that the EU's formal involvement in negotiations with Iran would strengthen the EU's hand and offer a unique opportunity to fortify the EU's global security image. By affirming a shared willingness to promote security and stability in the Middle East, the Tehran Declaration and the Paris Agreement went beyond purely nuclear matters.[34] The EU's proclivity for multilateralism and a comprehensive approach to security

and development implied that negotiations would soon be widened to matters such as "terrorism, Iran's approach to the Middle East peace process, regional issues as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."[35]

It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that Iran has been a watershed for the EU's CFSP. However, the EU's Iran policy also showed the inherent limits of the comprehensive approach and the determination to work in accordance with all relevant international institutions. Strengthening the norm of WMD nonproliferation globally is a challenge of major proportions, and it is laudable that the EU is actively engaged in encouraging the universalization of this norm and that it helps to strengthen those organizations that are already set in place to do so. The WMD Strategy was part of the EU's first-ever security strategy and served as a symbol of the EU's awakening as a global security actor. However, no significant success has been achieved, and no country has changed its WMD Strategy under influence of Europe's sticks-and-carrots approach. Moreover, although EU support to WMD treaties and institutions may well have had some impact, no serious study has ever been conducted to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. Even the argument that the EU "buys voice" within these institutions remains contested.[36]

Member states remain skeptical that the EU has the wherewithal, cunning, and experience to go beyond declaratory policy and make a real impact on matters of strategic importance. As a 2005 British House of Lords report has put it: "The EU institutions do not currently have the legal authority or bureaucratic flexibility needed to implement a comprehensive programme in the area of non-proliferation, which a number of EU Member States continue to regard as an inter-governmental prerogative."[37] The experience with the EU's WMD Strategy suggests that it is through voluntary commitment that member states can act collectively and orient national policies towards commonly agreed objectives. For the foreseeable future, the emphasis will be on refining working methods, coordination procedures and the administrative underpinnings of such a coordination process.

2. The EU as a Green Superpower

Since the early 1990s, the EU has tried to establish itself as a "Green Superpower." It has made serious efforts to become an internationally recognized leader in global environmental governance, particularly in the areas of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, renewable energy, and energy efficiency. European Commission President José Manuel Barroso stated (in 2008) that "Europe must lead the world in the shift to a hi-tech, low carbon economy,"[38] and former president of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering argued (in 2008) that "[o]n the European continent, we have managed to create lasting peace between our countries, now

we have to tackle the huge task of creating peace with the planet we live on."[39]

Within the EU itself, climate change has become a major agenda item. "Green" can even be considered one of the EU's main brand attributes.[40] Whereas halting WMD proliferation is a traditional "hard security" concern with established norms and treaties, global environmental governance is an area that lends itself exquisitely for the EU's preferred "soft" leadership style and strategy, based on directional leadership.[41] By focusing on this agenda, the EU has not only tried to shape a global rule-based and institutionalized system to fight climate change, but also tried to boost its own standing as an effective global actor. Although climate change has gradually become "high politics" (especially due to the link with security),[42] EU environmental leadership neatly fits Brussels' normative agenda, its desire to set transparent rules, and its self-proclaimed aim to make the world a better and safer place. Louise van Schaik and Karel van Hecke argue that the EU's climate policy "embodies almost all the European Union believes in, most importantly that it is possible to address a problem of the commons by means of inter-state cooperation."[43] Moreover, after 2005 (when the French and Dutch electorate voted down the Constitutional Treaty), the EU has also used climate change to appeal to "its" (i.e., European) citizens and to demonstrate the added value it can bring to their daily lives. Since climate governance is a core issue of the European project, it offers good insights into the EU's capabilities to use social power in international politics.

The aspiration of environmental leadership has been instrumental in consolidating the EU's actorness. Since climate change falls within the "mixed competence" of the EU and member states, international negotiations involve both the European Commission and individual national representatives. From the onset, the EU has worked hard to set in place a system of working groups aimed at streamlining national views and interests, and offering the European Commission the authority to negotiate on Europe's behalf in international fora. Since June 2003, the EU works through a so-called Green Diplomacy Network (GDN), which is "aimed at promoting the integration of environment into external relations through the creation of an informal network of environment experts within foreign ministries."[44] Although this green network may have raised the profile of climate change on the agenda of member states, it has also complicated consistency and decisiveness within the EU decision-making framework. In 2004, a system of "lead negotiators" and "issue leaders" was introduced to tackle this problem and to develop a coherent EU position on the international stage.[45] Still, it has proven difficult to go beyond a lowest common denominator position due to the great diversity of national climate policies.[46] Given the complex set-up of the EU's environmental policy—with the Commission, Council, presidency and member states all involved—the outside world has not always perceived the EU as a unified actor; quite the contrary.[47]

EU leadership has since the beginning been based on a three-pronged approach. First, the EU has aimed to convince other countries to take climate change seriously by demonstrating that it is possible to limit greenhouse gas emissions without harming economic development (so-called smart growth). This has been important for developing countries, and China and India in particular. The EU's idea-based leadership involved naming and framing the problem of climate change, as well as offering credible solutions (most notably the Kyoto Protocol and the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme—ETS). Second, the EU aims to be an "honest broker" and create a coalition between industrialized and developing countries. Third, the EU has championed the idea of "common, but differentiated responsibility" to fight climate change, implying that countries *historically* responsible for the largest share of emissions should be prepared to reduce them first, and offer developing countries financial compensation for climate change adaption and the transition to a low-carbon economy.[48] Taken together, these three approaches aim to offer the EU the required social power to upload the norm of sound environmental governance to the global level.

In the 1997 negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the EU proposed deep cuts and accepted the highest reduction target among all the major industrialized countries. In 2007, the EU even went as far as offering its own "independent commitment" of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020.[49] By going beyond existing standards and expectations, the EU tried to strengthen its credibility and offer directional leadership by setting a good example. As with the EU's WMD Strategy, Europe's focus on climate change set itself apart from the Bush administration's skepticism of treaty-based multilateralism. The Bush administration was opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, which offered the EU a golden opportunity to save Kyoto and raise its profile as a Green Superpower. The EU has been instrumental in including climate change on the agenda of major International Organizations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations (both the General Assembly and the Security Council), as well as the G8 and G20. In some cases the EU has even adopted an originally American idea—like building a global carbon market—and turned it into the "cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate change" (the EU's ETS).[50]

Like WMD proliferation, climate change has been mainstreamed in the overall framework of the EU's external relations, from the European Neighborhood Policy with eastern partners, to development cooperation with Europe's south. The only example of successful structural leadership was the EU's support for Russian WTO membership which persuaded Moscow to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.[51] Convincing Central Europe on the importance of fighting climate change has proven quite a challenge. In the run-up to the December 2009 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, Czech President Vaclav Klaus publicly stated that "climate change is a dangerous myth"[52], and

that the EU should instead focus on energy security, particularly in the light of the recent Russian threats to cut off gas supplies. Moreover, some new member states (like Bulgaria and Romania) were allowed to *increase* their carbon emissions from the original 2005-level in order not to hamper their economic growth, which undermined the credibility of the EU's notion of smart growth. Buying support from the South has proven equally difficult. The EU's Global Climate Change Alliance with poor developing countries has been chronically underfunded. The actual costs of adapting to climate change many times exceeds Europe's development assistance. The EU's so-called Adaptation Fund is modest, whereas the UNFCCC 2007 report on the costs to address climate change clearly indicated that the best results could be achieved by helping developing countries to invest in clean energy and sustainable development.[53] As Marc Pallemaerts and Jonathan Armstrong argue, the EU fails to issue reliable and verifiable data on the financial support it gives to developing countries for climate change mitigation, but overall the funding "falls well short" of the EU's commitments. With the financial crisis hitting Europe harder than expected, it is very unlikely that the EU will come up with additional funds, and certainly not enough to convince China and India to join more ambitious climate arrangements.

The EU's leadership was aimed at promoting a low-carbon economy that would be compatible with energy security, economic growth as well as competitiveness. Europe's vision of such a green, prosperous and sustainable world was put to the test during the December 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change summit. Instead of being a decisive actor, the EU was marginalized and it were US President Obama and his Chinese counterpart Wen who determined the—very modest—outcome. The EU's Swedish presidency even called the Copenhagen results "a disaster," and a "great failure."[54] All studies of the Copenhagen Accord concluded that the EU could not convince crucial third countries to follow Europe's lead. Fast-growing developing countries (since 2009 known under the acronym BASIC—Brazil, South Africa, India and China) did not take the EU seriously, and instead accepted the US as a frontrunner.[55] Especially China successfully blocked progress towards concrete targets and commitments and received support from other BASIC countries to ensure that the EU's approach and proposals were largely rejected. The Copenhagen experience has seriously damaged the EU's self-proclaimed leadership role and it has questioned the EU's ability to become a global actor of significance.[56]

The UN climate talks in Durban in December 2012 have hardly improved the EU's standing. The EU argued it would only sign up to more cuts if all polluters back a mandate in Durban envisioning a new legally binding treaty by 2015 that would come into force by 2020. But China, India and the US effectively blocked this new EU proposal from the very start.[57] Although the Kyoto Protocol was given a second wind, without the big polluters (the US, India and China) on board, the Protocol

will only cover about 15 percent of the world's GHG emissions. Indeed, since Russia, Canada and Japan retreated from the Kyoto process, this only leaves the EU, Norway and Switzerland as signatories. As could be expected, EU officials put a brave face on it. European Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard declared that the "EU's strategy worked. When many parties said that Durban could only implement decisions taken [at earlier climate conferences], the EU wanted more ambition. And got more!"[58] UK Energy and Climate Change Secretary Chris Huhne even went as far as saying that Durban "is a great success for European diplomacy."[59] The Durban Accord now involves a new "legal framework" to be negotiated among all parties at a new UN Climate Change Conference. This new framework should be in place in 2015 and operational in 2020. A new Green Climate Fund was envisaged to mobilize a promised US$100 billion a year in public and private financing by 2020 to help developing countries adapting to climate change and converting to clean energy sources. Ultimately, the EU's qualification of Durban as an "historical breakthrough"[60], has not been shared by others. EU leadership was scorned by Chinese and India delegates, who even publicly asked: "What qualifies you to tell us what to do? We are taking action. We want to see your action!"[61] Green MEP Bas Eickhout therefore concluded: "The EU has shown leadership in these Durban negotiations, but its strategy of pegging the ambition of its own climate action to that of the rest of the world has ultimately fallen short."[62]

The conclusion is therefore sobering. Surely, the EU can claim some credit for making climate change action a global priority. Although the importance of issue framing and agenda setting should be acknowledged, they pale against the importance of actual policy making. As Andrea Lenschow and Carina Sprunck have argued: "[R]egular 'reality checks' in Europe may undermine the myth of a Green Europe and the legitimacy that follows."[63] Crucially, the EU's use of social power to lift strict environmental norms to the global level has failed because Europe itself cannot fulfill these commitments. The notion of 'smart growth' based on the absence of any trade-off between the economy and environmental protection is no longer credible and appealing with the eurozone in a deep and structural crisis. Leading by example fails when the example (i.e., smart growth) is not fully accepted by the leader itself, and surely not when the example seems to fall short, publicly. EU member states have found it difficult to implement the EU's environmental *acquis*. Environmental infringements make up one-third of all violations of European Community law,[64] which indicates that member states themselves are performing poorly in implementing their own EU standards. When the EU fails to compel its own members to comply with the image of a Green Europe, the social power invested in Europe's Green brand is bound to suffer.

Copenhagen and Durban also showed that emerging economies have gained confidence and are no longer prepared to follow the agreements suggested by either the US or the EU; instead, they often dictate the

outcome of negotiations themselves. This reflects the changing global balance of economic power, as well as the ability of BASIC countries to create a common front, as India, Brazil and South Africa have done at Copenhagen after the creation of the IBSA (India—Brazil—South Africa) Dialogue Forum. With the direct involvement of China, IBSA representatives often spoke with one voice, outshining the EU. The EU's directional leadership also *de facto* tied its own hands during negotiations, since all Europe's cards where open on the table, and Europe's involvement and commitment was taken for granted. During the Copenhagen and Durban negotiations, so-called sweeteners were offered (such as access to offset credits, sinks[65] or surplus allowances) to countries to help them swallow bitter pills as incentives to commit to robust greenhouse gas mitigation efforts. But here the EU failed as well since it called for comprehensive national strategies to be in place prior to providing financial support for developing countries to tackle climate change.

All in all, mainstreaming and conditionality have not offered the EU a constructive framework in which social power could be used. The lack of strategic purpose and the lack of financial resources have undermined the EU's structural leadership since the EU could not change the costs and benefits for key emerging countries to persuade them to take bolder steps to combat climate change. As Louise van Schaik and Simon Schunz have concluded: "[T]he Union has largely failed to influence the global climate regime through exporting its policy solutions to the global level."[66]

3. Regulating Resource Extraction: Breaking New Ground

In one of the EU's information booklets, it is claimed that "Europe's mission in the 21st century is to . . . uphold the values that Europeans share, such as sustainable development and a sound environment, respect for human rights and the social market economy."[67] These norms and values underpin the EU's foreign policy, not only its CFSP, but all of the EU's external relations in general. In a most recent effort to use its social power to upload these values to the global level, the EU aims to play a major role in setting natural resource transparency rules. Especially Africa and Central Asia, with their wealth of mineral reserves, have become targets of fast-growing BASIC countries, comparable with the nineteenth-century "Scramble for Africa."[68] Since the beginning of the new millennium, China has become the biggest raw materials consumer. And it is a "key imperative for China to supply its domestic industries with the resources it needs; Chinese companies have stepped up their global investment in mining projects. These activities are supported by the Chinese government and are partly undertaken by state-controlled companies."[69] Most countries with an abundance of natural wealth still suffer from the well-known "resource curse," since these strategic resources are extracted at an alarming pace and without due regard for the economic, social and

environmental concerns of the societies in the region. Alex Benkenstein therefore claims that "[g]ood governance, transparency and accountability are essential, while tax regimes, environmental legislation and mining codes in general must be structured so as to ensure that all citizens, rather than just the political and economic elite of those countries, benefit from the exploitation of their mineral resources."[70]

Two major initiatives play a role in the attempt to arrive at global standards that ensure more transparent management of natural resources. First, the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition which was set up in 2002, and is supported by civil society groups worldwide. PWYP tries to force oil and mining firms to publish details of their payments to governments in the poor countries where they operate. The argument behind scrutinizing the operations of extractive industries in the developing world is to "ensure [that] some of the world's poorest benefit from the wealth that lies in the ground beneath them."[71] Second, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which is a so-called multistakeholder initiative set up by UK prime minister Tony Blair in 2002, and is supported by a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and International Organizations. Although both EITI and the PWYP-campaign share similar goals, EITI seems to be more embedded in the multilateral framework of states, major International Organizations and resource-related governance structures. PWYP is exclusively a civil society movement, aiming at mandatory solutions and changes in laws and regulations around the world, and argues that EITI implementation alone is insufficient to ensure full transparency.[72]Before elaborating on the preferred EU strategy to upload and consolidate these new norms and rules, it is in order to examine what is at stake for the EU to push these kind of initiatives.

Until the BASIC countries showed up in Africa, most of the continent's natural resources were developed almost exclusively by Europe. The EU's Lomé Convention and Cotonou agreement offered African countries a combination of financial assistance, development aid and stabilization funds encouraging them to assure the supply of natural resources to the European market. This postcolonial relationship was altered in the mid-1990s, when European leaders began to subscribe to the principle of free trade in a global market, instead of relying on the complex web of bilateral and multilateral treaties linking aid, concessional funding and raw materials supply. At the same time that the EU dismantled the old Lomé instruments, BASIC countries arrived in Africa, providing low interest loans, concessional assistance and infrastructure development in return of direct access to mineral and energy resources.[73] In short, BASIC countries adopted exactly the same formula that the EU had abandoned only a few years earlier.

Since Chinese and Indian mining, energy and agricultural firms don't comply with the stringent limitations on international bribery that prevail in the West, the EU and the US have tried to level the playing field by

pushing transparency provisions on African countries, using NGOs as a lever and a proxy. Both PWYP and EITI are therefore not just (or even mainly) engaged in altruistic norm-setting efforts, but part of an overall Western strategy to regain access to critical natural resources. The problem is that many European companies involved in oil prospecting and extraction of raw materials fear that strict, mandatory disclosure rules that only apply to EU-based companies would be very burdensome, would reveal commercially sensitive information, and would place EU industry at a competitive disadvantage. They therefore tend to support EITI's voluntary schemes, and actively lobby Brussels' policymakers to accept exemptions for countries and firms that would rather keep information secret.

European Commission President Barroso declared in May 2011, that "[b]ecause things have got to change, the European Union, alongside civil society and African leaders, supports the EITI as a new international standard to promote revenue transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. I want to go further by making these commitments binding in EU law."[74] In March 2011, the European Parliament called upon the European Commission to continue preparatory work on legislative proposals to ensure that extractive companies publish key information, including the payments they make for every project and country where they are involved.[75] On 25 October 2011, the European Commission announced legislative proposals in revision of the EU's existing transparency directive.[76] The initial call for a more active EU stance was made in a report first released in July 2011, which devised an "effective raw materials strategy for Europe."[77] The report sees the challenge of the effective governance of raw materials as an opportunity for Europe to use its own resources better, and to employ greener technologies.[78] But the overall goal is to avoid and/or diminish any restrictions and distortion of competition of trade in raw materials, and to establish an international regulatory platform.

How has the EU's social power been used in this area? The EU actively supports voluntary standards and corporate codes of conduct, such as laid down in the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, or the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performing Standards. A mechanism to make these voluntary standards mandatory within Europe is, however, lacking. Moreover, apart from Norway (which is not a member of the EU), no Western country has joined EITI as a so-called compliant country. Especially the Nordic countries are pushing transparency through as well as within the EU, using the collective normative and bargaining power of Europe to upload their own norm of open government and public access to government documents to the global level.[79] Several African countries (like Nigeria, Mali and Ivory Coast) have committed themselves to EITI's strict rules. Several EU member states are so-called supporting countries, but this remains a rather charitable status. It is even argued that the EU contributes to the on-going

"resource curse" of developing countries since it "is giving the private sector *carte blanche* on illicit behavior ranging from direct financial corruption of government officials to severe environmental degradation."[80] This situation sets obvious limits to the EU's directional leadership.

The EU can also not claim any idea-based leadership. Compared with the US, the EU is a late-comer in laying down the law on transparency. In July 2010, the US already passed such a law requiring companies listed on the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their payments to all governments for oil and minerals on a country-by-country, and a project-by-project basis (in the Dodd Frank Act). And in May 2011, the G8 endorsed the disclosure of industry payments to governments along the lines of the EITI.[81] The EU's legislative proposals are also broadly similar to the US Dodd Frank Act requirements. They go further in only two respects. First, the EU logging industry will fall within the scope of the proposed reporting requirements. The EU's FLEGT Action Plan (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) sets out a voluntary licensing system aimed to ensure that only legally harvested timber is imported to the EU from countries that take part of the scheme. The 2010 Timber Regulation is supposed to turn this voluntary scheme into a mandatory system, ensuring transparency and legality.[82] Secondly, the EU rules will apply to large unlisted companies as well as unlisted companies. Since nonlisted companies can potentially make significant payments to governments in the countries where they operate, this inclusion is important to create a level playing field in the EU, and beyond.[83]

Obviously, the EU's full commitment for regulating natural resource transparency is crucial. Although NGOs and the US were first in calling for new and tough norms to regulate natural resource trade, the EU reserves a key role for itself as a policy entrepreneur. Not only is the value of extractive industry firms in EU-stock exchanges around €2 trillion[84], but strong EU laws would also put pressure on other G20 countries, like Australia, Canada, South Africa and China to adopt similar legislation of their own. Over the years, UK and French political leaders have maintained close contact with celebrity diplomats such as Bono (the cofounder of ONE) and Bill Gates, who have pushed resource transparency higher on the international agenda. Germany has taken the lead to invite China and India to join the EITI, a call which has now been adopted by the EU itself. Jonas Moberg, head of the EITI International Secretariat, has argued that "the EITI should be both aspirational and inspirational. It alone does not lead to good management of the extractive sector, but it does provide an important platform from which other necessary processes can evolve."[85] Although the EU aspires a leadership role, the profile of the EU has remained remarkably low in this area, obviously limiting itself to leadership by proxy. The best approach to alleviating the EU's predicament will be to "investigate the feasibility of defining a globally integrated and multilateral natural resources management policy framework to address conflict and security challenges."[86] Incorporating such a

more *Realpolitik*-based approach into a possible new European Security Strategy, would certainly be a major step forward.[87]

4. Conclusions: Social Power in a Realist World

The EU's ambition to offer directional and idea-based leadership in international politics is based on the understanding that Europe needs to turn its weakness into an advantage. EU policy is largely norm-driven, although clearly some—if not most—of the proposed (new) norms are also in Europe's interest. The EU's policies are based on what it considers appropriate action, and most EU proposals are framed as altruistic initiatives to make the world a safer, sustainable and transparent place. By stressing the normative aspects of its foreign policy initiatives, the EU endeavors to convince other major international actors to subscribe to its own worldview based on multilateralism and the adherence to international law. But by stressing the logic of appropriateness of its own actions, the EU makes itself vulnerable to criticism. The EU's normative agenda raises suspicions that what is sold as morally superior and beneficial to all, is little more than a thinly disguised defense of Europe's own narrow economic and strategic interests.

Recalibrating the EU's PD is called for because using social power based on norm-driven action has limits. Whether we take an example from "high politics" (like halting WMD proliferation), or from new areas where the EU wants to determine what is appropriate and just (like climate change policy, or resource governance), the results have been meager, falling far short of the stated ambitions. As a result, the EU's expectations-capability gap is widening, which undermines the credibility of its CFSP as well as the new instruments and institutions it has set in place with the Lisbon Treaty in order to consolidate and improve its external representation and action. As a regulatory power, the EU may still be effective, but as a social power in international politics, the EU must not only change its normative tune but also adapt to the changing balance of global power. Dealing with rising powers like China, India, Brazil, as well as Russia and Turkey, requires a relationship based on a clear appreciation of each other's (national) interests. The EU's PD towards these countries should therefore shy away from lofty normative agendas that are not (widely) shared within target populations. Instead, PD should be based on commonalities, offering a mix of shared interests as well as values.

This chapter offers three explanations why the EU's social power in international politics is in decline. First, the EU's mistaken assumption that the rest of the world is gradually following the "EU model" complicates a realistic and effective approach to policy making based on leadership. Third parties around the globe may pay lip service to the EU's normative agenda, but tend not to comply with the Union since they do not subscribe to the postmodern assumptions on which this agenda is

based. Although the EU obviously has interests, it historically prefers to dress them up as norms, values and even ideals, hoping—and at times even assuming or insisting—that the rest of the world will follow. However, the attractiveness of the EU's model has plunged since the global financial crisis has laid bare the structural problems of European economic and political integration. If multilateralism is not effective inside Europe, why would it be the guiding principle in the rest of the world? If smart growth cannot be achieved inside the EU, why would it guide a new global climate arrangement? The EU's idea-based leadership remains undisputed, but cannot be followed-up by directional and structural leadership. All in all, the EU's soft power has declined markedly since 2009.[88]

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Social Power and Public Diplomacy

PD depends on, and is rooted in, communication. The social power derived from this strategy hinges on other actors knowing of one's positive and alluring policies and qualities. It is key to spread the social knowledge about one's attractiveness—or, in case of new PD: the importance of certain policy issues—, otherwise little social power can be derived and used. This explains why the importance of social power has increased with the onset of a new media era, since in a world where information technology is cheap, wide spread, and evasive, communication has become simpler. The problem with PD as a social power phenomenon is that we still lack detailed knowledge and a thorough understanding of how it works. How do certain fringe ideas become received wisdoms? What is the most effective way to change minds and win over hearts? What are the triggers that encourage the general public and elites to reframe the issues and think (as well as feel) differently? Knowledge is still very patchy on both the psychological and sociological aspects of these questions. What we do know, however, is that influencing the way people think, what they consider normal and desirable, is a key goal of any foreign policy, and touches upon the very roots of our debate on social power.

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Second, conditionality fails because the EU has as much, perhaps even more, to gain from trade relations with BASIC countries and other emerging economies, as vice versa. The reality of a shifting economic power balance has obviously not yet dawned upon EU officials, a painful example of political inertia and delusion that further undermines the

Union's standing as a serious global player. Geoffrey Garrett argues that a "*de facto* G2 is emerging almost by default, even though neither China nor the US will give their relationship this grandiose title."[89] The EU realizes all too well that if it wants to become an international actor, it needs to turn the G2 into a G3. But to acquire access to this exclusive global governance forum, the EU cannot limit itself to good ideas; it has to be able to deliver, economically, politically as well as strategically.

And finally, member states have little faith in the EU's ability to offer leadership—both within Europe and beyond. The EU's lack of a robust strategic culture and its altruistic approach to global affairs breed skepticism within national capitals, and raise doubts that the EU can defend Europe's interests.[90] The EU's normative agenda stands in the way of a foreign policy agenda based on an honest and reasonable balance between values and interests. By clarifying these interests and preparing its institutions to defend them, the EU may become more attractive to member states as a foreign policy actor. The EU's brief spell at negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran offers a good example of what is possible, even in "high politics." In today's Realist world, major players like the US, Russia, China and India would welcome an EU that uses its social power without normative window dressing. A more robust and realistic EU would also get the support of France and the UK.

It is often said that politics is the art of the possible. This is wrong since, especially in the EU, politics is the art of making possible what is necessary. As a regulatory powerhouse, the EU has to make the next step and devise a strategy to effectively use its social power in international politics. Clearly, the Union has to recalibrate its policies if it wants to improve the use of its social power. Given the improbability of the EU developing major military capabilities, the Union is destined to remain a *Zivilmacht* and hence has to optimalize its social power toolbox to defend its values and interests.[91] This requires a serious rethink of existing concepts, approaches and policies throughout all of the EU's bodies and agencies.

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CHAPTER NINE

Normative Power and the Future of EU Public Diplomacy

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1. Introduction—Normative Power and Public Diplomacy

> We Europeans believe that public diplomacy plays a special role in the external relations of the European Union . . . Public diplomacy should reflect not only what we do or want to do; but also what we are and what we stand for. As we move towards a new and uncertain global order, this is probably more important than it has ever been. The values we considered self evident before, may not always be so in future.[1]

For the last two decades scholars of the European Union (EU) have been seeking to understand the EU's "international identity" in order to make sense of what the EU is and what it stands for, as much as understanding what the EU does or wants to do in global politics.[1] The normative power approach to the EU in global politics has been developed specifically to understand the EU's international identity by examining its principles, actions, and impact.[2] As Vicki Birchfield points out, the normative power approach represents a variation on the dialectic of being and becoming[3]—that it involves both empirical analysis and "critical normative intervention."[4]

Steffen Bay Rasmussen, in line with the theme of this volume, suggests that "public diplomacy is generally associated with the notion of soft power . . . a method by which the attractiveness of a country's ideals and values can be promoted."[5] But he has also made clear that the "arguments about normative power also recognise that attraction—and the corresponding diffusion of ideas and norms—does not happen automatically, [but through] specific mechanisms for normative diffusion."[6] This

emphasis on normative power as an explicitly theoretical concept requiring an understanding of social diffusion and normative practices is important.[7] As Janice Bially Mattern has discussed, there is absolutely nothing soft about "soft power"—in the US case it is almost always used for the pursuit of "national interest," rather than because it is less coercive.[8]

What is necessary is an understanding of the specific mechanisms or modes of diffusion in the normative power approach and the roles they might play in EU public diplomacy (PD). In pointing to the different modes of diffusion in the normative power approach, Anna Michalski has suggested that "the strength of the EU's normative power is decided by its ability to shape other actors' perceptions of the appropriate cognitive content of international politics."[9] Rasmussen argues that "public diplomacy refers to the mechanisms of informational diffusion and the cultural filter diffusion" in the normative power approach.[10] These different mechanisms or modes are discussed more extensively below.

The mainstream approach to describing PD as "winning hearts and minds" comes from the British role during the Malayan emergency of the 1940s and 1950s.[11] The phrase has subsequently come to be associated with the US misunderstanding of the *Kampung Baru* ("new village") counterinsurgency program and propaganda struggles of the Vietnam War.[12] Thus in this chapter we look instead at the aim of *sharing* hearts and minds rather than winning them. This emphasis reflects the aim of moving the study of the EU as a global actor away from zero-sum winning-losing approaches towards understanding the role of the EU as sharing "European communion."[13]

As Margot Wallström, the former vice-president of the European Commission, recognized in 2008, the EU was rapidly moving from the old and relatively certain global order of the Cold War towards the new and relatively uncertain global order of the twenty-first century:

> This is not an exercise in "national branding"; it is not "propaganda," because we know that this does not work. It is the recognition of a fundamental shift, and especially so in relatively open societies, of how power, influence and decision-making has spread, and how complex it has become.[14]

As the next five sections set out, this fundamental shift in the role of the EU in global politics requires a recognition of how the EU has "gone global" (section 2); how EU diplomacy is "going public" (section 3); how EU PD needs to consider "sharing minds" (section 4); how the normative power of PD can ensure the EU is "remaining distinctive" in global politics (section 5); and concluding on the normative power approach to the future of EU PD (section 6). The chapter concludes, in line with Wallström, that the fundamental shift of how power, influence, and decision making has spread and become complex demands the reconsideration of normative power and EU PD. The emphasis in this chapter is on the

future of EU PD in a more globalized, multipolar, multilateral world. The chapter does not seek to explore the role of EU member states within this future shift but clearly, as Mai'a Davis Cross discusses in her chapter, if the EU and its member states are to have a future role at all, they must develop synergies not antergies in external actions and PD.

2. Gone Global—The EU in Global Politics

> As any diplomatic service, the EEAS will consist of a central administration and EU delegations in third countries and at international organisations . . . Furthermore, the EEAS will consist of a number of geographic directorates general covering all regions of the world, as well as multilateral and thematic departments, a policy planning department, a legal department and departments for interinstitutional relations, information and public diplomacy.[15]

The EU's imperative for engagement with the world beyond itself has deep roots and was an integral component of the earliest stages of European integration.[16] Being an innovative development in international relations—a regional organization that has sought to "go global" in the exercise of its influence—there is no previous model for it to follow. There is, however, a danger in being seduced by wanting to be a Westphalian post-Westphalian power: to want to play the games that states play rather than seeking to be an innovator in international relations. This tension between postmodern, post-Westphalian states can be found in the work of Thomas Diez and Robert Cooper.[17] The debate regarding the ideal type of power the EU is being and becoming has been critically relevant over the past decade, with an emphasis on the four ideal types of "region-state," "liberal-internationalist," "civilian power," and "normative puissance."[18]

The EU has already established the panoply of instruments that any respectable state might want to run a foreign policy: a diplomatic infrastructure (embryonic, imperfect but in place), membership of key international organizations, a network of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and military power (albeit small but now with missions on the ground). More innovatively the EU has developed the novel approach of increasing its size by persuading third countries that membership is the only respectable course of action for a (post-)modern European state. As the excerpt from the 2010 Council decision on the European External Action Service (above) illustrates, the main elements of the EU's external actions include geographical and thematic diplomacy, together with information and PD.[19] One immediate challenge for EU external action and PD is that responsibility for enlargement still falls under the remit of the Directorate-General for Enlargement of the European Commission. Another challenge is that the EU's desire in the 1990s to improve relations with its nearest neighbors, who had no immediate prospect of membership, was

soon overcome by the security discourses of the "war on terror" in the evolution of the European Neighborhood Policy, ENP.[20]

The EU thus has a very well-established relationship with its near neighbors—both prospective members and aspirants—but what of engagement with the world beyond? The EU has already "gone global." From early in its history it developed a network of association agreements and other forms of economic relationships. To these were added as "political dialogues" exchanges of views with third countries. Consequently embedded in the EU's foreign policy identity is this desire to remake the world—to create a negotiated order—largely through multilateralism.[21] This network of stabilization and association agreements, the ENP, and Generalized System of Preferences "plus" (GSP+) arrangements all serve as examples of the EU's layers of institutionalized global relationships. In this respect, going global provides an opportunity for procedural diffusion and PD in the 20 association agreements identified by the EEAS in May 2011—including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, Turkey, and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.

In 2003, the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) placed multilateralism as the touchstone, and arguably the *raison d'etre*, of the EU's international presence. The ESS set out the strategic objective of effective multilateralism: "[i]n a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective."[22] The security strategy also contained a list of countries who were possible strategic partners, which was largely a list of great and emerging powers. As Richard Youngs argued in 2005, many believe there is a need to harness EU power to promote objectives in a more concrete fashion and to make these relationships work in the EU's best interests.[23] The ESS list included the United States, Russia, Japan, China, Canada, and India, but was also open to "all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support."[24] The list of strategic partnerships now includes ten countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, and the United States.

At present there is a huge commitment of time for the High Representative and vice-president of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, in the conduct of EU diplomacy, but the direct benefits for the EU are not always apparent. While the creation of the EEAS was intended to relieve the routine aspects of diplomacy from the Commission and the Council, there are still unnecessary burdens for these two institutions and often with indeterminate effect. Examples include enlargement, negotiations, development cooperation, trade negotiations, international climate change negotiations, as well as the international economic and financial issues. Setting aside these capacity and coordination problems of making EU diplomacy work the EEAS, at best, aspires to create a twentieth-century

diplomatic infrastructure in a twenty-first century world. The EU currently underplays the need to engage with peoples as much as states. As Mark Leonard and more recently Thomas Diez have argued, there is a need to build relationships with non-EU publics and civil society organizations.[25] Having gone global with the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS in 2010, the EU is now going public with its diplomacy and public affairs.

3. Going Public—EU Diplomacy and Public Affairs

> The main objectives under the Public Diplomacy part of the Industrialised Countries Instrument are to enhance the visibility of the EU as a whole, promote a better understanding of EU's actions and positions and exert a positive influence on how the EU is perceived in partner countries. This is done by supporting EU Centres, public policy think tanks and research institutes. Targeted events are organised in partner countries. This complements national initiatives which typically focus on the bilateral relationship with Member States.[26]

Despite the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS, PD remains the Cinderella of the EU's global engagement. As the EEAS sets out (above), the main objectives of PD are to improve visibility, understanding, and perception of the EU in global politics. There is the need to strengthen the sharing of collective EU norms, identities, and values beyond the confines of diplomatic interaction. There is the pressing need to ensure that meaningful sharing of EU norms and values with those that should be reached—the wider publics and civil society of third countries.

Since the creation of the EEAS and its PD objectives, a rapidly emerging literature has sought to both describe the conduct of PD and make recommendations regarding the development of its PD.[27] However, what has been less discussed are the theoretical understandings on which the conduct and advocacy of the EU going public rest. As briefly discussed here, theoretical approaches regarding modernity, postmodernism, liberalism, superpower politics, and postcolonial theory are all implicated in a PD approach.

Robert Cooper has argued that the development of the EU's global presence demands the need to revert to the double standards of the colonial era if the EU is to engage effectively. In Cooper's terms, for "postmodern states," such as the EU, to conduct politics with "modern states," such as the developed world, may result in a qualitatively different form of relationship.[28] According to this logic, pursuing EU policies though diplomatic tactics such as constructive engagement with third parties may appear to validate unsavory elites through those contacts. This was clearly the case in EU relations with the dictators overthrown in the 2011 Arab uprisings.[29] For example, there was support of some EU member states

for Ben Ali in Tunisia, Qaddafi in Libya, and Mubarak in Egypt. At the very least the EU needs to ensure that the publics of these third parties are aware that the EU is not legitimizing dictators with whom the EU is speaking. In short, the EU needs to work harder at what Kagan identified as Europe's strength in forging the relationships created with peoples—alongside EU connections with their governments.[30]

Clearly Cooper's type of approach is not without significant concerns regarding the primacy given to top-down traditional diplomacy over bottom-up PD, and the aims of security over democracy.[31] As the Arab uprisings have illustrated, the EU cannot revert to a colonial view of modern and nonmodern peoples, but must instead encourage practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation.[32]

This is not "liberal mush," but rather would serve both an instrumental and a normative purpose.[33] The attitudes of publics to US foreign policy across the globe between 2003–8 illustrated how not having a systematic approach to "sharing hearts and minds" in third countries generates a more difficult climate for the pursuit of interests and ideals. As Pew Research and other public opinion sources have made clear, once public support is lost, mistrust of the United States will persist in both Europe and the Middle East.[34] This was not always the case for the United States. The power and influence that the United States exercised during the Cold War was comprised of a number of hard power components—military strength and alliances. However, as an important adjunct the United States created strategic shared value communities with allies (the "West") and acted tactically through the education of the elites of its allies through educational opportunities in the United States and the training of present and future military leaders. This created a unique reservoir of sympathetic elites: albeit one largely squandered over the last two decades.

The challenge for the EU is of course radically different to that of the United States during the Cold War. The EU is not engaged in an ideological or military struggle against an identifiable "other." Instead the struggle for EU PD, as the EEAS makes clear, (above) is to improve both the internal and external understanding of the EU; to make itself both heard and seen in an increasingly multipolar world; and to improve the perception of the EU in partner countries in the context of eurozone crisis and austerity politics. During the twentieth century former European metropols followed a similar practice to the US Cold War strategy of facilitating education for the nascent elites of the newly independent, postcolonial states. Education in the former colonial power still represents an attractive proposition to the successor generations of those in former colonies. For example, British Chevening scholarships, French Eiffel scholarships, and Commonwealth scholarships all provide opportunities for study in Europe. In the earlier colonial period education in the metropol provided the springboard for turning back the ideas of the colonizers against themselves in decolonial struggles (think of Mahatma

Gandhi). The normative potential of generating such "social independencies" is considerable, although there is also clearly a risk of sustaining postcolonial hegemony.

These theoretical approaches of postmodernism, state-centrism, liberalism, and postcolonialism all illustrate the potential benefits and risks of EU PD. In contrast, the rest of this chapter will articulate a normative power understanding of the EU diplomacy and public affairs in "going public." Working within critical social theory the normative power approach seeks to understand the interrelationships between material and nonmaterial forms of power in global politics. It attempts to understand whether and how physical and material forms of force and incentives are separable from nonmaterial forms of ideational power. To interrogate this possibility the approach distinguishes between three forms of power—physical force, material incentives, and normative justification. Conceptualizing normative power as ideational nonmaterial justification involves a three-part understanding of its use and analysis linking principles, actions, and impact. As the next section will now illustrate, a normative power approach to analyzing EU PD is facilitated by distinguishing between six modes or mechanisms of diffusion.[35]

4. Sharing Minds—EU Public Diplomacy

> Public diplomacy acquires particular importance in the context of the new EU diplomacy. This is very much related to the fact that the EU formulates its policy in public and that secrecy is inimical to its way of decision making, thus raising the need for information and communication . . . Indeed, a notable dimension of EU diplomacy is its transformative nature as the EU is a normative power focusing on the promotion of its values and normative framework.[36]

Josep Lloveras Soler, a former head of delegation at the European Commission, has argued that new EU diplomacy needs to learn to add value in the post-Lisbon period. He adds that a notable dimension of EU PD is the normative power of formulating policy in public, rather than secret. As summarized by Anna Michalski,[37] the normative power approach identifies six different ways in which policy and norm diffusion takes place: (i) *contagion* (unintentional diffusion); (ii) the *informational* mode through strategic communications; (iii) the *procedural* mode through institutionalized contractual agreements with third parties; (iv) *transference* through exchanges of goods, aid, trade, or technical assistance; (v) *overt* diffusion through the physical presence of the EU abroad; and (vi) the *cultural filter* leading to the construction of knowledge by third parties. This framework will now be used to understand the sharing of minds through EU PD.

Contagion

The contagion diffusion of norms takes place through the diffusion of ideas between the EU and the rest of the world. The discussion of historical precedence in the previous section suggests there are lessons to be drawn here for the EU as a "European communion." The EU needs to devote greater attention to producing "value interpreters" in third countries—those individuals and social actors who have developed an intuitive understanding of EU norms and values, how these impact upon the development of political and social institutions in the EU, and how they impact on an EU worldview. As an equal partner to EU diplomacy it needs to ensure that there is a reservoir of understanding in third countries as to the purposes to which short-term diplomatic decisions are intended to eventually lead. In this way PD is a means of sharing minds with others through promoting the contagion of ideas, understandings, and perceptions.

Informational

The informational diffusion of norms occurs through references to a range of strategic communications such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications such as initiatives from the High Representative or the president of the Commission. Drawing on Umberto Eco's idea that "translation is the language of Europe," European Commissioner Leonard Orban has argued that for the EU

> a society is multilingual not only when its citizens can speak different languages, but also when its languages maintain a constant communication through translation. Translation is indeed a continuous negotiation between the author, the translator and the reader. In Europe, we know this only too well, negotiation being the very essence of our staying together.[38]

Hence, the emphasis on value interpreters, value translation, and continuous negotiation is important for both the sharing of the EU amongst members and sharing minds through PD. However, this is not to create apologists for an EU foreign policy, which will not always constitute international best practice. Rather, it is to avoid a repeat of the experience of the United States, which has witnessed an ongoing decline in the number of "value interpreters" willing to even-handedly critique its foreign policy. Value interpreters are political and social commentators, and those with the respect of publics, who are willing to interpret EU actions in an open-minded manner. From this informational diffusion perspective, the purpose of PD is to ensure that interpreters and translators are able engage in a continuous negotiation regarding the EU in public settings outside Europe.

Procedural

The procedural diffusion of norms takes place through the institutionalization of relationships between the EU and third parties, involving political partnership as found in interregional cooperation agreements, membership of an international organization, association agreements, or enlargement of the EU itself. There are three procedural ways in which the EU can seek to build a body of value interpreters: first, to bring people to the EU; second, to give greater attention to EU "value translation"; and third, to ensure that such interpretation and translation remains a two-way communication process. These are the processes through which European values are experienced, translated, interpreted, and reflected on. There is already a considerable intellectual exchange between EU states and third countries. Shorter and longer duration migration has provided an important pool of value interpreters as migration to and from postcolonial societies have created kinship links that generate the sharing of ideas between states and societies outside the EU. Scholarships and educational exchange opportunities are structured approaches to facilitating the exchange of ideas. All of these are important and provide an informed "inside" view of European societies and facilitate the view that collective EU attempts to engage with the world beyond the EU are not inspired by malicious and malevolent design. The procedural institutionalization of relations provides opportunities for sharing minds with others through two-way partnership and communication processes. For example the EU's Visitors Program, established in 1974, facilitates short visits to the EU institutions from over 170 countries around the world.[39]

Transference

The transference diffusion of norms occurs when the EU is involved in the transfer of material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance, but is equally likely to be the result of more "grass roots" engagement of EU agencies and support for NGOs on the ground. There is more that can be done through public policy and transference to facilitate greater numbers of value interpreters. The "humane" handling of visa applications for travel to the EU and less daunting entry-point experiences do not conflict with appropriate border control arrangements and travel restrictions but would give the EU a competitive advantage over the present and future arrangements that prevail in the United States. The Erasmus and Socrates education exchange programs are a remarkable success story in having facilitated university student exchanges from member states and applicant states in creating social bonds within an EU of 27. The number of Erasmus students exchanged has gone from three thousand in its first year (1987) to a total of three million over the 26 year period to 2013.[40] There are minor educational initiatives attached to existing trade and aid agreements with third countries and the EU

needs to approach these more strategically and systematically. The need to use these to stimulate greater society-to-society contact as an adjunct of EU diplomacy was recognized in the creation of the Erasmus Mundus program beginning in 2004. Between 2004 to 2012 14,000 students from around the world have studied on Erasmus Mundus masters courses. Such transference diffusion facilitates a deeper sharing of minds than almost any other form of PD. There are similarities to traditional exchange programs such as EU and member state visitors programs, but are believed to have a deeper effect through earlier and more sustained sociocultural experiences. Whether it is the "Erasmus generation," "Erasmus generation 2.0," or the "Erasmus Mundus generation" that is being facilitated through PD transference, the longer-term consequences will take more than a generation to recognize.[41]

Overt

The overt diffusion of norms occur as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations, with the most obvious example including the role of EEAS delegations in third countries and at international organizations. The overt presence of EU PD goes beyond EEAS delegations to include the roles of the High Representative herself and the special representatives. As Catherine Ashton's statement on the European Parliament's Salafranca report illustrates, for the newly appointed special representative on Human Rights "communications and public diplomacy will be also be key. The EUSR should help us to be more visible and to promote human rights across the whole range of the EU's external policies."[42]

It is also possible to go further with in-country cultural diplomacy and in-country education. In-country cultural diplomacy goes beyond the role of EEAS delegations in third countries generating publicity about the practices and policy of the EU. What is needed is a more sustained and reflective approach to the sharing of ideas and information about cultures and peoples between and with the citizens of third countries. Censorship and other forms of control of information in third countries often ensure that peoples are not well served by the information that they possess on the EU. Such barriers to entry can be tackled by the same manner in which European industry has approached barriers to entry in important markets—by "outsourcing" to those third countries. The EU needs to enhance its presence in third countries to create value interpreters. The models of the Alliance Francaise, British Council, Goethe-Institut, Instituto Camões, Instituto Cervantes, and Società Dante Alighieri are instructive in that their work in third countries generates remarkable loyalty and affection through their educational and cultural activities. The EU needs a comparable but more active presence in third countries. The creation of the network of European Union National Institutes for

Culture (EUNIC) in 2006 marks a first step towards more overt public and cultural diplomacy. The EUNIC is made up of 29 members from 24 of EU member states in a network of international cultural relations institutes working in over 150 third countries with over 2,000 branches.[43]

Cultural Filter

The final factor shaping and transforming the diffusion of EU norms is the cultural filter. The cultural filter is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.[44] The cultural filter involves a number of mechanisms of identity, domestic salience and the construction of knowledge, including persuasive engagement, venues for dialogue and argument, and the transference and status of ideas. As the brief discussion of the five previous modes or mechanisms of PD diffusion illustrate, the cultural filter presents the greatest challenge for EU PD. For this reason, it might be suggested that as an adjunct to the EU's Instrument for Stability that promotes the strengthening of law and order in third counties the EU needs to be able to deploy a longer-term presence that promotes civil society "best practice" through education and the promotion of the free exchange of ideas. While the Instrument for Stability is specifically focused on conflict prevention, crisis management, and peace building, its crisis management activities give support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict. This presence could take place through the creation of a network of European "progressive foundations," similar yet different to the US "freedom houses," which would support governance best practice, the role of the media, social institutions, and the role of the state in democratic societies. This would take place by providing both the means to facilitate the gathering of intellectuals and other social actors within the "progressive foundation" host country, from the neighboring countries and regions, and to bring individuals and organizations from the EU member states, and beyond, to exchange experiences and ideas. There is clearly the expectation that such foundations would not be positively received in all host societies, particularly those with authoritarian governments. There are at least two routes to engaging with this expectation: first to ensure that foundations are nongovernmental organizations that work with and through both host and (non-European) regional organizations, NGOs, and civil societies. The second route is to encourage reciprocity with host governments and societies in the setting up of their partner foundations within the EU.

An immediate response to this idea might be to question "which" Europe is being promoted? It was not, however, difficult to measure and promote the "Copenhagen criteria" for applicant states. Since the Lisbon Treaty, it has become easier to decide which EU norms and values

to support and promote in third countries. The consolidated Treaty on European Union now identifies a catalogue of principles in articles 2 and 3, in particular freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. Natalia Chaban's work on popular opinion has identified how Asian news media professionals already see some aspects of the EU's normative power through its promotion of freedom, democracy, human rights, equality, and the environment.[45] The capacity of EU governments and societies to facilitate the rights and cultures of minorities is an obvious norm to support and promote in third countries, for example. Care and consideration will need to be exercised alongside principles and commitment with some governments and societies, which will be reluctant to see their control over information relinquished.

Although support for EU "progressive foundations" in third countries would be controversial, they may be facilitated by the newly created European Endowment for Democracy (EED) which, in the European neighborhood will assist:

> pro-democratic civil society organisations, movements and individual activists acting in favour of a pluralistic multiparty system regardless of their size or formal status. The EED will also provide assistance to young leaders, independent media and journalists, provided that all the beneficiaries adhere to core democratic values and human rights as well as subscribe to principles of non-violence.[46]

A regional-based approach to the idea of an overt presence to address the cultural filter could also encompass a network of EU universities shared with each region. During times of economic crisis and the ideology of austerity there will be resistance to the costs of educational expansion. But EU member state universities have been busy setting up satellite university campuses around the world over the past two decades for commercial reasons. In this case, as with local and community colleges around the world, the longer-term educational, social, and commercial benefits need to be argued for both the EU and the host society. There are antecedents to this with the 32 EU Centers of Excellence spread around the developed world in the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. Within the EU the European University Institute Florence (Italy), College of Europe Bruges (Belgium), and Natolin (Poland) all serve as examples of EU colleges. Such EU university colleges could be initially located in China, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East Asia. These would not be institutions to teach "European integration" as is the focus of current EU educational initiatives in third countries. Nor should they be "full-spectrum" universities engaged in all of the scientific and technical pursuits as other EU universities are already creating such satellites in third countries. Rather their central remit would be as schools of

public administration, law, journalism, and civil-military relations, not unlike the role of the Central European University created in 1991 to support the democratic transitions in Europe and Central Asia. Clearly, the governments of some developing countries of Asia and Africa have concerns about the idea of "democratic transition" being taught in local colleges and universities. Hence the importance of engaging with local and regional civil societies and NGOs in host countries to help clarify the developmental benefits of such education to host governments.

Their purpose would be to offer short- and long-term education to the next generation of top civil servants, lawyers, judges, journalists, and the senior military personnel. The curriculum would be devoted to examining how such professions are organized and practiced across the member states of the EU. Once established, the independence of content and functioning of these universities, as well as the progressive foundations, would have to be maintained diligently by local civil society, the EU, its member states, and regional partners involved in the establishments. By supporting the establishment of progressive foundations and shared university colleges, EU PD could provide a means of sharing minds with others by actively engaging with the cultural filters of identity, domestic salience and the construction of knowledge in a local context.

5. Remaining Distinctive—The Normative Power of Public Diplomacy

> Foreign policy in general has had the tendency to pretend to start from a coherent identity but in fact only constructed this identity in the process. It may be a unique character of the EU (indeed as a normative power) to celebrate diversity, and thus in contrast to the standard practice, it may be a core point of EU public diplomacy to "sell" and engage with different values and policy stances rather than to impose coherence when there is none.[47]

The chapter has argued how, in the context of the Lisbon Treaty and creation of the EEAS, the "fundamental shift" in global politics identified by Margot Wallström demands the consideration of the normative power approach when thinking about EU PD.

In this context, the EU needs to become more active in its approach towards PD where focusing upon value interpreters and value translators operating in third countries is crucial. If the practice of EU diplomacy is to be more fully understood in third countries there is the need to be more active in ensuring that there is an audience aware of the EU's aspirations. This does require an active form of engagement that is itself intended to facilitate the greater exercise of EU normative power. It will not be an approach that will yield quick results but is an essential component of smoothing the path of the EU as its goes global.

The chapter has further set out, following Wallström and Birchfield, that normative power and PD are interlinked through the dialectic of being ("what we are and what we stand for") and becoming ("what we do or want to do"). In this respect the chapter has suggested that EU PD should seek to share its values and objectives such as the more liberal norms of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, together with the more social norms of equality, solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance.

However, as Diez has suggested it may also be worth considering a further norm worthy of promotion through the practice of EU PD—that of diversity. Diez argues, alongside Wallström and Birchfield, that the construction of identity through the practice of foreign policy and PD is one of becoming, rather than pretending a coherent identify of being from the outset. In this respect he argues that the EU as a normative power needs to celebrate diversity in its PD—that it is not quite *sui generis* enough in attempting to engage with different values internally while imposing coherence on EU values externally.[48] Diez's advocacy of diversity and dialogue in EU PD is in line with the observation that the principle of subsidiarity can provide "a shared raison d'être where the Union acts to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart."[49] In this context it is worth reflecting on the idea that the normative power of EU PD may lie in remaining distinctive by not copying the traditional twentieth-century diplomacy and PD of states, but developing the inherent EU capacity for diversity and dialogue among 28 member states as a means of engaging in a more pluralist twenty-first century world of multipolarity and multilateralism.

6. Conclusion

First,this chapter has argued that the study of the EU's public policy can benefit from, indeed demands, a normative power approach to understanding the power of ideas in global politics. Second, it has been suggested that having "gone global" with the Lisbon Treaty and EEAS, a normative power approach can help thinking about the relative importance and use of traditional and/or PD. Third, the chapter has set out how the normative power approach to theorizing EU diplomacy and public affairs can be useful as the EU is increasingly "going public." Fourth, the main analysis of the chapter used the six modes or mechanisms of diffusion of the normative power approach to understand how EU PD could move toward "sharing minds" through engagement, dialogue and presence in third country societies. Fifth, the chapter has reflected on the value of subsidiarity and diversity in the fundamental shift of being and becoming when the EU practices PD.

As has been developed throughout, a normative power approach to the future of EU PD moves the emphasis away from imitating twentieth-

century traditional diplomacy and towards creating a more distinctive and appropriate twenty-first century PD. This normative power approach has suggested the need to move away from imitating US "soft power" for the pursuit of EU "supranational interests." In this respect, the traditional emphasis on the Cold War propaganda war of "winning hearts and minds" has been rejected in favor of *sharing* hearts and minds. This rejection of "national branding" or "propaganda" through soft power is in recognition of the fundamental shift of twenty-first century politics of how power, influence, and decision making has spread and become more complex. For the future of EU PD the fundamental shift is clear—there is a need to build relationships with non-EU publics and civil society organizations. This has been painfully demonstrated through the Arab uprisings, where the traditional paradigm of security, national interest, and diplomacy justified maintaining relations with authoritarian dictators. In contrast a normative power approach with an emphasis on sharing minds through EU PD suggests how to develop the six different mechanisms or modes of diffusion through contagion, information, procedure, transference, overt presence, and engagement within the cultural filter. In conclusion the normative power of PD can help the EU in "remaining distinctive" because "the EU needs to be unambiguously a *normative power* demonstrating that visions of the future for our neighborhood and in global politics more generally cannot be expressed adequately in either economic or security terms but need to be leavened with ideas, opinions, and issues of conscience."[50]

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★We are very grateful for the helpful comments of Mai'a Davis Cross, Jan Melissen, Simon Duke, Patrick James, and Geoffrey Pigman.

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Conclusions and Recommendations on Public Diplomacy in Europe

Jan Melissen

From Theory to Practice

Europe easily qualifies as the world's region with the greatest variety of public diplomacy (PD) practices, a rich field of activity that is begging for more theoretical reflection as well as historical inquiry. Conceptual and theoretical investigations help generate the kind of dialogue between the interdisciplinary study of PD and relevant work within International Relations (IR) that is necessary both to strengthen its theoretical foundation and inform international studies. Reaching out to constructivism and the normative power approach to theorizing upon PD, as in this book, helps to connect fields of academic work that can reinforce one another. Of equal and evident relevance is further historical research. As the foreword to this collection of essays indicates, the kinds of practices that are now associated with the term PD have a long historical pedigree among the states of Europe. The origins of PD do, however, go back to international relations well before the European diplomatic experience. In the Ancient Near East, the public variant of addressing other polities was no stranger to diplomacy. Evidence of that can be found in the Bible, which relates of envoys purposefully addressing foreign peoples in their own vernacular.[1] Closer to the present and in Europe, there is still a lot of PD history to be explored, and the insights to be gained from such research could shed a surprisingly interesting light on how the nations of Europe went about cultivating their international reputation. Great European statesmen have long recognized the importance of reputation as a source of power. For historians of diplomacy, there is still sufficient explaining to do.

There has been relatively little academic attention for contemporary European PD until the work of the European institutions, and in particular the European External Action Service (EEAS), started attracting the attention of Europeanists. This book's essays fill that gap, move beyond the EU institutional framework, and focus on the modalities and purposes

of PD in Europe today, the driving forces behind its practice by states and different nonstate actors, and the interplay between PD efforts at different levels of governance in the European Union. As becomes clear during the course of this book, in the academic debate and also among diplomats and other practitioners, the term PD is commonly used to refer to various forms of official engagement with people. In official communication, however, it is losing ground, particularly in Western Europe. One can only speculate whether or to what extent it did not stick with a number of governments because of its association with the War on Terror under George W. Bush's administration. Europe's projection to external audiences in the interests of reputation and foreign policy interests did not match the more politicized American approach that was more closely linked to short-term foreign policy objectives. As a matter of fact, many European countries had become intimately familiar with PD well before its rapid rise after the turn of the century. In post–Second World War intra-European relations, and rather obscured by more pressing agendas and the dominant Cold War political narrative, PD had quietly become part of the whole fabric of diplomatic life and conduct.

The European Experience: A Radical and Valuable Experiment

The distinctiveness of present-day Europe, characterized by far-reaching economic interdependence and ever-growing interconnectedness and interpenetration between its national societies and regions, makes European PD of considerable interest to students and practitioners of PD elsewhere. Most of the world's other international regions are not characterized by relationships that are similar in depth to Europe's highly permeable societies, facilitating the constant diffusion of ideas and the promotion of the transfer of policies across national boundaries and levels of governance. Without looking at things in the improbable terms of transferring the "European model" to distant parts of the world, and short of proselytizing and inculcating European values in others, this volume suggests that the practice and accumulated wisdom of PD in Europe may be able to offer more to other countries and regions than any other polity. One important underlying theme in this book's essays is that the diversity of the EU experience can be a valuable resource for other parts of the world. Other regions that are comprised of a mix of democratic and semiauthoritarian or authoritarian states could never achieve what Europe has. With its highly active civil societies and nongovernmental actors, its great variety of states (and contrasting relationships between them), assertive regions, activist town halls and cities with metropolitan glamour, Europe's PD environment constitutes a political and societal laboratory that has no equal. From this book's perspective, Europe constitutes the world's most radical experiment. After the ratification of the Lisbon

Treaty, overhanging this PD mosaic of competing actors sharing common values in a unique political and legal setting, the EU's revamped external relations capacity gives a distinct postmodern twist to Europe's communication with foreign publics.

The Impact of Economic Hardship

Another observation that emerges from various essays in this book is that economic hardship in general and the eurozone crisis in particular have left their imprint on PD practices across the European Union. In this field there are predictable imbalances as well as unexpected parallels between the "old" and the "new" Europe. There is a sense that the PD of the European states, in particular that of the Big Three (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), is in a state of partial relapse. Embassies may carry on with a lot of their usual business and local experimentation with dialogue-based PD, but it looks as if the crisis has forced foreign ministries to reconsider their priorities. While academics and think-tank experts are debating relational and integrative models of PD, it appears that economic competition has pushed European governments somewhat in the direction of more straightforward and simplistic promotional practices.[2]

In the "old" Europe, the primacy of *economic* diplomacy, the new mantra across the eurozone, has resulted in a certain resurgence of the corporate-inspired practice of branding. To be fair, branding can exceed the purposes of promotion and contribute to a nation's identity building, as well as the engagement of domestic stakeholders in the projection of a favorable image. In the words of one contributor, however, the critical difference between state-of-the-art PD and branding is that the latter silences controversies, while PD tries to build on them and turn differences and variety into strengths. To the extent that such changes can be observed, the eurozone's economic plight has done the cause of PD more harm than good. The "new" Europe's much earlier and wholesale embrace of the practice of nation-branding can be explained by the search for the redefinition of national identity, and the idea that such practices were part of the more market-based approach that came with their entry into a much more competitive economic environment. The ironic conclusion that suggests itself is that Western Europe's latest fashion in national image promotion has been following a path that bears a certain resemblance to the preference for business-oriented practices in Central and Eastern Europe.

Geopolitical Differences and Cultural Relations

Stretching the evidence in this book a little further, and to the degree that there is a certain resurgence of geopolitical perspectives in Western European PD, we can detect some similarity with such practices that have

a longer tradition in Central and Eastern Europe. In the West, one effect of greater economic rivalry among the partners in the common European project is intensified competition for cultural influence outside Europe, at least between the culturally self-contained former great powers that have their native language as a key asset of their cultural relations. On the one hand, the crisis in Europe results in deep cuts in the cultural relations budget, particularly in Southern Europe and among the smaller powers, but on the other hand we see countries like Germany and France spending more on their foreign cultural profile. In Central Europe, geopolitical perspectives have traditionally dominated the PD of governments like those of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). From a historical perspective, it is not surprising that in one way or another Russia and Germany always loom large in the PD of these countries. They have consistently targeted these two big neighbors in their PD strategies. In a broader sense, the geopolitics of memory in Central and Eastern Europe aims at including views in these countries on the history of the continent in official PD narratives. This historically infused PD may be seen more as reflecting an unresolved and—within the societies of Central and Eastern Europe—still politically contested past as well as the needs of the sending governments, than the preferences and interests of the public of the receiving nations in the West. Simultaneously, and reinforced by rapid developments in civil society, one can detect a postmodern variant of Central European geopolitically inspired PD: the desire to contribute to democracy promotion in the Eastern neighborhood (Belarus and Ukraine), as well as assistance to countries in transition in Northern Africa and the Middle East.

The Need for Improvement

Broadly speaking, this book suggests the European experience as a potential source of inspiration, but there is also criticism of the PD performance of, in particular, national governments and the EU institutions, sometimes implicit and occasionally harsher and more direct. This book's collective effort of debating Europe's PD was devised as an academic exercise rather than aiming at policy advice, but one can nevertheless easily distil a number of explicit recommendations from the various chapters. A third thread running through the chapters of this book could therefore be identified as the observed need for improvement in structures, policies, and practices. Passing rapidly over the subject, the general picture at the supranational level is perhaps most striking.[3] Brussels-based practitioners may be able to build on the experience of EU member states' governments but, by and large, the institutions are not in a position to put their money where their mouth is when it comes to communication at the global level. While the rest of the world is trying to make sense of a Europe in crisis, the bulk of

the EU communication budget is spent on the domestic backyard of the EU's own 28 member states. Meanwhile, no week goes by without governments, think tanks and the media debating the impact on Europe of the "rise of the rest." Clearly, this tendency toward myopia in the field of external communication is not in Europe's own best interests.

What makes matters worse, as various chapters in this book underline, is that EU-level communication with the rest of the world is too often one-way, which makes listening and learning so much harder. This can to some extent be justified by the need to explain in basic terms what the complex European Union is all about, but future policy information-based practices need to be combined more with two-way communication. Mutuality as the PD equivalent of the principle of reciprocity in diplomatic relations is simply indispensable for any meaningful dialogue with other parts of the world. With reconsideration of its predominantly informational practices in the years ahead, Europe could take a chance and cast off its longstanding image as a "missionary actor" that is sending rather than receiving. The fledgling European External Action Service now has a window of opportunity to do things differently. It could start to develop a PD capacity that, in due time, would be able to compete with more savvy national European governments, as well as nimble substate actors.

Europe's Public Diplomacy Opportunities

In spite of these critiques and the EU's present difficult condition, Europe possesses a range of notable and sturdy PD assets. As a multiactor and largely democratic environment, with a coherent set of shared values and an impressive record of interstate collaboration, Europe is structurally well placed for successful engagement with the outside world. The diverse nature of European civil society is an evident strength in comparison with other regions in the world. Within Europe, the diversity and dense texture of civil society permits the development of multidimensional networking practices like that of the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), which are based on collaboration with a plethora of nongovernmental actors. The innovative development of such relationship-based networks as a cornerstone of PD shows Europe in the direction of an approach that is a great distance from traditional informational practices. Closer to civil society and below state-level communication, this book sees more potential resources for European PD. There are opportunities for greater collaboration between actors at different levels, as well as more attention for the often-neglected domestic dimension of PD.

To begin with, substate international actors can make a significant difference. The PD achievements of Europe's assertive regions—including Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, and Bavaria—are well known. They have all benefited from the dialectics of progress, joining the PD game later

than states, and some of them have occasionally performed better than their national governments.

The potential of cities as emerging actors in PD is also particularly promising, but has so far been much less noticed in debates and the literature on PD. Their proximity to the civil population, eminently practical disposition in relationships with counterparts in other parts of the world, and their capacity to help them to solve their problems, have all added to their remarkable PD capacity and output legitimacy. The value-based discourse of cities is consistent with European narratives (on good governance, the rule of law, and antidiscrimination, etc.). They are the natural allies of the EU institutions that have helped them to extend their room for maneuver independently of the state, even though there are numerous recent examples of town halls' international departments and foreign ministries that have successfully worked side by side.

A palpable gap in professional cultures between local and national governments is, however, still to be bridged. Foreign ministries have a long experience in mediating between home and abroad and their diplomats are usually living overseas for many years, whilst the international departments of cities do still have more of a local feel. Their agility and result-oriented way of working with foreign counterparts is however refreshing and significant gains can be made by pooling efforts between national and local governments. Whether or not Europe is heading towards an order with neomedieval traits, this book suggests that the future lies in a PD that reflects the EU's inherent features of diversity governance and identity pluralism.

This book's findings also suggest that there are important gains to be made by integrating PD that is aimed abroad and its domestic dimension. Separation between the two is increasingly out of touch with societal realities, which call for a more complementary, so-called intermestic approach that connects the *inter*national and do*mestic* communication spheres. Instead of viewing the domestic public as part of a different ball game—that is, public relations or the official variant of corporate communication—it could in fact be seen as an important asset in communication with foreign publics. One positive trend is that Europe currently shows an increasingly diverse pattern of practices at the national level, with a slowly growing number of governments showing awareness of the potential of integrating communication with foreign and domestic publics. Remarkably, a more integrative practice by regions and cities may be one of various factors to push states in the direction of greater acceptance for the interplay between foreign and domestic communication.

As well as following the example of what works below the state level, governmental thinking on PD in Europe would benefit from open-mindedness. Some of the resistance inside European foreign ministries could perhaps be overcome by looking at the idea of integrated PD from an economic point of view. Governments have to demonstrate that they are capable of doing "more with less," and the need for budget cuts may give

an impulse to creative, "out-of-the-box" thinking about existing policies. Another argument that has actually led to greater governmental involvement with domestic publics, and that has helped pull bureaucracies out of their silo mentality, is that "domestic public diplomacy" enables governments to give greater prominence to EU affairs and the introduction of EU narratives.

Europe's diversity and its composite societal strength may offer some guidance to rising powers and regions elsewhere in the world. It is precisely the mosaic quality of Europe's PD efforts that reinforces its collective projection capacity. PD's accelerated mainstreaming throughout Europe's national governments, regions, and cities, as well as its international institutions has led to much greater awareness of its importance. As a result, Europe's PD capacity has augmented much more substantially in recent years than can be shown in a mere calculation of budgets dedicated to PD activities. It is quite likely that the eurozone crisis has contributed to a growing PD consciousness in government departments that are hard pressed to demonstrate their value added. The composite effect of all that European PD activity could be substantially greater, however, if actors at different levels muster a greater capacity to collaborate, thus maximizing the effect of working at different levels.

Debates about PD and soft power in Europe do not take place in isolation of politics and developments in international relations. In various ways, changing geopolitical realities and the eurozone crisis have impacted on debates about Europe's challenges in communicating with the rest of the world. They have introduced a degree of skepticism among member states about the EU's leadership capacity, as well as among third states about the fortunes that might be bestowed upon them if they follow the EU model. From a more academic point of view, it is also clear that the transforming regional and global environment in which the EU operates necessitates further reflection on our theoretical understanding of Europe's normative power, which remains one of the distinctive assets of this unique international actor. In the debate on Europe's soft, social, or normative power, the common denominator on all sides is that it is in Europe's best interests to adapt to the increasingly transnational nature of global politics.

As well as relations with states and other regional groupings, Europe needs to invest more in engagement with people in the wider global environment. This is required across all levels of governance and is not a centralized EU responsibility. The exigencies of European and EU external communication exceed by far the capacities of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Its struggle to shed informational traditions inherited from the European Commission and its lack of abilities to deal with civil societies in flux are compounded by a string of other difficulties. These vary from budgetary constraints, structural staff capacity, and professional orientation in many of the EU's delegations that fall short of meeting PD needs, to the temptation of member states to leave potentially controversial normative issues to the European Union.

This book's analysis suggests that modest expectations as to what the EEAS can achieve should be coupled with a clear idea and message as to where the EU is going. The debate that remains unresolved in this collection is whether the EU should rethink its present normative course. That would not at all imply Europe giving up its distinctive ideas and value-based PD. It would rather pose the question of whether its PD should be based on the search for commonalities with other regions in a process of more clearly articulated two-way learning.

Notes

1. Rayond Cohen, "Diplomacy through the Ages," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19.
2. R. S. Zaharna, Amelia Arsenault, and Ali Fisher, eds., *Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); and Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp, *Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," 2012).
3. See Mai'a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen, *Communicating Europe: At Ease with Tomorrow's World*, Clingendael Policy Brief (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," October 2013).

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