


ENVY & JEALOUSY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

— — —
A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH



ED SANDERS

Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

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PREFACE

Emotions vary between cultures, especially in their eliciting conditions, social acceptability, forms of expression, and co-extent of terminology. This book examines the sensation, expression, and literary representation of envy and jealousy in Classical Athens. Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy (Walcot 1978; Konstan and Rutter 2003) has primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on usage of the Greek words *phthonos* (envy, begrudging, jealousy, spite) and *zêlos* (emulative rivalry).

This lexical approach has value, especially in dealing with texts and civilizations from the past, but it also has limitations. These are particularly apparent with envy and jealousy in ancient Greece as: a) the discreditable nature of *phthonos* means it is never claimed for oneself, and renders its ascription or disclamation suspect; b) there is no Classical Greek label for sexual jealousy. Accordingly a different, complementary approach is required, which reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations.

Building on recent developments in the reading of emotion scenarios in classical texts (primarily the ‘script’ methodology of Kaster 2005), this book applies to Athenian culture and literature insights that are derived from modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, sociological, and anthropological scholarship, and which focus on the contexts, conscious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indicative behaviors of envy, jealousy, and related emotions. This enables an exploration of both the explicit theorization and evaluation of envy and jealousy, and also the more oblique ways in which they find expression across different genres—in particular philosophy, oratory, comedy, and tragedy.

It is hoped that, as well as providing new insights into the two emotions under direct consideration, this volume will contribute to ongoing debates as to how we can best research the emotions of historical cultures, and will also shed light on a number of literary issues relating to the texts and genres discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have incurred debts to many people in the course of researching and writing this volume, which arises out of a PhD thesis at UCL. It gives me great pleasure to be able to acknowledge and thank them here.

My greatest debt and most profound thanks are owed to my PhD supervisor, Chris Carey. On many occasions I have reflected on how fortunate I was to be supervised by him. Despite his many commitments he gave unstintingly of his time, both during and after the PhD, readily making himself available whenever I needed advice, and reading draft after draft with unfailing attention to detail. His immense and wide-ranging knowledge was a constant source of inspiration, and his regular ‘reminders’ of what “of course you will remember” pointed me both to books I should never have missed, and to ancient references I would never have found. Equally important, Chris’s inexhaustible courtesy, optimism, and humor ensured that being his supervisee was as much a personal as an intellectual pleasure.

My examiners, Douglas Cairns and Nick Lowe, provided some very useful comments and were generous with the time they spent in my ‘viva’ discussing revision for publication as a monograph. Douglas provided me with many pages of very detailed comments on matters large and small, and has since read and commented on two revised chapters—very much beyond the call of duty! I have taken the bulk of their advice into account in revising the thesis for publication. I have incurred debts to many others. Malcolm Schofield, Simon Goldhill, and Bob Sharples each supervised some of my earliest work on *phthonos*. In addition, Joanna Atkin, Markus Boberek, Vagelis Chaikalis, Angelos Chaniotis, Steven Colvin, Jamie Dow, Daniel Grey, Dimitra Kokkini, James Robson, Anne Sheppard, Paul Stenner, Geraint Thomas, and Vasiliki Zali have all read chapters and provided useful comments. My heartfelt thanks to all! Mistakes and omissions of course remain entirely my responsibility.

Some parts of this book have already been published in one form or another. I acknowledge with grateful thanks the following publishers for allowing me to reprint material: Koninklijke Brill NV (an earlier version of most of chapter 4 and some of chapter 5 having appeared as “*Pathos phaulon*: Aristotle and the rhetoric of *phthonos*,” in I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (eds.) (2008) *Kakos: Badness and anti-value in classical antiquity*); Steiner Verlag (part of chapter 5 having appeared in “‘He is a liar, a bounder and a cad’: The arousal of hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory,” in A.Chaniotis (ed.) (2012)

Unveiling emotions: Sources and methods for the study of emotions in the Greek world); and Oxford University Press (part of chapter 8 having appeared as “Sexual jealousy and *erôs* in Euripides’ *Medea*,” in E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (eds.) (2013) *Erôs in Ancient Greece*).

Finally, I would like to thank the following for their financial support: the Arts and Humanities Research Council (for funding two years of my PhD); the UCL Department of Greek and Latin (for a departmental studentship); the UCL Graduate School (for a travel grant to present at a conference in the USA); the Leverhulme Trust and Royal Holloway, University of London (who paid my salary during the latter part of my work revising this monograph); and last—but by no means least—my mother, Sharon Sanders (for both financial and moral support).

I dedicate this book to all those whose friendship, advice, and support has helped it come into being.

ABBREVIATIONS

For Greek authors and works, I follow the abbreviations listed in Hornblower, S. and A. Spawforth (eds.) (1996) *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd ed; Oxford and New York) xxix–liv where possible; otherwise those in LSJ.

Austin	Austin, C. (ed.) (1973) <i>Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta</i> (Berlin)
Kassel & Austin	Kassel, R. and C. Austin (eds.) (1983–2001) <i>Poetae comici Graeci</i> (Berlin and New York), 8 vols.
Kock	Kock, T. (ed.) (1880–1888) <i>Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta</i> (Leipzig), 3 vols.
Lewis & Short	Lewis, C. T. and C. Short (1879) <i>A Latin Dictionary</i> (Oxford)
LSJ	Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, and H. S. Jones (1940 and suppl.) <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> (Oxford)
Maehler	Maehler, H. (ed.) (1975) (post. B. Snell) <i>Pindari carminum fragmentis</i> (Leipzig, 4th ed.), 2 vols.
Mette	Mette, H. J. (ed.) (1959) <i>Die fragmente der Tragödien des Aischylos</i> (Berlin)
Mullach	Mullach, F. W. A. (ed.) (1860–1881) <i>Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum</i> (Paris), 3 vols.
Nauck	Nauck, A. (ed.) (1889) <i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta</i> (Leipzig)
OCT	Oxford Classical Text
Radt	Radt, S. (ed.) (1977) <i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta; Vol. 4: Sophocles</i> (Göttingen)
SE	Freud, S. (1975) <i>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud</i> (London), 24 vols.
Snell	Snell, B. (ed.) (1971) <i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta; Vol. 1</i> (Göttingen)
West	West, M. L. (ed.) (1989–1992) <i>Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantata</i> (2nd ed; Oxford), 2 vols.

NOTES ON TEXT

1. All dates are BCE unless otherwise stated.
2. Greek text has been copied from the online *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. References to Greek texts are to the most recent Oxford Classical Text (OCT); where no OCT exists (primarily minor Attic orators) I use the current Loeb. For fragments, see Abbreviations. As some fragments are not included in the most recent editions (e.g., *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*), I have used older editions throughout for consistency.
3. All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated.
4. I have directly transliterated most Greek names (e.g., Perikles, Timarchos, Euphiletos). However I have used the Roman spelling for some authors, literary works, and heroes where it is so much more familiar that a straight transliteration would be pedantic (e.g., Thucydides rather than Thoukudides, *Trachiniae* rather than *Trachiniai*, Achilles rather than Achilleus).

Introduction

This monograph examines the psychological sensation, social expression, and literary representation of envy, jealousy, and related emotions in Athens during the Classical period (479–322). It is primarily a contribution to the increasing body of research into ancient Greek and Roman emotions that has been published in the last two decades.¹ As well as looking specifically at this family of emotions, one of the main intentions of this book is to develop a methodological approach that contributes to the ongoing debate as to how research into emotions of the ancient Greeks and Romans (or indeed any historical culture) should be conducted.

As I am investigating a highly literary society, which has produced a wealth of literature, I have chosen to base this study entirely on such evidence.² Accordingly, alongside these specific emotions and the overarching methodological argument of this volume, I also aim to shed light on a number of literary issues relating to the texts and genres discussed. This will include both thematic and rhetorical issues, and the dynamics of the text-‘reader’ (or more properly text-audience) relationship.

1.1 Rationale and Methodological Approach

Emotion studies is a highly multidisciplinary field. There has been a large amount of research into the nature of emotions (both specific emotions and

¹ Major monographs and collections in English include: Cairns (1993); Williams (1993); Nussbaum (1994); Braund and Gill (1997); Konstan (1997); Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998); Konstan (2001); W. V. Harris (2001); Nussbaum (2001); Braund and Most (2003); Kaster (2005); Sternberg (2005); Konstan (2006); Graver (2007); J. T. Fitzgerald (2007); Konstan (2010); Munteanu (2011a); Munteanu (2011b); Chaniotis (2012); Sanders, *et al.* (2013).

² See further chapter 1.2. See Chaniotis (2012) for a range of approaches to ancient Greek emotions based on epigraphic, papyrological, and archaeological evidence, as well as literary.

emotions in general) across a variety of disciplines (e.g., cognitive and evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, physiology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and history, to name but some). Emotions research has burgeoned especially since the cognitivist ‘revolution’ of the 1970s. Those taking a cognitive approach to emotions argue that an emotion arises from a sensory perception that is evaluated by our brains (i.e., a cognition), automatically arousing certain physiological and psychological responses. Strict cognitivists believe cognition is the only important element in emotion;³ however, most emotionologists currently ascribe to it a major, but not exclusive role. Set against the cognitivists are ‘neo-Darwinists,’—so called because their approach dates back to Darwin—who are most interested in the physiological and neurobiological effects of an emotion.⁴ This camp argues that physiological changes are the initial emotional response, and thinking comes later (if at all).⁵ The cognitivist approach has similarities to Aristotle’s view of the emotions (see chapter 4), though Aristotle was more concerned with the sociological aspect of cognition than most of his latter-day successors.⁶

Within this large body of research on the emotions, a number of psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense to speak of an emotional episode or scenario than an emotion *per se*.⁷ Emotional episodes, described by Parrott as “the story of an emotional event,”⁸ begin with cognitions—perceptions of (or thoughts about) a situation—and our interpretations of them, frequently called the “antecedent conditions.”⁹ These arouse psychological and physiological feelings (frequently confused by laypersons with the ‘emotion’ itself). Attempts to regulate or cope with the emotion may follow (i.e., as the higher consciousness responds to the social and psychological ramifications of our feelings). Then come verbal expressions and physical actions resulting from the emotion. And eventually there is some sort of resolution.¹⁰

³ For example, Solomon (1993); Lazarus (1991); Nussbaum (2001).

⁴ For example, Ekman (1980a), whose research has focused on facial expression changes.

⁵ Darwin (1872); James (1884); Damasio (1994); Prinz (2004).

⁶ For a more detailed summary by a Classicist of these major approaches, see Konstan (2006) 7–27; see also Cairns (2003a) 11–20 and (2008). Among non-Classical scholars, Rorty (1980a), Lewis and Haviland-Jones (2000), and Solomon (2004) are excellent edited volumes that demonstrate a variety of disciplinary approaches to the emotions. P. E. Griffiths (1997) and Prinz (2004) provide useful critiques of what the major schools have to offer before propounding their own views. W. M. Reddy (2001) 3–62 critiques psychological and anthropological approaches from the historian’s perspective.

⁷ For example, Fehr and Russell (1984); Shaver, *et al.* (1987); Parrott (1991); Sharpsteen (1991); Russell and Lemay (2000); Gross (2007).

⁸ Parrott (1991) 4.

⁹ Sharpsteen (1991) 37 gives a useful definition of these as “the elements physically or objectively present in a situation, along with the perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals of them.”

¹⁰ P. E. Griffiths (1997) 55 refers to the antecedent conditions (or ‘stimuli’) as the “input” part of an emotion, and the rest as the “output.” See also Elster (1999) 246–83 and Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 49–78, whose formulations differ, but who both identify several different parts to an emotion episode. Some disagree with the concept of emotion episodes (e.g., Prinz (2004), who argues that most elements apart from feeling (e.g., situational antecedents, resulting actions) are not part of the emotion).

Some emotions are often considered to be ‘universal’ or ‘pan-cultural’: for example, the set of so-called ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions (anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust) which have been identified in very young children, and which have associated facial expressions that appear to be present in all cultures (albeit occasionally repressed).¹¹ However, even for these emotions, many aspects will vary between cultures; Cairns notes these include their eliciting conditions, social acceptability of the emotion, socially accepted forms of expression (which may vary not just between societies, but also within them, e.g., between classes and genders), and the extent their terminology overlaps.¹² Other emotions, including envy and jealousy, frequently called ‘nonbasic’ or ‘secondary,’ are thought to be more socially complex and therefore develop later as the child learns the social rules of his/her culture.¹³ They may involve blends of more basic elements (e.g., guilt may include fear and sadness, jealousy may include fear and anger).¹⁴ Nonbasic emotions can vary even more widely between cultures than basic ones. Constructionists argue that the elements of emotions that differ between cultures are so vast that each emotion should be considered as entirely unique to that culture; some claim Japanese *amae* and Southeast Asian *amok* as emotions, and cite them in support.¹⁵ However, even if these can be described as emotions (which is dubious), they are exceptions. While there may be major differences in a variety of aspects, other cultures’ emotions are usually identifiable and relatable to our own. For example, ancient Greek *orgê* is a phenomenon clearly comparable to English anger, and ancient Greek *aidôs* to English shame—even if the boundaries of these ancient Greek terms are not coterminous with their English equivalents, they may be aroused in some different situations, and there are differences in acceptable means and forms of expression.

Research into classical emotions has so far largely focused on emotions that are freely and frequently expressed in ancient literature: anger, shame, pity, grief, etc. It has primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on Greek emotion

¹¹ Lewis (2000) 275–78; Bates (2000) 384–85; Wierzbicka (1999) 24–25; P. E. Griffiths (1997) 44–99; Ekman (1980b). Exceptionally, Klein (1957/1975) argues that envy is also primary, associating it with the frustration a baby directs at his/her mother’s breast when it withholds the milk (s)he wants; cf. Joffe (1969) 539–42 for a critique; cf. Roth and Lemma (2008) and H. F. Smith (2008) for recent developments on Kleinian envy.

¹² Cairns (2003a) 12–13. There are also personal differences between individuals who are homologous within their society.

¹³ Lewis (2000) 277 argues that envy emerges in the latter half of the second year of life, along with embarrassment and empathy. Frankel and Sherick (1977) report that while a very young child will desire and take a toy, the awareness that it belongs to another child, and an attendant hostility characteristic of envy, only develop later; cf. Rosenblatt (1988) 57–58.

¹⁴ Damasio (1994) 131–39; Elster (1999) 242; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 104–14; Johnson-Laird and Oatley (2000) 466–67.

¹⁵ On *amae*, a kind of ‘pleasure at being dependent,’ see Morsbach and Tyler (1986). Newman (1964) describes *amok*, or ‘being a wild pig.’ For constructionist approaches to emotions see Harré (1986), Harré and Parrott (1996).

words and the contexts in which they are used (by a particular author or more generally), and comparing them with the nearest equivalents in our own lexicon.¹⁶ Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy has, for instance, mostly concentrated on usage of the Greek words *phthonos* (envy, begrudging, jealousy, spite—see chapter 3) and *zêlos* (emulative rivalry). The two principal works on these Greek emotions are Walcot's *Envy and the Greeks*, and Konstan and Rutter's edited volume *Envy, spite, and jealousy: The rivalrous emotions in ancient Greece*.¹⁷ Walcot provides an overview of Greek envy over the thirteen centuries from Homer to Boethius, from a comparative-anthropological perspective. He makes some false generalizations;¹⁸ however, the book is still relevant, giving useful pointers to the value system, and containing many insights into individual texts. Very little else was published on Greek envy, with the exception of Pindar's poetics,¹⁹ until Konstan and Rutter. This collection of essays has begun the modern socio-psychological investigation into the 'rivalrous' emotions in ancient Greece. However, most of the chapters limit themselves to an examination of *phthonos* (and sometimes *zêlos*) in one author or genre, and many appear to do so without any wider insight into investigations into these emotions in fields other than Classics.

This is not to argue that a lexical approach has no value. Indeed it is essential, particularly in dealing with texts and civilizations from the past, and this monograph will not neglect lexical issues. However a purely lexical approach has limitations. First, it encourages too great a dependence on the labels our own language uses, in trying to understand those of another language and culture.²⁰ This is exemplified in the most comprehensive study of ancient Greek emotions to date, Konstan's *The emotions of the ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and classical literature*,²¹ which, despite its awareness of the differences between ancient Greek and modern (Anglophone) experiences, still shows too great a tendency to look for one-to-one equivalents. For instance, he argues (somewhat unpersuasively) that Aristotle's *praotês* (*Rh.* 2.3) should be translated into English as "satisfaction," rather than "calming down."²² However, *praotês* is neither equivalent to satisfaction, nor to calming down: *praotês* is *praotês*, an ancient Greek phenomenon, and translation of any

¹⁶ Kaster (2005) is a major exception to the tendency to try to find English-language equivalents (see below).

¹⁷ Walcot (1978); Konstan and Rutter (2003).

¹⁸ For example, that *zêlos* should be translated jealousy, and *phthonos* envy, their use being in "much the same way as their English equivalents" (2); or dividing envy into "'professional envy,' 'sibling envy,' and 'sexual envy'" (3), passing over the many instances of envy of wealth in fourth-century oratory, and the *phthonos* of the gods—though he later devotes two chapters to this, undermining his own tripartite division.

¹⁹ See Bulman (1992); Kurke (1991) 195–224.

²⁰ Kaster (2005) 6–8.

²¹ Konstan (2006).

²² Konstan (2006) 77–90.

particular instance of the word is secondary to understanding that phenomenon.²³ Second, our own emotion labels can hide from our conscious minds the emotional scenarios they imply—which may not, in part or in total, be applicable to those of another culture.²⁴ Third, psychology can be obscured not just by the lexicon, but also by the fact that people can react to situations with a mixture of emotions, only some of which they may be conscious of, or choose to express. A final problem with a lexical approach, which applies particularly to envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, is that (unlike anger, shame, etc.) these emotions are not freely and frequently expressed in Greek. There are two reasons for this: first, the discreditable nature of *phthonos* (the primary Greek term covering envy and possessive jealousy) ensures that it is never claimed for oneself, and means that those who disclaim it of themselves or ascribe it to others have an obvious (and suspect) agenda;²⁵ second, because there is no ancient Greek word for sexual jealousy until well after the Classical period.²⁶ Such problems are not limited to these two emotions.²⁷

While a lexical approach is useful, therefore, it cannot be the sole methodology for a detailed investigation of the emotion concepts of another culture, and particularly cannot be the sole approach of a work looking at ancient Greek envy and jealousy. A complementary approach is required, one which reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations. Accordingly, in this study I adopt as part of my methodology the emotion ‘scripts’ approach advocated and used to great effect by Kaster.²⁸ Scripts are essentially similar to the emotion episodes or scenarios discussed above—an episode/scenario is in fact a specific instance of a general script. These scripts allow us to get behind the terms envy and jealousy in order to achieve a greater understanding of the elements that link a wide variety of envy and jealousy scenarios (and similarly for related ancient Greek emotions).

However, a purely script-based approach has its limitations too. Kaster argues that scripts must replace a lexical approach: he argues that one should

²³ Kaster (2005) 7 makes a similar point about translating Latin *fastidium*.

²⁴ Cairns (2008) 46 makes similar points to these two.

²⁵ It is notable that, while Greeks frequently admit anger, shame, pity, grief, etc., they almost never admit envy (see pp. 35–36).

²⁶ *Zêlotupia* is normally translated as jealousy, but this is controversial, at least in the Classical period (see Konstan (2006) 216–43, and pp. 164–65). Furthermore, the first surviving instance of the term—whatever it means—dates from the 380s, more than halfway through the period covered by this monograph.

²⁷ For example, arrogance is morally problematic and tends to serve a rhetorical agenda; ‘positive’ pride lacks an ancient Greek label.

²⁸ Kaster (2005) 8–9. Other scholars who argue for the use of scripts to investigate emotions include: Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) 210–18; Russell (1991) 442–44; P. L. Harris (2000) 285–88; Shweder and Haidt (2000) 405–6; Russell and Lemay (2000) 496–99; Cairns (2008) 46. Wierzbicka (1999) makes the case for metalanguage (instead of English language) scripts, though this has attracted criticism (e.g., Cairns (2008) 49–50). See also Abelson (1981) on scripts more generally in psychological analysis.

not seek English equivalents for (in his study) Latin terms, that doing so at best simplifies, and at worst confuses and misleads, because inevitably one English term will not cover the full range of scripts covered by one Latin term; furthermore, using an English term does not help at all if the reader's language is French or German, or some less-related language.²⁹ I do not agree with these points. To take the second one first, despite the absence of complete equivalence in emotional terminology, anyone who can read a book in English (as they must to make use of this study) can benefit by being given an English label on which to hang their understanding of a concept. For instance, on seeing the word *phthonos* in a Greek text, it is harder to bring instantly to mind a variety of related but separate scripts, than to remember that it comprises English envy, possessive jealousy, begrudging, etc.—provided we are clear what these English terms involve. It is beside the point that, for example, *orgê* is not anger (or *colère* or *Zorn*, etc.); certainly an ancient Greek might express *orgê* in some different situations and some different ways to when or how modern Anglophones might express anger, and they might think of the emotion in subtly different ways (e.g., as expressed by different metaphors), but understanding those differences is the entire purpose of a scholarly study; if anger will perfectly well translate *orgê* 95 percent of the time, it seems otiose not to use that perfectly respectable word when discussing a given instance of *orgê* in (or translating one into) English—unless the instance falls within the other 5 percent. This problem is in fact not confined to the study of emotions but covers a wide range of ethical, social, political, and institutional vocabulary for which there is no absolute equivalence between ancient Greek and modern terminology (in any language). To translate only where there is complete equivalence would, if pursued rigorously, lead to 'translations' in which most of the words of necessity remained in Greek. Retaining a Greek word is, of course, justified in contexts where it cannot be fully expressed by one English equivalent (e.g., *hubris*, where frequently no translation will adequately cover what the Greek word is conveying). But this problem is not replicated even with as multifaceted an emotion as *phthonos*, which covers a variety of scripts with different English names. While no one English word will cover all the meanings *phthonos* might have, in many instances where the word is used (i.e., many individual *phthonos* scenarios), the sense is totally unambiguous, and the reader will perfectly well understand what is going on if the English words envy, jealousy, begrudging, etc., are substituted in an English translation or discussion of the passage. Only when a Greek passage relies on the ambiguity between different senses of the word (i.e., different scripts), or when more than one script is being referred to in discussion, must the scholar stick to the original Greek word *phthonos*, as I shall at certain points in this study.

²⁹ Kaster (2005) 6–8, 29; he sums this up: "the only sound way to understand the emotional language of any culture, especially (but not exclusively) one not our own, is in terms not of lexical labels but of 'scripts'" (85).

To ensure that we, the investigator and readers, do indeed have a full understanding of the English scripts implied by such terms as envy and jealousy, which will allow us to examine ancient Greek scripts in this way, I take a methodological step so far (to my knowledge) not yet taken by any scholarly study. This is to apply to Athenian culture and literature directly insights on the contexts, conscious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indicative behaviors of envy, jealousy, and related emotions, derived from modern research into these emotions in a variety of fields in the social sciences.³⁰ Such an approach does carry its own risk: there is a danger that we will import into Athenian society concepts conditioned by an unrelated experiential framework; a related problem is how to avoid the circularity frequently inherent in comparative studies where evidence is limited. These limitations can be countered, however, by using Aristotle's examination of the socio-psychology of *phthonos* as a control: as will be seen in chapter 4, his analysis of *phthonos*, and his comparison of *phthonos* with a variety of other related emotions, provides directly comparable evidence to the sort of survey I undertake of modern social scientific scholarship on envy, jealousy, and related emotions in chapter 2. This script methodology enables me to explore not merely the explicit theorization and evaluation of envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, but also the more oblique ways in which they find expression across a variety of genres—including texts in which the role of these emotions is currently underappreciated.

1.2 Scope

Envy and jealousy are major topics, and one could spend twenty years and write several volumes investigating all their aspects in Greek culture. Of necessity, this monograph must limit its investigations. I have chosen to concentrate on Athens during the Classical period (479–322) since a large majority of surviving (BCE) Greek texts come from this society. Indeed, we have a relatively greater volume and range of evidence, both in kind and chronologically, about democratic Athenian society and values than for any other ancient Greek society. In concentrating on Classical Athens, I do not suggest that *phthonos* in this society would have differed in every respect from those of other *poleis* at the time, or from Athens at different times; however, there may not be a total commonality of outlook. Even leaving aside such a literary construct as Homeric society, arousal and appropriate expression of envy might well differ between democratic Athens and oligarchies of the fifth and fourth

³⁰ The fields I draw on most particularly are philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, and anthropology (see chapter 2). This study will, therefore, reciprocally provide comparative material for scholars of these emotions in other fields.

centuries, or between the oratory of fourth-century Athens and that of the first- or second-century CE Dio of Prusa. Again, sexual jealousy might be constructed differently in the literary genres of fifth-century tragedy and the second- or third-century CE Greek novel. It makes sense therefore to concentrate on one society, after which my findings will provide comparative material when investigating how envy and jealousy are constructed in other periods, places, genres, texts, and nonliterary media of ancient Greece.

In this book, then, I have concentrated on the literature of Classical Athens. By this I mean literature either written for performance in Athens (e.g., tragedy, comedy, oratory) or written in the Athenian intellectual milieu. I therefore include Aristotle, who lived and worked in Athens, and whose *Rhetoric* must clearly have taken account of the development of oratory there.³¹ However, I largely avoid authors who are not Athenian (e.g., Herodotus), Classical (e.g., Solon), or either (e.g., Homer, Pindar). This is not to say that these authors have nothing to contribute on the subject of *phthonos*—all of them do—and I do take account of them in the lexical review in chapter 3, which considers *phthonos* and related words in all Greek literature of the Archaic and Classical periods. However, I treat them delicately, and I avoid building assumptions based solely on them into my analysis of Classical Athenian texts. The more in-depth generic and textual analyses in chapters 4–8 are almost entirely Classical Athenian. I should perhaps also note here that the lack of a chapter on *phthonos* in Thucydides and Xenophon—or indeed Plato—reflects the fact that there is no coherent story to tell. While the word occurs frequently in these three authors, extended *phthonos* scenarios and narratives are relatively rare, and those that exist are more sensibly included within my general discussion of *phthonos* in chapter 3 (or, in one Platonic instance, in my discussion of Old Comedy in chapter 6).

Because the socio-psychological approach is particularly well suited to cultural history, to ideas expressed in literature or philosophy, it is these that I focus on. I therefore ignore material evidence such as decrees, epitaphs, and curses:³² the body of inscriptional evidence is vast and disparate; it is not immediately obvious that such texts will give insight into an emotional episode as such (antecedent conditions, psychological feelings, etc.); and it may be hard to control the results since (at least in some of the material) imputation of motivation will often be conjectural. There are also questions of methodology, as inclusion of material evidence would require a significant adjustment of the hermeneutic approach. One final limitation is that I focus on socio-psychological aspects, rather than political or economic issues.

³¹ Similarly Plato in his analysis of comedy in the *Philebus* (see chapter 6).

³² Eidinow (2007) briefly refers to envy and jealousy in relation to curses in general (230–31), as well as envy tied specifically to curses relating to commercial competition (204–5) and the institution of the *chorègia* (160, 296 note 17). Also *re* material evidence, see Dunbabin and Dickie (1983) on Greco-Roman iconography of *phthonos*.

Leaving aside the question of how much institutions such as ostracism really owe to envy,³³ political-economic envy has in any case already been well treated by Ober, as part of his investigation of elite and mass (i.e., non-elite) relations in Classical Athens.³⁴

1.3 Outline of the Book

The volume is divided into this introduction and seven further chapters, through which the argument develops in a linear fashion. Chapter 2 surveys and analyzes the insights of modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, sociological, and anthropological research into envy and jealousy. The two emotions are examined separately, and then compared for their differences and what they have in common. I show that, while many cognitive psychologists prefer to separate envy (felt when I lack something I want) from jealousy (felt when I want to retain or regain something I have developed an exclusive bond with), others prefer to concentrate on the situational aspects of rivalry between two people for a mutually desired object or person. Both approaches have analytical value, but also limitations: the former position tends to draw a dividing line between envy and all types of jealousy (including sexual), ignoring the fact that laypersons frequently conflate the words envy and jealousy in speech, and that envy is inextricably part of the jealousy scenario; the latter position draws a helpful distinction between social comparison and sexual scenarios, but occasionally downplays genuine differences between prototypical envy and (possessive) jealousy scripts. As well as examining envy and jealousy in depth, I compare envy with a number of other emotions that it overlaps with—such as emulation, greed and covetousness, and spite and *Schadenfreude*—and those that it tends to be (consciously) misrepresented as or (unconsciously) transmuted into—including anger and indignation, and a desire for justice. These insights into the various emotion scripts covered by the terms envy, jealousy, and related emotions equip us well for an in-depth exploration of similar emotions in other cultures—here Classical Athens.

Chapters 3 and 4 take two complementary approaches to the Greek vocabulary of envy and jealousy, in order to map the phenomena we are dealing with in Greek culture. Chapter 3 begins with a thorough lexical examination of *phthonos*, which I show can cover no fewer than twelve scripts. These include

³³ Some (e.g., Ranulf (1933) I.134–35 and ff., Walcot (1978) 53–61) have seen the institution of ostracism as a licensed outlet for envy against a prominent individual (perhaps instituted to dissuade the poor from attacking the rich as a class). However most of the evidence for this is provided by Plutarch, who is hardly contemporary. Cairns (2003b) 243–44 summarizes the evidence, and is rightly skeptical of this “reductive explanation”; see also Elster (1999) 187–89; Fisher (2003) 188. See Brenne (1994) for examples of what *ostraka* actually say.

³⁴ Ober (1989); see also Cairns (2003b).

most of the scripts covered by English envy and jealousy (e.g., begrudging envy, covetous envy, jealous of my position, possessive jealousy), and several more besides (e.g., begrudging refusal, rivalry, *Schadenfreude*, moral censure). I follow this with an analysis of *zêlos*, which covers one script included in envy but not *phthonos* (reflected in the English phrase “I envy you”), and a variety of other Archaic and Classical terms (*megairein*, *agaasthai*, *kotos*, *nemesis*, *eris*, *philon(e)ikia*, *philotimia*, *duskolia*, *dusmeneia*, and *baskania*) which can involve similar scripts to one or more of those included in *phthonos*.

In chapter 4 I turn to the first detailed socio-psychological examination of *phthonos*, that of Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* and (both) *Ethics* treatises, both to make use of his insights in their own right, and to compare his account with that of modern social scientific research, allowing us to utilize the latter with confidence. I first consider how Aristotle sites *phthonos* within a group of emotions concerned with response to someone else’s good or bad fortune. I discuss how envy (*phthonos*) is related to spite (*epichairekakia*) in his thought, and how as ‘bad’ emotions these are opposed to such ‘good’ emotions as indignation (*to nemesan*), justified pleasure in another’s misfortune (unnamed in Greek), emulation (*zêlos*), and disdain (*kataphronêsis*). I go on to show how this distinction survives, with minor alterations, the intellectual shift to the ‘doctrine of the mean’ in the ethical treatises. Next I turn to Aristotle’s views on *phthonos* itself, as described in the *Rhetoric*, where he discusses the situations in which *phthonos* arises, before showing how Aristotle’s ethical training (as outlined in the *Nicomachean Ethics*) can remove vices such as *phthonos* from one’s character. Finally, I use the findings of modern theory on envy and jealousy to critique Aristotle’s thought on *phthonos*, noting that he identifies scenarios from a variety of scripts (though he does not seem to realize this), and I also compare Aristotle’s thought on *phthonos* with other Classical Greek authors. While he generally reflects the prevailing usage of *phthonos*, it is apparent that the strict division Aristotle makes between *phthonos* (envy) and *to nemesan* (indignation) is not reflected in contemporary literary sources: *nemesis* (and its cognates) barely survive in the Classical period, their function in the Archaic period being mostly subsumed in the Classical by *phthonos*. I recognize this by introducing the script terms ‘bad *phthonos*’ and ‘good *phthonos*,’ henceforward used where necessary for clarity.

Chapters 5–7 examine the roles of *phthonos* in three genres of literature written for performance in front of mass (i.e., non-elite) audiences. Chapter 5 focuses on Attic oratory, a genre which makes frequent use of *phthonos* words. I begin not with oratory, however, but with Aristotle. Picking up on chapter 4, I demonstrate how *phthonos*’s badness prevents the use to which Aristotle would like to put emotions in rhetoric—namely, persuading an audience. I explore alternative reasons why Aristotle should still have discussed this emotion in his *Rhetoric*, and argue that its only acceptable use consistent with his philosophy is to accuse one’s opponent of being motivated by it. Turning to

oratory proper, I show that this is largely the case, first through a brief survey of all occurrences of *phthonos* words in the genre, and second by in-depth analyses of several speeches in which accusations of *phthonos* form a crucial part of the speaker's strategy (Isae. 2; Lys. 24; Aeschin. 2; Dem. 18 and *Epist.* 3). In fact, *phthonos* words are not once used in the genre to arouse an audience's envy. We do find several calls for an audience's *phthonos*, but crucially these are calls for moral censure (i.e., 'good *phthonos*'). I evidence this by a detailed discussion of Dem. 20 and 21. I end the chapter by considering how an orator might attempt to arouse an audience's 'bad *phthonos*' covertly. Because of the negative associations of the term and the concept, an orator must do so without using the word itself, and I examine a number of speeches which attempt to do just this in trials of Athenian politicians for embezzlement and bribe-taking (Lys. 28, 29, and 21; with similar passages in Dem. 3).

In chapter 6 I continue to focus on covert arousal of *phthonos* in an audience, here in Old Comedy. In the *Philebus*, Plato argues that one goes to a comedy in order to laugh at the misfortunes of one's friends, and he calls this *phthonos*. This emotion bears a close similarity to Aristotle's *epichairekakia* and to modern *Schadenfreude*. For all the difference in emphasis, I show that this reading has certain affinities in common with the 'carnival' approach to understanding Old Comedy, and particularly its predilection for *onomasti kômôidein* (abuse of named individuals). I focus in particular on *phthonos* against politicians, both named and as a class, in Aristophanes' political plays of the 420s, as providing the clearest and most coherent body of evidence for *phthonos* arousal in the genre, and because of the political connections with the previous chapter. I first consider passages criticizing demagogues in *Wasps* and particularly Paphlagon (i.e., Kleon) in *Knights*, and then consider passages dealing with ambassadors in *Acharnians* and generals in *Wasps*. The arguments advanced ostensibly play to the audience's moral censure (i.e., indignation) at the excesses of these groups and individuals, but in fact appeal as much if not more to their (transmuted) envy. These, however, are English emotions and, as I demonstrated in chapter 4, both fall within the purview of *phthonos* in Greek.

In chapter 7 I turn away from the audience to look at *phthonos* scripts on-stage in Old Comedy and in tragedy. While this emotion is not one of those regularly seen as motivating characters, it is not completely absent. I examine two scenarios in the former genre and three in the latter. In Old Comedy, I return to *Knights*, this time Nikias's and Demosthenes' *phthonos* for Paphlagon's swift rise to be Demos's most trusted slave, and his reciprocal *phthonos* for those who wish to take away this status. I then consider the redistribution of (wealth and) sexual favors in *Assemblywomen*. Turning to tragedy, Ajax's response to the Arms of Achilles being awarded to Odysseus (Soph. *Aj.*) owes most to rage and shame, but I argue that *phthonos* at losing 'his' Arms is also discernible when we compare the punishment he attempts to mete out to Odysseus with that of the Atreidai. Phaidra's response to her rejection by

Hippolytos (Eur. *Hipp.*) also owes a great deal to shame and rage, but alongside these what was formerly *zêlos* of his lifestyle seems to harden into *phthonos*, contributing to the libelous form of revenge. Finally, Kreusa's response on learning that her husband, with whom they had both longed for children for many years, now had a son while she did not, leads her through *phthonos* to try to kill that son. I show that in all of these plays characters exhibit psychology, expression, and action highly typical of English envy/jealousy scenarios, and clearly describable as *phthonos* by what has been revealed of the nature of that emotion in chapter 3. It is notable that neither Old Comedy nor tragedy lend themselves well to overt, large-scale, onstage *phthonos* scenarios, and a script approach is required in order to 'read' the scenarios that are there.

In chapter 8 I leave *phthonos* proper and move on to a detailed examination of sexual jealousy. The existence of this emotion in ancient Greece has been questioned,³⁵ and a minor concern of this chapter is to prove that an emotion comparable to our sexual jealousy does indeed exist in Greek literature. The main focus, however, is on how this emotion is constructed and expressed. I begin with Medea (Eur. *Med.*), who is normally portrayed as suffering from heroic pride or rage. While accepting the presence of these emotions as motivators, I argue that it is overly reductive to interpret Medea's psychology solely in these terms, and that sexual jealousy should be rehabilitated as one of her motivations. *Erôs* plays a major role in Medea's marriage, and her entire self-conception is bound up with being a wife, a mother, and a (sexual) woman. Jason's abandonment of her wrongs her in all three roles. I show how Medea's subsequent emotions (rage, hatred, grief, pride, and begrudging envy) are directly traceable back to this wrong, and how her desire for 'justice' (which typically masks envy), and the form of the revenge itself, fit in well with both the English sexual jealousy prototype and Aristotle's ideas on *phthonos*, *orgê* (anger), and *misos* (hatred). The main elements of this Greek jealousy script appear in two other tragedies (Soph. *Trach.* and Eur. *Andr.*), which I explore in similar level of detail. I conclude that Greek sexual jealousy requires three components: *erôs*, an exclusive relationship, and a desire to protect the integrity of that exclusivity by beating, damaging, or destroying the rival and/or partner. This destructive element shows that *phthonos*, like *erôs*, is inextricably part of the Greek sexual jealousy prototype. Finally, I turn to philosophy, oratory, and comedy, and briefly examine a number of texts in which elements of the sexual jealousy prototype recur (principally Pl. *Symp.*; Antiph. 1; Lys. 1, 3, and 4; Aeschin. 1; Ar. *Plut.*; Men. *Sam.* and *Pk.*)—this includes an examination of the term *zêlotupia* (normally translated as jealousy) in this period. By considering this wide variety of texts, I show how the jealousy script changes when the patient is a man, how male-male relationships differ from male-female, and the effect of genre on the use of sexual jealousy scripts to manipulate audiences.

³⁵ Konstan (2003b) and (2006).

Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories

The academic fields that have contributed the greatest extent to modern discussions of envy and jealousy are philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, and anthropology.¹ The approaches of these various disciplines are heterogeneous (both between and within disciplines), with surprisingly little interdisciplinary research.² My aim in this chapter is not to weld them into a homogeneous whole, even were this possible. Rather, my primary concern is to survey this body of research, in order to gain the broadest possible understanding of the ways in which the English terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ are used and understood, how they relate to other emotion terms, and how envy and jealousy scenarios unfold. This survey will allow me to differentiate the various scripts that fall within the terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ (and related emotions), and will provide the theoretical underpinning of my reading of Greek texts in subsequent chapters.

The large majority of the research published in the fields mentioned above, especially as relates to envy and jealousy, is Anglo-American, and even that which is not is almost entirely published in English. This creates two potential problems. First, it does not challenge the natural tendency of the author, or of English-speaking readers, to think of the emotional palette according to the way it is divided up in modern Anglophone society. Second, it creates potential problems for readers whose first language is not English—whether because

¹ There is some evolutionary and comparative psychological scholarship on emotions (e.g., Aureli and Whiten (2003); Bard *et al.* (2004); Keltner, Haidt and Shiota (2006)). However this field has as yet almost nothing to say about envy. It has a little to say about jealousy, though this has mainly involved looking at pets’ supposed (nonsexual) jealousy of other humans/animals that their owners demonstrate affection for (e.g., Morris, Doe and Godwell (2008); Panksepp (2010))—which is of limited use to our type of study.

² No academic monograph covering such a variety of disciplinary approaches to envy has appeared since Schoeck (1966/1969). Salovey (1991), Wurmser and Jarass (2008a), and Hart and Legerstee (2010) are three important edited collections containing a narrower selection of approaches to envy and/or jealousy.

the experiential bases of the phenomena are not totally familiar, the range and acceptability of expression differs in their own society, or simply because their emotional experience is lexically divided up differently. The script approach helps to solve these problems, and thus strengthens the overall methodological approach. It should not matter, in theory, whether the language of exploration is English, Russian, Mandarin, Swahili, or indeed a metalanguage—provided all readers know exactly what are the building blocks used (i.e., the individual scripts), and what it will mean when I discuss any particular Greek example using the English words envy, jealousy, etc. Considered in these terms, the almost wholly Anglocentric nature of this body of research becomes a positive advantage, providing all the more information about the English terms used throughout this book, and thus about the various scripts that fall within those terms—and so all the better assisting non-native English speakers to explore the Greek phenomena through the medium of English.

2.1 Envy

2.1.1 ETYMOLOGY

The word envy is derived from the Latin noun *invidia*, which corresponds with English “envy; jealousy; grudge; ill will; hatred; odium; unpopularity”; that in turn is derived from the verb *invidere*, which means “to look askance at; to look maliciously or spitefully at; to cast an Evil Eye on; to be prejudiced against; to envy, grudge; to be unwilling; to aspire to rival; to prevent, refuse, or deny.”³ Dictionary definitions for envy include:⁴ (noun) ill will, malice, enmity, harm, emulation, desire, a longing for another’s advantages, mortification, and ill will occasioned by the contemplation of another’s superior advantages; (verb) to feel envy at the superior advantages of; to regard with discontent another’s possession of (some superior advantage); to wish oneself on a level with (another) in some respect, or possessed of (something which another has); to feel a grudge against, to begrudge, to treat grudgingly; to have envious, grudging, or malevolent feelings; to vie with, seek to challenge. There are three related adjectives: enviable, envious, and invidious. Enviable means: to be envied. Envious means: full of envy, affected or actuated by envy, vexed at the good fortune or qualities of another; full of ill will; malicious; full of emulation; grudging, excessively careful; enviable; invidious; odious. Invidious means: tending to excite ill will or envy; looking with an Evil Eye; envious, grudging, jealous.

³ Lewis & Short; cf. Spielman (1971) 61. Klein (1957/1975) 181 n. 2 notes this accords with her view that envy is projective; see Cairns (2011) on the envious gaze in Greek literature.

⁴ *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* for the remainder of the paragraph, which is an abridged direct quotation.

2.1.2 ENVY SCENARIOS

Envy is a complex (or ‘blended’) emotion, and occurs in complex situations of social comparison.⁵ Its antecedent conditions involve three perceptions: (1) that someone else (the target) has some possession or quality; (2) that I (the patient) do not have it; (3) that this situation is wrong.⁶ A number of factors influence this third perception. One is self-esteem: the higher one’s self-esteem, the more likely one is to feel a sense of entitlement.⁷ Secondly, we are more likely to feel envy of our peers than nonpeers: we might feel entitled to the promotion our colleague has just been awarded, but we are less likely to feel entitled to be king.⁸ Finally there are what Parrott calls “personal variables” (i.e., character: some people are just more likely to feel envy than others).⁹

The feeling of envy itself is generally considered to be ‘blended’: a number of simpler affects are simultaneously aroused, with all or most needing to be present for envy to result. While modern scholars in a variety of disciplines agree that it is blended, there is considerable diversity on the number and nature of its components. Spielman notes four principal components: emulation (admiration and rivalry), a ‘narcissistic wound’ (“a sense of inadequacy,” inferiority, or “injured self-esteem,” ranging from disappointment to humiliation), covetousness (of the desired quality or possession), and anger (ranging from chagrin, through resentment, to spite, malevolence, hatred, and a wish to harm). Joffe sees six elements to envy: aggression, hate, resentment, admiration, covetousness, and narcissism (a desire to boost one’s self-image). Ben-Ze’ev notes envy involves both hostility and admiration, and occasionally self-pity, hope, or despair. Parrott believes it can involve: a longing or frustrated desire, a feeling of inferiority (which may manifest as sadness, anxiety, or despair), resentment (generalized or target-specific, manifesting as displeasure, anger, or hatred),

⁵ Foster (1972) 168–70; Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; R. H. Smith *et al.* (1996) 158–59; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 284–85; R. H. Smith (2004) 43. Salovey (1991b) has been greatly interested in applying ‘social comparison theory’ to envy and jealousy: see chapter 2.4.3. Early psychoanalysts did not believe envy to be a social phenomenon, but rather that it is rooted in infant psychosexual development – see Freud (1925) 248–58; Klein (1957/1975) 176–204; Joffe (1969); Spielman (1971) 64–80; Burke (1998) 3–17.

⁶ Rosenblatt (1988) 63; Elster (1999) 169; Wierzbicka (1999) 98, who prefers the weaker third perception “this is bad.” In this chapter I shall frequently use ‘patient’ to refer to the person feeling the emotion (some prefer ‘subject’), and ‘target’ to refer to the person arousing it (some prefer ‘object’ or ‘agent’).

⁷ Parrott (1991) 7; Salovey and Rothman (1991); cf. Festinger (1954). Rawls (1999) 469 for a contrary view, that the higher one’s sense of self-worth, the less likely one is to care about lacking something. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 286–87 sees no “positive correlation between envy and jealousy and a person’s low self-esteem.” On self-esteem and its maintenance, see Tesser and Campbell (1980); Tesser (1991).

⁸ Parrott (1991) 7; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 287; see also n. 59. Elster (1999) 169–70 further notes that in a hierarchy we are most likely to envy the person immediately above us on the ladder, which he terms “neighborhood envy”; cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 305–6. Compare Aristotle’s view (chapter 4) that *phthonos* is felt for those “similar and equal” to us.

⁹ Parrott (1991) 8; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 317. Aristotle would say that this is because they have a base character—see chapter 4.

guilt at feeling these affects, and admiration or emulation. Rosenblatt notes feelings of helplessness to acquire the desired good, “inadequacy and inferiority,” and target-directed anger.¹⁰ Clearly there is no exact agreement; however, a number of affects command sufficient agreement to allow us to operate with them as an irreducible minimum in the blend, and these are: emulation, covetousness, anger/aggression, resentment, hostility/hatred, and a feeling of inferiority or damaged self-esteem.

Envious feelings lead to a variety of actions. Elster notes that primarily “the action tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor”; Wurmser and Jarass agree, saying envy “wants the humiliation, disempowerment, and destruction of the envied one.”¹¹ This is true even if such destructive action is to our own detriment also.¹² This action tendency is the most fundamental, and verbal and physical actions prompted by envy will frequently act toward this goal. However, we should note that destruction does not have to be total; damage also helps relieve envious feelings. (For example, we are more likely to be driven to scratch our neighbor’s new car than destroy it completely.)¹³ Alongside direct destructive or damaging actions, anthropologists looking at non-Western cultures also tell us about indirect expressions of invidious hostility, including: “gossip, backbiting, and defamation,” invoking (or warding against) the Evil Eye, curses, and other types of spells.¹⁴

This primary destructive action tendency makes clear something that is not generally noted in the situational antecedents: it is not a necessary part of envy that I desire for myself the possession or quality that the other person has; my principal concern is to deprive them of it. This implies two distinct but related scripts: i/ I am upset that you have something, and I want to deprive you of it; ii/ I am upset that you have something, and I want to have it instead of you. If the good is transferable (i.e., if it is a possession), then the urge to destroy or damage the desired good is likely to be weaker in the second case (though it may not be, since envy’s strongest urge is to deprive the other person of their good). I will label these two envy scripts ‘begrudging envy,’ and ‘covetous envy.’¹⁵ It should be noted that these terms do not derive from social scientific

¹⁰ Spielman (1971) 76–77; Joffe (1969) 543–44; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 301; Parrott (1991) 12–15; Rosenblatt (1988) 63–64, who actually includes six components, confusing these three affects with the antecedent conditions discussed in the main text above.

¹¹ Elster (1999) 171. Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii. This destructive urge is one of the primary factors that distinguish envy from other emotions such as greed or emulative rivalry (see chapter 2.2).

¹² Rawls (1999) 466–67, 469; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283.

¹³ This suggests that envy is not an all-consuming emotion, as it does not blind us to such considerations as “Will the police care enough to investigate?”, “Will we be caught?”, and “What will be our punishment?”.

¹⁴ Foster (1972) 172–82 (quote: 172); Wolf (1955) 460. On envy and witchcraft in general, see: Schoeck (1966/1969) 40–76; F. Bowie (2000) 219–32. On envy and the Evil Eye in particular, see also: Spooner (1976) 284; Dionisopoulos-Mass (1976) 43–44; Kilborne (2008); Jarass and Wurmser (2008).

¹⁵ See further chapter 2.2.2 on the relationship between this ‘covetous envy’ script and covetousness proper.

research; I adopt them purely for the convenience of the reader, who, I believe, will find it easier to identify scripts quickly when provided with a meaningful label (as opposed to, e.g., ‘envy script 1’ and ‘envy script 2’).

2.1.1.3 TRANSMUTATION OF ENVY

Like all painful emotions, the feeling of envy is subject to a number of coping mechanisms, termed ‘defenses’ by psychoanalysts. These attempt, consciously or subconsciously, to amend one of the three perceptions that gave rise to the envious feelings, thus suppressing or preempting them.¹⁶ While all painful emotions are subject to defenses, these are particularly necessary for envy because of our cultural taboo surrounding the sensation and expression of that emotion. Envy—one of the Seven Deadly Sins, and (as a prohibition of covetousness) one of the Ten Commandments—is deemed both morally wrong and socially disruptive, and therefore, as Elster notes, “it is the only emotion we do not want to admit to others or to ourselves.”¹⁷ Accordingly we seek to ‘veil’ or ‘mask’ it—the difference being “between hiding an emotion one feels and showing an emotion one does not feel. . . . A mask can also serve as a veil.”¹⁸ Elster elaborates by noting that, when one envies, one feels the primary pain of lacking something another has; however, if aware that our feeling is envy, we feel a second pain, which is shame or guilt at feeling a morally taboo emotion.¹⁹ The primary pain of envy can cause us to act (destructively) against the other person or the desired object/attribute, or can cause the sort of psychological adjustments (i.e., defenses) discussed above. However, the secondary pain of the shame or guilt attached also causes psychological adjustments. As Elster puts it: “I can tell myself a story in which the other obtained the envied object by illegitimate and immoral means, and perhaps at my expense, thus transmuting the envy into indignation or anger.”²⁰

¹⁶ Klein (1957/1975) 215–20; Rosenblatt (1988) 64–66; Elster (1999) 172–75; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 232–33. These include: devaluing the good (so as not to want it); idealizing the good or devaluing the self (to feel unworthy of it); convincing oneself the other person deserves it more; devaluing other aspects of the rival; turning one’s attention to other goods; redoubling one’s efforts to succeed too; choosing friends one will not envy, etc.

¹⁷ Elster (1999) 164; Schoeck (1966/1969) 14; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 321; R. H. Smith (1991) 85, who says this is because envy “betrays . . . inappropriate hostility,” thus undermining claims of injustice. The Seven Deadly Sins and Ten Commandments only relate to (one or all) Abrahamic cultures; possibly there are cultures where envy is acceptable, though I have not found an example in anthropological literature.

¹⁸ Elster (1999) 96–97.

¹⁹ Elster (1999) 96–97; Parrott (1991) 13–14 and La Caze (2001) 34 also note this pain-enhancing guilt. Recent psychoanalytical research into envy has also noted the overlap between envy and shame: Rosenberger (2005); Kilborne (2008); Jarass and Wurmser (2008); Morrison and Lansky (2008).

²⁰ Elster (1999) 97–98, 169; cf. Rawls (1999) 473–74, R. H. Smith (2004). Parrott (1991) 5–6 and Etchegoyen *et al.* (1987) 50 also note envy’s tendency to disguise itself. See Elster (1999) 341–402 for a detailed discussion of the psychological processes of transmutation and misrepresentation, not specifically *re* envy.

The processes of ‘transmutation’ (which unconsciously hides envy both from oneself and others) and ‘misrepresentation’ (which consciously tries to hide it from others) are of enormous importance for a scholarly exploration of the emotion, because one must examine not just speech and behavior that is caused by overt envy (i.e., destructiveness, damage, curses, slander, etc.), but also speech and behavior ostensibly caused by such motivations as a desire for equality (or ‘justice,’ or ‘fairness’), moral (or ‘righteous’) indignation, resentment, anger, and hatred.²¹ As Elster points out, such a transmutation can be very “difficult to document,”²² though it might not be: disinterested observers often correctly spot envy, and say so, even if the patient cannot.²³ Reading an entire situation, through an understanding of the phenomena, can be very informative—especially when language points in a different direction²⁴—and we will find an understanding of envy’s tendency to masquerade as other emotions invaluable to an exploration of the emotion in Greek literature and culture. While at a large distance in time, and with only one authorial account to guide us, it will sometimes not be possible to determine with assurance whether a given scenario represents genuine indignation or transmuted envy, the psychology under which a character or individual acts will frequently prove of secondary importance to the ways in which envious psychology and envious individuals are portrayed, represented, and misrepresented in their own, an opponent’s, or an author’s voice in Greek literature.

2.2 Emotions Related to Envy²⁵

2.2.1 EMULATION AND ADMIRATION

It has often been pointed out by psychologists that there are two possible responses to the three perceptions listed as antecedent conditions for envy: malicious (i.e., begrudging or covetous) envy, and another emotion. Malicious envy will cause the patient to act to deprive the target of whatever has caused their envy; the other emotion accepts the merit of the target, and will instead cause the patient to focus on his/her own shortcomings. This second emotion is termed ‘nonmalicious envy’ by Parrott, ‘emulation’ by Kristjánsson, ‘admiring

²¹ Elster (1999) 97–98; Parrott (1991) 6; Etchegoyen *et al.* (1987) 52; Rawls (1999) 471–74. Parrott (1991) 10–11 notes that the key difference between envy and anger is whether the hostility is justified—often easier for an outsider to spot than protagonists.

²² Elster (1999) 165.

²³ Parrott (1991) 6: “it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the *last* person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.”

²⁴ Silver and Sabini (1978a) 109: “Envy is not identifiable with a particular behavior, but emerges out of specific contexts.”

²⁵ I exclude jealousy from this section, as its importance requires me to consider it separately in chapter 2.4.

envy' by Neu, and connected to (if not identified with) admiration by Ben-Ze'ev and Sandell.²⁶

However, admiration differs from this second emotion, due to the lack or presence, respectively, of a desire to improve myself. Ben-Ze'ev says admiration requires that, when I consider another person with an object/attribute I desire, my feelings are entirely directed toward him and are entirely positive. This will only happen when I consider him to be outside my reference group (e.g., because he is not similar to myself, or is not nearby).²⁷ If I want to be rich, I might admire Bill Gates, but envy my neighbor who has a slightly higher salary than me: my neighbor is within my reference group, while Bill Gates is not. Sandell takes a slightly different view. He notes that in admiration we do not separate the desired object/attribute from the target, who thus becomes a 'trait-object'—for instance, we may think we admire Bill Gates for being a successful businessman, but what we really admire is Bill-Gates-the-successful-businessman; we might know nothing else about him, and so do not separate the individual from the admired quality. However, in envy, we do separate the target (whom we generally despise) from the object/attribute (which we generally desire).²⁸

Admiration does not necessarily have an action tendency; however, emulation does: when I see someone with that desired object/attribute, I am motivated to improve myself.²⁹ For example, I decide to work hard so as to gain a promotion to a similar salary-band as my colleague, or to be able to buy the same type of sports car, or take holidays in similarly fashionable resorts. However, this is different from the malicious action tendency of (begrudging or covetous) envy, which might motivate me to circulate malicious rumors about him at work, scratch his car, or break his legs just before his skiing trip (i.e., destructive, target-focused actions).

It is also different from another script, which shares with emulation the desire to be like someone else or possess what they possess too, but does not share emulation's motivation to act to make it happen; rather it has no action tendency, tending to remain passive and unfulfilled. This script is reflected in the phrase "I envy you" which, despite the use of the word envy, is more akin to admiration or emulation, and is generally nonmalicious in intent.³⁰

²⁶ Parrott (1991) 9; Kristjánsson (2002) 139; Neu (1980) 433–34; Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 304; Sandell (1993) 1213. Wierzbicka (1999) 98 refuses to distinguish between the two emotions. La Caze (2001) 32 also does not appear to distinguish them, merely referring to "other forms of envy" including a "mild response to a friend's good fortune."

²⁷ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 304. In this view, if he is inside my reference group I will not simply feel admiration.

²⁸ Sandell (1993) 1213–16.

²⁹ Silver and Sabini (1978b).

³⁰ Schoeck (1966/1969) 14. Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106 believe "I envy you" expresses a compliment; conversely, Foster (1972) 172–73 links compliments to envy proper, and Elster (1999) 77 argues that "damning by faint praise may . . . be an *indirect behavioral effect* of envy" (*italics original*).

Nevertheless it shares with begrudging and covetous envy a painful feeling on contemplating our lack of something desired, and shares (in English) the term envy itself.³¹ This is therefore a third envy script, which is essentially Parrott's 'nonmalicious envy.' However, to reflect its relationship to emulation—which will prove important when we consider the Greek term *zêlos*—I shall adopt the label 'emulative envy' for this script. As with 'begrudging envy' and 'covetous envy,' I am not claiming that this term is of significance to either laypersons or social scientists; they are all my own labels, chosen because I believe they best describe the action tendencies (or lack of them) of the individual envy scripts, and will therefore be the most useful shorthand label for the reader.

2.2.2 GREED AND COVETOUSNESS

There has not been much research published on the connection of envy with these two emotions. Klein notes the similarity between envy and greed, as both are "impetuous and insatiable craving[s], exceeding what the subject needs and what the object is able and willing to give." However, she distinguishes them by noting that greed is merely introjective, while envy is also projective:³² greed makes us desire someone else's good, but that other person is largely irrelevant; envy will accompany our desire for the good with a stronger one to deprive the other person of it. If the good cannot be acquired, envy will try to destroy it (or the rival), while greed will merely remain frustrated. We can see that, as with emulation, there has been a change to the antecedent conditions, this time to the first condition: instead of (1) "someone else has a good," greed says (1) "there is a good"—both being followed in the same way by (2) "I do not have it," and (3) "this is bad." The absence of a reference to another person explains why other affects (emulation, anger, hostility, etc.) are not triggered, and the action tendency is different.

Covetousness is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as inordinate desire or lust for another's possessions. Ben-Ze'ev argues that it involves desiring what someone else possesses with "an excessive or culpable desire," and says that where envy is a two-person emotion, covetousness is really a one-person emotion: it is "concerned with having something," while envy is "concerned with someone who has something."³³ However, this does not

³¹ Parrott (1991) 10, who notes (with references) that there is some controversy as to whether what he calls nonmalicious envy is a type of envy or not. He rather inconsistently includes it within envy *because* laypersons use the term envy to mean both, while separating envy and jealousy *despite* laypersons often using jealousy to mean envy.

³² Klein (1957/1975) 181; cf. Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106.

³³ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 303; Kristjánsson (2002) 138–39 makes the same point. Frankel and Sherick (1977) suggest that covetousness (and greed) is developmentally prior to envy in young children (see chapter 1 n. 13).

accord with the dictionary definition, nor (I would suggest) with the lay understanding of the term; Ben-Ze'ev is describing not covetousness, but rather desire or greed. One distinction between the two terms may lie in the emphasis placed on getting more than one needs: I might covet my neighbor's ass because I need an ass,³⁴ but I am less likely to do so if I do not; I might, however, still be greedy for it as a possession. A stronger distinction is that covetousness does seem in fact to involve some reference to a current possessor. This may only be suggested by the familiarity of the aforementioned biblical injunction; however it is hard to think of coveting (as opposed to merely desiring) something that belongs to no one.

It seems, then, that we should put coveting somewhere between emulation and the script I have termed 'covetous envy.' Emulation wants what someone else has, without any desire to deprive them. Coveting wants what someone else has, but our focus is on obtaining the good itself, not on depriving the other, which is purely incidental. In the 'covetous envy' script, we ideally want to obtain the good, but our primary concern is with depriving the other person of it (see chapter 2.1.2). Coveting and covetous envy share antecedent conditions and may share action tendencies, but their motivation is different.

2.2.3 *SCHADENFREUDE*, SPITE AND MALICE

Psychologists have noted that envy, a painful feeling, is linked to *Schadenfreude*, a pleasurable one. They argue that this is because envy involves a feeling of inadequacy and a sense of injustice, leading to hostility and dislike of the envied person; when the latter suffers a misfortune, the patient's invidious dislike makes him feel his misfortune has somehow been earned, which gives him pleasure.³⁵ This pleasure in another's misfortune, a misfortune that is subjectively seen as deserved, has no English name—the German word *Schadenfreude* (*Schaden* meaning harm, damage, injury; *Freude* meaning joy) is generally used. The misfortune need not directly right the wrong, or counter the perception, that led to the envy;³⁶ for instance, we can feel *Schadenfreude* at our rich (hence envied) neighbor's car being damaged—he is no less rich, but we feel that on some level he 'deserves' it. This feeling that someone deserves the misfortune, a feeling that derives from the invidious comparison, is important: Wierzbicka points out that sadism is also a pleasure taken in another's misfortune, but it lacks this element, among others.³⁷

³⁴ Referring to *Exodus* 20.17.

³⁵ R. H. Smith *et al.* (1996) 158–59, 167; cf. Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii.

³⁶ R. H. Smith *et al.* (1996) 159.

³⁷ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 356, 369 and Wierzbicka (1999) 103–4 note this distinction, and that the misfortune should not be serious in *Schadenfreude*, but that it might be in sadism. Other differences include: that sadism takes an active part in the misfortune; it is narrower in focus and less discriminate in object; and it is linked to sex, physical pain, humiliation, and notions of control.

Experiments have shown that invidious comparison is necessary for *Schadenfreude* to be felt.³⁸ Like envy, *Schadenfreude* is based on the subjective perceptions of the interested party: the misfortune may, or may not, be seen by disinterested parties (i.e., those with no personal desire for the envied good) as deserved.³⁹

Schadenfreude is seen as a shameful emotion, like envy, and similarly it tends to be concealed in public—a certain guilt attaches.⁴⁰ However, as with envy, an alternative to concealment is a mask: the envious person, when he feels *Schadenfreude*, might consciously (through misrepresentation) or unconsciously (through transmutation) attempt to show that the target's misfortune was objectively deserved.⁴¹ This is analogous to an envious person attempting to show that someone's good fortune is objectively undeserved, concealing his envy with the mask of indignation. This suggests that *Schadenfreude* (like envy) is bivalent, that it can be felt both when the misfortune is subjectively deserved, but also when it is objectively deserved⁴² (i.e., I would not, in fact, need to envy someone to think they 'got their comeuppance,' I could merely be indignant). However, when invidious comparison is not present, we may believe someone has 'got their comeuppance,' but we will not feel pleasure at it, merely satisfaction—the pleasurable element is solely derived from our prior envy. The mask of *Schadenfreude*, then, lies in persuading others that we have not taken *pleasure* in another's misfortune, merely that we feel satisfied that a wrong has been righted, that someone undeserving of his good fortune has been 'taken down a peg or two.'⁴³

Spite and malice (the two words seem to imply the same phenomenon, differing merely in their idiomatic usage) are similar to *Schadenfreude* inasmuch as they are invidious: we act to spite someone to whom we have an invidious hostility, and malice likewise involves an active hostility.⁴⁴ However, they differ from *Schadenfreude* in that spite and malice in some way involve action by the patient against the target, while *Schadenfreude* does not.

³⁸ R. H. Smith *et al.* (1996) 159, 167; Brigham *et al.* (1997) 364–65.

³⁹ Brigham *et al.* (1997) 375–76. Chapter 2.3.1 for misfortune seen as deserved even by disinterested parties.

⁴⁰ Brigham *et al.* (1997) 365. Cf. n. 19 on guilt as a part of envy. Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 367–68 compares the desires to conceal envy and *Schadenfreude* (which he terms "pleasure-in-others'-misfortune").

⁴¹ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 356–57; cf. Brigham *et al.* (1997) 374–76; see also chapter 2.3.1.

⁴² By which I mean when the point of view of the patient differs from, or matches, that of personally disinterested observers (see n. 47).

⁴³ Kristjánsson (2006) 96 refers to this feeling, which stands in the same relation to indignation as *Schadenfreude* does to envy, as "satisfied indignation." We could say that envy and *Schadenfreude* both seek to hide one's subjective involvement behind a veneer of personal disinterestedness.

⁴⁴ Rawls (1999) 467–68.

2.3 Emotions That Mask Envy

2.3.1 INDIGNATION AND ANGER

Ben-Ze'ev has noted that envy appears to have two concerns: first, with our own inferiority; second, with someone else's undeserved superiority. He has argued, persuasively, that it is in fact the former that is properly envy, while the latter is indignation or (as he terms it) resentment.⁴⁵ There are two issues here: perceived inferiority/superiority, and desert. Envy often positions itself as a moral emotion ("He shouldn't have that," "It's not right."); however this is a mask—envy can never be moral.⁴⁶ If a disinterested observer would also see the difference in outcome as unfair or morally wrong, then the target will not deserve his superiority, and so the patient's moral outrage will be justified—this is indignation. However, if the patient argues that the target's possession of a good is wrong or not fair, while disinterested observers believe the patient's inferiority is deserved, then while the patient may *think* he feels indignation, observers will correctly perceive him to be experiencing envy.⁴⁷ As Parrott points out: "The distinction between resentment and malicious envy is one that is made using the objective facts of the social world." He notes that the patient may realize that his resentment is not justified, that his indignation is not so righteous after all; when he does, he may not give over his resentment, but may shift its focus from the target to a more generalized dissatisfaction with "the unfairness of life itself."⁴⁸ While envy tends to mask itself, true indignation, being personally disinterested and hence socially sanctioned, has no need of a mask. Similarly, while envy seeks the destruction or damage of the envied person or desired (but unattainable) object, indignation,

⁴⁵ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 282–84, 287–88; cf. Rawls (1999) 467, R. H. Smith (1991) 81 ff. I prefer indignation, as the term resentment (e.g., in La Caze (2001); Van Hooft (2002) 146) conflates moral and immoral responses (as I sometimes do intentionally in chapters 5 and 6, for reasons that will become clear there). Even more confusingly, the French *ressentiment* is used widely in the literature on envy (e.g., Scheler (1915/2007) 25 describes it as including "revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite").

⁴⁶ Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 283–85; Parrott (1991) 10–11; Rawls (1999) 467. See R. H. Smith (1991) 81 ff. for a contrary view, though he confuses envy's personal sense of moral outrage with disinterested indignation. La Caze (2001) 35 also seems to believe envy can be moral: she distinguishes indignation concerning a good we want from indignation concerning a good we do not, and calls the former "moral envy"; I cannot see any justification for this distinction. Ben-Ze'ev (2002) also argues that La Caze is mistaken.

⁴⁷ When I talk about disinterested observers, I mean *personally* disinterested—they may still be socially interested. (I am not interested in objective 'truth,' which is independent of observers, and so cannot arouse emotions.) We should note that even society is not monolithic: some observers might agree with the individual involved (saying his view is "fairness"), while others might not (calling it "the politics of envy") – see Cairns (2003b) 235–38. This suggests that an attribution of envy will depend on an observer's point of view, and in chapter 5.2 I show how Athenians could manipulate listeners' points of view to portray opponents as motivated by *phthonos*.

⁴⁸ Parrott (1991) 11.

being directed at someone breaching collective boundaries, merely seeks appropriate punishment. Because of the high frequency of transmutation or masking of envy, the ‘outsider’s’ evaluation of the facts can be crucial in determining whether expressed indignation is truly indignation, or really envy in disguise: indignation will only properly be felt at someone who does not deserve the object/attribute in question, while envy masquerading as indignation will be felt irrespective of whether he deserves it or not.⁴⁹ However, as mentioned above, portrayals and (mis)representations of individuals and groups as envious will frequently be of more interest to us than the rather sterile fact of whether someone long dead (and sometimes fictional) was genuinely indignant or, rather, envious.

Both Parrott and Ben-Ze’ev note that indignation/resentment is more akin to anger than to envy.⁵⁰ But is there a qualitative difference between indignation and anger, or is it merely a matter of degree? The psychological and psychoanalytical literature on envy tends to conflate the two.⁵¹ However, Wierzbicka says that anger is target specific, while indignation is more generalized,⁵² and Ben-Ze’ev similarly suggests that indignation is a response to a transgression of societal norms, while anger is a response to a more personal transgression.⁵³ These are plausible distinctions.

2.3.2 DESIRE FOR JUSTICE, AND DESIRE FOR EQUALITY

A related emotion, which envy is also frequently misrepresented as or transmuted into, is a desire for ‘justice’ or ‘equality.’ Those who are envious often express themselves with such comments as “You’re no better than the rest of us!”, “Why should he have that, we haven’t?”, or “That’s an obscene amount to earn!”. There are similarities here to moral indignation, but whereas that emotion is aroused by someone stepping outside of socially agreed norms of behavior, the desire for justice appeals to a more universal abstraction.⁵⁴ It initially seems somewhat controversial as to whether there is a justice element to envy: Ben-Ze’ev and Rawls, for instance, argue that there is not, R. H. Smith that there is.⁵⁵ However, the two camps miss each other’s points. Ben-Ze’ev and Rawls argue from a personally disinterested standpoint, while Smith

⁴⁹ We will see in chapter 4 that Aristotle makes a very similar point.

⁵⁰ Parrott (1991) 10–11; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283.

⁵¹ And, incidentally, also conflates anger with hatred in an ambiguous “hostility.”

⁵² Wierzbicka (1999) 87–90; she also says that indignation contains some element of surprise (sc. but anger does not).

⁵³ Ben-Ze’ev (2002) 152–53, who goes on to argue that anger is more transient than indignation (or “resentment,” as he terms it), and that it is more inclined to seek redress.

⁵⁴ Elster (1999) 350. Considering n. 47, we might say that indignation refers to expected norms, while desire for justice refers (incorrectly) to an objective truth.

⁵⁵ See n. 46. La Caze (2001) 35–36 also makes the same error with a sense of injustice as she does with “moral envy.”

makes his claim from a personally interested one. Just as with indignation/resentment, someone who is envious might *think* he is motivated by a sense of injustice—this would, after all, merely mean his invidious hostility has been transmuted rather than misrepresented.⁵⁶ In that sense, the sense of injustice is indeed often central to envy, as Smith asserts. However, even he does not believe that a disinterested observer will corroborate that personally interested sense of injustice.

A desire for equality is related to the desire for justice, and, like the latter, can be argued for as a ‘just’ end in itself: some societies will aim to redistribute goods such as money or property—or, indeed, to recognize inalienable rights—not to manage a specific instance of envy, but in an attempt to lessen the level of envy in society more generally.⁵⁷ Rawls argues that there are three conditions required for general envy: (1) that people feel undervalued, and do not think they can do anything about it; (2) this is felt as “painful and humiliating”, and social conditions are such that this painful and humiliating situation is constantly brought to their attention; (3) their social position gives no alternative to trying to pull down the rich, even at some loss to themselves. Societies that try to manage envy (or, from Rawls’s point of view, societies that set out to create just institutions) will aim to ameliorate one or more of these conditions—for instance by forbidding ostentatious displays of wealth, by placing burdens on wealthier citizens, or by enshrining citizen rights that enhance the status even of the lowliest.⁵⁸ This may not do any good, however: many psychologists believe that reduced inequality is at least as likely to lead to a rise as a fall in envy, due to the oft-noted tendency of envy to be directed at one’s peers.⁵⁹ Ben-Ze’ev notes two distinctions between envy and a genuine desire for equality: the former will only call for equality when it favors the envious person, while the latter will call for it when it disadvantages them as well; second, envy will also occur in respect of goods which cannot be equal by their very nature (e.g., beauty or intelligence).⁶⁰

⁵⁶ R. H. Smith (1991) 85–87 does not appear to be aware of the distinction between transmutation and misrepresentation.

⁵⁷ Rawls (1999) 468–69 distinguishes between particular and general envy.

⁵⁸ Rawls (1999) 469–71 argues that some (e.g., Schoeck (1966/1969)) see all “tendency to equality . . . [as] the expression of envy” (471); Neu (1980) 437–39 strongly disagrees with Schoeck. Kristjánsson (2006) 83 notes that we have a concept of justice-based emotions from early childhood, and since we are not aware of legal institutions at that stage, our innate sense of “what justice is” is essentially pre-institutional. In this context, we should note the ‘vigilant’ or ‘assertive egalitarianism’ of some hunter-gatherer societies such as the Hadza and the !Kung (see, for example, Woodburn (1982)).

⁵⁹ Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; Elster (1999) 170; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 316; Ben-Ze’ev (2002) 151; cf. n. 8. None of these studies, however, quotes any experiential evidence for decreased equality leading to a rise in envy.

⁶⁰ Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 316. See also R. H. Smith (1991) 90–92 on “natural inequalities”.

2.4 Jealousy

2.4.1 ETYMOLOGY

The word jealousy derives from the Greek ζήλος, meaning “eager rivalry, zealous imitation, emulation, jealousy, zeal; (used passively as) the object of emulation or desire, happiness, bliss, honor, glory; extravagance of style; fierceness.”⁶¹ Dictionary definitions for jealousy include:⁶² anger, wrath, indignation; devotion, eagerness, anxiety to serve; the state of mind arising from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry; suspicion, mistrust. The related adjective is jealous, which means: vehement in wrath, desire, or devotion; vigilant in guarding, suspiciously careful or watchful; troubled by the belief, suspicion, or fear that the good which one desires to gain or keep for oneself has been or may be diverted to another; resentful toward another on account of known or suspected rivalry; suspicious, fearful.

2.4.2 JEALOUSY SCENARIOS

Jealousy is often believed by laypersons to be similar to envy.⁶³ However, it has three quite different antecedent perceptions: (1) I have an exclusive relationship with someone (a partner) or something (a possession); (2) I am in danger of losing that exclusivity or the entire relationship with them/it; (3) because I have a rival for their affection/possession.⁶⁴ The prototypical jealousy scenario is sexual jealousy;⁶⁵ however one can feel jealous when the rival is a thing (e.g., my husband’s car or prized rosebushes), or non-love rival (e.g., the friends my wife ignores me for); and one can feel jealous at the potential or actual loss of an object/attribute (e.g., status or privileges), including loss of distinctiveness or exclusivity in being the only one to possess it. Unlike envy, which is rooted in social comparison, jealousy is therefore based on personal rivalry and fear of loss. It involves a unique bond with a unique individual or item, exclusivity, and (imagined, potential, or actual) alienation of affection or ownership.⁶⁶ Parrott argues that the partner or possession must be formative to our own self-concept for jealousy to be possible: what we fear to lose is not so much a beloved partner or valued possession, but actually a part of ourselves.⁶⁷

⁶¹ LSJ. The English word zealous is also derived from ζήλος.

⁶² *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* for the remainder of the paragraph, which is an abridged direct quotation.

⁶³ Indeed they are often used, incorrectly, as partial synonyms (see Cairns (2008) 50). I discuss this further in the main text below.

⁶⁴ Parrott (1991) 15–16; Neu (1980) 432–33; see Wierzbicka (1999) 99 for a slightly different formulation.

⁶⁵ Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289–90; Parrott (1991) 15–16; Sharpsteen (1991) 32–34, who also discusses emotion ‘prototypes’; Kristjánsson (2002) 155 ff. disagrees with the choice of sexual jealousy as a prototype for all jealousy. Some psychologists distinguish sexual from possessive jealousy (see chapter 2.4.3).

⁶⁶ Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289–90; Parrott (1991) 15–16.

⁶⁷ Parrott (1991) 16–17; cf. Tov-Ruach (1980) 466–68; Ben-Ze’ev (2010) 44–47.

Like envy, jealousy is generally considered a blended emotion, but again scholars differ considerably on the number and nature of its components. Freud believes it compounds four affects: grief, a narcissistic wound, enmity against the rival, and (perhaps) self-criticism. Shengold more vaguely says it is an individually varying mixture of hate and love. Spielman believes it has a similar mix to envy (emulation, narcissistic wound, covetousness, anger) with less emulation and more anger, combined with an unconscious homosexuality, and suspicion or mistrust (or paranoia). Sharpsteen and Planalp argue for a blend principally of anger, fear, and sadness. Parrott argues for fear of loss, anger, and insecurity. Kristjánsson plumps for envy, anger, and indignation. Ben-Ze'ev gives a particularly generous list: anger, hostility, resentment, and suspicion, as well as love, admiration, and distrust.⁶⁸ As with envy we find no consensus; but affects that would command widespread (if not universal) agreement—as an irreducible minimum to operate with—are anger, envy, hostility, fear of / grief at loss, and damaged self-esteem.⁶⁹ It is perhaps surprising that love is rarely included; possibly it is taken for granted, but perhaps it is simply not necessary: what matters is not that I love the person/object, but that they are *mine*.⁷⁰

Hupka argues that jealousy is more properly a type of anger, distinguished by the situations in which it occurs (these situations being culturally determined); thus when societies do not value romantic or monogamous attachments, and when the group is more important than the family or known paternity, jealousy as we know it is not observed.⁷¹ However, as Elster argues: “If a person is unaware of his emotion, it may be because he lives in a society that does not provide a unifying cognitive label for the behavioral and physiological expressions of that particular emotion.”⁷² (i.e., jealousy may not be commonly observed simply because there is no convenient label for it; it does not necessarily mean that it does not exist in that society).⁷³

⁶⁸ Freud (1922) 223; Shengold (1994) 619; Spielman (1971) 78–79, and cf. also Freud (1922) on a supposed connection between homosexuality and extreme jealousy; Sharpsteen (1991) 31, 36; Planalp (1999) 174; Parrott (1991) 4, and Neu (1980) 433 agree with fear of loss and insecurity; Kristjánsson (2002) 141–42, 144 and (2006) 17–18; Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 301, and in (2010) 42–43 he says that “three major components” are fear of loss, love, and anger or sorrow.

⁶⁹ Parrott (1991) 18–21 distinguishes ‘suspicious’ and ‘*fait accompli*’ jealousy (respectively when infidelity is suspected and certain). In the former, suspicion and fear of loss will be a large part of the blend; in the latter, grief, envy, and associated feelings (hostility, aggressiveness, destructive hatred) will be heightened.

⁷⁰ Ben-Ze'ev (2010) 40. Wurmser and Jarass (2008c) 15–19 discuss the conflict between love and jealousy: love is theoretically unconditional and about the individuality and unconditional acceptance of the other, while jealousy is about *my* sexual desires, *my* loss, *my* humiliation, *my* aggression; however, love seems almost inherently to contain the capacity to be overpowered by jealousy when sexual desire is frustrated.

⁷¹ Hupka (1991); Hupka (1981); see also Sharpsteen (1991) 34 and Salovey (1991b) 280.

⁷² Elster (1999) 412; see also V. Reddy (2010). Stearns (2010) suggests there are societies (and he provides some examples) where jealousy may be present psychologically, yet be subject to a strong social taboo on its expression.

⁷³ Kristjánsson (2002) 21 makes the same point for other emotions. As mentioned in chapter 1, and as will become clear in chapter 8, Classical Greek exhibits exactly this lack of label.

Like envy, jealousy can be disguised, though as it is more socially acceptable the complexity and variety of disguise is much reduced. Furthermore, since jealousy is caused by an interpersonal infraction while envy is caused by a social infraction, this suggests it is more likely to masquerade as anger rather than indignation (see chapter 2.3.1). Parrott notes that, while an outside person would perceive jealousy, the patient themselves will most likely experience, or believe they are experiencing, anxious insecurity (in the case of 'suspicious' jealousy) or indignant anger (with '*fait accompli*' jealousy).⁷⁴ This may lead to revenge against either the partner (if love turns to hatred) or the rival (if there is a strong admixture of envy). In the absence of such closure, a natural path would be a period of recrimination, followed by some measure of acceptance.⁷⁵

2.4.3 COMPARISON OF ENVY AND JEALOUSY

The above analyses concentrate on prototypical envy and jealousy scenarios. By nature such analyses highlight (and exacerbate) differences between the two emotions. Differences so far noted are: (1) envy is a desire for what someone else has, while jealousy is a desire to retain or regain something we see as ours; (2) jealousy involves an exclusive bond with a particular object/person, while envy does not; (3) envy involves social comparison, while jealousy involves personal rivalry; (4) envy is always destructive, while jealousy aims at possession, and only becomes destructive when there is a *fait accompli* (which involves a strong admixture of envy);⁷⁶ (5) envy has relatively more tendency to hatred, while jealousy has relatively more tendency to anger; (6) jealousy is more socially sanctioned than envy, so defenses are fewer, while (7) envy tends, both consciously and unconsciously, toward disguise.⁷⁷ Further distinctions have been noted by scholars. For instance, some argue that envy normally involves two people while jealousy must involve three—or at least a triangular relationship, if one of the three is not a person.⁷⁸ Foster notes that we envy a person, and the possession is only a trigger; however we are jealous of a possession/partner, and perception of a rival is the trigger.⁷⁹ And finally, R. H. Smith, *et al.* have found that envy tends to be associated with such

⁷⁴ Parrott (1991) 5–6, 18; see n. 69 for these terms.

⁷⁵ Hupka (1991) 255–56; Sharpsteen (1991) 43–45.

⁷⁶ We might think suspicious jealousy is also destructive, but this is only the case when it leads to extreme anxiety, and the jealous person has become almost convinced of the loss of the loved one/possession (i.e., when suspicious jealousy approximates to *fait accompli*).

⁷⁷ Parrott (1991) 23; Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 281; Klein (1957/1975) 182; Neu (1980) 432–35.

⁷⁸ Klein (1957/1975) 181; Spielman (1971) 80; Ben-Ze'ev (2000) 289–90; Kristjánsson (2002) 139–40, who notes three-person situations that involve envy rather than jealousy. For a variety of contrary arguments, see Sandell (1993) 1216; Laverde-Rubio (2004) 409–10; Cairns (2003b) 239 n. 12.

⁷⁹ Foster (1972) 168; cf. Neu (1980) 432–33.

affective states as longing, inferiority, and self-awareness, while jealousy is more concerned with suspiciousness, anxiety, hurt, and fear of loss.⁸⁰

While it can be analytically helpful to separate envy from jealousy conceptually, so as to understand both better, such a sharp distinction overemphasizes their differences at the expense of their similarities. First, in real life people tend to conflate the two: while ‘envy’ is rarely used for a jealousy situation, ‘jealousy’ is frequently used for an envy situation.⁸¹ Second, many situations (especially three-person situations) involve both envy and jealousy.⁸² Salovey and others have argued that, instead of trying to separate envy from jealousy as distinct emotions, one should look at situations that combine them.⁸³ This ‘situational’ approach sees two rivals O and P, and an object (or person) X: in envy, O has X, while P desires it; in jealousy, P has X, and fears to lose it to O; in rivalry, neither O nor P have X, but both try to possess it.⁸⁴ Instead of focusing on the distinction between envy and jealousy (conflating possessive and sexual jealousy in the latter), this approach therefore distinguishes between social comparison situations and sexual ones, both of which might involve any combination of envy and jealousy.⁸⁵ This situational approach is a helpful analytical tool. It is a rare situation that will clearly involve either envy or jealousy alone (as frequently one party will feel one, while the other feels the other), and the sharp distinction is undermined even further when we consider that envy is frequently part of the blend of feelings in the jealousy complex. We should therefore recognize that there are many situations that will involve some combination of envy and jealousy, and the prototypical scenarios above can help us pinpoint where these occur.

These disagreements may vex psychologists, but they are helpful to us in our aim to distinguish different jealousy scripts. First, there is ‘possessive jealousy,’ where I alone have something and do not want to lose it to someone

⁸⁰ Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); cf. Parrott and Smith (1993). R. H. Smith and Parrott are prominent among scholars arguing for a sharp distinction between envy and jealousy. Kristjánsson (2002) 147–48 disagrees strongly with attempts to distinguish these two emotions, his main criticism of (principally) Parrott and R. H. Smith being that their methodologies presuppose their conclusions, and so the experiments designed merely reinforce those presuppositions.

⁸¹ Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); Parrott (1991) 24; Parrott and Smith (1993) 906; Salovey and Rodin (1984) 780. Note that the dictionary definition of jealousy in the main text above does not include envy as a synonym, while the definition of envy does include jealousy. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 281–82 argues that the one-way confusion of envy and jealousy arises because of the frequency of situations in which these emotions co-occur, and because of the social unacceptability of envy.

⁸² Kristjánsson (2002) 146–47.

⁸³ Salovey and Rodin (1984) 780; Bers and Rodin (1984) 766–67; Salovey (1991b); Kristjánsson (2002) 147–48.

⁸⁴ Salovey (1991b) 265–66; cf. Salovey and Rodin (1986) 1111: “Envy may merely be jealousy in a social-comparison context.”

⁸⁵ Salovey and Rodin (1986). However, it is clear that even the ‘situational’ approach does not completely elide the difference between envy and jealousy.

else. Second, similar but subtly different, where I alone have something and will still have it (e.g., a status symbol at work, or a reputation for great wisdom), but am upset that someone else may come to have it alongside me—for convenience I will label this ‘jealous of my position.’ Third, ‘sexual jealousy,’ which many scholars (and, commonsense tells us, laypeople) see as distinct from possessive jealousy. And finally ‘envy’ (with all its subscripts), since laypeople frequently use the word jealousy interchangeably with envy to describe those scripts.

As will later become clear, ancient Greek *phthonos* covers all the envy and jealousy scripts so far identified (and more, see chapter 3.1), with the exceptions of emulative envy and sexual jealousy; and Greek sexual jealousy seems necessarily to involve *phthonos*, though not always the same *phthonos* script (see chapter 8). While the envy and jealousy prototypes will therefore be useful as an analytical tool for reading ancient Greek ‘scripts,’ it is more useful still to have a variety of modern English envy and jealousy scripts at our fingertips for reading scenarios in Greek literature.

2.5 Conclusion

Envy is a hostile emotion, usually felt for our peers, when they have some object or attribute we want. It is characterized by a stronger desire for them to be deprived of the object/attribute than for us to acquire it ourselves, and motivates us to act even if depriving them means losing something ourselves as well. Its action tendency is generally destructive, to the desired good and/or its possessor, and it operates through such expression as physical aggression, gossip and slander, compliments designed to arouse the ‘Evil Eye’ or invidious feelings in others, and curses or other types of black magic. Envy has a tendency to disguise itself as moral indignation, or some disinterested desire for justice or equality, but in fact it is never a moral emotion, as the invidious hostility blinds the patient to the target’s true deserts. In English, the term ‘envy’ can also be used for a different (weaker, nonmalicious) emotion, one that arises from similar antecedents, but has no action tendency; a statement that one feels it can act as a compliment.

The following is a summary of the envy and related scripts that can follow from noting that (1) you have something, (2) I do not, and (3) I feel a painful feeling on contemplating our relative positions:

Scripts (a), (b), and (e) are the three scripts that the term ‘envy’ covers in English. Scripts (a) and (b) are considered morally wrong and socially disruptive, and can be transmuted into indignation, anger, or a desire for equality/fairness/justice. On performing either of these scripts (i.e., on depriving the

TABLE 2.1 }

(a) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, but have no desire to obtain it myself	'begrudging envy'
(b) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, and a weaker desire to obtain it myself	'covetous envy'
(c) I feel a strong desire to act to obtain the good, and a weaker desire to deprive you	'covetousness'
(d) I feel a strong desire to act to obtain a similar good, but do not want to deprive you	'emulation'
(e) I have no strong desire to act, thus leaving you in possession and me lacking, with the painful feeling unchanged	'emulative envy'

other person) the satisfaction of our invidious desire can give us pleasure, termed spite or malice in English. The other person being deprived through someone else's action or through fate will give us the feeling of *Schadenfreude*. Just as our initial envy may be transmuted into the moral feelings of indignation, so these invidious pleasurable feelings may be transmuted into a moral feeling that someone who had an unjustified advantage has received their appropriate comeuppance.

Jealousy differs from envy in a number of respects, but has many similarities too. It is principally felt when there is some object/person with which/whom we see ourselves as having an exclusive bond, and can apply both in sexual and nonsexual situations. It frequently includes envy in its blend—along with anger, hostility, and potentially suspicion, fear of loss, or grief. It necessarily takes place in a three-person scenario (unless it is possessive rather than sexual jealousy, when one person can be replaced by an object), whereas envy can occur in a two-person scenario; three-person scenarios tend to contain various mixtures of rivalry, envy, and jealousy. Jealousy carries less of a social stigma than envy, and so has less of a tendency to disguise itself; when it does, righteous anger is the usual mask. In English, the term 'jealousy' can sometimes be used in place of the term 'envy.' The scripts covered by the term jealousy are therefore:

TABLE 2.2 }

(a) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want a rival to possess a similar good	'jealous of my position'
(b) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want to lose it to a rival	'possessive jealousy'
(c) I have an exclusive sexual/romantic attachment to someone, and do not want to lose him/her to a rival	'sexual jealousy'
(d) (Used to mean) envy	'envy'

Now that we are in full possession of the scripts that are covered by the terms envy and jealousy (and related terms), and the psychology and action tendencies associated with each, we are in a position to explore the related terms and scripts in ancient Greek literature and culture, which I do in the next chapter.

The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy

3.1 *Phthonos*

The primary Greek word that relates to both envy and jealousy scripts is *phthonos* (and cognate forms). This term generally covers the lexical ground covered by envy and nonsexual jealousy in English (in particular, the scripts I have labeled ‘begrudging envy,’ ‘covetous envy,’ ‘possessive jealousy,’ and ‘jealous of my position’), but is considerably broader still.

Around a third of *phthon-* words in the Archaic and Classical periods are derived from the verbal form *phthonein*. The substantive *phthonos* accounts for around a quarter of instances. The adjectives/adverbs *phthoneros/-ôs* (envious/jealous/grudging), *epiphthonos/-ôs* (liable to envy/jealousy, regarded with envy/jealousy), and *anepiphthonos/ôs* (the opposite of *epiphthonos/-ôs*) are all reasonably common, and we also occasionally find forms such as *phthonêsis* (the same as *phthonos*) or *hupophthonos/-ein* (secretly jealous, quite jealous). We also frequently see *aphthonia/-os/-ôs*, which collectively account for around a quarter of all *phthon-* words, and generally have the meanings ‘abundant,’ ‘plentiful,’ ‘generous’¹ – though occasionally they can mean ‘lack of *phthonos*.’²

In the Archaic period we find a number of aphorisms, particularly recorded under the name of the Seven Sages:³ “Envy no one” (Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 7.3 Mullach: μηδενὶ φθόνει). “Do not feel envy for mortal goods” (Sept. Sap. *Sent.* p. 216 l. 31 Mullach: μὴ φθόνει θνητά). “Flee the envy of all, and guard against the plots of those who hate you” (Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 1.7 Mullach: φεῦγε μὲν τὸν φθόνον τῶν πολλῶν, φυλάσσου δὲ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τῶν μισούντων). “As the

¹ Which as early as Hes. *Op.* 188; and *Hymn. Hom.* 3.536, 30.8, 30.16 has lost all but an etymological link to *phthonos* proper.

² For example, Pind. *Ol.* 6.7, 11.7, 13.25, *Pyth.* 8.71; Aesch. *Supp.* 322, *Ag.* 471, 939; Pl. *Prt.* 327b5, *Resp.* 500a5. The rare occurrence *aphthonêtos* always implies this.

³ Archaic if genuine, though some may be later misattributions.

red blight is a disease peculiar to food, so envy is a sickness of friendship” (Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 7.4 Mullach: ὥσπερ ἡ ἐρυσίβη ἰδιὸν ἐστι τοῦ σίτου νόσημα, οὕτω φθόνος φιλίας ἐστὶν ἀρρώστημα). “As rust attaches to iron, so *phthonos* does to the possessing soul itself” (Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 7.5 Mullach: ὥσπερ ὁ ἰὸς σίδηρον, οὕτως ὁ φθόνος τὴν ἔχουσαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἐξαναψήχει). Disease, sickness, and rust are strong indications of the social and moral unacceptability of *phthonos*.

Aphorisms continue throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. Pindar says “Nevertheless, envy is better than pity” (*Pyth.* 1.85: ἀλλ’ ὅμως, κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος).⁴ A more common theme in Pindar—indeed the epinician genre as a whole—incorporates *phthonos* into the rhetoric of praise for the victor, as something both to be desired as an indicator of success and shunned as potentially destructive.⁵ The Archaic poet Mimnermos too contrasts feeling envy for a live man of great fame with praising a dead one (fr. 25.1–2 West: δεινοὶ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ πάντες ἐσμέν εὐκλεεὶ ζῶντι φθονῆσαι, καθανόντα δ’ αἰνέσαι).⁶ As well as for someone successful, we feel *phthonos* for rivals, as when Hesiod says “Potter grudges potter and carpenter, carpenter; beggar envies beggar and bard, bard” (*Op.* 25–26: καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ).⁷ Finally, it is felt for a range of people close to one: neighbors,⁸ friends,⁹ relatives,¹⁰ fellow citizens,¹¹ and those “similar and equal” to oneself in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth.¹² These insights are often paralleled in research into English envy.

⁴ Cf. Hdt. 3.52.5–2. Envy is also contrasted to pity frequently in the oratorical *corpus* (e.g., Andoc. 2.6; Lys. 2.67, 20.15, 21.15, 24.2; Dem. 21.196, 28.18, 29.2. Arist. *Rh.* 2.9, 1387a3–5 and 2.10, 1388a27–30 notes that one cannot simultaneously feel both envy and pity for someone.

⁵ While the rhetoric of praise in the epinician genre can contain elements of hyperbole, it must nevertheless be rooted in agreed perceptions; hence victors must indeed have been envied by some. It was part of the encomiast’s task to manage that envy, and help reintegrate victors into their communities – see Most (2003) 134. On *phthonos* in Pindar, see especially Kirkwood (1984); Vallozza (1989); Kurke (1991) 195–224; Bulman (1992); Most (2003).

⁶ Arist. *Rh.* 2.10.1388a9–11 also notes that one does not feel rivalry, and hence envy, for the dead; cf. Dem. 18.315, but *contra* Dem. 20.141.

⁷ Assimilating *phthonein* with *kotein*, on which more in the main text below. On envy for rivals cf. Thuc. 2.45.1.4; Pl. *Spur.* 376d8; Isoc. 12.158; and more generally see discussion of *philotimia* and *philon(e)ikia* in chapter 3.3.

⁸ Pind. *Ol.* 1.47; Pl. *Phlb.* 48a8–50a9 (on which see pp. 102–4), Ar. *Eccl.* 565; Alexis fr. 51.1 Kock.

⁹ Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 7.4 Mullach; Pl. *Phlb.* 48a8–50a9 (see pp. 102–4), Def. 416a13; Aesch. *Ag.* 833; Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.8.1–4. But *contra* Arist. *Rh.* 2.4, 1381b21–23 and Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.22.1–23.7, whose views on (perfect) friends are somewhat different from those of other Greeks – see also p. 73 with n. 58.

¹⁰ Aesch. fr. 610–13 Mette; specifically stepmothers for stepchildren at Eur. *Ion* 1025; a brother who shot his brother at Sept. Sap. *Apophth.* fr. 10.30.3–5 Mullach; Eur. *Phoen.* 479 between the brothers Eteocles and Polynices (though this occurs in three lines the latest OCT (ed. Diggle) deletes as an interpolation); Hdt. 3.30.1.5 between the brothers Cambyes and Smerdis.

¹¹ Hdt. 7.237.2.4.

¹² Arist. *Rh.* 2.9, 1386b19–20; 2.10, 1387b25–28—see chapter 4.3.2; cf. Pl. *Lys.* 215d3.

Common uses of *phthon*- words are to accuse others of *phthonos*, to instruct others not to feel it, or to deny feeling it oneself. Accusations can be person-specific, and are frequently made by orators against their opponents in forensic speeches;¹³ there are similar agonistic accusations in plays,¹⁴ and (in oratory) against other cities.¹⁵ Prohibitions are, of course, another form of accusation—instead of saying merely “you are envious,” the prohibition adds “but you shouldn’t be.”¹⁶ A particular type of prohibition craves the audience’s indulgence before speaking (i.e., “Don’t begrudge me for speaking”);¹⁷ and Isocrates in particular occasionally comments that *phthonos* is what any speaker can expect for offering good advice.¹⁸ Denials of feeling *phthonos* are also not uncommon.¹⁹ These will logically only be made where one might be expected to feel *phthonos*, which suggests that any denial can indicate its potential presence. Certainly it should be treated skeptically: a speaker will be keen to show that he is not acting under this most base of emotions, and so will justify himself by ‘explaining’ the true cause of his actions.

Between them direct accusations, prohibitions, and denials make up around a quarter of all instances of *phthon*- words in the Classical period. Indirect accusations, where an individual other than an opponent, or a part or the whole of a group, is accused of being envious, account for many more.²⁰ This positionality—that *phthonos* is something YOU do (or someone else does), but I do not—is noteworthy, as it suggests that those who ascribe it to others or disclaim it from themselves have an obvious, and frequently suspect, agenda. There are only a handful of instances where the speaker claims *phthonos* for himself, or a group of which he is part, which makes these worthy of individual consideration. Isocrates notes that ‘we’ envy all those who are foremost in intelligence

¹³ Dem. 18 (§§ 13, 121, 279, 303, with similar accusations of *baskania* at §§ 108, 119, 132, 139, 189, 242, 252, 307, 317), Aeschin. 2 (§§ 10, 22, 51, 54, 139), Lys. 24 (§§ 1 twice, 2, 3), and Isae. 2 (§§ 23, 24, 27) are the Attic forensic speeches with the most sustained accusations of *phthonos*, and I discuss them at length in chapter 5.2. Other accusations occur at Isoc. 15.259; Dem. 9.54, 19.343, 25.52, 39.34, 45.35; *Epist.* 3.41.

¹⁴ For example, Eur. *IT* 503; Ar. *Eq.* 880, 1051, *Thesm.* 252, 757, *Eccl.* 1043.

¹⁵ For example, Lys. 2.48, 2.67; Isoc. 4.47, 14.20; Dem 15.15. Isocrates denies Athens feels *phthonos* of rivals at 4.29, 4.104.

¹⁶ Prohibitions occur at, for example, Aesch. *Sept.* 480, *PV* 584; Soph. *OT* 310; Eur. *Med.* 63, *Rhes.* 193, frs. 703.1, 1064.5 Nauck; Eupolis frs. 316, 358 Kock; Ar. *Ach.* 497, *Eq.* 580, *Lys.* 649, *Eccl.* 900; Pl. *Symp.* 223a1, *Euthd.* 297b6, *Prt.* 320c1, *Grg.* 489a4, *Meno* 71d6, *Hp. mi.* 372e7; *Resp.* 338a3, 528a2; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.5.24.5; *Andoc.* 2.6; Lys. 21.15; Isoc. 3.60, 15.302, 19.23; Isae. 6.61; Dem. 59.15.

¹⁷ For example, Dem. 20.74, *Exord.* 13.1; cf. Ar. *Ach.* 497, *Lys.* 649.

¹⁸ For example, Isoc. 9.39, 10.30, 15.8; and he says he specifically is envied at 12.15, 12.21, 12.23, 15.4, 15.13, 15.62, 15.163, *Epist.* 2.22, *Epist.* 9.15. See Saïd (2003) on *phthonos* in Isocrates.

¹⁹ Denials occur at for example Aesch. *Sept.* 236, *PV* 628; Soph. *Ant.* 553; Eur. *Med.* 312, *Hipp.* 20, *Hec.* 238, *HF*333, *Bacch.* 1005; Ar. *Lys.* 1192, *Thesm.* 252; Pl. *Ap.* 33a8, *La.* 200b7, *Prot.* 361e1, *Hp. mai.* 283e8; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.4.16.3; Lys. 20.15; Isoc. 4.29, 4.104, 8.124, 14.47; Dem. 23.188, 35.40, 42.22, *Epist.* 3.32.

²⁰ 52 instances in the oratorical corpus alone: Lys. 3.9, 12.66; Isoc. 5.68, 5.73, 5.131, 6.61, 8.13, 9.6, 12.81, 12.158, 12.172, 12.241, 12.251, 13.19, 15.142 twice, 15.316, *Epist.* 2.21, *Epist.* 4.4 (plus those in n.18); Dem. 4.8, 19.22, 19.228, 20.10, 20.56, 20.139, 20.151, 20.157, 20.164, 23.164, 25.75, 47.70, 57.6, 59.97, *Epist.* 2.4, *Epist.* 3.6, *Epist.* 3.10, *Epist.* 3.20, *Epist.* 3.28; Aeschin. 2.111; Lycurg. 1.69.

or anything else (10.56), and that all men suffer from feeling envy, as well as ignorance, confusion, and disorder, none of these things being irrational or foreign to human nature (15.130). Demosthenes rhetorically asks why Greek cities do not help less fortunate cities but sit on their hands, concluding it is because of envy (10.39), and says that all Greek states contend to be first, and envy and mistrust one another, which they should not (10.52). In all these instances, the speaker is saying *phthonos* is something ‘we’ do, but ‘we’ should not (i.e., he is generalizing about the human condition). This positioning is a rhetorical device that acts to palliate his criticism by removing a suggestion of superiority. In the whole Classical corpus, there are only three surviving instances where someone explicitly says ‘I feel *phthonos*’: one is spoken by the insane Pentheus, who begrudges Dionysus his time (Eur. *Bacch.* 820: ἄγ’ ὡς τάχιστα· τοῦ χρόνου δέ σοι φθονῶ); the second by someone who censures nobles who act like those of baser status (Eur. fr. 334.1–2 Nauck: πολλοῖς παρέστην κάφθόνησα δὴ βροτῶν ὅστις κακοῖσιν ἐσθλὸς ὦν ὁμοῖος ἦ);²¹ the third by the king of Armenia, who is jealous of the man his son goes hunting with, in case the son admires him more (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.39.8: καὶ ἐγὼ ἐκείνῳ, ἔφη, ἐφθόρουν, ὅτι μοι ἐδόκει τοῦτον ποιεῖν αὐτὸν μᾶλλον θαυμάζειν ἢ ἐμέ). The extreme rarity of these instances ‘proves the rule’ of how unusual it is to claim to feel *phthonos*.

In a fascinating passage, Xenophon tells us how *phthonos* arises. He says that men are naturally hostile: for thinking the same things fine and sweet, they fight over them and, differing, are opposed; both strife and anger tend to hostility; a desire to be greedy leads to ill will, while envy leads to hatred (*Mem.* 2.6.21.5–9: τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος). This passage shows that it is not only modern scholars who have noticed that emotions occur in episodes, following situational antecedents with psychological affects.

This brings us to the point where we must take a closer look at *phthonos* scripts. Even from the earliest surviving Greek literature there are several of these. *Phthonos*, or rather the verb *phthonein*, occurs ten times in Homer. This is not a large number, suggesting that the word is not yet all that common.²² However, while the word can each time be best translated into English as ‘refuse’ or ‘(be)grudge’,²³ nevertheless even these few instances cover an array

²¹ Karamanou (2006) 181–87. For *phthonos* as (socially acceptable) moral censure, see main text below.

²² Most (2003) 132 suggests that the paucity of *phthonos* words in Homer (particularly in the *Iliad*) implies it is not a ‘heroic’ emotion, and therefore largely inappropriate to a poem whose subject matter is heroic. However, the word also appears only once in Hesiod’s unheroic *Works and Days*, and does not appear frequently in any author until Pindar. We shall see in chapter 3.3 that there are several other words overlapping with *phthonos* (in its sense of ‘begrudging’) in early Archaic texts that become less common by the end of that period, so it should therefore not surprise us that the term *phthonos* becomes more common in Classical texts as there are fewer alternatives for an author to select.

²³ Most (2003) 129 prefers “to wish to forbid,” though I find this cumbersome.

of scripts. One scenario involves trying to stop someone doing something they wish: examples are Hera (not) begrudging Zeus the destruction of cities she loves (*Il.* 4.55–56), Penelope grudging a bard singing songs he likes (*Od.* 1.346), Odysseus refusing a ghost that wants to speak with him (*Od.* 11.149), and (not) refusing to let his nurse wash his feet (*Od.* 19.348). This we might term ‘begrudging refusal,’ and does not at first glance seem to relate to English envy or jealousy: the pain is not triggered by someone else’s or one’s own object or attribute. However, it is triggered at a pleasure someone will get from something mildly detrimental to you, and in the sense that grudging it takes away his or her pleasure, this is not unrelated to ‘begrudging envy’. A second Homeric scenario involves the speaker having something and not begrudging sharing it or giving it away: examples are Alkinoös not begrudging his daughter mules or anything else (*Od.* 6.68), his ghost in the underworld not refusing Odysseus a pitiable tale (*Od.* 11.381), and Telemachos not begrudging Odysseus some food (*Od.* 17.400). I will refer to this script as ‘begrudging sharing,’ and it is not dissimilar to ‘possessive jealousy’ or ‘jealous of my position’ scripts (despite the fact that ‘jealous’ does not work as an English translation—demonstrating again the superiority of using a script approach to complement a lexical one). Another passage contains *phthonos* twice, when the beggar Iros tries to remove Odysseus from his threshold, and the latter says: “I do not begrudge someone taking even a lot and giving it to you. This threshold will hold us both, and you should not envy what belongs to others” (*Od.* 18.16–18: οὔτε τινὰ φθονέω δόμεναι καὶ πόλλ’ ἀνελόντα. οὐδὸς δ’ ἀμφοτέρους ὅδε χεῖσεται, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν). The first instance implies (lack of) ‘begrudging envy’ or ‘covetous envy,’ depending whether Odysseus believes Iros’s loss would be his own gain; in the second Iros clearly wants both to deprive Odysseus and have his portion for himself, and since the threshold had previously been his alone this suggests both ‘covetous envy’ and ‘jealous of my position.’ I discuss each of these scripts in Greek literature in more detail below, but it is important to see how many of them are present even in the earliest surviving Greek texts. This suggests that *phthonos* did not develop from merely begrudging in Homer, only later to encompass envy and then jealousy; all these meanings are already apparent as far back as our written sources go.

Here it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the English word ‘begrudging.’ This was not covered in chapter 2, because there is no psychological research on it as a stand-alone emotion,²⁴ but it will be clear from the previous paragraph that we have found two new scripts that come under the English word ‘begrudge.’ First, what I termed above ‘begrudging refusal’: a desire to deny or refuse someone pleasure in doing something that happens

²⁴ Schoeck (1966/1969) 117, 220 refers to it as an aspect of envy. Kristjánsson (2006) 95 ff. uses “begrudging spite” as an idiosyncratic translation of *phthonos*.

to be mildly detrimental to oneself. Second, ‘begrudging sharing’: wishing not to share something I have. This might relate to some object that if I share I lose part of, and if so it shades into ‘jealous of my position’ or ‘possessive jealousy’; however, it can also relate to things for which sharing does not entail loss (e.g., an opinion, thoughts, wisdom, etc.). In addition, we have seen that the term begrudging can cover several envy and jealousy scripts, to wit: ‘begrudging envy,’ ‘covetous envy,’ ‘jealous of my position,’ and ‘possessive jealousy.’²⁵

A very large number of Greek *phthon*- words are best translated into English as ‘begrudge,’ and involve these scripts. Let us take first ‘begrudging refusal’ (i.e., seeking to prevent someone doing something they wish). As well as the four Homeric instances, Eteocles does not object to the chorus of Theban women honoring the gods (Aesch. *Sept.* 236); the chorus of old men will not begrudge Clytemnestra refusing to share happy news (Aesch. *Ag.* 263); Antigone will not grudge Ismene saving herself (Soph. *Ant.* 553); Deianeira should not begrudge Lichas for telling her of Heracles’ affair with Iole (Soph. *Trach.* 250); and Hyllos will not refuse Heracles’ request to carry him to his pyre (*Trach.* 1212). This script is not very common, and appears only in epic and the Archaizing genre of tragedy.

‘Begrudging sharing’ is extremely common. This is a script in which the speaker does not want to share something (often, though not always, intangible) whose sharing will be of no detriment to him. The sorts of things it refers to include wisdom (Theog. 770; Xen. *Symp.* 4.43.5–6; and many instances in Plato),²⁶ time (Eur. *Hec.* 238), shelter (Xen. *Symp.* 1.12.2), and physical items such as clothes (Eur. *HF* 333; Ar. *Thesm.* 29, 252; cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.68, 17.400 above). It also refers to begrudging speaking (Aesch. *Sept.* 480, *Supp.* 322; Soph. *Trach.* 250; Eur. *Med.* 63; Hdt. 7.139.1.2; Xen. *Symp.* 3.5.3), and similarly begrudging an oracular pronouncement (Soph. *OT* 310), an introduction (Xen. *Symp.* 3.14.5), or telling Orestes one’s name (Eur. *IT* 503).

Another common script is ‘begrudging envy,’ normally best translated into English with one of these two words. It is a pain felt when someone has something that we do not wish them to have, but generally not something tangible that we could ourselves obtain. The desire then is purely for them to stop being or having whatever makes them superior, not to obtain anything ourselves. Examples include begrudging someone honor (Aesch. *Ag.* 833; Hdt. 8.125.1.4, 9.71.4.1; Xen. *An.* 5.7.10.2–3, *Ages.* 1.4.3; Dem. 20.141), praise (Aesch. *Ag.* 904; Thuc. 2.35.2.5–8; Pl. *Symp.* 223a1), reputation (Mimnermos fr. 25.2 West; Pind. *Ol.* 8.55, *Pyth.* 2.90; Dem. 3.24), wisdom (Eur. *Med.* 297, 303,

²⁵ Cairns (2003b) 239 notes that the Irish term ‘begrudgery’ likewise covers both envy and jealousy.

²⁶ In whose works it accounts for 25 out of 129 *phthon*- words: *Ap.* 33a8; *Th.* 169c2; *Alc.* II 147c2; *Hipparch.* 228c6; *Theag.* 125a5; *La.* 200b7; *Euthydem.* 297b6, d8; *Prot.* 316d2, 316e4, 320c1, c2, 327a7, a8; *Gorg.* 489a4; *Meno* 71d6, 93c8; *Hp. mai.* 283e6, e8; *Hp. mi.* 363c4, 372e7; *Ion* 530d4; *Resp.* 338a3, 476e6, 528a2.

Bacch. 1005; Pl. *Tht.* 125a5; Isoc. 10.56), good fortune (Eur. *Med.* 312; Hdt. 7.236.1.5–8; Isoc. 1.26), gifts from the gods (Xen. *Ap.* 14.3, 32.2), superiority (Pind. *Nem.* 8.21; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.12.7; Lys. 3.9), physical prowess (Hdt. 3.30.1.5), political position (Ar. *Eq.* 1051), power (Hdt. 7.236.1.5–8), success (Pind. *Ol.* 6.74, *Pyth.* 7.15; Hdt. 7.237.2.4; Thuc. 4.108.7.2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.8.3), happiness (Pind. *Pyth.* 11.29), children (Eur. *Ion* 1302), and something good to one's own children (Pl. *Hp. mai.* 283e6–8; *Spur.* 377a8).

In 'covetous envy,' the same urge to deprive them is felt, but also a desire to obtain the goods ourselves. This applies particularly to tangible goods such as wealth (Eur. *Supp.* 241; Ar. *Eq.* 580; Thuc. 6.16.3.2; Philemon fr. 92.2 Kock; Pl. *Leg.* 956a1; Xen. *An.* 1.9.19.6, *Cyr.* 7.5.77.4; Lys. 21.15—but poverty does not attract it at Xen. *Symp.* 3.9.4), making money (Xen. *Vect.* 4.5.2; Isoc. 4.104, 8.124; Isae. 11.38), land (Hdt. 6.137.2.6; Isoc. 14.20), a prize of a beautiful woman (Eur. *IA* 53), other possessions (Eur. *Rhes.* 193), and getting sex (Ar. *Eccl.* 900, 1043). It also applies to intangibles such as political/military position (Hdt. 8.69.1.5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.13.6) and a king's friendship (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.28.3).

Various jealousy scripts can also be seen. Paphlagon is 'jealous of his position' in Demos's household (Ar. *Eq.* 879–80); King Pausanias of Sparta is jealous of his in rushing to take Athens before Lysander does (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29.7). Otanes opines that kings are always jealous of the best of their subjects (Hdt. 3.80.3.5–4.5). Odysseus jealously protects his reputation for being the wisest by destroying Palamedes (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.33.11); Plato talks of someone so jealous of sharing his good fortune that he will not make friends (Pl. *Leg.* 730e5), and the Platonic corpus also contains comments about those jealous of sharing their virtue (Pl. *Spur.* 376d5) or their professional skills (Pl. *Spur.* 376d8). Isocrates claims Athens does not begrudge its good things to other Greeks, being philanthropic (Isoc. 4.29); however, Herodotus tells of the ancient Athenians that they begrudged having made a gift of poor land to the Pelasgians, after the latter improved it markedly (Hdt. 6.137.2.6).

We find 'possessive jealousy' too, as where the king of Armenia is jealous of the man his son goes hunting with, in case the son admires him more (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.39.8). Agathon denies possessive jealousy when he says he will lend Mnesilochos his clothes (Ar. *Thesm.* 249, 252), and the chorus members in *Lysistrata* similarly when they offer all their goods to a girl selected to carry a basket in a procession (Lys. 1192). Maiandrios is jealous of his tyranny of Samos, begrudging handing it over to Syloson undamaged (Hdt. 3.146.1.4). Aristotle combines both jealousy scripts when he notes that people who do great deeds and have good fortune (including being honored for a distinction, or especially having wisdom or happiness) can feel *phthonos* at thinking that others will try to take something away from them (*Rh.* 2.10, 1387b28–31—see p. 70).

Sexual jealousy is a lexically complicated script in Greek, in that it is rarely represented by one emotional label, and accordingly (and because of its wide prevalence) I discuss this separately in chapter 8. However, at this point we can note that *phthonos* as possessive jealousy shades into sexual jealousy when Alkibiades wants to retain Socrates' attentions, and is jealous when he talks to another handsome man (Pl. *Symp.* 213d2—discussed further at pp. 164–65) and the lover more generally will be jealous of his beloved spending time with others (Pl. *Phdr.* 239a7). When wives are held in common, as by the Agathyrsoi, there is no *phthonos* (Hdt. 4.104.1.5).²⁷ However, Hera is jealous of Zeus's sexual couplings (Eur. *HF* 1309), and the chorus of Phthian women contemplate the jealousy of rival wives (Eur. *Andr.* 181—see further pp. 151–53). Aristotle too notes that one can especially feel *phthonos* for love rivals (*Rh.* 2.10, 1388a14–15).

Rivalry more generally is another script integral to *phthonos*, falling somewhere between envy (not having what someone else has) and jealousy (having and fearing to lose).²⁸ This is first found in Hesiod's *Works & Days*, where Hesiod identifies two types of strife (*Eris*). Good Strife—perhaps more similar to our 'strive'—involves emulative rivalry: we see someone else doing well and we are encouraged to emulate them, to work to achieve the same ends, and both we and they end up better off for the rivalry. Hesiod describes this as *zêlos* (*Op.* 23–24: ζῆλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ' ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν). However, Bad Strife is "cruel, tending to war, evil, and contest" (*Op.* 14). This is destructive rivalry, and Hesiod had already depicted this *Eris* as a daughter of Night and the parent of painful Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, tearful Pains, Battles, Murders, Quarrels, and others (*Theog.* 223 ff.). It is in describing Bad Strife that Hesiod says "Potter grudges (*koteei*) potter and carpenter, carpenter; beggar envies (*phthoneei*) beggar and bard, bard" (*Op.* 25–26). It is interesting here that *phthonein* is assimilated to *kotein* ('to bear a grudge against'), and clearly relates to a destructive form of rivalry ('strife'). This is not unique: Polynices uses it of his brotherly struggle with Eteocles (Eur. *Phoen.* 479—though see n. 10), Perikles more generally of rivals (Thuc. 2.45.1.4), Herodotus of generals vying for a prize for valor (Hdt. 8.124.1.2), Kri-toboulos of those in rivalry for primacy in a city (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.20.6), and Cyrus of soldiers vying in competition (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.10.2).²⁹

In the Classical period, *phthonos* can often be understood to involve malicious or spiteful action, so as to provide some sort of pleasure to the person feeling it—not dissimilar to the way that English envy is connected to *Schadenfreude*. This malicious *phthonos* is not necessarily felt toward those particularly

²⁷ Cf. chapter 2 n. 71 *re* modern anthropological scholarship on societies where monogamy is not usual.

²⁸ We can compare the 'situational' approach to rivalrous situations discussed at p. 29.

²⁹ For further cases, see my discussions of *kotein*, *eris*, and *philon(e)ikia* in chapter 3.3.

fortunate, nor is it necessarily due to personal animosity; rather its primary motive usually seems to be pleasure-seeking, with no care that the pleasure involves someone else's hurt. Electra keeps her voice down, lest someone maliciously decide to spread rumors (cf. Soph. *El.* 641, love of gossip-mongering being the assumed pleasure, and see below for the link between gossip and *phthonos*). Some hounds maliciously get in the way of a hunt (Xen. *Cyn.* 3.10.5—possibly a unique example of this emotion being attributed to an animal). Some gossip maliciously about Socrates, leading to general bad-feeling against him, and his subsequent conviction (Pl. *Ap.* 18d2, 28a9). The jealous lover who feels envy when his beloved possesses something rejoices when he loses it (Pl. *Phdr.* 240a5). The comic playwright Alexis links *epichairekakia* (spite) to *phthonos* in how someone views their neighbors (fr. 51.1 Kock). The clearest link of all between *phthonos*, neighbors, and pleasure in their misfortunes, is given by Plato, who argues that one goes to see comic plays in order to enjoy the misfortunes of one's friends (he initially says neighbors, and then changes this to friends), and that this is *phthonos* (Pl. *Phlb.* 48a8–50a9—see pp. 102–4 for a detailed discussion).

The compound *epiphthonos*/-ôs gives us another script. While it generally means 'liable to *phthonos*' or 'inducing *phthonos*' (i.e., invidious), a secondary meaning is odious or hateful. Jason is odious in saying he was driven by Eros (Eur. *Med.* 530); the Nurse says it is not hateful to save Phaidra's life (Eur. *Hipp.* 497); Parthenopaios, a foreigner, did not make himself odious to his adoptive city (Eur. *Supp.* 893). The aristocratic Knights say that insulting the base is not odious (Ar. *Eq.* 1274). A quibbling and clever tongue is hateful (Eur. *IA* 333), as is pushing away one's allies (Eur. *Rhes.* 334). Pausanias says maltreating a corpse is odious (Hdt. 9.79.1.6). The Athenians say they are worthy of their empire because of their past zeal, will, and ability, and did not acquire it by force but by invitation, and so they should not be hated (Thuc. 1.75.1.3). Perikles draws a parallel with *misos* (hatred), saying that those who try to rule others are hated (*miseisthai*), but it is worth being thought hateful (*epiphthonon*) for great ends, and that hatred (*misos*) does not last for long (Thuc. 2.64.5.2–5). Socrates says his conversation and words have become rather heavy and hateful, so that Athens desires to be free of them (Pl. *Ap.* 37d1–2). The Athenians hate (*misousi*) moneylenders, and so Nikoboulos is hateful (*epiphthonos*) (Dem. 37.52).

In two of these examples, *phthonos* is actually juxtaposed to, and hence linked with, *misos* (hatred). These are not isolated occurrences. Cyrus says he will be envied and hated for his treasures (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.19.3–4). When contestants at law choose a mutually acceptable arbiter, the loser envies the winner and hates the judge (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.27.6–7). Artaxerxes' courtiers envy and hate any one of themselves who presumes himself superior (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.12.7). Isocrates' opponent aims to arouse envy against him by talking about his wealth, and anger and hatred by talking about his legal practice (Isoc. 15.31). *Orgê* (anger), *misos*, and *phthonos* are appropriate responses to Meidias

(Dem. 21.196—see further pp. 91–93). We might conclude from this that Greek *phthonos* contains hatred or hostility within its mixture of affects, or at least is often associated with it—and again this is not dissimilar to English envy.

Anepiphthonos/-ôs, the contrary of *epiphthonos*, can imply that one is not arousing these feelings. However, it also frequently takes the meaning of ‘without blame/reproach/censure.’ Heracles tells his son to kill him without blame (Soph. *Trach.* 1031–33). Archidamus says the Spartans should take both Greeks and barbarians into their alliance, and since they are being undermined by the Athenians this is not censurable (Thuc. 1.82.1.7). The tyrant Hipparchos generally exercised power in such a way as not to invite others’ censure (Thuc. 6.54.5.2). The Athenians are not blameworthy for invading Sicily in support of their own security (Thuc. 6.83.2.4). Whatever renowned old men say is irreproachable (Pl. *Soph.* 243a4).

We can see that many instances of (*an*)*epiphthonos* imply censuring, and indeed *phthonos* is sometimes linked to the verb *epitimán* (censure). A challenger to a will manifestly censures (*epitimôn . . . phainetai*) the dead man for adopting and not dying childless, this being hateful (*epiphthonon*) and unjust because the censurer has children (Isae. 2.23). Isocrates will not give way to those who habitually censure and envy all speakers (Isoc 10.30). Those who cannot write well themselves will censure and envy (*baskainein*) Isocrates’ words,³⁰ and begrudge (*phthonêsousin*) him saying them (Isoc. 15.62). Androkles (a defendant) says he has never begrudged or censured anyone paying Isocrates for rhetorical training (Dem. 35.40).

Phthonos is not just linked to censure through the verb *epitimán*, or by the compound (*an*)*epiphthonos*, however. Sometimes *phthonos* itself actually implies censure. This first becomes apparent with a curious phenomenon known as *phthonos theôn*. This involves the striking down by a god or gods unnamed of someone excessively fortunate, and is widely identified by the word *phthonos* throughout the fifth and into the fourth century.³¹ This is in some ways related to a ‘jealous of my position’ script (i.e., that the mortal should not share a high level of good fortune only allowed to a god), which is itself a reflection of a ‘begrudging envy’ script in humans. We might psycholinguistically explain it by postulating that the lucky person is envied by his (only very rarely her) fellow humans, who accordingly want his luck to change but

³⁰ On *baskania*, see chapter 3.3.

³¹ For example at Pind. *Pyth.* 8.71–72, *Pyth.* 10.19–21, *Ol.* 13.24–26, *Isthm.* 7.39–39b; Aesch. *Pers.* 362, *Ag.* 904, 921, 939, 947, *PV* 859; Soph. *El.* 1466, *Phil.* 776; Eur. *Alc.* 1135, *Or.* 974, *IA* 1097; Ar. *Plut.* 87, 92; Hdt. 1.32.1.6, 3.40.2.3, 4.205.1.5, 7.10.1.7, 7.46.4.3–4, 8.109.3.2; Thuc. 7.77.3.4, 7.77.4.5; and *phthonos* is denied to the gods by Pl. *Phdr.* 247a7, *Tim.* 29e2. See Harrison (2003) on *phthonos* as a motivation of the gods in Herodotus. There is a second major script (or group of scripts) also usually labeled *phthonos theôn*, which appears from Homer on. However, the word *phthonos* is never used for this, but rather such terms as *agaasthai*, *megairein*, *kotos*, and *nemesis*, and so I discuss it when I deal with these terms in chapter 3.3. Ranulf (1933) is the seminal work on *phthonos theôn*; see also Walcot (1978) 22–51.

cannot admit that to themselves. When his luck does change dramatically they validate their invidious pleasure by foisting it onto a god—essentially by this mechanism transmuting their own envy and *Schadenfreude* into indignation (or censure) and satisfaction-at-comeuppance.

The fact that *phthonos* could occasionally be seen as justified, when felt in this sense by a god, probably explains a further development toward the end of the fifth century, which is that *phthonos* occasionally starts to mean justified ‘moral censure’ even in mortals. For instance, Diodotos says that if someone gives the best advice, but is suspected of being influenced even slightly by private profit, then Athenians feel censure at his profit and refuse to take his advice (Thuc. 3.43.1.3). Hiero opines that the good tyrant can pass his life without fear, censure, or danger, and in happiness (Xen. *Hier.* 7.10.3). Lysias says that in former times the Athenians resented those misusing their patrimonies (Lys. 27.11). Demosthenes notes that a moderate citizen can offer advice without fear of censure (Dem. 18.321). Isocrates believes it is reasonable for those who behave moderately to resent worthless people who have aimed at more power than is proper for mortals (Isoc. 4.184). Apollodoros says he was wronged by Stephanos, so his taking revenge (i.e., through a political prosecution) is not liable to censure (Dem. 59.15). We find this idea of censure used metaphorically too, where ‘Euripides’ stirs the reins of *phthonos* (Ar. *Ran.* 827: ἀνελίσσομένη φθονερούς κινούσα χαλινούς)—reins being used to guide the way something should go, implying that *phthonos* does too.

There are also a number of passages in the Attic oratorical corpus in which orators openly call on their audience to feel *phthonos*. If jurors knew Kallimachos as well as one speaker does, they would not feel grief at his loss, but resentment at what he has left (Isoc. 18.51). Jurors should not feel resentment for the true heirs to an estate, but rather for those contesting the will if they get what they do not deserve (Isae. 6.61). *Proxenois* deserve *phthonos* if they announce in the theater that they were awarded crowns by other cities (Aeschin. 3.42). Demosthenes’ guardian, in squandering his inheritance, should be resented, while Demosthenes himself should be pitied (Dem. 28.18). Nikoboulos’s opponent says he should be hated as a moneylender, and deserves *phthonos* because he walks quickly, speaks loudly, and carries a stick (suggesting he is getting too big for his boots; see Dem. 37.52). Demosthenes says Meidias might try to arouse resentment in the jury, on the pretext that Demosthenes should not be prosecuting him for a private quarrel (Dem. 21.29), but himself later calls for resentment against Meidias (Dem. 21.196; see p. 93).

We can note two things from these ‘*phthonos*-as-censure’ passages. First, they all relate to the abuse of political position or wealth, and this will be relevant when we consider Aristotle’s discussion of *to nemesan* below and in chapter 4. Second, they are all either written by Athenians or delivered in an Athenian court. This may be simply an accident of survival, however, or reflect

the fact that the vast majority of Classical literature is Athenian. Stobaeus (a fifth-century CE anthologist) quotes a fragment from Plutarch's (first-/second-century CE) treatise *On Slander*, in turn quoting Hippias of Elis (late fifth century BCE):³²

Ἱππίας λέγει δύο εἶναι φθόνους· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν τις τοῖς κακοῖς φθονῇ τιμωμένοις, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον, ὅταν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. καὶ διπλᾶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ φθονεροὶ κακοῦνται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῖς ἰδίοις κακοῖς ἄχθονται ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς. (Stob. 3.38.32)

Hippias says there are two types of resentment: the just type, when someone resents bad men who are honored, and the unjust type, when he envies the good. And the envious suffer double the distress of others; for not only are they aggrieved, as others are, at their own troubles, but also at other peoples' good fortunes.

This passage distinguishes between two *phthonos* scripts, those I have termed 'begrudging envy' and 'censure.' If the attribution of this passage is accurate (and given the great distances in time between the sources it may not be), then this provides evidence that by the end of the fifth century *phthonos* could be considered as a moral emotion—censure—across Greece.

Moving on from specific scripts to the resolution of *phthonos* scenarios, we find frequent mention in Greek texts of situations where *phthonos* leads to destruction. Heracles asks how anyone could worship Hera who, envying the amount of extramarital sex Zeus has, destroys the innocent benefactors of Greece (Eur. *HF* 1309). Envy, in destroying the minds of many people, will kill both "him" and "me" (Eur. fr. 551.1–2 Nauck). Someone wishes for the destruction of all who have something, envying their goods (Agathon fr. 23.1 Snell). Mnesilochos stabs a wineskin out of *phthonos* that someone else has it, making the wine run out (Ar. *Thesm.* 757). Cambyses murders his brother Smerdis from envy of his physical prowess (Hdt. 3.30.1.5). Parties in civil strife destroy those not taking part, out of envy that they might survive (Thuc. 3.82.8.21–23). Odysseus destroys Palamedes, sensing a challenge to his reputation as wisest (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.33.11). The son of Gobryas is murdered by a prince jealous of his hunting prowess (Xen. *Cyr.* 4.6.4.2–6). Socrates is destroyed by the slander and envy of the many, not the prosecution of one man (Pl. *Ap.* 28a9). The lover jealous of his beloved, and therefore wanting him to be less attractive to rival suitors, will be harmful to his beloved's property, the state of his body, and most of all to the development of his soul (Pl. *Phdr.* 241c2). When there is neither wealth nor poverty in a community, *phthonos* will disappear (sc. because there will be no need for its leveling

³² I am indebted to the anonymous OUP referee for bringing this passage to my attention.

tendency—Pl. *Leg.* 679c1; cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 565). One of Isocrates' friends points out to him that some people destroy others out of envy (Isoc. 15.142). That so many instances of *phthonos* lead to destruction again ties in with modern research on envy.

A particularly common way of damaging/destroying someone in Greek literature is to slander them, and *phthonos* is frequently directly linked to *diabolê* (slander: e.g., in Pind. *Ol.* 1.47; Pl. *Ap.* 18d2, 28a9, *Leg.* 731a3, 731a5, *Epist.* 3.316e1; Hdt. 6.61.1.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.8.3; Isoc. 5.73, 12.21, 12.251, 15.30–31, 15.163, 15.258–59; Aeschin. 2.10). Of 200 instances of *diabolê* and cognates in Attic oratory, these occur most frequently in Isoc. 15 (twenty-two instances), Aeschin. 2 (fourteen instances), and Dem. 18 (nine instances), in all three speeches as part of sustained accusations of *phthonos*.³³ We also find this connection in tragedy: for instance Phaidra's spiteful slander against Hippolytos, and Orestes' jealous slandering of Neoptolemos, both having fatal effects (discussed respectively in chapters 7.4 and 8.3). Further evidence connecting *phthonos* with *diabolê* occurs at Arist. *Rh.* 1.1, where Aristotle says it is not right to lead the juror astray using *orgê* or *phthonos* or *eleos* (1354a24–25: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον), having previously talked about *diabolê* and *eleos* and *orgê* and other passions of the soul as not having anything to do with the facts of the case, but being an appeal to the juror (1354a16–18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν). By juxtaposing these lists so closely, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that *diabolê* is how one 'does *phthonos*.' The idea that slandering someone is how one puts one's *phthonos* into effect accords with the findings of anthropologists that "gossip, backbiting, and defamation" are natural action tendencies of envy.³⁴ We saw above that gossip is linked with the malicious pleasure of *phthonos* by both Electra and Socrates (Soph. *El.* 641; Pl. *Ap.* 18d2, 28a9), and Hermione notes that female gossip fostered her destructive feeling—which I argue in chapter 8.3 is *phthonos*—toward Andromache (Eur. *Andr.* 930–53). McClure suggests that gossip is the female equivalent of male slander, operating in the *oikos* (the domain of women) while slander operates in the *polis* (the domain of men);³⁵ these texts provide some evidence of that.

To conclude then, we have seen a large number of *phthonos* scripts, and it will be helpful to summarize them here.

³³ The theme of *phthonos* in Isoc. 15 has been well discussed—see Saïd (2003) 226–29; Fisher (2003) 185–87; Cairns (2003b) 244–45; Walcot (1978) 72–73. I discuss these other two speeches in chapter 5.2.

³⁴ Foster (1972) 172 (see p. 16). *Re* gossip: see also my discussions of Phaidra and Hermione (chapters 7.4 and 8.3).

³⁵ McClure (1999) especially 160, 199–200. This is rather schematized, as men indulged in gossip too (cf. Fisher (2008) 192 n. 22, 207).

TABLE 3.1 }

(a) I have a desire to stop you doing something you wish, which is mildly detrimental to myself [Archaic/Archaizing]	'begrudging refusal'
(b) I have taken an invidious dislike to someone for something they have done [Classical]	'odious/hateful'
(c) I feel pleasure that someone I have an invidious dislike for has come to some harm [Classical]	'spite/malice/ <i>Schadenfreude</i> '
(d) I disapprove of someone for something (re money/political power) they have done that is objectively wrong [Classical]	'censure'
(e) I, a god, wish to strike down someone excessively fortunate [Classical]	' <i>phthonos theôn</i> '
(f) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive someone of a good, but have no desire to obtain it myself	'begrudging envy'
(g) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive someone of a good, and a weaker desire to obtain it myself	'covetous envy'
(h) I want something that someone else wants too, and currently neither of us has	'rivalry'
(i) I have a non-limited good/quality, and I do not wish someone else to have it too	'begrudging sharing'
(j) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want a rival to possess a similar good	'jealous of my position'
(k) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do not want to lose it to a rival	'possessive jealousy'
(l) I have an exclusive sexual/romantic attachment to someone, and do not want to lose him/her to a rival [Classical]	'sexual jealousy'

It can be seen that *phthonos* covers a very wide range of scripts indeed. We can note that it comprehensively covers the ground of English envy and jealousy, with the exception that 'emulative envy' ('I envy you') is excluded from *phthonos*. We shall see in chapter 8 that 'sexual jealousy' is also a partial exception; it is a lexically complicated script in Greek, and is only occasionally identified by the label *phthonos*.

3.2 *Zêlos*

Classical scholarship sometimes states that there are two Greek words relating to envy and jealousy, *phthonos* and *zêlos*, as if the two were equally relevant.³⁶ This is not the case. As we have seen, *phthonos* is by far and away the most important Greek emotion relating to both these English emotions. *Zêlos*, at least by the Classical period, covers a very straightforward range of scripts: (i) admiration, which has no action tendency; (ii) emulation, implying someone is far ahead of you and you are inspired to improve; (iii) emulative rivalry, implying someone

³⁶ For example, Walcot (1978) 2, who says that *zêlos* should be translated as 'jealousy,' and *phthonos* 'envy,' their use being in "much the same way as their English equivalents."

is not too far ahead of you and you are inspired to catch up; (iv) imitation, implying a copying which takes little effort; (v) zeal, implying strong effort but not necessarily a *comparandus*.³⁷ There is one aspect of these scripts which overlaps with English envy, which is *zêlô se* (“I envy you”).³⁸ this fits very comfortably with any of the first four *zêlos* scripts, but in English we include this script — which I labeled ‘emulative envy’ in chapter 2.2.1—within the semantic boundaries of envy. This is purely a matter of linguistics, and we would not necessarily expect a similar semantic coupling even in other modern European languages.

However, although *phthonos* and *zêlos* cover very different scripts, there is sometimes some level of overlap, or at least some gray area between the two, as regards the precise emotion felt—and the motivation—between rivals. It also seems to be the case that in the early Archaic period *zêlos* was more ambiguous, and could cover more invidious, destructive situations.

We saw above that Hesiod envisages two types of Strife, Good and Bad, and that the latter was related to *phthonos*. Of the former, Hesiod says: “She rouses even the good-for-nothing to work: for someone in need of work saw another getting wealthy, and so hastens to plough and nurture, and put his house in order; and neighbor emulates neighbor, hastening to wealth; for this Strife is good for mortals” (*Op.* 20–24: ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει· εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τις τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἥδὲ φυτεῦν οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’ ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν). This is almost paradigmatic of *zêlos* as described above, and shows it as wholly emulative and beneficial. However, Hesiod later says that at the end of the race of men, “*zêlos* will accompany all wretched men, evil-sounding, rejoicing in ills, hateful of face” (*Op.* 195–96: ζῆλος δ’ ἀνθρώποισιν οἰζυροῖσιν ἅπασι δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσῃ στυγερῶπης). *Zêlos* here sounds much more like destructive *phthonos*. A third passage says that the nonworking person will feel *zêlos* for the working one as the latter grows richer (*Op.* 312–13: εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἄεργος πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ κύδος ὀπηδεῖ), and here it is ambiguous as to whether emulative or invidious envy is meant.

Hesiod is not the only author who includes within *zêlos* scripts that would later be the province of *phthonos*; we find considerable support in other early Archaic texts. The verb *zêloun* occurs twice in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Kallidike says that if the disguised Demeter were to bring up her brother, her

³⁷ Arguably (ii)–(iv) differ more in degree than in kind, and would all fit within emulation as discussed in chapter 2.2.1.

³⁸ This is quite common in surviving Greek texts. For example, it accounts for around a third of all instances of *zêlos*-words in Aeschylus (2 out of 9: *Pers.* 712, *PV* 330), Sophocles (4 out of 14: *Aj.* 552, *El.* 1027, fr. 584.1 Radt, fr. 703.1 Radt), Euripides (10 out of 33: *Alc.* 866, 882, *Med.* 60, *IT* 1117, *Or.* 1673, *IA* 16, 17, 19, 677, 1406), and Aristophanes (5 out of 12: *Ach.* 1008, *Eq.* 837, *Vesp.* 1450, *Thesm.* 175, 1118). It is much less common in the oratorical corpus, occurring only four times (4 out of 101: *Isoc.* 12.260, *Epist.* 6.14; *Lys.* 2.72, 2.81)—perhaps unsurprisingly, given the adversarial nature of the genre.

mother would give her [Demeter] such gifts that anyone would feel envy (*zêlôsai*) for her (*Hymn. Hom.* 2.166–68), repeated more or less word for word by the mother (2.221–23). A handful of cognates and compounds are also informative. Kalypso says the gods are cruel and *zêlêmôn*, and resent (*agaasthe*—see below) a goddess sleeping with a mortal if she makes him her husband (*Hom. Od.* 5.118–20). I argue elsewhere that the usual translation of *zêlêmôn* as jealous is incorrect, that it means something more like begrudging or censure: the gods do not have a problem with Kalypso sleeping with a mortal, but they think she goes too far in taking him as a husband.³⁹ This explanation of *zêlêmôn* makes full sense of the verb *agaasthai* in the next line. Two compounds of *zêlos* can also be found: Odysseus expected Alkinoös, as men are, to be *duszêlos* if he saw him with his daughter (*Od.* 7.307); and Hera feels *zêlosunê* at Leto's giving birth to a perfect son (*Hymn. Hom.* 3.100). These words too mean something more painful, and potentially destructive, than emulative rivalry: the first seems similar to possessive jealousy, the second to begrudging envy. It seems then that *zêlos* in the early Archaic could have some of the invidious, destructive connotations more normally associated with *phthonos*, but (as in *Hes. Op.* 23) could also be a gentler, emulative emotion.

As the Archaic period progresses, we find that the destructive aspects of *zêlos* disappear, and the emulative come to prevail.⁴⁰ In Archilochos there remains some ambiguity: he says he does not feel *zêlos* for Gyges' gold (fr. 19.2 West), and tells a conquering queen that many will feel *zêlos* for her glory (fr. 23.21 West). He may be saying he does not want Gyges' gold, or making a stronger *ou phthonô*-type comment; similarly people may merely admire the queen, but could envy her glory. However, a century later Theognis could say without ambiguity that someone with intelligence and sense would be admired (*zêlôtos*; 455), and this is clearly emulative. Neither of the Archilochos fragments is obviously destructive, and both they and the Theognis fragment could be paraphrased by English "I envy you," which is at best a weak form of envy. After the Archaic period we only see the five scripts outlined above.

The links and differences between these *zêlos* scripts and *phthonos* are most notable when the two words are juxtaposed. Clytemnestra incites Agamemnon by saying that the unenvied person is also not admired (*Aesch. Ag.* 939). Oedipus laments that the good things he has (wealth, power, skill surpassing skill) make Kreon feel so much (*polu-*) *zêlos* that it turns to *phthonos* (*Soph. OT* 381–82). Pelops was so admired (*zêlos*) by men that he invited retribution (*phthonos*) from the gods and ill-willed murderousness from his citizens (*Eur. Or.* 973–74). Perikles says that those who wish to do as Athens has will

³⁹ Sanders (2012a) 168–69. In the next section I consider a number of more common terms that overlap with *phthonos* as begrudging or censure.

⁴⁰ It is not clear why, but we can note that by the time invidious *zêlos* dies out, *phthonos* has become a considerably more common word, and it is possible that these two developments are related.

emulate her, but if they do not succeed in gaining overseas possessions they will envy her (Thuc. 2.64.4.2–3). Socrates says that when Athens did well, it gained first admiration, but then envy (Pl. *Menex.* 242a4). The Athenian says when there is neither wealth nor poverty in a city, there will be neither *hubris* (wanton violence with the intention to insult and shame for the aggressor's pleasure) nor injustice, nor will emulation nor envy occur (Pl. *Leg.* 679c1–2). And Demosthenes says that funeral orations should inspire emulation for the courage of the dead, not envy for their honors (Dem. 20.141). While at the border, then, *phthonos* and *zêlos* might shade into each other, they are clearly (at least after the early Archaic) distinguished in both their related affects and their action tendencies. Sometimes one is the evil twin of the other, sometimes one is caused by a superfluity of the other—and juxtaposition highlights these distinctions.

One final compound of *zêlos* that appears from the fourth century is *zêlotupia*. This is regularly mistranslated as (sexual) jealousy, a meaning it does not in fact acquire until after the Classical period.⁴¹ I discuss this in more detail at pp. 164–65 where I show that in the fourth century it means either ‘possessive jealousy’ or ‘covetous envy,’ normally in a sexual scenario and if not then at least as a sexual metaphor. However, it does not mean ‘sexual jealousy’ in the sense of feeling an exclusive affectionate bond with a unique individual, who once returned that exclusive affection. In light of *zêlotupia*’s two scripts, it is not surprising to find that one of the few Classical instances of the word is paired with *phthonos* (Pl. *Symp.* 213d2).

3.3 Other Greek Terms

There are a number of words that overlap with *phthonos* scripts discussed above, and in this section I discuss the most important of these.

Several terms can mean ‘begrudging.’ In Homer *megairein* is as common, and *agaasthai* significantly more common, than *phthonein*. Both verbs have roots implying that someone is getting too big for themselves, and generally have similar meanings. The principal script for *megairein* is (not) begrudging someone doing something they wish to do which is mildly detrimental to yourself; the script referred to under *phthonos* as ‘begrudging refusal.’ For example, Agamemnon does not begrudge the Trojans burning their dead (*Il.* 7.408), nor Odysseus the Phaiacians their choice of contest to test him in (*Od.* 8.206). Athena asks Poseidon not to begrudge what she prays for (*Od.* 3.55), and Hera will not begrudge Zeus destroying one of her favored cities (*Il.* 4.54; this example is coupled with *phthonos* in the next two lines (τάων οὖ τοι

⁴¹ See Jones (2012) chapter 1 on *zêlotupia* as jealousy in the first-century CE novel *Chaïreas and Kallirhoe* (1.2.5, 1.5.4).

ἐγὼ πρόσθ' ἴσταμαι οὐδὲ μεγαίρω. εἴ περ γὰρ φθονέω τε καὶ οὐκ εἰῶ διαπέρσαι, οὐκ ἀνύω φθονέουσ' ἐπεὶ ἡ πολὺν φέρτερός ἐσσι)). While this verb is principally found in Homer, a handful of examples exist in later literature, principally in Archaizing contexts (i.e. literature concerned with the doings of gods and mythical heroes). Thus Prometheus does not begrudge telling Io her fate (Aesch. PV 626), and Apollo in an oracle does not begrudge the Spartans Tegea, though he refuses them the rest of Arcadia (Hdt. 1.66.2.5). A second script involves a god begrudging something to a mortal because of a prior lack of respect by that mortal: thus Apollo begrudges Teucer hitting his target because he did not sacrifice to him first (*Il.* 23.865)—this is more anger than begrudging, and I shall return to this below.

Both these scripts can be seen with *agaasthai*, another Homeric term that dies out after the early Archaic period. 'Begrudging refusal' is common: the bronze-greaved Achaians will not begrudge meeting Hector's challenge (*Il.* 7.41); Apollo grudges Menelaus the armor of a Trojan he has slain (*Il.* 17.71); Antinoös may begrudge Telemachos saying he wants to be king of Ithaca (*Od.* 1.389); and Poseidon begrudges giving safe passage to all men (*Od.* 8.565, 13.173). Close to this script, and also similar to one of *phthonos*'s, is a censuring resentment (e.g., Diomedes says he will only advise the other kings if they do not begrudge a younger man's advice (*Il.* 14.111)). The gods sometimes feel this toward those who have transgressed, and here it is very close to anger: Ithacans should fear the anger of the gods at how the suitors are behaving in their midst (*Od.* 2.67), and the suitors are eventually killed because of the gods' anger (*Od.* 23.64); Kalypso complains the gods are resentful (*Od.* 5.118: *zêlêmones*; 5.119: *agaasthe*; 5.129: *agasthe*) at her keeping a mortal man as a husband. Occasionally the gods can merely resent humans being too happy, such as Odysseus coming home and sitting with his friends (*Od.* 4.181), or having a happy life with Penelope (*Od.* 23.211). Finally, in Hesiod we find a third *phthonos*-like script for *agaasthai*, when Ouranos has 'begrudging envy' (*agômenos*) for his sons' looks, size, and strength (*Theog.* 619).⁴² A related word that appears occasionally in Classical literature is *agê*: the Chorus in *Agamemnon* talk about divine censure (Aesch. Ag. 131: *aga theothen*); and it appears as a human emotion as well, where Kleomenes feels both *phthonos* and *agê* for Demaretos, and so slanders him (Hdt. 6.61.1.3). Here *agê* appears to be almost a synonym for *phthonos*, highlighting the connection between the two emotions.

A third term meaning 'grudge' is *kotos* (or the verb *kotein*), and this is generally in the sense 'to hold a grudge' or be angry. *Kotos* is mostly hierarchical, normally being held by gods against mortals (occasionally other gods), or by

⁴² A fourth *agaasthai* script, which does not overlap with *phthonos*, involves admiration or wonderment (e.g., the Achaians admire Diomedes (*Il.* 7.404, 9.51, 9.711); listeners admire Zeus's or Achilles' words (*Il.* 8.29, 9.431, 9.694); and Telemachos wonders at Odysseus having returned home (*Od.* 16.203)).

kings. Thus Zeus is angry with the Trojans for killing Menelaus (*Il.* 4.11), but the gods do not hold a grudge against Agamemnon (*Il.* 14.143). Athena kills men in her anger (*Il.* 5.747), and holds a grudge against Apollo and Admetos (*Il.* 23.391), as Apollo does against her and Diomedes (*Il.* 23.383). Agamemnon does not care if Achilles holds a grudge (*Il.* 1.181), Menelaus and Alexandros shake their spears at each other in their rage (*Il.* 3.345), and Odysseus is angry at the Cyclops for killing his men (*Od.* 9.501). Melantheo chases Odysseus out of the house because of a grudge against him (*Od.* 19.71), Penelope angrily chastises Melantheo in turn (*Od.* 19.83), and Odysseus and Telemachus kill her brother Malantheus in anger (*Od.* 22.477). A second, related script is the gods' anger at a mortal who transgresses against them (similar to the second *megairein* script). Thus some god may hold a grudge against the Trojans for missing a sacrifice (*Il.* 5.177), Athena kills heroes who give her reason for anger (*Od.* 1.101), Zeus is angry at men who are unjust in assembly (*Il.* 16.386), and Hera and Athena hold a grudge against the Trojans (presumably because Paris awarded the apple to Aphrodite — *Il.* 8.429; 18.367). This term does not die out as early as the previous two; however, it only appears in the Classical period in tragedy, or in Archaizing contexts (i.e., gods and heroes), as when Zeus is repeatedly said to be angry when suppliants are betrayed (Aesch. *Supp.* 347, 385, 427, 478, 616); Apollo holds a grudge at Cassandra (Aesch. *Ag.* 1261); and the Furies' anger at Orestes is frequently referred to with this word (Aesch. *Cho.* 924, 1054, *Eum.* 220, 426, 501, 801, 840, 873, 889).⁴³ A handful of other instances show different scripts which overlap with *phthonos*: Hesiod's "potter grudges potter" juxtaposes *koteei* with *phthoneei* in adjacent lines (*Op.* 25–26), clearly used in the same envious rivalrous sense; Aeschylus similarly exhibits envious rivalry of Euripides (*Ar. Ran.* 844); and Clytemnestra's grudge at Cassandra that will lead the former to kill the latter (Aesch. *Ag.* 1261) clearly has implications of jealousy.

Homer's comment that the Achaians feel anger and resentment (*Il.* 2.223: *koteonto nemessêthen*) at Thersites brings us to another term: **nemesis** (and the verb *nemesan*). This word is very common in Homer, where it has several scripts, the first being a hostile reaction to something that can be as strong as anger or merely a milder resentment. Thus Achilles is resentful by nature (*Il.* 11.649), Patroclus tells Achilles not to resent him for bringing bad news (*Il.* 16.22), Hera speaks to the gods in anger (*Il.* 15.103), Ajax and Idomeneus would be angry with anyone they found quarrelling as they are doing now (*Il.* 23.494), and Mentor is angry with the Ithacans for not stopping the suitors (*Od.* 2.239). In many cases it is not clear exactly what point on the (English) anger-resentment spectrum is meant, but even when it is anger it is not as strong as rage (*cholos*, *mênis*, *thumos* in Greek). *Nemesis* is often felt by the gods against humans who have offended them, and then it is clearly equivalent

⁴³ The two *Cho.* instances are of *enkotos*, a word that appears only in Aeschylus and Herodotus.

to English anger, and similar to the contexts we have seen with *megairein*, *agaasthai*, and *kotein*. Apollo is angry at a Greek advance that kills a number of Trojans (*Il.* 4.507); Hera is angry at Hector's intention to take the Greeks' prizes (*Il.* 8.198); Poseidon is angry at Greeks hanging back from battle (*Il.* 13.119); Achilles should beware the gods' anger at his excessive dishonoring of Hector's corpse (*Il.* 24.53); Ilos will not give Odysseus poison for his arrow tips for fear of the gods' anger (*Od.* 1.263); and Zeus is very angry at evil deeds (*Od.* 14.284).

A second *nemesis* script is related, and that is censure or blame (a meaning that *phthonos* can take in the Classical period). Odysseus should not blame the Achaians for chafing at being stuck by the ships (*Il.* 2.296); it is not blameworthy for the Greeks and Trojans to suffer over such a woman as Helen (*Il.* 3.156); Ares tells the other gods not to blame him for avenging the death of his son (*Il.* 15.115); no one should censure Penelope for getting married before finishing Laertes' funeral shroud, as she will not do so (*Od.* 2.101, 19.146, 24.136); men will censure Telemachus if he sends Penelope back to her father's house (*Od.* 2.136); Menelaus is censorious of over- or under-zealous hosts (*Od.* 15.69); Odysseus does not censure Penelope for weeping for her husband (*Od.* 19.264). Two instances of censure relate more strongly to *phthonos*: Homer couples *nemesis* with *phthonos* in mentioning Penelope's 'begrudging refusal' at the bard singing the songs he wishes (*Od.* 1.346/350); and the suitors' anger at Odysseus's suggestion that he too try his bow (*Od.* 21.285), with Homer's comment that they fear he might succeed where they did not, suggests envy/jealousy.⁴⁴

Aside from Aristotle (and I will discuss his idiosyncratic take in chapter 4), there are about the same number of instances of *nemesis* in all Archaic and Classical texts between Homer and Aristotle as there are in Homer. Hesiod first deifies Nemesis (as he does a number of emotions), referring to her as a daughter of Night (*Theog.* 223), and saying that only bad things are left for men, while Aidos and Nemesis—here meaning something like Sense of Shame, and Sense of Righteousness⁴⁵—go to the gods (*Op.* 200). Theognis comments that the bad man does not understand Justice as he does not fear Nemesis (*Theog.* 280)—meaning something like Retribution, an obvious extension from the gods' anger at transgressing men (a meaning also given to the uncapitalized instances at *Theog.* 660 and 1182). Classical occurrences frequently relate to retribution from, or something being offensive to, the gods.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ A third Homeric *nemesis* script, which does not relate at all to *phthonos*, is shame—perhaps the link being that one (actively) feels shame when one (passively) is censured. This script can be seen at *Il.* 3.410, 14.80, 14.336, 16.544, 17.93/100, 17.254, 19.182; *Od.* 4.158, 4.195, 6.286. Unlike the previous two scripts, this does not survive beyond Homer.

⁴⁵ Wender (1973) 155.

⁴⁶ Aesch. *Sept.* 235; Soph. *El.* 1467, *Phil.* 518, 602, *OC* 1753; Eur. *Ph.* 182, *Or.* 1362, fr. 1040.4 Nauck; Pl. *Cra.* 401a6, *Symp.* 195a6, *Minos* 319a3; Dem. 20.161; Plato *Com.* fr. 173.14 Kock. We might also include here the fragmentary titles of two comic plays: Kratinos fr. 107/20.1 Kock; Men. fr. 169.1 Austin. Aristotle only briefly mentions *to nemesan's* association with the gods (*Rh.* 2.9, 1386b15).

They also sometimes relate to the goddess Nemesis (whose cult, dating from approximately the late Archaic, was based at Rhamnous in Attica), or her festival.⁴⁷ The meanings of anger or censure by mortals still exist, but appear fewer than fifteen times in the Classical period outside of Aristotle—and I discuss these further, and their relationship to *phthonos* as censure, at pp. 76–77.

The reader will have noticed that a number of scripts under all four of the above terms (*meгаairein*, *agaasthai*, *kotein*, *nemesis*) show a god angry at a mortal for an infraction: either a slight against themselves, or a transgression against appropriate behavior toward gods or men. These divine anger scripts are usually included under the label *phthonos theôn*.⁴⁸ However, this is a mislabeling, since none of these scripts are related to the many *phthonos* scripts discussed above (let alone labeled *phthonos*). The only exceptions are two instances of *agaasthai* (*Od.* 4.181, 23.211; cf. *aga* at Aesch. *Ag.* 131) in which the gods resent too much happiness—similar to the many instances of *phthonos* as divine censure that appear in fifth-century literature (see n. 31). Although the four Homeric terms largely die out, divine anger can still be seen in Classical tragedy (e.g., Athena in *Ajax*, Aphrodite in *Hippolytus*, Dionysus in *Bacchae*, Athena in *Trojan Women*).⁴⁹

A number of terms meaning rivalry also overlap with *phthonos*. The first to consider is *eris* (or the verb *erizein*), which we saw appear as Good Strife (friendly rivalry) and Bad Strife (begrudging and envy) in Hesiod's *Works and Days*.⁵⁰ The word is common from Homer right through the Archaic and Classical periods, and generally means either (i) strife in the sense of war, conflict, or angry argument; or (ii) non-contentious rivalry in the sense, for example, that one could not rival Odysseus in speaking (*Il.* 3.223), Aphrodite in beauty (*Il.* 9.289), or the men of the past in archery skill (*Od.* 8.223). While rivalry always contains a latent potential for envy, jealousy, and begrudging, we should not assume that these connotations are present in the majority of instances of the word. However, there are a number of situations—and in particular mythical stories—in which these do appear to be present; while *phthonos* vocabulary is not normally seen in these, the scenarios are similar to those in which we find *phthonos* scripts, or the label *phthonos*, elsewhere. The suitors in the *Odyssey*, who are described as in strife (18.13; 20.267, where

⁴⁷ Aesch. fr. 244.6 Mette; Soph. *El.* 792; Pl. *Leg.* 717d3; Isoc. 10.59; Dem. 41.11; Men. *Sententiae* 520, fr. 321.2 Kock. On Nemesis cults, see Hornum (1993) 6–14. On Rhamnous in particular, see Fortea López (1994) 24–30; Parker (1996) 154 and (2005) 406–7.

⁴⁸ As this is a book about human emotion I do not dwell on *phthonos theôn*, which has been admirably treated elsewhere – see Ranulf (1933); Walcot (1978) 22–51.

⁴⁹ See Walcot (1978) 25; Knox (1989) 66, cf. 72–73; Zeitlin (1985) 61; W. S. Barrett (1964/2001) 156. In these plays divine anger is clear from the insult-revenge scenario, even though emotional labels are frequently absent.

⁵⁰ Eris is deified elsewhere in epic too: Hom. *Il.* 4.440, 5.518, 5.740, 18.535; Hes. *Theog.* 226, *Op.* 804.

eris is paired with *neikos*), are all vying for a highly desired prize that only one of them can win, suggesting covetous envy as a likely accompanying emotion. A similar scenario suggests covetous envy may likewise be part of the three goddesses' *eris* to win the beauty contest and the golden apple (Eur. *Hec.* 644, *Hel.* 708, 1508, *IA* 183 twice, 1307). Eteocles' and Polynices' brotherly rivalry for Theban supremacy is regularly labeled *eris* (Aesch. *Sept.* 726, 935; Soph. *OC* 372, 422; Eur. *Phoen.* 81, 351, 798, 811b, 1277, 1495 twice), as occasionally is that between Atreus and Thyestes (Eur. *Or.* 13, 812, 1001; Pl. *Plt.* 268e10)—and cf. n. 10 on brotherly *phthonos*, to which can be added the zero-sum competition for a major prize. Achilles' and Agamemnon's quarrel over Briseis is also labeled *eris* (Hom. *Il.* 1.6, 1.8, 1.210, 1.277, 1.319, 2.376, 19.58, 19.64), as is Menelaus's with Paris over Helen (Hom. *Il.* 3.100, 7.111; Aesch. *Ag.* 698; Eur. *Hec.* 644, 1160), both scenarios suggesting possessive/sexual jealousy. The word is also used several times of Hermione's quarrel with her 'rival wife' Andromache (Eur. *Andr.* 122, 467, 490, 573, 960—and see further pp. 151–53).

Two rivalrous terms from the Classical period are *philon(e)ikia* (love of victory/strife, eager rivalry, contentiousness) and *philotimia* (love of distinction, ambitious rivalry).⁵¹ Thucydides (3.82.8.3 and 12) pairs both words with greed (*pleonexia*) in describing civil strife between two parties in a city (cf. 8.76.1.1)—not completely dissimilar to brothers' fights to control a city that we saw with *eris*, and we can note that Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.4, 1304a36) states that envy of those in power can be a cause of civil strife. Hermocrates says he will not allow *philonikia* to lead him to harm himself, just so he can also harm his opponents (Thuc. 4.64.1.4) — a hallmark of *phthonos* (and English envy). Cyrus tried to inspire *philonikia* for fine and good things (i.e., emulation) by holding games, but this aroused *eris* and *philonikia* (which, when paired, must mean envy) in his nobles.⁵² Isocrates (10.48) uses *philonikia* to describe the quarrel between the three goddesses, frequently described elsewhere as *eris* (with *phthonos* overtones — see above). Occasionally *philotimia* represents envy/jealousy. For example, Dionysus argues it was Heracles' jealousy (*philotimoumenos*) that Dionysus might copy him in bringing someone back from Hades that led him to exaggerate the dangers of attempting it (Ar. *Ran.* 281). Isocrates, repeating his own *topos* that others envy him,⁵³ once uses *philotimôs* to mean *phthonerôs* (Isoc. 15.244). *Phthonos* is also sometimes explicitly linked with these terms. Socrates, commenting on Hesiod's "potter envies potter" passage, says that things most similar are filled with envy and rivalry (*philonikia*) and hatred, while those not alike feel friendship (Pl. *Lys.* 215d3). Disputants sometimes

⁵¹ On *philotimia* in Classical Athens, see Whitehead (1983).

⁵² Cf. the passages in the main text above in which *phthonos* arises from excessive *zêlos* (Soph. *OT* 380–84; Thuc. 2.64.4.2–5.1; Pl. *Menex.* 242a2–4).

⁵³ See n. 18.

believe the other criticizes his argument out of grudging and contentiousness (*philonikia*), rather than in a desire to find the right solution (Pl. *Grg.* 457d4). The person seeking to satisfy the spirited part of his soul will become envious due to his ambitious rivalry (*philotimia*), violent due to his contentiousness (*philonikia*), and angry due to his bad temper (Pl. *Resp.* 586c9). An ambitious (*philotimos*) soul breeds envy, which is hard to live with, especially for the person feeling it (Pl. *Leg.* 870c5). Cyrus saw that many soldiers, being rivalrous in competition (*philotimos*), felt envy for each other (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.10.1). The Athenians' and Spartans' intense desire to defeat each other (*philonikia*) because of mutual envy allowed Philip to take control of Greece (Isoc. 12.158). Agamemnon's soldiers were filled with anger, rage, envy, and ambitious rivalry (*philotimia*; Isoc. 12.81). Demosthenes says a law is shameful and vicious, and similar to envy and contention (*philonikia*; Dem. 20.157). Athenians allowed legal appeals, knowing that there would be occasional unjust results due to contention (*philonikia*), envy, hatred, and other reasons (Dem. 57.6).

A number of words denote hostility that can sometimes be invidious and imply *phthonos*, in particular *duskolia* (bad-temperedness, discontentedness) and *dusmeneia* (ill-will, hostility). Frequently *phthonos* occurs in the same passage. For example, Isocrates says that many will sing songs and watch tragedies of the great men of the Trojan War period, but are hostile (*duskolos*) to living men who benefit them and cannot bear for them to be honored out of envy (9.6). Elsewhere, he says that some desire to be honored (*philotimos*) like him, and are *duskolos* and *zêlotupos* (15.245) toward those like Isocrates who work hard for what they themselves want to get easily. Some of his critics feel *phthonos* and *dusmeneia* (15.142). Reasonable people might feel *zêlos* for him, but those less able will be *duskolos* (15.149). Of Philip, he says that seizing Greek cities will bring *phthonos* and *dusmeneia* as well as much abuse (5.68). Most envy the Spartans and are *dusmenês* toward them (12.241). And parties in civil strife are *dusmenês* toward each other (6.67), where above we saw civil strife arouse *philonikia*, *philotimia*, *eris*, and *phthonos*. Turning to other authors, Medea says that stupid people feel hostile envy (*phthonos dusmenês*) for those who are intelligent (Eur. *Med.* 297). The Chorus in *Andromache* says women are exceedingly *dusmenês* to rival wives (*Andr.* 182), and later talks of hostile (*dusmenês*) *eris* in the house (467).⁵⁴ The Old Woman tells Mnesilochos he is *phthoneros* and *dusmenês* for puncturing her wineskin and spilling out all the wine (Ar. *Thesm.* 757). Plato says that the lover is *duskolos* and *phthoneros* of his beloved (*Phdr.* 241c2), that *phthonos* and *dusmeneia* are aroused against sophists (*Prt.* 316d3), and that those not wishing to abide by a judgment are *phthoneros* and *duskolos* (*Leg.* 844d1). Philosophers avoid envy and *dusmeneia* by not competing with people (*Resp.* 500c2). And in discussion

⁵⁴ See chapter 8.3 on jealousy in *Andromache*.

of the spirited part of the soul, as we saw above, he says that *philotimia* leads to *phthonos*, *philonikia* leads to violence, and *duskolia* leads to rage (*Resp.* 586c9).

One final overlapping emotion is *baskania*, which refers to putting the Evil Eye on someone; it frequently implies malice and hence is linked to envy.⁵⁵ According to Isocrates, those who cannot write well themselves will censure and envy (*baskainein*) his words, and grudge (*phthonêsousin*) him saying them (15.62; cf. 5.11, which raises similar themes). In *Knights*, Demosthenes calls Paphlagon a *baskanos* (103)—implying he envies the more established slaves. In *Wealth*, Chremylos accuses Poverty of *baskania* (571), after the latter accuses politicians of enriching themselves at others' expense.⁵⁶ Demosthenes says that criticism of the general Diopeithes' pillaging of the Chersonese is malicious (*baskainein*: 8.19, 8.22), perhaps hinting at accusations that Diopeithes was doing so to enrich himself,⁵⁷ rather than feed his army. And he labels Aeschines a *baskanos* no fewer than eight times in *On the Crown* (18.119, 18.132, 18.139, 18.189, 18.242, 18.252, 18.307, 18.317—see chapter 5.2 n. 45), implying that Aeschines envies his political eminence, an eminence Aeschines himself had long since lost.

3.4 Conclusions: A Comparison of *Phthonos* with Modern Theory

We saw from a very detailed survey of *phthonos* scripts that it covers approximately the same ground as both English envy and jealousy, but is considerably broader, covering also such scripts as 'begrudging refusal,' spite, rivalry, and moral censure. The main exception is the 'emulative envy' ("I envy you") script, which is not part of *phthonos*, but is instead covered by *zêlos* in Greek. In the early Archaic period, *zêlos* (including cognates) includes some scripts that later appear under *phthonos*. However, by the end of the Archaic period it is entirely an emulative, rather than invidious, emotion. A number of terms in the Archaic period (*megairein*, *agaasthai*, *kotos*, *nemesis*) cover similar ground to *phthonos*'s 'begrudging refusal' and 'censure' scripts. *Eris* covers similar ground to the 'rivalry' script in both Archaic and Classical periods, and several other terms (principally *philon(e)ikia* and *philotimia*) can also refer to invidious rivalry. *Phthonos* can also be implied by a number of other

⁵⁵ See Walcot (1978) 75, Aquaro (2004) 15–18, Cairns (2011) 45–48 on the relationship between *baskania* and envy. See Rakoczy (1996), Jahn (1855) on the Evil Eye more generally in Greek literature; also Dunbabin and Dickie (1983) on iconographic representations. See Foster (1972) on envy and the Evil Eye in other cultures.

⁵⁶ See chapters 5.4 and 6 on such allegations in (respectively) real-life oratory and Old Comedy.

⁵⁷ An accusation frequently leveled at generals in both real life and comedy (again see chapters 5.4 and 6.3.3).

hostile, malicious terms, such as *duskolia*, *dusmeneia*, and *baskania*. *Phthonos* is a highly destructive emotion, whose principal action tendency is to destroy or damage either the envied object or the rival. We see this quite frequently done through slander or gossip.

No tendency to transmutation has been noted from this lexical survey. However, by definition a lexical survey would be unlikely to show this. We should consider, though, that the prevalence of accusations of *phthonos* in Greek texts—when the accused would almost certainly be denying the accusation—does suggest (a) that *phthonos* might have been transmuted or misrepresented in a similar way to envy, and (b) that there would have been a similar first-person (“I am . . .”) attribution of indignation or desire for justice, where there was a second-person (“You are . . .”) attribution of envy.

In this chapter I have consciously ignored the views of Aristotle. This is for two reasons. First, because his was the most sustained attempt in the ancient world to explore the complex nexus of emotions aroused by others’ good fortune, and as such is best treated separately. Second, because while much of what Aristotle says about rhetoric is accurate, some—not unusually in theoretical systemizations—is not, and his account of *phthonos* and related emotions is similarly incorrect in some details. It was therefore necessary to complete this comprehensive survey of other (Archaic and) Classical texts before considering his account, which I now turn to.

Aristotle on *Phthonos*

In the mid-fourth century, Aristotle developed his own socio-psychological theory of the emotions, the first person ever to analyze them systematically in this way. His theory is laid out in *The Art of Rhetoric*.¹ In this treatise Aristotle argues that an orator, in trying to persuade an audience, has three modes of persuasion available to him: logical argument (*logos*), the speaker's own character (*êthos*), and "putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind" (1.2, 1356a1–4: ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς). He elaborates: "[The orator persuades] through his hearers, when they are led to emotion by his speech" (1.2, 1356a14–15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν). The third mode of persuasion is thus emotion (*pathos*),² which can legitimately be used as part of an orator's armory of rhetorical weapons to persuade his listeners.³

¹ All references in this chapter are to Arist. *Rh.* unless otherwise stated. On the treatment of emotions in *Rh.*, see Grimaldi (1980) and (1988); Furley and Nehamas (1994); Garver (1994); Rorty (1996); Gross and Walzer (2000); Konstan (2003a) and (2006). Konstan (2003c), Ben-Ze'ev (2003), Viano (2003), and Gill (2003) all deal, in whole or in part, with *phthonos* in the *Rh.*, and will be discussed to a greater or lesser extent in this chapter.

² Leighton (1996) 223–30 shows that, while Aristotle generally (e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 2.5, 1105b21–23) includes both emotions and *epithumia* (appetite = hunger, thirst, sex drive) within the *pathê*, in *Rh.* he excludes *epithumia*, as he is only interested there in *pathê* that affect judgment (i.e., emotions)—Viano (2003) 94 agrees; and Aristotle himself says that he has discussed the *pathê* that relate to persuasive argument (2.11, 1388b29–30). Grimaldi (1988) 14–15 reviews the various meanings of *pathos* in the Aristotelian corpus.

³ *Rh.* 1.2 appears to contradict 1.1, in which Aristotle says that "slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror" (1354a16–18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν), and "one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity—it is like warping a carpenter's rule" (1354a24–26: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὁμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσῃε στρεβλόν). Dow (2007) is persuasive on how to resolve this contradiction; see also Fortenbaugh (1979) 147; Grimaldi (1980) 9–11; Wisse (1989) 17–20; J. M. Cooper (1994) 194–96; Barnes (1995) 262. Whatever the tensions, it is clear from the rest of the *Rh.* that Aristotle *did* see a role for *pathos* in persuading an audience, so his comments in 1.1 need not detain us unduly. Arousal of emotions certainly occurred in real-life oratory: see Conley (1982) 307–8, Carey (1996) 399–406 for examples *re* all emotions; Johnstone (1999) 110–25 on pity; Allen (2000) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212–31 on gratitude; Fisher (2003) on *phthonos*; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers (2009) 77–98 on pity; Sanders (2012b) on anger, hatred, and *phthonos*; and chapter 5 of this book.

Aristotle discusses emotions in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, defining them as feelings that affect judgment and are accompanied by pain and pleasure (2.1, 1378a19–21: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή).⁴ In the following chapters (*Rh.* 2.2–11), Aristotle analyzes fifteen named (and several unnamed) emotions, stating the general psychological condition under which each arises, and who might feel each emotion, for whom, and in what circumstances. One of these emotions is *phthonos*.

4.1 The Placement of *Phthonos* in the *Rhetoric*

Aristotle generally treats the emotions in named pairs—such as anger and calmness, or friendship and hate. However, he treats as a group emotions relating to the fortunes of others. In *Rh.* 2.8 he begins with *eleos* (pity), which he describes as pain at someone's undeserved bad fortune (1385b13–14: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ . . . τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν).⁵ In 2.9, Aristotle discusses the relationship between pity and a number of other emotions. He begins by stating that *to nemesan* (indignation) lies most opposed to pity in being pain at someone's undeserved good fortune, both emotions being felt by someone of good character (1386b8–12: ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὁ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις· καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἡθους χρηστοῦ). *Phthonos* (envy) appears to be similarly opposed to pity, and perhaps even the same thing as indignation, but in fact it is a pain excited by the perceived good fortune, not of someone undeserving, but of those like us (1386b16–20: δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταῦτόν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ παραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου).⁶ He goes on to say that these feelings will be accompanied by their opposite emotions (1386b25–26: φανερόν δ' ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις),⁷ which

⁴ Frede (1996) discusses whether each emotion involves both pain and pleasure (pleasure in anticipating an action to alleviate pain), or just one or the other. She argues that Aristotle tends toward the former view in *Rh.* Book 1, and the latter in Book 2.

⁵ Aristotle goes on to say that we must believe we could suffer the same bad fortune in order to pity. Kristjánsson (2006) 89–92 argues that *eleos* is more properly translated compassion, and that pity should be reserved for pain at *deserved* bad fortune; his attempt to show that Aristotle implies this as a separate emotion, when he talks of putative pain (or lack of it) at parricides and murderers being punished (2.9, 1386b28–29), is highly unconvincing.

⁶ See chapter 4.3.2 for a discussion of the phrase τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου. I translate *phthonos* unambiguously as envy here; although Aristotle later cites *phthonos* examples corresponding to a number of different scripts, his definition here makes it clear that (begrudging/covetous) envy is primarily what he has in mind.

⁷ Aristotle clarifies “accompanied,” saying that the type of person who feels indignation is the same type of person who feels its opposite in a contrary situation (not that each individual episode of indignation will be accompanied by its opposite).

will be pleasurable or at least not painful (1386b27: ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται).⁸ Finally, in 2.11, Aristotle discusses *zēlos* (emulation). This is, like envy, a pain at someone else's good fortune (1388a32–33: εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων), though not because they have something, but because we do not; emulation (as Aristotle parenthetically explains) is a good emotion felt by good people, whereas envy is a bad emotion felt by bad people;⁹ emulation makes us act to acquire goods ourselves, envy to deprive someone else of them (1388a34–38: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπικεῖς ἔστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπικεῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον)).¹⁰ The opposite of emulation is *kataphronēsis* (disdain) (1388b22–23: ἐναντίον γὰρ ζῆλῳ καταφρόνησις ἔστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν).¹¹

This collection of emotions, and their relationship to each other, is on first reading rather bewildering. We can understand it better by considering the factors that separate these emotions.¹² Pity is a painful emotion triggered by perceiving someone to have some undeserved misfortune. Indignation is a painful emotion triggered by perceiving someone to have some undeserved good fortune. It is opposed to (*antikeisthai*) pity by the good/bad nature of the fortune. Envy and emulation are two other painful feelings on spotting someone's good fortune, and in a number of short passages Aristotle tells us how to distinguish the three.¹³

- a. We feel indignation because the other person does not deserve the good (2.9, 1386b10–11: τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις), but this is explicitly contrasted with envy, where it is not a concern (2.9, 1386b18–20: λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἔστιν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐ

⁸ Aristotle's desire to schematize can be restrictive. For instance, if something is opposite to painful, it should be pleasurable, but in some situations it might not be (e.g., any good person will be pained by a criminal escaping justice, but one's response to a convicted murderer being hanged will depend partly on one's attitude to the death penalty). Aristotle sidesteps this by saying "pleasurable, or at least not painful."

⁹ Aristotle does not seem to envisage the possibility of a bad person emulating another bad person (e.g., a mugger emulating a bank robber). Perhaps his desire to schematize, to present emotions as either 'good' or 'bad,' has led him to ignore such situations.

¹⁰ This self-improvement versus other-deprivation dichotomy reflects the split between emulation and envy in English (see chapter 2.2.1), and demonstrates that Aristotle does not include the script I have termed emulative envy in *zēlos*—incorrectly, as we saw in chapter 3.

¹¹ *Kataphronēsis* is difficult to translate, as no English word does it full justice. Barnes (1984) uses "contempt," but this does not capture the self-satisfaction, and desire to avoid similar misfortune, implied by Aristotle (see main text below). I believe "disdain" does so better, but these aspects should be borne in mind wherever I use this term.

¹² I loosely base this argument on an analysis by Ben-Ze'ev (2003) 102–4, which I amend significantly. For a detailed critique of Ben-Ze'ev's argument, see Sanders (2008).

¹³ He discusses each emotion in its own right according to who feels it, when, and against whom (2.1, 1378a23–26); but this is not how he distinguishes one emotion from another.

τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου), nor is the other's deservingness mentioned in connection with emulation.

- b. We feel emulation because we want the same good as someone else, though we have no desire to deprive them of theirs (2.11, 1388a34–37: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστιν . . . ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), but in both indignation and envy our concern is with someone else owning the good, not with our own lack (2.9, 1386b20–21: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν; 2.11, 1388a37–38: ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον).
- c. It is bad (*phaulos*) to feel envy,¹⁴ but good (*epieikes*) to feel emulation (2.11, 1388a35–36: διὸ καὶ ἐπικέες ἔστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπικεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων), and indignation is also associated with good (*chrēstos*) character (2.9, 1386b11–12: καὶ ἄμφορ τὰ πάθη [*to eleein* and *to nemesan*] ἥθους χρηστοῦ; 2.9, 1386b33–87a1: καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα [*to nemesan* and others (see below)], τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπικαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός).¹⁵

We can see, therefore, that Aristotle distinguishes these emotions by reference to three factors: whether the subject's character is good or bad; whether the object's deservingness is important; and whether the good itself is specifically desired. Each factor shows one emotion differing markedly from the other two.¹⁶

Aristotle also discusses emotions that are opposed to (*antikeisthai*) pity in a second way: pleasurable emotions on perceiving someone to have some bad fortune. What has changed this time is not the (good/bad) nature of the fortune, but whether we feel pleasure rather than pain on spotting it. However, such pleasures will differ from indignation, envy, and emulation in both factors: pleasure/pain, and nature of the fortune, and so will be what Aristotle terms “contrary” emotions (*enantia pathê*) to these.¹⁷

¹⁴ Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1107a9–11, where envy is one of only a handful of bad emotions, alongside spite (*epichairekakia*—see main text below) and shamelessness.

¹⁵ Grimaldi (1988) 56 cites Vahlen, J. (1914) *Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik* (Berlin) 266–8, on “the similarity, if not the identity, in the *Poetics* of ἐπικέης, χρηστός [*sic*], σπουδαῖος to denote the morally good.” Bonitz (1870) 813b37–38 notes that *epieikês* and *chrēstos* are opposite to *phaulos*.

¹⁶ We should note that Aristotle is not overly interested in mixed motives here, but presumably one can feel both indignation and emulation simultaneously, if one both wants what someone else has and thinks the other person shouldn't have it. However, since one cannot be both morally good and morally bad, for Aristotle feeling envy precludes feeling either of the other two emotions as well (though see n. 9).

¹⁷ Arist. *Cat.* 10 says there are four ways in which things can be opposed (*antikeisthai*): as relatives (*ta pros ti*—e.g., double and half); as contraries (*ta enantia*—e.g., good and bad; black and white); as privation and state (*sterêsis kai hexis*—e.g., blindness and sight); as affirmation and negation (*kataphasis kai apophasis*—e.g., he is sitting, and he is not sitting). At *Metaph.* 5.10, 1018a25 he says that contraries are the most strongly opposed.

Aristotle names one pleasurable emotion at someone else's bad fortune, disdain, which is a true contrary to emulation (2.11, 1388b22–23: ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ καταφρόνησις ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν): if we emulate those who have certain goods, we disdain those who do not have them; if we wish to copy someone in achieving something positive, we do not wish to copy them in achieving something negative (2.11, 1388b23–26: ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλωσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι καταφρονητικούς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν).¹⁸ Just as in emulation we feel a pain at not having the same goods as someone else, so in disdain we feel pleasure that we are not suffering such evils ourselves.¹⁹

The true contraries of indignation and envy are more complicated, not least because it is not immediately clear whether there are two feelings or one. Having compared indignation with envy, Aristotle goes on to talk about the opposite emotions accompanying the ones to which he has just referred:

φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μισαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχῃσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἄπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὐτῷ. καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ᾧ γὰρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν. (2.9, 1386b25–87a3)

And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones. For whoever is pained by someone suffering bad fortune undeservedly, will be pleased or at least not pained by those who suffer bad fortune oppositely [i.e., deservedly]. For instance, no good person [*chrēstos*] would be pained at parricides or murderers being punished; one must rejoice at such things, just as at people having good fortune deservedly. For both things are just, and make the good person [*epieikēs*] rejoice, since he must expect the same thing to happen to him as to someone like him. And all these emotions are felt by the same character [*ēthos*]; and contrary feelings are felt by the contrary character: for the same person is spiteful [*epichairekakos*] and envious [*phthoneros*], as someone pained by something's existence or genesis will necessarily rejoice at its absence or destruction.

¹⁸ Aristotle goes on to say that we can also feel *kataphronēsis* for those with good fortune, when it does not come with the right sort of goods (2.11, 1388b26–28: διὸ πολλὰκις καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη) — equivalent, in the modern world, to our contemptuous feeling for those we know will squander their lottery winnings, or for the *nouveaux riches* who buy vulgar status symbols.

¹⁹ Grimaldi (1988) 179 calls this “the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction.”

Where Aristotle says “And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones,” he initially appears to be talking about indignation and envy, the emotions he has been contrasting in the immediately preceding paragraph. In fact, in the following sentence, Aristotle talks about being pained by undeserved *misfortune*, which is not indignation but pity. “These ones” therefore refers to all the emotions so far discussed, pity (in 2.8) as well as indignation and envy (at the start of 2.9), and Aristotle deals with these three emotions one after another.²⁰

First, Aristotle says that the man pained by undeserved misfortune (i.e., the person who feels pity), already identified with the person who feels indignation, will also feel joy at deserved *misfortune* (1386b26–28 and 30) and deserved *good fortune* (1386b30–31).²¹ We therefore have four emotions: pity; indignation; pleasure at deserved misfortune (a sort of satisfaction at someone ‘getting their comeuppance’);²² and pleasure at deserved good fortune (‘happy for’).²³ All these emotions will be felt by people of the same (i.e., good) character (the *epieikês* or *chrêstos*)—people who can diagnose others’ deserts correctly and feel appropriate pain or joy.

Aristotle goes on to state that contrary feelings will be felt by the contrary (i.e., bad) character (the *phaulos*): that the *phthoneros* (the envious man) is also *epichairekakos* (spiteful).²⁴ Aristotle says later that this joy is roused similarly to envy (2.10, 1388a24–27: δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὥς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθίσονται), which must mean by the misfortunes of equals, rather than solely the deserving. This is appropriate, as someone morally bad will be unable to diagnose deserts correctly. He will feel envy and spite whether the other person deserves it or not.

We therefore find that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle posits three pleasurable emotions—pleasure at deserved misfortune, spite, and disdain—respectively contraries to indignation, envy, and emulation. Pity also has a contrary: ‘happy for.’ Each pair of emotions is aroused in the same individual in directly contrary circumstances. What distinguishes envy (*phthonos*) and spite (*epichairekakia*) from the others, then, is that they are felt by bad people in certain

²⁰ Grimaldi (1988) 155.

²¹ Cf. 2.9, 1387b16–18; see J. M. Cooper (1996) 242, who draws attention to this unnamed good contrary to indignation.

²² Kristjánsson (2006) 96–99 refers to this emotion as “satisfied indignation” (see chapter 2 n. 43), on the basis that it can only be felt after some injustice causing righteous indignation has been remedied; cf. the main text at that point, where I argue that satisfied indignation is in fact not pleasurable, merely satisfying (though I am using “pleasurable” in the everyday, rather than Aristotelian, sense).

²³ Adopting Ben-Ze’ev’s (2003) 118 term.

²⁴ Kristjánsson (2006) 94–100 insists on translating this emotion as “*Schadenfreude*,” by explicit contrast with “spite” or “malice.” I prefer “spite” because in *Schadenfreude* the patient does not usually take part in the action causing the pleasurable feelings, whereas if *epichairekakia* is to be a true opposite to *phthonos* (and, indeed, be included in the *Rh.*) it must be able to motivate action.

situations, in some of which good people will feel indignation, pleasure at deserved misfortune, emulation, or disdain (i.e., the ‘good’ emotions are only felt when appropriate, but the ‘bad’ emotions will be felt indiscriminately).

4.2 The placement of *Phthonos* in the *Ethics*

In saying in the *Rhetoric* that ‘good’ (*epieikês* or *chrêstos*) people feel indignation and emulation, while ‘bad’ (*phaulos*) people feel envy, Aristotle appears to suggest there are only two types of character (*êthos*): good and bad. The former would then feel a number of emotions related to others’ fortunes (pity and ‘happy for,’ indignation and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune,’ emulation and disdain); the latter only envy and spite, depending whether the fortune is bad or good. Good people would not be able to feel envy and spite at all; bad people would feel nothing else. If this interpretation were valid, an orator’s audience could consist only of people whose characters were either good or bad. People whose characters were somewhere in the middle, or who were sometimes good and sometimes bad, would not be envisaged. Anticipating slightly the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle argues that to be morally virtuous requires an ethical education, this would imply that those without such moral virtue (i.e., virtually everyone) were bad.

Is Aristotle really arguing that the vast majority of his orator’s audience will be morally bad individuals, capable of feeling only envy and spite? It seems inherently unlikely. If nothing else, why would Aristotle then devote 186 lines to good people (sixty-six lines to pity, eighty-two to indignation, and thirty-eight to emulation) and only forty-four to bad (envy)? Indeed, if the vast majority of the audience could only feel envy and spite, why even bother teaching an orator about pity and indignation? Such an interpretation would place Aristotle at odds with oratorical practice, where appeals to an audience’s pity and indignation (or righteous anger) are commonplace.²⁵

However, we should realize that the Greek words *phaulos*, *epieikês*, and *chrêstos* are much more flexible, and have a broader application, both socially and morally, than the English words ‘bad’ and ‘good,’ and—at least in the moral sense—moving from one to the other is possible.²⁶ It is likely Aristotle

²⁵ Carey (1996) 402–5; Dover (1974) 195–96; Allen (2003) 80–86; see also n. 3. Webb (1997) 120–25 shows that Roman oratory likewise attempted to arouse *miser cordia* (pity) and *indignatio* (indignation). Note that appeals ostensibly to indignation might in fact (partly/wholly) be to transmuted envy (see chapters 5.4 and 6).

²⁶ For Archaic literature the two senses are identical, ‘the good’ being synonymous with aristocracy and ‘the base’ with commoners. In democratic Athens the two become separated, so Euripides can talk about an honest poor man (*Ion* 834: *φ αὐ λος χρησ τός*). Aristotle is of course aware that these two senses are not identical. It should, however, be noted that to become morally good (through studying ethics) social ‘goodness’ (i.e., wealth and leisure) would be a prerequisite (see Hutchinson (1995) 203; Nussbaum (1994) 55–56).

intends they should be understood this way (even in the *Rhetoric*), i.e., as ‘characteristic of moral goodness’ and ‘characteristic of moral badness’, which is suggestive of a continuum.²⁷ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is much clearer that Aristotle does not believe most people to be either uniformly bad or uniformly good, but somewhere in the middle.²⁸ Most people’s characters have been partially educated, partially encouraged toward moral goodness (I discuss how in chapter 4.3.3). Much of the time people will not feel emotions that are either *phaulon* or *epieikes*. There will be instances where they feel one or the other, but with no reliability, and it is the orator’s job to try to tug them toward one end of the spectrum or the other, to try to awake an indignant or envious emotional response by appealing to their moral education or lack of it.

Aristotle (unlike the Stoics) does not believe that emotions are inimical to reason, and should therefore be eliminated as far as possible.²⁹ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues that people have dispositions to feel either a proper or an improper measure of emotion, and defines virtue in relation to feeling a proper amount of emotion, which he calls the mean (*mesotês*; *Eth. Nic.* 2.5, 1105b28–29; 2.7, 1108a30–b10).³⁰ However, one might not feel the proper amount of emotion: one might feel an excess or a deficiency (both are opposed to the mean and to each other), and both these extremes are vices (*Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1107a2–3; 2.8, 1108b11–12). For instance: a disposition to feel a lack of fear when proper (the mean) is bravery, a virtue; a disposition to feel a lack of fear even when one should feel fear (the excessive vice) is rashness; a disposition to feel fear too often (the defective vice) is cowardice (*Eth. Nic.* 3.7, 1115b11–16a9). Aristotle argues that the location of the mean will vary, not just from situation to situation, but from person to person—for instance, if eating two measures of food would be too little for all and ten too much, the right amount (the mean) will not necessarily be six measures: this would be too little for a champion athlete, but too much for a beginner; thus six measures might be an excess, a deficiency, or a mean (*Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1106a25–b3). Means are therefore relative to us, not to the object.

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, *nemesis* is a mean, and is said to cover four emotions: pain at undeserved good or bad fortune (indignation and pity), and pleasure at deserved good or bad fortune (‘happy for’ and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’).³¹ The excessive vice is *phthonos*, which is described as a

²⁷ As these formulations are clumsy in English, I shall continue using the designations ‘bad’ and ‘good,’ but the broader interpretation of these words should be borne in mind.

²⁸ Broadie (1991) 102.

²⁹ Nussbaum (1994) 9–10, 41–42; Gill (2003) 29; Knuuttila (2004) 6.

³⁰ As Nussbaum (1996) 316–17 points out, this means that even a correct action is not virtuous unless it has been motivated by morally appropriate emotions.

³¹ While this definition is idiosyncratic (to say the least), these are the same four emotions that Aristotle treats together at *Rh.* 2.9, 1386b25–33 where he argues they are all the product of the same good character, so there is at least some logic here. One of the four emotions (pain at undeserved good fortune) is the same as *nemesian* in the *Rh.* (and *nemesis* in the *Eth. Nic.*). See Coker (1992) 70.

pain felt at deserved good fortune (envy);³² the defective vice is unnamed, but is felt by the *epichairekakos*, and is a joy at undeserved misfortune (spite) (*Eth. Eud.* 3.7, 1233b19–25: ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ’ ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνόνυμον, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *nemesis* is again the mean, and thus a morally acceptable emotion, providing it is felt only when the object’s good fortune is undeserved (righteous indignation, what Aristotle calls *to nemesan* in the *Rhetoric*; the other three good emotions are dropped from the definition).³³ *Phthonos* is once again identified with an excess of indignation, feeling pain even when good fortune is deserved (envy); and this time the defective vice, being so far short of pain that one feels joy (presumably at undeserved bad fortune), is named as *epichairekakia* (spite) (*Eth. Nic.* 2.7, 1108b1–5: νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικός λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν).³⁴ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle seems to have replaced four emotions identified in the *Rhetoric* with only three, having lost ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune,’ the second virtuous emotion. But let us look closer. In suggesting that, in moving from indignation to envy, one moves from virtue to vice and ceases to concern oneself with desert, Aristotle is paralleling what he said in the *Rhetoric*, albeit in the language of his newly developed doctrine of the mean.

However, in both the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle is a little unclear, confusing the disposition to feel indignation on appropriate occasions, too often, or too little, with the emotions themselves. This suggests that the language of the doctrine of the mean is somewhat unhelpful when considering the emotions themselves, or at least these particular emotions, and Aristotle had to ‘shoehorn’ them in to some extent. For example, envy (*phthonos*)

³² Kristjánsson (2006) 95 disputes *phthonos*’s equation with envy, as he believes that would imply that we want the good ourselves, which is not the same as feeling indignation (*nemesis*) on too many occasions; he thus prefers “begrudging spite” as a translation. However, as we saw in chapter 2.1.2, envy also primarily involves a desire to deprive someone else, and only secondarily to acquire ourselves.

³³ Kristjánsson (2006) 102 believes that the definition given for *nemesis* in *Eth. Eud.* is correct, and that is why he chooses a different term from that used in the *Rh.* (*to nemesan*), which refers only to “indignation”; however his subsequent attempt to explain the difference in *nemesis*’s meanings in *Eth. Eud.* and *Eth. Nic.* is not persuasive.

³⁴ *Phthonos* and *epichairekakia* are not equivalent to other emotions treated in the ethical works, as they are not means that can be morally good in some measure, but are always vicious (*Eth. Nic.* 2.6, 1107a9–12); M. J. Mills (1985) 10; Broadie (1991) 102; Garver (2000) 66.

is not an excess of indignation (*nemesis*), as Aristotle seems to state. However, it is not unreasonable to argue—whether or not this is what Aristotle actually meant—that envy (*phthonos*) is an excessive disposition to feel pain at someone’s good fortune (i.e., when they deserve their good fortune as well as when they do not), while indignation (*nemesis*) is the virtuous disposition to feel that pain only when it is merited (i.e., when the person does not deserve their good fortune).³⁵ This does fit in with what he says in the *Rhetoric*.

It is by no means so obvious why spite should be the defective vice: one would expect the defect to correspond to an inability to be indignant even when appropriate.³⁶ Mills argues that the triad envy-indignation-spite is the only one in the *Ethics* in which there are two excesses, and he has suggested that really there ought to have been two triads, corresponding respectively to pain at good fortune and joy at bad fortune.³⁷ While he, like Aristotle, confuses a disposition to feel emotion with the emotion itself, he does point the way toward a resolution of Aristotle’s confusions. I follow Mills in positing two triads, relating to dispositions to feel (respectively) pain at someone else’s good, and pleasure at someone else’s bad, fortune. The virtuous mean in each triad corresponds to an ability to diagnose desert correctly and feel pain or pleasure in the right circumstances, while the excess in each triad corresponds to the lack of this ability coupled with feeling pain or pleasure indiscriminately. Since the deficient extremes correspond merely to a lack of this ability and a dearth of feeling, this allows us to use the language of the doctrine of the mean to relate four emotions from the *Rhetoric* (envy, indignation, spite, and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’) as in Table 4.1. Despite the limitations of the diagrammatic approach, these are not continuums of emotion, but rather continuums of dispositions to feel pain or pleasure on regarding others’ good or bad fortunes.

TABLE 4.1 }

Envy (felt by those disposed to feel pain at deserved and undeserved good fortune)	-----	Indignation (felt by those disposed to feel pain at undeserved good fortune)	-----	Apathy (felt by those disposed not to feel pain even at undeserved good fortune)
Spite (felt by those disposed to feel pleasure at undeserved and deserved bad fortune)	-----	‘Pleasure at deserved misfortune’ (felt by those disposed to feel pleasure at deserved bad fortune)	-----	Apathy (felt by those disposed not to feel pleasure even at deserved bad fortune)

³⁵ See Coker (1992) 65–68.

³⁶ Grimaldi (1988) 152; cf. Coker (1992) 70.

³⁷ M. J. Mills (1985) 10, who shows the triads as envious-indignant-unnamed and spiteful-unnamed-unnamed. See also Urmson (1980) 166–67; Konstan (2006) 115. Coker (1992) 71–80 postulates four triads of emotions, each based on *nemesis* in a different one of its four *Eth. Eud.* guises.

In the *Rhetoric*, envy and spite were depicted as emotions that affect bad people in certain situations. In the *Ethics*, however, they have become paradigms of badness: dispositions by the ethically uneducated to feel painful or pleasurable feelings excessively at someone's good or bad fortune, which an ethically aware person would feel more judiciously, and which, in that judiciousness, would be perfectly acceptable.

4.3 *Phthonos* and Those Who Feel It

4.3.1 WHAT GOODS EXCITE *PHTHONOS*?

Returning to the detailed account of the emotion in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines *phthonos* as a pain we feel when we see those like ourselves having good fortune concerning their goods, not because we want their goods, but purely because *they* have them (2.10, 1387b22–25: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγία φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνους).³⁸ This definition clearly describes begrudging envy (rather than possessive jealousy, spite, or any of the other scripts that we saw *phthonos* could cover in chapter 3.1),³⁹ and is reflected in modern psychologists' insistence that envy contains a stronger desire that the other person be deprived of what they have, than that the patient obtain the good themselves (see chapter 2.1).

Aristotle says in 2.10 that he has already spoken about the good things in life that incite *phthonos*, which he summarizes as the things that inspire those who love fame and honors, whether deeds or possessions, and who desire reputation and all the things that are due to good fortune; *phthonos* is felt for nearly all these things, especially if we desire them ourselves and think we should have them, or if their possession makes us surpass or fall short of others by a little (1387b35–88a5: ἐφ' οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστιν, σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἔστι, καὶ μάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὧν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν).

The earlier passages Aristotle refers to are *Rh.* 1.5–1.6, and these elaborate considerably on the good things. In *Rh.* 1.5 he discusses the external and bodily goods that bring happiness (*eudaimonia*): good birth, plenty of friends, good

³⁸ This definition is largely Platonic in origin: the various elements can be extracted from Pl. *Phlb.* 49c8–50a10 (see chapter 6.2; cf. Pl. *Def.* 416a13: Φθόνος λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοῖς ἢ οὖσαν ἢ γεγενημένους), though he talks about friends and neighbors rather than equals. Xenophon records a similar Socratic formulation, that envy is a pain, and consists in being grieved at the good fortune of friends (*Mem* 3.9.8.1–4: Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὅ τι εἴη, λύπην μὲν τινα ἐξηύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τὴν ἐπ' ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην, ἀλλὰ μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους).

³⁹ Though, as we shall see (chapter 4.3.2), the situations Aristotle gives as examples of *phthonos* make it clear he recognizes—even if only unconsciously—that it involves other scripts too.

friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, bodily excellences (such as health, beauty, strength, height, athletic prowess), fame, honor, good luck, and virtue (1.5, 1360b18–22). He says all these things are the product of good fortune, and as such incite *phthonos* (1.5, 1362a5–6: ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος). In *Rh.* 1.6 he goes on to talk about the good (*to agathon*) and the useful (*to sumpheron*). These are goods that should be chosen for their own sake, and not for the sake of something else (1.6, 1362a21–23). They include pleasure, happiness, goods of the soul (such as justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, and magnificence), health, wealth, friends and friendship, honor and reputation, good memory, the ability to learn, and more (1.6, 1362b5–28).

Two points should be noted here. First, there is some considerable overlap between goods desirable for their own sake (1.6), and those that bring happiness (1.5). Second, there is no mention in 1.6 that the goods listed are the product of good fortune (on the contrary, as the *Nicomachean Ethics* shows, many of them are virtues that must be developed by hard work over many years), nor that they incite *phthonos*. If Aristotle is saying that goods appearing in both lists—wealth, friends, honor—incite *phthonos* when judged to be the product of good fortune rather than hard work, that is tantamount to saying they incite *phthonos* when they are seen as undeserved. Aristotle is throwing into doubt his own distinction between *nemesis* (to do with desert) and *phthonos* (to do with the bad character of the observer) discussed above. We shall see in chapter 4.4.2 that in other Classical authors the line between these emotions is not where Aristotle states, and here, perhaps inadvertently, he undermines his own distinction.

4.3.2 WHO FEELS *PHTHONOS*, AND WHEN?

Aristotle elaborates on “those like ourselves” (2.10, 1387b24: τοὺς ὁμοίους), elsewhere referred to as equals (2.9, 1386b19–20: τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου).⁴⁰ People will feel *phthonos* toward those who are or appear similar to them in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth (2.10, 1387b25–28: φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσὶ τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα), and near them in time, place, age, and reputation (2.10, 1388a6–7: τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγύς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν). Additionally people feel *phthonos* for kin (1388a7–8: ὅθεν εἴρηται “τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται”) and anyone else they are in rivalry with (1388a9: καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται). Most especially is this the case for those who compete for the same things both in sport and in love,⁴¹ and in general any case where they desire the same things, presumably including those who are

⁴⁰ These comments are reflected in the observations of some modern scholars that envy is felt more for our peers (i.e., for people who have a little, rather than a lot, more than us—see chapter 2 nn. 8, 59).

⁴¹ This is particularly notable for my discussion of Greek sexual jealousy in chapter 8.

rivals in business: he quotes from Hesiod that “potter envies potter” (1388a14–17: ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν, διόπερ εἴρηται “καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ”).⁴²

People will feel *phthonos* (begrudging/covetous envy) when they fall a little short of having all the good things in life (2.10, 1387b28: καὶ οἷς μικρὸν ἐλλείπει τοῦ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν). People who do great deeds and have good fortune can also feel *phthonos* (possessive jealousy), as they think others will try to take something away from them (1387b28–30: διὸ οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχούντες φθονεροὶ εἰσιν). πάντας γὰρ οἶονται τὰ αὐτῶν φέρειν)—this includes those honored for a distinction, especially wisdom or happiness (‘jealous of my position’; 1387b30–31: καὶ οἱ τιμώμενοι ἐπὶ τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ). Ambitious people feel *phthonos* more than unambitious ones, as do those with a reputation for wisdom, who are ambitious as regards wisdom (1387b31–33: καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ); presumably they want to match those above them (envy), and stay ahead of those striving to catch up (‘jealous of my position’). In general, anyone wishing to be distinguished in anything can be envious/jealous in regard to that thing (1387b33–34: καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περὶ τι φθονεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο). The small-minded (*mikropsuchoi*) also feel *phthonos*, because everything seems great to them (1387b34–35: καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι), suggestive of spitefulness as well as envy. People feel *phthonos* (begrudging/covetous envy) for those whose possessions or successes they feel to be a reproach to them (1388a18: καὶ ὧν ἡ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθούντων ὕνειδος αὐτοῖς). Those who have lost something, or who never had it, feel *phthonos* for those that do have it, as do those who have not got it yet (1388a21–22: καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσῆκεν ἢ ἐκέκτηντο ποτε); this scenario also applies to youth, so older men envy younger, and money, so those who have spent much envy those who have spent little (1388a22–23: διὸ πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις καὶ οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν). These last examples cover several scripts: begrudging envy for unrecapturable youth; covetous envy for regainable money; possessive jealousy if what was lost was of personal significance.⁴³

⁴² Hes. *Op.* 25–26: καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονεῖ καὶ αἰοδὸς αἰοιδῷ—see chapter 3.1. I avoid the word envy in this paragraph, because Aristotle is effectively talking about rivalrous situations that will potentially involve both (begrudging/covetous) envy and (possessive) jealousy—compare the ‘social comparison’ approach of scholars such as Salovey, discussed in chapter 2.4.3. In the remainder of this section I indicate the scripts involved in each example Aristotle gives.

⁴³ There are some instructive contrasts with *zēlos*. While the small-minded (*mikropsuchoi*) and the old are prone to *phthonos* (2.10, 1387b34; 2.10, 1388a22), the high-minded (*megalsuchoi*) and the young will feel *zēlos* (2.11, 1388a38–b3). Both *phthonos* (2.10, 1387b26) and *zēlos* (2.11, 1388b3–7) can be felt for those who fall short of having all the goods mentioned in chapter 4.3.1; however, the one must be felt by bad (i.e., ethically uneducated) people, and the other by good (i.e., ethically educated).

Three other envious situations occur in the *Politics*. The rich are prone to treat the poor as masters do their slaves: they feel disdain (*kataphronêsis*) for them, and the poor will feel *phthonos* for the rich in return. Anyone great in a city is apt to cause civil strife, either through being envied or because they get ‘too big for their boots.’ And kings unrestricted by law are more despotic, so more envied, than those more restricted.⁴⁴ These situations do not on the face of it appear in the *Rhetoric*. However that treatise presupposes the context of a *polis*, and it is in that context that envy is described as being felt for equals (*τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου*). As Schofield points out, for Aristotle “a *polis* is an association of free and equal persons.”⁴⁵ In a *polis*, a man’s *homoioi* and *isoî* are his fellow citizens. Sparta indeed called its citizens *Homoioi*,⁴⁶ while in Athens and elsewhere *isonomia* (equality before the law) implied democracy.⁴⁷ The idea was the same in both cases: that all (male) citizens were equals, both politically and legally.⁴⁸ In the examples of envy given in the *Politics*, someone or some class is seeking to surpass his or their natural *homoioi* and *isoî*; the rest of his or their society responds with *phthonos*. *Phthonos* as moral censure plays no part in Aristotle’s thinking in the *Rhetoric* or *Ethics*; in these brief remarks in the *Politics* he is (once again) showing some reflection of a more popular morality (see chapter 4.4.2).

4.3.3 WHO DOES NOT FEEL *PHTHONOS*?

From this analysis we can conclude, even from the *Rhetoric*, that some situations exclude *phthonos*. People who are *not* similar or equal in any of the ways listed will not feel *phthonos* for each other. Even being dissimilar in only one respect can preclude *phthonos* (e.g., people who lived ten thousand years ago, or at opposite ends of the Mediterranean, or those far above or below us) (2.10, 1388a9–12: *πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεώτας οὐδεῖς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ’ Ἡρακλείαις στήλαις. οὐδ’ ὦν πολὺ οἴονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ’ ὦν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν*). But for a more detailed

⁴⁴ Pol. 4.11, 1295b19–23: ὥσθ’ οἱ μὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται, ἀλλ’ ἄρχεσθαι δουλικὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δ’ ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχήν, ἄρχειν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν. γίνεται οὖν δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονούντων τῶν δὲ καταφρονούντων. Pol. 5.4, 1304a34–38: οἱ δυνάμειος αἰτίοι γενόμενοι, καὶ ἰδιώται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ πλῆθος ὅποιοι οὖν, στάσιν κινεοῦσιν: ἡ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἡ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων. Pol. 5.11, 1313a20–23: ὅσφ’ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὦσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πάσαν τὴν ἀρχήν: αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἡττον γίνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἴσοι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἡττον.

⁴⁵ Schofield (1998) 45.

⁴⁶ Cartledge (1987) 15.

⁴⁷ Hdt. 3.80.26 (Athens), 3.142.15 (Samos), 5.37.2 (Miletus); Thuc. 3.82.8 (in general).

⁴⁸ See Ober (1989) 7, 70, 197, 240, etc. for the ideology of political and legal equality underpinning the Athenian democracy. Dem. 51.11 (*τὸ πάντας ἔχειν ἴσον καὶ δημοκρατεῖσθαι*) shows the link between equality and democracy being invoked in fourth-century oratory.

analysis of those who will not feel it, we must turn to Aristotle's discussion of virtue and ethical education in the *Ethics*.

We have already seen that morally good people cannot feel *phthonos*, but how does one become morally good? Aristotle believes the human soul is divided into an alogical half and a logical half (*Eth. Nic.* 1.13, 1102a26–32). The alogical half is the passionate, desiderative part of the soul, the seat of the emotions and bodily desires. However, since emotions are cognitive (i.e., they involve judgment), it is possible for them to be controlled by the logical half of the soul; the alogical half of the soul is (potentially) subordinate to the logical half.⁴⁹ Ethics involves training both halves of the soul. As Broadie notes: “human virtue, when achieved, is precisely an excellence of reason and feeling in partnership.”⁵⁰ Training of the logical half of the soul aims at practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) (*Eth. Nic.* 6.5, 1140b25–29). Training of the alogical half aims at moral excellence (*aretê êthikê*), which is brought about by the character (*êthos*) developing the habit (*ethos*) of acting in a certain way.⁵¹ One cannot truly have either moral excellence or practical wisdom without both being present (*Eth. Nic.* 6.13, 1144b30–32).

In order to eliminate *phthonos* and *epichairekakia*, one must habituate the alogical half of the soul, which feels emotions based on its training, only to feel pain or pleasure at someone's perceived good or bad fortune when it ought to be felt. This habituation is brought about by many influences, such as parental upbringing, the influence of society's norms and laws, and the scrutiny of peers. By habituation one builds up a kind of mental database of situations in which one has been taught that indignation is a proper response, or that someone has ‘got their comeuppance’ deservedly. When someone so trained perceives an instance of good or bad fortune, his cognitive response will recognize this fortune and say “deserved” or “not deserved” correctly, causing him to feel (or not) pain or pleasure accordingly. This ability is moral excellence, and is the training that a well-brought-up child might have, or an adult man before starting on a course of ethics.⁵²

Fortenbaugh believes that perfecting the alogical side of the soul is sufficient: since deliberation is not necessary for every individual virtuous response (sometimes there is insufficient time), practical wisdom is not necessary for a virtuous response to be guaranteed.⁵³ Sorabji rightly disagrees (see *Eth. Nic.* 6.13, 1144b30–32), but in my view goes too far in the other direction, by arguing that deliberation (by the logical half of the soul) is

⁴⁹ Fortenbaugh (2002) 23–27.

⁵⁰ Broadie (1991) 64.

⁵¹ Broadie (1991) 72; see also Kosman (1980). Aristotle notes the close similarity in the Greek words (*Eth. Nic.* 2.1, 1103a14–b25); LSJ confirms *êthos* is a lengthened form of *ethos*.

⁵² A. D. Smith (1996) 60 notes that, for Aristotle, education in habit must come before education in reason.

⁵³ Fortenbaugh (2002) 73–75.

required to find the mean in every instance of ethical emotional response, even if only subconsciously.⁵⁴ Fortenbaugh focuses too much on habituation, Sorabji too much on deliberation;⁵⁵ the truth is somewhere between the two. Aristotle makes plain that excellence is built through habituation: “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (*Eth. Nic.* 2.1, 1103b1–2: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ ἀνδρείᾳ ἀνδρεῖοι).⁵⁶ A good upbringing should habituate one to be properly indignant but avoid envy, to feel proper pleasure at others’ misfortunes but avoid spite. However, while someone with a good upbringing might hit on the morally correct response repeatedly, there is no guarantee that they will hit on it invariably, since for that to happen they must have true knowledge of where the mean lies, and that requires practical wisdom. An education in moral excellence is therefore necessary, but not sufficient, for practical wisdom: sometimes the acquired database will be insufficient to the situation, and then a trained ability to deliberate and reach correct conclusions will be required.

The man who has perfected both his moral excellence and his practical wisdom is *megalopsuchos*—the virtue is *megalopsuchia*⁵⁷—and such a man will not feel *phthonos*. Gill has argued that the *megalopsuchos* should not feel any of the rivalrous emotions covered by *Rh.* 2.9–11, since he has a goodly measure of all appropriate goods, and knows that what he does not have is unimportant. A second context Gill identifies as precluding rivalry for the many goods of life is (perfect) friendship: a friend will only compete with his friend in virtue, and will willingly lose all his possessions, and his life itself if need be, for his friend’s sake.⁵⁸

4.4 A critique of Aristotle on *Phthonos*

4.4.1 A COMPARISON WITH MODERN THEORY

It will be fairly obvious that there is considerable overlap between Aristotle’s views on *phthonos* and modern social scientific research on envy and related

⁵⁴ Sorabji (1980) 210–11.

⁵⁵ A. D. Smith (1996) argues that Fortenbaugh takes a Humean approach, pitting himself against the ‘intellectualists,’ each side stressing either character or intellect has priority in “determining good moral ends” (58).

⁵⁶ Translation from Barnes (1984).

⁵⁷ *Megalopsuchos* is normally translated “magnanimous,” and *megalopsuchia* “magnanimity.” In n. 43 I translated it “high-minded,” to highlight the comparison with “small-minded” (*mikropsuchos*).

⁵⁸ Gill (2003) 36–37—though note that Aristotle states that we wish someone to be our friend if we want them to emulate but not envy us (2.4, 1381b21–23: ὅφ’ ὧν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τοῦτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι). Xenophon also argues that *phthonos* is incompatible with friendship (*Mem.* 2.6.22.1–23.7).

emotions.⁵⁹ Aristotle says *phthonos* is an emotion aimed at those similar to us; majority opinion in modern research says envy is most strongly felt for peers, and the more like someone you are, the stronger your envy is likely to be. Aristotle says *phthonos* is primarily felt when we see someone in possession of some good; modern research talks of ‘social comparison’, when someone has some object or attribute that we desire. Aristotle says the primary drive of *phthonos* is that the other person should not have (i.e., should be deprived of) the good; modern research notes envy’s tendency to want to deprive the other of the envied object/attribute, even if that involves some loss for ourselves. *Phthonos* is connected with its spiteful opposite, in the same way that envy is required for *Schadenfreude* or spite/malice to be felt. It is clear that Aristotle’s understanding of ancient Greek *phthonos* bears much similarity to modern research on envy and related emotions. This is important because it means that we can—and I will—often use Aristotle’s work on *phthonos* to explain, in Greek terms, our reading of envy scenarios in Greek literature.

Aristotle initially describes *phthonos* through the ‘prototypical’, or most usual, script for the emotion: one which corresponds to our begrudging envy. From his later analysis it emerges that there are some significant differences between his more detailed thought about *phthonos* and begrudging envy. The most obvious is that *phthonos* covers more than just envy scripts: he quotes scenarios that are examples of begrudging envy, covetous envy, spite, possessive jealousy (though he does not highlight the requirement for an exclusive bond), and ‘jealous of my position’ scripts. Salovey’s ‘situational’ approach, which considers three-person rivalry situations that may involve any combination of envy and jealousy, is therefore at least as helpful for understanding how *phthonos* works (if not for the detail of individual scripts) as the rigid envy/jealousy separation of Parrott and Smith (see chapter 2.4.3). Second, emulative envy (as in the first-person statement “I envy you”) is philologically not a part of *phthonos* (also noted in chapter 3, where we saw *zēlos* words used for this type of first-person claim—though Aristotle has no reason to mention this). A third difference is that Aristotle does not draw out the action tendencies of *phthonos*, except in his comment that we want our neighbor not to have the good; modern research on envy is much more interested both in its destructive tendency, and ‘defenses’ against it (i.e., ‘coping’ mechanisms—see chapter 2.1.3). Fourth, Aristotle does not mention any tendency of *phthonos* to disguise itself (whether advertently or inadvertently), which modern research does note for envy; however he does say that *to nemesan* (similar to our righteous indignation) is easily confused with *phthonos*, and that the former is

⁵⁹ I compare the findings of this chapter with chapter 2. At least one reason for this overlap is that, because the cognitive approach has become so ubiquitous since the 1970s, modern scholars are much more receptive to absorbing points from Aristotle’s analysis than pre-cognitivists. Also important is the sociological dimension of at least some of the modern studies, a perspective shared with Aristotle.

‘good’ while the latter is ‘bad.’⁶⁰ Fifth, there is the moral aspect: Aristotle makes clear, both in the *Rhetoric* and the *Ethics*, that *phthonos* is a morally base emotion felt by morally base people; despite expression of envy being socially taboo, modern social scientists do not focus on the characters of those who feel it. Ben-Ze’ev comes closest by saying that any moral pretensions envy has are false, that envy can never be moral no matter how it cloaks itself; Kristjánsson will not even go that far, questioning whether envy should even be classed as a “negative emotion” at all.⁶¹

These differences are instructive for a variety of reasons. First, they confirm (as we saw in chapter 3) that the parameters of ancient Greek *phthonos* and modern envy (even minus emulative envy, plus nonsexual jealousy) are not coterminous. This means at a basic level that translation of *phthonos* will always require thought. More subtly it requires us to be wary of assumptions we might make on seeing *phthonos* terminology—one of the reasons I gave in chapter 1 for adopting a script approach to complement the lexical. Second, we should not assume that *phthonos* will dissipate in the way envy does when the person feeling *phthonos* has gained whatever it was they wanted, or the target of their emotion has been brought low; the bivalent (envy/jealousy) nature of *phthonos* combines with the competitiveness of Greek life to ensure that *phthonos* may remain even after its apparent aim (to bring low) has been achieved.⁶² Finally, the fact that *phthonos* is not so much reified as a bad emotion (as is ‘envy’), but rather reflects back on the character of the person feeling it, requires us to consider the motivations of an accusation of *phthonos*: unlike an accusation of ‘envy,’ it will not merely be questioning the moral motivation of someone at a particular moment, but will be branding them as someone morally base at all times and in all aspects. It is a statement about their character, and it will be very important to bear this in mind when we consider accusations and denials in the oratorical corpus that an opponent is/was motivated by *phthonos*.

4.4.2 A COMPARISON WITH ARISTOTLE’S CONTEMPORARIES

Many of the observations Aristotle makes about *phthonos* can be found in other Classical authors. Most obviously, Aristotle’s focus in his ‘prototypical’ definition on (primarily begrudging) envy is matched by the plurality of instances of *phthonos* words in the Archaic and Classical corpora that refer to begrudging or covetous envy situations. He also gives example scenarios that relate to many of the other scripts *phthonos* covers. In other Classical authors, gnomic utterances confirm that *phthonos* is felt for kin (see chapter 3 n. 10), or

⁶⁰ I come back to this idiosyncratic separation in chapter 4.4.2.

⁶¹ See chapter 2 nn. 46, 55; Kristjánsson (2006) 23–35 on “negative emotions.”

⁶² On the competitiveness of the entire ancient Greek emotional lexicon, see Konstan (2006)

the rich (Eur. *Supp.* 241; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.77.4, 8.2.19.3–4). It is also felt by the base for the worthy (Soph. fr. 188.1 Radt; Eur. frs. 295.2, 334.1 Nauck; Ar. *Eq.* 1274; Lys. 3.9), and against the wise (Agathon fr. 25.1 Snell; Anaxandrides fr. 54.5 Kock; Isoc. 2.46). *Phthonos* is felt against tyrants who abuse their powers, but not against benevolent ones or monarchs (Xen. *Lac.* 15.8.4; Pl. *Resp.* 579c1, 580a3; Isoc. 3.18). It is felt for political rivals (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29.7, 3.2.13.6, 3.4.8.3, *Mem.* 2.6.20.6). And it is regularly contrasted with pity (mostly *eleos*, occasionally *oiktos* or *to sunachthesthai*: see chapter 3 n. 4). Nearly all of these points are made too by Aristotle—and given these authors were not setting out to confirm his analysis, nor he theirs, this represents an impressive collection of corresponding points.

However, in one respect Aristotle's analysis differs significantly from contemporary usage, and this is in his distinction between the immoral emotion *phthonos* and the moral emotion *to nemesan* (or *nemesis*). This differentiation does not reflect the usage of these words in contemporary Greek authors. Aristotle tells us that *to nemesan* is felt at someone having some good fortune that they do not deserve, whereas *phthonos* is felt at good fortune whether it is deserved or not (*Rh.* 2.9, 1386b8–12 and b16–20). However, it is not acquisition or possession of *any* good thing (e.g., virtues of character such as justice or courage) that Aristotle says arouses *to nemesan*, but rather of undeserved wealth, power, and other such things that worthy people should get.⁶³ We saw above (chapter 4.3.1) that these are some of the important things Aristotle says arouse *phthonos* even when deserved, and this will become even clearer when we look at Attic oratory in chapter 5, as wealth, political power, and honors are the primary things that we see arousing *phthonos* in that corpus.

There are other indications that Aristotle is out of step with contemporary usage.⁶⁴ First, the phrase *to nemesan* appears nowhere outside Aristotle (*nemesis* is the usual substantive, though the verb *nemesaō* is seen, if not in articular infinitive form). Second, while *nemesis* and its cognates occur sixty-eight times in Homer and thirty-nine times in Aristotle, there are only about sixty-five surviving occurrences (including fragmentary texts) in other authors in the entire Archaic and Classical periods. As we saw in chapter 3.3, Classical occurrences sometimes relate to the goddess Nemesis or her festival, and sometimes to retribution from (or something being offensive to) the gods. Only rarely is it used in the Classical period to mean something close to anger

⁶³ *Rh.* 2.9.1387a8–13: εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ νemesᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐπὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νemesᾶν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νemesήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσὶν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.

⁶⁴ See Konstan (2003c) 76–77, whose analysis covers similar ground to my own in this paragraph, though with different emphasis. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in Aristotle avoiding contemporary language, or refining it for his purpose by reactivating archaic meanings, but he gives no indication that this is what he has done.

or censure by mortals, and it will be instructive to consider what arouses it. A lover behaving in an unloving way is censurable (Aesch. fr. 228c.3 Mette). Philoktetes should not be blamed for speaking intemperately when he is out of his mind with pain (Soph. *Phil.* 1193). It is not disgraceful for a man brought up in freedom and leisure to balk at menial tasks (Pl. *Tht.* 175e2). Someone should not be censured for becoming a slave to his lover in a search for wisdom (Pl. *Euthd.* 282b4). It is not blameworthy when legislating to consider that a citizen might be stubborn (Pl. *Leg.* 853d1). [Old men] will be exceedingly indignant at those who commit *hubris* against orphans and foundlings (Pl. *Leg.* 927c1). A lie is offensive by its nature to both shame and justice (Pl. *Leg.* 943e2). It is not blameworthy for a buyer to act in his own interests before oaths have been exchanged and a contract exists (Aeschin. 3.66). It is right to be indignant at what Phormio has done in putting someone forward as a witness who has a shameless way of life and is ungrateful (Dem. 45.71).

It can quickly be seen that none of these instances has anything to do with “undeserved wealth, power, and other such things that worthy people should get” (*Rh.* 2.9, 1387a8–13, quoted above).⁶⁵ In fact, the emotion that is aroused by such things outside Aristotle is *phthonos*.⁶⁶ The (probably contemporary)⁶⁷ pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander* demonstrates this by saying that the orator can arouse *phthonos* against: (a) those who have had, are having, or will have undeserved good fortune; (b) those who have never been, are not being, or will never be deprived of some good; or (c) those who have never suffered, are not suffering, and will never suffer some misfortune.⁶⁸ The emotion aroused in (a) is indignation, and that is made clear by the reference to desert (*anaxiōs*), making this emotion identical to that Aristotle calls *nemesis*; the emotions in (b) and (c) respectively correspond to Aristotle’s description of *phthonos*, and the emotion he calls *epichairekakia*. The author of this treatise demonstrates that a contemporary Greek could include all three emotions in the one word *phthonos*, and (as importantly) recognize *phthonos* as covering these three distinct scripts.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ A brief survey of *aganaktein* (‘to be indignant’) in the oratorical corpus shows that that word likewise is not used for undeserved wealth, power and the like, but rather describes a similar emotion to *orgē*.

⁶⁶ See chapter 3.1, where we saw *phthonos* includes, by the late fifth and fourth centuries, censure in regard to abuse of political position or wealth. See also Fisher (2003) 199–202, Cairns (2003b) 246–48, Konstan (2003c) 79–82 on *phthonos* as a morally appropriate emotion.

⁶⁷ The *Rh. Al.* is dated by Chiron (2002) as written after 344/343 BCE (xl – from an event mentioned in the treatise), and probably in the second half of the fourth century (cvii). This would make its composition contemporary with, or at most a few decades later than, Arist. *Rh.*

⁶⁸ *Rh. Al.* 34, 1440a35–39: φθόνον δὲ παρασκευάσομεν συλλήβδην πρὸς τούτους, οὓς ἀποφαίνομεν ἀναξίως εὖ πεπραχότας ἢ πρᾶττοντας ἢ πράξοντας, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ μηδέποτε ἐστερημένους ἢ <μὴ> στερομένους ἢ μὴ στερησομένους, ἢ κακοῦ μηδέποτε τετυχηκότας ἢ μὴ τυγχάνοντας ἢ μὴ τευξομένους.

⁶⁹ Cairns (2003b) 247.

⁷⁰ Kaster (2003) and (2005) 84–103 argues that Latin *invidia* also covers a morally bad emotion (i.e., envy) and a morally good one (i.e., indignation), and suggests differentiating these in accordance with Aristotle’s analysis as *phthonos-invidia* and *nemesis-invidia*. From what we see here, this method of labeling the two scripts will not work.

In chapter 3.1 I showed that a number of instances of *phthonos* in Classical literature are linked to (or even imply) resentment, censure, or reproach. This passage of pseudo-Aristotle confirms that a Greek theorist contemporary to Aristotle had noticed this too. For the sake of clarity, I therefore introduce and henceforward use where required two script names: ‘good *phthonos*’ for the positive aspect of *phthonos* (i.e., moral censure), and ‘bad *phthonos*’ for the negative (all the other scripts: begrudging/covetous envy, begrudging sharing, possessive jealousy, malice, etc.). As with the script names I introduced in chapters 2 and 3, it should constantly be borne in mind that these are adopted for analytical purposes only: for the Greeks, there was only *phthonos*. There is always, therefore—at least from the fifth century—some ambiguity inherent in the meaning of *phthonos* (i.e., whether it refers to the morally positive or negative type), though the sense would normally have been abundantly clear to the Greeks due to the social acceptability or otherwise of what was described.⁷¹ It is, however, this ambiguity that is played on frequently in the arousal of *phthonos* in audiences, both in the law court and in the comic theatre, the subjects of the next two chapters.

⁷¹ For clarity, I mean it would have been obvious to the Greeks when they were referring to *phthonos* as something socially divisive and destructive (e.g., in gnomic statements, or in accusations/prohibitions/denials), or when they were talking about it as something censuring or corrective (i.e., in stating that it was appropriate to feel *phthonos*). As a comparison, consider our word ‘light’: we have no difficulty in correctly interpreting it as meaning not-heavy or not-dark, depending on context.

Phthonos in the Attic Oratorical Corpus

5.1 *Phthonos* and the Aristotelian Orator

As we saw in the previous chapter (chapter 4.3.3), those with sufficient virtue never to feel envy (*megalopsuchoi* and perfect friends) will clearly be few and far between, and accordingly the vast majority of an orator's listeners will be susceptible to envy. However, the morally bad nature of *phthonos* raises problems—in terms of its explicit stimulation by orators—which do not apply to other emotions, at least in the Aristotelian perspective that does not recognize 'good *phthonos*.'

Emotion arousal is useful as an oratorical tool because emotions, by application of pain or pleasure through rational argument, affect judgment. In an insightful article, Leighton has discussed exactly how judgment can be affected by the emotions:¹ this will either be as the consequence of emotion, or as a constituent of emotion. Judgment alteration as a *consequence* of emotion can come about in four ways. The first is by allowing our reason to be overruled (e.g., if we pity someone, we let them off for a crime we know they have committed). Secondly, if we can be brought to favor or disfavor someone, we will be better or worse disposed toward giving them the benefit of the doubt when the situation is ambiguous. Thirdly, through perception: for instance, our strong support for one of two tennis players will affect whether we think a ball she hits is in or out. The final way is through strong emotion causing us to give more attention to an issue. Alteration of judgment as a *constituent* of emotion is more complex. It is not that one emotion rules out another, rather that the "emotions are complexes involving judgments, each complex excluding certain other emotion complexes, their judgments, and certain other judgments as well."² Aristotle gives one, and only one, effect of envy: he says that if an orator can put the jury into an envious state of mind, then his opponent

¹ The remainder of the paragraph summarizes Leighton (1996) 206–17; these are his own views, not his interpretation of Aristotle's views, on emotion arousal.

² Leighton (1996) 210.

will not be able to win pity from them.³ In Leighton's words: "It is not that envy brings about a change of judgments such that one does not show or feel pity; rather, to be moved to envy involves being moved to a particular set of judgments that excludes those of pity."⁴

But can an Aristotelian orator make use of this? Another of the three modes of persuasion (see introduction to chapter 4) is the orator's character (*êthos*): an orator must make his argument in a way that makes him appear worthy of trust, and it is good men that we trust; a good man's character is demonstrated by what he says, and it is pretty much the most effective means of persuasion available to him.⁵ However, since Aristotle specifically says that envy is bad (*phaulos*—see p. 61), if an orator presents himself as envious of his opponent in trying to rouse similar envy in his audience, he will show his own character to be base. If his character is "pretty much the most effective means of persuasion" available to him, displaying envy is not worth that sacrifice. Second, he cannot present himself as *not* envious, but still explicitly attempt to rouse envy in his audience: they will either believe he shares that envy, or that he does not and is merely spinning sophisms. Worse, by appearing to impute bad character to his audience, he may alienate them.

A third, and more complex, possibility is that the orator might seek to rouse envy in the audience while seeming not to. However, I do not believe this is possible either. First, the audience might spot it, which leads to the problems already mentioned—though this merely makes it risky, not impossible. A more serious objection is that, although rhetoric (like dialectic) is a skill that can be used to argue anything, an Aristotelian student must pursue a life of moral excellence and practical wisdom, and politics is an extension of this ethical life;⁶ accordingly an Aristotelian orator must not use unethical arguments, even if they might be rhetorically effective.⁷ A fourth explanation also fails: Aristotle cannot be instructing his orator how to deal with envy if it is used against him,⁸ because he does not tell him how to counter envy, only

³ *Rh.* 2.10, 1388a27–30: ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν οὕτως ἔχειν [i.e., to feel *phthonos*], οἱ δ' ἐλέεσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιούντες ὧσιν οἴοι οἱ εἰρημνέοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου παρὰ τῶν κυρίων. Cf. *Rh.* 2.9, 1387a3–5: διὸ κωλυτικά μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ' [to *nemesan*, *phthonos*, and their contraries] ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημνέας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεῖν ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα. Cf. also *Rh.* 2.9, 1387b17–21 for a similar comment relating to indignation.

⁴ Leighton (1996) 210.

⁵ *Rh.* 1.2, 1356a4–13: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἥθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπικρέει πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάπτων. . . . δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου. . . . σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἥθος.

⁶ Schofield (2006).

⁷ Hesk (2000) 219 says Aristotle believes that rhetoric without moral purpose is merely sophistry. Irwin (1996), Grimaldi (1972) 19–21, and Halliwell (1994) believe that the *Rhetoric* contains injunctions to behave ethically; contrast Engberg-Pedersen (1996) for an alternative view.

⁸ Irwin (1996) 144 says Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.1, 1355a29 ff.) believes that an orator needs to be able to recognize illegitimate arguments when his opponent uses them against him, even if he should not use them himself.

that envy can be used to counter pity. There are therefore problems with any use the orator might wish to make of envy within the purposes of *Rh.* 2.1 (i.e., arousing it in an audience to affect their judgment).

So what use can an Aristotelian orator make of the chapter on envy? Well, first, it has a negative role. This chapter has didactic purpose: if there were no discussion of what envy is and how it differs from indignation and emulation, how could an Aristotelian orator avoid straying from these acceptable emotions to envy? This, I believe, is why Aristotle devotes so much space to telling his orator exactly how one distinguishes these emotions from each other, and why he makes such a point of saying how acceptable and worthy indignation and emulation are, while envy is so base (see chapter 4.1). If envy did not exist, Aristotle would have had to invent it.

However, there is something more an Aristotelian student might extract from the *Rhetoric*. There is a second type of rhetorical use for the emotions, more acceptable for envy than manipulating an audience, and this is to explain one's opponent's motivation (*Rh.* 1.10, 1369a15–19).⁹ Prosecutors must consider all the motives that can affect defendants, and how many apply to their opponent, while defendants must consider how many do not apply to them (*Rh.* 1.10, 1368b30–32). Aristotle argues (*Rh.* 1.10, 1368b33–69a6) that all of a person's actions are caused either by the person himself (*di' autous*), or something external to him. The latter comprises things done out of chance or necessity (which itself subdivides into compulsion and nature); the former out of habit or desire (*orexis*). Desire subdivides into rational desire, or will (*boulêsis*), and irrational desire, which further subdivides into appetite (*epithumia*), and anger (*orgê*).¹⁰ In fitting the emotions into these, it would seem that at least all pleasurable emotions are subsumed within appetite: appetite is a desire for what is pleasant (*Rh.* 1.11, 1370a18: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν ὀρεξις). For painful emotions, it is helpful if we recall that anger (*orgê*) is a pain accompanied by a desire for revenge, and that revenge brings pleasure (*Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–b2).¹¹ In fact in general, painful emotions are accompanied by a desire to escape from pain, and that desire will be pleasant (*Rh.* 1.10, 1369b26–28): hatred is attended by a desire to harm,¹² pity by a desire to aid, envy by a desire to bring low, emulation by a desire to succeed. Thus pleasant

⁹ It should be noted that Aristotle does not explicitly say *phthonos* should be used in this way (let alone *only* in this way). Striker (1996) 288 notes that the idea of emotions being motivational is Platonic.

¹⁰ Leighton (1996) 222–23 notes that in *De an.* 414b2, *De motu an.* 700b22, and *Eth. Eud.* 2.7, 1223a25–27, this subdivision of desire is *thumos*, or spirit—a name less likely, in the context of my continuing discussion, to cause confusion with *orgê* as the emotion discussed in *Rh.* 2.2.

¹¹ Viano (2003) also locates pleasures within the *epithumia* and anger within the *thumos*; she argues that the *thumos* is probably also the seat of the competitive emotions. Elster (1999) 60–1 has some interesting comments on emotions and action tendencies in Aristotle.

¹² Strictly, Aristotle says that hatred, unlike anger, is not painful (*Rh.* 2.4, 1382a12–13); see J. M. Cooper (1996) 247–49 and Leighton (1996) 232–33 n. 14 for discussion of this point.

feelings are aroused by a desire to act in certain ways, and painful feelings by a desire to act in other ways.

This, then, is the second use an Aristotelian orator can make of the emotions, and, if the first is ruled out of court, the only use he can make of envy: he can show that his opponent is motivated by it. The association of this negative emotion with his opponent allows the speaker to alienate his audience from his opponent, reducing his credibility and making them less inclined to vote for him. Conversely, if his opponent is trying to show that the speaker himself is envious, the latter must demonstrate he is not motivated by that emotion. If Aristotle (on this reading) is right, then we should expect *phthonos*'s use in oratory to be confined to positioning statements (i.e., as to the opponent's *phthonos*, and/or the speaker's lack of it), countering his opponent's explicit accusation or the audience's potential perception (if he is a type of person commonly thought to be envious—e.g., a political rival).

5.2 *Phthonos* Accusations in the Attic Oratorical Corpus

I do not intend to make a comprehensive review of the theme of *phthonos* in oratory. Such a study would require far more space than one chapter, and in any event the topic has already been well examined, especially in political-economic terms.¹³ Instead, I limit my discussion in this chapter to two issues that relate to oratory as a genre: *phthonos* accusations (i.e., *phthonos* narratives between parties in legal cases); and arousing or suppressing an audience's (normally a jury's, occasionally an assembly's) *phthonos*.

First, we must confirm whether my analysis of Aristotle's views—to the effect that *phthonos* can only be used explicitly to explain one's opponent's motivation—is reflected in actual oratorical practice or not. Out of 139 instances of *phthonos* words (excluding *aphthon-*) in the oratorical corpus, we have already listed in chapter 3 a total of ninety-eight accusations, prohibitions, and denials (the latter two of which I argued were merely variants on accusations).¹⁴ We can add to this four statements that the opponent wants to arouse the audience's envy against the speaker,¹⁵ and five that the speaker is not blameworthy or is seeking to avoid the audience's *phthonos*.¹⁶ Of the remainder, twelve are gnomic statements about *phthonos* and, often, whom it is directed against;¹⁷ eight are statements that someone other than the speaker

¹³ See especially Ober (1989) 192–247; Fisher (2003); Saïd (2003); Cairns (2003b); Walcot (1978) 67–76.

¹⁴ Twenty-eight direct accusations, fifty-two indirect accusations, nine prohibitions, nine denials (chapter 3, respectively nn. 13 and 15, 18 and 20, 16 and 17, and 19) total 98.

¹⁵ Isoc. 15.31; Isae. 11.38; Dem. 21.29, 29.2.

¹⁶ Isoc. 15.100; Dem. 18.305, 18.321, *Epist.* 2.24; Aeschin. 2.167.

¹⁷ Isoc. 1.26 twice, 2.46, 3.18, 11.49; Dem 3.24, 18.315, 19.99, 19.313, 20.140 twice, 60.23.

does/will not feel *phthonos*;¹⁸ and in four cases the speaker appears to claim envy for a group of which he is part, but as a necessary rhetorical prelude to advising his listeners not to feel the emotion.¹⁹ It can be seen therefore that *Rh.* Book 2-style arousal of *phthonos*, to influence decision making, does not in any way account for 131 of the 139 instances of the word in the oratorical corpus.²⁰ Rather, as my above analysis of Aristotle predicts, these are *Rh.* Book 1-style positioning statements about who does (normally the opponent, sometimes another person) or does not (normally the speaker) feel *phthonos*. The remaining eight instances of *phthonos* in the oratorical corpus do attempt to arouse the emotion in the audience.²¹ Crucially, however, this is not ‘bad *phthonos*,’ but ‘good *phthonos*.’²² Never once, in the whole oratorical corpus, does a speaker attempt to arouse ‘bad *phthonos*’ by explicitly calling for it.²³

We have seen that accusations of *phthonos* are commonplace. However, explicit calls for an emotional response cannot emerge in a vacuum; rather they must be built up to, or subsequently explained—or at the very least arise naturally from narrated circumstances. It is notable that Aristotle, who makes the first and most explicit case for linking emotion arousal to rhetoric, does not tell an orator to call for emotions, but rather to show the audience that certain situations exist so that these emotions will arise naturally. For example, he says a speech might need to prepare the audience to be disposed to be angry, and show the opponents as liable for such things that cause anger, and that they are the sorts of people one should be angry at.²⁴

We should consider, then, how explicit cases for an opponent’s *phthonos* are built up (i.e., the situational, and sometimes behavioral, indicators highlighted to make their alleged *phthonos* obvious to the audience). Isaeus 2, *On the Estate of Menekles*, is a reply by Menekles’ adopted son to a speech by Menekles’ brother, who is disputing the will in which Menekles left to his adopted son what he owned by challenging the legality of the adoption. The brothers had originally fallen out over money, and this happened partly because Menekles had divorced the sister of the man he later adopted (i.e., the sister of the speaker) and had had to repay her dowry; accordingly there was a history of bad blood between Menekles’ brother and the speaker’s family.²⁵

¹⁸ Isoc. 7.31 (the poor); Dem. 8.71, 20.141 twice, 20.165 (the audience); 25.97 (ancestors); Isoc. 19.45, Aeschin. 2.139 (ironically, against the opponent).

¹⁹ Isoc. 10.56, 15.130; Dem. 10.39, 10.52—see pp. 35–36, where I argue that the ‘admission’ is required so the speaker can finesse telling his listeners that they feel *phthonos* without alienating them.

²⁰ Though of course the sociological insights of Aristotle’s analysis in *Rh.* 2.10 will still be germane.

²¹ Lys. 27.11; Isoc. 4.184, 18.51; Aeschin. 3.42; Dem. 21.196 twice, 28.18, 37.52. We can perhaps add Lys. 18.16 to this list (see n. 75).

²² See further chapter 5.3.

²³ I consider how a speaker might arouse ‘bad *phthonos*’ covertly in chapter 5.4.

²⁴ *Rh.* 2.2, 1380a2–5: δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἰοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τοῦτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἰοῖς ὀργίζονται.

²⁵ See Edwards (2007) 27–32 for the background to the speech, and an explanation of the structure of the argument.

The speaker argues that his uncle blames Menekles for having adopted at all, having wanted him to die childless, and since the uncle himself has a son, his censure of Menekles is *epiphthonos* (2.23) (i.e., he begrudged his brother also having what he had himself). The speaker says that one does not normally begrudge the right to adopt even to a nonrelative and try to steal it from them, yet the uncle does this to his own brother (2.24). He goes on to argue that, since there is almost no money or property remaining (nearly all the family money and property already being in the hands of the uncle: 2.40–41), this can only be due to *phthonos* (2.27). This *phthonos* is very close to Aristotle's definition. The uncle is not motivated by obtaining a desired good, as he might be with covetousness or greed, since the amount of money in question is (for him) negligible. His desire is solely to deprive the hated nephew, and a focus on depriving someone else rather than on one's own gain is *phthonos*. By focusing so closely on this motivation, the speaker turns the argument from one about rightful or wrongful possession between two equal appellants, into a dispute where one party is motivated solely by base character. This should help to win over the jury to his, the supposedly better man's, side.

Another sustained accusation of *phthonos* is found in Lysias 24, *On the Invalid*. The speaker, who is in receipt of the meager dole handed out to those whose property was less than three *minae* and who were too disabled to earn a decent wage, is being prosecuted on the twin grounds that his property is above this minimum threshold and that he is not too disabled to work. He responds to these accusations, which are probably well founded, not with logical argument but with evasion and irreverence.²⁶ He says that his opponent is a liar, and that he himself deserves praise not envy (24.1). His opponent is motivated by nothing except envy (24.1), and envies where others pity (24.2).²⁷ He (jokingly?) suggests his opponent might be prosecuting him maliciously for money²⁸—at any rate he cannot be prosecuting him out of enmity to gain revenge,²⁹ since because of his baseness (*ponêria*) the speaker has never had any dealings with him before—and so clearly his opponent feels *phthonos* for the speaker as a better citizen (24.3).³⁰ Let us examine these arguments more

²⁶ Todd (2000) 254 suggests he is trying to get the case laughed out of court. See also Edwards and Usher (1985) 263 ff. and Carey (1990) on the speaker's strategy, which includes elements of parody. Usher (1999) 106–10 suggests that the whole speech is in fact a parody, an exercise or '*jeu d'esprit*' (106), rather than a speech written for a real case.

²⁷ For example, where others see the speaker as worse off, his opponent sees him as better off (see main text above on not being able to feel both pity and envy simultaneously). This is a rather strange attempt to have it both ways: he is so poor he needs a dole, but rich enough that someone might think it worth prosecuting him for money: it is such inconsistencies that lend credence to the '*jeu d'esprit*' theory.

²⁸ See my comments at chapter 6 n. 27 (with bibliography) on the practice of *sukophantia*, and the *sukophantês* as a bad citizen.

²⁹ Rhodes (1998) argues that this is frequently a motivation for prosecution; Kurihara (2003) for a more nuanced assessment, where he denies its acceptability in public suits. Cohen (1995) 82–83 argues for the mutual exclusivity of enmity and envy in motivating prosecutions (though see n. 43).

³⁰ See Lys. 3.9 for another case where a speaker claims that some people envy anyone who is worthy (*chrêstos*); cf. also Pl. *Menex.* 242a3–4.

closely, bearing in mind the *phthonos* scripts we have seen. The opponent's case is that the speaker is in possession of something (the *dole*) that he does not deserve, which suggests he is motivated by justified indignation. This is a *to nemesan*-type emotion, or rather (following the argument of chapter 4.4.2) 'good *phthonos*,' since it relates to a putative abuse of money—even though very little money is actually at stake. To counter his opponent's case, the speaker plays with the ambiguity of the different *phthonos* scripts to portray his opponent as suffering from *phthonos* plain and simple (i.e., 'bad *phthonos*') with the aim that such a base emotion will repel the jury and cause them to throw the case out. The ambiguity allowed by the different *phthonos* scripts affords even more possibilities than English, where 'the politics of envy' can be presented as 'fairness' or *vice versa* (i.e., one emotion being transmuted into, or masked by, a different one—see chapter 2.1.3 and 2.3).³¹ Greek allows a speaker to do all this with just one word. Whether the *dole* is actually deserved or not—and thus the *phthonos* 'bad' or 'good'—is immaterial for our purposes: what matters is the rhetorical strategy, and the transmutation/masking of one *phthonos* script with another.

I now turn from money to politics, the other issue we frequently find connected to *phthonos* in Attic oratory, to consider one of the longest-running and most famous political grudge matches in Classical Athens, that between Aeschines and Demosthenes. In 343, when Aeschines 2 (*On the Embassy*) was delivered, Aeschines was forty-seven and a well-connected politician.³² Demosthenes was six years younger and,³³ while he still must have been considered a major, if up-and-coming, player in Athenian politics,³⁴ was less well connected. Nevertheless he may broadly speaking be considered a political contemporary of Aeschines, and certainly a political rival.³⁵ Let us consider how Aeschines characterizes Demosthenes' motivations and rhetorical strategy. He begins by stating that Demosthenes does not feel *orgê* for him, and the jurors can be sure of this because of his many lies (*pseudomenos*) and slanders (*diaballomenos*) about Aeschines,³⁶ yet he aims to rouse *orgê* among the jurors through those slanders (2.2–3).³⁷ *Orgê* is the most common retributive emotion

³¹ See Cairns (2003b) on the difficulty, even in English, of distinguishing genuine indignation from transmuted envy.

³² Carey (2000) 88 for date of speech, and 9 for Aeschines' birthdate of 390. Carey notes that "Aeschines had arrayed some of the biggest names in Athenian politics in his defense" (89).

³³ Yunis (2005) 9 for his birthdate of 384. Demosthenes and Aeschines both entered public life (i.e., began making political speeches) in the late 350s: Demosthenes with the *First Philippic*, dated 351 (Yunis (2005) 14 n. 15). It is not known precisely when Aeschines entered politics, but he had two other careers first (Carey (2000) 9), and so despite his slight seniority he may not have begun his political career until around the same time.

³⁴ He had been included in the ten-man embassy, headed by Philokrates, to Philip in 346.

³⁵ Buckler (2000) 113; Yunis (2005) 117–18.

³⁶ For example, if Demosthenes were telling the truth, he could understandably be angry; but since what he is saying is not true, any anger will be synthetic.

³⁷ Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of slander fourteen times in this speech (see p. 45 on the connection of slander with *phthonos*).

orators try to arouse against their opponents,³⁸ and it will clearly be detrimental to Aeschines' case if it can be shown that he himself does not genuinely share in that emotion. Aeschines goes on to accuse Demosthenes of *hubris*, lies, and abuse (*loidoria*) (2.8), themes that recur throughout the speech.³⁹ He says that Demosthenes envies him and uses slanders against him (2.10: ἐφθόνησέ μου ταῖς διαβολαῖς), and is prosecuting him out of excessive *phthonos*, terrible cowardice, and bad character (*kakoêtheia*) (2.22).⁴⁰ Having thus lodged Demosthenes' alleged *phthonos* in his audience's minds, Aeschines explains how these alleged motivations arose: despite boasting that his arguments would easily persuade Philip (2.21), Demosthenes apparently suffered stage fright and 'corpsed' (2.34–35); his arguments were treated disdainfully by Philip, who instead treated Aeschines' own remarks with the most respect. These, Aeschines implies, were the situational antecedents which, coupled with Demosthenes' *kakoêtheia*, caused his excessive *phthonos* (2.22—see above); and it is because of this *phthonos* that Demosthenes is prosecuting him now. Aeschines next describes Demosthenes betraying his fellow ambassadors while reporting back to the Assembly, thus causing uproar in the audience (the *dêmos*) who themselves called Demosthenes base and malicious (2.51: πονηρὸς καὶ φθονερός). This alleged treachery, Aeschines implies, was the result of Demosthenes' rivalrous envy against the other ambassadors. Shortly after, Aeschines again lists Demosthenes' bad points: his inconsistency, his *phthonos*, his collusion with the traitor Philokrates, and his treacherous and untrustworthy character (2.54), and finally toward the end of the speech Aeschines reminds us of Demosthenes' cowardice and *phthonos* once more (2.139). We see that Aeschines can very plausibly make the case for his rival's enmity being driven by envy.

In 330 Demosthenes had his chance for revenge. As Carey notes, “[b]y the time Aeschines and Demosthenes faced each other in court again, their positions had to a large extent been reversed. Demosthenes' influence had increased,”⁴¹ and Aeschines' had declined. Accordingly, when Aeschines attacked Ktesiphon for illegally proposing a crown be awarded to Demosthenes,⁴²

³⁸ Allen (2003), who argues that *orgê* is measurable, and should be dispensed in an amount appropriate to the crime. In reality orators did not generally seek to quantify the amount of *orgê* they were trying to arouse. Rubinstein (2004) demonstrates that the vast majority of calls for *orgê* occurred in prosecutions in public cases (*graphai*), and for crimes of which the whole city (including the jurors) could be presented as victims.

³⁹ *λοιδορ*- appears five times (and *βλασφημι*- twice more), *ύβρ*- six times, and *ψευδ*-/*ψευσ*- no fewer than twenty-six times in the speech. None of this is uncommon for Greek oratory—see Hesk (2000) 207–13 for the oratorical *topos* of describing your opponent as a master of deceptive word-spinning.

⁴⁰ In light of Aristotle's description of *phthonos* as *phaulon phaulôn* (“a base feeling of base men”), it is interesting and noteworthy that Aeschines couples it with *kakoêtheia*: a term Demosthenes will himself use about Aeschines (see also n. 56).

⁴¹ Carey (2000) 159.

⁴² See Hansen (1974) on the *graphê paranomôn*, especially 37–38, 54–57 relating to this case.

Demosthenes defended Ktesiphon (in *On the Crown*) by making the most sustained case in surviving Greek oratory for his opponent being motivated by envy.⁴³ He begins by stating that Aeschines mostly told lies about him (18.9: καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατεψεύσατό μου) and abusive slanders (18.10: λοιδορούμενος βεβλασφήμηκεν περὶ ἐμοῦ); he says that Aeschines has bad character (18.11: κακοήθης δ' ὢν, Αἰσχίνη),⁴⁴ that he spoke abusively (18.11: τὰς λοιδορίας τὰς παρὰ σοῦ τρέψεσθαι), and that he lied and slandered (18.11: κατεψεύδου καὶ διέβαλλες); that the case shows the spite, insult, abuse, and contumely of an enemy (18.12: ἐχθροῦ μὲν ἐπήρειαν ἔχει καὶ ὕβριν καὶ λοιδορίαν καὶ προπηλακισμόν); and that Aeschines is acting out of spite (*epêreia*) and *phthonos* (18.13: ἐν ἐπηρείας τάξει καὶ φθόνου τοῦτο ποιεῖν). This list of motivations is notably similar, indeed almost identical, to those Aeschines attributes to Demosthenes in *On the Embassy*, and they are repeated throughout the speech.⁴⁵ We might draw the inference that, while hostility is to be expected between major political rivals, *phthonos* (it can at least be claimed, however disingenuously) is not a natural result of political rivalry, but rather the mark of a vicious character (*kakoêtheia*). We can infer that only the *kakoêthês* will feel *phthonos*,⁴⁶ and seek to give effect to it by abusing, slandering, lying, and otherwise being spiteful about his political rival—actions, resulting from *phthonos*, which aim to destroy the rival's career.

It is not just rivals, however, who might envy major political figures: they can also be allegedly envied by the entire *dêmos*. However, the case must be made very carefully: accusing someone of envy directly is highly antagonistic, and when that 'someone' is the *dêmos*, politically potentially suicidal. We have already seen one way for an orator to do this: assign envy to "us" as a group, and then say that "we" should not feel it (see pp. 35–36). In his third Letter, *Concerning the Sons of Lykourgos*,⁴⁷ Demosthenes negotiates these tricky waters in an altogether more subtle way, building up very gradually

⁴³ E. M. Harris (1995) 147 argues, very plausibly, that Aeschines' main motivation in bringing this case was revenge; this would be an indication of enmity. I agree with Cohen (1995) 77–81, who believes Demosthenes argues Aeschines prosecutes through both enmity and envy—though this conflicts with Cohen's own views on their mutual exclusivity (see n. 29).

⁴⁴ Cf. n. 56. Usher (1993) 174 says that Demosthenes hammers home the emphasis on *êthos* with a succession of homophones (18.11.2: εὐηθες ὥθηθης).

⁴⁵ λοιδορ- appears fifteen times, βλασφημ- eight times, ψευδ-/ψευσ- twenty times, and διαβολ-/ διαβαλ- nine times. ἐχθρ- occurs no fewer than forty-six times (see n. 43). Accusations of *epêreia* (spite) occur four times (§§ 12, 13, 138, 320), and explicit accusations of *phthonos* also four times (§§ 13, 121, 279, 303). We also find eight accusations of *baskania* (§§ 119, 132, 139, 189, 242, 252, 307, 317—see end of chapter 3.3).

⁴⁶ Contrast with Aristotle where almost everyone can feel *phthonos*, because their *êthos* has not been trained (chapter 4.3.3).

⁴⁷ Goldstein (1968) considers the authenticity of this letter; he notes arguments against its authenticity (4–5), but following a detailed study concludes that there should be "a strong presumption in favor of authenticity" (181). The evidentiary value may not be diminished by a decision against authenticity, however, since it would still be informed by an understanding of the nature of the political process and the psychology of the participants.

toward an accusation. He begins by stating that Lykourgos was prosecuted many times by those who felt *phthonos* toward him, yet the *dêmos* always acquitted him (*Epist.* 3.6)—by implication, they did not as a rule share the accusers' *phthonos*. Moving from general prosecutions to the particular one in which the fine against Lykourgos was imposed, Demosthenes says that this came about due to gossip (*logos*) and envy (*phthonos*)—by persons unstated—and if the *dêmos* hesitate to overturn it, then they are in a state of confusion regarding what is democratic (*Epist.* 3.10). He goes on to talk more generally of those whom *phthonos* keeps from their just rewards (*Epist.* 3.20), and says that the whole *dêmos* is blameworthy if *phthonos* is more influential among them than gratitude (*Epist.* 3.28).⁴⁸ We should note that he still avoids accusing any individual of *phthonos*. Before finally reaching his direct accusation, Demosthenes plays still further with the opposition of gratitude and *phthonos*: he says he feels goodwill and friendship toward the *dêmos* (*Epist.* 3.37), and—he is now talking about his own exile, rather than Lykourgos's children's—he has hoped for their gratitude, magnanimity, and goodwill in return (*Epist.* 3.39–40)—but, he goes on, they begrudge (*phthonountes*) him words and benevolence (*Epist.* 3.41). We can see how gradually he has built up to this moment, and how, even now, his accusation is phrased as tactfully as possible.

5.3 Explicit Suppression and Arousal of Audience *Phthonos*

At the end of chapter 4, I gave pseudo-Aristotle's definition of *phthonos*, and showed that for him it encompassed the three scripts Aristotle refers to as *nemesan* (i.e., 'good *phthonos*'), *phthonos* (i.e., envy), and *epichairekakia* (spite). Pseudo-Aristotle goes on to say:

διαβαλοῦμεν δὲ τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ φθονεῖσθαι ποιήσομεν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἀποφαίνοντες ὑπὸ τούτων ἢ τῶν τούτοις φίλων τοὺς ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, κακῶς πεπονθότας ἢ πάσχοντας ἢ πεισομένους παρὰ τὸ προσήκον. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ μῖσος καὶ ὀργὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔξουσιν. ἂν δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἐνδέχεται, συνάξομεν, ἐξ ὧν φθόνον τοῖς ἀκούουσι κατὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐργασόμεθα. τὸ γὰρ φθονεῖν πλησίον τοῦ μισεῖν ἐστίν. φθονήσονται δὲ συλλήβδην, εἰ ἀναξίως αὐτοὺς εὖ πράττοντας ἀποφαίνωμεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντας, διεξιόντες ὡς ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ πεπόνθασι ἀδίκως ἢ πάσχουσιν ἢ μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ οὐδέποτε πρότερον ἐστερήθησαν ἢ νῦν οὐ στερίσκονται ἢ οὐ στερήσονται, <ἢ> κακοῦ οὐδέποτε τετυχηκότες ἢ νῦν οὐ τυγχάνοντες ἢ οὐ τευξόμενοι, εἰ μὴ νῦν αὐτοὺς οἱ κριταὶ κολάσωσιν. (*Rh. Al.* 36, 1445a12–26)

⁴⁸ See chapter 5.3 on these two opposite responses to a politician by the *dêmos*.

And we shall slander and create *phthonos* for our opponents from the opposite methods to these,⁴⁹ by showing that our hearers themselves or those for whom they care have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer badly at their hands or at the hands of their friends, contrary to what is fitting. For from such arguments they will be put in a state of hatred or anger at them. And if this proves impossible, we shall collect together all the arguments from which we can create *phthonos* for our opponents in the audience: for *phthonos* is very near to hatred. And, in short, they will feel *phthonos* if we can show them to be doing well undeservedly and that they are unfavorably disposed to the audience, going in detail through a) how many good things they have received, or are receiving, or are likely to receive unjustly, or b) that they have never before been deprived, are not being deprived now, or will never be deprived of some good, or c) that they have never suffered, are not suffering now, or will never suffer some misfortune—unless the judges punish them now.

The latter half of this passage repeats the one we saw before, and describes the same three scripts. However, some important points are added: first, that an orator *can* attempt to arouse *phthonos* in his audience (including ‘bad *phthonos*’); second, that *phthonos* is a useful adjunct to hatred and anger; and third, that the opponent should be portrayed as unfavorably disposed to the whole jury, not just the speaker.⁵⁰

Demosthenes provides excellent evidence for both the undesirability of ‘bad *phthonos*’ and the appropriateness of ‘good *phthonos*,’ and shows how the former should explicitly be suppressed and the latter aroused in his audience. In 356, a certain Leptines had proposed a law to the effect that the small number of wealthy individuals exempt from liturgies for past services rendered to Athens (either by themselves or their ancestors) should no longer be exempt, and this law had been enacted.⁵¹ Demosthenes’ speech *Against Leptines* was in support of an attempt to repeal this law, an attempt that was probably successful.⁵² Demosthenes says Leptines’ law is a disgrace to the city, unworthy of either their ancestors or themselves, as it makes them seem *phthoneros*, untrustworthy, and ungrateful (*acharistos*) (20.10).⁵³ This association of envy with ingratitude (i.e., the binary opposition of envy and gratitude)

⁴⁹ Note again the connection of *diabolê* with *phthonos*—see nn. 37, 45.

⁵⁰ We shall see below that in *Against Meidias* Demosthenes explicitly calls for the jury to respond with *phthonos* alongside hatred and anger (Dem. 21.196), and attempts to persuade them that his opponent is unfavorably disposed to all of them, not just to him personally. Rubinstein (2004) has shown, *re* this latter issue, that appeals to *orgê* and *misos* are common in public prosecutions and generally inappropriate elsewhere; cf. Kurihara (2003). See also Sanders (2012b) on appeals to hostile emotions (*orgê*, *misos*, *phthonos*) against an opponent in Attic forensic oratory.

⁵¹ See E. M. Harris (2008) 16–17.

⁵² E. M. Harris (2008) 20–21; Kremmydas (2012) 58–60.

⁵³ Kremmydas (2012) 201 says all three contravene democratic principles.

underpins the argument of the entire speech.⁵⁴ Demosthenes says that the city cares more about honor than money (i.e., it is grateful rather than envious as a rule), and this law is outside its character (20.13). If someone has a lot of money but has not done wrong to the city, one should not envy (*baskainein*) him; however, if he has a lot of money unlawfully, he may be punished by law (20.24). Demosthenes argues that an observer of the Athenian political scene might condemn the moral viciousness (*kakia*) of the authors of this law; when the city no longer needs someone who was previously a benefactor, “we” are so ungrateful (*acharistoi*) and base (*kakoi*) as to take away their rewards (20.55). Taking away something that has been given is *phthonos*, and “you” must not appear to be in the grip of that emotion (20.56).⁵⁵ This law will introduce a base habit (*ponêron êthos*) into the body politic (20.124). If you make this law operative, you will seem to be acting from *phthonos* (20.139). *Phthonos* is a sign of a base nature (20.140: ὅτι παντάπασι φύσεως κακίας σημεῖόν ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος).⁵⁶ There is no greater reproach than that our city should seem *phthoneros*, as it avoids all shameful conduct (20.140). Better men seek honors for themselves, rather than try to take away other people’s through *phthonein* (20.151). The law is shameful and base, and can be likened to *phthonos* and contention (*philonikia*) (20.157). And retaining the law will give the city the reputation of being untrustworthy, *phthoneros*, and base (*phaulos*) (20.164). Demosthenes ends the speech by appealing to the better nature of the jurors: their generosity over their envy, their sense of justice over vice, and all worthy things over all very base ones (20.165: ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν καθημένων ὑμῶν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου γνώμῃ φιланθρωπία πρὸς φθόνον καὶ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς κακίαν καὶ πάντα τὰ χρηστὰ πρὸς τὰ πονηρότατ’ ἀντιτάσσεται).⁵⁷ In a sustained attack then, spanning the entire speech, Demosthenes argues that Leptines’ law makes Athens seem as if it is responding to its benefactors with *phthonos*, when it should be responding with *charis*. Since, from an objective point of view (and Demosthenes frequently asks what a named outsider or group will think),

⁵⁴ See Fisher (2003) 193–200, Cairns (2003b) 246–47, Hesk (2000) 40–50 on Demosthenes’ strategy. The association of *phthonos* with ingratitude goes back (at least) to the poetry of Solon—see, e.g., frs. 5–6, 34, 36–37 West (although Solon does not use the word *phthonos*, he describes the poor as *agêtoi*—feeling *agê* (on which see p. 50)—for the wealthy); cf. Arist. *Pol.* 5.4, 1304a36 on *phthonos* as the driving force of the poor in *stasis*. Klein (1957/1975) argues at length for the binary opposition of envy and gratitude.

⁵⁵ Initially Demosthenes says he knows nothing of Leptines’ character and has nothing bad to say about it (20.13; cf. 20.102); this is belied by 20.55–56. Hesk (2000) 43–44 and Kremmydas (2012) 208 say that Demosthenes draws a distinction between Leptines’ character and that of the city.

⁵⁶ Compare Aeschin. 2.22 (*kakoêtheia*); Dem. 18.11 (*kakoêthês*); Arist. *Rh.* 2.11.1388a36 (*phaulon* . . . *phaulôn*).

⁵⁷ In total *χαρι-* appears twenty times in the speech, and *φθον-* thirteen times (only Isoc. 15, with fifteen instances, has more in the entire oratorical corpus); we can also note that *αἰσχυρ-* appears fourteen times in the speech, *πονηρ-* thirteen times, *κακ-* (excepting *kakourgos*) eleven times, *φauλ-* nine times, and *ὀνειδ-* three times.

these individuals really do deserve their exemptions, ‘good *phthonos*’ is ruled out. It can only therefore be ‘bad *phthonos*’ that Demosthenes is trying to suppress in his audience (the jury), while, simultaneously, showing that his opponent is motivated by it. Both techniques should help him win his case.

A different, and much more personally abusive, approach is taken in the speech *Against Meidias*, in which Demosthenes prosecutes Meidias for a punch the latter threw at him while he (Demosthenes) was acting as *chorêgos* at a civic festival, and for which he had already received a vote against Meidias in a *probolê* trial.⁵⁸ Demosthenes’ aim in this speech is to arouse the jury’s *orgê*, *misos*, and (‘good’) *phthonos* against his opponent,⁵⁹ and he chose to bring his case as a *graphê hubreôs* (a public case for *hubris*), rather than a *dikê aikeias* (a private suit for battery), possibly in order to make these very appeals.⁶⁰ Athenians believed there was a corrupting risk inherent in wealth that might cause the wealthy person to behave in certain ways that were unacceptable in a democracy: an ostentatious lifestyle (big house, expensive clothes), arrogance, frequent loud boasting, scorn for the democracy, and most of all a propensity to *hubris* (wanton, shaming, and often drunken violence) toward those less wealthy than themselves.⁶¹ Demosthenes takes this line, arguing that Meidias’s one punch at him was symptomatic of the man’s much wider *hubris* toward all Athenians, evidenced by his lifestyle and habits.⁶² Demosthenes begins his case by stating that Meidias treats everyone with *aselgeia*—the word normally means licentiousness, but MacDowell argues for a translation of “aggressiveness” and “bullying” here, and notes that the word is often linked with *hubris* in Greek.⁶³ In the earlier *probolê* trial, the Assembly was enraged (21.2: ὀργίσθη; cf. §§ 6, 36, 175, 183, 215, 226) at Meidias’s blow against Demosthenes, thinking he was overbold, brutal, and unrestrainable (21.2). Demosthenes has received blows and *hubris*, committed by Meidias against “me,” “you,” the laws, and everyone else (21.6–7).⁶⁴ He calls for an emotional response from the jury: he will not, however, tell them about the many instances of private *epêreasmos* (spite) and *hubris* which have caused him *orgê* personally, but only instances that should make them equally angry

⁵⁸ See MacDowell (1978) 195–97 on the *probolê* procedure; see E. M. Harris (2008) 75–81 on the earlier history of this case.

⁵⁹ He eventually calls for these explicitly in 21.196 (see main text below).

⁶⁰ See n. 50. See Dem. 21.25–28, 54.1, and Isoc. 20.19 *re* penalties and choice of case. For a detailed discussion of *graphê hubreôs* and *dikê aikeias*, see Fisher (1992) 36–85; also MacDowell (1978) 129–32, and 57–59 for the differences between *graphai* and *dikai* more generally. On *Against Meidias* being a *graphê hubreôs*, see MacDowell (1978) 131 and E. M. Harris (2008) 79; the latter disagrees (80–81 n. 20) with the suggestion in Rowe (1994) that it might be a *graphê* for *asebeia* (impiety).

⁶¹ Ober (1989) 206–11; Fisher (1992) 19–31, 102–4; Dover (1974) 110–11.

⁶² See Ober (1996), P. Wilson (1991), Fisher (2003) 201–2 for Demosthenes’ strategy.

⁶³ MacDowell (1990) 220.

⁶⁴ The speech continues in this vein. In all, ἀσελγ- (aggressive bullying) occurs eighteen times, ὑπερηφανία (disdain, contempt) five times, θρασ- (over-boldness) nine times, and ὕβρις- a staggering 131 times.

(*aganaktêsas*) (21.15) (i.e., those in which the whole city has been slighted).⁶⁵ Again and again in the speech he demands that they feel anger against Meidias and condemn him, because his crime was committed against the entire city (§§ 34, 42–43, 46, 70, 100, 108, 123, 127, 147, 183, 186, 196, 222).⁶⁶ To do this so explicitly, Demosthenes had to demonstrate that Meidias's one act of violence against himself *qua* liturgist was symptomatic of Meidias's habitually *hubristic* behavior against his fellow citizens, and he spends a good deal of the speech doing so.

Demosthenes also calls for jurors' *misos* (hatred). Aristotle notes that *orgê* is produced by offences against oneself, while *misos* does not require this: one can hate a class of people.⁶⁷ Demosthenes tells us, at some length, of Meidias's manipulation of the laws to have one Strato stripped of his citizenship (§§ 83–93). After describing this abuse, achieved through malicious prosecution, and reminding them of Meidias's impiety in striking him on a religious festival, he denounces Meidias as “abusive and disgusting,” and calls for juror hatred.⁶⁸ This hatred arises from the kind of person Meidias is, and thus accords with Aristotle's comments on the sorts of people we hate.

Finally, Demosthenes works on arousing (‘good’) *phthonos*. He has put down a number of markers linking Meidias's wealth to his arrogance (*thrasos*, *hyperêphania*, *hubris*) and other inappropriate behavior (§§ 20, 66, 96, 98, 109, 138, with later reminders at §§ 198, 201), and made several general comments to the effect that bad behavior resulting from wealth deserves punishment (§§ 98, 124, 143). He now brings Meidias's inappropriate use of his wealth center stage in a long section (§§ 151–74), deriding the small number of liturgies he has performed, and explaining why such liturgies as he has done should not be taken into account. This focus on liturgies is important. Unlike modern democracies, Athens had no income tax.⁶⁹ It therefore instituted a system whereby the rich (citizens and resident aliens) paid directly for certain expenditures for the military or cultural benefit of the *polis* (e.g., outfitting warships (*triêrarchia*), superintending the exercise halls (*gymnasiarchia*),

⁶⁵ We can note that *epêreasmos* and *hubris* are two of the three types of belittling (the other being *kataphronêsis*, contempt) that Aristotle says arouse *orgê* (*Rh.* 2.2, 1378b14–15)—see further pp. 140–41.

⁶⁶ For example, 21.34: “If he has committed *hubris* against a *chorêgos* undertaking his public duties, then he deserves the people's *orgê* and punishment. For at the same time Demosthenes suffered *hubris*, so did the *chorêgos*.” See Rubinstein (2004) on calls for *orgê* and *misos* in public prosecutions, on the grounds that the entire city has been injured.

⁶⁷ *Rh.* 2.4, 1382a3–6: ὀργή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιούτους, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη. Rubinstein (2004) 192–93 makes the same point, and agrees this is common in the oratorical corpus.

⁶⁸ Dem. 21.98: οὔτι νῦν Δ' ἀσελγής ἐστι καὶ βδελυρός· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ληθῆ· ἀλλὰ μισεῖν ὀφείλετ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δῆπου τοὺς τοιοῦτους μᾶλλον ἢ σφίζειν.

⁶⁹ Although there were many types of indirect taxes that fell on all citizens (e.g., customs dues, transaction taxes, production taxes, slave tax, etc.)—see Bresson (2008) 107–15; Migeotte (2009) 49–54.

producing choruses for the tragic/comic festivals (*chorêgia*), and giving public feasts (*hestiasis*)).⁷⁰ The benefit for the rich was that, if the system worked properly, they greatly reduced the risk of civil strife with the numerically far greater poor, in which they risked being killed and having their property expropriated.⁷¹ Over time, the traditional competition among the aristocracy found an outlet in competition to render services to the *polis*.⁷² A rhetoric of reciprocity grew up, whereby the rich performed liturgies and the *polis* responded with gratitude (*charis*)—which could be called on if ever they were on trial.⁷³ When wealthy individuals avoided or evaded their duty to perform liturgies, the *dêmos* responded with (‘good’) *phthonos*.⁷⁴ It is notably only after a long section deriding Meidias’s poor liturgy performance that Demosthenes finally calls for the audience’s *phthonos* at Meidias’s lifestyle and conduct, without any trace of pity, to accompany the *misos* and *orgê* he has been demanding for some time (Dem. 21.196: *φθόνον ἐξ ὧν ζῆς, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐξαπατᾷς ἔλεον. οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδαμόθεν σοι προσήκων ἔλεος οὐδὲ καθ’ ἑν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή*).

Against Meidias is far and away the most sustained oratorical case for the appropriateness of juror *phthonos* against the opponent, but not the only one. There are six other calls for it in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 27.11; Isoc. 4.184, 18.51; Aeschin. 3.42; Dem. 28.18, 37.52).⁷⁵ We saw on p. 43 that the majority of these have something to do with money, and particularly the misuse of it: not performing liturgies, squandering patrimonies, getting away with a small fine, and moneylending. The other instances involve the abuse of democratically voted honors, undemocratic behavior, or undemocratic levels of political power. Money, honors, and power are exactly the issues that Aristotle said aroused *to nemesan* (see p. 76), and also the issues

⁷⁰ Payment was initially voluntary; it became institutional over time, but some still performed extra liturgies voluntarily; see Ober (1989) 199; MacDowell (2009) 127–28; E. M. Harris (2008) 15 for a list of liturgies, with references to further bibliography. Some expenditures were allocated on a rota system, others by lot; some were defrayed by a group of moderately rich men, rather than by one who was very rich.

⁷¹ Aside from the brief oligarchic coups in 411 and 404–403, the Athenian democratic settlement was notably stable for its time. On civil strife (*stasis*), excluding Athens, see Gehrke (1985). See Ober (1989) for the most in-depth study of “mass” and “elite” relations in Classical Athens. See also Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 124–29.

⁷² On aristocratic competition in services to the *dêmos* see Whitehead (1983); Ober (1989) 84–85, 291 and (1996) 27–28; MacDowell (2009) 128.

⁷³ Ober (1989) 226–33; Fisher (2003).

⁷⁴ Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003b) 244–49 argue that economic differences—and the concomitant potential for the wealthy to avoid burdens that the poor could not avoid—ensured that (‘bad’) *phthonos* was always a latent possibility, ready for exploitation as part of an orator’s strategy. On *phthonos* as an appropriate emotional response to poor performance of liturgies, see further Sanders (2012b) 376–79.

⁷⁵ See n. 21. Carey (2007) 180 tentatively argues for *φθονήσαι* at Lys. 18.16 as per the manuscript, over *ἀγανακτῆσαι*, *θαυμάσαι*, *ὀργισθῆναι*, or *φροντίσαι* chosen by previous commentators, and if he is right this would also be ‘good *phthonos*’.

that arouse ‘bad *phthonos*.’ Despite these examples, though, it is striking that there are so few instances of (‘good’) *phthonos* being called for. It may be that (‘bad’) *phthonos* was so socially unacceptable that orators felt uncomfortable using the word even to mean morally acceptable resentment. This leaves a terminological lacuna regarding resentment over abuse of money and political power, which the word *phthonos* only goes part of the way to fill.⁷⁶

5.4 Covert Arousal of Audience *Phthonos*

We have seen how a speaker can suppress ‘bad *phthonos*’ in the jury when it is harmful to his case, and how he can arouse ‘good *phthonos*’ against his opponent when that opponent is in clear breach of acceptable behavior with regards to money or political power. However, sometimes the speaker will want to arouse *phthonos* proper in the jury, ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’, an ambiguity best expressed in English by the word ‘resentment.’ While a speaker cannot call for this explicitly—as I demonstrated both from my analysis of Aristotle’s views, and from the complete absence of calls for (‘bad’) *phthonos* in surviving oratory—a clever logographer would know that by pulling on the right ideological strings with sufficient subtlety he might be able to awaken the desired feelings.

We find these sorts of arguments, which I explore below, made frequently in political trials. There is a reason for this. There was a widespread perception in democratic Athens that those who were politically active (in the Assembly and/or the law courts, or filling magistracies) did rather well out of the system.⁷⁷ Some genuine rewards were available to them (voted honors and immunities from certain expenditures, free dining at public expense, etc.—though most of these were very rare); but still they were seen to make money in all sorts of underhand ways, including bribery (by foreign allies, or to avoid malicious prosecution), corruption (i.e., kickbacks), and embezzlement.⁷⁸ This prevailing assumption is underlined by Perikles’ pointed commendation of himself to the *dêmos* as incorruptible.⁷⁹ Hyperides (5.25) suggests that it was both expected and acceptable for public figures and generals to make significant personal profits—provided the money was used in the interests of Athens rather than against them—but this cannot have been the generally accepted

⁷⁶ I suggest at n. 84 one way in which this lacuna might have been filled.

⁷⁷ Sinclair (1988) 179; Carey (1994) 73. Henceforth I use the word ‘politicians’ as a convenient shorthand for those who are politically active in the direct democracy. We should not confuse this with politicians in a modern sense (i.e., salaried ‘professional’ politicians in modern representative democracies).

⁷⁸ Sinclair (1988) 176–186; Harvey (1985) 89–102.

⁷⁹ Thuc. 2.60.5,3–4: φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων—see Hornblower (1991) 333–34. Harvey (1985) 98 notes that only four Athenian public figures are so described in literary sources, three of them from the mid-fifth century.

view given the numbers prosecuted, which Hansen rightly calls “astonishingly high.”⁸⁰ Accusations of bribery, corruption, and embezzlement will in fact play to a range of hostile emotions. For instance, embezzlement is normally described as *klopê* (theft) in Greek, and in several speeches this is associated with explicit calls for *orgê*.⁸¹ Although we do not find explicit exhortations to (‘bad’) *phthonos* for such crimes, I contend that this is because *phthonos* had such negative connotations that it was much harder to play with explicitly than *orgê*—hence why there are only eight explicit calls even for ‘good *phthonos*’ in the corpus. Nevertheless, it should be clear from the previous section that accusations of elites abusing their positions with respect to money and political power will at least potentially play to a *phthonos* agenda, and I believe this allows some speakers to covertly arouse *phthonos* (‘bad’ and ‘good’ (i.e., resentment)) alongside *orgê*.

Close examination of several speeches concerning embezzlement and bribe-taking suggests this does indeed happen. Lysias’s *Against Ergokles* is the peroration of a speech for the prosecution in a case of embezzlement and bribe-taking.⁸² The speaker begins by listing a number of offences Ergokles has committed, and calls for *orgê* (28.2). However, he focuses on just one of the charges: that Ergokles has become wealthy from poverty at “your” (i.e., the *dêmos*’s) expense (28.1: καὶ ἐκ πένητος ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων πλούσιος γεγεννημένος), this phrase making clear who the rightful owners of the money are. The phrase *plousios ek penêtôn* (or similar) appears a number of times in the oratorical corpus,⁸³ and—as Aristotle notes in his description of *to nemesan*—while those who have been wealthy for a long time seem to be so justly, those lately wealthy do not (*Rh.* 2.9, 1387a24–26: αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν [ἀρχαιοπλουτοὶ] δοκοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δ’ [νεόπλουτοι] οὐ· τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν). ‘Correcting’ Aristotle in accordance with actual usage, we might expect this phrase to aim to arouse ‘good *phthonos*.’⁸⁴ However, by stating that this economic transformation was “at your expense,” the speaker seems to be trying to turn this from general disapprobation of the *nouveau riche* into a more personalized emotion.

⁸⁰ Hansen (1975) counts 144 Athenians prosecuted by *eisangelia* in surviving sources (11), seventy of whom were politicians (58), and the true figure must have been much higher: this is “astonishingly high” for a city of 20,000–40,000 citizens (11). Politicians were also prosecuted for bribery, corruption, or embezzlement under other procedures, including scrutiny for office (*dokimasia*), removal from office (*apocheritonia*, generally followed by *eisangelia*), audit at the end of a period of office (*euthunai*), and a procedure for recovery of state property (*apographê*)—see Hansen (1975) 9 and (1991) 203–24; Bauman (1990) 82–94; MacDowell (1978) 58, 62.

⁸¹ Lys. 27, 28, 29, 30; Din. 1, 2, some of which are discussed in chapter 5.4. Arist. *Rh.* 2.4, 1382a6–7 connects theft with *misos*, but this only finds support in the oratorical corpus in Din. 2.

⁸² Todd (2000) 286–87.

⁸³ Isoc. 5.89, 8.124; Lys. 1.4, 25.27, 25.30, 27.9, 28.1; Dem. 24.124, 57.45; see also n. 94.

⁸⁴ One way in which the terminological lacuna noted at the end of the previous section could be filled, without explicitly using the word *phthonos*.

Whether in English we would say it was covetous envy or possessive jealousy he was trying to awaken—clearly “this used to be yours” aims at more than mere greed—in Greek it seems clear that it is ‘bad *phthonos*.’ By avoiding the exhortation “you should feel *phthonos*”—explicitly stating the word itself would mean ‘good *phthonos*’—the speaker is able covertly to awaken feelings of *phthonos* proper, in all its ambiguity.

Having put down this marker at the start of the speech, the speaker states that Ergokles and his colleagues used to be poor and in need, but now have swiftly accumulated the largest property of all the citizens (28.2). He continues to contrast the impoverished jurors with his enriched opponent: the jurors are weighed down by the war tax (*eisphora*), so should not forgive embezzlers and bribe-takers (28.3); jurors would be rendered poor because of the *eisphora*, while Ergokles and his cronies became the most wealthy citizens (28.4);⁸⁵ as soon as they had taken their fill of and enjoyed the *dêmos*’s possessions, they thought themselves apart from the city (28.6); now Ergokles and his cronies are rich and hate the *dêmos*, they want to rule over it and, fearing to lose what they have embezzled, they want to turn Athens into an oligarchy (28.7). Konstan argues that *phthonos* is “an emotional response based on the judgment that . . . an equal . . . is getting above himself,”⁸⁶ and members of the *dêmos* conspiring to form an oligarchy would certainly fall into that category. This passage, delivered only a few years after the two coups referred to earlier,⁸⁷ clearly aims at arousing far more than *phthonos*: fear, anger, and hatred are at least as likely. But the repeated refrain of “we’re poor, they’re rich; we’re poor, they’re rich” should make it clear that *phthonos* is one of the emotions covertly being aroused throughout this passage.⁸⁸

Similar themes can be found in Lysias’s follow-up prosecution *Against Philokrates*. Ergokles was convicted and executed (29.2), but since no money was found, the prosecutor alleges that he must have deposited it with the man he was closest to, Philokrates, who must now be convicted similarly for the money to be recouped. The speaker calls Philokrates one of those who possess the city’s property (29.8: τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχοντας), and says that on conviction he would not be losing any of his own property, rather he would be giving the *dêmos*’s back to them (29.8). After two more references to the *dêmos*’s property (29.9–10), he says Philokrates was an accomplice of Ergokles in stealing their property (29.11), and they should grant no amnesty to those who steal their property (29.13). Finally, he concludes that if they are wise, they will take back their property (29.14). The constant focus on the wrongful

⁸⁵ This refers to huge military losses incurred by Thrasyboulos, a dead Athenian general; Ergokles was one of several subordinate generals (Todd (2000) 286–87).

⁸⁶ Konstan (2003c) 82.

⁸⁷ Usher (1999) 99 says that this passage plays to the “tensions of those times.”

⁸⁸ Chaniotis (2009) 200 refers to such verbal stimuli as “acoustic signals.”

possession of “your property” (the *dêmos* is addressed throughout in the second person) is striking, and seems calculated to arouse the jurors’ *phthonos*.⁸⁹

In another Lysias speech, *On a Charge of Accepting Bribes*,⁹⁰ we see how this type of attack might be countered. The speaker dwells at great length on his lavish expenditure on liturgies, and his other services to the city. He then pleads that he not be deprived of “my own” property (contrast the repeated insistence on “your” property in the two speeches just discussed), as the vast amounts he has spent on the city should win him gratitude (21.12; cf. 21.17, 21.25). Finally, he points out the sheer unlikelihood that someone who spends so much of his own money to the benefit of his city would then take bribes to harm it (21.22). This line of argument directly links two issues I have considered in this chapter. The speaker recognizes that the *dêmos* may feel *phthonos* for his supposed bribe-taking/embezzlement (i.e., possessing the *dêmos*’s money), and he cleverly draws a parallel to *phthonos* at liturgy avoidance (i.e., not spending money on the *dêmos*). By conflating these two issues, the speaker effectively attempts to defuse *phthonos* for one type of action by showing *phthonos* for another type not to be deserved. And he even makes this explicit: “You should pity me for being poor,” he says, “rather than feel resentment (*phthonos*) for me for being rich” (21.15: καὶ πένητα γενόμενον ἐλεῆσαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουτοῦντι φθονῆσαι). This provides some assurance that the emotional response to bribe-taking/embezzlement indeed is—or at the very least includes—*phthonos*.⁹¹

Finally, and as a lead-in to the next chapter, I want to look at one more speech, a deliberative one. Arousal of hostile emotions at opponents is characteristic of forensic speeches,⁹² but personal attacks are unusual in deliberative ones. However, Demosthenes makes an exception in a passage dealing with demagogues near the end of his *Third Olynthiac*. After extolling Athens’s political leaders of previous generations (such as Aristides and Miltiades), Demosthenes castigates the current crop of politicians,⁹³ whose policies have led to Athens’s impotence in the face of Philip’s attack on Olynthos. He begins by

⁸⁹ Many of the same themes that appear in Lys. 28 and 29 appear also in Lys. 27, *Against Epikrates*, including the phrases “they are stealing your property” (27.6) and “they have become wealthy from poverty out of your property” (27.9). See Usher (1999) 98–99; Todd (2000) 282.

⁹⁰ Todd (2000) 228–29 contends that the title of the speech may be misleading, and given various comments about being in possession of the city’s money it could be embezzlement that is the actual charge. It may be true that other charges are involved; however, the speaker does beg not to be convicted of bribery (Lysias 21.21: ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ μὴ καταγνώναι δωροδοκίαν ἐμοῦ).

⁹¹ We might also note, in light of Aristotle’s belief that one cannot simultaneously feel both pity and *phthonos* for someone (see n. 3), that the fact that the speaker eventually asks for pity suggests he believes he has by then successfully dispelled jurors’ *phthonos*.

⁹² See Sanders (2012b).

⁹³ 3.29: πολιτευομένους (see n. 77).

saying that some of these politicians have gone from being beggars to being wealthy,⁹⁴ they have become eminent from obscurity, some of their private houses are grander than public buildings, and their personal fortunes have risen as much as the city's have fallen (3.29).⁹⁵ Demosthenes alludes to wholesale embezzlement by the political class, and this is made even clearer when he goes on to say that, when politicians spend public money, the *dêmos* are grateful for them spending their (the *dêmos*'s) own possessions (3.31).⁹⁶ In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that such arguments are designed to play to latent *phthonos* in the *dêmos* toward politicians. Demosthenes' motivation here is to discredit more established politicians, and position himself rhetorically as being on the side of the *dêmos* against them, in order that his own advice might be more likely to be listened to.⁹⁷

5.5 Conclusion

We have seen that there is one use for *phthonos* by an orator that is consistent with Aristotle's philosophy: accusing one's opponent of being motivated by it. In practice this can be extended to any positional statement that loosely falls into the twin categories of "you (or some other person/people) feel *phthonos*" and "I do not feel *phthonos*." However, Aristotle's analysis of the role of *phthonos* in oratory is limited by an unresolved paradox between two positions he takes: first, that an orator's most effective weapon is his good character; second, that *phthonos* is (always) base. In explicitly arousing *phthonos* therefore, the orator risks demonstrating his own character to be base, thus removing his most effective weapon. Although Aristotle does not resolve this paradox (and indeed may not even have been aware of it), nevertheless his analysis does raise the valid question: what role, if any, is there for *phthonos* in oratory beyond positionality?

It is certainly the case that Athenian orators do not present themselves as *phthoneros*, nor do they attempt explicitly to arouse *phthonos* in their audience when it would be considered inappropriate by their fellow-citizens

⁹⁴ 3.29: ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν—cf. *plousios ek penêtôn* above (main text and n. 83).

⁹⁵ Compare this last allegation with "he is in possession of your money" above.

⁹⁶ We shall find very similar arguments advanced for comic purposes at Ar. *Vesp.* 655–712 (see pp. 107–9); however, the presence of such similar arguments in a public speech proves that the prejudices Aristophanes/ Bdelykleon plays to are very real.

⁹⁷ Thucydides has Diodoros say in the Mytilenean debate that if someone gives the best advice but is suspected of being influenced even slightly by private profit, then we feel censorious of his profit and refuse to take his good advice (3.43.1.1–4: ὧν ἡμεῖς τάναντία δρώμεν, καὶ προσέτι ἢν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύεται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκίσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανεράν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα). See also Lys. 18.16, with the amendment referred to in n. 75.

(i.e., the circumstances in which it would be ‘bad *phthonos*’); that type of *phthonos* they only attribute to their opponents. However Aristotle has created problems for himself by separating off moral *phthonos*, *phthonos* when it would be considered appropriate by their fellow-citizens (i.e., when it would be ‘good *phthonos*’), under the separate label of *to nemesan*—a separation that I have shown to be unjustified by contemporary texts. His less idealistic contemporary, pseudo-Aristotle, reflects everyday usage, found several times in fourth-century oratory, by including such moral resentment within *phthonos*. That rhetorician does not stop at advocating that orators arouse moral *phthonos*, however, but also advocates arousing envy and spite. It does seem that the badness associated with these emotions prevents them from being aroused explicitly (all surviving explicit calls for *phthonos* being for the moral version). However, orators can sometimes arouse ‘bad *phthonos*’ covertly alongside ‘good *phthonos*’ through manipulation of common civic values, while leaving unstated the exact point on the *phthonos* continuum that they are aiming for. This is not dissimilar to the modern facility to play to envy through the confusion of transmuted envy with indignation or ideas of fairness—but Greek can conveniently do it all with one word.

The vast majority of Classical speeches that survive come from Athens: all but one speech (Isoc. 19) in the entire oratorical corpus was written either by Athenians or for an Athenian audience (or both). Speeches in historiography of the period have a somewhat broader geographical base: even if two of the three major Classical historians come from Athens, they all put speeches into the mouths of non-Athenians, which might be expected to reflect the values of those other cities.⁹⁸ However, (mortal) *phthonos* is not a major element in historiography, and the genre yields little of interest that we do not find elsewhere. What comments we do have about it tend to focus on three areas: first, the role of envy in civil strife (e.g., Thuc. 3.82–84); second, jealous rivalry between Spartan kings and generals (e.g., Thuc. 4.108.7.2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29.7); and finally, envy between *poleis*, principally Sparta for Athens. Only the last of these appears in speeches, for instance when Corinth tries to arouse Sparta’s *phthonos* (among other emotions) at the Athenians, by dwelling on the subject cities Sparta has lost—and stands to lose—to Athens, and Corinth’s admiration for Athenian optimism, energy, and innovation (Thuc. 1.68, 1.70).⁹⁹ While an examination of *phthonos* arguments in historiographic speeches may be worthwhile for its own sake, it will tell us little more about either *phthonos* or Athens (the twin focuses of this volume) than we have seen, so I leave oratory here and move on to a new genre.

⁹⁸ See, for example, Debnar (2001) for discussion of speeches delivered to Spartan audiences in Thucydides.

⁹⁹ One can also see *phthonos* against a rival politician (Cleon against Diototos) aroused and suppressed respectively in Thuc. 3.38 and 3.42.

Audience *Phthonos* in Old Comedy

6.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, we saw prosecutors exploiting certain words and ideas in order covertly to awaken jurors' *phthonos*. The same practice occurs quite commonly in Old Comedy. Comedy shares some key features with oratory. Its pronounced metatheatricality keeps its communicative relationship with its audience overtly in view (unlike tragedy), and both explicitly and implicitly it claims the desire and the ability to influence its audience on important issues of public concern.¹ However, the audience at a comedy was different from that in the Assembly or courtroom, not necessarily in its social makeup, but certainly in its members' expectations of what would be put in front of them, and the emotional reactions they might expect to have as they listened.²

I will not be concentrating primarily in this chapter on representations of *phthonos* on stage (which forms the subject of the next chapter), but rather representations that invite or utilize it in the audience. Though this effect is by no means confined to political contexts, I will focus specifically on passages relating to politicians (demagogues, ambassadors, and generals). As in the previous chapter, I use the word 'politician' as a convenience, without any implication of similarity between politicians in Classical Athens's direct democracy and salaried 'professional' politicians in our modern representative democracy. Rather I mean those who regularly and voluntarily attempted to direct the political life of the Athenian

¹ There has been a long-running debate about the 'seriousness' of comedy (i.e., the intent of comic playwrights in giving advice to the audience): for example, Heath (1987); Henderson (1990); Silk (2000) 301–49. I am less interested in the intent than in the fact that comedy explicitly places itself within a civic discourse with its audience, and in the dynamics of how it does so.

² See Sanders (2012b) 362, where I argue that *sukophantai* would arouse hatred in a trial, but a different emotion on the comic stage—and we will see that I believe that emotion to be *Schadenfreude*. *Sukophantai* appear regularly as comic butts in Aristophanes (*Ach.* 818 ff., *Ran.* 1410 ff., *Plut.* 850 ff.), and other comic playwrights would almost certainly have treated them likewise (see Christ (2008) 170–74 and Fisher (2008) 197–208 for some *kômôidoumenoi* who appear in both Aristophanic and non-Aristophanic Old Comedy).

democracy, principally through advocating policy in the Assembly, by prosecuting (or defending) those elected or appointed by lot to fill political or civic posts, or by putting themselves forward for elected posts such as the generalship.

I concentrate on politicians for a variety of reasons. First, because it allows us to see political *phthonos*, which we have seen plays a significant role in oratory, in another civic and generic context. Second, the prominence of political *phthonos* in Old Comedy is a result of the visibility of politicians, and thus it demonstrates the importance of political *phthonos* in the everyday world of Classical Athens, outside of the comic theater. And finally, because the sheer volume of political abuse in Aristophanes' plays, and its persistence over time from *Acharnians* to *Wealth* (though here I focus on the plays of the 420s), makes it a good test bed and adds to confidence in the outcome, compared for example with an examination of the fewer and shorter passages playing to *phthonos* at luxurious lifestyles.

I necessarily rely on Aristophanes, as the only Old Comic playwright whose plays survive in their entirety, to explore this cultural phenomenon. However, as Wilkins points out, Aristophanes was not writing in a vacuum,³ and such themes will almost certainly be traceable in the surviving fragments of other Old Comic playwrights.⁴ The approach I adopt in this chapter is not intended as a comprehensive interpretation of the pragmatics and psychology of Old Comedy, even if such were possible on present evidence, but rather an exploration of one important aspect of the role of comic theater and its relationship with its audience that has a particular relevance to my theme.

6.2 *Phthonos* Arousal: An Approach to Old Comedy

In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says some people spread malicious gossip about him, which led to general bad feeling against him, and his consequent conviction; he is unable to name an individual involved except perhaps "some comic playwright."⁵ The connection of malicious *phthonos* with ridicule and/or pleasure occurs in a number of other places too.⁶ But it is Plato's *Philebus* that has

³ Wilkins (2000) xv; though see Bakola (2009) 6–8 on the pitfalls inherent in assuming conclusions from Aristophanes can be extrapolated to all Old Comic poets.

⁴ The increasing interest in the fragments of other Old Comedians (in particular Eupolis and Kratinos) can be seen in the growing scholarship on these playwrights: see Dobrov (1995); Harvey and Wilkins (2000); Storey (2003); Olson (2007); and Bakola (2009); this research has to huge degree been rendered possible by Kassel and Austin (1983–2001).

⁵ Pl. *Ap.* 18c8–d3: ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὢν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον;

⁶ Laches says that pretension to skill at arms invites *phthonos*, and is liable to ridicule (*katagelastos*) unless the claimant is outstanding (Pl. *La.* 184c1–4). Socrates says that a lover will necessarily envy (*phthonein*) his boys when they have property, but rejoice (*chairein*) when they lose it (Pl. *Phdr.* 240a5–6). Demosthenes chastises the Athenians because—due to some motive he cannot divine, which might be *phthonos*—they ask Philip's "hired men" among the population to speak, and laugh (*gelan*) at their abuse (Dem. 9.54).

the most extended treatment of this link, and this will be the starting point for my theoretical approach.

In the *Philebus*, Plato discusses comedy as an example of “false pleasures” of the soul.⁷ I give relevant excerpts from this extended, but important, passage on the facing page:⁸

There are a number of points that can be drawn out of Plato’s analysis. First, that *phthonos* includes the idea of malice or *Schadenfreude*.⁹ Aristotle separates *phthonos* as a painful feeling from its opposite pleasure, *epichairekakia*,¹⁰ saying that the same character will feel them in opposite circumstances. Plato however conflates both feelings in the word *phthonos*, and as we have seen, this is not the only Classical Greek passage that seems to show *phthonos* encompassing a malicious pleasure.¹¹ The second important point in the *Philebus* passage is the idea that we feel some sort of animus against characters in a comedy. Third is that those who are funny are those made to seem ridiculous.¹² Fourth, Plato is right that we do not laugh at those who have the ability to harm us in return—and a vast crowd can laugh with impunity at someone who could retaliate if they mocked him individually. Finally, and most importantly, Plato’s main claim: that *phthonos* (envy, malice, *Schadenfreude*) is the basis of comic pleasure.¹³ It is not clear if he means that it is publicly acknowledged as such.¹⁴ However, this is not important for our purposes: one can distinguish

⁷ Pleasures mixed with pain (see Frede (1993) xlv–xlvi, l–lii).

⁸ Translation from Frede (1993) 56–59, slightly adapted.

⁹ But without the possible guilt that *Schadenfreude* implies (see chapter 2.2.3). Frede (1993) 56 n. 2, Wood (2007) 78, Halliwell (2008) 301 and Munteanu (2011c) 95–97 all see *phthonos* here as *Schadenfreude*. Wood (2007) 79, 81 perceptively suggests that Plato was more concerned in this passage to analyze the nature of *phthonos* than the nature of comedy. Duran Lopez (1996) compares his thoughts on *phthonos* in the *Philebus* to his comments in other dialogues.

¹⁰ Cerasuolo (1996) 177, 181, 183 says that Plato’s comic *phthonos* is equivalent to Aristotle’s *epichairekakia*; cf. Halliwell (1991) 289, (2008) 300–1, 301 n. 93. See also Frede (1996) on mixed pleasures and pains in Aristotle. Frede (1993) liii suggests that Plato might to some extent anticipate Aristotle’s ideas of catharsis of comic (and tragic) emotions in this passage.

¹¹ See n. 6; also [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 34.1440a35–39 and 36.1445a12–26 (quoted respectively at pp. 77 and 88–89).

¹² Aristotle seems to agree with this: Arist. *Poet.* 1449a32–4: ἡ δὲ κωμωδία ἐστὶν . . . μίμησις φανλοτέρων . . . κατὰ . . . τὸ γελοῖον . . . Cf. *Tract. Coislin.* 4: κωμωδία ἐστὶ μίμησις πράξεως γελοίας (this treatise is a tenth-century CE epitome of Peripatetic views on comedy, possibly reflecting Aristotle). See n. 16 for further discussion and bibliography on this treatise.

¹³ Cf. Freud (1905/2002) 218–19, who says that one type of comedy relies on an unconscious comparison with the pleasure we took as children in various situations (e.g., somebody falling in the street, which gives us a pleasurable feeling of *Schadenfreude*). Bergson (1900/1911), while generally denying emotion a place in comedy (4), says laughter contains “an unavowed intention to humiliate, and consequently to correct our neighbour” (136).

¹⁴ *Aischrologia* was acceptable in Old Comedy (and other ritual contexts), but not normally in everyday discourse—see Halliwell (2008) 215–63.

ΣΩ. τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὥς ἐστὶ καὶ τούτοις μείζεις
λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

...

ΣΩ. τό τοι νυνδὴ ῥῆθ' ἐν ὀνόματι φθόνου πότ' ἐστι
λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γὰρ ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν
πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

So: Now, look at our state of mind in comedy.
Don't you realize that it also involves a
mixture of pleasure and pain?

...

So: Since we just mentioned the word 'envy': do
you treat envy as a pain of the soul, or what?

Pro: I do.

So: On the other hand, will not the envious
person display pleasure at his neighbor's
misfortunes?

Pro: Very much so.

*[Socrates digresses on the nature of those who are ridiculous. He argues they are: 1. ignorant
about the extent of their (a) wealth, (b) physical attributes, or (c) virtues, especially wisdom;
and 2. too weak to avenge themselves when laughed at.]*

ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν
καὶ λυπῶν μείζεις ἐν τούτοις οὐπω μοι
καταφανής.

ΣΩ. τὴν τοῖνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὴ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστι πού καὶ ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὐτ'
ἄδικον οὐτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὀρώντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ
μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἄρα οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἵπομεν ὅτι κακὸν
πάσιν;

ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων [ἄγνοιαν] . . . κακὸν
δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν γε οὖσαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ
γελῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ
φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτ' ἀπεργαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων
γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν
αὐτῶν φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι.
τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὁμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς
ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίνεσθαι
δὲ τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

(Pl. *Phlb.* 48a8–50a9)

Pro: You are right about this division. But I am
still not quite clear that there is a mixture of
pleasure and pain in these cases.

So: So take first the nature of malice.

Pro: Please explain.

So: It contains a kind of unjust pain and pleasure.

Pro: Necessarily.

So: Now, if you rejoice about evils that happen to
your enemy, is there any injustice or malice in
your pleasure?

Pro: How should there be?

So: But is there any occasion when it is not
unjust to be pleased rather than pained to see
bad things happen to your friends?¹⁵

Pro: Clearly not.

So: But we just agreed that ignorance is bad for
everyone?

Pro: Right.

So: Let us take now the ignorance of friends . . .
Did we not agree that it is bad if it is
ignorance?

Pro: We certainly did.

So: But if we laugh about it, are we pleased or
pained by it?

Pro: We are pleased, obviously.

So: But this pleasure in the face of the
misfortunes of friends – did we not say that it
was the product of malice?

Pro: Necessarily.

So: Our argument leads to the conclusion that if
we laugh at what is ridiculous about our
friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we
thereby mix pleasure with pain. For we had
agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul,
that laughing is a pleasure, and that both
occur together on these occasions.

¹⁵ Plato started by talking of *phthonos* as felt for the misfortunes of neighbors, but from here he changes to the misfortunes of friends (cf. the pseudo-Platonic *Definitiones* 416a13). This goes too far: it would not have been normal, in Classical Athens any more than today, to take pleasure in the misfortunes of friends. Other Greek passages talk about *phthonos* for neighbors (see chapter 3 n. 8).

between the overt and actual bases for an activity (i.e., it would be perfectly possible for *phthonos* to be a significant covert element in comic pleasure while masquerading overtly as indignation (by whatever Greek label)).¹⁶

For all the difference in emphasis, Plato's analysis of comedy in terms of *phthonos* has certain underlying tendencies in common with one of the major modern models for understanding Old Comedy, the Bakhtinian theory of "carnival." Goldhill and others argue that the notions of "inversion," "transgression," or "reversal," where the usual rules of society (e.g., respect for those in authority, laws against certain forms of abuse) are abandoned or turned on their head for some defined duration, match well the ribald, almost anarchic aspects of Dionysiac worship which are in some degree reflected in Old Comedy's (probable) origins—songs performed at the *kômos*, or revel—and its license.¹⁷ Carnival 'inversion' is often not truly anarchic, but rather follows a different set of rules that would be considered unacceptable outside of the carnival context, generally involving a 'reversal of norms'.¹⁸ One aspect of Old Comedy, which the carnival approach is especially helpful for understanding, is satires, or lampoons, in which well-known people (public figures, frequently politicians) are represented on stage in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous. This ridicule might arise from the representation itself (e.g., a physical caricature, or character satire)¹⁹ or, and this is common for lampoons involving those against whom society feels some animus (e.g., someone hated or feared), from the character suffering some misfortune.²⁰ This bears more than a passing resemblance to Plato's comic malice.

¹⁶ Golden (1992) 91–95, attempting to reconstruct the putative Arist. *Poet.* 2, argues for indignation (to *nemesan*) as the comic emotion by analogy with pity as the tragic, the two emotions being opposed at *Rh.* 2.9, 1386b8–12, and both becoming fear when we perceive the other's fortune as harmful to ourselves; cf. Golden (1984). If he is right, then at least *re* politics and money it should not be to *nemesan*, but 'good *phthonos*' (see chapters 4.4.2 and 5.3). In my view, Golden's is the most plausible suggestion for Aristotle's comic emotion, being based on genuinely Aristotelian texts. Other suggestions include: L. Cooper (1922) 66–67, anger and envy; Sutton (1994) 14–15, 24–30, aggressiveness, hostility, fear, and anxiety; Janko (1984), pleasure and laughter, taking *Tract. Coislin.* 4 (n. 13) as genuinely Aristotelian, *contra* L. Cooper (1922) 15–17; Halliwell (1986) 266 and (2008) 393 n. 11; Golden (1992) 98–102. Rosenbloom (2012) argues, without referring to Aristotelian poetics, that the comic emotions are pity, anger and indignation.

¹⁷ Goldhill (1991) 176–88; cf. Halliwell (2008) 204–6; Cartledge (1990) 2–5; A. M. Bowie (1993) 11. Henderson (1990) 285–86 disputes the use of the carnival model for Old Comedy. See Mikalson (2005) 91–99 on Dionysiac worship.

¹⁸ Carey (1994) 72, who refers to this as "controlled dysfunction, a calculated subversion of the norms of society in a festival context which offers a controlled outlet for disruptive behaviour and vicarious satisfaction of the impulse to disobey" (73). See Silk (2000) 76, who quotes Bakhtin on carnival inversion in Rabelais, on what inversion might include.

¹⁹ See Carey (1994) 70.

²⁰ Sutton (1994) 42–46 talks about a comic "surrogate" for the intended "target" (e.g., Paphlagon for Kleon); this surrogate is sufficiently similar to the target to remain recognizable, but sufficiently different to avoid arousing the same feelings (e.g., hatred, fear) as the original. Inasmuch as the surrogate is perceived as ridiculous, the audience can transfer such perceptions back to the original target, thus altering their emotions (hatred, fear) toward him. Sutton argues that this is both educative and purgative (i.e., cathartic; cf. Golden (1992) 5–32, Lear (1992) on comic *katharsis*). We should note that Greek laughter was often aggressive, or 'consequential,' in nature: laughing *at*, rather than laughing *with* (see Halliwell (1991) and (2008) 19–38).

As well as those actually represented on stage, Old Comedy often lampoons contemporaries by name: a process known as *onomasti kômôidein*; the individuals involved (who must have been well known for the joke to work) are known as *kômôidoumenoi*.²¹ Sommerstein has shown that over 50 percent of known *kômôidoumenoi* were politically active.²² He further notes that politicians were normally named in a derogatory context.²³ It is not just named politicians who are criticized in Old Comedy; several passages criticize them as a class (see below). The abuse and ridicule at these festivals of well-known individuals and certain privileged classes of citizens (such as politicians) can be seen as part of the ‘carnival’ license. When Athenians went to the comic theater, they enjoyed seeing abuse heaped on such people, and Aristophanes and his contemporaries provided what they wanted.

But why were politicians so singled out for abuse? Athens’s strong democracy may have been the cause. Ideologically, all Athenian citizens were equal; however, as Ober and Strauss argue, the wealthy remained “functionally more powerful” than the poor,²⁴ whether in seeking to advance themselves politically, or in the law court where their education would help them speak, or their money buy a good speechwriter. This is equally true of politicians of all social backgrounds,²⁵ who as a group in Athens (as in many subsequent systems) were frequently viewed as willing to do anything to gain and secure their position with the *dêmos*.²⁶ In the course of his career, a politician would expect to attract *philoî* amongst other politicians, and these might help each other out to ensure mutual political advancement and monetary advantage, perhaps by supporting each other’s policies in the Assembly, or through initiating or supporting each other’s sometimes spurious prosecutions (an unpopular pursuit, which is strongly associated with the *sukophantês*).²⁷ As discussed in chapter 5.4, a general feeling seems to have developed that politicians did

²¹ Allegations made as part of *onomasti kômôidein* may or may not have been true—see Halliwell (1984).

²² Sommerstein (1996) 327–31. Of the thirteen people known to have been satirized throughout a comedy, rather than just in one passage, six were politicians (see Sommerstein (1996) 334).

²³ Sommerstein (1996) 334; cf. Carey (1994) 69–71.

²⁴ Ober and Strauss (1990) 244; cf. Ober (1989) 214–19.

²⁵ Many politicians (especially the generals, who were still elected) came from the wealthiest and best educated class, even in the later fifth century (see Ober (1989) 112–18). Even the ‘new’ politicians from the 420s onward tended to be drawn from the wealthy urban commercial or industrial classes (see Connor (1992) 151–63).

²⁶ Balot (2001) 51–52.

²⁷ We see the operation of such activities clearly in the major legal speeches of the mid-fourth century (e.g., Aeschin. 1–3, Dem. 18–19). On shared prosecutions see Rubinstein (2000). On ‘the badness’ of *sukophantai* see Christ (1998) 48–71 and (2008) 170–74; Fisher (2008) 297–99; for a different view see Osborne (1990). Successful prosecutors often gained a personal monetary reward, and even when they did not they could gain gratitude from the *dêmos* for enriching the public treasury, which might help a political career. See also n. 2.

rather well out of the system. This would have led to a popular animus against them, which could be exploited by comic playwrights looking for targets. I propose therefore that one important aspect of Old Comedy—its attacks on politicians (individually and collectively)—appeals to the audience’s latent *phthonos* at the profit they make, and the advantages they take, from their position.²⁸ It is possible too that the ‘new,’ demagogic politicians may have attracted even more animus than their aristocratic forebears. We saw that Aristotle argued that the newly rich were more likely than the long-time rich to attract *to nemesan* (or rather ‘good *phthonos*’), as newly acquired wealth seemed less validly theirs.²⁹ In the same way, ‘new’ politicians were probably seen to profit more conspicuously from the system than aristocratic ones.³⁰ The *Schadenfreude* aroused in the audience at seeing politicians taken down a peg during this sacred time of licensed transgression would have acted as a safety valve for the *phthonos* that was naturally aroused against politicians, but which was dangerous if left untreated in a democratic system that relied on politicians to function properly—since unchecked public hostility might lead to the destruction of all politicians, to the ultimate impoverishment of the state.³¹

Goldhill has argued forcefully that Athenian drama cannot be divorced from its setting in, and constant interaction with, the democratic *polis*.³² He has further noted that while drama might not have the *intention* of promoting questioning of democratic values and ideology, one of its *functions* is to do precisely that.³³ However, although he notes that this applies to all drama, Goldhill’s interest then moves firmly toward an engagement with tragedy.³⁴ My interest here is in comedy, where the dynamics of the engagement are different due to comedy’s metatheatrical practice of explicit communication with the audience (see n. 1). I believe that, while comedy as a genre was

²⁸ Carey (1994) 73–74 also argues that comedy “offers an outlet for *phthonos*.”

²⁹ See p. 95.

³⁰ And hence the ‘rags to riches’ (*penês ek penetôn*) cliché that we saw extensively in chapter 5.4.

³¹ Cf. Carey (1994) 82, who says that jokes in Old Comedy lampooning the political class acted as a channel for hostility that could find more damaging outlets, thus allowing citizens to come to terms with inequalities over which they had no power.

³² Goldhill (2000), *contra* Griffin (1998). See also: Goldhill (1987), where he first argues for the connection between tragedy and its democratic setting; Friedrich (1996) and Seaford (1996), who, like Griffin, are dismissive of this connection; Griffith (1995), who is closer to Goldhill’s view, but sees other ideologies competing with the democratic, such as aristocratic ones (Goldhill (2000) disagrees, arguing that democratic ideology, unusually, allows for the free expression of, for example, aristocratic criticism); Rhodes (2003), who questions the extent to which the link is with democratic, as opposed to civic, ideology. Rosenbloom (2012) takes Goldhill’s side in the debate in an examination of the “democratic” emotions produced by drama.

³³ Goldhill (2000) 38.

³⁴ Goldhill (2000) 37 notes that this is relevant to comedy too—I would argue it is even more relevant to comedy than to tragedy.

not created intentionally as an institutional outlet for *phthonos*, one of its functions was to allow *phthonos* to find expression in nondestructive ways,³⁵ thus helping police the boundaries and manage tensions between ideologically equal, but in practice frequently unequal, citizens in the democratic *polis*. One important strand of this comic promotion of questioning served to hold the lifestyle and practices of politicians up to public scrutiny, reminding them that they were permanently on display, and militating against egregious misbehavior that could ultimately lead to dangerous levels of mistrust and hostility building up between the political class and the rest, thus risking the stability of the democratic system.

6.3 Politicians in Aristophanes

6.3.1 DEMAGOGUES

We saw at the end of the last chapter a passage from Demosthenes' *Third Olynthiac* that castigates more established politicians. However, Aristophanes had also made—or played to—very similar ‘charges’ some seventy years earlier, in *Wasps*.³⁶ Here I am concerned with two passages that discuss politicians in general (i.e., demagogues—I will return later to a third passage, which lampoons generals). Philokleon introduces the subject, while extolling the pleasures of being a juror: great tall men wait for him at the entrance to the court, and one puts his hand in Philokleon's, a soft hand that has stolen things from the *dēmos*, and they all plead: “Pity me, father, I beg you, if you yourself have ever filched anything, when holding a magistracy, or when in the army, going shopping for the common mess”—all of them talk this way (*Vesp.* 552–58). The passage suggests that abusing one's power for private gain through theft is absolutely standard for public officials, whether in high positions or low.

This foreshadows a later, lengthy section (655–712), devoted to the crimes of the political class.³⁷ With some internal plot inconsistency, Philokleon must now be instructed in these by Bdelykleon. A number of ‘charges’ are made. The first is that little of the city's income goes to jurors: while the city makes nearly 12,000,000 drachmas (2,000 talents) a year—from tribute from the Empire, other taxes, many percentages, lawsuit deposits, the mines, market taxes, harbor charges, rewards, and confiscated goods—jurors' pay accounts

³⁵ In this respect it has a similar function to ostracism—see chapter 1 n. 33.

³⁶ *Wasps* was performed in 422; *Third Olynthiac* was delivered in 349/348.

³⁷ While not formally a subset of the birth/wealth/educational elite, those wishing to make a name for themselves in the Assembly would in practice need sufficient economic freedom and leisure to attend regularly, and sufficient educational attainment to speak fluently, so would generally be in the upper socioeconomic stratum. See n. 25.

for only 900,000 drachmas (150 talents), somewhat less than 10 percent (656–65). The second charge, in reply to Philokleon’s question, is that the rest goes to politicians: Bdelykleon satirizes how politicians talk to the *dêmos*, who are taken in by their speeches and elect them (665–68). The third is that politicians take bribes: Bdelykleon says politicians intimidate the subject cities by threatening to destroy them through a speech,³⁸ unless the cities bribe them 300,000 drachmas a time not to (669–71). Fourth, that politicians collude to defraud the *dêmos*: they share each other’s bribes, then support each other’s cases, and get away with it because Philokleon (as a typical Athenian) keeps gaping at the jury paymaster (692–95).³⁹

Having made these charges, Bdelykleon then compares charge one to charges two and three in more depth, playing on a ‘politicians versus non-politicians’ dichotomy. The subject cities give politicians bribes, but Philokleon is content gnawing at the offal of the empire, and the subject cities see the rabble starving at the ballot box and wolfing down nothing, and think they are worthless because of it (672–75). Politicians are bribed—with an improbably varied list of items—but from all the land he rules from his naval duties, Philokleon (representing the Athenian everyman) gets nothing (675–79).⁴⁰ All those men are in powerful positions themselves, and paying out all sorts to their toadies; but if someone gives Philokleon just three obols, which he gained for the city himself by marching and fighting and besieging and many other toils, he is content—and this is slavery (682–85). Philokleon is ordered to be in the jury box at first light else he will lose his three obols, by some bullying stripling who will get his drachma however late he turns up (687–91). Philokleon (again as the Athenian everyman) rules over an empire from the Black Sea to Sardinia, but gets almost nothing out of it at all—and that little is dribbled out like olive oil, just enough to keep him alive (700–2). The contrast here could not be clearer: Philokleon and other normal Athenians do all the work of running the empire, while the political class reaps the rewards. Politicians are rolling in every kind of luxury, and splurging money on their favorites, but those who do an honest day’s work for the city get merely a pittance.

We might ask how much validity there was in these assertions. It is hard to be certain. However, the possibility of abuse of position by politicians was always present; certainly the Athenians were constantly aware of the possibility and took great pains to prevent it. Anyone caught embezzling funds or

³⁸ We might consider Kleon’s speech in the second Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.37–40).

³⁹ See Rhodes (2004) 228–29 on the ease with which demagogues could fool and flatter the Assembly.

⁴⁰ Philokleon is more than just a single ordinary Athenian, and sometimes plays incompatible parts (e.g., a man who loves to wield power over thieving politicians, but who has to be instructed in how politicians steal; a poor juror who needs his three *obols*, but rich enough to choose the lifestyle of an aristocrat).

taking bribes could expect serious sanctions from the *dêmos*: in chapter 5.4 we saw several cases (dating from around halfway between *Wasps* and *Third Olynthiac*) in which officials were prosecuted for alleged bribe-taking and embezzlement and sometimes executed, and such prosecutory control was almost certainly the norm. It was unlikely therefore that politicians were that corrupt as a rule (albeit in a gift-giving culture the gray area was large), but certainly Aristophanes seems to be playing to a general resentment that the political class as a whole did well out of the system,⁴¹ and many of them, particularly the demagogues (n. 37), would have been from among the elites. A nexus of emotions is therefore likely: first, envy among the (functional or actual) poor for those better off than them, however justifiable that status might be (envy, as ‘bad *phthonos*,’ not being interested in desert); second, indignation at genuine abuses; and third, transmuted envy masquerading as indignation, such as when the general emotional approach of the poor to the (potentially undeservedly) wealthy causes them to fixate on tiny peccadilloes with the same intensity as large crimes,⁴² or to be easily incited by prosecutors to find ‘Reds under the bed.’ These three scripts are distinguishable, but in Greek they were all covered by the one word *phthonos*, and so would have been especially easy to conflate—whether making one’s case in court (as we saw in chapter 5.4) or on the comic stage.

It is notable to what extent the fictional ‘charges’ in *Wasps* foreshadow those actually laid against Ergokles and Philokrates: they started their term in office poor, they ended it rich, so they have embezzled and taken bribes from “your” money. And in *Wasps* these accusations presage Bdelykleon’s final charge: “They want you to be poor,” he says, drawing a parallel to underfeeding a dog to make it more savage against enemies; “if they wanted to provide a living wage to the *dêmos*, they could do it easily” (703–6). Not only are politicians feathering their own nests, but they are purposely keeping everyone else poor so as to control them better. Behind its back, the political class is willfully enslaving the *dêmos*, and training it to be ever fiercer against enemies, so as to win an ever-greater empire for them to exploit.⁴³ And Bdelykleon proposes the solution: get rid of the politicians. “If you were not constantly being confined in some way by the cheats, think how rich you and all these men would be” (698–99: σκέψαι τούτων

⁴¹ See p. 94.

⁴² In the UK in 2009 there was a huge outcry against Members of Parliament (MPs), who had relatively moderate salaries but large expense accounts, when it was discovered what expenses some MPs had been charging. Popular revulsion at extremely wealthy MPs claiming for dredging the moat of a castle or for a duckhouse in an ornamental pond, turned with equal savagery against one whose claim for improvements to her official home included an 88 pence bath plug and whose bill (through an oversight) included her husband’s rental of two pornographic DVDs. In a different climate she would have been exposed merely to derision, but in difficult economic times and after several genuine scandals, her petty claims provoked fury equal to that at the much larger items.

⁴³ When *Wasps* was produced in 422, Athens was awash with money from the Empire.

ὥς ἐξόν σοι πλουτεῖν καὶ τοῖσιν ἅπασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀεὶ δημιζόντων οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ ἐγκεκλήσῃ. "They've cheated you," he is saying. "They have it, and you don't. Get rid of them, and then you will." The language is that of indignation; but the line between 'good' and 'bad' *phthonos* has been blurred almost to nothing.

A second Aristophanic comedy makes further hay with demagogues by focusing throughout on the *kômôidoumenos* Paphlagon (a thin cover for the demagogue Kleon).⁴⁴ *Phthonos* is doubly relevant to this play as there is plenty of *phthonos* onstage too (see chapter 7.1), but as with *Wasps* there are also passages aiming to arouse it in the audience.

Demosthenes starts by explaining to Sausage-Seller that he has all the qualifications for being a politician in Athens:⁴⁵ he is knavish, brazen, and from the market-place (181); he is not in any way noble (183–85); politics is right for him as he is uneducated and loathsome (191–93), though it may harm him that he can read a little (190); politics is a very base art, like making a sausage, and he can make mincemeat of the city's affairs, and win over the *dêmos* by sweetening them with words like a cook seasons a sausage (213–16); he has a foul voice and a base lineage, and is market-born (218).⁴⁶ In other words, Demosthenes says that politicians are the lowest of the low and the vilest of the vile, leading one to wonder how the very worst of *hoi polloi* might rise to the top. However, while the audience may see some truth in the caricature, they will recognize Demosthenes' description as a comic distortion, and as such it plays ambiguously to both 'good' and 'bad' *phthonos*.

In the two *agônes*, much of the raillery is general insulting,⁴⁷ or other types of shamelessness,⁴⁸ but several accusations are important to an examination of *phthonos*. First, that Paphlagon has been bribed by a foreign power, a bribe he immediately offers to share with Sausage-Seller for his silence (438–39). That politicians take bribes and share the spoils are both accusations that appeared in *Wasps*, as does the next charge: that Paphlagon has been cheating Demos of his due, only paying him a salary (presumably the three obols made so much of in *Wasps*),⁴⁹ while he intentionally prolongs

⁴⁴ Comic poets were in the habit of picking out the leading political figure for humiliation: (e.g., Perikles in Kratinos's *Dionysalexandros*, or Hyperbolos in Eupolis's *Marikas*—see Sommerstein (1996) 335). We should be careful not to overstate the desire to humiliate: the relish shown for *Wasps* as satire did not (as has been frequently noted) stop Athenians re-electing Kleon as general a few weeks later.

⁴⁵ On the identification of the slave as Demosthenes, see chapter 7 n. 3.

⁴⁶ De Ste. Croix (1972) believes Aristophanes expresses views on politics and politicians typical of his class, and works these serious views into his jokes wherever possible. Gomme (1938) argues the opposite: that Aristophanes' views were irrelevant to his writing, his only goal being to produce good comedy. See also Heath (1987), whose views are more nuanced, but closer to Gomme's.

⁴⁷ See Rosen (1988) on the iambic nature of much of the comedy of this play.

⁴⁸ Accusations of shamelessness, mostly against Paphlagon, occur eight times: at 277, 325, 385 twice, 397/8, 409, 638, 1206. On shamelessness in Old Comedy see Halliwell (2008) 243–63.

⁴⁹ Where *Wasps* depicts a representative figure of the *dêmos*, *Knights* distills it into a collective allegorical figure. On the personification and cult of Demos see Alexandri-Tzachou (1986).

the war so the *dêmos* does not notice him plundering and bribe-taking his way round Greece (801–7). The third charge is that Paphlagon bribes Demos. Paphlagon himself boasts that he knows how to feed the *dêmos* (715), and he and Sausage-Seller compete as to how much they can do for Demos/*dêmos*: first they try to bribe him with huge sacrifices (652–64), from which public meat will be distributed; Paphlagon later says he has filled the common Treasury with money, has racked and choked and extorted on his behalf, and cared nothing for private individuals in his aim to please (773–76); Sausage-Seller replies that he will offer Demos bread, and put a cushion under him (777–85), and later gives him items of clothing (871–72, 881–83).

A final accusation (related to the second) is that Paphlagon has abused his position for personal gain. The Chorus first makes the charge: Paphlagon devours the goods obtained in common (258); he examines those submitting their accounts like someone squeezing figs, destroying anyone inexperienced (259–63), and if he finds any citizen who is a simpleton, rich and not base, and trembling at public affairs, he does the same (264–65)—the reference is to *sukophantia* (see n. 27). Demosthenes adds that whenever Paphlagon goes into the public dining hall, he not only comes out full, but carrying away more food (282–83). Sausage-Seller says later that for every bite he gives the *dêmos*, he devours three times as much himself (717–18). Paphlagon's embezzlement is comically all about food, and the charge is proved when Sausage-Seller opens Paphlagon's box to find all the food he has embezzled (1218–20). Sausage-Seller explains: Paphlagon has always carried out his role in this way; he gives Demos a small part of his takings, and sets aside the greater part for himself (1221–23). Again this is similar to the 'charge' made in *Wasps*: that less than a tenth of the profits of the city go to the *dêmos* in pay, the remainder being stolen by politicians. Paphlagon, true to the nature of politicians in Aristophanes, staunchly maintains that his theft was for the city's good (1226),⁵⁰ but Demos rightly runs him out of town.

As with the charges made in *Wasps*, Aristophanes is playing both to general envy of the wealthy demagogues (and as I suggested above, the 'new' politicians, of which Kleon was the foremost, may have attracted more animus than ones from longer-established families), and to indignation at genuine crimes, but most of all to the gray area in between, in which latent—and not so latent—resentment at demagogues could thrive. Aristophanes counts on his audience's *phthonos* at politicians who seem to do 'quite nicely, thank you,' so as to rouse their laughter through *Schadenfreude* at Kleon's discomfiture and Paphlagon's comeuppance.

⁵⁰ Compare Hyp. 5.25, discussed at pp. 94–95.

6.3.2 AMBASSADORS

One specialized role in which some politicians acted was as ambassadors, and these are satirized in three passages of *Acharnians*. The first (61–90) is a splendidly unselfconscious report back to the Assembly by the Athenian ambassadors to the Persian king, followed by a second in similar vein by the ambassador to Thrace (136–54), both critiqued by Dikaiopolis.⁵¹ The third (593–619) is an argument between Dikaiopolis and the general (and *kômôidoumenos*) Lamachos. Ambassadors (to other Greek *poleis*, or to non-Greek powers such as Persia) were generally senior and experienced politicians, who were entrusted by the *dêmos* to negotiate on Athens's behalf. It is intriguing that, of all types of politician, they appear to be satirized more than any other.⁵² Aristophanes makes a number of 'charges' against them. If my surmise as to the comic point of such passages—that they play to popular animus by making such characters look ridiculous—is correct, there would seem to be a persistent undercurrent of popular resentment against the (supposedly) cushy life ambassadors led while in post.⁵³

Six specific 'charges' are alluded to in these passages. The first is that ambassadors are paid large amounts: two or three drachmas per day are mentioned (65–66, 602), rather more than the two or three obols a day for jury service and none for attending the Assembly.⁵⁴ Second, that the ambassadors draw out their negotiations (many years in one case, 66–67;⁵⁵ cf. 80–82, 136–39), thus ensuring they are paid for as long as possible. The third charge is that ambassadors are plied with vast quantities of good food, neat wine, and other luxurious comforts (69–70, 73–75, 77–78, 85–86, 88–89, 141).⁵⁶ The fourth is that ambassadors avoid the fighting that ordinary citizens have to do, by being sent on diplomatic missions (595–97).⁵⁷ Fifth, that only young men get to be ambassadors, while the old have to go to fight (599–601).⁵⁸ And the final

⁵¹ This passage serving to characterize him as a demotic hero.

⁵² Sommerstein (1996) 328: "of thirty-six known ambassadors of the Peloponnesian War period, twenty-two or 61% are mentioned in comedy."

⁵³ It is worth noting that a significant number of ambassadors were prosecuted—see Hansen (1975) 58 n. 6; Bauman (1990) 84–94.

⁵⁴ Pay for jury service was raised from 2 to 3 obols around the time of this play—see Powell (1988) 302, 331 n. 294; MacDowell (1995). Pay for attending the Assembly was introduced around 403/402 at one obol, and rapidly raised to three obols—Rhodes (1984) 146; Ober (1989) 98, 133). See also Markle (1985) 265 n. 1.

⁵⁵ Sommerstein (1973) 239 n. 9 notes the Archon referred to was in office some years before the Peloponnesian War started; *Acharnians* was staged six years into the war.

⁵⁶ The food includes an enormous bird three times the size of (the politician) Kleonymos, which Aristophanes names a *phenax*, to allow a joke about cheating (*phenakizein*, 89–90)—see Sommerstein (1973) 240 n. 12.

⁵⁷ There were several allusions in the *Wasps* passage examined above to the military service elderly jurors will have done to win and keep the Empire.

⁵⁸ See Rothfield (1999) 77–78 on this passage.

charge, that the same people always get to be ambassadors, their contrast with the *dêmos* (audience) emphasized by “you” (*humas men*) and “them” (*tôndi de*) (607–9).

Let us examine these charges in more depth. That ambassadors were over-paid cannot have been the general view of the *dêmos*: pay for ambassadors was set by the Assembly, and the level must have been considered appropriate for the job.⁵⁹ This was considerably more than jurors were paid; but the work was more specialized, went on for longer, and was potentially more dangerous—not just because of the rigors of traveling in the ancient world, but because ambassadors were not always treated well (and were occasionally even executed) by those they were sent to (or, indeed, by those who sent them).⁶⁰ The *dêmos* would have recognized that this required remuneration and incentivization well beyond a juror’s wage. As for the second charge, ambassadors dragging out their posting so as to draw more pay would certainly be grounds for prosecution under one of the procedures mentioned at chapter 5 n. 80, even if it did not emerge when (like all officials) they submitted their accounts and defended them at audit. If this type of misconduct were a regular phenomenon we would expect it to crop up much more frequently than it does in the oratorical corpus. Third, many ambassadors would have been treated luxuriously by their hosts, especially when they visited a rich kingdom such as Persia. However, they could not turn down hospitality without insulting their hosts.⁶¹ Fourth, unavailability for battle would necessarily be a concomitant effect of being sent on a diplomatic mission. However, as we have seen, the danger was not necessarily less as an ambassador. Fifth, the age issue could be an example of the young/old antithesis that permeates Old Comedy,⁶² though it might merely be embroidery for the other charges. Lamachos could not have been too young if he was a general,⁶³ though the charge may be aimed more at other ambassadors.⁶⁴ However, the best ambassadors were presumably

⁵⁹ See Westermann (1910) on the voting of pay and the amounts paid, which were to cover expenses and were not high given the expenses that could be incurred. See also Perlman (1976) 224–25; Harvey (1985) 203.

⁶⁰ Being sent as ambassador was a high-risk activity, since ambassadors who disappointed the *dêmos* could pay a very high price (death, or exile with confiscation of all property)—see Bauman (1990) 84–94; Hansen (1975) 58 n. 6. Philokrates in 343 is the most high profile (see Hansen (1975) 102).

⁶¹ It is worth noting that the ambassadors to both Persia and Thrace employ braggadocio. There may have been a tendency to bring back anecdotes of splendor, and the occasional souvenir may have added to this—see Olson (2002) 90 and Sommerstein (1980) 160 on Pylilampes’ peacocks, probably a gift from the king of Persia.

⁶² See MacDowell (1995) 350–51. Other examples include Pheidippides’ mistreatment of Strepsiades in *Clouds*, and the chorus of old, poor men in *Wasps*.

⁶³ Alkibiades became general in 419/418 (Thuc. 5.52) in his early thirties, but Thucydides comments that he came to prominence unusually young, because of his family connections (5.43).

⁶⁴ For example, Demosthenes was about thirty-seven when he was sent on the embassy to Philip in 346.

chosen for each job, irrespective of their ages. Sixth and finally, it would clearly make sense for people to be repeatedly chosen as ambassadors, since negotiations would benefit from expertise. Additionally politicians tended to be good speakers (a useful skill on an embassy),⁶⁵ and someone would also have to be well known to be elected as an ambassador by the Assembly.⁶⁶

All six charges, if genuine, are ones that we would expect to incur ‘good’ *phthonos*, since they are—or can be presented as—abuses of money and political position. However, in each case there is a good rationale for the perk. Rationality is of course not a bar to emotion, and as before there is good reason to think that the average person would both have (irrationally) envied them and resented their perks and (rationally) acknowledged that they were essential concomitants of the role. Even if rationality is left out of the analysis, situations can arouse mixed emotions, and just as a situation may not be completely moral *or* immoral (especially in a joke which takes its humor from a variety of real-life situations), so the emotion it arouses may not be entirely indignation *or* (transmuted) envy. Whatever mix of emotions is present, however, all will be one form of *phthonos* or another, and that invitation to *phthonos* comes very close to surfacing when Dikaiopolis turns to the audience and asks, “Have *you* ever been an ambassador?” (609–13).

We should note that it is not just ambassadors in general who are castigated, but many are by name. This includes Lamachos (595–619), but also a list of people sent to various towns in Sicily (603–6).⁶⁷ The *phthonos* played to, then, is not just toward ambassadors in general, but toward many named individuals who (presumably) could have been sent on these specific named embassies around this time. In a period of war and hardship, Athenians may have seen the need to send out ambassadors; but Aristophanes seems to be playing to a deep-seated resentment (*phthonos*) that they had to spend their dwindling cash supplies paying famous and probably reasonably well-off politicians to have time off from the difficult and dangerous life of the average Athenian citizen/soldier.⁶⁸

6.3.3 GENERALS

Along with ambassadors, another prominent special class of politician was generals. At this stage in Athens’s history, it was the norm for prominent

⁶⁵ Consider the account of the various politicians’ speeches to Philip at Aeschin. 2.22–39.

⁶⁶ This ensured there would be some inevitable recycling of the same candidates in all jobs filled by *cheirotomia* rather than *klêrôsis*. See Ober (1989), Connor (1992) on the role of the elite in Athenian politics.

⁶⁷ Aristophanes runs several of the names together, as if all these ambassadors are indistinguishable.

⁶⁸ Compare the ambassador to Persia lying down in covered coaches, while Dikaiopolis has to sleep among the rubbish by the city battlements (70–72).

generals also to be politicians.⁶⁹ Perikles is the most renowned, but others in this period include Kleon, Nikias, and Alkibiades. Unlike most posts in Athens, generals were elected (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 22.2, 44.4), and only one person could be general from each tribe. For someone to be chosen, he would therefore have to be well known, which biased the selection in favor of those rich enough to buy votes, or famous because of their political career or family connections. Like ambassadors, generals operated out of sight of the Assembly so were difficult to control, and it is unsurprising therefore that they were particularly prone to prosecution—and political satire.

Wasps, written nine years into a major war when generals would have been especially prominent, lays into them as well as demagogues in general. The unfortunate *kômôidoumenos* is Laches,⁷⁰ a general who had been leading operations in Sicily since 427.⁷¹ Early in the play Philokleon says he is off to see the trial of Laches, whom everyone says has a hoard of money, and against whom Kleon has enjoined jurors to turn up with three days' worth of anger (*orgê*), so as to punish him for his misdeeds (240–44). Deprived of his chance to be a juror in that trial, Philokleon later gets to adjudicate in the trial of the dog Labes (Thief), prosecuted by the dog Kuon (Dog), for stealing a Sicilian cheese.⁷²

One of the household slaves tells us that the dog Labes has run into the kitchen, stolen a fresh Sicilian cheese, and eaten it all (836–38). The second dog (Kuon) wants to prosecute him if there is a trial (841–42). When he gets the opportunity, he charges that Labes has committed the most terrible acts, not just against himself but against all the rowers in the fleet, by running off into the corner with a large cheese and gorging himself on it (908–11); he sailed all the way round the plaster and ate the casing from all the cities (924–25).⁷³ Whether or not the charge reflects a real prosecution, it seems to be playing to an Athenian fear that their generals might take bribes from an enemy instead of fighting them as the *dêmos* wished. If any evidence came to light, this would certainly be a prosecutable offence; and the Athenian *dêmos* was in any case in

⁶⁹ See Connor (1992) 144.

⁷⁰ Though Kleon is the more prominent target of *Wasps*.

⁷¹ Thucydides mentions Laches commanding in Sicily, an important arena, from summer 427/6 to winter 426/5 (3.86, 3.90, 3.103), in connection with the armistice of spring 423 (4.18), and as an oath-taker for the Peace of Nikias (5.19). He must therefore have been a senior and respected commander. D. Barrett (1964) 216 n. 17 believes he achieved little in Sicily, and that this scene satirizes a real prosecution by Kleon for bribery. Plato's *Laches* portrays him as brave and loyal, but not overly intelligent—not dissimilar characteristics to Aristophanes' Labes. See MacDowell (1988) 163–65 further on the real-life case (he suspends judgment on the charge).

⁷² Labes and Kuon thus fill well the role of comic surrogates—see n. 20. Their names are sufficiently similar to the targets that all would know who was being lampooned. MacDowell (1988) 250 and D. Barrett (1964) 217 n. 32 note that both surrogates share their targets' demes (l. 895). That Labes and Kuon are both their political alter-egos and dogs, and speak/act sometimes like one, sometimes like the other, is essential to the parody in this scene—see MacDowell (1995) 167–70.

⁷³ The verb *katasikelizein* (l. 911) is a contraction of *katasiteisthai* (feed on) and *Sikelia* (Sicily). Cheeses were cased in plaster—see D. Barrett (1964) 217 n. 33.

the habit of convicting unsuccessful generals,⁷⁴ without needing other reasons than their failure. However, given their evident suspicions about all politicians being on the take, bribery by the enemy must have been more than an occasional rumor—rumor (i.e., slander) being a good way to fan *phthonos*.

But Kuon has a second charge: that Labes kept all the cheese for himself and refused to give Kuon his share. He could not have been serving the interests of “you” (the ‘court’ onstage, and the audience) if he did not give a share to Kuon when asked (914–16). Labes should not be freed, as he is the most eat-it-yourself man of all dogs (922–23). He must be punished, as one kitchen cannot support two thieves (927–28). Kuon’s (Kleon’s) main gripe, then, is not that Labes (Laches) stole all the cheese (took bribes) himself, but that he would not share them with him. A real prosecutor would not of course have made this charge; but with Kleon being both a politician and a general, it serves to fan the audience’s *phthonos* still further (i.e., politicians must always have their cut, and will destroy you if they do not get it), while allowing Aristophanes to have a further dig at his old nemesis.⁷⁵

6.4 Conclusion

Plato is probably exaggerating when he says that the root of all comedy is malice. However, this approach to Aristophanes shows that his political comedies do indeed play extensively to audience *phthonos*—‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and indeterminate—for the political class.⁷⁶ While *kômôidoumenoi* are abused, at least with political *kômôidoumenoi* it is not just simple abuse, but rather the poet substitutes socially acceptable bases for his criticism (i.e., accusations of wrongdoing—allegations that seem sometimes meant to be serious). These accusations might have little to support them in the majority of cases, but the fact that they can be made, and regularly are, shows one way in which the Athenian system evolved institutions that had a symbiotic relationship with the democracy—in the case of political abuse in comedy, helping to keep the majority of politicians reasonably honest, and thus reinforcing the stability of

⁷⁴ A habit to which we owe Thucydides’ history. Dem. 4.47 says that all generals are tried two or three times. Hansen (1975) 58–65 infers by extrapolation from known *eisangelia* trials that an average of two generals of every board of ten might be put on trial, and the vast majority of *eisangelia* trials ended in death for the defendant (unless he fled into exile—e.g., Ergokles, as we saw in chapter 5.4).

⁷⁵ Aristophanes’ and Kleon’s quarrel dated back to the performance of *Banqueters* in 427, through a possible indictment of Aristophanes by Kleon (see the *parabasis* of *Acharnians*), and Aristophanes’ viciousness about Kleon in *Knights*—see MacDowell (1995) 111–12, 170.

⁷⁶ And it is not just Aristophanes: Kratinos, Eupolis, and other Old Comic playwrights do this too (see n. 44). Almost certainly *phthonos* is an essential part of satirization of people other than politicians also (e.g., Socrates in *Clouds*)—cf. Dem. 35.39–43, and Sanders (2012b) 373–74 for discussion of this passage, which seems to speak to widespread hostility toward sophists.

the democratic system. It is a nice paradox that Athenians both disapproved of *phthonos*, and spent large sums on a festival that utilized it constantly, in order to negotiate the relationship between the democratic *polis*, its citizens, and its public figures. As is generally the case with *phthonos*, this probably was not admitted to. But a skilled dramatist like Aristophanes knew just how far he could go in touching this nerve, without his audience realizing that *phthonos* was indeed the emotion he was playing to—a realization that, due to *phthonos*'s unacceptability, might have made the humor too uncomfortable for the laughter that would gain him his prize.

Onstage *Phthonos* in Old Comedy and Tragedy

I now move from a focus on emotions aroused in the audience to look instead at onstage *phthonos* narratives in both Old Comedy and tragedy, which we can set beside those in oratory seen in chapter 5.2. *Phthonos* narratives are comparatively rare in drama, and are not always identified by the word itself, so reading them requires all the knowledge of *phthonos* scripts that we have gained so far. While they are rare in drama, and when they do occur they tend only to be associated with short scenes, this is not the case with sexual jealousy, an emotion that, as we shall see in chapter 8, drives the entire plot of several tragedies, and appears regularly in other genres. The techniques demonstrated briefly in this chapter will be used to much greater effect there.

Nevertheless, *phthonos* is not entirely absent in Old Comedy and tragedy, and I look here at two plays from the former genre (Aristophanes' *Knights* and *Assemblywomen*) and three from the latter (Sophocles' *Ajax*, Euripides' *Hippolytos* and *Ion*). We have already seen that *phthonos* is far from alien to Old Comedy. Goldhill has argued that "[t]ragedy . . . resists the 'rivalrous emotions' of 'envy, spite and jealousy,' except as brief tokens in rhetorical battles."¹ While accepting that these emotions are perhaps less frequent in tragedy than some (e.g., rage, grief), I shall demonstrate over the next two chapters that envy, spite, and (in particular) jealousy in fact have more than a small role to play in the genre.²

7.1 *Knights*

As well as being a major element in audience arousal in *Knights*, *phthonos* is also a significant onstage force. We see it first in the attitudes of the two slaves

¹ Goldhill (2003) 178.

² The three tragedies discussed briefly in this chapter and the three in depth in the next chapter account for nearly a fifth of the thirty-two surviving tragedies. An emotion script approach demonstrates that at least some of these go well beyond "rhetorical battles."

Nikias and Demosthenes toward Paphlagon.³ Nikias and Demosthenes have been slaves to Demos for longer, but Paphlagon has usurped their place in the house. Demosthenes makes a number of specific complaints about Paphlagon. He says that he flatters Demos grossly, and lavishes attention on him (46–51); he presents what others have done for Demos as his own work (52–57);⁴ he drives the other slaves off from Demos, so he gets all the gratitude for serving him (58–60); he makes prophecies to Demos to his own advantage (61–63); he tells lies about the other slaves to get them whipped (63–65); and he takes bribes and blackmails the other slaves (65–70).

As so often in Old Comedy, this scene can be read at two levels: literally, as slaves in Demos's household complaining about a new slave gaining preference; and satirically, as longer-serving politicians complaining at a parvenu demagogue being the new darling of the *dêmos*.⁵ In line with the approach of the previous chapter, each complaint can be seen as reflecting dislikes and suspicions of—and resentment (*phthonos*) at—the behavior of real-life demagogues. But additionally here we can consider the depicted emotions of the onstage characters Nikias and Demosthenes themselves. The language is certainly that of indignation (or 'good *phthonos*'), but what is the underlying psychology?

Demosthenes and Nikias were already slaves, and already had individual relationships with Demos, which included doing many of the things that Paphlagon subsequently gets to do instead (bathing him, fanning him at dinner, etc.). Their exclusive relationships with Demos have now been usurped: they have not just a rival for Demos's affection, but in fact the affection has been taken away altogether—and, in their view, unjustly. This is, in English, a possessive jealousy scenario, and in Greek it falls squarely under *phthonos*; a not dissimilar case is seen in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, where the king of Armenia is jealous of (*phthonein*) the man his son goes hunting with, in case the son admires him more (3.1.39.8); and in some respects it is analogous to Euripides' Medea losing Jason to Glauke (as we shall see in the next chapter). A further indication that the emotion felt is *phthonos*/jealousy comes from the intended solution: to find another slave even more venal who can take away Paphlagon's position from him. Nikias and Demosthenes do not want to be favorites alongside Paphlagon (emulation). They do not want to be favorites again instead of Paphlagon (covetousness); they make no mention of

³ I agree with most commentators that the two slaves are meant as parodies of Nikias and Demosthenes specifically, rather than two other generic politicians—see, for example, MacDowell (1995) 87–88, Sommerstein and Barrett (1978) 33; see Dover (1987) 266–78, esp. 274, and Henderson (2003) for the contrary view.

⁴ As an example, Demosthenes mentions a Spartan cake he had baked in Pylos; the theme of Kleon stealing Demosthenes' victory at Pylos crops up again at 392, 744–45, and 1201.

⁵ Attacking the new favorite of the *dêmos* might well have been a feature of political rivalry; consider the charges laid against Alkibiades in 415 (profaning the Mysteries, and mutilating the Herms), which Thucydides says were fanned by those he had supplanted in the *dêmos*'s affections (Thuc. 6.28).

wanting the favored status back. They do not even want to replace Paphlagon with someone more worthy of the position (indignation). They only wish to deprive Paphlagon of it, even if it goes to someone new, someone even worse (i.e., even if depriving Paphlagon is to their own detriment too). This destructive urge identifies their primary emotion as *phthonos*. That is not to say that there is no genuine indignation ('good *phthonos*') there too—people can react to situations with more than one emotion—but their intended solution makes clear that transmuted jealousy ('bad *phthonos*') is dominant. Paphlagon later says they are *phthoneros* (1051: *Μὴ πείθου· φθονεραὶ γὰρ ἐπικρώζουσι κορώναι*). In itself this accusation is not decisive: as we saw in chapter 5.2, accusations of *phthonos* are rhetorically commonplace between political opponents (which is close to the satirical reading of this scene). However, a script approach confirms that in this instance the accusation is valid.

Such rhetorical accusations, however, are reciprocal, and Demosthenes' charges suggest that Paphlagon acts out of *phthonos*/jealousy to retain his own new position as Demos's favorite slave, as shown by his insisting on being the one to serve Demos and beating off the other slaves, and especially his slandering of them. We saw in chapter 3.1 that slander is frequently a means of giving expression to *phthonos*, and in chapter 5.2 that orators can bolster charges of *phthonos* with accusations of *diabolê*, supported by a battery of other charges (*pseudeis*, *loidoria*, *blasphemia*).⁶ It is Nikias who first accuses Paphlagon of slander (6–7: *κάκιστα δὴθ' οὗτός γε πρῶτος Παφλαγόνων αὐταῖς διαβολαῖς*), and Demosthenes agrees he is a very great slanderer (44–45: *Παφλαγόνα, πανουργότατον καὶ διαβολώτατόν τινα*); he refers to Paphlagon's slanders three times later in the play (486, 491, 496), and Paphlagon himself admits he will slander Sausage-Seller (288).⁷ Demosthenes' accusation that Paphlagon tells lies is repeated by Sausage-Seller (630: *ψευδατραφάξυος*) and admitted by Paphlagon (694–95: *εἰ μὴ σ' ἀπολέσαιμι, εἴ τι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμοὶ ψευδῶν ἐνείη, διαπέσοιμι πανταχῇ*). Demosthenes also calls Paphlagon a *baskanos* (103), implying he has an envious eye.⁸ Sausage-Seller eventually says that Paphlagon put a stop to buggery out of jealousy that any other orators might emerge (878–80): *οὐκ οὐκ δὴ ταῦτα δεινὸν ἐστι πρωκτοτηρεῖν παῦσαι τε τοὺς κινουμένους; κοῦκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἐκείνους οὐχὶ φθονῶν ἔπαυσας, ἵνα μὴ ῥήτορες γένοιτο*), which, looking through the vulgarity of Old Comic satire, explicitly accuses Paphlagon of being jealous of his position.⁹

⁶ See chapter 5 nn. 39 and 45, and main text at those places.

⁷ An admission that would not happen outside comedy.

⁸ Ironically a slur the logographer Demosthenes later makes his own in his speech against his long-time rival Aischines (see chapter 5 n. 45).

⁹ Probably also a reference to the prevalence of homosexual relationships in the upper classes from which politicians traditionally came, and to the educative and patronage aspects of such relationships, which helped an aspiring politician's rise.

7.2 Assemblywomen

Phthonos is a minor recurring theme in this play, from the point (almost half-way through) that Praxagora outlines her “communization” scheme for all personal property to become common possessions. She begins by saying there will be “no more clothes-stealing, no more *phthonos* of the neighbors, no more being naked, no more poverty, no more abusiveness (*loidoreisthai*), no more seizing property for debt” (565–67). *Phthonos* here is effectively equated with the ‘have-nots,’ with poverty and its concomitants. However, the argument is then advanced not in terms of *phthonos*, but in terms of equality: everything will be held in common and equal (594: *koinon, homoion*), and she describes this as democratic (631: *dêmotikê*), thus extending Athens’s democratic political ideology into the economic sphere.¹⁰ Furthermore, she says, this commonality will extend to sexual favors: thus one must have sex with someone old and ugly before one can enjoy someone young and handsome (614 ff.).

The following scenes subject these two aspects—equalization of property and sexual favors—to scrutiny (the latter to much greater comic effect). In the next scene, a citizen refuses to hand over his property “at least until” he sees what everyone else is going to do (769–70: *φυλάξομαι, πρὶν ἂν γ’ ἴδω τὸ πλῆθος ὅ τι βουλεύεται*). He does not want to lose his own property, but he is less concerned about this than that others might keep theirs while he does not. This is not a *phthonos* scenario as such; nevertheless, there is something *phthonos*-like about his stronger concern for what others have than for what he has himself, and his supposed openmindedness about being deprived of his own property so long as others are equally deprived.

The following scene contains a more obvious *phthonos* scenario (not least because of the presence of the word), as the girl and old woman bicker about who should get to have sex with the young man first. The girl tells the old woman not to envy (*mê phthonei*) young girls, who are voluptuous, with soft thighs and breasts (i.e., which will attract men), while she is only fit to lie beside Death (900–5).¹¹ However, the old woman later argues that she gets first go under the new law, and when the girl tries to prevent her the old woman accuses her of jealousy (*phthonousa*) in turn (1043–44). Both believe they have a right to sex with the young man—one by nature, the other by law—and that the other is trying to deprive them unjustly. Both become furiously indignant, but argue that the other’s expressed indignation is really

¹⁰ Sommerstein (1998) 194 suggests a democratic rationale for economic leveling: “because the poor age, and lose their looks, more quickly than the rich (who, apart from not having to spend such long hours working in the sun, can afford more and better unguents to keep their skins in good condition).”

¹¹ Ussher (1973) 200 suggests these lines are addressed to passersby, as are the old woman’s preceding lines. This renders the *phthonos* accusation very close to those in forensic oratory.

phthonos. As dispassionate observers we might have sympathy with both accusations, but the issue is less about what emotions are felt than about rhetorical strategy: each of them accuses the other of *phthonos* in wanting what she herself has, and they both deny the other's accusation by recourse to arguments about rights, thus making the same intuitive leap that modern psychologists have recognized about the easy confusion of transmuted envy with indignation/demands for justice. As with the reciprocal *phthonos* accusations in *Knights*, we can note some similarity to Attic oratory: there too, one accuses one's opponent of *phthonos*, yet claims other emotions for one's own motivation (see chapter 5.1–2).

7.3 Ajax

The action of Sophocles' *Ajax* revolves around two decisions taken by Ajax: first, to kill the Atreidai and to torture and kill Odysseus; second, to commit suicide. The motivation for the second decision is generally given as shame or loss of face (*atimia*): at having killed farm animals, at being unable to revenge himself, at being unable to take a great prize home to prove himself worthy to be his father's son; the only possible way he can salvage some *timê* now is to kill himself.¹² The motivation for his first decision is more controversial: some argue it is also shame, or at least *atimia* and an attempt to regain face;¹³ others that he is motivated by anger and a desire for revenge.¹⁴ I do not disagree with either of these motivations: people can do things for more than one reason, and they both seem central to his decision to kill the three men. But I believe a psychological approach indicates that jealousy (*phthonos*) is an additional motivation in Ajax's decision to torture specifically Odysseus before killing him.

The key to understanding this aspect of Ajax's emotional state is the Judgment of Arms, which takes place before the play begins. Although the Arms have been awarded to Odysseus, Ajax believes this is wrong. It is notable that he says in his first speech that the Arms that have been taken from him are

¹² Williams (1993) 72–73, 84–85; Cairns (1993) 230–31; Easterling (1989) 48; Zanker (1992) 22. Lansky (1996) for Ajax's shame being pathological. Winnington-Ingram (1980) 27, Konstan (2006) 105–6, Hesk (2003) 43, and Knox (1961) 5 all note that Ajax does not express regret for his attempt to kill the Atreidai and Odysseus.

¹³ Lansky (1996); Hesk (2003) 43; Simpson (1969) 88; Winnington-Ingram (1980) 18–19. Konstan (2006) 105–6 explicitly disagrees with shame as a motive, as Ajax never says he is shamed; this may be true, but he certainly talks about his *atimia* (e.g., line 98), and Kamerbeek (1953) 37 notes it is not accidental that some of Ajax's earliest words are *kompos paresti* ("boasting, talking big"; 96).

¹⁴ Konstan (2006) 105–6; Hesk (2003) 22, 42; W. V. Harris (2001) 64; W. V. Harris (2003) 124. Easterling (1989) 48 tells us Ajax felt insulted and wanted revenge, insults being one of the three types of behavior that Aristotle believes arouse *orgê* (Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378b10–15), which is a desire for revenge (Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–32).

“mine” (10: τᾶμ’ ἀφαιρείσθων ὄπλα),¹⁵ and this sense of prior possession is crucial. Homeric tradition held that Ajax was second only in arms to Achilles,¹⁶ a tradition that had remained intact through to the fifth century,¹⁷ and which confirmed that the Judgment should automatically have awarded the Arms to Ajax, to whom their value is not so much intrinsic as symbolic of this ranking. With no prior indication in the play that Sophocles intended to alter this aspect of the myth, the audience would have approached the play in the traditional expectation that the Arms would most fairly have gone to Ajax, and had been withheld from him unjustly. This interpretation, fed by Ajax’s reference to “my” Arms, is upheld through the play. Ajax believes Achilles himself, had he lived, would have awarded him his armor as the prize for excellence (442–44), and says that the Atreidai procured them dishonestly for Odysseus (445–46).¹⁸ Later Teukros says Menelaus has been discovered to be a thief who fixed the voting (1135), and Menelaus tries speciously to place the blame instead on unnamed judges (1136), but does not deny that there has been some error in the outcome of the voting, thus implicitly recognizing Ajax’s entitlement to the Arms. It is clear then that Ajax believed that the Arms should have been awarded to him, indeed that they were *already* his by right and had been taken from him illegitimately—and he was probably right to do so. This all suggests an anger response.¹⁹ However, his exclusive relationship with “his” Arms (i.e., a possession), which have been lost to a rival (Odysseus), suggests to us—and to the audience—to expect some behavior indicative of jealousy (*phthonos*) too.

What emotions does the play mention? First, anger. Ajax does not admit to it—perhaps surprisingly for an emotion that is supposed to motivate him; however, others do attribute anger to him. Athena says Ajax was made heavy with *cholos* on account of the Arms (41). The Chorus (his subjects, who know him well) says they hope Ajax has been converted from his *thumos* against the Atreidai (717–18), and later that Ajax wished to be reconciled with the gods after his *cholos* (744). And Teukros knows that Ajax could be portrayed as a bad-tempered man, whose *thumos* was roused to strife over nothing (1017–18). A second important emotion is hatred; Ajax does not express

¹⁵ All the commentators have noted this as significant: Jebb (1896) 26 says that with Achilles dead, Ajax considered the Arms belonged to him by right; cf. Garvie (1998) 133; Stanford (1963) 70. Kamerbeek (1953) 38 notes Ajax says they are “mine,” and not “due to me” (i.e., they are *already* “mine”).

¹⁶ Hom. *Il.* 2.768–69—see Hesk (2003) 32–33.

¹⁷ For example, Pind. *Nem.* 7.27—see Hesk (2003) 36–37.

¹⁸ Garvie (1998) 166 notes that the verb πράσσω here implies a “secret or underhand transaction”; cf. Stanford (1963) 117; Jebb (1896) 76.

¹⁹ Fisher (1992) 313–14 points to the irony inherent in the phrase “how great a *hybris* he had gone and avenged on them” (304: ὅσῃν κατ’ αὐτῶν ὕβριν ἐκτείσαιτ’ ἰών): strictly this is Ajax’s view, that he was avenging the Atreidai’s and Odysseus’s *hubris* against him; but since we know they were innocent it is Ajax who perpetrated the *hubris*.

hatred as an emotion (*misos*) for his enemies,²⁰ but he does admit to enmity as a cultural value (*echthros*). Menelaus says he and Ajax hated each other (1134), though other comments by him (1054), Agamemnon (1373), and Odysseus (1336, 1347) testify only to their hatred for Ajax. Ajax does however describe Odysseus as his *echthros* (389)—an enmity also noted by Athena (2) and Odysseus (78), who states that it dates from the Judgment of Arms (1337)—and more generally talks about “my enemies” (557, 653, 772, 829), which is clear in context means Odysseus and the Atreidai; the Chorus (196, 1042) and Tekmessa (495, 924) also talk about these three as “enemies.” A third emotion is wounded pride, or shame: Ajax does not use the words *aidôs* or *aischunê*, but he does say he is dishonored (*atimos*) (426–27, 440), and that the Atreidai will not dishonor him again (98), implying they have in the past; also he expresses a concern that his enemies are laughing at him (367, 382), and the Chorus (383, 957–58, 1043) and Tekmessa (961) agree.²¹

It is clear that Ajax does not talk about his emotions much. However, there are strong indications that he feels the affects listed above, and all stem from the decision to award the Arms to Odysseus. Perhaps unsurprisingly for such a truly Homeric hero, the language he uses is predominantly that of the Homeric value system (honor and dishonor, friendship and enmity); however, what one feels is not bounded entirely by what one says one feels, and we should not ignore these strong indications for Ajax’s emotional state. Anger, hatred, and wounded pride are all perfectly acceptable emotions—psychologically and generically—in their own right, especially in relation to dishonor, and there is no reason to believe that Sophocles did not intend to depict Ajax as feeling these emotions. However, modern psychological scholarship tells us that all three emotions are also affects that appear in jealousy scenarios, and combined with the situation it might not surprise us to see behavior typical of jealousy (*phthonos*) as a fourth (if lesser) emotional motivation. Ajax’s *phthonos* is not stated,²² but we know that one never admits to this emotion (chapters 3.1 and 5.2); however, it becomes clear if we consider the actions his emotional state impels: to only kill the Atreidai, but to both torture and kill Odysseus.

Of the affects discussed above, it is clear that Ajax’s anger and hatred are directed at, and wounded pride aroused by, all three of his enemies; however, it is only Odysseus who possesses “his” Arms, and this explains why Odysseus’s punishment differs from that of the Atreidai. The latter have dishonored him (98, 100), proved to be his enemies (557, 653, 772, 829), and are believed to be

²⁰ He only directly expresses hatred for the long-dead Hector (817–18, cf. 665), though he does make a general comment (in his deception speech) as to the amount one should hate enemies (678–80: ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἀρτίως ὅτι ὁ τ’ ἐχθρὸς ἡμῶν ἐς τοσόνδ’ ἐχθαρτέος, ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὐθις).

²¹ See Cairns (1993) 228–29, Knox (1961) 6, and Hesk (2003) 42 on Ajax’s sense of dishonor and his being mocked by his enemies. There is considerable similarity to Medea here (see p. 138).

²² The only mention of *phthonos* in the play is the Chorus’s description of the *phthonos* of Ajax’s enemies (157).

reveling in his humiliation (367)—the appropriate response from any (heroic) Greek is to kill them. But if he feels *phthonos* for Odysseus, we should expect to see something more destructive, more ‘spoiling,’ and we do. Ajax *will* kill Odysseus and take back his Arms, but first he wishes to humiliate him: he does not want Odysseus to die yet (106: *θανεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ τί πω θέλω*); he intends to tie him to a pillar and whip him until his back is crimson before he dies (108–10).²³ This shows more than enmity: for that he wished only to kill. His behavior toward Odysseus, now that he has him in his power, is spiteful, even sadistic—and Tekmessa says that while delivering this whipping that he was laughing (303) (i.e., he feels spite, or *Schadenfreude*).²⁴ These indications should alert us that *phthonos* too is part of Ajax’s mental state: the sadistic whipping cannot be motivated simply by anger, because otherwise he would apply it to the Atreidai too, and *Schadenfreude* is motivated by invidiousness not anger (see chapter 2.2.3). Ajax’s situation, affects, and resulting speech and actions match those of jealousy scenarios (see chapter 2.4.2), and we should recognize that one of his motivations (albeit perhaps a lesser one) is *phthonos*.

7.4 Phaidra

It is beyond doubt that the main emotion that Phaidra in Euripides’ *Hippolytos* labors under, apart from *erôs*, is *aidôs* (shame), and this is the primary motivation of her suicide and accusation of rape: only by neutralizing Hippolytos’s credibility with Theseus can she guarantee the preservation of her own, and her children’s, reputations.²⁵ However, there is a trail of evidence that Phaidra also feels *phthonos* for Hippolytos, as early as her first appearance on stage, and that this *phthonos* contributes to the reasons for leaving her suicide note. Shortly after Phaidra is carried on stage, in her starvation-induced delirium she speaks three passages of fantasy: in the first she says she wishes to draw water from the spring, and lie beneath the poplar tree in the lush meadow (208–11); in the second she wants to go to the mountain, and hunt wild animals in the pine wood with dogs, while she shouts at the hounds and casts Thracian spears (215–22); in the third she prays to Artemis that she can train horses in the exercise ground on her sacred precinct (228–31). It seems no

²³ For real-life parallels of tying to a pillar and whipping, see Aeschin. 1.59 *re* Hegesandros’s and Timarchos’s humiliation of Pittalakos; Fisher (2001) 197 on this treatment being indicative of servile status, and for further bibliography; cf. Lys. fr. 2b.4 on Teisis’s humiliation of Archippos (Todd (2000) 348, 350). Again see Medea (p. 142) for another example of *phthonos* wanting its target to suffer worse than death.

²⁴ Interestingly, Odysseus denies a desire to laugh at Ajax’s misfortunes when invited to by Athena (79–80), showing he is not himself motivated by *phthonos*.

²⁵ Of the vast literature on Phaidra’s *aidôs* see especially Dodds (1925); Segal (1970); Kovacs (1980b); Kawashima (1986); Sommerstein (1988) 24–28; Craik (1993); Cairns (1993) 314–40; Williams (1993) 225–30; S. Mills (2002) 53–60.

accident that all these are aspects of Hippolytos's carefree life: he worships Artemis, and in her company hunts wild animals with hounds in the green pinewoods (15–19; cf. 52–56); he goes to the virgin meadow watered by rivers (73–74, 76–78); and he exercises horses (110–12); as the son of an Amazon, the Thracian reference could even apply to him. It has been frequently noted that this is Phaidra's means of expressing her passion for Hippolytos.²⁶ But as Goldhill points out, it is also an expression of her transgressive desire to break out of the cloistered female world, and run free with Hippolytos—not just to be with him, but also to enjoy the pastimes themselves with him.²⁷ Even at this early stage, while she is besotted with Hippolytos but before his rejection, Phaidra envies Hippolytos his lifestyle—even if at present that is the emulative envy of *zêlos* rather than the destructive envy of *phthonos*.

However, this changes after his conversation with the Nurse, with his diatribe against women in general, his violent rejection and denunciation of Phaidra in particular, and his threat to reveal all to Theseus.²⁸ The “no” to incestuous adultery by itself would not be surprising, and neither would a shocked response; the Nurse and the Chorus, who are on Phaidra's side, have already responded in just this way (353–61, 362–72).²⁹ Phaidra is not reacting to this, but rather to Hippolytos's high-handedness and his threat to expose her. The high-handedness of his rejection is a blow to her pride;³⁰ and the threat to expose her, to destroy her, turns him into an enemy: it turns her erotic love to anger, which must be assuaged.³¹ We can see that Phaidra now feels for Hippolytos not just emulation for his lifestyle, but also wounded pride (a ‘narcissistic wound’ in psychoanalysts' terminology), hatred, and rage. We can note that these are the affects psychologists associate with envy scenarios (see chapter 2.1.2), and it is relevant that the last three were aroused simultaneously by the manner of his rejection and his planned exposure of her to Theseus (the two things she mentions in her exit speech): it is these that turn her *zêlos* to *phthonos*.

²⁶ Dodds (1925) 102; Knox (1952) 6; W. S. Barrett (1964/2001) 200. Glenn (1976) and Craik (1998) 32 see these desires as erotic; Dimock (1977) 244–45 believes Phaidra loves Hippolytos's chastity.

²⁷ Goldhill (1986) 124–25. Goldhill describes Phaidra as wanting the life of a Bacchant, and once again Hippolytos has prefigured this Dionysiac desire in returning with his friends from a *kômos* (55).

²⁸ Kovacs (1987) 54 argues that Phaidra is offstage during the denunciation. Halleran (1995) 200–1 cites the main scholarship for and against this view. I agree with Halleran that the scene is dramatically much stronger with her present; cf. W. S. Barrett (1964/2001) 284–85.

²⁹ Kovacs (1987) 27–28, 46, 56.

³⁰ Blomqvist (1982) 403. S. Mills (2002) 64–65 says moderns, conditioned by Christianity's “sex-phobia,” are inclined to focus on Hippolytos's desire for virginity, and see his downfall purely in that light; however, a Greek would have focused on his arrogance in thinking he was better than everyone else, including Aphrodite. See Kovacs (1987) 27 also on Hippolytos's “puritanism.” Goldhill (1986) 118 notes Hippolytos's rejection of the values of the *oikos* (sex, marriage, and children).

³¹ Kovacs (1987) 30, 59–60, 63 on Phaidra's enmity, and her desire for revenge as part of traditional heroic pride. See also Willink (1968) 30 and S. Mills (2002) 75–76 on Phaidra's enmity for Hippolytos, and the manner of her suicide as her revenge.

Phaidra gives effect to her *phthonos*, and carries out her revenge, through slander.³² This slander serves two purposes: first, it causes Theseus to punish Hippolytos—Phaidra uses her husband to mete out the punishment she cannot on her own; second, and even more important, it serves to deprive Hippolytos of the carefree wild existence that Phaidra has now realized she will never attain. An important element of *phthonos* is the desire to level down, the “if I can’t have it, no one will” urge.³³ So Phaidra’s slander serves these twin purposes (punishment, and leveling down) of the begrudging envy she directs at Hippolytos. But it achieves a third result for Phaidra herself: in life, she enjoyed the guilty female pleasures of gossip (384: *leschai*); but only in death, by choosing instead masculine slander,³⁴ has she finally been able to break out into the male outside world she was so desperate for in life.

7.5 Kreusa

Another (apparent) stepmother who feels *phthonos* for her (putative) stepson is Kreusa in Euripides’ *Ion*. Hermes tells us in the prologue that although Xuthus and Kreusa are long married, no children have been born to them, and they have a fierce—literally erotic—desire to have children (67: *ἔρωτιπαίδων*). This is an unusual phrase, almost disturbingly so, and it foreshadows the strong emotions to come. When Ion is invited to come to Xuthus’s home as his son, amongst his forebodings is the emotional effect on Kreusa:

ἐλθὼν δ’ ἐς οἶκον ἀλλότριον ἔπηλυσ ὦν γυναικά θ’ ὡς ἄτεκνον, ἣ κοινουμένη τὰς συμφοράς σοι πρόσθεν, ἀπολαχοῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν τύχην οὔσει πικρῶς, πῶς οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς εἰκότως μισήσομαι, ὅταν παραστῶ σοι μὲν ἐγγύθεν ποδός, ἣ δ’ οὐδ’ ἄτεκνος τὰ σὰ φίλ’ εἰσορᾷ πικρῶς, κἄτ’ ἣ προδοὺς σύ μ’ ἐς δάμαρτα σὴν βλέπῃς ἢ τὰμὰ τιμῶν δῶμα συγχέας ἔχῃς; ὅσας σφαγὰς δὴ φαρμάκων τε θανασίμων γυναικες ἡῦρον ἀνδράσιν διαφθοράς.

Then there’s the fact that I shall be coming as an outsider into someone else’s home and living with a childless woman, who may have been your partner in your earlier situation, but has now been deprived of that position: in her isolation, she will bitterly resent her misfortune. I am bound to be hated by her—and who could blame her?—when I stand close by your side. In her childless condition she will look on any

³² See p. 45 on the connection of slander and *phthonos*. Strictly, this instance is libel (written) rather than slander (verbal).

³³ This appears in other places in Greek literature (e.g., the begrudging of survival by those involved in *stasis* to those who sit it out (Thuc. 3.82.8.23 – ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο); or the Thirty’s desire that as many people as possible be implicated in their own crimes (Pl. *Ap.* 32c7–8: οἶα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοὶς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν)).

³⁴ For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, and a cavil at this schematization, see p. 45.

children of yours with resentment. You will have a choice, then: either to let me down and side with your wife, or to respect my rights and have a house torn with constant disruption. Look at all the wives who have stabbed or poisoned their husbands.³⁵

The prime emotion mentioned is hatred (*misein*), and there is no reason to doubt that *misos* is strongly involved—as indeed is shame (*aidôs*), which Kreusa later mentions (861). However, we have already seen that people can have multiple emotional motivations, and we should look closely at what Ion is saying here. Essentially he describes in brief the situational antecedents, affects, and resulting action of an envy/jealousy scenario. Alongside Xuthus, Kreusa burned with a fierce *erôs* for children; now he has one and she does not. Additionally, she will fear that Ion coming into the house will deprive her of a crucial part of her status (i.e., as potential mother of Xuthus's children—and possibly of Xuthus's future erotic affection too).³⁶ These twin concerns suggest respectively begrudging envy and jealousy for her position, both scripts part of *phthonos* in Greek.³⁷ Ion anticipates her feelings: she will bear the situation bitterly (*pherein pikrôs*), and resent it. His only error is in forecasting her response: she will not kill her husband, but Ion. His mistake is not hard to fathom. In the begrudging envy script Xuthus is her rival and Ion (a son) the desired good, while in the jealousy script Ion is her rival and the love and honor of Xuthus (as potential mother of his heir) the desired good. Ion is perhaps merely too naïve to anticipate which prize weighs more with her.

He also reckons without aides whispering poison into Kreusa's ear. The Chorus of her female slaves talks (676–722) of Kreusa's mental state on hearing the news, and prays Ion will die young (720). Freed from the generic constraints of the chorus to watch but not interfere, the Old Man (a family retainer) takes the same line, and incites Kreusa to murder her putative stepson.³⁸ He starts by stirring things up: Xuthus was the *xenos* (Kreusa the citizen), and on marriage he took her home and her inheritance (813–14), yet immediately—an immediacy reflected by juxtaposition in adjacent lines—he sired a son with another woman (815–16). He then invents details:³⁹ Xuthus, he postulates, took a slave to bed (the verb used, *numpheuein*, implying marriage) in secret to create a son (819–20), which he sent to Delphi to grow up. Adding insult to injury, he used Kreusa's childlessness to lie and persuade her to come to Delphi, so he could get his child back (824), and in time will hand

³⁵ Eur. *Ion* 607–17, tr. Waterfield (2001) 18–19.

³⁶ Cf. chapter 8 n. 68.

³⁷ There are some clear similarities to the situations of Deianeira and Hermione, as we shall see in chapter 8.

³⁸ Burnett (1970) 76 says “the guilt of the murder attempt is removed as far as is feasible from Creusa.”

³⁹ Owen (1939) 125 notes “without any correction from the Chorus, who had heard what Xuthus said.”

over her country to his son as its new ruler (829). “Your country, taken; your husband, abandoning you; his son the symbol of both. Kill them!” And this he goes on to urge her to do (843 ff.). This argument is designed to exacerbate in Kreusa’s mind the situational antecedents that will give rise to *phthonos*, and he incites her to *phthonos*’s usual action tendency: destruction.

Kreusa accepts his postulations as fact (912–15), and immediately after talking about Xuthus’s son, who grew up and now prospers, makes the comparison that “my son and yours” (916) did not. Again, the direct juxtaposition—yours lucky, mine unlucky—suggests the comparison is invidious. Kreusa finally says, “They say that stepmothers resent (*phthonein*) stepchildren” (1025),⁴⁰ and there is no reason to doubt the presence of the emotion when—very unusually in Greek literature—Kreusa herself comes very close to admitting herself to be feeling it.

7.6 Conclusion

Comedy and tragedy (unlike oratory) almost never focus on *phthonos* terminology.⁴¹ However, with careful attention to the details of envy/jealousy scenarios, one can see that *phthonos* does in fact occur in both genres, if not with the regularity of some other emotions. Its lesser status is unsurprising, particularly in tragedy, a genre that deals with heroes who, as in Homeric epic, tend to be associated with grander passions.⁴² For this reason its presence in these plays, albeit in a minor key, has by and large been previously overlooked, an oversight which can only be revealed and corrected through a script approach.

This is important for two reasons. On the level of interpretation, a script approach helps us to appreciate a fuller range of motivations for comic and tragic characters, and in particular to provide a fuller explanation for why they act in exactly the way that they do. On a methodological level, more importantly, this suggests that a script approach might pay greater dividends when looking for the right emotion in the right texts, such as *phthonos* arousal in (primarily political) forensic oratory and in the audience of Old Comedy. As the limited discussion of this chapter testifies, *phthonos* proper is not a major onstage emotion in drama. However, as we shall see in the final part of this book, that is not the case for sexual jealousy. In this last—and longest—chapter, I shall demonstrate that sexual jealousy narratives are hugely important in tragedy, and regularly visible in oratory and New Comedy, while the complete absence of any term for sexual jealousy in the Classical period makes a script approach not just helpful, but essential.

⁴⁰ A sentiment later more or less repeated by the Priestess, using the word *dusmenēs* (1329).

⁴¹ The tapestries scene in Aesch. *Ag.* is an exception, though this primarily describes *phthonos theôn*—see chapter 3 n. 31.

⁴² Goldhill (2003) 178; Most (2003) 129.

Sexual Jealousy in Classical Athens

In this final chapter I set out to answer four questions: (1) Did an emotion corresponding to our sexual jealousy exist in ancient Greece?¹ (2) How does ancient Greek sexual jealousy compare, in the situations in which it arises and the socio-psychology involved, with its modern English equivalent? (3) How is ancient Greek sexual jealousy expressed, verbally and in actions? (4) To what extent does Greek sexual jealousy overlap with *phthonos*? Classical Greek had no label for sexual jealousy,² and so (even more than for *phthonos*) a lexical approach is not possible. In this chapter I will demonstrate the full potential of a psychologically informed script approach to answer the sorts of questions posed above.

I shall mostly be concerned in this chapter with tragedy, which contains our clearest pictures of jealous Greeks. My primary focus will be on Euripides' *Medea*, from which I shall provide initial answers to the above questions. I shall support and modify these answers by referring to two other tragedies, Sophocles' *Trachiniae* and Euripides' *Andromache*, before turning to a wide-ranging (if necessarily less profound) exploration of the sexual jealousy phenomenon in a variety of other Classical Greek genres. I shall use this survey to demonstrate first how jealousy narratives derived from tragedy could be exploited in these other genres (in particular oratory) to manipulate audiences, and second how genre itself limits what scenarios can be presented.

8.1 *Medea*

Euripides' *Medea* is about a woman who, abandoned by her husband for another woman, revenges herself by killing the other woman, the latter's father

¹ Konstan (2003b) and (2006) 219–43 argues that probably sexual jealousy as we understand it did not exist in ancient Greece. It will quickly become clear that I disagree.

² *Zêlotupia*, first recorded in the 380s, is generally translated 'jealousy'; however, Konstan (2006) 222–32 argues against this translation, and I broadly agree with his arguments (see main text and especially n. 130).

(who arranged the match), and her own children by her ex-husband. To a layperson this story seems a straightforward tale of sexual jealousy, albeit carried to an unusual degree, and a few scholars (such as Mastronarde, Friedrich, and Cairns) agree that the Greeks likewise saw sexual jealousy as an important part of the plot.³ However, this is a minority view. The major current school of thought, first put forward by Knox and Easterling in the 1970s, sees Medea as a Sophoclean, or even epic hero: an Ajax, or an Achilles; she is driven, they argue, by a heroic pride.⁴ Others, such as Harris, Goldhill or Konstan, see her driven by a terrible wrath that has nothing (in Konstan's words) of "petty jealousy" in it.⁵ I do not intend to argue against pride or wrath as motivations. Medea is clearly enraged—anger words abound in the play—and arguments for her heroic pride can point to repeated claims that she has been dishonored, a repeated insistence that she cannot allow her enemies to laugh at her, and her clearly articulated choice to allow her passion to overrule her reason (1078–80). However, as I have argued before, people can respond to situations with more than one emotion. Euripides depicts his Medea as an immensely complex character, and reducing her emotional state to a monolithic pride or anger is too simplistic. Using the insights of modern psychology into prototypical jealousy episodes, I wish to rehabilitate sexual jealousy as a significant element in her motivation.

I shall begin by considering the 'situational antecedents' of the jealousy prototype. The Nurse informs us in the prologue that Medea lived with Jason as her husband (11: ξὺν ἀνδρὶ), assisting (13: ξυμφέρουσ') him with all matters: an unusually close, and equal, partnership in the Greek world.⁶ But Jason has left Medea and married (18–19: γάμοις . . . ἐννάζεται, γήμας) Kreon's daughter, Glauke.⁷ By line 19 we know we have an abandoned woman, her ex-partner, and a rival. The Nurse tells us too about the strength of their relationship: from the first moment Medea met Jason, she says, her heart was struck with *erôs* for him (8: ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγείσ'), and this was the foundation of their partnership. The Chorus too is well aware of the strength, and violence, of Medea's passion for Jason. From the time she fled Iolkos with him, she had mad passion in her heart (433: μαινομένη κραδίᾳ). Following her first confrontation with Jason, they talk of *erôs* that comes too excessively (627–28: ἔρωτες

³ Friedrich (1993); Burnett (1998) 194; Mastronarde (2002) 16; McHardy (2008) 61–62; Cairns (2008) 53–56.

⁴ Easterling (1977) 178; Knox (1977) 196, 207; Gabriel (1992) 353; Mastronarde (2002) 8–9; Goldhill (2003) 166–67; Holland (2003) 270.

⁵ Mastronarde (2002) 17–18; Goldhill (2003) 166–67; W. V. Harris (2003) 140–41; Konstan (2006) 57–59; I dispute too Konstan's epithet "petty": for example, there is nothing petty about Shakespeare's Othello's emotion. See Allen (2003) 90 on the connection between *orgê* and *erôs*, a connection denied by W. V. Harris (2003) 122.

⁶ Mastronarde (2002) 9, 167–68; see Page (1938/2001) 65 for a different view.

⁷ Jason's new wife is not named in the play, but for convenience I adopt the name most usually given her. Page (1938/2001) xxv n. 4 and E. Griffiths (2006) 8 note the alternative name Kreousa.

ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντες) and sing not one, but two hymns to the power of Aphrodite (627–42, 824–45). Jason too asserts that Medea feels *erôs* for him (530: ὡς Ἔρως σ' ἠγάγκασε), though Medea herself only speaks of it in the abstract (330: βροτοῖς ἔρωτες ὡς κακὸν μέγα).

We are never explicitly told that Jason felt *erôs* for her in return.⁸ However we do know that Jason and Medea's relationship had a strong sexual element, and this is made clear by the extraordinary frequency of Greek words for the bed: *lechos*, *lektron*, *eunê*, and *koitê* occur twenty times as a euphemism for their old relationship, and twelve for his new one.⁹ Indeed *Medea* has the highest number of bed words (at thirty-six) of any extant tragedy.¹⁰ In Greek “the bed” can be a euphemism for sex (and again *Medea* has by far the highest number with this meaning),¹¹ or marriage. The bed motif is first introduced by the Nurse and Tutor in the prologue, and the Chorus in the *parodos*, where it appears several times referring to Jason's new marriage (18: ἐννάζεται, 88: εὐνή, 140: λέκτρα, 156: λέχη).¹² Medea at this point is said merely to have *erôs* for the bed of death (151–52: τὰς ἀπλάτου κοιτάς ἔρος), since Jason has betrayed their marriage (207: ἐν λέχει προδόταν). The bed is here placed at the center of their marriage,¹³ and it is the bed as concrete symbol (rather than, for example, the abstract γάμος) that Jason betrays.

However, the bed is not just a metonym for their marriage, but also for what is performed on it: sex.¹⁴ Medea first draws attention to this herself, when she talks about going into the palace to kill Jason and his new bride as they lie

⁸ Medea does say she knows Jason now feels *erôs* elsewhere (491), though to Aigeus (698, perhaps dissimbling to avoid showing her true feelings) she says his *erôs* is for political advancement, not for her rival Glauke. The only other time the word is used is of Aigeus's desire for children (714).

⁹ Medea and Jason's relationship (*lechos* 41, 207, 555, 568, 571, 591, 641, 697, 999, 1338, 1354; *lektron* 286, 436, 443, 639; *eunê* 265, 570, 640, 1338; *koitê* 436); Jason and Glauke's (*lechos* 156, 380, 489, 491, 887, 1367; *lektron* 140, 594, 1348; *eunê* 18, 88, 1027); here and in nn. 10, 11 I exclude cognates that always mean spouse/bed-sharer (e.g., *xuneunetês*, *akoitis*). Bed words particularly abound during Medea's first and final scenes with Jason (446–626, 1317–1414).

¹⁰ Large numbers of bed words also occur in several other Euripides plays: thirty-three in *Helen*, twenty-eight in *Andromache*, and twenty-three in *Hippolytos*. Aeschylus's highest is seventeen in *Agamemnon*, and Sophocles' is nineteen in *Trachiniae*. All these plays' plots involve rivals for a legitimate spouse.

¹¹ Greek bed words (*lechos*, *lektron*, *eunê*, and *koitê*) are always potentially euphemisms for sex—though they can also mean bed, bedding, sleep, death, marriage, or spouse. For example, Hom. *Od.* 23 (re Odysseus's marriage with Penelope, centered round a physical bed) has twenty-one bed words, fifteen meaning bed/bedding (ten *lech-/lektr-*, five *eun-*), three meaning sex (219, 254, 346; two *eun-*, one *lektr-*), and three implying both (257, 294, 354; two *eun-*, one *lech-*); *Od.* 10 (re Odysseus's sexual relationship with Kirke) has ten bed words, two meaning bed (both *lech-*), and eight meaning sex (all *eun-*). This suggests that *eun-*, at least in origin, has a stronger implication of sex than *lech-/lektr-*. We can also note that the latter roots only give us an object (*lechos*, *lektron*), while the former gives us both an object and an activity (*eunê*, *eunazô*).

¹² Medea's bed is also referred to in the Nurse's opening speech (41: λέχος), but this line is almost certainly an interpolation, copied from 380 (see Page (1938/2001) 68).

¹³ Cf. Cairns (2008) 54–55.

¹⁴ Burnett (1998) 194–95 denies that the stress on Medea's bed has anything to do with her sexual pleasure, but a focus on pleasure misses the point: for Medea, sex with her husband is both an end in itself, and also a sign of the continuing health of her marriage, in which is bound up everything she holds dear (see main text below, and cf. nn. 53, 81).

on their bed (380: ὃν ἔσπρωται λέχος). The Chorus says Medea has lost her marriage since her bed is manless (435–36: τᾷς ἀνάνδρου κοίτας δλέσσα λέκτρον), and another queen now rules over her marriage-bed (443: τῶν τε λέκτρων ἄλλα βασιλεία κρείσσων δόμοισιν ἐπέστα)—both comments having strong sexual overtones.

In the *agôn* Medea complains Jason has made a new marriage (489: καὶνὰ δ' ἐκτήσω λέχη); if she had been barren, then she could understand him feeling *erôs* for someone else's bed (491: τοῦδ' ἐρασθῆναι λέχους); as things are, he has betrayed the oaths they swore.¹⁵ In response, Jason draws attention to her *erôs*, saying it would be invidious to point out that Medea is besotted with him (529–30: ἐπίφθονος λόγος διελθεῖν ὡς Ἔρωσ σ' ἠνάγκασε), doing it anyway. Jason constantly alludes to the sexual use of the marriage-bed: he says he did not leave her because he hated having sex with her, nor through longing for a new bride (555–56: οὐχ . . . σὸν μὲν ἐχθαίρων λέχος, καὶνῆς δὲ νύμφης ἡμέρω πεπληγμένος). *Himeros* means sexual desire, and its juxtaposition with *lechos* in the previous line indicates we should read the latter as sex, not bed or marriage; *numphê* also draws attention to Medea and Glauke's relative ages, a reason for Glauke being more sexually attractive. Jason argues that it is Medea who is chafed by matters sexual: "Honestly," he says, "all you women care about is sex. If sex is going well, you think you have everything; if there's a problem with your sex life, even the finest things are totally wrong" (568–73: οὐδ' ἂν σὺ φαίης, εἰ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος. ἀλλ' ἐς τοσοῦτον ἤκεθ' ὥστ' ὀρθομένης εὐνῆς γυναικες πάντ' ἔχειν νομίζετε, ἣν δ' αὖ γένηται χυμφορά τις ἐς λέχος, τὰ λῶστα καὶ κάλλιστα πολεμιώτατα τίθεσθε).

He exits, and the Chorus sings a hymn to Aphrodite (the goddess of sexual love—as usual in tragedy called *Kypris* for metrical reasons), primly wishing for a happy marriage.¹⁶ In words recalling Medea's falling for Jason, they pray that *Kypris* may not strike them likewise with desire for other beds (639: θυμὸν ἐκπλήξας ἑτέροις ἐπὶ λέκτροις; cf. 8)—bed words occurring three times in as many lines (639: λέκτροις; 640: εὐνάς; 641: λέχη). When Medea is telling Aigeus about Jason leaving her, he asks whether it was because of *erôs* for another woman or because his sexual union with Medea grew hateful (697: ἐρασθεὶς ἢ σὸν ἐχθαίρων λέχος). Again, the juxtaposition of sexual desire and *lechos* indicates how we should translate the latter. Medea replies that it was a great *erôs* (698: μέγαν γ' ἔρωτα). Despite Jason's avoidance of the word, Euripides makes very clear the extraordinary role of sexual passion, and the sex act itself, in their marriage.

¹⁵ Presumably marriage-oaths. Easterling (1977) 180–81, Allan (2002) 50–51 for the argument that Jason and Medea were legitimately married, despite her being a barbarian, and the Corinthian Women agree (267, 578).

¹⁶ De Wet (1983) 218–19 notes that by the fourth century Aphrodite had replaced Hera as the goddess of marriage, and contemporaneously it was being accepted that sexual desire had an important part to play in marriage. He argues that Euripides recognizes this in his plays.

Medea's womanhood, and her wifely duties for Jason, also loom large in her rhetoric. In her opening speech she says that everything in the world for her, as Jason himself knew, was embodied in one person: her husband (228–29: *ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα, γινώσκει καλῶς, . . . οὐμὸς πόσις*). This point is crucial. She goes on to lament the lot of women (230–51): a woman must pay a dowry, take a husband (233: *πόσιν*), and provide him with sex; he becomes a master to her inheritance, her house, and her body (233). Women must leave aside their own habits and customs (238), and work hard at taking on those of their husband (240: *ξυνενέτη*). She says that men have life easy: the hardest thing they have to do is fight in battle, but that is more than three times preferable to the danger of childbirth (250–51).

Having established the general hard lot of wives, and all they have to suffer—as women, as homemakers, and as mothers—Medea tells how she has personally suffered even more than other women as Jason's wife. Unlike her audience (the Chorus of Corinthian Women), she does not have anywhere to turn to: she has no city, no father, no friends, no mother, no brother, no relatives (252–58). This is because of all the things she did in her passion for Jason when she was first struck with *erōs* (8), before he took her from her home: she betrayed her father and her homeland, murdered her brother, and killed Jason's uncle, Pelias (32, 483, 503; cf. 1332).¹⁷ In forging their partnership she cut herself off from, and made enemies of, all those who should naturally be her *philoī*, and now she has nowhere to turn. In bloodily severing herself from her roles as daughter, sister, citizen, and princess, she has made being Jason's wife, mistress of his house, and mother of his children even more formative to her self-conception than is normal in ancient Greek society.¹⁸ Abandoned for another woman, and on the verge of having her children taken away from her, Medea has at a stroke lost everything in her life. Her entire self-conception is now formed by being a wife and a mother, and losing it all in this way creates exactly the antecedent situational conditions for a sexual jealousy scenario.

It is for these reasons that Jason's behavior has been such an outrage (255–56: *ὑβρίζομαι πρὸς ἀνδρός*), and Medea feels fully justified in seeking revenge, or justice, against her husband (261: *πόσιν δίκην τῶνδ' ἀντιτείσασθαι κακῶν*).¹⁹ She concludes her introductory speech: "Whenever a woman is wronged in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous" (265–66: *ὅτανδ' ἐς εὐνήν ἡδικομένη κυρῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρήν μαιφονωτέρα*). It is hard to overstate

¹⁷ The murder of the brother, part of the Medea mythology (E. Griffiths (2006) 7), is elided by Euripides.

¹⁸ Friedrich (1993) 227; see also Gabriel (1992) 351–52. Burnett (1998) 195 also notes that Medea's marriage-bed symbolizes these three roles: Jason's wife, mother of Jason's *genos*, mistress of Jason's *oikos*.

¹⁹ I agree with Page (1938/2001) that line 262, in which Medea extends her planned revenge to Glauke and Kreon, must (for narrative reasons) be an interpolation.

the importance of this comment. This is Medea speaking, not others attempting to understand her. To the obvious objection that Medea manipulates and deceives everyone she encounters in the play, I reply first that the context is one in which she is explicitly expressing her intention to take revenge (though the full extent of that revenge is at this stage unclear), and second that she does not conceal her motives from the Chorus anywhere else in the play. There is therefore no reason not to take this passage seriously. Though it would be a mistake to regard it as *the* clue to her psychology, it is an important indicator of just how we should understand the rest of the play. In her opening speech, Medea tells us it is as a wife and woman that she feels wronged, and the rest of the play must be read with this in mind. “Jason has abandoned me,” she is saying, “and in doing so he has hit me where it hurts most, in our marriage, in our bed, in our sex life, in the thing that makes us women more murderous than any other; and I *will* take revenge on my husband.”

This revenge, then, is an organic development from Medea’s abandonment as a wife and a woman, in favor of another. From the beginning Medea says she will seek revenge, and initially Kreon says he knows that will be against him and the newlyweds (288: τὸν δόντα καὶ γήμαντα καὶ γαμουμένην). But later she conceives a worse punishment for Jason. She talks successively with three men (Kreon, Jason, and Aigeus), and each one mentions the importance of children to him. Kreon orders Medea out the country, lest she do some evil to his daughter (282–83). He continually mentions how he loves his family, how his children are more dear to him than his country (327, 329). With delicious dramatic irony, in his exit speech (348–56) Kreon manages to mention resolve (λήμα, a quality he denies but Medea has: 176–77), the death of Medea’s children, and his fear (356: φόβος, cf. δέδοικά (282), ὀρρωδία (317)) that something might happen to his own. At this stage Medea still intends her revenge to be to kill the newlyweds and those who had arranged the alliance (366–67: ἔτ’ εἴσ’ ἀγῶνες τοῖς νεωστὶ νυμφίοις καὶ τοῖσι κηδεύσασιν οὐ μικροὶ πόνοι)—tying her revenge firmly to Jason’s remarriage—before reconfirming Kreon, Glauke, and Jason as her intended victims (374–75: τρεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς θήσω, πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ’ ἐμόν).²⁰ However, repeatedly expressed concern with children changes her mind. In her first scene with Jason, he says his abandonment of her was because a new marriage would bring advantages to their children, through alliance with the royal family and influential brothers. Finally, Aigeus explains he is on his way home from Delphi, where he went for advice to relieve his childlessness (670–71: ἄπαις). By this point Medea has fully grasped the importance men place on having children.²¹ In begging Aigeus’s help, she says she will cure his childlessness. With dramatic

²⁰ Mastronarde (2002) 233 says she continues to maintain the illusion for the audience (and Chorus) that she intends to kill Jason rather than the children. I disagree: I do not believe she has *yet* decided to kill the children.

²¹ Cf. McHardy (2008) 63.

irony for her intended revenge, she says she will help Aigeus go from being childless (*apais*) to having *paides*—a journey she will first make Jason take in reverse—before mentioning her potions (717–18: *παύσω δέ σ' ὄντ' ἄπαιδα καὶ παίδων γονὰς σπείραί σε θήσω· τοιάδ' οἶδα φάρμακα*) which, in death- rather than life-giving form, she will first use on Glauke.

When Aigeus leaves the stage she spells out her revised revenge: she will use her *paides* to kill the *pais* of the king with trickery and with potions; then she will kill her own children, thus destroying Jason's entire (i.e., past and future) house (774–94): something she had impotently wished for in the prologue (112–14: *ὦ κατάρatoi παῖδες ὀλοισθε στυγεράς ματρός σὺν πατρί, καὶ πᾶς δόμος ἔρροι*), before attaining the means to bring it about.²² Jason will neither see his *paides* alive again, she says, nor have more from his newly yoked bride thanks to her potions (803–6: *οὔτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεται ποτε ζῶντας τὸ λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νεοζύγου νύμφης τεκνώσει παῖδ', ἐπεὶ κακὴν κακῶς θανεῖν σφ' ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐμοῖσι φαρμάκοις*). She will kill not just Glauke, but her own children too, as that is the best way for her husband to be hurt (817). The Chorus reminds us that Medea is seeking revenge for the sake of her bridal bed (999: *νυμφιδίων ἔνεκεν λεχέων*) and because her husband abandoned her to make an *oikos* with another bedfellow (1001: *ἄλλα ξυνοικεῖ πόσις συνεύνῳ*), and this foreshadows the final scene.

After exacting her revenge, Medea has a showdown with Jason, and once again bed words and Medea's role as wife and woman recur repeatedly, with both the marriage and her revenge linked directly to sex. Jason says that after their marriage (1336: *νυμφευθεῖσα*—when she was a sexually ripe *numphē*) Medea bore him children, and now has killed them because of sex and the marriage-bed (1338: *ἐννῆς ἕκατι καὶ λέχους σφ' ἀπώλεσας*). Medea responds that she could not allow him to dishonor her marriage-bed (1354: *σὺ δ' οὐκ ἔμελλες τᾶμ' ἀτιμάσας λέχῃ*); she killed them because of his *hubris* and because of his newly built marriage (1366), and to bring him pain and grief (1370: *δῆξεται*; 1398: *πημαίνουσ'*). Jason cannot believe she did all this because of his remarriage (1367: *λέχους . . . οὔνεκα*), but Medea says that such a disaster is no small thing for a woman (1368). For her that is as full an answer as need be given, and takes us back to the end of her first speech, that “Whenever a woman is wronged in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous” (265–66).

I now turn to the emotions aroused in Medea by Jason's betrayal. The first introduced is grief, and again it is the Nurse who first informs us that Medea lies in bed, not eating, surrendering her body to tears (24–25). As Mastronarde points out “loss of appetite and inactivity, such as staying in bed, are signs of severe psychic turmoil (from grief or love).”²³ But her grief is really hammered

²² Cf. Mastronarde (2002) 184.

²³ Mastronarde (2002) 168—these are symptoms of betrayed *erōs*.

home to us in lines 131–206; the Chorus, the Nurse, and Medea (from inside the house) all use a plethora of suffering and grieving words: cries (132, 135: *βοάν*); wretched (133, 149: *δυστάνου/ος*); griefs (136: *ἄλγεσιν*); she pines (141: *τάκει*); alas (146: *φεῦ φεῦ*); wail (149: *ἀχάν*); grieving (159: *δυρομένα*); I suffer (161: *πάσχω*); sorrow (184: *πένθος*); and finally, in case we have not got the message, “I heard the loud-groaning wail of her mourning, as she cries her wailing and wretched griefs” (205–6: *ἀχὰν ἄιον πολύστονον γόων, λιγυρὰ δ’ ἄχρα μογερά βοᾷ*).

Two other strong emotions that Medea expresses are anger and hatred. Again, from the Nurse in the prologue we learn that Medea’s love has turned to hatred (16: *ἐχθρά*). Her eyes glare bull-like (92), and her rage (94: *χόλου*) will last till she rushes down on someone.²⁴ She is stirring up her heart and her wrath (99: *κινεῖ κραδίαν, κινεῖ δὲ χόλον*),²⁵ and the children should be on guard against her wild character and hating nature (102–3: *φυλσσεσθ’ ἄγριον ἦθος στυγεράν τε φύσιν*); her *thumos* is enlarged (108: *μεῖζονι θυμῷ*), and her spleen is hard to check (109: *μεγαλόσπλαγχνος δυσκατάπαυστος*). The Nurse says Medea will only give over her anger with difficulty (121: *χαλεπῶς ὀργὰς μεταβάλλουσιν*). The Chorus tells Medea not to sharpen her anger (157: *μὴ χαράσσου*), despite injustice from Jason and Glauke, as it is wearing her down; she should put aside the *orgê* in the depths of her *thumos*, and the temper in her breast (176–77: *βαρύθυμον ὀργὰν καὶ λῆμα φρενῶν*).²⁶

Kreon acknowledges Medea’s *thumos* is roused at her husband (271: *πόσει θυμουμένην*). She will be feeling *lupê* (pain, distress, grief) at being robbed of her husband’s bed (286: *λέκτρων ἀνδρός*).²⁷ He has heard she has made threats against the newlyweds and against himself. Medea dissembles: Kreon has done nothing wrong, she says; it is merely her husband she hates (310–11: *ἀλλ’ ἐμὸν πόσιν μισῶ*); she does not begrudge (312: *οὐ φθονῶ*) Kreon’s good fortune.²⁸ Jason, after some general comments about people who feel *orgê*, turns specifically to Medea: she hates him (463: *στυγεῖς*), he says; Medea agrees (467: *ἔχθιστος*). The Chorus observes that *orgê* is terrible (520: *δεινὴ τις ὀργή*) whenever *philoî* join in strife (521: *ἔρυν*).²⁹ Medea says Jason has committed *hubris* against her (603).³⁰ Jason continues to refer to her anger: the great *cholos* in

²⁴ The word used here, *kataskêpsai*, is generally used of storms or divine wrath (LSJ).

²⁵ Note the active voice of *kinei*: this is not something that is just happening to Medea, she is actively perpetuating it.

²⁶ Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–32: *orgê* is a desire for revenge for an injury. The Chorus believes Medea (a foreign woman) can only accept the injury; revenge is out of the question, so anger pointless. However, Medea *knows* she can take revenge, so spurs on (99: *κινεῖ*) her rage. See Konstan (2006) 61–65 for a similar argument *re* Hecuba in Eur. *Tro*.

²⁷ *Lupê* is the word Aristotle uses, in conjunction with a desire for revenge, to describe the emotion *orgê* (*Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30: *ὀργή ὁρεῖται μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας...*).

²⁸ A denial as ever necessitated by a lively concern that her audience (in this case Kreon) will believe begrudging to be exactly what she is doing—see p. 35.

²⁹ On the relation of *eris* to Greek jealousy, see p. 153; cf. pp. 40, 53–54.

³⁰ Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378b14–15 gives *hubris* as one of the three causes of *orgê*—Medea’s pride and rage are not isolated or competing motivations, but intimately bound up with each other.

her heart (590), her *orgê* (615), and her inability to let it go (621: *αὐθαδία*, cf. 103–4).

In all, Medea's anger is referred to twenty-one times throughout the play (*orgê*: 121, 176, 447, 520, 615, 870, 909; *cholos*: 94, 99, 172, 590, 898, 1266; *thumos*: 108, 176, 271, 865, 879, 883, 1056, 1079), and her hatred is referred to twelve times (*misos*: 311; *stugos*: 36, 103, 113, 463, 1374; *echthos*: 117, 290, 467, 1374; *echthra*: 16, 45). These feelings are almost invariably aimed at Jason, though in the prologue a few times at their children (36, 103, 113, 117), whose presence or existence highlights what she has lost. In addition, Kreon and Glauke are referred to on no fewer than thirteen occasions as Medea's enemies (*echthroï* 45, 95, 278, 374, 383, 744, 750, 765, 767, 809, 897, 1050, 1060; and she theirs twice: 734, 875), though she does not use other hating words about them.

A fourth emotion expressed regularly, if less frequently, is pride. This is behind Medea's claims that Jason dishonored her (696, 1354; the Nurse agrees: 20, 33) and that he committed *hubris* against her (255, 603, 1366). Her pride is further shown by her concern, expressed six times, that her enemies might laugh at her (383, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362): she could not bear to be an object of ridicule to them.³¹ The laughter of her enemies would be intolerable (797: *οὐ γὰρ γελᾶσθαι τλητὸν ἐξ ἐχθρῶν*; cf. 383, 404), she says; no one must think her low, feeble, or meek (807–8: *μηδεῖς με φαύλην κάσθεν ἡνομιζέτω μηδ' ἡσυχαίαν*); rather she wants supreme *kleos* (810: heroic renown). It is for such reasons that Medea is often portrayed as acting from heroic pride, but this pride is not unconnected to her jealousy. She will be mocked by the people who have taken away what defined her in life: her husband. And it is her husband himself who first begins to mock her: in his first *agôn* with her, he belittles her feelings—he says she is merely chafed (555: *κνίζῃ*) that he left her for reasons entirely unconnected with her, merely irked (568: *κνίζοι*) by feelings of sexual inconsequentiality—reducing even this sexual motive to the level of a physical itch. Medea fears her enemies will not take her seriously, and will just laugh at her and degrade her; and here Jason, the very person who should respect her most, is the one leading the way in belittling her.

Medea's expressed emotions—her anger, hatred, grief, and wounded pride—are not just standalone, but at least some of them are also part of a jealousy complex,³² since they are tied up with the destruction of Medea's marriage by Jason's abandonment of her, by his forsaking of her bed and her sexual favors for the bed and favors of a rival, and (more generally) by his

³¹ In the end she avoids her misfortunes giving her enemies pleasure, and takes pleasure in their own misfortunes herself (1133–35)—Allan (2002) 74–75, 83–84, 93 notes that she wishes to feel *Schadenfreude* so they cannot.

³² *Contra* Konstan (2003) 23–24. Cairns (2008) 53–56 also disputes Konstan's rejection of sexual jealousy as a motivation for Medea. NB: I am not arguing that anger and pride are not genuine motivations for Medea in their own right—I think they are—but anger, too, can also express a socially acceptable aspect of a less creditable response.

scorning and belittling her as a wife and a woman. Modern psychologists tell us that those who feel jealous typically talk about anger and betrayal, and try to take some measure of revenge. In English we do not expect a jilted woman to say, “I am so jealous”; rather she might scream “I can’t believe you cheated on me,” and run a nail down the side of his car. Medea essentially does the same, though this being Greek tragedy her revenge is more murderous (μυαιφονωτέρα: 266).

The form and extent of Medea’s revenge make us aware that a fifth emotion pervades the play, and that is *phthonos*, and more specifically the ‘begrudging envy’ script.³³ Just as modern theory tells us that *fait accompli* jealousy gives rise to envy,³⁴ so it does for Medea in this play. Envy’s most salient characteristic is a malicious hostility and ill will, which drives acts of deep destructiveness. Both modern English envy, and (according to Aristotle) ancient Greek *phthonos*, are characterized by a stronger desire for the other person not to enjoy something that the patient does not have, than a desire to obtain it also, and it is this leveling-down urge (“if I cannot have it, then no one will”) which drives envy’s destructiveness. It is characteristic of our emotion envy that it is frequently misrepresented as, or transmuted into, righteous indignation. Similarly in Greek culture, Aristotle talks about how easily envy (his primary script for *phthonos*) can be confused with indignation (which he calls *to nemesan*); and in non-Aristotelian usage we have seen that envy is often expressed in Greek literature as righteous indignation, helped by the fact that *phthonos* can imply both.³⁵ And this is what we see here: Medea talks many times about being wronged, and even more often about justice, almost from her very first words.³⁶ This emotion is valid (the Nurse and Chorus agree she has been wronged: 26, 158, 208, 267, 411, 578, 1232); but Medea’s genuine and justified indignation comes inseparably bound with transmuted envy.³⁷ She has been deprived of her marriage, and is to be deprived likewise of her children. Begrudging envy, aroused by jealousy, ensures she will not let Jason keep them.

So how might Medea’s jealousy be labeled in Greek? As I mentioned above, *zêlotupia* is the word typically translated as jealousy from the 380s, but when

³³ See Leuzinger-Bohleber (2001) 332 on Medea’s envy of Glauke. We know it is ‘begrudging envy’ rather than ‘covetous envy’ as Medea is completely uninterested in getting Jason back; she wants only to deprive Glauke of him.

³⁴ When one has already lost the partner (see chapter 2 n. 69).

³⁵ See chapters 2.1 and 4.4 for the various points made here.

³⁶ *Dikê*: 165, 219, 221, 261, 265, 309, 314, 580, 582, 692, 764, 767, 802. Gentili (1972) and (2000), and Giacomoni (2000) argue that Jason’s injustice is in not sharing his wife’s bed. Medea wants him in her bed *not* because she is sexually insatiable, but because that is the proper place for a Greek husband to be: fulfilling his conjugal duties.

³⁷ It is possible to read Greeks rationalizing jealous revenge through the language of justice, honor, and anger all the way back to Menelaus in the *Iliad*—see main text below with n. 99 re Bonanno (1973); cf. Pizzocaro (1994) 21–25 on Menelaus’s jealousy. See Goldhill (2003) 167 on *phthonos*, *timê*, and *adikia* in *Medea*.

Medea was written in 431 the word had not yet been coined. The primary word used in the play to imply sexual passion is *erôs*. This is more than a desire to acquire a sexual object; for instance Thucydides writes that the Athenians felt *erôs* for embarking on the conquest of Sicily (Thuc. 6.24.3)—here it implies a desire to acquire, enjoy, and retain, though Thucydides is of course employing a metaphor for sexual yearning. This is certainly applicable to *Medea*, whose *erôs* for Jason demands exclusive possession,³⁸ but it cannot be the whole story as, after her revenge and destruction of the rival, *Medea* is happy to end the play without possessing her husband.

Our best evidence for ancient Greek emotions comes from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,³⁹ but Aristotle ignores both *erôs* and *zêlotupia* (even though both play their part in oratory). He does deal with *zêlos*, etymologically the parent emotion, but that is merely emulation for goods and qualities we do not possess. *Phthonos* is more relevant: although it is principally felt when we lack something we want (English envy), it is also felt when we wish to hold on to something we see as ours (English jealousy). This is most clearly seen when *phthonos* is directed at someone who has something we have lost (*Rh.* 2.10, 1388a21–22: [φθονοῦσιν] τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς . . . ἐκέκτηντο ποτε). Aristotle is not speaking here of sexual jealousy, rather of possessive jealousy more generally; but he goes on to note that, among other cases, we feel *phthonos* most especially against our rivals in love (*Rh.* 2.10, 1388a14–16: πρὸς τοὺς . . . ἀντεραστάς . . . , ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τοῦτοις φθονεῖν). It is noteworthy for my argument in this chapter that at least one Greek author directly connects sexual (rather than just possessive) jealousy with *phthonos* (see p. 40 for other passages that suggest this connection), and it is clear therefore that *Medea*'s emotions can at least partly be described as *phthonos*.

However, there are two other emotions we must consider: *orgê* (anger) and *misos* (hatred). *Orgê*, according to Aristotle, is a desire for revenge in return for a belittlement (*Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–32). It is necessary to actually perceive that you have been belittled, and similarly for the belittler to perceive the revenge. Aristotle mentions three types of belittlement: *kataphronêsis*, *epêreasmos*, and *hubris* (1378b14–15). *Kataphronêsis* is contempt: showing you believe the other person to be of no importance (1378b15–17); *epêreasmos* is a disinterested slighting, thwarting someone's wishes with no benefit to yourself (1378b18–20);

³⁸ She does not require fidelity, or at least does not say so (and indeed in Greece it would have been unusual if she had—see Kovacs (1980a) 15–16), but she does not accept Jason having any other wife but her.

³⁹ Aristotle is not of course commenting specifically on Eur. *Med.*, and his treatise was written nearly a century later; likewise Euripides is not a philosopher, and is not bound to be consistent in his terms as would a philosopher. But the remarkable degree to which Aristotle's thinking explains *Medea*'s language is a testament to how well both men understood the socio-psychology of Greek emotions and emotion terms.

hubris involves taking pleasure in shaming someone (1378b23–25): it is an insult, an insolent arrogance. Medea several times says that Jason has treated her with *hubris* (255, 603, 1366); she does not include Glauke and Kreon,⁴⁰ however they are certainly included in the list of people who might laugh at her, behavior Aristotle considers *hubris* (1379a30–32). It is also fairly clear that Jason has considered Medea of no account in assuming he can pension her off at will, and in persistently belittling her emotions. It is clear then that *orgê* has an important part to play.

Misos differs from *orgê*. In Greek terms, it is the emotion one feels for one's *echthroi* (personal enemies), people who harm you without provocation. Kreon is in this position: he is peripheral to the jealousy triangle, but has abetted Medea's abandonment. But although he has harmed her, he has not belittled her—on the contrary, he wants her out of the country precisely because he fears how formidable an *echthros* she might be. Medea's feelings toward Kreon are thus well labeled *misos*.

Her feelings toward Glauke are best described (in Greek terms) as hostile envy, a blend of *misos* and *phthonos*, both of which can lead to destruction of their target. In accordance with Greek values, Medea cannot admit to *phthonos*, so she can only talk of her hatred. Self-presentationally, she avoids the charge of *phthonos* by lumping Glauke in with Kreon as jointly “my *echthroi*,” and she does so frequently. Although she could potentially feel *orgê* for them if they were to mock her, this has not yet happened. The appropriate action to take toward one's *echthroi* is to wish them harm; Aristotle describes *misos* (which he also refers to as *to misein* and *echthra*) as a desire to harm (*Rh.* 2.4, 1382a8); killing someone is the most harm you can do to them.

Medea's feelings for Jason, however, are best described as a mixture of *phthonos* not so much with *misos* (which, though present, is less important), but rather with *orgê*. Since once again Greek cultural taboos ensure that *phthonos* cannot be admitted, all that is left for Medea to talk about is her response to her belittlement and her injury by Jason: her *orgê*. David Konstan argues that:

The object of anger . . . is to cause pain to the other. A slight makes one feel small, and the only way to get even is to induce a similar feeling in the other. It follows that, for an angry person to get revenge, the original offender must be aware of it (*aisthesthai*), since there is no such thing as unperceived pain (hence the stipulation in the definition of anger that the revenge, like the slight itself, must be perceived), whereas to one who hates it is a matter of indifference whether an enemy is aware or not of the damage done to him. That is why we may wish that people whom we hate should die, but when we are angry, what we desire is that the other

⁴⁰ She does, however, believe they would treat her children with *hubris* if she left them behind (782), and the Corinthians would too after the children were made complicit in the royal deaths (1061, 1380).

person feel in return (*antipathein*) the kind of diminishment that provoked our anger in the first place (2.4, 1382a14–15). The death of the other would render that impossible.⁴¹

Kreon and Glauke wantonly inflicted harm on Medea; it is for that reason she wanted them dead. At first, she believes this is what she wants for Jason too (hence *misos* is present); however, as she reflects, she realizes that is not sufficient punishment. His was not the injuring of an *echthros*, but a deeply painful belittling; her anger is stronger than her hatred, and accordingly Jason must remain alive to perceive her revenge. This is why Medea, having determined that her revenge will be to kill Jason alongside Kreon and Glauke (373–75), eventually changes her mind: Kreon and Glauke will still die, but Jason must be left alive to know that his children are dead because of his treatment of Medea (774–96).

Sexual jealousy has suffered in the interpretation of this play partly because, like *phthonos*, its expression was taboo to the Greeks, but partly also because it does not have a convenient prototypical label in Greek, such as our word jealousy. The scenario was familiar to the Greeks; in this play, the Nurse, the Tutor, the Chorus of Corinthian Women, and Jason all recognize it, even if Medea does not,⁴² and the inference must be that the audience recognize it too. However, labeling the emotion is more difficult. Semantically, it appears—at least in this play—that sexual jealousy falls somewhere between *erôs*, *phthonos*, *misos*, and *orgê*.⁴³ We should also note that Medea emphasizes certain elements of the jealousy prototype more than we might expect from modern theory, especially the narcissistic wound (the *hubris* and the potential mocking laughter), her rage, and her hatred. It is possible that the status-conscious Greeks were more sensitive to these aspects of the jealousy complex than we, and therefore their vocabulary was better adapted to express these rather than the complex as a whole.⁴⁴

8.2 *Trachiniae*

Deianeira's sexual jealousy at the imminent introduction of Iole into her house is less controversial than Medea's. While many authors refer to it in

⁴¹ Konstan (2006) 47.

⁴² Cf. Cairns (2008) 55. Parrott (1991) 6 notes: "... it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the *last* person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions."

⁴³ Cairns (2008) 56 argues, with somewhat different emphasis, that Medea's sexual jealousy is part of her *orgê*: "the fact that anger at insult and injustice does not *invariably* encompass jealousy does not mean that it may not"—cf. his similar earlier comment regarding jealousy in English: "Anger at a partner who prefers someone else is a perfectly good way of referring to the prototypical scenario of 'jealousy'" (54).

⁴⁴ On the competitiveness of the Greek emotional lexicon, see Konstan (2003a) 117 and (2006) 259–61.

passing, though, they do not elaborate on it, and it is generally agreed that sexual jealousy does not play a major part in her motivation.⁴⁵ While I agree that Deianeira is no Medea, at least as Sophocles portrays her,⁴⁶ many of the elements I have identified in my discussion of Medea's jealousy can be seen likewise in *Trachiniae*, and a closer examination will illuminate both Deianeira and our understanding of Greek sexual jealousy.

Deianeira has been Heracles' wife for many years; she has born him children, has kept his house, and has woven at his loom: all the attributes of the 'good' Greek wife. The tragic action is precipitated by her learning that Heracles intends to set up Iole as some sort of permanent lover (whether as a wife or concubine)⁴⁷ within the household—it is unclear what Heracles' intentions are concerning herself, but Deianeira believes the worst. She thinks that if only Heracles could come to love her again, this would all be avoided, and she accordingly practices a piece of 'love magic' on him—which ends up killing him.

In *Medea*, *erôs* was clearly very much part of the plot, and loomed large in Medea and Jason's relationship. In *Trachiniae*, Sophocles uses a much lighter brush to paint Deianeira and Heracles' marriage, to the extent that some have even questioned whether their relationship was an erotic one at all.⁴⁸ It is notable that all four instances of *erôs* words in the play (354, 433, 441, 489) refer to Heracles' feelings for Iole, as does the sole instance of *himeros* (476), and two of the nine instances of *pothos* (368, 431), the first of which is described as "heated-up" (*ἐντεθέρμανται*). However, Deianeira does say that, like the gods, she has been conquered by the power of Eros (444). Furthermore, five of the nine instances of *pothos* relate to Deianeira: the Chorus says that her heart is beset with longing for Heracles (103: *ποθουμέναι*); in his absence she can never put to bed the longing (107: *πόθον*) of her eyelids without weeping; Deianeira herself says she fears Lichas might tell Heracles of her desire (631: *πόθον*) for him, before she knows if she is desired in return (632: *ποθούμεθα*, sc. after the spell has had its effect); finally Hyllos tells Heracles that Deianeira's spell was designed to awaken his desire (1142: *πόθον*).

In *Medea* we saw that much of the eroticism of the play comes from the repeated use of bed words, many of which mean sex. It is at least worth noting

⁴⁵ Easterling (1982) 141 n. to 545–46, Houghton (1962), and Scott (1997) note some jealousy; Faraone (1994) 121 and Goldhill (2003) 167 deny it.

⁴⁶ Errandonea (1927) notes that previous versions of the Deianeira myth had shown her as being as vengeful as Medea, and argues Sophocles had initially intended his Deianeira to follow this pattern. See also Levett (2004) 30 ff., Davies (1989) 469.

⁴⁷ Easterling (1982) 126, 130 argues that such words as *δάμαρτ'* (428) and *ἐγγιμε* (460) do not have any legal significance.

⁴⁸ For example, Faraone (1994) 120–21, (1999) 199; Heiden (1989) 84–85. The majority (and, as will become clear, my) opinion is encapsulated by Easterling (1982) 5: "*Eros*, treated in this play with an insight that rivals that of Euripides in *Medea* and *Hippolytos*, is a dominant motif throughout." See also Wender (1974) on erotic imagery in the play.

that at nineteen instances (excluding words always meaning spouse/bedmate) there are more bed words in *Trachiniae* than in any other Sophocles play—unsurprisingly perhaps, since this play involves a rival for a legitimate spouse. However, unlike in *Medea*, only one of these instances unambiguously means sex (360: λέχος), and that refers to what Heracles wanted to do to Iole out of wedlock, before her father refused.

Closer examination of other instances does, however, present a subtle picture of the role of the (metaphorical) bed in Heracles' and Deianeira's relationship. Recounting the story of Heracles' battle with Acheloos for her, when (presumably) Heracles did feel *erôs* for her, Deianeira says he chose her for his bed (27: λέχος). In the *parodos*, the Chorus notes that as the sun goes to bed (95: κατευνάζει), so does Deianeira—unable to put to bed (106: εὐνάζειν) her *pothos* for Heracles—go to her husbandless bed (109: εὐναῖς ἀνανδρώτοισι).⁴⁹ While Deianeira is preparing the treated robe, the Chorus sings a hymn to Aphrodite (497 ff.) in which they recount the Heracles-Acheloos battle. Both are said to be eager for her bed (514: ἰέμενοι λεχέων), and Aphrodite (with the appropriate epithet εὐλεκτρος: 515) stands between them as judge. The bed, with all its significance, plays such a central role in Deianeira's conception of her marriage, that when she thinks of Heracles and Iole she imagines herself and Iole waiting under one blanket for him (539–40: μίμνομεν μιᾶς ὑπὸ χλαίνης): even while he is screwing someone else, there she is in bed with him.⁵⁰ Finally, and most tellingly, is her suicide. The Nurse recounts a most vivid image: Deianeira preparing the bed (918: εὐνατηρίους) as she would for sex,⁵¹ clambering onto it, crying out, “O bed and my bridal chamber, goodbye forever. Never again will you receive me in this bed as his bedmate” (920–22: ὦ λέχη τε καὶ νυμφεῖ ἐμά, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χαίρεθ', ὥς ἔμ' οὐποτε δέξεσθ' ἔτ' ἐν κοίταισι ταῖσδ' εὐνάτριαν), then stabbing herself through the stomach with a sword. It is hard to imagine a suicide scene more laden with erotic imagery.⁵² Here and earlier, the play insists on bringing Deianeira's *erôs* for her husband to our attention. But what is stressed is not the frequency or nature of the sex, but rather the fact of it (i.e., the sex act itself), and everything that sex with her husband on their marriage bed conveys in terms of exclusivity and its implication for Deianeira's value—as wife, as woman, as mistress of the house—to her husband.⁵³

⁴⁹ A similar phrase occurs at Eur. *Med.* 436–37.

⁵⁰ See Easterling (1968) 63–64.

⁵¹ Levett (2004) 56; cf. Easterling (1982) 190 n. to 915–16.

⁵² Winnington-Ingram (1980) 81 notes the eroticism of this scene; cf. De Wet (1983) 81 n. 28; Easterling (1968) 66. Loraux (1987) 54–56 has some interesting comments on the symbolism of her death blow.

⁵³ Cf. nn. 14, 81. Levett (2004) 54–57 argues, rightly, that we should not assume that our modern conception of love was a necessary component of Greek *erôs*; he also points out that, while our conception of love is self-sacrificing rather than driven by self-interest, in Greece *erôs* and self-interest were not necessarily in conflict. See further my discussion of love, *erôs*, and jealousy at pp. 154–55.

Turning to the other basic emotions in the jealousy prototype we can see that, at least at first sight, hatred and anger do not play much part in this play. Hatred, certainly, is absent, but is anger? On hearing of Heracles' *erôs* for Iole, Deianeira imagines getting to grips with the god Eros as with a boxer (441–42), and protests to Lichas that she would be raving mad to blame Heracles (446–47), nor is it shameful for the woman who shares in the responsibility (i.e., Iole, 447–48). She does not sound like someone who is not angry, but rather like someone who is trying to convince herself not to be angry.⁵⁴ At the start of the second episode, Deianeira describes how she has been forced to take in this girl (this “no longer girl,” as she corrects herself), as a ship is loaded with cargo, and calls this treatment *λωβητόν* (538): outrageous, insulting, despicable.⁵⁵ She vividly imagines herself crouching under a blanket with Iole, waiting together for Heracles to come to bed,⁵⁶ and bitterly calls these her wages (542: *οἰκούρι*) from her “so-called faithful and good” (541: *ὁ πιστός . . . καγαθὸς καλούμενος*) husband. But then she says, “I cannot be angry (543: *θυμοῦσθαι*) with him,” because he is often sick with this disease (i.e., *erôs*). She then falls to bitter contemplation once again: to share a house and a husband in this way—“What woman could do it?”, she demands. She imagines Iole's bloom ripening as her own fades, and dreads Heracles being known as her husband (550: *πόσις*), but Iole's man (551: *ἀνήρ*).⁵⁷ But still she resists her bitterness: “It is not a good thing for a woman to keep on being angry [*ὀργαίνειν*],” she says (552–53). In this whole passage we are presented with a series of vivid images (the ship, the blanket, the flowers), each presented in emotive rhetoric, laden with bitterness. She knows that unchecked these musings might lead to anger (*thumos*, *orgê*), but she is determined that they will not.⁵⁸ Deianeira may not be presented in the extreme manner of Medea—she is a much more understated character in every way—but we should be in no doubt that anger is there, struggling to break through. However, unlike Medea she does not wallow in it; rather she tries to see things from her husband's point of view. In

⁵⁴ She cannot be trying to convince Lichas as she continues in the same vein at 531 ff. when alone (with the Chorus—traditionally not a bar to self-expression in tragedy). Holt (1981) 68 believes “her pride and her noble intentions will [not] allow her to admit” her anger. I believe rather that her good character will not allow her anger to take hold.

⁵⁵ Jebb (1902) describes *λωβητόν* as a “word of contumely.” He also suggests an equation between *λωβητόν* *ἐμπόλημα* and *βλάβη* (‘harm’). See also Cairns (1993) 55 on *lôbê* (which he translates “disfigurement”).

⁵⁶ Compare Clytemnestra, saying Agamemnon intended Cassandra as additional spice for her bed (Aesch. Ag. 1447: *ἐννῆς παροψώνημα τῆς ἐμῆς χλιδῆς*).

⁵⁷ Jason is similarly referred to almost invariably as Medea's *posis*. In fact, of twenty-one instances of the word in *Medea*, sixteen refer to Medea's husband (three are generalized, and only two to Glauke's husband), including by Kreon (271) and Jason himself (910). Several times this is juxtaposed with a word referring to Glauke, either marriage (262: *ἦν... ἐγγήματο*; 910: *γάμους... ἀλλοίους*) or bedmate (1001: *συνεύνη*). Only once is Jason referred to as Medea's bedmate (159: *ἐνδάταν*). Clearly Deianeira's concerns are not mere hyperbole.

⁵⁸ See Holt (1981) 69; cf. W. V. Harris (2001) 266.

(proto-)Aristotelian language, she works to change her perceptions, to convince herself she has not been slighted; hence her arguments that it is not really Heracles' fault because it is his nature (or "sickness"), and that a man has a right to treat his wife in this way. It is because she does not allow *orgê* to take hold that she does not seek revenge.

Continuing our survey of emotions, we see that grief too does not play nearly so great a role in *Trachiniae* as in *Medea*. Largely that is because Medea knew of her husband's desertion for some time before putting her revenge into action. Deianeira no sooner learns of Heracles' plans than she implements her own. She is stunned, and there is little time for grief, yet still we see the odd expression: to be suspicious but not to know for certain would grieve her (458: ἀλγύνειεν ἄν); and knowing the truth she must bewail with the Chorus how much she suffers (535: τὰ δ' οἶα πάσχω συγκατοικτιουμένη). Similarly, pride is less prominent in this play, although part of Deianeira's horror is at Heracles' potentially being called (550–51: φοβοῦμαι, μὴ . . . καλῇται) her husband but Iole's man; concern for her reputation is therefore not entirely absent,⁵⁹ but Deianeira is not a 'masculine' hero in the way Medea is, and does not have the same obsession with 'face.'

The emotion that dominates this play is Deianeira's fear, and from line 7 (νυμφείων ὄκνον) onwards it is connected to her marriage. She is fearful of marriage; she is terrified of her suitor Acheloos. Since her marriage to Heracles she has still known nothing but fear (28: ἀεί τιν' ἐκ φόβου φόβον τρέφω), but until now for her husband's safety. Now her fear is for the future with Iole in her house, but still it is not entirely this that causes the tragedy of the play. Deianeira has been riven with fear all her life without ever being driven by it to do anything. She lived with the fear her father would marry her to a monster, and the fear that the monster would prevail over Heracles; since her marriage she has lived with fear for her husband's safety. Fear has never been a strong enough emotion to make her act; rather she has always been paralyzed into passivity, and one must infer that fear of being displaced would likewise, by itself, be insufficient for her to shake off her passivity.

It is not therefore the fear, but the *fact* that she is about to be displaced—from her bed, from her marriage, from her home—that finally galvanizes her into acting. And the emotion this fact triggers above all, the emotion that finally motivates Deianeira to act, is jealousy.⁶⁰ The situational antecedents are all in place. Deianeira has an exclusive and unique relationship with her husband; while his love affairs have been legion, he has only ever sought sex from them, and a Greek wife could expect no better. Her whole self-concept is (like

⁵⁹ Heiden (1989) 83–84.

⁶⁰ Despite the presence of fear this is not suspicious jealousy. Deianeira no sooner becomes aware of the possibility that Heracles might replace her with Iole, than she becomes certain (perhaps too certain) of the fact of it: Heracles' intentions are a *fait accompli*. See chapter 2 n. 69 on suspicious and *fait accompli* jealousy.

Medea) bound up with her roles as wife, housekeeper, mother—and it is that self-concept that is now under threat, with Heracles bringing Iole into the house as a permanent rival. She does not imagine Heracles in the servant's quarters with Iole, but rather Iole is in the marriage bed itself crouching under the same blanket with her (539–40); she believes she will lose her position as mistress of the house to become a drudge (542: οἰκούρι'); she pictures her own beauty fading as Iole's ripens. As bedmate, as mistress of the household, as a desirable woman—Iole threatens her in every aspect of her self-conception. And Deianeira cries out in her helplessness, "Living together in the house with her, and sharing the marriage—what woman could do it?" (545–46: τὸ δ' αἶ ξυνοικεῖν τῇδ' ὁμοῦ τίς ἄν γυνή δύναιτο, κοινωνοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γάμων): an expression of womanly jealousy comparable with (if less hyperbolic than) Medea's "Whenever a woman is wronged in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous" (265–66).

It is Heracles' bringing Iole to live in her house that triggers Deianeira's incipient anger, grief, and pride. And it triggers one more emotion: *phthonos*. Deianeira believes she is to be usurped from her position as bedmate and wife by another woman—a rival. This rival is younger, prettier, and Heracles is in love with her in a way he was once, but is no longer, in love with Deianeira. In her soliloquy (531 ff.), Deianeira starts by thinking of them side by side, comparable ("two under one blanket"). She then uses harsh, belittling words to describe Iole and the situation: *phortos* (537: freight, a heavy burden, but also implying something low or vulgar), *lôbêtos* (538: outrageous, insulting, despicable), *empolêma* (538: merchandise).⁶¹ Next she expresses a refusal to share the house (545: ξυνοικεῖν) and Heracles (546: κοινωνοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γάμων); next her dread that Iole will shine in comparison to her, that Iole's youthful bloom will ripen (547: ἔρπουσαν) as her own fades (548: φθίνουσας). And finally, she expresses her horror at the outcome: that to others Heracles will be merely her *posis*, but Iole's *anêr* (550–51). This sense of personal rivalry, this comparison between oneself and another with a strong desire to beat the other, to win, is *phthonos*—and this can be particularly seen if we consider Aristotle's words on the emotion. In every way, Iole stands to become an equal (*Rh.* 2.9.1386b19–20: τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου) to Deianeira, and it is Deianeira who will fall short (*Rh.* 2.10.1387b28: ἐλλείπει) of having everything Iole has (i.e., youthful bloom, sexual allure). Aristotle notes that older people feel *phthonos* for younger (*Rh.* 2.10, 1388a22–23: πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις); but most striking is the line I mentioned earlier, that one feels *phthonos* for one's rivals in love beyond anyone else (*Rh.* 2.10, 1388a14–16: πρὸς τοὺς . . . ἀντεραστὰς . . .

⁶¹ The language here is very significant in relation to her earlier references to Iole. There is a very substantial change of tone. The objectification (*phortos*, *empolêma*) exculpates Iole—she is the passive object of Heracles' passion, not an agent, and Deianeira recognizes a kindred spirit—but the pejorative terminology reflects at least her fear and also suggests an admixture of hostility, despite her avoiding letting it lead to aggressive action.

ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν). An Aristotelian might argue that Deianeira is not a ‘bad’ person, in the way envisaged of the *phthoneros* in the *Rhetoric* (though Medea may be), but she is morally uneducated in the way envisaged in the *Ethics*, and as such will be susceptible to *phthonos*.⁶²

We can recall that Medea had already lost her husband to the rival, and accordingly the *phthonos* script that formed part of her sexual jealousy complex was ‘begrudging envy.’ A different *phthonos* script is involved here, however. If Deianeira wished to be the only wife rather than one of two, she would be ‘jealous of her position’; however, she seems to believe that Iole will oust her completely, and accordingly the *phthonos* script that forms part of her sexual jealousy complex is ‘possessive jealousy.’ She does not wish to destroy Iole, or even to damage her, but she does recognize her as a rival she has to beat, and it is this that makes her willing to adopt such unorthodox, and potentially dangerous, methods.⁶³

8.3 *Andromache*

A third play in which jealousy is a major feature is Euripides’ *Andromache*. In the prologue, Andromache sets the scene. She was apportioned to Neoptolemos in the division of the spoils of Troy, and as his slave has had a sexual relationship with him for many years, a relationship that has produced a son. Recently Neoptolemos has married Hermione, a young Spartan princess, but Hermione has not since become pregnant. Neoptolemos is currently away on an extended visit to Delphi, and Hermione and her father Menelaus (who has come from Sparta specially) intend to kill Andromache and her son in his absence. That Hermione is jealous of Andromache, and that her jealousy is behind the murder attempt, is widely accepted by scholars,⁶⁴ and it will be instructive to see how her jealousy episode compares with those of Medea and Deianeira.

It is already clear that there are some similarities in the situations, but also some differences: Medea and Deianeira were the original wives jealous of usurpers, while Hermione is the new (legitimate) wife jealous of her (concubine) predecessor; the father of the younger rival is actively involved here as in

⁶² It is notable that Bacchylides, in his version of the myth, attributes Deianeira’s action to “widely powerful *phthonos*” when she heard Heracles was sending “white-armed Iole to his house as a bride (λοχον)” (16.23–31)—cf. Walcot (1978) 23. Levett (2004) 33–34 believes the *phthonos* is aimed at Heracles; but we know from Aristotle that *phthonos* focuses on the rival (here Iole) rather than the object of competition (Heracles), so Sophocles’ version of the myth is fully consistent with Bacchylides’.

⁶³ Faraone (1994) provides some evidence of ‘real life’ uses of such love potions and their occasional fatal effects—see also pp. 156–58 on Antiphon’s *Against the Stepmother*.

⁶⁴ For example, Erbse (1966) 280; Walcot (1978) 23–24, who compares Hermione with Medea and Deianeira, as well as Clytemnestra; Kovacs (1980a) 45 *inter alia*; Knox (1989) 77; Allan (2000) 107–8, 116, 269 *inter alia*.

Medea; both ‘wives’ are living in the same house in *Andromache*, as they were destined to in *Trachiniae*, but never did in *Medea*; the husband is away from home (again as in *Trachiniae*), leaving the women to their own devices. Other, more important connections will become clear.

Andromache tells us in the prologue that since Neoptolemos married Hermione, the latter has persecuted her, saying that Andromache is using secret drugs (32: *φαρμάκοις κεκρυμμένοις*) to make her childless (33: *ἄπαιδα*) and hateful to her husband (33: *πόσει μισουμένην*) in order to supplant her as mistress of the house (34–35: *ναίειν οἶκον . . . τόνδ’*) and cast her out from her marriage-bed (35: *λέκτρα*) by force.⁶⁵ Hermione later confirms all these points: Andromache wishes to cast her out of her house and take it over (156–57: *δόμους κατασχεῖν . . . τούσδε*); she is hated by her husband (157: *στυγούμαι δ’ ἀνδρὶ*) because of Andromache’s drugs (157: *φαρμάκοις*), and it is Andromache’s fault her womb is barren (158: *νηδὺς δ’ ἀκύμων*). While the secret administration of love philters is not alien to Greek thinking,⁶⁶ no one in the play takes Hermione’s charge seriously.⁶⁷

Andromache dismisses the allegations (205), and addresses instead the understandable fear behind it: that because Hermione continues barren while Andromache has successfully borne him a son, Neoptolemos will, through desire for a legitimate heir, make Andromache his actual wife and mistress of his house, throwing Hermione out (156–57) or relegating her to a subordinate position (927–28).⁶⁸ Andromache knows that this is Hermione’s secret fear (34–35), and it is this she explicitly argues against at length in the first *agôn*. With ironic questions she makes these points (192–202): Hermione’s marriage is legitimate (and by implication her own relationship with Neoptolemos is not; she stresses her slave status, which ensures she can only be a concubine, in her opening speech); her city is destroyed, while Hermione’s is powerful (i.e., a useful marriage alliance); she is a slave (while Hermione is a princess); she is ageing while Hermione is youthful; if she bears more children they will be slaves like her current one; and as illegitimate slave children of a slave mother, the people of Phthia would never accept them as kings (whatever Neoptolemos might wish).⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Stevens (1971) 95–96 for commentary on individual words, especially for this translation of *ναίειν* (line 34).

⁶⁶ As Faraone (1994) and (1999) 116–19 shows, and as I discuss in the main text above for *Trachiniae*.

⁶⁷ Kovacs (1980a) 18–20 and Faraone (1999) 7, who suggest a philter could either be administered to Hermione to make her barren, or to Neoptolemos to make him uninterested in sex with her. While the accusation is not taken seriously, there is no suggestion in the play that she is simply making it up, so as to have a plausible excuse for attacking Andromache; rather, it speaks to her state of mind: jealousy and paranoid fear (of being set aside) have made her believe a fantasy.

⁶⁸ In all three plays I have looked at, the rival can provide the male with something the patient cannot: Glauke offers power and status, Iole youth and sexual allure, Andromache a male offspring.

⁶⁹ Goebel (1989) 34 agrees, especially with this last point; he points out Neoptolemos has already contracted one marriage to obtain legitimate children, so if Hermione were sent away he would have to contract another.

This would be true in Classical Athens, where a barbarian *pallakê* certainly could not replace a wife, nor the issue be legitimated⁷⁰—but tragic social norms should not be presumed to match Classical Athenian ones.⁷¹ As far as this play is concerned, clearly Neoptolemos has not yet shown any signs of trying to legitimate Andromache's son, but is it (from Hermione's perspective) so far-fetched? Certainly Peleus is far more protective of Andromache and her son than one might expect from a Greek of his grandson's slaves, as Andromache knows he will be, hence her repeated efforts to get a message to him (81), and in his argument with Menelaus he explicitly lays claim to the boy as part of his family (714: ἄπαιδας ἡμᾶς δεῖ καταστήναι τέκνων). Further, he says he will raise the boy to be a great enemy to “these people” (724: μέγαν τοῖσδ' ἔχθρόν)—presumably Menelaus's family or the Spartans in general—and this is unlikely for a common slave, but perfectly plausible for an illegitimate prince. We saw in *Medea* that Jason argues that, even if his sons are considered illegitimate to his new marriage, they would still have high status as half-brothers to kings. Clearly Peleus envisages Andromache's son having some similar status, and he implicitly portrays him as a potential war leader.

We should also note that the boy is Neoptolemos's only heir.⁷² If Hermione remains barren, the whole reason for him keeping her as his wife will disappear, and he is unlikely to retain her out of affection. It is without dispute that he hates her: aside from the two brief statements noted above (33, 157), Andromache later elaborates that Hermione's husband hates her (205: στυγελί ποσίς), not because of her drugs but because she is unpleasant to live with, and it is virtue that delights bedfellows (208: ξυνευνέτας). Furthermore, when Orestes asks Hermione if her *posis* instead cherishes (907: στέργει) some other lover (907: εὐνήν), she replies that Andromache is his bedmate (908: ξυνευνέτιν)—and by implication the one he cherishes.

This brings us to Hermione's other charge against Andromache: that she is still sleeping with her husband, even after his marriage.⁷³ As Kovacs points out, Andromache never argues against this—on the contrary, her statement that a wife should accept her husband having lots of concubines (215–18) tacitly admits that Neoptolemos has at least one.⁷⁴ Thus not only as a provider of

⁷⁰ MacDowell (1978) 89–90; as MacDowell notes, the extraordinary legitimization of Perikles' son by Aspasia required a special decree be passed to approve it. Cf. the famous distinction between concubines (*pallakas*) and wives (*gunaikas*) at Dem. 59.122.

⁷¹ Consider Eur. *Hipp.* 304–10: the Nurse warns Phaidra that Hippolytos is a bastard who believes himself legitimate (309: νόθον φρονούντα γνήσι'); cf. W. S. Barrett (1964/2001) 216–17.

⁷² Kovacs (1980a) 22.

⁷³ Kovacs (1980a) 15–18 advances strong arguments that this accusation is true; see, for example, Storey (1993) 182 for an alternative view. νῦν δ' ἐκκλείουπα (l. 38) suggests Andromache *has* stopped sleeping with Neoptolemos, though Kovacs plausibly argues that Andromache could be referring to abandoning the palace to seek refuge at the shrine of Thetis. Note, however, that—as with the allegation about potions—what really matters is not that the charge is true, but that Hermione believes it to be true.

⁷⁴ Kovacs (1980a) 17–18, where he comments that it would be perfectly natural for a Greek man to continue having sex with a slave after marriage. Storey (1993) 182 notes that “neither *gamos* nor *posis* is used in connexion with this [Neoptolemos's and Andromache's] union”.

children, but also as bedmate, Andromache has succeeded where Hermione has failed, and it is at least plausible she could take on the third task of a wife, as keeper of the home. Hermione is surely right then to fear her as a potential rival wife. Though her account of Andromache's actions and intentions is the distorted product of her own fears, and though her reaction to those fears is both excessive and violent, those fears remain intelligible within the world of the play.

In *Trachiniae* we saw a vivid, but brief, image of Deianeira and Iole crouching in bed together awaiting their man; in *Andromache* 'two wives' is a running theme.⁷⁵ Hermione introduces it first, saying it is not acceptable for one man to hold the bridle-reins for two women (178: *δυοῖν γυναικοῖν*); rather the man who wishes not to live poorly should be content to see just one woman in his bed. The Chorus's immediate reaction is to refer to Hermione and Andromache as 'rival wives' (182: *ξυγγάμοισι*). Orestes later agrees, sentimentously (if not entirely altruistically) opining that it is bad for one man to have two wives (909: *δίσσι' λέχῃ*). But it is the Chorus who argues this most fully, devoting the entire second *stasimon* (465–500) to the theme. They begin by saying they will never praise a man with two wives (465: *δίδυμα λέκτρ'*), and go on to compare this with a kingdom with two kings, a song written by two poets, two tiller men on a boat, and a crowd of experts: each leads to strife, and likewise two wives lead to strife in the house (467: *ἔριδας οἴκων*). *Eris* (strife) is a major theme of the play,⁷⁶ with the word occurring no fewer than nine times. Four of these describe as *eris* the situation in the house between Hermione and Andromache (122, 490, 573, 960—two spoken by the Chorus, one each by Andromache and Orestes), one is the Chorus's comparison with strife between two craftsmen (477), and two more are gnomic utterances by the Chorus deploring strife between rival wives in general (467) and between friends (644) (see below on the remaining two instances). Clearly the Chorus agrees with Hermione that Andromache's status in the house is problematic.

Does Hermione feel *erôs* for Neoptolemos? The word does not appear in the play at all, and neither does *himeros*; *pothos* appears only once, and refers to Hermione desiring death (824); and the verb *stergein* appears four times, but only once refers to love, and that is Neoptolemos's love (907: Orestes asking Hermione if her husband cherishes some other lover).⁷⁷ At no point in the play does Hermione express any affection for Neoptolemos. However she is highly sexualized,⁷⁸ though her *erôs* is expressed differently from that in

⁷⁵ See Storey (1993) 183 ff.

⁷⁶ Storey (1993) 187; J. R. Wilson (1979) 7–9.

⁷⁷ Two of the other three instances (180, 468) refer to a husband being content with one wife; the final one (214) refers to a wife putting up with a bad husband.

⁷⁸ Pagani (1968) 203; McClure (1999) 179–81, especially 181 n. 60: "At Pl. *Symp.* 191e, *φιλανδρία* [a quality of Hermione, see main text below] is explicitly connected with adultery: 'promiscuous and adulterous women' (*γυναικες φιλανδροί τε καὶ μοιχεύτραι*)".

Medea and *Trachiniae*, and makes much play with both her parental heritage (i.e., as the daughter of Helen and of Menelaus), and the connected and antecedent story of the beauty contest between Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite.

The word *Kupris* occurs five times in the play, and in each case is either used to refer to Aphrodite as the bringer of sexual desire, or as an adjective meaning ‘sexual.’ Hermione is the first to use the word, perhaps inadvertently showing how much sex preys on her mind, when she says a good husband should be content with one sexual partner (179: *εὐναίαν Κύπριν*). Andromache picks up on this, first mentioning how she suckled Hektor’s bastards when sexual desire (223: *Κύπρις*) caused him to stray, then warning Hermione not to outdo her mother in man-loving (229: *φιλανδρίᾳ*),⁷⁹ and finally directly admonishing her to keep silent about her sexual problems (240: *Κύπριδος ἀλγήσεις*). The Chorus takes this further, devoting the first *stasimon* (274–308) to a recapitulation of the beauty contest between the three goddesses—which Aphrodite won by delighting Paris with deceptive words (289: *δολίοις ἔλε Κύπρις λόγοις, τερπνοῖς μὲν ἀκοῦσαι*)—as well as Helen’s failure to reject Paris, and the ten years of war that followed.

Hermione’s sexual appetites have now been firmly linked to her mother’s, but Peleus takes things a stage further by drawing attention to her father’s sexual incontinence too: in his *agôn* with Menelaus, he says that when the latter recaptured Helen after ten years of war he should have killed her, but instead on seeing her breast he dropped his sword (i.e., was ‘unmanned’) and welcomed her kiss, being conquered by lust (631: *ῥῆσων πεφνκῶς Κύπριδος*). This scene is evoked again later, when Hermione, lamenting her earlier conduct, emerges from the house, tears off her veil, and bares her breast in public (830–35), an act of licentiousness that appalls the Chorus.⁸⁰ Finally, her sexual incontinence is shown by her willingness to elope with Orestes. While Hermione displays no affection for Neoptolemos at any point in the play, her highly sexualized nature ensures that she will lust for him, the only man she is allowed to sleep with—at least until she abandons her marriage and makes Orestes the object of her lust instead.⁸¹ No less than for Medea or Deianeira then, does *erôs* play a part in Hermione’s jealousy of her rival.

What of the other feelings we have seen as part of the Greek jealousy prototype? Hermione does not exhibit grief, but then (unlike Medea) she does not feel affection for her husband, nor has he left her yet—and her attempted murder of Andromache is intended to ensure he never does. She also does not

⁷⁹ Allan (2000) 100 suggests Hermione has tried to over-compensate for her inherited lust by “demanding too strict a form of monogamy from her husband”; cf. McClure (1999) 180–81.

⁸⁰ See McClure (1999) 194–95.

⁸¹ As with Deianeira (cf. n. 53 above), Hermione’s *erôs* and self-interest go hand in hand: she could feel *erôs* for Neoptolemos (without being ‘in love’ with him in the modern sense) because sex with him would give her what she most wanted. Sex is both an end in itself, and also a means to, and a measure of, other things (here status, worth)—see also n. 68 above.

express rage,⁸² though some bitterness comes out (e.g., her comments to Andromache that she is hateful to her husband (157), and to Orestes that some of her misfortunes were caused by her husband (902), who avoids her bed in favor of someone else's (908)). Hermione clearly considers Andromache a personal enemy, but again she does not talk about it; rather her hatred is manifested more in insults and in her intended murderous actions.⁸³

The emotion that most dominates the play, if (typically) rarely named, is *phthonos*—the particular script this time being ‘covetous envy’: Hermione wants what Andromache has (i.e., sex with Neoptolemos and a son by him) but has an even stronger desire to deprive Andromache of these (and destroy her). Having referred to the situation between Hermione and Andromache as “hateful strife” (122: ἔριδι στυγερᾷ) in the *parodos*, in their very next interjection (after Hermione’s diatribe against Andromache) the Chorus opines that “a female heart is liable to *phthonos* and always exceedingly full of ill will to rival wives” (181–82: ἐπίφθονόν τοι χρῆμα θηλείας φρενὸς καὶ ξυγγάμοισι δυσμενὲς μάλιστ’ ἀεί),⁸⁴ thus connecting *phthonos* to the ‘rival wives’ theme. *Eris* is also traditionally connected with *phthonos*,⁸⁵ and aside from the seven instances of *eris* that refer to Andromache and Hermione or comparative situations (see above), it is notable that the final two instances refer to envy/jealousy scenarios: the beauty competition between Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite (279), and the subsequent strife between Menelaus and Paris over Helen (362). Given the focus on inheritance to explain Hermione’s rampant sexuality, it is no accident that Euripides has brought up these two episodes from Hermione’s family’s past; he clearly intends *eris*, and by extension *phthonos*, to be an obvious theme of the play. As Hermione explains, in a lengthy attempt to shift the blame, this *phthonos* was fostered by gossip from her female friends (930–53);⁸⁶ and its result is as we have come to expect: (attempted) destruction of the envied person. *Phthonos* has a tendency to drag its target down to the level of the patient,⁸⁷ and Peleus has already noted that Hermione and Menelaus wished to destroy Andromache’s son to make Neoptolemos’s line as barren as theirs (711–14).⁸⁸ And in her first speech Hermione insists that if she cannot kill Andromache she will ensure that she

⁸² *Cholos* does not appear in the play. Three of the four instances of *thumos* (689, 728, 742—the fourth (1072) just means “heart”) and the single instance of *orgê* (688) apply to Peleus and Menelaus.

⁸³ It is left to Menelaus to describe Andromache and her son as enemies: he calls them *echthroi* twice (515, 520), and “most hated” (659: ἐχθίστους) once.

⁸⁴ Compare Medea’s comment that wives wronged in the marriage bed are murderous (*Med.* 265–266), and Deianeira’s plea, “Sharing the house and the marriage, what woman could do it?” (*Trach.* 545–46).

⁸⁵ For example, Hes. *Op.* 11–29; cf. Most (2003) 130–31.

⁸⁶ For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, see p. 45.

⁸⁷ For other examples of dragging down, see chapter 7 n. 33.

⁸⁸ Arist. *Rh.* 1.5 includes having children as one of the goods subject to good fortune that can excite *phthonos* in those who lack them (see chapter 4.3.1).

ends her days as Hermione's own personal drudge, cowering at her knees (164–65; cf. 927–28: Hermione's belief that Andromache will treat her beaten rival likewise)—the desire to beat the rival, and make that victory manifest, being another common tendency of *phthonos*.

Many similarities are now apparent from these three plays, and give us insights into this ancient Greek sexual jealousy-type emotion script. In all three plays, legitimate wives are (actually, potentially, or supposedly) abandoned for rivals, and their three roles as Greek wives— as housekeeper, as bedmate, and (except for Deianeira) as bearer of children—are threatened. All three women feel *erôs* for their partners, though what we might term 'being in love' with them is not an obvious part of this (especially for Hermione). All three are concerned about the exclusivity of their position as wife. All three are concerned with their status, and that the rival can give their husbands something they cannot (see n. 68). In two cases, the wife's jealousy is caused or increased by her rival (potentially or actually) living under her own roof; and in the third by the husband abandoning his own *oikos* to go to live under the rival's roof. The situational antecedents are, in all three cases, remarkably uniform. There is a little more variety in the emotions aroused, both in the precise affects and their intensity, but there are some obvious similarities: anger (in differing degrees) is felt for the partner who should have kept his marriage relationship exclusive (if not monogamous), and hostility (ranging from mild hostility to hatred) and *phthonos* (a variety of scripts) are felt for the rival. In two cases this *phthonos* causes the jealous wife to seek the rival's death, and in all cases there is a distinctly expressed desire to *beat* the rival.

Konstan argues that the absence, or at least the lack of explicit expression, of love or affection means that jealousy, as we understand it, did not exist in ancient Greece.⁸⁹ This position is open to two objections. First, this contradicts Konstan's own (valid) contention that there are cultural variations in emotions.⁹⁰ If these still allow us to use the obvious label for other emotions, why should jealousy be different? Second, it is by no means the case that modern English jealousy need involve love: people from whose relationship love has long since vanished can still be jealous when their partner goes off with someone new.⁹¹ What matters, even in modern English jealousy, is exclusivity (if not monogamy), not affection—what is important is that they are *mine*. The psychology and script summarized above are very clear, and their

⁸⁹ Konstan (2006) 219–43. Cohen (1991) 167–68 disagrees that the Greek marriage was necessarily devoid of either passion or emotional attachment, and provides a number of examples: see especially 168 n. 131 for his examples of "women's resentment at men's infidelity."

⁹⁰ The case is made for individual emotions throughout Konstan (2006), but the Introduction (3–40) especially makes the general case that emotions should be considered to be socially and culturally conditioned.

⁹¹ See chapter 2.4.2 on the absence of love from most psychologists' lists of affects in the jealousy complex.

uniformity across the three plays I have examined should demonstrate beyond doubt the existence of a jealousy-type emotion in ancient Greece, notwithstanding a supposed lack of emphasis on personal affection. It is perhaps more germane to read this latter as merely an indication of the difference in the roles of 'love' in modern Western and *erôs* in ancient Greek, marriages, or at the least a distinction in terminology and semantic boundaries.

It is notable that all three plays involve jealous women, and Goldhill's contention that jealousy is not a heroic enough emotion for tragedy, though mistaken as a general principle,⁹² does at least more generally seem to be borne out for men. However, before turning to other genres—to see how our Greek sexual jealousy prototype survives outside of exclusive, heterosexual marriage relationships—it is worth considering one other character in *Andromache* who could be labeled 'jealous': Orestes.

Orestes narrates (957–86) how Hermione had been promised to him in marriage, but that Menelaus reneged on the agreement and gave her to Neoptolemos. Later Orestes came to Neoptolemos and begged him to give Hermione to him instead. He is aware of Hermione's attempt to kill Andromache, and its failure, and has arrived with the intention of taking her away from Neoptolemos's house, if she wants to leave. His early questioning of her, supposedly to learn what has happened, is therefore clearly disingenuous.⁹³ As far as Hermione is concerned, he is pushing at an open door, and he departs with her. However, it is not enough for him merely to beat Neoptolemos by persuading his wife to elope with him. His hatred (1006–7: *ἔχθραν ἐμήν. ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν . . .*), aroused by his sexual rivalry with Neoptolemos (and the latter's insults of him, 977), requires that he must kill him too—and this he achieves, again through duplicity: he slanders (1005: *διαβολαῖς τε ταῖς ἐμαῖς*) Neoptolemos to the Delphians (see 1092–95 for the slanders' content) who, believing the slanders, then kill Neoptolemos.⁹⁴ The language of *phthonos* is not present here, but the necessary conditions, psychology, and action tendencies are consistent with a *phthonos* analysis: Orestes has a rival for the possession of a desired wife; he has been beaten by his rival in the past, but now has the opportunity to take the possession; he hates his rival; and he uses slander to destroy him.

It is surely right to see a link between the two halves of the play: that Orestes' sexual jealousy of Neoptolemos reflects Hermione's of Andromache.⁹⁵ Clearly Orestes, being a man, does not want the three wifely roles for himself,

⁹² Goldhill (2003) 171–72. However, as we have seen, jealousy is a major plot element in at least three of the thirty-two surviving tragedies, and if that ratio is reflective of lost tragedies, then by inference we can assume a jealousy plot was staged in Athens around twice a year (on average approximately one at each Lenaia and City Dionysia—not to mention other, local festivals).

⁹³ Allan (2000) 73.

⁹⁴ On slander and *phthonos*, see p. 45.

⁹⁵ McClure (1999) 160–62, 199–200; Allan (2000) 74. Kovacs (1980a) 5 does not see any link.

but he does want the husband/protector role, indeed admits to begging for it (972–73). Interestingly, for Orestes again the question of his promised bride appears to relate to issues of status, in his case his status as an outcast,⁹⁶ and the insult to his status by Neoptolemos’s withholding of “his” woman. We are not told whether he feels *erôs* for Hermione, but we should note the following: he once chose her for his wife; he tried to persuade, indeed begged, Neoptolemos (a marriage rival, hence already a personal enemy) to give up a woman already married, rather than picking any other eligible princess; and he is pursuing her still. The main difference between Hermione’s jealousy episode and Orestes’ is that Orestes succeeds in murdering his rival where Hermione fails. Euripides has been able to depict Orestes’ jealousy with such economy precisely because the example of Hermione is by this point so vividly in our minds.

8.4 Sexual Jealousy outside Tragedy

In this final section of the chapter I explore how well the closely portrayed tragic ‘type’ of the jealous woman is a model for jealousy in other genres, in particular in oratory and New Comedy. The most detailed portrayal of a jealous woman outside tragedy occurs in Antiphon 1, *Against the Stepmother*, which portrays a woman who allegedly caused the death of her husband⁹⁷ by the administration of a poison she claimed was a love potion (1.9: ἐπὶ φίλοις; 1.19: φάρμακον).⁹⁸ She makes use of another woman to administer the drug, the mistress (1.14: παλλακῇ) of her husband’s friend Philoneus, whom Philoneus was about to put away into a brothel. The stepmother describes the *pallakê*’s treatment by Philoneus as injustice (1.15: ἀδικεῖσθαι), and uses the same verb (1.15: ἀδικοῦτο) to describe her own treatment by her husband, thus appealing to the *pallakê*’s fellow feeling (1.15: καὶ αὐτῇ).

Though the text is not explicit about the fiction allegedly used by the stepmother to manipulate the unfortunate *pallakê*, the language used is highly suggestive. As Bonanno has shown, *dikê* is frequently used to express the reciprocal expectations of amorous relationships in Greece—that the one

⁹⁶ This status deters those who are not his *philoî* from offering him a wife (974–76); by returning Andromache to Menelaus, he will make Menelaus his *philos*, and thus obtain Hermione as his wife (985–86).

⁹⁷ Carey (1997) 41, Gagarin (2002) 149–50 on the plausibility of the charge. It is highly possible this is the case cited at Arist. *Mag. mor.* 1188b29–38, where the woman was acquitted on the grounds that she had no intention to kill (see Gagarin (1997) 140 and (2002) 149, Faraone (1994) 118). I am less concerned with her intentions, than the rhetorical means by which she allegedly persuaded the *pallakê*, and the speaker’s presentation of his stepmother to the court.

⁹⁸ Allegedly her second attempt involving poison (§ 9—and § 3 suggests previous attempts, possibly by other means). See Gagarin (1997) 111–12, Faraone (1994) 119 on fatal doses.

feeling *philia* should have her *philia* returned, and that both lover and beloved should behave in a certain way toward each other—and from Sappho onwards ‘*adikia*’ asserts that those expectations are not being met: that one party no longer feels *philia* for the other.⁹⁹ On its own the language of *adikia* could be open to a number of readings, but combined with the love philter it becomes more specific. This use of *adikeisthai* by the stepmother, about both her and the *pallakê*’s relationships, must be designed to play on the latter’s sensibilities. Though clearly the stepmother’s husband would not be placing a legitimate wife in a *porneion*, the connection is presumably with them both being put aside for a rival. The stepmother wins the *pallakê* over by presenting herself likewise as a jilted woman, and by playing on the *pallakê*’s insecurity, to persuade her of a commonality of interest. She tells her the potion will recapture their respective men’s affections (1.15: *φίλον ποιῆσαι*), something the *pallakê* believes she has lost.¹⁰⁰

This is in fact the only case in surviving sources outside tragedy where a (portrayed) jealousy scenario actually leads to the death of either the loved one or the rival, but despite its uniqueness, it shows that an audience would be expected to believe such scenarios could happen as plausibly offstage as on.¹⁰¹ Gagarin argues, rightly in my view, that the speaker’s “vivid story of the women seeking desperate remedies when they fear they are losing their men’s love would fit comfortably into the (all-male) jurors’ preconceptions about the kinds of steps desperate women take for the sake of love.”¹⁰² However, the speaker does not argue directly that his stepmother’s jealousy, or her use of drugs, was unjustified; he cannot risk jurors disagreeing and feeling sympathy for her. Instead he melodramatically, but effectively, refers to his stepmother as “that Clytemnestra” (1.17: *τῆς Κλυταιμνήστρας ταύτης*). We might think from the stepmother’s own arguments to the *pallakê* that Deianeira would be a more appropriate role model. However, the speaker does not want his stepmother compared with a rather pathetic woman, a victim, who merely wished to retain her husband’s affections and only killed him by mistake. He wants to link her to an unambiguous husband-killer, the sort of woman every Athenian would dread to have at home. Among her many motivations for killing her husband, Clytemnestra is driven by jealousy at his bringing Cassandra home to live as a

⁹⁹ Bonanno (1973). The language of *dikê/adikia* was also seen in *Medea*.

¹⁰⁰ Faraone (1999) 119 argues that *pharmaka* and *philtera* were generally used to make husbands care more for their spouses, rather than desire them sexually: the verbs used are typically *philein*, *stergein*, or *agapan*, rather than *eran*. This is not, of course, to say that the wife might not feel *erôs*—see n. 81 above.

¹⁰¹ See P. Wilson (1996) on tragic narratives in oratory; see also Hall (1995).

¹⁰² Gagarin (2002) 147. Gagarin goes on to note that many of them would have seen *Medea* (I would add *Trachiniae* and *Andromache*, to my mind much more apposite)—though only a portion of fifth-century tragedy survives, and the theme of the jealous wife must have come up repeatedly, so jurors might not necessarily have had any particular tragedy in mind.

mistress under her roof.¹⁰³ The speaker in Antiphon 1, then, by using the single name Clytemnestra, is calling to mind a whole battery of imagery against his stepmother. He avoids the ‘jealous wife’ story she spins to the *pallakê*—it would not help his case to focalize from her perspective. He needs a monster, not a woman with a scrap of justification, hence “that Clytemnestra.”

There are a number of other situations in the oratorical corpus where a wife is very upset at her husband bringing a mistress into their house. At Andoc. 1.124–25, the speaker mentions a certain Kallias who married a woman, then brought her mother into the house as a sexual partner, at which event the daughter tried to hang herself, then ran away.¹⁰⁴ At Andoc. 4.14–15, Alkibiades is said to bring free and slave mistresses (plural) into the house, leading his wife to apply for a divorce. She at least has somewhere to go (her family); Deianeira in *Trachiniae* does not, which might explain her more drastic measures to retain her husband’s affection. Similarly the stepmother in Antiphon 1 would be concerned for her position and status as wife, should her husband leave her for the other woman.¹⁰⁵ Such a scenario occurs in Isaeus 6, where the old man Euktemon moves first himself, then all his furniture and possessions to the house of his *pallakê*, Alke, leaving the legitimate wife and children destitute; however, at least he had the decency to put his mistress up in a different house (Isae. 6.21), as did Lysias with Metaneira (Dem. 59.22).¹⁰⁶

Most of the jealous characters we have seen so far have been women. For the remainder of this chapter I turn to jealous men. We have already seen one such character—Orestes in *Andromache*—and saw that his jealousy episode, almost unique in surviving tragedy, contained many of the same situational antecedents (with appropriate alterations for a putative husband’s status rather than a wife’s), affective states, and resulting destructive action as the women’s.

Our next jealous man appears in Menander’s *Perikeiromenê*. The soldier Polemon has fallen in love (128: ἐραστοῦ γενομένου; cf. 494: ἐρᾶς, 499: ἐρώντι) with Glykera, an adopted girl of unknown origin; and the adoptive mother gave her to him as if she were her real daughter (130: δίδωσι τὴν κόρην ὡς θυγατέρα αὐτῆς ἔχειν).¹⁰⁷ When Polemon’s servant Sosias reports seeing their

¹⁰³ At Aesch. Ag. 1412 ff. Clytemnestra lists the reasons for her killing of her husband, starting with his sacrifice of their daughter. She discusses his affairs in lines 1438–47, first sneering at his “soothing of Chryseises [plural] at Ilium,” then immediately pointing to Cassandra (1440: αἰχμάλωτος ἦδε) and calling her “sharer of his couch” (1441: κοινόλεκτρος τοῦδε), “his faithful bedmate” (1442: πιστὴ ξύνεινος), “his lover” (1446: φιλήτωρ τοῦδε), and “spice for my bed” (1447: εὐνῆς παροψώνημα τῆς ἐμῆς).

¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, Andocides lampoons the man by comparing him to Oedipus or Aegisthus (1.129). Once again, by drawing the audience’s attention to the theatre and pressing the right buttons, the speaker can make them tell the story for him.

¹⁰⁵ Dillon (2004) 21.

¹⁰⁶ Kapparis (1999) 212–13; Carey (1992) 97; Davidson (1997) 99.

¹⁰⁷ This formulation suggests legal marriage, but since Glykera is of unknown parentage and hence not a citizen, she should be a concubine (*pallakê*) rather than a legitimate wife. However, Polemon regards her as his wife (489: ἐγὼ γαμετὴν νεόμικα ταύτην), and the rival is described as a *moichos* (357, 370, 986), implying adultery. See Traill (2008) 40–45 on her status.

handsome young neighbor Moschion (unbeknown to all, Glykera's long-lost brother) kissing Glykera, Polemon flies into a rage (163: *εἰς ὀργήν*). In his mind, there is a 'love triangle' (himself, his wife/mistress, and his rival); he already feels *erôs* for her, and now also *orgê* and, as we shortly learn, grief (174: he lies on his bed weeping—cf. Eur. *Med.* 24–25) at her supposed betrayal of their exclusive relationship. As we have by now come to expect, this combination of circumstances and affects arouses his *phthonos*, causing him to carry out a destructive action: he cuts off the long hair that makes Glykera beautiful (173) before throwing her out of the house. While the language of *phthonos* is not present, it is clear that the situation, psychology, and action tendencies are consistent with a *phthonos* analysis: Polemon has a rival for the possession of a desired wife/mistress, she appears to have gone off with the rival, and so he damages her beauty so his rival cannot enjoy it. This scenario is very much in line with the cases we have examined so far (with the obvious rider that in comedy, rather than tragedy, even sharp emotion is not going to make a character kill), and it is clear that Polemon is jealous. The word he himself uses is *zêlotupos* (987); and this word, first appearing in our sources in Aristophanes' *Wealth* (dated 388), is traditionally translated 'jealous' (see below).¹⁰⁸

Menander's *Samia* appears to have a similar story. Uniquely in surviving Greek New Comedy, Demeas is a mature man in a loving, exclusive relationship—however this is not with a citizen woman (i.e., a marriage), but a Samian ex-*hetaira* called Chrysis; the third member of the 'family' is Moschion, Demeas's adopted son.¹⁰⁹ In the usual complicated way of New Comedy, Demeas comes to believe that Chrysis has slept with Moschion and had a child by him (the baby is actually Moschion's by a different girl). We learn from the prologue that Demeas feels *erôs* for Chrysis (21: *εἰς ἐ<πιδουμίαν*; 81: *ἐρᾷ*),¹¹⁰ and is concerned about younger love-rivals (26: *ὑ[π'] ἀντεραστῶν μευρακίων*).¹¹¹ When he discovers the supposed affair, he is furious (447: *τὴν χολήν*), but he immediately exonerates Moschion (his 'rival'), while placing all the blame on Chrysis (326 ff.), in both cases on grounds of previous character. He heaps imprecations on Chrysis, calling her a whore and a plague (348),

¹⁰⁸ Polemon's jealousy is widely recognized by scholars—for example, Goldberg (1980) 45; R. L. Hunter (1985) 67, 150; Zagagi (1994) 18, 30, 49, 150; Lape (2004) 173. Konstan (2006) 234–35 disagrees, but his argument that *zêlotupos* never means 'jealous' in Classical literature becomes strained here (see discussion in main text and n. 130).

¹⁰⁹ Lape (2004) 139 on Demeas's uniqueness; she also notes he is living permanently with a *hetaira* at an age when he would be expected to be (re)married. Chrysis, for her part, behaves not like the usual *hetaira* of New Comedy, but as a respectable Greek wife and mother; see Lape (2004) 141; Zagagi (1994) 55. Moschion, as a citizen, is the legitimate son of the *oikos* under Athenian law, notwithstanding his adoption—see Zagagi (1994) 116–17.

¹¹⁰ There seems to be a convergence of *epithumia* with *erôs*—see also Lysias 3.5, 39, 44, discussed in the main text below.

¹¹¹ Cf. Deianeira in *Trachiniae*. We should note that comedy presents a situation for men that tragedy portrays only for women.

and labels her as his Helen (336–37—a woman who ran off with a younger man who was then staying in her husband’s house).¹¹² He tells himself that he must leave behind his yearning and his *erôs* for her (350: ἐπιλαθοῦ τοῦ πόθου, πέπανυσ’ ἐρῶν), and he throws Chrysis (and the baby) out of the house, knowing she has nowhere else to go,¹¹³ spitefully telling her that he will find some other girl to love (385: ἀγαπήσει) him. It might appear from what we’ve seen that Demeas’s reaction owes something to jealousy. However, while the cuckold’s *phthonos* can lead to harm of the partner rather than the rival (as in *Perikeiromenê*, and indeed *Trachiniae*), the fact that no bitterness or violence is shown to the ‘rival,’ whom he even allows to continue living in his house, suggests that other emotions might be at work in this case.

Many scholars have pointed out the similarity of the *Samia* situation to that in Euripides’ *Hippolytos*,¹¹⁴ but Theseus certainly does act destructively toward his rival. On returning from a long trip away from home, he finds his wife Phaidra dead. He laments extensively, referring to her as his *lechos* (858) and *alochos* (801). He soon learns that his wife has left a suicide note, saying his son (her stepson) Hippolytos had made sexual advances to her, and she killed herself in consequence. Theseus immediately denounces and curses Hippolytos with death,¹¹⁵ and at this moment of sharp anguish refers to Phaidra as his *eunê* (885). It is hard to determine Theseus’s emotional motivation—he does not spend much time saying why he’s doing what he’s doing, mostly he just acts—but there are some indications. *Eunê* seems in origin to be slightly more sexualized than *lechos*,¹¹⁶ and if so it is interesting that he uses it uniquely at this point; later he returns to *lektra* (944) and *lechos* (1266). We should also note that his immediate response is to curse Hippolytos with death, implying hatred or jealousy.¹¹⁷ He calls Hippolytos *mê philos* (927), implying he is his *echthros*. He then comes up with the secondary punishment of banishment: he wants Hippolytos either to die (887–90) or to be banished (893–98), but he later rejects a quick death for him, so his suffering can be long-drawn-out (1045–49). This is reminiscent of Medea’s changing of Jason’s punishment: Theseus wants Hippolytos to have time to perceive his (Theseus’s) revenge. He also talks twice of Hippolytos dishonoring first Zeus (886), then himself (1040), and also says he

¹¹² See Goldberg (1980) 97–102 on this scene; also Lape (2004) 159–60. Once again, labeling with the name of a famous literary character is an easy way to make the audience tell the story for you.

¹¹³ R. L. Hunter (1985) 88.

¹¹⁴ For example, Goldberg (1980) 99; R. L. Hunter (1985) 116; Zagagi (1994) 56, 125 (where he quotes other references); Lape (2004) 155–56, 159. Theseus judges Hippolytos on (his view of) his past conduct, as Demeas does with Moschion and Chrysis.

¹¹⁵ W. S. Barrett (1964/2001) 187 notes the speed and violence of his public denunciation of Hippolytos on reading Phaidra’s suicide tablet; I prefer to note the speed and violence of the curse.

¹¹⁶ See n. 11 above.

¹¹⁷ See comments earlier in this chapter on Medea’s, Hermione’s, and Orestes’ desires for their rivals’ deaths, and why Medea ‘commutes’ Jason’s sentence.

attacked Phaidra with violence (886: βία; cf. 1073: ὑβρίζειν); Aristotle tells us that *orgê* is the correct response both to disrespect and to *hubris*.¹¹⁸ While Theseus's response to Hippolytos's (supposed) semi-incestuous rape is explicitly portrayed by shocked *orgê* and *misos*,¹¹⁹ very plausible (and traditionally heroic) emotions in themselves, the situational and affective aspects of the scenario are not inconsistent with a jealous response, and the audience may understand it as implicitly present. However, Euripides shies away from developing this aspect more fully. Could it be that jealousy is inappropriate for men (as opposed to women) in tragedy,¹²⁰ while it can comfortably be presented in comedy?

Turning to oratory, we might wonder if in Lysias 1, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*, the speaker Euphiletos is trying to hide his jealousy at being cuckolded by his wife. As he relates the story, dispassionately, he finds out that his young, demure wife has been having an affair with a young man (Eratosthenes), assisted by her maid. He forces the maid to tell him the next time Eratosthenes is in the house with his wife; when she does, he quietly goes out, gathers a group of his friends, returns to surprise the couple *in flagrante*, and kills Eratosthenes. He is tried for murder, but he argues that the ancient laws of Athens permit a husband to kill a *moichos* caught in the act—indeed, the way he presents the case is that they almost demand it. However those laws, while still on the statute book, were no longer considered *comme il faut*,¹²¹ and Euphiletos faces an uphill struggle to give the prosecution no handle for claiming that he was motivated by anything other than a dispassionate desire to uphold the law to the fullest; should they prove otherwise, then they will be able to argue much more convincingly that he was guilty of entrapment, while the defense rests on everything happening spontaneously. Euphiletos is on shaky ground because he has, by his own admission, known about the affair for several days before catching his wife and Eratosthenes in the act, and many will struggle to believe that he went about his life completely as normal, not in any disquieted state of mind, and not making any effort to stage manage the show-down. Jealousy is the obvious construction for the audience to put on his actions, the 'elephant in the living room,' and Euphiletos needs to avoid any hint that he was motivated by it. Accordingly, in one of Lysias's best character sketches, Euphiletos presents himself from the beginning as a simple, credulous, law-abiding man, who does everything because it is the right thing to do.¹²² He betrays no emotion for his young wife, neither *erôs* (despite their

¹¹⁸ Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378a30–b25.

¹¹⁹ The element of shock (without other attendant emotions) is similar to the response of Hippolytos, the Nurse, and the Chorus on finding out whom Phaidra's passion is for.

¹²⁰ Except Orestes of course, but Orestes is an extreme and unique figure in tragedy in many ways.

¹²¹ Carey (1989) 60–61.

¹²² See Carey (1989) 61–62 and Todd (2007) 51–52 on Euphiletos's self-characterization and strategy. Carey is unconvinced, saying "Euphiletos seems a little too innocent to be true" (63). Cf. Edwards and Usher (1985) 220–21, 224, 225, who see flashes of anger at his wife's adultery peppering Euphiletos's speech; this is rightly denied by Todd (2000) 16 and (2007) 51–52, especially n. 37. See also Konstan (2006) 234, who in my view takes Euphiletos far too readily at his word.

mutual flirting—1.12–13), nor *orgê* on hearing the maid's story or even on finding Eratosthenes in bed with his wife.¹²³ In his self-presentation, he moves from gullible old man to austere defender of the law without a bridge, leaving no time for the audience to dwell on his likely true response.

Mature men are not only portrayed as jealous (or not) in domestic cases. In two other speeches by Lysias we find them coming to blows over young lovers. In Lysias 3, *Against Simon*, the speaker, a man of advanced years, portrays his opponent Simon's jealousy over his lover—a young Plataian boy called Theodotos, with whom they were both enamored (3.5: ἐπεθυμήσαμεν)—leaving him for the speaker.¹²⁴ Simon is presented as responding with violence against both the speaker (and his family) and the boy on two occasions, both times while under the influence of alcohol (3.6–8, 12–18). However, despite the speaker's first assertion that initially Simon was impassioned about the boy too (3.5: ἐπεθυμήσαμεν), he later says his behavior (in waiting four years to prosecute) shows he was not really in love (3.39: ἐρῶσι, ἐπιθυμοῦσι; 3.44: ἐρᾶν); presumably he was using the pretense as a front for his then *hubris*, and present *sukophantia* (3.44). As for his own role in the brawling, the speaker attempts to generalize the dispute, labeling it “rivalry over a boy” (3.40: περὶ παιδικῶν ἐφιλονικήσαμεν ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους), and then comparing it to fighting over female *hetairai*, or through drunken rivalry or games or insults (3.43: ἐκ μέθης καὶ φιλονικίας ἢ ἐκ παιδιῶν ἢ ἐκ λοιδορίας ἢ περὶ ἐταίρας μαχόμενοι).¹²⁵ While clearly trying to downplay the quarrel, he draws on the audience's underlying assumption that *erôs* leads to a range of predictable consequences, irrespective of its object, and of the age of the subject.

Two other cases show similar features. The first is Lysias 4, *On a Premeditated Wounding*, which presents a fairly similar situation to Lysias 3, the differences being that the love object is a girl, the speaker is of indeterminate age, and the two litigants originally contracted to share in her favors (4.1). The slave-girl/prostitute, at least as presented by the speaker, clearly relishes the situation, twisting both men around her little finger (4.8, 17),¹²⁶ and the opponent is presented as sick with love for her (4.8: δύσερῶς ἐστι) and, spurred

¹²³ Though it is perhaps hinted at when he says Eratosthenes injured—1.26: ἀμάρτημα ἐξαμαρτάνειν—his wife and children.

¹²⁴ The speaker expresses embarrassment at his erotic relationship with a young lad at his time of life (3.4: ἄλλως δὲ ὑμῖν φαίνωμαι παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον διατιθεῖς), an age when he should be married; see Todd (2007) 278. Compare Demeas in *Samia* (23: ἡσχύνετ'; 27: αἰσχύνεται); see Lape (2004) 139–40. It is controversial whether Theodotos was a slave or free; see Carey (1989) 87, 90, who thinks Theodotos was probably a slave; Todd (2007) 279–81 and (2000) 43, who does not.

¹²⁵ See Fisher (1992) 67 on “Drunken brawls... over *hetairai* and boys”, also 86 n. 2 on this case; cf. Cohen (1995) 132–33; Carey (1997) 82, who mentions Simon's “vindictive jealousy”.

¹²⁶ There is a disparity between the girl's slave status and the power her sexuality gives her over the two men. Greek literature tends to treat sex with slaves as an objective process, even (e.g., in *Samia*) when the other partner is in love with them. This speech is more frank about the complexities that can be involved in real-life owner-object relationships when emotion intrudes.

on by this, liable to drunken violence (4.8: *παρωξυμμένος ὀξύχειρ λίαν καὶ πάρηνός ἐστιν*)—and indeed a violent brawl results (4.5–7).

Another example is seen in Aeschines 1, *Against Timarchos*, where the defendant is alleged as a young man to have moved in with Misgolas, an older man, to allow the latter to indulge his sexual practices (no *erôs* or *epithumia* is mentioned, though Misgolas did seek Timarchos out and persuade him to leave another man for him, so some passion might be presumed).¹²⁷ Effectively Timarchos was to be his companion, and exclusively so: Misgolas had allegedly paid in advance for the right to have sex with him exclusively (1.41: *ἀργύριόν τι προαναλώσας*—the phrase is one we might expect to see used for a relationship with a *hetaira*). Aeschines mentions an occasion when Timarchos neglected to turn up to accompany Misgolas at a procession: Misgolas was angered (1.43: *παρωξυμμένος*) by this and, on searching, by finding Timarchos “lunching” (1.43: *συναριστῶντα*) with foreigners. Despite Aeschines’ circumlocution, one can read between the lines that more than food was intended to be shared at this lunch: Misgolas threatens them with prison for corrupting a free youth (1.43: *ὅτι μειράκιον ἐλεύθερον διέφθειραν*); the phrase must allude to passive anal sex, the only inappropriate activity for a citizen, and one which Aeschines has already hinted Timarchos was open to if it allowed him to indulge his pleasures (1.41–42). Once again, a speaker is relying on his audience’s recognition of a scenario, together with its likely affects and outcomes. What is interesting about this case is the stimulus: most cases of male jealousy we have seen are provoked, not by imminent loss of status (as female jealousy is), but by the beloved’s sexual acts with another. What these acts are, however, are normally not specified (e.g., Lysias 3, Lysias 4), or are unremarkable (a hug and kiss in *Perikeiromenê*, vaginal intercourse resulting in pregnancy in *Samia*). The cause of Misgolas’s jealousy—being stood up on a date because his beloved is dining with other men—has a nice element of authorial precision to it, one sure to capture the imagination of any audience.

Later in the same speech, Timarchos is “lodging” with Pittalakos, a public slave. Hegesandros, a citizen, forms a desire (1.57: *ἐπεθύμει*) for Timarchos, asks Pittalakos to give him up, and when he refuses, persuades Timarchos personally to move in with him. Pittalakos is then described as feeling *zêlotupia* (1.58: *ἐζηλοτύπει*), a word (as noted above) normally translated as ‘jealousy’: however his only action is to make a nuisance of himself by hanging around (1.58: *ἐφοίτα*) Hegesandros’s house.¹²⁸ The scenario is one where we might expect jealousy, and despite our not being told we might assume, as with Misgolas, that Pittalakos felt *erôs* for Timarchos; it is in fact strongly

¹²⁷ I use *epithumia* here in the sense of passion, as it is used in Lys. 3 and *Samia* (see main text above); *epithumia* as a purely physical lust can always be presumed in Timarchos’s lovers.

¹²⁸ Fisher (2001) 195 believes that Pittalakos making such a nuisance of himself in itself suggests jealousy.

suggested by how pained (1.58: ὠδυνᾶτο) he was at Timarchos leaving him. But we do not hear that he is in any way angered at Timarchos's conduct, nor that he takes any violent or destructive action—on the contrary, it is Hegesandros and Timarchos who end up committing *hubris* against him. It is possible that the financial aspects of the situation provide the clue: Misgolas is said to have paid Timarchos a sum of money in advance, and so would have expected the right to have sex with him on an ongoing and exclusive basis (such arrangements can be shared by agreement, as in Lysias 4, but are not open more widely); Pittalakos is merely said to have cash (1.54: εὐπορῶν ἀργυρίου), and to be able to fund Timarchos's debauched lifestyle (1.54: χορηγὸν τῇ βδελυρίᾳ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ), an exchange that is exclusive while it lasts, but which neither side is obliged to continue. However, Pittalakos is loath to lose Timarchos's favors as a live-in lover, hence his hanging around Hegesandros's house: he is trying to win Timarchos back.¹²⁹ This is in fact the same behavior we see Polemon practicing in *Perikeiromenê*: having begrudged sharing Glykera's favors with another man, and having cut off her hair and kicked her out in jealous rage, he later repents and hangs around Moschion's house in an attempt to win her back. His attempts are certainly more violent than Pittalakos's (he tries to storm Moschion's house), but that is merely indicative of his being a soldier rather than a public slave.

Konstan has analyzed in detail usage of the word *zêlotupia* and its cognates.¹³⁰ They seem to be used in two types of scenario: either when someone possesses something that they do not want to share, or when they wish to share in something they currently do not. The first type is evidenced by the first two datable occurrences of the word: in Aristophanes' *Wealth* (388 BCE), and Plato's *Symposium* (380s BCE). In *Wealth* an impecunious gigolo, who sleeps with an old woman in return for her spending money on him, beats her up when another man looks at her; the old woman explains, "That's how *zêlotupos* he was" (1016: οὕτω σφόδρα ζηλότυπος ὁ νεανίσκος ἦν). Similarly, in *Symposium*, when Socrates is describing his (sex-free) love affair with Alkibiades, he says, "And from the time that I became his lover (213d1: ἡράσθην), I cannot look at or converse with another handsome man without him feeling *zêlotupia* and *phthonos* (213d2: ζηλοτυπῶν με καὶ φθονῶν), and he does all kind of

¹²⁹ Pittalakos allegedly believes he has "wasted" money (1.58), suggesting a position closer to Misgolas's prepayment. However, it is hard for him to respond with anger since he is lower status than Hegesandros—though see Fisher (2001) 190–91 on just what Pittalakos's current status is, raising questions about Aeschines' veracity. My concern as usual, though, is less with factual accuracy than with what scenarios can plausibly be put before an audience.

¹³⁰ Konstan (2006) 222–32, who disputes the accepted and usual translation of *zêlotupia* as 'jealousy' (LSJ), arguing for a whole range of alternatives including: one of the "competitive emotions," "covetous resentment," "invidious contention," "surliness," and "unwarranted insistence on exclusive possession" of a person. See also Fantham (1986), who especially notes the tendency of the *zêlotupos* to violence.

strange things and shouts abuse and can scarcely keep his hands off me.” What *zêlotupia* seems to imply in all four of the above cases (*Wealth* 1016, *Symposium* 213d2, Aeschines 1.58, *Perikeiromenê* 987) is possessive, rather than sexual, jealousy—though, as Konstan himself notes,¹³¹ there is no intrinsic reason why this cannot include sexual jealousy (i.e., possessive jealousy of a sexual object, as indeed I have argued (*contra* Konstan) that it does in *Perikeiromenê*).

The other usage of *zêlotupia* cognates is when one is not currently (or formerly) in possession of some person, object, or quality, and feels *zêlotupia* for those who are. This usage of the word is seen twice in Aeschines 3, *Against Ktesiphon*: first, Demosthenes is said to be motivated by *zêlotupia* to match the openness to bribes (3.81: ὑπὲρ τῆς δωροδοκίας ζηλοτυπίας) of one Philokrates; second, his apparently virtuous oration is mocked as polluted trash pretending to be virtuous (3.211: κάθαρμα ζηλοτυποῦν ἀρετῇν). The most vivid usage comes in Isocrates 15, *Antidosis*, where the author talks about those who feel envy toward him, feeling a passion to share his ability in speaking (15.244: πάντας τοὺς φιλοτίμως διακειμένους, ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν), but who are too lazy to apply themselves. He talks about their attitude toward others who do apply themselves and work hard to gain those same ends, describing them as being malicious and feeling *zêlotupia* and being agitated in their minds, and suffering almost as if they felt *erôs* (15.245: δυσκόλως ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖν καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τεταραγμένως διακεῖσθαι καὶ πεπονθέναι παραπλήσια τοῖς ἐρώσιν). Isocrates is explicitly using a sexual simile. However, this is not the possessive jealousy of those who are already in an exclusive erotic relationship, but the grudging, malicious envy that people who have a passion for those whom they will never attain feel against those more successful than themselves: the feeling of the spotty, geeky teenager for the jock who gets all the girls. *Zêlotupia*, then, in this aspect, is a close cousin to Greek sexual jealousy, but not identical to it (at least in the Classical period).¹³² It is actually not dissimilar to *phthonos*, both in its grudging, malicious nature, and in its being able to be felt both by those who possess and do not want to lose, and those who do not possess but wish to; however the sexual nature of *zêlotupia*, whether sexual in actuality or metaphorically (as in Aeschin. 3), moves it rather closer to jealousy than mere *phthonos*. Greek has a penchant for coupling words with similar meanings, and it is notable that *zêlotupia* is coupled with *phthonos* at *Symp.* 213d2. It also has a flavor of greed about it: a desire to have part of what one has none of (or a greater part of what one has a small part of), and to retain all of what one has to the exclusion of all others.

¹³¹ Konstan (2006) 226.

¹³² It also overlaps with modern English ‘sexual jealousy,’ though is by no means coterminous with it.

8.5 Conclusion

We have seen that there are degrees both of convergence and of divergence in representations of jealousy in men and women, and across different genres. In general, a jealousy scenario requires three people: two currently or formerly in a sexual relationship, and a rival. The jealous person will feel *erôs* for the partner, and this *erôs*, or at least a softer affection (*philein*, *stergein*, *agapan*), will normally have once been returned.¹³³ On learning of a rival, other affects are simultaneously aroused: typically *orgê*, *misos*, and *phthonos*,¹³⁴ with grief, pride, and fear of loss sometimes part of the mix. Generally some sort of destructive action follows, in tragedy (and occasionally elsewhere) typically murder, in other genres some attempt either to make the disputed partner unattractive (e.g., shearing Glykera's hair in *Perikeiromenê*, beating up the old woman in *Wealth*, when the word *zêlotupia* can be used), or to harm the rival (e.g., beating each other up in Lysias 3 and 4, Theseus's curse in *Hippolytos*, a threat of legal action in Aeschines 1). In script and in psychology this is all very similar to modern English sexual jealousy.

However, the social imbalance in ancient Greek (male-female, free-slave) relationships creates some notable differences too. Women, especially wives or concubines in pseudo-marriage situations (who will generally be older and have lost their looks), lack the ability to choose partners. Sex, status, and stability therefore go hand in hand.¹³⁵ Wives and long-term concubines exhibit jealousy when their status or the stability of their relationship is threatened, whether that is because they think they are about to be put aside for someone else, or because a mistress is being moved into their house; however they do not generally exhibit jealousy when their husbands merely have sex with someone else (albeit they may not be totally indifferent). Women in Greece, unlike men, do not generally have the freedom to leave their spouse for someone else, and are expected to be sexually faithful—it is therefore being cuckolded that arouses husbands' jealousy. Outside of the marriage bond, whether in homoerotic passion for a youth or desire for a slave woman, men operate in a context of unrestricted competition; they are sometimes (though not always) happy even to share the sexual favors of the beloved, but cannot accept being

¹³³ Of all the cases we have seen, the only one-sided attraction was on the part of Hermione; however, as a wedded wife she at least had the right to expect some affection from her husband, even though it had never materialized.

¹³⁴ A variety of *phthonos* scripts are embedded in these sexual jealousy scripts, depending on whether 1a) fear of losing the partner ('possessive jealousy,' e.g., Euphiletos, Lys. 4) or 1b) sharing them ('jealous of my position,' e.g., Deianeira, Misgolas) is present, or whether 2a) they have already been lost and one wants them back ('covetous envy,' e.g., Hermione, Simon), or 2b) wants merely to deprive the rival of them ('begrudging envy,' e.g., Medea, Polemon).

¹³⁵ By status I mean status as exclusive wife, keeper of the house, mother of children, etc., rather than a concern with *timê*, which is here only applicable to Medea for quite different reasons.

thrown over entirely, and they compete or struggle more overtly for possession.

As well as these striking gender differences, there are also genre differences. The most obvious is that surviving tragedy contains several clear, play-length portrayals of jealous women, while providing only two brief, ambiguous portrayals of jealous men. In surviving New Comedy, however, we generally find jealousy associated with men, and in oratory, even when we get the woman's point of view, it is focalized through the male speaker, who can choose motifs to play with or avoid as the circumstances demand.¹³⁶ We should therefore see the almost complete lack of jealous men in tragedy as a strategic omission. Good tragedians (and indeed comedians and logographers) edit situations and reactions: there is a divergence between tragedy and real life,¹³⁷ which comedy and oratory can approximate much more closely. New Comedy, however, allows the portrayal of jealous men (though at least in surviving plays it stops short of portraying it within conventional marriage), and the two plays we have considered portray scenarios much more similar to those represented in the oratorical corpus.

It should be recalled that all the texts considered come from one city over a relatively short period of time (Classical Athens),¹³⁸ and the exact contours of the Greek sexual jealousy emotion I have been examining are constructed in accordance with such social issues as status, citizenship, gender, sexuality, etc., in that society. For example: citizen women had little separate status from that derived from being someone's wife (or daughter); marriages were expected to be exclusive—if not, on the man's part, faithful—and legitimacy was crucial to citizenship;¹³⁹ homoerotic relationships existed (if, possibly, confined on the one part to the kind of higher-status men who could also afford to buy the services of a logographer, and on the other to citizen minors or slaves); and a large number of courtesans, both women and boy escorts, were available. It would be intriguing to see how this emotion, and its interaction with such social structures, was modified in other societies in Classical Greece, or indeed in other periods: for example, the homoerotic poetry of the Archaic period,

¹³⁶ New Comedy too tends to use male focalizers.

¹³⁷ Zeitlin (1990) 68–71 has argued that tragedy is mainly preoccupied with men, and that women are “the Other” who exist to define men and probe masculine values. Perhaps this indicates that jealous women in tragedy reify “the Other” within men, the potential vice of destructive jealousy in the hearts of all Greeks, which in the ‘Othering’ ideology of tragedy can only safely be portrayed in women. Possibly for the same reason, Homer does not portray Menelaus as motivated by jealousy in pressing his brother to war.

¹³⁸ The earliest text considered is *Trachiniae*, probably dated to the 440s (see Garvie (2005) 10); the last are the two comedies by Menander, who died in 291/o.

¹³⁹ Perikles' citizenship law of 451 is of interest here, in that it could be expected to lessen the concern a citizen wife would have for the security of her sons' inheritance, should her husband have additional children by a noncitizen mistress—and similarly lessen her jealousy toward a woman who could no longer be a rival.

which reflects very different (aristocratic, oligarchic, tyrannical) sociopolitical milieus;¹⁴⁰ Archaic tyrannies, or indeed Hellenistic kingdoms, where rulers might have more than one wife; Sparta, where women could inherit property in their own right, and could be 'lent' by the husband to a childless man for the production of a legitimate heir;¹⁴¹ and later periods in which romantic novels, containing scenes of jealousy, proliferate.¹⁴² There is no reason to believe that sexual jealousy would be unknown in these societies; however, the contours of the emotion, its gender specificity, and the forms and acceptability of its expression, might all be expected to alter to reflect these divergent sociopolitical structures within which male-male, male-female, and indeed female-female erotic relationships occurred.

¹⁴⁰ On the interconnections of "politics, poetics, and *erôs*" in the homoerotic poetry of Alcaeus, the Theognidean corpus, Ibycus, and Anacreon, see Davidson (2013).

¹⁴¹ Powell (1988) 244–46.

¹⁴² For instance *Chaereas* and *Kallirhoe*, in which Chaereas's sexual jealousy is properly described as *zêlotupia*, whose meaning has evolved by the first century CE, when the novel was written (Reardon (1989) 5); see Sanders (2012a) 158–59.

Envoi

In the absence of direct access to the emotional experiences of Greeks of the Archaic and Classical period in Athens and elsewhere, and given our dependence on written texts, it is perhaps unsurprising that so much effort has been devoted to lexical study. There are, as I observed in the Introduction, significant advantages to such an approach, especially when we wish to chart the semantic range and the conceptual boundaries between emotions as defined by ancient writers. However, an elusive emotion like *phthonos*, which is bounded by strict social rules (even taboos) on expression, can properly be explored only in the abstract by such an approach. I hope to have demonstrated that a methodological approach such as that adopted in this book, which focuses less on specific terminology than on identifying scripts and examining scenarios, can be fruitful in illuminating the emotions as experiences beyond the possibilities permitted by a purely lexical approach. The modern, multidisciplinary research into envy, jealousy, and related emotions has helped to illuminate the Greek phenomena. The use of scripts derived from modern social sciences as a means of exploring ancient phenomena inevitably raises questions, but the validity of using such modern readings of emotion is controlled and confirmed through comparison with ancient analyses such as Aristotle's. With the volume of scholarship that has been, and is being, published on individual emotions across a large variety of disciplines, I believe that Classicists studying emotion should be much more open to using this rich trove to inform future research—an intellectual cross-fertilization that in due course might become mutual.

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