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
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ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY



“Diplomacy: The art of restraining power.”

- Henry A. Kissinger

“In diplomacy, like in great many other things, the rules of engagement survive only until one remarkable person decides to break them.”

- Ilona Andrews

“Diplomacy is to do and say the nastiest things in the nicest way.”

- Isaac Goldberg

“To say nothing, especially when speaking, is half the art of diplomacy.”

- Will Durant

“Diplomacy is more than saying or doing the right things at the right time, it is avoiding saying or doing the wrong things at any time.”

- Bo Bennett

“In an ideological age, diplomacy may seem weak and prosaic. But sometimes it is all we have.”

- Noah Feldman

PUBLISHER'S NOTE



The beginning of diplomacy can be traced back over 2500 years when the concept of diplomatic immunity was first mentioned in ancient Indian epics. Early 'diplomats' were tasked with exchanging messages but their role became significantly more important in the Middle Ages when they were given the competency to negotiate binding agreements; and then the plenipotentiary diplomat was born. Diplomacy, like state sovereignty and mutual recognition, is a cornerstone of the modern state system. Part of the high politics toolbox, diplomacy can be a means of furthering a state's foreign policy agenda but it can also serve much nobler causes such as resolving conflicts and negotiating peace agreements.

There are many types of diplomacy, some of which will be highlighted in this annual edition. Diplomacy evolves as the international system changes. Secret alliances, the likes of which have caused much devastation in Europe in the early 20th century have been replaced by treaty organisations with public membership.

Whereas Gunboat and Coercive Diplomacy were common measures to containing emerging conflicts in past times, today coercive action between states is only used as a last resort. Multilateral and Preventive Diplomacy aimed at resolving conflicts together and before they escalate are preferred to using force.

The world has become too complex for unilateral solutions to global problems and as Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, said after Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, *no country can be great in isolation*.

Global issues such as economic and financial crises, the threat of terrorism, or conflicts in which several states' interests collide cannot be solved by one state alone. Former Chinese Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai, called diplomacy *the continuation of war by other means*. I would like to think that it is a lot more than that.

Countries have to come together, plan together and work together to avert crises, combat global threats and alleviate global suffering. This coming together is a core part of diplomacy. When problems cross borders, so must the will to solve them! Diplomacy that leads to cooperation can become a powerful weapon of peace for our planet.

In conclusion

For those who advocate diplomacy and for the lesser mortals who document it

A prayer

*'When we've been here ten thousand years
Bright shining like the sun
We'll have more grace to sing your praise
Then when we first begun'*

Linda Brady Hawke
Publisher



DIPLOMACY A CONTINUING JOURNEY OF DISCOVERY



BY HARDEEP S. PURI

A journey, by definition, requires a starting point and a destination. My association with the profession of diplomacy commenced when I joined the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in 1974. My exposure to diplomatic life had, however, commenced much earlier when, as a young 4-year-old, I accompanied my parents on my father's first diplomatic assignment to the Indian Embassy in Bonn, then the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. That association continued, even in a formal sense, when I retired, after an eventful career of 39 years in the Indian Foreign Service, in 2013. The three years I spent as Vice President of the International Peace Institute (IPI), an international think tank headquartered in New York and as the Secretary General of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM) till end March 2016 constituted, in a sense, an even more intensive association with multilateral diplomacy. What needs stressing is that the journey of discovery, I embarked on as a 4-year-old or later as a professional diplomat, is by no means over. I will be 65 next year and the journey of discovery continues.

'Modern' inter-state diplomacy could be regarded as tracing its origins to the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648. This is not to suggest that empires in medieval times did not exchange envoys and enter into treaty arrangements. In fact, diplomacy as an activity is perhaps as old as human civilisation. Wherever individuals or organisations have had to set relationships that had to address the challenges posed by dominance and power, whether political, economic or social, there has invariably been a need felt for 'diplomacy'.

Both as an 'activity' and as a 'profession', diplomacy is not always sufficiently understood or appreciated. Very often, failure to achieve objectives, however defined, is ascribed to the failure of diplomacy. What is not sufficiently appreciated is that the outcome may have been significantly worse, absent the diplomatic effort. Diplomacy was neither designed for instant success nor intended to ensure constant satisfaction.

Diplomacy has its opponents. Those who enjoy, what appear to be the benefits of power, political or economic, think they can afford to act unilaterally and use force, if necessary. Many of my generation, unaware of the benefits of multilateral diplomacy, convince themselves that the preferred course of action invariably lies in the realm of 'bilateral' diplomacy. This view overlooks the fact that, absent countervailing negotiating leverage, a bilateral negotiation can end up as one between unequal, resulting in unequal treaty arrangements. History is replete with such examples. A multilaterally negotiated outcome has the advantage of more closely approximating to a global good and numbers can make for insurance. It is not without reason that most countries in a dominant position dislike multilateral processes. The real worry is that more often than not, even the not so strong start overestimating their negotiating strength and come to grief by relying on bilateral arrangements that are unsatisfactory.

The multilateral system anchored in the UN is now 70 years old. It can boast of many successes - the evolution of normative arrangements, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, the establishment of UN Women, gender equality and women empowerment, Sustainable Development Goals, just to name a few.

An area where the UN could be said to be found wanting relates to peace and security. The world today is dangerously poised, the conflict in Syria, Yemen, an unravelled Libya, Ukraine and diminishing support for the Rule of Law. Is this the fault of diplomacy or that of member states that chose to act either unilaterally or outside the framework of responsible conduct?

The UN was established in 1945 to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. This is where the role of the United Nations Security Council becomes important. Why? Because countries can go to war only under two conditions, either in self defence or if the Security Council determines that there exists a threat to international peace and security and authorises counter measures inter alia through the use of 'all means necessary'.

India's decision to conduct surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) on September 29, 2016 was in 'self-defence' following an act of terror perpetuated from across the LoC. This was widely seen as such by the international community.

The continued use of terror as an instrument of state policy by countries is serious enough. An additional and more worrying trend is to arm the so called moderate opposition in order to effect regime change, which is resulting in devastating consequences. There are no good or bad rebels. Arming of non state actors invariably has unintended consequences, mostly negative.

The international community is regrettably witnessing a situation in which countries resort to the use of force without as much as even a reference to the Security Council, let alone its authorisation. This is, of course, not new.

The many contributions in this Annual Edition cover a wide canvass, bringing together an enormous amount of expertise. These contributions will hopefully be read both by experts and practitioners as well as others interested in different aspects of diplomacy.

We live in interesting times. The United States is preparing to inaugurate, in January 2017, its 45th President and the United Nations prepares to swear in its 9th Secretary General on 12 December, Antonio Guterres who will formally take charge in January 2017 as well. As we begin to prepare to usher in a New Year, it should be the expectation and prayer of every supporter of diplomacy that the effort in 2017 would be to reassert the primacy of diplomacy, strengthen the convening power of the UN and take the pendulum back to preventive diplomacy away from use of force and the arming of rebels.

The author has had a distinguished four decade career in diplomacy having served as India's Permanent Representative to the UN both in Geneva and New York. He is one of the few Indians who has presided over the UN Security Council and the only Indian to have chaired the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee.

He is the author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos (Harper Collins, September 2016).



FOREIGN POLICY IS NO LONGER MERELY FOREIGN...



BY DR SHASHI THAROOR



At midnight on August 15, 1947, independent India was born as its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, proclaimed 'a tryst with destiny - a moment which comes but rarely in history, when we pass from the old to the new, when an age ends and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance'. In Nehru's memorable words – 'India awoke to life and freedom.'

In his historic speech about India's 'tryst with destiny', Nehru, speaking of his country's dreams, said: 'Those dreams are for India, but they are also for the world, for all the nations and peoples are too closely knit together today for any one of them to imagine that it can live apart. Peace has been said to be indivisible; so is freedom, so is prosperity now and so also is disaster in this One World that can no longer be split into isolated fragments.' It was typical of that great nationalist that, at a time when the fires of partition were blazing across the land, he thought not only of India, but of the world.

In a sense, this was not entirely surprising, because India had, for millennia, been engaged with the rest of the world. It could indeed be argued that the India of today is the direct product of millennia of contact, trade, immigration and interaction with the rest of the world.

Nehru was, thus, speaking as heir to this history. When Nehru spoke at that midnight moment, he was speaking for a nation that had found its own voice in the world.

And he was doing so as a convinced internationalist himself, one who had seen much of the world in his extensive travels and was resolved to apply his own understanding of it to his newly independent nation's stance on world affairs. In the six decades since Nehru's India constituted itself into a sovereign republic, the world has become even more closely knit together than he so presciently foresaw.

Indeed, as the 21st century enters its second decade, even those countries that once felt insulated from external dangers - by wealth or strength or distance - now fully realise that the world is truly 'knit together' as never before, and that the safety of people everywhere depends not only on local security forces, but also on guarding against terrorism; warding off the global spread of pollution, of diseases, of illegal drugs and of weapons of mass destruction; and on promoting human rights, democracy and development. Jobs everywhere, too, depend not only on local firms and factories, but on faraway markets for products and services, on licenses and access from foreign governments, on an international environment that allows the free movement of goods and persons, and on international institutions that ensure stability - in short, on the international system that sustains our globalised world.

Today, whether you are a resident of Delhi or Dilli, Durban or Darwin - whether you are from Noida or New York - it is simply not realistic to think only in terms of your own country. Global forces press in from every conceivable direction. People, goods and ideas cross borders and cover vast distances with ever greater frequency, speed and ease. We are increasingly connected through travel, trade, the Internet; through what we watch, what we eat and even the games we play. The ancient Indian notion encapsulated in the Sanskrit dictum

'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' (the world is a family) has never been truer. These benign forces are matched by more malign ones that are equally global. In my time as a career official at the United Nations, I learned that the world is full of 'problems without passports' - problems that cross all frontiers uninvited, problems of terrorism, of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, of the degradation of our common environment, of contagious disease and chronic starvation, of human rights, and human wrongs of mass illiteracy and massive displacement.

Such problems also require solutions that cross all frontiers, since no one country or group of countries can solve them alone. One simply cannot forget that 9/11 made clear the old cliché about our global village - for it showed that a fire that starts in a remote thatched hut or dusty cave in one corner of that village can melt the steel girders of the tallest skyscrapers at the other end of our global village. In such a world, issues that once seemed very far away are very much in your backyard. What happens in North America or North Africa - from protectionist politics to civil society uprisings to deforestation and desertification to the fight against AIDS - can affect your lives wherever you live, even in North India. And your choices here - what you buy, how you vote - can resound far away. As someone once said about water pollution, 'we all live downstream. We are all interconnected, and we can no longer afford the luxury of not thinking about the rest of the planet in anything we do.'

It has taken us some time to internalise this conviction in India. After all, self-reliance and economic self-sufficiency were a mantra for more than four decades after independence, and there were real doubts as to whether the country should open itself further to the world economy. Whereas in most of the West, most people axiomatically associated capitalism with freedom, India's nationalists associated capitalism with slavery - for, after all, the British East India Company had come to trade and stayed on to rule. So India's nationalist leaders were suspicious of every foreigner with a briefcase, seeing him as the thin edge of a neo-imperial wedge. Instead of integrating India into the global capitalist system, as only a handful of post-colonial countries such as Singapore chose to do, India's leaders (and those of most former colonies) were convinced that the political independence they had fought for so hard and long could only be guaranteed through economic independence. So self-reliance became the mantra, the protectionist barriers went up and India spent 45 years increasingly divorced from global trade and investment; which only goes to show that one of the lessons you can learn from history is that history can sometimes teach you the wrong lessons.

It was only after a world-class balance of payments crisis in 1991, when our government had to physically ship its reserves of gold to London to stand collateral for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, failing which we might have defaulted on our debt, that India liberalised its economy under our then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. The amount of gold possessed by the women of the household has often been seen, in Indian culture, as a guarantee of the family's honour; surrendering the nation's gold to foreigners betokened a national humiliation that the old protectionism could not survive.



Since then, India has become a poster-child for globalisation. It is now widely accepted across the political spectrum that our growth and prosperity would be impossible without the rest of the world.

Young Indians today are likely to spend a lot of their adult lives interacting with people who don't look, sound, and dress or eat like them. Unlike their parents, they might well work for an internationally oriented company with clients, colleagues or investors from around the globe; and increasingly, they are likely to take their holidays in far-flung destinations. The world into which they will grow will be full of such opportunities, but along with such opportunities, today's young Indians may also find themselves vulnerable to threats from beyond India's borders: terrorism, of course, but also transnational crime syndicates, counterfeiters of currency, drug smugglers, child traffickers, pirates and - almost as disruptive - Internet hackers and spammers, credit card crooks and even imported illnesses such as swine flu.

Yet many Indians have not yet fully realised the importance of their government devising policies to deal with such challenges that would affect their and one day their children's, lives. Should such policies, in an ever more interdependent world, even be called foreign? One of the reasons that foreign policy matters today is that foreign policy is no longer merely foreign: it affects people right where they live. Each of us should want our government to seize the opportunities that the 21st century world provides, while managing the risks and protecting us from the threats that this world has also opened us up to. Indians, therefore, have a growing stake in international developments. To put it another way; the food we grow and we eat, the air we breathe and our health, security, prosperity and quality of life are increasingly affected by what happens beyond our borders. And that means we can simply no longer afford to be indifferent about our neighbours, however distant they may appear. Ignorance is not a shield; it is not even, any longer, an excuse.

Much of my own life has been conducted on the global stage. Born in London but brought up in India, I left the country at 19, studied abroad and joined the United Nations, serving it in Europe, in Southeast Asia and in the United States while helping douse humanitarian and peacekeeping fires around the world. I returned to India, more than three decades after leaving it, to play a part in its public life and contribute to developing, whether in or out of office, its vision of the world in the 21st century.

And yet it is not as an unreconstructed internationalist myself that I write here today. It is true that I have had the privilege of acquiring extensive international experience, especially during those nearly three decades of service at the UN, and I value the perspective this has given me on the world. But my own focus, in the relatively short period that I have been in public life, has inevitably been on the domestic realities of our country. When I think of the world today, I am conscious of the need to think of it not as a former UN official, but from the perspective of a second term Member of Parliament from Thiruvananthapuram, which despite being the capital of Kerala is still two-thirds a rural constituency. Though the city has long had connections to the outside world - one of its shipping harbours, Poovar, was the legendary Ophir of 'King Solomon's Mines', and it was one of the first Indian cities to enjoy air services in the 1930s, at the

same time as Karachi and Bombay - the concerns of most of its residents are largely domestic. I am obliged to remember that the bulk of my time in recent years has been spent in listening, and giving political expression, to the voices of the poor, the marginalised and the downtrodden in my district, a place emblematic in many ways of our ancient land now roaring into life in the 21st century.

What does looking at India's foreign policy mean from that perspective? For me, frankly, the basic task for India in international affairs is to wield a foreign policy that enables and facilitates the domestic transformation of India. By this I mean that we must make possible the transformation of India's economy and society through our engagement with the world, while promoting our own national values (of pluralism, democracy, social justice and secularism) within our society. What I expect from my national leaders is that they work for a global environment that is supportive of these internal priorities, an environment that would permit us to concentrate on our domestic tasks. Ensuring the country's security, and its freedom to make its own decisions in its own interests, is the first and most obvious of those priorities; but then comes the need to maintain good relations with those nations that are essential suppliers of the investment and trade, energy and mineral resources, food supplies and water flows without which growth, development and the elimination of poverty would not be possible. India is engaged in the great adventure of bringing progress and prosperity to a billion people through a major economic transformation.

At the broadest level, the objective of India's foreign policy must be to protect that process of domestic social and economic transformation, by working for a benign environment that will ensure India's security and bring in global support for our efforts to build and change our country for the better. So a fisherwoman in Thiruvananthapuram may not have the slightest idea who the foreign minister of India is or care about the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, but she will know if the price of diesel for her husband's boat or kerosene for her kitchen stove has become unaffordable; she understands international economics when a foreign trawler catches fish in waters her husband and his ancestors have fished in for generations; her livelihood is affected when fear of terrorism imposes restrictions on the movement of her community's boats, or when fear of piracy leads a foreign vessel to shoot at one carrying her brothers. Foreign policy might seem an abstraction to people like her, but it is relevant to her life just as much as to the diplomat in the pinstriped suit who speaks for India in global forums.

The changes that India undergoes domestically will have an inevitable impact on the outside world. So if Indians like me contemplate the shape of the world over, say, the next 20-25 years, we would also have to ask ourselves what sort of role the transformation of India in that time span would enable our country to play on the global stage, how we engage with it and what sort of responsibilities we are prepared to assume. To the extent that we can project an Indian vision on the world, what would 'PaxIndica' look like?

The writer is Second-term Member of Parliament for Thiruvananthapuram, and Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs.

sakura
japanese kitchen




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Edited, Printed & Published by: Linda Brady Hawke

Owned by: L. B. Associates (Pvt.) Ltd, H-108, Sector 63, Noida - 201301U. P. India

Published from: L.B. Associates (Pvt) Ltd, H-108, Sector 63, Noida - 201301, Gautam Budh Nagar District, Noida, UP, Delhi NCR, India,
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DIPLOMACY IN TESTING TIMES

BEWILDERMENT. UNCERTAINTY. VERTIGO.

BY ANA PALACIO

Donald Trump will be the 45th President of the United States with Republican control of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Bewilderment. For many, this result comes as a shock. After Brexit and following the referendum in Colombia, this newest monumental error in prediction underlines the fundamental flaws in the instruments used to understand our societies. Some have already proclaimed this election to be the 'death of data' in politics. The problem is not data per se, however, but rather a lack of comprehension of where society is. Our experts simply do not know what to measure. This underlines a painful truth - the already sizable gap between the elite and citizens will only continue to expand. Until leaders find a way to measure and understand what is happening on the ground in their own countries, we will continue to suffer shock and surprise.

Uncertainty. The immediate reality is that America and the world face profound uncertainty. The Trump Administration's biggest challenge will be domestic, facing American people deeply divided after the most fraught campaign in recent memory. However, the coming years will also shake the foundations of global order. Looking at the results of the election, it seems difficult at this moment to subscribe to the conventional wisdom that Washington's entrenched bureaucracy will narrow the margin of manoeuvre of the incoming president. In international affairs, we leave behind the world of yesterday. With Donald Trump, as was evinced throughout the campaign, all that we know is that nothing will be the same. For now we will have to wait and see. Europeans, like the rest of the world, are faced with profound questions. We can no longer assume anything about transatlantic relations, including the stability of NATO. In the midst of this fluidity, finding a unified European way forward is more important than ever.

Vertigo. Through the last year, many have spoken in apocalyptic terms about the possibilities of a Trump presidency. Now that it is upon us, we will see that the world is not actually ending; it is shedding its skin. Faced with the reality that beginning in January, Donald Trump will lead the indispensable nation, finding a way to adjust to this new world is incumbent on all of us. We have no other choice.

The writer is former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and former Deputy Prime World Bank, and a member of the State Council of Spain.



BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY FROM THE INFORMATION TO THE CONCEPTUAL AGE

BY KAI BRUNS



Driving through the affluent Chanakyapuri, the diplomatic enclave area of New Delhi, one cannot help but notice the 28-acre site that is home to the US Embassy complex. When opened in 1959, the Roosevelt House, the official residence of the US ambassador, was celebrated as a supreme achievement of modern architecture. The practice to establish permanent diplomatic missions emerged during the 15th century in Renaissance Italy, when travelling was a privilege of the elite and communication relied on messengers that went on horseback across borders. To that time, diplomatic missions were a highly innovative and cost-effective tool. Triggered by the desire to achieve political ends in a more efficient way, negotiations organised from a permanent mission became preferable to arbitration and were certainly cheaper than armed conflict.

About 600 years and a digital revolution later, the innovative air around diplomatic premises is gone, and one might wonder why we still rely on ostentatious diplomatic temples to conduct diplomacy? Our quest for cost reductionism, a central mantra of the information age, makes the expenses for the running of diplomatic premises and entertainment seem untimely. The increased number of diplomatic missions has put restraints on the public budget and it may be asked whether we are not ready for a next innovative phase in the development of diplomatic practice. Michael Small, a former Canadian diplomat, observed that we live in a world where the cost of communication approach is zero. Hence, geography does not matter anymore. We have already seen the installation of virtual embassies as the first point of contact for tourists and diaspora populations. Locally employed administrative staff, briefed via phone, email and video-conferencing, could do the rest. If necessary, the most urgent tasks could be dealt with by ad hoc missions or, if high politics are at stake, via summit diplomacy. The money saved could directly go into development aid or counterterrorism projects. So, why shouldn't this work?

What seems a visionary thought in the information age will lose its appeal the further we move into the conceptual age. While the digital revolution shaped our idea of what constitutes 'better' diplomacy, the conceptual age will shift priorities away from cost efficiency to the ability to sell a compelling story in an increasingly sophisticated diplomatic environment of the 21st century.

Diplomacy and the Impact of the Information Age

In the late 1950s, the dawn of the information age brought sweeping changes to our lives. It started a digital revolution that opened the chase for ever greater efficiency, which came in waves of digitalisation in form of computers, mobile phones and the internet. This process of cost reduction through information technology has been driven by three questions: Is what we offer in demand? Can someone do it cheaper? And can technology do it faster?

The combination of the digital revolution with general trends in diplomacy has had an enormous impact on diplomatic practice. Advances in travel and communication technology made shuttle diplomacy more frequent, and gradually turned sealed diplomatic pouches into secured emails. While before, diplomatic communication had been collected only a few times a week and took days to arrive at the ministry, today it is sent and received instantly. On the negative, faster communication to home also meant the decline of decision-making power for the diplomatic mission. The late Adam Watson, former British diplomat and university professor, pointed out the consequences for the diplomatic dialogue. It did not only include a wider range of ministries but led to a more direct involvement of heads of states, which resulted in greater international media attention and public awareness for diplomacy. As such, eventually, the diplomatic process was put under scrutiny. In the public eye, diplomatic receptions and cocktail parties still emulated the splendour of the historic 1815 Congress of Vienna and served little more than to entertain the elite. This image did not fit

The combination of the digital revolution with general trends in diplomacy has had an enormous impact on diplomatic practice. Advances in travel and communication technology made shuttle diplomacy more frequent, and gradually turned sealed diplomatic pouches into secured emails. While before, diplomatic communication had been collected only a few times a week and took days to arrive at the ministry, today it is sent and received instantly.



the spirit of the information age. Thus, diplomacy was to walk the thin line to impress with style but not by pomp anymore.

Faster obsolescence, meaning that an object is no longer wanted although still in good working order, is another by-product of the information age. Formerly majestic mission premises rapidly lost its appeal. The inventory became old-fashioned and technology outdated. A lack of funding postponed modernisation or motivated many missions to move to smaller premises or office towers. Rented rooms in luxurious hotels have become a fashionable alternative to receptions at mission facilities. Venues can be rented as needed, and rooms are kept to modern standards. Moreover, events such as national day festivities became effective marketing tools that enjoy greater media attention when celebrated at places more visible to the general public.

The demand for ever increased efficiency has become a conundrum for a diplomatic process that has grown more complex and includes a record number of stakeholders. From 2010 to 2015, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) faced budget cuts of 16 percent. During this time, the FCO had to defend its budget against partial budget cut demands of up to 40 percent. In concrete numbers, which meant that Britain's 268 posts in 168 states and roughly 4,500 diplomatic service staff worked on a budget of £1.3 bn. This is less than 0.1 percent of its GDP and compares little to the £38 bn and £13 bn that Britain spends annually on defence and development aid. Similarly, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs received INR 14,662 crore from the 2016 Union Budget to maintain 162 missions and roughly 600 officers around the world.

This 2.5 percent budget cut is not as drastic as the British one but indicates a similarly decreased appreciation for diplomacy conducted through the Ministry of External Affairs and raises the question of sustainability.

Developments in Bilateral Diplomacy

Ermolao Barbaro, a Venetian diplomat during Renaissance Italy, once said that the ambassador's duties were to 'advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandisement of his own state'. More than 500 years after Barbaro, there are situations in which his estimation might still be warranted. Mainly in regions of regular conflict, such as the Middle East or Africa, where borders are disputed and trade relations are limited. However, in regions where the diplomatic environment is less hostile, the perception of the primary diplomatic function has evolved. In regions where globalisation and technological advances have helped to create a greater collective identity, the line between domestic and foreign politics has blurred. For example, in the European Union (EU), effective public policy depends on a state's ability to demonstrate empathy and understanding for the needs of its diplomatic counterpart. In doing so, states rely on bilateral diplomacy to understand how its policies will affect others. Failure to recognise can lead to a rapid deterioration of relations. One example is the recent restraints on bilateral relations between Austria and Germany in the light of the refugee crisis. When Angela Merkel in 2015 gave her *Wir schaffen das* (we will manage) speech, it caused significant damage to bilateral relations which would affect the situation in Austria.



German Chancellor Angela Merkel



In contrast, looking at the conduct of contemporary diplomacy, Ermolao Barbaro would not recognise his profession anymore. First, states have lost its monopoly on news and information to global news and social media networks. As a result, diplomatic cables sent home have to have a greater analytical than descriptive value. Second, the role of diplomats during negotiations is an entirely different one. Once the diplomat's supreme discipline, negotiations are often led by experts from other ministries while diplomats take the role of a conciliator who gets the dialogue going, shows empathy for negotiation positions and flags red lines. As coordinators of bilateral affairs, diplomats also show an eye for the diversification of agenda topics to avoid that a single issue overtakes all others. Diplomats, therefore, institutionalise the diplomatic process through working groups and lobbying efforts within the host country. Third, engaged in an exercise of public diplomacy, the bilateral diplomat communicates with networks and public to forge alliances with stakeholders. These include not only government officials and elites but scientists, journalists and think tanks that have an influence on public opinion. Such networking is fundamental to the diplomats' function as a communicator who is able to attract media presence for state visits and issues that promote the branding of the sending state.

Lastly, the bilateral diplomat has become a promoter of his country, who is increasingly engaged in commercial or consular diplomacy. As mentioned in the last section, budget cuts led ministries to improvise at various levels. Faced with less money but greater complexity and more stakeholders, ministries have taken a mixed geographic and functional approach through which to prioritise regions and issues to advance their best interest. While global powers maintain ties with almost all countries, smaller and medium-sized countries have to give priority to strategic objectives and resources. Priorities are given to relations with its neighbours, other countries in the region, and those with which they share ideological and cultural ties. Consular tasks have become a priority topic due to increased global tourism, greater diaspora populations and the state's increased interest in economic diplomacy. In the latter case, diplomats do not only assist national companies to identify business opportunities but help with cluster match-making to encourage innovation. For example, in March 2016, a cluster match-making event took place in Hannover, Germany, which brought

together 24 industrial and scientific cluster networks from the EU to meet their US counterparts for initial talks and research collaboration.

Developments in Multilateral Diplomacy

While bilateral diplomacy is to brand a state's image and create empathy for its policies, multilateral diplomacy operates as a tool to maintain international order and, hence, bring stability to the global environment. It was at a time of greatest international instability that awareness arose for problems that had become too many, too technical and too urgent to be dealt with bilaterally. 'Diplomacy by Conference' of ministers was the new diplomatic channel that during World War I promised to be a more efficient communication tool to conduct intergovernmental relations. Based on the assumption that miscommunication or no communication was the root cause of international conflict, multilateral platforms such as the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, became expressions of a new and open diplomacy that allowed for greater public scrutiny and provided mechanisms for collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Two, further developments gathered momentum in the post-1945 period. On one hand, state functions steadily expanded leaving governments in charge to re-construct well-working, national economies. However, in an increasingly interdependent world, industrialisation and increased social and financial matters had gained a new international dimension. The new concept of total diplomacy was marked by a blurred boundary between domestic and foreign affairs and led to a plethora of multilateral platforms such as UNESCO, FAO and the institutions of the Bretton Woods system. On the other hand, and additionally to the proliferation of intergovernmental organisations, decolonisation lifted the number of states to new heights. In 1916, 66 sovereign states existed, their number had bulged to 105 by 1955. Today, over 200 states exist of which 195 (The Holy Sea and Palestine as observers) are involved in the work of the United Nations. For Kishore Mahbubani, former diplomat of Singapore, this is reason enough to consider the United Nations General Assembly not only a platform of sovereign equality but the 'Parliament of Man' with its primary function to organise the opinion of mankind.

In contrast, the role of multilateralism in the creation of norms seems a little underrated. The evolution of norms both as accepted patterns of behaviour and the codification of international law has contributed significantly to international order and stability. Active multilateral efforts led to the evolution of the use of force from a legitimate tool of foreign policy to an outlawed one, only to be applied in acts of self-defence or under international mandate. Moreover, multilateralism opened the door for a coordinated effort to codify international law in support of the conduct of friendly relations. For example, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations did not only codify diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Convention also served as a guide for the many newly independent states handing them an internationally agreed document in protection against subtle discrimination.

Diplomacy in the Conceptual Age

At the 2016 World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, leading scientists,

Bilateral diplomacy is to brand a state's image and create empathy for its policies, multilateral diplomacy operates as a tool to maintain international order and, hence, bring stability to the global environment.



business (wo)men and diplomats predicted a technological progress that will take us from the digital to the conceptual age. In general, this means that the available big data created during the digital revolution will be used to build a conceptual economy driven by innovation. What cost efficiency and technical evolution have meant for the information age will be empathy building and story-telling for diplomacy in the conceptual age. Or with the words of Joseph Nye, in the future, it will be the state with the best story that wins. The information age has made the world a village. In the conceptual age, a premium is placed on understanding the consequences of this new proximity.

In the 2016 Future FCO report, Britain's Thomas Fletcher remarked that we do not need less diplomacy but better one. However, what means better diplomacy? Better diplomacy defined by cost control and budget cuts will not have the means necessary to design a compelling narrative with a long-term effect. Effective public diplomacy will not only depend on a clear connection to policy objectives, but it will also need to integrate empathy for the impact of its policies on the receiving state. Fletcher's report gives concrete insights how to achieve this. It foresees a diplomatic working culture that reshuffles its priorities from competences, hierarchies and processes to one based on skills, networks and outcomes. Doing so, the FCO engages with the organisational consequences of the breakdown of the difference between domestic and foreign affairs. Ministries of External Affairs in general have lost its role as a gatekeeper to international affairs and need to become boundary spanners if they want to maintain its relevance. As a result, diplomats will have to keep contacts with new networks and non-state actors involved in the diplomatic process to become the go-to department on international issues in the service of a 'national diplomatic system'.

Building Bridges - Transition and Diffusion of Power

Maybe most importantly, diplomacy also works as a bridge builder between old and new power structures. It is the tool used to manage trends of power diffusion from states to non-state actors. The digital age empowered non-state actors and, by doing so, shifted power away from the state. While states remain the most powerful actor, diplomats have to work within a widened multilateral framework and understand the role of non-state actors. Published in 2012, the Futures for Diplomacy report of the Dutch Clingendael Institute pointed out that an increasing number of diverse topics, diplomatic processes and types of stakeholders require diplomats to become 'whisperer of international policy networks'. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of network management, influencing agendas and framing debates will become critical diplomatic skills in the conceptual age.

Multilateral diplomacy will also carry a particular role in the management of political power transition from West to East. As product of processes emergent from the Western world, great parts of the international architecture reflect power relations of 1945. In the light of the continued power transition for the benefit of Asian states, diplomacy will need to help display contemporary power relations.

India is currently the fastest growing economy and China has already overtaken the USA as the biggest one (regarding GDP based on PPP). So far, these states have taken on rules of procedure and other norms of Western

Multilateral diplomacy will also carry a particular role in the management of political power transition from West to East. As product of processes emergent from the Western world, great parts of the international architecture reflect power relations of 1945.



diplomatic cultures. However, as empathy building will be at the heart of the conceptual age, diplomats will become aware of more subtle differences in the diplomatic process. Kishore Mahbubani participated in both, negotiations within the EU and ASEAN context. He noticed essential differences in the outcome assessment of the diplomatic process. He remarked that in Europe, success of negotiations is measured by the quality of the final written draft. In contrast, the written document seemed secondary in the East Asian context in which building of trust and understanding between the parties stood in the forefront.

While Asia is home to almost 60 percent of the world population and contributes 50+ percent to the world's GDP, it is underrepresented in what has become the primus inter pares among the 6 principal organs of the United Nations - the Security Council. Therefore, it is only a matter of time until this discrepancy will be resolved or the United Nations General Assembly, as the 'Parliament of Man', will regain importance to function as a promoter of Asian diplomatic culture in the conduct of contemporary diplomacy.

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EFFECTIVE BUSINESS DIPLOMACY

BY DR. RAYMOND SANER

Business diplomacy is about making the environment suitable for business and to reduce risk and uncertainty. This in turn requires that Indian companies have to understand the historical factors that influenced a foreign country's economic, political, military, social and cultural forces, which all impact business practice today in a foreign country.

Diplomacy and business are not incompatible nor are they totally different. Professional boundaries between business and diplomacy have gradually become blurred especially after the end of the Cold War period. States are championing economic development and trade relations in today's global economy, which is increasingly interconnected and interdependent. Governments use economic and commercial diplomacy to represent their interests abroad and at home¹. However, Indian companies are less aware that they need to develop their own diplomatic competencies in order to be successful abroad and to be less dependent on information and guidelines provided by their Embassies abroad.

The routine work at Embassies abroad consists of well-known steps such as the ones of the chargé d'affaires or economic and trade advisor, who reads the press, meets with economic decision-makers and writes summaries for the ambassador on the state of business in the host country. Such summaries are later handed over to companies considering the possibility of investing in the host country. Today, the role of these summaries is no longer as important as it once was since similar information can be gathered by local corporate agencies. Companies without foreign branches can gather information on any country on Earth by means of the internet.

With the globalisation of means of communication, many governments and corporations have regularly updated internet sites containing pertinent information. The development of press agencies such as Reuters, AFP and Panapress has encouraged the circulation of a huge amount of information. Press agencies are increasingly fulfilling the task of Foreign Service officials. Multinationals employ local agents or firms not only to gather information, but also to act as facilitators in their dealings with local authorities.

The function of Business diplomacy management should be placed close to other core functions of an Indian company investing abroad. In addition to this, the diplomatic know-how should be a company-wide responsibility and the business diplomacy function should be under direct supervision of the Indian CEO.

Business Diplomacy Management: Know-how Indian Companies Must Have

Success of future investments abroad will depend on commercial prowess of an Indian firm and sufficient support from the Indian government, but success also will depend on how the Indian company interacts with non-business counterparts in a foreign country. An Indian investor has to be able to look for commonality of interests, while at the same time, be able to agree to disagree without falling into the trap of carrying out disagreements through conflicts. In other words, Indian investors moving to a foreign country need to acquire

diplomatic skills to manage the multiple differences between Indian and foreign business and societal contexts.

Foreign non-business stakeholders can be very problematic for an Indian investor if the Indian investor does not know how to respond to these non-business stakeholders in a competent and appropriate way. Business diplomacy management is for instance called for to constructively engage consumer groups, religious leaders, or other influential powerful forces.

Faced by an Indian company's competitive products and services might lead potential local partners to act very opportunistically and hence the local partner might not always honour agreements with an Indian business partner. Non-execution of commercial agreements might follow generating a sense of insecurity on the side of the Indian investor who cannot read the factors that might have led to non-traditional business practice by a foreign counterpart or to a withdrawal from cooperation with an Indian company in case of broken promises or abrupt changes of commitments.

The following skills and knowledge could be useful to an Indian company investing in a foreign country:

1. History of the foreign country targeted for investment by an Indian company;
2. Basic knowledge of the foreign country's legal systems (public law, constitutional law, administrative law, private law and criminal law), and principles of treaty making (soft and hard law);
3. Evolution of the foreign country's economy from pre-WWII to current times, understanding current foreign country's explanatory schemes of world development as seen through current ideological lenses;
4. Ability to be a gracious host to a wide variety of interlocutors from all parts of the foreign country's society including appreciation of all forms of art of a foreign country's society, past and present;
5. Cross-cultural awareness regarding norms and values governing decision-making and conflict resolution processes in the foreign country;
6. Understanding how the Indian and foreign state diplomats have solved previous conflicts with regard to commercial disputes;
7. Skills in presenting and representing one's own company and India at the foreign country's gatherings and official meetings, getting respect while at the same time respecting the foreign country's counterpart's personality and dealing with the foreign country's media and informal pressure groups;
8. Strategy, tactics, and procedures of negotiations with the foreign partner as well as being clear of the strengths and weaknesses of an Indian negotiator's negotiation behaviour.

Implementing Business Diplomacy: Management at Indian Firm Level

Diplomatic know-how at the firm level of an Indian investor has to be a strategic core competence as defined by Hamel and Prahalad². *A core competence represents the sum of learning across individual skill sets and individual organisational units. Thus, a core competence is very unlikely to reside in its entirety in a single individual or small team.*



Diplomatic know-how should hence be seen as a company-wide responsibility shared by top management and the respective heads of business units. In order to realise this core competence, an Indian company should create a Business Diplomacy Management function consisting of the following elements:

1. A Business Diplomacy Office, which would be similar to Public Affairs but expanded to include the diplomatic functions described above and placed under direct supervision of the CEO;
2. Business Diplomacy Managers as staff members of the new Business Diplomacy Office including specially trained business managers and economic and commercial diplomats seconded by the Indian Foreign Service;
3. A Business Diplomacy Liaison officer in the foreign country directly reporting to the top manager of the central Business Diplomacy Office at Indian headquarters;
4. Business Diplomacy Management Information System, which contains information pertaining to Business Diplomacy (including the profiles of active non-business stakeholders at the global level and in conflict-prone countries).

supports the new office's operations through appropriate rewards and sanctions and corresponding internal communication campaigns.

Taking care of business diplomacy and ensuring competent application of business diplomacy management would greatly increase the chances of Indian companies that plan to embark on a business venture in a foreign country. Such interest in business diplomacy should however, not be short-term one-off measures but rather consist of sustainable and fruitful engagements and dialogue with all parties involved in an Indian company's investment abroad.

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
5. Development of a business-related socio-political perspective (e.g., establishing a stakeholder analysis of the foreign country's stakeholders);
6. A Mandate to strengthen the overall organisational capacity in business diplomacy management at an Indian company's foreign subsidiary.

Positioning the new Business Diplomacy Office under the direct supervision of the Indian CEO should facilitate the gate-keeping function of this new unit, with the main function to scan the foreign country's environment, interact with foreign non-business stakeholders and engage in diplomatic missions under close direction of the Indian CEO. Further strengthening of values and ethics linked to business diplomacy should be expected from an Indian CEO taking an active interest in this strategically important function and accordingly

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CHEQUEBOOK DIPLOMACY

BY DR DANIEL S. HAMILTON





What power tools are available to statesmen to advance their national interests? According to the famous Realpolitiker Hans Morgenthau, there are just three - logic, bribes and threats. Threats play a large role in diplomacy and defence, but as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, military intervention costs blood and treasure, and often does not do the job. Logic is not always effective when those you are trying to influence are driven by fanaticism, like Daesh, or by sheer determination to hold onto power, like Putin. That leaves bribes or, perhaps more tactfully, the use of 'inducements' and 'incentives' to gain favour from other nations.

The Carrot rather than the Stick - Chequebook Diplomacy

The fact that countries use economic incentives to advance their geopolitical aims is nothing new, but what is newly important is that a host of states are growing in influence primarily by amassing economic power rather than building armies. "From a resurgent Russia to a rising China and across the Middle East," notes former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, "Countries are waging geopolitics with capital, attempting with sovereign Chequebooks and other economic levers to achieve strategic objectives that in the past were often the stuff of military coercion or conquest."¹

Hey, Big Spender

The most striking example of this trend is China's rise as a leading practitioner of Chequebook Diplomacy. Beijing does not refrain from sabre-rattling on security issues it considers important, such as territorial claims in the South China Sea. Nor does it hesitate to wield the economic stick to beat down countries that oppose its territorial claims, challenge its position on Tibet, or side with Taipei. Sitting on \$3.2 trillion in foreign reserves, Beijing has opened its Chequebook wide to cultivate countries around the world. It sustains the North Korean regime with food, arms, and energy. It rewards Phnom Penh with billions in 'no strings attached' aid for deporting Uighur asylum-seekers back to China.² It pledges many billions more in assistance and credits to African countries to develop energy and other resource flows and support Chinese positions in the United Nations. It announces loan commitments to South American and Caribbean nations that are greater than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and US Export-Import Bank combined.³ It purchases millions in Spanish debt, provides billions of dollars in state financing for key public works projects in Greece and Italy that support Chinese state-owned companies and Chinese workers, including a majority stake in the Greek port of Piraeus, and promises business to eastern Europe leaders in hopes that they will water down EU support for the international arbitration decision against China's claims in the South China Sea. Shortly after EU member states defied Washington by joining the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing announced it would invest in the EU's new €315 billion infrastructure fund.⁴

In addition to its efforts to promote the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to parallel the Washington-based World Bank, Beijing is using its One Belt, One Road (Yi Dai Yi Lu) and Maritime Silk Road strategies to woo nations

across Eurasia and the Middle East with promises of lucrative economic and infrastructure development without socio-political conditions. For construction of the China-Pakistan corridor alone, China has pledged investments in Pakistan worth \$46 billion over the next 10 years.⁵

China's newfound generosity has eclipsed Russia, which is less known for its carrots than its sticks, for instance periodically shutting off winter gas flows to Ukraine or banning Georgian wine imports as ways to squeeze neighbouring countries whose policies aren't in line with its own. However, Moscow has also offered subsidies, loans and aid to Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Armenia and tied neighbours into crucial energy deals. It has paid millions to Pacific Island nations such as Nauru to recognise two regions of Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - as independent states.⁶ It funnels cash to populist movements such as France's National Front to damage Europe's 'ever closer Union' and dangles the prospects of new commercial deals in front of EU member states in hopes of breaking EU sanctions against it.

Money Makes the World Go Round

The oil-rich Gulf sheikdoms, particularly the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have long used cash-based diplomacy to try to shape regional events and support figures sympathetic to their worldview. Between 1979 and 1989, Saudi Arabia matched dollar-for-dollar \$3 billion provided by the United States to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Riyadh supports Iraqi Sunnis fighting Daesh and those who oppose Shia political leaders.⁷ Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together supply Jordan with more than \$2 billion in annual aid, in part to contain and dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. Gulf monarchies funnelled billions to Egyptian military leaders following the ouster of former President Morsi.⁸ Saudi Arabia's rival, Iran, has also used its oil money to challenge Arab political dominance in the Middle East and extend its influence in Iraq, in Lebanon through Hezbollah, and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through Hamas.

The US has also pursued Chequebook Diplomacy to advance efforts to stop proliferation and secure regional peace arrangements. Via the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States has provided billions of dollars to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure.



The greatest triumph of Chequebook Diplomacy was the Marshall Plan assistance provided by the United States to Europe following World War II. Its great success elicits regular calls for new Marshall Plans - for Ukraine, for the Middle East, for climate change, the list never ends.



Of course, Western countries regularly revert to Chequebook Diplomacy to advance their national interests. Over many decades, the United States has used foreign assistance and trade to build and strengthen alliances around the world. In East Asia and the Pacific, for instance, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been actively engaged in supplementing the political and security elements of its regional architecture with an overlapping network of economic partnerships, including bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore; and membership in APEC and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

In recent years, Washington has tended to employ economic incentives as tools of state-building in countries whose fragility could threaten US interests. Given this focus, Nikolas Gvosdev, a Russian-American international relations scholar, has suggested that US efforts might be better characterised as 'Chequebook Security' than Chequebook Diplomacy.⁹ Examples include 'buying off' Sunni insurgents in Iraq, funding development projects in Afghanistan, restructuring Pakistan's debt in exchange for Islamabad's support in the anti-terror campaign, and helping countries in South America and Africa fight traffickers and organised crime.

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In certain circumstances, economic carrots can nourish peace. Without major financial inducements provided by the United States, the Israeli-Egyptian peace accords signed at Camp David in 1978 would have been unlikely. Before the accords, Israel and Egypt received less than 1 percent of official US military and economic assistance. Since then, both countries became the largest recipients of US largesse. In the western Balkans, the US and the EU have prevented conflict from reigniting in part by providing substantial economic assistance. The EU's Stabilisation and Association agreements, and such initiatives as Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, have been important carrots in EU efforts to pacify its turbulent neighbourhood.

A country may also offer economic carrots to compensate for its lack of capacity or will to project other forms of power. Germany and Japan are prominent examples. Following World War II, both countries faced constitutional constraints on projection of military power and turned their energies to rebuilding their economies. Each became adept at advancing their national interests in the language of economics. When German unification appeared as a real possibility in 1989, German economic payments to the Soviet Union sealed the deal. When the United States assembled a global coalition in 1990 to reverse Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait; both Germany and Japan chose to write checks rather than send troops. When Japan ran into difficulties with China, it lavished billions on ASEAN neighbours to shore up its position. Over the years, both countries have reinterpreted their constitutions to allow a wider range of missions, and have acted to balance their financial contributions with more forthright contributions to peace and security. Nonetheless, in both countries, the tendency to reach for the Chequebook remains strong.¹⁰

Sometimes the Check Bounces

The Camp David accords, German Unification, Chinese efforts to sideline Taipei - these are all prominent examples of successful Chequebook Diplomacy, but even in these cases, the Chequebook did not succeed on its own - in each instance, both logic and threats reinforced the power of the purse.

As a general rule, Chequebook Diplomacy is unlikely to succeed unless it is embedded in, and supported by, a broader policy framework. And if the overall framework is off track, more money can be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In the 1990s, for instance, the US brokered an agreement giving North Korea \$4 billion in energy aid and light-water reactors in exchange for freezing and dismantling its nuclear weapons program. The deal could not be sustained, however, and Pyongyang continues its nuclear weapons program today.¹¹ When the United States and Saudi Arabia bankrolled Afghanistan's anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, they gave little thought to the possibility that they could be funding and arming their future enemies.¹² Despite Beijing's largesse, its expansive claims in the South China Sea have only heightened its smaller neighbours' suspicions and fears. African countries have embraced China's



Chequebook Diplomacy, but feelings of resentment are growing, fed by shoddy construction, environmental damage and predatory practices.^{13 14} And while impressive Chinese pledges grab headlines, they often prove hollow.¹⁵

Lessons to be Learned

Perhaps the greatest triumph of Chequebook Diplomacy was the Marshall Plan assistance provided by the United States to Europe following World War II. Its great success elicits regular calls for new Marshall Plans - for Ukraine, for the Middle East, for climate change, the list never ends. Most of these appeals, however, are thinly veiled appeals for money. Those who espouse them offer little evidence that they understand the real reasons behind the Marshall Plan's success. As we approach the 70th anniversary of that plan, it may be useful to recall those reasons.

When war ended in Europe in 1945, the continent had been devastated. Between 1945 and 1948, the United States provided \$15 billion in assistance to Europe - a huge amount at that time. By early 1948, however, it was clear that America's Chequebook had failed to revive the continent, which remained traumatised and torn by divisions within and among its societies.

It was only then, as concerns grew about Europe's future, that American leaders understood that Chequebook Diplomacy alone was inadequate to safeguard the very US interests and values it had sacrificed so much to defend

during the war. It was only then that Washington sent Europe a clear message - the United States would contribute as it could to Europe's better future - but Europeans had to lead the way. If Europeans wanted American support, they would have to cast aside their divisions and demonstrate how they would build that better future - together. This was the 'Plan' in the Marshall Plan: America would fuel Europe's recovery, but Europeans had to work together to chart the way forward.

The Marshall Plan was a tremendous success - and its legacy continued to pay dividends for ensuing generations. Today, everyone recalls the money behind the Marshall Plan - but in the end, the Marshall Plan amounted to \$13 billion - less money than the \$15 billion the United States had invested in Europe in the three years after the war. That's the real lesson: it was not simply money that made the Marshall Plan work; it was the 'plan' behind the Plan. Not only did Europeans have to tell the Americans how they would use the funds, they had to do so together. The effect was to galvanise the European movement, to make real and practical what had only been a dream - a true European Community. The US and its partners built on their newfound, common engagement to forge other institutions, including the GATT, the OECD and NATO. The Atlantic Alliance created an umbrella under which European unity could develop, and together these institutions helped produce unparalleled peace and prosperity for their members for close to seven decades.

President Franklin Roosevelt and English Prime Minister Winston Churchill meet at sea in this famous photo of the founding of NATO. Behind them stands Gen. George C. Marshall, in Army uniform at left, who gave his name to the U.S. program to help Europe recover after World War II, the Marshall Plan.





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The lesson of the Marshall Plan and other successful examples of Chequebook Diplomacy is that the relative utility of the economic carrot, as well as that of other power tools, often depends on the ability of those possessing such resources to harness the full spectrum of power assets available to them, and to combine them in ways that successfully influence outcomes.¹⁶ Whether economic statecraft can serve as an alternative or a complement to hard security depends on the context in which such choices may be posed; whether decision-makers facing such choices are able and willing to deploy a range of power resources, including economic and military instruments, to advance their goals; what outcomes they seek; and the relative power and preferences of other relevant actors.

In short, sometimes you need to employ logic, sometimes you may need to threaten, and sometimes a bribe just might do the trick. However, usually you need all three.

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9 Nikolas Gvosdev, "The Realist Prism: Checkbook Security in an Age of Austerity," *World Politics Review*, Dec. 2, 2011.

10 Japan's main instrument to deal with the current refugee and migration crisis has been to offer billions in aid to the UN High Commission on Refugees, while keeping its own door closed. Germany, in contrast, has flung its doors open to refugees. See Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Gauging Japan's 'Proactive Contributions to Peace,'" *The Diplomat*, October 27, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/gauging-japans-proactive-contributions-to-peace/>

11 See Elaine Sciolino, "The World; Call it Aid or a Bribe, It's the Price of Peace," *New York Times*, March 25, 26, 1995.

12 Warde, *op. cit.*

13 The main impetus previously had been the record hike in mineral prices; key minerals like iron rose to over \$200/t in 2008, up from the long period of prices as low as in the \$20s/t during the 1990s and early 2000s. Prices recovered after dropping off during the global financial crisis, but since 2011 prices for many hard commodities have fallen sharply. The industry forecasts an end to the boom and expects another cycle of stagnation, albeit at prices still much higher than the hard scrabble days of the 1990s.

14 See Daniel S. Hamilton, "Asia's Pivot to the Atlantic: Implications for the United States and Europe," in Hans Binnendijk, ed., *A Transatlantic Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships*. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014.

15 Beijing trumpeted the award of its first major European tender, a highway in Poland, as a sign of its rising clout. The project was later abandoned. The Brazil-China Business Council found that only one-third of announced Chinese investments in Brazil between 2007 and 2012 actually appeared; around \$44 billion in publicized investments never were realized. See Brazil-China Business Council, "Chinese Investments in Brazil from 2007-2012: A review of recent trends," June 2013, available at http://www.cebc.org.br/sites/default/files/pesquisa_investimentos_chineses_2007-2012_-_ingles_1.pdf.

16 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. offers a clear overview of the different dimensions of power in *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), and *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Robert Zoellick, "The Currency of Power," *Foreign Policy*, November 2012; and David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton University Press, 1985).

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CRISIS DIPLOMACY AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

The legal protection for UN peacekeepers, historically connected to their impartiality, has been challenged given that the mission as a whole can come to be considered as a party to an armed conflict, rendering them combatants and legitimate targets under international humanitarian law.

BY LT. GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM AVSM VRC (RETD)







The international community that is meeting the challenges of today's threats is getting serious about prevention. Averting wars between states and conflicts within some of them is in the collective interest of all of us. If the international community is to do better in the future in this context, the UN will need real improvements in its capacity for preventive diplomacy, mediation and Preventive Deployment.

While according to Article 33 of the UN Charter, the initial responsibility for the pacific settlement of disputes lies with member states, including regional agencies or arrangements, Article 34 sets a relatively low threshold for the consideration of the Security Council, which 'may investigate any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.'

More than 10 years ago at the September 2005 Summit, a landmark resolution on conflict prevention was adopted, yet translating that rhetoric into timely action in practice remains a challenge. The Brahimi Panel Report had, in 2000, highlighted the pressing need for the UN and its member states to establish a more effective system for long term conflict prevention and observed that for preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the secretary general needs clear, strong and sustained political support from member states. The report noted the 'gap' between verbal posturing and financial and political support for prevention. Some of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report relevant to conflict prevention - including issues related to political will, lack of resources and insufficient linkages with development and humanitarian actors - remain unresolved issues even today. The report had also called for the secretary general's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisis preventive action. The most recent report (2015) of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) highlights how efforts aimed at conflict prevention struggle to galvanise the necessary political urgency for action, remaining 'the poor relative of better-resourced peace operations deployed during and after armed conflict'. It highlights how the Council has infrequently engaged in emerging conflicts, focusing instead on dealing with armed conflicts and emergencies after they occur. Hence, it calls for earlier Council engagement, including interactive dialogues in informal formats, regionally focused discussions and visits to turbulent areas.

The report stresses that political sensitivities regarding the Secretariat's role in bringing to the Council's attention on any matter that might threaten international peace and security must not deter the secretary general from bringing early analysis and frank advice to the Council, as provided for in Article 99 of the UN Charter. The indecisiveness of the Council in prevention stems from the resistance of member states to early international engagement and to political divisions, in particular among the P5, which tend to impede action by the Council. Council members are, in general, reluctant to spend the political capital needed to tackle a crisis early on. The Brahimi Report had stressed the importance of the Council translating its statements into action, stating that it was 'incumbent that Council members and the membership at large breathe life into the words that they produce.'

In one of the most quoted sentences of the Brahimi Panel Report, it declared, "The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not

what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates". The HIPPO report's critique of the experience of the subsequent 15 years is more broad-ranging. In recent years, it observes, mandates have become lengthier, and at times less realistic, manageable or achievable. It maintains that 'too often, mandates and missions are produced on the basis of templates instead of being tailored to support situation-specific political strategies.'

The HIPPO report calls for a more flexible use of the full spectrum of UN peace operations. It argued that the sharp distinctions - in budgets and management - between the two categories of peacekeeping operations and special political missions should give way to a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions. The report advocates embracing the term 'peace operations' to denote the full spectrum of UN peace and security missions and initiatives.

The secretary general's report states that the HIPPO's call for tailored peace operations that can respond effectively across the lifetime of a conflict is one of the recommendations that he would prioritise. His report uses the term 'peace operations' throughout to reflect the HIPPO's recommendations and 'to capture the holistic and tailored way in which UN peace and security tools must be used if we are to achieve better and more sustained effect.' The Secretariat, despite maintaining its current departmental structure, is moving more consistently to this terminology, but that is not yet the case in the C34 where a significant number of member states want to retain 'peacekeeping' as the focus.

The HIPPO report advocates sequenced and prioritised mandates to allow missions to develop over time 'rather than trying to do everything at once, and failing.' The secretary general's report supports HIPPO's suggestion that the Council consider how it can better prioritise and sequence tasks that it sets for peace operations. The Brahimi Report had recommended a two-stage mandating process, in the more limited context of obtaining firm commitments from member states for the forces necessary to carry out the operation. It recommended that the Council should leave a mandating resolution that contemplated a sizeable force in draft form until the secretary general could confirm that such commitments had been received. The report had warned against deploying partial forces incapable of solidifying a fragile peace, which 'would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the UN as a whole.' The tragic irony is that in most cases no heed was paid to the warning leading to disastrous results.

The Brahimi Report was also critical of the absence of a professional system in the Secretariat for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating long term strategies. It recommended the creation of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, administered jointly by DPA and DPKO, able to draw on the best expertise inside and outside the UN system to provide consolidated assessments of efforts to address the sources and symptoms of ongoing conflicts, and the potential utility of further UN involvement. Such a unit was never established, due to the opposition of some member states concerned about entrusting the UN Secretariat with its own 'intelligence' capacity.



In the years that followed, peace operations with a robust posture used force against spoilers seeking to undermine a political process, including when the UN Organization Mission in the DRC took action against rebel groups in the East in 2006, or Côte d'Ivoire (after the 2011 electoral crisis). In recent years, the Council has mandated peace operations to stabilise situations of ongoing fighting.



The HIPPO report is no less critical of the shortcomings of the Secretariat's policy, analysis and strategy development processes. It highlights the need for a system-wide dedicated capacity, reporting to the secretary general, to serve as the institutional hub for strategic analysis and planning. It was envisioned that this capacity would be housed in the Executive Office of the secretary general, in order to avoid bureaucratic friction from undermining the capacity to draw effectively on existing expertise, both internal and external. The secretary general's report stressed how 'quality analysis allows me to provide the Council with frank and well-considered advice that it needs in assessing options to respond to crisis'. In line with the HIPPO recommendation, he announced that he had established, within existing resources, a small, centralised analysis and planning capacity in the Executive Office of the secretary general. This new unit is expected to draw on and compile information and analysis across the system to prepare strategic considerations and options for possible UN responses. Initially dependent on extra-budgetary funds, the unit will need to be institutionalised.

While the development of strategic analysis and planning capacity is internal to the Secretariat, it is critical to its ability to provide the Council with the assessments and options it needs to improve its mandating decisions, including the sequencing of mandates and their review. Also essential, however, as emphasised by both the Brahimi and HIPPO Reports, is the frankness with which such assessments are conveyed to the Council.

The lack of strategic focus is exacerbated by the tendency of Council members to seek the inclusion of favoured issues, sometimes irrespective of their relevance or priority in the context of the situation under discussion. This also reflects advocacy efforts by Secretariat departments and NGOs, which also sometimes focus on language as an objective in itself without considering its urgency or achievability.

The Brahimi Report welcomed the Council's actions to give UN peacekeepers the explicit authority to protect civilians in conflict situations. In the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda and at Srebrenica, it stressed how 'peacekeepers - troops or police - who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic UN principles'. The report highlighted how once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates 'with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence', particularly against civilians. However, the report also questioned the credibility and achievability of a blanket mandate to protect civilians, acknowledging that UN operations can only protect a small fraction of the civilian population exposed to the potential risk of violence. Sixteen years down the line, the gap between expectations and resources available, remains one of the key issues echoed by the peace operations review.

The Brahimi Report declared that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence or in defence of the mandate should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. However, it categorically warned against the manipulation of consent by parties to the conflict, and against wrongly confusing impartiality with neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time. The report stressed how, once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and



the mission's mandate. To that end, 'the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour,' which means deployment of well-trained and well-equipped forces in adequate numbers so that they are able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterises traditional peacekeeping.

In the years that followed, peace operations with a robust posture used force against spoilers seeking to undermine a political process, including when the UN Organization Mission in the DRC took action against rebel groups in the East in 2006, or Côte d'Ivoire (after the 2011 electoral crisis). In recent years, the Council has mandated peace operations to stabilise situations of ongoing fighting. On March 28, 2013, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2098, establishing an intervention brigade based in Goma in the DRC under the command of MONUSCO. Its key task, renewed in subsequent resolutions, is to carry out offensive operations to neutralise armed groups that threaten state authority and civilian security.

The trend towards more robust mandates on UN peace operations has been driven by permanent members France, the UK and the US, along with some African TCCs. Significant concerns were raised by China, Russia and elected troop-contributing Council members after the adoption of Resolution 2098: involvement in enforcement actions could compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and the safety and security of peacekeepers. Russia, the only Council member, which explained its vote on Resolution 2100, expressed its concern about the growing shift towards the military aspects of peacekeeping and highlighted that what was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice. The legal protection for UN peacekeepers, historically connected to their impartiality, has also been challenged given that the mission as a whole can come to be considered as a party to an armed conflict, rendering them combatants and legitimate targets under international humanitarian law.

The HIPPO Report also endorses the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping, but says that adherence to these principles should not be 'an excuse for failure to protect civilians or defend the mission proactively', and that there should be 'a flexible and progressive interpretation of these principles'. The report also states that UN peace operations are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism tasks owing to their composition and character, and argued that other regional or ad hoc coalitions are better placed to undertake these.

Chapter VIII is devoted to regional arrangements, showing great foresight for their potential role at a time when regional organisations were little developed and institutionalised. This potential role has become a growing reality as African regional economic communities and the AU developed their own approaches towards regional and sub-regional peace and security. With the creation of the AU in 2001 and its increasing involvement in peace and security issues across the continent, it has become the UN's key partner in peace operations, and this partnership is a major focus of the HIPPO and secretary general's reports. Its role within its region is distinct from the role of the EU, which is a significant partner in international operations outside the EU and beyond Europe, deploying alongside UN peace operations.

Building on the willingness to deploy, the availability of troops and the increasingly developed capacity of its Secretariat, the AU has been authorised by the Council to be the first respondent in several crises in the continent. The issue of funding has become one of the most contentious aspects of AU-UN cooperation. The non-availability of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding of AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the Security Council is raised frequently in the Council, mostly by African members. This remains a controversial issue among Council members, dividing the main financial contributors on the Council from African countries.

The HIPPO Report recommends the use of UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support AU peace operations authorised by the Council, including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel, to complement funding from the AU and/or African member states. In January 2015, the AU Assembly agreed to contribute up to 25 percent of the cost of AU peace and security efforts, including peace support operations, to be fully achieved by the year 2020, envisaging that the other 75 percent of the cost of such missions would be provided by the UN through assessed contributions.

Finally, it may be appropriate to flag an issue that has been the subject of much discussion at almost every forum over the last couple of decades - the developed world with its resources of trained manpower and equipment, must return to UN peacekeeping if such operations are to be effective, and the Organisation is to retain any credibility. Legitimacy is another matter altogether, given the current lack of representation from Africa and South America in the permanent membership category in the Security Council. To suggest that the Western countries prefer to operate under the auspices of EU or NATO because of the 'inefficiency' or 'incompetence' of the UN system is hypocrisy of the highest order.

The writer was commissioned into the Maratha Light Infantry in December 1957, the General Officer commanded two battalions of the Regiment, a mechanised brigade group and a mechanised division, and served in operational assignments including counter-insurgency operations and in the 1965 and 1971 wars on the sub-continent. A graduate of the Australian Staff College (1968), he was with a training team in Iraq (1977-79), was on the faculty of the Defence Services Staff College (1980-81), and served as Military Adviser at the High Commission of India in London (1984-87). As Director General of Military Operations (1991), he led two defence delegations for discussions with Pakistan. Appointed the first Force Commander and Head of the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia, he set up and ran the mission from 3rd March 1992 to 2nd March 1993. He retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff on 31 August 1994. He is a recipient of the Vir Chakra for bravery in battle, and the Ati Vishist Seva Medal and Param Vishist Seva Medal for distinguished service. He was Director of the United Service Institution of India from 1st July 1996 to 31st December 2008, was Adviser to the Government of Sri Lanka on certain aspects of the peace process in 2002/03 and appointed as a member of the Advisory Board to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Peacekeeping Training Programme (PTP) from 01 September 2009 to 30 September 2012. He was conferred the Padma Bhushan by the President of India on the occasion of Republic Day 2009 for his contributions to National Security Affairs. A lifetime member of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, he has since February 2011, joined the Institute as a 'Distinguished Fellow'.



CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

HERITAGE AND INDIA'S GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS

BY DR VISHAKHA N DESAI



Since the ascension of Narendra Modi as the prime minister, it is amply evident that one of the priorities of the Indian government is to develop a more proactive strategy to position India as an emerging global power. He is one of the most travelled leaders of the country, having made more than 140 foreign trips in his first three years in office. His travels have included not only major global centres such as the US (four trips so far) and China, but also smaller and more remote locations such as Mongolia and Eastern Europe, often being the first Indian leader to visit the country in question.

In many cases, such trips are couched in economic terms; promoting Indian business or inviting business leaders to come and invest in India. Another agenda is a political one - establishing India's bona fides as an emerging global power and seeking a position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is credited with developing a much more proactive foreign policy agenda of the country known for being more reactive and far more cautious about engaging internationally. The shadow of the non-aligned movement doctrine is increasingly faint as the Modi Administration builds new strategic partnerships and security alliances around the world.

One of the more significant directions of the Modi diplomacy is a forceful use of India's millennial traditions to project India as a 'young nation' but 'an ancient civilisation,' a unique combination that can provide teachable moments for the world. As the Indian prime minister declared in his first Independence Day speech in 2014, India has the potential to be Jagatguru, the Teacher of the World, because of its ancient spiritual wisdom articulated by spiritual stalwarts such as Swami Vivekananda and Shri Aurobindo. Indian government has translated these ideas into action through major initiatives ranging from International Yoga Day to supporting Indian filmmakers participating in International film festivals and competitions.

All of these governmental initiatives are based on the now accepted concept of soft power initially coined by Professor Joe Nye as 'an ability to influence others not by military means or economic power but through the use of and attractiveness of one's culture and values.' A number of scholars and analysts have argued that the Indian government has traditionally not used its cultural strength or millennial concepts in the global arena to its strategic advantage.

It is clear from the historical review of programs supported by Indian Council on Cultural Relations (ICCR) that many of the projects have been ad hoc rather than strategic, and often focusing on the grand classical traditions rather than using the vibrant contemporary artistic practices. The renewed strategic focus on the use of cultural expressions as tools of 'soft power,' thus instrumentalising culture in the service of geo-political interests of the country, is increasingly visible in the public diplomacy vision within the Ministry of External Affairs. Arguably, the Indian government is now ready to be proactive in the use of culture in its foreign policy agenda.

However, it bears remembering that soft power rests not only on the use of cultural expressions (Yoga, classical Indian dance, Bollywood movies, etc) but also on its cultural values, and practices that create meaning for the society. One of the reasons India is seen as having attractive values in the global arena is its

intrinsic pluralism, or, as first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru described, Indian civilisation is a product of Indian "toleration of other ways than their own, their capacity to absorb other peoples and their cultural accomplishments, to synthesise them and develop a varied culture." Another quality that others find attractive about India is its capacity to live in many centuries at once, and to live with apparent contradictions without feeling a sense of deep conflict.

It's problematic, to say the least, if Indian leaders actively project Indian culture but choose its expressions selectively, excluding its uniquely syncretic traditions that come from the fusion of multiple religions and customs. It is equally troublesome if the pluralistic ethos of the society at home is not nurtured.

More importantly, as India becomes more proactive in projecting its cultural strength, it is crucial that equal attention is paid to nurturing and strengthening culture and cultural values at home. Indian government's allocation for cultural funding is miniscule compared to China and many European countries. While there have been some effort to preserve and protect our monuments, there is little money allocated to new archaeological projects or serious archaeological scholarship. Politicisation of culture is routinely manifested in allocation of funds and appointments of individuals with narrow religious agendas. Some respected scholars have pointed out that India had more experts and competent institutional leaders at the beginning of the country's independent journey than we currently have. Many of the country's leading institutions end up being run by bureaucrats rather than by experienced professionals because there has been little investment in training scholars and professionals who can run museums and cultural institutions generally. And those who are trained often are turned off by the sheer bureaucratic hurdles they face in getting anything done.

As India continues to emphasise vocational training and professional expertise - all important tools to provide competitive jobs in a globalising world - it is pertinent to remember that this cannot be done at the expense of promoting serious study of India's millennial traditions at home and abroad. And this study cannot be focused on the selective topics at the expense of some of the deepest values embedded in the culture that celebrates diversity and respect for differences. It is for these values that the world has looked to India in the past from Gandhi to Tagore and from Vivekananda to Aurobindo. India has also produced great leaders such as Akbar who promoted religious respect and great scholars such as Maulana Azad. If we are to nurture the spirit and insight of the future Gandhi or Maulana, it is crucial that we create an environment where these deep millennial insights are studiously explored at home and projected abroad.

The writer is Senior Advisor for Global Affairs to the President and Senior Research Scholar at Columbia university. She served as President and CEO of Asia Society, a Global non-profit organization dedicated to promote mutual understanding and strengthening partnerships among people and institutions of Asia and the United States in a global context. A frequent commentator and a scholar on the intersection of culture and foreign policy in Asian countries. Dr. Desai teaches a graduate seminar in the subject at Columbia University.



DIASPORA DIPLOMACY

INDIA-ETHIOPIA COOPERATION IN EDUCATION

While the foundation of India-Ethiopia relations in education can't be static and new forms like tele-education have emerged, India's involvement in Ethiopia's education system improvement is still one of the brightest and honourable examples of Indian participation in the development of Africa.

BY DR VIACHESLAV USOV



India-Ethiopia relations are often regarded to be an exemplary partnership between India and any African country. Cooperation between the two countries in the field of education can be described as a special theme that has both practical and emotional aspects. From the late 1960s and to early 1970s, thousands of Indian teachers, mostly from Kerala, went to Ethiopia under request of the Emperor Haile Selassie to teach the local population in the remotest parts of the country. Even the private secretary and advisor of Haile Selassie, who assisted him in developing the educational system of the country, one of the most underdeveloped in Africa at the time, was Indian.

As a matter of fact, Indian presence in Ethiopia was so remarkable that the word 'teacher' became almost synonymous with 'Indian' and to a great extent explains the tremendous goodwill that India still enjoys in Ethiopia. Ms. Gennet Zewide, Ethiopia's former Federal Education Minister and the former Ambassador of Ethiopia in India, whose fifth-grade teacher was also an Indian, assured that between 1960 and 2012, more than 200,000 Indians taught in her country. Through the 1960s and 1970s, more than 6,000 Indians were teaching in the country at any given time. "It was a flood", she says.

The policy of 'Ethiopianisation' promoted by the Derg regime that overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 resulted in many Indians, primarily businessmen and teachers, leaving the country. After the current Ethiopian government took power in 1991, more Indians were welcomed again into the country. As India-Ethiopia relations intensified, the size of the Indian community in Ethiopia raised correspondingly. Now it consists not only of businessmen, but Indian teachers and academics as well.

India - A Centre of Learning

Hailemariam Desalegn, the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia and former Deputy Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister, during the Second Africa-India Summit held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, stated that Indian teachers in schools and universities in Ethiopia were held in very high regard, and India on the whole was seen as a 'Centre of Learning'.

From the Ethiopian point of view, getting more Indian teachers in the country would help in capacity building and the knowledge empowerment of Ethiopian youth and contribute to faster nation-building. As Indian educational institutions are seen as more capable of producing well-educated professionals at a lower cost than Western universities, the Ethiopian government consciously gives scholarships to train Ethiopian students in India. By 2015, nearly 700 Ethiopians were able to study under the ITEC program alone. Experts from the Centre for WTO Studies in India also held workshops for senior Ethiopian officials to enhance their capacity for WTO accession negotiations. There have been exchanges between Indian Foreign Service Institute and their counterpart Ethiopian institutions. Additional scholarships have been provided by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) to Ethiopian students for university studies in India every year. The two countries have also agreed to cooperate in training Ethiopian Government sponsored students at various Indian Universities in the field of Engineering, IT and Social sciences for Masters and PhD level courses in more than 20 Indian universities.

Expanding Ethiopian Education System

Contrary to 1960-70s when Indians in Ethiopia were mostly teachers, in the 1990-2000s, the large expansion and reform of Ethiopia's university sector created a great incentive for Indian academics to come to Ethiopia as well. Until 2000, Ethiopia's higher education sector included only 2 universities and 17 colleges, a level that had been one of the lowest in the world. For the next 4 years, the number of universities was raised from 2 to 9, mainly by merging colleges and upgrading them to university status, and in 2004, 12 additional universities had been established. According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Education, by 2016, the university sector of Ethiopia has expanded to already 35 public universities and much more accredited non-government high education institutes and colleges. Pursuing the aim of producing the professionals Ethiopia needs for its fast economic and industrial development, the Ethiopian government in 2008 decreed that all universities, public and private, should modify their curricula so that 70 percent of student intake is to science and technology based subjects and 30 percent to the arts and humanities.

Education reform in Ethiopia, which was being implemented not only at the expense of the World Bank and other donors but at the expense of the military budget, has been very much appreciated by the African Union (AU). In January 2016, the AU Director for Administration and Human Resource Management Amin Idriss Adoum urged African countries to learn from Ethiopia's best practices regarding the increasing production of skilled labour in the vocational and technical spheres. The director also said Nigeria is already following the footsteps of Ethiopia while Senegal is in the process of adapting Ethiopia's strategy for meeting the needs of skilled technical personnel in the country.

Challenges and Solutions

However, the unprecedented growth of Ethiopia's higher education sector led to a shortfall of experienced lecturers as well as downgrading the quality of graduates. While projected academic staff for 2007 was estimated at no less than 3600 persons, in 2003 only 4 doctoral degrees had been awarded and the next year only 30 PhD students had been registered in Addis-Ababa University, the oldest and the most well-established in the country. Consequently, the percentage of lecturers possessing a PhD has declined in Ethiopia from 28 percent in 1995/96 to 9 percent in 2002/03. Not only the fast expansion of the higher education system, but academic brain drain from the country to mainly developed Western countries resulted in a great shortage of qualified academic staff in Ethiopia.

As an answer to the shortage of academics, the Ethiopian government increases expatriate staff, mainly from Nigeria, Cuba, and the UK with Indians constituting the majority of these expatriates. Sophie Thubauville, who explored the field of India-Ethiopia relations, estimates that the total number of Indian nationals in Ethiopia in 2012 alone was 4,000, of which more than 2,000 were Indian academics with their dependents.

India is considered to be a prominent labour-exporting country and its teachers and academics are the major 'human export' from the country after scientists, engineers, doctors and IT specialists. Indians are preferred in many developed and developing countries as they have a high command of English



The main agencies that recruit Indian academics to Ethiopia are situated in Hyderabad. This city also accommodates a large share of the 3,000 or so Ethiopian students who study in India.



and the necessary qualifications. In Ethiopia, degrees from India are highly valued and respected and the Indian academics have been offered a higher tax-free salary compared to their local colleagues plus additional benefits such as free flight tickets and housing. This enables them to have a higher living standard than local academics that have about four-five times less salary than their Indian colleagues.

Despite the official contacts between India and Ethiopia in the field of education mostly based on the system of scholarships that are offered to Ethiopian students for university studies in India, the bulk of Indian teachers and academics are recruited to Ethiopia through private placement agencies or on a basis of word-of-mouth references. Supplied with job offers by the Ethiopian Ministry of Education or by the individual universities, the recruitment agencies search candidates and organise interviews with the institutions that are in need of Indian lecturers. Their websites give all necessary information not only about the job, requirements for qualification, size of salary, tax-free and free air tickets between India and Ethiopia, cost of living in the country and saving potential; but also highlight Ethiopia's pleasant climate, availability of food, the safety of the country and some good job prospects to get work abroad in the near future 'as international experience is considered to be a big plus point'.

As the age for successful candidates should be below 65 years old and the retirement age in India is 60, the jobs offered by the Ethiopian universities can be especially attractive for retired Indian academics. It seems that some advertisements of recruitment agencies highlight the eligibility of retired academics intentionally.

The main agencies that recruit Indian academics to Ethiopia are situated in Hyderabad. This city also accommodates a large share of the 3,000 or so Ethiopian students who study in India. The Cure Hospital that offers tele-services to Ethiopian hospitals under Pan-Africa e-Network project can be seen as a real hub for India-Ethiopia cooperation in the education sector.

In spite of the visible privileges Indian academics have in Ethiopia, their future position in the country is not as reliable as one might assume. Ethiopian reliance on Indian academics can be only a temporary solution for Ethiopian universities and as soon as enough local professionals are available to take over the positions, foreign academics who receive a much higher salary will not be hired any longer. The inevitable resentment from Ethiopian academics who have

much less salary and some local difficulties such as the absence of international schools and a lack of healthcare and entertainment out of Addis Ababa means that academic positions for Indians are quite insecure and attractive only for a limited period of time.

While the main aim of the Indian teachers and academics that chose to move to Ethiopia is financial gain, many Indians 'built a cultural connection, lifelong friendship and bond' with Ethiopians. However, after India implemented an unprecedented rise of wages for its staff in the education sector in recent years, Ethiopia's once lucrative offers to Indian tutors do not seem so tempting. 'It's a big problem for us', says Gennet Zewide. 'We still want quality teachers from India as seeds around which our own teachers can learn and grow. But it's proving much harder to afford them any more'. Although some Ethiopians complain about the dominance of Indians in the field of education, many, especially those who had a personal experience and contacts with the Indian teachers like Gennet Zewide, regret this development.

Facing a number of constraints in its education sector, the Ethiopian government tries to find different solutions to the problem posed by a shortage of teachers and academics. Besides the invitation of foreign nationals to move to Ethiopia, it also widely uses advanced technologies, namely tele-education. India plays a major role in tele-education in Ethiopia. In 2007, India launched the Pan-African e-Network project (PAN) through which it offers tele-education, tele-medicine services, consultation and video-conferencing for 53 African countries, members of the African Union. Brainchild of former Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, it was first presented to the Pan-African Parliament in 2004. The idea is that India in collaboration with the African Union will help create in every African country an e-learning centre and a tele-medicine centre that will be linked to learning centres and medical institutions in India and provide services. As part of its intended transfer of technology and skills, the Indian government set up a pilot project in Ethiopia for tele-medicine and tele-education under the Pan-Africa e-Network project in July 2007. The Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa is still working well and is considered useful by the Ethiopian side. The tele-education project has been replicated by the Ethiopian side and linkages have been established between the Addis Ababa University and the Indian Institutes of Technology in Delhi and Kanpur. The entire cost of \$2.13 million was borne by the government of India as a grant.

India-Ethiopia cooperation in education is a distinctive phenomenon in the realm of India-Africa relations. Five decades of teaching the people of Ethiopia led to the emergence of several generations of those teachers in India. Their special meetings took place in Kerala in 2010, where most of these teachers were recruited. Nowadays, Indian academics have once again become an integral part of Ethiopia's attempts to get out of poverty and underdevelopment. While the foundation of India-Ethiopia relations in education can't be static and new forms like tele-education have emerged, India's involvement in Ethiopia's education system improvement is still one of the brightest and honourable examples of Indian participation in the development of Africa.

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WHAT IS DIGITAL DIPLOMACY, AND HOW IT IS PRACTISED AROUND THE WORLD

BY ILAN MANOR

On April of 2015, a devastating earthquake shook Nepal killing more than 8,000 people. Within hours of the deadly quake, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) launched a dedicated twitter channel through which it coordinated consular aid to Indians stranded in Nepal. Tweets published by the MEA included the emergency contact numbers for the Indian embassy in Kathmandu, information on flight scheduled to transport civilians from Nepal back to India and updates on India's assistance in search and rescue operations. This is but one example of how digitalisation has impacted diplomatic institutions and diplomats in a process generally referred to as Digital Diplomacy.

But what is Digital Diplomacy? How can it best be defined? This is a vexing question given the myriad ways in which digitalisation has impacted the practice of diplomacy. Arriving at such a definition becomes even more elusive since scholars and practitioners also use the terms Net Diplomacy, Social Media Diplomacy, Diplomacy 2.0 and Cyber Diplomacy.







This article aims to offer a definition of Digital Diplomacy. To do so, it first identifies certain events and processes that led to the emergence of Digital Diplomacy. Next, it demonstrates the manner in which Digital Diplomacy enables diplomats to overcome many of the limitations of traditional diplomacy. This paper also explores the challenges of practicing Digital Diplomacy before ending with a definition of the term.

So what is Digital Diplomacy?

Before defining Digital Diplomacy, it may be beneficial to identify events and processes that led Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to adopt digital tools. One such event is the Arab Spring of 2010. As Professor Phillip Seib of the University of Southern California has argued¹, MFAs and diplomats were taken by surprise by these revolts given that diplomats were not monitoring the environment in which the revolts took shape – that of Facebook. While Facebook did not cause the Arab Spring, it did serve as a modern day town square in which digital citizens came together to openly criticise their governments, an occurrence that could never have happened offline. Following the Arab Spring, MFAs began to migrate online so as to better anticipate events in foreign countries.

The second process that led to the rise of Digital Diplomacy was the use of the internet by terrorist groups to recruit of youth to jihadi movements². In an attempt to combat such activities, and prevent terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda from gaining online support, the US State Department took to the internet in order to wage a war of ideas and win over the hearts and minds of internet users.

The third and final process that led diplomats to adopt digital tools was the fact that these were being used by journalists and news organisations³. Diplomats have traditionally sought to influence how the media portrays events, actors and even countries given that the media shapes public opinion. In addition, MFAs rely on journalists and the media for information regarding events in foreign countries. Thus, once the media migrated online, MFAs were soon to follow.

Taken together, these three processes suggest that Digital Diplomacy is actually social media diplomacy. However, this is not entirely the case. Ambassadors now use messaging applications such as WhatsApp in order to

influence UN deliberations as they take place. In addition, MFAs have launched virtual embassies in virtual worlds in order to brand their nation. Therefore, Digital Diplomacy includes a variety of digital tools that far exceed that of social media. While digitalisation has brought with it many benefits, it is not without its challenges. It may thus be useful to explore such benefits and challenges before arriving at a definition of Digital Diplomacy.

Digital Diplomacy – Overcoming the Limitation of Traditional Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy was based on representation. An ambassador served as one king's representative to the court of another. This ambassador was also 'Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary' meaning that was within his purview to negotiate and sign treaties on behalf of his king. Yet, in the age of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), one sovereign or prime minister may simply call his counterpart. Likewise, in the age of diplomatic summitry (such as G20 meetings), leaders come together to directly negotiate with one another.

While ICTs have reduced an ambassador's agency opposite a foreign leader, they have increased his agency opposite foreign populations. Social Networking Service (SNS) such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram enable diplomats and embassies to converse online with foreign populations and foster relationships with them. Thus, Digital Diplomacy enables one to overcome the limitations of traditional diplomacy and continuously engage with a large and diverse audience. Notably, it is the two-way communicative nature of social media that represents the fundamental difference between Digital Diplomacy and 20th century diplomacy practiced via radio or television⁴.

Another limitation of traditional diplomacy was lack of representation. Consider, for example, that the Emperor of Ethiopia had decided to banish the Swedish ambassador from his court. Not only would there be no communication between the two countries, but the Swedish ambassador would also be unable to communicate with Ethiopian citizens be it in order to stimulate trade between both countries, strengthen political ties or even narrate his country's policies in Africa.

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Nowadays, however, lack of representation does not necessarily infer lack of communication as MFAs can create virtual embassies instead of physical ones. Such was the case with Virtual Embassy Teheran, a web-based embassy launched by the US State Department in December of 2011⁵. Through this website, the US State Department hoped to converse online with Iranian citizens, an occurrence that could not happen offline as both nations do not have diplomatic ties. Similarly, in 2007, the Swedish MFA launched a virtual embassy in the virtual world of Second Life. As Dr James Pamment of Lund University explains⁶, the embassy was meant to serve as a cultural hub that would showcase Swedish art through gallery exhibitions, lectures and concerts. Given that Second Life attracts millions of users from all over the world, this virtual embassy was actually the world's first global embassy.

If we return to the court of the Ethiopian Emperor, we may also consider that the Swedish ambassador was the very embodiment of Sweden to all those at court. It was the ambassador's duty to personify Swedish values, Swedish culture and even publicise Swedish accomplishments. To paraphrase Louis XIV, *'the Ambassador was the State'*. Yet such activities were usually limited to the court and thus failed to influence how the national citizenry viewed another country.

In modern diplomacy, the art of shaping and promoting a country's image abroad is often referred to as nation branding. And digital tools have proven themselves a powerful medium for nation branding. One interesting example is Finland's national 'emoji' application now available on the App Store. The application enables users to use a variety of 'emojis', or images that are representative of Finland's culture and history. Through this project, which attracted mass media attention, Finland was able to brand itself as a vibrant, technologically oriented and humoristic nation challenging the common perception of Finland as a dark and desolate country.

Other MFAs employ social media to brand their nation. Given that self-portraits in the age of social media are known as selfies, social media based branding may be conceptualised as Selfie Diplomacy⁷. The Kenyan Foreign

Ministry, for instance, has been using its SNS accounts to brand itself as the financial gateway to Africa and an emerging technological powerhouse. Poland, on the other hand, has been crafting a different selfie; labelling itself as the Heart of Europe.

Lastly, as was the case with extraordinary ambassadors, diplomats have been using digital tools in order to create trans-national networks. At times, such networks may include MFAs and NGOs that collaborate on advocacy campaigns. Such was the case with UK Foreign Office's campaign to 'End Sexual Violence in Conflicts'⁸. Through a global network of civil society organisations, individuals and diplomats, the Foreign Office aimed to influence policy and prevent sexual violence, which is rampant during times of armed conflict.

Other ministries aim to foster networks with their diasporas⁹. One example of these activities is the Indian MEA's Know India programme that targets second generation diaspora (i.e., children of immigrants). The Know India programme website offers a range of activities for second-generation diasporas so that they retain their cultural heritage and link to their country of origin.

The Challenges of Digital Diplomacy

One of the greatest challenges of Digital Diplomacy lies in its conversational nature. Following their migration online, diplomats and diplomatic institutions have been forced to contend with a vocal, unpredictable online public¹⁰. Indeed, verbal attacks and hate speech against diplomats are an inseparable part of Digital Diplomacy.

Additionally, an MFA's online activities may soon cause online controversy. Such was the case with the selfie published by the US First Lady Michele Obama. In the selfie, Obama holds a sign with the hashtag 'Bring Back Our Girls', referencing the abduction of some 250 Nigerian school girls by the Islamist Boko Haram group. The selfie was meant to raise media attention to this abduction and indicate that such a release was a US foreign policy priority.

Yet what followed was a social media campaign by Twitter users denouncing



the First Lady. Users soon uploaded their own selfies baring the hashtag 'Bring Back Your Drones', referring to the Obama administration's affinity to drone strikes against suspected terrorists. Thus, Obama's selfie reignited the online conversation regarding US morality in its War on Terror.

An additional challenge lies in MFAs' need to maintain their online diplomatic empires. In order to attract social media users to their accounts, MFAs must create attractive social media content. In order to brand their nation, MFAs must converse with online public and respond to questions and comments. In order to influence news coverage, MFAs must follow journalists online and in order to predict events in foreign countries, they must follow other diplomatic institutions. These all demand substantial resources. This challenge becomes even more evident when one realises the size of MFAs' Digital Diplomacy apparatuses. The US State Department, for instance, manages an empire of some 1,000 social media accounts¹¹.

It is also worth noting that Digital Diplomacy is not practiced in a vacuum. Indeed one MFA's online content may immediately be contrasted by another. For instance, the Hamas group that controls the Gaza strip recently published a new YouTube video depicting life in Gaza. This video is part of the group's online campaign in the upcoming Palestinian elections and it therefore portrays Gaza as a bustling city with an emerging economy, beautiful beaches and large communal parks.

Immediately after this video was released, Israeli diplomats used it to infer that Hamas had been lying over the recent years in its depiction of Gaza as the victim of an Israeli military siege. It is this example, which demonstrates that Digital Diplomacy is a competitive arena in which MFAs and diplomats bide over audience and media attention while attempting to discredit one another.

Digital Diplomacy also presents certain technical difficulties such as Bots, which are computer programs that are meant to imitate Internet users and post certain comments and opinions on social media and websites. By using Bots, one nation can impact the social media discourse in another. For instance, it has been alleged that Russia uses Bots in order to create a swarm of online criticism against German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Regular internet users, that visit social media sites or even online newspapers, will therefore get the impression that many in Germany oppose the Chancellor and her migration policies. In this manner, Bots warp online discourse and people's perception of reality.

Algorithms present an additional difficulty. Social networking sites are all based on algorithms that are meant to tailor our online experience. For instance, an algorithm may detect our political affiliation, world view and even sexual orientation. The algorithms, then, exposes us primarily to content that confers with our opinions and beliefs. As such, algorithms are actually bubbles that limit what we know about the world. This is a major challenge of MFAs and diplomats looking to alter the manner in which their nation is perceived. If, for instance, a social media user is inclined to support Palestinian statehood, it is unlikely that he will be exposed to content posted online by the Israeli MFA. Likewise, a social media user who is critical of the US is unlikely to be offered articles on US aid to Syria in his Facebook feed. It is therefore incumbent on diplomats to attempt and crack these algorithmic bubbles, a task which to date has proven most problematic.

A Definition of Digital Diplomacy

This article aimed to offer but a glimpse into the emerging world of Digital Diplomacy. Through a series of examples, it also aimed to demonstrate that Digital Diplomacy is a global phenomenon. From Nairobi to Delhi, and Lima to Ottawa, MFAs and diplomats are embracing digital tools. This process offers both great rewards, and great challenges. Finally, the article illustrates the fact that Digital Diplomacy is more than just tweeting. It is a conceptual shift in diplomatic practice that places emphasis on conversing with foreign populations. It is a cultural shift which requires that MFAs share information rather than guard it. And, it is a technological shift which necessitates that diplomats develop technological skills spanning from knowledge of social media algorithms to the writing of computer programs and smartphone applications.

For some diplomats, it is a time of innovation and experimentation. For others, it is a culture shock.

It is this realisation which demands a definition of Digital Diplomacy that is both inclusive and particular, that is both optimistic and weary. Thus, this article ends with the following definition of Digital Diplomacy:

'The positive and negative impact digitalisation has had on the practice of diplomacy at both the institutional and personal level.'

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- ² See *Digital Diplomacy: The Internet, The battle for Ideas & US Foreign Policy* (2010) by Hallams
- ³ See *Are We there Yet: Have MFAs Realized the Potential of Digital Diplomacy* (2016) by Manor
- ⁴ See *Digital Diplomacy: Theory & Practice* (2015) by Bjola & Holms; *Diplomacy in the Digital Age* (2015) by Hocking & Melissen
- ⁵ See *Is it the Medium or the Message? Social Media, American Public Relations & Iran* (2012) by Metzgar
- ⁶ See *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century* (2013) by Pamment
- ⁷ See *America's Selfie: How the US Portrays itself on its Social Media Accounts* (2015) by Manor & Segev
- ⁸ See *Digital Diplomacy as Transmedia Engagement* (2015) by Pamment
- ⁹ See *Practicing Digital Diaspora Diplomacy* (2016) by Bjola
- ¹⁰ See *Corporate Diplomacy in the Information Age: Catching Up to the Dispersal of Power* (2011) by Haynal
- ¹¹ See *Social Media at State: Power, Practice and Conceptual Limits for US Public Diplomacy* (2012) by Hayden

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ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY POWER DYNAMICS IN THE EAST ASIAN CONTEXT

As an international system is evolving to a 'peace through economic strength' strategy; long term strength requires sound economic and technological footing. In this regard, future diplomacy will be more about advising enterprises on overseas markets, providing security awareness among enterprises, and actively engaged in overseas labour disputes.

BY DR NABEEL MANCHERI





Economic diplomacy is defined as employing economic tools in pursuit of protecting a country's national interest. Traditionally, this has been used to promote trade, and attract foreign investment and business. However, in recent years, the term more or less has been discussed as using economic tools such as foreign aid or sanctions to influence the behaviour of other countries. In other words, 'economic diplomacy concerns both the economic dimension of foreign policy and the strategic dimension of economic policy'¹.

According to Goodman P of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), economics and diplomacy are two sides of the same coin. One side represents diplomacy to promote exports, investment and other economic activities that contribute to a country's prosperity; and the other side is to use it as an economic tool - from sanctions to trade negotiations - to shape the behaviour of other countries in support of a nation's security and other foreign policy objectives.² These economic tools are used for achieving not only economic objectives, but also political and strategic goals. Passive side of this proposition is that the economics or greater trade and investment among countries can deter the potential conflicts among countries.

The term 'economic diplomacy' has become increasingly prominent as the global trade and investment have grown exponentially in the last few years. Countries have become enormously interdependent on trade and investment. This is reflected in the increased trade-GDP ratio as trade constitutes more than 50 percent of the GDP of most of the countries in the world barring the less developed countries in Asia and Africa. The main argument in this paper is to investigate, how economic tools such as sanctions, export restrictions, import bans, foreign aid etc. are utilised to maintain the balance of power in East Asia along with analysing how greater economic interdependence among countries in the region prevents conflicts from escalation.

The current situation in the region could be theoretically understood through a neo-realist paradigm. In spite of increasing economic cooperation between the parties involved, the region is in a state of suspicion, which breeds tension and conflict. Robert J (1978) argued that states look to ensure security and survival through building up sufficient military capacity to assert sovereignty and that, if use of forces is considered too costly, and then there would be additional options of non-military instruments such as economic tools.³ Further, states are primarily concerned with relative gains that are either maintaining or improving their positions relative to other states. States maximise their security by increasing their relative power measured in terms of military and economic strengths in the international system. As a result, balance of power politics emerges as a tool to contain conflicts and this significantly reduces the likelihood of war.

Economic Dimension of Foreign Policy

Gartzke E and Quan Li (2003) argue that economic dimension of foreign policy is complex. Economic linkages involve interactions at the systemic, dyadic and national levels that are by themselves intricate. The political permutations of economic linkages further amplify complexity and authors elaborate that how economics matters to political processes is ultimately an empirical question,

but a question with significant analytical prerequisites.⁴ This complex relation between economics and security poses a strategic challenge in Asia today. According to Feigenbaum, A.E. (2013), "The same countries that are trading, investing and growing together are beset by security tensions and dysfunctional diplomatic relationships".⁵ Beijing's long-term strategic intentions cast deep anxieties among other nations in the region despite China becoming the top trade partner for many of Asia's major economies.

As explained in Matsuro 2014, the idea that deeper economic ties reduce the likelihood of war is also deeply rooted in historical thoughts.⁶ In 1748, Baron de Montesquieu observed, "Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations which differ with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities".⁷ Kant E, postulated in his 1795 essay, *Perpetual Peace*, that international commerce, international institutions and democratic governance are necessary for world peace.⁸ The case for free trade in the 19th century Britain was argued on moral terms, specifically that free trade not only created economic prosperity but would also ensure peace to the empire.⁹ Contrary arguments are abound and parallels are drawn, comparing the current situation in East Asia to early 20th century Europe. Britain and Germany went to war in 1914 even though they had close economic ties - a similar situation where China stands today. Then, and now, there was a regional military build up by Germany to become a naval power to compete with Britain, similar to what China is doing currently, competing with US and Asian countries. The argument is that economic interdependence may not prevent conflict under all conditions but may prevent from escalating to a full-scale war.

Hence, in one sense, better economic relations do not necessarily lead to cordial political relations among countries, and in many cases, strategic competition co-exists with deep economic interdependence. Examples are plenty - China and its relation with the US, Japan and the neighbouring countries in Asia. Economically, China is highly integrated with US, Japan and other countries in the region and has become No. 1 trade and investment partner for many of these countries. However, political relations between China and others are fragile. In this regard, economic diplomacy and its tools play a major role to keep the situation under normalcy and keep the balance of power not concentrated too much on a single actor. The balance is maintained by greater economic interdependence as relative economic strength is utilised for political gains and national power projections. Therefore, economic strength and interdependence play an important role in averting full scale military conflicts in the region.

How do better trade relations deter the potential conflicts? For example, Richard Katz argued in *Foreign Affairs* journal that the conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku did not escalate to war because of 'mutual-assured production', as China needed to buy Japan's products as much as Japan needed to sell them.¹⁰ Japan's total trade with China has tripled since 2000 rising by 30 percent year-on-year to more than \$300 billion. Both China and Japan share a mutual trade relation as 60-70 percent of goods imported by China from Japan comprises of machinery used to make China's own exports.¹¹ The cost of war is extremely high replacing the huge benefit from mutual trade that has actually

helped the countries from the region to march towards prosperity. Given this, the more the two countries benefit from trade, the more they have to lose in the case of war, and therefore both strive to avoid one.

Strategic Dimension of Economic Policy

East Asia is stuck in a number of territorial disputes and there are possibilities for military conflicts in the future. The East China Sea disputes among China, Japan and Korea or the South China Sea disputes among China and ASEAN members or the long and unsettled border problems between India and China are the major concerns to the peace and stability in East Asia. China's assertiveness in East Asia by various means including economic coercion is considered as a security threat by other nations and they have contested claims in the region. China's economic interests in the region are especially intermingled with their grand strategy and status, which can be interpreted as that of a regional power with military and economic capabilities far outstripping those of other states.

As China grows fast and economic relations with its neighbours grow bigger, the phenomenon may lead to a situation where China uses its trade strength as a strategic tool against its partners or similarly some of its trade partners invoke trade interdependence as deterrence against China. This national strength will be dependent on the import/export volume and bilateral investments. If a country is a large importer, it might possess power as a buyer. Power will increase with the size of the market of the importing country, or with the size of exports from an exporting country.¹² Such power can sometimes be coercive if a large buyer suddenly refuses to purchase as a threat for political concessions from a target country.¹³ Hence, in this sense, all countries in the region possess a certain amount of economic power that keeps the political tensions at bay. China possesses this strength the most as the largest trade partner and investment

companion and this strength is leveraged upon other states often to achieve political objectives or maintain status quo. The assertiveness of China in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea should be seen from this perspective along with the economic significance of the Sea, both in terms of energy and as a major trade route.

Direct and targeted trade restrictions are also being considered as an economic diplomacy tool. The control can be powerful when the exports are strategic items or scarce natural resources.¹⁴ China used this tool as an informal embargo on rare-earth exports to Japan during the 2010 Senkaku crisis. In this case, China used its dominant position in export to settle a political crisis.¹⁵ The confrontation between China and Japan in September 2010 over the detention of the captain and crew members of a Chinese fishing vessel by the Japanese coastguard resulted in a number of retaliatory measures by China. The most controversial among them was the halting of shipment of rare earth and related materials to Japan. This was a rare case of a country, taking an economic measure to solve a political dispute by using rare earth materials as a strategic weapon.

This shows that if one country is excessively dependent on another either for exports or imports, it may give the rival an edge in strategic matters. For example, Philippines with an unresolved territorial dispute depends on China for about 41 percent of its total exports and 27 percent of imports. In spite of the heightened tensions over territorial disputes in South China, culminating in prolonged standoff in Scarborough Shoal, trade between Philippines and China grew over 30 percent in the last 3 years. This over dependence of Philippines for its exports to China particularly agricultural products has proved to be a disaster.

Since 2009, Chinese vessels have been involved in aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. The activities such as Chinese patrol boats attempting to ram a Philippine vessel and the April 2012 standoff between the Philippine patrol vessels and Chinese surveillance ships have been seen as a deliberate





campaign of coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea. Moreover, China also resorted to economic measures to punish Philippines for perceived encroachment in the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Chinese authorities kept-off Philippine agricultural products from entering China and began slowing custom inspections of papayas, mangoes, coconuts, and pineapples and Chinese mainland tourist agencies were directed to stop sending groups to Philippines, which was considered a great economic blow to Manila.¹⁶ These measures have also been used against Taiwan and Japan during the height of political tensions.

The Implications

The overall picture emerging from China's superiority in trade and investment is that this would allow China to dictate terms as Beijing expands and enforces Chinese sovereignty claims in the region, rewarding those who fall in line and punishing those who do not. Consequently, this assertiveness would lead to a security threat to the ASEAN and other states in the region. To counter this Chinese clout, others are increasing their defence and economic cooperation within the region along strategically allying with outside powers such as the US. Countries such as Japan and South Korea are reformulating the long followed 'China+' strategies to 'ASEAN+' or 'India+', etc.

The implications of this economic over dependence on China will be multifaceted. Continued occurrence of Chinese assertiveness in the region such as declaration of ADIZ, naval manoeuvring in East and South China Sea or the continued infiltrations in Indian border areas may become routine affairs. China might use its trade power as a bargaining chip by selectively restricting exports or banning imports. No country from the region will be in a position to take a particular side if a bilateral confrontation or conflict occurs between China and an individual country from the region as the economic benefit for doing so will be higher than taking a side. Therefore, most of the countries would take a neutral stand. Some smaller countries such as Pakistan, Cambodia or Laos even may align with China as they are the largest recipients of China's economic aid. China's regional initiatives such as One Belt One Road (OBOR), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and massive infrastructure projects in countries in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are seen to be part of a grand strategy aligning economics with security interests. China remains an important player even in smaller countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam where India and Japan have a strong strategic hold. As a result, these countries might choose to remain impartial as taking sides would be detrimental to their own business. In effect, the trade relations of China neutralise the soft power capabilities that India and Japan possess in the region.

The increasing importance of trade and investment in bilateral relations necessitate widespread economic expertise in foreign policy, a strategy that China has successfully embraced. The countries like India need to train their diplomats and new recruits in such a way to deal with these issues and who could better grasp strategic importance of economic issues. As an international system is evolving to a 'peace through economic strength' strategy; long term strength requires sound economic and technological footing. In this regard, future diplomacy will be more about advising enterprises on overseas markets, providing security awareness among enterprises, and actively engaged in

overseas labour disputes. Additionally, embassies and consulates should be equipped both physically and intellectually to track economic and financial development trends, carry out economic research, and provide advice and proposals for investment and trade deals.

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EUROPEAN UNION'S ENERGY DIPLOMACY

BY DR MAXIME H. A. LARIVÉ



The European Union (EU), an economic and political endeavour of 28 Member States, has historically faced a core dilemma as being one of the largest world economic engines and one of the most dependent economic blocks on foreign energies. Approximately 53 percent of energy consumed by the EU is imported.


The concept of energy security is understood by the EU as composed of three dimensions - dependency, limited unified and integrated European energy market, and search of new sources of energy. These three dimensions underline the challenge to ensure that decisions on the composition energy mix are a national prerogative, while continuing to integrate at the European level energy policies related to infrastructures, solidarity, politics and energy market. Energy policies in the EU are another complex policy area wherein national prerogatives need to align with a common European internal and external energy policies in order to address the short and long term challenges related to energy, environment and foreign affairs. There is a clear dilemma on the development of new energy policies addressing the challenge between market and geopolitics.

This article reflects on two aspects - first, the energy status of the Union and its geopolitical complexities, and second, the current policies implemented by the EU seeking to combine economic growth, sustainability and leading the global fight against climate change.

European Energy Mix in a Global Context

Despite the lingering Eurozone crisis and the recent Brexit, the EU remains the largest economic block in the world, before the US and China. However, the ongoing slow economic situation of the EU is affecting the vitality of the industrial production of Europe. Compared to the US, China and the rest of Asia, the EU-28 overall energy consumption is well below (Figure 1) the ones

Figure 1: World Consumption of Energy per Region in 2013



Source: European Commission. 2015. "EU Energy in Figures. Statistical Pocketbook." p.14


of China and the US.

One of the reasons is the type of industries in Europe contributing to the

overall production. They tend to be more energy efficient than in other regions of the world. In addition, the sector of services tends to be more preeminent than conventional industrial sectors more present in China and Asia.

In comparison with other global economic powers, like the US and China, the EU is the region with the lower level of energy production. With 5.8 percent in 2013, the EU is well behind the US with 12.8 percent and China with 19.2 percent (figure 2). One of the reasons is the ratio of energy imports from neighbouring regions such as Russia, North Africa, and the Gulf states.


Figure 2: World Production of Energy per Region in 2013



Source: European Commission. 2015. "EU Energy in Figures. Statistical Pocketbook." p.10

Considering the composition of the energy mix imported by the EU-28, the European energy market is structured around imports composed of crude oil, solid fuels and natural gas, and internal energy production of nuclear energy, and renewables. 58 percent of energy imports are petroleum and 28 percent are gas; 86 percent of energy imported is composed of hydrocarbons (figure 3).


Figure 3: Net Imports by Fuels for EU-28 (2013)



Source: European Commission. 2015. "EU Energy in Figures. Statistical Pocketbook." p.39

As demonstrated in the figure below (Figure 4), EU energy dependency has continuously increased in the last 25 years. The share of gases and petroleum fuels has not declined overtime. The low decline beginning in 2007 peaking in 2010 represents the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the economic engine of the EU-28. With an economic slowdown, the imports of energy ultimately declined explaining a lower level of energy consumption.

Figure 3: Net Imports by Fuels for EU-28 (2013)



Source: European Commission. DG Energy. 2016. "Energy Statistics. Energy Datasheets: EU-28 countries." Updated on July 6

These figures demonstrate the high degree and increasing dependency of the EU-28 on foreign energy. The EU is ultimately in a peculiar situation wherein a lack of diversification on its energy mix and exporters threatens the uneconomic growth and overall production and maintenance of European standard of living.

Geopolitical Realities


With a considerable dependence on foreign energy, the EU is by default at the mercy of geopolitical shifts. Most of the EU main exporters are Russia, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Norway, the United States, Qatar, to name the largest. In the last decade, most of these countries have been impacted by serious crises. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been quite unstable since 2010 with the beginning of the Arab Spring and Russia has become a much more aggressive neighbour with imperialist desire under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. The EU is, in fact, surrounded by what has been described as a ring of fire due to complex regional instabilities.

With the power vacuum left after the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States causing considerable regional instabilities in Syria and Libya, non-state actors have caused considerable uncertainties affecting the production of energy and its transportation. In terms of quantity, two powers ought to be analysed - Russia and the United States.

Since the 1990s, Russia has been EU largest energy exporter especially for gas. With the rise of Vladimir Putin at the helm of the Russian state in 2000, gas has been utilised as a weapon. Energy is one of the instruments of Russian

foreign policy contributing to expanding Russian sphere of influence as well as pressing Europeans.

Figure 5: Energy Imports from Russia to EU-28 (2004-2014)



Source: Eurostat. 2016. "Energy Production and Imports"

Figure 5 demonstrates the high level of dependence of the EU-28 on Russian hydrocarbons highlighting that throughout the last decade, 1/3rd of solid fuels, 1/3rd of crude oil and 40 percent of natural gas come from Russia. Russia leads every category of exports per type of fuels. In solid fuels, Columbia (around 20%) and the United States (around 20%) follow. For crude oil, the next exporters are Norway (around 12%), Nigeria (around 8%) and Saudi Arabia (around 8%). And for natural gas, Norway (around 30%), Algeria (around 12%) and Qatar (around 7%) ensue. Clearly the data demonstrates the centrality of Russian hydrocarbons to guaranteeing the flow of energy, fuelling one of the largest global economic engines.

Russia has been increasing its sphere of influence by using his hydrocarbons in order to destabilise its direct neighbours, which are neither EU nor NATO members. This has been the case of Ukraine, a transit state, which has seen in 2006 and 2009 the flow of gas being cut off for political reasons. From the EU-28, the lack of unity and cohesive policy in interacting with Moscow has been one of the core weaknesses. Some EU Member States such as Germany, Italy, Poland, and France are highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and have signed bilateral agreements with Russia. Germany recently concluded and opened the Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. While others like the United Kingdom have been seeking for a tougher line, many see the opening of Nord Stream 2 has a setback for cohesive EU energy policy towards Russia.

"Under normal conditions, pipelines are of commercial nature," argued a EU diplomat in an article published by Reuters in 2015, "but in Russia's case, it is not just commerce, it implies a huge geopolitical dimension." Thus, the EU Member States have been divided on the way to sanction Russia for its military intervention in the region (Ukraine and Crimea). The fact that powerful Member States such as Germany and Italy continue to increase their energy



dependency on Russia undermine some other EU initiatives in the realm of security and diplomacy.

Even if the invasion and annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine are not directly related to energetic relations between the EU and Russia, both cases illustrate the inabilities of the EU-28 to agree on a common position in dealing with Russia clearly demonstrated a lack of political will by most national capitals.

The second major factor concerns the US with the Shale Revolution and the boost of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). In recent years, a revolution has taken place in the United States thanks to recent technological breakthrough (hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling). Shale gas has become cheaper to produce at a large scale. The Shale gas revolution is affecting the global market of LNG, especially in Europe.

The US Department of Energy projects that by 2035, 45 percent of US gas supply will come from Shale gas. This considerable boost of production is already having several consequences - reduce American imports of energy, contribute to transforming the US as a net exporter of natural gas, and ultimately changing the global energy power dynamics. The increase of American LNG in the European market may impact the power and influence of Gazprom, Russian state energy company, and producers from North Africa and the Middle East.

EU's Commitment to a Green Future and Economic Transition

The EU has a long history of commitment towards achieving a long term goal towards curbing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG). The Kyoto Protocol is to some extent the benchmark. For the EU, there is a direct connection between energy and environment. Energy security, as previously developed, consists on the security of supply for the EU, but within the complex concept of energy security, climate change ought to be incorporated. Now in the case of the EU,

energy policies take place at the EU and national levels. Each of the EU member states may agree with the environmental policies implemented at the EU level, however, this does not always translate into their incorporations domestically.


In 2007, the European Council presented a strategy to prepare the EU for the future, known as the 2020 targets. By 2020, the EU is committed to have made a reduction by at least 20 percent in GHG emissions based on 1990 levels, increased by 20 percent the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in energy consumptions, and improved by 20 percent its energy efficiency.

In Search of a Green Production and Growth

In parallel to geopolitical realities, the EU has made a commitment to decrease its GHGs without impacting the economic growth of the economic bloc. In order to decrease GHG, European countries have underlined the need to develop greener ways to produce energy. In terms of low GHG emissions, nuclear energy has proven to be a reliable model. However, the 2011 crisis at the Fukushima power plant in Japan brought back the debate on nuclear energy between environmental security and reliable source of energy with no GHG emissions. For instance, Chancellor Merkel made a commitment to transform Germany into a nuclear free country by 2022. However, other countries such as France have made a political commitment to their civilian nuclear powers and will not scale down in the years to come. Since the 1990s, the share of nuclear energy into the French energy mix represents roughly 75 percent of gross national electricity production. Despite commitment to become a nuclear free country, Germany does not have any objections to importing nuclear energy from France.

The second option is the emphasis on Renewable Energy Sources (RES) counting hydropower, wind energy, solar thermal, solar photovoltaic energy, bio-fuels and waste among others. The RES mix has considerably increased in the proportion of gross inland consumption.

Figure 6: Growth Electricity Generation (%) in the EU-28 (1990-2014)



Source: European Commission. DG Energy. 2016. "Energy Statistics. Energy Datasheets: EU-28 countries." Updated on July 6

As illustrated above (Figure 6), the growth electricity generation in the EU-28 has seen a decline in most of conventional sources of energy, but saw a considerable increase through RES. RES have experienced an increase by 17 percentage points in the last 25 years. However, the use of solid fuels, which include coal, remain considerably high. Poland is a large exporter and producer of coal and Germany has increased the amount of its share of electricity produced by coal since the Fukushima nuclear accident.

Looking inside the line of RES (Figure 6), the largest producers within the EU-28 of electricity by RES in 2014 were Belgium (18.4%), Denmark (55.9%), Germany (26.8%), Ireland (25.3%), Spain (40.9%), Croatia (74.2%), Italy (43.7%), Latvia (54.5%), Lithuania (50%), Luxembourg (49.2%), Austria (82.2%), Portugal (61.4%), and Sweden (55.9%, but 42.2% comes from nuclear).

Several powerful EU member states - France, Finland, the Netherlands, the UK and Poland - are not part of group. The Netherlands has 11.3 percent of its electricity based on RES, and 52.7 percent from gases. 81.4 percent of Polish

electricity is being produced by solid fuels, meaning coal; only 12.8 percent comes from RES. Finland has a more balanced source of electricity with 34.6 percent from nuclear and 38.6 percent from RES. The UK produces its electricity principally with solid fuels (29.8%) and petroleum (30%). Only 19.9 percent of its electricity comes from RES. France only produces 17.2 percent of its electricity based on RES, as over 75 percent of it is being produced by nuclear energy. These renewable energy sources require serious financial assistance from the European Union and national governments.

From Copenhagen to Paris

The Pew Research Center produced much research on the question of climate change. However, in a report published in April 2016, Europeans, at 85 percent, are with citizens of Latin American the most concerned about the negative impacts of climate change. Inside this 85 percent, Italy (90%), Spain (88%), France (87%) and Germany (84%) are the most concerned of Europe. The United States is one of the least concerned globally with only 69 percent. The popular commitment to addressing climate change was reflected by the desires of EU member states to agree to a common global agreement on addressing climate change.

With the Paris agreement of the COP-21, an annual meeting of the parties that are signatories of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in December 2015, the EU has made some new commitment beyond 2020. The targets sought to be attained by 2030 are to cut by 40 percent its GHG emissions (compared to 1990 levels), meeting a 27 percent share of renewable energy consumption, and seeing a 27 percent energy savings. The overall goal of the COP-21 is implementation of targets at the global level keeping temperature below an increase of 1.5 degrees celsius. The COP-21 represented in some way the validation that Europeans perceived themselves as the 'moral leader' in the fight against climate change. The COP-21 was an important moment for EU member states to demonstrate unity after the failed 2009 Copenhagen meeting exposing lack of European unity, rise of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and indecisiveness of the United States.

At the time of the preparation of the COP-21, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic body of the EU, initiated a climate diplomacy action plan. Such an initiative sought to promote and advocate for a legally binding international agreement at the end of the Paris talks.





At the time of the preparation of the COP-21, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic body of the EU, initiated a climate diplomacy action plan. Such an initiative sought to promote and advocate for a legally binding international agreement at the end of the Paris talks. Since the summer of 2015 wherein the EEAS committed to continue working with the Commission on revitalising EU energy and climate diplomacy, engaging with third country partners and promoting the development of global energy architecture, the EU from a foreign policy angle has remained silent.

The Development of Internal Market

Regarding internal energy market, the EU understands it as per a 2014 official document from the European Commission as being 'affordable and competitively priced, environmentally sustainable and secure for everybody.' This approach ultimately requires a more integrated internal market. Several policies have been ultimately about development. One of them, pushed by the Commission, aims to reform the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), push for greater diversification of supply, and greater coherence on energy policies within the EU.

The ETS is one of the instruments developed by the Commission to curb GHG emissions without affecting the economic growth. It entails in giving companies producing large amounts of carbon dioxide an allowable amount of carbon emissions, known as credits. Companies that produce less carbon dioxide will ultimately have more credits that they will be able to sell on the carbon market. It untimely pushes companies to make their production greener. Unfortunately, the oversupply of allowances and continuous low prices of carbon credits have not made the ETS a highly successful instrument. In order to reform the ETS, the Commission and Parliament introduced in 2014 a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) permitting to address the weaknesses of the carbon market by absorbing surplus allowances. Regardless of different initiatives, the push by the Commission has limited success.

According to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, EU's energy policy aims at four priorities - ensuring the functioning of the energy market; ensuring the security of energy supply in the Union; promoting energy efficiency and renewable forms of energy; and promoting greater interconnection of energy networks. The proposed Energy Union seeks to address the three challenges of security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. The implementation and development of the Energy Union consists on the development of an internal energy market. This internal market entails rules promoted by the Commission in order to facilitate energy trade within the EU-28 and a better integrated electricity market fuelled by renewable energy producers. This requires the development of energy infrastructure requiring funding at national and European level.

A 21st Century Green Power?

With these global and internal energy initiatives, where does the EU stand in the coming years and decades? As agreed at the end of the COP-21, politically interpreted as a global success, the EU wants to cut its GHG emissions by 20

percent by 2020 and by 40 percent by 2030. In the post-Paris world, the EU is confronted to several issues - security, solidarity and vision.

The first question of security is a reality. Since the summer of 2015, the EU has been facing a real humanitarian crisis seeing a massive influx of refugees from Syria, Libya, Eritrea, among others. The refugee crisis has contributed to the rise of populist parties already seeing their climb since the Eurozone crisis. In this climate of tensions, a series of attacks conducted by self-proclaimed Islamic State fighters killing civilians in France, Germany and Belgium have altered the priorities of European citizens and their governments. If the attacks and the refugee crisis cannot be directly linked, populist parties have been quick on connecting them. The perceived climate of insecurity in Europe is changing the strategic vision of the EU-28 and climate change has simply been one of the main victims.

Second, hard security is at the heart of the debate in Europe. The concept of solidarity is quite interesting as it raises the question of capital support of the European public opinion in order to address and implement cohesive energetic policies. In one of the last polls conducted by the European Commission's Euro barometer on the theme of energy back in 2007, the public responded positively to the need to harmonise energy policies through measure agreed at the EU level (62% in favour at the EU-27) against 32 percent in favour of measures at the national level. In case of shortage of gas and oil, 79 percent of the respondents at the EU-27 were in favour of assisting the affected member states to rely on other members' reserves. This sense of solidarity at the European level could provide the popular support required by the 28 capitals and Brussels in order to harmonise the energetic policies. However, domestic politics tend to trump European solidarity.

Last but not least, the EU is considered as one of the leaders in fighting climate change and 'greening' its economy. However, the EU has demonstrated since the 1990s its inability to bridge the gap between a strategy and its implementation. One of the challenges is the multi-layered energy policy at the national and European levels and the multitude of players from private corporations to national government to the Commission and other EU institutions. The strategic thinking behind an integrated and cohesive energetic policy within the EU and a common energy and climate diplomacy need to be clearly articulated and defended at regional and global levels. The US seems to be inclined to follow the Europeans for a global deal and worked on bilateral basis with China on curbing GHG emissions. Maybe it is one battle that the EU can undertake and lead using the global capital accumulated after the 2015 Paris climate deal. The EU, as a global player, has framed itself as a promoter of a rules-based global order through the use of multilateralism. The newly implemented European strategy informed by 'principled pragmatism' should be at good use in order to develop global consent and commitment for this common challenge.

The writer is Associate Director of the European Union Center at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He recently published a manuscript titled 'Debating European Defense and Security Policy. Understanding the Complexity.'



GIFT-BASKET DIPLOMACY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY

BY DR RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN



The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) concluded in Washington DC on April 1, 2016. Despite the somewhat non-enthusiastic beginning to the NSS process, it brought together a significant number of countries by the end of it in 2016. The process gained traction for a couple of different reasons. For one, more than 50 leaders from around the world took part in these summits, and this at the very least raised the issue to the forefront and led to greater awareness. Two, the NSS forced fresh thinking, particularly on the part of the established nuclear powers, on nuclear security, potentially dealing with issues such as insider threat, complacency and sabotage.

It is important to note this, despite best measures being in place, complacency has been a serious challenge. The 2012 incident at the Y-12 nuclear weapons facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee is a reflection of this challenge. The incident involved the case of an 82-year old nun, an anti-nuclear protester, breaking into the US government facility with weapons-grade uranium.

Even as governments understand and appreciate the importance of the old and new challenges in the nuclear security domain, they have not been able to convert their understanding into lasting commitments. This has been so because there has been a larger problem in great power politics - lack of consensus. The crisis in decision-making at the highest level among the major power has been a big stumbling block in realising a nuclear security regime.

This lack of consensus at the global arms control fora has given way to initiatives such as the 'Gift Basket'. Gift-Basket Diplomacy, simply put, is a new way of conducting multilateral negotiations, focusing on the least common denominator and aiming at making progress on a particular issue, without having to worry about consensus. One or more countries can propose an action or make a statement to undertake a series of measures unilaterally, in this case, on various aspects of nuclear security. The 'Gift Basket', thus, refers to 'gifts' of unilateral commitments to actions made by state parties.

The US initiated the process of Gift-Basket Diplomacy at the NSS 2012 held in Seoul. The process started after the Washington NSS in 2010 and in the run up to the second NSS, wherein the idea of gift baskets was discussed at the Sherpas meetings in 2011 and 2012. The objective of this exercise was to get countries in smaller groups to come together and pledge on a set of policy measures at the NSS 2012, which was thought to be far better an arrangement to the watered down communiqué that may be signed on by every participating country. It was felt that finding an agreement among a smaller group of nations may be far more effective than a summit communiqué that may not be agreeable to every single party. This resulted in more than 30 countries agreeing to 14 Gift-Basket diplomatic initiatives at the NSS 2012 in Seoul. These have included statements on physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear security regulation, insider threats, counter-nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism preparedness and response, nuclear training and support centres, among others.

India and Gift-Basket Diplomacy

Although India has attached significant importance to nuclear security and the NSS process (with the Indian prime minister attending three of the summits), it was not particularly enthused by the Gift-Basket Diplomacy

effort until recently. Nevertheless, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the establishment of a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) at the first Summit in Washington DC. GCNEP remains an important Indian initiative and it encompasses a holistic outlook to nuclear security through five schools under it: i) advanced nuclear energy systems; ii) nuclear security; iii) radiological safety; iv) nuclear material characterisation; and v) applications of radioisotopes and radiation technologies. GCNEP has also international collaboration as a key component in taking the nuclear security efforts forward – its engagements with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US, France, Russia and UK are noteworthy. Even as its full-fledged campus is being developed, GCNEP has held more than 30 international and regional programmes with participation of more than 30 countries. Key themes such as insider threat, vulnerability assessment, transportation security, and cyber security have been taken up in these programmes.

However, India had not joined any 'gift basket' effort until the last NSS in Washington DC in 2016. The Indian decision to join the 'gift-basket' initiative is beneficial in several ways. As the final NSS began, Amandeep Singh Gill, Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs) briefed the media that India had decided to join some gift baskets "in priority areas of counter-nuclear smuggling, the sharing of best practices through centres of excellence such as our own GCNEP, and finally the follow-up to the NSS decisions through a contact group in Vienna." This is in addition to another critical step by India to join and endorse IAEA's INFCIRC/869. INFCIRC/869, the joint statement of the previous Co-Chairs of the previous three summits, is the key in enhancing nuclear security implementation. This is important because it commits countries, which endorse INFCIRC/869, to support the IAEA's INFCIRC225/Rev.52 on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated facilities³, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources⁴, security of nuclear and radioactive material outside regulatory control⁵. These steps not only remain important from a global nuclear diplomacy perspective, but they also enhance India's own policies and practices in this regard.

The Need for a Dedicated Effort

Threat of nuclear and radiological materials has been around since the end of the Cold War, with fears of Soviet nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the issue gained certain centrality in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US with fears of terrorists possibly acquiring such material. A quick glance of some numbers illustrates the seriousness of the threat. As per the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), a total of 2,889 incidents of theft and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials were reported to the Agency between January 1993 and December 2015. This has reinforced the efforts at the global level to strengthen some of the existing mechanisms or write new rules and thereby strengthen nuclear security. The four Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) held so far is a reflection of the strengthened efforts in this regard. However, the formal NSS process has come to an end although the renewed attention needs to be continued if nuclear security is to be dealt with in an effective manner.



The Gift-Basket initiative, it must be noted that the whole process came into play in the first place because developing consensus was turning out to be a huge challenge. The fact that the Gift-Basket initiative is gaining greater traction and more countries are joining the process indicates that there is merit in continuing with it.



There are certain informal measures being conceived at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) level and also there are efforts by certain civil society groups that are taking up the cause of nuclear security. However, nuclear security is too important an area to be left to ad hoc measures such as this. The IAEA effort could be further expanded and streamlined to bring in participation of all the different stakeholders, the nuclear industry for instance. The NSS process, for instance, had two side events – an industry and an expert/civil society/academia gathering. Building a civil society and industry coalition has been significant for a couple of reasons. These two events added major impetus to the broad conversation on nuclear security, in addition to expanding the number of stakeholders that will push for a pro-active agenda in the area.⁶ These efforts must be welcomed as they also bring a new perspective and help break some of the stalemates in the larger nuclear debate.

However, it must be acknowledged that nuclear security debate per se has seen far greater convergence among big powers as compared to several other global security issues. Several factors have possibly contributed to this. One, even as the Obama Administration has taken a backseat on a number of global issues, the US leadership in the area of nuclear security has been critical. Its role in shepherding the NSS process has led to a fresh focus on the subject. It is unclear whether the next US administration will continue with such a focus after it comes into office. Two, nuclear security has remained an area that affects every single state even those who have tended to perpetrate terrorism because terrorists getting hold of such material will prove costly for all. Three, nuclear security is generally seen as [an] area that is not specifically targeted at a state; rather the focus is on non-state actors, particularly terrorists gaining access to these materials. Thus, given that no particular state has been the target of the global efforts, it has been generally easier to garner support for the NSS and whatever form it may take in the future.

While the Gift-Basket Diplomacy has seen many different countries taking initiative at the individual or at a collective levels, there have been varying perspectives on the initiative. Some states, for instance, believe that the idea of 'gift basket' is hijacking the entire consensus building process, thus not paying heed to some of the fundamental problems in the great power relations. It is important that a way be found to address these issues because they have come in the way of tackling international security and arms control questions. Two, many countries have been critical of the Gift-Basket Diplomacy as an effort by a smaller number of countries to the exclusion of others. These countries, for instance, argue that a diplomatic statement when it is being prepared by a particular country could be circulated to a larger number of countries to see if others want to join or not. The current process is one country or a few countries come together to make a statement on a particular issue and a few other like-minded countries possibly join in.

Even as there are certain setbacks to the Gift-Basket initiative, it must be noted that the whole process came into play in the first place because developing consensus was turning out to be a huge challenge. The fact that the Gift-Basket initiative is gaining greater traction and more countries are joining the process indicates that there is merit in continuing with it. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that other more binding and all-inclusive measures be given up - in fact, every effort must be made to pursue those measures but in the meantime, start with steps that are seen as least common denominators and then expand the base of support.

It must also be noted that the only binding mechanism on the physical protection of nuclear materials - the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force in April 2016. This fills a huge void in strengthening nuclear security efforts in the legal realm. Thus, given the enormity of the threat of nuclear materials, nuclear security is an area that needs to be pursued through multiple means. The formal NSS process may be over but the review and updating of the institutional, legal and regulatory mechanisms guiding nuclear security have to continue, something that has seen support across the board.

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3. <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8616/Nuclear-Security-Recommendations-on-Radioactive-Material-and-Associated-Facilities>
4. <http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/radiation-safety/code-of-conduct.asp>
5. <http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8622/Nuclear-Security-Recommendations-on-Nuclear-and-Other-Radioactive-Material-out-of-Regulatory-Control>
6. *Pro-activism or an activist agenda is seen with a critical eye by some states but overall, they have added value to the nuclear security cause.*

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PARTNER FOR INCLUSIVE GRO



Finchaa Sugar Factory, Ethiopia



Tendaho Sugar Factory, Ethiopia



Chalinze Water Treatment Plant, Tanzania



Electrification Project, Burkina Faso



Proposed OIA Industrial Park at Delhi NCR

At: Chhata Barsana Road, District Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India

After a successful decade of conceptualising and executing state-of-the-art infrastructure projects in Africa, OIA, as part of its diversification plans in India, is proposing to develop an Industrial Park at Delhi NCR. The 260-acre industrial land parcel located approximately 100 km from New Delhi with excellent road and rail connectivity, is a golden opportunity for companies who are keen to set up manufacturing facilities in India, as part of the 'Make In India' initiative.

This fully developed land parcel provides full-fledged infrastructure facilities such as DG Stand Power Plant, Natural Gas, Water, Dry & Liquid Warehousing, Effluent Treatment Plant and internal roads, amongst other facilities. The proposed site is ideally suitable for a manufacturing project that needs proximity to the Delhi NCR market.

Project Connectivity & Prospects:

- ✓ Access to Indian Railways with an option of railway siding.
- ✓ Proximity to proposed mega infra projects like Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), Kundli Manesar Palwal (Western Peripheral Corridor), North South Railway Corridor (DFC), Yamuna Expressway and Jewar Airport.
- ✓ Access to a huge consumer market of Delhi NCR and five North Indian states
- ✓ Proximity to the Indian Oil Corporation and Mathura Refinery
- ✓ Located in a prosperous agriculture belt with ready availability of raw materials
- ✓ "Ready to move in" infrastructure and developed internal roads
- ✓ Laboratory and office buildings
- ✓ Hand holding support to facilitate statutory and administrative compliances.

As per a feasibility study undertaken, the land parcel is highly recommended for five sectors: Food and Beverages, Chemical and Chemical Products, Electronics, Logistics and Warehousing, Machinery and Equipment.

WTH OF EMERGING ECONOMIES



Rural Electrification Project,
Niassa, Mozambique



OIA India Eye Care Centre,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



Electricity Access Scale-up and Sector Wide Approach
(SWAP) Development Project (EASSDP), Rwanda



18-Megawatt heavy fuel oil thermal power project,
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GREEN DIPLOMACY

INDIA AND THE NEW DYNAMICS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE TALKS

BY BALAZS UJVARI



The 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - held in Paris at the end of 2015 - marked a watershed in the two-decade long history of the UNFCCC process. While climate negotiations are still about preserving the environment and minimising economic losses while doing so, their modus operandi has changed over the years. Long gone are the days of Kyoto-style agreements seeking to bring all UNFCCC parties under a set of legally binding national target. Since COP15 in Copenhagen (2009), where efforts to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 resulted in definitive failure, the tone of climate negotiations has profoundly changed.

Although the Copenhagen Accord proved short-lived, COP15 did serve as a stepping stone to an overhaul of the UNFCCC process launched at COP17 in Durban (2011). At this conference, parties converged on three key points. First, it was decided that a new set of negotiations would be launched in order to develop a new regime with legal force by autumn 2015 in Paris; to that end, an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was established and mandated to produce this new convention. Second, largely due to the insistence of developing countries, parties were called to make national voluntary 'contributions', rather than 'commitments', to the fight against climate change.

Third, a two-step process was agreed upon, according to which nations were to reveal their intended contributions by March 31, 2015, leaving time for a scientific assessment of whether such efforts would suffice to realise the overarching goal - holding global temperature rise 'below 2°C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels'.

If the tone and language of UNFCCC negotiations has considerably changed since the first COP in Berlin in 1995, one thing has remained the same - the central importance of negotiating blocs. Among the major blocs in the process is now the BASIC, formed at the 2009 Copenhagen conference, including the world's first and third largest greenhouse gas emitters - China and India - together with Brazil and South Africa. In spite of their widely differing interests, the members of the group have successfully prolonged their cooperation on climate change. As a result, the Chinese delegate, for example, acted as a spokesperson for the BASICs when opening speeches were delivered in Durban (COP17).

The emergence of the BASIC as a key group in climate negotiations is in line with the emerging powers - notably China and India's quest for increased influence in multilateral policy-making, reflecting also a shifting balance of economic power particularly in the past two decades. Notably, the EU-28's share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had dropped from 23 percent in 2003 (in terms of purchasing power parity) to just 16.9 percent by 2015. By the same year, the share of China and India, for example, has risen from 8.9 and 4.6 percent in 2003 to 17.2 and 7.1 percent respectively.

Global governance structures have, however, largely failed to mirror these developments. While multilateral bodies have also been plagued by repeated calls for a multipolar system, by the daunting legacy of flawed policy approaches, frequent deadlocks on politically sensitive issues, shrinking budget, and the very limited involvement of civil society, these issues have all been dwarfed by the criticism provoked by legitimacy issues. Despite a handful of

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institutional reforms implemented in favour of emerging powers in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis (inclusion of all G20 members in the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; shifting 6 percent of voting rights from developed to emerging and developing countries in the International Monetary Fund), global governance structures remain overall dominated by the United States, Europe and Japan.

Until recently, emerging powers' action in multilateral structures were mainly driven by the desire to water down or derail robust proposals backed by developed countries (especially the European Union). In the past two years, however, the emerging powers have gradually shifted their emphasis from passively obstructing to proactively shaping the multilateral system informed by their own multilateral agenda. The most prominent consequence of this shift is the rise of parallel multilateral structures, demonstrating emerging powers' dissatisfaction with being in the passenger seat of global governance.

The first concrete outcome of this dynamic is the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) by the five BRICS countries. With the BRICS leaders signing the Agreement on the New Development Bank on July 15, 2014, the BRICS format finally acquired institutional qualities. Having been ratified by all BRICS parliaments, the agreement entered into force in July 2015, coinciding with the inaugural meeting of its Board of Governors on July 7 in Moscow and the 7th BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia on July 8-9. After its election by the Board of Governors in July 2015, the bank's Board of Directors was convened for the first time in January 2016 and went on to approve a significant number of policies and procedures for all functional areas of the institution. The next important step in the bank's establishment consisted of the finalisation of its headquarters agreement with the Chinese government and the city of Shanghai on February 27, 2016. The NDB's first regional office will be in South Africa, and is led by former ICICI Bank Managing Director K. V. Kamath (India). The BRICS-led institution is the first MDB since the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1991. It aims to 'mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries' through the provision of loans, guarantees, technical assistance and equity investment.

The NDB responds to the widely shared recognition that the existing set of financial schemes are inadequate to meet investment needs in infrastructure projects - a central pillar of development from the perspective of most developing countries. The institution has been heralded as complementary to the traditional multilateral and bilateral donors that have largely neglected this aspect of development finance despite repeated calls from beneficiary countries.

In spite of G20 leaders' pledge to address infrastructure needs at the Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010, neither the Cannes Summit in 2011 nor the Los Cabos Summit in 2012 led to further commitments in this regard. As a result, when developing country leaders turn to the World Bank for support with economic infrastructure (energy, transportation, telecommunication, etc) development in the spirit of the Seoul G20 summit instructions, they continue to face difficulties in obtaining finances for such purposes, despite some recent increase in financing. The NDB is expected to help reduce this gap by specialising in the provision of hard infrastructure finance, and thus help improve physical connections in and between developing countries.

Defying critics initially suspecting the NDB's involvement with polluting infrastructure projects (e.g. coal-fired power plants), the NDB has clearly upped the emphasis on green projects in recent months. The first batch of loans approved by the New Development Bank (NDB) for renewable energy projects is a clear sign that the bank indeed seeks to live up to its mandate and act in a sustainable fashion when financing infrastructure projects.

Clearly, faced with an increasing appetite from key emerging powers such as India to play a proactive role in the resolution of global issues like climate change, an agreement between the United States, the EU and Japan will not suffice any more. Rather than expecting that the rest of the world falls in line with their negotiating position, Western actors will increasingly have to gain insights into and grasp reasons behind alternative negotiating positions of emerging powers. However, doing so is only part of the job. This must be followed by a proper outreach. To that effect, the EU's preparation for multilateral talks, for example, will need to be restructured in such a way that less time is spent on internal pondering and more on outreach.

In the short term, actors such as the EU will increasingly mobilise its diplomatic presences (including those of the member states) located 'in country' in an attempt to leverage third country positions and even deploy the HR/VP on select occasions. In this regard, the Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) could be seen as a flagship initiative. The network builds on the idea of combining the strength of EU and member state delegations in countries such as Brazil, China, or India so as to jointly influence the position of their host nation on environmental issues. In the long-term, the EU may also use its strategic partnerships to transmit EU values to partner countries with a view to clearing a path for cooperation on the world stage.

India ratified the COP21 protocol on October 2, 2016 and will be inevitably a central actor around the table where international efforts to mitigate global warming are discussed. Being the 4th largest CO2 emitter after China, the United States and the EU, India is still facing underdevelopment in several parts of the country. How the nation's development objectives (e.g. bringing electricity to all of its citizens cheaply) can be reconciled with its climate commitments (e.g. avoiding coal-based electricity generation to the largest extent possible) is an issue Indian policy-makers will have to look at closely. Initiatives such as the BRICS-centred NDB with its focus on green projects may represent part of the solution. The world will be watching.

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THE EVOLVING NATURE OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

BY ROBERTO CORDON AND TREVOR HERDEN



Diplomacy has a long history as one of the earliest elements of international relations. Representatives of political entities have engaged in bilateral discussions since the dawn of conflict. Yet, multilateral diplomacy has only been practiced formally in the relatively recent past, with the Congress of Vienna acting as a 'watershed' moment.

In addition to codifying many elements of the diplomatic process as we know today, the Congress of Vienna also began an era of multilateral diplomacy, which complemented the then dominant paradigm of bilateral diplomacy. The confluence of diplomats from all corners of Europe on the Viennese palaces with varying and sometimes overlapping interests fostered a complex, country-to-country, yet multi-level diplomacy to an extent that had not been experienced before. Hence, multilateral diplomacy was born and over the ensuing two centuries, became a specialty within the field. In contrast to the bilateral diplomat, who is expected to have comprehensive expertise of a particular country or region, the multilateral diplomat is expected to be able to juggle various, often unrelated issues at once.

This paper explores the eras of multilateral diplomacy in its formation, explosion and reinvention of the past 200 years, and argues that multilateralism is evolving to a new form that draws again from its bilateral origins. To some extent, multilateral diplomacy has become a victim of its own success and the systems that underpinned it.

Multilateralism and the Collective Goods

What are we talking about? Multilateral diplomacy should foremost be understood as the interaction of multiple state actors to achieve a goal. Mostly, this results in multilateral discussions facilitated in international organs. In this colloquial way, multilateral discussions have many participants, who are attempting to achieve a global, collective good. Whether crafting and voting on a peace intervention resolution at the UN General Assembly or negotiating trade and tariffs at the WTO, the outcome is one that could not be achieved by any individual state.

The benefits of multilateralism are numerous, including an effort to integrate concerns of participating states, as well as increased knowledge sharing, with more efficiency as states are not required to negotiate multiple times over with one another and may instead simply participate in a single treaty. This approach should be considered then in opposition to bi- or tri-lateral 'small group' discussions. Myriad advantages apply to such smaller negotiations, such as relative speed, as well as more clear statements of interests and goals for the actors involved.

Congressional Multilateralism

The Congress of Vienna from 1814-1815 was relatively informal and led by the powerful Austrian Foreign Minister, Klemens von Metternich, together with noble representatives of the other victors of the Napoleonic Wars. As such, this version of multilateralism is a far cry from later iterations, where members of a foreign service, rather than simply powerful individuals, took a leading role.

The Congress suffered from a number of issues that made 'true' multilateralism impossible. First, the undemocratic nature of the proceedings meant that decisions were more imposed by the powerful actors unilaterally

The benefits of multilateralism are numerous, including an effort to integrate concerns of participating states, as well as increased knowledge sharing, with more efficiency as states are not required to negotiate multiple times over with one another and may instead simply participate in a single treaty.



than agreed upon in multilateral discussions. Second, the weakness of communication technologies created significant lag time for those diplomats actually attending the Congress. Some monarchs, such as Denmark's King Fredrick VI, actually came themselves to Vienna so that they could stay informed of developments and act without delay.

Still, the Vienna Congress was only a spark and it failed to significantly impact the inter-state relations of 19th Century Europe. The great spark that would take multilateral diplomacy to the forefront of international politics came in the early 20th Century, with the establishment the first truly multilateral international organisation, the League of Nations.

A Good Idea with Poor Implementation

As the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations came about during the negotiations at the end of WW I. It was intended to be the great bastion of multilateral discussion that would avoid any repetition of the so-called 'Great War'. While any student of 20th Century diplomatic history would point out the failure of that attempt, the League still maintains an important role as a symbol of multilateral diplomacy. The diplomats at the League were able to juggle unrelated, competing or overlapping issues in the same forum. Advances in communications aided diplomats significantly in receiving mandates from their home governments with short delay, rather than weeks or more for the diplomats at the Vienna Congress.

Still, the League of Nations faced many institutional problems in its operation. Abandoned by its leading proponent, the USA, and consumed by gridlock and mutually exclusive desires, the League was unable to achieve much of what it had been created to do. The effort to consider the views of all member states kept it from truly achieving much worth writing about. It would instead take a global horror at the scale of WW II to prompt changes to the diplomatic paradigm that would set multilateral discussions as plainly necessary and the best possible choice when working in international discussions.

Making Multilateralism Work

After WW II, there was an explosive growth of multilateralism. This was assisted not just by the creation of the United Nations in 1945, but the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. Together, these three institutions were created to provide global public goods such as peace-keeping, development and financial stability, to prevent another terrible world war. These institutions worked because of several factors - ease of communication, as well as the dominant political situations of the day. By 1945, telephones could be used to make transatlantic calls and daily news could be transmitted across the globe within hours of its occurrence. By allowing more information to reach diplomats sooner, multilateral diplomacy was aided in its ability to make decisions and broker deals knowing that there would be full support of home governments.

After WW II, there was also a proliferation of new sovereign states. These states, however, by and large did not take on important roles in the international system. New states in Africa, for example, largely became part of the international system only as far as they related to the struggle of the Cold War. Aid from the West or East served to keep many newly-independent countries politically in-line. Therefore, the true number of countries that carried a strong voice in multilateral discussions could remain relatively small.

Still, the importance of multilateral diplomacy should not be measured in the success of the UN alone, but also in the proliferation of trade. As rounds of the GATT - and later, WTO - indicate, early multilateral trade negotiations were rather efficient. The first round of GATT negotiation, the Geneva Round in 1947, lasted only 7 months with 23 countries represented. These agreements dealt with billions of dollars' worth of trade.

Throughout the end of the Cold War in particular, multilateral diplomacy experienced continued growth. There was a proliferation of multilateral treaties of all types in the 1970s and 1980s. The multilateral negotiations of the mid-20th century were greatly assisted by technological improvements, but they were also complicated by those same factors, as discussions included many more parties and issues became more nuanced. Still, during this period, perhaps assisted by the political dynamics of the Cold War, multilateral diplomacy maintained its central place in the tools of international politics. Peace-keeping, trade, and development aid, among others, were transformed by such multilateral processes.

Modern Challenges, New Solutions

The innate difficulties of group dynamics have greatly hindered multilateral diplomacy. These were exacerbated with the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. As the system of dual hegemony weakened, countries that had previously followed the lead of the hegemons, became more assertive in pursuing their own interests. The impulse stemming from such a shift in multilateral diplomacy is praiseworthy - each state may follow its own principles and that no one state should be able to drown out the desires of the many. Certainly, that desire is extremely laudable, however it also runs up against a simultaneous desire for results and, as group theory would predict, adding many actors to any negotiation only makes achieving a complex outcome exponentially more difficult.

With more players and faster communication to the home government, the role of the multilateral diplomat changes. It is not anymore one of negotiating

and scheming for an optimal result, but rather relaying information from his government and providing formal representation.

What the Future May Hold

Whether multilateralism is dying or simply shifting depends on individual perspectives. From mid-90s onwards, the international diplomacy has become much more focused on negotiating between small groups and building up many bilateral treaties. Countries such as Chile, which has negotiated more than 25 trade treaties in recent decades, exemplify this behaviour. While some of these trade agreements involve more than a single partner, they still are only small in comparison to the number of actors in a round of the WTO or other related organisations.

The other factor that comes along with so many actors taking part in multilateral discussions, especially those of the WTO, is standards of reciprocity and non-discrimination. If states are to treat one another identically in practice once a treaty is ratified, there is little interest in achieving a mutual outcome. To complicate matters further, the members of international organisations are supposed to reach broad agreements that assume a common set of beliefs, even though that is practically often not the case. Against the relative speed and simplicity of bilateral decision-making, the cons of multilateral diplomacy appear to greatly outweigh its pros.

The modern rise of individual states negotiating many bilateral treaties may be viewed as a departure from the norm of multilateral organisations facilitating agreements among large groups. It could also be clearly argued that these single states facilitating such agreements are simply changing the face of multilateralism. Trade agreements such as NAFTA and the TPP show that large scale multilateral arrangements are no longer in favour by the world's big superpowers. India has also chosen to pursue bilateral agreements with individual members of ASEAN. While these trade treaties may sometimes be multilateral - or, as with NAFTA, trilateral - they are not multilateral in the democratic nature enforced by international organisations.

The constant expectation of results in a world that has more players and moves ever faster has led to a reduction in the amount of traditional multilateral negotiation, which is being replaced by a mesh of numerous bilateral treaties.

The pluralistic nature of multilateral diplomacy, assisted by the rise of communication technologies and international organisations, made it perfect for addressing the issues of last century. As the 21st century has dawned, however, changing paradigms have led to an evolution of the multilateral traditions. This new chapter in diplomacy will surely prove just as dynamic and engaging a problem for modern diplomats as the problems of the past centuries. Multilateral diplomacy itself may not be dead, but its expression will demand different skills and competences, not totally unlike those that were useful back in 1815 in the palaces of Vienna.

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SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE PING- PONG DIPLOMACY

BY DR GEORGE KOO



On April 6, 1971, the 31st World Table Tennis Championship took place in Nagoya, Japan. Today, not many would remember the outcome of the international competition but the world remembers an act of friendship that led to 'the week that changed the world.'

When an American player missed his bus after practice and the Chinese players invited him to ride in theirs, the athletes became friends. When this encounter was reported back to Beijing, China's leader Mao Zedong promptly invited the American team to tour China after Nagoya.

The White House interpreted Mao's invitation as a clear signal that China was interested in re-establishing relations with the US. In response, President Richard Nixon sent Henry Kissinger to Beijing to secretly arrange for Nixon's visit to China (PRC).

Nixon went to China in February of the following year and he wrote that his diplomatic breakthrough with China was the week that changed the world. The encounter that led to his visit is known as Ping-Pong diplomacy. History will remember the event as the beginning of a new bilateral relationship between China and the US.

Cynics in the West attributed the entire matter to calculated manipulation by Mao rather than innocent friendship between athletes. Then again, pundits in the West tend to see ulterior motives related to anything that China does.

In reality, officials from China and the US had been maintaining low-level diplomatic contacts for some time and both sides had reached the conclusion that resuming official diplomatic relations was of mutual interests.

President Nixon felt that it was not realistic to isolate a quarter of the world's mankind indefinitely and Mao realised that Nixon wanted to get out of the Vietnam quagmire and could use China's help. Both were interested in forming a united front in the face of a common adversary, namely the Soviet Union.

Shanghai Communiqué

At the end of Nixon's visit in China, the US and the PRC jointly issued the Shanghai Communiqué. In the Communiqué, the US acknowledged that there

was only one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. This acknowledgement was absolutely essential to China in order for Nixon's visit to be considered a success.

The Communiqué has indeed served the bilateral relations well. Every US president since Nixon has pledged to honour the terms contained in the joint agreement. Despite, or perhaps, because of the latitude for interpretation by the ambiguity in the document, Beijing has been sufficiently reassured by the American pledge.

To the Chinese, the American pledge means that the US will not interfere in the evolving development of the cross-straits relations between Taiwan and the mainland. Washington will add to China's understanding with 'so long as the cross-straits relations proceed peacefully.'

Formal Normalisation

The next milestone in US-China relations was the formal normalisation between the two countries on January 1, 1979. One can see the greatest importance Beijing placed on this agreement for normalisation when the People's Daily splashed the news in the form of a proclamation, printed in a special one-page extra edition in bold red ink. The only previous occasion when such a special edition was published was to announce the detonation of China's first atomic bomb (and much later when China put a man in space).

Mao died in 1976 and by 1979, Deng Xiao-ping had returned to power and he celebrated the normalisation with a grand tour of the US in mid-January. Despite his diminutive physical stature, he was a media sensation. Photos of Deng wearing a ten-gallon cowboy hat charmed the American public. What followed after Deng's visit was a decade long honeymoon in Sino-American relations.

While Deng got the bilateral relations off on an upbeat note, he was busy leading the reform of China's economic policy. Where the central planners used to set the production goals and allocate the resources, now state control was gradually loosened. China went through a transitional phase when it was called a market economy with socialist characteristics. Eventually, China dropped any pretence and simply referred theirs as a market economy.

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Deng begins Reform

During this period, the world came to know Deng by a number of his favourite aphorisms. By 'to get rich is glorious,' Deng was recognising that as market dynamics were allowed to exert their influence on the economy, some individuals would become wealthy before others. He saw that it was inevitable and the country would be better off than when everybody remained equally poor under Mao.

"It doesn't matter if it's a white cat or black cat, so long as it catches mice, it is a good cat." This expression was a salute to pragmatism as Deng decided to move away from total state control to policies that would encourage individual initiative and entrepreneurship.

"Crossing the river while groping for the stones," reflected the experimental nature of the policy changes that Deng had embarked. Sometimes, this meant one small cautious step at a time, and measure the impact before taking another. Other times, policy changes were applied to a small region to fully understand the impact before introducing the change on a national scale.

These quotes reflected Deng's move away from ideology and dogma toward a pragmatic approach that was to stimulate China's economy and set China on the road of more than three decades of double-digit growth. Deng's pragmatism meant allowing foreign direct investments in China's economy, i.e., opening some windows even if it meant letting in some (Western) flies.

Tiananmen Resets Relations

The next major marker in the Sino-American relations was June 4, 1989. The previous nightfall and early dawn was when the People's Liberation Army tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square and the student protesters gathered there. On the way to the square, some PLA soldiers were assaulted and some bystanders and protesters were shot and killed. To this day, official tally of the casualty is not known.

Ironically, Soviet leader Gorbachev made a state visit to Beijing that May with a large contingent of Western media in tow. The media noticed a ragtag group of student protesters in Tiananmen that had been there since April.

The students had been protesting official corruption and unfair and arbitrary job assignment following their graduation. After interacting with the Western media, the student protest was energised and turned into a full-blown protest, ostensibly in quest of democracy.

After Gorbachev returned to Moscow, the media stayed behind to follow the student protest that in part they had inadvertently rekindled. Thus in the confrontation that ensued, the Western media had front row seats to witness the shootings, the bloodied civilians, the bodies on the street and the world famous image of the lone young man standing in front of a column of tanks.

The world was shocked by the images shown on their TVs as transmitted live from Beijing. China was loudly condemned for gross violation of human rights. Some members of the US Congress were particularly vehement and vociferous.

Gorbachev was a mere two years away from presiding the total implosion and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The USSR menace had been fading for some time and so was the importance and relevance of the Sino-American alliance to oppose the USSR. Tiananmen marked the end of the long Sino-American honeymoon.

Overseas Chinese invest in China

After the Tiananmen debacle, some of the Western companies already in China hesitated or even retreated from China. Deng strived harder than ever to open up China with economic reform. His historic tour of Shenzhen in 1992 as one of the first Special Economic Zones launched the transformation of a sleepy fishing village into an eventual megapolis that was to become more Hong Kong than even Hong Kong.

A popular notion was that the developed countries with advanced economies and technologies came pouring into China in response to the open windows. In reality, for the first decade after Deng's southern tour, the major influx of foreign direct investments did not come from the West.

The first chunk of FDI came over the border from Hong Kong-Chinese industrialists. They were the first to move their manufacturing operations to Shenzhen and surrounding area to take advantage of the lower wages and to enjoy various incentives.

The Taiwan companies were the next wave to follow and move their operations into China. Their lines of businesses, such as electronics were generally more sophisticated than the Hong Kong products. Both groups of investors enjoyed not only government incentives, but also the ability to operate in an environment of a common language and culture.

Often overlooked and not given enough credit, these Hong Kong and Taiwan companies introduced good manufacturing practices into China and helped raise the quality and productivity of the workforce of China. Local Chinese operations were forced to discard the lackadaisical attitudes ingrained by years of state control (popularly known as iron rice bowl mentality) and raise their productivity in order to compete.

By the time Western companies entered China in significant numbers to set up their manufacturing plants, the effectiveness of the Chinese workforce already had the benefit of a decade or more learning from the presence of Hong Kong and Taiwan companies.

Beginning of the Age of Terrorism

When Osama Bin Laden's gang of terrorists attacked New York's World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, a lot had already changed in the Sino-American relations.

The neoconservatives in the US saw the collapse of Soviet Union as the opportunity to project American might and move toward world domination as the sole superpower standing. Others in need of a replacement adversary to continue to justify the massive allocation for the national defence budget began to look at China as the most likely candidate.

The idea of American hegemony and a strong military budget often goes hand in hand among policymakers in Washington. They were the same folks that believe a shock and awe blitzkrieg in Iraq would lead to quick celebration of American soldiers as liberators in Baghdad - a horrendous miscalculation that continues to exact a toll in human suffering today.

Thus, consistent with a war-mongering mentality, politicians from the left and right-derived political profit by attacking a demonised China and accusing their opponent of not being tough on China. At every presidential election, aspiring candidates invariably attacked the incumbent for being soft on China.

Once the winning candidate moved into the White House, the newly elected president had to face the reality that the relationship with China was too important to be treated as a throwaway piece in the game of domestic politics.

By 9-11 2001, China's economy, doubling every 7 years, had become too large to dismiss in the name of politics. Its economy fuelled by low cost labour and being export driven complemented perfectly with the US economy driven by conspicuous consumption that needed low-cost imports from China.

Economists, not politicians observed that the two economies were just like Siamese twins joined at the hip. Killing one would be fatal to the other. Some members of Congress, knowing fully well that there is no downside to criticising China, have taken full advantage to pummel China for political points from their constituents.

Thus, as the world watched in horror the collapse of the twin towers in lower Manhattan, China's President Jiang Zemin called George W. Bush at the White House to express his condolences and offer China's solidarity with the US in the fight against the radical jihadists. Surely, Jiang must have thought that now that the Americans have a real enemy, they can direct their vitriol away from China.

Indeed, in the name of war on terror, Americans marched into Iraq and Afghanistan and now have their hands full dealing with the mess that they created. It was beginning to look like falling into another Vietnam quagmire that will take a long time to extricate. It became more important to get along with China than not.

Financial Crisis of 2008

Then came the world financial collapse of 2008. This crisis was caused by the funny money schemes such as credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities created by the wizards of Wall Street. The crisis caught the world by surprise.

To keep the giant multinational banks that were too big to fail from failing, the US government injected massive amounts of dollars to give the banks enough liquidity to keep their heads above water.

To protect China's economy from being swamped by the global financial tsunami, Beijing invested heavily in domestic infrastructure projects, such as superhighways, bridges, high-speed rail, ports and airports.

At the end of the crisis, the US government saved its economy and recovered the funds lent to the banks in distress. China got a breathtaking leap in infrastructure improvements that continue to fuel the growth of their economy.

Most damaging of all, the crisis shook Beijing's faith and confidence in Washington and in the stability of the dollar. To reduce their holdings and exposure to the dollar, China has entered numerous currency swap agreements with many of its trading partners and by-pass having to settle trade transactions in dollars.

Barrack Obama was elected president in 2008 and inherited two hot potatoes. In his 8 years, he managed to tame one of them, the financial demon that threatened to sink the US economy and right the ship at home.

On the international front, he was far less successful. Not only did he not end the conflict of Afghanistan and Iraq as pledged in his campaign, Obama's foreign policy had allowed and even encouraged Islamic terrorism to spread uncontrollably to Syria, Egypt and Libya.

Given the full plate, one would assume that the US would seek to find accommodation with China's rise, but the opposite has been true. The neocon hawks in Washington has been anticipating, almost gleefully, the inevitable 'Thucydides Trap' between a rising power and the reigning power.

The 'Trap' presaged the collision and conflict between China and the US. However, that a rising power and a reigning power must resort to killing each other is very much a Western idea based on Western experiences tracing back to the days of Athens vs. Sparta. It remains to be seen how far the US can push China into a corner before China gets exasperated enough to become a Western state and fight back.





China's Way Forward

Partly motivated by not holding vast reserves of US dollars, China's new leader, Xi Jinping, has been offering a different kind of international relations with his 'One Belt, One Road' initiative along with the formation of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). He is offering to apply China's experience and expertise in infrastructure projects gained since 2008 to build along the maritime and land silk roads from China to Europe. These projects could be financed by AIIB along with other development banks.

Xi is not going around giving away foreign aid packages. The beneficiary countries will be co-participants and co-investors in the infrastructure projects. The projects will have to be economically sound with reasonable prospect of payback. Xi believes infrastructure investments will improve the local economy. Eventually, the improved economies will be integrated for the benefit of all the economies on the belt or road.



Chinese President Xi Jinping (C, front) and representatives of countries ready to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Many countries are already seeing the appeal of being part of Xi's win-win collaboration. UK was the first to ignore Washington's contrarian advice and rushed to become the first Western power to be a founding member of AIIB. When Xi made his state visit to London in late 2015, the British government rolled out the red carpet to make sure that Xi got the message, namely, the UK considers China's friendship to be of their highest priority.

The newly elected president Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines seemed to agree with UK's point of view. He has shunned the confrontation on the contested island in the South China Sea favoured by his predecessor and signalled a willingness to talk the matter over with China. He too sees value in collaborating with China and being included in the maritime silk route.

Choices for India

For non-aligned nations such as India, there is a choice. On the one hand, India can seek the security that comes with being protected by the military might of Uncle Sam, subject, of course, to Uncle Sam's whim on whether defending India continues to be in his national interest. Since the US already spends beyond their means for the military, India will be expected to contribute their share of the burden.

America's reassurance to India on the ties that bind will be based on the fact that both have a democratic form of government. The people of India should be in the excellent position to decide on their own as to how well democracies have worked for them in the past and can function in the future.

On the other hand, India can seek to become an economic partner with China and collaborate on infrastructure development. China will not seek to interfere with how India is governed nor insist on entering into military alliances. India will simply benefit from China's experience in building and completing giant projects on time and under budget - something democracies are not good at.

Of course, developing relations with China and the US are not mutually exclusive. Keeping friendly relations with both superpowers will simply require skilful diplomacy and bearing in mind that the expectations from the two will be very different.

Just June this year, India along with Pakistan has signed the necessary memorandum to be admitted as member nations of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017. SCO has been evolving since it was established 15 years ago with China and Russia as the prime movers. Other current members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. With Iran expected to be the next member to be admitted, the SCO alliance will soon cover a huge part of Asia and nearly half of the world's population.

The primary aim of SCO is to promote mutual cooperation in safeguarding the military and economic security of its members. Non-interference of the internal affairs of the member states is part of the charter. Obviously it is an alignment not designed to please Washington. (The American application to be an observer was rejected in 2005.)

In joining SCO, India shows that it already knows how to hedge its bet. Xi is betting that more countries will see economic cooperation to be more aligned to their national interest than military confrontation favoured by the United States.

The writer went to the US as a child from China, grew up in Seattle and was educated at MIT, Stevens Institute and Santa Clara Univ. Dr. Koo has recently retired from a world leading advisory services firm where he advised clients on their China strategies and business operations. He is founder and former managing director of International Strategic Alliances. He is a former member of the board of directors of Las Vegas Sands and a current director of New America Media. Dr. Koo is a frequent speaker in various public forums on China and US China bilateral relations. He writes for Pacific News Service (New America Media) on issues relating to Chinese Americans and to US-China relations. He is a member of Committee of 100 and Pacific Council for International Policy.



PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IS BACK; BUT WILL IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

BY DR ROBERT MUGGAH



Preventive diplomacy is back in vogue. A series of United Nations (UN)-led reviews on the future of peacekeeping¹, peace-building² and the women, peace and security³ agendas vaulted preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention to the top of the international peace and security agendas. Commissioned by the outgoing UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, the General Assembly and the Security Council, the over-arching message of these reports is that a rebalancing of approaches to international peace and security is urgently required.

The UN secretary general's call for a 'culture of prevention' is hardly new. Preventive diplomacy enjoys a long history in and outside the UN. So what, if anything, is new? Will preventive diplomacy thrive, or falter as it has in the past? And what works when it comes to preventive diplomacy? These and other questions are uppermost on the minds of diplomatic, defence and development specialists around the world. The decisions taken in the coming years could shape the onset, duration and termination of conflicts in the decades to come.

The Turn to Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is much easier described than defined. It includes an array of actions intended to prevent disputes from escalating into full-scale violent conflict but also to keep wars from spreading after they break out. Scholar Michael Lund describes it as "... actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force by states or groups to settle political disputes"⁴. Preventive diplomacy includes the dispatch of diplomatic envoys, who may advise leaders, support mediation, and work with parties to find solutions to emerging crises.

Preventive diplomacy is not reservedly about deploying 'supermen' (and a few 'superwomen'), but can also include a 'sprinkler system' of measures. The most common types of measures include those sanctioned by the secretary general and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). For example, the DPA fields regional missions, a mediation support unit and a standby team

of experts to support negotiations, provide expert advice on power-sharing, constitution-building and security arrangements. For its part, the UN Security Council may engage with emerging threats even before they are formally tabled, including through confidence-building and early warning measures, informal fact-finding missions, informal mediation, and even advocating for demilitarised zones.⁵


The emergence of preventive diplomacy can be traced to the 1960s when it was first invoked by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.⁶ It was resurrected in the 1992 with the UN's *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.⁷ The Agenda did not explicitly define the concept. The 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace underlined its importance, especially the role of quiet diplomacy, supervision of ceasefires, verification of human rights violations and observation of electoral violence.⁸ It also received considerable support from the Clinton administration in the US at the time. In both documents, preventive diplomacy was subtly distinguished from the concepts of 'peacemaking' and 'peacekeeping', both of which entailed a wider range of activities emphasising security, governance and development.

The UN deepened its engagement in preventive diplomacy from the 2000s onward. Specifically, the 2004 report of the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* demanded a 'recommitment' in prevention.⁹ In 2008, the DPA established its Mediation Support Unit, ostensibly to help states solve their own challenges. The DPA's efforts were bolstered by a 2011 *Report on Preventive Diplomacy*¹⁰ and a 2012 study on Strengthening the Role of Mediation that even called for 'preventive diplomats'.¹¹ The UN also established a community of practice involving 22 agencies to strengthen prevention efforts at the field level. All of this culminated in a 'year of prevention' established by the UN secretary general in 2012, with associated priorities grafted into his five-year plan.

Those advocating for a culture of prevention also urged a shift from outsider-driven to more locally managed measures. They called for more investment in 'Southern' practitioners to facilitate, mediate, conciliate,

Twenty first century turbulence, tension and transition have raised tricky questions about the UN engagement. In the context of violent extremism and organised crime, it is not always clear if and how parties are able to guarantee the implementation of agreements or the extent to which they are susceptible to coercive or diplomatic pressure from either outsiders or insiders.





adjudicate and arbitrate. There was a simultaneous push to support ‘cycles’ of prevention, while reinforcing regional and national capacities over the long-term. The UN, for its part, continued investing in civilian-led political missions including 12 envoys and mediators, its 11 field-based missions and 3 regional offices¹². However, there were also calls within and without to invest in ‘peace architectures’ in order to embed such processes at the grassroots level and stimulate local ownership.

Regionalisation of Preventive Diplomacy

Not surprisingly, regional organisations waded into the preventive diplomacy game over the past two decades. Arguably one of the most active areas for regionally-led preventive diplomacy is Sub-Saharan Africa. The African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council, together with its panel of the wise, standby force and continental early warning system are major players, often in close cooperation with the UN. Sub-regional groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – often with support from the region’s hegemon, Nigeria – have successfully managed disputes among its members. Different regional groups have established early warning systems such as ECOWARN in West Africa, CEWARN in East Africa and CPR-EMSA in Southern Africa.

Meanwhile, regional efforts are also picking-up in Asia, the Middle East and the Americas. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently established a regional forum to anticipate, prevent and monitor conflict. The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) has also played a role in mediating potential conflagrations between and within states across the region. Even the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council have deployed mediators from Syria to Yemen, albeit with mixed results. The Organization of American States (OAS), and especially the newer Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), include preventive diplomacy as a central part of their mandate.

The Obstacles

Notwithstanding rhetorical enthusiasm in preventive diplomacy, it has not fully caught-on in practice. The concept failed to gain traction partly due to the intrinsic difficulties of anticipating future threats and ‘selling’ early action to leery governments, who were expected to foot the bill. As a result, preventive diplomacy has traditionally been under-prioritised and under-funded. This type of collective action dilemma, hardly unique to preventive diplomacy, nevertheless contributed to poor uptake by multilateral and bilateral agencies. Crisis prevention, thus, became the norm. However, there are other, more practical, constraints that have limited the purchase of preventive diplomacy.¹³



Part of the reason it failed to lift off is due to the absence of a shared definition. Some governments define preventive diplomacy as 'soft' mediation while others assume it includes more 'muscular' interventions, including the issuing of credible threats of pre-emptive action. Scholars such as Stephen Stedman also argued that its potential was often vastly overstated, causing diplomats to 'founder early in a crisis instead of later'.¹⁴ Likewise, in some parts of the world, preventive diplomacy is interpreted as zero-sum consensus. In others, it is based on hard bargaining and should yield positive-sum outcomes. These terminological disputes stretch back more than two decades.

Another stumbling block relates to the anxieties of some states with the interference implied by preventive diplomacy. Some governments are naturally wary of intervening in their neighbours' affairs. Many are also twitchy about entering into dialogue with non-state actors (for fear of legitimising them). For example, the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy of Central Asia (UNRCCA) will only involve non-state parties if national governments agree. Likewise, the ASEAN regional forum is reluctant to address tricky domestic tensions for fear of offending the sensibilities of its membership. Another roadblock is the fact that regional actors risk closing their eyes to problems lest they be seen as meddling in one another's affairs.

A Preventive Diplomacy Renaissance?

The apparent renaissance in preventive diplomacy is not occurring in a vacuum. It is emerging in large part as a response to the radically changing character of organised violence around the world. Major atrocities during the 1990s – the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic conflicts and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and state collapse in Somalia – concentrated minds both within and outside the UN Security Council and General Assembly. An over-riding concern was to identify ways to prevent simmering conflicts from escalating into full-scale wars and to limit regional contagion. The question was whether massive spending in peacemaking and peacekeeping was enough.

For the past decade, researchers detected a pronounced downturn in the number of conflicts between 1989 – when they were peaking at roughly 50 per year – and the present. Today, with some exceptions, the remaining 20 or so international and civil wars are smaller and more localised than in the past. However, that does not mean they are easily resolved. To the contrary, they are frustratingly protracted, combine political, extremist and criminal actors and motivations, and routinely target citizens. The decline in conflict frequency also coincides with a surge in explosive social unrest stretching across North Africa and the Middle East, as well as expanding transnational crime networks in so-called fragile states.

Twenty first century turbulence, tension and transition have raised tricky questions about the UN engagement. In the context of violent extremism and organised crime, it is not always clear if and how parties are able to guarantee the implementation of agreements or the extent to which they are susceptible to coercive or diplomatic pressure from either outsiders or insiders. Rather than relying exclusively on the tools of negotiated settlement, policy entrepreneurs are exploring a new generation of tools designed to prevent and reduce organised violence before it explodes into warfare. Examples include innovative violence-

prevention efforts in Central and South America and the Caribbean featuring alternate forms of mediation involving regional organisations, city mayors and former gang members.

There is a deeper economic imperative driving the resurgent interest in preventive diplomacy. For one, the 2008 global financial crisis underlined the value of investing in prevention rather than spending billions on humanitarian relief, peace-keeping operations, post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Some analysts estimate the average cost of a civil war in a medium-sized developing country as the equivalent of over 30 years of GDP. Many traditional donors have already started feeling the pain. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that member-states are spending \$34 billion upward to mitigate the effects of fragility. And the costs continue to rise.

The latest UN high-level panels have renewed the preventive diplomacy agenda. Not only will this expand the resources available for testing out tried and true measures, it could open the way for more experimental approaches.



Nowhere are the outsized costs of responding to conflict more obvious than in the case of peacekeeping. The number of UN peacekeeping operations has ballooned to 16 as of 2015. UN and regional peacekeepers are staying in countries on average for 15 years or more. There are over 122,000 personnel spread around the world at a cost of \$8.5 billion a year, the highest levels of spending ever recorded. The UN peace support system is reaching a breaking point and member-states are growing impatient about spiralling expenditures. To some diplomats, the choice is clear. It must either double down on preventive diplomacy or risk dangerous over-stretch.

The Benefits of Preventive Diplomacy

Fortunately, there is also a growing recognition that preventive diplomacy works. It is not always obvious to the casual observer; however, the evidence base is increasingly clear. There have been about 800 peace agreements signed since the 1950s. Macro-level research suggests that about 68 percent of the time, concentrated mediation efforts successfully bring active armed conflicts to a close. Even when wars resume, as they do around 30 percent of the time



within a year of their termination, they are 80 percent less violent.¹⁵ The point is that investment in prevention – including preventive diplomacy – is useful even when peace agreements are not fully successful.

Micro-level research shows that various kinds of mediation are positively correlated with reducing conflict-related violence. For example, Beber examined 35 armed conflicts and 151 mediation processes between 1990 and 2005. He found that while preventive diplomacy ‘works’ in reducing conflict onset and duration, multiparty mediation is not necessarily more effective than single party mediation.¹⁶ Likewise, DeRouen et al. determined that while preventive diplomacy minimises the likelihood of extreme organised violence, the type of mediation is shaped by war type (international wars are more likely to be mediated), war duration (the longer the war, the higher the probability of mediation) and war intensity (the higher the number of battle deaths, the higher the likelihood of mediation).¹⁷

There is still a knowledge gap, however, when it comes to knowing why preventive diplomacy works, what kinds of mediators and mediation are most successful, and the most appropriate sequencing.¹⁸ Part of the problem is that experimental and quasi-experimental design research is virtually impossible in highly volatile and politicised environments. Obtaining evidence for what does and does not work is complicated for both practical and political reasons. Confidentiality is crucial in some mediation processes, thus preventing researchers from observing or fully understanding the factors that did or did not lead to preventing violence from escalating. To be sure, the science of preventive diplomacy is still in its infancy.

The latest UN high-level panels have renewed the preventive diplomacy agenda. Not only will this expand the resources available for testing out tried and true measures, it could open the way for more experimental approaches. UN member states have spoken loudly and clearly about the central place of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in preserving international peace and security. Some member states are going so far as to call for a re-balancing of assessed contributions to the UN to be distributed more evenly between peacekeeping to preventive diplomacy. This proposal could provide much needed capital, but also flexibility, potentially improving not just the quantity, but quality of action on the ground.

The writer is research director of the Igarapé Institute and the Sec Dev Foundation. He is thankful to Henk-Jan Brinkman (Chief of Policy at the UN Peace building Support Office) and Stephen Jackson (Chief of Policy Planning at the UN Department of Political Affairs).

[1] See UNSG (2015) *High Level Review on the Future of Peacekeeping*. New York: UN Secretary General, http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf

[2] See UNGA and UNSC (2015) *High Level Review of Peacebuilding*. New York: UNGA and UNSC <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/2015review/>

[3] See UNSC (2015) *Women Peace and Security*. New York: UNSC, <http://wps.unwomen.org/en/high-level-review>

[4] See Lund, M. (1995) *Underrating Preventive Diplomacy*, *Foreign Affairs*,

July/August, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1995-07-01/underrating-preventive-diplomacy>

[5] It is important to stress that preventive diplomacy and mediation are overlapping but not necessarily synonymous practices. Preventive diplomacy includes facilitation and engagement. Mediation can be both preventive and reactive, including to limit escalation and prevent conflict relapse.

[6] See Djibom, J. (ND) *An Analysis of Hammarskjöld's Theory of Preventive Diplomacy*, Thesis Paper with UN DPKO. <http://media.peaceopstraining.org/theses/djibom.html>

[7] See UN (United Nations). 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. Report of the secretary-general. New York: UN.

[8] See UN (United Nations). 1995. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. Report of the secretary-general. New York: UN.

[9] See UN (United Nations). 2004. *A More Secure World: Threats, Challenges and Change*. Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: UN.

[10] See UN (United Nations). 2011. *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results*. Report of the secretary-general. New York: UN.

[11] See UN (United Nations). 2012a. *Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution*. Report of the secretary-general. New York: UN. UN (United Nations). 2012b. “The secretary-general’s fiveyear action plan, II. Prevention.” <<http://www.un.org/sg/priorities/prevention.shtml>>.

[12] See Kugel, A. (2015) *United Nations and Preventive Diplomacy*, *UMA-UK, New World*, <http://www.una.org.uk/magazine/1-2015/alisha-kugel-united-nations-and-preventive-diplomacy>.

[13] See EastWest (2008) *International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy*. Sydney: Lowey, <http://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/ideas-files/International%20Task%20Force%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf>

[14] See Stedman, S. (1995) *Alchemy for a New World Disorder: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy*, *Foreign Affairs* July/August, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1995-05-01/alchemy-new-world-order-overselling-preventive-diplomacy>

[15] See Mack, A. (2012) “Even Failed Peace Agreements Save Lives”, *Political Violence @ a Glance*, 10 August, <https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2012/08/10/even-failed-peace-agreements-save-lives/>

[16] See Beber, B. 2009. “The effect of international mediation on war settlement: an instrumental variables approach.” *NYU Discussion Paper*. <<https://files.nyu.edu/bb89/public/files/>

Beber_MediationIV.pdf> and Beber, B. 2012. “International mediation, selection effects and the question of bias.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29(5): 397-424.

[17] See DeRouen, K., J. Bercovitch & P. Pospieszna. 2011. “Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(5): 663-72.

[18] See Muggah, R. and White, N. (2013) “Is there a preventive action renaissance? The policy and practice of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention”, *NOREF Report*, February, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/00175abccdb1df5f006c8e40da206643.pdf

CRAFT HOUSE FASHION & LIFESTYLE STORE

Quest for quality and premium merchandise get over as you step in Craft House, fashion & lifestyle store spread out in 4000 square feet at The Metropolitan Hotel & Spa. Located at the lower lobby level of The Metropolitan Hotel & Spa, the swanky interiors of Craft House have beautifully upholstered display counters, further enriched by glass and mirrors. A shopper's paradise involves guests in luscious shopping and provides them with a holistic shopping experience.

Craft House showcases creative ensemble of apparel, one can select from the latest range of capes, suits, kurtis, palazzos, skirts, sarees and more. It also offers exclusive and exquisite statement Indian jewellery consisting of precious and semi-precious jewels set in gold, silver and mixed metal. Merchandise made from silk and other fine materials such as scarves, tasseled stoles, and designer accessories like bags, footwear and bangles can also be indulged into.

In addition, Craft House also stocks the rich and mystical heritage of India presented through hand woven Shahmina and Pashmina shawls, stoles and mufflers in an array of weaves, colors, embroidery and prints. It also features an array of teas hand-picked fresh from the tea gardens in Darjeeling and Assam, full of delicate flavours of pure whole-leaf as well as blended assortments. For those seeking harmony of the body, mind and soul there is the NeoVeda Home Spa collection including beauty enhancement products based on the principles of Ayurveda, and aroma oils and incense to synergize the senses with nature.

Guests can also explore various premium merchandise such as home décor range, objet d'art etc., manufactured in India by hand picked artisans and master craftsmen.

Craft House, having won the mandate and loyalty of visitors to India and discerning locals, added in its portfolio, 'Delhi Bazaar Craft House', the exclusive Indian store concept at state-of-the-art integrated International Departure T3 at Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA). With 'Delhi Bazaar' as its central theme, the 4000 sq feet store showcases the best merchandise India has to offer to world travelers transiting through the T3 terminal. The Delhi Bazaar Craft House, the nouvelle concept by Craft House, is tagged as the biggest Indian profile store at the airport. It is the only uni-brand store in the terminal to showcase premium merchandise manufactured and produced in India, displayed in a hassle-free ambience appealing to foreign as well as Indian clientele. An ideal blend of the traditional and contemporary India, the strong local knowledge, established infrastructure and passion is reflected in the spirit and philosophy of Delhi Bazaar Craft House.

All in all, from the best fashion to beauty to culture, Craft House presents a vibrant sophistication and dynamism of the 21st century, utilizing the best of materials from softest silk to the finest pashmina and precious metals and stones, to create a range of contemporary luxury lifestyle products that are hand crafted by Indian artisans and craftsmen.

Unique Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd.

Delhi Store

The Metropolitan Hotel & Spa
Bangla Sahib Road
New Delhi – 110001
Tel – 011 42500200

Airport Store

Delhi Bazaar Craft House
International Departure, Terminal 3 (T3)
Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA)
Delhi

E-Store: www.crafthouseindia.com

E-Mail Id: info@crafthouseindia.com







PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TODAY'S WORLD

Public Diplomacy in today's times needs to be more structured, focused and professional. The key words are - cost effectiveness, innovation and uniqueness, ensuring maximum and long-lasting recall value.

BY SARAH BERRY

Over the years, Public Diplomacy has had quite a few of its dimensions modified due to many factors such as changing times, target audiences and objectives. If one were to Google the description of the term Public Diplomacy, Wikipedia would suggest it to be a term in international relations, which, broadly speaking is the communication with foreign public to establish dialogue designed to inform and influence.

From my experience, however, Public Diplomacy or People's Diplomacy is, in my own and simple words, an art and a science. There are diverse tools and methodologies that are used in order to achieve the desired impact on the pre-determined target audience within pre-defined budget outlines and timeframes.

In my assignment at the Embassy of Switzerland in New Delhi, I addressed a part of this broad term through projects for the future decision makers of tomorrow or in other words, the students of today.

One might ask "Why students?" Well, "why not?" would be my reply. Of course, there are many other target audiences that could be a part of an endeavour encompassing Public Diplomacy. It all depends on the priorities set.

Having said the above, with the concept of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' or the 'World is one family' gaining more importance in the globalised world we currently live in, countries strive to project themselves in increasingly effective and creative fashions. Besides this is the fact that India is the largest democracy

in the world, with an ever growing spending capacity, more aware citizens and a youth population of approximately 65 percent below 35 years of age.

It is this target audience, comprising of the future decision makers or even partly the current ones, that has to be focused upon in order to deviate (to a certain extent) from the clichés attached to a country, generate more awareness about the diverse USPs and encourage more direct/indirect investment in the concerned nation.

Public Diplomacy in today's times needs to be more structured, focused and professional. The key words are - cost effectiveness, innovation and uniqueness, ensuring maximum and long-lasting recall value.

The above seems 'easier said than done' as it requires strategic planning (long-term, but essentially medium- and short-term), action versus time plan, appropriate public diplomacy tools, solid existing and ever growing network of partners (government and private), professional implementation and concise documentation.

Since the domain of education is wide, focus has to be clear. In my case, at the Embassy, it was schools (government and private). The target cities could be metros, but also Tier B and C cities, which see greater receptiveness and have potential.

The impressionable target audience of school students looks, generally speaking, eagerly for an active exchange with peers across the world. With growth



Public Diplomacy in today's times needs to be more structured, focused and professional. The key words are - cost effectiveness, innovation and uniqueness, ensuring maximum and long-lasting recall value.



in technology (video conference/skype etc.), the world has, indeed, 'come closer'. The exchanges are not only restricted to joint projects in diverse fields, but also actual physical travels by students between countries. As is obvious, these exchanges require careful selection of partners in host countries, methodical logistical planning and professional execution. Having said this, these exchanges provide an excellent platform for a plethora of future opportunities for synergy.

It is not only that those exchanges should be restricted to peers, but it must go a step further and involve experts, especially in fields such as Science/ Technology and Research & Development, amongst others. A number of awareness generation programs (about the country) can be initiated with schools, which are aimed as 'teasers' or also 'hype generators'. These public advocacy initiatives can include a range of fields such as art and architecture, science and technology, culture, social causes, etc. The tools could range from project researches, diverse competitions such as quizzes/presentations/creative writing/arts/photography/interactions etc., underlining the main words - creativity and cost effectiveness, while generating enthusiasm about the country, beyond what is already known.

With the above targeting students mainly, schools bear a constant need for training at decision making levels, starting from teachers. Imparting curriculum using interactive didactic tools and technologies has seen a surge in the education scenario in India.

Another important domain is Language, which sees a lot of scope in India. Preparation and promotion of didactic tools, trainings for faculty and joint exchange programs are in huge demand. Switzerland speaks 4 official languages - German, French, Italian and Romansh. Through the medium of language, interactive didactic interfaces were designed with Switzerland as focus. With universities, the approach was dove-tailed. This segment is a career conscious segment about to embark on a professional journey. Across all sectors, a need to learn, unlearn and relearn exists. Therefore, exchanges, but of a different kind, are rich sources of knowledge. Industrial site visits, visits by experts, electronic exchanges with peers on joint projects, representation at events, amongst a host of others, serve as some of the probable public advocacy tools. Of course, faculty are always open to exchanges on teaching methodologies and innovative didactic developments.

Vocational Training and Skill development also assume significant importance, especially with the diverse initiatives taken by the government. The focus, however, should be on understanding the challenges being faced during the implementation of various initiatives, engagement of appropriate workforce and adequate guidance at the diverse steps involved.

My experience in the field of Public Diplomacy, especially in the sector of Education, was a huge learning curve. Planning to implementation, liaison and involvement of varied partners, creative projects, extensive coverage and the overwhelming responses and appreciation received are the most enriching professional lessons; not to mention the challenge of resource limits and timelines.

So, if you are about to set-out on your journey in this field, make sure that you are armed with the ability to 'think-out-of-the-box' and work under pressures of time and finance. The rewards of leaving an unforgettable experience with millions of people is very fulfilling, rest assured.

The writer is Trainer – soft skills/image enhancement and Consultant – public diplomacy/brand management/creative writing, and can be reached at sarahhcares@gmail.com



IMPERATIVES OF REGULATORY DIPLOMACY

Regulations are the new focus of economic statecraft. Their increasing importance is reflected in the negotiations on global financial standards, multilateral trading rules, and regional economic unions.

BY K.N. Vaidyanathan and Akshay Mathur



The global trade in services, investment and labour has created a new dynamic of economic exchanges between countries. To accommodate these new areas of global integration, international agreements, earlier limited to rules such as cross-border tariffs, are also expanding. As a result, many countries are increasingly negotiating regulations that were once the domestic domain of governments. This has engendered 'Regulatory Diplomacy', which has become the central focus of economic engagement worldwide – with wide-ranging implications.

The shift in the nature of international agreements is most evident in the evolution of three areas - global financial standards, multilateral trade agreements, and regional economic unions. In all three areas, the harmonisation and reciprocal recognition of national and provincial regulations are being intensely negotiated across global fora such as the G20, the Financial Stability Board, ASEAN and among countries signing up for trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

India has underestimated the scope and scale of this global transition and remains constrained by capacity required to steer the global dialogue in its favour. As a result, the international regulatory architecture is crystallising in a way that is not in India's strategic economic interests.

I. Global Financial Standards and the Monetary System

Since the 2008 trans-Atlantic financial crisis, there has been a focus on re-engineering global financial regulations. The G20-backed Financial Stability Board (FSB)^[1] has introduced measures to -

- (i) Enforce capital adequacy in banks in the form of the Basel 3^[2] norms introduced in 2013;
- (ii) Ring-fence the 'too-big-to-fail' banks (now called the Global Systemically-Important-Financial Institutions or G-SIFI;
- (iii) Monitor 'over-the-counter' derivatives for transparency;
- (iv) Subjugate shadow banking or the unregulated intermediaries in the system.^[3]

However, these priorities are only relevant to developed, Western economies. Not a single Indian financial institution qualifies as a G-SIFI. Moreover, the one-size-fits-all approach to capital adequacy for banks does not work for countries such as India, which need investments for infrastructure and growth. India is ahead of the West in derivative contracts that are already traded, cleared, and settled on exchanges in India, providing transparency that is unmatched globally.^[4] And shadow banking^[5] accounts for less than 15 percent of India's total financial assets - but is revered by small enterprises because its socio-economic reach fills a void in the formal banking system.^[6]

India could accrue some benefit from these initiatives if it uses these rules to drive internal reforms. For instance, Basel 3 has new technical regulations for measuring risk (e.g. measuring risk with mark-to-market loss indicators for counterparties, leverage ratios that measure off-balance sheet leveraging^[7]) that can be adopted to monitor non-performing assets – a known problem in India and other countries such as China.

What matters to countries like India are -

(i) The regulation of globally-referred benchmarks such as LIBOR, EUROBOR, and TIBOR, which undergird the \$220 trillion of financial products globally, including India, and

(ii) The reform of credit rating agencies (that were central to the 2008 crisis). Global institutional investors interested in investing in India still have to resort to investment-grade rating assessments by private multinationals such as Fitch, Moody's and S&P to assess creditworthiness of even small businesses and infrastructure projects. This effectively blocks the estimated \$70 trillion of global long-term capital from being used productively in India.^[8]

The developed world is also ignoring India's long-term demand for better coordination of monetary policies globally. The fear amongst emerging markets of the spill-over effects of the US Federal Reserve's monetary policy on currencies remains. The former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, has repeatedly called for a new Bretton Woods-like agreement on monetary policies.^[9] But so far, the US Federal Reserve and its counterparts in other advanced economies have shown no interest in this proposal, and continue restricting themselves to narrow mandates of ring-fencing their own economies in direct contradiction to the G20's spirit of collaborative global economic governance.

II. Multilateral Trade Agreements

Global trade negotiations have expanded from tariffs and duties to cover a much wider range - including harmonisation between countries of regulations on services, state-owned enterprises, e-commerce, labour, and the environment. The proposed trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic mega-regional trade agreements have catalysed this push. India and China are not a part of either agreement, but both will be impacted if these rules become the template for all trade agreements negotiated globally in the future.^[10]

Some of the new measures will, for example, limit public-sector companies from raising finance from their national government.^[11] This will be detrimental for India, where public-sector companies are the key to national and foreign economic interests. It will also impact a large part of the world where the public sector plays a central role in the economy.

Other measures propose to make standards set by foreign private entities influential in the design and enforcement of regulations across countries, and create a legal basis for their adoption. For instance, the US and Europe-based Forest Stewardship Council has helped design the environment regulations for the TPP. If adopted globally, these rules will impact India's export of furniture and handicrafts due to the difficulty of proving the legal harvest of timber in India.^[12]

Similarly, the provisions in the TPP for Investor-State Dispute Resolution indicate a preference for foreign private law firms and organisations as the arbitrators for settling disputes between governments and business. If this becomes the norm, it will bypass local court systems everywhere, and could particularly disadvantage and disfavour countries such as India where governments lack expertise in, and finance for, foreign arbitration.^[13]

On the other hand, India would have willingly supported proposals within

the emerging regulatory frameworks in areas of its comparative strength, such as services or labour. Free movement of natural persons (Mode 4) has been India's long-standing request at the World Trade Organisation, but it continues to be ignored at that forum.

To counter these gaps, India can introduce measures on labour in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), on which it is collaborating with China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a response to the TPP and TTIP. Unfortunately though, this regional effort has no creative counter-measures and the RCEP will, at best, be a melding of existing FTAs in goods.

III. Regional Economic Unions

In addition to the harmonisation of trade regulations is another set of complex economic arrangements, where regulatory inter-operability between countries is the basis of economic exchange.

The European Union exemplifies this best - both the pros and cons of regulatory harmonisation. While common rules enabled the free flow of goods, services, people and capital across the EU countries, weak management also made the union susceptible to systemic risks and asymmetric accumulation of economic benefits. This resulted in the Eurozone crisis of 2010, and Brexit respectively.

Despite centrifugal forces such as negotiations with Greece pressing for a disintegration of the common market, the EU's response to the Eurozone crisis was to introduce the 'Banking Union', which empowers the European Central Bank to regulate Eurozone banks by using common policies.^[14] This approach confirms that more, not less, regulatory integration was deemed necessary for successful financial globalisation.

A more recent example is the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), parented by the ASEAN secretariat. Just like the EU, the AEC aims to establish a single market for goods, services, capital markets, and even the movement of skilled labour - all through harmonisation or mutual recognition of each other's regulations.



The AEC is in the process of establishing the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF) by which a bank in one ASEAN country will become a local bank across ASEAN ('ASEAN Bank')^[15] with preferential regulations. This will especially threaten the Western banks that currently dominate the cross-border financial system in Asia.^[16]

Similarly, the ASEAN Insurance Integration Framework (AIIF) and the ASEAN Capital Market Infrastructure (ACMI) have been conceptualised to integrate the functions of underwriting and clearing settlement across ASEAN member countries.^[17] A systematic harmonisation of cross-border regulations on licensing requirements, accounting standards, minimum capital requirements, large exposures, and consumer protection, is in process.^[18]

The developed world is also ignoring India's long-term demand for better coordination of monetary policies globally. The fear amongst emerging markets of the spill-over effects of the US Federal Reserve's monetary policy on currencies remains. The former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, has repeatedly called for a new Bretton Woods-like agreement on monetary policies.





Now is the time for India to use that strength to influence the design of the evolving global regulatory framework. This can secure India's international economic interests while the country builds its domestic economy and consolidates its economic integration with the world.



By October 2015, the AEC had already achieved 92 percent (469 of 502) of its goals, with the most progress made on measures required to make the AEC a single market.^[19]

Such regional unified markets will compete aggressively with India for capital, talent, and business, attracted by the \$2.6 trillion ASEAN market - the third largest in Asia and seventh largest in the world.^[20]

In contrast, India does not even have a domestically harmonised regulatory system. Nor have India's regional economic ambitions (for example, in SAARC) or mutual recognition agreements fructified (for example, an India-ASEAN FTA in services), leaving us behind the curve.

Meanwhile, this evolution of regulatory architecture in international finance, multilateral trade, and regional economic unions, confirms that regulatory diplomacy has emerged as a core component of statecraft. India has an advantage here - its regulatory agencies such as SEBI, IRDA and RBI are capable and credible. Now is the time for India to use that strength to influence the design of the evolving global regulatory framework. This can secure India's international economic interests while the country builds its domestic economy and consolidates its economic integration with the world.

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This article was first published by Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

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THE DIPLOMATIC TRAILING SPOUSE

**An Observer in a Coveted
Profession, Shrouded in
Myth and Reality
Or
A Marionette in Restraint?**

BY JAYSHREE M. TRIPATHI





For the last 30 years I have been a part of the 'Indian Foreign Service Family', but a small link in a massive chain of strength that spans continents. I deliberately say 'small', as I was a non-working diplomatic spouse and did not directly contribute to the function of the mission. How do others view us as we embark on our travels to distant lands? Our children are wrenched from their friends, extended families and comforting environs. Yet they brave all odds and settle into their new routines at a new school, with dignity and deserve our commendations. How many of us have sat and cried for hours, after the children are off to school and the husband has left for the chancery and we are on our own, in a new residence? We have to make it 'home' too, for our children, yet keep a 'representational area', with new local staff?

We enter countries, and then often take precedence over the local Indians or people of Indian origin at the banquet tables of the host country's president or prime minister or even the foreign minister, the more senior our husbands become? Then, plan our tables for the local dignitaries, visiting VIPs and diplomatic colleagues and others. How we are rated for our hosting of National Days? My heart beats a hundred times faster as each Independence Day and Republic Day approaches, hoping the chosen menu will suit everyone from back home ... north, south, east and west, northeast and northwest too - fellow Indian citizens. They always come first.

Sleepless nights, heart aflutter, wondering if the catered food will be enough for the numberless guests that may or may not arrive, for the early morning flag-

hoisting. We are informed: "There were 350/1600 guests last year", the figures vary from country to country, so we order an extra 100 plates, just in case. There is gravy, dry, veg, non-veg, cuisine from across the nation, juice galore, mineral water and masala chai.

Someone remarked a few years ago as we sat down after all the guests had left one such function: "All the spouses should be awarded golden brooches when their husbands retire - fashioned into two samosas and two gulab jamuns, for remembrance of their hard work!"

I was not amused.

I have yet to skilfully master the art of answering the following query without a pause: "So, what did you do?"

Let me pay tribute here to the pioneer women of our service. These women followed their husbands without question, to new posts and missions, even risking their lives at times. One such incident related to us at a meeting involved reminiscences of camping for the night after hours on horseback through hard terrain, only to find out the next morning that they were pitched on the edge of a ravine! Our trivial complaints about delayed flights pale in comparison! What hardships they endured - what dedication and devotion they manifested. They gave of their lives unstintingly. These are memories I carried with me through difficult postings in distant lands.

A book written by the wife of an overseas colleague used the term 'Diplomatic Baggage' to describe the accompanying spouses, quite a rough take on us! Are our lives worthwhile, in this fast-paced modern world where women



H.E. Shiv Shankar Menon, India's High Commissioner for Sri Lanka, Smt. Mohini Menon, Deputy High Commissioner Sibabrata Tripathi, Smt. Jayshree Tripathi, Defence Adviser Ghan Shyam Sondur, Smt. Medha Sondur with a distinguished Guest on Republic Day, India House, Colombo

are making their mark across the seas, with salaries that make you gasp for breath? A former college classmate of mine is a senior judge of a High Court in India, another heads the overseas division of her company in the USA, yet another is a chief editor, a chief publisher, the principal of college ... the list is endless.

How will I recall the Indian Foreign Service in the years to come? The camaraderie, the spirit of mischief as we, as younger wives grumbled about the making of 2000 samosas and gulab jamuns or our aching feet, standing from 6 am till 9 pm at various charity bazaars, for the annual international women's organisations? Raising funds? Or vowing never to ask for help when we were senior wives and regretting not being able to muster up the courage to do so, in such a position, given the different times we lived in and the undiplomatic comments we may be forced to hear!

Instead, I paused to relive the fascinating images that captured my spirit when I felt down about not being someone in my own right. How else could I have travelled the world and yet retained the spirit of my country with me?

Time freezes in the kaleidoscope of past images, of river-rafting in Nepal, volunteering at the paralympics in South Korea, skiing (with not much success) in Finland, learning to dance the Baile in Panama, watching the Chhau dancers from Odisha enthral audiences in Colombo, as they appreciated a dance form similar to theirs. The make-up process of the Kathakali troupe was another fascinating experience for the public in Panama.

I can still feel the sense of unease regarding the airport being closed down in Antananarivo, a few days before we were to arrive there and the crisis that ensued later for some months or my disbelief at standing on the shore of the River Nile thinking how calm the water seemed, despite the fiery negotiations on water rights?

Or the sadness that lingers, for I still mourn the death of good people we once knew, assassinated for their beliefs. Then I recall the lighter moments! One wet, dreary afternoon overseas, I watched an 'Etiquette Expert' on a television programme declare that it is quite all right to eat the following with your fingers: Artichoke (pull away the leaf, dip in sauce, scrape flesh off base of leaf with the top of your teeth, discard leaf), Asparagus, Bacon, Bread (must be broken, never cut), Cookies, Corn on the Cob, Fast Foods, Hors d' Oeuvres, Canapés, Crudites,

Sandwiches, Small Fruits, even berries with stems ... and to leave napkin neatly to the right of the dinner plate (no re-folding) at the end of a meal, after gentle dabbing my lips ... a far cry from the sorisa macchhahjola with rice that can only be eaten, relished rather, with one's fingers at home!

That I should never look too tired, too bored, too hungry, too angry, or slouch in my chair, to keep social conversations short; avoid talking about topics that evoke opinions or emotions, namely religion, politics, money; that I shouldn't interrupt anyone's speech or help finish their sentences ...

That I should never put my purse, evening bag on the table or retouch my lipstick or settle my hair, and remember to send a handwritten 'thank you' note within 24 hours.

On a serious note, customs do differ the world over and it can be nonplussing for a new wife or spouse to encounter the intricacies of a formal Western 'sit-down' dinner with strange vegetables, though such formality is becoming redundant.

What can a new spouse do when planning her/his first representational dinner? What do the terms of attire have to do with the food to be served: Formal/Informal/Casual? (I have come across 'Optional' too, but then, at age 45 and after 15 years in the diplomatic world, nothing fazed me!). Why does she/he hesitate to call the Head of Mission's spouse? Or the other spouses, with whom she/he has yet to form a rapport with? If formal dinners were not the norm in a person's home, one cannot blame the little things that may be inadvertently overlooked by the novice.

Of course, a husband and wife team effort would be laudable, but diplomats rarely have the time to indulge in this pastime - of casting a memorable and different Indian menu. Or maybe they do nowadays? It would be interesting to know. An acquaintance from the West once confessed to agonising for three days over a formal menu, for a dinner with local dignitaries.

I often have too.

Then the question of which wines to serve with Indian food, (must we? moot point) to complement all the tarkaris, makhanis, mughlai, handi, kadhai, tawa dishes etc and bhajas and chutneys and pulses, the pickles ... quite a difficult task if you have always been vegetarian and never had a drink in your life.

We diplomatic spouses are a global phenomenon, the 'observers' in contrast to our diplomatic spouses, the 'actors' in the world of contemporary diplomacy. Consider this, Professor Petr Skalnik, Czech anthropologist and diplomat, in his article entitled *Anthropology of Diplomacy: A New Sub-field*.





H.E. Sibabrata Tripathi, India's High Commissioner for Kenya and Smt. Jayshree Tripathi, at the University of Nairobi on Gandhi Jayanti - also celebrated as the UN International Day of Non-Violence

The intricacies of the bouquet of each definite French wine, or the easy spirit of the young-bodied California (my memories flash unbidden to our very own and very sweet princess, which was available only in Goa three decades ago). I have tasted other Indian wines since then, the Sula and Grover labels come to mind, and I must commend a Goan 'sparkling wine', even if it was initially accepted as a 'tolerable table wine' by the French!

Now, onto the 'Art of Conversing'.

A while ago, browsing the web I came across this interesting article written

under the pseudonym, Vita Urbis: "... Grace is pleased to be back home in Canada for a while. Truth be told, she found the last posting a bit trying, what with the oppressive heat and the flies and the servants you could never really rely on to prepare food properly or hygienically. She had to supervise constantly. Sometimes she actually had to do things herself..."

Grace was ever mindful of Rule Number One in the Diplomatic Spouses' Guide to Living Abroad: Be charming and never, ever, utter a single word about anything. Not a word. About anything.

Grace has been a Diplomatic Wife Extraordinaire for 40 years and has the ability to rise gamely (smile always-at the ready) to whatever demanding occasion his career with External, as she still insists on calling it, has thrown her way.

Not only can she whip up a gourmet dinner for 12 at an hour's notice (our cooking takes much longer, especially due to the number or variety of dishes we generally tend to serve), is a part of fund-raising galas, the Diplomatic Spouses' Association, and a real sport, as her friends point out and if anyone can measure out her life in sterling silver coffee spoons, she can (The Ottawa Citizen May 17th 1999).

Familiar thoughts, the world over!

We diplomatic spouses are a global phenomenon, the 'observers' in contrast to our diplomatic spouses, the 'actors' in the world of contemporary diplomacy. Consider this, Professor Petr Skalnik, Czech anthropologist and diplomat, in his article entitled Anthropology of Diplomacy: A New Sub-field, talks of a group of anthropologists with experience in diplomacy who were to discuss "... their fascinating experiences in a coveted profession clouded in myth and ritual. How diplomats treat people in their host country, how they relate among themselves as members of a Corps Diplomatique, how they work and live together in an embassy and how (do) they cooperate with their Home Ministry".

There is not much emphasis on the spouses, called the 'observers' and children, an area of accompanying 'family' that is both sensitive and fraught with complications. These can arise from, say, the need to work, to continue a career or do research, as well as take into account the children's schooling, their psychological well-being, after being continuously uprooted and taken away from friends and relatives. We do not have 'in-house' counsellors. Teenagers would rather listen to someone else's mother or father. Family counsellors are necessary to cope with the tremendous pressures children face daily in this day and age. Times are different. Not everyone can cope. Yet we are an integral part of the 'Mission Family'.

We as a 'family' have grown and every step has been a learning experience. More and more women are now able to live and work overseas mainly due to the efforts of the earlier nurturers and leaders. They have shown the way to manage a life of great responsibility. It is this that makes it all worthwhile.

Still, a question hovers in my mind - will all the people I have met over three decades reduce me to samosas and gulab jamuns or tandoori chicken with butter naan?!!

Seriously though, I do hope they will recall my support in their times of need, during a family bereavement or a child's christening or a special prayer session. I hope they will have appreciated my helping hand at one of their functions, my speech composed to complement their activity of the year. Will they recall the time I have spent visiting hospitals with hampers for the babies born on



Spouses of Heads of Mission (SHOM) at India House, Nairobi, wearing traditional sarees. SHOM was founded in Kenya by Smt. Jayshree Tripathi

Independence Day, my volunteering hours and hours for charity work that often leaves one drained, both emotionally and physically?

Will my local staff recall my frustration at their careless handling of our crystal (serious matter) or losing my dinner napkins (trivial)? Or my listening to their hopes and aspirations and helping out with some significant contribution before we departed, to help them and their children?

We have to keep abreast with globalisation and changing trends. We need to modify our styles of representation without losing our identities. It is this very individuality that will temper and enhance whatever new norms we accept. There is no question of aping other nations. We are fortunate to be able to draw from our expansive standard cultural traditions and complement them in our unique ways. That will be the true hallmark of 'Spouse Diplomacy' of the future.

It is the people, all the languages, the religions, even the colours, the richness and diversity of our nation that forms the very strength of our service. No matter where we are, the tricolour will always bring tears to the eyes, as we listen to the strains of the national anthem or just watch it flutter in the breeze, in an alien land.


Diplomacy has changed drastically in the last decade. New internal rules have come into place too.

Many of the 'gen-next' are wary of marrying into the Indian Foreign Service, as they are intent on rising in their own careers. However, accompanying spouses nowadays may work, with permission, in varied professions. They have many

opportunities to study, learn new languages, volunteer at schools and charitable organisations, travel into realms once only read about and discover the heritage of new cultures.

Thirteen months into retirement now – in reflection of the decades gone by, I hope people will choose to remember me for my undivided attention, as I listened to their words. Yes, that would please me!

The writer is an 'arranger of words' and a nomadic teacher since 1983. She has a Master of Arts Degree in English Literature from Delhi University (1978) and a Post Graduate Diploma in Human Rights Law (2001) from the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. She worked briefly in print media in the 1980's and has been an examiner in English for the International Baccalaureate Diploma. As the spouse of a recently retired Foreign Service officer in India's civil services, she has lived and taught across three continents, in diverse cultures – where vacancies existed and were permissible. Her interests include human rights for all and world 'news and views'. She considers herself to be a constant learner. Her published works include: "The Sorrow of Unanswered Questions" (2001 International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka); Dilemmas and Scattered Weaves: Musings in Narrative Verse, Flash Vignettes of Travels through the Diaspora" (2014 Quills Publishing); "Tales in Verse from India for Children Everywhere" Vols. 1&2 (2014, Pothi; Book Baby).



SPORTS DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SPORT: DIPLOMATIC TOOL OR STIRRER OF TROUBLED WATERS?

BY PROFESSOR ALAN TOMLINSON

The founder of the modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, once called sport the ‘free trade’ of the future: *“Let us export runners, rowers and fencers; there is the free trade of the future, and on the day when it is introduced within the walls of old Europe the cause of peace will have received a new and mighty stay”*.

De Coubertin believed that sport could generate necessary forms of competition between nations, but within boundaries of tolerance defined by the rules of the game, the spirit of ‘fair play’ derived from the organised games cultivated in Britain’s elite, male public schools, and the principle of a truce that was said to have been adopted by the ancient city-states of Greece so that conflicts could be suspended to allow the Olympic Games to take place. Raised in France, entering adulthood in the wake of his country’s humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, de Coubertin saw sport as a means of restoring national pride, whilst simultaneously fostering forms of international cooperation that could re-educate the youth of competing nations.

In 1892, addressing a meeting at the Sorbonne in Paris, de Coubertin speculated on the fate of athletics, emphasising its democratic and international nature. And he pointed to the ‘unexpected prospects’ that were opened up by this internationalism. Other indices of modernity – railways, the telephone, the telegraph, science, congresses, exhibitions – had, he said “Done more for peace than any treaty or diplomatic convention” and, he hoped, “Athletics will do even more”.

Of course Olympic Games in Athens, Paris, St. Louis, London and Stockholm did little to stem the currents of international rivalry that fuelled World War I. However, the Olympic story was continued after that war and also after World War II, even though the last pre-war Summer Olympics was the Berlin games of 1936. At that event, Hitler’s chief propagandist Joseph Goebbels could claim: “German organisation, German hospitality and German enthusiasm for Olympic ideals created the background for an incomparable example of true Olympic competition. The German nation, thus, provided the world with renewed proof of its capability and its willingness to cooperate in large international projects designed to further international peace”. He hailed the games as a ‘true festival of peace’ that could further ‘the happiness of nations,

contributing to the welfare of the peoples of the world and creating a bridge upon which the different countries meet one another.’ The master propagandist of Germany’s Nazi regime here appropriated the language and the tone of the classic diplomat. So, not only was the idealistic claim of de Coubertin rendered impotent, in the context of the international rivalries and the military might of nations; his very language could be ruthlessly appropriated by ideologues as extreme as Goebbels. It seems then that any aspiration to employ sport as a means of diplomatic communication or as a mechanism for diplomatic relations is subject to distortion, doomed as an ideal.

Indeed a wholly opposed scenario might develop, best expressed in George Orwell’s words, written in 1945, in which sporting encounters become little more than ‘war minus the shooting’; in this scenario, sport, far from a peace-inducing project, ‘is an unfailing cause of ill-will’. He was writing in the wake of a football tour of Moscow Dynamos in the autumn of 1945, just weeks after the end of World War II, in which ‘bad feeling’ was expressed in the matches, and argued that at ‘the international level sport is frankly mimic warfare’ in which ‘the most savage combative instincts are aroused’. In Orwell’s dystopian view of competitive sport and organised games, the only place for diplomatic endeavour would be in counting up the casualties and informing the next of kin.

Sport’s potential as a diplomatic tool lies, if anywhere, somewhere in between the extremes of de Coubertinesque idealism and Orwellian negativity.¹ Is this potential likely to be achieved in the 21st century? Specialist scholars of international relations and diplomacy have turned their attention to sport, arguing that sport has developed an unprecedented and exceptionally visible profile in a globalising world, acting as a force for the diffusion and redistribution of political and economic power. They link this to the ‘relative rise in the importance of soft power’, generating expanded forms of persuasion and attraction in international relations since the Cold War came to an end.² Diplomacy, it is argued, is a primary tool of soft power; increased interest in diplomacy, and place-branding of cities and nations, can draw upon international sporting events and schedules. Look at Qatar, for instance, a tiny, oil-rich and controversially autocratic state, which has landed the men’s FIFA World Cup for 2022, world cycling championships and international athletic

The developed world is also ignoring India’s long-term demand for better coordination of monetary policies globally. The fear amongst emerging markets of the spill-over effects of the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy on currencies remains. The former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, has repeatedly called for a new Bretton Woods-like agreement on monetary policies.





Back in 1966 when England won the men's football **World Cup**, playing all its games at **Wembley Stadium**, having longer rests between matches than its closest rivals, the **World Cup** was presented to the England Captain Bobby Moore by Queen Elizabeth II, which was overlooked by Sir Stanley Rous, the then president of FIFA.



events. Alongside the country's tourist policy and savvy art market, sporting events allow Qatar to present a welcoming face to the world, both protecting its economy for when the oil-revenue runs low, and seeking to internationalise and add a cosmopolitan dimension to an elitist, dictatorial regime in which democracy, women's rights or ethnic equality are anathema to the dynastic ruling class.

Lately, scholars have also distinguished between two categories of sports diplomacy: one is a well-established approach, in which 'sport is employed by governments as an instrument of diplomacy'; the second is 'international-sport-as-diplomacy', that refers to the forms of diplomatic communication, representation and negotiation that take place in and around international sporting competition, involving primarily non-state actors such as the International Olympic Committee or international sporting federations (such as football's much-maligned and recently disgraced FIFA).³ The first of these forms is small in scale, as many international sports have no official link to state diplomacy. The second outstrips the first in scale, generating countless controversies and revelations of corruption across international sports governance, expedited by the absence of any forms of monitoring or accountability in organisations often ruled solely by the power of their own internal structures, such as the FIFA Congress. However, internationalised sport has become so anchored in global media culture in recent years that Murray and

Pigman also identify a newer 21st century category of 'specialised diplomacy of international sport'.

Such specialised diplomacy is far removed from the occasional appearances of statesmen and women at high-profile sporting encounters, or even the explicit commitment of a state ministry to sport development on the international stage, of which France was a highly influential pioneer.⁴ And, it also goes beyond international-sport-as-diplomacy, as it recognises the need for negotiation between a multitude of actors to frame, plan, allocate or stage the mega sporting event. Hence, a breed of lobbyists, agents, PR teams, corporate sponsors and media outlets complement the city or the state seeking to attract an international event; the sporting spectacle has in this sense come to represent industry of event-seeking and management in which layers of interested parties purport to contribute to the 'diplomatic' dynamic and momentum necessary for the securing of the biggest events.

Back in 1966 when England won the men's football World Cup, playing all its games at Wembley Stadium, having longer rests between matches than its closest rivals, the Word Cup was presented to the England Captain Bobby Moore by Queen Elizabeth II, which was overlooked by Sir Stanley Rous, the then president of FIFA, whose friend Arthur Drewry had been president of FIFA just under 6 years earlier when the world governing body awarded England the competition, backing a bid from The FA led by its then Secretary, Sir Stanley





Rous. Some Europeans and South Americans called ‘foul’ on what looked like a stitch-up by and for the English, but Rous’s FIFA took no action. Rous was seen as a skilled diplomat, having also worked with Britain’s Foreign Office to resolve issues of sensitivity concerning the flag of the communist North Korea, entering the competition after a play-off with Australia following the mass withdrawal of African and Asian teams.⁵ But in essence, Rous was a power-broking networker who could work a room and mobilise support in ways that might today be seen as morally reprehensible, and verging on the corrupt.

International sport governance certainly needs more diplomats and fewer crooks in its ranks. However, it must also learn from history and precedent, and balance the idealism of sporting enthusiasts with the commercial and political forces that shape the political economy of modern sport. Some of the contemporary demands on international sport are higher than it has ever faced before; classic forms of diplomacy are needed, for instance, for interactions with the man who sanctioned the doping cover-ups of Russian athletes of recent years, especially for and at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics. But then again, if diplomatic players in the modern sporting world find themselves faced by Vladimir Putin or his political-sporting czar Vitaly Mutko, perhaps the soft power that has broadened the diplomatic potential and profile of sport has peaked; the Russian Federation, among but also a strong influence upon many others, has torn up the diplomatic rulebook, and perhaps international sport is after all ‘war minus the shooting’.

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The writer is an internationally renowned scholar and researcher on the social history and sociology of sport, leisure and popular culture. He has contributed prominently to the growth of sport studies as an established field of scholarly and academic endeavour, co-founded the pioneer degree programme in sport journalism at the University of Brighton, and has edited/authored over thirty volumes and over 100 articles/chapters. Dr Tomlinson’s research interests focus on the application of cultural studies to the analysis of sport. The study of sport as part of a critical sociology of consumption. Challenges of investigative sociology and the nature of sport journalism. *Sport and spectacle*.

TRACK 1.5 DIPLOMACY IN THE CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

BY DR LEONARDO PAZ NEVES

It is widely said that conflicts are changing. There is a growing complexity in the way interstate and intrastate conflicts are intertwined. And yet, there is an unprecedented protagonist role from the international society (with its diverse array of actors) in local conflicts, and that has added further complications for the traditional barriers of the sovereignty.

Traditionally, one way, or the main way, of addressing conflicts in the international system was through the Formal Diplomacy carried out by diplomats (here called Track I Diplomacy). Diplomacy is a tool of foreign policy that is used to establish contacts with other countries (and currently, also with international institutions). Generally speaking, it is a state-to-state approach.

In the context of conflict, the Track One Diplomacy has several strengths, the most notable ones being:

1. Political power;
2. Access to military;
3. Capacity to access resources on a large scale (financial and material);
4. Access to diplomatic corps, with broad knowledge on other states' affairs and on international relations;
5. Better positioned to promote larger initiatives and/or to exert pressure for behaviour change.

Nonetheless, the Track One Diplomacy also has several weaknesses:

1. Sometimes power may corrupt the conflict resolutions efforts, in the sense that it may disregard some pivotal interests from weaker (and often non state) actors;
2. Track One Diplomacy has to obey a certain protocol that constraints fluid communication and generally requires a considerable amount of time to achieve results;
3. Diplomatic missions also normally work well before and after the conflict, at the peak of the conflict, they withdraw, as a general rule;
4. Since Track One is carried out by State, its position is quite rigid as it has to abide by the foreign policy principles;

5. In democracies, Track One Diplomacy is largely affected by electoral cycles.

Despite the fact that the Track One Diplomacy is still the major platform where negotiations for conflict resolution occur, it has been complemented, for quite a long time, for the Track Two Diplomacy.

Track Two Diplomacy is widely known as 'unofficial or informal diplomacy'. It operates through the interaction of members of rival parties of a given conflict (and often with a third party). Among those members, we can include individuals, associations, political parties, religious groups, etc. The main idea is that this modality should function as a complement for the Track One initiatives, allowing groups of the civil society to gather support and, sometimes, prepare the ground for official negotiations. That modality is particularly useful in intrastate conflicts or interstate conflicts with a large component of local tensions and communal violence.

The Track Two alternative has some advantages when related to the Track One, for instance:

1. It is not (necessarily) co-opted by power and/or politics, therefore it can address issues at the grassroots level, which is a great confidence building trait;
2. Track Two actors have less political constraints, especially regarding losing its constituencies, since they are the constituencies themselves;
3. This alternative manages to empower groups that are alienated from the debate/negotiation. That ability helps to give platform to these groups, which generate a sense of ownership of the process for those groups;
4. It does not cease after the conflict erupts. The Track Two is viable in all circumstances;
5. It not affected by electoral cycles. Despite the fact that Track Two Diplomacy constitutes an important complement for the formal Diplomacy, it has its own disadvantages:
 - a. Track two actors have limited reach, access and influence in foreign policy and on political structures;



Martti Ahtisaari



- b. Track Two generally generate results on a long term perspective;
- c. Despite the fact that Track may operate in conflict situations, it has not enough power and/or resources to change its dynamics;
- d. Due to the scarce resources, Track Two actors rarely manage to sustain long negotiations and implement agreements;
- e. Track Two negotiations have little effect on authoritarian countries, since their regimes are less sensitive (and less influenced) to its civil society groups;
- f. Due to the possible multiplicity of players, Track Two actors are generally less coordinated and tend to overlap other initiatives.

Despite the fact that Track One and Track Two Diplomacy are supposed to be complementary, they still are unable to cover all the possibilities and cope with many issues at hand. Their weaknesses and disadvantages, together, still leave some gaps. To address those gaps, a third and new possibility emerged. The Track One and a Half Diplomacy is an alternative that, as the name suggests, function between the formal and informal diplomacy.

The Track One and a Half Diplomacy, thus, is the interaction between a government or a formal representative of the warring party of a given conflict and a non-state actor – usually, an individual characterised by high degree of legitimacy and influence (they are often former presidents, high ranking international officials or prominent leaders). This interaction is naturally informal, given the fact that this individual does not represent his (or any other)

government. However, given to his/her standing, they have the access that ordinary non-state actors do not have.

The Track One and a Half actor often is characterised by several important qualities that qualify him/her for this position. The main characteristics are - large political and academic visibility - as mentioned, this actor not only has a deep political background, but he/she also is also widely recognised by his/her knowledge in a given theme and/or region. They also enjoy great respect by the international community (and especially by the actors involved in the conflict). This respect is normally translated into a sense of confidence from the parties involved in the negotiations. And more importantly, Track One and a Half actors often have better access to public and private funds to sustain their initiatives.

It is possible to identify some important initiatives that illustrate this alternative to the Track One and Track Two Diplomacy. In 2005, the former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari headed a mediation initiative between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government. The result of this initiative was the signature of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding that determined abandonment of the independence claim of the Aceh region and the disarmament from the side of the Free Aceh Movement and the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops from the region.

Another important example is the Guinea Worm Ceasefire negotiated by the Carter Center (led by the former US President Jimmy Carter), between the Sudan Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. In 1995, during the civil war in Sudan, large portions of the country were virtually inaccessible to health aid workers due to the insecurity on the field. To deal with the situation, the former president and Center managed to negotiate the longest humanitarian ceasefire up to that moment to allow that humanitarian aid reach the population. The ceasefire lasted for almost 6 months and helped to pave the way to the eradication of the Guinea Worm Disease.

As mentioned before, the growing complexity of the current conflicts demands a new and comprehensive set of tools and methods to address these conflicts. Track One and a Half Diplomacy is an interesting and important initiative. However, it is not enough; there is a dire need of new alternatives that can complement the negotiation and mediation efforts from various tensions across the globe.

The writer is a Political Scientist, Study and Debate Coordinator at the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) and a Professor in the Department of International Relations at IBMEC. He has worked with the civil affairs section of the Joint Center for Peace Operations in Brazil (CCOPAB) and he was Executive Coordinator of International Conflict Prevention Analysis Group (GAPCon/UCAM). He has a degree in Social Sciences from the Federal Fluminense University (UFF), a Masters' from IUPERJ and is a PhD from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He published the books "Failed states and the axis of evil in American security policy" and "The CEBRI and International Relations in Brazil", this later having received the Economic Culture Trophy of the Journal of Commerce in 2014. Leonardo Paz has experience in Political Science and International Relations, with focus on international conflicts, failed states, peacekeeping, democracy, security policy in South America and the USA, South-South cooperation and human rights.



AMERICA'S TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

BY DR C. DALE WALTON

The ceasefire that ended the 1991 conflict, ultimately proved to be a chain anchoring US prestige to the behaviour of the perpetually troublesome Saddam Hussein. In early 1991, few observers assumed that Saddam not only would survive the war's aftermath - strengthening his domestic political position through the use of massive, sometimes genocidal violence - but that he then would proceed to 'bait' Washington for the next dozen years.



The 1991 Persian Gulf War was a diplomatic and military triumph for the United States, with a huge, de facto US-led coalition efficiently removing the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. After this victory, however, a quarter century of trouble began for Washington,¹ with misfortunes and mistakes piling one upon another; by the Obama Administration's second term. The US position in the Middle East was gravely diminished and the region itself was in the midst of long historical crisis where end appears nowhere in sight.

The ceasefire that ended the 1991 conflict, ultimately proved to be a chain anchoring US prestige to the behaviour of the perpetually troublesome Saddam Hussein. In early 1991, few observers assumed that Saddam not only would survive the war's aftermath - strengthening his domestic political position through the use of massive, sometimes genocidal violence - but that he then would proceed to 'bait' Washington for the next dozen years. When initially drawn up, the ceasefire seemingly was an inadequate instrument for purpose of coercive diplomacy. Indeed, the consequences that Iraq continuously paid for Saddam's provocations - most importantly, the continuing sanctions that largely destroyed the country's economy even before the 2003 invasion - were deadly serious. A prudent leader would have yielded to the will of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and attempted to regain entry into the international community, but Saddam was both imprudent and indifferent to the sufferings of the Iraqi populace.

Enforcement of Iraqi good behaviour widely came to be seen as a US, not UNSC, responsibility, and Washington was constantly embarrassed by Saddam's defiance for over a decade. The 2003 invasion of Iraq certainly reflected the GW Bush Administration's (dangerously naïve) 'freedom agenda' for the Middle East and that wider world, but it also was the product of sheer exasperation on the part of US policymakers. Ironically, it was hoped that a 'quick fix' of Mesopotamia would allow Washington to refocus on other foreign policy priorities.

American influence with Turkey and Egypt has declined markedly in recent years. With regard to Egypt, Obama's willingness to support the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government of Mohamed Morsi - even as that regime seemed to be moving toward the consolidation of theocratic authoritarianism - destroyed his credibility with anti-Brotherhood Egyptians. It is unlikely that Washington's influence in Egypt soon will recover; certainly,

former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton can expect little deference from Egyptian counterparts offended by her previous 'pro-Brotherhood' actions.

Lately, the US relationship with Israel has also been difficult with the US president and Israeli prime minister more or less publicly acknowledging their mutual disdain and distrust. At the same time, US relations with Saudi Arabia are strained, in large part because of Washington's attempts to effect a rapprochement with Iran, a state that the Saudi government treats (whether wisely or not) as an implacable, existential enemy. After decades of obsessively cultivating their relationship with Washington, many Saudi leaders are clearly disgruntled and inclined to downgrade their purported 'special relationship' with the United States.

Washington's response to the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars has been confused. Washington's willingness - albeit after some vacillation - to overthrow the Gaddafi government sent a worryingly mixed message, as, in recent years, Gaddafi had attempted to improve relations with the West and even surrendered his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. The country's subsequent collapse into a failed state has not sharpened Washington's reputation for farsightedness - and also helped to create Europe's current refugee crisis, as hundreds of thousands seeking passage across the Mediterranean have flowed to the chaotic Libyan coast.

The Syrian Civil War has proven even more troublesome for Washington than Libya's, with Washington's efforts to oust Bashar Assad thus far having been thwarted. Worse still, warnings that Damascus must not employ chemical weapons - as doing so would cross a 'red line' - were blatantly defied, with no real consequences beyond further bluster from Washington. Russia's relationship with the Obama Administration is generally hostile, and it has played its limited hand of cards ably, keeping its Syrian client from complete defeat while frustrating Washington's designs.

The rise of ISIS is the most horrifying development to emerge from the Iraq/Syria maelstrom, and Washington's Middle East policy - most particularly, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 - played an unfortunate part in creating the conditions for it. This was, it should be emphasised, a matter of unpredicted future developments, not active malfeasance. In 2003, the notion that the overthrow of the Iraqi government somehow would create the space necessary for a hyper-violent terrorist group to establish semi-permanent control over



Transformational Diplomacy is a diplomacy initiative championed by former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for reinvigorating American Foreign Policy and the United States Foreign Service.

substantial populations and resources simply would have seemed preposterous. Predicting the future is a decidedly imperfect art, as events following the 2003 invasion demonstrated; by striking a fatal blow against the decayed regional order, the GW Bush Administration unwittingly released the furies.

The Obama Administration's nuclear negotiations with Iran represent a truly transformational diplomatic effort, but it also reflects the grave decline of US power in the Middle East. A long series of flawed decisions by the Clinton, GW Bush, and Obama Administrations have, cumulatively, helped both to destabilise the region and compromise Washington's ability to guide future events. Washington hopes the Iran nuclear deal will eliminate one of the most troubling regional security issues - the prospect of nuclear acquisition by an Islamist government that, for decades, has openly worked to dismantle the current world order. Moreover, the Obama Administration has made abundantly clear its anticipation that Iran not only will remain non-nuclear but also will progressively abandon its attempts to damage global order in general and eventually will establish a permanent détente with the West. This truly would be transformative; a US-friendly and status quo-oriented Tehran would alter the strategic calculus enormously, perhaps even allowing a recalibration of Saudi-

Iranian and Israeli-Iranian relations and opening a way forward to settlement of the Syrian Civil War and the final elimination of ISIS.

The current Saudi and Israeli governments, however, clearly have a far less optimistic vision of Iran's future behaviour. They demonstrate no discernable faith in the denuclearisation aspect of the Iran agreement, much less in the notion that Tehran is on the verge of a 'foreign policy overhaul' that would dramatically and permanently alter not only the behaviour of the Islamic Republic, but its entire perspective on the current global order. Unfortunately, the events of recent months have done much to bolster the argument for pessimism. Iranian international behaviour has not improved discernibly, since the deal's completion in mid-2015; arguably it has worsened. In January 2016, Revolutionary Guards even had the temerity to parade US Navy sailors, who had been seized after accidentally drifting into Iranian waters, before video cameras - a scene depressingly reminiscent of the Iran Hostage Crisis, one of the greatest American humiliations of the 20th century.

US diplomatic and military leverage has corroded massively during the post-1991 period, particularly in the last decade. President Obama's risky wagering of many of the remaining US 'poker chips' on the Iranian nuclear agreement was and is understandable, given the paucity of palatable alternative paths. However, the underlying reality should be acknowledged: the 'Iran breakthrough plan' is a desperate stratagem. It may work, and, if so, resolve only the region's major security issues (Iranian WMD acquisition) and even might open grand new possibilities for settlement of other problems bedevilling the region. The latter, however, is very unlikely: the purported evidence that Iran's government is undergoing a radical change in general worldview is far from overwhelming. Even if Tehran has abandoned all nuclear ambitions, it may merely have concluded that there are better, less risky ways by which to undermine the global order and work toward its eventual collapse.

Iran might well continue to refrain from building nuclear weapons in coming years - the immediate objective of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - and, if so, that would be the most significant US victory in the Middle East in some years. However, it is also entirely possible that Iran will simply profit from the deal as much as possible while continuing its nuclear program, just as North Korea did with the Clinton-era Agreed Framework. In either case, however, the likelihood that nuclear diplomacy eventually will lead to a more general positive transformation of the Middle Eastern security environment is far, far smaller than the Obama Administration wish to admit - particularly to itself.

References:

¹ The term "Middle East" as used herein excludes reference to countries in Central or South Asia. Although countries such as Afghanistan Pakistan are, justifiably, often referred to as part of the "Greater Middle East," from an US policymaking perspective "Af-Pak" presents its own set of unique challenges. "Af-Pak" thus may be considered, for the purposes at hand, to be a distinct foreign policy "theater" that is beyond the scope of this essay.

The writer is Associate Professor of international relations at Lindenwood University; his areas of interest include - Geopolitics US military-strategic history; Strategy and the US presidency; Strategic relationships and security problems in Asia.



“Art is my paradise. When I enter, I forget the rest. Colors and Me...that is the entirety of that moment.”

BY ‘nishu’ NATASHA CHADHA BHAMBRI

So, to begin with, please know me as ‘nishu’ Natasha Chadha Bhambri, a Contemporary Visual Artist. Apart from creating artworks in various mediums and exhibiting them in India and Abroad, I have been taking onsite projects of Art installations, Murals and Sculptural creations. My signature works being called Maati Bandhus (Local Sand Sculptures).

I am currently spearheading a unique art project called ‘ART CONNECT’ at Gurgaon District Prison, with a vision of giving an expanse to art above and beyond decor and investment. I’ll be writing for the coming six months, from this corner of ‘The Diplomatist’, I’ll be extending my perceptions on - Art and it’s Connect with our lives. For any inputs on the Perceptions of Art or The Project- Art Connect, please feel free to place your query on the FB Page @ Nishu2016ArtConnect or mail us at natashabhambri@gmail.com.

To me, Art has always been more ... It didn’t have to only colour the walls, it was meant to colour the sheer fabric of our society. As I grew in my fraternity, I understood better, how can my vision be realised and thus emerged- ‘ART CONNECT’, where while, we were beautifying the prison compound and spreading positive energy for both the prison staff and the inmates alike, we were also, imparting a dependable skill to the inmates, with a hands on training for future, so that they become an asset to the society instead of a threat. While colouring this small dark corner of our society, the hopes of colouring the bigger picture with brighter hues kept getting stronger. With the cooperation of the Gurugram Prison Department and India Vision Foundation and, of course, our team of inmates, we have successfully set a precedent via the strong messages conveyed through the walls and artworks in, on and all around the prison.

Let’s get to know about ‘ART CONNECT’. It is a Pilot Art Project being run at GURGRAM DISTRICT PRISON Haryana by Mr Harinder Singh. SP (GDP), Haryana Prison Department, Monica Dhawan - Director ‘IVF’ – INDIA VISION FOUNDATION - (An NGO initiative of Dr Kiran Bedi) and ‘nishu’ NATASHA CHADHA BHAMBRI - Indian Contemporary Visual Artist - (Art Connect).

It all started with some enthusiastic and absolutely inspiring words from Dr Kiran Bedi. She foresaw that if Art got connected to prisons, it could shower new colours on the social landscape. And just like that, she passed this baton of hope to the project called ‘ART CONNECT’ - A path leading the inmates to a new life, and in turn, the society, itself. This is a determined effort in the same direction of keeping the inmates constructively occupied and their skill

training be done with hands-on experience with the Masters. Simultaneously, we create permanent artworks in the prison compound which brings positivity all around making it an inspiring place for inmates and the Prison staff, equally. The Gurugram Prison, today, boasts of Murals, Assemblage Murals, recycled wall mounts, installations, Texture works and Sculptures (Malbaa Bandhu, Maati Work (nishu’s signature work) Wire works Metal work, Pebble work, Wood Chip work, etc.).

Art has been in Galleries, Airports, Farmhouses, Collections and museums for long. It’s time it served the ‘bigger purpose’....Connect hearts with Art..Where it’s been most needed for the longest time. The dark untouched corners of the society filled with people against their own. Art has reached where no one wants to and dares to tread and is subtly attempting to light up the corner for bigger benefits of humanity.

The certified and experienced trainee inmates can be reintegrated in the society with a positive and strengthened path to follow. In the direction of ‘Saving the next victim’. When this project started it seemed like a far reaching endeavour but, with the overwhelming cooperation of the Inmates, Prison Authorities, IVF and ART CONNECT we have the exemplary prison in Gurgaon laden with art inside out. A team of 8 hard working inmates was the backbone of the first leg of this project. Aman, Manish, Ravi, Parveen, Anand, Hari, Subhash and Babulal. They knew what it meant to all of us. The combination of enthusiasm, patience and perseverance got the creativity to spread its best hues on this giant 5000sq ft canvas of the facade of the prison.

We started with an art workshop but soon enough entire prison became our canvas!

‘GuruGram District Prison has established itself as a role model for the rest of the prisons in the country under the ambitious leadership of SP Mr Harinder Singh. He has recently been honoured with the President’s award for his emphatic services in his domain. His enthusiasm, as everywhere else, was the strength Of the project ‘ART CONNECT’.

The pillar of support, throughout this project, has been –

India Vision Foundation (IVF), Delhi based Non - Governmental organization (NGO), which recently completed its 22 years. This foundation was born out of the Ramon Magsaysay Award (equivalent to Asian Nobel Prize conferred to Dr. Kiran Bedi, the first lady IPS (Indian Police Services) of India, for forging ‘positive relationships’ between people and police through creative leadership. IVF seeks to carry forward its service in all those areas which were the



basis of the award; namely Police and Prison Reforms; Women Empowerment with a mission statement to 'Save the next victim'. Presently, we are working in prisons of three states Delhi (Tihar), Haryana (Gurgaon, Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Bhiwani, Jhajjar, Rohtak and Sonapat) and Uttar Pradesh (Ghaziabad). The reformation activities in prison are based on a very unique 3S Model of Sanskar (Value Education), Shiksha (Education) and Skill (Training & Development). India Vision Foundation counsel, motivates, trains & skills communities inside and outside of prison.

They not only provide support to inmates in reformation and rehabilitation but also equip inmates to make a prison a better place by identifying their talents by conducting the analysis and then helping them to enhance their skills as per their requirement and interest. They collaborate with different corporate, volunteers, institutes to support them and their families. With a vision to bring about reformation they started a pilot project as ART CONNECT, which has transformed the prison inside out ...

These are few of the content-based artistic creations in the Prison compound: **'TITLOH'** is a creation not only to reinforce the reuse of the junk in a creative way but it intends to symbolically highlight the metamorphic journey that we envision the inmates to go through and become the butterflies of the skies of our social garden.

This Metallic installation comprises of wings of the discarded ceiling fans n exhaust fans, metal sheet of the kitchen chimney, small and big fence mesh and used cables.

'THE NESTING ROCKS'

Time and Tide shaped the rocks into smooth pebbles and ceaseless brushstrokes and sparkling hues transformed them into pretty birds nesting on the same branch. They may be different kind, colour and creed yet their journey and destination is the same.

The contrasting symbolic reference to the rocks n birds has been used in this artistic creation to depict the life story of every inmate. While brushstrokes are the efforts on skill development and bright hues are the positive motivation n support extended to them.

Thus..... **'THE NESTING ROCKS'**!!

'UDAAN'

This assemblage mural, created with the help of discarded wires and paints, depicts the eventual flight towards freedom we all aspire to take. In this case, inmates will connect with the work on their level for freedom from this prison. On other spiritual level, we all connect with this work because it's a journey we all have set on since our births. Flight of the spirit and the soul to attain the eternal enlightenment, in the form of ultimate freedom from all the shackles of life...we, thus, see the transformation of the human into a bird ready for its **'UDAAN'**

'HIS HAND'

Is a full wall mural created to motivate the inmates and convey...

"Sometimes, you can't see it but 'His Hand' (His Blessing) is always there to protect you. You might only see the problems you face but keep the faith that he is saving you from the bigger ones"

'MULAKAAT'

This creation is dedicated to the emotional pull between the inmates - 'the seekers' and visitors - 'the givers'. The stretch of the lower hand depicts the eagerness and strong urge and the gentleness of the upper hand expresses the care and concern, which is overseen by the humongous functional clock that symbolises the drastic impact of the 'never enough' time on these meetings thus....**'MULAKAAT'**.

Note - The **'MAATI WORK'** (Texture) in this artwork is a signature work of the contemporary visual artist 'nishu' Natasha Chadha Bhambri.

'FAÇADE OF THE PRISON'

'MUKTA-RASHTRA'

It's a symbolic compilation of national symbols to depict the strengths and vision of our Nation. A pair of two tranquil peacocks spread their feathers unto the skies, alongside the tri-coloured kites, depicting the national ambitions soaring high into the seven skies with calm and delight. The lotus, our national flower, in full bloom and blossoming yet depicts the prosperity in all senses of wealth that we cherish and foresee, as a nation. Advancing force to reckon with, which can be life giving so as taking, has been symbolised by the free flowing and falling waters, concluding into a serene flower of all hues, under the shadows of the Ashoka Stambha, our national emblem, a 'Maati' work, where all us - particles of sand, well bound for the nation strong enough as a Stambha, to face sun and moon. The parapet walls all along are displaying the complimenting unity and passion of each citizen. On extreme right, our national animal Tiger keeps guard of the peace depicting doves encircling the seven giant palm-prints, symbolising diversity in unity, in our nation, which was a dream of our father of the nation - Mahatma Gandhi. Bapu's presence in unique woodchip work highlights his lesson 'exclusivity in simplicity', while his lyrics still echo in our hearts. The national tree, stands tall, wide and deep depicting the stability of our systems and depth and spread of our cultural heritage. The nation gives a tribute to its martyrs, without whose sacrifices, nation just wouldn't be. The Amar Jawan Jyoti and India gate, engulfed by the shrubbery of emotions depicts the vision of a nation built on past n new footprints marking the sacrifices of all and growth in the greens, which is possible with the participation of all, as depicted by the Hasta-chakra. The central panel marks the strength of unity in diversity while staying rooted in our culture, still spreading global. The use of tribal art-form of 'Warli' to create 'Maati' base human figures on the backdrop of contemporary n myriad colour mixes is a silent interaction of the mélange.

It was a collaborative effort of lighting a candle in this dark corner of society.

I, as an artist, strongly believe that I can't change a person but I can change his heart with my art. I also have faith in the power of art to be able to make essential changes in the society with ease, only if, used by the right souls, for the right cause with the right intentions. Art can enrich the soul of the society... ..

I'll leave you with food for thought...

Art's Soul is Soul's Art wonder... ?

The writer is an Indian Contemporary Visual Artist. She can be contacted at www.lanishuartist.com and via Twitter - @nishubhambri

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International Departure, T3, IGI Airport, Delhi

APPAREL | PASHMINA | SILK | JEWELLERY | TEA | NEOVEDA SPA | DECOR

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