ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA DURING 2006-2008: IT'S IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ETHIOPIA

BY

DAWIT MEZGEBE TSEGAYE

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OCTOBER 2009

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Declaration

I, under singed declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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Dawit Mezgebe Tsegaye

October 2009

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

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Yacob Arsano (Ph D)

October 2009

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Acronyms

AEUO	All Ethiopian Unity Organization
AIAI	al - Ittihad al - Islamia
ALS	Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Movement
ANDO	Argoba National Democratic Organization
AU	African Union
BGPDUF	Benshangul- Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
EDL	Ethiopian Democratic League
EDUM	Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
ENDF	Ethiopia's National Defense Force
EPLF	Eritrean People Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GPDM	Gambela Peoples Democratic Movement
HNL	Harrari National League
HPR	House of Peoples Representative
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority for Development
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OFDM	Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries

OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice
PM	Prime Minister
REMDSJ	Rainbow Ethiopia Movement for Democracy and Social Justice
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
SDAF	Somali Democratic Alliance Forces
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian people's Democratic Movement
SMPDUO	Shecko Majenger Peoples Democratic Unity Organization
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPDP	Somali Peoples Democratic Party
UDJ	Unity for Democracy and Justice
UEDF	United Ethiopia Democratic Force
UEDP	MEDHIN -United Ethiopian Democratic Parity- MEDHIN
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	The United States
USC	United Somali Congress
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front

Abstract

The present study deals with Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 and its impact on the domestic politics and foreign relations of Ethiopia. The research found out Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia for two major reasons: (1) to assist the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia which made its call to the Ethiopian government, and (2) to avert the danger posed by the Union of Islamic Courts. The Ethiopia's military intervention is analyzed from the systemic, Nation-state and Individual decision making level of foreign policy analysis. Secondary data sources are used to conduct the study.

The domestic political impacts of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia are: (1) most of the political parties joined together in support of the military action. (2) The clear and present danger posed on Ethiopia's security was averted. (3) The ruling and the opposition political parties were divided. This helped the incumbent government to divert the public attention from the post-2005 election domestic political crisis. But on the other hand, the military intervention strengthened the opposition political parties in the parliament, by re-organizing themselves and creating opposition political forum. The relationship between the Christian and Muslim communities of Ethiopia continued peacefully. The military intervention helped to reduce the threat of instability in the Somali region of Ethiopia, although it did not abolish the insurgency problem in the region.

The merits of the military intervention to Ethiopia's relation with the Horn of Africa countries, the US and EU are: (1) Ousting the radicals from power in Somalia. (2) Legitimizing the Transitional government of Somalia. (3) Ethiopia's emergence as hegemonic power in the region; and (4) marginalization of the Eritrean government from the regional and continental organizations. The US and EU continued, the political, economic and development support in spite the post 2005 election crisis, because the Ethiopian government shifted the US and EU attention from focusing on domestic political crisis to the regional security. The demerits of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia include: (1) the conflict in Somalia has continued. (2) The intervention is perceived by the Muslims as US proxy war on terror. (3) The US and EU do not list the

ONLF and OLF as terrorist organizations.(4) Ethiopia’s withdrawal created power vacuum in Somalia, and (5) Somalia’s future remains unpredictable and complex.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Horn of Africa is one of the major geo-political regions of Africa, because of its geographical and political significance in terms of trade, religion, politics and culture. As Mengiste (2007: 13) defines, “the Horn of Africa's proximity to the Middle East and its links with the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the East, the Nile River in the West constitutes fundamental geographical facts that influence relations in the region.”

The Horn of Africa is important in terms of geography, because of its strategic significance in connecting “the three continents of Africa, Europe, and Asia” (Mengiste, 2007: 13). This geo-political strategic importance has made the region unstable and this is explained by Matthias (2008:7) as, “historically and currently, it is one of the conflict prone regions of Africa.” And “the greater Horn of Africa-including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda is a region of strategic importance. It is also a region in crisis” (Lyons, 2006: V). Since the topic of the paper is “Ethiopia’s Military Intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008: its impact on the Domestic and Foreign Relations of Ethiopia”, then the researcher will explain the major factors for the intervention as follows. The post-1990 Somalia, particularly after the removal of Said Barre's regime, has been the lawless and anarchic state in the Horn of Africa. This has caused the conflict and crisis with both domestic and external dynamics in Somalia, which led to the Ethiopia’s military intervention. The domestic political dynamics of the post-1991 Somalia, which contributed for the crisis and conflict in the country, have multiple factors and these, according to Weber (2008: 14) are:

> The conflict in Somalia is multi-leveled. The domestic causes of conflict lie in the disastrous fragmentation of warlord fiefdom, the absence of a state, the mushrooming of criminal networks, and repression of the population by warlords, factions of the Islamic courts movement, and the Transitional Federal Government.

On the other hand, the external dynamics of the conflict is coming from outside Somalia by different forces and from countries, which are supporting different factions for their own political purpose. As Weber (2008:14-15) further explains, thus:

> Beyond Somalia, a main factor in the war is the power struggle between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The absence of a legitimate

> government in Somalia facilitates this proxy war. Regional interests economic, political and ideological are played out in Somalia, relatively unhindered by a functional Somali state. The civil war in Somalia thus increases the existent polarization in the Horn of Africa.

This internal and external dynamics of the conflict has created non-stop war and violence in Somalia. Particularly the internal political dynamics has created the situation in which Somalia has been safe haven for Warlords, pirates, gangs and other Islamic radical movements in addition to the armed anti -Ethiopian government elements of the Oromo and Ogaden liberation movements. This situation created the non-stop civil war inside Somalia and has a negative impact on the Ethiopian national security and the region's peace. In order to end the Somalia civil war, stop the suffering of Somalia's people and ensure the security, wellbeing and stability of the region, the neighboring countries proposed the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which took place in Nairobi in October 2004. But the formation of the TFG of Somalia and its relation with Ethiopia is faced by stiff resistance from different factions and caused internal political unrest in Somalia which helped for the rise of Union of Islamic Courts that led to Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006 which is explained by (http://www.historyguy.com/ethiopia-somalia war-2006. html, 2008), as:

> In the latest phase of the long Somali civil war, Ethiopia intervened in late 2006 to aid the internationally recognized Somali government based in the city of Baidoa. The Transitional Government of Somalia (TGS) is opposed by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamic group which seized control of the national capital Mogadishu earlier in 2006 from a coalition of warlords.

In order to oust the ICU, and thereby to assist the TFG of Somalia and maintain its national security by avoiding the threat of the ICU, Ethiopia intervened militarily since December, 2006 (http://www.historyguy.com/ethiopia-somalia war-2006. html, 2008).If this situation invited the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, then does this intervention have an impact on the domestic and foreign relations of Ethiopia? The research analyzes these issues in-depth in the following chapters.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The end of Cold War has changed the political and geographical setup of the Horn of Africa such as, the emergence of new state (Eritrea), the change of regime in Ethiopia, and the foreign military intervention (that of UN and US) from 1992-1995 which according Dodds (2005: 165)

is, “justified and approved by the security council because the Somali state had collapsed and violent civil war had broken out.” Another important regional geo-political crisis that has played significant role in Somalia’s conflict and civil war is the Ethio-Eritrea border war of 1998-2000.According Henze (2001: 6), “two erstwhile friendly African states (Ethiopia and Eritrea), went to war in May 1998. Both were regarded as beacon of hope for the war torn Horn of Africa.” This boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea which is not still resolved is used to generate the proxy war in the failed state Somalia. Particularly, in 2006 as Lyons (2006: 3) explains, “the Horn of Africa witnessed major escalations in several conflicts.” One of these conflicts took place when Ethiopia intervened in Somalia militarily since 2006, for the main reason of defending its national interest and supporting the TFG. But the basic concern of the research is, does such intervention have an impact on the domestic and foreign relations of the country? For instance, in the case of domestic relation, do the people of Ethiopia fully support such intervention? Meaning, does the intervention enjoy the full-fledged support of both the opposition and the ruling party's members of parliament? What an effect does such an intervention have on the Somali Region of Ethiopia? In the post-1991 ethnically arranged federal system of Ethiopia, the different Somali clans wanted to dominate the Region’s administration. Particularly the struggle between the Ogaden and non-Ogaden clans intensified which threatened the Region’s and Ethiopia’s national security which is described by Aalen (2002:70), as:

> After the fall of the Derg, the Ogaden tribe dominated the regional administration, but later twelve clans united against them and Ogaden party was ousted from the regional government. This has led the Ogaden National Liberation Front [ONLF] to resort to violence to fight the new regional administration and the central government.

Such domestic political groups and their violent activities threatened the peace and development activities of Region Five and the Ethiopian state so that the Ethiopian government had been compelled to take military action against these forces which were based in Somalia to defend its national security and interest. In terms of foreign relations, does the military intervention have an impact on the relation of Ethiopia with the Horn of African countries, the US and EU?

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The research is intended to make valuable contribution on the Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia since 2006-2008, and its impact on the domestic and foreign relations of Ethiopia. The research aims to make further study on the issues such as, what forced the Ethiopian government to intervene in Somalia particularly since 2006, and what more immediate factors lead to the

intervention. Domestically, the study analyses the impact of the intervention on the relation between the ruling and the opposition political parties; the impact of the intervention on the peaceful coexistence of the Christian and Muslim population of Ethiopia; and the impact of the intervention on the peace and development activities of the region five (Somali region).With regard to the foreign relation of Ethiopia, the research analyses the impact of the intervention on the relation of Ethiopia with the Horn of Africa countries, the US and EU respectively, including the merits and demerits of the intervention on the Ethiopia's foreign relation with these actors.

1.4 Research Questions

This research has been guided by the following sets of key research questions?

a) Why Ethiopia militarily intervened in 2006 in Somalia? Is this intervention important for the national security and national interest of Ethiopia?
b) What is the impact of this military intervention on the domestic relation of the Ethiopia's government with the opposition political parties?
c) Did the military intervention and the Jihad, which was called by the Union of Islamic Courts, affects the peaceful coexistence between the Christian and Muslim population of Ethiopia?
d) What was the impact of the military intervention on the Region Five's peace and development?
e) What is the impact of this military intervention on the foreign relation of Ethiopia, with Horn of African countries, the US and EU?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The Horn of Africa is conflict prone region, and particularly the post-cold war era has significantly witnessed the failure and collapse of state like Somalia. Such political developments have made Somalia battleground for different groups and states including Ethiopia to participate in the proxy war. Basically, this study can contribute its share as a reference for further study concerning the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, regarding its impact on the domestic and foreign relation of Ethiopia, plus the significance of the intervention on its merits and demerits on the domestic politics and foreign relations of Ethiopia.

1.6 Research Method

The data used for this research was gathered from various secondary resources which include Newspapers, Magazines, Journals, Reports, Monographs, Unpublished materials, Constitution, Proceedings and Internet Sources. The researcher used these secondary data sources in-depth to analyze and explain the research problem.

1.7 Limitations of the study

Some of the major constraints the researcher faced are:

- Shortage of relevant materials particularly relevant documents, research papers and books written on this issue because of the recent nature of the military intervention.
- Diplomats and professionals could not respond because of duty constraints in providing basic information and documents, concerning the research topic.
- The very sensitivity of the issue in terms of the national security of Ethiopia, concerned officials, government agencies and concerned ministries were not available for discussion with the researcher in Ethiopia.

1.8 Scope of the Study

This research is aimed at assessing the historical development of the Ethio-Somalia relations and in particular with the main objective of studying the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 to 2008, and its impact on the domestic and foreign relation of Ethiopia.

1.9 Organization of the Study

This research paper has five chapters. The first chapter deals with the introduction, the statement of the problem, method and its approaches. The second chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The third chapter deals with the nature of Ethio-Somalia relations since the independence of Somalia to present, the Ethiopian foreign policy towards Somalia since 1991 and the major factors and actors for Ethiopian intervention. The fourth chapter deals with the impact of the military intervention on the domestic politics of Ethiopia. The fifth chapter deals

with the impact of the military intervention on Ethiopia’s foreign relations and the future prospect of Somalia. Finally the conclusion of the findings is presented.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This chapter aims to provide conceptual explanation for Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008. The author will attempt to show the implications of the intervention to foreign and domestic politics of Ethiopia. He will also attempt to explain how the intervention can be conceptualized in view of level of foreign policy analysis. The author will attempt how the Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia is compared with other military interventions in Africa. The chapter begins by defining the concept foreign policy.

2.1 Foreign Policy and the Three Levels of Analysis

Foreign policy is an important part and parcel of an overall policy of a given state, which focuses on its relation with other states and international actors. Foreign policy "refers to external affairs, particularly to decisions and actions taken by states in their dealings with other states or such external actors as international organizations, multinational corporations and other transnational actors" (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:590). To understand further the foreign policy of a given country, it is important to know the three levels of analysis of foreign policy, which are defined by Jackson and Sorensen (2007:228), as:

1. The systemic level (e.g. the distribution of power among states; their economic and political interdependence),
2. The nation - state level (e.g. type of government democratic or authoritarian; relations between the state apparatus and groups in society; the bureaucratic make up of the state apparatus), and
3. The level of individual decision - maker (his/her way of thinking, basic beliefs, personal priorities).

Based on the three levels of analysis, the author begins by explaining the systemic levels of analysis and evaluating its relation with the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008.

2.2.1 The systemic level

The system level in the international relations is the global state system, which "contains states of very different type: great powers and small states; strong, substantial states and weak quasi states" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 27). These states to interact each other have their own foreign policies at the systemic level of analysis. According Jackson and Sorensen (2007: 228), Foreign policy has a theory which is related with the international political relation between the

states, and explained "by pointing to conditions in the international system that compel or pressure states towards acting in certain ways, that is, to follow certain foreign policy."

At the systemic level analysis of foreign policy, diplomacy, propaganda and political warfare, economic and military power(war) are used as instruments of foreign policy to achieve the goals of states in their foreign relation (Chandra, 1995:73-131).Intervention in the internal affairs of the states (direct or indirect), politically, economically and militarily is one of the instruments of foreign policy that states use to ensure their national interest which is against, "article 2 of the United Nations chapter that enshrines the principle of non-intervention" (Dodds, 2005: 161). Military intervention is one form of the direct intervention in the internal affairs of states to fulfill the national interest of the intervening state politically, economically and militarily to sustain its wellbeing. Military intervention by powerful states on the weaker states has taken place several times in the post- World War II period. For instance in the African case, "military intervention has occurred particularly where Western interests (primarily economic ones) have been involved" (Tangari, 1985: 130). To mention some, the French military intervention in Gabon in 1964, Zaire 1977-78 and Chad between 1968-72 and 1975-80 were for economic reasons of controlling raw materials and natural resources for industrial input in France (Tangari, 1985: 130).

Coming back to the research topic, what are the conditions in the international system which compelled Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia? In the systemic level analysis of foreign policy which is also called structural explanation, "States rationally pursue their national interests, whether defined in terms of security, power, wealth or prestige" (Stein, 1990: 180). Therefore to preserve its national interest in terms peace and security, which is part of the region and the globe, that has been endangered by threat from the failed state Somalia, which is its neighbor, the military intervention which can be viewed from structural explanation of power on pursuing the national interest of Ethiopia had taken place from 2006-2008. From the systemic level analysis of foreign policy of Ethiopia, the military intervention can be analyzed from the regional and global perspective of peace and security.

Regionally, the post - 1991 Horn of Africa has complex political, social and economic crisis, which involves several actors within and outside the region. Particularly, the failure of the state in Somalia has contributed for the instability of the region that has an impact for Ethiopia's security which is explained by Frazer (2007), as:

> The situation in Somalia poses a threat to regional stability. Extremist remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts and the radical al-Shabab militias are seeking to re-establish their influence and capacity both inside Somalia

and allegedly attempted to link with the Ogaden faction of AIAI and the ONLF inside Ethi opia.

It is understandable that, the Somalia's crisis has spillover effect to the neighboring countries and particularly to Ethiopia because of its geographical proximity and other factors those include the involvement of regional countries, which are anti –Ethiopia for different reasons. For example, "Eritrea and many Mideast countries sabotaged and inflamed the crisis in Somalia by Sheltering, financing, training and arming various terrorist groups and pirates of Somalia" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No.116, 2009: 3). This contributed for further crisis in Somalia by strengthening different armed groups through time and particularly by consolidating the Sharia courts and their militants that created the UIC that was powerful. This can be justified by the UIC's effort to control the whole of Somalia, which is explained by Seifert (2008:29) as, "in June 2006 the UIC took over power in Mogadishu, rapidly extending their influence to the south and central parts of the country." This threatened the existence and survival of the TFG in Baidoa that was the closest ally of Ethiopia. Such rapid military success of the UIC, its move to topple the TFG of Somalia by taking the seat of the TFG (Baidoa) militarily led to the call of support by the TFG leaders. And PM Meles Zenawi described this as, "we were invited by the Transitional Government of Somalia to help them out with their challenge" (Fortune Vol. 9, No.455, 2009:22). Such a call from neighboring country has to be responded positively, and Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia in 2006, by taking its foreign policy direction in the region and particularly based on the political reality and security situation in post-1991 Somalia as the core of its military action which states that, "our proximity to Somalia would be beneficial to our development if there were peace and stability in Somalia. Peace can come to our region if a government committed to fighting disorder, terrorism and extremism in cooperation with its neig hbors is established in Somalia" (http://www.mfa.gov.et, 2009).

The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in 2006, by call of support from the TFG can be justified and its legitimacy has international legal support that can be argued based on the UN Charter Article 2(4) exception which evolved in the last 50 years, and explains, "States have relied on it as a legal justification for their intervention in other states. Among these exceptions, one that is often cited is the consent of the host-state to the military actions of the intervening state" (The Sub- Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 007, 2009:5). In general, regionally and particularly on the Somalia's peace, "the current crisis has underscored that Ethiopia must lie at the center of any stabilization of the Horn" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Abdul-Mohammed, 2009).This has been confirmed by Ethiopia's commitment in the region's peace in which, "as a

member of IGAD, the Peace and Security Council of African Union(AU), an active participant in the UN and international forums, Ethiopia will continue exerting efforts to help insure peace and stability In Somalia"(The Ethiopian Herald Vol. 65, No.116, 2009: 3). It is based on this stand of Ethiopia in the regional peace and stability that the intervention has to be viewed at the systemic level analysis of foreign policy of a state.

Globally, after the US was attacked on its soil by al-Queada in 2001, the Ethio-US relation strengthened and according Smidt (2008: 132), "immediately after September 11, 2001 the FDRE declared her alliance with the United States of America in the newly proclaimed 'War on Terror'." The War on Terror defined by Zeleza (2008:10) as, "an imperial war in so far as it seeks to advance the agenda of the world preeminent imperial power. It obviously involves intense conflict between states, within states and is international in its scope." The major reason for such commitment by the FDRE in the fight against international terrorism is, Ethiopia has been the victim of terrorist attacks which were planned, organized and masterminded in the post 1991 Somalia, and this is related with the domestic political crisis of Somalia which has an impact on the security of Ethiopia and the region because,

> The disintegration of Somalia has in itself brought even growing danger. The crisis in Somalia has allowed religious extremism to take hold. Somalia has become a haven and conduit for terrorists and extremists. Anti - peace elements are using the country as a base and place of transit in order to threaten Ethiopia's peace. Somalia's disintegration has brought danger to the peace in our country (http://www.mfa.gov .et/ foreign-policy-And-relation/relations-with-Horn-Africa-Somalia. php?, 2009).

This contributed for the terrorist organization such as, al-Ittihad al- Islami which was based in failed state Somalia for conducting, and "planning several attacks in Ethiopia and contributing through some of its members to the preparation of the attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998"(http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal,2007).Furthermore, international terrorism caused other damages from Somalia. For instance, " in November 2002 the Paradise Hotel was bombed and an attempt was made to shoot down an Israel Airliner with a shoulder- held surface- to- air missile near Mombasa in Kenya" (Otenyo as cited by Woldeslase, 2007:6). With regard to Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006, it can be argued these are the major reasons: The affiliation of the UIC leaders to al- Qaeda with the aim of destabilizing Ethiopia through anti-Ethiopia armed opposition groups of ONLF, OLF and WSLF is one major reason. Another one is the connection of the UIC leaders such as Shiekh Hassan Dahir Aweys an irredentist, who in the early 1990's organized and led the terror attacks

by commanding the Jihadist organization AIAI, “which invaded Ethiopia with Al-Qaeda’s support and launched a terrorist campaign in side Ethiopia against civilian targets in a bid to wrest the Somali- inhabited Ogaden region from Ethiopia” (The Reporter Vol. 13, No.664, 2009:14). Such terrorist activity by the leadership of the most wanted terrorist individuals on the US list of terror strengthened the Ethio-US relation in the region because of the security threat that emanated from the failed state Somalia. This international terror threat from Somalia, and Ethiopia’s commitment in the region’s peace and security, earned Ethiopia particular attention and role by the US and the West. Particularly the US, which was the victim of international terrorism in the Horn of Africa by al-Qaeda’s attack strongly, supported Ethiopia’s commitment in the region politically, economically and militarily. One major example for this cooperation and commitment by the US with Ethiopia is, “Pentagon wants to make Ethiopia a bulwark in a region where Somalia is a dangerously failed state, Sudan and Eritrea are pariahs and Kenya has troubles of its own” (The Economist Vol. 387, No. 8574, 2008: 45).

In general, Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, can be seen from the system level analysis of foreign policy from two angles: first, in terms of the threat that emanated form the viewpoint of security in the regional and the global level for the reasons such as, the failure of the state in Somalia which encouraged radical Islamic movements to take power and which made Somalia safe haven for international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, and other anti - Ethiopian opposition armed groups like OLF, ONLF and WSLF which are the threat for the internal peace and security of Ethiopia. Second, Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia by the call of support from the TFG, can be seen from the political interdependence point of view of relation of states in terms of stabilizing, pacifying the neighboring country. Such support to stabilize Somalia and avoid the security threat strengthened, the US - Ethiopia relation in terms of military, economic and developmental aid and played pivotal role in isolating countries like Sudan and Eritrea in the region which are still supporting the Islamic movements in Somalia.

2.2.2 The Nation-State Level

The end of Cold War ensured the demise of Communism and the emergences of the new world order which is described by Mesfin (1999: 218) as, “the supremacy of the US with Western Europe under the wings of the eagle.” Such global or systemic change in the international political order has made the EPRDF to adopt the new reality according Hirt (2008: 227) in which, “it immediately shifted its stand from a Marxist - oriented, isolationist movement into a seemingly open-minded, pro-western government.” Before evaluating the EPRDF's foreign policy at the nation - state level, it is important to explain the nation state level analysis of foreign

policy. The Nation state level analysis of foreign policy is explained by Stein (1990:178) as, " it sees states as entities whose behavior, like that of individuals, can be explained with reference to their individual natures, large states act differently from Small states, rich nations act differently from poor ones, and democratic or libertarian states act differently from authoritarian or totalitarian ones."

Discussing the post - 1991 Ethiopian political system, after the demise of the Derg regime, Ethiopian politics has been transformed in to the new era with the complete change of political structure and radical changes in the Ethiopian state that is explained by Turton (2006:1) as, "the transformation that has taken place in the political structure of Ethiopia since 1991 has been both radical and pioneering. It has been radical because it has introduced the principle of self-determination for federated regional units in a formerly highly centralized unit."

Such a change in the Ethiopia's political order further strengthened by the new constitution, in which "the 1994 constitution assured that both the federal and the regional governments have their own legislative, judicial and executive power and the right to levy taxes and allocate budgets" (Aalen,2002: 1). The Ethiopian ethnic federal system, which is based on parliamentarian political system, has federal government, "with a bi-cameral parliament and constitutional president was assigned the responsibility of national defense, foreign relations, and the setting of national standards of major policies" (Aalen, 2002: 1). With such political and administrative setup, in comparison to the Derg regime, the EPRDF rule has brought fundamental changes on the rights of people with regard to freedom of expression and free press which were unthinkable during the Derg regime. For instance Bahru (2008:351), explains:

> The post - 1991 situation has been encouraging in a number of ways. The FDRE constitution has ensured the exercise of hitherto suppressed rights. More than any time in the past, the public (particularly that of Addis Ababa) has been able to express its views freely. The mushrooming of the private press has broken in some measure the government's monopoly of the media. The expansion of NGO's and CSO's has created an opportunity to work for country and compatriots outside the government framework.

In addition to such changes at the national political level, the constitution of the FDRE includes "Article 39 of the constitution, which asserts the right of nations, nationalities and people's to self - determination, up to and including secession" (Aalen, 2002:45). To analyze the Ethiopia's military intervention of Somalia in 2006 at the nation-state level by using the relations between the state apparatus and groups in society, the study begins by assessing the post- 1991 political situation in the Region Five of Ethiopia. The EPRDF government ethnic federal state structure

created the opportunity for political groups that are organized under ethnic identity to take part in the political process for groups such as the ONLF which "is founded in 1984"(The Sub-Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No.009, 2009:3), and it joined the EPRDF government so that, "Region Five was ruled by ONLF, which held key administrative posts in the Somali [national] regional state at the beginning of the 1990's"(http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Haggmann/index/.html,2007). But ONLF started its anti-Ethiopia activity earlier, "and at the end of 1992, al-Ittihad, in close coordination with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) , launched surprise attacks on the Somali Region of Ethiopia" (Medhane, 2002:157), this pushed EPRDFfor further political action in which, "ONLF ousted by EPRDF in 1994" (http://hornofafrica. ssrc.org/Hagmann/index/.html,2007).

This increased the group's violent activities which created the headache for the EPRDF leadership because, "the Somali Region remained immersed in political turmoil, aggravated by inter-clan conflict, corruption and nepotism in the mid-1990's which turned out to be difficult for the EPRDF led government to resolve"(Medhane, 2002:157). The absence of state and government in Somalia helped the ONLF and AIAI to plan and coordinate their attacks from Somalia, which had been security threat for Ethiopia in the 1990's. For example, "al- Ittihad also took credit for a number of terrorist attacks and explosions that took place in different towns of eastern Ethiopia and the capital(Addis Ababa), between 1993 and 1996" (Medhane, 2002:158). The security threat posed on Ethiopia further aggravated in the post 9/11 Somalia and particularly by the coming to power of the UIC in 2006 that has closest link with anti-Ethiopia armed opposition groups and the al-Queada, so that it planned and organized attacks against Ethiopia in Somalia by taking power in Mogadishu. This is done by the cooperation of groups such as ONLF,OLF and others in side Ethiopia's territory in the eastern part of the country by conducting terrorist attacks and insurgent activities against the Ethiopian government that is described by Fraser (2007) as:

> An increasingly violent insurgency is operating in the Ogaden, where ONLF, the United Western Somalia Liberation Front (UWSLF), extremists affiliated with the Ogaden faction of AIAI, and terrorist affiliated with the extremist al Shabab militia and the UIC are stepping up their attacks against government targets.

Such threat viewed from the Nation-state level analysis of foreign policy, forced the Ethiopian government to intervene in Somalia, which explained by PM Meles as, "there was clear and present danger to us as part of a triangular conspiracy involving the Eritrean government, the Shabab and armed opposition elements of Ethiopia"(Fortune Vol. 9,No. 455,2009:22).

The security threat and the terrorist attacks in the Somali region of Ethiopia which are carried out by anti-Ethiopia insurgent movements which oppose the EPRDF government such as, the ONLF, OLF and WSLF has to be stopped. In order to avoid and minimize such threats which are organized and planned in the failed state Somalia the FDRE government has decided to intervene militarily in Somalia in order carryout the full responsibility of sovereign state which is to insure the peaceful day-to-day life of its citizens, the functioning of institutions and government agencies. This is why the FDRE government crafted clear foreign and security policy to defend its national security thereby to accelerate the Peace and development endeavor of the nation.

2.2.3 Individual Level

The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 can also be evaluated from the level of individual decision maker analysis of foreign policy that is explained by Stein (1990:176-177) as:

> Since nation-states are governed by people, it treats international politics as a function of human behavior and a product of human choice. It assumes that the same factors that determine individual decisions explain national ones as well; in other words people wage war and make peace for the same kinds of reasons they make decision about anything else.

Foreign policy decision making in Ethiopia is most of the time in favor of the leader's opinion, having its root in the political culture of the country, which is explained by Berouk (2004:6) as, "The Ethiopian political tradition bequeathed maximum power to the extent feasible to one single leader, and concurrently, favored personality cults." The same is true in the post-1991 Ethiopia. Based on FDRE constitution Art.72 (1) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is the head of government and by the responsibility vested up on him by the FDRE constitution Art.74 (1), he is in charge of safe guarding the country's territorial integrity, sovereignty and the security of its people, because he "exercises an overall supervision on the implementation of the country's foreign policy. It is based on these powers and responsibilities of the PM that the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 can be analyzed at the level of individual decision making analysis of foreign policy. It is the responsibility and duty of every head of government to defend his/her country from an aggression and threat (particularly this is Ethiopian political culture). In what PM Meles described as "clear and present danger", the security threat of the UIC summed with anti- Ethiopia government insurgent groups like ONLF and OLF threat of attack made him to intervene in Somalia to avoid further danger. For example,

“the UIC over played its hand when, in mid - December declared Jihad against Ethiopia” (http://hornof africa.ssrc.org/Harper/, 2007). This wage of war and the jihad declaration on Ethiopia by the most internationally wanted terrorist groups and their leaders in Somalia cautioned the Ethiopia’s PM Meles Zenawi with regard to the country’s national security and peace. Furthermore what led to Ethiopia’s military intervention is this, “On 21 December 2006, Shiek Hassen Dahir Aweys, one of the UIC leaders declared from Mogadishu that Somalia was in the state of war against Ethiopia” (http:// www.bloggersnews.net//14238, 2009).

Another important factor that has to be mentioned is Islam’s political impact on the region's security particularly if the UIC controls power in Somalia, Ethiopia will be cornered by two Islamic neighboring states which are sharing long boundary lines in east and west which are security threat to Ethiopia’s national security. Such geo-political factors concerned the Ethiopia’s PM on deciding about the military intervention in Somalia according Weber (2008: 19) because , “what might be frightening to premier Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, to be cornered by two Islamic states might be welcomed by President Bashir, who already feels surrounded by Christian majority states in the Horn.”

In general such perceived threats, open declarations of war by the UIC leadership, and the constitutional responsibility of the Prime Minister had been translated by the EPRDF’s leadership and its members of parliament in to foreign policy decision. It can be argued that, the chaotic situation in Somalia and particularly the UIC control of Mogadishu which was perceived as a source of threat for the Ethiopia's national security and peace, led to the military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia in 2006.

2.3 Types of Military Interventions in Africa

Intervention in the internal affairs of state which is (direct or indirect) is used as an instrument of foreign policy of a state at the systemic level of global political order. Particularly, “in the 1990's, the notion of diplomatic or military intervention by one state in the affairs of other for humanitarian objectives had become more and more accepted practice” (Okoth citing Buttros Ghali, 2008: 74). In the African context, there are military interventions, which are very different from that of the West and other big powers in terms of their aim and goal. Military interventions in Africa are categorized into three, and they have the purpose, which is “to try and minimize chaos when a neighboring state collapses,” (Mazuri, 2008: 45). According Mazuri (2008:45-46), the three types of interventions in the African continent, which has occurred in the post - colonial period to the present are the following:

> (a) Unilateral intervention by a single power. A famous example of unilateral intervention is the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. Tanzanian troops put Uganda virtually under military occupation for a couple of years. (b) Another, slightly different kind of intervention was the 1994 invasion of Rwanda by Uganda. It is called a "Bay of Pigs" style intervention. Just as Eisenhower and Kennedy trained Cubans to invade Cuba in the "Bay of Pigs" Operation in 1961, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda trained exiled Rwandans to intervene in Rwanda in 1994.

[What makes different the Uganda's invasion of Rwanda in 1994 from the Cuban operation of 1961 is that, it has succeeded in achieving its goal of ending genocide by avoiding the criminal government and facilitated the return of Tutsi refugees.]

> The second type of intervention is regionally supported single power intervention. Example: Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone with the blessing of ECOWAS and ECOMOG. A third type of intervention is what might be called "inter - African Colonization and annexation". This is done in an effort to establish stability. E.g. in 1964 Tanganyika government annexed Zanzibar.

Compared with the three types of African military interventions, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008, is similar with the first type of military intervention which is a unilateral intervention by a single neighboring power. What makes the Ethiopia's intervention exceptional is that it was done for the purpose of supporting the TFG and ousting of the UIC, which is the main enemy of Ethiopia. Another exception is the failure of the Somali state that made the intervention different. Because as Seifert (2008:30) describes, " it was not a war between two states in the classical sense, since the Somali state ceased to exist in 1991 and has not resurrected so far." Finally, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 can be categorized with the first type of intervention in which Ethiopia was not occupying force except trying to help the TFG and stabilize Somalia thereby trying to eliminate forces which are threats to its security, and stability.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

Different theories of war can be taken into account to examine and justify the importance of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008. To begin with there are different causes of war according Chandra (1995: 126) such as, "biological, psychological, sociological, economic and political." Chandra (1995: 126) explains War materializes from different global factors which have push or pull effect in international relations of states, when the following

conditions exist, “when a state of opinion violently hostile to the existing state of affairs; inadequacy of international organization to deal with conflicts; inadequate system of law and unstable equilibrium of material forces.”

In the international system of global politics war has been used for different purposes such as, it is used as an instrument of foreign policy to achieve certain objectives of the states and the ruling elites in international relations. For example Jeong (2002:53) argues, “War has been used for all purposes, including preservation of territories from attack, expansion of empires, and punishment of enemies and defense of allies.” Evaluating the Ethiopia’s military intervention from the point of view of the above definition, it fulfills certain objectives of the country's foreign policy. For example, Ethiopia by allying with TFG militarily punished the UIC and overthrown it from power by capturing Mogadishu and other strongholds of it. Ethiopia also preserved its territory and ensured its internal peace and security by crushing domestic opposition armed groups like OLF and ONLF which were hiding in Somalia (http://crs.org/ethiopia/ horn-conflicts, 2008).

Starting from the 20th century, war is very prominent and consistent phenomena in the African continent with different forms, causes, factors, dynamics, and regions with varying duration. The wars also differ in terms of the military equipment, the modes of engagement employed plus they affected Africa and its people (the civil and military), in terms of the economy, society, politics, culture and the environment. Zeleza (2008: 3-4) argues based on the ideological and political character, war in Africa can be classified into five categories: Imperial wars; Anti - colonial wars; Intra-state wars; Inter-state wars and International wars.

By ending the Discussion of wars, the researcher examines the Ethiopia’s military intervention from different theories of war in the next section.

2.4.1 Strategic Theory of World Politics

Strategic theory of world politics is directly related to foreign policy analysis at the level of individual decision making in which the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, can be justified from the point of view of EPRDF's leadership and its chairman PM Meles Zenawi in conducting Ethiopia foreign policy and decision making regarding the situation in Somalia, and the Horn of Africa in general. Strategic theory is one of the theories of war, which is to mean “. . . strategic calculation of leaders when they decide to undertake a given foreign policy. It seems obvious that leaders of states calculate the likely consequences of the decision to initiate war against another state” (Lemke, 2002: 38). As mentioned earlier, the failure of the Somali state has posed severe security danger at three levels of the international system, (at state

level-Ethiopia; at the regional level-Horn of Africa, and international level, piracy).According Medhane (2008: 42), the emergence of radical Islamist movements, especially the UIC in Somalia became real threat for the security of the region in general and Ethiopia in particular. Because the UIC has its root in the 1990's with the ONLF according (http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ world/ war/somalia.html, 2009) in which "it was formed in 2000 by former members of AIAI, a group that fought along with the ethnically Somali OLF, AIAI and ONLF forces which sought the secession of the Ogaden region from Ethiopia."

Weber (2008: 19) argues that, these threats coupled with the participation and military help of other anti-Ethiopia states in the region such as Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt by arming, training plus financially and diplomatically assisting the UIC and other anti - Ethiopian elements, forced Ethiopia's leaders to militarily intervene in Somalia. Another important incident that has led to Ethiopia's military intervention was especially, when "the UIC overplayed its hand in which, in mid-December, it declared Jihad against Ethiopia" (http://hornoafafrica.ssrc.org/harper/, 2007). This contributed in alarming the Ethiopian ruling elite to initiate and use the strategic theory of world politics to conduct the war in Somalia for the purposes of security and peace in addition to the following reasons globally and internally according (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/indexz.html, 2007), "Ethiopia has been promoted to the status of strategic ally with Washington for that very reason; if the region were normalized, the Ethiopian regime would appear as the fading authoritarian government that it is." The strategic theory of world politics is similar to the Escalation Theory of War that is argued by Waltz in his book, 'Man, the State and War'. According to Waltz,

> In the anarchy of the international system, statesmen make decisions and respond to the decision of others. This action- reaction process in time can lead to situations in which statesmen deliberately provoke a war or lose control over events and eventually find themselves propelled into war. In effect, one think leads to another until war is the consequence of the interplay of foreign policies (Gilipin, 1988).

The Jihad declaration by UIC, their irredentist policy of 'Greater Somalia' coupled with the frequent threat of attacking Ethiopia and their support of ONLF and OLF had compelled the FDRE government to militarily intervene in Somalia to assist the TFG and thereby to avoid the 'clear and present danger' on Ethiopia's peace and Stability, which was an action-reaction process that led to war.

2.4.2 Theory of Just War

The theory of just war is useful in analyzing the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 from the systemic level analysis of foreign policy in terms of its legitimacy, the moral acceptance, and the reasonable cause to go to war. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to support the TFG, and thereby to avoid threats coming from radical Islamic groups like the UIC, and other anti-Ethiopian armed insurgent groups. From such solid security concerns the intervention can be evaluated through the Theory of Just War. Before going to the analysis, the study explains the brief history of the theory of Just War, and then defines the elements of Just War.

Historically, "Just war traditions were established in the medieval period of Christian history and were further developed in the seventeenth century by Hugo Grotius, the father of modern International Law" (Jeong, 2002: 62-63). According this theory, war is restricted to be used as an instrument of maintaining social order, having two sets of criteria which are: The justice of war (*Jus ad bellum*), it governs the morality of becoming involved in the violence of war, and another one is, justice in war (*Jus in bello*) that focuses on the actual conduct of war (Jeong, 2002: 62-63). By combining these two criteria, the Just War Theory is explained by Jeong (2002:63) as:

> The just war theory espouses that there are right or just circumstances under which going to war is considered morally acceptable. A legitimate authority for a reasonable cause and with an ethical purpose may undertake just war. In just war theory, decisions on war ought to be made and legitimized by duly constituted authority, and war has to be conducted by competent authority. The principle of right intention allows fighting war for self-defense but not for the purpose of revenge or desire for territorial expansion. War should have the goals of restoring just order and its outcome needs to produce peaceful conditions.

The Ethiopian government as the 'just war' justified the Ethiopian military intervention because the intention of the radical Islamic movements of Somalia was to destabilize Ethiopia, by committing different terror activities against Ethiopia's national interest and its sovereignty. These activities made the Ethiopian government to morally consider going to war right, and it gave it legitimate authority to engage the war in order to maintain peace and security in the country and thereby assist the TFG and make it stronger, capable government. This is further detailed by The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 144 Feb (2009: 3) as:

> The threat posed on Ethiopia was clear after the UIC showed anti - Ethiopia sentiment and declared Jihad on several occasions. It started showing blatant disregard for the sovereign integrity of Ethiopia by working to realize Zaid

> Barre's 'Greater Somalia' dream through terrorism; annexing the Somali region of Ethiopia, as well as Somali inhibited areas of Kenya and Djibouti.

The above mentioned factors demonstrate the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia as just war based on the first criteria of "Just war Theory" i.e. *Jus ad Bellum* or Justice of war because it was based on self-defense, was not for the revenge and territorial expansion of the Ethiopian state. But what as the 'Just war theory' assumes cannot be fulfilled is, Ethiopia's intervention couldn't bring about the desired peace, and order in Somalia because the fighting is still going on. Another important point which is against the 'Just war theory' concerning this intervention is related with *'Jus in Bello'* or actual conduct of war. Since the Ethiopian army was not fighting with the regular army of a sovereign state, the warfare was between an organized army (that of Ethiopia) and the insurgents (that of UIC). This condition couldn't able to conduct a proper war and ensure the safety of civilians and created a sentiment by the majority of Somalis on Ethiopia as an invader, because of the continuity of humanitarian crisis, the war and the suffering of Somalia's population as a result of Ethiopia's military intervention which is described by Time (2007) as:

> The Ethiopian army, which invaded last December, had killed thousands of Somalis and lost thousands of its own in some of the fiercest fighting that the capital, Mogadishu, had seen in 16 years of civil war. There was also an acute and mounting humanitarian crisis, as hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the capital for makeshift camps in the desert.

2.4.3 Conflict Theory

The failure of the state in Somalia, which has coincided with the end of cold war at the global level brought conflict into the regional level. Because Sikod (2008: 201) explains, "the end of cold war was associated with a rebound phenomenon, in which long suppressed rivalries resurfaced at a time of declining international focus and attention, but nevertheless fueled by surplus weapons from Cold War stocks."

Such excess weapons, with the failure of the state in Somalia greatly helped for the formation of different warlords, factions and armed insurgent groups that are mostly anti-Ethiopian in nature. These groups were able to launch attacks and escalate conflict in the region that led to the intervention of Ethiopia in 2006. The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 can be seen from the theory of conflict because of the existence of political realities in the Horn. McGinnis (1999: 3) describes the political reality in the Horn of Africa countries as, "the

general existence of insurgencies and the tendency of states to support neighboring rebel groups strongly suggest the operation of a balance of power type system." But before discussing the theory of conflict, the word conflict has to be defined. Conflict can be defined in different ways but "its definition varies considerably depending on the objectives of the study and the methods employed" (Mesfin, 1999:117). To make clear the readers understanding about conflict in relation to the research topic the term defined by Mesfin (1999:118) as, "an escalated, natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Parties in conflict believe they have incompatible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over and, injure or destroy one another."

From the above definition of conflict, it is possible to assume that due to the incompatible goals between the Ethiopian leadership in alliance with the TFG on the one hand, and the UIC insurgents on the other, has flared up the confrontation with the aim of neutralizing, destroying and injuring of each other. This has contributed for the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in which, "more than 16,000 civilians have been killed since the start of 2007 and a million uprooted from their home" (The Daily Monitor Vol.15, No, 045, 2009: 2). Conflict is recurrent situation in Somalia between 1977 and 1991.According The World Bank (2005: 9) Somalia endured three major armed conflicts, and "the first was the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977 - 78, in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali inhabited region of the Ogaden." The other two conflicts were intra- state or domestic conflicts between the Somali government and different factions such as SNM (Somali National Movement) and USC (United Somali Congress) that resulted from the domestic political settings explained by UNDP (1999) as:

> . . . The major causes of internal conflict in Africa today are the breakdown of governance resulting from the manipulations of ethnic, religious, and other societal differences by power elites. Poor governance practices such as lack of accountability and transparency produce cultures of mismanagement, rent - seeking and impunity. The protracted effects of such policies as systematic exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, disregard for the rule of law and violations of human right trigger or exacerbate conflict

What distinguishes the first conflict (the Ogaden War of 1977-78) from the current one is, in the first conflict, Somalia was having the viable government with regular army and all the important institutions in order to run the state? In the case of the current conflict Ethiopia intervened in the failed Somalia state. Furthermore, conflicts and actors in conflict have been changed after the end of cold war because, " . . . the changing nature of the international system, namely the trans-

nationalization of security problems and the changing nature of war" (Seifert 2008: 31), has made this intervention (conflict) to be seen from the current aspect of global politics, in which "the changing nature of the international system has led to the emergence of a new trinity of violence: new civil wars, transnational terrorism and new wars" (Turn/Zangal cited by Seifert, 2008: 31). Since the Ethiopia's intervention of 2006 was in the "failed state" Somalia that has no regular army, then this conflict is categorized with the new wars which have the following three features: "first, privatization of violence in wars, second, an asymmetry between the combatants and third, formerly regulated forms of violence becoming autonomous" (Munkler cited by Seifert, 2008: 31). In addition, the new wars can be distinguished definitely from the classic ones by their differing aims (like religion), the way of war fare e.g.: - insurgent wars with sudden hit and run tactics, and their funding to conduct the war (Kaldor cited by Seifert, 2008: 31).

In general, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 can be categorized as the new wars in conflict theory because, its aim was to avoid the establishment of Islamic Somalia state which, was the threat for Ethiopia's national security and territorial integrity. In the case of the UIC, their aim was Jihad (Holy War) against Christian Ethiopia and to establish Islamic government based on Quranic Law. In terms of the funding, Ethiopia was funded by the U.S, while different radical Islamic groups, governments and anti-Ethiopian states, which are fighting the proxy war, funded the UIC. In terms of the warfare, Ethiopia had fought with regular army; while the UIC used insurgency with hit- and- run tactic by using civilians and mosques as a shield.

By concluding the second chapter, which in-depth discussed the conceptual, and theoretical

Framework of the study, the next chapter analyses the following key issues. It analyses the Ethio-Somali relations from 1960 to the present, and Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Somalia from the Imperial regime to the EPRDF government. Furthermore it examines factors, which contributed for the Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006-08.

CHAPTER THREE

Background to Ethio- Somali Relations

3.1 Introduction

Since its independence in 1960, the Somalia - Ethiopia relations has not been peaceful, mutual or healthy. The relation was based on mistrust, suspicion and conflict. The two countries fought two major wars during 1964-65 and 1977-78. One way or the other Somalia was cooperative with armed and political groups and countries which are anti- Ethiopia (http://www.mfa.gov.et/Foreign-Policy-And-Relation/Relations-With - Horn - Africa - Somalia. Php? 2009). There are several factors that can be mentioned as causes for such unhealthy relation between the two countries. For instance, the border dispute over the Ethiopian Ogaden territory which is part of colonial legacy; the clan and blood relationship of the Ethiopian Somalis with the people of Somalia, and religion (Islam) can be mentioned. This is further discussed in-depth in the next sub-chapters of this chapter. The major source of the problem (like in the most African case) is the colonial legacy that is defined as "… the modern map of Africa reveals those straight state boundaries along lines of latitude and longitude which were clearly drawn in the chancelleries of Europe and bore little relationship to African conditions" (Chamberlain, 1974:98), e.g. The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is the result of the colonial legacy of Italian occupation of northern Ethiopia (Mesfin, 1999).

The colonial legacy is the cause for the three sources of the persistent problem between the two nations that led to conflict among them. And the three sources of the persistent problem on the Ethio-Somali relation include: the dream of Italian expansion, the dream of British expansion and the inherited dream of Somalia's expansion (Mesfin, 1977: 7). The cumulative product of these expansionist dreams is ' The Greater Somalia' policy, which particularly got emphasis and mobilized the Somalis during the Ziad Barre's regime (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 144, 2009: 3).This irredentist policy according Lewis (1983:79) has the aim of, "the further expansion of Somali unification to embrace French Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya,[and it is] boldly enshrined in the Republic's Constitution." This interest led Somalia to different conflicts in its post independence period with its neighbors, especially with Ethiopia. Since Somalia's independence, the Ethio - Somali relation has passed through three ideologically different regimes of Ethiopia, and these are the Imperial Regime (Monarchy), the Derg regime (Socialist), and the EPRDF (Revolutionary Democracy).

Successive regimes have followed their own foreign policy towards Somalia in which there are similarities and differences. The next section discusses briefly the foreign policy of the Imperial and Derg regime towards Somalia.

3.2 Ethiopian Foreign Policy towards Somalia 1960 to 1991

In order to understand the recent Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, it is important to examine the continuous trends of Ethiopia's leadership perception towards Somalia that is described by Medhane (2002: 156) as, "successive Ethiopian regimes were almost paranoid towards aggressive Somali irredentism." The reason for this includes several factors, which can be mentioned as the nature of the Somalia's foreign relation in the region. For example, "from its independence in 1960, Somalia supported separatist movements in all its neighbors" (McGinnis, 1999:1). Another important global political feature of this period was the 'Cold War' between the two super powers, the US and USSR. Therefore to avoid the threat posed by Somalia's expansionist policy, and to ensure its national interest in the region and the world politics, Ethiopia was having carefully crafted foreign policy and goal, which "stressed Ethiopia's political independence and the preservation of its territorial integrity were the foremost foreign policy goals" (Berouk, 2004:1). After Zaid Barre came to power by a military coup in 1969, tension had grown, both countries switched alliances and major conflict had taken place in 1977, in which Ethiopia successfully defeated Somalia. The Ethiopian foreign policy towards Somalia from 1960 - 1991was almost similar as explained by Medhane (2002:156), thus:

> Always wary of the Greater - Somalia slogan, both the Imperial government and the Derg had maintained an offensive military posture towards Somalia under Said Barre. Short of peaceful political formula, their threat was shaped by military logic. Their foreign policy and security interests are characterized by militarization and defeat. Having faced two major wars launched by Somalia with in a period of two decades, both Haile Selassie and the Derg remained in a state of high alert and vigilance against what they consider as a hostile Somalia state. The vocabulary of peaceful co-existence, possible partnership/ cooperation, and above all people relations was almost non-existent in their dictionary.

Such foreign policy and relation, which is based on mistrust and vigilance, continued even after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the demise of the Derg regime.

3.3 An Overview of the Post- 1991 Ethiopian Foreign Policy

In order to understand the causes and the designed objectives of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, it is important to overview the post - 1991 Ethiopian foreign

policy in general and the objective of the policy towards Somalia in particular. After the collapse of the Derg regime, the EPRDF, which is led by (the then president), PM Meles Zenawi, and the EPLF led by President Esayeyas Afeworki controlled Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively. This contributed for the creation of new state, "Eritrea" in the Horn, which shrunk the Ethiopia's geographical size and made it land locked (Lyons, 2006: 1 - 6). The new Ethiopian federal government, adopted the new foreign policy which is based on its own domestic policy that has 'triple promise' according Merera (2003: 160), and these are: " to bring durable peace, democratic governance and quick economic development by creating an egalitarian nation - state in which all country's diverse communities are empowered."

Such promises to be fulfilled, the new Ethiopian government needed a foreign policy which can be used as an instrument in maintaining the external relations of the country with the new global political order of globalization. Therefore the EPRDF regime by departing from the foreign policy of its predecessors adopted a new foreign policy based on the domestic first, external second approach. The major difference between the pre-1991 and the post-1991 foreign policy of Ethiopia is that, in the previous two regimes the foreign policy of Ethiopia was originating based on from the external to domestic looking approach, which focuses and arises from the foreign relations and the global political context of the country. On the contrary the post-1991 foreign policy formulation origin is the domestic issues in which by fulfilling the 'triple promises', Ethiopia will be stronger and able to conduct external relations to insure its national interest and foreign policy objectives (Ministry of information, 2002 V- VIII). The foreign policy of the EPRDF government at the nation-state level of analysis reflects the ruling party's goals, and objectives in its external relation. This summarized by the FDRE Foreign Affairs and National security policy strategy (2002), as follows:

> To bring about development and realize it in the framework of globalization, we need extensive market opportunities, investment and technical support. For some time yet, we will also need grants and loans to finance our development endeavors. We also require considerable technical and financial support to build and strengthen institutions of democratic governance, so crucial for the growth of democracy. Our foreign policy goal will be exactly this. Our main objective will be to create an enabling environment for development and democracy and, in this context, to identify markets, attract investment, solicit grants, loans and technical support and make maximum utilization of all possibilities. Our diplomacy should be, in the main, that of economic diplomacy.

In addition to its commitment to the democracy and development in Ethiopia, the EPRDF's foreign policy has also another objective concerning external threats that are originating from outside. This is clearly defined by the FDRE Foreign Affairs and National security policy strategy (2002), as " . . . our foreign and national security policy has the objective of resisting external threats to our security and building our capacity to reduce our vulnerability." It is based on this objective that Ethiopia has militarily intervened in Somalia during 2006 – 2008. Furthermore, to understand the objective and goal of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08, it is important to revise the post-1991 Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Somalia.

3.3.1 The Post - 1991 Ethiopian Foreign Policy towards Somalia

The collapse or failure of state in Somalia since 1991, posed severe danger in the security, peace, and stability of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Because the internal conflict in Somalia was very dangerous for the region with spillover effects on the neighboring countries. In order to avoid such threats and reduce its vulnerability the FDRE government crafted foreign policy towards Somalia by taking the domestic and external political situations very seriously. Domestically to win the hearts and minds of Ethiopian Somalis and to discredit "the Greater Somalia" ideology by those who want to use the Ethiopian Somalis for this goal, the FDRE government used its constitution as the guarantee for their equality. This further expressed by FDRE Foreign Affairs and National security policy strategy (2002), in which:

> People's rights are guaranteed being implemented. Ethiopian Somalis are living in brotherhood and voluntary unity with other Ethiopians. Ethio-Somalis are, in the spirit of equality, democracy, development and an Ethiopian Identity, resting on strong foundations and contribution to the building of the country.

Externally, the absence of state and proper institutions to control the overall activity and function of the government in Somalia posed a severe security danger for Ethiopia. And Medhane (2002:156-157), describes this, "the stateless situation and civil war brought with it a microcosm of old and new security problems for Ethiopia." To avoid such a security threat that emanates from the absence of government in Somalia, the FDRE's foreign policy towards Somalia is carefully crafted to avoid dangers and it is clearly stated by FDRE Foreign Affairs and National security policy strategy (2002), as:

> Our fundamental policy remains to persistently work towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia. But in light of the continuing instability the policy we pursue should essentially be a damage limitation policy to ensure that the instability does not further harm our country, the region and the people

of Somalia. If the instability is not stopped, the only option left is to limit the damage that may be caused.

As it is already discussed, peace and stability cannot be achieved in Somalia still. Therefore to limit the damage that arises from Somalia's instability, the EPRDF government adopted three policy options in its foreign policy towards Somalia, which is stated in the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (2002), as:

1. We have to try to help those regions, which are comparatively stable and do not shelter extremists and terrorists in order that the relative peace they enjoy is maintained and even strengthened. Those that can be mentioned in this regard are the regions known as Somali Land and Punt Land. In the spirit of damage limitation and to assist these regions maintain their stability; it is necessary that the links be strengthened in such areas as trade, transport and the like in the interest of our country and the people inhibiting the region.
2. We shall certainly continue to be exposed to various dangers as long as peace and stability elude Somalia as a whole. In recognition of this, we must create the capability to defend ourselves and foil any attack by forces of extremism, terrorism and other anti peace elements originating in Somalia. In this regard we must always be vigilant.
3. We have to work in cooperation with the Somali people in the region, and the international community as a whole, to weaken and neutralize those forces coming from any part of Somalia to perpetrate attacks against our country while maintaining the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Somalia, we have to ensure our right to safeguard our people and defend ourselves.

Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 is part of the EPRDF's foreign policy and its three options in order to defend Ethiopia's national security, peace and territorial integrity which clearly is the continuity of the Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Somalia since 1960 that is explained by (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Abdul-Mohammed,2009), as: "Ethiopia has regularly used military force in order to remove threats, to back up its political efforts and to demonstrate its power and resolve. The current EPRDF government is no exception to the pattern established by its Imperial and Communist predecessors." Furthermore the EPRDF government in order to avoid the issue of non-interference in Somalia's internal affairs, It has used the request of the TFG for military assistance in order to oust the UIC as one major reason. And the UIC's threat on the Ethiopia's national security is another reason to limit the damage that arises from old security threat, which can be explained by Seifert cited by Weber (2008:35), as follows:

> Ethiopia, Somalia's biggest and most influential neighbor had been against the courts since they came to power while keeping good relations with the TFG. Ethiopia did not want to see a strong Islamic state next door and thus kept on supporting the TFG. Fears with in Ethiopia were aggravated by some of the courts' leaders raising the 'Greater Somalia' policy again, there by fuelling Ethiopian fears of the loss of the Ogaden region.

To summarize the argument, Ethiopia used the military intervention in Somalia as its foreign policy instrument to fulfill its foreign policy objective that is peace and security with its neighbors. To avert the security threat that originates from the failed state Somalia, FDRE's foreign policy objective regarding Somalia is defined by Medhane (2002: 160), as: "Ethiopian policy was mainly aimed at creating possible safe havens for its own security inside Somalia."

3.4 The Major causes of Ethiopia's Military Intervention

The geo - politics of the Horn of Africa has several impacts in the political dynamics of the countries in the region. For example the colonial scramble for the Horn among the three major European rivals had brought several claims and counter claims of territories by the countries of the Horn. Furthermore, this it led to the emergence of new country such as Eritrea, which has got recognition and Punt land and Somaliland, which did not. Concerning the research topic, there are several causes for the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08. For instance, the internal political dynamics of Somalia such as clan politics, Islam, and armed Somali groups that are anti – Ethiopia can be mentioned. And the Ethio-Eritrean border war of 1998 - 2000, which has been continued as proxy war in Somalia is included too.

3.4.1 Clan Politics in Somalia

Somalia has a relatively homogeneous society in terms of language (Somali) and religion (Islam). Demographically lineage underpins Somali society, with divisions defined along clan and sub-clan lines. In order to understand the clan, sub-clan division further, it is important to mention the major clan families in Somalia. These are: "traditionally, the main clan families of Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn, along with minority clans, constituted Somali society" (World Bank, 2005: 7). But in the recent peace processes of Arta and Mbagathi to solve Somalia's internal political crisis, Somalia represented by "the four major clan families of Darod, Hawiye, Digil - Rahanwayen, and Dir (with in which the Issaq is included as the largest clan), along with minorities (Bantu, Barawans, and Banjul)" (World Bank, 2005: 7). Clan is very important in the Somali society because it serves as a base for socio- political organization (Terlinden and Hassan Ibrahim, 2008: 68). Clan has been used as an important instrument socially and politically in the Somalia society for different purposes by having institutions and laws at different times. For

example Lewis (1983:196-201), explains the impact of clan in the Somali society during the colonial time as:

> During the pre-colonial period, Somali society was predominantly nomadic, stateless, and organized on the basis of kinship, with social and political relations structured around clans, sub-clans and families. Ad hoc assemblies of elders (Shir) managed the internal and external affairs of respective groups, drawing on customary law (xeer) as well as the Islamic Sharia.

Even during the colonial period and after the end of colonial period the clan politics continued and played significant role in the Somali politics, and "Certainly clan politics strengthened with the arrival of the colonial powers. Moreover, when the nationalist Somali politicians took over power from the colonial masters, clan politics were given full event" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/hassan.barush / 2007). Coming to the discussion, the clan politics and the subsequent internal wars in Somalia has brought the end of the Barre's regime in 1991. Then, the next issue will be, how did clan politics contributed to the intervention of Ethiopia in 2006? In Ethiopia there are ethnic Somalis from Somalia's clan family (meaning there are Ethiopian Somalis in the Eastern part of Ethiopia which are structured around clans and sub- clans and families with Somalia proper). Particularly in post-1991 Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Somalis with the opportunity of having their own regional administration created difference among themselves on the naming of Region Five, which has the link with Somalia's clan politics. This further explained by Hagmann (2007), as:

> Since the introduction of ethnic- based administration by EPRDF in 1991, Somali and other ethnic groups in Ethiopia came to perceive ethnic identity and territorial claims as one and the same. The region's non - Ogadeen clans including non - Ogadeen Darood, Issaq, Dir and other genealogical groups, strongly refute the 'Ogaden' label for their region, fearing that rhetorically justifies Ogaden domination.

In the one hand, this fear of Ogaden domination in the internal politics of the Ethiopia Somali Region plus, the subsequent conflict between the Ethiopian army and the ONLF, and on the other hand, the kin and blood relation of the Ethiopian Somali clans and the sentiment it creates on the Somali people in the Somalia proper can be considered in explaining the clan politics of Somalia as one cause of Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia. In the case of Somalia, clan politics which is based on clan identity has been very important particularly in the absence of law and the failure of state since 1991 in which "Somalia had fallen apart in to the clan and lineage divisions which, in the absence of other forms of law and order, clan alone offered some degree of security" (Lewis, 1983: 263). In addition to this clan politics has also been used for keeping peace and

order in the failed state Somalia. According Terlinden (2008: 62), this is explained as: “pacification and violence control after the state's collapse succeeded primarily through traditional governance by council of elders, applying the institution of the xeer (the traditional law) and shir (Inter-clan reconciliation conferences).” The base of clan politics is the clan identity in Somalia, which is having impact on politics, social, and economics, that can be described by World Bank (2005:15), as:

- Nearly all armed conflicts in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines.
- Clan identities are malleable and can be shaped by leaders to pursue control of resources and power.
- Clan identities are not the basis for conflict; rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions.
- Clan groups can serve as destructive or constructive forces as well as traditional conflict moderators.

Considering the above points, the Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08 can be examined from the clan politics angle and it will be difficult to bring stability in Somalia. Because the clan politics is very complicated in Somalia as explained by Weber (2008:20),in which: “deepened by the mistrust of clans and sub clans against each other, the possibility to achieve stability and security through the support of one clan against the other can not turn into a national security strategy for Somalia.” Regarding to the Ethiopian Somalis, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia because, groups like the ONLF which was ruling Region Five “ held key administrative posts after the creation of the Somali Regional State at the beginning of the 1990's”, was ousted in 1994 by EPRDF for its violent activity in the region and its connection with terrorist and irredentist groups in Somalia. This led to inter-clan conflict in the region Five of Ethiopia in which, “the notorious political infighting between Somali clans, particularly between Ogaden and non-Ogaden clan coalitions, is a case in point” (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hagmann/index 1. html, 2007).

Furthermore this conflict included other ethnic group in the Region Five. For instance, “Violent tensions and armed opposition groups arose, including the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, the Western Somali Liberation Front and Others” (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/index2.html, 2007). The clan and blood relation of the Ethiopian Somalis with the Somalia proper, has created an opportunity for anti - Ethiopia groups and movements to use Somalia as their base, this further deepened with clan politics and identity in Somalia. Therefore to avoid threats, violence and terror activity in Ethiopia's Somali territory, Ethiopia has been compelled to intervene because of clan politics in Somalia which contributed

its part for the escalation of conflict by strengthening anti- Ethiopia feeling among the Somalia clans which are in both countries.

3.4.2 Islam

Historically Islam has been one of the major factors that influenced the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Even if Islam has come first to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, with regard to Somalia, "from historical records, Islam first took its foothold along the coast of Somalia which is popularly called Banadir" (Ogutu and Kenyanchui, 1991: 121).

With regard to Islam's relation to politics, it has played significant role in the modern world politics. For example, according Weber (2008:16), "historically, Islam did also play a role in the political field. Dervish movements and Sufi Brotherhoods were sources of resistance against various colonial regimes." Prior to the colonial period, Islam had played an important role politically in the Horn of Africa by being political and social agent in the absence of state in the earlier periods since the time of Prophet Mohammed in which, " Islam has provided a ready-made framework for law, public administration and military organization for people without established state structure" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Abdul-Mohammed, 2009). By continuing its political influence in the post - independent Somalia, Islam attached with Arabism had also been psychological instrument to elevate the Somalis spirit as Mesfin (1977:9) explains it: "Arabism and Islamism Promise to be for Somalia, bountiful sources of fortune, politically and economically." In the 1980's and 1990's Islamic resurgence in the political field strengthened when socialism started to collapse as Huntington (1997: 114), described for the reason of, "Leftist and communist movements had been discredited and then seriously undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union and International Communism." In the case of Somalia, particularly after the failure of its state in 1991, Islam has become key role player in economics; politics and law of the country in the absence of proper government institutions in which a system of Sharia-based Islamic Courts become the main judicial system funded through fees paid by litigants. Over time the courts began to offer other services such as education and health care. The courts also acted as local police forces, being paid by local businesses to reduce crime (Medhane, 2008: 45).

Such internal political dynamics, in the failed state Somalia confirmed the rise of Islam as a political force both in the domestic and external affairs of the country. This is justified by the growing influence of Islam in the Horn of Africa which is explained by Shinn cited in Woldeslase (2007: 21), as: "Islam plays an important role in the politics of Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular." Islam concerning with Somalia case, has its root from Saudi Arabia's school

of Islamic teaching and has changed its feature to a political force in the power vacuum that has been created after 1991 is explained by Medhane (2002:77-78), as:

> From the very beginning the somali Islamists adopted a revolutionary politico - religious agenda and started the daunting task of changing the whole fabric the Somali society based on a new Wahhabi teaching alien to the Shafi'i school of law. Wahhabia (Wahabbism) is a derivative of the Hanbali sect and forms the basis of the political and spiritual ideology of the Saudi monarchy. The movement is centered around spreading its mission by force. But in the 20th century, Wahhabism had been endeavoring to make inroads into many parts of the Muslim world, including the Horn of Africa. Somalia is one of the places where the Saudi elite promoted radical Wahhabism to flourish.

This philosophy of Islam strengthened radicalism by creating psychological changes in the believers. For instance, "Wahhabism embodies a fundamentalist philosophy whose adherents are more likely to be attracted to terrorism and Jihad" (Woldeslase, 2007: 21). The homogeneous nature of the Somali society in terms of religion (Sunni Islam) and language (Somali) plus the socio - political organization of it that is based on clan, has created fertile ground for radical Islamic groups to rally the people of Somalia behind them. Then the next question will be how does Islam played its role to push Ethiopia to intervene militarily in Somalia? Islam has played the significant role in terms of ideology and politics in coordinating and organizing forces which are radical and anti-Ethiopia by using religion as a divide in which Ethiopia is Christian state that "has become a regional surrogate or proxy for the United States and Britain" (http://one – state.net/globres.html,2009),which are the major enemies of Islam and the Muslim world. Such religious hatred coupled with the absence of the state in Somalia paved the way for radical Islamic cause of al- Queada plus, thereby to sheltering anti-Ethiopian government armed opposition groups of OLF, ONLF, and terrorists. The Somalia's territory had been a safe haven to plan, coordinate and organize attack in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. For example, "al - Ittihad al - Islami, was put on the list of terrorist organization for planning several attacks in Ethiopia and contributing through some of its members to the preparation of the attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam in August 1998" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal, 2007).

Furthermore, particularly the coming to power of the radical Islamic movements of UIC and its leaders Sheik Sharif Hassan Ahmed and Hassan Dahir Aweys with their aim of reviving "Greater Somalia" policy again fuelled Ethiopian fear of the loss of the Ogaden Region (Weber cited in Seifert 2008: 35) has made Ethiopia's intervention inevitable to limit the damage that can be manifested in terms of security, territorial integrity and peace of Ethiopia. Finally, Islam played

decisive and critical role by raising the nationalist feeling and sympathy towards the UIC, and enabled to destroy clan devotion (Medhane, 2008: 44), and it contributed for the conflict to be exacerbated and Ethiopia to Intervene.

3.4.3 Ethio –Eritrean proxy war

The post 1991 Horn of Africa has got new member state called Eritrea, which "was formally declared independent on 23 May 1993," (Henze, 2001: 263). Immediately after its independence Eritrea was having very unsettled foreign relations with the neighboring countries because as Hirt (2008:222) explains, "Eritrea's foreign policy is strongly shaped by the narrow circle of the leadership of the PFDJ (People's Front for Democracy and Justice), it may be assumed that personal and psychological factors have an impact on its foreign policy."

The Eritrean foreign policy was based on arrogance and invincibility that, it started to destabilize the region by creating tensions and provocations with the neighboring countries except Ethiopia in which Henze (2001: 264), described it as: "Eritrea accused Sudan of abetting subversion in 1994 and broke relations in 1995. It provoked a quarrel with Yemen over Hanish islands soon after and subsequently quarreled with Djibouti." While all these were happening, the Ethio - Eritrea relations and Eritrean relation with the US and Europeans was relatively good and cordial (Mengisteab and Yohannes cited in Hirt, 2008: 227). In terms of the stability and the security of the Horn of Africa, it can be said that the newly independent Eritrea is the Carbon copy of the pre-1991 Somali state in terms of its foreign policy objective in which, "Eritrea follows a long-standing tradition with in the Horn by trying to destabilize its neighboring countries through the support of militant opposition groups" (Hirt, 2008: 222). Ethio - Eritrean relation was some what relatively peaceful when compared it with others, but what caused the border conflict? Was it really a border issue or anything else? The reasons for the Ethio-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 explained by Henze (2001:264), as:

> Eritrea used Ethiopian currency until November 1997 when it replaced it with its own legal tender, the Nacfa, initially valued at par with the Ethiopian birr. Ethiopia henceforth required that hard currency be used in trade. Ethiopia had already stopped drawing on the Assab refinery for part of its petroleum supply. Tensions over trade, border controls, and ports subsequently developed. In May 1998, Eritrea suddenly occupied several districts along the border, which had been under Ethiopian Administration.

This clearly shows that the Eritrean regime sheer interest of developing itself with the expense of Ethiopia in which when the PFDJ was unable to full fill what it intended, then its last resort had been war. This created huge causalities and destruction on both Ethiopia and Eritrea in terms of

human resources' and infrastructure in which, "an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 people were killed, one million were displaced, and a generation of development opportunities was squandered"(Lyons, 2006: 7). This war ended with the victory of Ethiopia which is achieved as Lyons (2006: 7) explains, when "Ethiopia launched a major offensive in May 2000, broke through defenses, and forced Eritrea to pull its troops back to pre - May 1998 positions." Then the next issue will be, How did this border war contributed for the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08? Immediately after it conquered the Ethiopian territory, Eritrea made itself busy to create another front for the Ethiopia military in other parts of the country, particularly through the Eastern part of Ethiopia in which Somalia is suitable for such purpose, and Medhane (2002:159) describes this situation, as:

> Eritrea tried hard to open another military front against Ethiopia from Somalia. Taking advantage of its close relationship with Hussein Aideed, Eritrea tried to attract even Libyan support for al - Ittihad in late 1998. In fact Eritrea tried to revive the WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) of the Said Barre era and combine the forces of Hussein Aideed, al - Ittihad and ONLF to attack Ethiopia.

After the end of the border war in 2000, the Ethio-Eritrea peace process, which aimed at resolving the border dispute and bring about sustainable peace between the two countries faced severe problem. This is because there was serious disagreement withregard to the implementation process. Lyons (2006: 3), explained this disagreement of the two countries, as: "the U.S. brokered Algiers Agreement to end the 1998 - 2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is at cross roads." This created an impasse to the situation in which Ethiopia was unable to accept the EEBC (Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission) ruling and border demarcation by imposing different restrictions, which frustrated the Eritrean regime.

Therefore to pressurize Ethiopia to accept the EEBC ruling and there by restoring its credibility in Eritrea, the Eritrea's leadership strengthened its involvement in Somalia by supporting the anti-Ethiopia elements, and other radical Islamic insurgents who were launching attacks from Somalia. This created another front or the proxy war for the Ethio - Eritrea border crisis of 1998 - 2000 (Lyons, 2006: 3-4). In the international political stage, the PFDJ authoritarian and repressive domestic political order resulted, the isolation of Eritrea which is explained by Hirt (2008:229), as: "Eritrean foreign relations suffered from continuous relative isolation, aggravated by its own human right violation from the view point of Western nations, and its continuous involvement in regional affairs by supporting opposition movements of neighboring countries."

Such political isolation led Eritrea to become the member of the Arab league and thereby to become the strongest opposition force for all pro - Ethiopia factions in Somalia such as the TNG and the TFG. From the point of view of the topic, it can be plausibly argued that, Eritrea by reversing its policy towards the Islamists once which were its enemy, has been their strongest ally in order to use them as its instrument of destabilizing Ethiopia's peace and security. This Eritrean government strategy is clearly explained by Hirt (2008:232), as:

> . . . It actively supports the Islamic forces in Somalia, allegedly with military support an obvious reversal of stand in which it declared a few years ago that the Islamic fundamentalists were enemies for the national unity and integrity of the country. In fact, there may have been unofficial support for the Islamic al-Ittihad movement in Somalia by the PFDJ in previous years, but what is new is the public support for the UIC by the Eritrean government, although it denies having sent military support to Somalia.

To summarize the argument, the Ethio - Eritrea border war of 1998 - 2000 can be taken and contributed as one of the major causes of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08, and can be taken as an extension of the conflict between the two countries in the form of proxy war. In addition to this military intervention, the Somali politics and the Ethio - Eritrea confrontation in Somalia can destabilize the Horn of Africa at any time and it will be a threat for the region because of the following reason, "the great threat of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea today arises from their recent and rapidly expanding military involvement in Somalia" (Lyons, 2006: 9).

3.5 Actors in the conflict

The actors in the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia are multiple and they are groups which are part of anti - Ethiopia forces having their own political and ideological agendas. They can be categorized as anti - Ethiopia Somali armed groups, the major one is the UIC and its Youth military wing al-Shabab, the other one is the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS) which is formed in Eritrea (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol.LXV, No.051, 2008: 3). The other ones are the armed Ethiopian opposition groups which are fighting to topple the EPRDF government such as the ONLF, OLF, and EPLF (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 144, 2009: 3) The last one's are countries which are in the region and the Middle East which have anti Ethiopia agenda of destabilizing the country which had played role in this conflict by arming, training, financing and supporting are "Sudan and Eritrea, along with Egypt and other Muslim majority states in the region Support the UIC"(Weber, 2008: 19).

Due to the importance of the Horn of Africa's geo - political setup it has been the focus of the prominent countries from the Middle East and North Africa in which, "Governments and contenders for power have been supported by Egypt, Israel, Libya, Iran and other governments and non - governmental organization in neighboring region" (McGinnis, 1999: 4). Furthermore the US that is the strong ally of Ethiopia has participated by providing arms, financial support and intelligence and by backing the Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia during 2006-08 through the international organizations such as the UN and AU.

CHAPTER 4

Ethiopia's Military Intervention in Somalia during 2006 – 2008 and its impact on the Domestic Politics of Ethiopia

4.1 Overview

Horn of Africa is strategically important for several factors. For example, geographically the Horn is strategic, because it is closer to the two vital world water bodies, which are necessary for the international economic activity and trade. Furthermore both have high significances in the global military and political activities, and particularly since the major oil producing region of the Middle East is closer, and Aberra (1994:682) explains the region's importance as: "it is likely that the Indian Ocean, the Red sea, and the main oil routes will become more, not less, important in the period a head, the Horn's importance will also increase." The Horn is also known in terms of humanitarian crisis that is common since 1970s and according McGinnis (1999:1), it is characterized by, "recurring bouts of war, drought and famine." One of these states in the Horn which is the victim such human suffering is Somalia which is described by World Bank (2005: 6), as: "Somalia Republic (1960 – 1991), constituted the former Italian Colonies of South - Central Somalia, Punt land and the former British protectorate of Somaliland." Somalia is strategically important country in the Horn of Africa, because it is "located in the Horn of Africa along the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean" (http://www. fpif. org/briefs/Vol.2, 2008). Somalia has three neighbors which share land boundary with it. Somalia "shares its international border 2,380 km with three neighbors: Kenya 682 km; Ethiopia 1,645km; and Djibouti 613 km" (Kurian, 1987: 1793). Compared with Djibouti and Kenya, Somalia shares the longest land border with Ethiopia, and this has huge significance in the economic, political and social relation of the two countries people and government.

Since its independence in 1960 up to 1991, Somalia had passed through two different regimes. These are: - parliamentary democracy from 1960-1969, and military dictatorship from 1969-1991 which were the last viable governments in its modern history. The authoritarian, military dictatorship rule of Somalia came to power in 1969 by a military coup, "led by General Siad Barre, toppled Somalia's nascent parliamentary democracy, banned political parties, and dismantled the national assembly" (http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol 2, 2008).

The Siad Barre's regime which initially adopted socialist ideology by being the strong ally of the USSR, had later shifted its alliance to the US, is the last fully functioning government of Somalia. This regime brought its end by the political feature which was authoritarian dictatorship that was, “marked by corruption, in efficient governance, and increasingly fragmentary politics centered on clan based political parties and patronage” (http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10783/section/6, 2009).This regime was a war mongering and irredentist in the region. This is justified by the conflicts it created with and outside Somalia. For example, “between 1977 and 1991, the country endured three major armed conflicts. The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977 -78, in which Somalia’s forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to Liberate the Somali - inhabited region of the Ogaden” (World Bank, 2005: 9)This hugely contributed in shaking the political base of the Barre’s regime and Somalia’s internal security . Furthermore it shaped and changed the internal political dynamics of Somalia during this time to be dictatorial, that led to the formation of different armed opposition groups which were supported by the neighboring countries and flared up the internal conflict in Somalia by different armed clan movements. Thus the World Bank (2005: 9 – 10), explains this as:

> The first of these movements was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf. This mainly Majerteen clan movement engaged the regime in periodic skirmishes in the north east of the country and was met with harsh repression. The second major armed conflict was the war between the Somalia military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was formed in 1981 by some members of the Isaaq clan following the Ogaden war. The third armed conflict before 1991 pitted embattled government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements included the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye Clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogaden Clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerteen Clan).

All these armed movements were faced by tough military engagements and harsh responses from the Somali military in which hundreds of thousands fled their homes, and perished. This at last brought the "violent over throw of military dictator Said Barre in 1991, [in which] Somalia has not seen any kind of centralized working government" (Seifert, 2008: 28). The post - 1991 Somalia has been very chaotic, unstable and is infested by different warlords, which are based on clan arrangement. Finally, the post 1991 Somalia's internal political situation explained by Farah (2001:88), as:

> Sudden and total collapse of centralized institutions of government created political void filled up by clan - based factions commandeered by unpredictable notorious "warlords" who got entangled in protracted and so far inexorable violent power struggle and competition for control over the wins of the fallen state (Farah, 2001: 88).

Such struggle and competition by different factions and actors for control of resources with in Somalia has posed severe danger in terms of peace and stability in the daily life of people. This situation brought about famine, massive starvation and internal dislocation for the people, plus humanitarian crisis, which one way or the other invited intervention at different times by different international actors.

4.2 The Post - 1991 interventions in Somalia

One of the major features in the global political order after the end of Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union that has become prevalent in the developing states is, "communal conflicts became more prominent and, arguably, more prevalent than they had been previously" (Huntington, 1997: 255). Such political phenomena led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Genocide in Rwanda, Civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and DRC. In order to avert such global turmoil which resulted political, economic and social crisis led to the emergence of new phenomena called humanitarian intervention. According Dodds (2005: 161), human intervention is very important to avert international crisis, “which is justified in cases where massive violations of human rights have occurred and an international response is required to prevent a further loss of life.” Somalia is one of the countries in the post 1991 World, which frequently hosted humanitarian intervention through military force to prevent humanitarian crisis that is the product of the political, economic and social reality which is the result of state failure and absence of government in Somalia. The humanitarian intervention in Somalia is the first one in its kind to be conducted by the UN and later the US followed. Human Rights Watch (2007) explains chronologically the humanitarian intervention as follows:

> Between 1991 and 1993, as people died of starvation and related illnesses in their tens of thousands, freelance and clan- based military obstructed aid efforts and looted relief. A 1992 United Nations (UN) - negotiated ceasefire failed and prompted the first UN intervention to protect relief access and aid workers - the operation known as the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM).
>
> In December 1992 UNOSOM's failure to end the fighting led the United States to overcome its initial reluctance and to send troops, under US command, to the

> UN Task Force on Somalia (known as UNITAF and codenamed "Operation Restore Hope"). In May 1993 UNOSOM and UNITAF were replaced by UNOSOM II, which had a more robust mandate under chapter VII of the UN charter and more than 30,000 troops from various countries. US troops withdrew in 1994 after they became embroiled in conflict with General Aideed. UNOSOM II left Somalia in March 1995 without achieving a breakthrough towards long term political stability for Somalia, initially a key objective of the mission.

Even if these interventions could not achieve their objectives, they paved the way for critical political development, such as the creation of armed groups based on clan in the absence of government in Somalia, which has been security threats for Somalia, the region, and the world. This is explained by Medhane (2002:35), as: “apart from UNOSOM II's role in the Somali civil war, which allowed the al-Ithaad to exist militarily in a Semi-clandestine and key low - level overt position.” This is one of the early organizations which were having a very strong anti-Ethiopia outlook and irredentist policy, that played significant role in orchestrating deadly terrorist attacks from east to central Ethiopia. Another important political development from these interventions is “the islamaization of clan leadership" (Medhane, 2002: 35). These two important political developments in the failed state Somalia have given rise to the emergence of radical Islamic group known as UIC, which is one of the major factors for the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008.

4.2.1 The Ethiopia's Military Intervention during 2006 - 2008

Ethiopia shares very long land boundary (1,645km) with Somalia. Furthermore in the Geo - politics of the Horn of Africa, “the Ethiopia - Somalia nexus is the core of the region” (McGinnis, 1999: 1), because the relationship of the two countries since Somalia’s independence in 1960 has not been peaceful due to the irredentist policy Somalia followed in the region. This explained in detail by Human Rights Watch (2007) as follows:

> Ethiopia and Somalia are historically, socially, and politically intertwined, with several episodes of religious and territorial disputes over the Somali region of Eastern Ethiopia known as the Ogaden, most recently in 1964 and 1977. Ethiopia’s concerns are containing Somalia’s nationalist sentiments towards the ethnic Somali Ogaden region remains a key in Ethiopian foreign policy decision making.

Such historic, Social and political linkage with Somalia has been creating both positive and negative impacts in the relation of the two countries. In the positive sense of their relation, “Ethiopia has helped and facilitated the independence of Somalia”(Mesfin, 1999: 85). Even the

EPRDF government and PM Meles played significant role by organizing different reconciliation conferences to stabilize Somalia for example, “supported by IGAD and OAU, the Ethiopian - sponsored Sodore peace process which began in late 1996. . .” (Farah, 2001: 90) can be mentioned. In the negative sense of their relationship, Somalia and Ethiopia were helping each other's opposition rebel groups (McGinnis, 1999: 1), since Somalia’s independence and this trend continued. In the post 1991 period, particularly after UNOSOM II left Somalia by creating power vacuum and the country “descended into anarchy and warlord rule” (Seifert, 2008: 29),which created the opportunity for radical Islamic groups, anti - Ethiopia insurgent movements and other terrorist organizations to run freely in Somalia. For example the main Ethiopia's enemy and irredentist Somalia organization the UIC “was formed in 2000 by former members of al - Ittihad al - Islamia (AIAI)” (http://www.globalsecurity.orgmilitary/ world/war/somalia.htm, 2009).Since its formation this organization has performed different terrorist activities against Ethiopia's national interest and its security by collaborating with other anti - Ethiopia insurgents.

But after the 9/11 attacks of al - Qaeda in the US, there has been dramatic shift in terms of the state's role in keeping security and peace in the globalized world, and the "War on Terror" changed states role in the global security in which,

> In the post - cold war era the state began to lose its pre-eminence as being the principal actor in the structure of international security. Globalization, regionalization, and economic liberalization had diluted the state's sphere of influence and replaced it with transnational institutions and super national organizations. However, 9/11 has given a boost to the warring power of the state. The state as an entity, became more powerful; in its actions against terrorism, even when disproportionate to the acts of terror, are not questioned (Kaartikeyaa, 2005: 137).

In the case of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia being the security target of terrorist and irredentist groups with in Somalia has to be ready to confront challenges and threats which jeopardize the region, because “Ethiopia, as the core country of the Horn, could play a very pivotal role in the stability, democratization and development of the Horn of Africa” (Mesfin, 1999, 156), when such conditions exist. One of such roles is Ethiopia's effort to bring about secular, stable Somalia government, which can be an ally in security and peace for its neighbors. For example Ethiopia's full commitment in the formation of TNG (Transitional National Government) in 2000 and TFG in 2004 can be taken into account. It was with this aim of fulfilling its commitment and avoiding the threats that emanated from the UIC that Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia during 2006-08. Another important factor is, the UIC’s leadership irredentist policy and its impact on the domestic political affairs of Ethiopia, which is very dangerous, has to be stopped. Because the:

> Nationalist statements from some of the UIC leadership further fuelled Ethiopian fears that the UIC hoped to unite ethnic Somali communities in neighboring northern Kenya and Ethiopia's Ogaden with Somalia. Ethiopia was also concerned by the potential impact on Ethiopia's own large Muslim and Somali population of the Islamic courts' effort to establish political Islam in Somalia (http://www.hrw. org/en/ node/10783/section/6, 2009).

The UIC's involvement in the internal affairs of Ethiopia with regard to its national security is exposed when; the UIC extended its support to the ONLF, which created havoc in the Somali Region. The UIC's advance in Somalia, with its territorial expansion by taking the strategic southern town of Kismayu in late September 2006, allegedly with a coalition of forces including advisors from Eritrea and fighters from the ONLF and OLF (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No.144, 2009: 9), plus the imposition of strict Sharia law by the UIC in the second half of 2006, confirmed the group's radicalism, and its declaration of Jihad on Ethiopia invited the Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006-08. What further pushed the Ethiopia's government to intervene in Somalia in addition to the above mentioned issues is, "the UN security council on December 6 passed resolution 1725 authorizing a regional military intervention in Somalia, a development long desired by the TFG" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No.144, 2009: 9). This legitimized Ethiopia internationally to take military action in Somalia, and with this "the Ethiopians marched into the country in December 2006 to help Somalia's interim government oust the UIC, which had taken control of much of Southern Somalia" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No.051, 2008: 9). This clearly shows that Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia in 2006 based up on the TFG's request and thereby to ensure its national security, peace and territorial integrity, and to bring about regional peace in the Horn of Africa.

What makes different the Ethiopia's military intervention in 2006-08 different from the previous UN and US led interventions is that, the former is purely political in terms of its objective while the later are humanitarian interventions which aimed to avoid humanitarian crisis. What makes all similar is that they are military interventions.

4.3 An Overview of the post 1991 Ethiopian Domestic Politics

The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 has several impacts in the domestic politics of Ethiopia, which is related with the domestic level analysis of foreign policy, when viewed from different angles of the country's historic, socio - economic and political setup. Historically and politically the modern day Ethiopian state is the product political, economic and social struggle internally and externally. This is further explained by Merera (2003:1), as: "The

modern multi - ethnic empire - state of Ethiopia was created by wars of expansion and conquest, scarring the history of successive generations. The scars have had profound effects not only on people and events of Yesteryear but also on the way the present is understood and the future faced".

These scars of people which are the result of economic marginalization and political exclusion from centralized Ethiopian state have brought an armed opposition and insurgent movements in various parts of the country, which are concentrated in two social and economic zones. First, the pastoralists in the eastern part of the country which includes Somalis in the Ogaden, Afars, Oromos and Bejas and second, the Christian highland regions which have suffered neither from economic marginalization nor political exclusion and they closely related with the state (Clapham, 1994: 706 - 707). These highland insurgent movements have brought about the change of regime and new political organization in the Ethiopia's domestic politics in which the ethnic federal state arrangement and government introduced in Ethiopia since 1991. This in certain ways reduced the old scars by avoiding the highly centralized state structure and confirming the equality of the people of Ethiopia in which, "the sovereign power is not given to the Ethiopian people at large or to the federal member states, but resides with the nations, nationalities of Ethiopia" (FDRE Constitution, Art. 8-1).

Then the next issue will be on the domestic political impacts of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008. For example, what was the political impact of the intervention between the ruling party and the opposition political parties? Will the radical Islamists of the UIC have created a domestic political impact on the relation between the Christians and Muslim population of Ethiopia by declaring jihad? What is the impact of this intervention in the Region Five in terms of peace, security and development?

4.3.1 The Political Impact: Between EPRDF and the Opposition political Parties

In post -1991, following the down fall of the Derg regime, Ethiopia is restructured along a federal system. Accordingly the state was divided in to nine regional states, which are delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns; language, identity and consent of people concerned (FDRE Constitution, Art.46-2), and these are: The State of Tigray, The State of Afar, The State of Amhara, The State of Oromia, The State of Somalia, The State of Benishangul/Gumuz, The State of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples, The State of the Gambella Peoples, and The State of the Harari People (FDRE Constitution, Art. 47-1).

Established in 1989 by TPLF, EPRDF is ruling Ethiopia since 1991. EPRDF is an umbrella political organization which constitutes four major ethnic and regional political parties of TPLF, ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF. It also constitutes other affiliated parties, generally known as PDO's (Peoples Democratic Organizations) (Pausewang et al, 2002: 13-14). Since its assumption of state power in 1991, EPRDF is committing itself "with bold initiative of reordering the Ethiopian state and society on the basis of multi- party democracy" (Merera, 2003: 144). In order to full fill this bold initiative, there has to be political space in terms of allowing opposition political parties to be formed and participate freely with in the country's politics, the emergence of free press, and periodic election to be conducted between different political parties. In comparison with the two previous regimes, the EPRDF government played substantial role in widening the political field for different actors to play, and in order to achieve this EPRDF, "conducted major elections in June 1992, and 1994, May 1995, and 2000" (Merera, 2003: 144), and the May 2005 election is the recent one.

Particularly the May 2005 election was unique in Ethiopian political history because it was "the historic multi - party election [and] participation was extraordinarily high, at 25 million more than 80% of the Ethiopian electorate turned out to vote (considering the calm and successful completion of the election)" (Balsvik, 2007: 170). Another important milestone in this election is the largest increase of seats taken by the opposition political parties in comparison with the previous two elections in which, "before the election, opposition parties had had only twelve seats. . . . Preliminary election results at the beginning of June 2005 announced that the ruling EPRDF party had won a clear majority, 320 seats, while the opposition coalition had won almost 200 seats" (Balsvik, 2007: 172).

Table1: the political parties and their seats in the third tenure of the House of Peoples Representatives (2005 - 2009).

No	Party	Number of Women MPs as related to their to their parties			
		Men	Women	Total Seats	Share in Percentage
1	TPLF	24	14	38	
2	ANDM	58	29	87	
3	OPDO	74	36	110	
4	SEPDM	64	28	92	
Total Chairs occupied by EPRDF		200	107	327	62.17
5	AEUO	42	1	43	8.18
6	UEDP-MEDHIN	34	2	36	6.84
7	REMDSJ	8	0	8	1.52
8	EDL	1	1	2	0.38
9	UEDF	51	1	52	9.89
10	SPDP	23	1	24	4.56
11	OFDM	10	1	11	2.09
12	BGPDUF	7	1	8	1.52
13	ANDP	7	1	8	1.52
14	GPDM	3	-	3	0.57
15	ANDO	1	-	1	0.19
16	HNL	1	-	1	0.19
17	SMPDUO	1	-	1	0.19
18	Independent	1	-	1	0.19
Total		410	116	526	100%

N.B The Number of Members the House is stated as 526 as the remaining 20 failed to take up their seats.

Source: (http://www.ethiopar.net/type/English/basinfo/regionfo/html, 2009).

According (Art. 45) of the FDRE constitution, FDRE have a parliamentarian form of government, with the structure that,

> Consists of the House of People's Representative, the Council of Federation and the Council of Ministers which are the supreme legislative and executive organs. The House of People's Representative is the highest legislative organ of the country. It has up to 550 elected representatives out of which 20 are reserved for representatives of minority group whose population may not exceed 100,000 (Vander Loop, 2002: 17).

In relation to the research topic, one of the powers and functions of the HPRs under FDRE Constitution, Article 55: (9) is, "on the basis of a draft law submitted to it by the council of Ministers it shall proclaim state of war". It is based on this power that, the Ethiopian Parliament gave PM Meles Zenawi the authority to take legal action against the "clear and present danger" of Islamic forces in neighboring Somalia, by adopting the motion by a 311 - 99 vote, and with 16 members abstaining (news VOA.Com;2009). Therefore to implement this decision and thereby to carry out its national responsibility which is, "basing itself on national efforts to overcome the danger of strife and collapse emanating from within, our foreign and national security policy has the objective of resisting external threats to our security and building our capacity to reduce our vulnerability" (http://www.mfa.gov/et, 2009). The FDRE government took the following action, "on the 24, December 2006, . . . the Ethiopian government has taken self -defensive measures and started counter attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic courts and foreign terrorist groups" (http://www.bloggersnews.net/14238, 2009). Then what an impact did this intervention created politically between EPRDF and the opposition political parties? The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 has created different political impacts between the ruling party EPRDF and the opposition parties and between the opposition parties themselves.

The political impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 on the domestic (national) politics of Ethiopia can be analyzed based on the viewpoints of both the ruling and the opposition political parties, which are very different. The military intervention's political impact at the national level has been visible when the resolution was placed for parliamentary voting in the HPR. During the passing of the resolution, to authorize the military intervention in Somalia, there was major political difference between the ruling and the opposition political parties and within the opposition political camp itself. Even if all political parties in the HPR (the ruling and the opposition political parties) understood the importance of

the intervention for Ethiopia's national security, two of the opposition political parties opposed the resolution for the following major political reasons.

UEDF, one of the main parliamentary opposition political parties, expressed its opposition for the resolution by saying; the military intervention may put the country into quagmire that would be difficult to come out from.

CUDP opposed the resolution by explaining its concern with regard to the shortness of the time allotted to the deliberation among the members of the HPR, and it suggested for international arbitrators to intervene rather than Ethiopia.

Another important political impact of the intervention in the domestic politics of Ethiopia is, it created division among the major opposition political parties in which UEDF, OFDM, and CUDP were the main opponents of the resolution, while EDUP - MEDHIN was the only opposition political party which supported the resolution and the intervention on the basis of Declaration of self defense (http://www.sudantribune.com/article19028, 2009).

On the other hand the resolution of the military intervention, and the military intervention itself has been used by the ruling party EPRDF to bring about consensus among Ethiopians and it tried to get support of opposition political parties by explaining the military intervention is for clear self - defense purpose to safeguard Ethiopia's security which was threatened by the strategy put up from Asmara to Mogadishu. According the ruling party EPRDF, defending the country at such critical time has to be the priority of every Ethiopian and every political party apart from political differences, and this has been clearly explained by the chairman of EPRDF, PM Meles Zenawi as, “parties should not dispute on fundamental national security issues, sovereign matters and on core interests and well being of the people on such issues, all Ethiopians are expected to take common position” (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 082, 2008). Even if the ruling party EPRDF tried its best to convince and rally behind it the opposition political parties in the HPR, it is only EDUP - MEDHIN that supported the military intervention in Somalia during 2006.

Not only during the deliberation of the resolution in the HPR to authorize the Ethiopia's military intervention of Somalia during 2006 - 2008, but also after the resolution has passed in the HPR and Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia, the military intervention created different political impacts domestically which will be discussed next.

Politically the following major domestic impacts are the result of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008.

The ruling party EPRDF to divert the internal political crisis that has started during the post 2005 election period between itself and the opposition political parties has used the military intervention. From the beginning, “the majority of the opposition forces objected the vote in favor of the authorization of military action fearing the government would engage the country in a war that may be used by the government to direct the attention from internal problems” (http://www.sudantribune.com/article19028, 2009).

Due to the highest priority given to the country's national security by the ruling party EPRDF, it has been forced to concentrate on the national security issue which diverted the domestic political course and interrupted some democratic reforms in the country which had been agreed by both the ruling and the opposition political parties jointly, which were very important to tackle some of the challenging problems facing the country's democracy and democratization process. These include, “ reform of the National Electoral Board, joint government - opposition missions to investigate human rights concerns in Oromiya, revising the media law and parliamentary rules of procedure, and establishing a code of conduct for the press” (http://www.reliefweb. int/rw/rwb.nst/, 2009).

EPRDF's effort to divert the internal political challenges by concentrating on the military intervention has contributed for re-organizing, creating coalition and formation of new opposition political party such as Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ). The Ethiopia's military intervention during 2006 - 2008 has created favorable opportunity for the opposition political parties to strengthen themselves and play critical role in voicing their opposition against the incumbent government even if they complain of attention diversion of the ruling party. For example the opposition political parties created the Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia with the main political objective of forming strong opposition coalition which is important to make the forth coming (2010) election free and fair. The opposition forum is initially constituted of five parties and they are the following, UEDF, UDJ (Unity for Democracy and Justice), EDUM (Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement), Arena (Arena Tigray for Democracy and Sovereignty), and SDAF (Somali Democratic Alliance Forces) and these parties formed an alliance which is called Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia (The sub - Saharan Informer, Vol. 7, No. 006, February 2009). Currently the forum constitutes eight member political parties (Capital Vol. 11, No 523. Feb. 22, 2009).

Another important political impact of the military intervention domestically is, it has united all the opposition political parties including EDUP - Medhin which forced the ruling party EPRDF to withdraw Ethiopia's troop from Somalia. According Professor Beyene Petros chairman of the

UEDF, the interventions is futile and he explained his dismay as, “the government has continued to sacrifice our citizens for zero result which needs not a treatment but a complete stop" (Capital Vol. 10, No. 511, September 28, 2008: 16).

When the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, and its impact on the domestic politics of Ethiopia are considered from EPRDF's point of view, it has achieved its goal and accomplished its mission in keeping peace and security of the country. For instance, according the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the intervention, “The Ethiopian army thwarted the direct threat posed by extremists and the government in Asmara that has sent its destabilizing force, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)” (Capital Vol. 11, No. 524 December 28, 2008: 10). Another important impact of the military intervention on the domestic politics of the country according EPRDF is that, the government has been able to avoid and minimize cross border raids and attacks by the armed opposition groups based in Somalia in which, “the regime has got rid of the opposition political forces that were about to use the institution of UIC in vast lands of Somalia to the end of launching an attack in that direction” (http://www.ss informer.com/commentary/2007/June, 2009). Furthermore the government and the ruling party had been successful to temporarily change the course of the domestic political problem which started during the controversial May, 2005 election and continued after. It tried to rally the public at large and the opposition political parties behind it by engaging in Somalia which posed severe danger to Ethiopia's national security and territorial integrity, in which "the incumbent was also able to divert the attention of the domestic and international public from the un right politics that reigns in the country” (http://www.ssinformer.com/commentary/2007/June, 2009).

To conclude with the domestic political impacts of the military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, it is clear that due to the well organized effort of the opposition political parties and their strength in the HPR, they had been able to make the government and the ruling party to concentrate in the internal problems of the country ranging from democratization process to the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. The intervention also created unity on their stand against the military intervention by the opposition parties and this led to the formation of coalition in order to confront the ruling party in the coming election. Another important impact of the opposition political parties is their point of argument against the intervention during the debate in the HPR to authorize the military intervention had held true. For example, as UEDF said, the intervention had hold the country in quagmire from December 2006 - January 2009, and

as CUD said, the ruling party and the Ethiopian government at last resorted for international help and arbitration by withdrawing from Somalia in 2009.

In general, the domestic impact of the military intervention was perceived by the opposition political parties differently, particularly those that are the member of the Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia concentrate on two critical issues. The first one is political which is concerned with the democratization process of the country in which EPRDF strategy to divert the attention of the public at large from internal political problems did not succeed, and the opposition political parties had taken the intervention in Somalia as failure, and their voices in the HPR and the political reality in Somalia had forced the Ethiopia's troop withdrawal. The second impact is economic which directly affects all Ethiopians in terms of the cost the military intervention needed to carry out. First of all, the Ethiopian economy is an agriculture based economy, which depends on the export of primary products and import of manufactured goods, in which the import is much higher than export and it is seriously underdeveloped (Eshetu, 2004: 89 - 94). In such an economy, the Ethiopia's military intervention of Somalia during 2006 - 2008 has created financial burden on the government and the people, because the Ethiopia's military had been deployed in Somalia more than two years, and "to start with costs, military adventurism costs the country dear in terms of human lives and hard currency" (http://www.ss informer.com/commentary/2007/June, 2009). And this has huge impact on the economy of the country and the lively hood of its people, because one way or the other the money that has to be used for development had been squandered in the war and this in turn brought about high tax, inflation and other related economic problems on the public at large and the country's economy. The opposition political parties as had further emphasized this, "the finance spent in Somalia could be one of the reasons that paralyze the government from saving the nation's living standard from deteriorating, [and] it is distracting our attention and resources from our development" (Capital Vol.10, No. 511, Sept 28, 2008: 8).

To sum up the opposition political parties dismay on the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008, Seye Abraha explains it as "Ethiopia is left with a waste of money, loss of life and defamed name. This is all unwanted price we paid" (The Sub - Saharan Informer, Vol. 7, No. 006, February 2009). To conclude with, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, it created a domestic political impact that has both economic and political basis which one way or the other had created historic legacy both negative and positive in both the ruling party and the opposition political parties. Concerning the ruling party EPRDF and its leadership even if the intervention was costly in terms economic and human resources, it

successfully carried out its responsibility of defending the country and its people from "the clear and present danger" that was posed by Islamists for the time being. This can be taken as the major positive impact on the domestic politics of the country.

4.3.2 The Impact on the Relation between the Christian and Muslim Population of Ethiopia

Islam in Ethiopia has come as early as Ninth century in which, “it is well known that Ethiopia was a refuge to the followers of the prophet Mohammed when they were being persecuted in Arabia” (Mesfin, 1999: 79). In terms of history also, “Islam as a religion is a much Ethiopian historically speaking, as its Arab” (Mesfin, 1977: 35).Since its arrival in Ethiopia, Islam co - existed peacefully with the Christian faith through harmony and by respecting each other without causing any significant instability (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV,No.123,2009). But this relationship faced critical obstacle in the 16th century most particularly,

> In 1527, the tide began to turn against the Christian kingdom. Galvanizing for his own ends an irresistible population movement of the nomadic Afar and Somali, a military genius by the name of Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim, more popularly known as Ahmad Gragn or Gragn ('the left Handed"), led the Muslims in a series of sweeping victories over the Christian kingdom (Bahru, 2002: 9).

After this tide had passed, successive Ethiopian kings normalized the relationship between the Christians and Muslims to bring peace and stability in the country on the issue of religion. The Christian - Muslim peaceful co- existence continued in Ethiopia after the sixteenth century tide more or less with minor incidents, and this is explained as, “for the last four hundred years, with only brief interludes, Ethiopia’s history has been marked by mutual respect and tolerance among faiths. The attitude of successive governments have been to nurture this accommodation and resist the politicization of religion”(http:// hornofafrica.ssrc.org/ Abdul-Mohammed,2009).This shows politically the Ethiopian rulers were astute enough in making the Ethiopian state by taking different measures on the cultural and religious aspect that is described by Jesman (1963:22), as:

> In Ethiopia the assimilating genius of the race encompasses even the Muslims. Most of the Jiberti, the Muslim indigenous minority of the Christian Highlands of Agau and Sabean stock, and most of the present generation of the Harari, the racially mixed population in the south- east, genuinely feel that they are not the reluctant subjects of the Ethiopian crown, but full citizens.

The above issue can further be strengthened by saying that Christian - Muslim relation in Ethiopia was not as such a security and peace threat to the country and its people as region was in traditional Ethiopia. For instance, Mesfin (1999:149) describes this as:

> The most important evidence for this may be that even with in the same religious groups, whether Christians or Moslems, there was always regional fighting. Moreover, there were cases when Moslems fought on the side of Christians against their co-religionists. One such example is Asma'addin who, more than once, fought on the side Sertse Dinghil, and the chronicler speaks of him as a truthful and trustworthy man.

But all these do not mean that there was no problem in the Christian- Muslim relation in the traditional Ethiopia. The Christian - Muslim religious division in Ethiopia was having economic and political impact on the followers of Islam such as denial of certain political and economic rights which is explained by Bahru (2008:334), as: " . . . Islam was relegated to a clearly secondary status in the past. A major handicap that Ethiopian Muslims had suffered was their exclusion from the hereditary usufruct right to land (rest) prevalent in the north. As a result, the Muslims had traditionally been forced to concentrate on trade."

In the modern Ethiopia, particularly after Emperor Haile Selassie came to power and between (1936–1974) major and fundamental changes has happened to the Islamic religion and its followers. Italian colonialists to weaken the strong patriotic anti- colonial sentiment of the Ethiopian people used particularly religion. Therefore to win the hearts and minds of the Ethiopia Muslims Italians did the following Change towards Islam and Bahru (2008:334) explains this as:

> During the period of Fascist Italian Occupation (1936 - 41), the new rulers, in line with their policy of undermining the political prerogatives and cultural advantages of the Christian Amhara ruling class, introduced politics favorable to Islam, such as recognition of Sharia Law, the use of Arabic language for instruction and in the media, and the building of mosques, including the Grand Mosque in Addis Ababa. Most of these policies were reversed after the restoration of the Hayla Selasse regime in 1941.

The most radical changes that abolished religious inequality in the modern Ethiopia took place in 1974, and this is discussed by Bahru (2008:334) very briefly as:

> A more enduring, and this time indigenous, wind of change began to blow in 1974, heralded by a mammoth demonstration of the Muslim population of the capital, with the enthusiastic support of several Christians.
>
> The ultimate result of this popular demonstration was the official recognition of Islam as a national religion, as made explicit in the official celebration of three Muslim holidays and the ascription of equal protocol status to the patriarch and the imam.

These changes that had taken place in the 1974 continued in the post - 1991 Ethiopia under the EPRDF rule. Different foreign and domestic anti - Ethiopian forces have tried to use religion as an instrument to destabilize the country and its people. Particularly in the post- 1991 period different terrorist groups attacked Ethiopia through different directions, and the threat has continued after the UIC is formed in Somalia, which one way or the other led to Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006-08, then the next question is, does this intervention has an impact on the Christian- Muslim relation in Ethiopia?

Islam is playing crucial role in the modern world politics apart from being religion; it is political instrument too (Mesfin; 1999, 79). And this political development of Islam in to Islamic fundamentalism dates back to the medieval period when Islam was used as religious instrument to avert the external threat that originated from other societies in which, "the genesis of the global Islamic fundamentalist movement goes back to the 13th and 14th centuries when Islamic scholars began to call for the strict return to the Qur'an in order to solve the crisis prevalent at the time in Muslim societies threatened by outside enemies" (Medhane, 2002: 10).

In the present world, this Islamic fundamentalism is explained as modern phenomenon of Islamic extremism with its aim of establishing a modern society based on Islamic laws, and state has to be an agent in fulfilling the political, social and economic goals of Islam (Medhane, 2002: 10 - 11). This is how Islam is transformed from religion to political instrument, in places where there is power vacuum and failure of the state by providing basic services, security and other to the people who are in need. Political Islam is widening its influence in the Middle East and it is expanding in the North and Horn of Africa. It is this extremist radical Islamic ideology that has been followed by the UIC and its irredentist policy, which were the threat for Ethiopia's national security, and the region's peace that pushed for the military intervention of 2006-08. Because the extremism of these radical groups in the Horn is a threat for long standing peace among people of different faith which is contrary to the previous period in which Islam, " in the north east Africa has been pacific in nature and closely linked with, the tolerance between Christianity and Islam"(http:// hornofafrica.ssrc.org/ Abdul-Mohammed, 2009). Since Ethiopia has large Muslim population, the FDRE government is responsible in keeping the peace between the followers of different religions in the country. The propaganda and agitation of the UIC and other top al - Qaeda leaders may create the anti - Christian and anti - Ethiopia sentiment on the Ethiopian Muslim population. Therefore to avert the danger that may arise from fanatic religious groups in Ethiopia, which support al-Qeada, the FDRE government has been vigilant. Because, "Addis Ababa also fears the radicalization of its Muslim population by Islamists, some of who are

accused of having deep ties to al -Qaeda and other terrorist groups" (NewsVOA.Com, 2009). Concerning the impact of the military intervention on the Christian - Muslim relation in Ethiopia, and the religious harmony existed peacefully in the country, and Smith (2008:135) explains this as: "there is no visible Islamist scene in Ethiopia. But Muslim communities enjoy economic growth and unheard opportunities for their cultural and religious activities." Such an opportunity intensified the support of the Ethiopian Muslim community, in defending the country's sovereignty while the relation between the two major religions is peaceful, and the intervention was not having significant impact in destabilizing the peaceful co-existence of Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia. The declaration of Jihad against Ethiopia by the UIC rather unified Ethiopians all across the spectrum, and made the intervention to be viewed as, " . . . necessary to defend the country's security, a position, reinforced by the resolution voted by Ethiopia's parliament, including ethnic Somali members" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Milas/index 3, html, 2007).

In general, rather than creating conflict and instability in the country, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 has forged strong relation and unity among Ethiopians of different faith.

4.3.3 The Impact on the Somali Region of Ethiopia

The FDRE is composed of nine - ethnically based administrative states. One of these states is,

> Ethiopia's Somali - Region, which includes the Ogaden, has a population of approximately 4.5 million people, of which approximately 1.8 million live in five zones (Dagahabur, Fik, Gode, Korehe and Warder) with severe humanitarian needs. Unfortunately, three of these zones - Dagahabour, Korahe and Warder are also where the insurgent activities are the most prevalent (http://www.reliefweb int/rw/rwb.nsf, 2009).

Ethiopia shares long land boundary with Somalia by its Somali region in the east, which one way or the other has been the security concern of the country since Somalia's independence in 1960. Longer boundaries between countries have an impact, politically, socially and economically both positively and negatively as Mesfin (1999:69) explains, thus:

> - - - All other things remaining equal the longer the length of boundary between countries the more the possibilities for and the more the effectiveness of interpenetrating and interacting for positive or negative purposes. A short sighted and culpable view of this fact from only one side often leads to tragic consequences.

This long boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia has contributed more in the negative way of interaction such as interpenetrating of the Ethiopian territory by the Somalis and other anti-Ethiopia, and anti - government insurgencies and armed opposition groups. Particularly in the post - 1991 period, the failure of state in Somalia has contributed largely in the negative ways on the Ethiopia's national security, peace and territorial integrity in the Eastern part of the country is justified by Medhane (2002:158), as:

> In fact ONLF appears to be an armed wing of al - Ittihad in the region five of Ethiopia. They planned joint military operations and coordinated their intelligence activities and logistics during the battles fought with the Ethiopian army. Al - Ittihad was active in subversive activities in Eastern Ethiopia mainly by supporting proxy anti-Ethiopian armed movements like the ONLF, IFLO, OLF and lately an obscure armed movement known as Tokichima.

These and other anti-Ethiopia activities led to the military intervention of 2006-08, which played significant role in assuring peace, security and the continuity of development activities in the Region Five which was hampered by groups like ONLF, OLF and others. “The state is responsible for ensuring security for its people” (Report of The Commission of Africa, 2005: 161); therefore to ensure security for its people from the threat that are posed with in Somalia and to end conflict and violence with in the region five, the FDRE's government took several military measures. Before intervening in Somalia militarily in2006-08, the FDRE government had taken domestic military action to ensure the peace and security of the country. For instance , “recent Ethiopian military moves against the ONLF in the Eastern Ethiopia may be designed to shore up rear bases before larger moves in to Somalia” (Lyons, 2005: 18). Furthermore, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006 used to avoid violent conflicts in the Region Five, because conflict and violence only create destruction which has the following social, economic and political impacts within a given state or society,

- Violence deepens the poverty, in equality and economic stagnation,
- The damage and destruction of health and education systems perpetuates the inequalities and exclusion that fuel tensions,
- The breakdown in institutions, social and cultural structures, and the trauma created by violence and displacement deepens resentment and divisions increasing the risk of future conflict (Report of The Commission of Africa, 2005: 159).

According PM Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, ensured, not only the FDRE’s government commitment but also the army's effort and role in the continuation of development activities, good governance, and democracy in the region and the country in general (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 144, 2009). Furthermore the

intervention was critical in avoiding danger, which were posed by ONLF with regard to distributing humanitarian aid, commercial trade, the movement of aid and development workers in the region (http://www.reliefwebint/rw/rwb.nsf, 2009). To summarize the impact of the military intervention in the Region Five's peace, security and development, plus Ethiopia's stability the FDRE government, confirmed this by issuing the following statement, "the ENDF unequivocally fulfilled their mission of defeating and foiling well planned aggressions from collections of terrorist forces of ONLF, OLF, EPLF, ICU and other Mideast tyrannical regimes" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 116, 2009). Ethiopia has proved once again to its friends and enemies, that it can defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peace at any cost. Therefore, development activities, the day-to-day peaceful people's life and other institutions continued working in the Region Five because of this intervention which foiled the plan of OLF, ONLF, and other anti Ethiopia insurgent groups. One major terrorist incident that took place in the region during the Ethiopia's military intervention of2006-08 is in April 2007 in which, " the ONLF conducted an attack that killed nine Chinese oil workers and seventy seven Ethiopians, many of whom are civilians" (http://www.relefwebint/rw/rwb.nsf, 2009). This is one of the terrorist attacks conducted by ONLF and this has proved that the government cannot fully destroy ONLF, OLF and eliminate their security threat from the Region except minimizing their insurgent activities and weaken their military activity.

To conclude with the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008 has created a significant domestic political impact in terms of re-organizing and strengthening opposition political parties by firmly opposing the military intervention that is taken by the ruling party for diversion of the post 2005 election related internal political crisis. In terms of defending the country's peace, stability and territorial integrity, even if there were differences in the case of the strategy, length of deployment period and the unnecessary costs of the intervention, the ruling party had tried to create support and consensus with the opposition political parties and it was able to get the support of EDUP-Medhin. Concerning the impact of the intervention on the relation between the Muslims and Christians, once again it has proved that Ethiopian's are united in defending their country irrespective of whichever religion they follow and the UIC's attempt to divide Ethiopians on the basis of religion has failed. Regarding the peace, stability and development activities in the Somali Region of Ethiopia the intervention avoided the threat posed by ONLF and OLF in terms of distributing humanitarian aid and other day –to- day activities of the region's government and people. In general, the intervention's positive impacts outweigh the negatives ones on the domestic politics of Ethiopia, when compared with the threats and dangers

which were suppose to be real by the UIC and other anti Ethiopia armed opposition groups which are based in Somalia.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ethiopia's Military Intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 and its impact on the Foreign Relations of the country

5.1 Overview

Ethiopia has long history of statehood and independence in the African continent, which is described by Jesman (1963:10), as: "Ethiopia is the oldest African country yet in many respects, it is in Africa rather than African." This long history of statehood and independence of the country and its people is condensed and described by Zewdie (1994:25), as:

> Ethiopia is a country, which has a long history of civilization dating back over 3,000 years. In its long history different people migrated from all direction to the present- day Ethiopia, turning the country in to melting- pot of diverse people with a varied and enriched culture and at times outstanding levels of socio-economic development. However, this situation was not sustained and there were periodic reverses, such that Ethiopia today is on the list of the least developed countries of the world.

The present day Ethiopia which, "is located at the heart of the Horn of Africa" (Berouk, 2004:2), is very important geo-politically in the region and the world for several reasons. One of the major reasons for Ethiopia's importance in the region is its strategic significance and location in terms of military and economic activities of the region. For example, "any world power that has good or bad intentions on the East African region cannot do so without touching or passing via Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia's geographical location has made it very important in global strategy" (Military Intelligence Department cited in Berouk, 2004:2). It is this factor that was the major cause of rivalry between the then two super powers during the Cold War era, and the post-1991 period made the US the strong ally of Ethiopia in the region. Another geo-political factor, which makes Ethiopia very important in the region is, Ethiopia is the water tower of the Horn of Africa, having four major river systems. Except Awash, the rest are flowing to the neighboring countries as far as Egypt, and one way or the other they have an impact on hydro politics of Ethiopia and the region. These are:

> The first group of rivers which consists Takkaze, the Abbay, and the Baro, they are called the Atbara, the Blue Nile, and the Sobat in Sudan, the second group consisting of Ganale, Wabe shable, both flowing to Indian Ocean, the Gibe which is called (Omo in its lower course starts and ends in the South-Western

> highlands. The final destiny of this river is lake Rudolph? (Turkana), and the inward flowing Awash sets from highlands west of the capital (Addis Ababa) and ends in the north-eastern Sands (Bahru, 2002:2).

These trans- boundary river systems make Ethiopia "the veritable water tower of the Horn of Africa. This is an important factor" (Mesfin, 1999:68), in such a way that, Ethiopia can use its water resources in addition to its domestic development need, as an instrument of its foreign policy to influence its neighbors behavior politically, economically and socially. Because, "Water is a source of power, and that water scarcity is a critical and highly strategic issue which affects the social and economic development of nations and, consequently threatens to undermine their political power" (Dolatyar and Grey, 2000:15).

It is based on these strategic, geo and hydro-political factors of Ethiopia that, the research examines the impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia During 2006-08, on the foreign politics /relations/ of Ethiopia with the Horn of Africa countries, the US and EU. This chapter deals with the systemic level analysis of Ethiopia's foreign policy and the impact of the military intervention on the regional and global politics of Ethiopia.

5.1.2 The impact on the relation between Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa countries

The impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention on the foreign relations of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa countries can be evaluated from the systemic level analysis of the Ethiopia's foreign policy. This is done by taking the Horn region as center of discussion based on the distribution of power among the region's states and their economic and political interdependence with Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa includes the following countries: "Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya" (McGinnis, 1999:1).

Ethiopia is the core of the Horn of Africa because all countries that share border with Ethiopia constitute the Horn of Africa (Mesfin, 1999: 68-69). These countries are Eritrea in the north, Sudan in the west, Kenya in the south, Somalia and Djibouti in the East. In the addition to the boundary factor that makes Ethiopia the core of the region, "Ethiopia occupies a central position in the Horn by virtue of its location, size of population as well as ancient history and civilization" (Mengiste, 2007:12). The Horn of Africa also constitute the distant member Egypt because of the hydro-politics of the region, which is based on the Nile river for the following fact, "because of the location of Ethiopia and Egypt at the producing and receiving end of the course of the Nile

respectively, and due to the total dependency of Egypt up on the river" (Tesfaye, 2001:59). This dependency of Egypt up on the Nile River for its survival exposed Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa for Egyptian political interference. Then, the next discussion will be on the impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006- 08, on the relation between Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa countries.

Ethiopia is "…. The largest and potentially hegemonic state in the region" (Clapham, 2002:1421), which has significant role and leverage in the security and stability of the region and the continent. This can be seen from the distribution of power among the region's states in which, Ethiopia is perceived and seen by most political analysts in the region as regional superpower and Farah (2001:90) explains this, "the regional superpower, Ethiopia, which recently won the bloody border war with the newly formed independent Eritrea." This has proved Ethiopia's military superiority in the region in which most of its neighbors and regional political analysts believe that, "Ethiopia can project force beyond its own borders, and also act with sufficient restraint to prevent its use of Military power from turning in to a destabilizing adventurism" (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/ Abdul-Mohammed, 2009). It is based on this reality that Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia in 2006. But this intervention has created an impact on the relation between the Horn of Africa countries by dividing them as pro- Ethiopia/TFG and pro-UIC supporters. This further described by Weber (2008:18), as "the intervention by Ethiopian troops and subsequent outbreak of violent conflict in Somalia split the region." This split created polarization of countries of the region based on the different arguments about the intervention, and it analyzed by Mohammed (2007), as:

> the current crisis in the Horn of Africa, including the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in pursuit of what Ethiopia perceives as its legitimate national security interest-namely to insure that the Transitional Federal Government defeats its adversary, the Union of Islamic Courts has led in some circles to much polarized and simplistic thinking and analysis on the region. Some analysts portray the war in Somalia as the latest in a long ground of national and religious wars between highland Christian Abyssinians and lowland Somali Muslims. Others portray this as Ethiopian aggression in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement and its century's old search for secure access to the sea. Others portray the conflict as a pre-emptive invasion to prevent the establishment a Taliban style state in Somalia that would provide a home base to al Qaeda. Some insist that is proxy war between Ethiopia and its arch -enemy Eritrea.

From the above analysis the credible argument about the intervention is, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to defend its national security to assist the TFG and to defeat the Eritrean proxy war, which was fought by the UIC. Then the impact of the Ethiopia's intervention on the foreign politics /relations/ of Ethiopia and the Horn countries rests on the issue of supporting TFG or UIC, which had divided the Horn in to pro- and anti- Ethiopia group of countries. This support of TFG and UIC in the region has both political and religious aspect among the region's countries. Politically, the intervention created division within the Horn of Africa region based on the national interest of the regional countries in either supporting Ethiopia and TFG or the UIC.Weber (2008:18) defines this, as:

> There are the more Western oriented neighbors who are close to the AU and international position that the TFG is the legitimate transitional government of Somalia and should therefore be supported and stabilized in order to be in a position to take over state affairs and to rebuild the state structures in Somalia. Since the TFG originated in various IGAD initiatives, the IGAD countries in the region felt predominantly obliged to accompany the TFG until it is functioning as a government in Somalia.

But the IGAD as regional organization has its own problem regarding the Issue of Somalia, which is related with the affiliation of member states with different international organizations based on relgion and others. For instance,“ most of the countries of IGAD have a double loyalty (as members of the OIC, the Arab league and CENSAD) and tend to waver between the Arab and IGAD agenda in Somalia”(Medhane, 2002:149). Such double standard in the foreign policy of the Horn states affected Ethiopia's relation and its foreign politics in the region, and created division as pro-and anti-Ethiopian countries concerning the intervention. Another important political issue is, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia has been useful for Eritrea's government to further involve in Somalia for its own political goal in which, Eritrea “harbors, finances, trains and arms almost every insurgent and terrorist outfit in the Horn of Africa with the aim of destabilizing its neighbors and the region as a whole” (The Ethiopia Herald Vol.LXV, No. 217, 2008:3). This is aimed to indirectly attack Ethiopia in Somalia by supporting the UIC for its own political advantage. For example, Eritrea, “Supported UIC in alliance with the OLF and ONLF” [in order to open a front far from its southern border with Ethiopia, and this], “war would also serve Eritrea by tying down Ethiopia in the east’’ (Lyons, 2005: 18). In addition to this,

Eritrea's involvement in Somalia, which has negative impact on the regional stability, serves its domestic political agenda and this is explained as,

> Eritrea has been meddling in Somalia by training arming terrorists in the Horn. The festering question here is the fact that that why Eritrea has been interfering in adding fuel in conflicts of the region. The answer is as clear as tuck. The state in Asmara had no internal stability so that it needs to hold the intention of the people towards such conflicts (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 169, 2009).

Such foreign relation policy of Eritrea, with such domestic political turmoil further isolated the Eritrean government in the region. Because it interferes in the internal affairs of its neighbors and its rigid stand in which, "it is not committed to solving problem peacefully and making its relation with neighboring countries smooth. It had seen working against the interest of the people in the region including the people of Eritrea (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 169, 2009). This created a negative impact on the relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea even after the intervention and the hostility between the two governments increased. Furthermore this led to regional political isolation of Eritrea by IGAD regarding the Somalia's issue and the IGAD 33rd extraordinary session of council of Minster condemned:

> Further acts of the government of Eritrea calling for the overthrow of the TFG and attacks on AMISOM which are acts of aggression against a sovereign country and legitimate government and forces, and calls up on the UN security council (UNSC) to impose sanctions on the government of Eritrea without any delay (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 225, 2009).

This can be taken as a positive impact of the intervention on Ethiopia's foreign politics in the Horn of Africa region. Because Ethiopia has been able to expose its arch- rival Eritrea, and marginalize it politically from the IGAD.This is done by strengthening Ethiopia's relation with the member states by firmly supporting the issue of Somalia's stability with them. This has been converted in to political action when, "the six member- state organization squarely put the blame in Eritrea, a one- time member of the bloc- as the primary aggressor, and called for an immediate UN sanction against the Red sea country" (The Reporter Vol.13, No.663, 2009:1). Finally, this shows that Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006- 2008 has been able to justify Ethiopia's effort to stabilize Somalia and ensure the region's peace in which the IGAD member states fully supported Ethiopia, which can be taken as positive impact on the foreign politics of Ethiopia in the region.

Even if Ethiopia was able to create political unity among the Horn of Africa countries in terms of supporting the TFG as legitimate representative government of Somalia, with the exception of Eritrea, religion has played significant role in dividing the nations in the Horn of Africa in terms of supporting the UIC in which,

> The states that identify as Christian majority states in the region, such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and southern Sudan's autonomous government, stand on the side of TFG and receive support and military backing from the US. In turn, Sudan, and Eritrea along with Egypt and other Muslim majority states in the region, supported the UIC (Weber, 2008:15).

Somalia is homogeneous in terms of religion (Islam), and the UIC used Islam politically to get support from countries like Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan in the region. With regard to Ethiopia's military intervention in 2006, Islam has been taken by Eritrea politically to advance its anti-Ethiopia interest in Somalia by completely reversing its previous stand and by having new political position with the principle of,

> "Enemy of my enemy is my friend"…which now actively supports the Islamic forces in Somalia, allegedly with military support an obvious reversal of stand in which it declared a few years ago that the Islamic fundamentalists were enemies for the national unity and integrity of the country (Hirt, 2008:232).

Such reversal of stand by the Eritrean government is to portray Ethiopia as a Christian country, which is warring against Muslims in Somalia, and to show the intervention as purely religious to the Arab and Muslim world. Islam also attracted Muslim countries of the region, Egypt and Sudan in to Somalia conflict by supporting the UIC for their own political advantage in the region and the Nile on particular.

Egypt and Ethiopia have long history of friendship and hostility that dates back to the early civilization, and "historically, the two permanent and most important elements in Ethiopian-Egyptian relations have been religion and water" (Yacob, 2007:197). These two most important elements of their relations have an impact on the Horn of Africa politics. For Example, these elements of relations have contributed negatively towards Ethiopia's national interest. For instance Egypt, "which has long had its particular interest in destabilization in Ethiopia and reportedly in seeking a foot hold in Somalia for that purpose"

(http//hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Milas/index2.html, 2007), used religion as a political catalyst to intervene in the region there by to achieve its hydro- political goal by indirectly confronting Ethiopia in Somalia, since the fall of Said Barre by supporting radical Islamic groups. Egypt is also still supporting the UIC since its formation, and this was clearly seen prior and during the Ethiopia's intervention in 2006-08. Such anti- Ethiopia political activity by Egypt is not new, because "historically, efforts at destabilizing Ethiopia to prevent it from using its Nile waters have always been part of Egypt's foreign policy" (http//hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Milas/index2.html, 2007). This can be justified by the Egypt's support of the Eritrean Liberation Front in its formation in 1958 in Cairo. In short, the Egyptian involvement in Somalia before and during the Ethiopia's military intervention in 2006-08 can be taken as part of the challenges Ethiopia faces to use the water resources development plan of the nation which includes, "the protracted civil wars, inter- state wars and political instability" (Yacob, 2007:169).

Regarding Sudan, Religion played more role than hydro- politics in the relation of the two states, in which,

> In the second half of the 19th century, the emergent revolutionary Islamic government of the Mahadists in Sudan and the more unified Christian government in Ethiopia came in to headlong conflict with each other. The bone of contention in those days was not over the water resources (Yacob, 2007: 193-194).

Coming to the contemporary Ethio-Sudan relation, and regarding the post- 1991 Somalia, Sudan's support of the UIC other than religion is the same as Egypt's hydro- political interest in which, "Egypt and Sudan have for long been well aware of the stake involved in Nile waters and have acted constantly in terms of what they perceive to be their best interest" (Legesse, 1994: 777). Coming to the issue of religion, in relation to the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08 with the Sudan Republic, Islam has been taken politically to justify the support of Sudan to the UIC for the following reason, "under the regional motto of mutual intervention and neighborly disturbances the support for the courts might well be a result of a power competition between Sudan and Ethiopia" (Weber, 2008:19). In addition to this the support of Sudan to the UIC, is for the formation of Islamic Somalia state which is a security and political threat to Ethiopia and on the other hand, the formation of Islamic Somali state in the Horn of Africa is seen as viable way to reduce Sudan's Islamic government political and religious tension and fear of its neighbors which the majority are Christian states and its own southern territory (Weber, 2008:19).

To conclude with Islam and its impact on the foreign politics of Ethiopia in relation with the military intervention of 2006-08, Islam's ideological influence on the Somalia society has been able to unify the public against Ethiopia's military presence in Somalia, the TFG and the AMISOM (Seifert, 2008: 38). This further contributed for the collapse of President Abduallahi Yusuf's government and the coming to power of moderate Islamist government of Sheik Shariff Ahmed, "which allied itself with the Ethiopian government"(The Reporter, Vol. 13,No.659, 2009:11).

The Ethiopia's military intervention during 2006-08, has both positive and negative impacts on the foreign relations of Ethiopia with the Horn of Africa countries. The following are the positive impacts in the foreign relations of Ethiopia in the region,

Ethiopia by assisting the TFG military outlawed the UIC, and able to move the seat of TFG from Bidoa to Mogadishu, and this proved that " Ethiopia is the region's pillar of Peace by it own right" (The Reporter Vol. 13,No. 663,2009:19). Ethiopia has also been able to politically defeat countries like Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan which are supporters of the UIC by the recognition of TFG in the region and the world as, "the legitimate authority of Somalia" (The Sub-Saharn Informer Vol. 7,No. 018,2009:1).

Ethiopia successfully exposed the Eritrea's mission in Somalia, and has been able to marginalize it from the region, the continent and the global political stage by the condemnation of IGAD and the call of sanction by the UNSC too.

Ethiopia has continued its peaceful relation with the neighboring countries, and its commitment in Somalia militarily, understood by the region's countries positively in which they deployed their force in Mogadishu. E.g. Uganda and Burundi contributed for AMISOM. In addition to this, the Ethio- Sudan relation is peaceful as PM Meles said on the recent visit of President Al-Bashir, "Sudan is an ally and close neighbor" this never affected by the intervention (The Reporter Vol. 13, No. 659,2009:2).

Ethiopia's foreign relation with its closest neighbors Kenya and Djibouti is not affected by the intervention, because these two countries are also seriously concerned for Somalia and the region's peace, which is justified by their genuine commitment in the Somali peace process. Ethiopia's relation with these two countries is described by Dr. Tekeda Alemu shortly as, "There

are no potential problems. …And the relationships in most fields affable" (http:// www. norway. org.et/ ethiopia/ NUPI.htm, 2009).

Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia divided the UIC leadership in to two factions, and the moderate Islamists led by Sheik Sharif accepted Ethiopia's role in Somalia positively.

With regard to Islam, Ethiopia has proved to the region and the world that it was/is not fighting religious war in Somalia. This is proved by the PM Meles as, "If Somali people wanted to be governed by Islamic laws; we don't have any problem with that" (The Ethiopia Herald Vol.LXV, No. 139, 2009:3). Furthermore, what most anti- Ethiopian forces and countries of the Gulf and Middle East tried to incorrectly portray and convince the Muslims and the world was that the intervention is religious, in which "because of the action of the intervention, the wrong image that Ethiopia is primarily Christian nation amidst an ocean of Muslims is unnecessarily reinforced" (http:// www. ssinformer.com/commentary/2007/June, 2009). This is firmly disproved and exposed by Ethiopia's acceptance of Sheik Sharif's moderate Islamic government in Mogadishu.

Finally, the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 - 2008, has positive impact politically and militarily on Ethiopia's relation with the Horn of Africa Countries. Because the military intervention has proved that Ethiopia is strong and powerful in the region, which is the continuity of its history and foreign relation in which, "although poor, Ethiopia has a long history of statecraft and a sense of national identity and a military tradition which together mean that is capable of acting in pursuit of a clearly-conceived national interest" (http:// hornofafrica. ssrc.org/Abdul-Mohammed/html, 2009). And this once again proved to the neighboring countries and to the Horn of Africa region Ethiopia's strong position in terms of military and politics, so that after the intervention Ethiopia, "has also re-emerged hegemonic power out of the intervention as it showed the neighboring countries, in clear terms and actions, that it can directly middle with their internal business. The country has also achieved military victory in one of the many fronts in which Eritrea is belligerent" (http://www.ssinformer.com/commentary/2007/june, 2009).

With regard to the negative impact of the intervention on the foreign relation of the country in the region, it is because of lack of cooperation and commitment from the international community, and intentional organizations like the UN, AU, and EU to assist the Ethiopia's cause in Somalia and the region has contributed for the continuity of conflict, revival of Islamic militant groups, and the existential threat of piracy. All these are threat for regional stability.

The intervention also caused domestics political turmoil with in the Somali political elite and conflict once again continued which can be explained as,

> Unfortunately, because of and as the result of extreme disagreement and bloody bickering among Somali power elites and stakeholders, peace and stability once again failed to materialize. On the top of that and without exceptions the international community abandoned and denied the people of Somalia badly needed assistance and support to overcome communal infighting which destroyed Somalia for the last eighteen years (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 116, 2008:9).

Another negative impact of the military intervention is it contributed for the escalation of humanitarian crisis which includes security, food deficits, and internal displacement in the Horn of Africa state of Somalia which is explained as, "according to reports issued by various relief organizations operating in Somalia, the Humanitarian situation has become the worst crisis on the African continent since the events of December 2006" (http://www.workers.org/print/php, 2009).

By ending the discussion about the impact of the military intervention on the foreign politics of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa region, the next Part of the study will focus on the major global actors in the region, in this case the US and EU. Both have economic political and security interest in the region, and they have close relation with the Ethiopian government for the economic and development aid they provide. The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 has different impacts on the relation of Ethiopia with the US and EU because, "The EU and the United States have significant leverage over Ethiopia in the form of foreign aid and political influence" (http://www.how.org/en/news/2007/08/04/ethiopians-dirty-war, 2009).Based on this reality, the research analyses the merits and demerits of the military intervention on the Ethiopia's relation with the US and EU respectively.

5.1.3 The impact on Ethio-US relation

The Ethio-US relation has begun long ago in 1903, while most of African territories were under colonialism, and it was cordial and good relationship. This relationship got new momentum in the post world war II period, after Ethiopia defeated Italia's occupation of 1935-1941, where the US was dominant super power with the USSR. Particularly in 1953, the new chapter of this relationship was marked by the signing of two agreements, and these were a mutual defense agreement, which was important for Ethiopia military training, acquire arms, and this in turn gave

the US permission to operate and use Kagnew Shaleka communication station in Asmara. From this agreement Ethiopia was able to get 282 million USD in military and 366 million USD in economic assistance up to 1978 (http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.html,2007).

The Ethio-US relation," was considered to be the best on the continent until the Ethiopia Revolution Overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie's regime and installed an anti- capitalist regime in 1974, headed by a military committee known as Derg" (Yacob, 2007:211). The Derg regime switched its military and ideological alliance to the USSR, this lowered the Ethio-US relation from 1977-1991, to level where, the diplomatic relation was at the level of charge d' affairs, and the US imposed during this period legislative restriction on the assistance to Ethiopia except humanitarian assistance. After the end of cold war, the demise of the Derg regime, and the coming to power of EPRDF, the Ethio-US relation improved very highly to the level where Ethiopia has become the strong ally and strategic partner of the US in the Global War on terrorism (http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.html,2007).

Regarding the research, the Ethio-US relations and the impact of the military intervention on the bi-lateral relations of the two countries can be examined from two recent political eras in the US. The first one is the Ethio-US relation during the Georg W. Bush or (the Republican) era, and the other one is the Barack Obama's (Democratic) era of the current US administration.

5.1.4 George Bush's Administration

Apart from its lower approval rates of the Bush administration on the global political scale, what makes this administration different from others in the US political history of foreign relations can be mentioned as,

> The Administration has made Africa a foreign policy priority, and that includes the promotion of conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, strengthening governance capacity, cooperation with international organizations, and counter terrorism efforts. All of these elements are part of the picture when we consider the Horn of Africa sub- region and Ethiopia in particular (http://www.relifeweb.int/rw/rwb/nsf,2009).

Another important political feature of the Bush administration, and its legacy is the War on Terror which is attached with September 11, 2001 terror attack on the US soil, that "renewed global concern with international terrorism" (Lumina, 2008:181). What attracted the US attention in Horn of Africa, prior to this attack was, "in August 1998, the US embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania were bombed and hundreds of Africans and 12 Americans perished" (Dodds, 2005: 211). This brought stateless Somalia in the forefront in the region's peace and security threat, because it is easy to go in and out of Somalia with the absence of effective government in the country. After the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror has begun in Afghanistan, Iraq and then, "US generals frequently refer to Somalia as the 'third front in the war on terror.' Hundreds of foreign Islamist fighters are heeding calls from Osama bin Laden to fight in Somalia according to analysts in the region" (http: //www. time.com/time /world/, 2009). With regard to Ethiopia, Somalia is a thereat for Ethiopian peace and security because terrorist groups created and developed in the stateless Somalia like AIAI which, "took credit for a number of terrorist attacks and explosions that took place in different towns of eastern Ethiopia and the capital (Addis Ababa), between 1993 and 1996" (Medhane, 2002:158). Such security threat by terrorists led to Ethio- US security cooperation, which describes, "The alliance between the United States and Ethiopia was born of pragmatism" (The Economist Vol. 397 No. 8574, 2008:45). Ethiopia being a victim of terrorism from Somalia since 1991,and the 9/11 terror attack on the US, and its global concern further made Ethiopia and US too close that, "immediately after September 11,2001 the Federal Republic of Ethiopia declared its alliance with the United States of America in the newly proclaimed 'War on Terror' "(Smidt, 2008:132). This alliance between Ethiopia and the US brought significant advantage for Ethiopia in the region politically, militarily and economically, and increased Ethiopia's strategic importance in which,

> Ethiopia had successfully established itself as a reliable ally to counter the Sudan with its diverse Islamist government and as a potential hegemonic regional power, which could help that the permanent Somali crisis would not become a threat to "world security" as it was defined by the US (and in this case also by Ethiopia) (Smidt, 2008:132).

Concerning Somalia, significant change in its domestic politics, i.e. the formation of UIC in 2000, and through gradual consolidation of resources and power, in 2006 they controlled most of southern Somalia including Mogadishu, and expanded to the other parts of the country, by including wider agenda of confronting Ethiopia (Medhane, 2008 :47). This led to the military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia from 2006-2008.Then what was the impact of this intervention between Ethiopia and the US during the George Bush's administration? The following are the major impacts of the intervention in Ethio- US relations during that time:

US was contributing to Ethiopia's defense budget and the US supported the Ethiopia's military intervention by backing the UN resolution 1725, which passed on December, 2006 by the UNSC to authorize the entry of armed personnel in the Somali territory (http:// www. bloggersnews. net/14238,2209). This gave the Ethiopian government international legitimacy to its military action.

The resolution also eased the 1992 arms embargo against the Somali government (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/Somalia.html, 2009).This is also a diplomatic and political victory for Ethiopia, which was arming and training the TFG and this is political blow for countries like Eritrea and the UIC supporters. This was not possible without the firm support of the US government.

US backed Ethiopia's military intervention in 2006 by providing arms, fuel and other logistical support (http://one-state.net/globres.html, 2009).

The Administration's officials praised Ethiopia's military in their deployment in Mogadishu and the Republicans were interested to reward Ethiopia (The Economist Vol. 397, No. 8574, 2008:45).

The US also supported the Ethiopia's military intervention by launching air strikes in side Somalia against suspected al-Queada operatives who were fleeing with Islamist fighters in addition to providing naval support (http://one-state.net/globres.html, 2009).

Another important positive impact of the intervention on the Ethio-US relations, according PM Meles Zenawi is, "first they were very generous in terms of sharing intelligence with us. That has been very supportive secondly they were diplomatically of our help to the stabilization of Somalia" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol. LXV, No. 139, 2009:3).

Another major achievement on the Ethio-US relations which is the result of Ethiopia's stabilization effort in Somalia is, Ethiopia has been able to expose the Eritrea's regime destabilization activity in Somalia, which contributed for major policy shift of the US against Eritrea in which, "the US Directorate of Defense Trade Controls imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol. LXV, No. 028.2008:3). In general these are some of the major impacts of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08 on the Ethio-US relations during President Gorge Bush's administration.

5.1.5 The Obama's Administration

The coming to power of the 44th US president Barack Obama in January 2009 was coincided with the withdrawal of Ethiopian defense forces from Somalia. The new administration accepted Bush's administration setback in Somalia's politics which, " leaves in Somalia an Islamist movement even more powerful than when the Ethiopian troops and the TFG defeated them in 2006", this continued as security concern for the US in the Horn of Africa. In addition to this, Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia, "poses a problem for President Barack Obama as it leaves vacuum in the region" (The Sub-Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 003, 2009:5).The research analyzes in brief about the impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08 on the Ethio-US relation of the Obama administration, with regard to peace, security and stability of the region. According to US Ambassador to Ethiopia, H.E Donald Yamamato, the Ethio-US relation continues strongly on the issue of security and peace in the region by sharing the same view and concern with the Bush's administration regarding Somalia in which, "Somalia is still a security threat for Ethiopia and the whole region" (The Sub- Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 007, 2009: 2). Even if there are differences between the two countries recently in the US State Department Human Rights report of 2008 in Ethiopia, " Ethiopia called the report as not accurate referring to it as an irritant to the excellent relationship between Ethiopia and USA" (The Sub-Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 009,2009:3). To conclude with, even if the Obama administration is still five months old and working hard to win the economic crisis in the US and the world, it follows the same security policy concerning global security threats regarding radical Islamic movements and terrorists starting from Afghanistan, Pakistan to Somalia, so that the current US ambassador to Ethiopia firmly explained the US government stand on the continuity of the strong relation between Ethiopia and the US in which, " the US commitment to continue relations with Ethiopia is to ensure regional and continental peace and security and fight terrorism which his country strongly shares with Ethiopia" (The Ethiopian Herald Vol. LXV, No. 145, 2009:1).

In general, the negative impacts of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008, on the foreign politics of Ethiopia, and the Ethio- US relation are the following: The military intervention has created wrong perception and negative image on Ethiopia by the Gulf and Middle East Muslim countries, that Ethiopia is fighting the US's and the West's "War on Terror" in the neighboring Somalia. This is clearly expressed as, "Ethiopia has become regional surrogate or proxy from the US and Britain. This is evident from the coordination of the US military and Ethiopian troops in Somalia" (http://one- state.net/globres.html,2009).This has been

useful in uniting and getting support for anti- Ethiopia, anti-US forces of radical Islamic groups such as the UIC, and contributed for the continuity of attacks against the Ethiopian and TFG forces which led to the Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia.

Another negative impact of the military intervention on the Ethio- US relation is, the Ethiopia's government is not only supporting the TFG by intervening militarily in Somalia, but it has been able to crush the armed opposition anti- Ethiopian groups such as the ONLF and OLF too. Even if Ethiopia was able to dismantle the UIC within a week and reduced the fundamentalists' threat in the region, the US government is not cooperative to reward the Ethiopia's government politically. This means that the Ethiopia's government effort to enlist the ONLF and OLF on the US list of terror has not been successful, and this has dismayed the Ethiopia's government, because the US government is still reluctant to do so (The Economist Vol. 397, No. 8574, 2008:45).

5.1.6 The Impact on Ethiopia relation with EU

The end of the Second World War and the subsequent economic crisis in Europe and the domination of the US and USSR in the world politics initiated the need for political unity among the western European countries. This was the basis for the 1957, treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC) or the Common Market by six founding member states. Through gradual political and economic development, in 1967 the EEC transformed to European Community, and then in 1991 the Maastricht treaty, European Community integrated so that in 1992 the European Union (EU) created (Lowe, 2001:184-200), with the driving force of "economic integration and free trade" (Khana, 2004:418). Currently the EU, "is the most successful regional organization that has engaged 27 member states in economic, social, cultural and political ties for the past two decades" (Capital Vol. 11, No. 542, 2009: 28). In addition to its success what makes EU different from other regional organization is, it "can make binding rule for its member in some areas and the EU is a special kind of tightly knit security and welfare community: violent conflict among members is out of question" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 269).

Concerning the research, before analyzing the impact of the intervention on the Ethiopia – EU relations, it is important to explain, the EU's role in the region and Somalia since 1991. Regionally,

> During the 1990's the increased number of violent internal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the failure of states such as Somalia, Liberia , and Sierra Leone led to a recognition by the European Union (EU) of the need to prevent conflict and 'state failure'. This new policy focus was reinforced by the establishment of the European Commission Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the events of September 11, 2001 (Rosendahl, 2008:87).

In order to avoid and curb such political problems in the Horn of Africa, the EU has followed and played neutral outlook and positive role in Somalia's conflict without influenced by any other country in the region. Skillful diplomatic action and deep understanding of the situation in Somalia and the region supported this. In addition to its humanitarian aid for Somalia's people who were affected by famine, civil war, drought, its political support to the IGAD's stand and initiative in stabilizing conflict-ridden Somalia was also very commendable. Furthermore EU's recognition of TNG in 2000, and TFG in 2004 as legitimate representative of Somalia's people was also a major diplomatic success in the Horn of Africa for countries like Ethiopia which is working to the establishment of viable Somalia state and government that is crucial for the region's peace and security (Medhane, 2002:174-175). After this brief analysis of EU's role in the Horn and particularly on Somalia's internal conflict and civil war, then, the impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in the relation between Ethiopia and EU will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

The EU is the major and the biggest donor for Ethiopia, and Ethiopia "has been one of the foremost beneficiaries of European development assistance" (Capital Vol.11, No.542, 2009:8). This clearly shows that Ethiopia-EU relation has not been affected by the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia for several reasons. For example, Ethiopia's security concern which is threatened by the failure of the state in Somalia since 1991 is seriously shared by the EU in which, "the 2003 European security strategy describes 'states failure' as one of the principal threats for European security, as state failure cause regional instability, organized crime and terrorism" (Rosendahl, 2008:87). It is because of the failure of state in Somalia that the UIC terrorist group was able to destabilize the Horn of Africa with its radical Islamic agenda in collaboration with other anti-peace elements of the region. Furthermore EU recognized the goal of the military intervention the same way as the FDRE government and the TFG in which, "the rapid expulsion of the Union of Islamic Courts by Ethiopian forces in December 2006 and the consequent installation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu has raised new hopes that peace and stability would finally emerge" (Rosendahl. 2008:86). Another important factor that was commonly shared by the EU and Ethiopia with regard to Somalia was

both support “the building blocks” approach (Farah, 2001:90) which “proposes that ‘local administrative structures could constitute building blocks’ in the restoration of peace and statehood of Somalia” (Bryden cited in Rosendahl, 2008: 89). With such common political goals between the EU and Ethiopia, regarding Somalia during the intervention the relation continued as usual in which, “aid from European Union countries will keep probably flowing, however patent Ethiopia’s human rights violations” (The Economist Vol. 397, No. 8574, 2008:45). Furthermore, the EU supported the FDRE government stand on the issue of Somalia’s stability by passing a resolution through its parliament by making the following calls to the international community and African States: the African Union’s member states were pressed to provide peace keeping troops while the international community was urged to provided financial and logistical support for those troops; the resolution also called for existing UN arms embargo on the country to be enforced (http://afp.google.com/article5/8/, 2009).

Such resolution helped Ethiopia to get response from countries like Uganda and Burundi in deploying their troops in Mogadishu and the enforcement of the UN embargo helped Ethiopia to make the call to UN to impose sanction on the Eritrean government in its interference in the Somalia’s internal politics. In conclusion the EU- Ethiopia relation has continued as usual and it is not hampered by the intervention, rather “ the government of Ethiopia and EU has agreed to cooperate on migration and development” (The Ethiopian Herald Vol.LXV, No. 14, 2009:1). In addition to this, development aid and other grants from the EU to the FDRE government has continued. For example, “the commission is providing six million Euros for health, food, water and sanitation actions targeting the most vulnerable people in Ethiopia, including refugees and internally displaced persons” (The Reporter Vol. 13,No.663, 2009: 2).

In summary, the Ethiopian’s military intervention in Somalia during 2006-08, has more of positive impact on the foreign relation of Ethiopia with Horn of Africa countries, the US and EU in terms of the importance of peace and security of the region by the creation of viable, secular or moderate Islamic government and state of Somalia by supporting the TFG. Another important political impact of the intervention is related with the post-2005 election political crisis of the country. The post-election political crisis has created a negative image and suspicion on the regime by the major donors (the US and EU). Because these donors were concerned with the democratization process of the country, and the subsequent political turmoil of the post-2005 election which is described as, “ since the disputed 2005 elections, plagued by accusations of electoral fraud and mass protest demonstrations political repression greatly increased” (The Amnesty International Report,2008:7).Such domestic political problems when faced by external

threats which are posed by the UIC, the radical Islamic groups and anti- Ethiopian armed opposition groups in the stateless Somalia ,it has been used by the EPRDF government to shift the focus of the international community from democratization process in the country to the regional security. This has been successfully used for the regime maintenance, and continuity of the EPRDF leadership without the international community challenge. Therefore the EPRDF government has been able to divert the international community's attention and concern by militarily intervening in Somalia in December 2006. This is further described as;

> The incumbent was also able to divert the attention of the domestic and the international public from the "un right politics" that reigns the country. The government has succeeded not only in diverting the attention of the international community, but also managed to win their trust using another card, ally of the West, when the former card, champion of democracy, expired; and all this could have been difficult without the military adventurism in Somalia. It is because of this project of "win their trust by other means" that the leaders in Addis have got some relief from the pressure exerted on them following the controversial May 2005 elections (http:// www. ssinformer. com/ commentary/2007/june/, 2009).

Another important impact of the military intervention on the global politics and security is, Ethiopia's commitment in Somalia has also exposed what is not been viewed and imagined by the international community with regard to the clear and present danger that is created in Somalia which has regional and global impact in terms of security from international terror attack to the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This has made Ethiopia to be at the center of Somalia issue in Horn of Africa and magnified its foreign relation with the US, EU and other actors which are committed in Somalia's and the region's peace.

5.2 Somalia after the withdrawal of Ethiopia

After the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia in January 2009, conflict in Somalia has continued with the, "escalation of tension between radical Islamists on one side and the government forces and moderate Islamists on the other" (The Sub- Saharan Informer Vol.7.No. 011, 2009:5). This makes Somalia's future more unpredictable. Another important issue that has to be considered seriously in the future of Somalia's peace and stability is, "how to accommodate both the TFG and the Somaliland leadership. Since 1991 the Northern part of Somalia where Somaliland is situated, has been one of the only regions of the country that has witnessed relative stability" (http://www.bloggersnews.net/14238,2009). This political crisis on the Somalia's unity has very complicated consequence in the region, the continent and international politics with regard to the issue of recognition of Somaliland and it will be very challenging to explain its

outcome in Somalia's internal peace, stability and security. The other concern is what has to be done and planned to bring about sustainable peace in Somalia with regard to "the distribution of power between the qabills (clans)?" (http://www.bloggersnews.net/14238, 2009). Because clan identity is the basis of Somalia politics and this has been clearly seen in the recent fight to control Mogadishu and its political impact on the relation between TFG and other clans, in which, "the current stalemate in Mogadishu between the TFG and Hawiye clans warns of another imminent political failure, one that risks a bloody denouncement" (http:// hornafrica.ssrc.org/Hassen-Barnes/index1.html,2007).

Another important political factor in the Somalia's future and its uncertainty is the involvement of other states in the internal affairs of Somalia which is done through the support of different factions and groups, is linked with the hydro-politics of the region, religion (Islam), and the continued confrontation and the unresolved border dispute of Ethiopia and Eritrea since 1998. This is summarized as,

> the continuing involvement of Egypt and its Arab partners in Somalia would appear to have the same root in Egypt's Nile Basin policy…Libya, Saudi Arabic, Syria, Iran and Djibouti are supplying arms and finance, and specifically refers to the involvement of Eritrea in supplying arms and, training troops to the SCIC, and facilitating collaboration between it and the ONLF. This is likely to further heighten the growing tension in the region. Part of the solution would have been to enforce the arms embargo. But this was always unlikely to happen, as the UN lacked the capacity to make it happen (http: //hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Milas/index2.html,2007).

In general, the prospect of Somalia's future is very complex and hard to imagine, because of the complex nature of the actors and their different interests, which are incompatible. Particularly, after the Ethiopia's withdrawal, Hizbul-Islam and al-Shabab are strong opponents of the TFG or "the unity Government" which is fragile and ready to collapse (The Sub- Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 019, 2009:5). The most critically peace and security threat for Somalia's future and the region is the fundamental and radical Islamic group called al-Shabab which is,

> The only organized Islamist group in Somalia with obvious target; to form an Islamic caliphate that has no border and different nationalities. They don't recognize Somalia's international boundaries..A big concern for neighboring Ethiopia, which had conflicts with Somalia Islamists since the collapse of the central government in 1991(The Sub Saharan Informer Vol. 7, No. 019, 2009:5).

Finally the Somali crisis has no end in sight near the future, because “decisive international action to contain the Somalia crisis is long over due” (http:// www. crisis. group.org,2006).

Conclusion

The Horn Africa is strategically important in the world politics because of its geo-political location. Geo-politically the Horn is close to the Middle East, which is politically in crisis, the Arabian countries that are the major oil producers, and it is linked with the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This geo-Political location exposed the region for several foreign interventions since the earlier times, and this contributed for the creation and the continuity of the conflict in the region.

Ethiopia is the core of the region, and in terms of hydrology it is the water tower of the region which has an impact, on its foreign relation in the region and away.

After the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa witnessed major political crisis in which the new state Eritrea is created, Somalia become failed state and immersed in civil war. Particularly, the absence of government and proper state institutions in Somalia hugely contributed for the instability of the region because of the infiltration of international terrorist organizations. In addition to this armed anti- Ethiopia opposition groups have made Somalia their base to launch attacks on Ethiopia.

The absence of government in Somalia also contributed for the radical Islamic Groups to fill the power vacuum and one of these organizations is the UIC, which declared jihad on Ethiopia and threatened the TFG, which led to the Ethiopia's military intervention of 2006-2008 in Somalia.

The Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia During 2006-08 and its impact on the domestic and foreign relation of the country has been conceptualized and analyzed from the three levels of foreign policy analysis. These levels of analysis are, first the systemic level analysis, in which the Ethiopia's military intervention has been analyzed from the regional and global perspective of peace, security and stability, in which Ethiopia intervened to assist the TFG and ousted the UIC's militias from power and there by ensured peace and security of region which was destabilized by anti-Ethiopian forces and states like Eritrea, Egypt and others. At the systemic level of analysis, this helped Ethiopia to ally itself with other countries and particularly the US on fight against terror, because Ethiopia has been the victim of terrorism which is based on the stateless Somalia since 1991.Second, at the nation state level analysis of foreign policy, every state is responsible in keeping its peace, security, stability and territorial integrity. Therefore the FDRE government decided to intervene in Somalia militarily in 2006, because of "the clear and present danger" that was emanating from the stateless Somalia by the Ethiopian armed opposition groups of

ONLF,OLF and WSLF which were/ are still assisted by the UIC and the Eritrean government to destabilize Ethiopia. Third, at the individual level analysis of foreign policy, PM Meles is the head of FDRE government, and based on the responsibility and duty vested up on him by the constitution, he decided to intervene militarily to defend the country and its people from the open declarations of war by the UIC and its most wanted international terrorist leaders like Shiek Daher Aweyes.

Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia has also been compared with other three types of military interventions in Africa and it is Similar with the unilateral intervention of a single neighboring power, e.g. the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. Viewed from the strategic theory of world politics the intervention is similar to individual level analysis of foreign policy analysis, and in addition to this the intervention has also been viewed from the theory of just war which is similar to systemic level analysis of foreign policy. Finally, the intervention has also been seen from different conflict theories because of the nature of the insurgency and the change of conflict in the post-1991 world political order.

Before analyzing the impact of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008, the Ethio-Somalia relation has been assessed. The Ethiopian foreign policy towards Somalia from 1960 to 1991 was almost the same and from 1991 to the present has been studied and the study found out Somalia is security threat for Ethiopian state since its independence. The post- 1991 Ethiopian foreign policy towards Somalia analyzed the situation in Somalia based on the facts on the ground. And the absence of government in Somalia is a threat to Ethiopia's peace and security, and the FDRE adopted three policy options to limit the damage that emanate from Somalia. But the failed state Somalia has been used as a launching pad to attack Ethiopia by different foreign and anti- Ethiopia government forces, and this led to the military intervention of the 2006-2008. This was caused by clan politics of Somalia in which there are ethnic Somalis in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Political Islam used to mobilize forces by the UIC against Ethiopia and the other cause was the Ethio- Eritrea proxy war, which is linked with the 1998-2000-border war between the two countries.

The following are the Merits of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 – 2008, on the domestic politics of Ethiopia: the intervention has saved the Ethiopia from the clear and present danger posed by the UIC and other armed anti – Ethiopia opposition groups such as ONLF and OLF; the intervention is used by the government to divert the attention of the public from the post- 2005 election domestic political problems; the intervention from the beginning

strengthened the opposition political parties in the parliament to stiffly resist the ruling party's position. At the same time the ruling party used the intervention to divide the major opposition political parties which is used for regime maintenance; the intervention also is useful in re-organizing and creating of opposition political forum, which is vital for the democratization process of the country and because of it the opposition political parties urged the troop withdrawal and they succeeded.

The demerits of the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 – 2008, on the domestic politics of Ethiopia are: the military intervention had cost Ethiopia dearly in terms of economic and human resources, this has created economic burden for Ethiopia and it forced the government to withdraw its forces from Somalia; the military intervention cannot completely destroy the ONLF and OLF insurgent activities in the region five (Somali) region of Ethiopia.

The Merits of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006-2008 on the foreign relation of Ethiopia (with the Horn of Africa countries, the US and EU) are: Ethiopia ousted the UIC from power and the TFG has been the legitimate government of Somalia; Ethiopia also re-emerged hegemonic in the Horn of Africa; Ethiopia has proved to the Muslim world that it is not fighting religious war in Somalia by accepting Sheik Sheriff Ahmed's moderate Islamic government; the military intervention has been used to split the UIC leadership in to two factions and the moderate Islamists led by Sheik Sheriff Ahmed accepted Ethiopia's role in Somalia positively; Ethiopia has convinced the UN and AU in the deployment of international forces to assist the TFG, and AMISOM has been deployed in Mogadishu; With regard to US and EU, Ethiopia has got political, diplomatic, and economic aid. Particularly the US has assisted Ethiopia financially, militarily and diplomatically (in the UN and AU) and the support has continued; the military intervention also used by the Ethiopian government to strengthen its relation with the US and EU after the post -2005 election political crisis, as an ally of the west in the region's security.

The Demerits of the military intervention in Somalia on Ethiopia's foreign relation are: the conflict continued in Somalia because the Ethiopia's military intervention has been used to mobilize the wider Somalis to fight the TFG which is Ethiopia's ally, and this worsened the humanitarian crisis; Ethiopia and TFG's effort to establish peaceful Somali state cannot materialize because of the division within Somali's political elite because of Ethiopia's military intervention; the military intervention did not succeed FDRE government interest of listing the ONLF and OLF on the US list of terror organizations; the Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia during 2006 – 2008 is still perceived by most of the Muslim states as the proxy of the US

war on terror, and this cannot be changed even if Ethiopia accepts Sheik Sheriffs Moderate Islamic government.

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