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# Diplomacy and Security Community-Building

## EU crisis management in the Western Mediterranean

Niklas Bremberg

ROUTLEDGE

# Diplomacy and Security Community-Building

This book contributes to the ongoing debate in International Relations on the role of security communities and formulates a new mechanism-based analytical framework.

It argues that the question we need to ask is how security communities work at a time when armed conflicts among states have become significantly less frequent compared to other non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (e.g. terrorism and the adverse effects of climate change). Drawing upon recent advances in practice theory, the book suggests that the emergence and spread of cooperative security practices, ranging from multilateral diplomacy to crisis management, are as important for understanding how security communities work as more traditional confidence-building measures.

Using the EU, Spain and Morocco as an in-depth case study, this volume reveals that through the institutionalization of multilateral venues, the EU has provided cooperative frameworks that otherwise would not have been available, and that the de-territorialized notion of security threats has created a new rationale for practical cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan diplomats, armed forces and civilian authorities. Within the broader context, this book provides a mechanism-based framework for studying regional organizations as security community-building institutions, and by utilizing that framework it shows how practice theory can be applied in empirical research to generate novel and thought-provoking results of relevance for the broader field of IR.

This book will be of much interest to students of multilateral diplomacy, European politics, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

**Niklas Bremberg** is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, and has a Ph.D. in political science from Stockholm University.

"This timely book tackles the crucial issue of European security in the neighbourhood with analytical sophistication, originality and a wealth of empirical material. A must read for anybody interested in practice approaches, security, European foreign policy and the future of the Mediterranean."

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"Niklas Bremberg's fascinating book breaks new ground in the study of the European Union in security community-building by arguing that the EU's enlargement process creates a dynamic relationship between community-building and boundary-building. The book's unique contribution is its rich, detailed study of the post-Cold War evolution of Spanish–Moroccan diplomatic relations within the context of a highly original use of practice theory in the EU's crisis management in the Western Mediterranean."

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# Diplomacy and Security Community-Building

## EU crisis management in the Western Mediterranean

**Niklas Bremberg**

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**For Axel and Esther**

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# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AQIM | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| AU | African Union |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| CCM | Civilian Crisis Management |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CIVCOM | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
| COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EC | European Community |
| EMAA | Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement |
| EMP | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| ERCC | Emergency Response Coordination Centre |
| ESDC | European Security and Defence College |
| EU | European Union |
| EUMC | European Union Military Staff |
| EUMS | European Union Military Committee |
| FAC | Foreign Affairs Council |
| FAR | Moroccan Royal Armed Forces |
| ISDR | International Strategy for Disaster Reduction |
| JHA | Justice and Home Affairs |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MIC | Monitoring and Information Centre |
| MoD | Ministry of Defence |
| MoI | Ministry of Interior |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PDJ | Party of Development and Justice (Morocco) |

| | |
|---|---|
| POLISARIO | Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Western Sahara) |
| PP | People's Party (Spain) |
| PROCIV | Council Working Group on Civil Protection |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| PSOE | Socialist and Workers' Party (Spain) |
| RELEX | Directorate-General for External Relations |
| TEU | Treaty on European Union |
| TFEU | Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| UfM | Union for the Mediterranean |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UMA | Arab Maghreb Union |
| UME | Military Emergency Unit (Spain) |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| US | United States of America |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

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I would like to believe that the seed for this book was first planted in my head about fifteen years ago as I spent a year as an exchange student in Alicante, Spain. Among the many things that make an impression on a young person in such circumstances, I could not help but notice that several traffic signs in the harbour had not only English or French but also Arabic subtitles. What I did not know then was that those signs play an important role in directing the traffic during the busy summer months when hundreds of thousands of European residents with family ties to North Africa go back and forth across the Strait of Gibraltar. It had not been clear to me until then just how closely situated the Maghreb actually is to Spain in not only geographical but also social terms. I was reminded of this again, albeit in a more sinister way, when I spent another year in Madrid between the Parsley Islet crisis in July 2002 and the Madrid bombings in March 2004. However, it was only a couple of years later as I was accepted into the Ph.D. programme at the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, that the initial seed could be transformed into a thesis which also forms the basis of this book.

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Stockholm, July 2015

# 1 Introduction

On 11 July 2002, a group of Moroccan soldiers set up camp on a tiny, uninhabited rock in the Strait of Gibraltar called the Parsley Islet[1] allegedly to strengthen Morocco's capacity to counter international terrorism (*El País*, 2002). This would spur one of the most serious bilateral crises between Spain and Morocco since the end of the Cold War as the government in Madrid framed it as an attempt by the Moroccan regime to alter the disputed territorial status of the rock by military means. After a few days of failed attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the crisis on behalf of the European Union (EU), Spain dispatched a contingent of elite troops and 'recaptured' the islet. This was done without a single shot being fired, and the Moroccan soldiers were transported back to the Moroccan mainland, via the Spanish enclave-city Ceuta. The Moroccan government responded by stating that it considered Spain's action to be equivalent to a declaration of war. Yet war was not declared and the crisis was officially brought to an end a couple of days later when Spanish and Moroccan representatives at a meeting in Rabat agreed to return to the status quo ante. The meeting took place after the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stepped in as unofficial mediator upon a direct request from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacio (Cembrero, 2006; Gillespie, 2006a, 2010; Monar, 2002).

From an outsider's perspective, the Parsley Islet crisis might seem to be a bizarre incident or at least an anachronistic way of handling a dispute between modern states, one of which being a member of the EU. To some observers it was simply the 'stuff of farce' (*The Economist*, 2002). Farcical or not the crisis spurs a range of questions of relevance not only for students of the EU but also for students of International Relations (IR) and diplomacy. What does the crisis tell us about the ways in which states practise international security (or rather fail to do so) in the twenty-first century and what lessons can be drawn of broader relevance for diplomatic studies and international cooperation? This book argues that the Parsley Islet crisis in many ways highlights the challenges that the EU faces in its southern neighbourhood. These challenges can be said to be even more daunting at a time when the EU is trying to come up with a proper response to the so-called Arab Spring which has led to increasing instability in North Africa and the Middle East (Pace, 2014; Peters, 2012; Youngs, 2014). At the heart of the matter lies the question of whether

the EU can promote security beyond its borders and in its neighbourhood. This seemingly straightforward question digs right into a central problem that both mainstream and critical scholars in the field of European integration and IR have sought to address since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Huysmans et al., 2006; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007; Webber et al., 2004).[2] Of course, the question is only seemingly straightforward since it immediately spurs a host of follow-up questions. What constitute the borders of the EU? For whom does the EU promote security and from what? What does it mean in practice for regional organizations such as the EU to promote security?

The central argument in this book is that even though the EU is far from being a coherent international actor it is possibly the world's most advanced *security community-building institution* (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Bellamy, 2004; Bremberg, 2015). War is unimaginable among EU member states and the EU (together with other regional organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe) reinforces security community-building in Europe in terms of an ongoing reimagination of the 'European space' through practices of economic and political integration (Zürn and Checkel, 2007). Even though it might perhaps be argued that the ways in which EU member states have responded to the recent economic crisis in Europe could threaten to undermine public support for further economic integration, the EU can nonetheless be said to challenge a closed meaning of security by redefining national security away from an emphasis on territorial defence to non-military threats and trans-boundary risks through multilateral diplomacy and crisis management (Boin et al., 2013; Howorth, 2007; Smith, 2004).

The book's argument departs from an understanding that there is no reason to assume that this process is neatly confined to Europe, since the EU's enlargement process entails a dynamic relationship between community-building and boundary-drawing (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008; Christiansen, 2005; Christiansen et al., 2000; Rumelili, 2007; Smith, 1996). Since the end of the Cold War the borders of the EU have expanded in a series of enlargement and the Union now consists of twenty-eight member states. While it seems unlikely that EU enlargement will move beyond the Balkans in the near future, the Union has sought to come up with ways to expand its regulatory and legal frameworks beyond its borders to neighbouring countries without granting them membership, i.e. the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Several scholars suggest that the ENP is best understood as a means for the EU to exercise power and influence over states in its near abroad that are highly dependent on trade and aid from the Union (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2012; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Smith, 2005). Others suggest that it rather serves as a vehicle for an open-ended process of socialization involving both EU members and neighbouring non-members (Manners, 2010). Still others suggest that the recent events in the southern neighbourhood following upon the Arab Spring have proved that the ENP does not work as it was intended to do (Lehne, 2014). To be sure, any attempt to analyse how the EU promotes security beyond its borders

needs to take the inherent duality of the Union's relations with neighbouring non-members as an analytical starting point and the security community concept provides useful conceptual tools to do so as it explicitly seeks to capture the dynamics between power and socialization in international politics.

The evolution of Spanish–Moroccan diplomatic relations in the post-Cold War era is particularly interesting in relation to the question whether the EU promotes security beyond its borders. The EU has sought to promote region-building in the Mediterranean since the 1990s (Pierros et al., 1999; Bicchi, 2007) and the Union is now deeply involved in the complex mix of cooperation and conflict that constitute Spanish–Moroccan relations (Gillespie, 2000; Hernando de Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009). In this book it is argued that the ways in which the EU affects these relations reveal important insights on several issues that are not only of interest to students of EU external relations but also to students of security communities in IR. Focusing on the relations between a member state and a neighbouring non-member is crucial for our understanding of how the EU promotes security because although military threats to European states in the Mediterranean are undeniably scarce, other non-military threats and trans-boundary risks are potentially perceived as threatening both to EU member states *and* non-members. From a normative perspective it can also be argued that our analytical and empirical focus should not be limited to exploring the conditions for cooperative security practices that only involve EU member states because that risks omitting the question of whether security communities might create insecurity beyond their boundaries (Möller, 2007).

The notions of inside/outside and security/insecurity is highly relevant in this context because since the end of the Cold War the southern Mediterranean has been portrayed as a region of instability by the EU and many of its member states due to a host of problems linked to insufficient economic development, illegal migration, terrorism and religious radicalization (Huysmans, 2000; Del Sarto, 2006; Bicchi, 2007). While these trends pre-date the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, as well as the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), those attacks are often described as having contributed to tilt the EU's focus in the region even further towards strengthening counter-terrorism and border control measures and away from other goals such as democracy promotion and economic development (Joffé, 2008; Wolff, 2012). The ongoing securitization of the southern Mediterranean region by the EU and many of its member states might at first sight suggest that there is little room for the EU to act as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis Spain and Morocco. However, an important finding in the literature on security communities is that security dynamics do not necessarily vanish but rather transform themselves as inter-state peace is 'secured' (Waever, 1998). In fact, processes of securitization might be a means for security communities to expand through formal or informal inclusion of its periphery (Acharya, 2001; Adler, 2010).

Importantly, this book departs from an understanding that focusing primarily on discursive representations of security threats runs the risk of losing

sight of more low-key and routine-based security practices that the EU and its member states engage in and that are equally important for the formation of intersubjective understandings of what constitute a security threat and, more importantly, *how* to deal with it. This is an important point to make since it cannot be taken for granted that security has a fixed meaning, especially at a time when inter-state wars are not perceived to be the main security threat and when ingrained military connotations of territorial defence and deterrence are challenged by the acknowledgement of an increasing number of non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (see Kaldor, 1998; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011). In line with insights derived from practice theory in the social sciences the argument advanced in this book is that we need to focus much more on the 'praxeology' of security in order to better understand how the EU promotes security in its neighbourhood because the meaning of security cannot primarily be established deictically but rather by becoming aware of the pragmatic context and social practices in which actors are embedded (Kratochwil, 2011; Neumann, 2002).[3] This book therefore seeks to answer the questions of whether, how and to what extent the EU promotes cooperative security practices not only among the circle of member states, but also beyond the Union's borders in the Western Mediterranean. The empirical focus in the book is set on Spain and Morocco because by asking how the EU promotes change in the way in which security is *practised* between these two neighbouring, and at times conflicting, states allows us to explore how security communities work in the present era and thus to discuss the concept's relevance at present times.

Thus, even though the book focuses specifically on the EU, Spain and Morocco the empirical findings are analysed in the broader context of the role regional organizations play in security community-building processes. In order to do so an analytical framework is devised based on three security community-building mechanisms, and by applying the framework in a case study of Spanish–Moroccan cooperation in relation to three EU policy fields (see below) the book shows how recent advances on practice theory in IR can be applied in empirical research generating novel and interesting results of relevance for EU studies and diplomacy. A main finding is that through the institutionalization of multilateral venues, the EU has provided cooperative frameworks that otherwise would not have been available, and that Spanish and Moroccan practitioners have become increasingly embedded in them. Another key finding is that the de-territorialized notion of security threats and a subsequent focus on crisis management increasingly structure the discourse and practice in the field of security and defence in both Spain and Morocco. This has created a new rationale for practical cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan diplomats, armed forces and civilian authorities in the post-Cold War era, even though it has not meant that old and protracted disputes have disappeared entirely. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed in the final chapter of this book, together with suggestions as to how to carry the lessons from the case study on to future research

endeavours. The book ends with a discussion on how these findings relate to how the EU has responded to the events that are reshaping its southern neighbourhood since 2011.

## Studying the EU as a security community-building institution: problems and prospects

The relevant question to ask about security communities today is not 'do they exist?' but rather 'how do they work?' (Bially Mattern, 2001: 353). Nonetheless, proposing to study the EU as a security community-building institution in order to explore the question of how the EU promotes security in its southern neighbourhood entails ontological, epistemological and conceptual choices that obviously need to be discussed. It also raises the question of what analytical purchase is gained from drawing upon and engaging with the literature on security communities in IR rather than other sets of literature that deal with EU external relations.

To begin with, EU member states closely resemble the definition of a pluralistic security community proposed by Karl W. Deutsch as a group of sovereign states integrated to the point where there is: 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).[4] In contrast to most realist explanations in IR regarding the demise of inter-state wars among the major European powers in the post-1945 period which would typically point to a particular configuration of balance of power under US hegemony (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1990; Rosato, 2011; Waltz, 1993),[5] transnational transactions among societies and mutual responsiveness between governments which was early on stressed by Deutsch seem to better explain the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change in Europe that have endured also after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. As such, it might appear that the security community concept have a great deal in common with liberal explanations on the peaceful evolution of the European order, such the democratic peace theory (Russett, 1993) or complex interdependence (Nye and Keohane, 1977), especially since security communities are thought to rest on a: 'perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 36).[6]

However, there are indications that security communities might evolve among non-democratic states (Acharya, 2001) and focusing primarily on the convergence of preferences and interests among states as many liberal explanations do fails to account for the emergence of the intersubjective belief that common problems must and can be resolved by institutionalized procedures without resort to physical force which forms the basis of security communities. Indeed, several studies building on constructivist insights on international socialization and collective identity formation have since the 1990s contributed to our understanding of how security communities work

(Anderson et al., 2008; Bially Mattern, 2001; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2007; Möller, 2007; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Williams, 2001, 2007; Williams and Neumann, 2000).

Adler and Barnett have made a major contribution in this vein and they point out that the defining quality of security communities is shared knowledge structures which enable new interpretations of social reality, implying that states do not necessarily only seek to achieve security within the: 'limits of some ontologically privileged anarchy' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 436; Wendt, 1999). They also distinguish between loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities and the EU and its member states can be said to closely resemble a tightly coupled pluralistic security community in that the members not only practise self-restraint towards each other but also seek to collectively handle security threats.[7] But in order to discuss whether, how and to what extent the EU promotes cooperative security practices beyond its borders the relationship between institutions and practices needs to be clarified, and questions on power and agency in security community-building processes need to be addressed.

### *Regional organizations as security community-building institutions*

It is commonly argued in the literature that security communities are essentially embodied in the creation of a 'we-feeling' or 'sense of community' but it should be said that Deutsch originally suggested that such communities also rest on: '*institutions* and *practices* strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5, emphasis added). To be sure, the roles and functions of international institutions is a much debated issue in IR. Seen from a realist perspective institutions merely reflect underlying power structures and they only survive as long as they serve the great powers that created them in the first place (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995; Rosato, 2011), whereas liberal institutionalists argue that institutions primarily function so as to enhance the prospects for cooperation among states in that they lower transaction costs and improve the possibilities for actors to make credible commitments (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Martin, 1992). Constructivists rather point to the role that institutions play in not only advancing states' interests but also shaping states' preferences because interests that motivate actions: 'emerge from a process of interaction and socialization' (Checkel, 1998: 326; Iain Johnston, 2005).

In relation to security communities, Adler and Barnett point to the role that regional organizations might play as: 'sites of socialization and learning [being] able to foster the creation of a regional "culture" around commonly held attributes' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 43). Regional organizations function as security community-building institutions to the extent that they promote 'strong multilateralism' which refers to: 'the institutionalization of security communities by means of multilateral debates, dialogue, persuasion, seminar diplomacy, and discursive legitimation, on the basis of collective knowledge' (Adler, 1998:

150).[8] To paraphrase Neumann (2013: 4), regional organizations matter in this regard to the extent that they turn generic venues for social interaction into specific sites 'where something happens' (e.g. security community-building). The density and complexity created over time by the myriad of overlaps in terms of member states and policy areas between organizations such as EU, NATO and OSCE can now be said to constitute an essential feature of security community-building in contemporary Europe (Gheciu, 2008; Hofmann, 2009; Pouliot, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2003). Surely: 'Europe easily qualifies as the thickest institutional environment beyond the nation-state anywhere on the globe [and there is a] strong and unambiguous role for socialization spurred by European regional organizations' (Zürn and Checkel, 2007: 260).[9]

What makes the EU particularly interesting in terms of security community-building is that the Union now spans the whole spectrum from trade to military crisis management.[10] In the post-Cold War period the EU has been taking on an increasingly important role when it comes to providing safety and security inside *and* outside of the Union (Boin et al., 2013; Bremberg and Britz, 2009; Elbe et al., 2005; Howorth, 2007; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007; Webber et al., 2004).[11] This is most conspicuously captured by the build-up of the Union's military and civilian capacities for crisis management and peacekeeping operations as well as common European policies to protect people, the environment and property, not necessarily against the threat of foreign invasion, but rather to address non-military threats and trans-boundary risks such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks.[12] However, the depth and breadth in terms of policies and legislation, coupled with its supranational institutions, sets the EU apart from any other regional organization in the world. It is therefore important, from a comparative perspective, that the analytical framework applied to study whether and how the EU promotes change in the way in which Spain and Morocco cooperate focuses on mechanisms of security community-building that might be present in other regional settings as well.

### *Diplomacy as relations management and practices of cooperative security*

The constructivist reappraisal of the security community concept can in many regards be said to have favoured an analytical focus on collective identities over common practices. This is understandable since collective identities are important for any community in that: 'they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are' (Hopf, 1998: 175). In this way, collective identities imply a set of interests with respect to actions and with respect to particular actors, such as not waging war against other states that are considered to be part of the same community.[13] However, focusing primarily on collective identities might lead us to mistakenly believe that they are a necessary precondition for security communities to emerge and endure. In contrast to this, Möller points out that Deutsch did not only stress the *commonality* of values (collective identity) but also the *compatibility* of values (mutual responsiveness) in security community-building (Möller, 2007: 46). For example, Ikenberry

observes that in transatlantic cooperation: 'Norms of consultations and reciprocity … can exist at least partially independently of substantive norms and values' (Ikenberry, 2008: 26), and Checkel and Katzenstein argue that the European security community is actually: 'based on a relatively thin conception of collective identity that is lacking in emotional strength [because] Europeans have made peace in … a community of strangers' (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 12).

Indeed, if we want to understand how security communities work an important step is to: 'focus less on how people *represent* one another [and more] on what practitioners actually *do* when they interact on the diplomatic floor' (Pouliot, 2010: 5, emphasis in original). States can be said to form security communities to the extent that the people representing them practise self-restraint on a daily basis so that inter-state conflicts are handled through compromises, applying legal and diplomatic measures. This understanding obviously places an emphasis on diplomatic practices as an important means for the reproduction of security communities since: 'peace exists in and through practice when security officials' practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes' (Pouliot, 2008: 279). Generally speaking, practices are here understood as meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations. In this perspective, security communities are best understood as being constituted by *communities of practice* defined as: 'like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice' (Adler, 2008: 196).[14] Interestingly, this can be said to advance Deutsch's notion that security communities is fundamentally about how to 'learn to act together' (originally to eliminate war as a social institution) (Deutsch et al., 1957: 3).[15]

However, the role of diplomacy in processes of security community-building is not only limited to sustaining the community as such. It is also very much related to maintaining as well as transcending the social boundaries of the community. Bjola suggests that diplomacy is essentially about managing relations of friendship and enmity in international relations (Bjola, 2013).[16] To be sure, diplomatic practice is not all about peaceful negotiations since war and diplomacy are heavily imbricated in one other, as for example threatening (e.g. invoking military force) is a practice inherent to all known diplomatic systems (Neumann, 2012: 314). The difference between security community and balance of power lies not in diplomacy per se but in the repertoire of diplomatic practices, or to put it differently whether states argue with or about diplomacy (Pouliot, 2008).[17] The question to ask in relation to security community-building is how the repertoire of diplomatic practice among a group of states might change, and under what conditions relations of enmity might move towards less antagonistic dispositions. Bjola argues that although many of the factors discussed above (e.g. power, interests and identity) might predispose actors to see themselves as either enemies or friends, there is room for agency in diplomatic interactions as diplomats are in the unique position

to influence what type of relationship to enter into with other actors, on what terms and what to do about it (Bjola 2013: 17).

It is uncontroversial to claim that diplomats (and other agents performing similar functions) often represent diverging interests and positions as an essential diplomatic task is to act as mediator or negotiator. But by doing things together over time, they might learn that there is something more at stake in acting together than in acting separately (although the reverse also holds true as unsuccessful collaboration could make it even more difficult to develop relations of friendship). The bottom line here is that how you work together is crucial for learning how to act in concert. By analogy, as tightly coupled pluralistic security communities start to develop into a 'mutual aid society' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30), it becomes important to understand how cooperative security practices (i.e. ways to collectively deal with security threats) emerge and spread. Such cooperative security practices might range from multilateral diplomacy to military and civilian crisis management, or indeed any other cooperative practice that constitute security as being interdependent. Importantly, practices of cooperative security are not only: 'an assemblage of military, diplomatic, political, economic and, social practices, but they also consist of constellations of communities of practice, some of whose performances may be in the realm of peacekeeping, while others exist in the realm of economic integration' (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 27). This is particularly salient in Western Europe where traditional security and defence policies based on territorial defence have been losing ground ever since the end of the Cold War (Gärtner, 2003). The logic of collective defence as a means of military deterrence is increasingly being complemented with notions of joint military operations in order to deal with essentially non-military security threats before they 'hit home'.[18]

In the EU, these changes are most obviously seen in the development of the Union's military and civilian crisis management capacity, the CSDP (Grevi et al., 2009; Howorth, 2007). The CSDP is not based on the transposition to the EU of the role and functions of national armed forces (i.e. territorial defence) and its rationale is not based on defending the EU against an external military threat (Howorth, 2007: 40). It is rather shaped by the: 'need for multilateral legitimacy, the military needs multilateral sharing of capacities in international operations, and [a] strong interest in effecting military modernization in Europe' (Haaland Matlary 2009: 6).[19] Several scholars have stressed the importance of socialization of diplomats and military officials in transnational policy fields (both in the EU and NATO) as explaining the development of the CSDP (Cross, 2006, 2010; Giegerich, 2006; Mérand et al., 2011; Meyer, 2005, 2006; Meyer and Strickmann, 2011). Mérand points out that: 'senior officials from foreign and defence ministries, not politicians, were the key actors behind [CSDP]' (Mérand 2010: 366). Lessons from operations and missions on the ground have continuously been brought back to Brussels for over a decade now and what seems to be taking place is the gradual convergence of threat perceptions and ways-of-doing things among diplomats,

militaries and bureaucrats from a majority of EU member states increasingly centred on the institutions in Brussels.

Another example of cooperative security practice within the EU is related to ongoing changes in which national policies to protect civilian populations in the case of large-scale invasion (i.e. civil defence) are increasingly being replaced by policies aiming at providing protection in the face of natural and man-made disasters, as well as terrorist attacks (i.e. civil protection) (Alexander, 2002; Bremberg and Britz, 2009). Large-scale disruptions and catastrophes are increasingly acknowledged as threats to the functioning of European societies (Elbe et al., 2005). Within the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the EU has increasingly developed 'policies of protection' to deal with non-military security threats such as international terrorism and organized crime (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007).

As such, cooperative security performed as multilateral diplomacy and civilian/military crisis management are essential features of the tightly coupled European security community alongside the practice of self-restraint among the members of the EU. This is highly important in relation to the question of how the EU works as a security community-building institution in that it directs our attention to the ways in which that the EU promote practices of mutual assistance, also beyond the borders of the Union. This is also why it is highly interesting to explore to what extent the EU can be said to change the ways in which Spain and Morocco cooperate on security.

### *Power and security communities*

An early finding in the literature on security communities was the tendency for security communities to emerge and expand around powerful political and economic 'core areas' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 37–41). This is clearly at odds with basic assumptions of realist thinking in IR which basically postulate that power in international politics does not attract but repel, and that therefore, balance of power is an inescapable outcome under conditions of international anarchy (Kaufman et al., 2007; Waltz, 1979). Since the EU is not a state and even further from being a traditional great power it is ill-equipped to perform international security by means of militarily balancing other great powers and cajoling smaller states to join its ranks. However, conceiving power in international politics as only being about an actor's material capacity to get others to do what they otherwise would not do is at best insufficient in that it only captures the compulsory dimension of power. Barnett and Duvall suggest that power should more generally be understood as 'the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate' (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). Power is both about the kind of social relations (interaction or constitution) and the specificity of social relations (direct or diffuse).

Thus, rather than seeing power as being primarily a function of the possession of material capabilities what matters more in terms of security

community-building is the 'authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the "we-feeling" and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 39). The power of security communities can be said to rest with the ability to define legitimate political actions, such as for example the resolution of conflicts with peaceful means, and security communities tend to develop around 'powerful' and 'successful' groups of states: 'because of the positive image of security and material progress that are associated with [them]' (ibid.: 40). In this perspective, it matters less that the EU does not have an army and more that the EU represents the world's largest common market and that a majority of the member states have enjoyed peace for more than sixty years.

This point is obviously related to Manner's suggestion that the EU's 'normative power' (i.e. the ability to shape conceptions of what counts as normal) in international politics ultimately stems from its historical legacy of overcoming inter-state wars among its members as well as its unique political–legal constitution (Manners, 2002). However, from the perspective of practice the normative power of the EU rests not so much on the EU's unique identity as with the continuous spread of cooperative security practices. For sure, what the EU is doing is equally important as what the EU is (or how it is conceived by others) and there are indications that the 'mental geography' of security communities is different from that of groups of states practising balance of power as they: 'do not simply fall back into balance of power dynamics externally, but also transform the security dynamics on their periphery' (Adler and Greve, 2009: 71). This can be characterized as a disposition towards spreading the community outward through explicit or implicit practices of socialization (ibid.).

But this does not mean that the expansion of security communities needs to be based on some kind of altruism. It could just as well follow a 'logic of securitization' by which sustaining the security community is predicated on its continuous spread through formal or informal inclusion of its periphery (Acharya, 2001; Adler and Barnett, 1998; cf. Buzan et al., 1998). However, while the standard definition of socialization describes a social process in which an actor internalizes the norms and values of a given community (Checkel, 2005a), practice theory does not emphasize norm internalization as the universal means to achieve commitment to communal standards (Nicolini, 2012). Instead it is assumed that shared practical understandings can evolve through social interaction even though actors' understandings of self and other(s) might remain unaltered. What is important is whether actors learn to do something in a new way, not that they first change their normative beliefs.

Moreover, the social power of practices does not primarily rely on scientific knowledge or truth claims but rather on the establishment of ways-of-doing things that appear self-evident: 'The order of things is established through the iterated practices performed by capital-endowed agents, because their doing something in a certain way makes the implicit but powerful claim that "this is how things are"' (Pouliot, 2008: 282). This is important for the question of

how the EU promotes security beyond its borders, because it suggests that the development of shared practical understanding is not exempt from the exercise of power. To the extent that non-members are beginning to practise security in ways similar to the ones that are developed within the circle of EU member states, it can be said that the European security community has expanded mainly on terms set by its members. In this sense cooperative security practices, such as military and civilian crisis management, function as 'anchoring practices' rendering other practices possible (Sending and Neumann, 2011; Swindler, 2001).[20] It is therefore: 'nothing naïve and idealistic in the steps and practices the EU uses to build partnerships, neighbourhoods, and unions. Rather, these steps and practices help translate normative power into real material influence and, sometimes, political control, but they do such things peacefully' (Adler, 2010: 79). Importantly, this implies that we need to pay close attention to how power is exercised through the institutionalization of a myriad of overlapping relations between the EU, the member states (e.g. Spain) and neighbouring non-members (e.g. Morocco).

### *Security communities and outsiders*

As stated above, practices of exclusion and inclusion are an integral part of any (security) community and Deutsch stressed early on the importance for security communities to be able to respond to the interests of 'outsiders' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 119). The expansion of security communities is not necessarily captured by the process of extending formal membership of a particular regional organization because regional organizations such as the EU might: 'fulfil a role as a "security community-building institution", but the community itself is founded on the relationships between actors rather than particular institutional arrangements' (Bellamy, 2004: 10). Moreover, we should not assume that attempts to expand cooperative security practices are always successful since it cannot be ignored that any given security community may in the 'perception of non-members be an insecurity community' (Möller, 2007: 35). This implies that it is imperative to carefully study how security practices unfold in concrete settings. If we assume that security communities expand to the extent that 'new' members adopt practices first established among 'old' members, then we need to explore to what extent the 'old' members adapt ingrained ways-of-doing things as the community expands. For security community-building to take place in the sense of learning to act together there needs to be mutual responsiveness among states in terms of acknowledging possibly diverging perceptions of security threats.

In the literature on the EU's relations to neighbouring non-members there are important insights that can be drawn upon in this regard. Lavenex and others observe that the EU is promoting the 'extension of parts of the Union's *acquis communautaire* beyond the circle of member states towards their immediate neighbourhood [and] a form of governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together' (Barbé, 2010; Lavenex 2004: 681).[21] This

'external governance' follows: 'functional needs when it is seen to increase the efficiency and problem-solving capacities of internal policies [and] it may serve foreign policy goals geared at stabilizing the neighbourhood of the enlarged Union' (ibid.). What makes these observations relevant here is that they bring to the forefront the importance of transgovernmental cooperation between sub-units of national governments and administrations in both EU member states and non-members in various policy fields (cf. Keohane and Nye, 1974). In relation to the question of how the EU promotes security beyond its borders it is particularly interesting to note that JHA policies on internal security do not have a particularly strong basis in the *acquis communautaire*. Instead, as pointed out by Lavenex and Wichmann: 'large parts of the acquis consist less in transferable legal instruments than in operational cooperation. A particular feature of cooperation in JHA is its network character and predominance of transgovernmentalism as a mode of governance' (Balzacq, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2007; Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009: 85).[22]

Thus, transgovernmental networks play a prominent role when it comes to rule expansion from the EU to neighbouring non-members in relation to cooperation on internal security. Importantly, these networks are constituted by security practitioners from both EU member states and non-members who deal predominantly with operational aspects of issues and problems such as trafficking, border control or disaster management. The networks can be said to serve as a 'tool for "socializing" third countries in to common European standards' (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009: 98). For example, Wolff describes how EU–Moroccan border management cooperation has developed into a tit-for-tat relation as Moroccan authorities have begun to see an opportunity to modernize their own border management equipment and know-how through cooperation with Spain and the EU (Wolff, 2012: 139).

This also illustrates how practitioners from non-member states are exposed to the ways-of-doing things that are already established within the circle of EU member states. But what is important to note here is that while practically engaging in exchanges over how to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks practitioners from both EU institutions and member states are, as a result, also getting a first-hand account of the dispositions, experiences and threat perceptions of the non-members. In terms of agency it is the mutual responsiveness between practitioners that fosters a sense of community and to the extent that transgovernmental networks serve to bring practitioners from EU member states and non-members together to develop shared understandings of security threats through common cooperative security practices it can be argued that the EU functions as a security community-building institution.

### *Towards an analytical framework for studying the EU as security community-building institution*

To summarize, when studying regional organizations, such as the EU, as security community-building institutions, the analytical focus should be set on

the extent to which and with what means they provide venues for regional and bilateral cooperation involving both member states and non-members, and whether these venues make it possible for an increasing amount of practitioners from different countries to meet, discuss and possibly also find common solutions on various issues. To this end, the following three mechanisms have been selected in order to conduct empirical research on the EU as security community-building institution. The first two mechanisms relate to different levels of state bureaucracies since it can be assumed that communities of practices develop along distinctive (albeit not necessarily separate) pathways depending on what kind of practitioners we are dealing with, for example ministers and bureaucrats or militaries and diplomats. The third mechanism relates to qualitative changes in how security is practiced among representatives of states since it can be assumed that such changes reveal important clues as to whether a process of security community-building is taking place:

1 Institutionalization of multilateral venues. A similar mechanism is suggested by Adler and Barnett as well as Pouliot (see above); however, here it is operationalized as the setting up of common decision-making structures bringing together high-level representatives (e.g. heads of state, ministers, senior diplomats) from EU member states and non-member states on a regular basis, either bilateral or regional. Institutionalization here refers to both the creation of formal institutions for political cooperation as well as the cooperative practices developed over time. Frequency and regularity of meetings are taken as simple proxies for an ongoing process of institutionalization, although the 'quality' of the social interaction in the venues, in the sense of what kind of decisions are being made and what policy matters are being discussed, also need to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
2 Expansion of transgovernmental networks. This mechanism builds on the work by Lavenex and others (see above); however, here it is operationalized as the extent to which practitioners (e.g. civil servants at governmental departments and agencies and also military officers) from EU member states and non-members are brought together in cooperative endeavours in relation to EU policy fields. Again, frequency and regularity of exercises and workshops can be used here as proxies to determine how embedded practitioners are in such networks, but qualitative accounts are also needed in order to determine the 'substance' of the cooperation, both in terms of how policies are shaped and what the outcomes are.
3 Practising cooperative security as crisis management. A similar mechanism is suggested by Adler and Barnett in relation to the changed role of the military in tightly coupled pluralistic security communities (see above); however, here it is operationalized as changes in security policy as well as military and defence planning in EU member states and non-members. It is particularly interesting if territorial defence is less emphasized in favour of international and/or regional cooperation, especially with an aim of

jointly countering non-military threats and trans-boundary risks. Policy documents, speeches and official statements are used here to probe how far EU members and non-members have gone in revising the concept of security and in embracing the notion of cooperative security as civilian and military crisis management. Naturally, there is only so much that can be retrieved from official documents and they need to be complemented with other sources of information as well, for example interviews with practitioners such as diplomats and military officers.

## Research design and case selection

Various analytical frameworks have been applied in order to study different aspects of security communities and there is no particular method *par excellence* that would serve as a template for a study of the EU as security community-building institution.[23] The study upon which this book rests is inspired by a style of scientific reasoning which favours inductive, interpretative and historical modes of inquiry (cf. Pouliot, 2010). The study includes one EU member state, Spain, and one non-member, Morocco, but it is not designed as a comparative study of two states but as a case study of the EU as a security community-building institution. Case studies in social science include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparison between several cases, and ensuring 'relatability' of findings is the prime focus for case-oriented research rather than trying to generalize to unobserved phenomena, as quantitative research usually aim to do. This essentially means that logical inference or analytical generalisation, as opposed to statistical inference/generalization, is applied in case study research regardless of whether the aim is to test theories or develop concepts (Pouliot, 2014; Suganami, 2008). Moreover, cases should not be treated as equal and undifferentiated instances of observations, but rather as meaningful and complex configurations of events and structures (Ragin, 1997). A major strength of case study research lies in the ability to provide detailed and focused accounts of events that general theories often only can provide probabilistic statements on.

### *Case study research and process-tracing*

The collection of data for this book draws upon process-tracing techniques. George and Bennett propose that process-tracing as a method is particularly suited for case studies as it attempts to identify: 'the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable' (George and Bennett, 2005: 206). Moreover, process-tracing finds a place in qualitative research due to its focus on detailed case studies and historical scholarship, and the focus on identifying mechanisms or intervening variables is what makes process-tracing particularly apt either to test theories or to be used in conceptual development. As Checkel notes: 'Mechanisms operate at an analytical level below that of a

more encompassing theory; they increase the theory's credibility by rendering more fine-grained explanations' (Checkel, 2005b: 4).

However, mechanisms in the social realm need not necessarily be conceived of as having an ontological status of being real but unobservable entities 'out there'. From an interpretivist or constructivist perspective, mechanisms can rather be seen as heuristic, analytical constructs used to make sense of the social world.[24] Pouliot suggests that process-tracing as a method is informed by a *processual* understanding of causality, rather than a *correlational* one (Pouliot, 2007: 373; Pouliot, 2014; cf. King et al., 1994). Accordingly: 'explaining causality is subordinate to understanding meaning' (Pouliot, 2007: 367). This is highly relevant in relation to studying the EU as a security community-building institution because security community-building seen as process allows for equifinality in the sense of: 'several explanatory paths, combinations, or sequences leading to the same outcome, and these paths may or may not have one or more variables in common' (George and Bennett, 2005: 20; cf. Adler and Barnett, 1998: 49; Deutsch et al., 1957: 70).

There are, of course, different ways in which process-tracing can be applied (e.g. Norman, 2013; Wood, 2008). One way is to construct a so-called detailed narrative, which is basically a meticulous, explorative study of how an event or phenomenon came about. Even though it is descriptive, it is certainly not without analytical value because: 'A well-constructed detailed narrative may suggest enough about the possible causal processes in a case so that the researcher can determine what type of process-tracing would be relevant for a more theoretically oriented problem' (George and Bennett, 2005: 210). This is also why this kind of process-tracing technique was chosen to structure the case study since there is reason to believe that security communities develop over time and not always in similar pathways. However, besides the general need to be able to account for equifinality by carefully scrutinizing the sequence of events, the aim of constructing a detailed narrative follows from the argument that this book departs from, namely that in order to better understand how the EU promotes security in its neighbourhood it is important to become aware of the pragmatic context and social practices in which the relevant actors are embedded (Bueger, 2014; Kratochwil, 2011). Thus, in order to be able to say something about how security community-building works in practice it is paramount to understand the practical understandings, dispositions and ways-of-doing things that guide actors' behaviour, and by constructing a detailed narrative using archival sources and elite interviews, the case study upon which this book draws is well equipped to do that.

### *Country selection*

Spain is highly interesting in relation to the question of how the EU promotes security since EU membership has had a great impact on Spanish foreign and security policy, especially in relation to the Maghreb countries (Hernando de Larramendi and Mañe Estrada, 2009; López García and Hernando de

Larramendi, 2002). But Spain has also had a significant impact on the formulation of the EU's Mediterranean policies since the beginning of the 1990s (Gillespie, 2000). While Morocco is not a member of the EU, it has longstanding ties with Western powers such as the US and several EU member states (not least France) and it is perceived to be one of the 'avant-garde countries' within the ENP (Levenex and Schimmelfennig, 2007: 151). However, Spanish–Moroccan relations are particularly interesting in relation to the EU as a security community-building institution since they entail a complex mix of cooperation and conflict.

For example, Spain has a colonial legacy in Morocco and the enclave-cities Ceuta and Melilla (situated on the North African shore and claimed by Morocco) are vivid remnants of Spanish imperial policies dating as far back as the sixteenth century, and a latent source of dispute (*El Mundo*, 2006, 2007; Powell, 1995). In effect, these Spanish cities constitute the land border between the EU and Morocco. There are other unsettled territorial issues as well, which allegedly spurred the Parsley Islet crisis in 2002. In addition, Morocco's longstanding occupation of the former Spanish colony, Western Sahara, is also a source of bilateral tensions, as large parts of Spanish civil society tend to support Polisario's struggle for Saharawi independence, while subsequent Spanish governments since the 1980s have rather sought to maintain working relations with Rabat. In relation to economic issues such as fisheries agreements and agricultural trade with the EU, Spain and Morocco have competing interests and other sensitive issues, such as unregulated migration towards Europe and drug production in the northern parts of Morocco, also contribute to a strain on relations between Madrid and Rabat from time to time (Gillespie, 2006).

Moreover, terrorism is a trans-boundary security threat that has received much attention in both countries, especially after the bombings in Casablanca in 2003 and Madrid in 2004 (Jordán and Horsburgh, 2006; Potomac Institute, 2009). On both occasions, the deeds were carried out by persons being part of or having links to Islamist terrorist networks. In Casablanca, a Spanish cultural establishment was attacked, besides other targets, and among the perpetrators behind the Madrid bombings, several persons had Moroccan origins. However, rather than driving a wedge between Spain and Morocco, it seems as if these attacks have served to bring the governments on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar closer together in the efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks (Boukhars, 2011: 142). For example, the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as the radicalization, training and participation of an increasing number of Spanish and Moroccan citizens in rebel groups in Syria, Iraq and Mali is regarded as posing a threat towards both countries (*El País*, 2014a, 2014b).[25]

### *Policy fields*

In terms of putting the analytical framework to work, the mechanisms devised above (institutionalization of multilateral venues, expansion of transgovernmental

networks and practicing cooperative security as crisis management) are explored in three EU policy fields: (1) trade; (2) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); (3) civil protection. These policies capture a wide range of EU policies, from civilian to military cooperation, while the institutional set-up within the EU varies across the policy fields (see Figure 1.1). They also have an external dimension and thus affect the EU's relations with neighbouring non-members, such as Morocco. The case study is thus designed as a *within-case comparison* of the EU as a security community-building institution.

EU trade policy is selected because it was among the first to be communitarized already in the EEC, and the European Commission has a long history of representing the member states in international trade negotiations and vis-à-vis trading partners. Besides being a formidable power *in* trade, it has also been suggested that the EU is increasingly becoming a power *through* trade to the extent that the Union uses market access: 'as a bargaining chip to promote changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners, from labour standards to developmental policies' (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011: 294). Controlling the access to the Internal Market through trade concessions and association agreements can thus be seen as powerful leverage for countries with strong economic ties to the EU (i.e. nearly all neighbouring non-members) (Dannreuther, 2004: 158; Moravcsik, 2003).

The CSDP is selected as it is meant to provide the EU with the means necessary to conduct the kind of military and civilian crisis management operations that have become increasingly sought after in the post-Cold War era. Since 1999, the institutional infrastructure of CSDP has been set up in Brussels and various missions and operations have been conducted. It is kept firmly on an intergovernmental basis as part of the CFSP, and the Commission has mainly had a support function whereas the High Representative for the CFSP has acted as: 'the external face of the EU and to help forge consensus on policy issues within the council' (Howorth, 2007: 66). But more important for the purpose of this study is that the CSDP can be seen as a practical expression of collective and cooperative security in the EU that also serves as a tool for the Union and the member states to cooperate with non-members on military and civilian missions (nearly all military operations have received contributions from non-members, such as Morocco's participation in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia).

EU civil protection aims to better protect people, environment and property in the event of major natural or man-made disasters both inside and

| | **Civil** | **Military** |
|---|---|---|
| **Supranational** | Trade | |
| **Intergovernmental** | Civil Protection | CSDP |

*Figure 1.1* Selected EU policy fields
Source: author

outside the EU. As a policy area civil protection has developed rapidly within the EU over the last decade and with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force it now has a proper legal base in the treaties. It was selected because civil protection can be said to cover many operational aspects of disaster and crisis management, and as such, it relates to both civil defence in member states and international humanitarian relief operations abroad. What makes it highly interesting for the purpose of this book is that the Commission has supported the creation of a so-called Euro-Mediterranean Civil Protection System aiming not only at promoting confidence-building among the participants but also at bringing neighbouring non-members, such as Morocco, closer to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism through more structural cooperation.

### *Empirical material and data collection*

The empirical material collected for the case study covers the period from the early 1990s until 2010. The bulk of the material can be divided into two main parts: documents and interviews. Policy and legislative documents relevant for the selected EU policy areas have been collected. Interpreting this material serves in large part to construct detailed narratives of how Spanish–Moroccan cooperation, in relation to the selected policy fields, has evolved over time. These narratives serve as the basis for the within-case comparison. Primary sources from the European institutions, such as conclusions adopted by the Council of the EU or proposals presented by the European Commission, have largely been retrieved from the web-based archives of the corresponding institutions. Spanish primary sources, such as legislation, defence directives, foreign policy statements, speeches and parliamentary debates, have been accessed through the web pages of the Spanish Parliament, the *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior as well as the Spanish Prime Minister's Office. Moroccan primary sources, such as Mohammed VI's speeches and statements on behalf of the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs and other high-ranking Moroccan officials, are available in French on the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web page.

Another source of empirical material is classified US intelligence documents. Documents from the US embassies in Algiers, Madrid and Rabat (released by Wikileaks and made available through the Spanish newspaper *El País*) have been consulted as a way of contrasting information retrieved from official policy documents. Secondary sources, such as policy reports and newspaper articles, have also been consulted in order to produce the detailed narratives. Furthermore, these narratives also in part rely on academic analyses of the EU's external trade relations, the development of the CSDP and EU civil protection. Statistical data on trade volume between the EU and Morocco, and Spain and Morocco, as well as on military spending in the EU and the Maghreb, have been collected from databases of the European Commission, the Spanish Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Trade and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Another important part of the empirical material is constituted by semi-structured elite interviews with European and national bureaucrats, diplomats, military officers and civil protection practitioners. Around seventy interviews have been conducted mainly in Brussels, Madrid and Rabat during a period ranging from September 2008 to October 2010 (see Appendix I). The interviewees were, at the time of the interviews, working at the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, various Permanent Representations to the EU, the Spanish Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Spanish General Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergencies as well as the Moroccan Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior and Moroccan the General Directorate for Civil Protection.

As a standard operating procedure all interviewees have been asked a set of questions. However, in order to get a hold of as broad a sample of interviewees as possible for each of the three EU policy areas, all interviewees have not been asked exactly the same questions. After all: 'the goal of interviews is rarely simply confirmatory. Social scientists want to be surprised' (Rathbun, 2008: 698). As a general theme, the interviewees at the European Commission and Council Secretariat have been asked to describe the day-to-day policy-making and decision-making processes in their respective policy areas, the historical evolution of certain policies and instruments, and how they perceive the future of the cooperation.

Spanish and Moroccan interviewees have instead been asked to elaborate on how they perceive the present and future role of the EU in their respective policy areas in relation to the development of both regional frameworks and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. To the extent that it has been possible, the interviewees have been asked to reflect upon how the cooperation in their respective policy fields is undertaken (or not undertaken) from a more practical point of view and to give the richest possible examples to back up their statements. In those cases where the interviewees agreed to be recorded transcripts have been made. Direct quotes are only used throughout the analyses if the interview which is being quoted has been recorded and transcribed. The interviews have mainly been conducted in English or Spanish and all quotes from Spanish interviewees presented in the analysis have been translated to English by the author.

### *Methodological limitations*

In terms of research design, methodological choices and empirical data this book comes with a set of limits. To begin with, other policy areas could have been considered apart from the three selected. For example, migration and energy are areas where it can be expected that the EU has an effect on Spanish-Moroccan relations or it might also be the case that Spanish–Moroccan relations in these areas affect the formulation of the EU's policies in these areas (cf. Wolff, 2012). However, the reason not to include any of these policy areas has first and foremost to do with the notion that crisis management plays an important

part in developing cooperative security in the post-Cold War era. Focusing on CSDP and civil protection are thus better suited as a way to explore changes in military and civilian structures and capacities as well as security and defence policy in Spain and Morocco. These two policy areas are therefore better choices than, for example, migration and border control in relation to the question of how the EU in practice promotes security community-building beyond its borders.

Moreover, the choice to focus on trade should not only be seen as providing a useful contrast to military and civilian crisis management since EU trade policy with neighbouring non-members such as Morocco incorporates wider issues of association agreements and regulatory convergence with the rules of the Internal Market. It is also situated within the broader framework of the ENP to a much higher degree than, for example, energy policy, and although energy is rapidly becoming an important policy area within the EU, it is not (yet) institutionalized to the same extent as EU trade policy. But it should nonetheless be stated that the choice to focus on the three selected policy areas poses certain constraints that need to be taken into account when discussing the findings from the case study and the possible implications they might have for the broader debate in IR on why, how and under what conditions security communities emerge and expand.

Spanish–Moroccan relations obviously have a host of idiosyncratic features, which makes it hard to generalize about the role of the EU in terms of security community-building in other parts of its neighbourhood on the basis of specific case findings, but studies such as this one aims to provide a heuristic understanding of the conditions under which EU policies are pursued, and thus also provide a broader understanding of the EU as a security community-building institution. On the other hand, focusing on Spain and Morocco could be criticized on the grounds that these two states seem particularly inclined towards cooperation within EU-promoted frameworks, and that the role of the EU would perhaps be judged differently if another dyadic couple would have been included as well. Methodologically speaking, the problem here would basically be that of 'selecting-on-the-dependent-variable'. However, it cannot be argued that relations between Spain and Morocco are always a walk in the park, which the Parsley Islet crisis in 2002 clearly shows. Although it would undoubtedly be ideal to have included more than one pair of EU member states/non-members, there is a significant trade-off between depth and width in qualitative research. This book is no exception to that rule. Therefore, it deliberately seeks to conduct an in-depth and detailed study focusing on what can be described as a though case for the EU as a security community-building institution in the sense that even though we would expect the EU to influence Spanish–Moroccan relations there are still tensions between Spain and Morocco related to territorial and other issues. Thus, if the EU does not function as a security community-building institution towards Spain and Morocco, it would be difficult to assume that it would do so in other parts of the southern neighbourhood.

In terms of data collection, interviews are an important source of experience-near information based on practitioners' own accounts of their activities. Although interviewing is certainly not a flawless method of gathering material it is often, on pragmatic grounds, the best means available to obtain a particular kind of data. Rathbun suggests that interviewing 'is often the best-suited method for gathering data on those characteristics of the social world that differentiate it from the natural world: human beings' effort to intentionally transform their environment on the basis of cognition, reflection and learning' (Rathbun, 2008: 690). Nonetheless, interviewing practitioners is, in many regards, problematic in that it is based on the premise that there is a possibility that their experiences and 'sense of practice' can first be verbalized by the practitioners themselves and then transmitted to and understood by researcher.

There is no doubt that it is a notoriously tricky task to retrieve the meaning(s) that actors attribute to social practices. It goes without saying that it is even harder in cases where the researcher's access to practitioners is limited, which often is the case when studying foreign, security and defence policies. Although the sample of interviews gathered for this study is deemed to be satisfyingly broad, there is reason to be careful when interpreting it. For sure, the material does not necessarily reveal practices, but rather *accounts* of them. Reflecting on the logic of practicality and its implication for the study of security communities, Pouliot concludes that: 'Qualitative interviews may take the researcher some distance in the recovery of practical perspectives and subjective meanings. But because such conversations mostly verbalize reflexive knowledge, background dispositions must be read between the lines and distilled from the analysis of practices' (Pouliot, 2008: 285). Bueger suggests that textual sources (e.g. documents such as handbooks, manuals, notes, activity reports) combined with interviewing is an important technique to uncover implicit structures of meaning, either by having practitioners describe a practice they participate in on an everyday basis or by asking experts, who have spent a considerable amount of time observing the practice, describe it (Bueger, 2014: 18–20). The detailed narratives developed in the subsequent chapters is thus to be seen as an attempt to analyse practices combining both textual sources and interviews.

## Structure of the book

Chapters 2 to 4 present the empirical analysis of the EU as a security community-building institution in three policy areas: trade (Chapter 2), CSDP (Chapter 3), and civil protection (Chapter 4). The analytical focus in these chapters is set on the questions of whether, how and to what extent the EU promotes security community-building in relation to Spain and Morocco in these respective policy areas, and focusing on the institutionalization of multilateral venues, the expansion of transgovernmental networks and practicing cooperative security as crisis management. These policy areas span the spectrum from supranational to intergovernmental policy-making in the EU, as well as civilian and military capacities, but they also have a clear bearing on

Spanish–Moroccan relations in the post-Cold War era. Morocco is heavily dependent on trade with the EU, but at the same time Spain has, for domestic reasons, sought to limit the access of Moroccan goods (notably agriculture), to the Internal Market. Illegal migration has put a strain on relations between Madrid and Rabat, but Spanish and Moroccan civil protection authorities cooperate intensively to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks, and they do so increasingly within EU-promoted regional frameworks. Moreover, Moroccan and Spanish troops have participated alongside each other under the EU's banner in Bosnia.

The concluding Chapter 5 presents the main findings from the empirical analysis of the case study and discusses what implications might be drawn in relation to the book's aim of contributing to the theoretical debate in IR on the security community concept in the post-Cold War era. The most important finding is that the EU supports the expansion of communities of practitioners that both transcend institutional divides between members and non-members and are brought together by a shared interest in developing common practices, not least in relation to non-military threats and trans-boundary risks. This challenges not only constructivist understandings that security communities necessarily rest on a strong sense of collective identity or 'we-feeling', but it also suggests an alternative understanding of how the EU might influence neighbouring non-member states when the bid for membership is not on the table. These findings are then discussed in relation to how the EU has responded to the Arab Spring and the events that are reshaping its southern neighbourhood since 2011. The chapter ends with a note on future research, as well as a discussion on how the analytical framework developed in this book might serve as an inspiration to study other regional organizations in other parts of the world.

## Notes

1 *Perejil* in Spanish, *Leila* in Arabic. The surface of the islet measures 13 hectares and it is situated 147 metres off the Moroccan coast and 11 kilometres west of the Spanish enclave-city, Ceuta.

2 Security is an essentially contested concept in IR, see among others Wolfers' seminal piece on the undetermined meaning of national security (Wolfers, 1952). On the development of the concept of security in IR, see Buzan (1983), Ullman (1983), Katzenstein, et al. (1996), Baldwin (1997), Buzan, et al. (1998), Huysmans (1998), McSweeney (1999), Bigo (2000), Buzan and Hansen (2009).

3 Practice theory can be said to draw upon a distinct social ontology in which: 'the social is a field of embodied, materially, interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical understandings' (Schatzki, 2001: 12; cf. Bourdieu, 1990). On practice theory in IR, see Adler and Pouliot (2011a), Bueger and Gadinger (2014). For an example of applying practice-based frameworks to study EU foreign policy, see Bicchi (2011). For critical discussions on practice theory in IR, see Hopf (2010), Duvall and Chowdhury (2011), Bially Mattern (2011), Navari (2011), Ringmar (2014).

4 Deutsch distinguished between amalgamated (i.e. a 'formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single large unit, with some type of common

government') and pluralistic (i.e. 'legal independence of separate governments') security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6). It is the notion of pluralistic security communities that has rendered most scholarly attention (and controversy) in IR since it implies the possibility of a sense of community among independent states that is strong enough to make war unimaginable even though the monopoly of organized violence need not be transferred to a new political entity.

5 Hyde-Price suggests that the structural arrangements of 'balanced multipolarity' between France, Germany and the UK: 'shapes and shoves the post-Cold War European security system [and] generates the complex mix of cooperation and competition that characterises European international relations in the early twenty-first century' (Hyde-Price, 2007: 5). Interestingly, in this neo-realist interpretation balanced multipolarity apparently works to diffuse balance-of-power practice among EU member states (and thus drastically reducing the threat of military conflict), and it also allows the EU to pursue 'milieu-shaping' goals aiming at stabilizing the neighbourhood to the south and east (Hyde-Price, 2007: 107–116).

6 This can be compared with Haas' neo-functionalist notion of the role of political elites in initiating processes of political and economic integration in Europe (Haas, 1958) but it should be noted that: 'Deutsch focused less on Europe than other integration theorists and to this day the idea of "security communities" might have better purchase as a general theory of integration, because its focal point is the transformation of international relations and intersocietal exchange, rather than the development of supranational institutions and the demise of state sovereignty' (Rosamond, 2000: 41).

7 A loosely coupled pluralistic security community is defined as a: 'transnational region of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Owing to their shared structure of meaning and identity, members expect no bellicose activities from other members and, therefore, consistently practice self-restraint' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30). The tightly coupled version can be said to be an enhanced version of the first, although it is different to the extent that is has developed a 'mutual aid society' that: 'construct collective system arrangements [and] a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system' (ibid.).

8 The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has performed an essential function as a security community-building institution especially after the Cold War. One of its main achievements in the post-Cold War era has been to help to reshape the concept of security from essentially meaning military deterrence to take on a broader notion of cooperative and collective security that also includes non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (Adler, 1998). Since the 1990s, a similar notion of security has increasingly taken hold in organizations such as the EU and NATO as well (Haaland Matlary, 2009; Howorth, 2007; Williams, 2007).

9 For example, the OSCE covers a vast geographical space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and NATO includes the US, Canada and Turkey and cooperates closely with non-members like Sweden. NATO can be seen as an 'institutional expression' of the transatlantic security community, while the EU reflects the same community's European pillar (Risse, 2008). The overlaps in terms of members and policies between EU and NATO further entrench what Gheciu refers to as the 'Western-liberal security community', but it is likewise something that might at times give rise to clashes among the members due to colliding threat perceptions and security practices (Gheciu, 2008: 7).

10 According to Waever, the EU essentially performs three functions in terms of security community-building: '[1] keeping the core intact, ensuring there is one

center rather than several in Western Europe … [2] silent disciplining power on "the near abroad"… [3] a potential role as direct intervenor in specific conflicts' (Waever, 1998: 99).

11 This is not the same thing as arguing that the EU is a unitary actor equivalent to a state in terms of foreign and security policy, and ever since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s, there has been much scholarly debate on the (lack of) coherence in EU foreign policy-making as well as how to best study the EU's 'actorness' in international politics (Hill and Smith, 2011). On the EU as an actor and its roles in international politics, see Diez (2005), Duchêne (1972), Bretherton and Vogler (2006), Elgström and Smith (2006), Hill (1993), Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002), Rosecrance (1998), Sjöstedt (1977), Sjursen (2006), Waever (2000), Zielonka (2006).

12 For example, art. 222 of the EU treaties stipulates that: 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster' (OJEU, 2010b).

13 This also implies that transnational transactions cannot simply be used as proxy for measuring security community-building because: 'not all transactions will produce a collective identity; after all, interactions are also responsible for creating an "other" and defining threats' (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 47).

14 At first sight, communities of practice might seem to come conspicuously close to the concept of epistemic communities in IR (Cross, 2013; Haas, 1992). Although there are conceptual overlaps, it is important to note that epistemic communities are typically stipulated to wield social power as a consequence of acquired and acknowledged expertise, whereas communities of practice have a broader repertoire.

15 This does not mean that communities of practice must necessarily be thought of as being based on a voluntary commitment to a common cause, because: 'practice … performs community and not the other way around' (Nicolini, 2012: 94).

16 On diplomacy, see among others Barston (1997), Constantinou and Der Derian (2010), Satow (1917/1979), Sending, et al. (2015).

17 To put it differently, if there is anything that characterizes security communities it is not the absence of conflicts among its members, it is rather the peaceful resolution of such conflicts (Pouliot, 2006).

18 While it is too early to tell whether the crisis spurred by Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula in the spring of 2014 will lead to further military cooperation within NATO and EU it does serve to underscore that territorial notions of security and balance-of-power practices have not vanished altogether from Europe. Responding to external threats might led to a deepening of security communities (e.g. the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Western European states) although we should be reminded of Deutsch's early finding: 'Even where foreign threats were present, their effects were transitory [even though] foreign military threats at times served a useful purpose' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 45).

19 Contemporary notions of defence in the EU can thus be said to have changed: 'from primarily having a territorial, stationary function to having an international, even global scope, serving diffuse political interests [and this] provides opportunities for an EU security policy and changes the role that the state plays in this policy field (Haaland Matlary, 2009: 17). Howorth suggests that the guiding principles of CSDP are: 'pragmatic, institutional, multilateral, multi-level, international, diplomatic, ruled-based and transformative rather than strategic, coercive, narrowly self-interested, parochial or military' (Howorth, 2007: 52).

20 Conventional constructivist explanation would possibly assign this anchoring role to norms, identities and discourse whereas a focus on practice privileges the 'unspoken realities' upon which symbolic and linguistic activities are based, and rather sees anchoring practices as: 'the infrastructure for repeated interactional

patterns' (Swindler, 2001: 94). Interestingly, such anchoring practices: 'remain stable not only because habit ingrains standard ways of doing things, but because the need to engage one another forces people to return to common structures. Indeed, antagonistic interchanges may reproduce common structures more precisely than friendly alliances do' (ibid.).

21 Interestingly, EU external governance is: 'conditioned by the resurgence of [the EU's] fundamental identity as a "security community" in an altered geopolitical context' (Lavenex, 2004: 681).

22 Kirchner and Sperling refer to something similar in: 'the establishment of EU-sponsored networks that intermediate relationships between national authorities, judicial or police, or eliminate the barrier posed by national borders to direct contacts formally segregated by strict jurisdictional boundaries created by national frontiers' (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 240).

23 Examples of previous studies include qualitative interviews with policy-makers, diplomats and militaries; discourse analysis of representations of collective identity; ethnographically inspired participant observations in non-governmental organizations and transnational networks; as well as cultural and narrative analyses on the historical meaning of community (Pouliot, 2007: 374–377). For an insightful analysis of the methodological choices found in the debate on the inevitable decline vs. predestined stability of the transatlantic security community found both in realist and constructivist camps in IR, see Hellmann (2008).

24 On mechanism-based reasoning in social science, and IR in particular, see Bennett (2013), Bennett and Checkel (2014), Guzzini (2013). On analytical eclecticism, see Katzenstein and Sil (2008).

25 According to US intelligence sources, Spanish authorities consider AQIM to be a major threat to Spain's security (US cable 245274, US cable 171424).

# 2 Institutionalization of multilateral venues between the EU, Spain and Morocco

It is commonly suggested that Spain's accession to the EC in 1986 had a detrimental effect on Morocco's trade relations with Europe, not least as a consequence of Spanish agricultural exports gaining privileged access to the Internal Market under the rules of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Tovias, 1996). Since the 1980s the Union has enlarged both to the north and to the east and the regulatory framework of the Internal Market has also expanded. This chapter focuses on EU trade policy as well as the broader economic issues affecting Spain and Morocco, since doing so reveals important pieces of the puzzle relating to how the EU promotes security community-building in the post-Cold War era. This is because Spanish–Moroccan economic and political relations can be said to be managed, to an increasing extent, through the creation of multilateral frameworks in which representatives from Morocco, Spain (as well as other EU members) and EU institutions regularly come together to deal with issues of common interest. The EU–Morocco Association Council is the prime example here, although the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the adoption of Morocco's Advanced Status with the EU in 2008 can be seen as further testaments to an ongoing process of institutionalization of EU–Moroccan relations that also affects the bilateral relation between Morocco and Spain.

The picture that emerges from the detailed narrative presented in this chapter suggests that there is an ongoing process of institutionalization of multilateral venues in the sense that common decision-making structures have been set up and that they have also contributed to bringing together high-level representatives from Spain (together with other EU member states) and Morocco on a regular basis. The meetings in the EU–Morocco Association Council in the period from 2000 to 2010 are both frequent and regular and during the same period Morocco's Advanced Status with the EU was adopted. The analysis presented here combines data on trade with interviews with Commission and Council officials, as well as with Moroccan diplomats with first-hand experience of the work that led to the adoption of Morocco's Advanced Status. It also draws upon interviews with Spanish and Moroccan diplomats in Madrid and Rabat regarding the Advanced Status as well as the Spanish EU Presidency in 2010, the EU–Morocco summit and the developments in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). These interviews

provide interesting insights from practitioners dealing with EU–Moroccan and Spanish–Moroccan relations on an almost day-to-day basis and they have also been useful as a means to assess the 'quality' of the interaction in venues such as the Association Council in terms of how proposals are discussed and finally decided upon.

## Euro-Mediterranean economic relations: building a free trade area on Europe's terms

To date the most ambitious region-building initiative stemming from Brussels is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It was launched in 1995 during the Spanish EU Presidency and it incorporated fifteen EU member states and ten Mediterranean non-members at the time (Gillespie, 2000).[1] The EMP set out to establish 'a common area of peace and stability [and create] an area of shared prosperity [as well as] develop human resources and promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies' (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Following the OSCE template developed during the Cold War, Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation was stipulated to cover three 'baskets': (1) political and security; (2) economic and financial; (3) social and cultural.[2]

However, the economic rationale behind the EMP can in many ways be said to resemble previous initiatives stemming from Brussels.[3] Generally speaking, it operates on the logic of harmonizing the EU's trade relations with Mediterranean non-members through the establishment of a series of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) (see Table 2.1).

*Table 2.1* Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

| *Country* | *Start of negotiations* | *Signing of agreement* | *Coming into force* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | June 1997 | April 2002 | September 2005 |
| Egypt | March 1995 | June 2001 | June 2004 |
| Israel | December 1993 | November 1995 | June 2000 |
| Jordan | July 1995 | November 1997 | May 2002 |
| Lebanon | November 1995 | June 2002 | April 2006 |
| Morocco | December 1993 | February 1996 | March 2000 |
| Palestinian Authority | May 1996 | February 1997 | July 1997* |
| Syria | March 1998 | — | — |
| Tunisia | December 1994 | July 1995 | December 1997 |

Source: *Mediterranean Yearbook* (2008)

Note

* Interim Association Agreement signed between the EU and the PLO (on behalf of the Palestinian Authority)

Previously, such agreements were based on the practice of establishing non-reciprocal preferential agreements for the Mediterranean non-members, but the long-term aim of the EMAAs that were negotiated during the 1990s is rather to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. This basically means that those Mediterranean non-members that have signed and ratified the agreements commit themselves to liberalize trade with the EU by dismantling import tariffs on industrial and manufactured products. The *modus operandi* of these agreements is to stipulate transition periods for tariff reduction in certain sectors and related to certain goods. For example, in the case of Morocco the agreement sets the end date for the transition period to 2012 since it did not enter into force until March 2000 (although the original target date for the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area was set at 2010) (Escribano and Lorca, 2008; OJEC, 2000).

Nevertheless, creating a free trade area is something entirely different from maintaining a regime of preferential market access, which the EU was practising in the 1970s and early 1990s (see Bicchi, 2007; Dawson, 2009; Pierros et al., 1999). Moreover, the sheer size of the Internal Market vis-à-vis the economies of the Mediterranean non-members hints at the emergence of a EU-centred hub-and-spoke system of economic exchange. In order to support the Mediterranean non-members' adjustment to the competitive pressures stemming from European markets once the liberalizing trade provisions would be fully implemented, it was decided that the EMAAs would be accompanied by more generous financial and technical aid programmes funded by the EU.

Thus, the MEDA programmes (1995–2006) were launched as an integral part of the EMP with the aim of contributing to the economic modernization of the Mediterranean non-members' economies, not least the private sector, and to promote regional and cross-border economic cooperation (Council of the EU, 1996).[4] This also granted the European Commission an important role in managing the EU-funded programmes as well as supporting Mediterranean non-members in the implementation of the association agreements. Morocco has been one of the main beneficiaries of aid from the EU through MEDA programmes and the EU's support to Morocco through the ENP for 2011 to 2013 is estimated to €580.5 million, an increase of approximately 20 per cent over 2007 to 2010 (see Table 2.2). Additional funding to Morocco under the SPRING programme, as part of the EU's response to the Arab Spring, amounts to €80 million, primarily for support to human rights and education, health and rural development (Bicchi, 2014; see also Chapter 5).

### *EU–Morocco trade*

There has been a steady increase of the total EU–Morocco trade volume since the mid 1990s (see Figure 2.1). In 2013, trade with the EU represented around 54 per cent of the total of Morocco's external trade including both imports and exports (European Commission, 2014). The lion's share of Moroccan exports to the EU is represented by industrial and manufactured products, such as machinery and transport equipment (around 55 per cent in

*Table 2.2* Financial aid EU–Morocco 1995–2013

| | *Total amount (million €)* | *Amount per year (million €)* | *Amount per inhabitant (€)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENI (2014–2017)* | 728/890 | 182/222.5 | 5.5/6.74 |
| ENPI (2011–2013) | 580 | 193.3 | 6.2 |
| ENPI (2007–10) | 654 | 163.5 | 5.45 |
| MEDA II (2000–2006) | 982 | 140.3 | 4.8 |
| MEDA I (1995–1999) | 660 | 132 | 4.7 |

Source: Jaidi and Martín (2010); European Commission

Note

* The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) budget for the period 2014–2017 is only indicative. At the time of writing the European Commission estimates that it will range between €728 and €890 million and final allocations will depend on Morocco's needs as well as its commitment to reforms. In 2014, EU financial assistance under the ENI amounted to €218 million.





*Figure 2.1* EU–Morocco trade volume 1995–2013 (trade in goods; figures in €m.)
Source: European Commission

2013), whereas agricultural and food products still represent around 20 per cent. Phosphate (partly originating in the occupied Western Sahara) is another important export commodity. However, by way of comparison, it should be noted that Morocco's share of the EU's total external trade amounts to less than one per cent.[5] While the EU is by far Morocco's most important trading partner,[6] Morocco only counts as the EU's 29th trading partner (European Commission, 2014). The same applies to trade in services. In the service sector, exports to Morocco account for one per cent of total EU exports, and imports from Morocco account for 0.6 per cent of total imports. The services imported by the EU consist of transport (28 per cent), tourism (53 per cent) and business and communications services (19 per cent) (European Commission, 2007).

These figures put the asymmetrical economic relationship between the EU and Morocco in a clear perspective, and in terms of trade balance, the EU enjoys a persistent positive balance with Morocco. All in all, the Moroccan trade balance is in structural deficit vis-à-vis the EU.[7] Importantly, the figures suggest that even though the total volume of trade has increased, it can nonetheless be said that the trade relations between the EU and Morocco have remained on a more or less constant level for a considerable amount of time in terms of the relative importance that trade with the EU represents for the Moroccan economy. Still, the EU–Morocco trade volume in absolute terms has increased steadily ever since the mid 1990s. It is of course difficult to estimate how much of the increase can actually be attributed to the entering into force of the EU–Moroccan Association Agreement in 2000 (considering that the transition period stretches to 2012). The enlargements of the EU in the 2000s seem to imply that the growth of the Internal Market has had an aggregated effect on the trade volume with Morocco. The steady increase in the trade volume between the EU and Morocco might also be attributed to the growth of the Moroccan economy, which experienced an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.9 per cent during 2000 to 2010 and an estimated average annual GDP growth rate of 4 per cent during 2011 to 2013 (World Bank, 2015).[8] The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 had a negative effect on trade between EU and Morocco (Paciello, 2010). Although the trade volume had bounced back by 2010, this first and foremost serves to underline the extent to which the Moroccan economy is dependent on the EU and on the economic development of Morocco's main trading partners, such as France and Spain.

Besides trade in industrial and manufactured goods, agriculture plays an important role in the Moroccan economy. It is estimated that almost half of the Moroccan workforce is employed in this sector (although agriculture's share of Morocco's GDP only amounts to about 10–15 per cent). It is often the case that the contradictions in EU trade policy come to the fore in negotiating trade deals on agricultural products, as the EU seeks to promote free trade in general but at the same time seeks to protect the interests of certain member states (such as Spain). However, it should be noted that negotiations on agricultural trade between the EU and Morocco have changed somewhat since 2005 when the Euro-Mediterranean Roadmap for Agriculture was adopted. The change basically consists of applying a 'negative list approach', meaning that trade in all agricultural products is meant to be liberalized, except for those products on the so-called negative list.[9] Accordingly, this also creates a broader mandate for the Commission in the negotiations on trade in agricultural products. However, the dual nature[10] of agriculture in all Maghreb countries is a serious obstacle to further liberalization of trade in agricultural products between Morocco and the EU besides the old and entrenched habit of European protectionism (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 141).

But there are other indications that suggest that the Moroccan economy is getting intertwined with the Internal Market in ways that not only has to do with trade in the traditional sense of lowering tariff barriers. For example,

when it comes to the textile industry (another important sector of the Moroccan economy) an interesting trend can be identified. Morocco: 'has seen a surge in exports vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and Spain, while losing ground with most other EU countries' (Söderling, 2005: 15). This reflects: 'a sharp increase in *intra-textiles trade*: exports of finished textiles to the U.K. and Spain were multiplied by 18 and 26 respectively in nominal terms between 1995 and 2002' (ibid., emphasis added). This could be explained by the effects of outsourcing and intra-firm trade between European and Moroccan companies, and as the textile industry plays an important role for the Moroccan economy, it can be argued that there is an increased leverage on behalf of the EU to make Morocco comply with the Internal Market rules regulating textile products. The Agadir Agreement between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan is an interesting development in this regard as it uses EU rules of origin (see below).

### *Spanish–Moroccan trade*

Spanish–Moroccan trade relations basically follow the overall pattern of EU–Morocco trade relations (including a temporary contraction of the trade volume after 2008), although Morocco's trade deficit vis-à-vis Spain was actually shrinking until 2007 (see Figure 2.2). These figures could also first and foremost be attributed to the effects of sustained economic growth in both Spain and Morocco, until the combined effects of a domestic economic slowdown and the global financial crisis started to take its toll on the Spanish economy. However, there has been an interesting shift in Spain's trade relations with the Maghreb since the mid 1990s. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia now import more from Spain than thirteen Central and South American countries do all together (Martín, 2004: 68). The Maghreb countries have also increased their share in Spain's external trade, even though it is still quite marginal. In the period from 1996 to 2003, Spanish exports to the Maghreb increased from 1.8





*Figure 2.2* Spain–Morocco trade volume 1995–2013 (trade in goods; figures in €m.)
Source: Spanish Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Trade

to 2.3 per cent of the total volume of Spanish exports. In terms of Spanish imports from the Maghreb, it increased from 1.6 to 2.6 per cent (ibid.). Nonetheless, in the same period, Spain superseded both the US and Germany as a trading partner with the three Maghreb countries, surpassed only by France and Italy.[11]

The issue of the EU–Morocco fisheries agreements has been a source of recurrent tensions in Spanish–Moroccan relations and it is thus of particular interest in relation to the role of the EU as a security community-building institution (see Gillespie, 2006a). Fisheries as an economic issue are in fact not covered by the current EU–Morocco Association Agreement, even though it is an exclusive competence of the EU and it is regulated through the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). It is quite telling that the EC had not signed a single agreement on fisheries with Morocco until Spain and Portugal entered in 1986. The bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco that was signed in 1983 was extended by the EC until December 1987, and the first EC–Morocco Fisheries Agreement was then signed in May 1988 (García Pérez, 2009: 239–240).[12]

The agreement that was reached between the EU and Morocco in 1995 (during the run-up to the launch of the EMP) stipulated both a large financial compensation to Morocco (around €500 million) and a substantial reduction of the European quotas in Moroccan fishing waters (García Pérez, 2009: 241). The agreement expired in 1999, but the negotiations that were meant to lead to a new one collapsed (something which might have contributed to setting off the Parsley Islet crisis in 2002). A new EU–Morocco Fisheries Agreement was not signed until July 2005 (after there had been a shift from a conservative to a socialist government in Spain), and entered into force in April 2007 (Council of the EU, 2006a). This meant that during the period from 1999 to 2007, no vessels from the EU fishing fleet were allowed to operate in Moroccan territorial waters. Even though the fisheries sector has been in steady decline in terms of its relative economic importance to the EU since the 1990s, and has been in decline in Spain as well, this lapse in the Fisheries Agreement nonetheless took a heavy toll on Spanish fishermen (not least in Galicia and Andalucía).

Moreover, the 2005 Fisheries Agreement operates under the regime of the EU's 'new CFP'. The changes in the CFP essentially entail a shift away from managing the access of the EU fleet to the fishing waters of third countries towards promoting a sustainable fisheries industry as well as the modernization of the fisheries sector in the partner countries.[13] It thus seems inevitable that the Moroccan fishing waters will become ever *less* important to the Spanish fleet in the future. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that the shift on behalf of the EU's policy to support the modernization of the Moroccan fishing industry presents Spain with new opportunities in terms of direct investments, technical assistance and commercial cooperation as a substitute for the tiresome and quite unfruitful pursuit of higher catch quotas in extra-communitarian waters (García Pérez, 2009: 252).

### *The Agadir Agreement and US–Moroccan free trade*

Besides the steady increase in the trade volume between EU–Morocco and Spain–Morocco, there are also other aspects of the economic relations that have experienced important changes, for example, trade in services, tourism, remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 145–146). In 2005, the FDI stock in Morocco represented 44 per cent of GDP, compared with 10 per cent in 1990.[14] France is by far Morocco's main provider of FDI (representing 33 per cent in 2011), whereas Spanish FDI to Morocco has increased over the last decade (6 per cent in 2011). The UAE and Saudi Arabia have also recently increased their share of the FDI stock in the country (17 per cent and 6 per cent in 2011) (Invest in Morocco, 2011).[15] FDI inflows to North Africa and the Middle East have dropped substantially (27.6 USD billion in 2008 to 13.4 USD billion in 2013) as a consequence of political instability in many countries in the region after the Arab Spring, but it has not had a large negative impact on Morocco and it was actually one of the few countries in the region that managed to raise funds in international debt markets in 2014 (World Bank, 2015: 83). There are also signs of closer ties developing between Morocco and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the wake of the Arab Spring. The GCC has launched a USD 5 billion development aid programme in Morocco, and a new GCC–Morocco partnership envisions closer cooperation on trade, investment, energy, education and environment (*Arab News*, 2013). However, the fact that Morocco declined an invitation to join the GCC in 2011 hints to the limits of the relationship.

The revenue from the tourism sector represents about 5–6 per cent of GDP for Morocco, and the country is in the process of developing this sector, not least to accommodate European tourists who are taking advantage of the geographical proximity (Escribano and Lorca 2008: 146). In December 2006, the EU and Morocco signed a so-called open skies agreement on civil aviation to open up national aviation markets and to harmonize air traffic legislation between the parties (OJEU, 2006). This might further boost air travel between Europe and Morocco (and thus will also benefit the Moroccan tourism industry). Moreover, considering the large number of persons with Moroccan origins currently living and working in Europe (e.g. Belgium, France and Spain), remittances are increasingly important for the Moroccan economy. These money flows are estimated to represent around 10 per cent of the Moroccan GDP and they seem to: 'fluctuate in accordance with the European economic cycle' (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 146).[16]

A particularly interesting development since the entering into force of the EU–Morocco Association Agreement is the signing of the Agadir Agreement between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (all of which have signed association agreements with the EU). The Agadir Agreement was signed in Rabat in February 2004 (entered into force in 2007), and it is portrayed as another step in the process towards completing the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. The interesting part of the agreement is that it uses EU rules of origin,

which essentially means that signatory parties are allowed to keep preferential tariffs with the EU as long as the value being added in the manufacturing process is created somewhere within the area established by the agreement.[17] Escribano and Lorca argue that the focus of the Agadir Agreement is: 'more liberalizing (everything liberalized except the products subject to schedules) than its alternative (nothing liberalized except the products agreed)' (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 151).

It is hard to estimate the effects on trade among the parties, but the authors are sceptical as to its real potential due to recurrent political tensions among the countries, and they suggest that it will not necessarily alleviate the 'under-performance' of these economies in terms of trade with each other (ibid.). This is consistent with what other observers have also noted, and Martín points out that countries in North Africa and the Middle East comprise the region of the global economy with the lowest levels of trade integration, since regional trade represents only: 'little more than 5.7 per cent of their total trade, a figure that has not changed for some time now' (Martín, 2010: 76).[18]

Furthermore, Morocco signed a free trade agreement in 2004 with the US and it entered into force in January 2006 (Office of the US Trade Representative). This might seem to put Morocco in a difficult position in terms of abiding by EU rules of origin. However, the US–Morocco agreement only applies to domestic value-added products, and as it turns out, such restrictions actually place the EU in a more favourable position as to the goal of completing the comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, in contrast to the US's aim of establishing a more limited US–Middle East Free Trade Area. Dawson suggests that Morocco might actually benefit from having signed a free trade agreement with the US and an association agreement with the EU because it places Morocco in a privileged position as an 'export platform' for both EU and US markets.

For example, US companies might now more easily locate their production in Morocco in order to benefit from relatively inexpensive labour costs as well as duty-free imports from the EU and the US and then: 'export their finished products on a preferential basis to either market, provided that minimum local value-added requirements (at least 35 per cent) are satisfied. The same logic applies to the EU and other firms' (Dawson, 2009: 143). Indeed, there are several indications that the Moroccan economy is getting intertwined with the EU and Spain beyond the confines on trade enshrined in the EU–Moroccan Association Agreement originally negotiated and signed in the 1990s.

## Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation in the 2000s: progress and stalemate

The current EU–Morocco Association Agreement replaced the previous bilateral agreement signed in 1976 and it thus constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Morocco and the EU. Importantly, the agreement stipulates that the parties shall engage not only trade but also in political dialogue on all issues

of common interest, especially when it comes to matters of peace, security and regional cooperation.[19] The first meeting of the EU–Morocco Association Council was held in October 2000. It was presided over by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, in his capacity as President of the Council of the EU together with the rest of the 'EU Troika'.[20] Morocco was represented by a delegation headed by the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Benaissa. Furthermore, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Josep Piqué i Camps, also attended the meeting together with delegates from several EU member states (EU–Morocco Association Council, 2000). Since then, representatives of the EU and Morocco have met annually in the constellation of the Association Council, except for in 2002 (i.e. the year of the Parsley Island crisis), and the EU–Morocco Association Agreement and the Association Council can be said have become the institutional framework within which the parties recurrently discuss bilateral and international matters of common concern (Jaidi and Martín, 2010: 10).[21]

Besides the various bilateral Association Councils that have been set up since the 1990s between the EU and the Mediterranean non-members, the EMP has also provided venues on a regional level for political dialogue between EU member states and Mediterranean partners. One of the most important forums has been the regularly held Euro-Mediterranean meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, although ministerial meetings have been held on a regular basis in many other policy fields as well. Moreover, national diplomats and EU officials serving as 'senior officials' have been in charge of setting up the meetings acting as the 'Euro-Mediterranean committee', as well as for updating the work programme of the EMP. Aliboni and Ammor note that: 'Given that the same people have always participated in the two gatherings, the difference between the two configurations has been only formal in nature and has in fact become blurred' (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009: 9). These practitioners have also engaged in political dialogue within the framework of the EMP

At the launch of the EMP in the mid 1990s, the senior officials' meetings were envisioned to function as gatherings of the 'EU troika' and one representative from each Mediterranean partner.[22] However, already at the 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Minister conference in Malta in 1997, it was decided that representatives from all EU member states would participate in the meetings. In addition, a decision was taken at the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meeting in Valencia in 2002 (during the Spanish EU Presidency) to strengthen the sense of 'ownership' of the EMP by all partners through the introduction of the principle of co-chairmanship.[23] It should be noted that the role of the EU has in many ways centred on a continuous effort to institutionalize the political dialogue between member states and Mediterranean partners. One Council official with long experience from working with the EMP suggested that the Commission and the Council Secretariat over time provided an 'institutional memory' to the regional framework. The official then went on to describe how it would work in practice:

> We [in the General Secretariat] have to go back to the council working groups and prepare the common positions with regards to the EU activities, such as the ESDP and other activities. Then this position is conveyed through the EU Presidency to third countries, that is, to the Mediterranean partners in the framework of the Barcelona Process [the EMP]. We work very closely with the Commission in drawing up the agenda, the conclusions and implementing the conclusions from the Euro-Med foreign affairs ministerial meetings or in other sectors.
>
> (Interview No. 34, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

The same interviewee also made an interesting reflection on the dynamics that have been evolving in the foreign ministers' meetings as a habit of getting together has emerged:

> What is happening is the creation of a regular habit of meetings, getting together. First they were the 15 + 12 [the EMP], then 37 [after EU enlargement] and now 43 [the UfM], so it's an important and numerous group. The habit of meeting, the now natural habit of meeting in a regional setting, not only calling each other bilaterally, creates the ministerial conclusions which provides political responses to the various challenges … Now more or less every area of cooperation should result in a ministerial meeting, which is a very interesting dynamic per se.
>
> (Ibid.)

Still, in the second half of the 2000s (after 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003) there are indications that much of the political momentum that had been built up in the EMP has been fading. For example, when the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration was organized in Barcelona in 2005 it fell short of expectations, since only a few heads of states from the EU member states and the Mediterranean partners bothered to show up (Gillespie, 2006b). However, as the momentum in the EMP was slowly fading, something else was emerging on the horizon that would turn out to have significant implications for EU–Moroccan relations.

### *European Neighbourhood Policy: promoting 'bilateralization' as a means to achieve regional goals?*

In the run-up towards the EU's Eastern enlargement in 2004, the President of the European Commission, Romani Prodi, proposed that the EU needed to develop a comprehensive policy towards all neighbouring states in order to prevent the build-up of a sharp delineation between EU members and non-members of the expanding Union. In a by now famous speech, he described the vision accordingly:

> I want to see a 'ring of friends' surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea …

> sharing everything with the Union but institutions. The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union. The centrepiece of this proposal is a common market embracing the EU and its partners: it would offer a single market, free trade, open investment regime, approximation of legislation, interconnection of networks and the use of the euro as a reserve and reference currency in our bilateral transactions.
>
> (Prodi, speech, 2002)

Following the Commission's proposal, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP is supposed to constitute an integrated policy on aid, development and cooperation towards the whole of the EU's 'neighbourhood'.[24] Compared to earlier EU policies towards the Mediterranean, the explicit focus on regulatory convergence (primarily with the rules governing the Internal Market) between EU member states and non-members constitutes a novel feature of the ENP. This could probably be attributed to the fact that the scope of EU legislation pertaining to the Internal Market has expanded drastically ever since the signing of the Single European Act, but it can also be seen as a conscious strategy on behalf of the Commission in order to come to terms with non-tariff barriers to trade between the EU and neighbouring states, and thus indirectly also promoting the goal of regional economic integration.[25]

The logic behind the ENP draws heavily upon the Commission's experiences from monitoring the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe during the pre-accession phase (Kelley, 2006). Furthermore, the declared intention of the ENP is not to replace already existing frameworks for handling the Union's relations with partner countries, but rather to coordinate them better and thus increase their leverage. In the Mediterranean region, it specifically aims to: 'contribute to develop further regional integration, building on the achievements of the EMP, notably in the area of trade' (European Commission, 2004: 4). Thus, instead of offering the prospect of membership to Morocco and other non-members in North Africa and the Middle East, the ENP can be said to offer them enhanced cooperation with the Union and its member states through legislative approximation and the exchange of experience and best practices. The ultimate prize is of course enhanced access to the Internal Market, but participation in EU-funded programmes would also be an incentive. However, the cost for Mediterranean non-members, in terms of adjusting to EU rules while not being promised membership, is quite substantial and the rewards are still vague which can be said to generally diminish the appeal of the ENP.

In terms of conditionality, the ENP does not provide the Commission with the same kind of leverage vis-à-vis the Mediterranean non-members as it experienced in the pre-accession phase in Central and Eastern Europe, simply because EU membership is not on the table. It is the Mediterranean non-members that formally decide how far they want to go in harmonizing with

*Table 2.3* First generation of ENP action plans

| *Country* | *Egypt* | *Israel* | *Jordan* | *Lebanon* | *Morocco* | *Palestine* | *Lebanon* | *Tunisia* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date of adoption | March 2007 | April 2005 | June 2005 | January 2007 | July 2005 | May 2005 | January 2007 | July 2005 |

Source: *Mediterranean Yearbook* (2008)

the *acquis communautaire* by negotiating and adopting so called ENP Action Plans with the Commission (see Table 2.3). Nonetheless, in 2006, the EU: 'took first steps towards coupling … policy-transfer with partial organizational engagement of ENP countries with EU agencies and programmes' (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2007: 152).[26]

Furthermore, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was launched in 2007, and it implies that financial support to both ENP programmes and individual partner countries is now provided through one overarching instrument.[27] The ENPI is said to explicitly target approximation to EU policies and legislation while aiming to improve the EU's capacity to support cross-border cooperation along the Union's external borders. It is described as a 'policy driven' instrument operating within the framework of the existing bilateral agreements between the EU and neighbouring countries (e.g. EU–Morocco Association Agreement).

There is thus an interesting dynamic at play between the EU and certain Mediterranean non-members, such as Morocco, within the ENP framework. In contrast to the EMP, which can be said to have worked using the logic of the lowest common denominator, the ENP can be described along the lines of a 'regatta' where those neighbouring states that are willing and able to move closer to the EU are allowed and encouraged to do so. The implicit understanding on behalf of the Commission seems to be that this will at the same time put pressure on those countries that are lagging behind, so to speak. Not surprisingly, Morocco is often described as one of the 'avant-garde' counties within the ENP framework (Levenex and Schimmelfennig, 2007: 151). The ENP Action Plan for Morocco was adopted in 2005 and it outlines a quite comprehensive set of priorities in areas within the scope of the already established EU–Morocco Association Agreement.[28] It might appear as if the ENP constitutes a fundamental break with the region-building aspirations of the EU that emerged in the early post-Cold War era and was enshrined in the EMP. Indeed, Del Sarto and Schumacher have argued that the change between EMP and ENP essentially consists of a shift from promoting region-building in the whole Mediterranean area to pursuing 'differentiated bilateralism' between the EU and individual countries in the region (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 38). However, promoting region-building and enhancing bilateral relations do not necessarily exclude one another. In fact, the practice of holding high-level ministerial meetings within the EMP and the setting-up of bilateral Association Councils took place *simultaneously* in the period 1995 to 2008.

From the perspective of the EU, the ENP thus serves the dual purpose of 'softening' the borders of the Union to a certain degree (while still not offering membership to countries such as Morocco) and deepening economic and political cooperation with certain interested non-members when the regional frameworks are blocked. For a non-member such as Morocco, the ENP can be said to provide an opportunity to enhance its relations with the EU on a more 'tailor-made' basis without having to wait for other less enthusiastic Mediterranean non-members to follow suit.

### *Union for the Mediterranean: a failed attempt to revitalize Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation*

If the EMP can be seen as a successful attempt by Spain in the 1990s to promote its interests towards the Maghreb within a bigger 'costume' provided by the EU, then the quite ill-fated Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) should probably be seen as a failed attempt by France to regain its position at the helm of the EU's policy-making towards the Mediterranean. In February 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy (before being elected as French President) held a speech in Toulon where he laid out his vision of a union that would only include states bordering on the Mediterranean. Later the same year, President Sarkozy returned to the proposal at a speech to the French diplomatic corps in which the vision of 'concrete solidarity' achieved in the fields of environment, cultural dialogue, economic cooperation and security would form the basis of this proposed 'Mediterranean Union' (speech, Sarkozy, 2007).

Although the French President tried to make it clear that this proposal would not ignore that which had been accomplished by the EMP, it has been suggested that at the heart of the matter was the understanding that previous frameworks such as the EMP had failed to deliver concrete results. Accordingly, they had focused too much on political dialogue at a regional level as a means to build confidence among the EU member states and Mediterranean partner countries (Balfour and Schmid, 2008). Moreover, after 9/11 and Iraq, and considering the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict and other unresolved conflicts in the Mediterranean region (e.g. Cyprus and Western Sahara), the aim of the Barcelona Declaration appeared more distant in 2007 than it had a decade before. It was thus time to focus instead on 'concrete solidarity' realized through 'ambitious but realist projects'. More importantly, in the French view, there was also a need to separate regional cooperation in the Mediterranean from the inherent (although not necessarily effective) political conditionality of EU-funded programmes (ibid.).[29]

How the French proposal would relate to already existing frameworks, such as the EMP and ENP, was not clear at first. Exactly what role the Commission should play in the original proposal was not specified. Not surprisingly, the French proposal received much attention from other EU member states, not least Spain, as it presented a number of uncertainties and it seemed to challenge

the basic *modus operandi* of the EMP. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, quickly and publicly welcomed the French proposal, suggesting that the time had come for the Barcelona process to take on a more mature institutional set-up. At the same time, though, he was also keen to stress that it should preferably be done in the shape of a '*Euro*-Mediterranean Union' (i.e. not exclusively a union for Mediterranean states) (*El País*, 2007). At a meeting in Rome in December 2007, the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, and President Sarkozy jointly issued an 'appel' stating that the entity now referred to as 'Union for the Mediterranean' would act as the engine of cooperation in and for the Mediterranean. The 'appel' also stated that the EMP and ENP would still be central to the relationship between the EU and Mediterranean non-members, and that it would not interfere in any way with the negotiations on Turkish membership of the EU (Appel de Rome 2007). Thus, by the end of 2007, the French proposal had been substantially amended.

The final and complete steps towards 'communitarization' were then taken at the European Council meeting in Brussels in March 2008 (European Council, 2008). The ground for that decision had been prepared at a previous meeting in Hannover between the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French President. The German government had early on raised its concerns about the idea of excluding non-Mediterranean countries, and was promoting the full participation of all EU member states as well as the Commission. At the meeting in Brussels, it was decided that the UfM: 'will include the Member States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states' (ibid.). The European Council also invited the Commission to: 'present to the Council the necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be called "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" with a view to the Summit which will take place in Paris on 13 July 2008' (ibid.). The Commission then presented an amended proposal containing suggestions as to creating a North–South co-presidency and a secretariat for the UfM (European Commission, 2008).[30]

The UfM was launched at a summit in Paris in July 2008 and all 27 EU member states and 17 Mediterranean non-members participated.[31] It was decided that the UfM would build upon the 'political acquis' of the EMP (e.g. Euro-Med ministerial conclusions and adopted work programmes). The proclaimed ambition was to bring more focus to cooperative projects of mutual interest to EU member states and Mediterranean non-members (such as maritime transport, solar energy and civil protection), as well as trying to place the cooperation on a more equal footing. It was also decided that the first two-year co-presidency of the UfM would be headed by France and Egypt (2008–2010). Later in the same year it was decided to place the UfM secretariat in Barcelona.[32] Nonetheless, the UfM quickly found itself in stalemate after the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Marseille in late 2008 (Council of the EU, 2008a). This was partly spurred by Arab protests against the Israeli offensive in Gaza in early 2009, although the ongoing conflict in Cyprus also served to block the UfM (for

example, the inauguration of the Secretariat was seriously delayed, although it was eventually held in March 2010).[33]

Some hopes were placed on the Spanish EU Presidency in 2010 to move things forward, as Moratinos declared before the Spanish Parliament that Spain's upcoming presidency would be 'eminently Euro-Mediterranean' (speech, Moratinos, 2009). However, the failure of the 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Water, held in Barcelona in April 2010, to reach a conclusion on water management only serve to testify to the difficult circumstances under which the Spanish presidency had to operate and how intractable the political conflicts had become in the UfM.[34] Furthermore, the 2nd summit of the UfM, which was supposed to be held in Barcelona in June 2010, had to be postponed due to the persistent political stalemate (see below).

Although it is still too early to assess the long-term effects of this state of affairs, it needs to be taken into account that under the previous EMP framework foreign ministers were able to regularly hold meetings even though tensions in the region were running high (for example during the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and in the years after 9/11 and the Iraq war). The political agenda of the EMP has increased steadily since 1995, whereas the UfM has hardly moved at all in the last couple of years and especially so after the Arab Spring (see also Chapter 5). On the other hand, even though the principle of co-chairmanship was acknowledged at the meeting in Valencia in 2002, not a single Euro-Med Foreign Minister meeting was held outside of the EU. The role played by the General Secretariat and the Commission also gives the impression that the EMP, to a great degree, was run by the institutions in Brussels to promote the interests of the EU member states. The principle of co-ownership enshrined in the UfM could perhaps help to alleviate this asymmetry to some degree, but it must be taken into account that it seems that one reason why no Euro-Med Foreign Minister meeting was held outside the EU was that the Mediterranean partners would not necessarily agree among themselves on where to hold such a meeting.

One senior Spanish diplomat with first-hand experience of drafting the Barcelona Declaration in the 1990s interestingly noted that the problem with the UfM was that the original French ambition to focus primarily on concrete projects while institutionalizing the principle of north–south co-ownership as a means to start afresh paradoxically served to politicize Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to an unprecedented level. Instead of diverting attention from the underlying conflicts in the region in order to focus on 'practical' and 'concrete' issues (as the EMP had done somewhat successfully in the past, although not necessarily stating it as being an explicit aim), the UfM rather served to exacerbate them instead.[35] Another interviewee at the Council Secretariat also expressed concerns that the problems that the UfM has been facing more or less from the start might actually serve to undo the previous achievements of the EMP in terms of the gradual development of a habit of getting together.[36] To be sure, this only makes it even clearer that the practice of consultation is instead strengthened in bilateral settings, as seen in the case of the EU and Morocco.

***Morocco's Advanced Status: another step on the way to 'deepening relations' with the EU***

It is not only ironic but also quite telling of the dynamics in the Mediterranean region that the deepening of EU–Moroccan relations took a step forward at almost exactly the same time as the UfM ground to a halt. At the 7th EU–Morocco Association Council meeting, held in Brussels in October 2008, the parties adopted a joint document in which Morocco's relationship with the EU was envisaged as having achieved an 'Advanced Status' (EU–Moroccan Association Council 2008a).[37] However, it should be noted that the process leading up to the Advanced Status started shortly after the EU–Morocco Association Agreement had entered into force. In early 2000, Mohammed VI, while on a state visit to France, expressed his opinion that the time was ripe to explore new ways to further institutionalize the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. The king's speech gives voice to Morocco's longstanding aspirations in terms of moving closer to the EU based on a notion of 'more than association while just short of accession' due to geographic reasons and the realities of everyday economic, social and cultural relations (speech, Mohammed VI, 2000a).

Interestingly, already at the 6th EU–Moroccan Association Council meeting in 2007, a decision was made to set up a joint ad-hoc working group to explore the modalities of deepening bilateral relations. The first meeting of this group was held in January 2008 and subsequent meetings were then held in May, July and September of that same year. The working group included representatives from the Commission, several EU member states and Morocco. The Moroccan negotiators presented a first draft paper and then the representatives of the EU reacted and presented their version (Document du Royaume du Maroc 2008). It was this process of fine-tuning the positions that eventually led to the preparation of the EU–Moroccan joint document on the Advanced Status, as one interviewee at the Commission who participated in the ad-hoc working group on the Advanced Status explained:

> The ad-hoc working group was a quite interesting experience because it was both very effective and conducted very transparently. From the EU side, it was done in the open troika format, meaning the Commission, Presidency and the Council Secretariat being the main drivers of the process. All the other member states were also present. They could watch the discussion, listen and learn. On the Moroccan side, it was also a very large delegation, with all the ministries present at a quite high level, ensuring that all the work was appropriated by the relevant line-ministries. It was an interesting line of discussions, very open and very frank.
>
> (Interview No. 5, European Commission)

The same interviewee also said that the Moroccan government and its representatives in Brussels had been calling for something similar to the Advanced

Status for quite some time, basically ever since Mohammed VI's speech in Paris in 2000. The launch of the ENP in 2004 had, to some extent, met with Morocco's calls for deepening bilateral relations, but around 2007, the Moroccan government approached the EU again:

> The Moroccans call it Advanced Status, we call it deepening of the bilateral relationship. For us, Advanced Status doesn't mean anything concrete. We don't see it as the end of a process either. We see it as a continuing process of deepening relations. We are taking big steps with the decisions taken this year [2008] but there clearly are other areas where we could go further, and that is what we envision to do. So it's nothing that will put an end to the process of deepening the relations, on the contrary.
>
> (Interview No. 5, European Commission)

One Moroccan diplomat serving on Morocco's mission to the EU in Brussels added that the Moroccan government had invited civil society actors, together with academics and parliamentarians, to participate at ministerial meetings when the Moroccan position was finalized. The same interviewee was also keen to emphasize the efforts to forge a 'national consensus' on the issue of the Advanced Status.[38] However, one official at the European Commission's Delegation in Rabat suggested that it was first and foremost the Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs that had been pushing for the Advanced Status as part of the overarching goal of regulatory convergence with the EU and the Internal Market while other Ministries, mainly the Finance and Interior, had taken a more cautious approach, possibly because the ministries estimated the costs associated with adjusting to quite demanding EU standards differently.[39]

The joint document on the Advanced Status lists a range of proposals as to how the EU and Morocco could enhance their bilateral political and economic relations. Many of them refer to the possibility of holding ministerial meetings between Morocco and EU member states or, for example, allowing Moroccan diplomats and functionaries to participate at Council working group meetings and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU. However, such meetings would be organized on a strictly ad-hoc basis and not in a fully institutionalized manner as originally suggested by Morocco.[40] Moreover, Morocco is encouraged to align with the CFSP declarations and to establish a framework agreement for Morocco's participation in EU-led military and civil crisis management operations under the CSDP. However, aligning with previously agreed-to common positions within the CFSP is, of course, not the same thing as formally having a stake in the decision-making process leading up to such a position.[41] But the practice of having Mediterranean non-members aligning themselves to the CFSP is not without its problems, as most of them are members of other international organizations (e.g. AU, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference) that do not necessarily take the same position as the EU on matters of foreign and security policy.

For the most part, the Advanced Status deals with enhanced economic relations, among other things suggesting a 'deep free trade agreement' (Accord de Libre-échange Approfondi) between the EU and Morocco. Regulatory convergence and approximation with EU standards is said to play an important role here, and one way to ensure this would subsequently be to 'integrate' Morocco into the committees that are set up to govern the implementation of EU legislation in those policy areas where the EU has exclusive competence. An interesting example is set by the EU–Morocco aviation agreement, signed in 2006 (see above). In the joint document, it is stated that Morocco's integration to the 'Single Sky' committee would constitute a logic step after the signing of the aviation agreement (EU–Morocco Association Council, 2008a).

Although trade in agricultural products is a recurrent (and controversial) theme in EU–Moroccan relations, the Advanced Status does not focus explicitly on the dismantling of trade tariffs, but rather on the modernization of the Moroccan agricultural sector (for example by granting EU support for Morocco's 'Green Plan' to enhance its export capacities). Such an explicit focus on non-tariff issues relating to agricultural trade rather than focusing on dismantling tariffs on the EU side can of course be seen as poorly disguised protectionism, although it should be noted that negotiations on agricultural trade between the EU and Morocco have changed since the so-called Rabat Roadmap was adopted (see above).

Above all, the Advanced Status carries a significant symbolic value both for Morocco and the EU as it serves to reiterate the willingness on both sides to move closer together. Another Commission official made a very interesting reflection on what this means not only for EU–Morocco relations but also in terms of setting an example for other neighbouring countries as well. The EU–Morocco 'Single Sky' agreement would accordingly be a case in point:

> What's interesting is that we don't only liberalize the air traffic gradually, but Morocco agrees also to take on most of the EU *acquis* in the field of aviation. If you read the agreement, you'll see that they have agreed to transpose directly a number of directives. Now, what's interesting is that since we have an 'open sky' with them and they have transposed a number of directives, we have opened the doors to them to participate in the open skies committee in the Council. There you see the emerging policy of the Union towards our neighbours. We have the European Economic Agreement with Norway and so on, and it has very sophisticated institutional structures, consultation mechanisms in place to elaborate our directives, there's a court of justice to arbitrate in conflicts among the parties. We are not there with our neighbours, but as we incorporate them into some of the Internal Market policies, we're moving in that direction. This is very much new ground. There is no clearly spelled-out policy of the EU towards our neighbours, especially towards our most ambitious neighbours such as Ukraine and Morocco, or Israel in some cases. The idea and the logic in which we are moving is that we will need to find ways to associate

> them into our decision-making processes because we want to integrate them into some of our Internal Market policies.
>
> (Interview No. 5, European Commission)

However, it should also be noted that another Commission official dealing with trade issues hinted that the discussions about regulatory convergence between the EU and the Mediterranean non-members is something of a publicity stunt as there are not too many in the Commission that really believe it will happen anytime soon.[42] Nonetheless, the same interviewee also admitted that, in order to secure access to the Internal Market, a country such as Morocco would sooner or later have to comply with EU standards ranging from food security standards to regulations on services and investments. Moreover, an official at the Commission's Delegation in Morocco said that the process towards regulatory convergence has been helped by the launch of the ENP in 2004 because it changed the role that the Delegation plays on site in Rabat. It now actively monitors the implementation of the ENP Action Plan for Morocco and provides a direct link between Moroccan authorities and EU programmes and thus funding opportunities.[43]

Moreover, deepening EU–Morocco relations are also justified along the lines that it is needed in order for the EU to be able to effectively support a strategically important partner facing an unstable domestic situation, which indirectly threatens the security of EU member states. Discussing this issue before the Arab Spring, one Commission official put it rather bluntly:

> In the Maghreb, Morocco is the most fragile of all the four countries. The country with the most daunting economic and social challenges, they are the poorest and they don't have that many alternatives. Also, they have a tradition of being close to the West. It's nothing new; they have always been close to us. So there is the reflex of aligning themselves to us, but there are also objective reasons. They know that they have to accelerate, put all the cards on the table, they're running against time and they need to modernize and simply make people richer. They're trying to avoid a social explosion and the Islamists taking over the country. The situation is not the same or felt in the same way in Algeria or Tunisia. That is also the reason why we are helping Morocco so much. They are the most fragile … we clearly have a self-interest here.
>
> (Interview No. 5, European Commission)

This view was also echoed by another interviewee at the Council Secretariat:

> The only way out for Morocco is Europe due to the way that the country is situated in the North western corner of the African continent. The country is not landlocked, but it is locked in a way because the Sahel and the area south of the Sahara would not bring stability to Morocco; it's too unstable. To the East, you have Algeria and the problems between the

> two countries. The only issue is to the North, towards Europe. They breathe air from Europe and they are aware of that of course. So they want, they are willing to, there is no suspicion from their side. With other partner in the area there is more of a suspicion and they might question what we are asking them to do. With Morocco, there is none of that, you might say that there is certain confidence, which is something very good.
>
> (Interview No. 18, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

Asked about the time frame and resources needed to implement the quite demanding suggestions put forward in the joint document on Advanced Status, one Moroccan interviewee said that it should first and foremost be seen as a continuation of Morocco's Association Agreement with the EU and the ENP Action Plan.[44] Goals related to trade and tariffs would thus be easier to deal with, whereas regulatory convergence relating to industrial policy, transport, environment and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) would be much harder to achieve. The same interviewee also said that no matter what, it will be a very cumbersome and costly process. However, this Moroccan diplomat was at the same time keen to point out that moving forward with the implementation of the Advanced Status is 'our challenge'.[45] Another Moroccan diplomat working with Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation stressed that Morocco supports the principle of reinforced cooperation for individual Mediterranean non-members with the EU (as seen in the ENP and Advanced Status) since it is clear that not all countries want to move at the same pace or towards the same goal.[46] The ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict blocks most efforts aiming at enhanced regional cooperation in the Mediterranean, and Morocco often finds itself at odds with other Arab countries on a wide range of issues, at least according to this interviewee.

### *The Spanish EU Presidency 2010 and the 1st EU–Morocco summit*

Spain has been a strong supporter of enhancing EU's relations with Morocco, as this constitutes a central piece of what can be said to be Spain's overall policy towards the Maghreb dating back to the 1980s (Hernando de Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009). In 2010, Spain held its 4th EU Presidency. On previous occasions, the Spanish government had been able to use the Presidency to put the Mediterranean on the agenda of the EU and thus promote its interests in the region (both the launch of the EMP in 1995 and the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Minister meeting in Valencia in 2002 took place with Spain at the helm if the EU). However, this time Spain had to exercise the role of the Presidency under the new rules stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty.[47] As already noted, Spain was not able to host the planned UfM summit in June 2010, but another item on the Spanish Presidency's agenda was achieved, namely, hosting the 1st EU–Morocco summit.

The summit was held in Granada in March 2010 and was hosted by the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. It was attended by the

President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, along with the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durão Barroso and the Moroccan Prime Minister, Abbas el Fassi. The summit served an important symbolic function since it was the first of its kind to be held between the EU and an Arab country. The Spanish EU Presidency was also the first to be conducted under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. It was uncertain exactly what role the Spanish government should play, taking into account that both Van Rompuy and Ashton were new to their posts, and that the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the permanent President of the European Council shall represent the EU vis-à-vis third states on occasions such as the summit with Morocco.[48] But in a by now well-established manner, the EU–Moroccan summit was officially depicted by the participating parties as a sign of the high level of maturity and confidence characterizing their relations as well as the strategic importance of the partnership.

An interesting novelty in comparison to the standard operation procedure in the Association Council setting was that the EU–Morocco summit adopted a *joint* declaration (rather than having the two parties issuing separate statements afterwards). The parties recognized the need to adopt a new ENP Action Plan for Morocco that would ensure the putting into practice of Morocco's Advanced Status, and at the end of the declaration, the possibility for a new contractual arrangement to replace the current Association Agreement was hinted at (Council of the EU, 2010a). Furthermore, issues such as human rights and Western Sahara are of course sensitive topics in EU–Moroccan relations, and they have served to put a strain on the relationship in the past. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the paragraph on Western Sahara in the joint declaration stipulates that the solution to the conflict needs to be political, definitive, sustainable and (arguably most important) *mutually* acceptable to the conflicting parties (ibid.). However, at the press conference following the summit, Van Rompuy went further than the declaration and added that the EU wishes to see improvements to the human rights situation in the context of the Western Saharan conflict, saying that 'the EU continues to be active on the front lines regarding the humanitarian aspects of conflicts. We would like to see improvements for human rights in this context and for the situation of those who defend human rights' (speech, Van Rompuy, 2010).

After the 1st EU–Morocco summit, the process of deepening EU–Morocco relations took another step forward as the 9th EU–Morocco Association Council meeting was held in December 2010 in Brussels under the Belgian EU Presidency. There, the parties signed three agreements; a framework agreement on the general principles for the participation of Morocco in EU programmes (added as a protocol to the EU–Morocco Association Agreement), one agreement on reciprocal liberalization measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, and one agreement between the EU and Morocco establishing a dispute settlement mechanism (Council of the EU, 2010b).[49] However, it should also be noted that this meeting had been preceded by violent events in the 'capital' of Western Sahara, el-Ayoun

(Laayoune), where protesters renouncing poor economic and social conditions there had been suppressed by Moroccan forces. The spokesperson for Catherine Ashton made a statement on her behalf in which she is said to 'deeply regret the incidents' and appealed to 'all parties to remain calm and restrain from any further violence' (High Representative for the EU, 2010). But apart from issuing such a statement, the EU did not use the occasion to put more tangible pressure on Morocco, as the scheduled 9th Association Council meeting was duly held.

In general terms, Spanish interviewees at the Ministries for Foreign Affairs in Madrid claim that even though it is important to maintain good relations with Morocco on a strictly bilateral level, other venues such as the EU–Morocco Association Council provide increasingly important frameworks for cooperation. One Spanish diplomat was keen to explain that it is in Spain's interest that Morocco continually moves closer to the EU:

> We think that Europe can stimulate a domestic reform process in Morocco exactly through exercises such as the joint document on Advanced Status and the EU–Morocco summit, etc., etc. It's not so much a strategy based on conditionality as it is to try and make Morocco understand that it is in its own interest to deepen the reforms that they have already decided upon … Well, that mechanism and the work of international and European persuasion shows that the strategy of using the closeness to the EU as a leverage of persuasion works for the Moroccan reform process. And this is our absolute priority and conviction in terms of foreign policy towards Morocco. For Spain, a modern and prosperous Morocco is the only guarantee for stability.
>
> (Interview No. 60, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Another Spanish diplomat said that the bilateral cooperation between Spain and Morocco has expanded sector-wise on a transgovernmental level due to the expansion of EU-supported regional frameworks and through the possibility that the ENP now grants to Morocco in terms of participating in EU-funded programmes. The bottom line, according to this interviewee, was that 'everything is much more practical than what it appears to be' while at the same time admitting that it is a cumbersome process relying on a 'slow methodology' where few quick successes should be expected.[50]

Nonetheless, a senior Spanish diplomat with extensive experience of working in the Maghreb made the interesting observation that in many sensitive areas (such as agricultural trade, fisheries and migration) it has actually helped to have these issues becoming increasingly 'communitarized' in the EU. Accordingly, the zero-sum logic that tends to occur on a bilateral level when states have conflicting interests in specific issue areas are reduced when the same issues are handled in a multilateral forum such as the EU–Moroccan Association Council:

> Negotiations on agricultural products, fisheries and services take place within the framework of the EU and its agreements with Morocco. This

> is in Spain's interests and it's something positive. It is also easier to defend an interest that could lead to a disagreement when it's not only your country and the other at the table. That creates two poles and thus leads to polarization, but when there is a group of states and there are more interests at play, it often gets more, let's say, technical and not as political. It minimizes the risk of politicization.
>
> (Interview No. 36, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Migration is of course a highly sensitive issue in Spanish–Moroccan relations and it has often led to conflicts in the past, but the same interviewee suggests that as the EU has gained more competence in this policy area, something similar has happened, although in the Spanish–Moroccan case the cooperation seems to have first improved bilaterally before it was taken to the EU. Rather than primarily being a country of origin, Morocco is nowadays increasingly a transit country for sub-Saharan migrants on their way to Europe, and Spain is not the only destination. The Spanish and Moroccan governments have worked together to promote a global approach to migration since the nature of the phenomenon today makes it ever less useful to conceive of it as a strictly bilateral question:

> I would say that bilateral cooperation on migration made it possible for Spain and Morocco to act as initiators, and to some extent, as leaders of the initiative that came out of the conference in Rabat in 2006. It was the first Euro-African conference on migration and development which tried to set the basis for a dialogue not only on irregular migration but also to development frameworks for legal migration … The global approach of the EU, and later the one of UN as well, contain elements that were conceived at that conference, which was an indirect effect of Spain and Morocco working together. These are two countries with a long and complex relationship when it comes to migration, certainly with difficult moments, but they have nonetheless managed to develop cooperation. So the EU's approach is one positive effect, the other is that in relation to one of the classical issues of tension between Spain and Morocco there is today a much better cooperation.
>
> (Interview No. 36, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

However, one Moroccan diplomat pointed out that even though Spanish–Moroccan cooperation on migration has moved forward on a bilateral level over the last couple of years, it is not only Morocco that is cautious when it comes to signing a so-called readmission agreement with the EU. This interviewee suggested that the Spanish authorities do not necessarily push for such an agreement because they see an interest in keeping 'room for manoeuvre' vis-à-vis the Moroccan authorities in this regard.[51]

It has already been suggested that the EU–Morocco summit that was held during the Spanish EU Presidency in 2010 is important due to its symbolic

content, but it also seems to have been an interesting exercise in exploring common grounds in relation to sensitive issues. One Spanish diplomat explained the difference between preparing for the Association Council meetings and the EU–Morocco summit:

> The Association Councils make unilateral statements on behalf of the two parties. For the first time, there was a need to find a common language shared between the EU and Morocco, taking into account that in the EU there is no unity on the issue of Western Sahara. In the end, we had to find something that could unite, and it basically was the declaration of the UN Security Council on Western Sahara … From the point of view of what could have been done, it might not look like much, but from my perspective, and considering the different positions, it could not have gone much further. Moreover, Morocco had declared from the beginning that their priority was Western Sahara.
>
> (Interview No. 60, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

This interviewee also commented on the rather atypical preparation of that summit, as it had to be organized under the new provisions stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty:

> We were very conscious of the example that this summit would set. From an institutional point of view, it was a success in terms of the work and coordination between the Commission, Council Secretariat and the Spanish Presidency. We think it worked in very satisfactory manner. The organization of the summit was initiated with a communication that was prepared by the rotating Presidency, and it was then consolidated within the EU institutions and after two months of meetings in the Council working group for Maghreb–Mashreq we had practically a finished document in which only two issues were still left open. One was on human rights and the other was on Western Sahara. These two issues arrived, we could say, undigested to the summit, and the corresponding paragraphs in the declaration had not been closed. The goal was to close them at the summit with the help of a political intervention from the highest level, particularly from President Van Rompuy.
>
> (Interview No. 60, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

On the other side of the Strait, Moroccan diplomats also argue that the Advanced Status is something that will not only enhance EU–Moroccan relations, but possibly also improve Moroccan-Spanish relations. However, one Moroccan diplomat working with EU affairs pointed out that the Moroccan government would like to see even more structurally based consultations with the EU on multilateral issues, not only in Geneva and Brussels, but also at other multilateral forums.[52] The same interviewee also suggested that Morocco would be in favour of developing of a more common focus on strategic issues,

such as international security, regional stability, migration and counter-terrorism than what is suggested in the joint document on the Advanced Status.

While the Advanced Status opens up for the possibility for Moroccan ministers and officials to attend EU Council meetings, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), this interviewee pointed out that from a Moroccan perspective, what is needed is to find ways to institutionalize such participation and not only have it done on an ad-hoc basis, as is currently stipulated by the joint document.[53] Such institutionalization of the cooperation was also suggested in the original proposal set forth by the Moroccan delegation in the joint working group, but they eventually had to settle for the ad-hoc solution after negotiations with representatives of the EU institutions and member states (see above).[54]

When asked to comment on whether Spanish–Moroccan relations can be said to be improving due to the Morocco's Advanced Status with the EU, one Moroccan diplomat said that there is nothing that really prevents relations between Spain and Morocco from deteriorating again as they did in 2002, although the 'Parsley Island crisis' should nonetheless be seen as a parenthesis and the governments on both sides of the Strait have learned their lessons.[55] Interestingly, the Spanish counterparts in Madrid seem to agree with this point of view, and one Spanish diplomat willingly acknowledged that embedding Spain and Morocco in a broader EU framework will not automatically prevent conflicts in the future. However, this interviewee also stressed the following in relation to the events in 2002:

> Well, a conflict does not emerge out of the blue. There is always that spark that sets off the explosion. Over a couple of years there had been a build-up of an environment with misunderstandings and distances creating a loaded atmosphere in which a spark eventually would come along. It shows the dangers associated with permitting such a situation of misunderstandings, silences, lack of contacts and reproaches to evolve. It led to things that are absurd in this day and age. Perhaps in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries these matters could have been solved at the point of a canon, but not today. For two countries, or for two regions, this was simply too much … But it was useful because it underlined the risks.
>
> (Interview No. 36, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

## Practices of consultation and changing expectations

One striking features of EU–Morocco relations analysed in this chapter is the persistently high level of economic interaction measured against the total level of trade between the parties. The analysis clearly shows that the EU is by far Morocco's most important trading partner. Since the mid 1990s, about 50–60 per cent of the total amount of Moroccan imports and exports on a yearly basis have either originated from or been destined for the EU. At the same time, the relative importance of trade with Morocco for the EU is all but

insignificant, as it amounts to no more than roughly one per cent of the EU's total trade volume. This of course effectively serves to illustrate the gross power asymmetry between the EU and Morocco, but the importance in political terms that the EU places on its relations with Morocco should nonetheless not be underestimated, judged by the persistently high levels of financial aid that it has granted to Morocco ever since the signing of the first association agreement in the 1960s.

The most straightforward explanation for the EU's power *in* trade vis-à-vis Morocco is of course that Morocco's prime trading partners are also EU member states. Spain is becoming an increasingly important trade partner for Morocco, although France still retains its position as Morocco's principal partner. However, the argument that the EU also wields power *through* trade finds support here in that regulatory convergence with the Internal Market is increasingly important for Morocco as it seeks to secure access for its exports to the EU. Recent developments in the textile and air traffic sectors serve as examples of how the EU increasingly sets the standards under which Moroccan economic actors operate. With the expiration of the transition period of the EU–Morocco Association Agreement in 2012 and the signing of the US–Morocco free trade agreement in 2004, it does seem likely that Morocco's position as an 'export platform' for the EU and US markets will be further consolidated, but also that the Moroccan economy will be even more closely linked to the Internal Market. Another indication that changes to EU policies also affect Morocco is the recent changes to the Common Fisheries Policy. This has served to reshape (to some extent) the old practice on behalf of the EU which sought to secure access for European vessels in non-communitarian waters. The EU has instead moved to supporting the modernization of the Moroccan industry through technical and financial means. As a consequence, Spanish–Morocco relations are also affected, as a traditional bone of contention in relation to EU–Moroccan fisheries negotiations has been partly removed.

These findings give empirical support to the argument that security communities tend to grow around political and economic 'core areas' (Deutsch et al., 1957). But what is important in relation to the question of how the EU promotes security community-building is not only the gravitational force that the Internal Market is exercising on neighbouring economies. It is rather the way in which this structural power is translated into a process of security community-building between Spain and Morocco. It is essential here that the EU–Morocco Association Agreement has not only served to provide the legal basis for trade negotiations, but also to institutionalize the political dialogue between the parties, particularly after the setting up of the EU–Morocco Association Council in 2000. Representatives from the Council, the Commission, Morocco and Spain (and other EU member states) do regularly meet to discuss matters of common concern. The EU has furthermore responded to Moroccan requests to deepen the political cooperation between the parties by granting it an Advanced Status, and the EU–Morocco summit that was held in March 2010 during the Spanish EU Presidency was the first of its kind with a Mediterranean non-member state.

There are thus indications that what is happening is the creation of habits of consultation. This practice has evolved first and foremost in a kind of 'tri-lateral' setting, with EU institutions and member states on one side and Morocco on the other. However, it might of course be argued that the institutionalization of EU–Morocco relations on these terms does not necessarily lead to the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change among the participating parties. To be sure, Spain and Morocco did actually succumb to sable-rattling over a tiny, uninhibited rock in the Strait of Gibraltar in 2002, and the EU could do little about it. But one important finding from the analysis is that both Spanish and Moroccan diplomats suggest that the two sides have learnt their lessons from the Parsley Islet crisis and that Morocco's involvement in an increasing number of EU policy areas has actually served to lessen bilateral tensions for a range of contentious issues, such as agricultural trade, fisheries and also migration. As a result, these issues now tend to take on more of a technical character, which also hampers the tendency for polarization that would otherwise be present. The adoption of Morocco's Advanced Status only seems to have reinforced this dynamic, which is also something that Spain endorses because Morocco's enhanced relations with the EU is regarded as being in Spain's interest.

Still, at the heart of the matter lies the problem of estimating whether this also gives rise to possible socialization effects of Spanish and Moroccan diplomats and other high-ranking representatives regularly meeting in venues such as the EU–Moroccan Association Council. The institutionalization of multilateral venues in which views on various policy issues can be exchanged does not necessarily have to lead to the development of mutual trust. However, there is reason to believe that the practice of self-restraint does not rest only on the development of a 'we-feeling', but could also develop as a function of taken-for-granted ways of doing international politics. Furthermore, it has previously been observed that norms of consultations and reciprocity can mature independently of substantive norms and values related to collective identities (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Ikenberry, 2008). The findings presented in this chapter do not unequivocally point to the idea that diplomatic solutions have become the self-evident way to go about business in Spanish–Moroccan relations as a consequence of Spain's EU membership and Morocco's ever deepening economic and political relations with the EU. On the contrary, the fact that both Spanish and Moroccan interviewees insist that the Association Council serves as a means to handle underlying conflicts rather suggests that if there is anything that appears self-evident to them, then it is that conflicts might indeed escalate.

To be sure, even though diplomacy plays an essential role in international politics, we should recognize the difference between arguing *with* diplomacy and arguing *about* diplomacy. The first practice applies to security communities, whereas the latter applies to states practising balance of power. This distinction might seem tautological, but it is placed in a different light when considering the possibility of *overlaps* of practices, seen as the possibility that

actors' dispositions and expectations might respond simultaneously to two sets of practices (Adler and Greve, 2009). I argue that the analysis presented in this chapter indicates that the EU works so as to broaden the repertoire of practices in Spanish–Moroccan relations (primarily through the Association Council and the ENP, and to a lesser extent, through the EMP/UfM). In this way, the EU adds another layer to Spanish–Moroccan bilateral relations as well as embeds them in a larger cooperative framework which draws on practices that constitute security communities, namely consultation, reciprocity and self-restraint.

Finally, it would certainly be preposterous to claim that any Spanish or Moroccan interviewee willingly suggested that inter-state war is preferred as a means to solve bilateral conflicts. What rather seems to be the case is that long-standing territorial disputes (notably related to Ceuta, Melilla and Western Sahara) have created a disposition among Spanish and Moroccan diplomats to try and prevent situations where things get out of hand, and to find a *modus operandi* to prevent the escalation of what appear to be almost cyclical crises (often spurred by 'minor' incidents that are then exploited by the media or political actors on both sides of the strait). Indeed, the notion that things can always 'go wrong' seems rather vivid in the thoughts of the members of the two diplomatic corps that have been interviewed for this study. What is interesting here, however, is that this understanding seems to inform an embryonic version of the practice of self-restraint that is not premised on the transcendence of age-old disputes, but rather on an awareness that even though conflicts still persist, they need not be unavoidable (see Bjola, 2013). The important point that I want to make is that settling bilateral disputes through the threat of force is indeed recognized as a departure from what can be said to be the standard operating procedures in Spanish–Moroccan relations in the post-Cold War era. To put it differently, inter-state war across the strait is not fashionable anymore, and it is other non-military threats and trans-boundary risks that to an increasing extent define Spanish and Moroccan security policies, as we will see in the next chapter.

## Notes

1 Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Since 1995, the EU has been enlarged to include 28 member states (as of 2014), Cyprus and Malta became EU members (in 2004), Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005 and Libya was accepted as observer (in 1999).
2 On the EMP, see Adler et al. (2006), Bicchi (2006, 2007), Biscop (2003), Del Sarto (2006), Pace (2006), Panebianco (2006), Volpi (2004).
3 For example, the EEC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972. It was the first attempt by the European community to harmonize its trade relations with all Mediterranean non-member countries (which at that time included Spain) within a common framework. The Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was launched in 1990 and it in many ways resembled the GMP even though it to a larger extent promoted region-building in the Mediterranean as well as a more neoliberal approach to development (Bicchi, 2007: 155).

4 MEDA stands for 'MEsures D'Accompagnement financières et techniques à la réforme des structures économiques et sociales dans le cadre du partenariat euro-méditerranéen'.
5 By comparison, Israel and Turkey provide around 50 per cent of the total amount of exports from all Mediterranean non-members to the EU. The Mediterranean non-members have, since the 1970s, experienced a small reduction in their share of EU external trade, especially in exports (Tsoukalis, 1997: 244). Developing countries in other parts of the world have nonetheless suffered much bigger losses in both imports and exports vis-à-vis the EU. The exception is South-East Asia and China which have steadily increased their share of EU external trade despite negative trade preferences.
6 For example, in 2013 trade with the US represented 6.1 per cent of Morocco's total trade, in comparison with China (5.2 per cent), Saudi Arabia (4.5 per cent), Russia (3.2 per cent) and Brazil (3.1 per cent).
7 In relation to other Maghreb countries, the trend is reversed in the case of Algeria due to the EU's heavy dependence on energy imports, and the trade balance is less favourable to the EU in the case of Tunisia (albeit it is still positive).
8 However, Moroccan GDP growth during the 2000s was quite 'volatile' in that it varied substantially from year to year (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 138–139).
9 As opposed to the logic of only negotiating the tariffs for those products that have been put on a 'positive list', thus making it similar to the functioning of the Agadir Agreement (see below). The Euro-Mediterranean Roadmap for Agriculture (also called the Rabat Roadmap) operates on two levels: the commercial (tariffs) and the non-commercial (rules and regulations). This allows for asymmetrical and temporal solutions for liberalizing trade relations, which means that there is no need for simultaneous reciprocity.
10 This refers to the fact that only some parts of the Moroccan agricultural sector are highly capitalized, irrigated and modern, producing export agriculture with an emphasis on Mediterranean products (e.g. fruit, olive oil, vegetables) and marketed mainly towards the EU. A large part of the agricultural sector is still traditional, low-intensive and cereal-based agriculture plagued by frequent droughts and controlled by government price policies. It should also be noted that repeated droughts plaguing Moroccan agriculture might suppress agricultural exports to the EU for reasons unrelated to trade policy (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 141). Another structural problem is that the harvest calendars in southern Europe and North Africa overlap to a large extent since these countries all produce 'Mediterranean agricultural products'. However, the so-called Health Check of the CAP and the support for cross-border rural development cooperation between Spain and Morocco through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development suggest that there might be an increased European demand for Moroccan agricultural products in the future.
11 Energy constitutes an important issue in Spanish-Maghreb economic relations. The Maghreb–Europe gas pipeline connecting the Hassi R'mel fields in Algeria with Morocco and Spain was completed in 1996. The pipeline has the capacity to transport some 12 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually, and it is owned and operated jointly by the three countries (Dawson, 2009: 45). In fact, natural gas is, as of today, the only commodity that is legally traded between Morocco and Algeria since the border between the countries was closed in 1994 (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008: 180–181). Together with oil, natural gas represents the main share of Algeria's exports to Spain and it also helps explain the country's persistent trade surplus with the EU.
12 Due to the way in which the agreement was formulated and how it was applied, it can also be seen as a tacit recognition by the EU of Morocco's de facto jurisdiction over the fishing waters outside of Western Sahara (García Pérez, 2009: 239–240).

13 This agreement thus comes accompanied by a financial contribution of €36.1 million per year (2007–2011), of which €13.5 million is earmarked for support to developing Morocco's fisheries sector. In total, 137 vessels from the EU fleet are allowed to operate in Moroccan waters (compared with the 690 vessels that were allowed during the previous agreement) and these figures include some 100 Spanish vessels (García Pérez, 2009: 242).
14 However, in contrast to what has happened in Central and Eastern European countries since the 1990s: 'FDI in the Maghreb has followed a fiscal logic, based on obtaining proceeds from privatizations and the granting of licenses in public services, ignoring its productive modernization component and the strategy of climbing up the value-added chain' (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 146).
15 Morocco and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed close relations for many decades and Saudi Arabia is a firm supporter of Moroccan claims to Western Sahara (Willis, 2012).
16 The economic importance of remittances is perhaps better understood if we take into account that the gap between the EU and the countries of North Africa in terms of nominal GDP per capita was around 10:1 in the late 1990s, and it has not shrunk since then (see Tsoukalis, 1997: 244). Indeed, the Mediterranean Sea is in this regard Europe's 'Rio Grande'.
17 In the standard example, it is envisioned that cotton from Egypt and buttons from Jordan are used to produce shirts in Morocco, which are then exported to the Internal Market, while the products are still subjected to the regime of preferential tariffs established by the four countries' Association Agreements with the EU.
18 However, it should also be noted that there are some recent indications of closer economic ties in this region: 'The difficulty recently experienced by the export to Egypt of Logan model automobiles manufactured in Morocco and the protectionist pressure received by the authorities of the former country reveal that, for the first time, South–South trade liberalization is creating market tensions, an unequivocal symptom that its effects are beginning to be felt' (Martín, 2010: 76; see also Hufbauer and Brunel, 2008). Besides the Agadir Agreement and its relatively meagre prospects, it also needs to be taken into account that the EU is, as of 2005, promoting the creation of a 'Pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of cumulation' including Mediterranean non-members alongside EEA countries (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) (Council of the EU, 2005). It might be possible that the Agadir Agreement and such a system could work to reinforce each other and eventually also to enhance trade among Mediterranean non-members as an effect of enhanced trade relations between the EU and individual countries in the first place (as in the example of intra-firm trade in the textile sector between Spain and Morocco).
19 Article 5 of the agreement states that the parties shall meet on a regular basis, and whenever necessary, in the form of an Association Council: 'Political dialogue shall be established at regular intervals and whenever necessary notably: (a) at ministerial level, principally within the Association Council; (b) at the level of senior officials representing Morocco, on the one hand, and the Council Presidency and the Commission on the other; (c) taking full advantage of all diplomatic channels including regular briefings, consultations on the occasion of international meetings and contacts between diplomatic representatives in third countries; (d) where appropriate, by any other means which would make a useful contribution to consolidating dialogue and increasing its effectiveness' (OJEC, 2000).
20 At this particular occasion, represented by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, the Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Pattern, and the incoming EU presidency represented by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh.
21 In 2003, the parties decided to set up six subcommittees under the Association Council, dealing with such matters as the Internal Market; Industry, trade and

services; Transport, environment and energy; Research and innovation; Agriculture and fisheries; and Justice and security (EU–Morocco Association Council, 2003).

22 Until the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, the 'EU troika' was confined to the Council of the EU and comprised the current, immediate past and following EU presidencies to ensure a degree of continuity in the policy-making of CFSP. However, this practice changed after the High Representative for the CFSP was put in place in 1999. The troika format then came to comprise the EU presidency together with the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations (Smith, 2004: 229–230). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the High Representative now acts as the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council as well as vice-president of the European Commission responsible for External Relations.

23 In Valencia, it was also decided that the next foreign minister meeting's agenda should be included as a permanent issue in the agenda of each senior official meeting so as to avoid it from being held hostage to 'non-related issues' (for the most part related to the Arab–Israeli conflict) (Schumacher, 2002: 235).

24 The ENP covers Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. On the ENP, see Aliboni (2005), Barbé et al. (2009), Dannreuther (2006), Johansson-Nogués (2004), Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2007), Smith (2005), Tzifakis (2007).

25 However, this also needs to be seen in the light of the growing disagreement between the EU and the US on the wider issue of international trade. EU trade policy: 'is evidently seeking to shape the wider multilateral system, so that it is compatible with its own internal policies … U.S. initiatives on new trade rules have by and large served those sectoral interests that seek greater market access. In contrast, the EU approach to rules is based on agreed common preferences on how to strike a balance between liberalization and other policy objectives' (Woolcock, 2005: 396). For example, the WTO meeting in Cancun in 2003: 'exposed a clash between an EU philosophy of trade liberalisation based on the design and enforcement of new multilateral rules reproducing the EU's own approach (the so-called Singapore issues – investment, competition policy, government procurements and trade facilitation) and the approach of most of the rest of the world, which continues to view trade rounds as fora for the exchange of reciprocal conditions' (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2005: 261).

26 There are also indications that some degree of policy and regulatory convergence are indeed taking place between the EU and neighbouring states, but the outcome of such processes is highly varied and uneven, suggesting that the role of the EU differs quite substantially in different policy areas and in relation to different countries (Barbé et al., 2009, see also Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009).

27 The ENPI replaces MEDA, PHARE and other such financial aid programmes. The so-called cross-border cooperation component of the ENPI finances joint programmes which aim to bring together sub-national regions of EU member states and neighbouring countries sharing a common border, using the EU's Structural Funds approach based on multi-annual programming, partnership and co-financing.

28 For example, the following priorities are listed: '(a) pursuing legislative reform and applying international human rights provisions; (b) enhanced political dialogue on the CFSP and ESDP and enhanced cooperation on combating terrorism; (c) negotiation of an agreement on liberalizing trade in services; (d) the development of a climate conducive to foreign direct investment, growth and sustainable development; (e) cooperation on social policy with the aim of reducing poverty and vulnerability and creating jobs; (f) support for the education and training system, scientific research and information technologies as crucial factors in the country's

economic development; (g) effective management of migration flows, including the signing of a readmission agreement with the European Community, and facilitating the movement of persons in accordance with the *acquis*, particularly by examining the possibilities for relaxing the formalities for certain jointly agreed categories of persons to obtain short-stay visas; (h) development of the transport sector based on safety, security and reinforcement of national and regional infrastructures and their inter-connection with the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T); (i) development of the energy sector, including inter-connections and infrastructure under optimal safety, competitiveness and quality conditions; (j) integration of the Moroccan electricity market into the European electricity market, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding on the gradual integration of the electricity markets of the Maghreb countries into the EU's internal electricity market' (European Commission, 2005).

29 It has also been suggested that the proposal to create a 'Mediterranean Union' was an attempt by France to take the question of Turkish EU membership off the table while presenting Turkey with something similar to a 'privileged partnership' with the EU instead (Balfour and Schmid, 2008).

30 The Commission and the Council Secretariat had previously served as the de facto secretariat for the EMP, which guaranteed a significant role for the EU institutions. The secretariat of the UfM, however, was envisaged to be a small, technical secretariat focusing on implementing projects and fundraising.

31 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia (EU candidate), Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya (UfM observer status), Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Mor occo, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (EU candidate).

32 After which Spain also agreed that the reference to the 'Barcelona Process' could be omitted.

33 The former Jordanian ambassador, Ahmed Masa'deh, was appointed as the first general secretary of the UfM together with no fewer than six deputies.

34 The participants at this meeting, whom were supposed to come up with a regional strategy on water management in order to secure water access in the region and reduce the potential for future conflicts, failed to reach an agreement since Israeli and Arab delegates could not agree on a formulation on whether Palestine was to be described as 'occupied territories' or 'territories under occupation' (*El Mundo*, 2010).

35 Interview No. 69 (Spanish Embassy to the Netherlands).

36 Interview No. 68 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

37 The meeting took place during the French EU Presidency, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, presided over the meeting together with Christian Jouret (General Secretariat of the EU Council), Hughes Mingarelli (European Commission) and the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, Karl Schwarzenberg (representing the incoming EU Presidency). Morocco was represented by a delegation headed by the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taïb Fassi-Fihri. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moratinos, and the Portuguese Secretary of State for European Affairs, Manuel Lobo Antunes, also attended the meeting (EU–Morocco Association Council, 2008b). Typically, Moratinos expressed his satisfaction that EU–Moroccan relations had passed a 'historic milestone' with the adoption of the Advanced Status, and his Moroccan homologue expressed his gratitude towards Spain, Portugal and especially France for their support in the process (ibid.).

38 Interview No. 31 (Diplomatic Representation of Morocco to the European Communities).

39 Interview No. 49 (European Commission's Delegation in Morocco).

40 Compare this with the proposal to set up an 'EU–Moroccan Political and Security Committee' suggested by Morocco (Document du Royaume du Maroc 2008).

41 However, the Advanced Status suggests further intertwinement between Morocco and the EU in other fields also related to security. For example, Moroccan

participation in training and seminars at the European Police College (CEPOL), or a cooperation agreement with Europol is envisioned. In the field of civil protection, the joint document suggests that the Commission and Morocco should sign an administrative arrangement to enhance the cooperation with the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection.

42 Interview No. 27 (European Commission).
43 Interview No. 49 (European Commission's Delegation in Morocco).
44 Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
45 Ibid.
46 Interview No. 50 (Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
47 In December 2009, the European Council appointed the former Belgian Prime Minister, Herman Van Rompuy, as its permanent President and the former British Trade Commissioner, Catherine Ashton, as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, taking on the double-hatted function of being permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council as well as vice-president of the European Commission responsible for External Relations. Although the principle of the rotating presidency is still being kept in relation to Council constellations other than Foreign Affairs, the new rules imply that the EU member state holding the presidency is quite circumscribed in terms of agenda-setting in the CFSP (Missiroli, 2010). For example, article 15 of the TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, reads: 'The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.'
48 Apparently: 'The Spanish authorities took the political decision not to push for national policy initiatives in order not to hold up the work of the new [EU] foreign policy structures' (Morillas, 2011: 248).
49 The meeting was attended by Belgian deputy Prime Minister, Steven Vanackere, and the EU Trade Commissioner, Karel de Gucht, together with the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taïb Fassi-Fihri, the Moroccan Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Aziz Akhenouch, and the Moroccan Minister for External Trade, Abdellatif Maâzouz.
50 Interview No. 37 (Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
51 Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs).
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 See also, Document du Royaume du Maroc (2008), Council of the EU (2008).
55 Interview No. 50 (Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

# 3 Practising cooperative security beyond the EU

This chapter focuses on the development of the EU's capacity to conduct military and civilian crisis management operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP reflects profound changes taking place in the majority of EU member states since the end of the Cold War in terms of security policy, defence planning, threat perceptions and modernization of armed forces, as well as notions of the legitimate use of military force (Gärtner, 2003; Haaland Matlary, 2009; Howorth, 2007; Meyer, 2006). Moreover, the CSDP equips the EU with military and civilian capacities which build on national assets to tackle an ever wider range of security threats. In relation to the question of how the EU promotes security community-building in the case of Spain and Morocco, the CSDP is highly relevant since it serves a means for the EU to engage both member states and non-members in cooperative security practices since non-member states often participate in EU-led military and civilian operations, as for example Morocco did in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Importantly, the CSDP should not only be seen as an indication of the tightly coupled pluralistic security community among EU member states in terms of the concrete manifestation of cooperative security. The development of common institutions within the EU relating to the CSDP and the way in which it enhances the EU's capacity to cooperate with non-members provides yet another piece to the puzzle of how the EU works as a security community-building institution in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the CSDP seems to reflect an understanding of security that is increasingly focusing on the de-territorialization of security threats and the subsequent need to jointly counter such threats within the circle of EU member states, but also together with partners. Thus, the focus in this chapter lies with a detailed narrative of the development of CSDP institutions and capacities together with Spanish and Moroccan security and defence policies in the post-Cold War era. Besides data on defence spending in the EU and the Maghreb and documents related to the CSDP and Spanish and Moroccan security and defence policies, the analysis also draws upon interviews conducted in 2008–2010 with senior Spanish officers working at the DIGENPOL (General Directorate for Defence Policy) at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in Madrid, Moroccan diplomats working

with the CSDP dossier at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rabat, and EU officials handling the cooperation with Mediterranean partners at the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The results point to a dynamic cooperation between Spain and Morocco in which the CSDP can be said to serve as a template for how security cooperation should be done, although an interesting finding is that the most intense cooperation in terms of exercises and training takes place in more informal settings, such as the 5+5 Defence Initiative.

## Developing a common security and defence policy for the EU

It is by now a commonplace in the EU literature that the British–French declaration issued at Saint-Malo in December 1998 served as the launch pad for the process that led to what is today known as the CSDP. The summit was indeed revolutionary in the sense that the British and French governments jointly and publicly supported the goal that the EU should develop a military capacity.[1] At the same time they underlined their joint commitment to Euro-Atlantic cooperation on security and defence stating that the EU: 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises' but at the same time stressing that this would not interfere with their commitments to NATO (Howorth, 2007: 34–35). The institutional basis for the CSDP was then agreed upon at the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 and the military capacity objectives was first set at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December that same year (European Council 1999a, 1999b). The Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) were agreed upon in order for the EU to be able to fulfil the so-called Petersberg tasks of humanitarian response, peacekeeping and peacemaking.[2] Thus: 'within a mere 12 months, at the very dawn of the new century, the EU succeeded in reaching agreement on arrangements over which it had simply avoided discussion for over 50 years' (Howorth, 2007: 4).

Another common theme in the literature is that the civil wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s made it painfully clear that the EU did not have the means necessary to intervene in an armed, ethnic conflict on its doorstep and it therefore served as a 'powerful exogenous stimulus' to develop a military crisis management capacities because: 'posturing in traditional Cold War military-power terms, the EU found itself both confronting an absent adversary and incapable of dealing with a very present and destabilizing security environment' (ibid.: 55). Since then, lessons from military and civilian operations have been brought back to Brussels and there are indications that an increasingly cohesive policy community of diplomats, militaries and bureaucrats has started to take shape around the CSDP (Cross, 2010; Meyer, 2006).[3] Even though there is a strong element of muddling through in the development of the CSDP it should be noted that during its first decade of existence, capabilities have been committed, operations have been launched and concepts have been drafted

more or less simultaneously as the EU has enlarged and the EU treaties have been revised (Grevi et al., 2009).

### *Institutions*

The CSDP belongs to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which means that it is kept on an intergovernmental basis.[4] The Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in 2009 does not change the fact that the Council of Ministers unanimously makes the decisions on matters relating to the CSDP, with no formal role having been granted to the European Commission or the European Parliament in terms of decision-making on how, when and where military troops are to be deployed under the EU banner. However, the new provisions on 'permanent structured cooperation' (art. 42(6) TEU) allows for the possibility of a smaller group of EU member states to strengthen their cooperation on military matters on the basis of qualified majority in the Council. Also before the Lisbon Treaty several bodies in the EU have shaped the development of CFSP/CSDP (Howorth, 2007: 63–67; Smith, 2004). The European Council is the highest decision-making body in matters related to the CSDP, although much of the heavy lifting in terms of negotiating the CSDP among the member states has been done at meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in the pre-Lisbon set-up).[5] The member states' ambassadors in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) have had an important policy-shaping function in clearing the agenda for the Foreign Ministers' meetings.

An important change was the creation of the High Representative for the CFSP through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and the former General Secretary of NATO, Javier Solana, was appointed to the post in 1999. With the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the HR/CFSP has changed in that it now serves the double-hatted function of both being vice-president of the Commission responsible for External Relations and being responsible for the EU's Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Catherine Asthon held the office from 2009 to 2014 and Federica Mogherini took over in 2014. The High Representative acts as the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and is also the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS merges the parts of the Commission that deal with External Relations and the parts of the Council Secretariat that deal with the CFSP/CSDP. However, the EEAS does not have competence over external trade, developmental aid, civil protection, enlargement or the ENP which is being dealt with by other Commissioners.

Moreover, a range of new bodies directly related to the CSDP have been created since 1999 (and as the EEAS was set up in 2010 a number of them were moved out of the General Secretariat of Council and into the EU diplomatic service under the High Representative). The Political and Security Committee (PSC), where permanent representatives with the rank of ambassadors of the member states regularly meet a couple of times a week in Brussels, contributes to the formulation of policies by drafting opinions for

the Foreign Affairs Council and oversees the implementation of agreed policies. Although it covers in principle all aspects of the CFSP, its core business is planning, preparation and oversight of civilian and military operations and it has been suggested that the PSC has: 'set in motion dynamics of social influence that can mould a group of national officials into a socially cohesive policy community with shared objectives and increasingly shared attitudes concerning the use of force' (Meyer, 2006: 112; Cross, 2010; Mérand et al., 2011).

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body of the EU and it is formally composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member states. The EUMC meets at least biannually, but it is normally attended by the member states' military representatives in Brussels (often the same national representatives as in NATO). The main function of EUMC is to deliver to the European Council, through the PSC, the unanimous advice of the Chiefs of Defence Staff on all matters with a military dimension as well as recommendations for action. The unanimity of EUMC is *sine qua non* to the commitment of EU forces to any military operation. It is thus: 'the key decision-shaping body in crisis management situations, drawing up and evaluating strategic military options, overseeing the elaboration of an operational plan and monitoring operations throughout the mission. It is also responsible for giving advice on the termination of an operation' (Howorth, 2007: 74).[6]

The setting up of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 should also be mentioned as it serves as the platform within the EU where the member states discuss issues of modernizing the military forces and integration of the national defence markets.[7] The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), which has been set up in the Council Secretariat, provides the EU with an intelligence gathering and early warning capacity (Fägersten, 2010).[8] Finally, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was set up in 2005. The ESDC is a so called virtual academy based on a network of already existing national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU member states that deal with issues of security and defence. The aim is to provide training in the field of the CSDP to military and civilian personnel.[9] Between 2005 and 2010, it is estimated that about 2,500 individuals from EU member states, non-members and other international organizations have attended ESDC courses.

### *Capacities*

The EU does not have any military assets of its own and there is no standing 'European army'. The political debate among the member states has instead been centred on what capacities they should commit to the CSDP and how to commit them. The Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) were early on conceived of as a force catalogue from which appropriate resources would be drawn for various EU operations in line with the Petersberg tasks.[10] Throughout a series of capabilities pledging conferences during 2000 to 2004, this pool of resources was refined (Howorth, 2007: 103). This also meant that a learning process took place, where the original goals were revised since a range of problems

quickly emerged in the wake of the process of trying to pool military resources of member states for EU operations in the early 2000s.

First, committing troops on paper is not the same thing as actually having the right type of military force available for deployment at short notice. Some estimates suggest that the EU member states can at best muster some 15,000 to 20,000 deployable troops at any given time in 'serious military missions' (Howorth, 2007: 104). Second, in order to generate an effective EU capacity for international crisis management, a range of strategic deficiencies among the member states would have to be addressed (such as, for example, the lack of strategic air-lift capacity, air-to-air refuelling, operational headquarters and special operations forces).[11] Addressing these problems implies top-down leadership, pooling and specialization within the circle of EU member states, all of which undoubtedly touches upon sensitive issues of national sovereignty. In 2004, the EU took a step to move beyond the initial HHG by launching the Headline Goal (HG) 2010 (European Council, 2004b).[12]

Apart from the military capacities, there is also an increased capacity for civilian crisis management (CCM) within the CSDP. The Helsinki European Council in 1999 referred to the need for 'non-military crisis management', but it was the Portuguese EU Presidency in 2000 that provided the first input to CCM in establishing four priority areas: police; strengthening rule of law; strengthening civil administration and civil protection (European Council, 2000). However, the acknowledgement that there is a growing need for civilian capacities in CSDP has also given rise to a tricky balancing act between the EU institutions. This is due to the fact that CCM necessarily entails competences that do not only belong exclusively to the EU member states but also to the European Commission, since many of the civilian goals overlap with the aims of humanitarian assistance and developmental aid, which is primarily dealt with by the Commission (Gourlay, 2004).

Before the setting up of the EEAS, relations between the Council and the Commission was handled through the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), set up in 2000. It is intended to facilitate: 'coordination between member states and the EU. It also advises the PSC about issues of coherence and comprehensiveness in CCM' (Howorth, 2007: 126). For example, in 2004, the Council adopted the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 and the team working on the CHG was established in the Council Secretariat with the full involvement of the Commission in order to link the civilian and military headline goals (ibid.: 130).[13] In 2007, the CHG 2010 was approved, typically calling for greater coordination between civilian and military means in the EU, as well as strengthened cooperation with non-EU member states and other international organizations (Council of the EU, 2007c). The Council issued a declaration on strengthening the CSDP's capabilities in December 2008, which emphasized the need for both military and civilian resources in order for the EU to contribute to international peacekeeping operations as well as tackling the risks and threats facing the EU (Council of the EU, 2008b). The European Council meeting on defence in December 2013

did little to change the course of developments and concluded by calling for increased effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP, enhanced capabilities and efforts to strengthen Europe's defence industry (European Council, 2013).

### *Crisis management as political doctrine*

The European Security Strategy which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003 provides a unique statement on behalf of the EU as it represents an attempt to paint a common picture of how the member states portray the security challenges of the post-Cold War era. It sets the tone by declaring that Europe has never been so prosperous, secure or free as it is at the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, it also states that: 'The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which *the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked*… Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable… Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable (European Council, 2003: 2–3, emphasis added). The key security threats to the EU are in the strategy defined to be: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; failed states and organized crime. Accordingly, in: 'contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats are purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments' (ibid.: 7). Moreover, the conceptual shift from defence seen as deterrence to security seen as crisis management is further epitomized in the following passage:

> Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.
>
> (ibid.)

The EU's self-proclaimed preference for multilateralism, regional cooperation and international law also find an expression in the strategy. The support for the UN is reiterated but so is also the support for NATO since the transatlantic relationship is said to be 'irreplaceable'. Although the concept of collective territorial defence against a potential foreign enemy is absent there are references being made to the importance that geographic proximity plays for the EU in tackling new security threats. For example, EU enlargement is depicted as both a virtue and a vice in that: 'The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European

Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations' (ibid.: 8). The Mediterranean is furthermore depicted as an area inflicted by 'serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts' (ibid.) and the strategy emphasis the need for further engagement with Mediterranean non-member states.

The European Security Strategy typically calls on the EU to become more active, capable and coherent in its foreign and security policy. This applies to: 'the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats' (ibid.: 12). The need to modernize the armed forces of the EU member states is also reiterated, both in order to boost the capacity to act together within the EU and to cut costs in national defence budgets (ibid.).

Since 2003, there have been a few adjustments to the strategy. In the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy submitted by HR/CFSP, Javier Solana, to the European Council in 2008, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organized crime are continuously depicted as the main challenges to what is described as the EU's 'security interests'. In addition, a range of other security threats are also being identified, such as cyber-attacks, shortage of energy supplies and climate change (European Council, 2008b).[14] The report hints at a notion of security with few adversaries, but with greater perceived instability at the borders of the EU: 'Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible' (ibid.: 5).[15] The Mediterranean region receives a fair amount of attention in the 2008 report as an area of 'major importance and opportunity' for Europe, but also as a particularly risk-prone region due to: 'complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration' (European Council, 2008b: 7). Morocco (and Israel) is also singled out in the report as a key partner in the region with whom the EU is working towards deepening bilateral relations.

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the subsequent amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) can be said to largely codify what had already been taking place in practice in the CSDP (besides a few institutional innovations such as the EEAS).[16] The EU treaties now contain provisions with specific bearing on the CSDP, and art. 42 of TEU stipulates that the CSDP shall be an integral part of the CFSP. It shall also provide the Union with an operational capacity that draws on civilian and military assets to be used outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. These tasks shall be undertaken by the EU using capabilities provided by the member states.

Moreover, art. 42 of TEU stipulates that the CSDP shall include the 'progressive framing of a common Union defence policy' and that this will lead to a common defence when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.[17] The article also contains a 'common defence clause' stipulating that: 'If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter' (OJEU, 2010a). Furthermore, art. 43 of TEU formally expands the scope of the CSDP operations and mission beyond the original Petersberg tasks so that they now include: joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. Importantly, it also specifies that: 'All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories' (OJEU, 2010a). The need to counter terrorism (as well as natural and man-made disasters) is also highlighted in the EU's solidarity clause,[18] enshrined in art. 222 of TFEU:

> The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
>
> (OJEU, 2010b)

The treaties thus stipulate that the EU member states shall assist any member state that suffers a terrorist attack or a large-scale natural or man-made disaster, although always at the request of that member state's political authorities. Member states shall also coordinate among themselves in the Council, and the European Council shall regularly assess the security threats facing the EU in order to enable the Union and the member states to take 'effective action'.[19]

### *Crisis management in the field*

As of 2015, the EU has launched over thirty CSDP military operations and civilian missions, of which sixteen operations and missions were still in force (EEAS, 2015). The geographical scope of past and present CSDP operations and missions span the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Civilian CSDP missions presently make up the majority.[20] On the

military side, nine CSDP operations have been launched since 2003.[21] Currently, the largest military operation ever conducted by the EU is the EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. EUFOR Althea was launched in December 2004, taking over from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) (Howorth, 2007: 235–238).[22] Compared to the 1990s, the situation in Bosnia had improved substantially when the EU operation was launched, but it nonetheless inherited the same 'robust' mandate as SFOR since 'EU governments agreed that, like SFOR, EUFOR should be prepared to use force if necessary, to act as a deterrent to any potential return to civil war' (Keohane, 2009: 213). EUFOR Althea has from the start been carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and it is a good example of how closely inter-linked, in practice, the EU and NATO are in the field of international crisis management. For example: 'NATO's SHAPE is [EUFOR Althea's] headquarters; NATO's JFC Naples retains an important coordinating and extraction role; and most commanding officers are double-hatted. NATO procedures are used, and the military chain of command leads up to NATO DSACEUR … the operation builds on interoperability standards of NATO and suits the professional practices associated to NATO' (Mérand, 2010: 371).[23]

Military forces from 22 EU member states and 11 non-EU members originally participated in EUFOR Althea, including Morocco.[24] Several member states and non-members withdrew from the operation in line with the decision by the EU to downsize the troop level even further to about 2,500 troops in 2007.[25] From 2008 onwards, there have been discussions among the EU member states regarding whether EUFOR Althea should continue to operate in Bosnia. Some member states have favoured a withdrawal, either for political, operational or financial reasons (such as Finland, France and Spain), whereas other member states (such as Austria, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the UK) have voiced concerns that if EUFOR Althea were to be withdrawn completely, it could undermine the authority of the EU Special Representative and perhaps also the stability of the country (and ultimately the peace in the Balkans) (Keohane, 2009: 219).[26] Apart from being the EU's most ambitious military operation to date, EUFOR Althea clearly testifies to the challenges and possibilities facing the EU in the field of international crisis management in that it shows how something that: 'began as a purely military mission was transformed into a complex civil-military project in which the entire range of EU instruments was brought to bear' (Howorth, 2007: 237).[27]

If EUFOR Althea can be seen as CSDP success story then the EU responses to the Libyan regime's brutal repression of demonstrations in early 2011 can be said to clearly point to its limits. In March 2011, the EU welcomed UN Security Council resolution 1970 (calling for Qaddafi to step down) and announced that sanctions had been adopted and stated that the EU from now on considered the National Transitional Council in Benghazi to be its political interlocutor (European Council, 2011). The EU adopted a series of sanctions against individuals and entities, aiming at preventing arms and money from reaching the Qaddafi regime. Moreover, as the US was hesitant in the early

stages of the crisis, the diplomatic footwork of the UK and France at the UN Security Council was instrumental for the adoption of resolution 1973 (after the Arab League, through Lebanese diplomats on the UNSC, had called for a no-fly zone over Libya) which called for an arms embargo and international action to protect civilians albeit not allowing 'foreign occupation' (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 12–13). At first sight, a military operation with an UN mandate to protect civilians in the EU's southern neighbourhood would seem to perfectly match the criteria for when to launch a CSDP operation. However, the EU member states failed to keep a united front at the UN as Germany abstained when resolution 1973 was adopted and no EU operation was launched at this time. Instead a coalition between France, UK and the US led the initial air and naval operations against Qaddafi's forces on 19 March 2011.[28]

In April 2011 the Council of the EU approved a CSDP operation (EUFOR Libya) to provide military support and security to humanitarian assistance in Libya, after France had pushed for more EU involvement in the Libyan crisis (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 17; Council of the EU, 2011b). An operational headquarters was set-up in Rome, although the Council decided that military support and security would only be given on the request of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). As it turned out, OCHA never made such a request and EUFOR Libya was never launched.

The fact that there was no EU military response to the Libyan crisis in March 2011 and that EU member states had to rely on the US and NATO capacities to such a large extent has led several diplomats and scholars to the conclusion that this was the effective end to the CSDP (Menon, 2011).[29] However, that might be a somewhat rash conclusion, and it should be noted that in May 2013 the Council approved the launch of a civilian Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) within the CSDP framework (although the mission has been operating from Tunisia since 2014 due to the deteriorating security situation in Libya). Outside of the CSDP, the EU has provided humanitarian aid to Libya and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism was used to mobilise EU civil protection teams and assets to assist civilians both in Libya and at its borders during the crisis in 2011 (see Chapter 4). The EU was also involved in the evacuation of EU citizens from Libya, and the EU Military Staff (on request by the European Commission's DG ECHO) coordinated the use of military aircrafts from member states for the evacuation of refugees from Tunisia (EEAS, 2011).[30]

## Spanish and Moroccan security and defence policies in the post-Cold War era

Spain is usually not considered to be among the most important EU member states when it comes to shaping the CSDP. The Spanish defence budget has been steadily shrinking in terms of percentage of GDP, from 2 per cent in 1988 to about 1 per cent in 2008. Spain abolished military conscription in 2001 and it is estimated that the Spanish Armed Forces had roughly 309,000 personnel in 1988 and about 216,000 in 2012 (Howorth, 2007: 100–101;

World Bank, 2014).[31] Even though Spain is the fifth largest defence spender in the EU, both France and the UK annually spend more than four times as much on defence as Spain. The UK, France, Germany and Italy together account for about 75 per cent of the total military expenditure in the EU, whereas the average expenditure among the remaining EU member states (2.9 million USD) equals that of Vietnam (3.2 million USD) (Howorth, 2007: 117). The conventional wisdom holds that the 'big three' (UK, France and Germany) are by far the most important actors in an intergovernmental policy area such as the CSDP in terms of their superior military capacities and economic weight. However, although the combined defence budgets of all EU member states represent a quarter of the world's total defence spending it is less than half of what the US spends. Moreover, among the five largest defence spenders in the EU it is only Germany that roughly keeps its spending at the level it had before the 2008 global financial crisis (see Figure 3.1).

To be sure, numbers only tell us so much. What also needs to be taken into account is that the capacity for actually deploying troops and personnel abroad in military operations is an important factor in estimating how much influence EU member states wield over the CSDP. Seen from this perspective, middle-sized or small EU member states like Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden are certainly not irrelevant, as they contribute with much sought-after capacities for military as well as civilian operations and missions.[32] For example, Spain has been the second largest troop contributor to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, and in 2008, a Spanish Major General was appointed as COMEUFOR for the operation.[33] The increasing participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in international operations constitutes one of the single most important changes in Spanish security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War.





*Figure 3.1* Military expenditure in the EU 1988–2013
Note: Figures in million USD, at constant 2011 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure, which is in million USD at 2013 prices and exchange rates. By comparison, in 2012 the US military expenditure reached 671,097 million USD.
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (http://milexdata.sipri.org)

Until becoming a member of NATO and the EU, Spain had practically been absent from international operations.[34] But, since 1989, Spain has participated in various UN, NATO and EU operations and contributed with more than 100,000 troops in about 50 international missions on four continents.[35]

The magnitude of this change is perhaps best appreciated when taking into account that basically the entire Spanish military leadership in 1981 (the year Spain entered NATO) had personally experienced the Spanish Civil War, and fought with Franco against the forces loyal to the Spanish Republic.[36] It would in fact be more appropriate to describe the territorial organization of the Spanish Armed Forces during the Francoist regime as being set up with the aim to occupy Spain rather than to defend it against the threat of foreign invasion (Payne, 1967; Serra, 2008: 127).[37] Today, it would be hard indeed to find a high-ranking Spanish military officer that has not served in Bosnia under NATO or EU command (*El País*, 2011). Thus, the contrast could not be greater between the ostracized, autocratic Francoist regime of the Cold War and contemporary Spain having been a member of both EU and NATO for more than two decades now and actively taking part in international operations (cf. Linz and Stepan, 1996: 110).

It would of course be difficult to claim that Moroccan diplomats and military officers are embedded in transnational networks on security and defence to the same extent as their Spanish counterparts have become since the 1980s onwards.[38] But there are several indications that military cooperation regularly takes place between Spain and Morocco, and that the Moroccan foreign policy elite is starting to embrace a similar notion of security as their Spanish counterparts, albeit possibly for different reasons (see below). Since the end of the Cold War, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) have participated in several UN peacekeeping operations (for example in Haiti and the Ivory Coast) as well as in other international operations headed by NATO and the EU. The FAR have since the early 1980s: 'established and maintained close collaboration with NATO, conducting joint, bilateral exercises with, among others, the United States, France and Spain and also securing much-needed military assistance' (White, 2007: 483). In 1991, Morocco supported the US-led coalition force in the Gulf War by stationing 6,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, despite large demonstrations being held throughout the country in support of Iraq (ibid.: 482). Furthermore, since 9/11, Morocco has become an increasingly important ally for both the US and the EU in the struggle against international terrorism, as well as against drug trafficking in the Maghreb and in the wider Sahel region, not to mention controlling migration from Africa towards Europe.[39]

Even though Morocco has constantly moved closer to the EU and the US in the post-Cold War era, it has not experienced the same drastic cuts in defence spending as many European countries, mainly due to persisting tensions with Algeria and the need to keep a large military presence in the occupied territories of Western Sahara. In 2012, Morocco spent an amount equal to 3.6 billion USD (3.5 per cent of GDP) on defence, although in the same year Algeria spent almost three times as much (9.1 billion USD/4.5 per cent of GDP) (see





*Figure 3.2* Military expenditure in the Maghreb 1988–2013
Note: Figures in million USD, at constant 2011 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure, which is in million USD at 2013 prices and exchange rates
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (http://milexdata.sipri.org)

Figure 3.2). As of 2012, the FAR had about 246,000 personnel (US cable 164775; World Bank, 2014).

Over the last couple of years both Morocco and Algeria have embarked on large military modernization programmes. It might be tempting to suggest that there is an arms race going on in the Maghreb, but it should to be noted that certain military equipment that has been purchased rather seems to be aimed at bolstering Morocco's and Algeria's counter-insurgency capabilities and to improve their maritime patrol capabilities. Of course, it cannot be completely discarded that procurements of advanced military equipment (e.g. aircrafts, submarines, air defence systems, frigates armed with surface-to-surface missiles) could also be: 'related to traditional views about the need for armed forces to be equipped with modern weapons in order to bolster the country's regional or international profile. Such procurements may also be linked to a perceived threat from neighbouring countries' (Wezeman, 2009: 3).[40]

Having emerged from the devastating civil war in the 1990s, and profiting from the revenues of its large energy resources, Algeria seems to be in a much better position vis-à-vis its long-standing rival, and judging by the figures on military expenditure alone, Morocco would seem to be destined to lose any eventual military standoff in the Maghreb. However, that need not necessarily be true since it has to be taken into account that the US granted Morocco the status of non-NATO ally in 2004 as recognition of its strategic importance.[41] This status ensures Morocco 'strategic parity' with Algeria (Sater, 2010: 137).[42] The explicit support from the US together with closer cooperation with EU member states such as France and Spain suggest that even though tensions are most likely to persist between Morocco and Algeria, war with Algeria is not perceived by Moroccan elites as being an immediate or even particularly salient threat. Any future military conflict would seem more likely to take on the

characteristics of a proxy war between Moroccan armed forces and the Polisario (backed by Algeria) in Western Sahara, and even that does not seem to be a particularly likely scenario.[43]

### *Morocco and the CSDP*

Morocco is the only Arab country to have participated in a CSDP operation, namely in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2004 to 2007. Morocco participated with troops deployed in Mostar as part of the Multi-National Task Force South-East (MNTF SE) together with French, Spanish, German, Italian and Albanian forces (Marsou, 2007: 51). The principal task assigned to the Moroccan contingent was to guard the base in Mostar, but Moroccan military personnel also occasionally assisted the Bosnian civilian population in rural areas with medical care (ibid.: 54). Moroccan forces had been present in Bosnia since 1996 (originally with about 1,300 troops), participating in both NATO IFOR and SFOR (ibid.).[44] This essentially meant that the Moroccan contingent stayed on and changed their uniform insignias from NATO to EU just like many other participants (see above). In line with the general down-sizing of the troop levels in Bosnia in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Morocco only kept 130 soldiers in the country from May 2004 and then chose to withdraw from the operation in Bosnia when the EU made the decision to further downscale the operation by 2007 (see above).

Morocco's participation in EUFOR Althea is typically depicted as a success by the EU. According to an interviewee at the Council Secretariat, the EU's opinion is that the Moroccan contingent deployed in Bosnia had satisfyingly completed their mission and that there would be no 'impediment' for Morocco to participate in future CSDP operations.[45] The same interviewee explained that France covered some of the expenses relating to Morocco's participation in EUFOR Althea in order to help the Moroccan forces stay on in Bosnia when the NATO mission was completed.[46]

Furthermore, representatives of the EU have on numerous occasions suggested that Morocco should sign a framework agreement for participation in future CSDP operations and missions. For example, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy sent a letter in July 2010 to Morocco and five other Mediterranean partners (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Egypt and Montenegro) with an invitation to sign such an agreement.[47] At the 9th EU–Morocco Association Council meeting held in December 2010, the EU issued a declaration stating that Morocco had signalled an important endorsement of the CSDP with its participation in EUFOR Althea and that the EU would like to see such an experience repeated within ongoing or future operations. The EU also calls for the signing of a framework agreement on Morocco's participation in CSDP operations as well as a permanent agreement on sharing classified information (EU–Moroccan Association Council, 2010).

Several meetings between Moroccan officials and representatives of the PSC have been held in recent years following upon what was suggested in Morocco's

Advanced Status adopted in 2008 (see Chapter 2). In March 2009, an ad-hoc meeting to discuss strategic matters was held at the Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Rabat. The General Secretary of the Moroccan MFA, Youssef Amrani, and the Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Helga Schmid, attended the meeting. According to a communiqué issued by the Moroccan MFA, the parties discussed several question of common interest, notably in relation to the Maghreb, the Middle East, regional dimensions in the European Security Strategy and the situation in Africa (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).[48]

The EU's ambition is to continue holding such meetings in order to strengthen the political dialogue on security and defence. According to Moroccan interviewees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rabat and Morocco's representation in Brussels, the Moroccan government would like to institutionalize the political dialogue with the EU in order to move beyond ad-hoc meetings with the PSC. Morocco's aim in this regard would be to develop a more 'strategic focus' on issues relating to international security, regional stability and terrorism.[49] However, apart from the PSC, the Council Secretariat also keeps Morocco informed about ongoing developments of the CSDP on a regular basis. Such meetings usually take place in Brussels with officials from the Secretariat and diplomats from the Moroccan diplomatic mission to the EU.[50] It should be noted that besides participating in actual operations and engaging in political dialogue, Morocco can also partake in CSDP activities such as European Security and Defence College training courses. One interviewee at the Council Secretariat explained: 'In EU terminology, "training" is basically seminars. It's not in the field. It's about EU procedures and structures.'[51] Having this possibility is of course not the same thing as participating in EU military exercises, but that is not an option available to Morocco, or any other non-EU member state for that matter (see below). Morocco is instead briefed afterwards as well as informed beforehand of the exercises. Nonetheless, the same interviewee was keen to point out that:

> What we always say in the Euro-Mediterranean context is that we, of course, want to offer the same opportunities to all partners but it's up to them to decide in what activity to be engaged and what they would like to pick up more intensively. So it's flexible. Now Morocco and Egypt are the ones most interested in what we do. There are several ways of showing this interest. We from the Council Secretariat are open to have bilateral meetings and informal contacts, even on the phone, to explain certain things and inform what we're planning on the operations and missions or other activities. So it's basically the two delegations from Morocco and Egypt that are interested also in this more informal exchange.
>
> (Interview No. 3, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

On the whole, Morocco's involvement in the CSDP might not look that impressive, but as this official emphasized: 'in comparison to other Mediterranean

partners it is progressing'.[52] Other interviewees at the Council Secretariat stressed that it is not necessary for Morocco to sign a framework agreement on participation in the CSDP in order to contribute to future operations since it can continuously be done on an ad-hoc basis (as was the case in Bosnia). Signing such an agreement with the EU would of course also send a strong political signal of commitment on behalf of Morocco to both EU member states and non-members, or in the words of one interviewee at the Council Secretariat: 'it's a nice business card'.[53]

Asked how the ad-hoc based cooperation on CFSP would work in practice one interviewee at the Council Secretariat explained that it basically deals with forging common positions and declarations:

> It's a common practice. All former candidate countries, when they were negotiating their membership, had to align themselves to the common positions of the CFSP. It's a process. Today the same thing is valid for Turkey… We are asking them to align themselves with our policies. We hope that we can do the same thing with our Mediterranean partners. So we proposed this some three years ago to all of them, this was before the talk of the Advanced Status for Morocco. But they were not very positive. And it's still the same position. I mean, most of these countries belong to other organizations such as the Arab League or the African Union or the Organization of Islamic Conference. The EU doesn't necessarily have the same position as these organizations, so it's not easy for them to align themselves to our positions. This is a concrete proposal but we haven't seen any concrete results, in general. Particular for the Moroccan case is that there have been some other issues as well, such as the Western Sahara issue. The proposal is on the table, but that's also where we are at the moment. How would it work in practice? Well, say that we tomorrow adopt a declaration on nuclear proliferation towards Iran and India. We would then ask our partners to align themselves to that declaration and if they do, we would put in a footnote that, for example, Morocco and Tunisia are aligning themselves to the declaration.
>
> (Interview No. 18, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

However, one diplomat at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that even though Morocco is open to future participation in CSDP operations, it all depends on the kind of operation that the EU would consider launching, and that Morocco would seek to cooperate with the EU on the CSDP without a framework agreement also in the near future.[54]

### *Spain and the CSDP*

On the other side of the strait, Spanish support for the development of a European common defence dates back at least to the debates preceding the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and Spain is often described as belonging to

the group of EU member states that: 'have edged closer to [CSDP] and begun to reevaluate the precise nature of their relationship to NATO' (Howorth, 2007: 154). By the time that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) was being discussed among the EU member states in the early 1990s, the Spanish government was in favour of implementing: 'new diplomatic and military mechanisms' (Barbé, 1998: 151).[55] With enhanced European cooperation on security and defence, the Spanish government identified the possibility of combining two key interests: integration with Europe and stability in the Mediterranean (Barbé, 1999; Gillespie, 2000; Ortega, 1995). As early as 1990, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, claimed that: 'There is a European dimension of security that cannot be forgotten, and this dimension is the Mediterranean one' (Fernández Ordóñez, quoted in Barbé, 1998: 147).

But as the process of EU treaty revisions continued with the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996–1997, Spain's activism in this policy field gradually waned. With the Popular Party (PP) having won the elections in 1996, the Conservative government under José Maria Aznar instead focused on matters relating to the first and third pillars of the EU (notably institutional reform of the EU and enhanced cooperation in JHA) (Barbé and Mestres, 2007: 53). Nonetheless, the first Aznar government (1996–2000) continued along the path set out by previous Spanish governments, only with less diplomatic intensity in matters relating to security and defence cooperation in the EU.[56] The Spanish disposition did not significantly change as a consequence of the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 and Spain endorsed the British–French call for the build-up in the EU of a capacity for autonomous action backed up by military force.[57]

It can certainly be argued that there is a high degree of continuity as to Spain's support for the CSDP, but the Spanish policy on the subject did experience an interesting (albeit not lasting) volte-face under Aznar's second term in office (2000–2004). The shift was most conspicuously seen in the wholehearted backing of the US's 'war on terror' after 9/11.[58] The Aznar government went out of its way to lend political support to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 even though a majority of Spanish citizens did not approve of it.[59] Spain also rejected a proposal set forth by France, Germany, Luxemburg and Belgium to create an independent EU military headquarters in Tervuren (Belgium). However, as it was clear that the UK, France and Germany were about to bury the hatchet ahead of the European Council meeting in December 2003, Spain also accepted the compromise to set up an EU military planning capability (Barbé and Mestres, 2007: 54).

The Aznar government can be said to have taken a more outspokenly pro-Atlanticist stance than any previous democratically elected government in Spain. But this did not mean that it at the same time completely blocked any further development of the CSDP.[60] During the Spanish EU Presidency in 2002, the European Council in Seville adopted a declaration on the contribution of the CSDP in the fight against international terrorism (European Council,

2002). Moreover, during the European Convention in 2002–2003, the Spanish government sought to contribute to the debate on the CSDP in the (non-ratified) Constitutional Treaty. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ana de Palacio, submitted a contribution on behalf of the Spanish government urging for the implementation of the Seville declaration so that: 'The possibility should be envisaged of developing a military concept on defence against terrorism and other new threats' (European Convention, 2003). The Spanish Minister also called for: 'A broader definition of the Petersberg tasks should include other tasks that imply the use of military means, i.e. conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization operations, military advice, disarmament operations and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism. It should also include the use of military means in support of Member States against the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction' (ibid.).

However, the terrorist attacks in Madrid perpetrated by radical Islamists on 11 March 2004 had a profound impact on Spanish politics, as they contributed to the change of government following the general elections held only three days later.[61] Among the first decisions that the newly elected Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, made was to follow-up on his pre-election promise to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq (Zapatero, speech, 2004a). In his inaugural speech in April 2004, Zapatero also made it clear that: 'what is good for Europe is good for Spain' (ibid.). In a move to further distance the new Socialist government from the previous one, Zapatero referred to the need for sharing obligations with Spain's partners to promote international peace and security albeit within the UN framework and at the same time denouncing notions of pre-emptive warfare and unilateral actions.

Zapatero also explicitly referred to the gradual build-up of the EU's capacities to conduct international crisis management operations as the: 'fundamental guide for the modernization, training and equipping which is necessary for our Armed Forces to effectively fulfil their missions' (ibid.). With the PSOE in power, Spain strongly endorsed the further development of the CSDP, which can be seen in the National Defence Directive endorsed by the Spanish government in December 2004. It depicts the CSDP as a nearly integral part of Spanish security and defence policy: 'We are Europeans and our security is inextricably linked to that of the continent' (Consejo de Defensa Nacional, 2004). Therefore, Spain should seek to promote and support an 'authentic European security and defence policy' for example, by contributing to providing the EU with the civil and military capabilities required for active and independent intervention to prevent and resolve conflicts and to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter (ibid.). The subsequent National Defence Directive of 2008 presents few novelties with regards to the CSDP (Consejo de Defensa Nacional, 2008).

However, with the new conservative government under Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy in office after the elections in 2011 there is a slight shift in the National Defence Directive back towards stressing that the: 'Atlantic Alliance remains the most appropriate link for security and collective defence for

Spain' and that the EU must find a way to reinforce the external projection of CSDP in tandem with NATO (Consejo de Defensa Nacional, 2012). Besides that, one of the main preoccupations of the 2012 National Defence Directive is how to ensure an effective Spanish security and defence policy in times of fiscal austerity, and the repeated solution is that should be achieved through enhanced international cooperation with Spain's partners (ibid.).

## Practical security cooperation in the Western Mediterranean: the 5+5 Defence Initiative

Besides the CSDP and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, there is another venue through which Spain and Morocco cooperate on matters related to security in the Mediterranean: the so-called 5+5 Defence Initiative. This initiative was launched in December 2004 following a declaration of the Ministers of Defence from Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauretania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. It was originally proposed by France in the early 1990s as a means to promote cooperation among these countries and it has evolved to bring together ministers from various line ministries on an informal basis (e.g. foreign affairs, interior, tourism, transport, social affairs) since there is no treaty that formally created the 5+5 as an international organization (Algora Weber, 2008: 62–64; Algora Weber, 2009).

Even though the 5+5 Defence Initiative is a relatively recent creation compared to the meetings of ministers of foreign affairs and of the interior, the regional cooperation in the Western Mediterranean on security and defence took off quite rapidly. The cooperation focuses broadly on four themes: air security; maritime surveillance; the support of the armed forces to civil protection; and training and exercises. The Steering Committee for the 5+5 Defence Initiative (where each participating country has two representatives) was set up in 2005 in order to discuss the annual action plans. Since then, the activities in the 5+5 format have steadily increased each year to include seminars, training courses and military exercises, such as for example the Hispano-Portuguese maritime surveillance exercise 'Seaborder 09' in which vessels from France and Morocco also participated (see Appendix II). Moreover, the Spanish government invited Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia to participate at the informal meeting of the EU Ministers of Defence held in Palma de Mallorca in February 2010, during the Spanish EU Presidency, in order to explore 'possible joint actions in the face of common threats and risks in the Mediterranean' (Spanish Ministry of Defence, 2010b).

Another highly interesting feature of the initiative is the creation of a 5+5 Defence College. It was originally a French proposal that was eventually endorsed by all participating countries at a meeting in Cagliari (Italy) in 2007 (Algora Weber, 2008). The college is modelled after the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in that it is a virtual institution relying on the existing military educational structures of the participating countries, such as, for example, the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional

(CESEDEN) in Spain. The training courses are given at three levels, and bring together military officers from the rank of captain (basic level), and lieutenant colonel (intermediate) to colonel and general (superior) from all participating countries (ibid.: 71).

## Spanish and Moroccan cooperative security in discourse and practice

Spanish security and defence policy has undergone a process of profound change ever since the end of the Cold War. One important factor in the process has been Spain's participation in international operations, but there has also been: 'an important legislative process to modernize and make inter-ministerial coordination and the armed forces structures more flexible in view of the abolition of compulsory military service' (Barbé and Mestres, 2007: 57). By and large, these changes can be said to reflect a change in the perception of threats to Spain's security among Spanish politicians, diplomats and military leaders, which is in line with similar changes in other European countries in the post-Cold War era. In short, it is a move from emphasizing territorial defence to stressing participation in international operations as a means to enhance Spain's security as well as to provide a rationale for modernizing the Spanish Armed Forces. A recurrent theme in the Spanish discourse on security and defence in the post-Cold War era is the de-territorialization of security threats as well as the uncertainty and unpredictability that surround them. This process started well before the CSDP became operational although it is hard to imagine such a process taking place without Spain's membership in the EU and NATO, in terms of the exposure of Spanish politicians, diplomats and military officials to the debates on security in these European and transatlantic forums (cf. Mérand, 2010).

In 1998, a joint parliamentary committee presented a report on the need to modernize the Spanish Armed Forces and to reform the old model of a conscript army by introducing an all-volunteer military force. The motive behind such a reform was openly referred to as the changed strategic outlook in Europe after the demise of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, it stated that the end of the Cold War did not necessarily mean enhanced security but rather the emergence of new risks and threats: 'Paradoxically, the disappearance of a great enemy has not led to the desired stability because the emergence of small conflicts has given rise to a situation of more complex uncertainty than the previous uniform and monolithic threat' (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 1998). It also established what might be described as a leitmotif of Spanish security and defence policy, namely that: 'Autarchic defence concepts based on national self-sufficiency have been overcome and, although security and defence concepts based on proper military capacities are still valid, there is a striving among nations for political and military cooperation as a means to obtain more security at less cost' (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 1998).

The report was followed by the Spanish White Book on Defence in 2000. It largely expanded on the need to modernize the Spanish Armed Forces in

order to meet the security challenges of the post-Cold War era. Although the concept of territorial defence was not abandoned (the main objective of the Spanish Armed Forces is still to preserve the independence of the Spanish nation and protect the territorial integrity of the Spanish state), it established clearly that the security of Spain is dependent on the security of its partners, which is realized through Spain's participation in organizations such as NATO and the EU. It also reiterates the Spanish notion of the Mediterranean dimension of European security:

> The Mediterranean is an area of contrast and imbalances in political, economic and social terms which, as a consequence, make it inclined towards instability … To find solutions to the problems of security in the Mediterranean and create a space of peace and prosperity it is necessary that there exists communication and confidence between the two shores, an aim to which aspires the forums for dialogue promoted by the Atlantic Alliance and the Barcelona Process of the European Union, which are complementary to each other and promoted by Spain.
>
> (Spanish Ministry of Defence, 2000)

The Strategic Defence Review was then concluded in 2003. It can be said to anticipate the ESS adopted later the same year in that it stated that military aggression against Spain is highly unlikely, but there are a range of new security threats on the horizon caused by the 'negative effects of globalization' (such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, environmental dangers, uncontrolled migration and cyber-attacks) (Spanish Ministry of Defence, 2003: 47–52). Consequently, the Spanish Armed Forces need to be 'flexible' and 'adopting to change' since a too fixed focus on the already 'known' threats might in fact be counterproductive (ibid.).

In late 2005, the new Law on National Defence was passed. It replaced the previous law on national defence that had been in force since 1980. The current law encapsulates many of the conceptual changes relating to security, defence and the Armed Forces debated in Spain since the end of the Cold War. Although it departs from the notion that the Spanish Armed Forces shall defend Spanish citizens as well as Spain's sovereignty, its territorial integrity and the constitutional order, it clearly stipulates that the function of the Spanish Armed Forces today is not merely territorial defence but that they shall also contribute to international peace and security as well as assist Spanish authorities when handling terrorist attacks, natural catastrophes or other calamities (Ley Orgánica 5/2005).[62] Highly interesting, the law also provides the legal basis for the Military Emergency Unit (UME). The Spanish government made the decision to create the UME already in October 2005 whereas the intervention protocol of the unit was established in March 2007 (Real Decreto, 399/2007). There is of course nothing new in that military capacities are being used in times of peace to support civil authorities in handling large-scale catastrophes, it is rather quite logical, following upon the broader changes described above, that

the Spanish government decided to create a military unit whose primary function is not defence in any traditional sense but to perform tasks that are better described as protection against man-made and natural disasters.

The discourse surrounding the Moroccan security and defence policy in the post-Cold War era bears some interesting similarities to what can be seen in the cases of the EU and Spain. Shortly after ascending to the throne in 1999, Mohammed VI made an address to Moroccan troops before their departure to Kosovo as a contribution to the NATO-led KFOR force. In the address, the Moroccan monarch depicted Morocco's participation in international operations as an expression of Moroccan traditions and practices which honour solidarity among nations and international law.[63] On a later occasion, the monarch called for the modernization of the Moroccan FAR in order for them to adapt to the 'rapid changes' in the field of military technology taking place in the post-Cold War era.[64] Even though the relation between international cooperation and military modernization is perhaps not as pronounced in the Moroccan discourse as in the Spanish case, Mohammed VI can nonetheless be said to establish a connection between the traditional role of the Moroccan FAR as the defender of the Moroccan nation and Morocco's territorial integrity, and the necessity to reform due to rapidly changing and more complex security threats. This is, for example, expressed in the speech delivered on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Moroccan armed forces in 2006.[65]

Although the Moroccan monarch seldom explicitly mentions the nature of the changes that affect the international community, representatives of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs are more candid in this regard. Especially after 9/11 and the terror attacks in Casablanca in 2003, terrorism figures prominently as a major security threat: 'International and regional security are confronted with a major challenge characterized by its diffuse and unpredictable nature as well as its lethal consequences which effect regions and countries regardless of race, culture or religion. The fight against the curse of terrorism demands a coordinated effort in order to eradicate its origins and various manifestations' (Rachad Bouhlal, speech, 2003). To be sure, focusing on terrorism goes well with Moroccan interests, not least in seeking wider international support for its cause in the conflict over Western Sahara, and in order to make sure that its allies pay attention to terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

However, terrorism is not only depicted as a significant security threat. Interestingly, the way in which Moroccan representatives suggest that terrorism and other security threats should be dealt with resonates well with the changing notion of security seen in the case of the EU and Spain. For example, at the margins of the 60th session of the UN General Assembly, the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Benaissa, quite typically called for a 'global' and 'multidimensional' approach to security in order to reflect the view that the interdependence of security, development, human rights, rule of law and democracy constitute the most effective way to counter the threats and

challenges facing the international community, and that Morocco favours a collective approach to security based on a notion of prevention (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Moroccan diplomats are keen to portray contemporary security threats as being complex with essentially non-military and trans-boundary features requiring development aid and preventive measures rather than primarily military force in order to be dealt with. For example, a high-ranking Moroccan diplomat remarked that the main threats to security in the 'Mediterranean space' are terrorism, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, human trafficking and environmental degradation (Hilale, speech, 2007). Not only do these threats also figure prominently in the European Security Strategy (ESS), according to the same diplomat peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean is a strategic objective for Morocco. However, the important point here is that it is stated that such an objective cannot only be achieved with 'hard security' (i.e. by military means): 'The new threats that our country unfortunately has to face are more complex and more difficult to counter … Morocco's strategy in terms of security is multidimensional because it seeks to integrate national, regional and international approaches' (ibid.).

Morocco can be said to have used the notion of the increasing de-territorialization of security threats to promote its own interests. In a telling example, the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taïb Fassi Fihri, made a statement in 2009 calling for a 'tri-continental approach' to security involving countries in Africa, Europe and Latin America. Accordingly, the primary reason is that terrorist networks in the Sahel region cooperate with Latin American drug cartels in their efforts to ship drugs to Europe through routes in West Africa where many countries do not have the means necessary to counter that threat. This ominous combination of factors is said to have, in a description not very different from Spanish accounts of the 'negative effects of globalization', a negative impact on Morocco's security as well as the region's which implies that countries in Europe, Latin America and West Africa have a shared responsibility to find long-term solutions to this menace (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

### *The logic (and limits) of cooperative security*

The CSDP can thus in many ways be seen as a response to a phenomenon experienced not only by Spain but by most other EU member states, namely, what to do with the national armed forces at a time when inter-state war is not the prime security threat.[66] This also reflects the change that is embedded in the shift from territorial defence to international crisis management, and a shift from the logic of deterring threats to defusing them. However, what is particularly interesting here is that this change seems to have a certain practical aspect to it, as one Spanish interviewee at the MoD in Madrid explained:

> The insight that no single country can handle today's crises on its own is behind the references to collective defence and shared security in the National Defence Directive, while certain emphasis is being put on our neighbourhood and all what can done in common. But it's not all about obtaining the legitimacy which is granted by the UN Security Council or the legitimacy that derives from the fact that several countries are doing something together, and the more the better. It's also about an insight from a more practical point of view, and that is that doing something together with others is always more effective. Logically, we'll cooperate with other states through NATO and through the EU. But we'll not necessarily stop at that. We'll cooperate with the countries in North Africa through 5+5 and we'll cooperate with other states when it's necessary.
>
> (Interview No. 42, Spanish Ministry of Defence)

Commenting on the changes to Spanish security and defence policy since the late 1990s, the same interviewee was keen to point out that this should certainly not be seen as unique to Spain:

> The conceptual changes are not unique to Spain. I think that most other countries are doing something similar. It is being done in NATO, EU and in individual member states. The first reason is that it has become clear that in order to confront the new threats it's not sufficient to rely on military means. Crisis management requires the coordination of civil and military efforts … The other reason is that it's increasingly more difficult to do something related to security in one single country due to the effects of globalization … There is a need to expand the field of security policy not only to include civilian means but also to include other countries in order to work together.
>
> (Ibid.)

The development of the CSDP, and especially Morocco's participation in operations and other activities are also said to be well in line with the general aims of Spain's security and defence policy towards the Mediterranean: 'It's absolutely complementary. That is to say that security in the Mediterranean is one of the great priorities for Spanish defence policy. We try to deal with it from all possible angles.'[67]

On the Moroccan side, interviewees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rabat agree that regional frameworks promoted by the EU and NATO can be said to support the broader aims of peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean, but according to them, the main obstacle inherent to, for example, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, is the lack of funding.[68] Furthermore, both Spanish and Moroccan interviewees point to the fact that the Arab–Israeli conflict blocks almost every attempt at regional cooperation in the Mediterranean, especially when it comes to sensitive issues such as security and defence. This would also be one of the main

reasons why Morocco deliberately pursues a policy of bilaterally moving closer to the EU, also in relation to the CSDP.[69]

However, it also needs to be taken into account that the EU wants Morocco and other non-members to become more involved in the CSDP since it would show that it is not exclusively by and for EU member states:

> Everybody wants that. But they [i.e. non-members] want to be the actors in such operations, not the subject or object of our actions … It's good for the EU also to show that what we are doing is not particularly European, but rather that we do things with a UN mandate and with third countries participating. This is attractive also for member states since third countries end up paying a little bit of the costs.
>
> (Interview No. 26, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

But there are, at the same time, limits to how far the participation of non-EU member states in CSDP can go. Contributing with troops or other military capacities to already decided operations is one thing, but taking part in the decision-making on what kind of operations to launch and where to launch them is something else entirely. To be sure, the participation of non-EU member states in decision-making on the CSDP is not being discussed, as one Council official explained:

> It is not on the agenda at all, because you know that the EU and its members take its own decisions. We can't open up the house in order to take decisions together. It's one of the basic principles, of CFSP as well. Decision autonomy, as we call it. Take the [CSDP], where there is NATO implications, there the basic principle is decision autonomy. We take our own decisions and the others take theirs, and then we might try to converge our positions. So that's how the decision autonomy principle works. Same thing when we deal with third countries.
>
> (Interview No. 18, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

### *Established practices, informal settings*

On both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, there is a noticeable interest in promoting security cooperation outside of the frameworks promoted by the EU, and the 5+5 Defence Initiative is the prime example here. Spanish and Moroccan interviewees suggest that the reason that the initiative works fairly well compared to other regional frameworks is that it deliberately focuses on practical cooperation, and the geographical focus is deliberately set on the Western parts of the Mediterranean basin (which means that it is not hampered by the Arab–Israeli conflict).[70] When dealing with practical matters such as maritime surveillance and the armed forces' support of civil protection, Moroccan and Algerian representatives can put aside their differences over Western Sahara, at least according to an interviewee at the Moroccan

MFA in Rabat.[71] When asked to elaborate on what cooperation in 5+5 entails in practice, one Spanish interviewee also gave examples of its future potentials:

> We are doing exercises within the 5+5 format, such as air and maritime exercises in which all countries participate. Well, small and simple things, like cooperation between patrol vessels in case of marine pollution or oil-spills … We have a system of maritime information exchange, basically to locate ships and vessels. So in the Western Mediterranean, we have an internet-based system called Recognized Maritime Picture in which ten countries share open and non-classified information, but it's a *common* [interviewee's emphasis] system. It's very important and it's practical … There are currently agreements between Spain, France and Italy where the Western parts of the Mediterranean is divided geographically in terms of responsibilities in case of accidents. We hope that in the future, although I'm not going to say in a near future but we have great expectations, that when it comes to search and rescue there will also be areas of responsibility designated to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Would that come to pass, it would have an impressive practical importance. That is to say that day-to-day cooperation creates these kinds of mechanisms. That's the transcendental character of practical cooperation.
>
> (Interview No. 42, Spanish Ministry of Defence)

Another interviewee at the Spanish MoD responsible for civil defence said that within the 5+5 format both Morocco and Algeria have shown a particular interest in Spain's Military Emergency Unit (UME) as it has been sent to assist France, Portugal and Morocco on occasions (notably with fire-fighting aircrafts).[72] Even though civil protection is usually not a responsibility for the Ministries of Defence in the countries of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, one interviewee at the Spanish MoD implicitly referred to the changing role of the armed forces:

> We have a network of contact points in case of natural disasters [in the 5+5]. Well, that is not really a responsibility for the Ministry of Defence, it's civil protection. But in the end, they all end up requesting assistance from the armed forces anyway. So we have a network of contact points in order for us to have the information on disasters immediately, but of course the decisions to send assistance are taken elsewhere. We have done exercises on that too.
>
> (Ibid.)

As for the 5+5 Defence College, the same interviewee made a very interesting observation:

> The Defence College of 5+5 is identical to that of the EU. It does not have a permanent residence. It has recurrent modules on three levels of

> study. We started last year [2008] with the first training modules. This year [2009] Spain will organize one of the two superior training modules of the 5+5 Defence College. We'll dedicate it to aspects of security that affect the Western part of Mediterranean which is the geographical area of the 5+5 [and] we'll discuss questions related to migration and search and rescue.
>
> (Ibid.)

Even though it should be noted that these interviews were conducted before the Arab Spring, they point to interesting perceptions regarding cooperating on matters related to security and defence and whether it has improved over the last decade:

> I would say that in the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, we're in a bit of a stalemate, and we'll have to wait and see if we can get the process going again. As for NATO, the situation for the Mediterranean Dialogue has improved. We also have at our disposal a new instrument for cooperation and that is the 5+5, and I think it has proven to be a much greater success than what we could have hoped at the beginning. In that sense, I think that there is reason to be optimistic about security cooperation in the Mediterranean in that the instruments that we have now are better than they were a couple of years ago. If we misuse them or if we fail to take advantage of these opportunities it's our own fault, but there is no doubt that we have much more possibilities today than we had some years ago.
>
> (Ibid.)

This interviewee can be said to have reflected on the matter in a rather nuanced way that seems to have been confirmed by recent events in North Africa (such as the increasing instability in Libya and the return of military rule in Egypt after the coup in 2013):

> If we are to talk about security in the Mediterranean, one of the things that we should work on is the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the other thing is the stability in North Africa. It's not that there is a threat from North Africa towards Europe, there simply is none. We have excellent relations. But there is a risk, if we can call it that, or rather a situation that we need to be aware of so that we might try to prevent it from happening in the future [and] it is to avoid that fundamental Islamism spreads in North Africa. That is why I would like to underline that one thing is to say that we are better off now because we have more and better instruments and it is another thing to say that we are better off because the general situation have improved. They are actually two different things.
>
> (Ibid.)

Reflecting on the future of the CSDP in comparison to NATO when it comes to international crisis management, the same interviewee summarized

in broad strokes the post-Cold War conceptual changes in security and defence:

> The EU perhaps has a broader variety of possibilities, but compared to NATO, its capacities are much smaller. That's the situation we're in, but there is no doubt that the EU is in better shape to talk about a comprehensive approach [to security] although currently its capacities are limited. When they are better developed in the future, it will be within an organization that has both civilian and military elements. I can see that from a conceptual point of view, the EU is better prepared to handle this new situation of crisis management with various types of means.
>
> (Ibid.)

## Broadened security, expanding community?

The findings presented above suggest that there is a strong disposition among EU member states to cooperate not only among themselves, but also with non-members in matters relating to security and defence. This is highly relevant in relation to the question posed in this book, because as a consequence the Union can be said to promote the spread of cooperative security practices, which do not primarily rely on the logic of military deterrence and territorial defence, but rather on the logic of defusing threats and crisis management. Judging from the analysis, it can also be said that the institutionalization of the CSDP further embeds diplomats, military officers and bureaucrats within the EU in these types of cooperative practices, but what is equally important is that it seems to be working so as to also embed diplomats and military officers from non-EU member states (albeit to a lesser extent). This institutionalization process seems to be enhancing and possibly also expanding already existing transgovernmental networks in the field of international crisis management, seen in, for example, the embryonic liaison between the Political and Security Committee and the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, the CSDP becomes a vehicle for disseminating cooperative security practices based on the notion of international crisis management that has developed within the EU since the 1990s.

Spain is a case in point in this regard. Spanish security and defence policy has changed profoundly since the 1980s due to the country's membership in the EU and NATO. The Spanish government consistently portrays the CSDP as essential to fulfilling Spain's aim of being an active partner in international peacekeeping and crisis management as well as a means to modernize the Spanish Armed Forces. The Spanish Ministry of Defence actively seeks to promote military cooperation in the Mediterranean region and especially in North Africa. Cooperative security practices developed within the EU and NATO (e.g. participating in exercises, developing training modules, establishing networks) are regularly applied in relation to countries such as, for example, Morocco and Algeria, as this is seen as contributing to the aims of the Spanish security and defence policy. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, the absence

of any conventional military threat to Spain has also meant that the role of the armed forces has expanded from primarily territorial defence to a peacetime support function vis-à-vis the national civil protection system in order to enhance the Spanish state's capacity to handle 'new' security threats, such as international terrorism and natural disasters. But what is interesting here is that it seems to be self-evident that Spain's ability to counter such threats in part relies on its neighbours' ability to do so as well, and that this creates a disposition towards practical cooperation with a country such as Morocco related to a wide range of threats.

Morocco paints a more nuanced picture. On the one hand, it is the only Arab country that has participated in a CSDP operation. Morocco is also among the few Mediterranean non-members that has explicitly shown an interest in deepening the cooperation with the EU on matters relating to the CSDP as part of its Advanced Status. Morocco also has regular exchanges, in terms of exercises, with NATO and EU member states such as France and Spain, and it is a non-NATO ally of the US. On the other hand, persistent tensions with neighbouring Algeria and the on-going occupation of Western Sahara imply that territorial defence is still a major concern for Morocco. Historically, the relationship between the monarchy and the armed forces has been strained (not least after failed military coups in the 1970s) and Moroccan military officers are highly constrained in dealing with foreign counterparts, which arguably serves to hamper the effects of participation in international operations and exercises in terms of socialization. However, judging by the accounts from the Moroccan foreign policy elite, it seems as if Morocco is beginning to embrace a notion of comprehensive and cooperative security since doing so would promote Moroccan interests vis-à-vis its partners at a time of changing and uncertain circumstances.

One finding presented in this chapter that is of great relevance for the question posed in this book is that the de-territorialized notion of security identified in the empirical material and referred to by several interviewees appears to lend itself quite naturally to a practical disposition that security threats need to be countered through cooperative measures, and not only for the sake of cooperation as such. Depicting the de-territorialization of a range of threats, which are essentially non-military and trans-boundary, also makes it logical to present the case for enhanced regional and international cooperation, something that the EU certainly wants to promote. The development of the 5+5 defence cooperation nicely illustrates the practical implications of the changes to the concept of security in Spain and Morocco. The initiative's focus on maritime surveillance and the armed forces' support to civil protection authorities can be seen as indications that there are increasingly common threat perceptions on issues such as international terrorism and trafficking as well as natural and human-made disasters. Thus, although it might not seem intuitive at first, the findings presented above suggest that these kinds of cooperative security practices can flourish among states that have old and protracted conflicts, such as Spain and Morocco.

It should also be made clear that none of this is meant to say that the spread of cooperative security practices is first and foremost a function of

'altruistic' considerations. What rather seems to be behind the development of the CSDP in the first place is the gradual encroachment of the idea in Spain and other EU member states that the 'new' security threats cannot be handled in the 'old ways'. Indeed, in the analysed material, there are, alongside the ever increasing list of security threats (e.g. terrorism, organized crime, failed states, regional conflicts, climate change, etc.), recurrent references to the *uncertainty* about what it is that constitutes a threat today. Curiously, when the Cold War is invoked in the contemporary discourse on security and defence in the EU and Spain, it is often portrayed as a historical period marked by great existential threats, but at the same time, great certainty about what it was that constituted *the* threat.

However, the de-territorialized notion of security that Spain and Morocco now seem to embrace probably serves diffuse political interests. For example, in the Spanish discourse on security analysed above, the 'first line of defence' is often depicted as being drawn abroad, and it is commonly stated that the security of Spain is inherently dependent on the Spanish Armed Forces' capacity to conduct international operations in cooperation with its allies and partners. To be sure, this can also be seen as serving the rather secular goal of maintaining a political interest in further military modernization in times of decreasing defence budgets. If the threat of foreign invasion during the Cold War served as an argument in favour of keeping relatively large military forces in Europe, in the post-Cold War era it is rather the need to be able to go abroad that serves as an argument in favour of keeping relatively smaller, but well-equipped and highly trained military forces.

The way in which Moroccan diplomats depict the security threats facing Morocco in the post-Cold War era and the proposed means to deal with them indicate that the de-territorialized notion of security has entered the Moroccan discourse as well. Morocco's security is now portrayed as dependent on achieving stability and development in the Mediterranean region as well as countering, in cooperation with its allies and partners, the threats posed by trafficking and Islamist terrorist networks in Western Africa and the Sahel. This can be seen to suggest that the Moroccan elite has first and foremost 'learnt to speak' the language used in documents such as the European Security Strategy, even though the underlying goal would still be to secure support for Morocco's claims on Western Sahara and to ensure continuing strategic parity with Algeria.

But the point here is not primarily to try and establish possible underlying motives. It is instead to highlight the practical consequences of 'speaking' and 'doing' cooperative security as crisis management (cf. Kratochwil, 2011). As a result of the changes referred to above, Morocco can be said to cooperate more intensively with Spain in terms of military exercises and vice-versa. Indeed, these findings suggest that security practice is not outside of or apart from security discourse. Furthermore, the analysis supports the argument that Spanish and Moroccan diplomats and military officers are part of an emerging, but still loosely defined, community of like-minded practitioners in the Western Mediterranean. This community is not necessarily supported by the

EU directly, but it certainly seems to be benefitting from the ways in which international security and crisis management is conceived of and practised in Brussels.

While sharing an interest in sharing knowledge and learning how to deal with non-military threats based on templates developed in the EU and NATO, this community can also be said to expand the boundaries of the European security community in the post-Cold War era. An important finding here is that it does not primarily do so on the basis of common practices of self-restraint, but rather by increasingly sharing a notion of what role the armed forces should play in international peacekeeping and crisis management. Indeed, Spanish–Moroccan cooperation on civil protection can be said to be the other side of the same coin, but in this case, the EU has a more direct supporting role vis-à-vis the transgovernmental networks of civil protection practitioners that are emerging in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

## Notes

1 The main hurdle that had blocked the way for European defence cooperation (as opposed to Euro-Atlantic) since 1945 was thus cleared by a stroke of the pen. The British government accepted that the EU should develop a military component (separable but not separate from NATO) and the French accepted NATO as a cornerstone of European (and not only Euro-Atlantic) cooperation on security and defence. However, it has more recently been suggested that the Saint-Malo declaration was in fact the product of a French–British 'constructive misunderstanding' which was crucial to set the process in motion but did not necessarily determine its outcome. The argument is that: 'whilst some in France saw CSDP as a tool in which to further the construction of "Europe politique", it was viewed in London as an instrument designed to improve military capabilities and that would also revitalize NATO' (Bickerton et al., 2011: 3). Interestingly, the UK and France play a pivotal role in terms of being the two major military powers in the EU and they can be said to be: '*bound to participate* in all [CSDP] initiatives in which one of them engages in order to shape, constrain, or counteract the former' (Haaland Matlary, 2009: 6, emphasis added). Realist-inspired analyses have suggested that CSDP is part and parcel of a 'preemptive' strategy by France and the UK to 'entangle' a re-unified Germany (increasingly stronger and thus potentially dangerous) (Hyde-Price, 2007). Other, perhaps less academic accounts, depict the whole thing as a French attempt to undermine NATO and that it was successful only because the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was caught off guard (cf. Howorth, 2007: 38–45).

2 The Petersberg tasks were originally defined by the members of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992. Having been founded in 1948 but being largely overshadowed by NATO during the Cold War, the WEU experienced a short revival in the 1990s before it was 'subsumed' in under the EU as a consequence of the CSDP. After the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in 2009, the members decided to terminate it and the WEU ceased to exist in 2011(cf. Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

3 It also needs to be taken into account that the interest of the US in keeping large military forces stationed in Europe has been waning ever since the threat of the Soviet Union vanished, and that paved the way to for an greater role for the EU in security and defence as it stood clear to most EU member states that US troops might not be around forever. Besides that, shrinking defence budgets in most EU

member states since the end of the Cold War have created incentives to 'pool' military resources in multilateral forums, and the prevailing US supremacy in all military matters plays a large part in the understanding that European armed forces need to modernize or else risk becoming irrelevant (not only for the EU but also for NATO) (Vedby Rasmussen, 2006).

4 The CSFP dates back to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which entered into force in 1993, and it was referred to as the second pillar in the pre-Lisbon setup (Smith, 2004).

5 Since 2002, the Ministers of Defence of the EU member states have been authorized to meet under the aegis of the Council. These meetings have been important for the development of the CSDP as they have been: 'instrumental in helping move the debate on capacity away from the raw numbers of the HHG and towards a clear set of qualitative criteria' (Howorth, 2007: 76).

6 The EU Military Staff (EUMS) includes almost 200 senior officers from the member states. The EUMS is also a General Directorate within the Council Secretariat, and it is the only permanently integrated military structure of the EU. It performs the operational functions of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, as well as providing military expertise to the High Representative. EUMS works under the political direction of the PSC and under the military direction of the EUMC.

7 EU Ministers of Defence also meet regularly in the format of the EDA's Steering Board. On competing institutional logics regarding defence market integration in the EU, see Mörth (2003b).

8 Other CSDP bodies are the EU Satellite Centre in Torrejón (Spain) and the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

9 The ESDC organizes high-level courses and orientation courses on the CSDP, some of which are also open to participants from non-EU member states (e.g. US, Russia, Japan, China) and international organizations (e.g. UN, OSCE, NATO). The objective of the ESDC is to promote knowledge on the CSDP and EU policies, institutions and procedures, as well as to promote 'a common European security culture' (Howorth, 2007: 114).

10 The original aim was to have 60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft deployable within 60 days and sustainable in operations for one year.

11 The main problem in the early phase of the CSDP allegedly was that the thinking behind setting up the HHG in 1999 drew heavily upon the experience from the Balkans, with the aim of having: 'the ability to carry out a Kosovo-type operation with minimal reliance on US inputs' (Howorth, 2007: 104). Since then, such kinds of operations (i.e. driving the Serbian army out of Kosovo) have increasingly been amended by the broader and revised Petersberg tasks which call for more focus on quality rather than quantity in crisis management operations.

12 At the 2004 European Council meeting in Brussels, the member states identified a range of objectives to be completed within the time horizon of 2010: the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Civil-Military Planning Cell (CMPC) by the end of 2004; implementation of an EU strategic lift command by 2005; setting up the EU battle groups by 2007; having an EU aircraft carrier and air wing and escort capacity by 2008; and compatibility and network linkage of a communications equipment and assets by 2010 (ibid.: 107). The EU battle group concept is perhaps the proposal that has received the most attention lately. The basic idea is to have battalion-size forces available on standby on a six-month rotating basis to be deployed for EU operation within short notice. The battle groups are units of 1,500 troops prepared for combat in 'demanding' environments, deployable within 15 days, sustainable in the field for 30 days with potential extension to 120 days. They are defined as: 'the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations

or for the initial phase of larger operations' (ibid.). The EU member states have agreed to commit national military resources, either as a one-nation force or as part of a multinational battle group (member states can also offer certain niche capacities). Since 2007, the EU has had the capacity to undertake two concurrent operations deploying battle groups, although until early 2011, the EU has never made use of this possibility.

13 By way of example, in April 2005, the elaboration of planning and scenarios for stabilization and reconstruction, conflict prevention, strengthening of institutions and support for humanitarian operations had been concluded. The process of building up the EU's civilian capacities in the CSDP has been similar to the process on the military side in the sense that the member states agree upon a set of quantitative targets and then hold a series of 'capabilities commitment conferences' (cf. Howorth, 2007: 126–130).

14 Climate change was already identified as a 'threat multiplier' by the HR/CFSP and the Commission in a joint report earlier the same year (High Representative for the CFSP, 2008).

15 The conceptual link between security and development is also being made in the ESS: 'The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development' (European Council, 2003: 13).

16 For example, the CFSP is still subject to 'specific rules and procedures' (i.e. decisions are taken unanimously by the representatives of the member states), although the role of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy changed so as to increase the coherence of the CFSP and the EU's external relations. The European Council is formally stipulated as being the body within the EU that decides on the Union's overall foreign policy, whereas the Foreign Affairs Council shall frame the CFSP and make the necessary decisions for defining and implementing it. Furthermore, the pre-Lisbon GAERC Council is split into two council constellations. Thus, the High Representative is the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council whereas the member state holding the rotating EU presidency chairs the General Affairs Council in the post-Lisbon setup.

17 However, it is stipulated that CSDP shall not prejudice the specific character of security and defence policies of certain member states (i.e. the neutral or non-aligned), and that it shall respect the obligations of those member states that see their common defence realized through NATO. It should be noted that the treaties have had provisions relating to common defence in the EU ever since the TEU was first ratified in the early 1990s (Howorth, 2007: 121).

18 Such a clause was already discussed as part of the (non-ratified) Constitutional Treaty, and the European Council decided to endorse it separately immediately after the Madrid bombings in March 2004 (European Council, 2004a).

19 Furthermore, the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with article 31 of the TEU (i.e. unanimity), where this decision has defence implications, and the European Parliament shall be informed. The Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with the support of the structures developed in the context of the CSDP and by the recently created Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI) (referred to in art. 71 of TFEU). The two committees shall, if necessary, also submit joint opinions to the Council.

20 For example, in 2008, the EU launched its largest CSDP civilian mission called EULEX Kosovo. The aim of the mission is to assist and support the authorities in

Kosovo in strengthening the rule of law, specifically in the areas of police, judiciary and customs. EULEX Kosovo operates under the general framework of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and it is a so-called technical mission with mainly monitoring functions, although it retains a number of limited executive powers. The mission reached its initial operational capability in early December 2008 and its full operational capability in April 2009. At the moment, the mission has around 1,700 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officials and approximately 1,100 local staff deployed in Kosovo. Among the CSDP civilian missions, other examples can be mentioned, such as the EU Border Assistance Missions (EUBAM) in Moldova and Ukraine, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan, the EU Police Mission (EUPOL COPPS) in the Palestinian Territories and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at Rafah.

21 Such as for example, the operations Artemis in RD Congo in June–September 2003 and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic in January 2008–March 2009. The EU also conducts a counter-piracy naval operation in the Gulf of Aden/Somalia since 2008 (EUNAVFOR Atalanta).

22 See also, Keohane (2009: 213). Following the decision by NATO to conclude SFOR and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1575, 7,000 troops were deployed under the EU's banner to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement, but also to contribute to the broader aims of EU policies towards the Western Balkans (i.e. gradually preparing the countries of the region for eventual EU membership) (Howorth, 2007: 236). In 1995, NATO initially deployed 60,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina to oversee the Dayton Agreement, but the troop level was subsequently downsized as the situation in the Western Balkans stabilized (Howorth, 2007: 235, Keohane, 2009: 212).

23 It is thus not particularly surprising that the transition from NATO to EU command meant that force generation for EUFOR Althea proved easier than for other (and smaller) CSDP operations: 'mainly because 80 percent of the SFOR peacekeepers were European, and their governments wished them to remain in Bosnia as part of the EUFOR force. Thus, they simply changed their NATO/SFOR badges for EUFOR insignia' (Keohane, 2009: 214).

24 However, Turkey has made the largest non-EU contribution to EUFOR Althea.

25 In June 2009, Spain contributed with the largest contingent among the EU member states (323), compared to, for example, Italy (288), Poland (203), Hungary (158) and Germany (132), Turkey contributed with the largest non-EU contingent (208), compared to, for example, Switzerland (25), Chile (21) and Albania (13) (ibid.: 215). In January 2011, about 1,600 troops were being kept on the ground in Bosnia under the EU banner.

26 The Council of the EU has since then been considering the possibility of transforming EUFOR Althea into a non-executive capacity-building and training operation, although: 'due to the ongoing lack of consensus among Member States, the EU Council has been keen to stress that a political decision on the possible evolution of Operation Althea, would need to take political developments into account, including the future role of the EU Special Representative' (ibid.: 220)

27 For example, the main orders that the first Force Commander (COMEUFOR) for EUFOR Althea received from HR/CFSP, Javier Solana, were essentially of a non-military character. The fight against organized crime had become more important than keeping the peace in the multi-ethnic state when the EU took over from NATO. Thus, the operation has had to take into account the presence of other EU bodies and missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the EU Special Representative, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and the European Commission Delegation (as well as the local Bosnian authorities). In 2006, the PSC adjusted the mandates for EUFOR Althea and EUPM so as to make the EUPM the lead mission in

anti-crime measures and the role of the EU Special Representative was also upgraded in order to better coordinate the two operations (Keohane, 2009: 218).

28 US intelligence, surveillance and command capacities were essential to the operations, even though France, the UK and other partners conducted a large number of the 9,700 airstrikes launched during the campaign By the end of March, NATO assumed control of the operations under Operation Unified Protector (EUObserver, 2012; *New York Times*, 2011).

29 However, the EU was not completely sidelined, not least because France had a hard time accepting that NATO would assume complete political leadership of the international coalition against Qaddafi's regime. This led the UK and France, in a 'show of diplomatic creativity', to set up the Libya Contact Group (comprising NATO countries, the UNSG and the Arab League) (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 17). EU representatives also participated in the Libya Contact Group and the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, worked to try and bring together divergent positions vis-à-vis Libya of some key international partners through her participation in the Cairo Group (comprising AU, Arab League, EU, OIC and the UN).

30 In total there were about 7,500 EU citizens in Libya of which 6,500 asked to be evacuated. About 4,400 EU citizens were evacuated from Libya using military means. The EU set up a coordination mechanism with member state capitals to establish the location and number of citizens for evacuation. The Humanitarian Aid department of the Commission (DG ECHO) had contact with humanitarian aid agencies in the region and the EUMS was in contact with Ministries of Defence of EU member states to coordinate the use of military means.

31 By way of comparison, in 2012, the UK had 169,000 personnel; France 326,000; and Germany 186,000 (World Bank, 2014).

32 Even though it is only the UK and France that keep military troops trained for full-scale warfare on a par with the level of US troops, several EU member states such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain do have military forces that can take on the challenge of expeditionary warfare whereas the remaining member states usually only have capacities for less demanding peace-support tasks (Howorth, 2007: 115).

33 Since 1992, Spain has deployed a total number of 46,000 troops in Bosnia, first under the UN's, then NATO's, and lastly, the EU's banners (Spanish Ministry of Defence, 2010c, see also, Barbé 1998: 152).

34 One of the first Spanish contributions to a multinational military operation came during the Gulf War in 1990–1991, when Spain sent naval units to participate under the WEU flag in the embargo imposed against Iraq by the UN Security Council. In addition, Spain granted the use of its bases to US forces en route to the Persian Gulf (Barbé and Mestres, 2007: 51).

35 For example, Spanish military officers and personnel have gained experience from participation in UN peacekeeping operations such as UNAVEM 1 and 2 (Angola), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNAMIR (Rwanda), ONUCA (Central America), ONASUL (El Salvador), MINUGUA (Guatemala) and ONUVEH (Haiti) (Barbé and Mesteres, 2007: 52). In 2011, it is estimated that Spain participated with 3,000 troops in five operations: 1,521 militaries and 40 gendarmerie (*guardia civil*) in Afghanistan (ISAF); 1,100 in Lebanon (UNIFIL); 40 in Bosnia (EUFOR Althea); 395 in Somalia/Indian Ocean (EUNAVFOR Atalanta); 38 in Uganda (EUTM) (Consejo de Ministros, 2010).

36 See Chapter 4.

37 This also puts in perspective the remark made by the former Spanish Minister of Defence, Narcís Serra, in an interview with the author, that one of the main concerns for the Socialist government in the early 1980s was to make sure to keep the militaries in the barracks while at the same time bringing the Spanish Armed Forces under strict civil control (Interview No. 48).

38 The strained relationship between the Moroccan monarchy and the armed forces dates back to the failed military coups of the 1970s. According to US intelligence, Muhammed VI still considers the military to be a potential threat to the monarchy: 'FAR officers will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussions about Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreign military officers, including our [i.e. US] attaches' (US cable 164775). There is also the problem of corruption in the military ranks, and while the Moroccan government is allegedly trying to come to terms with the problem, it is a difficult task to accomplish since it is in fact a means to ensure the FAR's loyalty to the throne (ibid.).

39 For example, Morocco contributes to NATO's naval counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour). In 2006, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was hosted by Morocco, bringing together all NATO members and seven Mediterranean non-members in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue initiative (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauretania, Morocco and Tunisia). The meeting in Rabat was the first of its kind in the format of 26+7 to be held in a southern Mediterranean country (NATO, 2006). A more recent, albeit smaller example of military cooperation with EU member states was the naval exercise of the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) held in Casablanca in September 2010, with vessels from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Morocco. EUROMARFOR was originally launched by France, Italy and Spain in the early 1990s as a multinational maritime unit in order to increase cooperation and interoperability between their naval forces. In 1995, the unit was placed at the disposal of WEU to conduct Petersberg tasks. At first, it was: 'greeted with mistrust by the southern [Mediterranean] states, who feared that these units … were intended for western interventions on the southern shores of the Mediterranean' (Biscop, 2002: 96). Such fears were eventually dispersed as southern Mediterranean countries were invited to participate in exercises and operations (ibid.).

40 Indeed, in terms of military procurements, the patterns of the Cold War seem not to have vanished completely from the Maghreb. For example, in 2008, Morocco ordered 24 F-16C combat aircraft from the US, 1 large FREMM frigate from France and 3 smaller SIGMA-90 frigates from the Netherlands, whereas Algeria has purchased 180 T-90 tanks, 28 Su-30MK combat aircraft, 2 submarines and a large number of air defence systems from Russia (Wezeman, 2009).

41 Other non-NATO allies of the US include: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, New Zeeland, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

42 This entitles Morocco to priority delivery of defence materiel, participation in defence research and development programmes, and US loan guarantee programs for the purchase of military equipment (White, 2008: 103).

43 The Algerian President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is reported to have said in a meeting with US Senator Richard Luger in 2005 that Algeria does not consider Western Sahara to be a 'casus belli', although the Algerian government maintains that Polisario has the right to fight on its own territory (US cable 38855).

44 Morocco has also contributed with troops to NATO KFOR in Kosovo since 1999.

45 Interview No. 67 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

46 This is a rather common practice in EU operations due to the fact that the participating states (EU member states as well as non-members) need to cover their expenses themselves. The UK has made similar arrangements for New Zeeland's participation in EUFOR Althea and Holland did so with Chile and Bulgaria. Spain had proposed to work out such an arrangement with a number of Central American countries but these plans were then abandoned after Spain decided to pull out of Bosnia in 2010 (Interview No. 67 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

47 Interview No. 62 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

48 Another example of the exchange of views between the EU and Morocco on the CSDP can be seen in the seminar held in Rabat in March 2008 which was jointly organized by the Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the EU Institute for Security Studies, gathering representatives from the Moroccan FAR, Spanish Armed Forces, EUMC, and the Commission together with diplomats and researchers from Europe and North Africa (EU–ISS 2008).
49 Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Interview No. 31 (Moroccan Diplomatic Mission to the EU).
50 Interview No. 3 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU), Interview No. 62 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).
51 Interview No. 3 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).
52 Ibid.
53 Interview No. 34 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).
54 Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
55 Prior to the European Council meeting in Maastricht in December 1991, the Socialist government under Felipe González had (together with France and Germany in a joint communiqué) defended the inclusion in the TEU of the terms 'common defence' and 'common defence policy' as well as the incorporation of the WEU as: 'an integral part of the process of European Union and in charge of implementing the security and defence policy' (Barbé, 1998: 151). At the same time, Spain supported the notion of complementarity between the EU and NATO (ibid.). In 1995, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, building on the experience of successful joint operations and exercises, launched the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR with the aim to provide the WEU with a military capacity to conduct Petersberg tasks (Biscop, 2002).
56 Still, Spain supported a gradual integration of the WEU into the EU together with the idea that decisions on defence cooperation should be taken in consensus, although reinforced cooperation among certain member states could be accepted on a case-by-case basis. Spain believed that NATO should still play a central role in European security and that the 'European pillar' of NATO should be strengthened (Barbé, 1998: 155).
57 Following the European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999, Spain made a commitment to contribute about 10 per cent of the troops (i.e. 6,000) stipulated by the Helsinki Headline Goal (Barbé and Mestres, 2007: 55). Security and defence issues did not figure prominently among the Spanish priorities for the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 (which eventually led to the Nice Treaty), but Spain in practice endorsed the majority of the proposals on the institutional setup of the CSDP as well as the overarching goal of strengthening the EU's military and civilian capacities throughout the early 2000s (ibid.: 54).
58 In early 2000, PP won an absolute majority in the Parliament, and in obvious contrast to the previous Socialist governments' policy of aligning with the Franco-German axis in order to advance Spanish interests in the EU, the re-elected Conservative government instead sought to move closer to the UK and the US This probably was also meant to serve long-standing Spanish interests so as to gain international support for the struggle against domestic terrorism in the shape of the Basque terrorist organization ETA.
59 In a survey conducted in February 2003 by the well-esteemed Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 90 per cent of the participants said that they were not in favour of an invasion of Iraq, and 67 per cent said that they thought that Spain should remain neutral if an invasion were to be launched (21 per cent said that Spain should support the US-led coalition in case of invasion) (CIS, 2003). On the eve of the invasion, Aznar met in the Azores with the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the Portuguese Prime Minister, José Manuel Barroso and the US President, George W. Bush, to express his full support of the plans to topple Saddam

Hussein. Moreover, in January 2003, the so-called Letter of the Eight was published in a British newspaper, and among the signatories was the Spanish Prime Minister giving public support to US demands on Saddam Hussein's regime to give up its alleged WMD programme (*The Times*, 2003). Apart from Aznar, the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK also signed the letter. This can also be seen to mark the peak in the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, with France and Germany vigorously opposing an attack on Iraq unauthorized by the UN Security Council (cf. Andersen et al., 2008; Cox, 2005; Pouliot, 2006).

60 For example, Spain supported the decision in late 2000 by the WEU to concede the organization of crisis management operations to the EU.

61 Ahead of the 2004 election it looked like the PP would gain enough support to be able to stay in office for a third term in a row. However, the poor way in which the Aznar government handled the situation is commonly regarded as having helped shift the balance in favour of the PSOE instead. Both Prime Minister Aznar and the Minister of Interior, Ángel Acebes, quickly blamed ETA (although evidence early on indicated that radical Islamists had done the deed) so as to say that Spain's involvement in Iraq had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks in Madrid. For a detailed analysis of the way that Spanish authorities handled the aftermath of the attacks, see Jordán and Horsburgh (2006). On Spanish counter-terrorist policies developed after 2004, see Reinares (2008).

62 Moreover, article 4 of the law establishes that the Spanish Parliament has to authorize the participation of Spanish troops in operations outside of Spain's borders. The aim probably being to prevent controversies such as the one spurred by the Aznar government's decision to lend military support to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

63 'Nous avons décidé de vous dépêcher à la province du Kosovo pour participer a l'opération du maintien de la paix et d'élimination des séquelles de la guerre destructrices. Cette initiative du Royaume du Maroc relève d'une pratique enracinée dans son histoire et d'une tradition marocaine qui a marqué la politique de notre pays. Elle procède également d'une perception consciente des engagements du Maroc sur le plan international, du devoir de solidarité avec les différents peuples pour soutenir la légitimité internationale et contribuer au triomphe des principes du droit et de la légalité' (Mohammed VI, speech, 1999).

64 'Les mutations rapides que connait le monde ont donné lieu a de nouvelles formes de défis accompagnées d'une évolution technique et technologique face a laquelle la modernité est devenue un exigence majeure, particulièrement dans la domaine militaire. La souplesse et l'adaptation aux développements des événements exigent de nous de suivre l'évolution en améliorant des méthodes de formation militaire, en modernisant ses outils et en rehaussant le niveau intellectuel et scientifique des militaires' (Mohammed VI, speech, 2000b).

65 'Il fit alors de votre institution une armée issue du peuple pour le peuple, veillant à la souveraineté de la nation, protégeant son intégrité territoriale et se tenant prête à défendre fermement et vaillamment ses valeurs et ses institutions sacrées… Gardez donc constamment à l'esprit les impératives de la modernisation, de la qualité de l'encadrement et de la maîtrise des méthodes de planification, de préparation et de programmation au sein des institutions militaires d'instruction et de formation supérieure. Vous n'en serez que plus aptes à assimiler les changements et les mutations rapides que connaît la communauté international, dont le système est soumis à des interférences et à des complications croissants' (Mohammed VI, speech, 2006).

66 Interview No. 32 (Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU).

67 Interview No. 42 (Spanish Ministry of Defence).

68 Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

69 Interview No. 50 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
70 Interview No. 42 (Spanish Ministry of Defence), Interview No. 54 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Interview No. 50 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
71 Interview No. 50 (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
72 Interview No. 41 (Spanish Ministry of Defence).

# 4 A Euro-Mediterranean civil protection community in the making

The previous chapter analysed how Spanish and Moroccan security and defence policies have changed in the post-Cold War era to the extent that a greater emphasis is placed on countering non-military security threats through cooperative security practices. This chapter picks up the thread and focuses on the development of EU civil protection, and civil protection cooperation in a Euro-Mediterranean setting. Unlike trade and CSDP, EU civil protection is perhaps not a particularly well-studied policy area, but it is nonetheless highly relevant for the purpose of answering the question on how the EU promotes security community-building. EU civil protection aims to strengthen the Union's capacity to support member states to deal with man-made and natural disasters, and the setting up of common institutions in the EU has also served to enhance the cooperation on civil protection between members and non-members. Furthermore, there are indications that the development of EU civil protection to a large extent has been driven by transgovernmental networks of national civil protection authorities, which makes it particularly interesting in order to shed light on how the EU works as a security community-building institution.

Civil protection refers to the protection of people, the environment and property against natural and man-made disasters. Of course, the origin of such disasters is inherently of a non-military nature but the main point to be made here is that international cooperation aiming to prepare for and handle the consequences of natural and man-made disasters is related to the changes to the notion of security in the post-Cold War era. This is first and foremost seen in the perceived de-territorialized and trans-boundary nature of most security threats today. For example, terrorist networks might be active in several countries, and earthquakes, tsunamis, accidental marine pollution or nuclear meltdowns might affect several countries. However, this does not only serve as an explanation for why EU civil protection has developed rapidly in the last decade, as it also points to the fact that the external dimension of EU civil protection has become increasingly important.

This chapter provides a detailed narrative of the development of EU civil protection and cooperation on civil protection in a Euro-Mediterranean setting, as well as Spanish and Moroccan civil protection in the post-Cold War era.

Aside from legal and policy documents relating to civil protection in the EU, Spain and Morocco, the analysis draws upon interviews conducted with practitioners working with EU civil protection in the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and national representatives in the PROCIV Council Working Group, as well as with practitioners at the Spanish and Moroccan civil protection authorities, and at the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Moroccan Ministry of Interior (including visits to the Spanish UME's base at Torrejón de Ardoz and the Moroccan National Civil Protection Unit at Rabat-Salé). These interviews provide important insights into how the cooperation on civil protection among EU member states and non-members has evolved in practice.

## EU civil protection

Civil protection is primarily a competence for EU member states to deal with within their national security and defence policies, as the responsibility to carry out the tasks related to civil protection usually falls upon national disaster management and rescue services, as well as the police and armed forces (Bremberg and Britz, 2009; Britz, 2006; Ekengren et al., 2006). Nonetheless, civil protection in the EU has increasingly become a matter of 'high politics', especially in the wake of large-scale terrorist attacks in the US (New York 2001) and in Europe (Madrid 2004 and London 2005). An obvious example is the adoption of the Solidarity Clause after the Madrid bombings, and its subsequent incorporation into the EU treaties (art. 222 TFEU). However, the EU had been promoting cooperation on civil protection for quite some time before 9/11. It was already mentioned in the Rome Treaty, although at that time it was mainly conceived of as dealing with environmental and technological risks.

The impetus for enhanced cooperation among member states on civil defence was provided by the Italian minister, Giuseppe Zamberletti.[1] At an informal meeting in Rome in 1985, it was suggested that: 'a high-level working party on civil defence should be convened to provide a channel for the regular exchange of information and frequent meetings held at ministerial level' (European Commission, 1987). The Council Working Group on Civil Protection (PROCIV) was subsequently created, and in 1989, the Council of the EU passed a resolution on 'the new developments in Community cooperation on civil protection' (OJEC, 1989). By 1994, six resolutions had been adopted by the EU establishing the: 'operational instruments dealing with the preparedness of those involved in civil protection and the response in the event of disaster, based on the subsidiarity principle laid down in the Maastricht Treaty' (Vincent, 2002: 2). By the early 1990s, the shift from 'civil defence' to 'civil protection' had been completed in the EU nomenclature, although this was not necessarily done in all member states until later.

EU civil protection has developed steadily over the last decade and a number of important Council decisions were taken from 2001 onwards, for example establishing what was then called the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) (Bremberg and Britz,

2009). However, there was no treaty-based article on EU civil protection defining the scope and substance of the cooperation until the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in 2009. Art. 6 TFEU now stipulates that civil protection belongs to the category of policy areas where the Union has competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states.[2] Art. 196 TFEU on civil protection establishes that the EU shall encourage cooperation between member states in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disaster. The EU shall support and complement member states' action at national, regional and local level in risk prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel and in responding to natural or man-made disasters within the Union; promote swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union between national civil-protection services; and promote consistency in international civil-protection work. The European Parliament and the Council shall establish, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, although any harmonization of laws and regulations of the member states is excluded.

In December 2013, Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (previously Community Civil Protection Mechanism) was passed. It defines EU civil protection accordingly:

> The protection to be ensured by the Union Mechanism shall cover primarily people, but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, against all kinds of natural and man-made disasters, including the consequences of acts of terrorism, technological, radiological or environmental disasters, marine pollution, and acute health emergencies, occurring inside or outside the Union. In the case of the consequences of acts of terrorism or radiological disasters, the Union Mechanism may cover only preparedness and response actions.
>
> (OJEU, 2013)

Art. 196 TFEU and Decision 1313/2013/EU can be seen as the latest steps in the institutionalization of EU civil protection, to a large extent codifying that which has been taking place in practice since the early 2000s.

### *Institutions*

The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council has been the main decision-making body on civil protection in the EU due to the fact that civil protection usually is the responsibility of the Ministries of Interior in most EU member states.[3] Civil protection also belonged to the so-called third pillar of the pre-Lisbon setup, which implied that decisions in the Council were made on the basis of unanimity, whereas the Commission was responsible for drafting proposals on EU civil protection upon request from the Council (Jönsson and Jarlsvik, 2005:

53–54). Civil protection used to be assigned to DG Environment in the Commission which in many ways reflected the fact that it from the start had been linked to the EU's environmental policies due to the original strong focus on natural disasters and technological accidents. The Lisbon Treaty brought about institutional changes in the sense that civil protection now falls under the ordinary legislative procedure where the European Parliament is fully involved as co-legislator alongside the Council, and as a consequence, decisions are made by qualified majority in the Council. Moreover, EU civil protection has in recent years been transferred to DG ECHO, under the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, which is another indication of the broadening of the focus on man-made and natural disasters inside as well as outside of the EU.

As for factors influencing the development of EU civil protection as a policy area, previous research has pointed to a 'north-south divide' among EU member states (Bremberg and Britz, 2009). This division has mainly been structured around competing notions on the proper nature of the cooperation and how it should be organized at the EU level.[4] It has also been heavily influenced by diverging ways of organizing civil protection at the national level in the EU member states. To simplify matters slightly, southern EU member states (e.g. France, Spain, Greece) have been pushing for further development of EU capacities to respond to natural and man-made disasters, whereas northern EU member states (e.g. UK, Netherlands, Sweden) prefer to keep the main bulk of the resources on a national level and instead develop the Union's capacity for coordination and prevention.[5] Interestingly, this has meant that decisions in the Council have been made on the basis of the lowest common denominator, but at the same time, transgovernmental cooperation among national civil protection authorities within the EU has become increasingly intense since the 1990s. EU civil protection has therefore developed a strong operational component, and the cooperation between the member states comprises disaster response assistance as well as prevention measures, such as training programmes and simulation exercises, involving practitioners from basically all EU member states.

Recent developments are said to have revealed a complex balancing act between strategic/political coordination (in the Council) and operational coordination (by the Commission) of civil protection operations in third countries.[6] Moreover, the European Council has provided the strongest impetus to move ahead with EU civil protection over the last couple of years, since national ministers responsible for civil protection in the JHA Council constellation usually have a harder time trying to reach common ground.[7] The Commission can also be said to have sought to move the agenda forward by appealing to a functionalist logic on the need to counter non-military threats and trans-boundary risks to civilian populations and societal functions in Europe and abroad:

> Today's disasters are often of a cross-border nature and require multilateral and coordinated responses. At the same time, boundaries between

> internal and external disasters are increasingly blurred … Often the same instruments – *in particular civil protection assets* – are deployed by the Community and Member States to respond to the same needs *within the Union and beyond EU borders*, either as a stand alone disaster response contribution or as a complement to humanitarian aid. Any EU response to a given disaster has to make use of the most appropriate components available on the basis of needs.
>
> (European Commission, 2008b)

Another example is provided by the report on climate change and international security that the Commission, together with the High Representative for the CFSP, submitted to the European Council in March 2008. The report lists various threats to international security caused by present or future effects of climate change (such as intensified conflicts over borders and resources as well as 'environmentally-induced migration'), all of which is said to call for: 'EU and Member State planning and capabilities including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments (civil and military) to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change' (High Representative for the CFSP, 2008). Quite typically, the report also calls for closer cooperation with non-member states in order to manage the effects of climate change on international security.

### *Capacities*

The EU does not have any exclusive capacities to manage disasters and emergencies on its own, and there is nothing like a standing 'EU civil protection force'.[8] The EU's role lies in the ability to coordinate and facilitate the use of member states' capacities and resources when a disaster affects several member states or transcends the capacities of one affected state in the EU or abroad. The most important instrument that the EU has at its disposal is the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, which was originally launched in 2001. Although the proposal had been discussed among the member states for some time before 9/11, the terrorist attacks definitely served to speed up the decision-making in the Council.[9] All 28 EU member states together with Iceland, Norway, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro participate as full members of the Union Mechanism, which includes a number of instruments such as the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC),[10] the Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) as well as training programmes (e.g. courses, simulation exercises and exchange of experts). The Union Mechanism also allows the Commission to co-finance with the member states some of the transport costs associate with civil protection operations.

It is through the ERCC that member states as well as states not participating in the Union Mechanism can make appeals for civil protection assistance from the EU. Since 2001 it has monitored over 300 disasters and has received more than 180 requests for assistance. For example, in May 2014, the Union

Mechanism was mobilized following a request for assistance from both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia after devastating floods in the region. 22 participating countries responded with offers for assistance. The Mechanism was also called upon to in July 2014 by the WHO to provide assistance in the fight against Ebola (e.g. facilitating the transportation of hospitals, vehicles, equipment and supplies to the affected regions in West Africa). In 2012 and 2013, for example, it was activated to help Syrian refugees in Jordan for the delivery of in-kind assistance by the participating countries (such as ambulances, tent heaters, wool blankets, hygiene parcels and kitchen sets), and rapid assistance was also provided to fight forest fires in Greece, Portugal, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania.[11]

Moreover, so-called civil protection modules have been adopted by the EU consisting of national resources from one or several member states (OJEU 2008a, 2010c, 2013). These modules are meant as a means for member states to commit national assets and in that way contribute, on a voluntary basis, to the 'rapid response capability' of the EU in the field of civil protection. Importantly, the Union Mechanism also serves as a means for the EU to cooperate with non-members on a regular basis (for example by involving practitioners in exchange and training programmes). The Decision 1313/2013/EU provides the legal basis for granting assistance for prevention and preparedness to member states and non-members, as well as to civil protection operations inside and outside the EU.[12] Participation is open to all EU candidate countries whereas non-members may cooperate in activities under the Union Mechanism where agreements between these countries and the EU so allow.[13] As a common practice, such agreements are signed directly between the Commission and the relevant authorities in the third countries, allowing the Commission to share information and involve them in training exercises without having to seek previous authorization from the Council.[14]

Moreover, the external dimension of EU civil protection is also related to the CSDP. Civil protection is listed as a priority within the civilian crisis management (CCM) area of the CSDP. This has meant that even though the CSDP is kept firmly on an intergovernmental basis, it in fact partly overlaps with certain Community competences, such as humanitarian aid, technical assistance, institution-building and post-conflict reconstruction (Gourlay, 2004: 405ff.). It should be noted that no EU civil protection operation has thus far been launched in the shape of a CSDP mission, and it does not seem likely that it will happen in the future because it would both entail a difficult decision-making procedure (Sundelius, 2005: 78). One Council official was particularly keen on this point:

> One should also realize that it could be a very cumbersome way of managing a situation, because then you would need to go through COREPER and get advice from them each time, or even the ministers. It shows to the outside world that the EU does something in political terms, but on the other hand, it might not be the right response to have this cumbersome

> procedure launched … Many member states like the very practical side of civil protection cooperation. It's not so politicized but it functions rather well … I'm not going to say anything bad about ambassadors, they are usually very intelligent people, but they are not necessarily the right people to deal with forest fires and earthquakes. At least not in the beginning, but surely later on when we need to make political decisions on how to prevent these things from happening again.
>
> (Interview No. 10, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

Or as another interviewee at the Council Secretariat explained:

> Usually in the EU, if something works, we keep it, and if something doesn't work, we forget it. Just like the concept of civil protection in [CSDP] civilian crisis management. Now we work with capabilities, and in civilian crisis management we don't even talk about civil protection anymore. We know it's a priority, but if you look at the capabilities for civilian crisis management, they include police, rule of law and civil administration and that's it. There is no element of civil protection … We have just accepted this as a state of affairs and the member states never complained.
>
> (Interview No. 26, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU)

The development of EU civil protection is thus to be considered as part of a broader process in which the traditional notion of territorial defence is losing ground in most EU member states. Cold War notions of the need to protect the civilian population and mobilize civilian means in case of foreign invasion (i.e. civil *defence*) are increasingly giving way to a notion of protection against large-scale disasters and terrorist attacks, and although such events occur in peace time, it is acknowledged that military capacities might be needed in disaster management (i.e. civil *protection*) (cf. Alexander, 2002). Civil protection is also a policy area in the EU in which the link between solidarity and self-interest among the member states in an era of new security threats is particularly pronounced. Furthermore, with the notion of de-territorialized security threats comes the understanding that the cooperation on civil protection cannot stop at the borders of the EU.[15]

What is particularly interesting in relation to the question of how the EU works as a security community-building institution is that the need to cooperate with non-members was largely unforeseen when the Union Mechanism (previously Community Mechanism) was created about a decade ago. At that time, it was basically intended to enhance EU internal security and serve as a support for the member states.[16] However, as one Commission official suggested, when something 'big' happens in the neighbourhood, the EU is going to get involved in handling the aftermath no matter what.[17] Furthermore, this self-interested cooperative dynamic seems especially salient in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean civil protection.

## Euro-Mediterranean civil protection

Civil protection as a field of cooperation has enjoyed high levels of political support within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (Bremberg, 2010). At the 9th Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers' meeting in Lisbon in 2007, it was recognized that the: 'rising trend in vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters in many parts of the Mediterranean confirms the need for greater safety and security measures to be in place to the benefit of its citizens' (Council of the EU, 2007c).[18] On another, previous occasion, the ministers had referred to the cooperation on civil protection as: 'an important political measure to strengthen trustful relationships by promoting cooperation and interaction between regional and local authorities, civil population and civil society' (Council of the EU, 2006b). The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism adopted in 2005 in Barcelona explicitly stated that the EMP partners shall help victims of terrorism and provide assistance to each other to handle the consequences of terrorist attacks, as well as strengthen national and collective mechanisms to deal with the aftermath, as well as build contacts, share experiences and participate in joint emergency exercises. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has also served to bring more focus on regional cooperation on civil protection in the Mediterranean,[19] and the Commission has proposed to progressively establish 'a wider Euro-Mediterranean space for civil protection' in which:

> the [Union] Mechanism will provide the focal point for linking the European Community and its Member States to the non-EU partner countries taking part in this space. This would provide more permanent cooperation on operational, training, exercises and research aspects, on the basis of equality and improved co-ownership, to reinforce arrangements for better protection of UfM countries' populations and territories. The setting-up of additional regional civil protection structures that duplicate or undermine existing programmes and structures should be avoided.
>
> (EU guidelines on civil protection cooperation with Mediterranean partners)

This makes sense when taking into account that the Union Mechanism has been activated in the Mediterranean region on a number of occasions since 2001.[20] For example, it was used to coordinate the assistance sent by several EU member states to Morocco after the Al Hoceima earthquake in 2004 (see below). The ERCC (or MIC at that time) also received requests for assistance from both Cypriot and Lebanese authorities to assist them in handling the humanitarian crisis and the environmental damages caused by Israel's offensive in southern Lebanon in 2006, and several EU member states contributed with personnel and equipment to the EU civil protection operation. During the devastating forest fires in Greece in the summer of 2007, several EU member states and

non-members (among them Turkey and Israel) dispatched assistance (mainly aircrafts and firefighters). The Union Mechanism was also used to mobilize EU civil protection teams and assets to assist civilians both in Libya and at its borders during the crisis in 2011 (see Chapter 3). While there are many similar examples in which the Union Mechanism has been activated in the region, there are also indications that a more structured cooperation on civil protection is taking shape in a Euro-Mediterranean context.

### *The Euro-Mediterranean civil protection programmes*

The EU's support for civil protection cooperation on a regional level in the Mediterranean has mainly been realized through three subsequent programmes (Bremberg, 2010). Originally conceived of as confidence-building exercises in line with the aim of the Barcelona Declaration, these programmes have over time developed into more of an operational cooperation between EU members and non-members. Several interviewees stress that it is the technical and practical nature of civil protection has been essential for the success of the Euro-Med programmes.[21] As one interviewee at the Commission asserts:

> The uniqueness of the programme is that it is at the same time very political but it also has operational components. There is a genuine interest from both sides to participate, be it from the Israeli side and the Arab side. So here we can overcome some of the political problems that we have in other forums, where you have a political dialogue without an operational component. Here you have that operational component and you have concrete benefits from the cooperation in terms of cross-border match of materials that the countries might have when it comes to forest fires, flash floods or major disasters that could also be due to terrorism, aid to the victims and to the population. So there is an interest, and I think that this is a key element as to why this program can run so smoothly despite the political problems.
>
> (Interview No. 15, European Commission)

The technical and practical nature of the cooperation is also reflected in the fact that civil protection practitioners from EU member and non-member states are said to be able to easily discuss matters of common concerns, although this is something that comes with both benefits and disadvantages:

> The civil protection world is a quite close-knit community, which is good in one sense because they are able to cooperate, but it is also a problem because if it is kept too close then we will not reap the benefits of the work that the other organizations [referring to the UN and the Red Cross] do.
>
> (Interview No. 6, European Commission)

Another important factor behind the success of the Euro-Med programmes that several interviewees refer to is the rapid evolution of the Union Mechanism,

especially the ERCC (previously MIC). EU civil protection enjoys a certain political momentum due to the recent efforts to boost the EU's crisis and emergency response capabilities to deal with trans-boundary security threats, and that has also spilled over to a certain extent into Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation:

> There was no such thing as the MIC back then [when the first programme was launched] and the developments within the EU has led to a new strategic thinking as to what can be made and what can be gained from such a programme [the PPRD South]. It's not all about confidence-building measures, it goes far beyond that if you compare this to 1996. Now we are really discussing concrete issues in the activities. So this is a programme that is very dear to the Mediterranean countries and we have done our best to match their expectations with the funding that we have made available, which is now more than double what we had before in the Bridge Programme.
>
> (Interview No. 15, European Commission)

The first Euro-Med programme (the so-called Pilot Programme for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters), was launched in 1996 following a joint proposal by Egypt and Italy. The programme ran until 2004, concentrating mainly on training and information, networking of civil protection schools, exchanges of civil protection experts and technical assistance: 'through the various training courses and seminars and the exchange of experts, the programme allowed the networking among practitioners from all the participating countries. High-level meetings, bringing together the Heads of Civil Protection services, were also held to evaluate the results of the project' (Courela, 2004: 13).[22]

The succeeding Euro-Med Bridge Programme for the Prevention, Reduction and Management of Natural and Man-made Disasters introduced activities relating to risk prevention, information to the public, and the identification of measures to facilitate requests for mutual assistance in the event of major emergencies (Bremberg et al., 2009).[23] Several training exercises and expert exchanges took place from 2005 to 2008 involving civil protection practitioners from both EU member states and Mediterranean partners (see Table 4.1). An evaluation report on the programme concludes that: 'the bringing together of Mediterranean nationals has … continued to build confidence and reinforce a common understanding of the importance of collaborating together in reducing risks and responding to disasters' (Olding, 2007: 3). In a speech held in Marrakech (Morocco) in 2006, a senior official at the Commission pointed out that the Bridge Programme has been relevant for establishing common understandings and trust among multinational relief teams that are expected to cooperate during emergencies in foreign countries: 'By supporting joint initiatives in the Mediterranean area, it contributes to make prevention,

*Table 4.1* Main activities of the Bridge Programme 2005–2008

| *Category of activities* | *Total planned (January 2005–March 2008)* | *Total realized (9 June 2007)* |
|---|---|---|
| Self-Training Workshop | 14 | 11 |
| Exchange of Experts | 11 | 11 |
| Technical Assistance | 11 | 7 |
| Civil Protection Schools Network | 2 | 1 |
| Large-scale Disaster Simulation Exercise | 1 | 1 |
| Establishment of Centre of Operations Network | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 42 | 32 |

Source: Olding (2007)

preparedness and response to major disasters more effective and to promote cooperation on common concerns among neighbouring European and non-European countries' (Bucella, speech, 2006).

As for the next phase of the Euro-Mediterranean civil protection, the Commission's Regional Strategy Paper for the ENP (2007–2013) envisioned a long-term programme building on the previous and the: 'Euro-Mediterranean system will have to be closely linked to the civil protection systems existing at European level, such as the Community Civil Protection Mechanism' (European Commission, 2007: 18). In March 2009, the first Euro-Med Programme of Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and man-made Disasters (PPRD South) was launched with the aim of contributing to the development of an effective and sustainable Euro-Mediterranean Civil Protection System.[24] PPRD South is funded through the ENPI with approximately €4.4 million.[25] It also aims to promote knowledge of risk exposure in the region, establish a Risk Atlas of the Mediterranean, reinforce the existing prevention mechanisms at the regional, national and local levels, improve the capacity for a coordinated, effective and efficient disaster response capacity and improve the information and awareness of populations regarding risk exposure, prevention and response (Terms of Reference PPRD).

PPRD South is managed by a consortium of EU member states and Mediterranean non-members. The consortium appoints the members of the executive committee, whereas all EU member states and participating Mediterranean non-members will be represented on the steering committee. It is directed by Italy, with Algeria, Egypt, France and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) acting as co-directors.[26] The first PPRD South programme ran until 2013 and the second PPRD South programme is envisioned to run until 2016. Interestingly, the mid-term evaluation of the first PPRD programme suggested that its:

> main strength and added value (compared to other, e.g. UN initiatives), is to engage civil protection operational actors in concrete experience/knowledge transfers through joint events and experts networking … the CPAs' [civil protection authorities] visit to the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) enhanced their understanding of how it operates though the extent of their possible institutional cooperation with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism/MIC needs to be further clarified.
>
> (European Commission, 2010: 3)

The Commission would also like to more closely link the cooperation on civil protection under the PPRD to other problems affecting the Mediterranean (e.g. climate change, desertification and water shortages). The aim here is to involve more actors from the Mediterranean non-members, such as the ministries responsible for the environment, urban planning and finance as well as civil society and NGOs, and thus expand the scope beyond the national authorities directly responsible for civil protection and civil defence in the partner countries and also in the EU member states.[27]

### *Transgovernmental networks and challenges to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on civil protection*

The observation that the success of the Euro-Med programmes is partly a function of already existing ties between civil protection authorities of EU members and non-members is supported by the remarks made by both Spanish and Moroccan practitioners. However, the Euro-Med programmes have proved to be able to provide useful regional forums:

> We have an absolutely impressive cooperation with Morocco. Together, we deal with things that no Euro-Med programme could ever solve, that is the crossing of two million persons under the OPE each year. But it needs to be said that it's important to have a connection with the other countries as well. You know that in Paris and Marseille they decided that the PPRD is a fundamental activity for the UfM. The other projects have been affected by the crisis, and when it is impossible to talk about other things, it often happens that they end up discussing civil protection, because it's a good thing. It's an 'apple pie' so to speak. But that aside, we have excellent relations with Morocco as do France.
>
> (Interview No. 39, Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection)

One Moroccan official at the Directorate General for Civil Protection stressed that Morocco is an active supporter of the Euro-Med programmes for the quite simple reason that all Mediterranean countries basically share the same risks when it comes to natural and man-made disasters, such as forest fires, earthquakes, tsunamis and maritime pollution.[28] But there is a need to cooperate and learn from each other's experiences, and that usually goes beyond existing

bilateral arrangements. That, according to this interviewee, is essentially what the Euro-Med programmes provide to the participating practitioners.

Spanish and Moroccan interviewees assert that the Euro-Med programmes have been successful in terms of actually carrying out planned activities as well as measured in terms of the high number of participants. But it should also be noted that Spanish interviewees stressed that Spain supports the development of Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation as part of the EU's broader policy framework towards the Mediterranean, be it within the UfM or the ENP. As one Spanish interviewee emphasized:

> The Mediterranean is part of the EU's neighbourhood policy. While we have a bilateral agreement with Morocco, it's clear that this is a European policy. This is Spain's position. I could say it louder but not clearer.[29]
>
> (Ibid.)

The scope of Euro-Mediterranean civil protection now comprises both EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Mediterranean non-members in North Africa and the Middle East. For example, as members of the UfM, Albania, Bosnia and Montenegro (which is also a member of the Union Mechanism) participate in the PPRD South, whereas Mauritania and Libya participate as observers. Although the proclaimed long-term aim of the PPRD South is to bring the participating non-members closer to EU civil protection, there is a differentiation at play in terms of the type of relationship that the non-members can establish with the Union Mechanism. Generally speaking, the countries on the Western Balkans participating in the PPRD do so as part of a pre-accession strategy, which provides the EU with some leverage.[30] The PPRD South has also brought Euro-Mediterranean civil protection in under the ENP framework (except for Turkey and the Western Balkan) in terms of funding and programming by the Commission. All ENP Action Plans for the Mediterranean non-members contain references to cooperation with the EU on civil protection and disaster management.[31]

For example, Morocco is encouraged to: 'take part, as appropriate, in training and activities relating to conflict prevention, management of crises and natural disasters, civil protection and possible participation in EU-led civil and military peacekeeping exercises and operations' (European Commission, 2004c: 7).[32] Even though Algeria has been reluctant towards the ENP, it has been one of the most active partners in the Euro-Mediterranean civil protection programmes, and the country has held one of the co-directorships of the Bridge Programme and continued to do so under PPRD South. On the other hand, neither Tunisia nor Syria participated to any large extent in the activities under the Bridge Programme (see Table 4.2). Although Tunisia adopted its first ENP Action Plan in 2005, it stopped participating in the Bridge Programme after the EU criticized the country's poor record on human rights, whereas Syria decided to refrain from any cooperation on civil protection that would involve Israel (Olding, 2007). This has changed after the Arab Spring in the

*Table 4.2* Participation in the Euro-Med Bridge Programme 2005–2008

| *Country* | *No. practitioners* | *No. workshops attended* |
|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 19 | 10/10 |
| Egypt | 23 | 9/10 |
| Israel | 8 | 5/10 |
| Jordan | 31 | 10/10 |
| Lebanon | 20 | 10/10 |
| Morocco | 17 | 10/10 |
| Palestine Authority | 16 | 9/10 |
| Syria | 2 | 1/10 |
| Tunisia | 6 | 4/10 |
| Turkey | 32 | 10/10 |
| EU[1] | 62 | 10/10 |

Source: Olding (2007)

Note

1 These figures represent the number of attending practitioners from EU member states. The practitioners represent Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden.

sense that Tunisia is now an active partner in the second PPRD South programme, while the EU has decided to suspend Syria from participating as long as the country is embroiled in civil war.

Furthermore, the EU is not the only international organization promoting civil protection cooperation on a regional level in the Mediterranean. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE) established in 1987 the EUR–OPA Major Hazards Agreement. It is a platform for the exchange of knowledge and best practices in the field of natural and technological disasters (prevention, risk management, post-crisis analysis and rehabilitation).[33] However, according to a senior official at the CoE Secretariat, the cooperation has no operational component and the budget is in no way near the amounts that the Commission continuously provides to the Euro-Med programmes.[34] NATO is also seeking to promote cooperation on Civil Emergency Planning between its members and non-members under the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. But the cooperation has only recently begun to evolve, and when it comes to the budget for regional cooperation, the same as for the EUR-OPA Agreement applies.[35]

The UN is the most important organization besides the EU when it comes to civil protection cooperation in the Mediterranean. Various UN bodies and frameworks are involved in promoting the development of disaster management capabilities among the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.[36] This is not necessarily a problem, and it could actually work so as to strengthen regional cooperation, but EU civil protection has developed rapidly over the last decade, and it has done so without necessarily specifying the role for the

Union Mechanism within the global system for disaster response coordinated by the UN. As a consequence, the early Euro-Med civil protection programmes have been described as operating in a 'policy vacuum' in relation to the UN (Olding, 2007: 15).[37] One major weakness of past programmes has indeed been the low level of coordination with the work that the UN is doing in the region, and it is something that the first PPRD South apparently sought to remedy with the UN/ISDR as member of the consortium.

Aside from the international and regional frameworks, there is also a myriad of bilateral arrangements that EU member states and Mediterranean countries have established over the years, mainly as part of broader developmental policies with an aim to develop civil protection and disaster management capabilities.[38] In practice, this bilateral dimension of the cooperation has proved to be vital in many EU civil protection operations in the Mediterranean since: 'the role of the Mechanism in recent disasters in the Mediterranean region has been eclipsed by the bilateral response of many member states who have a long track record in disaster response and who are able to mobilize quickly and under less bureaucratic procedures' (Olding, 2007: 14). But it is important to note that when it comes to the question of how the relations between EU member states and Mediterranean non-members should be conceived of in relation to the Union Mechanism, essentially relating to the question of whether Mediterranean non-member states could be integrated beyond the scope of what is currently foreseen, there are quite diverging positions among the practitioners.[39] Moreover, the dividing line does not only split EU member states, but also the Commission and the Council.

On the one side, some interviewees in the Commission express a preference for opening up the Union Mechanism to those Mediterranean non-members with sufficiently advanced civil protection systems (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Israel).[40] Naturally, they assert that this could not be done immediately but that it should be seen as a question of time rather anything else. Interviewees in PROCIV were also asked about the possibility of fully integrating Mediterranean non-members in the Union Mechanism, and some of them (certainly not all) expressed a cautiously positive attitude. For example:

> For them [the Mediterranean non-members] to reach a level where we can say that they are ready to be integrated in the Mechanism, that would take many years. For me, the real value of the [Euro-Mediterranean] programme is confidence-building, even though we might also see other results. They will also improve their systems, they will have an updated map of risks, prevention system and those things… Yes, it should be the aim, the beacon that should direct their work. The direction is set, but there is a lot of work to be done in these countries.
>
> (Interview No. 22, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU)

On the other hand, interviewees working in the Civil Protection Unit at the Commission, as well as at the Council Secretariat, were more reluctant to say

that something like full-scale integration with the Community Mechanism would be on the cards for the Mediterranean partners. This was not necessarily because the national civil protection systems of the Mediterranean partners were not considered advanced enough, but rather because it would be important to keep the 'European identity' of the Union Mechanism.[41]

Another interviewee with long experience from working with EU civil protection explained that the EU divides the neighbouring countries into mainly three categories: accession or pre-accession countries (which need to adapt to EU standards as they will be fully integrated into the Union Mechanism once they join the EU); the Mediterranean countries; and the Eastern neighbours. The EU needs to develop close cooperation with both Mediterranean countries and Eastern due to shared risks and threats but the Mediterranean countries are in general more important to the EU when it comes to jointly managing natural and man-made disasters because the Mediterranean is a more risk-prone region.[42] However, it is not really necessary to integrate them into the Union Mechanism in order to achieve enhanced and better cooperation, in fact that could threaten to create more problems than it would solve according to this interviewee.

Instead, what is needed is a focus on the issues that are of strategic importance to the EU and the Mediterranean partners, such as prevention, capacity-building and host-nation support. The underlying logic is that the EU will need to get involved anyways if something 'big' happens in its neighbourhood.[43] Moreover, judging from the experience of how the cooperation in the EU has developed since the 1980s, the key issue for achieving the aim of enhanced cooperation on civil protection is training and joint exercises in order for the practitioners to get together, and this can very well be done without necessarily integrating non-members fully into the Union Mechanism.[44] As another PROCIV representative pointed out:

> Integration with the MIC? We just have to wait and see … It's very important with prevention and preparedness, going there and helping to build the systems. We try to spread best practices from our systems, and that is confidence-building because we are opening up things that are rather sensitive. We are going to their administrations and they tend to be rather closed, but in this field they are opening. That is one of the main achievements that the [Euro-Mediterranean] programme has reached and that should be improved.
>
> (Interview No. 11, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU)

Finally, the ways in which civil protection is organized among the Mediterranean non-members varies considerably, and this presents a specific challenge to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.[45] For example, Morocco and Algeria have proper civil protection directorates at the Ministries of the Interior (much in line with how the French civil protection system is organized). Risk exposure and experiences of handling natural and man-made disasters vary among the

countries and it has had an effect on how the national civil protection systems have evolved.[46] Most importantly, the shift from civil defence to civil protection is not as pronounced among countries in North Africa and the Middle East as it is among most EU member states. Civil protection usually is placed under the Ministries of the Interior in the Mediterranean non-members, but it has been noted that: 'Within these ministries, priorities and human and financial resources allocation may be skewed toward other security-related activities, inter alia, anti-terrorism, countering drug and human trafficking and other criminal activities' (Tag-Eldeen, 2010: 85).

There are also indications that Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation has relied heavily on personal contacts among the practitioners, which has proved to be valuable in order for the right persons to quickly get in contact with each other when disasters strike. But this informality is also said to be an obstacle to the further institutionalization of the cooperation. The logic behind establishing a network of national contact points around the Mediterranean for the Union Mechanism through the Euro-Med programmes has been to have the ERCC working as a regional coordination and information hub. Even though such a network of contact points has been established, one interviewee suggests that there is a risk of superimposing a network system on top of the existing domestic structures in the Mediterranean non-member countries without incorporating or really building upon them.[47] Furthermore, the often hierarchical structure of civil protection systems together with the traditional role of the armed forces in most countries in North Africa and the Middle East might also hamper the smooth functioning of this network since civil protection personnel and desk officers are not always allowed to act with discretion to the same extent as their counterparts in most European states (Tag-Eldeen, 2010). Typically, asked about the different, and possibly conflicting, notions of civil protection another interviewee stressed that the Commission does not spend much time on 'conceptual discussions', but rather takes a pragmatic approach, adding that it focuses on improving the participating non-members' capacities and not 'redefining their concepts'.[48]

## Spanish and Moroccan civil protection

The origins of the modern Spanish civil protection (*protección civil*) concept dates back to the 1940s and the period right after the Spanish Civil War. At that time, it was conceived of as part of the military concept of civil defence (*defensa civil*). Spanish civil defence was developed as a response to the Second World War, and the main threat was perceived to be bombings against the civilian population by a foreign enemy.[49] As a consequence of the changed role of the Spanish Armed Forces in peacetime, civil defence has today almost completely been replaced by the concept of civil protection in Spain (CEP Handbook, 2006: 170–171).[50] The contemporary Spanish civil protection system was codified in 1985 when the Law on Civil Protection was enacted.[51] Civil protection is by law defined as the: 'physical protection of the population

and goods in cases of severe risk, public calamity, or extraordinary catastrophe in which the lives and physical integrity of the people are endangered' (Ley Orgánica 2/1985). The law also stipulates that civil protection is part of a comprehensive security policy aiming to protect the lives of Spanish citizens regardless of whether the country is at war or peace. Military capacities can be used to support civil protection in peacetime, which is also often the case when large man-made and natural disasters occur. The Spanish defence directive from 2008 stipulates that threats to Spain's national security include threats such as climate change, and it explicitly states that the Spanish Armed Forces shall fully support the national civil protection system (Consejo de Defensa Nacional, 2008).

As an overarching principle, the Spanish state is responsible for organizing civil protection in Spain and the national government is the superior management and coordinating body. Due to the decentralized structure of the Spanish state, the national government's main responsibility lies in monitoring the development and implementation of regional civil protection preparedness plans.[52] In case of a major emergency, the Spanish state performs a coordination function between administrative bodies on a sub-state level, but the national government may also delegate this function. The delegation is made on request by the minister of the interior and on the initiative of the president of an autonomous region or local authority, to regional or local authorities (Real Decreto 407/1992). The Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias, DGPCE), placed under the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), performs a support and coordinating function between the MoI, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the relevant regional civil protection authorities in case of large-scale emergencies.[53] However, the actual response to emergencies shall be carried out through the planning, coordination and direction of the responsible public services: fire brigades, rescue and sanitary services, and so on. The bulk of these resources and capacities are owned and managed by authorities on regional or even local levels.

Events such as the Prestige accident in 2002 (causing a large oil spill off the north-western coast of Spain), the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and the large forest fires in Guadalajara (Madrid) in 2005 have led to a review of the Spanish civil protection system,[54] and in addition to civilian capacities, the changes in the Spanish law on national defence have linked military capacities more closely to civil protection. In 2005, the Spanish government made a decision to create the Military Emergency Unit (UME) (Real Decreto 399/2007). The UME serves as a rapid response unit providing support to the civil protection system, and it operates upon request from the government or delegated ministries. The unit remains under military command during operations, though its actions shall be coordinated with relevant civil protection authorities (Roldán 2008/2009).[55]

In relation to the question posed in this book, it is important to note that most Spanish interviewees describe the UME in terms of being a natural and

logical step in line with the broader changes in Spanish security and defence policies that have taken place over the last decade. One interviewee simply said that the UME is one among several other instruments available to the Spanish state in case of emergencies.[56] Another suggested that it has become apparent to most Spanish policy-makers that the Spanish state needs an instrument like the UME since the otherwise decentralized Spanish civil protection system is not really suitable to handle large-scale natural or man-made disasters that affect several autonomous regions or otherwise overwhelms the capacities of one single region.[57] Accordingly, it is only 'natural' to draw upon military capacities to create such an instrument since the armed forces are one of the few remaining competences that belong exclusively to the Spanish state (as opposed to the decentralized rescue services). Another interviewee explicitly suggested that the UME should be seen as an expression of how Spain has dealt with the question of what role the armed forces should play when the threat of inter-state war is practically extinct from Western Europe.[58]

The Moroccan civil protection system has certain similarities with the Spanish system, although it is based on a French model and it is far from being decentralized. The Moroccan civil protection (*protection civile*) concept was codified in legal terms with a Royal Decree (*Dahir*) issued in 1955, and civil protection is defined in broad terms as aiming at protecting people, property and national heritage in case of calamitous events and disasters (El Yaagoubi, 2007).[59] According to Art. 18 of the Moroccan constitution, all Moroccans shall in a spirit of solidarity bear the burdens caused by national calamities (Constitution de la Royaume du Maroc). As an overarching principle, it is the Moroccan government, formally the Prime Minister, which is responsible for defining the national policy in the field of civil protection, whereas the Ministry of Interior is responsible for implementing national policies on civil protection. Inter-ministerial coordination in the field of civil protection is also the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior since it involves several ministries in the work of protection and prevention against emergencies and disasters. All Moroccan regions have regional commands for civil protection which are meant to support the *Walis* (regional governors) in technical and operational matters.[60] These regional commands are also responsible for preparing regional civil protection plans which are then submitted to the Directorate General for Civil Protection (Direction Générale de la Protection Civile, DGPC) in Rabat.[61] In 1997, the former Civil Protection Inspectorate was upgraded to the Directorate General for Civil Protection (DGPC) under the Ministry of Interior.[62]

However, the Moroccan regions do not enjoy anywhere near the same amount of autonomy as, for example, the Spanish autonomous communities. They are better conceived of as being similar to the French *départements* (i.e. administrative entities within a highly centralized state). Moreover, the role of the Walis in the Moroccan civil protection system should not be underestimated, as they personally represent the Moroccan monarch and they usually enjoy strong political backing from the *Makhzen*.[63] Apart from civil protection units, the

Walis may also call upon assistance from the Moroccan security forces, such as the police and the gendarmerie, and in exceptional circumstances, also the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR).[64]

Coordination of civil protection takes place between the Moroccan state and local authorities through the Ministry of Interior. The Centre for Surveillance and Coordination (CVC) is responsible for crisis management on a national level (e.g. risk prevention and coordination of operations), and it also runs the operational Crisis Centre (*Salle de Crises*), which is responsible for coordinating national as well as international assistance on Moroccan territory. It should also be noted that military capacities (e.g. transports, tents) can and are frequently used to support civil protection operations in Morocco.[65] The 1955 Royal Decree is still the basic legal text regulating Moroccan civil protection, but in the light of the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and the earthquake in Al Hoceima in 2004, there is work being done to revise and modernize the Moroccan legislation in the field of civil protection (*Aujourd'hui Le Maroc*, 2006).

This process can be said to have started after Mohammed VI made a public appeal in 2004 after the Al Hoceima earthquake stating that this event made it evident that the Moroccan state was not sufficiently apt to face 'emergency situations' (Mohammed VI, speech, 2004). According to one Moroccan interviewee, the speech gave the official blessing to go ahead with the modernization of Morocco's civil protection system and to enhance the coordination between the various branches of the Moroccan security forces and other public authorities in order to be better prepared to cope with crises and emergencies.[66] The same interviewee also noted that it is nowadays hard to make a distinction between civil protection and security policy, mainly because terrorist attacks might cause pollution, urban fires or other types of disasters typically associated with civil protection. For example, the Moroccan Centre for Surveillance and Coordination is also used to monitor potential 'social crises' such as large public events or even protests. To be sure, this illustrates some of the problematic aspects of Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation noted above (cf. Tag-Eldeen, 2010).

### *Spanish and Moroccan civil protection in relation to the EU*

The Spanish DGPCE is responsible for preparing requests for assistance to the Union Mechanism. It is at the same time the Spanish contact point for the ERCC, and Spain has, over the years, contributed to several EU civil protection operations. Spain has had several experiences of receiving assistance through the Union Mechanism (for instance during the Prestige accident in 2002 and during the forest fires in northern Spain in 2006). The Spanish Ministry of Interior is financially responsible for operations undertaken by the disaster support units as part of the Community Mechanism, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for financing operations outside of the framework of the Union Mechanism.

Interestingly, when Spanish civil protection resources are used as part of the Union Mechanism, it is seen as a responsibility for the Ministry of Interior, even though the operation is conducted outside of the EU. Accordingly, the Spanish law on disaster support units makes an explicit reference to EU civil protection and the need to meet the requirements of enhanced coordination within the EU (Real Decreto 285/2006). Even though the Lisbon Treaty rules out harmonization of national legislation on civil protection, this serves as an illustration of how national authorities and legal systems adjust to the developments of EU civil protection.

Morocco participates in international cooperation on civil protection within several international forums, such as the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement, UN/ISDR as well as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. The Arab League's civil protection cooperation (Bureau Arabe de Protection Civile) is situated in Casablanca. As for Morocco and EU civil protection, it should be noted that the Union Mechanism was activated and used in the operation sent to Morocco after the earthquake in Al Hoceima in 2004. The Commission has also been exploring the possibility of signing an administrative arrangement on civil protection with Morocco. For example, the joint document on the Advanced Status hints at this possibility (EU–Moroccan Association Council 2008a). The idea behind an administrative arrangement instead of a cooperative agreement with a third country is that such an arrangement is not legally binding and it deals with technical cooperation in terms of exchange of information, training and exercises. It would also be seen as a sign of commitment on behalf of the EU and Morocco. However, at the time of this writing, no such arrangement has been signed by the two parties.[67]

As a further indication of the ongoing cooperation between Morocco and the EU on a practical level, Morocco was invited to participate in the CCAEX08 exercise held during the French EU Presidency in 2008. The aim of the exercise was to test the EU's capacities to support the member states' crisis response efforts (Council of the EU, 2008c). What is interesting here is that Moroccan authorities were allowed access to the Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) in order to receive the information that was dispersed as part of the exercise. A simulated request for assistance was also sent from Morocco to the ERCC in Brussels. Moroccan representatives also participated at the follow-up session, and that was yet another unprecedented event.[68]

### *Spanish and Moroccan civil protection in practice*

Bilateral cooperation on civil protection between Spain and Morocco is regulated by a convention signed in Rabat in 1987, which entered into force in 1993 (Convenio Protección Civil, 1987).[69] The convention stipulates the areas of cooperation, such as, for example, technical assistance and training programmes. It establishes a 'regime of reciprocity', meaning that Spanish and Moroccan authorities may call on each other's assistance in case of emergencies or catastrophes. A Joint Commission for Civil Protection examines and proposes

actions in the areas of cooperation established by the convention, such as common operations protocols and joint exercises. The executive organs of this Commission are the Spanish DGPCE and the Moroccan DGPC. Morocco is also one of the main beneficiaries of Spanish development aid, and the Spanish agency for international cooperation and development (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, AECID) supports several projects throughout Morocco related to civil protection, such as disaster prevention in rural areas.[70]

Spanish–Moroccan civil protection cooperation has mainly focused on training exercises in the fields of nuclear safety and emergency medicine.[71] For example, Moroccan practitioners participated as the only non-European contribution to a seminar held in Madrid on psycho-social support in emergencies and catastrophes organized by the Spanish DGPCE during the Spanish EU Presidency in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2010). Another example is that the Spanish Military Emergency Unit (UME) serves as a source of inspiration in the ongoing process of modernizing Moroccan civil protection after the Al Hoceima earthquake, and there has been some exchange between Spanish and Moroccan authorities in this regard.[72] According to Moroccan interviewees, this kind of knowledge exchange is in line with Moroccan interests both because the Moroccan civil protection system is quite well developed by international standards and because Morocco's cooperation with France mainly focuses on other aspects of civil protection.[73]

Both Spanish and Moroccan civil protection practitioners confirm that the bilateral cooperation works smoothly in terms of training and assistance. One Spanish interviewee explained that:

> When there is a need for it, we send our fire-fighter airplanes. They have also offered to send their forest fire units and we've accepted them. It's the neighbour next door. It's like that guy who owns the house at the other end of village. The Mediterranean is a village. Some people live closer, others live further away.
>
> (Interview No. 39, Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection)

Another Spanish interviewee at the Ministry of Defence made an interesting reflection on the practical dynamics implied in civil protection cooperation:

> For example, cooperation in the case of natural disasters is a very logical and natural thing. It's not about the Spanish Armed Forces assisting the armed forces of another country that has been hit by an earthquake, but rather assisting the whole national administration of that country, which is something inter-ministerial. The Spanish authorities work with the authorities of the other country in an inter-ministerial fashion, and here the international and the inter-ministerial get intertwined. I think that this is where we are heading, but I insist that it's an incremental and slow process.
>
> (Interview No. 42, Spanish Ministry of Defence)

The undoubtedly most important case of Spanish–Moroccan bilateral cooperation in this field is the so-called Operation Cross the Strait (*Operación Paso del Estrecho*, OPE). Since 1986, the Spanish DGPCE has been coordinating an annual civil protection operation in the Strait of Gibraltar (López García, 2004). It basically consists of establishing and monitoring civil protection plans to assist Spanish regional and local authorities, public health services and so on when handling the risks relating to massive flows of people and vehicles.[74] Many thousands of persons with (mostly) Moroccan and Algerian origins living in Europe cross the narrow strait during the holiday seasons (mainly in the summer, but also in connection to important Muslim holidays during other parts of the year).[75] In 2013, the Spanish authorities estimate that some 2.3 million persons were transported back and forth between Spanish and North African ports (see Figure 4.1). These figures represent a significant increase compared to 1995 (some 1.4 million persons). However, in 2008, the numbers amounted to 2.6 million persons and the decrease in the period 2009–2012 is most probably related to economic crisis in Europe, yet another reminder of how closely connected the two sides of the Strait of Gibraltar are in social and economic terms (see Chapter 2). Interestingly, the OPE was not disrupted during the 'Parsley Islet crisis' in 2002, and the crisis does not seem to have had any direct effect on the number of persons crossing the Strait that year.

Moroccan authorities have made efforts to facilitate the management of the OPE, such as simplifying the customs and administrative procedures at the Moroccan ports. The Minister for Moroccans residing abroad, Nouzha Chekrouni, stressed the smooth working relations between the authorities of the two countries, as well as their capacity to solve common organizational problems (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). On the occasion of





*Figure 4.1 Operación Paso del Estrecho* 1995–2014
Note: The numbers in the figure represent the total number of persons per year departing and returning through Spanish ports. Data on departures from 2010 unavailable.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Interior

the meeting of the Spanish–Moroccan Joint Commission for the OPE, held in October 2008 in León (Spain), the two delegations were headed by the Subsecretary of the Spanish Ministry of Interior, Justo Zambrana, and the Governor and Director of Migration and Border Surveillance at the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, Khalid Zerouali. The two ministers took advantage of the occasion to again underscore the 'excellent relations and the high levels of mutual understanding between the two governments' (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2008b). Furthermore, the Spanish Minister of Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, visited his Moroccan homolog, Taieb Cherkaoui, in Rabat in August 2010 to discuss the OPE as well as migration, drug trafficking, terrorism and security cooperation (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2010b).

Another example of Spanish–Moroccan cooperation on civil protection can be seen in relation to the Al Hoceima earthquake. In the middle of the night on 24 February 2004, an earthquake struck the western parts of the Mediterranean, close to the port city of Al Hoceima situated in the rocky and isolated Rif region in northern Morocco.[76] The initial Search and Rescue operations were conducted that morning by Moroccan civil protection units and the Moroccan Armed Forces together with the Moroccan Red Crescent. At first, the UN Resident Coordinator in Rabat estimated that the Moroccan government had the situation under control, and that it would not need to request international assistance (OCHA, 2004a). However, that assessment changed quickly, and by 25 February, the Moroccan government called for international assistance (OCHA, 2004b). The widespread destruction of homes and livelihoods in the villages around Al Hoceima, together with the recurring aftershocks, made the surviving population wary of returning to their homes, and this quickly transformed the initial natural disaster into an escalating humanitarian crisis, as an estimated 15,000 people were left homeless, thus requiring shelter and relief efforts (OCHA, 2004e). The operations in Al Hoceima were made difficult by the fact that the earthquake had wreaked havoc in villages in the mountainous and in remote parts of northern Morocco at a time of the year when the weather is not particularly forgiving.

UN OCHA dispatched, on 25 February, a UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination) team to support the Moroccan government and local authorities in coordinating the international assistance being sent to Al Hoceima (OCHA, 2004b).[77] Trucks from the Spanish enclave city of Melilla carrying relief items had also arrived that same morning. One Moroccan official at the Moroccan DGPC recalled that, in a single day, the Al Hoceima airport had received some 50 aeroplanes carrying personnel and equipment, adding that this shows how civil protection cooperation is 'solidarité en marche'.[78] By 26 February, an EU coordination team dispatched by the Union Mechanism had been deployed on the ground in Al Hoceima with the mission to coordinate and facilitate the exchange of information between the civil protection teams from the member states that had sent assistance to Morocco (see Table 4.3).[79]

There are indications that the Moroccan authorities were not sufficiently prepared in host-nation support to handle the massive inflow of international

*Table 4.3* Civil protection assistance to Morocco

| *Country* | *Assistance* |
|---|---|
| Austria | 2 SAR teams (34 persons and 20 dogs) |
| Belgium | 1 C-130 military aeroplane carrying power generators, 1 aircraft carrying tents, blankets, purification units and medicine |
| Czech Rep. | 2,100 blankets |
| France | 1 SAR team (15 persons and 2 dogs) and approx. 2 tons of relief material, 17 tons of humanitarian aid, 20 power generators, 2,880 blankets, 96 tents and 110 tarpaulins |
| Germany | 2 assessment experts, 10,000 blankets, 10 tents (Type SG-30), 250 tents, 500 kitchen sets |
| Greece | 22 SAR persons, 2 dogs, 1 vehicle containing SAR materials and devices, 1 mini bus, medical assistance and 1,000 blankets |
| Iceland | 1 SAR team (20 persons) |
| Italy | 3 aeroplanes carrying 32 SAR persons, technical equipment, 20 tents and 300 blankets |
| Luxembourg | 30 SAR persons, power generators, medicines kits, equipment for SAR teams, communication equipment, 1 vehicle for sniffing dogs, 1 mini bus |
| Netherlands | 45 SAR persons, 1 doctor, 4 dogs |
| Portugal | 1 SAR team (16 persons), 6 dogs, 10 power generators, 1 support team with approx. 3 people, 5,000 blankets |
| Spain | 41 SAR persons, 10 dogs, 2,000 blankets, 1,000 hygiene kits, 150 first aid kits, 100 beds, medicines and technical supplies |

Source: OCHA (2004d)

Note: Assistance coordinated through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism

assistance (IFRC Final Report). Moreover, Mohammed VI did not visit the disaster-struck area until February 28, and it has been suggested that the king's late public involvement caused disarray among the Moroccan authorities that were supposed to handle the disaster. For example, the distribution of humanitarian aid destined for the remote villages surrounding Al Hoceima was slower than expected (Suárez Collado, 2008). Some civil protection teams found themselves stranded at the Al Hoceima airport waiting for clearance from the Moroccan authorities. Interestingly, one Spanish interviewee recalled that the two coordinators of the EU civil protection team approached their Moroccan liaison to convey the message that things had to be done quickly or else they would have to leave. The reason that they could be so frank was because they were Spanish and French, implying that the ties among the practitioners from these countries are particularly strong, as they rest on several years of cooperation on civil protection:

> In the case of Al Hoceima in Morocco, they were just stuck there not doing anything. Then the two coordinators that we had sent there went to

> talk to Colonel Benyan and they said to him: 'look, we're here now and things need to be done within an hour or else we're leaving.' Who could have told him that if not a Frenchman or a Spaniard?
>
> (Interview No. 39, Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection)

However, the same interviewee also stressed that the operation in Al Hoceima did not only revealed a lack of preparation on the Moroccan side, but also on the EU's behalf. The Union Mechanism did not manage to completely coordinate and appropriately prepare the incoming assistance from the EU member states. Apparently, one European civil protection team left the port of Tangier and set out to cross the Rif mountains equipped only with summer garments.[80] By 1 March 2004, virtually all international SAR teams had left the affected area around Al Hoceima and the immediate civil protection operation had by then given way to the more prolonged post-disaster reconstruction work and humanitarian aid efforts (OCHA, 2004e). A couple of weeks later, Mohammed VI gave the speech stating that the earthquake had shown that the Moroccan authorities were not sufficiently prepared, and that there was an apparent need for modernization of the Moroccan civil protection system.

## A 'close-knit community'

The analysis of civil protection cooperation presented in this chapter indicates that there is convergence on the highest political level among EU member states and Mediterranean non-members as to the need to protect people, property and the environment from natural and man-made disasters in the Mediterranean region. The means to do so is said to be improved regional cooperation, although this is perhaps not a particularly surprising finding, as it could first and foremost be seen as the convergence of political discourse. But the analysis also points to actual cooperation taking place regionally through the subsequent Euro-Med civil protection programmes, and bilaterally, which the Spanish–Moroccan case reveals. The Euro-Med programmes have steadily increased in scope, funding and participants since the mid 1990s. Furthermore, the development of EU civil protection and the Euro-Med programmes have evolved more or less side by side over the last decade, and regional cooperation in the Mediterranean has benefited from the creation of EU instruments such as the Union Mechanism (as in the case of the Moroccan earthquake), and non-members have been able to influence the shape of the Euro-Med programmes (e.g. Algeria and Egypt acting as co-directors). Moreover, the analysis suggests that the de-territorialized notion of security threats and a practical disposition to do something about them have coalesced so that discourse and practice seem to be reinforcing each other, particularly in the field of civil protection.

Another interesting finding here is that the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean seems to have been facilitated by the understanding that the EU has a clear self-interest in supporting neighbouring non-members due to

the perceived interdependence between members and non-members in terms of non-military threats and trans-boundary risks. The external dimension of EU civil protection has become ever more salient as a rationale, not least for the Commission, in order to further institutionalization of the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean since the EU needs to get involved whenever large-scale disasters strike in its neighbourhood. Simply put, the logic here is that it is not only better to be safe than sorry, but that it is even better if you can get your neighbours to be prepared because otherwise you will probably end up dealing with the consequences yourself. It can also be argued that the analysis points to the tacit limits to non-members' integration with EU civil protection since it is only the candidate countries that are expected to become full members of the Union Mechanism. The Commission's explicit strategy to handle the problem is to reduce the barrier between members and non-members within a 'wider Euro-Mediterranean space for civil protection' where the Union Mechanism would play a vital role as a coordination and information hub for real-time assistance as well as a supporting the exchange of best practices.

Interestingly, lessons from the way in which the cooperation evolved among EU member states in the 1980s and 1990s suggest that training programmes and joint exercises are especially effective in enhancing practical cooperation on civil protection. Civil protection practitioners, together with EU officials, have provided much of the impetus for the development of EU civil protection, although political leaders (not least in the European Council) have played an important role, especially after 'big' events such as the terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid. To be sure, one of the main driving forces behind the development of EU civil protection has been the persistent focus on operational cooperation, despite lingering political disagreement among the member states on its future shape and form (Bremberg and Britz, 2009). In a similar fashion, the operational dimension has gained importance in the Euro-Med programmes even though both the EMP and the UfM have been plagued with stalemates on the political level.

What do these findings mean for the question of how the EU works as a security community-building institution? The analysis points to the fact that the practice of self-restraint, combined with notions of collective security among EU member states, have facilitated the emergence of EU civil protection in its present shape and form. But to grasp what the findings from the above analysis entail it is necessary to recognize the shift from territorial defence to crisis management in most EU member states and the profound impact it has had on the role assigned to national armed forces (Gärtner, 2003). To some extent, the relationship between military and civilian goals and means has been turned upside down. The civil defence concept prevalent during the Cold War was based on the premise that civilian capacities should be prepared to be made available to serve the military in case of war, whereas the concept of civil protection rather stipulates that military capacities are to be prepared and made available to serve civilian authorities to manage man-made and natural disasters, including terrorist attacks. The analysis suggests that this

conceptual change occurred at different speeds in different national contexts and that the shift from civil defence to civil protection is not as pronounced among the countries in North Africa and the Middle East. This obviously has to do with the fact that the threat of inter-state war is still a constitutive feature of the regional order in the Middle East, albeit it seems less so in North Africa (see Chapter 3).

However, the analysis also indicates that practices to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks are spreading beyond the borders of the EU. The Union Mechanism has not only served as a means for EU member states to assist each other and share best practices, as it has also been shown to be increasingly important as a vehicle to involve non-members. Importantly, the specific ways to deal with trans-boundary risks and non-military threats imbued in EU civil protection can be seen as a product of knowledge about (possible) future risks and threats, and agreement on how to handle them. This is not to say that civil protection cooperation is mostly 'events-driven', because it has to be taken into account that events (however devastating they might be) do not present themselves with ready-made interpretations as to what proper lessons should be drawn from them. Thus, civil protection cooperation should not be seen as purely functional responses to past events and perceived future threats since the analysis indicates that there are ongoing political struggles to define the scope and content of civil protection (both between EU institutions and member states).

The point to make here is that the analysis supports the argument that the Euro-Med programmes serve to provide a social venue in which capital-endowed agents iteratively are doing things in a certain way that conveys the implicit yet powerful message that 'this is how we do things in this field' (Pouliot, 2008). They thus serve as a 'socializing tool' in that practices developed among civil protection practitioners from EU member states are transferred to their counterparts in the participating Mediterranean countries (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009; Wolff, 2012). Importantly, this process is not unidirectional. Spanish and Moroccan practitioners, as well as EU officials, testify to the close-knit nature of the civil protection cooperation as being an important factor behind the success of the Euro-Med programmes. This has allowed the cooperation to evolve around practical problems relating to natural and man-made disasters on almost a person-to-person basis (even though it has also at times proved difficult to expand the circle to involve other organizations and fields of expertise). Learning and knowledge exchange are favoured by the shared professional identities of the participants, and established practices are partly adapted to deal with trans-boundary risks and non-military threats in light of the experiences of the practitioners from the non-members (for example, seen in the work to develop a Mediterranean Risk Atlas) (Adler, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 2011a).

Regional cooperation has indeed been facilitated by the already established transgovernmental links between civil protection authorities (e.g. Spain and Morocco), but the relevant point here is that the EU supports a regional

network-based community that builds upon, *as well as* transcends, already existing bilateral relations. This is the most important finding taken from the analysis above in relation to the research question since it points to the fact that a nascent community of like-minded practitioners is taking shape around the Mediterranean, fostered by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice (i.e. protecting people, property and the environment in the face of natural and man-made disasters), and that the Euro-Med programmes together with the Union Mechanism have facilitated this process.

Finally, the above analysis suggests that transgovernmental networks perform an important, but poorly understood function in security community-building in that they transcend institutional boundaries and help bring security practitioners together. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in that political cooperation on a regional level in the Mediterranean at best advances at a painstakingly slow pace, but the operational cooperation on civil protection is able to move ahead despite the fact that political controversies among EU member states and Mediterranean countries are blocking the ill-fated UfM. Thus, communities of practice can very well function as initial building-blocks in a wider region-building exercise, and the way in which the Euro-Mediterranean civil protection community has emerged provides us with an important piece to the puzzle of how the EU works as a security community-building institution in the post-Cold War era.

## Notes

1 Interview No. 33 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).
2 In contrast to those policy areas where the EU is granted either 'exclusive competence' (e.g. external trade) or 'shared competences' (e.g. agriculture) (OJEU, 2010b).
3 On JHA, see Monar (2006).
4 A 'north–south divide' seems also to be present in public opinion in terms of concerns about natural and man-made disasters, terrorist attacks and armed conflict. According to a Eurobarometer survey on EU civil protection, the highest levels of concern about natural disasters (e.g. floods, earthquakes) are found among respondents in southern and eastern parts of Europe: Bulgaria (66 per cent very concerned), Greece (51 per cent), Czech Republic (51 per cent), Italy (49 per cent), Cyprus (47 per cent), Spain (46 per cent). The lowest levels of concern are in Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Denmark: in each case, no more than 6 per cent are very concerned about natural disasters occurring in their country. Concerns about man-made disasters (e.g. oil spills, nuclear accidents) are again higher in southern and eastern parts of Europe than in northern Europe: Spain (54 per cent very concerned), Bulgaria (53 per cent), Latvia (49 per cent), Italy (48 per cent), Cyprus (47 per cent) and Czech Republic (47 per cent). The lowest levels of concern are in Denmark (10 per cent very concerned), Netherlands (10 per cent), Sweden (12 per cent) and Finland (15 per cent). The pattern is similar in relation to terrorist attacks: Spain (48 per cent very concerned), Czech Republic (45 per cent), Latvia (41 per cent), Bulgaria (41 per cent) and Cyprus (39 per cent). Again, the lowest levels of concern are in Netherlands (5 per cent very concerned), Sweden (8 per cent), Denmark (9 per cent) and Finland (10 per cent). In relation to armed conflicts the patterns are similar to those observed for other types of disaster: Cyprus (50 per cent very concerned), Spain (46 per cent), Czech

Republic (42 per cent), Latvia (40 per cent) and Bulgaria (39 per cent), while Denmark (5 per cent), Sweden (5 per cent), Netherlands (7 per cent) and Finland (8 per cent) are the countries with the lowest proportions of very concerned respondents (Eurobarometer, 2012).

5 Several interviewees in PROCIV confirm that there is still a kind of 'north–south divide' in the Council, but even though it might be too early to measure the effects of the new voting rules in the Council, many of them suggested that the new procedures of the Lisbon Treaty might eventually help to overcome it (Interview No. 10, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Interview No. 11, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, Interview No. 14, Portuguese National Authority of Civil Protection, Interview No. 21, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, Interview No. 22, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, Interview No. 24, Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU, Interview No. 28, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, Interview No. 32, Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU).

6 Interestingly, one interviewee said that the PROCIV working group in the Council managed for the first time to agree on a 'working definition' on civil protection when it had to prepare a common position of the EU regarding the UN guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Interview No. 28, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU). On the so-called Oslo Guidelines, see United Nations (2007), OJEU (2008b).

7 Interview No. 33 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

8 In 2006, a former Commissioner, Michel Barnier, proposed that the EU should set up a EU civil protection force (Barnier, 2006).

9 Interview No. 33 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

10 Previously called the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).

11 Other major emergencies in which the Union Mechanism has been activated include accidental marine pollution in Spain (autumn 2002); earthquakes in Algeria (spring 2003), Iran (2003/2004/2005), Morocco (winter 2004), Pakistan (autumn 2005) and Haiti (winter 2010); the tsunami in South Asia (winter 2004/2005); typhoon in the Philippines (autumn 2012); forest fires in Portugal (summers 2003/2004/2005), Spain (2006), Greece (summer 2007) and Israel (winter 2010); floods in Romania and Bulgaria (spring/summer 2005), Hungary (spring 2010) and Rumania (summer 2010); Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the US (autumn 2005); as well as during Israel's offensive in southern Lebanon (2006), the Russian–Georgian conflict (summer 2008) and the terrorist attacks in India (autumn 2008).

12 Financial assistance also to non-members was made available already through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument established in 2007. This instrument expired in 2013 as the Decision 1313/2013/EU was passed.

13 For example, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey participate as EU candidates and the Commission has signed administrative arrangements or memoranda of understanding with Australia, Russia and Ukraine. The Commission has also suggested the possibility of signing such an arrangement with Morocco.

14 Interview No. 4 (European Commission).

15 Public support for humanitarian aid among the EU member states appears to be strong. A survey conducted on behalf of the Commission shows that 80 per cent of the participants answered the question 'How important do you think it is that the EU funds humanitarian aid activities outside the EU?' with 'very important' or 'fairly important'. According to the report based on the survey: 'At the national level, four of the Mediterranean countries appear as the strongest supporters for EU funded humanitarian aid and respondents in Cyprus (95 per cent), Greece (91 per cent), Malta (90 per cent) and Portugal (89 per cent); all show staunch support for the Union's presence in such activities. Similarly high figures are also noted in other

parts of the EU with 86 per cent of respondents in Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland and Slovenia perceiving this as important' (Eurobarometer, 2010: 30).

16 Interview No. 33 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

17 Interview No. 7 (European Commission).

18 The Mediterranean non-members were formally invited for the first time to participate at the 19th meeting of the national Director-Generals of Civil Protection in the EU held in Porto during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007.

19 Civil protection was listed among the UfM's six prioritized projects at the summit in 2008, and linking the Mediterranean partners more closely with the Union Mechanism was declared to be: 'one of the main priorities for the region' (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, 2008).

20 Major disasters in the Mediterranean region where the Community Mechanism has been activated include earthquakes in Algeria (2003), Morocco (2004) and Italy (2009); forest fires in Portugal (2003/2004/2005), Spain (2006), Albania (2007), Italy (2007) and Israel (2010); and floods in Algeria (2006).

21 Interview No. 6 (European Commission), Interview No. 13 (European Commission), Interview No. 15 (European Commission).

22 The activities organized under the Pilot Programme continued during times marked by high tensions in Euro-Mediterranean relations caused by events such as the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001.

23 See also, Nardin (2010). The programme was referred to as 'Bridge' since it was launched with financial backing from France to fill a gap which would otherwise have been created if the partner would have had to wait for funding from the next EU budget cycle (2007–2013) (Interview No. 29, Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme).

24 The PPRD South is identical to the 'joint civil protection programme' referred to at the UfM's Paris summit in 2008 (Interview No. 6, European Commission, Interview No. 13, European Commission).

25 According to the Commission's estimates, the EU has spent some €15 million on Euro-Mediterranean civil protection since 1996. However, these numbers do not include contribution made by EU member states and Mediterranean non-members to cover for example participants' travel expenses, etc. It also needs to be taken into account that the Euro-Med programmes are not meant to provide funding to purchase equipment (e.g. aircrafts or field hospitals).

26 In a similar fashion, the Pilot Programme was directed by an Italian–Egyptian consortium and the Bridge Programme by a French consortium (with Italian, Egyptian and Algerian co-directors). Unlike Italy and France, Spain has not directed any Euro-Med programme to date, even though several activities have been organized by Spain. This is allegedly not due to a lack of political will, but rather due to the lack of state capacity and resources, since the Spanish civil protection system is decentralized to a much higher degree than the Italian or the French (Interview No. 32, Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU).

27 Interview No. 15 (European Commission).

28 Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).

29 Interview No. 39 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection).

30 Interview No. 7 (European Commission).

31 All except the ENP Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements do not explicitly refer to civil protection cooperation, although they do include references to political dialogue on peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean, in line with the 1995 Barcelona Declaration (see Chapter 5).

32 The same basically applies to the ENP Action Plans for Jordan (European Commission 2004b), Tunisia (European Commission 2004d), Israel (European Commission, 2004e), Lebanon (European Commission 2006a) and Egypt (European Commission, 2006b).

33 The cooperation under the EUR-OPA agreement involves Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon while a large number of CoE member states do not participate (e.g. many north European countries).
34 Interview No. 8 (Council of Europe).
35 Interview No. 2 (NATO), Interview No. 20 (NATO).
36 For example, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN ISDR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
37 Interview No. 4 (European Commission), Interview No. 6 (European Commission), Interview No. 13 (European Commission), Interview No. 15 (European Commission) and Interview No. 19 (Evaluator Euro-Med Bridge Programme).
38 For example, France cooperates intensively on a bilateral level with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Lebanon. Italy does so with Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco whereas a country such as Sweden has a history of cooperation with Jordan (Olding, 2007: 21).
39 Integration with the Union Mechanism would mean becoming a full member and thus actually enjoying a status similar to the one currently enjoyed by non-EU member states such as Iceland, Norway, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro.
40 Interview No. 6 (European Commission), Interview No. 13 (European Commission), Interview No. 15 (European Commission).
41 Interview No. 4 (European Commission), Interview No. 33 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).
42 Interview No. 7 (European Commission).
43 Interview No. 7 (European Commission).
44 Interview No. 7 (European Commission).
45 This is also true among the EU member states, but although it seems to have served to hamper the cooperation from time to time, it has never brought it to a complete halt (Bremberg and Britz, 2009; Interview No. 19, Evaluator Euro-Med Bridge Programme; Interview No. 29, Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme).
46 For an overview of the civil protection/civil defence systems in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Tunisia, see Tag-Eldeen (2010).
47 Interview No. 29 (Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme).
48 Interview No. 66 (European Commission).
49 Interview No. 43 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection).
50 For example, the Law on National Defence, adopted in 2005, stipulates that the Council of National Defence shall in wartime coordinate the civil protection system and that in peacetime the armed forces shall, together with other state and public authorities, preserve the security and well-being of the citizens in cases of grave risks, catastrophes and calamities (Ley Orgánica 5/2005).
51 Several interviewees stressed that the modern Spanish concept of civil protection was developed as a consequence of Spain's democratization and subsequent decentralization, but also because the older concept of civil defence had acquired unwanted connotations due to the Francoist regime's habit of relying on the military to uphold public order (Interview No. 41, Spanish Ministry of Defence, Interview No. 39, Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection).
52 Spain is divided into 17 autonomous regions (*Comunidades Autonómas*) and 50 provinces (*provincias*). Every administrative level (state, region, local) prepare so-called civil protection plans (*planes territoriales*) as well as preparedness plans for specific risk areas (*planes especiales*). For example, floods, earthquakes, chemical accidents, transports of dangerous goods, forest fires or volcanic activity. Importantly, the Spanish state is solely responsible for preparing plans for nuclear emergencies and war (Real Decreto 407/1992).
53 It also maintains the Operative Coordination Centre (*Sala de Coordinación Operativa*), holds exercises and provides training to civil servants responsible for

handling risks and emergencies (e.g. fire brigades, rescue and sanitary services, law enforcement and security agencies) at the National Civil Protection School in Madrid (Interview No. 38, Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection).

54 Between 1950 and 2005, 133 disasters were recorded in Spain. 109 of these disasters were man-made technological disasters (e.g. industrial accidents, urban collapses and fires, terrorist attacks and accidents of air, terrestrial and maritime transit), and 24 were natural disasters (e.g. floods and heat waves) (Arcos González, 2007: 375–376). In Spain, incidents related to extreme weather seem to be on the rise. In terms of technological disasters, transit accidents are most frequent. Floods (31.5 per cent) and air traffic accidents (30.2 per cent) represent the highest share of mortality among the approximately 7,000 persons that have been killed by man-made or natural disasters in Spain in the period 1950–2005 (ibid.).

55 Besides this military capacity, the Spanish gendarmerie forces (*Guardia Civil*) also have units prepared to handle nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC) disasters (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2005).

56 Interview No. 44 (Spanish Military Emergency Unit).

57 Interview No. 40 (Spanish Prime Minister's Office).

58 Interview No. 32 (Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU).

59 See also, ICDO (2006).

60 Morocco is divided into 16 regions which are in turn divided into 48 provinces and 13 prefectures.

61 The regional commands participate in the development of the so-called ORSEC (*ORganisation des SECours*) plans for the provinces and the prefectures of the regions. The regional commands shall also prepare specific operational plans and make sure that these are constantly updated and in case a serious disaster strikes, it is the regional commander for civil protection that will assume command of civil protection operations, but still under the authority of the governor of the concerned province or prefecture.

62 The DGPC is, at present, responsible for coordinating Moroccan civil protection, organizing emergency and rescue services, as well as the fire brigades. In 1984, the responsibility for rescue and emergency services, as well as fire brigades, was transferred to the Moroccan state from local authorities, which means that civil protection in Morocco comprises both paramilitary and civilian components. Firefighters make up the paramilitary component whereas the civilian component consists of administrative staff, doctors and technicians. The National Civil Protection School was created in 1985 and it holds training courses and exercises for personnel in the rescue services and fire brigades as well as for volunteers. The DGPC is also responsible for preparing and executing anti-locust operations throughout the country since locust invasions constitute a perennial threat to Moroccan agriculture (see Chapter 5).

63 Interview No. 57 (UN Resident Coordinator in Morocco).

64 On local levels (urban and rural townships), the Pashas and Caïds are responsible for overseeing rescue operations, even though actual operations are undertaken by civil protection units.

65 Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).

66 Interview No. 58 (Moroccan Ministry of Interior).

67 Interview No. 4 (European Commission, Interview No. 61 European Commission).

68 Interview No. 1 (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU).

69 Spain has signed similar conventions on civil protection with all its neighbouring states. France, Portugal, Italy and Morocco have done the same with these states, as well as with Tunisia. Morocco has, however, not signed a convention with Algeria, and bilateral contacts are only maintained on a case-by-case basis. Interview No. 39 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection), Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).

70 However, it should be noted that even though Spain is increasingly important, it is still France that is Morocco's main partner when it comes to civil protection both in terms of training and assistance, due to the strong historical ties between the two countries, and because of the fact that French is widely spoken in the Moroccan administration, which is of course something that helps the practical cooperation. Interview No. 52 (Spanish Embassy in Morocco), Interview No. 55 (Spanish Embassy in Morocco), Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).
71 Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).
72 Interview No. 58 (Moroccan Ministry of Interior), Interview No. 44 (Spanish Military Emergency Unit).
73 Interview No. 57 (UN Resident Coordinator in Morocco), Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Civil Protection Authority), Interview No. 56 (Moroccan Civil Protection Authority).
74 For example, approximately 5,600 cases of social assistance and 3,200 cases of sanitary assistance were provided by Spanish authorities during OPE 2009. The UME was dispatched in December 2007 around the time of the *Eid al-Adha* (the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice) in support of the civil protection authorities when a heavy storm caused delays in several Spanish ports, and a large number of persons were in need of sanitary assistance (Interview No. 44 Spanish Military Emergency Unit).
75 In Spain, the main points of departure are the ports of Algeciras, Alicante, Almería, Tarifa and Málaga. The main points of return from North Africa are the Moroccan ports of Al Hoceima, Nador and Tangier, as well as the Algerian ports of Argel, Ghazaouet and Orán and the Spanish ports of Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2008a).
76 The earthquake reached 6.3 on the Richter scale, and even though Al Hoceima was situated closest to the epicentre, it was the surrounding villages of Ait Kamra, Tamassint and Imzourn that were most badly hit in terms of loss of human lives and material damages (OCHA, 2004a). Aftershocks were also felt in the area during the following days (OCHA, 2004b). It is estimated that more than 600 persons died and almost 1,000 persons were injured, making it the worst earthquake in Morocco since the 1960s when an earthquake almost completely destroyed the city of Agadir (Suárez Collado, 2008).
77 The UNDAC team estimated that day that SAR teams from Spain, Holland, Portugal, Iceland, Luxembourg and Italy had already arrived in the affected area. Even Japan had sent a SAR team, but it was not expected to arrive for another few days. Smaller assessment teams from Germany, Switzerland, Greece and Turkey had also been deployed in the area. Furthermore, aeroplanes from Algeria, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain carrying emergency workers, relief items and medicine arrived in Al Hoceima on 25 February.
78 Interview No. 51 (Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection).
79 According to UN OCHA, the EU and UNDAC teams also cooperated closely during the operation (2004c). In the days immediately following the earthquake, international assistance was not only sent in the form of civil protection teams, but also as humanitarian aid and emergency funds made available from, for example, the UNDP, ECHO, US/AID, the Red Cross, the Red Crescent as well as from various countries and NGOs.
80 Interview No. 39 (Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection).

# 5 Conclusions

## Rethinking security communities in the post-Cold War Era

Deutsch observed that states might waver uncertainly for a considerable amount of time within a 'broad zone of transition' in security community-building processes (Deutsch et al., 1957: 33) and this can be said to find ample support in the study on the EU, Spain and Morocco, presented in this book. In some regards, Spain and Morocco act in ways that could be described as characterizing members of a (nascent) Euro-Mediterranean security community while in other regards, they rather seem to uphold balance-of-power practices, even going as far as threatening to use military force. Spanish–Moroccan relations in the post-Cold War era are marked by an increasing economic exchange and transgovernmental cooperation between civil protection authorities, and to some extent, also among the armed forces. However, these cooperative practices have developed at the same time as territorial disputes are left unresolved and are seen as a latent source of distrust and conflict on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Parsley Islet crisis in 2002 effectively serves to illustrate this point. The official reason given as to why Moroccan soldiers were sent to the islet in the first place was not to conquer it, but to enhance Morocco's capacity to handle 'new' security threats such as international terrorism, which of course can be said to be of great concern to Spain as well. It has been suggested that a motive behind Morocco's action was to 'test' Spain's willingness to defend a contested piece of territory in order to set a precedent for other Spanish possessions in North Africa (i.e. Ceuta and Melilla), although it is of course hard to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt (Gillespie, 2010). There are also indications that the Moroccan government was not fully aware of the operation until the Spanish authorities demanded an explanation, and the failure to effectively communicate between Madrid and Rabat seems to have exaggerated the crisis (Cembrero, 2006). The way in which the Spanish government reacted to the crisis hints nonetheless at the possibility that it seized an opportunity to forcefully set an example towards the Moroccan regime, which is not the kind of action that we would expect from members of a security community. However, when the Parsley Islet crisis is analysed together with the findings presented in this book, a more nuanced picture emerges and it rather seems to the case that overlaps of security practices to a large extent define the dynamics

of cooperation and conflict in Spanish–Moroccan relations in the post-Cold War era.

Thus, one of the book's main findings with bearing on the question of how the EU promotes security community-building in its neighbourhood is that through the institutionalization of multilateral venues (ranging from the EU–Morocco Association Council to the Euro-Mediterranean civil protection programmes), the EU has provided cooperative frameworks that otherwise would not have been available, and that Spanish and Moroccan practitioners have become increasingly embedded in them. Furthermore, the way in which transgovernmental cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan authorities has drawn upon instruments and capacities developed within EU policy areas such as the CSDP and EU civil protection suggests that the EU's role as a security community-building institution is less that of a 'peaceful hegemon' and perhaps more that of a facilitator.

Another key finding is that the de-territorialized notion of non-military and trans-boundary security threats and a subsequent focus on crisis management increasingly structure the discourse and practice in the field of security and defence policy in both Spain and Morocco. This has created a new rationale for practical cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan armed forces and civil protection authorities in the post-Cold War era, even though it has not meant that old and protracted disputes have disappeared entirely. The EU has played an important role in this process, both with regard to the CSDP and EU civil protection, in that it has provided venues for cooperation and also templates for Spanish and Moroccan practitioners to apply in other settings (e.g. the 5+5 Defence Initiative).

What do these findings imply for the broader questions on how security communities emerge and expand? To put it differently, what are the theoretical implications of these findings for the discussions in IR on collective identity, socialization and practice in relation to processes of security community-building? This concluding chapter summarizes the book's main findings and discusses the implications derived from the study on the EU, Spain and Morocco. It also seeks to put the findings in relation to the events that are reshaping North Africa and the Middle East since 2011.The chapter ends by proposing a set of questions which aim to carry the findings from this book on to future research endeavours.

## Security community-building in the absence of collective identity

One of the most striking features of the relations between the EU and Morocco is the persisting high levels of economic exchange measured against the total level of Morocco's external trade. However, this book shows that the role that the EU plays as a security community-building institution in the case of Spain and Morocco is not primarily related to the gravitational force of the Internal Market on neighbouring economies. It is rather seen in the way that this structural power is translated into a process of security community-building in

which a habit of consultation has evolved first and foremost in a kind of 'trilateral' setting with the Commission and EU member states on the one side and Morocco on the other. That Morocco is now involved in an increasing number of EU policy areas has served to lessen bilateral tensions with Spain on a range of contentious issues (e.g. agricultural trade, fisheries and also migration). As a result, these issues now tend to take on more of a technical character when negotiated at the EU–Morocco Association Council, which is said to hamper the tendency for polarization that would otherwise be present, and Morocco's advanced status with the EU only seems to have reinforced this process.

It has been noted that the institutionalization of multilateral venues does not have to imply that mutual trust develops among the participating parties or that there are firm expectations of peaceful change. However, practicing self-restraint seems not only to rest on the development of a 'we-feeling' as it could also be a function of taken-for-granted ways of doing international politics. Procedural norms of consultations and reciprocity can exist partially independently of substantive norms and values. The important point to be made here is that the EU works so as to broaden the repertoire of practices in Spanish–Moroccan relations and that it adds another layer to Spanish–Moroccan relations, embedding them in a larger cooperative framework which ultimately draws upon practices that constitute security communities.

The study upon which this book rests can thus be said to show how recent advances on practice theory in IR can be used to generate new ways of thinking about how the EU promotes security beyond its borders. Collective identities should not necessarily be seen as a precondition for the spread of cooperative security practices (even though the creation of regionally-based identities might be conducive for security communities to emerge). The focus on communities of practice has proven fruitful to the point that the 'standard' constructivist accounts in IR of security communities as being constituted by a sense of 'we-ness' through processes of collective identity-formation on a regional basis needs to be reconsidered. The EU has, since the 1990s, promoted a Euro-Mediterranean region-building exercise with admittedly few successes. But it seems strange to argue that this failure is primarily due to a lack of a collective identity around the Mediterranean basin. The emergence of a collective identity that would somehow embed the existing various national, ethnic, religious and otherwise political identities in the region would, in any case, be the end result of a long process of community-building, and could not be the precondition for the process to start. Even more important, there seems to be no good reason to assume that such an identity (if it ever would emerge) would have to be 'thicker' or 'thinner' in terms of emotional attachment than the European identity which allegedly is lacking in emotional strength, suggesting that inter-state peace can develop also in a community of strangers (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009).

Moreover, while there are good reasons to assume that there is an important discursive element in processes of security community-building, this study

has clearly illustrated that the social construction of security communities is not primarily discursive but very much practical, and that it is futile both from a theoretical and a methodological perspective to focus only on the discursive level of social interaction. The findings presented in this book suggest that the creation of multilateral institutions (e.g. EU–Morocco Association Council), the emergence of EU-promoted regional networks (e.g. Euro-Med civil protection programmes) and the emulation of CSDP measures (e.g. the 5+5 Defence College) indicate that common practices precede collective identity. This, in a nutshell, captures how the EU works as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis Spain and Morocco in the post-Cold War era.

However, this should not been seen as an argument against the power of socialization in security community-building. It is rather an argument about what precedes socialization and what it is that makes it possible in the first place (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a). Overall, this analysis gives support to the basic socialization argument in IR, albeit in a 'thin' or 'minimal' version. But as students of IR, we should perhaps not be too surprised, as this is also what has been identified in studies on international socialization in Europe (i.e. the 'thickest' institutionalized region of the world in terms of regional organizations) (Zürn and Checkel, 2007). We also know that socialization can work in different ways when self-interested actors start to engage in social interaction. Strategic calculation combined with instrumental rationality is not something that necessarily prevents socialization (Checkel, 2005a).

The way in which cooperative security practices in relation to non-military threats and trans-boundary risks spread in communities of practitioners related to the Euro-Med civil protection programmes or the CSDP are good examples of how this kind of diffusion works in concrete settings. Rather than seeing practices of cooperative security as being first and foremost dependent on actors creating a new collective identity (i.e. imagining themselves as being part of the same community or being socialized into the norms of a given community), such practices can actually start to evolve without a strong sense of mutual identification or 'we-feeling' (cf. Bjola, 2013; Ikenberry, 2008). More interestingly, it also suggests that practices usually identified with mature or tightly coupled security communities (e.g. reciprocity and self-restraint) might actually develop under conditions when the collective identity among a given set of states is weak or even absent, provided that there are already established venues for cooperation and cooperative practices that can be emulated in new settings.

## Communities of practice and the exercise of power

The analysis presented in this book suggests that there is convergence on the highest political level among EU member states and Mediterranean non-members in order to achieve the goal of protecting people, property and the environment in the Mediterranean from natural and man-made disasters. The means of doing this is allegedly through improved regional cooperation on

civil protection. This can of course be seen as mainly reflecting a convergence of political rhetoric, but there are numerous examples of practical cooperation taking place as well. The interesting finding here is that the EU has contributed to fostering a community of like-minded practitioners bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice in a Euro-Mediterranean setting.

Moreover, EU civil protection and the Euro-Med programmes have developed more or less side by side since the 1990s, and the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean has benefited from the creation of EU instruments such as the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. EU member states clearly have an interest in supporting the Euro-Med programmes since the trans-boundary nature of most natural and man-made disasters implies that the EU would need to get involved whenever large disasters strike in neighbouring countries. The conceptual shift from civil defence to civil protection in the post-Cold War era identified in the analysis also plays an important role for changing the rationale in favour of regional cooperation. Indeed, this shift can be seen as the other side of the same coin as the de-territorialized notion of security and crisis management seen in relation to the CSDP.

Furthermore, the Union Mechanism has not only served as a means for EU member states to assist each other and share best practices, but it is also increasingly important as a means to involve non-members. The Euro-Med programmes thus provide a social venue in which capital-endowed agents iteratively are doing things in a certain way. There seems to be a socialization process taking place in the sense that practices developed among practitioners from EU member states are transferred to their counterparts in the participating Mediterranean countries. The close-knit nature of the civil protection cooperation in which learning and knowledge exchange are favoured by the shared professional identities of the participants has been an important factor behind the success of the Euro-Med programmes, and the analysis points to the fact that regional cooperation on civil protection has been facilitated by the already established transgovernmental links between civil protection authorities.

However, what is important to note here is that the EU supports a regional network-based community that builds upon, as well as transcends, already existing bilateral relations. This is an important finding in relation to the question of how the EU promotes security since it indicates a nascent community of like-minded practitioners taking shape around the Mediterranean, fostered by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice (i.e. protecting people, property and the environment in the face of natural and man-made disasters). Transgovernmental networks thus perform an important, but perhaps poorly understood function in security community-building, in that they transcend institutional boundaries and bring together practitioners from various states on a regular basis. This means that practising cooperative security in ways that have been identified in this book can be seen as the first step in the security community-building process, and even though it would not be necessary to change constructivist assumptions that say that practices serve to uphold interests which are derived from identities, there is

reason to believe that practices can change identities (and in turn also change interests) through social interaction.

Importantly, power asymmetry does not seem to constitute an unfavourable condition for the development of the kind of practical cooperation identified in the case study on the EU, Spain and Morocco. Indeed, nothing in this book would fundamentally contradict the notion that security communities emerge around economic and political 'core areas', because power can and does influence the direction of social interaction. This is, for example, illustrated by the fact that the lack of effective regional frameworks for economic cooperation in the Mediterranean and the actual low levels of economic and political integration in North Africa and the Middle East have further enhanced the effects of the 'bilateralization' of the EU's economic and political relations with neighbouring non-members in the Mediterranean. This seems to be what is going on within the ENP. On the one hand, this can be said to increase the EU's negotiating power vis-à-vis Morocco. On the other hand, Morocco has encouraged this process as a means to move closer to its traditional allies and also because the prospects of enhanced economic cooperation in the Maghreb are bleak to say the least.

But the analysis has also shown that power, in terms of military capacity or economic strength, does not explain the outcome of the interactions in the multilateral venues and transgovernmental networks identified here. Furthermore, the EU has not been able to make any big changes in terms of lowering tariffs on agricultural trade with Morocco against the will of subsequent Spanish governments, even though the Commission (and some EU member states) believes that it would be a wise policy to do so. The EU has also been unable to 'force' Morocco to sign a so-called readmission agreement on illegal migration, even though it has been suggested several times, and despite the fact that the EU is said to have considerable leverage on Morocco in terms of the country's dependence on trade and aid with the EU.

Thus, the power of the EU in relation to closely situated non-members, such as Morocco, seems to rest primarily in the ongoing institutionalization process through the association agreement and the ENP. The important point to make in relation to the broader discussion on security community-building is that this analysis suggests that the power of the EU first and foremost lies in its capacity to continually provide funding and institutional 'hardware' for multilateral frameworks for cooperation, which almost always draws upon rules, procedures and norms developed within EU policy areas. To put it differently, the role of the EU as a security community-building institution lies in its capacity to provide the venues in which social interaction between members and non-members can take place, especially on a transgovernmental level.

## Practising cooperative security and building community

The absence of any conventional military threat to Spain in the post-Cold War era has meant that the Spanish Armed Forces' role has expanded from

having a primary focus on territorial defence to instead focusing on crisis management in order to enhance the Spanish state's capacity to handle the 'new' security threats, such as international terrorism and natural disasters. Spain actively seeks to promote military cooperation outside of the EU, especially in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and cooperative security practices developed within the EU and NATO are regularly applied in relation to Morocco since it is seen as a means to 'secure' Spain. Morocco is the only Arab country that has ever participated in a CSDP operation and the Moroccan regime has shown an interest in deepening its cooperation with the CSDP as part of its advanced status with the EU (aside from its already quite close cooperation with the US and NATO). Persistent tensions with Algeria and the ongoing occupation of Western Sahara have meant that territorial defence is still a major concern for the Moroccan Armed Forces, but there are indications that the Moroccan elite is beginning to embrace notions of cooperative security similar to the EU and NATO, not least because this serves to promote Moroccan interests vis-à-vis its allies.

The point that this book makes is that the CSDP builds upon transgovernmental networks on security and defence, and that it simultaneously enhances the EU's role as a security community-building institution in the post-Cold War era. It does so because, as an EU policy area, the CSDP further embeds EU diplomats, military officers and bureaucrats in cooperative security practices that do not rely on the logic of military deterrence and territorial defence, but rather on the logic of defusing de-territorialized security threats and crisis management. To a lesser extent, it also embeds diplomats and military officers from certain non-EU member states, and the case study has shown how Spanish–Moroccan relations are affected by this development.

The analysis suggests that promoting the spread of cooperative security practices to tackle non-military threats and trans-boundary risks need not be a function of altruistic considerations on behalf of the EU. It is instead the perception that non-military security threats cannot be handled in the 'old ways' that lies behind the development of the CSDP. To be sure, the de-territorialized notion of security could certainly serve diffuse political interests, but the relevant point to be made here is that as a consequence of the changes referred to above, Spain and Morocco engage with each other more intensively than before in terms of practical military cooperation. Indeed, security practice is not outside of or apart from security discourse.

The implication that follows from these findings has a clear bearing on how we should understand how security communities work in the post-Cold War era. By focusing on cooperative security practices relating to non-military threats and trans-boundary risks, and by showing how they spread through communities of practitioners relating to the CSDP, as well as EU civil protection, this book provides an important piece to the puzzle of how security communities expand in the post-Cold War era. To fully appreciate what these findings entail, it needs to first be acknowledged that most scholars engaging with the security community concept have in fact mostly taken as their

starting-point the realist conception of inter-state war as an ever-present possibility (and thus having an order-creating function) under conditions of international anarchy. This is also true for scholars working within a constructivist perspective in IR, although their explicit aim has often been to show how and with what means the threat of inter-state war can be overcome by groups of states forming a security community based on 'we-feeling' and mutual trust (e.g. Adler and Barnett, 1998). Even though much of this work has been successful in showing that realist understandings of international politics seriously misrepresent the role that the threat of inter-state wars play in explaining state behaviour, there has nonetheless been a lack of attention to the question of how non-military security threats effect processes of security community-building.

Here, the threat posed by international terrorism in the post-Cold War era makes for a case in point as it transcends the division between internal and external security in both discourse and practice. Indeed, the findings discussed in this book point to how the de-territorialization of security threats has become a salient feature of post-Cold War conceptualizations of security in both Spain and Morocco. While this is not a particularly original statement in the debate on the changing concept of security, it is a highly relevant point to be made in the discussion on the security community concept because it shows how the notion of de-territorialized security threats has been merged with a particular disposition towards practical cooperation that is enhanced by the changed role of national armed forces. This is not only to say that, methodologically speaking, taking, for example, arms control measures as an indication of security community-building would be to fatally miss where the 'action' is in such processes takes place today. Theoretically speaking, the relevant point here is that practicing cooperative security as crisis management might help to shape common threat perceptions through practically showing how security should be done in order to counter 'new' security threats.

Of course, it could be argued that even though international terrorism is perceived by a pair of states as a common threat that needs to be countered by taking joint measures, that in and of itself does not necessarily require any deeply held trust by the parties to begin with. In a straightforward rationalist explanation, the cost of not cooperating to counter such a threat could be deemed as being too high (even though the states in question could still have other protracted bilateral conflicts that they would be willing to set aside for the time being) or the benefit received from granting support to a powerful ally could be equally high (so that otherwise conflicting or at least non-cooperative states would do the same). Indeed, this would basically be consistent with the realist perspective in IR, which also stipulates that as soon as the common threat vanishes, the states would go back to the way things were before.

But this explanation fundamentally misses the point, because the way in which non-military threats and trans-boundary risks are perceived and, more importantly, the way in which the proper means to deal with the them are perceived, has less to do with the distribution of material capabilities or balance of power and more to do with the gradual hollowing out of the notion

of military deterrence in favour of a notion of crisis management that encompasses both military and civilian means to counter post-Cold War security threats. This book has not only shown what this means in practice for states such as Spain and Morocco, but it has also pointed to how the EU works as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis these two states that have had protracted territorial conflicts. Even though it can be questioned whether Morocco should be considered a fully-fledged member of the European security community, what is important to note here is that the repertoire of cooperative security practices between Spain and Morocco has broadened considerably since the end of the Cold War and as a consequence of these two states being increasingly embedded in frameworks for cooperation provided by the EU.

Thus, the analysis has pointed to an emerging, but still loosely defined, community of like-minded practitioners in the Western Mediterranean. This community is not necessarily dependent on the EU, but it certainly benefits from the ways that security and crisis management are conceived of and practiced in Brussels. While having an interest in sharing knowledge and learning how to deal with non-military threats based on templates developed in the EU (and NATO), this community can also be said to expand the boundaries of the European security community in the post-Cold War era. However, it does not primarily do so on the basis of common practices of self-restraint, but rather by *increasingly sharing a notion of what role the armed forces should play in international peacekeeping and crisis management.* Conceived in this way, the security community concept is certainly not redundant in the post-Cold War era; it rather opens up new avenues for research far beyond the scope of this book.

## The EU and the Arab Spring

The events in North Africa and the Middle East unfolding as of 2011 and onwards, at an early stage referred to as the 'Arab Spring', have put into question previously held understandings about the stability of authoritarian regimes in the region as well as the soundness of the EU's policies, such as the ENP, towards its southern neighbourhood (Pace 2014; Peters, 2012; Youngs, 2014). Political transition in Tunisia, modest reforms in Morocco, status quo in Algeria, growing instability in Libya and the return of military rule in Egypt, not to mention the protracted and deeply demoralizing civil war ravaging Syria which threatens to destabilize a host of neighbouring countries, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, present the EU and its member states with challenges but also opportunities. It could be argued that at the start the Arab Spring looked like the opportunity that the EU had been waiting for since it seemed to hold the promise that the ENP could work perhaps a bit more according to its original intentions had several countries in North Africa embarked on further political liberalization. At the time of writing, however, it is only Tunisia that can be said to live up to such expectations.

There is no doubt that the Arab Spring has also placed the previous working arrangement in Euro-Mediterranean relations in a stark, and not

necessarily flattering, contrast. Even though the ENP in some cases did serve the aim of allowing non-members, such as Morocco, to enhance their relations with the EU, there was also undeniably an element of preserving the status quo for the sake of being able to cooperate with authoritarian regimes in North Africa on matters related to counter-terrorism and border control while not pushing too hard (or not at all) for human rights and democratization. This book has not explicitly focused on these normative questions, but the findings hint at several problematic aspects of security community-building in the post-Cold War era that should be analysed further. For example, to what extent does the spread of cooperative security practices to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes also help the latter suppress non-violent political activities that these regimes do not approve of? Moreover, it is not certain that increased cooperation among armed forces in the Western Mediterranean on international crisis management also increases North African militaries' support for civilian rule and democracy.

Closely related to these normative concerns is the question of whether the EU will play a transformative role or rather support the status quo in a rapidly changing and considerably less stable Euro-Mediterranean region. Apart from the paralyzing effects of the economic crisis in Europe, the Union is grappling to come up with an appropriate response to the Arab Spring and its aftermath at a time when the foreign policy system of the EU is still trying to find a new balance after the changes brought about with the Lisbon Treaty. The EU's initial responses seem in many ways to confirm the notion that the EU is not a particular cohesive international actor and that its strengths rather lie elsewhere. After a zigzagging initial response to the protests in Tunisia,[1] the EU Foreign Affairs Council in January 2011 expressed its support for the 'democratic aspirations' of the people of Tunisia and Egypt (Council of the EU, 2011a). HR Ashton then visited Tunis and Cairo in February, and soon afterwards the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and the ENP, Štefan Füle, admitted in a speech to the European Parliament that 'Europe' had not insisted enough on defending human rights and democracy in the region, because: 'Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build' (Füle, speech, 2011).

In March 2011, HR Ashton and the Commission issued a joint communication proposing 'A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with Southern Mediterranean' (European Commission, 2011a) and shortly afterwards another joint communication introduced revisions to the ENP intended as 'a new response to a changing neighbourhood' (European Commission, 2011b). The EU's new approach to the southern neighbourhood is said to support 'deep democracy' and 'sustainable economic growth', and it allegedly introduces a so called more-for-more principle under which increased support in terms of financial assistance, enhanced mobility, and access to the Internal

Market would be made available to the most advanced partner countries in terms of political and economic reforms. Interestingly, the Commission was already conducting a revision of the ENP since 2010 and the changes introduced as a response to the Arab Spring, arguably do not represent: 'a significant departure from previous EU policy, which over the past twenty years has increasingly favoured findings paths of cooperation with partner governments [in North Africa/Middle East]. The difference, at least on paper, is that democratic commitments appear stronger conditions for gaining the additional incentives' (Balfour, 2011: 30). Furthermore, it has been noted that even though the EU was quick to announce increased financial support for countries in North Africa and the Middle East which undertake political and economic reforms there was a significant gap between financial commitments and actual payments in the period 2011–2013. Of course, this has to do with the fact that many countries in the region are unable to receive and spend the money due to high levels of political instability, but increased EU conditionality has also translated into less flexibility in the use of funds which in many cases leaves the EU: 'with little option but not to spend' (Bicchi, 2014: 328).

This is consistent with the findings presented in this book in that it illustrates how the expertise built up over many years in the Commission and the Council Secretariat on how to tailor the EU's relations with non-members in North Africa, for all its misperceptions, shortcomings and insufficiencies, provided the baseline of shared practical understandings from which EU officials acted. In this way, the EU's responses can be understood, somewhat simplistically put, as an outcome of an overlap between new discourse and entrenched practices. The present situation is a crisis in the senses that it has rendered the established ways-of-doing things obsolete, but it is far from certain that the policies and instruments applied by the EU thus far are adequate. To be sure, it can be questioned whether they ever were in the past. Ironically, the notion that the countries in the Maghreb were sitting on a 'time bomb', due to unfavourable economic development, rapid demographical growth and security challenges, has been present for quite a while in Brussels and it can be said to have provided the rationale the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean since the 1990s.

But the Arab Spring does not only serve as a means to think critically about the underlying philosophy of the ENP and its latest revisions, it can also be said to put the EU's capacity to act as a military crisis manager into perspective. In the case of Libya in 2011, the EU proved to be ill-equipped to rapidly react to an evolving crisis in its immediate neighbourhood, and it was eventually an ad-hoc coalition drawing mainly on British, French and US military capacities (with a UN mandate and the political endorsement of the Arab League) that intervened, before handing over the operation to NATO (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014). The EU seems to have been much better suited to respond to the Libyan crisis in terms of humanitarian aid. For example, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism was activated in order to support the evacuation of EU citizens and to facilitate the repatriation of Tunisian and Egyptian citizens from Libya, and following upon the analysis in Chapter 4

of this book this might perhaps not come as a surprise. While no CSDP military operation was launched as a response to the Libyan crisis in 2011, the EU did launch a Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya) in 2013 besides deciding on financial aid and post-conflict reconstruction support.

Another similar example is the crisis in Mali in early 2013. The Malian crisis, caused by a quick advance on Bamako by rebel forces, is closely linked with developments in Libya in the sense that after the fall of the Qaddafi regime heavily armed Tuareg fighters (previously under Libyan patronage) returned to northern Mali. Many joined ranks with Islamist groups operating unhindered in the north since Malian authorities had lost control of these parts of the country following a military coup in 2012. The crises in Mali and Libya are similar in the sense that the EU was not involved in the immediate military response (even though the EU had been advocating a so-called comprehensive approach in response to security and developmental challenges in the Sahel region since 2008). Instead, it was France who took the lead upon a direct request from the Malian government. *Opération Serval* was launched on 11 January 2013 and by mid February all major rebel-held towns had been seized by French and African troops (Cristiani, 2014; Heisbourg, 2013; Nicoll, 2013).[2] However, the EU did launch a CSDP military training mission to support the reconstruction of the Malian armed forces in February 2013, and the EU is among the biggest aid donors to Mali.[3] The EU's Sahel Strategy also calls for greater coordination among local and regional actors, and to that effect liaison officers for EUCAP Sahel Niger (another civilian mission under the CSDP) are placed in Nouakchott (Mauritania) and Bamako.

Although it might be too drastic to say that the EU's lacklustre responses to the acute phases of the crises in Libya and Mali constitute the last nail in the coffin for the CSDP as a tool for 'robust' military intervention, it does seem likely that the EU as such will not engage in any large-scale military operations in the near future (Menon, 2011). More limited civilian and/or military CSDP operations, in cooperation with non-member states and regional organizations, seem to be what lies in the cards ahead. The interesting observation in relation to the findings presented in this book is that the EU's responses to the crises in Libya and Mali are very much in line with the ways in which the EU has sought to promote security in its neighbourhood through strengthening regional crisis management capacities. They also point to what seems to be entrenched military and diplomatic networks of European and US practitioners sharing notions of threats (i.e. transnational terrorist networks operating in poorly governed territories) and ways of dealing with them (i.e. institution-building and regional cooperation involving various local actors).

These networks can be seen as communities of practice in the field of international security, which are not necessarily congruent with the boundaries of certain organizations such as EU or NATO. This understanding provides important clues as to the question of under what conditions the EU responds to crises, implying that it does so less as an independent actor and more as junior partner embedded in transnational networks of diplomats and

militaries. It also suggests that further analytical attention should be directed to these networks as a means to understand how international security is performed in practice. Trying to determine the extent to which ways-of-doing things and practical understandings are being transmitted to and negotiated with local actors, for example militaries and security forces in West African countries, would be a way to start probing whether these communities are expanding.

Another interesting observation that can be made regarding the EU's responses to the Arab Spring and which relates to the findings presented in this book has to do with EU–Moroccan relations. It has already been noted that the revisions to the ENP introduced in 2011 add money but do not really represent any significant changes, other than signalling a stronger commitment to democratic reforms on behalf of the EU. Some argue that the flaws of the underlying technocratic approach of the ENP have now been clearly exposed and that the EU needs to come up with something else (Lehne, 2014). But it seems quite hard to say what that would be, not least when taking into account that the EU only seem capable of supporting processes of political reform if it is invited to do so (as in Tunisia) but that is often not the case (as in Egypt or Algeria). Libya presents a particularly difficult case due to its weak state structures and deteriorating security situation.

Morocco paints a more nuanced picture in this regards, especially when taking into account that the Arab Spring has thus far not brought about profound political change in the country. There were demonstrations throughout the country demanding reforms in early 2011, but the regime was quick to counter them by holding a referendum on a new constitution which was then in place already by September the same year. The new Moroccan Constitution can be said to strengthen and broaden the powers of the prime minister and the Parliament in the Moroccan political system, but it typically fails to circumscribe the king's powers effectively. For instance, while the Prime Minister must be chosen from the largest party in the Parliament, the cabinet must still be approved by the monarch (Madani et al., 2012). However, the EU was quick to welcome the new constitution as: 'a significant step [that] … signals a clear commitment to democracy and respect for human rights' (European Commission, 2011c). Elections were held in November 2011 and similar to many other countries in the region in the early stages of the Arab Spring, an Islamist political party, Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD), received the majority of the votes. For Morocco, this meant that the first Islamist-led government took office in January 2012.

What is important to note here is that neither the economic crisis in Europe nor the Arab Spring have changed the course of EU–Morocco relations to any significant degree, as the EU is still perceived to be Morocco's main economic partner, a source of stability as well as an inspiration (Rieker and Bremberg, 2014). At a time when the EU is trying to adjust to the changes under way in its southern neighbourhood, Morocco is among the very few countries in the region with which the Union enjoys broad and deep cooperation. Indeed, the

Arab Spring and its aftermath only seem to have brought the two parties closer together. To be sure, the cooperative dynamic between the EU and Morocco is an effect of a high degree of mutual responsiveness that have emerged over the years and which existed before the Arab Spring. This mutual responsiveness is ultimately based on the shared notion that the relationship is mutual beneficial, and for Morocco the attractiveness of the ENP, also after the changes introduced in 2011, lies in its open-ended character which makes it particularly equipped to accommodate the different interests of the parties. For the EU this would be stability, migration control and gradual reforms; for Morocco, it would be greater access to European markets, financial support and external legitimacy for the regime.

Moreover, the Arab Spring does not only present the EU with challenges and opportunities since the Moroccan regime is also well aware that the instability in the Maghreb and Sahel could have spill-over effects on Morocco. Further economic integration and political cooperation are seen as the best means to avoid such a scenario. Given the turbulent situation in neighbouring countries and Morocco's tense relations with Algeria, the prospects for regional integration in the Maghreb are bleak. This makes it even more important for Morocco to ensure closer ties with the EU. Even though it might be argued that the reform process in Morocco is driven mainly by the regime's interest in survival and securing external legitimacy, and the EU can thus be criticized for granting external legitimacy to a political system which still does not fully respect human rights, the EU continues to serve as an inspiration for many reform minded actors in Morocco (Rieker and Bremberg, 2014). The enhanced powers of the European Parliament over issues such as trade and association agreements could possibly serve as to politicize EU–Moroccan relations beyond the current state of affairs since the Parliament has traditionally taken a stronger stance on human rights and Western Sahara than Morocco's traditional allies in the Council. Although it is of course hard to say whether and how this might affect EU–Morocco relations it should be kept in mind that institutional changes within the EU and shifting political equilibriums have had repercussions for the Union's enlargement and neighbourhood policies in the past.

## A note on future research avenues

Beyond the difficult yet necessary task of reflecting upon how the findings presented in this book relate to ongoing and still very volatile developments in the Euro-Mediterranean region there is also another set of lessons for future research that can be drawn. In terms of follow-up studies, one way forward would be to take a cumulative approach vis-à-vis this book which would basically mean to focus on the same three EU policy areas but with a broader set of member/non-member. A dyadic couple that naturally comes to mind here is Greece and Turkey, although there might of course be other possibilities as well. Reflecting on the findings on Euro-Mediterranean civil

protection, it seems particularly promising to go ahead with a more comprehensive comparative study focusing exclusively on civil protection cooperation including several Mediterranean non-members (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the Western Balkans countries).

A second, slightly different approach would be contrasting, meaning that some of the EU policy areas would be changed while keeping the choice of member/non-member. Trade, the CSDP and civil protection could be substituted for border control, asylum, migration, energy or environmental policies instead. For example, taking into account how climate change has been so prominently linked to security threats in the political discourse of the EU as of late, it would be interesting to study whether and how this has had an impact on environmental cooperation with non-members. To be sure, studying more thoroughly the issue of border control and migration towards Europe and the way in which Spain and Morocco deal with this issue would certainly provide another important, albeit perhaps more disturbing, piece to the puzzle of how the EU works as a security community-building institution in the post-Cold War era.

A third possible way forward for future research projects would be to take a comparative approach in the sense that the framework used in this book could be taken as a point of departure for studying other regional organizations, such as, for example, ASEAN or AU. From a comparative perspective, the interesting question to ask would be to what extent such organizations engage in promoting cooperative security practices among their members and non-members in ways similar to what has been identified here. Are non-military threats and trans-boundary risks as high on their security agenda, or is it rather inter-state war these organizations should primarily help to prevent? Is transgovernmental cooperation on issues relating to civil protection as salient among them or are they more 'traditional' in their outlook?

The essential question to ask would be how and to what extent organizations such as ASEAN and AU work as security community-building institutions in the post-Cold War era, and whether they differ in some significant way to how the EU works in this regard. Although there might be reason to assume that there are differences in how regional organizations work in different parts of the world, focusing not primarily on institutions but on practices would help a great deal to meaningfully compare the nature and the quality of interactions among groups of states in different parts of the world. It could be that the institutional set-up of regional organizations varies significantly (e.g. ASEAN is usually described as relying on informal institutions, whereas AU is said to have been inspired by the institutional set-up of the EU), but that practices of self-restraint and cooperative security to deal with non-military threats and trans-boundary risks are more similar across them. Questions such as these will probably play a prominent role in future debates on the security community concept, provided that more regional organizations around the world get involved in crisis management to handle threats and risks rather than prevent inter-state war.

## Notes

1 Or as in the case of French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michele Alliot-Marie, even suggesting to support Ben Ali's regime (BBC News, 2011).
2 In total some 4,000 French troops participated in the military operation alongside the Malian armed forces and troops from neighbouring African countries (including about 2,000 troops from Chad). Besides African assistance, the French operation could rely on the rapid provision of C-17 aircrafts by the UK and Canada (later followed by the US, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden) and the early leasing of commercial heavy-lift Antonovs. The US also provided intelligence and logistics to France and it should also be noted that Algeria supported the French operation by granting French planes en route to Mali access to its air space.
3 In May 2013 the European Commission committed to €523 million at a donor conference for Mali held in Brussels (out of a total of €3.2 billion from other aid donors).

# Appendix I

| *No.* | *Position* | *Date/location* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Council of the EU, General Secretariat, EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) (Head of Crisis Response Section) | 1 December 2008, Brussels |
| 2 | NATO (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Head of Mediterranean Dialogue) | 4 November 2008, Brussels |
| 3 | Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG E VIII Defence Issues (ESDP and the Mediterranean) | 6 November 2008, Brussels |
| 4 | European Commission, DG ENV (Policy Officer, Civil Protection) | 11 November 2008, Brussels |
| 5 | European Commission, DG Relex (Maghreb Unit) | 6 November 2008, Brussels |
| 6 | European Commission, DG AidCo (Project Manager, Euro-Med civil protection) | 23 September 2008, Brussels |
| 7 | European Commission, DG ENV (Deputy Head of the Civil Protection Unit) | 2 December 2008, Brussels |
| 8 | Council of Europe (Executive Secretary, EUR-OPA Major Hazard Agreement) | 18 November 2008, Strasbourg (telephone) |
| 9 | European Commission, DG AGRI (Maghreb Unit) | 2 December 2008, Brussels |
| 10 | Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG H IV (Civil Protection) | 22 October 2008, Brussels |
| 11 | Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 13 October 2008, Brussels |
| 12 | European Commission, Secretariat General (Policy Officer, Crisis Management) | 22 October 2008, Brussels |
| 13 | European Commission, DG AidCo (Head of Sector, Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities) | 23 September 2008, Brussels |
| 14 | Portuguese Authority for Civil Protection (Representative PROCIV) | 3 November 2008, Lisbon (telephone) |

| *No.* | *Position* | *Date/location* |
|---|---|---|
| 15 | European Commission, DG Relex (Policy Officer, Middle East and Southern Mediterranean, Euro-Med Unit) | 30 September 2008, Brussels |
| 16 | European Commission, DG Relex (European Neighbourhood Policy) | 29 September 2008, Brussels |
| 17 | French Ministry of Interior (Direction de la Sécurité civile, Executive Director Euro-Med Bridge Programme) | 14 November 2008, Paris |
| 18 | Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Administrator, Middle East /Mediterranean Task Force) | 23 October 2008, Brussels |
| 19 | Head of the Evaluation Mission of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme (Consultant) | 1 December 2008, S:t Lucia (skype) |
| 20 | NATO (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Responsible for Civil Emergency Planning in the Mediterranean Dialogue) | 8 October 2008, Brussels |
| 21 | Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 3 October 2008, Brussels |
| 22 | Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 13 October 2008, Brussels |
| 23 | European Commission, DG Relex (European Neighbourhood Policy) | 18 November 2008, Brussels |
| 24 | Permanent Representation of the UK to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 10 December 2008, Brussels |
| 25 | European Parliament, DG External Policies (Specialist Security and Defence) | 17 November 2008, Brussels |
| 26 | Council of the EU, General Secretariat, DG E IX (Civilian Crisis Management) | 24 October 2008, Brussels |
| 27 | European Commission, DG Trade (Maghreb Unit) | 27 November 2008, Brussels |
| 28 | Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 7 October 2008, Brussels |
| 29 | Co-director Euro-Med Bridge Programme (Consultant) | 1 November 2008, Stockholm |
| 30 | European Commission, DG Relex (Instrument for Stability) | 7 October 2008, Brussels |
| 31 | Moroccan mission to the EC (Ad-hoc working group on Morocco's 'Advanced Status') | 31 October 2008, Brussels |
| 32 | Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU (Representative PROCIV) | 12 November 2008, Brussels |
| 33 | Council of the EU, DG H IV (Civil Protection) (Ret.) | 13 November 2008, Brussels |

| *No.* | *Position* | *Date/location* |
|---|---|---|
| 34 | Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force) | 27 October 2008, Brussels |
| 35 | Member of Spanish Parliament (Partido Popular) | 17 March 2009, Madrid |
| 36 | Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Subdirector General del Maghreb) | 16 March 2009, Madrid |
| 37 | Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Área de Asuntos del Mediterráneo) | 16 March 2009, Madrid |
| 38 | Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Jefa del Área de Actuación Operativa) | 16 March 2009, Madrid |
| 39 | Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Consejero Técnico de Relaciones Internacionales) | 18 March 2009, Madrid |
| 40 | Spanish Prime Minister's Office (Director de Departemento de Infraestructura y Seguimiento de Situaciones de Crisis) | 22 April 2009, Madrid |
| 41 | Spanish Ministry of Defence (Subdirector General Cooperación y Defensa Civil) | 17 March 2009, Madrid |
| 42 | Spanish Ministry of Defence (Subdirector General Planes y Relaciones Internacionales) | 22 April 2009, Madrid |
| 43 | Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (Desk officer seconded from DIGENPOL) | 16 March 2009, Madrid |
| 44 | Unidad Militar de Emergencias (Teniente Coronel) | 21 April 2009, Torrejón de Ardoz |
| 45 | Former Spanish Minister of Defence (1982–1991) | 15 June 2008, Barcelona |
| 46 | Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection (Commandant) | 3 June 2009, Rabat |
| 47 | United Nations Development Program (Conseiller Environnement et Développement Durable) | 3 June 2009, Rabat |
| 48 | Moroccan State Secretariat for Water and Environment (Chef de la Division Prévention et Stratégie d'Intervention) | 5 June 2009, Rabat |
| 49 | Delegation of the European Commission (Conseiller Affaires Politique, Commerce, Information, Culture) | 4 June 2009, Rabat |
| 50 | Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chef du Service Coopération Régionale Euro-Méditerranéenne) | 5 June 2009, Rabat |

| *No.* | *Position* | *Date/location* |
|---|---|---|
| 51 | Moroccan Directorate General for Civil Protection (Inspecteur National) | 3 June 2009, Rabat |
| 52 | Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) (Responsible for Environmental Cooperation) | 4 June 2009, Rabat |
| 53 | Head of Civil Protection in Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer | 3 June 2009, Rabat |
| 54 | Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chef de la Division de l'UE) | 5 June 2009, Rabat |
| 55 | Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) (Responsible for Environmental Projects) | 4 June 2009, Rabat |
| 56 | National Mobil Unit of Intervention (Civil Protection) at Salé | 3 June 2009, Salé |
| 57 | UN Resident Coordinator in Morocco | 2 June 2009, Rabat |
| 58 | Moroccan Ministry of Interior (Director of Migration and Territorial Surveillance) | 4 June 2009, Rabat |
| 59 | Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ambassador at Large for Mediterranean Affairs) | 19 July 2010, Madrid |
| 60 | Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Subdirector General del Maghreb) | 19 July 2010, Madrid |
| 61 | European Commission, DG Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (Civil Protection Unit) | 6 October 2010, Brussels |
| 62 | Council of the EU (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Partnerships and Military Capabilities Unit) | 4 October 2010, Brussels |
| 63 | European Commission, DG AidCo (Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities) | 8 October 2010, Brussels |
| 64 | European Commission, DG AidCo (Head of Sector, Environment, Statistics, Civil Protection and Cooperation with Local Authorities) | 8 October 2010, Brussels |
| 65 | European Commission, DG Relex (Desk Officer Morocco) | 5 October 2010, Brussels |
| 66 | European Commission, DG Relex (Policy Officer, Middle East and Southern Mediterranean, Euro-Med Unit) | 6 October 2010, Brussels |
| 67 | Council of the EU (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Partnerships and Military Capabilities Unit) | 6 October 2010, Brussels |
| 68 | Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Administrator, Middle East /Mediterranean Task Force) | 5 October 2010, Brussels |

| *No.* | *Position* | *Date/location* |
|---|---|---|
| 69 | Spanish Embassy to the Netherlands (Ambassador) | 7 October 2010, the Hague |
| 70 | Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force) | 4 October 2010, Brussels |
| 71 | Council of the EU (Policy Unit, Principal Administrator, Middle East/Gulf/ Mediterranean Task Force) | 4 October 2010, Brussels |

# Appendix II

| *Country* | *Activity* | *Date* |
|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 2nd Superior Training Module of the 5+5 Defence College: 'Contribution of the 5+5 Initiative for security in the Mediterranean' | April |
| | Working session on 'the contribution of the Armed Forces in Civil Protection in case of large-scale disasters' | 1st Semester |
| | Seminar on 'the objective of humanitarian de-mining' | May |
| | Exercise on air security AIR 10 | TBD |
| France | 2nd Meeting of the Army Chiefs of Staff of 5+5 | March |
| | Meeting of Committee on Education | March |
| | 1st Basic Training Module 2010/2011 of the 5+5 Defence College, on 'air security' | October |
| | Exercise on chemical threats | October |
| Italy | 5th Expert Meeting of the Virtual and Regional Centre for Maritime Traffic Control (V-RMTC 5+5 NET) | 2nd Semester |
| | 3rd Conference of the Directors of Military Health of 5+5 | May |
| | Visit by squadron | TBD |
| Libya | Expert Meeting on the Training Centre for land de-mining | May |
| | 3rd Meeting of the Air Force Chiefs of Staff of 5+5 | October |

| *Country* | *Activity* | *Date* |
|---|---|---|
| Malta | Seminar on inter-operability in the field of search and rescue | February |
| | 10th Meeting of Steering Committee of 5+5 | May |
| | 5th Meeting of the Naval Chiefs of Staff of 5+5 | May |
| | Maritime Exercise 'CANALE 10' | June |
| | 2nd Conference of Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of 5+5 | October |
| | 11th Meeting of Steering Committee of 5+5 | November |
| | 6th Ministerial Meeting | December |
| Morocco | 2nd Intermediate Training Module 2009/2010 of the 5 +5 Defence College | 1st Semester |
| | Exercise on search and rescue | TBD |
| | Exercise on marine pollution | TBD |
| | Exercise on pandemic A/H1N1 | TBD |
| Mauretania | Exercise on search and rescue | TBD |
| Portugal | 3rd Training Module Intermediate Level 2009/2010 of the 5+5 Defence College | June |
| | Seminar on 'Interoperability of the Armed Forces in the countries participating in the 5+5 Initiative' | 2nd Semester |
| Spain | Spanish-Portuguese Exercise on Maritime Security 'SEABORDER 09' | TBD |
| | Seminar on 'The legal framework for mutual assistance between the countries participating in 5+5 in case of large-scale catastrophes' | February |
| | Informal meeting of the Ministers of Defence in the EU and Ministers of Defence 5+5 | February |
| | Workgroup meeting on 'Common handbook of the 5 +5 on maritime surveillance' | 1st Semester |
| | 1st Training Module Intermediate Level 2010/2011 of the 5+5 Defence College | October |
| | 2nd Conference of the General Inspectors of Defence | 2nd Semester |
| Tunisia | 2nd Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Euro-Maghreb Centre for Research and Strategic Studies | TBD |
| | Seminar on 'Perspectives and future of women in the Armed Forces of the countries participating in the 5+5 Initiative' | September |

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