DISCOURSE APPROACHES TO POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse

Michele Durocher Dunne



Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Context, data, methods

In the *Cairo Times* (March 2000), former editor Max Rodenbeck wrote:

> To tell the truth, the only real epidemic I can discern is the one affecting the language of public discourse in Egypt. Haven't you noticed how some cancerous agent is eating away at the meaning of words? Take some of the slogans that have been much used of late, such as transparency, accountability, and – dare I say it – democracy. The fact is that somewhere between their pronouncement and their application, these words seem to grow weak and listless and muddled. Eventually they lose their potency or mutate into something else entirely. (Rodenbeck 2000: 5)

With all due respect to Rodenbeck (and with sympathy for his frustration), I would reply to his comment that it is not the case that words like democracy have grown "weak and listless and muddled;" rather they are energetically performing work in context, but work that is so different from what one expects that one can easily fail to recognize it.

My interest in the problem of democracy in the Middle East, including how the issue is discussed publicly, arose during more than ten years of working in the region or on policy issues related to the area in the United States Department of State. How to square American commitment to the principle of democracy with other American interests in the region was a nettlesome problem, and one to which this study does not propose an answer. I also was frustrated by what I viewed as the difficulty of many American experts on the Middle East (I include here many scholars as well as government officials) in interpreting public political discourse on democracy and other issues in the region, and in understanding the role such discourse plays in political life. It is in this area that I hope to make a contribution.

I should clarify here that my interest is in how and why the issue of democracy is discussed in Egypt, and not in the history of the Arabic word *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") itself or in the intellectual pedigree of the concept in the Middle East. That the concept of *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") is considered by many Egyptians to be part of an external discourse based in the West is significant, and I will have more to say on that subject. I am not per-

suaded, however, that in the Middle East democracy is discussed as it is – and political practices are as they are – because there is no authentically Arabic word for "democracy," *al-diimuqraaTiyya* coming directly from the Greek. Such views draw on an Orwellian, cognitivist view of language that goes against the social view of language I will use in this book.

Another reason the problem of democracy interested me, particularly as regards contemporary Egypt, was the widely diverging interpretations of where Egypt is headed. As I listened to or read instances of public discourse on democracy in Egypt during 1999–2000, I found there were competing stories of what was going on: slow but steady progress in democratization (put forth primarily by the government and its supporters) versus steady deterioration in political and civil liberties (put forth by opposition politicians and civil rights activists). The course of my own research confirmed a strangely mixed picture. I was able to carry out my research completely unharrassed by the government, for example, and those I interviewed (including inside the government) seemed to speak freely and without fear of repercussions. In fact, those I interviewed did not even request confidentiality; it was my decision not to use names in most cases. At the same time, however, two Egyptian publications I used in this study (the pro-Islamist newspaper *al-Shaab* and the liberal secularist journal *Civil Society*) were closed down by the government for at least part of 1999–2000, as was one opposition political party whose discourse I studied (the Labor Party, a party that had originally been leftist but later allied itself with the Muslim Brotherhood). Most troubling of all, internationally known sociologist Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who graciously shared his expertise with me and put the library of his Ibn Khaldun Center at my disposal, was convicted in May 2001 on charges related to his work on civil and human rights and sentenced to seven years in prison. After two retrials, he was finally acquitted in March 2003.[1]

1. Egyptian security authorities arrested Egyptian-American sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim and dozens of employees of The Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies on the night of June 30, 2000. They were held for questioning for several weeks and released in early August 2000, but then were charged in late September 2000. Dr. Ibrahim was charged with violating a 1992 Military Decree forbidding the acceptance of foreign funds without government permission, as well as with violating several articles of the regular penal code including seeking to harm the reputation of the state (due to his writings on election rigging and Muslim-Christian tensions), defrauding a donor, falsifying documents, and conspiring to bribe public officials. Twenty-seven other persons were charged with various offenses related to aiding and abetting Dr. Ibrahim. All 28 were tried in a State Security court in a trial that began in November 2000 and ended in May 2001 with the conviction of all defendants. Dr. Ibrahim was convicted on all charges except conspiring to bribe

Having acknowledged that there were discouraging developments in Egypt related to democracy and civil society while I was researching and writing this book, I should make clear that it was never my intention to take a normative approach by defining democracy or passing judgment on who was or was not democratic. What I sought to do instead was to examine how speakers in the political realm in contemporary Egypt used the concept of democracy, in order to understand better what their discourse meant and the political circumstances it reflected. Following the example of linguist John Wilson, I determined that I could get further by examining *what* speakers did in public discourse and democracy and *how* they did it with language than by considering *whether* they should have done it or not.

This study proposes a new way of reading Arabic political discourse. Building on work by Bakhtin, Scollon, Wilson, Billig, and others, I will show that viewing an instance of Arabic political discourse (whether spoken or written) as the product of social interactions greatly enhances one's appreciation of the discourse. Thus I will not treat a speech by Egyptian President Mubarak as if the speech were solely produced by the president himself, but rather will treat the speech as produced by complex social interactions among various individuals and communities of practice inside and outside the Egyptian government, and will show how pragmatic phenomena in the speech reflect those interactions.

In looking at such a speech, I will argue that it is less edifying to explore what the speech *says* than what it *does*, that is, the social, political, or other functions the speech performs for those who were involved in its production. In public discourse about democracy in contemporary Egypt, I will show that construction of public identity and negotiation of power relations (i.e., positioning vis-à-vis domestic and foreign allies and rivals) rank high among functions performed. The key questions, then, are *what* a particular instance of discourse about democracy is getting done for the group of people behind it, and *how* these functions are accomplished on the linguistic level.

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a public official, and was sentenced to seven years in prison. Two other persons were sentenced to five years in prison, four were sentenced to two years in prison, and 21 were given one-year suspended sentences. Dr. Ibrahim pursued an appeal, and on February 6, 2002, Egypt's Court of Cassation overturned the verdicts and ordered a retrial, in which he was reconvicted of all charges in July 2002. The Court of Cassation again overturned the verdict and released Ibrahim on December 3, 2002. The Court of Cassation itself conducted the second retrial, acquitting Ibrahim of all charges on March 18, 2003.(U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Country Report on Egypt 2002.)

Employing a social understanding of language derived from the Russian semiotician Bakhtin and linguist Ron Scollon, I tried to see how discourse accomplished social interactional aims and how instances of discourse were connected to each other; as Bakhtin says, a speaker (or writer) "does not disturb the eternal silence of the universe;" rather each new instance of discourse is a link in a chain (Bakhtin 1986: 69). After investigating the social context within which the selected instances of discourse were produced, I turned to a linguistic investigation. Drawing on the work of Wilson, Billig, and other linguists, I decided to focus on small things such as the use of pronouns and definite articles, in order to show how much profit can be derived from them in understanding what is going on in a text. My hope is that through this analysis I will elicit what Tannen calls "the aha factor" (Tannen 1984: 38), helping to make explicit what the reader of discourse – whether linguistic, political scientist, or Middle East area specialist – already senses implicitly but cannot quite pin down.

The methodology I will demonstrate has two levels: a social/ethnographic level that explores the interactional context that produced the discourse, and a linguistic level that explores specific linguistic devices employed in the discourse. In applying this methodology, I will try to answer the following questions: what social and political functions does talking about democracy serve for various political actors on the Egyptian political stage, and what linguistic traces of such functions can one find in instances of discourse about democracy?

Introducing the data

Texts

The following are principal and supplementary texts that I will consider in this study. Unless otherwise noted, all spoken and written data were in Arabic. The principal texts were produced between June and December 1999. Following are the texts chosen, broken down into three basic groups (see summary in Table 1 below):

- Excerpts from several speeches by Egyptian President Muhammad Husni Mubarak. The two most significant speeches for the purpose of this analysis are those delivered on October 5, 1999 (upon Mubarak's swearing-in for a fourth term of office) and on November 13, 1999 (upon the opening of a new session of parliament, the last such session before general elections were to be held in November 2000). In addition, I will consider brief ex-

cerpts from Mubarak's speeches on June 29, 1999 (upon receiving an honorary doctorate from George Washington University, delivered in English), and August 25, 1999 (meeting university students in Alexandria, Egypt) by way of comparison.

- A written petition signed by the heads of the Wafd, Tagammu, Nasserist, and Labor Parties in late August/early September 1999. I will use the text as published by the pro-Islamist *al-Shaab* newspaper (a semiweekly organ of the Labor Party that was shut down by the government in May 2000) on September 3, 1999, which one of the authors verified was accurate. By way of comparison I will consider some antecedent texts including a December 1997 opposition petition, the April 1999 "Casablanca Declaration" issued by Arab human rights organizations at their first regional gathering, and a May 1999 statement by Egyptian human rights groups.
- Newspaper commentaries and other writings by two intellectuals who have made democracy a major theme in their work. They are:
  - Fahmi Huwaydi, an Islamist intellectual. The two most significant texts are a December 7, 1999 commentary published by the government-owned daily newspaper *al-Ahram* and a September 3, 1999 commen-

Table 1. Primary and secondary texts to be analyzed

	Mubarak speech excerpts	**September petition**	**Newspaper commentaries**
Primary texts	1. October 5, 1999 (swearing in) 2. November 5, 1999 (opening parliament)	September 3, 1999	Huwaydi: 1. September 3, 1999 *(al-Shaab)* 2. December 7,1999 *(al-Ahram)* Mustafa: 1. September 28, 1999 *(al-Ahram)* 2. November 30, 1999 *(al-Ahram)*
Secondary texts	1. June 25, 1999 (George Washington University) 2. August 29, 1999 (meeting students)	1. Political parties' statement (Dec 1997) 2. Casablanca Declaration (Apr 1999) 3. Human rights groups' statement (May 1999)	Huwaydi: *Al-islaam wa al-diimuqraaTiyya,* 1993 Mustafa: 1. *Al-niDHaam al-siyaasi,* 1995 2. *Al-intixabaat al-barlamaniyya,* 1997

tary published by the pro-Islamist *al-Shaab* newspaper (after *al-Ahram* newspaper declined to publish it). Huwaydi's 1993 book *Al-islaam wa l-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*) will be considered by way of comparison.

– Hala Mustafa, Director of the Political Systems Unit at the Ahram Strategic Studies Center; in 2001 she became editor of a journal entitled Al-diimuqraaTiyya ("Democracy"). Most important will be Mustafa's columns of September 28, 1999 and November 30, 1999, published in the op-ed pages of al-Ahram newspaper. For purposes of comparison other excerpts from Mustafa's extensive writings on democracy will be considered.

Ethnographic data

At least as important as the texts are ethnographic data collected in interviews, which I conducted in Cairo between January and June 2000. To protect the confidentiality of those who generously shared information about how texts were produced, I will not use actual names (except in the case of the two writers mentioned above, as their identities would be easily discovered by anyone who reads the Egyptian press).

- Regarding the excerpts from President Mubarak's speeches, I interviewed four people who were involved (in varying degrees of intensity) in preparing such speeches in 1998 and 1999. They included a senior government official, a prominent journalist reputed to be a confidant of Mubarak, a senior think tank academic with a long history of contributing to speeches, and a younger academic from a think tank closely associated with the Egyptian government.
- Regarding the September 1999 opposition petition, I interviewed four members of the "Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform," which produced the petition. The four included the principal organizer and drafter of the petition (a human rights activist), an attorney who heads another human rights organization, a human rights activist with family ties to opposition politics, and a prominent intellectual well known for his background in human and civil rights. I also attended a political seminar hosted by the Committee.
- Regarding the two intellectuals, I interviewed Mustafa and Huwaydi themselves. Other interviewees also commented on their writings.

- In addition to the above, I interviewed several others for their general insights into the subject of discourse on democracy in Egypt. They included the publisher of a well-regarded Cairo magazine, the editor of a journal on democracy-related subjects, and the head of a foundation that funds democracy-related projects. Their comments were most useful for background purposes and for helping to direct my ethnographic research.

Theoretical framework

In this book I will employ a social understanding of language described by the Russian literary critic and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin, who understood discourse as both shaped by and shaping social situations. I will also draw heavily on linguist Ron Scollon's theory of Mediated Discourse Analysis, which treats all discourse as the residue of social interaction. In examining the social interactions that shaped texts, I will use concepts developed by anthropologists Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger including *social practices* and *communities of practice*. My investigation of the specific linguistic strategies and devices used in the texts is derived largely from work in pragmatics done by linguists John Wilson and Michael Billig, as well as from sociolinguists Deborah Schiffrin and Deborah Tannen. I will discuss the work of all of the above-mentioned scholars, as well as of many others, in more detail in Chapter 2.

Discourse defined

In this book I will treat discourse, per Schiffrin, as "utterances" (1994: 39). As Schiffrin notes, this simple definition captures two important principles: first, that discourse is above (i.e., larger than) other units of language (such as the clause or sentence), and second, that the smaller unit of which discourse is composed is the *utterance* (an actual instance of language use, inherently contextualized) as opposed to the abstract sentence. One problem with the definition, in my view, is that it does not necessarily imply that the utterances are organized in some fashion, which they clearly are.

Deciding which sets of utterances to group together is problematic. I will tend to take a broad interpretation, such as that of Foucault (see, for example, 1984), which leads to an understanding of discourse (i.e., sets of utterances) that (unlike Aristotle's rules for classical drama) need not abide by any unity of time or place. My particular focus will be thematic, i.e., discourse about democracy.

Thus a speech made by President Mubarak in 1999 and an interview given by him a year earlier may both be considered part of his discourse on democracy, if the subject is treated in both. Looking at the problem from another angle, Mubarak's utterances about democracy in the 1999 interview and those of another Egyptian figure from elsewhere in the political spectrum might both be said to form part of an Egyptian discourse about democracy. What should be clear from these examples is that my focus will be on selected sets of utterances by various speakers that treat a common problem.

In addition to the term discourse, I will in many cases refer to instances of discourse or texts. By "instance of discourse" I mean a set of utterances related to the discourse under consideration, for example, an interview by a political figure in which democracy appears as a significant theme. By "text" I mean a written artifact of an instance of discourse that might originally have been oral or written, for example a written transcript of a speech delivered orally, or an excerpt from a book. Texts always have some distance from the original communicative event. Whether written or spoken, it is important to note that in this book "discourse" will always refer to something that was actually said or written.

The nature of texts

> The text-artifact does indeed have a physical-temporal structure, precisely because it was originally laid down, or sedimented, in the course of a social process, unfolding in real time; on reading, it is perceived and understood in real time. (Silverstein and Urban 1996: 5)

Looking at the texts discussed in this study, what does one have? Speeches made by Husni Mubarak, a petition by opposition groups, newspaper columns? Not really, if by speeches, for example, one generally means specific and unrepeatable discursive events, with all the verbal and non-verbal elements of communication that implies. Videotapes of Egyptian television broadcasts of Mubarak's delivery of the speeches capture some of those aspects but still are not the events themselves, and in any case the reader cannot view them while reading this study. For the purpose of analysis, I will use transcripts of parts of those speeches I made from videotapes. So in the case of the speech excerpts what one has in hand is at least five steps removed from the original event that interests us: the community of practice produced a draft speech, Mubarak delivered the speech before the Egyptian Parliament, Egyptian television broadcast the delivery, the broadcast was videotaped, I viewed the tapes and chose

excerpts I thought relevant, and I made written transcripts of those excerpts (thereby turning an oral discursive event into a written text). At each stage along the way people made choices (e.g., Mubarak departed from his written text, the television crew focused momentarily on the members of Parliament and missed a gesture by Mubarak, I selected some excerpts and not others, etc.) that left an imprint on the data I will analyze.

Such also is the case with the texts that were originally written; the petition as published by *al-Shaab* newspaper was embedded in an article that omitted mention of the human rights activists and intellectuals who were the main impetus behind its drafting, and the op-ed articles may have been changed or rejected along the way by editorial page staff members. Thus the texts at hand can most usefully be understood as artifacts of discursive events – in which one can find the residue of many interactions – rather than as the events themselves. Sometimes much can be lost in this distance from the original discursive event, but also sometimes (as with the case of the petition in *al-Shaab* newspaper) the imprints or residue of interactions on the artifacts can enrich the discussion, and I will try to benefit from that as much as possible. The *al-Shaab* newspaper article is an excellent reminder that no written text or oral instance of discourse is absolute or original; rather all are part of a continuing social process of re-contextualization.

Locating texts about democracy

> …a sort of stylized literature on politics and political change in the Middle East has developed over the last several decades…much of this social science literature treats the Arab world as congenitally defective, "democratically challenged" as it were, and seeks to find biological, cultural, and/or religious causes for this disability. (Anderson 1998: 78)

In choosing to look at instances of discourse about democracy, my aim is partly to contribute to understanding of a complex and often emotionally-charged issue in Middle East area studies. The hypothesis with which I begin is that Egyptian speakers use the term "democracy" in public discourse for reasons that may not be at all obvious to hearers (who, in turn, may appropriate the discourse in their own social interactions for various reasons), whether those hearers are fellow Egyptians or foreigners. This should not be understood to mean, however, that I consider the speakers necessarily disingenuous in their use of the term. On the contrary, my point is that Egyptian speakers are no different from any others in that their public discourse accomplishes social and political work, work that may not be what the hearers imagine it to be. Previous unpublished

research of my own, for example, highlighted the important role of discursive construction of identity in policy speeches by a member of the U.S. Cabinet.

Regarding which instances of discourse will be considered part of a discourse on democracy, I generally sought instances in which the Arabic word *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") appeared at least once. One exception is an excerpt from a speech by President Husni Mubarak delivered on October 5, 1999, in which Mubarak discusses the role of institutions in domestic political life but never uses the word *al-diimuqraaTiyya*. Mubarak's speech does fit in with my other criterion, however, which is that I sought instances in which there was some claim by the speaker about Egypt's identity as a democracy, for example, what it entails for Egypt to be a democracy, what sort of a democracy it is (or is not), what sort of a democracy it should (or should not) be. Such instances treated a constellation of related issues such as civil society, the role of institutions, electoral practices, and the rule of law.

While this book is not a work of political science, one look at the data will tell the reader that I opted unabashedly for an elite view of politics. In no way is this choice intended to devalue the excellent work of anthropologists and political scientists (Singerman, for example) who argue for a much more broadly-based understanding of political life than the traditional one. My experience is that despite such work American scholars and policymakers – part of the American elite – continue to read the public discourse of Arab leaders and elites with interest, partly because it is natural to be interested in one's counterparts. Thus the problem that preoccupied me was how to help such readers gain better insight into Arab political discourse.

Methodological approach and research strategy

As mentioned above, the methodology I will demonstrate has a social/ethnographic level (that seeks to determine *who* produced a text and *what* they were trying to accomplish) and a linguistic one (that seeks to determine *how* the text accomplishes its functions through language). The first step in the methodology is to select a political issue or problem for examination, and then to select one or more texts in which discourse about the issue is carried out. In my case, I arrived in Cairo to do research in September 1999 and began reading the press and meeting informally with both Egyptian and foreign observers of the local political scene until I identified a subject of interest. Once I decided to focus on the subject of democracy, I began collecting texts from the media. I obtained

videotaped speeches from Egyptian television (with the help of friends better technically equipped than I) and clipped speech texts and articles from the newspapers. As I discovered important antecedents to the principal texts that were published before my arrival in Cairo, I looked for them on the Internet, Foreign Broadcast Information Service archives, and press archives. In addition, several of the people I interviewed generously provided copies of texts that they had helped produce.

Once I had selected the texts, I turned to the questions of *who* (which persons or groups) produced them and *what* the texts were doing, i.e., what kind of social interactional work was being accomplished via the texts. After some general informational interviews, I interviewed as many of those involved in producing the texts as I could in Cairo between January and June 2000. I tried to find out who did what in producing the texts, in what ways those people were organized, and what functions the texts performed for the individuals and the groups to which they belonged.

Once I had a basic idea of the producers and community(ies) of practice behind the texts, and of the functions the texts performed for them, I turned to the question of *how* the texts performed those functions on the linguistic level. Armed with a collection of linguistic analytical tools that others and I had found helpful in previous research on political discourse, I combed the texts for traces of linguistic strategies that performed the social functions in question. Finally I went back to several of the participants and reviewed my ethnographic and linguistic findings with them, and then refined my findings according to their helpful feedback.

Preview of overall findings

My principal findings are summarized below and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6:

- Analyzing texts or other instances of discourse via the proposed methodology reveals political significance much different from that apparent upon first inspection, and sheds new light on political situations. A petition that at first glance looked like a typically feckless effort by opposition political parties, for example, turned out to be the brainchild of human rights activists and to constitute an effort by those activists to seize control of the issue of political reform, typically the domain of the parties.

- Because certain issues command public attention at certain times in social or political situations (i.e., they become the "buzz words" of the day), they become particularly useful for speakers seeking to accomplish necessary social interactional work. Ethnographic research showed me that during 1999–2000, democracy was one of several issues (another one seemed to be *al-9awlama*, "globalization") that represented for Egyptians the powerful, external discourse emanating from the hegemonic West. Intellectuals, for example, used their columns in *al-Ahram* newspaper to carve out unique niches in the Egyptian intellectual establishment by discussing how to respond to democracy (and the Western discourse it represented) while still remaining loyal to other concepts (Islamism in one case, Mubarak's leadership in another) that were strongly relevant to the local political scene.
- While in common parlance words are often contrasted with actions (particularly when discussing democracy in the Middle East), my findings supported a view of words *as* a kind of action, carrying out important work including (but not limited to) constructing public identity and negotiating power relations. Excerpts from Mubarak's speeches contained linguistic features that constructed a certain identity for the president by associating him personally with pro-democracy feelings and convictions, for example, but distancing him from an assessment of his record on democratization and from promises of future progress. Discourse by both the President and those in political opposition tended to replicate, and thereby reinforce, the strong executive-weak civil society balance of power in Egypt.

A brief look at what is to come: Chapter 2 reviews major works on discourse analysis that form the theoretical underpinnings of this study, and outlines the major linguistic tools to be used. Chapter 3 situates the texts I will analyze in terms of the groups of people and social interactions that produced them, and identifies social functions performed by the texts. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to a linguistic analysis of the texts, showing how the texts perform the social functions of identity construction and negotiation of power relations via specific linguistic devices and strategies. Chapter 6 expands on the overall findings outlined above and offers advice for applying the methodology.

Chapter 2

Political talk as mediated discourse

This chapter will lay out the theoretical basis for the methodology I will use, including work of the principal theorists on which I will draw and definition of the main linguistic tools I will use in the analysis. The final section will treat problems and issues encountered in applying the methodology to discourse in Arabic.

Principal theorists

In discussing the theoretical underpinnings of this study, I will divide the many scholars whose work informs mine into the following categories: theorists on discourse generally, on political discourse, and on Arabic political discourse.

Theorists on discourse

Among the scholars whose work on discourse provides the most basic theoretical underpinnings for the understanding of discourse I will employ in the proposed dissertation are Bakhtin, Goffman, Scollon, Lave and Wenger, Grice, Levinson, Tannen, and Schiffrin.

Bakhtin.

> Form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social phenomenon – social throughout its entire range and in each and every of its factors, from the sound image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning. (Bakhtin 1981: 259)

As crystallized in the quote by Russian literary critic and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin above, in the following pages I will analyze discourse as produced by, embedded in, and helping to shape specific social situations, and will propose that knowledge of those situations greatly enhances the benefit one receives from reading or hearing the discourse. I will focus on neither form nor content of discourse exclusively, but rather will view them as united to each other. Bakhtin's views on language and discourse, social languages, the unity of form and content in discourse, and what he called *hidden polemic* and the related

idea of *hidden dialogicality* will inform my analysis on a basic level. In "The Problem of Speech Genres" Bakhtin differentiates the *utterance*, which he calls a unit of communication and defines basically as a speaker's turn (bounded by the utterances of others, by silence, or by action), from the *sentence*, a unit of language and of grammar (1986: 71–73). In the same essay, Bakhtin proposes that any utterance is a link in a complex chain of utterances, a major recurring idea in his writings. A speaker is not the first speaker, "the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe," but rather presupposes the existence of preceding utterances with which his new utterance enters into relations, "builds on them, polemicizes with them, or simply presumes that they are already known to the listener" (Bakhtin 1986: 69). Specifically regarding discourse, in his essay "Discourse in the Novel" (Bakhtin 1981), Bakhtin argues for studying it in its social situation and relation to other instances of discourse, saying that discourse "lives, as it were, beyond itself," and that therefore, "To study the word as such, ignoring the impulse that reaches out beyond it, is just as senseless as to study psychological experience outside the context of that real life toward which it was directed and by which it is determined" (1981: 291).

In addition to Bakhtin's general ideas about the salience and interconnectedness of utterances, several related concepts are especially relevant to the study of political discourse. "Discourse in the Novel" propounds his idea of "social languages," living communicative and belief systems "made up of all the markers that give that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language" (1981: 356). Bakhtin notes further that such social languages (including, for example, professional jargons) are "directly intentional" and clear for their speakers but "for those not participating in the given purview, these languages may be treated as objects, as typifactions, as local color" (1981: 289). Certainly elite political discourse in any given country can be viewed as constituting one or more social languages, which may seem opaque or even ridiculous to non-participants in the discourse.

In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Bakhtin sheds light on another reason why political discourse may appear opaque to non-participants, which he calls *hidden polemic* or *internally polemical discourse*. He defines such discourse as "the word with a sideward glance at someone else's hostile word" (Bakhtin 1984: 196), which responds indirectly to another's discourse while ostensibly addressing another referential object. Two important aspects of hidden polemic, according to Bakhtin, are that it is not at all confined to rarified genres

like literature and politics but is common in everyday speech, and that it has profound implications for style.

A related concept is what Bakhtin calls *hidden dialogicality*, in which the discourse responds to another (not necessarily hostile) discourse that is not made explicit.[1] A simple example given by Bakhtin is a novel passage that gives only one side of a telephone conversation. Again, the style-shaping significance is strong, as "each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another speaker" (Bakhtin 1984: 197).

Goffman. Erving Goffman's ideas about footing helped to shape the way I will portray public discourse. The idea of production formats (Goffman 1981: 144–45) is particularly helpful in viewing public discourse, as it breaks down the notion of speaker into animator, author, and principal, which may or may not be the same person. The animator is what Goffman calls the "talking machine," the one whose voice articulates the instance of discourse; in the case of a political speech, this would generally be the speaker him/herself. The author is "someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded" (Goffman 1981: 144), which in the case of a political speech would be not only the speechwriter(s), I would argue, but the community of practice (see Lave and Wenger's notions on this subject below) involved in shaping the speech. The principal is the one "whose position is established by the words that are spoken…someone who is committed to what the words say" (Goffman1981: 144). In a political speech, this might be the official him/herself or might go well beyond, for example in the case where a cabinet official's "we" can be understood to claim principalship from a head of state or entire administration for his/her discourse.

So far I have spoken of production formats as applied mainly to oral discourse, but the idea seems equally applicable to written political discourse. Normally one expects that the writer of a commentary, essay, or book him/herself constitutes animator, author, and principal, but particularly in the case of political writings this need not be so. The named writer may be the animator, but may well not be the sole author (consider staff writers, ghost writers, political compatriots) or principal (the writer may be claiming to speak for an entire party or political faction).

1. Please also see section on Scollon below for his contribution on the issue of hidden dialogicality.

Looking beyond discourse production, Goffman also tries to unwrap the problem of participation and explores different *participant frameworks* (Goffman 1981: 129–140) for discourse. He contests the prevalent notion of conversations occurring simply between two individuals, classified by utterance into the simple roles of speaker and hearer. He discusses participation that may or may not (as in the case of eavesdropping) be "ratified" (Goffman 1981: 132), communication that may be "subordinate" (1981: 133) (such as hushed commentary by bystanders to an event), and different kinds of audiences and "imagined recipients" (1981: 138) of public talk.[2]

Scollon. My approach to discourse and social context is largely informed by linguist Ron Scollon's theory of Mediated Discourse (1998), which treats all texts as artifacts of discursive events, the residue of social interactions. Thus it will be necessary to combine a detailed analysis of the texts themselves with an ethnographic investigation of the circumstances under which the texts were produced, akin to Wodak's "discourse-historical approach" (Wodak 1999). Scollon presents public discourse (news discourse in his case, but his approach is equally applicable to political discourse) as a "process of social interaction in which participants use or appropriate texts and produce texts as almost incidental (from our point of view) tools by which they…engage in the day-to-day social practices within their community of practice," and via which "they construct for themselves various discursive identities" (Scollon 1998: 4).

It is important to specify here among whom these interactions are taking place, in Scollon's view. He considers inadequate the commonly-held sender-receiver model of public discourse, i.e., that the speaker (e.g., journalist) sends out a message that is received directly by the hearer (reader, television viewer). Scollon argues that more apt metaphors are those of drama or sports; the discourse is a "spectacle" staged for the benefit of viewers, and the salient social interactions are among the players themselves rather than between the players and the audience: "Although the game is played *for* the spectators, it is played *among* the athletes, referees, and other on-the-field performers" (Scollon 1998: 75).

If viewers/hearers of public discourse cannot be said to be interacting with the producers of the discourse, with whom do they interact? Looking from the side of the viewers, the salient social interactions would be among, for example,

2. Note the overlap between Goffman's notion of "imagined recipients" and Bakhtin's idea of "hidden dialogicality." Both concepts acknowledge the fact that in public discourse the speaker or author takes into account previous texts and/or anticipated responses to the discourse being produced, and that this has a significant impact on shaping the discourse.

the members of a family watching a news broadcast. Although the broadcast would mediate their interaction, one could not say that the family members were actually interacting with the television journalist. Their conversation in front of the television would be what Scollon calls a *site of engagement*, within which the text of the television broadcast would be available for appropriation, rejection, etc.

According to Scollon, similar fundamental ritual practices underlie many different types of interaction, from face-to-face conversations to much more complicated interactions such as the production of a news broadcast. However simple or complex, interactions must always establish the *channel* (the grounds for interaction), the *identities and social positioning* of participants, and the *topics* to be addressed. Scollon uses transcripts of several telephone calls to show how the channel, identity/positioning, and topic frames are routinely opened and closed in such conversations, often but not always in that very sequence. Applying the argument to news discourse, Scollon posits that it is these same frames that construct the social practices by which power alignments are negotiated among members of media establishment: "The broadest scope for the exercise of power is constituted in the power to frame communicative events, that is, to control the channel. Within that is the power to position participants in relationship to each other through delegating or withholding the delegation of topics. Finally, within that is the power to speak in one's own voice or to control the representation of the voices of others" (Scollon 1999: 30). The applicability to political discourse here is clear. The person(s) who decides whether or not a speech or statement will be made holds the most power over the discourse, followed by the one who decides who will say it, and then by those who determine how it will be said.

Scollon illustrates the discursive construction of identity of television broadcast journalists, print journalists, and also of newsmakers. Television journalists' identities and status within their organizations are constructed, for example, in the practices by which the anchor hands the floor over to the reporter, and the way the reporter hands it back. Bylining and attribution practices in newspapers perform a similar function. Scollon uses examples of such practices to prove that the primary forms of social interaction in media discourse are not between journalist and viewer/reader, but among (in the case of print journalism) reporters, editors, and editorial staff laying out the newspaper (and taking advertising concerns into account): "Thus, within this pattern of social interaction, the person of the reporter is constructed, constrained, and

finally displayed as a spectacle for the interpretation of the consuming reader" (Scollon 1998: 214).

Furthermore, as regards the discursive construction of newsmakers' identities, Scollon illustrates the significant power that journalists wield. As journalists see it, "the role of the newsmaker is not to create events, but to provide statements as the raw material of the journalists' stories" (Scollon 1998: 245). For simplicity's sake, as data for this study I have chosen texts with minimal involvement by journalists other than the authors themselves, but as will become evident, the roles of invisible editors and censors, for example, cannot be disregarded.

In the following chapters I will show that identity construction and power relations are major concerns in political discourse, an idea that should not be surprising in itself. Somewhat less obvious, however, is the fact that the speaker him/herself may be only marginally involved in determining identity construction and positioning, that the ostensible topic (the so-called "substance" of the speech) may be a much less substantial concern to those involved in crafting the speech than identity and positioning, and that the intended audience of the discourse may be other than the ostensible audience.

Scollon also explores Bakhtin's idea of hidden dialogicality as it applies to intellectual property laws and media discourse, where "hidden dialogicality constitutes a domain of self-censorship or avoidance or alternatively of high risk discourse" (Scollon 1999: 1). Hidden dialogical partners, according to Scollon (emphasis in original), "are *there* as dialogic contributors to a discourse to the extent we can establish that the producers of the utterances expect, fear, hope, or wish them to be there" (Scollon 1999: 9–10). The main point here is that looking for hidden dialogicality is one of many ways in which one can help, as Scollon says, to "pull back the curtain that hides the wizard behind it who is ventriloquating what appears to be the main discourse" (1999: 9).

Lave and Wenger. As one considers the group or groups of people whose interactions result in the production of instances of political discourse, the idea of community of practice will be useful. Scollon draws on the anthropologists Lave and Wenger's (1991) ideas about communities of practice, which (along with Goffman's production format) will guide my investigation of the social interactions that produced the texts I will analyze. According to Lave and Wenger, a community of practice is "an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their communities" (Lave and Wenger 1991: 98), in other words, a group of people engaged on a regular basis in some shared activity. The authors

are interested in communities of practice as sites of learning via apprenticeship (which they call "legitimate peripheral participation"), but the notion serves just as well to describe groups of people involved in social practices related to political life such as forming policy positions and writing speeches. The interaction among members of various communities of practice appears to exert a large influence on how and why political discourse is produced. Lave and Wenger note that members of communities of practice, while engaging in social practices aimed at joint production of some kind, may well "have different interests, make diverse contributions to an activity, and hold varied viewpoints" (Lave and Wenger 1991:98), all of which, as I will demonstrate, certainly holds true for communities of practice producing political discourse.

Pragmatics: Grice, Levinson, and others. As I gather a set of linguistic tools for analyzing Egyptian political discourse, a number of ideas from pragmatics are helpful. Among them are philosopher H.P. Grice's Cooperative Principle and theory of conversational implicature (Grice 1975), which explain some major ways that speakers are able to convey more than they actually say in conversation. The Cooperative Principle, which according to Grice is always assumed by participants in conversation, states that participants will make their contribution such as is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation. Grice theorized that, by way of observing the Cooperative Principle, participants abide by four principles or maxims (I have taken the maxims from Levinson, as he states them somewhat more concisely than does Grice in "Logic and Conversation"):

> *The maxim of Quality*
> try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
> (i) do not say what you believe to be false
> (ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
>
> *The maxim of Quantity*
> (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange
> (ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required
>
> *The maxim of Relevance*
> (i) make your contributions relevant
>
> *The maxim of Manner*
> Be perspicuous, and specifically:
> (i) avoid obscurity
> (ii) avoid ambiguity

(iii) be brief
(iv) be orderly (Levinson 1983: 101–102)

According to Grice, Speaker A may convey more than he/she actually says by openly *flouting* one of these maxims, because Speaker B will assume that A is observing the maxim and therefore will search for a meaning by which the Cooperative Principle would be preserved. Levinson (1983) gives the following simple illustration:

A: Where's Bill?
B: There's a yellow VW outside Sue's house.

In this example, B's response appears to flout the Maxim of Relevance (perhaps Quantity I as well). Speaker A, assuming B is still being cooperative, searches for a meaning of B's utterance that is relevant, e.g., that Bill must be at Sue's house. Thus a conversational implicature has been made.

In political discourse as in everyday discourse, speakers use implicature to good effect. Among the properties Grice attributed to conversational implicatures is that they are cancelable or *defeasible*, that is the speaker may deny that the implicature was intended. The ability to suggest – and then to be able to deny, if necessary, that one has suggested – is key to political discourse.

Deixis (from the Greek word meaning "pointing") is another pragmatic phenomenon, simpler than implicature, which can help to elucidate the social context of political utterances. Deictic or indexical expressions encode information about the context (time, place, person) of utterance and thus reveal something about how the speaker (or, in my case, the community of practice shaping the instance of discourse) visualizes the situation at the time of utterance. Classic examples of deictic expressions in English are "now" (time deixis), "here" (place), "I" (person), as well as definite articles ("the") and demonstrative pronouns ("this"), none of which can be understood by the hearer without additional information about the context of utterance. In terms of general theory on deixis, I will rely primarily on Levinson (1983: 54–96), who was drawing mainly on the works of Lyons and Fillmore in the 1970s. Wilson, Billig, and others have shown the utility of analyzing deixis in political discourse (see below). I will discuss their works in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5, in which I analyze the use of deixis in the instances of discourse selected for this study.

Interactional Sociolinguistics (Schiffrin and Tannen). Interactional sociolinguistics, defined by Schiffrin as "a theoretical and methodological perspective on language use that is based in linguistics, sociology, and anthropology" (Schiffrin 1996a) also provides a number of useful ways of approaching political

discourse. Here I refer particularly to Tannen's work on conversational style (Tannen 1984), frames (Tannen 1979), and oral and literate strategies (Tannen 1982), as well as Schiffrin's work on identity construction (Schiffrin 1996b) and discourse markers (Schiffrin 1987).

Tannen's book *Conversational Style* builds on work by Gumperz, Hymes, R. Lakeoff, and many others to develop a theory of how conversational style springs from "the need to serve basic human needs in interaction" (Tannen 1984: 19). Tannen focuses particularly on the conflicting needs for human closeness and for independence, which results in a range of styles on a spectrum from what she calls "high involvement" to "high considerateness." Although I will generally not view political discourse within this bipolar frame, Tannen's general approach – that interactional goals are so strong that they supersede the theoretical (Gricean) goal of clarity – accords with my understanding of political discourse, and the involvement/considerateness divide in some cases provides an illuminating additional perspective on an instance of political discourse.

Tannen's work on frames (Tannen 1979) opens up another window on political discourse, one that I will use in my analysis. Tannen defines frames, also know as schemata or scripts, as "structures of expectation" (taking the term from R. N. Ross) based on "organized knowledge" about past experience. Tannen identifies omission, repetition, false starts, backtracking, hedges and qualifiers, negatives, contrastive connectives, modals, inexact statements, generalizations, inferences, evaluative language, interpretation, moral judgement, incorrect statements, and additions as linguistic indicators of frames operating in discourse (Tannen 1979: 166). As my own perspective is interactionally rather than cognitively oriented, I will choose to look at frames in terms of how they reflect what the speaker is trying to do, as opposed to how they reflect how the speaker thinks. Specifically, linguistic features may indicate that a speaker is trying to evoke for hearers a certain frame or set of expectations, for example, that the current political configuration of a government is normal and natural, whereas the ideas or demands of a political opposition are unnatural.

As I will analyze some instances of discourse that were originally written and some that were spoken, I will mention some of Tannen's ideas on written versus spoken discourse (Tannen 1982). Tannen finds that hypotheses put forward by Chafe and others that written discourse is characterized by "integration," while spoken is characterized by "fragmentation" do not stand up to scrutiny:

> Integration (and its opposite, fragmentation) is a surface feature of linguistic structure. Involvement (and its opposite, detachment) is a deeper dimension, reflecting what Goffman 1979 has described in face-to-face interaction as footing, i.e., the speaker's stance toward the audience (and I would add, toward the material or content). Therefore, features of integration and involvement, which Chafe finds characteristic of writing and speaking respectively, can be combined in a single discourse type. (Tannen 1982: 2)

Further complicating the matter is that much of my "spoken" data came from written scripts, and then was later converted (by me) into another written form, a transcript. All this is by way of saying that I do not expect straightforward differences between the written and spoken genres of data.

In addition to Scollon's view of discursive construction of identity, I will draw on Schiffrin's (1996b) insights on the subject. Schiffrin's focus is on narratives, which appear frequently in political speeches and writings, and observes that:

> the way we use language to display epistemic and agentive aspects of self, during our stories, positions us in relation to the characters in those stories: what we say we do and believe within a story world continually reflects, and has consequences for, the way we conduct our social relationships within those worlds (Schiffrin 1996b: 196).

Schiffrin finds that "presentations of self may contradict (as well as reinforce) one another" (Schiffrin 1996b: 195), which I would suggest in some cases at least results from different social functions being served and may, for political speakers, have the virtue – as do implicatures – of deniability.

Schiffrin's work on discourse markers (Schiffrin 1987) also has some utility in looking at political discourse, although discourse structure will not be a major theme in this study. Schiffrin shows that many discourse markers are used to structure discourse and thus, that they reveal the structure of arguments (which points are primary, which are intended to be subsumed under others, how one argument is connected to others previous or subsequent to it in the discourse), which is helpful in unraveling political utterances. Schiffrin's data is entirely in English, but some work has been done on equivalent discourse markers and how they structure texts in Arabic (see Sarig 1995).

Theorists on general political discourse

There are many schools of analysis of political discourse, including those focusing on rhetoric, argumentation, propaganda, semantics, and lexicology. Scholars

whose work on political discourse has most influenced mine are those working in the fields of sociolinguistics, critical discourse analysis, and pragmatics, particularly Billig, Wilson, Wodak, and Fairclough.

Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a school of discourse analysis practiced primarily in Europe by scholars including Wodak, Fairclough, van Djik, Fowler, Chilton, and many others. Using a linguistic lens to examine social problems (for example, power, racism, sexism, anti-semitism, unemployment, immigration), CDA views language as action in a social context and brings with it a viewpoint explicitly committed to progressive social change.

While my approach here differs from that taken by most CDA analysts, CDA work on political discourse elucidates some principles crucial to what I am trying to do. First, CDA makes an excellent argument for why political discourse – even that of the elite, which very few people in any given society actually read or listen to – is worth analyzing. In the words of Fairclough, "political discourse provides the clearest illustration of the constitutive power of discourse: it reproduces or changes the social world by reproducing or changing people's representations of it and the principles of classification which underlie them" (Fairclough 1995: 182). In other words, political language matters because it not only reflects political conditions but shapes them, by first shaping how people discuss and see such conditions. Second, I have taken partly from CDA (and interactional sociolinguistics) the idea of viewing texts in terms of the social functions they perform. Fairclough, for example, classifies such functions as ideational, interpersonal, and textual (Fairclough 1995: 58), similar to Scollon's topics, relationships, and channels in discourse.

Third, CDA emphasizes the relationships among texts (intertextuality) and the need to study texts in their historical context. Wodak in particular develops these ideas into what she calls the "discourse-historical approach," the main aim of which is:

> …to integrate texts of as many different genres as possible as well as the historical dimension of the subject under investigation. The discourse-historical approach relates to three dimensions: to the content of the data, the strategies employed, and the linguistic realizations. In this context, strategies refer to plans of actions with varying degree of elaborateness, the realisation of which can range from automatic to conscious, and which are located on different levels of our mental organization (Wodak 1999: 189).

Wodak generally uses teams of researchers from various disciplines to carry out such work; what I will do is necessarily on a much more limited scale.

Billig. Turning to another scholar who uses linguistics to shed light on a political problem, Billig's work on what he calls "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) will provide part of the theoretical framework within which I will view the construction of Egypt as a democracy in public discourse. Refuting the postmodernist notion that nationalism is less relevant in the era of globalization, he explores the ways in which the concept of national identity is deeply ingrained in modern life and is "flagged" daily in dozens of ways one does not even notice, so that it later can be evoked strongly and overtly in times of crisis. Billig makes particularly good use of what he calls *homeland deixis* to make his point:

> If the national home is to be homely, then "we" must make it so. "We" cannot do this by constant, conscious endeavor. To be at home, "we" must routinely and unconsciously use the homeland-making language. "We" must daily inhabit the environment of this language. Small, unnoticed words of deixis are important in this respect. They help to shut the national door on the outside world. "The" shuts the door more tightly than "this"…What is "ours" is presented as if it were the objective world: *the* is so concrete, so objective, so uncontroversial…When the homeland-making phrases are used with regularity, "we" are unmindfully reminded who "we" are and where "we" are. "We" are identified without even being mentioned. In this way, national identity is a routine way of talking and listening; it is a form of life, which habitually closes the front door, and seals the borders. (Billig 1995: 109)

What Billig is doing here is strange-making (making what seems perfectly normal look strange) of a high order. By showing how national identity is constructed in the most banal ways – "not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion," but "the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building" (Billig 1995: 8) – Billig shows how political structures and power relations are replicated daily in discourse. For my work, what is relevant is how Egypt is discursively constructed as a certain kind of democracy in banal ways (such as *homeland deixis*), which I see as a subset of how Egypt is constructed as a nation. One would expect this to be done in the political discourse of the president, other officials, and political figures closely related to the government, but as it turns out, speakers and communities of practice elsewhere on the political spectrum wittingly or unwittingly contribute in their own ways to the same process.

Wilson. Wilson's 1990 book *Politically Speaking: The Pragmatic Analysis of Political Language* provides an important model for this study, both in terms of general theoretical perspective and specific analytical tools. (One key difference is that Wilson does not focus in any depth on the interactional aspects of political discourse. For that I will rely primarily on Scollon and Critical Discourse Analysts such as Wodak.) Wilson defines pragmatics as "simply…the analysis of meaning which is beyond what has been said, and it is accepted that locating each meaning may involve more than one procedural method of analysis" (Wilson 1990: 7). I share Wilson's discomfort with the Orwellian thesis that language controls and mediates thought as well as with some critical linguists' aim to discover the one true interpretation of an instance of discourse. Wilson proposes a more modest, but I think equally valuable project: "The question that is interesting from the linguistic point of view is *how* did they [i.e., political speakers] do it, not *whether* they should have done it or not" (Wilson 1990: 15; emphasis mine).

Regarding specific tools of analysis, Wilson explores implicature, presupposition, pronoun use, metaphors, and question formation in political discourse in Great Britain and elsewhere. His work on pronouns and other ways of referring will be particularly useful in my examination of speeches. Drawing on earlier work by Brown and Gilman and others, Wilson suggests that "pronouns may be selected within interaction for reasons beyond those reflected at a purely formal or categorical level; they may function communicatively to reveal various aspects of the speaker's attitudes, social standing, sex, motivation, and so on" (Wilson 1990: 46). Pronoun choice may pragmatically convey information about the speaker him/herself, the speaker's attitude toward the referent, or both.

A related tool Wilson uses to show how a political speaker may try to express proximity to/distance from an idea is by ways of referring. Examining cases in which the speaker refers to him/herself in the third person ("the President," "the Dean"), Wilson shows that "the point being made is that it is not the actions of a specific individual identity that is at issue but the actions associated with a role, actions which any individual (whoever he or she may be) would equally be constrained in performing" (Wilson 1990: 95). While this seems to make sense intuitively, it turns out to be difficult to prove. Wilson uses several theoretical approaches, including Wilson and Sperber's Relevance Theory (1987), which states in sum that every act of communication carries with it the presupposition of relevance. Relevance here means that the effort required to process the communication is less than the benefit derived from processing it. Thus if a president uses "the President" rather than "I" to refer to him/herself, the fact that

the speaker used a less common and therefore less easily processed form generates the implicature that he/she has additional information to convey, which in this case may be that whatever beliefs or associations arise from the utterance should be attached to the office rather than to the individual him/herself.

In addition to Wilson, other scholars who have treated pronouns and reference in political discourse include Chilton, Connor-Linton, De Fina, and Zupnik. Connor-Linton (1988), working on a quantitative analysis of nuclear discourse, classifies referents of "we/us" versus "they/them," suggesting such a scheme might "serve as an indirect index of the general 'deictic' placement of referents in each author's world-view" (Connor-Linton 1988: 109). Moreover, Connor-Linton posits that the use of pronouns requires the reader to take the author's perspective "at least provisionally" in order to locate the referent, thus making such use "a subtle form of persuasion, requiring the reader to participate in the author's world-view" (Connor-Linton 1988: 111). Zupnik (1994) agrees that pronouns are used to persuasive effect but argues that resolution of pronouns (particularly "we," which may be inclusive or exclusive) is by no means simple, and depends on interaction between "discourse spaces" (an idea akin to frames), participant roles, and indexical usage. Analyzing a debate among pundits on American television, Zupnik finds that the speaker on whom she focuses uses the first person plural pronoun to include his interlocutors and the audience potentially as agents of his demands and criticisms, thereby avoiding full responsibility for his utterances.

Zupnik and others also have employed Brown and Levinson's politeness model to show how usage of "we" helps to mitigate threats to the positive and negative face of the audience and speaker. Looking at a speech by President Reagan, Chilton (1990) shows how Reagan uses politeness strategies including pronouns to construct a certain socio-political configuration. By employing "we" to include and exclude various referents in different instances, Reagan manages to claim closeness with Congress, claim identity with "the people," and to "have this constructed presidential-congressional-national unity mediated not only to domestic but also to foreign hearers" (Chilton 1990: 218).

De Fina (1995) relates pronoun use to Goffman's production formats (*animator, author, principal*), showing how two Mexican politicians signal identity or solidarity (she differentiates between the two) with parties to a conflict. In one of the texts analyzed, frequent use of first person plural pronouns points to a *principal*, a community the first speaker is claiming to represent, whereas in the other text the second speaker generally refers to himself in the first person singular, thereby presenting himself as an observer of the conflict rather

than a participant. Thus, according to De Fina, "the speaker's identity emerges through consistent use of certain pronouns with a stable referent and through the oppositions and connections established in the text between these referents and the referents of other pronominal and non-pronominal forms" (De Fina 1995: 379).

Scholars on Arabic political discourse

The two-stage methodology that I will use in this book has not been used in analysis of Arabic political discourse previously to my knowledge. Other scholars have used different methodologies to analyze Arabic political discourse, however, and below I will review briefly a sampling of recent work by Ayalon (1994), Bengio (1998), Ismail (1995, 1998a, 1998b), and Mazraani (1995, 1997). The first three authors examine political lexicon (with little or no consideration of other linguistic features) as a way of understanding political culture (Ayalon, Bengio) or political economy (Ismail). Ayalon and Ismail use a deductive approach, starting with a hypothesis and seeking examples from various instances of political discourse. Bengio takes a more inductive approach, defining her corpus (selected excerpts from Iraqi Ba'th discourse 1968–98) and eliciting key words, phrases, and trends.

Mazraani (1997) differs from the other three in both purpose and approach. First, her purpose is not to shed light on a political situation via discourse, but to shed light on an aspect of language (dialectical code-switching) via political discourse. Second, her method is clearly inductive, analyzing a few political speeches in detail. Third, Mazraani uses only data that were spoken, whereas Ayalon and Ismail focus on written data and Bengio uses both.

Ayalon. Ayalon's (1987) book Language and Change in the Arab Middle East: The Evolution of Modern Political Discourse takes a broad-brush approach, tracing the evolution in words used to discuss political concepts such as citizenship, representation, parties, constitutions, etc. during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He contrasts, for example, the use of the term ra9aayya ("subjects") to refer to the populace of Arab countries under Ottoman rule during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to the increasing use of sha9b ("people") in the mid-nineteenth century and later to muwaaTinuun ("citizens") in the twentieth century. His data are primarily excerpts from newspaper reports and books.

The most interesting part of the book for my purposes is Ayalon's discussion of the evolution in usage of the word *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") during the nineteenth century. According to Ayalon, *al-diimuqraaTiyya* came into common use in discussions of European struggles for political freedom in the Arabic press, where the concept initially was not differentiated from *jumhuuriyya* ("republic"), a synonymy preserved in modern Greek, Ayalon points out, where *demokratia* serves for both notions (Ayalon 1987: 106). The two notions apparently became differentiated in the Arab press in the late nineteenth century due partly to the need to translate into Arabic the names of foreign political parties, particularly those of the United States: *diimuqraaTiyyuun* ("Democrats") and *jumhuuriyyuun* ("Republicans"). Ayalon offers this prolonged synonymy of concepts – until late in the century in which modern Arabic was shaped –as an explanation for the fact that Arabic continues to use a foreign loan word to express the concept democracy. He warns against drawing unwarranted conclusions from the phenomenon:

> To assert that the notion of democracy was a novelty in the modern Middle East is not to pass judgment on the degree of political freedom in Islam. This is of little relevance to our purpose, and its discussion might take us far afield from the issues with which we are concerned. Regardless of whether or not Islam was democratic in theory or practice, it is a fact that there was no equivalent to the word "democracy" in pre-modern Middle Eastern languages. Muslim thinkers had often been occupied with such issues as justice *9adl* and oppression *DHulm*. Whether or not their society and polity were "democratic" was a question of little meaning to them... "Democracy" represented an unimportant variant of "republic," one that was seldom discussed during the formative century of modern Arabic. This is probably the reason why the shapers of the language, who diligently devised Arabic names for so many other imported concepts, failed to offer one for democracy and eventually settled for the foreign word *diimuqraaTiyya*, despite its inelegance by traditional standards of style. (Ayalon 1987: 106–108)

Bengio. Bengio's (1998) book, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, identifies and traces the path of key words and phrases appearing in Iraqi Ba'th party discourse (Saddam Hussein's speeches and written material from Baath party newspapers) from 1968–98. Bengio's work on how Saddam Hussein's speeches construct a cult of personality around the leader, how Iraqi Sunnis dominate discourse and attempt to discursively disqualify certain other religious groups, and how the Baath developed a unique set of terms surrounding the concept of

democracy provides some important parallels and bases of comparison for my analysis.

Bengio devotes an entire chapter to the changing ways in which the Baath has described Iraq as a democracy and the functions served by such descriptions. The first constitution of the Iraqi Baath state in 1968 described Iraq as a *dawla diimuqraaTiyya sha9biyya* ("popular democratic state") for several reasons, among which Bengio points out that "a reference to 'democracy' was, after all, de rigueur in the twentieth century" (Bengio 1998: 58). Bengio speculates that the term also was used partly to counter Syrian Baath accusations of "rightist deviation," and that combining "democracy" with "popular" allowed the Iraqis "to make it appear different from the common variety, with its Western overtones" (Bengio 1998: 58). Thus describing Iraq as a democracy positions the Baath both in league with the West (by using a term considered *de rigueur* according to standards set by the West) and in opposition to the West (by modifying the term in a way suggesting that Western democracies somehow were not popular). A 1990 version of the constitution, perhaps reflecting increased confidence on the part of the Iraqi regime, drops the modifier "popular."

Bengio's analysis is greatly aided by the fact that the Baath published a *Saddam Husssein Political Dictionary* containing the leader's favorite words and expressions and "memorable quotes" (Bengio 1998: 10). Among the terms related to democracy with uniquely Iraqi Baath meanings are *al-liibiraaliyya* ("liberalism"), *al-barlamaaniyya* ("parliamentarism"), and *al-ta9addudiyya* ("pluralism"); all are pejorative epithets meant to show Iraqis what a sham Western democracies are. According to Bengio, Saddam Hussein rehabilitated the term *al-ta9addudiyya* during Shiite and Kurdish uprisings after the Gulf War in an apparent attempt to open a safety valve for expression of frustration (Bengio 1998: 68).

Ismail. Political scientist Salwa Ismail examines aspects of contemporary Egyptian political discourse in several articles (1995, 1998a, 1998b). Ismail's analysis is at a conceptual level, not a linguistic or even ethnographic one, and thus differs significantly from this study. Nonetheless Ismail's work provides useful insights, for example, about the interdiscursivity (a term not used by Ismail) between discourses on democracy between Islamist and secularist intellectuals in Egypt. Ismail shows in "Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism in Egypt" (Ismail 1998a) the interdiscursivity between texts by secularist intellectual Farag Foda (killed by militant Islamists in 1992) and writings by Islamist leaders. In "Democracy in Contemporary Arab Intellectual Discourse" (Ismail 1998b), Ismail observes that both Islamist and

secularist discourses on democracy tend to be framed in terms of reactions to the West:

> In sum, the problematic of democracy is thought of in terms of the experiences of the "Other." This is true of the intellectuals who use the West as a model to emulate as well as those who reject that model. While rejection is articulated in terms of difference and specificity, emulation is posited as an obligatory step for joining the march of humanity, catching up, and staying in history. Democracy in this sense becomes a historical imperative dictated by the necessity/desire to remain in history and to be historical agents. (Ismail 1998b: 96)

Ismail also shows sensitivity to issues related to power in and over discourse. Discussing the 1994 short-lived dialogue between the Egyptian government and Islamists in "State-Society Relations in Egypt: Restructuring the Political" Ismail notes that "In setting the agenda for discussion, the government assured its control over the process. Political reform, understood as constitutional reform, was ruled out as a subject of discussion…The main issues on the government's agenda were of an executive and administrative nature" (Ismail 1995: 42). Ismail also observes that the government is by no means the only party attempting to exert power by defining terms of discourse. Discussing the secularist-Islamist debate over individual rights versus communal good, Ismail says that "in their struggle for power, the Islamists' discourse and strategies aim at bringing about closure by fixing meanings" (Ismail 1998b: 107).

In "Populism Contra Democracy: recent democratist discourse in the Arab world," Aziz al-Azmeh takes an approach similar to that of Ismail (1998a) in that he attempts to describe in broad outlines trends in Arab intellectual discourse on democracy. Al-Azmeh's purpose appears to be more to critique than to analyze. More direct than Ismail, al-Azmeh notes with evident frustration "the assimilation of democratic vocabulary by political discourses which, in their preponderant presence and effect, are out of sympathy with the liberal notions of democracy and at best ambiguous and multivocal" (al-Azmeh 1994: 113) and concludes that Arab democratist discourse in its "ahistorical perfectionism" veers toward an unsustainable populism and thus "feeds the main political carrier of populism at present, which is the total plebiscitarianism of political Islam" (al-Azmeh 1994: 128).

In my view, both al-Azmeh and Ismail miss an important point by taking it as their mission to unmask the supposed emptiness of Arab discourse on democracy. Taking the issue head-on, al-Azmeh dismisses as "instrumentalism" the fact that various political currents "adopt democratic enunciations in a nominal fashion, thereby making it possible for the notion of political liber-

ties to be interpreted in a variety of different ways that each valorize it for a particular ideological current" (al-Azmeh 1994: 115). Ismail is less direct, but her articles strongly imply that both Arab governments and Islamists use the rhetoric of democracy without embracing democratic values. While Ismail and al-Azmeh are justified in saying this, my point is that articulators of political discourse must be using terms like "democracy" for some reason (many reasons, as it turns out), and that it is illuminating to explore what kind of work they are trying to get done in using such terms.

Mazraani. In Mazraani's book *Aspects of Language Variation in Arabic Political Speech-Making* (1997) and her related article "Functions of Arabic Political Discourse: The Case of Saddam Hussein's Speeches" (1995), Mazraani undertakes a detailed linguistic analysis of selected speeches by Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Qadhafi.

Taking a variationist approach, Mazraani explores the relationship of language forms to functions, primarily through the prism of code-switching and code-mixing (using two or more codes within a single utterance or even a single word) among varieties of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and Arabic dialects. She examines each speech for code-switching at the level of phonology, morphophonology, syntax, and lexicon. The key question, as Mazraani expresses it, is "What is the aim of the speaker, what is he actually attempting to convey in his speech, and how would this affect the linguistic choices he makes?" (Mazraani 1997: 86).

Relying on work by Tannen and others on involvement, Mazraani relates code-switching to the speaker's desire to create involvement on the part of the audience. Looking at two speech excerpts by late Egyptian President Nasser, Mazraani concludes that:

> When the speaker switches from MSA to dialect he is generally aiming at involving the audience in his discourse by co-opting their emotions and explaining his meaning…Involvement is established through the combination of dialectal linguistic characteristics, easily understood, the ideational (concreteness) and interpersonal (personalisation) functions, conversational prosody (fast tempo, stressed time markers) and involvement strategies (dialogue, conversational and reported speech types of discourse). (Mazraani 1997: 97)

Comparing the Egyptian, Libyan, and Iraqi data Mazraani finds some shared tendencies relating use of different codes to perform different functions. Modern Standard Arabic is generally used to construct abstract arguments, recall historical events, and express political ideas and axioms: "Because in these cases

the speaker is instructing his audience, the tone is authoritative, that of superior to inferior, and MSA is the expected code for such purposes. Accompanying paralinguistic features such as slow delivery and pauses are employed to give full emphasis to some words and to signal the 'weight' of the message" (Mazraani 1997: 189). Dialectal varieties, on the other hand, are often employed by speakers to engender a sense of solidarity, for example by rephrasing abstract concepts to ensure audience comprehension ("leveling" with the audience) or by recounting anecdotes or conversations: "Whereas in MSA passages the politician is often vicariously judging and guiding, in dialectal passages, he plays a more modest role, more 'human' in his desire to create unity and understanding" (Mazraani 1997: 190).

Mazraani's aim is principally to explore the universality of functions of code-switching in Arabic political discourse (hence her choice of speakers from three Arab countries, speaking different dialects) and secondarily to compare its function in Arabic to that in political discourse in other languages, such as English. To this end she makes some general observations on the Arabic political speech as a textual genre. Regarding political discourse in English Mazraani draws on work by Atkinson (1984) on rhetorical strategies and by Gumperz (1982) on code-switching. Mazraani finds that in her data the Arabic speakers employed some of the same rhetorical strategies for creating involvement identified by Atkinson in English-language speeches, i.e., listing of elements in sets of three, contrasting pairs, and references to "us" (Mazraani 1997: 204–211). She also finds parallels between her data and that of Gumperz and others regarding functions of code-switching, i.e., that one code may be used to convey feelings and personal experiences while another serves to treat subjects in a more detached manner (Mazraani 1997: 214).

Linguistic tools

The principal tools I will use in examining how the social functions of the discourse were accomplished on the linguistic level are DEIXIS (including references to self and others), INTERDISCURSIVITY (including HIDDEN POLEMIC), and FRAMES.

Deixis

> Unmemorable clichés and habits of political discourse are worth attention because of, not despite, their rhetorical dullness…Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this deixis of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely. (Billig 1995: 93–94)

From the Greek word meaning "pointing" or "indicating," deictic or indexical expressions encode information about the context (time, place, person) of production and cannot be understood without information about the context of production. Indexicals include pronouns, definite articles, demonstrative pronouns ("this" or "that" in English, *haa<u>dh</u>aa* or *<u>dh</u>aalika* in Arabic), verb tense, proximal/distal terms, and time expressions. Levinson also refers to "discourse deixis" (Levinson 1983: 62) involving reference to other parts of a discourse (e.g., "this" referring to a proposition previously stated) and "social deixis" (Levinson 1983: 63) encoding social distinctions relevant to participant roles, particularly aspects of social relationship between speaker and addressee or speaker and referent e.g., honorifics, summons forms, vocatives, and titles of address) (Levinson 1983: 63). Levinson distinguishes between gestural usage (which requires vision to interpret) and symbolic usage of deictic expressions (Levinson 1983: 65); all usages discussed in this study will be symbolic. The significance of deictic expressions for my purposes here is that they not only reveal something about how speakers view the situation of production of an instance of discourse, but that such expressions frequently are used to try to shape another's view (perhaps a listener, reader, or co-participant in production) of the situation.

As regards utterances, the "deictic center" generally is the speaker, the time of producing the utterance, and the location of the utterance. Looking at the speaker, it is useful to bear in mind Goffman's *production formats*; looking at how the roles of "animator," "author," and "principal" (Goffman 1981: 144–5) are distributed or claimed in political discourse can be enlightening (more on this in the discussion on pronouns below). There are in addition "derivative usages" in which expressions shift the deictic center to other participants (Levinson 1983: 64) in the discursive event. In political discourse, this shifting of the deictic center sometimes is done to achieve persuasive effects. In addition, proximal deictic expressions generally are used to express physical proximity, but also can be used (deliberately or not) to express emotional proximity to an event or set of circumstances, which Levinson called "empathetic deixis" (Levinson 1983: 81).

The principal sorts of deictic expressions I will explore are the ways a speaker refers to him/herself and to others (via pronouns or other expressions) and how the definite article and demonstrative pronouns are used to construct a certain reality that is essential to the identity the speaker is claiming. At the end of each section is a brief discussion of differences between Arabic and other languages in which other scholars have worked (primarily English) regarding specific linguistic devices.

Pronouns. Pronominal references to self and others are a form of deixis that has been studied extensively and profitably in looking at political discourse. Wilson notes that "pronouns may be selected within interaction for reasons beyond those reflected at a purely formal or categorical level; they may function communicatively to reveal various aspects of the speaker's attitudes, social standing, sex, motivation, and so on" (Wilson 1990: 46). The linguist may view pronoun choice as revealing information about the speaker (a sociolinguistic approach) or as deliberate choice by the speaker (a pragmatic approach). I will generally take a pragmatic approach (partly because the instances of discourse I am analyzing are all planned and scripted), but Wilson notes that the distinction between the two is sometimes difficult to make (Wilson 1990: 47). Wilson examines pronominal choice in terms of how a speaker portrays him/herself in relation to the topic and to addressees (self-referencing), how the speaker uses pronouns to portray a conflict with others as personal or impersonal (relations of contrast), and how a speaker refers to third parties outside him/herself and addressees (other referencing) (1990, 61–68).

A number of other scholars have focused on self-referencing in public political discourse, particularly the distribution of "I" versus "we." Relating pronoun choice to Goffman's production formats, De Fina shows that constant employment of "I" in semi-spontaneous (partly written and partly improvised) political discourse in Spanish may indicate a high degree of speaker involvement with topic or commitment to authorship, whereas "we" gives indications both on authorship and on identification with others regarding principalship of the discourse (1995, 384). Connor-Linton (1988) and Zupnik (1994) have explored the use of pronouns as persuasion in political discourse. Looking at written discourse, Connor-Linton argues that authors use pronouns deliberately to require readers to participate in the author's world view "at least provisionally" in order to resolve references (Connor-Linton 1988: 111), whereas Zupnik (analyzing a television program) demonstrates a speaker's use of "we" to include other participants in his utterances and thereby avoid full responsibility for those utterances. As Wilson notes, the use of pronouns in many cases may

generate implicatures that can be denied (Wilson 1990: 68), deniability being a useful tool in political discourse.

The main point is to realize that pronominal choice is not at all rigidly fixed but is available for manipulation and used by politicians to good effect. Wilson identified such usages as being:

> to indicate, accept, deny or distance themselves from responsibility for political action; to reveal ideological bias; to encourage solidarity; to designate and identify those who are supporters (with us) as well as those who are enemies (against us); and to present specific idiosyncratic aspects of the individual politician's own personality. (Wilson 1990: 76)

Other references to self. There are times when the author(s) of an instance of discourse will refer to him/her/themselves by terms other than pronouns. President Mubarak may refer to himself as "the President," for example. In his analysis of British and American political talk, Wilson notes that the choice of pronouns or other terms further or close to the deictic center (e.g., I, me, we, you, he, one) may be manipulated to direct attention towards or away from the speaker him/herself. Even further from the deictic center of "I" is the definite article + description ("the President"), which Wilson shows may be used to direct attention "away from designated individuals towards some generic role or conceptual category" (Wilson 1990: 77). Wilson notes that there is always a tension in political discourse between politicians' aims to gain allegiance and support for their actions and their desire to evade full responsibility for potentially unpopular decisions or courses of action (Wilson 1990: 50).

References to others. Just as pronominal and other sorts of references to self play a major role in constructing identity in discourse, references to others carry out much of the work of negotiating power relations. Wilson showed how politicians have particular styles in this regard, based on their own pronominal scales. For example, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher often used "those who…" as a distancing strategy to designate political opponents, often in contrast with a "we who" calculated to include speaker and addressees. Wilson pointed out that the unnamed opponents also can be linked in a text with named persons or groups, generating a deniable pejorative implicature that associates the two (Wilson 1990: 68). In Chapter 5, I will discuss how the discursive positioning of others helps to depict power relations.

This, that, and the other: "Homeland Deixis." As the quote from Billig above argues, the small, overlooked words of political discourse do important work in carrying out actions including (but not limited to) identity construction.

Billig focuses on the problem of national identity and how it is constructed and reinforced ("flagged") in public discourse daily, largely through the use of unremarkable phrases such as "the nation," "the Prime Minister," "here," etc., which he refers to as "homeland deixis." I will try to show how such words in my selected texts construct and reinforce a certain image of reality and from there how the speaker constructs an identity by situating him/herself within the constructed reality. Billig also points out that opponents within a political system often participate, wittingly or not, in this construction of the nation, an issue I will take up in more detail in Chapter 5:

> In order for the political argument to take place within the nation, there must be elements which are beyond argument. Different factions may argue about how "we" should think of "ourselves" and what is to be "our" national destiny. In so doing they will take for granted the reality of "us," the people in its national place…In the rhetoric of established nationalism, there is a *topos* beyond argument. (Billig 1995: 96)

Interdiscursivity

Just as those who produce an instance of discourse may use pronouns or definite articles as part of constructing identities, they may appropriate excerpts from instances of discourse or texts previously produced by others or themselves. Variously called polyvocality, dialogicality, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and appropriation, the core idea put forward by Bakhtin, Goffman, Fairclough, Scollon, and others is that no human text is completely original but rather each is a connection in a string of texts. Scollon points out that a text appropriated for mediated social action brings with it the conventionalizations of social practice of its previous history, which then are modified by its use in a new text (Scollon 1998: 15). In some cases the older, appropriated text may be made explicit (e.g., a newspaper commentary that quotes from a Mubarak speech), in some cases the older text may be implicit but discernable (e.g., Casablanca declaration language employed in an Egyptian political petition), and in many cases it may be unclear which texts a new text draws on. In any event, the point is to discover how participants in producing a text use interdiscursivity – associating themselves with or disassociating themselves from other texts – to forge their public identities and to position themselves and others.

Hidden polemic. Bakhtin described a form of interdiscursivity he termed hidden polemic in part by contrasting it with overt polemic, which refers directly to another's discourse and refutes it. In hidden polemic, by contrast, "discourse

is directed toward an ordinary referential object, naming it, portraying, expressing, and only indirectly striking a blow at the other's discourse" (Bakhtin 1984: 196). Thus participants in political discourse may address a certain subject – say, democracy – and in so doing attempt to strike indirect blows at the discourse of other participants. Bakhtin differentiated between hidden polemic and what he called "hidden dialogicality" (1984: 197), in which the response to another's discourse is not necessarily a hostile one, but still the other's discourse remains obscured, akin to listening to one end of a telephone conversation. The telephone example alone is an excellent overall argument on behalf of the sort of approach to political discourse I am advocating, for surely if we could find out something about what the unheard party were saying we would have greater insight into the significance of the conversation. So too, for example, if we could find out that those who produced a given text were responding to criticism or initiatives (whether from inside or outside the community of practice), we would comprehend the text differently.

It is not particularly surprising that political discourse indirectly addresses the discourse of other speakers, but Bakhtin added other insights. First, in either hidden polemic or hidden dialogicality, the hidden voice of the other speaker is present in some form in the new instance of discourse and plays a central role in determining the tone, structure, and meaning of the new instance: "each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another speaker" (Bakhtin 1984: 197). Second, hidden polemic is by no means confined to digs and barbs at others, but also includes speech that constrains itself in expectation of a hostile response, "speech with a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like. Such speech literally *cringes* in the presence or the anticipation of someone else's word, reply, objection" (Bakhtin 1984: 196; emphasis mine). Here the implications of hidden polemic for power relations – or, to put it differently, the impact of power relations on shaping political discourse – start to broaden. In addition, there is the issue of why dialogicality would be hidden rather than open (why not just name the rival or critic or supporter in question?) and what the decision to conceal the addressed discourse says about power relations.

Frames

Frames, also known as schemata or scripts, are "structures of expectation" (Tannen 1979, after R. N. Ross) that a speaker evokes for him/herself and other participants in discourse. Linguistic devices such as omission, repetition, false

starts, backtracking, hedges and qualifiers, negatives, contrastive connectives, modals, inexact statements, generalizations, inferences, evaluative language, interpretation, moral judgment, incorrect statements, and additions are indicators of frames operating in discourse (Tannen 1979: 166). I will be interested in how the evoked frames reflect what the speaker is trying to do via the discourse, as opposed to how they reflect who the speaker is or how he/she thinks, again, more a pragmatic than a sociolinguistic approach. As with the small words of deixis, such linguistic devices in discourse indicate that the speaker is attempting evoke discursively a certain picture of reality. In Chapter 5 I will discuss how those pictures of reality replicate or challenge existing power relations.

Working in Arabic and English

Applying the methodology to Arabic discourse

It should be clear from the discussion above that the sort of discourse analysis I will do in this book differs methodologically from what has been done before, and that I am drawing on methods that have been used primarily in European languages (and in Chinese by Scollon). Most of the linguistic tools can be applied to Arabic with relative ease, taking into consideration that the analyst must have a sense of what sort of usages are typical and atypical in Arabic.

Take, for example, the analysis of pronouns as deictical expressions. The inventory of Arabic independent pronouns is larger than that of English, as in Modern Standard Arabic there are feminine forms for the second person and the third person plural, plural forms for the second person, and dual forms for the second and third persons. See Table 2 below.

Arabic object and possessive pronouns follow a similar system and are used in essentially a similar way as they are in English. One difference between Arabic and English is that person reference is marked on verb forms, making the

Table 2. Comparative inventory of Arabic and English subject pronouns

	Arabic			**English**	
	singular	**dual**	**plural**	**singular**	**plural**
1st person	*anaa*		*naHnu*	I	we
2nd person	*anta/anti*	*antumaa*	*antum/antunna*	you	you
3rd person	*huwa/hiya*	*humaa*	*hum/hunna*	he/she	they

use of an independent pronoun with a verb unnecessary (though the pronoun is sometimes added for emphasis).

Regarding other forms of deixis, particularly use of the definite article *al-* ("the"), applying research done in languages such as English (for example, Billig's work on *homeland deixis*) to analyze Arabic texts requires some adjustment but is potentially rewarding. Speakers of Arabic employ the definite article *al-* differently from the way speakers of English employ "the." In English, a singular noun may be used with the indefinite article "a," the definite article "the," or no article at all: "a reform," "the reform," "reform," the latter of which refers to a general category or concept. Arabic, on the other hand, has no indefinite article, and uses no article at all to indicate indefiniteness. Thus an Arabic noun without an article is indefinite and one with the definite article may refer either to a specific instance or a general category: *iSlaaH* ("a reform"), *al-iSlaaH* ("the reform" or "reform"). Wright's grammar of Arabic distinguishes between these two uses of the definite article, which are called *laam al-9ahd* ("the definite article of knowledge," i.e., the article employed to indicate a specific thing or person) and *laam al-jins* ("the definite article of genus," i.e., the article employed to indicate a category) (Wright 1977: 269).

Regarding how speakers of Arabic may manipulate the usage of the definite article for pragmatic purposes, consider an example from the texts selected for this study:

1. The title of Hala Mustafa's November 30, 1999 column ***Al-diimuqraaTiyya*** *wa dawlat al-mu'assasaat* ("**Democracy** and the institutionalized state")

In example 1, *diimuqraaTiyya* plus the definite article *al-* clearly refers to the concept designated by the English noun (without article) "democracy." Without the article, *diimuqraaTiyya* would mean "a democracy," meaning a single indefinite instance rather than the general category.

2. The title of the petition by opposition groups as published September 3, 1999 in *al-Shaab* newspaper *nidaa' min ajl* ***al-iSlaaH*** *al-siyaasii wa al-dustuurii fii miSr* ("Petition on behalf of political and constitutional **reform** in Egypt")

3. Lines 37–38 of the same petition, calling for ***iSlaaH*** *siyaasii wa dustuurii ji<u>dh</u>rii* ("**a** radical political and constitutional **reform"**)

Example 2 is similar to 1; the definite noun *al-iSlaaH* corresponds to the concept designated in English by the noun (without article) "reform." In example 3, however, usage of the indefinite *iSlaaH* ("a reform") calls to mind the category of "reform" but discursively minimizes the size of the reform demanded by

omitting the definite article. In Chapter 5, I suggest that the petition's repeated (though not entirely consistent) choice of indefinite nouns to express demands has the cumulative effect of making those demands sound less emphatic and less concrete than they might otherwise be.

The point here is that speakers of Arabic, like speakers of other languages, are likely to exploit pragmatically choices such as whether or not to attach the definite article *al-* ("the") to certain nouns or noun phrases in order to accomplish social interactional work, e.g., in this case to replicate existing power relations by mitigating demands made in a political petition. Examining such a phenomenon in discourse requires that the linguist be familiar with the idiomatic usage of such expressions and alert to patterns and variations. The aim is not to seek the rare or unusual usage, but to be sensitive to how normal, everyday variations may be used to carry out the social functions of the discourse.

One more note on the definite article: Arabic, unlike English, has a construction called the Idafa construct, a pair or string of nouns in which there is a relationship of belonging, e.g., *ra'iis al-jumhuuriyya* ("the president of the republic"). All terms in the Idafa construct are considered definite if the last term bears the definite article; note than in the example only *jumhuuriyya* is prefaced by *al-*, but both terms are definite, i.e., "*the* president of *the* republic."

Translating and transliterating

All transcription is according to the system laid out in Appendix A, and all translations are my own (except in a few cases where the author of the text provided his/her own translation, which are noted). Generally I have tried to translate into idiomatic English, but in some cases I have provided a more literal gloss in order to show fully a linguistic feature under discussion. In a few cases where I considered the literal gloss awkward, it is shown following the idiomatic translation, for example: "to liberate political life from restrictions from which it suffers (lit: from that from which it suffers among restrictions)."

Readers also should be aware of some differences between the treatment of written and spoken Arabic instances of discourse in this study. Spoken excerpts are triple-processed: transcribed in Arabic, transliterated into Latin script (reflecting the actual pronunciation as heard on tape), and then translated into English, all of which appears in the appendices. Written texts are only transcribed in Arabic and translated, as written texts typically are not transliterated. For the purpose of displaying examples in my analysis, however, I will transliterate phrases from spoken excerpts into the Latin alphabet as necessary so that the reader can see morphological features such as verb conjugation (indicating

pronominal choice) and the definite article. When dealing with the definite article I will observe the convention of showing *al-* as written in transcribing written texts, and will show all words in pause form (without final vowels showing case endings). In transcribing oral excerpts, however, I reflect the article as heard. In Modern Standard Arabic pronunciation, the consonant /l/ in *al-* is assimilated to the first consonant of the word it modifies if that consonant is /t/, /th/, /d/, /dh/, /r/, /z/, /s/, /sh/, /S/, /D/, /T/, /DH/, or /n/. Thus the newspaper name cited as *al-Shaab* would be pronounced *ash-sha9b*. In addition, the initial vowel in *al/* is unstable and may be changed or deleted in pronunciation depending on what precedes it.

In this study I will abide by English-language conventions for spelling names of Arabic proper names, including those of newspapers and political parties, such as *al-Ahram*, rather than transcribing them accurately, which would yield *al-ahraam*. As regards *al-Ahram* specifically, the Arabic-language daily newspaper *al-Ahram* is at the center of a massive government-owned publishing establishment that produces newspapers, magazines, and books in Arabic and foreign languages, as well as a prestigious think tank, the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. I will italicize *al-Ahram* only when referring specifically to the daily newspaper.

One final note is that the excerpts of spoken discourse are transcribed *as heard* on the videotapes. In some cases speakers of Arabic will note errors in case endings or unexpected vowels, such as *muSr* instead of *miSr* or *maSr* ("Egypt"). I made no attempt to "correct" such features, preferring to reflect pronunciation as heard.

Numbering of examples

There are two ways in which examples are given. Short examples, generally involving one or a few words, are cited within the paragraphs of my analysis, with the transcribed Arabic in italics, followed by an English translation within quotes inside parentheses, for example: *al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii* ("political reform"). Longer examples, involving excerpts of more than a few words, are numbered and separated from the text by a carriage return, with the Arabic text first, followed below by an English translation, for example:

C.1.a) 2 *la-qad kaana **9tiqaadii** d-daa'im…*
my belief has always been…

When there is some linguistic feature to which I wish to draw particular attention in an example, both the Arabic transcription and its English equivalent of the feature are shown in bold face.

There are four components to the numbering system for examples. First there will be an upper case letter indicating in which Appendix the example being cited may be found. Second will be a numeral indicating what part of that Appendix contains the example. Third will come a lower case letter indicating where the example falls in the series of examples from that Appendix in the chapter so far. Last will be numerals indicating the line numbers within the Appendix where the example can be found. Thus an example numbered "C.1.a) 2" means that the example may be found in Appendix C.1, beginning at line 2, and that it is the first (a) example from that Appendix in the chapter so far. I apologize in advance for any confusion this system causes. It is intended to allow the reader to locate any example in the appendices quickly.

Chapter 3

Situating the Discourse

In the introduction to this study, the key questions I proposed to address in looking at instances of discourse about democracy were (1) *what* those who produced the discourse were trying to accomplish, and (2) *how* those functions were carried out via language. This chapter gives my findings on the first question.

First, I will give a brief historical background to the events and interactions behind the data, intended primarily for readers who are unfamiliar with the contemporary political situation in Egypt. Second, I will draw on the ethnographic data to discuss communities of practice, social practices, and interactions behind each instance of discourse, and will draw some preliminary conclusions about key social functions performed by the discourse. Third, I will summarize and compare functions across the various instances of discourse.

Broad historical context of data

In this section I will attempt to situate the data in terms of the broad context of contemporary Egyptian political history. There are of course many ways in which to view the history and politics of any nation or people, and my choices are admittedly subjective. My intention is to depict the political backdrop of 1999–2000 against which I see the more specific social interactions that produced the instances of discourse under study as unfolding, and to provide a brief general background for readers who are unfamiliar with recent Egyptian history. One theme that emerged as I composed this section was of two competing stories of democracy in Egypt in the 1990s: a story (promulgated by the government and its supporters in the intellectual elite) of slow but steady *progress* along the path of democratization versus a story (promulgated by human rights activists and supporters of opposition political groups) of slow but steady *deterioration* in political and civil liberties.

Demography and economy

In 1999–2000, Egypt was a nation of over 64 million people, with nearly all the population clustered in the Nile Valley. About one-third of the population

lived or worked in the capitol city of Cairo, and most elite political activity took place there. For this reason I will mostly describe social interactions that took place in Cairo, with the exception of a few that took place in the coastal city of Alexandria, a traditional summer escape for the elite.

Egypt's formal economy was still primarily a government-dominated one in 1999–2000, though a long-term process of liberalization begun in the 1970s had increased the share of private industry. President Mubarak undertook significant and controversial macroeconomic reforms in the 1990s (particularly after the United States forgave Egypt's debt following the Gulf War) in cooperation with the World Bank as part of efforts to improve Egypt's competitiveness for direct foreign investment. In addition there was a large informal sector of the economy and of political life, manifested in extensive social and distributional networks based on family and neighborhood relationships (see Singerman 1995, 1996).

Government

During the period covered by this study, the Egyptian elite body politic was dominated by a strong presidency, as it had been since the Free Officers' Revolution of 1952 unseated King Faruq. In September 1999 Muhammad Husni Mubarak was confirmed for a fourth six-year term as president in an uncontested referendum, having been in office since his predecessor Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981. Although there was some discussion among Egyptian intellectuals and opposition politicians about the need for term limits, the 71-year old Mubarak was physically and mentally fit and generally considered a capable leader.

Mubarak, Sadat, and Gamal Abd al-Nasser all were military officers but of the three Mubarak had the most successful military career, having risen through the ranks to become Chief of the Air Force, Egypt's most prestigious branch of the armed services. Those I interviewed for this study often cited Mubarak's military background as explaining the president's behavior and style. One Egyptian journalist known for his astute observations of the political scene quipped: "Mubarak runs the country like an air base; every pilot has to have a signed slip of paper to take off."

During the course of my interviews, several Egyptian intellectuals mentioned that they believed Mubarak to be sincere in a general sense about democratization, but that his thinking on the subject remained rooted in experiences of the late 1960s and 1970s. Abd al-Nasser began to distance himself from one-party rule after it was discredited upon Egypt's defeat by Israel in

the 1967 war, and Sadat (who succeeded upon Abd al-Nasser's death in 1970) emphasized institution-building and restored limited pluralism beginning in 1974. Sadat, however, thought of the democratization process "as his own initiative and domain of action, to be (un)regulated as he saw fit" (Korany 1998: 50). As criticism of the peace treaty with Israel and other policies mounted, Sadat sharply curtailed political liberties in 1981 and shortly thereafter was assassinated by an Islamic extremist. A prominent scholar affiliated with the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies told me he believed Mubarak saw himself as continuing the gradual transition from one-party rule to institutionalized rule begun by his two predecessors, while fostering greater stability than they did by "ingeniously centering himself, positioning himself so as not to look too autocratic, in touch with both the right and the left."

Another way in which Mubarak encouraged political stability was by changing his cabinet far less often than his two predecessors had done. He did bring in a new cabinet headed by Atif Ubayd in October 1999, apparently responding to widespread criticism of economic suffering (including a foreign currency crisis) associated with reform measures carried out by the previous cabinet headed by Kamal Ganzuri.

Political life

The Egyptian parliament consisted of a lower house (*maglis al-shaab*, "People's Council") with 454 members, 444 elected and ten appointed, and an upper house (*maglis al-shuura,* "Consultative Council") with 264 members, 176 elected and eighty-eight appointed. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for autumn 2000, a factor that motivated and colored discussions of democracy in 1999–2000. The lower house in office during the period of this study suffered from low credibility among the elite due to suspicions of a greater-than-usual dose of government rigging in the 1995 elections. Only thirteen of the deputies elected in 1995 came from opposition parties, the remainder being either from Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) or independents (many of them affiliated with the NDP in one way or another).

Although by March 2000 there were fifteen legal political parties in Egypt, only a few commanded any significant following, and other political forces with significant followings were denied legal status under the Political Parties Law of 1977 that mandated (among other conditions) that a party must have a political platform different from all others and must not be religious in nature. Aside from the NDP, parties included the centrist Wafd (the most powerful party before 1952), the Arab Nasserists, the leftist Tagammu, and the

Labor Party.[1] Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat Party (representing younger, moderate Islamists) were denied legality, as was the Communist Party. The Emergency Law, a major curb on political activity, had been in place since 1981 and was renewed for another three years in Spring 2000. A veteran journalist closely connected to the government told me – as part of his argument against rapid democratization – that he considered all the political parties irrelevant because "the two real political forces in this country are the military and the Muslim Brotherhood."

Civil society

In addition to the Emergency Law, other laws passed in the 1990s had a significant impact on democracy-related issues. In 1993 a new Syndicate Law increased government regulation of professional syndicates in an effort to prevent their domination by Islamists. Press Law 93 of 1995 stiffened penalties for journalists convicted of libel; journalists and human rights activists often cited it in my conversations with them as a step backward for freedom of expression. At the same time, the fact that Egyptian journalists resisted the law strongly and eventually persuaded Mubarak to modify it proved that the press was among the more powerful institutions in Egypt. In 1999–2000 the Egyptian press was a large and complicated institution; many publications were government-funded, some were licensed by the government but represented opposition political forces or were politically independent, and still others were licensed outside of Egypt but functioned effectively inside the country. All publications were subject to government censorship, though censorship generally was not as heavy-handed as it had been during the Abd al-Nasser and Sadat eras. As a former managing editor of *al-Ahram* newspaper told me, "Sadat used to call at noon every day to ask what the headlines were for the next day, and to change them if he didn't like them. The censor was right there in the room with us. Now it is nothing like that." Nonetheless self-censorship by journalists and publications was widespread, partly due to fear of lawsuits.

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1. The Labor Party, a socialist party created by Sadat in the mid-1970s, formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1980s. The party's newspaper *al-Shaab* became pro-Islamist and featured regular writings by leading figures in the Muslim Brotherhood. In May 2000 the Political Parties Committee of the Maglis al-Shuura "froze" the party and withdrew *al-Shaab's* publication licence after a struggle for the party's leadership erupted. The struggle was widely believed to have been instigated by the government as punishment for *al-Shaab's* role in fomenting student demonstrations at al-Azhar University over a novel (considered blasphemous by Islamists) that was reprinted by the Ministry of Culture.

Another law that helped shape discourse on democracy in 1999–2000 was the non-governmental organizations (NGO) law, proposed by the government in spring 1999 to regulate the activities (particularly fund-raising) by non-governmental organizations. After vociferous protest by foreign and local NGOs and foreign governments, the law was amended somewhat and passed in June of 1999; then in June 2000 the Egyptian Supreme Court declared the NGO law unconstitutional on procedural grounds. (The People's Assembly passed a new version of the NGO law, harsher than the 1999 law in some respects, in June 2002.) In any case, one prominent human rights activist made the argument that "whatever the government says about democratization, the laws enacted since 1992 and government interference in elections tell you the real story." From his point of view "the real story" was one of deteriorating political and civil liberties, the exact opposite of the "continuing on the road to democracy" story being told in the discourse of President Mubarak and others in or close to government.

Specific social contexts of data

In this section I will present my findings from ethnographic research regarding the communities of practice, social practices, and specific social interactions that produced the Mubarak speech excerpts, September 1999 petition, and newspaper commentaries by two Egyptian intellectuals.

Mubarak speech excerpts

This section must begin by describing the difficulty of obtaining detailed information about how specific speeches articulated by President Mubarak were written. The community of practice was extremely small, busy, and not accustomed to sharing information about its practices with outsiders. Having worked with the staff of the U.S. Secretary of State helped me understand the strong pressures of time and confidentiality under which high-level government officials and their staffs work. It was difficult to obtain specific information about interactions behind certain speeches, and I had to extrapolate general information I gathered about the COP and its social practices more in this case than I did for the September petition or the writings by intellectuals, where the specific information about how the discourse was produced was less sensitive.

During my research I interviewed four people who had participated in writing speeches for President Mubarak. One was a high-ranking government

official who had extensive experience in speechwriting, one a prominent journalist reputed to be a long-time confidant of Mubarak's, and the other two were think-tank intellectuals with ties to the presidency. In addition, I interviewed a number of Egyptian intellectuals and civil rights activists who had interesting observations to make about Mubarak's statements on democracy, how they had evolved, and what functions they served. I struggled with what to do with this information from outsiders. I concluded in the end that it told me more about relations among different communities of practice or about how instances of Mubarak's discourse are appropriated by people in their own social interactions (both subjects that will be treated elsewhere in this study) than it told me about interactions inside Mubarak's own community of practice. Thus the following section is drawn entirely from my interviews with those who have actually participated in producing Mubarak's speeches. In a few cases I have included a particularly pithy quote from an outside observer (especially if the observation concerns some direct dealing with a member of the Mubarak establishment), but in every case it is labeled as information from the outside.

Community of practice behind the speeches. The community of practice (COP) that produced Mubarak's speeches in 1999–2000 was small and somewhat amorphous. There was no regular speechwriting staff, and several participants in the COP told me that Mubarak did not rely on one person to write his speeches, something of a change from earlier in the Mubarak era when Osama al-Baz (Political Advisor to the President) or Mustafa al-Fiqqi (a career diplomat who served as Secretary to the President for Information) used to handle all speeches.

In addition to the fact that the lead speechwriter differed from speech to speech, the number of contributors to any given speech had increased in the years leading up to 1999. According to a participant, "It used to be that one person wrote the speech from A to Z, but that is no longer the case." For each speech there was an overall coordinator responsible for principal drafting and for incorporating elements drafted by others. In many but not all cases al-Baz still played the coordinating role. In others, the President's son Gamal Mubarak, a senior official elsewhere in the government, or an outsider would coordinate. First Lady Suzanne Mubarak also played a role in guiding the President's public statements, particularly those made to foreign audiences. In two of the speeches I considered, non-government persons played the principal drafting/coordinating role; one was a prominent journalist, the other a prominent intellectual, both known and trusted in government circles.

The coordinator of a given speech often requested (in Mubarak's name) contributions to the speech from several people. Participants mentioned Economy Minister Yusuf Butrus Ghali as a regular contributor of language on his portfolio. On the issue of democracy, al-Baz on a number of occasions during 1999 solicited contributions from outside the government. As one occasional contributor noted, this diffuse process "makes it difficult to say who really wrote a speech. And it can lead to gaps and differences on issues between one speech and another."

President Mubarak himself played an active role in preparing his own speeches, according to an official with long experience in the COP. Early in the process, Mubarak would meet with the principal coordinator and sketch out the main themes or "headlines" of the speech. After the coordinator prepared a first draft, Mubarak would read and revise it, asking for more on one subject or another. Mubarak had strong preferences regarding style: "direct, simple language, no metaphors or rhetorical flourishes" according to one speechwriter. He liked clarity and disliked exaggeration, and was not given to the sort of cultural references, religious or secular quotations, and anecdotes that his predecessors (Abd al-Nasser and Sadat) used in their speeches.

Some outside observers told me that Mubarak's directness detracted from his ability to speak effectively without a script. In one anecdote recounted to me by an outsider, al-Baz reportedly asked a prominent mainstream journalist for advice about how to improve the President's public image (one of al-Baz's many duties). The journalist replied that the President should never speak off text, as his spontaneous remarks were often brusque to the point of being insulting, inviting insulting treatment of the President in return. My own comparison of videotapes and published texts, confirmed by a speechwriter, was that when delivering a speech, Mubarak adhered closely to the written text, making only a few, brief unscripted remarks on the margins.

Returning to the composition of the COP, in all cases it would seem that Mubarak himself and al-Baz must be considered to constitute the core COP responsible for his speech drafts, assisted by junior staff members who perform duties such as word processing and grammar checks. The President's wife and son Gamal also were part of this inner circle. In addition, during 1999 there were a few others (at least one other government official, a senior journalist, and one academician) who were called upon to perform principal drafting or coordination duties, and a number of others (again, sometimes inside government, often not) who were asked to contribute ideas or specific language for use in speeches and other public statements. All of these I will refer to as occasional

COP members, who were brought in to supplement the core COP for some time and then released.

Whether or not these occasional COP members were salaried government employees seemed to matter little to the core COP, but perceived loyalty to Mubarak and the party line was important. An academic who drafted one speech and provided ideas for several others in 1999 mentioned that he used to write regularly for Mubarak until 1987, when the academic called publicly for legalization of the Muslim Brotherhood: "Mubarak got angry and said to me 'I thought you were with us!' I think he thought I worked for him." It was more than ten years before al-Baz solicited input from the academic again.

The Mubarak speechwriting COP, while appearing to be isolated from the rest of the government in terms of its work, in fact was part of larger communities of practice, both inside the government and outside it. As will be shown below, factions within the Egyptian government (and outsiders allied with such factions) played a role in shaping discourse produced by the speechwriting COP. In addition to being part of a number of COPs within his own government, Mubarak himself participated in communities of practice on the international scene: two relevant COPs, for example, might be called "Arab heads of state" and "Arab heads of state enjoying a close relationship with the President of the United States." Each of these COPs had its own set of practices and interests, which Mubarak (perhaps more precisely the coordinator of any given speech, on Mubarak's behalf) tried to protect and further in the speech excerpts under consideration. (See Springborg 1989: 23–32, for a more detailed, though somewhat dated, discussion of Mubarak's political style.)

Social practices of the COP. Discussions with participants in the Mubarak speechwriting COP highlighted a number of typical social practices that helped shape President Mubarak's discourse on democracy during the summer and fall of 1999. First, as mentioned above, Mubarak himself played a central role in selecting the drafter of a speech and also spent time shaping and revising the draft. Speeches were put together in an ad hoc way by combinations of government officials and outsiders; one might even say that the speechwriting COP was reconfigured for each speech. Accordingly the role of the head speechwriter was relatively weak. While it might seem obvious that a head of state or senior official would take a major role in writing his own speeches, both Egyptian COP participants (based on their experience with Mubarak's predecessors) and I (based on my experience in the U.S. government, where senior officials had little time for writing or reviewing speeches and generally entrusted the task to a senior speechwriter) found it surprising. A former speechwriter for

Mubarak contrasted the present situation with the relationship between late Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the famous speechwriter and author Muhammad Hassanein Haykal saying "With Mubarak it's not like it was with Abd al-Nasser; when you heard Abd al-Nasser you were hearing Haykal, one hundred per cent."

Looking at COP members below Mubarak's level, a second social practice that flowed from the first was a tendency for COP members to focus strongly on the president and his perceived needs and preferences, sometimes to the exclusion of other factors. This focus sometimes caused them to be caught off guard by international reactions to the President's discourse, which was ironic as several COP members told me that they knew Mubarak cared about how his public statements were received on the international scene. An occasional contributor remarked "all those bureaucrats, they are like radar sets tuned to pick up only the President, so they often don't read what's going on in the outside world."

The third relevant social practice, soliciting language from outsiders on democracy (among other subjects), resulted from the first two. Outsiders understood that they were asked to contribute language or ideas on democracy because the core speechwriting COP believed Mubarak wanted to keep pace with a developing international discourse on the subject. An academic close to the government remarked that "democracy and civil society are 'en vogue' right now and they can't overcome this discourse," a sentiment echoed by a number of other participants and observers. In addition, several participants mentioned that COP members considered talk about democratization and related concepts (civil society, institution-building) to be reassuring to potential foreign investors. Mrs. Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak reportedly tried to serve as conduits to the international scene to some extent, and were believed to have more liberal views on democratization than some party and government officials.

Fourth, as in any government there were different factions within the Mubarak government and party (as well as outsiders who allied themselves with factions inside) that competed to have their ideas enshrined in the President's rhetoric. As one intellectual allied with younger, more liberal elements in the government put it: "If the President says it, then there is no need to defend ideas such as democracy, plurality, and human rights against those who say those ideas are only for the opposition." A Mubarak confidant who occasionally coordinates speeches told me that "There are many forces in the National Democratic Party trying to push Mubarak to preserve the status quo: 'Mr. President we have managed to encircle the Islamists but they are still dangerous. Egypt has many friends but also many enemies,' etc. Such people are organized, have solidarity,

and know each other, whereas those who defend democracy are divided." Mubarak reportedly occasionally expressed weariness with competing demands regarding democratization from inside and outside his government and party, and reacted with characteristic caution. The confidant mentioned above said "I have spoken to Mubarak about these things many times. He thinks he carries a heavy load. Often he says he cannot run with this load or he will fall."

Specific social interactions behind the speeches. A series of interactions between al-Baz and a non-government contributor to speeches in the spring and summer of 1999 illustrates some of the social practices mentioned above. In the spring of 1999, the government proposed a new law regulating the activities (especially fund-raising) of non-governmental organizations. According to the contributor, members of the speechwriting COP were taken aback when the new draft law caused an uproar both inside Egypt and outside: "I had to explain that the old Egyptian law was seen as a classic case of state strangling civil society, cited all over the world, so of course any change attracted international attention." Al-Baz reportedly was deeply concerned about how the flap over the law would affect Mubarak's visit to the United States planned for June 1999 and requested advice on how to manage the crisis. The outside contributor (the same one whose help had not been sought since he made a public remark in 1987 that was considered disloyal; see above) prepared, at al-Baz's request, press guidance on the NGO law and a speech for Mubarak to deliver in the United States, focusing on democracy and related themes. The contributor, who also solicited contributions from others, said his draft speech underwent significant revisions within the speechwriting COP and that "when I read the final version, I saw that I had written about 50 per cent of it."

The contributor said al-Baz was pleased with how these two texts helped to manage the NGO law crisis, and subsequently asked the contributor for a paper containing ideas on political reform. Al-Baz warned him not to "go wild" because "you know our President doesn't like anything drastic." The contributor thought that some of the ideas from the paper he submitted were incorporated into Mubarak's draft speech immediately following the September 1999 presidential referendum, but "then his people got to work on it and three or four weeks later he retreated." Mubarak's "people" in this case meant high-level members of the National Democratic Party.

Social functions of the speech excerpts. Let us return now to the overall question: What kind of work were members of the speechwriting COP trying to get done by addressing the subject of democracy as they did in the speeches under

consideration? Discussions with participants led me to conclude that principal functions included (1) construction of an agentive, pro-democracy public identity for Mubarak as he began a new term of office, an identity that was deemed helpful primarily in managing relations with the international community, and (2) discursive replication of the existing power structure regarding the domestic political playing field, intended both to elicit cooperation from non-governmental domestic political forces and to remind them that any political reform would be restricted and top-down.

In terms of identity construction, the COP was trying to construct an image of Mubarak as a leader who understands the international discourse on democracy and will make democratization a major policy emphasis in his fourth presidential term. When I asked COP participants why democracy was discussed at greater length in Mubarak's speeches in summer and fall 1999 (as compared, for example, to equivalent speeches a year earlier), three of the four participants mentioned Mubarak's desire to find a new mission for his fourth term. The image being constructed is of Mubarak leading Egypt on the path toward democracy. Egypt is a stable place, safe for foreign investors, a place where civil society and the role of institutions are gradually becoming more rooted in Egyptian political life. All of this is portrayed as a long process. A senior journalist and confidant of Mubarak's emphasized repeatedly during out conversation that the important thing was not how much democratization had taken place so far but the fact that "there is no going back."

Looking at the discursive replication of the power structure, it seems that via the excerpts on democracy under discussion the COP was trying to create a certain image of reality. The speech excerpts discursively position Mubarak in the center, time and again: the center of his own government, the center between the government and the people, the center of the Egyptian political spectrum. Related to this centering of Mubarak, the excerpts reinforce the image of a strongly centralized government as a desirable reality, and of democratization as a top-down process completely controlled by the government. In turn, those who complain about the process or pace are denigrated as ignorant or ungrateful dreamers. As the Mubarak confidant/sometime speechwriter said to me, "Those who are crying for the moon, saying we must have a Western-style democracy, let them wait. Please let us do it our own way."

September petition

The petition published by *al-Shaab* newspaper on September 3, 1999 (see full text and translation in appendix) was signed by the heads of four of Egypt's

legal opposition political parties: the Wafd, Tagammu (a.k.a. National Progressive Unionist Grouping), Arab Nasserist, and Labor Parties. Research into the petition's history revealed that it was drafted during the summer of 1999 by a group of four people, drawn from a larger "Preparatory Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform." The Committee's seventeen members included Egyptian human rights activists, members of political parties and groups (the Muslim Brotherhood and Communists, neither of which are legalized parties, in addition to the four signatory parties previously mentioned), and intellectuals. The drafters included two opposition party members, one human rights activist, and one prominent intellectual.

Communities of practice behind the petition. Recall that, according to anthropologists Lave and Wenger, a community of practice is "an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their communities" (Lave and Wenger 1991:98). The Committee that produced the petition can itself be considered a community of practice (COP), I will argue, but one nested within a complex set of other COPs. At the very center was a four-person drafting group, but I will not treat that group as a true COP as it apparently did not continue to exist as a body after completing the task of drafting the petition. The Committee, on the other hand, met regularly beginning in June 1999 (and continued to meet as of spring 2000) to accomplish jointly the specific, agreed-upon work of promoting political reform. The September petition constituted a sort of manifesto or opening statement for the committee. Thus I will refer to the Committee for Political and Constitutional Reform as the primary COP, the COP whose members' interactions were most directly responsible for producing the petition.

Members of the COP with whom I spoke knew who did and did not belong to the Committee, and who was allowed to speak for the Committee. At a February 23, 2000 political seminar organized by the committee, to which non-members were invited, the chair of a panel discussion intervened at one point during the discussion, beginning "Speaking on behalf of the Committee for Political and Constitutional Reform…." According to Lave and Wenger, COPs make it their business to perpetuate themselves via recruitment and apprenticeship, and that was also true of the Committee. Two members of the committee told me that they were looking to recruit more like-minded Egyptian intellectuals and activists, and that as of February 2000 membership had been expanded to twenty-three.

Members of the Committee divided themselves into three types of participants: human rights activists, representatives of political parties and groups,

and independent intellectuals (academics and journalists) known to have a strong interest in democracy issues. The first two types of participants can be considered as belonging to loosely-construed human rights and opposition political party COPs respectively, where members do similar work and occasionally work together. A more common social practice of both human rights groups and opposition parties, however, is to work separately or even at cross purposes from similar groups, which are viewed as rivals as well as potential collaborators. Occasional cooperation is short-lived and energies typically dissipate quickly. According to one participant with roots in the leftist party Tagammu, the seven opposition groups (five legal parties plus Muslim Brotherhood and Communists) have a coordination committee that meets but does not get much notice in the opposition newspapers: "Actually," he said, "that reflects the situation in the parties, where some members want to work with other parties and others do not." I will refer to the human rights community and opposition party community as secondary COPs in terms of their relation to the Committee and to the petition.

Academics and journalists sitting on the committee are more difficult to classify, especially as they were invited as individuals rather than as representatives of organizations to which they belong or for which they work. While they might be considered to belong to several communities of practice (university professors, think tank intellectuals, print journalists), those COPs seem to have been far less relevant to the social interactions that took place inside the Committee than were the secondary COPs of the human rights organizations and political parties. At no point during my interviews did any member of the Committee mention that a particular think tank or publication, for example, had played an important role in shaping the petition.

Another salient level of COPs within which the Committee is nested is composed of individual COPs corresponding to each human rights organization and political party or group represented on the committee. These I will call tertiary COPs, and social interactions inside them and among them were critical to the petition's production, as I hope the following discussion will illustrate. Tertiary COPs involved included opposition political groups (Wafd party, Tagammu party, Nasserist party, Labor party, Muslim Brothers, Communists) and human rights organizations (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Group for Democratic Development, Hisham Mubarak Center for Human Rights Legal Aid, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights).

Table 3 below illustrates the nested nature of the COPs. The drafting subcommittee was a temporary body drawn from the larger Committee. The Com-

Table 3. Communities of practice behind the September petition

	Drafting sub-committee		
Primary COP	Committee for political and constitutional reform		
Secondary COP	Human rights groups	Opposition parties	Intellectuals
Tertiary COP	1. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 2. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 3. Group for Democratic Development 4. Hisham Mubarak Center for Law	1. Wafd 2. Taggamu 3. Nasserists 4. Labor 5. Muslim Brothers 6. Communists	Individuals

mittee for Political and Constitutional Reform is the primary COP, whose social practices are most relevant to the petition's production. The Committee's seventeen members viewed themselves as belonging to three broad categories (human rights activists, political party members, intellectuals), at least two of which can be viewed as constituting loosely-construed secondary COPs, which I will refer to as the human rights COP and opposition COP. Each of the secondary COPs, in turn, is composed of individual organizations (e.g., the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies is part of the human rights COP, the Labor Party is part of the political parties COP) that can be considered as tertiary COPs in terms of their closeness to the process of producing the text. While the opposition parties fit fairly well into the definition of COPs, the human rights groups were a bit more ephemeral and centered on one person, as are many Egyptian organizations. Each of the human rights groups listed below consisted largely of one principal activist/organizer (who participated in the Committee), with a staff of a few researchers and/or attorneys and some clerical help.

While Table 3 divides participants in social interactions resulting in the petition's production into categories that I believe are meaningful, the divisions are by no means neat. Human rights activists, for example, often have roots (e.g., family connections, activism during university years) in opposition parties, and party members often have day jobs as academics, lawyers who take on human rights cases, or journalists. One intellectual interviewed had extremely strong credentials as a human rights activist. Although Committee organizers said they invited him to participate as an individual intellectual (he now works for a think tank not directly concerned with human rights), during the interview he

described himself in ways suggesting that he still felt a part of the human rights COP. Thus individuals often participate simultaneously in more than one of the secondary or tertiary communities of practice mentioned above (perhaps actively in one, peripherally in another), a factor that actually appeared to enhance their usefulness to the primary COP of the Committee.

Social practices of the COPs. The COP I will refer to as "the Committee" was formed in early June 1999 at the initiative of a group of human rights activists. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) organized the Committee with a view to producing a series of joint activities, beginning with producing the text that became the September petition. In a general sense, typical social practices of the Committee included meeting once or twice monthly to discuss political reform issues, to approve texts such as petitions or public statements, and to organize activities by member organizations such as public meetings and rallies.

Looking at the way the Committee was constructed reveals much about attitudes and tensions inside the Committee and between it and the secondary and tertiary COPs. For the human rights activists organizing the Committee, working directly and publicly with political parties was considered a risky new venture. First, participants in the human rights COP generally steer clear of such cooperation because they do not want to provide the government with evidence for its accusations that human rights groups are simply an arm of the political opposition. Second, human rights activists are extremely suspicious of the intentions regarding democratization of most participants in the opposition COP. One particularly cynical human rights activist participating in the COP said "the parties exist in a certain political space allotted to them; they are trapped in it and at the same time are afraid to lose it…the government and parties share an interest in perpetuating the status quo, as both the government and half the parties would be swept out of existence if there were real democracy."

A changing (deteriorating, from the point of view of activists) human rights situation in Egypt in 1998 and the spring of 1999 pushed the human rights activists to abandon the usual social practices of their COP and to initiate limited cooperation with other human rights activists and with opposition political parties. Several of the human rights activists interviewed described what one called a "growing sense of despair," a sense that the government was reasserting itself and decreasing the scope for human rights activities. The most obvious manifestation was the government's proposal of a new law regulating the activities of non-governmental organizations, a law that was passed by the parliament in June 1999. "There was a sense that there was no space for NGOs, political

parties, unions, etc. to work, that the whole system was rotten; all activities had to be licensed, regulated, restricted" said one participant.

In an attempt to mediate the threat of inviting members of the opposition COP into the Committee, the principal organizer said "we invited some specific people (*shaxSiyyaat,* "personalities") rather than letting the parties send representatives, choosing those we thought most sincerely interested in human rights and most able to work with others." Again another Committee participant put it bluntly: the opposition politicians who participated were those who were *mutahammishiin* ("marginalized") within their own parties due to their relatively liberal views on democracy and on cooperating with other parties. Marginalized though the opposition participants might be, the human rights activists tried to use them as effectively as possible, inviting them as "individuals" but then expecting them to act as advocates for the Committee within the tertiary level COPs of their parties. According to a Committee member, "it was understood that they were participating as individuals rather than as official representatives, and that it would be their jobs to go back to their parties and gain support for the petition."

In fact, in organizing the Committee COP, human rights activists tried to manipulate the presumed weakness and self-interest of the opposition parties to the advantage of the new Committee. According to the principal organizer, "the [opposition] parties are not participating in a whole-hearted manner but will use their participation as a tool in their negotiations with the government. If they get something out of the government, they will drop their participation in the Committee. All of this is no surprise to us; we know how they operate." Although organizers were trying to exploit the parties' presumed bad faith, it also was a continuing worry for members of the Committee. A human rights attorney on the Committee said "we need to broaden the committee further because the parties are incapable of bringing about any kind of change. If they control the process it will become simply a matter of bargaining between them and Mubarak over how many seats they will get [in the 2000 parliamentary elections]." It was a disappointment, but not a surprise, for members of the Committee that by May 2000 some of the political groups (including the troubled Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood) were no longer participating in Committee activities.

In addition to the cynicism with which human rights activists regard the opposition parties in general, it appears that another of the social practices of the Committee was to provide a forum for members of secondary or tertiary COPs to criticize other COPs directly. During a February 23, 2000 Committee

seminar that I attended, three participants rose during the discussion period to accuse opposition parties of complicity in a rigged electoral system; in the words of one journalist "The opposition parties are not just window-dressing in this political system but even worse; they are partners in the game." Several participants also accused the parties of being undemocratic in their internal practices. A panel member from the Tagammu party defended his party against the charge of being undemocratic, but neither he nor other panel members denied their parties' complicity in rigging. While participants who made the charges might not have been members of the Committee, the fact that such people were invited to the gathering suggests that the organizers (again CIHRS, part of the human rights COP) did not mind seeing their Committee partners from the opposition COP squirm. Lave and Wenger note that members of communities of practice, while engaging in social practices aimed at joint production of some kind, may well "have different interests, make diverse contributions to activity, and hold varied viewpoints" (Lave and Wenger 1991: 98).

Specific social interactions producing the petition. As mentioned above, organizers of the Committee that produced the petition indicated that in early 1999 they were motivated by a perceived urgent need to address the larger political context of human rights, due largely to the government's proposal of a new law regulating and restricting activities by NGOs, and were actively debating whether to work directly with opposition parties. In April 1999, seventeen Egyptian human rights activists participated in the "First International Conference of the Arab Human Rights Movement," held in Casablanca, Morocco. According to the head of a NGO that funds human rights activities, "at Casablanca there was a desire to contextualize human rights, to reconnect them to the local context." The resulting Casablanca declaration says that "the necessity to preserve the non-partisan nature of the [human rights] movement and ensure its independence from political parties does not exclude a continuing dialogue with parties, aiming at cooperation to consolidate democratic transformation and respect for human rights" (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 1999: 13).

One of the authors of the Casablanca Declaration was an intellectual with strong human rights credentials, who confirmed that the Egyptian participants themselves contributed the idea of blessing cooperation between human rights and political groups. He said the idea had been debated by Egyptian activists since a conference in January 1994 – at which time he had strongly opposed it – and that before Casablanca a key group of activists debated the idea extensively and came up with the idea of "not really an alliance with political groups but a sort of joint platform" for action. The key concern of members of the

human rights COP, according to a paper submitted to a conference in Autumn 1999 by one participant, was "how to stand in the forefront of the struggle for democracy, be a dynamic factor in everyday politics with the aim of improving the structural conditions of human rights, without however being implicated in the agenda of a specific political party or ideology or that of an alliance of political parties" (Hassan 1999: 5).

After returning to Egypt from Casablanca, in May 1999 four human rights groups put out a joint statement entitled *miSr tataTTalla9 ilaa iSlaaH diimuqraaTii jidhrii* ("Egypt aspires to radical democratic reform"), which human rights COP members described as the first time several groups had managed to cooperate to produce a joint statement. According to one of the activists involved, "afterward there were discussions that the five demands were not just those of human rights groups," and participants resolved to draw in new members from other communities of practice.

Members of the Committee mentioned several documents as antecedents to the September petition: a December 1997 statement on democracy issued by opposition parties, the April 1999 Casablanca Declaration, and the May 1999 statement by human rights groups. All deal with the subject of democracy and political reform:

- The December 1997 statement, as published by the opposition newspaper *al-Wafd* on December 12, 1997 (p. 3), is a rambling text of some 3300 words to which seven political groups (the Wafd, Tagammu, Liberals, Labor, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, and Communists) agreed, basically the same political groups represented in the 1999 petition with the exception of the nearly-defunct Liberal Party. Several members of the Committee participated in the two-day conference resulting in the statement, but participants from the human rights COP ascribed authorship of the 1997 statement clearly to the political groups and did not consider it a joint effort. The 1997 statement calls repeatedly for *al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii wa al-diimuqraaTii* ("political and democratic reform").
- The April 1999 Casablanca Declaration was adopted by the First International Conference of the Arab Human Rights Movement, held at Casablanca, Morocco April 23–25, 1999. Several of the members of the Egyptian delegation to the conference helped to form the "Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform" that issued the September 1999 petition. The Declaration lists *al-niDaal min ajl al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("struggle on behalf of democracy") first among the responsibilities of Arab human

rights groups, and its list of priorities for action by such groups parallels closely the list in the September 1999 petition (CIHRS 1999, 13).

- The May 1999 statement issued by four Egyptian human rights organizations (Group for Democratic Development, CIHRS, Hisham Mubarak Center for Human Rights Legal Aid, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights) is entitled *miSr tataTTalla9 ilaa iSlaaH diimuqraaTii jidhrii* ("Egypt Aspires to Radical Democratic Reform"). The statement uses the immediate crisis of the draft law on non-governmental associations (passed by the parliament in June 1999) to make larger points, listing five priorities for reform.

Comparing the three antecedent texts with the September 1999 petition, it is immediately obvious that the petition is the shortest: 250 words, half the length of the May 1999 statement and less than one-tenth of the December 1997 statement. It is also significantly shorter than the Casablanca declaration (roughly 3400 words), but is not directly comparable as the declaration also deals with many subjects beyond democracy and Egypt.

Among the Casablanca (April 1999), May 1999, and September 1999 statements the list of priorities overlap: all list five elements including lifting emergency laws. The difference is that (as seen in Table 4 below), as the list of priorities progresses from Casablanca (April) through the May statement to the September 1999 petition the list becomes increasingly political in tone, suggesting that the Egyptian human rights activists were deliberately raising the political profile of their work as part of the same process that led them to organize the "Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform."

The December 1997 statement's list of priorities contains many of the same elements as does the September 1999 petition (emergency law, elections, parties, press) but they are organized differently. There are ten principal priorities, some having as many as nine sub-priorities listed beneath them in a text of over 3300 words. (The drafter of the September petition mentioned above may also have

Table 4. Human rights priorities as listed in texts

Casablanca declaration (April 1999)	**Human rights statement** (May 1999)	**September petition** (September 1999)
Torture	Emergency law	Emerg. law, detentions
Emergency laws	Unions/syndicates	Elections
Detention	Press	Political parties
Judiciary	Parties	Press
Legal reform	Torture	Unions, civil society

had the 1997 statement in mind when he mentioned brevity as a goal.) So, while the need to draw in political parties may have driven human rights activists in a more overtly political direction, the political parties may have been persuaded by the human rights activists to abandon their everything-but-the-kitchen-sink style in favor of a more concise list of priorities.

Having noted that the September petition has a more politicized list of priorities than the antecedent documents, it may be considered surprising that it uses the word *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") less frequently than the antecedents. *Al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") or *diimuqraaTii* ("democratic") appears 22 times (out of roughly 3300 words) in the 1997 statement, three times (out of roughly 150 words in the section laying out priorities for human rights groups) in the April 1999 Casablanca Declaration, six times (out of 535 words) in the May 1999 statement, and only once (out of 255 words) in the September petition. Moreover the 1997 and May 1999 statements use *diimuqraaTii* ("democratic") in their titles and in their key demands – "political and democratic reform" (December 1997 statement) and "radical democratic reform" (May 1999 statement) – whereas the September 1999 petition calls for "political and constitutional reform." Members of the human rights COP decided deliberately to shift away from using *al-diimuqraaTiyya* for reasons related to the power struggle between them and opposition politicians, an issue that I will explore in more detail in Chapter 5.

Drafting the petition was not particularly difficult, according to several participants, because the petition "clearly was intended to cover points of agreement, not to resolve differences." The drafters deliberately kept the petition at a high level of generality, mentioning for example "constitutional reform" without going into detail about what kind of reform; previous discussions on the constitution foundered on the question of the place of Islamic law. An intellectual on the Committee said that the main points he pushed for in the petition were lifting the emergency law, term limits for the president, and "our willingness to submit to a gradualist approach." Two participants mentioned that the only problem in getting Committee agreement was with the last paragraph of the petition, which calls for transformation of Egypt into a *jumhuuriyya barlamaaniyya* ("parliamentary republic"), an idea that conflicts with the agenda of Islamist groups (who seek an Islamic republic). "In the end, agreement on that paragraph was political, not ideological," according to a Committee member, i.e., the Islamists signed off on the paragraph because it was politically expedient to do so, not because they agreed with it in principle (more on this below).

Once the petition draft was written and vetted within the Committee, participants from the opposition COP were charged with persuading party heads to sign it. The party heads apparently made significant changes to the draft petition, adding or deleting entire phrases and sentences. In addition, members of the opposition COP seem to have been eager to take credit for the petition. "There is a bit of jealousy in the parties' attitude toward the human rights groups; they don't want to give over the issue of democracy to us altogether," said the Committee's organizer, a human rights activist. Although the Committee was drawn from the three parts of the COP, when the petition was published both the parties and the government (via their respective newspapers) attributed not only principalship but also sole authorship to the parties; the *al-Shaab* newspaper article accompanying the text, for example, makes no mention of participation by those not belonging to the opposition COP. (Human rights groups also promulgated the petition on their own. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, for example, published the petition in its newsletter *Sawasia*, but such publications reach a much smaller audience than the opposition newspapers.) The human rights organizer of the Committee acknowledged wearily that such a move by the parties was not agreed upon in the Committee, although "we knew once the parties got their hands on it, they would do as they liked with it." One Committee member suggested that portraying the petition as solely an opposition product served both the parties' desire to claim credit for the effort and the government's desire to discredit it.

The Labor Party – the only legal pro-Islamist party as of September 1999, and therefore the party (along with the illegal Muslim Brotherhood) whose ideology was least compatible with the *jumhuuriyya barlamaaniyya* ("parliamentary republic") vision put forward in the petition – was the last to sign the petition, vacillating over period of a couple of days. An article accompanying the published text of the petition in the Labor Party newspaper *al-Shaab* adopts a defensive tone in explaining the delay, saying it was due merely to bureaucratic procedures within the party and not to any internal disagreement, as reportedly claimed by the leftist newspaper *al-Ahaali* (*al-Shaab* newspaper, September 3, 1999, p. 1). Two explanations for Labor's decision to sign on to the petition by (non-Labor party) Committee members involved allegations that party chief Ibrahim Shukri was bargaining with the Egyptian government either on (1) the number of parliamentary seats Labor might be permitted to take in the 2000 parliamentary election or (2) the arrest on suspicion of slander of *al-Shaab* newspaper editor Magdy Hussein in mid-August 1999. Both explanations suggest that Shukri delayed signing at first because he did not want to interfere

with the negotiations, but was disappointed with the government's offers to him and decided that joining forces with non-Islamists by signing on to this "radical discourse" (in the words of a participant) was an appropriate response. Whether true or not, such explanations reveal the deep cynicism among human rights COP members about opposition COP members.

The signed petition was published in opposition newspapers and circulated for signatures. Estimates of those who signed varied widely among members of the Committee to whom I spoke; some said 200, others as many as 600. Committee members told me there was no public reaction to the petition from the government, nor was one expected. Members of the Committee claimed that behind the scenes, however, Mubarak put pressure on political parties not to follow through on agreed-upon activities in the weeks between the petition's signing and the September 25 presidential referendum. The Wafd canceled a planned rally, for example, while Tagammu did what human rights activists considered an extremely poor job of organizing an eve-of-the-referendum rally (party leaders themselves failed to show up), which one Committee member attributed to Tagammu's reluctance to "embarrass the President."

Despite continuing tensions among members of different secondary and tertiary COPs, the Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform continued to meet as of spring 2000, having set an agenda for 2000 of focusing first on efforts to lift the emergency law and second on parliamentary elections. On February 23, 2000 I attended one of the Committee activities open to invited non-members, a seminar on elections held at CIHRS offices in Garden City. Five panelists and a chair (all men aged roughly forty to sixty-five) representing various opposition political groups made oral presentations, some on their personal experiences as alleged victims of election-rigging, others on what needed to be done to repair the system. Then the chair opened the floor for discussion, at which point members of the audience (women and men, ranging in age from twenty to sixty, but mostly appearing to be in their twenties and thirties) took turns standing and delivering impassioned speeches about the injustice of the government/National Democratic Party (NDP) and the fecklessness of the opposition parties. There was little response from panelists, though a panelist from Tagammu defended his party against charges of undemocratic internal procedures. The chair also contradicted the assertion that opposition parties bargain directly with the NDP to obtain seats in rigged elections, apparently leaving open the possibility that bargaining is less direct and/or takes place with government rather than party officials. At the same meeting, the chair circulated for signatures another petition to President Mubarak, requesting that he drop

charges against Hafez Abu Sa'da, the Secretary General of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, who was charged with violating a military decree forbidding accepting foreign contributions without official permission.[2]

Social functions of the petition. The petition is an excellent example of why it is often more enlightening to view an instance of discourse as a "spectacle" in which the relevant interactions are among the "players" rather than as direct communication between the players and the audience (i.e., the sender-receiver model). The fact that Committee members (from the human rights COP as well as the opposition COP) were unclear about – in fact, seemed uninterested in – how many people signed the petition, when and how it was delivered to President Mubarak, and whether there was any government reaction suggests that the petition served its principal functions just by being produced, agreed upon, and published. Two different well-informed observers (one Arab but not Egyptian, one Western) of the local political scene remarked to me that it was typical of the opposition parties to dissipate their energies, to sign the petition but fail to gather a significant number of signatures or to carry out planned follow-up activities such as rallies. While that might well be true, it misses an important point about this particular petition, which is that members of the opposition COP viewed their work as done once it was signed and published. In other words, participants cared more about the interactions among themselves than they did about how the audience received their "spectacle," and therein lies the key to understanding what the petition was meant to do for those who produced it.

The petition most likely performed a number of functions for different members of the primary, secondary, and tertiary COPs, about many of which I will never know. The two functions that I will examine are *identity construction* of the primary COP (the Committee) and negotiation of *power relations* by members of the secondary and tertiary COPs vis-à-vis each other. By *identity construction* I mean that the petition allowed the Committee to put itself on the map politically and publicly, to express what the Committee was about and what it was trying to do. It is important to note here that it was more important for the identity to be constructed internally – for members of the Committee to work out a group identity among themselves – than for that identity to be perceived by outsiders. This accounts for Committee members' relative indiffer-

2. In May 2000 the government dropped the case against Abu Sa'da and EOHR attorney Mustafa Zidane, which began in December 1998 after EOHR published a report on allegations of torture during a 1998 murder investigation in the village of al-Kush.

ence to how others (other signatories, the government) reacted to the petition once it was published.

By negotiation of *power relations* I mean that the petition performed the function of allowing secondary and tertiary COPs to reformulate their relationships to each other, as both collaborators and competitors having various interests in the issue of political reform in Egypt. Here I must emphasize that when I say "the petition" I mean not only the text in the commonly understood sense, but the text as an artifact of a series of social interactions, the whole process of forming the Committee and producing a text I am calling "the petition." The process of producing the petition gave members of the human rights COP the opportunity to wrest initiative on the political reform issue from the opposition COP. After arguing about the advisability of taking on explicitly political issues and working with political parties since at least 1994, some key members of the human rights COP agreed to move forward with a plan, which they managed to have incorporated into the Casablanca Declaration in April 1999. The opposition COP, at the same time, was carrying out its own positioning work via the process of producing the petition. Part of that work was to deny the human rights activists what they sought (leadership on the political reform issue), work that the opposition parties accomplished partly by claiming sole authorship of the petition when they published it.

Despite the apparent tensions between the human rights and opposition COPs, clearly the two communities shared some interests or their members would not have been able to cooperate within the Committee to produce the petition. One shared interest was that both faced either ongoing or impending crises in spring 1999 and wanted to tackle the political reform issue as a way of managing those crises. For the human rights COP the crisis was the new government law on NGO activities, whereas for the opposition parties the impending crisis was the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2000. The presidential referendum of September 25, 1999 also provided both COPs with motivation to make a public statement (one that calls for presidential term limits), though, as mentioned above, the human rights activists accused the oppositionists of cowardice because they failed to hold scheduled political rallies on the eve of the referendum. Another important positioning function of the petition was that it allowed the opposition and human rights COPs to experiment with using each other, to join forces in order to disguise each COP's smallness and weakness in order to produce a statement on political reform at a time when each COP (for its own reasons) believed such was required.

Newspaper commentaries

In this section I will discuss how addressing democracy as a central issue in newspaper commentaries has helped two intellectuals find special niches in their respective communities of practice (COPs). Dr. Hala Mustafa and Fahmi Huwaydi are alike in two ways: both were frequent contributors to the op-ed pages of *al-Ahram* newspaper (the most prestigious of the government-owned daily newspapers) in 1999–2000, and both made the issue of democracy a centerpiece in their writings during the 1990s. Apart from that they are quite different: one is female, the other male; one is a liberal secularist, the other an Islamist; one began her writing career in the 1980s, the other in the 1960s. Mustafa is the Director of the Political Systems Unit at the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a think tank that is part of the Ahram publishing empire (and in 2001 became editor of a new journal entitled *Al-diimuqraaTiyya* "Democracy"), and Huwaydi is an Islamist intellectual who writes a weekly column for *al-Ahram* newspaper. Principal texts that I will consider include two commentaries by each of them published during fall 1999, as well as books on the subject of democracy published by each of them since the early 1990s.

Communities of Practice Behind the Commentaries. As mentioned above, the instances of discourse under consideration here were written by individuals rather than COPs per se, but the COPs of which the authors considered themselves members exerted a strong influence on their writings. In my conversations with him, Fahmi Huwaydi described himself as an Islamist intellectual. He said he was not a member of any political organization, but his father was among the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Huwaydi was jailed twice for his political sympathies, once in the 1950s and again in 1984–86. He began writing in the 1960s, and started his column in *al-Ahram* newspaper after his release in 1986. Huwaydi's position as both columnist for a government-owned daily newspaper and an Islamist intellectual with close family ties to the Brotherhood is an unusual one in the Egyptian press, which tends to be divided up fairly sharply along partisan lines. Several times during our conversations he described the difficulties of remaining politically independent, saying "you have to pay a price," but he seemed content that the price was not too high. He has been called a "neo-Islamist" or Islamic reformist for his practical, future-oriented efforts to show that Islam is entirely compatible with (and contains within itself the seeds of) democracy (Korany 1998: 43–46). Huwaydi's work makes him a member of several communities of practice; the most relevant for

this discussion are two COPs I will call "Islamist intellectuals" and "mainstream columnists," i.e., columnists in mainstream publications.

Hala Mustafa's position at the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies qualifies her for membership in a COP I will call "academics close to government." I say that her position "qualifies" her for such membership because although the Ahram Center as an institution is known to work closely with high-level government officials on public policy issues, not all academics affiliated with the Center necessarily are close to government circles. Mustafa, however, is an excellent example of an academic who consciously nurtures her ties with the government in order to maximize her influence on policy, while in turn those ties give her a unique position within academic circles. Discussing the dilemma of trying to nudge forward government policy on democratization while still protecting her reputation for loyalty, Mustafa said she had long since decided where she could be most effective: "I prefer to make a small change from inside the system rather than to accomplish nothing from outside." Mustafa also found she had to clothe her liberal, secularist views in diplomatic language in order to avoid being pigeon-holed as either a "reactionary" (by Nasserists) or an "atheist" (by Islamists).

Social practices of the COPs. One social practice shared by both of the intellectuals under discussion was to write prolifically, though the question of who would publish their writings differed significantly for the two. In addition to her many op-ed commentaries, Mustafa is the author of four books on democracy as well as two on political Islam, and in 2001 became editor of the new journal *Al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Democracy*); previously she had been editor of a journal called *QaDaayaa barlamaaniyya (Parliamentary Issues)*. Her most recent works were published by the Ahram establishment, which Mustafa considered extremely important. When I spoke to her in early 2000 she was awaiting agreement from the Ahram publishing establishment to publish *Al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Democracy*). She had had the pilot issue in hand for more than six months, but said she would wait patiently for Ahram's response rather than seeking another publisher because she wanted the journal "to be taken seriously" in government circles. In June 2000 she told me that she had approval from Ahram to publish the journal, but was still trying to resolve a question of funding, i.e., whether the journal would be published by the Ahram Center for Strategic and International Studies (most likely with a grant from foreign sources) or be funded by the Ahram publishing establishment itself. Mustafa was holding out for the latter, which would give her new journal the status of an "insider" publication,

one that enjoyed full approval by the Egyptian government. Her patience paid off, and the journal's first issue came out in January 2001.

A third social practice of the "academics close to government," one in which Mustafa particularly excelled, was appropriating the discourse of government officials. Mustafa made a point of writing an op-ed commentary after President Mubarak made a speech in which he addressed democracy as a significant theme. Mustafa told me that she did so because "I want to give the best possible interpretation to his statements, the interpretation that should be held." Moreover, Mustafa believed that if she succeeded in promoting the "best" (i.e., most pro-democratization) interpretation of Mubarak's statements, that interpretation encouraged more pro-democratization policies on the part of the government.

Mustafa's columns became what Scollon calls a "site of engagement," i.e., a window in which an individual appropriates instances of public discourse in order to accomplish her own interactional work. Scollon argues that instances of news discourse, for example, "are not always and openly available for interpretation," but are "available as texts for appropriation only within the purposes, goals, and agency of the members of the community of practice." Furthermore, Scollon says that these occasions of appropriation of discourse "are at the same time sites for the discursive construction of the person" (Scollon 1998: 20). Mustafa appropriated Mubarak's discourse in a way deemed suitable within her COP – a way that expressed loyalty to the President by rendering him the ostensible service of drawing approving attention to his speeches – while promoting her own pro-democracy ideas. And in doing both of those things, she accomplished the important social work of constructing her own public identity.

For Fahmi Huwaydi, working as he did at the intersection of two COPs (Islamist intellectuals and mainstream columnists), publishing his writings was a more complicated matter than it was for Mustafa. In fact, dealing with censorship of his writings was among Huwaydi's most significant social practices. Like Mustafa, he wrote frequently in 1999–2000, contributing weekly columns to two non-Egyptian Arabic publications, *al-Sharq al-Awsat* newspaper and *al-Majalla* magazine, in addition to *al-Ahram* newspaper. Unlike Mustafa, however, Huwaydi frequently faced rejection of columns he submitted to *al-Ahram* newspaper. In 1998 he put out a book containing 38 columns rejected by *al-Ahram* newspaper between 1986 and 1988, *Al-maqaalaat al-maHDHuura* (*Censored Columns*), published by Dar al-Shuruuq, a publishing house known for publishing works by contemporary Islamist thinkers. In the introduction to his book of censored columns, Huwaydi wrote that he was given neither guide-

lines nor explanations for the rejections: "I was told only that my column was 'postponed'…and sometimes I would receive a phone call on Sunday or Monday morning from a member of the editorial staff asking 'Do you have another column ready?'" (Huwaydi 1998: 7). This process continued for many years; in March 2000 he told me that several of his columns had been rejected in the last month. He professed indifference to *al-Ahram* newspaper's rejections, calling the newspaper "silly," as the columns would then be picked up by non-Egyptian publications, which in turn were offered for sale in downtown Cairo.

Huwaydi confirmed that the censored articles were often, but not always, those that dealt with Egyptian domestic issues. Of the thirty-eight censored articles in his 1998 book, fifteen deal with explicitly Egyptian topics, thirteen are on broader topics relevant to the Egyptian scene (terrorism, for example, or the application of Islamic law), and ten deal with Arab-Israeli affairs. Although one of Huwaydi's articles on democracy that I will consider in some detail was censored, democracy was not a major theme in most of his censored articles. My point here is not that Huwaydi's writings on democracy have been heavily censored; in fact, Ahram publishing house published his 1993 book *Al-islaam wa l-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*). My point is that his perseverance in submitting his weekly column faithfully to *al-Ahram* newspaper despite the censorship suggests that he was able to live with the tension of repeated expressions of disapproval from at least one of his COPs (and conversations with outside observers indicated that Huwaydi's writings often met with disapproval from the Islamist COP as well), and that perhaps those very expressions of disapproval helped Huwaydi to maintain membership in two disparate COPs.

Interactions leading up to the publication of Huwaydi's September 3, 1999 article in the pro-Islamist newspaper *al-Shaab* illustrate his practice of dealing with censorship. During a trip to a wealthy beach community in the coastal city of Alexandria during summer 1999, Huwaydi witnessed an event that disturbed him. A police officer reprimanded a rowdy Egyptian youth for disturbing the peace. The young man turned on the officer and screamed that he was the son of "so-and-so" and "you know what he can do," at which point the officer backed away and apologized. Discussing the event with Alexandrians, Huwaydi learned that such incidents were common. Huwaydi said he decided to write a column on the subject, using the incident to highlight the fact that "there are people here who are above the law." The article frames the point in terms of democracy, saying *al-diimuqraaTiyya al-Haqiiqiyya allatii laa taj9al aHad fawq al-Hisaab miftaaH asaasii li-al-mushkila laa rayb* ("true democracy that puts no-one above accountability is a basic key to the problem, no doubt"). *Al-Shaab* news-

paper notes at the bottom of the column that *al-Ahram* newspaper "refused to publish" it, a point that Huwaydi confirmed. In the column he also mentions an article (printed by *al-Ahram* newspaper in August 1999) written by a fellow columnist, Adil Hammuda, in which Hammuda recounted a similar example of bad behavior by the rich and mighty on Alexandria's beaches. Huwaydi said the lesson was that "it's all right to talk about a specific incident, but if you go deeper it's not all right."

Huwaydi told me he had not given the censored column to *al-Shaab* newspaper directly. "People think I write for the opposition papers, but it's not true. *Al-Shaab* newspaper reprinted it from one of the Gulf papers" for which Huwaydi writes, a fact not mentioned in the *al-Shaab* article, which also features a photograph of Huwaydi. Thus the complicated business of censorship-management seems to involve a number of social practices for Huwaydi and his two COPs. Huwaydi writes his columns diligently and submits them to *al-Ahram* newspaper. Someone at *al-Ahram* newspaper, i.e. a censor, often decides to "postpone" publication of the column and informs Huwaydi. Huwaydi then gives the column to one of the non-Egyptian publications, which prints it within a day or two. *Al-Shaab*, a newspaper affiliated with the Islamist movement, then often reprints the column with a notice about *al-Ahram* newspaper's censorship and a photo of Huwaydi. Hence a number of interests are satisfied: Huwaydi's column is published both outside and inside Egypt, *al-Shaab* newspaper has an occasion to best *al-Ahram* newspaper and claim a connection with a prominent columnist, and Huwaydi's credentials as an Islamist are reinforced by being rejected by *al-Ahram* newspaper and published in *al-Shaab* newspaper, without, however, jeopardizing his position in the mainstream columnists COP.

The last social practice of Huwaydi's that I will mention is that he used his writings on democracy to help work out several sets of contradictions: he is both an Islamist and a democrat, son of a leading Muslim Brother but not himself a member of the Brotherhood, part of both the opposition and the mainstream of Egyptian political and intellectual life. He told me that he wrote his 1993 book *Al-islaam wa al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*), for example, "due to a personal problem." He said that during his imprisonment in the 1980s "I faced two problems: I was the victim of an undemocratic regime, and at the same time I found that the people I was imprisoned with were not convinced of the need for democracy. I noticed that the Muslim Brothers did not understand democracy, were afraid of it. So the book was written to address those two problems."

Social functions of the commentaries. Mustafa and Huwaydi have chosen to combine in their writing different strains of opinion – for Mustafa, pro-democracy and pro-Mubarak, for Huwaydi, pro-democracy and pro-Islamism – that do not mix easily. The very fact that they do not mix easily seemed to enable the two writers to stake claims to unique identities inside their communities of practice. Mustafa's writings on democracy allowed her to stake a claim to being both the most prolific writer on democracy-related issues in her COP of "academics close to government," as well as to being the premier academic interpreter of Mubarak's utterances on democracy. The latter role helped nurture both her status within her COP and her ties to government officials. Huwaydi's arguments about the compatibility of Islamism and democracy made him unusual among Islamist writers (who more often promoted ideas of *al-9adl*, "justice," or *al-Hurriyya*, "freedom" than democracy per se) and unique among *al-Ahram* newspaper columnists. In addition, his deft management of censorship issues, sometimes involving his writings on democracy, reinforced his claim to membership in the Islamist thinkers COP while preserving his position in the columnists COP, a position he clearly valued strongly.

Summarizing social functions of the texts

To review, among the key functions I see the selected instances of discourse as performing for the relevant communities of practice are the following:

- For the COP writing President Mubarak's speeches, construction of a vaguely ("purposefully ambiguous," in the words of one observer) pro-democracy public identity for the president upon his new term in office, as well as discursive reinforcement of the existing power structure as it pertains to domestic political life;
- For the COP that produced the September petition, construction of a group public identity, as well as renegotiation of power relationships among members of the secondary and tertiary COPs (human rights and opposition political groups);
- For the intellectuals, carving out unique niches for themselves inside their respective COPs by mixing support for democracy with another element (support for Mubarak, in Mustafa's case, and for Islamism, in Huwaydi's case).

Chapters 4 and 5 will explore how this work is accomplished via specific linguistic devices and strategies.

Chapter 4

Identities under construction

Having introduced the instances of discourse on democracy that I selected to examine and the communities of practice that produced them, it is now time to turn to the texts themselves in order to explore *how* in linguistic terms the texts perform certain social functions.

The title of this chapter and the next indicate that I organized my analysis of the texts via the key social functions performed. I might just as easily have divided up the analysis text-by-text or linguistic device-by-device, but I chose to do otherwise in an effort to stay true to a social understanding of discourse; I am arguing for the usefulness of thinking about what a text *does* rather than what it *says*. That being decided, dividing up the analysis by social functions is not easy because it is difficult to tease apart concepts such as identity construction, positioning, and replication or revision of power relations. By staking a claim to a certain public identity, for example, it seems that a speaker must thereby make a claim about his/her position relative to other players and to the power structure. And a speaker might well make replicating or seeking to revise power relations a large part of constructing his/her own public identity.

The principal linguistic devices I selected to examine identity construction in the texts were deixis (especially self-referencing and use of the definite article) and interdiscursivity, both of which often operate by generating implicatures (see discussion of the linguistic devices in Chapter 2). This is not to claim that these were the only devices used, but that when I looked at the texts they were to me the most apparent ways to understand how identities were constructed.

Identity construction in Mubarak speech excerpts

In this section I will examine some linguistic devices – particularly self-referencing via pronouns and other terms and use of deictics such as the definite article – used to create certain aspects of public identity for President Mubarak. I will focus on excerpts regarding democracy from Mubarak's speeches before the Egyptian Parliament on October 5, 1999 (upon being sworn in for a new presidential term) and November 13, 1999 (upon the opening of a new session

of Parliament). See Appendix B for full Arabic transcripts, transliterations, and English translations of the October excerpts and Appendix C for the November excerpts. As noted in Chapter 3, the community of practice writing Mubarak's speeches shifts, or is reformulated, for each speech, and I will show that the style and approach to identity construction differs somewhat from one speech to the other.

Self-referencing in the speech excerpts

In both of the excerpts Mubarak uses first person singular subject and possessive pronouns *anaa* ("I") and *-ii* ("my") as well as first person plural pronouns *naHnu* ("we") and *-naa* ("our") to refer to himself. In some cases the plural pronouns appear to express an inclusive "we" that refers to Mubarak and some undefined audience (the Parliament, perhaps the cabinet, perhaps television viewers); in other cases the "we" seems exclusive (perhaps referring to Mubarak and his administration only); in still other cases the "we" seems to have as its referent Mubarak alone. In addition, Mubarak in some cases uses as his subject *miSr* ("Egypt"), far from the deictic center of *anaa,* which I will argue appears to be a sort of self-referencing.

In the excerpt on democracy from the November 13 speech (Appendix C.1), Mubarak in several places mentions his ideas and feelings about democracy, in which he refers to himself using the first person singular possessive pronoun:

C.1.a) 2 *la-qad kaana **9tiqaadii** d-daa'im…*
my belief has always been…
3 *anna d-diimuqraaTiyyata tanmuu bi–r-ra'yi al-Hurr…*
that democracy develops via freedom of opinion…

C.1.b) 19 *fa-la-qad kaana **mawqifii** l-waaDiH...*
my clear **position** has been…
20 *hiya anna S-SaHaafa yagib an takuuna qaadirat-an bi-nafsihaa...*
that the press must be capable on its own
21 *9alaa iSlaaHi salbiyyaatihaa.*
of correcting its negative aspects

C.1.c) 25 ***thiqatii** l-kaamilata fii anna l-mu9aaraDa da guz'-un min il-Hukm!*
my complete **confidence** in the fact that the opposition is part of governance!

Mubarak also uses first person singular verb forms several times in the excerpt, including twice in the remainder of the sentence of which line 25 forms part:

C.1.d) 23 *wa lastu fii Haagat-in…*
I need **not**…
24 *illaa an **u'akkida** la-kum,*
do more than to **stress** to you,
25 ***thiqatii** l-kaamilata fii anna l-mu9aaraDa da guz'-un min il-Hukm!*
my complete **confidence** in the fact that the opposition is part of governance!

First person verb forms also appear in a two-part contrastive statement in which Mubarak claims he is talking about greater opposition representation in Parliament:

C.1.e) 28 *wa **lastu ataHaddathu** 9an wuguud-in shakliyy-in li-l-mu9aaraDa…*
I am not talking about a token presence for the opposition…
29 *bal **innanii ataHaddathu** 9an wuguud-in Haqiiqii!*
rather **I am talking** about a real presence!

And he uses a first person singular verb to wish members of Parliament good luck in the elections scheduled for November 2000:

C.1.f) 56 ***arguu** li-l-gamii9i fii-haa HaDHDH-an Tayyiba.*
I wish to all good luck in them.

Thus one sees in these lines that Mubarak associates himself personally with believing, taking positions on, having confidence in, stressing, talking, and wishing about democracy via use of the first person singular. In looking at speeches by British politicians, Wilson found that the combination of first-person singular forms and mental-process verbs (such as "think," "want," "wish") was often used to communicate attitudes, particularly sincerity (Wilson 1990: 62), which appears to be what is going on here as well.

In a part of the November speech where Mubarak seems to be promising the opposition a greater share of parliamentary seats, however, the president refers to himself via the first person plural pronoun:

C.1.g) 36 ***innanaa laa nuSaadiru** 9alaa Haqq il-mu9aaraDa fii tamthiili niyabii..*
we do not stand in the way of the opposition's right to a
37 *akthara tawaazuna.*
more balanced parliamentary representation.
38 *wa laysa hunaaka maa yamna9u min an **nabHatha** ansab as-subul li-taHqiiqi dhaalik.*
There is nothing to prevent **our exploring** the best way to achieve that.

In a section of the excerpt where he mentions steps taken so far, Mubarak uses neither "I" nor "we" but "Egypt." While this is ambiguous, I would argue that he is clearly defending his own record on democratization here (see particularly lines 9 and 11; emphasis reflects Mubarak's voice stress) and thus is referring to himself:

C.1.h) 6 *wa 9alaa haadhaa Tariiq…*
And on this path
7 ***xaTTat muSr*** *xuTuwaat-in haama.*
Egypt has taken important steps
8 *laa yast-*
that cannot–
9 *laa yastaTii9u inkaaruhaa illaa mukaabir-un gaaHid.*
that cannot be denied except by an arrogant ingrate.[1]
10 *wa* ***talaazamat*** *mundhu waqt-in mubakkir masiirata l-iSlaaHi l-iqtiSaadii,*
It [Egypt] has embraced, from an early date, the path of economic reform…
11 *wa s-siyaasii,*
and political,
12 *fii xuTuwaat-in gaadda.*
via serious steps.
13 ***ataaHat*** *Hurriyata r-ra'yi wa s-saHaafati bi-shakl-in ghayri masbuu',*
It [Egypt] has granted freedom of opinion and of the press in an unprecedented way

Intriguingly, Mubarak also refers to himself in the first person singular in what became the most controversial, frequently-quoted (by the Egyptian press) line in the speech:

C.1.i) HM 65 *wa idhaa* ***kuntu a9id*** *bi-an takuuna l-intixabaati l-qaadimatu naDHiifat-un – naDHiifat-an wa naziiha,*
If **I promise** that the coming elections will be clean – clean and fair,
66 *taxDHa9u fii kulli maraaHilihaa li-ishraaf-in kaamil-in min al-qaDaa',*
subjected in all stages to complete supervision by the judiciary–

1. The Arabic phrase *mukaabir-un gaaHid* can be literally translated as "an ungrateful arrogant [person]," but I have reversed the noun and adjective for a more idiomatic translation, "an arrogant ingrate."

Aud: 67 X-X-X-X (applause)
68 *allaa<u>dh</u>ii ya9tazzu bi-hi kulli miSrii,*
of which every Egyptian is proud,
69 *wa tuwaffir la-hu d-dawla kulla maa huwa gadiir-un bi-hi min istiqlaal,*
and to which the state provides all necessary independence,
70 *li-annanaa **nu'min** bi-an istiqlaal aS-SulTati l-qaDaa'iyyati hiya min – huwa min ahammu rakaa'iz al-Hukmi fii miSr.*
because **we believe** that the independence of the judiciary is among the most important pillars of governance in Egypt.
71 *aquulu innanaa i<u>dh</u>aa kunaa gamii9–an*
I say that if we collectively
72 *HaariSiin 9alaa Damaanaat – Damaan intixabaat-in Hurrati wa naziiha,*
are eager for guarantees – to guarantee free and fair elections,
73 *fa-inna 9alaa l-aHzaabi wa l-afraadi l-mu<u>sh</u>aarikiina fii l-9amaliyyati l-intixaabiyya,*
then it is up to the parties and individuals participating in the electoral process,
74 *an yatagannabu l-mumarasaati <u>gh</u>ayru d-diimuqraaTiyya,*
to put aside undemocratic practices

A notable grammatical feature of the sentence in lines 65–70 is that it contains the beginning of a conditional clause *i<u>dh</u>aa kuntu a9id…* ("If I promise…") that should have a second part but does not, at least not inside the same sentence. Instead, the following sentence (lines 71–74) connects back by the use of the verb *aquulu* ("I say") and a new conditional clause *i<u>dh</u>aa kunnaa gamii9–an HaariSiin 9alaa Damaanaat* ("If we collectively are eager for guarantees/, and thus the second part of this sentence *fa-inna 9alaa l-aHzaabi wa l-afraadi…* ("it is up to the parties and individuals…) functions as the complement to both the first and second conditional clauses. In Arabic grammar the second clause of a conditional ("if…then…") construction is called the *jawaab* ("response"). Thus, the "response" given to both "If I promise…" and "If we collectively…" is "it is up to the parties and individuals participating…," i.e., it is not a change of behavior by the government that is necessary to guarantee free and fair elections, but a change by parties and individuals.

The other important aspect of example C.1.i. is that the speaker gradually shifts the perspective from the first person in line 65 *i<u>dh</u>aa kuntu a9id* ("If I promise") to the more distant first personal plural in line 71 *aquulu i<u>dh</u>aa kun-*

naa gamii9–an ("If we collectively"). The combination, then, of (1) the distance between the conditional clause introduced in line 65 and its complement in line 73 and (2) the shift from the first to the second person plural significantly weakens the effect of the use of the first personal singular in line 65, which at first listen suggests a high degree of personal commitment by Mubarak to the pledge.

A brief note on how the excerpt above was appropriated by members of the Egyptian press: while reporting the sentence above accurately in full texts of the speech, newspaper headlines dropped the conditional, e.g., *al-Ahram* newspaper November 14, 1999 carried a headline on page 1 saying *a9id bi-an takuun intixaabaat majlis al-sha9b al-muqbila naDHiifa wa naziiha wa yushrif al-qaDaa' 9ala kull maraaHilihaa* ("I promise that the coming People's Assembly elections will be clean and fair and that the judiciary will supervise all phases"). The conditional went unnoted, and press comment focused on the implicature (no doubt deliberate but also deniable, as implicatures must be) that Mubarak was admitting that previous elections were less than clean and fair.

In the October 5 speech excerpt (Appendix B.1) Mubarak refers to himself in the first person singular when he appears to be positioning himself relative to his parliamentary audience:

B.1.a) 1 *wa qad laa takuunu furSat-un muwaatiyyat-un al-yawm…*
Perhaps today is not the best time…
2 *likayy **ataHaddatha** 9alaa naHw-in,*
for **me to talk** (lit: "that I talk")
3 *akthara tafSiilin 9an haaDHaa l-barnaamig…*
in a more detailed way about this program…

B.1.b) 10 ***laakinnanii**…*
But I…
11 ***astaTii9u an u'akidda** 9alaa 9adad-in min al-Haqaa'iqi l-muhimma.*
I can highlight a number of important facts.

Immediately following, however, Mubarak switches to the first person plural in discussing the record on democratization:

B.1.c) 12 *awwal-an…*
First…
13 *an al-barnaamig allatii **nataHaddathu** 9an-h…*
the program that **we are talking** about…
14 *wa **na9malu** 9alaa tanfiidhih…*
and **we are working** to implement

15 *yastanidu ilaa guhd-in da'uub…*
is based on an ongoing effort…
16 ***badhalnaahu*** *mundhu* ***Hammalnaa*** *sh-sha9bu l-mas'uuliyya.*
we have undertaken since the people **charged us** with responsibility.

In lines 13 and 14, the "we" might include Mubarak and others (the Parliament, his administration), but the usage of "we" again in line 16 suggests the referent is Mubarak himself, as none of the other referents have been in office as Mubarak has since 1981, when "the people charged us with responsibility."

Homeland deixis in the speech excerpts

Another aspect of identity construction in the October speech excerpt that merits attention is the use of the definite article, another form of deixis, to construct a political scene in which the carefully-centered Mubarak is the arbiter of "reality." As mentioned above, the definite article is often used in Arabic to denote concepts that would be expressed without the definite article in English, e.g., *al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii* ("political reform"). (Please see Section 2.4.a. for a discussion of differences between Arabic and English regarding usage of the definite article.) I am not trying to compare Arabic to English, or to claim that Mubarak's use of the definite article is strange or exceptional. Indeed, just the opposite is the case; attaching the definite article to certain words or phrases consistently sounds entirely natural and easily becomes the habitual way in which those phrases are cited, thereby reinforcing views of "reality" evoked by those phrases. To quote Billig: "What is 'ours' is presented as if it were the objective world: *the* is so concrete, so objective, so uncontroversial" (Billig 1995: 109).

In the October speech excerpt, Mubarak drops all reference to himself from line 17–77 (the end of the section on democracy) and instead takes the role of lecturer, sketching out a certain view of the players in Egyptian political life and their rights and duties. First, the three players:

B.1.d) 30 *9alaa l-gam9i bayna guhdi* ***d-dawla****…*
joining efforts of **the state**…
31 *wa guhdi* ***mu'assasaati l-mugtama9i*** *l-muxtalifa…*
with those of **the** various **institutions of society**
32 *ma9a dawri l-waTan –* ***l-muwaaTini l-fard****…*
with the role of the nation – **the individual citizen**…
33 *li-annahu maa lam tatakaamil guhuud,*
For when efforts

34 *allatii yabdhuluhaa shurakaa'u t-tanmiyyati l-asaasiyyuun…*
expended by the principal partners in development
35 *fii iTaari xuTTat-in waaHidat-in…*
(are not integrated) into one plan..
36 *tunassiqu bayna* ***haadhihi l-adwaari th-thalaatha****…*
that coordinates **these three roles**…
37 *yuSbiHu mini l-9asiir…*
it becomes difficult…
38 *an natawaqqa9a an-nagaaHa l-kaamil.*
for us to expect complete success.

As seen above, the three players are defined as ***ad****-dawla* ("**the** state"), *mu'assasaati* ***l****-mugtama9i (*"**the** institutions of society"), and ***al****-muwaaTini* ***l****-fard* ("**the** individual citizen"); Mubarak stumbles on this last category, which he initially calls *al-waTan* ("the nation") but then corrects himself. The fact that the three form a set in the reality being constructed is made explicit in the use of the demonstrative pronoun (also a deictic) in line 36, ***haadhihi l****-adwaari th-thalaatha* ("**these** three roles"), the demonstrative pronoun Arabic being used in combination with the definite article.

Mubarak then goes on to describe *the* duties of each of the three players:

B.1.e) 39 *inna* ***muhimmati d-dawla*** *hiya an tuhayyi'a l-manaaxa l-munaasib…*
The duty of the state is to create the proper climate
40 *wa an taDa9a s-siyaasaati s-saliima…*
and to put into place sound policies
41 *allatii taDmanu taHqiiqa l-awlawiyyaati S-SaHiiHa.*
to guarantee that correct priorities are attained
B.1.f) 49 *wa* ***muhimmatu mu'assasaati l-mugtama9i*** *l-mutamaththilati bi-****l-aHzaab****…*
The duty of **the institutions of society**, represented by **the parties**...
50 *wa* ***n-niqaabaat****…*
the syndicates…
51 *wa* ***l-itiHaadaat****…*
the unions…
52 *wa* ***gam9iyyaati n-nashaaTi l-ahlii****…*
and the non-governmental organizations…
53 *an tusaa9id 9alaa tawsii9i Haqqi l-mushaaraka.*
is to help broaden the right of participation

54 *wa an takuuna Taraf-an asaasiyy-an fii 9amaliyyati l-irtiqaa'i l-mustamirr…*
and to play a principal part in the continuing effort to upgrade
55 *bi-qudraati l-muwaaTiniin.*
citizens' capabilities.

B.1.g) 65 *wa **muhimmatu l-muwaaTinu** an ya9rifa annahu miHwaru t-tanmiyati wa mawDuu9h*
The citizen's duty is to realize that he is the axis and object of development
66 *wa an irtiqaa'a Hayaatihi rahn-un…*
and that improving his life is tied to…
67 *bi-qudraatihi l-mutazaayida…*
steadily increasing his capabilities…

It is also worth noting that in example B.1.f, Mubarak defines *the* sorts of social institutions he is designating as legitimate partners: *the* parties, *the* syndicates, *the* unions, *the* NGOs, all of which are regulated by the government, professional syndicates and NGOs having been the subjects of new regulatory legislation in the 1990s.

Where is Mubarak in this tripartite framework? He seems to place himself outside (or perhaps more properly above) the fray, lecturing on the situation. Lecturing, however, from a position of authority and popular legitimacy that is invoked explicitly in line 16:

B.1.h) 16 *…mun<u>dh</u>u Hammalnaa **<u>sh</u>-<u>sh</u>a9bu** l-mas'uuliyya.*
since **the people** charged us with responsibility.

Building on a legitimacy derived from *the* people, Mubarak discusses a number of "facts," "priorities," etc. related to his plans and policies, all made more concrete by addition of the definite article:

B.1.i) 11 *astaTii9u an u'akidda 9alaa 9adad-in min **al-Haqaa'iqi l-muhimma**.*
I can highlight a number of important facts (lit: **the important facts**)

B.1.j) 19 *wa tarsiixi **mafhuumi dawlati l-mu'assasaat**…*
and deepening **the understanding** of **the institutionalized state**…

B.1.k) 41 *allatii taDmanu taHqiiqa **l-awlawiyyati S-SaHiiHa***
which will guarantee achievement of **the proper priorities**

B.1.l) 46 *li-t-tadaxxuli fii-**l-waqti S-SaHiiH***
to intervene at **the proper time**

B.1.m) 57 *wa ta9mila 9alaa taHqiiqi t-tagaanusi bayna ahdaafihaa…*
work to bridge the achievement of their own goals
58 *wa bayna **muqtaDayyaati l-SaaliHi l-9aamm.***
with **the requirements of the public interest**

As mentioned above, my argument here is not that the definite article is used in an unusual way in these excerpts, though in most of them there are options available to say the same thing without the definite article. In example B.1.i., for instance, Mubarak might have said *Haqaa'iqi muhimma* ("important facts"), in B. 1.j, he might have said *mafhuum-in min dawlati l-mu'assasaat* ("an understanding of the institutionalized state"), and in B. 1.k. he might have said *awlawiyaat-in SaHiiHa* ("important priorities"). My argument is that repeated attachment of the definite article to concepts such as important facts, understanding, public interest, proper priorities, and proper time (reinforced in the last two examples by the evaluative adjective) has the effect of positioning Mubarak as a sort of omniscient judge.

All in all, choices made regarding self-referencing and use of the definite article in the two speech excerpts serve the speechwriting community of practice's interest in creating a certain public identity for Mubarak. Looking at the November excerpt, he associates himself personally with pro-democracy convictions and feelings (which helps position him among the good guys in the international community) but he distances himself from an evaluation of his own record on democratization and from promises of progress related to the 2000 elections, a "purposeful ambiguity," as one influential intellectual described Mubarak's statements on democracy to me. Turning for a moment to construction of the self in narratives, Schiffrin (1996b) showed that it was not unusual for presentations of self to be contradictory, and that narrators often displayed different elements of their epistemic (emotive) and agentive selves. In the October excerpt, the more controlling aspect of Mubarak's public identity is highlighted: he has all *the* facts, knows what *the* public interest is, and from this omniscient position will hand out *the* roles to those who will be allowed to play.

Identity construction in the September petition

Construction of a group identity, I suggested in Chapter 3, was among the chief social functions performed by the petition drafted by the Committee on Political and Constitutional reform, published in the Egyptian press in early September 1999. In this section I will discuss linguistic traces of that identity

construction that I believe are observable in the petition, mostly in patterns of self-referencing. As I will show below, the group identity constructed is weak and tentative, perhaps partly due to tensions inside the Committee but also partly by design, as an effort to mitigate the "face" threat to both the opposition political parties and to the Mubarak government represented by the petition.

Al-muwaqqi9uun 9alaa haadha al-nidaa' ("the signers of this petition") is how the petition community of practice (the Committee) refers to itself at the beginning of the first and also the beginning of the final paragraph of the petition, lines 26 and 41 of the Arabic text (Appendix D.1) respectively. There are four other self-references, three in the form of verbs (one with an independent pronoun attached), and finally the list of names at the bottom. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the only names cited are the heads of the four legal opposition parties (Fouad Serrag al-Din, Head of the Wafd Party, Khaled Mohie al-Din, Head of the Tagammu Party, Dia' al-Din Dawoud, Head of the Nasserist Party, Ibrahim Shukri, Head of the Labor Party), omitting the representatives of illegal political groups, human rights activists, and intellectuals who signed some pre-publication form of the petition. The pronominal self-references are as follows:

D.1.a) 26 *al-muwaqqi9uun 9alaa haadha al-nidaa, idh* ***yataTalla9uun*** *ilaa taHriir al-Hayaa al-siyaasiyya*
The undersigned, in that **they aspire** to liberate political life

D.1.b) 27 *fa-****hum yuTaalibuun*** *bi-an yabda' haadha al-taHriir*
they demand that such liberation begin

D.1.c) 41 *in al-muwaqqi9iin 9alaa haadha al-nidaa'* ***ya'muluun***
The signers of this petition **hope** (lit: "they hope")

There are several aspects of this way of self-referencing (either as "the signers of this petition" or simply "they") that I find striking. First, even the phrase "the signers of this petition" remains rather unspecific, as nowhere does the text of the petition itself mention who the signers are, a fact that facilitated the opposition party leaders' appropriation of the petition and sole credit for it by showing only their names, as least as it appeared in *al-Shaab* newspaper. Second, at no point does the petition shift to the second person plural *naHnu* ("we") in referring to the signers. Third, there is no explicit reference to the Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, in a document I am claiming was intended largely to get the Committee on the political map. All of these aspects conflict with patterns of self-referencing established in previous documents (December 1997 opposition party petition on political reform, April 1999 Casablanca Declaration of the Arab Human Rights Movement, and the May 1999 human

rights groups' call for political reform) that members of the COP mentioned as antecedents to the September petition:

- The opposition parties' petition, as published by *al-Wafd* newspaper on December 12, 1997, lists in the petition's text the names of all political groups (including illegal groups) involved, as well as claiming that unnamed "scores of politicians, intellectuals, university professors, experts, and researchers" participated. For the remainder of the petition, the overwhelming majority of references to participants is via the first person plural.
- The Casablanca Declaration consistently uses a corporate identity, *al-mu'tamar* ("the conference") to refer to the group that produced the declaration, which included human rights activists from fifteen Arab countries.
- In the May 1999 statement by Egyptian human rights groups, the groups refer to themselves as *muna<u>DHDH</u>amaat Huquuq al-insaan al-maSriyya al-muwaqqi9a 9ala haa<u>dh</u>aa al-nidaa'* ("the Egyptian human rights groups signing this petition"), and repeat the self-reference as "the human rights groups" twice more in the statement. In the penultimate paragraph, however, the self-reference shifts to the first person plural: *kamaa **natawajjah** bi-nidaa'inaa ilaa kull quwaat al-mujtama9* ("as **we direct** our call to all forces of society"), and *li-**nukaafiH** ma9–an min ajl <u>gh</u>add diimuqraaTii* ("so that **we may struggle** together for a democratic tomorrow"), in an apparent attempt to build solidarity with addressees.

Considering first why the drafters of the September petition did not specify participants even by types (i.e., politicians, human rights activists, intellectuals – categories into which they considered themselves divided), as did the December 1997 opposition petition, one might say that the petition was intended to be signed eventually (after its publication) by many Egyptians, not only by those involved in producing it. This does not explain why the petition does not refer to "the Committee" as a corporate identity, however, as did the Casablanca Declaration. Nor does it account for why the petition producers, in employing pronouns, chose *hum* ("they"), as opposed to *naHnu* ("we"), much closer to the deictic center.

What would account for the self-referencing choice of *hum* ("they") as opposed to "we" or "the Committee" would be a need or desire for participants to distance themselves somewhat from the petition. Previous works on political discourse highlight a couple of possibilities. Wilson, in examining British political discourse, found that that self-referencing by means other than "I" or "we" represented a strategy of distancing from either the topic or the participants

involved in the discourse (Wilson 1990: 62). A second possibility, suggested for example by Zupnik (drawing on Brown and Levinson 1978), is that choice of a pronoun further from the deictic center can "mitigate the threat of particular speech activities (criticisms, demands) to the positive and negative faces" of others, as well as defending the speaker's positive face (Zupnik 1994: 372). Zupnik showed how an American political activist distanced himself from his utterances by employing "we" rather than "I" during a televised panel discussion, but her ideas can be logically extrapolated to account for a choice of "they" rather than "we" as a group self-reference.

Besides pronominal choice, other stylistic features of the petition show traces both of the strains of attempting to form a group identity, however weak and tentative, among disparate communities of practice and of the efforts to mitigate the threat that group identity poses to the Mubarak government. One notable feature is that the petition's five demands are agentless; it is only by implication that the reader understands that it must be the government that should undertake the measures demanded:

D.1.d) 27–28 *fa-hum yuTaalibuun bi-an yabda' haadhaa al-taHriir bi-ittixaadh xamsa ijra'aat asaasiyya hiya:*

They demand that such liberation begin with five basic measures, which are:

29 *1 – ilghaa' Haalat al-Tawaari' wa al-ifraaj 9an al-mu9taqaliin al-siyaasiyyiin wa al-9afuu 9an al-masjuuniin al-siyaasiyyiin fii ghayr qaDaaya al-9unf*
1 – Lifting the state of emergency, releasing political detainees, and pardoning those political prisoners in cases not involving violence.

Compare this with the language in the May 1999 human rights organizations' statement, which makes explicit who the demandee is:

> *fii haadha al-iTaar hunaaka xuTuwaat Daruuriyya min al-waajib an yanDHur al-sayyid al-ra'iis fii al-qiyaam bi-haa, rubbamaa duun intiDHaar balwarat barnaamij shaamil li-al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii, mithla: 1. waqf al-9amal bi-qaanuun al-Tawaari'*
> "In this regard there are necessary steps that the President is bound to consider undertaking, perhaps without awaiting crystallization of a comprehensive program of political reform, for example: 1. Ceasing implementation of the Emergency Law." (Statement by Egyptian Human Rights Organizations, May 14, 1999)

In sum, it seems that the choice of those who produced the September petition to refer to themselves as "they" rather than "we," as well as their choice not to direct their demands at a specific target, reflects a distancing strategy that serves at least two social functions. First, it constructs a group identity that is relatively weak and un-corporate (as compared to patterns established in antecedent documents), accurately reflecting the experimental nature of the human rights-political parties alliance. Second, the distancing mitigates the petition's threat (inherent in the fact that it presents demands) to (a) the face of those whom it addresses, particularly President Mubarak and (b) to the face of the opposition parties. Such an effort is in keeping with what members of the Committee told me about the weak ideological commitment to and ambivalent attitude of opposition political parties toward the petition; the parties wanted to use their participation in the Committee as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the government over upcoming elections, but did not want to go so far as to anger Mubarak just as he was about to be re-elected. Human rights activists and intellectuals also had reason to mitigate the threat of their demands to Mubarak; as a Committee member told me "we wanted to express that we would submit to a gradualist approach" when it came to reform. Mitigating the threat to Mubarak was also a way of mitigating the threat to opposition parties, by adopting a style that was more in keeping with statements by opposition parties than statements by human rights groups; more on this in the discussion of power relations in Chapter 5.

Identity construction in newspaper commentaries

Turning now to the newspaper commentaries by Hala Mustafa and Fahmi Huwaydi, I will explore how, in terms of specific linguistic strategies, each used the issue of democracy to construct a unique public identity within their respective communities of practice. Huwaydi and Mustafa construct public identities for themselves that are utterly different, which is not surprising as they belong to different communities of practice; Huwaydi is an independent Islamist intellectual, while Mustafa is a secular political scientist affiliated with a pro-government think tank. The common threads between them are that both are intellectuals, both are frequent contributors to the op-ed page of *al-Ahram* newspaper, and (most important from the point of view of this study) both have made democracy a major theme in their writings. As I will show, they use linguistic strategies differently to accomplish their aims. Looking at the inter-

action among self-referencing patterns, use of the definite article, implicature, and interdiscursivity in the commentaries is particularly enlightening in this regard.

Huwaydi

In a column entitled *haamat al-qaanuun wa qaamat al-rijaal* ("The weight of the law and the stature of men") published by *al-Shaab* newspaper on September 3, 1999 (Appendix E.1), Fahmi Huwaydi switches between the first person singular and first person plural pronouns in referring to himself, though he uses the first person singular more often. In some cases his use of *naHnu* ("we") seems to be inclusive, i.e., he seems to include the reader in the "we" apparently in an attempt to persuade the reader to share his point of view (see Connor-Linton 1988, Zupnik 1994):

E.1.a) 28 *wa i<u>dh</u> **naHmad** allaah 9alaa **annanaa lam nablug<u>h</u>** tilka al-marHala ba9d*
W**e thank** God that **we have not reached** this stage yet

In other cases the "we" seems to be exclusive and seems designed to situate Huwaydi within one of the communities of practice (recall he is both an Islamist and a mainstream columnist, an unusual combination) to which he belongs:

E.1.b) 16 *katab **zamiilunaa** al-ustaa<u>dh</u> 9adil Hammuuda maqaal 9ammaa yajrii fii al-maariinaa*
Our colleague Mr. Adil Hammouda wrote a column about what is going on in Marina

In example E.1.b, the fact that Huwaydi chose the first person plural possessive pronoun *-na* ("our") instead of the singular *-ii* ("my") implies that Adil Hammouda (a prominent columnist) is the colleague not just of Huwaydi but of others as well. These others are the mainstream columnists, among whom Huwaydi thereby places himself. Huwaydi reinforces this implication by his use of the term *ustaa<u>dh</u>* (literally "professor," but used to address or refer to an educated person without a doctoral degree), which is an honorific term normally used by people who work together in white-collar settings to signify respect and collegiality.

There is an additional implicature generated by Huwaydi's association of himself with Hammouda. Recall that the September 3 column was published by *al-Shaab* newspaper because it was rejected by *al-Ahram* newspaper. By referring to Hammouda's column on the same subject (misbehavior by the nouveaux

riches at an Alexandria resort), which Huwaydi points out was published by *al-Ahram* newspaper August 21, Huwaydi generates the implicature that in fairness his own column also should be published. After its rejection, allowing the column to be printed elsewhere (initially in an expatriate Arabic publication, then in *al-Shaab* newspaper) with the notice that it was censored by *al-Ahram* newspaper generates the further implicature that Huwaydi is being unfairly singled out among columnists for censorship. Such an implicature (deniable, of course, which helps Huwaydi keep his job at *al-Ahram* newspaper*)* performs at least two useful social functions for Huwaydi, in addition to attracting readers' attention to his work. First, it helps reinforce his claim to membership in the Islamist intellectual community of practice, which is subject to significant government restrictions on its activities. Second, it helps construct a public identity for Huwaydi that is independent and courageous.

Looking first at the latter aspect of public identity, it is striking that Huwaydi uses the first person singular to refer to himself in contexts that appear risky or controversial, which is the opposite of what one saw, for example, in the Mubarak speech excerpts. Two more excerpts from the September 3 column:

E.1.c) 9 *wa innamaa alladhii namaa **DHannii** akthar wa akthar wa **shaja9anii** 9alaa al-mughaamara bi-al-fatwaa fii al-mawDuu9*
In addition, what strengthened **my conviction** and **encouraged me** to venture a fatwa [Islamic legal opinion] in this matter

E.1.d)42–43 *wa **aHsub** an thamma furSa muwaatiyya al-aan. Haythu al-Hadiith 9an al-taghyiir yushakkil aHad 9anaawiin haadhihi al-marHala, ba9d maa taHaddath 9an-hu al-ra'iis mubaarak*
And **I think** there is an opportunity at hand now. Talk about change fills the headlines these days since President Mubarak spoke about it

In example E.1.c Huwaydi associates himself personally (although, interestingly, as an object rather than an agent) with a controversial action, the issuance of a fatwa, an Islamic legal opinion of the sort made notorious in the Salman Rushdie affair. (Here of course it is used metaphorically, as Huwaydi is not a cleric and his column can in no way be considered an actual fatwa.) In example E.1.d he associates himself personally with a different sort of risky opinion, that of a gentle challenge to President Mubarak to fulfill his promises about change.

Returning now to the Islamist intellectuals' community of practice, Huwaydi makes his claim to membership primarily through interdiscursivity with Islamic terms and holy scriptures. Allusion to "venturing a fatwa" in example c above generates the (deniable) implicature that, as an Islamist, Huwaydi might

be qualified to issue an Islamic legal opinion. In addition, Huwaydi says that the incident at Marina reminded him of a Hadith, a saying traced back to the Prophet Muhammad or one of his companions; well-established Hadith have a status in Islam second only to that of the Qur'an itself:

E.1.e) 3–6 *amaa idhaa* ***sa'altanii*** *li-maadhaa hiya min 9alaamaat al-saa9a, fa-****raddii*** *annanii* ***qara't Hadiith nabawii*** *yushiir ilaa an min tilka al-9alaamat inqilaab al-umuur ra's 9alaa 9aqib, bi-Haythu "talid" al-amma rabbahaa, wa lamaa waqa9at 9aynaaya 9alaa maa ra'ayt fii maSiif "maariinaa"* ***qult*** *an alladhii shaahadtuhu laa yaxtalif kathiir 9an al-mathal allaadhii warad fii* ***al-Hadiith***

If **you ask me** why it is a sign of the times, **my answer** is that **I read a prophetic Hadith** alluding to such signs in which matters are turned head over heels, so that a handmaiden gives birth to her lord. When **my eyes** beheld what **I beheld** at the "Marina" resort **I said** that it did not differ much from the case mentioned in **the Hadith**.

E.1.f) 25–27 *thamma* ***Hadiith nabawii*** *yuSawwir 9alaa naHw Saa'ib fadaaHa maa yuSiib al-mujtama9 idhaa maa ixtallat mawaaziin al-9adl fii-h, wa istaTaalat qaamat al-rijaal fawq al-qaanuun, idh yuqarrir*: *"innamaa ahlak min qablakum annahum kaanu idhaa saraq fii-him al-shariif tarakuuh, wa idhaa saraq fii-h al-Da9iif aqaamuu 9alay-h al-Hadd."*

There is **a prophetic Hadith** that depicts accurately the enormity of what befalls a society if justice does not prevail and the stature of men becomes greater than that of the law, which says: "As for your [pagan] forefathers, if a nobleman stole from them they let him be, whereas if a poor man stole from the nobleman then they punished him."

Note than in example E.1.e, Huwaydi uses the first person singular, associating himself personally with the allusion to the Hadith. In his 1993 book *Al-islaam wa al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*), Huwaydi devotes many chapters to interpreting excerpts from the Qur'an and the Hadith in order to show that the Western concept of democracy is fully compatible with the values of Islam.

Huwaydi's self-association with the Islamist community of practice via interdiscursivity with religious discourse, however, is fraught with tensions, and he distances himself as often as he associates himself. In the September article, for example, the lesson he draws from the Hadith cited in example E.1.f

is not the expected religious one (that the misbehavior of the nouveaux riches is incompatible with Islamic values) but a secular one: that accountability of all before the law is a key element of secular democratic values. And the example he holds up is of a Western country:

E.1.g) 34–36 *fa-innanaa najid an al-mujtama9aat al-diimuqraaTiyya hiya allatii ta9luu fii-haa qiimat iHtiraam al-qaanuun. wa ingilteraa allatii tu9add a9raq al-diimuqraaTiyyaat al-gharbiyya hiya awfiruhaa HaDHDH-an fii haadhaa al-baab. al-diimuqraaTiyya al-Haqiiqiyya allatii laa taj9al ahad fawq al-Hisaab miftaaH asaasii li-al-mushkila laa rayb…*

We find that democratic societies are those in which the value of respect for the law is paramount. England, considered the most deeply-rooted of Western democracies, is also the most fortunate in this regard. True democracy, which places no-one above accountability, is undoubtedly a basic key to the problem…

Elsewhere in the article (not in the excerpted portions), Huwaydi further demonstrates his independence from the Islamist community by praising an article published in the weekly political magazine *Rose al-Yusuf*, a magazine known for its vehemently anti-Islamist editorial line. In addition to interdiscursivity with religious and secular discourse, in the September 3 column Huwaydi also draws upon President Mubarak's discourse (unusual for Huwaydi), but I will take up that subject in the next chapter.

Mustafa

In two columns published on the op-ed pages of *al-Ahram* newspaper in the fall of 1999, Hala Mustafa employs several linguistic devices (notably her choices regarding self-referencing, interdiscursivity, and use of the definite article) in her treatment of democracy to claim certain aspects of public identity. The central aspect of identity that I will discuss here is Mustafa's claim to be the definitive interpreter of President Mubarak's statements on democracy within her community of practice (intellectuals close to government). *Al-ra'iis mubaarak wa 9ahd jadiid li-al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("President Mubarak and a new era for democracy"), published September 28, 1999 (Appendix F.1) builds on themes from a speech delivered by Mubarak in August 1999, and *Al-diimuqraaTiyya wa dawlat al-mu'assasaat* ("Democracy and the institutionalized state"), published November 30, 1999 (Appendix F.3) quotes extensively from Mubarak's

November address before Parliament, attempting to amplify the theme of the "institutionalized state."

Interdiscursivity with Mubarak's speeches is the most obvious device employed in the articles; both are filled with quotes short and long from the two speeches mentioned, showing the author's close attention to the President's discourse. In addition to direct quotes, Mustafa picks up terms or phrases from the speeches, particularly those that were new in Mubarak's discourse at the time, for example *al-mujtama9 al-madanii* ("civil society"), used by Mubarak for the first time in the August speech and picked up by Mustafa in the September 28 article and *tad9iim wa tarsiix dawlat al-mu'assasaat* ("supporting and deepening the institutionalized state"), a phrase from Mubarak's November address to which Mustafa dedicates most of her November 30 article.

In addition to the attempt to associate closely with Mubarak, interdiscursivity with Western political science terminology helps build another aspect of identity for Mustafa (who holds a doctorate in political science), that of a sophisticated intellectual with ties outside of Egypt. Not only does Mustafa translate such terms into Arabic but in the November 30 article she actually includes the English terms in bold below in Latin script following their Arabic translations:

F.3.a) 16–17 *mustawaa "al-mu'assasiyya **Level of Institutionalization**" fii ayy mujtama9 mi9yaar assaasii li-Damaan al-diimuqraaTiyya*
the "Level of Institutionalization" in any society is a basic standard for ensuring democracy

F.3.b) 17–18 *in binaa' al-mu'assasaat yuSbiH al-sharT al-Daruurii li-al-wuSuul ilaa diimuqraaTiyya saliima **Full Democracy***
institution building is a necessary condition for achieving Full Democracy

F.3.c) 22–23 *maa yu9raf bi-DHaahirat "shaxSana al-quwwa" **Personalizing Power***
the phenomenon known as "Personalizing Power"

Mustafa does the same thing once in her September 28 article, where she includes the English phrase "Developmental Process" in Latin script. Such a practice is unusual in *al-Ahram* newspaper, where terms from English or other Western languages often appear in Latin script in advertisements but seldom within the text of articles. Thus Mustafa's use of terms in Latin script sets her apart.

In the articles under consideration, deixis is used to establish a certain reality within which the author's identity is secured. Mustafa makes striking use of the definite article, for example, in contexts where – even accounting for differ-

ent use of the definite article in Arabic versus English – it is not required. There follow two examples from the September 28 article:

F.1.a) 12–13 *wa rubbamaa ta'tii fii muqaddimat al-qaDaayaa allatii iHtallat makaana baariza Dimn al-awlawiyyaat qaDiyyat al-diimuqraaTiyya wa hiya **al-qaDiyya** allatii rakkaz al-ra'iis 9alay-haa bi-akthar min ma9naa wa fii akthar min jaanib*
Perhaps among the most prominent priorities has been the issue of democracy, **the issue** on which the President has focused on in more than one way and to which he has devoted special concern.

F.1.b) 15–16 *fa-hiya **al-qaDiyya** allatii tamatta9at bi-istimraariyya wa ihtimaam malHuuDHa bi-shakl yatajaawaz maa awallathaa al-9uhuud al-saabiqa*
It is **the issue** that has enjoyed longevity and significant interest, exceeding that allotted it in previous eras.

Thus Mustafa defines democracy as *the* issue for Mubarak, bolstering her own importance as *the* interpreter on *the* issue of importance. Similarly, in the November 30 article, Mustafa uses the deictic demonstrative pronoun plus an adjective to claim that Mubarak is strongly interested in the "institutionalized state:"

F.3.d) 8–9 *wa **haadhaa al-ihtimaam al-miHwarii** alladhii yuuliih al-ra'iis mubaarak "li-dawlat al-mu'assasaat" innamaa yarja9 ilaa irtibaaTihaa al-wathiiq wa al-mubaashir bi-9amaliyyat al-taTawwur al-diimuqraatii.*
This pivotal interest devoted by President Mubarak to the "Institutionalized State" goes back to its profound and direct connection with the process of democratic development.

In addition to deictical expressions, the sheer number of mentions of democracy in Mustafa's two articles tends to reinforce both her claim that the issue is of central importance to Mubarak and her claim to be the leading pro-government intellectual writing on the subject. In the November 30 column she uses either the noun *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") or the adjective *diimuqraaTii* ("democratic") twenty times in Arabic (and once in English, in example b above), and in the September 28 column she uses them fourteen times; each article is roughly 1200 words long.

At the beginning of this section I mentioned that Mustafa's choices regarding self-referencing are among the ways in which she constructs a public

identity in the articles. In this case, it is the absence of self-referencing that gives Mustafa's writings a distinctive quality. The newspaper gives the byline of "Dr. Hala Mustafa," naming the author in the same way as it does other op-ed writers; use of "Dr." before the name of a writer holding a Ph.D. is common practice in Egypt, and establishes the author's bona fides as an intellectual. Within the articles themselves, however, there is not a single reference of the writer, pronominal or otherwise, to herself. Such a choice helps construct an image of the writer that is distant, offering no glimpse of the person behind the professional. It is reminiscent of government discourse and, combined with the extensive interdiscursivity with Mubarak's speeches, helps buttress the construction of Mustafa's identity as a quasi-official interpreter of his statements on democracy. The absence of self-referencing also might be connected to a strategy of self-protection; Mustafa said she took care to clothe her liberal, secularist views in diplomatic, unemotional language in order to avoid being pigeon-holed as a "reactionary" (by Nasserists) or an atheist (by Islamists).

Summarizing identity construction strategies

In the preceding analysis, I have shown how in each instance of Egyptian political discourse examined, part of the function of talking about democracy was to construct certain aspects of public identity, and that such identities were constructed through extremely simple linguistic devices such as the use of pronouns and the definite article:

- For the community of practice that wrote Mubarak's speeches (including, but not limited to, the president himself), self-referencing and other forms of deixis helped to construct an image of Mubarak as sincerely pro-democracy in terms of his personal feelings, an image deemed helpful especially in managing Egypt's relations with other nations. At the same time, the speech excerpts tried to distance Mubarak personally both from an evaluation of the progress toward democratization realized so far and from expectations of significant changes in the upcoming elections.
- For the communities of practice that produced the September petition, the self-referencing pattern in the petition helped to establish (primarily for the benefit of the participants themselves) that human rights activists and opposition politicians could work together on the issue of political reform, but that both were willing to take a gradualist approach to the issue and would back away from direct confrontation with the government.

- The individual intellectuals used newspaper commentaries on democracy to establish unique identities within their respective communities of practice. Fahmi Huwaydi, via a combination of self-referencing and interdiscursivity, claimed membership in both the mainstream columnists and the Islamist intellectuals communities of practice, but also demonstrated his independence from the Islamists by flouting certain social practices. Hala Mustafa, via interdiscursivity, use of the deictic definite article, and self-referencing (in her case, an absence of the latter), put forth her claim to unique insight into President Mubarak's discourse, constructing herself as the definitive interpreter of the president's utterances on a subject, democracy, that she claimed was a matter of high importance to him.

In the next chapter I will examine how the texts use some of the same linguistic strategies, especially interdiscursivity, as well as others such as frames and references to others, to carry out the social function of negotiating power relationships, both inside the communities of practice that produced the texts and between those communities and outsiders.

Chapter 5

Power relations replicated and challenged

> In a dialogue with President Mubarak at the Cairo International Book Fair in January 1992, I used the term "civil society" in my intervention. Unlike his habit, the president interrupted me to pose a sharp question, "what's wrong with the military people?" I explained to him what the term "civil society" meant, and attempted to clarify that it does not hold an opposite meaning to the military. The president nodded and took down a few notes about this new term… "civil society."
>
> Six years later, President Mubarak used the term "civil society" in his address before the International Economic Forum of Davos – Switzerland 1997. More recently, in a speech he gave to Egyptian university students in Alexandria (August 25, 1999), the president once again used this term "civil society." It was mentioned in a more elementary fashion than the previous time and thus attracted the headlines of Egyptian and Arab newspapers (e.g., *al-Ahram* newspaper of August 26, 1999).
>
> The Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (ICDS) is proud to be the pioneer think tank in presenting and fostering the concept of "civil society" in both Egyptian and Arab arenas for the last eleven years. ICDS is also proud that the leader of one of the Arab World's largest countries has become a faithful believer in "civil society." (Ibrahim 1999: 7)

In the above passage from the September 1999 issue of the English-language magazine *Civil Society and Democratization in the Middle East*, prominent Egyptian intellectual Saad Eddin Ibrahim (who was convicted by a State Security Court in May 2001 on charges related to his pro-democracy activities and acceptance of foreign funding without government permission and later exonerated by a higher court; see note in Preface) stakes a claim to a kind of authorship of the term "civil society" as it eventually appeared in Mubarak's speeches. More specifically, Ibrahim claims to have imported the term from external discourses in 1992, at which point it was totally unfamiliar to Mubarak. Mubarak used the term in speeches in Switzerland and elsewhere after 1997, but Ibrahim implied in the quote above that it was Mubarak's use of "civil society" in a domestic forum (a speech before students in Alexandria in August 1999) that was particularly significant, a victory worth celebrating for his Ibn Khaldun Center. Ibrahim's short article does not mention that the Arabic translation of "civil society" – *al-mujtama9 al-madanii* or *al-mujtama9 al-ahlii* – itself remained contested in 1999, an issue that will be discussed below.

Ibrahim's article is a good example of interdiscursivity and how it relates to power relations. He appropriates discourse by President Mubarak, claiming to have been the one who introduced the president to the term "civil society," and thereby associating himself with the power of the presidency. He also draws indirectly on some unnamed external discourse on democracy (it must be external or why would not the president have heard of the term before 1992?), showing his access to an outside discourse associated with the power of the West, and claims to have connected Mubarak to that discourse.

Part of what is going on in the quoted passage above and, I will argue, in the texts under examination in this study, is an attempted negotiation of power relations carried out via discourse about democracy. In the quoted passage it is fairly obvious; Ibrahim states openly that he is positioning his center as the "pioneer think tank" in promoting understanding of civil society, and goes so far as to express "pride" in (implying at least partial responsibility for) Mubarak's conversion to the idea. Thus the passage attempts to renegotiate power and status relations between Ibn Khaldun and rival think tanks (and probably between Ibrahim and individual rival intellectuals), between the Center and the Mubarak government, perhaps between Egypt and the West on some level (as the Egyptian president is portrayed as mastering or appropriating a term from Western discourse). In the texts under study, the attempts to negotiate power relations – whether by replicating existing power structures or challenging them – might not be as obvious, but I hope to show they are just as present and as useful in interpreting the discourse. The power relations being negotiated may be those inside the community of practice that produced the text or between that community and others.

The linguistic devices studied in the last chapter – forms of deixis and interdiscursivity – also will be useful here. Regarding deixis, in this chapter I will again look at the use of definite articles and patterns of referring, but regarding referring I will focus on references to others rather than to self. Regarding interdiscursivity, I will introduce into the analysis the variety that Bakhtin called "hidden polemic." Finally, I will also examine how frames carry out some of the work of power relations in discourse on democracy.

Power relations in the Mubarak speech excerpts

In the excerpts from President Mubarak's October 5 and November 13, 1999 speeches, references to others, frames, and interdiscursivity all contribute to-

ward replicating discursively the top-down, centrally controlled elite power structure for which Egypt is well known. (See Korany 1996, Ibrahim 1996, Springborg 1989, and others; also see Singerman 1995 and Fandy 1998 on alternate power structures formed by non-elite Egyptians.) Potential challengers to state supremacy regarding democracy (political parties, non-governmental institutions, citizens, anyone who would criticize Mubarak's record) are discursively isolated, cut down to size, linked to undesirable phenomena. Pledges to hold fair elections or increase the opposition share of parliamentary seats are heavily hedged, leaving the impression that promises have been made and not made at the same time. Most likely such tendencies in the discourse – coexisting with the pro-democracy sentiments with which Mubarak personally is associated – reflect the ambivalence of members of the speechwriting community of practice regarding democratization, and the conflicting priorities of projecting a vaguely pro-democracy image for Mubarak while expressing his intention to maintain firm control of the domestic political scene.

References to others in the speech excerpts

In the two speech excerpts under question, President Mubarak does not refer to any person or group by name, but refers many times to persons or groups by category such as "citizen" or "institution." The most obvious instance in which Mubarak uses naming to denigrate an opponent is in the November 13 speech (full text in Appendix C.1):

C.1.a.) 7 *xaTTat muSr xuTuwaat-in haama,*
Egypt has taken important steps,
8 *laa yast-*
that cannot –
9 ***laa yastaTii9u inkaaruhaa illaa mukaabir-un gaaHid.***
cannot be denied except by an arrogant ingrate.

In line 9 of example C.1.a., three grammatical devices combine to isolate the unnamed critic of Mubarak's record on democratization (see the previous chapter for my argument for considering "Egypt" in line 7 as a form of self-reference for Mubarak). First, *mukaabir-un gaaHid* ("arrogant ingrate") is in the singular, discursively minimizing the number of ingrates who might deny that Egypt has taken important steps. Second, the phrase is indefinite, a stylistic choice rather than one clearly determined by meaning. Third, the preceding particle *illaa* ("except"), combined with the negative *laa yastaTii9u* ("he/it cannot"), further

isolates the ingrate. In addition, of course, the negative connotations of the noun *mukaabir* ("ingrate") and adjective *gaaHid* ("arrogant") are clear enough.

A less obvious tactic for minimizing a potential opponent, but one I would argue is also effective, appears in the October 5 speech excerpt (full text in Appendix B.1). As mentioned in the previous chapter, in this speech excerpt Mubarak defines the legitimate players in Egyptian political life as the state, institutions (i.e., groups licensed and regulated under Egyptian law), and the individual citizen, and then outlines the duties of each player. Although institutions are identified as the most potentially dangerous players (see discussion below under *Frames*), the excerpt also discursively minimizes the role of citizens by referring to them only in the singular:

B.1.a) 32 *ma9a dawri l-waTan – **l-muwaaTini l-fard**…*
with the role of the nation – **the individual citizen**…

B.1.b) 65 *wa muhimmatu **l-muwaaTinu** an ya9rifa annahu miHwaru t-tanmiyati wa mawDuu9h*
The citizen's duty is to realize that he is the axis and object of development

B.1.c) 71 *9indamaa yastaqirru fii Damiiru **kullu muwaaTin**…*
when **each citizen** has clearly fixed in his conscience...

72 *Darruuratu Htiraami l-qaanuun…*
the necessity to respect the law

In examples B.1.a, B.1.b, and B.1.c above (b and c are part of an entire section on the duties of the citizen), Mubarak refers to "the citizen" in the singular – a stylistic choice by the speechwriters, as references in the plural would also have been appropriate – underlined by the use of the noun *fard* ("individual") along with "citizen." In addition, the duties of the citizen as envisioned in the excerpt are purely cognitive rather than agentive:

B.1.d) 65 *wa muhimmatu l-muwaaTinu an **ya9rifa** annahu miHwaru t-tanmiyati wa mawDuu9h*
The citizen's duty is **to realize** that he is the axis and object of development

B.1.e) 71 *9indamaa **yastaqirru fii Damiiru** kullu muwaaTin…*
when each citizen **has clearly fixed in his conscience**…

72 *Darruuratu Htiraami l-qaanuun…*
the necessity to respect the law

73 *wa **l-Hirs** 9alaa adaa'i l-waagibi l-waTanii…*
eagerness to do his national duty…

74 *wa* ***l-idraaku l-mas'uul****…*
and **a responsible awareness**...
75 *li-ahammiyati t-tawaazun bayna l-Haqq wa l-waagib…*
of the important distinction between rights and responsibilities…

So the duties of this individual citizen are to "realize," to "have fixed in his conscience," to be "eager," to have "a responsible awareness," i.e., all cognitive or emotive rather than agentive. Thus the excerpt tends to reinforce a power structure in which the citizen is isolated, and is encouraged by the government to sit back and examine his conscience rather than take the initiative.

Frames in the speech excerpts

Among the linguistic devices Tannen describes as indicating frames operating in discourse, negatives, conditionals, and qualifiers are used extensively in the Mubarak excerpts. As mentioned above, in many cases the use of such linguistic devices generates implicatures, which appear to be deliberate but are also deniable. There are many examples, but I will focus on three passages that strike me as particularly revealing as regards power relations. First, in the October 5 speech Mubarak's delineation of the responsibilities of institutions in particular marks institutions as potentially dangerous:

B.1.f. 56 *wa an tuHaafi<u>DH</u>a 9alaa kayaanihaa l-waTanii…*
[Their duty is also] to preserve their national identity…
57 wa ta9mila 9alaa taHqiiqi t-tagaanusi bayna ahdaafihaa…
work to bridge the achievement of their own goals…
58 wa bayna muqtaDayyaati l-SaaliHi l-9aamm.
with the requirements of the public interest
59 ***kay laa takuuna adaat-an fii aydii quwa-n aw gamaa9at-in xaarigiyya****…*
so as not to become a tool of any external power or organization…
60 *kamaa tumaarisu dawrahaa d-diimuqraaTii wa T-Taw9ii…*
In addition, they must play their democratic and voluntary roles…
61 ***duuna an tuqHima nafsahaa****…*
without embroiling themselves…
62 Taraf-an fii Siraa9–in hadafhu t-tamyiiz bayna maSaaliHi *l-muwaaTiin…*
in a conflict of which the goal is favoritism regarding citizens' interests…

63 *aw taghliib maSaaliHi fi'at-in,*
or the triumph of one faction's interests
64 9alaa Hisaabi fi'at-in uxraa.
at the expense of another faction.

The passage in example B.1.f uses a number of linguistic devices in order to associate institutions with negative practices. The very fact that Mubarak is admonishing institutions to work at preserving their "national identity" and bridging their goals with the public interest casts doubt upon their patriotism. The negatives used in lines 59 and 61 reinforce this impression because a negative generally is used only when its affirmative would otherwise be expected (Tannen 1979: 170), i.e., that institutions would become tools in the hands of foreign powers or would embroil themselves in parochial conflicts. Thus, merely by admonishing institutions in this way, the excerpt portrays them as potentially dangerous and irresponsible, without actually accusing them.

Lines 62–64 of example B.1.f show how the use of evaluative language (another indicator of frames) contributes toward building an image of institutions as irresponsible in this excerpt. Words and expressions such as *tamyiiz* ("favoritism, discrimination") and *9alaa Hisaabi* ("at the expense of") have strongly pejorative connotations and suggest that, without Mubarak's guidance, non-governmental institutions cannot be trusted with public welfare. The speech excerpt itself provides the solution, using some of the same words (such as *maSaaliH*, "interests," and *fi'a* or the plural *fi'aat*, "faction/s" or "segment/s") to describe one of the state's duties:

B.1.g) 43 *tawaazunu l-maSaaliHi bayna kull fi'aati l-mugtama9.*
a balance of interests among all segments of society

Thus the effect of the excerpt is to portray a power structure in which only the state can be trusted to have the public's interests at heart, in which certain institutions may participate but must be closely watched and in no way trusted, and in which the citizen is isolated and should remain passive.

In the November speech (Appendix C.1), negatives, qualifiers, and contrastive connectives combine to evoke certain frames in a striking passage regarding opposition representation in parliament:

C.1.b) 36 *innanaa* ***laa nuSaadiru*** *9alaa Haqq il-mu9aaraDa fii tamthiili niyabii..*
we do not stand in the way of the opposition's right to a

37 ***akthara tawaazuna.***
more balanced parliamentary representation.
38 *wa* ***laysa hunaaka maa yamna9u*** *min an* ***nabHatha ansab as-subul*** *li-taHqiiqi dhaalik.*
There is nothing to prevent our **exploring the best way** to achieve that.
39 *wa* ***laakinna bidaayata T-Tariiq*** **–**
But the beginning of the road –
Aud: 40 XXXXXXXXX /?/

The negative in line 36 *laa nuSaadiru* ("we do not stand in the way") and qualifier in line 37 *akthara tawaazuna* ("more balanced") both are intriguing in that they suggest Mubarak is admitting there is room for improvement in the present situation, i.e., that the government has in the past stood in the way (or at least that people think the government has done so) and that opposition parliamentary representation is not "balanced." The remarkable statement in lines 38–39 then appears to contain a pledge to remedy that situation – but one that is undermined at least six ways by my count: (1) the negative *laysa hunaaka maa* ("there is nothing") and (2) negative verb *yamna9u* ("he/it prevents") combine to create the impression, paradoxically, that there *is* some obstacle to exploring enhanced opposition representation that Mubarak is at pains to deny. Then (3) the verb *nabHatha* ("we explore") also is weak, i.e., a pledge only to consider action rather than to undertake it, an impression enhanced by (4) *ansab as-subul* ("the best means") i.e., what will be considered is not even action itself but "the best means" to undertake action. Carrying on to line 39, 5) the contrastive connective *laakinna* ("but") serves to deny even the weak expectations created by the preceding statement (Tannen 1979: 170) and then 6) *bidaayata T-Tariiq* ("the beginning of the road") contains the presupposition that there is a "road" to enhanced opposition representation, a road not even begun yet.

Interestingly, as seen in line 40, Mubarak's audience begins applauding when he is in the middle of the utterance in line 39, apparently a slightly delayed reaction to his utterance in line 38. The applause (which occurs infrequently during Mubarak's speeches) is sustained and accompanied by mumbling in the audience, to which Mubarak replies with a spontaneous (unusual for him) exchange with the audience:

C.1.c) 39 *wa laakinna bidaayata T-Tariiq –*
But the beginning of the path –
Aud: 40 XXXXXXXXX /?/

HM: 41 *uh @ ha…*
Uh @ ha
42 *maa ttafa'tuu wi xtalaftum,*
You agreed and you disagreed,
43 *maa ntu Hayyartuunaa.*
You perplexed us.
Aud: 44 @@@ /?/

Clearly Mubarak's audience (members of a parliament largely from Mubarak's National Democratic Party but including a number of opposition party members) considered his statement in line 38 noteworthy, though whether it merited applause because they viewed it as a significant new step or because it was so cleverly hedged is not clear. That Mubarak replies to their response with laughter (represented in transcript by @) and teasing about their inability to make up their minds, which then provokes laughter from the audience, adds to the total effect that Mubarak is making a promise and not making it at the same time. In this way the existing power relations – Mubarak in total control, teasingly dangling a small piece of bait before a weak opposition – are reproduced in the excerpt.

Interdiscursivity and hidden polemic in the speech excerpts

In the two speech excerpts, Mubarak makes no direct reference to or quotation from discourse by others. An outside academic who coordinated one speech told me that someone (probably Mubarak himself or al-Baz) removed all the quotes the academic had included in the draft speech; he speculated that Mubarak avoided quotes (from the Qur'an as well as other sources) because the president did not want to embarrass himself by making errors. In the excerpts under study, Mubarak does refer once to his own discourse, however, and uses several phrases from a lexicon on democracy-related issues shared by other players on the Egyptian and international scenes. First, the reference to his own discourse, which appears in the October 5 speech:

B.1.f) 1 *wa qad laa takuunu furSat-un muwaatiyyat-un al-yawm…*
Perhaps today is not the best time..
2 *likayy ataHaddatha 9alaa naHw-in,*
for me to talk in a [way]
3 *akthara tafSiil-in 9an haadhaa l-barnaamig…*
more detailed way about this program…

4 *alladhii yushakkilu Hagaru z-zaawiya…*
which constitutes the cornerstone…
5 *fii ru'yat-in mustaqbaliyyat-in,*
of a forward-looking vision
6 *li-xiyaaraati miSr ma9a bidaayati l-alfiyyati th-thaalitha.*
of Egypt's options upon the beginning of the third millennium.
7 *li-anna maw9ida dhaalika huwa liqaa'una l-qaadim ma9a bad'i l-dawra l-gadiida,*
The appointed time for that is our next meeting, upon the beginning of the new session
8 *li-maglisikum al-muwaqqar,*
of your esteemed assembly,
9 *in shaa' allaah.*
God willing.
10 *laakinnanii…*
But…
11 *astaTii9u an u'akidda 9alaa 9adad-in min al-Haqaa'iqi l-muhimma.*
I can highlight a number of important facts.

In this example, Mubarak is looking ahead to the speech that he will make in November. He builds up the forthcoming speech as a "forward-looking vision of Egypt's options upon the beginning of the third millennium," an implied apology for the more modest content of the present speech. The apology is mitigated almost immediately by the contrastive connective *laakinnanii* ("but I") and the positivist phrase *astaTii9u an u'akidda 9alaa 9adad-in min al-Haqaa'iqi l-muhimma* ("I can highlight a number of important facts"). Once again, the example shows Mubarak in control, extending to his audience the amount of information he deems appropriate and no more.

In a passage from the November speech that immediately follows the passage in example C.1.c above, hidden polemic and other strategies are used to score points against the opposition parties (emphasis in line 48 is Mubarak's, not added by me):

C.1.d) 45 *wa laakinna **bidaayata T-Tariiqi** tatamaththal fii an tuSliHa l-mu9aaraDatu min awDaa9ihaa.*
but **the beginning of the road** would consist of the opposition rectifying its own affairs
46 *wa an takuuna **akthara diimuqraaTiyyat-an fii daaxilihaa.***
of being **more democratic internally**

Aud: 47 /?/
HM: 48 *wa an tu9abbira bi–l-fi9l 9an* ***maSaaliH al-gamahiir!***
and *truly representing* ***the interests of the masses!***
Aud: 49 XXXXXXXXXXX
HM: 50 *ayyuhaa l-ixwa l-axawaat…*
Brothers and sisters…
Aud: 51 @@, /?/
HM: 52 *@wusht l-waaqi9 walla eeh? @*
@Is that a realistic perspective, or what?@
Aud: 53 @@@XX

Example C.1.d represents what is by far the most dynamic passage (the one in which Mubarak's vocal tone became the most animated, and which drew the longest instance of audience applause) of the entire speech given on November 13, 1999. Part of the reason, I would argue, is Mubarak's polemic against the opposition, which is overt and hidden at the same time. The polemic is overt in the sense that the opposition is the direct referential object. What is hidden is the interdiscursivity, for Mubarak here is using some phrases used by the opposition to criticize or make demands from his government and party, such as line 46 *akthara diimuqraaTiyyat-an fii daaxilihaa* ("more democratic internally"), line 45 *bidaayati T-Tariiq* ("the beginning of the road") – close to a phrase used in the September 1999 petition *al-xutwa al-uulaa fii al-Tariiq* ("the first step on the road/path"), and line 48 *maSaaliH al-gamahiir* ("the interests of the masses"), a patently leftist phrase. Hence the largely pro-Mubarak audience might also be responding to Mubarak's turning-of-tables on the opposition. As in example C.1.c, Mubarak pauses to laugh and throw an aside to the audience that brings more laughter, enhancing the impression that both speaker and listeners are delighting in the repartee.

Another reason for the enthusiastic applause to lines 45–48 may be structural. In his seminal study of political speechmaking, Atkinson notes that lists of three items can be extremely effective "claptraps," particularly if the speaker marks the three carefully with intonation (rising on the first element, falling at the termination of the third) (Atkinson 1984:62). This is the case with the example above. Lines 45, 46, and 48 constitute a three-part list of demands, and Mubarak marks the third element with heavy stress and falling intonation, clearly bringing his point home.

In the most remarked-upon passage from the speech (see previous chapter, Section 4.2.a.), Mubarak borrows from the discourse of human rights groups and opposition parties:

C.1.e) HM 65 *wa **i<u>dh</u>aa kuntu a9id** bi-an takuuna l-intixabaati l-qaadimatu **na<u>DH</u>iifat-un – na<u>DH</u>iifat-an wa naziiha**,*
If I promise that the coming elections will be **clean – clean and** fair,
66 *tax<u>DH</u>a9u fii kulli maraaHilihaa li-i<u>sh</u>raaf-in kaamil-in min al-qaDaa'*,
subjected in all stages to the complete supervision of the judiciary-
Aud 67 X-X-X-X
HM 68 *allaa<u>dh</u>ii ya9tazzu bi-hi kulli miSrii,*
of which every Egyptian is proud,
69 *wa tuwaffir la-hu d-dawla kulla maa huwa gadiir-un bi-hi min istiqlaal,*
and to which the state provides all necessary independence,
70 *li-annanaa nu'min bi-an stiqlaal aS-SulTati l-qaDaa'iyyati hiya min – huwa min ahammu rakaa'iz al-Hukmi fii miSr.*
because we believe that the independence of the judiciary is among the most important pillars of governance in Egypt.

As with example C.1.b, what is intriguing about line 65 of example C.1.e is that it generates the implicature that Mubarak is acknowledging that previous elections were not *na<u>DH</u>iifat-an wa naziiha* ("clean and fair"); otherwise, how would it be relevant for him to promise that the coming elections will be so?

This implicature, along with the verb *a9id* ("I promise") that appears to contain a speech act (see Austin 1962 and Levinson 1983: 226–262), are both significantly weakened by the belatedly-completed conditional clause that begins in line 65 with the conditional particle *i<u>dh</u>aa* ("if"). The complement or *jawaab* ("response") appears in line 73, but it serves primarily as the complement to another conditional clause, which begins in line 71:

C.1.f) 71 *aquulu innanaa **i<u>dh</u>aa kunnaa** gamii9–an,*
I say that **if we** collectively
72 *HaariSiin 9alaa Damaanaat – Damaan intixabaat-in Hurrati wa naziiha,*
are eager for guarantees – to guarantee free and fair elections

73 ***fa-inna*** *9alaa l-aHzaabi wa l-afraadi l-mu<u>sh</u>aarikiina fii l-9amaliyya-ti l-intixaabiyya*,
then it is up to the parties and individuals participating in the electoral process
74 *an yatagannabuu l-mumaarasaati <u>gh</u>ayru d-diimuqraatiyya,*
to put aside undemocratic practices

Thus, the postponement of resolution of the conditional clause (as well as the fact that the resolution involves action by others, not by Mubarak or his government) is another instance of a promise that seems to be made but is undermined linguistically, taking away from its value as a speech act.

Power relations in the September petition

In addition to constructing a group identity (however weak and tentative) for the "Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform," the petition published in early September 1999 performed the important work of negotiating power relations. As I hope to show in this section, the power relations being negotiated were primarily those between secondary communities of practice (COPs) involved in producing the petition – especially opposition politicians and human rights activists – and to a lesser extent between the Committee and the government of President Mubarak, to whom the petition is addressed. Or, to put it another way, the ways in which human rights activists and opposition politicians chose to speak to Mubarak and address political reform in the petition carried out their struggle with each other for control of an issue of mutual concern.

In the spring and summer of 1999, members of the human rights COP decided to wrest the initiative on political reform from the opposition politicians COP, where responsibility for the issue generally resided. As the human rights activist most centrally involved in the petition told me, "there was a profound realization that we could not achieve any of our human rights goals without political reform. Also, some of the political groups, especially the leftists, were becoming more aware of the role human rights groups could play. In forming the Committee, we were trying to fill a gap." Linguistic traces of those power struggles can be seen in how interdiscursivity (including hidden polemic) and deixis (especially use of the definite article) operate in the text.

Interdiscursivity and hidden polemic in the September petition

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the petition produced by the Committee bears a strong resemblance to a statement issued by Egyptian human rights groups in May 1999, and also has links to the April 1999 Casablanca Declaration and a December 1997 statement by opposition parties. (See a full text of the petition in Appendix D.1.)

The ascendancy of the human rights COP is evident in several aspects. First, in its brevity (250 words) the petition resembles statements by human rights groups (the May statement is approximately 535 words) more than those of Egyptian opposition politicians (the December 1997 statement weighs in at over 3000 words). Second, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the list of demands in the petition (lifting the emergency law, guaranteeing free and fair elections, deregulating formation of political parties, deregulating press ownership and access, and deregulating unions and NGOS) closely parallels the list in the May statement (lifting the emergency law, deregulating unions, freeing the press, deregulating party activities, ceasing torture), completely different from the everything-but-the-kitchen-sink set of demands in the 1997 opposition statement.

Third, human rights participants succeeded in imposing their preference for what they regarded as "precision" in the petition's wording. As two human rights activists on the Committee told me, for example, they preferred to use the term *al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii wa al-dustuurii* ("political and constitutional reform") rather than *al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democracy") to express the petition's chief demand. The selected phrase appears twice in the petition, including it its title (example D.1.a):

D.1.a) 25 *nidaa' min ajl* ***al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii wa al-dustuurii*** *fii miSr*
Petition on Behalf of **Political and Constitutional Reform** in Egypt

D.1.b) 41–42 *al-xutwa al-uulaa fii al-Tariiq ilaa* ***iSlaaH siyaasii wa dustuurii jidhrii***
The first step on the path toward **a radical political and constitutional** reform

Interestingly, the May 1999 statement written and approved by the same human rights activists uses "democracy" more extensively, for example in its title *miSr tataTalla9 ilaa iSlaaH diimuqraaTii jidhrii* ("Egypt aspires to a radical democratic reform"); the 1997 opposition statement also uses "democracy" frequently. When asked about this difference, one activist involved in producing both the September and May texts denied any special significance, saying only that his aim was "more precise language." Another activist involved in both explained

that he and others from his COP feared that democracy could be interpreted as meaning "only elections," the central concern for politicians but one among many for human rights activists. Thus it seems that the human rights activists might have shifted their language in order to avoid its potential misuse by the opposition politicians.

Despite the fact that human rights activists shaped the petition in important ways, the opposition politicians also left significant traces. Here is where Bakhtin's idea of hidden polemic can be seen operating, specifically what Bakhtin referred to as a text's "cringing" in anticipation of another's objection (Bakhtin 1984: 196). The fact that the five demands contained in the petition are agentless, for example, reflects the stylistic preference of the parties, according to one of the drafters. Contrast the way the petition's five demands are introduced:

D.1.c) 27–28 *fa-hum yuTaalibuun bi-an yabda' haadhaa al-taHriir* ***bi-ittixaadh xamsa ijra'aat asaasiyya*** *hiya:*
they demand that such liberation begin **by taking five basic measures**, which are:

with, for example, the more direct way demands are directed at Mubarak in the May statement by human rights groups:

> *fii haadhaa al-iTaar* ***hunaaka xuTuwaat Daruuriyya min al-waajib an yanDHur al-sayyid al-ra'iis fii al-qiyaam bi-haa****, rubbamaa duun intiDHaar balwarat barnaamij shaamil li-al-iSlaaH al-siyaasii, mithla:*
> ("In this regard **there are necessary steps that His Excellency the President is bound to consider undertaking**, perhaps without awaiting crystallization of a comprehensive program of political reform, for example:").

Deixis in the September petition

The "cringing" nature of the petition can be seen most clearly in the last paragraph (lines 41–47 of Appendix D.1), the most controversial part of the petition according to members of the Committee. First, there is the fact that one of the most timely demands of the petition, that the president be limited to two terms in office, appears not in the list of five demands, but in the very last sentence of the document before the signatures, almost as an afterthought:

D.1.d)45–47 *bi-Hayth yakuun ra'iis al-dawla ramz li-al-waTan wa yajrii intixaabihi –* ***ba9d dhaalik*** *– bayn akthar min murashshaH, wa bi-maa laa*

yaziid muddatayn mutataaliyyatayn
The president would be a symbol of the nation and his election would take place – **from then on** (lit: **after that)** – among more than one candidate, and would be limited to two consecutive terms.

Second, the phrase *ba9d dhaalik* ("after that") is awkward, as the referent of the deictic *dhaalik* ("that") is not immediately apparent. One of the drafters confirmed that *dhaalik* refers to the referendum on Mubarak's fourth consecutive term, which was scheduled to take place (and did take place) on September 25, 1999, only a few weeks after the petition's issuance. "Some of the political parties had already endorsed Mubarak for a new term," the drafter explained, so "it had to be clear that the call for term limits was not intended to apply to the upcoming referendum." Even so, the choice of the unspecific and distant *dhaalik* instead of a clearer reference to the approaching referendum suggests both an attempt to avoid offending Mubarak and a discomfort in handling the subject of the referendum.

Another form of deixis that expresses the "cringing" nature of the petition is the fact that many of the measures demanded are presented in indefinite form. This is not to say that the indefinite forms are peculiar, but to note that in many cases a definite form would have been equally appropriate and idiomatic. The following are some of the demands or complaints in indefinite form in the petition that might have been expressed in definite form:

D.1.e) 26 *taHriir al-Hayaa al-siyaasiyya **mi-maa tu9aaniih min quyuud***
to liberate political life **from restrictions from which it suffers** (lit: from that from which it suffers among restrictions)

D.1.f) 28 *bi-ttixaadh **xamsa ijra'aat asaasiyya** hiya*
by taking **five basic measures**, which are:

D.1.g) 31 *Damaanaat li-**intixaabaat Hurra naziiha***
guarantees for **free and fair elections**

D.1.h) 32 *fii DHill **munaafasa siyaasiyya kaamila wa mutakaafi'a***
within the context of **complete and fair political competition**

D.1.i) 32 *la-haa **ishraaf qaDaa'ii kaamil***
under **complete judicial supervision**

D.1.j) 39–40 *sa9y-an ilaa **mujtama9 ahlii** qaadir 9alaa al-musaahama fii binaa' al-diimuqraaTiyya wa al-taqaddum*
leading to **a civil society** capable of contributing to democracy and progress

D.1.k) 41–42 *al-xutwa al-uulaa fii al-Tariiq ilaa **iSlaaH siyaasii wa dustuurii jidhrii***
The first step on the path toward a **radical political and constitutional** reform

D.1.l) 42 *bi-maa yuhayyi' al-manaax li-**intiqaal silmii** li-l-sulTa*
creating the climate for **a peaceful transfer** of power

D.1.m) 43–44 *taquum 9alaa **ta9addudiyya Hizbiyya Haqiiqa***
founded on **a true party pluralism**

D.1.n) 44 *tatadaawal fii-haa al-aHzaab al-Hukm Tibq-an li-maa tusfir 9an-hu* **intixaabaat naziiha**
in which parties alternate in power depending on the results of **fair elections**

What is notable about examples D.1.e-D.1.n is that in every case the petition producers had available an alternative of making definite the expressions indicated in bold. For example, in D.1.e. the petition producers might have written *taHriir al-Hayaa al-siyaasiyya min **al-quyuud** illatii tu9anniihaa* (to liberate political life from the restrictions that afflict it), in D.1.f. they might have written *bi-ittixadh **al-ijra'aat al-xamsa al-asaasiyya al-taaliyya**:* ("By taking the following five basic measures:"), in example D.1.g. they might have written *Damaanaat li-**al-intixaabaat al-Hurra wa-al-naziiha*** ("Guarantees for free and fair elections"), etc.

As noted in the previous chapter, general concepts such as "political reform," "party pluralism," "civil society," etc. that are expressed in English with no article, in Arabic generally are expressed with the definite article. (Please see Section 2.4.a. for discussion of differences between Arabic and English regarding use of the definite article). Without the article, the expression may suggest that the speaker is referring to a single instance (e.g., "a civil society") or to part of a whole (e.g. "some political reform"). In other cases, the expression without the definite article is best translated into English without any article, but it remains the case that the Arabic speaker chose to make the expression indefinite rather than definite. The point is that, while no single example above is egregious or unusual, the repeated choice of indefinite expressions has the cumulative effect of making demands sound less emphatic, less concrete; in effect, it is the opposite of what Billig called "homeland deixis" and what President Mubarak did in his speeches (see Billig 1995, discussed in Chapter 4 of this study).

Contrasting examples D.1.e-D.1.n. from the September petition with similar phrases from the May 1999 human rights statement, one sees that some of the same terms are used as part of demands made, but with definite articles. The

May petition contains phrases such as: *waqf kaafat **al-quyuud** al-ijraa'iyya wa al-qanuuniyya* ("ceasing all **the** procedural and legal **restrictions**") and *tajmiid kaafat **al-quyuud** 9alaa nashaaT al-aHzaab al-siyaasiyya* ("freezing all **the restrictions** on activity by the political parties") as compared to D.1.e. *mi-maa tu9aaniih min **quyuud*** ("from **restrictions** from which it suffers"). The May statement also uses the phrase *al-mujtama9 al-madani* ("civil society") four times, each time in definite form as compared to D.1.k. *mujtama9 ahlii* ("a civil society").

As noted above, the two statements also use different Arabic words to translate the adjective in "civil society," a phrase reflecting interdiscursivity with Western discourse on human rights and democracy. According to the editor of an Egyptian journal on subjects related to civil society, in 1999 the translation *madanii* for "civil" had fallen somewhat out of favor because it carried the connotations both of "civilian" as opposed to "military" (recall Mubarak's reaction to the term, reported in a quote heading this chapter) and of "secular" as opposed to "religious," a possible affront to Islamist political groups. *Ahlii*, on the other hand, carried the connotation of "people's," which was more acceptable to the broad spectrum of participants in the Committee and thus was used in the September petition.

In terms of power relations, then, the process of producing the September petition in the first instance constituted an effort by the human rights COP to gain the upper hand over the opposition politicians' COP regarding the struggle for political reform, an effort manifested in significant conceptual and organizational affinities between the September petition and the May statement by human rights groups. The opposition politicians, while not wanting to surrender the issue to the human rights activists, were concerned about protecting their capital with the Mubarak government, and so managed to introduce linguistic strategies of "cringing" (before an anticipated hostile response from the Mubarak government) into the petition. The differences between the human rights activists and the opposition politicians should not be too sharply drawn, however, and the human rights activists acquiescence in such "cringing" reminds us of the dialectic nature of such relations. I mentioned in Chapter 4 that one of the principal intellectuals involved in the petition's production said that he and human rights activists wanted the petition "to express our willingness to submit to a gradualist approach" regarding political reform. The same intellectual also noted that Egyptian opposition parties are "not very extreme; that is the way of Egyptians, to be modest and self-disciplined." Another way of looking at the latter statement by this intellectual is that opposition forces, in

their own way, participate in replicating discursively the strong president-weak opposition dynamic in Egypt.

Power relations in the newspaper commentaries

In the excerpts on democracy from commentaries by Hala Mustafa and Fahmi Huwaydi, part of the work carried out is to negotiate power relations within communities of practice to which the two writers belong. To a lesser extent, the excerpts also address power relations between the writers and members of other communities of practice: members of the Mubarak government, for example, or the editorial staff of *al-Ahram* newspaper. As with the aspects of identity construction discussed in the last chapter, interdiscursivity is a major way the writers carry out the work of negotiating power relations. Ways of referring to others and deixis also perform some of the work.

Mustafa

Negotiation of power relations – primarily within her community of pro-government intellectuals, but also to some extent between Mustafa and some government officials – is an important function of the Mustafa excerpts. Power relations also are closely tied to the construction of identity for Mustafa; note that some of the linguistic strategies discussed in the last chapter, such as the absence of self-references and the use of the definite article, have significant implications for power relations. The absence of self-references evokes government discourse (thus supporting Mustafa's claim to be close to government circles) and bolsters Mustafa's importance within her intellectual community of practice, as it (along with the deictic definite article *al-* attached to issues Mustafa wants to highlight) creates a discursive reality in which her interpretation is *the* interpretation on *the* issue of importance to Mubarak. These two strategies are at least as important in carrying out the work of power relations as those that will be discussed below.

Regarding power relations inside her COP of pro-government intellectuals, Mustafa stakes a claim to special status primarily by associating herself with President Mubarak via several discursive practices. The first two practices are forms of interdiscursivity. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, she includes fairly lengthy quotes from his speeches in the two articles under study. In the article published September 28, 1999 she quotes from Mubarak's speech to students in the Egyptian city of Alexandria on August 25, and in the article

published November 30, 1999 she quotes extensively from Mubarak's November 13 speech before the Egyptian parliament. Second, in discussing democracy and related issues she uses phrases similar to those used by Mubarak without directly quoting him. Third, she engages in some practices of referring to the president that are more typical of a government insider than of an ordinary intellectual or journalist.

Looking at Mustafa's use of phrases borrowed from Mubarak's discourse without being directly quoted, there is for example in the November article (Appendix F.3) the following two variations of a phrase:

F.3.a) 9–10 *fa-al-diimuqraaTiyya bi-Hukm al-ta9riif laa taquum bi-duun mu'assasaat qawiyya* ***tuda99imuhaa wa-turassixuhaa***
Democracy by definition cannot stand without strong institutions to **support and secure** it.

F.3.b) 47–49 *li-dhaalik kullihi fa-inn al-da9wa ilaa* ***tad9iim wa tarsiix*** *"dawlat al-mu'assasaat" yu9add xuTwa haama wa asaasiyya fii Tariiq da9m al-diimuqraaTiyya wa maa tastalzimuhu min iSlaaH*
For all these reasons, the call to **support and secure** the "Institutionalized State" is considered an important and basic step on the way to supporting democracy and the reform it requires.

Mubarak uses the same combination of two verbs in his October speech (Appendix B.1):

B.1.g) 17 *kaana Hagaru z-zaawiyati fiih…*
The cornerstone in it was...
18 *huwa ta9uud –* ***tad9iim*** *dawri l-mu'assasaati fii-l-mugtama' al-miSrii.*
returning – **supporting** the role of institutions in Egyptian society
19 *wa* ***tarsiixi*** *mafhuumi dawlati l-mu'assasaat…*
and **securing** the concept of a state based on institutions…
20 *fii waaqi9naa s-siyaasii…*
in our political reality…

Another form of interdiscursivity between Mustafa's articles and Mubarak's discourse is her use of Mubarak-like phrases, for example her use of the phrases including the adjective *diimuqraaTii* ("democratic") attached to process nouns – democratic development, democratic transformation, etc. Below is one example from her September article (F.1.a) and two from her November article (F.3.c,d):

F.1.a) 25 *inna haadhihi ba9D malaamiH* ***al-taTawwur al-diimuqraaTii*** *fii 9ahd al-ra'iis mubaarak*
These are some of the indicators of **democratic development** during the era of President Mubarak

F.3.c) 8–9 *wa haadhaa al-ihtimaam al-miHwarii alladhii yuuliih al-ra'iis mubaarak "li-dawlat al-mu'assasaat" innamaa yarja9 ilaa irtibaaTihaa al-wathiiq wa al-mubaashir bi-****9amaliyyat al-taTawwur al-diimuqraatii****.*
This pivotal interest devoted by President Mubarak to the "Institutionalized State" goes back to its profound and direct connection with **the process of democratic development**.

F.3.d)15–16 *fa-haadhaa al-bu9d yu9add min akthar al-ab9aad al-Hayyawiyya wa al-laazima li-****9amaliyyat al-taHaawul al-diimuqraaTii****.*
This is counted among the most vital and essential dimensions of **the process of democratic transformation**.

That Egypt is undergoing a gradual democratization process, or is on a path toward democratization, is a key argument in a number of Mubarak speeches on the subject to both foreign and domestic audiences. (Several human rights activists whom I interviewed expressed frustration at Mubarak's success in persuading foreign audiences that Egypt is on the "path" to democracy, while Egyptians themselves wonder when they will ever arrive.) Similar phrases to those used by Mustafa (i.e., "democratic" + process noun, or a noun-noun construct including "democracy" + a process noun) employed by Mubarak in summer 1999 include:

- "the extension of democracy" and "the road to democracy" in a speech delivered in English in Washington DC on June 19, 1999
- ***masiirat al-diimuqraaTiyya*** *allatii tazdaad 9umq-an* ("**the march of democracy** that is increasingly being deepened") in an address on July 22, 1999
- ***ta9miiq al-mumaarasa al-diimuqraatiyya*** ("**deepening democratic practice**") in his statement on September 24, 1999, on the eve of the presidential referendum.

Mustafa also associates herself with Mubarak via naming practices that constitute a form of interdiscursivity with the discourse of government officials. In both her articles she refers to him in the following ways:

- *al-ra'iis* ("the President")
- *al-ra'iis mubaarak* ("President Mubarak")
- *al-ra'iis Husnii mubaarak* ("President Husni Mubarak")
- ***ra'iis al-jumhuuriyya*** ("**the President of the Republic**")

never simply as "Mubarak." While the first three ways are common enough ways to name Mubarak in Mustafa's community of practice, the last *ra'iis al-jumhuuriyya* ("the President of the Republic"), used twice in her November article, is more commensurate with the practice of a senior public servant than with that of an intellectual. If a personal observation may be permitted, the absence of references in Mustafa's writings simply to "Mubarak" recalled for me a social practice that I noticed at the U.S. State Department, where junior officials would often refer to the Secretary of State by last name ("Albright" or "Christopher") in casual discourse, but officials working on the Secretary's immediate staff nearly always referred to her/him as either "the Secretary" or "Secretary Albright" (or "Secretary Christopher"). Those with the closest relationships with the Secretary also would occasionally, in intimate meetings or phone calls, refer to the Secretary by first name or nickname, e.g., "Madeleine" or "Chris," but almost never by last name alone.

My point here is a bit paradoxical but nonetheless, I believe, accurate: that Mustafa, by referring to the president by more respectful or honorific terms than are strictly necessary for an intellectual, stakes a public claim to an insider status that differs from that of others in her community of practice. When I asked Mustafa about this, she explained that in her view there were two sorts of insiders in policy circles: those who were charged with implementing policies (i.e., salaried public servants), and those who were privileged to contribute ideas and suggest changes. She aspired to membership in the latter group.

Although I believe that Mustafa's articles attempt to negotiate power relations primarily within her own community of practice (intellectuals close to government), there are some indications of renegotiation of power relations between Mustafa and government officials. In my conversations with Mustafa, she expressed the opinion that President Mubarak might face resistance to democratization from within his own administration and political party. It is difficult to separate the two types of power relations, however, as my sense is that criticizing government officials and policy is one of the ways Mustafa builds her bona fides among fellow intellectuals. Such criticism is also related to Mustafa's claim of a special bond with Mubarak, as I will demonstrate below.

Mustafa's criticisms fall into two general types, relatively mild and relatively harsh. The relatively mild criticism is directed at government policies on democratization, and will be explored below. The relatively harsh criticism (which appears in both the September and November articles, Appendices F.1 and F.3 respectively) is aimed at unnamed bureaucrats, whom Mustafa portrays as impeding Mubarak's efforts to spread democracy:

F.1.b)19–21 *ayD-an wa 9alaa al-ragh<u>h</u>m min al-taariix al-ma9ruuf li-markaziyyat al-dawla fii miSr wa **9alaa al-ragh<u>h</u>m min al-ir<u>th</u> al-biiruuqraaTii al-<u>th</u>aqiil**, fa-qad <u>sh</u>ahid **al-mujtama9 al-madanii** numuu-an malHuu<u>DH</u>-an siwaa' min al-naaHiya al-kammiyya aw al-naw9iyya 9alaa madaa al-9adqdayn al-maaDiiyyayn*
In addition, despite the well-known history of the centralized state in Egypt and **despite the heavy legacy of bureaucracy**, **civil society** has seen significant development, both quantitative and qualitative, during the past two decades.

F.3.e) 42–44 *wa laakin <u>dh</u>aalik al-turaa<u>th</u> al-taariixi al-haam lam yaHull duun <u>DH</u>uhuur **9aqabaat** uxraa ka<u>th</u>iira laysa aaxirahaa wujuud ir<u>th</u> aariixii aaxar wa huwa **al-ir<u>th</u> "al-biiruuqraaTii" (ayy tasalluT wa ta9qiid al-jihaaz al-idaarii li-al-dawla)** wa alla<u>dh</u>i yaHudd min al-fa9aaliyya al-Haqiiqiyya li-ayy **mu'assasa** fii al-majaal al-siyaasii.*
But this important historical legacy did not arise without the appearance of many other **obstacles**, not the least of which is another historical legacy, **the "bureaucratic" legacy (that is, controlling and complicating the state's administrative apparatus)**, which limits the actual effectiveness of any **institution** in the political realm.

Mustafa uses several discursive strategies to criticize bureaucrats in the two excerpts. First, she associates the noun-adjective phrase *al-ir<u>th</u> biiruuqraaTii* ("the bureaucratic legacy") with a pejorative adjective (*<u>th</u>aqiil*, "heavy," in F.1.b), negative identification (*9aqabaat*, "obstacles," in F.3.e), or pejorative definition (*tasalluT wa ta9qiid al-jihaaz al-idaarii li-al-dawla*, "controlling and complicating the state's administrative apparatus," in F.3.e). Second, Mustafa refers to the bureaucrats simply as an unfortunate "legacy" rather than as people or even as a corporate entity. Third, in both articles note that the bureaucrats are set up in opposition to the sort of progress Mubarak is claimed to be seeking at the time. In the September article the bureaucracy is seen as trying, but failing, to hinder the progress of *al-mujtama9 al-madanii* ("civil society") during the last two decades, i.e., the Mubarak era; recall that Mubarak's use of the term *al-mujtama9*

al-madanii ("civil society") was the most notable feature of his August 25, 1999 speech. In the November article, the bureaucracy is hindering the effectiveness of any *mu'assasa* ("institution"); recall that Mubarak dwelt extensively on the theme of institutions in his October 5, 1999 and November 13, 1999 speeches. Mustafa thus renegotiates power relations both with unnamed and dehumanized bureaucrats – and, once again, inside her circle of intellectuals – by showing herself to be more in synch with Mubarak than is the bureaucracy that is hindering achievement of the president's goals.

Mustafa was always careful to distinguish between President Mubarak and all others in the Egyptian government; even those close to Mubarak (such as the prime minister and members of Mubarak's own small staff) were sometimes criticized in her articles (e.g., her *al-Ahram* newspaper columns of January 6, 1999 and November 22, 1999), another indication that Mustafa was trying to express closeness and loyalty to Mubarak himself, not his administration as a whole. Within the two articles under examination in this study there are also a few gentle hints at criticism of Mubarak's own policies and record on democratization. Unlike the stabs at bureaucrats, they are minimized linguistically so as to diminish their potential sting:

F.3.f) 16–18 *aghlab 9ulamaa' al-siyaasa ya9tabiruun mustawaa "al-mu'assasiyya* Level of Institutionalization" *fii ayy mujtama9 mi9yaar assaasii li-Damaan al-diimuqraaTiyya, aw bi-9ibaara uxraa inn binaa' al-mu'assasaat yuSbiH al-sharT al-Daruurii li-**al-wuSuul ilaa diimuqraaTiyya saliima*** **Full Democracy**
Most political scientists consider the "Level of Institutionalization" in any society a basic standard for ensuring democracy, or in other words, institution building is a necessary condition for **achieving a Full Democracy**.

The criticism here is by implication; by talking about institution building as a necessary condition for "achieving full democracy" Mustafa implies Egypt is not a full democracy; otherwise the statement would be irrelevant. Note, however, how gently the negative implication is made. First, *diimuqraaTiyya saliima* ("full democracy," Mustafa's own translation) is given in the indefinite, in a case where the writer might have appended the definite article if she so chose. Second, the opinion expressed is attributed (at least indirectly) to *aghlab 9ulamaa' al-siyaasa* ("most political scientists") rather than claimed by Mustafa personally. (I discussed in the previous chapter how Mustafa's inclusion of the terms "Level of Institutionalization" and "Full Democracy" in English as well as Arabic connects

her with the discourse of political scientists abroad.) Third, the goal of *diimuqraaTiyya saliima* ("a full democracy") is linked positively to *al-mu'assasiyya* ("institutionalization"), one of Mubarak's own expressed goals.

The second gentle criticism comes in the very last sentence of the November article:

F.3.g) 47–49 *li-dhaalik kullihi fa-inn al-da9wa ilaa tad9iim wa tarsiix "dawlat al-mu'assasaat" yu9add xuTwa haama wa asaasiyya* ***fii Tariiq da9m al-diimuqraaTiyya wa maa tastalzimuhu min iSlaaH***
For all these reasons, the call to support and secure the "Institutionalized State" is considered an important and basic step **on the way to supporting democracy and the reform it requires** (lit: what it requires of reform).

Again, the criticism is by implication, i.e., that reform is required to support democratization implies that not enough has been done so far. *ISlaaH* ("reform"), however, is minimized linguistically using the same structure used by the producers of the September petition (example D.1.e above): *maa tastalzimuhu min iSlaaH* ("what it requires of reform"), as opposed to a more straightforward structure using *iSlaaH* ("reform") with the definite article, for example *al-iSlaaH alladhi tastalzimuhu* ("the reform it requires"). As with example F.3.f, Mustafa links her hint at criticism to Mubarak's "institutions" theme, showing that the President is already taking "an important and basic step" toward solving the problem. In both cases of hinted-at criticism of Mubarak's policy or record on democratization, my sense is that the power relations function is largely to bolster Mustafa's bona fides as an intellectual, albeit one claiming to be close to and in sympathy with Mubarak. This power relations function is in addition to (and does not conflict with) the criticism's function of promoting Mustafa's pro-democratization agenda; recall that Mustafa acknowledged that her aim was to put the most forward-leaning, pro-democratization spin possible on Mubarak's public statements.

Huwaydi

In the discourse of Fahmi Huwaydi on democracy, negotiation of power relations is carried out subtly. As a well-established columnist and skilled essayist, Huwaydi strikes a tone in his writings that is confident, independent, and high-minded. I have argued above that Huwaydi (in his professional capacity) can be considered as belonging to at least two communities of practice (COPs), those of Islamist intellectuals and mainstream newspaper columnists.

As I hope to show below, the excerpted columns negotiate power relations for Huwaydi within the two COPs, showing not only his belonging to both of them (discussed in the previous chapter) but his independence from them as well, generally via interdiscursivity and hidden polemic. In one of the columns Huwaydi also contests power relations between himself and the editorial page staff at *al-Ahram* newspaper, which in a sense expresses his membership in the columnists COP (all members of which are subject to censorship) and his attempt to outsmart the social practices of that COP.

Huwaydi's September 3, 1999 column (Appendix E.1), rejected by *al-Ahram* newspaper and published by *al-Shaab* newspaper, is an overt polemic directed at the powerful newly rich in Egypt, an open critique of existing power relations in the society, carried out on the level of abstract principle. Beyond the overt polemic, there are two places in the article where Huwaydi uses interdiscursivity to replicate or challenge power relations in a way that performs social work useful to him as an individual. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Huwaydi uses references to the Qur'an and Hadith in the column to express his identity as a member of the Islamist intellectuals COP. Toward the end of the article, however, he abruptly shifts from a focus on Islamic values to one on democratic values:

E.1.a)34–36 *fa-innanaa najid an* ***al-mujtama9aat al-diimuqraaTiyya*** *hiya allatii ta9luu fii-haa qiimat iHtiraam al-qaanuun. wa ingilteraa allatii tu9add a9raq al-diimuqraaTiyyaat al-gharbiyya hiya awfiruhaa HaDHDH-an fii haadhaa al-baab.* ***al-diimuqraaTiyya al-Haqiiqiyya*** *allatii laa taj9al aHad-an fawq al-Hisaab* ***miftaaH asaasii li-al-mushkila laa rayb****…*

We find that **democratic societies** are those in which the value of respect for the law is paramount. England, considered the most deeply-rooted of Western democracies, is also the most fortunate in this regard. **True democracy**, which places no-one above accountability, **is undoubtedly a basic key to the problem**…

Huwaydi's use of terms like *al-mujtama9aat al-diimuqraaTiyya* ("democratic societies") and *al-diimuqraaTiyya al-Haqiiqiyya* ("true democracy") – part of the discourse of secular civil rights activists and political scientists rather than of Islamists – seems jarring, coming as it does in paragraph 21 of a 23–paragraph column largely devoted to contrasting contemporary Egyptian social relations with Islamic social principles. Note also that Huwaydi employs deixis to underscore his attachment to democracy, choosing to append the definite

article *al-* to all his references to democracy: in addition to the two in example E.1.a, Huwaydi also mentions *al-binaa' al-diimuqraaTii* ("democratic building" or "democratization"). Such shifts, however, highlighting first Islamic values as supreme then switching to democratic values, are vintage Huwaydi. In the September 3 article he does not rehearse all the arguments about why he believes the two value systems are compatible, arguments he makes fully in his 1993 book *Al-islaam wa al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*). Regarding power relations, his embrace of both systems allows him to stake a claim to both membership in the Islamist intellectual COP and the (generally secularist) columnists COP and to independence from both; in effect, he holds the banner of Islam before secularists and the banner of democracy before Islamists.

Huwaydi's reference to democracy is also a lead-in to an instance of interdiscursivity with President Mubarak's discourse, a rare occurrence in Huwaydi's writings:

E.1.b) 42–45 *wa aHsub an th*amma furSa muwaatiyya al-aan. Hay*th*u al-Hadii*th* 9an ***al-tagh*yiir** yu*sh*akkil aHad 9anaawiin haa*dh*ihi al-marHala, ba9d ***maa taHaddath 9an-hu al-ra'iis mubarak**, mu'akkid-an annahu **min sunan al-Hayaa. wa huwa kalaam kulluhu Haqq, xuSuuS-an i**dh**aa** ittasa9 niTaaq al-tagh*ayyur wa lam yaqif 9ind Huduud al-a*sh*xaaS wa al-siyaasaat, wa innamaa *sh*amil al-tagh*ayyur man*DH*u-umat al-qiyam ayD-an.*

And I think there is an opportunity at hand now. Talk about change fills the headlines these days **since President Mubarak spoke about it**, affirming that **change is a norm in (lit: among the norms of) life**. **All of which is true, especially if** the boundaries of change are broadened, not stopping at persons or policies, but encompassing change in how values are ordered as well.

Huwaydi is referring here to a phrase used by Mubarak in the question and answer period following Mubarak's August 25, 1999 speech before university students in Alexandria, Egypt. (Coincidentally, Hala Mustafa quotes the same excerpt in her September 28 column; see Appendix F.1 lines 30–31.) According to the Arabic-language report of the exchange posted on the Egyptian State Information Service website, Mubarak was replying to a question about changes that might be expected in his next presidential term:

> *qaal al-ra'iis bi-al-qaT9 laa budd an takuun hunaak **tagh**ayyuraat wa **hiya sunnat al-Hayaa** mu**sh**iir-an ilaa an haa**dh**ihi al-tagh*ayyuraat wa malaamiHuhaa hiya mawDi9 tafkiiruhu wa diraasatuhu min al-aan*

> "The president said that definitely there must be changes, as **changes are the norm in life**, indicating that these sorts of changes will be the focus of his thought and study from now on."

Huwaydi refers to Mubarak's phrase in a way that is respectful, even approving at first glance, following the phrase with *wa huwa kalaam kulluhu Haqq* ("all of which is true"). The approval, however, is mitigated by the following clause: ***xuSuuS-an idhaa*** *ittasa9 niTaaq al-taghayyur wa lam yaqif 9ind Huduud al-ashxaaS wa al-siyaasaat, wa innamaa shamil al-taghayyur manDHuumat al-qiyam ayDan.* ("**especially if** the boundaries of change are broadened, not stopping at persons or policies, but encompassing change in how values are ordered as well"). *XuSuuS-an idhaa* ("especially if") qualifies the preceding phrase, indicating a frame or set of expectations that the change Mubarak speaks of will not encompass more than a change of personnel. Recall here that Huwaydi's column, published in early September, was written in the context not only of an upcoming presidential referendum but of an expected cabinet change.

What we seem to have in the September 3 column then is an open polemic directed at the excessive privileges of Egypt's newly rich, and a slightly veiled polemic directed at Mubarak, quoting the president in a seemingly approving way, only to withdraw that approval by implying that the change Mubarak has in mind will be inadequate to address the problems Huwaydi has raised in the column. When I discussed the column with Huwaydi, however, another purpose for the Mubarak quote came to light. When I raised the quote, he smiled and said "sometimes I put such things in to help the article reach the readers." I noted that in this case the strategy of appeasing the editorial page staff did not seem to work, as *al-Ahram* newspaper rejected the column, and he laughed and agreed.

Thus it becomes clear that there are imbedded layers of polemic here. The September column is overtly directly at a certain problem (the powerful newly rich), and directed in a more veiled way at another problem (the assumed inadequacy of changes that Mubarak will make). At the same time, it carries out the social work of claiming both membership in and independence from two communities of practice for Huwaydi. In addition, it also addresses power relations between Huwaydi and the editorial page staff at *al-Ahram* newspaper, attempting to cajole them into publishing a controversial column by including an approving reference to a quote from the President. Note, however, that Huwaydi did not remove the reference to Mubarak when the column did not run in *al-Ahram* newspaper. Even if it was unsuccessful with *al-Ahram*, the reference to Mubarak's quote still carries a sort of criticism and challenge, standing Huwaydi

in good stead with the president's critics; Huwaydi's reference to the need for change in *al-qiyam* ("values") would resonate particularly with Islamists.

Turning now to Huwaydi's December 7, 1999 column (Appendix E.3), entitled *rabiHat al-diimuqraaTiyya wa xasir al-islaamiyyuun* ("Democracy won and the Islamists lost"), we see him again switching back and forth between Islam and democracy. The column's subject is the Kuwaiti parliament's defeat of a royal decree giving women the right to vote. Admitting that it is a victory for democracy in the region for a royal decree to be voted down, Huwaydi nonetheless laments that women were thereby done an injustice by Kuwaiti Islamists, who led the campaign against the decree. Huwaydi quotes a number of Qur'anic verses and Hadith to argue that Islam considers women and men to be equal (refuting some Hadith quoted by Islamists to justify discrimination) and to argue that there are no valid religious grounds to deny women the right to political expression.

As mentioned above, Huwaydi writes columns for Arabic-language publications that are distributed in the Gulf region, so his interest in Kuwait is natural and the column indicates that he followed closely the debate in Kuwait over women's rights. Huwaydi also is adept at a certain kind of hidden polemic, i.e., addressing one referential issue (in this case, women's rights in Kuwait, as well as the conceptual issue of democratic versus Islamic values and practices) while at another level addressing another issue and/or another speaker. In the December column, beneath the open polemic against Kuwaiti Islamists, I would argue that he is addressing Egyptian Islamists as well. At the time Huwaydi wrote the column, Egyptian Islamists were becoming embroiled in a debate with the government over women's rights. In late November the Islamist-dominated Labor Party held a public conference on women's rights in response to a government-sponsored conference on the same subject. As reported in the pages of *al-Shaab* newspaper (see November 26, 1999 p.1; November 30, 1999 p. 3; and December 3, 1999 p. 7), the Islamist conference upheld conservative social values and contested those promoted by the government-sponsored conference, which were condemned as Western and hostile to Islamic traditions. The dueling conferences turned out to be only the warm-up for a debate between the government and Islamists over a new personal status law proposed by the government, which would have given women the right to no-fault divorce and to travel abroad without their husbands' consent; the law was eventually passed containing the no-fault divorce provision but without the travel provision.

Huwaydi, then, used the column on democracy and women's rights in Kuwait partly to carry out the debate with his own community of Islamists begun

in *Al-islaam wa al-diimuqraaTiyya* (*Islam and Democracy*), i.e., that Islam itself enshrines many of the same liberal values found in Western-style democracy, including the equality of the sexes. Early in the column he claims membership in a broad Islamist community of which the Kuwaiti Islamists are also part:

E.3.a) 2 ***laa astaTii9 an uxfii shu9uur-an bi-a****l-Sadma wa-****al-Huzn*** *izaa' isqaaT qaanuun Huquuq al-mar'a al-siyaasiyya, wa Hajbihi fii majlis al-umma al-kuwaytii.*
I cannot hide feelings of shock and **sadness** at the defeat of the women's political rights bill in the Kuwaiti National Assembly.

E.3.b) 7 *ammaa* ***al-Huzn fa-sababuhu an al-nuwwaab al-islaamiyyuun kaanuu fi*** *Talii9at mu9aariDii al-qaanuun…*
As for **the sadness, its cause was that the Islamist deputies led the opponents of the bill**

In example E.3.b, the fact that the Islamist deputies' role in defeating the bill causes Huwaydi *al-Huzn* ("sadness") generates the implicature that he is associated with the Islamists (i.e., Huwaydi gives information about his personal feelings that does not seem to be required in the column, except that he is trying thereby to communicate additional information). The implicature is strengthened by the negative verb *laa astaTii9 an uxfii shu9uur-an bi-…al-Huzn* ("I cannot hide feelings of …sadness"). Recall that a negative is an indication of frames operating in discourse, showing that the affirmative *astaTii9 an uxfii* ("I can hide") would otherwise be expected. Thus Huwaydi indicates that perhaps the reader would expect him to hide his feelings of sadness at the events in Kuwait (again, because of his well-established Islamist sympathies), but that he will not do so because he has a point to make.

Huwaydi's point is related to power relations, i.e., he challenges power relations with his COP by claiming to be wiser than fellow Islamists who fret over women's rights when there are large issues at stake:

E.3.c) 18–21 *sami9t al-duktuur muHammad 9amaara yaquul marra maa zaHaa ann al-ba9D yujaadil fii tawallii al-mar'a li-al-imaama al-9uDHmaa, wa hal tajuuz aw laa tajuuz, wa laakinnahum yatajaahaluun maa aal ilayhi Haal al-imaama al-9uDHmaa fii zamaaninaa ba9da-maa aSbaH yatawalaahaa al-wilaayaat al-mutaaHida al-amriikiyya wa al-bank al-duwalii?!*
afiiquu ayyuhaa al-saada!
I heard Dr. Muhammad Amaara say once what a shame that some argue about a woman leading the Islamic world (lit: nation), and

> whether it is permitted or not, while they ignore what has happened to leadership in our times, since the United States of America and the World Bank have taken over!
> **Wake up, Gentlemen!**

Example E.3.c is the last paragraph of the December 7 column. The column begins by discussing the specific circumstances of the Kuwaiti parliamentary vote on women's voting rights, then moves on to discuss the political and religious debate that took place in Kuwait, then cites Qur'anic verses showing that Islam entitles women to political participation, then discusses the general principle of equality of the sexes in Islam. The argumentation takes a surprising turn in the last paragraph, where the debate over women's rights is set in sharp relief against a background of domination by the United States and World Bank. In this respect, Huwaydi quotes Dr. Muhammad Amaara, an Islamist columnist for *al-Shaab* newspaper; this interdiscursivity is one indication that Huwaydi intends his point for fellow Egyptians. The final imperative ***afiiquu ayyuhaa al-saada!*** ("**Wake up, Gentlemen!**"), emphasis in original, is what indicates most clearly that Huwaydi intends this message for the Egyptian audience; *al-Ahram* newspaper is not read widely outside of Egypt.

Thus the pattern of embedded polemics we saw in the September 3 is repeated in the December 7 column in a slightly different way. In the September column Huwaydi took an incident he witnessed in Egypt, drew from it a broad lesson challenging the power structures of Egyptian society, then at the end quoted Mubarak in a way that was both approving and challenging, thereby taking a stab at redressing power relations in his relationship with the censors. In the December column, Huwaydi begins with a story taking place in Kuwait, which he gradually develops into an overall argument about women's rights that expresses his independence from the Islamist intellectuals COP, and then turns into a rather sharp political point that challenges the COP's priorities. This last challenge is so subtly made that it might almost be missed without the final imperative statement (perhaps the reason Huwaydi included it). As the September column primarily challenges the government and its supporters, whereas the December column primarily challenges the Islamists, it is easy enough to see why the former was rejected by *al-Ahram* newspaper (but printed by the Islamist newspaper *al-Shaab*) and the latter was printed in *al-Ahram* newspaper as one of Huwaydi's regular weekly columns.

Summarizing power relations strategies

The examples and analysis above show how power relations are replicated and/or contested by participants in discourse on democracy, and that there is often more interactional work going on than meets the eye upon initial examination of such discourse and more subjects being discussed than the direct referential object of "democracy," "political reform," or "civil society." In the excerpts from discourse on democracy discussed in this study, some of the ways in which power relations are addressed includes:

- The community of practice writing Mubarak's speeches (including, but by no means limited to, the president himself) satisfied conflicting interests by projecting a pro-democracy image for the president while discursively replicating the centralized, top-down nature of the Egyptian political power structure. Examples include discursive isolation of the citizen, portrayal of non-governmental institutions as potentially dangerous and untrustworthy, and replication of the strong president-weak political opposition dynamic.
- The production of the September petition constituted a struggle for control of the issue of political reform between members of the human rights community of practice and the opposition politicians community of practice. Linguistic traces of the struggle include a close organizational affinity between the petition and an antecedent statement by human rights groups, as well as strategies of "cringing" (i.e., making demands while discursively undermining them in anticipation of a hostile response from the government) inserted mostly at the behest of opposition politicians. Thus even members of the political opposition participated in the replication of top-down power relations with the government.
- Newspaper columnists Hala Mustafa and Fahmi Huwaydi, in writing about democracy, also challenged power relations inside and outside their respective communities of practice. Mustafa used linguistic strategies including interdiscursivity and naming practices to bolster her importance within her community of intellectuals, while Huwaydi used interdiscursivity to demonstrate his independence from his community of Islamists and to contest power relations between himself and the censors at a government-owned newspaper.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The irresistible discourse

To conclude, I will show how the analysis I did in Chapters 3–5 shed light on the significance of the texts concerned, expand upon overall findings I introduced in Chapter 1, and offer advice for applying this methodology to political discourse.

A new view of the significance of texts

In Chapter 1, I mentioned that my view of the political significance of the texts I examined altered significantly following ethnographic research and linguistic analysis; here I will make explicit how my views changed.

Regarding the excerpts of President Mubarak's speeches, I approached them initially with the expectation that I would find a significant gap between the fairly liberal way in which democracy was discussed in the President's speeches and the conservative way it was practiced in Egypt. What I found, however, was that once I proceeded from a superficial reading to a deeper analysis of the texts, this gap disappeared; the discourse replicated the practice. Discussions with members of the community of practice involved in producing the speeches showed me that the attitude of COP members (including Mubarak himself) toward democracy was more complicated than I had imagined. Rather than simply giving the concept lip service, the COP sincerely wanted democracy to be a major theme of Mubarak's fourth term in office, but at the same time felt the need to reinforce the prerogative of the executive to administer democracy in small doses and to limit the amount of initiative permitted from NGOs and grassroots activists. And these functions – construction of a nuanced identity showing Mubarak at once as pro-democracy and firmly in control, and replication of the existing top-down power balance between the government and civil society – were carried out by the linguistic hedges, frames, and other devices discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

When I first took an interest in the petition published in *al-Shaab* newspaper on September 3, 1999, several observers of the Cairo political scene asked

me why I was interested in what was clearly another meaningless exercise by feckless opposition political parties. Both my instincts and linguistics background told me, however, that people generally have reasons for opening their mouths or putting pen to paper. My ethnographic and linguistic spadework revealed that the petition constituted a risky effort by human rights activists to wrest control of the issue of political reform from opposition parties, and that the text was a discursive battlefield between approaches to political reform by different communities of practice. Research into the petition thus alerted me to developments on the political scene (particularly inside the human rights movement) of which I had been unaware.

After doing research into newspaper commentaries by Hala Mustafa and Fahmi Huwaydi, I learned that being an intellectual in contemporary Egypt who promotes the ideal of democracy is difficult but also potentially rewarding. Huwaydi and Mustafa each tried to contextualize the abstract concept of democracy by linking it to other political phenomena more relevant to the contemporary Egyptian scene: Islamism in Huwaydi's case and Mubarak in Mustafa's. What the two intellectuals told me about their work, and the linguistic devices used in their writing, showed the difficulty of bridging such disparate concepts. The fact that they were able to bridge them credibly, however, allowed Mustafa and Huwaydi to carve out unique niches in their communities of practice.

Overall findings

Irresistibility of certain discourses

Why "democracy?" A number of times while writing this study, I asked myself whether an examination of any other current issue – economic reform or terrorism or personal status laws – in Egyptian political discourse would show similar findings. To some extent it might, in that the methodology used here can be applied to many other issues, and the researcher would be likely to find that basic social functions such as identity construction were being carried out via those issues as well. At the same time, there seemed to be reasons why "democracy"– including related issues such as civil society, freedom of expression, and institution building – was an especially compelling topic among Egypt's political elite during 1999–2000, the period of this study. Undoubtedly the referendum on Mubarak's fourth presidential term in September 1999 and the

parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2000 played a role, but those I interviewed also indicated that democracy had become a fixture in Egyptian public discourse in reaction to a larger discourse, based outside of Egypt, in which Egyptians wanted or needed to participate. As one Egyptian academic close to government circles said to me regarding Western talk about democracy, "it's a discourse that cannot be resisted."

What I am suggesting is that certain issues – at certain times and in certain societies – may be especially salient and therefore especially available or suitable for use in accomplishing necessary social interactional work such as identity construction, positioning, and negotiation of power relations. Such issues become a form of what Scollon referred to as *cultural tools*, i.e., they become buzz words, attention-getters, nearly-blank screens on which participants in public discourse may project what they like and be certain to command attention. What emerged from my discussions with participants in social interactions behind the selected instances of discourse was that "democracy" was part of a basket of issues –"globalization," for example, seemed to be in the same basket – which Egyptians viewed as representing powerful external forces emanating from the hegemonic West, forces with which Egypt had to contend one way or another. Thus expressing views on "democracy" became one way of recommending how Egypt should respond to this irresistible external discourse – appropriate it and turn it to Egypt's advantage, embrace part of it and adapt it to Egypt's special needs and culture, treat it with extreme skepticism, reject it as hypocritical or culturally unsuitable, ignore it – which, in turn, was a way to express an identity (whether individual or group) and position oneself vis-à-vis one's colleagues and rivals.

This is not to say that Egyptians who discussed democracy lacked sincere convictions on the subject; in fact, even bitter opponents on the issue often gave each other credit for some degree of sincerity. For example, several human rights activists and journalists who criticized harshly President Mubarak's policies told me they nonetheless believed that Mubarak thought he was gradually democratizing Egypt. The point is that there is no contradiction between having sincere convictions on a subject and using that subject to accomplish necessary interactional work. I was aware throughout my research, however, that my efforts to separate the convictions of those producing discourse on democracy from the interactional work being done in the discourse contained within it the danger of being misinterpreted. This point most troubled me when dealing with the work of individual writers who, unlike those who produce texts working in groups, have to accept full principalship for their writings.

Seeing words as actions

During one of my early interviews in Cairo, as soon as I had explained my interest in public discourse on democracy my interlocutor (a strong supporter of the Egyptian government and of Mubarak) said "you will find a complete difference between talk and practice." Several of the others I interviewed were disappointed (and a few were relieved) that my study would not contrast what was being "said" with what was being "done" regarding democracy in Egypt, whether by the government or opposition political forces, thereby "exposing" hypocrisy and contradictions.

My findings do not bear out such a distinction between word and action; rather, they suggest that words are a kind of action and are linked to other kinds of actions. The connection is seen most clearly in what linguists call speech acts, utterances that perform actions, e.g., the promise (albeit mitigated) and implied acknowledgement of past faults in President Mubarak's utterance – *idhaa kuntu a9id bi-an takuuna l-intixabaati l-qaadimatu naDHiifat-un – naDHiifat-an wa naziiha* ("If I promise that the coming elections will be clean – clean and fair") – in his speech before the Egyptian parliament on November 13, 1999. Even in less obvious cases, however, I believe the point is still valid. Is not, for example, President Mubarak carrying out a kind of political action by discursively delineating (in his October 5, 1999 speech) a political playing field on which the only valid players are the state, institutions licensed and regulated by the state, and the individual, isolated citizen?

Part of my interlocutors' disappointment at my failure to contrast words with action perhaps was rooted in their sense that words were the only sort of action permissible regarding democracy in contemporary Egypt, and their dissatisfaction at that state of affairs. Freedom of expression was the major accomplishment regarding democratization touted in President Mubarak's speeches during 1999–2000, and indeed many of my interlocutors said they believed Mubarak's conception of democracy to consist mostly of a degree of freedom of expression, along with the building of institutions (licensed and regulated by the government) and a certain amount of freedom for the judiciary. The ability of citizens to change their government via a democratic process, however, was not part of the political picture drawn in Mubarak's speeches. And as it happened, even speakers from opposition political or human rights groups tended to replicate in their public discourse on democracy this top-down, centrally controlled power structure. There is more than one player in this game, though disparities of power are real.

Applying the methodology

This book demonstrates the applicability to political discourse of a method of analysis combining ethnographic research into the communities of practice and social interactions that produced a text (*what* those who produced the text were trying to accomplish) with investigation of linguistic strategies and devices employed in the text (*how* the producers accomplished their goals via language). To those who would apply this method to other political situations and problems, my recommendation is to approach discourse by asking "what is going on here?" rather than "what message is being sent?" Much of the work of public discourse is done by and for participants themselves; without considering this, it is easy to be puzzled by or to misread texts. Those who produce public discourse do so as members of communities of practice, and often an instance of discourse functions primarily to get work done among members of the community of practice and only secondarily to accomplish work with the presumed audience. Thus the ostensible topic is often not the only or even the principal topic under discussion, and the ostensible audience is often not the only or even the principal intended audience.

Turning to the linguistic side of the analysis, the linguistic tools I employed most heavily in my analysis were various forms of deixis (including ways of referring to self and others and use of definite and indefinite articles) and interdiscursivity (including hidden polemic). Certainly pragmatics and sociolinguistics offer many other tools with which to approach texts. I found that some linguistic tools were more revealing than others when looking at a particular text; for me, interdiscursivity was the most important tool for understanding the discourse of writers Mustafa and Huwaydi, hidden polemic most revealing in looking at the September petition, and various forms of deixis most efficacious in interpreting President Mubarak's speeches. In addition there were entire potential levels of linguistic analysis that I left untouched, such as discourse structure and argumentation.

In this book, I decided against that direction because I thought that studies of argumentation and rhetoric already were familiar to political scientists and others studying political discourse in the Middle East. I chose instead to go off in the direction of analyzing small, everyday linguistic phenomena such as deictical expressions because I wanted to show how profitable it can be to study them, especially when the analysis is informed by ethnographic research. They reveal patterns and strategies by which participants in producing political

discourse express proximity or distance from ideas, associate or disassociate themselves from other people, minimize or maximize the impact the challenge the discourse is intended to present to others. The social practices and linguistic patterns I discovered were not extraordinary but ordinary, and that is what made them so significant. As Billig says, it is this "deixis of little words" and (to extend the metaphor) the "deixis" of everyday social practices that do so much of the interactional heavy lifting in discourse. If one pays attention to these mundane social and linguistic patterns they can reveal new ways to read discourse, but it is easy to ignore what at first listen sounds like what Billig calls "the hum of distant traffic;" perhaps the constant hum of traffic outside my Cairo window while writing this book helped me to tune in.

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Appendix A

Transliteration and transcription key

A.1. Transliteration system

The following system will be used in transcribing oral excerpts and transliterating written texts from Arabic:

Arabic	*Transliterated Symbol*
أ	∅ initial (except when substituting for ق)
ء	‘ (all other cases)
ا	-an (when final indefinite accusative ending) aa (all other cases)
ب	b
ت	t
ث	th
ج	j (written texts) or g (oral texts, reflecting Egyptian pronunciation)
ح	H
خ	x
د	d
ذ	dh
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	sh
ص	S
ض	D
ط	T

ظ	DH
ع	9
غ	gh
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
ه	h
و	w or uu
ي	y or ii
أي	ay (written and some oral excerpts) or ee (Egyptian pronunciation)
ة	t (when in a non-final indefinite term in an idafa construct) a (all other cases)

A.2. Other transcription conventions (adapted from Schiffrin 1994):

{carriage return}	end of intonation unit
,	continuing intonation followed by pause of less than ½ second
?	rising intonation followed by pause
!	animated tone followed by pause
.	falling intonation followed by pause
…	perceptible pause of ½ second or more
–	truncated or cut off sound
italics	emphatic stress
X	applause (each X represents one second duration)
-X-	scattered applause
@	laughter
/?/	inaudible utterances, mumbling

Appendix B

Excerpt from Mubarak speech delivered October 5, 1999

B.1. Transcript of excerpt from televised speech by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak upon taking oath of office before Parliament, October 5, 1999.

Videotaped from Egyptian television. Duration 3 min 57 sec.

HM: وقد لا تكون فرصة مواتية اليوم…

1 wa qad laa takuunu furSat-un muwaatiyyat-un al-yawm…

لكي أتحدث على نحو…

2 li-kayy ataHaddatha 9alaa naHw-in,

أكثر تفصيلا عن هذا البرنامج…

3 akthara tafSiil-in 9an haadhaa l-barnaamig…

الذي يشكل حجرة الزاوية…

4 alladhii yushakkilu Hagaru z-zaawiya…

في رؤية مستقبلية'

5 fii ru'yat-in mustaqbaliyyat-in,

لخيارات مصر مع بداية الألفية الثالثة.

6 li-xiyaaraati miSr ma9a bidaayati l-alfiyyati th-thaalitha.

لأن موعد ذلك هو لقاؤنا القادم مع بدء الدورة الجديدة'

7 li-anna maw9ida dhaalika huwa liqaa'unaa l-qaadim ma9a bad'i l-dawra l-gadiida,

لمجلسكم الموقر'

8 li-maglisikum al-muwaqqar,

إن شاء الله.

9 in shaa' allaah.

لكنني…

10 laakinnanii…

أستطيع أن أؤكد على عدد من الحقائق المهمة.

11 astaTii9u an u'akidda 9alaa 9adad-in min al-Haqaa'iqi l-muhimma.

أولا…

12 awwal-an…

أن البرنامج الذي نتحدث عنه…

13 ann al-barnaamig alladhii nataHaddathu 9an-h…

ونعمل على تنفيذه…

14 wa na9malu 9alaa tanfiidhih…

يستند إلى جهد دؤوب…

15 yastanidu ilaa guhd-in da'uub…

بذلناه منذ حملنا الشعب المسئولية.

16 badhalnaahu mundhu Hammalnaa sh-sha9bu l-mas'uuliyya.

كان حجر الزاوية فيه…

17 kaana Hagaru z-zaawiyati fiih…

هو تعود – تدعيم دور المؤسسات في المجتمع المصري.

18 huwa ta9uud – tad9iim dawri l-mu'assasaati fii l-mugtama9 al-miSrii.

وترسيخ مفهوم دولة المؤسسات…

19 wa tarsiixi mafhuumi dawlati l-mu'assasaat…

في واقعنا السياسي…

20 fii waaqi9inaa s-siyaasii…

والإداري…

21 wa l-idaarii…

والاجتماعي.

22 wa l-igtimaa9ii

لأنه المفهوم'

23 li-anna l-mafhuumu,

الذي يضمن أكبر قدر من المشاركة الجماعي ‘

24 alladhii yaDmanu akbara qadri min al-mushaarakati l-gaama9ii,

وتغليب الموضوعية…

25 wa taghliibi l-mawDuu9iyya…

عند وضع السياسات’

26 9inda waD9i s-siyaasaat,

واتخاذ القرارات…

27 w-ittixaadhi l-qaraaraat…

كما أنه الأسلوب الذي يوفر الثبات والاستقرار للعمل العام.

28 kamaa annahu l-usluub alladhii ywaffiru th-thabaata wi-l-istiqraara li-l-9amala l-9aamm.

ويقوم هذا البرنامج أيضا…

29 wa yaquumu haadhaa l-barnaamigu ayD-an…

على الجمع بين جهد الدولة…

30 9alaa l-gam9i bayna guhdi d-dawla…

وجهد مؤسسات المجتمع المختلفة…

31 wa guhdi mu’assasaati l-mugtama9i l-muxtalifa…

مع دور الوطن– المواطن الفرد…

32 ma9a dawri l-waTan–l-muwaaTini l-fard…

لأنه ما لم تتكامل الجهود’

33 li-annahu maa lam tatakaamil guhuud,

التي يبذلها شركاء التنمية الأساسيون…

34 allatii yabdhuluhaa shurakaa’u t-tanmiyyati l-assaasiyyuun…

في إطار خطة واحدة…

35 fii iTaari xuTTat-in waaHidat-in…

تنسق بين هذا الأدوار الثلاثة…

36 tunassiqu bayna haadhihi l-adwaari th-thalaatha…

يصبح من العسير…

37 yuSbiHu mini l-9asiir…

أن نتوقع النجاح الكامل.

38 an natawaqqa9a an-nagaaHa l-kaamil.

إن مهمة الدولة هي أن تهيئ المناخ المناسب…

39 inna muhimmati d-dawla hiya an tuhayyi'a l-manaaxa l-munaasib…

وأن تضع السياسات السليمة…

40 wa an taDa9a s-siyaasaati s-saliima…

التي تضمن تحقيق الأولويات الصحيحة.

41 allatii taDmanu taHqiiqa l-awlawiyyaati S-SaHiiHa.

وأن تحمي بقوة القانون…

42 wa an taHmii bi-quwwati l-qanuun…

توازن المصالح بين كل فئات المجتمع.

43 tawaazunu l-maSaaliHi bayna kull fi'aati l-mugtama9.

وأن تضمن توجيه عائد التنمية لصالح كل المواطنين'

44 wa an taDmana tawgiiha 9aa'idi t-tanmiyati li-SaaliHi kulli l-mu-waaTiniin,

وأن تكون على استعداد دائم…

45 wa an takuuna – takuuna 9alaa sti9daad-in daa'im…

للتدخل في الوقت الصحيح'

46 li-t-tadaxxuli fii-l-waqti S-SaHiiH,

لضبط حركة المجتمع'

47 li-DabTi Harakati l-mugtama9,

حفاظا على سلامه الاجتماعي.

48 HifaaDH-an 9alaa salaamihi al-igtimaa9i.

ومهمة مؤسسات المجتمع المتمثلة بالأحزاب…

49 wa muhimmatu mu'assasaati l-mugtama9i l-mutamaththilati bi-l-aH-zaab…

والنقابات…

50 wa niqaabaat…

والاتحادات…

51 wa l-ittiHaadaat…

وجمعيات النشاط الأهلي…

52 wa gam9iyyaati n-nashaaTi l-ahlii…

أن تساعد على توسيع حق المشاركة.

53 an tusaa9id 9alaa tawsii9i Haqqi l-mushaaraka.

وأن تكون طرفا أساسيا في عملية الارتقاء المستمر…

54 wa an takuuna Taraf-an asaasiyy-an fii 9amaliyyati l-irtiqaa'i l-mustamirr…

بقدرات المواطنين.

55 bi-qudraati l-muwaaTiniin.

وأن تحافظ على كيانها الوطني…

56 wa an tuHaafiDHa 9alaa kayaanihaa l-waTanii…

وتعمل على تحقيق التجانس بين أهدافها…

57 wa ta9mila 9alaa taHqiiqi t-tagaanusi bayna ahdaafihaa…

وبين مقتضيات الصالح العام.

58 wa bayna muqtaDayyaati l-SaaliHi l-9aamm.

كي لا تكون أداة في أيدي قوى وجماعات خارجية…

59 kay laa takuuna adaat-an fii aydii quwa-n aw gamaa9aat-in xaarigiyya…

كما تمارس دورها الديمقراطي والطوعي…

60 kamaa tumaarisu dawrahaa d-diimuqraaTii wa T-Taw9ii…

دون أن تقحم نفسها…

61 duuna an tuqHima nafsahaa…

طرفا في صراع هدفه التمييز بين مصالح المواطنين…

62 Taraf-an fii siraa9–in hadafhu t-tamyiiz bayna maSaaliHi l-muwaaTiniin…

أو تغليب مصالح فئة'

63 aw taghliib maSaaliHi fi'at-in,

على حساب فئة أخرى.

64 9alaa Hisaabi fi'at-in uxraa.

ومهمة المواطن أن يعرف أنه محور التنمية وموضوعه.

65 wa muhimmatu l-muwaaTinu an ya9rifa annahu miHwaru t-tan-miyati wa mawDuu9h

وأن ارتقاء حياته رهن…

66 wa ann irtiqaa'a Hayaatihi rahn-un…

بقدراته المتزايدة…

67 bi-qudraatihi l-mutazaayida…

على تحسين مهاراته وكفاءه.

68 9alaa taHsiini mahaaraatih wa kafaa'ah.

وأن المجتمع…

69 wa ann al-mugtama9…

يصلح بصلاح مواطنيه…

70 yaSluHu bi-SalaaHi muwaaTiniih…

عندما يستقر في ضمير كل مواطن…

71 9indamaa yastaqirru fii Damiiru kullu muwaaTin…

ضرورة احترام القانون…

72 Daruuratu Htiraami l-qaanuun…

والحرص على أداء الواجب الوطني…

73 wa l-HirS 9alaa adaa'i l-waagibi l-waTanii…

والإدراك المسئول…

74 wa l-idraaku l-mas'uul…

لأهمية التوازن بين الحق والواجب…

75 li-ahammiyati t-tawaazun bayna l-Haqq wa l-waagib…

الحرية والمسئولية…

76 wa l-Hurriyati wa l-mas'uuliyya…

وحق الفرد وحقوق الجماعة.

77 wa Haqqi l-fard wa Huquuqi l-gamaa9a.

ثانيا…:

78 thaaniyy-an…

B.2. English translation of excerpt from Mubarak speech delivered October 5, 1999

HM: Perhaps today is not the best time for me to talk in a more detailed way about this program, which constitutes the cornerstone of a forward-looking vision of Egypt's options upon the beginning of the third millennium. The appointed time for that is our next meeting, upon the beginning of the new session of your esteemed assembly, God willing. But I can highlight a number of important facts:

First: the program that we are talking about and working to implement is based on an ongoing effort we have undertaken since the people charged us with responsibility. The cornerstone in it was return – supporting the role of institutions in Egyptian society and securing the concept of a state based on institutions in our political, administrative, and social reality. Because this concept guarantees the maximum collective participation and most objectivity in policy formation and decision-making, and also provides stability in public work.

This program is founded on joining efforts of the state with those of the various institutions of society and of the nation – the individual citizen. For when efforts of the basic partners in development are not integrated into one plan that coordinates these three roles, it becomes difficult for us to expect complete success. The duty of the state is to create the proper climate and to put into place sound policies to guarantee that correct priorities are attained, as well as to protect with the force of law a balance of interests among all segments of society. It is also to ensure that the fruits of development are directed to the welfare of all citizens, and to be – be ready to intervene at the proper time to curb the movement of society in order to keep the peace.

The duty of society's institutions, represented by parties, syndicates, unions, and non-governmental organizations, is to help broaden the right of participation and to play a principal part in the continuing effort to upgrade citizens' capabilities. Their duty is also to preserve their national identity and work to bridge the achievement of their own goals with the requirements of the public interest so as not to become a tool of any external power or organization. In addition, they must play their democratic and voluntary roles without embroiling themselves in a conflict of which the goal is favoritism regarding citizens' interests or the triumph of one faction's interests over at the expense of another faction.

The citizen's duty is to realize that he is the axis and object of development, and that improving his life is tied to steadily increasing his capabilities as well as

improving his skills and proficiency. He must realize that society works for the welfare of its citizens when each citizen has clearly fixed in his conscience the necessity to respect the law, eagerness to do his national duty, and a responsible awareness of the important distinction between rights and responsibilities, freedom and responsibility, and the rights of individuals versus the rights of the community.

Second:

B.3. Arabic text of excerpt from Mubarak speech as published by al-Ahram newspaper October 6, 1999, p. 5

وقـد لا تكـون الفرصة مواتية اليـوم لكي أتحدث على نحو أكثر تفصيلا عن هذا البرنامج، الذي يشـكل حجرة الزاوية في رؤية مسـتقبلية لخيارات مصر مع بداية الألفية الثالثة، لأن موعد ذلك هو لقاؤنا القادم مع بدء الدورة الجديدة لمجلسـكم الموقر إن شـاء الله، لكنني أستطيع أن أؤكد عددا من الحقائق المهمة:

أولا: أن البرنامج الذي نتحدث عنه ونعمل على تنفيذه يسـتند إلى جهد دؤوب بذلناه منذ حملنـا الشـعب المسـئولية، كان حجـر الزاوية فيـه هو تدعيم دور المؤسسـات فـي المجتمع المصري، وترسيخ مفهوم «دولة المؤسسات» في واقعنا السياسي والإداري والاجتماعي، لأنه المفهوم الذي يضمن أكبر قدر من المشاركة الجماعية وتغليب الموضوعية عند وضع السياسات واتخاذ القرارات، كما أنه الأسلوب الذي يوفر الثبات والاستقرار للعمل العام.

ويقوم هذا البرنامج أيضا على الجمع بين جهد الدولة وجهد مؤسسات المجتمع المختلفة مع دور المواطن الفرد، لأنه ما لم تتكامل الجهود التي يبذلها شركاء التنمية الأساسيون في إطار خطة واحدة تنسق بين هذا الأدوار الثلاثة، يصبح من العسير أن نتوقع النجاح الكامل.

مهمة الدولة هي أن تهيئ المناخ المناسب، وأن تضع السياسات السليمة التي تضمن تحقيق الأولويـات الصحيحـة، وأن تحمي بقوة القانون توازن المصالح يبـن كل فئات المجتمع، وأن تضمن توجيه عائد التنمية لصالح كل المواطنين، وأن تكون على استعداد دائم للتدخل في الوقت الصحيح لضبط حركة المجتمع حفاظا على سلامه الاجتماعي.

ومهمة مؤسسات المجتمع المتمثلة في الأحزاب والنقابات والاتحادات و جمعيات النشاط الأهلي، أن تساعد على توسيع حق المشاركة، وأن تكون طرفا أساسيا في عملية الارتقاء المستمر بقـدرات المواطنين، وأن تحافظ على كيانهـا الوطني وتعمل على تحقيق التجانس بين أهدافها وبين مقتضيات الصالح العام، كي لا تكون أداة في أيدي قوى وجماعات خارجية، كما تمارس

دورهـا الديمقراطـي والطوعـي دون أن تقحم نفسـها طرفا في صراع هدفـه التمييز بين مصالح المواطنين، أو تغليب مصالح فئة على حساب فئة أخرى.

ومهمـة المواطـن أن يعرف أنه محـور التنمية وموضوعها، وأن ارتقـاء حياته رهن بقدراته المتزايدة على تحسين مهاراته وكفاءاته، وأن المجتمع يصلح بصلاح مواطنيه، عندما يستقر في ضميـر كل مواطـن ضرورة احتـرام القانون، والحـرص على أداء الواجـب الوطني، والإدراك المسـئول لأهميـة التوازن بيـن الحق والواجـب، والحرية والمسـئولية، وحق الفـرد وحقوق الجماعة.

ثانيا:

Appendix C

Excerpt from Mubarak speech delivered November 13, 1999.

C. 1. Excerpt from televised speech by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak November 13, 1999, upon opening of Parliamentary session. Videotaped from Egyptian television. Duration 4 minutes 30 seconds.

HM: أيها الاخوة الأخوات...

1 ayyuhaa l-ixwa l-axawaat…

لقد كان اعتقادي الدائم...

2 la-qad kaana 9tiqaadii d-daa'im…

أن الديمقراطية تنمو بالرأي الحر...

3 anna d-diimuqraaTiyyata tanmuu bi–r-ra'yi al-Hurr…

والمشاركة الواسعة...

4 wa l-mu<u>sh</u>aarakati l-waasi9a…

والتمثيل الصحيح...

5 wa t-tam<u>th</u>iil aS-SaHiiH…

وعلى هذا الطريق...

6 wa 9alaa haa<u>dh</u>aa Tariiq…

خطت مصر خطوات هامة.

7 xaTTat muSr xuTuwaat-in haama.

لا يست–

8 laa yast–

لا يستطيع إنكارها إلا مكابر جاحد.

9 laa yastaTii9u inkaaruhaa illaa mukaabir-un gaaHid.

وتلازمت منذ وقت مبكر مسيرة الإصلاح الاقتصادي‘

10 wa talaazamat mundhu waqt-in mubakkir masiirata l-iSlaaHi l-iqtiSaadii,

والسياسي‘

11 *wa s-siyaasii,*

في خطوات جادة.

12 fii xuTuwaat-in gaadda.

أتاحت حرية الرأي والصحافة بشكل غير مسبوق ‘

13 ataaHat Hurriyata r-ra'yi wa s-saHaafati bi-shakl-in ghayri mas-buu',

وفتحت الأبواب أمام صورة جديدة لملكية الصحف‘

14 wa fataHat il-abwaaba amaama Suwar-in gadiidat-in li-milkiyyit S-SuHf,

التي لم تعد وقفا على الصحافة القومية والحزبية ‘

15 allatii lam ta9ud waqf-an 9alaa S-SaHaafati l-qawmiyyati wa l-Hizbiyya,

وإنما ظهرت لأول مرة منذ أربعين عاما…

16 wa inna-maa DHaharat li-awwili marra mundhu arba9iina 9aam-an…

صحافة مصرية مستقل.

17 SaHaafat-un muSriyyat-un mustaqill.

وبالرغم العديد من الممارسات السلبية…

18 wa bi-r-raghmi l-9adiidi min il-mumaarasaati s-salbiyya…

فلقد كان موقفي الواضح…

19 fa-la-qad kaana mawqifii l-waaDiH...

أن الصحافة يجب أن تكون قادرة بنفسها.. هي

20 hiya anna S-SaHaafa yagib an takuuna qaadirat-an bi-nafsihaa...

على إصلاح سلبياتها.

21 9alaa iSlaaHi salbiyyaatihaa.

وانه لا ينبغي أن يكون هناك سلطان على الصحافة سوى القانون.

22 wa-annahu laa yanbaghii an yakuuna hunaaka SulTaan-un 9alaa S-SaHaafati siwaa l-qanuun.

ولست في حاجة…

23 wa lastu fii Haagat-in…

إلا أن أؤكد لكم‘

24 illaa an u'akkida la-kum,

ثقتي الكاملة في أن المعارضة ده جزء من الحكم!

25 thiqatii l-kaamilata fii anna l-mu9aaraDa da guz'-un min il-Hukm!

بدونها لا يكتمل الإطار الديمقراطي.

26 biduunihaa laa yaktamilu l-iTaaru d-diimuqraati.

Aud: 27 X-X-XXXX

HM: ولست أتحدث عن وجود شكلي للمعارضة…

28 wa lastu ataHaddathu 9an wuguud-in shakliyy-in li-l-mu9aaraDa…

بل أنني أتحدث عن وجود حقيقي!

29 bal innanii ataHaddathu 9an wuguud-in Haqiiqii!

لأن وجود معارضة قوية‘

30 li-anna wuguuda mu9aaraDat-in qawiyyat-in,

يجعل الحزب الحاكم في أي بلد‘

31 yag9alu l-Hizb al-Haakim fii ayy balad-in,

أكثر يقظة ونشاطا‘

32 akthara yaqDHata wa nashaaT-an,

واكثر التصاقا بمصالح الجماهير.

33 wa akthara ltiSaaq-an bi-maSaaliH il-gamahiir.

Aud: 34 X-XXXXX

HM: …إننا

35 innanaa…

إننا لا نصادر على حق المعارضة في تمثيل نيابي..

36 innanaa laa nuSaadiru 9alaa Haqq il-mu9aaraDa fii tamthiili niyaabii..

أكثر توازنا.

37 akthara tawaazuna.

وليس هناك ما يمنع من أن نبحث انسب السبل لتحقيق ذلك.

38 wa laysa hunaaka maa yamna9u min an nabHatha ansab as-subul li-taHqiiqi dhaalik.

ولكن بداية الطريق–

39 wa laakinna bidaayata T-Tariiq–

Aud: 40 XXXXXXXXX /?/

HM: أه @ ها…

41 uh @ ha…

ما اتفقتوا اختلفتم'

42 maa ttafa'tuu wi xtalaftum,

ما انتو حيرتونا.

43 maa ntu Hayyartuunaa.

Aud: 44 @@@ /?/

HM: ولكن بداية الطريق تتمثل في أن تصلح المعارضة من أوضاعها.

45 wa laakinna bidaayata T-Tariiqi tatamaththal fii an tuSliHa l-mu9aaraDatu min awDaa9ihaa.

وأن تكون أكثر ديمقراطية في داخلها.

46 wa an takuuna akthara diimuqraaTiyyatan fii daaxilihaa.

Aud: 47 /?/

HM: وأن تعبر بالفعل عن مصالح الجماهير!

48 *wa an tu9abbira bi–l-fi9l 9an maSaaliH al-gamahiir*!

Aud: 49 XXXXXXXXXX

HM: أيها الإخوة الأخوات…

50 ayyuhaa l-ixwa l-axawaat…

Aud: 51 @@, /?/

HM: @ @ وجهة الواقع ولا ايه؟

52 @ wusht l-waaqi9 walla eeh? @

Aud: 53 @@@XX

HM: إن انتهاء الفصل التشريعي السابع لمجلسكم الموقر يعني…

54 inna ntihaa' al-faSli t-tashrii9i is-saabi9 li-maglisikum al-muwaqqar.. ya9nii…

أننا على أبواب انتخابات برلمانية جديدة.

55 annanaa 9alaa abwaab intixaabaat-in barlamaaniyyat-in gadiida.

أرجو للجميع فيها حظا طيبا.

56 arguu li-l-gamii9i fii-haa HaDHDH-an Tayyibaa.

في إطار منافسة شريفة'

57 fii iTaari munaafasat-in shaarifat-in,

تدخلها الأحزاب ويدخلها الأفراد'

58 tadxuluhaa l-aHzaabu wa yadxuluhaa l-afraad,

تعميقا للديمقراطية'

59 ta9miiq-an li-d-diimuqraaTiyya,

وتوسيعا لحق المشاركة'

60 wa tawsii9–an li-Haqqi l-mushaaraka,

التي نعمل لترسيخه وتعميقه'

61 allatii na9malu 9alaa tarsiixhi wa ta9miiqhi,

في الوعي المصري'

62 fii l-wa9yi l-miSrii,

الفردي والجماعي'

63 al-fardii wa l-gamaa9ii,

في الممارسة العملية.

64 fii l-mumaarasati al-9amaliyya.

وإذا كنت اعد بأن تكون الانتخابات القادمة نظيفة ونزيهة'

65 wa idhaa kuntu a9id bi-an takuuna l-intixabaati l-qaadimatu naDHiifat-un – naDHiifat-an wa naziiha,

تخضع في كل مراحلها لإشراف كامل من القضاء'

66 taxDHa9u fii kulli maraaHilihaa li-ishraaf-in kaamil-in min al-qaDaa',

Aud: 67 X-X-X-X

HM: الذي يعتز به كل مصري'

68 alladhii ya9tazzu bi-hi kulli miSrii,

وتوفر له الدولة كل ما هو جدير به من استقلال'

69 wa tuwaffir la-hu d-dawla kulla maa huwa gadiir-un bi-hi min istiqlaal,

لأننا نؤمن بأن استقلال السلطة القضائية هي من– هو من أهم ركائز الحكم في مصر.

70 li-annanaa nu'min bi-an stiqlaal aS-SulTati l-qaDaa'iyyati hiya min – huwa min ahammu rakaa'iz al-Hukmi fii miSr.

أقول إننا إذا كنا جميعا'

71 aquulu innanaa idhaa kunnaa gamii9–an,

حريصين على ضمانات– ضمان انتخابات حرة نزيهة'

72 HaariSiin 9alaa Damaanaat – Damaan intixabaat-in Hurrati wa naziiha,

فإن على الأحزاب والأفراد المشاركين في العملية الانتخابية'

73 fa-inna 9alaa l-aHzaabi wa l-afraadi l-mushaarikiina fii l-9amaliyyati l-intixaabiyya,

أن يتجنبوا الممارسات غير الديمقراطية'

74 an yatagannabuu l-mumaarasaati ghayru d-diimuqraaTiyya,

أو التي تسيء على العملية السياسية في مصر'

75 aw allatii tusii'u li-l-9amal as-siyaasii fii miSr,

أو تمس سمعة مؤسسة يجب أن نحرص تماما على صورتها وعلى دورها.

76 aw tamassu sum9ata mu'assasat-in yagib an naHriSa tamaam-an 9alaa Suuratihaa wa 9alaa dawrihaa.

الاخوة والأخوات…

77 al-ixwatu wa l-axawaat…

C.2. English translation of excerpt from Mubarak speech delivered November 13, 1999

HM: Brothers and sisters…my belief has always been that democracy develops via freedom of opinion, broad participation, and genuine representation. And on this path Egypt has taken important steps, steps that cannot be denied except by an arrogant ingrate. It has embraced the path of economic reform…*and political*… via serious steps. It has granted freedom of opinion and of the press in an unprecedented way and opened the doors before a new form of press ownership, one that is no longer based solely on nationalist and partisan presses, but rather for the first time in 40 years an independent Egyptian press has emerged. Despite a number of negative practices, my clear position has been that the press must be capable on its own of correcting its negative aspects, and that there should not be any authority over the press except the law. I need not do more than to stress to you my complete confidence in the fact that the opposition is part of governance! Without which the democratic framework would not be complete.
Aud: X-X-XXXX
HM: I am not talking about a token presence for the opposition…rather I am talking about a real presence. Because the presence of a strong opposition makes the ruling party in any country more alert, active, and dedicated to the interests of the masses.
Aud: X-XXXXX
HM: We…we do not stand in the way of the opposition's right to a more balanced parliamentary representation. There is nothing to prevent us from exploring the best way to achieve that. But the beginning of the road…
Aud: XXXXXXXX/?/
HM: Uh @ ha. You agreed and you disagreed. You perplexed us.
Aud: @@@/?/
HM: …but the beginning of the road would consist of the opposition rectifying its own affairs, of the opposition being more democratic internally,
Aud: /?/
HM: and *truly representing the interests of the masses!*
Aud: XXXXXXXXXX
HM: Brothers and sisters…
Aud: @@/?/
HM: @Is that a realistic perspective, or what?@
Aud: @@@XX

HM: The end of your seventh parliamentary session means that we are at the doors of new parliamentary elections. I wish to all good luck in them, in the context of honorable competition. The elections will be entered by parties and individuals, deepening democracy and broadening the right of participation, which we are working to establish and deepen in the Egyptian consciousness, both individual and collective, and in practice. If I promise that the coming elections will be clean – clean and fair, subjected in all stages to the complete supervision of the judiciary–

Aud: X-X-X-X

HM: of which every Egyptian is proud, and to which the state provides all necessary independence, because we believe that the independence of the judiciary is among the most important pillars of governance in Egypt. I say that if we collectively are eager for guarantees – to guarantee free and fair elections then it is up to the parties and individuals participating in electoral activities to put aside undemocratic practices, or those that harm political work in Egypt, or those that violate the reputation of an institution whose image and role we should be utterly eager to preserve. Brothers and sisters…

C.3. Arabic text of excerpt as published by al-Ahram newspaper November 14, 1999, p. 6

الإخوة والأخوات..

لقد كان اعتقادي الدائم ، بأن الديمقراطية تنمو بالرأي الحر والمشاركة الواسعة، والتمثيل الصحيح، وعلى هذا الطريق خطت مصر خطوات مهمة، لا يستطيع إنكارها إلا مكابر جاحد، وتلازمت منذ وقت مبكر مسيرة الإصلاح الاقتصادي والسياسي في خطوات جادة، أتاحت حرية الرأي والصحافة بشكل غير مسبوق، وفتحت الأبواب أمام صورة جديدة من ملكية الصحف، التي لم تعد وقفا على الصحافة الحزبية والقومية، وإنما ظهرت لأول مرة– منذ أربعين عاما – صحافة مصرية مستقلة.

ورغم العديد من الممارسات السلبية، فلقد كان موقفي الواضح هو أن الصحافة يجب أن تكون قادرة بنفسها على إصلاح سلبياتها، وانه ينبغي ألا يكون هناك سلطان على الصحافة سوى القانون.

ولست في حاجة إلا أن أؤكد لكم ثقتي الكاملة في أن المعارضة جزء من الحكم بدونها لا يكتمل الإطار الديمقراطي، ولست أتحدث عن وجود شكلي للمعارضة، بل أنني أتحدث

عن وجود حقيقي، لأن وجود معارضة قوية يجعل الحزب الحاكم في أي بلد أكثر يقظة ونشاطا، واكثر التصاقا بمصالح الجماهير.

إننا لا نصادر على حق المعارضة في تمثيل نيابي أكثر توازنا، وليس هناك ما يمنع من أن نبحث انسب السبل لتحقيق ذلك، ولكن بداية الطريق تتمثل في أن تصلح المعارضة من أوضاعها، وأن تكون أكثر ديمقراطية في داخله، وأن تعبر بالفعل عن مصالح الجماهير.

إن انتهاء الفصل التشريعي السابع لمجلسكم الموقر يعني أننا على أبواب انتخابات برلمانية جديدة، أرجو للجميع فيها حظا طيبا، في إطار منافسة شريفة تدخلها الأحزاب ويدخلها الأفراد، تعميقا للديمقراطية وتوسيعا لحق المشاركة الذي نعمل لترسيخه وتعميقه في الوعي المصري الفردي والجماعي، وفي الممارسة العملية.

وإذا كنت اعد بأن تكون الانتخابات المقبلة نظيفة ونزيهة تخضع في كل مراحلها لإشراف كامل من القضاء، الذي يعتز به كل مصري، وتوفر له الدولة كل ما هو جدير به من استقلال، لأننا نؤمن بأن استقلال السلطة القضائية هو من أهم ركائز الحكم في مصر، أقول إننا إذا كنا جميعا حريصين على ضمان انتخابات حرة نزيهة، فإن على الأحزاب والأفراد المشاركين في العملية الانتخابية أن يتجنبوا الممارسات غير الديمقراطية، أو التي تسيء على العملية السياسية في مصر، أو تمس سمعة مؤسسة يجب أن نحرص تماما على صورتها ودورها.

Appendix D

September petition text

D.1. September Petition, as published by al-Shaab newspaper September 3, 1999, p. 1. Article accompanied by photos of four party leaders (Shukri, Dawoud, Serraj el-Din, Mohie al-Din) with namesunderneath. Text of petition itself begins at line 25.

نداء من أحزاب العمل والناصري والوفد
والتجمع من أجل الإصلاح السياسي والدستوري
شكري: لا يمكن حرب الفساد والتصدي للتحديات الخارجية بدون ديمقراطية حقيقية

تنشر «الشعب» فيما يلي نداء الأحزاب السياسية من أجل الإصلاح السياسي والديمقراطي بعد توقيع المهندس إبراهيم شكري – رئيس الحزب – عليه، وكان النداء قد وصل للحزب ونص على حظر نشره قبل الأربعاء الموافق الأول من سبتمبر، وقد تقرر عرضه على المكتب السياسي للحزب ترسيخا لعمل مؤسسات الحزب، وقد عرض فعلا على المكتب السياسي في اجتماعه مساء الثلاثاء الموافق الحادي والثلاثين من أغسطس وقد وافق عليه المكتب بإجماع الآراء، وهانحن ننشره بعد توقيع السيد رئيس الحزب عليه.

كانت جريدة «الأهالي» قد نشرت في عددها الصادر أول سبتمبر النداء قبل توقيع رئيس الحزب عليه ودون ذكر موقف الحزب منه، كما ذكرت الجريدة أن هناك أنباء حول وجود انقسام حقيقي وشيك في حزب العمل، ويؤكد الحزب أن هذه الأنباء شائعات غير صحيحة، وأن الحزب يسير على بركة الله في طريقه مصمما على تحقيق برامجه مؤكدا وحدة الحزب، وفاعلية مؤسساته الشرعية.

ومن جانب آخر، وفي معرض تعليقه على النداء الصادر من الأحزاب الأربعاء، قال الأستاذ إبراهيم شكري – رئيس حزب العمل –في تصريحات خاصة ل «الشعب» إن أهمية البيان لا تأتي فقط من المطالب التي وردت فيه، ولكن من الاهتمام والمتابعة وتفصيل هذه المطالب، وطرحها على الرأي العام والمسئولين للسير بخطوات حقيقية نحو تحقيقها. وقال شكري: إن ما يحدث في مجال الحياة السياسية الحزبية والنقابية من قيود لا يمكن أن يستمر، وأن كل المصريين

يطمعون إلى دخول القرن القادم دون قيود في مجال الحريات، وقال شكري أن حرب الفساد وتطوير جميع مجالات الحياة في مصر، ومواجهة التحديات الخارجية لا يمكن أن تتم بالكفاءة المطلوبة دون تغيير شامل في مجال الحريات، ودون إلغاء قانون الطوارئ.

وفيما يلي نص النداء:

نداء من اجل الإصلاح السياسي والدستوري في مصر

الموقعون على هذا النداء، إذ يتطلعون إلى تحرير الحياة السياسية مما تعانيه من قيود على مشارف قرن جديد وفي مناسبة الاستفتاء على فترة رئاسة جديدة: فهم يطالبون بأن يبدأ هذا التحرير باتخاذ خمسة إجراءات أساسية هي:

1- إلغاء حالة الطوارئ والإفراج عن المعتقلين السياسيين والعفو عن المسجونين السياسيين في غيرقضايا العنف.

2- توفير ضمانات لانتخابات حرة نزيهة، بحيث تجري كل الانتخابات العامة القادمة دون أي تدخل إداري، وفي ظل منافسة سياسية كاملة ومتكافئة، يتوافر لها إشراف قَضائي كامل، واستنادا إلى جداول انتخابية خالية من الأسماء المكررة وأسماء المتوفين والمهاجرين، بحيث يوقع الناخب باسمه أو ببصمته عقب الإدلاء بصوته.

3- إطلاق حرية تشكيل الأحزاب تحت رقابة القضاء الطبيعي وحده، وأحكام الدستور، ورفع القيود على النشاط الجماهيري السلمي.

4- إطلاق حرية إصدار الصحف وملكية وسائل الإعلام وإتاحة فرصة متكافئة للأحزاب والقوى السياسية في طرح آرائها وأفكارها في كل أجهزة الإعلام المملوكة للشعب.

5- كفالة استقلال النقابات المهنية والعمالية والجمعيات الأهلية سعيا إلى مجتمع أهلي قادر على المساهمة في بناء الديمقراطية والتقدم.

إن الموقعين على هذا النداء يأملون أن يكون تحقيق هذه المطالب هو الخطوة الأولى في الطريق إلى إصلاح سياسي ودستوري جذري، بما يهيئ المناخ لانتقال سلمي للسلطة، يحقق الاستقرار بتحويل مصر إلى جمهورية برلمانية: الشعب فيها هو مصدر كل السلطات، تقوم على تعددية حزبية حقيقية، تتداول فيها الأحزاب الحكم طبقا لما تسفر عنه انتخابات نزيهة، وتشكل حكومات تعتمد على ثقة ممثلي الشعب وتتضامن في المسئولية الوزارية أمامهم، بحيث يكون

رئيـس الدولـة رمزا للوطـن ويجري انتخابه – بعد ذلك– بين أكثر من مرشـح' وبما لا يزيد عن مدتين متتاليتين.

توقيعات

فؤاد سراج الدين' رئيس حزب الوفد

خالد محي الدين' رئيس حزب التجمع

ضياء الدين داود' رئيس الحزب العربي الناصري

إبراهيم شكري' رئيس حزب العمل

D. 2. English translation of September Petition as published by al-Shaab newspaper September 3, 1999 p. 1. Article accompanied by photos of four party leaders (Shukri, Dawoud, Serrag el-Din, Mohie al-Din) with names underneath.

Petition by the Labor, Nasserist, Wafd, and Tagammu Parties On Behalf of Political and Constitutional ReformShukri: It is not possible to fight corruption and resist external threats without true democracy

Al-Shaab publishes below a petition by the political parties on behalf of political and democratic reform following its signature by Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, Labor Party Chairman. The party received the petition, which was embargoed until Wednesday September 1, and decided to send it to the party's political bureau in accordance with the operation of party institutions. It was presented to the political bureau during its meeting the evening of Tuesday August 31, at which point the bureau adopted it unanimously. Thus we are publishing it following the signature of Mr. Ibrahim Shukri, Party Chairman.

Al-Ahali newspaper printed the petition September 1, before the Party Chairman signed it. The paper did not mention the Party's position on the petition, but mentioned that there was news of an impending split in the Labor Party. The Party asserts that these are untrue rumors, and that with God's blessing the party is continuing on its course, determined to carry out its plans, and affirms the Party's unity and the effectiveness of its legitimate institutions.

In a related development, in comments on the petition's issuance by the four parties, Mr. Ibrahim Shukri – Labor Party Chairman – said, in remarks given exclusively to *al-Shaab* that the statement's importance lies not only in the demands it presents, but in maintaining interest in and following up the de-

mands, as well as presenting them to the public and to government officials accompanied by realistic steps for implementation. Said Shukri: The political life of parties and syndicates cannot continue to be restricted as it is; all Egyptians aspire to enter the new century without restrictions on liberties. Shukri said that combating corruption, developing all facets of life in Egypt, and facing external threats cannot be done with the necessary competence without comprehensive change in the realm of liberties, and without canceling the emergency law.

Following is the text of the petition:

Petition on Behalf of Political and Constitutional Reform in Egypt

The signers of this petition, in that they aspire to liberate political life from restrictions from which it suffers at the dawn of a new century and on the occasion of a referendum on a new presidential term, demand that such liberation begin by taking five basic measures, which are:

1 – Lifting the state of emergency, releasing political detainees, and pardoning those political prisoners in cases not involving violence.
2 – Providing guarantees for free and fair elections, so that all upcoming general elections may take place without any administrative interference, within the context of complete and fair political competition, and under complete judicial supervision. Electoral lists should be free of repeated names as well as of names of the deceased or of emigrants, and the voter should sign or give a fingerprint after casting his vote.
3 – Allowing the free formation of parties according to normal judicial supervision and constitutional provisions only, and lifting restrictions on peaceful assembly.
4 – Allowing unfettered publication of newspapers and ownership of the media, and granting parties and political forces equal opportunity to express their ideas and opinions via the public media.
5 – Guaranteeing the independence of trade unions, professional syndicates, and civic associations leading to a civil society capable of contributing to democracy and progress.

The signers of this petition hope that satisfying these demands will be the first step on the path toward a radical political and constitutional reform, creating the climate for a peaceful transfer of power and achieving stability by transforming Egypt into a parliamentary democracy in which the people are the source of all authority. Such a republic would be founded on a true party pluralism, in which parties alternate in power depending on the results of fair

elections, forming governments depending on the confidence of the people and accountable before them. The president would be a symbol of the nation and his election would take place – after that – among more than one candidate, and would be limited to two consecutive terms.

Signed
Fouad Serrag al-Din, Head of the Wafd Party
Khaled Mohie al-Din, Head of the Tagammu Party
Dia' al-Din Dawoud, Head of the Nasserist Party
Ibrahim Shukri, Head of the Labor Party

Appendix E
Excerpts from two articles by Fahmi Huwaydi

E.1. Excerpts from article by Fahmi Huwaydi published by al-Shaab newspaper September 3, 1999, p. 2. Byline: Fahmi Huwaydi. Photo of Huwaydi centered in column.

هامة القانون وقامة الرجال

رأيت واحدة من علامات الساعة الصغرى: رجل أمن يسترضى مذنبا ويطلب منه السماح والعفو!..أما إذا سألتني لماذا هي من علامات الساعة' فردي أنني قرأت حديثا نبويا يشير إلى أن من تلك العلامات انقلاب الأمور رأسا على عقب' بحيث «تلد» الأمة ربها ولما وقعت عيناي على ما رأيت في مصيف «مارينا» قلت إن الذي شاهدته لا يختلف كثيرا عن المثل الذي ورد في الحديث لأن الذي نعرفه منذ كان هناك «أمن» أن المذنب هو الذي يسترضى رجل الأمن أما أن يحدث العكس فتلك هي المفاجأة التي احسبها غير مسبوقة أو ملحوقة' ومن ثم يسوغ لنا القياس أن نعتبر الواقع – بدورها – من علامات الساعة الصغرى.

ليس ذلك فحسب' وإنما الذي نمى ظني أكثر وأكثر وشجعني على المغامرة بالفتوى في الموضوع' أن المذنب المذكور لم يكن من أبطال المصارعة أو الملاكمة' ولا كان زعيم عصابة مرهوب الجانب' ولكنه كان مجرد صبي لا تتجاوز قامته ركبة رجل الأمن' وفي أي ظرف عادي ربما تعثرت قدما الواحد منا فيه' وهو ماشي في الطريق. ولكن «المحروس» الصغير استمد خطورته من كونه واحد من أبناء «الأكابر» وبهذه الصفة استطالت قامته وارتفع صوته بالتهديد والوعيد' وصار بوسعه أن ينهر رجل الأمن ويزجره' بل وأن بجبره على أن يلاينه ويسترضيه بصوت منكسر وخفيض.

(Para 6) يوم السبت ٢١/٨ كتب زميلنا الأستاذ عادل حمودة مقالا عما يجري في مارينا. وروى قصة كلب صغير من تبعية أو حاشية أحد الأكابر' الذي راح يتحرش بالجالسين قبالة الشاطئ' وحينما اقترب من مكان يجلس فيه أحد الأطباء مع أسرته' هشه الطبيب حتى لا يخيف ابنته' عندئذ جاء السيد الكبير غاضبا ونهره قائلا: أتضرب الكلب يا كلب! ولم يكتف صاحبنا بذلك' وإنما اختفى لحظات عاد بصحبة نفر من البلطجية الذين ساقوا معهم كلابا كبيرة متوحشة' وانهالوا ضربا على الطبيب أمام الجميع!

...في المقال قصص أخرى شبيهة بقصة الصبي الذي أشرنا إليه، وهي قليل من كثير تتتابع وقائعه كل يوم على مرأى ومسمع من الناس، الذين كادوا يفقدون الشعور بالدهشة إزاء ما جرى.

(Para 19) ثمة حديث نبوي يصور على نحو صائب فداحة ما يصيب المجتمع إذا ما اختلت موازين العدل فيه، واستطالت قامة الرجال فوق القانون، إذ يقرر: « إنما أهلك من قبلكم أنهم كانوا إذا سرق فيهم الشريف تركوه، وإذا سرق فيه الضعيف أقاموا عليه الحد».

استنادا إلى هذا المنطوق، فإن انهيار القاعدة القانونية سبيل مؤد إلى الهلاك. وإذ نحمد الله على أننا لم نبلغ تلك المرحلة بعد، ولكن أخشى ما أخشاه أن يكون ما يجري تحت أعيننا الآن طور مؤد إلى تلك النهاية المفجعة.

إن تراجع أو انهيار قيمة القانون والنظام العام لا يتم بين يوم و ليلة، ولكنه حصيلة تراكم عوامل عدة، لعل أهمها غياب الرقابة الشعبية. وانعدام المساءلة. تلك النخبة التي أطلق لها العنان دون أن تكون موضع حساب أو مراجعة، تستشري وتستعلي بمضي الوقت وتتصور أنها فوق القانون. لذلك فإننا نجد أن المجتمعات الديمقراطية هي التي تعلو فيها قيمة احترام القانون. وانجلترا التي تعد أعرق الديمقراطيات الغربية هي أوفرها حظا في هذا الباب.

الديمقراطية الحقيقية التي لا تجعل أحدا فوق الحساب مفتاح أساسي للمشكلة لا ريب، ولكن ذلك لا يعني بالضرورة البقاء في موقف الانتظار حتى يكتمل البناء الديمقراطي. وإنما يمهد الطريق لحل الإشكال موقف حازم الإدارة، ومثل يضربه الكبار لتلقين النخبة دروسا في احترام القانون وفي مصر جهاز للإدارة لا ريب، وكبار من ذلك الطراز الذي ننشده يعول عليهم الكثير لإنجاز هذه المهمة.

وفي كل الأحوال فإن الأمر يستحق مناقشة موسعة من جانب الغيورين على الحاضر والمستقبل. وأحسب أن ثمة فرصة مواتية الآن. حيث الحديث عن التغيير يشكل أحد عناوين هذه المرحلة، بعد ما تحدث عنه الرئيس مبارك مؤكدا أنه من سنن الحياة وهو كلام كله حق، خصوصا إذا اتسع نطاق التغيير ولم يقف عند حدود الأشخاص والسياسات، وإنما شمل التغيير منظومة القيم أيضا.

هذا المقال رفضت جريدة الأهرام نشره

E.2. English translation of excerpts from article by Fahmi Huwaydi published by al-Shaab newspaper September 3, 1999, p. 2. Byline: Fahmi Huwaydi. Photograph of Huwaydi centered in column.

The Weight of the Law and the Stature of Men

I saw recently one of the little tell-tale signs of our times: a security officer appeasing a wrongdoer, begging his pardon and indulgence! If you ask why it is a sign of the times, my answer is that I read a prophetic Hadith alluding to such signs in which matters are turned head over heels, so that a handmaiden gives birth to her lord. When my eyes beheld what I beheld at the "Marina" resort, I said that it did not differ much from the case mentioned in the Hadith. We know that as long as there has been "security" it has been the wrongdoer who appeased the security officer; I consider it unprecedented for the opposite to happen, justifying deeming it a sign of the times.*

In addition, what strengthened my conviction and encouraged me to venture a fatwa* in this matter was that the aforementioned wrongdoer was not a prize-fighter or a gang leader but a mere youth barely knee-high to the security officer. Under ordinary circumstances any one of us might trip over him as he walked down the street. But this little darling derived his importance from being one of the sons of the "big shots," which enabled him to raise his voice in threats and intimidation, to scold and upbraid the officer, even to force the man to treat him leniently and conciliate him in a soft, timid voice.

(Para 6) Saturday 8/21 our colleague Mr. Adil Hammouda wrote a column about what is going on at Marina. He told the story of a small dog belonging to the entourage of one of the big shots, which was harassing some people sitting on the beach. When the dog went near a doctor and his family, the doctor chased it away so it would not frighten his daughter, at which point the big shot got angry and scolded the doctor saying "Are you hitting the dog, you SOB?!" Our friend did not stop there, but came back a few minutes later with a group of toughs accompanied by big, mean dogs, who fell upon the doctor in front of everyone!

That is not the only surprising part. When the aggrieved doctor went to the police department and gave a statement testifying to what transpired and describing the perpetrator, the police did not make a move or call to account the man for what he had done for this reason: because he is one of the big shots with connections, who consider themselves above the law and above accountability! Also in the article are stories similar to the one we mentioned about the youth, which are only a few of many such incidents taking place daily

before the eyes of people, who have almost lost their sense of surprise at what is going on.

(Para 19) There is a prophetic Hadith that depicts accurately the enormity of what befalls a society if justice does not prevail and the stature of men becomes greater than that of the law, which says: "As for your [pagan] forefathers, if a nobleman stole from them they let him be, whereas if a poor man stole from the nobleman then they punished him."

As we see from this text, collapse of the foundation of law leads to total destruction. We thank God that we have not reached this stage yet, but I fear that what is going on now before our eyes is a step on the path to such a disastrous destination.

The retreat or collapse of the value of law and public order does not take place overnight but results from an accumulation of factors, of which perhaps the most important is the absence of public vigilance and scrutiny. This elite, which has been given free rein without being subject to accountability or audit, has risen in stature and deteriorated in behavior over time, and now sees itself as above the law. For this reason we find that democratic societies are those in which the value of respect for the law is paramount. England, considered the most deeply-rooted of Western democracies, is also the most fortunate in this regard.

True democracy, which places no-one above accountability, is undoubtedly a basic key to the problem, but this does not necessarily mean waiting until democratization is complete. An energetic administrative attitude would pave the way for clearing up this ambiguity, setting an example that elders would use to teach this elite a lesson about respecting the law. Egypt undoubtedly has the requisite administration and elders, upon whom a great deal would depend in achieving such a goal.

In any case the matter merits broader discussion among those concerned about the present and the future. And I think there is an opportunity at hand now. Talk about change fills the headlines these days since President Mubarak spoke about it, affirming that change is a norm in life. All of which is true, especially if the boundaries of change are broadened, not stopping at persons or policies, but encompassing change in how values are ordered as well.

***Al-Ahram* newspaper refused to publish this column.**

Translator's comment: Hadith and fatwa are Arabic words but have come into common* usage in writings in English by scholars in Middle East studies. A Hadith is a saying traced back to the Prophet Muhammad or one of his companions; well-established Hadith have a status in Islam second only to the Qur'an itself. A fatwa is a formal legal opinion issued .by an Islamic jurist

E.3. Excerpt from article by Fahmi Huwaydi published by al-Ahram newspaper December 7, 1999, p. 11. Byline: Fahmi Huwaydi

ربحت الديمقراطية وخسر الإسلاميون!

لا أستطيع أن أخفى شعورا بالصدمة والحزن إزاء إسقاط قانون حقوق المرأة السياسية' وحجبه في مجلس الأمة الكويتي. الصدمة لأن ذلك حدث بينما نحن نطوي صفحة القرن العشرين ونتطلع مع غيرنا من البشر إلى أشواق قرن جديد' وإذا بالسقوط المدوي للقانون يذكرنا بأن بعض مجمعاتنا ما زالت تقف بعيدا عند نقطة الصفر' ولم تحسم بعد – ضمن بديهيات أخرى كثيرة – قضية مساواة المرأة بالرجل' ولا حقها في ممارسة حقوقها السياسية.

أما الحزن فسببه أن النواب الإسلاميين كانوا في طليعة معارضي القانون' وكانت لهم اليد الطولى في حشد الأصوات لصالح إجهاضه وعدم تمريره. ليس ذلك فحسب' وإنما استخدمت المرجعية الشرعية لحرمان المرأة من حقوقها السياسية' الأمر الذي أعتبره بمثابة تشويه لموقف الإسلام تطوع به من تصوروا أنهم يحسنون صنعا.

(Para 6) رغم ما جرى' ينبغي أن نسجل أن التجربة الديمقراطية في الكويت كانت الرابح الأكبر بقدر ما أن النواب الإسلاميين والجماعات أو المنظمات التي وقفت وراءهم كانوا الخاسر الأكبر' حيث سيسجل عليهم التاريخ أنهم وقفوا ضد حقوق المرأة السياسية' فظلموها وظلموا الإسلام معها.

لا يستطيع أحد أن يقلل من أهمية إبطال المجلس النيابي لمرسوم صادر عن أمير البلاد' وهو ما يحدث لأول مرة – في حدود علمي – وفي زماننا هذا فإن مثل هذه المراسيم العليا تتحول إلى نصوص مقدسة لا يجوز المساس بها عند آخرين.

(Para 23) سمعت الدكتور محمد عمارة يقول مرة ما زحا أن البعض يجادل في تولى المرأة للإمامة العظمى' وهل تجوز أو لا تجوز' ولكنهم يتجاهلون ما آل إليه حال الإمامة العظمى في زماننا بعدما أصبح يتولاها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية والبنك الدولي؟!

أفيقوا أيها السادة!!

E.4. English translation of excerpts from article by Fahmi Huwaydi published by al-Ahram newspaper December 7, 1999, p. 11. Byline Fahmi Huwaydi.

Democracy Won and the Islamists Lost!

I cannot hide feelings of shock and sadness at the defeat of the women's political rights bill in the Kuwaiti National Assembly. Shock because this happened as we are turning the page of the twentieth century and, along with the rest of humanity, looking with anticipation at a new century. Then the defeat of this law comes along to remind us that some of our societies remain close to square one, and have not yet settled – among other things – the issue of equality between men and women, as well as women's political rights.

As for the sadness, its cause was that the Islamist deputies led the opponents of the bill and were the ones who gathered votes in order to abort it and prevent its passage. In addition, Islamic authority was used to deprive women of their political rights, which I consider tantamount to defaming Islam's position, done by those who imagine themselves to be doing right.

(Para 6) Despite what happened, we must note that the democratic experiment in Kuwait was the big winner, whereas the Islamist deputies (and the associations and organizations behind them) were the big loser, as history will record that they stood against women's political rights. Thus they did an injustice to women and to Islam as well.

No-one can underestimate the significance of the fact than an elected assembly invalidated a decree issued by the country's Emir, a first in recorded history. Such decrees usually become sacred texts with which others may not tamper.

(Para 23) I heard Dr. Muhammad Amaara say once what a shame that some argue about a woman's holding positions of high leadership, and whether it is permitted or not, while they ignore what has happened to leadership in our times, since the United States of America and the World Bank have taken over!

Wake up, Gentlemen!

Appendix F

Excerpts from two articles by Hala Mustafa

F.1. Excerpts from article by Hala Mustafa published by al-Ahram newspaper September 28, 1999, p. 10. Byline: Dr. Hala Mustafa

الرئيس مبارك وعهد جديد للديمقراطية

قدم الرئيس حسني مبارك في خطابات سياسية هامة متتالية رؤية متكاملة لمستقبل مصر وهي مقبلة على الألفية الثالثة بكل متغيراتها وتحدياتها التي تفرضها على كافة أرجاء المعمورة. فمصر بتاريخها وحضارتها تراثهاوثقافتها الممتدة عبر قرون من الزمان تستحق أن تتبوأ مكانة عالية وراقية بين أمم وشعوب العالم.

كانت رسالة رئيس الجمهورية واضحة في الحديث عن النهضة الشاملة واستكمال بناء الدولة العصرية وفي أحداث التوازن بين الإصلاح الاقتصادي ومثيله السياسي والإداري' فالإصلاح في النهاية هو عملية متشابكة متداخلة متعددة الأبعاد والأركان. كما أنه عملية ممتدة لا تقف عند حد معين' ولكن تتطور وتنمو مع المجتمعات ذاتها.

ولذلك فقد لمست خطب الرئيس أغلب القضايا الجوهرية الحيوية التي احتلت – وما زالت – ساحة النقاش العام وشكلت أولويات مهمة للأكاديمين والسياسيين والمواطن العادي على حد سواء. وربما تأتي في مقدمة القضايا التي احتلت مكانة بارزة ضمن الأولويات قضية الديمقراطية وهي القضية التي ركز الرئيس عليها بأكثر من معنى وفي أكثر من جانب وأولها عناية خاصة' وهي عناية ليست مستحدثة ولا ترتبط فقط بمضمون خطابات رئيس الجمهورية في الآونة الأخيرة' ولكنها بدأت منذ اللحظة الأولى لتوليه مسؤولية الحكم في أكتوبر ١٩٨١. فهي القضية التي تمتعت باستمرارية واهتمام ملحوظة بشكل يتجاوز ما أولتها لها العهود السابقة.

وهذا الاهتمام لا يتم رصده فقط من خلال خطب الرئيس ولكن من خلال ما ترجم على أرض الواقع وشهده المجتمع المصري على مدى ما يقرب من العقدين من الزمان.

(Para 11) أيضا وعلى الرغم من التاريخ المعروف لمركزية الدولة في مصر وعلى الرغم من الإرث البيروقراطي الثقيل' فقد شهد المجتمع المدني نموا ملحوظا سواء من الناحية الكمية أو النوعية على مدى العقدين الماضيين وهو الأمر الذي يحرص الرئيس على دفعه باستمرار

مثلما أشار في خطابه الهام أثناء لقائه بطلاب الجامعات (إننا نخطط ونعمل لتحقيق نهضة مستمرة فـي كل مجـالات الحياة المصرية نهضة لا تسـتند إلى الجهد الحكومي وحده ولكنه تقوم على أكتاف مؤسسات الدولة والمجتمع المدني من أحزاب ونقابات واتحادات وجمعيات أهلية).

إن هذه بعض ملامح التطور الديمقراطي في عهد الرئيس مبارك' والذي أعطاه دفعة جديدة حينما أولى عناية خاصة لمسألة تمثيل الأجيال المختلفة في الحياة السياسية والعامة والحرص على دعم الكفاءات فقد أشار (علينا أن نبحث عن الموهوبين والجادين في كل موقع لكي نضعهم فـي دائـرة الاهتمام ونتابع تنمية مواهبهم وقدراتهم لأن تفوق الـدول أصبح رهنا بقدراتها على اسـتثمار ذخيرتها العقلية التي تتجسـد في الموهبين والجادين والمبتكرين والمبدعين ورجال البحـث العلمـي والمتخصصين فـي تطبيقات العلوم المختلفة). وأيضا حينما أشـار إلى أهمية التغيير باعتباره (من سنة الحياة).

F.2. English translation of excerpts from article by Hala Mustafa published by al-Ahram newspaper September 28, 1999, p. 10. Byline: Dr. Hala Mustafa

President Mubarak and a New Era for Democracy

In a series of important political speeches President Mubarak has presented a comprehensive vision for the future of Egypt as it approaches the Third Millennium, with all the changes and challenges it poses to the hopes of the world. Egypt, by virtue of its history, civilization, and culture extending over many centuries is entitled to occupy an exalted position among the nations and peoples of the world.

In speaking about a comprehensive renaissance, completing the building of a modern state, and balancing economic reform with its political and administrative counterparts, the message of the President of the Republic was clear. In the end reform is an integral, multifaceted process. It is also an extended process that does not end at a certain point but develops along with societies themselves.

Therefore the President's speeches have touched on most of the vital and essential issues that have held – and still hold – the floor in public discourse and that have constituted important priorities for academics, politicians, and the ordinary citizen alike. Perhaps among the most prominent priorities has been the issue of democracy, the issue on which the President has focused on in more than one way and to which he has devoted special concern. This concern is not new and is not seen only in the content of the President of the Republic's

speeches in recent days, but started from the first moment in which he took up the responsibilities of leadership in October 1981. It is the issue that has enjoyed longevity and significant interest, exceeding that allotted it in previous eras.

This interest is observable not only in the President's speeches but also in how they have been translated on the ground, as seen by Egyptian society over nearly two decades.

(Para 11) In addition, despite the well-known history of the centralized state in Egypt and despite the heavy legacy of bureaucracy, civil society has seen significant development, both quantitative and qualitative, during the past two decades. President Mubarak is intent on pushing the issue forward continuously, as he indicated in his important speech while meeting with university students (We are planning and working to achieve a continual renaissance in all areas of Egyptian life, a renaissance that does not depend only on government effort but rests on the shoulders of state institutions and of civil society, including parties, syndicates, unions, and civic associations).

These are some of the indicators of democratic development during the era of President Mubarak, given new impetus by his special attention to representing different generations in political and public life as well as by his eagerness to bolster capabilities, indicating that (We must search out those who are gifted and serious wherever they may be in order to keep them in view and keep track of the development of their gifts and abilities, because the competitiveness of countries has become tied to their ability to invest their intellectual resources, embodied in the gifted, the serious, the creative, the innovative, men of scientific research, and those specializing in various applied sciences). Also he indicated the importance of change, considering it (a constant in life).

F.3. Excerpts from article by Hala Mustafa published by al-Ahram newspaper November 30, 1999, p. 10. Byline: Dr. Hala Mustafa

الديمقراطية ودولة المؤسسات

في أكثر من موقع وبأكثر من معنى أشار الرئيس مبارك في خطابه الهام أمام مجلس الشعب والشورى' إلى أهمية دور المؤسسات (في نهضة الدولة العصرية' والاعتماد على نظم وسياسات مستقرة وتقاليد راسخة..وقوانين شفافة..) تضمن مسيرة العمل الوطني. وأكد الرئيس على أن دولة المؤسسات هي ضرورة قومية يجب العمل على (..ترسيخ مفهومها وتعميقه في الفكر

والممارسة' وعلى كافة المستويات' وفي جميع الأجهزة..حتى يصبح مستقرا في وجدان كل مصري..)

وهذا الاهتمام المحوري الذي يوليه الرئيس مبارك «لدولة المؤسسات» إنما يرجع إلى ارتباطها الوثيق والمباشر بعملية التطور الديمقراطي. فالديمقراطية بحكم التعريف لا تقوم بدون مؤسسات قوية تدعمها وترسخها. صحيح أن مقومات أي تجربة ديمقراطية تقوم على أسس وركائز عدة تبدأ من الدستور والقانون والبيئة التشريعية بشكل عام أي الإطار الرسمي والقانوني' إلى المناخ الثقافي السائد ونظام القيم الذي يولده في المجتمع' والذي يضمن بدوره قناعة الأفراد بالمبادئ الديمقراطية' إلا أن إحدى أهم هذه الركائز تظل متعلقة بالبنية التنظيمية والمؤسسات للدولة' أي تلك البنية التي تسمح بتحقيق الديمقراطية على مستوى الممارسة وتجسيدها في الواقع العملي. فهذا البعد يعد من أكثر الأبعاد الحيوية واللازمة لعملية التحول الديمقراطي. حتى أن أغلب علماء السياسة يعتبرون مستوى «المؤسسية Level of Institutionalization» في أي مجتمع معيارا أساسيا لضمان الديمقراطية' أو بعبارة أخرى إن بناء المؤسسات يصبح الشرط الضروري للوصول إلى «ديمقراطية سليمة Full Democracy» والمقصود «بالمؤسسية» وجود قواعد متعارف عليها تقوم على الكفاءة وحسن الأداء واحترام النظام' تحكم عمل التنظيمات المختلفة' تعلى من قدر المصلحة العامة في مواجهة المصالح الشخصية أو الاهتمامات والولاءات الضيقة للأفراد..

(Para 6) وبنفس المنطق فإن «دولة المؤسسات» هي التي تجنب إية تجربة ديمقراطية ما يعرف بظاهرة «شخصنة القوة Personalizing Power» والتي تعني الخلط بين الوظيفة العامة وبين شاغلها. وهذا يعني عمليا عدم الاعتماد على فرد أو مجموعة أفراد لتسيير العمل السياسي أو العام أو المهني' وإنما الاعتماد على تنظيم رسمي أو مؤسسة ذات قواعد واضحة ومستقرة – ولا يعني ذلك التقليل من عنصر التميز أو التفوق لدي بعض الأفراد وإنما تعني وجود معايير موضوعية للعمل ولاختيار القيادات والكوادر لا تخضع للتميز الشخصي وإنما تعلي من شأن «الكفاءة» والصالح العام' فضلا عن ضمانها لاستمرارية أداء المؤسسة وعدم خضوعها للتقلبات أو الانهيار في حالات التغيير الدورية وهو ما أكد عليه الرئيس مبارك بقوله (..في دولة المؤسسات التي تحكمها نظم وأهداف ثابتة مستقرة – تظهر كفاءة العمل الجماعي وتسود روح الفريق' ويستقر في الأذهان مفهوم المسئولية التضامنية' ويصعب على فئة أو فرد – مهما علا شأنه – أن يحدث تغييرات جوهرية في الأهداف الوطنية' انطلاقا من رؤية ذاتية أو مراعاة لمصالح فئوية' وذلك لأن مرجعية دولة المؤسسات تنبع من استنادها إلى الالتزام المؤسسي وليس لارادات الأفراد..) وهو ما يؤدي إلى تغليب معايير الكفاءة وإيجاد آليات منظمة للتطوير'

والتغلب على أي نواح للقصور أو السلبيات التي قد تظهر' فضلا عما يقود إليه من تفعيل وتنشيط سبل الرقابة والمتابعة والتقليص بالتالي من احتمالات أو إمكانيات نمو المصالح الخاصة على حساب المصلحة العامة' أي بعبارة أخرى الحد من إمكانية استشراء الفساد.

(Para 8) ومن هنا يمكن تفهم المغزى العميق وراء تأكيد الرئيس مبارك بالحاح على دعم عملية «بناء المؤسسات»' فمصر تمتلك رصيدا ضخما في هذا المجال' ومنذ وقت مبكر' أي منذ أقامت أول مؤسسة تشريعية – في الربع الأخير من القرن التاسع عشر – على طراز عصري' وكذلك الحال بالنسبة للأحزاب مع إنشاء أول حزب سياسي بالمعنى الحديث في بدايات القرن' وغير ذلك من عوامل مشابهة. ولكن ذلك التراث التاريخي الهام لم يحل دون ظهور عقبات أخرى كثيرة ليس آخرها وجود إرث تاريخي آخر وهو الإرث «البيروقراطي» (أي تسلط وتعقيد الجهاز الإداري للدولة) والذي يحد من الفعالية الحقيقية لأي مؤسسة في المجال السياسي.

(Para 9) فضلا عن استمرار الإعلاء – في أحيان كثيرة – من دور «الأشخاص» مقابل المؤسسات التي يعبرون عنها' وهي سمة ربما ترتبط أكثر بخبرة التنظيم السياسي الواحد الذي عرفته مصر في مرحلة تاريخية سابقة' والذي نسعى اليوم للتخلص من آثاره السلبية. لذلك كله فإن الدعوة إلى تدعيم وترسيخ «دولة المؤسسات» يعد خطوة هامة وأساسية في طريق دعم الديمقراطية وما تستلزمه من إصلاح.

F.4. English translation of excerpts from article by Hala Mustafa published by al-Ahram newspaper November 30, 1999, p. 10. Byline: Dr. Hala Mustafa

Democracy and the Institutionalized State

In more than one place and in more than one way President Mubarak in his important speech before the People's and Consultative Assemblies indicated the importance of the role of institutions (in the renaissance of the modern state, and the dependence upon stable systems and policies and firmly rooted traditions…and transparent laws) in securing the course of national work. The President affirmed that the institutionalized state is a national necessity requiring work (…spreading understanding of them and deepening such understanding in thought and practice, on all levels and in all organizations…until it is firmly established in the consciousness of every Egyptian…)

This pivotal interest devoted by President Mubarak to the "Institutionalized State" goes back to its profound and direct connection with the process of democratic development. Democracy by definition cannot stand without strong

institutions to support and secure it. It is true that the value of any democratic experiment rests on numerous foundations beginning with the constitution, the law, and the legislative environment in a general sense – in other words, the official and legal framework – and extending to the prevailing cultural climate and system of values in the society, which in turn ensure individual acceptance of democratic principles. Also one of the most important pillars of democratization is related to the organizational and institutional structure of the state, the structure that permits democracy to be achieved at the practical level and concretized in everyday reality. This is considered among the most vital and essential dimensions of the process of democratic transformation. Most political scientists consider the "Level of Institutionalization"* in any society a basic standard for ensuring democracy, or in other words, institution building is a necessary condition for achieving "Full Democracy."* "Institutionalization" signifies the presence of acknowledged rules based on equality, performance, and respect for the system, which govern the work of various organizations and invoke the public interest in confronting personal interests or the narrow concerns of individuals.

(Para 6) By the same logic, in any democratic experiment the "Institutionalized State" is that which jettisons the phenomenon known as "Personalizing Power,"* meaning confusion of public office with the individual holding the office. Practically speaking this means not depending on any individual or group of individuals to facilitate political, public, or professional work, but rather depending on an official organization or institution with clear and stable regulations. This is not meant to detract from the element of distinction or superiority of some individuals, but it means that there are objective standards for work and for choosing leaders and members, standards that do not bow to personal preference but rather favor "equality" and the public interest. This is to say nothing of the fact that such standards ensure that the organization is stable and does not fall victim to vicissitudes or collapse when there are cyclical changes, which is what President Mubarak asserting in saying (In an institutionalized state governed by systems and stable goals a sense of collective work and team spirit prevails, and joint responsibility becomes a deeply rooted understanding. Thus is becomes difficult for any faction or individual, whatever their stature, to effect radical changes in national objectives, motivated by subjective considerations or factional interests. That is because the authority of an institutionalized state derives from institutional commitment rather than individual will…). This is what leads to establishing equal standards and organized mechanisms for development, as well as to overcoming any shortcomings or problems that may arise.

In addition it leads to mobilizing mechanisms for supervision and control, and to circumventing expectations or possibilities for satisfying personal interests at the expense of public interests; in other words it puts an end to the possibility of corruption.

(Para 8) Thus it becomes possible to understand the profound lesson behind President Mubarak's urgent emphasis on supporting the process of "institution building." Egypt possesses a rich heritage in this field, dating back to the founding of the first legislative institution – in the first quarter of the nineteenth century – along modern lines, as well as the founding of the first political party in the modern sense at the dawn of the century, as well as other similar factors. But this important historical legacy did not arise without the appearance of many other obstacles, not the least of which is another historical legacy, the "bureaucratic" l egacy (that is, controlling and complicating the state's administrative apparatus), which limits the actual effectiveness of any institution in the political realm.

(Para 9) In addition there is the continued prevalence – in many cases – of the role of individuals as opposed to the institutions whom they represent, a characteristic perhaps linked mostly to the experience of one-party rule that Egypt knew in a previous historical period, one whose negative consequences we are trying to overcome today. For all these reasons, the call to support and secure the "Institutionalized State" is considered an important and basic step on the way to supporting democracy and the reform it requires.

Translator's comment: Phrases marked by asterisks (Level of Institutionalization, Full* Democracy, Personalizing Power) are given in English text (Latin script) as well as in .Arabic in the original

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